Johnson's Russia List
2016-#3
7 January 2016
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"We don't see things as they are, but as we are"

"Don't believe everything you think"

You see what you expect to see 

In this issue
 
  #1
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
January 6, 2016
Lack of experts can stimulate Russian studies programs in the US
High-profile American officials now believe that Russia poses a national security threat to the U.S. Could better Russian Studies programs and a more robust supply of Russian experts alleviate the problem?
By Pavel Koshkin
Pavel Koshkin is Executive Editor of Russia Direct and a contributing writer to Russia Beyond The Headlines (RBTH). He also contributed to a number of Russian and foreign media outlets, including Russia Profile, Kommersant and the Moscow bureau of the BBC.

With Russia's military involvement in the Middle East, the ongoing Ukraine crisis and Russia's confrontation with the West elsewhere in the world, 2016 may see an extensive revival of interest in Russian Studies programs in the U.S. That would mark a significant turnaround because after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. establishment and academia largely neglected the field. Quite simply, Washington stopped viewing Moscow as an existential threat.

There might be several indicators that the trend is reversing. One of them is the fact that top U.S. officials are now making public comments that Washington lacks experts on Russia. The U.S. has systematically failed to figure out the motives of the Kremlin, as The Washington Post argued in late December, and that might be the result of not enough Russian experts within the current administration.

Two signs of increasing interest in Russia

However, the interest in Russia (or, at least, concerns over the Kremlin's policy) stems not from a feeling of deep respect toward Russia; rather, it results from the fact the U.S. doesn't understand Russia, which it deems as one of the nation's most important national security challenges, as indicated by the statements of top U.S. officials. Representatives of American academia, think tanks and the political establishment agree that they miscalculated Russia's policy in the post-Soviet space and in the Middle East. And this is the first sign of a revival of interest toward Russia.  

"We've been surprised at every turn," said Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John McCain (R-Ariz.). "We were surprised when they went into Crimea, we were surprised when they went into Syria."

"We have a situation today, in which Russia is now seen as a credible military threat not only in the Ukraine, but also in the Black Sea basin as a whole and in the Baltic [region]," said Stephen Blank, senior fellow for Russia at the American Foreign Policy Council, at the convention of the Association of Slavic, Eastern European and Eurasian Studies (ASEEES) that took place in November 2015. "And as we have seen, it completely confounded many American predictions. Russia has been successful not just in projecting power into the Middle East, but also sustaining that power."

The second sign is the fact that the ASEEES convention at the end of 2015 brought together many experts from all over the world and was, in fact, more rigorous and relevant from the point of view of the addressed questions. Middle Tennessee State University professor Andrei Korobkov, who regularly participates in such conventions, told Russia Direct that the number and heft of the 2015 ASEEES participants indicates that the interest in Russia seems to be increasing.

Concerns over the Kremlin's overtures

However, what remains questionable is the major driver behind such interest. As indicated from the 2015 ASEEES Convention's agenda and comments of experts, the U.S. pays much more attention to Moscow because it sees Russia as a military and national security threat, as a revisionist country, which aggressively promotes its propaganda through media, tries to break current international rules, redraws the map of Europe and successfully conducts its policy in the Middle East.  

Nevertheless, one should not confuse concerns over Russian foreign policy overtures with Russophobia, as some participants of the ASEEES convention argue.
Susan Smith-Peter from CUNY College of Staten Island thinks today's misgivings over Russia have nothing in common with the fears about nuclear war with the Soviet Union, which was commonplace in the U.S. in the 1980s. Moreover, there was an ideological divide then: a negative attitude toward socialism and communism in general. Today, it is no longer the case.

"Now it is not that there is a phobia about Russia, it is just a sort of confusion about what Russia is," Susan Smith-Peter said. "It is not like it was in the 1980s, when people were thinking about the Soviet Union a lot and were afraid that a specific thing could happen, which is nuclear war. Now well-educated people in the U.S. ask the question: What is going on with Ukraine? Just give me some kind of context, they say. They are just confused."

Today, politicians and ordinary people alike have a rather negative attitude toward Russian President Vladimir Putin, but not toward Russia as a whole. William Whisenhunt of the College of DuPage echoes this view. He argues that Americans tend to focus on people, individual actors, like it was the case when Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the 1980s and gained a great deal of sympathy among Americans.

John Pat Willerton from the University of Arizona believes that such a personality-centric view can be explained by the fact that, for the West, it is common to view Russia "as an authoritarian country."  "So, when you are dealing with an authoritarian country, you describe it in terms of the leaders of the country," Willerton told Russia Direct in an interview. "We've been talking about American policy in Syria and Putin's policy there."

Anti-Americanism drives interest in the U.S. within Russia

Likewise, the current confrontation with the United States, which some experts describe as a new Cold War, sparks interest in the U.S. within Russia and, especially, among members of academia. But this leads to increasing anti-Americanism.

For example, in some cases, American Studies in Russian academia is boosted by anti-American sentiments, which means that the U.S. is primarily depicted by some Russian academics as the spoiler for Russia, said Ivan Kurilla, a professor of the European University in St. Petersburg during one of the panels at the ASEEES convention ("Teaching Russian-American Relations: The view from Russian and American Classrooms").

According to him, previously, students in Russia were eager to study the U.S. because they found this topic really exciting and interesting, "but what I hear now that America is the country which always tries to spoil the chances of Russia, to make something bad for us and this is frustrating."

This is the challenge for teaching U.S.-Russia relations in contemporary Russia, he argues, pointing out that, "It is not only an educational task, our [educational] problem, but also, more importantly, our social mission." The problem of teaching U.S.-Russia relations in contemporary Russia is not easy given the rise of anti-Americanism.

The situation is exacerbated by the fact that there are many misconceptions and prevailing biases about the history of U.S.-Russia relations that exist also in the United States, Kurilla believes. There are at least two prevailing stereotypes among the general public that existed both now and during the Soviet era: "Good Russian people vs. bad Russian government" and the messianic perception of the American mission toward Russia, which was depicted by well-known American historian David Foglesong in his famous book, The American Mission and The Evil Empire.

Challenging different perceptions

Another challenge for teaching U.S.-Russia relations is the different perception of Russian and American audiences of the country of their study, Kurilla added. William Whisenhunt, a professor at the College of DuPage, who teaches U.S.-Russia relations for American sophomore students, echoes Kurilla's view.

"Teaching Russian history to American students is always a comparison, there is always a comparative aspect to it," he said during the ASEEES convention, implying that such an approach might lead to the rise of misconceptions and stereotypes. "I used to resist that in the class, I didn't want to talk in that way: Don't talk about Russia in the American view, but then I gave up," he added, explaining that his students kept looking at Russia through their lenses.

In his approaches of teaching U.S.-Russia relations, Whisenhut tends to focus more on people and their personal stories and accounts, not political leaders and diplomats, who by definition and their nature are inclined to politicize the topic. But the problem of many colleges and universities, as Kurilla sees, is that they see the history of U.S.-Russia relations mostly as diplomatic history, like "a pure diplomacy" or just geopolitics.

"What I think is we have to go beyond diplomacy," he said, pointing out that the history of U.S.-Russia relations is much more "about the transfer of technology, about immigration, about many cases of social interaction, which was very important during approximately two centuries of U.S.-Russia relations. If you know all of these [social and cultural] processes beyond diplomacy, you will probably understand differently."

History as the key to mutual understanding and respect

Knowing history also has a significant impact on the perception of a country and increased understanding of its intentions. For example, those professors who teach Russian history to Americans, including Whisenhut, Smith-Peter or Lee Farrow of Auburn University at Montgomery, argue that the students who come to their classes without knowing Russian history usually change their minds about the country after their courses, with a positive shift in their attitude.

"I can assume our students know nothing when they are coming to the class about Russia," Farrow said, adding that by the end of the semester, students seem to be more interested and enthusiastic about Russia. "So, by teaching Russian history, we do change their minds, they have a much more favorable impression [toward Russia]. Even though we talk about some bad events in Russia, their appreciation of Russia as a place and culture, with great history and rich literary life, is dramatic."

Farrow also adds that there are Russian-American organizations focused on positive aspects of the history of U.S.-Russia relations, "They want these kind of things to be better known because they are trying to balance the negative image" of Russia created by media and politicians; they tend to "show there have been a lot of exchanges between Russia and America, a lot of positive interaction."

One such interaction was the 1941-1945 Lend-Lease Program, under which the U.S. provided the UK and the Soviet Union with food, oil, provisions, vehicles and materials to help them in the fight against Nazi Germany. Another event that underlines the shared history of the U.S. and Russia is the end of the Civil War in the U.S. During the Civil War of 1861-1865, Russia was the power that openly supported the American North that was fighting for the abolition of slavery and, moreover, sent its fleet to New York harbor in 1863.

In addition, the meeting of Soviet and American soldiers on the Elbe River on April 25, 2015, and the defeat of a common enemy - Nazi Germany - was the symbol of another wartime collaboration that included many more instances of mutual support and military collaboration in 1941-1945.

Russian Studies and American Studies: Tools of soft power?

Because the study of U.S.-Russia relations could a be a tool of reaching mutual understanding and improving mutual perceptions, there is a temptation to compare teaching the history of Russia or the U.S. with soft power. Indeed participating in different conferences and coming up with joint collaborative research or the collection of articles might be seen as the result of a soft power initiative, Whisenhunt and Stanford University political analyst Kathryn Stoner argue.

All this "can increase [to a certain] extent peer-to-peer dialogue," said Stoner in an interview with Russia Direct during the ASEEES Convention. However, skeptics raise their eyebrows at the nature of the term "soft power," because they see it in a negative light.

For example, Kurilla says, "Soft power has a sort of negative connotation. It is a tool of international relations theory, but how it is used in political discourse is mostly in the Cold War confrontation logic." After all, Russian politicians, including Putin, frequently claim that the U.S. uses its soft power against Russia.

Kurilla is reluctant to see the teaching of American Studies as a part of American soft power in Russia. "I don't want to reduce our teaching to the logic of soft power and the Cold War confrontation, I don't like this use of soft power as a term applying to education," he said.

In contrast, Victoria Zhuravleva, professor at the Russian State University for the Humanities, argues that academia should be more rigorous in promoting the study of U.S.-Russia relations as a sort of soft power tool.

"Universities and research organizations need to expand the academic knowledge about each other in order to influence the foreign policy establishment and the media as well as to promote the pragmatic agenda of bilateral relations," Zhuravleva told Russia DIrect. "Of course, Russian Studies and American Studies programs can be a soft power mechanism for better understanding of mutual motivations and intentions. The problem is bound up with the asymmetric role of academia in foreign policy making in Russia and in the United States. The state power in Russia doesn't need both a multifaceted knowledge about the U.S and a serious expertise of U.S. foreign policy actions. At the same time, in the U.S. good academic and expert knowledge does not always translate into good policies."
 
#2
www.rt.com
January 7, 2016
Christmas Eve for millions of Orthodox Christians across the globe

Orthodox Christians across the world are getting ready for one of their major holidays, celebrated on January 7: Christmas. Believers in Moscow have gathered for the Christmas Eve service in the iconic Christ the Savior Cathedral despite the biting cold.

About 350,000 believers will take part in Christmas liturgies in Moscow, according to city authorities. Patriarch Kirill will head the service at Christ the Savior Cathedral.

President Vladimir Putin, however, may not appear there; last year he chose to attend a small church outside Voronezh, where hundreds of people from war-torn Eastern Ukraine gathered to pray.

In his Christmas address, Patriarch Kirill has called to pray for peaceful resolution of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine.

"Confrontation between brothers, which appeared on Ukrainian soil should not divide children of the Church... A real Christian cannot hate neighbors," he said.

The Orthodox Church follows the Julian Calendar, which is 13 days behind the Gregorian Calendar adopted by the Roman Catholic Church in the 16th Century. That is why Orthodox Christians celebrate their Christmas on January 7.

This is a holiday for Russian Christians (nearly three-quarters of Russians are Orthodox), the Jerusalem Orthodox Church, the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Georgian Orthodox Church, and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, as well as for some Protestants who use the Julian calendar.

Christmas in the Orthodox Church is traditionally preceded by the 40-day Nativity Fast in anticipation of Jesus' birth. The believers used to refrain from eating meat and deny themselves any form of entertainment.

The fast period ends with the first star in the night sky on January 6, which is considered a symbol of Jesus Christ's birth.

 
 
#3
Putin greets Orthodox believers on Christmas Day  

TASS MOSCOW, January 7. /TASS/. Russian President Vladimir Putin greeted Orthodox believers, all Russians celebrating Christmas, the Kremlin's press service said on Thursday.

"This holiday fills us with festive fun, gives birth to most light feelings and thoughts. It unites us around ideals of kindness, love and mercy. These eternal values pay a special role in the history of Russia, and over centuries they have been the spiritual, ethic base of the society," the greeting reads.

"It is very important that these days the Russian Orthodox Church, other Christian confessions in Russia continue the traditions of their responsible service, help people find belief, give them force in life. They participate actively in upbringing of the growing generations, in development of the institutes of family, maternity and childhood. This big work deserves deep, sincere respect," the president said.

He wished the Orthodox believers and all people in Russia, who celebrate Christmas, happiness, peace success in good deeds and undertakings.

Earlier, Putin attended an Orthodox Christmas service at the Intercession of the Theotokos Church in the village of Turginovo, in Russia's central Tver Region.

Putin already visited the very same church, also known as the Protection of Our Most Holy Lady Theotokos and Ever-Virgin Mary Church, in 2011 for the Christmas service. His parents were baptized in this church in 1911.

President Putin traditionally visits various Russian churches during the most important religious festivals. He usually prefers to stay in Moscow for Easter and travels to other parts of the country for Christmas.

Last year, the Russian president attended the Orthodox Christmas service at a newly restored church in Russia's Otradnoye village near the southern city of Voronezh.

In 2014, Putin visited the newly built Holy Face of Christ the Saviour Church in Russia's southern resort city of Sochi, located outside the Olympic Park.

In the previous years, he also attended Christmas Eve services in the city of St. Petersburg where he was baptized, in the Tver region where his parents were baptized in 1911, as well as in the Kostroma region, in Karelia, in the northern town of Veliky Ustyug and in the Moscow region.

In 2001, the president celebrated Christmas in the Russian capital, where he attended a service at Moscow's main Orthodox Cathedral of Christ the Saviour. In 2000, when he was still the acting president, Putin attended a Christmas Eve service at the Church of Life-Giving Trinity on Sparrow Hills (Vorobyovy Gory) in Moscow.

Christians conclude a four-week fast during which they confess their sins and receive communion. And on Christmas Eve they have special fasting, "until the first star," in memory of how the Magi came first to the birthplace of Christ following the movement of the star in the sky. At present, a candle in front of the altar, which is lit at the end of the Christmas Eve service at about noon, symbolizes the star.

Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Russia recited Christmas Eve liturgy at the Christ the Saviour Cathedral in Moscow. The service at Russia's main cathedral was attended by Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev.

The festive Christmas service recalls the great event that marked the beginning of a new era for mankind. At the moment of birth of Godman God's grace touched every person, every family line, and from that time the person has the opportunity to accept the gift.

Russia's main Orthodox cathedral, the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour, built to commemorate the victory in the Patriotic War of 1812, is dedicated to the biblical birth of Jesus, since on this very day, December 25 of the older Julian calendar, the last soldier of the Napoleon army left Russia. For the first time ever, the Christmas Eve service was held with open Holy Doors to symbolize the openness of God's word for all.

The Russian Orthodox Church today has more than 30,000 churches and 800 monasteries in almost 70 countries. Religious services are conducted during the night and in the morning in all Orthodox churches on all continents.

January 7 is also Christmas day for Orthodox Christians in Serbia, Jerusalem, Georgia, and the monastic community of Mount Athos in Greece, one of Orthodox Christianity's holiest sites. A midnight mass also took place in the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem which marks the spot where Christians believe Jesus was born in the West Bank town.
 
 #4
Christian Science Monitor
January 4, 2016
Czarist echo? Russian Orthodox Church drives to restore its political clout
The Russian Orthodox Church sees itself as the spiritual generator of public policy and the ideological bulwark of the state. Under Putin, priests have become fixtures in the military, schools, and other public institutions.
By Fred Weir, Correspondent

MOSCOW-Baikonur Cosmodrome may lie in Kazakhstan, but it is an iconic symbol of modern Russia: the coming together of cutting-edge science and Space Age power.

But just before the mid-December blastoff of the latest Soyuz mission to the International Space Station, the countdown procedure was halted to allow a robed and bearded Russian Orthodox priest a few minutes to shuffle around the mighty rocket, sprinkling holy water on its fuselage, murmuring snatches of biblical verse, and calling upon God to keep it safe. He also blessed each of the three astronauts - American, Russian, and British - about to make the journey.

Such is the new normal in today's Russia. The 1993 Constitution strictly defines Russia as a secular state, in which no religion is the official or obligatory one. But many people in post-Soviet Russia yearn for ideological certainties to fill the void left by communism. And with the ascent of Vladimir Putin and Russia's new order, the Russian Orthodox Church, an ancient institution that was nearly annihilated during seven decades of Soviet rule, is returning to a highly visible and central role in the life of the country.

Furthermore, the line between sacred and secular appears increasingly blurred in Russia. Unlike in the West, where religion and politics occupy separate spheres, the Orthodox Church sees itself as the spiritual generator of public policy and the ideological bulwark of the state. Priests have become regular fixtures in the Army, schools, hospitals, and other public institutions. When President Putin gave his recent state-of-the-nation address to parliament, Patriarch Kirill - the Orthodox equivalent of the pope - was seated prominently among top government officials in the audience.

That has prompted leaders to supplement their dubious democratic legitimacy with backing from the church that's been a key pillar of Russian statehood for 1,000 years.

"The main idea our temporal authorities are offering these days is a return to Russian 'great power' status," says Nikolai Svanidze, a historian and leading TV personality. "What the church brings to that is historical depth, clear philosophical outlook, and cultural traditions that most Russians relate to.

"But it's a hopelessly archaic institution, profoundly reactionary, and with a long habit of subordinating itself to the state," he adds. "It's incapable of taking any kind of progressive stand in favor of the country's development, and together with our current authorities it is driving Russia down the blind alley of the past."

About 70 percent of Russians identify themselves as "Orthodox" - though only a small fraction go to church regularly - and polls show the church is one of the most highly respected institutions in the country.

But clerical support for the authorities comes with a hefty price tag. Under Putin, the Kremlin has transferred back to the church about 28,000 objects once nationalized by the Soviets and worth billions of dollars, including churches, monasteries, and precious artifacts, mostly at the expense of state museums.

The church's move into banking

There seems little doubt that the church hopes to expand its social influence by moving into areas that are considered part of the public space in most Western countries. One ambitious plan officially put forward by the church is to create an Orthodox banking system, similar to the Islamic one, which would ban usury and be based on Christian principles. The idea has reportedly been endorsed by several banks and Russia's chamber of commerce.

"It's not clear what the church wants to accomplish through this, whether they are seeking greater public responsibility or just acting to lower interest rates" for the population in these difficult times, says Marina Mchedlova, an expert with the official Institute of Sociology of Religion in Moscow.

More important, the church has achieved some successes at influencing public policy. When the female punk rock group Pussy Riot staged an irreverent and illicit performance in Moscow's main cathedral, the church was among those insisting the charges be increased from simple "hooliganism," which suggests a minor offense, to include the sentence-multiplying addition "with intent to foment religious hatred," because the anti-clerical content offended many Orthodox believers. The church's view won, and the three young women were given two years in labor camps.

In recent years, the church has successfully lobbied for a law banning "homosexual propaganda" and has continued to push for much tougher legislation against issues including "blasphemy," abortion, and pornography.

"Many people think the church is only clergy, and it should not speak about secular matters, but we have overcome this Soviet legacy," says Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin, who was the church's most recognizable spokesman until he was abruptly fired by the patriarch Dec. 24. "The church is millions of people, and they have every right to speak about the concerns of society, especially ethical ones like family values, corruption, education policy, abortion, and relations with power. Many priests do speak out about such things these days, and I think that's a good thing."

Ironically, Father Chaplin told the media that disagreements over the church's relationship with the state played a role in his dismissal. He said that the church should speak to the Kremlin in a clear voice rather than through cozy personal relationships, and slammed the patriarch for snuffing out independent voices inside the church.

"Immoral elites are hampering the nation's development," he said, adding that "to prevent a revolution, we need to actively offer models of peaceful reforms," according to the Interfax news agency.

A debate in the church on how far to go

Indeed, experts say there is considerable debate within the church itself over how far it should carry efforts to regain its czarist-era role as the main arbiter of Russian spirit and morality, and hence the chief legitimizer of the state's policies and actions.

"The church is divided, and there is no single plan for how to project influence" outside the realm of purely religious authority, says Iosif Diskin, chair of the interreligious affairs commission of the Russian Public Chamber, a semiofficial civil society assembly. "Most agree that religion brings a moral dimension to social and political life, without which we cannot have a stronger and more united nation. But there is disagreement over methods, with some favoring direct political action, others calling for moral persuasion. There is no one position."

But the church has created external tools to project its will into the political arena in the form of public organizations with names like Orthodox Rus, The Orthodox Brotherhoods, and the Union of Orthodox Women. There are now dozens of such groups that enjoy ongoing connections with the church but are able to operate independently.

Much of their work involves noncontroversial activities, such as charity work, religious outreach, and public support for the church. They operate scores of radio stations and several newspapers and websites; they also prepare programming for the church's own nationwide TV network Spas (Salvation). Through such channels they keep up a running critique against what they see as a wave of blasphemy, sin, and moral degradation that's washing over Russia.

"We don't go in for politics, and we want the church to avoid the temptations of involvement in government and financial operations as well," says Viktor Semyonov, head of the year-old Orthodox Rus movement, which describes its goal as the revival of Russia's spiritual traditions based on Orthodox culture. "Our church survived 70 years of Soviet repression because of its spiritual strength. It still doesn't get the respect it deserves because there are so many forces arrayed against it."

But there are darker allegations that church-founded organizations may be linking up with - or at least providing religious cover for - nationalist and ultrapatriotic groups that sometimes turn violent.

Vandals attack 'blasphemous' art

The Sakharov Center in Moscow, a museum and art gallery named after the famous Soviet-era dissident, has seen its exhibitions smashed repeatedly by gangs of vandals who accuse it of sponsoring "blasphemous" art. Whenever lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender Russians attempt to stage a public protest, similar gangs appear to intimidate and often physically attack them as police look on.

If you compare the harsh prison sentence handed to the Pussy Riot band, whose actions were peaceful and caused no property damage, with the routinely lenient treatment of violent right-wing and pro-religious vandals by the courts, it gives a clear indication of which side the state is on, says Alexei Makarkin, deputy director of the independent Center for Political Technologies in Moscow.

"Those Pussy Riot women were treated as criminals and got two years" for dancing provocatively in a church, he says. "People who break into an exhibition and destroy works of art are charged with misdemeanors and given two days. That's pretty indicative. No one is saying the church is behind such actions, but it does fail to condemn them."

Putin invites church leaders to state events

Leaders of church front groups do seem to evince ultraconservative views, which make them outliers even in Russia.

Vladimir Osipov, co-chair of the Union of Orthodox Brotherhoods, with 50 chapters around Russia, says his group's purpose is "to strengthen Orthodox faith in Russia. We are struggling for purity of the Orthodox religion against evasions and heresies. We believe that monarchy is the ideal" form of government. "There are a lot of sad things going on in our society. In the West they cultivate homosexuality and other perversions," he says. "Our people are against such things."

Mr. Osipov even says the Orthodox Church should withdraw from the World Council of Churches, the main global forum for interreligious dialogue.

"We thought they might be enlightened by Orthodox faith, but the majority there turn out to be Protestants who introduce unacceptable ideas like same-sex marriage and women priests. We should leave," he says.

It's not clear how far the Kremlin is prepared to go to accommodate demands from the church and its supporters. Many leading Russian officials, including Putin, are devout believers. In addition to inviting church figures to participate in major state functions, and putting in appearances at key religious ones, Putin reportedly pays frequent, unpublicized private visits to famous churches and sites of Orthodox significance whenever he is traveling around the country.

Recently the Russian government seriously inconvenienced itself by postponing a lavish reburial of two members of the late Czar Nicholas II's family - which was to have been attended by Putin, many top Russian figures, members of the exiled royal family, and other international dignitaries - because the church expressed doubts about the authenticity of the remains.

The church reciprocated when the Kremlin intervened militarily in Syria's civil war recently. Chaplin went on TV to declare the Russian mission "a holy war against terrorism."

But disagreements occasionally surface as well. Patriarch Kirill was notably absent from the grand ceremony where Putin announced the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and the church has remained largely silent about Russian involvement in Ukraine's subsequent civil war.

Experts say that's because the turmoil has strengthened the breakaway Ukrainian Orthodox Church in its struggle to win over millions of Ukrainian believers who still pay allegiance to the Moscow-based church.

"The patriarch disappeared from view, because he was against Russian intervention in Ukraine. Anything that erodes the authority of his church takes priority for him," says Nikolai Petrov, a professor at Moscow's Higher School of Economics.

"What role the church should play in our society is seen very differently from the church and the Kremlin points of view. They appear to act together when interests coincide, but there is no doubt in Putin's mind that the church has to play a subordinate role.

"Any attempts by the church to play an equal or independent role in politics will be rebuffed," Dr. Petrov says. "There is no doubt about who is in charge here."
 
 #5
RFE/RL
January 6, 2016
For Protesting Russian Truckers, A Christmas Far From Home
by Tom Balmforth

KHIMKI, Russia -- After dark in the frigid parking lot of an Ikea outlet north of Moscow, in the trailer of a grubby white truck heated by a generator, a dozen men are sitting in winter coats and hats watching a Soviet blockbuster on a projector.

The cramped space has been a living room, a kitchen of sorts, and, more recently, the center of New Year festivities for a small group of protesting long-haul truckers who have lived in this parking lot since December 3. They intend to stay until spring -- or longer -- to protest a new road-tax-collection system called Platon that they say will drive them out of business.

With Russia's economy staggering through a dark time brought on by dropping oil prices, and no sign that Western sanctions over Moscow's interference in Ukraine will be lifted soon, their unusual blue-collar protest is a sign of strain on President Vladimir Putin's working-class support base.

"[Putin] has lost all 10 votes from my family, that's for sure," says Ivan Alutai, a 31-year-old trucker from Petrozavodsk, far north of Moscow, smoking a cigarette outside the vehicle.

The ranks of the protesting truckers at this encampment have thinned to less than a dozen rigs since they set up base last month -- although some of them have been joined by their wives and children so they can celebrate the New Year and Orthodox Christmas together. Russia's main faith marks Christmas on January 7, and the official holiday stretches from December 31 to January 11 this year.

Inside the truck, up a wooden pallet used as a stepladder, a small electric stove sits next to some tea bags. The walls are draped with tinsel and a hat for Grandfather Frost, the Russian Santa Claus. The men are watching a black-and-white Soviet film -- Optimistic Tragedy, a popular 1963 movie about the Bolshevik Revolution -- beamed onto the far wall by a projector.

Illuminated in the glow are a sack of potatoes and plastic bags filled with supplies brought to them as holiday gifts by supporters in Moscow.

Forlorn Sight

With its 10 or so parked trucks draped with banners lambasting the road tax and the state media that has largely ignored their protest action, the encampment in Khimki, 20 kilometers north of Moscow, makes for a forlorn but defiant spectacle.

In this filthy urban sprawl next to a massive road junction flanked by tower blocks and commemorative tank traps marking the point where Nazi forces were stopped during their assault on Moscow, the truckers while away their time.

Young activists from the capital have put on a series of film nights for the truckers using a projector in the back of a truck. The truckers have accordion sessions, as one of their number plays the instrument. On December 17, they were treated to a visit from Russian rock legend and protest bard Yury Shevchuk, who performed for them.

Alutai's wife and 3-year-old son, Lavrenty, were visiting for Orthodox Christmas, and his mother dropped in at the New Year. Until recently a staunch supporter of Putin, Alutai's mother had been fiercely against the protest and her son's participation -- because of state television, he believes.

"She came here and everything in her head changed," he says. "What they show on TV, it isn't true at all. It's all lousy lies. Until you actually come here, the moron box has its effect."

Uncle Vova

Alutai says he has no intention of abandoning his protest in the face of the cold temperatures that have dropped to -16 degrees Celsius. "I've already got nothing to lose," he says.

Alutai, who owns his own truck and is self-employed, says that the tax will severely erode his profits. He's also angry that the payment collection system is run by a company controlled by a son of Arkady Rotenberg, an old friend and judo sparring partner of Putin.

Alutai blames Putin for his predicament. "To be honest, I thought until the very last moment that Uncle Vova was going to say there had been a mistake. And then it turned out that he had known about this all the time," he says.

"Uncle Vova has lost my trust," he adds, using a diminutive form of the name Vladimir.

Days in the truckers' protest camp are bookended by police checks. "They come and note down the number plates of the vehicles," he says. The truckers, meanwhile, are convinced they are closely watched and listened to by the Federal Security Service (FSB) and police.

"We started drawing out plans in the snow, and the next thing, there was a police build-up," says Sergei Gorodishenin, a 33-year-old trucker from Vologda, a small city northeast of Moscow.

The truckers say it has made it hard for other drivers to join them, or for those in Khimki to stage protests such as the "Snail," in which truckers have driven in convoys at minimum speed, clogging up highways.

Gorodishenin, who has fallen ill during the cold snap in Moscow, says that some truckers' families have been pressured back home, and they themselves fear that they could be punished by the authorities for their protest.

Despite all these factors, the truckers assert they are intent on maintaining their encampment. "Naturally, we're not going to reveal what our plans are," Gorodishenin says.

"And there are FSB agents sitting over there in the corner," Alutai chips in with a laugh, adding, "They're warming their ears" -- a Russian idiom for eavesdropping.

Before long, Alutai's wife returns from Auchan, the French hypermarket across the huge mall from Ikea, along with 3-year-old Lavrenty. As they posed together for a picture, Alutai jokes darkly with his wife, "We'll have something to remember in the gulag."
 
 #6
The Nation
January 5, 2016
Uncle Sam Got a Shiny New Propaganda Bullhorn for Christmas
A new partnership is turning Radio Free Europe into an anti-Russia propaganda machine.
By James Carden
JAMES CARDEN James W. Carden is a contributing writer at The Nation and the executive editor for the American Committee for East-West Accord's EastWestAccord.com.
 
As we begin 2016, with the American mainstream media's anti-Russia bias as deeply entrenched as never before, comes the news that the US government-funded Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) has partnered up with the online magazine the Interpreter.

Previously, the Interpreter had been a "special project" of the Manhattan-based Institute for Modern Russia (IMR), a think tank funded by the exiled Russian oligarch Mikhail Khordorkovsky. In announcing the change, the magazine's editor-in-chief, the journalist and CNN fixture Michael Weiss, said his organization was "excited to serve as an outpost of such a venerable news organization."

An RFE/RL official told The Nation that the deal stipulates that RFE/RL will have exclusive rights to publish and translate articles from the Interpreter for RFE/RL's audience abroad, while The Interpreter will be, in turn, obligated to publish each installment of ITS intractably Russo-phobic "The Power Vertical" blog.

According to Weiss, given his "magazine's trajectory, a partnership with RFE/RL makes perfect sense." That is only too true, given the marked decline in RFE/RL's standards since the heyday of the Cold War.

Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty were founded in 1950 by the State Department's first Director of Policy Planning, George F. Kennan, in coordination with the postwar Office of Policy Coordination (OPC). In founding RFE and RL (the two entities merged in 1976), Kennan and the OPC, according to Kennan biographer John Lewis Gaddis sought "to provide financial support and employment opportunities for Eastern European �migr�s, as well as anti-Soviet broadcasts to their homelands."

Thereafter, funding came via the CIA, but according to RFE/RL, it parted ways with the agency by 1971. For most of its history, RFE/RL abjured the temptation to call for revolutionary movements abroad, focusing instead on broadcasting news stories that otherwise would not have been allowed to air in communist Eastern Europe.

Yet the propaganda RFE/RL had for so long avoided is something of a specialty of The Interpreter. As I pointed out at length in the pages of The Nation this past June, in addition to smearing a former US ambassador to Russia as a Kremlin "agent of influence" within the NATO hierarchy, the Interpreter has imputed treasonous motives to those with whom they disagree, all the while airing some of the more outlandish accusations against the Russian government.

For its part, RFE/RL has, of late, routinely published interviews and op-eds to audiences in Ukraine that only serve to reinforce the deep divisions racking that country. The most recent example of this was an interview given by a former US Ambassador to Russia, Michael McFaul, in which he flatly declared "Обаме с Путиным просто не о чем говорить": "Putin and Obama have nothing to talk about."

So much for diplomacy.

More interesting, however, is what the Interpreter's move to RFE/RL says about how easily Congress has been fooled into believing the rank alarmism regarding Russian-funded media that it and its many friends in the mainstream media have so enthusiastically propagated. Throughout 2015, The Economist's Ed Lucas (who recently co-authored a report decrying the supposedly far-reaching effects of Russian propaganda for the Center for European Policy Analysis), the Washington Post's Anne Applebaum and other lesser lights, have been ceaselessly ringing the alarm over the civilizational threat posed by Russian state-funded media outlets like RT.

More often than not, critics of Russian state-funded media operate under the false assumption that Vladimir Putin is the moving force, if not the actual author, of each and every piece of propaganda that Russian media produce. This week The Washington Post published the utterly fantastic claims of former Reagan and George W. Bush officials David B. Rivkin Jr. and Paula J. Dobriansky that "Nobody in Russia gets to freelance propaganda-wise. Thus, anti-Obama rants, even when coming from prominent individuals outside government, have Putin's imprimatur."

Yet another notable example of this rapidly expanding genre of propaganda-alarmism came courtesy of the American Enterprise Institute's Leon Aron, who took to the pages of The Weekly Standard in August to complain that RT, unlike RFE/RL, is "generously funded, slick, and unconstrained by moral scruples." Unsurprisingly, Aron-who currently serves on the board of RFE/RL's parent organization, the Broadcasting Board of Governors-made it clear that he believes that compared to RT, RFE/RL is woefully underfunded.

Meanwhile, the journalist Peter Pomerantsev, who, with Weiss, co-authored their own report on Russian propaganda for the Interpreter in October 2014, has been busy appearing before congressional committees as an "expert witness" on Russian propaganda. Appearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in April, Pomerantsev declared, "Russia has launched the most amazing information warfare blitzkrieg we have ever seen." In November, Pomerantsev appeared again before Congress, this time as a witness before a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on Russian propaganda, alongside none other than Leon Aron.

Pomerantsev's message was eagerly picked up by California Congressman Ed Royce, who with New York Congressman Elliot Engel co-sponsored the United States International Communications Reform Act of 2015 (HR 2323). Longtime Voice of America correspondent Al Pessin strongly objects to Royce and Engel's bill, noting that "You can't win respect and communicate if no one is listening, and people will stop listening if Congress transforms VOA into a Russian- or Chinese-style state broadcaster."

And yet the addition of the Interpreter to the RFE/RL stable brings it a step closer to becoming just that.

