#2
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
December 23, 2015
The world in 2015: A nostalgia for balance
The year 2015 has demonstrated a severe imbalance in the world order and the impossibility of returning to interaction governed by old principles. As global players strive for a return to their individual perception of a "golden age," Fyodor Lukyanov considers which geopolitical model appears the most likely in the near future.
By Fyodor Lukyanov
The author is the editor in chief of the Russia in Global Politics magazine and head of research at the Valdai International Discussion Club.

The year 2015 is the first in which no-one is contesting the obvious anymore: that the world system is in a severe imbalance, one which keeps generating new crises. Many realized this a long time ago, but were reluctant to admit it, i.e. to give up the cozy perception dating back to the late 20th century that everything is going well and inevitable relapses can be successfully contained.

For example, Russia's actions to incorporate Crimea and support the anti-Maidan movements in eastern Ukraine were viewed as one such relapse. The leading powers (in terms of their impact on the world order, i.e. the West) tried - through consolidated political, economic and psychological pressure - to make the Kremlin change its behavior and return "to the right side of history." In other words, they proceeded from the premise that the notion of "as it should be" exists.

The pressure on Russia failed to produce the desired effect, and then came the final turning point. In the case with Syria, no-one knows anymore what this "as it should be" is. The Middle East of 2015 has come to represent despair: The more effort is made, the more obvious it is that, first, such effort is ineffective, and second, that it is impossible in principle to rally the participants in this multi-layered conflict around a single goal.

ISIS: seeking to reset the game

The trend of the year is the hopeless desire to return to "the golden age," with each player having their own idea of this. The most striking example is, of course, the main troublemaker of the Middle East region, which is now customarily referred to as Daesh (known in the West as Islamic State, or ISIS). Here, everything is straightforward: back to the caliphate, when everything was fair and square; down with the achievements of the so-called "civilization" that colonizers forced on the true believers.

The certain popularity that radical Islamists from what was once called Mesopotamia enjoy in the West, the interest in their ideas and actions is a sign that even outside of the proposed "caliphate" people feel an emptiness inside and increasingly long for something different from what they have now.  

Having said that, it is not only the self-proclaimed caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of ISIS, who hankers after a golden past. Those who belong to mainstream global politics look back into the past for inspiration too - albeit a not-so-distant past.

A yearning for a more stable era

The memorable dates of the year 2015 are a reminder of historical events linked to the establishment of a particular world order: the 200th anniversary of the Congress of Vienna, the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II and the establishment of the UN, the 40th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act, the 25th anniversary of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe.

Up to the end of the 20th century, the notion of a world order was always about balance. A complex balance, involving numerous players, as was the case in the 19th century. Or a relatively simple balance, as after World War II, when there emerged a system of equal dominance of two superpowers. A balance inevitably envisaged a mutual recognition of spheres of influence in one form or another. That was the foundation for the Vienna model, the Yalta system, the Helsinki Final Act.

At first glance, it may seem that the 1990 Paris Charter, which declared an end to spheres of influence and division lines, is based on a different principle. However, in practice, it too required a balance, not for confrontation but for rapprochement. In effect, this is what Mikhail Gorbachev dreamt of: As far as he was concerned, the end of the Cold War should have been based on a convergence, an equal and mutual coming together of previously competing blocs. The break-up of the Soviet Union shut the door on that option: Russia was not perceived as a second center in Europe.

Irrespective of what is being declared officially, an ideal for Russia would be a return to some form of agreed spheres of influence. Hence the nostalgia for Vienna and Yalta. The ideal for the West is the situation of the 1990s, when the spheres are no more and the influence has become universal. Hence the constant references to Helsinki (omitting, however, to mention that component of the Helsinki Accords that established the very same spheres of interest) and Paris, which envisages a commonality.

A proliferation of global actors

Neither of these nostalgia-inducing models can be brought back. What makes today's politics different from the era of "world orders" is how uncommonly democratic it is. There are too many of those who are influencing the processes now.

Now the list consists of not just the major powers, as before, but also of numerous mid-range countries seeking to make it into the international premier league, interstate organizations with their bureaucratic inertia, huge corporations (with communications giants being in a league of their own), non-state actors, like non-governmental organizations (ISIS, in effect is one of them) and even some individuals who possess intellectual power over other people.

Inside states too, decision-making is made more complicated by the fact that governments are unable to fully control what is happening on their territory: It is impossible to fence oneself off from the numerous influences of a global world.

Clearly defined spheres of interest are out of the question. Those who used to belong to them in the past are no longer prepared to accept this type of relations, while those who used to control them do not have enough levers of power to force anyone.

The outgoing year has shown that the dominant trend is not the universality of a pyramid-like world, as it seemed in the 1990s, but the fragmentation of the world into more manageable segments. They operate according to their own rather than universal rules. The Trans-Pacific Partnership set up in October this year is a prototype of this type of a "bloc." Another component should be the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, which U.S. President Barack Obama hopes to reach an agreement on before the end of his presidential term.

A balance of two oceans

The year 2015 has not only become a Rubicon marking the start of something new, it has also shown that it is impossible to bring back the past. The authors of the Valdai Club annual report, which this year is called "War and Peace in the 21st Century," are convinced that "the rise in chaos and unmanageability in international relations cannot last forever ... most likely, we are witnessing the emergence of a new structure of the world, based on what is effectively a balance, albeit loose, of two large groups of states."

"Now, a new order will not be reborn on the post-war ruins of the previous order but will gradually 'germinate' from a dialectic chaos of rivalry and interdependence," reads the report. This is happening organically, irrespective of the will of the main players, who are still captivated by the past.

A flexible balance of "the two oceans" with America in the center on the one side, and the continental mass of Eurasia with a close partnership between China and Russia on the other, is at first glance somewhat disconcerting. It looks too much like yet another version of the classic geopolitics of the Mahan and Mackinder variety or like the grim predictions of George Orwell with his Eurasia and Oceania.

In fact, these are two communities that are united by common interests from within but are interdependent and not confrontational to each other, at least not always. This is the best option that one can imagine today. Yet another version of an "end of history"-inflected "eternal peace," predictably, has turned out to be a utopia.

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 #3
http://warontherocks.com
December 23, 2015
The Seven Deadly Sins of Russia Analysis
By Michael Kofman
Michael Kofman is an Analyst at the CNA Corporation and a Fellow at the Wilson Center's Kennan Institute. Previously he served as Program Manager at National Defense University. The views expressed here are his own.

