#2
Moscow Times
December 4, 2015
Russians Less Keen for Democratic Transfer of Power

The number of Russians supporting regular democratic changeovers of political power is at its lowest point in recent history, a poll published Thursday showed, reflecting the popularity of President Vladimir Putin amid the patriotic fervor and increasingly strong rhetoric against foreign enemies surrounding Russian military actions in Ukraine and Syria.

Forty-five percent of respondents to the survey by the independent Levada Center pollster said they supported regular rotation of leaders through elections, down from a steady 60 percent recorded a year ago and in every poll since 2007, when the survey began.

Meanwhile, the number of respondents saying that political leaders should appoint their successors - as Putin himself was appointed by Boris Yeltsin in 1999 - rose to 22 percent from the mid-teens in previous surveys.

The shift in public attitudes comes amid a crackdown on domestic opposition in politics and the media and the steady beating of war drums on state television against Islamic terrorists and Ukrainian "fascists" - who are often said to have the backing of the United States. Moscow has supported separatists in eastern Ukraine, where around 8,000 people have died since mid-2014, and began bombing targets in Syria in September.

Putin has meanwhile seen his approval ratings rise to record highs of almost 90 percent, even as the economy has fallen into recession. According to the Levada poll, 57 percent of respondents wanted to see Putin as president following scheduled elections in 2018, and a further 11 percent wanted to see a candidate nominated by Putin in power. Fewer than 20 percent wanted to see a new president with different policies.

The survey polled 1,600 people across Russia in November. It's margin of error did not exceed 3.4 percent.

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 #3
www.rt.com
December 3, 2015
Most Russians want Putin to remain president after 2018 - poll

Two-thirds of Russian citizens say that after 2018 they would like to see Vladimir Putin or his personally proposed successor as president after the elections. Less than 20 percent of Russians say that the nation should choose someone with a different approach.

According to a poll conducted by the independent agency Levada Center in late November, 57 percent of respondents would prefer to see Putin reelected as president in 2018. Eleven more percent said that the incumbent president should be replaced by someone he himself proposes as his successor.

Eighteen percent said that they would prefer another person as president who would suggest a different political course, while 14 percent of responders said it was too difficult for them to answer the question at the moment.

In the same poll, 48 percent of Russians said that currently no politician in the country could effectively replace Putin, while 33 percent said that the replacement could be found once the need arises and 6 percent answered that they already know a perfect candidate. Twelve percent of respondents said they found the question too complex to answer.

The share of Russians who think that replacement of officials is a key condition for a successful political system dropped from 60 percent to 45 percent over the past year and the share of those who think that political leaders must appoint their successors and pass their posts to them increased from 17 to 22 percent over the same period. A total of 19 percent of Russians (against 11 percent a year ago) answered that successful politicians can occupy their posts for an indefinite period of time - the longer the better.

Vladimir Putin's popularity rating has been growing constantly throughout the current presidential term, hitting historical highs several times, after such events as accession of the Crimean Republic into the Russian Federation or the beginning of the Russian counter-terrorist operation in Syria.

According to the state-owned polling agency VTsIOM, in late October Putin's approval rating was higher than ever at 89.9 percent, beating the previous high set in June 2015, when the average monthly rating was 89.1 percent.

In late June 2015, the Levada Center reported that according to their data, the share of Russians who are happy with Vladimir Putin's work as president had reached 89 percent. Sixty-four percent think the current policies of the Russian authorities are correct - also the highest in history. The proportion of Russians who expressed dissatisfaction with Putin's work was 10 percent.

Last year, Putin's press secretary Dmitry Peskov said that in his opinion Putin did not need any publicity, bad or good, and the people's love for Putin was a manifestation of their love for Russia. During a major Q&A session in 2014 Putin himself stated that high ratings were not among his major priorities.

"This is not for making some remarks on paper, this is for the country and the people, to make everything better," the president said, adding that "when politicians start thinking primarily about their ratings they begin to slide, because this is some sort of profanation, not real work."

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 #4
Levada.ru
December 3, 2015
Nearly half of Russians say no replacement for Putin right now - poll

Almost 50 per cent of Russians believe it is impossible to find Putin's replacement right now and most would like to see him as their president after the 2018 election, the results of the latest opinion poll published on the website of the Russian independent polling organization Levada Centre on 3 December have shown.

As against to 57 per cent, 18 per cent of those polled would like to see as their president another person with a different policy, the pollster said. Eleven per cent do not mind another person to become president given that he or she continues Putin's policy.

Asked as whether it is possible to find Putin's replacement right now, 48 per cent of respondents answered in the negative, and 6 per cent in the affirmative.

The number of those who think that change of power should take place regularly after democratic elections has decreased from 60 to 45 per cent since November 2014, and the number of respondents who believe that those at power should appoint their successors has increased from 17 to 22 per cent.

As many as 48 per cent of those polled believe that Russia needs a leader capable of administering the work of the government, parliament, judicial and regions authorities. Forty-five per cent want a leader who would comply with the constitution and cooperate with all public and political forces of Russia, including the opposition.

Some 32 per cent of respondents think that Russia always needs a heavy hand, and 21 per cent believe that full power should not be in the hands of one person.

The poll was conducted in November 2015 among 1,600 urban and rural residents aged 18 and over in 137 population centres in 48 Russian regions, Levada Centre said. The margin of error was given as 3.4 per cent.

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 #5
Interfax
December 3, 2015
Putin: Average life expectancy in Russia to exceed 71 years in 2015

The average life expectancy in Russia will exceed 71 years in 2015, Russian President Vladimir Putin said in his annual address to the Russian Federal Assembly on Dec. 3.

"The average life expectancy in Russia has grown by more than five years over the past decade and, based on preliminary estimates, it should exceed 71 years this year," Putin said.

"But surely, there are still a lot of problems that we have to resolve," Putin said, noting that the Russian healthcare system will switch fully to insurance principles starting in 2016.

"It is the direct duty of insurance companies operating within the mandatory medical insurance system to defend patients' rights, including in the event of an unfounded refusal to provide free medical aid," he said.

 #6
Rossiya 1 TV
December 3, 2015
Putin calls for fair elections, anti-corruption scrutiny for officials

Russian President Vladimir Putin has demanded the 2016 parliamentary elections to be fair and transparent and has raised his voice against corruption. He made the statement in his annual address to the Federal Assembly on 3 December, shown live on official state channel Rossiya 1 and several other national TV channels.

Putin said: "Electoral competition should be fair and transparent and be held within the law and with respect to voters. At the same time, it is important to ensure unconditional public trust in the elections' results and their solid legitimacy. Honourable colleagues, I believe that the necessary attention in electoral programmes of candidates for deputies will be paid to the issues of countering corruption as these issues are definitely causing concern in society. Corruption poses an obstacle for Russia's development. Today officials, judges, law-enforcers, deputies of all levels have to provide declarations of their income and expenditure, on the presence of real estate and assets, including those based abroad [at this moment the camera zoomed in on Prosecutor-General Yuriy Chayka, whose family was earlier this week mentioned in an anticorruption report of Russian opposition activist Aleksey Navalnyy's Foundation for Fighting Corruption]. Now the information about contracts and work contracts, which government and municipal officials plan to conclude with companies belonging to their relatives, friends and associates, will be subject to disclosure. Situations, in which there are signs of personal interest or conflict of interests, should immediately come under heightened scrutiny from law-enforcement bodies and certainly the public society."

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 #7
Rossiya 1 TV
December 3, 2015
Putin says situation in economy difficult, but not critical; rouble stabilizes

The situation with the Russian economy is difficult but not critical, Russian President Vladimir Putin has said. He made the statement in his annual address to the Federal Assembly on 3 December, shown live on official state channel Rossiya 1 and several other national TV channels.

"Last year we encountered serious economic challenges. Prices for oil and our other traditional export commodities dropped. The Russian financial institutions and companies' access to the global financial markets was restricted. I know, things are tough now for many. Difficulties in the economy affect earnings and our people's living standards in general," he said.

"The situation is indeed difficult. However, as I said before and would like to say again, it is not critical. We are seeing positive tendencies even today. Industrial production and the national currency rate, in general, have stabilized. The decline in inflation can be noticed. Compared to the year 2014, we are seeing significant decrease in capital outflow. This does not mean though that we should calm down and wait for everything to change miraculously, or simply wait for oil prices to go up," Putin said.

"The global economy's patterns are changing rapidly. New trade blocs are being formed. Radical changes in the sphere of technologies are taking place. Countries' positions in the global division of labour are being defined at this very moment for decades to come, and we can and we must take the place among the leaders. Russia has no right to be vulnerable. We should be strong - in economy, in technologies, in professional competencies, and we should use to the full extent today's favourable opportunities, which we may not have tomorrow," he said.

Putin went on to comment on the key priorities for the Russian economy. Firstly, he said, is "changing the economy's structure" as the most "competitive manufacturing is still accumulated in the raw materials and extractive sectors".

He said that several industries, such as construction, car manufacturing, light industry and railways construction, have ended up in the risk zone, and they would be given state support.

Thirdly, Putin said, social security services should be targeted at people who need them most, the low income and disabled citizens.

The fourth point on the list was balancing of the state budget and budget planning. Putin said that the deficit should not exceed 3 per cent in 2016.

Finally, he talked about the need to improve the business climate in Russia. Putin ordered the government agencies to lessen control on small and middle-sized businesses and foster "freedom of entrepreneurship".

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 #8
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
December 4, 2015
Putin talks tough on Turkey but holds back on anti-West rhetoric
Analyzing Russian President Vladimir Putin's annual speech to the Federal Assembly, Russian observers interviewed by RBTH underlined the contrast between Putin's harsh stance toward Turkey and his apparent readiness to cooperate with the West, though they said the address was lacking in groundbreaking ideas.
YEKATERINA SINELSCHIKOVA, RBTH

Against the backdrop of Moscow's military operation in Syria, terrorist attacks in Paris and on a Russian airliner in Egypt, as well as the recent incident involving a Russian Su-24 bomber shot down by Turkey along the Syrian border, it was expected that Russian President Vladimir Putin's annual address to the Federal Assembly on Dec. 3 would pay special attention to international security.

In many ways, these expectations were met: Speaking of Turkey's actions, Putin pledged not to forget what he called "this act of complicity in terrorism" and said that Ankara "will regret more than once what it did."

This aside, there was no audible military rhetoric in the president's speech, while the domestic political agenda turned out to be almost liberal, though it could hardly be described as either groundbreaking or revolutionary.

'This won't be limited just to tomatoes'

"The words 'this won't be limited just to tomatoes' [Putin was referring to the recently introduced ban on the import of fruit and vegetables from Turkey to Russia - RBTH] are, in fact, the keywords of the address," said Mikhail Remizov, president of the National Strategy Institute.

In his view, this means that Moscow is set on the most serious response possible and will take open-ended measures against Turkey.

Apart from his condemnations of Ankara, Putin's other foreign policy points were notable for their lack of aggression.

"There was a statement about seeking a broad coalition in the fight against terrorism, especially with the Western powers," said Yekaterina Schulmann, a political scientist and associate professor at the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration. She described Putin's delivery as rather conciliatory in the current situation.

"In addition, there were several declarations throughout the text that Russia is willing to cooperate, to participate in global markets, economic and international organizations," she said.

Yevgeny Minchenko, director of the Moscow-based International Institute of Political Expertise, also noted that on this occasion there was not even a hint of anti-Western rhetoric in Putin's words on foreign policy; all the critical arrows were directed against terrorists and Turkey.

'Land of opportunities'

Putin addressed the domestic political and economic parts of his speech to different groups of citizens, and they came across as relatively positive.

"The main thing that he said was that Russia is a land of opportunities, you are free to work in a large number of fields, we will not create obstacles," said Dmitry Orlov, CEO of the Agency for Political and Economic Communications, close to the Kremlin, commenting on Putin's speech.

There were also anti-corruption proposals, specifically about the transfer of accounts relating to budget funds to the federal treasury - for even greater transparency in budget spending - and Putin also spoke about the introduction of clear criteria for the effectiveness of import substitution.

"The president has traditionally demonstrated his ability to respond to challenges in a non-banal way," said Orlov.

However, Remizov saw no groundbreaking economic ideas in Putin's speech. In his view, it was about purely cosmetic measures, which do not suggest a revival in economic growth, even if they deserve support.

According to Yekaterina Schulmann, the speech's domestic economic part turned out to be almost liberal, at least as far as is possible in the present circumstances.

"However, all the talk about reducing the pressure of the controlling bodies on business and about the development of hi-tech exports ended with a proposal to strengthen the powers of the controlling bodies, create new power structures and give budget funds to somebody else," said Schulmann.

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 #9
Russia ready to fight terrorism together - key foreign aspect of Putin's address
By Tamara Zamyatina

MOSCOW, December 3. /TASS/. Russia is fighting against terrorism for the sake of the future of civilization. This is the gist of the message to the international community contained in Russian President Vladimir Putin's state-of-the-nation address to the Federal Assembly, polled participants in Thursday's event in the Kremlin told TASS.

State Duma member Vyacheslav Nikonov, of the United Russia party, believes that the international community's response to Putin's call for presenting a strong common front against the terrorist organization calling itself the Islamic State was mixed. Putin proposed this initiative at the UN General Assembly session last September and has now explained it in greater detail in the message to the Federal Assembly.

"Russia's call for a wide international coalition to fight against terrorism has drawn a greater response from Europe than from the United States.

Washington has turned a blind eye on the hard fact the Islamic State militants are being financed from Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. In contrast to the United States the Europeans, who have already fallen victim to terrorism and been able to feel the effects of an unprecedented influx of illegal migrants, do see certain chances of cooperation with Russia, of which the just-concluded agreements with France are evidence," Nikonov told TASS.

"France has stepped up the anti-terrorist operation in Syria after the terrorist attacks in Paris. British Air Force planes on Thursday dealt strikes against the militants' oil facilities in eastern Syria. Germany is sending a contingent of 1,200 to fight against the Islamic State. Naturally, these countries will be acting in conformity with US policies. Nevertheless, it is quite obvious the West is aware the future of civilization is under threat. The Russian president stated that quite clearly in his message," Nikonov said.

Russia's General Staff on Wednesday presented what he described as a "killer piece of evidence" showing caravans of oil tanker trucks delivering crude oil from militants-controlled Syrian territories. Now this will cause major influence on efforts to plug the loopholes the terrorists are financed through and to do away the Islamic State.

The head of the New York office of Russia's Institute of Democracy and Cooperation, Andranik Migranian, believes that the United States in the first place is not interested in the emergence of a wide international coalition.

"Washington needs obedient junior allies. Russia is no good for this role, because it has been operating against the militants in Syria far more effectively than the US-led pseudo-coalition of 60 counties. In the wake of the successful operation by Russia's air group in Syria Germany and Britain have decided to make their own contribution to the struggle against the Islamic State. They cannot afford to let Russia take all the credit as the main crusader against terrorism," Migranian told TASS.

He recalled that some members of the US-led coalition were also sponsors and accomplices of terrorists. "In his message the Russian president stated loudly and clearly we will not forget and never forgive those who catered to the militants' interests and shot down Russia's Sukhoi-24 bomber during its combat mission against terrorists in Syria. Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan keeps arguing the attack was well-founded and that he will resign, if he sees convincing proof of Ankara's involvement in oil trade with the Islamic State. Now that Russia's General Staff has presented irrefutable evidence exposing Erdogan's criminal business he is doomed to suffer a political defeat," Migranian believes.

"The Russian president's message to the Federal Assembly reflected Russia's strategic readiness to take joint action for the sake of eliminating the Islamic State. It is beyond doubt that Russia's pro-active stance will meet with support from the world public, while the attitude of ordinary citizens, of the electorate, will force Western politicians to cooperate with Russia in the war against terrorism in reality, and not just verbally," Migranian said.

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 #10
Intellinews
December 3, 2015
Terrorism, bread and babies in Russia's sights for 2016, Putin tells nation
Ben Aris in Moscow

As the world reels amid terrorist chaos created by the US and now abetted by Turkey, resurgent Russia will drive the counter-offensive, President Vladimir Putin said in his annual state of the nation address on December 3, while overtly threatening more retribution against Ankara for downing one of his country's bombers.

In a tight one-hour speech to more than 1,200 state officials and dignitaries gathered in the Moscow Kremlin, the Russian leader urged the international community to unite in "one mighty fist" against the terrorist scourge, while leaving no doubt as to whom he blamed for its emergence.

"Someone wanted to change unfavourable regimes, roughly imposed their rules, and what was the result?" Putin said in a clear but unspecified attack on the United States. "They stirred up a mess, destroyed statehood, drove peoples against each other, and then, having opened the way for radicals, extremists and terrorists, quite simply washed their hands of it."

But the focus of the speech was far more on domestic issues than in 2014. Russia is also on track to overcome its current economic difficulties and perform on equal terms on the world markets, Putin stressed, without even broaching the crisis around Ukraine and Russia's seizure of Crimea last year, which incurred broad Western economic sanctions.

In one of the key calendar speeches where the Russian leader outlines his plans for the coming year, the event marked a new sense of direction in the Kremlin's agenda following lackadaisical speeches at the St Petersburg Investment and Economic Forum in the summer and at the VTB "Russia Calling" conference in the autumn.

In both of those speeches Putin said almost nothing about reform and economics, whereas beyond the battle cries regarding terrorism, this speech could be set up with the two words: "bread and babies". Putin dived deep into detail when outlining the government's answer to the acute demographic crisis the country faces and the need to reform agriculture so that Russia will be self-sufficient in food by 2020.

While he delivered an almost ritual poke at the US over disorder in the world, Putin's invective this year was however almost entirely reserved for Turkey, following the November 24 incident in which a Turkish jet shot down a Russian Su-24 bomber near the Syrian border.

"Allah decided to punish the Turkish elite by relieving them of their sense and judgement ... They will regret they ever did this," Putin said to the assembled Russian elite that included the widow of the pilot killed in the incident, and the widow of a marine killed in the ensuing search operation.

Russia imposed food sanctions on Turkey on December 1 on a business estimated to be worth $765mn. This will cause chaos in Turkey's agricultural sector in the same way that Russia's retaliatory food ban on Europe has done in the West. And the president explicitly said there is more to come.

"If somebody may have thought that after committing a treacherous war crime - the killing of our people - it will be possible to get away with a ban on tomatoes or restrictions in construction and other industries, they are grossly mistaken," Putin said. "We shall remind them many a time what they have done and they will more than once feel regret. We are perfectly aware of what action is to be taken."

Within half an hour of the end of the conference, Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak told TASS that the Turkish Stream pipeline construction project has been suspended. The pipeline would have provided Turkey with cheaper gas and billions of dollars of Russian investment.

The Kremlin is clearly incensed by the Turkish leadership's decision to shoot down their plane that was in Turkish airspace, by their own admission, for a mere 17 seconds.

Putin combined his verbal attack on Turkey with fresh calls for a broad international coalition against terrorism that he first floated during his UN speech on September 24, and repeated after last month's terrorist strikes in Paris. He said that there should be "no safe havens" for terrorists and repeated the Russian claim that Turkey is buying oil from the Islamic States (IS) and selling it on the international markets, thus financing terrorism.

"We know who in Turkey makes money and allows terrorists to make profit," the Russian president said, reiterating recent Russian allegations made against President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's family and entourage that were vehemently rejected by Ankara. The money is used by gunmen for "recruiting mercenaries, purchasing weapons, organizing inhuman terrorist attacks directed against our citizens, citizens of France, Lebanon, Mali and other countries," he added.

All this will play well with the domestic audience. A recent poll from the independent pollster the Levada Centre found that three-quarters of Russian feel their country is once again a major power in the world, although the same number said they think Russia should improve its relations with the West. It is this context that Putin is playing to: there is a palpable sense of fear in Moscow that another terror attack is imminent, while memories of the Nord-Ost theatre siege and the Beslan school massacre are still fresh, not to mention the bombing of a Russian jetliner over Egypt in November that claimed 224 lives.

In the most recent bne IntelliNews Watcom footfall index, traffic at shopping malls in the capital have plunged by 10% in the last month as shoppers stay away fearing a terror attack. Still, one in two Russians support Putin's decision to launch airstrikes against rebels in Syria, according to another recent poll.

Corruption

International politics was dealt with relatively quickly and firmly in a well articulated and deftly timed speech that will primp up Putin's image at home after a recent small drop. However, the president's rating remains soldily over 80%.

Putin then moved onto business and fixing the investment climate next with a range of suggestions and abominations. This was remarkable, as in the two big economic forums this year he said next to nothing about reforms or business - itself unusual as he usually reels off a long list of the latest positive macroeconomic results.

He singled out corruption as a major problem and discussed giving Russia's general prosecutor more powers, but called on him to use his powers of arrest prudently. This was an acknowledgement of the main corruption-related issue: wine-maker Boris Titov has been appointed Russia's anti-corruption tsar, the ombudsman for business, and has claimed that more than 100,000 entrepreneurs have been falsely imprisoned in Russia by bureaucrats abusing their powers in an effort to extract a bribe.

This fight is not going well after Titov was able to get less than 2,000 of these people released last year, and the lack of small- and medium-sized enterprises is a major drag on growth. But as part of a package to improve the business climate, the president promised to leave taxes low and continue cutting red tape.

During his speech, Putin also proposed changing the rules on detention and decriminalising a number of articles of the Criminal Code to make it harder to work this scam.

"I am asking the Russian State Duma to support the proposal of the Russian Supreme Court to decriminalize some articles of the Russian Penal Code and transfer some of the crimes that pose no great threat to the public or society to the category of administrative offences but with one major reservation - the offence will be classified as a crime if it is committed for a second time," Putin said.

He also annouced that Russia's capital amnesty would be extended for another six months. Introduced last year as part of Putin's deoffshorisation drive, Russian businessmen are allowed to bring cash home with no questions asked. But teh scheme has been a failure as domestic business still don't trust the government: Putin blamed the "complex rules" on the lack of ehthusiasm.

Bread

Putin then picked up the agricultural theme, which emerged as one of two non-terror-related main arcs of the speech. Russia has been thrown back on its own resources and found them lacking after it bans one foreign supplier after another. The most recent ban on Turkey's food stuffs has been delayed to January 1 to give shops a chance to find alternative sources of fresh produce, but analysts are expecting that even then there will be shortages.

More damagingly, already high food prices will be sent higher. Estimates vary from the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) official comment on the morning of speech that overall inflation will not rise by more than 0.2% to 0.4% as a result of the sanctions, with others putting the increase in inflation as high as 2%. That would prevent the CBR from cutting interest rates again soon and could delay a return to economic growth by at least four months or probably much more.

"By 2020 Russia should become self sufficient in food production," Putin said, then calling on anyone with an idle piece of potential agricultural land to sell it, while more state support was also offered to "efficient" farms.

The government has been investing heavily in agriculture, which has been pretty much the only sector to report growth this year. Russia is on track to bring in a bumper harvest of more than 106mn tonnes of grain in 2015 and has already become a major grain exporter. (Turkey could be in trouble here too as it was the second largest buyer of Russian grain in 2014 after Egypt.) All this has seen Russia climb up the global grain export rankings and it plans to increase its grain exports this year.

In 2014, Russia earned $20bn from agricultural exports overall, which was 25% more than was earned through arms sales, and one third of revenues from exporting gas, Putin said.

Babies

The second big theme was children. The demographic disaster of the 1990s when male life expectancy fell into the 50s is about to hit the working population and will seriously impede economic growth for the next decade.

The Kremlin launched what has turned out to be a highly successful maternity programme of subsidies and better natal care several years ago and as a result the natural population growth has been way ahead of even the most optimistic forecasts: the birthrate began to rise strongly in 2008 and the population has been growing in the last two years.

"People want children. Ever second child at the moment is born into a family that already has two or three children. People want babies because they believe in the future of this country," Putin said to rousing applause.

This maternity programme was due to expire at the end of this year, but Putin announced it would be extended by another two years.

All in all the president was in a combative mood but set a pragmatic tone with the speech. Between warning Turkey that Russia "doesn't tolerate treachery" he took a leaf from the US play book that he has no problem with his "friends" the Turkish people. The bulk of the speech was dealing with the specific issues and carried an unusual amount of detail on individual regions. But Putin also played to the soaring sense of Russian national pride by quoting Dmitry Mendeleyev, the Russian scientist who invented the periodic table, whose words 100 years ago "directly apply to us today".

""Dispersed, we will immediately be destroyed. Our power is in unity, in warriorship, in the tight-knit family spirit that increases the population, and in the natural growth of domestic wealth and peace," Putin waxed.

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 #11
http://readrussia.com
December 4, 2015
5 Most Important Things from Putin's Address to the Federal Council
By Editors

Putin's annual address to the Federal Council lasted 58 minutes this year, 12 minutes дуыы than in 2014. No need to listen for almost an hour: here're some of the principal points made by the Russian president in his speech.

1. On Turkey-ISIS oil trade allegations:

"We know who are stuffing pockets in Turkey and letting terrorists prosper from the sale of oil they stole in Syria. The terrorists are using these receipts to recruit mercenaries, buy weapons and plan inhuman terrorist attacks against Russian citizens and against people in France, Lebanon, Mali and other states. We remember that the militants who operated in the North Caucasus in the 1990s and 2000s found refuge and received moral and material assistance in Turkey."

2. On Turkish people:

"Meanwhile, the Turkish people are kind, hardworking and talented. We have many good and reliable friends in Turkey. Allow me to emphasise that they should know that we do not equate them with the certain part of the current ruling establishment that is directly responsible for the deaths of our servicemen in Syria."

3. On Russian plane shot by the forces of Turkey:

"...We were ready to cooperate with Turkey on all the most sensitive issues it had; we were willing to go further, where its allies refused to go. Allah only knows, I suppose, why they did it. And probably, Allah has decided to punish the ruling clique in Turkey by taking their mind and reason."

4. On import substitution programmes:

"We are ready to guarantee the demand for the goods produced under these programmes and projects. I propose giving the Government the right to purchase on a non-competitive basis up to 30 percent of the products manufactured under special investment contracts. Whatever remains should go to the free markets, including those abroad, to motivate these companies, to monitor the quality of their products and reduce overheads."

5. On Russia's strategy:

"Russia has no right to be vulnerable. We must have a strong economy, excel in technology and advance our professional skills. We must fully use our current advantages, as there are no guarantees that we will have them tomorrow."

What Putin didn't mention: Ukraine, Fifth column, United States. He didn't really mention EU either.

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 #12
Valdai Discussion Club
http://valdaiclub.com
December 2, 2015
RUSSIA'S EURASIAN MODEL OF MODERNIZATION
By Yaroslav Lissovolik
Yaroslav Lissovolik is professor of international economics at the Diplomatic academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

As Russia's literary classicists claimed, the most important issue for Russia is a sense of direction and in today's context this is exactly what is lacking in Russia's economic policy paradigm.

This lack of direction in the economic sphere is not just a phenomenon of the past several years - it seems to have set in after the crisis of 2008 shattered the previous paradigm of the seemingly seamless integration of Russia into the world's financial markets and the strong growth performance driven by high oil prices.

Which way to take after the oil price collapse? The Western model greatly discredited in the 1990s appears unpalatable for the broader populace, while the Asian model is viewed with a dosage of distrust by the elites. Just as Russia after the dissolution of the USSR threw itself headlong into economic cooperation with Europe in the 1990s, so too the latest turn to the East is taking place under pressure and in haphazard fashion. There needs to be an anchor, a vision that overcomes the divides within the country and offers a way of integration into the world economy that surmounts the decades-long pattern of disorientation between East and West.

That kind of vision may be represented by the Eurasian school of thought that emerged nearly a century ago and that seeks to base Russia's development path on the basis of its idiosyncratic traits, most notably its geography, it history, cultural and economic traditions. The core philosophy of this school of thought is that for Russia to be successful in its economic exploits it needs to take advantage of its geographical position between Europe and Asia in order to benefit from rising economic interaction between these centers of the global economy. In today's circumstances a Eurasian model of economic modernization could be predicated on the following key features:

- Integration into the world economy: combining integration efforts in both Europe and Asia as a way to facilitate greater trade and investment flows in all of Eurasia, with Russia being one of the key potential beneficiaries in intermediating the rise in economic activity between the likes of China, Japan, Korea, ASEAN on the one hand and Europe on the other. In this respect, the Eurasian integration process has been greatly bolstered by China's Silk Road project, which Russia will seek to support.

- Eurasian integration in the "near abroad": the more successful Russia is in promoting greater economic integration in the post-Soviet space, the greater its capability to attract trade and investment flows into Eurasia. A more integrated Eurasian economic space will be in a stronger bargaining position to negotiate alliances with other trading blocks and to intermediate the rising economic interaction between Europe and Asia.

- "Open regionalism" and prioritizing multilateralism: in the stand-off between regionalism and multilateralism, Russia should accord greater priority to supporting global international organizations such as the WTO in reinforcing international norms that limit the scale of preferential treatment and discrimination in the world economy. The formation of trading blocks in Eurasia needs to comply with the principles of "open regionalism" of the WTO.

