#2
World Economic Forum
https://agenda.weforum.org
September 17, 2015
Which country has the most engineering graduates?
By Joe Myers
[Chart here https://agenda.weforum.org/2015/09/which-country-most-engineering-manufacturing-and-construction-graduates/]

A diverse and highly skilled pool of talent is a key driver of economic growth, allowing economies to make the most of their human capital.

The World Economic Forum's Human Capital Report 2015 provides data for 124 economies across a range of indicators, including the number of graduates in engineering, manufacturing and construction.

The Russian Federation tops the list with nearly half a million graduates a year in the field. The United States follows in second, with Iran completing the top three.

A minimum of 100,000 graduates are needed annually to make the top 10, highlighting the popularity of the field.

The data for this ranking is taken from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics.

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 #3
Gazeta.ru
December 29, 2015
Russia's 2015 agenda dominated by foreign policy over internal issues
Editorial, Russia went abroad. How will the outgoing year go down in history?

It is obvious that, from the moment of the accession of the Crimea, Russia entered a pivotal historical period. How historians will assess this period in centuries to come is difficult to predict - a period is pivotal precisely in that it can still swing the country in one direction or in another. The outgoing year of 2015 was in this sense not ground-breaking - rather, it consolidated the new, fluid, post-Crimean reality in which more events happen in a year than in the decade of the sated and tranquil naughties.

The main instrument of the past year was the refusal to compromise - especially when it came to internal consumption. What Putin and Kerry actually spend five hours discussing, what talks Lavrov holds as he wheels about the world, and what Medvedev reaches agreement on, or fails to reach agreement on, in China is unimportant. The main thing is that Russian citizens should know that our proud Varyag is not giving in to the enemy [allusion to the best-known line from a 1904 song devoted to heroism of the crew of the Russian cruiser Varyag displayed in the Battle of Chemulpo Bay in the Russian-Japanese war].

Compromise, negotiations, mutual concessions - in public perception, all this has become the lot of the weak.

Who dares wins - this is our diplomacy, relayed from the top and willingly accepted at the bottom. Its apotheosis was the threat "you won't get away with [just the Russian ban on the importation of your] tomatoes" addressed to Turkey that was made public by the president in his message to the Federal Assembly.

In the same way, the state once and for all shook off the desire to come to terms with anyone in internal politics also. Three years' imprisonment for a solitary picket, new jail sentences under the old "Bolotnaya case" [against opposition activists arrested for protesting on Bolotnaya Ploshchad in 2012], the arrest in absentia of Khodorkovskiy, the house arrest for the director of the Ukrainian library [Nataliya Sharina, director of the Library of Ukrainian Literature in Moscow, who is accused of inciting ethnic hatred], and at the same time, total disregard for public investigations into corruption in power, are another important hallmark of the outgoing year.

Debating and discussing topical problems - be they the problems of import replacement, the management crisis in Crimea, or the truckers' protests - are also no longer part of the internal agenda. Discussions, reflections, and the search for a compromise have been replaced with slogans and labels. He who is not with us, is against us.

Gone are semitones, allowances, and the analysis of the situation from various sides. Politicians have seemingly forgotten that a complex situation does not have a single prime cause. There is always a range of current actions, inactions, and circumstances. Accordingly, a problem must also be tackled by a range of measures, and not in one fell swoop. But in the outgoing year, it was precisely the tactic of simple explanations and simple solutions - which are in fact no solutions at all, but which look vivacious and devil-may-care - that prevailed.

"The peak of the crisis has passed," the president says, and promises to punish "speculators" if food prices continue to grow. "The internal tourist market is developing in Russia," the head of the Federal Agency for Tourism rejoices, as if not noticing that a record number of Russian citizens will this year spend the New Year holidays at home - a vacation in Russia, unlike closed-off Egypt and Turkey, has proved to be beyond the reach of the pockets of many people. The head of the Ministry of Agriculture reports the successes of import replacement, but on social networks folk post photos of noticeably empty supermarket shelves.

The mood in society consequently fluctuates in a range from elation to horror. Whereas a year ago, at the peak of the Crimean euphoria, the mood of the majority was belligerently cheerful and that of the minority quietly stunned, in the outgoing year moods took on the character of a strange dichotomy.

We are, as it were, all mounted on horseback and wielding a sabre, but at the same time, we are fatalistically resigned to the fact that we are becoming visibly poorer.

The bombings of Syria, the threats levelled at Turkey, and the digs aimed at Obama still elicit spasms of national pride, but in stores and pharmacies, faces are increasingly gloomy - there is no longer the money for the former customary consumption. And none is foreseen, judging by the fact that no concept of a strategy for the progressive development of the country exists. If not each day, then definitely each month is becoming absolutely unpredictable.

No one can say for sure what will become of the rouble exchange rate and prices, or of pay and credits; it is not known what new payments could be introduced or increased, what sanctions could be adopted on what range of goods, or to what countries access will be opened or, as is more likely, be barred.

This is returning the whole country once again to living one day at a time, whereby it is impossible to plan the children's vacations or an expensive purchase, a course of treatment involving special medicines, or the acquisition of a home or a motor vehicle, because it is not known whether all this will be available tomorrow, or at what price.

The stability that we have been straining after for years has vanished, once again giving place to day-to-day survival in the hope of a bright future at some later time.

Against this background, the resignation just before the new year of Aleksey Chalyy, head of the Sevastopol legislative assembly, also looks symbolic. That same Chalyy, whose informal black sweater at the historic signing of the treaty on the accession of Crimea to Russia only a blind man failed to notice. But the jackets have nevertheless forced out the sweater - Chalyy explained his resignation by "the impossibility of remaining in this post, because in 18 months the city's legislative and executive branches have not got any nearer to realizing a blueprint for the city's development that is supported by the population."

Yes, there is simply no time for Russia. Despite the obvious problems inside the country, 2015 was the year of the final triumph of foreign policy over internal policy. If the events of 2014, which passed under the sign of Ukraine, were nevertheless closely connected with Russian soil - refugees travelled to Russia, soldiers on leave travelled as volunteers from Russia [the Russian government's official explanation for the presence of Russian servicemen in east Ukraine is that they are "on leave"], and Crimea was hooked up to national programmes and budgets - 2015, with Egypt and Turkey and with Syria and Iran, was a year of exclusively international subject matter, which filled all the airwaves and every discussion. The internal problems, which are growing with every passing day, seemingly ceased to exist.

Only the outside world, without an internal world, remains. Especially since there is less and less money for this internal world.

But neither the individual, nor the country can remain for long without an internal world. This is freezing and devastating.

There is hope that next year could all the same be partly a year of returning to ourselves. And not only because the accumulated internal problems will begin increasingly to make themselves felt, and not even because federal parliamentary elections are looming. But simply because the individual cannot remain for long without himself or herself, without his or her own life, his or her own problems and joys. As soon as people realize that internal problems are more important than external problems, they will begin not only to improve life somewhere else, looking at the television, but also to set straight their own lives, the life of their city and country. Because unless this happens, there is a world around us, but there is no world inside us. And in that case, there is no life either.

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 #4
Komsomolskaya Pravda
December 30, 2015
Russia's economic minister cautiously optimistic in year-end interview
Aleksandra Kozlova interview with Economic Development Minister Aleksey Ulyukayev: Russian Federation Economy Minister Aleksey Ulyukayev gave Komsomolskaya Pravda a forecast of how long rouble would fall for - He answered basic topical questions relating to the Russian economy from our publication's correspondent

Everyone has their own New Year traditions. For a third year now we are summing up the symbolic end of year results on the eve of 31 December with the head of the Economic Development Ministry. And there really is something to talk about now: the rouble has again reached record levels, enterprises are suffocating without loans, and sanctions are continuing to multiply. Aleksey Ulyukayev explained what measures the government is taking to deal with the situation. And he shared his predictions.

Businessmen demand changes

[Interviewer Aleksandra Kozlova] Businesses have many complaints about the government's economic bloc. People are moaning, saying let's change something. According to their calculations enterprises need R1,500bn in order to be "revitalized". But not just by printing money - this should be done through loans (or bonds). So that money really reaches the enterprises and will then be paid back. Is this possible?

[Ulyukayev] We understand - the situation is serious. And we are trying to draw up the appropriate mechanisms to resolve it. For example, developing a bond market. We have created a tool for project financing. It enables money to be attracted with state-funded guarantees, we are using the National Welfare Fund. I always try to convey one idea. Everyone knows about the risks of investing. But there are also the risks of not investing. And they are no less. If you have not invested today you have not created a tax base.  This means the source of replenishing the budget in future years has been undermined. This means important social commitments will remain unmet. There is a very important logic here, I think. Unfortunately, the law of "preferring current benefits over future benefits" operates in the economy. The preference for what will happen in three days' time prevails over what will occur in 30 years' time for all of us. That is why more attention must still be devoted to strategic matters.

[Kozlova] Do you know [State Duma] deputy Markov?

[Ulyukayev] The chairman of the Budgetary Committee? Of course I know him.

[Kozlova] He recently compared you to a diver who periodically puts on a suit, dives to the bottom of the economy, and tries to fumble around for it there. How appropriate is the comparison?

[Ulyukayev] Appropriateness and correctness are a matter of upbringing and education. I do not want to call anyone to order here. We are actually living in a free country. But as far as the comparison is concerned - I think that diving is a very honourable profession. It flatters me.

[Kozlova] So are we at the bottom or not?

[Ulyukayev] The problem is not whether the diver goes down to the bottom. But whether the bottom has become equal to the surface? How can we ensure that not everyone ends up at the bottom? That is what is important. And in fact the task of the diver is - to see the reefs, banks, and dangers that hinder the ship. And is it the bottom or not? I think that the potential for the economy to fall has been exhausted. It was exhausted by the middle of 2015. And now variation around this low bar is occurring. Whether you call this the "bottom" or something different is not that important.

[Kozlova] So we can expect a recovery now?

[Ulyukayev] The sharp decline has ended but unfortunately there is no sharp rise. There are major fluctuations in the trade and financial markets. Our figures are either slightly positive or slightly negative. Thus, between July and October there was apparently a positive dynamic. In November this again changed in a negative direction. On the whole, a process of adaptation of enterprises and the economy to the new conditions is still under way.

[Kozlova] Oh, there is good news as well...

[Ulyukayev] Yes, companies' profits have increased substantially. On the whole, during the first 11 months of this year - 44 per cent higher than last year because costs have fallen. This creates a base for future investments. And we are winning on import replacement. The competitiveness of enterprises is higher - the financial result is higher. And companies are investing this profit. So some positive trends are nevertheless being felt. So whether or not it is the bottom is a good subject for your brother journalist to exercise his wit. But in essence, the question is much more serious. The question is, are there serious grounds here for the resumption of sustainable economic growth?

[Kozlova] And what is the situation here?

[Ulyukayev] The most important thing is the adaptation of the economy to the new conditions. The level of adaptation is high, we can see this. A large number of support tools, and several elements in the anti-crisis plan have proved to be unneeded. They turned out to be unnecessary, the system itself restructured. On the other hand, the vulnerability and excessive dependence of the economy on commodities are still present. So world shocks have had a major effect on us. The second important point is the gradual normalization of the situation with interest rates in the economy and with credit as a whole. The third is the expectation that in 2016 growth in the population's real incomes will resume. Fourth - investment activity. All of the above inspires hope that we will move into positive figures next year. Initially not high, counted in tenths of percents. But we will try to increase this pace.

Fifty dollars a barrel

[Kozlova] So what will happen with oil prices? The future fate of the rouble also depends on this...

[Ulyukayev] The current situation with oil prices is the result of a convergence of several factors, both on the demand side and the supply side. So several more months will be needed for manufacturers and consumers to find a new balance. For many countries a level of 35-40 dollars a barrel is unacceptable. Their budgets are calculated on a price of 60-90 dollars. Ours, incidentally, is one of the most conservative, it assumes 50 dollars. Only Norway and Kazakhstan have a lower price. But things cannot continue like this for long. A new balance must be found. My feeling is that this balance will be found during the second half of 2016. It seems to me that it will be at a level of around 50 dollars a barrel. Forecasting oil prices is a very thankless task. Time will tell.

Sanction as a blessing

[Kozlova] We have been living under sanctions for more than a year now. Can a conclusion be drawn?

[Ulyukayev] At first it was very painful. Painful because it was impossible to refinance. Because the acquisition of technologies was called into question. Painful because exchange rate correlations immediately changed. And this means that dependence on imports, imported components in places where this was high, immediately resulted in an increase in prices.

But it turned out that the restricted access to global capital markets is not only a misfortune but also a blessing. Because following the devaluation, costs fell, and this means that the financial position of companies improved. Because we got used to the capital outflow, which is now characteristic of all the developing countries, before the others did.

On the whole, the influence of the sanctions now is close to zero. It cannot be eternal. In this race between the shield and the sword, the shield is perhaps more reliable. Our economy has become more diverse. We now have a much bigger share of domestic production in the structure of retail and wholesale trade. And greater stability of companies as a whole.

About Ukraine and Turkey

[Kozlova] Let us move to another of our realities, which will happen here from 1 January. Sanctions against Ukraine enter into force...

[Ulyukayev] The story with Ukraine did not occur "suddenly". We have been preparing for it for two years. Ukraine is creating a free trade zone with the European Union - God help it. But Ukraine is linked to Russia by a large number of agreements. Veterinary, customs, and many others. Joining another system of relations means that the rules have to be different as well. Otherwise, it will become much more difficult for our exporters to operate in this market. Ukraine is not maintaining any commitments towards us, but it wants us to keep ours to it. That does not happen. So we are taking measures to support our economy. We have brought our commitments into line with their commitments. That is, we have cancelled the preferential regime, and Ukrainian producers will now pay the same duty as countries with most favoured regime status - like Germany, Sweden, or America.

It is another matter that a food embargo is being introduced for Ukraine at the same time as this. But time-wise, this is just a coincidence. It is a response to the fact that Ukraine joined the anti-Russian sanctions in July this year. That is why the same regime as for the EU countries was introduced. If this had been even two years ago, when food imports from Ukraine were of the order of 2bn dollars, this would have been perceptible but they have now fallen 11-fold in two years. Now they are worth less than 200m dollars. So we are not expecting any inflation spikes...

[Kozlova] But then we are also introducing sanctions against Turkey...

[Ulyukayev] This is a problem that suddenly fell upon us, this is aggression. And the president's decree that we all know about was the response to this aggression. For Turkey the food embargo is narrower. But several consequences are possible as a result of the radical and abrupt nature of these changes. Including inflationary ones. For example, our dependence on the Turkish market for vegetables is quite large - tomatoes, primarily. There is nothing particularly complicated about this, because there are a large number of suppliers that are ready to occupy this niche. The only thing is that time will be needed to conclude new contracts and develop the logistics. Time will be needed, during which it is possible that there will be some distortions, including with regard to prices. I think that this is a matter of a few weeks or months, during the course of which the situation will be stabilized.

Pensions issue and taxes

[Kozlova] Raising the retirement age in Russia. So, does it need to be raised or not?

[Ulyukayev] It is impossible to manage without this. Because the Pension Fund deficit will increase, the correlation between workers and pensioners is constantly changing in favour of pensioners. The demographics indicate that the time spent in retirement is increasing and the time spent at working age is decreasing - the demographic pyramid whose base was much wider than the top has been overturned. Hypothetically there are two options. The first. Changing the demographic correlation so that the number of workers relative to the number of pensioners increases or does not fall. Raising the retirement age serves precisely this purpose. The second option. It is possible not to do this but then you will have to be prepared for the so-called replacement rate to start to fall. That is, the correlation between pensioners' incomes - pensions - and average salaries will steadily decline. The question is who, as it were, will pay the price? The second option, where current pensioners pay, is the worst. The pensioners' risks are the greatest because they depend on medicines, the price of food, elderly people must be better protected. So the second method is not suitable, it is unjust, and completely inhuman. The first remains.

[Kozlova] So it will definitely be raised!

[Ulyukayev] I am always surprised - why do pensioners worry about the retirement age rising? This will not affect them, they are worrying needlessly. There is no need for them to be concerned. It is young people and middle-aged people who need to worry about this. But I think that this active generation should be prepared for it beforehand, they should have time to take the necessary decision. To earn more, change qualifications, enter the voluntary savings system. All of this is extremely important. So raising the retirement age is essentially a mandatory decision in this sense. The sooner we take it, the less radical it will be.

[Kozlova] This should, evidently, be a gradual transition?

[Ulyukayev] Of course, there will be a gradual transition. It is planned that from 1 January 2018 men will retire not at the age of 60 like now, but at 60.6. From 1 January 2019, at 61. From 1 January 2020, at 61.6. And so on. And at some point we will reach the age of 63-65 - identical for men and women.

