#1
Consortiumnews.com
November 19, 2015
How Russians See the West and Russia
By Natylie Baldwin
Natylie Baldwin is co-author of Ukraine: Zbig's Grand Chessboard & How the West Was Checkmated, available from Tayen Lane Publishing. In October 2015, she traveled to six cities in the Russian Federation. Her fiction and nonfiction have appeared in various publications including Sun Monthly, Dissident Voice, Energy Bulletin, Newtopia Magazine, The Common Line, New York Journal of Books, OpEd News and The Lakeshore. She blogs at natyliesbaldwin.com.
The U.S. mainstream media's recent depictions of Russia amount to little more than crass propaganda, including the inside-out insistence that it is the Russian people who are the ones brainwashed by their government's propaganda. Author Natylie Baldwin found a different reality in a tour of Russian cities.
After a year and a half of conducting research on Russia, the world's largest country, mostly for a book I co-authored on the history of post-Soviet U.S.-Russia relations and its context for the Ukraine conflict, it was time for me to finally go see this beautiful, fascinating and complex nation in person and to meet its people on their own terms and territory.
On this maiden voyage to Russia, I visited six cities in two weeks: Moscow, Simferopol, Yalta, Sevastopol, Krasnodar and St. Petersburg. In each city, I talked to a cross-section of people, from cab drivers and bus riders to civil society workers, professionals, and entrepreneurs of small- to medium-sized businesses.
I even had an opportunity to hear what teenagers had to say in two of those cities as my travel mate and I participated in a Q&A session with students of a private high school in St. Petersburg and teens who were part of various youth clubs in Krasnodar. Their questions reflected a thoughtful engagement with the world as they led to discussions on environmental sustainability, socially responsible economics and how to promote initiative, goodwill and peaceful conflict resolution.
Many of the adults were no less thoughtful during the formal interviews and informal conversations I had with them. Admittedly, I wondered how I would be received as an American during one of the most acrimonious periods of U.S.-Russia relations since the end of the Cold War.
It helped that my travel mate has been going in and out of Russia since the 1980s, lives part-time in St. Petersburg, and has developed good relations with many Russians across the country. Once most Russians realized that I came in goodwill and did not approach them or their country with a superiority complex, they usually responded with some combination of curiosity, honesty and hospitality.
Below is a summary of what Russians that I spoke to thought about a range of issues, from their leader to their economy to the Ukraine war, Western media's portrayal of them and what they wanted to say to Americans.
What Russians Think About Putin
In every place I visited in Russia, there was a consistent attitude among the people on a number of significant issues. First of all, there was consensus that the Yeltsin era in the 1990s was an unmitigated disaster for Russia, resulting in massive poverty, an explosion in crime, the theft of the Soviet Union's resources and assets by a small number of well-connected Russians who went on to become the oligarchs, and the worst mortality crisis since World War II.
As Victor Kramarenko, an engineer and foreign trade relations specialist during the Soviet period and, more recently, a years-long executive with a major American corporation in Moscow, explained the Yeltsin era: "The Russian economy was devastated. We went from being an industrial power that defeated the Nazis, showed resilience, rebuilt quickly, and had great achievements in aviation and space to a place where morale collapsed and a lack of trust and a pirate mentality emerged."
I learned from my interviews that Russians credit Vladimir Putin with taking the helm of a nation that was on the verge of collapse in 2000 and restoring order, increasing living standards five-fold, investing in infrastructure, and taking the first steps toward reigning in the oligarchy. Many stated that they wished Putin would do more to decrease corruption.
A couple of people I spoke to said they believed that Putin would like to do more on this front but has to work within certain limitations at the top. However, according to a recent report by Russian news magazine, Expert, Putin may be initiating a serious anti-corruption drive using a secret Russian police unit that is outsmarting corrupt officials who are used to evading investigation and accountability. Time will tell how successful and far-reaching this turns out to be.
Russians also think Putin has been a good role model in certain respects. As Natasha Ivanova told me over lunch at an Uzbek restaurant in Krasnodar, "He's fit and doesn't drink alcohol or smoke. Now you see young people more interested in sports and fitness and not smoking and drinking."
After the mortality crisis of the 1990s when millions of Russians died premature deaths from heart problems and complications from alcoholism, this development is celebrated. Natasha Ivanova's friend, Anna, chimed in, "Putin's also orderly and has common sense."
Natasha Shidlovskaia, an ethnic Russian who grew up in western Ukraine and now lives in St. Petersburg, admires Putin's sharp mind: "He's very smart. His speech is very structured and organized. When a person speaks, you know how he thinks."
Jacek Popiel, a writer and consultant with first-hand experience in Russia and the former Soviet Union, has commented on the Russian historical experience of constant invasions and periodic famines and how it has shaped their view of government and leadership: "Russians will readily accept an authoritarian government because such is needed when national survival is at stake - which, in Russia's history, has been a recurring situation."
But Russian acceptance of powerful central authority also includes a check on it. This is the concept of Pravda. The literal translation of this word is "truth," but it has a deeper and wider significance - something like "justice" or "the right order of things." This means that while accepting authority and its demands, Russians nevertheless require that such authority be guided by moral principle. If authority fails to demonstrate this they will, in time, rise against it or remove it.
A group of professionals in Krasnodar echoed this when they insisted during a discussion one evening that a strong leader was needed to get things done, but the leader needed to be responsible to the people and their needs. Most believed that Putin successfully met this criteria as is confirmed by his nearly 90 percent approval rating. Moreover, when the subject of freedom and its definition was raised, one participant asked, "Does freedom presuppose a framework of rules and order? Or does it just mean that everyone does whatever they want?"
One criticism I heard from two women in Krasnodar was disappointment that Putin had divorced, particularly in the same time frame as when he'd declared "The Year of the Family."
Another four women, who were involved in civil society work, were upset that some authentic Russian non-governmental organizations (or NGO's) were getting caught in the dragnet of the foreign agents law - legislation they understood was motivated by a desire to crack down on provocateurs associated with the National Endowment for Democracy.
But, due to the effects it was having on genuine NGO's in the country, they believe the law is ultimately a mistake. Three of the four were prepared to continue their work, including reform of the law's implementation, while the fourth was considering leaving Russia.
Economic Conditions
Russians acknowledge that they are in a recession and attribute it to a combination of sanctions, low oil prices and lack of economic diversity and access to credit. But they generally do not blame Putin and did not express despair, or resentment that money was being invested in Crimea. Instead, they are putting their heads down, adapting and getting through it.
As the participants at the Krasnodar meeting of professionals explained, Russian entrepreneurs were becoming more creative by forming cooperatives to get new ventures off the ground; for example, finding one person in their network who has access to raw materials and another who has needed skills.
Despite what some commentators in the western corporate media have said, Russians are not going hungry. I saw plenty of food in the markets and some Russians told me that there were pretty much the same everyday products on store shelves as before, they just noticed higher prices due to inflation, which has started to come down. That downward trend is expected to continue into 2016, according to the International Monetary Fund.
We ate out frequently during our stay and most restaurants were doing decent business while some were very busy, including during non-rush hours. I did not notice any significant number of vacant or shuttered buildings, although many were under renovation. Russians in every city I visited were as well dressed as people in American cities and suburbs and looked as healthy (although, I noted fewer overweight people in Russia).
And, alas, the smart phone was nearly as ubiquitous among Russian youth as American.
Ukraine, Crimea and Foreign Policy
Almost everyone I spoke with strongly supported what they view as Putin's calm but decisive policies of standing up to major provocations from the West, including attempts to exploit historical ethnic and political divisions in Ukraine, resulting in the illegitimate removal of a democratically elected leader.
Kramarenko explained a sentiment I've often heard from Russians about the high hopes they had after the end of the Cold War and how Russians have subsequently become disillusioned over the years with the actions of Washington policymakers. It also helps one to understand the more negative attitudes toward the West that the independent polling agency, Levada Center, has reported in recent months:
"'Back to the civilized world.' That was the motto. Russians were fairly open about wanting to cooperate and integrate [with the West]. But they have gotten three wake-up calls over the years. The first was the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. It was painful and wrong but we figured 'let bygones be bygones.' The second wake-up call was the Sochi Olympics. I worked with a sponsor and there was a flood of anti-Russian sentiment, Russia was always in the wrong. Russians asked - why do they characterize us so black when it doesn't correspond to reality? Ukraine was the third wake-up call. We were under no illusions about Yanukovyich's corruption, but the turning point came when the [Maidan] protests became violent and the police were attacked. There was a split among Russian intellectuals at that point, but the general people turned against it."
Volodya Shestakov, a lifelong resident of St. Petersburg, agrees:
"Yanukovich was extremely corrupt and ripe for a revolt. The original Maidan protesters wanted to get rid of oligarchy, but they didn't get less oligarchy. The Ukrainian economy is in very bad shape. Western corporations like Monsanto planned to go in. There are also shale gas deposits. It will be an environmental nightmare. [Current President Petro] Poroshenko is a puppet of Washington."
The conclusion that Kiev's current leadership consists of Washington lackeys came up often in conversations with both continental Russians and Crimeans. Tatyana, a professional tour guide from Yalta, a resort city in Crimea, told me:
"No one asked us if we wanted to go along with Maidan. There are Russians as well as people who are a mix of Russian and Ukrainian here. We are not against Ukraine as many of us have relatives there, but Maidan was not simply a spontaneous protest. We are aware of the phone call with Victoria Nuland and Geoffrey Pyatt, we saw the photos of her with Yatsenyuk, Tiagnibok [leader of Svoboda, the neo-fascist group that was condemned by the EU in 2012], and Klitschko on television. We saw the images of her handing out cookies to the protesters."
Crimeans saw the violence that erupted on the Maidan as well as the slogans being chanted by a segment of the protesters ["Ukraine for Ukrainians"] and became very concerned. The citizens of Sevastopol, a port city in Crimea and longtime home to Russia's Black Sea fleet, had meetings on what they should do if events in Kiev spiraled further out of control, possibly creating dangerous consequences for the majority ethnic Russian population there.