- Asian Industrial policy: a policy that instead of an exclusive emphasis on import-substitution and weak currency (as was the case in the Latin American model of industrial policy) prioritizes export-promotion. This is precisely the area where Asia's model of industrial policy could serve as a guide, in particular the model pursued by South Korea, where sunset clauses were used for state support to companies, which was in turn conditional on the attainment of a certain market share abroad.

- European stabilization instruments/anchors: in terms of financial stability Russia could emulate the Western system of economic rules, most notably fiscal and monetary rules. With respect to monetary policy this implies greater prioritization of lower inflation, while in the fiscal sphere Russia could introduce ceilings on the level of the non-oil budget deficit as well as on the overall level of public debt.

- Oil and gas sector: the oil and gas reserves could be used as a tool to promote greater competition between Europe and Asia to forge trade and investment alliances with Russia. Russia could also take advantage of its significant reserves in the Far East to promote greater competition between China, Japan and South Korea for access to these resources in return for greater cooperation in economic sphere.

In the end, Russia's Eurasian model of economic modernization could be based in part on Asia's experience in growth promotion (including via industrial policy) as well as Europe's experience in securing financial and broader economic stability via a system of economic policy rules.

Russia's economic diplomacy will need to promote greater competition between European and Asian suppliers for access to Russia's large domestic market, while Eurasian integration will dovetail the Chinese efforts to forge ties with Europe via the Silk Road project. What is missing thus far is a competitive system of production at the micro-level of companies and industries - one of the keys to success could be greater integration of Russia's vanguard companies with Asian and European corporate leaders via joint ventures, strategic and technological alliances.

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 #13
www.rt.com
December 4, 2015
Putin wants Russia to become world's biggest exporter of Non-GMO food

Russia could become the world's largest supplier of ecologically clean and high-quality organic food, said President Vladimir Putin on Thursday. He also called on the country to become completely self-sufficient in food production by 2020.

"We are not only able to feed ourselves taking into account our lands, water resources - Russia is able to become the largest world supplier of healthy, ecologically clean and high-quality food which the Western producers have long lost, especially given the fact that demand for such products in the world market is steadily growing," said Putin, addressing the Russian Parliament on Thursday.

According to the President, Russia is now an exporter, not an importer of food.

"Ten years ago, we imported almost half of the food from abroad, and were dependent on imports. Now Russia is among the exporters. Last year, Russian exports of agricultural products amounted to almost $20 billion - a quarter more than the revenue from the sale of arms, or one-third the revenue coming from gas exports," he said.

Putin said that all this makes Russia fully capable of supplying the domestic market with home-grown food by 2020.

In September, the Kremlin decided against producing food products containing genetically modified organisms (GMOs).

Russia imposed an embargo on the supply of products from the EU and the United States as a response to Western sanctions. After Turkey shot down Russian Su-24 bomber, Russian authorities decided to ban the import of fruit, vegetables and poultry from Turkey. The ban will take effect from January 1.

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 #14
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
December 3, 2015
COP21: Facing the challenges of climate change before it's too late
With representatives of 195 nations currently taking part in climate change talks in Paris, or COP21, as the negotiations have been called, the issue of preventing global temperatures from rising by a key 2°C is on top of the agenda. What challenges face the international community and does Russia have a meaningful role to play in fighting global warming?
SERGEI STROKAN, VLADIMIR MIKHEEV, SPECIAL TO RBTH

A sense of urgency has brought the leaders and high representatives of 195 countries to the climate change talks being held in Paris, or COP21, to define commitments to a safer and healthy environment through restraints on man-made damage inflicted on nature.

With one of the primary goals being to prevent average temperature from rising by 2°C or more, which would spell disastrous consequences for human civilization, one of the main focuses was on cutting down on greenhouse gases and other pollutants. Air pollution alone is the cause of 3.7 million premature deaths each year around the world. The World Health Organization warns that, with more people moving to the cities, deaths from urban air pollution will increase substantially. The mooted solution, reiterated at the discussions in Paris this week, is a "green" economy.

The path toward a low-carbon economy and society in general terms must have a price tag. Who is in a position to bear the costs of introducing a green economy? Sergei Komlev, head of price formation and contract structuring at Gazprom Export, placed emphasis on the most environment-friendly of the fossil fuels, natural gas, one of Russia's main export commodities.

"Russia and Gazprom can support Europe in achieving its goal of reducing emissions by continuing to supply natural gas. If you look at the history of our relations with Europe, in the time span of over 50 years we have supplied something like around 4,000 billion cubic meters of natural gas. These supplies have allowed Europe to switch to gas from high-pollution coal in power generation and also in commercial and residential sectors.

"Lately, we have made estimates that our deliveries and wider use of natural gas in power generation have allowed Europe to reduce the amount of CO2 emitted into the atmosphere by 1.5 billion tons.

"Now that the EU has set an ambitious target of reducing CO2 emissions by the year 2050, it has been realized that natural gas is the least expensive way of reaching this goal. With the broad use of natural gas in power generation, in the industrial and residential sectors, and as motor fuel in transportation, Europe would save up to 1 trillion euros."

This optimistic scenario does not resonate well with the bread-and-butter and down-to-earth needs of many states, often called the "emerging economies." With still a quarter of its population deprived of electricity, India cannot precipitate cuts in GHG emissions, Prime Minister Narendra Modi admitted while pledging to cut Delhi's emissions per unit of GDP by up to a third, without setting a date.

In Europe, not everyone is happy with the drive to reform the EU Emissions Trading System, as suggested in a document published in July 2015. It became clear that Poland, which is heavily dependent on the dominant share of coal in its energy balance, along with Latvia, Lithuania, Croatia, and Greece, would like to slow down the process in order to preserve the competitiveness of their industries.

How can Moscow contribute to the noble cause? And what are the challenges faced by the global community? Troika Report put these questions to Alexei Grivach, deputy director general of gas projects at Russia's National Energy Security Fund.

"First of all, Russian natural gas has been part of the European energy mix and contributed to cleaning it. The share of coal in the energy balance has fallen dramatically: from 71 percent in 1980 to 16 percent in 2010. In the same period, the share of gas almost doubled, from 14 percent to 27 percent."

"It was a great time for European climate improvement aspirations, and fitted into the de-carbonization policy. Unfortunately, last year the European energy policy changed and ignored the ecological potential of natural gas. This irrational measure led to a decrease in the consumption of gas by 120 bcm in 2014 compared to 2010. That was the result of subsidizing renewables, which are good for mitigating climate change, but it also led to a rise in coal consumption in the European Union. So it ended up with a sort of coal 'renaissance' within the EU."

- Is the arrival and steady flow of imported cheap coal to Europe a real setback for the goal of creating a "green" economy"?

"Coal is the main polluting substance for the environment, not only in Europe but around the world. It will make no sense talking about saving the environment if we do not address the issue of decreasing coal consumption globally."

- What's to be done?

"From my point of view, the solution is natural gas, nuclear power generation, and renewables when they are economically efficient. This is the best energy mix for the future world."

Whatever the 195 nations agree on at COP21, it still remains a hurdle to define the exact legal status of the final, hopefully, universal document and its binding power. No less shaky is the issue of financing the long-overdue adaptation of the existing polluting practices and introducing mitigation measures.

Yet there seems to be a full understanding that the failure of the joint efforts to address the truly formidable global issue of climate change, affecting the lives of every individual on the planet, would have truly dire consequences for the future of mankind on Earth.

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 #15
Interfax
December 3, 2015
Percentage of Russians who speak English doubles to 30%

About a third of Russians (30 percent) speak English to one degree or another: 20 percent can read and translate using a dictionary, 7 percent are familiar with colloquial language, and 3 percent are fluent speakers, according to Romir research holding.

Only 16 percent of respondents claimed to speak English in 2003, and 3 percent of them were presumably fluent speakers, the experts said.

The second best-known foreign language in Russia is German. Six percent of present-day respondents say they speak German (7 percent in 2003), and about 1 percent are fluent speakers (both now and twelve years ago).

The percentage of Russians who speak French has not changed either (1 percent). Another one percent speaks Spanish (the percentage was close to zero in 2003) and one percent speaks Arabic. No more than 0.5 percent of respondents speak other languages, the experts said.

Seventy percent of 1,500 respondents interviewed in all federal districts do not speak foreign languages. The index stood at 76 percent in 2003.

"English was the main contributor to the rise in the knowledge of foreign languages. The percentage of persons who speak English is higher amongst people aged from 18 to 24 and lower in older groups. Most Russians who speak English one way or another live in the northwest," Romir said.

The percentage of Russians who speak Spanish, Italian and Chinese is slightly higher in the northwestern regions of the country. The percentage of Russians who speak German is two times higher in central regions and in the 25-44 age group. Most respondents who speak French are aged from 25 to 34.

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 #16
Gazeta.ru
November 16, 2015
Compulsory debate participation likely for State Duma election - Russian website
Natalya Galimova, Andrey Vinokurov exclusive report, Participation in election debates could be compulsory in 2016. Parties will be forced to take part in debates

Gazeta.Ru has learned that in the 2016 Duma election, participation in debates could be compulsory for the parties. The idea of legislation being amended accordingly is being seriously discussed and will with a high degree of probability be put into effect, Gazeta.Ru sources says. "Compulsion" to debate could affect governor candidates also. As far as the presidential election is concerned, sources say, "there has to be a separate discussion".

Russia's power structures and the leadership of the State Duma are discussing the possibility of enshrining in legislation the duty for all parties to participate in campaign debates, a source in the leadership of the parliament's upper house told Gazeta.Ru, which was confirmed by a source close to the Kremlin.

They say that the idea is being discussed quite seriously, there is a high probability of the corresponding bill being submitted and, accordingly, of it being adopted. If the idea is given practical effect, the provision will begin to operate as early as the 2016 Duma election.

The source in the leadership of the State Duma points out that participation in debates is not obligatory at the present time: "Parties may ignore them, may simply not show up, and then the other participants' disputation with a blank space begins. This discredits the institution of elections and reduces trust in them. It is logical to require all parties to take part in the debates, therefore."

But Gazeta.Ru's source adds that it is not a question of requiring absolutely all candidates who have been nominated by this political force or the other to attend debates: the parties must, as now, themselves decide whom they should put up to debate their opponents."

The source close to the Kremlin says that the enshrinement in law of a provision on parties' compulsory participation in debates would contribute to the "shaping of the traditions, principles, and standards of political behaviour". "Debates are a key format of campaign competition. Compulsory participation would enhance the status and significance of this format, contribute to the increased quality of the competition, and stimulate the parties to more meaningful discussion, not simply the hanging out of slogans extolling their beloved selves. This is a systemic solution."

How to punish those who, possibly, would ignore the provisions of the law?

"This is to be discussed."

"Removal from the elections is too harsh a decision. It could, perhaps, be a question of a party losing its free air time, advertising time included," the source in the State Duma leadership says.

The idea of the legislative enshrinement of parties' duty to send their candidates for debates has to some extent been dictated by the recent governor elections, a source close to the One Russia leadership acknowledges. Meaning primarily the campaign in Irkutsk Region, where Sergey Yeroshchenko, incumbent leader of the region, lost in the second round to Communist Sergey Levchenko. "This is a case where non-participation in debates harms those that do not attend them," Gazeta.Ru's source says. "Yeroshchenko's non-participation benefited Levchenko. He criticized the authorities, but no-one conducted a meaningful debate with him."

The possibility of the extension of compulsory participation in debates to the level of regional elections, primarily governor ones, has been discussed to date," the source close to the Kremlin says.

But, he continues, there is a particular aspect here: whereas amendments to the federal legislation are sufficient for enshrining compulsory participation in debates in Duma elections, when it is a question of regional campaigns, each constituent part of Russia has to adopt amendments to its own laws also: "The entire body of regional legislation has to be changed." It is not a fact, the source says, that the constituent parts will succeed in getting this done by the next single polling day."

We, for our part, would add that if there is a command from the federal centre, everyone will have to get this done in time. Whether the aforesaid governors will be required to attend debates personally or can send proxies in their place, is another matter. At the present time this is left to the discretion of the regional authorities and is regulated in each constituent part of Russia in its own way. It is not inconceivable that it will remain this way, the source in the State Duma leadership believes. But there's no decision as yet.

It is possible that the "compulsion" to debates will proceed in phases.

"If the provision governing the compulsory participation in debates is employed in Duma elections, this could be a signal for the regional political systems. The logic of a phased approach could be employed: the political system as a whole is signalled that debates are important from the perspective of competition, then the applicability of these provisions in relation to regional campaigns could be discussed," the source close to the Kremlin says.

The parties also could set a certain example by their behaviour, he adds. Meaning primarily One Russia, which has announced compulsory participation in debates in party primaries for all its candidates.

And what about the presidential election? How likely is it that the provision governing a compulsory "trek" to discussions with one's opponents, provided it is adopted, would extend to this also?

"There has to be a separate discussion in this case," the source in the State Duma leadership believes. "The institution of the presidency has a special role in Russia's political system."

This is underscored also by the fact that a presidential election is not part of the logic of the single polling day (the presidential campaign takes place in March, all the other elections, in September - Gazeta.Ru). The legal treatment of these procedures (electioneering - Gazeta.Ru) could be special, distinct from the campaigns of another level, therefore."

We would point out that no incumbent Russian president has thus far taken part in debates in person. In 2012, for example, his proxies attended debates with his opponents in place of Vladimir Putin. This was protested by the other participants in the presidential race. Mikhail Prokhorov and Sergey Mironov even said that they would not debate the head of state's proxies.

Sergey Obukhov, secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee, told Gazeta.Ru that he supported the idea of requiring parties to take part in debates: "We have already had such bills. We are prepared to submit one more."

He believes that if One Russia were to support the initiative, this would mean that it had been decided to spur the party of power ahead of the elections: "For One Russia needs to be stimulated somehow so that it works, not simply hides behind Putin's approval rating."

The deputy points out that in the 2011 Duma election, One Russia participated in debates quite actively, but then, in the regional elections, it "grew lazy".

As far as the presidential and governor elections are concerned, Obukhov maintains that the initiative involving compulsory participation in debates is hardly likely to go through: "They would not dare do this. According to the prevailing notion, if a governor goes to debate with an opposition activist, he is in this way acknowledging: 'I am the same as you'. The gods will not descend to the level of any old clowns from small parties which also are involved in elections," the Communist says.

Igor Lebedev, deputy speaker of the State Duma from the LDPR, told Gazeta.Ru that Liberal Democrats would support a provision on compulsory participation in debates were the corresponding bill to be submitted to the State Duma. But, he says, it would be no bad thing to extend the "rules of the game" to the governor level as well. "Whereas in the Duma election One Russia is still participating in debates, the governors are ignoring them," Lebedev complains.

Mikhail Yemelyanov, first deputy leader of the Duma faction of A Just Russia, believes that the imposition of "compulsory" debates is an "artificial demonstration of political competition". "With real competition all parties have an interest in debates as it is. If some party shuns them, this means that it is confident of victory with the aid of administrative resources and manipulation."

Yemelyanov anticipates his party supporting such an initiative here, although it would with far greater pleasure welcome equal opportunities for all participants in the elections.

Yemelyanov believes that President Putin is the sole political player who could forgo debates without damage to himself: "Putin is a special case, he does not belong to any political force, and his actual approval rating is very high."

"But when the party of power and its governors do not attend debates and achieve high results, you want to ask: 'How come?'"

Aleksandr Khinshteyn, One Russia member of the State Duma, told Gazeta.Ru that the party of power had a policy geared to candidates' participation in debates as it is and that this position will most likely be recorded at the outcome of the election congress: "The possibility of the adoption of such a provision (on compulsory participation in debates - Gazeta.Ru) does not cause me personally any concern, it paints a positive picture."

Khinshteyn believes that debates are an inalienable part of political life and that in declining them, a candidate only makes things worse for himself.

The One Russia member emphasizes here that "reason and expediency" should be present in all things, this is why Putin could shun debates. "I understand the expediency of debates between Putin and, for example, Andrey Bogdanov, the former leader of Right Cause, who has also run for president. What sort of debates would they be," Khinshteyn says.

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 #17
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
December 2, 2015
How the Kremlin's campaign against NGOs could backfire
Amidst the Kremlin's attempts to clamp down on the activities of both Russian and foreign NGOs, there are growing concerns that President Putin could be reaching back too far into the Soviet totalitarian past.
By Ivan Tsvetkov
Ivan Tsvetkov is Associate Professor of American Studies, International Relations Department, St. Petersburg State University. He is an expert in the field of historical science and contemporary U.S. policy and U.S.-Russian relations. Since 2003, he has been the author and administrator of the educational website "History of the United States: Materials for the course" (http://ushistory.ru)

The Kremlin's campaign against organizations deemed to be "undesirable" to the state continues to gain momentum. On Nov. 30, the Office of the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation updated the list of undesirable organizations, the so-called "stop list."

The "stop list" now includes the Soros Foundation, which used to operate in 30 countries worldwide. The Soros Foundation worked in Russia between 1995 and 2003 and provided support for civil, educational and cultural initiatives. According to the Russian authorities, the organization undermined the foundations of the Russian constitutional system.

Not only foreign NGOs are at risk

In November, the Russian Ministry of Justice issued the same allegations against Memorial, Russia's oldest human rights advocacy group, upon a routine inspection of its activities. The organization was accused of "undermining the constitutional order and calling for the overthrow of the current government." These accusations were based on Memorial's website content, which included statements on Russian military involvement in Ukraine and the wrongful sentencing of the Kremlin's political opponents in the Bolotnaya Square case.

Although the Russian Ministry of Justice revoked its accusations that Memorial undermines Russia's constitutional order, the authorities still insist on changing the charter of the NGO and adjusting it to Russia's Civil Code, because, according to them, the charter violates Russian legislation. In particular, the Justice Ministry forbids Memorial from spreading confidential information and acting to deliberately harm any organization. This could indicate that the Kremlin is choosing more subtle tactics and its campaign against NGOs is still going on.

It remains to be seen what will come of such strong assessments assigned by the Ministry of Justice experts: Memorial might be eliminated and/or its leadership might have to stand trial. A year ago, the organization was on the verge of closing. To prevent that from happening, human rights activists had to adopt the humiliating "foreign agent" status, which, according to the Russian law of 2012, is mandatory for NGOs that receive foreign funding and are involved in politics.

Obviously, the Russian authorities are increasing their pressure on NGOs that interfere with the establishment of full political and ideological control over the Russian society. This tendency has been particularly prominent since the beginning of Vladimir Putin's third presidential term in 2012. However, the persecution of Memorial stands out due to its public profile and special role in the Russian social and political system.

Memorial is not a typical human rights center (HRC) that brings human rights violations into public view. The organization originated in the late 1980s to early 1990s as part of the movement for the rehabilitation of Soviet political prisoners, and its main mission has always been fostering the remembrance of tragic pages of Soviet history in order to prevent the recurrence of the totalitarian past.

It is worth pointing out that the U.S.S.R. was condemned for its part in mass repressions against its own citizens, which played a key role in the de-legitimization of the Soviet leadership and the fall of the Soviet empire. In the 1980s, problems with the economy and the rise of nationalism at the periphery of the U.S.S.R. definitely contributed to the weakening of Moscow, but when the Communist party lost its mandate for ruling the country, it mainly had to do with the denunciation of the Red Terror under Stalin.

New Russian leaders that came to power after 1991 initially did not feel threatened by the continuous study and publication of ugly facts from the Soviet past. Memorial staff managed to compile an impressive database on the victims of Stalin's repressions with hundreds of thousands of names and helped establish the Day of Remembrance of the Victims of Political Repressions, an annual commemorative event that occurs on Oct. 30 and is attended by top political figures.

It seemed that Russia turned this dark page of its history and left all horrors of totalitarianism behind. Even though it was still perceived as a great country that has continuously existed since the 9th century, it was deemed that its new rulers had nothing in common with Stalin, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, or the crimes exposed by Memorial.

Back to the U.S.S.R.?

However, from the beginning of his rule, Russian President Vladimir Putin has thought it wise to restore the memory of the "positives" of the Soviet experience. It is highly likely that he was driven by his own nostalgia and hoped to capitalize on the public longing for the lost "golden age," but this course of action set a major political trap for Putin. At some point (possibly, after his April 2005 statement that the collapse of the U.S.S.R. was the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century), Putin lost the ability to separate himself from the Soviet past.

The U.S.S.R. was no longer a forgotten relic of history. It made a comeback and became a part of Putin's political baggage. In his desire to build on the positives of the Soviet past, the President brought in all the negatives because the good and the bad are inseparable in this case. From this point on, Memorial quickly started turning into the Kremlin's worst enemy and bitter political opponent.

Putin refrained from resolute and unconditional condemnation of the crimes of the Soviet regime, which, among other things, meant that Russia lost some of its sovereignty and became an inferior state, not unlike Japan, which received its constitution from victorious Americans.

The unredeemed sin of totalitarianism weighed heavily on the Kremlin and grew to be a powerful political constraint. Whenever the authorities made a decision to tighten the Russian legislation and increase political control, it was inevitably viewed through the prism of historic events, associated with Putin's KGB background and compared to the Great Purges of the Stalin era.

Without such skeletons in the closet, the Kremlin surely would have been in a better position and would not have run into enormous difficulties in its search for the ideological justification of the chosen political course. Then the gamble on the international arena might have been unnecessary.

Demons of history

Still, the most unpleasant consequence of Putin's rash policies is the ghost of the same leadership de-legitimization tool that destroyed the U.S.S.R.

The pressure on Memorial and the revival of Stalinism, which is becoming more obvious in Russia by the day, signify that the authorities no longer believe in exhorting the demons of history that were set loose.

It appears that the government strategy relies on the propaganda machine and its ability to purge negative images of the U.S.S.R. from the public mind and put on a positive spin, unless organizations like Memorial and their foreign sponsors can put a stop to that.

In the meantime, Russia is objectively struggling, and the scope of its problems is nearing the level that sufficed to bring down the Soviet Union. Economic recession and lack of new sources of growth, conflicts with the U.S. and Europe, the terrorist threat and uncertain goals in Syria can all undermine the legitimacy of the elite's rule and its grip on the country.

Under these circumstances, accusations of moral involvement in Stalin's repressions (even if they are based only on the actions against Memorial) can become an extremely powerful tool in the hands of anti-Kremlin forces. That may be the real reason why the Kremlin has attempted to shut down Memorial.

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 #18
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
December 2, 2015
Why the Kremlin is pursuing a well-known human rights group
Opposition activists have questioned the Kremlin's recent attempts to limit the activities of Memorial, Russia's most famous human rights advocacy group. Is this really a cause for concern?
By Artem Kureev
Artem Kureev is an expert from the Moscow-based think tank "Helsinki+" that deals with protecting interests of Russians living in the Baltic countries. Kureev graduated from Saint Petersburg State University's School of International Relations.

In November of this year, the Russian Ministry of Justice completed its investigation into Memorial, Russia's most famous human rights advocacy group. Given Memorial's highly visible public profile and its focus on human rights, charity work and historical research, some opposition activists have raised concerns about the Kremlin's pursuit of this NGO.

The range of Memorial's activities is quite wide, from investigations of Stalinist repressions, to protecting the rights of modern "political prisoners." The objectives of Memorial's leadership are the "development of civil society in countries with a totalitarian past" and the "promotion of a democratic rule of law in these countries."

These actions would appear to pose little threat to the Kremlin. Yet, the Russian Ministry of Justice, after its official investigation, concluded that by their actions, members of Memorial were "undermining the constitutional order of the Russian Federation, calling for the overthrow of the current government, and changing of the political regime in the country."

This position, however, changed on Nov. 22 when the Ministry recommended that the NGO adapt its charter to the new version of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, specifying the rights and responsibilities of the group's participants.

Though Memorial was no longer considered to "undermine the constitutional order" of the country, the Ministry of Justice insisted that participants of the NGO should be forbidden from sharing confidential information and acting to deliberately harm the work of the organization.

In addition, Memorial should make such questions as the use of the NGO's property, admission of new participants and election of the chairman the prerogative of the General Assembly. Memorial representatives said that this might mean the rewriting of the whole charter, so they are ready to insist on change of these conditions.

These developments, on the background of tragic events in France and Syria, has received rather little attention. At the same time, many Russian human rights activists have expressed concerns that, as a result of this investigation, the government could close this NGO or prohibit it from carrying out activities in the field of human rights advocacy.

So why did Memorial run afoul of the Russian authorities? And how likely is a complete or partial ban on its activities?

Why Memorial fell out with the Kremlin

Memorial emerged in 1989 when the Soviet Union was falling apart at the seams. Most politicians and social activists were proposing a "new path" for Russia, criticizing Soviet reality and advocating strong de-Sovietization. During two and a half decades of its activities, the NGO worked tirelessly on the systematic creation of lists of victims of Soviet repressions, and issued a large number of historical documents and reference books. The NGO's structure includes extensive archives and a library, as well as the Creativity and Life in the Gulag Museum.

At the same time, the leaders of Memorial were not just historians and researchers. In parallel with its historical activities, the organization increasingly started developing activities in human rights advocacy.

In addition, Memorial started to raise "uncomfortable" questions about Soviet history, such as the mass deportations of peoples of the U.S.S.R. and the so-called Katyn Massacre of Polish prisoners of war, to which this NGO devoted a disproportionate amount of attention. Thus, in the mid-2000s, disputes started arising between Memorial and the Russian government, which had begun taking steps towards creating a new state ideology, and a certain rethinking of Russian history of the 20th century.

After all, living through the difficult 1990s, Russians suddenly started to realize that not everything was that bad in the U.S.S.R. There was free and very good medicine, medical care, education and science. There was no extreme nationalism, drugs in schools, or any of the problems of modern society. The elderly could count on financial security in their old age.

At the same time, no one was denying that repressions existed in the Soviet Union. Thus, Russian President Vladimir Putin did not allow a debate to be restarted by Russian nationalists about who was really responsible for the execution of Polish officers in Katyn, and personally attended public commemorative ceremonies on this theme.

However, the main disputes between the Kremlin and Memorial did not arise in the plane of historical issues. Already in the mid-1990s, this NGO started being active in the educational and human rights spheres. Thus, this organization begun to actively oppose the Russian government's anti-extremism policy, by launching in 2005 a program to counter the fabrication of criminal cases involving Islamic extremism.

Offices of Memorial were often turned into extra-parliamentary opposition clubs, where, for example, documentaries critical of the Russian government were shown and, often, even ones banned in the Russian Federation.

The representatives of Memorial participated in many high-profile cases involving human rights abuses, almost always taking an uncomfortable (for the Kremlin) pro-Western stance. Naturally, this organization also defends the interests of the LGBT community, and in a rather conservative Russia, this is not welcome.

Since the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian crisis, Memorial has been consistently pursuing a "pro-Western" policy, speaking in support of Ukrainian extremists, the Ukrainian prisoner Nadezhda Savchenko, and the base-jumpers that painted a star on a Moscow high-rise in the colors of the Ukrainian flag.

Naturally, Crimea's joining of the Russian Federation was recognized by Memorial's experts as illegal, being called a "cavalier and cynical" move. In general, this NGO conducts extensive informational activities, actively contributing their materials to various Western and Russian opposition media outlets.

It should be noted that it was not the historical activities of Memorial that led to censure by the Russian authorities. Moreover, starting as early as 2007, the organization has been receiving grants from the Russian state budget. At the same time, it was under the patronage of the West as well.

Thus, after a search of Memorial's St. Petersburg office (which was subsequently recognized by St. Petersburg courts as unlawful), the U.S. State Department issued a statement saying it was deeply concerned about this situation. In the statement they noted that, "Research organizations like Memorial play an important role in setting up a democratic society and ensuring the protection of human rights."

Memorial has never concealed receiving such support, transparently publishing on its website a list of sponsors, which includes a large number of Western funds. However, it was this partnership with foreign funds that led to Memorial being declared a "foreign agent" in April 2013.

Although the management of the NGO strongly objected to such measures, in September of the same year, Memorial's recognition as a "foreign agent" was judicially sanctioned as lawful and justified. At the same time, the subsequent demand by the Russian Ministry of Justice, seeking the liquidation of Memorial, was rejected by the courts.

Are Russian NGOs under threat?

There is hardly any threat to the continued operations of this NGO today. It might have to make specific amendments to the organization's statutes and remove a number of materials from the organization's website.

We should bear in mind that Memorial is really a kind of "school of history" and a symbol of human rights activities in the post-Soviet space. It is only that some of its activities are somewhat alien and incomprehensible to most Russians.

History remains in the past, conclusions should be drawn from it, and we must move on. We cannot just paint everything black or white. Henry VIII and Ivan the Terrible were bloody tyrants, but many historians consider them as progressive monarchs. Peter the Great would cut off the heads of boyars, but raised Russia on a par with Europe's great powers.

