#2
Irrussianality
https://irrussianality.wordpress.com
December 8, 2015
OPINION POLLS
PEACE OR JUSTICE?
By Paul Robinson
Paul Robinson is a professor in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa, and the author of numerous books on Russia and Soviet history, including 'Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich: Supreme Commander of the Russian Army'
[Chart here https://irrussianality.wordpress.com/2015/12/08/peace-or-justice/]

Which is more important - peace or justice? According to the standard interpretation of Just War Theory, there is a 'presumption against war'; the harm war does is so great that anybody wishing to wage it has to prove their case beyond all reasonable doubt, and peace - defined as 'an absence of war' - is a supreme value. Some philosophers, however, claim that there is no presumption against war. Rather there is a 'presumption against injustice'. In this view, an absence of war ('negative peace') is not true peace at all. In order to produce a 'positive peace', in which justice flourishes, it is permissible to fight.

An interesting new survey reveals that the inhabitants of different countries have very different attitudes towards this issue. According to the Halifax/IPSOS Global Snapshot, produced for the 2015 Halifax International Security Forum, 'over 70% of Americans and Chinese - more than any other country - believe that under certain conditions, war is necessary to achieve justice ... [but] only 38% of Russians agree with that statement.' I have been unable to copy the chart used in the Global Snapshot Report, but have entered the data into an Excel spreadsheet to produce a version which shows the main results, as follows:

Percentage saying that war is sometimes necessary to achieve justice (Halifax-IPSOS)

A number of things come out of this. First, the Anglosphere (the USA, UK, Australia, Canada, and to some extent India) is remarkably belligerent. Second, Hispanic countries (Mexico, Spain, Brazil, and Argentina) seem remarkably peace-loving. Third, Russia is a lot less inclined to wage war for some interpretation of 'justice' than most Western states. How do we explain these differences?

Power may have something to do with it. The United States, China, and Saudi Arabia are, probably not coincidentally, the first, second, and third largest spenders on defence in the world, while the UK is fifth. It would appear that having a lot of weapons may create, or spring from, an inclination to use them. But that wouldn't explain why Russia and Japan (4th largest and 7th largest spenders respectively) are so much less inclined to use force than the USA and China. There appear to be some missing variables.

Culture and history are obvious candidates to fill the gap. As I have mentioned in previous posts, 'just war' isn't part of the Russian philosophical tradition. War is seen as a tragic necessity, fought for reasons of security and not as a means of pursuing 'justice'. By contrast, the modern Western philosophy of universal human rights means that it is relatively easy for Western Europeans and North Americans to regard war as something which can bring justice to the world. The religious zeal of the Saudis may perhaps give them a somewhat similar attitude. Overall, I speculate that countries which prefer peace to justice either haven't had much experience with war (Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico), and so haven't got into the bad habit of thinking that it might be a good idea, or have had really bad experiences with war (Japan, Spain, Germany, and Russia), and so have learnt the hard way that war doesn't bring justice and is best avoided.

What obviously isn't true is the much beloved neoconservative idea that democracies are peace-loving. Some are, but some aren't. And Russians, it appears, value peace more highly than Americans.

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 #3
www.rt.com
December 9, 2015
Before Su-24 downing Putin personally apologized to Erdogan over previous airspace violation

Prior to the downing of the Su-24, Russian President Vladimir Putin had personally apologized to Turkey's Erdogan for the previous violation of Turkish airspace by a Russian aircraft, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has stated.

In an interview with Italian journalists, Lavrov said that Russia sees no other reason behind the incident with its Su-24 other than an attempt by Turkey to undermine anti-terrorism efforts or even derail the political process in Syria, which has begun to take shape on the basis of the Vienna agreement.

"Our assessment of what happened on November 24 remains completely the same. We see no other explanation other than a desire to disrupt counterterrorism efforts and make them less effective, or to prevent the Russian Federation from working in Syrian airspace, or perhaps even to derail the political process beginning to take shape on the basis of the Vienna agreement."

Lavrov also said that Moscow has long known about the use of Turkish territory for the training of Islamic State (IS, formerly ISIS/ISIL) militants for a number of operations, including in the North Caucasus, but was reluctant to talk about it publicly, not wanting to believe that official support came from Ankara.

"Frankly, we have known for a long time how Turkish territory is being used for commercial operations with ISIS, for the transfer of weapons and terrorists to Syria, as well as to provide extremists and militants with an opportunity to heal and rest, and then get ready for new operations, not only in Syria, but also in other regions, including our North Caucasus," Lavrov said.

Lavrov has proposed a thorough examination on how Turkey performs goals set by the coalition in Syria.

"We need to examine how a member of the US-led coalition - the Republic of Turkey - performs goals set by the coalition," the minister said. "Why is it not bombing terrorists as such, but the Kurds instead? [Kurds] whom Americans consider as potential, and maybe already actual, allies in the fight against terror."

Islamic State can be defeated "quickly enough" if the potential of the US coalition and that of Russia's air force are united, the Russian foreign minister stressed. It's also important to arrange coordination with ground forces, Lavrov stated.

"It [the anti-terrorist coalition] should be comprised, first and foremost, of ground forces, with air support. Air power is sufficient if you sum up the potential of the US coalition and of the Russian Federation, and in the case of establishing a clear interaction with ground forces, I believe the Islamic State problem can be solved quickly enough."

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 #4
Government.ru
December 9, 2015
In Conversation with Dmitry Medvedev: Interview with five television channels

Prime Minister answered questions from TV anchors Irada Zeinalova (Channel One), Sergei Brilyov (Rossiya), Kirill Pozdnyakov (NTV), Yelizaveta Osetinskaya (RBC TV) and Mikhail Fishman (TV Rain).

Sergei Brilyov: Good afternoon. On behalf of the media holding that hosts this broadcast it is my pleasure to welcome you on Rossiya 1, Rossiya 24 TV stations, as well as Vesti FM and Mayk radio stations. We are live with the annual Conversation with Dmitry Medvedev.

Good afternoon, Mr Medvedev.

Dmitry Medvedev: Good afternoon.

Sergei Brilyov: Mr Medvedev, you know all my colleagues present here today. Since I represent the network that is broadcasting today's interview, I would like to ask the first question, if I may.

The past year was quite challenging, to say the least. The Government prepared an anti-crisis plan. Although it is clear that it has played its role, the question of whether it has been effective is less obvious. Every three months we are hearing that we have reached the bottom, and that the economy has started to grow. This growth then comes to a halt and some new trends emerge. Is the anti-crisis plan working or not? What are your impressions about it?

Dmitry Medvedev: It is true that the situation is challenging. Let me remind you, however, that the last several years were not easy for us either. This is just the way things are internationally and domestically. Speaking about my perspective, I can say that the anti-crisis plan delivered on its objectives. This has helped us weather the most difficult period this year, and this plan has succeeded in nearly all spheres that we identified as being of the utmost importance.

What does this mean? The goal was to stop the decline in production and in the economy as a whole. Based on the data that are available to the Government, I can tell you that the downturn in the economy and production has been stopped, and we believe that growth will resume next year. This is the first thing I wanted to say.

The second is that the key priority of any antirecession plan is to prevent a decline in living standards. Of course, it's for the people to decide if we have succeeded or not, but I'd like to say that we have implemented very important measures, such as the indexation of the funded component of retirement pensions to equal inflation. As a result, the pensions that our people receive do not lose value due to inflation. This is very important, considering that very few countries approve such indexation measures in conditions that can be described as an economic crisis. But we have done this.

The third thing I'd like to mention, which I consider to be of exceptional importance for the national economy, is, of course, support for our financial system. We can talk as long as we please about taking care of people's income and about indexing their wages, but nothing good will come of this if the financial system falters and the banking system totters. We have supported our financial system, and our banking system is in functioning properly. I don't accept recent criticisms. You've helped the banks, these people say, but the banks have enough money and other assets as it is. But when banks go down the drain, when they collapse, the entire economy comes to a standstill. Those who remember the 1998 crisis and other difficult periods know this very well.

We have supported our production sectors and the agriculture industry. There are a number of programmes underway. Where did the crisis strike first? It has hit the most vulnerable spots such as the automotive industry. We have invested big money in our automotive industry, so this is why now, despite the downturn... Yes, the sector has declined, although not as much as we feared. The agriculture industry is in good shape. This year's growth rate will be between 2.5 percent and 3 percent even despite a number of restraints, primarily financial ones. This is why I believe that the antirecession plan has succeeded. It's a different question whether we should extend it.

Yelizaveta Osetinskaya: Mr Medvedev, next year's budget looks very optimistic: the price of oil, that's factored into it, is $10 above the current price, the inflation rate is half what we have now, and growth, instead of decline. Don't you think that this budget is excessively optimistic? Do you have a plan B and how does the Government intend to deliver on the objectives set forth in this budget?

Dmitry Medvedev: According to the latest estimates, and judging by the forecasts we have to date, I can say...Let me first explain why I said "to date." What I meant is that the current situation is extremely volatile, as the economists say, which means that there is a lot of uncertainty in terms of economic development. Of course, we have had to update our forecasts more than once. So, according to recent estimates, and judging by the latest forecasts, I think this scenario is quite realistic. We can cut the inflation rate in half, down to 6.4 percent, as we promise in this budget because inflation is already slowing. You know all too well that inflation has almost levelled off in recent months. This is my first point.

My second point is that we can move into a trajectory of tangible, if not solid, economic growth. It is true that there are different perspectives in this respect. The Central Bank has its perspective, which is somewhat less optimistic than that of the Ministry of Economic Development. That said, under the most pessimistic forecasts we'll have zero growth, while there are also relatively optimistic economic growth projections predicting an increase of up to 1 percent. This is quite good, since, as we know, economic growth rates are sluggish around the world. The European economy is growing at 1.5 percent. This is an average for the EU, and in some member states the economy is actually shrinking. As for our partners, for example a close partner like Brazil has been in a recession for the last 18 months. The Chinese economy has slowed considerably as well, which goes to show that this is a global trend.

For that reason, we believe that in the current environment our scenario is quite realistic. However, not having a plan B, as you said, or even a plan C, if need be, means poor governance. Of course, oil prices are far from gladdening. We discussed this issue recently with you. It's true that the price of oil is at its lowest point in the last 17 years. I'll remind you what happened over the last few years. Just a few years ago we were at the peak with oil at $150 per barrel, and now the price is $37-$38 per barrel. I'm talking about Urals, not Brent, which often pops up in various tables and on websites. If you compare these prices with 1998 when oil was at its all-time low of $9  a barrel, I mean an all-time low for Russia, not the Soviet Union, it turns out the purchasing power of the dollar has changed by almost three times. Thus, we could argue that the price of oil is at a 20-year low.

Of course, there is nothing positive about the fact that the Russian economy depends on oil to such a large extent, but we were not the ones who created this structure. This dependency has been shaped over the last 60 years, so it will surely take more than five or ten years to turn things around. So if the need arises, if the times are hard, if we face a worst-case scenario on the oil and gas market, we'll have to make adjustments. In this respect, the position of the Government will be absolutely realistic.

Mikhail Fishman: Mr Medvedev, since the issue of oil prices has come up, naturally, amid falling budget revenues, the budget as a whole has to be trimmed. However, my question concerns the budget structure, because over the past few years we have been seeing a significant (relative) rise in defenсe spending against the backdrop of social spending cuts, in particular education and healthcare. I'd like you to comment on this. Is this a change of priorities?

Dmitry Medvedev: Mikhail, I take a somewhat different view of this. Indeed, over a certain period we increased defenсe spending. This is so. What's more, it was done practically five years ago, and I believe that we did the right thing, because by that time, unfortunately, the status of our military hardware, as well as the status of our armed forces as such, was below par. Now we've brought this spending up to international levels and our objective is to provide our armed forces with some 70 percent of new weapons and equipment by 2020. Why? Because no one country, not even the smallest country, can sacrifice its defenсe capabilities. Even a very small country in terms of population and territory has to earmark significant resources for defenсe and security. What about our country then? We are the biggest, the largest country in the world, with the longest border. If we do not have effective armed forces we will simply have no country. I believe this to be obvious.

However, I'm saying this now, not to say that we've built up security and military spending and that this is our main priority, our overriding priority while everything else is subordinated to it. That would be a one-sided approach. Indeed, this had to be done at some point.

Regarding social spending. Let's admit it openly and frankly: Over the past 15 years, social spending has been growing rapidly. Yes, there were prerequisites for this: Oil prices rose and we were able to spend more. As a result, we significantly expanded the scope of our social commitments, very much so. Suffice it to recall wages and pensions in the late 1990s, even relative to foreign exchange rates, and today these are totally different figures. And we have not reduced anything. Absolutely nothing! We have not abandoned a single social obligation. So, in this sense, the social budget has been developing practically according to the same scenario as the Defence Ministry's budget.

You have mentioned certain segments: education and healthcare. Naturally, I realised that you were going to ask me about this. You know, yesterday, I took a closer look at the figures and spoke to my colleagues, other ministers. The budget of the education system - both the federal and consolidated budget - is practically unchanged. It may be changing by one-tenth of the GDP, downward. It's practically the same. The healthcare budget for next year - both federal and consolidated - is growing. Just a little, also by tenths of the GDP but it is growing, not falling.

Therefore, contrary to existing perceptions, or even some kind of a myth that social spending is declining and military spending is rising, this is not the case. Our social spending is steady, not falling. If we could, we would have increased it, but we can't do it now. However, I want to reiterate that our priorities remain unchanged with regard to education and healthcare, and spending will remain the same as in 2015.

Kirill Pozdnyakov: Mr Medvedev, I would like to focus on healthcare. On the one hand, we are now doing more high-tech surgeries, which is definitely good news. On the other hand, media are publishing a fairly large amount of information about research institutes, such as the ones operated by the Finance Ministry, working on plans to introduce restrictions on the number of free physical examinations or ambulance calls.  All services in excess of an established standard will be provided for a fee. What is this about? Is someone trying to attack the holy of holies, our free medical care?

Dmitry Medvedev: No, no one. Anyone who would try that will get a slap on the wrist or other body parts.

Kirill Pozdnyakov: They'll have to go...

Dmitry Medvedev: Correct, they'll have to go see a doctor. Of course, we need to understand how the money is spent, so there must be regulations in place. Free medical services aren't actually free. They are financed from what is called national wealth, through taxes and deductions, which all individuals and corporations pay. This wealth, this portion of the budget, should be spent properly.

Therefore, we have introduced guaranteed free medical care. It means that everyone is guaranteed to have access to a certain number of medical services. These guarantees must be honoured religiously. Any attempts to cut guaranteed services are unacceptable, and must be addressed by the executive authorities and law enforcement agencies. This is how it must be.

But we must see to it that these guarantees meet today's requirements. You mentioned high-tech medical treatment. I, of course, can't help but comment on this. As you may recall, I used to address national high-priority projects including the healthcare project.

What did we accomplish at that time? We initiated normal, free and high-tech surgery using modern equipment for the first time in recent Russian history. Since then, the volume of this type of surgery has increased almost tenfold. By the way, we achieved this over the past seven to eight years. Currently, various kinds of high-tech medical treatments are conducted free of charge, and there are no queues in some areas, although this still isn't true for all types of treatments. I believe this is a substantial and even dramatic change in the healthcare system because it is one thing to simply pay for medications (people are doing this, one way or another), but it is another thing to pay for extremely expensive high-tech medical treatment. As a rule, the whole world is doing this with the help of compulsory or voluntary medical insurance systems. Naturally, we are still mostly using the compulsory medical insurance system which is performing quite well. Instead of going abroad, many Russian citizens have started undergoing this surgery in Russia because foreign hospitals are more expensive and various other problems. We need to maintain this system no matter what. Please note that, in his address, the President specially talked about this issue and said that, until the compulsory medical insurance programme's section on high-tech medical treatment is fully effective (certain directives need to be issued in this area, and certain economic processes initiated), we will be forced to finance this type of surgery straight from the budget. We will simply borrow budget funding and allocate it. I believe this is the best way to guarantee that people will be able to afford medical treatment.

