#2
Moscow Times
November 23, 2015
Russians Fear Clashes With Islamic State More Than With NATO - Poll

Nearly one in five Russians believe their country could become the site of "major clashes" with NATO forces within the next decade, a recent poll indicates.

According to the poll, 19 percent of respondents said battles against NATO were possible on Russian territory.

An even higher number, 28 percent, think that battles between Russian and NATO forces could occur outside of Russia's borders during the next decade, a survey released on Saturday by the independent Levada Center pollster indicated.

About half of respondents for both questions said such conflicts were unlikely, while the rest were undecided.

The possibility of battles with Islamic State militants was considered more likely by Russians.

"Major clashes" taking place overseas between the Russian army and Islamic State were viewed as a possible development by 59 percent of respondents, the poll indicated.

Battles against Islamic State within Russia were considered possible by 33 percent, Levada reported.

Some Russians also feared an armed conflict with China. Major clashes with Chinese forces beyond Russia's borders were viewed as possible by 13 percent of respondents, while clashes within Russian territory were viewed as possible by 11 percent, the poll indicated.

The poll was conducted on Nov. 13-16 among 800 adults in 134 cities and towns around Russia, and gave a margin of error of no more than 4.1 percentage points.

Islamic State is a terrorist organization banned in Russia.

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 #3
Interfax
November 21, 2015
Western sanctions cost Russia 1.5% of GDP - Alexei Kudrin

Russia's GDP would have been 1.5 percent higher if sanctions had not been imposed against Moscow, former Russian Finance Minister and Committee of Civil Initiatives Chairman Alexei Kudrin has said, pointing out that no positive effect from the sanctions has been seen in any industry.

"The sanctions have considerably complicated the situation in the country. The GDP is 1.5% lower that it would have been without them. The devaluation which took place is partially caused by the oil and partially by sanctions," Kudrin told reporters on Nov. 21.

In several industries with due account of the devaluation they would have been helpful, but still "the results are lacking or are in an embryo state," he said.

"According to the estimates of the military, some import substitution has already been conducted in the weapons production. But I do not see this, this is not reflected in the economic figures. In other industries this does not happen, even in agriculture," Kudrin said.

In agriculture the lack of development is caused by other reasons, including the difficult access to credits and the regulation of the sphere, but the positive effect from sanctions is presently not seen in any sphere, the former minister said.

Kudrin also said that the current economic situation in Russia is worse than that during the 2008-2009 crisis, and the measures the government is taking to improve it are insufficient.

"The Russian economy is seeing a hard year, and unlike the 2008-2009 crises, the people's real incomes have been declining for the first time since the early 2000s," Kudrin said at a civil forum in Moscow on Saturday. "The measures the government is taking to support the economy and the people are insufficient, in my view," Kudrin added.

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#4
Interfax
November 21, 2015
Former Russian Finance Minister calls for reform of political system, NGO laws

Former Russian Finance Minister and leader of the Civil Initiatives Forum (OGF) Aleksey Kudrin, has called for a series of initiatives to reform the Russian electoral and political system, privately-owned Russian news agency Interfax reported on 21 November.

Kudrin said the OGF was concentrating on working with civil society and was not ready to form a political party, Interfax reported.

"I'm not ready to set up something myself, I'm working with civil society at the moment," Kudrin said. "I think that this is a base, a future foundation, in part for a structured platform and position which in the end will be represented by a party."

Kudrin said he support the efforts of citizens who are ready to work in the political sphere and be engaged in creating their own parties.

"I think the current authorities are restricting political movement. This limits the possibilities of representation of certain forces in parliament. There should be political life, and I hope that in future, political activity will get more open," he said.

"Our forum is not a political event, we are building our work on a non-party basis," Kudrin said, state-owned TASS news agency reported the same day. "But we are not indifferent to the formation of our political system. We cannot agree with that viewpoint that there can only be one (viewpoint), and it is the most correct, exclusive position for all issues," he said at the third OGF forum.

An initiative entitled "Proposals", presented to forum representatives, says the OGF notes the "degradation of the Russian electoral system, reflected most of all in the restriction of citizens' voting rights".

The problem has got worse since the OGF's last forum a year ago, the document said.

The OGF proposes changing the norms which have increased the number of signatures required for registration of candidates to 3 per cent of the number of voters in an electoral district, back to just 0.5 per cent as it was in 2012. It also called for the refunding of candidates' cash deposits at elections at all levels, and either getting rid of, or at least lowering, the so-called municipal filter for the election of governors.

The OGF also called for a change in Russia's legislation on non-governmental organizations, state-owned RIA Novosti news agency reported that day. In particular, it said the so-called "NGO foreign agent law", should be changed, proposing such organizations should be re-classified as "foreign lobbying", and a moratorium be introduced on use of the foreign agent law until changes are made in the legislation.
 

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 #5
Wall Street Journal
November 21, 2015
Russian Corporate Bonds' Unlikely Winning Ways
They are the best performing in the emerging markets in 2015, Citigroup says
By RICHARD BARLEY

From adversity comes opportunity. But given the degree of adversity facing Russia at the end of 2014-sanctions over Ukraine, plummeting oil prices, a collapsing currency-it is surprising quite how much of an investment opportunity it has turned out to be this year.

Russian corporate bonds are the best performing in the emerging markets in 2015, Citigroup notes, with a total return year-to-date of 24%. That is despite Russia being downgraded to junk status, a recession and ongoing turbulence in oil and the ruble.

Part of the reason is that markets panicked right at the end of 2014: Russian corporate bonds were thus extremely cheap as 2015 started, having lost 12.1% in the previous year. Sanctions have helped bondholders too, as issuance from Russia has been extremely limited, creating scarcity value for existing bonds. Russian companies have weathered a sudden stop in financing remarkably well. Meanwhile, worst-case scenarios around Russian geopolitical risk haven't played out.

The Russian central bank won plaudits too from investors more generally as it proved willing to slam interest rates up to 17% to avert a ruble meltdown, helping to generate credibility.

A trickle of corporate issuance has started to emerge now, and has rewarded buyers. Norilsk Nickel's $1 billion bond, sold in early October, has risen by three points already; a €1 billion issue from Gazprom is up four points.

Russian corporate bonds still offer a decent yield premium. But opportunities like 2015's are one-time affairs. Russian markets already have come in from the cold: a further windfall is unlikely.

 #6
Most critical phase in Russia's banking sector development is over - Sberbank CEO

BERLIN, November 23. /TASS/. The most critical phase in Russia's banking sector development is over, Chief Executive Officer of Russia's Sberbank said in an interview with German's Handelsblatt published on Monday.

"We were in a veritable crisis, but the most critical phase is over," Gref said.

The bank managed to adapt to the situation, he said responding to the question regarding the impact of Western sanctions on Sberbank's operations.

"We have now weathered the worst, and the situation has normalized completely," Sberbank CEO added.

Meanwhile, Sberbank believes the situation in Russia's banking sector is a large-scale crisis, Gref said earlier. The next year will also be a challenging one, the banker said.

Sberbank is working very closely with Asian partners, Gref said. "Now we are borrowing money primarily in China, though not as much as we would like to... And if the sanctions continue, we will have no alternative to China," he added.

Sberbank's profits "will be down by 25 to 30% this year," the banker said. "However, we will certainly be more profitable in 2016 than today," he added.

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 #7
Forbes.com
November 23, 2015
Oops, Russia Recession Not Done Yet
By Kenneth Rapoza

Russia's economy is through being difficult, despite investors pricing in a recovery for some time now.

While the fundamentals are improving, meaning they are not contracting as much as they once were, Russia's fourth quarter GDP numbers are sure to show an economy still in decline. Russia hasn't hit zero yet, even if it has indeed bottomed out.

October economic data was mixed in Russia. On the one hand, industrial production is improving. But on the other, consumer data is deteriorating. Net-net this points to further downside risk for fourth quarter growth following stabilization in the third, Barclays Capital's Daniel Hewitt says in London.

Industrial production has improved for five months straight to -3.4% year over  year, from the bottom of -5.4% in May. The improvement in yearly IP reflects base effects rather than an increase in production. IP has simply stopped declining, but Russian manufacturers have not yet started to improve. Demand is subdued, but not horrific.

Manufacturing PMI increased to the neutral zone of 50.

Finally, investment has been improving for three months to -5.2% yearly, from the July bottom of -8.5%. "Profits are running at a better level in 2015 compared to 2014, and investment seems to be stabilizing," says Hewitt. "The data suggest that production has adjusted to the worse economic circumstances and is starting to benefit from improved incentives due to currency weakness overcoming declining oil prices."

Central Banker Elivira Nabiullina has pulled of a yeoman's job in maintaining market confidence in the ruble, but foreign and domestic. The ruble is now at 64 to the dollar, one of its strongest levels in months despite oil prices in the low $40s.

The problem is also on the consumer side. The weaker ruble isn't keeping Russians happy. Prices also remain high. Inflation is over 14%.

October consumption data indicates further declines in retail demand. For households, the further declines in global oil prices leading to additional fiscal adjustments and currency weaknesses are still being incorporated into their spending patterns.

Plus, the decline in real wages accelerated to -10.9% on the year, worst than consensus. The freeze on public sector wages combined with ongoing inflation led to further declines in real wages.

The drop in real sales accelerated to -11.7% annually in October. It's now below the worst decline rate seen in 2009, when it fell 9.4% in September. It's also approaching the 1998 ruble crisis lows.

Rising unemployment will keep the headwinds blowing across Russia this winter.

Russia's government policy has been oriented towards having households bear the brunt of the economic adjustments from lower oil prices and sanctions.  Although GDP stabilized in the third quarter, Russia's economy is not out of the woods yet.

Sberbank, Russia's largest commercial bank, said in September that it believed the country had pulled out of its recession in the third quarter thanks to a 0.01% growth in quarterly GDP numbers. Barclays think that number over zero is unlikely to hold.

Hewitt told clients in a note on Thursday that lower oil prices and ruble weakness will push real GDP about -0.8% lower in the fourth.  Even so, this still leads to slightly better growth in 2015 of -3.7%, compared with their previous forecast of -4.0%. Hewitt has retained his growth forecasts for 2016 at flat (0%) and for 2017 at 1.9% based on rising oil prices in those years and not because of any huge structural improvements on the ground.

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 #8
www.rt.com
November 23, 2015
Russian stock market hits highest level since spring 2008

The ruble-traded MICEX is at its highest level in seven years. The impetus appears to come from Russia and the West uniting in their efforts to fight ISIS in the Middle East. Traders are betting that the recent rapprochement may lead to the lifting of sanctions against Moscow.

The MICEX got as high as 1865 points, and as of 5:30pm Moscow time the index had slid back to 1,858, but is still up 33 percent this year.

The dollar-denominated RTS Index has hit 900 points for the first time since July. RTS has risen six percent since the beginning of November. Overall, the index is more than 13 percent up this year.

Brian Jacobsen, who manages $242 billion at Wells Fargo Advantage Funds, says that recent rapprochement between President Vladimir Putin and the West makes it a good opportunity to invest in Russian stocks.

"This could be a turning point in the relationship between Russia and the West. We need some time to see how things unravel, but the timing might be right," Jacobsen told Bloomberg in an interview.

"The conflict in Ukraine abated, a decline in oil stabilized, we might see sanctions being lifted. So if you combine all these factors, we could see a good valuation opportunity," the chief strategist added.

In 2014, Jacobsen was pessimistic about the Russian economy and suggested avoiding doing business with Moscow. At that time plummeting oil prices pushed the world's biggest energy exporter into crisis.

Last week, US investment bank Goldman Sachs advised to buy the ruble next year. According to Goldman estimates, the Russian currency will be among the best performers along with the US dollar and Mexican peso.

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 #9
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
November 19, 2015
Three urban legends about Russian business people
A Skolkovo professor dispels some myths about doing business with Russians.
By Moty Cristal
Moty Cristal is Professor of Professional Practice in Negotiation Dynamics at the Skolkovo Moscow School of Management

There is a clear distinction between business in Russia and business with Russians. When people say, "doing business in Russia", usually they have in mind a very old Soviet structure, very centralized government holdings, that actually doesn't allow any free choice or doesn't allow any Western capitalistic development of opportunities, and this is far from being the case in today's economy.

Doing business with Russians

Most of the executive positions in the private sector, and many of the top posts in the government and the government-owned companies are held by young generation Russians, people between the age of 25 and 45. This is a generation that grew up in times of economic prosperity, under a market that offers a lot of opportunities. And from my experience, I find the new generation of young Russian entrepreneurs as being extremely curious, extremely open. They are to some extent nationalistic and are proud to be part of the 'Rodina', or the motherland. They want to do business in Russia or develop the Russian private sector. At the same time they have cultural awareness for the need to compete in the global markets. In other words, in order to bring to life the Russian spirit, the Russian entrepreneurship and the Russian creativity, they need to act on a global level, which requires adopting international business norms, not only negotiations.

There are several wrong perceptions about Russian business people, but they can be broadly classified into three Urban Legends.

Legend 1: All Russians are KGB agents

This is like saying every American who understands a little bit about foreign policy works for the CIA or that every Israeli is a Mossad agent.

Not all Russians are KGB agents, and the intelligence agencies actually stay away from the business sector. If someone doesn't have a very solid business experience, doesn't understand business opportunities or how the supply chain works, you could be suspicious about him. However, the assumption that all Russians are KGB agents is far from reality. Some people benefit from creating an impression that they have links to intelligence agencies, as this may give them an aura of power while negotiating with a business counterpart.

Legend 2: Russians are tough

Russians are not tough if you know how to deal with them. The facade of toughness usually is a communication methodology, which has proven to be very successful when Russians deal with Russians. But when Russians deal with non-Russians, they know that their 'vlast', or 'sila', which are the words for 'authority' and 'force', may work against their benefit.

The very famous Russian 'net', which is 'no', is slowly developed to 'well, basically no, but let's see what we can do about it.' I think this is a significant improvement in the way Russians negotiate.

Young executives are much more open not to say no at the beginning, and try to understand and in a Harvard manner, and try to seek common ground. Working globally, I would argue that Chinese are much tougher than Russians and still reflect this power mentality when they come to do business and to negotiate.

Legend 3: Russians don't have or share emotions

Once, after finishing a very long educational project, I stood next to the vice-president of a big industrial company, and asked him, "Dmitry, are you finally happy?" He smiled and said, "Moty, I'm Russian. I cannot be happy. I'm satisfied." And when I tell this anecdote, all my Russian audiences and students start to laugh, because it really reflects this Russian habit to hide emotions behind the poker face or behind a cold face. But this is far from being the truth.

Russians have feelings like any business people. They hate, they love, they're enthusiastic, they're anxious. The important thing is to attach, or get connected to the individual and to the emotion. How do you do it? You do it through informal meetings, informal gatherings, through relationship building.

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#10
Forbes.com
November 23, 2015
Russia's Foreign Trade Is Falling Fast, But It's Still Balanced
By Mark Adomanis

Over the past few weeks, the general tenor of Russian economic coverage, while hardly rosy, seems to have gotten just a little bit better. There was a modest rally in US-traded Russian equities. Large fund managers (like Wells Fargo and its $242 billion) are tentatively dipping their toes back in the water, moving to a "mildly overweight" position on Russian stocks for the first time since 2014. Russian credit default swaps are even getting a bit cheaper, recently hitting their lowest level since October 2014 (before oil prices and the ruble collapsed).

Calling this a "rally," seems a bit of a reach: the primary reason that investors are looking at Russia with renewed interest is because Russian assets are incredibly cheap. But with investor sentiment moving in a positive direction there's generally less of the apocalypticism that has been a near-constant ever since Russia annexed Crimea and started an ill-disguised war in the Donbass.

But investor sentiment and real economic performance don't always march in lockstep. Perhaps the (tentative!) move back towards Russia on the part of Western investors reflects "irrational exuberance" more than it does a genuine improvement in any important indicator.

As always, it helps to look at the numbers. Rosstat, Russia's state statistical service, recently released new information on foreign trade from January-September. In my humble view, the data reflect an economy that took a really sharp downward hit early in the year but that has (mostly!) stabilized over the past few months.

In the January-September period Russia's dollar-denominated exports were down by a total of 31.5%. The decline was paced by a 42.7%(!) drop in the dollar value of oil exports. Over the same January-September time frame domestic oil production had actually increased by 1.4% and the physical volume of oil exports grew by more than 8%. The sharp and sustained drop in prices that started in October and accelerated through November and December, though, made this larger volume of exports worth a whole lot less. Natural gas exports were also hit relatively hard in dollar terms, falling 28.6% on a year-over-year basis.

From January through September, Russian imports were down even more, falling by 38.2%. Hardest hit were "automobiles, equipment, and other means of transports" which declined by a whopping 42.7%.

The first nine months of 2015 saw particularly sharp declines in bilateral trade with Spain, Latvia, Poland, the United Kingdom, France, and the Czech Republic. Russian trade with China, Japan, India, Turkey and (interestingly) the United States held up marginally better.

As should be clear, nothing that has been outlined above is "good" and it seems obvious that a country would prefer not to experience what Russia did, namely a 34% year-over-year decline in its total foreign trade turnover. That's painful and wrenching and it has all number of (nasty) consequences for Russian consumers.

But what the Rosstat data also show is that Russia's economy, commonly described a plodding Soviet dinosaur, somehow adapted to the new reality of cheap oil really quickly. Despite a more than 40% drop in the value of it oil export earnings, Russia has still managed to run a current account surplus throughout 2015. That's not what you would expect from a "petrostate" that had grown fat and complacent on oil money and cheap imports. It's certainly not what's currently happening to Saudi Arabia, where the government is burning through cash at a prodigious rate as it desperately attempts to avoid a currency depreciation.

"Stable" doesn't' mean "strong" or "rapidly growing," but in late 2015 Russia's economy seems to have adjusted to a new normal in which its energy exports are much less valuable. Russia, in other words, is not buying more than it can afford: unlike other major energy producers it's not running up unsustainable current account deficits in order to placate the population and defer the pain of economic adjustment.
 

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 #11
Moscow Times
November 21, 2015
Russian Justice Ministry Report on NGO Memorial Heads to Court
By Joanna Kozlowska

The Justice Ministry report accusing the rights group Memorial of "undermining the constitutional order and calling for the overthrow of the Russian government," following the ministry's inspection of the NGO's activities and dated Oct. 30, has been sent to a magistrates' court in Moscow's Tverskoy district, the RIA Novosti news agency reported Friday.

The ministry alleged that the organization's statute was in breach of Russian law; a protocol of administrative violation was also drawn up which said that Memorial had failed to submit all necessary documents for inspection.

Memorial board chairman and co-founder Arseny Roginsky wrote a letter to Justice Minister Alexander Konovalov on Thursday, urging him to review the case and revoke the accusations, according to a copy of the letter posted on Memorial's website.

In particular, Roginsky rejected the report's claims that the NGO had been "calling for the overthrow of the current government and for changing the country's political regime," which - according to Kommersant - referred to Memorial's criticism of the conflict in Ukraine and of sentences dealt out to activists involved in the Bolotnaya Square protests in May 2012.

"Such [inspection reports] damage not only the civil society organizations which they target. They undermine trust in your ministry, and more importantly, in the constitution. This is dangerous," Roginsky said in the letter.

The group was previously put on a list of organizations labelled as "foreign agents." The term, which in Russian is strongly suggestive of cold-war era espionage, is applied to civil society groups receiving foreign donations and deemed to engage in loosely defined "political activity."

A working group under Russia's presidential administration has vowed to clarify what should be regarded as political activity, following criticism from the presidential human rights council that said the term should not encompass "the shaping of public opinion," the Kommersant newspaper said in a separate report Friday.

According to Kommersant, officials from the justice ministry have recently proposed that the "foreign agent" law be amended, and the term rephrased as "NGOs pursuing political goals."

In the same report, Kommersant wrote that the presidential administration is presently engaged in a review of NGO legislation, and has recently laid out the eligibility conditions for tax breaks and donations from the state budget.

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 #12
www.opendemocracy.net
November 23, 2015
Truthiness in Russia
What we're missing from the propaganda debate: how state propaganda feeds off and enhances public sentiment.
By Nelli Babayan
Nelli Babayan is Fellow at the Transatlantic Academy, German Marshall Fund US and Associate Fellow at the Center for Transnational, Foreign and Security Policy at Freie Universit�t Berlin. Her latest book is Democratic Transformation and Obstruction: EU, US, and Russia in the South Caucasus. Find her on Twitter @nellibabayan

As opinion polls show, Russian propaganda is not effective in improving Russia's image abroad. The situation is dramatically different inside Russia, where most popular media outlets seem to operate based on the concept of 'truthiness': preferring concepts or facts one wishes to be true rather than the concepts or facts known to be true.

According to Stephen Colbert 'truthiness is tearing apart' the United States since at least 2005. In Russia, state-sponsored truthiness has actually had a unifying and uplifting effect. What often is missed from the debates on Russian disinformation or propaganda is that the state narrative promoted by state-controlled media does not simply shape, but often feeds off already existing public sentiment.

Enduring support

State narrative does not come from scratch, but is likely to be embedded in already present sentiments among the Russian public, which distinguishes itself from the west and would like to again see Russia as a great power. These sentiments, described in more detail below, are also the drivers of the specific narratives Russian media shape. By doing so, Russian media ensure the enduring support of the government's actions that may seem controversial to an outside viewer. Thus, as an outcome and in a sort of a cyclical motion, Russia's media techniques (or propaganda) reinforce these sentiments making them even stronger at the same time justifying the government's actions.

Large portions of the observations here are based on the analysis of opinion poll data, which may seem controversial in an authoritarian setting. Yet, in conversation with me, polling experts argue that polls largely reflect the actual opinions of the respondents, even if the interpretations of and the reasoning behind these opinions can vary. Academic research also acknowledges that despite caveats, Vladimir Putin's popularity rankings seem real. More specifically, support of governmental policies and Putin's remarkable ratings are explained by limited access to various sources of information. Thus, the polls largely measure 'the power of collective perceptions'. Whether these perceptions are based on rational thinking or, as some may argue, emotions is of lesser significance, since the existence of given perceptions causes certain actions regardless their origins.

Russia's specific narrative based on creating the idea of 'others' clearly derives from the existing perceptions and enhances them. Russia's capitalisation on these perceptions is clearly visible in the attitudes towards the west, which helps it fend off possible negative reactions of the public to the consequences of the sanctions. The US, the European Union (EU), and other institutions have initiated numerous projects on the economic and political development of other states, while association and trade with the EU have been presented as a development opportunity. But the message of democratic and free market ideals seems to have left Russians unimpressed: even if 57 per cent of respondents in 2014 (a decrease from 76 per cent in 2000) wanted expansion of economic, political and cultural ties with the west, an even higher 77 per cent of surveyed Russians believe the prosperity of their country is possible only by taking a different path to the west.

This dislike of the west is not a Putin-era phenomenon, but is rather vested in the still alive anti-western sentiments and the perceived western disregard of Russia's interests in the 1990s: 72 per cent of respondents in 1999 said that Russia should take a different path from the west. Meanwhile, 53 per cent of surveyed Russians have responded that they 'absolutely do not feel as a person of western culture' and 28 per cent have responded that the feeling of the western culture is not important. Russians' animosity towards the west has been also lodged in Moscow's lament over the 'lost empire'.

While many lamented the loss of the great power status, the president has become the embodiment of the country's symbolic might, and Crimea's annexation has provided Russians with 'imperial satisfaction'. While Russians, with the exception of Putin, seem content with their countries role as an 'energy superpower', this image propagated also in the west, yields in positive attitudes to the advancement of such images as of a strong and modern military power.

Thus, the Russian government's actions are explained not only by authoritarian practices but are alsosupported by the sentiments of large portions of its population. Sixty eight per cent of respondents in November 2014 considered Russia a superpower as opposed to 14 per cent in March 1994 or 48 per cent in September 2012.

The great power rhetoric of Russia's authorities, which started with president Putin also conforms to the noticeable trend among Russian population: 64 percent of respondents prefer to live in a 'large country that is respected and sometimes feared by other countries"' rather than 'a small, comfortable and non-threatening country'.

With the increase in the opinion that Russia is a superpower, there is a noticeable increase in the opinion that Russia should not pay attention to western criticism-from 38 per cent in February 2007 to 57 per cent in December 2014-while 87 per cent think that the west is hostile towards Russia, since it wants to 'grab' Russia's natural resources (46 per cent), is afraid (43 per cent), is religiously, culturally and morally different (30) from, and is envious (24) of Russia.

Anti-American attitudes

Europe is rarely considered as an equal rival, but it is on the animosity towards the US, as the main adversary of Russia's success, that the authorities and the media capitalise. Interestingly, attitudes towards the US were highly positive in the aftermath of the Soviet Union's collapse: the negative turn started with the US involvement in Serbia through NATO and despite Russia's objections.

While every US president after the collapse of the Soviet Union has attempted a sort of reset with Russia, those after all ended in disappointment both on the levels of political elites and the public. During the reset period initiated by the first administration of Barack Obama 53 per cent of respondents considered the US to play a negative role in international affairs, while 22 percent thought of US-Russia relations as cold, 4 per cent as tense, 47 per cent as normal, and one per cent as hostile. With the events in Ukraine, sanctions, and intensified media programming, Russians' perceptions of the US as of October 2015 have worsened: 71 per cent think negatively of US role in international affairs, seven per cent consider US-Russia relations normal, 32 per cent as cold, 42 per cent as tense, and 12 per cent as hostile. Similarly unflattering Russian perceptions of the Americans provide ample bases for undermining US policies or statements by alluding to the ignorance of high-rank officials, reporting events, which did not happen, or doctoring images to place US diplomats in the midst of protests in Russia.