[Kozlova] And another initiative, which the Finance Ministry also periodically suggests - it says taxes will have to be raised...

[Ulyukayev] Here, I am categorically against. What are taxes? They are a sort of social contract. We pay taxes for receiving public services from the state. Security, environmental protection, health care, support for culture. There are countries where people are willing to pay bigger taxes because they get more services from the state. There are countries that get relatively few services but they also pay little tax. But having the idea that it is possible to take more taxes from the population while not providing them with high-quality public services is a strange idea. If in addition to the police, where there are more than a million people, you also support private security companies - another million people, this means businesses pay twice. And this undermines the foundations of trust between the taxpayers and the state. In my view, the fiscal burden is excessive now, and not too low. We need to think about reducing the tax burden and not about increasing it.

[Kozlova] A good idea.

[Ulyukayev] No, the most important thing is that this is an idea that has been tested. After all, at the beginning of this century that is how we acted. We abolished turnover taxes, introduced a flat scale for income tax, and as a result we did not get less but more tax. It worked.

A bit of poetry

[Kozlova] I know that you seemingly set the muse aside when you took up this post but perhaps you can come up with something for the New Year? Perhaps you can read something?

[Ulyukayev] One short poem inspired a bit by the current strange winter.

"The ice thins, sleep gets deeper.
We twist our fingers at our temples
Either despair from tea,
Or coffee yearning.
Incomprehensible threats
Make our dreams thin.
Either from Santa Claus,
Or from the Spring Maiden."

I nevertheless hope that if not Santa Claus then the Spring Maiden will definitely bring us all we deserve: a quiet life, comfort, prosperity, and happiness for us, and our children.

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 #5
Gazeta.ru
December 26, 2015
Russian pundit views current regime, likely future scenarios
Natalya Galimova interview with Effective Policy Foundation head Gleb Pavlovskiy: 'The Kremlin Is Living Without Sensing the Country Beneath It'; Effective Policy Foundation Head Gleb Pavlovskiy on the Russian System of Management

The year 2016 will be the moment of truth for the current model for treating the state. A transformation is inevitable in Russia, and it will be preceded by yet one more escalation, Effective Policy Foundation head Gleb Pavlovskiy believes. But through its escalations the regime is creating a demand for extremality which it cannot satisfy. Someone else could enter the state vacuum. That was how in 1917 Lenin and Trotskiy filled the "demand for greatness" created by the Provisional Government.

[Galimova] In the book "The Russian Federation System. Sources of Russian Strategic Behaviour," you characterize Putin's 2012-2015-model style of management as "the style of indirect interpretation." His entourage today leaves the president "with an incomplete idea about what has been decided and trying to remember the words Putin uttered." The president "builds relations in such a way that he can always say: I did not know that and I did not promise that." He has "constructed above the regime an unreachable floor where he alone resides. And although he still has contact with his entourage, he does not want to bear responsibility for decisions."

Please cite examples of the manifestation of the "indirect interpretation style."

[Pavlovskiy] You can see them every day and hear them in any speech. What does Putin's famous expression "decide for yourselves" mean - is it giving us a free hand? Of course not. It is the impossibility of management by directive when control is maintained through the technique of uncertainty. The entire management of the Ukraine crisis after Crimea was conducted in that manner.

Take the president's message - it contains phrases which can be interpreted in contradictory ways. Either as the rejection of escalation or as defence along the perimeter. The president met with the captains of business, and what did he say to those captains? He conducted a political briefing with them based on the current press, and the captains remained completely silent.

And this is not about one man but about the features of the system.

If we had before us a truly bureaucratic power vertical, it would accept directives and carry them out. But we are talking about a system to which orders cannot be given.

It is a stateless system, that is a non-bureaucratic system. The monstrous executive apparatus is always busy and is wholly engrossed with deals. It is a functioning but undisciplined system similar not to a state but to the Gorbushka [software, music, and video market in Moscow], or the Yuzhnyy port [automobile market]. It is saved by a spineless readiness, after it has received a signal to its advantage, to turn the other way. So orders are issued in the form of an indirect hint or, as they say, a "signal," and that launches a new series of deals.

[Galimova] Why was it during Putin's current presidential term that this style of management arose?

[Pavlovskiy] It did not arise, it flowered. The choice of direction was made under Boris Yeltsin. It was a choice in favour of a Presidential Staff technocracy with the super-sovereignty of the head of state. When, for instance, Boris Nikolayevich [Yeltsin] in conversation with Eldar Ryazanov could say: "I wake up and I think, who shall I give the country to?" As though he were talking about a garage. And he sincerely believed he owned the country.

The choice in favour of the country as the president's domain and not as a political nation or an ideological goal was definitively made between 1993 and 1996.

After all, you constantly hear it said: "That is for the president to decide." And at the same time everyone understands that the president is not engaged with, for instance, the housing and municipal services problem. He cannot determine the size of the fine for long-haul truck drivers. But everything is presented as allegedly his personal decision. All decisions are attributed to one man because there are no procedures for the passage of management signals. The system does not dare to abandon it. Here nothing can be dictated from the top except prohibitions for the population. That was when Turkish tomatoes suddenly became disgusting while it seemed that, conversely, there was nothing wrong with Georgian wines.

But what does a ban mean? A new demand for services. Phoning round your friends and placing an order for the production of incinerators (devices for burning rubbish and other waste - Gazeta.Ru) for burning food. But that is not corruption, but a tax farming state. We are ruled by tax farmers.

It is dangerous for tourists to fly to Egypt, it is banned. Why? We are not at war with Egypt, we view it as a friendly country. But we have treated it as though it were a hostile state.

By also destroying tourism to Turkey we have treated our urban middle class - the system's most loyal supporters - as serfs. We have deprived them of the freedom of consumer choice. The last remaining freedom!

[Galimova] Do you not think that the ban on flights first to Egypt and then on charter flights to Turkey is explained inter alia by the regime's plan to ensure an influx of vacationers to Crimea? Far from everyone can travel to Europe - particularly when you consider the current exchange rates.

[Pavlovskiy] Explanations of that kind are chosen when there is an obvious lack of purpose. Any idea of ours of heroically conquering has a subtext - lining our pockets. We destroy communications. We want simultaneously to provide a picture for the Sunday TV programmes and show the Turks how angry we are and at the same time allow tourism to earn money for Crimea, where they have already said they will not take everyone. But ambiguity of that kind always comes a cropper. There is nothing left except people being accustomed to bosses who are incapable of managing ordering everyone about. And ordering them to no purpose. The champion word of 2015 is "absurdity" - it can be heard from the Kremlin corridors to the most far-flung regions.

"The memoranda on Putin's desk are reports of attacks by reptilians"

[Galimova] At his annual press conference the president confused Governor Turchak with his father and showed he was unfamiliar with how paid parking lots are introduced in Moscow. Putin is obviously being misinformed. In your view, to what degree do the Russian leadership and Putin personally understand, know, and feel what is happening in the country?

[Pavlovskiy] Information flows into the Kremlin from everywhere and of course there are plenty of lies. But all presidents in the world are lied to, the question is the malice of the lies. You recall the "Agitprop" that existed in the USSR and how it fried our brains with "Malaya Zemlya" [a book about Brezhnev's alleged wartime exploits] and solidarity with the bloody Ethiopian son of a bitch Mengistu Mariam? In Russia there is "neoprop" - the machinery of stultifying television propaganda. It pumps up the population's loyalty by keeping the mass consciousness in a state of hysteria. Russia's people are being moved to the world of a sinister political serial, and that is where they live.

But this causes the country's leaders to lose the ability to make strategic decisions and to assess risks. Even if they themselves want to shield themselves from their own propaganda. Imagine for a minute that Putin, like myself, does not watch television. I don't believe it, but let's assume so. However, all around him are television viewers who have assimilated the language of lies. A network of false stories in which reptilians are prowling around the Kremlin has been imposed on top of reality. There are real threats, but you cannot see them because you are told they have found fascists from the Moon in "Memorial" [human rights organization]. I am convinced that the memoranda on Putin's desk are reports of attacks by reptilians and of UFOs shot down over the week.

"Neoprop" operates as an all-Russian multiplier of stupidity. In this distorted picture of the world, the Malaysian Boeing downed through stupidity can be portrayed as an aircraft containing dead bodies launched by the CIA in order to "bring Putin down." Look at it through the eyes of the poor Kremlin television viewer: Since there are enemies, who are also "our partners," why for the sake of a Kremlin coup should they not undertake a simple operation - filling a Boeing with dead bodies and dropping it over the Donets Basin?

Reality has been dissolved in fantasy and they do not sense the risks.

After all, it was said that Syria was simply "military exercises," right? Our bombers were sometimes edging along the Turkish-Syrian border, but that did not seem to be a problem for the Kremlin. It was just like taking off in Kubinka [air base near Moscow] and crossing Smolenskaya Oblast and accidently cutting a corner across Belarus. Where are they to acquire an understanding of how the world lives when the TV news has already described how it is structured with Rothschild there and Soros, Browder, and the CIA here?

A politician cannot watch Russian political television and remain rational.

Ostankino's "neoprop" is crack cocaine, you lose your sense of reality.

[Galimova] What is the danger of the loss of reality?

[Pavlovskiy] Whatever you like, in particular being prepared to sacrifice ourselves. Emotionally we are already ripe for the role of Christmas turkeys. We only ever wanted what was good, we have risen from our knees, we are the great Russia... But when the show ends we say: "Ri..i..ght, we have been wrong again!" And it could end any way you like, given that the Kremlin is not safeguarding national security and is sauntering around criminal regions like the Middle East, provoking its neighbours over trifles.

We have crept into the world as ignoramuses, rejecting the conservative diplomacy customary for Russia. The Foreign Ministry is talking prison slang like a hoodlum and is offended that "they do not understand us" and waiting for everyone to rush to Moscow to negotiate. The classes of the real threats have not been identified. The authorities watch Star Wars. They fight the environmentalist Vitishko, "Open Russia," and the pop-whistleblower Navalnyy as though they were fighting the Death Star (the combat space station from Star Wars - Gazeta.ru). That is a gift to Russia's rivals - in their capitals and corporation headquarters groups of clever men are selecting the moment for putting the ignoramus's nose out of joint. It will all end with a blackout: After failing to resolve the latest selection of tasks, the System will be left in limbo and will come to a standstill.

What is most dangerous seems to me to be the loss of the ties between the state and the population and all its groups. Television has remained the only form of connection.

But this is not a strong connection, it needs to be fed from budget revenue. But the Kremlin is reckless. Why do excessively reckless gamblers lose? Not because they are idiots but because they do not know how to stop gambling at the right time. Our regime is encouraging protracted gambling in order to keep the masses in a constant state of excitement.

[Galimova] But on the other hand, while people are in that state they are less inclined to blame their misfortunes on the regime, believing economic problems to have been inspired by Russia's enemies. You do not expect anything untoward from people in that state. Although, of course, there are also "glitches" - as with the long-haul truck drivers, for instance.

[Pavlovskiy] How to create in the "ordinary man" a false sense of belonging to the regime? In the USSR they had great difficulty seeking to do this, they set up meetings at all levels - from yard meetings to meetings at workshops and factories. There is nothing of the kind now. It is the mass of supporters, the "overwhelming majority," which they use at times to frighten the country and at others to instruct it, which acts as the controller of behaviour. It is only a sense of the situation's emergency nature that imposes discipline.

When a person is vigilant and is looking round him in alarm, that means he is utterly harmless. But he is also economically uncompetitive.

Unrenewable resources have to be brought into play. The regime cannot stop the game, and in cases like that people always lose. When the game stops, everything will grind to a halt.

"We have sleepwalkers in front of us"

[Galimova] Is Syria also a game?

[Pavlovskiy] Of course. It's hunting for a nonexistent cat in the dark room where the evil Turkmen live.

[Galimova] What was the main aim - diverting the West's attention from Ukraine, thus breaking out of isolation, keeping Al-Asad in power, or demonstrating to citizens that without Russia it is impossible to resolve a single important problem in this world?

[Pavlovskiy] Making a spectacular entrance onto the world stage, sitting on the global throne, and once there thinking what to do next. The Kremlin has no desire to focus on a single main aim, and there is no aim. It had to emerge from isolation following the Ukraine story. And it was clear that the United States would not have let us crawl away easily - we had to hit hard. And we did hit hard! But after hitting, we had to record a rapid profit, the way they do with risky stock exchange operations. We had to change the game. But no, we hit out again and again. Since the Turkish scandal we have been gradually ceasing to understand what we are doing and we are obviously waiting for a prompting from Washington.

Now Iraq has started to be of interest to us. But it is always like that in the Middle East - once you have gotten there, they are happy to play with you. They will pique your interest and ensnare you.

In our country they think: "We will not let ourselves be misled - there will be no second Afghanistan." But this is no Afghanistan.

Here they will pretend to be a friend like Anwar al-Sadat (the former president of Egypt - Gazeta.Ru) and wait for you to turn your back...

[Galimova] In your opinion, does the Russian leadership have an understanding of the conditions under which we could end the operation in Syria? Putin said it will last as long as the government troops' offensive against the positions of ISIL (banned in Russia - Gazeta.Ru). But that sounds too oblique.

[Pavlovskiy] We have entered a situation without analysing how we will get out. What are we counting on? On the world being in a chaotic state and on two or three events unexpectedly changing the military and political situation. What events - we do not know, but who does know? Like the story of the refugees in Europe, which has overturned the European agenda, creating for us a Syrian corridor of intervention. In 2016 there will probably be a couple of windows of that kind through which we may jump (out of Syria - Gazeta.Ru). But we do not know whether we want to jump out!

But you should not see this as mere stupidity. It is a profound disorientation linked to the loss of 25 years of comfort from the benefits of globalization.

The Kremlin is living without sensing the country beneath it. The situation is tragic, because we have sleepwalkers in front of us.

[Galimova] After Turkey shot down the Russian bomber, people started saying, that is how wars start: No one wanted a military confrontation, but the situation became heated and it happened. At the recent meeting of the NATO countries' foreign ministers, the diplomats admitted that they did not rule out mirror-image measures from Moscow with respect to Ankara, but they had no precise understanding of how Putin would react. Fortunately, the reaction in response was not of a military nature. But the question remains: Is a direct clash possible between Russia and a country that is a member of the alliance?

[Pavlovskiy] The fact that the NATO countries do not understand how Putin will react is not an advantage for us, but an additional risk. When you do not know what threats to expect from your former partner who has suddenly decided to become your adversary, the normal reflex that arises is to play it safe.

Take 2014. The interaction between Russia and the West can be described as a succession of situations involving the exchange of blows. The West hurriedly makes the first decisions that come to hand, after all, something had to be decided! : Crimea had been taken, would Odesa [Odessa] be taken tomorrow? And from Ostankino they were shouting: "Yes, we will take it! We will take Odesa and Kyiv [Kiev] and we will get to Lviv!" What was the West supposed to think? The degree of escalation was climbing and at a certain moment someone might have lost their nerve.

The most serious epic fail for our pseudo-bellicosity was that we had no idea of fighting to victory. When Bush went into the Middle East, he had the idea of building "a democratic Greater Middle East." He lost a whole pile of money, he plunged the region into turmoil and blood and achieved nothing. But he nevertheless had a victory plan and he had his 15 minutes of glory: Baghdad was taken.

We are waging a war without an idea, without an ultimate goal, and without a chance of winning. And what might victory in Syria look like?

Al-Asad will take control of the country's entire territory as Kadyrov senior did with Chechnya? That is unrealistic. He will carve off Syria's Alawite chunk and reign there? In that case he will be overthrown and "eaten up" right there in the palace.

[Galimova] But a third scenario is possible - Al-Asad handing over power to another candidate acceptable also to us.

[Pavlovskiy] The people who do not know how to solve the problem of supplying Moscow with tomatoes will know how to structure a system for managing Syria? And will overcome Turkey at the same time? Don't make me laugh.

"Someone else could fill the state vacuum"

[Galimova] You talk a lot about the system's shortcomings and weaknesses. Where does its strength lie?

[Pavlovskiy] The system is splendid. It has skilfully dodged the threats. On several occasions already we have avoided defeat without resolving the question of building the state.

The very fact that we still exist today in this current stateless form is already a great success. Unless you take a look ahead to 2016, of course.

[Galimova] Why is the system managing to dodge away? Is this luck, good fortune?