Attempts to force Russians today to live with a constant feeling of guilt for the repressions that took place in the past, from which, incidentally, all peoples of the U.S.S.R. suffered, will hardly bring positive results. We must know historical facts in order to make conclusions from them, rather than rubbing them in the faces of peoples and nations for the sake of achieving political goals.

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 #19
NGO U.S. Russia Foundation for Economic Advancement and Rule of Law recognized as undesirable in Russia

MOSCOW. Dec 4 (Interfax) - The Russian Prosecutor General's Office has recognized a non-governmental organization (NGO) from the United States - the U.S. Russia Foundation for Economic Advancement and the Rule of Law (USRF) - as an undesirable organization in Russian territory, Prosecutor General's Office spokesperson Marina Gridneva told Interfax on Friday.

"The president of the foundation is a U.S. citizen, who has been banned from entering the territory of the country [Russia] for the period up to 2025 due to activities directed against the interests of the Russian Federation," she said.

In addition to this, "the foundation extended financial assistance to Russian NGOs that fulfill the functions of a 'foreign agent' and participate in political processes in the territory of the Russian Federation," Gridneva said.

"It has been established that the activities of this organization pose a threat to the foundations of the constitutional system of the Russian Federation and the state's security," Gridneva said.

"Information concerning the adopted decision has been forwarded to the Justice Ministry of Russia in order to include this foundation in the list of foreign and international non-governmental organizations whose activities have been recognized as undesirable in the territory of the Russian Federation," she said.

The Prosecutor General's Office also explained that the decision to recognize the activities of this U.S.-based NGO as undesirable in Russia had been made based "on the results of analysis of the received materials."

According to information published on the USRF website, in Russia the foundation is managed by the board of directors, which includes U.S. and Russian citizens. The foundation has 11 Russian employees at its Moscow office. The director of the USRF branch in Russia is Anna Danilina.

The USRF president is Mark Pomar, who, prior to joining USRF, headed the IREX non-profit organization specializing in student and scientific exchanges.

Recognition of the organization as undesirable entails a ban on conducting operations involving money and other assets, a ban on the establishment of its structural branches in Russian territory and other consequences.

In July, the Federation Council, the upper house of Russia's parliament, urged the country's Prosecutor General's Office, Foreign Ministry and Justice Ministry to check whether or not the activities of 12 foreign NGOs operating in Russian territory comply with Russian legislation. The so-called stop-list compiled by Russian senators then included 12 foreign NGOs. Most of them are linked with the United States.

The list included the Open Society Institute (Soros Foundation), the National Endowment for Democracy, the International Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, the MacArthur Foundation, Freedom House, the Charles Stuart Mott Foundation, the Education for Democracy Foundation, the East European Democratic Center, the Ukrainian World Congress, the Ukrainian World Coordinating Council, and the Crimean Field Mission on Human Rights.

The Federation Council said then that the activities of these NGOs were aimed at influencing the internal political situation in Russia.

One of the organizations on this list - the MacArthur Foundation - announced the closure of its branch in Moscow on July 22.

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 #20
Moscow Times
December 4, 2015
Truck Protests Signal New Kind of Social Activism
By Vasily Kolotilov

"I think I will set my car on fire soon. The tax will take us all down. I get 112 rubles a month in social payments for my kid - how am I supposed to raise him on that?" says Rasul, a truck driver from Russia's North Caucasus republic of Dagestan.

His battered truck is buried under snow in a parking lot outside Moscow. He is outraged by the new truck tax system and is considering joining the protest movement, despite possible backlash from the authorities.

"You know why our young men join the terrorists? Islamic State [a terrorist organization banned in Russia]? It's because of despair, they have no jobs and no perspective," another Dagestani trucker explains. "And [the authorities] want to make our life even worse."

Billionaire Arkady Rotenberg - President Vladimir Putin's long-time judo sparring partner and close ally - and his son Igor are currently the most reviled authority figures in trucking circles. Igor Rotenberg owns 50 percent of Platon, the company responsible for collecting the newly introduced levy for driving trucks weighing more than 12 tons on federal highways - according to Russia's legal entities registry EGRUL.

Anatoly Chubais, the architect of privatization in the early 90s, had previously borne the title of "national allergen" for decades, but the palm must now be passed to the Rotenbergs.

Check Your Miles

Platon, the collection system, launched on Nov. 15, with truckers having to pay a levy for every kilometer they travel. Every heavy-vehicle owner has to register with the system and file his itinerary in advance online, or equip the truck with a mobile tracker. Implementation of the system kicked off the largest social protest wave in years.

The protests began in mid-November and were particularly active in southern Russia and the Siberian and Volga Districts. The large presence of individual entrepreneurs in these regions meant that the levy greatly impacted their business structure, regional programs director at the Independent Institute for Social Policy Natalia Zubarevich told The Moscow Times.

Dealing with Revolt
Authorities have attempted to tamp down protest fervor - interfering with the protest movement.

Police officers have approached truckers, insisting they sign paperwork promising not to participate in any protest activities, Rasul said. He and his friends may have withstood the pressure, but hundreds of drivers across Russia have yielded when confronted by the police.

When truckers headed en masse to Moscow, police repeatedly halted their progress - checking drivers' documents and detaining them for unpaid fines or any available pretext, trucker coordinator Kirill Poroshin said.

Protesters believe the authorities have made conciliatory gestures in an attempt to stop the protest dead. Russia's Transport Minister Maxim Sokolov met with truck driver representatives on Nov. 28 in St. Petersburg, but truck drivers consider the meeting an empty gesture, protest coordinator Alexander Rastorguyev said.

"We wanted to hear that Platon would be canceled - he did not say that," Rastorguyev said. When, on Nov. 30, the protest coordinator announced a protest march of truckers from St. Petersburg to Moscow, he was detained by police and fined 1,000 rubles ($15) the following day.

Police are focused on keeping the protesting truckers away from the capital and have been successful thus far - the planned demonstration in Moscow was canceled.

But the protest lives on. "At the moment it's a network without a center. Thus it is hard for the government to maintain because they don't have a center to strike," says ex-deputy Labor Minister Pavel Kudyukin, a Russian Labor Confederation council member.

Impact

Platon looks to be more trouble than its worth. "600 billion rubles ($9 million) is spent on the roads every year and Platon's estimated revenue is 40 million rubles ($600,000) with 10 million going to RTITS, Rotenberg's company. It's not economically viable, it's a dumb political decision," Zubarevich says.

But scrapping the levy is not an option for the government. "The budget money has been spent to design the system and it is supposed to be returned," Kudyukin said.

Furthermore, as the price of oil collapsed and the Russian economy shrank, the government began penny-pinching. Economic experts are monitoring the introduction of indirect taxes such as not indexing pensions for inflation and introducing obligatory housing renovations, director of the Social Policy Institute Sergei Smirnov said.

Coming to Terms

While the state is resolute when dealing with political protest of the liberal middle class, social outrage with an economic grounding usually evokes a much softer reaction - authorities are usually eager to avoid confrontation.

Following the initial backlash to Platon, the government proposed a reduction in tariffs and fines. The concessions have not appeased the truckers who demand the system's removal. Although total abolition is unlikely, the truckers are confident they can win further victories.

"We are not like those white-ribboned dreamers in 2011. We have crowbars, and we won't hesitate to use them when we are pushed to the wall," proclaimed a middle-aged trucker from the North Caucasus region while sipping tea at a roadside cafe outside the Moscow Ring Road.

No matter how the truck driver protests conclude, their effectiveness demonstrates that organized citizens are capable of effectively challenging unpopular government initiatives, Smirnov said, there will be more to come in the near future.

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#21
BBC
December 3, 2015
Several influential Russians back probe into prosecutor corruption claims

Several influential people in the Russian establishment, including Nikolay Patrushev, Russian Security Council secretary and former head of the Federal Security Service, have indicated support for an investigation into allegations against Prosecutor-General Yuriy Chayka and his family made by opposition activist and anti-corruption campaigner Aleksey Navalnyy.

"There should be an equal approach to all people," Patrushev said when asked by a journalist whether an investigation should be launched into Chayka's family in connection with the allegations levelled by Navalnyy, Russian internet and satellite broadcaster Dozhd TV reported on its website on 3 December.

On 1 December, Navalnyy's Foundation for Fighting Corruption released a film entitled "Chayka", featuring an investigation into alleged corruption and criminal links involving Chayka's two sons and several senior prosecutors. The film has had more than 1.5m views on YouTube within 48 hours of publication, prompting calls for Chayka to provide a public explanation.

Vladimir Bessonov, a Communist member of the State Duma, told the lower house of the Russian parliament on 2 December that he would be inviting Chayka to answer allegations of corruption.

Iosif Kobzon, a popular singer and a State Duma member from the ruling One Russia party, said Chayka should leave his post if allegations of corruption turn out to be true, RIA Novosti (part of the state-owned International News Agency Rossiya Segodnya) reported on 3 December.

He also said that as a Duma member he would insist on an investigation into the matter. "He has the law behind him; the law, which he must protect and abide by," Kobzon said.

Chayka has dismissed the claims, saying they were "sponsored" and false. He also said he knew the "sponsors" and would name them soon.

Chayka's supporters

Some politicians, meanwhile, have voiced their support for Chayka and his family, saying they were respected people and the allegations against them were untrue.

Communist Party leader Gennadiy Zyuganov said the information in the film was "far-fetched". "Even more so because it is not Navalnyy who prepares [these publications] but men from the CIA. I see no point in summoning [Chayka to the State Duma]," he said, privately-owned Russian news agency Interfax reported on 3 December.

Moscow Region governor Andrey Vorobyev also supported Chayka and his family, saying he was not planning to end business relations with the prosecutor-general's younger son Igor, who was one of the central characters in the film.

Igor Chayka worked with "a lot of diligence" when he was an aide to the region's governor and "knows his trade", RIA Novosti quoted Vorobyev saying on the same day.

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 #22
Minister sees Moody's upgrading Russia rating outlook as recognition of effective policy

MOSCOW. Dec 4 (Interfax) - Moody's Investors Service's decision to upgrade the rating outlook for Russian government bonds to stable from negative is an acknowledgement of the effectiveness of the Russian authorities' fiscal and monetary policies, Finance Minister Anton Siluanov told reporters.

"The upgrade of the outlook, made for the first time in a fairly long time, indicates recognition of the effectiveness of the macroeconomic policy, both monetary and fiscal, that Russia is pursuing," Siluanov said.

In order for Russia to get back into the group of countries with investment ratings, it needs to "reduce the budget deficit, which is unsustainable in the long term, and transition to stable economic growth," the minister said.

"The Russian economy has adapted to the new external conditions to a significant extent. However, this adaptation is not complete yet," Siluanov said.

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 #23
Forbes.com
December 3, 2015
Gazprom Gets Vote Of Confidence On Nord Stream II
By Kenneth Rapoza

A worker uses a metal grinder on a section of pipeline onboard the Castoro Sei, a pipe laying vessel operated by Saipem SpA, during the construction of the Nord Stream AG natural gas pipeline, in the Baltic Sea. The Nord Stream II pipeline project is an extension of that. The project faces new political risk in eastern Europe, where anti-Russia sentiment is strong. (Photo by Timothy Fadek/Bloomberg)

The Czech Republic said it will not sign a document asking the European Council president Donald Tusk to railroad Gazprom's massive Nord Stream II pipeline into Europe.

A number of former Soviet allies, led by Poland, are lobbying the European Commission to stop the billion dollar pipeline deal, citing concerns over energy security.  Poland has been busy connecting other Baltic States to a new electric power grid that will ultimately disconnect it from Russia. And now the Nord Stream deal faces some political headwinds as Poland is joined by Hungary, Slovakia and Lithuania in a unified voice against any new Russia energy projects in the region.

Nord Stream II is an extension of the three year old existing Nord Stream pipeline and could provide up to 55 billion cubic meters more natural gas from Russian shores through the Baltic Sea to the coast of Germany.  Gazprom signed a memorandum of understanding on the pipeline extension with Shell, E.On, OMV Group and BASF in September. Western sanctions against Russia were specifically for oil and gas drilling projects, but also banned financing so it is unclear how this project will get off the ground so long as the sanction regime is in place. ExxonMobile lost a $720 million joint venture deal with Rosneft because of the sanctions.  The deal currently exists only on paper.

Nord Stream is expected to face political headwinds in the Baltics.

"Nord Stream II would be, above all, detrimental in geopolitical terms," Poland politician Jacek Saryusz Wolski was quoted saying in The Financial Times on Nov. 30. He said that Russia uses Gazprom as a means to exert political pressure on former Warsaw Pact members, and has it used it to "blackmail the EU, its eastern member states and its eastern neighbors," he said.

Among the questions surrounding the project include European strategy for the diversification of natural gas. Gazprom accounts for nearly a third of foreign natural gas imports in Europe. Germany is its biggest market. Some allege that the German government will push the deal through regardless of sanctions.

Gazprom controls 50% of Nord Stream.

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 #24
Moscow Times
December 4, 2015
Russians Find New Holiday Spots After Egypt, Turkey Bans
By Joanna Kozlowska

Russian tour operators have seen increasing demand for tours to India, Thailand, and the UAE following restrictions on travel to Egypt and Turkey - Russians' two preferred destinations in the first half of 2015, Russian media reported on Friday.

At the same time, officials' attempts to revive interest in domestic travel seemed to be falling flat, while the whole outbound tourism sector was expected to shrink 40 percent - with demand for foreign tours set to plunge even further, according to the RBC news portal.

With flights to Egypt banned on Nov. 14 and a de-facto ban on selling package tours to Turkey in place from Nov. 24, Russians have started looking eastwards: the Russian Association of Tour Operators reported a 10-15 percent rise in demand for Thailand packages, with India and Vietnam attracting 5 percent more bookings each, according to its CEO Maya Lomidze, the Kommersant newspaper and RBC news portal reported Friday.

Alternative destinations in the Middle East have also been sought after, with demand for tours to the UAE climbing 20 percent.

In addition, many tourists seemed unwilling to give up on Turkey: according to Irina Ryabovol from the travel agency Momondo, interest in individual flight bookings to the southern coastal resort of Antalya - traditionally a package destination - has risen 20.4 percent since the embargo came into force, Kommersant reported.

Ryabovol added that Istanbul remained in the top 10 of Russians' favorite destinations in terms of airline ticket searches, Kommersant wrote.

At the same time, Russian officials' expectations that the restrictions would lead to a revival of the domestic travel sector are not borne out by the market.

Despite earlier claims by the head Russia's federal tourism agency Rostourism, Oleg Safonov, that the domestic tourism market could grow by 30 percent by the end of the year, Russian holidaymakers seem only marginally more interested in traveling within the country, the Kommersant report went on to say.

According to Lomidze and Sergei Romashkin, head of the Delfin travel company, the sector could see growth in the region of 10 percent - a "standard" result, the newspaper wrote.

Romashkin went on to name Kaliningrad and Sochi as potential "rising" destinations, while demand for Crimea tours fell due to the recent power blackout, the article went on to say.

"Officials are hoping for a surge in domestic demand, but this is out of the question ... those who planned to sunbathe on an Egyptian beach are hardly likely to go skiing in Krasnaya Polyana instead," he said, Kommersant reported.

Tours to Egypt and Turkey accounted for 38 percent of all foreign package sales this year, according to Rostourism data, Kommersant reported.

The state-backed RT news portal reported Friday that direct flights between Russia and Egypt could resume soon after Egypt's national carrier addressed security concerns, with EgyptAir waiting for a green light from Russia's federal air transport agency Rosaviatsia.

Russia wants to restore flights to Egypt, but that could only happen when it is confident that Egyptian airports comply with security requirements, the Russian Transport Minister Maxim Sokolov said Thursday, RT wrote.

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 #25
Russia, U.S. cooperating in telecommunications, environmental issues, access to drinking water in Arctic

MOSCOW. Dec 4 (Interfax) - Russia and the United States are cooperating in spheres of mutual interest in the Arctic Council, Russian Foreign Ministry Ambassador at Large, senior official in the Arctic Council Vladimir Barbin has said.

"Speaking of the U.S. program, they have lots of projects Russia is interested in [...]. Naturally, we will be cooperating with them," Barbin said at a youth forum of indigenous small-numbered peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East, 'Russian North'.

In his words, the sides are interested in cooperation in the field of "telecommunications, protection of the marine environment, development of the network of natural reserves and nature conservancy areas, access to quality drinking water and new environmentally friendly electric power sources."

"The Arctic Council operates on the principle of consensus," Barbin said.

"This means the Arctic Council cannot be successful if national interests of any state are disregarded. Hence, all countries are focused on cooperation," he said.

"Tensions are rather low in the Arctic compared to other regions, and we are interacting there," Barbin said.

The United States is presiding in the Arctic Council in 2015-2017.

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 #26
Moscow Times
December 4, 2015
U.S.-Russian Relations on The High Frontier
By Matthew Bodner

In the summer of 2000, a Soviet-designed Proton rocket was rolled out to its launch pad at Site 81 of the Baikonur Cosmodrome, a former military black site hidden on the sprawling steppes of Kazakhstan from which the Soviet Union embarked on its conquest of space in the late 1950s.

Rockets like this one, and a myriad of others designed by legends of the Soviet military-industrial complex, had illuminated the Kazakh desert for decades - propelling amazing feats of Soviet engineering into space under the crimson banner of international communism.

But times had changed. The space race was over.

The Proton rocket set to launch that summer was plastered with a large logo advertising the American fast-food giant Pizza Hut, which helped finance the mission.

Its cargo was Zvezda, a space module in which Russian cosmonauts and American astronauts could cohabit while orbiting Earth.

Zvezda was the third piece of the International Space Station (ISS), a massive facility in space designed and constructed by NASA and its Russian counterpart, Roscosmos, and its long-awaited launch allowed the station to be officially opened for business.

Fifteen years later, ISS has the distinction of being the largest ever collaboration between nations during peacetime - a feat that earned a Nobel Peace Prize nomination.

The cost of the ISS project had been valued at up to $150 billion, and today is a partnership of 16 nations operating under the umbrella of NASA and Roscosmos - making the station one of the final frontiers of U.S.-Russian relations following almost two years of political animosity.

Sean Fuller, NASA's top official coordinating work with Roscosmos, said the ISS program's significance in U.S.-Russia relations has been its ability to draw on different approaches and experiences to find the best common path to overcome various concrete challenges.

"The strength of the program is that all of the partners have previous experiences and expertise in different areas, and while the United States and Russia have very strong histories of spaceflight, we tackle problems differently," explained Fuller.

U.S.-Russia Cooperation in Space: A Brief History

In 1957, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, the world's first artificial satellite, kicking off the famous Cold War space race that continued until the mid-1970s. After the United States beat the Soviets to the moon, the U.S.S.R. shifted their focus to building space stations.

As part of the policy of detente pioneered by U.S. President Richard Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, the two sides decided to use their space programs as the symbol of a new era in their tepid bilateral relations.

The product of this effort was the 1975 Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, a rendezvous between a U.S. Apollo spacecraft and a Soviet Soyuz capsule above the Elbe River in Germany. It showed what was possible, but was a one-off. Superpower tensions flared not long after and the space programs again went their separate ways.

Twenty years later, after the fall of the Soviet Union, senior leadership on both sides saw an opportunity to use their space programs as tools of reconciliation and cooperation rather than of political competition.

This was pursued in two phases. Phase One, launched under a protocol signed at the 1993 summit between U.S. Vice President Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, initiated a program known as the Shuttle-Mir missions.

Over the course of the decade, NASA would fly 11 space shuttle missions to dock with the Soviet-built Mir space station so that the U.S. space agency could gain vital experience in long-duration stays in space.

Shuttle-Mir was an important step towards the larger vision of the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement, known as Phase Two: the construction of a massive international space station, adapted from plans for Russia's proposed Mir 2 space station and the U.S. Space Station Freedom, both projects that were stalled in the 1990s amid post-Cold War budget cuts.

Snapshot of a Partnership

NASA's Fuller joined the U.S. space agency out of college in 1996, and has made a career of working with the Russians following his first visit to Moscow in 1997 as a NASA space shuttle mission planner.

"It was a new experience," he said, "I still remember that first time I walked onto Red Square thinking 'by golly, I never thought I'd be here.'" Over the last two decades, Fuller has worked at various levels of the partnership, fostering deep relationships with his Russian counterparts.

Fuller describes his bonding with Russian space officials in a similar way to other NASA officials who have been living, working, or traveling to Russia since the mid-1990s: things were awkward at first, but people quickly warmed up to each other.

For Fuller, it began in 1997 at a picnic with a few Roscosmos officials in Alexandrovsky Sad outside the Kremlin. "We really got to know each other on the personal level, about lives and families ... it really created a good bond that continues to this day."

Since those early meetings, Fuller has made his way to the top of NASA's organizational structure in Moscow, surviving marathon meetings with Roscosmos officials that concluded with feasts and toasts proposed to cooperation in space - an experience Fuller described soberly as "a bit different ... operating."

Today he presides over a permanent NASA contingent of no fewer than 30 employees spread between three Roscosmos facilities in Moscow's surrounding region - the U.S. agency even rents an entire floor of a Moscow hotel to house its personnel.

Fuller manages everything from his small office in Roscosmos headquarters at Prospekt Mira. There he coordinates regularly with senior Roscosmos leadership, and even works with Russian space companies like RSC Energia and the Khrunichev Space Center.

But most of the action happens at Russia's Mission Control Center in Korolyov, a town just outside Moscow named after the Soviet Union's most esteemed rocket designer - Sergei Korolyov.

"Our job specifically is to be there working with their flight control team," said Keith Zimmerman, a NASA flight controller who has rotated in and out of Russia's mission control center for 20 years.

Teams of four rotate the day and night shifts so that NASA has people in Russian mission control at all times to ensure communication with flight controllers in Houston.

While groups of Russian and U.S. flight controllers working on certain parts of the ISS talk to each other regularly, Zimmerman's team is there to facilitate communication between groups that work together less frequently, and - of course - coordinate responses to emergency situations.

Getting to Know One Another

Establishing this relationship took time. During the Shuttle-Mir program, the Russian side had to overcome a deep suspicion of U.S. scientists stealing secrets, concerns stoked by nosey NASA engineers asking too many questions about how Mir worked.

"We started asking questions about their space station systems because we didn't have any space station of our own yet, and we were still working on building one," said Zimmerman

"They thought that we might be trying to steal their ideas and technology to design our own station," Zimmerman said, though they eventually understood the intent was to ensure the shuttles could work with Mir systems, and this required a basic understanding of how the station worked.

Beyond trust issues, there were cultural differences that had to be understood and bridged - a problem that NASA officials in Russia say most often got in the way during planning for missions.

"With spaceflight, a lot of it is driven by hard physics, so a lot of the technical stuff is pretty well defined by physics, and it really comes down to how you operate and plan it within those rules," Zimmerman explained.

This is where approaches differed, a product of the kinds of missions the two space agencies had been planning and executing in the final decade of the Cold War.

NASA in the 1970s developed space shuttles in anticipation of building a large space station, but the funding never materialized. The Soviets jumped straight into space station design, mastering the art, but never succeeded in fielding its own copy of the U.S. shuttle to service them.

Therefore, NASA planning was geared toward making the most of the shuttle's two-week flight times, with plans constantly being optimized and revised over the 18 months leading into a launch, and then daily during a mission.

The Russians were approaching the operation of their Mir space station in a completely different manner, leading to some frustration when the two sides came together to plan missions in which the space shuttle would visit Mir.

"On the shuttle we were very detailed, every minute was laid out, because there was limited time," Fuller explained. "But we learned pretty quickly that its okay to operate that way for a week or two, but it you're living in space for six months, that's going to get old real quick."

Likewise, Fuller said that in the beginning, the way plans were drafted caused friction. While NASA was making plans on computer software that allowed changes to be made quickly and effortlessly, Roscosmos was adamantly opposed to most changes.

Their opposition was largely based on how Roscosmos drafted plans - on a giant scroll drawn out box-by-box by a man and a drafting board. To make a simple change required the entire scroll to be remade.

"So we learned a lot of that from the Russian [space] culture, but then likewise as we moved on to ISS we developed a next-generation computer planning tool, and they were brought in to that [program] so we had a kind of melding of the two approaches for ISS," he said.

According to Fuller, this ability to merge strengths and approaches to spaceflight is the essence of the ISS program's success. As problems were ironed out, they were left with a better approach to sending people to space.

In terms of co-managing a station, NASA officials say that today they do not encounter major problems with their Russian colleagues, though sometimes disagreements happen - be it over fixes to common problems, launch schedules for Russian or U.S. rockets, and so on.

"I think we are definitely the more flexible ones," Zimmerman said. "If there are a couple of options to address the problem, and the Russians are just absolutely insisting that it has to be this or that for whatever reason, we will - more often than not - agree to their option."

These problems are minor, and the growing pains of Shuttle-Mir feel far away. For 15 years, ISS has been successfully co-managed by Russia and the United States, and has grown to become a massive 1 million pound structure in orbit.

Though U.S.-Russia relations turned turbulent in 2014, the two sides agreed this year to extend the ISS program until at least 2024 - four years beyond its original planned conclusion. Observers on both sides doubted this was possible in the current political climate.

As Fuller acknowledged, "as things in the world have changed, there [remains] certainly a strong interest in both governments - actually in all of the governments involved - and ISS has shown what we can achieve together."
--
All In It Together

NASA and Roscosmos exchange personnel, ensuring that their respective mission control centers have the human and technological resources available to smoothly handle daily operations as well as the occasional problem - sometimes things go very wrong.

When emergencies arise, it is the job of Keith Zimmerman and his NASA colleagues rotating in and out of Russia's Mission Control Center, to help facilitate communication and coordinate responses from the U.S. and Russian sides.

"In the event that problems occur, it helps to have someone locally to explain what the problem is and what we're doing about it, and here's what you [Roscosmos] can do to help. And that's why the Russians have a team in Houston as well," he said.

One such emergency - one of the more dramatic in the history of the U.S.-Russia space partnership - took place in June 1997, when the Mir space station was hit hard by a Russian resupply spacecraft with two Russian cosmonauts and one NASA astronaut aboard.

The collision punched a hole in the space station's hull, destroying a solar panel. As air hissed out into the void, the station's crew felt their ears popping as a result of the rapidly falling air pressure, and the station itself was sent into a dramatic spin.

Mission control was unaware that anything had gone awry, as the station was beyond the range of Russia's communications coverage - which at that time was limited to a period of 5-10 minutes every 90 minutes.

Zimmerman had been preparing to touch base with the NASA astronaut, Michael Foale, before attending meetings with a senior Russian official, so he had his interpreter in tow. As Mir came into range, the control center was flooded with the sounds of alarms - never a good sign.

"The Russians were talking so fast that I couldn't catch any of it," Zimmerman said. "My interpreter just had this funny look on his face, and said 'uhhh, they hit something.' It was a very crazy 10 minute communication pass while they were trying to find the leak, seal it, and save the station."

The crew struggled to seal the hatch. The doorway was blocked by a series of electrical cables, feeding power to the station from the solar panels attached to the damaged module. These cables would need to be cut before the hatch could be closed, but this would kill Mir's power.

"At the end of the communications pass, they were just starting to seal the hatch, and before they did that the comms pass ended," Zimmerman said. No one was sure if the crew was dead, if they abandoned ship, or sealed the hatch and saved Mir.

The crew saved the station, and managed to close the hatch. Meanwhile, NASA increased communications with Mir - thus allowing Roscosmos to work faster to help the crew in space - by activating three ground stations across the world, crucial assets that Russia had lost with the fall of the U.S.S.R.

"This was Mir, and it was their ship, so it was their responsibility to figure out what had gone wrong and what the problem was, and we helped out where we could by providing extra communications assets. Our sites were in the gaps where theirs weren't, so we gave them more opportunities to talk to the crew," Zimmerman recounted.

The 1997 Mir incident was perhaps the most dramatic in the history of the partnership. But space exploration is a series of inevitable pitfalls, and collaborative problem-solving has been necessary throughout the course of the ISS program. When the U.S. space shuttle Columbia disintegrated upon reentry in 2003 - killing the seven NASA astronauts aboard - Roscosmos helped NASA send people and supplies to ISS via its Soyuz spacecraft.

And NASA has returned the favor when things go wrong on Russian missions, allowing cargo to be ferried up on U.S. vehicles if need be, and always assisting with its expansive communications system - something Russia lacks to this day. When a construction worker severed a cable connecting Russia's mission control to its satellite dishes in 2012, causing Roscosmos to lose control of very single satellite and spacecraft it had in space, their ability to use U.S. communications was crucial.

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#27
The Hill
www.thehill.com
December 3, 2015
Former Pentagon chief: US shares blame for poor relations with Russia
By Rebecca Kheel

The United States is as much to blame for the state of U.S.-Russia relations as the Kremlin, a former Defense secretary under former President Bill Clinton said Thursday.