They believe that those dangerous consequences were prevented when Putin intervened and agreed to requests from Crimeans to be reunited with Russia. Crimeans and continental Russians believe that this intervention protected Crimea from those extremist elements that had hijacked the Maidan protests and risen to power in Kiev, threatening Crimeans' safety and interests.
Moreover, Crimeans that I interviewed who participated in or were witness to events that led up to what is variously referred to as the "Crimean Spring" or the "Third Defense of Sevastopol," did not expect the Russian government to step in and assist them or to accept their requests for reunification. This was due to the numerous times since the 1990s when Crimeans voted, either directly or through their parliament, for reunification, which Russia had always ignored.
According to Anatoliy Anatolievich Mareta, leader (ataman) of the Black Sea Hundred Cossacks, a turning point came after the Feb. 21, 2014 agreement (in which Yanukovych agreed to reduced powers and early elections) was rejected by armed ultra-nationalists on the Maidan and the Europeans subsequently abandoned their role as guarantors:
"A one-day meeting of anti-Maidan supporters was held in Sevastopol. Thirty thousand Crimeans gathered in the center of the port city to resist and declare that they didn't recognize the coup government in Kiev and would not pay taxes to it. They then decided to defend Sevastopol and the Crimean isthmus with arms. They chose a people's mayor, Aleksai Chaly, and checkpoints were set up. After extremist Tatars and Ukrainian ultra-nationalists showed up in Simferopol, throwing bottles, teargas, and beating busloads of ethnic Russians with flag poles, our help was requested."
As the situation deteriorated further, with a standoff between local residents and local police officials who were beholden to and taking orders from Kiev underway, Mareta admitted that the Cossacks realized that theirs was a revolt that amounted to a suicide mission if Kiev gave the order to put it down with full force. "Their hearts were in it, but their minds knew they might lose," Mareta said.
This was confirmed by Savitskiy Viktor Vasilievich, a retired Russian naval officer and resident of Crimea who served as an election monitor during the Crimean referendum in Sevastopol. "The Russian military was very cautious and waited for the order to intervene," he said. "It was an unexpected gift."
From Feb. 28-29, 2014, Cossacks from parts of continental Russia, including Kuban and Don, began to arrive to reinforce the isthmus after Ukrainian planes were blocked from landing at the local airport as Russian soldiers, stationed legally in Crimea under contract, manned the gates.
Crimeans told me that it was understood at the time that the "little green men" who appeared on the streets in the coming days were Russian soldiers under lease at the naval base who had donned unmarked green uniforms. The people viewed them as protectors who allowed them to peacefully conduct their referendum without interference from Kiev, not invaders.
The population expressed gratitude to the Russian president for protecting them. I saw billboards throughout Crimea with Putin's image on them, which read: "Crimea. Russia. Forever." I asked several residents if this represented the general sentiment among the population. They confirmed enthusiastically that it did.
While in country, I attempted to get an interview with a representative of the Crimean Tatars, an ethnic minority population in which there is reportedly division in terms of support for the reunification with Russia, but was unsuccessful.
But the overall support for reunification with Russia should not come as a surprise to those familiar with Crimea's history. The Russian naval fleet has been based at Sevastopol since Catherine the Great's reign in the Eighteen Century. During the Soviet era, Premier Nikita Khrushchev - who was Ukrainian - decided to move Crimea from Russian administration and give it as a gift to Ukraine.
Since both Russia and Ukraine were part of the Soviet Union at the time, the possible future consequences of such a decision were not considered. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, Crimea remained in Ukraine as an autonomous region while Russia kept its naval base there as part of a legal agreement (lease) with the Ukrainian government.
Not only is Sevastopol Russia's only warm water port, it is the place where the Soviet army blocked the Nazi advance for eight months during World War II. By the time, the siege was over, around 90 percent of the city had been devastated.
Kramarenko summed up continental Russians' view of the reunification: "Most people, both Crimean and Russian, think Crimea is Russian. The referendum, along with the lack of violence, gives it legitimacy."
Surveys of Crimean and Russian opinion by Pew, Gallup and GfK within a year of the referendum show consistent support for Crimea's reunification with Russia and the legitimacy of the referendum itself. See here, here and here.
Western Media
When I asked Russians if they had access to Western media, they all said they did, through both satellite and the Internet. But they did not find the Western media to be accurate or thorough in their coverage of Russia in general and the Ukraine crisis in particular.
Volodya Shestakov told me, "The Western media narrative of Russia is distorted. The corporate media distorts news in its own interests ... and to suit politics. Americans are the first target of corporate propaganda."
Nikolay Viknyanschuk, originally from eastern Ukraine and also a resident of St. Petersburg explained further: "There are certain patterns used [within the Western media] and they prefer to stay within those patterns. What they cannot explain, they cut off or ignore. If Russia is an aggressor, why didn't it take Kiev?"
He also lamented Western media's over-reliance on a short news cycle, sound bites and talking heads who lead the audience in what to think, "Commentators and so-called journalists' interpretations are relied upon instead of presenting primary source material."
Lack of context was another complaint about the Western media's presentation of the Ukraine issue. I can personally attest to this as the conversations I had with educated Americans about the Ukraine crisis reflected little to no historical understanding of the country as having been under the control of different political and cultural entities, creating divisions that, combined with poverty and deep corruption, made it vulnerable to instability.
As Shestakov explained: "Russia, Ukraine and Belorussia [Belarus] are ethnically and culturally the same. There are only mild differences. Russia started in Kiev [Kiev Rus] but expanded and the capital moved to Moscow. When Ukraine got independence in 1991, a fictitious narrative was pushed in school textbooks of an independent people who were repressed by Russia. The Ukrainians have been manipulated. Russians don't hate Ukrainians. There is no hostility on our part. We regret what has happened."
Vasilievich reiterated these historical points: "There was resentment that Ukraine was always viewed as the 'little brother' in the relationship after Russia united to become its own independent nation. Parts of Ukraine were always under the rule of Russia [in the east], Poland or the Austro-Hungarians [in the west]. Ukraine is a vast area with rural villages and there is an ideology of small rural areas with Polish influence in the western most regions. The Americans knew what divisions they were manipulating."
According to the extensive research of Walter Uhler, president of the Russian-American International Studies Association, there was no historical reference to even a clearly defined, much less independent, territory called Ukraine until the Sixteenth Century when the term was used by Polish sources, but "with the demise of Polish rule, the name Ukraine fell into disuse as a term for a specific territory, and was not revived until the early Nineteenth Century."
Tatyana confirmed that Western media is freely available online in Crimea as well for those who understand English, but it is often seen as distorted.
Additionally, most Russians find the demonization of their president by Western media and politicians to be childish and a reflection of the observation that Washington policymakers seem to have assigned Russia the role of enemy long ago for their own reasons, regardless of what Russia actually is or does in reality.
As Valery Ivanov, a 25-year old college graduate who earns a living as an emcee and a translator in Krasnodar, said, "The Western media and government portrays Russia as an aggressor because Russia is a strong country and a potential competitor."
What to Say to Americans
One thing that stood out in my discussions with Russians was how they almost always made a point of differentiating between the American people and the government in Washington. They like and admire the American people for their openness and achievements, but they find Washington policymakers' penchant for interfering in other parts of the world in which they don't understand the consequences of their actions to be profoundly misguided and dangerous.
At the end of my interview with each person, I asked them if there was one thing they could say to the American people, what would it be. It was interesting how, even though they all worded it differently, the essence of their answers was identical: we are all the same; we may have minor differences in language, culture and geography that influence us but we all want the same things - peace and a stable, prosperous future for our children and grandchildren.
Several Russians underscored the point that if Russians and Americans got together and related to each other as regular people, there would be no real conflict. Valery Ivanov said, "If we were to meet in a bar for a drink, over American whiskey or Russian vodka, we would become good friends."
Nikolay Viknyanschuk added, "Let's be friends on a personal and family level. We should strengthen friendship between San Francisco and St. Petersburg. You are people and we are people. We all have five fingers on each hand."
Volodya Shestakov offered this insight about his own transformation in how he saw Americans during the Cold War versus how he saw them afterward, when he was able to travel and to meet them: "When I looked at U.S. people, I saw them as alien, like from another planet. When I met American people, I no longer saw them that way. The liquid in our bodies is all from the same ocean."
They also would like more Americans to come visit Russia and open themselves up to what Russia has to offer. Marina and Irina, two of the civil society activists in Krasnodar emphasized, "Let's cooperate. Let's share experience and meet each other. We have a rich history and culture to share and we want to invite Americans to come and meet us."
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#2
The National Interest
November 20, 2015
Comeback: Putin's Newfound Global Clout
The Russian president has unexpectedly gone from pariah to powerbroker.
By Nikolas K. Gvosdev
Nikolas Gvosdev is a contributing editor at The National Interest and co-author of Russian Foreign Policy: Vectors, Sectors and Interests (CQ Press, 2013). The views expressed here are his own.
Vladimir Putin should have left the G-20 summit in Antalya, Turkey, in an upbeat mood. The Russian president clearly demonstrated that on the world stage he is neither isolated nor marginalized. His interactions with other key global leaders, both in the multilateral format of the summit as well as in numerous bilateral sidebars, showed, in the words of a headline in The Guardian, Putin's dramatic transformation from "pariah" to "powerbroker" in the span of a single year.
It is telling that the most public rebukes delivered to Putin for the continuing crisis in Ukraine came from Canada's newly elected prime minister Justin Trudeau. Other Western leaders indicate that they brought up the Ukrainian situation in their talks with the Russian president but the tone seemed to shift from last year's unequivocal condemnation in Brisbane of Russian actions to one of "agreeing to disagree" on the situation today. Putin's tete-à-tete with Angela Merkel, for instance, seems to have been focused more on technical aspects related to the full implementation of the EU-Ukraine association agreement and Russia's likely trade response-as well as Russia's apparent willingness to discuss restructuring Ukrainian debt-rather than on holding Russian feet to the fire on complete implementation of the Minsk Accords.