The 2011-2012 protests in Russia generated arguments that Putin's regime may be under threat. However, not only protests have subsided, which of course can be the result of government's actions, but the approval rankings of Russia's policies and of Putin himself have increased. At the same time, the media and the head of Russia's Orthodox Church argued that the Church became a victim of information war, giving 'the impression that Russia is under siege by its enemies'. Juxtaposing 'us' against 'them', the authorities framed the December 2011 protests as a western plot to undermine Russia's position in world politics.

The perceived ideological isolation of Russians has been promoted for many years and given the changes in perceptions of threats and enemies, this strategy seems to have been successful: while in the period of 1989-1994, less than 40 per cent of surveyed Russians thought that Russia had enemies, in 2013 that figure increased to 78 per cent.

Russian state media has picked up these attitudes and provided twofold framing of the events in Ukraine and Crimea's annexation. First, Russia attempts to restore justice by protecting Russian speakers, and second, Russia is under the threat of western plots. While respondents in Europe and the US clearly demonstrate their negative attitudes towards Crimea's annexation, the attitudes in Russia drastically differ. Surveys conducted in April 2014 show that 88 per cent of Russian respondents believed that Crimea's annexation was a free act of self-determination, which according to 75 per cent of respondents has demonstrated the return of the 'traditional great power' status. More than a year later, in October 2015, 83 per cent said they would disagree with the hypothetical idea of returning Crimea to Ukraine and 75 per cent did not approve Gazprom's decision to lower the price of gas supplied to Ukraine.

In addition, 48 per cent were convinced that the conflict in Ukraine erupted because the US wanted to 'orchestrate another color revolution"'. Moreover, the narrative created by the Russian government and media of the brotherly Ukraine contrasted with Ukraine overrun by Nazis and fascists supported by the west played perfectly into Russian's perceptions of Ukraine as a state: in the period of 2001-2015 approximately 60 per cent of Russian respondents did not consider Ukraine to be a foreign country. Similar perceptions are present in relation to other post-Soviet states. For example, in October 2015, 50 per cent (as opposed to 34 per cent in August 2009) of respondents said Georgia is not a foreign country; Belarus's sovereignty ranks even lower with Russians as in 2001-2015 as more than 60 per cent of respondents did not consider it a foreign country.

How to end the blame game?

Russians have continued to blame the west in domestic hardships: 72 per cent believed that sanctions simply aim to humiliate Russia, while 66 per cent advised that no changes should be made to Russia's foreign policy and approved Russia's countersanctions. Yet, they have started to pay less attention to the events in Ukraine and became more concerned with the economic situation in Russia.

In an environment of economic decline and rising inflation, Putin's decision to destroy food products from countries under sanctions shocked Russians. As half of survey respondents disapproved food destruction and approximately 300 000 signed a petition to stop it, this has perhaps become one of the most unpopular decisions by Putin and triggered the need to divert attention from domestic to external issues, such as Russia's involvement in the Syrian conflict.

While the coverage of food destruction subsided, Russian media has actively renewed its coverage of the events in Syria. In time of rising economic concerns Russia has made a decision to interfere in the Syrian conflict, despite Putin's previous stern objections to any external intervention. In support of Putin's decision and in an effort to ensure popular support, Russian media has compared ISIS to the Nazi threat as the rationale for intervening.

European and US political rhetoric has insisted that Russia's involvement in Syria's conflict has aimed to ensure the survival of Assad's regime rather than combating terrorism. Russia's official rhetoric has differed. Russia's involvement in the conflict has been framed as the fight against ISIS, since the latter threatens not only the security of the Middle East but also Russia.

Thus, Russia's involvement in the Syrian conflict is presented as fight against terrorism, which highly resonates with the Russian population due to the explosions of apartment buildings in Buynaksk, Moscow, and Volgodonsk in 1999, Moscow theater hostage crisis in 2002, and Beslan school siege in 2004. At the same time 40 per cent in September 2014 as opposed to 28 per cent in March 2012 agreed with the opinion that terrorists are instigated by the West and are fighting against the legitimate Assad government. Thus, it should come as no surprise that while in September 2014 55 per cent of respondents in Russia considered ISIS as a threat to regional and global security, 54 per cent did not approve US airstrikes on ISIS strongholds.

Given Russians' generally negative attitudes to democracy promotion or sanctions in the name of human rights, October 2015 poll results are largely predictable: 72 per cent approve Russia's airstrikes of ISIS positions and 48 per cent agree that Russia should support Assad in his fight against ISIS and Syrian opposition.

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 #13
Interfax
November 21, 2015
Quarter of Russians view doping charges against athletes as groundless

One quarter of Russians - 25 percent - believe the World Anti-Doping Agency's (WADA) charges against Russian track-and-field athletes are groundless and can be explained by hostile attitudes toward Russia in general, the Levada Center public opinion foundation told Interfax after conducting a poll of 1,600 respondents in 134 populated areas in 46 regions of Russia on November 13-16.

Nearly one third of the respondents - 31 percent - are of the view that some of Russian athletes might have used doping, but "this was not that widespread," 9 percent believe the accusations may well be substantiated, and 20 percent view them as quite trustworthy.

Another 16 percent of the respondents were undecided.

The poll showed that 73 percent of the respondents believe that using banned drugs to help Russian athletes enhance their performance and win at international competitions is unacceptable, 14 percent consider it quite acceptable, and 13 percent are undecided.

More than half of those polled (51 percent) stated that Russian athletes use prohibited drugs just as often as athletes from other countries, 27 percent believe Russian athletes use doping more rarely and 4 percent more often than their foreign opponents. Another 18% were undecided.

Asked how the doping scandal may affect the Russian national teams' participation in the 2016 Olympic Games, 42 percent see it as likely that the team may be barred from the games, 44 percent rule out this scenario, and 14 percent are undecided.

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 #14
Moskovskiy Komsomolets
November 20, 2015
Russian analysts discuss whether thaw with West will ease sanctions
Andrey Kamakin, Syria is one thing, sanctions are another

Will our Western "brothers-in-arms" stop the sanctions war started against us?

The latest six-month period of validity of the economic and political sanctions introduced by the European Union against Russia is nearing expiration: Theoretically, these fetters should be broken in January. But clearly, the chances of this theory being realized are not 100 per cent definite, to put it mildly. So far our European partners have been extending these restrictive measures without any superfluous disputes or rigmarole. Or else they have even added in new ones. True, since the time of the previous extension, serious changes have taken place in relations between Russia and the West: A common enemy has emerged in the form of ISIL. Can this fact bring us closer together to the extent that this will lead to the repeal of the sanctions or at least their relaxation?

In spite of the fact that Vladimir Putin as commander in chief has ordered the Russian guided missile cruiser Moskva to collaborate with the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle on the coast of Syria "as with an ally," this new Entente will not abrogate the anti-Russian sanctions.

An EU summit devoted to the sanctions issue will be held on 18 December. In the opinion of the majority of Western analysts, it is not worth expecting any sensations: Sanctions will most likely be extended once again. Fedor Lukyanov, chief editor of the Russia in Global Politics journal, largely agrees with this assessment: "Of course, the European Union will not be able to move so fast." Nevertheless, since the West's priorities have sharply changed, the situation in this respect is more favourable for us than it was, say, six months ago. "I think that if the trends that we have been observing recently continue, there will not be such a united consensus in the European Union on the question of sanctions as was the case up to now." Lukyanov is not ruling out the possibility that an "interim decision" will follow - there have been certain leaks about this already - envisaging the extension of sanctions by three to four months.

France may be an important supporter of a new approach with regard to Russia, in Lukyanov's opinion. True, this will not turn the tide by any means, since the key position in the EU is that of Germany, which is less friendly to Russia today. "Even before now there have been countries in the EU which, with varying degrees of loudness, have expressed doubts about the expediency of extending sanctions," Lukyanov reasoned. "But they were not weighty enough. If France joins them, this will be more substantial. But in any case, it will all depend on Germany."

Sergey Markov, general director of the Institute for Political Studies, sees the situation in far darker hues. From what he said, it is not worth expecting sanctions to be repealed either now or further into the future, "since their aim is to topple Vladimir Putin," and this aim remains in force. Furthermore, according to Markov's theory, Russia's successes in Syria make it even more relevant for the West to change the political regime in Russia. Our country's increased foreign policy activity testifies to Russia's return to the ranks of the great powers, and Western leaders categorically cannot countenance this, as it limits their own status.

The developments regarding military collaboration in Syria will not result in anything else, the expert believes. It's apples and oranges, as the saying goes. In other respects, Russia and the West are pursuing absolutely different, sometimes diametrically opposed, aims. And where these cross each other, the degree of confrontation will, conversely, only grow. "I am convinced that the situation in Donbass will deteriorate," Sergey Markov predicted. "There will be the forcible derussification of Ukraine, and it will be turned into a malicious enemy, controlled from without. And there will be powerful blows aimed at disrupting the parliamentary and presidential elections in Russia."

There is one definite plus in this gloomy futurology: Its accuracy will be easy to check, through experience, so to speak. And quite soon.

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 #15
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
November 23, 2015
How ISIS has fundamentally changed our view of global terrorism
Unlike al-Qaeda, which formed as a terrorist network, ISIS views itself as a new type of geopolitical actor that can use any means necessary to advance its anti-Western, anti-state goals.
By Anton Varfolomeev
Anton Varfolomeev is an associate professor at the National Research University, Higher School of Economics. He has worked as a member of Russian delegations at the Council of Europe's Committee of Experts on Terrorism, and anti-terrorist units of the OSCE and G8. He holds a Ph.D. in political science.

The monstrous Islamic State of Iraq and the Greater Syria (ISIS) has claimed responsibility for the bombing of the Russian airliner in Egypt and for the terrorist attacks in Paris. It would seem that the activities of ISIS should find unconditional support from another monster - the largest network of terrorist organizations of the 2000s - al-Qaeda.

However, for the past year and a half, relations between the two terrorist organizations have been severed. As of February 2014, the High Command of al-Qaeda has refused to support ISIS, saying that it maintains no relations with the organization and cannot be held responsible for any of its actions. What do the largest terrorist organizations have in common, and in what do their strategies and worldviews diverge?

How 9/11 changed our view of non-state actors

The current international system for many years has been based on a simple axiom: threats to international peace and security can come only from states or combinations of states. The subject of all actions, which the UN General Assembly included in its well-known 1974 definition of aggression, is the state. And yes, all military blocs in the 20th century were created by some states in order to face perceived threats from other states or alliances.

The amazing paradox is - could the authors of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) even think that their Article 5, in terms of collective self-defense, would be applied for the first time after a few suicide bombers used passenger airliners as a weapon of attack against the United States - and NOT on a European member of NATO? Moreover, these attackers were not from the "East," against which for decades the NATO bloc was focused.

It is unlikely, that half a century ago, military leaders and diplomats, even in their worst nightmares, could have foreseen that any private group or organization would be able, in the future, to measure its power and influence on world affairs on par with the major powers. States had no competitors in the sphere of international security.

However, over time, this well-established state of affairs changed. After 9/11, not only NATO, but also the UN Security Council - incidentally, the only body with the authority to qualify whether any situation is a threat to peace and security - has recognized that not only a state, but also non-state actors can create this kind of situation.

New realities have forced all countries to face the need to respond to the new challenges, which come not from other states - that can be easily seen on a map, have an army, parliaments, laws and public opinion - but come from non-state actors that traditionally have not been regarded as real opponents to traditional state institutions.

With resolutions 1368 and 1373 (2001), the Security Council opened a new page in history: states admitted that they could be threatened by private terrorist organizations, such as al-Qaeda.

Why has a perverted interpretation of Islam become the ideological foundation for terrorists?

It's possible to put forward some cynical theses. The recognition of al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden as a threat by the leading nations of the world was the result of not only the barbaric attack perpetrated by the terrorist organization, but also the result of the ideas and strategies that were adopted by bin Laden and his supporters. They opposed the existing network structure of nation-states, declared the current idea of statehood as insolvent, the values of the "civilized world" (historically European) as worthless.

Why was it that the fundamentalist, perverted tenets of Islam have become the ideological base for terrorist attacks around the world - from the U.S. to Indonesia, from Afghanistan to Israel, from India to Russia? Is it possible that the thesis of Samuel Huntington, about the "clash of civilizations," is really coming true?

One of the reasons is the Islamic world's anti-Western and anti-state approach to such key concepts as "sovereignty" and "citizenship," which are essential to modern states.

We know that both of these categories in Sharia law are superseded by the concept of the Ummah. Ummah is the Muslim community, the Muslim society in general. Strictly speaking, the Ummah, in the modern sense, is the term that refers to the entire worldwide Muslim population. The global concept of the Ummah erases all international borders, and, to a large degree, nullifies the concept of identity through citizenship.

It is no accident, as experts point out, that in the Arabic language a kind of "secularization" of this term has taken place. It signifies not only a religious community, but also, for example, the "Arab Nation."

We know, that in particular, one of the official titles of the former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi sounded like "Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Arab Nation" (as opposed to any particular state).

Islamic Ummah and the concept of the nation-state

Mutual relations within the Muslim Ummah overlap mutual relations of the citizen-nation-state type, because they are more voluminous and inclusive. From this, we get the very peculiar attitudes of Islamic fundamentalists towards the principle of inviolability of borders, and the ideas of the leaders of al-Qaeda  on the "Great Islamic Caliphate."

It is necessary to stress once more that this is the outlook of a terrorist organization - and not Islam. This is a perverse, sectarian interpretation by terrorists. Global terrorist ideology of the "jihad" is disguised as fundamentalist Islam, but in fact, this is not jihad in its classic Qur'anic understanding.

However, in his time, Osama bin Laden had declared himself a sheikh, that is, a spiritual authority across the entire Ummah. Confidants, according to numerous testimonies, called him "Sheikh Osama" or "Emir bin Laden." And his missives - fatwas - if we follow this logic, should have become guidelines to action for all of the faithful, again, regardless of borders and citizenship.

That is to say, exploiting for his own criminal purposes the traditional Islamic concept of Ummah, the self-proclaimed Sheikh bin Laden was trying to lift himself above any state framework, and above the framework of conventional political relations.

Thus, it would be wrong to say that al-Qaeda, and similar structures, are positioning themselves as being equivalent to states, and that they consider Western state institutions as their peers. Such terrorist organizations, operating on a global scale, place themselves above any state or society.

First of all, as we have already noted, the concept of citizenship and sovereignty are alien to their understanding of the law and, consequently, a society cannot be built on the basis of these concepts.

Secondly, modern societies are depriving themselves of the right to exist, because they do not recognize their ideology. And pluralism - in the worldview of ideologues of terrorism - is a thing totally unacceptable. In their point of view, alternatives to their worldview and understanding of the world simply cannot be.

Incidentally, such positioning unites terrorists and adherents of totalitarian sects: for the first, and for the second, are characterized by the same conviction that only they possess true knowledge and understanding, which place them above the rules generally accepted by the "uninitiated."

The idea of the "chosen people" is one of the favorite philosophical postulates of terrorists of all stripes. Hence, we see why it is easy for these "chosen ones" to use brutal misanthropic means and methods for the realization of their own ideas.

The above, no doubt, applies to the ideology of ISIS. What are the specifics of the strategy and the outlook of its supporters?

What is the key difference between ISIS and al-Qaeda?

Let's start with the names. Right here, it becomes clear that the militants fighting in Syria, Iraq and other countries, are declaring themselves as representatives of a "state." The Russian language Wikipedia pages dedicated to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State are fundamentally different.

Al-Qaeda is described as a private terrorist organization, while the Islamic State is described as a quasi-state with its own "capital city," "currency," "official language," etc. (Notably, this type of distinction is not found in the English and French language pages of Wikipedia).

In actual fact, the ideological orientation of the leaders of ISIS and al-Qaeda are the same - creating a "caliphate." The tactics are the same - terrorist attacks, hostage taking, and the terrorizing of local populations. However, between the two, there are serious strategic differences.

We should note that in their descriptions of ISIS, experts and journalists almost never use the terms such as "network," "network structure," or "network principle of organization," which were previously applied to the descriptions of al-Qaeda. All this is because the management of ISIS is built on a strict hierarchical principle.

This quasi-state establishes control over territory, expanding "its borders," introducing "laws" and a system of administration. The Taliban did roughly the same thing, proclaiming the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (in fact, the Taliban tried to stand on a par with member states of the United Nations, having established formal "diplomatic relations" with a number of Arab governments).

The strategy of ISIS, in comparison to al-Qaeda, is more pragmatic and tied to the ground. The organization is not abstracting itself from the concepts of "state" and "national territory" - since these still dominate the modern world. It uses for its own purposes ancient traditions and customs, as well as the achievements of Western management.

Eyewitnesses have noted that in areas under their control, the insurgents have repaired the infrastructure - many people in the territories controlled by ISIS were supplied with clean water, electricity, fuel, and given access to health care in hospitals - that has not been working for many years.

ISIS leaders are adopting management practices that appear to be the most effective - and not just those that should be implemented due to fundamentalism and "true custom." Against the background of an ideological screen, being built is a cynical and pragmatic practice of public service.

In this lies the particular danger of the Islamic State, which, unfortunately, increases the prospects for survival of this regime, and makes destroying it more difficult.

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 #16
Le Monde diplomatique
November 2015
Putin's Syrian bet
Putin has taken an enormous risk in backing Syria's Assad with military force. If his gamble pays off, Russia could be the peacemaker with only marginal military losses. If not, he invites destabilisation and threats from ISIS back home.
By Alexei Malashenko
Alexey Malashenko is chair of the Religion, Society and Security programme at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's Moscow Centre. His latest book is The Fight for Influence: Russia in Central Asia, Carnegie, Moscow, 2014.

Russian Sukhoi Su-34 fighter-bombers and Kalbir cruise missiles fired from the Caspian Sea have changed the balance of power on the Syrian battlefield, at least in the short term. The intensity of the bombing has allowed the Syrian government forces to take the offensive again. It's unsurprising that Putin is giving Bashar al-Assad this tactical support: Syria is the last vestige of Russia's Middle East presence, a symbol of past glory. Russia's steadfast support of the Assad regime led it to play a decisive role, in 2013, in dismantling Syria's chemical arsenal, to avoid western intervention (1). It has proved wrong those who claimed Russia was now only a regional power, with no interests outside the post-Soviet space.

From the first armaments contracts in 1956, Syria maintained very close relations with the Soviet Union, strengthened by Syria's short-lived political union with Egypt (United Arab Republic, 1958-61) and the rise to power in 1963 of the Baath Party, inspired by Arab socialism. President Hafez al-Assad, before his death in 2000, urged his son Bashar to maintain the relationship as vital to keeping his clan at the head of the country.

After the breakdown of Russia's alliance with Egypt and the loss of support facilities at Alexandria and Mersa Matruh in 1977, the Syrian port of Tartus was the only base for Russian warships in the Mediterranean. Over the past few months, these have become a noticeable presence off the Syrian coast; in September the huge Typhoon-class nuclear submarine Dmitry Donskoy was in the area.

Russian aid to Syria has grown since the Arab Spring. The collapse of the Tunisian, Egyptian and Libyan regimes, the dismantling of Iraq and the emergence of ISIS in 2014 convinced Russia that it must continue to support Assad and strengthen its position in the region. Widespread instability and difficulty in reading the policies of the West, especially those of the US, have driven governments to diversify their alliances. France has sold arms to the Gulf states; Russia has recently signed trade, military and technical agreements with Egypt, Iraq and Jordan; Saudi Arabia finances Egyptian purchases of Russian arms, and the Saudi sovereign wealth fund decided in July to invest $10bn in Russia.

Nostalgia for Nasser

Some Arab politicians and military officers are nostalgic for the days of Gamal Abdel Nasser, in the 1950s and 60s, when ideological competition between the Soviet Union and the West gave Arabs room for manoeuvre. It was not by chance that Egypt's president Abdel Fatah al-Sissi praised Nasser during his electoral campaign in 2014. Putin has renewed old ties and secured an arms contract worth $3.5bn by supporting Sissi - who visited Moscow in August - without hesitation.

Russia hopes to strengthen its influence under cover of international law. In a statement at the UN General Assembly on 28 September, Putin proposed the idea of "a resolution aimed at coordinating the actions of all the forces that confront the Islamic State and other terrorist organisations. [...] Naturally, any assistance to sovereign states can and must be offered rather than imposed, exclusively and solely in accordance with the UN Charter. [...] I believe it is of the utmost importance to help restore government institutions in Libya, support the new government of Iraq, and provide comprehensive assistance to the legitimate government of Syria" (2).

Russia is returning to the Middle East, though without claiming that it will regain the influence the Soviet Union once had on international relations. But it also faces a paradox: Assad is far from popular in many Arab countries, and this alliance aligns Russia with Iran, Hizbullah in Lebanon and the Shia militias in Iraq, in a regional confrontation that their Sunni adversaries increasingly present as sectarian. If Putin wants to demonstrate Russia's strength and ability to help its friends - both to public opinion at home and to his regional partners - he can't afford to show weakness by giving up Assad.

Can the conflict be resolved by an accord? From the Russian viewpoint, this would be possible if the West accepted that Assad should remain in power, at least for a defined period. Putin told the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO, the Russian NATO) (3) summit in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, in September that it was vital to consider political compromise in Syria, saying that Assad was ready to involve the "healthy" part of the opposition in government. This would make it possible to form a Syrian coalition including that part of the opposition able to break with the jihadist movements. The president could then hand over "of his own free will" to a successor who would be approved both by the major political forces in Syria and by external players.

This may seem unlikely at present, but has already been discussed by foreign ministers - albeit reluctantly. If it comes about, Russia could look like an agent for peace. Intervening at the request of the Syrian government would give it the status of geopolitical counterweight, like the Soviet Union during the cold war, and protector of minorities in the region - a role that tsarist Russia assumed with regard to Eastern Christians.

Trading Syria for the Donbass?

But Russia is playing on a far bigger chessboard. There are indications that it may be planning to "exchange" Syria for the Donbass region of Ukraine, torn between those who want to rejoin Russia and those faithful to Kiev. If the US and its allies were willing to take greater account of Russia's interests in Syria, Russia could be more understanding about Ukraine. In September, Russia and Ukraine, with the European Union as mediator, agreed a price for gas to suit both Ukraine and Russia's Gazprom, which has been finding it difficult to secure new contracts (4). Though it is uncertain that the Minsk I and II agreements of 2014 and 2015 will be applied in full, a meeting in October raised hopes of a lasting truce in the Donbass, with the effective withdrawal of heavy weaponry and both sides accepting that local elections should be postponed to allow an institutional solution.

Russia is at an impasse. At the UN General Assembly, Putin accused some members of NATO of having orchestrated "a military coup [...] from outside that triggered a civil war." But he defended the Minsk agreements:"Ukraine's territorial integrity cannot be ensured by threats and force of arms. What is needed is a genuine consideration for the interests and rights of the people in the Donbass region, and respect for their choice."

In Syria, the post-Assad future, and whether a coalition may be possible, is uncertain. Every player in the conflict sees a different solution. Russia continues to increase military and technical aid. The airstrikes by Russian planes are a major logistical exercise: since the enemy is quite near, the airbase at Latakia needs to be protected by Mil Mi-24 assault helicopters and tanks. Official sources talk of 2,000 men, which the military apparently consider sufficient. But the Crimean crisis has already shown how hard it is to determine the real numbers of troops involved. There is however nothing new about the presence of military advisors: Russia has been sending them to the Middle East since the 1950s.

The role of Russian troops may be limited to protecting the Syrian army's principal bases, and special operations. Russians remember the "limited contingent" initially sent to Afghanistan and the stalemate (1979-89) during which, according to official figures, 14,000 Soviet troops died and 50,000 were wounded, while 1.5 million Afghans were killed. ISIS ideologues have pointed out that this disastrous war contributed to the fall of the Soviet Union. A ground intervention in Syria would do little for Putin's popularity.

Keeping Assad in power

According to western leaders, Russia's main objective is not to crush ISIS but to keep Assad in power. The airstrikes have targeted different opposition groups, including the Al-Nusra Front, affiliated to Al-Qaida. Russia hopes that confronting ISIS will encourage other countries involved to join it in a "war on extremism". However, a worldwide coalition is unlikely; at best, there will be some technical coordination to prevent air accidents. Also unlikely is a coalition of Russia, Iran and China, as discussed in the Russian media, to rival the one led by the US. China refuses to intervene outside its own borders, and Iran is pursuing its own ends - although the powerful General Qassem Suleimani, commander of the Revolutionary Guards' Al-Quds force which is fighting in Iraq and Syria, has been seen in Moscow. Israel's prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu, who is worried about such rapprochements and fears that an alliance between a Shia axis and Russia will allow Hizbullah to obtain arms, has sought assurances from Putin.

