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Robert C. Bonsib, Esq.
and
Megan E. Coleman, Esq.
We are available to assist individuals and organizations in need of representation regarding investigations and criminal matters in the federal and state trial and appellate courts.
301-441-3000 (office)
Robert C. Bonsib, Esq.
Fellow, American College of Trial Lawyers
Washingtonian Magazine Top 30 Lawyers
Best Lawyers in America - White Collar &
Non-White Collar Criminal Defense
Super Lawyers - Maryland & D.C.
Robert C. Heeney Award by Md St Bar Assoc. for Distinguished Career in Criminal Law
Maryland Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions Committee
Past Chair, MSBA Criminal Law Section
Past Chair, Prince George's County Criminal Law Committee
Former federal and state prosecutor
39 years of trial experience
301-509-5100 (cell)
Email Robert C. Bonsib, Esq.
Megan E. Coleman, Esq.
Board of Directors, Maryland Criminal Defense Attorneys Association
CJA Panel for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Member, National Association of Criminal Defense Attorneys; Prince Georges County, Montgomery County and Maryland State Bar Associations
Email Megan E. Coleman, Esq.
240-328-8378 (cell)
For more information about Robert C. Bonsib, Esq. and Megan E. Coleman, Esq. please visit www.robertbonsib.com |
Quick Links to Articles by Robert C. Bonsib, Esq. & Other Resources Representing a Client During a Criminal Investigation - 3 Parts
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MARCUSBONSIB, LLC 
MarcusBonsib, LLC is a five-member litigation law firm located in Greenbelt, Maryland. Founding Partners Bruce L. Marcus & Robert C. Bonsib are Fellows of the American College of Trial Lawyers, AV rated by Martindale-Hubbell and are ranked in the Top Lawyers edition of Washingtonian Magazine. Together with Senior Associate Joseph A. Compofelice, all three are listed in Super Lawyers. MarcusBonsib, LLC is ranked as a Best Law Firm by Best Lawyers and US News. Associate Megan E. Coleman has distinguished herself as a criminal defense lawyer as has Associate Janine M. Evans in the field of family law, civil and professional discipline law. MarcusBonsib, LLC attorneys are active in practice areas including commerical and business litigation, personal injury, family law, professional discipline, white collar and non-white collar criminal defense and construction litigation.
6411 Ivy Lane, Suite 116, Greenbelt, MD 20770. (301) 441-3000.
vist our website - MarcusBonsib. LLC
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Counterfeit statute not constitutionally vague or overbroad - duration of traffic stop not unreasonable
The CSA rejected challenges to CR 8-611 which prohibits trademark counterfeiting on the basis that use of the term "intellectual property" was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The CSA found that limiting language in other parts of the statute as well as established body of intellectual property law would provide a person of common intelligence sufficient notice as to the statute's meaning.
The Court also reject McCree's contention that a traffic stop of more than 15 minutes in duration was unreasonable and that a K-9 alert which occurred 18 minutes after the initiation of the traffic stop constituted a period of unlawful detention.
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Jury trial waiver not
knowingly made
In conducting the inquiry required by Rule 4-246 which governs the waiver of trial by jury, the court erroneously advised Winters that with respect to his burden to prove that he was not criminally responsible, his burden was one of proof beyond a reasonable doubt rather than by a preponderance of evidence. Concluding that this misstatement may have made less attractive the decision to elect trial by jury, the COA concluded that the jury trial waiver was not knowingly made and, therefore, reversed the conviction.
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Ineffective assistance of counsel - failure to object to evidence re: post-Miranda silence of defendant
Post conviction relief was granted based on defense counsel's failure to object approximately 30 times during the trial to evidence that the State admitted where Coleman remained silent in the face of police questioning after he was in custody and had received his Miranda warnings. Without objection the State elicited testimony such as when questioned by the police, Coleman "remained silent" - "remained very silent. He did not say anything" - "... put his head in his hands and looked at the floor."
The COA rejected as an acceptable trial tactic not objecting because defense counsel did "not like to object as often in a jury trial as he does in a court trial because he does not want the jury to think there is something going on and then form a bad impression of the attorney and client..."