[Pavlovskiy] Not at all. It is a high degree of mobility and "agility." The shortcomings and merits of the Russian Federation System lie in one and the same thing - it is not a state. If the present team were to start honestly setting up stable and lawful institutions, the result would be a weak state with a mediocre economy. But we are not building institutions, we conquered Georgia. We can also occupy the Arctic as long as the ice does not melt. When Bush Junior was teaching the Kremlin geopolitics he liked to say: "You study the facts - we make them!" Now by annexing Crimea, we too have created our own facts. But please note that the Kremlin has less idea than anyone what to do with them.

The Russian Federation system is unique. To be honest, I cannot find any close analogies.

As a country we do not believe in anything, but we are able artificially to create a situation of belief in ourselves. We do not believe in principles or in long-term coalitions based on ideology or friendship and we are not trying to create them. The Russian Federation arose in a period when it had no allies left in the precise sense of the word, even the former USSR republics wanted to cut loose. And the system learned to survive alone at the expense of the rest of the world by an original method.

[Galimova] In your book you talk among other things about the Putin majority, believing that "one day it will become apocalyptic for Russia": "It has already proven that for the sake of preserving its position and emotional well-being it is prepared to carry out any acts of tyranny inside and outside the country. And upon hearing the call of a more powerful extreme, it responds to it eagerly." Where do you see the Putin majority's apocalyptic role?

[Pavlovskiy] It is all simple: There is the population living on a modest annuity from the regime in the absence of a political nation, policy, or state. But this is a "Praetorian majority." It has grown accustomed to the magic atmosphere of extremality and miracles - miracles simultaneously dangerous and profitable. We have an "almost war," but at the same time everyone knows that in actual fact there is no war, yet it is breathtaking. Escalation after escalation. Today the audience has been warmed up, but where is the soloist?

The Kremlin team no longer offers the attractively profitable policy it promised. It has turned out that the concert has been postponed but we have to pay twice over for our seats.

A state vacuum has arisen which someone else could fill. With a slightly more profitable proposal for the Praetorian mass.

[Galimova] Someone truly radical?

[Pavlovskiy] We have lots of radicals who talk the talk. The problem is not radicalism but the fact that through its military escalations the regime is creating a demand to which it will be unable to respond. The situation was more or less the same in 1917. The provisional government appropriated for itself the prerogatives of the overthrown monarch and the State Duma.

And Kerenskiy's jabbering about how Russia had risen from its knees and would be an example to the whole world fuelled an appetite for something of indeterminate grandeur. Lenin and Trotskiy quietly came in via this backdoor.

[Galimova] But in 1917 the situation in Russia was completely different.

[Pavlovskiy] I am not comparing people. I am saying that in politics anyone who builds up expectations of miracles beyond his powers to deliver is preparing an invitation for someone else. The regime is rushing to bring the future closer but is not thinking about it and has banned politicians from talking about it. Meanwhile resources are running out and the future is ever closer and ever more painful.

I see 2016 as a "terminal" year - the moment of truth for this model for treating the state.

[Galimova] Why 2016 in particular?

[Pavlovskiy] Incantations about a great Russia with dwindling resources and an obvious inability to manage what is left are accelerating the crisis. Everything is caving in, there is less money, yet the Central Bank chairman is advising us not to look at currency exchange rates and at the habits of the middle classes. I think some kind of transformation is inevitable in the country - of course, it is to be desired that it will not be a destructive one - but before that you can expect yet another escalation. And according to the laws of Russian escalations, the next one should be broader and more risky than the past ones.

[Galimova] If 2016 is the finale to the present behavioural model, what will come next?

[Pavlovskiy] A finale is not a disaster. The fantasy machine is coming to a halt and it is clear that it has nothing more to play with: No money, no mobility, no supporters or competent cadres. But when resources collapse, a decision has to be made rapidly, you have to make not "geopolitical" decisions but real ones. When it becomes clear that there is no state and the command control centre has "gone for a Klinskoye" [reference to commercial for Klinskoye beer] people will start doing something.

[Galimova] Is it possible that the situation will change in part through the elections to the State Duma which will in fact take place in 2016?

[Pavlovskiy] Any real agenda for 2016 will require an audit of the country and of available resources. What do we still have? Who is still doing his job rather than safeguarding his dacha? What has to be revoked immediately?

For instance, a considerable proportion of the current Duma's output can be categorized as useless. This is the most inglorious of all Dumas over the past 100 years.

It would be good if a consensus were to form in society around the idea that the deputies of this Duma should not enter the next Duma - any of them. Then the elections might still acquire state value. But in any event the elections will be different from the way our sages are planning them. And what exactly they will be like is a question for those who go to play on this field and how have a stake there. I have no stake in it.

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 #6
Sputnik
January 4, 2016
Weak Ruble to Help Russia Withstand Low Oil Prices

WASHINGTON (Sputnik) - Russian oil industry will endure low commodity prices due to Russia's weakened national currency, Moody's Investors Service said in a press release on Monday.

"Russia's weak ruble will help the country's national oil companies withstand low oil prices, but economic sanctions limit access to long-term external financing from US and EU financial and capital markets for the Russian giant Rosneft (Ba1 stable)," the release stated.

In December 2015, prices for Brent oil fell below $37 per barrel, reaching a level last seen in December 2008. Following the decline, the value of Russia's ruble, which is traditionally dependent on the price of oil, fell to a 3.5-month minimum against the dollar, exceeding 71 rubles per dollar.

Moody's argued that the global oil and gas industry will have to reduce spending in 2016 in the face of decreasing oil prices. The rating agency added that excess supply will continue to influence the oil sector, which will likely see a rise in defaults in 2016.

Moody's also noted that national oil companies in Latin America will likely face high refinancing risk, while China's three national oil companies - China National Petroleum Corporation, China Petrochemical Corporation and China National Offshore Oil Corporation - will have to confront deteriorating credit metrics through 2017.

The strength of the Russian currency against the US dollar has declined twofold since the beginning of 2014 amid the Western economic sanctions imposed on Russia over Moscow's alleged involvement in the Ukraine crisis as well as the global collapse in oil prices. Russia has repeatedly refuted any involvement in Ukraine's internal affairs.

 #7
Sputnik
January 3, 2015
Russia Oil Output Rises to New Record High in 2015

Russia's oil production reached a record 534.081 million metric tons in 2015, media reports said.

People walks in front of the Lukoil Neftochim Headquarters in Sofia on July 27, 2011

In 2015, Russia's oil output amounted to a record 534.081 million metric tons, 40 percent higher than in 2014, according to media reports.

Russia's oil exports to non-CIS countries increased by 10.6 percent and reached 220.267 million tons, sources said.

Rosneft remains the country's largest oil company; it produced more than 189 million metric tons of oil last year. Coming on Rosneft's heels are Lukoil and Surgutneftegas, with oil output standing at over 85 million metric tons and 61 million metric tons, respectively.

In late December, Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak laid the drop in oil prices at Saudi Arabia's feet. According to Novak, Saudi Arabia increased oil production by 1.5 million barrels per day in 2015.

At the end of 2015, world oil prices dropped to their 2008 level, and at the December 31 trading session crude was worth 37.61 dollars per barrel.

Russia Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich, for his part, said that he does not believe oil prices will plummet to 25 dollars per barrel. At the same time, he added that the period of such low prices "cannot last too long."

When hammered out, Russia's budget for 2016 stipulated global oil prices would be about 50 dollars per barrel.

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 #8
The National Interest
January 4, 2016
The Truth About Sanctions Against Russia
Western sanctions have failed to deliver a 'devastating blow' but they also seem here to stay.
By Nikolay Pakhomov
Nikolay Pakhomov is a political analyst and consultant in New York City. He is a Russian International Affairs Council expert. You can follow him on Twitter @nik_pakhomov.

The extension of sanctions against Russia by the EU and their expansion by the United States demonstrated that the restrictive measures will remain in place for the foreseeable future. However hard for the Russian economy, the sanctions have not delivered a devastating blow, which could have led to a significant change in Kremlin policy. These measures were arguably not created to ruin the Russian economy, which is too large and important for the world to do without. The sanctions were designed to warn Russia against foreign policy actions that the West does not agree with. Instead, they became a crash course for Russian policy makers and elites, reminding them that for Russia to truly secure an independent standing in international relations it should be ready and able to withstand international pressure, especially in the economic sphere.

Since the start of Western sanctions against Russia it has been obvious that the measures are not as severe as they could have been-and for good reason. Consider the sanctions leveled against the Russian energy sector: among other things, they have been aimed at reducing financing options for Russian energy companies and preventing them from developing complicated offshore and Arctic projects. Both spheres play a very important role in strategic planning for these companies, but the restrictive measures did not harm much of their current operations. The reason is simple: Russian companies supply, according to different estimates, up to a third of the EU's natural gas and oil demand. In such situation, any immediate or devastating measures against these companies can hardly be expected.

At the same time, with sinking oil prices, it would be difficult to argue that the sanctions do not harm the strategic perspectives of Russian energy companies and, as such, put a drastic pressure on the Russian economy as a whole-which is still very dependent on energy exports, although less than before. More importantly, after the sanctions were confirmed by the United States and the European Union at the end of 2015 it became clear that this pressure is here to stay.

Only a few months ago, several Russian and foreign insiders thought that with the fragile ceasefire more or less holding in eastern Ukraine, and with many European companies discontented by profit loss due to the sanctions, the restrictive measures would be lessened-at least by the EU. One can recall the Paris talks in the "Normandy Four" format in October, which de facto confirmed the continuation of the Minsk process into 2016. At the same time, the leadership of Lugansk and Donetsk People's Republics postponed their elections, opening the possibility of holding them within the Ukrainian legal space. The latter would be a step in the direction of reconciliation. But, when extending and expanding the scope of sanctions, the EU and the United States did not take into consideration the improvement and stabilization of the situation in Eastern Ukraine.

It should come as no surprise: the political elites in Europe and the United States have attached so much political significance to the sanctions that the sanctions have become irreversible, at least without a significant move on the part of Russia. Since there are no signs that Moscow will, for example, reverse its decision on Crimea, one cannot expect an end to Western sanctions against Russia any time soon.

This means that for the Kremlin, the sanctions have become a permanent factor in decision making, and make other domestic and international problems more severe. Those include the question of whether Russia has loyal allies who can help. It has become obvious that, on the one hand, even Russia's business partners in Europe cannot assist it in dealing with the sanctions. In the last months of 2015, the world saw how Germany wanted to have it both ways, attempting to continue implementing North Stream 2 while keeping the sanctions in place. Italy, deprived of natural gas from the South Stream after the crisis in relations between Russia and the West started in 2014, became frustrated by German actions, but to no avail.

On the other hand, it is not clear how much support Moscow will receive from Beijing on various issues. Certainly, China might need Russian natural gas and oil, but how far can this cooperation go? Even in terms of expanding buyers for Russian energy resources, Moscow needs to diversify its partners in Asia-if China becomes the chief client in the region and cooperation with the Europeans decreases, will Beijing be able to dictate the terms of cooperation to Moscow?

In Russian domestic policy, Western sanctions also increased pressure on the Kremlin to act on many fronts. For years, businessmen, officials and experts have been discussing the investments needed to modernize Russia's energy sector. But with high oil prices there was no major incitement to modernize: why bother when profits are easy and high? Now, not only has the price of oil gone down, but Western sanctions, including the ban on energy-related services, equipment and technologies, are not going anywhere. Only in November 2014, after Western sanctions were imposed, did the Russian government approve a plan of measures to decrease the Russian energy sector's dependency on imports. This was done after years of discussion and a broad consensus that the measures were long overdue. Would have they been implemented without the presence of sanctions? As of December of 2015, subsequent measures, necessary to support the domestic production of equipment for offshore production, were still being discussed. The United States and the European Union may expand the list of sanctioned services, equipment and technologies anytime. Therefore Russian companies, with the support of their government, should act fast to get the necessary technologies (maybe through cooperation with Asian companies) and use them to modernize.

Furthermore, the majority of sectors that Russia needs to develop and grow its economy can fall prey to Western sanctions. Are they ready to withstand this kind of pressure? Do Russian companies in those sectors have enough partners in Asia, in case they need access to international know-how or services if they become the target of Western sanctions?

There is a broader question: How mature is the Russian economy to weather further Western reactions to a more assertive Kremlin foreign policy? In the twenty-first century, it is impossible to build a strong economy providing decent living conditions for one's population while in international isolation. This fact is understood in the Kremlin-during a meeting with business leaders on December 24, President Putin said: "To expand the capabilities of national businesses we also intend to develop economic ties with other countries and take part in integration processes." But this task will be far more difficult to achieve against the pressure of Western sanctions, which do not seem to be going anywhere.

The curious student of history and international relations may still wonder what is the real reason for these sanctions: disagreements over Ukraine, or Western concerns over a more assertive Russian foreign policy and the prospect of Russia becoming a full-scale power center in international relations? In reality, such alternative reasoning does not exist: Russia's expectation of having its position on Ukraine acknowledged by the West shows that a more assertive Russia is already here.

After Russia claimed its right to a more assertive foreign policy, its economy has found itself in a far more challenging international environment. So far, it has not been completely broken, and Russian society seems ready to endure harsher economic conditions for the benefit of a more ambitious foreign policy course: at least 59 percent of Russians support the country's foreign policy. But this endurance challenge is set to continue at least for the coming year. The Kremlin has no choice but to further implement the measures necessary to build an economy adequate for a country aspiring to be a true power center in current international relations.

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 #9
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
January 4, 2015
What to expect from Russia's Syria policy in 2016
Moscow has been relying on hard power in Syria over the last three months and risks falling into a trap of over-reliance on it next year. While this strategy has yielded some results, such as engaging the U.S.-led coalition into more decisive talks, in 2016 the same approach is likely to prove its inefficiency.
By Yuri Barmin
Yury Barmin is a strategic risk consultant based in Moscow. He holds an MPhil Degree in International Relations from the University of Cambridge. His interests include Russian foreign policy and the politics of the Gulf. Follow him on Twitter at @yurybarmin.

Vladimir Putin's decision to intervene in Syria in late September was undoubtedly one of the most important events in global politics this year. Involvement in a conflict outside the former Soviet Union means that the Russia is taking a shot at regional leadership, if not at contesting the global role of the U.S. altogether. Now in Syria, there is no going back for Moscow. While it is not entirely clear for how long Russia can sustain its military campaign at the present level, it will need to act accordingly to its newly stated geopolitical ambitions.

Up until late 2015 Russia was very cautious in its Syria policy. It openly supported Syrian President Bashar Assad but was reluctant to make more assertive moves fearing that it would put Russia at odds with other regional powers, such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

The second half of 2015 brought about a dramatic change in Russia's vision of Syria. The deployment of Russian warplanes to the country and their military involvement in the conflict put Moscow in the heart of the conflict. It is remarkable how the rhetoric about Russian President Vladimir Putin's attempts to take part in the settlement of the crisis has changed since late 2014.

A year ago, powers like Saudi Arabia and Qatar were voicing their anger over Russia's support of Assad saying that Moscow has no role to play in this crisis. Now that the Syrian war has become Russia's war, they have accepted Moscow as a legitimate stakeholder in the conflict, albeit on the other side of the barricades.

By cementing its military presence in Syria in 2015 Russia has essentially guaranteed itself the leading role in the Syrian crisis in 2016. This is especially important given the fact that there are hopes now that starting in January, the Syrian government and the opposition may start negotiations on a ceasefire.

While previously Russia's participation in diplomatic efforts to bring the Syrian war to an end weren't backed by any influence on the ground, this time there is hard power that Moscow may employ at any time, meaning that its bargaining power in Syria has increased markedly in 2015.

The U.S.-Russia resolution that calls for a ceasefire and political talks in Syria is largely a result of the military build-up in the country that Moscow carried out in autumn. The Syrian crisis is far from over and Russia will need to use all of its diplomatic clout to guarantee Assad's presidency for the transitional period. As of now there is a degree of certainty that Moscow may in fact achieve this goal since some Western powers have become more flexible on the issue of Assad.

However, it is wrong to argue that, with the resolution on Syria having been unanimously adopted at the UN Security Council, violence in the country will subside. Some opposition groups have already voiced their pessimism about the plan that Russia and the United State have proposed, while the Islamic State of Iraq and the Greater Syria (ISIS) and Jabhat Al-Nusra have no intention to stop fighting in the first place.

Moscow itself is not entirely sure whether a diplomatic settlement of the crisis is possible, which is why a further military build-up in Syria is still possible. Putin has hinted at this when he recently said that Russia is using far from everything it is capable of and that it could resort to other military means in Syria if needed.

This is probably a key element of Russia's strategy in Syria for 2016: Moscow has prepared a variety of tools to be employed if necessary but will prefer not to expand its military activity in Syria. This is easy to explain given the fact that military gains in Syria have so far been limited and there is no clear exit strategy.

