#2
www.rt.com
February 20, 2015
15 terrifying images from Kiev's 2014 Maidan revolution
[Photos here https://www.rt.com/news/233807-ukraine-maidan-riots-photos/]

Burning tires, barricades of rubble and blood on the pavement - RT presents the most striking photos from last February's Maidan riots in Ukraine, which turned the capital Kiev into a warzone and led to an armed coup in the country.

1. With police carrying batons and riot shields, and protesters metal clubs and home-made protective gear - their clashes at times looked more befitting of a medieval battle field than a modern city.

2. The equipment of the riot police failed to provide any significant protection from Molotov cocktails, widely used by the protesters, with numerous officers being turned into human torches on the streets of Kiev.

3. The more rowdy protesters used every means available to provoke the police. At times it seemed like their sole aim was to escalate the violence.

4. Thousands came out to Maidan frustrated by the president's decision to postpone the signing on an association agreement with the EU.

5. The rioters employed a variety of unconventional weapons against the police, with metal chains being especially effective given their added reach.

6. Law enforcement officers responded to the violence caused by the rioters by beating and detaining numerous protestors on Kiev's Independence Square (Maidan) and nearby streets.

7. The recipe for a Molotov cocktail is simple and thousands of these so-called "poor man's grenades" were hurled at the police during the Maidan riots.

8. This is no celebration! Colorful fireworks became a dangerous weapon in the hands of the Maidan rioters.

9. Dead bodies soon became a common picture in the heart of the Ukrainian capital as unidentified snipers were allegedly firing at both the protesters and security officers.

10. As the tensions kept rising on Maidan, both rioters and the police switched from hand-held weapons to firearms.

11. Darkness never completely descended on Independence Square no matter the hour, with burning barricades used to keep security officers at bay blazing through the night.

12. Skeletons of burned-out vehicles and heaps of tires made perfect makeshift material for the barricades.

13. Around a hundred people are believed to have lost their lives during the peak of the Maidan riots on February 18-21, 2014.

14. Kiev's streets were ripped up by protesters to replenish their stock of stones to hurl at riot police.

15. Central Kiev woke up in ruins after the riots, with the scale of devastation making it hard to believe that the square used to be one of the city's main tourist attractions.

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#3
YouTube
Battlefield Kiev Ukraine protesters firebomb cops

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e1oCTA8SSVs

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 #4
Facebook
December 29, 2015
The Maidan massacre cover-up
By Ivan Katchanovski
University of Ottawa

The Maidan massacre cover-up: The new sessions of the Maidan massacre trial in the end of December have revealed various evidence of concealed snipers and spotters shooting or targeting Maidan protesters from at least five Maidan-controlled buildings or locations. All these locations of snipers and spotters (Zhovtnevyi Palace, the Bank Arkada, the Hotel Ukraina, and Horodetskoho Street and Muzeinyi Lane buildings) were identified in my APSA paper, which also included links to photos and videos of these snipers and/or spotters on Zhovtnevyi Palace. But the official investigation publicly denied that any snipers were in these locations, with a partial exception of a belated admission about possible "unknown snipers" in the Hotel Ukraina. The evidence made public during the trial includes a previously edited out video segment of "snipers" on Zhovtnevyi Palace, previously denied information about snipers in the government investigation case, forensic medical reports, and bullet impact locations in trees. Not a single Ukrainian media reported these revelations or broadcast the video segment of the persons identified by the protesters as "snipers" on Zhovtnevyi Palace. (2h42m-2h45m)

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 #5
AP
December 30, 2015
For Ukraine's Rebel East, 2016 Promises More Tension
By INNA VARENITSA

The holiday market in the central square of Donetsk, the principal city of rebel-held eastern Ukraine, has all the trappings of a celebratory time - shiny ornaments, colorful toys and a cartoon-faced kiddie train on a meandering track. But the aura is more forced than festive, as the region's people face a new year that gives little promise.

While full-scale fighting in the war between Ukrainian forces and Russia-backed separatists died down in 2015, true peace appears a distant prospect. Shooting and shelling erupts sporadically despite repeated cease-fires called under an internationally mediated peace agreement. The latest truce was declared last week by the Contact Group negotiators from Ukraine, Russia and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, but the antagonists each have claimed violations by the other side since then.

It's an emotional whipsaw for Donetsk's residents.

"A feeling of peace? Sometimes there is. But when they start to shoot, you don't feel any kind of peace," said Alexandra Kirichenko, an 18-year-old student, walking down a street where apartment windows shattered by fighting were blocked off with plywood sheets.

In the central square, a middle-aged woman named Galina was trying to sell toys for parents to give their children on New Year's Eve, the main day for presents in much of the former Soviet Union. Her mood was as grim as the toys were merry, her words as terse and direct as a telegram from the front lines.

"Uncertainty; you live from day to day; constant tension, fear," said Galina, who declined to give her last name.

Even if the fear abates for a few hours or days, the region's economic difficulties make life a constant grind. The Ukrainian government has halted payment of pensions and social stipends to the rebel-held areas and cut off business contacts. The isolation brings both high prices for scarce goods and high unemployment.

"It's harder and harder to sell anything," said Galina, whose stock of toys was compiled before the war, which has killed more than 9,000 people, started in April 2014.

If the fighting is less intense than it was a year ago, the issues behind it remain just as passionate and resistant to resolution as ever.

The fighting began after separatists in the primarily Russian-speaking Donetsk and Luhansk regions seized government buildings, saying they wanted no part of the new government formed after Russia-friendly President Viktor Yanukovych fled in the face of mass protests in the capital Kiev. The separatists alleged the new government was so Ukrainian nationalist that it was effectively fascist and would run roughshod over the east.

The Minsk peace agreement signed in February - a second try after the first agreement of five months earlier failed to get traction - calls for the Donetsk and Luhansk regions to remain part of Ukraine, but with ill-defined "special status." That lack of clarity obstructs real resolution, and the continuing fighting and economic suffering only reinforce the stalemate.

"To return to what existed before - to a unified Ukraine, etc. - is already impossible. You can't wash away our citizens' memories of what Ukraine did in this period," said Denis Pushilin, the head of the rebel parliament in Donetsk.

For Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, the situation is equally difficult. Granting amnesty to the separatists and giving them special status, as envisioned by Minsk, could be politically ruinous, angering nationalists who reject any concessions to the rebels.

"The Minsk agreement exists only on paper. And so, especially on the border, it doesn't make any difference - shooting with them continues," a rebel who declined to provide his name told The Associated Press.

Russia, which Kiev and the West allege is supplying troops and weapons to the rebels, has brushed off the separatists' drive to be annexed by Moscow and says it is committed to fulfilling the Minsk agreement. Russia last week announced that a close ally of President Vladimir Putin, former parliament speaker Boris Gryzlov, had been named the new Russian representative to the Contact Group.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said the appointment of such a prominent figure indicates Russia is intensifying its commitment to the Minsk agreement "despite the fact that efforts to implement this document now unfortunately are in a pretty deplorable state."

Ukrainian political analyst Vadim Karasev said Russia's interest in resolving the conflict may be more a matter of pragmatism than principle and that Ukrainian authorities see it similarly.

"The alternative to the Minsk agreement is war, and that's too expensive for Kiev and for the Kremlin," he said.

 #6
https://dninews.com
December 29, 2015
Ukrainian frontier guards humiliate civilians

The Ukrainian military working at the only check point in the Luganskaya Village toughened conditions of the admission of civilians, subjecting them to rigorous inspection in the cold and unreserved humiliations - claimed LPR's Deputy Chief of the People's Militia Corps Igor Yashchenko.

"On the eve of the New Year's holidays the number of civilians passing through the check point in the Luganskaya Village has considerably increased, it makes about three thousand people per day. The frontier service of Ukraine together with units of national battalions have considerably toughened access control," claimed Yashchenko.

According to him, all the adjacent territory was enclosed with barbed wire, there were erected hurdles creating great nuisances in movement of citizens and delays when crossing the check point.

"Big groups of people, from 500 to 700 people appear at the check point, while the border guards of Ukraine let pass no more than 15 people per hour, subjecting people to rigorous inspection in the cold. It is unreserved humiliation," noted Yashchenko.

According to him, the facts of such attitude towards civilians are recorded and reported by the OSCE Mission representatives. He specified that the People's Militia takes all the measures to simplify passage of civilians in both directions and to ensure their safety.

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 #7
Reuters
December 30, 2015
Corruption in Ukraine is so bad, a Nigerian prince would be embarrassed
By Josh Cohen
Josh Cohen is a former USAID project officer involved in managing economic reform projects in the former Soviet Union. He contributes to a number of foreign policy-focused media outlets and tweets at @jkc_in_dc

United States Vice President Joe Biden has never been one to hold his tongue. He certainly didn't in his recent trip to Kiev. In a speech before Ukraine's Parliament, Biden told legislators that corruption was eating Ukraine "like a cancer," and warned Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko that Ukraine had "one more chance" to confront corruption before the United States cuts off aid.

Biden's language was undiplomatic, but he's right: Ukraine needs radical reforms to root out graft. After 18 months in power, Poroshenko still refuses to decisively confront corruption. It's time for Poroshenko to either step up his fight against corruption - or step down if he won't.

When it comes to Ukrainian corruption, the numbers speak for themselves. Over $12 billion per year disappears from the Ukrainian budget, according to an adviser to Ukraine's National Anti-Corruption Bureau. And in its most recent review of global graft, anti-corruption watchdog Transparency International ranked Ukraine 142 out of 174 countries on its Corruption Perceptions Index - below countries such as Uganda, Nicaragua and Nigeria. Ordinary Ukrainians also endure paying petty bribes in all areas of life. From vehicle registration, to getting their children into kindergarten, to obtaining needed medicine, everything connected to government has a price.

The worst corruption occurs at the nexus between business oligarchs and government officials. A small number of oligarchs control 70 percent of Ukraine's economy, and over the years have captured and corrupted Ukraine's political and judicial institutions. As a result, a "culture of impunity" was created, where politicians, judges, prosecutors and oligarchs collude in a corrupt system where everyone but the average citizen benefits.

While there are numerous examples of high-level corruption in Ukraine, a few stand out for their sheer brazenness. In one case, $1.8 billion of an IMF loan to Ukraine meant to support the banking system instead disappeared into various offshore accounts affiliated with PrivatBank in Ukraine, which is owned by Ihor Kolomoisky - one of Ukraine's leading oligarchs.

Thanks to the anticorruption group Nashi Groshi ("Our Money") the details have come to light. Forty-two Ukrainian import firms owned by 54 offshore entities borrowed $1.8 billion from PrivatBank. The offshore firms then used the IMF money to order goods from fictional "suppliers," with the $1.8 billion in loans from PrivatBank secured by the goods on order.

However, when the fictional suppliers inevitably did not fulfill their end of the bargain, PrivatBank was left holding the bag with its $1.8 billion gone offshore. As a Nashi Groshi investigator noted, "this transaction of $1.8 billion abroad with the help of fake contracts was simply an asset siphoning operation." Unfortunately for Ukrainians - as well as Western taxpayers who fund the IMF - neither Kolomoisky nor anyone else in Ukraine has been held accountable and the case faded from public view in Kiev.

Powerful politicians and businessmen in Ukraine can also count on Ukrainian officials to protect them from European prosecutors. After a two-year investigation, Swiss prosecutors recently opened a criminal case against Mykola Martynenko - a close Parliamentary ally of Ukrainian Prime Minister Arsenyi Yatsenyuk - for allegedly accepting a $30 million bribe through a Czech company and attempting to launder the money through Switzerland. However, despite repeated requests from the Swiss for assistance, Ukrainian officials are protecting Martynenko, according to a report in the Kyiv Post, and Ukraine's prosecutor general publicly refuses to pursue the case.

Switzerland is not the only country with whom Ukraine declines to cooperate. As part of an investigation into suspicions that Ukraine's former Minister of Ecology Mykola Zlochevsky laundered $23 million, Britain's Serious Fraud Office requested assistance from Ukrainian authorities. However, Ukraine not only refuses to provide assistance to the British, but prosecutors actually wrote letters exonerating Zlochevsky, forcing the British to unfreeze Zlochevsky's accounts and dismiss the case.

To contain rising populist sentiment and preserve Western support, Poroshenko should take the following steps:

First, Poroshenko needs to immediately fire current Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin. The United States' Ambassador to Ukraine recently called out Shokin's office for "openly and aggressively undermining reform," and leading reformers in Ukraine's parliament and civil society continue to demand Shokin's ouster.

Despite this pressure, though, Shokin remains in place. Since he is a close ally of Poroshenko, it's not hard to see why. Poroshenko is himself a wealthy oligarch, and in a system where prosecutors are used as weapons against opponents in business or politics, Poroshenko remains determined to maintain control over this critical lever of power. However, while Poroshenko's seeming motivations for protecting Shokin are understandable, it's time for the Ukrainian president to place his country's interests above his own.

Second, Poroshenko needs to sell all of the assets in his multi-billion dollar business empire. When campaigning for president last year Poroshenko promised to do just that, saying "As president of Ukraine, I only want to concern myself with the good of the country and that is what I will do."

Poroshenko is the only one of Ukraine's 10 richest people to see his net worth actually increase in the past year, and his bank continues to expand while others lose their licenses. One of his industrial companies also won a large shipbuilding contract - a clear conflict of interest with Poroshenko's role as president.

Moreover, while no evidence exists that Poroshenko uses his position to promote his broader business interests, Ukrainian television recently reported that Poroshenko shut down an investigation into damage to a protected historical site stemming from illegal construction on land Poroshenko owns.

Third, Poroshenko must take a hands-on role in the war against corruption. While a new National Anti-Corruption Bureau and anti-corruption prosecutor are in place, they have not started work yet. Anti-corruption activists in Kiev fear both of these organizations will be "eaten by the system," according to Daria Kaleniuk, executive director of the Anti-Corruption Action Center, a Ukrainian civil society organization. Poroshenko must provide these organizations with high-level political support to ensure this does not occur. With Ukraine's citizens becoming angry and restless, one of Ukraine's leading anti-graft watchdogs believes a third Maidan revolution may occur if the Ukrainian people don't begin to see powerful people prosecuted and jailed.

Finally, Poroshenko should replace Yatsenyuk as Prime Minister. Although Yatsenyuk deserves great credit for pushing through painful economic and energy sector reforms - a task he proudly called "political suicide" - he sloughs off responsibility for fighting graft, noting that "I am not responsible for the prosecutor's office... nor for judiciary."  Yatsenyuk faces corruption investigations as well, which is not something Poroshenko needs from the second-most powerful official in the country.

To be clear, Ukraine has not completely ignored the fight against corruption. Besides the new National Anti-Corruption Bureau and anti-corruption prosecutor, government procurement tenders moved online and major civil service reform just passed. The key drivers of these measures, though, are not government officials or politicians - many of who fight these changes tooth and nail - but leading civil society organizations such as Transparency International and Ukraine's Anti-Corruption Action Center. These reformers demand radical change, and given the billions of dollars stolen each year by powerful people, they are doing so at great personal risk.

Poroshenko must join Ukraine's reformers in pushing for this change - and if he refuses to do so, he should resign.

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 #8
Vice.com
December 22, 2015
'People Are Walking With a Noose Around Their Necks': Inside Ukraine's Huge Shadow Economy
By Philippa Stewart

Leonid is not exactly what you would expect from a black market money dealer.

He is young, well-built, handsome, and well-dressed. The upmarket café he chose to meet in is the kind that serves its meals on slates and offers menus in English as well as Ukrainian.

Leonid orders tea and adds honey before he begins to speak quietly, barely audible across the table. "The black market in Ukraine, it is not so black. It is just how things are here," he said.

"We're used to giving a 'present' to the doctor when we go. Right now the present is 200 hriyvna ($9)," he added. This could also be a week's shopping in some of Kiev's cheaper supermarkets.

Up until four years ago, Leonid worked in various banks before being laid off because of Ukraine's rapidly declining economy. He started off waiting next to currency exchange windows, trying to tempt customers with a better rate than those offered by the banks. Then he moved up to doing deals in his car.

Now he deals with any amount up to around $100,000 - often taking deliveries of currency in gym bags.

"If it is more than about $100,000 it becomes dangerous and difficult to count, and it is a big bag of money. You have to understand even $300,000 can be as big as this table," he said, gesturing to the table for four where we sat.

"If it's less than $50,000 then consider it done. For really large amounts I try to do the transactions in different places so I am not as visible... Sometimes if it is two days in a row, people who share the office space start asking questions.

"They are nervous because they are doing things that they shouldn't be... I don't want to know what they are doing and they don't want to know about me."

Leonid would not give his full name to VICE News, not for fear of being arrested, but because he did not want to be robbed. He also said he did not want to come to the attentions of the secret service, describing some instances when he had a bad feeling about a transaction being set up.

'Everybody is used to these shady transactions in life'

"There is something about the way they are talking on the phone, if they won't tell you exactly when they will arrive. Sometimes I have just thrown away my phone and walked away from a deal. You trust your instincts. I just don't want to be visible."

Ukraine's economy is in trouble, according to the World Bank, the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is expected to shrink by 12 percent by the end of 2015. In addition to this, Russia is demanding payment of a $3bn debt, leant by the Kremlin when Viktor Yanukovich was still president of Ukraine.

"People are walking with a noose around their necks," said Leonid. "Life is getting more expensive, but the salaries don't increase, and so they have to do something about it."

Ukraine's shadow economy is one of the largest in the world, reaching 47 percent of GDP by the first quarter of 2015. "The loss of economic entities' trust in the improvement of the economic and political situation in the near future forced them to actively use schemes for concealing income, including such as expansion of losses and non-payments," said a government report published in August.

Leonid explained: "Everybody is used to these shady transactions in life. They are trying to crack down on shady things, but it is going to take a long time for them to do it."

According to Igor Vinnychuk, an economics expert at Chernivtsi National University, a lot of Ukraine's shadow economy activities walk the grey area between illegal and legal.

"In Ukraine, we should clearly highlight several areas of shadow economy, which have varying degrees of legality. For example, there may be the illegal production or sale of legal goods."

Vinnychuk said that the most profitable businesses in the shadow economy were the illegal production of alcohol - which makes up about 40 percent of the country's total alcohol production and is worth about $1.1 billion - illegal manufacturing of oil products, and amber mining.

Illegal oil production makes up about 30 percent of the industry in Ukraine with an estimated value of $550 million and about 99 percent of amber mining is actually being done illegally in Ukraine and is worth about $330m a year.