As the clock counts down to the end of another tumultuous and difficult year of dealing with Russia, the natural instinct is to look back on the battles and surprises of 2015 with an eye to making predictions for the coming year. There is material aplenty: the battle of Debaltseve, Moscow's operations in Syria, a crisis with Turkey that still burns bright. A new year offers new opportunities for prognostication: Where will Russia strike next? What is Putin thinking? What are the likely flashpoints of 2016? Instead of this traditional exercise, Russia experts should reflect on a year of discussions, briefings, round tables, merciless PowerPoint decks about hybrid war, and occasional spats in the virtual pages of outlets like War on the Rocks. What are the nagging questions, questionable assumptions, and unknowns that beset the analytical and policymaking community?

Experts and policymakers who deal with Russia are living in a high-tempo environment, keeping pace with military interventions, crises, and the frequent twists in bilateral relations. However, in any such endeavor, it is possible to learn lessons that are not true. This is my own attempt at presenting a list of questionable bits of analysis and assumptions that exist within the community. In doing so, I hope to push people to critically examine how they look at Russia. Why do we say some of these things, and more importantly why do we think them?

1. The Russian Government is Brittle. Or is it?

Presenting Vladimir Putin's regime as brittle is often analytical shorthand for arguing that his regime is dangerous in the near term, but equally likely to implode in short order, with Russia descending into turmoil and instability. Indeed, Moscow has accumulated so many domestic and foreign policy problems that it would make this a logical assessment were it not for the poor track record of such predictions. With each new outbreak in what has become an almost routine series of political, economic, or foreign policy crises, a segment of the Russia-watcher community invariably begins to make predictions of Putin's imminent demise. Unfortunately, the science of predicting regime change seems to lag significantly behind astrology. We should remember that few predicted the Soviet Union's rapid demise, the start of the Arab Spring, or anticipated the rapid fall of Victor Yanukovich in Ukraine following the start of the Maidan.

There are two ongoing case studies on the merit of such predictions. The first is Pakistan, a country that by the same theory should have collapsed long ago under the weight of its many problems. The second is North Korea, which soldiers on despite decades of predictions and estimates of the regime's imminent implosion. As former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates remarked on our ability to predict the nature and location of the next conflict, "our record has been perfect" given that "we've never once gotten it right." The same should be said of our ability to judge regime brittleness. The point is not that neo-Kremlinology or assessments of political stability are a waste of time, but that this is a single layer of analysis that should be taken with a healthy dose of skepticism.

Undoubtedly those who regularly predict Putin's downfall will one day be vindicated, but for planning and analytical purposes, our expectations should be tempered. The next test of political brittleness comes in 2018 when we will see how ready and willing the Russian public is to accept Putin's automatic re-election. Nobody knows what the state of the economy, currency valuation, foreign exchange reserves, oil prices, or international position of Russia will be that year.

2. The United States has a Putin Problem, not a Russia Problem. Or Does it?

The individuals in power matter, and another Russian leader may not have chosen to annex Crimea or invade Ukraine in response to the Maidan's victory. That being said, the lingering debate on whether the United States has a Putin problem or a Russia problem is an unsettled one. If one assumes that the real problem is Putin's regime, however long it might last, then the natural course of action is to avoid any bargains with Russia, cauterize the damage to the bilateral relationship and wait for another leader. My personal view is that whoever succeeds Vladimir Putin will not prove to be all that different, and will likely follow a similar policy path.

Russian history suggests that Putin is anything but an aberration in leadership, pursuing security dilemmas in the same manner of many previous occupants of the Kremlin. Seeing Russia's security space as a zero-sum game and securing it by limiting the sovereignty of its neighbors is almost canon for Russian foreign policy (as it was for Soviet policy). We should ask if Putin's foreign policy is fundamentally so different from that of Boris Yeltsin, Russia's first democratic leader, or if Russia was simply too weak during Yeltsin's rule to challenge the post-Cold War security arrangements in Europe. In early 2014, Henry Kissinger warned Washington not to fixate on Putin when he wrote that "For the West, the demonization of Vladimir Putin is not a policy, it is an alibi for the absence of one."

Yeltsin too believed in the application of force to achieve desired political ends in Russia and on its periphery. Examples are found among Russian interventions in Transnistria and Tajikistan in 1992 and Abkhazia in 1993, the use of tanks to suppress a constitutional crisis in Moscow, the First Chechen War in 1994-96, and the Russian paratrooper deployment to seize Pristina International Airport in 1999 ahead of NATO's deployment in Kosovo. In retrospect, that administration was not short on military gambits, complaints about NATO expansion, or gripes with U.S. military interventions. The character of Yeltsin's government was quite different from Putin's regime, but arguably it was under his leadership in the 1990s that Russia began and ended its brief flirtation with democracy. In truth, we have Yeltsin's presidency to thank for Putin.

Putin's view of the world may have evolved during his rule, but there is little evidence that we should expect his successor to travel a different path. Thus far, there is nothing to suggest that the next Russian leader, when faced with a similar international and regional environment will not attempt to engage the West, leave disappointed and revert to the ruthless pursuit of Russian national interest. Another question seldom raised is whether U.S. policy towards Russia would truly change if its troublesome leader were to disappear tomorrow.

3. Moscow Cannot Keep This Up. Or Can it?

Current discourse on Russia's economic frailty folds into the broader discussion on whether or not Moscow can sustain the current state of confrontation. In other words, how long can Moscow keep this up? The underlying question is whether Russia will cease being a problem in the near- to mid-term by succumbing to its economic woes. The narrative that Russia will run out of money is prevalent in the West, even though Moscow's foreign reserves have both stabilized and shown a modest rebound in recent months. The bigger question is why do we talk about Russia as though it was a bank or a company? Did Russia go out of business after the 1998 default?

What is the actual connection between Western security considerations vis-a-vis Russia, its foreign and national security policy, and the amount of money it has on hand? Putin announced ambitious military reforms in 2009, when the price of oil fell to $35 per barrel. Russia invaded Ukraine and annexed Crimea in 2014 even though the Russian economy was clearly entering a recession in late 2013. Looking further back, Russians persevered through the financial default and currency crisis of 1998, many going the better part of a year without salaries. Putin was anointed as Yeltsin's successor following this economic carnage, and in the aftermath launched the Second Chechen War in 1999, a prolonged conventional and counterinsurgency campaign.

This discussion begs a more essential question as to whether or not the economy has ever been a foundation of Russian power in the international system. In a previous article for War on the Rocks, I argued that Russia has often appeared to be the sick man of Europe, technologically backwards, with a lackluster economy, and a political system that consistently lags behind the needs of its society. That being said, despite Western fears to the contrary, the Soviet Union was never a superpower by virtue of being a serious economic competitor to the United States, let alone the West, at best attaining 57 percent of America's GNP in the late 1960s before falling behind.