In any event, The Interpreter has now come full circle: The two-year campaign by the magazine and its friends to scare the Washington establishment over the alleged threat posed by Russian state-funded media, has made it, in the eyes of RFE/RL anyway, an indispensable agent with which to battle the phantom challenge posed by Russian state media.   
 #7
Russian Nationalism among Young Very Different than Among Older Groups, Sociologist Says
Paul Goble
           
Staunton, January 6 - Relatively few young people in the Russian Federation are attracted to Russian nationalism of the traditional kinds, Vladimir Petukhov of the Moscow Institute of Sociology says. Instead, they manifest what might be called "young nationalist views."

In a 2014 study on youth attitudes in Russia and China that has been summarized by Pavel Pryanikov this week at ttolk.ru/?p=25847, the Moscow scholar suggests that Russian nationalism among the young in his country is "radically different than traditional imperial nationalism."

It includes "a high level of rejection of the present-day Russian state and its organs, a negative attitude toward the ideas of internationalism, and an orientation toward informal self-organizing structures." One could describe it has "'nationalism for oneself,' in contrast to messianic Russian nationalism of previous eras" which call for Russians to sacrifice themselves for a Third Rome or the Third International.

According to Patukhov's research, only six percent of those surveyed call themselves supporters of the idea of "'a special Russian path of development'" although "almost a quarter" find the idea of "'Russia for the Russians'" attractive, less than the 37-38 percent who back internationalist values, a figure far less than among their parents.

The Moscow sociologist says that "the main thing which distinguishes the present generation of Russian youth from the rest of the population" is that it is the first that has not had to adapt to new, post-1991 conditions, because for its members, those are the only conditions they have known.

"If older generations of Russians have experienced periods of social-political growth," Pryanikov summarizes Patukhov's findings, "today's youth are divided and atomized." And they are not members of groups along the traditional ideological spectrum. Only 16 percent fall into one of them, but most say they aren't in any - or can't say.

In contrast to their parents, they are prepared to work for themselves and their own interests but they have little interest in solidarity with others. Instead, they are focused on private life and conceive freedom "exclusively in terms of the freedom of individual choice" rather than as a value for society as such.

They thus view democracy instrumentally as something that they think is necessary as long as it delivers the goods rather than as a value in and of itself.  And consequently they remain skeptical about it. They are strikingly tolerant of action by others who are ready to engage in political struggles even though most are not interested in doing so themselves.

Thus, majorities consider unsanctioned meetings, blocking of roads, and hunger strikes acceptable. And large pluralities consider internet hacking, dissemination of extremist ideas via the Internet and even the formation of bands and seizure of buildings acceptable, again far more than their parents.
 #8
Quartz
www.qz.com
January 6, 2016
Russian female entrepreneurs say Russia could become a model of workplace gender equality
By David Lepeska
David Lepeska is an Istanbul-based journalist who's written for The New York Times, FT, Foreign Affairs, The Atlantic, The Guardian, The Economist, and other outlets.

Moscow, Russia-The seeds of Natalya Tumanova's future were planted at age five, when she watched her grandfather build the family dacha just outside Yekaterinburg, the city named after the first woman ruler of imperial Russia. She studied architecture, moved to Moscow and, while working at Andrey Chernikhov, one of Russia's leading studios, led an apartment complex project in the city of Kazan, in 2009.

"I realized then that I could be a leader, that I didn't need a boss telling me what to do," the 33-year-old explained during a recent interview at a hotel in central Moscow. "I could create a project from the start through to the end, like my grandfather had done, so I decided to start my own firm."
A deeply patriarchal state populated by repressed beauties and lorded over by a domineering, oft-shirtless president-that's the simplistic Western view of Russia. But an avant-garde of Russian businesswomen has in recent years developed a nurturing environment for female entrepreneurs. And despite its often retrograde culture, some of them believe their country could become a model of gender equality in the workplace.

At first glance, Russian women seem unusually influential in business. In a 2015 study of 35 countries by the consultancy Grant Thornton, Russia had the most women in senior management positions: 40%, nearly double the rates in the UK (22%) and the US (21%). A similar proportion is cited in surveys by PWC in 2012 (pdf, link in Russian) and by the International Labor Organization last year (pdf), though the ILO ranks Russia 25th out of 80 countries.

Look closer, however, and the picture is less rosy. PWC found that women in senior management are most often found in auxiliary roles, such as chief accountant or head of human resources. A 2013 report from Ward Howell found that Russian women account for just 1% of CEOs in the country's top 160 firms (link in Russian); compare that to a (still meager) 4.4% in the Fortune 500 in the US. And they make up only 8% (pdf, p. 8) of company board members according to Credit Suisse (and less than 5%, according to the ILO), compared to a global average of 12%.

Still, there are reasons to be optimistic. Since 2007, the number of companies founded by women has grown by 350%, compared to 65% for companies founded by men, according to data from the Moscow-based think tank Human Capital. Overall, some 55% of Russian businesses are run by women.

Alena Popova, co-founder of Human Capital, sees several root causes. Due to decades of war and a high (often alcohol-related) male mortality rate, Russia has nearly 115 women for every 100 men. Russian men are still expected to be breadwinners, and thus feel considerable pressure to succeed; as a result, women tend to be more willing to take risks. The financial crisis of 2008 and Russia's ongoing economic troubles have lowered barriers to entry and presented new opportunities. Finally, the enforced gender equality of Soviet times-itself partly a product of the loss of so many men to war-changed social attitudes.

Female entrepreneurs and advocates interviewed for this article agreed that Russian workplaces are generally free from sexism. Maria Podlesnova, the founder and CEO of Rusbase, a media site focused on tech and entrepreneurism, has a hard time remembering a single incident of unprofessional or boorish behavior from her male peers and colleagues. "Maybe sexual harassment is widespread in the US and Europe, but this is absolutely not the case in Russia," the 31-year-old said during a recent interview at her office in central Moscow. "In modern tech society there is no place for sexism or machismo."

Russian women tend to do best in creative, tech, and media fields, which generally attract more progressive types and require less startup funding. Also, the Internet marketplace is ready-made: in Russia, women online shoppers outnumber men 10 to 1.

Natalia Sindeyeva owns Dozhd ("Rain") TV, Russia's last remaining independent news station. Marina Kolesnik, a Harvard MBA and former McKinsey consultant, oversees Oktogo.ru, the country's leading hotel booking site. And Svetlana Mironyuk oversaw one of the leading state-owned news outlets, RIA Novosti, for years, until its 2013 closure. (A new agency opened under the same name.) The list goes on.

Old prejudices die hard

Yet the deck remains stacked against businesswomen. For starters, women in Russia earn about 30% less than men on average, according to a recent World Bank study, and some two-thirds of Russia's women entrepreneurs are unable to access the funding they need, according to a 2014 study (pdf) from the World Bank Group's private sector arm.

Tatiana Gvilava, head of the All-Russian Public Organization for Businesswomen, Russia's largest organization for women in business, has proposed a Russian bank exclusively for women-pointing to successful equivalents in Saudi Arabia.

Another obstacle is prejudiced attitudes. Podlesnova says most Russians working outside the tech, creative, and media sectors assume successful women have had some help. "It's important to prove to other people that you've done it by yourself, not with any man's, or with 'daddy's' money, especially if you're beautiful and young," she says.

Yana Zadorozhnaya, a 26-year-old journalist and public relations manager from Almaty, Kazakhstan, might fit that description. She fell in love with Moscow when she arrived a few years ago, and in September partnered with an American techie friend to launch Moskvaer, a media site presenting a sharp, 21st-century perspective on life in the city.

"Nowadays women in Russia, just as in Europe, have all the opportunities to be what they want to be," says Zadorozhnaya. "But what I noticed is that, not all, but a lot of Russian and Central Asian women still prefer to be 'happily married' housewives and mothers, rather than strong, confident women. Probably it's a matter of habit, hardened by generations."

Moreover, certain industries have a habit of keeping women out. Popova wrote recently (Russian) that female CEOs and board members tend to be in "education, health, food service, retail, hotels, tourism, beauty products, and sport, as well as advertising and media," and predominantly in small businesses without access to large amounts of capital. Political power, and the natural-resource industries that underpin Russia's economy-oil, gas, and metals-remain male preserves.

"We need to work hard to promote women leadership in Russia," says Popova. She also runs Startup Women, an organization that supports women entrepreneurs, and a project called First Team, which aims to add a dozen women candidates to the ballots in the 2016 parliamentary elections.

Yet even in politics there are signs of change. In 2013, a few months before the US's Janet Yellen was named chair of the US Federal Reserve, Russia's Elvira Nabiullina became the first woman to head the central bank of a G8 state (even if Russia has since been kicked out of the G8). Valentina Matviyenko heads the upper chamber of Russia's parliament, and Olga Dergunova oversees the government body that manages state assets.

The conservative backlash

Any advances women are making, however, are happening despite, rather than because of, government policy. The Duma began work on gender equality legislation in 2003, and again in 2011. Both times it was put on hold. A proposal to implement quotas for women's participation in politics, specifically the Duma, has received approval from some legislators (including Elena Mizulina, who wrote Russia's notorious law against "homosexual propaganda"), but has gone nowhere.

Moreover, as Russia's conflict with the West has intensified-and especially since Russia's annexation of Crimea in mid-2014-so has a return to traditional values and gender roles, as a kind of salute to nationalism and a bulwark against "degenerate" western society. Finally, domestic violence affects up to one in three Russian women, and as many as 10,000 of them are believed to be killed each year by their husbands.

The surprise, for many, is that Russia has made the advances it has. Today, an aspiring woman entrepreneur in Russia can tap support groups, conferences, mentors, angel investors, even a hotline, all focused on shepherding her to success.

Back when Tumanova launched her studio in 2010, she had little help and few models to emulate. Still her firm has gone on to complete more than 300 projects all over Russia, as well as in Germany, Italy, and England. She points to one area where she never needed advice: dissuading wealthy clients, predominantly men, from their own bad taste.

"Sometimes a client has unusual ideas that he doesn't want to let go of," she said, the corners of her mouth hinting at a grin. "I like to remind him that he came to a specialist for a reason: because he wants expert input. Sometimes it takes some convincing, but generally my voice is heard."
 #9
Wall Street Journal
January 6, 2016
Russia's Taxi-Hailing Apps Gain Ridership
Gett, Yandex.Taxi and Uber make inroads, despite protests by taxi drivers
By OLGA RAZUMOVSKAYA

MOSCOW-Marat Vorokov used to run espresso stands in two Moscow malls and work as a chauffeur, but when the country's recession hit, he lost his job and had to shut his miniature coffee shops. To make ends meet, Mr. Vorokov now drives for Gett, an Israel-based cab-hailing service that operates in Russia.

"Of course it is better to work for myself than to have a business and worry about it," he said.

Gett, along with two other popular services, Yandex.Taxi and Uber Technologies Inc., have formalized the way ordinary Russians used to get around. Car owners have a long tradition of moonlighting as cabdrivers to make cash. But instead of flagging down a passing car and negotiating a ride, Russians now use their smartphones to call for a taxi.

Moscow, the most populous city in Russia, has seen robust competition between ride-hailing services in a market worth an estimated 60 billion rubles ($854 million). Car-hailing apps compete not only with the traditional cabs and personal cars, but with overcrowded public transportation. The most popular form of Moscow public transport-the Soviet-designed subway system-carries 9.7 million riders a day.

"The global taxi market is growing between 3% and 5% per year," said Shahar Waiser, the founder and chief executive of Gett. "With the advent of online services, the demand for using taxis has begun to grow, and in the next three to four years, the market may be two to three times bigger."

Ordering a cab was once out of reach for most Russians. Official cabs meant long waits and expensive rides.

"In the Soviet Union, being a cabdriver was a prestigious profession," says Vitaly Krylov, head of Gett in Russia. "Taking a taxi was expensive, and taxi drivers for that reason were part of the elite layer of society."

After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Russia was flooded with secondhand cars. A gray economy emerged as poorly trained drivers in badly maintained cars tried to make a quick buck. The use of gypsy cabs remained popular through 2000s, though these were notoriously unsafe.

"The word 'taxi' lost its respect," Mr. Krylov said.

In 2010, unlicensed operators still accounted for roughly 80% of the taxi market, according to Tigran Khudaverdyan, the head of Yandex.Taxi.

Yandex.Taxi, a subsidiary of Yandex NV, Russia's most popular search engine, was the first taxi-hailing service to launch in Russia in 2010. Gett and Uber entered the market soon after. The impact on illegal cabs was immediate, Mr. Khudaverdyan said, adding that the market share of gypsy cabs dropped to 30% by 2015, he said.

Rider habits are changing, too. A recent survey by Kremlin-friendly pollster VTsIOM showed that 79% of Russians have taken a cab more than once a month in the past year, following the arrival of taxi-hailing apps. Half of the riders say they take a taxi several times a month; and 22% hail a car several times a week. Ridership skews toward the young. According to the survey, 21-to-26-year-olds reported using cabs two to three times a week. More than half of Russians polled say technology influenced how often they took cabs.

"A large portion of our users aren't only those who have always used cabs-whether often or not-but those who have never used them," said Yevgeniya Shipova, Uber's Russia spokeswoman.

But U.S.-based Uber faces an obstacle in Russia that it doesn't face in other markets: a pervasive mood of anti-Americanism, encouraged by official propaganda that depicts the U.S. as Russia's main antagonist. Russia is under U.S. and Western sanctions following the annexation in 2014 of Crimea and intervention in Ukraine. Anti-Americanism has soared in the country, with 80% to 90% of Russians viewing the U.S. negatively, according to recent polls.

Drivers for competing companies frequently-and publicly-complain that Uber is an American company out to take their jobs. Its rivals complain that the company competes unfairly, with many Uber drivers operating without a taxi license.

Ms. Shipova said the company operates in accordance with the Russian law and that its drivers have required licenses.

As in other countries, the usefulness and ease of cab-hailing services has threatened traditional taxi companies. Russian drivers who don't use car-hailing apps often complain that these services literally are driving them out of their jobs by offering prices they can't compete with. Cheaper rides also has meant more business.

An Uber driver could earn more than 100,000 rubles weekly ($1,356) by working eight to 10 hours, five days a week, said Ms. Shipova. Meanwhile, Yaroslav Shcherbinin, head of the public transportation workers' union Taxist, said union drivers on average earn 60,000 rubles to 80,000 rubles for a week's work.

Earlier this year, around 4,000 taxi cabdrivers protested for three days against the three services in Moscow, Kazan and several other major cities by not taking orders from the apps. The protesters' chief demands: lower commissions and increase in fares. The protests eventually died down and drivers returned to working for the services.

"I'm going to open you a big secret: we all work for all of them," said Mr. Vorokov, who recently started to work for Yandex.Taxi in addition to Gett.
 
 #10
Russia Insider
www.russia-insider.com
January 4, 2016
Why Oil Prices Have Fallen and How That Affects Russia's Economy
The oil price fall is mainly the result of the rise in US interest rates rather than the supply glut. It does not threaten the Russian budget or mean Russia is running out of money, but it has delayed cuts in Russian interest rates
By Alexander Mercouris
Alexander Mercouris is a writer on international affairs with a special interest in Russia and law.  He has written extensively on the legal aspects of NSA spying and events in Ukraine in terms of human rights, constitutionality and international law.  He worked for 12 years in the Royal Courts of Justice in London as a lawyer, specializing in human rights and constitutional law. His family has been prominent in Greek politics for several generations.  He is a frequent commentator on television and speaker at conferences.  He resides in London.

The year 2015 ended with further falls in oil prices.    

As is now traditional, this have given rise to more predictions of disaster for Russia's economy.

This whole subject is much misunderstood.  The major effect on the oil price is on interest rates - not the Russian budget, which gets all the attention.

Oil prices are anyway likely to stabilise - and even rise - before long, whilst the effect of their fall on the Russian economy is diminishing.

To explain all this it is necessary to begin with oil prices, since they are the heart of the story.  

The Oil Price Fall

Firstly, it should be said clearly that the short term reason for the oil price fall since November is the US Federal Reserve Board's decision to increase US interest rates.

Given the close correlation between oil price movements and those of US interest rates, the well nigh universal failure to recognise this fact is baffling.  

Oil prices started to slip in mid November, when it finally became clear the long period of dithering at the US Federal Reserve Board about whether or not to raise interest rates was finally coming to an end, and that US interest rates would indeed rise in December.

That it is rises in US interest rates that cause oil prices to fall is shown by recent history.

Oil prices began their fall in the summer of 2014, as the US Federal Reserve Board's quantitative easing programme ended and as rumours spread of an imminent rise in US interest rates.  

As it became clear over the course of the winter of 2015 that the Federal Reserve Board would not raise US interest rates, oil prices stabilised and briefly rose.

In August 2015, as rumours again began to spread that the Federal Reserve Board would raise interest rates in September, oil prices fell again.  

They then stabilised when the US Federal Reserve Board put off its decision again.

Finally, in November, when it became clear US interest rates would finally rise in December, oil prices fell again, and continued to do so in December after the rate rise took place.

The reason the price of oil is so closely linked to US interest rate movements is because oil trades have acquired something of the quality of a hedge against falls in the value of the dollar.  

As the value of the dollar is largely determined by the state of US interest rates, rises or falls in US interest rates have an immediate effect on the price of oil.

That is not to say that the other factor that determines the oil price - supply and demand - has no role.  However, as with the price of gold, supply and demand for oil is only one factor in determining its price.

World Recession Coming?

If the short-term reason for the oil price fall since November was the rise in US interest rates in December, it is now starting to look as if there might be another, longer-term reason.

Manufacturing in the US and China and in parts of Europe has been steadily contracting for the last few months.  World stock markets performed poorly in 2015.

It is possible that just as the oil price rise of 2006 to 2008 was a harbinger of the 2008 financial crisis, so the collapse in oil prices since 2014 is a harbinger of a coming world recession.

It is still too early to say this for sure.  However if there is a global recession, then the upward trend in US interest rates will go into reverse, which should - as it did in 2009 - strengthen the oil price.

The Supply Glut

Understanding of this issue is clouded by the present supply glut.  Those however who point to the supply glut as the cause of the oil price fall are confusing cause and effect.

As I have laboured to explain before, the oil supply glut is the result of the oil price fall, not its cause.

Oil prices began their fall in the summer of 2014, before OPEC's decision in November 2014 not to go for production cuts.

Oil prices fell again in August and November 2015, in both case before OPEC reaffirmed its decision in November 2015 that it would not go for production cuts.

In all these cases OPEC's - or rather Saudi Arabia's - decision to resist production cuts has undoubtedly put more downward pressure on oil prices.  However since oil prices began their fall before those decisions were made, these decisions cannot have caused the fall.   

In fact, an oil supply glut is precisely what would be expected to happen when oil prices fall, as producers scramble to produce more oil to maintain their cash flow in order to compensate themselves to the extent they can for the fall in the price of their product.

The Effect on the US Shale Oil Industry

Those who cite record US oil production figures in early 2015 as proof of the resilience of US shale producers misunderstand the connection between prices and output.  

It is precisely the most heavily indebted and highest cost producers - in this case the US shale oil producers - who in conditions of an oil price fall are under the greatest pressure to step up production to maintain their cash flow so that they can service their debts.

These same producers are also the ones who are simultaneously under the greatest pressure to cut their costs, in order to squeeze the most they can from what oil they produce.

Neither the higher production nor the cost cutting are however in the end sustainable.

In the case of the cost cutting, one should be especially careful about accepting some of the claims made about it, which speak of costs being slashed by as much 30%.  

Cost cutting on such a scale suggests radical action taken by an industry in crisis - for example by freezing work on new sites - rather than a genuine sustainable improvement in productivity.  

Shale oil is here to stay.  The technological breakthrough is real, and the industry will survive in some form.

That is not inconsistent with an immature industry that has grown over-fast on the back of high prices now finding itself in crisis.

Human nature being what it is, the inclination to hang on as long as possible in the false hope that the lower cost producers who are currently flooding the market - the Saudis and the Russians - will crack first, is understandable.  

Eventually - when it becomes clear this will not happen - investors and creditors lose hope and pull out, bankruptcies spread, and production collapses.

All the indications we have suggest this process is now underway.

Saudi Arabia and the Oil Price Fall

As I predicted, the Saudis have made it perfectly clear they have no intention of raising the oil price by cutting their production.  

Constant speculation the Saudis cannot absorb the low prices are wrong, and fail to take into account the depth of their financial resources.  

Obviously the Saudis cannot withstand low prices indefinitely at current levels of spending.  However they certainly have the financial firepower to outlast the shale producers, which is all they have to do.

Saudi Arabia's 2016 budget, which has attracted so much attention, drives home the point.

The widely quoted claim that it is based on an oil price of $29 a barrel is unconfirmed and most likely wrong.  There is in fact a wide range of estimates - or more properly guesstimates - of the level at which the Saudi budget has pitched the oil price.  One puts it as high as $45 a barrel.

The point is anyway meaningless.  A budget is not a price forecast.  

Finance officers when drawing a budget have to take a plausible seeming price as a basis for their calculations.  Finance officers tend to err on the side of caution, and it would not be surprising if Saudi Arabia's finance officers - many of whom are foreign consultants - have just done so when drawing up the Saudi budget.  The fact the Saudis have calculated their budget around a certain oil price does not mean they expect oil to be that price.

What the Saudi budget shows - and is intended to show - is that the Saudis can and will run a deficit of 15% of GDP in order to achieve their objective - which is to knock out the shale oil producers - and that they have both the will and the financial resources to do this.  

In this calculation the Saudis are right.  Whilst their financial resources are not infinite, they are of a scale the US shale producers simply cannot match.

As it happens information coming out of both Saudi Arabia and the US suggests the Saudis think victory over the US shale producers is now in sight, and that it will take no more than a few more months.

Prospects for a "Snap-back" in Oil Prices

If that is true, then a sustained increase in oil prices in the second half of 2016 is very likely.

This is because lurid headlines of filled oil tankers unable to find ports to unload their cargoes grossly exaggerate the true size of the present oil glut.

By historic standards this glut is small.  

Estimates vary, but the best guesses put the global over supply of oil at between 1 to 3 million barrels of oil a day, as against total global consumption of oil of 96 million barrels a day.

This level of over supply only exists because oil producers are working flat out to produce as much oil as they can in order to maintain cash flow at a time of depressed prices.  

Saudi Arabia's production alone has increased by roughly 1.5 million barrels since oil prices began their fall in the summer of 2014 - an amount that alone may cover the entirety of the current over supply.

Saudi Arabia is not the only producer working flat out to pump out as much oil as it can.  

Russia is doing the same, as are all the other OPEC producers, and as are the shale producers in the US.

It is this tightness of the oil supply glut that argues against oil prices falling as far and remaining low for as long as they did in the 1980s-1990s.  

The glut in that period was much bigger, with producers like the Saudis and the Russians producing far below their potential levels, which meant that any increase in demand could almost immediately be matched by a rise in supply.

That is definitely not the situation today, which is why comparisons between that period and now are certainly wrong.

The fact that the supply glut is so small means is that it will take only relatively small falls in output - or increases in demand - to bring the oil market back into balance, or even to create an oil shortage.

Given that current levels of output are unsustainable - even in Saudi Arabia, which cannot maintain production at existing levels for long without causing lasting damage to its wells  - that is almost certain to happen, probably sooner rather than later, and more probably in 2016 than 2017.

When that happens oil prices will stabilise and probably rise.

Iran and the Oil Glut

What of Iran, whose extra output following the lifting of sanctions is believed by some to be a further factor extending the oil glut?

The reality is the impact of Iran on the oil market will be smaller than some are expecting   

Iran claims it can supply half a million barrels of oil a day in addition to the one million barrels of oil a day it is currently exporting as soon as sanctions are lifted. It says it can then double this amount to one million barrels of oil a day a within a month.

On the face of it, this appears to mean that the Iranians will double the amount of oil they supply to the market from one million to two million barrels a day within one month of sanctions being lifted.

These figures however put the impact of what the Iranians claim they will do in perspective.

The amount the Iranians say they will add to the oil they are already exporting is one million barrels of oil a day.

This is actually less than the amount by which the Saudis have increased their oil production since the oil price fall began in the summer of 2014.

If Saudi Arabia simply cuts back to the levels of early 2014, it will absorb the entirety of any new production coming from Iran in 2016, after sanctions are lifted.

In reality this "extra" million barrels of Iranian oil is a fiction.

What the sanctions on Iran prevent Iran doing is legally selling more than one million barrels of oil a day.  

That does not mean that Iran is not already producing and selling more than one million barrels of oil a day.

As is well-known in the oil industry, Iran is already selling a large part of the oil it produces over and above one million barrels a day illegally, at a heavy discount, through various intermediaries in places like Bahrain.  

The lifting of sanctions will not add an extra million extra barrels of Iranian oil to the oil market.  It will simply mean the Iranians can sell their oil legally themselves rather than have to go through intermediaries to whom they have to give discounts.

It is because the Iranians are already producing - and selling - most if not all the "extra" oil they say they will sell once the sanctions are lifted, that they can be so precise about how much more oil they will sell once the sanctions are lifted.

The Coming Stabilisation of the Oil Market

If the oil market does balance at some point in 2016 - as the Saudis expect and as all the indications suggest - does that mean there will be a dramatic snap-back in prices?

Oil prices will surely rise - probably by more than most expect - but probably not to anything like the figure of $100 a barrel we saw in 2014 - and especially not if there is a global recession - unless there is a dramatic shift in monetary policy in the US, which for the moment looks unlikely.

With further US interest rates unlikely in an election year, the oil market should however finally stabilise, bringing the extraordinary period of volatility that began in the summer of 2014 finally to an end.  

The Oil Price and the Russian Budget

Before discussing the effect of the recent oil price fall on the Russian economy as a whole, it is necessary to say something about the Russian budget.

When oil prices began to fall in the summer of 2014 various supposedly knowledgeable people predicted it would be a disaster for the Russian budget, which supposedly needed an oil price of $110 a barrel in order to balance.

Though 2015 proved that claim totally wrong, the same supposedly knowledgeable people are now saying that because Russia's draft budget for 2016 is based on an oil price of $50 a barrel, the budget - and Russia - face disaster or a "fiscal crisis" if the oil price falls below that level - as it has currently done - and remains below $50 a barrel into 2017, when the Reserve Fund will supposedly run out.

It is very strange that after being proved so completely wrong about the Russian budget in 2015, the same people insist on making the same mistake about the Russian budget in 2016.  

However, as Russia Insider has said many times, there is no penalty in the West for getting Russia wrong, provided one does so from an anti-Russian position, and this is just one more example.

In the case of the 2015 budget, the supposedly knowledgeable people overlooked the possibility Russia would float the rouble, allowing it to decline in line with oil prices, insulating the budget from the effect of the oil price fall.

For 2016 some commentators claim they have taken this factor into account - though it is not clear whether they have really done so - and that they still expect the budget to go into deficit if the oil price remains below $50 a barrel.

This whole theory of a "break-even" oil price for Russia's budget - or indeed the budget of any oil producer - is methodologically highly dubious, and should be abandoned - a fact recently pointed out in a study discussed by one of its authors in the Financial Times.

Nonetheless it is likely Russia's budget will be in deficit in 2016.  The Russian government after all predicts it will be.

However, some perspective and a sense of proportion are needed.

The very worst case scenario so far outlined - Citi's - puts the Russian budget deficit in 2016 at 4.4% of GDP if the oil price falls to $30 a barrel.

A budget deficit of 4.4% of GDP scarcely looks like an unaffordable figure.  In fact it looks fully in line with what might normally be expected of an economy going through a recession.  By way of comparison, the British budget deficit at the moment - during a period of "recovery" - is 4.9% of GDP.

Can Russia finance a deficit of 4.4% of GDP, assuming the Reserve Fund runs out?

The short answer is of course it can.

The question people who talk in apocalyptic terms about the future of the Russian budget never ask themselves is how do governments which run budget deficits - which is to say most governments most of the time - finance them?

The short answer is that if they are Japan, Britain or the US, they increasingly print the money, but if they are other governments they borrow it.

If Russia ever were to find itself in a position where it had to finance a budget deficit of 4.4% of GDP after the Reserve Fund had run out, it would do so by raising the money by floating a bond on the international money markets - or conceivably in Russia - something which most governments do most of the time.

The sanctions do not prevent Russia from doing this and - since what we are talking about is a sovereign bond - it is legally doubtful they can be extended to prevent it.  

Barring a government like Russia's from floating a bond would be a far more radical step than disconnecting Russia from SWIFT, and would not only invite a legal challenge but would be certain to encounter intense opposition from the financial communities of the various European capital markets where such a bond would probably be floated.

Even if Western governments took this extreme step, the Russians could still try to float their bond in one of the Far Eastern markets which have a legal system strong enough to enforce it (Singapore might be a possibility), or conceivably they might try to float it in Moscow itself - an action that might actually strengthen the Russian financial markets by drawing in Asian and Middle Eastern investors, and by offering Russian financial institutions the security of a government bond to invest in.

In reality Western governments are most unlikely to try to interfere with a bond.

The device the Western powers are using to try to stop Russia raising money in this way is not sanctions - which would be legally highly dubious and extremely controversial - but downgrades of Russia's credit rating.

I have previously discussed how dubious and overtly politicised the credit rating downgrades Russia has suffered are.

The point is that Russia's rating is now so obviously unfair and politicised that it by now must cut little ice with the Asian and Middle Eastern institutional investors - many of them sovereign wealth funds - to whom the bond would mainly be pitched.

Most probably they would be anxious to hold the bonds of a powerful country with a huge raw materials base, a small deficit, a large trade surplus, very low levels of government debt, and a record of paying its debts on time.

I have discussed this possibility at some length not because I think it is going to happen - I don't - but because the constant myth-making about the Russian economy makes doing so unavoidable.

Briefly, because the Russian government has avoided borrowing during the Putin era - running a budget surplus whenever it can, and relying on the accumulated savings in the Reserve Fund when it has been obliged to run a deficit - it doesn't mean it cannot do so.  

As it happens, it briefly considered doing so during the 2009 crisis - when the budget deficit was 6% of GDP - and there is nothing to prevent it doing so in future if the need arises.

I suspect that if and when that does ever happen, it will cause as much surprise to the supposedly knowledgeable people currently predicting disaster, as did floating the rouble in 2014.

Putin has insisted that the budget deficit in 2016 must be no more than 3% of GDP, and has said that if the oil price stays below $50 a barrel the budget will have to be cut.  

There is almost certainly sufficient slack in the budget to make cuts possible if the need is there, and Putin is quite obviously determined to avoid Russia having to borrow if it possibly can.  Rather than resort to borrowing, I suspect the government will prefer to impose cuts.   

As to the future, what happens to the budget ultimately depends less on oil prices and more on what happens to the economy, to which I shall now turn.

The Oil Price, the Rouble and Inflation in Russia

The major effect for Russia of the collapse in oil prices is not its effect on the budget, but its effect on the rouble.  

The rouble has fallen in lockstep with oil prices, causing double-digit inflation in 2015, and making repayment of debt in foreign currency more difficult.

Both these processes however now appear to be coming to an end.

Inflation in 2015 peaked at annualised rate of 17%.  It may have been even higher in the first few weeks of 2015, with some prices rising by 20%.  As recently as November it was running at an annualised rate of 15%.

Rosstat - Russia's statistical agency - has now reported inflation for the whole year of 12.9%.

This suggests inflation has been falling rapidly in recent weeks, and that it may already be in single figures.

The official prediction for inflation in 2016 is 6-7%, though Economics Minister Ulyukaev has said that because of the further fall in the rouble since November headline inflation may not hit single fingers until the second half of 2016.

The major effect of a currency devaluation on inflation is that it makes imports more expensive.  

With the quantity of imports already slashed because of the size of the devaluation in 2014, the effect on inflation of any further devaluation of the rouble is diminishing.  

It may be diminishing even faster than the government realises.  The government predicted just a few weeks ago that inflation in 2015 would be "just above 13%"  To the government's surprise it turned out less at 12.9%.

Though there could still be the odd rises over the course of the coming year, overall the inflation trend seems to be firmly down.

That suggest that single figure inflation is indeed in sight, and that any forecasts - such as Citi's - that increase the rate of inflation and of the budget deficit mechanically in response to every fall in the rouble and in the price of oil are wrong.

The Oil Price, the Rouble and Foreign Debt Payment

December is traditionally a month for heavy debt repayment, a factor that generally adds to the downward pressure on the rouble during that month.

The big story of the rouble this December is however that it fell more gradually than oil prices - the reverse of what happened December 2014, which was a month of particularly heavy debt payments.

This together with capital inflow in the last two quarters of 2015, strengthens the impression that the major period of deleveraging and of foreign debt payment is coming to an end.

Repayment of foreign debt at a time of falling oil prices and when Russian banks and companies are effectively cut off from Western capital markets, has been a heavy burden on the economy, and has put more pressure on the rouble.  Many Western analysts - and some Western governments - doubted it could be done.

As German Gref, Sberbank's CEO, has however said, Russia has improved its reputation for financial solidity by doing it, and it will reap the rewards in the future.

The end of the period of repaying foreign debt should - all other things being equal - finally ease the pressure on Russian banks and companies, leaving them with more money to invest.

It should also relieve pressure on the rouble, causing it to steady, and eventually to decouple from the oil price.

The Oil Price and Russian Interest Rates

With the levels of inflation and of foreign debt payment falling, it is interest rates which now are the principal drag on the economy.

Interest rates peaked at 17% during the rouble crisis in December 2014.

They were then steadily reduced over the first half of 2015, falling to 11% by July.

They have however remained at this still very high level ever since.

It is these very high interest rates that are preventing business investment, and which are deterring consumers from buying high value items - such as cars - on credit.

It is the Central Bank's failure to cut interest rates further since July that is what was almost certainly responsible for the further contraction in the economy which happened in November.

It is also the reason for the darkening in the mood some have noticed in December.  

The Central Bank's failure to cut interest rates despite falling inflation has met with incomprehension and anger - with accusations flying around that it is part of a "5th column" that is serving Western interests, and which is undermining Russia.

My own view is that the Central Bank - shell-shocked by its failure to anticipate the rouble collapse in December 2014, and humiliated by the way the Finance Ministry had to ride to its rescue that month - missed its window to cut interest rates below 10% in the summer.   

The country has paid a heavy price for that failure in the form of a deeper recession in 2015.  I am confident that if interest rates had been cut below 10% in the summer, the effect on inflation and the rouble would have been minimal, but production this autumn would have been higher, and the contraction of the economy for the whole year would have been less than 3% instead of 3.8%.

By contrast, I think the Central Bank has been right to leave interest rates alone in the second half of 2015.

With oil prices falling and the rouble under renewed pressure the Central Bank simply didn't have the option of cutting interest rates once it missed its window in July.

That is the single biggest consequence of the renewed oil price fall since the summer.

It has delayed by several months the reduction in Russian interest rates because the Central Bank is not willing to take risks with the rouble.

The point was recently explained by Russian Economics Ulyukaev, who said it is not the level of the rouble that matters, but the volatility there has been over the last few months, caused by uncertainty over the price of oil.  

Looking Forward - the Russian Economy in 2016

Economics is not an exact science despite the attempts by some of its practitioners to argue otherwise.  

The Russian economy has however in 2015 performed much in line with what might have been expected given the oil price collapse and the decision to float the rouble in 2014: a severe inflation spike in the first quarter, a severe contraction in the second quarter, and a general stabilisation in the second half of the year, with output stabilising and inflation falling.