Vinnychuk added that one of the most common shadow activities is smuggling. "The amount of smuggled cigarettes is estimated at being worth between $360- $450m. Smuggling in Ukraine exists principally because of participation in the process by the people very people that should be combatting it. One of the biggest challenges in Ukraine is a huge level of corruption."

Vinnychuk added that the excessive amount of paperwork and documents needed by business in Ukraine often meant they worked in the shadow sector rather than face mountains of bureaucracy.

"Achieving this level of shadow economy in Ukraine is owed largely to ineffective and ill-conceived policies in the areas of taxation and regulation of economic activity," he said.

'Corruption threatens the very existence of the state'

He added that there is a "neutral or apathetic attitude towards the phenomenon" which was largely formed during Ukraine's time in the former USSR.

With conflict in the east leaving much of the country's mining and industrial areas destroyed or inaccessible to the west of the country, yet more pressure has been put on the ailing economy.

According to the National Bank of Ukraine, the country lost 15 percent of GDP and almost 20 percent of its total economic potential by losing control of territory in the east.

"Prior to the conflict in eastern Ukraine, the share of exports of goods from the old industrial regions of Ukraine was about 45 percent of the national total," Vinnychuk said.

The war has also had an indirect effect on the growth of the shadow economy. Some people returning from the front find that they either cannot pay taxes, or do not want to because of a growing resentment towards what they see as the failings of the government to the Ukrainian people.

Lawyer Mihail Gulak said he had been a battlefield medic on the frontlines in the east before returning to Kiev last year. "Before I left, everything was good. Business was good and I had the money I needed, then I went to fight in the east and everything changed. I got back here and there was no help, no recognition for what I had done."

Gulak's office is in a single story building, with a long, narrow run of rooms that feels similar to a strip mall. On the back of one chair is his army uniform, washed and ironed since the war. As he speaks, he gesticulates with a hand decked out with a gold ring inlaid with a large red stone.

"This government does not value people who are doing things for this country and this is why I am not willing to pay taxes," he said. "Until the country has a good and honest ruler there won't be any changes."

The government has said it is attempting to tackle corruption and clamp down on shadow economy activities by introducing and anti-corruption offices.

"The anti-corruption bureau cannot do anything about this," Gulak said, referring to the wide-scale corruption in the country. "They took not very good people as investigators. Basically they hired amoral idiots who do not know what they are doing."

Vinnychuk agrees that corruption is the key to Ukraine's growing shadow economy: "Corruption was and remains one of the biggest obstacles on the way to reform of Ukraine's economy."

"Corruption threatens the very existence of the state; it is the main obstacle to improving living standards, economic development, civil society and combating organized crime."

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 #9
Reuters
December 28, 2015
Political feuding imperils Ukraine's future, Obama's record
KIEV | By Alessandra Prentice and Pavel Polityuk

On his most recent visit to Kiev, U.S. Vice-President Joe Biden said he spends more time speaking to Ukrainian officials than to his own wife.

He may not be exaggerating: senior U.S. officials, including Biden, are deeply embroiled in trying to persuade Ukraine's leadership to hold the line and implement the reforms they have promised to carry out.

But despite these efforts, divisions inside the ruling coalition are growing and many of the reforms are stalled. If the leaders fail, it will be a deep embarrassment to Washington, the EU, and the IMF which sacrificed relations with Russia to support these people.

"I think we may have logged close to 1,000 hours on the telephone," Biden told reporters during his visit this month, referring to his calls with Ukraine's President Petro Poroshenko, before adding the quip that it was more time than he spends talking to Mrs Biden.

The Obama administration, with the EU, has invested deeply in making a success of Ukraine's Feb. 2014 revolution, when protesters forced a Russian-backed leader to flee and pro-Western opposition figures took over.

A look at statements issued by Biden's office shows that since 2014 the vice president spoke by telephone 40 times with Poroshenko and 16 times with Prime Minister Arseny Yatseniuk.

That is in addition to four visits by Biden to Kiev since the change in power, and multiple meetings with Poroshenko and Yatseniuk in Washington and in Europe.

Biden was not alone in spending time on Ukraine. In 2014, U.S officials and members of congress paid more than 100 visits to Ukraine, according to a spokesman for the U.S. embassy in the Ukrainian capital, Kiev.

Yet despite intense efforts by the White House the project is now in danger of unraveling.

If that happens, it will be a squandered opportunity for Ukraine to break a 25-year cycle of chaos and corruption and would rob the Obama administration of a rare foreign policy success.

RARE BRIGHT SPOT

When Viktor Yanukovich, the Moscow-backed Ukrainian President, fled Kiev on Feb. 21, 2014 en route to exile in Russia, Washington saw an opportunity to realize its foreign policy goals.

It hoped the new Ukraine would be the kind of free market democracy Washington wanted to promote, and also that it would pull out of Moscow's orbit.

After Russia responded by annexing Ukraine's Crimea Peninsula, and pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine tried to secede, Washington doubled down on its commitment to Kiev.

Along with Europe, it imposed sanctions on Russia, even though that tipped relations between Moscow and Washington to their worst since the Cold War.

Meanwhile, the new pro-Western Ukrainian authorities faced a dire situation. War against the separatists killed thousands of people and made hundreds of thousands homeless. State coffers were empty, the currency in freefall, and business and homes still dependent on Russia for energy supplies. Soviet-era industries were held by politically-connected insiders. Corruption had become entrenched.

The International Monetary Fund agreed to keep Kiev afloat but demanded a restructuring of its debt and a swathe of reforms to its finances, politics and industry.

Initially, the news from Kiev was positive. In a statement before the Foreign Affairs Committee in Congress in March this year, senior U.S. diplomat Victoria Nuland reeled off a list of reforms enacted by the new authorities.

"Ukraine began to forge a new nation on its own terms," Nuland said.

That was a welcome bright spot for an administration that had suffered foreign policy setbacks in Libya, Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan. But in the past few months Ukraine's reform drive has stuttered.

While Kiev has made some headway on its pledges, including cleaning up its banking sector and revamping the police force, many promises have either stalled in parliament or remained on paper only.

For example, little progress has been made in reforming the office of the general prosecutor, which U.S. officials and other Western supporters have repeatedly said should be a key focus of efforts to root out cronyism and graft.

After much wrangling, the Ukrainian parliament on Friday approved next year's budget, a prerequisite to secure the next tranche of $17.5 billion in IMF loans.

However, it remains to be seen whether the budget meets all the requirements of the IMF. Previous amendments to the tax system were only temporary, and a new tax code is still pending.

Meanwhile, public disputes have broken out between allies of the president and Yatseniuk, whose partnership had formed the core of the reform push.

There was a mass brawl in parliament earlier this month between feuding members of the ruling pro-European coalition that saw Yatseniuk lifted from his feet by an irate lawmaker.

Days later, during a meeting that was supposed to discuss reform but turned into a shouting match about corruption, the interior minister threw a glass of water at Mikheil Saakashvili, a former president of Georgia who took Ukrainian citizenship and was appointed a regional governor by Poroshenko.

LAST CHANCE

At his meetings in Kiev with Poroshenko, Biden delivered a warning, according to a source close to the Ukrainian president who spoke to Reuters on condition of anonymity.

"Biden showed that results are important to the United States. That the current team have a last chance to do something," the source said, when asked what was discussed during their latest meeting in Kiev. "Patience is close to running out."

Preaching against corruption is not easy when any hope of resurrecting Ukraine's economy depends on reviving the very industries that have been crooked for decades.

Just months after Ukraine's revolution, Biden's own son Hunter Biden took a post as a director of a Ukrainian gas company. The New York Times said "the credibility of the vice president's anti-corruption message may have been undermined" by the role. Biden says he and his son do not discuss business.

According to several Ukrainian lawmakers who spoke to Reuters, the prime minister may be dismissed early next year, possibly after losing a vote of no confidence in parliament. That could trigger an early parliamentary election.

Losing Yatseniuk would be a blow for U.S. policy in Ukraine. In a leaked recording of a telephone call between Nuland and the U.S. ambassador to Kiev, she described him by the affectionate nickname "Yats." Washington sees Yatseniuk, a fluent English speaker, as the lynchpin of Ukraine's reform effort.

According to a second source close to Poroshenko, Washington will work with any prime minister, as long as a reformist coalition keeps power.

"Their view is -- sort out the top people yourselves," the second source said of Washington's approach.

"The main thing is to save the coalition and prevent any backwards steps. The two main points the Americans are pushing at Kiev are 1) protect political stability, 2) strictly fulfill the IMF demands on which financial help depends," the source said.

If he was forceful in his meetings with Ukrainian officials behind closed doors, Biden was only slightly less blunt in a public speech to the Ukrainian parliament.

"If you fail, the experiment fails," he said in his speech, during which he appeared to be trying to address his remarks as much towards the box where the government sits as to lawmakers.

"It may be your last moment. Please for the sake of the rest of us, selfishly on my part, don't waste it. Seize the opportunity. Build a better future for the people of Ukraine."

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 #10
www.readukraine.com
December 28, 2015
Ukraine's Politics are Heading for Crisis Again
By Mark Adomanis

After a year that started off as decidedly nightmarish, there has been some tentative good news on the economic front. Ukraine's economy has (at least for the moment) stopped shrinking. The current account, which had been in an enormous deficit ever since the global finance crisis, has finally been brought back into balance. Recently, Ukraine even got a (modest!) upgrade on its sovereign debt. Things are still pretty bleak for most Ukrainians, already low living standards have collapsed due to the combination of devaluation and inflation, but there's a plausible narrative for meaningful improvement over the course of 2016 and in the years ahead.

However, with Ukraine it always seems to be a case of one step forward and two steps back. That small bit of economic good news comes alongside the release of a new Gallup poll that ought to scare the daylights out of anyone who wants to see Ukraine move towards a "European future."

When asked, a mere 17% of Ukrainians expressed support for President Petro Poroshenko, down from 47% the year before.

Now, by any standard, that is an abysmally low number. As the Russians gleefully delighted in pointing out, it is substantially lower than the widely detested Viktor Yanukovych managed in his last full year in office.*

The problem is not just that Ukrainians have soured on one particular politician. Politicians come and go, and these comings and goings are a perfectly natural part of the political lifecycle. Russia presents an excellent case study in the dangers attendant with the personification of political power, and so it's not necessarily a bad thing (and arguably rather healthy) that Ukrainians are so skeptical about their current leadership.   

The real problem is that Poroshenko's individual poll numbers are considerably less catastrophic than the rest of the government's. 17% support might sound bad in the abstract, but it looks downright rosy in comparison to the mere 8% of respondents who expressed support for the national government's performance or the paltry 5% who thought that enough was being doing to combat corruption. Even in a place dealing with the sorts of problems that Ukraine is, those are downright toxic numbers, similar to the public's level of support for Yeltsin during Russia's 1998 economic nadir. And we all remember what happened after that.

Ukrainians are evidently increasingly dissatisfied with the system as a whole. They are opposed not to specific actions of specific political actors, but to the entire way in which the system operates. Sooner or later that will precipitate some kind of crisis: governments with less than 10% support in the polls tend not to last very long.

For a country which putatively underwent a "revolution" which (again, at least putatively) transformed the very foundations of the political system, it is hard to imagine a more serious problem. The most obvious solution to the current ills ("throw the bums out!") has already been applied. All of this malaise and dissatisfaction are taking place in a post-revolutionary context. The worst vestiges of the old system were supposed to be gone by now, replaced with younger, fresher, and less corrupt faces. Unfortunately, though, Ukrainians do not think that that has actually happened.

I would love to weave a happy narrative in which there are quick, easy, and painless solutions to the current impasse. But there aren't. The evidence available to date strongly suggests that whoever ends up in power will, in short order, become broadly unpopular. This is what happened to both Yatsenyuk and Poroshenko who came to power with popular mandates only to see those mandates evaporate.

This, incidentally, is why I think it would be a huge mistake to turn Mikhail Saakashvili (whose popularity was recently touted by the Financial Times) or some other outsider into a knight in shining armor. Saakashvili is popular precisely because he's not seen as part of the system: the minute that status changes, the benefits of outsider status will start to wither away. No one is going to swoop in and magically save the save.

Ultimately, the current atmosphere of political discontent has its foundations in the performance of Ukraine's economy. There is a very good chance that, in the not too distant future, this performance will improve. There is a less-good chance that it will improve enough for the population to feel particularly satisfied: according to the IMF's latest (relatively optimistic) projections, Ukraine's economy won't recover its 2012 level of output until 2020.

Eight years of relative economic decline is an awful lot to ask for, and given how negatively public opinion has already moved it seems implausible (not impossible, but unlikely) that voters will sit around for a decade calmly waiting for reforms to take hold.

The most likely outcome, then, is a reprise of the cyclical political instability that has bedeviled Ukraine for much of the past decade. That fate is by no means set in stone. Strong political leadership could avert that outcome just as weak political leadership could help accelerate it. At the moment, though, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the gains of the Maidan are looking more ephemeral than at any other point since Yankukovych fled.

*Yanukovuch's ratings would obviously have been lower right around the time of Maidan, but for the most part his ratings fluctuated within a narrow band of around 30%. It is thus not "normal" for a politician to be as hugely unpopular as Poroshenko is right now

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 #11
Intefax-Ukraine
December 29, 2015
Ukrainian govt's resignation would require new coalition formation or early elections - PM Yatseniuk
 
The Ukrainian Cabinet's possible resignation would require the establishment of a new parliamentary coalition, or early parliamentary elections, Prime Minister Arseniy Yatseniuk said.

"If a decision is made on the Cabinet of ministers' resignation, this implies failure to fulfill the coalition agreement. This means that the one who undertakes political responsibility for the government's resignation is supposed to form a new coalition and appoint a new Cabinet of ministers, or otherwise all of us run in early elections. There is no other option," Yatseniuk said at a press conference in Kyiv on Tuesday.

Yatseniuk said he was prepared to step down if the parliamentary coalition makes this decision. "If the coalition decides that this prime minister of Ukraine does not meet the requirements set by the coalition, a new coalition and a new government is welcome at the voting hall. I will be honored and proud to hand control over the executive branch to a new premier, but I will complete my work," he said.

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#12
Ukraine finds way to implement decommunization law without extra financing

KIEV, December 29. /TASS/. Ukraine has discovered a way to follow its decommunization law without extra financing, taking the example from the city of Dnipropetrovsk, which kept its name, originally taken after Soviet figure Grigory Petrovsky and currently announced to be after Saint Apostle Peter.

On Tuesday, the Dnipropetrovsk government decided not to rename the city but to change the origins of the existing name.

According to the city website, more than 80% of its residents opposed the name changing. Leader of the "Opposition Block" party Natalia Nacharyan said that this way budgeting for supporting the residents and restoration of municipal utilities may be saved.

In April, Ukraine's parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, passed a law condemning Communist and Nazi totalitarian regimes, banned their propaganda and symbols. In May, President Pyotr Poroshenko signed four relevant laws, or the so-called "de-communization package."

Under the law some 84 cities and towns, 857 villages and more than 10,000 streets, which names may be associated with Soviet figures, must be renamed.

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 #13
www.readukraine.com
December 25, 2015
Banning the Communists: Not a Terribly Good Idea!
By Mark Adomanis

Ukraine's recent decision to ban the communist party underlines just how little has changed since the Maidan, not how much

It's depressing that I have to do this, but before penning a "defense" of the Ukrainian Communist Party I should stipulate that its political, economic, and social values are about as far away from mine as it is possible to be. That is to say that, unlike supports of the party, I think free markets are great, I think private ownership of productive assets is even better, and I think that there is precious little to "mourn" in the collapse of the Soviet Union. The good old days weren't so good after all, and many of the "achievements" lauded by communists exist largely in their own imaginations.

But while I have nothing but contempt for it policy positions, and the generally corrupt, self-interested way in which it's conducted its internal affairs, what I don't think is that the Ukrainian Communist Party is such an abomination that it should be banned from the political sphere entirely.

That view, apparently, sets me apart from the current Ukrainian government which, in its zeal to turn the page on its Soviet past, has passed a sweeping set of de-communization laws.

The laws, to put it mildly, are just the slightest bit draconian. They forbid the public display of either Soviet or Nazi symbols and make something as harmless and trivial as singing the Soviet national anthem punishable by a maximum of five years in prison.

Tellingly, while making rhetorical support for communism or the Soviet government a criminal offense, the laws also mandate the acceptance of an (extraordinarily divisive!) interpretation of the actions of groups like the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. Officially at least, criticism of either group is a criminal offense with punishments similar to those for the thought-crime of liking the Soviet Union.

The "insurgent army" was, of course, deeply complicit in human rights violations on a massive scale: historians are in broad agreement that, at a minimum, it was responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands of Polish Civilians in the areas under its control. Indeed, given its history of collaboration with the Nazis, an honestly administered "anti-totalitarian" law would likely prohibit support for the UPA as well as the Soviets or the Nazis.

While they were supposedly intended to underline the extent to which post-Maidan Ukraine has been transformed, these laws actually show just how little has changed. The Ukrainian government is still mandating the acceptance of a single "correct" interpretation of history (the Soviets were "criminals" and the UPA was an "independence movement") while literally making the promotion of alternate views a criminal offense. In comparison to the Soviet past it is true that the heroes and villains have been switched, but the thought processes and the need to "prohibit" inconvenient points of view are eerily similar.

If you think that I'm somehow being unfair, consider what Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, two of the West's leading human right organizations (which, incidentally, have been unremittingly critical of the Russian government) had to say about the issue.

HRW said that the laws could have "very negative implications for freedom of expression" in Ukraine, and steadfastly said that it "calls on Ukraine to repeal this legislation."

Amnesty International was, if anything, even more withering in its reaction. It called the banning of the communist party "a flagrant violation of freedom of expression" that should be "immediately overturned."

In the usually modest language of NGOs, that's just about as strong as criticism comes. It's bordering on the equivalent of an ALL CAPS e-mail. Thus we have a situation in which two leading international defenders of human rights have officially gone on the record calling not just for modest modifications to Ukraine's de-communization laws, but for their outright and immediate repeal. If that doesn't suggest that the laws are badly flawed, then what would?

Freedom of speech either exists for hated, marginalized groups like today's Communist Party of Ukraine (which is, rather understandably, loathed by a huge majority of Ukrainians due to its friendless towards Russia and the Russian-backed separatists) or it doesn't exist at all. That's what freedom of speech means, the freedom to offend, irk, mock, and otherwise criticize the power that be. If you're only "free" to mouth the government approved line then you have the same kind of "free speech" that prevailed in the Soviet Union, a pale imitation of the real thing.

No this doesn't mean that Russian propaganda is right that Kiev is a "fascist junta." Russia itself isn't "fascist," and it has a wide range of laws that impose far more severe restrictions on freedom of expression than do Ukraine's de-communization laws.