Today, plenty of senior U.S. officials consider Russia to be a strategic threat and a serious opponent to NATO even though its GDP is barely a tenth of America's. In a recent interview discussing Russia, Deputy Defense Secretary Robert Work applied Mearsheimer's definition of a great power to Moscow, highlighting the return of great power politics in the international system. Granted, he said this was a narrow lens, but if the United States considers Russia to be a great power (or regional power with a big nuclear arsenal) when its economy represents a mere 3.3 percent of global GDP, then the connection between economic fundamentals of power and Russia's position in the international system merits further discussion.

4. Russia Cannot Sustain Military Operations. Or Can it?

Following closely the discussion of economic weakness is a general sentiment that Russia is unable to sustain military operations due to financial or force constraints. Going back to early 2015, the notion that Russia's armed forces are tied down or "stuck" in Ukraine seems to have dissipated. The merit of such estimates was cast into doubt when, in September of this year, Russia was simultaneously sustaining its deployment in Ukraine, conducting the expensive strategic exercise Center 2015, and deploying an expeditionary operation to Syria. I too was wrong in arguing that logistical and financial constraints would limit Moscow's involvement in Syria given its lack of assets to sustain expeditionary operations.

Much to my own surprise, Russia surged sea lift by reflagging Turkish commercial ships to support its increasing troop presence and base expansions. For Moscow, necessity is the mother of invention, whereas for the United States it is usually the mother of procurement. Russia also found plenty of funding to test expensive land attack cruise missiles of almost every variety. In a recent press conference, Putin showed no signs that economic constraints would impact military operations. Instead, it seems Russia can sustain this and all other lines of effort for at least a few years. At 4.2 percent of GDP, or 3.3 trillion rubles, Russia's defense budget is the highest it has been since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Too often we trade in our analytical expertise for an accountant's glasses, as though we could count the Russian Ministry of Defense's money or its available troops better than it can. On the issue of sustainment of military operations we need a dose of analytical humility.

5. Russia is Still a Power in Decline. Or is it?

I fundamentally believe that Russia is a power in structural decline, but increasingly I wonder about the relevance of that assessment. It seems with each year we can infer less and less from such a statement. Celeste Wallander and Eugene Rumer, two longtime Russia experts whom I hold in the highest regard, once wrote:

"Despite several years of economic growth and a new dynamic leader, Russia remains a power in decline. Neither its recent economic success nor its vigorous leadership is sufficient to make up for the long-term losses the country has suffered or to compensate for the contemporary shortcomings that belie key elements of Russian power."

The only problem with this remarkable piece in The Washington Quarterly is that it was published in late 2003. Roughly a decade later, President Obama similarly opined that Russia is a "regional power" acting out of "weakness."  Many of Russia's underlying weaknesses were as true then as they are now, but if Russia is declining, it is doing so very slowly, and its leadership does not accept such a predestined fate. As improbable as it may be, absent a sudden Russian collapse, at some point we may be forced to admit that Russia is declining so slowly the country might just be muddling through.

6. Demography Will Determine Russia's Fate. Or Will it?

Russia's demographic problems are commonly referenced as one of the drivers of its supposedly assured structural decline. Analysts often mention demography to either blithely support the notion that Russia will simply cease to be a problem for the West in the long term, or worriedly speculate that the country will become dangerously unstable. But what might Russia's demographics truly determine? Will Russia somehow be less of a strategic threat or a concern for the United States if it has a smaller population? It is almost certain that Russia will have enough manpower to maintain 1,550 strategic nuclear weapons, along with a conventional force to overmatch any of its neighbors, save China. Perhaps counterintuitively, in the short term, Russia's armed forces have steadily increased in size from roughly 667,000-700,000 in 2012 to 900,000 today.

When considering long-term alternative futures it is worth noting that Russia's economy and national budget is inexorably dependent on energy and resource extraction. These are industries that are not labor-intensive. At the same time, Russia is the beneficiary of a large labor influx from former Soviet Republics, often making it the third- or second-highest recipient of migrants in the world. Can Russia nationalize such labor at the cost of internal social cohesion? How much will its government budget truly suffer following a labor force contraction? Is it even fair to assume that warfare or similar state tasks will remain manpower-intensive 30 years from now? Are Russia's demographic problems fundamentally different from those of other developed states, including many U.S. allies? It strikes me that Russia's demographic decline is more of an open-ended question than a definitive statement on the future of the country.

7. For Putin, It's All About Regime Survival. Or is it?

Moscow's annexation of Crimea, invasion of Ukraine, and launch of operations in Syria are sometimes explained as the throes of a falling political system engaged in a "survival project." The underlying theory unifying these actions is regime survival, brilliantly advocated by Lilia Shevtsova in a number of articles and op-eds. The problem with this approach is that regime survival circularly explains everything and absolutely nothing at the same time: There is no political regime on earth that is not interested in its survival. Regime survival is a constant motivation for many, if not all, political systems and politicians. It is so fungible an analytical approach that it lends itself useful to explaining any and all policy choices by Putin.

At its core, this argument arbitrarily takes the domestic political outcomes of Moscow's actions, such as high approval ratings at home, or a resurgent sense of nationalism, and moves them back in time to become the primary objectives of foreign and national security policy. That could be true, but it seems impossible to prove or disprove. Regime survival may not be an incorrect explanation of Moscow's motives, but it is certainly incomplete as an analysis of the real sources of Russian decision-making.

Russia Analysis in Perspective

In my own narrow lane of Russian military analysis, there is always room for a more balanced, informed, and nuanced understanding of Russia. Perhaps the greatest woe of discussions on Russian military, strategy, and decision-making (other than debates on hybrid warfare) is the constant seesaw between two extremes. Too often, we are engaged in an asinine debate as to whether Russia's military is five feet tall or 12 feet tall. Assessments tend to track more closely with where one sits in the policymaking or national security establishment, versus where the Russian military actually is, and what it can do. Here I believe the starting point should always be Bismarck's observation that "Russia is never as strong as she looks nor as weak as she looks." When it comes to decision-making analysis, Putin is regularly cast in stark terms as either a brilliant strategist, outfoxing the West at every turn, or completely incompetent without any notion of what he will do next.

Perchance the broadest and most vexing question for U.S. decision-makers and experts today is this: How do we deter Russia? It is as vague as it is recurrent. The short answer is that the United States does deter Russia, which is why we're all still here 70 years after nuclear weapons were first used. A more analytically interesting - and politically valuable - question would be how the United States should manage great-power competition in the international system and keep confrontation with Russia from escalating into war. If crises are inevitable among the major players, and it seems they are, then managing escalation dynamics is paramount. When faced with a problem, bureaucracies have a predilection for pursuing activity and confusing it for achievement, to paraphrase Fareed Zakaria. To better structure a policy or a strategy towards Russia we should confront our own underlying assumptions and the merits of prevailing narratives, and more rigorously seek to fill existing gaps in analysis.