With the economy's exposure to external shocks diminishing as imports are choked off and as debt is paid off, the big question now is how quickly the Central Bank will bring down interest rates.  

If it maintains them at current levels for much longer then it will prolong the recession to no good purpose.  

I strongly doubt that will happen given the political storm that would cause.  Though much will depend on what happens to oil prices in the next few weeks, I suspect the Central Bank is already planning further cuts in interest rates at its next meeting in January.  

Regardless of what happens in January, by midyear the situation should be sufficiently stable, with inflation falling fast, more foreign debt paid off, and the rouble sufficiently stable, for more cuts in interest rates to take place.

By that point output should already be rising and it will then be possible to say that the period of economic rebalancing was drawing to an end within the two year period that Putin predicted a year ago.

If oil prices by then are also rising, it will be more icing on the cake.
 
 #11
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
January 5, 2016
Cautious hopes for a Russian economic rebound in 2016
Russia's Deputy Minister of Economic Development Oleg Fomichev argues that there is relative optimism for economic growth in Russia. He explains what needs to be done to improve the investment climate and support Russian innovation and start-ups.
By Alexey Khlebnikov

For a very different take read the Q&A with Lomonosov Moscow State University's Oleg Buklemishev: "What the Russian economy needs to do next to avoid stagnation"

The Big Three credit rating agencies - Standard & Poor's (S&P), Moody's and Fitch Group - forecast slightly positive economic growth for Russia in 2016, which they think will come about with a stabilizing economy and continuing adjustment of Russian business to the new reality of low oil prices and certain reforms.

This spark of optimism is quite welcome, especially in the beginning of another year. The year 2015 has been quite important and even crucial for the Russian economy: It marks the first year without access to Western financial markets and the first year with extremely low oil prices. This seriously challenged the Russian economy, which still cannot get rid of its "oil curse," deeply ingrained bureaucracy and huge government-controlled corporations that dominate the country's economic life.

However, during recent years, Russia has witnessed certain improvements in the sphere of innovations and start-ups, which gives a glimmer of hope for the pivot of Russia towards a more innovative, high-tech economy. With that in mind, Russia Direct sat down with Deputy Minister of Economic Development Oleg Fomichev, who is in charge of innovation and start-ups in Russia. Below, he gives his view on the current state of the Russian economy with a vision for what's ahead in 2016.

Russia Direct: In what shape is the Russian economy today? Is it better or worse than what you personally expected at the end of last year when the ruble started to fall so dramatically?

Oleg Fomichev: The current economic situation is definitely not that good. The Russian economy is not in the best shape, but it is not as bad as it was expected one year ago. As you know, the government has its own anti-crisis plan - we have direct financial measures, which targeted particular sectors of the Russian economy, like the banking sector and some other sensitive industries. So the current downturn of the economy is not as deep as it was expected one year ago.

In any case, the situation is not good taking into account not just sanctions. Actually we do not consider them as the only factor of the downturn. It is mostly due to weaknesses of the Russian economy and low prices for Russia's main export - oil and gas.

We are now relatively optimistic about economic dynamics for the next several months and the next year because we see from June, and more positively from September, we see an upturn in the Russian economy. We see that Russia's GDP now is stable and is even slightly rising and we expect this tendency to strengthen further. But anyway the situation is very unstable, so we are cautious about the current state of affairs and preparing measures to strengthen these dynamics.

RD: Recently Russian PM Dmitry Medvedev unveiled a new Strategy 2030, which concentrates on four priorities: investment activity, import substitution, the quality of state governance, and budgetary policy. How timely do you think this new strategy is for the Russian economy? Do you think all 4 priorities are chosen correctly?

O.F.: I am not in a good position to discuss whether the Prime Minister set priorities right or wrong. Of course these four priorities are among the most important in the strategy but when we go further with the development of the strategy, of course, there will be further discussions as the planning horizon, 2030, is quite distant and priorities might be changed along the way.

If we are talking about whether it is the right or wrong time to develop the strategy, there are two divergent positions among experts.

One says that it is the right time just because when you don't have long-term priorities and a vision for the future, it is very hard to perform the current actions and you couldn't take into account the long-term outcomes of what you are doing right now. It is very hard to choose between several short-term actions, especially under budgetary restrictions, when you couldn't see which one of them directly targets a long-term priority.

The second position is that we have to wait for a while, say for at least a year, taking into account several factors. The first factor is the political cycle. We currently have elections and a political struggle between different parties. So every initiative that is discussed during this time can be interpreted as a mean for a political fight between pro-government, anti-government and opposition parties. And the second one is that it is very hard for now to develop long-term priorities due to the very risky and uncertain situation in which Russia is now. Considering this factor it is also discussed that in one-two years from now the situation will become more stable and predictable and in such environment it is easier to develop a long-term strategy.

So, with these two positions, I think, the government will choose something in the middle. We will wait for one year discussing the strategy but start to develop it right now.

RD: Now let's turn to the more specific sphere which you are managing. How would you describe the situation with development of innovation in Russia in general? What are the successes and failures in this field? What are the main obstacles the field is facing?

O.F.: The current situation as economists like to say is a matter of two hands: on one hand and on the other. On the one hand, we see, I would say, a very successful movement of start-ups and we actually have been witnessing the rise of start-up activities for the last four-five years.

All of these started to happen with the development of Russian institutions aimed at helping start-ups to exist and grow; I mean here Skolkovo, Russian Venture Company, Rosnano and the Foundation for Assistance to Small and Medium sizes enterprises (SME) in high-tech. All of them are helping young entrepreneurs to start up, to find venture capital or seed capital or business angels. This movement I would say is very good and we are very optimistic about that.

But on the other hand we have a relatively bad, let's say honestly, a bad business environment. When we are talking about small and medium-size innovative companies, first of all they are small companies and they also perform in the same business climate as the other small companies perform. So we have red tape and also have many restrictions in our environmental, technical and security regulations, and it is very hard for them to get access to finance to banks on affordable rates, etc.

So we have here two tendencies and they collide because when we see start-ups, which are relatively successful, then they face the reality of the Russian business climate. As a result, some of them survive, some of them go elsewhere and some of them just die.

And this is a serious challenge for the Russian government and for the Russian economy because we of course will move on with the further development of specific innovation ecosystem but the first priority is to enhance overall business climate for start-ups in Russia to become world-class, or at least, industry leaders.

RD: The development of innovation is directly connected with the amount of investment going there. Lack of investment in Russia it is one of the major issues, especially considering the current political situation. How to solve this issue of lack of investments?

O.F.: Two points here. The first one is specific investments for start-ups, which are provided through governmental funds, venture capital funds and grants from several Russian institutions. So on the stage of a young start-up, teams can get necessary financing to get their own project. But when they go out of the techno parks and business incubators into real life and try to find, let's say, financing from banks or microfinancing organizations - this is the stage where they face real problems.

So we develop several more measures to support not just small innovative companies but also small and medium size companies as a whole. For example, the Corporation for Support for Small and Medium Size Enterprises (SMEs) which is created on the basis of the Agency for Credit Guarantees (formed a year ago and provided guarantees for loans for the SMEs).

These guarantees will be supported by guarantees by financing from SME-Bank (under Vneshekonombank, a.k.a. VEB), which is also becoming subordinate to this Corporation. This Corporation will be responsible for more instruments of support for these SMEs.

RD: There is an opinion that government is a bad investor and the Russian government is an even worse investor. But on the other hand it is the only guarantor of stability for investors. Why is it so?  How do you think then the government should build its policy to improve the situation with investment in Russia.

O.F.: Frankly speaking, the Russian government relatively seldom invests by itself directly in businesses. It has many state-owned corporations and it is a problem in itself because the government does not perform itself but, rather, through the state-owned corporations.

If we are talking about direct investments, let's say in innovative companies, the government allocates funds through developing institutions, most of which have requirement to have outside private investment to invest into companies. For example, Skolkovo Foundation, Rosnano they jointly invest with private investors into particular companies and Russian Venture Company provides funds for private venture capitalists to invest into particular innovative companies. So these instruments and tools which government possesses we consider truly market-oriented as they combine state funds with private sector funds.

There are also several tools that allow the government to invest directly like federal targeted programs, however they mainly targeted at infrastructure development. It is a necessary investment but we also consider them as not so effective as they could be and, therefore, in this sense, we introduce internationally recognized instruments like Public Private Partnerships (PPP), concessions and so on which help to ensure that infrastructure is also built with the private financing and under private management.

RD: Talking about start-ups and SMEs, it is quite obvious that the Russian economy is dominated by huge corporations with big state participation, which makes it hard for small and medium companies to get to the market because big companies totally dominate them in terms of innovations, amount of investments and resources they have. Do you think it is bad for the economy and if yes, how it can be improved?

O.F.: Well, actually there is no direct collision between huge companies and SMEs because it is hard to say that, let's say, Gazprom is preventing a SME from entering the market for gas development. But if we are talking about the combination of resources of huge state-owned companies and SMEs, what can be done?

Every state-owned corporation and especially huge ones have an obligation since the last year to procure a particular part of their goods and services from the SMEs. 10 percent of all procurement must be done directly through SMEs and 18 percent overall. And now we are thinking about raising this rate during next several years as it is a good motivation for both huge companies, which can develop their own ecosystem, and for SMEs to have demand for their goods and services from the huge corporations. This is eventually a win-win situation for both.

RD: There are more and more start-ups leaving the country for the U.S. or Europe. Some officials say it is a natural process and it does not say anything about a bad investment environment or complex political situation in the country. How do you assess this view?

O.F.: Firstly, I do not have any statistical data that their number is rising because during previous years we also had this movement and, honestly speaking, some part of this flow is objective because some start-ups just do not have any market in Russia. They have markets in Europe, in Asia because they develop particular products and technologies aimed specifically at those markets but it is not the main share of start-ups that are leaving Russia. We really consider that the majority of the start-ups leaving do so because of the poor business climate, lack of economic stability and unpredictable institutions. That is a problem.

RD: Why should foreigners or anyone at all invest in Russian start-ups and innovations?

O.F.: There are a number of reasons. First of all, because of the brilliant human capital, as the level of technical sciences in Russia is still very high and we have a lot of brilliant minds. Russian students and scholars win many of the natural sciences international contests. Russia has prominent scientific schools not only in Moscow and St. Petersburg but also in Tomsk, Novosibirsk, Krasnoyarsk, etc. So, that is why investing Russia you invest into top-level scientists and science at a relatively low price.

The second reason is the size of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). If you invest in Russia, you get the market of the EEU.

The third reason - we have various instruments to support both venture capitalists who invest in Russian start-ups and for start-ups - like special economic zones, tax incentives, governmental grants and so on.

There are plenty of reasons to invest in Russia.
 
 #12
Carnegie Moscow Center
January 4, 2016
What's in Store for the Russian Economy in 2016?
By Andrey Movchan
Andrey Movchan is a senior associate and director of the Economic Policy Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center.

There is no reason to expect any serious changes in the Russian economy in 2016. The coming year is likely to see a behind-the-scenes struggle between two special interest groups: those who will profit if industries are nationalized, and those who will benefit from foreign investment.

Russia enters 2016 coming off two recession years. The country's GDP peaked at $2.15 trillion in 2013. In 2015 it will not exceed $1.2 trillion, and the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank expect GDP to decline even further in 2016. Though 2014 was not technically deemed a recession year thanks to some statistical sleight of hand, Russia's economy is now smaller than Mexico's and is only the 15th largest in the world (or 75th based on per capita GDP).

Current trends in the Russian economy can be traced back 15 years, to the beginning of Vladimir Putin's first term as president. By the time Putin took office in 2000, Russia was beginning to operate according to a rent-based economic model, with cash flows from natural resource exports increasingly consolidated in the hands of a small group of people closely tied to the Kremlin. Over the next twelve years, this model predominated. Budget revenues, gold and hard currency reserve volumes, GDP growth, and the exchange rate all began to correlate directly with oil prices.

Dutch disease was partly to blame. Russia could not escape the negative side effects of a booming natural resource sector despite enacting stringent measures to sterilize the money supply, and amassing gold and hard currency reserves that amounted to more than 33 percent of GDP. Foreign investment and credits flowed into the economy, but unlike "domestic" cash flows-which were largely tied up in U.S. securities-this money supply was expensive and sucked revenues out of the economy. At the peak of Russia's Dutch disease in 2013, the market-based exchange rate and the inflation-adjusted exchange rate differed by 50 percent.

Economic development was also crippled by the destruction of institutions, corruption, and the absence of legal protection for businessmen and investors. Moreover, the  investment of petrodollar revenue streams into non-oil businesses began to decline sharply in 2009. Following a brief recovery from 2010 to 2012, GDP growth began to decelerate by 1.5 percent per year as a result of dwindling investment and shrinking capital expenses, even with petrodollars rolling in and the state openly embracing foreign investment. Structural issues quickly became visible at the macro-level, as the growing monopolization of the Russian economy and its dependence on state-controlled behemoths such as Gazprom, Rosneft, and Russian Railways led to high inflation.

Confident that oil would remain expensive and in demand in Europe in the long run, the Kremlin used primitive tactics to maintaining high approval ratings when stagnation began to set in. It raised wages in the bloated public sector (which accounts for 38 percent of Russia's labor force) faster than the pace of GDP and productivity. It increased social security benefits unreasonably quickly. It spent budget funds ineffectively and irresponsibly. In 2013, wages in Russia rose by double digits and tariffs increased by more than 8 percent, even though GDP hardly grew at all. At the same time, investment, capital construction, and exports all declined.

In 2014, the shock of falling oil prices began to exacerbate Russia's stagnation. This shock curtailed the country's inordinate consumer consumption.The plunge in Russian GDP was less a reflection of reduced production value in the resource sector than of falling imports, and decreased spending by households and companies. The oil shock softened Russia's skid into stagflation, while measures taken by the Central Bank kept gold and hard currency reserves sufficiently high, which allowed the ruble to lose half of its value compared to the U.S. dollar, and offset the Dutch disease that had ailed the country since 2005.

Low oil prices in 2015 ravaged all of Russia's key economic indicators. Demand for durable goods shrank by almost half, imports plummeted 35 percent, trade turnover in rubles fell almost 12 percent, and foreign investment-which had fallen to almost zero in 2014-was nonexistent in 2015. A GDP decline of about 3-5 percent in real terms will be accompanied by inflation of at least 14-16 percent when all is said and done in 2015.

Nevertheless, Russia enters the New Year having nearly recovered from the effects of declining oil prices. Its gold and hard currency reserves are equivalent to roughly two years of imports, the ruble exchange rate is relatively stable, and inflation is gradually declining. Of course, the consequences of fifteen years of irresponsible economic policies won't just disappear. Russia still has an undiversified rent-based economy with no institutional, technological, or demographic engines of growth.

Having survived the oil shock, Russia has simply returned to its long-term trajectory of stagnation, only now with a much smaller economy.

Still, 2016 promises to be even worse. Poor Central Bank policies have left the banking industry so crippled that it risks entering a period of instability reminiscent of the financial crisis of 1998. In a best-case scenario, Sberbank President German Gref's prediction will materialize and 10 percent of Russian banks will have their licenses revoked. In a worst-case scenario, the collapse of one or two large banks will set off a chain reaction and cause panic throughout the entire banking system.

As the government has openly admitted, the two key programs it championed as panaceas for the Russian economy-import replacement and the pivot to China-are failing to yield the desired results. Import replacement is unfeasible with the unemployment rate below 5 percent and production capacity utilization at almost 90 percent. Meanwhile, China, which has never viewed Russia as a serious partner (Russia's share of trade in the Asia-Pacific Region is 1 percent) has more important issues to deal with than a philanthropic pet project on its northern border.

The Russian government has thus far taken a wait-and-see approach to the economy. The 2016 budget leaves no hope for reform or for the development of economic alternatives to natural resources. Still, the government understands that it may face a crisis in the coming year, and is already openly discussing whether to substantially raise taxes on Russia's remaining businesses and individuals (which would certainly intensify the recession and possibly reduce the tax base) or make significant cuts in social spending (which could spark mass unrest). It will be increasingly difficult for the government to resist the temptation to depart from its monetarist policies embracing the free movement of capital, market exchange rates, and limits on cash issues.

Russia certainly has enough reserves and economic inertia to make it through 2016, so there is no reason to expect serious changes immediately. Instead, the coming year is likely to feature a behind-the-scenes struggle between two special interest groups: those who will profit if industries are nationalized, and those who will benefit from globalization and foreign investment. Those who benefit from state financing and are pushing for complete nationalization will be pitted against those who want to buy up Russian businesses inexpensively and privatize them. The winner will emerge sooner or later, but probably not in 2016.
 
 #13
Izvestia
December 30, 2015
Economist urges "structural changes" in Russian economy
Nikita Isayev, head of the Institute of Contemporary Economics, How to conquer the crisis. Economist Nikita Isayev on why structural changes are needed in the Russian economy

The year 2015 is drawing to a close, one of the most difficult years in Russia's recent history. For the first time since the Afghan campaign the Russian Army is conducting an operation in foreign territory, the geopolitical situation has deteriorated, and the threats from terrorism have intensified. Furthermore the rise in inflation, the instability of the rate of exchange, and the fall in oil prices are hitting Russian business and the public hard.

The economic problems of recent years have been joined by foreign policy challenges. Many foreign partners do not like Russia's active position in the international arena. The sanctions that the United States and the EU imposed against Russia, on the one hand, have made it more difficult to seek sources of economic growth and - it would be stupid not to acknowledge this - intensified the economic downturn. On the other hand, the Russian authorities and society are left with no option - the Russian economy must be diversified. And the sources of growth should be not hydrocarbons but small and medium-sized business and new technologies.

Today President Vladimir Putin enjoys a high level of confidence among the public. This level of unity among citizens has not existed at any stage in the recent history of the country's development, not even in the early 2000s. Although at that time Putin was already head of state, the consequences of the "privatization economy" reduced the level of confidence in the authorities. Of course, the unity of the civil society that we are observing today is much more "honest" than the unity of society in the Soviet state.

Only one thing can fragment Russian society - inaction or erroneous decisions by representatives of the political elites in Russia. A high level of confidence in the authorities coupled with problems in the economy amount to a suitable moment for reforms.

When representatives of the authorities, criticizing the opposition, assert that the opposition only knows how to criticize, it is partly true. To be fair, it must be noted that problems do exist within the country. The list of them is unfortunately continuing to grow along with the widening of the economic crisis, which is not stopping/has not ended/has not "bottomed out," as certain ministers and vice premiers are saying. The economic crisis is intensifying. And it is undoubtedly necessary to point to the problem areas.

Russia is having difficulty emerging from the crisis largely because it is not managing to impose order in its own home. To clear up the mess that was created by companies and oligarchs clinging onto orders, contracts, and raw materials markets while forgetting national interests. The endless corruption scandals, the kickbacks, and the inaction of officials at the local level are causing ever increasing irritation among the civil society.

Here are just a few questions for the present government. Why are reforms in Russia only a pretext for increasing the taxation burden? Who will worry about a decent life for our old people, whose social provision has been devoured by real inflation of 50-60 per cent, while the Finance Ministry is not even capable of index-linking pensions in accordance with the level of inflation? How come it is entrepreneurs who are sitting in the prisons for nonpayment (not always proven) of taxes, rather than the embezzlers of state funds? Who is skimming off a margin from the anticrisis trillions for the restoration of the economy? How can the management of the government be entrusted to a person who is not capable of making independent decisions?

An anticrisis plan must be formulated. At the February economic forum in Krasnoyarsk proposals for an anticrisis plan should be discussed without fail. What should go into this plan? First, proposals for changing budget policy with the emphasis on the development of human capital as well as small and medium-sized business. Second, we must try to find additional sources of income for the budget system in order to preserve the reserve funds. The existence of these funds is a guarantee of macroeconomic stability, and hence the stability of the entire economy.

It is also necessary to offer the president a strategy for the socioeconomic development of Russia. In this context the horizon for planning the long-term strategy should be a period of more than 10-15 years. Russia must learn to plan development 70-80 years ahead, as is done in both China and the United States.

Despite the fact that the state will never be a more effective owner than representatives of business, it is the state that has a duty to control property that concerns the citizens of our country. This applies first and foremost to oil and gas, to natural resources. The country's wealth should become a genuine popular asset with a clear and transparent system of control, a system of replaceability of leaders, management, and regional representatives. With the reasonable and fair awarding of bonuses. The way in which this is abused by the current leaders of state corporations rightly annoys society. It is necessary to formulate and introduce a single system of accountability, of evaluation of the effectiveness of the activities of managers of state companies. To make provision for accountability and punishment for mistakes in management and for abuses. The citizens of our country owe these resources to their forebears, who opened up, united, and annexed lands to form part of Russia together with the wealth that was and is buried within these lands.

Russia has a duty to have an extremely strong economic force in the shape of the military industrial complex. It should be managed according to an extremely tough classical system where corruption, slovenliness, and sabotage are cauterized. A further strengthening of the prestige of the profession of officer in the Russian Army is also necessary.

In all the other sectors of the economy the state should ensure maximum freedom. It is necessary to seek a further lowering of administrative barriers, the elimination of entrepreneurs' dependence on the arbitrary will of bureaucrats, and the guaranteed observance of legal guarantees at every level of power. At the same time there should be no excesses - granting excessive, uncontrolled freedom or, on the contrary, strengthening the influence of state control could become a source of social tension.

Despite the problems in the economy, the authorities have a duty to fulfil their social commitments. Concern for pensioners and poorly off citizens and free high-quality education and medicine should be the priority in practice, not just in words.

The further development of the economy is impossible without a reform of budgetary relationships. The federal government should transfer some of the taxation sources of revenue to regions and municipalities so that regional and local authorities can effectively carry out the tasks entrusted to them - the development of primary and secondary education and health care, highway maintenance, the provision of amenities. At the same time the regional and municipal authorities should more actively uphold their interests at the level of the government, the State Duma, and the Federation Council. At the moment the place of conscious citizens has been taken by "tame" public organizations such as the All-Russia Congress of Municipal Formations and the All-Russia Local Government Council. Their members are deputies of local assemblies and representatives of local self-government bodies who do not see the problems and are restricted in their actions because of the system of appointments.

Let me emphasize again. Russia is at an extremely important, key point in its development. The Russian economy needs structural changes.


 
 #14
Voice of America
January 6, 2016
Russian Economy Killers: Oil and Sanctions
by Bernard Shusman

Russian President Vladimir Putin gets a bad report card, even a failing grade, for his handling of the economic crisis in his country, according to 27 percent of analysts who participated in a major survey conducted by Bloomberg Business.

These are hard times in Russia, with the collapse in oil prices, economic sanctions against the country for its actions in Ukraine, the collapse of the ruble and significantly impaired economic growth.

Russia's growth started to decline rapidly in the first quarter of 2012, well before oil prices fell or economic sanctions took hold. The World Bank estimates that by 2017, Russia's GDP will be smaller than it was in 2012.

Russia's former finance minister, Alexei Kudrin, says he believes the economy is likely to decline in 2016, although he thinks growth is possible in 2017.
Others see growth even earlier.

"The worst, I think, is over at this point," said world-renowned Russian expert Timothy Frye of Columbia University's Harriman Institute. "From 2012 to 2015, economic growth in Russia decelerated at a rate of around 1.5 to 2 percent a year. The last quarter, we've seen the economy start to stabilize and adjust to the new reality of lower oil prices.

"So, although the consensus forecasts are for around zero or around 0.5 percent or maybe 1 percent growth in the coming year, what's really concerning about the economy going forward is that nobody is predicting rates of economic growth beyond 1 percent, 2 percent, barring some really significant change in government policy," he added.

Frye believes that people don't expect those government policies to change very much because they would come at great political cost.
Government pressure

So what to do about it?

There has been a lot of arm-twisting by the Russian government to have major industries, such as Gazprom and Rosneft, limit their foreign currency holdings to help prop up the ruble.

The government also has been pushing for help from the oligarchs who have made billions - primarily in the oil and gas industries - since they were privatized.

But many interest groups in Russia have distinctly different views about nationalization in the economy, said Frye, who also teaches at a university in Moscow.

"There are a lot of Russian companies that are suffering because of the sanctions," he said, "but there are also some companies in Russia that are benefiting from Russia's turning away from the global economy.  For example, agriculture is a sector that has benefited somewhat from the ban on European food goods being brought into Russia, and they've experienced some moderate rates of economic growth."

Investing across borders

This also applies to private foreign investment.

For many Russian billionaires, there has been no better investment than real estate in London, New York and Paris.

Hundreds of millions of dollars have left Russia and wound up in apartments and condos, especially in New York's strip of high-rise buildings along 57th Street and in the Time Warner Center. Many are absentee landlords who use the properties for rental income.

According to one report, Russian billionaire Dmitry Rybolovlev paid $88 million for a penthouse just off New York's Central Park. Neighbors complain that such a purchase by foreign investors drives up real estate prices in cities the purchasers have no intention of living in.

Ed Mermelstein, an international investment lawyer, helps Russian oligarchs in their quest for investments in New York - primarily real estate.

His view is that the Putin government is putting pressure on people who are moving money out of Russia.

"The idea [of the Russian government] is to, in many cases, repatriate much of the funds that have left Russia," he said. "In many cases, the way they have left the country is not something the government was very happy about in hindsight."

It is clear, however, that new money is not leaving Russia, Mermelstein added.

Putin's poll ratings are still sky-high in Russia. But if the economy continues to drag, such high poll numbers could be short-lived.

 
 #15
Gazeta.ru
December 30, 2015
Russian editorial sees 2015 economic, political gloom continuing into 2016
Editorial
Khaki-coloured Christmas tree. What kind of country we will be returning to after the New Year holidays

There is a folk saying that how you greet the New Year will also be how you say goodbye to it. The astonishing zigzags of Russian foreign policy in recent years - from the annexation of Crimea to the military operation in Syria - prevent it from being directly applied to the entire country. It is hard to even imagine what else our leaders will dream up in the coming year and how our "Western partners" will respond. Nevertheless the crucial trends are clear. The only question is in what specific forms they will be embodied.

Vladimir Putin gave Milana Mikheyeva, a five-year-old from the village of Aeroport (Tomsk Region), a New Year gift of a photograph of himself and a Russian flag. In her mother's words, the little girl had herself asked the president about this and had sent him a letter. Total politicization, which has not bypassed even children, is perhaps the main result of recent years. This is not even a personality cult, rather a nationwide game of playing at being a great power.

When a few years ago we were shown on television unfortunate American soldiers greeting Christmas in distant Iraq, we could not even contemplate that soon the television would be showing our guys greeting the New Year in those same lands. Our propaganda was inclined to see only dangerous games by the American "military machine" in the fact that the war in the Near East was by no means coming to an end. As became clear this year, we ourselves are not averse to playing that game.

War has become our everyday political life, and our spreading Christmas trees are now standing next to Syrian palm trees.

What can we expect next?

In a couple of head-spinning autumn months in the outgoing year Turkey, which had been regarded as almost our main potential ally at the crossroads between Europe and Asia, turned into an even worse enemy than Ukraine and the United States. Admittedly the reciprocal tension has apparently stopped growing in recent weeks, but there are no signs of a de-escalation.

The problems between the two countries will increase. One way or another Turkey will see our Syrian operation as interference in a zone of its strategic interests, in approximately the same way that we see any appearance of Western forces close to our borders. The ill-starred Turkish Stream project might have reconciled our countries, but here we are no longer willing to make concessions and overpay Ankara for transit services.

But in fact the main thing is that the systems of power in both of our countries are very similar in their utilization of hard-line foreign policy rhetoric to strengthen their position within the country. And so a new clash is possible at almost any time.

Ukraine will also definitely remind us of its existence. It has been officially acknowledged that implementation of the second Minsk agreements is being deferred until 2016, but it appears that none of the parties seriously believe that they will ever be implemented at all.

For everyone Donbass [Donets Basin] has become a bargaining chip in their own games. For Russia and the West in their geopolitical showdown. While for Kiev it has turned into a universal explanation for why the reforms promised by the Maydan are not being successfully implemented in any way.

Obviously none of these games is going to end in the immediate future, and so Donbass will not be seeing a peaceful life for a long time yet. And the biggest danger here is that the trigger for a new explosion may turn out to be actions by any almost uncontrolled group to which the other side would have to respond nevertheless.

The main thing is that the country seems to have gone crazy:

The utilization of military methods for resolving a conflict no longer scares it, and both its allies and its foes are prepared to exploit this.

Some in search of help, and others in the hope of attrition for our country. So in the future too we will "not abandon our friends" throughout the world but our "friends" will come under increasingly severe pressure.

And all of this is against the backdrop of by no means the most favourable forecasts for the oil price, on which the state of our economy is directly dependent. Saudi Arabia's 2016 budget has been calculated on the basis of "very low prices" for oil - an average weighted price of 29 dollars a barrel has been factored in. Meanwhile the Russian government is still counting on 50 dollars [per barrel]. The price has now reached what wits joke is the normal temperature for the human body - 36 dollars - and has definitely no intention of increasing.

What are we going to do given such an oil price and a dollar exchange rate that clearly might leap to R80-90?

The president is promising to respond to the sanctions and the unfavourable raw-material market conditions by broadening freedom of enterprise.

But as yet we can see only measures to toughen currency regulation and the abandonment of indexation for the pensions of working pensioners, which have followed in the wake of the introduction of the Platon system for truckers and the expansion of fee-charging parking lots in the capital. An increase in the tax burden on small businesses was successfully fended off only with difficulty. That is to say, despite all the promises, the regime is apparently set on offsetting the costs out of the population's pockets. And there are no particular grounds for hoping for fundamental changes to this policy in the coming year either.

A possible result may be an increase in the mood of protest, which will probably not turn into a centralized protest but will create a feeling of almost constant tension - like the truckers' protests, the citizens' protest rallies against those same fee-charging parking lots, and the demonstrations by doctors and teachers.

Parliamentary elections are scheduled for September 2016, and so the backstage struggle may intensify. For systems of the Russian type elections are always a serious challenge: On the one hand it is desirable to achieve total victory, while on the other achieving this as quietly as possible, without suspicions of massive violations.

Given the considerable risk that the new year will be overshadowed by new terrorist acts - Islamists have now identified pretty clearly that they now regard Russia as their main enemy - the authorities will also be tempted to tighten the screws even further. But do they have sufficient administrative resources for this?

Right now everything looks as if in 10 days' time we will most likely be returning to the same times to which we will be saying goodbye on New Year's Eve.

And unfortunately, this is still not they worst-case scenario.

But now, on the eve of New Year, one would very much like to hope that its onset will see an end to these grown-up games rather than to champagne and mandarin oranges. And to see most children receiving Lego or dolls as a gift, as in the old days, rather than a portrait of the president.
 
 #16
Consortiumnews.com
January 5, 2016
Failed US Sanctions on Russia
By Gilbert Doctorow
Gilbert Doctorow is the European Coordinator, American Committee for East West Accord, Ltd. His latest book Does Russia Have a Future?(August 2015) is available in paperback and e-book from Amazon.com and affiliated websites.

The U.S. mainstream media excludes almost all reporting and analysis that challenges the neocon/liberal-interventionist "group think" about the supposed Russian threat, but once in awhile a backhand acknowledgement of reality slips through, as Gilbert Doctorow was surprised to find.

The newest issue of Foreign Affairs continues to show a significant drop-off of professionalism in the mostly Russia-phobic essays at the flagship American magazine on international relations. Yet as low-grade as these essays may be, one of them is highly damaging to the dominant Washington narrative against Vladimir Putin's Russia. [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2015-12-14/not-so-smart-sanctions]

Emma Ashford, a visiting research fellow at the neoliberal/libertarian Cato Institute, produced an essay that is a jumble of statistics and arguments, many of them contradictory, and all of them set out without prioritization. The author clearly lacks experience and judgment. But what makes this essay newsworthy is that hit or miss the author is going up against the U.S. establishment and directly calling for an end to U.S. sanctions against Russia.

If I may sequence her arguments properly, the sanctions a) have been totally useless in changing Russian foreign and military policy in the directions desired by the U.S., b) they have caused very little damage to the Russian economy but much harm to immediate European and American economic interests, and c) they have caused the Russians to join with other BRICS members in creating institutions and pursuing financial practices that ultimately will undermine U.S. global hegemony, thereby compromising America's future.

Along the way, Ashford agrees with IMF predictions that "even with continued low oil prices ... growth will return to the Russian economy in 2016." This means the sectoral prohibitions have not impaired the economy in the ways intended.

The author notes that Moscow circumvented the sanctions partly by turning to China, where it concluded a $400 billion gas deal, a 150 billion yuan currency swap and other major agreements. Moreover, the sanctions on individual targeted companies have been compensated by largess from the Kremlin so as to attenuate any losses.

And the travel bans and property arrests on targeted members of the elite have only been a minor nuisance, which never provoked them to turn against their president. Looking to the future, Ashford does not expect the sanctions to eventually work, calling that "wishful thinking."

The essay goes off the rails when Ashford tries to explain the "costs of containment" to the U.S. and its allies in Europe, which she characterizes as "major." Next we read that in Europe the European Commission estimates that sanctions cut growth by 0.3 per cent of GDP in 2015. Perhaps even she understands that is not much, so Ashford tries again by citing predictions from the Austrian Institute of Economic Research that continuing the sanctions on Russia may cost Europe "over 90 billion euros in export revenue and more than two million jobs over the next few years."  Predictions about the "next few years" are not the kind of hard data that normally moves politicians.

And she trots out the widely cited figure of 400,000 German jobs that are at risk over sanctions. Still more vaguely, she speaks of how major European banks like Soci�t� G�n�rale in France and Raiffeisen in Austria may be destabilized and require state bailouts if their large loans to Russian concerns become uncollectible due to borrowers' insolvency.  Turning to the U.S., Ashford directs attention to the administrative and legal costs that American banks have to bear as they enforce regulations calling for freezing and managing the assets of sanctioned individuals. They have had to hire additional legal and technical staff to ensure they are in conformity with the myriad of sanctions and thus avoid rippling penalties from the federal authorities for the least error of execution. At what cost? Not a word, although that is obviously a difficult measure to quantify.

Meanwhile U.S. energy companies are suffering foregone (not specified) profits by being unable to pursue the large exploration and production contracts they had concluded with Russian counterparts. And they may possibly lose the multi-billion-dollar investments they made in such projects before the sanctions came into effect. Still, there is no reason to see any of this as crippling punishment for U.S. energy companies.

I think it is fairly obvious that all of the foregoing "costs" for the U.S. and its allies are not much more than mosquito bites. By presenting them as she does, the author shows lack of discernment in what constitutes proof to justify a dramatic change in direction of a fundamental foreign policy stand by the U.S.

But her lapse of professionalism does not end there: Ashford moves on, falling into glaring logical inconsistencies. We are told that the sanctions "may harm European energy security." Specifically, Ashford cites a prediction from Cambridge Energy Research Associates that as a result of sanctions Russian oil production may drop from 10.5 million barrels a day today to 7.6 million barrels in 2025.

This does not jibe with her remarks earlier in the essay on how the Russians were circumventing sanctions: "Russia has been able to find loopholes ....[and] in order to obtain access to Arctic drilling equipment and expertise, Rosneft acquired 30 percent of the North Atlantic drilling projects belonging to the Norwegian company Statoil."