The healthcare system is facing many challenges. Patients are being forced to pay for services which should be free. We know about bribery and extortion but it is our common job to deal with these processes. This is the job of the executive branch, law enforcement agencies and the patients themselves. They should understand that the more they give in to these kinds of transactions, the more corrupt the system becomes.

They need to report any implication of paying extra for a simple surgery or any other simple medical service.

Sergei Brilyov: Where should they complain?

Dmitry Medvedev: Where? At a higher-level agency, of course; in this case, a district healthcare department. They must tell them that a certain doctor or outpatient clinic is attempting to commercialise these healthcare services. I assure you, this will help.

Irada Zeinalova: Mr Medvedev, Finance Minister Siluanov said at a Federation Council meeting that next year would be the last time the Government will be able to use the Reserve Fund to cover the budget deficit. Is this alarming news?

Dmitry Medvedev: Yes, we should be alarmed by what Minister Siluanov said, but we are reasonable and sensible people. It is the Finance Ministry's job to dramatise the situation to make us go cold. I'm saying this openly because only the Finance Ministry can do this. The Finance Ministry is the last ditch, and the Finance Minister, whoever it is, is obliged to dramatise the situation. And this is the right approach.

As for our reserves, let's ask ourselves: Why have we accumulated them? We have accumulated them for a rainy day like this one, when we'll be able to spend them rather than sit on them mumbling: "Yes, it's a difficult situation, but we won't touch these funds. We'd better tighten our belts more and deny ourselves everything, but we won't spend our reserves." What kind of a position is this? No, we will spend our reserves, but in a reasonable way. We know that these reserves will not last forever, but if events take the predicted turn, they will allow us to weather the most difficult economic period. That's one thing.

Second, the reserves must be replenished at the first possible opportunity, and there have been opportunities like that this year. The rouble rate is highly volatile, and the Central Bank buys foreign currency whenever possible, which amounts to replenishing the reserves. We'll continue doing this, and hence the task of the Government - a clever government, which is how I see our Government - is to spend the reserves, but on the other hand, to prevent a situation where we go broke. And this is what Mr Siluanov is managing...

Irada Zeinalova: ...while at the same time trying to scare us.

Dmitry Medvedev: Yes.

Mikhail Fishman: Is he trying to scare us when he says that one day we'll have to choose between introducing new taxes and cutting social spending?

Remark: Let's take a closer look at taxes.

Dmitry Medvedev: First of all, Irada, you're right. There should be both good and bad guys in the Government. We determined all these roles in advance. There's no doubt about that. Now, I'm a good guy.

Sergei Brilyov: Oh, can I ask the good guy a question, Mr Medvedev? In particular, about taxes, since the subject has come up. We know how the posh housing and luxury tax stories can end, judging from Mr Depardieu's case. He has relocated to Russia.

Dmitry Medvedev: He's not the only one.

Sergei Brilyov: They come here, among other things, because of the 13 percent tax. Now, here is a question, not from the rich but from the middle class, which is, of course, watching the Duma debate with some anxiety, especially from the leftist perspective, regarding the possibility of introducing a progressive tax rate and moving away from 13 percent. What do you think about this?

Dmitry Medvedev: Sergei, do you consider yourself to be a member of the middle class?

Sergei Brilyov: I do.

Dmitry Medvedev: So, what do you think about the introduction of this "progress"?

Sergei Brilyov: You're putting me in an awkward situation. I've never gone to the polls nor do I plan to, but you're compelling me to give a political answer. I take a bad view of this. I believe that 13 percent should remain.

Dmitry Medvedev: Well, I see. As a matter of fact, yesterday, I also conducted a mini poll among my colleagues, other ministers, realising that we will address this issue at some stage, maybe even including the introduction of progressive taxation. I believe, first, that the 13 percent income tax, which we introduced in 2000, is something that has proven a 100 percent success of ours. Ours - I mean the ruling authority that has been around since 2000: President Putin, the government and other authorities who subsequently dealt with it. This tax has put us into a totally different league. Remember how salaries were paid in the 1990s (everyone here worked during the 1990s and remembers this very well). Money, a significant part of it, was paid in envelopes [=off the books]. When the 13 percent level was introduced the gray sphere practically disappeared and now people pay their taxes (I mean income taxes). It makes more sense to pay than not to pay. Well, then, why kill the goose that lays golden eggs?

Yes, there is a view - many leftist parties adhere to it - that progress is essential. What's at issue? It's our society's readiness for progressive taxation and the readiness of our tax system. After all, progressive taxation has pluses, since it equalises - apparently more fairly - the chances of those who participate in the sharing of the public pie, those who generate tax revenues and those who then use public funds. Well then, the collection of progressive tax revenues involves significantly higher administration costs. We will simply have to force everyone to file declarations, albeit online. Even if your wages are relatively low you will have to file a declaration from each place of employment. This will make things more complicated.

Finally, there are countries where tax evasion is a serious crime. We don't have this yet, unlike many other countries where not paying your income taxes or some other tax is simply not possible.

So the decision was made (it was endorsed by the President) not to touch the tax system in general and the 13 percent income tax in particular for the next several years.

Lastly, to ensure that those who make more money share their income in some way or the other... After all, why are incomes necessary? It's rare when a person just sits on his capital and does not invest it in anything. Usually he considers buying  a house, a car, etc. . Well, upscale housing and expensive cars are taxed at a higher rate now. So, those who procure expensive housing will contribute a greater part of  their  income all the same. I believe that today this is the optimal approach. And then we'll see what happens in five to seven years.

Kirill Pozdnyakov: Maybe we should talk about ways to save money?. I believe many people would like to ask this question, because there are legends that officials, including former ones, enjoy some incredible benefits that cut into the budget, and that spending on the government apparatus, despite claims that it is being cut, is nevertheless rising at the expense of other programmes. Is there anything that can be cut? Is that popular sentiment correct?

Dmitry Medvedev: There are things that can be cut, and that feeling is correct. Indeed, spending on the state apparatus is inflated. The state apparatus is such a thing ... The minute you turn away from it... it tends to expand. It lives by well-known governance laws. As far as I can remember (I've been in public service for a long time now), we have on many occasions decided to cut the state apparatus. It's not that we failed to act on our decisions. We did act, but then six or 12 months later, someone starts needing more money. A new task, or a new function always requires more money. Purchasing new equipment or anything like this also involves more spending. As a result, spending is always growing. I believe that any government in any country must make regular decisions on cutting government spending and trimming excess spending.

In addition, we still have traditions that were formed in the Soviet and post-Soviet period. Let's face it, our government officials are accustomed to riding in noticeably more expensive vehicles than do officials in other countries. I don't think this the proper thing to do. If you make enough money, go ahead and buy yourself a nice private car and enjoy it. However,  middle-class, not top-of-the-line, vehicles should be purchased for official use.

We decided to pare down our ministries that are part of the government bloc. The President takes all decisions on the security, defence and law enforcement departments  as these departments are related to security, although there are cuts  that can be made in these departments as well. So, we have decided to reduce the government bloc by approximately 10 percent starting next year. This is not the first time we will be doing this based on what I just said. We will, of course, see to it that this decision is implemented.

In addition, we will cut an entire line of spending on the state apparatus. More decisions are being made in other areas, including, by the way, in the sphere of civil servants' pensions and vacations. I pointed this out once during a meeting.

I said that civil servants have longer vacations than other categories of employees, but is our work that much more hazardous? There may be different approaches to this. Our work is complicated, but I wouldn't say that civil servants should have more time off than any other category of government employees. We decided to cut their vacation time. Perhaps, not all of my fellow public servants agreed with this decision, but this was the right thing to do.

With regard to the regions, there really is a decision to pay all sorts of bonuses and support former top officials from local and regional budgets. This has been left up to the regions to decide. So, I believe that the regional leaders should come clean and tell residents of their respective regions that if they feel that they have quite a prominent region head they should say that they want to provide him or her with life-long support, and let him keep the official vehicle and the country residence. Let the people decide. If they agree to it, let him or her keep their benefits. However, if the people are against it, then such benefits should be cut, because they come from the budget. We will of course provide the regions with the appropriate recommendations. I discussed this issue with our colleagues from the People's Front who engage in providing expert opinions. They've been doing this for quite a long time now. I believe that this is absolutely the right thing to do, because we need to set things straight. But I emphasise: this should be done not from Moscow, not by the President or the Government. Let the regional authorities take the liberty and say whether they want to keep or withdraw the benefits. That's the way to go.

Irada Zeinalova: Yes, hazardous production facilities. Of course, they should decide for themselves. I'm talking about money again. We met last year...

Dmitry Medvedev: Irada, they are always asking me about money.

Irada Zeinalova: But I'm talking about big money. We met last year, and, as you might recall, the dollar broke all records. That situation was very difficult psychologically.

Dmitry Medvedev: That's true.

Irada Zeinalova: This week, we are also posting some discouraging news. We understand it, this is the end of the year ... But one dollar costs about 70 roubles again. Is this the limit? What exchange rate does the Government consider the most appropriate when drafting the budget and for economic development? What can we expect?

Dmitry Medvedev: Irada, you've asked the right question, and I'm glad you recalled our conversation of 12 months ago at this same table. Indeed, to be frank, everyone, even members of the Government and, naturally, representatives of the Central Bank, were much more alarmed at that time. Of course, we realised that this process couldn't last forever, but we still had to see whether we had reached the bottom of the barrel and to evaluate exchange rate limits. Everything has stabilised. Indeed, the rouble has entered an entirely new stage, and we are now using a floating exchange rate. And that's good because no one is dictating the rouble's exchange rate. Any control implies that the exchange rate is unrealistic, and an unrealistic rate can crash at anytime. This is what happened during the Soviet and post-Soviet periods. So we're using a floating rate of exchange. But there is no hiding the fact that the rouble depends on oil revenue and oil prices to a great extent. I said this a while ago.

It's true, that I'd like to be able to say that our oil prices have hit bottom. I think this explains the rouble's sliding exchange rate. And the current exchange rates won't continue if oil prices rebound. Although forecasts are an unrewarding task, any oil price hikes influence the rouble's exchange rate, and the people have adapted to this. Therefore, the 2016 budget forecast uses an average exchange rate of about 63 roubles to the dollar. It appears that the rouble will hover around these figures. But obviously, various factors will influence the rouble rate.

I'd like to remind you that, aside from oil prices, major economic powers and the most important financial markets have been closed to us for a long time. Basically we are using our own sources of development. This is both good and bad because we have been forced to assess the value of our own economic potential for the first time. What did we do in the past? I'm talking about the Russian Government of the 1990s and 2000s. When we were in trouble, we took out Western loans. These loans were mostly taken out by commercial institutions, including banks and major corporations. They used these loans to compensate for liquidity shortages, to obtain sources of currency for signing import contracts and so on. This is now history, but we continue to live, and we even continue to develop. True, we are worse off than we would like to be. But, on the other hand, we are learning to understand the internal resources of the Russian economy. Indeed, the Russian economy has proved its self-sufficiency, and this is an established fact. To put it straight, not every country has a self-sufficient economy; some countries are unable to live without foreign assistance. But our country can certainly live and develop even in these conditions, although there is little that's positive about it.

Mikhail Fishman: This sounds promising, of course, but let me continue on the subject of money. Not without pride, you said that the Government is fulfilling its obligations with regards to the pay-as-you-go component of retirement plans. This is great, but for the second year in a row it has been decided to freeze the accumulative part of the pension. On the one hand, this undermines people's trust in the very idea of personal retirement savings that the Government obviously committed to. At the same time, the Government has been constantly discussing possibly raising the retirement age. I believe these two issues are connected. There are economists that claim that it is necessary and inevitable. Therefore, I would like to understand what your intentions are with regard to both the accumulative element and the raising of the retirement age. What are you going to do?

Dmitry Medvedev: Here is what I would like to say in response to the first and second parts of your question. There is hardly any connection between the two issues. Speaking about the accumulative part, it is true, for a few years now we have decided to freeze the accumulative element of the pension. Does it affect the interests of the people who are covered by this system? There are different opinions. Let me express the one I believe is absolutely fair. They are not affected because this freeze concerns neither the entire amount of money that people will be paid when they retire nor our current pension obligations. Moreover, we are distributing almost the entire accumulated fund between the current retirees as the pay-as-you-go part and people get paid all they are entitled to. That means they now receive their pension in full and will receive it in the future. This is a compulsory measure, unfortunately, we can't avoid it. There are two reasons why. First, we had to prepare the pension institutions that manage the respective component of pensions, or the private pension funds, for joining the insurance system so that they would be transparent, open and free of fraud. Unfortunately, there were many incidents of fraud.. The second reason is purely financial. We do need money for development. This is approximately 345 billion roubles that we can spend on current immediate tasks, including anti-crisis measures.

This situation is temporary. I personally told my colleagues in the Government that we decided not to cancel the accumulative component and the current pension system because the pension system must be generally consistent. In the early 2000s we promised that it would consist of two elements and we must keep them. In this respect, there has been no step back.

Now, about the retirement age. This is a more complicated issue. First, there is no firm decision yet. The discussion continues and everyone is well informed about it. The question is when it is reasonable to retire for a specific person and which retirement age serves the interests of the state.

Let me remind you how the pension system was built, including the retirement age. The retirement age was introduced as a concept in 1932. When I was giving a speech at the State Duma, I looked at the statistics and was shocked. The average life expectancy in our country in 1932 was 35 years - due to hunger, civil war and so on, but nevertheless.

So, life expectancy was 35 years then, but the retirement age was set at 55 for women and at 60 for men. It was the lawmakers' decision. Happily, the situation has improved radically since then, and life expectancy has recently increased a great deal. I see this as our major achievement. It may be less than in Japan or in Scandinavian countries, but still. And our women are doing better than men: their life expectancy is about 76 years, which is seven years longer than eight years ago. Our men live shorter lives, because of their bad habits, but their live expectancy has nevertheless increased from 10 years ago. This is good. And if they take control of their health, their life expectancy will increase to match that of our dear ladies.

This is a major achievement that has been brought about by our efforts in healthcare, by walking away from bad habits and taking up sports, and also by improved medical services. Hence, we can ask ourselves about the appropriate retirement age. But there is no answer to this question. We need to hold additional consultations and talk with experts and the public, because they have different priorities. Here's an example to illustrate my point. I can tell you this with full knowledge, because I dealt with it personally. It concerns the retirement age for officials. When we only started discussing this idea, everyone thought, for some reason, that officials would be happy to extend their retirement age by five years. Nothing of the sort! Some of them said they would like to work as long as possible, and their decision did not depend on the post they occupy, while others said they would be happy to retire earlier  to help bring up grandkids, grow vegetables and in general do more at their dachas, and so on. So, priorities differ. However, we've decided to increase the retirement age for officials to 65 years, but do this gradually, in stages. I believe that this gradual approach is a good formula for increasing the retirement age for all Russian citizens.

Mikhail Fishman: What I asked is whether the Government is taking too long to approve this long pending measure?

Dmitry Medvedev: It depends on your point of reference. The proponents of liberal economic views want us to move faster, while conservatives are trying to slow us down. You see, I believe that we shouldn't move too fast, but on the other hand, we must not lose time either. Of course, had we made the decision by now, there would have been additional support for the budget. But are people ready for this? I'm not sure.

Hence, we should encourage people to survey their priorities in life and decide what they would do when they reach the age of 55 or 60 years: would they continue to work or retire? It was not a coincidence that we recently discussed how to pay pensions to working pensioners.