But, I'm going to go out on a limb and suggest that the people who fought to have Yanukovych overturned didn't do so in order to create a government with a record on free speech marginally better than Russia's. The whole point was to get Ukraine as far away from its wretched communist past as possible.

And so the people, and I very much include myself among them, who want to see Ukraine become a "modern, European" country need to remind its current leadership that one of the most crucial aspects of democracy is allowing people whom you otherwise despise (like the Ukrainian Communist Party) the freedom to speak their minds. Only when that happens will Ukraine have succeeded in its goal of adopting European values. 

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 #14
www.opendemocracy.net
December 29, 2015
Ukraine's media: a plea for pluralism
Ukraine's media is caught between propaganda and counter-propaganda. We need to stop this black and white thinking.
By Igor Burdyga
Igor Burdyga began his career as a journalist with Interfax-Ukraine in 2007 before moving to Kommersant-Ukraine. Since the fall of 2013, he has worked as a special correspondent for Vesti.Reporter, reporting on EuroMaidan, the annexation of the Crimea and the military conflict in eastern Ukraine. Since spring 2015, he has also been a freelance correspondent for the Ukrainian edition of Deutsche Welle.
 
Over the past 15 to 20 years, progress in information technology has come to play a cruel joke on journalism. The ability to instantly report on events happening at the furthest corners of the globe has brought maximum efficiency to the profession, breaking down borders and making the world 'smaller'.

Yet this progress has resulted in information overload, allowing the media to flood people with an endless stream of news, opinions and comments, which few people are capable of digesting.

Explanatory journalism

Under these conditions, so-called 'explanatory journalism' has come to play an increasingly important role. This is journalism that tells its audience how a particular incident, phenomenon or statement impacts them personally, and how it relates to their value systems and principles.

In a pluralistic society, the commitment to a particular belief system is important for building audiences around specific media resources. Conservatives and liberals, supporters of free enterprise and socialists, supporters and opponents of migration, tend to group around the publication which best reflects their personal views.

As practice shows, this approach does not necessarily preclude editors' commitment to objectivity or accuracy, or to presenting a balanced point of view-though this is largely a matter of editors' professionalism. Nevertheless, it's difficult to imagine Libération welcoming a raise in the retirement age, the Financial Times - outrage at tax cuts for business, or even Vice News opposing the legalisation of marijuana.

But ideological bias does not transform journalism into propaganda. Rather, it promotes discussion both between different social groups and within them.

The illusion of objectivity

In over 20 years of independence, Ukraine's domestic media has never become a space for this sort of discussion. The reason? The near complete absence of active discussion in the media, as well as the inability of most Ukrainian citizens to identify the key questions facing society and to split into-at the very least-left- or right-wing, conservative or liberal, supporters of mono- or of multiculturalism.

For instance, the 'hot topics' in Ukraine's media prior to 2014 included the status of Russian language and issues relating to historical memory, such as the actions of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army during the Second World War. Most media outlets never managed to clearly crystallise their position on these topics, thereby maintaining the illusion of objectivity. As a result, Ukraine's levels of civic engagement and political culture can best be described as 'low'. This situation allows a single party platform to promise both radical market reforms and 'buckwheat' (code for food security), communism and Christian Orthodoxy.

The turbulent events of the last two years have greatly increased the level of civic consciousness in Ukraine, but, at the same time, have completely confused it from an ideological perspective. And the mass media has played a largely negative role in this matter.

Rather than determining their position on the geopolitical options, the revolution of February 2014, the annexation of Crimea or the war in the Donbas, the majority of Ukrainian media took sides on these questions depending on the interests of their owners. Rather than drawing a line in domestic politics between democrats and authoritarians, believers in the free market and statists, pacifists and militants, clerics and secularists, journalists simply divided readers into supporters and opponents of European integration-pro-Maidan and anti-Maidan, vatniki (citizens of the south-east deemed to be pro-Russian) and vyshivatniki (citizens of 'patriotic', anti-Russian views), patriots and separatists.

Instead of being a space for public discussion, Ukraine's media has become a battlefield of propaganda and counter-propaganda.

A decline of confidence

The result has been a rapid decline of public confidence in the media. According to surveys conducted by the Democratic Initiatives foundation and the Razumkov Center in July 2015, 47 per cent of Ukrainians do not have confidence in domestic media, while 45 per cent do.

In two years, Ukraine's balance of confidence/non-confidence in the media has decreased. Journalists are losing their monopoly on the distribution of information; volunteers, army officers as well as members of volunteer battalions enjoy a much higher rating of public confidence.

Many of these figures regularly post achievements and problems on Facebook, showering government officials with blame and raising morale through patriotic anecdotes. These bloggers often have more subscribers than your average online media source. Of course, posts on Facebook are far from objective, or even true. But nearly two years on from the deposing of Viktor Yanukovych, neither objectivity, nor truth are in demand. In the past 18 months, Ukrainian society has become accustomed to hysterically consuming information, which is designed to provoke an emotional rather than analytical response from its audience.

Citizens are tired of the war and the crisis, and are increasingly disillusioned with the new post-Maidan government. Thus witness the birth of two hashtags that have come to define our response to news: #zrada (#betrayal) and #peremoha (#victory).

Simple dichotomy

'I don't understand. Is this #betrayal or #victory? Help me figure it out.' This ironic comment on social media has rapidly become Ukrainian society's latest demand when it comes to the media. And as the press loses public confidence, it is left with no choice but to apply this simple dichotomy to everything happening in Ukraine.

This has turned out to not be so simple. Take the Minsk-2 peace agreement, for example, which demands not only the immediate bilateral ceasefire, extensive monitoring, prisoner release and decentralisation of power, but also early local elections in rebel-held territory. Clearly, ceasefire in the Donbas is a #victory, yet the participation of separatists in future elections can be seen as nothing other than #betrayal.

This ambiguity is clear, but Ukrainian media still remains unprepared to accept the fundamental non-homogeneity of its audience, and of society as a whole. It cannot explain to its readers why victory for one person can be considered betrayal by another. Instead, many publications prefer to alternate perspectives in an attempt to support discussion. That is, of course, if choosing between victory and betrayal can be called a discussion.

This article first appeared on Ostpol.de in translation by Dinah Zeldin. We are grateful for Ostpol's permission to repost this article here.

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 #15
TASS
December 30, 2015
Russia-Ukraine trade turnover down 80% in 2015

Trade turnover between Russia and Ukraine decreased by 80% in 2015, First Deputy Minister of Economic Development Alexey Likhachev said in an interview aired by the Rossiya-24 TV news channel on Wednesday.

"Trade turnover has already taken a beating as it will plunge by 80% by the end of 2015 compared with the "fattest" years," he said, adding that "this is the most unprecedented case of falling trade turnover with one of top 10 countries."

According to Likhachev, trade turnover is likely to go down further next year. "So far there are no good news on Russian-Ukrainian trade and economic track," he said.

On December 24, Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada (parliament) passed the law, which enables the government to impose economic sanctions against Russia. Particularly, the government will have the right to impose "a ban on foreign economic operations or their restriction" as well as abandon tariff preferences.

Ukraine's parliament passed the document in response for Russia's law "On suspension of the force of Agreement on free trade zone regarding Ukraine by the Russian Federation," which implies suspension of the force of preferential trade regime with Ukraine for preventing threats to Russia's economic stability due to implementation of the trade and economic section of the agreement on Ukraine-European Union association from January 1, 2016. On November 18, the Russian government also made a decision to impose food embargo against Ukraine starting from January 1, 2016 due to Kiev's joining anti-Russian sanctions.

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 #16
With loss of Russian market Ukraine's crisis exit prospects look bleak
By Tamara ZAMYATINA

MOSCOW, December 23. /TASS/. Ukraine's economic association with the European Union and the suspension of the free trade zone agreement between Russia and Ukraine it has entailed will not let the authorities in Kiev find a way out of a prolonged crisis, polled experts have told TASS.

Russian President Vladimir Putin on December 16 signed a decree to suspend the operation of the free trade zone agreement with Ukraine "in connection with the exclusive circumstances concerning the interests and economic security of Russia." And on Tuesday, December 22, the State Duma voted for a law to strip Ukraine of all benefits and preferences.

In November, Ukraine suspended preparations for signing an agreement of association with the European Union due to a decline in trade with its main partners - Russia and the CIS. The agreement was to take effect on December 31, 2015. On Monday, December 21, the EU-Russia-Ukraine troika exerted futile attempts to iron out trade contradictions. Putin said after the talks that when the Russian delegation proposed controversies for discussion, the chief EU delegate took her leave, dropping at the last moment: "Game Over." But it was Russia that was accused of disrupting the talks, though. Putin added: "I believe that we will get back to all these issues many more times again. We wish to mend relations with our partners - Ukraine and the European Union."

The head of the international development directorate at the Institute of Modern Development, Sergey Kulik, believes that Europe will fail to provide a worthy substitute for the Russian market despite its strongest wish to do so and the current political trend in favour of support for the authorities in Kiev. "Most Ukrainian goods fall short of the European quality standards. Moreover, the EU is unable to let Ukraine take some niches in the over-saturated European food market. In the meantime Ukraine at the moment is a mostly agrarian country," Kulik told TASS.

"With the expansion of the Ukrainian crisis most Russian experts [if not all of them] have become aware the European Union will inevitably have to pay ever greater, unexpected costs, financial in particular. And these costs will keep snowballing with the disruption of trading and economic ties between Russia and Ukraine. This explains why Brussels looked so nervous at the EU-Russia-Ukraine talks," Kulik said.

He believes that the European Union and Kiev will have to look for third countries where to market Ukrainian products: "Kiev is already in talks with Ankara on creating a free trade zone. But Turkey is a major exporter of farm produce itself. Why should Turkey import Ukrainian vegetables and animal fat? In the meantime, Ukraine in its current deplorable financial condition cannot afford to import Turkish goods."

Kulik explained why Russia was so much worried over the forthcoming economic association of Kiev and the European Union: if the current duty-free trade regimen remains in force, a flow of re-export goods may start pouring into Russia through Ukraine and the CIS countries. "Brussels refused to turn an attentive ear to Moscow's arguments. The suspension of the free trade zone with Ukraine became inevitable. It is crucial to ensure this measure should be supported by Russia's partners in the Eurasian Economic Union. Otherwise, the risk of re-export of European and Ukrainian goods through Belarus, Kazakhstan and Armenia will remain," Kulik warned.

Deputy Director of the CIS Countries Institute, Vladimir Zharikhin, has recalled that before the government coup in Kiev at the beginning of 2014 Russia had been Ukraine's number one trading and economic partner.

"Before the government coup bilateral trade stood at $40 billion a year. In Russia's overall export Ukraine accounted for several percent, while in Ukraine's export Russia's share was as large as 45%, and most of the export items were high-tech products. This explains why Ukraine's former president, Viktor Yanukovich, had paused the coming into effect of the economic part of the agreement of association with the European Union, hoping to preserve the free trade zone agreement with Russia in this way," Zharikhin has told TASS.

When they saw for themselves the specifics of trading and economic relations within the Ukraine-Russia-EU triangle, the new authorities in Kiev asked Brussels to act as a go-between to help harmonize relations with Moscow.

"But the European Union refused to take Russia's arguments into account. It disrupted the negotiations and in this way once again framed Ukraine, thereby upsetting the slightest chance it might find a way out of the current grave financial and economic turmoil," Zharikhin said.

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 #17
Gazeta.ru
December 18, 2015
Ukrainian ex-governor urges compliance with Minsk accords
Interview with Serhiy Taruta, ex-governor of Donetsk Region, by Dmitriy Kirillov in Donbass: 'In the spring we will see a new flare-up of war.' Ex-governor of Donetsk Region Serhiy Taruta on the situation in Donbass and the Minsk Agreements

The freezing of the conflict in Donbass [Donetsk Basin] is regarded as the most likely scenario, many experts in Donetsk and Kyiv [Kiev] are saying this. Gazeta.ru discussed the situation in eastern Ukraine and the fulfilment of the Minsk Agreements with Ukrainian People's Deputy Serhiy Taruta, ex-governor of Donetsk Region.

[Kirillov] People in Kyiv are saying that you made a sensational statement at the "Restoration of Donbass" forum ("Restoration of Donbass" is the Ukrainian project of Oleksandr Klymenko, the fugitive minister of taxes and duties under ex-President Yanukovych - Gazeta.ru) to the effect that Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko is not telling the public the truth and the war in the east could end in six months. Did you really say that?

[Taruta] Well, that is not exactly true. I go to all forums where a dialogue on Donbass is possible, and I discuss these matters with everyone. We have a roadmap, whether or not one person may like it, while someone else does not. And it has been accepted by Western countries and confirmed by the president of Ukraine. And if Petro Poroshenko has signed it, that means he has assumed political responsibility. Of course he did not coordinate this roadmap with the Supreme Council, but that does not remove his political responsibility.

There is an approved, coordinated plan, and therefore it is important now for our president to speak frankly and honestly. To discuss with everyone all the possible scenarios for peace to come to eastern Ukraine.

What worries me most of all at the moment is the sense that the conflict is being frozen. Our president says: "Russia, Russia, Russia!" But Russia, which has now been joined by France and Germany, says: "Wait, you are not doing your part!" And so we are now passing the blame, like passing a ball, for the fact that the Minsk process is not moving forward, but it is important to understand one simple thing: We, Ukraine, have important commitments - to adopt three laws by the end of the year. And yet I do not understand how this can happen! There is most likely no consensus around them. Yet nobody is working [in that direction] in the parliament, the president has not come along, talked about it, convinced people He should be active here, and nobody will do this job for him.

I myself am ready to help Petro Poroshenko in this matter, because I realize that if the roadmap scenario coordinated by the West is not put into practice, then as a result of the policy of freezing the conflict, in the spring we will see a new flare-up of war. That is my understanding of the situation. Heaven grant I am mistaken.

[Kirillov] But do you believe that the peace scenario is possible? That Russia will go its part of the way?

[Taruta] Let us do our part, let us "knock the ball into their pocket" and see what happens next. Of course this scenario does not suit the militants, but here the West will work with Russia to ensure that all points are fulfilled, and the OSCE has a major role in monitoring the situation. But at the moment it is simply necessary to adopt three points. Ukraine made a commitment under the Minsk-2 accords that the parliament would adopt laws on amnesty, on elections, and on the special status of these territories. Nobody has rescinded that, whether anyone likes it or not. Maybe I do not like it either, but it must be done.

It is expected that these laws will be examined and adopted by the Ukrainian parliament. But it is not even examining them, the draft laws have not gone through the committees! Our committees are a point where the situation can only heat up, but there is no alternative!

[Kirillov] Do you have contacts on the opposite side?

[Taruta] This is obligatory again now.

Do you know that once again they are not allowing the Medecins Sans Frontieres organization into Donetsk? Why not? We need an explanation! But what they are saying is really frightening.

As of today, according to the information we were given by representatives of Medecins Sans Frontieres, there is a disastrous situation there in certain penal institutions, where there is a very high level of tuberculosis infection. If this is not taken care of, in the near future we could see an outbreak of tuberculosis, and that could threaten the entire population of Donetsk Region. And that is very dangerous!

Furthermore there is a problems with an increase in the number of HIV-positive people, and things are pretty bad with medicine in general. There are cities where the ambulance only goes out to gunshot wounds. I am in constant contact with Alchevsk, that is how it is there. Ischemic disease and strokes "do not exist" there, these are the residents' personal survival problems. We must sound the alarm!

[Kirillov] Do you know who you are going to call?

[Taruta] Well, that is classified information. But there are plenty of people on the Russian side who are moderate and just plain smart.

Tuberculosis knows no borders, if the problem is not dealt with, the epidemic will spread into Russia too.

[Kirillov] I know there is a draft law in the Supreme Council on imposing a blockade of the occupied territories...

[Taruta] A draft law on the blockade of Donbass - it is scandalous! It is hardly likely to be adopted, but the very fact is bad. Some people want to please the electorate who are far removed from the conflict zone and do not understand what is happening there. It seems to me that this is more like a "Self-Help" project, and there is nothing humane about it, no humanity, no understanding of what heals and what, on the contrary, tears apart. Unfortunately, our politicians have not learned to try to glue the country together, they are trying to tear it apart again. Because with these blockades they are creating a new zone of annoyance and rejection of Ukraine.

[Kirillov] So what about the energy blockade of Crimea, then?

[Taruta] No, Crimea is an annexed territory, everything is clear in this regard, and the toolkit is completely different there. But as far as Donbass is concerned, it is, in fact, not an annexed territory, and of course you could say today that Russia has seized it, but Russia itself does not confirm this, even though it is feeding them. But then one must understand that there are 4 million people there now, 10 per cent of the country's population! So are we now going to leave 4 million people without a future, for the sake of our own political ambitions? How can one look at it this way? What signals are we giving to those people there who are waiting for the restoration of U! kraine's unity? "Ukraine has abandoned you, survive whatever way you want! Adapt to the environment that now exists in your territories, and everyone can now save his own skin as best he can!" - that is what it sounds like now.

I am sure our parliament will not adopt the law on the blockade of Donbass, but the draft law that has already been registered indicates first and foremost that we in the Supreme Council have not learned to be constructive. Once again, political preferences are placed above common sense.

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 #18
RIA Novosti
Putin's aide says new appointment shows commitment to end conflict in Ukraine

Sukhumi, 29 December: According to an aide to the Russian president, Vladislav Surkov, the appointment of Boris Gryzlov as the plenipotentiary representative in the contact group for the settlement of the situation in Ukraine attests to the seriousness of the Russia's intention to reach a settlement in 2016.

"The appointment of my old comrade, you could say, Boris Vyacheslavovich Gryzlov, to the post of plenipotentiary representative in the contact group for the settlement of the conflict in Ukraine shows that Russia and the Russian president attach very great significance to this problem and thus significantly elevate the status of our presence in this process. This attests first of all to the serious intention and decisiveness to solve this issue in the coming year one way or another," Surkov told journalists after talks with Abkhaz President Raul Khajimba [Khadzhimba].

Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed Gryzlov plenipotentiary representative of the Russian Federation in the Contact Group for Ukraine and his decision was published on the official internet portal of legal information. Gryzlov told RIA Novosti that he has been set the task to do everything necessary for the conducting of talks in conditions of a protracted internal conflict in Ukraine while proceeding from the need for complete and faithful adherence to Minsk agreements.