Nor does this jibe with her assertion at the end of her essay when setting out her recommendations on what punitive measures should replace sanctions if we accept that they have been a failure. There she urges the U.S. to export oil and liquefied natural gas to Europe so as "to provide Europe with an alternative source of energy" and "to starve the Russian state of revenue." This would, she says "allow European states to wean themselves off Russian oil and gas."

One of these positions may be correct, but they cannot all be correct, and it should not be up to the reader to choose from this Chinese restaurant menu.

Given the unimpressive nature of Ashford's arguments against sanctions coming from their past and present economic consequences, her real knock-out blow against sanctions comes in the completely different and unquantifiable area of argumentation that is political and geopolitical. She faults the sanctions for prompting a "rally round the flag" phenomenon in Russia that has, perversely, raised President Putin's approval rating from 63 percent in March 2014 when Russia took possession of Crimea to 88 percent in October 2015. His power, which theoretically should have been shaken by the U.S. and E.U. sanctions, has instead consolidated.

The sanctions also encouraged Russia to take actions to protect its financial institutions that ultimately will threaten the global economic influence of the United States. These measures include the creation of an alternative international payment system to SWIFT, the creation of a domestic credit-card clearing house that challenges Visa and MasterCard, and the creation of a BRICS development bank that duplicates the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.

The net effect of these actions, once implemented, will be to cause the United States "to have a harder time employing economic statecraft," by which she means imposing crippling financial sanctions on other states as they succeeded in doing to Iran. In the same vein, Ashford sees a threat in Russia's shift away from trading in dollars.

Ashford's recommendation, the true punch-line of the article, is that "the United States should cut its losses and unilaterally lift the majority of the sanctions on Russia." This advice surely will set off alarms within the Beltway.

In that sense, Ashford's essay may have dealt even a harder blow against Washington's "sanction Russia" consensus than did John Mearsheimer's iconoclastic Foreign Affairs article from 2014, "Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West's Fault," a top-drawer essay that caused dyspeptic fits and sparked a lively debate in the follow-on issue of the magazine.
 
 #17
The American Conservative
www.theamericanconservative.com
The Distortion of Russia
One does not need to love Vladimir Putin to appreciate that Washington shares interests with Moscow.
By PHILIP GIRALDI
Philip Giraldi, a former CIA officer, is executive director of the Council for the National Interest.

With relations between Washington and Moscow at a low ebb, can simply talking to Russians provide hope that there might still be room for cooperation?

I recently returned from spending a few days in Moscow, speaking at a conference hosted by RT International, Russia's global television news service. One of the few major countries I have never visited, Russia proved to be quite a pleasant surprise. Moscow was modern, clean and far removed from its gray socialist roots, a very "European" city in every sense. As my wife and I were driven into the city from the airport, the road turned on a bend in the Moscow River and suddenly the Kremlin walls, surmounted by the golden domes of the churches within appeared bathed in late afternoon sunlight. It was a once in a lifetime vision combining place, time and context that can be unforgettable, like the first time one recalls Gibbon's words while looking out over the Roman Forum.

Admittedly, we conference attendees were being entertained in VIP style, to include a fabulous gala dinner with entertainment provided by the Russian Army Chorus and an opera singer performing pieces from Borodin's Polovtsian dancers. Mikhail Gorbachev and Paata Shevardnadze were in attendance and President Vladimir Putin was a surprise speaker. The sponsors worked hard to create a good impression for the speakers, who came from twelve countries, and in that they were eminently successful as their hospitality was exceptional.

Did we know we were being manipulated? Of course, but we were careful not to regurgitate propaganda. On my panel, "Information, Messages, Politics: the Shape-Shifting Powers of Today's World," Wikileaks founder Julian Assange spoke by video link from the Ecuadorean Embassy in London.

I argued that security and privacy could indeed coexist in most countries but that it would require governments to reign in the extralegal powers that they have accumulated over the past fifteen years in their respective "wars on terror" and the creation of a clearly defined set of rules for police intervention into one's privacy. Namely, one must go back to the old practice in many countries requiring convincing a judge to issue a warrant or the equivalent to undertake a clearly defined limited action based on probable cause. And, I added, the judge should work in consultation with something like an ombudsman, a non-government adviser, whose sole responsibility would be to make the case for not violating someone's civil liberties. I concluded pessimistically that I see no chance of any American president doing the right thing, noting that President Barack Obama had basically rejected reasonable corrections on surveillance proposed during the past year.

I should perhaps unnecessarily point out that no speaker at the conference was coached in any way to adhere to a line, while many of the enduring insights derived from the experience were obtained from mixing with the Russian people. That was relatively easy to do because, even though my Russian is elementary, Russians have for some time been learning English in their schools from the first grade on up and are, unlike Americans, very well informed on what is going on in the world.

In my previous life I encountered many Russians overseas and so was prepared to note yet again that they are by and large like what most Americans believe Americans to be-hard working, friendly and somewhat chatty. Like nearly everyone else on this planet, the talk of Russians turns quickly to their children, schools, where they live and what kind of lives they want to have. They are quick to produce photos of their pet dogs and cats. They are also increasingly religious, with the Russian Orthodox church playing a leading role in the state. Christmas lights were on display everywhere, churches destroyed by Stalin are being rebuilt and there was even a bustling Christmas Market in Red Square.

But there was also a dark side that kept surfacing. Both ordinary Russians and those who are journalists or teachers kept coming around to the same issue: why does the United States hate Russians so much and why does the American press seemingly have nothing good to say about them? They were questions I could not answer in any coherent way. I observed somewhat defensively that Russia under Vladimir Putin had become more authoritarian, that the media has lost much of its freedom and that the old Yeltsin style gross systematic corruption has reportedly been replaced by a newer, more subtle cronyism version of something similar. And I mentioned both Crimea and Ukraine as sometimes mishandled in the government's undeniable agitprop while also conceding that the Russian case was legitimate on many levels. I expressed my own view that the crisis had been engineered by Washington in the first place, seeking to bring about regime change in Kiev. Concerning RT International itself, I mentioned to several of its spokesmen and reporters that its coverage was frequently unreliable on subjects that are close to home as it was skewed to adhere to the government line. They did not disagree with me.

But somehow none of the back and forth seemed to answer the question and in retrospect I don't think I have a good response. President Vladimir Putin has numerous critics inside Russia but he remains wildly popular and is viewed as a genuine nationalist of the old school, meaning that for most citizens he is perceived as behaving in terms of Russia's actual interests. That has made him an appealing figure on the world stage. A recent opinion poll in the United Kingdom revealed that four out of five Britons would vote for Putin rather than their own Prime Minister David Cameron if given the choice. I wonder how a similar poll would play out in the U.S. as the Obama Administration does little to inspire, believing as it does in globalism rather than nationalism. Nor does it admit to many genuine national interests in foreign policy instead choosing to encourage tokenism combined with a bizarre desire for constant agitation to create new democracies.

As for the negativity regarding Russia, to be sure there are many older Americans entrenched in the media and government as well as in the plentitude of think tanks who will always regard Russia as the enemy. And then there are the more cunning types who always need the threat of an enemy to keep their well-paid jobs in the government itself and also within the punditry, both of which rely on the health and well-being of the military-industrial-congressional complex. And there will always be reflexive jingoists like Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham.

But all that hardly explains why there appears to be little understanding in the media and inside the Beltway that a good relationship with Russia is indispensable, and not only because Moscow has the power to incinerate the United States if it is ever backed into a corner and motivated to do so. Russia has proven to be a good partner in Syria where it negotiated and carried out Damascus's elimination of its chemical weapons in early 2014. It is also the driving force behind current negotiations to end the conflict completely. It has consistently been a reliable ally against terrorism, in recognition of its own vulnerability to ISIS and other Islamic militants. What Russia's elected leaders do inside their own country should be largely irrelevant to America's interests, but somehow the cart has been put before the horse, a practice not uncommon in the U.S. media.

Other speakers at the conference were as dismayed as I was by the negativity towards Russia and also provided some additional insights into why Americans just don't get it. One European speaker joked that U.S.A. could stand for United States of Amnesia in that developments elsewhere in the world are subjected to a superficial 24-hour news cycle before being completely forgotten. Professor Peter Kuznick of American University observed that students in the U.S. rank low on science and math scores, which makes the news, but the area in which their scores are actually lowest is history. He quizzed a class of top students on the Second World War and asked how many Americans died in the conflict. The response was 90,000, which is nearly 300,000 short of the true number. How many Russians? The answer was about 100,000, which is 27,900,000 short. Not knowing something about that number means not understanding what motivates Russia. Kuznick observed that roughly 3,000 Americans died on 9/11. To use the numbers of 9/11 as a basis for appreciating the impact of the Russian war deaths would require the U.S. to experience a 9/11 attack every day for the next 24 years.

But there maybe is hope. I returned to Washington to read a short New York Times article by Professor Jeffrey Sommers of the University of Wisconsin:

"The Syrian crisis presents an opportunity for a real 'reset' with U.S.-Russia relations. Policy and opinion makers in both countries poorly understand each other... maintaining progress can only advance in a stable world, not through upending states from Egypt, Iraq, Libya to Syria, while hoping democracy follows... The architect of U.S. Cold War policy, George Kennan, warned at the end of his life, in 1998, that President Clinton's policy of advancing NATO east risked war... It's clear Putin never intended to seize Ukraine, or even the Donbass. Instead, Putin's actions signaled that the status quo over NATO's forward movement must change. The Donbass was his leverage. Putin is a tough nationalist, but rather than fueling the fire of Russian revanchism, Putin is actually the one carefully dousing those flames. Putin wants partnership with the West, but is not willing to be its supplicant... The United States and Russia will not reconcile their worldviews soon. Yet they can pursue common objectives in the Syrian-ISIS crisis that over time could expedite resolution of that challenge."

One does not have to love Mother Russia or Vladimir Putin to appreciate that it is in America's interest to develop a cooperative relationship based on shared interests. Ukraine, which is every bit as corrupt as Russia if not more so, is not a vital U.S. interest while working with Russia is. The regime change in Ukraine, which was engineered by the United States, created the current crisis, not Putin. Putin several times asked for dialogue, asking only that Washington show some respect to Moscow, a reasonable plea. This year, he has stated very clearly that his country wants to work with the United States. It is an offer that should not and cannot be refused by anyone who genuinely cares for the United States of America and the American people.
 
 #18
www.project-syndicate.org
January 5, 2016
Can America and Russia Cooperate in Syria?
By Michael McFaul
Michael McFaul, US Ambassador to the Russian Federation from 2012 to 2014, is Professor of Political Science, Hoover Institution Fellow, and Director of the Freeman Spogli Institute at Stanford University.

STANFORD - President Vladimir Putin's decision to intervene in Syria marked a major turning point in Russian foreign policy in 2015. Over the last 15 years, Putin has increasingly relied on the use of military power to achieve his domestic and foreign-policy objectives, starting with the invasion of Chechnya in 1999, then of Georgia in 2008, and then of Ukraine in 2014. Putin's Syria gambit was the logical, if dramatic, next step in Russia's increasingly aggressive foreign policy.

Syria, however, is supposed to be different from these previous interventions. While Putin correctly calculated that most of the world would condemn his military actions in Chechnya, Georgia, and Ukraine, he hopes for solidarity and support from the international community for his actions in Syria.
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Pro-Kremlin commentators point to US Secretary of State John Kerry's recent trip to Moscow as proof that military intervention to fight terrorism in Syria has ended Russia's international isolation and generated new respect for its standing as a responsible global power. Russia is back, so the argument goes, because the world needs Russia.

Such conclusions are premature. In the long run, Russia could become a partner in the global fight against terrorism. And, in principle, the United States, the European Union, and countries around the world should welcome Russian cooperation in this mission. In practice, however, several key short-term issues must be resolved before the long-term goal of cooperation with Russia can be achieved.

First, Russia, which has intervened to defend its long-time client, President Bashar al-Assad, must stop bombing Syrian opposition forces supported by the US and its coalition, and start fighting the Islamic State (ISIS). In the first weeks of the Russian bombing campaign, the strategy was obvious: eliminate all third parties in the civil war and thereby force the world to choose between the lesser of two evils, Assad or ISIS.

More recently, Russian bombers have begun to attack a few ISIS targets, but the Kremlin's air campaign remains focused on other opposition forces. To be a partner with the West, Russia must change its bombing targets dramatically and permanently.

Second, Putin must engage more seriously in the international efforts to launch a political transition process in Syria. Assad cannot stay. He could serve in an interim, transitional role, as some dictators have done in other transitions from authoritarian rule. But he cannot remain in power for the simple reason that his presence only drives more volunteers to the ISIS cause.

Assad's regime has killed more people in Syria than all other groups combined. He rarely attacks ISIS terrorists, focusing his military efforts instead on other insurgents. He is not, therefore, a useful ally in the fight against terrorism.

Moreover, the vast majority of victims of Syrian government military operations are civilians, not terrorists. According to the Syrian Network for Human Rights, Assad killed 181,557 civilians between March 2011 and November 2015, while ISIS murdered 1,777 civilians in this period. If the objective in Syria is to stop the civil war, Assad should be no one's idea of a peacemaker.

As a demonstration of Russia's influence over the regime, Putin should first pressure Assad to stop killing civilians. If Putin cannot achieve this objective, there is no reason to believe that he can deliver Assad or his generals to the negotiating table.

Third, Russia must change its bombing methods. Too many civilians are dying. These types of attacks by Russia generate more inspiring footage for jihadi channels on YouTube - exactly what ISIS wants.

Fourth, Russian media must stop accusing the US of supporting ISIS. How can the US join forces with a country that makes such false claims and portrays America as the enemy?

Fifth, Putin needs to stop the flow of fighters from Russia into Syria. Even Russian estimates suggest that by September 2015, some 2,400 Russian citizens had joined ISIS.

Finally, to be a useful partner in Syria, Russia must stop expecting concessions from the US on Ukraine. Such linkage will never work.

To enable cooperation with Russia, the US and its allies also must make some adjustments - as well as some commitments. First, moderate opposition groups receiving money and weapons from the US should not be compelled to fight only ISIS. Rather, they should be able to define their own military strategies, including a focus on fighting Assad's forces as a means of pressuring the regime to negotiate. They cannot be expected to fight ISIS when Assad is attacking them.

Second, US officials must press the Kremlin to get serious about pushing for a political transition, ultimately including free and fair elections. The US and the rest of the world cannot be tempted into believing in the false promise of autocratic stability. Assad's dictatorship has produced only death, displacement, and instability over the last four years. There is no reason to expect that his regime could produce stability in the future.

Third, American leaders must be crystal clear about segregating US support for Ukraine and cooperation with Russia in Syria. Sending ambiguous signals serves no purpose.

Finally, US leaders must remain realistic about the weak prospects for successful cooperation. Russia's bombing campaign has changed little on the ground, and its pledges to support a political transition are not new. Two previous international peacemaking efforts in which Russia participated (Geneva I and Geneva II) ended in failure.

In the year ahead, the US should seek an alliance with Russia to defeat ISIS; but it should do so with no illusions about the probability of success - and real concerns about the cost of failure.
 
 #19
BBC
January 6, 2016
Russian experts cast doubt on North Korea's H-bomb claims

Russian experts have expressed doubts that the nuclear test reportedly carried out by North Korea involved a proper hydrogen bomb, the Russian media reported on 6 January.

"It's a fact that they carried out a test, but there are doubts as to whether it was a hydrogen bomb. There is no information about the physical infrastructure that the DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea] had", privately-owned Russian military news agency Interfax-AVN quoted Col-Gen Vladimir Yesin, former chief of the Main Staff of the Russian Strategic Missile Troops, saying. "I do not see a direct threat to Russia from North Korea's actions, bearing in mind our relations with them, but there is a threat for the entire world," Yesin added.

RIA Novosti (part of the state-owned International News Agency Rossiya Segodnya) quoted nuclear energy expert Aleksandr Uvarov saying it was "too early to say that North Korea has completely mastered the capability to create thermonuclear explosives".

"Judging by the published estimates of a very low yield of the explosion, the conclusion that offers itself is that one cannot speak of a test of a proper thermonuclear charge," Uvarov said. One possibility, he went on, was that it was in fact a failed test in which nuclear explosives in effect failed to go off - but in that case Pyongyang would not have made so much of the test. More likely, it was "a test of a 'normal' nuclear charge with the aim of testing out some technology for the creation of components of a proper, much more powerful thermonuclear one," Uvarov suggested.

Speaking on state-controlled Russian Channel One TV, nuclear expert Mikhail Rylov made a similar suggestion. "From professional experience, I can surmise that it was after all a normal nuclear explosion with so-called thermonuclear enhancement; this means that a nuclear bomb explosion results in the compression of a certain amount of light substances, namely tritium, with the emission of thermonuclear energy. This is, however, not a full-scale bomb. In general, I have a quiet suspicion that everything that the [North] Koreans explode is not bombs but devices," said Rylov, who is the director of the St Petersburg-based cross-sector expert certification, research and monitoring centre for nuclear and radiological safety.
 
 #20
The Atlantic Council
January 5, 2016
Putin's Fragile Popularity
BY ANDREAS UMLAND
Andreas Umland is Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation in Kyiv and general editor of the book series Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society, published by ibidem Press, Stuttgart and Hannover.

One of the mantras of today's Kremlin apologists, as well as of some self-described political realists, is that current Russian President Vladimir Putin is unusually popular among Russians. In the interest of pragmatism, they say, the West should acknowledge this allegedly hard fact and adapt its policies accordingly-i.e., try to rebuild a partnership with Russia's President. In as far as Putin appears to be an embodiment of the Russian national will, it is argued, we had better try to deeply understand and fully consider his views and plans for the world. For better or worse, Putin-as one of the texts on him claims-is "Russia's choice," and we should get used to this sociological given.

But how genuine, sustainable, and historically relevant are the impressive pro-Putin polling results continually reported by public opinion research agencies?

High rates of official public support for rulers of undemocratic systems are not unusual. The Germans, for example, once overwhelmingly supported a leader who was much more autocratic, expansionist, and aggressive than Putin. Yet should Hitler's popularity in the 1940s, even after his death, mean that we ought to have more empathy for him because the "Fuehrer" (leader) temporarily represented a large part of the German nation? One could list dozens of dictators who were praised during and shortly after their repressive rules, but many of these once-admired hyper-patriots left behind ambivalent if not catastrophic legacies. More often than not, their crimes affected not only surrounding states and ethnic minorities but also the titular nations in their own countries.

Moreover, it is difficult to establish the validity of public opinion research results under conditions of ideological monism and political repression. What does Russian polling data actually tell us? Is Putin's popularity really as high as respondents' answers suggest? How ready are citizens to openly express their political views in an authoritarian system dominated by former Soviet state security officers? Are the preferences recorded in the polls reflective of the entire gamut of respondents' worldviews? To what degree are such views shaped by plural sources of information provided by professional journalists?

Anyone who has watched political news and talk shows on the dominant Russian state television channels knows that these are not media in the Western sense of the word. The emotionality, aggression, and absurdity of the government's political TV programs-that misrepresent many international affairs events as anti-Russian plots-may be difficult for non-Russian speakers to imagine. The daily spread of domestic and foreign political hate speech, craftily formulated half-truths, and increasingly bizarre historic myths on the Kremlin-controlled television channels goes far beyond the biased interpretation or fake messages of the Kremlin's foreign media like Russia Today or Sputnik News. There is, in fact, no proper political mass journalism remaining in Russia; all of the country's far-reaching media disseminate similar m�langes of purposefully selected world news, crudely manipulated political stories, and manifestly abstruse conspiracy theories.

To be sure, Russian opposition members, decent social scientists, foreign Kremlin critics, and free-thinking intellectuals do appear on late night shows on state TV. Their carefully calibrated presence, however, functions only as decoration designed to create the impression of political pluralism and freedom of speech, and to provide a target for the numerous Kremlin apologists in the studio. Often, the judiciously selected "dissidents" on the talk shows are shouted down by the Kremlin's representatives, interrupted by the shows' moderators, or even publicly ridiculed by the Russian government's defenders. They are mere extras in a political theater play with a predetermined plot.

These and other peculiarities of public discourse in Russia today mean that Putin's high popularity rates measured by polling agencies are fragile indicators. His public support would sink rapidly under conditions of real journalism, genuine multiparty competition, and actual freedom of expression. In big cities and among younger Russians, Putin's popularity is probably lower than the available data suggests.

At the moment, Putin appears like a heroic figure in contemporary Russian history. But when the political system finally reopens, his public image will be quickly reduced to that of yet another unfortunate dictator and self-serving distractor on Russia's long road to freedom.
 
 
#21
Washington Post
January 5, 2016
Putin's anti-Obama propaganda is ugly and desperate
By Paula J. Dobriansky and David B. Rivkin Jr.
Paula J. Dobriansky was undersecretary of state for global affairs from 2001 to 2009 and is a fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. David B. Rivkin Jr. is a constitutional lawyer who served in the Justice Department and the White House under Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush.

Although international relations are not conducted under Marquess of Queensberry rules and political satire can be expected from one's foes, intensely personal attacks on foreign leaders are uncommon except in wartime. While Soviet-era anti-American propaganda could be sharp, it did not employ slurs. But in recent years racist and scatological salvos against foreign leaders have become a staple of official Russian discourse.

Turkish, German and Ukrainian officials are cast as sycophantic stooges of the United States. While slamming Ankara at a December news conference for shooting down a Russian plane that violated Turkish airspace, Russian President Vladimir Putin opined that "the Turks decided to lick the Americans in a certain place." Sergey Glaziev, a senior adviser to Putin, has called Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko "a Nazi Frankenstein," and Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin compared Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk to "a rubber doll from a sex shop."

The ugliest vilification campaign, however, has been reserved for President Obama. Anti-Obama tweets come openly from government officials. Rogozin, while commenting on Obama's 2015 State of the Union address, compared Obama to a Tuzik, Russian slang for a pathetic small dog. Irina Rodnina , a well-known Duma member, tweeted doctored images of Barack and Michelle Obama staring longingly at a banana.

Nobody in Russia gets to freelance propaganda-wise. Thus, anti-Obama rants, even when coming from prominent individuals outside government, have Putin's imprimatur. Russian media personalities, including Dmitry Kiselyov, the host of the widely viewed "News of the Week" TV roundup, often deliver racist slurs, as compiled by Mikhail Klikushin on the Observer Web magazine. Evgeniy Satanovskiy, a Russian academic and frequent guest on Kiselyov's program, recently also referred to Obama as a "monkey," prompting derisive laughter and applause from the audience. Meanwhile, the famous nationalist comedian Mikhail Zadornov regularly deploys the term "schmoe" - a slang Russian prison acronym for a person who is so debased he deserves to be defecated upon - alongside Obama's name. "Obama schmoe" has become ubiquitous enough to be scrawled on the runway of Russia's Latakia air base in Syria.

Russia's print and electronic media channels carry stories depicting Obama as lazy and incompetent. Shops sell bumper stickers, posters, T-shirts and cardboard cut-outs with images of Obama as an ape and a chimney sweep. One Russian city held a contest inviting children to kick Obama's cardboard image. Obama has been burned in effigy on numerous occasions, and zoo animals have been named after him, including a black piglet at the Volgograd zoo.

This despicable onslaught is not just the random venting of a narcissistic Kremlin leader but also an indispensable component of Putin's efforts to mobilize domestic support for his policies and enhance his standing. The fact that this propaganda campaign is working - Putin and his policies remain popular - is attributable to several factors.

First, the Kremlin controls the news and entertainment media. Journalists who have refused to toe the official line have been fired, jailed or killed. This state monopoly, particularly when combined with the palpable failure by the West to communicate effective rebuttals to Russian audiences, has enabled the regime to mold Russian perceptions on every major policy issue.

Second, these propaganda themes skillfully capitalize on nostalgia felt by the Russian people about Moscow's imperial past, which is often perceived in a highly idealized light. The repression of the Soviet and Czarist periods has been played down, and a key related theme is that Russia has always been the victim of foreign machinations and intrigue.

But Putin's propaganda campaign also bespeaks of certain desperation. The Russian economy is in free fall, buffeted by both falling oil prices and Western sanctions. Fuel shortages and the resulting disruption of deliveries of key commodities pose a particular challenge to the Kremlin. Corruption and mismanagement are rampant and have drawn the ire of the Russian people.

There is widespread labor unrest in cities where private-sector workers have not been paid for months at a time. There also have been months of strikes by long-distance truckers protesting extortionist road fees and corruption. Even fire and rescue first responders employed by the federal Ministry of Emergency Situations have not been paid in months. That emergency personnel in such major cities (and places where revolutions have started in Russia's past) as St. Petersburg and Moscow, with responsibilities for handling public protests, have gone without pay underscores the precariousness of Russia's finances and the risks it is forced to incur.

Against this backdrop, and lacking either democratic or ideological legitimacy, Putin's government is increasingly brittle. As the Kremlin doubles down on its aggressive foreign policy and increases domestic repression, it has also intensified its global propaganda efforts. Moscow has heavily invested in its broadcasting assets, with the satellite network RT being the pivotal component, giving it an unprecedented ability to reach domestic and foreign audiences.

All Americans should be outraged by the Kremlin's messaging campaign and support a robust U.S. response. To present such a response effectively to global audiences, Congress should promptly enact bipartisan legislation proposed by House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Edward R. Royce (R-Calif.) and ranking Democrat Eliot L. Engel (N.Y.) to revitalize America's public diplomacy infrastructure. Winning the global battle of ideas is an essential part of fostering a stable democratic world order. Consistent with our core values, the United States must lead in challenging Moscow's racist propaganda and highlighting the moral narrative of democracy, tolerance, human rights and rule of law.
 
 #22
Washington Free Beacon
http://freebeacon.com
January 7, 2016
U.S. General: We Have 'Hugged' the Russian Bear for Too Long
U.S. commander in Europe calls for more forces and equipment to deter 'a revanchist Russia'  
By Daniel Wiser  

The commander of U.S. forces in Europe says the United States has accommodated Russia for too long amid aggressive military actions by Moscow and a shrinking U.S. footprint in the region.

U.S. Air Force Gen. Philip M. Breedlove, who is also NATO's supreme allied commander in Europe, said that the United States had "hugged the bear" in Europe-a reference to Russia-after the fall of the Soviet Union in an attempt to promote cooperation with Moscow, the Department of Defense's news service reported on Tuesday. Breedlove recently met with U.S. Marine Corps Gen. Joseph F. Dunford Jr., the new chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the headquarters of U.S. European Command in Stuttgart, Germany.

After the rise of President Vladimir Putin, Russia explicitly rejected the outstretched hand of the United States, he said. He added that Russian intransigence began before Moscow's recent airstrikes in Syria and support for separatists in a part of eastern Ukraine known as the Donbass.

"What I would offer is that if you look at Russia's actions all the way back to '08-in Georgia, in Nagorno-Karabakh, in Crimea, in the Donbass, and now down in Syria-we see what most call a revanchist Russia that has put force back on the table as an instrument of national power to meet their objectives," he said in remarks to reporters.

While Putin has become more bellicose abroad, U.S. forces in Europe have declined. The New York Times reported in October that the United States has reduced its permanent troops in Europe by 35 percent since 2012, as well as withdrawn vehicles and weapons.

"Across that time ... we have changed our force structure, we have changed our [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] allocations, we've changed our analytical allocations, [and] we've downsized the forces in all the media here in Europe," Breedlove said.

He is now advocating for a more robust U.S. military presence in Europe. He noted that the Army has begun deploying a brigade-sized unit to the region, along with 200 M1 Abrams tanks and additional vehicles and weapons.

Yet it remains unclear if the bolstered forces will be enough to deter Russian adventurism. The United States currently has about 30,000 troops in Europe, compared to a height of 300,000 soldiers at the end of the Cold War. U.S. forces often have to borrow equipment from allies, such as British helicopters.

Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, the Army's top general in Europe, told the Times that, "we have to figure out how you make 30,000 feel like 300,000."

All U.S. troops in Europe must now train for an Article 5 event, Breedlove said, in which an attack on one NATO ally would be treated as a threat to all members. Planning for such a scenario began before Russia invaded Ukraine's Crimean peninsula in early 2014, he said.

"Now every soldier, sailor, airman or Marine that comes to European Command will be focused on redeveloping that high-end kinetic fighting capability," he said.

In Russia's new national security strategy, NATO and the United States are identified as threats. The Institute for the Study of War said in an analysis that the declaration was part of the Kremlin's information warfare.

"The accusations in the new strategy represent Russia's disinformation doctrine of reflexive control, which the Kremlin employs to both disguise itself as a besieged rather than an aggressive actor and to preempt assertive Western military action," wrote analyst Hugo Spaulding.

Though Russia has yet to directly attack a NATO member, it has continued to apply pressure on the alliance and Western allies through a variety of means. Russian hackers are the suspected culprits behind a cyber attack in Ukraine last month that led to power outages for tens of thousands of people-one of the first ever hacks against civilian infrastructure. And the Kremlin has expanded sanctions against NATO member Turkey after the latter shot down a Russian jet that appeared to violate its airspace in November.

Additionally, analysts say Russia's new agreement with Armenia to create a joint missile air defense system threatens the neighboring countries of Turkey and Georgia. Georgia has sought closer relations with the West by opening a NATO training center and conducting military exercises with the United States.

"An expanding military presence will put Russia in direct competition with Turkey's ambitions in the South Caucasus and Georgia's cooperation with NATO and U.S. forces," said the intelligence firm Stratfor in an analysis.
 
 #23
New York Times
January 6, 2016
Putin's Year in Scandals
By Masha Gessen
Masha Gessen is the author, most recently, of "The Brothers: The Road to an American Tragedy."

GOING into 2016, Vladimir V. Putin is a very different politician from the one he was a year ago. His most significant changes have little to do with what he has done in the last 12 months. Instead they were wrought by the justice systems of two foreign countries - Britain and Spain - and a slew of Russian and Western journalists and activists. Thanks to all these disparate efforts, there has emerged a vivid, comprehensive and, most important, public picture of allegations of corruption and connections to organized crime that in the past had been the province of rumors or maverick investigations publishers wouldn't dare to print.

Starting in early 2015, there were the 34 days of hearings in London about the death of Alexander V. Litvinenko, the rogue Russian secret-police agent who died of polonium poisoning in England in 2006. The possibility that the Russian government and Mr. Putin himself may have been behind the murder had long been discussed by journalists and detailed in books, but it took almost a decade for it to be raised in a legal venue.

The hearings, held at the request of the Home Office, formally were "an inquiry," rather than a trial, but they took place in a courthouse and were presided over by a (retired) judge, Sir Robert Owen. (A trial would have been impossible because Russia has refused to extradite the two men suspected in the murder.) Russian officials snubbed the proceedings. The British lawyer Richard Horwell, representing the Metropolitan Police Service, raged in his closing statement: "The Kremlin cannot exactly complain if the eyes of the world look to it for responsibility for Litvinenko's murder," adding that "of all of Litvinenko's targets, Putin was the one most frequently in his sights." Justice Owen is expected to release his report on Jan. 21.

In May, Spanish prosecutors petitioned a Madrid court for permission to charge 27 people with money laundering, after a giant decade-long investigation that implicated, among others, highly placed Russian officials, some of whom have business or property in Spain. The 488-page complaint names a sitting member of the Russian Parliament, a former prime minister and a former defense minister. It draws numerous connections between the presumed ringleader, Gennady Petrov, an influential figure in St. Petersburg, and Mr. Putin's inner circle.

In early December, the German television channel ZDF released two films about Mr. Putin. One presented a comprehensive portrait of the Russian president, reviewing facts and footage that had been known before. The other, called "The Trace of Moscow," linked the Litvinenko case to the Spanish investigation: Mr. Litvinenko, it claimed, had been digging into the very connections between Mr. Putin and organized crime that the Spanish investigators exposed. In part thanks to Open Russia, an organization founded by the former oil tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who spent 10 years in prison and now lives in exile in London, both German films got some play on the Russian-language Internet: The organization translated them and posted them on its website.

Another corruption probe that unfolded during 2015 implicates Mr. Putin's own family. Early in the year, the Russian business publication RBC released an investigation into a vast university expansion project, undertaken on a giant section of land that belongs partly to Moscow State University and partly to the Russian state. The report meticulously documented the sheer scale and scope of the project, and the involvement of many of Russia's most prominent state and private business managers. But it gingerly stepped around identifying the woman in charge, who had declined to be interviewed. RBC would say only that she was called Katerina Tikhonova - a very common Russian name - and that she had been seen in public with Kirill Shamalov, the son of a close friend of Mr. Putin's.

The following day the journalist Oleg Kashin posted on his blog a piece titled, "It's Her." Katerina Tikhonova, he wrote, was Mr. Putin's daughter. The president's press secretary, Dmitri S. Peskov, responded with a non-denial denial. "I don't know who that is," he said. "Many girls have been passed off as Putin's daughters." Then Reuters, in a large investigation of Russian corruption it published at the end of the year, reported that Ms. Tikhonova, 29, was indeed Mr. Putin's daughter, that Mr. Shamalov was her husband and that both were billionaires.

Yet another investigation released last month revealed apparent links between the Russian prosecutor general and the country's most notorious organized crime family. Such allegations have become so prominent in the public conversation lately, even in Russia, that they were raised with Mr. Putin on Dec. 17, during his highly scripted annual news conference.

He dismissed them, including those about his daughter, without engaging with them: "I don't discuss questions concerning my family members. They aren't involved in any business, they aren't involved in politics, they don't stick their noses anywhere." But that Mr. Putin had to face such accusations at all shows that a new understanding about Russia is taking hold: Russia is a mafia state - not only because it is run like the mafia, but also because it is run by organized crime.
 
 #24
http://readrussia.com
January 5, 2016
"Stalinist" Has a Meaning, and It's More Complicated Than "Bad"
By Mark Adomanis

If I'm being honest, there are times I worry that I simply won't have enough to write about. Sure Russia is a big, complicated country, but it's not that big or complicated. Particularly in the depths of winter, when the great majority of the Russian Federation is locked in never-ending darkness and cold, it's possible to imagine a few weeks passing by where nothing very much happens.

Fortunately for me (and fortunately or unfortunately for you, depending on your estimation of my writing) barely a day goes by where someone doesn't write something extremely wrongheaded or demonstrably wrong about dear old Russia. The latest examples relate to "Stalinism," and comes from New York Times op-ed writer Ross Douthat.

Douthat's "Stalinist" gaffe came towards the end of a generally quite interesting column about the potential crack-up of the "liberal order." Amidst a long list of potential disasters, including Jeremy Corby's election as prime minister, the break-up of the European Union, or ISIS creation of a "new Islamic empire," Douthat mentioned Putin's "Stalinist nostalgia."

Douthat had earlier identified "Vladimir Putin's Russia" as one of the bad actors that was "at least temporarily" defying the liberal project. Douthat also bemoaned Russia's "power politics" in both the Middle East and the near abroad. It was very clear from the context, then, that by "Stalinist nostalgia" Douthat was referring to Russian foreign policy broadly and to the seizure of Crimea and the "hybrid war" in Eastern Ukraine in particular.

Now simply as a matter of fact, nothing that Putin is currently doing in the former Soviet space is actually "Stalinist" in any recognizable sense. The "Novorossiya project" was based not on Stalinist conceptions of nationalism or the "friendship of peoples," but on a dusted-off historical term from the 18th century Russian empire. The term "Novorossiya" was not used at all under communism, which is a large part of why most of the residents of the Donbass found it so baffling and why, ultimately, it has been abandoned.