Some of these existing options that are available to Russia in Syria but have not been used yet likely include two new airbases. While the Russian Defense Ministry denies that it needs new facilities in the country, some reports as well as satellite images suggest that Russia has been conducting construction work at old Syrian bases and that its helicopters have been spotted at two such facilities.

It is hard to imagine the scope to which Russia's military presence may expand in Syria due to the fact that Russia has access to virtually any military facility under the control of the Syrian Arab Army.

In the event that the UN resolution on Syria succeeds and a ceasefire commences it is still likely that Russia will continue its military build-up in the country. A ceasefire between Assad and the opposition will mean that the sides will have to concentrate on the fight against ISIS, Jabhat Al Nusra and other extremist groups as opposed to fighting each other.

Russia will have to take one of the leading roles within a wider coalition against terrorists to back its ally Assad but also to stay relevant in this conflict to exert more power on the diplomatic front.

Precisely because of the fear of losing existing influence in Syria, Moscow will not change its position on Assad and his role in the country. While Western powers seek to convince Russia that the Syrian President is the cause of the war, Putin believes that Assad is the only force that may stop jihadists.

But Moscow knows it all too well that the act of abandoning Assad will be interpreted in the West as its weakness and a strategic loss. Even worse, it will mean the inability of Russian military prowess to yield meaningful results, which would cast shadow on the entire strategy behind Putin's foreign policy.

All in all, it seems that Moscow will find itself in a difficult position in Syria in 2016. While reluctant to do so, Russia will need to maintain its military force in the country and will likely even increase it in an attempt to secure a spot of a key player in the Middle East. Consequently a pullout from Syria looks more and more unrealistic because it will leave Russia without its main lever against the West in this conflict.

Moscow has been relying on hard power in Syria in the last three months and risks falling into a trap of over-reliance on it next year. While this strategy has yielded some results, such as engaging the U.S.-led coalition into more decisive talks, in 2016 the same approach is likely to prove its inefficiency once it becomes clear that real territorial gains of Assad forces aren't commensurate with resources that Russia invested in the campaign.

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 #10
The Unz Review
www.unz.com
January 2, 2016
Week Thirteen of the Russian Intervention in Syria: Debunking the Lies
By The Saker

Ever since the first rumors began to circulate about an impending Russian military intervention in Syria the Internet and the media have been flooded with all sorts of silly rumors, myths and outright lies about what could/would happen. These rumors, myths and outright lies are still being spread today, and not only by pro-US interest groups, but even by supposedly pro-Russian "analysts". All this nonsense completely obfuscates the reality of the Russian intervention in Syria (but maybe that was the goal all along?) and tries to paint the Russian operation as a failure. After three months of Russian air and missile strikes in Syria, it is a good time to ask the question of whether the Russians have achieved some tangible results or whether, as some are suggesting, this has basically been a big PR operation.

The key issue here is what criteria to use to measure "success". And that, in turns, begs the question of what the Russians had hoped to achieve with their intervention in the first place. It turns out that Putin clearly and officially spelled out what the purpose of the Russian intervention was. On October 11th, he declared the following in an interview with Vladimir Soloviev on the TV channel Russia 1:

Our objective is to stabilize the legitimate authority and create conditions for a political compromise

That's it. He did not say that Russia would single-handedly change the course of the war, much less so win the war. And while some saw the Russian intervention as a total "game changer" which would mark the end of Daesh, I never believed that. Here is what I wrote exactly one day before Putin made the statement above:

Make no mistake here, the Russian force in Syria is a small one, at least for the time being, and it does not even remotely resemble what the rumors had predicted (...) There is no way that the very limited Russian intervention can really change the tide of the war, at least not by itself. Yes, I do insist that the Russian intervention is a very limited one. 12 SU-24M, 12 SU-25SM, 6 SU-34 and 4 SU-30SM are not a big force, not even backed by helicopters and cruise missiles. Yes, the Russian force has been very effective to relieve the pressure on the northwestern front and to allow for a Syrian Army counter-offensive, but that will not, by itself, end the war.

I was harshly criticized at that time for "minimizing" the scope and potential of the Russian operation, but I chose to ignore these criticisms since I knew that time would prove me right.

What happened then was a typical exercise in hyperbole: many putatively pro-Russian commentators took turns writing euphoric "analyses" which day after day spiked the public's hopes only to then later come crushing down in disappointment. Predictably, the more the gap between expectations and reality on the ground grew, the more the critiques Putin and Assad could gloat about the Russian "failure to win". That kind of pseudo-analysis is built on a typical "straw man" fallacy: the ridiculous notion that the Russian intended to single-handedly defeat Daesh. Sadly, "pro-Russian" commentators greatly contributed to the construction of that "straw man" by their (and not the Russian military's) completely unrealistic expectations and predictions.

Following the second week of the Russian intervention in Syria I wrote:

The Russian force is small and vulnerable. Of course, one option for the Russians would be to expand the airfield near Latakia, but that would take time and more resources and my understanding is that they want to consolidate their current airfield first. However, as a stop-gap measure, the Russians could use Russian-based bombers. If Iran allows Russia to conduct in-air refueling in Iranian airspace or if Iran allows Russia to use Iranian airbases, then many more SU-34/SU-35SM or SU-34/SU-30SM "air force packages" could be engaged in Syria. In theory, Russia could even provide her Tu-22M3 to deliver gravity bombs, her Tu-95MS to deliver cruise missiles and her Tu-160 to deliver either one or both. I don't think that there is any military necessity to use these strategic bombers right now, but it might be a good idea to do so for political reasons - just to flex some more 'military muscle' and show the Neocons that Russia is not to be messed with. Submarine launched cruise missiles would also work, especially if launched by a Russian sub in the Mediterranean which the USN did not detect.

And this is exactly what happened next: Russia began to use her strategic aviation to augment her capabilities and to show the West that the Kremlin meant business. I then concluded by saying:

So far, the Kremlin has done a superb PR job explaining that Daesh is a direct threat to Russia and that it was better for Russia to "fight them over there than over here". This logic, however, is predicated on the idea that a very limited Russian intervention can tip the balance. There is a very fine conceptual line between tipping the balance and fighting someone else's war and that is something the Kremlin is acutely aware of. Hopefully, this line will never be crossed.

To be fair to the Kremlin, saying that it is better to "fight them over there than over here" is in no way a promise the tip any balance. But there were many Russian commentators who did say that the Russian intervention would, indeed, tip the balance and the Kremlin did not directly refute these claims. So I suggest the following goal setting by the Kremlin:

Primary objective: stabilize the legitimate authority and create conditions for a political compromise
Secondary objective : tip the balance of the war in favor of the Syrian armed forces.
Having discarded the silly strawman arguments and we have established the real Russian goals we can now evaluate whether Russia has been successful or not.

Following only three weeks of Russian air and missile operations, Assad came to Moscow and the first multilateral negotiations, which brought together the foreign ministers of Russia, the US, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, took place in Vienna. All the countries which had unleashed their aggression against Syria under the "Assad must go" slogan now had to accept that Assad was not going anywhere. This was a complete diplomatic triumph for Russia. This first triumph was followed by another series of triumphs at the UNSC. In the meantime, on the ground in Syria, the Syrian military, for the first time in months, actually began a series of counter-offensive which slowly, but systematically, began to push back Daesh in most sectors of the front. So if the criteria is "stabilizing the legitimate authority and creating conditions for a political compromise", then the Russian operation is nothing short of a total victory, a true diplomatic triumph achieved in a very short time. In less than one month, the Russians succeeded in making Assad's presence at the head of a legitimate government in Damascus an indisputable reality which all Assad-haters had to accept, and the conditions for a political compromise were created, at least in diplomatic terms.

Now let's take a closer look at what has actually happened in military terms. But before we do that, let me repeat once again that tipping the military balance has never been the primary Russian objective, only a secondary one which could be achieved, or so the Russians hope, in the process of achieving the first, main, one. To prove my point, I will have to repeat again and again something I have been mantrically repeating for the past three months: the "operational-tactical group of the Russian AirSpace Force (RASF) in Syria" (that is its official name) is roughly equivalent to just one aviation regiment. Without going into many details, you need to know that Russian military theory has developed a very strict set of norms which outline in great detail the kind of forces needed to successfully execute any specific task. What is absolutely clear to anybody with even a basic understanding of warfare and, especially, air operations, is that one single aviation regiment cannot be used to defeat a force with well over 100,000 combatants deployed across a territory of roughly 150,000 km2 (just in Syria) supported by a network of bases and training camps in Turkey and other countries of the region and which gets a quasi infinite supply of weapons, combatants and money from numerous wealthy state sponsors. Ask anybody with even a superficial knowledge of Russian military theory and he/she will tell you that this is not the kind of task an given to an aviation regiment. Those who say otherwise simply don't know what they are talking about.

What is truly remarkable is that the range of missions accomplished by this aviation regiment equivalent size force has been one which normally have been given to an aviation division (a force roughly 3 to 5 times larger). Let me repeat that: this regimental size force has, for three months nonstop, successfully executed the amount of airstrikes normally given to a force 3 to 5 times bigger. Now I don't know about you, but for me this sure is the sign of a fantastically successful operation. Ask any military commander how he would feel if the force he commands could accomplish not just the full set of tasks it is supposed to accomplish, but 3 to 5 times more, and this in real combat operation. I assure you that this commander would be elated. The fact that some are still capable of speaking of a Russian military failure is a sign of either dishonesty or ignorance (or both).

Some pseudo-analysts have tried to justify their negative evaluation of the Russian operation by counting the percentage change in the territory controlled by the government forces as opposed to Daesh and its allies. Again, this is a case of either dishonesty or professional incompetence. The fact that Daesh controls roughly 80% of the Syrian territory is meaningless nonsense. Not only because this 80% of land only includes 20% of the population of Syria, but because the very notion of "control" means nothing in the context of this war.

What is really happening is this: most of the combat operation are centered around major urban areas (cities) and specific lines of communications (roads). In terms of small towns or the rest of the countryside, it is not really "controlled" by anybody. Typically, when the government forces take village "A", the Daesh forces go to "B" and when the government takes "B", Daesh goes back to "A". (Those interested in these tactical issues should read this interview of a Russian military specialist with a great deal of experience of Syria translated by my friend Tatzhit Mihailovich). The government forces are already overstretched and are barely capable of mounting an offensive without having to move their forces allocated to the defense of key cities. This is also why the Syrian counter-offensive has been so slow: a dire lack of manpower.

Furthermore, since the real fighting centers around urban areas and key axes of communications, the very use of percentages of territory are meaningless in measuring the success of failure of these operations. Take the example of Aleppo: if/when the Syrians finally fully liberate the city from Daesh, which would be a major success, the percentage shift in controlled territory will be absolutely insignificant. Yet it would be a major success for the government forces.

None of the above, however, really answers the question of whether the Russian military intervention in Syria has tipped the balance in favor of the Syrian government or not. Some say that it has, others deny that. My strictly personal opinion is that no, it has not or, I should say, not yet. But there are some signs that it might in the near future. What are these signs?

First, the pressure on Turkey to stop acting like a rogue-state led by an irresponsible megalomaniac has been increasing ever since the downing of the Russian SU-24 and the subsequent Russian revelations about the Turkish regime and, specifically, the Erdogan family's involvement in the illegal purchase of Daesh oil. So far the regime is holding fast, but it is clearly hurting politically and the tensions are now flaring up inside and all around Turkey. While I don't expect Erdogan to cave in to external pressures, I do think that the tensions in Turkey will end up hurting Daesh, probably in a minor way unless the conflict with the Kurds truly blows up, at which point Daesh will be affected in a much more significant manner.

Second, there are some signs that Daesh is running into military difficulties in Iraq and political difficulties in the rest of the Arab world. The fact that the Saudis have now felt the need to create what is basically a Sunni anti-Shia terrorist force (aka officially as "Islamic anti-terrorist force") is a clear sign that Daesh is not living up to their expectations.

Third, the Russians are now providing heavy artillery systems and training to the Syrians who are now slowly but surely acquiring the kind of firepower which the Russians have used with devastating effectiveness against the Wahabis in Chechnia.

Fourth, while the Russian air operations are, by definition, incapable of defeating a well-dug in and dispersed guerrilla force, it can place a great deal of stress on its logistics and supply lines. It also severely restricts the mobility of Daesh forces, especially by night.

Fifth, with the direct support of the RASF, the Syrians, backed by Hezbollah, have begun retaking control of some segments of the Syrian border with Lebanon and Turkey. That is, by the way, one of the most difficult yet crucial tasks for the government forces: to take as much of the Syrian border with Turkey under control (the Iranians will do that with the Iraqi border). This has not happened so far, and it will not happen in the near future, but the events are moving in the right direction.

But what will really decide of the outcome of this war is not firepower but logistics. Currently, the Syrians are at a huge disadvantage: not only are the short on ammunition and, especially, spares, but their entire armament is outdated and way past its theoretical service life. The Syrian government forces have also suffered terrible losses in manpower but the Syrians cannot afford a full mobilization as this would greatly hurt an already suffering economy. Keep in mind that the Syrians have been fighting this war for longer (4 years and 9 months) than the Soviet Union fought WWII (3 years and 10 months). The fact that cracks are showing everywhere are normal. In fact, the only thing which the Syrians seem to have an infinite supply of is courage.

Daesh (and when I speak of Daesh I mean all of them, the "good terrorists" and the "bad ones") is, so far, enjoying a quasi limitless supply of combatants, equipment, supplies and, most importantly, money. With the full backing of the USA, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, Israel and many European countries, this is hardly surprising. Daesh also enjoys a huge geographical advantage because it can use Turkey, Jordan and Iraq as a rear base and safe heaven.

Make no mistake here, the Syrians are the underdog here and there is nothing the Russians can do to change that, at least not alone. The key issue here is what Iran is capable and willing to do in this situation. Iran has already done a lot and I believe that the Iranians will do more but only if there is no other way. It is not that the Iranians lack courage or means, but the fact that they are already taking a huge risk in being so deeply involved in this war. I am personally surprised by the fact that the USA, especially, Israel have not already started to denounce an "Iranian invasion of Syria", especially since the USA did not have any qualms about denouncing a totally fictional "Russian invasion" of the Donbass. But if the number of Iranian boots on the ground goes up this kind of propaganda will be used (even if the Iranians are legally present at the request of the legitimate Syrian government).

Sadly, the AngloZionists have succeeded in created an immense and truly toxic mess with their interventions in the Maghreb and the Middle-East. Just as in the Ukraine, there is no simple solution to stop the conflict and return to peace. In the Ukraine, the Empire unleashed a nauseous mix of Nazis and Jews, while the Middle-East is now threatened by a massive Takfiri infestation. Neither Russia nor Iran will ever be able to solve this conflict by "winning" it. Things have gone way too far and just as peace will return to the Ukraine only after a full-denazification, peace will only return to the Middle-East after a full de-Takfirization of the region, including in Saudi Arabia and Qatar. To those who will accuse me of being naïve about the realistic prospects of ridding the Ukraine of Nazis and the Middle-East of Wahabis, I will reply with a few simple and basic questions: do you really and sincerely believe that peace can be made with Nazis and Takfiris? Do you think that either group will simple "give up" their delusional insanity and become a "normal" political force? Or do you really believe that only liberating the Donbass and Syria of these shaitans and leave them in control of the rest of the Ukraine/Middle-East will really bring peace to the Donbass or Syria?

The truth is that the war in the Ukraine will only end when all of the Ukraine is liberated, just as the war in the Middle-East will only end when all of the Middle-East is liberated. You might not like this notion - I sure don't - but reality has never been dependent on our likes or dislikes. This will be a long war.

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 #11
The National Interest
January 3, 2015
What Russia Said About NATO and Why It Matters
By Thomas Fedyszyn
homas Fedyszyn has been a professor of national security affairs at the Naval War College since retiring from the Navy in 2000. The views voiced here are his alone.

National Security Strategies (NSS) of great powers have many audiences. Vladimir Putin's latest effort, "About the Strategy of National Security of the Russian Federation" was issued on New Year's Eve 2015. He should hope that this forty-page publication will be read by his local citizenry because the international audience will neither be surprised nor enlightened by it. Official Russian sources argue that Putin is embarking on a "proactive" foreign policy in order to prevent Russia from being "closed off from the rest of the world." In fact the tough tone of the document hides a very clear defensiveness along with the suggestion that Russia will not be able to compete with its newly labeled adversaries in the long-term. This alone could lead to trouble.