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 #19
Russia Insider
www.russia-insider.com
December 28, 2015
Boris Gryzlov and Ukraine: Russia brings on a Heavy-Weight
Appointment of Boris Gryzlov to represent Russia on the Contact Group brings a key Russian decision maker into the heart of the crisis.
By Alexander Mercouris

That the Russian leadership continues to accord the Ukrainian conflict the highest importance is confirmed by a very interesting appointment the Kremlin has just announced.

This is the appointment of Boris Gryzlov as Russia's representative on the so-called Contact Group.

The Contact Group was set up in June 2014 as a result of the talks in Normandy between Putin, Poroshenko, Merkel and Hollande.

Its original purpose was to help put into effect the peace plan Poroshenko was expected to announce later that month.

In the event Poroshenko's peace plan proved a major disappointment, amounting to nothing more than a demand the east Ukrainians disarm unilaterally and their leaders flee to Russia, in return for the vaguest possible promise of eventual "decentralisation", with no explanation either of what that meant or of the process whereby it would be achieved.

Unsurprisingly, Poroshenko's peace was rejected by the east Ukrainians and by the Russians (who called it - correctly - an ultimatum rather than a peace plan).  However it limped on as a sort of convenient fiction until the Battle of Debaltsevo.  The Minsk Protocol of September 2014 was supposedly an amendment of it.

Poroshenko's peace plan was replaced by the Minsk Agreement of February 2015.  Unlike Poroshenko's peace plan and the September 2014 Minsk Protocol, this is an international agreement to which Russia is a party,  which is incorporated in international law by a Security Council Resolution.

The Contact Group has however continued to function as the main venue for discussions between the militia and the Ukrainian government.  

This is so even though the Ukrainians insist that they will not negotiate with the militia, whom they call terrorists.  

The result is a bizarre situation where the person who speaks for Ukraine's government in the Contact Group - former Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma - does not formally represent Ukraine, but is supposedly there in a private capacity.

Gryzlov's appointment represents a significant upgrade of Russia's representation in the Contact Group.

What do we know of Gryzlov?  The short answer is surprisingly little, though it is possible to guess more.

Gryzlov trained as a radio engineer in Leningrad, supposedly working in the same radio electronics factory in Leningrad/St. Petersburg from 1977 to 1996.  Thereafter, and somewhat inexplicably, he emerged as a major political figure in the late 1990s, being elected to parliament in 1999.  

In March 2001 Putin appointed him Russia's Interior Minister, putting him in overall charge of Russia's police.  

As a radio engineer and plant manager Gryzlov's qualifications for the post of Interior Minister are not obvious.  However he headed the Interior Ministry during a key period.  

This was the hottest period of the war against jihadi terrorists in the Caucasus and in Russia, with Caucasian jihadi groups involved in a succession of terrorist outrages across Russia.

The Interior Ministry under Gryzlov's leadership was at the forefront of the struggle against them.

More important still, Gryzlov was also Interior Minister in overall charge of Russia's police at the time of the arrest in October 2003 of the oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky.

Khodorkovsky - like some of the other oligarchs - had contacts within the Russian security forces.

When the Russian authorities began to put together their case against Khodorkovsky it was by no means a foregone conclusion it would succeed.

That Khodorkovsky was arrested shows that Gryzlov had the police in hand, and that he is reliable.

In fact it is difficult to avoid the feeling that Gryzlov was appointed Interior Minister because Putin needed someone in charge of the police who was reliable and who could be counted on to keep the police loyal in the coming show-down with Khodorkovsky.  Gryzlov fitted the bill.

That suggests there is more to Gryzlov than there seems, and that his back story is more complex than that of a mere radio engineer.   

With Khodorkovsky safely arrested, Putin a few weeks later transferred Gryzlov from the Interior Ministry to the parliament, where in December 2003 he became Chairman of the State Duma (the lower house of Russia's parliament) and parliamentary leader of United Russia.  

Gryzlov kept these posts until September 2011.

Though less fraught task than running the Interior Ministry during a counter insurgency war and in the lead-up to Khodorkovsky's arrest, they were nonetheless key posts, keeping the parliament in hand during the potentially difficult transition period of Medvedev's Presidency.

They are again the sort of posts that are given to a reliable man.

Following Putin's decision in September 2011 to return to the  Presidency, Gryzlov quit his positions in parliament and as parliamentary leader of United Russia.

Since then, though he holds no formal post, Gryzlov continues to be a key figure in the Russian power structure.  

This is shown by the fact that he remains a permanent member of Russia's Security Council.

Russia's Security Council, though almost completely ignored in the West, is in reality Russia's key decision making body, where all major decisions are discussed and agreed.  The Security Council's 13 permanent members are the most powerful people in Russia.  Gryzlov is one of them.

The fact Gryzlov holds no other publicly disclosed position other than that of permanent member of the Security Council is not a sign he is less powerful or less important than the other 12.  Rather it suggests the work he does is secret.  

The appointment of such an important man to represent Russia on the Contact Group is a dramatic  development.

What makes this appointment even more striking is that Gryzlov has been given plenipotentiary powers.

This means that he can on his own initiative and without consulting Moscow make decisions that are binding on the Russian government.

All of this obviously begs the question of what are the reasons for this appointment?

Whilst obviously we don't know the full details, it is possible to say a number of things and to make the odd informed guess.

Firstly, Gryzlov is someone at the very top of the Russian power structure.  

As a permanent member of the Security Council he has played his part in shaping Russian policy during the Ukrainian conflict.  He will be fully familiar with all its aspects.

Over the last two years Putin has had to devote an immense amount of his time to dealing with the crisis in Ukraine.  

Gryzlov's appointment appears at least in part intended to relieve Putin of some of this burden, freeing him to give more time to deal with other matters.

Secondly, Gryzlov far outranks every other Russian official engaged on the ground in Ukraine.

This is important because Russia has suffered from the poor quality of its representatives on the ground in Ukraine.

Direct contacts with the Ukrainian government apparently happen at various levels.  However Russia's actual representative in Kiev has been Mikhail Zurabov, who is Russia's ambassador to Ukraine.

Zurabov is not a professional diplomat.  He is a liberal politician and former minister closely associated with former Finance Minister Aleksey Kudrin and Economics Minister German Gref.

Like his predecessor as Russia's ambassador to Ukraine - Yeltsin's former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomydin - Zurabov seems to have been sent to Kiev as a form of gentle exile after he fell out of favour.  This happened in 2010, at a time when Yanukovych seemed securely in control, and there seemed no need for someone able to act decisively in a crisis.

There have been many complaints about Zurabov.

He is regularly accused of excessive passivity during the Maidan protests.  He is also criticised for  his failure to put Russia's case forcefully during the fighting in the Donbass.  

Some of these criticisms may be unfair.  They take little account of how difficult the job of Russia's ambassador in Kiev must be.

However it is true that throughout the crisis Zurabov has been almost invisible, and he does seem to be  genuinely out of his depth.

The other major figure representing Russia in Ukraine - who however in typical fashion likes to act behind the scenes - is Putin's former spin-doctor and close friend and adviser, Vladislav Surkov.

Surkov is far too complex a figure to be discussed in detail here.  Suffice to say that as Putin's spin-doctor he has managed the rare feat of antagonising both sides of Russia's political divide.  He is hated equally by Russia's pro-Western liberals, and by the Communists and Russia's conservative nationalists, whilst being mistrusted it seems by everyone except Putin himself.

Amazingly Surkov has managed the same feat in Ukraine.  

The Maidan movement accuses him - falsely - of being the man behind the massacre of the protesters during the Maidan protests.  

Supporters of militia commander Strelkov accuse him of engineering the downfall of their hero.  

Supporters of the militia also accuse him of planning the betrayal of the militia and of Novorossia.

The reality is that Surkov does seem to have played an important role behind the scenes, becoming an important channel of communication between the Kremlin and the militia commanders.

The exact nature of his role however remains obscure, and it is doubtful whether he is really as important as his critics believe he is.  Even if he does entertain the plans his critics accuse him of, the fact he acts so secretly must limit his effectiveness.

Regardless, the point about Zurabov and Surkov is that Gryzlov far outranks them both.

With Gryzlov now representing Russia in the Contact Group, neither Zurabov nor Surkov any longer have an obvious role, and it is likely both will be relegated or - in Surkov's case - removed from the scene entirely before long.

As for the reasons for Gryzlov's appointment, it is surely connected to Russian frustration with the deadlock in the Minsk process.

Not only has the Ukrainian government entirely failed to carry out the political commitments it made in February in Minsk, but the military situation in the Donbass is deteriorating once more.

Gryzlov's appointment puts a strong man - and one Putin trusts - in place to deal with the situation as it deteriorates.  

With Putin feeling increasingly confident that Western interest in Ukraine in slackening, he has now brought a tough and reliable man onto the scene who can be relied upon to shape the situation in Russia's interests.

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 #20
Fort Russ
http://fortruss.blogspot.com
December 29, 2015
Ukraine Is In A State Of Confusion: West Adopts Russia's Stance on Donbass

u-f.ru
http://u-f.ru/News/u386/2015/12/29/731113
Translated by Ollie Richardson for Fort Russ

The verdict in Kiev is disappointing for the Ukrainian authorities. In particular, the former head of foreign intelligence service of Ukraine, Mykola Malomuzh, said that the West does not want to support Kiev and has almost entirely adopted the Russian strategy of resolving the crisis in Donbass. The corresponding statement of Malomuzh was made on the air of Ukrainian TV.

According to the former head of foreign intelligence service of Ukraine, this information is continually voiced in various European forums, but not at the official level.

"I, visiting international forums in London, Monaco and other countries of the world over the past year and three months, have seen the trend of a reduced interest in Ukraine," said Malomuzh.

He also noted that the West is not going to help Kiev to regain control over the territory of Donbass, and instead offers to solve the problem using ways based on the maturity of the conflict, the conducting of elections and the liberation from militias.

"I mean, the script is almost Russian... It (Russia - ed.) managed to achieve all this, despite painful pressure, and thus this format of anti-terrorist operations are akin to the format of the world," said the Ukrainian representative."

According to Malomuzh, at the moment there is a gradual retreat of the West from the previously given political position on Ukraine. At the informal level there is the question about the end of the problem, but we are not talking about establishing the boundaries of Kiev, but the question of granting special rights to the population of Donbass.

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 #21
AP
December 28, 2015
Crimeans Enter 2016 Struggling, but Optimistic

SEVASTOPOL, Crimea - As New Year's Eve approaches, the central square of Crimea's largest city is festooned with bright festive decorations, including a soaring artificial tree that flashes and winks. But areas just a few steps away are sunk in darkness, the street lamps turned off because of an electricity shortage.

Sevastopol and the rest of Crimea are slowly recovering from a blackout that hit the Russia-annexed peninsula in late November when unidentified attackers blew up pylons of the lines from mainland Ukraine that supplied nearly all its electricity. The blackout underscored how dependent Crimea remained on Ukraine, which lost control of the Black Sea Peninsula in March 2014. Following the ouster of Ukraine's former Russia-friendly president, Moscow sent in troops to take over the mostly Russian-speaking region and annexed it after a hastily-called referendum.

For about two weeks after the pylon bombing, the peninsula's 2 million people were almost entirely without power, and critical establishments such as hospitals relied on their own emergency generators. Conditions eased somewhat after Ukraine restored one of the power lines and after the first of several underwater electricity cables from Russia went into service. That so-called "energy bridge" had been under development before the blackout.

While Ukrainian nationalists and Crimean Tatars who oppose Russian annexation vengefully cheered the blackout, most of Crimea's people appear to see it as confirmation they did the right thing by voting to split off from Ukraine.

Businessman Artyom Kryuchkov said he and his wife had to buy an electric generator and stand in lines to get petrol. But the hardships did not make him or his family want to go back to Ukraine.

"The two-week long black-out brought us closer to each other," Kryuchkov said.

"By punishing Crimeans, Ukrainian officials have lost Crimea and played right into Putin's hands," Andrei Kolesnikov of the Moscow Carnegie Center said in a recent article. "By pursuing revenge against the regime they have hurt ordinary people instead. This will only make the regime stronger, and the besieged fortress will become even more besieged."

Crimea faces an array of problems, including a severe decline in tourism, a key piece of its economy. Crimea's tourism minister, Sergei Strelbitsky, bragged in October that some 4 million people had come to the region's beaches and mountains in 2015 - but that's far below the 5.7 to 6 million recorded in the two years preceding the annexation.

Many residents complain that the region is poorly run.

"The main negative thing is the work of local authorities: heaps of garbage around, bad roads and the inability or unwillingness (of officials) to tackle the issues," Kryuchkov said.

While local schools and hospitals have received expensive equipment and funds for refurbishment from Russia in recent months, Moscow's investment in Crimea is not evident when driving on Crimea's potholed roads or walking by crumbling building facades.

In December, Crimean Governor Sergei Aksyonov complained that Moscow had not sent "a single kopeck" from the billions it had promised. Aksyonov accused the government of seeking too much control over how the peninsula spends the money. Russian state news agencies in turn quoted an unnamed government source saying that Moscow has sent 2 billion rubles ($28 million) to Crimea, but that local authorities simply don't know what to do with it.

Foreign investors fled after the peninsula was slapped with Western economic sanctions, casting doubt on the region's future. Major Russian companies including cell phone operators, oil firms and banks closed their branches in Crimea fearing the backlash of Western sanctions, leaving the region's banking and telecommunications to obscure private-owned firms.

These days, even ardent supporters of the annexation like former Sevastopol mayor Alexei Chaly admit that federal incentives to restart the economy, such as a plan to establish a free economic zone in Sevastopol, have failed.

"Sea, warm climate, a free economic zone - that's an advantage," Chaly, speaker of the Sevastopol parliament, said in an interview with the RIA Novosti news agency last week. "But the disadvantages are the collapsed infrastructure and an unpredictable government."

But Kryuchkov and his wife, who both work in tourism, are somewhat optimistic.

"The prices are going up, we see lots of problems with getting new documents, the banks are still few in number," Olga Kryuchkova said. "But for people who went through the 1990s it's nothing. We've seen worse times."

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 #22
Russia starts laying second optical fiber cable to Crimea across Kerch Strait - minister

SIMFEROPOL, December 28. /TASS/. Russia has started laying the second optical fiber cable from mainland Russia's Krasnodar Territory to the Crimean Peninsula across the Kerch Strait, Communications and Mass Media Minister Nikolay Nikiforov said on Tuesday.

"We are in the process of laying a second cable. There may be more follow-up projects in the longer term," Nikiforov said.

He recalled that on the very first day of Crimea's reunification with Russia all radio communication channels with the peninsula went dead.

"But as soon as April 2014 the laying of a cable under the sea was completed within a record-tight deadline. The cable across the Kerch Strait has reliably linked Russia's Krasnodar Territory and all mainland Russia with the territory of the Crimean Federal District," Nikoforov said.

He is certain that the second cable will provide the peninsula with a stable communication link.

The head of the Crimean Republic Sergey Aksyonov said Crimea would now be able to stop using Ukraine's communication services.

"We have repeatedly heard people's proposals for disconnecting our communication system from Ukraine. From there we get a relatively small amount of Internet traffic, about 15%-20%. Now we can say that we are fully independent," Aksyonov said.

Ukrainian media last week quoted one of the organizers of the so-called food and energy blockade of Crimea, the peninsula's former deputy prime-minister, Lenur Islyamov, as saying Crimea would be disconnected from Ukraine's Internet resources and other communication systems. Aksyonov said the Internet blockade the Ukrainian radicals had warned to establish would cause a temporary loss of no more than 20% of the traffic.

"We have an optical fiber cable from the mainland. There is no risk. In the worst case we may lose up to 20% of Internet traffic we received from minor providers," Aksyonov said on December 28.

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 #23
New York Times
December 28, 2015
Ending Crimea's Isolation
By DIMITER KENAROV
Dimiter Kenarov is a freelance journalist covering the Balkans and the Black Sea region. His work is partly supported by The Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting.

Once a peninsula, Crimea has become an island. For nearly two years, the territory has been unrecognized, cut off from the mainland by a militarized border, embargoed and mostly forgotten by the international community and the media. The early optimism of some Crimeans that Russia would quickly integrate the peninsula and turn it into a showcase territory has evaporated.

Last year, the Russian writer Leonid Kaganov said that the annexation of Crimea was like stealing an expensive cellphone without its charger. He was proved right. The full scale of Crimea's isolation became apparent recently: On Nov. 22, Ukrainian nationalists and Crimean Tatar activists sabotaged four power lines feeding Crimea with electricity from Ukraine, plunging the peninsula - and its two million residents - into darkness. This untenable situation has dragged on for over a month and even though power has been mostly restored, the overall state of affairs is still precarious.

Emboldened by the havoc of the electricity crisis, Ukraine's prime minister, Arseniy P. Yatsenyuk, announced on Dec. 16 that his country would halt trade with Crimea by mid-January and leave future electricity supply an open question.

Crimea's economy can hardly afford any more isolation. Although Russia raised pensions and salaries in the local government and state-run companies after annexation, these gains have been erased by high inflation, a weak ruble and soaring costs of basic commodities because of the disruption of regular supply routes. Many private businesses are in shambles and the sun-drenched tourist season along the coastline - a mainstay of the Crimean economy since Soviet times - has become a pale shadow of its former self.

The few foreign visitors these days seem to be hapless representatives of European fringe parties seeking publicity, old pals of the Russian president, Vladimir V. Putin, like Silvio Berlusconi, and dazed-and-confused celebrities like the veteran American boxer Roy Jones Jr. At the same time, Crimea has experienced an exodus of young professionals. Sick and tired of the island life, they have decided to seek better fortunes in Ukrainian cities like Kiev and Lviv or the big cities of Western Europe.

Geographically and politically secluded, blithely unaccountable to the outside world and sometimes even to Moscow, Crimea has become the perfect breeding ground for large-scale corruption, profiteering and human rights violations - a kind of black site, inaccessible to international monitoring organizations and beyond the reach of law. Crimea was run as a fief of local oligarchs and Mafia bosses for decades before the 2014 crisis, but the situation today is even bleaker, a result of rabid nationalism and divisive politics.

The Crimean Tatars, the indigenous minority that has consistently opposed Russian rule, have been especially hard hit. Russian authorities have seized the headquarters of their governing body, the Mejlis, banned two Tatar leaders from visiting the peninsula and refused to renew the license of the Crimean Tatar television channel. At the same time, prominent members of the community have been subjected to harassment and intimidation. The Crimean Tatar activists who blew up the power lines last month did so while calling for the release of political prisoners and the end of political repression.