In fact, during the peak of Stalinism anyone caught using such outdated, reactionary terminology would be lucky to escape with their life (Stalin had people shot for a whole lot less than attempting to rehabilitate Tsarism). More than on most concepts, where his policies were adjusted as needed, Stalin had a series of very clear positions on issues related to nationalism. And while Stalinist nationalities policy was many things, it was most certainly not about celebrating the Russian colonization of Southeastern Ukraine.

Meanwhile the concept of a "Russian world," another concept that the Kremlin has used to justify its meddling in the near abroad, has no historical precedence whatsoever: it's essentially something that the current government invented out of thin air. And in its focus on Russian language, religion, and, yes, ethnicity, it is far more parochial in its aspirations than Stalinism, which genuinely aspired to be a worldwide revolutionary movement.

Stalinism might have been murderous and wretched, but it claimed to speak for all people in all places: the peasant in India, the worker in Brazil, even the office worker in New York City, all of these people could be (and sometimes were!) "Stalinist" in their politics. The "Russian world," quite obviously, does not hold the same kind of appeal for anyone who did not grow up in or around the Soviet Union. A few scattered oddballs will, perhaps, be so deeply moved by Pushkin's poetry that they will declare their allegiance to Moscow, but this is barely an "ideology" and more a romanticized form of ethnic nationalism. Romanticized ethnic nationalism can certainly be dangerous (just ask Europe!) but its difference from Stalinism is hard to exaggerate. To put it bluntly, Stalin's camps were littered with the corpses of such "bourgeois" nationalists.

Douthat is right that Putin is up to no good. Neither Novorossiya nor The Russian World are praiseworthy, positive concepts. In fact, they were both crudely manipulated by the Kremlin to justify whatever it needed to do at a particular moment in time. In their hysterical lashing out at "fascists" and "fifth columnists," the proponents of these ideologies are clearly acting in a way that is at least vaguely reminiscent of their Soviet forbearers.  

But if you're going to combat a policy you need to understand its ideological basis. Labeling Russia's actions in the near abroad "Stalinist" betrays a near-total unawareness of their provenance, goals, strategy, and tactics.

And not to belabor the point, but there's a moral component here as well. Stalin murdered millions of innocent people and the cruelty of the system he created beggars belief. Just as we don't use allusions to the Holocaust lightly because, intuitively, we understand that to do so would cheapen the memory of the horror that occurred, we should also be extremely wary of calling some aspect of Russian policy that we find objectionable "Stalinist." Now there are, unfortunately, certain regimes that genuinely merit a "Stalinist" label, North Korea most obviously.

But "Stalinism" was an identifiable political philosophy and method of governance, one that was based on forced "mobilization" of the masses and the widespread use of lethal violence in pursuit of non-market methods of rapid industrial development. Russia's government has its share of sins, but its sins are extremely different from those of the Stalin-era Soviet Union.
 
 #25
Times Higher Education (UK)
January 7, 2016
Alexander Yakovlev: The Man Whose Ideas Saved Russia from Communism, by Richard Pipes
Vladimir Tismaneanu on a study of one man's journey from 'Homo Sovieticus' to 'Homo Antisovieticus'
Vladimir Tismaneanu is professor of politics, University of Maryland, College Park, and author of The Devil in History: Communism, Fascism, and Some Lessons of the Twentieth Century (2012).

Alexander Yakovlev: The Man Whose Ideas Delivered Russia from Communism
By Richard Pipes
Northern Illinois University Press, 168pp, �21.00
ISBN 9780875804941
Published 25 January 2016

In this slim, highly provocative book, Richard Pipes, the doyen of Russian studies in the West, engages in a much-needed exercise in historical reparation. We have here the first biography of an ideologue turned heretic and then apostate, whose ideas begot, to a decisive extent, the collapse of Lenin's state. Organised in short chapters focused on the key moments in Alexander Yakovlev's political life, the book highlights the most significant moments in Soviet history during the second half of the past century. Indeed, the title of one of Yakovlev's own books could serve as a condensed assessment of the real nature of a system once celebrated as the Great Experiment: A Century of Violence in Soviet Russia. Violence, ruthlessness, brutality, extremism: these were for Yakovlev the defining features of the Soviet dictatorship. As Pipes shows, he came to such intransigently devastating conclusions as a result of an agonising search for historical and moral truth.

Pipes accurately argues that Mikhail Gorbachev's worldview, with its revolutionary consequences, was crucially influenced by Yakovlev's Weltanschauung, an outlook much more articulate than the general secretary's rather inchoate views. In fact, most scholars agree that it was Yakovlev who proposed the policies known as perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness). Born in 1923 to a poor peasant family, Yakovlev absorbed from his early youth the main tenets of the Soviet doctrine: egalitarianism, internationalism, the cult of the party and its luminaries, etc. He fought and was wounded during the Second World War. In the war's aftermath, he studied at party schools and became an enthusiastic ideological apparatchik. He was the embodiment of Homo Sovieticus, subserviently conformist. He saw poverty and injustice around him, but sang loyally in harmony with the prevailing optimistic libretto.

The shock came in February 1956, with Nikita Khrushchev's earth-shattering anti-Stalin "Secret Speech". Yakovlev was in the audience and witnessed what can now be seen as the beginning of the end for Lenin's party. From that moment on, he gradually developed doubts regarding the institutional, cultural and moral legitimacy of Bolshevism. The Prague Spring was another eye-opener. As head of the party's ideological department, Yakovlev opposed the chauvinism encouraged by Leonid Brezhnev and his sycophants. He was demoted in 1972, following the publication of a mildly unorthodox article, and was sent as ambassador to Canada. It was there that he met Gorbachev in 1983. The two men exchanged views about the desperate need to reform the USSR. Yakovlev returned to Moscow and, after Gorbachev became number one in March 1985, he climbed the ladder to full Politburo membership. Thanks to him, cultural liberalisation moved with breathtaking speed. De-Stalinisation proceeded dramatically, to the dismay of conservatives who came to abhor Yakovlev. They were convinced that he was a Central Intelligence Agency agent recruited during his 1959 Columbia University fellowship.

Finally, as Gorbachev acted chaotically and refused to break completely with the old system, Yakovlev radicalised. He questioned the entire Bolshevik tradition, compared it to fascism, and found the origin of the catastrophe in Lenin's sacralisation of violence and abysmal contempt for the rule of law. It became clear to him that Bolshevism and democracy were irreconcilable. Homo Sovieticus morphed into Homo Antisovieticus. He wrote books in which he demonstrated that, from the very outset, Leninism was a totalitarian project. Stalin exacerbated what Lenin initiated. In documenting Yakovlev's epiphany, Pipes makes a seminal contribution to the literature on disenchantment, apostasy, illumination and awakening.
 

 #26
Gallup.com
January 4, 2015
Ukrainians' Life Ratings Sank to New Lows in 2015
by Zach Bikus
[Charts here http://www.gallup.com/poll/187985/ukrainians-life-ratings-sank-new-lows-2015.aspx]

Story Highlights

36% are "suffering," the highest among former Soviet states
9% are "thriving," down from 21% in 2011
79% view economic conditions in Ukraine as "poor"

WASHINGTON, D.C. -- Conflict-weary Ukrainians gave their lives in 2015 the worst ratings that Gallup has measured yet in that country. On a ladder scale with steps numbered from 0 to 10, with 10 being the best possible life, Ukrainians on average rate their current lives at a 4.0. Ukrainians' optimism about the future also dimmed last year, with their ratings of their lives in five years sinking to a new low of 5.2.

With their economy in shambles during a deadly year of fighting between Ukrainian forces and pro-Russian separatists, it is not surprising that this depressed outlook permeates nearly every segment of Ukrainian society. Current life ratings have dropped among residents from all age groups, education levels and genders. This remains true for residents' perceptions of their lives in five years, with the exception of the richest Ukrainians, whose ratings of their future lives have improved slightly over the past year.

This poor outlook is likely related to Ukrainians' growing dissatisfaction with their living standards. The percentage of residents who report being satisfied with their standard of living has dropped from 27% to 17% over the past year, while the percentage of Ukrainians who view the country's economic situation as "poor" jumped from 62% in 2014 to 79% in 2015.

Unsurprisingly, those living in Western Ukraine evaluate their current lives much more highly than those in the war-torn South and East, where renewed fighting threatened a shaky truce at the time of the survey. Life ratings in the North region of the country fall between these two extremes.

As their outlook on life continues to get worse, fewer residents in Ukraine are considered "thriving" than ever before. Gallup classifies respondents as thriving if they rate their current lives a 7 or higher and their lives in five years an 8 or higher on a ladder scale with steps numbered from 0 to 10, based on the Cantril Self-Anchoring Striving Scale. Only 9% of Ukrainians in 2015 were thriving. As recently as 2011, more than twice as many (21%) were classified as thriving.

As thriving percentages have declined, the percentage of Ukrainians who are "suffering" (those with a score of 4 or below) have increased, reaching a high of 36% in 2015. This is considerably higher than the suffering percentages measured in most post-Soviet states in 2015.

Bottom Line

Poor life evaluations are likely symptoms of discontent from continuing political, social and economic troubles, as well as a general malaise in the country because of the stalled conflict in Eastern Ukraine. Ukrainians' low evaluations of their lives can be expected to remain depressed until economic and political stability return to the country.

These data are available in Gallup Analytics.

Survey Methods

Results are based on face-to-face interviews with 1,000 adults, aged 15 and older, conducted July 7-Aug. 14, 2015, in Ukraine. For results based on the total sample of national adults, one can say with 95% confidence that the maximum margin of sampling error is �3.8 percentage points. The margin of error reflects the influence of data weighting. In addition to sampling error, question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of public opinion polls.

Since 2014, Crimea has not been included in the Ukraine sample. Settlements in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of the East region have also been excluded, resulting in approximately 10% of the population excluded (approximately 30% of the East region population excluded) in 2014 and 2% of the population in 2015.

For more complete methodology and specific survey dates, please review Gallup's Country Data Set details.
 
 #27
Irrussianality
https://irrussianality.wordpress.com
January 4, 2016
UKRAINIANS UNHAPPIER THAN EVER BEFORE
Paul Robinson
University of Ottawa

Gallup published a new poll today, measuring Ukrainians' 'life ratings'. This follows a survey of Ukrainian political opinion issued in late December. One caveat is necessary. Although Gallup has only just issued these results, it carried out the actual surveys in July and August of last year. The results are therefore rather out of date. Nevertheless, they are interesting. According to Gallup:

Conflict-weary Ukrainians gave their lives in 2015 the worst ratings that Gallup has measured yet in that country. On a ladder scale with steps numbered from 0 to 10, with 10 being the best possible life, Ukrainians on average rate their current lives at a 4.0. Ukrainians' optimism about the future also dimmed last year, with their ratings of their lives in five years sinking to a new low of 5.2.

Gallup considers anybody who rates his or her life at 7.0 or higher to be 'thriving', and anybody who rates it at 4 or below to be 'suffering'. Since 2012, the percentage of the Ukrainian population in the first category has halved, while the percentage in the second category has risen by about 50%.

Gallup notes that the 'life ratings have dropped among residents from all age groups, education levels and genders'. Also, 'The percentage of residents who report being satisfied with their standard of living has dropped from 27% to 17% over the past year, while the percentage of Ukrainians who view the country's economic situation as "poor" jumped from 62% in 2014 to 79% in 2015.'

These negative figures correlate with dissatisfaction with the political authorities. On 23 December Gallup published another poll indicating that President Petro Poroshenko's approval rating had fallen to 17%, and that only 8% of Ukrainians had confidence in their government. Support for Poroshenko was greatest in the west of the country. Not coincidentally, this is also the region where people rate their lives the highest. By contrast, southern Ukrainians rate their lives more poorly than any of their compatriots and at the time of the survey only 7% of them supported their president.
---
Comment by Mark Chapman

The people who overthrow the Poroshenko government will be those who have nothing left to lose, and who are therefore careless of their fate. Ukraine is not there yet. It may not be, especially as Poroshenko still has most of the hard boys on his side, because the last thing they want is a return to government which maintains good relations with Russia. So Ukraine will have to stagger on yet awhile, living on handouts and crumbs from the EU's table. But unless it develops lucrative new markets in which to sell its goods, it is stuck with a lifestyle in which it buys goods from the EU with money given to it for that purpose, and sells more or less nothing. Western companies could come in to invest and rejig industry so Ukraine makes goods salable in the EU, but the country is still extremely corrupt and they fear anemic profits due to corruption or loss of their investment altogether - for all its puffing and blowing, Ukraine has made no meaningful progress against corruption, and its oligarchy still controls a disproportionate share of its GDP, although the optimistic west would term it "privatization".

However, no matter how you look at it, it must be acknowledged that Ukraine in its present state as well as its forecast future state is providing no incentive whatsoever for its breakaway regions to consider rejoining, while its performance is encouraging more such desertions.


 
 #28
Facebook
January 4, 2016
Maidan snipers
By Ivan Katchanovski
University of Ottawa

A website of a leading Ukrainian academic journal publishes recollections by a Maidan protester who maintains that the Maidan protesters were massacred by government snipers from the government quarters. http://uamoderna.com/blogy/martynenko/maidan-part3 The author describes witnessing killing of one of the protesters, but reported timing and location match well-documented killing of Melnychuk from the Maidan-controlled Hotel Ukraina. My APSA paper describes it as follows: But the shootings of the protesters from the hotel did not stop completely, indicating that the shooters were from the Maidan side. Eyewitnesses in another video of the shooting around 4:57pm and the direction of the entry wound indicate that a bystander was killed in front of Zhovtnevyi Palace by a bullet from the Hotel Ukraina. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sjUzaw5pIBYAfter this shooting, a speaker on the Maidan stage threatened to burn the Hotel Ukraina, as they did the Trade Union building a day earlier, because of constant reports of snipers in the hotel.  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KhCnS2LQXFY
Бои и массовый расстрел 18-20.02.2014 в Киеве глазами студента-историка. Часть 3 - Україна модерна
UAMODERNA.COM

Ivan Katchanovski: A reporter of the largest German newspaper also witnessed this shooting and he interviewed a Maidan medic who stated that this protestor was killed from the Hotel Ukraina. The Bild reporter also refers in his video to this hotel, but I do not know German. I would appreciate it if this reference would be translated. http://www.bild.de/.../claas-weinmann-kiew-scharfschuetze...
BILD-Reporter in Kiew - Im Kreuzfeuer der Scharfsch�tzen
BILD.DE
--
January 5, 2015
Ivan Katchanovski: �
The unreported revelations of the Maidan massacre trial, the Oscar-nominated documentary, and the media coverage

Results of forensic medical reports made public for the first time during the trial on December 22 showed that Iosyp Shyling, whose killing was prominently featured in the Winter on Fire documentary as a graphic example of the government-perpetrated massacre, was shot from a Maidan-controlled area. He was shot in the left side of his face from right to left, from front to back, and from top to bottom directions. The expert report stated that this protester was turned by the right side of his head towards the source of the gunshot. The oval shape and dimensions of the entrance wound also indicate that the gunshot came from the relatively small sideway angle. (52-58m) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SepELY-VfgE

This previously withheld information and Shyling's position in several videos, such as a RT video, seconds before and after he was shot dead point toward the gunshot from the Bank Arkada. (0:42) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m6f9YKu8WQ8 My APSA paper presented various evidence, such as videos and testimonies by protesters and SBU Alfa officers, about snipers on this green building. But the official investigation, including its investigative experiment, concluded that Shyling was killed from the Berkut barricade, which was located to his front left side at nearly horizontal level based on information from numerous videos and Google Earth.

The Maidan massacre trial hearing concerning the Shyling's killing focused on a widely publicized but misrepresented video, which was used in this Oscar-nominated documentary and its trailer. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RibAQHeDia8 The video shows Shyling seconds before and after his killing near Dmytro Holubnychyi, a teenage protester wearing a Bandera portrait. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4oTI7iUCZRE This video was shown during the trial, specifically its ending showing that he and some other protesters fled from the barricade on Instytutska Street within two minutes after Iosyp Shyling was killed in the head at 10:28am and immediately after a loud call by one of the protesters that 'they [shooters] are behind." But Holubnychyi statement in his media interview that he and other protesters came under live ammunition fire by the shooters from the Hotel Ukraina was not mentioned during the trial. http://life.pravda.com.ua/person/2014/02/27/154450

Like in the cases of other such revelations from the trial, the Ukrainian media, such as this Hromadske TV video, did not report the revelations concerning the killing of Shyling. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Flk2eOzycYs
Засідання від 22.12.2015 у справі про �Вбивства 39 людей 20.02.2014 під час Євромайдану�.
Онлайн трансляція засідання �Вбивства 39 людей 20.02.2014 під час Євромайдану�.
---
January 5, 2016
Andreas Umland
Kyiv, Ukraine  
[Andreas Umland is Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation in Kyiv]
 
I cannot assess the soundness of Ivan Katchanovski's conclusions about the identity of the snipers, but his research deserves serious consideration. The author is not a Kremlin propagandist, but a well-published political scientist teaching at one of Canada's premier universities. His paper is well-referenced and -argued. The well-known video with Pashinskiy is an unequivocal indication that Euromaidan people had during that time also, at least, one sniper gun in the Kyiv city center. I am not sure, however, whether this and other indicators are sufficient to bluntly accuse parts of the Euromaidan of a murderous false flag operation, even if some of the snipers were indeed shooting from buildings "controlled" by the Euromaidan. These were chaotic days with lots of masked and unmasked people running around, in downtown Kyiv. Some of those pretending to be Euromaidan protesters were, without any doubt, spies, agents, provocateurs, infiltrators etc. It is thus not easy or, perhaps, even impossible to establish the exact identities of the snipers. In any way, there are many unanswered questions which Katchanovski's scrupulous research should help to clarify.
Канадский ученый обвиняет в расстреле �Небесной сотни� активистов Майдана
Прибалтбюро сообщает: Oбновленную версию доклада о снайперах на Майдане презентовал в этом месяце канадский политолог украинского происхождения, профессор...
MIKLE1.LIVEJOURNAL.COM


 
 #29
International Committee for the Red Cross
January 6, 2016
Ukraine: The people of war-damaged Nikishyne prepare for winter (video)

Nikishyne is a small village north-east of Donetsk in eastern Ukraine. It suffered serious damage at the beginning of 2015 during fighting and almost everyone fled. They returned to find their homes damaged or destroyed. The ICRC is providing construction materials, food, hygiene articles and other basic necessities as the people of Nikishyne prepare for the harsh Ukrainian winter.

Video: https://www.icrc.org/en/document/ukraine-war-damaged-nikishyne-prepare-winter
 
 #30
Stratfor.com
January 5, 2016
The U.S. Could Spoil Russia and Ukraine's Delicate Compromise

Following a last-minute deal between Russia and Ukraine to extend the Minsk negotiations into the new year, notable changes are occurring in eastern Ukraine that hint at possible concessions made by both sides. The biggest player left out of the formal negotiations, the United States, will be important to watch because Washington's support for Kiev and pressure on Moscow could stall early indications of progress.

On Dec. 30, Russia and Ukraine agreed to extend the deadline for implementing the Minsk protocols, which call for a full return of the border between Russia and the separatist territories to Ukrainian control, require Kiev to decentralize power and require elections to take place in eastern Ukraine. The extension was negotiated through the Normandy Four format, which includes France and Germany alongside Ukraine and Russia. Moscow pushed for the extension but Ukraine wavered, disputing the requirement for elections in eastern Ukraine and pointing out the continued cease-fire violations in the region. However, just before the four leaders involved in the talks held their phone call, German Chancellor Angela Merkel made a private call to Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko that likely led to his concession. In addition, French President Francois Hollande indicated after the four-party call that elections are part of the agreement.

The extension of the deadline appears to have led to notable changes on the battlefield in eastern Ukraine. During the past week, cease-fire violations have decreased significantly. There had been a relative increase in the exchange of fire following the breakdown of the withdrawal process, but over the holidays the number of incidents dropped from more than 50 per day to about a dozen a day.

This relative calm comes as Ukrainian intelligence reported increased movement by Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) agents among separatist units positioned on the line of demarcation. The FSB agents are reportedly purging separatists who are deemed uncontrollable. It has been difficult to determine at times whether escalations in eastern Ukraine were occurring because of orders from Russia or whether separatist leaders were acting of their own accord. Regaining control over the separatist leaders would allow the FSB to ensure that Moscow's intentions are carried out in eastern Ukraine.

Another Russian move in eastern Ukraine could help Moscow take greater control of the situation. Following reports that separatists had taken over the small village of Kominternove, which had been on the Ukrainian-controlled side of the demarcation line, reports emerged that the forces there are regular Russian military forces. Although this action might seem aggressive, having Russian forces positioned forward in proximity to Ukrainian forces also gives Russia more direct control over the level of conflict in eastern Ukraine.

These reports indicate that Russia (and the FSB, which seems to be in control of the Ukraine portfolio again) can dial the eastern Ukrainian conflict up or down depending on the state of negotiations. With the cease-fire being largely observed, Moscow will hold its strategic position until it is assured that Kiev will follow through with its part of the bargain.

But the big player that has been silent on the issue since the extension was agreed upon is the United States. In the weeks before the Normandy Four meeting, the United States deployed Secretary of State John Kerry to Russia to negotiate with his counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, and Russian President Vladimir Putin on several issues. Washington was pushing for concessions on Syria, and some positive notes came out of the marathon meetings. However, any major concession from Russia on Syria would come at a steep price: Washington backing off its support for Kiev.

However, it does not appear that the United States is ready to cave to Russia's demands. In fact, Washington seems intent on maintaining economic pressure on Moscow: The United States expanded its sanctions on Russia days before the Normandy Four meeting.

The next thing to watch for is whether the United States adds pressure on Russia by increasing support for Ukraine's positions within the Minsk negotiations. The United States is not formally part of the Normandy Four talks on Minsk, and Moscow would like to keep Washington at a distance for now to improve its chances at using the Europeans to gain concessions from Kiev. However, if Washington supports Kiev's desire to stall the implementation of its part of the Minsk agreements until Moscow fully implements its part, Ukraine could feel emboldened to stand up to European and Russian pressure on the issue. Thus, although 2016 began with hints of compromise, the larger standoff between Ukraine and Russia - and the United States and Russia - is still very fluid.
 
 #31
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
January 5, 2015
The Minsk Agreements in 2016 and Russia's new national security strategy
The situation in Ukraine dominated Russian media coverage at the end of 2015, with new focus on the Minsk Agreements for Eastern Ukraine and recent energy-related events on the Crimean peninsula.
By Anastasia Borik

Last week, Russian media focused on the prolongation of the Minsk Agreements, Russia's new national security strategy and the issue of Crimea's energy security. In addition, new information released by investigators working on the assassination case of Russian opposition leader Boris Nemtsov led to extensive discussions in the Russian media about the relationship between the Kremlin and Chechnya.

Minsk agreements prolonged

On Dec. 30, during a telephone conversation between leaders of the "Normandy Quartet," the Minsk Agreements on Ukraine were extended to 2016. This extension had been expected; after all, since the moment of their signing, not one of the 13 points in the agreements has been fully implemented.

The business newspaper Kommersant is not too optimistic about the chances of the Minsk Agreements being fulfilled in 2016. Despite all efforts undertaken by Moscow, which is suffering more than all the others from the non-execution of the Minsk Agreements, due to large-scale sanctions imposed by the West, these accords will inevitably come face to face with Ukrainian domestic contradictions.

In particular, this concerns the status of the self-proclaimed republics - the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) and the Luhansk People's Republic (LPR), the situation with the victims of the conflict, as well as the exchange of prisoners. Even if it is possible that the technical arrangements have some hope of being implemented, then the political settlements - including the role of the two republics - will be virtually impossible to reconcile, says Kommersant.

The business newspaper RBC noted that during these recent negotiations, the leaders were suddenly faced with the issue of the Kremlin's new economic policy towards Ukraine, and Vladimir Putin had to explain Russia's position, justifying the introduction of a restrictive economic and trade regime with Ukraine.

The newspaper also pointed to the continuing sharp differences between the parties when it comes to conducting elections in the breakaway republics.

President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko insists on having these elections cancelled, and to have special EU missions sent to territories that are not under Kiev's control.

The analytical website "Expert" presented the views of the expert Gevorg Mirzayanov. He also believes that hard times await the Minsk Agreements in 2016. It is unlikely that Poroshenko will suddenly change his position on political reforms and seriously work on implementing all provisions contained in the Minsk Agreements, as there is significant opposition in parliament to these reforms.

At the same time, the self-proclaimed republics can benefit from this protracted implementation - a truce would give them an opportunity to strengthen their economic positions and their recent public statements are invariably of a peaceful character, allowing them to score some political points as well.

Russia gets a new national security strategy

On the last day in 2015, President Vladimir Putin approved a new national security strategy for Russia. The updated document reflects the changes in the international situation, as well as Russia's position on the world stage. Among the listed threats are ISIS, Western sanctions, the bloc approach to international affairs, as well as internal factors, including the country's dependence on raw materials.

The business newspaper Vedomosti believes that this new strategy contains a clear message for Washington - which appears in the document both as a potential partner, and as a destabilizing element in the global system (especially noted are the negative roles played by the U.S. and EU in the conflict in Ukraine). Russia is ready to cooperate, and expects that the West will somehow respond to its readiness, notes the newspaper.

The website of the Echo of Moscow radio station featured the views of politician Tatiana Sukhareva. She criticized the new strategy, particularly highlighting the two phobias of the Russian regime, "color revolutions" and "destruction of traditional values." The interpretation of both these threats can be arbitrarily quite broad, which frees the hands of the government for undertaking security measures in the country. The politician believes that if Putin and his inner circle would only pay more attention to the development of the country, and the problems of ordinary citizens, they would not have to be so fearful of social movements.

Results of the Boris Nemtsov murder investigation

In late December, the Investigative Committee of Russia (ICR) published the preliminary results of its official investigation into the murder of opposition leader Boris Nemtsov, which took place nearly a year ago in Moscow. The report lays the blame on Zaur Dadayev, a retired officer of the Sever ("North") Regiment of the Interior Ministry Troops, and five of his accomplices.

According to the ICR, the organizer was Ruslan Mukhudinov, who is on the federal wanted list. In general, the main result of the investigation was a de facto recognition that this case had nothing to do with any political conflict, but a murder motivated by personal hatred.

The business newspaper Kommersant noted that just like in all other cases where Chechens were involved in a crime, the investigation results never revealed the real instigators and organizers. The accused Mukhudinov could not have been the organizer, the newspaper believes, because of his young age and the position he held (i.e. he worked as a driver), and that means that the investigators did not want to follow the existing leads, since these could bring them to very high-ranking Chechnya politicians. Kommersant noted that even some obvious witnesses, whose testimony could have radically changed the situation, were not questioned.

The website of the Echo of Moscow radio station aired the opinions of politician Gennady Gudkov. He directly accused the Chechen leadership in the death of Nemtsov. Gudkov believes that the Kremlin was not involved in the murder of the opposition leader - and initially was extremely outraged at the arbitrariness of the regional authorities.

However, maintaining calm in the rebellious region is still more important for the Kremlin than seeking justice for the murder of an opposition leader, and thus the Investigative Committee was issued a command from the "top" - to put brakes on the case, the leads of which could lead to the Chechen leadership. This explains the final statement issued by the ICR.

Moskovsky Komsomolets considers that the version claiming that there was no connection between the murder of Nemtsov and his political activities simply does not hold water. The murder of such a major opposition figure simply cannot be blamed on simple violence, which the ICR report claims.
Recommended: "The 'mastermind' of Boris Nemtsov assassination name"

The publication refers to the lawyers of the daughter of the murdered politician, who say that the published results lack the most important factor - the motive for the murder. The newspaper also reminds its readers that the head of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, has not responded to numerous accusations, made by opposition politicians, concerning his involvement in the murder, nor have the investigators questioned him.   

Energy ultimatum and Crimea's energy security

The contract between Ukraine and Russia for the supply of electricity to Crimea ended on Jan. 1, 2016. In the negotiations for concluding the new contract, the Ukrainian side insisted on inserting a clause that stated that Crimea belonged to Ukraine, as a condition to supply electric energy.

In light of this, Russia will most likely not sign any new agreement, which will lead to new problems when it comes to supplying the peninsula with energy (which still has not recovered from the sabotage of electricity transport towers in Ukraine back in November). President Putin ordered the Russian Public Opinion Research Center to conduct a survey of residents of Crimea, the results of which show that 94 percent of the inhabitants of the peninsula are quite ready to "suffer" from energy shortages, rather than be a part of Ukraine.

Ivan Zhilin, correspondent of the opposition Novaya Gazeta in Crimea highlighted the unique character of this survey - this time, in contrast to the referendum on Crimea joining the Russian Federation, the residents were not asked to vote for "Russia" and "against Ukraine." The Ukrainian authorities who initiated a product and energy blockade against Crimea themselves forced inhabitants of the peninsula towards this decision. To return the confidence of a population after punishing it is not an easy task, concluded Zhilin.

The pro-government Channel One highlighted the almost subversive activities taking place in Ukraine, which, contrary to its obligations under the contract, failed to supply energy to the peninsula. The TV channel quoted Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak, who called Ukraine's demands "blackmail," and expressed outrage at the actions taken by the Ukrainian government.

The survey, according to the editorial board, was necessary precisely because energy is an important issue for all Crimeans - many of who have not recovered fully from the November blackouts. The unanimous opinion of the inhabitants of Crimea and Sevastopol indicates that this ill-considered decision of Kiev has decisively turned these former citizens of Ukraine against that government.

Political analyst Gleb Pavlovsky, speaking live at the Echo of Moscow radio station, criticized the way the survey was conducted. The analyst believes that it was absurd to carry out such a survey, because the results were obvious from the beginning, and ridiculous to turn to citizens on an issue in which they have no authority to act.

Moreover, Pavlovsky believes that in this "Crimean survey" the Russian authorities have launched a new political technology, with the assistance of which they plan to legitimize other unpopular decisions, concerning not only Crimea, but also the country as a whole.

Quotes of the week:

Sergey Lavrov on Petro Poroshenko's position on the Minsk Agreements: "Poroshenko had every opportunity to push through, past the radicals... solutions that would have brought into life the provisions of this important document. However, the very terms that he selected, speak of the fact that he is boiling for a fight, and thus, perhaps, gaining some domestic political points. How successful this stance is, I do not know. His ratings indicate the opposite."

Head of DPR Alexander Zakharchenko: "The main thing that both the European Union and Russia must clearly understand - the Donbas is prepared to consistently keep implementing the Minsk Agreements, in accordance with all listed measures, point by point - however, in the very order in which they are written. If the Kiev authorities cannot comply with the "road map" that they themselves have signed, that is, implementing all the listed measures, then that is their problem. We can help the Kiev authorities, but only if they ask us. We are willing to be forgiving, because we want to stop the war."

Head of Crimea Sergey Aksenov: "It is high time Kiev stopped dancing on the rake, and forget about Crimea ever returning to Ukraine. This is a case when, contrary to the old adage, it is bad to dream."

Political analyst Gleb Pavlovsky about the survey in Crimea: "This of course was no sociological survey, because it cannot be called such, when the president has outlined his position, the correct answer, and then ordered such a poll to be conducted. And then, they call a person at home via a landline, and he is asked to express his opinion, right? This, certainly, is no survey, but an opinion poll at gunpoint."


 
 #32
UNIAN (Kyiv)
January 6, 2016
Over 800 monuments to Lenin toppled in Ukraine

Ukraine has dismantled more than 800 monuments to Lenin,  a Russian communist revolutionary, politician, and political theorist (1870 - 1924), according to head of the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance Volodymyr Vyatrovych.

"More than 800 monuments to Lenin have been dismantled in Ukraine as of now," he told TV Channel 5 on Tuesday, Ukrainian online newspaper Ukrainska Pravda wrote.

He also said that statements that objects with artistic value were destroyed on the pretext of de-communization were not true. At the same time, he claims that the spontaneous process of de-communization, which had started before Ukraine adopted the law on de-communization, is still under way.

"The de-communization law gives us an opportunity to disassemble everything that has some artistic value and store it in museums, otherwise it will be part of spontaneous d de-communization, which is still under way in Ukraine," he said.

"We can showcase the Soviet past in special museums, theme parks, but we cannot let the Soviet past remain part of our life, as it distorts us," he added.

According to rough estimates, there are about 1,400 monuments to Lenin left in Ukraine.
 
 #33
The Guardian
January 4, 2016
Ukrainians say farewell to 'Soviet champagne' as decommunisation law takes hold
New regulations in Ukraine ban names of streets, towns and products from glorifying communism
Shaun Walker in Moscow

This past New Year's Eve marked the last time Ukrainians could pop open "Soviet champagne", as the Kiev factory that makes it has announced it is changing the popular drink's name due to a law on decommunisation.

The regulations, which came into force last May, ban any street, town or product from having names that glorify communism. They also make it a crime to deny the "criminal character of the communist totalitarian regime of 1917-1991 in Ukraine".

However, in the latest sign that many appear to be following the law in letter but not in spirit, the drink will be renamed Sovietov. "We have taken this step to save one of the main traditions of the new year celebration," the company said.

Ersatz champagne with the "Soviet" brand name has been produced since 1937, when the brand was first introduced at the height of Joseph Stalin's purges. It is a popular drink on New Year's Eve and at other celebrations, and comes in sweet, semi-sweet and dry versions - and at a fraction of the price of real champagne.

More seriously, the new law means that all Ukrainian town and street names with links to Soviet leaders or officials will have to be changed, and statues of Lenin will have to be removed from town squares.

Kiev's main Lenin statue was pulled down by protesters in December 2013 at the beginning of the Maidan revolution, and since then there has been a spate of Lenin downings across the country. Now, the move is official, though the first Bolshevik leader remains standing in some places, especially in the east of the country. In the town of Lisichansk, the monument has not been removed but was vandalised just before new year, with red paint poured over Lenin's head and "I am the butcher of Ukraine" daubed on his body.

On 23 December, the Ukrainian parliament approved a list of 108 towns and villages that will have their names changed after local consultation, including Artemovsk, a major town in east Ukraine named after Comrade Artem, an early Russian revolutionary. The town will go back to its pre-revolutionary name of Bakhmut.

The biggest Ukrainian city affected by the law was Dnipropetrovsk, named after the Bolshevik leader Grigory Petrovskiy. However, in a sleight of hand, local politicians voted to rename the city in exactly the same way: Dnipropetrovsk. The proviso is that it is now named after St Peter, not Petrovsky. It is unclear whether the "new" name will be legally approved.

Kiev's decommunisation law has caused controversy, with many criticising an addendum which states that Ukrainian independence movements during the second world war - some of which collaborated with the Nazis and were involved in massacres of Jews and Poles - should be respected as "fighters for Ukrainian independence".

At a time when the country is embroiled in a war that has seen Russia-backed rebels take control of an eastern chunk of the country, the law does not seem to work to consolidate society, but rather the opposite. Many of those in eastern cities who are pro-Kiev are uneasy about Ukrainian nationalist heroes and disagree with removing the Soviet heritage. Critics have said the law itself is reminiscent of Soviet methods.