ISIS has served Russia's interests by allowing Russia to show its friends in the region that it can still take a decisive role. Russia can present itself as protector of the Muslim countries of Central Asia, through the CSTO. More than ever since the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia talks of maintaining stability in "Eurasia" and protecting its allies from external threats. For many years, this meant the Afghan Taliban; now it includes ISIS, which is gradually penetrating southern Central Asia.

ISIS identified Russia as an opponent from the start. Last year it released a video warning Putin: "These are the planes [captured by ISIS] that you sent to Bashar [al-Assad]. Allah willing, we will send them back to you. [...] Your throne has already been shaken [...] and will fall with our arrival [in Russia]." ISIS also vowed to free Chechnya and all of the Caucasus. This may seem ambitious, but the jihadists are in a position to strengthen their influence in the North Caucasus, still beset by protests against central authorities, as well as economic and social problems. There will probably be more attacks like those on the Russian embassy in Damascus (in May, September and October), and they could spread to Russian soil.

The decision to invade Afghanistan in 1979 was made at a meeting of the Politburo, within the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Leonid Brezhnev allowed his colleagues to convince him. The head of the KGB, Yuri Andropov, future general secretary of the Central Committee, initially opposed the invasion, but later came round.

Today, we know who makes the decisions, and how: though the senate unanimously approved sending Russian troops to Syria in September, Putin makes all the decisions himself, based on his own understanding of the situation. Some decisions seem to have a strong emotional element, and to be made without sufficient thought as to consequences.

Russians remember the Cuban missile crisis of 1962: Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev had suddenly decided to send nuclear missiles to Cuba. He claimed to have discussed this with his colleagues, but we now know that he took the decision alone, and that his entourage was only informed of it (5). The US's sharp reaction, blockading Cuba and threatening to invade it (6), forced Russia to back down, and the incident seriously damaged Khrushchev's credibility with his colleagues.

Many see Putin as more decisive and effective than President Obama. They claim he has demonstrated this in his management of the Syrian crisis, and is one step ahead of his partners/rivals. But providential military victories are often followed by a stalemate, or even a retreat. All the bombing over the past year has not forced ISIS to retreat. Russia's attempt to return to the Middle East will only succeed if it is able to create conditions favourable to an international political solution.

Notes
(1) See Jacques L�vesque, "Russia returns", Le Monde diplomatique, English edition, November 2013.
(2) Full transcript at http://gadebate.un.org/listbydate/2...
(3) The CSTO's members are Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
(4) See Catherine Locatelli, "Gazprom's eastern future", Le Monde diplomatique, English edition, June 2015.
(5) William Taubman, Khrushchev: the Man and His Era, Norton, New York, 2003.
(6) See Daniele Ganser, "Russian roulette in Cuba", Le Monde diplomatique, English edition, November 2002.

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 #17
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
November 23, 2015
Why is Russia now bombing ISIS with long-range missiles?
Russia has launched airstrikes against ISIS targets in Syria using strategic long-distance bombers for the first time. Russian experts see the use of long-range missiles as a testing ground for new types of weapons, as well as a good way of intensifying the airstrikes in Syria, since other accessible resources have now been exhausted.
TATYANA RUSAKOVA, RBTH

Russia has used its strategic long-distance bombers against ISIS for the first time, striking targets in the Syrian town of Raqqa, the radical jihadist organization's de facto capital, on Nov. 17.

In the course of the strikes, in a flight that lasted five hours and 20 minutes, the Tu-22M3 planes covered a distance of 2,800 miles (4,510 km), while the strategic Tu-160 and Tu-95MS missile carriers remained in the air for eight hours and 20 minutes and 9 hours and 30 minutes, respectively.

New missiles see first use in latest strikes

According to the Defense Ministry's press office, the strategic missile carriers launched 34 cruise missiles during the mission, which saw the first combat use of the new X-101 strategic air-launched cruise missiles. The X-101 has a range of 3,400 miles (5,500 km).

In the last two-three years the Tactical Missile Weaponry Corporation (which includes the Raduga scientific-productive association, the developer of the X-101) has put "about 10 new products" into operation, including long-range missiles, according to a statement made by the corporation's director Boris Obnosov in 2014.

According to Obnosov, the corporation is keeping pace with the U.S. in terms of developing long-range precision tactical weapons and in some fields even has an advantage.

In this sense the bombing of terrorist positions could have been a "trial run" of new types of weapons, as in the case of the launching of the Caliber cruise missiles from the Caspian Sea on Oct. 7.

A necessary measure?

Observers interviewed by RBTH are of the opinion that the use of long-range aviation against ISIS can be considered an "act of revenge" for the terrorist act that downed the Russian passenger airplane over Egypt's Sinai Peninsula on Oct. 31, resulting in the deaths of all 224 people aboard.

"The use of long-range aviation is natural and the only way to quickly intensify the airstrikes in Syria," said independent expert and author of August Tanks Anton Lavrov.

"The base and the group in Latakia are now acting with limited capacity. From a military viewpoint, the objectives that would require two dozen strategic bombers simply do not exist in Syria," he said.

Russia's only aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, could perhaps act as a reserve for Russia's air force in Syria. The ship, which carries 12 multipurpose MiG-29K fighter jets with precision missiles and 14 heavy Su-33 carrier-based jets with unguided missiles, could be of vital support to the air force at sea. However, currently the aircraft carrier is located in the Barents Sea and is conducting combat preparation exercises.

However, editor-in-chief of the specialized website Voeniy Paritet (Military Parity) Andrian Nikolayev believes that strategic bombers are being used solely with the aim of creating a demonstrative effect.

"In the conditions of international sanctions Moscow must show its muscles, that is, its capabilities in countering terrorism in order to increase the chances of lifting the sanctions," he told RBTH.

In Nikolayev's view, this is precisely why Russia has decided to replicate the U.S.'s combat experience, sending its Tu-160 and Tu-95MS bombers with mandatory use of winged missiles for the massive airstrike.

"However, this experience is outdated. Currently, for targeted strikes the West is effectively using the Predator and Reaper armed unmanned aerial vehicles. Russia still does not have attack drones. That is why it must use what it has, even if it's rather extreme," he said.

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 #18
Moscow Times
November 23, 2015
Hagel: Russia, U.S. Must Fight Islamic State Together
By Anna Dolgov

Former U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel called for including Russia in a consolidated global battle against Islamic State, and suggested putting aside the inevitable disputes between Washington and Moscow for the sake of the fight against terrorism.

Hagel dismissed the disagreements between the West and Russia about Syria's President Bashar Assad as secondary, and said operations in Syria should be focused on defeating Islamic State, according to an interview Sunday with CNN.

"Assad is a very bad guy," Hagel said. "There are bad guys all over the world. But I think it's pretty clear that ISIS represents the real threat to our country, to the world."

He called for bringing together various countries - including traditional opponents or adversaries of the United States - to fight the Islamic State.

"The Russians have got to be part of this," Hagel said. "I think the Iranians have to be part of it."

"It isn't an alliance," he added. "It's - let's seize on the common interest. What is the common threat to all those countries? What's our common interest here? ISIS. And you build around that. I don't think you're going to find a resolution to Assad until you figure out how you're going to deal with ISIS."

Watch the interview on CNN website.

Relations between Moscow and the West turned fetid over Russia's annexation of Crimea from Ukraine last year and Russia's support for separatist insurgents in eastern Ukraine.

But following the downing of a Russian passenger plane over Egypt on Oct. 31, and a series of terrorist attacks in Paris on Nov. 13 - Islamic State has claimed responsibility for both terror acts- Moscow has toned down its adamantly anti-Western rhetoric of the past year, and called for unity in fighting Islamic State.

Russia's air strikes in Syria were widely seen as an attempt to distract attention from its meddling in Ukraine and to reassert itself as a major international player while supporting the Assad regime, but calls for a joint fight against terrorism have been part of Russian President Vladimir Putin's stance since long before the Ukrainian crisis.

Hagel did not mention Ukraine, but suggested that differences between the United States and its opponents, such as Russia, could be put on the back burner in the face of a formidable common enemy.

"We're gonna have differences with Iran for years and years, with Russia for years, but you can't let those differences dictate, or you can't become captive to the differences," Hagel told CNN. "Let's center on the core threat, the common threat, build out from there."

Hagel resigned as defense secretary last year, following disagreements with White House administration officials over Syrian policy.

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 #19
www.thedailybeast.com
November 22, 2015
Can Barack Obama and Vladimir Putin Fix Syria Together?
By Eleanor Clift
Eleanor Clift covers politics for The Daily Beast.  

After Paris, is there any chance Russia and the U.S. can find a way to get rid of Assad and concentrate on destroying ISIS? Two former ambassadors say the answer is complicated.
There was no sound, only pictures conveyed to the media when the U.S. President and the Russian President sat down to talk at a coffee table in a hotel lobby in Turkey last weekend. Just two days after the attacks in Paris, photos of the two men in serious conversation conveyed a sense of welcome urgency. With Syria in the headlines training jihadists to strike in the heart of Europe and the French declaring their country at war, a moment for new leadership was suddenly at hand.

Would President Obama and President Putin answer the call to forge a grand alignment to defeat the Islamic State? French President Hollande will be in Washington Tuesday to meet with Obama; then he travels to Moscow to meet with Putin. Secretary of State John Kerry, in the midst of talks in Vienna, said he was optimistic a cease-fire could be reached in Syria.

For those trying to understand the Rubik's Cube that is Syria, a ceasefire would be between Assad's regime and the more moderate opposition. It has nothing to do with ISIS, except without it, there can be no unified fight against ISIS.

At the potentially historic coffee table summit in Turkey, a translator was with Putin while National Security advisor Susan Rice accompanied Obama. Delegates to the G-20 summit milled about and heavy security kept everybody away from the foursome for 35 minutes. With the brutality of ISIS demanding a global response and more refugees in Europe than at any time since World War Two, we won't know until their memoirs are written whether Obama and Putin feel the weight of history, and whether they can set aside their differences to confront a common enemy the way FDR did with Josef Stalin to confront Hitler.

Former Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul cautions against using words like "alignment" when it comes to working with Russia, or falling too much in love with any sweeping metaphor. That will only end in disappointment, he says.

But the downing of a Russian jet by ISIS could be a game changer.  "This is the moment to make the case that doubling down on [Syrian President] Assad won't work," McFaul says. And if Putin shifts his strategy in Syria away from propping up Assad, and directs his firepower against ISIS, the ceasefire Kerry seeks could be within reach.

"There's not a strategy where you defeat ISIS without having a political settlement in Syria," says McFaul.  Now a professor of political science at Stanford, he uses an academic term -- "Pacted transition" -- to describe a pact between Assad and the more moderate opposition, where elements of the regime would commit to a road map and time line that results in a new head of state and relegates Assad to an interim honorific role.

"Not a change of regime, a change at the top, and that's an important difference," says McFaul. The regime would commit to no more barrel bombing of civilians; the opposition would turn away from extremism.

Easing out Assad is key, and unless Russia is ready to make that deal, this peace attempt could fail like two previous efforts in 2013 and 2014. "Putin believes we're na�ve about the Middle East, and we don't appreciate the role that a strong man can play," says McFaul, who served as ambassador to Russia from 2012 to 2014.

"We've had that debate in Syria, Egypt and Libya. Our view at the time, change is underway - it's not about whether we want it or not, people have taken to the streets. Do we push for a more peaceful transition or will there be violent revolution? The longer you support Assad, the more likely it becomes violent revolutionary change."

Before Paris, Putin tried to cast himself as leading the fight against ISIS when in reality Russian planes were bombing the opposition forces that the United States supports. Putin fighting ISIS was "a giant myth," says McFaul. He never once bombed ISIS until early this week, after publicly confirming the terror group had brought down that Russian jet over Egypt with a bomb.

Former Ambassador to Syria Robert Ford is skeptical that the Russians are really changing their stance about Assad, and as long as Assad is in place, the armed opposition will not mobilize to fight against the Islamic State.

"This is the same Damascus government that dropped barrel bombs and chemical weapons," says Ford, who is now a senior fellow with the Middle East Institute in Washington. "These are 20-year-old and 30-year-old battle hardened fighters. Syria is an incredibly brutal police state - and they've been fighting for years. Do you think they will go home to where the police can find them?"

Ford is not convinced that a few cosmetic changes in Damascus will turn the battle from a civil war into a unified assault against ISIS. Kerry keeps plugging away at a diplomatic solution, and it should become apparent soon whether the Russians are giving up on Assad and pressuring him to accept a transitional government, and if the Paris attacks, and the downed airliner, have fundamentally changed Putin's thinking.

To bring an end to World War Two, all parties agreed Hitler was the fundamental problem. It would be history-making if Obama and Putin could resolve their impasse over Assad and focus on degrading and defeating ISIS. For Obama, it would save his legacy on foreign policy; for Putin, it would restore Russia's greatness along with the personal stature that he craves on the world stage.

"Do you really think the Russians care anything about Paris?" Ford asks. "The way of proving it would be getting rid of Assad. But maybe Putin is like Donald Rumsfeld. You don't fight the Islamic state with the Syrian leader you want; you fight it with the Syrian leader you have."  

Historical analogies are never perfect, but when the future of Western civilization hangs in the balance, the mutual respect Obama and Putin managed for 35 minutes in Turkey could be the start of something big.

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 #20
www.rt.com
November 23, 2015
Medvedev: US Mideast policy contributed to rise of Islamic State

Russian PM Dmitry Medvedev has blamed the strengthening of terrorist group Islamic State on "irresponsible" US policies in the Middle East, calling for all nations to stop attempting to destabilize the situation in sovereign countries for their own purposes.

"Instead of concentrating their common efforts on fighting terrorism, the United States and their allies have started to oppose Syria's legally-elected president, Bashar Assad," Dmitry Medvedev was quoted as saying by TASS. "A reasonable policy in Mideast countries is supporting legitimate regimes that are capable of securing the territorial integrity of local countries, not in trying to destabilize the situation," he said.

The Russian PM recalled that some time ago the US contributed to the strengthening of the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization, leading to the 9/11 attacks. He also noted that the lessons of the past confirm that the terrorist threat can only be fought by a joint effort, without division into competing alliances.

The comments came shortly after US President Barak Obama vowed to destroy Islamic State (IS, formerly ISIS/ISIL), in statements made to the press during a visit to Kuala-Lumpur, Malaysia. Obama also urged President Vladimir Putin to "go after the people who killed Russia's citizens," referring to the downing of the Russian A231 airliner over Sinai, Egypt, on October 31.

Last week, Russia's Lower House of Parliament approved a declaration expressing solidarity with all nations that have suffered from terrorist attacks, calling on them to form a major coalition to fight terrorism and put an end to attacks on civilians.

"The Deputies of the State Duma urge lawmakers from Europe, North America, the Middle East and Central Asia, and other regions of the world to do all in their power to create an international anti-terror coalition. The necessity to protect human lives and the moral duty to terror victims make this an obligation for us all," reads the resolution. "Only the joint efforts of the whole international community would be able to stop the terrorism that is expanding now right before our eyes," it says.

This document also mentions the United States' role in destabilizing the Middle East, as well as Russia's past warnings about a potential crisis in the region.

"Apparently, the irresponsible and faulty policies of Western countries launched under the slogan of 'exporting democracy' have already led to an emerging and strengthening of the so-called Islamic State. Attempts to use radical groups as a battering ram for the displacement of disagreeable regimes can cause further negative developments. Now France and other European nations are actually paying for Washington's shortsighted and selfish policies," the resolution says.

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 #21
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
November 19, 2015
No longer any excuse for disunity after terrorist attacks
The recent series of terrorist attacks in France has forced Russia and the West to recognize the undeniable fact that there is a common enemy - international terrorism, represented first and foremost by ISIS. This enemy must be crushed with united efforts, while all other disagreements should be given secondary importance.
By Georgy Bovt
The author is a political analyst and member of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, an independent Moscow-based think tank.

After recognizing that a terrorist act was responsible for bringing down the Russian passenger airliner in Egypt, Russian President Vladimir Putin affirmed that "Russia's business in Syria is correct." Revenge for the deaths of the 224 passengers has now become a matter of national principle.

"The murder of our people in Sinai is among the bloodiest crimes in terms of number of victims. This will remain with us forever. But it will not prevent us from finding and punishing the criminals," said Putin, citing Article 51 of the UN Charter on a country's right to self-defense. Russia has promised an unprecedented reward of $50 million for information leading to the capture or death of the terrorists responsible for the tragedy.

Although Putin was careful in using the words "revenge," "chastise" and "punish" in reference to the terrorists, his press secretary Dmitry Peskov was more blunt, saying that the special services had received an order to "destroy" everyone involved in the terrorist act. That is, without a trial. Moreover, by citing Article 51 and by using a hard tone, Putin made Russians understand that the terrorists' "punishment" will be similar to the actions of the Israeli special services, which in their time hunted down the Palestinian terrorists who captured and murdered Israeli athletes during the 1972 Olympics in Munich and killed them without any judicial hassle.

Russia's next steps

What consequences could Moscow's official recognition of the terrorist act have? It is unlikely that this will become a reason to immediately cut air communication with other countries (as was done with Egypt) that pose a significant terrorist threat. Several Russian parliamentarians have already voiced such thoughts. But in my opinion, this extreme measure will be implemented only in the case of a more dangerous escalation of terrorism. For now Russia's federal air transport agency is recommending the level of air security be increased on flights to 47 countries, including some European countries and the U.S.

Concerning Syria, the expected and already announced increase in the number of strikes on terrorist targets will not lead to a Russian ground operation in the country. A single anti-terrorist front will also not be formed, for now. Yet coordination between Moscow and the West after the terrorist acts in Paris and the G20 summit in Turkey, where the subject matter was discussed in a new context, will doubtless intensify. Relations between Russia and the West in light of the new recognized threat are obviously better today than they were a year ago.

Moscow is therefore bound to increase the number of air strikes on ISIS positions but will refrain from striking forces belonging to the Free Syrian Army, which the West considers the "moderate opposition." However, the West has still not given Moscow the list of sites controlled by the so-called "moderate" opposition in order that Russia not bomb them. This, unfortunately, demonstrates the extremely low level of trust between the sides. However, closer coordination between the sides concerning those who certainly should be bombed has already begun. The fact that immediately after Putin's statement the Russian air force launched an attack on what is basically the Islamic State (ISIS) capital, Raqqa, is proof of this.

A final battle with the forces of Rome

With respect to the ground operation, even though experts believe that a full victory over ISIS will be impossible without it and neither the forces of Assad nor the Kurds are enough, the matter is much more complex. And more ominous. Islamic State, which gives significant importance to the early Islamic surahs (verses) in its propaganda and ideology, actually longs for a "decisive and final" ground battle with the "forces of Rome," that is, the West and the Christian world as a whole. The battle, according to such prophecies, must take place near the Syrian town of Dabiq (now controlled by ISIS), which is not far from Raqqa. If this interpretation of ISIS's intentions is true, then the Parisian terrorist act and the downing of the Russian plane are both provocations, "invitations to a battle" from the fanatics.

If the invitation goes unanswered, there will be more "invitations." This confirms that the fanatics and obscurantists have posed a very serious challenge for our civilization. And for now our disagreements on things that are profoundly secondary are preventing us from forming an answer to the challenge.

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#22
Sputnik
November 23, 2015
US Must Stop Depicting Its War on Assad as 'Battle Between Good and Evil'

National security analyst and retired US Army veteran Daniel L. Davis suggests that given that the Syrian war has turned into a situation where there are no clear good guys and bad guys (in the US understanding of the terms), perhaps it's time for Washington to switch to a policy of simply staying out of the conflict altogether.

In his analysis, published in The National Interest magazine on Monday, Davis noted that "Americans have always loved the classic battles between good and evil: minutemen vs. Redcoats, the Greatest Generation vs. Hitler, Darth Vader vs. Luke Skywalker...We like the clean lines that allow us to love and support the good guy while hating and opposing the bad guy. No complications, no difficult moral decisions to make."

This line of thinking, the analyst noted, leads to tremendous complications when it comes to the war in Syria, given that neither the so-called 'moderate' rebels nor Syrian President Bashar Assad seem to fit the simple 'good guy'/'bad guy' dichotomy Americans know and love.

Davis pointed out that while the Western media has repeatedly reported on and amplified the scale of the alleged 'atrocities' committed by the Syrian government against the country's civilian population, "only rarely...do these same outlets report on the war crimes frequently committed by the [moderate] opposition groups we support."

Listing off just a few reports by human rights groups on the massacres carried out by the so-called moderates, the journalist asked his readers to imagine an end game scenario where this ragtag collection of rebels and terrorists somehow did manage to overthrow Assad.

"What happens next?", Davis queried. "Will these groups work together to form an effective interim government, leading to fair and free elections and an end to the violence?"

"The likelier scenario," the analyst continued, "is that once Assad is out of power, the strongest of these groups will turn on each other in a new fight for control of the new government."

Unfortunately, Davis noted, the world has already knows exactly how such a dynamic tends to play out, with the Libyan experience.

The expert recalled how, "in 2011, the US supported rebel groups in Libya against Qaddafi by conducting hundreds of cruise missile and airstrikes. After the Libyan leader was killed by rebels, President Barack Obama optimistically said to the Libyan people: 'You have won your revolution. And now, we will be a partner as you forge a future that provides dignity, freedom and opportunity'."

"Mere months later," Davis noted, "the once-unified opposition fragmented and turned on itself. Now four years after we succeeded in removing a tyrant from power, Libya remains one of the most unstable, violent and ungoverned areas in the world."

With this experience in mind, and in light of the fact that the US has already observed "all participants of the war in Syria [committing] war crimes," the analyst noted that "American policymakers have to face some hard questions with no good answers: if there aren't any good guys, who do we support - or do we support anyone?"

"It may be," he continued, "that none of the warring sides represent or would support our values and thus, regardless of which side ultimately prevails, American interests will not be served." Given these facts, the expert suggested that perhaps "the best we could hope for might be to use US diplomatic and humanitarian resources to encourage the combatants to resolve their differences, while trying to contain the violence and leading humanitarian efforts to lessen the suffering of the innocents."

Preempting the response of hawks, both left and right, by noting that "such a policy would likely be attacked as 'defeatist' or as a failure to lead," Davis countered by noting that "the hard facts" are that US attempts to resolve civil conflicts in other countries in recent years have resulted only in "a worsening of the violence, an increase in the suffering of those we've sought to help, and ultimately, the establishment of regimes that neither represent American values nor provide peace and democracy to their people."

Trustingly, and perhaps naively, Davis concludes with the thought that "as we near the Presidential primary season, we can only hope that the ultimate winner -whether Republic or Democrat or Independent, male or female -will show the wisdom, moral courage and leadership necessary to preserve American values and interests."

And although the journalist doesn't ask it, his analysis does beg the question about just what exactly the American establishment thinks might happen if Assad's secular nationalist government, known prior to the crisis for its religious and ethnic tolerance, and its penchant for things like women's rights, were to fall. Even in the best case scenario, in which the most moderate of moderates managed to capture and secure power, it would be difficult to imagine them being able to hold together the fragile tapestry of Syrian society better than the Ba'ath Party, with its inclusive, secular patriotic ideology had over the 40 year period prior to the war.

The most likely scenario, based on the balance of forces emerging among the rebel and terrorist groups in recent months and years, is that groups like al-Nusra and ISIL, together with the hundreds of other jihadist gangs believed to be operating in the country, would fight it out with each other, before conducting a genocidal campaign to expel or simply murder anyone considered a heretic, as their ideology proposes.

A retired US Army Lt. Col with 21 years of service under his belt, Davis is a veteran of the US war in Afghanistan, and a veteran of both US campaigns in Iraq, serving in Operation Desert Storm in 1991, and then again in 2009.

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 #23
The Unz Review
www.unz.com
November 20, 2015
Week Seven of the Russian Intervention in Syria: Dramatic Surge in Intensity
By The Saker
[Text with graphics here http://www.unz.com/tsaker/week-seven-of-the-russian-intervention-in-syria-dramatic-surge-in-intensity/]

This week was clearly dominated by two major events: the terrorist attacks in Paris and the Russian official declaration that Kogalymavia Flight 9268 was, indeed, destroyed by a bomb.

First, I would notice that contrary to so many prediction that the Russians, Egyptians and other nations involved would lie and cover up this attack, this did not happen. Both the Russians and the Egyptians were open and honest about this attack from day 1. There is something to be learned here: while some politicians clearly have lost the ability to speak the truth even if they tried to, others did not. While lying is the standard operating procedure for most (all?) of "western" (Empire-run) states, this is still not the case everywhere else. It is simply wrong to assume that Russia is some kind of "anti-USA" and that the Kremlin has a policy of systematic deception like the White House. To the extend that Russia could be considered an "anti-USA" this ought to include categorically different methods and motives.

Second, and this might seem highly counter-intuitive, it is undeniable that Daesh did everything in its power to invite retaliation: not only did Daesh immediately claim that it blew up Flight 9268, it also claimed the credit for the Paris attacks and even threatened more such attacks, including against the USA. Again, this might seem outright bizarre, but Daesh appears to be doing everything it can to create a large, multi-national coalition to destroy it. We must keep this in mind every time we consider the retaliatory steps taken by Russia, France and others (see below).