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 #4
The Unz Review
www.unz.com
December 23, 2015
Putin Blues
By Israel Shamir

Heavy darkness befalls the North; the sun rarely emerges from between the clouds. This year, Russia has noticeably less street illumination, and the spirits are anything but festive. Only the whiteness of the snow and Christmas trees break the gloom and remind us of the forthcoming low point of the cosmic wheel, Yuletide, when days starts to wax and nights to wane. As this stellar event foretells the Nativity of our Savior, this is a period of hope after a very difficult year, all over the world.

Putin supporters are unhappy

The Russians keep guessing what President Putin will tell them in his traditional televised address to the nation at the break of the New Year. He should say, this year is over, and we shall all cheer, people propose. Even the most optimistic ones are disappointed by lacklustre economic performance, and they blame the government of Prime Minister Medvedev and his liberal monetarist team. Meanwhile Putin rises above the blame game, but the government is less and less popular.

-As the Rouble drops, even the rather pro-Kremlin mass-circulation newspaper KP (full disclosure: I write an occasional column for the KP) published a call for the economy and finance ministers to resign or to be fired. There is a very little chance that Mr Putin will take this advice and clean his government stables.

-He could beef up his credit by dumping some (or all) of his ministers, but Putin is stubborn and unusually loyal to his colleagues. No accusation has ever convinced him to dismiss a man of his team. His former defence minister Mr Serdyukov has allegedly been involved in some shady dealing, while Serdyukov's paramour and assistant amassed millions by selling prime MOD assets to her cronies. Still, Putin did not dump him, and saved him from jail. (He had to resign to become a CEO, while she served a few weeks in prison, at most).

-Last week, the opposition leader Mr Navalny aired some heavy charges against Attorney General Chayka. For his defence, Chayka said that the man behind the campaign is the notorious Mr Browder. Browder is an American crook who managed to appropriate many high-quality Russian assets for pennies during Yeltsin's privatisation. Eventually he was forced to part with his loot and he has been sentenced to many years of jail in absentia. Browder is slime, no doubt, but it is a weak defence for Chayka. Still, Putin refused to drop Chayka or even to initiate an independent investigation of his alleged crimes.

-Putin stands by the most hated politician of Yeltsin's era, Mr Anatoly Chubays. The Financial Times called him Father to the Oligarchs. After leaving the government, Chubays has been appointed to lead the RUSNANO, a state-owned corporation notorious for its embezzlement and waste. Putin saved him many times over from prosecution.

-Putin went, hat in hand, to Yekaterinburg for the grand opening of Boris Yeltsin's Memorial Centre (price tag - nine billion roubles) and referred kindly to the loathed late President who appointed him his successor. People were furious seeing their president enjoying himself among the carpetbaggers of Yeltsin's regime.

-Can you imagine Fox TV transmitting Russian propaganda? In Russia, a major chunk of Russian media, state-owned or subsidised by the taxpayer, transmits pro-Western and anti-Russian agenda, alleged the eminent film director Nikita Michalkov, a staunch supporter of Putin, in his video seen by over two million viewers in a few days. He called upon Putin to assert his line and banish the enemies within, but state TV refused to broadcast the video.

-Putin's recent press-conference provided a chance for more criticism. Beside the points mentioned above, the journalists asked why state enterprise CEOs are paid millions of dollars a year, while everybody else is called upon to tighten the belt. They asked why the Russian Central Bank keeps buying US bonds and supports the US Dollar at the expense of the Rouble. They asked why import substitution does not work etc.

These are protests from the pro-Putin crowd, from people who supported his takeover of Crimea and his entry into Syrian war. They could bear some deprivation, but they are upset by Putin's condoning thieves, by his apparent cronyism, by his oligarch friends. Until now, the critics avoided attacking Putin, but these are the early swallows. Dr Stepan Sulakshin, the head of a Moscow think tank, publicly accused Putin of knowingly leading Russia into further degradation.

This bubbling dissatisfaction of Putin's supporters may yet turn more dangerous for the president than the 2011 Fronde of his hipster enemies. Meanwhile, head-strong Mr Putin does not wish to yield ground, sacrifice some of more hated ministers and CEOs, or attune internal policies to public expectations. Perhaps he is right, and things are not what they appear, but justice must be seen, not only done.

Talking Turkey with Israel

The Turkish friction caused by Erdogan's decision to shoot down the Russian bomber is another source of Putin's blues. He had spent a lot of effort nurturing relations with Turkey. All this effort went down the drain. There are multimillion projects, from a gas pipeline to tourism. All that was cut down at once. Putin's plans to deliver gas to Europe bypassing the hostile Ukraine collapsed. This is a huge setback for the Russian president.

The rhetoric between the leaders became acrimonious. Hotheads in Russia speak of seizing the Bosporus and Dardanelles, of turning Istanbul into Constantinople and planting the cross on the ancient St Sophia church. The Turkish president threatened to occupy Russia within one week - with help of NATO.

Turkey's choice is a result of its over-involvement in Syria. With so much investment, Erdogan was loath to see Syria gone. While his decision to down the Russian jet was rather extreme, the relations already were tense.

Putin's trip to Erevan and his condemnation of "Turkish genocide of the Armenians in 1915" was an unnecessary provocation. No other world leader did it, but Francois Hollande of France who flew in for two hours and proceeded to Baku, the capital of Azeri Turks thus levelling the playing field. I actually called upon Putin to avoid this step, but the strong Armenian lobby insisted on this trip.

Afterwards, there was a supposed leak (in reality: a fake) of a harsh and insulting conversation between Putin and the Turkish ambassador. I checked with the Ambassador and other sides. It was a fake, but this fake has been spread in millions of sites and posts.

However, the $64,000 question is about Syria: will it become a vassal state to the reconstituted Ottomans or will it remain a sovereign state with strong ties to Russia. Russia thought it has a stronger hand as an invitee of the Syrian legitimate government; Turkey denied Bashar's legitimacy.

The rift between Turkey and Russia became a fact. Its main beneficiaries were the US - and Israel. For the last five years, the relations between Israel and Turkey were hostile, since Israeli commandos massacred nine peace activists on board the Turkish vessel Navi Marmara. In face of the Russian threat, the Turks agreed to make peace with Israel.

Israel is involved in the conflict more than it admits. The Russians has published their evidence of Daesh oil being smuggled to Turkey by Turkish companies. This caused a lot of indignation in Russia and elsewhere. How do they dare to buy stolen oil and finance the terrorists!

The Russians forgot to mention that the smuggled oil goes to Israel. Israel is the main buyer of oil produced by the Kurds and by Daesh. This was reported and corroborated by the FT and by Al Araby al Jadeed. The Russian media avoided the topic, as Putin cherishes his good relations with Netanyahu.