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Frye-Reed requirement of general acceptance in the relevant scientific community
not met
Although not a criminal case,
Chesson v. Montgomery Mutual, provides a valuable overview of how the courts are to consider admissibility of new or novel scientific theory or methodology. To ascertain general acceptance, a trial judge considering whether a scientific technique is valid and reliable will consider not only testimonial evidence, but also law journal articles, scientific journals that have reliability and other publications which bear on the degree of acceptance by recognized experts in the field. General acceptance does not equate to unanimity of opinion, nor universality and is not subject to a quantum analysis.
The COA further noted, using the comparative bullet lead analysis issue, that a method once considered generally accepted can lose that application in the relevant scientific community so the theory returns to a disconfirmed state.
In Chesson, a worker's compensation case, the COA rejected the plaintiff's expert called to offer a causation opinion regarding injuries allegedly suffered by the workers as a result of exposure to mold in an office building.
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Rule 4-252 violations bar review of merits of claim of Fourth Amendment violation
Maryland Rule 4-252 requires certain mandatory motions to be raised by motion or be waived and further requires that the motion "shall state the grounds upon which it is made."
Noting that the purpose of the Rule is to alert both the court and the prosecutor to precise nature of the complaint.
The COA found that not only was the contention of an unlawful arrest not specified in Ray's written motion, but it was also not argued at the time of the motions hearing.
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Please enjoy this newsletter summarizing current cases and other developments in the area of criminal law and procedure compliments of Robert C. Bonsib, Esq., Megan E. Coleman, Esq. & MarcusBonsib, LLC.
[click on hot link at end of each case summary to review entire opinion]
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Indigent criminal defendant entitled to state-furnished counsel at initial appearance before District Court Commissioner
The COA held, in round two of this case, that under the due process component of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights that an indigent defendant has a right to state-furnished counsel at an initial appearance before a District Court Commissioner. This case came before the COA after the General Assembly amended the Public Defender Act to eliminate the statutory right to be represented in such circumstances thus mooting the COA's 2012 decision finding a statutory right to counsel. Now the COA addressed the constitutional issue that it did not reach in the 2012 opinion and found that such right also existed under the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Emergency Rules changes intended to address the implementation of this decision were proposed by the Rules Committee on October 15, 2013 (click here to review 181st Report of Rules Committee)
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Maryland DNA Collection Act constitutional
In King v. State, 425 Md 550 (2012) the COA held unconstitutional the Maryland DNA Collection Act which permitted law enforcement authorities to collect DNA samples from individuals arrested for violent and certain other offenses. The Supreme Court reversed King.
On remand the COA held that the DNA search of King did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights. No challenge had been made in King's original appeal to the lawfulness of collection of his DNA under Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The COA elected to address this argument despite contentions by the State that it had not been preserved and rejected the challenge noting that the COA has interpreted historically Article 26 in pari materia with the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
The COA also held that it was King who had the burden to prove a violation of the Act when raising a challenge as to whether the DNA Collection Act had not been complied with and, further, held that even if the Act was violated that suppression of the evidence was not the appropriate sanction for a statutory violation of the Act.
King v. State (COA 9-25-13)
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Search of cell phone upheld as incident to arrest - jail call to probation officer to rebut alibi testimony not unduly prejudicial
After his arrest, the defendant's cell phone was opened and the arresting officer immediately observed as a screen saver photograph a photograph of car rims that the defendant was suspected of stealing. Noting that the search was contemporaneous with the arrest and limited in nature, the search was upheld - but differentiated from a search of the contents of the cell phone that occurs after the passage of time such as that in United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405 (4th Cir. 2009).
The CSA also held that it was more probative than prejudicial to permit the state to offer as rebuttal evidence a telephone call from the jail to the defendant's probation officer during which to gave an alibi to his probation officer that was different from that presented by defense witnesses at trial.
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Right to File Coram Nobis waived when no application for leave to appeal filed - COA will not give
Padilla v. Kentucky
retroactive effect
The COA rejected a claim for coram nobis relief by Miller on the basis that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when he plead guilty in 1999 to an offense that subjected him to adverse immigration consequences. Concluding that he did not timely file an application for leave to appeal on that basis and within 30 days of the guilty plea, he waived the right to raise the issue. Nevertheless, the COA elected to consider whether, even if Miller had not waived his right to waive the coram nobis claim, he was entitled to the benefit of a retroactive application of Padilla.