"It's as much our fault as it is the fault of the Russians, at least originally," said William Perry, who served as Defense secretary from 1994 to 1997. "And it began when I was secretary."

Perry, who was speaking to reporters at a roundtable hosted by the Defense Writers Group, also lamented the lack of military-to-military communications between the two countries and doubted the United States could work with Russia in Syria.

While Russian President Vladimir Putin has caused the recent rifts in relations by annexing Crimea and backing rebels in Ukraine, Perry said, the United States has done plenty over the last 20 years that caused Russia to feel disrespected.

"The problems today I think are mostly ... Russian actions," he said. "Entering Ukraine, threatening the Baltic nations, threatening the use of nuclear weapons - all those I think I put on the scoreboard of the Russians as being errors and things that are aggravating this deteriorating relationship.

"But if you look over a 20-year period and put the scoreboard together, there are at least as many American mistakes as there were Russian."

Specifically, Perry cited the expansion of NATO and the decision to send U.S.-led NATO forces to Bosnia in 1996 as the start of the downfall of U.S.-Russia relations.

Prior to that, he said, relations were going well, including four joint military exercises between Russia and NATO.

"We were on the way to forging a really positive and solid relationship between the U.S. troops, and then in 1996 we announced we were going to expand NATO, which, as I said, I'm not opposed to in general, but it was premature," he said. "That was the first move down the slippery slope."

Still, in Bosnia, the United States and Russia came to an agreement to operate under the same command, thereby avoiding any potential disastrous accidents between the two nations, Perry said.

He doubts that could happen in Syria today.

"You cannot imagine getting that decision today that we got back in 1997, '96," he said.

Despite issues between the two countries, Perry said it's "stupid" the United States cut off military-to-military communications after the crisis in Ukraine.

"It's been true for decades - it's still true today and true not just for Russia, but for China and others, as well - whenever there's a political upset between the two countries, the first thing that goes is the military-to-military relations," he said. "It's a political statement, 'We're going to cut off a military-to-military relationship.' It's stupid, but that's what we do. That's the time when you need you're military to military relations most of all."

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 #28
New York Times
December 4, 2015
Editorial
Russia's Fury Over Montenegro and NATO

It is a measure of how cold the West's relations with Russia have become that NATO's membership invitation to Montenegro - a small, poor Balkan state with a military force of 2,000 and no strategic significance save putting the last bit of Europe's Mediterranean coastline under the alliance - would provoke furious cries of "provocation" and "encirclement" from the Kremlin.

Secretary of State John Kerry insisted that NATO is not focused on Russia "per se," but the inescapable perception is that that's exactly where the old Cold War alliance is once again. Inviting Montenegro into the alliance at a time when Russia and NATO are pursuing different military goals in Syria was a message to Moscow that it does not have a veto over Western actions.

The invitation to Montenegro was not in itself unexpected. In the first years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO served more as a certificate of membership in the West than as a military alliance. Along with two other former Yugoslav republics, Bosnia and Macedonia, Montenegro has had a "membership plan" - a road map to full membership - for several years. (Bosnia's membership is being delayed by a breakaway Serbian enclave,Macedonia's by Greece's objection to its name) Earlier this fall, Montenegro was told it had made the cut.

As Western relations with Russia have deteriorated, President Vladimir Putin has escalated his efforts to prevent any further encroachment on what he sees as Russia's sphere of influence. The 2008 war with Georgia was motivated at least in part by Russia's desire to make sure that no more former Soviet republics move closer to NATO or the European Union. To NATO, Russia's annexation of Crimea and involvement in eastern Ukraine were unacceptable violations of the post-Cold War order.

Though Montenegro poses no threat to Russia, Mr. Putin considers any expansion of NATO an affront to Russian power. A Cold War posture is also seen in Mr. Putin's efforts to prop up the murderous and flailing Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad, even if that means taking actions that undermine Western efforts to destroy the Islamic State.

There may be other reasons to question Montenegro's membership in NATO, such as sharply divided sentiments among Montenegrins about joining the alliance. But Russia's ire should not determine NATO policy.

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 #29
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
December 3, 2015
Russia denies breaching INF arms treaty, accuses USA

Comment by the Information and Press Department on US allegations of the violation of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty by Russia

We've taken note of statements made by high-ranking US State Department and Department of Defence representatives at Congressional hearings, who again allege that Russia has violated the provisions of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), as well as - probably to add weight to their accusations - of several other arms control treaties, such as the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and the Treaty on Open Skies (TOS).

We regret that our American partners continue to engage in militaristic rhetoric and to push the INF issue to the plane of military and military-technical "response" measures, while not having provided any proof of their allegations. The US Administration doesn't go to the trouble to provide facts, even not entirely valid ones. Its representatives only say that they have facts at their disposal, and everyone must believe them. They refuse to answer what facts these are, or who has established them, or if they can be checked. Congress, US allies and partners and the public are invited to accept as fact that Russia is allegedly producing and deploying ground-based intermediate-range missiles and launchers that are prohibited by the INF Treaty.

These allegations obviously aim to cast a shadow on Russia's arms control policy and at the same time to draw public attention away from US actions, which misinterpret INF provisions when they hinder the creation of weapons Washington needs.

A point at issue is the Mark 41 vertical launch system for Aegis Ashore, the land-based component of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) System, which the US is deploying in Romania and plans to deploy in Poland. The MK-41 VLS is installed on surface ships for launching Standard-3 interceptors and Tomahawk intermediate-range cruise missiles. A Pentagon representative said at the hearings that the land-based MK-41 is not suited or designed to launch cruise missiles. We don't consider this question to be settled, because only military and technical experts can determine if the above statement is true, while our American partners refuse to hold a practical discussion on this. Therefore, we consider it reasonable to view the ground-based MK-41 VLS as a cruise missile launcher, and its deployment on dry land as a direct violation of the INF Treaty.

We also have questions about the use of target missiles during US BMD tests with characteristics that are similar to those of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. The scale of the production of the target missiles and the nature of their testing do not correspond to the declared goals. The United States could be using the alleged BMD tests to streamline the production and combat use of intermediate- and shorter-range ballistic missiles that are prohibited by the INF Treaty. We must say that our American partners are reluctant to discuss this very serious issue with us. Moreover, the 2016 National Defence Authorization Act directly prohibits the transfer of telemetry data from the target missiles to Russia, something we have not asked for. This precautionary measure is additional evidence reinforcing our conclusions.

Besides, the United States has produced unmanned combat air vehicles, which fall under the INF category of land-based cruise missiles, for years. When we ask how this complies with the IMF Treaty and accompanying documents, our American partners pretend not to understand our questions and resort to deliberations that are not directly connected with the INF Treaty terms and definitions.

We have repeatedly reaffirmed Russia's commitment to the INF Treaty and urged our American colleagues to stop using megaphone diplomacy to discuss disputed issues related to implementation of the INF Treaty and to use bilateral expert dialogue, which, we believe, is better suited to address the arising issues. However, we see that the United States continues to use groundless accusations in order to refrain from discussing unpleasant issues.

It is especially alarming that all the ballyhoo raised by the United States over the INF Treaty is being used to justify a comprehensive response, which includes a range of long-term military programmes to modernize and increase the effectiveness of nuclear weapons, as well as US military build-up on Russia's borders in Europe and Asia Pacific. The United States plans to implement these measures even if the INF problem is settled, as it has been announced at the Congressional hearings. The INF issue is being shamelessly used to create an atmosphere of never-ending military tension in the Euro-Atlantic region. It is only logical that we take note of these statements and draw appropriate conclusions from them.

As for the CFE Treaty, the United States is traditionally glossing over its role in undermining its viability and is hushing up Russia's willingness to hold concrete consultations on a new CFE verification regime. We'd like to remind our partners that the ball is not in our court but in that of NATO. Presenting the situation differently amounts to avoiding the obvious truth.

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 #30
Consortiumnews.com
December 2, 2015
Obama Ignores Russian Terror Victims
By Robert Parry
Investigative reporter Robert Parry broke many of the Iran-Contra stories for The Associated Press and Newsweek in the 1980s.

Exclusive: President Obama has displayed a stunning lack of sympathy for the Russian civilians killed in an ISIS plane bombing in Egypt and for two Russian military men slain as victims of U.S. weapons systems in Syria, putting insults toward President Putin ahead of human decency, writes Robert Parry.

Normally, when a country is hit by an act of terrorism, there is universal sympathy even if the country has engaged in actions that may have made it a target of the terrorists. After 9/11, for instance, any discussion of whether U.S. violent meddling in the Middle East may have precipitated the attack was ruled out of the public debate.

Similarly, the 7/7 attacks against London's Underground in 2005 were not excused because the United Kingdom had joined in President George W. Bush's aggressive war in Iraq. The same with the more recent terror strikes in Paris. No respectable politician or pundit gloated about the French getting what they deserved for their long history of imperialism in the Muslim world.

But a different set of rules apply to Russia. Along with other prominent Americans, President Barack Obama and New York Times columnist Thomas L. Friedman have expressed smug satisfaction over the murder of 224 people aboard a Russian charter flight blown up over the Sinai and in the slaying of a Russian pilot who had been shot down by a Turkish warplane and the killing of a Russian marine on a rescue mission.

Apparently, the political imperative to display disdain for Russian President Vladimir Putin trumps any normal sense of humanity. Both Obama on Tuesday and Friedman on Wednesday treated those Russian deaths at the hands of the Islamic State or other jihadists as Putin's comeuppance for intervening against terrorist/jihadist gains in Syria.

At a news conference in Paris, Obama expressed his lack of sympathy as part of a bizarre comment in which he faulted Putin for somehow not turning around the Syrian conflict during the past month - when Obama and his allies have been floundering in their "war" against the Islamic State and its parent, Al Qaeda, for years, if not decades.

"The Russians now have been there for several weeks, over a month, and I think fair-minded reporters who looked at the situation would say that the situation hasn't changed significantly," Obama said. "In the interim, Russia has lost a commercial passenger jet.  You've seen another jet shot down. There have been losses in terms of Russian personnel.  And I think Mr. Putin understands that, with Afghanistan fresh in the memory, for him to simply get bogged down in a inconclusive and paralyzing civil conflict is not the outcome that he's looking for."

In examining that one paragraph, a "fair-minded" reporter could find a great deal to dispute. Indeed, the comments suggest that President Obama has crossed some line into either believing his own propaganda or thinking that everyone who listens to him is an idiot and will believe whatever he says.

But what was perhaps most disturbing was Obama's graceless manner of discussing the tragedy of the Sinai bombing, followed by his seeming pleasure over Turkey shooting down a Russian SU-24 last week, leading to the killing of two Russian military men, one the pilot who was targeted while parachuting to the ground and the other a marine after his search-and-rescue helicopter was downed by a TOW missile.

Even more troubling, the key weapon systems used - the Turkish F-16 fighter jet and the TOW missile - were U.S.-manufactured and apparently U.S. supplied, in the case of the TOW missile either directly or indirectly to Sunni jihadists deemed "moderate" by the Obama administration.

The Ever-Smug Friedman

Columnist Friedman was equally unfeeling about the Russian deaths. In a column entitled "Putin's Great Syrian Adventure," Friedman offered a mocking assessment of Russia's intervention against Sunni jihadists and terrorists seeking to take control of Syria.

While ridiculing anyone who praised Putin's initiative or who just thought the Russian president was "crazy like a fox," Friedman wrote: "Some of us thought he was just crazy.

"Well, two months later, let's do the math: So far, Putin's Syrian adventure has resulted in a Russian civilian airliner carrying 224 people being blown up, apparently by pro-ISIS militants in Sinai. Turkey shot down a Russian bomber after it strayed into Turkish territory. And then Syrian rebels killed one of the pilots as he parachuted to earth and one of the Russian marines sent to rescue him."

Ha-ha, very funny! And, by the way, it has not been established that the Russian SU-24 did stray into Turkish air space but if it did, according to the Turkish account, it passed over a sliver of Turkish territory for all of 17 seconds.

The evidence is quite clear that the SU-24 was ambushed in a reckless act by Turkey's autocratic President Recep Tayyip Erdogan who has been collaborating with Syrian and foreign jihadists for the past four years to overthrow Syria's secular government. And the murder of the pilot after he bailed out of the plane is not some reason to smirk; it is a war crime.

Even uglier is the lack of any sympathy or outrage over the terrorist bombing that killed 224 innocent people, mostly tourists, aboard a Russian charter flight in Egypt. If the victims had been American and a similar callous reaction had come from President Putin and a columnist for a major Russian newspaper, one can only imagine the outrage. However, in Official Washington, any recognition of a common humanity with Russians makes you a "Moscow stooge."

The other wacky part of both Obama's comments and Friedman's echoes of the same themes is this quick assessment that the Russian intervention in support of the Syrian government has been some abject failure - as if the U.S.-led coalition has been doing so wonderfully.

First, as a "fair-minded" reporter, I would say that it appears the Russian-backed Syrian offensive has at least stopped the advances of the Islamic State, Al Qaeda's Nusra Front and its jihadist allies, including Ahrar al-Sham (which technically separates itself from Al Qaeda and thus qualifies for U.S.-supplied weaponry even though it fights side-by-side with Nusra in the Saudi-backed Army of Conquest).

The Afghan Memories

Obama's reference to Afghanistan was also startling. He was suggesting that Putin should have learned a lesson from Moscow's intervention in the 1980s in support of a secular, pro-Soviet regime in Kabul, which came under attack by CIA-organized-and-armed Islamic jihadists known then as mujahedeen.

Wielding sophisticated surface-to-air missiles and benefiting from $1 billion a year in Saudi-U.S.-supplied weapons, the Afghan fundamentalist mujahedeen and their allies, including Saudi Osama bin Laden, eventually drove Soviet troops out in 1989 and - several years later behind the Taliban - completed the reversion of Afghanistan back to the Seventh Century. Women in Kabul went from dressing any way they liked in public, including wearing mini-skirts, to being covered in chadors and kept at home.

Obama's bringing up Afghanistan in the Syrian context and Putin's supposed one-month Syrian failure was ironic in another way. After Al Qaeda's 9/11 attacks, the United States invaded Afghanistan in pursuit of bin Laden and has been bogged down in a quagmire there for 14 years, including nearly seven years under Obama.

So, Obama may not be on the firmest ground when he suggests that Putin recall Moscow's experience in Afghanistan a few decades ago. After all, Obama has many more recent memories.

Further, what is different about Putin's Syrian strategy - compared with Obama's - is that the Russians are targeting all the terrorists and jihadists, not just the Islamic State (also known as ISIS, ISIL or Daesh). While U.S. propaganda tries to present the non-ISIS jihadists as "moderates" (somehow pretending that Al Qaeda is no longer a terrorist organization), there is, in reality, very little distinction between ISIS and the alliance of Nusra/Ahrar al-Sham.

And, as for Official Washington's new "group think" about the Syrian government's lack of progress in the war, there is the discordant news that the last of rebel forces have agreed to abandon the central city of Homs, which had been dubbed the "capital of the revolution." The Associated Press reported on Tuesday that "thousands of insurgents will leave the last opposition-held neighborhood in" Homs, with the withdrawal beginning next week.

Al-Jazeera added the additional fact that the remaining 4,000 insurgents are "from al-Nusra Front, Ahrar al-Sham and the Free Syrian Army." In other words, the "moderate" Free Syrian Army was operating in collusion with Al Qaeda's affiliate and its major jihadist partner.

While it's hard to get reliable up-to-date information from inside Syria, one intelligence source familiar with the military situation told me that the Syrian government offensive, backed by Iranian troops and Russian air power, had been surprisingly successful in putting the jihadists, including ISIS and Nusra, on the defensive, with additional gains around the key city of Aleppo.

The Belated Oil Bombings

Also, in the past week, Putin shamed Obama into joining in a bombing operation to destroy hundreds of trucks carrying ISIS oil to Turkey. Why that valuable business was allowed to continue during the U.S.-led war on ISIS since summer 2014 has not been adequately explained. It apparently was being protected by Turkish President Erdogan.

Another irony of Obama's (and Friedman's) critical assessment of Putin's one-month military campaign came in Obama's recounting of his meeting during the Paris climate summit with Erdogan. Obama said he was still appealing to Erdogan to close the Turkish-Syrian border although radical jihadists have been crossing it since the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011.

"With respect to Turkey, I have had repeated conversations with President Erdogan about the need to close the border between Turkey and Syria," Obama said. "We've seen some serious progress on that front, but there are still some gaps.  In particular, there's about 98 kilometers that are still used as a transit point for foreign fighters, ISIL shipping out fuel for sale that helps finance their terrorist activities."

In other words, all these years into the conflict - and about 1½ years since Obama specifically targeted ISIS - Turkey has not closed its borders to prevent ISIS from reinforcing itself with foreign fighters and trafficking in illicit oil sales to fund its terror operations. One might suspect that Erdogan has no intention of really stopping the Sunni jihadists from ravaging Syria.

Erdogan still seems set on violent "regime change" in Syria after allowing his intelligence services to provide extensive help to ISIS, Al Qaeda's Nusra and other extremists. The Russians claim that politically well-connected Turkish businessmen also have been profiting off the ISIS oil sales.

But Obama's acknowledgement that he has not even been able to get NATO "ally" Turkey to seal its border and that ISIS still remains a potent fighting force makes a mockery of his mocking Putin for not "significantly" changing the situation on the ground in Syria in one month.

Obama also slid into propaganda speak when he blamed Assad for all the deaths that have occurred during the Syrian conflict. "I consider somebody who kills hundreds of thousands of his own people illegitimate," Obama said.

But again Obama is applying double standards. For instance, he would not blame President George W. Bush for the hundreds of thousands (possibly more than a million) dead Iraqis, yet Bush was arguably more responsible for those deaths by launching an unprovoked invasion of Iraq than Assad was in battling a jihadist-led insurgency.

Plus, the death toll of Syrians, estimated to exceed a quarter million, includes many soldiers and police as well as armed jihadists. That does not excuse Assad or his regime for excessively heavy-handed tactics that have inflicted civilian casualties, but Obama and his predecessor both have plenty of innocent blood on their hands, too.

After watching Obama's news conference, one perhaps can hope that he is just speaking out of multiple sides of his mouth as he is wont to do. Maybe, he's playing his usual game of "above-the-table/below-the-table," praising Erdogan above the table while chastising him below the table and disparaging Putin in public while cooperating with the Russian president in private.

Or maybe President Obama has simply lost touch with reality - and with common human decency.

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 #31
Moskovskiy Komsomolets
November 29, 2015
Russian commentary calls for Russia-Turkey tensions be "stopped in tracks"
Ivan Starodubtsev and Valeriya Markova, Russian-Turkish Crisis: What Will Happen Next; Will Tension in Relations Between Moscow and Ankara Be Successfully 'Stopped in Its Tracks'

The incident involving the Russian aircraft downed by the Turks offered the latest confirmation of the familiar phrase "a chain is only as strong as its weakest link." Where was the "weakest link" in Russian-Turkish relations, those multi-level and strategic relations (I say this without a trace of irony)? The answer is widely known - in our diametrically opposite views of the events of the "Arab spring." However, as long as Russia did not intervene directly and, as regards Libya, simply gave its "nod" to the operation in the Security Council, the difference in the countries' positions, although important, was not critical. Bilateral relations approached a dangerous boundary line with the start of the operation in Syria which soon, in early October, led to incidents  involving Russian aircraft which had violated Turkish airspace.

However, let's digress a little: According to information from Turkish observers, over the course of 2014 over 1,000 instances of the reciprocal violation of each other's air borders by Turkey and Greece were recorded. Right now the average is assessed at 40 (!) a day. The incidents are settled by means of lively diplomatic correspondence. The public is not burdened with such trivia, and jobs are ensured for the diplomatic corps.

Why did a tragedy occur with the Russian Su-24 which may or may not have violated the border and may or may not have been given a warning? Let us discard immediately the theory that what happened was an accident, and also the statements from the Turkish leadership that the Turkish Air Force was operating on autopilot and did not know who they had in front of them. In the West an innocent face in such cases is accompanied by the interjection "whoops," while in Russia they sa "oi" and in the Caucasus "vakh-vakh," while in Turkey the expression is "eyvah-eyvah."

Let us note that the incident was caused by the very logic of the unsuccessful dialogue between Russia and Turkey regarding Syria since 2011, when the civil war began in the country, and by the inability to work out a common view of its post-war structure. Russia's active intervention in the crisis as a "game changer" [two words in English] was received very badly in Turkey. Immediately after that the Turkish official media started preparing the public for the possible development of events. In particular a campaign was launched under the slogan "Russia is fighting the wrong terrorists" and "Let us defend Syria's fraternal Turkoman population."

The Russian side had calculated that it would be enough to have the Turkish aircraft in our sights and to use this frankly strong-arm method to indicate the new boundaries of what was permitted to Turkey, which apart from everything else was very frightened by the reinforcement of the Syrian Kurds. The Russians' October apologies and declarations that there was now coordination between the sides were just an artificial sweetener designed to allow the Turkish leadership to save face when it had essentially been confronted with a fait accompli. It was obvious that by then the Russians had abandoned attempts to develop a common position and the main thing was to ensure the safety of their rear positions and to avoid a direct clash. The priority direction for a strike - the fight against the "oil outlaws" feeding ISIL - was announced by President Putin during the G20 summit in Antalya.

Russia's present position with regard to Turkey - "no, pal, it is simpler and bigger than anger, I don't need you any more" - is a justified, logical, and understandable homage to the tragedy. All necessary conclusions will undoubtedly be drawn from it, bar one: "We and Turkey are no longer economic partners." Restrictive measures are all very well, and they will obviously be tough and long -term. In addition to the practical steps announced by the Kremlin the day before, the "Turkish Stream" may be cancelled and the "Akkuyu" nuclear power station may be frozen.

But what are we going to do, are we going to stop selling gas, oil, coal and other raw material tomorrow? That means we are already trading, that is "the patient is probably alive," even if he has amputated limbs. The rest consists of nuances...

In the search for options for a potential settlement, whether it is in a month, a year, or later, it is worth turning to the closest analogue, which we can identify, with some degree or other of similarity, as being the still unsettled incident involving the Mavi Marmara ship seized by Israeli security forces en route to the Gaza Strip. The Turkish side's demands to Israel and the apologies and compensation are now directed towards Turkey itself.

The prospects for Turkish apologies instead of the "regrets" already expressed to Russia are obscure, to put it mildly. But the main thing in this case, after waiting for passions to abate, is to stop the issue in its tracks. That is, to remove it from the competence of the two countries' leaders and hand it to a specially formed commission to investigate. The start of the commission's work is an essential, although we should note also insufficient, condition for cleansing other areas of collaboration of their bitter taste and ensuring their existence independent of the political agenda.

However, despite the undoubted importance of settling what has already happened, it is the following which nonetheless seems to be the key issue: Is the reinforcement of the Russian grouping in Syria a sufficient guarantee that there will be no new incidents between the Russian Federation and the Turkish Republic? Particularly against the background of the beefing up of combat operations. That is, are there enough solely strong-arm instruments when the prime cause of the tragedy - the difference in the positions of Moscow and Ankara over Syria - has  been and remains where it was before, and Russian-Turkish dialogue has been broken off? Is there any need to say with what danger a repeat incident might be fraught?

Experts' opinions

Boris Makarenko, president of the Political Technologies Centre:

"In the long term this will end with the sanctions being lifted, because Russia and Turkey are too successful as trading partners. Some people are now saying: It is a good thing that tourism is being closed down and that Crimea will benefit from it. But those people have forgotten that it is not as warm in winter in Crimea and there are problems with electricity there. You can replace tomatoes and citrus fruit, but many other steps will be more painful.

"The question is now being resolved of how to act in order to assuage the sense of geopolitical dignity of individual Russian high-ranking officials. What does instil hope is that they were not brandishing the full package of sanctions from the start and so far they are counting on obtaining an effect from each sanctions step.

"The Turkish side must take certain steps to ensure that the operation against ISIL does not lead to a clash between the Russian and Turkish armed forces. The NATO countries cannot disavow Turkey, they must help find a means of collaborating."

Ilshat Sayetov, candidate of political sciences and director of the Foreign Literature Library's Russian-Turkish Scientific Centre:

""I hope that matters will not reach the point of violent and military actions. But the heat is high enough and it does not look like the two sides are prepared to cool it soon. Much will be decided at the meeting in Paris, after all Putin and Erdogan are linked by many years of friendship, although I doubt a return to their previous level of relations is possible.

"Temporizing benefits relations, because the Turkish authorities' reaction is important for Russia and the leadership, they are leaving the Turks room for diplomatic manoeuvring. Rejecting Turkish tomatoes is a lesson for Turkey, but the question is how it will benefit Russians.

"The attitude towards this conflict in society is the biggest problem. People are starting to blame not only Erdogan - the man who gave the order - but also everyone, they are recalling the Crimean wars and talking about nationalist character traits. These stereotypes are leading to savage actions: Turks were beaten up at a construction site recently and stones were thrown at the Turkish Embassy. In actual fact the number of Russian-Turkish marriages is about 200,000-300,000 - that means more than 1 million people who love each other. The delicate fabric of friendship took a very long time to weave in both the scientific and cultural spheres - this is a very fragile thing which could be destroyed in a month."

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#32
Russia Beyond the Headlines/Kommersant
December 4, 2015
Under the shadow of the Su-24 shootdown
A week after a Turkish fighter jet shot down a Russian Sukhoi Su-24m bomber near the Syria-Turkey border, a correspondent traveled by road from Iraqi Kurdistan to Turkey.
YURI MATSARSKY, KOMMERSANT

The Kurdish militia offensive in Northern Iraq has forced Islamic State (ISIS) militants to withdraw deep into the country. However, substantial parts of Iraq are still in the hands of the Islamists. This includes oil fields, roads, and cities such as Mosul with hundreds of thousands of inhabitants. The ISIS currently controls many kilometers of highways around Mosul that connect Iraqi Kurdistan with Turkish Kurdistan. Kommersant Special Correspondent Yuri Matsarsky traveled from Iraqi Kurdistan to Istanbul.

Communication between Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey is not interrupted but is significantly damaged. Cars are taking detours on country roads.

"It's a long way, it'll take a lot of time," a girl employee at a transportation agency in Suleimaniyah says. "It's about 15 hours to the Turkish border and Diyarbakyr, where there's an airport," she says. "But that's the minimum time, it can take longer."

There are two airports that are still functioning in Iraqi Kurdistan, Suleimaniyah and Erbil. Regular flights connect northern Iraq to Baghdad, Basra, Doha, Istanbul, and even London and Munich. But the war in the region often disrupts airport services, leading to flight cancellations.

At the end of November flights were suspended for almost a week while the Iraqi government awaited the launch of Russian missiles from ships on the Caspian Sea towards Syria. It was possible to go beyond Iraq only via automobile, taking detours along country roads to avoid ISIS.

Those narrow dirt roads, occasionally filled with concrete and asphalt, are literally swarming with trucks. They transport oil to Iran and Turkey.

On the way back, they bring food and construction material for the Kurds.

High oil prices - one of the main sources of income for Kurdistan - have created a construction boom in the region. And even though the prices have fallen, the construction projects are being completed. There are real skyscrapers being erected in Erbil, and contemporary office buildings are coming up in Kirkuk and Suleimaniyah.

The sheer number of trucks has led to the roads being congested for a few hundred kilometers, and right up to the border. Buses go around them using tertiary roads, which are usually nothing but hardly visible lanes on the rocky earth. In late November, it gets dark early in the desert and passengers help the bus drivers on these bypasses with the light emanating from their cell phones. The country roads often pass just a couple of dozen of kilometers from the IS vanguards and a wrong turn can be fatal.

A Russian passport

On the Iraqi-Turkish border, passenger transportation moves separately from the cargo trucks, in a different line. It is smaller but nevertheless extremely slow.

"Give me your passports, I'll take them to the Turks," says a driver. "What's this? A Russian passport? Wasn't it a Russian plane that the Turks downed a few days ago? I think they won't be very pleased to see your passport. I'm afraid we may have to spend the night here now."

But in the end it wasn't so bad. Passport control took about two hours and was done at a distance. The driver had taken the passports to the border guards and brought them back with stamps permitting entry. No representative from the Turkish authorities came to see the passengers.

In Turkey, the reaction to a Russian document is neutral.

"It makes no difference to me whether you're Russian or Chinese, Indian or Brazilian," says Mustafa, a hotel manager in Istanbul. "Everyone is a human being. Yes, relations between our countries are not so good at the moment. But this is a matter between politicians, not between us."

Mustafa says the politicians want the people to fight but that should not happen. "Let Erdogan and Putin quarrel between themselves while we continue visiting each other and doing business with each other."