Third, while it is too early to call the recent French attacks a "false flag" it is logical to at least consider that possibility as likely, if not highly likely. I personally do not like knee-jerk conclusions and I would prefer waiting for more info to come out. But at this point in time whether this was a "real" attack or a "false flag" really makes no difference. Why? Because whether the French 'deep state' was an accomplice/culprit or whether the regime is completely incompetent, the "action is in the reaction" - that is to say that the French are getting involved with their own military operation in Syria and they are doing so in coordination with the Russians. So, at this point in time, I suggest focusing on that.

But first, let's look at the really important development this week.

Russia dramatically increases her anti-Daesh operations

While you can read my initial assessment here, the dramatic surge in Russian strikes against Daesh is important enough to take a more detailed look at it.

First, in purely military terms, what the Russians did was both predictable (and I had predicted just that for several weeks now) and highly significant. The small Russian contingent at the Khmeimim air base in Latakia was, if amazingly skilled and outright heroic, simply too small to really hurt Daesh. Keep in mind that Russia does not have the kind of power projection capabilities the USA has and that regardless of that disadvantage, the Russian succeeded in creating a full airport capable of supporting the 24/7 night and day operation of about 50 aircraft in a record time. And they did that without the Empire ever getting any good intelligence about what the Russians were up to. By the time the Empire understood what the Russians had done, it was way too late to stop them. In terms of organization and logistics, this was an absolutely brilliant operation and the folks who organized it most certainly deserve to get a medal and promotion for it. I mention that here because it was probably simply impossible to bring in a bigger force. Even right now the Khmeimim air base is over-saturated with flights and the extra aircraft flow in will make a very difficult situation even worse. This is why I predicted that the long-range aviation would have to be brought in at least as a stop-gap measure until either a "Khmeimim 2" airport is built near Latakia or another airfield(s) become(s) available (maybe in Iran). Bottom line is this: bombing or not bombing, the Russians had no choice but to bring in the long-range aviation.

Second, and this is significant, the Russians clearly decided to take advantage of the fact that the long-range aviation was not constrained by any logistical difficulties: the force they brought in this time around is a big and powerful one: not only will another 37 aircraft now join the Russian force in Syria (including the formidable SU-34: to the 4 already present in Syria another 8 will be added for a total force of 12), but 25 long-range bombers are now fully dedicated to the Russian effort, including Tu-22M3, Tu-95MC and Tu-160. Now this is a "big stick". Even the "old" Tu-95MC and Tu-22M3 are highly modernized versions of excellent airframes who can deliver plenty of very powerful and highly accurate munitions in any weather conditions, including gravity bombs and strategic cruise missiles. In other words, Russia has at least doubled her Syria-based capabilities and much more than doubled it if the Russia-based long-range bombers are included. From being a small force, the Russian air force contingent now dwarfs what the French will bring in on their Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier and what the Empire has been using until now. We can now expect the Daesh logistics, communications and infrastructure to suffer a major degradation. And just to make sure that it hurts were it counts, the Russians began their long-range attacks with strikes on oil processing and distribution networks, including depots, trucks, fueling stations, etc. The Russian long-range bombers will not make a big difference to the Daesh frontline fighters, but their attacks on the Daesh infrastructure will free the Russian helicopters and Su-25s to finally provide close air support to the Syrian forces (so far, this task was mostly limited to the Syrian Air force which cannot fly at night). I also believe that the current SU-24 and SU-34 force will also be given much more frontline attack missions to provide the Syrians with much needed firepower. Bottom line: the Russians have brought in a "big stick" and this time Daesh will really hurt. But, remember, Daesh wanted exactly that (see above).

Third. The Kremlin did an excellent job of "selling" this dramatic increase of the pace and intensity of Russian operations in Syria. Polls show that most Russians fully approve. However, from personal contacts in Russia, I am told that they approve but are getting very uncomfortable. There is no denying that Russia has now suffered from what I like to call a "mandate creep": from going in to support the Syrians and fighting the Takfiri crazies away from home rather than at home, Russia is now promising retribution for the murder of her citizens. Putin made that absolutely clear when he said that military forces and special services will be used to hunt down the perpetrators of this atrocity. He said:

We will find and punish these criminals. We will do this with no limitation period. We will find out all their names. Will will hunt them down everywhere, regardless of where they are hiding. We will find them in any location on the planet and we will punish them. (...).

He even added a "Dubya" -like warning that anybody supporting or protecting them will be fully responsible for the consequences of doing so.

All those who might try to render assistance to these criminals must know that the consequences for such a protection will lie entirely upon them.

Keep in mind that the last time Putin issued such a warning was in 1999 when he promised that Russia would hunt down the Chechen Wahabi terrorist everywhere, "even in toilets", and kill every one of them. At this occasion Putin used a colorful Russian slang idiom "мочить" which can very roughly be translated as "off them off" (or even to "f**king blast them"). What is less remembered is that the Russians did just that: they killed every single Takfiri insurgency leader including Baraev, Dudaev, Maskhadov, Iandarbiev, Hattab, Raduev, Basaev and many many others. Some of these executions were botched (Iandarbiev) some were superb (Dudaev, Hattab). But Putin got every single one of them. Every one. Putin has just made exactly the same threat, though in more diplomatic terms. And while most Russian agree with Putin, and while they know that he does not make empty threats, they also realize that suddenly a small and local military operation has turned into a potentially worldwide chase for terrorists. Considering how poorly the USA did just that after 9/11 there are plenty of good reasons to be worried. But I would also immediately add that most Russians also realize that Putin and Dubya are in different leagues and that while the USA seems to be chronically unable to do anything right "Russia does not start wars - she ends them" (as the expression goes in Russia). Bottom line: I believe that the Russians will not repeat the mistakes made by the clueless US Neocons and that the hunt for Daesh leaders is now on.

Fourth. There is an uncanny political dimension to this about which I am frankly very unsure. Everybody in Russia knows that Qatar is the prime sponsor of terrorism in Syria and in Egypt. How will the Kremlin square that knowledge with the publicly made promise to punish every person guilty for the murder of 224 Russian citizens in anybody's guess. Since Qatar is basically one giant US base, there is no way to strike at Qatar without hitting the CENTCOM. Alternatively, the Russians could decided to hunt down and kill specific Qatari officials in various "accidents". What is certain is that the Russian foreign intelligence service - SVR - has teams capable of such actions (Zaslon, Vympel), as does the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff - GRU - which has Spetsnaz GRU officer teams and special operation forces SSO units capable of such operations. For better deniability (assuming that is a goal), the Russians might also use their deep connections inside the Russian mob (quite a few of whom are ex-secret services, especially in the middle-ranks) to "subcontract" such an operation. Whatever options the Kremlin choses, I would not sleep well if I was a Qatari official involved in this atrocity. Bottom line: Putin has publicly made it a point of personal honor to get every single one of the bastards responsible, regardless of where or who they are, and I strongly believe that he will deliver on that promise.

Fifth. There are other nations besides Qatar who are also very much co-sponsors of Daesh. They include Turkey (and, by extension, NATO), the KSA and even the Ukraine (see here and here). Potentially, all of them can become targets of Russian retaliation (whatever form it takes). Finally, there are all the western financial institution who are providing crucial services for Daesh, including many involving the export of oil from Daesh controlled territory and the import of modern weapon (primarily US-made) into Daesh territory. The list is long and the fact that the Russians have now openly threatened a long list of powerful entities is certainly a dramatic increase in the scope of the Russian involvement in this war.

Sixth. As with any escalation the stakes and the risks for Russia have now sharply increased. The timeframe has now officially changed from "about three months" to "as long as needed", the size and nature of the force committed now fully engages the Russian political prestige and all of the above makes Russia a prime target for Daesh retaliation, both inside and outside Russia. Now that Putin has officially declared that Russian special services are tasked with the elimination of those who blew up the Russian aircraft, the use of some kind of "boots on the ground", even if these are "special boots", becomes much more likely. For somebody like myself who has always been very reluctant about the use of military force it is disturbing to see how rapidly Russia is getting pulled-in into the war in Syria with no exit strategy I can discern, at least not in the foreseeable future. I personally do not believe that the Russians will send in boots, but I cannot say that I am categorically certain that this will not happen. Currently unpredictable events might well force them to.

The attacks in Paris

Tragic and horrible as these attacks were, the first thing that comes to my mind is the obscene difference in which the western media and zombified public treated 129 (provisional figure) murdered French and 224 murdered Russians. We had the "Je Suis Charlie" abomination and now we have the "Je Suis Paris" collective (planetary!) grief-fest. I don't recall any "Je Suis Russie", or "Je Suis Donbass" grief-fests? Or any "Je Suis Aleppo" or even "Je Suis Iraq". Apparently, Russian or Arab lives matter a hell of a lot less than US or French lives (even if only in Iraq the body count is well over a million!). This is disgusting, unworthy of respect, utterly dishonest and terminally stupid. This is no "homage" to any victims, but your garden variety media-induced hysteria. The West ought to be ashamed of such pathetic lack of simple courage and maturity. Truly, did they really believe that they can play at such "terrorist games" and not eventually get hurt themselves (by a false flag or otherwise)?! Did not Putin warn the West of exactly that when he said:

I'm urged to ask those who created this situation: do you at least realize now what you've done? But I'm afraid that this question will remain unanswered, because they have never abandoned their policy, which is based on arrogance, exceptionalism and impunity. (...) In fact, the Islamic State itself did not come out of nowhere. It was initially developed as a weapon against undesirable secular regimes. (...) The situation is extremely dangerous. In these circumstances, it is hypocritical and irresponsible to make declarations about the threat of terrorism and at the same time turn a blind eye to the channels used to finance and support terrorists, including revenues from drug trafficking, the illegal oil trade and the arms trade. It is equally irresponsible to manipulate extremist groups and use them to achieve your political goals, hoping that later you'll find a way to get rid of them or somehow eliminate them. I'd like to tell those who engage in this: Gentlemen, the people you are dealing with are cruel but they are not dumb. They are as smart as you are. So, it's a big question: who's playing who here? The recent incident where the most "moderate" opposition group handed over their weapons to terrorists is a vivid example of that. We consider that any attempts to flirt with terrorists, let alone arm them, are short-sighted and extremely dangerous. This may make the global terrorist threat much worse, spreading it to new regions around the globe, especially since there are fighters from many different countries, including European ones, gaining combat experience with Islamic State. Unfortunately, Russia is no exception. Now that those thugs have tasted blood, we can't allow them to return home and continue with their criminal activities. Nobody wants that, right?

Prophetic words by Putin indeed. But since the AngloZionists have a long and "distinguished" tradition of using death-squads, vicious dictatorships and, of course, terrorists, Putin's words were ignored. Heck, even after the Paris attacked the West is still supporting Nazis in the Ukraine! I suppose it will take some Nazi atrocity in London, Warsaw or Munich to wake up the zombified western general public to the simple reality that sponsoring and using terrorist is always a very dangerous policy. If not, then the West will continue on a neverending cycle of terrorism sponsoring and grief-fests, over and over again.

[Sidebar: I am often criticized for stating that Russia is not part of the West, ever was, and never will be. If you believe that I am wrong, ask yourself a simple question: why is it that Russian victims of atrocities (including Western sponsored atrocities!) are treated just like Black or Brown people and not like the other putatively "civilized" Whites? QED.]

Oh how much I wish most people in the West could understand Russian read the Russians newspapers, watch Russian talkshows or listen to Russian conferences! They would see something which they have been conditioned to consider impossible: far from fearing the West, most Russians find it crippled with narrow-minded consumerism, devoid from any real moral or ethical values, fantastically ignorant and provincial and suffering from terminal infantilism. Even the tiny pro-Western minority has now given up on defending the West and, at most, it retorts against the typical tsunami of anti-western arguments something like "what about us - are we not as bad?" or even "let's not sink down to their level!". It is quite amazing to see that happening in a country which used to almost worship anything western just 20-30 years ago! I should add that if the most despised and ridiculed country must, of course, be Poland, France is not far behind in the list of "most pathetic", As for the USA, it is the least despised adversary simply because most Russian respect the US for defending whatever it perceives has its national interests and for making Europe it's "bitch". The Russians always say that to get something done one must talk to the USA and not waste time with its European colony.

If we look beyond all that rather shameful display of narcissistic self-pity, the real question is what is France going to do about it? Here again, there are two dimensions:

First, in purely military terms France will now commit the Charles de Gaulle with its wing of Rafales to the strikes on Daesh. Good, but compared to what the Russians are brining to the fight, it's really irrelevant.

Second, in purely political terms, the French just might do something very interesting: apparently they have agreed with the Russians that the Russian forces in Syria will provide "cover" for the French. I am not really sure why a Rafale would need "cover" but whatever - what matters here is that the French have de-facto entered into an alliance with Russia over Syria and that, in turn, could open the door for other western countries. In other words, we just might (finally!) see a multi-national Russian-lead alliance take on the fight with Daesh and that, in turn, means that these countries would de-facto find themselves allied with Damascus. If northern Europe walks in lockstep with Uncle Sam, countries of southern Europe (Italy? Greece?) might decide to assist the Russians, as might Egypt or Jordan. I am not sure that such a coalition will happen, but at least now it might and that, by itself, is also an interesting development. This being said, Hollande is about to meet Obama in the US and he will probably be told in no uncertain terms that he must not "play ally" with Russia. Considering how abjectly subservient Hollande has been the the USA, I am not optimistic at all about the French meaningfully joining forces with Russia.

Third, there is no doubt in my mind, but many others do disagree, that the Zionist regime in power in Paris is making the maximal use of all these events to stir up an anti-Muslim hysteria in France. And I am not talking about the stupidity of insisting to serve an non-halal meal with wine to an Iranian leader who also happens to be a cleric, or the now "old" anti-hijab harassment in French schools. What I am talking about is the openly declared idea that traditional Islam is incompatible with the secular French Republic and that it therefore represents a danger to society. Conversely, the only "good" form of Islam is one of abject collaborationism with the Zionist regime typified by the infamous Hassen Chalghoumi, Imam of the mosque in Drancy. The message is xclear: the only "good Muslim" is a Zionist Muslim. All others are potential or actual, terrorists and shall be treated as such. That, in turn, makes it easier for Takfiri recruiters to find more volunteers for their terrorist operations which, in turn, make it possible to the regime to pass even more draconian laws, including laws against free speech or Internet freedom. Being a real, pious and practicing, Muslim in France will become very, very hard in the near future. It certainly appears to me that the warnings of Sheikh Imran Hosein are coming true.

The unknown "breaking point" of Daesh

After six weeks of very hard fighting Russia has brought in the big stick, but those who expect Daesh to collapse under Russian air operations should not rejoice too soon. Breaking Daesh will probably take a much bigger effort. But let me explain why I am saying "probably".

For the first time in many weeks and months Daesh is truly in a difficult situation, not a desperate one yet, but a difficult one. Unless something changes in the current dynamic, time is now beginning to run against Daesh. Still, the resilience of Daesh in the current conditions is close to impossible to predict, at least without some very good information from the frontlines and that is something which most analysts, including myself, don't have. When a force is put under pressure the way Daesh has been, there is a breaking point somewhere in the future at which point the force collapses really fast. The problem is that it is extremely difficult to estimate how far away in time such a (wholly theoretical) breaking point might be because it really depends on the morale and determination of the Daesh fighters on the ground. All we can say at this point in time is that such a breaking point exists in a theoretical future and that we hope that it will be reached soon. But we also have to be aware that this might not be the case at all. Not only that, but we have to take a long hard look at the most puzzling issue of them all: why did Daesh deliberately place itself in such a position. Here are a few hypotheses I can come up with:

1) Daesh leaders are crazed lunatics. They are in such a hurry to get to heaven that all they want is to die in combat against the infidels. Alternatively, they are so deluded about their power that they think that they can take on the entire planet and prevail. While I cannot discount this hypothesis completely, I find it highly unlikely simply because even if the rank-and-file Takfiri is an ignorant goat herder, the middle and top level commanders are clearly sophisticated and well-educated.

2) Daesh has outlived its utility for the AngloZionist Empire and now it is sent into a battle it cannot win, but which will kill off thousands of now useless liver-eating sociopaths. Maybe. I don't know where any evidence to support this hypothesis could be found, but this one at least make sense to me.

3) The real purpose for Daesh has always been the same: to inflict such damage to the entire Middle-East that, by comparison, an Israeli occupation would appear as a liberation to the few lucky ones who would survive the medieval horrors meted out by Daesh on a daily basis on all the territories it controls. So the bigger and the bloodier the fight, the better for the Israelis who have taken a relatively strong state controlled by relatively strong Baathist leaders - Assad p�re et fils - and who have now turned it into a heap of smoldering ruins. The problem with this theory is that unless something changes Daesh will not win, but lose, and that Assad will come out not weaker, but much stronger. And I won't even mention the fact that Syria now has a small, but battle hardened military whereas the putatively "invincible" Tsahal only is experienced at shooting unarmed civilians. So if there was an Israeli plan to prepare for a future "Grand Israel" it backfired pretty badly.

Frankly, I find none of the hypotheses above really convincing and that makes me nervous. The question which always haunts all analysts is "what am I missing" and, in this case, it also haunts me. I honestly cannot imagine that the Daesh leaders would sincerely believe that they can win the kind of "war against everybody" they apparently are determined to fight. I would hope that somebody with better understanding of Daesh, fluent in Arabic and well-versed in Takfiri literature would give us all the reply to this apparently simple question: what does Daesh really want? I will gladly admit that I have no idea. And that worries me a lot.

The Resistance and its options

Seven weeks into the Russian intervention, the Resistance to the Empire is doing well and it still has the potential to intensify its struggle. First and foremost, what is most needed at this point in time are more combatants on the ground. I still believe that the Russians are not going to provide ground troops for Syria. My guess is that Hezbollah is pretty close to being maxed out. Unless I am missing something, this means that the only party capable of providing many more combatants on the ground is Iran. Right now, the official line out of Moscow, is that one of the goals of the Russian intervention is to give the Syrians enough time to reorganize and field a much bigger force. Maybe. I hope that they can do that soon enough to fully use the momentum created by the Russian intervention.

As for the Russians, they are also coming close to being maxed out. In terms of air force, they could have allocated even more aircraft, but they did not do so simply because they know that there is only that much any air force can do when intervening in a civil war. Still, this time around the Russians really "mean business": According to the latest figures, the latest Russian strikes was formidable: ten ships from the Caspian Sea and the Mediterranean coordinated strategic cruise missile strikes on Daesh targets (18 cruise missiles were fired by only four ships the Caspian Sea flotilla see footage here: https://youtu.be/yf2SZ_gjtA0). According to official figures, in just four days, the Russian air force have conducted 522 sorties, deploying more than 100 cruise missiles and 1,400 tons of bombs of various types. Just one cruise missile strike in Deir ez-Zor had killed more than 600 militants. Clearly, Daesh is taking a formidable beating (the "pretend airstrikes" of the US-lead "pretend coalition" probably gave them a false sense of security of what an angry superpower can *really* do when it means it).

I am quite certain that Russia can keep up this pace of operations for a long while: while the stocks of the latest "Kalibr-NK" are reportedly low, Russia is now using a lot of her immense Cold War arsenal where there stocks of cruise missiles and gravity bombs are plentiful. Russia will run out of targets long before she runs out of these strategic weapons. This is no joke, by the way: it makes no sense to fire multi-million Ruble cruise missiles at non-lucrative, secondary or even tactical targets. The situation is better with relatively cheaper gravity bombs, but the biggest problem is that Daesh targets will eventually split into two groups: destroyed ones and well hidden ones. At this point the Russian intervention will not become useless, but it will reach a point of diminishing marginal returns, both in a financial and in a strategic sense. This happened to the USA and NATO in Kosovo and it happened to Israel in Lebanon. Of course, the AngloZionists then switched their attention to what they call "infrastructure" and "support" target destruction, but which are basically terror strikes against the civilian population. Russia will not engage in such systematic policy of war crimes and thus the option of bombing Raqqa into oblivion is not something we will see the Russians do (the US, in contrast, probably will). This leaves only the naval component of the Russian task force.

The main task of the Russian naval task force has been to protect the Russian logistics and to provide air defenses to the newly built airbase with Latakia. Apparently, Russian denial notwithstanding, there are S-400s in Khmeimim, but if not, we can assume that S-300s are there. So the air-defense task for the Russian naval task force is now been replaced by a role of support for the Russian logistical effort which I expect to not only continue, but even to also sharply increase. This is where the Russians can do the most good and where they are not maxed out: help the Syrians reequip, reassemble, reorganize, retrain and *finally* provide them with relatively modern equipment (at least on par with what Daesh has). My guess is that after 4 years of war the Syrians need literally *everything* and this is were the Russians can play a crucial role.

The current Russian naval task force allocated to Syria is far from being trivial, see for yourself:

This is by no means a small force. Still, there have been some speculations that the Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov might join the naval task force off the Syrian coast. I find that rather unlikely. Unlike the US aircraft carriers, the Admiral Kuznetsov was designed from day 1 to be primarily an anti-aircraft platform (primarily to protect the Russian submarine bastions) and not as a landstrike aircraft carrier. The Russians are currently reconsidering this role, but for the time being the Kuznetsov has very limited landstrike capabilities. Of course, if needed, the Kuznetsov could be used to strengthen the air-defense capabilities of Syria or the Russian contingent in Syria, but that is not something which will directly affect Daesh. Still, I would not count out the Kuznetsov either: according to the latest reports, she will be sent to a patrolling area off the Kola Peninsula, but that is not set in stone.

In terms of direct attack support, a possible Russian option would be to use submarine-based cruise missiles, but with 25 long-range strategic bombers already allocated to this task, this would not be a game changer either. My feeling is that the Russians are now as strongly committed as they can be. The only thing they could do now would be to increase the flow of modern weapons to Syria and to provide the technical personnel to train the Syrians. In my opinion this, along with an energetic political campaign to force the West to accept the facts on the ground, is the most likely Russian strategy for the future: continue to pound Daesh, while re-building the Syrian military and "engaging" Russia's western "partners".

Frankly, I will conclude by saying that I find this Russian strategy as militarily sound as it is morally correct. Russia cannot win this war "for" the Syrians. The best thing Russian can do is to provide meaningful help, and that she is very much doing.

With Hezbollah probably maxed-out, the big unknown is Iran: will the Iranians dare to bring in a much larger contingent of ground-forces to take the pressure off the Syrians? I hope not - because that would mean that the Syrian could do well even without such aid, but I still consider an Iranian surge as very likely.

As for the Syrians, Assad has just declared that he would not leave power before the defeat of Daesh. In other words, Assad has just turned the tables on the West and declared that the "departure" (i.e. elimination) of Daesh is now a pre-condition of his departure. Only time will show whether this is grandstanding or true confidence.

What about the "Indispensable Nation":

I realize that bashing the USA is always a popular exercise, but for all my hostility to the AngloZionist Empire I also have to admit that the US is in a very bad and complicated position: it has created a bloody mess (literally), then it painted itself into a political corner, and all of its so-called 'regional allies' are, I believe, inherently disloyal and pursue their own interests. If you look at the relationship between the USA, on one hand, and countries like Turkey, Qatar, the KSA or Israel on the other, it really is hard to establish who uses whom and whether what we are seeing is a case of a tail wagging the dog. Take Qatar: there is no doubt that the presence of CENTCOM in Qatar gave the Qatari a strong sense of impunity which, in turn, bred arrogance and, frankly, irresponsibility. The Qatari wanted Assad "out" so they could get their gas to the Mediterranean, but now they are directly involved in the bombing of a Russian airliner. As for their much wanted pipeline, they can forget it for at least a decade now. How smart was that? More relevantly: is Qatar a good ally for the USA? What about Turkey which is actively supporting, financing, equipping and training Daesh (and al-Qaeda - same difference!) under the convenient protection of NATO. They apparently cannot decide which is worse: Assad or the Kurds, and since they fear them both, they end up in bed with liver-eating sociopaths. Is that a good ally for the USA? I won't even go into the Israeli issue - we all know that AIPAC runs Congress and the Neocons try run the White House. None of which elicits any big love or loyalty from the Israelis who are constantly looking at the "Russian option" (partnering up with Russia) to get things done in the Middle-East. Besides, since the slow-mo genocide of Palestinians by the Ziocrazies currently in power is continuing, being allied to the Israelis means being hated by everybody else. Still, at least and unlike the other "regional allies" of the USA, the Israeli regime itself is stable, fairly predictable and can unleash an immense amount of violence. So compared to the Saudis, the Israelis look outright attractive. Still, at the end of the day, the USA has to try to get out of this mess without alienating its allies too much, but also without being manipulated by them.

Some seem to believe that the correct policy for the USA would be to work together with Russia. While this would undoubtedly make sense for the USA as a country, it would make no sense at all for the USA as an Empire. For the US (AngloZionist) Empire and the "deep state" forces which run it Russia is, indeed, a far bigger threat because Russia directly threatens the imperial status of the USA. The USA can either be the "Indispensable Nation" and world hegemon, or a "normal country" part of a civilized and multipolar world system ruled by the rule of law. It cannot be (or do) both. So when the US "deep state" is categorical in its refusal to do anything meaningful with Russia, it does act logically, at least from its point of view. As any other Empire, the USA sees its relationship with any competitor (actual or possible) as a zero-sum game which means that anything good for Russia is bad for the USA and vice-versa. Yes, this is sick and sociopathic, but this is how all Empires function. Hence the current US policies: the only good coalition is a US-lead one, any anti-Russian force must be supported, there will be no negotiations with Russia - only demands and ultimatums, etc. Add to this the apparently total lack of well-educated and competent diplomats (Americans get killed in every single negotiation they have conducted with the Russians), and you will see why the US is so averse to any notion of being anything other than hostile and confrontational with Russia.