The COA then concluded that although under Padilla v Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) Miller received ineffective assistance of counsel when his counsel failed to inform him that his guilty plea to drug distribution made him subject to automatic deportation, under Chaidez v. United States, __ U.S.__, 133 S.Ct. 1103 (2013), that Padilla did not apply retroactively because it had announced a "new rule" of constitutional procedure.
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Rule 4-263(e)(6) requires defense disclosure of factual information in recordings that may be used for impeachment - use of recorded statements as substantive evidence - other crimes evidence - pretrial identification suggestivity
The defense interviewed prosecution witnesses and recorded those interviews but resisted producing those recordings despite the prosecution's demand that such defense discovery was required under Rule 4-263(e)(6). After an in camera review by the court satisfied the court that the recordings contained only fact information and did not reveal any attorney mental processes, it ordered the production of the defense created recorded interviews. The CSA rejected Thomas' position that such recordings were only going to be used for impeachment if the witness deviated from prior statements.
The Court then rejected Thomas' position that the State was required to meet the foundational requirements of Rule 5-613(b) to use the statements to impeach the witnesses by first confronting the witness with the substance of the statement. The Court agreed with the State that since the purpose was to use the statements as substantive evidence under Rule 5-802.1 and since the statements were recorded, the witness was available for cross-examination and the recorded statements were inconsistent, the additional requirements of Rule 5-613(b) were not applicable.
Next, the CSA rejected Thomas contention that evidence of prior narcotics activity was inadmissible holding that under Rule 5-404(b) such evidence was admissible to prove a motive for the homicide.
Finally, Thomas challenged the pre-trial identification procedure contending that police suggested the person to be identified by the eyewitnesses and threatened arrest if they did not come to the station to view the pictures. The detective denied such improprieties and the trial court found the detective's testimony credible.
The CSA upheld the trial court's ruling, concluding that not every instance of police improper behavior is impermissibly suggestive - noting "THE SIN IS TO CONTAMINATE THE TEST BY SLIPPING THE ANSWER TO THE TESTEE." (emphasis in original).
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Evidence to rebut defendant's testimony at prior trial admissible in retrial - evidence of other crimes/bad acts admissible as necessary to prove elements of gang statute - omnibus motion insufficient- failure to preserve motion to dismiss
Marshall testified at his first trial which ended in a mistrial. At his second trial, the prosecutor introduced his testimony from the first trial and then introduced other evidence to show that his testimony at the first trial was not truthful. The CSA approved both the admission of the prior testimony and impeaching testimony.
Marshall's objection to the admission of other crimes and bad act evidence was rejected. The CSA agreed with the State that the proof of the offense elements of gang affiliation and the requirement to prove Thomas' involvement of two or more crimes made the evidence directly relevant to the proof of the offense.
Prior to the first trial, Marshall filed a motion to dismiss the charge of gang participation on the grounds that CL 9-804 was void for vagueness. The judge at the first trial never ruled on the motion. Prior to the second trial Marshall filed an omnibus pre-trial motion but no specific motion to dismiss. Noting that with the declaration of the mistrial, any motions filed in connection with the first trial were moot and that the omnibus motion was not specific in its grounds as required by Denicolis v. State, 378 Md 646 (2003), the issue was not preserved for appellate review.
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Opening statement references what jury would hear from defendant's own words in his pre-trial statement was not improper comment - K-9 handler's testimony interpreting "alert" of K-9 as to presence of accelerates was
expert testimony
Comments in opening that "the defendant himself will tell you .. that he burned down the garage" and "I am going to ask you to listen to what the defendant has said" were not improper comment on Simpson's right to not testify where the statements were based upon statements given by Simpson pre-trial. The COA held that the remarks did not invite the jury to adversely consider the defendant's silence as demonstrative of guilt and did not challenge the defendant to testify or face the possible negative implications from remaining silent.
The CSA held that the fire investigator's testimony regarding his observations of the alerts of a canine that had been trained to detect the presence of fire accelerants was expert testimony and the investigator should have been identified by the State as an expert (Rules 4-363 & 5-702), however, in this case the CSA found that the erroneous admission of the evidence was harmless.
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