What's more, Putin's unscheduled lobby summit with President Barack Obama-and the release of images showing the two leaders in much friendlier poses than has been their usual wont-suggests that something has changed. Ukraine cannot also be reassured by signals that the so-called "Turkish Stream" pipeline-which appeared to be on the rocks even a few short weeks ago-may be back on track (albeit in a somewhat more reduced fashion and later on schedule), following Putin's meetings with Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan. (The real test will be whether actual progress is made during the next session of the Turkey-Russia intergovernmental commission meeting next month.)
It is, of course, the Syria crisis, with the related issues of migrants flooding Europe and the terrorist attacks last week in Paris (now connected with the earlier downing of the Russian airliner over the Sinai), which swept Ukraine off the agenda. In these areas, Putin has had important cards to play.
Already Russia's foray into Syria achieved its first objective. The regime of Bashar al-Assad has stabilized and tightened its control over those parts of Syria still under its jurisdiction. In contrast to several months ago, no analysts are now proclaiming that Assad's fall is imminent. Russian (and Iranian) support has made it impossible to dismiss Assad as a continuing relevant factor and player in Syria's future. The Western powers-and other Arab states-have adjusted accordingly. Now, the emphasis has shifted to getting a political process in place that does not require Assad's immediate departure from power as a non-negotiable first principle for getting a ceasefire in place-even if Washington, Paris, and Riyadh still maintain that Assad ultimately has no political future in Syria.
Having degraded the rebel groups most immediately threatening Assad's immediate survival-Russian military strikes have now begun to focus more directly on the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The Russian military is showing that it, too, can carry out some of the missions that were being conducted by the U.S.-led coalition-without having to operate under Washington's aegis. In turn, Putin has ordered the Russian air and naval units operating in the Syrian theater to coordinate with French efforts to strike ISIS targets, holding out the possibility of coordinated joint Franco-Russian action in the future.
France's president Francois Hollande is now calling for the formation of a grand coalition to fight and crush ISIS, and has positioned himself as the indispensable unifier who is attempting to bring together Washington and Moscow. Hollande's announcement that he plans to travel to Moscow next week could represent the end of efforts to isolate Russia over Ukraine-and Hollande's visit has leaders not only in Kyiv but in other parts of Central Europe concerned. While EU sanctions remain in place on Russia for now, they must be renewed every six months-and pressure may grow for partial relaxation or suspension of these measures, if not in January, then certainly by June 2016.
Depressed oil prices and other negative economic factors are still cause for depression in the Kremlin-but Russia's geopolitical position has markedly improved over the last month (reflected in the current rally of the Moscow stock exchange).
Seven years ago, another French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, found a way for Europe to move past the Georgia war to restore relations with Moscow. Is Hollande seeking to do something similar? We'll have a better sense in seven days.
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#3
Levada.ru
November 19, 2015
Majority of Russians think terrorist attack on their country likely - poll
Majority of Russians think a terrorist attack in their country is quite possible in the next 12 months, as revealed by poll results published on Russian independent polling organization Levada Centre's website on 19 November.
The poll was conducted on 13-16 November 2015 among 1,600 respondents aged 18 and older across 134 settlements in 46 regions in Russia.
Out of those polled, 65 per cent said a terrorist attack in Russia in the next 12 months was either "quite possible" (47 per cent) or "certainly possible" (18 per cent).
When asked what they thought caused the Russian A321 crash in Egypt, 57 per cent attributed the incident to an act of terrorism, while 20 per cent said the reason behind it was a technical malfunction. In its report of the results, the Levada Centre noted that most of the respondents had been polled before the Russian Federal Security Service confirmed that the Sinai crash was a terrorist attack.
Some 18 per cent of respondents put the blame for letting the attack happen on the airport security; 17 per cent, on Egypt's special services; and 16 per cent said the Islamic State group, also known as ISIS or ISIL, or other related groups were responsible. Only 5 per cent said Russia's authorities were to blame because with the air strikes in Syria they had initiated a war with IS.
The majority of respondents, or 77 per cent, said it was generally the right thing to ban flights to and from Egypt after the crash.
Some 73 per cent of those polled replied either "certainly yes" or "possibly yes" when asked whether President Vladimir Putin should have addressed the nation and expressed his condolences to the families of the victims immediately after the crash.
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#4
Reuters
November 20, 2015
Russian parliament gives blessing to security overhaul after plane bombing
BY ANDREW OSBORN AND MARIA TSVETKOVA
Russia's parliament backed a sweeping overhaul of national security, including possibly expanding the powers of the country's intelligence services, after the Kremlin concluded a bomb downed a Russian passenger plane over Egypt last month.
In a rare meeting of both chambers of parliament on Friday, deputies, senators adopted a resolution calling for tougher penalties for terrorists, stricter public security measures and new action to combat extremism.
"You can't have too much security and any system needs perfecting," said Valentina Matviyenko, a close ally of President Vladimir Putin and the head of the Federation Council, the upper house of parliament. "Such work is going on at full pace."
Putin on Tuesday vowed to hunt down those responsible for blowing up an Airbus A321 packed with Russian tourists over Egypt on Oct. 31. All 224 people on board were killed.
The Kremlin has also cited the Paris attacks, in which at least 129 people were killed, as another reason why Russia and the world need to get tougher on Islamic State.
Matviyenko said security measures at airports, on public transport and in places where large events are held, had already been beefed up, on Putin's orders, in the past week.
But she and others said more needed to be done. Among the suggestions: Reinstating the death penalty for terrorists and setting up an international Nuremberg-style tribunal to try Islamic militants.
"There are proposals to widen the powers of the intelligence services and law enforcement agencies and to toughen criminal responsibility not only for terrorist activity but for anyone who supports it morally, financially or with information," said Matviyenko.
Sergei Naryshkin, the head of the lower house of parliament, said lawmakers now needed to analyze the legal base underpinning national security to better protect people and strategic sites.
Russia has intensified its air strikes against Islamist militants in Syria in response to the Egypt plane bombing, but lawmakers say they want to ensure Putin knows he has their full support if he decides to go further.
Most Russians approve of Putin's actions in Syria and his personal popularity is at a record high of almost 90 percent, opinion polls show.
But his handling of the Egypt plane crash appears to have drawn a more mixed reaction with one survey, conducted by the independent Levada pollster, showing that 73 percent of Russians thought he should have addressed the nation personally afterwards to offer his condolences.
Sergei Mironov, the leader of the Just Russia party, said on Friday it was "essential" in the wake of the plane bombing for Russia to bring back the death penalty, currently subject to a moratorium, for terrorists and their accomplices.
Putin's spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, said Mironov's idea was a new one but that the issue was complex, while Sergei Ivanov, Putin's chief-of-staff, said Russians would back such a proposal but that it was "premature" to reinstate capital punishment.
Many of the speakers blamed the West for the rise of Islamic State and for hindering the fight against it by refusing to team up with Russia.
"The West blew up the situation in the Middle East and North Africa, and sowed chaos, bloodshed and a humanitarian catastrophe," said Matviyenko.
"Measures must be taken to ensure nobody has the right to act like that in the world using such methods."
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#5
Kremlin proceeds from moratorium on death penalty in Russia
MOSCOW. Nov 20 (Interfax) - Russian presidential press officer Dmitry Peskov has refrained from giving detailed comments on the proposal made by Sergei Mironov, chairman of the State Duma faction A Just Russia, to use the death penalty on terrorists, saying that the Kremlin currently proceeds from a moratorium on this measure of punishment.
"It's a very complex issue. There is a long of debate going on, but eventually it's a decision on moratorium, which is in place. We now proceed from this moratorium," Peskov said.
Peskov said Mironov made this proposal on Friday morning. "It's a new proposal and therefore I cannot word any position yet," he said.
Peskov said more detailed comments should be sought from the author of this idea. He also said the position of Russian President Vladimir Putin on this matter has not changed yet.
"No, the president has not voiced any other viewpoints," Peskov said.
Sergei Mironov, leader of the faction A Just Russia, said earlier on Friday that the death penalty should be used for terrorist crimes as an exception.
"Today I will suggest introducing the death penalty for terrorists and their accomplices, as an exception from the rules," Mironov told reporters on Friday before a joint meeting of the State Duma and the Federation Council on counterterrorism issues.
Mironov reiterated that international terrorism represented by the so-called Islamic State has now declared a war. "If it's a war, a war should be won," the politician said.
In this regard, unified efforts of the global community are extremely important, he said. "We glad that we already have allies, primarily it's France," he said.
Mironov said the so-called Islamic State is "a real cancerous tumor on our planet."
The death penalty has not been legislatively abolished in Russia. In 1996, when Russia entered the Council of Europe, Russia declared a moratorium on the death penalty, which is replaced with life in prison. The moratorium expired on January 1, 2010, but the Russian Constitutional Court prolonged it in November 2009 until the moment when the State Duma will ratify the protocol on abolishing the death penalty.
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#6
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
November 19, 2015
If Russia, the West refuse to cooperate in Syria now, it will be insanity
Foreign policy experts believe that Russia and the West should give up their differences over the crisis in Syria and start working together, even if it means sacrificing some of their vital interests in the Middle East.
By Pavel Koshkin and Alexey Khlebnikov
Shortly after the Nov. 13 terror attacks in Paris, another round of diplomatic talks on Syria took place in Vienna. Then, just a day later, the Russian and American presidents had an opportunity to talk for about 20 minutes on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in Turkey, with Syria and terrorism reportedly topics of discussion.
Following these high-profile meetings, the Russian security services admitted that the crash of a Russian passenger airliner in Egypt was the result of a terror attack. Given numerous threats emanating from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Greater Syria (ISIS) that they will commit even more terror attacks throughout the world, including in Europe and Russia, cooperation between countries to fight terrorism and increase the chances of a political settlement of the Syrian conflict becomes vital.
However, skeptics point to the many differences that hamper global leaders' attempts to come up with a compromise. Even the Kremlin's spokesperson, Dmitry Peskov, admitted that there is no reason to be overly optimistic about the impact of the brief meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and his American counterpart Barack Obama during the G20 summit.