What's New

The Western press is highlighting that this assessment names the United States and its NATO allies as Russia's principal security threat, with relations reaching a new low after Russia's annexation of Crimea. However, this theme is merely a reiteration of Russia's Military Doctrine (December 2014) and Maritime Doctrine (July 2015). It does up the ante of Obama's NSS (2015), which labels Russia just as an aggressor in Ukraine and Crimea, without honoring Moscow as a principal threat. NATO's most recent Summit Declaration (Wales 2014) also falls short of 'threat' terminology but does 'condemn' Russian actions in Ukraine and Crimea.

The new NSS's discussion of the situation in Ukraine and other so-called 'color' revolutions is instructive in the Russian belief that not only are the intelligence services of the United States behind them, but that radical social, nationalist and religious groups are being joined by international NGOs and private citizens. Should this sweeping and comprehensive alliance exist in any members of the former Soviet Union, there probably is good reason for Russia to expect many more such 'color' revolutions.

Russia's View of NATO

Russian proof of NATO aggression is the development of its Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) and the fact that additional Western troops are being stationed on the alliance's eastern borders. There is no mention that NATO bolstered its RRF in direct response to Russian revanchism in Crimea and Ukraine, several months after the aggressions occurred. Further the troop buildup in Poland and the Baltics is composed of rotational-not permanently-stationed-forces and their numbers are dwarfed by Russian counterparts across the border. Clearly the document authors citing "NATO's military buildup" paid little attention to the pitiful response made by NATO members of increasing each member's defense expenditures to at least 2 percent of GDP. Russia is more than double this percentage.

A Nuclear Option?

While there is lip service offered to curbing Russian nuclear potential in the NSS, the qualifications that follow make it clear that this is empty verbiage and no fundamental change from the Gerasimov Doctrine. The document offers that Russia will continue to maintain its nuclear arsenal as a deterrent and would resort to the nuclear option "only if all other non-military options failed." Of course, Russia retains the prerogative to make this determination.

Russia's Economy

Perhaps it is in the realm of non-military affairs that Russia watchers should pay particular notice. The document acknowledges that Russian economic stability is in danger due to its "low level of economic competitiveness and its resource-dependent economy." It notes a "lag in the development of advanced technologies, the vulnerability of the financial system. . . the economy going offshore. . . the strength of the shadow economy." It indirectly acknowledges the effect of Western sanctions by labeling "ensuring Russia's food independence" a strategic task and calling for increased government support for agriculture. Even looking through rose-colored glasses, one sees a faltering system refusing to enter the global economy-a system that has lost attractiveness to outside investors and cannot keep pace with even middling competitors.

Perhaps one newsworthy entry is the Russian assertion of the existence a U.S. Military-Biological Laboratory Network located in nations bordering Russia. As to its actual existence, time will tell.

The Russian Constitution requires the publication of an NSS every six years and this one was just slightly overdue, replacing the May 2009 version. Vladimir Putin's pronouncements and earlier strategic documents prepared the world of most of its contents and they should come as no surprise. Its veracity is comparable to most of Russian recent official announcements, but shouldn't be greeted only with smirks. After all, it is worrisome if only Putin believes its contents.           

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 #12
The Unz Review
www.unz.com
January 3, 2016
Collapse of Ukraine's Economy in Five Charts
By Anatoly Karlin
[Text with charts here http://www.unz.com/akarlin/ukraine-economic-collapse/]

And make no doubt about it - a collapse is exactly what it is, and it afflicts way more of the country than just the war-wracked Donbass. Ukraine now vies with Moldova for the country with the lowest average wages in Europe.

Gabon with snow? Saakashvili is hopelessly optimistic. That would actually be a big improvement!

GDP is at 60% of its 1990 Level

As of this year, the country with the most pro-Western revolutions is also the poorest performing post-Soviet economy bar none. This is a not unimpressive achievement considering outcomes here have tended to disappoint rather than elate. Russia itself, current GDP at about 110% of its 1990 level, has nothing to write home about (though "statist" Belarus, defying neoliberal conventional wisdom, at a very respectable 200% does have something to boast about).

Back in 2010, although by far the worst performing heavily industrialized Soviet economy, Ukraine was still performing better relative to its position in 1990 than Moldova, Tajikistan, and Georgia. In the intervening 5 years - with a 7% GDP decline in 2014 which has widened to a projected 9% in 2015 - Ukraine has managed to slip to rock bottom.

How does this look like on a more human level?

Housing Construction is Similar to That of 5 Million Population Russian Provinces

With a quarter of its population, Belarus is constructing as much new accomodation as is Ukraine. 16 million strong Kazakhstan is building more. Russia - more than ten times as much, even though it has less than four times as many people.

The seaside Russian province of Krasnodar Krai, which hosted the Sochi Winter Olympics, with its 5 million inhabitants, is still constructing more than half as much housing as all of Ukraine. No wonder the Crimeans were so eager to leave.

New Vehicle Sales Collapse to 1960s Levels

The USSR might have famously concentrated on guns over butter, yet even so, even in terms of an item as infamously difficult to acquire as cars under socialism, Ukrainian consumers were better off during the 1970-1990 period than today. Now Ukrainians are buying as few new cars as they were doing in the catastrophic 1990s, and fewer even than during the depth of the 2009 recession.

And even so many Maidanists continue to giggle at "sovoks" and "vatniks." Well, at least they now make up for having even less butter than before with the Azovets "innovative tank." Armatas are quaking in fear looking at that thing.

Debt to GDP Ratio at Critical Levels

And this figure would have risen further to around 100% this year.

Note that 60% is usually considered to be the critical danger zone for emerging market economies. This is the approximate level at which both Russia and Argentina fell into their respective sovereign debt crises.

To be fair, the IMF has indicated it will be partial to flouting its own rules to keep Ukraine afloat, which is not too surprising since it is ultimately a tool of Western geopolitical influence. And if as projected the Ukrainian economy begins to recover this year, then there is a fair chance that crisis will ultimately be averted.

But it will be a close shave, and so long as the "meet the new boss, same as the old boss" oligarchs who rule Ukraine continue siphoning off money by the billions to their offshore accounts with impunity, nothing can be ruled out.

Resumption of Demographic Collapse

Much like the rest of the post-Soviet Slavic world, Russia had a disastrous 1990s in demographic terms, when mortality rates soared and birth rates plummeted. But like Russia - if to a lesser extent - it has since staged a modest recovery, incidentally with the help of a Russian-style "maternal capital" program. In 2008, it reached a plateau in birth rates, which was not significantly uninterrupted by the 2009 recession.

Since then, however, they have plummeted - exactly nine months after the February 2014 coup. The discreteness with which this happened together with the fact that the revolt in the Donbass took a further couple of months to get going after the coup proper implies that this fertility decline was likely a direct reaction to the Maidan and what it portended for the future.

This collapse is very noticeable even after you completely remove all traces of Crimea, Donetsk, and Lugansk oblasts which might otherwise muddy the waters (naturally, the demographic crisis in all its aspects has been much worse in the region that bore the brunt of Maidanist chiliastic fervor). Here are the Ukrstat figures for births and deaths in the first ten months of 2013, 2014, and 2015:

        Births    Deaths
2013    350658    441331
2014    354622    445236

2015    329308    450763
Furthermore, this period has seen a huge wave of emigration. Figures can only be guesstimated, but it is safe to say they are well over a million to both Russia and the EU.

The effects of this will continue to be felt long after any semblance of normalcy returns to Ukraine.

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 #13
Sputnik
January 2, 2016
Over 400,000 Ukrainians Ready to Integrate Into Russian Society

MOSCOW (Sputnik) - More than 1.3 million displaced Ukrainians have contacted FMS since the start of the armed conflict in southeastern Ukraine in April 2014. Over 419,000 have filed asylum claims, according to the agency.

"Russia has done everything in its power to take in Ukrainian citizens who have been forced to flee Ukraine. Over 400,000 people are potentially ready to integrate into the Russian society," the migration agency said.

FMS estimates that a total of 2.6 million Ukrainians are currently living in Russia, 1.1 million of them from the war-hit southeastern regions.

According to the UN Refugee Agency, Russia is the world's second biggest recipient of asylum claims after Germany.

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 #14
www.rt.com
January 4, 2015
Crimeans vote to give up electricity contract with Ukraine even if it means more power cut-offs

A survey ordered by Vladimir Putin shows Crimea residents would rather break an electricity contract with Kiev, than sign one calling the peninsula part of Ukraine - even if it means further blackouts that began when a pylon bearing power lines was blown up.

Over 93 percent of respondents voted against signing a new electricity supply contract with Ukraine in the poll conducted by the All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) as the current contract expired. The results were announced by the center's head, Valery Fyodorov, on Friday.

The wording of the contract suggested by Kiev, which describes the peninsula as part of Ukraine, was the apparent reason for the negative vote. Crimea voted to withdraw from Ukraine in March 2014.

In addition, 94 percent said they were ready to put up with minor disruptions in electricity while Russia is working to provide 100 percent power supply to Crimea in the following months. Before the secession and power cuts that followed, Ukraine had supplied almost three quarters of Crimea's electricity.

"Six and a half percent have voted for the contract, while 92.6 percent didn't support signing the contract that says Crimea and the city of Sevastopol are parts of Ukraine," Fyodorov said.

About 2,500 people in Crimea and 500 in Sevastopol participated in the poll, meaning the statistical margin for error doesn't exceed 4.5 percent, according to Fyodorov.

Respondents had to answer two questions. The first was whether Crimeans supported signing a contract that describes Crimea and Sevastopol as integral parts of Ukraine. If the answer to the first question was "no," then the second question asked whether Crimeans were ready to suffer electricity shortages in the following three to four months.

If Ukraine doesn't change the wording in question, Russia is most likely to abandon the contract, Dmitry Peskov, the Russian president's press secretary, said, upon learning of the outcome of the poll. Putin has already been informed of the results of the survey, he added.

The vote was ordered by President Putin, who wanted to know if locals approved of the renewal of the contract with the Ukrainian Ukrenergo company.

The order followed yet another power line disruption that occurred on December 30 when an electricity pylon was blown up. Ukrainian ultranationalists from the Right Sector group had already damaged a pylon in November, and then prevented rescue teams from repairing it. Since that act of sabotage, Crimea has been suffering from constant blackouts, prompting Russia to boost its own power supplies to the republic and fly in emergency generators.

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 #15
Forbes.com
January 2, 2016
Russia Gives Ukraine A Break On Fuel Costs, But Prices Likely Going Lower Anyway
By Kenneth Rapoza

Russia said Friday that it was giving Ukraine a "discount" on natural gas prices, but further declines in energy prices will likely make the $17.8 savings a moot point anyway. Bonus for trying to be nice to Kyiv, though, Gazprom.

Russia's main supplier to Ukraine, Gazprom, will charge $230 per 1,000 cubic meters of natural  gas for first quarter deliveries. The price is locked in and was signed by decree by Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev on New Year's Eve. Russia and Ukraine have been locking horns on gas prices all year. European moderators have been forced to mediate the dispute, which has often led Gazprom to stop deliveries of gas to Ukraine.

The lower price is mostly reflected by falling natural gas futures in the market and not Moscow subsidies, as in the olden days when the two countries were on speaking terms.  Ukraine will likely end up paying a bit more than market rate because energy prices are seeing falling to the low $30s in the first half of next year anyway. Lower oil prices tend to translate into lower natural gas prices as well.

BP CEO Bob Dudley said in a BBC interview this weekend that oil futures will hit their "low point" in the first quarter of 2016 before stabilizing by the end of the year. "Prices are going to stay lower for longer, we have said it and I think we are in this for a couple of years. For sure, there is a boom-and-bust cycle here," Dudley said. Oil prices fell 34% in 2015 due to prolonged global oversupply and lackluster demand from China.

February oil futures are $37, having fallen in December to their lowest point since the Great Recession. The Russian ruble continues to track oil. The currency weakened to 73 to the dollar, its lowest level ever.

Meanwhile, Ukraine continues to deal with the Russians in East Ukraine. Crimea is essentially fully sanctioned by the U.S. government, and Ukraine is forced with paying the Russians - the bane of their existence nowadays - some $3 billion in overdue debts.

Naftogaz said last week that it's been getting a lot of its gas and oil supplies from Europe, but the origin of that fuel is likely to be Russian.

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 #16
www.thedailybeast.com
January 4, 2016
Khodorkovsky: From Russian Multi-Billionaire to 'Murderer'?
Putin just hates this guy. Jailed for more than a decade, then forced into exile, the former head of Yukos oil is now charged with murder.
By Anna Nemtsova

MOSCOW - A lot has been happening to former oil tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky in Russia since he left that country. The 52-year-old opposition leader, who now lives in exile in Europe, is once again wanted by the Russian courts-and this time Khodorkovsky is accused of murder.

The once-powerful owner of the Yukos oil company has already spent over 10 years in Russian prisons for alleged fraud, and clearly has no intention of going back to be locked up again. But days before Christmas the Russian Investigative Committee issued an international warrant for his arrest and the court in Moscow endorsed it.

The alleged crime involves the murder of a mayor in Siberia back in 1998, and given how long Khodorkovsky was in prison without these charges being brought against him, one might assume the real crime, in the view of Russian President Vladimir Putin, was rather more recent.

A few days before the decision, Khodorkovsky spoke at a press conference in London: "A revolution in Russia is inevitable," the former oil tycoon said.

Many in Moscow were, shall we say, irritated? And not only Putin's partisans. Even if people would like less of a heavy hand from the Kremlin and more freedom to express themselves, they're hoping for modernity and stability, not upheaval.

In the wake of Khodorkovsky's remarks, pressure on his supporters increased both in Moscow and St. Petersburg. Several dozen policemen searched for criminal evidence around apartments, offices and even a private vehicle that belonged to employees of Open Russia, a community of activists supported and financed by Khodorkovsky. The movement's website, openrussia.org, has posted investigative reports and opinion pieces exposing human rights violations and large-scale corruption among top officials in Russia.

Why did the Kremlin go after Khodorkovsky more than two years after Putin pardoned him? It's not just the press conference, certainly.

To hear Khodorkovsky tell the story, Putin's afraid of him. "Putin sees me as a threat, economically, because of the possible seizure of Russian assets abroad," Khodorkovsky told the press. The Kremlin denied that Putin had anything to do with the new arrest warrant.

A Duma deputy, Dmitry Gudkov, suggested just how big the monetary question might be: "Authorities do not want to pay over $50 billion compensation to Yukos."

In 2014, a tribunal in the Hague ruled the Russian state had forced bankruptcy on Yukos, the biggest private oil company in the country, in order to appropriate its assets and prevent Khodorkovsky from entering politics.

The court imposed $50 billion in damages, which was roughly 2.5 percent of Russia's GDP at a time it was already in recession.

Since then, the Duma has been working to change legislation to help avoid international court decisions, but by putting Khodorkovsky on trial for murder, even in his absentia, authorities shift the focus from them to him.

To hear Khodorkovsky tell the story, Putin's afraid of him.
"They are preparing the world for Russia's decision not to pay the money," Gudkov told The Daily Beast in a recent interview.

For Khodorkovsky, the exile's life in France, the U.K., or in Switzerland was never the same as in Moscow, where he had a team of young activists working for him. His former partner, and head of the Yukos-Moscow management company, Aleksei Kondaurov told The Daily Beast that this third trial against Khodorkovsky is Moscow's revenge for several big Yukos victories in international courts, including the Strasbourg Court of Human Rights as well as The Hague.

"This is also a revenge for Khodorkovsky and his Open Russia supporting opposition candidates at elections," Kondaurov said. Last week, Khodorkovsky told BBC that he was thinking about asking the U.K. for asylum.

Meanwhile in Moscow, the old patterns from Soviet dissident days decades ago are coming back. Friends in the Open Russia community called each other on the phone with a question: "Did they come to you?"

Zoya Svetova, a journalist and human rights defender at Open Russia, remembered the arrests of her dissident parents in the 1980s: "When the KGB came to arrest my father, my husband helped to burn some family papers; now, my colleagues delete documents from their computers. We exchange a memo, an instruction for what to do, when they come: do not open the door, immediately call your lawyer," Svetova told The Daily Beast.

Many Russians look on Khodorkovsky favorably-at least 33 percent of the population approved of his release from prison in 2013. But seeing what pressure the opposition movement has suffered, not many have been willing to join.

Last year only 2 percent of Russians said they would vote for Khodorkovsky in the next presidential elections.

"The idea is to discredit him with the murder trial, so Russian politicians would not take his money, people would be afraid of working with him," Kondaurov told The Daily Beast.