What is the solution to the Crimean crisis? The authorities in Kiev, as well as many foreign governments, refuse to recognize the annexation of Crimea and insist that the peninsula return to within Ukraine's borders. At the same time that Prime Minister Yatsenyuk promises to cut off trade, President Petro O. Poroshenko is suggesting that the prospect of Ukrainian visa-free travel to the European Union will lure Crimeans back into Kiev's arms. It's a carrot-and-stick strategy that aims to make the living situation in Crimea as bleak as possible, while presenting Kiev as a future beacon of light. These tactics have little chance of success.

On a visit to Kiev earlier this month, Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. announced: "The United States does not, has not, never will recognize Russia's attempt to annex Crimea."

But Russia has already annexed Crimea. The takeover of the peninsula was duplicitous, and the March 2014 referendum was hardly fair, but there is no turning back. Had Russia unofficially occupied Crimea, as it did with Moldova's Transnistria and Georgia's Abkhazia and South Ossetia, there might still have been hope. But anyone who believes the Kremlin will relinquish its claim on Crimea because of a blockade, or that a majority of Crimeans will peacefully agree to return to being Ukrainian citizens is delusional or a demagogue. Crimea may be a millstone around Russia's neck, but it is also a crown jewel that it will guard at all costs. The peninsula will leave Moscow's control only if the Russian Federation itself falls apart.

Many politicians recognize this in private yet do not dare say it out loud. Sooner or later, however, Ukraine and the international community need to come to terms with the facts. Keeping the peninsula in darkness and isolation, slowly strangling it, will certainly not deter Mr. Putin. It will only create another frozen conflict zone in the Black Sea region, allow criminal networks to flourish with impunity and provide convenient cover for continuing human rights violations.

Settling the fait accompli status of Crimea is still a political taboo. Kiev cannot easily forgive the violence that Russia has committed against eastern Ukraine. There are fears that recognizing Russia's claim to Crimea would be construed as appeasement and could green-light the invasion of other regions in Russia's "near abroad."

But Crimea is a special case historically, geographically and politically. It is more than just a territory for Russia. It is part of a myth, a source of identity, a place that was once known as "the garden of the empire." Understanding that Crimea's return is the only nonnegotiable issue for Moscow, and accepting that politics is the art of the possible, opening international talks on the recognition of Crimea's de facto Russian status may be the only realistic solution.

This may prove the most productive way to compel Moscow to fully cooperate on much thornier issues, like eastern Ukraine, and free Kiev to focus more fully on internal reforms. It could also lead to improvement of the human rights situation in Crimea itself by opening up the peninsula to the world (including monitoring organizations) and negotiating with the Russian government toward a strict and detailed road map for safeguarding the cultural and political rights of local minorities. Leaving the situation to fester in the darkness for another 10 or 20 years, turning Crimea into another Cuba, would not benefit anyone, Ukrainians, Russians, or least of all, Crimeans themselves.

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 #24
Pravda.ru
December 29, 2015
Crimea recovering after decades in Ukraine's oblivion - Polish official
Interview taken by Dmitry Babich

Janusz Korwin-Mikke is a Polish deputy of the European Parliament. For years he has the label of an "ultra right" politician attached to him, even though the parties headed by him never have extremist names. During his initial success two years ago, Mr. Korwin-Mikke's party was named The New Right. Now Mr. Korwin-Mikke is the leader of the Coalition for Renovation of Poland "Freedom and Hope" (the Polish abbreviation for the name of this political movement is KORWIN). He took part in the Polish presidential election in 2015, getting 486 votes. Mr. Korwin-Mikke is known for his independent political views, last month he made a trip to Crimea, braving the EU's restriction. He later faced a lot of criticism for that trip from both the Polish and the Ukrainian authorities. Dmitry Babich talked to Mr. Korwin-Mikke about his opinions on the future of the Russo-Polish and Polish-Ukrainian relations, as well as on the future of Poland inside the EU.

Q: "Mr. Korwin, what was your main impression about your trip to Crimea?"

"Crimea is a great place, but it is visibly underinvested. It is visible, that the place has not been getting sufficient money injections for at least 15 years. So, my prescription for Crimea is just more investment and more free market. If Putin really manages to get a free economic zone installed there, that would do the locals a great service."

Q: "How did people react to the recent changes, when Crimea stopped to be a part of Ukraine and became a part of Russia?"

"About half of the people whom I met in the street were optimists. They said life became much better, they viewed Russia as a better manager of their territory than Ukraine. The other half were somewhat less enthusiastic, they said something like: "Yes, in some ways life is better, but there are new problems." But I did not meet anyone who would say life is worse now than it was under Ukraine. I must add, though, that I probably did not have enough exposure to the Crimean Tatars. There were three persons from the local Tatars' public organizations, and they sounded pretty satisfied with Russia's performance. OK, I realize that they don't represent the bulk of the Crimean Tatar people. The real picture may be a lot more nuanced."

Q: "What was the attitude of the people in Crimea to Ukraine's energy blockade of their peninsula? Were you in Crimea when there was an electricity shortage caused by the destruction of the energy lines by the Ukrainian nationalists and the so called "Crimean Tatar activists"?"

"This energy blockade was condemned by everyone. And even those Crimean Tatars which were initially pro-Ukrainian became pro-Russian as a result of this blockade from the side of Ukraine. As a result of its inability to stop the illegal actions of the "activists," the Ukrainian government further lost in the opinion of the people in Crimea."

Q: "You are known for the independence of your opinions, for your ability to counter the so called mainstream views in your native Poland. Right now one of the strongest stereotypes in the Polish media is the positive view of the Maidan revolution in Ukraine. The Polish media try to present it as a positive event, writing off all of the subsequent horrors on the "Russian aggression" and the endemic corruption of the Ukrainian state. What is your take on Maidan?"

"I don't share the mainstream media's illusions about this event. First, it was a very violent revolution, dozens of people got killed. Second, its consequences are not going to be good for Poland. When I publicly questioned the wisdom for Poland of giving full support to the protesters, I was blasted by the Polish media. But who else was guilty of the murder of the two dozen policemen and probably of about sixty civilians? The Polish media did not want to look for the answer, they just accused me of being on the payroll of "Putin's propaganda."

Q: "But why do you think the coming to power of Ukrainian nationalists in Kiev was not good for Poland? The Polish mainstream media viewed the victory of Poroshenko as something that would strengthen Ukraine's independence and Poland's security..."

"The media and the public opinion in Poland have a somewhat outdated vision of what the Ukrainian independence is. They have similar misconceptions about, say, the Lithuanian independence. Poles still view Ukraine, Lithuania or Belarus through the prism of "liberating" these countries from Russia's yoke. This could make sense in the Soviet times, but it does not make sense now. Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus are now indeed independent countries. And as new independent countries they have some scores to settle with Poland. Ukrainian nationalists have some territorial claims against Poland, even if the Ukrainian state does not announce it officially. We should not forget that the supporters of  [the pro-Nazi Ukrainian nationalist leader of the 1940s Stepan] Bandera killed thousands of Poles in 1943 and 1944. So, under the new nationalist leadership Ukraine becomes a potential enemy of Poland. In this situation, Poland's relations with Russia may be built on the principle "an enemy of my enemy is my friend." We should probably be grateful to the Russian president Putin for the fact that Ukraine keeps most of its troops in its eastern borderlands, and not on the border with Poland."

Q: "This is a logical view, but it is rare to hear from politicians in Poland..."

"There are some Polish politicians who hate Russia even more than they love Poland. I don't belong to their group. I love Poland before anything else."

Q: "But don't you think that the statements of the Polish foreign minister Witold Waszczikowski go against this policy line? Waszczikowski said earlier this year that he "did not understand what Russian athletes were doing at international sport events." He also added that he did not understand what Russian students were doing in European universities..."

"Waszczikowski is a troubled spirit, and I think in the near future he will have his hands full distributing diplomatic positions among various people. He is just glad his party (Law and Justice - PiS in Polish abbreviation) won the election."

Q: "Do you share the view of some European experts that the government controlled by the Polish nationalists from PiS will be dangerous for Poland?"

"I would not really give the name of the Polish nationalists to all of these people from PiS or from the Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska - PO, the second biggest party in Poland). PiS is rather pro-American, while PO was more, like, pro-German. But I have doubts about them really defending the Polish national interests.  The foundations of their policies are shaky. They are hooked to the EU, and I won't be surprised if the EU ceases to exist in a few years.  Polish policy should be founded on a more sophisticated network of alliances than just throwing our lot together with the EU."

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 #25
BBC
December 28, 2015
Ukraine's traumatised soldiers struggle with civilian life
By David Stern
BBC News, Kiev

Sergiy Goptarev says he wants to leave his time fighting in eastern Ukraine behind him. But he is finding it difficult. The memories arrive like uninvited visitors.
Now a civilian, he can be seized by an anxiety attack when he goes past a wooded area on public transport. He is gripped by the fear that fighters could spring from the trees and attack.

The war in the east against pro-Russian militants is the first on Ukrainian territory since World War Two. Tens of thousands of the country's citizens have served in a conflict that has left some 9,000 people dead and more than 20,000 wounded, according to the UN.

Untold numbers, like Sergiy, have lingering psychological wounds.

Bad memories

Sergiy was drafted and fought for four months at the end of last year in the east. His unit kept open a vital supply line to soldiers fighting at Donetsk airport, at the height of one of the conflict's most vicious battles.

"We did everything we could to help them," he says.

Sergiy is back home now, having received his discharge at the beginning of the year.

The bad memories come at night. "I don't sleep much, three to four hours," he says. "I wake up and I can't remember if I dreamed something or not. But I have this feeling as if I fell from somewhere.

"I lie there, not understanding what happened. This lasts about 15 seconds, and then I understand that everything's okay," he adds. But after that he finds it hard to get back to sleep.

The condition that he and his comrades suffer from is commonly called post-traumatic stress disorder, or PTSD.

For much of Ukrainian society it is not a familiar condition. And that goes for the soldiers too.

During the Soviet era, there was some recognition of what was called "Afghan syndrome" among veterans of the 10-year war that began in 1979, but few understood actually what was involved, and how it could be treated.
--

Post-traumatic stress disorder

PTSD is an anxiety disorder caused by witnessing or being involved in a frightening or distressing event.

Any traumatic event has the potential to lead to PTSD.

How is PTSD diagnosed?

Trauma of migrant crisis takes its toll on mental health

The 'living nightmare' of PTSD

UK National Health Service: Causes and treatment of PTSD

US National Institute of Mental Health: What is PTSD?
--

Symptoms of PTSD can include depression, sudden eruptions of anger, heavy drinking or sleeplessness.

In the most serious instances, soldiers can harm themselves or those closest to them.

Mental health workers speak of an increase in domestic violence, although there are no statistics to confirm this, and it is difficult to establish a direct causal link to PTSD.

The soldiers are loath to admit that they are suffering emotionally.

Among Ukrainian men there is a general attitude that to acknowledge personal difficulties is tantamount to saying that you are weak.

"When our tooth hurts, we go to a dentist," says Vladimir Nezenets, a psychological therapist. "When we have emotional problems, we grab a bottle of vodka."

Vladimir, himself a veteran of the war in the East, believes every fighter returning from the front exhibits some form of PTSD. "They all are suffering - it's just a matter of degree. And this depends largely to what extent the person was psychologically prepared for what would come," he says.

The scale of the problem seems to have left the authorities scrambling, though. Vladimir and other health workers say the government's response so far has fallen way short of what is needed, with only a handful of clinics and specialists providing assistance.

Canine therapy

Parliament deputies recently voted to set up universal testing for all fighters returning from the front, but many question whether this is feasible.

Consequently, civic organisations have stepped in to fill in the gaps.

Vladimir is associated with a non-profit group called Hero's Companion - which works with Canadian and German organisations - that trains dogs to be round-the-clock helpers to the veterans.

The dogs do small tasks, or are a calming influence. If a PTSD sufferer has a panic attack, the dog will lay his head on the soldier's lap, or even lie on him.

The dogs are still being trained for their individual assignments. But some veterans meet in informal sessions with regular dogs, which Hero's Companion activists say also has a positive stimulus.

"We had fighters from the 95th brigade here and they played and lay on the grass with the dogs," said Anatoly Trubchaninov, one of the group's directors, at their kennel-base outside Kiev. "They came as serious, severe men, and left here smiling like little children."

Sergiy Goptarev finds assistance with a group called Palm of an Angel, which organises therapy through art classes, as well as concerts, fishing and horseback riding.

Recently, he and five other former soldiers gathered in the main building of a Soviet-era holiday camp near Kiev. They beat sticks together, sang upbeat songs and painted patriotic images on t-shirts.

Life is still hard for the veterans and Sergiy, who is now unemployed, spends much of his time at home surfing the internet.

But their memories and personal worries, at least for that moment, were put aside.

"The therapy helps distract you," Sergiy said. "When you do something fun, it brings a smile to your face and creates positive emotions."

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 #26
Daily Telegraph (UK)
December 29, 2015
Inflation hits 44pc in Ukraine amid economic collapse
War-torn economy sees prices soar as it plans to ease capital controls following IMF bail-out
By Mehreen Khan
[Charts here http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/12072614/Inflation-hits-44pc-in-Ukraine-amid-economic-collapse.html]

Inflation will hit 44pc in Ukraine this year, as the embattled economy has seen prices soar amid economic collapse.

Consumer prices have hit eye-watering levels in 2015, according to the country's central bank governor. Inflation averaged 24.9pc in 2014.

Valeria Gontareva, of the National Bank of Ukraine, said authorities were aiming to get inflation to around 5pc by 2019.

The war-torn economy, which has been plunged into crisis following conflict with neighbouring giant Russia, will also start to gradually lift capital controls as it begins to receive disbursements of bail-out cash from international lenders, said Ms Gontareva.

Ukraine is set to receive around $9bn in rescue cash in 2016, including $4.5bn from the International Monetary Fund, $1.5bn from the EU, and $1bn loan guarantee from the United States, which will be released in the first quarter of next year.

The economy has also lumbered under capital controls which limit the purchasing of foreign exchange in a bid to protect the collapsing value of the hryvnia.

Bail-out cash will also help boost Ukraine's dwindling foreign exchange reserves, which have steadily grown over the last months to stand at $13.3bn in December.

Ukraine has been locked in a stalemate with Moscow over the repayment of a $3bn bond. Kiev defaulted on the debt earlier this month after Russian authorities refused to take part in a private sector debt haircut.

The issue has also stoked tensions with the IMF in Washington, which changed its lending rules to continue providing aid to governments who fall into arrears.

But Ukraine's central bank chief said there was now no "hindrance" to the release of IMF aid to the country in 2016.

"The IMF mission has agreed everything, they don't need to come to Kiev anymore."

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 #27
Ukraine Today
http://uatoday.tv
December 29, 2015
Agrarian rally spreads throughout Ukraine

Farmers furious about tax changes enacted by nation's lawmakers before winter recess

Ukrainian farmers are staging dozens of rallies nationwide and blocking roads to protest against change in taxation enacted into law by deputies before their holiday recess.

The angry farmers and their supporters are demanding simplified tax system and special VAT rules for the agricultural sector in 2016, something the budget for 2016 lacks.

Read also Residents of Kryvyi Rih gather to protest against local election fraud

Hundreds of agrarian workers protested to no avail outside parliament before the new budget was passed, paid their 'respects' to a dead pig with a sticker on his body, reading "Tax reforms are death to business."

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 #28
https://davidrmarples.wordpress.com
December 28, 2015
Ukraine's Quest for Survival: a Review of 2015
By David Marples
David Marples is a Canadian historian and Distinguished University Professor at Department of History & Classics, University of Alberta.

A year that began with the battle of Debaltseve in Ukraine ended with more centrally based conflicts inside the Parliament. The contrast is symbolic: the main problems for Ukraine may now lie within the heart of the country rather than from the Russian-supported separatist regimes in Donetsk and Luhansk.

The Debaltseve conflict, which saw the separatists capture the key town linking Donetsk and Luhansk in February, threatened to unhinge the Minsk-2 agreement, a bizarre series of negotiations that had seen Ukraine represented by a disgraced former president, Leonid Kuchma, and which were presided over by a self-proclaimed dictator, Aliaksandr Lukashenka of Belarus. The agreement anticipated the impossible, namely that Ukraine would be in control of its eastern borders by the end of 2015.

It also promised regional decentralization without formally recognizing the two breakaway "republics," the leaders of which were signatories of Minsk-2. The year also saw what has been termed "Decommunization," ending with the disbandment of the Communist Party of Ukraine, itself a rehash of the original Soviet party headed for many years by Petro Shelest and Volodymyr Shcherbyts'kyi.

The introduction of four laws that were approved by President Petro Poroshenko in May also laid the groundwork for the eradication of Communist memory-alternatively Soviet memory-with the removal of Lenin statues and the prospective changes of hundreds of towns, villages, and streets. It also defined the so-called "fighters for the independence of Ukraine" in the 20th century, with nebulous punishments decreed for those besmirching the reputation of these organizations and their leaders.

The Parliament in theory is a united assembly, comprised mostly of the leaders of the ruling coalition made up of President Poroshenko and Arsenii Yatsenyuk and their respective followers (the Radical Party left the coalition on September 1). Smaller groups include some remnants of the Regions Party, no longer officially affiliated, but essentially there is no official opposition. Ostensibly the goal is structural reforms, and already there have been some positive results, such as the creation of a US-supported new police force. Other programs have made slower progress, generally blamed on the continuing prevalence of oligarchs.

In late May, Poroshenko made an intriguing addition to the political leadership with the appointment of former Georgian president Mikael Saakashvili as governor of Odesa, possibly the most corrupt region of Ukraine. The move was seen as a direct affront to one of Saakashvili's worst enemies, Russian president Vladimir Putin. But it actually served to undermine the ruling coalition as became evident by the end of the year.

In the background to these political events was a struggling economy and the virtual collapse of the national currency against the dollar. A much-needed IMF loan came with demands for reforms, the raising of domestic gas prices, and a stringent budget for 2016 that was passed toward the very end of the year. Beyond the ruling coalition, the hard right forces organized demonstrations in Kyiv, culminating in a major protest against autonomy for the eastern regions at the end of August. Grenades were thrown by demonstrators killing several people and injuring dozens, including 90 police, and the culprits evidently were members of the Radical and Svoboda parties. The bill attained a majority in the parliament notwithstanding.

But it was the December events in Kyiv that will remain in the minds of many, largely because of their visual transmission through social media. On December 11, as Yatsenyuk ended his question time period in Parliament, Oleg Bama, an MP from the Poroshenko faction, approached the podium bearing a bunch of red roses. As the bemused Prime Minister accepted them, he was hoisted into the air by Bama who tried to drag him from the podium. Yatsenyuk attained the antithesis of the sort of images sought by current Russian leaders, by clinging to the podium without dropping the flowers. Poroshenko condemned the attack, but the damage was done.