The Middle East has only become more complicated and more unpredictable
The Middle East is so turbulent and brings together a number of geopolitical stakeholders with competing interests, which only complicates the situation and makes it more unpredictable.
"There is a total mess and unpredictability in the Middle East," well-known Middle East expert, Vitaly Naumkin, the director of the Institute of Oriental Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences, said during the Nov. 9 presentation of his new book Conflicts and Wars of the 21st Century at the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) in Moscow.
Naumkin argues that the world needs new approaches for how to deal with the Middle East and makes no bones about the fact that global stakeholders have been increasingly manipulating the region in their own interests.
One of Naumkin's co-authors, Dina Malysheva, an expert from the Russian Academy of Sciences, argues the long history of failed states in the Middle East has brought to the geopolitical scene non-state actors such the Islamic State of Iraq and the Greater Syria (ISIS) and has created a fertile soil for terrorism.
"The transnational agenda make these conflicts [in the Middle East] multilayered: they are rooted in local realities, but manipulated by external players and under the influence of transnational ideologies [such as that of ISIS]," she added.
Given the fact the more than 16 million Muslims live in Russia, the problem of transnational ideologies becomes increasingly relevant for Russia, because the ISIS ideology is seen by many Russian Muslims as "a viable idea," said Malysheva, adding that the challenge is not only to destroy physically ISIS, but also to withstand its ideological, economic and political influence.
Two dangerous movements in the Middle East
Today there are too many time bombs in the Middle East, argues Veniamin Popov, an experienced diplomat and former ambassador to Yemen, Libya and Tunisia, who also took the floor during the RIAC discussion.
According to him, there are two dangerous movements that are driving events forward in the Middle East. The first is the appearance of ISIS as an idea that is impossible to destroy with weapons alone. The second is the political longing of the Kurds, who cannot help jumping at the opportunity to create their own independent state [Kurds are living in four Middle East states: Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey - Editor's note]. But the Kurdish aspirations for independence and their attempts to cerate a state will be very painful, given the fact that not all countries of the region are interested in this.
"We'd better be ready for the worst-case scenario of development of events," warns Popov. At the same time, he proposes promoting Russian diplomacy in the region and using the idea of Russia saving the Muslim world in the Middle East.
However, Irina Zvyagelskaya, professor at the Russian Academy of Sciences and one of the authors of Russia Direct's recent report on the Middle East, argues it will be a challenge to persuade many Arab countries now that Russia is saving the Muslim world. She believes that Russia's policy in this region is very ambivalent, because some Arabic countries are very unfriendly toward Russia.
"The problem is that we have never fought with the Arab countries," she said, putting into question Russia's recent diplomatic and military activism in the region.
Likewise, another Russian Academy of Sciences expert on the Middle East, Vladimir Akhmedov, sees Russia as a "newcomer in the Middle East," because it doesn't know the region well. Moreover, Moscow doesn't have the experience of the colonial powers, which were fighting for influence in the Middle East. Yet it doesn't mean that Russia doesn't project its influence in the Middle East, he concludes. But it should take into account the experience of others.
Sergei Markedonov, associate professor at the Russian State University for the Humanities in Moscow, echoes Akhmedov and warns that Moscow should not repeat the mistakes of the United States. That means Russia should shy away from idealism.
"It is necessary to clearly understand certain risks and vulnerabilities," he said during the RIAC discussion. "If we are talking about a pan-Islamic project without an understanding of the factors that make Muslim ideas attractive, we could make a lot of mistakes. Saving the Islamic world is idealism, but in this situation, one should be realistic. This problem requires a complex approach."
ISIS and terrorism
The Middle East turbulence is now being echoed in the new day-to-day routines of ordinary citizens in Russia and Europe, as indicated by two recent terror attacks: the crash of the Russian passenger aircraft in Egypt and the Nov. 13 terrorist attacks in Paris. All this leads to the question: If the influence of ISIS is so great, to what extent does it pose a threat to the world?
Akhmedov argues that the role and the status of ISIS are exaggerated. According to him, ISIS is just a project, with no clear understanding of strategic goals.
However, Moscow Carnegie Center's Alexei Malashenko believes the ISIS is not just a project - it is a decisive attempt to create a state, a certain structure, which could be attractive for outsiders. And this may pose a serious challenge. According to him, ISIS is a radical idea that poses a global threat and this threat is impossible to destroy with just weapons and military intervention.
"The Islamic State [ISIS] is forever," said Moscow Carnegie Center's Alexei Malashenko during a Nov. 10 discussion at the Sakharov Center in Moscow, pointing out that the idea of creating the global caliphate is perennial and "it will never disappear." As long as this radicalism exists and penetrates people's minds, it will always be a challenge for governments, which do not have a clear understanding of how to fight it.
ISIS brings together not only radicals, but also pragmatists, who have aspirations to build the state, said Malashenko. If ISIS is destroyed, its supporters will scatter around the world to implement their ideas, which will only aggravate the Syrian standoff and the problem of international terrorism.
Likewise, Grigory Kosach, a scholar and professor at the Russian State University for Humanities, and Vasily Kuznetsov, an expert at the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), who also spoke at the Sakharov Center, agrees that ISIS is an idea that is impossible to root out in the near future.
The problem is that ISIS presents a robust idea of alternative political governance, argues Kuznetsov. But the paradox is that ISIS embodies the crisis of this political governance in the entire region. As long as the crisis exists, the idea of ISIS as "a sort of black hole will dominate and fill the vacuum," he said during the discussion at the Sakharov center.
Cooperation in Syria is possible despite differences
Despite many challenges between global stakeholders in the Middle East, some experts agree that cooperation between some countries is possible. For example, Kuznetsov believes that nothing should prevent Russia and the U.S. from fighting together against ISIS in Syria, because generally their interests don't contradict each other.
However, Arkady Dubnov, an international observer who moderated the discussion in the Sakharov Center, points out that the rhetoric between the Kremlin and the White House is not only "discouraging," but also "shocking," which might hamper any future cooperation.
Likewise, Malashenko seems to be skeptical about the full-fledged and extensive cooperation in the Middle East between Russia and the West.
"The problem is that those in Russia who deal with foreign policy, they do improvisation," he said, pointing out many are under the influence of political rhetoric and not mindful of the implications of such dangerous improvisation. Amidst such ideological confrontation, any partnership is unlikely.
The challenge for such cooperation is distrust. After all, some Western experts are also raising their eyebrows at Russia's airstrikes against ISIS and see the Kremlin in this context rather as a troublemaker than problem-solver.
They doubt that Russia is really sincere in its declared goals in Syria to fight ISIS and team up with the West, which hampers the possibility of a reliable and long-lasting cooperation between the Kremlin and the West. For example, Michael O'Hanlon, senior fellow and director of research at Brookings Institution's Foreign Policy Department, argues that Russia's major goal is to back Syrian President Bashar Assad.
"I don't admire Russia's role in Syria so far," he told Russia Direct. "I think the declared purpose of fighting ISIS is not sincere, and that in fact Russia is interested primarily in propping up Assad... How sad I am over the loss of life resulting from the aircraft bombing. My thoughts and prayers are with those individuals and their families; this was a terrible tragedy."
At the same time, O'Hanlon admits that, "There may be a way to reconcile Russian and American interests" to find ways just "to minimize the dangers of working at cross purposes with each other, or even coming into direct accidental conflict with each other."
"It's too soon to know if Russia's role in Syria and also the [Russian] plane crash [in Egypt] can in any way help us towards a resolution of the problem," he said. "It's possible but hardly guaranteed."
Robert Legvold, professor emeritus in the Department of Political Science and the Harriman Institute of Columbia University, is also skeptical about cooperation between Moscow and Washington.
"Because the United States and Russia are aiding opposite sides in a civil war, mere logic says that their military assistance guarantees that it will make the Middle East violence worse," he told Russia Direct. "At best, the Russian leadership may calculate that by saving the Syrian regime - if not necessarily Assad personally - they are contributing to a military stalemate that will force the warring parties to the table and start a political process."
Nevertheless, Legvold believes that the third round of the Vienna process "gives some hope for progress" in boosting U.S.-Russian cooperation against ISIS. Yet it remains to be seen if other stakeholders in the Middle East will be ready to cooperate.
"While the United States and Russia have now reached common ground on the basic principles to govern the outcome sought, they continue fight over the process by which they get there," he said. "Add Paris to Egypt and the message is clear: the United States and Russia are in a global war with ISIS, not a regional war where they can afford to muck about in a proxy war over the niceties by which the warring parties in Syria sit down and begin talking to one another. On both the Russian and U.S. sides, refusing to go the extra length to reconcile their positions on Syria-and both have to compromise-is insanity."
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#7
Experts hope for success of talks on global anti-terror coalition
By Tamara ZAMYATINA
MOSCOW, November 20. /TASS/. French President Francois Hollande's forthcoming talks with Barack Obama in Washington and Vladimir Putin in Moscow should clarify prospects for forming a global coalition to destroy the Islamic State (IS) terrorist group.
"Global public opinion is hoping for success of Francois Hollande's mission. Even if the US, French and Russian military do not unite under joint command, coordination of their strikes on IS targets would also mean success," Alexey Arbatov, head of the International Security Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences, told TASS.
"Coordination of joint action implies exchange of intelligence data, distribution of targets among allies, help in assessing results of these strikes, and rescue aid in the event that someone's aircraft or helicopter is attacked by terrorists," he added.
"The international situation in the modern world is changing rapidly. The world has realized that radical Islam is now the main threat to human civilization. Therefore, the United States, France and Russia can stand united against the IS terrorists."
Viktor Kremenyuk, deputy head of the Institute of the US and Canada at the Russian Academy of Sciences, said that "French people were longing for the authorities to take decisive steps for revenge on the IS."
"Hollande is less dependent on the US than German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Therefore he feels it his right to invite Barack Obama to unite with Russia in the face of the global terrorist threat as it was during World War Two in the face of Hitler's threat," Kremenyuk told TASS.
Obama's behavior during talks with the French leader will depend on his intention to end the period of estrangement between Washington and Moscow, he added.