Of course, such pressure is nothing new for the former tycoon. Vera Chelysheva, the author of Prisoner #1, a book about Khodorkovsky, has been covering his trials for many years. "I cannot see how the unbreakable Khodorkovsky I know could be stopped by more falsified accusations, by more pressure, after what he has suffered through," said Chelysheva. "He is a free spirit, he will not stop his struggle."

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 #17
The Kremlin Stooge
https://marknesop.wordpress.com
January 3, 2016
The Unbearable Unseemliness of Partnership
By Mark Chapman

Well, sometimes the faster it gets
The less you need to know...

The Tragically Hip, from "Blow at High Dough"

Jim Hoagland, at The Washington Post, is upset. Not furious, or anything - it would never do to get angry at such a solid, reliable and inspirational ally as Germany. No, it's more....miffed. The kind of vague disquiet you feel when a good friend suddenly reveals a side of themselves you didn't know existed. It's kind of like Germany got sloppy drunk at an international party and threw up on the carpet, or in the punch bowl. The kind of embarrassing performance that will probably fade with time, but good friends should step in immediately and set Germany straight, in case there's a deeper problem that foreshadows, say, a precipitous descent into alcoholism. That's kind of how Mr. Hoagland views Germany's unseemly insistence that going into business on a pipeline deal with Russia is just a straight commercial arrangement (thanks for the tip, Warren).

Pardon me while I segue sharply away from this subject for just a moment, but I promise all will be made clear. In the sidebar to the referenced article, from the very same newspaper, is a piece entitled, "It's Time to Curb this Widely-Committed Journalistic Sin". The sin referred to is the contempt in journalism for the requirement that disputable assertions be backed by reasoned argument or reference to a reputable source. Use of the passive voice, such as "it is widely believed" is not good enough on its own and is often a cover for something the author would devoutly love to be true, but cannot prove is true. Curiously, the author goes on to assert, in the very next paragraph, that a statement such as "it is widely believed that MH17 was shot down by a surface-to-air missile fired by Russian-backed separatists" is an example of a reasonable statement...because almost everyone believes it. The author does not touch upon this widely-held belief being the direct result of a massive campaign of deliberate disinformation, and an investigation in which a major suspect was allowed unrestricted access to all of the evidence and a seat on the investigation.  But we can only do so much in one post, and we simply can't take that one on right now.

Anyway, where I wanted to go with that is to appoint you all members of a sort of jury panel. We're going to look at Mr. Hoagland's piece, and I want you to watch for examples of occasions in which Mr. Hoagland makes a disputable assertion that is not backed up by facts - just an "ask anyone" kind of substantiation. Ready? Let's go.

Oh; just a bit of stage-setting first - Mr. Hoagland is part of a growing lobby group which is putting pressure on Germany to back out of its deal with Russia's Gazprom and other shareholders to twin the Nord Stream gas pipeline, which would double the available supply of Russian gas to Germany, making Germany a significantly more-important gas hub for Europe. It would also result in Russia sending only domestic supply through Ukraine's pipeline network, for Ukrainians' use so long as they pay in advance, and not subject to transit fees. Every article on the subject mentions that Ukraine reaps $2 Billion annually from Russia for transit fees for basically doing nothing except letting Russia use its pipes, and Washington and Brussels are becoming increasingly worried that this payment might be lost to the Ukrainian economy. This is at the heart of their objections to the new pipeline capability and the deal with Germany. The Anglosphere knows it is useless to appeal to Gazprom, and so is concentrating a full-court press on Germany.

While it's true that Germany has earned the world's respect for its overall performance since World War II, I'm going to draw the line at "repeatedly taking the moral and political high ground". Is that so? Was the Siemens scandal, in which the company - which was German last time I looked - paid €2.5 billion in fines for bribery a good example of the moral high ground? How about Deutsche Bank's £840,000 fine plus £1.5 million in compensation for funneling mortgage loans exclusively through mortgage brokers to people with poor credit history, and then wiping them out with made-up fees when they fell into arrears? I'm sure even those of us with the shortest memories can recall Volkswagen's deliberate installation of test-cheating software in over 11 million cars which would sense when a test was being conducted and supply bogus emission figures which made it compliant with regulations, but otherwise would allow the engine to emit as much as 40 times the allowable pollutants - which have been linked to respiratory illnesses such as bronchitis and emphysema - in the interests of achieving better mileage. Pretty hard to see that as an example of the moral high ground, what? Nobody is dumping on the Germans, and every country has an element which is more interested in making money than just about anything else you can name, but Germany no more fits the mold of gilded saint than anyone else.

So why is Germany 'risking its hard-earned reputation'? As an aside, that is kind of comical coming from the country which systematically blew the basement out of its international reputation in the past 5 years with its deliberate and open instigation of rebellions in countries around the world as an excuse to send in the western military to sack and ruin those countries - Ukraine and Syria are only the most recent examples. But let's leave that for the moment. The implication - hell, it's spelled out - is that if Germany persists with this deal, it will sacrifice its international reputation for decency. That's not even close to true, and it is laughable for Hoagland to suggest the rest of Europe is going to look down its nose at Germany when it is Germany who underpins the European Central Bank, which bails out European spendthrifts and idiots who cannot manage their own money. Pack yer bags; we're goin' on a guilt trip! No, we're not. Don't even think about it. Yes, Washington will be pissed off to see its own efforts to control the European gas distribution network come to naught, but is that something that should keep Germany awake nights? Where's the substantiation for his statement that "the vast changes in the global energy markets of the past year have made the Russian deal obsolete, as well as damaging to European unity"? Ukraine is not part of the European Union, and it is Ukraine which is squalling loud and long for Europe to help it because Russia is about to take it out of the gas-transit business. How is the 'Russian' deal (the pipeline is actually owned by five major international shareholders, of which Gazprom is one, and Gazprom itself is owned by the Russian state just to a sufficient degree to constitute a majority, 50.002%) 'obsolete'? Is Europe now in a position to do without Russian gas? It certainly is not. What are Hoagland's grounds for saying "the pipeline deal with Vladimir Putin is seemingly corrupt"? What is Putin's involvement in the pipeline? Zero. What makes it "seemingly corrupt"? Ask anyone. Everybody knows it is. Lastly, why should the United States government get involved - at the Presidential level, no less - in a business deal between Germany and Russia to which it is itself not a party? Let me ask you this, Mr. Hoagland - is there anything, anything in the wide world that the United States considers not its business?

We have a pretty good idea why Washington objects to a new pipeline deal which will bring gas to Europe, and not even more of it (twinning Nord Stream will replace Ukraine's transit, not augment it), which is the whole point - Washington and Brussels want Russia to be on the hook for subsidizing Ukraine to the greatest degree possible, because every dollar that doesn't come from Russia has to come from the IMF or other western donors. Similarly, for so long as Ukraine is Russia's buffer transfer zone between it and its European gas markets, Russia has to care to some extent for Ukraine's well-being. It can't let Ukraine fail. Whereas if Ukraine is no longer necessary to Russia's gas operations, it is totally a western responsibility to heal the shattered country whose civil war the west cheered so enthusiastically, and no skin off Russia's nose if it collapses into complete ruin. Also just by the bye, the United States government still nurtures a dream whereby it will itself become a major supplier to Europe of gas through LNG tankers and terminals. I'm not going to go into detail again on what a stupid idea that is, I did so here more than a year ago. Forcing Russia to continue supplying gas to Europe through Ukraine forces Russia to take an interest and an active hand in stabilizing and rebuilding Ukraine, although Europe means to keep it forever within its own sphere of influence.

Anyway, let's get back to Mr. Hoagland at The Washington Post, before this turns into a book. Here we go again, with "Putin's objective". Is there any detail about the conduct of business in Russia that Mr. Putin does not run personally? Granted, producing far, far less of the resource you depend on to heat and light your homes, power your industries and a thousand other things means that you are going to have to come to terms with whoever has it for sale, and in Europe's case it boils down to either Russia or the creaking Frankenstein's monster the United States is trying to cobble together, which is a combination of ocean-transit LNG by tanker and a pipeline from devoted toady ally Qatar through Syria to Turkey, which the current stubborn clinging to the seat to which he was elected by Mr. Assad makes moot.

And at this point, my friends, Mr. Hoagland stepped off the edge of reason. Indulge me, for a second. Journalists regularly consult experts, it gives their copy authenticity. It seems reasonable they must have lists, in descending order of reliability. In the case of economists, the first page should be headed, "Reliable Economists". Anders Aslund will not be found on this list. Page 2 could be headed "Less Reliable Economists". Anders Aslund will not be found on this list. The third page could be titled, "Idiots Who Can Barely Add, But Who Are Nonetheless Convinced That They Are Smart". Anders Aslund will not be found on this list. The last page could be headed, "Disturbed Whiny Attention Whores Who Are To Economics What The Reverend Jim Jones Was To Organized Religion". Anders Aslund is on this list. More correctly, Anders Aslund is this list. Who is the economist Mr. Hoagland relied upon to underpin his case? I rest mine - Anders Aslund.

Anders Aslund tells Mr. Hoagland that the Nord Stream pipeline does not make economic sense. Why not? Well, because "Consumption of natural gas in the European Union has fallen by 21 percent over the past decade, and the existing Gazprom pipeline under the Baltic Sea is now operating at half capacity. And Gazprom is no ordinary state corporation. It pursues Russia's geopolitical goals, cutting supplies or raising prices when the Kremlin wants."

I sometimes wish I were King Henry, so that all I had to do was shout "Who will rid me of this troublesome economist???", and some knights would ride off to Georgetown University and hack off his head with a sword (although in light of its dense wooden composition, a bow saw might be more practical). Then his chowderheaded foolishness would be stilled forever. It seems that the bigger a coruscating DayGlo neon megawatt idiot you are, the more anxious journalists are to draw upon and broadcast your elitist ramblings, or perhaps he is the only one who will do it for free.

Yes, Anders, you bright spark, you - EU consumption of natural gas overall decreased; in 2014, by 10.7%. Does that mean the EU is importing less gas? Well, no, actually, you effing hammerhead, it does not - in fact, over the same period, reliance on imported gas increased 2.8%. How can those two realities coexist? Why, because EU domestic production fell by 10.6% in 2014. The decline in some countries was abrupt and dizzying; in France it dropped by 96.1%, in Spain the decline was 58.2%, in Bulgaria by 35.3%, a drop of 18.7% in The Netherlands and 14.3% in Germany. Only the Czech Republic and Romania increased production. The 'energy boom' in Norway - a major producer of EU supplies - passed its peak in 2009 and is in rapid decline. EU overall consumption may have declined, but not as rapidly as domestic production, which means the EU is more reliant on imported energy than ever. You can rearrange pipelines and delude yourself as much as you like, but you will not change that fact. Of course, it doesn't impact your pontificating one bit, because you don't see it. Aslund, lest we forget, is the author of "How Ukraine Became a Market Economy and Democracy". Has been since 2009, apparently. Let's skip over a few highlights, shall we? "Ukraine is today an undisputed independent state. It is a democracy and has transformed into a market economy with predominant private ownership." I'll say - 70% of its GDP is controlled by its oligarchs. "Ukraine's postcommunist transition has been one of the most protracted and socially costly, but it has taken the country to a desirable destination." I don't quite know what to say to that. Not without resorting to the worst kind of profanity. In fact, Aslund's vision is quite a bit like a hypothetical situation in which the west captured a former hardcore fascist country, didn't change a God-damned thing except the leader, and then assured the citizenry that its former practices were actually signs of democratic progressiveness. A big feature - in terms of publication by Ukraine, not numbers of attendees - of the Holiday Season in Ukraine this year was torchlight parades celebrating the birthday of Nazi collaborator Stepan Bandera. How many other European market democracies held similar celebrations? The idea that Ukraine is closer today to a desirable destination than it was in 2009 stupefies comment.

Why is Nord Stream operating at half capacity? Anders Aslund and several of his fellow dunderheads would have you believe it is because of a declining appetite for Russian gas, and they say as much. I guess that would be reflected by a decline in Gazprom's exports to Europe. Uh, oh - I see a problem. Gazprom's exports to Europe in 2012 were 149.9 BCm. In 2013 they were 172.6 BCm. That was the highest over a 9-year period - almost the decade that Aslund describes, in which the EU is allegedly consuming less gas. And it is: just not less Russian gas, and the reliance on the figure which shows declining consumption is a classic bait-and-switch. The EU is using less gas because it has less gas. You can also see why the UK is among the countries attracting hysterical western pushback for stonewalling on the Nord Stream deal; exports by Gazprom to the UK went from 3.8 BCm in 2005 to 16.6 BCm in 2013.

In 2014, Putin addressed a letter to the heads of Europe, in which he highlighted the growing unreliability of Ukraine as a transit country - this should have been seen as a direct warning that Russia intended to eliminate further risk of transit through Ukraine, as Gazprom has indicated on previous occasions. About 50% of Russia's gas exports to Europe as a whole go through Ukraine. When Ukraine is taken out of the equation, not only will Nord Stream need every cubic centimeter of capacity, it will need more than the current pipeline can handle. And then there is the absurd European Third Energy Package requirement that any company which owns the pipeline cannot also own the gas that goes through it, and must reserve 50% of its capacity for "competitors"; the EU is okay for a single company to build a pipeline at its own expense, but then wants that company to give its competitors a free ride.  Gazprom got around that by forming an international consortium, which will build and own the pipeline. Gazprom is a shareholder. Nord Stream II should not fall under the Third Energy Package, as it is a supplement to an existing and already-approved line, although Donald Tusk continues to insist the pipeline must comply with every European regulation he can find plus whatever he can make up. The Poles, for obvious reasons, are very supportive of an independent and prosperous Ukraine - because they will be pressured to take a significant share of the economic refugees if it collapses. But the signal from Merkel - AKA "The Chancellor of the Free World" - looked pretty clear in her reply to Putin's letter, which read (in part), "There are many reasons to seriously take into account this message [...] and for Europe to deliver a joint European response. When we take all these steps, we can be sure that we have reached a joint response for the countries that face this problem because they are getting gas from Gazprom. European states would like to be good clients but we would also like to be sure Russian gas supplies are not interrupted."

But there's another fly in the ointment, one that is not mentioned in polite circles: over 50% of Ukraine's domestic gas supply comes from Russia, and Ukraine's own supply peaked years ago. It has been in steady decline ever since. There was never a question of who would pay for that so long as Europe's supply went through the same pipes. Ukraine regularly stalled on payment, argued over the price after it had already taken the gas, and when Russia said "no more for you until you pay", just laughed and siphoned off gas intended for European customers for its own use. So long as European gas goes through Ukraine, Ukraine has Russia over the proverbial barrel, as already discussed. But it is important to note that once Europe's supply no longer goes through Ukraine, Russia has no incentive to keep Ukraine from economic collapse. That means that if Ukraine can't pay for its own domestic supply, up front, then it's a hard old world, Ukraine. The latest western democracy project will be caught between the loss of its transit fees, loss of its tax-free preferred-trading-partner status with Russia as a potential member of the Eurasian Union (and with it, its Russian markets), a cratering currency, loss of a third of its tax base, and a partnership with a multinational entity that insists on reforms and the adoption of grinding austerity policies in exchange for lending it anything more than emergency starvation cash.

And Ukraine, indisputably, is an unreliable partner. Part of that is not its fault, because its western sponsors encourage it to hate and cheat Russia at every opportunity which presents itself, and it openly gloats over its achievements when it rips off Russians, rationalizing that they are all thieves themselves and too drunk to notice. Kiev protests that it only cheats Russians, and is otherwise as honest as the day is long, but it is easy to see that it considers anyone fair game who does not support their vision of Ukraine. The "Soyuz" main pipeline supplying natural gas to Hungary and Croatia from Russia via Belarus and Ukraine blew up a couple of days ago, inside west Ukraine, and there is good reason to believe it was a deliberate act of sabotage by Ukrainian activists, who have threatened before on repeated occasions to attack pipelines carrying Russian gas. If they were indeed responsible, it was a bit of an own goal, since that's the line that is used to reverse-flow gas to Ukraine from Hungary. Ukrainian activists recently blew up some of the power pylons carrying nearly the entire electrical supply to Crimea, apparently frustrated by the country's inability to achieve a military victory in the civil war against its own eastern regions.

From Brussels and Washington's point of view, it is essential that Russia participate in the rehabilitation of Ukraine as a prosperous monument to NATO expansion. Because it frankly cannot be done without it. Russia is understandably unwilling to cooperate under those circumstances, the scenario being what it is. Ukraine will therefore be taken off the board as a transit country, and its entire livelihood is now in peril. The west is trying to rectify its enormous blunder by bullying Russia into continuing to send European gas through Ukraine, and it is not working. One of Ukraine's greatest failings is its inability to see who is leading it into ruin, because it is so much fun to stick out its tongue at Russia and pull faces. Have fun, Ukraine.

