In late October Google announced an internal R&D activity aimed at developing  clinical diagnostics based upon labeled, magnetic, intravascular nanoparticles. Immediate reactions by the trade press varied from (mostly) skepticism to amazement, bewilderment and hope. If you have not seen the Google announcement or the deluge of reactive articles, they are all easily found on the Web.

     Count me among the skeptics. The technical and regulatory hurdles are well known by relevant scientific experts. In addition to those matters, I strongly question Google's wisdom in heading down this path. Let me explain.

     There are two main approaches to product-focused R&D. (I'm not talking about exploratory or basic research; that's a different animal.) The first, and in my view the preferable, approach is to combine an intimate pre-existing knowledge of identified target markets and customers with purpose-built teams of internal and external technology innovators. The second approach is to aim for not-very-focused home runs by exploiting the knowledge and experiences of teams of skilled scientists and engineers over the long term in the hope of achieving real breakthroughs in technology that might yield a big economic return in some broadly defined (or undefined) market(s). This latter approach is the one often associated with "corporate R&D" formerly carried out by firms like Bell Laboratories, Sarnoff, Xerox and Corning, where I worked in the corporate R&D division.

     Google seems to be following neither approach. They have started with a very speculative product concept and staffed an ad hoc technical team to work in that direction. Google seems to have understood neither the clinical application nor the market nor the technologies that would have to be mastered before a product could be commercialized. I think they are engaged in a fool's errand. I think they are doing it because it generates headlines that advertise Google's innovative nature and because they can afford to quickly build a technical team.