I'd like to remind you that working pensioners didn't draw their pensions in the Soviet Union. They had to choose between drawing a pension and working past the retirement age. The choice was based on serious legal and economic arguments. What is a pension? In fact, it is a payment issued for the loss of one's employment function, or the ability to work. If you haven't lost your ability to work, then why should you receive a pension? This was the reasoning of our predecessors, who represented left-wing views, by the way. We changed the trend, and now working pensioners receive both their pensions and their wages. The only thing we haven't done for them this time is to index their pensions, but I believe that we were in the right this time. So, it depends on your point of reference. But I think that we'll have to take this decision in the next few years, but only after consulting the people.

Sergei Brilyov: Mr Medvedev, please give me a yes-or-no answer; we don't want to run out of time here. Will current pensioners receive another pension increase next year? Will things take their usual course?

Dmitry Medvedev: Yes, of course.

Sergei Brilyov: This will remain in the plans.

Dmitry Medvedev: Speaking about pensioners, our position is the following: Those who don't work, naturally, have the right to their pension including indexation. More likely than not, we'll carry out this indexation in two stages, depending on the economic situation in the country. There is a standard indexation and another indexation is likely subject to our [economic] performance in the first three months [of next year]. This is the position, incidentally, that we've defined jointly with United Russia. I think that it's a fair and appropriate position and it conforms to the economic state of affairs today.

Sergei Brilyov: And it's immune.

Dmitry Medvedev: As far as working pensioners are concerned, they work and they receive a pension, but their pension is not subject to indexation because they have a job. I think this is also fair, because as long as they find enough strength to work, they don't need these small sums from indexation so badly.

Yelizaveta Osetinskaya: Mr Medvedev, the people of Crimea are paying something of a high price for being citizens of Russia. The latest events have shown that Crimea is still isolated, and that its social support system, in effect, exists separately from the rest of Russia. When will this situation be dealt with and how? And most importantly, how much will it cost and who will foot the bill?

Dmitry Medvedev: Ms Osetinskaya, I think if we ask the residents of Crimea if they are paying too high a price to be part of Russia, the absolute majority of them will say that they are ready to pay an even higher price as long as they don't have to return to the madhouse they were in not so long ago.

Yelizaveta Osetinskaya: I think this depends on how you poll them.

Dmitry Medvedev: You know, no matter how you ask, the first reaction will be the same. I'm not talking about manipulation. I mean the average person being asked a simple question. I've put these questions to ordinary people, people you meet in the street.

About Crimea's integration - in fact, it is already integrated in the Russian legal and economic realm. This is exactly why we closed the Ministry of Crimea, because we moved on to a different form of government. Crimea is an integral part of the Russian Federation, both in the legal and economic sense. Local residents timely receive their pensions and benefits. The Crimea is now integrated in the Russian legal framework, which, in my opinion, is much more effective than what they had before.

Yet, Crimea remains really vulnerable for two reasons. One is the huge underinvestment of the past, maybe, 20 years, maybe even from the post-war period. Crimea, which was a gem even 100 years ago, failed to develop the way we all wanted it to during the Soviet period. This neglect grew even worse over the last 20 years. Therefore, there are problems, which only worsened due to the well-known position of the Ukrainian leadership. However, no matter what the Ukrainian rulers say, the recent blackout was nothing less than genocide. That was a cruel - even beyond any reason, as people say - thing to do. I mean cutting off public institutions and households from power supplies, - those same people whom the Ukrainian authorities even refer to as "their people" ("Our people live there, so Crimea should be returned to us," they say). What else can we say? A disgusting and cruel thing to do. But, honestly, we were ready for it. We stocked diesel engines and backup power supply systems, so we prevented a collapse from happening and provided power to the critical institutions such as healthcare centres and social services even during the most difficult period. The first power supply line went back online recently. Soon we will connect the second leg of the first stage, and two more in May. The resulting capacity will be 800 MW. This should solve Crimea's problems.

But of course, we will not stop here. The plans include building two new power plants by 2018, in Sevastopol and Simferopol. When this happens, the Crimea will stop being an energy deficient region, but will have an energy surplus. So I'd say the overall situation is normal there.

Finally, last but not least: not all of this is about the money. I return to where I began. It is a completely different story, and you are well aware of the enthusiasm with which the Russian people embraced this integration. .

Yelizaveta Osetinskaya: My question was more about the economic aspect. How much does all this cost?

Dmitry Medvedev: As for the financial aspect - it was not cheap. Of course it wasn't.

I visited Crimea in the previous years, at invitations from Crimean and Ukrainian leaders, so I can say in all sincerity: I wanted out of there as soon as possible. The beautiful land was a mess, and their attitude toward it was no different. It seemed that the Ukrainian leadership never actually treated it as their land, never bothered to invest in it.

What did they do? They bought land there to build fancy houses for themselves but little else.

More to be posted soon...

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#5
www.rt.com
December 9, 2015
Russian economy to return to growth - Medvedev

Government measures to stop recession in the economy have been successful and Russia will return to growth, according to Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev.

"The anti-crisis plan has worked. It allowed us to survive the most difficult period of the year. The plan has brought result in almost all areas," Medvedev told journalists on Wednesday.

He added that Russia had managed to stop the decline in production. "The contraction of the economy and production has been suspended," said the Prime Minister.

According to Medvedev, the government intends to cut inflation to 6.4 percent in 2016 and return the economy to growth.

"I believe this scenario is quite realistic, and we really will be able to halve inflation...We're ready to return to economic growth. Perhaps it won't be steady, but still definite growth," he said.

Last week, US ratings agency Moody's upgraded the Russian government bond outlook from negative to stable, citing the stabilization of Russia's external finances. The company attributed this to the macroeconomic adjustment that has helped mitigate the effect of the fall in crude prices on official foreign exchange reserves.

The ability of Russia to return to growth depends on crude prices. Brent crude was trading at $40.62 as of 11am GMT on Wednesday. Traders have been recently concerned about the glut on the oil market.

 #6
Tax system in Russia to remain unchanged for next few years - PM

MOSCOW. Dec 9 (Interfax) - The Russian government is not planning to raise taxes in the country in the next few years, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev said.

"Currently a decision has been made, it was supported by the president, that we in the next few years will not touch the tax system in general and we will not touch the income tax at 13% in particular," he said during an interview with leading Russian television channels.

Asked whether a progressive income tax scale might be introduced instead of the 13% flat rate, introduced in 2000, Medvedev said "gray" wages that were widespread in the 1990s had practically stopped being paid.

"All taxes are being paid. It's better to pay than not to pay. Why kill the goose that lays the golden eggs?" he said.

A progressive scale would have its advantages, but introducing it would incur higher administrative costs, he said.

"We'd have to force everybody to file declarations. True, they can be e-declarations. But even if you have a low salary you would have to file a declaration for one job, then another. That would complicate everything considerably," he said.

Medvedev said he did not think Russians had yet achieved the sort of legal awareness that makes paying taxes an "absolute imperative" and declining to pay them a serious crime.

In any case, wealthier Russians pay more than ordinary Russians when it comes down to tax on expensive real estate and expensive cars.

"Here, expensive real state and expensive cars are now taxed at an elevated rate, and whoever buys expensive real estate will still be sharing some of their income," Medvedev said.

"I think this is the optimal approach for now, but what the situation is in five or seven years from now, we'll have to wait and see," he said.

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#7
Government.ru
December 1, 2015
The implementation of roadmaps for the national entrepreneurial initiative

Conference on the implementation of roadmaps for the national entrepreneurial initiative

From Dmitry Medvedev's opening remarks:

The national entrepreneurial initiative has become a fundamentally new programme to improve the business climate in the country. This year will see the main stage of this paramount national project come to completion.  The programme's reforms were shaped by entrepreneurs, who also monitored their subsequent implementation.

The initiative is being implemented in roadmap format and currently work is progressing on 11 such roadmaps.  Among these are roadmaps for customs, tax administration, export support, urban development, power grids, competition, assessment activity, company and property rights registration, improving the overall quality of the regulatory environment, and expanding access to natural monopoly procurements for small and medium sized companies and for companies with state participation.

Regarding the broadening of access to the energy infrastructure for businesses, the time required to connect to the electricity grids has been halved in cases where there is no need to build network infrastructure, i.e., with capacity below 670 kW. Over the course of the year, connection fees for users have been reduced by 67 percent for businesses with a capacity under 150 kW. In the housing construction sector, a finite number of official approvals and endorsements has been established, regardless of the region of issue. The Government intends to trim this list even further.

The implementation of a roadmap in the customs sphere has made it possible to significantly reduce the number of documents required for customs declaration and clearance.

Regarding export support, the creation of the Russian export centre to provide support to exporters on a one-stop basis, has proven to be a key decision. RosEximBank has launched a programme to grant loans at subsidised interest rates to support the manufacturing of high-tech products. An array of activities was rolled out to simplify  retail and small wholesale export trade and the procedure for submitting documents in order to confirm one's zero interest rate VAT status was simplified.

In the registration of property rights, we have put in place an online document submission system. Registration time has been reduced to 10 working days. By this indicator, Russia ranks eighth in the World Bank's Doing Business rating.

The procedure for the registration of new companies also has been streamlined significantly. Now this can be done online (online registration) and therefore the number of mandatory procedures to set up a business has been reduced by a factor of three.

Special attention was given to small and medium sized business. An obligatory procurement quota for state-owned companies from small firms was established at no less than 18 percent of their annual volume.

I have approved a provision whereby the Federal Corporation for the Development of   Small and Medium Business will now be able to monitor the activity of regional authorities in the procurement of goods and services from small companies.

The national entrepreneurial initiative as a large-scale project to improve the business climate has materialised. This is not only our view, but also an internationally recognised one: according to well-known ratings, Russia has moved from the 120th position in 2011 for doing business to 51st this year. We are also among the top five countries that have implemented the largest number of the ease-of-doing-business measures.
 

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 #8
Kremlin.ru
December 8, 2015
Meeting with Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu

Vladimir Putin had a working meeting with Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu. In particular, the Defence Minister informed the President on the discovery of the flight data recorder from the Russian fighter jet shot down in Syria by the Turkish Air Force.

President of Russia Vladimir Putin: How is work proceeding, Mr Shoigu? You and I will have to discuss preparations for the annual meeting of the [Defence Ministry] Board on the year's results, but now let us get down to our current matters, please.

Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu: Mr President, in line with your instruction, on December 5 we increased the intensity of our strikes and prepared and launched a massive aviation and missile attack using Tu-22 strategic bombers from the territory of the Russian Federation. For the first time we launched Kalibr cruise missiles from the Rostov-on-Don submarine based in the Mediterranean Sea.

Both the aviation and the submarine fleet were successful, hitting all the targets. The Kalibr missiles have once again demonstrated their efficiency at long distances. We tested both the launch of the missiles and their flight, as well as ensuring they hit the targets, which were two major terrorist facilities in Raqqah.

Over these last three days, Tu-22 airplanes have carried out 60 combat missions and hit 32 targets. All targets have been previously thoroughly scouted using all forms of intelligence, so we can say with full confidence that significant damage has been done to ammunition depots, plants manufacturing various types of mines and, of course, to oil infrastructure, in other words, processing, transport and shipping.

In addition, simultaneously with Tu-22 aircraft and the submarine, our airplanes from the Hmeymim airfield have been working for three days. We carried out over 300 sorties and hit more than 600 different targets. I must also say that your instructions have been fulfilled: Su-30 fighters provide air escort to absolutely all flights. This is also true of strategic aviation flying at high altitudes, as well as strike aircraft and bombers taking off from the Hmeymim airbase.

Vladimir Putin: And has the submarine made underwater launches?

Sergei Shoigu: Yes, Mr President, the submarine made underwater launches because in May you gave instructions to test our new weapons in all environments where it can be used - in the air and in water. We launched Caspian Flotilla missiles from the sea. Now, we have tried and demonstrated real launches of missiles from the Mediterranean against real targets. We warned our colleagues in Israel and the United States that we would conduct these launches today. Before that, this vessel made surface launches in the northern seas, the Northern Fleet.

From the Hmeymim airfield, we actively worked on territories where militants who shot our pilot are based. As a result, all these areas have been liberated, and the Syrian Army's special operation forces...

Vladimir Putin: Searching for the crew?

Sergei Shoigu: Yes. The Syrian service members searched the territory, detected our aircraft's crash site, and all these bandits were leaving so fast they did not have time to take anything from the aircraft, so we discovered a parametric recorder, which we brought here and which I would like to show you.

Vladimir Putin: With regard to strikes from a submarine. We certainly need to analyse everything that is happening on the battlefield, how the weapons work. Both the Calibre missiles and the Kh-101 rockets are generally showing very good results. We now see that these are new, modern and highly effective high-precision weapons that can be equipped either with conventional or special nuclear warheads.

Naturally, we do not need that in fighting terrorists, and I hope we will never need it. But overall, this speaks to our significant progress in terms of improving weaponry and equipment being supplied to the Russian army and navy.

As for the parametric recorder, let's look at it now. Have you opened it?

Sergei Shoigu: No, Mr President.

Vladimir Putin: I will ask you not to open it for now, and to open it only together with foreign experts and carefully record everything. As I understand, the parametric logger will give us the opportunity to clearly understand the full trajectory of the Su-24 from the location and moment that it took off to the moment it fell - its speed, altitude, all the turns made during the flight. In other words, we can understand where it actually was and where it suffered that felon blow from the Turkish Air Force, which we have now discussed many times.

And I want to qualify this right away. Of course, we need to know this information. But regardless of what we learn, our attitude toward what was done by the Turkish authorities will not change. I repeat, we treated Turkey not only as a friendly nation but as an ally in the fight against terrorism and nobody expected this treacherous stab in the back. But for ourselves, of course, we need to know everything in detail, what happened there. So we need to work with this device very carefully and thoroughly, at a highly professional level, together with international experts. In any case, we should invite anyone who wants to take part in this work.

We must certainly thank our service members in the special forces, the search and rescue unit, and the Syrian service members for retrieving this recorder, which will certainly help us determine what happened.
<...>

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 #9
Kremlin.ru
December 9, 2015
Meeting of the Mariinsky Theatre Board of Trustees

Vladimir Putin held a meeting of the Mariinsky Theatre Board of Trustees.

Items on the agenda included establishing a branch of the Mariinsky Theatre in Primorye Territory, using the Primorye Opera and Ballet Theatre as a base, and other projects the theatre is involved in, in particular, organisation of the Moscow Easter Festival, which will mark the 125th anniversary of the birth of renowned Russian composer Sergei Prokofiev.

President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Good afternoon, friends,

It is a great pleasure to see you all here in Russia, in Moscow, here at the Kremlin. I welcome our foreign friends and trustees, and everyone representing the Russian side too, of course. Your presence here bears witness to your interest in culture in general, and to Russian culture in particular.

It is not by chance that UNESCO chose the Mariinsky Theatre to host the opening ceremony of the International Cultural Forum, which marks this influential organisation's 70th anniversary. The opening will take place in mid-December, in a week's time.

Let me take this opportunity to express my gratitude to everyone taking part in this legendary theatre's life. It is in many ways thanks to your support for the Mariinsky and its talented troupe that the theatre continues to grow and expand its cultural influence in Russia and throughout the world.

Of course, the opening of the new stage has greatly increased the theatre's possibilities. The trustees made a big contribution to this work too. The advanced technology solutions used make it possible to stage the very latest shows and also arrange wide-scale broadcasting of concerts and performances, taking great art and its achievements to millions of people.

In talking about the theatre's development, we must mention one of the big events in its current 233rd season, of course. I am referring to the establishment of a branch of the Mariinsky at the Primorye State Opera and Ballet Theatre. I want to thank the maestro, Mr Gergiyev, for responding to our requests, including my requests, and giving the Far East his attention. As I understand it, there are some big plans now regarding this project. They include more tours to and exchanges with the Asia-Pacific region countries, and organising an international music festival in Primorye Territory on the lines of St Petersburg's White Nights festival.

The initiatives designed to attract young people and students to the theatre are especially important. I hope that Mr Gergiyev will give us some more detail about these plans.