Last week, Israelis attacked suburbs of Damascus and killed some Russian allies, Hezbollah fighters. Again, Russians took it quietly. None of indignation caused by downing of the bomber seeped into the Russian media.

Israel supports al-Nusra, declared a terrorist organisation by the UN. This is not a secret: recently the Daily Mail published a report glorifying Israeli soldiers saving lives of the Islamist fighters. Thousands of wounded guerrillas received medical assistance in Israeli hospitals and went back to fight Bashar.

Israel has a good working relations with Daesh, too. I was told that Daesh troops entered the Palestinian camp al Yarmuk being equipped with long lists of Palestinian activists. They were assembled and publicly executed. The Palestinians think that Daesh received the names from Israeli secret service and acted upon their request. Moreover, Daesh never ever attacked a Zionist target.

Putin - and Russian media did not say a word on that. Perhaps Putin is right; Russia does not need such a strong enemy as Israel, since Israeli leaders can say "Jump, Uncle Sam," and Uncle Sam will ask "How high?" However, they could tone down their indignation regarding Turkish oil smuggling, Turkish help to the guerrillas and other Turkish misdeeds.

Israel is objectively an enemy: it is an enemy of Russia's allies Hezbollah and Iran; it wants dismemberment of Syria in order to keep Golan Heights for good; it prefers a Somalised Syria to a healthy and strong one. But Netanyahu plays his hand cautiously despite his feeling of invulnerability.

The Israeli attack on the Damascus suburbs took place despite the Russian C-400 operating in Syria. Experts say the C-400 has been placed in Latakia and it can't effectively protect the skies above the Syrian capital, while the C-300 purchased by the Syrians and located in Damascus has been hit by Israelis. Meanwhile, the Israeli Air Force is training at avoiding and coping with a C-300 in Cyprus, as that country has a C-300 of its own, recently bought from the Russians.

Putin has nothing to gain from confrontation with Israel; Israel prefers to have its way without fighting the Russians. Perhaps, sooner or later, the Israeli and Russian Air Forces will joust; but meanwhile both sides prefer to postpone that moment.

Putin hopes Erdogan will give up on Syria. This is not an easy task, but not an impossible one, either. For that, Putin must work with President Obama - or with the next American President.

Putin vs Western Leaders

It is often said that President Obama is a weak leader. I do not think so. He is a wily and sophisticated player. He voids every agreement his country made with Russia. There were, and are agreements galore: from Minsk to the recent UN SC resolutions. At first (and second) sight, the agreements follow the Russian line. Otherwise, the Russians would not sign them. However, after a while Obama offers a different interpretation. I would not like to argue against him in a court of law. He is as tricky as any lawyer.

Did he give up on the "Assad must go" mantra? It is not clear. He, and his Secretary of State John Kerry sometimes say that he may stay, but quickly contradict themselves and insist on his departure. They introduce new and peculiar ideas daily. For example, they say "Only Sunnis may deal with the Syrian crisis". This strange idea inspired the Saudis and they even claimed they organised a huge coalition of Sunni states to fight Daesh. Needless to say, within a few days this "coalition" vanished like dew under sunrays.

However, at the bottom line, Obama plays by a Cold War script against Russia. Like a drunkard accuses others of heavy drinking, he accused Mitt Romney of "Cold War thinking", and warned Putin of his "Cold War thinking", but as a disciple of Zbigniew Brzezinski he hardly can think of anything else. Even Pentagon generals complained about this matrix of his mind, says Seymour Hersh.

There is nothing Putin wants less than a new round of the Cold War. He is not a new Soviet leader. People who dream of a new Stalin are barking up a wrong tree. One may regret it, and many Russians do regret it, but Putin has no great plans of social rearrangement. His ambition is more modest: he wants Russia to be independent, prosperous, great, and equal to other great nations like it was in 19th century.

Last week I was at the St Petersburg Cultural Forum, a gathering of artists, curators, and art ministers from 40 countries, and it was clear that Putin's Russia is much more interested in its pre-revolutionary past and in the 19th century in general, than in 20th or 21st century art. They performed a lost play by Puccini, they reconstructed Petipa ballets, they read Tolstoy. They rebuilt palaces, they fixed old theatres, even the pre-revolutionary circus had been returned to its old glory inclusive of its old well-forgotten name and the royal circle. So many restaurants bear names reminding everyone of the Tsar times.

There is a wind of nostalgia in Russia, and it is for Russia of Leo Tolstoy and Tchaikovsky. Putin has ordered that the remains of the White generals, philosophers, artists be brought back for burial on the Russian soil. Soviet and Communist memories are suppressed. Recently, Prime Minister Medvedev called for another bout of commemorations for Stalin's victims. I am not sure that this is a wise policy; perhaps it would be better to let past to take care of itself. But here we are: Putin and his crowd are old-style liberals, not social reformers. They do not want to raise the banner of revolt. They want to fit into the world as it is, but as equals.

The problem is, there are people who are hell-bent on hegemony and full-spectrum dominance, and they are not likely to allow Russia to go its own way. They want to impose their rules, and set in place their docile rulers. That's why the very modest intentions of Putin meet so much resistance in NATO and the Pentagon, in the White House and in Westminster. What's worse, these people already control the mainstream politics of many countries, from the US to Japan, to France and Sweden. It does not matter which of the mainstream politicians win elections, the result is the same.

Putin's (and Russia's) hope lays in politicians outside the controlled mainstream. Donald Trump is a good example. Putin is not particularly interested in US internal politics and in Mr Trump's unusual proposals. This is an internal matter of the US, and Putin steers clear of it, like he wants the US to steer clear of Russia's internal matters. For him, what is important, is that Trump's America would not try to dominate the world and impose its agenda. The moral question whether Trump's ideas about Muslims or Latinos are lofty or base is a question for the American people to decide. Putin and many other foreign leaders want America's non-interference in their internal affairs.

The rude Mr. Trump seems to be the candidate least likely to push the button for nuclear suicide of mankind. Much less likely than nice Mrs Clinton who could nuke Russia because Russians do not celebrate gay marriages. Remember, her nice husband bombed Belgrade because the nasty Serbs did not allow for the secession of Croats (or was it Albanians?)

Trump - or any straightforward decent politician who does not take orders from the Masters of Discourse - would be able to play ball with Mr Putin, by classical rules of international law. Trump and Putin could return the concept of sovereignty to its privileged position. This would end many wars. The war in Syria began when Mr Obama and Mr Hollande said "Assad must go". By the classical rules, no state may interfere in the affairs of another sovereign state. From the Russian point of view, the war in Syria is first of all a war for sovereignty and against global Imperial vassaldom.