The USA is in a terrible mess, the upcoming elections are only making matters worse and that makes the USA highly unpredictable. Yes, there is, I suppose, a small chance that the French might set a precedent for collaboration with Russia, but I am not holding my breath here. Maybe if another massacre is committed in Europe, especially Germany, but even that is a long shot. Still, there have been cases in history when a slave gave some good advice to his master and maybe this will happen this time around. I sure hope so.

Addendum: was I wrong about my predictions about the Russian intervention in Syria?

I think that this is a good time to reply to those who have accused me of being wrong about the Russian intervention in Syria. I could have done that as soon as these accusations were made, but I concluded that to do so in the flag-waving "go Russia! go!" kind of atmosphere this was futile. Many at that time were sure that this was the "showdown of the century" (no less), a "game changer" and that it was all "over" for Daesh. Seven weeks into this intervention, I propose to revisit what I actually said.

First, I never said that no military intervention would take place. In fact, I repeated over and over again that I cannot prove a negative and that an intervention *might* take place, I even suggested one (limited to intelligence support, training and weapons). All I said that the kind of intervention which was discussed 7-8 weeks ago would not take place: no Russian boots, no MiG-31, no forces in Damascus, no Russian SSBNs, no Airborne Forces, etc. And, indeed, that kind of intervention did not happen. Furthermore, I also said that the notion that Russia could "protect" Syria from NATO is laughable. It still is! Does anybody still seriously believe that the Russian contingent in Syria really has that kind of capabilities?! If so, I got a bridge to sell them. Now, I will gladly admit that I did not think that Putin would agree to what I consider an extremely daring and risky option of sending a very small force into Syria, a force just barely big enough to (maybe) give enough relief for the Syrians to reorganize and counter-attack. That I did, indeed, miss. As did everybody else who predicted a *much* larger Russian intervention (with MiG-31s and all the rest of the nonsense). I will also admit that I am still amazed at the fact that the Russians, who are both intervention-averse and risk-averse, did go for such a risky move and I marvel at the superb way they executed their operation. But they way they actually did it is something which nobody predicted.

Second, I also got in trouble for raising the alarm about the limited capabilities inherent to any air operation and, specifically, to a rather small Russian one. Now that the Russians had to use their cruise missiles and strategic aviation (which I did predict, by the way) is there anybody who will deny that I was right about the limitation of using airpower against Daesh, especially with the low number of aircraft initially brought in?

Third, I did point out that the Russian law and general public are extremely foreign intervention averse. That is still very true and that is still limiting the Kremlin's options. This is why Russian officials go out of their way to stress that the Russian intervention in Syria is primarily in Russia's national interest.

I want to set the record straight today not because of some ruffled feathers or a hurt ego, but because I am sick and tired of having to reply to a toxic combo of strawman accusations and j ingoistic predictions. High-fiving, flag waving and back-slapping are all very fine unless you are the one sent into combat. Then they become obscene.

There are those out there (quite a few, in fact), who accuse me of "pessimism" and of writing "defeatist" analyses when what is needed is "uplifting" and "inspiring" essays. If that is the accusation, then I plead "guilty as charged". But I will also add that this is not how I see my role. My role is to write truthful and honest analyses regardless of whether they are received as "uplifting" or "pessimistic". There are plenty of "inspiring" and "uplifting" blogs out there, so if that is what you are in to, you know where to find them.

Finally, I also got into trouble for saying early on that one ought to wait for facts before coming to conclusions about what happened to Flight 9268 and for saying that my personal working hypothesis was that it was a bomb. Then I was accused of being na�ve when I said that I did not believe that the Russians would lie about it. I know that there are still those who believe that the Israelis did it or that some kind of directed energy weapon did it. Whatever. There never was a shred of evidence to support either one of these hypotheses and I very much doubt that the future will bring any. To which we will be told that "the absence of evidence is not the evidence of absence". Again - whatever. It is also possible that a swarm of subatomic UFOs did it. "Possible" is a very low standard since almost anything is possible. But is it "probable" or "likely"? As soon as the "evidentiary bar" is raise just above the "possible" level all these theories instantly collapse. Again, while others are welcome to explore all sorts of "possible" hypotheses, I personally will stick to those who are at least probable.

At the end of the day it is you - the reader - who gets to pick and chose whatever you like. There is a big and diverse blogosphere out there and that is a very good thing. I strive to present fact-based and logical analyses and I am not trying to win a popularity contest of "inspire" you (-: unless, of course, you find fact-based and logical analyses inspiring :-)

Having clarified this, I won't do that again the next time I am accused of writing what I never wrote or of failing to cheer on the good guys.

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 #24
The International New York Times
November 24, 2015
Putin's Emergency Politics
By Maxim Trudolyubov
Maxim Trudolyubov is editor-at-large at the business newspaper Vedomosti, writes The Russia File blog for the Kennan Institute, and is a Richard von Weizs�cker fellow at the Bosch Academy in Berlin.

Much has changed for Vladimir Putin since the terror attacks in Paris. The trope that aggressions in Crimea and Ukraine show that he is more of a threat to the West than ISIS was useful to President Obama's critics, but that's now older than yesterday's news. Given the joint French-Russian airstrikes against ISIS in Syria last week, Russia is now a de facto Western ally. Putin the pariah has a shot at redemption, or so it might seem.

Just weeks ago, Fran�ois Hollande declared that the Russian leader was "not our ally in Syria," and warned - albeit obliquely - that Mr. Putin should refrain from propping up President Bashar al-Assad's murderous regime. In August, France canceled the delivery of two Mistral helicopter carriers to Russia, selling them to Egypt instead. But the tables have turned. This week, the French president plans trips to Moscow and Washington to foster Russian-American cooperation in stamping out the Islamic State.

Mr. Putin is a proven master at manipulating emergencies - real or imagined - to get what he wants. Witness how he consolidated his hold on power by skillfully distorting the nature of his domestic critics and has used the threat of extremism to re-centralize Russia's political system. In essence, he applies his own brand of emergency politics to keeping the country in a near-constant state of alarm; security takes precedence over political, legal and marketplace freedoms.

Until the Paris attacks, the prospects for Mr. Putin's Middle East adventure were not looking good. Russia was bolstering the Assad regime's air force, but neither the Syrian Army nor its Iranian allies were showing any real gains against rebels on the ground, and ISIS was not a primary target. Then, on Oct. 31, a Russian passenger jet carrying tourists home from Egypt went down in the Sinai Peninsula. It looked like Mr. Putin had led his nation into a deadly quagmire, and his innocent countrymen were paying the price.

Though the Russians must have known that a bomb had destroyed the jetliner, the Kremlin stopped short of officially declaring a terrorist attack, thereby freeing Mr. Putin from a political obligation to retaliate. Instead, in a difficult logistical operation, some 70,000 Russian tourists were evacuated from Egypt, their luggage sent home separately by military transport. The details were broadcast in news reports that were surreal even by the state-run media's standards; no political context or reasons for the evacuation were given. Since no one seemed to know the reasons for the crash, the reactions of the victims' families were generally subdued.

Then, on Thursday, Nov. 12, ISIS suicide bombers struck a Beirut marketplace, killing 43 people. The next day, Paris was hit. Mr. Putin seized the initiative. On Sunday, Nov. 15, he used the G-20 summit meeting in Antalya, Turkey, to meet privately with Mr. Obama and apparently signaled his willingness to compromise on Mr. Assad's place in the future of Syria. On Monday, Nov. 16, he and Mr. Hollande agreed to coordinated airstrikes against ISIS. On Tuesday, Nov. 17, he announced that the Russian airliner had in fact been downed by a terrorist's bomb, and vowed vengeance.

"We will search for them everywhere, no matter where they are hiding," he declared. "We will find them in any place on the planet and will punish them." As he spoke, Russian missiles were already being launched from the Mediterranean into the ISIS stronghold in Raqqa.

To Putin watchers, the performance was familiar. In September 1999, then-Prime Minister Putin launched a war against Chechen separatists with a vow that the Kremlin would "pursue terrorists everywhere, and if we catch them in the toilet, we'll ice them in the toilet."

That war defined Mr. Putin as a leader. His goal, then in Chechnya, now in Syria, is to tame a restive region by giving a free hand to a loyal warlord, no matter how brutal, who will crush all jihadists, separatists and rivals in order to maintain stability.

Just as he rose to Russian leadership on a wave of crisis 16 years ago, Mr. Putin is now re-entering the world stage at a moment when France and its West European neighbors are in a state of high alert. (As the journalist Leonid Bershidsky has pointed out, he probably considers himself to be more expert in crushing terrorism than any other head of state in the world today.) Because of Moscow's expanded stake in the Middle East conflict, no significant decisions regarding the West's response to ISIS are now possible without the Kremlin. The United States must take into account Franco-Russian cooperation. President Obama, who on Sunday called upon Mr. Putin to align himself with the Western coalition against ISIS, was set to meet on Tuesday with Mr. Hollande, who, in turn, will hold talks with the Russian leader on Thursday in Moscow.

It would be well for both men to remember that Mr. Putin moves fast. By jumping to help Mr. Hollande he subtly undermines trans-Atlantic ties. The Crimean crisis is long gone and Ukraine is rapidly becoming a distant subject. When it comes up again before Russian and Western diplomats, the Kremlin will surely push to link Russia's partnership on Syria with Western concessions on Ukraine.

Though it's difficult to guess what concessions Mr. Putin might demand in exchange for Russian cooperation against ISIS, it is quite clear what he wants on Ukraine: A redrawn constitution, elections that install a pro-Moscow government, and a settlement of the fighting that will keep the country in the Kremlin's orbit.

Mr. Putin is once more at the top of his game at a time when an anxious West is on high alert. He has made clear his stance: stronger border controls, strict limits to refugee flows, and a general consolidation of the administrative power of the state. These policies have many supporters in Europe. Are we to witness a convergence of sorts? What's the next move in this international game of three-dimensional chess? Ask Mr. Obama, or Mr. Hollande.

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 #25
Government.ru
November 19, 2015
News conference by Dmitry Medvedev
The Prime Minister answered questions from journalists following the APEC Leaders' Meeting.

Question: Anastasia Savinykh, ITAR-TASS. Mr Medvedev, Russia has long been advocating integration cooperation. Yesterday, you met with Pacific Alliance leaders. Did you reach any agreements? What did you discuss, in general?

Dmitry Medvedev: The APEC Leaders' Meeting, which has been held in the Philippines, mostly focused on regional cooperation. There is the APEC group, which has not expanded in the past few years, but the issue has been put back on its agenda, and there are also other regional groups, for example the Pacific Alliance, which was established in 2012. It is true that such a meeting was held yesterday on the proposal of forum organisers, including Peru, which is a member of both APEC and the Pacific Alliance.

The idea is to develop comprehensive cooperation between these two groups. The Pacific Alliance, which is a group of Latin American countries, is expanding, and we can expect it to continue to expand. At the same time, it has common interests with some of the APEC economies. Each of these two groups has their achievements and also different opinions on the development of international trade.

I believe this is a positive example of ways to promote cooperation. Yesterday, we supported the idea of cooperation between these groups, APEC and the Pacific Alliance, so as to make use of both groups' economic development models. I hope it will be fruitful.

Question: Ksenia Golovanova, Interfax. Mr Medvedev, you made a rather hard-line statement on your arrival in Manila, when you spoke about the need to pool the efforts of all countries in the fight against terrorism. Did you raise the issue of establishing a broad international coalition at the meeting or during bilateral contacts with APEC partners? If so, was this Russian initiative supported by our US partners?

Dmitry Medvedev: The APEC meeting deals with economic issues; this organisation does not discuss security issues. However, considering the recent developments, this issue was raised by virtually each APEC participant, each delegation head, including the presidents and prime ministers and everyone else, during conversations. This is true. No matter who I spoke with, virtually everyone started the conversation by offering their condolences to Russia and the French Republic. And, of course, this eventually led to a discussion on counter-terrorism measures.

The agenda did not include any anti-terrorist issues, but I discussed them with my colleagues during our private conversations. Naturally, everyone wanted to receive more detailed information about what happened, about our response, our plans and our current actions. In this sense, these conversations proved useful, and they'll also continue during the upcoming ASEAN summit.

Naturally, the concerned parties are voicing their stances openly and behind the scenes. You know our position, and other countries have their own positions, including the United States, and European countries, which is changing now. Indeed, I have voiced my position. After arriving here, I expressed my surprise over the fact that it was possible to sacrifice such complicated issues, basically, the interests of all people. You see, we're talking about a war on terror, a war that has been declared against the civilised world. Given this, we need to reach agreement instead of trying to find out who stands to gain, whether it should be done with Russia or not because Russia is allegedly behaving incorrectly, etc. I consider these assertions to be immature and undignified. But I hope our partners will modify their position after the latest events, and that this will eventually help establish an anti-terrorist coalition that can unite countries interested in eradicating terrorism in the Middle East and destroying the 'Islamic State' as it is. I believe that it is absolutely obvious to everyone now that the 'Islamic State' is, essentially, a kind of international terrorist group that threatens the entire civilised world. Naturally, we'll continue to maintain this effort. The President has conducted talks on this. Contact with the French president, among others, will continue soon, and consultations on this issue will continue at other levels.

Question: Tatyana Golovanova, the Sputnik news agency. Now is the high tourist season in the Asia Pacific countries, including Vietnam and Thailand. Has the possibility of increasing the number of tourists from Russia over the situation in Egypt been discussed and, most importantly, are our partners prepared to reinforce security?

Dmitry Medvedev: I have to admit that these issues have been discussed, because our partners, naturally, are closely watching what's going on. They are aware of our decision to suspend flights to Egypt and about the threats that exist in a number of regions and, of course, based on economic considerations they would like to get the resultant increase in tourism. I've discussed this with the president of Vietnam, the prime minister of Thailand and other colleagues informally, so to speak. In principle, they are ready and they assure us that they will implement proactive measures to ensure security, especially given that there are quite a few problems here in the Asia Pacific region, and it is also necessary to put things in order regarding the safety of tourists who come here to vacation. Additional opportunities are opening up.

Question: Pavel Zarubin, the Rossia TV network. It was recently announced that Russia is prepared to reschedule Ukraine's debt. Have we already submitted our proposals or not yet? When can we expect a response? And how do you think Kiev will respond?

Another question. 1 January is drawing near, when Russia can introduce a food embargo on Ukrainian products. The economic development minister mentioned this, among other things, yesterday. What is the likelihood, do you think, that Russia will have to introduce this embargo and what will be the implications for the Ukrainian economy?

Dmitry Medvedev: I'll start with the first part of the question, debt restructuring. We have made such proposals, in an absolutely partner-like tone, and I understand there has been contact between the Russian and Ukrainian finance ministers. Our position was also made known to the IMF. We're proposing preferential terms to restructure the credit: $1 billion each year starting next year. This is even better than what IMF representatives have asked us to do.

But if we agree to restructure this debt, our partners should agree to several conditions, which have been mentioned previously. Here they are again. First, they should stop acting up with regard to the sovereign character of this debt. It's clear to all upright people that the issue concerns the obligation of Ukraine as a state and not its companies. This is perfectly obvious, and everything else is mere speculation.

Second, it should be borne in mind that if we agree to restructure this debt, we will request guarantees that the other side won't change its mind later. Unfortunately, Kiev is likely to do just this in its current economic situation. What kind of guarantee can this be? It can be a guarantee from solvent states - the United States, the EU as a group, or individual EU members - or collateral provided by a top-tier European or any other comparable bank.

Third, a decision on this issue should be taken within three weeks, for during the next three weeks the issue of Ukraine  and its debts will be discussed and the the IMF, a key participant in these discussions , will need to change its own (lending) rules.  In short, a decision should be taken quickly.

And lastly, this debt will default in early December. If no decision on restructuring guarantees is taken, we will consider Ukraine as a state to be in arrears, which means in default. This is our current stance.  

Now the second part of the question, about the food embargo. There is nothing new here. Economic Development Minister Ulyukayev spoke about this yesterday. Indeed, as soon as Ukraine introduced so-called sanctions against Russia we told them: if that's what you want then we'll introduce sanctions against Ukraine, as we have against all states, including the European states that have introduced similar sanctions against Russia. However, we put the introduction of sanctions on hold only because our governments are in talks, with the participation of the EU, on the adaptation of terms for Ukraine's accession to the EU zone of free trade. We agreed with the EU that we would work on this for a year. Now the year is almost done. The results are zero, nothing yet. I regard the probability that some agreements will be achieved as very low. However, miracles do happen, including on issues such as these, so we are patiently waiting. If no agreements are reached, this pause will come to an end. The documents have been signed and one document says in no uncertain terms that it starts working on Ukraine (it has been put on hold) on 1 January 2016. This also applies to a number of other positions that we're not talking about now. Such are the decisions on the issue.

Ukraine's economic losses, I believe, will be significant. Some of our Ukrainian colleagues are plucking figures out of thin air. I believe it is rather difficult to estimate them. Even despite the decline in trade between Russia and Ukraine, it still amounts to hundreds of millions of dollars, because we still maintain a considerable volume of trade with Ukraine. How are they going to compensate for this? It's up to them. It has to be said that, the way I see it, these foodstuffs are not welcome at least in one place, in the EU, because the EU is overstocked with foodstuffs as it is. In addition, after Ukraine started collaborating with the EU and signed a free trade zone agreement, the EU made a "favourable" decision for Ukraine and imposed quotas on goods originating from Ukraine. What does this mean? It means that after this wonderful alliance emerged, the volume of supplies, supplies of products from Ukraine to the EU has declined, not increased. The Ukrainians themselves told me about this. If this is the kind of partnership they have, you can only shrug and say: Well, this is what you wanted and this is what you get. This is what the situation is. It's hopeless in terms of cooperation, but it was not our choice.

Question: Masha Glebova, RIA Novosti. I also have a question as a follow-up to the Ukrainian debt issue. Will Russia - as part of the debt negotiations - bring up the issue of lifting or easing Western sanctions against Russia? And if a debt rescheduling agreement is achieved, do you believe this could be a reason for the West to lift sanctions against Russia, at least partially?

Thank you.

Dmitry Medvedev: There is nothing I can say here. It wasn't we who imposed sanctions, but a number of Western countries. I have no idea what they are going to do. We haven't asked for anything from them and, of course, we won't start now. There is no point in it whatsoever. We are engaged in talks with Ukraine for one simple reason: Ukraine is a country very close to us, and, no matter what kind of political relations we have now, the people who live in Ukraine are very dear to us - as individuals and as a culture. Indeed, we have always had very close ties with Ukraine. Therefore, we are trying to negotiate with them on this loan as well, the loan that Ukraine wanted so much to obtain some time ago. For us, the sanctions are something that have absolutely nothing to do with this loan. It's up to them to decide what they should do. We are not setting any conditions in that regard. That is all.

Question: Channel One. Natalya Yuryeva. Back to holiday leaves and air transport. This year, Transaero, one of Russia's largest air carriers, filed for bankruptcy. Other airlines are also facing tougher times. The threat of terrorist attacks has inevitably led to security measures being tightened, which involves more expenses. Meanwhile, demand for air tickets is falling. Do you think it necessary to support Russian air carriers? Is the Government ready to provide such support? And will Russian air carriers, and not just Aeroflot alone, be able to survive in these conditions?

Dmitry Medvedev: I perfectly recall the times when Aeroflot was the only air carrier. I am not sure, however, that this was an ideal model, because if there is no one to compete with, this is not very good. But let me note that air transportation is a rather specific business.

Many large developed countries have only one air carrier. However, such carriers don't always provide quality services. But you're right, air transport in Russia is going through a hard time for two reasons: Transaero's bankruptcy and problems related to terrorism.

At a meeting that I held, we reviewed ways to provide support to air carriers. In all likelihood, we will have to adopt certain decisions, because air transport is a fairly complicated area in general. Here's what I think. I would like to see several air carriers operating in Russia, which could provide services to our people. In other words, they should be able to provide transport services in various directions. Indeed, following Transaero's bankruptcy, a considerable part of its business was taken over by Aeroflot, but this doesn't mean that other companies can't have their share of the market. As far as I know, talks are underway. If there's a need to support the market, I think we will be willing to look into it.

Question: Tatyana Grigoryants, Vesti FM Radio. As a follow-up, will there be any further restrictions on air travel to countries other than Egypt? Will there be any recommendations advising Russian tourists to refrain from trips abroad in the near future?

Dmitry Medvedev: Here's what I can tell you. As long as there are no obvious problems, no routes should be shut down. On the one hand, we must comply with the safety regulations (air carriers and the relevant services must do so in all countries, including ours), but, on the other hand, there must be clear information about what's going on. These issues are already being discussed. I would therefore like to say the following. So far, flights to only one country - the Arab Republic of Egypt - have been suspended, and this applies both to Russian and Egyptian carriers. This was done for security reasons. I cannot rule out a situation where we will have to consider similar restrictions in relation to other routes and other countries. But so far it hasn't been done, and I hope it never will.

Regarding recommendations, I can tell you this. Situations where a particular state recommends that its citizens not go to certain other countries is a fairly frequent occurrence worldwide. Even major states, such as the United States and European countries, do this for security reasons. In each case, there must be good reasons for doing so, and this decision is normally taken at the appropriate level. Once the decision comes into force, citizens of that particular country who go to a country which is included on the travel warning list do so at their own risk, because we can't prohibit people from going where they want to go. Clearly, anyone can get anywhere even if there's no air traffic to that particular country. Therefore, such recommendations are occasionally issued. At the moment, there are no such decisions, except, in fact, a decision that concerns the Arab Republic of Egypt by air transport.

Question (via interpreter): Asahi Agency. I have a question about the Trans-Pacific Partnership. In a statement on the completion of the relevant talks, the original term "welcome" was replaced by the word "note." Was this change made at Russia's request, because Russia doesn't support the TPP, or not?

Dmitry Medvedev: I'll start by saying that we never comment on the inner workings related to drafting a particular declaration or statement as to who wants what to be included in the final statement, who insists on this or that wording.

I can only tell you from my own experience, and I've attended many various summit meetings, that some or other country always insists on something. Sometimes, disputes concern such minor details that may seem trifling to an outsider, such as a comma in the wrong place, or an unacceptable modality or verb, and so on. So, I won't comment on this part of your question, because it's wrong to ask who insisted on what during the drafting of the declaration.

But I will answer the second part of your question, which concerns Russia's attitude to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). We have a calm attitude towards this form of trade cooperation, which is being advocated by the United States. We see how hard the US government, the US administration has been working to unite these countries. We also see that the Trans-Pacific Partnership has major potential, based on the high degree of economic integration, the absence of many obstacles and administrative problems, etc. We are glad that they have come to an agreement on this issue. It was hinted that Russia and several other countries would be welcome to join it, but I haven't seen any documents to this effect or official invitations. What is important, as I said during my address this morning, is that there are other forms of partnership and trade systems in the making. We have recently created the Eurasian Economic Union, which has signed a free trade area agreement with Vietnam. We may sign such agreements with other countries. We are willing to discuss this with Japan as well, if they are interested. But this process should be based on clear rules. In other words, the agreements that are being drafted, discussed or signed must not undermine the common trading rules. All these countries are members of the World Trade Organisation, and in view of this, all our ideas should comply with WTO rules. Besides, these discussions should be transparent and understandable to other countries that may be considering joining an alliance. Discussions must not be held behind closed doors. Unfortunately, the Trans-Pacific Partnership discussions were held behind closed doors. Now, if all of us stand for open trade based on modern rules, for removing obstacles to trade, and for liberalising international trade, as everyone claims to be, then these agreements should be prepared openly.

Those are our concerns. What will come of this agreement? We'll see.

Question (via interpreter): Manila Standard. Mr. Prime Minister, although Russia is not a party to territorial disputes in the South China Sea, would it be possible, if the international tribunal ruled in favour of the Philippines, that Russia would endorse that ruling?

Dmitry Medvedev: Indeed, we are not a party to the dispute. However, the dispute is there and it involves states that have an interest at stake. We have repeatedly stated our position through the Foreign Ministry and naturally, also in contact with our partners. I've talked about this, among other things. I can make it public. That won't be difficult. First of all, we believe that such disputes should be discussed and resolved amicably through negotiations. This is always better than anything else. Second, in addressing the relevant issues regarding the South China Sea, it is important to proceed according to the basic guidelines and principles of international law and the Convention on the International Law of the Sea of 1982. Third, obviously, any decision can be challenged and so we have decided for ourselves that we will have no preferences on the issue regarding the position of one party or the other. We hope that all of these problems will be resolved accordingly - if these are amicable talks, then by way of talks. But if the parties have decided to take a certain issue to an international court... this is their right and if a ruling is delivered it will be the ruling of an international court.

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 #26
The National Interest
November 23, 2015
This Is How America and the Soviet Union Almost Started a Nuclear War
By Paul Dibb
Paul Dibb is Emeritus Professor of Strategic Studies at The Australian National University.