"The White House head's reputation is at stake. By the end of his presidential term, Obama may want to strengthen his reputation as a global leader whose decisions do not depend on the opponent Republican Party and the Congress with a Republican majority," Kremenyuk said.
"In the current situation, Obama has to affront the Republicans who have submitted a bill to Congress against admitting Syrian refugees to the US. So, the US closes its doors to refugees when the whole world is helping them, though half of Europe fled to America in 1939 and 1940," he went on.
"Francois Hollande, in turn, wants to play the role of a global leader who reconciles the US and Russia and takes the anti-IS initiative into his hands. This role is an important political trump for Hollande, regardless of the success of his mission," the expert said. "I'd like to hope for success at the forthcoming complicated talks, as the threat of the spread of terrorism is serious and long and the sooner world leaders unite efforts against IS the more hopes we have for victory."
Yevgeny Satanovsky, president of the Middle East Institute, expressed regret that the European Union decided to extend sanctions against Russia when the French president was making attempts to unite Washington and Moscow against the Islamic State threat.
"Russia and the West can become anti-terrorism allies only when anti-Russian sanctions are lifted," Satanovsky told TASS.
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#8 Russia: Other Points of View www.russiaotherpointsofview.com November 19, 2015 RUSSIAN FEDERATION SITREP By Patrick Armstrong Patrick Armstrong received a PhD from Kings College, University of London, England in 1976 and retired in 2008 after 30 years as an analyst for the Canadian government, specializing in first the USSR and then Russia. He was a Political Counselor in the Canadian Embassy in Moscow from 1993 to 1996. [Text with links here http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/2015/11/russian-federation-sitrep-1.html] PARIS. The usual "solidarity" theatre. None of this means a thing and won't until we start to hear about the role of Wahhabism in all this, where it comes from and who spreads it; Daesh's Turkey supply route; that Washington and its allies cannot support jihadists in one place and expect to control them in another; that US neocons and "humanitarian interventionists" have produced a catastrophe; that Assad is an ally; that Iran is an ally; that Putin is not only an ally but knows what to do; that NATO is wasting its time "protecting" the Baltics from Russia and should either start really dealing with its members' security or give up. That will require an unprecedented amount of truth-telling. Danielle Ryan speculates on changes in the spin machine. BUT MAYBE WE ARE HEARING... The CIA man who helped start it all reflects that Western intervention made it worse. A retired British general dares to say "Wahhabi". A former CIA deputy director thinks it's time to team up with Assad. Even the WaPo starts to get it - US-supplied missile destroys a US-supplied Humvee. Meanwhile, Russia's initiative gains support in Vienna. PUTIN (ONCE AGAIN) EXPLAINS HIS POSITION. Take seven minutes and watch this video from about a year ago. And ask yourself: does this sound right or wrong? If you think it wrong, see Joe Biden agree with him: "[Our allies] poured hundreds of millions of dollars and tens, thousands of tons of weapons into anyone who would fight against Assad except that the people who were being supplied were Al Nusra and Al Qaeda and the extremist elements of jihadis coming from other parts of the world." (Text) SYRIA. Obviously much is happening and the situation is very fluid. Russia stepped up operations against Daesh (the airliner was brought down by a bomb), targeting the oil business - videos of hits on storage tanks and trucks. Oil is a major source of Daesh funds; the US claims at last to be targeting it. (How could it not have seen those lines of trucks? But the US effort had been rather half-hearted.) Long-range aviation seems to be hitting infrastructure while (more) aircraft based in Syria concentrate on close air support to the Syrian Army (progressing). The big question is this: it is clear to the objective viewer that Russia is leading the attack; will Paris sign up with Moscow? Ideas that France "lead" the attacks are absurd: only Russia and the USA have "full service" militaries. Hollande is close to it: "In the next few days, I will therefore meet with President Obama and President Putin to unite our forces and to achieve a result which, at this point, has been put off for far too long." There's an opportunity because France is sending its carrier to the Med and Putin told the Navy to coordinate efforts with it. The two military heads have talked. Gilbert Doctorow, an astute observer, expects cooperation - there's huge popular support in France for it. Obama himself has taken a baby step towards the Putin position which was, again, upheld at Vienna. In short, Assad is not the problem, Daesh is. Even - even! - Clinton gets it. REFUGEES. Syria's UN Ambassador says about a million refugees have returned since the Russian strikes, and associated Syrian army victories, began. A million? Well, anyway, it's clear that the solution to the European refugee/migrant problem is make the countries they came from worth living in again. More truth-telling will be required here: as I said before, the refugees come from places NATO "saved". MESSING WITH THEIR MINDS. Russian TV "accidentally" showed a frightening Russian weapon. Or maybe it's just a piece of paper. The US will probably wind up spending billions and billions. ECONOMY. More evidence that the Russian economy is turning around from Bloomberg. ISOLATED PUTIN. The RI Humour Editor permits herself a small smile. Reality and polite diplomacy proves a powerful combination against fantasy and bluster. SPORTS DOPING. Yes, no, maybe. But I am always suspicious when another anti-Russia campaign starts. WHO'S IN CHARGE? 50 analysts from the US Defense Intelligence Agency have claimed their reports were manipulated to give "a more positive picture to the White House". The former DIA head says warnings were ignored. "Shellback" argues that the US int establishment does not support what the US Administration is doing. Are these catastrophes the work of amateurs and ignoramuses? MH17. Remember that? Some Dutch media companies are suing the government to try and get more information. (In Dutch). By the way, US satellites detected the explosion of the Russian airliner, so what did they see with MH17 and why are we still not told what it was? You know why. |
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#9
www.rt.com
November 20, 2015
ISIS could be used to reignite extremism in Russia; Syria strikes aim to prevent this - official
The Russian Foreign Ministry believes that Islamic State could be used to "aggravate the situation in Russia," a department head told Kommersant. He also questioned the aim of US-led strikes in Syria, which had spared IS oil trade until Russia intervened.
"All of the threats targeting Russia's security are taken seriously," the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry's Department for New Challenges and Threats, Ilya Rogachev, said in an interview with the Kommersant newspaper.
"Today there is a possibility of renewed attempts to aggravate the situation in Russia with the help of ISIL [Islamic State, IS/ISIS]," he stressed, noting that the Russian Security Service has been actively addressing the potential threat.
Rogachev stressed that Russia's airstrikes in Syria are aimed at containing the terrorists pre-emptively - before Islamic State militants "come knocking at our door." He also stressed that Russia's fight against terrorism in the North Caucasus region is "the only successful example of its kind" resulting in a population being "successful de-radicalized."
"We need to carve out this cancer while it has 'only' consumed half of Syria and nearly half of Iraq," the official stressed.
Russia has been conducting dozens of sorties against Islamic State and other extremist targets in Syria on a daily basis since September 30 after an official request was made by President Bashar Assad.
It is possible that the terrorist attack on the Russian A321 plane in Sinai, Egypt, which killed 224 people, was carried out by IS as "revenge" for Russia's fight against terrorism in Syria, Rogachev said. The US has passed along certain information to Russia about the crash that is currently being investigated, according to the foreign ministry official.
"As far as I know, the American partners have passed to us certain information about the plane, and the competent agencies are working with it," he said. "The circumstances of this tragedy are constantly being discussed at different levels with the British side."
'US rushed to strike ISIS oil network only after Russia intervened'
Commenting on the effectiveness of the US-led coalition's efforts to fight IS in Syria thus far, Rogachev stressed that, despite an air campaign lasting over a year, their airstrikes had caused almost no damage to oil fields controlled by IS. "There were almost 8,000 military flights. Almost quarter of the time the jets came back without striking, taken to mean that they found no targets to attack. Meanwhile, ISIL continued to receive oil ... thousands of tanker trucks drove all across the region."
Rogachev noted that Russia has been calling on UN member-states to adhere to UN Security Council Resolution 2199, which calls for strong opposition to illegal oil trade by terrorist groups, adding that "we have not abandoned various attempts to offer certain measures that would urge [UN] states to approach their responsibilities in that respect more thoroughly."
"If one year ago experts were talking about ISIL extracting 30,000 barrels a day, now there is talk of 40,000-50,000 barrels. Meanwhile UN Security Council Resolution 2199 recognizes that illicit oil trade is the main source of ISIL income and obliges all states to oppose it in the strongest terms," Rogachev stated.
On Monday, the US said they had bombed over 100 IS oil trucks - for the first time in a year and following weeks of daily Russian sorties.
"It's impossible not to notice, that even this [US move to bomb IS tankers] was compelled by the decisive and effective actions of the Russian Air Force. Taking [the Russian strikes] into account, one can't help but wonder: has the US-led coalition actually set a task of militarily defeating ISIL?" Rogachev wondered.
Russia's General Staff said on Wednesday that some 500 IS tanker vehicles have been destroyed by Russian bombers over the past few days, resulting in the disruption of the terror group's oil trade.
Rogachev then pointed out that only after Syrian ground troops had begun to make progress against Islamic State did the French take it upon themselves to attack the terrorists' existing Syrian oil infrastructure, citing self-defense after the Paris attacks.
"We cannot support such actions" because they are being done without the approval of the Syrian government, Rogachev said.
The Russian official stressed that while targeting terrorist camps could theoretically be tied to self-defense, the French strikes targeting oil infrastructure have nothing to do with that.
Instead, they come as the coalition is expecting the Syrian army to take the oil fields back from Islamic State, demonstrating that as far as France is concerned, both Islamic State and Syrian President Bashar Assad are the enemy, Rogachev concluded.
At the same time, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov told Radio Russia on Thursday that Western expectations of Syrian President Bashar Assad's imminent fall were misplaced.
Lavrov stressed that Assad has public support and no peaceful resolution of the conflict is possible without his participation. "All the forecasts made by our colleagues in the West and some other parties that the people would rise up and oust him never came true. This means one thing: Assad represents the interests of a significant part of Syrian society. So no peaceful solution can be found without his participation," he said.