Last month, a Kiev court banned the Ukrainian communist party, accusing it of promoting separatism. The move was criticised by human rights organisations. John Dalhuisen, of Amnesty International, said: "The decision may be seen as dealing with the damaging vestiges of the Soviet past. In fact, it does exactly the opposite by following the same style of draconian measures used to stifle dissent."

However, Volodymyr Viatrovych, director of Ukraine's institute of national memory, said this was a false perception. "A lot of people think we don't need to do anything with the Soviet past, that it will disappear of its own accord and a new generation will appear who don't remember it," he told the Guardian. "But the example of Russia shows us that if you don't do anything with your Soviet past, it will resurrect itself. And we see a lot of people, even of the younger generation who were born after the Soviet Union collapsed, but they are absolutely Soviet and have a totally Soviet world view."


 
 #34
http://readukraine.com
January 7, 2016
Encounters with Homo Sovieticus and Digital Ukraine
By Tim Louzonis
Tim Louzonis is a co-founder of AIM Realty Kiev and a long-time expat with Ukrainian roots.

What's the difference between a capitalist fairy tale and a Marxist fairy tale? - an old Soviet joke

I'm that annoying guy next to you on a flight, who will talk to you if you don't immediately slip on your noise-cancelling headphones. Much the same way, I always make it a point to talk to taxi drivers in Ukraine. These men (they are usually men) will offer you unfiltered political views and colorful social commentary, often whether you like it or not.

On a scorching day last summer I fired up the Uklon taxi app and within minutes I was sitting in a sparkling new Toyota with a slick dashboard-mounted GPS system. We began crawling along Khreschatyk in midday traffic and against the soft purr of the car's air conditioner, the disgruntled forty-something taxi driver began ranting and raving about how life was so much better in the Soviet Union when most people had had "good jobs" and that in today's Ukraine there is nothing for the people. In my seven years in Ukraine I've had many similar encounters.

Usually I attempt to lighten the mood, telling these drivers, "Hey, I was an exchange student in Odessa in 1993 and back then sour orange juice sold in boxes was a luxury good and we were all millionaires in kupony." But this man was having none of it and continued his diatribe, telling me that the only solution was to shoot Ukraine's current leaders. In the US we might call someone like this a "low-information voter" or an "angry white man."

Now I don't know this man's story, how he came to own a brand new Toyota, or why he was driving it as a taxi.  But I do know that the economic system of Papa Lenin wasn't turning out GPS-equipped luxury sedans with climate control systems back in the day. I'm also quite familiar with the tired sermons of the nostalgic of Homo Sovieticus, who preaches to me about the bygone golden era of economic prosperity that never was. I should be more sympathetic-this man was enjoying only the superficial benefits of globalization and technology, but clearly he was being run over by the train of economic progress.

While I try to be sympathetic to those left behind in the wake of the Soviet economic collapse, my own encounters with Homo Sovieticus in Ukraine have become too brief and limited for me to claim that I deeply know and understand him. Since moving to Kyiv about a year ago, I've had little contact with the Soviet mindset aside from taxi drivers, cleaning ladies, and cashiers at the supermarket.  

Unlike some of my expat comrades, who work in manufacturing, agriculture, retail, or light industry, our business serves foreigners and I'm largely shielded from Homo Sovieticus, and my dear business partner usually handles whatever "local" contact is required. (Come to think of it, he does curse a lot more often than I do.)  For me it's all too easy to see grotesque caricatures of Homo Sovieticus instead of living and breathing human beings. This often happens when I ride Kyiv's metro: reeking of garlic and vodka, casting an overpowering body odor, holding clenched fists and a tight jaw, chest puffed out, elbowing its way into a crowded subway car, staring out with hostile "dead trout" eyes, a wounded animal claims its territory. Each time I'm struck by the spectacle of it, but not the poker-faced passengers around me, who've deftly deployed their eye contact avoidance systems, to them he's just a normal part of the quotidian human landscape, as they carry on with VK, Facebook, Instagram, or their masked internal monologues.

"Guys, the era of the geek is upon us" - J. Rodda, Middlebury College, Class of '95

A few years ago I was taking the night train from Kyiv to Lviv. Earlier that day my sleeping car neighbor had been in Kyiv for a job fair sponsored by Amazon Web Services. He told me that it had gone well and he was expecting a job offer, but he was unsure that he'd want to move his young family far away from his children's grandparents; but anyway he'd have time to think about it. We chatted late into the night about the pro's and con's of him staying in Ukraine and keeping his job at a small game developer in Lviv versus moving to Seattle and adjusting to life at a big company and to the cultural differences in the US. Upon waking the next morning he already had an SMS with a job offer from Amazon. Well, at least he got to sleep on it. I had just encountered Digital Ukraine, a key battleground in the global war for IT talent.

One of my first contacts with Digital Ukraine was an IT guy named Alex, whom I met at an English speaking club in Lviv in 2010. At first I thought Alex might be from South Asia. He had darkish features and the faintest of accents in English and I really couldn't place him anywhere in the English-speaking world. One of his secrets, he explained, was reading books only in English because bestselling technology and self-improvement books often aren't immediately available in Russian after their publication and this Tim Ferriss disciple didn't want to wait. Alex also opened my eyes to Lviv's underground economy of digital workers. Instead of seeing lazy young people hanging out in cafes all day and night, he helped me to recognize Amazon's mechanical turks, Behance's designers and to understand that many IT workers were moonlighting on Elance for extra cash.  

Alex once asked me, "Did you know that tiny Lviv [pop. 700,000] has often ranked in the top ten alongside some of China and India's mega cities for total value of completed freelancer tasks on Elance? So there is all this hidden wealth among the Lviv's young creative class and doubtlessly all across Ukraine. But having highly marketable skills for location-independent work makes residence in Ukraine unnecessary for a lot of these young people. Alex and I did a little web project for visitors to Lviv, but it wasn't surprising when he moved to the US several years ago.

Often Ukraine's young people don't wait until after university to leave the country.  I guess I'm enough of a geek to make amateur anthropological assumptions about Ukraine using the demographic data that are visible in Tinder's dating app. (This misuse of the app partly explains why I'm still single). During this year's winter holidays I couldn't help but notice that most of the "new people in [my] area" tend to be young women with a degree from, or who are attending, an American or European university. I can only assume that they have come back from abroad to visit their families and then they will head back overseas for opportunities they (and their parents) don't see in today's Ukraine. But perhaps more research is required.

Healthy discontent is the prelude to progress - M. Gandhi

These two Ukraines-Homo Sovieticus and Digital-exist side by side, alternate universes within the same country, city, on the same bus and subway car. Sometimes I wonder how long they will co-exist. Digital Ukraine is young and talented, but it is also ambitious, restless and a constant flight risk. Countless Cassandras have long predicted the total collapse of Ukraine as a result of brain drain and their voices will only grow louder if visa-free travel with the EU becomes possible later this year. I usually feel that this talk is overblown. But how much longer can Ukraine continue to eat its seed corn and live off the Soviet legacy of excellence in math and theoretical sciences? When will new investments in education and healthcare happen so that life in Ukraine will become more appealing for young, upwardly mobile, globalized Ukrainians and their children? Will we one day witness a complete hollowing out of Ukraine's young and talented class and be left with passive-aggressive Homo Sovieticus and his oligarchic overlords like something out of a bad zombie movie? No...that movie is already playing next door in the Land of the Wounded Bear and even Ukrainian Homo Sovieticus isn't clamoring for a sequel.

Let's get in touch

In this column I'm going to explore the many facets of Kyiv's expat life and subculture. What's your Kyiv expat story? Drop me a line.
 
 #35
The Daily Signal
http://dailysignal.com
December 31, 2015
In Ukraine, Lenin Gets the Boot From Uncle Sam
By Nolan Peterson
Nolan Peterson, a former special operations pilot and a combat veteran of Iraq and Afghanistan, is The Daily Signal's foreign correspondent based in Ukraine. The Daily Signal is the multimedia news organization of The Heritage Foundation.

KYIV, Ukraine-There's a saying in Ukraine about the four stages of being poor. It goes like this: First, you don't have any hryvnias (the Ukrainian currency). Second, you don't have any food. Third, you don't have any dollars. And finally, you don't have your $2 bill.

For Ukrainians, dollars are a precious and jealously guarded rainy-day commodity. And for whatever reason, when the U.S. reintroduced the $2 bill in 1976, notes dated from that year became a popular good luck charm. Many Ukrainians still keep a $2 bill from 1976 in their wallet, with no intention of ever spending it.

But starting in 2014, as Ukraine's currency fluctuated wildly against the dollar in the wake of revolution and amid a war against Russian-backed separatists, bank tellers reported a trend: Many Ukrainians were exchanging their $2 bills.

Some said it was a sign of how desperate the situation had become in the post-Soviet country. One Ukrainian journalist saw it more symbolically.

"They were cashing in on the American dream," she said.

Ukrainian Azov Battalion soldier Ivan Kharkiv (right) and another soldier in front of a poster that says "Bye, Bye Lenin." (Photo courtesy Ivan Kharkiv)
Ivan Kharkiv, right, with the Ukrainian Azov Battalion, poses with another soldier in front of a poster that reads 'Bye-Bye, Lenin.' (Photo courtesy Ivan Kharkiv)

Ukrainian proclivity for American culture runs deeper than affinities for Big Macs, Nikes, and Hollywood flicks.

In the quarter-century since the fall of the Soviet Union, Ukraine has gone through revolutions and war to build a functioning democracy and free itself from Russian vassalage. Accordingly, for many Ukrainians, embracing American culture is a symbolic way to resist Moscow dating back to the Cold War.

Even today, Ukrainian rock bands sometimes play classic rock hits as a throwback to the Soviet days, when Western music was banned and rebellious musicians would sneak Western rock songs into their sets to the delight of crowds.

Psychological Operations

For some Ukrainian soldiers on the front lines of the ongoing war against Russian-backed separatists, American cultural symbols became a way to get under the enemy's skin.

Over the summer in the front-line village of Artemivsk, four Ukrainian soldiers raised the Ukrainian flag in a pose remindful of the famous image of U.S. Marines raising the flag at Iwo Jima.

One soldier in the photo was Denys Antipov, commander of a recon drone platoon in the 81st Airborne Brigade.

"Morale is good," Antipov told The Daily Signal in an interview, describing conditions on the front line. "But we need a truck-it would be better if we had wheels to run away from shelling. We are a good target for the Russians."

While the photo was partly a way "to have some fun," Antipov said, the true purpose was "a kind of training before taking the same photo in Moscow."

"It's the future Kremlin flag photo," he said. "This was just a rehearsal."

In Pisky, a front-line city just outside the apocalyptic remains of the Donetsk airport, a Ukrainian soldier manning a machine gun emplacement in the trenches wore a T-shirt trumpeting the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library.

The soldier said he bought the shirt in Kyiv and was wearing it as a statement against Russia. When asked why he chose to wear that shirt into combat, he replied, "Reagan won the Cold War."

He added: "And Putin would hate it."

Over the summer in the Ukrainian village of Krymske, outside the separatist stronghold of Luhansk, Ukrainian soldiers renamed a street from that of a Soviet luminary to "John McCain Street." They taped a paper printout with the U.S. senator's picture to a power pole to make it official.

Canadian journalist and filmmaker Christian Borys asked the soldiers when they were going to name a street after President Barack Obama.

"When he sends us weapons," more than one replied.

'USA Is OK'

With sounds of gunfire audible in the background, 21-year-old Ivan Kharkiv, a soldier with the Ukrainian National Guard's Azov Regiment, introduces himself in a clip on YouTube as "Thomas Miller." A U.S. flag waves behind Kharkiv, a gift from a friend in New York City.

To Kharkiv's right in the video is another Ukrainian soldier, whom Kharkiv introduces as "Ashton Kutcher." The soldier nods approvingly and uncomprehendingly as Kharkiv speaks in thickly accented, staccato English.

"No vodka, no Russia, no Putin. Only Coca-Cola, only Barack Obama," Kharkiv said.

"USA is OK," he added.

Kharkiv, whose father fought with the Soviet Red Army in Afghanistan, stood at a front-line position in Shyrokyne. The perpetual hotspot in the Ukraine war has seen more than a year of trench warfare, including heavy artillery attacks and tank battles. Ukrainian forces dug in here to stop a combined Russian-separatist offensive on nearby Mariupol, a key industrial city on the Sea of Azov.

Kharkiv told The Daily Signal that shortly after he raised the U.S. flag in Shyrokyne, combined Russian-separatist troops fired mortars at his position.

"It pissed them off," he said. "The sad part is they probably thought, 'Look, we were right. It's the NATO legion; Americans really are fighting here.

"Their propaganda is so dumb, sometimes all we can do is laugh about it," he added.

Blaming the Americans

Russian propaganda has painted the 2014 Ukrainian revolution as a CIA-sponsored coup to put in place a neo-Nazi regime in Kyiv.

Some Russian news reports have claimed that U.S. troops and weapons systems, including Apache helicopters, have been fighting for the Ukrainian government in the Donbas, Ukraine's contested eastern territory on the Russian border.

Consequently, for some Ukrainians living in the Donbas with little access to news sources other than Russian ones, America is still the enemy. For them, as for many people living in Russia under the influence of the Kremlin's propaganda, the Cold War never ended, and Soviet-era paranoia about global CIA conspiracies still runs deep.

In August 2014, this correspondent visited the Ukrainian city of Slavyansk less than a month after Ukrainian troops retook the area.

Evidence of the fighting was ubiquitous. The skeletons of tanks blown up by landmines sat on roadsides. Bullet and shrapnel holes pockmarked burned out buildings, making some walls look like Swiss cheese. Artillery craters dimpled the asphalt surface of roads like the surface of water in a rainstorm.

But the worst damage was in the small village of Semyonovka,  just outside Slavyansk.

As they retreated from Slavyansk, combined Russian-separatist forces clashed here with Ukrainian troops. The residential blocks of this rural neighborhood resembled a scene from World War II.

Almost every house was destroyed. Windows were shattered and nearly every vertical surface was riddled by artillery shrapnel. Trees were stripped bare of branches and leaves, leaving behind only charred trunks.

The ground was churned into turbulent piles of black earth, interrupted every so often by the fins of unexploded mortars, which protruded above the surface. Everyday items like pots, pans, and toy dolls were scattered in ruined heaps where artillery detonations had blown them out from the interiors of homes.

It was a scene of absolute destruction and a measure of the intensity of this war.

Most residents had left before the battle, but a few stayed behind to ride out the fighting in their basements. About a month later, some residents were out on an overcast afternoon trying to salvage what was left of their homes.

Opposing Views

A simple survey with the help of a translator found that recollections of the battle varied widely among those who had been there for it.

Alexandra, 63, hid in her basement for the opening days. But she decided to flee when artillery shredded her home. She returned weeks later to find her home and the entire area in ruins.

She blamed the damage on combined Russian-separatist forces and said she was grateful that Ukrainian troops were back in control.

"At least it's better than when the rebels were in charge," she said. "Now the army is here, so nothing bad will happen."

While Alexandra waited for a bus to take her into Slavyansk, across the street a middle-aged woman pushed a wheelbarrow loaded with concrete debris. Her husband and son were nearby, clearing away the walls of their home, which artillery had reduced to rubble.

"When the army leaves, there will be the People's Republic of Donetsk," the husband responded when asked about his allegiances, referencing one of the self-proclaimed separatist republics.

"This is all America's fault," his wife said while loading more rubble into the wheelbarrow. "The stupid people in the White House are causing problems all over the world."

The husband said the family had hidden in their basement during the battle. When asked who had destroyed their home, whether it was combined Russian-separatist or Ukrainian artillery, the man's response highlighted the power of Russian propaganda.

"It was the American CIA bomber planes that did this," he said.

What led him to that conclusion, especially since he had witnessed the battle firsthand? The man responded: "I saw it on the news."

Bye-Bye, Lenin

Under Soviet rule, American culture was a forbidden fruit in Ukraine and other Soviet states.

America, after all, was the enemy.

Inside a Soviet-era bomb shelter in Mariupol, the walls are lined with comic book-style illustrations of U.S. fighter jets dropping nuclear weapons on Soviet women and children.

"We were training to fight a war with America," said Igor Bulgakov, 49, a former Ukrainian army lieutenant colonel who served as an officer in the Red Army during the Soviet war in Afghanistan.

In post-Soviet Ukraine, however, America and Russia have swapped roles.

In 2015, the U.S. Army began training the regular Ukrainian army and National Guard to fight combined Russian-separatist forces. The exercise, called Fearless Guardian, is ongoing at a former Soviet military base in Yavoriv, Ukraine.

Meanwhile,  Kyiv passed a series of sweeping "decommunization" measures outlawing Soviet symbols such as statues of Vladimir Lenin, the hammer and sickle flag, and the Soviet national anthem.

"We are at war," Ostap Kryvdyk, an adviser to the vice speaker of Ukraine's parliament, told The Daily Signal in an earlier interview, adding:

The attack of Russia on Ukraine is not only a military attack, it is first and foremost an information attack that was started by the Soviet Union before and continued by Russia as the heir to the Soviet empire.

When Bulgakov was a lieutenant in the Red Army, he carried a picture of Lenin in his wallet. "Now I hate Lenin. I hate communism," he said.

Bulgakov retired from the military in 2007, but supports the Ukrainian war effort by driving supplies to troops on the front lines.

"We're in a war with Russia because they're stuck in a Soviet mindset and we aren't," Bulgakov said. "We will never again be like brothers with Russia."


 
 #36
Atlantic Council
January 4, 2016
New Russian Management of the Donbas Signifies Putin May Be Ready to Negotiate
BY ANDERS �SLUND
Anders �slund is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and author of "Ukraine: What Went Wrong and How to Fix It."   

On December 26, Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed one of his close, trusted aides, Boris Gryzlov, Russia's representative in the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine, which concluded the two Minsk agreements on the Donbas in September 2014 and February 2015. This appointment suggests an important change in Russia's policy toward Ukraine. Gryzlov is a heavyweight in Putin's inner circle, a permanent member of its security council, former minister of interior, speaker of the State Duma, and a colleague from Putin's St. Petersburg KGB days.

Gryzlov replaces lightweight ambassador Azamat Kul'mukhametov, who has held that post since April. His appointment was seen as an attempt to downplay Russia's role and to force Ukraine to negotiate with the leaders of the Russian-controlled Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) and Luhansk People's Republic (LNR). Now, the Kremlin has taken direct control.

This year, three strong-minded rebel commanders (Pavel Dremov, Aleksei Mozgovoy, and Aleksei Bednov) were killed in a professional fashion, making observers presume the killers belonged to the Russian military intelligence. In the summer, it became evident that the troops of the DNR and LNR were directly subordinated to the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Russian commanders were identified by the Ukrainian Defense and Security Council.

The political leaders of DNR and LNR have been the same since August 2014, when Aleksandr Zakharchenko replaced Alexander Borodai as prime minister of the DNR and Igor Plotnitskiy became head of the LNR. Their appointments marked the end of Russia's attempted Novorossiya project, the incorporation of eight Ukrainian regions into Russia. Both leaders are considered of limited capability with no political appeal but obedient to Moscow.

In the second half of 2014, the occupied Donbas went through terrible destruction. Russian engineering troops blew up bridges and factories were subject to extensive artillery fire. All banks and ATM machines were looted and banking ceased. Most shops closed, leaving little but grocery stores. Rebels plundered or seized small, medium-sized and state enterprises, while big private enterprises, largely owned by Rinat Akhmetov's DTEK and Metinvest, were protected by the Kremlin. They continue to operate according to Ukrainian law in Ukrainian currency and pay Ukrainian taxes. Their workers have to go to ATM machines in free Ukraine to collect their salaries. Roughly 2-2.5 million people have fled the Donbas and about as many remain; 1.4 million moved to free Ukraine. Within the DNR and LNR territories, the population has moved, from small towns close to the fighting to the main cities, Donetsk and Luhansk. The economy has been devastated. This territory that produced 10 percent of Ukraine's GDP now works at about 30 percent capacity. The border from Ukraine to the DNR is relatively open, while the LNR allows much less transborder traffic.

During the Minsk negotiations in February 2015, one of the main Russian demands was that the Ukrainian government provide public financing to the occupied Donbas, although the Ukrainian government was not able to control the territory or collect taxes there. Sensibly, Ukraine has insisted that it can only pay pensions to people who are registered in non-occupied Ukraine and collect their pensions there. In April 2015, Russia hesitantly started paying pensions in cash to residents in the occupied Donbas.

In October, the Kremlin changed its management of the occupied Donbas, though this has not been publicly announced. Several blogs mentioned the change on October 30, and businessmen operating in the area have confirmed the changes. The management passed from the Russian presidential administration to the Russian government. Putin's personal assistant Vladislav Surkov was replaced by Deputy Prime Minister Dmitri Kozak. Both are Putin loyalists, reporting directly to the President, but Surkov is an aggressive troublemaker who was in charge of the Novorossiya project, while Kozak, a lawyer from St. Petersburg, is in charge of regional affairs, including Russia's management of its frozen conflicts.

The economic management of the occupied Donbas has changed as well. Under Kozak, Russia's Deputy Minister of Economic Development for regional development Sergey Nazarov is in charge of the region's economy. He chairs a Russian working group for humanitarian assistance for the occupied Donbas, involving all the relevant Russian agencies and commanding the governments of the DNR and LNR. Private Russian enterprises do not seem to play any role.

Thus, the Russian federal government swiftly changed from lawless destruction to financing the reconstruction and humanitarian aid in the occupied Donbas. As a consequence, the still-operating companies have inched up their production. DTEK has been allowed to repair the state-owned railways with its own means so that it can transport coal produced in its mines in the occupied Donbas by rail to its power stations in free Ukraine.

Needless to say, the Russian government operates only in rubles, but it is trying to restore the banking system. An excellent journalistic article reports that the "only bank open is the rebel-run Republican Central Bank, which has around 100 branches." There are other reports that a Russian state bank, the Russian National Commercial Bank, has entered this territory.

The transition to Kozak and Gryzlov is undoubtedly an important milestone. Kozak's appointment indicates that Russia has concluded its active military phase and moved on to long-term management of frozen conflicts. The appointment of Gryzlov is more curious. He represented Putin in the roundtable negotiation that led to the settlement of the Orange Revolution with repeat elections in December 2004. If Putin authorized Gryzlov to make substantial concessions to Ukraine then, he might be ready to do so again. The Russian war in the Donbas has been neither small nor victorious, so the best the Kremlin can do is to forget about it. In any case, unlike his predecessor, Gryzlov can negotiate with the authority of the Kremlin.

 
 #37
Consortiumnews.com
January 6, 2016
Reality Peeks Through in Ukraine
By Robert Parry
Investigative reporter Robert Parry broke many of the Iran-Contra stories for The Associated Press and Newsweek in the 1980s.

Exclusive: With corruption rampant and living standards falling, Ukraine may become the next failed state that "benefited" from a neoconservative-driven "regime change," though the blame will always be placed elsewhere - in this case, on the demonized Russian President Putin, writes Robert Parry.

Nearly two years since U.S. officials helped foment a coup in Ukraine - partly justified by corruption allegations - the country continues to wallow in graft and cronyism as the living standards for average Ukrainians plummet, according to economic data and polls of public attitudes.

Even the neocon-oriented Wall Street Journal took note of the worsening corruption in a Jan. 1, 2016 article observing that "most Ukrainians say the revolution's promise to replace rule by thieves with the rule of law has fallen short and the government acknowledges that there is still much to be done."

Actually, the numbers suggest something even worse. More and more Ukrainians rate corruption as a major problem facing the nation, including a majority of 53 percent last September, up from 48 percent last June and 28 percent in September 2014, according to polls by International Foundation for Electoral Systems.

Meanwhile, Ukraine's GDP has fallen in every quarter since the Feb. 22, 2014 putsch that overthrew elected President Viktor Yanukovych. Since then, the average Ukrainian also has faced economic "reforms" to slash pensions, energy subsidies and other social programs, as demanded by the International Monetary Fund.

In other words, the hard lives of most Ukrainians have gotten significantly harder while the elites continue to skim off whatever cream is left, including access to billions of dollars in the West's foreign assistance that is keeping the economy afloat.

Part of the problem appears to be that people supposedly responsible for the corruption fight are themselves dogged by allegations of corruption. The Journal cited Ukrainian lawmaker Volodymyr Parasyuk who claimed to be so outraged by graft that he expressed his fury "by kicking in the face an official he says owns luxury properties worth much more than a state salary could provide."

However, the Journal also noted that "parliament is the site of frequent mass brawls [and] it is hard to untangle all the overlapping corruption allegations and squabbling over who is to blame. Mr. Parasyuk himself was named this week as receiving money from an organized crime suspect, a claim he denies."

Then, there is the case of Finance Minister Natalie Jaresko, who is regarded by top American columnists as the face of Ukraine's reform. Indeed, a Wall Street Journal op-ed last month by Stephen Sestanovich, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, hailed Jaresko as "a tough reformer" whose painful plans include imposing a 20 percent "flat tax" on Ukrainians (a favorite nostrum of the American Right which despises a progressive tax structure that charges the rich at a higher rate).

Sestanovich noted that hedge-fund billionaire George Soros, who has made a fortune by speculating in foreign currencies, has endorsed Jaresko's plan but that it is opposed by some key parliamentarians who favor a "populist" alternative that Sestanovich says "will cut rates, explode the deficit, and kiss IMF money good-bye."

Yet, Jaresko is hardly a paragon of reform. Prior to getting instant Ukrainian citizenship and becoming Finance Minister in December 2014, she was a former U.S. diplomat who had been entrusted to run a $150 million U.S.-taxpayer-funded program to help jump-start an investment economy in Ukraine and Moldova.

Jaresko's compensation was capped at $150,000 a year, a salary that many Americans would envy, but it was not enough for her. So, she engaged in a variety of maneuvers to evade the cap and enrich herself by claiming millions of dollars in bonuses and fees.

Ultimately, Jaresko was collecting more than $2 million a year after she shifted management of the Western NIS Enterprise Fund (WNISEF) to her own private company, Horizon Capital, and arranged to get lucrative bonuses when selling off investments, even as the overall WNISEF fund was losing money, according to official records.

For instance, Jaresko collected $1.77 million in bonuses in 2013, according to WNISEF's latest available filing with the Internal Revenue Service. In her financial disclosure forms with the Ukrainian government, she reported earning $2.66 million in 2013 and $2.05 million in 2014, thus amassing a sizeable personal fortune while investing U.S. taxpayers' money supposedly to benefit the Ukrainian people.

It didn't matter that WNISEF continued to hemorrhage money, shrinking from its original $150 million to $89.8 million in the 2013 tax year, according to the IRS filing. WNISEF reported that the bonuses to Jaresko and other corporate officers were based on "successful" exits from some investments even if the overall fund was losing money. [See Consortiumnews.com's "How Ukraine's Finance Minister Got Rich."]

Though Jaresko's enrichment schemes are documented by IRS and other official filings, the mainstream U.S. media has turned a blind eye to this history, all the better to pretend that Ukraine's "reform" process is in good hands. (It also turns out that Jaresko did not comply with Ukrainian law that permits only single citizenship; she has kept her U.S. passport exploiting a loophole that gives her two years to show that she has renounced her U.S. citizenship.)

Propaganda over Reality

Yet, as good as propaganda can be - especially when the U.S. government and mainstream media are moving in lockstep - reality is not always easily managed. Ukraine's continuing - and some say worsening - corruption prompted last month's trip to Ukraine by Vice President Joe Biden who gave a combination lecture and pep talk to Ukraine's parliament.

Of course, Biden has his own Ukraine cronyism problem because - three months after the U.S.-backed overthrow of the Yanukovych government - Ukraine's largest private gas firm, Burisma Holdings, appointed his son, Hunter Biden, to its board of directors.

Burisma - a shadowy Cyprus-based company - also lined up well-connected lobbyists, some with ties to Secretary of State John Kerry, including Kerry's former Senate chief of staff David Leiter, according to lobbying disclosures.

As Time magazine reported, "Leiter's involvement in the firm rounds out a power-packed team of politically-connected Americans that also includes a second new board member, Devon Archer, a Democratic bundler and former adviser to John Kerry's 2004 presidential campaign. Both Archer and Hunter Biden have worked as business partners with Kerry's son-in-law, Christopher Heinz, the founding partner of Rosemont Capital, a private-equity company."

According to investigative journalism inside Ukraine, the ownership of Burisma has been traced to Privat Bank, which is controlled by the thuggish billionaire oligarch Ihor Kolomoysky, who was appointed by the U.S.-backed "reform" regime to be governor of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, a south-central province of Ukraine (though Kolomoisky was eventually ousted from that post in a power struggle over control of UkrTransNafta, Ukraine's state-owned oil pipeline operator).

In his December speech, Biden lauded the sacrifice of the 100 or so protesters who died during the Maidan clashes in February 2014, referring to them by their laudatory name "The Heavenly Hundred." But Biden made no heavenly references to the estimated 10,000 people, mostly ethnic Russians, who have been slaughtered in the U.S.-encouraged "Anti-Terror Operation" waged by the coup regime against eastern Ukrainians who objected to the violent ouster of President Yanukovych, who had won large majorities in those areas.

Apparently, heaven is not as eager to welcome ethnic Russian victims of U.S.-inspired political violence. Nor did Biden take note that some of the Heavenly Hundred were street fighters for neo-Nazi and other far-right nationalist organizations.

But - after making his sugary references to The Heavenly Hundred - Biden delivered his bitter medicine, an appeal for the parliament to continue implementing IMF "reforms," including demands that old people work longer into their old age.

Biden said, "For Ukraine to continue to make progress and to keep the support of the international community you have to do more, as well. The big part of moving forward with your IMF program - it requires difficult reforms. And they are difficult.

"Let me say parenthetically here, all the experts from our State Department and all the think tanks, and they come and tell you, that you know what you should do is you should deal with pensions. You should deal with - as if it's easy to do. Hell, we're having trouble in America dealing with it. We're having trouble. To vote to raise the pension age is to write your political obituary in many places.

"Don't misunderstand that those of us who serve in other democratic institutions don't understand how hard the conditions are, how difficult it is to cast some of the votes to meet the obligations committed to under the IMF. It requires sacrifices that might not be politically expedient or popular. But they're critical to putting Ukraine on the path to a future that is economically secure. And I urge you to stay the course as hard as it is. Ukraine needs a budget that's consistent with your IMF commitments."

Eroding Support

But more and more Ukrainians appear to see through the charade in Kiev, as the poll numbers on the corruption crisis soar. Meanwhile, European officials seem to be growing impatient with the Ukraine crisis which has added to the drag on the Continent's economies because the Obama administration strong-armed the E.U. into painful economic sanctions against Russia, which had come to the defense of the embattled ethnic Russians in the east.

"Many E.U. officials are fed up with Ukraine," said one Western official quoted by the Journal, which added that "accusations of graft by anticorruption activists, journalists and diplomats have followed to the new government."

The Journal said those implicated include some early U.S. favorites, such as Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk, "whose ratings have plummeted to single digits amid allegations in the media and among anticorruption activists of his associates' corrupt dealings. Mr. Yatsenyuk has denied any involvement in corruption and his associates, one of whom resigned from parliament over the controversy this month, deny wrongdoing."

The controversy over Yatsenyuk's alleged cronyism led to an embarrassing moment in December 2015 when an anti-Yatsenyuk lawmaker approached the podium with a bouquet of roses, which the slightly built Yatsenyuk accepted only to have the lawmaker lift him up and try to carry him from the podium.

In many ways, the Ukraine crisis represents just another failure of neocon-driven "regime change," which has also spread chaos across the Middle East and northern Africa. But the neocons appear to have even a bigger target in their sites, another "regime change" in Moscow, with Ukraine just a preliminary move. Of course, that scheme could put in play nuclear war.

Taking Aim

The Ukraine "regime change" took shape in 2013 after Russian President Putin and President Barack Obama collaborated to tamp down crises in Syria and Iran, two other prime targets for neocon "regime changes." American neocons were furious that those hopes were dashed. Ukraine became Putin's payback.

In fall 2013, the neocons took aim at Ukraine, recognizing its extreme sensitivity to Russia which had seen previous invasions, including by the Nazis in World War II, pass through the plains of Ukraine and into Russia. Carl Gershman, neocon president of the U.S.-funded National Endowment for Democracy, cited Ukraine as the "biggest prize" and a key step toward unseating Putin in Moscow. [See Consortiumnews.com's "What the Neocons Want from Ukraine Crisis."]

Initially, the hope was that Yanukovych would lead Ukraine into an economic collaboration with Europe while cutting ties to Russia. But Yanukovych received a warming from top Ukrainian economists that a hasty split with neighboring Russia would cost the country a staggering $160 billion in lost income.

So, Yanukovych sought to slow down the process, prompting angry protests especially from western Ukrainians who descended on Maidan square. Though initially peaceful, neo-Nazi and other nationalist militias soon infiltrated the protests and began ratcheting up the violence, including burning police with Molotov cocktails.

Meanwhile, U.S.-funded non-governmental organizations, such as the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (which receives money from USAID and hedge-fund billionaire George Soros's Open Society), hammered away at alleged corruption in the Yanukovych government.

In December 2013, Nuland reminded Ukrainian business leaders that the United States had invested $5 billion in their "European aspirations," and - in an intercepted phone call in early February 2014 - she discussed with U.S. Ambassador Geoffrey Pyatt who Ukraine's new leaders would be.

"Yats is the guy," Nuland said of Arseniy Yatsenyuk, as she also disparaged a less aggressive approach by the European Union with the pithy phrase: "Fuck the E.U." (Nuland, a former aide to ex-Vice President Dick Cheney, is the wife of arch-neoconservative ideologue Robert Kagan.)

Sen. John McCain also urged on the protests, telling one group of right-wing Ukrainian nationalists that they had America's backing. And, the West's mainstream media fell in love with the Maidan protesters as innocent white hats and thus blamed the worsening violence on Yanukovych. [See Consortiumnews.com's "NYT Still Pretends No Coup in Ukraine."]

Urging Restraint

In Biden's December 2015 speech to the parliament, he confirmed that he personally pressed on President Yanukovych the need to avoid violence. "I was literally on the phone with your former President urging restraint," Biden said.

However, on Feb. 20, 2014, mysterious snipers - apparently from buildings controlled by the far right - fired on and killed policemen as well as some protesters. The bloodshed sparked other violent clashes as armed rioters battled with retreating police.

Although the dead included some dozen police officers, the violence was blamed on Yanukovych, who insisted that he had ordered the police not to use lethal force in line with Biden's appeal. But the State Department and the West's mainstream media made Yanukovych the black-hatted villain.

The next day, Feb. 21, Yanukovych signed an accord - negotiated and guaranteed by three European nations - to accept reduced powers and early elections so he could be voted out of office if that was the public's will. However, as police withdrew from the Maidan, the rioters, led by neo-Nazi militias called sotins, stormed government buildings on Feb. 22, forcing Yanukovych and other officials to flee for their lives.

In the West's mainstream media, these developments were widely hailed as a noble "revolution" and - with lumps in their throats - many journalists averted their misty eyes from the key role played by unsavory neo-Nazis, so as not to dampen the happy narrative (although BBC was among the few MSM outlets that touched on this inconvenient reality).

Ever since, the major U.S. news media has stayed fully on board, ignoring evidence that what happened was a U.S.-sponsored coup. The MSM simply explains all the trouble as a case of naked "Russian aggression.