The U.S. government has just released one of the most worrying reports about the risk of nuclear war in the Cold War and the dangers of miscalculating Soviet intentions.

The top-secret document was released in October 2015. It's a damning report made by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) in February 1990 about the U.S. intelligence community's poor knowledge and lack of understanding of the USSR during the 1983 nuclear war scare.

Strategist readers will recall that in October 2013 I authored an ASPI Special Report The nuclear war scare of 1983: how serious was it? I had access to 57 U.S. intelligence documents-many of them National Intelligence Estimates on the USSR formerly highly classified-that had been obtained under the Freedom of Information Act (FOI) by the National Security Archive. Using those sources I painted a frightening picture of events in 1983 when the world stood on the edge of the nuclear abyss without America even realizing it. But there was one piece of critical evidence missing-the 1990 PFIAB report, which has only recently been released.

There was a series of crises in 1983 concerning the deployment by the U.S. in Europe of Pershing II theatre nuclear weapons with a flight time of 5 to 6 minutes to Moscow; President Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI, or 'Star Wars'); his calling of the Soviet Union an 'evil empire'; the Soviet Union's shooting down of a Korean civilian airliner; and above all a major NATO exercise in November 1983 called 'Able Archer', which Moscow saw as a deception operation for the countdown to nuclear war. The Soviet Union's intelligence organs mounted an unprecedented collection effort in an urgent attempt to detect warning indicators of NATO's preparations for war. There was also an unprecedented emphasis on civil defense exercises, increased readiness of Soviet ballistic missile submarines and forward deployed nuclear capable aircraft, and massive military exercises responding to a sudden enemy nuclear strike.

In May and August 1984, two top-secret U.S. intelligence post-mortems reviewed recent Soviet military activities and political statements, but-despite the evidence that the CIA had seen from Oleg Gordievsky the KGB chief in London-they declared that "the Soviet leaders do not perceive a genuine danger of imminent conflict or confrontation with the United States."

The PFIAB Board's report states that the evidence didn't support such categorical conclusions. It says that Soviet actions strongly suggested that the USSR's military leaders may have been seriously concerned that the U.S. would use Able Archer as a cover for launching a real attack and that the evidence strongly indicated that the war scare was real, not least in the minds of some Soviet leaders and particularly the General Secretary of the Communist Party and former KGB chief, Yuri Andropov.

The PFIAB report says that the situation could have been extremely dangerous if during the NATO exercise-perhaps through a series of ill-timed coincidences or because of faulty intelligence-the Soviets had misperceived U.S. actions as preparations for a real nuclear attack. The report is sharply critical of U.S. intelligence estimates for being overconfident and overly sanguine. The US intelligence community, it says, "did not at the time, and for several years afterwards, attach sufficient weight to the possibility that the war scare was real." The Board repeatedly criticizes U.S. intelligence on Soviet leaders, saying at the time of the 1984 post-mortems that "the U.S. knew very little about Kremlin decision-making" even though senior intelligence analysts wrote confidently about "Soviet leadership intentions." U.S. intelligence judgements "were overconfident, particularly in the judgements pertaining to Soviet leadership intentions-since little intelligence, human or technical, existed to support them."

The Board's report concludes that in 1983 the U.S. may have inadvertently placed its relations with the Soviet Union on a hair trigger and that for Soviet leaders the war scare was real, and that U.S. intelligence post-mortems didn't take it seriously enough. As a result, the President was given assessments of Soviet attitudes and actions that understated the risks to the U.S.

And where was the Australian intelligence community's assessments of the Soviet Union in 1983? The Office of National Assessments (ONA) advice to the Defense Committee's Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1983 (classified Secret AUSTEO) was that the USSR "has achieved superiority in the critical area of ICBMs and intermediate nuclear forces" and "The U.S. sees the USSR as able to destroy virtually all U.S. missiles on the ground using only a portion of Soviet forces, while the U.S. cannot inflict similar damage on Soviet forces even using its entire ICBM force." It asserted that "U.S. strategic planners must calculate that in a full nuclear exchange the USSR could have the final advantage in terms of survival at some level short of national extinction." ONA was effectively arguing that it was the Soviet Union that had "strategic superiority," sufficient for its leadership to be sure of fighting and winning a nuclear war and that the overall balance of power had moved to favour the USSR decisively. Thus, ONA-Australia's paramount intelligence agency-was parroting the U.S. intelligence community's group-think about Soviet military superiority when, in fact, the PFIAB Board assesses the Soviets at that time perceived that the correlation of forces had turned against the USSR, that the US was seeking military superiority, and that the chances of the US launching a nuclear first strike were growing.

The implications of all this for the Australian intelligence community is that the PFIAB report of 1990 should become a compulsory training manual for all new intelligence recruits as a case study in how not to do intelligence analysis about your enemy. When analysts attempt to arrive at a single strong conclusion, as in 2003 with assertions about 'evidence' of Iraq's nuclear weapons, they run the risk of being dangerously wrong.

This piece first appeared in ASPI's The Strategist here:
http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/americas-greatest-intelligence-failure/

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 #27
Wall Street Journal
November 21, 2015
Stalin's Man in London
The debacle of Yalta was prepared well before Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin convened in 1945.
By STEPHEN KOTKIN
Mr. Kotkin, a professor at Princeton University and fellow at the Hoover Institution, is the author of "Stalin."

THE MAISKY DIARIES
Edited by Gabriel Gorodetsky
Yale, 584 pages, $40

Should the United States join forces with Russia and Iran to resolve the continuing bloodbath in Syria? No doubt if Washington entered into a coalition with these authoritarian regimes, many would-rightly-charge America with betraying its core democratic values. But sometimes supping with the devil can become a lifeline.

Great Britain faced just such an unpalatable choice in the period between the two world wars.

Neville Chamberlain, the British prime minister, detested Adolf Hitler but committed his country to paying what he considered an acceptable, if ever-escalating, price to conciliate the Nazi. The benefit, in Chamberlain's mind, was avoiding another catastrophic war on the Continent. After all, was not Hitler merely trying to "fix" the blatant injustices of the 1919 Versailles Peace Treaty and unite ethnic Germans "stranded" across international borders? Chamberlain's critics on the Labourite left and even a few on the Tory right demanded an alliance against Nazi Germany with Stalin's Soviet Union, arguing that Britain could not survive without another powerful ally on the Continent.

Hitler, of course, went on to violate the agreements he signed, consigning Chamberlain and appeasement to everlasting infamy. Yet despite the prime minister's egregious misreading of the F�hrer-and his dithering, which worsened Great Britain's options-Chamberlain's ultimate nightmare was utterly thinkable: Namely, if Britain had allied militarily with Stalin to stop Hitler, the Soviets might end up occupying the heart of Europe. How in the world would the democracies evict the Communists? Solving one big problem (Hitler) threatened to create another (Stalin). In the event, World War II brought both the necessary alliance with Moscow that Chamberlain had resisted and the Soviet occupation he had so presciently dreaded.

New light is shed on the British predicament by the previously secret writings of Ivan Maisky, the Soviet ambassador to Britain at the time. "The Maisky Diaries: Red Ambassador to the Court of St James's 1932-1943" offers a distillation of a separate forthcoming three-volume translation of Maisky's nearly 1,600 pages of dense handwritten and typed entries, which were published in Russian between 2006 and 2009.

The book is deftly edited by Gabriel Gorodetsky, who contextualizes the entries with declassified Soviet and British archival documents. This is a must-read for aficionados of diplomatic history and especially of interwar British high society.

Maisky got launched on a Soviet diplomatic career thanks partly to revolutionary underground connections he made during a stint in London exile (1912-17), and got appointed envoy to the Court of St. James's in 1932. Readers will discover how Maisky skillfully shaped British government and even public opinion to the benefit of Stalin's regime. The diaries also show Maisky to have been uncannily well informed about internal British affairs-a strength that, paradoxically, induced his own government to freeze him out and would precipitate his recall in 1943.

Maisky is a skilled writer, and his entries are rendered here in a delightfully fluid translation as he recounts regular conversations with Communist "symps" such as Sidney and Beatrice Webb, H.G. Wells and George Bernard Shaw (who regaled Maisky with racy stories about Karl Marx's family and maid, as told to him by Marx's daughter Eleanor before she committed suicide). But the Soviet envoy also had frequent t�te-�-t�tes with foreign office titans Anthony Eden, Lord Halifax and Lord Simon, among many others, as well as no fewer than five British prime ministers: Ramsay MacDonald, Lloyd George, Stanley Baldwin, Neville Chamberlain and Winston Churchill.

Chamberlain deemed Maisky "a revolting but clever little Jew," while Tory parliamentarian Henry "Chips" Channon labeled him "the Ambassador of torture, murder and every crime in the calendar." But they and others in the British establishment accepted invitations to luncheons at the Soviet Embassy at 13 Kensington Palace Gardens and invited Maisky to their own mansions and country estates. Lord Beaverbrook, a right-wing press baron nonetheless eager for good relations with Moscow, commended Churchill to Maisky in 1935, advising that the future prime minister was "without a rival in British politics. I know all about his prejudices. But a man of character who tells the truth is worth much to a nation."

Churchill and Maisky would cultivate each other assiduously. We see the bulldog cozying up to the Soviet dictator through his envoy on Nov. 16, 1937, when he remarks that Trotsky is "a perfect devil. He is a destructive, not a creative force. I'm wholly for Stalin." This was hardly personal, for Churchill further noted that "we need a strong, very strong Russia" as a counterweight in Europe and Asia. But with Stalin murdering his own military officer corps at the time, Churchill, Maisky wrote, "began asking me: what was happening in the USSR? Hadn't the most recent events weakened our army? Hadn't they shaken our ability to withstand pressure from Japan and Germany?" Maisky lied and reassured him that the Red Army remained strong despite Stalin's massacres.

Maisky plied his targets with morsels of ostensible inside information and gifts of caviar and flavored vodka, and he took cunning advantage of the animosities among British figures. But sometimes he was taken aback. "How much snobbery there is even in the best English people!" he noted on Oct. 16, 1939, after the social-justice crusader Beatrice Webb told him that "Churchill is not a true Englishman, you know. He has negro blood. You can tell even from his appearance."

Several important contributions emerge from this book. First, not just leftists but top members of Britain's establishment forecast the likely demise of market capitalism, clinging to their hopes for some form of British "Conservative socialism." You cannot properly defend freedom if your faith in it wavers.

Second, notwithstanding the tireless efforts of Maisky and his co-conspirators on the British side, no bilateral grand alliance was possible in the 1930s because neither Chamberlain nor Stalin wanted one. And when the alliance of a democracy and a dictatorship belatedly did come about, following Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, it remained hobbled by profound distrust and cross-purposes.

Perhaps the diary's biggest story concerns the post-World War II order. Although Churchill, unlike Chamberlain, had crucially recognized the Nazi threat for what it was, Churchill, also unlike Chamberlain, failed to fully recognize and pre-empt the Soviet threat already during the war. The mistakes, in both cases, derived from a fixation with British imperial interests. ("Then Churchill spoke of the Middle East," Maisky records of a meeting on July 3, 1942. "He immediately came to life.")

The diary descends into tedium as Maisky details the runaround in London between 1941 and 1944 over opening a second front in Europe to alleviate the pressure on the Soviet Union, but he offers shrewd commentary on the consequences of a British strategy to let the Soviets do the fighting against Nazi Germany. "A second front would seem preferable," he wrote to himself on Feb. 7, 1943. "But is that really the case?" In other words, the debacle of Yalta, which de facto ceded Eastern Europe to Soviet occupying forces, was effectively prepared well before Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin convened in the Crimea in February 1945.

Diplomacy with the devil can be necessary for a democracy: There is no way Britain and the United States could have stood up to Nazi Germany without the Soviet land army. But strong steps must simultaneously be undertaken to contain the menace of this kind of ally.

As for Maisky, Mr. Gorodetsky acknowledges his grandiosity-the envoy returned to the Soviet Union in 1943 with 70 pieces of luggage, necessitating six 3-ton trucks for the drive from Cairo to the Soviet Union via Palestine, Iraq and Iran-but insists he had "outstanding success." True enough, except that carrying out his job-penetrating deep into the British establishment-ensured that the paranoid Stalin regime would not allow Maisky to continue doing so.

Ultimately, he was betrayed and broken by the odious system he faithfully served. Arrested in 1953 as an alleged British spy, he spent two years behind bars. Then he begged to be reinstated in the Communist Party and promised, if appointed house historian of Soviet foreign relations, to unmask "the most eminent bourgeois falsifiers." In fact, with these diaries, he has unmasked himself.

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 #28
New York University
Bill Bradley, Jack Matlock, Stephen Cohen, and John Pepper on "U.S.-Russian Conflict from Ukraine to Syria"-November 23

Former U.S. senator Bill Bradley and former U.S. ambassador to Russia Jack Matlock, Jr. will be among the panelists for "U.S.-Russian Conflict From Ukraine to Syria: Did U.S. Policy Contribute to It?"-a discussion at NYU's School of Law on Mon., Nov. 23, 6-8 p.m.

The event, organized by the American Committee for East-West Accord and hosted by NYU's Jordan Center for the Advanced Study of Russia, will also include: Stephen F. Cohen, professor emeritus of Russian Studies, history, and politics at New York University and Princeton University; John Pepper, former chairman and CEO of the Procter & Gamble Company who helped lead the company's entry into Russia in the 1990s; and Yanni Kotsonis, director, Jordan Center for the Advanced Study of Russia, and a professor of history and Russian and Slavic Studies, who will moderate the session, which is co-sponsored by the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs.

Bradley, a presidential candidate in 2000 who served three terms in the U.S. Senate, is currently managing director of Allen & Company LLC. Matlock, U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union under Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush, also served as a senior director on the National Security Council and as ambassador to Czechoslovakia.

The discussion will take place at NYU School of Law's Greenberg Lounge, 40 Washington Square South (between MacDougal and Sullivan Sts.). To RSVP, please email jordan.russia.center@nyu.edu or call 212.992.6575.

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 #29
New York Times
November 23, 2015
Crimea in Dark After Power Lines Are Blown Up
By NEIL MacFARQUHAR

MOSCOW - Saboteurs blew up the main power lines leading into Crimea early Sunday, plunging the disputed peninsula into darkness and prompting the Russian government to impose a state of emergency there.

Most of the more than 1.8 million residents of the peninsula, annexed by Russia last year, lacked electricity, Russian news agencies reported, although backup generators were being used to provide power to hospitals and for other vital purposes.

Sergei V. Aksyonov, the prime minister of Crimea, asked people not to use electric appliances like heaters - the temperature was more than 60 degrees - and said streetlights would remain off to preserve power for more essential purposes.

The government imposed a 10 p.m. curfew on restaurants and entertainment sites.

The four trunk lines running from Ukraine to Crimea were all damaged, and two districts in the Ukrainian region of Kherson were also without electricity, Volodymyr Demchyshyn, the energy minister of Ukraine, said in a statement. Most of the electricity used in Crimea still comes from Ukraine even after Russia annexed it in March 2014.

Unknown people presumed to be Ukrainian nationalists knocked out all four of the main electricity lines running through the Kherson region - the first two were severely damaged on Friday and two more by explosions just after midnight on Sunday morning.

Officials in Ukraine said some power could be restored in 24 hours and all four destroyed pylons restored within two or three days, but they said unidentified demonstrators were preventing repair crews from getting access to the site.

Six repair brigades had arrived in the area and were ready to start work, Yuri Kasich, of Ukrenergo, the state agency that runs the power grid, was quoted as saying by Ukrainian news services. Mr. Kasich declined to say who was causing the problem, but he said workers had yet to start the repair work.

The government in Crimea imposed rolling blackouts on most residential neighborhoods and announced that it had enough fuel on hand for emergency generators to keep them running for a month.

Crimea announced a day off for nongovernment workers on Monday, and shut down public services that use a lot of electricity, like the trolley-bus service in the port city of Sevastopol, replacing it with regular buses on some routes.

Russia's Black Sea fleet, which has its headquarters at Sevastopol, announced that it had not been affected by the power failure.

Reports in Ukraine said that the police had clashed with activists from the right-wing nationalist Right Sector movement in the area on Saturday after the initial damage. Ukraine still claims the peninsula.

When the first two lines were shut down on Friday, Crimea's Ministry of Fuel and Energy warned residents that disruptions in the power supply and other services like cellphones were possible and suggested that they stock up on batteries, water and other essentials.

Russia plans to replace the electricity supply from Ukraine with power lines from the Russian mainland, but those are not yet complete.

In September, activists from the Tatar minority, which accuses Russia of repressing its members in Crimea, tried to blockade the roads in the Kherson region used to transport food and other goods to Crimea.

Russia's annexation of Crimea and its support for separatists in eastern Ukraine provoked the worst crisis in relations between Russia and the West since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, with the West imposing economic sanctions.

Alisa Sopova contributed reporting from Kiev, Ukraine.

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 #30
Kremlin: no information from Kiev yet on resumption of Crimea electricity supply

TEHRAN, November 23. /TASS/. Russia has not received any information from the Ukrainian side on the time of resuming electric power supply to Crimea, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told journalists on Monday.

"We do not have any information on what measures are being taken and when there will be the result and when the electricity supply will be restored," the Kremlin spokesman said.

Over 1.6 mln people remain without electricity in Crimea

Uncertainty persists in Crimea over the timeframe of restoring electric power supply after all the four Ukrainian power transmission lines were damaged in a subversive explosion.

Russia's Energy Ministry has reported that 1.66 million people remained without electricity in Crimea as of 08:00 a.m. Moscow time (05:00 GMT) on Monday. Social facilities on the Black Sea peninsula are connected to backup power generators. Crimea generates only 366 MW of electricity, including 232 MW generated by mobile power plants.

Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak has said electric power supply in Crimea will be restored within several hours.

"Electric power supply in Crimea will be restored within several hours after repair teams are admitted to restoration works and complete them," the minister said.

However, the repair teams of Ukraine's Ukrenergo power utility have not been able to start work so far to restore the damaged sections of electricity transmission lines running from Ukraine to Crimea due to disturbances in the emergency area.

Ukrenergo spokesman Zinovy Butsyo could not specify when the repair work would start.

Crimean authorities believe that the Black Sea peninsula's electric power blockade has been organized by Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada deputies Mustafa Dzhemilev and Refat Chubarov, and also former Crimean Vice-Premier, owner of ATR TV Channel Lenur Islyamov. They officially stated earlier about their intention to cut Crimea off electricity supply. They are assisted by the supporters of the Right Sector extremist movement banned in Russia.

The blast that damaged electricity transmission lines in Ukraine has prompted an emergency reduction of power generation capacities at Ukrainian electric power plants. Ukrenergo First Deputy CEO Yuri Kasich said that "two power units were switched off at the Pridneprovsk and Uglogrosk thermal power plants, and also the Zaporozhye and South Ukraine nuclear power plants reduced their capacity by 500 MW."

The Crimean authorities have imposed an emergency regime on the peninsula. Large cities in Crimea have been connected to backup power generators. However, the Crimean authorities have introduced rolling blackout schedules over the shortage of electricity generated on the peninsula. Ukrainian electricity supplies meet 70% of Crimea's electric power needs. The Black Sea peninsula is currently 880 MW short of electricity.

Crimea is expected to get rid of its "energy dependence" on Ukraine by the autumn of next year after Russia builds and puts into operation two stages of a power link between the southern Krasnodar Region and the Black Sea peninsula.

Kiev has not commented on the situation with subversive acts carried out at the sites of power transmission lines and has assumed a wait-and-see position.

As Kiev has not officially responded to the subversive acts in the Kherson region, local authorities feel at a loss. All state institutions have either switched off their phones or are refusing to give any information. The Kherson Region branch of the State Emergencies Service has said literally the following: "We don't know anything. Police is controlling everything there. So what do you want from us?"

In reply to a remark that it is the duty of the State Emergencies Service to eliminate the consequences of an emergency situation, the on-duty officer was outraged and cried out that nothing could be done until "those activists are there.".

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 #31
Interfax-Ukraine
November 23, 2015
Only one power supply line leading to Crimea can currently be repaired - Ukraine's Interior Minister
 
The Ukrainian Interior Ministry now believes that only one power line used for supplying electrical power to Crimea, the 220 kilovolt Kakhovka-Titan power line, can currently be repaired, Ukraine's Interior Minister Arsen Avakov said at an emergency meeting of the Ukrainian government on Monday.

"Repair work can only be done on one line, the 220 [kilovolt] Kakhovka-Titan [power line]. As for the others, we insist that work cannot be done on them at this time until we fully clear these lines in terms of potential threats of more explosions and subversive attacks. We have information that such attacks are possible, regardless of the point of view of the Mejlis and Crimean Tatars and law enforcement officials," he said.

Avakov added that he believes the issue needs to be addressed by the National Security and Defense Council (NSDC).

"I would ask for this issue to be resolved not only and not so much in the sphere of economics, but as a security issue to develop radical and appropriate measures on power supply issues. And, accordingly, discuss this matter in the NSDC in the next few days," he said.

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 #32
Blasts of power transmission lines prove Kiev's inability to keep situation under control

MOSCOW, November 23. /TASS/. Explosions hitting electric power transmission lines on the Ukrainian territory have both deprived Crimea of electricity supply and done damage to the Ukrainian energy system. However, Kiev has actually given no response to this subversion act. This is simply political schizophrenia, experts say.

Crimea was completely cut off from Ukraine's electricity supplies overnight to November 22 after two power transmission lines were blown up in the Kherson Region. As many as 1.64 million Crimean residents were left without electricity. However, the subversive act has affected the Ukrainian energy system as well - two districts in the Kherson Region remain without electric power supply.

Also, Crimea's disconnection from Ukraine's electricity supplies will intensify the construction of a power link Russia is building between the southern Krasnodar Region and the Black Sea peninsula. As a result, the Ukrainian electric power system may lose the market that has yielded almost $12 million in revenues in the nine months of this year alone.

The Ukrainian Interior Ministry has opened a criminal case in "the deliberate damage done to the electric power facilities." Ukrainian President Pyotr Poroshenko and Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk have not commented on the situation yet.

No one has claimed responsibility yet for blowing up the power transmission towers but experts believe that the subversion acts were organized by Ukrainian right-wing nationalists and radically-minded ex-heads of Crimean Tatars.

Refat Chubarov, the leader of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People that has not been officially registered either in Russia or Ukraine, promised to cut Crimea off electricity in late September. Also, Crimean Tatar radicals have been blocking the Ukrainian commercial transport on the territory of Crimea since September 20 with the support of the Right Sector radical organization and other Ukrainian right-wing forces. Characteristically, the accident area has been encircled by militia of the Right Sector organization, preventing specialists from starting repairs.

"Crimea's disconnection is a provocation that will have very grave consequences," Ukrainian political scientist Vadim Karasyov was quoted by Ukraine's Vesti web portal as saying.

"Crimea is the sole thing that keeps us in parallel operation of the energy systems of Ukraine and Russia. If Russia switches us off, we'll at least have to introduce rolling blackouts. Aside from this, there are no stocks of anthracite and normal coal at thermal power plants. This will make the whole country grind to a halt," the expert said.

"This was organized by Chubarov and other leaders of the Mejlis," President of the Center of Political Studies Sergei Mikheyev told TASS. "The technical work was done by the Right Sector," he added. "They even took photos against the background of the blown-up power transmission towers and are presenting this as their own victory."

"This once again proves the insanity of the Ukrainian politicum: people are blowing up power transmission lines on their own territory, cutting off electricity supply for whole districts of their own country, creating a lot of financial problems for themselves and believe that they are achieving a victory in this way," the expert said.

"It seems to me that this is a symbolic act generally characterizing the entire current situation and the current Ukrainian leadership: 'We'll make worse for ourselves to do harm to a neighbor.' This self-destructive logic of the Maidan continues to develop and manifest itself in various places," he added.

"The blow-up of electricity transmission lines itself is evidence that the processes currently taking place in Ukraine are not controlled by the central authorities," Deputy Director of the Russian Institute of Strategic Studies Tamara Guzenkova told TASS.

"But this is actually a real terrorist act. In general, we see the schizophrenia of Ukrainian life," the expert said.

Kiev would not like to further exacerbate relations with right-wing radicals, she added. "The Ukrainian authorities have driven themselves in a trap and do not understand what to do," the expert said.

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 #33
Kyiv Post
November 23, 2015
Crimea blackout triggers fears of Russian backlash
By Allison Quinn

Two days into the electricity blackout in Crimea, human rights activists on the peninsula warned that some hospitals were being affected, while Ukrainian authorities predicted a fierce backlash from Russia.

Meanwhile, Russian-installed leaders on the peninsula warned residents that the blackout would last for another month.

More than 1 million people on the occupied peninsula were left without power on Nov. 21 after electricity towers supplying electricity from Ukraine were blown up in the Kherson Oblast, north of Crimea. Activists taking part in the blockade of Crimea were thought to be behind the stunt, though no one has claimed responsibility yet.

Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk on Nov. 23 seemed to implicitly express support for the blockade, calling for an official ban on goods being transported from Ukraine into Crimea. Ordering members of Cabinet to prepare corresponding legislation that would specify which goods can be brought into Crimea and which are banned, Yatsenyuk also called for engaging the Crimean Tatar community in the work "so that our decision will take into account" the needs of that community, a statement on the Cabinet's website said.