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#10
New York Times
November 20, 2015
For Russia, Links Between Caucasus and ISIS Provoke Anxiety
By NEIL MacFARQUHARN
BEREKEI, Russia - A handsome, new, white brick house, still lacking windows, sits deserted in the middle of this quiet agricultural village in Dagestan, the homeowner having slipped away midconstruction with his wife and three small children to join the Islamic State.
He was not the first. That came in January, soon after leaders of the long-running Islamist insurgency here in Dagestan, Russia's southernmost republic, began pledging allegiance to the self-proclaimed caliphate in Syria and Iraq. Around 30 men and women, townspeople say, have melted away this year.
"When they lived here they were all followers of one extremist line of Islam, so when one left, he became an example and the others left, too," said Capt. Abbas Karaev, 27, the village policeman, sitting in Berekei's squat municipal building, a structure so dilapidated and dusty it appeared abandoned. "They were told it was a jihad in Syria, and they would go to paradise if they died in this war. That is all they had in their heads."
Much like the disaffected Muslim communities in Europe, the Caucasus region and the swath of former Soviet republics across Central Asia have become a vital recruiting ground for the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL. Law enforcement officials estimate that there are at least 2,000 fighters from the Caucasus among up to 7,000 recruits from Russia and the former Soviet Union now in Syria and Iraq.
At the same time, the Islamic State is steadily establishing a foothold in the Caucasus. It is tapping into the rage and resentment over Russia's constant, brutal and arbitrary security presence in order to foster a new crop of homegrown, fanatical opponents to revive the insurgency that the Kremlin suppressed.
The majority Sunni population in the region has been further inflamed by the Russian military's intervention in Syria on the side of President Bashar al-Assad, a member of a Shiite sect who has killed tens of thousands of his Sunni opponents.
For the Kremlin, the ever more pronounced links between the Islamic State and the Caucasus provoke anxiety.
More than a decade ago, Russians were terrorized by a devastating series of attacks on schools, airplanes, a theater, the Moscow Metro and other public targets mostly at the hands of Chechens. The prospect of thousands of battle-hardened, Russia-hating jihadists returning under the banner of the Islamic State, or of a new group of native, fanatical fighters fanning out across Russia, is alarming.
To date, with what radicalized Muslims view as jihad still raging in Syria and Iraq, there is scarce evidence of blowback in the Caucasus. In Dagestan in 2015, for example, only 95 people died violently through September, compared with 208 in 2014 and 413 in 2011, according to the Caucasian Knot website, which tracks the conflict.
Nevertheless, the Islamic State is known for biding its time, carefully building local structures and military ability before striking. It remains active in the Caucasus region, releasing a stream of sophisticated propaganda videos and promising to return to exact revenge for Russia's actions.
Certainly, President Vladimir V. Putin is concerned. When he announced in September that he would deploy the Russian Air Force in Syria, part of his stated rationale was to destroy the militants there before they could strike at home. Then just weeks later, on Oct. 31, a bomb exploded on a charter jet bringing mostly Russian vacationers back from Egypt, killing all 224 on board, and the Islamic State claimed responsibility.
It is all a far cry from the early days of the Syrian civil war, when Russia welcomed the prospect of its most violent extremists lured away by the seductive buzz of jihad. "This sewer of people flowing from here to Syria means that the threat here has diminished," said Zubairu Zubairuev, a spokesman for the Dagestan government, who nevertheless denied that the government actively helped young radicals to leave or, as human rights advocates have said, killed those who stayed.
Then in June came the declaration of the so-called Dagestan Governorate of the Islamic State and the start of an almost daily chorus of threats against Russia on social media.
That much was evident in a recruitment video made by a charismatic, young radical imam who appeared on an Islamic State website in August.
Speaking in Russian, the imam, Kamil Sultanakhmedov, called on fellow Muslims to "join the mujahedeen of the Caucasus," while lauding the benefits of leaving Dagestan.
"Today, the Islamic State is making your jihad easier," said Mr. Sultanakhmedov, who had been the imam in the village of Novokayakent at a mosque frequented by Salafis, ultraconservative Islamists whose strict interpretation of religious texts has inspired extremism. "Today, you can fearlessly send your family, your parents, to a place where the infidels will never enter their house, never mock them or intimidate them."
He also threatened Russia, saying the Islamic State would eventually spread from Iraq and Syria to the Caucasus. "We will take this land away from you," he said. "We will kill you; we will slaughter you, burn you; and, if needed, we will make you sink. You will try on our orange robes and taste the heat of our swords."
Two other popular, radical young imams from the Caucasus also spoke on that video, including Nadir Medetov, who had been under house arrest in Dagestan. Many experts took his appearance as a sign that law enforcement agents helped him - and many others - to leave, back when that seemed like a good idea.
Spurred in part by repressive measures Moscow ordered to prevent terrorist attacks at the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, thousands of insurgents went to Turkey and eventually on to Syria. Once there, the fighters split, with hundreds following Omar al-Shishani, an Arabic pseudonym meaning Omar the Chechen, while the rest allied with the Nusra Front, the branch of Al Qaeda in Syria.
Many of those allied with the Nusra Front remain based in the province of Idlib, which has been the target of ferocious air raids by the Russian military.
It did not take long for the Chechens to distinguish themselves as among the most effective fighters in the often hastily trained ranks of the Islamic State.
Kurdish militia commanders were impressed. At critical points in the fierce fighting that took place in Syria's Hasaka Province this summer, just when it seemed that the Kurdish forces would overrun a position or gain a foothold in some strategic town, a different breed of enemy materialized.
They were Chechen fighters, some eventually identified by their documents and the Russian on their cellphones. They waged war longer and with more tenacity, and their snipers appeared to use their weapons with greater precision, the Kurdish commanders said.
With their battlefield grit and ever-rising numbers, experts say, the Caucasus fighters have been rising in an Islamic State hierarchy dominated by Iraqis.
Back home, the Caucasian Emirate, a militant group, was in disarray with so many leaders killed. The Islamic State stepped into the vacuum, prompting many field commanders to switch their allegiance.
Not all of the recruitment videos focus on fighting. Some discuss the orderly management of utilities and garbage collection in the Islamic State, for example, or highlight animal husbandry and beekeeping.
"They offer them some kind of feasible political project," said Ekaterina Sokirianskaia, who analyzes the Caucasus for the International Crisis Group. In contrast, federal law enforcement agents here have been sweeping up Muslims en masse from Salafi mosques and forcing them to submit repeated DNA samples.
In Makhachkala, the capital of Dagestan, a lawyer who defends Salafi clients said that the Islamic State has succeeded in Dagestan for three reasons: the simplicity of its message, the fact that it has a tangible achievement in seizing land in Iraq and Syria, and the much-publicized cruelty against its enemies.
"We are going to return soon and we are going to kill everyone - that is a simple message," said the lawyer, adding that it mirrored local tradition. "It is part of our temperament. If you have a problem with someone, the first reaction is to beat him to a pulp."
So far there is little sign of Islamic State adherents returning, and Russia maintains fairly stringent border controls. Even those who make it back face long jail sentences under a new law against joining armed conflicts abroad that contradict Russia's interests.
A rare family who admitted that their son had joined the Islamic State said he had left his village of about 3,500 people in January, telling them that he was going to Moscow to work. He contacted them about a month ago from Mosul, Iraq, saying he had married a Turkish woman and was working as a medical orderly in a hospital.
Their son, 25, wanted to come back, the family claimed, but the Islamic State had taken his passport. Even if he had his passport, Russia was not likely to welcome him. "It was the best people, the very best people who left this village," his father said with a groan.
Ivan Nechepurenko contributed reporting from Berekei, and Rukmini Callimachi from Hasaka, Syria.
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#11
Financial Times
November 20, 2015
How Putin managed Russians' grief over Isis jet bombing
Cool communication strategy prevented air disaster from becoming a political liability for president
Kathrin Hille in Moscow
When buildings around the world lit up in the tricolour following last Friday's Paris terror attack, it could just as well have been a tribute to Russia. The country, which also boasts a blue-white-and-red flag, lost 219 of its own citizens when a bomb brought down a Russian passenger jet three weeks ago. Just like France, which is in shock over the shooting attacks that killed 129 in Paris, Russia is also a victim of Islamist terrorism.
But in a departure from the scenes unfolding in France, the Russian people have largely refrained from asking larger questions about their own tragedy or pressing their government for answers.
This is not just a matter of Russians' famous stoicism, say political analysts. It is also the result of a coolly executed communication strategy designed to prevent the country's deadliest-ever air crash from becoming a political liability for president Vladimir Putin and his military campaign in Syria.
Delay has been a key Kremlin tactic. Even as western governments began to express concerns that the October 30 crash was the result of an Isis-planted bomb, the Kremlin managed to smother talk of terrorism for more than two weeks.
There was an immediate outpouring of sorrow in St Petersburg, the doomed aircraft's destination, with vigils on the city's central square and hundreds laying flowers at the airport. Sympathy also welled up on social media. But it remained apolitical.
"[The] acknowledgment of a terrorist act at the time when it happened could have and without doubt would have been perceived as a punishment for the invasion in Syria," Gleb Pavlovsky, a former Kremlin adviser, said in a radio interview. "[That] would have come across much more painfully. And the Kremlin always tries to soften this first strong painful reaction. The more time passes, the more it mixes with other issues."
It was only this Monday when Mr Putin changed tack. In a video released by the Kremlin, Russia's intelligence chief was shown reporting to the president that a bomb had brought down the plane. Mr Putin then declared that he would step up the military operation in Syria in defence of Russia against the terrorists.
The announcement came on the heels of a G20 summit in which French president François Hollande had declared that his country was now at war with Isis, and the fight against the groups was increasingly becoming an international priority.
"Putin turned around and acknowledged: yes, the plane was, after all, blown up by terrorists," writes Sasha Sotnik, one of Russia's most prominent bloggers. "Now - after the Paris events - that is possible. Because this has befallen not just Russia, but more like - the whole world is under threat, and we together with our colleagues will fight terror."
Not all Russians accept this narrative. Some Putin critics began trading conspiracy theories almost immediately after the crash. But following years of censorship and propaganda emphasising patriotism, security and strong leadership, such voices are rare.