It would be good to hear more about one of the Mariinsky's other projects too. Next year, in 2016, the international music world will mark the 125th anniversary of the birth of Sergei Prokofiev. We have said in the past that this outstanding composer does not get enough attention here in Russia. The Mariinsky Theatre is in the process of preparing a big programme devoted to this great composer, which will unite around his name top-level musical events in Russia and around the world.

I ask the Ministry of Culture to give its attention too to the events planned to celebrate this anniversary at state level, and I would like to hear from the Minister today what the ministry is planning in this respect.

Thank you very much for your attention.

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#10
Moskovskiy Komsomolets
December 3, 2015
Russian daily says Putin's address long on "emotional rhetoric", short on detail
Mikhail Rostovskiy, Khaki-Coloured Message: Putin Addressed the Federal Assembly As the Supreme Commander in Chief. But the President's Speech Did Not Answer Important Questions

The official name of the event during which Vladimir Putin made an angry statement to the effect that "Turkey's ruling clique" will not be able to get away with [just the Russian ban on the import of] tomatoes after killing our people, and that "Allah has decided" to punish it by depriving it of reason sounds like this: "The President's Message to the Federal Assembly." But the more I listened to Putin, the firmer my conviction became that on this occasion, VVP [Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin] was speaking in the Kremlin's Hall of St George only secondarily, or even tertiary, in his role as the state's civilian leader.

The Message to the Nation from the Supreme Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces - this is what, from my point of view, the event to which we were witness was really called.

No, Vladimir Putin was not apparelled in a military greatcoat. The president wore an ordinary civilian suit. No, the head of state's speech did not boil down to the thesis "The enemy will be smashed! Victory will be ours!" From the point of view of external formalities, the usual ceremonial trappings of the Message were not breached by one iota. Vladimir Vladimirovich spoke about civilian affairs not simply a great deal, but a very great deal.

The need to clean up the city of Komsomolsk-na-Amure. The measures that should be adopted for the full-fledged development of children's creativity. The possibility of reducing the number of jurors in judicial trials from 12 to five, six, or seven. The decriminalization of a whole series of articles of the Criminal Code. The extension of the maternity capital programme - VVP touched on all these and many other topics during his speech.

But however skilful a speaker may be, it is always clear to his audience which topics he regards as genuinely of importance and which he regards as necessary makeweights. And on this plane, Putin's policy speech left very little ground for doubts or alternative interpretations: In December 2015, the president regards as the most important topic "the defence of the country's interests" along the external perimeter of its borders. All the rest are problems of the "rear," which also must work in the interests of the "front."

There is one fundamental difference between the speech of a peacetime president and the speech of a supreme commander in chief of the Armed Forces. The peacetime president is obliged to recount in detail precisely how and using what methods he intends to resolve the most topical problems facing the state at a given moment in time. But the commander in chief has no such obligation. The disclosure of detailed information on his intentions could be interpreted as offering assistance to the enemy. Therefore the commander in chief has the full right to limit himself to the declaration of his "great goal" - "without fail, we will triumph." If you look at VVP's speech from this angle, during his Message to parliament, Vladimir Putin also behaved like a "model commander in chief."

What, for example, did we learn about Putin's specific plans and intentions in the sphere that he now regards as his priority - foreign policy? Apart from the fact that the Kremlin does not intend to make peace in the near term with Turkish President Erdogan, almost nothing.

The foreign policy part of Putin's speech contained a great deal of emotional rhetoric, solemn vows, and calls for nationwide and international unification: "At the basis of our actions will be, above all, responsibility to our country, to our people... In the battle against terrorism, Russia has demonstrated the utmost responsibility and leadership. These decisive actions have been supported by Russian society... It is necessary to set aside all quarrels and differences and create a single, powerful fighting force, an antiterrorist front that will act on the basis of international law and under the aegis of the United Nations."

The foreign policy part of Putin's speech contained fairly convincing historical parallels: "In the 20th century, the reluctance to unite forces in good time in the battle against Nazism was paid for in tens of millions of lives and the bloodiest world war. Today, we have once again locked horns with a destructive, barbaric ideology, and we do not have the right to allow these newly fledged bigots to attain their goals."

Also present in VVP's speech were his usual hints at the negative role of America in the world: "And we know why this happened. We know who wanted to remove inconvenient regimes and crudely impose their own rules... They stirred the pot, destroyed statehood, and set people at loggerheads, and then simply, as we in Russia say, washed their hands, having opened the way for radicals, extremists, and terrorists."

But what was missing altogether from the foreign policy part of Vladimir Putin's speech was a detailed declaration of his intentions: How much longer, according to his supposition, could the operation of the Russian Armed Forces in Syria last? How precisely does the Russian Federation president plan to punish Turkey, while at the same time minimizing the consequences of Ankara's inevitable retaliatory measures?

Is the Russian head of state not alarmed by the fact that the number of countries to which Moscow has promised very "harsh retaliatory measures" is growing by the day (even Montenegro, which has decided to join NATO, has now appeared on this list)? How are things developing with Russian-Ukrainian relations? Does only complete hopelessness lie ahead for Moscow and Kiev, or does Vladimir Putin expect, after all, the appearance of "a light at the end of the tunnel"?

Both these and other highly important questions were left "overboard" by the president's policy speech. The reasons for this phenomenon were partly mentioned above. "Information openness" does not figure among the qualities that are obligatory for a supreme commander in chief. But let me say bluntly: The absence of specific foreign policy details in the president's speech alarmed me greatly.

Russia is a country around which the international situation is "complex" at any moment in time. But the degree of tension that exists today has not existed for a very long time - at the very least, since the late Brezhnev and Andropov eras. And in this situation, I am not prepared simply to believe that the authorities know what they are doing. I would like to know for myself precisely what the authorities are doing and why. Unfortunately, I did not obtain this understanding from listening to Vladimir Putin's Message to the Federal Assembly. It is possible, however, that I am a bad listener.

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 #11
BBC Magazine
December 8, 2015
Putin's winter fairy tale
By Steve Rosenberg
[Photos here http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-34972707]

Vladimir Putin's position on Syria and Ukraine may have been criticised in the West, but Russia's president is adored and admired by many at home, as Steve Rosenberg discovers on a visit to Volokolamsk.

In Russia, there is something magical about the early winter snow. It transforms muddy fields and dilapidated farmhouses into a fairy tale - a snow globe you want to pick up and shake and could stare at for hours.

Of course, every fairy tale has its heroes. And, 70 miles from Moscow, so does this one.

Viktor Krestinin shows me his cows. Then he reads me his couplets. Viktor is the poet-farmer of Volokolamsk. Here's one of his verses:

Be you a genius or a VIP, there's no wonder,
We all end up 6ft under,
We all get our just deserts I tell,
But some go to heaven and some to hell.

From the way in which Viktor describes his president, there'll be no burning in hell for Vladimir Putin.

"I support Putin and how he's hammering the terrorists in Syria," Viktor tells me. "Putin's a real leader. It's like me and my farm. This place was a mess before I took charge. And Russia was a real mess before Putin took over."

While he backs Russia's military campaign in Syria, Viktor tells me he's against the idea of putting Russian troops on the ground there.

"But what if Putin said it was necessary?" I ask.

"Well, if the motherland says it's necessary, then we obey. You don't discuss the orders of the commander in chief. You carry them out."

At School Number One in Volokolamsk, I'm given a similar lesson.

"When we listen to his speeches on TV, we feel Putin cares for all the people. He's a good president," says teacher Ludmila Verbitskaya.

Ludmila has been teaching English here for 35 years. Her son, she says, has become a monk. And her president, she tells me, has become a good Christian.

"You trust him completely?" I ask.

"Completely. 100%."

"And whatever decision he takes about Syria, about the military operation, you will support that?"

"Yes we will support."

"Do you think he makes any mistakes?" I enquire.

"We are not afraid of his mistakes," says Ludmila. "Every man can make mistakes. But if he trusts in God, God will correct him."
Map showing Russian Federation and the location of Volokolamsk

Out on the street I get talking to Marina. She's worried, because she believes it was Russian air strikes in Syria that provoked the attack on the Russian passenger jet over Sinai. I remind her that those air strikes were Vladimir Putin's idea. So, does she believe the air operation was a mistake?

"Well, if it was, there's nothing I can do about it," Marina says.

"Has this changed your attitude to Putin?" I ask.

"No, not at all," replies Marina. "We love him, he's a man of the people!"

Few Russians hold their president directly responsible for the decisions he takes. That's partly because of the age-old tradition here of respecting the man at the top - the tsar, the emperor, the general secretary, whoever it may be. And, partly, because of Russian television which heaps praise on Vladimir Putin from morning till night.

Across town at the Patriots of Russia club, teenage cadets in uniform march along singing about the joys of military service.

"You and I are destined to serve Russia! Serve Russia, this remarkable country!"

This is just the kind of patriotic fervour which Putin's Russia has been nurturing.

Inside, one of the cadets takes apart a Kalashnikov rifle and puts it back together again - all in just 16 seconds.

"Vladimir Putin is a great ruler," the cadet tells me. "It's not just Russia that thinks so. But the whole world."

The Patriots of Russia make me feel very welcome. That cannot be said for my final destination.

We drive to the Textile Workers Culture Palace. A big sign in the hall declares: "Terrorism is a threat to society."

We had hoped to meet the local choir, "Constellation". Instead, we meet a policeman. The culture palace director has called in the constable, suspecting that we are terrorists planning an attack. He asks us to fill out a form explaining the purpose of our visit.

"Do you really think we're terrorists?" I ask the culture palace director.

"These days you can't be sure of anything," she replies.

Police paperwork complete, we're finally allowed into the rehearsal room. As we enter, Constellation is singing about a river flowing through a forest of birch trees, and a white bird flying to heaven and back bringing divine forgiveness to Earth.

"Music helps us so much," one of the singers Maria tells me. "The TV news bulletins now are full of shooting and killing. But coming here gives us faith in the future. But it's not just the music. There's also something special in the Russian character that helps us to stand strong and overcome trouble."

The thing about fairy tales is that, despite all their twists and turns and dramas, they normally have a happy ending. Russians are still counting on one. And many people here still trust their president to make it happen.

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#12
http://gordonhahn.com
December 8, 2015
Putin: A Russian Neo-Traditionalist, Not a Western Conservative
By Gordon M. Hahn

Many in that small but not insignificant minority of Western, including American conservatives who to one degree or another support many of Russian President Vladimir Putin's actions do so often under the illusion that he is a conservative. To what extent do Putin's positions correlate with Western conservatism and to what extent do they differ?

Putin is not a conservative in the Western or American sense of the term. (Neither is he a Stalinist or restorer of the Soviet or even Russian emoire of old. Indeed, Putin has just approved a new monument and museum to be built in downtown Moscow dedicated the victims of Stalinism and communism.)

Russian Neo-Traditionalism, Not Conservatism

Although some of the positions Putin stakes out in building a post-Soviet Russian traditionalism overlap with views held by some Western conservatives, Putin is a Russian traditionalist and statist rather than a Western-style conservative.

Putin's new Russian traditionalism or neo-traditionalism is based on several principles: (1) statism, (2) stability, (3) freedom of, not freedom from religion, and (4) cultural and social conservatism or traditionalism.

Putin's Statism

Putin is a statist in politics, economics, and sociocultural matters. In politics, the state and political stability are almost always to be given preference over individual liberty and freedom when these principles clash. For example, if mass public demonstrations run the risk of devolving into violence or attempts to overthrow the authorities, then those demonstrations will be banned or other wise restricted.

This is not to say there is no freedom of association and speech in Russia. There are political protests held somewhere in Russia everyday, and all points of view can be heard on the state and private airwaves, print media, and Internet. Another example is the state's willingness to block the participation of some political parties in elections for fear they may destabilize the legislative and political process. Another is the state's complete control of national television broadcasting or 'airwaves' (excluding satellite and Internet television), though ownership in radio, print and Internet is decentralized and includes private vendors.

In simple terms, Putin and many Russians are willing to restrict political and civil rights in order to ensure there is no risk of political instability whatsoever. This is an approach almost all American conservatives abhor. Russian liberals and leftists, on the other hand, are quite eager to put controls on media, especially conservative-dominated talk radio shows, to enforce political correctness (conformity) in the media, schools, universities, and the workplace in order to ensure 'balance,' and to enforce reverse discrimination against white males, calling it affirmative action and breaking the glass ceiling. On this last category, Putin would most certainly not aver.

The same is true with 'Putinomics'. Since Putin's arrival in the Kremlin in 2000, the state's role in the economy has steadily expanded. Putin nationalized large chunks of major industries, creating national giants, and increased the state's share in the economy from minority-ownership to majority-ownership. There has been no major restructuring through privatization or significant sectoral diversification. Exports of energy (mostly oil and gas), natural resources (gold, diamonds, coal) and unfinished products (steel and other metals) comprise most of Russia's trade exports and budget revenues. Exceptions are the nuclear energy industry (state-owned) and the private but highly subsidized (as in the West) agricultural production and food manufacturing industries, where real reforms have produced globally competitive industries. Regardless, fully or partly state-owned companies account for some 60 percent of Russian stock market valuation, compared to 80 percent in China. State-owned banks control over half of Russia's banking operations.

In 2011, the Russian business weekly Biznes i vlast' (Business and Power) examined the state's share in companies' total shareholder value in order to determine the level of state participation in key economic sectors. The research showed that state participation was greatest in transportation (railways, oil and natural gas pipelines) with the state holding 75 percent of assets. Other sectors registered as follows: aerospace and shipbuilding - 57 percent, electricity - 50 percent or more, natural gas production - 50 percent, production of electronic hardware - 27 percent, machine-building - 15 percent, telecommunications - 14 percent, construction - 9 percent, oil industry - 23 percent, oil refining - 8 percent, and non-ferrous metals production - 3 percent. The steel industry's assets are completely under private ownership (http://rbth.com/articles/2012/03/23/what_kind_of_capitalism_has_russia_built_15160.html). However, much of the privatization in these spheres occurred in the 1990s not under Putin. Indeed, in 2004 the Kremlin nationalized one of Russia's largest oil companies 'Yukos', and in 2011 Putin reversed most the privatization of electricity production and supply, which was a test case of privatization for major sectors in the economy.
Beyond sectoral ownership analysis, there are some areas where the economy has seen liberalization in the Putin era, but it has been achieved by way of a state-driven modernization that seeks to keep any economic liberalization from affecting the political economy and politics proper. This can be seen from the spheres where liberalization has occurred: business freedom, trade freedom, fiscal freedom, labor freedom, and freedom from corruption (www.heritage.org/index/country/russia). Another caveat here is that almost all these successes are the results of reforms carried out during Dmitrii Medvedev's presidency. Thus, it depends on how much free rein one thinks Medvedev had in order to determine how much credit then Prime Minister Putin deserves. Medvedev billed himself as a Reaganite/Thatcherite conservative in economics at the outset of his presidency, but the promised robust privatization program never materialized, leaving the economy largely state-run and state-owned.

It is really only in the social and cultural realms that many of Putin's views approximate Western conservatism. He defends religious freedom against attempts by Russian liberals to restrict religious freedom. For example, rather than banning religious education in public schools, Putin's Education Ministry implemented a program of choice, whereby parents could choose from courses on Russian Orthodox Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, and ethics for their children. Official state functions and chaplains for the military include the clergy of Russia's other traditional religions - the ROC, Judaism, Islam, and Buddhism. State funds help finance the building of churches, synagogues, mosques, and datsans. To be sure, Putin has given pride of place to the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) but only slightly, and 80 percent of believers in Russia identify themselves as Russian Orthodox.

Inconsistent with his pro-religious socio-cultural position is Putin's tolerance of free, state-funded abortions, which remains a non-issue in Russian politics - a holdover from the Soviet era that Western liberals do not challenge.