UkrEnergo, Ukraine's state-owned monopoly electricity transmitter, promised on Nov. 22 to at least partly restore power within 24 hours if its repair workers were given access to the downed lines. But Mustafa Dzhemiliev, the speaker of the Crimean Tatars' Mejlis and one of the initiators of the blockade of Crimea that began in late September, promised to provide only partial access - to the lines that provide power to Ukraine.

"Now we will partially allow specialists to clear (the area) and conduct repairs. There is one power line there, which, passing by Crimea, leads to areas in Kherson Oblast. They are without power there as well, it turns out. We will let them restore that line. ..." Dzhemiliev said on Nov. 23, according to Interfax-Ukraine.

Police have opened a criminal case against those behind the explosions on the charge of deliberately damaging power facilities, as well as two cases against activists for allegedly assaulting police officers.

While a state of emergency was officially declared on the peninsula by Russian occupying authorities, the Kremlin offered an unusually calm statement on the matter, with presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov noting that "emergency situations happen," and adding that the Russian emergency services should be able to respond adequately.

Not everyone was ready to believe that the Kremlin would take the blackout lying down, however.

Ilya Kiva, the head of the Interior Ministry's department for countering drug-related crimes, told journalists on Nov. 23 in Kherson Oblast that Russian tanks had approached the front line with Ukraine after the incident with the electricity towers.

"That is why in the given situation we are trying to be prepared. ... We know that Russian forces have already gotten tanks ready - about 12 tanks went right up to the contact line, and that is one of the possible ways in which events will develop - so we don't want them to see the energy blockade as a reason for the deployment, for the movement of Russian forces into Ukraine," Kiva said in comments to Ukrainian television channel 112 Ukraina.

Ukraine's Border Guard Service issued a statement in response to Kiva's warning, saying they had observed no build-up of Russian troops on the border.

Some expressed concerns that Russia may retaliate for the blackout in other ways.

Oleksiy Skrypnyk, a lawmaker from the Samopomich party, said the blackout could have a boomerang effect.

"If Russia cuts us off from the parallel part of their electrical system, at a minimum, this would lead to rolling blackouts. The result of that would be worse than (what is happening) in Crimea," Skrypnyk wrote on his Facebook page.

Residents of Kherson Oblast were alarmed by the fact that activists apparently blew up the electrical towers.

"Blowing up electrical towers is equal to throwing lawmakers in garbage cans. It's extremism," said Andriy Malchenko, a Kherson resident. "If Ukraine wanted to cut off Crimea, it could do it. But not this way."

Sergey Askyonov, the Kremlin-backed leader of Crimea, on Nov. 23 warned residents to be prepared for the worst in comments to RIA Novosti.

"Unfortunately, we must inform our residents that, most likely, this period will stretch on for a while," he said. "We believe that we must prepare for the worst, that this period will drag on until the first line of the power bridge from Kerch is ready, meaning Dec. 22."

While the peninsula has been relying on generators to pick up the slack over the last several days, it is not clear how long those will last.

The group Human Rights in Crimea issued a statement late on Nov. 22 saying certain hospitals on the peninsula were already suffering from the blackout, with many hospitals only able to provide power to the emergency rooms and operating rooms, "while the remaining departments are functioning depending on unstable electrical connections."

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 #34
Bloomberg
November 23, 2015
Ukraine Bids for Attention With Crimea Blackout
By Leonid Bershidsky

Even if Russian President Vladimir Putin wanted to end his country's conflict with Ukraine so he could build an alliance with Western powers to beat Islamic State -- and it's not clear at all that he does -- Ukrainians wouldn't let him.

In the last minutes of Nov. 21, someone (more on that later) blew up two transmission towers in Ukraine's Kherson region, cutting off Crimea's electricity. Lights went out all over the peninsula Russia annexed from Ukraine last year. Plunged into darkness, citizens heard loudspeaker announcements: The authorities are doing their best to resolve the situation, stay calm, Nov. 23 will be a day off for everyone but civil servants. On Monday morning, according to the Russian energy ministry, 1.66 million of Crimea's 2 million residents still didn't have power in their homes. Hospitals, garrisons and government offices were running on emergency backup. There wasn't much the Russian authorities in Crimea could do except wait for Ukrainians to restore supply, but that might be too much to ask of them.

In September, 2014, as fighting raged in eastern Ukraine between the country's military and pro-Russian separatists aided by Russian troops, the parliament in Kiev -- which doesn't recognize Crimea's  annexation -- declared the peninsula a free economic zone, effectively allowing the free movement of Ukrainian goods to the Russian-held territory. Another free economic zone exists on the Russian side. The arrangement gave Ukrainian producers a chance to export duty-free to Russia, though technically only to Crimea.

Four months later, the Ukrainian government approved a year-long deal with Inter RAO, a large Russian electricity supplier, to provide electricity to Crimea and to the rest of Ukraine. The country didn't produce enough to cover its needs, and it depended on Russian coal imports to power its generation.

Despite the conflict between the two countries and Putin's military aggression, the two economies remain intertwined. Despite a two-thirds drop in Ukrainian exports to Russia in January through August (in line with the overall export decline), these exports are still bigger than to Poland, Germany and France combined. Moscow remains Kiev's biggest trading partner in terms of both exports and imports. That's an uncomfortable fact for Ukrainian officials whose avowed goal is integration into the European Union. Their rhetoric is fiercely anti-Russian, and squaring the deals with it is not easy -- Ukraine's powerful, unruly civil society is extremely sensitive to hypocrisy. Since the 2014 "Revolution of Dignity," it is also prone to taking matters into its own hands.

On Sept. 20, Crimean Tatar activists and the Ukrainian extreme nationalist group Right Sector decided to do away with the Crimean free economic zone, claiming that 80 percent of the Ukrainian food sent to Crimea went on to mainland Russia to take advantage of higher prices there. "We cannot feed the bandits who mistreat our compatriots in the occupied territories," Mustafa Jemilev, a veteran Tatar activist banned from entering Russia, explained at a press conference.

The Tatars and ultranationalists established checkpoints on roads leading to the peninsula and stopped letting trucks through. The government probably could have unblocked the roads, but chose not to interfere. Jemilev and another Tatar leader who helped establish the "food blockade," Refat Chubarov, are both parliament members elected on President Petro Poroshenko's party ticket. Soon after the blockade began, Poroshenko appointed Jemilev head of Ukraine's Anti-Corruption Policy Council. During a meeting with Jemilev and Chubarov, Poroshenko promised to have the free economic zone law rescinded.

The "blockade" probably did more damage to Ukrainian companies than to Russian power in Crimea: Stores in the peninsula filled with Russian and Turkish goods, albeit at higher prices. Yet the activists who maintain the checkpoints had a more potent weapon. On Nov. 13, the Ukrainian utility, Ukrenergo, announced that the country no longer needed Russian electricity because some new nuclear power capacity had just come online. Just a week later, the first two transmission towers in the Kherson region were blown up.

Kiev dispatched a national guard unit headed by Ilya Kiva, an eastern war hero who used to be a Right Sector leader, to restore peace to the area and make sure nobody died from contact with dangling high-voltage cables. The group was attacked by activists, some of them balaclava-clad, and one of the servicemen was stabbed. After Kiva left, the remaining two transmission towers exploded. Rather than get mad and threaten destruction, Kiva posted half-apologetic messages on Facebook showing he sympathized with the protesters. "The blockade continues!" he wrote. "Crimea has no light! I'm off to bed."

Ukraine's energy minister, Vladimir Demchishin, said on Monday that electricity could be restored within 72 hours, but workers would need the police to ensure access to the area. That's apparently not forthcoming. The national police force put out a statement late on Saturday saying: "All matters of energy supplies to occupied territories must be handled at the government level. The national police does not involve itself in political actions and doesn't interfere with their progress."

Jemilev has promised to let repair crews do their job, but he stressed that energy supplies from Ukraine to Crimea should be stopped, so it's not clear whether the repairs will take place anytime soon. It's clear that the Ukrainian government is unwilling to take on the activists so that life in Russian-held Crimea could go back to normal. That would be highly unpopular. "People in Crimea must bear their share of responsibility for the decisions they made, or that were made for them, in 2014," journalist Vakhtang Kipiani wrote on Facebook.

Russia foresaw attempts to cut off power to Crimea, and it's laid a high voltage cable across the bottom of the Kerch Strait that separates the peninsula from the Russian mainland. The project suffered from delays because Russia didn't have the thick cable or the expertise required to lay it, and European, Japanese and Korean companies initially interested in the project refused to take it on because of Crimea-related economic sanctions. The Russian energy ministry now says Russian companies were building the "energy bridge" with no outside help, though Ukrainian investigative journalists have reported that a Chinese firm was doing the job. In any case, the undersea cable is supposed to go live by the end of the year. Crimea can hardly wait that long to get power back.

Russia and Ukraine have been exchanging economic blows every few weeks. Air travel between the two countries has been cut off since last month; Ukraine demanded a hefty fine from Russian carriers for flying to Crimea, but they refused to pay and were banned from Ukrainian airports.  In response, Moscow banned Ukrainian airlines from flying to Russia. For next year, Russia is imposing a food-import embargo on Ukraine, like the one already in effect against most Western countries.

The Crimea energy situation, however, is more dangerous than any of that tit-for-tat. Russians who backed the annexation, Purtin's core electorate, expect the president to deal with such threats. All he can do, short of sending troops into mainland Ukraine, is to lean on the Kiev government. But even if it is capable of fully controlling its territory, it is playing a complicated game with the protesters, whose leaders are part of the political establishment.

Regardless of how the crisis is resolved, Ukraine is not a receding hot spot. Poroshenko and other politicians in Kiev desperately need international attention to their fight against Putin, not to the persistent corruption and paralysis that have prevented the government from introducing meaningful reforms. They know Putin doesn't want to take harsh action because recent terrorist attacks have made him a more legitimate ally for the West in the fight against Islamic State. Poroshenko cannot allow a rapprochement between Russia, Europe and the U.S. because he's afraid his government will lose Western support.

Putin, for his part, has proved that he has no reverse gear. He will be putting pressure on Kiev and perhaps stepping up military activity against Ukraine even as an alliance against Islamic State is discussed. Western leaders shouldn't expect concessions from him. They must either reject his offers of a closer alliance or embrace them on a tactical level, with the understanding that Putin is not giving anything up in return.

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 #35
The Unz Review
www.unz.com
November 23, 2015
Country 404 vs. Crimea
By Anatoly Karlin

According to a fable often told by Russians themselves, there once lived two peasants. One of them had one cow, the other had two cows. The poorer peasant found a lamp, rubbed it, and out popped a genie, who proceeded to ask him if he wanted 5 cows. He refused and instead wished for one of his neighbor's cows to drop dead.

This story is what comes to mind on the news that various Crimean Tatar and far right batallion "activists" blew up the transmission towers carrying electricity to Crimea, plunging the peninsula into a blackout that looks set to last weeks.

In fact, it's something of a metaphor for today's Ukraine in general.

(1) "Activists" blockade Crimea, putting an embargo on food products. Belatedly realizing that the whole affair will lose whatever minimal sense it might have possessed in the first place when Russia bans all Ukrainian food imports on January 1, 2016, on Ukraine's accession to the EU Free Trade Agreement, they decide to up their game, presumably on the belief that if their water blockade failed to win Crimean hearts and minds in favor of Ukraine last summer, then deprivation of electricity as winter approaches surely will. No matter that said electricity blockade will affect not just those evil moskali and Ukrainian zradniki (traitors) who overwhelmingly voted to leave Country 404, but also 90% of the world's Crimean Tatars whom they are ostensibly fighting for.

(2) Fifty armed National Guardsmen are sent to restore order. The "activists" naturally start to fight them and the efforts of the totalitarian Poroshenko regime to take away their Constitutional rights to blow up infrastructure on Ukrainian soil. In the video above, one of the masked activists, clearly suffering from a terminal case of Maidanism, says the Guardsmen are akin to separatists. Two of the Guardsmen are seriously injured: One gets a brain concussion after getting hit by a stick, while another gets a knife in his stomach.

In any normal functional country, including in any European nation that the Maidanists vaunt so much, they would at this point be getting mowed down by special forces as the terrorists they are. However, in Ukraine, they are "civic activists," so they are left unharmed to continue to strike heroic Diogenes-in-a-pylon poses. And after a crowd of sympathizing "activists" gathers at the Presidential palace, Poroshenko quickly flip flops and promises that there would be no more attempts to storm them in a hastily arranged meeting with the (self-proclaimed) "Mejlis" leaders of the Crimean Tatars.

You must construct additional pylons!? Not so fast...

(3) Ilya Kiva, the commander of those National Guards supposedly tasked with restoring order so that repairs could be done, immediately afterwards posted the following message on Facebook (the favored communications medium of Maidanist politicians): "The troops are now at their place of permanent dislocation, and the blockade continues! No electricity to Crimea! Slava Ukraine! And now I go to bed..."

(4) In the meantime, while svidomy Ukrainians digest their great peremoga (victory), the sabotage has forced two nuclear power plants in neighboring Kherson oblast to effect a dangerous emergency shutdown. There is a chance that the blackouts could spread to the neighboring Ukrainian oblasts of Kherson and Nikolaev according to the head of the Ukraine's energy company Yury Katich.

Russia has ceased supplying coal to Ukraine in retaliation. Considering that Ukraine's electricity network runs in significant part thanks to Russian and LDNR coal, this is not an unreasonable retaliation for the blockade of Crimea.

At this point, there can only be two explanations for this turn of events, on which in turn will depend any further developments.

a) The first variant is that Ukraine is a Country 404, a failed state powerless to prevent its "activists" from sauntering about and blowing up infrastructure at will in the hope that it kills more Russian cows even if some Ukrainian cows also get caught in the backblast.

b) The more cynical and darker possibility is that this was all planned. As Egor Kholmogorov points out in an article for Izvestia, now is a perfect window for this kind of sabotage, because the center and east of the territories controlled by Kiev have recently been connected to new power lines from the Rivne Nuclear Power Plant to the west, allowing it to minimize any fallout on Ukraine itself, while Russia is less than two months away from launching its energy bridge to Crimea. This implies that the timing of this operation was chosen by people a "great deal more informed than those of the Right Sector and the supporters of the Mejlis."

If the latter explanation is in fact the correct one - and considering the possible casualties stemming from a sudden and prolonged loss of power, especially now that winter is coming - then this would make this sabotage something more than a tragicomic skit. As Kholmogorov argued, it would make it an an outright act of state terrorism - and if Russia has any sense of honor and consistency left, it would reply with the usual punishment meted out to sponsors of terror, including wide-ranging economic sanctions at the very least.

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 #36
Ukraine Today
http://uatoday.tv
November 21, 2015
Over 2,500 Ukrainian soldiers killed since Russia invaded Ukraine

General Staff reports casualty numbers of Ukrainian soldiers since invasion began in February 2014

2,673 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed since Russia annexed Crimea and started a war in east Ukraine.

Non-combat casualties of the Ukrainian Armed Forces amounted to 831 people, lieutenant-general Ihor Voronchenko, personnel department chief of the General Staff, Friday, 20 November.

8519 Ukrainian servicemen were wounded, most of them - 5913 people - were injured not in combat.

Voronchenko reported that the General Staff is planning the seventh wave of mobilization in Ukraine not earlier than February-March 2016. He did not specify the mobilization plans

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 #37
www.rt.com
November 23, 2015
Implementing Minsk Agreement: Current priorities
By Dr Alexander Yakovenko, Russian Ambassador to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Deputy foreign minister (2005-2011).

There is little doubt that the Minsk Agreements remain the only reliable way of solving the Ukrainian crisis. Despite recent signs of stabilization, the situation in Donbass remains tense.

There are still signs of skirmishes at the disengagement line, security problems have grown, the humanitarian situation is worsening. Holding local elections in Donbass under a mutually acceptable Ukrainian law represents another challenge for parties to this conflict.

During the last meeting of foreign ministers in the Normandy format that took place in Berlin on 6 November, the security issues were at the center of attention. It was noted that the withdrawal of weapons of the caliber of 100 mm or less is proceeding on schedule. The Normandy group has called upon the sides to comply with the time-frame set.

The method used to withdraw weapons up to 100 mm may also be applied to weapons of a larger caliber. It is vital for the Contact Group and its working subgroups to consider this possibility and to coordinate a schedule for the withdrawal of heavier weapons as soon as possible.

Another matter under discussion is demining. Mines are seriously complicating life in Donbass and can also create major problems in winter, for the restoration of the economic, transport and social infrastructure will be impossible without clearing the mines. That should also be a priority for all parties.

High on the agenda is the humanitarian situation in Donbass that remains very poor. The continued blockade, the insufficient number of crossing points and the difficulties with the provision of social services and the payment of pensions, allowances and other social benefits are further complicating matters. The recent report by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights provides ample evidence of that.

A huge boost to resolution of the humanitarian crisis in Donbass can be provided by UN humanitarian agencies and NGOs that are willing to help the affected people. Such assistance should be welcomed by the authorities in Donetsk and Lugansk.

Those practical issues should not undermine the need for a solution to issues pertaining to the political reform. This includes primarily an agreed law on local elections, an amnesty and a constitutional reform that would permanently seal a special status of Donbass in accordance with the Minsk Agreements. The Normandy Four summit of 2nd October in Paris confirmed, quite unequivocally, the need for their full implementation, the only alternative being another slide to violence fraught with disastrous consequences for all.

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 #38
Interfax-Ukraine
November 20, 2015
Ukraine security chief says Russia changed tactics, seeks to destabilize country

Russia is trying to create what would appear like a frozen conflict in Donbass and to destabilize Ukraine, the head of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), Vasyl Hrytsak, has said.

"The Russian aggressor has changed its tactics. Its tactics are to create what appears to be a frozen conflict in the east of Ukraine and to do everything to destabilize the situation inside the country, to destroy our statehood," the Interfax-Ukraine news agency on 20 November quoted Hrytsak as saying.

He called on the Ukrainian people to be united "as never before".

"An declared war virtually started between Russia and Ukraine. Almost all political leaders, law enforcers, military leadership fled. The enemy annexed our Crimea, and the example of the Heavenly Hundred heroes [protesters killed during the antigovernment demonstrations in winter 2014] will be significant for those strong in spirit who rushed without hesitation to the country's east to defend their native land," Hrytsak said.

Hrytsak also gave assurances that he would do everything to bring to justice those responsible for the shooting of the Heavenly Hundred, the Ukrainian news agency UNIAN reported on the same day.

"None of those who participated in the atrocities against the participants of the Revolution of Dignity will be forgotten, so that not only heavenly punishment but also earthly punishment finds those who committed the crime, who gave the order to kill. I will continue to do everything in order to punish all those guilty," Hrytsak said.

In his speech, the SBU chief noted that 11 security service officers had been killed and over 100 SBU officers had been wounded during the ongoing security operation in the country's east.

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 #39
Kyiv Post
November 20, 2015
Experts: Time running out for government to fulfill EuroMaidan goals
By Mark Rachkevych

The EuroMaidan Revolution was successful in terms of ousting disgraced ex-President Viktor Yanukovych and his cronies, and shifting Ukraine back toward the path of European integration, according to a significant majority of 31 experts polled this month by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation policy center.

However, two years later, the revolution's other goals have not been achieved, namely eradicating systemic corruption and punishing those guilty of crimes.

These failures could lead to the undoing of the current government, led by President Petro Poroshenko and Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk, because public trust in them is low, Iryna Bekeshkina, director of the Democratic Initiatives, said at a roundtable to discuss the expert poll's findings in Kyiv on Oct. 20.

Authorities haven't brought one conviction related to crimes committed during the Maidan, including killings of protesters, torture, police brutality, abuse of power, Ukraine's prosecutor's office announced this week in a series of briefings.

The situation reminded Bekeshkina of the aftermath of the Orange Revolution in 2004, a peaceful uprising that reversed a rigged presidential election that favored Yanukovych. Afterward, Freedom House elevated Ukraine's status to being a "free country," yet the nation remained extremely corrupt, according to Transparency International.

Ukraine is in the same precarious position today, Bekeshkina said. More than 70 percent of Ukrainians believe the nation is heading in the wrong direction, Social Monitoring found in a separate nationwide public opinion conducted earlier this month.

"This (current) regime isn't sustainable. They must act fast because what's needed is painful and it will affect their close ones, their relatives and friends," she said of the urgency to combat corruption. "(Public) trust towards government is falling rapidly, this is very dangerous, but it is still not that high as during the Maidan."

What also is needed is for parliament to pass legislation in line with the revolution's goal of "democratization," Kyiv Mohyla Academy political science professor Oleksiy Haran said at the discussion.

"We need a 'Maidan' in parliament to pass the necessary laws, that's the path we need to take...we need civic activists who can write specific laws related to sectoral changes and then lobby them to fruition," Haran said, who was one of the experts polled.

He lamented that that civic activists from the revolution didn't form their own party in the movement's aftermath and instead joined existing parties.

"They did this for pragmatic reasons because they feared the new party wouldn't have passed the 5-percent threshold" in the October 2014 parliamentary election, Haran said.

A new political nation is emerging following the revolution, the poll found among its positive outcomes, in addition to "growth of national consciousness" and heightened civic activity and volunteering.

On the negative side, Russia's aggression and war against Ukraine was the most frequently mentioned by experts, including the loss of "territorial integrity."

Experts were roughly divided in half on whether a third mass uprising, or Maidan III, could erupt in the near future.

Foremost among the reasons given for another popular uprising to occur is the "lack of progress with the implementation of essential reforms and corresponding tangible changes in the lives of ordinary citizens."

To this end, according to Haran, thanks to changes brought on by the revolution, "no branch of government can ignore pressure from civil society or the public (anymore)...this is revolutionary."

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 #40
Carnegie Moscow Center
November 23, 2015
Poroshenko's Catch-22
By Oleksandr Holubov
Oleksandr Holubov is a Ukrainian journalist and economic commentator with Deutsche Welle.

Poroshenko must rely on a patchwork of political alliances that are alternately cooperative and confrontational. If he begins investigating officials - whether from the Yanukovych regime or otherwise - he will quickly face an army of new enemies and upset the fragile balance that allows him to remain in power.

In June 2014, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko called on newly-appointed Prosecutor General Vitaly Yarema to begin investigating corruption among high-level officials-including his close associates. The investigations were supposed to be a central part of Poroshenko's plans to reform the country after the Euromaidan revolution ousted notoriously corrupt former president Viktor Yanukovych.

However, it has taken more than a year and a new prosecutor general, Viktor Shokin, for any high-level arrests to be made. These arrests have indicated to some that Poroshenko is finally getting serious about cracking down on corruption. Yet they have little to do with Poroshenko's avowed desire to weed out graft. Rather, they are best interpreted as political maneuvering; an attempt to add money to the country's coffers; and an effort to boost the president's approval ratings.

On October 31, Gennady Korban, who is closely linked with oligarch and former Dnipropetrovsk governor Igor Kolomoisky and has opposed Poroshenko-backed candidates in consecutive elections, was arrested. Shokin, one of Poroshenko's most loyal allies, charged Korban with a number of crimes, including establishing a criminal organization and kidnapping. Korban was arrested in a joint operation conducted by the Prosecutor General's Office and other Ukrainian law enforcement agencies that involved 500 troops and a number of armored vehicles.

Over the course of the past year, the relationship between Poroshenko and Kolomoisky has deteriorated precipitously. Their animosity peaked this March as the two men vied for control over Ukrnafta, a state-run oil company. Armed men sent by Kolomoisky-who owns a minority stake in the company but controls the management-surrounded the Ukrnafta headquarters in Kyiv, resulting in a showdown between the two oligarchs. Shortly thereafter, the men came to an agreement: Poroshenko reportedly agreed to have Shokin drop criminal charges against Kolomoisky (who agreed to step down from his post as governor of Dnipropetrovsk) and to allow Ukrnafta to pay dividends to the state, the majority shareholder in the company.

Poroshenko has made similar deals with other oligarchs in the past. For example, Group DF-whose head Dmitri Firtas owns significant assets in the gas sector and was close to former president Yanukovych-is now being forced to repay its debts to Naftogaz, the state oil and gas monopoly. In return, Kyiv promised to unfreeze assets that belong to Firtash's company.

Make Them Pay

Despite their deal, Kolomoisky apparently instructed the Ukrnafta management to not pay dividends to the state. This is money Poroshenko needs to bolster the country's finances. With Kolomoisky allegedly not keeping his end of the bargain, the president decided to raise the stakes.

Poroshenko called the event a "new stage of de-oligarchization," and his associates maintain that Korban's arrest is part of a routine criminal prosecution that has no political undertones. (Korban's record is by no mean spotless: he has boasted about being Ukraine's number one corporate raider.)

Unsurprisingly, the Kolomoisky camp contends that Korban was put in jail for rejecting the president's demand that he leave politics. And there may be something to this: despite the severity of the charges against him, Korban was only placed under house arrest.

Kolomoisky's own comments offer insight into what's actually going on. After alluding to the political motives behind Korban's arrest, Kolomoisky took a more conciliatory tone, saying that he does not feel pressure from the presidential administration, and that he and Poroshenko are "communicating normally." This can be read as a signal that Kolomoisky is ready to compromise.