The Russians want to light their Christmas trees and wish Merry Christmas and go with their women and children to a Christian church without being scolded by the Obamas and Clintons of this world for insufficient political correctness and failure to mention Kwanzaa.

That's why it is important for all of us if we may hope to reach peace, this Christmas or the next one.

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 #5
Kremlin.ru
December 22, 2015
First Russian Internet Economy Forum

Vladimir Putin attended the First Russian Internet Economy Forum.

The First Russian Internet Economy Forum is taking place in Moscow on December 21-22. The plenary session, attended by representatives of the national IT industry and relevant ministries and agencies, is dedicated to initiatives for the long-term development programme of the Russian Internet segment and branches of the economy using internet technologies.

Prior to the plenary session, the President attended an exhibition of innovative projects, where was shown, in particular, developments in bank technologies, cyber- protection for industrial facilities and those directed at enhancing the accessibility of public services for the public.

Vladimir Putin also had a conversation with Forum participants.

President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Good afternoon, friends.

Together with your board, we have just had a detailed discussion of the issues you considered yesterday regarding specific branches of the economy. I found it interesting. I hope we have managed to agree on certain matters. I can see my aide Igor Shchegolev here, the former Minister and now my Presidential Aide. We agreed that if our colleagues decide to do so, then we will be happy to hand over the responsibility for everything you agreed on and proposed as necessary for joint efforts to promote your initiatives to one of your colleagues, whom I invited to work at the Presidential Executive Office with Mr Shchegolev. This will allow us to promote your ideas within the Presidential Executive Office as well, and also within the executive bodies in the Government and the regions of the Russian Federation, which is no less important.

Generally, in the past years the Internet has certainly become part of our daily lives. Moreover, it has become a separate industry practically all over the world, and you spoke about this yesterday. Russia is keeping abreast of things, of course. I may be saying very general things not intended for this audience, maybe for those who are standing there with the cameras, so that people in this country will find out more about this: Russia has the largest number of Internet users - in excess of 80 million people, with 62 million of them going online on a daily basis. As one of the board members said, people look at their phones about 300 times a day to see what is going on in the world, or in everyday life, things that interest people who use the Internet.

The number of commercial Internet users is also growing rapidly. The Internet market accounts for 16 percent of the GDP. Remote access technologies are extensively used to provide public and municipal services, which I am very happy to say, because just recently we were only beginning here. Generally, there has been good progress. In the previous year, more than a third of all public and municipal services became available online.

The significance and influence of the Internet are constantly growing. We need to use the Internet as a driver of modernisation for the entire country (this is an undisputed fact and nobody has any doubt about it, and we are ready to help and support you in your endeavours) to raise the quality of life, to create a new technological basis for the national economy and, of course, for the social spheres - education and healthcare.

The Internet Initiatives Development Fund has become one of the instruments available for resolving these tasks. We set it up two years ago and it seems to be doing well. It already has 6 billion rubles at its disposal. Over the 2.5 years of its work, the Fund has added over 170 projects to its portfolio designed to resolve specific issues facing both individuals and businesses.

We definitely need to develop a strategy for the long-term development of the Russian Internet, taking into consideration the overall development tendencies of the world wide web. I fully agree with you that, bearing in mind the overall tendencies and with great respect for our partners and competition, we must create common living and working conditions for all on this market. Nobody, primarily our national participants, should be put in a situation that would make you less competitive. I fully agree with those who referred to the decisions we are making in the real economy, in industry and agriculture, saying: we do offer certain benefits to Russian market players, to national producers, so why not do the same here. I agree: we are ready to consider this and do something, provided, of course, that it does not violate our WTO commitments. I am certain we can find appropriate solutions.

I would like to wish you success. Thank you very much.

#6
www.rt.com
December 22, 2015
'14 years of occupation by world's richest nation, Afghanistan remains desperate'

Outside forces cannot dictate what a country's governing system is going to look like, but that's what's happening in Afghanistan, says Medea Benjamin, cofounder of left-wing NGO Code Pink told RT.

Two attacks took place in Afghanistan on Monday. Three rockets hit the diplomatic area in Kabul some way from the center of the city. That happened after a motorbike suicide bomber carried out an attack on the Bagram air base killing six US troops.

Meanwhile, the Taliban is aggressively pushing back into Helmand province. The militants are said to be close to overrunning the key city of Sangin.

US Secretary of State John Kerry has described developments in Afghanistan as positive. However, American political activist Medea Benjamin doesn't agree calling it a ridiculous statement.

"The US has spent probably a trillion dollars in Afghanistan and it remains one of the poorest countries in the world; one of the worst places for women to have children; one of the worst rates of illiteracy among women," she told RT.

The US invaded Afghanistan in 2001 after the 9/11 attacks carried out on US soil, and according to Benjamin, "it is certainly not a country that after 14 years of being occupied by the richest country in the world has much to speak for it in terms of development."

Islamic State (IS, formerly ISIS/ISIL) is now fighting the Taliban which could make things even worse for the Afghan people.

Activist argues that it is terrible that after all of these years and the billions of dollars the US has put into training local Afghan forces they are still not able to control their own country.

"I think it is a reflection of the fact that outside forces coming in cannot dictate what a country's governing system is going to look like," said Benjamin.

She suggests there has always been a need for a political solution to the problems in Afghanistan and the US should put its money into developing the country instead of the military.

Speculating on possible solutions, the activist said there have been constant attempts at talk with the Taliban. However, she believes that they need to get serious about that.

"John Kerry should put some of his diplomatic energies into finding a political solution that is going to unfortunately have to include the Taliban as part of a transition. The Taliban are local people and they can't be wished away," Benjamin told RT.

"But I think the remaining 10,000 US troops are not going to be enough to dictate to the Afghan government what its policy should be," she continued.

Benjamin said that it has to be a political solution and all energy and resources should be put into that goal.

'Obama administration wants to push SEAL abuses in Afghanistan under the rug'

Meanwhile, a New York Times report has accused the US Navy of covering up the abuse of Afghan detainees which took place in May 2012.

The Naval Criminal Investigative Service launched an investigation into a case where torture resulted in the death of a man detained by US Navy SEALS. Despite eyewitness accounts against the US servicemen, the navy probe dismissed the charges, claiming the evidence didn't support the alleged misconduct.

Criminal defense attorney and former CIA officer Jack Rice speaking about detainee abuse said that in a case like this there should not have been a minimal investigation.

"This should have been a full-blown criminal investigation, which is far more serious on the military side," he told RT.

He added that if they wanted to take this to the extreme, they could have been charged in Federal Court, which is a civilian court in the US.

"Based upon the fact that there was a death in this case it should have not been investigated as it was," Rice said.

Rice argues that the investigation could be reopened "based upon the seriousness of the case and the fact that essentially it was dismissed."