Anybody want to sum that up in a couple of trenchant lines? Oh, look: Jarod Kintz, author of "The Titanic Would Never Have Sunk if it were Made Out of a Sink", would like to.

"The only gift I have to give, is the ability to receive. If giving is a gift, and it surely is, then my gift to you is to allow you to give to me."

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 #18
Medium
https://medium.com
January 1, 2015
What Russia wants in 2016: A new world order
By Dominic Basulto
Dominic Basulto writes about innovation for The Washington Post and foreign policy for Russia Direct. Author of the new book "Russophobia": http://amzn.to/1NwjeU5

Now we know what Russia wants in 2016. Not a bigger piece of Ukraine. Not the right to prop up the regime in Syria. Not the restoration of the old Soviet Union. Not the right to use nukes on the world stage. No, what Russia wants in 2016 is a whole new world order.

Rossiya 1-the same Russian TV network that gave us the documentary film Crimea: The Way Home to explain Russia's annexation of Crimea-is back with a bigger, better two-hour "documentary" featuring an extended interview with Vladimir Putin that gives us the Kremlin's view of the current international world order.

It would be easy to dismiss the documentary film, which premiered on December 20 on Russian television, as just another bit of Russian state propaganda, except for the fact that a surprising number of high-powered politicians, diplomats and cultural tastemakers show up in the film-Julian Assange, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Jon Stewart, Lord David Owen, Shimon Peres, Pervez Musharraf, and yes, Oliver Stone (who shows up just 38 seconds into the film).

I probably shouldn't have mentioned Oliver Stone because, well, now you know that the film might just be a giant conspiracy flick starring Vladimir Putin as the unreliable narrator. Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union 25 years ago, suggests Putin, the U.S. has become a hegemonic actor on the world stage, turning Europe into a vassal state and systematically attempting to sow rage and chaos around the world-especially in the Middle East-in order to step into the void with its "illegal" attempts at democracy promotion.

As Putin suggests in a series of interview clips, the world forever changed with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. (Coincidentally this is the same year that former President George H.W. Bush first mentioned the "new world order" in a speech about Iraq.) In the 1990s, then, a bipolar world morphed into a multipolar world, but all the participants of the post-Yalta system continued to play by the old rules.

Well, kind of. It depends on how you define "play by the rules."

That's where the "World Order" documentary actually becomes interesting. Putin suggests that all the old rules set into place to prevent a new global war after the end of World War II have been ignored again and again by the U.S. The whole point of the UN Security Council, points out Putin, is to prevent one nation from unilaterally acting alone on the world stage to destabilize the global world order.

And, yet, that's exactly what's happened ever since the 1990s.

The film seeks to link a number of disparate world events-the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the American military campaigns in Iraq, the Arab Spring in the Middle East, the violence in Ukraine, the Middle East refugee flows to Europe, and now the military intervention in Syria-as part of a broader global conspiracy by the U.S. to remain the unchallenged global hegemon. Even the new trade blocs-the TTIP and the TPP-are seen as a way for the U.S. to spread its power and influence in new ways to Europe and Asia.

All of that would sound like some bizarre JFK conspiracy hatched by Oliver Stone-the world is out to get Russia!-except for one thing the standard bit players in any Russian propaganda film are nowhere to be found. In the Crimea documentary, you had the Night Wolves motorcycle gang, the Crimean partisans, and the rabid right-wing Ukrainian nationalists setting school buses on fire. In contrast, a number of Russian actors make their way onto the stage in "World Order"-notably, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Kremlin press spokesperson Dmitry Peskov-but it's the foreign actors who do the biggest talking.

Serbian filmmaker Emir Kusturica explains why refugee flows into Europe are so dangerous. Shimon Peres explains how he and a longtime rival-Yasser Arafat-eventually  came to the negotiating table, something the U.S. has refused to do with Russia. DSK explains how the powers that be will stop at nothing-including a potential frame-up in New York-to quash any efforts to supplant the U.S. dollar as the underpinning of the global financial system. Assange even suggests that the U.S. drops surveillance nets over the UN in New York in order to monitor and prevent dissenting opinions.

In the film, Putin actually comes off as one of the most rational actors on the world stage. (OK, OK, so that's how these propaganda films work, eh?) Hillary Clinton is seen cackling at the idea that the U.S. finally got rid of Qaddafi in Libya ("We came, we saw, he died"). Barack Obama is seen clumsily retreating from the mockery of Jon Stewart about the failure of the U.S. to enunciate any kind of policy for the Middle East.

As Putin notes in the film, war is an inescapable reality of geopolitics. What's changed over the past 25 years, though, is how we wage this war and who controls the very concept of war. War, says Putin, should be civilized, transparent, understood and controlled. And there should always be a diplomatic option to end any war. But as we're seeing now with ISIS, the very notion of "war" seems to be slipping away from us. We no longer know who we are fighting, or why. And the rules keep seeming to change.

Putin also offers his view of "interests" in the geopolitical context. Every nation has "interests," he suggests. What are needed are general, transparent rules of the game so that each nation can pursue its own interests. If the rules are routinely broken, or even worse, if double standards are applied in the interpretation of these rules, that's when the problems start.

Cut, splice, cut, splice... You can come up with your own interpretation of the current world order. Yet, it's hard to set aside the notion that the world is once again on edge and that the world needs Russia to play an important role to keep things in balance. That's the problem with multipolarity-it's not enough just to have one global hegemon.

In hindsight, it almost seems like Russia actually got things right after the break-up of the Soviet Union. NATO advancing to Russia's borders after the collapse of the Soviet Union probably wasn't a good thing. The U.S. playing divide and conquer in the Middle East was certainly not a good idea, given the rise of ISIS and the massive refugee flows into Europe.

There's a clip of Putin from the 1990s, stating his opposition to the bombing of Yugoslavia. There are clips of Putin from his recent UN speech in New York, in which he outlined the scope of the problems facing the world today. There are repeated outtakes from politicians acknowledging that, in hindsight, Russia has been more progressive than the U.S. in recognizing the changing contours of global affairs since the breakup of the Soviet Union.

And that's really the point: that the world has forever changed since the break-up of the Soviet Union, an event that Putin has famously described as the biggest catastrophe of the 20th century. Over the last 25 years, the bipolar world became a multipolar world, but the U.S. continues to ignore this fact. It continues to divide the world into "good" and "evil," without any regard for traditions, history or culture. It continues to portray itself as the "moral leader" of the free world, a term that Putin dismisses as a cliché of the Cold War era.

Massive refugee inflows into Europe and the rise of ISIS are two events that probably nobody predicted 25 years ago, but now they're here, and Russia is proving the more willing and agile of the two former superpowers to create a New World Order. Until someone treats Russia as an equal, it will continue to rage against the machine. That might not sound so terrible, except for one very terrifying detail: Russia still has nukes and isn't afraid to use them.

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 #19
The Atlantic
December 30, 2015
The World According to Russia
A documentary on state television gives a glimpse of Vladimir Putin's philosophy.
By Jeffrey Tayler
JEFFREY TAYLER is a contributing editor at The Atlantic and the author of seven books.

"Do you realize what you have done?" Vladimir Putin demanded at the United Nations in September. The question was a rebuke to the American-led bloc of countries that initially viewed with optimism the Arab Spring, which began five years ago this month, but has since given way to chaos and Islamist violence across once-stable parts of the Middle East and North Africa. Those events, and much else, look different when viewed from Russia than they do from the United States, and a documentary that aired recently on Russian state television helps explain the worldview behind Putin's question.

The two-hour-plus film, Miroporyadok (World Order), explores, in the words of its narrator Vladimir Solovyov, "what is happening with us [Russians], what sort of world we have inherited from our parents, and what sort of world we will leave to our children." Partly through interviews with the Russian president himself, it also offers a window on Putin's own realpolitik perspective, one that I've found to be widely shared throughout Russia over many years of living in the country-a worldview according to which international relations consist of competing blocs of nations pursuing their interests, and the violation of sovereignty is a recipe for instability. This stands in contrast to Obama's own position, which he stated at the UN two years ago, that "sovereignty cannot be a shield for tyrants to commit wanton murder, or an excuse for the international community to turn a blind eye to slaughter."

"I believe," Putin tells Solovyov, "that no one should ever impose any sort of values he considers correct on anyone. We have our own values, our own conceptions of justice." Putin doesn't name names here, but the implication is clear throughout: World Order endeavors to incriminate American foreign policy and place the blame for the current chaos in the Middle East on the United States. The film's anti-Americanism is subtle but relentless, and the spin comes mostly from omission of relevant facts. And though it originated within the Russian state propaganda machine, some of its criticisms of wrongheaded U.S. policies and blundering interventions in the Middle East since September 11, 2001, would give American liberals, centrists, and even a few conservatives little cause for dispute. Yet the documentary goes further, leaving the strong impression that greedy, bungling, incorrigibly myopic conspirators "from across the ocean" (a phrase Putin uses repeatedly in the film to describe the U.S. leadership) bent on world domination are to blame; Russia comes off as unjustly demonized and Russians themselves forced to suffer economically as a result.  

The last point is not stated, but is implied, and gives another clue about how the world looks from Russia. For Russians, to a degree unthinkable in the United States, foreign policy is also domestic policy, not least because their Near Abroad includes Ukraine, with which their ties of blood, history, and culture remain intimate. And thanks to multiple invasions of Russia during the 19th and 20th centuries, a preoccupation with national security and national pride figure strongly in Russian politics, with the possibility of war not at all remote. A philosophy of realpolitik-and not, say, values promotion-would come naturally under the circumstances.

Indeed, as the film tells it, the root of all international evils is the American penchant for democracy-spreading, both subtle (via U.S. support for "color revolutions" in the post-Soviet sphere) and overt (as in overthrowing Saddam Hussein). Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov declares that the Arab Spring was fomented from abroad, disregarding the Middle Eastern region's widespread popular discontent with official corruption, political stasis, and lack of job opportunities. The United States intervenes despite bitter experience within living memory; the American director Oliver Stone appears onscreen to tell viewers that "America didn't learn the lesson of Vietnam, which is you shouldn't go around invading other countries."

But Putin denies chiding Obama directly at the UN for the consequences of the Arab Spring. "I wasn't saying this [to President Obama]" Putin tells Solovyov, but to the constellation of leaders, both American and European, who have been meddling in Muslim lands since 2001. "I have always been telling [these leaders] that they have to act carefully. It's wrong to impose one's scheme ... of ideas concerning good and evil, or in this case, good and democracy," on countries "with differing cultures, a different religion, with other traditions. But frankly, no one listens, because they apparently consider themselves infallible and great." No one, he adds, holds those leaders accountable, whatever the outcome. When an "operation" produces the wrong results, Putin says, the (again, unnamed) leaders in question just say, "Oh well. Next!" After all, "They're great and sitting across the ocean, the dollar is the world's currency, they have the biggest economy in the world."

The "operations" to which Putin refers include, of course, the 2003 Iraq war, which Russia, France, and Germany opposed. Then-French President Jacques Chiraq, Putin claims, even foresaw that terrorist attacks in Europe, resembling those that occurred in Paris this year, could grow out of the anarchy that would result from Saddam's overthrow. Another is the imposition of a no-fly zone over Libya in 2011 (to prevent the regime from using its air force to stage a massacre-a fact that goes unmentioned). The film replays video of then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's remark, delivered with a callous laugh, about Libyan strongman Muammar Qaddafi's subsequent death-"We came, we saw, he died!"-followed by footage of the tyrant's brutal murder, which drives home the real-life consequences of the intervention and its bloody aftermath. (Eerily, the film also shows Qaddafi addressing Arab leaders at a 2011 Arab League summit, and asking, after Saddam Hussein's execution, "Who among you is next?")

The Wikileaks founder Julian Assange also makes an appearance, citing cables revealing U.S. efforts to undermine the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad-though American officials continue to maintain that Assad must go eventually, the cables in question most likely concern Wikileaks revelations made in 2006. The film shows Syrians lamenting the chaos the presumably American-backed terrorists have unleashed. No mention is made of Assad's murderous crackdown on the demonstrations that set off the revolt, or of the barrel bombs deployed against civilians to this day at great cost to civilian life, or of the U.S. air campaign against ISIS.

But the message of World Order, as the title implies, extends geographically wider and historically further back than America's post-September 11 policies in the Middle East. As the film, and presumably Putin, have it, the real problem today is not the rise of ISIS but the breakdown in relations between Russia and the West. A key cause of this conflict has been the eastward expansion of NATO since the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, which has brought with it the stationing of troops on Russia's border with the Baltics, plans to one day admit Ukraine (and Georgia), and, as an eventual result, Russia's intervention in Ukraine.

"Why did [the West] support the coup?" Putin asks, using his term for the uprisings that brought the ouster of then-Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych in 2014. He cites Western fears that Russia was trying to recreate the Soviet Union. "I think many of our partners see they made a mistake, but just don't want to admit it. They took advantage of popular discontent not just with Yanukovych, but going back to independence. ... Does anyone think things are better there now?"

Few would dispute Putin's damning description of Ukraine's post-Maidan straits: "The standard of living has fallen catastrophically. ... What have they gotten in return? Possibly [Ukrainians] will be allowed to travel to Europe without a visa. And possibly not."  

But Putin emphasizes that he does not blame Europeans for the policies of the United States, since, in his view, they are nothing more than "vassals" taking orders "from across the ocean," at least as far as foreign policy goes. He surely understands the relationship to be more complicated than that, but such an approach places the blame for the standoff between Russia and the West on America, and lets him make a direct overture to Europe. "We don't expect our European partners to give up their Euro-Atlantic orientation" but they would do well to "unite with Russia" to resolve "economic, political, security, and economic problems. ... We are ready to work with them and aren't about to pout about the sanctions," he says.

Significantly, though he never rules out cooperation, Putin makes no such overture to the United States. Rather, the film closes with Solovyov asking him the question used to tease viewers in the intro: Will there be war-World War III, in particular?

Probably not, Putin responds, as long as no crazy individual decides to use nuclear weapons and start it. But just in case, "Russia will continue perfecting its [nuclear] weapons. The nuclear triad forms the basis of our security policy. We have never brandished our nuclear bludgeon, and never will, but it retains its proper place and role in our military doctrine."

The upshot, according to World Order: Putin considers possible a renewed relationship with Europe, but sees no such likelihood with the United States. This is one area where the views from Washington and Moscow aren't so different-and that is bad news.

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 #20
Sic Semper Tyrannis
January 2, 2015
http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis
An alternative foreign policy
By David Habakkuk

Before discussing what kind of foreign and security policy is appropriate for the United States - or the countries of Western Europe, or indeed anyone else - it is necessary to be clear about how the world has been changing.

In an article last October entitled 'The Unipolar World Is Ending', a very good Russia-watcher, Gilbert Doctorow, argued that we are actually moving towards a new bipolar world. Central to his case is the contention that the emerging Chinese-Russian alliance is based not simply upon a shared fear of U.S. 'containment' strategies directed against them, but on ideological considerations.

Failure to grasp this fact, in my view, leads people to assume either that the emergence of what might be called a 'Mackinderite consolidation' in Eurasia is either not really happening, or is likely to be ephemeral.

Key paragraphs from Doctorow's article:

'On the side of the EU and the USA, democracy, precisely as practiced in America, neo-liberal economics, and human rights in their latest and most expansive edition that has barely taken root among US and European progressives, are the defining elements of what constitutes a good society. By definition, only such societies are stable and peace-loving. Those countries which differ with the golden standard must be brought into line to ensure a peaceful world. This can be done any which way: by subversion or non-military coercion to bring about regime change, or by pure military force if non-military methods fail to bring about the desired results.

'On the side of Russia and China, there is the belief that for nation-states true freedom means freedom to follow their own development course and to organize their societies in keeping with national traditions. Moreover, they staunchly defend the principles of Westphalia, meaning the equality of sovereign states and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states.'

(See http://russia-insider.com/en/essay/unipolar-world-ending/ri10595 .)

The piece, I suspect, reflects the influence of Richard Sakwa's analysis of the 'new Atlanticism', published shortly before, and available at http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/The-New-Atlanticism-17695 .

One can formulate this in terms of different responses to the patent failure of Marxist-Leninist secularisation of universalistic millenarian strands in Christianity. The lesson drawn by élites in the United States and Western Europe, and the 'liberals' who dominated Russian politics in the immediate post-Soviet period, was that the American nationalist secularisation of these strands has been vindicated.

The basis of the ideological challenge which Putin has been articulating with progressively greater force over the past years is that the appropriate lesson of the failure of Marxism-Leninism is that all forms of universalistic millenarianism lead naturally to disaster.