However, in a similar conversation, which took place a couple of hours before the official statement that Moscow was going to stop the visa-free regime with Turkey, Mustafa admitted that only two days after the death of the two Russian servicemen on the Syrian-Turkish border, Russians cancelled up to 20 percent of their reservations in Turkish hotels.

But there are still many Russian tourists, and other visitors. The businessmen who were once called shuttle traders have also not gone anywhere. Having become respectable and wealthy, they are still profiting from the same business they engaged in after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

They buy inexpensive Turkish clothes, send them to Russia and resell them in flea markets or through trade networks. It is they who are the main clients of an entire block of wholesale clothing stores in Istanbul's Laleli neighborhood. Practically all the vendors here speak Russian, and in their minds convert the prices from Turkish liras to Russian rubles. Obviously, the news about the anti-Turkish sanctions did not have a very positive effect on them. The vendors are still confused and, hoping that good relations would be restored.

Meanwhile it seems like the Russian buyers understand that the break in economic relations will last for a while.

"We'll take the new collection anyway, it's nice. If not Russia, we'll ship it to Ukraine or Moldavia," says Lena, one of the first Russians to engage in shuttle trade with Turkey. She has come to a store managed by familiar vendors and is examining the clothes on the mannequins with expertise.

But she herself does not intend to buy anything. She says that before taking the wholesale batches you need to be sure that they will pass the Russian border. If the customs agents do not let them through, logistic work must be done to take them to other countries, to look for mediators and retailers. Only then can you buy and send the jeans and jackets.

Lena, who has lived in Istanbul for the last 15 years, is convinced that she has enough acumen and money to redirect her business to other countries. But she feels sorry for those who have not accumulated enough resources. Thinking about how much money can be lost and how Russians will go without Turkish clothes and footwear, Lena sighs, saying that it will be difficult for everyone to get out of the current crisis. She also admits that she does not want to look for new partners in Odessa or Chisinau to replace the old trustworthy ones who have been successfully working in dozens of Russian cities for a long time.

First published in Russian by Kommersant

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 #33
Russia Direct
December 3, 2015
Four scenarios for what happens next in Russian-Turkish relations
While escalation of the conflict between Russia and Turkey is unlikely for now, so too is any full restoration of ties between the two estranged nations. What's most likely is a new type of frozen conflict.
By Alexey Chesnakov
Alexey Chesnakov is a Russian political scientist and director of the Center for Current Politics (CPC). He is the author of several publications dealing with the domestic and foreign policy of Russia. Chesnakov has also served as Deputy Head of internal policy for the Administration President of the Russian Federation (2001-2008), as a member of the Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation (2009-2010), and Deputy Secretary-General of the United Russia political party (2012-2013).

After Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on the adoption of economic sanctions against Turkey, the acute crisis in Russian-Turkish relations incited by the Nov. 24 shoot-down of a Russian military aircraft has, by all accounts, turned into a protracted standoff.

In addition, Putin's refusal to meet with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at the Paris climate summit, like his previous avoidance of answering the latter's telephone calls, bears witness to Moscow's firm desire to extract more from the Turkish side than just "apologies."

In this type of situation, there are four possible scenarios:

Escalation. This possibility cannot be excluded so long as the chance exists of future clashes between Russia and Turkey in the Syria-Turkey border zone. It may turn into an reality if Ankara continues supporting the Syrian Turkmens and Russia does not cease its strikes on the positions of the Turkmens and other Turkish allies among the Syrian opposition forces. Any incident could lead to unpredictable military consequences. Political reasons for escalation may be steps taken by either side that sharply alter the balance of mutual interests; for example, if the Bosporus is closed to Russian ships.

Freezing. The two sides maintain their current positions, continuing with their sharp political rhetoric but hold themselves back from actions that could further exacerbate the situation. In particular, Russia suspends flights along the Turkish-Syrian border, and Ankara does not support the Turkmens and closes the border to prevent the entry of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Greater Syria (ISIS) militants, weapons, ammunition and contraband. In diplomacy, this is expressed in not imposing further sanctions on each other.

Warming. Ankara and Moscow, through the mediation of a closely connected country (the attempts of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in such a role have been reported), agree on regular contacts with a view to gradually restoring contacts at least at the level of military and diplomatic agencies. Some of the sanctions are gradually lifted at the same time. For the realization of this scenario, the Turkish side must find a new language to replace the minimalistic "regrets" about what has transpired.

Restoration. For this to happen, there needs to be a meeting at the highest level: Putin and Erdoğan. After such a meeting, it is possible that Moscow will announce the repeal of the sanctions imposed earlier. The sides start to cooperate in Syria across a broad spectrum of military and political issues. There is one condition essential to such a scenario - a high level of trust between the sides, enforced by real mechanisms of cooperation between Russia and NATO.

Future escalation is disadvantageous to both sides. For Russia, which is in an economic crisis, events developing in this direction can put a strain on the budget. Moscow must bear the costs alone, under the permanent threat of fresh clashes with foreign air forces. There will be no coalition in Syria and the NATO countries will be forced to support Turkey.

For Ankara, escalation is also a dead end - the displeasure in Europe at its conduct will expand, and if the conflict with Russia deepens, the attitude toward Turkey could change. The problem arises of increasing numbers of refugees. And this is highly disruptive for both Turkey itself and for the European countries.

A warming of relations is not predicted for the near future. After the imposition of sanctions and dramatic announcements, any quick withdrawal would be perceived as a sign of weakness. The controversies between Moscow and Ankara are deep and fundamental, and they stem from differing perspectives on the nature of the Syrian conflict. Keeping Syrian President Bashar Assad in power is a priority for the Kremlin while his removal is a priority for Ankara. In view of this, complete restoration of relations is also unlikely at this point.
 

On the other hand, it must be recognized that despite all of the tough rhetoric, there is nothing to be gained by severing the path to compromise. Sanctions against Turkey are still limited. In Syria, it will be necessary to come to an agreement about the demarcation of flight paths. For Moscow, there is no sense in fighting a war on two fronts - an open one against ISIS and another one against Turkey - a hybrid, indirect one. It is exactly the same for Erdoğan, who cannot simply retreat. Thus, as of today, the most realistic scenario is that that the conflict will enter into a frozen phase.

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 #34
New York Times
December 4, 2015
The Key to Crushing ISIS
By ANATOL LIEVEN
Anatol Lieven is a professor at Georgetown University in Qatar. His most recent book is "Pakistan: A Hard Country."

Since the latest terrorist attacks in Paris, President Obama and a range of other Western leaders have agreed that ISIS must be crushed, Syria and Iraq stabilized, and the flow of refugees reversed. If ISIS, Al Qaeda and their supporters are the greatest enemies of the West, then we must respond accordingly, by focusing on destroying them while making unpalatable compromises with others where necessary. The successful waging of war requires concentration, ruthlessness, prioritization and a willingness to abandon old shibboleths and seek new allies.

We must remember that in this war with Islamist extremism, Russia is not an enemy but an ally, and Turkey under its present government is at best an extremely equivocal "friend." Nevertheless, Turkey's interests in Syria should be respected, and Ankara should be given guarantees that the West will not shift toward unconditional backing for Russia and the Syrian government. In return, Ankara needs to provide much firmer guarantees that it is not in fact buying ISIS oil or otherwise indirectly assisting the Islamic State.

As with World War II, this requires a two-part strategy: one for winning the war itself, and the second for creating a new postwar political order. The first goal involves supporting the existing Syrian and Iraqi states in alliance with Russia and Iran. The second requires creating what in effect will be new states in northern Iraq and eastern Syria.

It needs to be recognized that Russia's position in Syria is in very much the same state as America's in Iraq. Both Moscow and Washington are using air power to support the armies of the existing states, in the conviction that not to do so would lead to a victory for ISIS and its allies and for Islamist terrorism and extremism in the world. In both cases, this is an entirely justifiable position.

In Iraq, if we do not back the government, then ISIS is likely to march into Baghdad - or Iran will intervene directly to prevent this, very likely triggering a general war across the Middle East. In Syria, as Vice President Joe Biden has admitted, parts of the so-called moderate opposition are not only militarily ineffective, but are often closely aligned with Al Qaeda - and since when did Al Qaeda become an acceptable U.S. ally? Therefore, we also need to recognize that if we help to destroy the existing Syrian government we are helping to create the probability of an ISIS victory. Russia's view on this is also shared - in private - by large sections of the U.S. intelligence community.

The problem is that in both Syria and Iraq, it was to a very great extent the savage oppression of the governments based in Damascus and Baghdad that infuriated large sections of their Sunni populations and created the conditions for ISIS to take over the leadership of the Sunni resistance. Simply to restore the rule of the existing Syrian and Iraqi regimes over the whole of their territory would require prolonged and ferocious repression, leading to more waves of refugees and more Sunni Islamist revolts - revolts that would doubtless once more be backed by Saudi Arabia, Turkey and other Sunni states. Washington has realized this in the case of Syria, but not in the case of Iraq. Moscow, it seems, has not yet realized this in either case.

To create an effective strategy to defeat ISIS and Al Qaeda will require a radically new Western strategy, based on a new and truly international coalition backed by the United Nations. The first step toward this is to recognize - as an increasing number of American analysts have started to do - that the "Pax Americana" in the Middle East has now comprehensively failed, and that the United States has nothing to lose by seeking the help of Russia and other states to create an international solution.

The goal that we should be working toward is full military and political cooperation between the West and Russia in order to defeat ISIS and promote a postwar settlement. This settlement should involve the creation of fully autonomous areas in Sunni northern Iraq and eastern Syria, along similar lines to the present Kurdish region of Iraq and with full control over their internal affairs. This would require a combination of the mobilization of local Sunni forces against ISIS, with some degree of international military presence. It would have to involve both Syria and Iraq, because the ISIS-led revolts in these countries have effectively dissolved the frontier between them, and because a political solution in Syria is out of the question if ISIS continues to rule northern Iraq.

Full Russian participation in this strategy is essential for two reasons: (1) Because Russia has a highly effective air force based in Syria, and therefore no political solution can be reached without Moscow's agreement; and (2) Because Iran's agreement to any settlement will also be essential, and Russia's influence in Tehran will be necessary to reaching such an agreement.

Procuring a Russian agreement to the creation of these two new entities would not be easy; but there would be considerable prizes for Russia in such a deal. The first would be that the existing Syrian state would be preserved over much of its territory, allowing the continued presence of Russian military bases and economic ties. If Russia can be brought to agree to such a settlement, then given the Syrian government's dependence on Russian support, Damascus would have no choice but to agree.

The second would be an American and NATO recognition of equal partnership with Russia in solving this crisis - a recognition of Russia's international status that Kremlin leaders have been seeking in vain from the West since the end of the Cold War. Such a partnership should in turn lead to a diminution of tension between the West and Russia over Ukraine, and to a genuine search for a federal compromise there.

All of this may seem far too radical a shift for Western governments to adopt. But let me repeat: We are at war, and wars have always been won by leaders who have been willing to accept the iron logic of war, ditch old habits and adopt radical new approaches. Or we can carry on as we are now, and lose the war.

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 #35
Moscow Times
December 4, 2015
Moscow Must Avoid Shadow War With Ankara
By Mark Galeotti
Mark Galeotti is professor of global affairs at New York University.

Moscow is sanctioning Turkish goods and holidays, something that will have a distinct impact on an economy which earns $6.5 billion a year from Russian tourists, but is this enough to assuage President Vladimir Putin's evident fury at the shooting down of one of his bombers? And if it is not, what else can he do short of direct - and hopefully unthinkable - military action against a NATO member with an army not that much smaller that Russia's? The temptation may be, to strike from the shadows.

Turkey and Russia have, after all, a long and bloody history not just of outright war, but of border, indirect, covert and political struggles. From proxy wars in the Caucasus khanates and Ukraine in the 17th century, through to political tussles over Poland in the 18th, and cultural-religious ones in the Balkans which lasted through into the 20th, these are two countries with a long tradition of underhand conflict.

Today, Moscow's capacities to blend political, intelligence, information and even criminal assets into multi-vectored campaigns is greater than ever. For a president eager to extract a pound of flesh, this may seem a tempting option.

For a start, Turkey - ever volatile - is going through a particularly violent and turbulent time. This year has seem presumed Islamic State bomb attacks, others against Kurdish rallies, and a spate of other killings including last week's which saw a prominent Kurdish human rights lawyer killed. Against this backdrop, Russian agents and hirelings might be able to launch attacks of their own (and how many more would it take to ensure other tourists, for example, stay away, further hitting the economy?) without it obviously being a Muscovite maneuver.

Indeed, part of the value of such incidents might also be to provoke further violence between Turkish factions themselves. Stirring up trouble between Kurds, ultra-leftist terrorists like the DHKC/P, criminals, and a government also prone to sanctioned and unsanctioned violence and then sitting back to enjoy the show might suit the Kremlin well.

The presence of an organized and active Kurdish movement is also a potential asset. With the Kurds having in effect established a state for themselves in Iraq, and being one of the more effective militias in Syria (much to Ankara's chagrin), renewed pressures for their independence or autonomy within Turkey is inevitable. In this case, the Russians - who have supported the Kurds in the past when it was expedient - could be useful friends to them. This could just mean political support in international fora, but could also involve funding or even arming the more radical groups.

Given that Turkish President Recep Erdogan is engaged in an ambitious effort to re-establish Turkey as a regional power, one could also see Russia responding by more aggressively countering this. From Azerbaijan to Turkish-controlled Northern Cyprus (whose president is increasingly at odds with Ankara), through to Israel (an important trading partner, despite the obvious personal antagonism between Erdogan and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu), there is a wealth of areas in which to introduce problems, from a judicious smear or leak here, to an outright assassination or staged provocation there.

And yet Putin should think thrice before striking once. The chances of his strategy becoming clear in the end are great and this would anger Ankara and worry the West. Besides, Turkey is no soft target, Erdogan doubly so. The irony is that Turkey is in many ways similar to Russia, from its revisionist plans and the aggressiveness of its intelligence agencies, to the character of its ambitious autocrat-presidents. It may lack the excitement of a war in the shadows, but ultimately Putin would be best served sticking to the humdrum world of the boycott and the diplomatic rebuke.

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 #36
Russia Insider
www.russia-insider.com
December 4, 2015
Memo to Putin: Going After Erdogan Personally May Be Unwise
Publicly humiliating Erdogan by accusing members of his family of involvement in the illegal oil trade may simply cause Erdogan to dig in
By Alexander Mercouris

The last few days have provided further proof that behind the mask of calculation Putin is a passionate man.

His reaction to the shooting down by Turkey of the Su-24 has been exceptionally strong, and has surprised many in the West.

It has also shocked the Turks, who clearly did not expect it.

Ever since the Su-24 was shot down the Turks have struggled to contain the fallout.  

Erdogan has made repeated efforts to contact Putin - by trying to telephone Putin immediately after the SU24 was shot down, and by angling for a meeting with Putin at the climate change summit in Paris.

Instead Putin has chosen to escalate the row.  

Not only has he refused to speak to Erdogan since the shoot-down, but his language has become steadily harsher, calling the Turkish action a "stab in the back", and openly accusing Turkey of colluding with the Islamic State's oil smuggling operation.

Matters have now escalated to the point where Putin is openly saying the SU24 was shot down to protect Turkey's illegal oil smuggling operation.

On 2nd December 2015 the gloves finally and fully came off.

The Russian military held a press conference in which they provided overwhelming evidence not just of the illegal oil smuggling operation between Turkey and the Islamic State, but of its industrial scale.

Echoing Putin's anger, the tone of the press conference was angry and emotional, with charges that corrupt Turkish businessmen are plundering Iraq and Syria of their oil resources.

The single most incendiary thing that came out of the news conference was however the claim that members of Erdogan's own family are involved.

I find these allegations perfectly plausible, though it is fair to point out that the Russian military did not provide evidence against members of Erdogan's family that would stand up in a court.

The shady business dealings of members of Erdogan's family - including his son - have however long been talked about, and anyone who who follows Turkish politics at all closely will not be surprised or shocked by the Russian claims.

Having said this, I question whether making this charge public in this way was wise.

Whatever view one has of Erdogan the reality is that he dominates Turkish politics and is likely to do so for some time.

His party has just won - by a resounding margin - parliamentary elections.  There is no obvious alternative to him.  He is genuinely popular with many Turks, and he has a solid base of support amongst the Turkish people.

Given that this is so I wonder whether it was wise to embarrass him in such a public way.  It is impossible to see how his relationship with Putin can now be repaired, and it looks like any sort of constructive dialogue between him and Putin has for the foreseeable future become all but impossible.

This matters.

There is undoubtedly a need to put pressure on Turkey to close the border with Syria and to stamp out the illegal oil trade.  Orchestrating pressure on Turkey to do this is essential.  Exposing the scale of the illegal oil trade between the Islamic State and Turkey was unquestionably the right thing to do.

Closing the border and stamping out the oil trade is however something that will need Erdogan's personal agreement.  I wonder however whether publicly humiliating him by accusing members of his own family of involvement in the very criminal activity he is being called on to stamp out is the right way to get him to give it.  

Erdogan must be feeling ashamed and furious, knowing that the illegal activities he surely knows all about have been publicly exposed, even if the Western media has drawn down a curtain of silence over what has happened.  

An angry and humiliated man is generally a less pliable man, especially if he is as proud and prickly as Erdogan is known to be.  

On the face of it what has happened must incline him to be more defiant and more resistant to pressure to close the border and stamp out the oil trade - as the Russians want - than he might otherwise have been.

In saying all this I realise that I am not informed about what has been going on behind the scenes.  

Clearly the Russians have been talking to Erdogan in private about the illegal oil trade for some time, and clearly he has been playing them for fools, causing the talks to go nowhere.

Anyone who has ever engaged with Russians in business conversations quickly learns this is the stupidest thing one can do.

It would not be surprising in light of this if Russian anger with Erdogan has been building up for some time, and if the incident with the SU24 finally caused it to boil over.

I do hope however that this is not just an emotional response, and that the Russians have fully thought this thing through.

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 #37
The National Interest
December 3, 2015
How the West Can Defuse Russian-Turkish Tensions
NATO must work to keep aggression from spilling over.
By Maxim A. Suchkov
Dr. Maxim A. Suchkov is an expert of the Russian International Affairs Council and a columnist for Al-Monitor's Russia Pulse. He is the author of "Essays on Russian Foreign Policy in the Caucasus and the Middle East" (NOMOS Publishers, 2015). He was previously a Fulbright Visiting Fellow at Georgetown University's Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies and Visiting Fellow at New York University. Follow him on Twitter: @Max_A_Suchkov

Turkey's downing of a Russian jet has transformed Russian public interest in the country's strategy in the Middle East. In the initial stages of the Russian campaign in Syria, about 14% disapproved of it while the majority of people had a blurry understanding-apart from what had been in the mainstream news-of what Russia was seeking in the region. The disastrous incident with the Su-24 jet has triggered what may be called a "Russian paradox": while most people still have a vague notion of what the Russian upsurge in the Middle East is all about, public support for it has quadrupled, with various groups of people, from rank and file to the experts to the opinion-makers, demanding a decisive retaliation against Turkey and more harsh actions against "radical Islamists" in Syria. "We were stabbed in the back" by "accomplices of terrorists": President Putin's initial assessment, presented in tough terms, may have sounded too emotional, but it is a label that will surely endure and shape Russian discourse on the issue for a long while.

The possibility of such a tragedy has been discussed from the very beginning of the Russian campaign. Experts warned that once there were casualties, it would be a blow to the notion of the success that the Kremlin expected. Russian intelligence forces have noted that weapons capable of reaching Russian planes, at the heights where they operated, hadn't fallen into the hands of the " radicals" they bombed. In this respect, Moscow was expecting a "provocation" from the U.S., Saudis or Qataris, but not the Turks, given their dynamic bilateral relations. Certainly, Moscow knew about the ties of different groups in Turkey, including some in the government, with ISIL and other extremist Sunni groups. But Russia calculated that Ankara's main objectives were twofold: toppling Assad, and undermining the Kurds with cheap oil from ISIL-controlled facilities as a profitable perk. None of them, in Moscow's vision, included a direct attack on the Russians-even though disagreement over Assad has poisoned relations for a long while. The Russian narrative of the ISIL threat acquired another dimension when President Putin, speaking at the G20 Summit in Turkey, strongly condemned the financial feeding of terrorists and vowed to expose those who support ISIL through oil purchases.

When the downing of the Russian plane took place several days later, there were four specific factors that took the Russians from being speechless to being infuriated.

First, the very fact that the shoot-down took place was shocking. Regardless of Turkey's claims, Russian officials continue to believe that Erdogan's team overreacted. The explanation presented by the Turks as "concrete grounds" for the downing didn't seem to hold up against criticism, no matter how you approach them. If the jet was entirely in Syrian airspace-as the heat signature allegedly reveals-then the downing was not legal in any case. If the plane indeed violated Turkish airspace and Turkish forces were able to spot it and react, the argument goes, was it all that necessary to shoot it instead of escorting it out, considering recent incidents in which other countries shepherded Turkish jets out of their airspace? In this case, however, the calculus behind the arguments seems somewhat stretched, since doubts remain how the ten warnings that the Turkish side claims it had signaled were delivered within the seventeen seconds the plane allegedly spent in Turkish airspace.

Erdogan's later lamentations that Ankara did not know the jet was Russian seem to clash with his initial statements that Russians had repeatedly violated Turkish airspace before, and thus the Turkish government didn't feel guilty for shooting it down. The Turkish president's claim that he had tried to call Putin but "Putin has not returned my call" seems incredibly clumsy, since it came days after the catastrophe and bore no evidence. Finally, Prime Minister Davutoglu's statements that Russia's plane had to be downed because it violated Turkish airspace and because Russians have bombed the Turkmen in the region demonstrate a poor logic, mixing up root causes: was it ultimately about the Turkmen or the airspace violation?

Second, Russians were appalled by the video images of the two pilots being shot by the "Turkmen rebels"-who later turned out to be members of the right-wing Turkish group "Grey Wolves"-while the emergency helicopter that arrived to rescue the pilots was shattered by a rocket fired from the ground. Soon after the incident, media in the region reinforced the narrative put forward by the Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry of the downing as a pre-planned provocation rather than a spontaneous response. That, too, helped shape a perception of an intentional hostile act rather than a "tragic mistake."

Third, the way in which Turkish officials took responsibility for the action suggested that they were rubbing it in the Russians' face. It didn't take long, either, before it was perceived as a daunting challenge, together with a thick layer of national insult. Even now, as the case turns ugly for Turkey, Erdogan seems to be exacerbating the situation, galvanizing Russia's response with warnings not to "play with fire."

Fourth, NATO's response to the incident stirred some strong reactions in the public as well. Moscow hardly expected the alliance to turn away from its member at a critical time. Neither did it hope to hear a strong condemnation of Ankara's decision. Unlike previous confrontations, to the majority of Russians Moscow seemed to be the clear victim, not an aggressor. But even in this case, the West, as the Russians saw it, was trying to devise arguments defending the "bad guy."

Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan are certainly similar in many ways. Both leaders are inclined to authoritarian-style governance practices. Both have a certain vision to restore the respect (some would say fear) and the power their nations historically possessed. However, the aforementioned four factors have also transformed Russians' perception: it's no longer just about Putin but about Russia itself. So no matter who adopted the decision to down the plane, and how, they deeply miscalculated both Putin and the Russians. Airstrikes on ISIL, its oil facilities and others the Kremlin considers "extremists" will be redoubled, not restrained, even if they bear severe implications.

Doing so drags Moscow further into the conflict. If that was an intentional calculation of those who decided to escalate with Russia, it was a short-sighted one. No matter how questionable Russian policy in the Syrian crisis may be, it is fairly predictable and dictated by a number of understandable drivers. The more insecure and vulnerable Moscow would feel, however, the more risky its policies may get. Should this happen, it will certainly turn out ugly for all the interested players.

Having a specific perception of Turkey, reinforced by a long history of wars, the downing came as a challenge not only to Kremlin officials, but to the entire population from Novocherkassk to Lipetsk (where the two killed servicemen's funerals took place). It is a dangerous trend that is being stoked by the media as well as open discussions on the internet and social networks. Testing the limits of Russian response has never ended well for either side in recent history. Moscow is at the point where it is too ready to risk testing the limits of Turkey's counter-response. In that sense, when it says it is prepared if necessary to use S-400s, or the fighter jets that will from now on accompany its bombers, it means it.

An immediate targeted military response is unlikely. For Putin, revenge is best served cold. He might consider the long-term complications for Turkey, including political and security issues, as well as trade sanctions, tourism restrictions and businesses suspensions. The State Duma has reportedly been proposing to introduce a five-year imprisonment for denying of what is widely known as the Armenian genocide, while security experts relish on the prospects of arming the Kurds and working toward creating an independent Kurdistan. Both issues have historically been prime irritants for the Turks, but these are still brainstormed emotional arguments, not real policies up for debate. There are high-level officials in Russia, as well as serious experts, who argue against using this political heavy artillery. Although the context is extremely polarized and full of clamor for such actions, it may lead to even more dramatic consequences and stir up some of the skeletons that Russia has in its own closet.

It is important for everyone to understand that this time is not about whose story wins, Russia's or Turkey's. Public support from NATO may help the Turkish narrative win an international audience-or, at least, neutral treatment. However, given the scale and profoundness of public indignation in Russia, this "victory" will antagonize the country even further, reinforcing distrust and widening the chasm between Russia and Turkey-and more importantly, between Russia and the West. Who will be the winner in this case?

The incident has damaged more than just the bilateral Russian-Turkish relationship. It hampered NATO unity, though no signs of contention came to light publicly, and it made any hope for an idea of an alliance between the U.S.- and Russia-led coalitions dead on arrival. The downing of the Russian plane was the last sigh of Turkey's "zero problems with neighbors" policy, which means Erdogan's Turkey will now be the problem child of the transatlantic family, though its senior members may now claim otherwise.

The Russians, for their part, face a tough choice. You may think of Putin as an omnipotent decision-maker, but he is under tremendous pressure from all sides: his own ambition, wounded personal pride from a man he trusted, hard-liners in the administration and public fury. To not answer is a sign of weakness and is not in the Russian national character. But any strong answer may lead to disastrous consequences, bringing NATO and Russia to a catastrophe of much bigger and-God forbid-nuclear proportions.

Putin's initiative to disarm Syria's chemical arsenal was once a face-saving act for the Obama administration. Now there is a chance for the American president to save face for Putin, even though the idea may sound like nonsense to many in Washington. The recent meeting between Putin and Obama on the sidelines of the Paris climate conference showed no signs of progress in anti-terrorist unity on the ground, as the two parties continued to stick to their policies. But bad is called good when worse happens; this seems to be the case for Russian relations with the U.S. and Turkey.

The best way to defuse the situation is for the West to take measures to restrain the recklessness of its Turkish NATO partner and continue to urge Ankara to show its serious commitment to work against ISIL-not for the sake of Moscow, but for its own pragmatic reasons. Another crisis with Russia is not in anyone's interest. The crisis came out of nowhere, with no particular security interests at stake or preconditions to threaten them. It is a crisis that Russia did not produce, but one that will keep major powers at one another's throats-all while ISIL continues to gain strength and the tentacles of radical Islamism continue to creep across the region and the world.

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 #38
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
December 3, 2015
Lessons from Russia's moves in the Middle East in 2015
In an interview with Russia Direct, John Hopkins University's Robert Freedman discusses the implications of Turkey's downing of a Russian jet as well as the Kremlin's recent moves in Syria.
By Pavel Koshkin

Turkey's downing of the Russian warplane grabbed the attention of global media last week and revealed all the difficulties and controversies of Russia's direct involvement in the Syrian conflict.

At the same time, it put into question the possibility of Russia-West cooperation against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Greater Syria (ISIS). It also revealed the extent of the Kremlin's foreign policy problems in the Middle East.

As some pundits argue, Syria for Turkey is like Ukraine for Russia. So, involvement in the direct campaign in Syria is like the West's attempt to increase its influence in Russia's Near Abroad, the policy that the Kremlin has been lambasting since the NATO's expansion in Eastern Europe and the instability in Ukraine. Turkey's ambitions to restore the Ottoman Empire's influence make it similar to Moscow's, with its aspirations to restore Russia's global influence and its idea of the Russian world (Pax Russica).  

To understand the implications of Russian-Turkish tensions for the situation in the Middle East, Russia Direct sat down with Robert Freedman, visiting professor at John Hopkins University's Department of Political Science.

Russia Direct: What lessons should the Kremlin learn from Turkey's downing of the Russian jet, in your view?

Robert Freedman: First, it [Moscow's Syrian campaign] is not a cost-free operation for Russia. While Russian President Vladimir Putin may have hoped he could use the situation in Syria to support Syrian President Bashar Assad and demonstrate Russian influence in the Middle East, so far the Russian operation in Syria has cost Russia a passenger plane with 244 lives, a fighter-bomber, and a helicopter, with more losses likely to come.
Related: "Is an Assad victory in Syria the lesser of two evils?"