Much was made by analysts of the typical parliamentary "circus" but few observed that during the ensuing brawl, there were no Regions Party MPs and no Communists. The pugilists were almost all supporters of Euromaidan and mostly pro-Western politicians.

Three days later at the Council for Reforms, the Azeri-born Interior Minister Arsen Avakov was addressing the assembly. Sakaashvili, seated prominently at the front of the room shouted out that he (Avakov) was a thief. Avakov did not take the insult lightly, resorting to obscenities and demanding that Sakaashvili should "get the hell out of my country." Sakaashvili elected to stay, rising to his feet with staccato attacks on the speaker, who then responded by flinging the contents of a bottle of water at the former Georgian leader. Yatsenyuk further demeaned himself by joining in the attacks on Sakaashvili.

Opinion polls in Ukraine suggest that Sakaashvili is now the most popular political leader in Ukraine, and a potential replacement for the unpopular Yatsenyuk as Prime Minister. In fact in an open contest he would also beat his old friend, the president, quite convincingly. Other politicians such as Finance Minister Natalia Jaresko, came to the defence of Yatsenyuk, whom Sakaashvili maintains is deeply enmeshed in corruption, including in the latter's new home of Odesa.

The two events demonstrate a deep rift within the ruling coalition. Only the two leaders of each branch remain civil to each other. Sakaashvili's appointment is simply a catalyst since the fiery politician can be counted upon to inflame feelings by his uncompromising attitude and Boris Yeltsin-style populism. Just as Yeltsin was initially removed from his post as Moscow city leader by Gorbachev in 1987 after his attacks on corruption in the city, so Sakaashvili could also find his new career cut short. Alternatively (and also like Yeltsin after 1989), he could rise to the very top in Ukraine, which would mean the end of the post-Euromaidan coalition.

Neither option should be entirely surprising. Ukraine's political leaders since independence have been former Communists or oligarchs, and sometimes both. Only Viktor Yushchenko could be termed a national reformer but his tenure was marred by political in-fighting and a miserable record on all fronts. His comments in late December blaming Yulia Tymoshenko for all his troubles only illustrate his continuing self-deception. It is precisely because of the records of former and current leaders that the prospect of Sakaashvili appears so enticing and the reason why some respected analysts are calling for a new Euromaidan. But both these "solutions" would constitute major disasters.

The country requires a period of sustained stability, which is best served by the ruling coalition. Poroshenko needs to support his ailing Prime Minister, rather than sit on the sidelines. Neither figure may survive in the long term, but at present they are the elected leaders and best placed to attain reforms-their own business interests notwithstanding.

As Joerg Forbrig of the German Marshall Fund has commented, Ukraine is "flirting with political suicide" and one can no longer simply lay all the blame on Russia and Putin. The east and the success of the peace process remains in question, but it would only be exacerbated by an internecine conflict within the Kyiv leadership. Two years of turmoil and warfare, as well as the loss of Crimea, have taken their toll. The watchwords for 2016 should be compromise and survival, rather than confrontation and revolution. The survival of Ukraine depends on it.

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 #29
www.telesurtv.net
December 28, 2015
Russia Says Ukraine Preparing Military Offensive in Donbass

The Russian Foreign Ministry said the Kiev government was planning a military operation against rebels in the Donbass region with the knowledge of the EU.

The Ukrainian government is preparing a military operation in the rebel-held region of Donbass in the country's east, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov claims, adding that the European Union was aware of these plans, which will further destabilize the country.

"Europe more and more understands what is going on, including the new attempt of the Kiev authorities to use military force - and such plans are being nurtured," Lavrov said according to the Russian-based media outlet Interfax. "The initiating military actions by Kiev would have severe, tragic consequences, especially for the Ukrainian people."

Europe and the United States claim that the rebels in Donbass are supported by the Russian government, which Moscow denies. The rebels say that they are seeking self-rule after the people in the eastern Ukraine rejected the coup that took place last year against the Russian-allied president.

Lavrov also said that European politicians say one thing to him in private that contradicts what they say in public about the situation in Ukraine.

"Alone, most of EU members tell me things I find quite sensible: that it was wrong to confront Russia over Ukraine, which, in fact, fell victim to this European Union policy that forced it to chose between the two," the minister said in an interview.

The new government in Ukraine, led by Western-backed Petro Poroshenko, is seeking to join the EU and NATO in an attempt to defend the country from what it calls a westward Russian expansion.

Following the coup against President Viktor Yanukovych, which some refer to as the Ukrainian revolution, people in Donbass and Crimea rejected ousting Yanukovych and the new government.

Rebels took over the Crimea region in eastern Ukraine and held a referendum on rejoining Russia. The referendum won and Crimea was reunified with Russia. The U.S. and the EU claimed the Crimea rebels were also supported by Russia, which Moscow flatly denies.

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 #30
Interfax-Ukraine
December 29, 2015
Situation in Kominternove remains tense, village occupied by Russian military men

The situation in the militants-occupied village of Kominternove near Mariupol that is a part of so-called 'grey zone' remains stable and tense, representative of the Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukrainian Defense Ministry Vadym Skibitsky said.

"Today the situation in Kominternove is stable and tense. There is a company of the ninth separate infantry regiment of the first army corps in a number of 80-100 people. A part of them are masked as civilians and pretend to be the local population," he said at a briefing in Kyiv on Tuesday adding that this was a unit of Russian Armed Forces.

Skibitsky reported that as of Tuesday, the enemy withdrew a part of the hardware from the village that according to him is kind of show-off and provocations.

"Actions of the Russian side - units of the first army corps - are of demonstrative character. This provocation aimed at making ATO forces to respond to brought machinery and to provoke open fire and counter-offensive. It might be used by the Russian party to accuse Ukraine of the breach of Minsk Agreements," the directorate's representative said adding that Ukrainian anti-terrorist operation forces refrained from a response to this attack.

"With no results achieved, Russian militants were instructed by the curators, changed their uniform into the civilian one and the guise of local residents testified to OSCE observers about periodic entrance of Ukrainian Armed Forces into Kominternove," Skibitsky said.

He noted that today the militants hold "preventive conversations" with the local population.

The intelligence service also said that on December 27 there was another provocation in this residential area, when Russian media reported that place with OSCE Special Monitoring Mission and Joint Coordination Center for Ceasefire Monitoring was shelled by the sniper.

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 #31
www.rt.com
December 23, 2015
Caught in the act: German state channel accused of faking Russian soldiers in Ukraine
[Video here https://www.rt.com/news/326902-germany-fake-documentary-ukraine/]

A Russian television channel alleges a German state broadcaster hired actors to show Russian involvement in the eastern Ukraine conflict. The scandal centers around a Russian 'volunteer' paid by the German company to say he was fighting in Ukraine.

The documentary film, entitled 'Strongman Putin' produced by ZDF, suggests many Russians are fighting for the separatists opposed to the Kiev government. However, holes in the channel's story start to open immediately, such as the Ukrainian flag being visible on the soldier's uniforms.

However, this was nothing in comparison to the lengths they went to in order to find a hero for their story, the Russia 1 TV channel found out.

"Igor is a volunteer for the separatist fighters, a fact which he is proud of," the documentary by ZDF says.

The only problem was 'Igor' was in fact an unemployed 27-year-old from Kaliningrad, Yury Lobyskin, who had never joined the separatists.

"A German journalist called Dietmar came to see me as well as a film crew from Germany and said 'let's film a documentary about you' saying that you went from Kaliningrad to Donetsk to fight for the separatists," Lobyskin admitted. 'Dietmar' is ZDF political observer Dietmar Schumann, the Rossiya 1 report states.

"[Dietmar] said to me that they needed me to say that I was wounded, despite the fact that I have never be wounded. Firstly they took me to Moscow and then two hours later I was in Rostov."

Lobyskin was met at the airport by the German channel's Russian speaking producer Valery Bobkov, who offered Yury 50,000 rubles (some $700 at current rate) to take part in the documentary. He was taken to the Donbass region where the conflict was taking place and instructed what to say.

"[Bobkov] trained me for three or four days. He told me exactly what to say and encouraged me to write things down," Lobyskin said.

The fact that Yury had never been near an army was instantly visible, as he had to be told what to do on numerous occasions, such as how to walk properly with a gun. One episode where he stopped a car at a checkpoint had to be repeated three times before the film crew got the shot they were looking for. The ZDF documentary even suggested that Yury had been paid 25,000 rubles a month to fight as a separatist and had left his 'wife' and 'young child' back in Kaliningrad.

"[Bobkov] found a girl and paid her 2-3,000 rubles and asked her to play the role of my wife. I don't have any children and I had never seen this girl before."

Despite its criticisms of Russian President Vladimir Putin, the documentary's ratings were not high and the film was criticized in Germany.

"I don't think that the Germans believe everything they see on television. There are a number of people who criticize our mass media, such as state channels like ARD and ZDF. Germans are very good at reading between the lines and I don't think that this one-sided position against Russia will prove to be effective," said politician Alexander Gauland, who spoke to Russia 1.

When asked to comment on the situation by Russia 1, ZDF said the film crew who took part in making the documentary were busy filming another project. The channel said 'Igor' the protagonist in the film was real and was given money because they felt sorry for him.

However, on the raw tapes, it is clearly audible how Lobyskin is being given instructions about what to do. When the broadcast was shown to the public, this speech could no longer be heard, as it had been dubbed over.

This is by no means the first time that ZDF has been caught altering material to portray Russia in a bad light.

In February, a citizen's media group lodged a complaint against the broadcaster for airing a photograph of "Russian tanks in eastern Ukraine".

The news segment aired by ZDF featured a photo with the caption "Russian armored vehicles moved through Isvarino in the Lugansk region, February 12, 2015," citing "Ukrainian army spokesman Andrei Lysenko." However, there is one glaring problem with the photograph in question: it shows Russian tanks in South Ossetia in 2008, not Ukraine.

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 #32
www.rt.com
December 29, 2015
Anti-Semitic video uploaded by Ukrainian MP branded 'despicable and heinous'
[Video here https://www.rt.com/op-edge/327355-vitko-radicals-ukraine-israel/]

The fact that a member of the Ukrainian Radical Party has been filmed singing a song saluting Adolf Hitler is not surprising, considering the rise in anti-Semitism throughout Europe, including in France and Ukraine, Rabbi Ralph Tawil told RT.

Ukrainian lawmaker Artyom Vitko, who is on a committee to improve Ukraine-Israel ties, was filmed singing pro-Hitler songs. The video followed just days after Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko had apologized to Israel for Ukrainian collaborators' role in the Holocaust.

RT: A Ukrainian MP, who's on a committee to improve Ukraine-Israel ties, is filmed singing pro-Hitler songs. What was your reaction to that?

Rabbi Ralph Tawil: When I first saw it, I thought it was despicable and heinous, but I was not surprised because we see the rise of anti-Semitism throughout Europe, Ukraine included. And we are also seeing the rise of the radical right-wing parties like in France [the National Front]; and the Radical Party by Oleg Lyashko in Ukraine. So, I am not surprised by it, even though it is despicable.

RT: Will Tel Aviv let this lie?

RRT: I think that [Petro] Poroshenko made the apology and that took a lot of courage. In order to really prevent another Holocaust or another mass genocide - if necessary - not only to apologize, but to make sure that it doesn't happen again. So I think that Tel Aviv will make an issue of it and request that such incitement be not allowed in [the] Ukrainian parliament. And that would really be a courageous act for Poroshenko, for the president, but one that should be done.

RT: Could this incident affect Ukraine's hopes to improve ties with Europe?

RRT: Europe is dealing with this problem or not dealing with it - it is widespread throughout Europe. Every European country has its own racist and right-wing movements that are gaining power. So I think that Europe unfortunately will not react to it. However, they should react to it as part of their attempt to make sure such a genocide of any people does not recur.

RT: How concerning is the fact that the man praising Hitler is a member of the Ukrainian parliament? What kind of backlash do you expect?

RRT: The real problem is that Vitko, being a party lackey, is doing what Lyashko, his party leader, said and just continuing. The fact that it is with music, that it was raised to YouTube, shows that there is a following, shows that there are people that want to hear this. The fact that it's played on the radio and on YouTube and that he uploaded it shows that there is a following for this. And the fact that it's music also touches an important chord. We know that, for example, that DAESH/ISIS/ISIL uses music in all their videos to inspire these atrocities. I am afraid that if more music like this gets uploaded, with Ukrainian parliamentary members singing it and performing it,  it would lead to a strengthening of the anti-Semitic, racist  parties like  the Radical Party [of Oleg Lyashko] in Ukraine.

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 #33
Kyiv Post
December 30, 2015
Prosecutor General's Office says it has lots of evidence of who killed Maidan activists
By Ilya Timtchenko

Two years have passed since the mass shootings on Feb. 20, 2014, when more than 100 EuroMaidan Revolution protesters were killed. Those who were responsible have still not been put on trial, bolstering claims that the government is incapable of prosecuting the killers.

However, the Prosecutor General's Office of Ukraine now says it finally has concrete evidence that proves who was guilty. Three ex-Berkut special force policemen - Serhiy Zinchenko, Pavlo Abroskin and Dmytro Sadovnik - are accused of killing at least 39 unarmed activists. Additionally, Sadovnik is blamed for directing the murderous crackdown in downtown Kyiv.

There is clear evidence that all three were definitely involved in the mass killings, Senior PGO Prosecutor Oleksiy Donskiy said during an interview on Ukrainian online news channel Hromadske.tv on Dec. 29.

"There are video recordings where you can see that Sadovnik is directing (Abroskin's and Zinchenko's) actions," Donskiy said. "He is giving commands how they should retreat or where they should secure their positions. This was obviously not chaotic activity. These actions were managed by Sadovnik from the moment he arrived there."

The prosecutor's office says it will provide evidence that Zinchenko and Abroskin are directly responsible for the killings they are charged with.

"We collected sufficient and incontrovertible evidence of the involvement of the accused in the alleged crimes," Donskiy said. He added that the mass killings were done intentionally.

Abroskin's lawyer says the charges against his client are false, news agency Ukrainska Pravda reports.

All three men had been in custody since spring of 2014. On Dec. 28 the Svyatoshyn District Court of Kyiv extended the detention period of the ex-Berkut members until Feb. 25 of next year.

However, on Sept. 19, 2014, Pechersk District Court in Kyiv decided to change the preventive measures against Sadovnik from holding him in custody to house arrest. Soon after that, in October 2014, the former commander of the Berkut special forces disappeared.

Donskiy says that, even though there is enough information to prosecute already, a lot of additional information was lost when Sadovnik disappeared.

"A lot of the evidence was built through (Sadovnik), through his connections and his subordinates," Donskiy said.

In a previous interview with Radio Svoboda, Donskiy said that the PGO was able to trace down Russian phone numbers that ousted President Viktor Yanukovych continuously contacted during the Maidan shootings. They concluded that those who used the cell phones were linked to the Russian armed forces.

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 #34
Ukraine Today
December 30, 2015
Ukraine's PM Yatsenyuk lays out 2016 goals in annual New Year speech

Success and Failure: Ukrainian leader addresses EU, NATO, reform and economy issues on December 28

Sanctions against Russia, gas, NATO, the budget and the possibility of early parliamentary elections - these were just some of the topics Ukraine's Prime Minister touched on during his year-end speech.

During the hour long question-and-answer session, Arseniy Yatsenyuk warned against the scenario of the collapse of the government coalition.

Ukraine's Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk: "If someone wants the coalition to break up, then they can make a political statement about this. This would result in the establishment of a new coalition. I would like to see anyone do this in snap parliamentary elections. This is called democracy. Or the third option is not to make empty promises and continue to fulfill the agreement and vote for bills necessary for the country."

Concerns that Russian sanctions against Ukraine promoted by a free trade pact with the European Union would harm business were also addressed.

Ukraine's Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk: "Ukraine has held 16 consultations about how it will fulfill the free trade agreement with the EU and whether this would involved any risks for Russia. After this process it is clear there are absolutely no reasons for Russia to even mention any risks the EU trade pack could cause."

Despite such reassurances of a brighter future, general Ukrainian disenchantment with the government is growing. The slower than hoped pace of post-EuroMaidan reforms and lack of progress in stemming corruption is damaging trust in the current leadership. Yatsenyuk did address this issue however he appeared to avoid taking responsibility for failures, including the failure to reform the country's courts system.

Ukraine's Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk: "As for the judicial reforms, we must recognize that during the previous two years, nothing has changed. My position has been and remains - we must replace all the 9,000 judges and we must not carry out just cosmetic reform. Next year, judicial reform will be a national priority."

Other priorities set out by the Prime Minister were growing Ukraine's economy, European Union and NATO membership and regaining militant-held territory in the east of country.

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 #35
https://dninews.com
December 29, 2015
Having collapsed to the bottom Ukraine will stay there for decades

According to Ruslan Bortnik, the director of the Ukrainian Institute of Analysis and Management of Politics, the economic and political crisis which already exists in Ukraine will turn into a depression that can last for decades, reports The Politnavigator.

"There will happen something that Western politicians have warned us about, namely that when we stop falling, we will reach the bottom and get stuck there. In such a state of the economic and political depression we can stay there for decades. The budget for 2016 was prepared without consultation with the society, sectoral players or associations representing certain economic interests. Let's be honest, the budget, as well as the tax code, were not even peppered by the Ukrainian government. As a result, the economic policy of the state is completely virtual, its purpose is to receive another IMF loan. Which will not be spent on the Ukrainian economics, it will supposedly go to the reserves and for the services of various kinds of consultants"
 
The Prime Minister of Ukraine Arseny Yatsenyuk has already boasted about the growth of the GDP and foreign exchange reserves of the country, achieved through loans. According to him, next year the standard of living in Ukraine will grow tremendously.

"Next year will be a year of a moderate economic growth with the forecast of the GDP growth of 2%. One of the indicators is the gold and currency reserves of Ukraine. This figure was about $6 billion. Today, owing to our cooperation with the IMF, the World Bank, international creditors, the United States and the European Union, the total amount of the foreign exchange reserves has amounted to more than $13 billion. On the foreign currency accounts of the government there is also the sum of about $1.8 billion"
 
Ruslan Bortnik does not share Yatsenyuk's optimism. He claims that the year of 2016 will result in the final cleansing of the national economic elites.