Such a perspective leads naturally to a view of early twentieth century history in which the heroes are neither the revolutionary radicals, nor the liberals. Instead, they are Tsarist statesmen like Stolypin or Peter Durnovo, and intellectuals like those who produced the 1909 'Vekhi' symposium - which, as the Wikipedia entry will tell you, was the brainchild of the Jewish literary historian Mikhail Gershenzohn.
(See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vekhi .)

This seems to have been an immensely serious attempt find a way out of various kinds of 'cargo cult' thinking to which intellectuals in societies attempting to 'modernise' are prone. Among many variants of these, as well as the Marxist and romantic nationalist, were the liberal.

And Gershenzohn put quite bluntly a point that remains relevant today, that in societies lacking the cultural preconditions for liberalism, a brutal authoritarian regime may actually be an indispensable protector of 'Westernised' élites, and of such prospects as there may be for relatively civilised forms of 'modernisation'.

In a sentence that was to prove prescient, Gershenzohn argued that 'so far from dreaming of union with the people we ought to fear the people and bless this government which, with its prisons and bayonets, still protects us from the people's fury.'

In 1917, his co-author Nikolai Berdyaev would point to the prophetic nature of 'Vekhi', in an article entitled 'The Ruin of Russian Illusions'. Towards its conclusion, he would write that 'the Russian "Bolshevik Revolution" is a dreadful worldwide reactionary phenomenon, just as reactionary in its spirit, as the ''Rasputinism'', as the Black Hundred khlystyism.'

(See http://www.berdyaev.com/berdiaev/berd_lib/1917_280.html .)

Among rather few attempts in the mainstream Western media to make some sense of the ideological challenge Putin is making, a discussion in the 'Atlantic' by Jeffrey Tayler of a recent two-hour film 'World Order' presented by Vladimir Solovyev is of some interest.

(See http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/12/russia-putin-miroporyadok/422196/ .)

Apparently there is a subtitled version of the whole at http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=cf6_1451260176 .

In general, however, one can see few signs that Western élites have any kind of grasp of the ideological challenge they face.

Another feature of the new bipolar world is that we are seeing a new nuclear arms race, as indeed the Clinton-era Defense Secretary, William J. Perry, noted recently.

(See https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-new-nuclear-arms-race/2015/12/11/83445bc0-a021-11e5-bce4-708fe33e3288_story.html .)

However, once again Western élites have very little grasp of what has been happening. If one cannot grasp the ideological dimensions of the 'New Cold War', you will obviously not be able to grasp the military ones.

At the time when it was becoming clear to thinking people in the Soviet élite that the Marxist-Leninist secularisation of Christian eschatology deserved the contempt which figures like Berdyaev had accorded it, they confronted a question as to what the Cold War was about.

Part of the 'cargo cult' thinking of the 'Eighties in Russia was that the Cold War had essentially been about ideology - in which case, Western notions of 'rollback' and 'liberation' could be seen as both justified and in the interests of Russians.

As William J. Perry appears to be beginning to realise, Western policies could hardly have been better calculated, if we had actually wanted to convince Russians this was 'cargo cult' thinking.

To cut a rather long story short, it is clear that a mainstream Russian official perception is now that Western strategies have all along been aimed at 'escalation dominance', with the aim of destroying not simply communism but Russian power, and indeed Russian independence.

It may be, as 'bth' appears to think, that getting involved in bitter intra-Ukrainian disputes - which Americans in general seem incapable of even trying to understand - is a worthwhile objective for your country's policy. Apparently, many of the British élites seem to think this.

But you must appreciate the consequences. Clearly, the Russians are looking for 'asymetric' responses which enable them to run risks of confrontation with the United States alike in Ukraine and Syria.

Among them, as the Katrina van Heuvel report to which I have linked fails to grasp, is a simple one.

As they plan for the 'Doctor Strangelove' scenarios, the Russian military will want to ensure that, should the extraordinary technological capabilities of Americans give them the capacity for a largely successful 'first strike', there will still be a few surviving Russian submarines.

And their captains will then send the nuclear torpedoes to which the report refers off, programmed, say, to target the outlets of the Charles, Hudson, and Potomac rivers. And a few of them will get through.

You don't need many. One for each river should do.

To come full circle, a really interesting question then becomes how far the emerging Chinese-Russian alliance will go in co-operation on military-technological development.

In view, this is likely to be partly a question of how far the Chinese have the strategic sense that it is not in their long-term interests to indulge their enthusiasm for 'reverse engineering' too far.

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 #21
Consortiumnews.com
January 2, 2015
Hearing the Russian Perspective
By Gilbert Doctorow
Gilbert Doctorow is the European Coordinator, American Committee for East West Accord, Ltd. His latest book Does Russia Have a Future? (August 2015) is available in paperback and e-book from Amazon.com and affiliated websites. For donations to support the European activities of ACEWA, write to eastwestaccord@gmail.com. © Gilbert Doctorow, 2015

The neocons and liberal hawks who dominate the U.S. foreign policy and media establishment are pushing the world toward a nuclear showdown with Russia as few people hear a comprehensive response from the other side, an imbalance that a new Russian documentary addresses, writes Gilbert Doctorow.

Without mincing words, the new Russian documentary World Order is a devastating critique of U.S. global hegemony justified in the name of "democracy promotion" and "human rights" ever since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1992.

It is directly in line with Russian President Vladimir Putin's first repudiation of the American unipolar world issued in his speech to the Munich Security Conference in February 2007 and his further, ever more explicit exposés in a succession of speeches that challenged specific manifestations of "American exceptionalism."

World Order, which is now posted on YouTube (in Russian) [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZNhYzYUo42g] and at another site (with English subtitles) [http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=cf6_1451260176], illustrates through graphic footage and the testimony of independent world authorities the tragic consequences, the spread of chaos and misery, resulting from U.S.-engineered "regime change" and "color revolutions," of which the violent overthrow of the Yanukovich regime in Ukraine in February 2014 is only the latest example. (Some of the highlights from Putin's interview are translated into English here and here.)
https://www.rt.com/news/326666-putin-ukraine-soviet-union-turkey/ 

The title of the film follows on Putin's address to the 70th anniversary gathering of the United Nations General Assembly in September 2015 which had as its central message that world order rests on international law, which in turn has as its foundation the UN Charter.

By flouting the Charter and waging war without the sanction of the UN Security Council, starting with the NATO attack on Serbia in 1999 and continuing with the invasion of Iraq in 2003 up to its illegal bombings in Syria today, the United States and its NATO allies have shaken the foundations of international law.

As set out in World Order, Putin's identification of the root cause of the failure to bring the U.S. back to reason lies not in given individuals, like Barack Obama or George W. Bush, but in the mentality of Western, and in particular American elites formed by their impunity, their ability to walk away from the catastrophes their policies create without any feeling of responsibility, without being held to account. Their evasion of responsibility and failure to learn from error come from being the richest and militarily most powerful nation on earth.

World Order presents dramatic evidence of the brutality which flows from American policies when functioning if flawed states are converted into failed states through color revolutions, as has happened across the Middle East and North Africa since the new millennium. We are shown Saddam Hussein's final moments before execution, then the denunciation of this judicial murder by Muammar Gaddafi before a laughing audience of Arab League deputies, then the barbaric mob murder of Gaddafi himself followed by the exultant face of Hillary Clinton after this triumph of U.S. foreign policy.

We also listen to Gaddafi's detailed prediction of the vast flood of refugees and spread of jihadists in North Africa that would follow should his regime be toppled. And we are given video footage from the 2015 refugee flows into Europe with their mob scenes at state borders that bear out those warnings.

Diverse Points of View

The foreign interviewees in World Order comprise an impressive and diverse selection of leaders in various domains, including American film director Oliver Stone; Thomas Graham, former National Security Council director for Russia under George W. Bush and current managing director at Kissinger Associates; former IMF Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn; former Pakistan President Perwez Musharraf; former French Foreign Minister Dominique Villepin; former Israeli President Shimon Peres; Wikileaks founder Julian Assange; and deputy leader of the Die Linke party in the German Bundestag Sahra Wagenknecht. Others, like UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon, put in cameo appearances.

Strauss-Kahn, Musharraf and others charge that the U.S. plots against and destroys foreign leaders who dare to oppose America's total control over global flows of money, goods and people. Wagenknecht addresses the question of Germany's subservience to American Diktats and its de facto circumscribed sovereignty. The statements support Putin's long-standing argument, reiterated in the film, that the Western European allies of the U.S. are nothing more than vassals.

Vladimir Putin's closing remarks about the place of nuclear arms in Russia's military doctrine must not be played down. Saying aloud that Russia has not and will not brandish its nuclear truncheon, is, in effect, doing just that. All of this is of one piece with the way Russia's aerospace forces have conducted their attacks in Syria on the Islamic State and on the armed opposition to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad these past two months.

The use of heavy bombers flying 15,000 kilometers from the Kola Peninsula, in northwest Russia along the Arctic Circle, with the help of night-time in-flight refueling; the use of cruise missiles fired from frigates in the Caspian Sea at distances of 1,300 km to targets in Syria; and the use of cruise missiles launched from Russian submarines in the Mediterranean have all had a political dimension far exceeding military necessity in the Syrian theater: they demonstrate Russia's capability of waging global war, including global nuclear war. These actions are also depicted in the film.

Is World Order propaganda? It most certainly is. Is it directed primarily at the Russian domestic audience, as the Telegraph newspaper insists? No. Like all of Putin's foreign policy addresses, whether delivered abroad or at home, as in the Valdai Discussion Club, whether issued with subtitles in English or not, its primary audience is in Washington, D.C. with a secondary audience in Brussels.

One may suppose that the purpose is not to touch off or accelerate an arms race but, on the contrary, to bring the other side to its senses and persuade it of 1) Russia's seriousness about defending militarily what it sees as vital national interests and 2) its ability to deliver massive destruction to an enemy even in the face of a possible first nuclear strike, and so to reinstate the Mutually Assured Destruction deterrence that America's global missile defense was supposed to cancel out.

However, in World Order, Putin lists several areas of common concern over which Russia is prepared to cooperate with the West. Indeed these very same prospective areas of cooperation come up repeatedly in the public writings and speeches of the relatively few "fighters for peace" who are trying to draw the world community back from the brink into some kind of détente.

Dangerous Clash

Yet, pulling that raisin out of cake is to seriously misunderstand the very clear message coming out of Russia: that the destruction of world order by U.S.-led "democracy promotion" and its spread of "universal values" will not be tolerated and that Russia has set down certain red lines, such as against NATO expansion into Ukraine or Georgia over which it will fight to the death using all its resources. We ignore these messages at our peril.

As we enter the U.S. presidential electoral season and a vast number of foreign policy and military advisers are emerging to give counsel to the candidates on relations with Russia and other major powers in the hope of securing high posts in the next U.S. administration, it is worth looking again at the lessons of the summer and autumn of 2008, when what became the "reset" policy was formulated, through April 2009 when its implementation began.

That initiative took shape the last time that the United States and Russia were on a course of confrontation leading straight to armed conflict. The context was the Russian-Georgian war and the deployment of U.S. naval forces off the coast of Abkhazia, poised to attack the nearby Russian ground forces.

The imminent threat of war and the ongoing campaigning for presidential elections in November formed a nexus of circumstances not very dissimilar from where we are today when U.S. and allied air forces compete for space in the skies above Syria with a substantial Russian force that includes fighters, bombers and the most advanced air-defense system in the Russian arsenal.

I have set out the origins of the reset policy in the 15-page chapter entitled "Obama Changes US-Russian Relations" in my 2013 book Stepping Out of Line to which I refer the reader for full details. Here I will limit myself to several key facts and conclusions as they bear on our present situation.

First among these key facts was the mobilization of America's political and scientific elites to bring about a change in U.S. foreign policy that would take us back from the brink of war. Many of the names which came into play then are once again being summoned by the fighters for peace to weigh in on the side of the angels.

The problem is that those who had created the conventional wisdom about the role of the U.S. in the world were ill-prepared to go beyond tinkering at the edges of that wisdom, resulting in the failure of reset to go to the heart of the dispute with Russia and ultimately this led to many tears of regret all around.

An Incomplete Reset

The starting point of what became the "reset" was the founding on Aug. 1, 2008, of the Commission on U.S. Policy Toward Russia under the aegis of former Senators Chuck Hagel (Republican) and Gary Hart (Democrat), setting the bipartisan course of the initiative. It had as its backers the Nixon Center in Washington, a think tank whose Honorary Chairman was former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. It was also supported by the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, a research center within the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.

Members included former U.S. ambassadors to the USSR or Russia James Collins, Jack Matlock and Thomas Pickering as well as former National Security Council or Defense Department officials and top business leaders, such as the former chairman of the world's largest insurance company, Maurice Greenberg. Among those who worked closely with the Commission either inside or outside were former Secretary of State George Schultz, former Defense Secretary William Perry and former Senator Sam Nunn.

Ultimately the Commission issued a 17-page report entitled "The Right Direction for U.S. Policy toward Russia" which contained many of the points taken up in the papers outlining reset which President Obama's delegation signed off with the Russians when they met in London on April 1, 2009, on the sidelines of the first summit meeting between Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev.

The centerpiece of "reset" - as defined in the state papers signed in London - was renewal of the 1994 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (START) that was scheduled to expire in December 2009. It also called for organizing "contacts between our two governments in a more structured and regular way." And it went on to urge greater cooperation between societies: more cultural exchanges, student exchanges, scientific cooperation, and cooperation among NGOs.

START renewal was established as a priority of the Obama administration's overall foreign policy, which called for stopping and reversing deployment of nuclear arms and enforcing non-proliferation. In the end, that objective was achieved. But in the end, that achievement did nothing to prevent the outbreak of a new arms race and ever greater risk of nuclear war among the great powers that we see today.

A major reason for this failure was the timidity of those calling for a new policy on Russia. The report from the Commission assumed continuing U.S. hegemony in world affairs. It stood by the policy of continuing expansion of NATO membership, including to Ukraine and Georgia, and the only concession was to slow down the timetable. It called for the continued roll-out of the global missile defense shield.

While the authors urged ending U.S. restrictions on trade with Russia and its admission to the World Trade Organization, they nonetheless espoused the conventional wisdom on the dangers of Russia's dominant position as energy supplier to Europe and came out in favor of building gas pipelines to Europe skirting Russian territory and thereby diversifying Europe's energy supplies at Russia's expense.

A New Security Architecture

The overriding Russian concern for a new security architecture to be put in place in Europe that would bring them in from the cold received a sympathetic if noncommittal response from the Commission. The proposals in this regard put forward by President Medvedev in April 2008 should be formally reviewed, they said, but without any specific recommendations.

With respect to "democracy promotion" in Russia, the Commission members called for the volume of criticism of Russia to be turned down. They also called for a show of decency by Americans in their dealings with Russia.

Aside from the new strategic arms reduction treaty, Obama's reset came to naught.

It bears stressing that today's situation is more threatening than in 2008. Against a background of shrill Information Warfare between Russia and the West, the denigration of the Russian leadership and of the country in general by the occupant of the Oval Office and by leading members of Congress has advanced to levels unequaled in the worst days of the Cold War.

Meanwhile Russia's strategic military capabilities in both nuclear and conventional warfare have advanced incredibly from the levels of 2008 when Western military observers expressed their satisfaction that the performance of the Russian military did not seem much improved over the days of the ill-fated Afghan war that brought down the Soviet Union. Today, if we are to escape from the cycle of "resets" - from bitter disappointment over souring of relations after a few landmark fruits of cooperation and then the onset of new, heightened risks of nuclear war - we must seize the nettle and resolve to address the underlying problems of international relations that the Russian leadership cite, most recently in the documentary film World Order.

Détente, i.e., relaxation of tensions and improved atmospherics, is only a good beginning, nothing more.

It's worth noting that the film's director and co-author is one of the most intelligent and fair-minded presenters on Russian television, Vladimir Soloviev, who is best known today for prime-time evening debates on hot domestic and international issues in which the "other side," whether Ukrainian or American or the Russian opposition parties in the Duma, is always present in what amounts at times to astonishing openness of discussion on live television, when it does not descend into shouting matches.

Soloviev has a Ph.D. in economics from the Institute of World Economics and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences. He was an active entrepreneur in the 1990s and spent some time back then in the U.S., where his activities included teaching economics at the University of Alabama. If he is the author of propaganda, one can be certain it is sophisticated and serves certain philosophical and ethical values, not individuals or power for power's sake.

The documentary was released by the state broadcaster Pervy Kanal on Dec. 20.

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