So long as Russia concentrates its attacks on non-ISIS and non-Al-Nusra opponents of Assad - some of whom have been armed with TOW missiles - such losses at the hands of ISIS and non-Islamist rebels are likely to rise, as will friction with the United States and its allies.

Second, I would say that it is ironic that Russia, which has complained so loudly about EU and U.S. sanctions because of its seizure of Crimea and its activities in Eastern Ukraine, now has put a number of economic sanctions on Turkey. In both cases, neither the EU/ U.S. nor Russia was willing to go to war, so economic sanctions were the next best option.

Third, neither Turkey nor Russia has many friends in the world. Turkey has succeeded in alienating Egypt, Israel, the Kurds and Syria, and its relations with the U.S. are problematic at best, given Turkish President Recep Tayyp Erdogan's increasingly authoritarian Islamist policies, and the two countries' differences over the Kurdish party PYD.

For its part, Russia's only friends are right-wing European politicians like Marine Le Pen (who gets subsidies from Russia), and to a lesser extent China, to which Russia is increasingly a junior partner.

The bottom line is that Turkey and Russia need each other, and I would not be surprised if reconciliation is achieved in the not too distant future. Turkey needs Russian natural gas (its dependency is currently 55 percent), and, as Europeans shift their purchases of Russian natural gas elsewhere, Moscow needs Turkey as a customer.

RD: Let's talk about the common threat for Russia and the West. Can Moscow and Washington find common ground in Syria and team up against ISIS after the Nov. 13 terror attacks in Paris and the Russian aircraft crash in Egypt?

R.F.: In theory, yes, but in reality no, until Russia is willing to get rid of [Syrian President Bahsar] Assad and his immediate entourage. The reason is that a lot of the attraction for ISIS comes from the actions of the Assad regime using barrel bombs, poison gas, starvation and other weapons against his opponents. This attracts volunteers to ISIS. And, again, unless and until Russia is willing to get rid of Assad, I don't think there will be any serious cooperation.

RD: How do you assess Russia's campaign in Syria so far?

R.F.: I am mixed. In other words, there have been some military successes helping the [Assad] regime, for example, to regain control over an airport in the North. But there have been losses in the South despite Russia's bombing. I think Putin clearly made the decision to help Assad, but he doesn't necessarily want a long-term occupation, except for the base near Latakia. So, Putin will be trying to cut a deal, in which he hopes to preserve Assad for at least 18 or more months, but that's the sticking point.

RD: In this regard, how should the West regard Russia in Syria - as a troublemaker or problem-solver?

R.F.: Again, it won't be a problem-solver until it gets rid of Assad. That's the bottom line. And as I mentioned in my lecture, this is the demonstration by Russia to show it is back as a major power in the world. In fact, it didn't need to fire cruise missiles from the Caspian Sea, but it did it to demonstrate Russıa's strategic power.

So, it is the demonstration effect that Russia is back as a player in the world. The question is if it is going to be constructive player or destructive player. The longer Assad is in power, the more it is a destructive, not constructive power.

RD: From your point of view, how strong is ISIS and is its threat to Russia really so great?

R.F.: There are, reportedly, according to Russia's figures, about 4,000 Russians, including 400 Chechens, who are fighting on behalf of ISIS. There is also a problem when the United States begins a slow withdrawal from Afghanistan: Then there will be a penetration of ISIS into Central Asia, which is the soft underbelly of Russia. So, it is a problem.

I think that Mr. Putin, until the blowing up of the Russian aircraft [in Egypt], downplayed that problem: He used ISIS as an excuse to shore up the Assad regime, because bombings done by Russian aircrafts were aimed primarily - 90-95 percent - against the non-ISIS enemies of Assad.  
   
RD: Some experts say that ISIS is forever. So, can ISIS be destroyed at all?

R.F.: Yes, it can. I am one of those who believe that if you put boots on the ground, you can destroy Raqqa which is the center [of ISIS]. The question is if you destroy Raqqa, who is going to occupy it? And you don't want  American or European forces occupying it for the long term. You want to have Syrian, Sunni forces occupying it. But they are not going to be willing to fight ISIS unless they think they are going to get Assad out as a trade-off.

Who joins ISIS? I think it is pretty clear now. If you are a second class Muslim in Europe without a future and you have the ideal of a restored Caliphate, where you can be an important figure, you are attracted to it. Then you have the former members of the Baath regime of former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein, who provide some military support [to ISIS]. Why did people join the Nazis after all? They thought the Nazis were winning. [It is also the case with ISIS]. So, if you destroy Raqqa which is a very important symbol, that shows that the caliphate is not winning. That's why I think Raqqa has to be destroyed.

RD: The Slavic convention ASEEES brought together a lot of experts who were mulling over Russia's foreign policy in 2015. In your view, what are the major failures and achievements of the Kremlin's foreign policy this year?

R.F.: Ok, we'll start with the failures. I think that heavy-handed actions that Mr. Putin has used has driven Finland and Sweden into seriously considering for the first time joining NATO. That's a huge mistake on his part. He was projecting Russian power, but it proved to be counter-effective. This is number one.

Number two is that the Russian strength in the Middle East comes primarily from American failures: in Egypt, Russia had a big success, due to the Obama administration's confusion as to how to relate to the Sisi government. That was the case until the airliner was shot down, and now Russian-Egyptian relations are more problematic.

However, unlike the United States, which was wavering on supporting the Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Sisi government, Russia came immediately to support the Sisi government. And for this reason, I expect a quick reconciliation betwen Russia and Egypt.

Also the Kremlin made use of the mistakes of the United States in getting too close to Iran, which alienated the Saudis. Consequently, the Saudis began seriously negotiating - without a lot of success so far with Russia. So there are two big successes.

RD: What are the major drivers of Russia's foreign policy in 2015 and what factors will shape it in 2016?

R.F.: There is one straight line: What Russia wants to do is what Putin wants to do. Putin wants Russia restored as a great power and Russia wants to have a multipolar world, in which Russia is a major pole, and not the American unipolar world. I think he is going to continue to try to do that.

RD: What are the missed opportunities for U.S.-Russia cooperation in 2015?

R.F.: It is very hard to talk about missed opportunities when the Russians, first of all, invaded and annexed Crimea and aided actively separatists in Ukraine and then lied about the shooting plane [MH17 Malaysian Boeing over Eastern Ukraine] and lied about who used the poison gas in Syria, this does not make for close collaboration.

RD: So, you don't see any chances for cooperation in future?

R.F.: I don't see any unless Russia's policy changes.

RD: Ok, if you think that there won't be any improvement, what does the Kremlin get wrong about the U.S.?

R.F.: It gets it mostly right about the United States: Putin realizes that U.S. President Barack Obama is a weak president, who is not interested in conflict. So, he is willing to take advantage, which he has done.

RD: Well, what about Obama? What does he get wrong about Russia?

R.F.: Obama thinks he operates within the 21 century, Putin thinks he operates within the 19th century. And where the world is now is more the 19th century than the 21st century.  

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 #39
Counterpunch.org
December 3, 2015
How Russia is Smashing the Turkish Game in Syria
by PEPE ESCOBAR
Pepe Escobar is the author of Globalistan: How the Globalized World is Dissolving into Liquid War (Nimble Books, 2007), Red Zone Blues: a snapshot of Baghdad during the surge and Obama does Globalistan (Nimble Books, 2009).  His latest book is Empire of Chaos. He may be reached at pepeasia@yahoo.com.

So why did Washington take virtually forever to not really acknowledge ISIS/ISIL/Daesh is selling stolen Syrian oil that will eventually find is way to Turkey?

Because the priority all along was to allow the CIA - in the shadows - to run a "rat line" weaponizing a gaggle of invisible "moderate rebels".

As much as Daesh - at least up to now - the Barzani mob in Iraqi Kurdistan was never under Washington's watch. The oil operation the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) runs to Turkey is virtually illegal; stolen state-owned oil as far as Baghdad is concerned.

Daesh stolen oil can't flow through Damascus-controlled territory. Can't flow though Shi'ite-dominated Iraq. Can't go east to Iran. It's Turkey or nothing. Turkey is the easternmost arm of NATO. The US and NATO "support" Turkey. So a case can be made that the US and NATO ultimately support Daesh.

What's certain is that illegal Daesh oil and illegal KRG oil fit the same pattern; energy interests by the usual suspects playing a very long game.

What these interests are focused on is to control every possible oil asset in Iraqi Kurdistan and then in "liberated" Syria. It's crucial to know that Tony "Deepwater Horizon" Hayward is running Ug Genel, whose top priority is to control oil fields that were first stolen from Baghdad, and will eventually be stolen from Iraqi Kurds.

And then, there's the Turkmen powder keg.

The key reason why Washington always solemnly ignored Ankara's array of shady deals in Syria, through its fifth column Turkmen jihadis, is because a key CIA "rat line" runs exactly through the region known as Turkmen Mountain.

These Turkmen supplied by Ankara's "humanitarian" convoys got American TOW-2As for their role in preserving prime weaponizing/ smuggling routes. Their advisers, predictably, are Xe/Academi types, formerly Blackwater. Russia happened to identify the whole scam and started bombing the Turkmen. Thus the downing of the Su-24.

The Turkmen fifth column

Now the CIA is on a mission from God - frantically trying to prevent the rat line from being definitely smashed by the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) on the ground and Russia in the air.

The same desperation applies to the Aleppo-Azez-Killis route, which is also essential for Turkey for all kinds of smuggling.

The advanced arm of the "4+1" alliance - Russia, Syria, Iran, Iraq, plus Hezbollah - is taking no prisoners trying to re-conquer these two key corridors.

And that explains Ankara's desperation - with a little help from His Masters' Voice - to come up with an entirely new rat line/corridor through Afrin, currently under Syrian Kurd control, before Damascus forces and Russia air power get there.

Once again it's important to remember that a gaggle of Turkmen outfits are Ankara's fifth column in northern Syria.

Most Turkmen live in Kurdish territories. And here's the ultimate complicating factor; the majority happens to live in the Jarablus region, currently controlled by ISIS/ISIL/Daesh. It's exactly this area that is cutting the geographic connection between the two Kurdish cantons, Kobani and Afrin.

So imagine a continuous Syrian Kurd control/autonomy/corridor all across the Turkish-Syrian border. For Ankara this is the ultimate nightmare. Ankara's strategy is to move its Turkmen pawns, with added "moderate rebels", all across the Jarablus region. The pretext: wipe Daesh off the map. The real reason: prevent the two Kurdish cantons - Afrin and Kobani - from merging.

And once again Ankara will be directly pitted against Moscow.

The Russian strategy rests on very good relations with Syrian Kurds. Moscow not only supports the Syrian Kurd canton merger, but qualifies it as an important step on the way to a new Syria rid of takfiris. Russia will even officially recognize the PYD (Democratic Union Party) and allow them a representative office in Russia.

Ankara regards the PYD and its paramilitary arm, the YPG (People's Protection Units) as branches of the PKK. It gets curioser an curioser when we know that both Moscow and Washington are cooperating with the YPG against ISIS/ISIL/Daesh.

The predictable All-Out Ankara Freak Out came in the form of Sultan Erdogan declaring the Euphrates a "red line" for the YPG. If they try to move westward to fight Daesh, sending them out of the Jarablus area, the Turkish Army will strike.

It's absolutely key for Turkey to control this area between Jarablus and Afrin because here is the site of the would-be "safe zone", actually a no-fly zone, which Ankara dreams of implementing using the 3 billion euros just extorted from the EU to house refugees but also control northern Syria. Turkmen would be in charge of the area - as well as the Azez-Aleppo line, assuming the SAA does not clear it for good.

The case for UEBA

So Ankara is looking at two very unpleasant Turkmen-filled scenarios to say the least.

Turkmen instrumentalized by Ankara to become gatekeepers against the Kurdish YPG; that means a nasty sectarian divide, orchestrated by Turkey, whose greatest loser is the unity of the Syrian nation.

Meanwhile, the SAA and Russian air power are on the verge of total control of Turkmen Mountain.

This will allow the "4+1" to go much deeper fighting against the so-called Army of Conquest and its twin-headed reptile, Jabhat al-Nusra (a.k.a. al-Qaeda in Syria) and Ahrar al-Sham, the whole lot "supported" and weaponized by Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

The "4+1" inexorable advance comes with extra benefits; the end of all rat lines in the region, and no more possible threats to Russia's air base in Hmeimim.

Make no mistake that Moscow will inflict as much pain on Sultan Erdogan as possible.

As Turkish newspaper Radikal quoted him, Prof. Abbas Vali of Bogazici University confirmed, "The PYD was pleased about Russia's intervention in Syria. An alliance between the PYD and Russia is inevitable. Russia's bombardment of the radical Islamist groups on the ground will have a huge impact on the PYD operations."

So no matter which way we look, Turkey and Russia are on a serious collision course in Syria. Moscow will support Syrian Kurds no holds barred as they push to link the three major Kurdish cantons in northern Syria into a unified Rojava.

As for Washington's "strategy", it now boils down to the CIA need of a new rat line. That could imply sitting on the - weaponized - sidelines watching Turkmen and Kurds slug it out, thus creating an opening for the Turkish Army to intervene, and the Russian Air Force to prevent it, with all hell guaranteed to break loose.

The fact remains that Sultan Erdogan badly needs a new CIA-secured rat line to weaponize not only his fifth column Turkmen but also Chechens, Uzbeks and Uyghurs. And Bilal Erdogan, a.k.a. Erdogan Mini Me, desperately needs new oil smuggling routes and a couple of new tankers; Russia is watching their every move. The latest news from Russia's Defense Ministry has struck like a volcanic eruption; the Erdogan family mob was branded as "criminals", with Moscow presenting only an appetizer of the all the evidence it has in store.

So we have the Afghan heroin rat line. The Libyan oil racket (now over). The Ukraine fascist rat line. The Libya to Syria weapon rat line. The stolen Syrian oil trade. The northern Syrian rat lines. Let's call them UEBA: Unregulated Exceptionalist Business Activities. What's not to like? There's no business like war business.

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 #40
The Economist
December 5, 2015
Russian-Turkish politics
Tsar v sultan
Russia does not want a shooting war with Turkey. A trade war, maybe

TWO portraits flanked by red roses and candles rest on a bench outside the Russian defence ministry. The makeshift memorial honours the soldiers killed last month by "accomplices of ISIL"-Russia's new nickname for Turkey. After Vladimir Putin declared Turkey's downing of a Russian jet near the Syrian border to be a "stab in the back", a chill has descended over Russian-Turkish relations. Mr Putin accused Turkey's Recep Tayyip Erdogan of protecting and profiting from the Islamic State's oil trade; Mr Erdogan promised to resign if Russia could provide proof. On December 2nd Russia's defence ministry presented information it says does just that. Mr Erdogan called it "slander".

In a few seconds, the missile a Turkish plane fired last month undid years of diplomacy. Until the incident, the Kremlin saw Turkey as a strategic partner. Ordinary Russians knew it as a place to go on cheap beach holidays. Bilateral trade flourished, especially in energy, and Turkish construction firms helped build up Sochi for the winter Olympics. Last year Mr Putin paid Mr Erdogan perhaps his ultimate compliment, calling the Turkish leader "strong" for supporting ties with Russia even as the West had turned away because of the conflict in Ukraine.

Now, Turkey has suddenly become Russia's main enemy. The Kremlin's chief propagandist, Dmitry Kiselev, spent most of his Sunday night broadcast slamming the country, accusing Mr Erdogan of complicity with terrorists and fascists. Turkey "is now truly dangerous," he warned viewers. At the climate summit in Paris this week, Mr Putin met in private with Barack Obama, but shunned Mr Erdogan. The Russian government has also unveiled economic sanctions against Turkey, focused on agriculture and tourism.

The tension is not limited to politics. Russia's minister of sport instructed football clubs not to hire Turkish players during the upcoming transfer period. Dozens of Russian universities have cut ties with their Turkish counterparts, and Russian exchange students have been recalled from Turkish schools. Turkish trucks have been held up at the Russian border and lawyers have been fielding complaints from Turks in Russia who find themselves facing harassment from migration officers. "It's happening all over, from Vladivostok to Kaliningrad," says Murad Musayev, a Moscow-based attorney. "Collective responsibility according to nationality has become the rule."

Both sides stand to lose from sanctions, though the economic effects will be more of a pin prick than a stab. Embargoes on Turkish food and bans on charter flights will hurt some Turkish firms. But Turkish exposure to Russia amounts to only 1% of GDP, says Fatma Melek, an economist at Akbank in Turkey. Losses related to sanctions will be even less. Russia, in turn, can expect a bump in inflation of 1%-1.5%, says Natalia Orlova, an economist at Alfa Bank in Russia. The embargo seems designed to look bolder on television than in reality. Turkish lemons, which account for as much as 90% of all lemons in major retail chains, were left off the list of banned products. Gas supplies, the pillar of bilateral trade, have so far remained untouched, though Turkish Stream, a joint pipeline project, looks likely to be frozen.

Relations between Ankara and Moscow will not improve any time soon. The shooting down of the plane has exposed deep and bitter disagreements over Syria that had been smouldering for some time. As Turkish-backed Syrian opposition groups take an increasingly anti-Russian stance, Syrian peace talks look ever more shaky, says Vitaly Naumkin, director of the Institute of Oriental Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences. The conflict with Russia has also forced Turkish officials, who had often engaged in fiery anti-Western rhetoric in the past couple of years, to revise their priorities. "Now they understand that Turkey's security interests are with the West, with NATO," says Suat Kiniklioglu, director of the Centre for Strategic Communication, an NGO. "They've reverted to default mode."

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 #41
Washington Post
December 4, 2015
Allying with Putin against the Islamic State would be a devil's bargain
By Oleksandr Turchynov
Oleksandr Turchynov is secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine.

Winston Churchill was under no illusions about his wartime alliance with Joseph Stalin. "If Hitler invaded hell, I would make at least a favorable reference to the devil in the House of Commons," he remarked to an aide. This was not a bond forged in friendship and trust. It was a temporary partnership of necessity in the face of a common enemy. As soon as Nazi Germany was defeated, the reality of Stalin's intentions became clear. Promises to hold free elections in the countries under Soviet occupation were broken, and the West spent the next 40 years trying to contain the threat the Soviet Union posed.

This needs to be kept in mind as we contemplate events in Syria. In the aftermath of the horrific terrorist attacks in Paris and the bombing of a Russian plane over the Sinai, it is understandable that Western governments should want to form the broadest possible international coalition, including with Russia, to defeat those responsible. But shared grief is not the same as shared interests. Cooperation with Russia in the fight against the Islamic State needs to be carefully weighed against several bigger foreign policy issues.

The areas where Russia's interests in Syria conflict with those of the West remain at least as significant as those where they overlap. Whereas the West's priority is destroying the Islamic State, Russia's primary aim is to keep the Bashar al-Assad regime in power. So far, a large majority of Russian airstrikes in Syria have been directed against non-Islamic State targets, including moderate groups such as the Western-backed Free Syrian Army that are helping fight the terrorist group on the ground. These strikes have also exacerbated the flow of Syrian refugees toward Europe.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has direct interests in Syria as a regional ally, a market for Russian military exports and a base for the Russian navy's Mediterranean fleet. But his approach is influenced by wider considerations, one of which is to prevent another authoritarian regime from succumbing to the demands of its people. As we well know in Ukraine, Putin is determined to resist the tide of global democratic change and willing to use violence against other countries to stop it. He sees freedom as a threat to his own hold on power and an indication of advancing Western influence. Russian policy in Syria is framed by an attitude of strategic hostility toward the West and its values.

While the Kremlin pretends to be fighting terrorism in Syria, Russia itself merits designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. Its aggression against Ukraine has cost more than 8,000 lives, including the indiscriminate shelling of civilian areas and the murder of political opponents carried out by its special forces and Russian-sponsored terrorists. It was a Russian-supplied Buk missile that reportedly shot down Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 in July of last year, resulting in the loss of 298 innocent lives. More than 1.5 million people in Ukraine have been internally displaced as a result of illegal Russian aggression. The Russian state has shown itself willing to carry out the assassination of regime critics, both at home and abroad, using terrorist methods.

Yet none of this will prevent Russia from trying to extract advantage from the war in Syria. Putin is a master of tactical opportunism, and in the past two weeks Russian jets in Syria have been dropping bombs inscribed with the message "For Paris" in a gesture of apparent solidarity. Positioned as a friend of the West in its fight against terrorism, Putin hopes to secure the relationship he has always wanted - one that sets aside international law and the rights of smaller nations in favor of great-power dealmaking and the principle that might is right.

Russia has already invoked the grand alliance against Hitler as a precedent for fighting the Islamic State. Be in no doubt that it will also demand a new Yalta as the price of cooperation now. In his recent speech to the United Nations, Putin praised the post-World War II agreement that began the division of Europe by recognizing the territorial gains Stalin achieved under the Nazi-Soviet pact. The town of Yalta, of course, now lies in Russian-occupied Crimea as a poignant reminder that the past lives with us. All Putin needs is for the West to drop sanctions and accept his land grab in Ukraine for the circle to be complete.

The West needs to be hardheaded in its assessment of the risks involved in doing business with Russia over Syria and firm about the limits of any cooperation. Islamist terrorism is a major threat and has the capacity to cause death and suffering on a huge scale. It must be dealt with as a matter of urgent priority. Yet the greatest long-term threats to a peaceful and liberal world order remain Russian terrorism and the determination of a revanchist Kremlin to impose a new sphere of influence and systematically try to destabilize its neighborhood, not only in Ukraine but also in the Caucasus, the Baltic States, Poland and the Balkans. The civilized world must defeat terrorism, not selectively but in all forms and on all fronts.

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 #42
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's remarks and answers to media questions at a news conference on the results of the first day of the OSCE Ministerial Council and bilateral meetings, Belgrade, December 3, 2015
 
Good evening,

The main session of the OSCE Ministerial Council meeting is over. The debates are ongoing. The final results of the meeting will become clear tomorrow, but it is possible to reach the first and possibly most important conclusions.

First, we had a very meaningful discussion, which reaffirmed the need to set aside everything that doesn't concern the fight against terrorism, which is the world's main enemy now, and especially everything that can hinder this fight. We are finishing our work on a document that will put forth this stance of the OSCE foreign ministers clearly and unambiguously.

Second, it's clear that the threat of terrorism comprises a number of issues that have gone almost unnoticed until recently, but are now seriously influencing the situation in Europe. One of them is illegal migration. We had a very earnest discussion on this issue. We believe that common principles and approaches should be formulated within the OSCE based, of course, on international humanitarian law, the principles and standards of which should guide actions of all  countries. The migration issue concerns primarily the EU countries, which is where the majority of migrants are heading. Russia is willing to cooperate with the EU on this issue. By the way, a migration dialogue is not on the list of issues for branch interaction with Russia that have been suspended by Brussels. Our EU partners want to maintain it. We are willing to do this too, but only based on reciprocity and within the general context for our relations with the EU.

We drew the attention of our partners to the fact that many problems in Europe, including numerous conflicts and the Ukrainian crisis, are rooted in the lack of understanding of systemic drawbacks in European security and cooperation architecture.

The OSCE was designed to encourage an intellectual change in the mentality of the two sides that were fighting a Cold War. The fundamental principles of interaction and cooperation were sealed in the Helsinki Final Act forty years ago. Since then, all of the most important OSCE achievements have been connected to major summit meetings that recorded the next step in coordinating our global political approaches. These documents include the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, the Charter for European Security, and the OSCE Commemorative Declaration that was signed in Astana, Kazakhstan in December 2010. They set out very important provisions, such as indivisible security, an equal right to security for all states, which implies that no steps should be taken to strengthen one's security to the detriment of other countries. These principles have been proclaimed and signed at the top levels, by the presidents and prime ministers of the OSCE countries. But no mechanisms have been created for the implementation of these political commitments. Russia has, more than once, proposed signing a treaty on European security that would stipulate the creation of agencies to implement the principle of indivisible security. But our Western partners have rejected this proposal.

When the OSCE was still developing as a full-fledged organisation in the 1990s, the focus was on the technical aspects rather than on the quality of the agencies that would deal with the main issue - security. The relevant mechanisms and institutions have been created, including the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media and other agencies that have just been proclaimed, but not given an intergovernmental basis for their operation. Their current problem is that these agencies have become "a thing in itself" and can be easily manipulated. They often seriously exceed their authority, do not cooperate with intergovernmental agencies, such as the OSCE Ministerial Council or the OSCE Permanent Council, and so have become a headache for all of us. For example, on the issue of election observers, they can send 10 observers to some country and 1,500 to another, and insist on sending 600 instead of the agreed 300 observers to other countries while refusing to cooperate with their governments. The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media sometimes sharply criticises relatively harmless mistakes, but keeps silent about or expresses only mild disapproval of the authorities that prohibit journalists from practicing their profession. This is a major obstacle to our work. Some of our Western partners make a fetish of these agencies, trying to busy the OSCE with endless and mostly useless discussions of humanitarian issues, such as human rights, minorities' rights (they refuse to discuss the issue of ethnic minorities and stateless persons), human rights activists, the LGBT community and other groups. We must act in accordance with the conventions that preclude discrimination of any kind. As I have indicated, the issue of stateless persons is of major importance for us, because hundreds of thousands of ethnic Russians are stateless persons in the Baltic countries, and their passports give their status as "non-citizen."

We tried to continue the discussion on the importance of overhauling these OSCE institutions, streamlining budgetary programmes and extra-budgetary activities that are currently marked by complete arbitrary law and by an absolute lack of transparency. We are ready to continue this conversation and to hold talks on establishing a solid legal framework. This primarily concerns the approval of the OSCE charter.

But, most importantly, we need to focus on the OSCE's military-political security 'basket.' As I see it, many colleagues actually heard us today. The issue of turning slogans and political obligations that promise equal and indivisible security into practical deeds is becoming more and more topical.  The remainder is just symptoms, and this issue, namely, a shortage of practical mechanisms for ensuring equal and indivisible security, is a systematic flaw of the OSCE and the entire system that has evolved in Europe.

My hope is that they are beginning to hear what we have to say, not judging from the session's resolution, but rather on unofficial discussions that have been held on the European security issue.  They are beginning to listen to us more attentively than they did two or three years ago because the current situation in this area doesn't satisfy anyone.

If we don't accomplish this within the OSCE, then NATO-centrism will persist, the alliance will expand eastwards, and European demarcation lines will become more pronounced.  Most of my colleagues realise the malignant nature of this inertia, at least in our private conversations.

Question: Yesterday, you said that you expected to hear something new on the situation around the downed Su-24 bomber from your Turkish counterpart. Did you hear anything new? Did you discuss Turkish counter-sanctions announced the other day by Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu?

Sergey Lavrov:  The Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu and I met at his insistence. Mr Cavusoglu, without saying anything new, reaffirmed the approaches voiced by the President and Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey. We confirmed and set forth the same assessments that had been voiced the very first day our bomber was shot down in a criminal manner and contrary to all accepted procedures being applied in such cases. We also confirmed broader assessments voiced in President Vladimir Putin's address to the Federal Assembly.

Question: You have also held a bilateral meeting with US Secretary of State John Kerry. What issues did you discuss? Did you discuss the conditions for sealing off Turkish-Syrian and Turkish-Iraqi borders and for involving the Kurds in this process?

Sergey Lavrov: Of course our first item of discussion was the ISIS issue. US Secretary of State John Kerry agreed with me that efforts to seal off the Turkish-Syrian border and probably the Turkish-Iraqi border are a pressing and long overdue measure, because all this is interlinked. How can this be accomplished? You know our considerations as to who could cooperate, the Americans realise that this must be accomplished, that the Kurds are allies in this respect and in the fight against ISIS, and that they are also allies of the United States and many European countries who help the Kurdish militia to maintain their combat readiness while fighting terrorists. Certainly, sealing off a border is a comprehensive process, and we need to pool the efforts of everyone on the ground and to provide them with air support. It's so far hard to say what specific form this process will assume, but it is an established fact that this issue has already been recognised as being one the most important problems.

In a broader context, we discussed the implementation of the decisions reached in Vienna by members of the International Syria Support Group. First of all, we need to clarify whom we will list as terrorists. The concerned parties, including members of the US-led coalition are divided on this score. Regarding the Kurds, some coalition members, including Turkey, are voicing positions that are diametrically opposite to those of the United States and many Europeans.

