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Health care reform is a long way from completion (leaving
aside here the important question of the extent to which the House or Senate
bills will bring actual "reform" instead of mainly "more of the same"). So it is too soon to judge the consequences
of the changes for religious institutions and individuals--but not too soon to
be worried.
1.
Abortion. The House bill has robust language (the
"Stupak amendment") to keep the federal government from supporting elective
abortions. The Senate bill's language is
weak and troubling.
2.
Conscience
protections. The House bill includes a
section (259) to protect medical staff and institutions from being penalized by
government for not offering, referring for, or paying for abortions. The Senate bill does not include this
provision.
3.
Diversity
requirements. The Senate bill includes
funding for mental and behavioral health education and training grants. To be eligible, an institution must show a
"knowledge and understanding of the concerns" of "individuals and groups from
different racial, ethnic, cultural, geographic, religious, linguistic, and
class backgrounds, and different genders and sexual orientations." In addition, the institution must show that
such diverse individuals "participate" in the institution's programs (HR 3590,
sec. 5306). Empathy with and
understanding of patients is of course important--though a professional does not
need to be of the same group as a patient in order to be empathetic and to
provide excellent help.
But does this language (such diversity must be reflected in
the institution itself) mean that an institution of a particular religion or
that for religious reasons maintains traditional sexual standards would be
ineligible for these education and training grants? What makes this a relevant and acceptable
condition of eligibility?
(The US Commission on Civil Rights has issued a
letter about
the House bill and
another one about the Senate bill, pointing to a number of unconstitutional
affirmative action requirments. Hat tip to
Hans von Spakovsky.)
Given the significant divergence today between various
secular standards and the deep convictions of many religious institutions and
individuals, it is no doubt difficult to implement sweeping government
regulations and programs while manifesting respect for those convictions. This is all the more reason why, if
institutional religious freedom is to exist, policymakers need to design their
rules and programs from the start with a deep commitment to preserving that
freedom. A freedom that is protected
only because a legislator or two managed at the last minute to wrench a
concession from the majority is hardly on firm ground.