Consistent with his religious stance, Putin has put modest limits on homosexuality, specifically the banning of propagandizing homosexuality and transgenderism to children. As an aside: clearly, any sane gay person would much prefer to live in Russia than in the many repressive Islamic countries with which the U.S. has had close ties. As another aside: I do not recall U.S. President Barack Obama lecturing the Saudi King about the need to observe gay rights, including gay marriage, the stuff of fun, prosepctive Saturday Night Live sketch.

One area where some conservatives seem to suffer from military envy is their sometimes support or understanding for Putin's robust foreign policy and military adventures. Conservatives tend to be more hawkish than liberals and leftists, putting aside the fact that some liberals are becoming rather gung ho when it comes to humanitarian interventions that often do not involve a vital American interest. Most conservatives, excluding libertarians and some others, respect a leader willing to stand up for the country's national interests and security. The conservative critique of President Obama's foreign policy is sometimes couched in terms such as: 'At least Putin defends his country.'

Conclusion

Putin is a Russian traditionalist and statist rather than a Western-style conservative. His views, while closer to those of American conservatives on social issues, are much closer to American liberal and leftist positions regarding state interference in the economy. Putin has achieved in the Russian economy what President Obama and other American and even European leftists can only dream of, for now. Even in politics, Putin is closer to the increasingly intolerant left than the right.

So which is greater - the extent to which Putin's positions correspond with conservatism or differ from conservatism? It appears the latter and by a considerable, not conservative margin.

Gordon M. Hahn is an Analyst and Advisory Board Member of the Geostrategic Forecasting Corporation, Chicago, Illinois; a Senior Researcher, Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies (CETIS), Akribis Group, San Jose, California; and an Analyst/Consultant, Russia Other Points of View - Russia Media Watch, http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com.....


 

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 #13
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
December 8, 2015
Scandal with high-profile official reveals flaws in Russian 'sistema'
The scandal surrounding the family of Prosecutor General Yuri Chaika points to weaknesses in Russia's current political system, which depends more on loyalty than on efficiency.
By Ivan Tsvetkov
Ivan Tsvetkov is Associate Professor of American Studies, International Relations Department, St. Petersburg State University. He is an expert in the field of historical science and contemporary U.S. policy and U.S.-Russian relations. Since 2003, he has been the author and administrator of the educational website "History of the United States: Materials for the course" (http://ushistory.ru)

A week ago the Anti-Corruption Foundation, headed by well-known opposition activist Alexei Navalny, released a film entitled Chaika (a reference to Chekov's play "The Seagull"), dedicated to exposing the family business empire of Prosecutor General Yuri Chaika.

The film, which scored more than 2.5 million YouTube hits in its first week, alleges that for many years the prosecutor general's sons, under their father's protection, carried out corporate raids and set up organized cartels to obtain large government orders and even silence intractable rivals.

In addition, the  the Anti-Corruption Foundation managed to establish that two deputy prosecutor generals (still in office) were linked through their wives' businesses to the leaders of one of the biggest Kushchevskaya (a rural locality) criminal groups in the Krasnodar region, who some time ago were convicted on charges of murder and other serious crimes.

Immediately afterwards, the president's press secretary Dmitry Peskov told reporters that Kremlin officials had not yet had time to digest the evidence put forward by the Anti-Corruption Foundation, since they had been busy preparing for the annual presidential address to the Federal Assembly.

A week later, Peskov dumbfounded his audience even more by announcing that after studying media reports about the film, the presidential administration had found nothing interesting or noteworthy in it, since it was about the prosecutor general's adult children, who were not forbidden by the law to do business.

Chaika himself briefly commented that the film was untrue and "made to order," while in his message to the Federal Assembly Russian President Vladimir Putin called for greater efforts in the fight against corruption and, rather mockingly, assigned the task to the Prosecutor General's Office under Chaika's command.

However preposterous it might seem by U.S. or European standards of communication between politicians and the media, the Russian reality is such that the Kremlin's reaction infuriated many, but surprised no one. For Russians, this type of behavior on the part of the authorities is all too familiar.

More recently, the nearly ubiquitous Navalny uncovered a palace in a prestigious Moscow suburb registered to Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu's sister-in-law, and the online community Dissernet, which searches for plagiarism in university dissertations by members of the Russian elite, stated that State Duma Speaker Sergei Naryshkin's thesis had been almost totally plagiarized.

But in neither case (as in dozens of others like them) did those at the center of the scandal even bother to make a public statement, never mind resign from their posts - not even temporarily during the investigation.

Anecdotal evidence of the Russian authorities' muted response to corruption exposés is sufficient to realize that there is nothing unique about these incidents or the Kremlin's instinctive reaction to bury its head in the sand and protect senior officials from the wrath of the public.

No, the fact is that there is a deliberate strategy aimed at maintaining the political balance in Russia's highly corrupt system (or sistema), which is devoid of the traditional Western institutions of full national representation, media freedom, and a fair, independent judiciary.

Kremlin spin doctors understand that the two extremes of Western-style full-fledged democracy and North Korean-style total clampdown cannot be allowed to coexist. In modern Russia, either could lead to revolution: one that is "velvet," as in the case of perestroika in the 1980s, or one that is bloody and ruthless, as in 1917.

Instead, over the last decade a model of interaction has developed between state and society that closely resembles a controlled nuclear reaction in which the operator (the Kremlin) closely monitors the temperature in the reactor (public discontent), taking measures to prevent this temperature from rising to unacceptable levels. At the same time, the task of creating loyal and subservient elites totally dependent on the Kremlin and suspended on the hook of incriminating evidence is ongoing.

The exposure of the prosecutor general's family and the lack of a public response from the president is more like a finely orchestrated political-engineering operation, aimed primarily at maintaining and strengthening political loyalty to Putin at the top.

Using the anti-corruption zeal of Navalny and his supporters, the president is sending a signal to the political elite: "See, I know all about you. Not only your well-being, but your very life and freedom lie in the palm of my hand. Stay loyal and support all my undertakings however much they hurt your interests. Be loyal and you can continue to live as you do, no one will touch you. I also can protect you from public discontent."

Indeed, thanks to the Kremlin's control of national television, millions of viewers are "mercifully" rid of negative emotions: They know nothing of the prosecutor general's family business, Shoigu's palace, or Naryshkin's plagiarism.

The liberal public, meanwhile, is able to discuss the situation on Facebook and Twitter without mincing words. But it will not take to the streets. Only yesterday a court delivered its first conviction under the new law on rallies, sending the violator to prison for three years. It is unlikely that many volunteers will be ready to destroy their own lives for the sake of proving the wrongdoing of the prosecutor general's children.

There are just two vulnerabilities in Putin's carefully constructed political equilibrium.

First, the entire system is underpinned by the artfulness of the Kremlin's manipulators, whereupon the political balance could collapse at any moment due to unforeseen events or, more likely, political error. To keep the mechanism in working order, a whole host of things have been heaped onto the political scales: Crimea, Donbas, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Greater Syria (ISIS) and now, Turkey.

What will the Kremlin do when the reserves of patriotic euphoria run out? Where will Russia find operable institutions of civil society when "manual control" is no longer an option?

Second, the hyper-loyal and Putin-dependent bureaucratic class has created a very comfortable environment for the president. Unfortunately, the mounting pro-Putin unanimity inside the Russian elite is making the latter decreasingly viable.

Meanwhile, the country is plunging headfirst into deep economic stagnation, recovery from which demands not boundless devotion to the president on the part of officialdom, but something quite different: low taxes, cheap credit, reliable protection of private property and less foreign policy adventurism.

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#14
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
December 9, 2015
Russia can now ignore rulings by European human rights court
The Russian State Duma has passed a law making it possible to recognize, upon a motion from the president or the government, some rulings by international courts as unenforceable in Russia. While critics say the law is aimed at limiting the powers of the European Court of Human Rights, an RBTH source says the state is merely defending its sovereignty and creating a "safeguard" against unwanted cases.
YEKATERINA SINELSCHIKOVA, RBTH

Russia's parliament, the State Duma, has approved a draft law that makes it possible, in certain cases, not to implement rulings by international courts, primarily the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Under the draft law, upon a motion from the president or the government, the Russian Constitutional Court has the right to recognize these rulings as unenforceable.

Despite concern in Europe, Russian parliamentarians are convinced that motions like these will happen very rarely and the bill itself does no damage to "investment activity or private property protection" in Russia. They have attempted to justify the decision by insisting that the bill is not at odds with international practice, alleging that similar laws have already been adopted in some European countries, including Germany and the UK (in fact neither of these countries have legislation allowing them to ignore rulings by the ECHR).

The issue of the supremacy of international law over national law was raised in the Duma back in the summer of 2015. At the time, deputies asked the Constitutional Court for a clarification and it concluded that Russia has the right not to abide by some ECHR rulings.

Russia, which ratified the European Convention on Human Rights in 1998, is often the subject of cases at the ECHR and has been hit with some punishing rulings, the largest of which was a 2014 order to pay the shareholders of the now-defunct Russian oil company Yukos - controversially broken up by the state in 2003 - over $2 billion in compensation. Moscow has so far refused to pay the sum.

Simply a safeguard

The emergence of this bill can be primarily attributed to the difficult domestic and international situation, an assistant professor at the Moscow State Law University, lawyer Alexander Manov, who has experience of working at the ECHR, told RBTH.

"Unfortunately, currently legal practice in Russia is excessively politicized. I think, MPs are just taking a precaution in the event there are attempts to exert external pressure on our country, and they have reasons for that," he said.

The ECHR does not have an executive body; it operates via the council of ministers of the Council of Europe, with which Russia has rather strained relations at present. Furthermore, there are cases that present a real problem for Russia.

"Indeed, human rights are sovereign, but the state is sovereign too. It is a safeguard against claims that can undermine the prosperity of another part of the population. In particular, this refers to the ruling under which Russia has to pay 1.87 billion euros to the shareholders of the oil company Yukos," said Manov, who said that he is convinced that the new bill will not affect ordinary situations and ordinary people.

Having said that, he added, the adoption of this law is likely to create certain difficulties in the future: At some point, Russia's relations with the West will return to normal and Moscow will be brought to account for not conforming with European laws.

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 #15
Interfax
December 9, 2015
Peskov: No restrictions for messengers planned

The Kremlin said that no restrictions for the quick data transmission systems, the so-called messengers, are planned to introduce.

"I am aware that the issue is really being worked on, but not in the aspect of restrictions. As far as I am concerned, there are no restrictions there, but the issue is being worked on, but this is not caused by any instructions, moreover those by the presidential administration," Kremlin press secretary Dmitry Peskov told reporters on Dec. 9.

He said that the introduction of any restrictions on messengers would be very inconvenient for him personally. "A restriction would be inconvenient for me, and I believe that it would be inconvenient for all of us," Peskov said.

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#16
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
December 9, 2015
Russian economy moves out of recession
Economic crisis: After a year of unprecedented economic turmoil, the country is in calmer waters but there are still challenges ahead.
DARIA LITVINOVA, SPECIAL TO RBTH

In the wake of sharply declining oil prices, a ruble that almost halved in value and the imposition of economic sanctions, many believed 2015 would witness a default in Russia like that of 1998, with banks collapsing, inflation going through the roof and ordinary people facing catastrophe.

Those fears were not realized. Russia's economy took a battering and real incomes were bruised this year, but as 2016 comes into sight, the economy has started to slowly pick up again. "Quarterly evaluations show that the recession, as it is defined, is over," Alexei Ulyukayev, Russia's Minister of Economic Development, said at a meeting with European diplomats in Moscow last month.

Foreign experts echoed his statement: the credit rating agency Standard & Poor's (S&P) reported 0.5 percent growth in the third quarter after almost four quarters of decline, and predicted that growth would continue. But Russian analysts remain cautious, warning that the crisis is not over yet and that there's a long road ahead for the economy to get back to where it was in the late 2000s.

Rough time for rouble

Currency hardships began in December 2014, the second "Black Tuesday" in the country's history, when the rouble fell 41 percent against the dollar and 34 percent against the euro.

The Central Bank of Russia, the financial regulator, reacted quickly - and at the time controversially - by raising its key interest rate to 17 percent from 10.5 percent, eliciting outrage from politicians and public figures.

The regulator "shot dead the Russian economy, to spare its suffering," oil giant Rosneft's spokesman Mikhail Leontyev said at the time. Within a couple of months, currency rates had stabilized, though with oil prices having fallen from around £50 a barrel in November 2014 to less than £30 in August 2015, euro and dollar exchange rates stubbornly remained almost twice those of mid-2014. The euro was worth 70 rubles compared with 46 and the dollar more than 60 rubles instead of 35.

Yet it didn't get worse, thanks to the Central Bank's policy, according to Alexander Abramov, an investment expert at Moscow's Higher School of Economics. "The bank acted vigorously, and the fact that we have a relatively stable currency rate and a moderate inflation rate we can credit to them," he said, adding that another Black Tuesday this year was highly unlikely.

At the same time, the Central Bank could only do so much, given the circumstances and condition the country's economy was in facing sanctions and low oil prices, says Vladimir Bragin, chief analyst at Alfa Capital.

Mortgage slump

A weaker ruble prompted rising prices and inflation. People's real incomes sank significantly, which led to a drastic drop in demand for bank services. In the first six months of 2015, the residential mortgage market dropped by a total of 40 percent, and banks earned eight times less from issuing loans than in the same period in 2014. With the Central Bank withdrawing licenses of small banks almost every month, ordinary Russians feared for their savings and depositors rushed to withdraw cash from their bank accounts. The dreads word "default" re-entered the Russian vocabulary.

But fears were overstated. When S&P issued its report with positive numbers in November, officials announced that Russia was out of recession. The report reflected a growing confidence that Russia's fiscal managers had successfully negotiated the crisis. By September, Central Bank head Elvira Nabiullina had even been named best head of a central bank in 2015 by Euromoney magazine.

Nabiullina, according to the magazine, fought the "macroeconomic storm" by implementing "moderate policies" - raising the key interest rate, carrying out measures to strengthen the ruble and giving financial institutions access to additional liquidity. Euromoney concluded that Ms Nabiullina's economic "therapy" had worked.

Dmitry Miroshnichenko, an expert at the Centre for Development Institute of the Higher School of Economics, agrees. He says that the Central Bank stabilized the situation and is now in control.

Future challenges

It's too early to judge whether Russia's economy will continue to grow - the results of the fourth quarter will not be available for a while yet, and Russia's economy remains dependent on oil prices - meaning a breakthrough is only possible if they rise, he says.

"If there is no 'help' from the outside world, our economy might grow, but this will be much slower than that of the world economy," Miroshnichenko says. "We're at the bottom of an abyss and right now we are very slowly crawling out of it."

Bragin sees room for a bit more more optimism. "I think we have come to a point of economic restoration. Even taking the rate of inflation into account, companies have started earning more money. I believe next year the dynamics might surprise us," he says.

Storm damage

Yet the damage the economic storm has done is obvious. According to a World Bank report in late September, the number of Russians living below the poverty line in 2015 reached 14.2 percent - compared with 11.2 percent in 2014.

"It is the first significant rise in the number of poor in Russia since 1998-99," according to the report.

Former finance minister Alexei Kudrin believes the Russian government needs to tackle structural reforms - such as raising the pension age, cutting public spending and reducing support for state-run companies - if it is to avoid further trouble.

"After the crisis, the economy will face stagnation, because there haven't been any structural reforms. That's the most serious challenge that the president faces: stagnation of the economy for the next five years," Kudrin said during a round-table event devoted to the 15th anniversary of Vladimir Putin first being elected president in March.

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 #17
CNBC.com
December 8, 2015
Ex-Russia Fin Min: We need 'painful' structural reforms
By Gemma Acton

Russia cannot blame the commodity slump alone for its recent economic woes, according to the country's former finance minister.