We also noted that it was necessary to assist Staffan de Mistura, Special  Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for Syria, in establishing a Syrian opposition delegation as quickly as possible. All of us want to launch the political process as soon as possible. This can be accomplished only when an opposition delegation will be represented together with a Syrian government delegation which, as far as I know, is ready to hold talks. The Syrian opposition delegation, we feel, should include a wide  range of opposition forces, with the exception of terrorists and extremists. There should be no selective approach whatsoever, for example when one group being favoured by an external player dominates the delegation. They are addressing this very difficult task rather actively today. We have submitted our proposals regarding the opposition delegation's potential makeup. To our mind, these people make it possible to represent a wide range of opposition forces. To the best of my knowledge, Saudi Arabia and other regional countries have submitted their ideas. The United States is voicing its own opinions. It is important for the UN to sum up all this. Saudi Arabia wants to hold a meeting of opposition members during the establishment of this delegation. As far as I know, this mostly includes those opposition members in favour with Saudi Arabia. We acted similarly while hosting a meeting of opposition members in Moscow, but we invited everyone there without exception, and those who wanted to take part came to Moscow. We are advising our Saudi colleagues to do the same and not to strike off anyone from the list of invited delegates. By the way, the Egyptian side that has hosted several meetings in Cairo, during which the Cairo-2 group, with its own platform and a 'road map' for overcoming the Syrian crisis, was formed and they acted in the same manner.  Those members of the Syrian opposition who gathered in Moscow also have their own platform. By the way, a Syrian government delegation also joined them at various stages. I hope that all efforts invested in creating favourable conditions for launching inter-Syrian dialogue will not be wasted in vain. We have informed all members of the International Syria Support Group about this in detail, and our UN colleagues are informed as well. I'm confident that they will take into consideration the contributions of all parties and will carry out their mission.

The list of terrorists is very important in this context. Our partners want to call a ceasefire when the political process begins. Everyone agrees that a ceasefire agreement should not apply to terrorist organisations. To implement all these ideas we need to agree whom we call terrorists.  We are very apprehensive of attempts to proclaim some openly extremist and terrorist groups that have repeatedly cooperated with Al Qaeda, Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS as semi-moderate, semi-extremist, as those which should not be barred from the political process on an obligatory basis and as organisations that can mend their ways. This option is very dangerous. Despite the apparent simplicity of this task, specifically, the compilation of just two lists, we have a lot of work to do. It would be hard to continue the Vienna Process, unless we complete this work, because everything would otherwise boil down to pointless conversations and catching the wind with a net once again.

Question: Did US Secretary of State John Kerry and you discuss the Russian Defence Ministry information about Turkey's alleged oil trade with ISIS?

Sergey Lavrov: Mr Kerry said they are still analysing this information and cannot conclude yet that it is true. In my opinion, the quality of the documents, videotapes and photographs provided by the Russian ministry speaks for itself. We'll give our partners time to carefully analyse the facts provided by the Russian Defence Ministry.

Question: Can you comment on the statement made by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan today to the effect that Russian citizens buy oil from ISIS? In fact, Mr Erdogan has accused Russian citizens of involvement in oil trade with ISIS.

Sergey Lavrov: I haven't heard this statement, but it's strange that it was made days after illegal oil trade became an issue in the media based on the facts we provided. I can only remind you of the saying, that a guilty conscience gives itself away. This is all that comes to mind now.

Question: What steps will Russia take with regard to Turkey?

Sergey Lavrov: We've said that this criminal and illegal act will not remain unanswered, and that our relations with the current Turkish authorities cannot be the same now. We've always said, and President Vladimir Putin reaffirmed this in his address at the Kremlin today, that we consider the Turkish people friends. We don't equate the Turkish people with those who issued this criminal order. We have said how this decision by the Turkish authorities will affect our relations. The Russian President has formulated his decision, and the Government has issued a resolution based on that decision. This is public knowledge. We want to avoid taking steps that will damage relations between people. Problems are known to happen from time to time. But this is not a policy of the Russian President and the Russian Government. We won't create problems for the people of Turkey or Russia.

Question: Is Britain's decision to deliver bombing raids against ISIS evidence that the world can fight against terrorism together?

Sergey Lavrov: We believe that the more embracing the fight against terrorism, the more effective it will be. Some of our partners say that they cannot reliably coordinate the fight against ISIS and other terrorist groups until the fate of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is made clear. We thought the issue was settled at the Vienna meetings and their documents, which clearly state that the Syrians alone should decide the future of their country. I believe that this is explicit enough. These documents do not stipulate any conditions for launching a political process or any forecasts of its outcome, and neither do these documents set out any preliminary conditions for stepping up the fight against terrorism.

President Putin said in his address to the parliament today that a common anti-terrorist front must act in line with international law. This implies a decision by the UN Security Council or the approval of the government on whose territory counterterrorism operations are waged. A foreign country that wishes to join this fight should have this approval. As far as I know, UK Prime Minister David Cameron has inferred that UN Security Council Resolution 2249, which was unanimously adopted after the terrorist attacks in Paris, has given the UK carte blanche to attack ISIS forces in Syria. I'd like to draw your attention to a very important fact, which explains why Russia approved that document. The resolution says clearly that the UN Security Council calls upon all member states that have the capacity to do so to coordinate their efforts against ISIS, in compliance with international law, in particular with the UN Charter. This call is clearly addressed also to the Syrian government, because Syria is a country where ISIS is fighting for its evil plans. This urge to coordinate efforts is addressed to any country that is fighting ISIS. You don't have to be a lawyer to understand the meaning of this resolution and its mandate.

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 #43
Moscow Times
December 4, 2015
Remembering Eldar Ryazanov - in His Own Words
By Michele A. Berdy
Michele A. Berdy, a Moscow-based translator and interpreter, is author of "The Russian Word's Worth" (Glas), a collection of her columns.

This week in Russia has been colored by sorrow: Eldar Ryazanov, one of the country's most famous and beloved film directors, died at the age of 88. Since his death, television stations have been replaying his films from the 1960s through 1980s, and Russians - who are among the greatest quoters in the world - are slipping lines from his films into just about every conversation.

This is always hard on us foreigners. Someone says an odd little sentence like Он, конечно, виноват, но он ... не виноват (Of course he's guilty, but ... he isn't guilty) and everyone laughs. You stand there with an uncertain smile on your face until someone explains that it's a line from Берегись Автомобиля (Watch Out for the Car), said in defense of a 1960s Soviet Robin Hood by the great actor Oleg Yefremov. One more cultural allusion understood.

My favorite bit in that movie is when a fussy little car owner - a guy who made enough money to buy a Volga from selling electronics under the counter in a state commission shop - is describing some minor problems with his car to his enormous, laconic mechanic. He complains about a problem with steering. Поглядим (We'll take a look), the mechanic says. And it makes this ticking noise when you switch gears. Послушаем (We'll listen). And yesterday it smelled of gas. Понюхаем (We'll smell it.) Over the years when I would explain in excruciatingly boring detail some little glitch in one of my Zhigulis, my (big, laconic) mechanic would just say: Поглядим. Послушаем. Понюхаем. And laugh.

Another favorite Ryazanov movie with an automotive theme - cars, in their rarity, had particular meaning in the late Soviet period - is Гараж (Garage). It takes place in an organization called НИИ Охраны животных от окружающей среды (the Scientific Research Institute for the Protection of Animals from the Environment). Уже смешно! (It's funny already.) The institute's co-op has to eliminate several garages to allow for some road construction, and the party bigwigs think they can just kick out the least privileged employees. But at their meeting a young scientist locks them all in a building to force them to resolve the issue fairly. Over the long and hysterical night - Будь проклят тот день, когда я купил машину! (Cursed be the day that I bought a car!) - all the truth of misuse of authority, bribery, nepotism, and protectionism come out. Попрошу факт продажи Родины зафиксировать в протоколе! (I ask that evidence of selling out the Homeland be entered into the minutes!)

I also love Служебный Роман (An Office Affair), partially to watch the actress Alisa Freindlikh's transformation from "наша мымра" (our frump) to a knockout, but mostly because of the incredibly rich life of the staff. The office is like a big village, with the secretary Vera the town gossip and expert on all things feminine. From her I learned: Именно обувь делает женщину женщиной (It's shoes that make a woman a woman). Write that down.

In the film Вокзал на Двоих (Train Station for Two) you can learn about спекулянты (speculators, black marketeers) selling melons. In the Soviet era, speculation was a serious crime, but the vendors don't see it that way. They're performing a service: Я не спекулянтка! Мы посредники между землей и народом. (I'm not a speculator! We're middlemen between the earth and the people!)

Ryazanov was our middleman between reality and people, and I'm sorry he's gone.

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 #44
Moscow Times
December 4, 2015
Inoculated Against Russian Propaganda
By Daria Litvinova

Immediately following the harrowing terrorist attacks in Paris on Nov. 13, Russian pro-Kremlin media adjusted their rhetoric, abandoning their previous anti-Western and anti-U.S. vitriol even before the Kremlin spoke of a broad military alliance.

"A listener called Komsomolskaya Pravda radio station ... and said that Americans are not our enemies, that it is politicians and officials who poisoned the well, but people feel good [about Americans]. ... The presenter is also very friendly, and the whole program is devoted to [explaining that] Americans are not the enemies," Andrei Arkhangelsky, culture editor at the prominent Ogoniok weekly magazine, wrote on his Facebook page on Nov. 16. The post received thousands of likes and hundreds of shares.

Listening to the radio and monitoring the official political line has been Arkhangelsky's hobby since 2014. He tunes into Moscow FM stations daily, untangling the web of propaganda and describing its development on his Facebook page and in columns for the independent Slon news website.

FM stations are always first to pick up on trends. "Radio - no matter how strongly pro-Kremlin it is - is about live broadcast. It's about spontaneous reactions, naturalness, directness, emotions," he told The Moscow Times.

The Russian political and social agenda has become integrally linked with the chorus of  television channels, newspapers, radio stations and social media commentators. While the propaganda industry requires governmental expenditure, resources and management, the Russian government requires propaganda for subsistence - it no longer simply influences public opinion but cannot be extricated from the national narrative.

Its expanding influence has provoked resistance from journalists, who explore and expose exaggerations, manipulations and blunt lies that fill the air on every relatively important subject. They do this as a hobby, separate from their regular jobs in prominent news outlets.  

Public activism in Russia comes in waves, the early 2010s were the time of election observers and street politicians - and now television commentators and media observers have taken up their work.

To Understand Society through Radio Language

Andrei Arkhangelsky, 41
Culture editor for the Ogonyok weekly magazine. Began listening to radio stations - such as Ekho Moskvy, Business FM, Vesti, Russian News Service and Govorit Moskva - and writing about them in 2014. Is interested in the media language and journalist psychology.

Arkhangelsky, 41, has been listening to Russian radio for almost a year - stations such as Ekho Moskvy, Business FM, Vesti, Russian News Service and Govorit Moskva.

His columns and Facebook page examine how shades of radio language differ in various situations. "I'm very much interested in the media language, I study it as a cultural phenomenon. This language ... draws a portrait of society," he said.

The tone of pro-Kremlin radio stations has changed significantly in the past couple years, he said. Even a year ago some stations could afford talking about opposition firebrand Alexei Navalny, for example, and give his lawyers airtime, but after things started crumbling in Ukraine, the tune changed into a simplistic opposition of "good guys" versus "enemies."

Meanwhile, there is no solid ground under current propaganda, he believes - it is all based on the idea of supporting and justifying anything the authorities do. "Current propaganda changes enemies almost every month. And listeners change their point of view as easily - I've observed it on numerous occasions," Arkhangelsky said.

His daily and thorough Facebook observations show that the first time Western countries were excluded from the media's list of enemies was on the eve of Russia launching air strikes in Syria in late September.

"Today, the airwaves of state radio stations had a year's worth of good and neutral [information about] America. This amount of positive information about the United States in one day can be called an anomaly," Arkhangelsky wrote on Facebook on Sept. 29, the day before Russia began its air campaign alongside the international coalition headed by the United States.

A week later Arkhangelsky had concluded that there was no solid official agenda thus far, and state media remained divided between the opposing narratives.  

"The official agenda is stuck between 'America 1' and 'America 2' - between the all-time evil and the insecure partner. It's a strange, hesitating tone, and it's not clear which [narrative] will dominate. The propaganda is at a crossroads, it is still deciding how to talk about America," he wrote on Oct. 7.

According to Arkhangelsky - who said he was also very much interested in journalistic psychology - those who engage in the crusades that state media launch are ordinary people. "Geopolitics are a lot like childhood, when you feel on top of the world and there's no need for compromises," he said.

"The past 25 years haven't changed those 40-50 years old people - they just decided not to grow up. And those who are 20-25 now ... were looking for something to believe in, and for them the Soviet Union became that something - a dream of a lost paradise, the time when 'everyone was afraid and respected us,'" Arkhangelsky added.

To Immunize the Audience

Alexei Kovalyov, 34
Journalist, translator. Used to work for the state-owned RIA Novosti news agency, left it shortly after it was liquidated in 2013. Started a blog that soon turned into the Noodleremover web project with more than 200,000 monthly visits.

"Nowadays production of false information [in the media] in Russia is almost an industry. It's not a case of casual inaccuracies or distorted perceptions, it's a deliberate process of creating fakes, and it's only gaining speed," said Alexei Kovalyov, whose website devoted to exposing lies and inaccuracies in pro-Kremlin reports has recently recorded 211,000 visits a month.

Kovalyov, 34, launched NoodleRemover.com - its name originates from a Russian idiom "to put noodles over one's ears," meaning to lie - in early October and started regularly exposing  state-owned and pro-Kremlin media for manipulating their readers.

He himself used to work at a state-owned media outlet - the RIA Novosti news agency - but was dismissed, as were many other agency employees, following its liquidation at the end of 2013, when Rossiya Segodnya was launched in its stead under the rule of West-bashing television host Dmitry Kiselyov and Margarita Simonyan, the editor-in-chief of RT.

In the spring of 2014, as Simonyan's team began work in earnest, Kovalyov noticed that the agency changed its tone, embracing RT's manner of reportage.

According to Kovalyov, RT and RIA Novosti used similar know-hows, publishing stories with headlines like "96 percent of readers of an American newspaper voted for [Russian President Vladimir] Putin" - a claim based on an online poll on a small website where most voters were Russians - and citing experts that were not experts.

"For example, there was this expert on fighting terrorism, Scott Bennet, that both RT and Sputnik (RIA Novosti's project targeting audiences abroad) used. He was saying that Putin was the best thing that had happened to Russia. But the only thing the English-language Google knows about [Bennet] is that he spent three years is prison in the United States for pretending to be in the military," Kovalyov said.

Kovalyov began by posting on Facebook, but it proved inconvenient for including screenshots and links, so he started a blog on Medium.com - a popular platform among media professionals.

"My post [on Medium] about RT's real traffic got 60,000 hits," he said, in reference to a post about RT overstating its popularity in Western countries. The post is cited by many opposition-leaning outlets, including the blog of opposition leader Navalny.  

The post challenged RT's claims of drawing millions of British and U.S. viewers. The RT reports on its own viewership had cited research carried out by a U.S. Agency, but the agency's website contained no record in support of RT's claims, Kovalyov claimed.

With every post receiving 20,000-30,000 hits, Kovalyov started a more ambitious project called NoodleRemover. "I want people to learn to see these things, to make them immune and skeptical enough" to not trust state television channels blindly as they do now, Kovalyov said.

Kovalyov currently works as a reporter and a translator, but has plans to develop NoodleRemover in his free time.

In the future NoodleRemover might become a crowd-sourcing project, where people can share fake or clearly manipulative reports, as well as taking courses on media literacy. "There is no such thing in Russia, but they teach that in Western countries, and also on the [online platform] Coursera," Kovalyov said.

When asked about the channel's attitude to someone exposing their content on a daily basis, RT spokespeople told The Moscow Times they were "happy Alexei Kovalyov has found a new occupation - having a blog about bad people that dismissed him. We will be even happier to find out that he's being paid for it," the comment read.

Delving Deep Within the Web

Ilya Klishin, 28
Editor-in-chief of the Dozhd television channel's website. Found himself interested in pro-Kremlin trolls in 2011, when a series of mass street protests, organized on social networks, sparked in Moscow. Has his own sources who share their experiences and important documents with him.

It was in late 2011, recalls Ilya Klishin, editor-in-chief of Dozhd television's website and an expert on social networks, when, after a series of mass protests in Moscow, pro-Kremlin trolls flooded the Internet.

Klishin, 28, launched the famous Facebook page for the first protest in 2011. Tens of thousand of people signed up to gather on Bolotnaya Ploshchad to protest the results of the State Duma elections.

"They were real people. But when we opened a page for the second rally on [Prospect] Sakharova, we found out the Kremlin deployed bots to this page - they had Indian and Pakistani names and wrote [their pro-Kremlin comments] in perfect Russian," he said.  

Consequently, Klishin became interested in pro-government social media activities, and began exploring and writing about it for various media outlets: Vedomosti business daily, Slon news website and others.

People began reaching out to him, sharing stories and documents as proof that the Internet has an entire system of pro-government commentators.

Klishin went through 7,000 tweets in 2012, analyzing how an artificially promoted hashtag - #tukhlymarsh (rotten march), that referred to an opposition rally in Moscow - gained momentum on Twitter by real people trolling the Internet, not automated bots.

According to Klishin, the Russian government contracts so-called advertising and PR agencies, through which people are employed as pro-Kremlin Internet activists.

"It's not like there are government officials posting comments on Facebook and building up  hashtags on Twitter. There are companies with people on payroll that work in shifts and spend days in their offices writing right comments in the Internet," he said.

When the Kremlin was expanding its Internet activities abroad in 2014, Klishin was one of the first to take note.

"It was then when prominent Western outlets, including The Guardian and The Huffington Post, raised the alarm about Russian trolls coming. But the panic was premature. Only now, with the topic of Ukraine slowly dying down, the main soft power of the Kremlin can launch in full gear," Klishin wrote.

Right now the system works quite effectively - it has been established and functions smoothly without major changes, the journalist told The Moscow Times.

Klishin said he would continue tracking and exposing the government's media minions, but numerous investigations by the Russian media into governmental spending on Internet trolls has failed to spark any major scandal or public outrage. "I think society is not ready, it's too apathetic right now," he told The Moscow Times.

Little Hope for Success

Klishin's sentiment was echoed by Vasily Gatov, Russian media analyst and visiting fellow at the USC Annenberg Center on Communication Leadership and Policy in California.

"Exposing lies is an important, but not a groundbreaking element of any counter propaganda work. New goals and values that would replace the ones that are [being imposed and] currently dominate in society, are," he told The Moscow Times.

Currently there are no such values in Russian society, Gatov said, that's why exposing propaganda is not effective and mostly influences a small audience - or sometimes benefits the  very propaganda it seeks to discredit.

One of the purposes of propaganda is to depreciate the very concept of truth.  

Russian television nowadays performs an important job - it legitimizes lies, says political analyst Vladimir Gelman. "When the television lies and doesn't even try to hide it, it sends a signal to people that there is no truth - there are simply different kinds of lies, and the one shown on television is the right one," he told The Moscow Times.   

Yet Kovalyov of the NoodleRemover project remains optimistic.

That a blog maintained by a single citizen provoked such a positive response bodes well for the future. "I was surprised at first, but apparently I'm not the only one who needs all this," the journalist told The Moscow Times.

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 #45
http://gordonhahn.com
December 2, 2015
'Putin's Russia' or Russia's Putin?
By Gordon M. Hahn
[Footnotes and links here http://gordonhahn.com/2015/12/02/putins-russia-or-russias-putin/]

Introduction

Western observers often use the term 'Putin's Russia' in discussing developments in Russian politics, economics, society, and culture. This has become a 'meme' of sorts. Its use is usually an effort to imply the Russian political regime's authoritarianism-relatively soft, in this author's view-under Russian President Vladimir Putin. Raising the point of Putin's authoritarianism in one's work, preferably at the outset of any piece of writing, is requisite if one hopes to get published nowadays. The phrase 'Putin's Russia' is often intended to lead the reader to make the inferences, such as 'the Russia of Putin', the 'Russia that Putin controls', 'Putin controls Russia', 'Putin controls part (most) of Russian life', or the preferable 'Putin controls everything in Russia.' However, but the real operational dynamic in the relationship between Putin and 'his' Russia is quite the reverse - 'Russia's Putin.'

Putin like most other Russians today is very much a product of the late Soviet and post-Soviet Russian experience. This includes all those born before 1980 or so, meaning they experienced the Soviet demise. For these Russians the formative political experiences were the Soviet meltdown and collapse. To one degree or another, the political, economic, social, cultural, and civilizational preferences of these generations of Russians reflect those of Putin, and Putin's reflects those of Russia and Russians. We can ignore the phenomenon or aspect of Russia's Putin and consider Russia to be in some twisted state of inorganic subordination to Putin-one manufactured by Putin and his allies. But we would be better off appreciating the extent to which Putin actually represents Russia and its population's dominant preferences and then make policy accordingly.

A key pillar in the 'Putin's Russia' meme is that the Kremlin controls all mass media in Russia and thus shapes the minds of Russians to Putin's needs and liking. I have discussed numerous times elsewhere the extent to which this is a misleading exaggeration. In addition to the regime's having far from full control over television in Russia, the Internet remains almost entirely free, and there are a plethora of independent radio channels and print media. Moreover, there is significant pluralism of views on state-owned, 'Putin's media', including, for example, state-run television, the main source of news for most Russians. In fact, on a series of political talk shows on state channels one regularly meets anti-Putin Americans and other foreigners living in Moscow openly expressing their disdain for Putin, Russian policy and even Russia as a whole.

We can 'bust' the misconception communicated by the 'Putin's Russia' meme as well as that portraying a mythical total and totalitarian effect of television and state media in general on public opinion by comparing Russian public opinion with Putin's views on the eve of his rise to power. This period-the late 1990s-was one in which neither Putin nor the state controlled mass media in Russia to any significant degree whatsoever. In order to explore and verify the 'Putin's Russia' and 'state television society myths, I will analyse public opinion and Putin's opinion on three key foreign policy issues-NATO expansion, Ukraine, and Syria-in the late 1990s and more contemporaneously. I might address the consistency or lack thereof between Putin and Russia on domestic policy issues perhaps at another time. Here, I will demonstrate that a meme of 'Russia's Putin' is no less part and likely a much more salient aspect of today's Russia than that of 'Putin's Russia'.

NATO Expansion, 'Putin's Russia' and Russia's Putin

Continuing expansion of NATO and the Yugoslav wars created a strong majority against NATO in Russian public opinion. By March 1999, 69 percent of Russians, according to a VTsIOM opinion survey, felt to one degree or another that Russia had something to fear in countries joining NATO, only 31 percent did not think so.[1] By June 1999, VTsIOM found that 73 percent of Russian citizens had a negative view of NATO, 27 percent - a positive view.[2] This was particularly true regarding NATO expansion to former Soviet republics.

NATO's reputation among Russians deteriorated with each round of expansion and especially with the alliance's bombing of Yugoslavia. For example, in April 1996, a VTsIOM poll found that 55 percent of survey respondents opposed NATO membership for the Baltic states, Ukraine and "other" former Soviet republics now independent states, while 19 percent approved and 26 percent were indifferent.[3] As the Yugloslav crisis deepened, the West began discussing NATO intervention in the war, and NATO prepared to accept the Visegrad three into the alliance at its April 1997 summit, Russians responded in a repeat VTsIOM poll revealing that now 61 percent were opposed, 17 percent were for, and 21 percent were indifferent.[4] One month later, as NATO bombs fell on Yugoslavia, another repeat VTsIOM survey showed 64 percent were now opposed, 19 percent were for, and 17 percent were indifferent.[5] By the time Putin had come to power, a 2001 survey showed a strong majority of Russians, 75 percent, were increasingly convinced that NATO was subordinated to the American national interest rather than those of all its members (25 percent).[6]

As the number of accessions to NATO and MAPs for the NATO accession process grew through the 2000s, Russians developed an overwhelmingly negative attitude towards NATO. According to VTsIOM opinion surveys, between November 2001 and November 2011 most of what positive sentiment towards NATO and by extension the U.S. and the West remained among Russians after the 1990s had disappeared. In November 2001 and November 2011 VTsIOM polls, respondents were asked to choose among Russian policy options in relation to NATO; 16 precent and 4 percent, respectively, supported an effort to join the alliance; 36 and 43 percent chose trying to improve relations with it; and 16 and 29 percent supported formation of an alternative alliance.[7] Similarly, polls showed that from 2005 to 2009 the percentage of Russians supporting the creation of a counter-alliance had more than doubled from 16 to 39 percent, and the proportions who supported seeking cooperation with NATO dropped from 52 to 33 percent.[8] Moreover, the portion of Russians that saw NATO as a Russian national security threat doubled from 'only' 21 percent of respondents in 2003 to 41 percent by 2009.[9] In 2009-2011 approximately 60 percent of Russians, with marginal variation (59-62 percent), considered NATO expansion to the east as a threat to Russian national security.[10]

A rare case of Putin going sharply against the grain of Russian (and his own) opinion came a month after his inauguration when he suddenly changed colors and said it was possible Russia might one day join NATO. Indeed, a VTsIOM poll found that only 30 percent of respondents approved of Putin's statement, 31 percent expressed bewilderment, 21 percent - outrage, and 19 percent - indifference.[11] This turns the favored Western expression 'Putin's Russia' on its head. Putin's views on NATO expansion are well-known.

Less well-known is the concurrence between Putin's standard opposition to NATO expansion and that of his predecessor, expressed in very similar terms. It is now long-forgotten that the Russians and Yeltsin personally began to resist NATO expansion early on at least with regard to the former Soviet republics. The first open break over NATO came at the 1 December 1994, when Russian Foreign Minister traveled to Brussels to sign a Partnership for Peace agreement with the alliance but instead refused to sign in protest of a NATO communique` released earlier in the day proclaiming a policy of NATO expansion. On December 5th, Yeltsin protested against attempts "from a single capitol"-(that is, Washington)-to decide "the destinies of whole continents and the world community as a whole" and warned this was pushing Europe "into a cold peace."[12] That Yeltsin sounded precisely like his successor would over the next decade of continuing NATO expansion demonstrates that the worsening of U.S.-Russian relations has had more to do with that expansion than with 'Putin's Russia.'

Indeed, Putin seemed to channeling his late predecessor when he took to the rostrum on 10 February 2007 at the annual Munich Conference of Security Policy and castigated NATO expansion, unipolarity in international relations, and American unilateralism: "More and more we are witness to the flouting of the basic principles of international law. Above all the rights of one state are overtaking separate norms, indeed the entire system of (international) law. The United States is overstepping its national borders in every field: in economics, in politics, even in the humanitarian sphere....And this, of course, is very dangerous. ...Russia is a country with a history that spans more than a thousand years and has practically always used the privilege to carry out an independent foreign policy. We are not going to change this tradition today."[13]

This demonstrates considerable continuity, consistency, and relative ubiquity in Russia regarding the view that NATO expansion portends nothing good for the country's national interests and security.

Russia's then seeming acceptance of NATO expansion had more to do with Russians' traditional sense of honor and ability to hunker down, re-group, and exact revenge like a wounded bear in winter. President Bill Clinton's famous quip of sorts to his 'Russia hand' Assistant US Secretary of State for Russia and CIS Affairs Strobe Talbott in a private exchange during the April 1996 Moscow summit demonstrated great awareness and trepidation that the full-court press with which Washington and Brussels were pushing NATO expansion plans forward was creating grave tensions between President Yeltsin's liberal camp and the hardline opposition: "We haven't played everything brilliantly with these people; we haven't figured out how to say yes to them in a way that balances off how much and how often we want them to say yes to us. We keep telling Ol' Boris, 'Okay, now here's what you've got to do next-here's some more shit in your face.' And that makes it real hard for him, given what he's up against and who he's dealing with. ... We've got to remember that Yeltsin can't do more with us than his own traffic will bear. ... I've got some domestic politics of my own-stuff I can't do that I'd like to do, stuff I've got to do that I'd like not to. But he's got a much harder deal than I do."[14]

Putin decided to stop accepting Washington's unilateralism-that is, 'more shit in his face'-to the West's dismay. With regard to NATO, we now are dealing not only with Russia's Putin but 'NATO expansion's Russia'.

Ukraine and 'Putin's Russia'

Putin generally reflected Russian public opinion when as far back as 1994 - that is, during his democratic period when Putin was still St. Petersburg Mayor Anatolii Sobchak's deputy mayor for international relations - he warned a group of foreign Russia experts about the 25 million ethnic Russians left abroad after the Soviet collapse: "For us, their fate is a question of war and peace." A decade later, as Russia's president Putin made a similar point more softly in reaction to the 2004 Orange Revolution: "We want to avoid a split between east and west in Ukraine. The Russians in Ukraine deserve a safe future. We cannot go back to the Russian Empire. Even if we wanted to - it would be impossible." .... "We are not against change in the post-Soviet space. But we want to make sure that those changes do not end in chaos."[15]

The Russian public clearly sees Ukraine as close, part of a broader ethnic Russian or Slavic culture. Although there is survey data on Russians' self-identity as a Eurasian and/or European country, as noted above, there is little or no reliable data on average Russians' views regarding Ukrainians' relationship to any Eurasian civilization. Opinion surveys show a majority of Russians considering Ukrainians to be a 'fraternal people', brothers to Russians. Thus, in 1998, nearly two years before Putin's rise to the presidency, 89 percent of Russians fully or mostly supported the idea of a "Slavic Union" including Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.[16]

Russian-dominated Ukrainian regions and long-standing historical legacies, such as Crimea's 300-long history as a Russian territory, certainly play a role here. Thus, in opinion surveys since the 1990s Russians have consistently expressed their support for the return of Crimea to Russia in large majorities. In May 1998, for example, 77 percent supported Crimea's return to Russia (in 2002 - 80 percent, in 2008 - 85 percent, in March 2014 - 79 percent).[17] In 1994, Russians in similar numbers - 70 percent - supported defending the 25 million ethnic Russians living in other post-Soviet states;[18] the largest diaspora being located in Ukraine, in particularly in its southern and eastern regions, most of all Crimea and Donbass.