"It is disturbing that they seem to make a decision to treat this as inconsequentially as they have really based upon the death of one of the detainees," he continued.

The SEAL's commander said the evidence provided in the report was inconsistent.

Rice said it was possible there are inconsistencies in the report. "But that in itself it doesn't mean that you shouldn't go forward with an investigation," he added.

According to Rice, he regularly encounters reports that have inconsistencies within them.

"That doesn't stop the investigation, that doesn't stop the prosecution; just because some things don't completely add up does not mean you should not continue to dig; it doesn't mean that you should not potentially even charge somebody with serious criminal offenses," he added.

The former CIA officer considers the US government is trying to bury the investigation itself.

"The fact that what they did was divert this to a minimal investigation and to the kind of investigation and process for inconsequential events, rather than something far more serious really tells me that they are sort of trying to push it away, to try to put it under the rug."

In 2009 President Obama said he didn't think 2000 pictures of torture should be released because this would endanger US troops abroad. Rice argues that President Obama decided he was not going to release the Abu Ghraib photos.

"When he was running for office he promised he wanted transparency and he wanted the American people and the world to see the photos themselves," he told RT.

In conclusion he said that "the likelihood of success in reopening this is not very certain at this point."

"My expectation is it will not be reopened," Rice predicted.

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#7
The National Interest
December 23, 2015
America's Cold War Master Plan to Nuke Russia
Now for the first time, we know which Russian cities would have been destroyed, and why.
By Michael Peck
Michael Peck, a frequent contributor to the National Interest, is a defense and historical writer based in Oregon. His work has appeared in Foreign Policy, WarIsBoring and many other fine publications.

If the Cold War had turned thermonuclear, we know that the United States and Soviet Union would have been devastated.

But now for the first time, we know which Russian cities would have been destroyed, and why. The U.S. government has finally declassified the 1950s Strategic Air Command target list, which would have dispatched American bombers and missiles on nuclear strikes across the Communist world.

"SAC listed over 1200 cities in the Soviet bloc, from East Germany to China, also with priorities established," according to the National Security Archive, the non-governmental organization which requested the declassified information. "Moscow and Leningrad were priority one and two respectively. Moscow included 179 Designated Ground Zeros (DGZs) while Leningrad had 145, including 'population' targets." [http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb538-Cold-War-Nuclear-Target-List-Declassified-First-Ever/]

But at least in theory, this would not have been wanton destruction or terror bombing. There was supposed to be method behind the nuclear madness. SAC's priority was to destroy Soviet airpower before Soviet bombers-this was before ICBMs were developed in the 1960s-could strike American and Western European targets. Some 1,100 airfields were targeted and prioritized, with the Soviet Tu-16 Badger bomber bases in Bykhov and Orsha in Byelorussia at the top of the list. Once Soviet airwar capability had been destroyed, and assuming both sides were in any state to continue the war, then Soviet industry would have been bombed next.

And so would a lot of innocents. The SAC target list, compiled in 1956 and published as part of a 1959 nuclear weapons planning study, deliberately included civilian populations.

The SAC plan specified "the 'systematic destruction' of Soviet bloc urban-industrial targets that specifically and explicitly targeted 'population' in all cities, including Beijing, Moscow, Leningrad, East Berlin, and Warsaw," noted National Security Archive researchers. "Purposefully targeting civilian populations as such directly conflicted with the international norms of the day, which prohibited attacks on people per se (as opposed to military installations with civilians nearby)."

Most of the 800 pages of documents consist of lists of targets and their associated alphanumeric target numbers. SAC planners assumed in 1959 they could strike with 2,130 B-52 and B-47 bombers, RB-47 reconnaissance aircraft, and F-101 fighter escorts. In addition, there would be 376 nuclear-tipped cruise and bomber-launched missiles, as well as early intermediate-range missiles. The 1959 study also states that missiles-this was before ICBMs were developed in the 1960s-had such a low chance of destroying their targets that manned bombers would be the primary weapons.

Because SAC was so fixed on quickly knocking out Soviet air power, H-bombs would have been dropped to explode on the ground rather than in mid-air. While airbursts would have produced more heat and radiation, the focus on was achieving maximum blast damage to destroy Soviet aircraft and bases, despite some unintended side effects. "While the objections to surface burst and the probability of radioactive fallout affecting friendly forces and people have been considered, the requirement to win the Air Power Battle is paramount to all other considerations," said the SAC study.

However, SAC defined the Soviet airpower infrastructure quite broadly, to include any command and industrial centers that could support a Russian air campaign. Thus Moscow was listed as having numerous military command centers, aircraft and missile factories, atomic weapons laboratories and oil refineries.

Despite being a Nuclear Age force, SAC's strategy more resembled the U.S. bomber offensive against Germany and Japan in World War II than twenty-first century warfare. Concentrating on the Soviet air force and its infrastructure would have been familiar goals to B-17 and B-29 commanders (which were indeed the people who ran SAC in the 1950s, including Curtis Lemay). Though it also seems a quaintly long-war strategy, as if the Soviets were really going to capable of mass-producing bombers and nuclear weapons after the initial nuclear exchange. The belief that missiles were too unreliable, and only manned bombers could be trusted, sounds much like the drone vs. manned aircraft debate today.

Did SAC's targeting strategy make sense? The better question is, who cares? Fortunately for the human race, we never had a chance to find out.
 

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 #8
Russia Beyond the Headlines/Rossiyskaya Gazeta
www.rbth.ru
December 23, 2015
From literary jam to live readings: Recapping the Year of Literature
The Year of Literature offered much to enjoy for writers, bloggers and sweet lovers alike. RBTH has collected all the most interesting facts and figures from this literary extravaganza.
ANASTASIA SKORONDAEVA, ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA

The ceremony of passing the baton from the Year of Literature to the Year of Cinema was held in St. Petersburg on Dec.  14. All the attention on literature this year has thrown up some interesting statistics.

1) The winner of a narrating competition held during the festival book market took home 55 pounds of fruit and vegetables. During the first weekend of fall, shelves filled with books were interspersed with the usual ones holding produce at Moscow's Danilovsky food court and market. Surprised shoppers were able to take home good literature along with their normal purchases.

2) Continuing the culinary theme, 120 liters of "literary jam" was cooked around Russia. The staff of Rossiyskaya Gazeta found old recipes and made jam outdoors in writers' estates for the entire summer. They made the plum dessert from Anna Karenina in Tolstoy's Yasnaya Polyana estate in Tula Region and used local apples from Sergei Yesenin's native village of Konstantinovo in Ryazan Region to make a jam celebrating his birthday. Read more>>>

3) In December, 1300 people took 60 hours to read Leo Tolstoy's War and Peace in a live broadcast. Three months before Natasha Rostova and Andrei Bolkonsky took the stage, another live reading project, Chekhov Alive by Google, saw the great playwright's characters broadcast over the internet for 24 hours straight.