Speaking exclusively to CNBC at the Moscow Exchange London Forum on Tuesday, Alexei Kudrin acknowledged the ongoing impact of the weakness in commodities

"The drop in GDP (gross domestic product) this year mainly has to do with the drop in oil prices - it will be like this this year and next year," he said.
However, the former Russian finance head - who attended in his capacity as the chairman of the Moscow Exchange - highlighted other factors as being at least as important.

"We need structural reforms in various areas. That will lead to diversification. But these reforms are often painful and that is why the government postpones them to after parliamentary and presidential elections in early 2018," he said.

Kudrin suggested the reforms most needed are "primarily, the reform of the pension system, decentralization of the budget and allocation of more funds for infrastructure."

Mikhail Shamolin, CEO of Russian conglomerate Sistema, was more positive about the government's efforts. Also speaking to CNBC on Tuesday, he affirmed that the Russian government "is doing a lot in many different areas (to help) local businesses to develop."

Conceding that government policies will be critical in determining the trajectory of Russia's recovery, Shamolin added that he saw the biggest issue ahead as being whether or not privatization and de-monopolization of certain industries will take place.

With oil prices slumping this week to lows not seen since 2009, on the back of OPEC's decision to keep supply levels unchanged, it seems unlikely that Russia's economy would not be acutely impacted.

Indeed, this is a country which in 2013 depended on natural resources for an estimated 18 percent of total GDP, according to the World Bank.

Shamolin placed more emphasis on the hit Russia has taken from the commodities sell-off, conceding that its economy has long been structurally dependent on oil. He noted: "This doesn't change overnight."

"That cannot be overcome in one year or even two or three years", he added.

Economic sanctions following Russia's annexation of Ukraine are another challenge the country has had to deal with in the past two years. Yet, Shamolin pointed out the bright side of this hurdle.

"I think the whole situation creates opportunities in certain sectors such as agriculture where the growth rates have come up and demand has come up and loads of opportunities for local production have been generated," he said.

Nonetheless he agreed that their eventual removal would be helpful to government efforts to drive an economic turnaround, acknowledging that going forward it would be "better to be without sanctions than with sanctions."

What happens next with the sanctions is sharply in focus as Russia's relationship with the West morphs in the face of shifting geopolitical alliances surrounding the rise of the so-called Islamic State.

Kudrin echoed the Sistema CEO's point about improved diversification and its welcome effect on the economy, saying "we have an opportunity to diversify and are optimistic about improvements in productivity - something lacking in previous years."

Alexey Moiseev, Russia's deputy finance minister, also sounded an upbeat tone in London, telling CNBC that "in terms of the economy, most things we say, are priced in."

"Now we are looking into recovery mode definitely," he said.

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 #18
Levada.ru
December 8, 2015
Russians split over authorities' efforts to combat "foreign agents" - poll

Russians are split in their attitude to the authorities' fight against "foreign agents", the results of the latest opinion poll published on the website of the Russian independent polling organization Levada Centre on 8 December have shown.

Those who justify the fight against "the West's fifth column" has increased from 36 to 41 per cent over the past year, however 25 per cent of those polled believe that these efforts by the authorities are just an attempt to protect themselves from public criticism. As many as 34 per cent were undecided.

As regards the witch-hunt, 33 per cent of respondents think that it may be increased in the near future, but 53 per cent consider this scenario improbable or impossible. The number of those polled who feel themselves free in Russian society remains at the same level as in 2014 amounting to 66 per cent, the pollster said. Twenty-six per cent think the opposite.

Some 22 per cent of respondents believe that a dictatorship may be established in Russia in the near future, whilst 68 per cent doubt it or consider impossible.

The poll was conducted on 20-23 November among 1,600 urban and rural residents aged 18 and over in 137 population centres in 48 Russian regions, Levada Centre said. The margin of error was given as 3.4 per cent.

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 #19
AP
December 9, 2015
Putin's Foe Khodorkovsky: Revolution in Russia Is Inevitable

MOSCOW - Exiled tycoon and former prisoner Mikhail Khodorkovsky, in a rare public appearance Wednesday, threw down the gauntlet to the Kremlin, saying revolution in Russia in inevitable and that he will help to bring it about.

Speaking on Wednesday at a conference in London, Khodorkovsky accused the Kremlin of pursuing a suicidal foreign policy, introducing unlawful laws and prosecuting citizens with the use of corrupt courts - developments that he described as an "anti-constitutional coup."

He said President Vladimir Putin has driven Russia into a position when a revolution is "inevitable and necessary."

The 10 years that Khodorkovsky served in a Russian prison transformed an oligarch into a symbol of anti-government resistance.

Once Russia's richest man, the charges of tax evasion and embezzlement against Khodorkovsky have been seen as punishment for challenging the Kremlin and harboring political ambitions. Upon his release, he left the country and has remained in exile.

The 52-year old said he is not interested in politics as a career but he "cannot stand idle and watch what is going on in Russia" and would like to help a peaceful revolution.

"I will certainly do my best to ensure that the rule of law is restored through a revolution, so that as a result ... Putin and his entourage will have to be held accountable to society in front of an independent court," Khodorkovsky said.

Khodorkovsky had spent 10 years in prison on two sets of charges when he was pardoned and released in December 2013, shortly before the Winter Games in Sochi. He had been due to be released in August the following year.

Khodorkovsky said on Wednesday that when he was pardoned he gave his word to Putin not to go into politics before his prison term would have ended and while he was taking care of his ailing mother. Since his mother died last August, Khodorkovsky said he felt he "no longer had any obligations."

In an unexpected raising of tensions, Russian investigators this week called Khodorkovsky for questioning in connection with a murder investigation, in a summons delivered to his elderly father's home in Moscow in connection.

Investigators announced in June that they were reopening the probe into the 1998 slaying of Vladimir Petukhov, mayor of Nefteyugansk, the town where Khodorkovsky's company, Yukos, was headquartered at the time. Khodorkovsky and his associates have denied involvement in the killing.

Khodorkovsky said on Wednesday that he had no intention of working with Russian investigators, whom he accused of concocting the charges. A former security chief at Yukos was sentenced to life in prison in 2007 for ordering the murder.

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 #20
Ex-Yukos chief ready to testify only to Swiss authorities in Siberian mayor murder case

MOSCOW, December 9. /TASS/. Former head of the now defunct oil giant Yukos Mikhail Khodorkovsky said on Wednesday he would testify only to the Swiss authorities in the case of a Siberian mayor murder.

Khodorkovsky, who is living abroad, was summoned to Russia's Investigative Committee on December 11 to testify in the case of the murder of Nefteyugansk Mayor Vladimir Petukhov.

"If the country where I'm now living deems it necessary to get answers to these questions [formulated by investigators], I'll answer these questions," Khodorkovsky said at an online conference in the office of the Open Russia opposition movement.

Khodorkovsky said earlier on Wednesday he didn't intend to go to Russia to be questioned at the Investigative Committee over the case of the Siberian mayor's murder.

"I can say one thing: I won't take part in this show," the ex-Yukos chief said.

A TASS source familiar with the matter said earlier the ex-Yukos head was charged in absentia and investigators might request his arrest in absentia and his inclusion in an international wanted list, if he failed to appear before the Investigative Committee on December 11.

Nefteyugansk Mayor Petukhov was murdered in the morning of June 26, 1998 as he was walking to his office. Two unidentified persons gunned down Petukhov and his body guard Kokoshkin. The mayor died while the body guard was wounded. The mayor's death was preceded by a conflict with Yukos, a single-industry enterprise in Nefteyugansk.

The Moscow City Court sentenced Yukos ex-security chief Alexey Pichugin to life imprisonment for this murder. He was convicted for organizing three murders and four assassination attempts.

Russian Investigative Committee spokesman Vladimir Markin said on June 30 that investigators had reopened the criminal case into the murder of Petukhov over new information that ex-Yukos head Khodorkovsky could have ordered the murder of Petukhov and some other crimes.

Yukos case

The former head of oil giant Yukos, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, and his business partner Platon Lebedev were found guilty of embezzlement and tax evasion in May 2005 and sentenced to nine years in prison.

While serving their prison term, both Khodorkovsky and Lebedev were found guilty of embezzlement and money laundering in a second criminal case in December 2010 and sentenced to 14 years in prison, with account taken of the jail term they had served.

Khodorkovsky was pardoned by Russian President Vladimir Putin and left prison in December 2013. Lebedev was released in early 2014.

Media reports said the ex-Yukos head wrote in his pardon request that he pledged not to go into politics.

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#21
Putin Majority Breaking Down But Elite Splits and Mass Protests Won't Come Immediately, Solovey Says
Paul Goble

Staunton, December 8 - The truck drivers' strike and the seriousness with which the Kremlin has reacted to it show that "the Putin majority, the Putin consensus and Putin stability are all beginning to break down, Valery Solovey says; but that does not mean that more mass protests are likely to occur in the immediate future.

The MGIMO professor says that "really serious mass protests will begin significantly later, somewhere in a year to eighteen months. For the time being, the system has a sufficiently great reserve of strength and in society there is still too great a fear of social cataclysms" to expect otherwise (obzor.press/intervyu/12719).

Some Russian defense officials are indeed talking about taking measures to defend government buildings in Moscow, but this is because "fear has big eyes and certain paranoid aspects in the behavior of the Russian authorities have been obvious for a long time: the authorities are afraid, but they still do not understand specifically what they are afraid of."

With regard to the Russian-Turkish crisis, Solovey says that Putin took the downing of the Russian plane as a personal affront and has responded accordingly. Some close to him have tried to "restrain" him because they think that "Putin overrates Russia's possibilities which are not so great and that the geopolitical ambitions of the country clearly don't correspond to its economic position."

"These people see," Solovey continues, "that things are not very good, that Russia should reduce its ambitions and that Putin should recognize the need to do so.  But one must understand that the powers that be in Russia are organized in such a way that all key political decisions are taken exclusively by the president."

The elite's ability to influence him is limited, and it cannot force him to take positions significantly at odds with what the Kremlin leader wants to do.

Some people speak about a split in the Russian elite, but "there is no such split in the country, and it will not appear in the foreseeable future. There is an obvious fear among the elite and growing concerns on its about its future," given "the unpredictability and irrationality" of Putin's actions.

At the same time, Solovey argues, "the elite feels itself to be the president's hostage, a typical example of 'the Stockholm syndrome.'" As a result, "hopes that it will come out against him are at the very least naïve."

Any split in the elites, he suggests, "will come only when mass demonstrations of society begin and when pressure comes from outside. Without this fundamental condition," Solovey stresses, "no split in Russian elites will occur."
 

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 #22
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
December 9, 2015
Cable wars: Can Russia really cut the jugular?
Both the U.S. and Russia have the means to clip undersea cables but don't worry, unless there's a full on war, your internet surfing won't be interrupted.
RAKESH KRISHNAN SIMHA, SPECIAL TO RBTH

There are more than 285 cables crossing the world's oceans, with the entire network spanning over 885,000 km. They are only a few inches thick - the size of a soda can - which makes tapping into or cutting them a piece of cake.

It was the U.S. that drew first blood when it launched Operation Ivy Bell in 1970 to tap a secret Russian Navy cable in the Sea of Okhotsk. The Sea of Okhotsk was strictly off limits to foreign vessels and the Russians had installed a network of sound detection devices along the seabed to detect intruders. The area also saw numerous surface and subsurface naval exercises. And yet the U.S. risked World War III by sending a nuclear powered submarine into Russian territorial waters and installing a tap on the undersea cable.

Because it was a recording device, U.S. submarines had to make trips every couple of months to retrieve the tapes and install new ones. Each of these missions could have sparked nuclear war. The Russians came to know of the U.S. tap through a spy in 1981 but they did not remove the device, instead feeding false data to the NSA for several years.

Tapping underwater cables is more common than you think. Both the U.S. and the U.K. as part of Five Eyes - the intelligence gathering network of the five English speaking countries including Canada, Australia and New Zealand - are known to tap into undersea cables owned by other countries. The U.S. even has a nuclear powered submarine, USS Jimmy Carter, specially designed to tap undersea cables and eavesdrop on the communications passing through them.

This is not only illegal but also compromises commercial and banking secrecy. At best, this data is used to track terrorists but who are we fooling; this intelligence is shared among the Five Eyes members, giving them an edge in the commercial and diplomatic arenas.

Russian undersea capability

Considering the extent of U.S.-led tapping of undersea cables, you wouldn't expect the Russians to practise espionage abstinence. As long as there is American spying on global cables, you can bet Russian submarines and spy ships will aggressively operate near undersea cables vital to US interests.

It is but natural that the Russians would want to have some capability of tapping into or disrupting the communications channels of the U.S. and some of its leading allies such as the U.K. In September 2015, the Russian spy ship Yantar, equipped with two self-propelled deep-sea submersible craft, was seen cruising off the U.S. east coast on its way to Cuba. Why Cuba? Well, a major cable lands near the American naval station at Guantanamo Bay. According to U.S. Navy officials, the Yantar's submersible vessels have the capability to cut cables miles down in the sea.

However, reports that Russia is going to pull the plug on the internet are highly exaggerated. The main reason, if you haven't noticed the obvious, is that Russia is also connected to the outside world. Moscow relies on the global system of undersea cables for communication and banking services among others.

Yes, Russian submarines most likely continue to map the telephone and internet cables under the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, but this is an exercise like any other. Monitoring undersea cables does not mean Russia is ready to cut them at a moment's notice and leave the U.S. digitally stranded. It's the same as having the power to wipe out your enemy with a nuclear first strike but you won't because it's not an especially nice thing to do and secondly, you are guaranteed to suffer too.

If at all it comes to war, there are other ways to disrupt communications. The most likely scenario is a massive cyber attack on U.S. internet networks. Russia has an army of cyber warriors who are trained for the job.

A second option is to explode a nuclear warhead at a height of 300 km over Nebraska. The result would be "fundamental collapse" as the United States EMP Commission describes it. There won't be any material destruction but every microchip in the country will be fried and all electronic systems will fail. All phones and mobiles will stop functioning, the transport system would come to a halt, the banking system, airports, food and fuel distribution systems would collapse. The fabric of modern society would be ripped apart.

You get the picture - when you have weapons that can do the job much more quickly and efficiently, it would be counter intuitive to undertake the tedious job of clipping undersea cables. The report that Russians are going to disrupt global communications is the result of the fervid imagination of writers at the New York Times. However, few people outside the western world accept American news at face value any more.

The reality is that the U.S. is connected to the outside world through a multitude of systems - including satellite so that a cable break will not necessarily bring down the entire grid.

Besides commercial cables, the U.S. has secret undersea cables that carry military data. If anything, Russian submarines and ships could be searching for their location. These are more at risk than commercial cables because there would be fewer alternate routers if one or more are sabotaged.

Choke points

The only people who actually monitor internet choke points worldwide are the NSA and other American spy agencies. Major undersea cables cross into American borders and territorial waters, making wiretapping much easier for the U.S. to accomplish than any other country.

NSA defector Edward Snowden showed the extent to which American and British spy agencies were intercepting submarine cable data. "Well, if you had the choice, you should never send information over British lines or British servers," he said.

Several countries, including some European ones, have started moving away from U.S. servers and data companies. Some like Brazil have launched a project to build a submarine communications cable to Portugal that not only bypasses the US entirely, but also specifically excludes U.S. companies from involvement.

Meanwhile, you can chat, browse and post online as usual, secure in the knowledge that Russia isn't interested in targeting these activities.

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 #23
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
December 8, 2015
Russia and the EU: United by the refugees' tragedy
Similar approach to border controls is key to managing migration.
DMITRY BABICH, SPECIAL TO RBTH
Dmitry Babich is a political analyst at Sputnik International.

In recent years, Russia and the European Union have developed a taste for stressing what divides them, particularly the "differences in values" which presumably make us two worlds apart. But there is at least one sphere where both the problems and the solutions are similar - that of migration and border controls.

The dilemma of Ukrainian refugees in Russia has not got as much attention in the global media as the plight of refugees from the Middle East and Africa that are currently flooding the EU. Meanwhile, we are dealing with comparable figures here.

