It is not my position that Internet openness, which by the way has different meanings for different people, could never possibly be subject to some "threats" along the lines suggested by advocates of net neutrality regulation. Rather, my position is that, in light of the present state of marketplace competition and the lack of evidence of present consumer harms caused by existing ISP practices, the costs of imposing net neutrality regulation almost certainly will exceed the benefits.

Of course, some net neutrality regulatory models would impose more costs than others. For instance, Title II regulation would be much more costly that the proposed "commercial reasonableness" standard, which, if properly implemented, is less rigid and more flexible than Title II regulation. Assuming adoption of any form of net neutrality nondiscrimination regulation, the "commercial reasonableness" standard would be less costly and therefore preferable from the standpoint of promoting consumer welfare - which, after all, should be the primary objective.

I started working in the communications policy arena in 1975, so I have witnessed the dramatic changes that have occurred in the communications marketplace for almost 40 years. When I was at the FCC from 1978-1981, AT&T essentially still retained dominant market power, even though its grip already was beginning to loosen. And online services, what we now call information services, already were beginning to emerge.

Over this long arc of almost 40 years, the transition from narrowband to broadband and from analog to digital has enabled the change from mostly monopolistic markets to competitive markets.

So, the reality is that today's broadband marketplace is effectively competitive. And because consumers value openness, properly understood, competitive forces almost certainly will maintain Internet openness that benefits consumers. And competition will do so in a way that is less costly to society than if regulators attempt to micromanage openness.

To the extent that "openness" is equated with enforcement of a rigid non-discrimination standard, the adverse consequences from such regulation in the form of higher costs are exacerbated as opposed to, say, the more flexible multi-factored "commercial reasonableness" standard. These higher costs will include not only the direct costs associated with regulatory compliance and so forth, but, more importantly, the opportunity costs associated with lost or diminished investment and foregone innovation and consumer choice.

When Democratic Chairman Bill Kennard in 1999 rejected pleas to impose "open access" mandates on cable broadband operators, what he said about "nondiscrimination rules" and not dumping the morass of regulation from the telephone world onto the broadband pipe is most pertinent to our discussion today.