Meanwhile, having dissolved the pain over the crash in the perception that Russia is now fighting shoulder to shoulder with its foreign partners against the evil of terrorism, Mr Putin is charging ahead.
Moscow initially estimated the Syria operation to take no more than a few months, but now pledges to intensify it. This Friday, parliament is expected to debate the possibility of a ground operation - an option so far categorically excluded by the Kremlin.
"We will pursue [the terrorists] everywhere, wherever they may hide. We will find them in any spot on the planet and we will punish them," Mr Putin said this week.
For Russians, this language is eerily reminiscent of that with which the president signalled the start of the second Chechen war in 1999. Having come full circle and once again put war at the centre of his political agenda, Mr Putin may sooner or later have to explain what lies ahead.
In the second Chechen war, he promised a quick and decisive victory. Russia eventually found itself bogged down for a decade.
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#12
Carnegie Moscow Center
November 20, 2015
Divisions and Defiance Among Russia's Muslims
By Alexey Malashenko
Alexey Malashenko is the chair of the Carnegie Moscow Center's Religion, Society, and Security Program.
Russia's official Muslim establishment blames the West for the rise of the self-proclaimed Islamic State and refuses to admit that radical Islam has a real social base, ignoring the radicalization of many ordinary Muslims in Russia and Central Asia.
The terrorist attacks against the Russian passenger jet over Egypt and in Paris have found Russia's Muslim community (umma) divided, despised and defiant.
The Russian umma is large and diverse. It comprises around 16.5 million Russian citizens and approximately four million migrants from Central Asia and Azerbaijan. Members of this sizeable group hold very different opinions on the so-called Islamic State, Russia's intervention in Syria, and the recent terrorist attacks.
Many representatives of Russia's Muslim political establishment and the clergy is voice conspiracy theories similar to those aired in the Russian media, claiming that the Islamic State is a Western plot designed to destabilize the global situation and squeeze Russia out of the greater Middle East. Mukhamed Salyakhetdinov, the head of the Association of Muslim Public Organizations, said that the authorities "shouldn't look for masterminds among Muslims" and that the Islamic State is managed "from the outside."
In a similar fashion, Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov has declared that the Islamic State and other Islamist organizations are the brainchildren of Western intelligence services. Earlier this year, Kadyrov said that the Charlie Hebdo massacres were aimed at "inciting anti-Islamic sentiments."
The message is that radical Islamist terrorism is an invented phenomenon, a weapon used to discredit Muslims worldwide. If Islamic fundamentalism is an illness or a "cancerous tumor," then it can be tackled only through "invasive surgery."
This approach ignores the inconvenient fact that Islamic fundamentalism has a strong social base across the Muslim world. Islamist parties have gained seats in parliaments and won elections in several countries. The Islamic State is the most extreme manifestation of this trend, but it is not an artificial creation.
This mindset also dangerously fails to confront the fact that grassroots radical Islam is on the rise throughout Russia. A few years ago, it could only be found in the North Caucasus. Now, Islamist activists can be found throughout Russia, even as far as the Far East.
In Russia, these Islamists are more usually referred to as Salafis or Wahhabis. They are increasingly exploiting the weaknesses of mainstream Islam in Russia, where two thirds of imams are over 70 and out of touch with the modern world. More radical and charismatic young clerics, many of whom have graduated from Islamic universities in the Middle East, are now maneuvering to take over these mosques.
Russia has thousands of Salafi cells that belong to the radical Hizb ut-Tahrir movement from Central Asia. Several thousand Russian Muslims are now believed to be fighting with the Islamic State and many emissaries from Iraq and Syria have been arrested in Russia after trying to recruit young men and women.
The Islamic State may have as many as half a million sympathizers in Russia today. Many of these oppose the organization's use of terrorism, but still see it as a kind of Muslim democracy that dispenses social justice and equality. It is an appealing idea, when contrasted with Russia's economic crisis, corruption, and growing inequality.
Accordingly, many Russian Muslims see Russia's military intervention in Syria as an unjust war against Islam.
The downing of the Russian airliner on October 31 brought Russia under direct attack. President Vladimir Putin has put Russia in the front line against international (meaning Islamist) terrorism, laying claim to be the Islamic State's Enemy Number One-and potentially laying Russia open to terrorist retaliation on Russian soil.
Russia has endured terrorism before-from Chechen militants, but they made demands and asked to negotiate with the Russian authorities. But the men who organized the attacks in Paris and against the Metrojet Airbus A321 over Egypt are not interested in dialogue. The indiscriminate killing they perpetrated when they stormed the Bataclan concert hall makes that clear.
This time the threat is harder to determine. It could come from someone from the North Caucasus, where the Caucasus Emirate, formed at the end of the Second Chechen War, has dissolved and many of its commanders have transferred their allegiance to the Islamic State.
It could also come from a Central Asian migrant in Russia. The vast majority are there peacefully, with many working at construction sites and outdoor markets. But radical Islam also has many adherents in Central Asia, especially in the Fergana Valley. (In 2002, I had a conversation with an imam at one of the Uzbek mosques in the valley. After heaping praise on Uzbek President Islam Karimov, he whispered to me, "If we had fair elections now, bin Laden would win them hands down." He may have been exaggerating, but there is no way of knowing as modern Uzbekistan has never held fair elections).
After the Paris tragedy, Russia is likely to adopt a zero-tolerance policy toward its migrants, as the United States has done for many years, with the slightest legal infraction getting a migrant deported back to his or her home country.
A new crackdown could have a serious effect on Russia's changing Muslim community.
The Russian umma has become increasingly divided as its members choose among different interpretations of Islam. The growth of Middle Eastern Islamist radicalism and the latest acts of terror, with their anti-Western and anti-Russian ideology, are making those divisions sharper. They are also fueling Islamophobia and interconfessional tensions, which are likely to only radicalize fundamental Islamists even further.
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#13
Russia Beyond the Headlines/Gazeta.ru
November 19, 2015
Syrian ex-deputy premier: If we don't stop the rot, there will be no Syria
Former Syrian Deputy Prime Minister Qadri Jamil, a leader of the moderate Syrian opposition, believes that both the opposition and supporters of President Bashar al-Assad must unite against the Islamic State (ISIS) radical jihadist group before carrying out constitutional reform.
VLADIMIR VASHCHENKO, GAZETA.RU
Since the beginning of the civil war in Syria, Qadri Jamil, until recently deputy prime minister, stood for a political settlement of the conflict and the establishment of transitional government with the participation of representatives of the opposition and supporters of President Bashar al-Assad.
Jamil has a good knowledge of both Syria's ruling Baath party and Russian politicians and public figures. He graduated from the Lomonosov Moscow State University, speaks Russian and adheres to left-wing political views. He currently heads the Popular Front for Change and Liberation and is still in favor of dialogue between the government and the opposition.
Q: With whom in the Syrian opposition can you conduct a dialogue, since so many organizations and forces have armed formations? How do you know who is a terrorist and who is not?
Qadri Jamil: Those who in principle agree to a peaceful settlement and ceasefire can be seen as moderate opposition. This is the main criterion. It is necessary to take into account the fact that at a certain stage of the war, the Syrians had one choice: to fight or to fight [he grins sadly].
There was no political solution; people were looking for an opportunity to join the power that could help them to save themselves and their families. Some went to ISIS, but we must understand that on the inside they are against Islamic State.
And now we must either destroy those who are in ISIS en masse (which is almost impossible), or look for ways to split Islamic State. Let this be the same Free Syrian Army about which [Russian Foreign Minister Sergei] Lavrov said that it should participate in the political process. This is an escape route from the ideology of ISIS for many Syrians.
And if the Free Syrian Army [the largest group in Syria fighting against the Assad government - Gazeta.ru] joins the coalition against Islamic State, we will find a common language with it. The Syrian problem is now complex and it should be solved comprehensively.
Q: But one of the Free Syrian Army fighters, Khalid Al Hamad, ate the heart of a captured Syrian regime soldier in front of a television camera. Do we need to conduct a political dialogue with him, too?
QJ: Those who eat the hearts of soldiers, of course, cannot be part of the dialogue and there's nothing to talk about with them. As I said, you can hold negotiations only with those who agree to them.
But there are also those who went to fight against the government due to objective circumstances. It is necessary to group together all the healthy forces of both the regime and the opposition against the worst enemy of humanity - ISIS.
Q: You support the Russian Federation's operation in Syria. But what about your political opponents, for instance, the president of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces, Khaled Khoja, who called Russia's actions in the Syrian Republic 'an occupation'?
QJ: It's now a transitional period, which means temporary. When I was in the government, I endured Khoja for a year and a half. And then we will go to the polls and see who wins.
I've always said if we do not stop the negative processes in Syria, we will soon have nothing to argue about, because there will be no Syria. There will be no country of ours. Now there are two problems; these are a huge humanitarian catastrophe and ISIS.
It is immoral to speculate who will be the president and who will be the prime minister when half of the people of Syria have become refugees.
But as for the Russian operation - yes, I support it. They do not talk about it for some reason, but the Russian air force intervened when Islamic State was already near Damascus, and there was a danger that the city would fall.
Q: Why, in your opinion, did the war start in Syria in the first place?
QJ: We have some members of the government who like conspiracy theories and argue that it began in March 2011.
I am not against the conspiracy theory, but then let's tell the full truth: Its first stage began in 2005, when Syria started liberalizing the economy, which resulted in the impoverishment of the people, a rise in unemployment.
They have become the social base of the Islamic Revolution. The Islamists simply turned them in a certain direction, as well as providing weapons and money. A continuation of these processes followed in 2008, when the Syrian regime started trying to flirt with Turkey and Qatar.
Under pressure from these countries, we started to change our laws and political system, their channels such as Al-Jazeera began to broadcast [in Syria]. They prepared the ideological ground for conflict.
Today, ISIS in Syria and Iraq can be compared to Nazism in Germany in the 1930s. Populist slogans of leaders lead to the mass support among the poor people deprived of life prospects.
Q: You know very well the members of the ruling party in Syria - the Baath. Do you think its members have a political future in your country?