There were kudos, too, when "reformer" Natalie Jaresko was made Finance Minister along with other foreign "technocrats." There was no attention paid to evidence about the dark underside of the Ukrainian "revolution of dignity," as Biden called it.

Though the neo-Nazis - sometimes even teamed up with Islamic jihadists - were the tip of the spear slashing through eastern Ukraine, their existence was either buried deep inside stories or dismissed as "Russian propaganda."

That was, in effect, American propaganda and, as clever as it was, it could only control reality for so long.

Even though the fuller truth about Ukraine has never reached the American people, there comes a point when even the best propagandists have to start modifying their rosy depictions. Ukraine appears to have reached that moment.


 
 #38
Le Monde diplomatique
January 4, 2016
Ukraine conflict reaches the Caucasus
By Jens Malling

Broken columns, damaged balustrades, fallen statues and faded mosaics are everywhere - proof that Abkhazia was once part of a great empire. Only the empire in question is not Greek or Roman, but a Soviet one. Structures in the architectural style of socialist classicism that Stalin favoured dominate. For years Abkhazia's ideal location on the Black Sea made it the preferred holiday destination for every combine-worker and kolkhoz-farmer from the 15 Soviet republics.

Abkhazia has been de facto independent since a devastating war with Georgia in 1992-3 - a conflict that arose from the breakup of the USSR in 1991. The scale of the fighting is clear from many houses in the capital Sukhum, where bullet-holes still cover the walls. Apart from the thousands who died, there was widespread destruction of infrastructure, buildings and equipment; and the majority of the 240,000 Kartvelians (Mingrelians, Georgians, Svans) in the territory fled. The government in Tbilisi has never - like most UN members - recognized Abkhasia's independence and wants to have the territory back under Georgian control.

Since 1921, different constitutions had defined Abkhazian autonomy in association with the Georgian Soviet Republic. This was unilaterally cancelled by the Georgians in March 1990, in the chaotic period when the Soviet Union fell apart and Georgia became an independent country. The move ignored the interests and wishes of the Abkhazians, leaving them without their own constitutional status, and they considered it a quasi-colonial annexation (1). Two years later their worst fears came true, when the Georgian government backed its decision by sending forces to Sukhum to secure control of the area, which covers 8,600 square kilometres (roughly the size of Corsica).

Largely owing to Stalin's settlement policy, the Abkhazians had become a minority in the territory. In 1989, 45.7% of them were considered to be 'Georgians', most of them of Mingrelian descent, and 17.8% to be Abkhazians. Russians were 14.3%; Armenians 14.6%; Greeks 2.8%; and Ukrainians 2.2%. A small Estonian minority also lived in the territory, as shown in the 2013 award-winning Tangerines, an anti-war movie by Georgian director Zaza Urushadze about the 1992-3 fighting in Abkhazia. Mainly because of the Georgian exodus, Abkhazia has seen its post-war population shrink from 525,000 in 1989 to around 241,000 in 2011 (2): Abkhazians are now the majority, though there is still much ethnic diversity.

This corner of the Caucasus was largely forgotten until August 2008 when the Five Day War between Georgia and Russia erupted, over another territory where Tbilisi claims supremacy - South Ossetia. The conflict greatly soured relations between the West and Russia; and is seen as a run-up to the war in the Donbass six years later. Professor of Russian and European politics Richard Sakwa called it Russia's 'first war to Stop NATO expansion' (3) - the fighting in Eastern Ukraine is the second - and it seriously changed the balance of power in the region by questioning the West's ability and will to make Georgia a member of the Atlantic Pact.

A further result of the August war was that Russia recognized Abkhazia's - and South Ossetia's - independence. The move was condemned in western capitals as a violation of international law, although six months earlier the EU and US had themselves recognized Kosovo's independence from Serbia. Russia unilaterally lifted international sanctions against Abkhazia that had destroyed its trade and vital tourist industry. Since then, Abkhaz relations with its large northern neighbour have been very strong and its presence in Abkhazia is felt widely, not least through a large contingent of Russian soldiers stationed there. In Sukhum and Moscow, they are viewed as peacekeepers. In Tbilis, they are considered an occupying force on Georgian territory. Moscow issues Russian passports to Abkhazians, who need them for travelling since their own documents are not recognized abroad; the elderly need Russian passports to receive pensions from Moscow. It is believed that more than half the Abkhazians now hold Russian passports; and the currency is the Russian rouble. Abkhazia has is own native language, but Russian is widely spoken. The country's most important trade partner by far is Russia, with Turkey in second place. In the first six months of 2014, more than a million Russian tourists visited Abkhazia (4). The small republic has fertile lands and grows agricultural products, including tea, tobacco, wine and fruits.

The fact that Russo-western relations are now deteriorating even further over Ukraine, and the EU and US have effectively turned their backs on Abkhazia (adopting a pro-Georgia stance) has made Abkhazia and Russia become even closer. Recently the two sides put their intentions for closer cooperation on paper. President Vladimir Putin and his Abkhazian counterpart Raul Khajimba signed a far-reaching agreement on alliance and strategic partnership in Sochi in November 2014, which came into effect in March 2015. Putin has promised subsidies to Abkhazia amounting to €247 million over the next three years (5), modernization of the Abkhazian military and a common defence and security space; and the deal aims to coordinate foreign policy and strengthen cultural and economic cooperation. Abkhazia will adapt its customs' legislation to the standards in the Eurasian Economic Union. Healthcare, education and social policy are to be harmonized. Border-control and combating international crime are to be carried out through a Joint Information and Coordination Centre (6).

The agreement was condemned in the West; organizations like the EU and NATO see it as a violation of Georgia's 'territorial integrity' (7).

The ever-warmer feelings between Sukhum and Moscow coincide with the August 2014 election of the pro-Russian Raul Khajimba as Abkhazia's president. Critics warn that increasing Russian influence might jeopardize the independence that Abkhazia fought for in the 1992-93 war (8). But the Abkhazian foreign minister, Viacheslav Chirikba, doesn't share their concerns: 'Abkhazia has been an independent country for more than twenty years. We will not become a part of any other country. We have defended our independence and shown that we are ready to sacrifice our lives for it. We reached a victory and managed to build up a functioning democracy - one of the few democracies on the former Soviet space. We have elections, which are very competitive by all standards. We have freedom of the press. We have freedom of religion and ethnic expressions. Abkhazia is a very relaxed, democratic country almost with a Mediterranean feel to it. We have shown the world that we can function as an independent state with all state institutions. At the same time we want to develop closer ties with Russia on the levels of security, economy and culture. Our strategic partner is Russia. She is the sole guarantee of our security against attempts by Georgia to invade Abkhazia again. Furthermore, Moscow is by far the largest donor to Abkhazia. Without Russian assistance we would be in very bad shape.'

The parliament and government building is close to Sukhum Bay, full of Russian holidaymakers. The hall of the foreign minister's office is decorated with photos: in one of them Chirikba shakes hands with Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov; another shows the Abkhazian leader and national hero Nestor Lakoba, who was murdered by Beria under Stalin in 1936. The country's large red, white and green flag with a hand and stars is in place. So are the flags of those nations who recognize Abkhazia's independence - Venezuela, Transniestria, Nagorno-Karabakh, Nauru, Nicaragua, South Ossetia and Tuvalu.

It is unlikely that the 'frozen' conflict between Abkhazia and Georgia will be solved any time soon or that Abkhazia will obtain recognition from the West. Quite the contrary, according to expert on Georgian-Abkhazian relations George Hewitt: 'Given the pro-Georgian position adopted by the West as soon as former Foreign Minister of the USSR and Georgian national Eduard Shevardnadze returned to post-Soviet Georgia in March 1992 and the consequent negative attitude towards both Abkhazia and South Ossetia, worsening relations with Russia following events in the Ukraine can hardly help improve the situation. Neither Abkhazians nor South Ossetians can expect any changes in their favour in the near future. Also, the West's sanctions on Russia cannot but have an impact on the regions, which depend so much on Russian financial support.' Hewitt holds that the initial response by the West to the break-up of the USSR and the former Soviet Republic of Georgia, based on ignorance of the internal dynamics of Georgia's problems, was a bad mistake.

Chirikba regrets the way Abkhazian-Georgian relations are portrayed in the western media: in Abkhazia, the US and the EU are sees as biased in favour of Georgia. Meanwhile out in the streets of Sukhum, people are frank about Abkhazia's marginalized position on the global scene and its narrow room for manoeuvre. 'On one side, there is Georgia, the US and NATO; on the other are Abkhazia and Russia. It is a fact. It is politics.'


 
 
#39
Wall Street Journal
January 7, 2016
Split Personality
Will Ukraine become part of the West, like Poland? Or will it be drawn back into Moscow's shadow, like a larger version of Belarus?
By EDWARD LUCAS
Mr. Lucas writes for the Economist. His latest book is "Cyberphobia: Identity, Trust, Security and the Internet."

THE GATES OF EUROPE
By Serhii Plokhy
Basic, 395 pages, $29.99

Ukraine is the laboratory for experiments that will determine Europe's future. Will it continue to exist as an independent, unified country? Or will it split along regional, ethnic or linguistic lines? Will it become part of the West, like a bigger Poland? Or will it be drawn back into the shadow of Moscow, like a larger version of Belarus?

To Europe's shame, the answers to these questions do not lie wholly in the hands of Ukrainians. As Harvard historian Serhii Plokhy writes in this exemplary account of Europe's least-known large country, the post-Soviet Kremlin has switched from building a modern state to "the idea of forming a single Russian nation . . . unifying the eastern Slavs on the basis of Russian language and culture. Ukraine has become the first testing-ground for this model outside the Russian Federation."

The resulting headlines of the last two years-of bravery, brutality, insurrection, annexation, espionage, propaganda, economic sanctions and foreign intervention-all have roots in a story that goes back more than a millennium. In particular, they are about who is the real heir to a long-forgotten superpower-Kyivan Rus-which brought the rule of law, Christianity and nationhood to lands that include parts of modern Belarus, Moldova, Poland, Russia and Ukraine.

This will be baffling territory for many readers. But one of the joys of reading the "The Gates of Europe" is that what might seem a dense account of distant events involving unfamiliar places and people is leavened by aphorism and anecdote. The Slavic tribes of that era despised bridal virginity, for example, seeing it as evidence of undesirability. The Viking princess Helga, establishing her warrior-trader kinsfolk's grip over their far-flung conquest, dealt with some of her menacing and filthy Slavic suitors by insisting that they wash before she received them. Locked in her sauna, they were scalded to death.

Helga's Slavic-Viking hybrid realm was the 10th-century proto-state for what later became Kyivan Rus, a country with no precise date of birth but a definite date of death: Dec. 7, 1240, when the Mongol invasion conquered the capital. But the question of who can claim the legacy of Kyivan Rus is vital. Yaroslav the Wise-a remarkably enlightened successor to Helga-appears on both Russian and Ukrainian bank notes, mustachioed in the style of a Ukrainian Cossack on one, bearded like a Russian czar on the other. His bones disappeared in 1944 in Kyiv as the Germans were retreating; they may now, Mr. Plokhy hints, be hidden in a Ukrainian church in Brooklyn.

Ukraine has often been wiped off the geographical map while remaining on the intellectual one. Kyivan Rus, for example, bequeathed its traditions of legality to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (another forgotten superpower) and thence to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Ukrainian national identity awakened in the 19th century in the literary sphere, when the prospects of an independent state were still unimaginably distant. Such stirrings of national sentiment infuriated many Russians then, as they do now. Mr. Plokhy quotes the unthinking imperialism of a poem that Alexander Pushkin wrote after the crushing of a rebellion in Warsaw: "Right of rebellion recognized, / Will Lithuania spurn our rule? / And Kiev, decrepit, golden-domed, / This ancestor of Russian towns- / Will it conjoin its sainted graves / With reckless Warsaw?"

In fact, the heritage of Kyivan Rus is eminently shareable, like Roman law and Greek philosophy. But for the Kremlin to admit that Ukraine is a real country would be to cast doubt on the legitimacy of Russia's own quasi-feudal statehood.

Ukrainians have often been midwives of their own misfortunes, making it easy for malevolent outsiders to divide and corral them. As Mr. Plokhy notes, Ukrainians are "successful rebels" but "amateurs at building a state." That weakness was displayed in the shambles that followed World War I, when a short-lived Ukrainian republic flickered and died among sickening bloodshed. It has been even more painfully visible in the years since the Soviet collapse, when the country's political class, in governments of all stripes, has displayed a dispiriting level of venality and incompetence.

Oddly, one of the relatively bright spots was in the early years of Soviet rule, when the Communist leadership believed that strengthening Ukrainian language, culture and identity was an essential part of building a modern Soviet state. But such hopes were soon shattered. As Mr. Plokhy writes: "The eruption of the Stalinist volcano reduced to ashes the high hopes that Ukrainian nation builders had once cherished with regard to the revolutionary regime in Moscow." A putative Ukrainian Piedmont had become a Pompei.

After the mass starvation and purges of the Stalin era, many Ukrainians welcomed the German invaders in 1941. That proved to be a tragic mistake. The Nazis persecuted Ukrainian nationalists, and every sixth Jew who died in the Holocaust came from Ukraine. A minor flaw of the book is that it glides over one of the great untold episodes in postwar military history: the Ukrainian resistance to Soviet rule, which involved tens of thousands of men and the creation of a parallel underground state, and lasted for more than a decade.

But as Mr. Plokhy rightly maintains, Ukraine is not a country in which it makes sense to draw straight lines or demand clear categories. It was and is a hybrid of overlapping and often indistinct linguistic, ethnic, cultural, historical and religious sub-identities. These are not exactly divisions-certainly the idea of a country cloven between a "Russian-speaking" east and a "Ukrainian-speaking" west is misleadingly simplistic. But the big hope now is that outside pressure may have finally crystallized Ukraine's identity. It has worked before: The partitions of Poland were the starting point for modern Polish nationalism, and the Napoleonic invasion of Germany gave rise to pan-German ideas. "Invaded, humiliated, and war-torn," Mr. Plokhy concludes, Ukraine seems to be following a similar pattern. Much hangs on the outcome.
 
 #40
http://gordonhahn.com
January 7, 2016
Maidan Ukraine, the Ultra-Nationalist Tradition, and Anti-Semitism, Parts 1 and 2
By Gordon M. Hahn
Gordon M. Hahn is an Analyst and Advisory Board Member of the Geostrategic Forecasting Corporation, Chicago, Illinois; Adjunct Professor and Senior Researcher, Middlebury Institute for International Studies at Monterey; Senior Researcher, Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies (CETIS), Akribis Group, San Jose, California; a Contributor for Russia Direct, www.russia-direct.org; and an Analyst/Consultant, Russia Other Points of View - Russia Media Watch, http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com. Dr Hahn is author of three well-received books, Russia's Revolution From Above (Transaction, 2002), Russia's Islamic Threat (Yale University Press, 2007), which was named an outstanding title of 2007 by Choice magazine, and The 'Caucasus Emirate' Mujahedin: Global Jihadism in Russia's North Caucasus and Beyond (McFarland Publishers, 2014). He also has authored hundreds of articles in scholarly journals and other publications on Russian, Eurasian and international politics. Dr. Hahn has taught Russian politics and other courses at Boston, American, Stanford, San Jose State, St. Petersburg State (Russia), and San Francisco State Universities as well as the Middlebury Institute for International Studies at Monterey, California. He also has been a Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (2011-2013) and a Visiting Scholar at both the Hoover Institution and the Kennan Institute.

[Text with footnotes here http://gordonhahn.com/2016/01/07/maidan-ukraine-the-ultra-nationalist-tradition-and-anti-semitism-parts-1-and-2/]
[Part 3 forthcoming next week]

Initially, it appeared that the xenophobia tied to the numerous neo-fascist, ultra-nationalist, and national chauvinist elements inside and around the Maidan Ukraine's Wiemar-like regime would be focused almost entirely on Russians - the so-called 'vatniki' (referencing lined jackets warn in the Gulag to imply Russians are inherently sheep and slaves) and 'koloradi' (beetle bugs) - of the initially democratic but increasingly ultra-rightist February 2014 Maidan revolution. However, increasingly Ukraine's significant strain of anti-Semitism and those who propagandize it are rearing their ugly head ever more insistently. The following article reviews the Ukrainian strains of xenophobia and anti-Semitism throughout Ukraine's history and under the new Maidan regime.

The Rise of Ukrainian Ultra-Nationalism and Its Alliance with the Nazis

The core of the new Ukrainian nationalist movement was the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) led by Stepan Bandera was based largely in Polish Galicia. In contrast to their counterparts living in the totalitarian USSR, Ukrainian nationalists in Galicia had political space to develop an organized movement in autocratic but relatively free Austro-Hungary and much more so the fledgling nation-states and democracies of early interwar Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Hungary that replaced the Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires. This put Ukrainian nationalists there in a position to make another attempt at achieving Ukrainian independence in the interstesces created in the region by the great conflagration of World War Two, or so it seemed. Encouraged by the era's principle of national self-determination, but the only major nationality left out of the region's new nation-state order, the 7 million Western Ukrainians, most of whom lived in Poland, gave birth to a new national movement. Unfortunately, that movement would be tainted by the ultra-nationalism, neo-fascism, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism that was also part and parcel of both the region and the era. These 'isms' in turn were violently opposed to the equally radical communist competitor of the region and era.

Despite growing Polish nationalism and authoritarianism in the wake of Marshal Joseph Pilsudski's 1926 military coup, some civic space remained in which Ukrainians' could self-organize the core of the new Ukrainian nationalist movement, Bandera's OUN. Founded in 1929 as a revolutionary nationalist organization, much of its leadership spent time in Nazi Germany, and the group held up the notion of an ethnically pure Ukrainian nation. The OUN emerged out of the 'integral nationalism' movement - a reaction to the failures in establishing an independent Ukrainian state during the opportune upheavals in the revolutionary period of 1917-20. Integral nationalism was not an integrated system of ideas but a collection of basic concepts intended to "incite people" to nationalist revolutionary action. The Ukrainian historian Orest Subtelny notes that Ukrainian integral nationalism "clearly contained elements of fascism and totalitarianism." It resembled the agrarian fascism of the Romanian Iron Guard, the Croatian Ustashi, and Hungarian Arrow Cross. A key element was similar to an integral component of many Russian nationalist strains of thought frequently emphasized by Westerners - sobornist (in Russian sobornost'). Sobornist in the Ukrainian ultr-nationalist milieu of both the inter-war period and today signifies national collectivism; the nation's cause supercedes the rights and interests of individuals when they clash. The OUN's ideology proposed "revolutionary action, radical solutions, and the creation of "a new breed of 'super' Ukrainians," according to Subtelny. OUN leaders' ideological tracts also contained elements of the anti-Semitism extant at the time across Europe's ultra-nationalist and neofascist groups.

On the eve of World War II, the organization included some 20,000 members, with sympathizers numbering many times more. Snyder's "irritant" carried out hundreds of sabotage acts, dozens of "expropriations" of government moneys, and over 60 successful or attempted assassinations, including Polish Interior Minister Bronislaw Pieracki in 1934. The entire leadership of the OUN's home base in Galicia was arrested in response to the Pieracki assassination, including its future pre-eminent leader Stepan Bandera. Bandera and his close Galician associates were "predisposed to "a violent, heroic type of resistance" and by the eve of the war had reached a fever pitch of "fanaticism," according to Subtlelny.[1] In 1939, as the war began, the OUN split between its older generation rooted in the 1917-1920 struggle for independence and based abroad mostly in Germany and the younger Galicia-based wing, the members of which came to OUN in the 1930s. The former was led by Andrei Melnyk, who supported close ties with Germany alone - the OUN-M or Melkynites. The "young radicals" or OUN-B or OUN-R (revolutionary) were led by "the dynamic, strong-willed Stepan Bandera, who recently had been released from a Polish prison. Bandera supported the creation of a military underground and the development of contacts not just with the Nazis but the Western powers as well.[2]

Ukrainian-Polish conflict became a central feature of Ukrainian nationalism. After Poland's defeat of the Red Army's attempt to export communist revolution to Europe through Galicia in 1919, the Western Powers temporarily recognized Warsaw's jurisdiction over the Galicia on condition it was given administrative autonomy and Ukrainian cultural autonomy. Galicia's Ukrainians, however, refused to recognize the authority of the Polish state, boycoted the 1921 census, and the 1922 Polish sejm or parliamentary elections. In 1923, the Western Powers recognized Poland's hold on Galicia, but Warsaw failed to grant Galicia administrative and cultural autonomy. For example, Ukrainian-language schools created under the Hapsburgs were "systematically eliminated," with 2,048 of 2,400 closed in Eastern Galicia by 1937.[3]

Under the secret protocols of the Soviet-Nazi or Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Soviet troops moved into Galicia and all of western Ukraine, what was then eastern Poland, in September 1939. Like many other OUN members and thousands of other western Ukrainians, Bandera's grandfather Andrei, a Uniate Catholic priest and a founding member of the 1918 self-declared Western Ukrainian National Republic, was executed by the NKVD. He was accused of having allegedly close ties to the OUN, but he denied this during interrogation, confessing that he only sympathized with the organization and was simply a Christian scholar.[4] At the same time, the Soviets initially supported Ukrainization in education and culture, but Ukrainian and all other political parties except for the communists were forced to disband. Tens of thousands, including many OUN members and supporters, fled to German-occupied Poland. When Soviet policy shifted in 1940 and repressions against Ukrainians and Poles ensued in force, deporting 400,000 Ukrainians from Galicia alone, Western Ukrainians remaining in Soviet occupied areas were left with only one political force to protect them - the ultra-nationalist OUN. Since Jews were disproportionate in numbers among the Communists who backed the Soviet takeover, Ukrainians' (and Poles') already strong anti-semitism became even more robust. The historical irony for Ukraine was that the Soviet communists' incorporation of Galicia into the USSR meant that it was the Soviet dictator Stalin who united all Ukrainians inside a single state entity for the first time in centuries.[5]

Ukrainians in the eastern parts of German-occupied Poland called the 'General Government' run by Hans Frank immediately began cooperating with the Nazis in so-called self-help committees staffed mostly by OUN members and supporters from Falicia who fled from the Red Army. The committees were coordinated by the Ukrainian Central Committee (UCC), which the OUN used to raise national consciousness, expanding Ukrainian educational, publishing and youth group infrastructure, despite German warnings that the committees were to refrain from political activity. After the German invasion of the USSR, the UCC extended its work to Galicia. Transcarpathia came under Hungarian occupation, which relied on a 'Rusynification' policy based on the idea that the ethnic Rusyns were linked with Hungarians.[6]

With the Nazi invasion of the USSR on 21 June 1941, it was time for Ukrainian nationalists to turn the tables on the communists. But not before the Soviets in retreat massacred several tens of thousands of their Ukrainian prisoners en masse in Lviv, Sambir, Stanislavyiv, Rivne, Lutsk, and Volhynia during the week of 21-28 June 1941. Many in Galicia, in particular the OUN, turned to Hitler's Nazis as a vehicle for attaining Ukrainian independence or at least avoiding Stalin and communism, submitting to the devil they did not know. Subtelny calls the Nazi-OUN relationship in German-occupied Ukraine "tenuous" and one which each side sought to use "for its own, often contradictory purposes."[7] But both parties had in common a rabid rascism, a cult of violence, and an interest in, and no compunction about slaughtering Poles, Jews, and communists.

OUN ultra-nationalist discourse was traditionally fascist, racist and violent with the objects of its ire focused largely on Jews, as well on their traditional imperial overlords, Poles and Russians. As Per A. Rudling demonstrates, the Nazis and OUN had much in common: "The OUN shared the fascist attributes of anti-liberalism, anti-conservatism, and anti-communism, an armed party, totalitarianism, anti-Semitism, Fuhrerprinzip (the Fuhrer principle), and an adoption of fascist greetings." OUN leaders stressed to the German Nazi leadership that they shared the Nazi worldview and goal of a fascist Europe.[8] The author of the most detailed study of the OUN, Franziska Bruder, concluded that the OUN is "a classic representative of a nationalist movement with fascist characteristics that appeared in East-Central Europe."[9]

The OUN's most influential ideologist was Dmytro Dontsov translated the writings of Mussolini, Hitler, Goebbels, Rosenberg and Franco and wrote his own anti-Semitic articles for publication in the OUN's Visnyk and other journals. OUN literature held that inter-racial marriages should be banned and that "Ukrainians are those who are blood of our blood and bone of our bone. Only Ukrainians have the right to Ukrainian lands, Ukrainian names, and Ukrainian ideas." Antisemitism was rampant in OUN publications.[10] In 1938, Volodomyr Martynets, the editor of the OUN's main ideological organ Razbudova Natsii (Awakening of the Nation) wrote: "How to deal with the Jews? We have over two million of them in Ukraine. ... Should we allow them to continue to abuse the Ukrainian national organism? Assimilate them? Take them in? Amalgamate them? Get rid of them from Ukraine? How? Expel them? Where? It is neither that easy to expel 2 million people, nor get rid of them altogether. Nobody wants them; everybody is only happy to get rid of them. In practice, other than the Spaniards, no single European Christian nation has been able to solve the Jewish problem in a fully satisfactory way. Various methods have been used, and not a single one of them has solved the issue."[11]

That the OUN's preference for violence would hold sway in any final solution to the 'Jewish problem' was evident throughout OUN texts of the 1930s. One frequent icon of the OUN was the violent haidamaki and the 1768 uprising: "When this new, great day [of national revolution] arrives, we will have no mercy. There will be no cease-fire, the Pereiaslavl or Hadiack peace treaties will not be repeated. A new Zalizniak, a new Gonta will come. There will be no mercy, neither for the big, nor for the small, and the bard will sing: 'And father slaughtered son'." Similarly, the OUN's 1935 military instructions demanded that "a fighter should not hesitate to kill his father, brother, or best friend ir he gets such an order." In 1936 Bandera himself indicated the scale of atrocities he thought would be needed to protect the Ukrainian nation from othera and establish Ukrainian statehood: "The OUN values the life of its members, values it highly; but-our idea in our understanding is so grand, that when we talk about its realization, not single individuals, nor hundreds, but millions of victims have to be sacrificed in order to realize it." Moreover, the OUN supported the Nazis plans for European conquest.[12]

Not surprisingly then, Bandera and the OUN collaborated, broke and again collaborated with the Nazis. At the beginning of the war, Bandera received Nazi funding to carry out sabotage attacks in the USSR as Nazi forces advanced across Poland and then the Soviet Union. Under the cover of the Nazis, the OUN declared an independent state in Lviv on 30 June 1941 and put Bandera's Bandera's deputy and "close associate", Yaroslav Stetsko, as its premier.[13] The OUN's move sparked a rift between the Banderites and the Nazis soon had a falling out in 1941, but not before the OUN carried out pogroms in July with "above average brutality" compared with their Nazi colleagues against Lviv's Jews killing 5,000 in what was perhaps a demonstration of the OUN's sympathy for Nazi anti-semitism.[14] Subtelny apologizes for the OUN and other Ukrainians' active participation in the Jewish holocaust, claiming "Ukrainian participation in the massacres was neither extensive nor decisive. In fact, the OUN's deep, premeditated involvement is clear. On 25 June 1941 Stetsko informed Bandera that he "was setting up a militia that will help remove the Jews and protect the population," and instructions to OUN fighters urged that "the liquidation of undesirable Polish, Muscovite, and Jewish activists, especially supporters of Bolshevik-Muscovite imperialism. Destroy the officer staff, shoot the Muscovites, Jews, NKVD men, the political instructors, and all who want war and our death." Pogroms spread beyond Lviv and were led by the Stetsko government's 'Nachtigall Battalion' led by the notorious Ukrainian anti-Semite Roman Shukhevych and estimated Jewish deaths range from 13,000 to 35,000.[15] In several days in late September on the outskirts of Kiev at a ravine near Babi Yar, nearly 34,000 Jews were executed by Nazi Eizsatzgruppen mobile death squads with assistance from the Ukrainian auxiliary police dominated by OUN members.[16] Subordinated auxiliary police units were the standard instrument with which the Eizensatzgruppen recruited locals to assist them in their dirty work. The auxiliary police searched for, detained, transported, and sometimes assisted the Germans in the execution of Jews and other 'alien' groups.[17]

Bandera and the entire OUN-B leadership were arrested days after their declaration of independence and sent to a concentration camp. This and the Nazi-approved formation of Ukrainian 'expeditionary groups' to follow the Nazi army into Ukrainian lands and organize the rear led to OUN-B assassinations of OUN-M officials and mutual recriminations made to Nazi officials. As the OUN-M sought to replace the OUN-B and engaged in increasingly overt political activity, the Nazis turned on the Ukrainian nationalists. In September, the Gestapo executed the leaders of the expeditionary committees, and in November over forty members of the OUN-M were executed. The Nazi government then instituted a brutal policy against suspect Ukrainians and divided the Ukraine between different governates for Poland and Ukraine, with other parts distributed to Hungarian or Romanian occupational regimes.[18]

During the OUN leadership's internment, OUN elements continued to wage war on Jews, Poles, and 'moskals' (a derogatory Ukrainian term for 'Muscovites'). The central role was played by Waffen SS 'Galician Division' death squads, characterized even by Subtelny as "the most important case of Ukrainian collaboration with Hitler's regime on the organizational level" by the OUN. Eager to slaughter Jews and other ethnic enemies and hoping to parlay the volunteer Galicia Division (GC) into a Ukrainian army that in the likely post-war chaos could fight for the establishment of an independent Ukrainian state, over 82,000 OUN members and sympathizers answered the call, and 13,000 were eventually brought into the GC's ranks. In addition, OUN, its sympathizers and other Ukrainians played a role - sometimes with real enthusiasm - in rooting out, detaining, and/or shipping Ukraine's 2 million Jews to the Nazis' 50 Jewish ghettos and killing about 850,000 of those in 180 large concentration camps locatd in Ukraine.[19]

At the same time, a partisan movement emerged in western Ukraine. Combining the Taras-Bulba Borovets' partisans, the 'Polissian Sich' formed in late 1941, and elements of the Petlurist Ukrainian National republic government-in-exile, the Ukrainian Insurgent or Partisan Army (Ukrainska Povstanska Armiya) or UPA was born. In 1942 members of both OUNs established partisan units in Volhynia, and by the end of the year the Banderite wing of Volhynia partisans decided to form a Ukrainian army. Gradually building up its forces, the OUN-UPA was boosted by the Nazis' release of the OUN leadership in early 1944. Usurping the UPA name, the Banderite OUN forced units of the original UPA and Melnykite OUN into the new UPA, killed many of the original UPA's leaders and others who refused to subordinate themselves to the OUN-B, and appointed Shukhevych as the new UPA's commander. The disasters at Stalingrad and Kursk and the beginning of the Red Army's march west forced the Nazis to give the Ukrainian ultra-nationslists more freedom to organize militarily and politically. The OUN-UPA's new political organ, the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council, called on the USSR's non-Russian nationalities to rise up against Moscow, signaling a shift in OUN fascism's ethnic targeting from Jews to moskals.[20]

Nazi Germany freed Bandera and the OUN leadership, hoping his Ukrainian partisans could help stop the advance of the Soviet army, which had marched through much of eastern Ukraine and was moving west. Therefore, Bandera was able to set up a headquarters in Berlin and manage Nazi training of Ukrainian insurgents. Many had already served in the occupation's police and did the Nazis dirty work, such as rounding up Jews. The top leadership of the OUN-UPA was now dominated by Nazi-trained commanders, and it expanded and disciplined the UPA's ranks by terror and forced recruitment, led by its special service shock troops, the Sluzhba Bezpeki (Security Service) or SB. However, the Nazis' clearly declining prospects prompted a shift in the OUN's preference regarding a protector. Expanding contacts with the democratic Western powers motivated a change in official rhetoric, even as the level of OUN-UPA slaughter mounted in the homeland. Thus, in this period some OUN-UPA units accepted a Jew here or there to counter a shortage of medical personnel; however, these Jews were executed when the Red Army approached.[21]

In spring 1943 the interim OUN-B leader Mykola Lebed' ordered an ethnic cleansing of Ukrainian territory taregeting all ethnic minorities. Although Poles and after them the Jews bore the brunt of OUN-UPA spear, mass extermination aimed to liquidate Czecks, Hungarians, Armenians, and other ethnic groups. In 1943, the OUN-UPA's SB in Volhynia issued orders to "physically exterminate Jews who were hiding in the villages," and Jews who escaped the ghettos were captured and executed on the spot by OUN-UPA forces. A strategy of luring Jews out of their hiding places in order to execute them was adopted. The murders of Jews culminated in early 1944 and reached 'only' several thousand, given that almost all of Ukraine's Jews already had been slaughtered or were in labor camps. By March 1944 the OUN-UPA was reporting to the Nazi SS on its successes in exterminating Jews and Poles, and in talks OUN-UPA chaplain, Father Ivan Hrymokh (Grymokh), assured the Nazis that the view that the Banderites viewed the German Reich as an enemy was "mistaken" and would not have engaged in illegal activity if in 1941 the Reich had granted Ukraine simply protectorate status. Hromykh stressed that while engaging in illegal activity, the OUN-B was "was maintaining the rules not to attack German interests and aim all its forces toward the preparation for a decisive struggle against the Muscovites." OUN-UPA songs hailed the slaughtering: "We slaughtered the Jews, we'll slaughter the Poles, old and young, everyone; we'll slaughter the Poles, we'll build Ukraine." Thus, from mid-1943 through most of 1944 OUN-UPA and the OUN's security service carried out widespread, brutal massacres of Poles across Galicia and Volhynia that left 60,000-88,700 dead. Ukrainians claim Poles began the massacres in 1942 and continued them in 1944-45 in areas west of the San River.[22] However, Ukrainians cannot point to any documentation of Polish murders on a scale or so carefully organized and ideologically justified  like that detailing the scale and premeditated nature of the crimes perpetrated in Galicia and Volhynia by the Ukrainian nationalists.