According to official statistics from Russia's Federal Migration Service, since April 2014, as many as 404,000 Ukrainian citizens have applied for refugee status in Russia, while 265,000 more applied for resident status. Adding to the problem is the fact that Russia's already limited capacity to absorb migrants is now strained by the influx of mostly economic migrants from Central Asia and the Caucasus.

Experts note the relative ease with which Russia managed to give shelter to at least one million Ukrainian citizens from the embattled southeast of Ukraine. Some of them stayed and some returned to Donbass - but they all had to spend at least some time in Russia since the civil war in Ukraine started April 2014. The lack of a linguistic and cultural barrier is among the key reasons for their absorption.

Common ground

"Russians managed to find housing and jobs for the refugees from southern and eastern Ukraine, because for almost all of them Russian is their native language and most of them have Soviet or post-Soviet education and working skills," says Valery Fyodorov, head of Moscow-based VTSIOM Center for Public Opinion Studies. "According to our polls, the attitude in Russia to migrants from Ukraine is pretty positive."

The other reason for the absence of a visible "migration shock" from the Ukrainian crisis was Russian government policy, which exempted Ukrainian citizens from rules applied to other foreigners from former Soviet republics. They were allowed to stay in Russia without registering or getting refugee status for longer periods.

However, the liberal policy ended December 1, 2015, when the Federal Migration Service canceled the exemption, limiting the duration of unregulated stays for Ukrainians in Russia to the usual 90 days - the same for citizens of - for example - Uzbekistan or Azerbaijan.

Ukrainian migrants in Russia are now facing a choice: Apply for refugee status or return to Ukraine, which may not be a bed of roses for them - especially under the new, post-Maidan regime.

Stricter control

So, even with Ukrainian refugees, the authorities in Russia are taking steps to stem their flow - very much like the authorities of the EU, which have to regulate the flow of refugees from Syria, even while sympathizing with the plight of the victims of the Islamic State or Assad's government.   

"At least 800,000 Ukrainian citizens who preferred Russia to other regions of Ukraine as their destination while fleeing the civil war in Ukraine - these people are both a challenge and a huge opportunity to Russia," said Zhanna Zayonchkovskaya, a civil activist and migration expert at the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of Economic Forecasts. "But the authorities prefer to view it only as a challenge."

A lot of analysts in the EU are bemoaning the fact that the need to regulate migration from the war zones of Africa and the Middle East imposes some limitations on one of the EU's undisputed achievements - the freedom of movement between EU member states. However, the new border controls between France and Italy, as well as between Austria and some of its Balkan neighbors, have their analogues between Russia and its post-Soviet neighbors.

Eurasian Union

The project of the recently launched Eurasian Economic Union, touted in Russia as a Eurasian response to the European Union, also presupposes free movement of products, capitals and workforce. When unveiling the plans for the Union in 2011, Russian President, Vladimir Putin, said all former republics of the former USSR, as well as Asian neighbors, were invited. This gave rise to the expectation that people would be able to move as freely within the post-Soviet space as they did in Soviet times.

Reality, however, is a lot gloomier. Russia already had to establish visa regimes with two members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS, the loose alliance of post-Soviet states, which replaced the Soviet Union in 1992). Turkmenistan on its own initiative set up a visa system between itself and the other post-Soviet states back in 1998, Georgia (after its conflict with Russia) followed suit in mid-2000s. With Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan - the three biggest sources of economic migrants to Russia - Moscow tightened the entry rules, punishing even minor overstays of registration periods by prohibiting entry for up to five years. For the citizens of small and impoverished Kyrgyzstan, which joined the Eurasian Economic Union in 2014, the rules are not much better.

So, migration-wise, whether we want it or not, Russia remains part of Europe - drawing and repulsing inhabitants of its former "provinces," it both attracts them and restricts their movements. And the common language here is both uniting and alienating, just like in the cases of the "imperial" English, French or Portuguese.   

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 #24
RIA Novosti
December 8, 2015
Russian envoy: Raised focus on relations with China predates Western sanctions

Russian ambassador to the People's Republic of China Andrey Denisov has denied that Russia's "eastward turn" - its visible attempt to improve relations with countries in the Asia-Pacific region, primarily China - was a response to the introduction of sanctions against Russia by several Western countries; rather, he said, it had been mooted over a decade earlier. His remarks were made during an exclusive interview with RIA Novosti (part of the state-owned International News Agency Rossiya Segodnya), published on its website on 8 December.

"The eastward turn is primarily a strategic choice taken by Russia, and is not at all linked with [Western] sanctions policy. In any case, it began a long time before the procession of sanctions descended upon us. Our government first seriously began talking about a turn to the East at some point around three years ago, when nobody was threatening us with sanctions," he said.

"But if we go deeper, it began even earlier, at least at the beginning of the 2000s," he added, pointing out that trade between Russia and China had almost trebled between 2005 and 2015.

Remarking on the effects of Western sanctions, the ambassador admitted that they had "unfavourably affected the development of our economy"; however, he added, they have also "stimulated our more attentive attitude to the opportunities available on the Eastern markets". He pointed to the energy and agriculture sectors as areas in which sanctions had had the greatest effect on Russian policy in regards to cooperation with China. "I repeat, we developed and still develop cooperation with our Chinese partners in these areas without sanctions in mind, but the absurd sanctions pressure from the West, of course, stimulated this cooperation," he clarified.

Denisov also commented on the deployment of US Navy destroyers in the South China Sea. "We call for territorial disputes to be resolved, first of all, exclusively by political and diplomatic means, not only without the use of force, but also without its demonstration. Secondly, on the basis of international law. And thirdly, amongst the directly-involved sides themselves."

"Russia's position applies not only to the South China Sea issue, but to various types of territorial dispute in general, of which there are many in the world," he noted. He added that "increased US military power is, of course, an unpleasant factor for us", as "in future this may create a real military threat".

"I must say that our American neighbours' policy on the Pacific ring represents a surprising combination of 'dove of peace' rhetoric and very aggressive activities in practice," he said.

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 #25
www.rt.com
December 9, 2015
'Hopefully, no nukes will be needed' against ISIS - Putin

Vladimir Putin has praised the Russian cruise missiles fired against terrorists in Syria from the sea. He expressed hope that these weapons would not have to be armed with nuclear warheads.

Meeting in the Kremlin with Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu, who reported the latest results of the anti-Islamic State (IS, formerly ISIS/ISIL) ops in Syria, the Russian president made a notable remark.

"We must analyze everything happening on the battlefield, how the weapons operate. The Kalibrs (sea based cruise missiles) and KH-101 (airborne cruise missile) have proved to be modern and highly effective, and now we know it for sure - precision weapons that can be equipped with both conventional and special warheads, which are nuclear," Putin said.

"Naturally, this is not necessary when fighting terrorists and, I hope, will never be needed," the president added.

On Tuesday, a Russian Kilo-class submarine, the Rostov-on-Don, fired Kalibr-PL cruise missiles against an IS installation near the terrorists' stronghold in Raqqa. Water-to-surface cruise missiles were launched from a submerged sub in the Mediterranean Sea, according to the Russian defense minister.


"We've been registering the missiles launches, flights and, of course, their hitting the targets," Shoigu said. "We warned our Israeli and American colleagues about these launches."

Kalibr and KH-101 cruise missiles have been deployed for the first time this year in Russia's counter-terrorist operation in Syria.

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 #26
www.rt.com
December 9, 2015
Su-24 downing gave grounds for war, but Russia decided against symmetrical response - Medvedev

The downing of a Russian Sukhoi bomber by the Turkish Air Force was sufficient reason to start a war, but Moscow chose not to respond symmetrically, says Russia's Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev.

"What did 20th-century countries used to do in a similar situation? A war began," Medvedev said on the 'Talk to the Prime Minister' TV program.

Medvedev said Ankara had "violated the norms of the international law," giving Russia what's called in international judicial language 'a casus belli', or a reason to start a war.

"That was a direct assault on a foreign state. In the present situation a war is the worst what could happen. That's why a decision was taken not to give a symmetrical answer to what the Turks had done," the PM explained.

"Yet we had to make them understand they're going to hold responsibility for their actions. Exactly for that reason and for the safety of our citizens the relevant decisions were taken," Medvedev said regarding the economic and other sanctions Russia has introduced towards Turkey.

It should be realized that Russia's actions are not effectively sanctions, but rather a "protective reaction" of the Russian state, Medvedev said.

Speaking about the Russia's military spending, the PM stressed that the decision taken five years ago to increase defense expenditures was "absolutely correct."

"What can we say about our country? It is the largest country in the world with the longest border line. If we don't maintain reliable armed forces, we would simply not have our country anymore," he said.

At the same time the prime minister declined to release defense budget expenditures on the military operation against Islamic State terrorists in Syria.

"It's classified. I can tell you the following: employment of the Russian armed forces [in Syria] stays exactly within the budget of the Defense Ministry. They have made no requests for wider defense responsibilities regarding the given situation (operation in Syria)," Medvedev said.

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 #27
The National Interest
December 7, 2015
Should the U.S. Leave NATO?
By Doug Bandow
Doug Bandow is a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and a former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan. He is the author of Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire (Xulon).

Is NATO a military alliance or social club? The "North Atlantic" Treaty Organization just invited Montenegro to join. With 2,080 men under arms, Podgorica is a military nullity. Having peacefully separated from Serbia years ago, Montenegro neither threatens nor is threatened by anyone. Adding it to NATO is like accumulating Facebook Friends. They do little more than allow preening Washington officials to wander the globe gloating how popular the U.S. is.

During the Cold War NATO was viewed as deadly serious. Washington was determined to defend Western Europe from the avaricious, totalitarian Soviet Union. The allies had been devastated by World War II and faced an aggressive communist superpower. The nightmare scenario was a Red Army armored attack through the Fulda Gap. For years war seemed to be a real possibility.

Then the Soviet Union collapsed. The Warsaw Pact dissolved. The Central and Eastern Europeans raced westward. And NATO lost its raison d'etre. The quintessential anti-Soviet alliance no longer had anything to defend or defend against.

For a time allied officials were nervous about the organization's future. But as Public Choice economists would predict, institutional instinct took over. Supporters proposed new roles for NATO, such as promoting student exchanges and combating the drug trade. Eventually they subordinated the military to the political, and being less concerned about economic and legal reform, became a geopolitical Welcome Wagon for former Warsaw Pact members. The slogan seemed to be "come one, come all."

The good times came to a halt last year with the Ukraine crisis. The Baltic States suddenly looked vulnerable and alliance members remembered the little matter of Article 5, which committed them to battle against a nuclear-armed power to protect largely indefensible nations. Worse, the Baltic three, which had been absorbed by the Soviet Union, were irrelevant to the security of the rest of Europe. Nor did Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania add meaningful military assets to the alliance: they currently have, respectively, 5,750, 5,310, and 10,950 men under arms. Americans and Europeans were expected to risk nuclear war as an act of international charity.

Proposals to add Georgia and Ukraine would multiply the dangers. Russian aggressiveness, though unjustified, illustrates how important Moscow views its influence in both nations, which also never were seen as relevant to European security. Both were not only part of the Soviet Union but the Russian Empire. Bringing them into NATO would be seen by Russia as comparable to the Warsaw Pact inducting Mexico and Canada. Washington would not, shall we say, be pleased. The West's laudable desire to protect the right of Georgians and Ukrainians to chart their own course unfortunately is seen by the Russian government-in part because of maladroit allied policies, such as NATO expansion-as provocative attempts at encirclement. Nothing in Kiev or Tbilisi is worth a nuclear confrontation. Especially one in which the U.S. likely would find most of its European allies back in Brussels locked in a fetal position.

The problem is not just NATO's recent expansion. An alliance on autopilot ignores changes within existing members. For instance, Turkey is proving to be another area of confrontation that undermines U.S. and European security. Never quite the geopolitical lynch-pin that it was made out to be, Ankara spent years prosecuting a brutal campaign against Kurdish separatists and occupied more than one-third of the Republic of Cyprus, creating an ethnic Turkish state recognized only by Ankara. Turkey turned in an ever more authoritarian and Islamist direction once President Recep Tayyip Erdogan dropped his early liberalizing pretensions. Ironically, he now appears determined to create a presidency modeled after that of Vladimir Putin. So much for NATO promoting liberal democracy. (That always was a job for the European Union anyway.)

Worse, though, is Ankara's irresponsible shoot-down of the Russian plane. Even assuming that Turkey's claims as to the Russian incursion and Turkish warnings are accurate, 17 seconds over Turkish territory did not warrant such a deadly response. Indeed, Ankara routinely violates the airspace of fellow NATO member Greece. That policy forces cash-strapped Athens to waste its limited resources responding. One wonders at the Erdogan government's reaction if Greece chose to down the Turkish offenders. (NATO is talking about bolstering Turkey's air defenses against Russia; how about aiding the Greeks against Ankara?)

Of course, Turkey knew that Russian forces have no hostile aims-indeed, none of the active combatants, including Syria, are targeting Turkish personnel or materiel. Ankara may have been protecting the illicit oil trade or insurgents in an area dominated by the al-Qaeda-linked al-Nusra Front, or attempting to punish Moscow for backing Syria's President Bashar al-Assad. The first two undermine American interests. The latter might fit with an official aim of Washington, but runs against the more fundamental objective of destroying the Islamic State. None of these potential Turkish goals justifies allowing Ankara to drag NATO into a war with Russia. My Cato Institute colleague Ted Galen Carpenter suggests defenestrating this misbegotten alliance member.

Striking is how all of these members, new and old, as well as aspirants-the Baltic States, Georgia and Ukraine, and Turkey-degrade U.S. security. Montenegro, at least, plays the harmless role of the Duchy of Fenwick in the Mouse that Roared. Although its inclusion in the alliance will further antagonize an already paranoid Russia, Podgorica really is irrelevant strategically and militarily. The others are not. In a worst case all of them could ensnare America in a war with a nuclear-armed power over modest, indeed, minimal, security stakes. The policy frankly is mad.

However, even if Washington's NATO commitments did not bring far more dangers than benefits, they would be unjustified. Europe could, if it was so inclined, defend itself. Why, 70 years after the conclusion of World War II, 26 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and 22 years after creation of the European Union, are the Europeans still dependent on America?

Retired Gen. Robert Scales, commandant of the Army War College, recently complained that: "At 30,000, there are fewer American soldiers protecting Western Europe, a piece of the planet that produces 46 percent of global GDP, than there are cops in New York City." But why can't an area that accounts for almost half of the world's production (an overstatement, but never mind) and has a larger population than America provide its own soldiers for defense? Why can't an area of such economic prowess, which has around eight times the GDP and three times the population of its only possible antagonist, Russia, deploy an armed force capable of deterring any threats?

The reason the Europeans don't do so is because they don't want to and don't have to. Some don't believe that Moscow actually poses much of a threat. Others figure only the nations bordering Russia face any risk, and there's little interest in "Old Europe" for confronting Moscow over "New Europe." And almost everyone assumes America will take care of any problems.

Particularly striking is the lack of military effort from those supposedly threatened by the supposed new Hitler to the east. This year NATO-Europe came in at 1.5 percent of GDP, well short of the two percent objective. Only Estonia, Greece (mostly to confront Turkey), Poland (first time ever), and the United Kingdom made that level. Notably missing are France, Germany, and Italy (the continent's other major powers), Latvia and Lithuania (squealing loudly about Russian threats), and Turkey (challenging Russia over parochial rather than alliance interests).

Over the years American officials have pleaded, cajoled, contended, and begged the Europeans to do more. Even during the Cold War such efforts failed to yield much fruit. They have even less chance of working in the future. Reported Jan Techau of Carnegie Europe: "the dependence of European NATO allies on the United States has further increased since the end of the Cold War, not decreased." Indeed, he added, "while European membership in NATO has nearly doubled since 1990, defense spending by Europeans has gone down by 28 percent since then."