"When some territory is seized, the police forces are entered there to carry out a cleansing. Today, it is citizens of the country who are being "cleansed"  as they are being forced to think not about their rights but about the banal survival. The budget adopted by the Verkhovnaya Rada is the budget of cleansing which "cleans" out the national economic elites. The privatisation scheduled for 2016 will not bring to the country large transnational corporations but a speculative capital like that of Soros that will destroy two thirds of the industrial facilities to eliminate potential competitors and prepare the rest for resale, possibly, to the same Ukrainian oligarchs"

Economist Vsevolod Stepanyuk believes, on the other hand, that the entire saga of privatisation aims to sell the last profitable state enterprises to the Americans for a song. According to him, Ukrainian oligarchs, who have done so much for the victory of Euromaidan, are unlikely to be admitted to the competition.

"Such plants as the Odessa Portside Plant still have a strategic importance in the world, not only in Ukraine. Besides, Ukraine was and still can potentially be a major exporter of electricity. That's why someone might be interested in buying generating companies of Ukraine for a pittance. Ukraine will stay in the dark because its population will be unable to pay for electricity but someone will sell electricity to Europe and have a good profit from it. Judging by the fact that today it is the IMF that requires the privatisation, I think, such objects will be bought by the US multinationals rather than our oligarchs. Our oligarchs are already so pressed that they are unable to do anything, and they have no money.  You do not need go too far for an example. During Yuschenko's presidency two regional generating companies were sold to an American company for next to nothing. So, another pro-American government already set an example, and now it will be the same, only on a larger scale"

No wonder that senior US officials, including the US Vice President Biden, are deeply involved in trying to convince the authorities of Ukraine to follow a strict line and implement the reforms that they had promised to implement.

The Reuters has estimated that, since 2014 the US Vice President Joe Biden has spoken 40 times to the Ukrainian president Poroshenko on the phone and another 16 times to the Prime Minister Arseny Yatsenyuk. Biden has made four personal visit to the capital of Ukraine since the coup and also held several meetings with Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk in the US and Europe.

However, Biden was not alone in spending time on Ukraine. According to the press-secretary of the US embassy in Kiev, in 2014 US officials and members of Congress made more than 100 visits to Ukraine. And yet, points out the Reuters, the pro-American project in Ukraine is in danger due to internal disagreements.

"Despite the intensive efforts of the White House the project is now in danger. Disagreements within the ruling coalition are growing and many of the reforms have stalled. If these leaders fail, it will become a deep embarrassment and defeat for Washington, the EU and the IMF who sacrificed their relations with Russia to support these people"

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 #36
Tablet
www.tabletmag.com
December 29, 2015
Bedlam Erupts During Trial of UKROP Party Leader
The trial of Hennadiy Korban is widely seen as a proxy conflict between oligarchs Ihor Kolomoyskyi and Ukrainian President Poroshenko
By Vladislav Davidzon

Hennadiy Korban, the leader of Ukrainian nationalist party (UKROP) who is currently under house arrest, is being tried for allegations of kidnapping political opponents and government officials, leading a criminal gang, and taking part in corporate raids. Korban vehemently denies these charges.

Though he is widely acknowledged to be nefarious, there is a widespread sense among Ukrainians that Korban is being targeted because he is an outsider of President Poroshenko's majority in parliament and a key proxy for oligarch Ihor Kolomoyskyi. The troublesome Kolomoyskyi, has clashed with Poroshenko repeatedly this year over embezzlement of state assets and deployment of extra-legal paramilitary force. The case is being widely watched across Ukraine as a bellwether for the issue of selective justice, especially as the pugnacious Korban earned gratitude for his role in tamping down separatism in Eastern Ukraine.

Criminal loyalty seems to have been thrown by the way side however. In a widely read Politico interview with the journalist Oliver Carroll this week, Kolomoyskyi, the former governor of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, expediently distanced himself from his erstwhile ally and business partner, referring to Korban as an "independent" actor.

On Christmas Day, armed SBU agents hauled Korban out of his Dnipropetrovsk apartment where he was serving house arrest. The next day he reappeared in a Kiev court where a petition was filed by the prosecutor general's office to change his pre-trial holding from home arrest to remand. The proceeding quickly degenerated into a farcical carnival sideshow as Korban began engaging in the timeless Ukrainian legal tradition of feigning illness to garner sympathy: the maneuver of showing up in court in a wheelchair will be familiar to connoisseurs of mafia films. The tough guy commander of thousands of men against pro-Russian separatists was carried out on a stretcher. The party later released a video of him writhing around theatrically in an ambulance.

The hearings on Sunday night also turned into pandemonium, as several dozen unknown hired thugs known as "Titushki" swarmed the court house and disrupted proceedings, leading to a scuffle with police. Ukraine Today reports that members of parliament (who hold parliamentary immunity) used fire extinguishers to attack the police. After Korban began 'going' into seizures, the woman who was his defense counsel also fainted. The next morning the state tried to allocate Korban another lawyer, who refused the case having only an hour to prepare for her court appointment. Ukrainian social media filled up with jokes that no one wanted to represent Korban.

On Monday, a judge carried out the prosecutor's 60-day petition; the ruling was accompanied by chants of "Shame on you!" from Korban's supporters. Korban has vowed to appeal the verdict.

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 #37
Euromaidan Press
http://euromaidanpress.com/
December 29, 2015
Ukraine's loud arrest of "Poroshenko's main political opponent": what you need to know
By Viktoriia Zzuhan
Viktoriia Zhuhan is an editor at Euromaidan Press, a columnist at Kultura Liberalna (Poland) and a journalist at Espreso.TV (Ukraine).
[Photos and video here http://euromaidanpress.com/2015/12/29/what-you-need-to-know-about-korbans-new-arrest/#arvlbdata]

Late at night on 25 December 2015, the Dnipropetrovsk politician Henadiy Korban was taken from home arrest and transported to Kyiv. A reality show style drama with fainting, surgery, fights in the court and a 30-hours non-stop hearings followed in the last days of 2015, contributing to further discrediting  Ukraine's authorities.

One of the Dnipropetrovsk-based UKROP party leaders Henadiy Korban has found himself under the spotlight on the morning of 31 October. He was detained by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and party offices and his affiliated volunteer organization was searched. The party's lawyers then claimed that documents justifying the investigative action were not provided, and the right to legal aid was denied. Journalists were barred from the scene without any legal justification.

On 6 November, Korban was placed under house arrest for two months until 31 December. The commentators connected this prosecution with Poroshenko's war against the oligarch Ihor Kolomoysky, affiliated with UKROP party.

Record breaking 30-hours court hearings' timeline

24 December: Late at night Henadiy Korban was transported from Dnipropetrovsk to Kyiv in order to verify his diagnosis due to which the politician had been ignoring requests to meet the investigators.

25 December: Korban had a heart surgery at Kyiv Amosov Institute of Cardiovascular Surgery due to the threat of a heart attack.

26 December: The court was considering the prosecution's file about changing house arrest into detention facilities. Prosecution demanded transporting the politician to the hearings and the court approved it, though the defense disputes the forensic-medical examination of Korban's health condition.

27 December: During the hearings that started, Korban had complained about his poor health and later fainted. His lawyer Oksana Tomchuk fainted as well after having spent 17 hours in court.

Masked young men  came to the hearings getting involved into numerous fights with Korban's comrades. The judge decided to close the hearings to the broad public.

28 December: The judge rejected lawyers' appeal regarding disqualifying the prosecutors and didn't consider the appeal regarding his own recusal. Korban refused the services of his lawyers, the new lawyer claimed she had too little time to learn the case.

The court ruled to change the house arrest into detention facilities until 25 February. The lawyers claim that the sentence included names of the lawyers that Korban had refused, which they believe suggests it was written before the hearings.

The court hearings lasted for 30 hours, setting a record in Ukraine's jurisprudence.

What is the UKROP party leader accused of

The politician is suspected in creating a criminal organization, seizing funds of a particularly large scale, the theft of an automobile and unlawful possession.

Now the prosecutors claim that due to the electronic bracelet data, Korban violated the house arrest regime over 30 times. Also, one of the witnesses has filed a claim regarding Korban putting pressure on him/her, as well as trying to destroy the documents proving unlawful activities.

Due to the prosecution, the UKROP leader had provided health certificates issued by a private clinic belonging to Korban himself through the affiliated persons. As a result of the searches conducted, proof of paying money to some MPs had been found. Also, some corruption "schemes" planning raids on many enterprises were found.

From a raider to a martyr

"Political repressions, persecution for patriotic beliefs, and arbitrariness of the law-enforcement system in Ukraine have acquired a menacing scale," a petition to Petro Poroshenko says. An UKROP parliament member Vitaliy Kupriy published the text of the petition on Facebook announcing it to appear on the President's website in the nearest days.

"The most drastic example is the 'case of Henadiy Korban,' which proves the existence and spreading of practices of fabricated criminal proceedings and administrative pressure of the presidential vertical on courts, prosecution, security service, newly established police,and the National Guard," the petition goes on to demand to stop political repressions and set free all political prisoners.

This new turn in the case against "Poroshenko's main political opponent," as many call Korban, didn't bring Ukrainians to the streets. Yet, bloggers and commentators widely criticize the authorities for turning litigation into a dramatic show with overnight arrests, 30-hours long hearings, fights in the court room and legal violations on almost every step of the process.

The more Korban's case reminds the political repressions from Yanukovych's times, the fewer people remember Korban giving out food to win snap elections to the parliament in the scandalous 205 district, and even fewer - him admitting to having conducted corporate raids in the past.

In a country where no one has been punished for shooting down a very recent revolution and lack of judiciary reform is widely criticized abroad, such a rapid and dramatic development of prosecuting Poroshenko's main political opponent's protégé evokes painful associations. The very end of a political year of 2015 seems to have added to Ukraine's dictionary a worrisome new term "Poroshenko's regime."

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 #38
Euromaidan Press
http://euromaidanpress.com
December 30, 2015
Is Putin preparing to expand the war to Kherson?
By Alex Leonor
Alex is a contributor to Euromaidan Press. Alex is a graduate student studying political and military history. He is an avid consumer of Russian propaganda.

The blockade and blackout of Crimea got the Kremlin's attention. Putin may be preparing a response to expand his hybrid war to Kherson Oblast. Russian propaganda trumpeted the formation of supposed "self defense groups" or "partisan bands" in Crimea, Donbas, and Kharkiv right before Russia attacked these regions. The same pattern seems to be repeating in Kherson Oblast. Late last week a couple of videos surfaced of a Kherson farmer and a local politician complaining about thefts and coercion from individuals wore the uniform of the Ukrainian Aidar territorial battalion. These videos were quickly picked up by Russian propaganda, which proclaimed that "residents of Kalanchatskyi District, Kherson Oblast are arming themselves and uniting in self defense units." Kalanchatskyi District shares a border with occupied Crimea.

These videos initially appeared on the website Kherson.life. This supposed local news website was registered anonymously in late September. It is hosted on a dedicated server in Moscow.

Three days ago Russia's Luhansk separatist project reached out to the new propaganda project in Kherson. The head of the so-called Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) Iigor Plotnitsky wrote an open letter to the people of Kherson, which was immediately translated into English on a separatist-linked website. He decried their "suffering" from the "battalions controlled by Kyiv and former Crimean Tatar and now Kherson-Turkish radicals." and then proposes that if their "elected people's representatives" appealed to the LNR for help "we will figure out how to help." He concludes his letter with the cry: "Long live the future People's Republic of Kherson..."

An expected next step for a Russian separatist propaganda project in Kherson would be the formation of a "Kherson Fraternity" similar to the Donetsk and Sevastopol based "Odesa Fraternity" or the Russia and Donetsk based "Kharkiv Territorial Fraternity" which serve as political fronts for Russian subversion and terrorism inside these districts. A Kherson front group supposedly headquartered in Luhansk and operating out of Crimea could give Russia another layer of deniability to conduct terrorism in Kherson Oblast.

The Russian propaganda outlet RIA Novosti Ukraine took the narrative one step further, reporting that representatives of the Kherson self-defense groups said that the marauders wearing the Aidar uniforms had a "...Tatar appearance. They have a sneaking suspicion that they are not related to military formations of Ukraine, but to a radical Islamist wing."

The mention of potential links to "radical islamists" hints at the direction Russia may spin this narrative: The Crimean Tatars, funded by Turkey, will make an assault on Crimea and the peaceful Ukrainians living to the north of Crimea as part of Turkey's general offensive against Russia. Russia will justify the use of force in southern Ukraine (or more likely, its "support" for "self-defense" units that operate out of Crimea and act a lot like Russian special forces.) The hardline Russian propaganda outlet News Front is already pushing reports about how fighters from Turkey and ISIS are coming into Kherson.

While all this propaganda is going on, farmers in Kherson did indeed protest recently and block the highway from Kherson to Odesa, though they were protesting against amendments to the tax code. Also, there is probably some friction between the blockade participants and locals, which is not unusual whenever a large group of soldiers or activists begins activity on a new territory. The timing of this Russian propaganda push of impending violence alongside the peaceful protests of Kherson locals indicates a Russian attempt to co-opt local grievances and launch a separatist project using them as cover. The previously mentioned Russian propaganda outlet News Front published a story yesterday titled "The Crimean Blockade and the Genocide Budget could lead to a Popular Uprising in the Kherson Region." The story appears to have been quickly taken down. Perhaps it was published too soon? As in Donbas, as in Crimea, Russia is taking the cover of local grievances to build a narrative of repression, foreign influence, and armed locals rising up. What is Putin's next step?

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 #39
UNIAN (Kyiv)
December 29, 2015
Russia does not want Donbas. It wants Ukraine.
By Roman Tsymbaliuk

It's no secret that the Kremlin has one owner, but there are several towers whispering in his ear. Each of these "towers," or interest groups, is responsible for certain tasks. A whole team emerged that distributes the funds to the occupied Donbas. And these people are perfectly comfortable: they bring the "Russian world" and feed from the pork barrel. In this situation, the Kremlin hustlers can present themselves to the "tzar" as valuable aides and count on his mercy.

However, the "eminence grises" closer to the very top understand that, having stopped at the parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, the Russian Federation has gained nothing, globally Russia gained nothing. Indeed, it has grown an atavistic part to its body: a subsidized region, which Russia had itself destroyed. But the rest of Ukraine today is only ready to look at its neighbors, who cynically speak of some kind of 'brotherhood,' through the sight of a gun.

The appointment to the Contact Group of Boris Gryzlov, one of Putin's closest confidants, aims to try once again to force the official Kyiv to agree with Russia on the elections in the occupied Donbas. This man, as a permanent member of the Russian Security Council, took a direct part in developing the plans of seizing Ukraine's south-eastern regions.

Kremlin is satisfied with its current puppets in Donbas, as the extermination of the too-independent local leaders is complete.
Thus, the Kremlin's perception of the electoral process in Donbas is very peculiar, but yet it's clear: the votes should be counted by some apprentice of Churov [Head of the Russian Central Elections Commission], while only the separatist clones of "United Russia" should campaign, with the participation of pan-Ukrainian parties being highly undesirable. No one intends to change or remove the leaders of the occupied areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. So far, the Kremlin is satisfied with its current puppets in Donbas, as the extermination of the too-independent local leaders is complete.

At the same time representatives of Moscow will continue declaring at all levels their implementation of Minsk-2 [ceasefire agreements], thereby prolonging the negotiating process. The calculation is simple: to freeze the status quo in Donbas until the presidential and parliamentary elections in Ukraine. The Kremlin's strategists hope that by playing, as usual, on Ukraine's inner controversies, they can push back Donbas in its present shape into the Ukraine, providing for a "special status" for the region, without actual subordination to Kyiv. The minimum task is to deprive of power President Poroshenko and PM Yatsenyuk. Snap elections to the Ukrainian parliament can speed this process up. If the revenge-seekers come to power, then the situation will be frozen permanently by the Transnistrian scenario.

The Minsk process for the Kremlin is just a curtain. Behind this curtain goes the work on gradual absorption of the occupied parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. No one in the Kremlin is going to return the occupied territories. Moreover, if Kyiv wishes to fulfill the political part of the Minsk agreements, it will only be used for the implementation of Moscow's vision of the structure of Ukraine. The Moscow-orchestrated militants will be endlessly agreeing stuff with the Kyiv authorities and voicing the Kremlin's older demands: federalization, Russian language as a second state language, and Ukraine's non-aligned status.

Moscow is not planning to give up on Donbas, because it needs to keep focus on the whole of Ukraine. At least, that's how the Kremlin's officials perceived Putin's words that Russia can't "give up on the Russians of Donbas to the nationalists to "eat them up." The occupier is set to gain a firm foothold. As they say in Moscow, the "nation-building" is in full gear in the occupied parts of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. That is the Kremlin's logic of a suitcase without a handle. They will keep the seized territory, although it's lifeless. Today, no one in the Kremlin wishes to "hear the Donbas." No one listens to the locals which once chanted "Putin! Bring in the troops!" This is the senseless and the merciless "Russian world." So, we can hardly hope that this world will be destroyed by the plunging oil prices or Putin's sudden flight to Mars.

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 #40
www.foreignpolicy.com
December 29, 2015
The Problem With Ukrainian Police Reform
Ukraine's police are getting a much-praised makeover. But there could be trouble down the road.
BY ERICA MARAT
Dr. Erica Marat is an assistant professor at the College of International Security Affairs of the National Defense University. Find her on Twitter @ericamarat.
 
Over the past year, thousands of newly recruited police officers have taken to the streets of Kiev, Odessa, Lviv, and other cities across Ukraine. In contrast to their predecessors in the old, post-Soviet militsia, these newcomers are polite, well-trained, and physically fit. Perhaps most importantly, they refuse to take bribes. Many of the new recruits sympathized with the 2013-2014 Euromaidan demonstrations that overthrew the corrupt political order of former President Yanukovych, and they are genuinely interested in building a new, more democratic Ukraine. Over a quarter of the new police force consists of women - one of the highest rates in the world. The new units enjoy high approval ratings in Kiev and are regarded as a symbol of a "civil" state.

International experts are thrilled, too. They tout the new patrol police as one of the brightest rays of hope in post-Euromaidan Ukraine. It's been described as a "force for change" and even the "cops who would save a country." It's no wonder the foreigners are happy - much of the new police reform has been funded through the U.S. State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), with additional help from Canada and Japan.

So far, so good. But this apparent success masks some important shortcomings that could undermine it in the months and years ahead. The police reform process has been opaque and top-down, led by a few powerful officials with little input from civil society. As a result, the international donors who have partnered with the Interior Ministry risk repeating a problem that has plagued similar efforts to clean up law enforcement in other parts of the world. All too often, donors tend to give their help to corrupt and autocratic political elites still mired in militarized and secretive systems.