4) From June 25-28, Red Square hosted its first ever book fair, at which more than 500,000 books from 300 publishing houses across 50 regions of Russia were presented. From St. Basil's Cathedral to the State Historical Museum the square hosted discussions, a library, a writer's office and even a children's playground. More than 200,000 people attended the writers' seminars, concerts and theatrical performances that formed part of the year's biggest literary event. Read more>>>

5) Literature also caught the public imagination away from the big-name festivals, markets and awards. Sergei Nifashev, a street cleaner and blogger from Blagoveshchensk, collected more than 100 rare editions in his basement, finding all of them among the city's trash! When he went through the books he found old money and photos. A rare find indeed, and not one we recommend trying to repeat - there could be all kinds of nasty bugs lurking among the trash.

An abridged version of the article first published in Russian by Rossiyskaya Gazeta:
http://www.rg.ru/2015/12/14/goda.html

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 #9
Reuters
December 23, 2015
Ukraine health system in danger of collapse as reforms stall
STAIKY, UKRAINE | BY ALESSANDRA PRENTICE
 
Paint is flaking on the damp walls and cracked ceilings of the small hospital in the Ukrainian village of Staiky and much of the equipment is over 30 years old.

Running hot water is not guaranteed and the hospital, serving about 2,800 people in Staiky and other villages, has not been refurbished since Soviet times.

There is also little hope of a change for the better among medical staff who rely on charitable donations, often from local businessmen, to buy even basic medicines and the petrol needed to visit patients in remote areas.


A reform drive launched by the Western-leaning government installed after a pro-Moscow president, Viktor Yanukovich, was overthrown in a popular uprising last year has become mired in bureaucratic inertia, arguments and allegations of corruption.

"I don't know who is writing and carrying out reforms at the top or if they have ever been to a village and seen how people live and with what medical services," said family doctor Nadiya Martynenko in Staiky, a cluster of dilapidated one-story houses on the River Dnieper, an hour's drive from the capital Kiev.

She said state funds cover only the electricity and meager staff salaries, and that over the past decade "they've cut everything they could and even what they shouldn't ... it's very precarious."

Staiky is far from unique. Soviet-era hospitals across the country of 42 million are crumbling, underpayment of medical staff continues to foster a system of bribe-taking and Ukraine's poor vaccination rate has placed it on a blacklist alongside some of the world's poorest countries, including South Sudan.

Corruption has plagued Ukraine since the country gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. But under Yanukovich, it became much worse.

Health Minister Alexander Kvitashvili, one of several foreigners appointed to ministerial positions in the hope that their outsider status and international experience would help Ukraine make good on reform promises, hoped to recreate successful reforms carried out in his native Georgia.

A year after his appointment, the health bill outlining reforms is stuck in parliament.

"It's frustrating. There are vested interests - they're everywhere ... Working with the parliament we differ on what a basic understanding of reform is," Kvitashvili told Reuters.

Without a complete reboot, "financially the system will collapse in about a year, if not faster, because there is no way Ukraine can increase spending to a sustainable level," he said.

DEMOCRACY STRUGGLING

The stalled health bill is one of many examples of the slow progress Ukraine is making in reforming its economy, prompting Western backers to question Kiev's commitment to ending crooked practices that pushed the country to the brink of bankruptcy.

Squabbles in parliament have held up other bills. Some of these are required for the disbursement of funds under a $40-billion international bailout program, and Kiev's Western backers warn that its attempt to rebuild itself on transparent, democratic lines is under threat.

Ukraine's progress has also been hampered by a conflict in the east of the country between government forces and pro-Russian separatists and a deterioration in relations with Russia, which annexed the Crimea region in 2014.

The health ministry's reforms were finalised in April and brought to parliament for approval in July but discussions have dragged on, Kvitashvili said. As he did so, he turned off his cellphone, its ringtone set to the theme tune from TV series Game of Thrones, in which rival clans battle for influence.

Part of the plan focuses on separating the procurement and delivery of health services, a system which until now has allowed most contracts to be brokered in backroom deals with little external oversight.

According to a report by the Anticorruption Action Center, a Ukrainian civil society organization, only six out of 6,500 authorized pharmaceutical companies took part in the procurement of HIV drugs in Ukraine in 2013, sharing among themselves a market worth $30.9 million.

The salaries of doctors are too low to eradicate the use of bribes between patient and practitioner, which means many of the health industry's financial dealings are done in the shadows.

"You can see head doctors driving Porsches and having Vertu phones, but the hospitals are in an abysmal condition," Kvitashvili said.

The "informal" part of the healthcare economy amounts to about $7 billion per year - more than triple the size of the state's annual expenditure on health, he estimated.

Frustration over the lack of progress prompted Kvitashvili to tender his resignation in the summer, only to have it rejected by parliament.

Some commentators have said he lacks the know-how to navigate the web of allegiances that continues to bind Ukraine's ruling class despite avowed attempts to move on from the political cronyism of the past.

"I believe he wants reforms, but he doesn't totally understand the reality of Ukraine - that if someone promises their support it doesn't mean they won't try and trip you up," doctor and healthcare commentator Evgeny Komarovsky said

Alexandra Ustinova, from the Anticorruption Action Center, also said there was a conflict of interests in some of the appointments at the ministry, such as bringing in a lawyer who used to work for a pharmaceutical company owned by a member of parliament from President Petro Poroshenko's party.

"CATASTROPHE"

Giovanna Barberis, the Ukraine representative of the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), said "the obstacles (to reforms) are huge and sometimes it looks pretty grim because the pace is extremely slow."

The start of an immunization campaign following an outbreak of polio on Sept. 1 was delayed by several weeks, prompting Ellyn Ogden, worldwide polio coordinator for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), to criticize the "highest levels of government" for an inadequate response.

She said "no other country in the world is in such a dire situation or shows such disregard for protecting children against childhood diseases."

The Global Polio Eradication Initiative, which is spearheaded by the World Health Organization, said: "For some time, Ukraine has been a catastrophe waiting to happen."

Ukraine did not buy drugs, medicines or vaccines for most of this year as the health ministry sought to approve a temporary procurement system via international organizations to bypass the compromised system that Kvitashvili hopes to reform.

The temporary system was finalised in late October, and Ukraine plans to buy around $100 million of vaccines and medicines, but severe shortages remain.

"There are no anti-diphtheria vaccines in the country," healthcare commentator Komarovsky said.

Meanwhile the more drastic reform bill is languishing in parliament and Kvitashvili says his resignation is still on the table.

"Well my letter is still there. I did not withdraw it. We will see how the Parliament will act," he said by email.

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