It should be noted, however, that Ukrainians participated in Nazi war crimes against Russians, Jews and other minorities sometimes because they were communists raher than because they were non-Ukrainian. As the Nazis swept east, Ukrainian CPSU members and sympathizers also felt fascism's wrath. Therefore, in the five major pro-Soviet partisan units in late-war Ukraine, 46 percent of the fighters were ethnic Ukrainians. The local population in Ukraine was 80 percent Ukrainian.[23] The Germans occasionally executed Ukrainian nationalists in the Donbass, but overall the OUN had a small following in southeastern Ukraine throughout the war. The OUN following developed in the region by way of the relaxation of anti-nationalist (as in anti-religious) policy granted by Stalin as the war began, the German occupation of the region, and the import of OUN forces as a result. The southern port city of Mariupol became a relative OUN stronghold in the region. Nevertheless, the OUN's influence was still minimal even under the German occupation and erased completely when the Red Army moved back into the region in 1943. The Galician dialect of OUN members was barely decipherable in Russified Donbass, where Ukrainian speakers often denied speaking Ukrainian, claiming they spoke a local language. Indeed, many spoke a peculiar mix of Russian and Ukrainian. The difficulty of communication made conversion rare. Some Russians joined the OUN but remained suspicious of its extremist ideology. Some proclaimed a position of a Soviet Ukraine without Germans and Bolsheviks. The OUN's main operative in Donbass during the war, Yevhen Stakhiv (Yevgenii Stakhov), acknowledged that the main concern of the few OUN members in Donbass was social ills, not Ukrainian independence, which was simply seen as one possible vehicle to correct the social order. Donbassians rejected the propaganda of Stakhiv, who was a Francoist, because they saw it as "fascist," and Stakhiv eventually discarded Dontsov's integral Ukrainian nationalism in favor of "a democratic Ukraine without discrimination against its national minorities."[24]

Whereas the Donbass and some other regions in central and southeastern Ukraine largely rejoiced with the Red Army's return, western Ukraine was a completely different story. In the Donbass, the OUN's emissaries and sympathizers in Donbass and elsewhere in southeastern as well as central Ukraine, especially those who collaborated with the German occupation regime, were subject to repressions carried out by the NKVD and supported by the bulk of underground and returning pro-Soviet locals. Mass repressions in the post-war years were significant. The number of false accusations is unknown, but 21,412 people were tried as German traitors and spies in the first seven months of 1946. Almost all were imprisoned - most to ten years - and 2 percent of those tried were executed.[25]

Whereas elsewhere in Ukraine there was little and usually no resistance to the return of Soviet power, OUN-UPA nationalists of western Ukraine continued their partisan campaign from the forests of Galicia and Volhynia until the mid-1950s. With the Wehrmacht's withdrawal and the Soviet rear weakened by the offensive into Europe and towards Berlin, battalion-sized units of OUN-UPA partisans took control of large areas in western Ukraine and took on MVD and NKVD special units, as too many Ukrainians in the Red Army were in reality or suspected of being reluctant to fight the Ukrainian partisans. In 1944-45 pitched battles took place between the somewhat dispersed 30-40,000 OUN-UPA partisans and Soviet force concentrations numbering sometimes as many as 30,000 troops. After the Nazi surrender in May 1945, the Soviets were able to step up operations against the partisans. Hundreds of raids and special operations were carried out to root out straggling units. As the partisans retreated into the Transcarpathian Mountains, there were mass arrests and executions across western Ukraine. Tens of thousands of OUN members and sympathizers had openly collaborated with the Nazis. In order to deprive them of their support base, the NKVD blockaded and depopulated areas of Galicia, Volhynia, and the Transcarpathian foothills, deporting families and sometimes entire villages of OUN-UPA members. As many as 500,000 may have been deported to Siberia in 1946-49. Suffering heavy losses, the OUN-UPA took the decision to avoid large frontal engagements and break its forces into smaller units, returning to an insurgent strategy, but by 1948 most units had disbanded. Establishing "loose, sporadic contacts with the British and American secret services," the OUN-UPA then resorted to a strategy of propaganda, sabotage, terror, and assassinating Soviet officials. With Shukhevich's death in a skirmish near Lviv in March 1950, the OUN and UPA soon ceased their existence.[26]

With the post-war Ukraine SSR extending into formerly Polish, Austrian, and Hungarian Ukraine, Soviet power was ensured by the OUN-UPA's dispersal and destruction. Western Ukraine's subjugation was consolidated with the Greek Catholic Church's liquidation; its entire hierarchy was arrested and exiled to Siberia by 1946 for collaboration of some clergy with the Nazis. Finally, the entire western Ukrainian peasant class was herded on to collective farms, repeating in the west the fate eastern Ukrainians and others who fell under Soviet rule experienced in the 1930s minus the famine.[27]

With the collapse of the USSR, disparate Ukrainian and Ukrainian diaspora elments begean to re-fashion the neo-fascist OUN. Many were involved in the first major anti-Soviet organization of the perestroika era, Rukh, which emerged in 1989. However, the first few post-Soviet administrations of independent Ukraine kept a lid Ukrainian ultr-nationalism through most of the 1990s. The Orange revolution of winter 2004-2005 provided an opening to Ukrainian radicals, who had been organizing and waiting for their moment.

Yushchenko's Orange Regime: Maidan 1.0

Ukrainian ultra-nationalism's first moment in power came with the Orange regime under the Viktor Yushchenko administration. It openly supported and used the state to propagate the Galician OUN-UPA model in attempting to construct a new Ukrainian national identity. Policy was anti-eastern and anti-Russian in both domestic and especially foreign policy. Western Ukraine became dominant in domestic policy, which in ideology was overtly ultranationalist, and included xenophobic and anti-Semitic aspects. The West moved to the forefront in foreign policy. Through its silence, the West effectively endorsed former Yushchenko's unbalanced policy. An emerging anti-Russian stance was disguised as an anti-Soviet one, in the hope that it would sway public opinion in favor of Ukraine's entry into NATO and the EU.

Neither Yushchenko nor his government had an explicit nationalities policy. There was no ministry for nationalities policy or inter-ethnic relations and no specific legislative bills or official policy statements addressing such issues. Instead, two domestic policy areas indirectly shaped inter-ethnic relations, especially Russian-Ukrainian relations: (1) the proselytization of state ideology rooted in the revision and falsification of the history and (2) language policy. The state ideology implied anti-Russian and anti-Semitic attitudes. Language policy discriminated against all of Ukraine's minorities, but especially Russians, who by dint of numbers had the strongest justification for demanding their language became an official Ukrainian state language. Moreover, the shift in favor of western Ukrainian preferences on these issues helped to revive the inter-communal and inter-regional schisms that shook the country's political stability and stateness during the 1990s.

World War Two: Historiographical Battleground

Yushchenko succeeded in consolidating or at least further developing a Ukrainian national identity, but one that is largely ethnic and western Ukrainian rather than civic and all-Ukrainian, Consequently, it would alienate many Russians, Transcarpathian Rusyns, and even some Crimean Tatars even as it mobilized the western Ukrainians. The campaign was based on two pillars often present in the mythologies of communalist movements-a heroic myth and a victimization myth. Together, these two myths were to form the foundational myth for Ukrainian nation- and state-building, and ther were particularly noxious to southeastern Ukraine, especially its pro-Russian and Soviet nostalgic elements. First, the heroic myth was the full rehabilitation of Stepan Bandera, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), and the Waffen SS Galician Corps. Second, the vicitimization myth was the Great Famine or 'Holodomor' or 'famine-murder' or genocide, which was blamed or at least strongly associated with Russia, rather than the internationalist communist ideology or its ethnic Georgian Soviet leader, Iosif Stalin.

Yushchenko aggressively supported the rehabilitation of Ukraine's World War II-era neo-fascist organizations, the OUN and UPA, as well as its leading figures. In 2007 he granted an INP request to designate Shukevych a national hero and awarded a similarly honorific status to Stetsko. Yushchenko also used state funds to finance the building of monuments to other OUN figures at sites of the Jewish Holocaust in Ukraine, including in former Jewish ghettos and the infamous Babi Yar.[28] In addition, he has been willing to engage in legal repression of those who dare question his ultra-nationalist false narrative on issues such as the Holodomor (see below). There were certainly moderate Ukrainian nationalist historical figures, who incidentally are more popular than Bandera and the other OUN-OPA figures, Yushchenko could have chosen to glorify the Ukrainian national liberation struggle and in doing so would have not alienated the southeast. The revolutionary era Rada leader Mikhail Hrushevskiy and the great 19th century poet Taras Shevchenko are the best examples.[29] Shevchenko wrote both in Russian and Ukrainian and therefore would have been one who could have helped found a more inclusive civic national identity rather than the ultra-nationalists' preferred ethnic one.

Perhaps more problematic in terms of long-term consequences was Yushchenko's use of the state to proselytize a new, official nation-building ideology rooted in the revision and falsification of Soviet and World War II history. In particular, despite their problematic nature for a regime claiming to become European and democratic, the Orange regime rehabilitated the legacy of the neo-fascist OUN-UPA and held its leaders-including the infamous pro-fascists Bandera, Shukevych and Stetsko-up as the heroes of Ukraine's national liberation struggle. This became a point of pride for many-though far from all-in the country's west and political provocation for almost all the southeast, especially in Crimea and Donbass. Yushchenko's historians depicted the OUN and UPA as pluralistic and inclusive organizations rather than the totalitarian, intolerant, and racist organizations their ideological tracts fostered. Instead of an organizations that deliberately sought Jews out to kill them, the Orange revolution in power claimed that Jews were invited in as part of its fight against not just againmst Stalin but also against Hitler with which OUN-UPA allied.[30]

Since Yushchenko likely was a genuine opponent of the OUN's fascism, totalitarianism, terrorism, fuhrer principle, and ethnic cleansing and certainly needed to appear as such in the eyes of his Western supporters, he needed to fashion the new OUN-UPA myth in a way that did not offend the Western principles of multiculturalism and inter-communal tolerance and respect. To overcome this paradox, Yushchenko's historians deployed the revised and falsified history of Ukrainian integral mationalism and Banderism contained in OUN-UPA propaganda materials dated from the post-1943 period after its leaders decided to tone down its racist ideology in the wake of the German army's rout at Stalingrad as it became more apparent that the Nazi experiment would collapse and the West and/or the Soviets would be deciding Ukraine's future. In addition, to post-1943 propaganda materials and even revised and falsified pre-1943 documents from its pre-1943 period, Yushchenko's ideologists used revised and falsified histories and 'scholarly' materials produced by former OUN-UPA members, their descendants, and other members of the Ukrainian diaspora in North America and Germany.[31]

Yushchenko's government used three institutions to propagandize the new myth: the Institute of National Memory (INP) founded in May 2006, the OUN-B front group or "fa�ade structure" called the Center for the Study of the Liberation Movement (TsDVR), and the archives of Ukraine's intelligence and security organ, the SBU, with which the TsDVR cooperated closely along with the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry as well. As the INP's director Yushchenko appointed academician Ihor Yukhnovs'kyi, a supporter of the neo-Nazi Social Nationalist Party of Ukraine.[32] According to Yukhnovskiy, "the basic goal of the INP is to develop activities that focus on the consolidation and growth of the state-creating patriotism of the Ukrainian people (narody) ... the resurrection of memory about the sacrifices and repressions that the Ukrainian nation (natsia) endured ... [and that] all those who fought for Ukraine, suffered, died, should be treated as national heroes of Ukraine. The policies of all government entities should be based on the Ukrainian idea."[33] All of these institutions were "interlinked"; their "directors cross-referenced and legitimized each others' existence." The SBU, according to German scholar Per Rudling, "was tasked with the most important aspects of Yushchenko's apparatus of memory management: to guard the memory, the institutions, resources, and archives of the Ukrainian security forces."[34] Speaking in 2008 historian Sofia Hrachova noted the SBU "uses this monopoly to political ends, publishing selections of that represent historical events according to the current official perspective."[35]

The revisionists' chief ideologist was Yushchenko's director for both the Central State Archives of the SBU (Archives Holovnyi Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Sluzhba Bezpeky Ukrainy or HDASBU) and TsDVR, Volodomyr V"yatrovich, who devoted "partocular attention" to the OUN-UPA and the Jews. V"yatrovich ignores all sources-Jewish and memoirs and German and Soviet archival documents-that disprove his contention that Jews were welcome and important within the OUN-UPA. Instead, he has focused on the five named Jews who served in the UPA (not OUN members), including "Stella Krentsbach/Kruetzbach", who is a fictitious person created by OUN-UPA post-war emigres. V"yatrovich's HDASBU circulated the post-war OUN forgery Do pochatku khyha faktiv (The Book of Facts) to a series of government organizations in an attempt defend the OUN, Shukevych and his Nachtigall Battalion, which slaughtered Jews, and presented it as an authentic World War II-era document to the public.[36] In April 2008 the SBU convened a public "hearing" to focus attention on V"yatrovich's narrative that because of the UPA the Jews and Ukrainians fought the Nazis together side-by-side. SBU director-then and again after the 2014 Maidan revolution-Valentyn Nalyvaichenko presided over this and the entire SBU portion of the Yushchenko exercise in myth-making. He noted that the goal was to replace KGB lies with "historical truth" and "liberate Ukrainian history from lies and falsifications." The SBU itself said the forgery "objectively certifies...collaboration between Ukrainian and Jews." Well-known anti-Semites and Holocaust deniers, including but not limited to Levko Luk"ianenko and Yurii Shukhevich, were frequent guests at Yushchenko's 'research' institutes. Finally on this score, the Yushchenko ideologists were able to popularize these falsehoods using willing popular literary figures, such as Moisei Fishbein and Oksana Zabuzhko, who repeated the government's fabrications, including the Stella Krentsbach/Kruetzbach fiction, and produced works based on Yushchenko's false narrative and OUN-fabricated documents and propaganda provided by the TsDVR.[37]

As Rudling convincingly argues, the false Semitophilic narrative of the OUN-UPA's historical revisions proffered by its past and present supporters inside and outside Ukraine and its government "constitutes a form of Holocaust 'revionism'."[38] Indeed, there is much in common between Holocaust revisionism and outright denial, on the one hand, and the Ukrainian ultra-nationalist narrative of a benign OUN-UPA deceptively maligned by Soviet and Russian propaganda, on the other, especially as regards its discourse on OUN-UPA's relations with the Jews. Yushchenko was careful to balance his tolerance of some anti-semitism within his ultra-nationalist wing by way of occasional personal demonstrations of sympathy for the Jews. Nonetheless, the Orange regime and its memory-making institutions consistently took steps to downplay and marginalize the OUN-UPA's killings of the Jews and the Jewish nature of the tragedy at Babi Yar.

Yushchenko ignored international and U.S. appeals to honor the Jewish victims of the Holocaust at Babi Yar. Indeed, it appeared to take steps to ensure that none of the proposed projects could undertaken by either transferring jurisdiction to the INP. After an international movement was formed to lobby for the building of a major memorial to the victims of the Holocaust at Babi Yar, Ukraine's Council of Ministers on the basis of a directive issued by President Yushchenko, decreed on 1 March 2007 that the territory of Babi Yar was designated a historical preserve but transferred from the authority of the Kyiv City Council to the pro-OUN-UPA INP, outraging the international Jewish community.[39] In addition, throughout the Yushchenko presidency fewer and fewer Ukrainian officials attended the Jewish commemorations at Babi Yar. By October 2008 not one Ukrainian official attended because, as Rabbi Yakov Dov Bleich-who in June 2001 was accompanied by Pope John Paul II to the site to pray together-told those present: "We...do not have the right to allow what happened at Babi Yar to be forgotten. We cannot be silent, when history is being written according to someone's pleasure."[40]

Instead of commemorating the Jewish loss, the Yushchenko's government allowed Babi Yar to be used by ultra-nationalists, many of them with anti-Semitic attitudes, such as the rising neo-fascist, pro-OUN Svoboda Party (SP) led by the openly anti-Semitic Oleh Tyahnybok. Their commemorations at the site in 2007, 2008, and 2009 ignored the Jewish character of the tragedy and the OUN-UPA's role it, claiming Babi Yar was a massacre primarily of Ukrainians, especially those of the OUN-UPA ultra-nationalists. In February 2007 the head of SP's Kiev organization, Andriy Mokhnyk declared at Babi Yar: "(T)here are myths about Babyn Yar. First, Germans executed mainly non-Ukrainians at Babyn Yar (read: Jews). Second, supposedly Ukrainian nationalists (read: OUN members) helped the Hitlerites conduct the executions ... It is a blatant lie. Babyn Yar is mainly a site of the tragedy of Ukrainians, with over 55,000 Ukrainians being murdered there. Simultaneously, Babyn Yar is a hallmark of the unbrerakable Ukrainian spirit. In Babyn Yar, the Germans shot activists of the Ukrainian nationalist underground movement. ... They were executed as fighters of the Ukrainian national revolution."[41]

Victim Narrative: Holodomor

The second pillar of the Orange regime's myth-making is a "victimization narrative" based on a revision and falsification of the Holodmor or Great Famine of the early 1930s. Rather than being portrayed as a Soviet attempt to build communism through collectivization of all agriculture in the USSR that killed some 3 million, Yushchenko's ideologists put forward the interpretation that the famine was an attempt to commit genocide and targeted the Ukrainian nation alone. In this Ukrainian nationalist view, the Holodomor was not a consequence of the communist ideology and Stalin's practice of it, but rather part of a centuries-long Russian effort to destroy the Ukrainian nation.

While spending much time and energy attempting to revise and deny the real history of the Holocaust in Ukraine, the Yushchenko government spent even more endeavoring to win international recognition of the 1930s famine as a "Ukrainian Holocaust", despite the numerous other territories and peoples of the USSR who suffered from the very same famine. In April 2007 Yushchenko submitted but was unable to push through the Supreme Rada a law that would have criminalized the denial of the famine's genocidal character. Thus, those who deviated from the state ideology's current line on the intent behind Stalin's crime would have been subject to imprisonment, presumably including leading Western historians such as Robert Conquest or those who might assert that other Soviet territories and ethnic groups also were victimized.[42]

A revolution and eight years later, the Maidain regime's own Yushchenko, President Petro Poroshenko, blamed the ethnic Georgian Stalin's Soviet famine on the Ukrainian nationalists' other favorite scapegoat - Russia. At a 28 November 2015 ceremony commemorating the Great Famine, Poroshenko transferred the blame for the tragedy from Soviet communism to Russia and by insinuation those sympathetic towards Moscow, especially ethnic Russians: "We pray for multimillion heavenly legion of the Ukrainian nation. The bright spirits with no guilt who were killed here are invisibly with us. The Holodomor was nothing other than a manifestation of the centuries-long hybrid war that Russia has been waging against Ukraine."[43]

As I have shown on this site, Russophobia would reach dangerously racist proportions after the ultranationalist-led Maidan revolution of 2014. Ukrainian ultra-nationalists, such as those that came to play a major role in the Yushchenko government, are consistently careful to avoid the fact that ethnic Ukrainians played the lead role in Ukraine in carrying out the grain and seed grain confiscations and overall collectivization process. For these actions and the crimes that accompanied, ethnic Russians and Jews are often scapegoated. The entire Soviet experiment is often referred to as the "Muscovite-Bolshevik" regime or occupation, putting the blame on the Soviets' crimes on ethnic Russia, ethnic Russians, and a mythical Russian quest to destroy Ukraine. Moreover, many Ukrainian (and Russian) ultra-nationalist historians are quick to, and frequently emphasize that there was an inordinate or disproportional number of Jews in the Bolshevik party and leadership. In this way, the term 'Muscovite-Bolshevik' is a coded discursive slur against both ethnic Russians and Jews.

Orange Anti-Semitism

The Orange regime's willful tolerance and support of ultra-nationalist historical revisionism and denial as at a minimum a price that had to be paid for national myth-making in the alleged absence of alternative models and heroes-one wonders why the far more reasonable national independence movement of the late 19th and eary 20th centuries was not the Orangists' choice-led to a sharp increase in explicit displays and tolerance of anti-Semitism.[44] A striking example was an article published for the Babi Yar massacre's 65th anniversary in the largest mainstream newspaper in Ukraine at the time, Silski visti, written by its editor-in-chief Volodomyr Bilenko. In his "appeal" to Jews, Bilenko asked them to plea to Ukrainians for forgiveness: "(I)n the name of fairness and sincere co-existence, you should apologize before the Ukrainian people for the perfidious murder of S. Petlura, for participating in mass repressions against Ukrainians, for participating in the organization of the Holodomor, and finally for the convoluted thinking used in Israel for the destruction of innocent Lebanese children. Now Israel should come and repent before Babi Yar."[45] The direction things were moving and may still move could be seen in an attempt made in not-so-valed fashion by Yushchenko's and Nalyvaichenko's SBU to scapegoat the Jews for the horrors of Soviet rule. Thus, in July 2008 it issued a "highly selective" list of nineteen perpetrators of the Holodomor "famine-genocide." Of the nineteen, eight were designated as being of Jewish nationality by placing their Ashkenazi names next to their adopted Slavic names.[46]

Red flags should have been seen about the democratic nationalist movement in Ukraine, as Yushchenko in the same period was repeatedly denying the existence of any anti-Semitism whatsoever in Ukraine. On 17 September 2005 Yushchenko categoriacally stated: "In Ukraine there is no anti-Semitism or any kind of manifestation of xenophobia." The irony was abundant, as the statement came in Philadelphia, the city of brotherly love, where America's latest 'beacon of democracy' in the former USSR made the statement in receiving the Liberty Medal award. Three years later, on 23 September 2008, Yushchenko told a conference of Jewish-American organizations: "(I)n Ukraine such a shameful phenomenon as anti-Semitism is absent."[47] None of this should have surprised. Yushchenko had long maintained a close relationship with ultranationalist elements in western Ukraine. His "Our Ukraine" coalition included several ultranationalist groups. Early on, Yushchenko was on the board of MAUP, a private university in Kiev dominated by Ukrainian nationalists, produced nearly all of Ukraine's anti-Semitic print material, and welcomed former KKK leader David Duke as a visiting scholar. Yushchenko was forced to resign from MAUP's board in 2005 after a three-year campaign by Jewish leaders in Ukraine and the U.S. demanding he do so.[48]

Overt anti-semitism continued to plague the Ukrainian diaspora community, which strongly supported Yushchenko and bitterly opposed the contemporary Ukrainian communists, who are more akin to European socialists than Stalinist or even late Soviet communists, and blame communism's crimes on Jews. For example, in 2011 the �migr� Internet publication included a 'best and worst' of 2011 written by one Oksana Bashuk Harper. She noted among her worst events of the year the following: "Ukraine's Communist Party leaders, including comrades Symonenko and Vitrenko -for saying the Holodomor, the famine orchestrated by the Soviet Communist Party, is history and no longer important, and Israel's President Shimon Peres-for lecturing Ukrainians to forget their history, Holodomor included, motivated, perhaps, by the desire to protect Lazar Kaganovich, also a Jew, and a key architect of the genocide."[49]

Yushchenko, however, revealed his true leanings after his defeat in the 2010 presidential election in which he received a mere 5.5 percent of the votes, by issuing a decree officially rehabilitating the WWII-era Ukrainian neo-fascist OUN leader Stepan Bandera as a national hero.[50] This provoked a sharp reaction at home and abroad. A Crimean Supreme Soviet deputy burned his passport in protest against the rehabilitation, and a lawyer from the Donbass filed a lawsuit to have Bandera's Hero of Ukraine honor annulled. Poland's President Lech Kaczynski accused Yushchenko of putting "current political interests [over] the historical truth" and warned the move had driven a wedge between the two eastern European Slavic states. In reaction to Kaczynski's remarks ultranationalist Ukrainians marched on the Polish Embassy in Kiev.[51] In December 2010, the Kiev city council announced it would be renaming three of its streets after Bandera's associates, Shukevych, Stetsko, and Melnyk.[52] Two years after Yushchenko's demise, Bandera and presumably the OUN-UPA along with him enjoyed a positive assessment among 32 percent of all Ukrainian citizens; obviously, the majority of these would be from western Ukraine and might have constituted a majority and likely an overwhelming majority in the west.[53]

Language Policy

In addition to his draconian historiographical policies, Yushchenko undertook the implementation of an integrated national culture based on western Ukraine's identity. Thus, he initiated an aggressive Ukrainization policy in language and education in an effort to eliminate the Ukrainian language's second-rate status created under Soviet power. In doing so, he politicized the language issue and created more fertile soil for division within the country, especially in highly Russophone regions and districts like Donbass and Crimea. Although Ukrainian was instated as the only language with state status in Ukraine's constitution, several articles, including several on Crimea, posed the task of developing Ukraine's other languages as well. Moreover, during the heady days of 1991 when Ukraine was achieving its long-sought independence, a very different model was supported by the then more moderate nationalists. At that time, the Ukrainian Supreme Rada passed a Declaration of the Rights of Nationalities of Ukraine that pledged the government to grant official language status to the mother tongue of any ethnic group living compactly in any of Ukraine's regions.[54]

By contrast, the Orange regime referred to Russian as one of the minority languages, even though all data showed that far more than 50 percent and as many as 80 percent of Ukraine's mostly bilingual and even multilingual citizens were Russian-speaking. Official documents, including birth and death certificates and other legal documents, were issued only in Ukrainian. A campaign to change the names of streets, schools, and buildings was instituted. Some Russians were forced to Ukrainize their names in their passports.[55] One strategy of Ukrainian nationalists given patronage by Yushchenko's government used to strengthen a western Ukrainian ethnic state, society and identity during Yushchenko's Orange regime was to eliminate from education and dictionaries words in common usage in both the Ukrainian and Russian languages.[56]

Svoboda Rising: Rise of Ultra-Nationalists Under Yushchenko

Not surprisingly, the Orange Revolution and Yushchenko's policies sparked a sharp rise in Ukrainian ultra-nationalism, anti-semitism, and general racist xenophobia and hate crimes. On the streets, NGO monitors documented a dramatic rise in violent crimes with a suspected hate-bias motivation, in particular "a revival of anti-Jewish prejudice in the form of an increase of anti-Semitic attacks and incidents." In addition to Jews, hate crimes mostly targeted people of African and Asian origin and those from the Caucasus and the Middle East.[57] They also targeted Russians and Roma, according to a December 2011 European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance report, which noted that "tolerance towards Jews, Russians, and Romani appears to have significantly declined in Ukraine since 2000 and prejudices are also reflected in daily life against other groups, who experience problems in accessing goods and services."[58] The perpetrators of the most serious hate crimes were from loosely organized groups of skinheads "united by extreme nationalist and racist ideology."[59]

At the same time, Yushchenko's government downplayed the ultra-nationalists' rise and downgraded the state's capacity to combat such phenomena. In 2008, the Interior Ministry claimed there were only 500 such skinheads in Ukriane, but NGO monitors suggest that the "number...is likely to be much higher." The government also discontinued official data collection and public reporting on violent hate crimes and disbanded both the State Committee for Nationalities and Religion and the Interior Ministry's Human Rights Monitoring Department and thus, according to Human Rights First, "significantly weakened the government's efforts to combat racist and bias-motivated incidents."[60]

In the corridors of power, Yushchenko's nationalist policies were faciliated the rise of neo-fascist Oleh Tyahnybok's ultra-nationalist, anti-semitic, anti-Russian and deceptively-named 'Svoboda' or 'Freedom' Party (SP). Tyahnybok hails from Lviv. His father was a sports physician and lead physician of the Soviet National Boxing Team and was honored under the communist regime with the Hero of Sport of the USSR award. Oleh, also a physician, graduated in 1993 at the age of 23 from Lviv Medical Institute and is certified urologist and surgeon. In October 1991, as the USSR collapsed, he and Andriy Parubiy co-founded the radical neo-Nazi Social-National Party of Ukraine (SNPU), which included Nazi insignia and anti-Semitic pronouncements. Tyahnybok was elected to the Lviv Oblast parliament in 1994 and to Ukraine's Supreme Rada in 1998 and, as a member of Yushchenko's Our Ukraine electoral bloc, in 2002. In February 2004, the SNPU sought to re-brand itself as a more moderate nationalist party, changing its name to the All-Ukrainian Svoboda (Freedom) Union or simply the Svoboda party, discontinuing the use of the modified Nazi Wolfsangel as its symbol, disbanding its para-military wing the Patriots of Ukraine, and moderating its party program and public statements. The caveat to the last change was that its neo-fascist ideology was to remain fully intact in reality; only its pubic face was being revamped.[61]

Despite the plan to soften its image, Tyahnybok let loose a series of inflammatory and racist remarks at a July 2004 speech in at the grave site of an UPA commander on Yavornaya Mountain in the Carpathians. He stated the following: "The enemy came and took their (UPA's) Ukraine. But they (UPA fighters) were not afraid; likewise we must not be afraid. They took their automatic guns on their necks and went into the woods. They got them ready and fought against the Moskaly (derogatory for Russians), the Germans, Zhydy (derogatiory term for Jews) and other scum who wanted to take away our Ukrainian state! And therefore our task-for every one of you: the grey-headed and the youthful-we must defend our native land. ... These young men and you, the grey-headed, are the very combination, which the moskal'sko-zhydivs'ka (Muscovite-Jewish) mafia ruling Ukraine fears most.[62]

The same month Tyahnybok was expelled from Our Ukraine's parliamentary faction party for his remarks at Yavornaya. In 2012, Tyahnybok refused to renounce these words, stating to a BBC journalist: "All I said then, I can also repeat now. ... Moreover, this speech is relevant even today."[63]

Tyahnybok has issued other unsavory remarks and declarations. In 2005, he and 17 others signed an open letter titled 'Stop the Criminal Activities of Oragnized Jewry' addressed to Ukraine's leadership, including President Yushchenko. The letter listed Jewish businessmen who got rich during the 1990s, claiming they control Ukraine, and called for investigations into the activities of Jewish organisations, such as the Anti-Defamation League, which, the letter said, is led by people "suspected of serious crimes." The letter referred to Zionism as "Jewish Nazism" and asserted that 'organized Jewry' spreads its influence across Ukraine through such organisations in order to commit "genocide" of the Ukrainian people through impoverishment.[64] Svoboada has called for "purging" Jews from Ukraine, damaged synagogues and Jewish cemeteries, demonstrated against Hassidic Jews' annual pilgrimage to the grave of Rabbi Nachman of Bratslav in the southern Ukrainian town of Uman.[65] In 2012, Tyahnybok's comrade in the SP, Ihor Miroshnichenko, called actress Mila Kunis a "dirty Jewess" and not a real Ukrainian.[66]

The SP's official program begins by stating that the "state...secures the continuous development of the Ukrainian nationality (Ukrainskaya natsiya)" rather than that of all ethnic groups comprising the population of Ukraine. The first two measures listed for achieving this goal are a "fundamental purge" of all former CPSU and KGB officials from Ukrainian state structures and their replacement by people according to their "patriotism and professionalism." Given Tyahnybok's association of Russians and Jews with the CPSU and KGB, there is little doubt who would not be considered to be in possession of sufficient 'patriotism.' Correspondingly, the program calls for: making "manifestations of Ukrainophobia" a crime; introducing in Ukrainian internal passports data on the holder's nationality, which would be determined by birth certificate or that of the holder's parents and "taking into account the wishes of the Ukrainian citizen"; requiring all candidates for public office to indicate their ethnicity in their official biographical data; introducing for public discussion a legislative bill that would establish the proportional representation of Ukrainians and national minorities in the executive branch; banning dual citizenship (which would affect Russian and Jews for the most part); "facilitation of the mass return of ethnic Ukrainians" to Ukraine; banning the adoption of Ukrainians by foreigners; creating a state committee "responsible for the defense and spread of the Ukrainian language"; requiring that no less than 78 percent of mass media communication is in Ukrainian; repealing all taxation on Ukrainian language publishing, commuications, and information; ceasing all state budget support for school textbooks and other educational materials not in Ukrainian; requiring a course on "The Culture of the Ukrainian Language" in all higher educational institutes; instituting a program for "patriotic education"; facilitating the creation of single Ukrainian local church with its center in Kiev; acknowledgement of "the fact of the occupation of Ukraine by Bolshevik Russia in 1918-1991, as a result of which there was an unprecedented genocide of the Ukrianian people; securing from the Verkhovna Rada, the United nations, the European Parliament, and the world's parlimants recognition of the Ukrainian genocide in the 20th century" as "a result of which 20.5 million Ukrainians were destroyed"; opening up a "criminal case of the Holodomor to be recognized as a state crime against the Ukrainian people"; implementing a public criminal trial of communism; banning the communist ideology and establishing criminal liability for "denial of the Holodomor as a genocide of the Ukrainian people"; creating a special investigative structure for the search of the criminals who destroyed the Ukrainian nation and after uncovering them holding them criminally responsible; recognition of the struggle of the OUN and UPA as the "national liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people" and the soldiers of the UPA and the OUN underground as participants in that struggle; awarding compensation still owed to the OUN-UPA veterans; spreading "the truth about the Liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people in the 20th century in all educational institutions"; reestablishing Ukraine's tactical nuclear potential; and repealing Crimea's autonomous status.[67]

In 2009 Svoboda joined a federation of European ultra-rightist parties called the Alliance of European Nationalist Movements which includes Belgium's National Front, Britain's National Party, Hungary's violently chauvinist 'Jobbik' Party, Italy's Tricolor Flame, and Sweden's National Democrats.[68] At the time, Svoboda maintained close ties to France's National Front and honored the Front's leader Jean-Marie Le Pen at Svoboda's 2004 congress. In December 2012, the European Parliament (EP) adopted a resolution expressing "concern about the rising nationalistic sentiment in Ukraine, expressed in support for the Svoboda party, which, as a result, is one of the two new parties to enter the Verkhovna Rada. The EP resolution recalled that "racist, anti-Semitic and xenophobic views go against the EU's fundamental values and principles" and therefore appealed "to pro-democratic parties in the Verkhovna Rada not to associate, endorces, or form coalitions with this party."[69] This was just one year before the very pro-democratic parties appealed to in the resolution joined in an opposition alliance to protest President Yanukovich's decision to postpone signing the EU association agreement and Western officials, including US Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland and Senator John McCain, would be meeting with Svoboda leader Tyahnybok during the opposition alliance's demonstrations on the Maidan.

The decline in Yushchenko's popularity surely played into radical parties' hands; thus, the SP's sudden rise in popularity, but the state ideology and identity played into the hands of the extremists. In March 2009, Tyahnybok's SP for the first time was a regional parliamentary election. Not surprisingly, the victory occurred in the western Galician oblast of Ternopil, with Svoboda winning 35 percent of the vote and more than doubling the vote of the second-place party's 14 percent.[70] In 2010 it won city assembly elections in the three Galician western oblasts' capitols of Lviv, Ternopil, and Ivano-Frankivsk.[71] As noted above, Svoboda then won more than 10 percent of the vote in the 2012 Ukrainian Supreme Rada elections and 30-40 percent in the same three western regions (see Table 5).

Some saw the handwriting on the wall in 2009. Director of the Philosophy Department at NANU and one of three co-chairs of the Babi Yar Community Committee, Academician Myroslav Popovych warned in March of that year: "We are suffering through a period of declein of Ukraine's national democrats ... (T)he prestige of an aggressive nationalistic course, such as that of the Svoboda Party is increasing ... (I)n place of national democrats can come (to power) an aggressive nationalistic movement and then the civil peace in Ukraine, of which we are so proud, will come to an end, And many forces for which this will be satisfactory will be found."[72] Looking back from the perspective of 2015, Popovych's words are indeed prophetic. Rabbi Andrew Baker, director of international affairs at the American Jewish Committee, summed up the results of Yushchenko's rule: "We really thought a decade ago that this sort of ultra-nationalism would be disappearing by now. We thought it was [a temporary] thing. We were wrong."[73]

In his last year and a half in office, not only did Ukraine collapse economically but politically as well. In the wake of the 2008 financial meltdown in the U.S. and the ensuing global economic crisis, Ukraine suffered a major financial crisis from which it still has not recoevered. Yushchenko had permanently alienated southeastern Ukraine's voters from himself-as well as from Kiev and the west-but Ukraine's declining economic fortunes and conflicts between oligarchic clans over the natural gas profits split the Orange coalition that brought Yushechnko to power. In response, he stepped up his efforts to play to the nationalist wing in the runup to the presidential election, poisoning the Ukraine political well for years to come. Yushchenko then divided the Orange movement by accusing his former Orange Revolution comrade and now main presidential rival, Yulia Tymoshenko, of "high treason" for allegedly plotting with the Kremlin to undermine Ukraine's sovereignty after she cut a new gas deal with GazProm.