First, the U.S. insists that it will never leave. So long as it frenetically "reassures" allies, trying to convince them that Americans are worthy to subsidize Europe, the latter will respond by not doing much. Second, Russia doesn't threaten America or most of Europe. The latter have little incentive to spend more. Third, domestic economic concerns remain paramount throughout the continent. There are few votes to be gained from supporting greater military expenditures to meet a phantom threat because it would gladden hearts in Washington, Vilnius, and Kiev.

The United States should do in 2016 what it failed to do in 1990. It should announce that the world has changed since creation of a U.S.-dominated NATO. It is time to refashion the alliance for a world in which allies had prospered and enemies had disappeared. One possibility for the future would be a European-run NATO, with America perhaps as an associate member. Another alternative would be a continental defense run alongside the European Union. Maybe there's something else.

But the time for subsidizing, coddling and reassuring the Europeans is over. American taxpayers deserve as much consideration as European ones. U.S. military forces shouldn't be deployed to advance interests of greatest concern to other nations. Any future alliances forged by Washington should act as serious military pacts, not international social clubs.

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 #28
Meduza
https://meduza.io
Vedomosti
December 7, 2015
Who are you calling 'propaganda'? Why the mechanics of Russian television aren't what you think they are

Kremlin-controlled television networks are often treated as one of the central pillars of Vladimir Putin's presidency and Russia's soaring patriotic fervor today. Is today's Russian TV a sexed-up, polished form of the propaganda that ultimately lost its luster in the Soviet Union? In an opinion piece for the newspaper Vedomosti, Inliberty chief editor Andrei Babitsky says things aren't so simple, arguing that Russian TV is better understood as an open market for patriotic trash than a factory for propaganda. Meduza translates that text here.

It's commonly said that Russian television's raison d'être is propaganda. If this hypothesis is correct, there should be ways to test it. For instance, television stations should strive to be credible, their effectiveness should grow with the size of their audiences, and they should react to all the important political issues of the day, not merely "pretending that nothing happened."

Obviously, network television in Russia doesn't meet all these conditions. The quality of the rhetoric on TV doesn't measure up to any standard, even compared to the very worst Moscow's broadcasters have to offer. Russian television's audience hasn't been growing for several years already (the average share of Channel One's audience, for example, has fallen from 18.4 percent to 14.5 percent over the past five years). At the same time, all available indicators show that support for the Kremlin is at best growing, and at worst fluctuating in ways unrelated to ratings on television. Finally, the TV networks ignore the same social issues that state propaganda gladly addresses on the Internet.

But if Channel One isn't an instrument of propaganda, what is it? The answer to this question, unfortunately, is older than television. The Kremlin's TV performs an organizational, not propagandistic, function. National television creates something like a stock exchange, where different persons and businesses can sell timely patriotic content to the state. This was particularly noticeable after the Turkish Air Force shot down a Russian bomber at the Syrian border.

It works like this. The state can't know all its own extra-legal resources available for harassing the Turks, and neither the ministers nor the generals (except for the most zealous ones) are going to go around calling up their subordinates, demanding some half-baked retaliation. They're too lazy for that, and it leaves a trail. But the lower-level market players-the border guards, police officers, and office heads-know exactly what resources are at their disposal, and they're more than ready to sell them to the highest bidder. That's how, one fine day, hundreds of people and organizations in different regions across the country are able to start a small war-all without an explicit order.

Politicians most likely forgot long ago that there was a Russian-Turkish Scientific Center at Moscow's All-Russia Library for Foreign Literature. But the recently appointed director, yet to distinguish himself, hadn't forgotten, and he promptly shut the center down.

The system is perfectly liberal in its contours: it's not central planning, but a stock exchange open to anyone to come sell their goods and earn a paycheck. It's thanks to this market that an absolute nobody like Igor Kholmanskikh went from Uralvagonzavod assembly shop manager to Putin's plenipotentiary envoy to the Urals Federal District, and it's how a group of bikers, the "Night Wolves," managed in the span of a couple of years to become something approaching a national political force.

It's undeniable that this market's structure, despite the high price, has many advantages. The buying and selling all happens in one place, you don't have to pay for anything before it's ready, and most importantly you don't need to try all that hard. Because Russian television deals in price tags, not placards.

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 #29
Russia Insider
www.russia-insider.com
December 9, 2015
Ten Years of RT - And Why We Need It
Because of RT and alternative media millions of Westerners know what they otherwise wouldn't - that Turkey is colluding with the Islamic State to buy its oil
By Alexander Mercouris
Alexander Mercouris is a writer on international affairs with a special interest in Russia and law.  He has written extensively on the legal aspects of NSA spying and events in Ukraine in terms of human rights, constitutionality and international law.  He worked for 12 years in the Royal Courts of Justice in London as a lawyer, specializing in human rights and constitutional law. His family has been prominent in Greek politics for several generations.  He is a frequent commentator on television and speaker at conferences.  He resides in London.

As RT TV is about to celebrate its tenth anniversary, last week provided the clearest possible indicator of why we need it.

The biggest news story of the week was beyond question the Russian military's news conference which provided detailed evidence of the industrial scale of the illegal oil trade between the Islamic State and Turkey.

Given that governments around the world have made fighting the Islamic State the priority, this is a vitally important issue.  

Without the money it makes from oil the Islamic State would lack the funds to set up its Caliphate or organise itself as a state.  

Governments that do not acknowledge this fact - and which fail to do anything about it - are simply not serious when they say they are fighting the Islamic State.

How then did the Western media report the Russian news conference?  Did they make it their headline?  

Did they show the people of the West the Russian satellite pictures that show lines of oil tankers carrying Islamic State oil heading for Turkey and stretching out beyond the horizon?

Not at all!  The short answer is that they barely reported the story. To the extent they did their reports were perfunctory.  

It was not as if the Western media dispute the story. They could hardly do so given that the US has admitted the Russian satellite imagery is accurate.

It is not as if the Western media deny the importance of the story. On the contrary ask most Westerners today and they would say that the Islamic State is the biggest threat around.

Despite this the Western media chose to treat the news conference as if it was an event of no importance - discussing things happening on the far side of the moon - not about the Islamic State and how it sustains itself and who supports it.

In Britain - where there was a parliamentary debate to discuss whether to bomb the Islamic State in Syria or not - the Russian news conference was barely mentioned at all, whether in the House of Commons or in the media, even though it took place as the debate was underway.

The curtain of silence the Western media drew down over the story says much in itself.

Firstly, it calls into question how serious Western governments - like the British government - really are when they say they want to fight the Islamic State.

Secondly, it begs the question about the nature of the relationship between the Western powers and Turkey.

The key point to take away however is the one about media bias.

The Western media and Western governments routinely call RT a "propaganda channel", accusing it of bias in its news reporting. Some Western politicians, with that excuse, make no secret of their desire to suppress it.

Bias however can express itself in many ways. One - the most important - is by suppressing inconvenient facts or news.

That is what the Western media has tried to do to this story.

However, though the Western media and Western governments have - for reasons best known to themselves - tried to suppress this story, they are no longer fully able to do so.

Ten years ago the Western media had an unchallenged monopoly over international news. If it set out to suppress a story, it could easily do so.

Today, because of RT and the rise of alternative media, it no longer can.

The result is that because RT heavily covered the story of the news conference tens of millions of Westerners know about it, despite the Western media's attempt to suppress news of it.

This is not of course the only time this has happened. On the contrary it now happens all the time.

That of course is why RT makes Western governments and Western media so angry, and why they try to discredit it by call it a "propaganda channel".

As to that, George Orwell once said that in a time of universal deceit telling the truth is a revolutionary act.

To the extent that that is true, by covering the Russian news conference RT has just committed a revolutionary act.

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 #30
Wall Street Daily
www.wallstreetdaily.com
December 8, 2015
When Will Putin Run Out of Money...or Support?
By Martin Hutchinson
For 27 years, Martin Hutchinson was an international merchant banker in London, New York, and Zagreb

Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin must be a happy man right now.

He has two overseas expansion projects for Russia, in Ukraine and Syria, both of which are going well.

Diplomatically speaking, he's running circles around President Obama and the West in general.

There are just two worries for him at this point: oil prices that may remain in the $40 to $50 range, and an impending election in March 2018.

Economic Malaise

The Russian economy has been in decline since the price of oil fell below $100 per barrel, and there's no sign of it bottoming. The International Monetary Fund projects a continued decline in 2016 and only very modest growth in 2017.

Meanwhile, the Russian budget is heavily in deficit in 2015 and is running down the Russian Reserve Fund at a rapid pace.

Putin has drained 2.6 trillion rubles ($41 billion) in 2015, more than half of the fund's total. At present rates, the fund will run out before the end of 2016.

At the same time, Russian military spending is increasing rapidly to compensate for Putin's geopolitical ambitions.

To top it all off, a new U.S. president will arrive in January 2017, and the chances are surely high that he or she will be less accommodating of Russian expansionism than the incumbent.

Thus, for budgetary and geostrategic reasons, it's likely that Russia's position will be grim by early 2017.

Assuming oil prices are still low in January 2017 and with an election little more than a year away, Putin will be left with two unpalatable options.

He can either stand down his military adventurism and squeeze the budget generally, hoping that the economy will recover enough to garner re-election.

Or he can double down on expansionism, raid the Russian companies that have cash and valuable assets (notably Gazprom, Rosneft, and the energy and minerals sectors in general), squeeze domestic consumers a la the old Soviet Union, and perpetuate both his rule and his aggressive foreign policy.

The problem with the former is that ending expansionism will be highly unpopular with the chauvinist Russian people. And it's unlikely that Putin would be able to get the economy recovering quickly enough to make voters forget the national "humiliation."

The latter option would require either canceling the March 2018 elections or holding wholly fictitious ones in which Putin wins with a Soviet-style majority of 99.98%.

Given Putin's temperament and approach to life, I'd bet he'll choose this alternative.

Putin the Omnipotent?

A permanent Putin dictatorship (lasting until, say, his 80th birthday in 2032) would be a very unpleasant place to live and a dangerous antagonist for the West.

Like the Soviet Union, its economy would be centrally planned, with the energy and resource sectors devoted wholly to the service of the military machine - although there may be some private enterprise still permitted in non-strategic sectors, such as retail.

The country would be expansionist in the former Soviet Union (especially Ukraine and Kazakhstan), the contiguous parts of Eastern Europe (such as the Baltic States and Bulgaria), and parts of the Middle East.

Iraq would probably become a Russian protectorate to provide additional oil revenue for the machine.

And there'd be no Communist theory behind this behemoth, just autocracy - the Russian economy is simple enough and has sufficient natural resources that this brutal approach can be made to work adequately.

Alternatively, if Putin chooses the path of retrenchment and a more or less fair election in March 2018, it's likely that he'll lose - although Russian voters have been confused in the last decade by high energy prices during a period of poor economic management.

Thus, the limited understanding of market mechanisms available in an economy that hasn't been properly run since Pyotr Stolypin was shot in 1911 has been blurred further.

Perhaps the people won't blame Putin for their renewed poverty?

In any case, the inheritance of an opposition leader, perhaps a sober version of the well-meaning Boris Yeltsin, seems very unattractive.

Oil prices might well still be low, so there'd be no chance of massive foreign exchange revenues.

The commanding heights of industry would be in the hands of Putin's cronies, so the new leader would have no chance either to influence their policies or to install better or friendlier management without yet again violating property rights, a very fragile flower indeed in Russian circumstances.

Plus, the new leader would inherit the remnants of a powerful and expensive military, unproductive of any gains that could be sold to the Russian people. This same military would bedevil the new leader's relations with the rich West.

Finally, he'd have little chance of attracting foreign investment to boost the economy. The energy sector would be running down because of past poor management and low prices, while the remainder of the economy would be a "no-go" area for foreign investors because of the uncertainty of Russian property rights.

Thus, after a single term in office, although admittedly of six years rather than four, Putin would be swept vengefully back into power in March 2024, to undo any beneficial changes the intermediary might have made.

Bottom line: Putin seems all-powerful now, but economic forces are likely to cause a crisis by early 2017 that will result either in his removal or the abolition of democracy.

Either way, the prospects for the Russian economy are bleak.

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 #31
Christian Science Monitor
December 9, 2015
From Russia, with love
What I learned from what 'Mama Zoya' lived.
By Jeannie Ferber

Were it not for Zoya Fedorovna, my time in Russia would have been merely a rich adventure in my life. But Russia was much more than an adventure. It was a gift - and Zoya's home my second home. I, along with her son Nikolai and his friends, did philanthropic work in villages where building trust had a chance of trumping politics. For 10 years, starting in 1999, we traveled more than 40,000 miles, following tire tracks across fields that turned into roads without names, which took us to people who showered no little kindness on us.

By my third visit to Talitsa, a village in the old and gentle Ural Mountains, it was the most natural thing in the world to call her "Mama Zoya." I thereafter slept on an extra cot in her room, where we spent early mornings talking. The moment I'd turn over, she'd get up and come sit on the edge of my bed and begin some new story. It took me a long time to pinpoint what made her face so childlike, and then, suddenly, I knew: It was as if the sun were always shining on it.

Life never allowed Zoya to be nostalgic. When she was 17, war carried off youth, love, and things sentimental. She was hurried through a medical course and made sole "doctor" of a village orphanage - with one assistant her own age. Zoya was in charge of more than 50 of the thousands of children sent from what was then called Leningrad to distant villages as the ravages of World War II consumed more and more of Russia.

After years of being in Mama Zoya's presence and listening to her stories, I came to be in awe of her ability to care. Her stories were all equally remarkable, though it's hard to fathom how one person could have experienced so much.

There was, for example, that early morning in May 1943.

Someone began pounding on the door. Exhausted from yet another night with too little sleep, Zoya, then 19, got off the divan (where she always slept fully clothed during the war) and quickly took in the situation. Her heart melted at the sight of the little boy looking up at her. His mother was having trouble, he said, pointing to the horse cart behind him in which she lay. It was still six miles to the nearest hospital. Zoya started out with them but, halfway to the hospital, they had to stop. Telling the boy to hold the blanket firmly and shield his mother from the wet falling snow, there, on the roadside, Zoya delivered twins.

Because of people like Mama Zoya, I learned to speak Russian. It mattered greatly to her (and to all my friends) that I understood their stories. They yearned for the good of Russia to be shared, yearned for us to care about each other - and they still do.

Slowly, I came to see that caring is more than love. It didn't matter if you agreed with someone or if it was hard to get along. There was a moral demand to care. Mama Zoya was not naive. (How could she be, with such a life?) She was constantly observing events and proclaiming, "What kind of stupidity is this?!" Still, the world's stupidity didn't obviate what she saw as the need to care.

By the time the sun had risen through the mountain ash and into our window, Mama Zoya would leave me to write in my journal. Soon the courtyard door would begin swinging open and shut, with the morning breeze blowing in friends and neighbors - each to be given a cup of tea and something to eat. There was no such thing as too many guests, an awkward time to arrive, or the need to knock.

"From generation to generation our house has always been full of people," Mama Zoya once told me. "My father always said, 'No one ever stole your wealth with his stomach.' "

When Mama Zoya got to the curtain that served as the door to our bedroom, she would turn to me and say, "Write about the people." When I was back in the United States, virtually every time I called, which was close to once a week, she would ask, "Have you written?"

I cannot help caring about a people who so cared for me. Mutual caring is even more dear, I've found, during difficult times. Without Russia, I wonder if I ever would have known such caring. But only now I realize that something more than human affection allowed us to transcend our different backgrounds - not to mention historical conflicts and continuing difficulties. It is what Tolstoy wrote in his epic "War and Peace": "It is possible to love someone dear to you with human love, but an enemy can only be loved with divine love."

Thank goodness Tolstoy wrote that. Thank goodness for writing. Thank goodness for my Mama Zoya.

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