Even at the height of the present Ukrainian civil war, 63 percent of Russians retained a very favorable (13 percent) or favorable (50 percent) attitude towards citizens of Ukraine, down from 81 percent ion 2006 and 75 percent in 2009. A distinction is made between the mostly Orthodox Christian, ethnic Russian and russophone population of Crimea and Donbass (Donetsk and Lugansk/Luhanks) and the more ethnic Ukrainian and Uniate Catholic central and especially western Ukraine. Regarding Donbass, while a small minority supports the accession of Donetsk and Luhansk to Russia, a majority of Russians supports the Donbass rebels and looks upon the Donbass population more favorably than that of the rest of Ukraine, having in mind in particular the western Ukrainian provinces which are more or less hotbeds and the native land of Ukraian ultra-nationalism, neo-fascism, and hatred for Russia and 'moskals' (Muscovites, read: Russians). In 2014 80 percent expressed a good or very good attitude towards Donbassians, in 2015 - 79 percent. By contrast, only 53 and 55 percent viewed central and western Ukrainians favorably or very favorably.[19] Russians have expressed unequivocal support for the Donbass rebels and various kinds of Russian support for them, but reject Donbass's annexation, preferring an independent Donbass state (41 percent) and Donbass's autonomy within Ukraine (21 percent) to Russian annexation (15 percent) and Donbass non-autonomous status within Ukraine (7 percent).[20]

Putin's Syria Intervention

I have already dealt with the compatibility between Russian public opinion and Putin's Syria intervention elsewhere. To sum it up briefly here, a late September 2015 Levada Center survey found somewhat shaky support for Putin's Syria military intervention relative to public support expressed in surveys regarding NATO and Ukraine: 39 percent approved of Putin's policy (11 percent fully approved, 28 percent mostly), 11 percent disapproved (8 percent largely disapproved, 3 percent definitely disapproved), and 33 percent expressed no interest.[21]

The Levada Center conducted another poll from October 23-26 and found that 53 percent of respondents now approved of Russian policy in Syria, up from 39 percent a month earlier. Those who said they did not approve doubled to 22 percent from 11 percent.[22] It worth noting that it is in the age of the oft-alleged 'total media control' that a significant gap between Putin's policy and Russian opinion emerges.

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 #46
Wall Street Journal
December 4, 2015
The Perplexing Case of the Three Vladimir Putins
By STEPHEN SESTANOVICH
Stephen Sestanovich, a professor at Columbia University and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, is the author of "Maximalist: America in the World From Truman to Obama." He is on Twitter: @ssestanovich.

Six different Vladimir Putins-that's how many Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy counted in their excellent book, "Mr. Putin," in which they identified the Russian president's many personas. I counted only three on Thursday during his annual address to the Federal Assembly. But they're all important, and each has a message for Western diplomats.

The first Putin was the one who'll command the headlines-the war president exhorting the world to back his "anti-terrorism" campaign in Syria and threatening anyone who gets in his way. The money quotes in the speech were the saber-rattling references to Turkey. Mr. Putin spoke of the Turkish government as a "ruling clique"; he suggested that its leaders had lost their minds and promised further retaliation for the downing of a Russian warplane on the Syrian-Turkish border. ("They'll regret it. We know what to do.") Even by Mr. Putin's theatrical standards, this was pretty wild talk. His confrontation with Turkey is about to become more harrowing.

The second Putin was the invisible one-the war president who stirs up a crisis and then simply drops it. I waited through the entire Fidel Castro-length address, wondering whether Mr. Putin would refer to Ukraine at all. The answer was yes: at the very end, a one-sentence mention of Crimea. But about the ongoing crisis in eastern Ukraine, not a word.

Mr. Putin has not necessarily decided to call off his Ukrainian adventure. He's not conceding defeat-yet. Even so, he seems to understand that victory is out of the question. Western governments should remember this success during the next phase of the standoff between Turkey and Russia. Mr. Putin talks very tough and breaks a lot of crockery. But he knows his limits and responds to push-back.

The heart of Thursday's speech was not about war and peace but about domestic issues, especially the slowing economy. Here we saw yet another Putin-someone who neither blustered about his problems nor pretended that they don't exist. Sometimes he emphasized the bright side (talking about technical advances in Russian medicine, for example, or improved life expectancy). Yet the overall message was downbeat, even chastened. There were no promises of resumed growth; energy prices will stay low, he recognized. Mr. Putin told his audience that Russia faces massive problems of governmental corruption, especially in law enforcement. The country's economic prospects are blighted by the systematic breakup, year after year, of legitimate businesses by official bullying and intimidation.

For all the hysteria that he cultivates-Ukraine one year, Turkey the next-Mr. Putin can't ignore what's on the Russian national mind: concern about the predatory system he has built. Sooner or later, he-or his successor-will have to deal with it.

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 #47
New York Review of Books
December 3, 2015
Writing in the Kremlin's Shadow
By Masha Gessen
Masha Gessen's new book, about Tamerlan and Dzhokhar ­Tsarnaev, is The Brothers: The Road to an American Tragedy. (June 2015)
[Gessen in Facebook: "In which Moscow correspondents fall for the Kremlin. Starring Steven Lee Myers"]

Steven Lee Myers's The New Tsar: The Rise and Reign of Vladimir Putin is published by Penguin Random House.

The problem with "Walter Cronkite and the rest of them," the American correspondents in Moscow, my grandmother used to tell me, was that all they ever did was regurgitate the Soviet media. The only exception was, she said, The New York Times' Harrison Salisbury, who seemed to find sources and stories outside Pravda. My grandmother worked as the censor for foreign correspondents stationed in Moscow. She was never allowed to have direct contact with correspondents, but they loomed large in her imagination, and she in theirs. She loved Salisbury's stories because they gave her something to read, and a lot of work: whenever she encountered a passage that had not been lifted directly from a Soviet newspaper, she translated it into Russian and called it in to Stalin's secretary: decisions on what would be cut and what would be transmitted were made in the Kremlin.

Salisbury was even more inventive than my grandmother realized: after a while he devised a system for fleshing out his reporting. He would fill his dispatches with reasonable and not-so-reasonable guesses on policy and would treat the censorship process as a sort of interview: whatever was cleared for dispatch, was confirmed. Ingenious as this reporting-by-groping-in-the-dark approach was, Salisbury found it frustrating and lobbied his editors, long and unsuccessfully, to include a disclaimer with his stories, letting the readers know that his dispatches had been edited by the Soviet censor. What he never realized was that his editor was occasionally Stalin himself.

All journalists rely on the voices of their sources, but reporting from a country where access to information is highly restricted presents both special challenges and hard lessons. Traditionally, foreign reporters in Russia have relied heavily on sources who, even if they are not Joseph Stalin himself, are close to the seat of power, where information is concentrated. Even after direct censorship of foreign correspondents was abolished in the late 1950s, a variety of restrictions compelled Moscow correspondents to err on the side of official sources. During perestroika, the story was its own justification: change was largely coming from the top. Still, the best reporters took advantage of the opening to venture further and deeper into Soviet society than any of their predecessors had. "The last generation of foreign reporters in the Soviet Union was the luckiest," David Remnick, the future editor of The New Yorker, wrote about his book, Lenin's Tomb, the journalistic account of Russia to which all subsequent books in the genre were destined to be compared.

The generation of Moscow correspondents that came onto the scene  two decades later was, arguably, the least fortunate. Unlike their predecessors, who witnessed a country opening up, those who have been writing about Russia since 2000 have been forced to describe a country shutting down. It is a sad and graceless task: one's vision is continuously obscured by the very process one is trying to understand. It also has meant, to a degree unacknowledged today just as it was in Salisbury's time, a recourse again to sources in and around the Kremlin. The wars in Syria and Ukraine, the political crackdown of the last few years, the apparent accompanying rise in Putin's popularity, and even the fate of those who led or took part in the Russian protests of 2011-2012 are all topics that, in Western coverage, have largely been framed by the Kremlin, even as the reporters in question increasingly see the ancient Russian fortress as the seat of evil.

Consider the case of Steven Lee Myers's The New Tsar: The Rise and Reign of Vladimir Putin. A correspondent for The New York Times in Moscow for seven of the sixteen years that Putin has been in power in Russia, Myers has joined the ranks of authors attempting to make sense of the last decade and a half of Russian life and politics. Other recent books in this area have focused on particular aspects of Putinism: Peter Pomerantsev's Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible looked at propaganda; Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan's The Red Web focused on censorship; Karen Dawisha's Putin's Kleptocracy tracked theft and graft. Focusing on a specifically delineated story, as these authors have, provides a partial solution to the problem of unreliable and unverifiable sources-but can sometimes resemble a blind man's attempt to describe an elephant by feeling a small part of its body.

Unlike all of these books, Myers tries to tell the story of everything, from Putin's rise to power to the strange four-year interlude when Dmitry Medvedev occupied the president's chair, to the protests of 2011 and 2012 and then the Sochi Olympics and the war in Ukraine. Overall, he argues that Putin has followed a classic dictator's arc, from good intentions to ever increasing power, isolation, and aggression.

Its wide scope is both the book's strength and the source of some of its limitations. Myers places some frequently discussed events in relation to international developments that other books have left out, particularly the evolving state of Russian-American relations. This background, which was important to Myers when he wrote about Russia for a US newspaper audience, seems particularly valuable now, when so much of what the Kremlin does is inflected by Russia's relationship with the United States. For example, he reminds the reader that in 2011, during Medvedev's presidency, Russia dropped its objections to US intervention in Libya-a useful counterpoint to Putin's intransigent support for Bashar al-Assad in Syria.

But the newspaper reporter's tendency to present as facts the interpretation of events put forward by one's sources may also be the book's greatest weakness. When Myers, for example, describes the transfer of the Russian presidency from Medvedev back to Putin in 2011 and 2012, he adopts the theory-promoted by some Kremlin watchers-that there was a genuine rivalry between Putin and his more-liberal-minded protégé in which Putin ultimately triumphed, forcing Medvedev to give up the presidency without a fight. But both men claimed publicly that they had agreed on the handover of power months or years earlier-and Myers provides no persuasive evidence to convince the reader to disbelieve them. In these chapters, Myers shifts his point of view from Putin to Medvedev, writing about what the junior politician felt and believed, including impugning to him a lesser distrust "of the West, of democracy, of human nature." The reader never learns how the author knows these things. His objective correspondent's voice sounds jarring when he writes as though he could get in his characters' heads.

The problem with such speculation, even when well-informed, is that persistent repetition, in the absence of a clearly audible alternative, has a way of turning what is merely a supposition into an accepted story, heard as fact. Listening continuously and predominantly to sources in and around the Kremlin has produced a number of such widely accepted but uncorroborated stories. Some of them are fairly innocuous, but others stand in the way of a deeper understanding of Russian life and politics. Myers opens the book with a highly detailed description of a 1941 battle on the Neva River, near Leningrad, in which Vladimir Spiridonovich Putin, the future father of the future president, was wounded:

"His orders seemed suicidal. He was to reconnoiter the German positions and, if possible, capture a 'tongue,' slang for a soldier to interrogate....There was no choice but to obey. He and another soldier approached a foxhole along a dug-in front, carved with trenches, pocked with shell craters, stained with blood. A German suddenly rose, surprising all three of them. For a frozen moment, nothing happened. The German reacted first, unpinned a grenade and tossed it. It landed near Putin, killing his comrade and riddling his own legs with shrapnel. The German soldier escaped, leaving Putin for dead."

Vladimir Putin Senior has been dead for sixteen years and there is no known record of his recounting the story of the battle. Instead, Myers relies on the Russian state news agency RIA and on the younger Vladimir Putin's authorized biography for the details. These are the instruments of myth-making, and they deserve to be examined as such, but Myers puts them forward as fact.

Propaganda is most effective when it succeeds in imposing its language and framing on events. Myers is certainly no Putin apologist-he does not mean the word "tsar" in any way that could be construed as complimentary. Yet the later pages of his book are, sadly, replete with examples of just how well Kremlin propaganda works. When Myers describes Putin's campaign against protesters in 2012, he writes, "One wanted activist, Leonid Razvozzhayev, fled to Ukraine but was arrested there by masked agents and returned to Moscow, where he claimed he had been kidnapped and tortured." In fact, Russian law enforcement has no right to make an arrest outside of Russia, so any such incident in Ukraine was a kidnapping-yet the way this sentence is structured suggests that Razvozzhayev's "arrest" is a fact while his kidnapping is merely a "claim."

In another instance, Myers acknowledges that the mass protests in 2011 and 2012 involved people across Russia, from all social and economic backgrounds-a reality that was well documented by researches in Russia (the Levada Center) and outside of it (Mischa Gabowitsch at the Einstein Institute in Potsdam). But then he proceeds to use Kremlin tropes about the protesters, referring to them as the "disgruntled elites." Myers also adopts the Kremlin's classification of "systemic" (meaning, integrated into government institutions) and "nonsystemic" (meaning, shut out by the Kremlin) opposition. Quite apart from the problematic distinction this phrasing implies-between a sort of civilized, integrated opposition and the wild people out in the streets-the use of "opposition" is itself a misnomer because the word implies a level of organization and visibility impossible in today's Russia.

The Kremlin's efforts to shape the telling of events work in counter-intuitive ways. We may think of propaganda affecting mostly a domestic Russian media audience-and it does, but that audience has the option of shutting off the television and shrugging off the news. Moscow correspondents are not so lucky. They have to work with the available information, and if they conclude that the best and most important sources of information are those who hold the most of it, then they subject themselves to a constant barrage of propaganda. It may be that no amount of critical thinking is sufficient to counter the misleading or misinformed intentions of their sources: not only facts but also frames and basic assumptions must be questioned. But if nothing can be trusted, how can anything be used?

Harrison Salisbury was acutely aware of this problem. In his letters, he constantly complained of deteriorating as a reporter and warned his editors that his "news sense is not as sharp as it should be." He asked for an outside perspective and in 1950 requested a leave of absence in order to air out his head. His editors were not particularly helpful on either count. Salisbury may have been more humble and more given to self-doubt than present-day correspondents. Or he may have been helped by the fact that his communication with the Kremlin occurred by way of an intermediary-my grandmother-and even she hid behind a curtain. He may thus have been spared the seductive sense of self-importance that access to the inner circle-or to those who claim to have access to the inner circle-can confer, especially in a society where everything, including access, is closing down.

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 #48
Remarks by Stephen F. Cohen
Professor Emeritus Princeton University and New York University
At San Francisco Commonwealth Club
(Adapted from the audio)
November 18, 2015
 
I am delighted to be here in San Francisco with you. The farther you go from Washington and the mainstream media, the better introductions you get!
Some of you may know that the small group of us who have been protesting against the American policy since the Ukraine crisis began two years ago have been described in harsh and derogatory language as "Putin's apologists, Putin's useful idiots and Putin's best friends in America."

Paris should have changed everything but for these people it hasn't. I clicked on the Internet this morning and there it was again.  So let me begin with a word about myself.

My answer to these charges is that, "No,  I .... not you, am a patriot of American national security,"  And I actually have been since I started studying Russia about 50 years ago.  I started out in Kentucky and then went to Indiana University, and old friends here today can testify that I was doing this many years ago.  Along the way I came to a conviction, exactly how and why doesn't matter that American national security runs through Moscow.  It means that an American President must have a partner in the Kremlin--- not a friend, but a partner.  This was true when the Soviet  Union existed, and this is true today.

And it is true whichever existential or grave world threat you may emphasize. For some people it is climate change, for others it is human rights, for some it is the spread of democracy.  For me, for quite a while, it has been the new kind of terrorism that afflicts the world today.  These terrorists are no longer "non-state actors."  These guys are organized, they have an army, they have a self-professed state, they have ample funds and they have the ability to hurt us gravely in many parts of the world.  Everyone seems to have forgotten 9-11 and Boston, but Paris should have reminded us of what's at stake.
 
So for me, international terrorism is the threat in the world today that should be America's national security priority. And I mean it should be the top priority for the President of the United States whether he or she is a Republican or Democrat.  It is the existential threat represented by a combination of this new kind of terrorism, religious, ethnic, zealous civil wars--and, still worse, these guys desperately want the raw materials for making weapons of mass destruction.  A cup of radioactive material in those planes on 9-11 would have made lower Manhattan uninhabitable even today.

Terrorists today are using conventional weapons, bombs, mortars and guns.  But if they had cup of this radioactive material in Paris, Paris would have needed to be evacuated.  This is the real threat today.  This kind of threat cannot be diminished, contained, still less eradicated unless we have a partner in the Kremlin.  That is the long and short of it; note again I didn't say a "friend,"  but a partner.  Nixon and Clinton went on about their dear friend Brezhnev and their friend Yeltsin;  it was all for show.  I don't care whether we like the Kremlin leader or not; what we need is recognition of our common interests for a partnership---the way two people in business make a contract. They have the same interests and they have to trust each other--because if one person violates the agreement, then the other person's interests are harmed.

We don't have this with Russia, even after Paris, and this is essentially what I've been saying we need for the past several years.  In return people say that my view is "pro-Putin" and unpatriotic, to which I say, "No, this is the very highest form of patriotism in regard to American national security."

So I will make a few points today, very briefly and rather starkly, rather than give a lecture.  I'm less interested in lecturing than in finding out what others here have to say.  

My first point is this:  The chance for a durable Washington-Moscow strategic partnership was lost in the 1990 after the Soviet Union ended.  Actually it began to be lost earlier, because it was Reagan and Gorbachev who gave us the opportunity for a strategic partnership between 1985-89.  And it certainly ended under the Clinton Administration, and it didn't end in Moscow. It ended in Washington -- it was squandered and lost in Washington.  And it was lost so badly that today, and for at least the last several years (and I would argue since the Georgian war in 2008), we have literally been in a new Cold War with Russia.  Many people in politics and in the media don't want to call it this, because if they admit, "Yes, we are in a Cold War," they would have to explain what they were doing during the past 20 years.  So they instead say, "No, it is not a Cold War."

Here is my next point.  This new Cold War has all of the potential to be even more dangerous than the preceding forty-year Cold War, for several reasons. First of all, think about it.  The epicenter of the earlier Cold War was in Berlin, not close to Russia.  There was a vast buffer zone between Russia and the West in Eastern Europe. Today, the epicenter is in Ukraine, literally on Russia's borders.  It was the Ukrainian conflict that set this off, and politically Ukraine remains a ticking time bomb.  Today's confrontation is not only on Russia's borders, but it's in the heart of Russian-Ukrainian "Slavic civilization."  This is a civil war as profound in some ways as was America's Civil War.

Many Ukrainian antagonists were raised in the same faith, speak the same language and are intermarried. Does anyone know how many Russian and Ukrainian intermarriages there are today?  Millions. Nearly all of their families are intermixed. This continues to be a ticking time bomb that can cause a lot more damage and even greater dangers.  The fact that it is right on Russia's border, and in effect right in the middle of the Russian/Ukrainian soul ... or at least half of Ukraine's soul .... since the half of Ukraine yearns to be in Western Europe, this makes it even more dangerous.

My next point and still worse:  You will remember that after the Cuban Missile Crisis, Washington and Moscow developed certain rules-of -mutual conduct. They saw how dangerously close they had come to a nuclear war, so they adopted "No-Nos,' whether they were encoded in treaties or in unofficial understandings. Each side knew where the other's red line was.  Both sides tripped over them on occasion but immediately pulled back because there was a mutual understanding that there were red lines.  TODAY THERE ARE NO RED LINES.  One of the things that Putin and his predecessor President Medvedev, keep saying to Washington is:  You are crossing our Red Lines!  And Washington said and continues to say, "You don't have any red lines. We have red lines and we can have all the bases we want around your borders, but you can't have bases in Canada or Mexico."  Your red lines don't exist."  This clearly illustrates that today there are no mutual rules of conduct.

In recent years, for example there have already been three proxy wars between the United States and Russia;  Georgia in 2008, Ukraine beginning in 2014, and prior to Paris .... it appeared Syria would be the third.  We don't know yet what position Washington is going to take on Syria.  Hollande made his decision; he declared a coalition with Russia.  Washington as they understand in Russia, "is silent or opposed to a coalition with Moscow."

Another important point:  Today there is absolutely no organized anti-Cold War or Pro-Detente political force or movement in the United States at all--not in our political parties, not in the White house, not in the State Department, not in the mainstream media, not in the universities or the "think tanks."  I see a colleague here, nodding her head, because we remember when, in the 1970s through the 1980s, we had allies even in the White House, among aides of the President. We had allies in the State Department, and we had Senators and Members of the House who were pro-detente and who supported us, who spoke out themselves and listened carefully to our points of view.  None of this exists today.  Without this kind of openness and advocacy in a democracy, what can we do?  We can't throw bombs to get attention; we can't get printed in mainstream media, we can't be heard across the country.  This lack of debate in our society is exceedingly dangerous.

My next point is a question: Who is responsible for this new Cold War?  I don't ask this question because I want to point a finger at anyone.  I am interested in a change in U.S. policy that can only come from the White House, although Congress could help. But we need to know what went wrong with the U.S.-Russia relationship after the end of the Soviet Union in 1991, and why.... or there won't be any new thinking.  And there will be no new policy. At this point, there is no new thinking in the American political-media establishment.  There is a lot of new thinking in the European Parliament.  There is a lot of angst in the French media and in Germany and in the Netherlands and even Cameron in London is rethinking.

The position of the current American political media establishment is that this new Cold War is all Putin's fault--all of it, everything. We in America didn't do anything wrong. At every stage, we were virtuous and wise and Putin was aggressive and a bad man. And therefore, what's to rethink?  Putin has to do all of the rethinking, not us.

I disagree.  And this is what has brought the outrageous attacks down on me and my colleagues.  I was raised in Kentucky on the adage,  "There are two sides to every story."  And these people are saying, "No to this story, the history of Russian and American relations, there is only one side.  There is no need to see any of it through the other side's eyes.  Just get out there and repeat the "conventional mainstream establishment narrative."  If we continue doing this, and don't address the existing situation, we are going to have another "Paris" and not only in the United States.

This is why I say we must be patriots of America's national security and rethink everything.  For whatever reason, the Clinton Administration declared a "winner-takes-all policy" toward Post-Soviet Russia.  It said,  "We won the Cold War."  This isn't true. Former Ambassador to Moscow Jack Matlock during the Reagan-Gorbachev era, explains in his books what happened as he stood by Reagan's side at every step of the negotiations with Gorbachev.  The reality is that the Clinton administration adopted unwise policies in its winner-take-all approach. What were the consequences of these policies?  There were a lot of consequences.  The worst was, it blew the chance for a strategic partnership with Russia at a turning point moment in history.

The four U.S. policies that have most offended Russia and still offend them today are obviously the following:

1)  The decision to expand NATO right to Russia's borders:  It's nonsense when we say Putin has violated the Post-Cold War order of Europe. Russia was excluded from the post-Cold War order of Europe by NATO's expansion.  Russia was pushed "somewhere out there" (beyond a zone of security).  Russia kept saying, "Let's do a Pan European Security Arrangement like Gorbachev and Reagan proposed."  The NATO-expanders said, "This is not military, this is about democracy and free trade, it's going to be good for Russia, swallow your poison with a smile."  And when the Russians had no choice in the 1990s, they did; but when they grew stronger and had a choice, they no longer stood by silently.

Russia started pushing back, as any Russian leader would have done who was sober and had the support his own country.  I don't say this as a joke.  By the end, Yeltsin could barely walk.  He was pushed out of the presidency, he didn't resign voluntarily.  But the point is, anyone could have predicted this situation back in the 1990s--and some of us did so, often and as loudly as we were permitted.

2)  The refusal on the part of the  United States to negotiate on missile defense: Missile defense is now a NATO project.  That means missile defense installations, whether on land or sea (sea is more dangerous) are now part of NATO expansion and its encirclement of Russia.  Missile defense is part of the same military system.  Russians are absolutely convinced that it is targeted at their nuclear retaliatory capabilities.  We say, "Oh no, it's about Iran, it's not about you."  But go talk to Ted Postel at MIT.  He explains that latter-stage missile defense is an offensive weapon that can hit Russia's installations.  It also violates the IMF Agreement because it can fire cruise missiles. Meanwhile we are accusing Russia of developing cruise missiles again; and they have begun doing so again because we are back in an unnecessary tit-for-tat arms race for the first time in many years.

3)  Meddling in Russia's internal affairs in the name of democracy promotion:  In addition to funding the National Endowment for Democracy's "opposition politics" programs across Russia and Ukraine--are you aware that when Medvedev was President of Russia and Ms. Clinton and Michael McFaul had their wondrous "reset" (which was a rigged diplomatic game if you looked at the terms of it), that Vice President  Biden went to Moscow State University and said that Putin should not return to the presidency.  He then said it directly to Putin's face.  Imagine, Putin comes here in the next few weeks and tells Rubio or Clinton they should drop out of the U.S. presidential race!

Are there any red lines left anymore when it comes to our behavior toward Russia.  Do we have the right to say or do anything we wish?  This extends to everything, and it certainly extends to politics.  The White House simply can't keep its mouth shut, being egged on by vested anti-Russian lobbies and mainstream media.  We all believe in democracy, but like it or not, we will not be able to impose democracy on Russia; and if we could, we might not like the democratic outcomes that might result.

So ask yourself, is there a Russian position that needs to be carefully thought through in the aftermath of Paris?  And does Russia have any legitimate interests in the world at all?  And if so, what are they?  What about their borders?  Do they have legitimate interests in Syria?  

4)  My last point is a prescriptive hope (until Paris, I didn't think there was much hope at all). Now there is still a chance to achieve the lost partnership with Russia, at least in three realms.

*  Ukraine:  You know what the Minsk Accords are. They were formulated by Angela Merkel, Francois Hollande,  Ukraine's President Poroshenko and President Putin.  They call for a negotiated end to the civil war in Ukraine.  They recognize that the conflict has been primarily a civil war and only secondarily a matter of Russian aggression.  I don't care what American mainstream media says--this has been basically a Ukrainian civil war.  To put an end to that civil war would be exceedingly security-building today.

*  Syria: before Paris I thought there was almost no chance for an American coalition with Russia.  Part of it .... and I'm not big on psychological analyses, but at least in part it was due to Obama's mind-fix about Putin.  He resents him and speaks out about him in ways that are not helpful.  But with Paris and Hollande announcing that there is now a French-Russian coalition, with Germany agreeing, and I would say almost all of Western Europe is on board, there is a chance, but only if the White House seizes the opportunity.  We will see very soon.

*  The false idea that the nuclear threat ended with the Soviet Union:  In fact, the threat became more diverse and difficult. This is something the political elite forgot. It was another disservice of the Clinton Administration (and to a certain extent the first President Bush in his re-election campaign) saying that the nuclear dangers of the preceding Cold War era no longer existed after 1991. The reality is that the threat grew, whether by inattention or accident, and is now more dangerous than ever.

Last year, in an unwise pique of anger, Russia withdrew from the Nunn-Lugar Initiative which you may remember was one of the wisest pieces of legislation that Congress ever passed.  In the 1990s, we gave Russia money to lock down and secure their materials for making weapons of mass destruction. In addition we paid salaries to their scientists who knew how to make and use these materials and who might otherwise have gone to Syria, Yemen or the Caucasus to sell their knowledge in order to employ themselves. Russia did withdraw but said it wants to renegotiate Nunn-Lugar on different terms.  The White House has refused.  After Paris, one hopes that Obama picked up the phone and said, "I'm sending someone over, let's get this done."

Unfortunately, today's reports seem to indicate that the White House and State Department are thinking primarily how to counter Russia's actions in Syria. They are worried, it was reported, that Russia is diminishing America's leadership in the world.

HERE IS THE BOTTOM LINE:  We in the United States cannot lead the world alone any longer, if we ever could.  Long before Paris, globalization and other developments have occurred that ended the mono-polar, US-dominated world.  That world is over.  A multi-polar world has emerged before our eyes, not just in Russia but in five or six capitals around the world.  Washington's stubborn refusal to embrace this new reality has become part of the problem and not part of the solution.  This is where we are today .... even after Paris.

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