What such an approach tends to miss is that the police aren't responsible only to people at the top. Polices forces should also answer to the people they serve. For this reason, successful police reform depends on forging a consensus between the state and society on how and when the state may employ violence: consider, for example, the ongoing discussion in the United States on the relationship between the police and African-American communities. That debate is taking place in the wider democratic context of free media, frequent and fair elections, and impartial courts.

But Ukraine and other countries with a long history of authoritarianism lack such venues for an effective state-society dialogue. As in other post-Soviet states, Ukraine's Interior Ministry (which oversees the police) was designed to support government policies, to punish dissent, and to demonstrate the government's reach across the country. Despite several rounds of competitive elections, a diverse civil society, and numerous media outlets, Ukrainian officials continued to use the police to coerce the opposition right up until the Euromaidan uprising. International donors looking for quick results risk inadvertently supporting, or even strengthening, the state's punitive apparatus, without ensuring more active participation of the citizenry in overseeing the police.

To date, Ukraine's new police have been focused on a myriad of petty matters: smoking in public places, homeless people sleeping in tourist areas, and cars parking around bus stops. But the new policing model in Ukrainian cities does not explain how bigger and more violent crimes are prevented through policing small things. Meanwhile, top-level police offers, accustomed to deploying excessive force against peaceful demonstrations or operating criminal syndicates, remain unchallenged and unreformed. And while a shiny new police force might challenge small-scale corruption, there has still been no serious anti-corruption drive from the top.

Even more worrisome are the Interior Ministry's plans to organize a new SWAT force supported by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, the Border Patrol, and the State Department's Bureau for Narcotics and Law Enforcement. In a repeat of the patrol police project, only a closed circle of ministry officials and U.S. donors are involved in designing the new force, which is supposed to replace former special operations police forces such as "Berkut," infamous for its deadly violence against Euromaidan demonstrators. Activists worry that adopting the U.S. model for a militarized police force will allow Ukraine's leaders to use brutal force against anti-government demonstrations in the future. A better fit might be found in neighboring Poland and the Czech Republic, where military police units are assigned exclusively to the armed forces or to carry out counterterrorism missions.

Since the ouster of Yanukovych, Ukraine has experienced an inflow of former government officials from Georgia, including former president Mikheil Saakashvili. Inspired by the reforms they carried out at home, these officials have sought to export their experience to Ukraine. The Georgian police reform eradicated petty corruption and gained international praise for its dramatic break with a repressive past.

Yet Saakashvili's reform also transformed the Interior Ministry into the single strongest government body, one amply equipped to spy on the political opposition. Unfortunately, the methods used to direct top-down reform in Saakashvili's Georgia are now being replicated in post-Euromaidan Ukraine. Only a narrow group of people are interacting with the external donors and making key decisions. Civil society activists are only invited to oversee procedures already in place, as opposed to generating ideas for the reform's direction. The vision of change is transmitted directly from the deputy-minister level to specific projects on the ground, bypassing public discussion.

The only exception to this pattern of top-down reform occurred earlier this year, when civil society activists were allowed to influence the drafting of the new police law adopted in July 2015. The activists succeeded in redefining the police as an agency that "serves society by ensuring protection of rights and freedoms," ordering the police to report instances of human rights abuse, and requiring the police to carry identification badges. Because of this substantial public input, the drafting the new law was a textbook example of a genuine police reform process. That's a good sign for the future. But so far there's little evidence that the authorities have learned from this example.

Though they often disagree among themselves about the course of the police reform, activists are united in their push for three major changes. First, they insist that the head of the police, designed as a professional, non-political post, should be recruited on a competitive basis, not appointed by the Minister of the Interior. Second, the deputies of local police chiefs should also be selected through fair competition. Both demands aim to break the long tradition of police units that owe their loyalty to respective governments rather than the public.

Third, there has so far been no discussion at all on the future of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), a key component of the internal security apparatus. The SBU's surveillance reach inside the country is vast, and before the Euromaidan revolution, the government routinely used it to suppress political opponents. In Georgia, the powerful, unreformed intelligence agency became a highly controversial issue in the 2012 parliamentary elections, which dealt a severe blow to Saakashvili's regime.

The Ukrainian and Georgian experiences with police reform reflect larger trends in the ex-Soviet Union and in other countries emerging from authoritarian rule. International efforts typically provide police with new uniforms, refurbish police stations, and train officials. Programs focus mostly on institutional objectives and formal legal structures; only a small fraction of funds goes to civil society groups who promote the rule of law.

Donors usually operate under the assumption that reformed police forces will, thanks to greater professionalism, assume a neutral role in the political landscape, thus safeguarding the democratization process. So far, however, there is little evidence that this is happening in the former USSR. Despite years of donor assistance in Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, the police in these countries still arbitrarily arrest political opponents during elections, curtail the work of the mass media, and brutally suppress anti-governmental mass protests. In worst-case scenarios, the police use skills acquired through donor training projects to carry out the political decisions of the incumbent elites.

Instead of cosmetic upgrades, donors must concentrate on promoting collaboration between the state and society. To be sure, a top-down process is likely to get results much more quickly than one involving the participation of civil society. Yet it is only through the latter that a post-Soviet police force can be transformed into one appropriate for the needs of a democratic society. It is not the speed of police cars or the availability of body cameras that define effective police reform. The rule of law can be upheld only by a police force that answers to the public - and that can only happen if the people have their say.

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 #41
Stratfor.com
December 29, 2015
Ukraine: Caught Between East and West

Summary

Editor's Note: This is the second installment of a five-part series that explores the past, present and future of the confrontation between Russia and the West on the Eurasian landmass.

Russia's desire for influence in Ukraine is as old as the Russian state itself. It has fought for centuries to protect its stake in the Eastern European nation from the encroachment of the West, often turning to natural gas cutoffs or outright military intervention to do so.

Since the end of the Cold War, Ukraine has vacillated between East and West, split between the country's pro-Russia and pro-Europe factions. Now, as Ukraine swings once more toward the West, Russia stands to lose much of its power over one of its most important satellites.

Analysis

There was once no distinction between the Russian and Ukrainian nations in their earliest forms; both peoples belonged to the loose federation of eastern Slavic tribes known as Kievan Rus that emerged in Eastern Europe toward the end of the ninth century. Over time, the medieval state grew to become one of the largest on the Continent, spanning between the Baltic and the Black seas. But it was different from its neighbors to the west: Orthodox Christianity was the dominant religion in Kievan Rus, setting it apart from the mostly Catholic Western Europe.

In the 13th century, Kievan Rus began to destabilize in the face of internal discord, only to be swept away completely by invading Mongol hordes from the east. The state's capital, Kiev, as well as the rest of the land that is now Ukraine, languished until the Western Catholic powers of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and then the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth conquered it at the start of the 14th century. Meanwhile, the principality of Muscovy, which lay northeast of Kiev, grew to become the new center of the Slavic Orthodox civilization to the east.

Emergence of the Ukrainian Front

The two major powers - the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to the west and the burgeoning Russian Empire to the east - competed for control of Ukraine over the next 300 years, giving rise to the East-West divide that exists in the country to this day. But a third force - the Cossacks - began to gain influence in Ukraine as well, complicating loyalties even further. A frontier people, the Cossacks had a fierce warrior mentality and were constantly feuding with their Asian and Muslim neighbors to the south. They were also staunch observers and defenders of their Orthodox faith.

The Cossacks were the precursors of Ukraine's modern independence movement, belonging to neither the Catholic Poles nor the distant Orthodox Russians. In 1648, Bohdan Khmelnytsky - perhaps the most famous Cossack - led an uprising against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and established an independent Cossack state centered on the banks of the Dnieper River, which bisects the city of Kiev. However, much like the kingdom of Kievan Rus, the Cossack state did not last. Six years after launching his rebellion, Khmelnytsky allied with Muscovy in its war against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, ultimately leading to the integration of Kiev and modern-day eastern Ukraine with Muscovite Russia. Western Ukraine remained under Polish control.

As the Russian Empire expanded throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, its influence in Ukraine grew. The Partitions of Poland gradually chipped away at the commonwealth's territory, granting the Austro-Hungarian Empire control of the far western Galicia region while giving the rest of the country to Russia.

In the early 20th century, after the fall of the Russian Empire, a Ukrainian nationalist movement emerged in the western province of Lviv. When the Soviet Union was founded in 1922, Lviv was the only Ukrainian territory that was not incorporated into the new Soviet state. Instead, it became the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and Kiev was its capital.

Josef Stalin's forced collectivization of the Soviet Union's agricultural sector brought starvation to the Ukrainian countryside in the 1930s, and soon after World War II began the Nazis invaded. When the Allies defeated Nazi Germany, all of Ukraine, including the province of Galicia, was brought under the Soviets' domain for the first time in centuries. The next 40 years were relatively calm for Ukraine, though they were marked by Soviet rule. When the Soviet Union finally collapsed in 1991, Ukraine became an independent state.

The Past 25 Years: Tug-of-War Between Russia and the West

The end of the Cold War brought an unprecedented degree of independence to Ukraine. Nevertheless, the legacy of suzerainty lingered, making the country's political scene more volatile. Russia continued to influence Ukraine from the east, while the newly formed European Union began to exert its power over the country from the west. Within Ukraine, competing political factions emerged that were loyal to one foreign patron or the other.

At first, the weak Ukrainian government attempted to rebuild the country while maintaining a precarious balance between Russia and the West in its foreign policy. But when the pro-Russia Viktor Yanukovich won a narrow and contested victory over his pro-West opponent, Viktor Yushchenko, in Ukraine's 2004 presidential election, mass protests erupted. After what became known as the Orange Revolution, the election results were deemed illegitimate, and Yushchenko assumed the presidency instead.

During the decade of political polarization that followed, Ukraine began to politically reorient itself toward the West, and it formally pursued membership in the European Union and NATO. This aggravated tensions with Russia. Moscow responded by cutting its natural gas flows to Ukraine in 2006 and 2009 and by expressing explicit discomfort with Kiev's new pro-West policies.

Still, the defining feature of this period was the infighting taking place within Ukraine's own government, especially between Yushchenko and his running mate, Yulia Timoshenko. Their dispute, which divided the government, prevented the country from meaningfully integrating with the West and led to a steep decline of the government's popularity among Ukrainian voters. By the next presidential election in 2010, the political tides had turned: Yushchenko garnered a mere 5 percent of the vote and ceded the presidency to Yanukovich accordingly.

However, Yanukovich's victory was hardly sweeping, and the bulk of his support came from constituencies concentrated in the country's pro-Russia east and south; he registered very little support in Ukraine's pro-Europe center and west. Upon assuming office, Yanukovich wasted no time in reversing his predecessor's efforts to integrate Ukraine with the West. He made NATO membership illegal and extended the Russian Black Sea fleet's port lease in Crimea by 25 years in exchange for lower natural gas prices. These decisions alienated and angered pro-West Ukrainians, who complained that Yanukovich abused his power.

The final straw came when Yanukovich pulled out of an EU free trade agreement just before an Eastern Partnership summit, again in return for financial aid and lower prices on energy imports from Russia. Protests erupted, eventually becoming the large-scale demonstrations known as the Euromaidan movement that culminated in Yanukovich's ouster in February 2014. The scale and intensity of the protests were unmatched by any in Ukraine's post-Soviet history.

When a new pro-West government led by President Petro Poroshenko rose in Yanukovich's place, Ukraine swung away from Russia yet again. Unsurprisingly, ties between Ukraine and Russia have deteriorated again, but this time Russia has responded more aggressively. To counter what it considered to be a dangerous level of Western influence near its borders, Russia annexed Crimea and instigated a pro-Russia rebellion in eastern Ukraine. The situation there has come to a tense standstill as Russia faces off against the West.

The Next 25 Years: Moving Away From Russia

A look at Ukraine's long history shows that major shifts in the country's foreign policy and political orientation are not unique to the Euromaidan uprising. The country has frequently pivoted between Russia and the West as the pro-Russia east and the pro-Europe west vie for power.

However, the latest conflict in eastern Ukraine has polarized the country more than any other in its post-Soviet history. In fact, it resembles how divided Ukraine was before it was incorporated into the Soviet Union. This polarization is likely to continue in some form for several years, if not decades, as the military engagement with Russia becomes ingrained in Ukrainian society and weakens the historical bonds between the two countries. Animosity will probably only intensify as younger generations with no memory of Ukraine's Soviet period grow up in a country where Russia poses the greatest threat to national security.

In the meantime, the high level of economic integration that has defined the relationship between Ukraine and Russia for centuries is also likely to weaken in the coming decades. Because of the crisis in eastern Ukraine, the two have already significantly reduced trade ties: Ukraine has slashed its imports of Russian natural gas, while Russia is preparing to embargo Ukrainian agricultural products. Such retaliatory measures will probably intensify over time, and the two countries will come to rely less on each other economically. Similarly, political and military ties will remain neutral at best. Each of these factors makes a reorientation toward Russia highly unlikely in the next 25 years.

As Ukraine's ties with Russia erode, Kiev will meanwhile try to strengthen its connection with the West. This does not necessarily mean that Ukraine will become an EU and NATO member, since those institutions will undergo changes of their own over the next 25 years. However, Ukraine will probably integrate further with the two countries that played a major role in shaping its pre-Soviet history: Poland and Lithuania. Poland and the Baltic states are currently in the throes of a long-term effort to merge their energy and economic infrastructure to create a regional bloc. Joining the bloc will become increasingly attractive to Ukraine in the coming decades, especially if membership comes with the political and security backing of the West's most powerful member, the United States.

This potential grouping, which harken back to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, will be made more feasible by the sweeping demographic changes taking place in Ukraine. The country is set to experience one of the steepest population declines in the world: It will lose 21.7 percent of its population by 2050, dropping from 45 million people to 35 million. As it does, Ukraine will need to secure partnerships with larger countries or multinational alliance groups to maintain its economic viability and gain security patrons to protect itself from Russia - something that also interests Poland and the Baltic states, as well as Moldova, Romania and other countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

However, Ukraine and Russia will not sever all ties over the next 25 years. The deep cultural, linguistic and religious bonds that exist between them are not likely to be broken entirely over the course of a generation. Still, the bonds will weaken, as will the two countries' broader bilateral ties when Ukraine moves out of Russia's shadow.

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 #42
New York Times
December 29, 2015
Investing in Ukraine's Future
By JOHN E. HERBST, STEVEN PIFER and WILLIAM B. TAYLOR Jr
John E. Herbst, director of the Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center at the Atlantic Council, was American ambassador to Ukraine from 2003-6. Steven Pifer, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, was ambassador to Ukraine from 1998-2000. William B. Taylor, Jr., executive vice president at the United States Institute of Peace, was ambassador to Ukraine from 2006-9

Just over a year ago, President Obama signed into law the Ukraine Freedom Support Act, which provided congressional backing to sanctions on Russia following the Kremlin's illegal annexation of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine. Since then, sanctions have hurt Russia's economy and prevented individuals in President Vladimir V. Putin's inner circle from traveling to the West. The Obama administration should be commended for sustaining a successful sanctions regime.

But Washington must do more than just punish Russia. It must bolster Ukrainians as they struggle to build a new, reform-minded government while continuing to fight to maintain their country's territorial integrity.

As winter sets in, the continuing war in Ukraine's east has devolved into an economic siege as Russia leverages gas supplies, coal shipments and debt repayment to attempt to extract concessions from a Ukrainian government that is still battling Russian proxies violating the Minsk II cease-fire. With Ukraine's economic output having shrunk by a quarter, the currency sharply devalued and a population fearful of an uncertain future, Ukraine is teetering on the brink.

Appropriately funding efforts to improve Ukraine's stability is a down payment on Europe's collective security. Russia's land grab in Crimea violates the very security architecture - including the Helsinki Final Act responsible for establishing the inviolability of Europe's national borders - that has kept Europe secure since World War II. But the durability of this system depends on the West's willingness to defend it. Failing to do so signals to both adversaries and allies that agreements among nations simply do not matter.

Support for Ukraine's democratic aspirations in the face of Russian aggression is one of the few areas where both Democrats and Republicans agree. But the gap between rhetoric and resources pledged is shockingly wide. Next year, Ukraine can expect approximately $3 billion to $4 billion in conditional support from the United States and the European Union, combined. This sum is insufficient. Lawrence Summers, the former United States Treasury secretary, called on Europeans to deliver on promises to support Ukraine's reform efforts with increased funding of $5 billion to $10 billion, calling it an important "security investment." He's right.

Congress and the Obama administration should work together to provide an additional $2 billion to $5 billion in economic support. At the same time, Washington should seek to persuade the European Union to make a similar commitment for a total of $10 billion, the optimal amount of support to allow Ukraine's government room to maneuver. If budget concerns prevent that, it is essential that together the United States and European Union find at least $5 billion in assistance, the minimum threshold to ensure the viability of an independent Ukraine that can sustain its nascent reform effort and withstand a persistent campaign of economic sabotage by Russia.

This grand aid package could include loan guarantees, direct budget support grants and debt swaps, as well as assistance to support reforms in key sectors, like banking, energy and the judiciary. It could also be used to encourage investment in Ukraine. Loan guarantees, which have been the preferred method of support approved by Congress to date, should only constitute part of the package. There is a limit to how much debt Ukraine can take on before default. Loans could be paired with direct budgetary support to assist with balance of payments and with debt swaps, which have a proven track record of helping sustain young democracies: The United States granted them to Poland in the 1990s.

As former American ambassadors to Kiev, we recognize one of the main challenges in providing economic support to Ukraine: corruption. This is why any future assistance package must be made conditional on the Ukrainian government's commitment to accelerate reform and root out corruption. The current Ukrainian leadership is far from perfect, but the seeds of accountability have been planted, and Ukraine's robust civil society ensures a steady supply of nurturing sunlight. The recent resignation of a notoriously corrupt parliamentary kingmaker and the appointment of a new top anti-corruption prosecutor are signs of Ukraine's progress.

Longtime observers of Ukraine who are impatient for change have criticized the pace of reform. But the move toward market pricing in the gas sector, cleaning up the banking sector by closing insolvent banks and introducing transparency checks into banks' ownership structures are commendable. So is the creation of the National Reform Council, the development of an official anti-corruption strategy and the gradual adoption of e-government and other transparent-governance tools.

A new Ukraine was born in the Maidan, but the United States and Europe have thus far failed to make an adequate commitment to its success. That must change. The West must now provide support commensurate with the military and economic threat Kiev faces, while also pushing the Ukrainian government to reform. A global order based on rule of law is at stake. Defending it cannot be done on the cheap. For the West, a Ukraine impoverished by Kremlin aggression will be far more costly.

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