Few Arrests and Almost No Jail Time

Poroshenko's campaign to tame Kolomoisky has had some unexpected side effects. The prosecution of Kolomoisky's team looks particularly questionable in light of the fact that no carrharges have been brought against the allies of Poroshenko and Prime Minister Yatsenyuk who have been accused of corruption. What's more, the Yanukovych administration officials implicated in embezzlement schemes and accused of violence against protesters during the revolution remain free.

Two days after Korban's arrest, the Prosecutor General's Office subpoenaed three former Party of Regions members who are now MPs in the opposition bloc: Vadim Novinsky, Oleksandr Vilkul, and Natalia Korolevskaya. According to the subpoenas, none of them had appeared for questioning. However, shortly thereafter, the targets of the investigation published derisive posts online saying that they would happily participate in the investigation at any time-implying that the prosecutor's claims that they had failed to appear were disingenuous.

In the end, another Yanukovych associate, former justice minister Yelena Lukash, was arrested on charges of embezzlement. Lukash is well known to have supported violent crackdowns on protesters during the revolution. Indeed, her name is on the EU and Canadian sanctions lists. Still, Ukrainian law enforcement officials didn't begin to look for her until September 10 of this year.  Though they have finally found and arrested her, Lukash says that she was in Ukraine the entire time and wasn't trying to hide from investigators. The court placed Lukash under arrest for two months, but Novinsky paid five million hryvna to bail her out of jail.

Because Poroshenko does not have a strong political faction backing him, he must rely on a patchwork of political alliances that are alternately cooperative and confrontational. The Kolomoisky case is just the starkest illustration of this dilemma: if Poroshenko begins investigating officials-whether from the Yanukovych regime or otherwise-he will quickly face an army of new enemies and upset the fragile balance that allows him to remain in power. If he does not weed out corruption, however, he will lose support from the voters who elected him, and the Western countries and institutions that have backed his government.

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 #41
Two Anniversaries, Two Countries - Ukraine's Maidan at Two, Russia's Foreign Agents Law at Three
Paul Goble

Staunton, November 22 - Anniversaries are occasions for recalling the past and thinking about the future, and they are especially instructive about both when two or more of them occur at the same time.  That is the case this weekend when Ukrainians mark the second anniversary of the Maidan and Russians take note of the third anniversary of Putin's foreign agents law.

The first provides an occasion for reflecting on just how far Ukraine, with all its problems domestic and foreign, has moved beyond  being a former Soviet republic, and the second provides one for thinking about just how little progress Russia, despite all its resources and other advantages, has made in that regard.

Two commentaries on the former event and one about the latter are particularly valuable.

In Kyiv's "Novoye vremya," Irina Bekeshkina, a Ukrainian sociologist, says Ukrainians are now asking themselves whether the Maidan "won or lost;" but she suggests that the most important result is that civic activity has not "'demobilized'" and therefore continues to play a role (nv.ua/opinion/bekeshkina/dva-goda-spustja-majdan-pobedil-ili-proigral-81462.html).

The number one demand of those who came to the Maidan was achieved: the departure of Yanukovich and new elections for the Verkhovna Rada and the presidency. But two other demands, a struggle against corruption and the punishment of those responsible for repression against the Maidan, have not.

In part, this recalls the situation after the Orange Revolution when those in office changed but these goals were left unachieved. "However," Bekeshkina writes, "there is one distinction" and that is the continuing "active civil society" now.

After 2004, Ukrainians turned away from politics and assumed that their new leaders would take care of everything. But after 2013, "no one places particular hopes on the powers that be. More than that, people are very disappointed in it. Happily, by the common efforts of civil society and Ukraine's Western partners, the changes the country needs are moving forward."

In short, "active society is not 'demobilizing'" this time around but rather seeking to "keep its hand on the pulse of events."  That is because people recognize that "otherwise the revolution could fail."

A second article, this one by Moscow commentator Yevgeny Ikhlov, is even more upbeat on this anniversary about Ukraine, arguing that that country has "ceased to be post-totalitarian and post-Soviet" and is on the way to becoming a normal European country (kasparov.ru/material.php?id=56516038E0E61).

Ukraine has gone through a number of revolutions over the past 25 years, Ikhlov argues, but after the latest one, "it has not degenerated into nomenklatura fights as in 2006 and has not displayed either Jacobean or nationalist hysteria" as some countries in Eastern Europe did in the early 1990s.

Instead, he writes, "a bilingual political nation has been born, not bad laws have been adopted, and a normal East European system of parties has been restored." In short, "Ukraine has ceased to be a post-totalitarian and post-Soviet country" and moved toward becoming a normal European one.

Moreover, over the last two years, Ikhlov says, "Ukraine has withstood Russian aggression and created a not bad army. In this, it recalls France of 1793, but without the guillotine and civil war." But most important, "Ukraine has become a state where civil society is stronger than the government but without the Weimar syndrome."

Consequently, despite all its problems, he concludes, "Ukraine has every chance to pursue" its path toward normality "peacefully and democratically," no small achievement when one compares what its people have done with what other peoples in the region have signally failed to do.

Not surprisingly, the third anniversary of Putin's foreign agents law is being marked less in Russia where the Kremlin leader's actions have made that increasingly difficult but rather abroad where many Russian activists have either taken refuge or made use of the freedoms there that they no longer have at home.

In an interview this weekend with Radio Poland, Elena Shakhova, the head of the Civic Control rights organization in Russia, says that over the last three years, more than 100 NGOs have fallen under the provisions of Putin's law and both they and Russia have suffered as a result (radiopolsha.pl/6/249/Artykul/229738).

In response to the repression which the Kremlin has visited on NGOs and Russian society and on the occasion of this anniversary, her group has launched an Internet project called Human Rights Agents (hragents.org/) so that Russians can know what is going on in a sector that Putin has used his control of the media to demonize.

Shakhova who has been working in human rights groups since 1998 said that in her memory, there had "never been such a level of repression against civil society" in Russia as there is now. Not all of that, of course, is connected with the foreign agents law; but much of it is. And she concluded that "we will continue to struggle" because "truth is on our side."

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#42
www.rt.com
November 22, 2015
Most Ukrainians think country headed in wrong direction on 2nd anniversary of Maidan uprising
[Graphics here https://www.rt.com/news/323013-ukraine-maidan-2nd-anniversary-poll/]

Two years ago, protesters gathered in central Kiev to demand change and reforms, eventually ousting then-President Yanukovich. However, 730 days later, the country is far from prosperity, with mounting debts and a costly conflict in the east.

On Saturday, thousands of people gathered in Kiev's central Independence Square, better known as Maidan, to celebrate the Day of Dignity and Freedom, marking the second anniversary of the Euromaidan protests. Various events were held around the city.

President Petro Poroshenko attended a commemorative ceremony devoted to those killed during the Maidan protests and laid flowers and lit candles at the "Heavenly Hundred" memorial.

"Together with all the heavenly hero's we honored the memory of our hero's," Poroshenko tweeted.

He was booed by some protesters, however, who had come to decry the country's dire economic situation. "Neither Poroshenko, nor the authorities... they don't care for the people. We stay here with our questions concerning Financial Maidan... They neither want to hear us nor to hold restructuring measures," one man told Ruptly.

Ukraine's desire to move out of Moscow's orbit and into the arms of the West does not seem to be paying dividends. According to statistics from the International Monetary Fund, Ukraine's economy will contract by a staggering 12 percent in 2015, while Kiev's external debt is expected to reach 153 percent of GDP in 2015 before and 134.2 percent in 2016.

READ MORE: World Bank sharply downgrades Ukraine's GDP forecast

The average standard of living has nosedived for the general population, with Ukraine's national currency, the hryvnia, losing three-times its value against the US dollar since the protests first started on November 21, 2013.

"Many people two years ago were very optimistic and they thought Maidan would mean a break with the past and a bright future. Unfortunately, for that vast majority that bright future has not appeared. The biggest problem is corruption and very little is being done, and Ukraine is not making very much progress," author and political analyst Martin McCauley told RT.

Despite the great fanfare that came with the introduction of new reforms to improve standards of living and stem corruption, President Petro Poroshenko, who was elected in May 2014, has achieved neither. A recent poll by the Yaremenko Ukrainian Institute for Social Research showed that 72 percent of those asked do not believe Ukraine is heading in the right direction, saying either the reform process is moving too slowly or not at all.

One of the reasons for the uprising against Viktor Yanukovich in November 2013 was the former-president's reluctance to sign a trade deal with the EU, which vast numbers of the Ukrainian public believed would also eventually bring EU membership and visa free travel. However, with the continent gripped by a refugee crisis, the appetite for loosening the bloc's borders further is waning, despite the EU's vague, lukewarm allusions to the possibility of visa free travel for Ukrainians.

"The European Union has mandated specific changes in Ukrainian legislation, but even if all of the requirements posed by the European Union are met in legislation, that does not guarantee there will be visa free transit between Ukraine and the European Union," said Nicolai Petro of the Political Science Department at Rhode Island University, who spoke to RT.

Things are not looking any brighter for President Poroshenko on the second anniversary of the Maidan riots. His approval rating remains low, while he still has the small matter of a not so small debt to Russia that needs to be attended to. The three billion dollar loan is scheduled to be paid back in December.

"Ukraine has a three billion dollar Eurobond dispute with Russia and that is ongoing and Ukraine is not really able to pay for that. For all intents and purposes, Ukraine is bankrupt," McCauley said.
 

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 #43
Sputnik
November 21, 2015
True Reasons Why Maidan Protests Resulted in Ukraine's Coup

Political impotence, foreign diplomatic meddling and outright treason by the country's former leaders allowed the 2013 protests to degenerate into a full-blown coup, Ukraine's ex-interior minister told Russian media on Friday.

Exactly two years ago the so-called EuroMaidan finally succeeded in its months-long coup attempt, illegally installing a pro-Western government in power at the expense of Ukraine's democratic processes.

What started off as a series of street protests against the government's decision to put on hold the planned EU integration accord, eventually spilled out into an armed showdown between the radicals and police, and a coup in February, Vitaly Zakharchenko told Russia's RIA Novosti news agency.

"When a group of radicals led by several Verhovna Rada deputies came to the government headquarters in downtown Kiev and started beating up the police officers there was nothing we could do about it because these MPs enjoyed parliamentary immunity," Zakharchenko said.

"We kept asking parliament and the president to suspend these deputies' parliamentary status so that we could prosecute them, but they did nothing to stop this, so I believe that the Party of Regions and the Communists, who were later banned by the new government, are responsible for what happened next," he added.

Another factor that did not allow the authorities to quickly stabilize the situation were the Western diplomats who were shuttling between the protesters and the presidential administration  telling the western public and President Viktor Yanukovych that what was what going on in Kiev was just a peaceful rally and they should not use force to break it up, Zakharchenko said.

"And all this at a time when the so-called "peaceful protesters" were lobbing Molotov cocktails at the police and shooting at them from hunting guns and assault rifles... Meanwhile, the diplomats kept saying that everything would be all right," the ex-interior minister recalled.

And last but not least, some members of President Yanukovych's  inner circle turned out to be traitors who ordered the November 30, 2013 police crackdown on protesting students in Kiev which eventually led to the coup d'�tat  of February 21, 2014," Vitaly Zakharchenko said in conclusion.

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 #44
Foreign Ministry: Russia is interested more than others in resolving the crisis in Ukraine

MOSCOW, November 21. /TASS/. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova has rejected the assumption that the situation in Syria overshadowed the crisis in Ukraine for Russia pushing that conflict into the background.

"It is very common concept today that the Syrian events come to the forefront and everyone forgets Ukraine and it is Russia which is interested in it, first and foremost. I would like to tell you that every week we deliberately bring the Ukrainian topic on the agenda for discussion regardless of questions of journalists. The Contact Group, which includes a Russian representative, meets almost on a daily basis," the diplomat said in a TV interview on Saturday.

"We are more than others interested in not letting this issue stay on the conflict stage in resolving it and moving to its settlement for many reasons," she said.

"This is certainly the proximity of the two countries, closeness of the two nations. This is a huge number of refugees, displaced persons, people who came from the Ukraine to Russia," Zakharova said.

"Obviously, that is the matter of implementation of the Minsk agreements which, on the one hand, should serve as the basis for co-existence of the different parts of Ukraine as a single state. On the other hand, this is a condition, far-fetched, of course, and we all understand, but these are conditions which let Europeans prolong the sanctions. That is why Ukraine is a very important issue for us," the diplomat said.

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 #45
http://newcoldwar.org
November 20, 2015
Long-delayed revelations in killings of the first Maidan protesters and in the Bulatov case

From a report on the Facebook page of Ivan Katchanovski, Nov 20, 2015

The Prosecutor General Office of Ukraine officially confirmed during Poroshenko-ordered briefings this past week that the first three Maidan protesters that were killed in January 2014 were not killed from Berkut positions, as was claimed by the 'Euromaidan' leaders and much of the media but from Maidan-controlled areas from a distance of a few meters. (Report in ZN.ua.)

The investigation did not identify any suspects, witnesses, or videos of their killings. The GPU now suggests versions of their killing by plain-clothed police or by "agents provocateurs." But the investigation still would not even consider a version that they were killed in a false-flag operation. (The story is reported briefly in Russian-language news here.)

The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) also claimed this week that unknown provocateurs were responsible for the momentous December 1, 2013 attack on the presidential administration. This was done in spite of admissions by Right Sector leaders of the key role of this far right organization in the attack and various videos showing participation in this violent attack of far right organizations and activists including  the neo-Nazi Social National Assembly/Patriot of Ukraine members; football ultras; Dmytro Korchynsky, the Bratstvo leader and now commander of the Bratstvo-led St. Mary battalion of the Ministry of Internal Affairs; and Andriy Dzyndzia, who joined the NSA/PU-led Azov regiment after the 'EuroMaidan'.

Similarly, the SBU officially confirmed that its investigation has produced no suspects and no leads in the widely publicized case of Dmytro Bulatov, who claimed that he was abducted and crucified for being one of the leaders of the Automaidan. But the investigation still would not confirm statements by other Automaidan leaders that his abduction and crucifixion were fake.[1]

All this evidence in the killings of the first protesters, the December 1 attack, and the Bulatov case was already presented in my Maidan massacre paper. Such misrepresentation of the other cases of political violence is another evidence indicating that the Maidan massacre was similarly misrepresented.

Note:
[1] A Jan 31, 2014 report on Radio Free Europe concerning the kidnapping and release one week later of Dmytro Bulatov begins: "A prominent Ukrainian anti-government activist who disappeared more than a week ago has turned up in a village near Kyiv, saying that he was kidnapped and tortured by unknown men who spoke with Russian accents."

The report continues, "On January 31, Amnesty International called Bulatov's treatment 'a barbaric act' and demanded an immediate investigation...

" 'It is very hard to see a way out the current crisis when such horrific abuses against protest organizers are taking place,' Amnesty International said in a statement..."

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#46
Facebook
November 19, 2015
The Ballistic Reports and Other New Unreported Revelations of the Maidan Massacre Trial in Ukraine
By Ivan Katchanovski
University of Ottawa

Results of forensic ballistic expert analyses of the Maidan massacre were for the first time made public during the Berkut officers trial on November 12. Forensic analyses of bullets in March 2014 revealed that 11 protesters (Poliansky, Korneev, Baidovsky, Kemsky, Bliok, Saienko, Zhalovaha, Shymko, Dmytriv, Khrapachanko, and Smolensky) were killed from the same single 7.62x39 caliber weapon, and that this weapon could have been a Kalshnikov assault rifle, a hunting AKM-based carbine, or other firearms of this caliber (1h42m). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HIISM02GruI

The results of this long withheld ballistic expert report independently confirm my APSA paper findings that all these 11 protesters were killed from the Maidan-controlled Hotel Ukraina. https://www.academia.edu/.../The_Snipers_Massacre_on_the_Maid...
A report by Maidan NGOs and lawyers representing families of the victims stated that the government investigation concluded that one of these 11 protesters (Khrapachenko) was killed from this hotel. A testimony by Volodymyr Pastushok, a member of the Volhynian Company of the Maidan Self-Defense, reported direction of wounds, and time-stamped photos also show that Oleksander Khrapachenko from this unit was killed and another person wounded at 11:27am near the Berkut barricade on Instytutska Street by shots fired from the Hotel Ukraina. Pastushok said that investigators told him that they lost his initial testimony and tried him to change it and to say that Khrapachenko was shot not from the Hotel Ukraina but he refused. The prosecution then simply omitted the Khrapachenko case and charged the Berkut police with killings from the different positions of the 10 other protesters, even though both they and Khrapachenko were shot dead from the same single weapon.

A brother of another of these protestors testified in an earlier court hearing that Andrii Saienko was killed not from a Berkut position but from a top floor of the Hotel Ukraina. He made this conclusion on the basis of his brother's position in a video at the moment of his killing and an entry wound location in upper right chest area and a steep wound channel. Even though Saienko's brother and his lawyer officially handed in to investigators this video file in October 2014, the prosecution still charged two Berkut members with killings of these protesters, including Saienko. (p. 27 of the APSA paper). Videos of the moments of their killings and directions of their wounds made public during the trial also showed that Baidovsky and Kemsky were killed from the same Maidan-controlled hotel. My APSA paper cites and links to these and other publicly available videos, trial proceedings, conclusions of forensic medical reports, and eyewitness testimonies which indicated that all these 11 protesters were killed from the Hotel Ukraina. This analysis and official ballistic results suggest that a sniper or a group of snipers using the same weapon was able to kill the protesters from different sides of the hotel from almost the start of the killing spree till almost its end.

During the November 12 hearing, both defense lawyers and a prosecutor publicly revealed for the first time that ballistic analyses of bullets extracted from the protesters did not match bullets, which were fired from Berkut weapons and stored in the central bullet database of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (5h14m-5h54m). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HIISM02GruI

The official forensic bullet reports announced in court on November 12 concluded that Mykola-Oleh Pankiv was killed from a different 7.62x39 caliber weapon, which could have been an AKM-type assault rifle, an AK-based hunting carbine, or another firearm of this caliber (1h42m). Results of forensic medical reports made public on the same date in court indicated that he was shot from above (1h31m). They are consistent with my study findings that this protestor was shot from the Bank Arkada roof or from a roof window of a Horodetskoho Street building (p. 39).
The ballistic expert report stated that it cannot determine if the bullet extracted from the Pankiv body was fired from the same 7.62 caliber weapon as bullet pieces found in bodies of Solchanyk and Tarasiuk. A new video compilation shows that a Berkut member fired from his AKM at the general direction of these two protesters at about the moment of the killing of Solchanyk and within 1 minute range, when Tarasiuk was killed. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PCckJ3J4uXw

While their killings by this Berkut member cannot be excluded, Tarasiuk's entry wound in the neck and an exit wound in the chest area and testimonies of eyewitnesses cited in my study point towards a shot from a steep upper position, which matches the Hotel Ukraina (p. 29). The likely Tarasiuk's killing by the same exactly weapon from the Hotel Ukraina, apparent position of Solchanyk at the moment of his killing, the blood on the right side of his neck, and different sounds of shots, compared to the AKMS shots fired by Berkut at the same time, indicate that Solchanyk was most likely shot dead from the Hotel Ukraina. However, detailed information about their killings have not yet been made public in court or in the media.

The ballistic expert report also mentioned that ammunition found in Opanasiuk's body was not of industrial production. This indicates that he was killed with a hunting ammunition. The trial previously revealed that he was killed instantly in the heart area while facing not the Berkut positions but the Hotel Ukraina at the moment of his killing in the "47" video (2:33). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y7TZMjrkAB4

The trial on November 9 revealed crucial new information corroborating my study findings that Voitovych was also killed from the Hotel Ukraina within 2 minutes of the Opanasiuk's killing in the same place. The official investigation did not identify the exact place and the time of the Voitovych killing but noted that he was probably killed from the Hotel Ukraina (2h29m). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o6PhLzCEG70But the Berkut was charged with killing both of them. His father during his court testimony identified the Voitovych position soon after his killing.in a Svoboda video (16:11) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IsE7lYVa5kk

His position facing the Hotel Ukraina and the direction of his entry wound in his cheek in the forensic medical report point towards a shooter in this Maidan-controlled hotel and not to Berkut positions. This video also shows that Oleksander Huch was lying on top of Voitovych. The videos of his wound, his x-ray scan of a bullet and his comments on his VK page show that Huch was wounded in his legs from in an upward and steep angle direction. His reported position indicates that he was likely shot from the Hotel Ukraina by a ricochet, possibly with the same bullet as Voitovych. A Belgian TV video captured at a distance a moment of their shooting. The Internet version of the video does not have sufficient resolution to see what exactly happened at that spot but it indicates that there was one gunshot at that time (1:26).
http://nieuws.vtm.be/.../80471-reporter-tussen-de-vliegende-k...

The moment of the Voitovych shooting in the Belgian video, Huch, and Trapezun, who witnessed their shooting and carried away in his hands wounded Huch were not mentioned during the trial session devoted to the Voitovych killing. Similarly, the Trapezun interviews about snipers at the Hotel Ukraina and Horodetskoho Street buildings wounding him and other protesters were not mentioned at all during the November 10 trial session concerning killing of Tochyn. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GVyYuqQk0ZM Tochyn was killed in the same time as Trapezun reported snipers shooting him and other protesters from these locations and SBU Alfa radiointercepts reported a group of likely snipers on the roof of a Horodetskoho street building.

Tochyn's position in the "47" video at the moment of his killing and direction of entry and exit wounds in a forensic medical report, which was made public for the first time during this trial, suggest that he could have been shot from a government-controlled Club of Cabinet of Ministers during exchange of fire between Berkut and snipers shooting at both protesters and the police from these Maidan-controlled locations. However, the entry wound was identified in the forensic medical report as being much bigger and of irregular pattern compared to the identified exit wound (2h07m). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d7wU3subkQE Forensic studies state that typically the sizes and patterns of entry and exit wounds are opposite that the ones reported in the Tochyn case. Therefore, there is also a possibility that Tochyn was shot from the opposite direction, and this direction is consistent with reported presence at the time of his shooting of the snipers in the Hotel Ukraina and in the adjacent building on Horodetskoho Street.

Although my paper is a political science study, the defense lawyers found and introduced as new evidence two videos, which I cited in my paper. They stated that they just found about these videos, which are available on the Internet, from my study. (3h26m). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HIISM02GruI Previously some of the relatives of the killed Maidan protesters introduced as new evidence a Belgian TV video, which was reposted in the Facebook group devoted to the Maidan massacre soon after I publicized it.

The ongoing trial revelations provide more evidence in support of my study conclusions that the protesters were massacred from the Maidan-controlled locations in a false-flag operation, but that killings of some of the protesters by the Berkut cannot be excluded. The long withheld results of the ballistic expert reports alone suggest that that the absolute majority of the protesters were shot from the Maidan-controlled buildings, mainly the Hotel Ukraina. They indicate that nearly all of 16 protesters, killed by identified 7.62 caliber bullets, were shot from this hotel and nearby Horodestkoho Street and Bank Arkada buildings. Such caliber bullets were extracted from bodies of 16 out of 39 protesters, with whose killings Berkut members were charged, two protesters were killed by pellets, and one by unspecified hunting ammunition. It is likely that the absolute majority of other protesters, who were shot dead by bullets which were not found, were also killed from the same weapons. In addition, the official investigation did not charge the Berkut special company members with killings of 10 other protesters, because they were killed from other positions, such as the Hotel Ukraina. The mainstream media in Ukraine and the West again did not report these crucial new revelations from the Maidan massacre trial.

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 #47
Kyiv Post
November 21, 2015
Poroshenko vows killers of Maidan protesters will go to prison
By Euan MacDonald

Those responsible for the mass killing of EuroMaidan protesters will go to prison, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko said on Nov. 21, as Ukrainians marked the second anniversary of the start of the mass popular uprising that toppled a corrupt government, but also sparked Russian aggression against the country.

Poroshenko, visiting a memorial to the "Heavenly Hundred," as the dozens of Maidan protesters shot by police sniper fire on Feb. 20, 2014 are known, said those responsible for the massacre had been "cursed by the people," Ukrainian news magazine Novoye Vremya reported.

"Morally, they have already been punished: the people have cursed them, and the Lord has deprived them of their Motherland," he said. "And no matter how long those bastards hide in Russia, that which they have done has no statute of limitations. The procedure of prosecuting them in absentia will go on only temporarily. They will all go to jail, along with their henchmen."

The dull gray skies and persistent rain at the memorial site in Kyiv reflected the somber mood in the Ukrainian capital.

The site is located on Institutska Street, on a hill above Kyiv's central square, Maidan Nezalezhnosti - the epicenter of the public protests against former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych. The memorial has the portraits of the dozens of protesters who died on the street nearby, with a candle and flowers placed by each picture.

Acknowledging public anger with the lack of progress in investigations and prosecutions of those responsible for opening fire and killing the largely unarmed Maidan protesters, Poroshenko said he was "also dissatisfied with the pace of the investigations."

"(But) the investigations into more than 2,000 crimes against the protesters do require a lot of effort and time," the president said.

He said that much of the evidence of who was behind the savage attempt to crush the protests had been destroyed before the new government had gained full control of the law enforcement agencies.

"(There were) many who managed to cover their tracks and hide," the president said.

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