QJ: Yes, the vast majority of Baathists are not interested in the continuation of bloodshed and are not associated with corruption. On the contrary, the war has affected them very negatively. They can well participate in building a new Syrian future with honest representatives of the opposition.
Q: And what will be the political future of Assad?
QJ: His future will be determined by two factors: firstly, Assad himself, and, secondly, the Syrian people. It is necessary to hold an election after the political settlement. There will be nothing without it.
Q: What do you think about the experience of the Syrian Kurds, who have built their own system of governance in the north of Syria? Maybe federalization is needed?
QJ: What is happening in the north of Syria, in Al-Hasakah, where self-government has been introduced, is a very interesting experience, which should be carefully studied and which could be used in the future, during the constitutional reform.
By the way, not only have the Kurds established a system of self-government there, there are also the Assyrians and Arabs; they have found a common language and have developed a governing method for the territory where they live. This method works successfully.
And it happened because Damascus had no control over this part of the country under the circumstances. Just do not call it federalization. It happened in neighboring Iraq, and it clearly was not for its benefit.
What exists in the north of Syria, I would call democratic self-government. We can and must speak about it, when we draw up a new constitution based on the Vienna Agreement.
Q: Many call the conflict in Syria a religious war. Do you think this is true?
QJ: Religious contradictions - this is only an outline. In fact, there are both thugs and corrupt officials in all rival camps and in all confessions. The essence of the processes taking place in Syria is social.
An abridged version of the interview first published in Russian by Gazeta.ru
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#14
www.rt.com
November 20, 2015
Russia's anti-terror cooperation may lead to easing of Western sanctions
The Paris attacks and the downing of a Russian Airbus have prompted renewed cooperation between Russia, US and EU in the fight against Islamic State. This raises the possibility of Europe lifting or easing sanctions in 2016, provided the rapprochement continues.
In December, EU officials are due to decide on sanctions policy against Russia.
According to Wall Street Journal sources, Brussels is considering three options. The toughest one includes extending sanctions by a year; a milder ruling includes half a year rollover. And the third option is a three-to-four month extension to show Moscow that tensions are easing.
"The fact that we have Russia and the West on speaking terms again is a good thing. It could lead to better cooperation, and better cooperation could lead to reconsidering the sanctions. We are seeing a situation that seems to be more an overlap in common interests," Moritz Kraemer, managing director of sovereign ratings at Standard & Poor's, told Bloomberg.
But besides certain advantages, the easing of sanctions would be a challenge for the Russian economy.
Pros
Russia's investment climate will improve. European and US investors will be able to return to the Russian market. This will help to reverse capital outflow.
Russian banks and companies will return to the global financial markets. At present, they are cut off from long-term (over 30 days) international financing by western banks.
According to Rosneft CEO Igor Sechin, the Russian oil major hasn't cancelled any projects with western companies. The lifting of sanctions is likely to speed up these projects.
A demand for the dollar will drop, and the Russian ruble is likely to significantly strengthen. This will increase people's wages in dollar terms, and is likely to boost consumer spending, currently suffocating under a weak domestic currency. Consumers will also have more options with goods that are currently banned in Russia returning to the shelves.
Cons
The strengthening ruble in combination with low oil prices poses a problem for the Russian budget. Moscow calculated on $50 per barrel crude and 63 rubles per dollar exchange rate for its 2016 budget. A weaker ruble helps offset low oil prices.
This spring, when the ruble was at its strongest in 2015 (49-50 rubles per dollar), was the toughest period for the Russian budget. Russian business daily Kommersant estimates the budget could lose about 800 billion rubles because of the difference between real and projected oil prices.
However, if oil prices rebound or GDP grows more than the targeted 0.7 percent, this problem could be mitigated.
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#15
Reuters
November 20, 2015
Sanctions fail to stem access to finance for Russian corporates
BY GARETH GORE AND MICHAEL TURNER
MOSCOW/LONDON, Nov 20 (IFR) - US and European sanctions are inadvertently providing a boost to the same Russian companies they are supposed to punish, with some in Russia boasting the restrictions have triggered a reworking of the local financial system that has made access to funding cheaper and easier.
At the heart of the financial rewiring are domestic banks such as Sberbank and VTB. Despite being barred from global capital markets, both have seen a surge in corporate deposits as Russian companies fearful of an escalation in Western financial sanctions repatriate cash piles held abroad.
As well as providing sanctioned banks with a cheap source of hard currency, such inflows have ironically put the Russian banking system in a better position to help other companies shut out of global markets, either because they are directly subject to sanctions or because investor appetite for their debt has dried up.
"Now sanctions are in place, more and more corporates realise that there is a risk their name could appear on the list and we saw a highly accelerated withdrawal of foreign currency liquidity from foreign banks and a growth of corporate deposits in Russia," said Herbert Moos, deputy president at VTB.
The bank has seen corporate deposits swell by 20% over the last year, helping fuel an increase in its corporate lending - in the third quarter alone, loans to the sector increased 13%. "It's enormous growth," Moos said of the deposit inflows. "Virtually all of it is euros or dollars. It's basically cash coming from European or American banks back to us."
According to the Central Bank of Russia, despite a deep, oil price-induced recession, corporate lending in the country is up 7.1% this year. The increase has been a lifeline for companies locked out of capital markets, proving predictions of mass defaults wrong.
MARKETS CLOSED
Although the vast majority of Russian companies are free to tap global capital markets, sanctions and a precipitous drop in oil and gas prices - Russia's main exports - have effectively closed the market to many. Russian companies raised US$40bn through 60 Eurobond deals in 2012. This year there have been just five deals, raising under US$5bn.
Still, companies say access to finance remains unproblematic and cheap, raising questions about the efficacy of sanctions introduced last year to punish Russia for its role in the Ukraine conflict. The sanctions were initially directed at individuals close to the heart of Russian government but later widened to ban some companies from accessing international financial markets.
"There is a queue of Russian and foreign banks willing to lend to us - we are taking constant calls," said Vsevolog Rozanov, chief financial officer at unsanctioned Russian conglomerate Sistema. "The best companies now have easier access to credit - and at lower spreads over central bank rates - than they did before the sanctions."
Two elements have been key in enabling the Russian financial system to adapt to the partial closure of international capital markets: assertive moves from the CBR to guarantee funding for the country's banks following a collapse in the rouble last year, and the repatriation of tens of billions of corporate deposits.
The CBR's operations have flooded the banking system with liquidity, helping offset lost international funding and deposit outflows at smaller banks. At its height last December, the central bank lent Rbs9.3trn (US$142bn) to the country's banks - equivalent to 15% of their balance sheets - through various operations.
"The Eurobond market is traditionally important for Russian banks as a source of funding, but it is not the decisive source," said Alexey Simanovsky, deputy chairman at the central bank. "It is better to have access, but if there is no access then banks find alternative sources. The economy needs financing and will be financed."
EXCESS LIQUIDITY
At the same time, banks have seen their deposit levels grow 14% this year, according to the CBR. Larger banks have been particular beneficiaries as Russians take their money out of smaller banks perceived to be less safe. But mass conversion into dollars and corporates repatriating overseas deposits has also led to large inflows of dollars.
Such has been the influx of dollars that banks have begun to wean themselves off the US$50bn dollar repo facility set up by the CBR last year to guarantee access to hard currency.
"We have more than enough liquidity, especially in terms of foreign currencies," said Ilya Polyakov, deputy chairman at unsanctioned lender Rosbank.
Rosbank has used its excess liquidity from a large inflow of deposits to help corporate clients locked out of international markets. It was a mandated lead arranger on a US$750m loan for Russian fertiliser company EuroChem, for instance, and a US$350m loan for mining firm Polymetal. Neither company is under financial sanctions.
The bank has grown its corporate loan book 7.5% so far this year. Loan origination in the third quarter is double what it was a year ago.
"We have been looking to increase our corporate loan book for some time now, and the current situation has been a good opportunity to do that - and to support new and existing clients during these difficult times for the Russian economy," said Polyakov. "Like state banks, we are actively trying to support many of these companies."
Banks based in Russia have not been the only ones extending loans. Gazprom filings show the oil company, which is not under financial sanctions but which was shut out of global bond markets for a year until last month, received a 350m one-year loan from Italian lender Intesa Sanpaolo in January and a 300m four-year loan from UniCredit in June.
JP Morgan led a US$500m three-year loan from a consortium of international banks in April. Deutsche Bank led two such deals amounting to a combined 360m earlier in the year. Banca IMI - the investment banking arm of Intesa Sanpaolo - UniCredit and JP Morgan were chosen to lead Gazprom's Eurobond when it returned in October.
"Russian companies haven't been sitting around waiting for bond markets to reopen," said Polyakov. "They've turned to their back-up plans and have been out looking for alternatives sources of financing such as bilateral loans and club deals: and in many cases they have found them."
LUCRATIVE CLIENTS
Increased liquidity in the Russian banking system and competition from international banks to be seen to be aiding lucrative clients during their time of need has meant that many large companies are able to borrow at lower rates - as measured by the spread over central bank rates - than before the sanctions regime kicked in.
Even sanctioned entities are benefiting from the situation. Lukoil, which is on the sanctions list and unable to tap international markets, more than trebled its short-term foreign currency borrowings in the first half to US$1.1bn. During that time its weighted-average annual interest rate dropped to 2.77% from 4.44%.
Although international banks are unable to lend sanctioned entities money for more than 30 days, Russian banks are free to do so.
"It is our role to provide financing to the companies that need it and that is what we have been doing over previous months," said Alexander Morozov, CFO at the country's largest lender, Sberbank, which is on the sanctions list. "We see the current situation as an opportunity to expand our loan portfolio in certain parts of the economy, such as exporters. We have an excess of dollar liquidity at very low cost and we intend to use it."
UNTENABLE
But some warn that the current situation is untenable and that corporate financing requirements have decreased markedly because of the ongoing oil-induced recession in Russia, leading many companies to cut capital expenditure. When growth returns, they argue, the banking system may prove insufficient to meet corporate borrowing needs.
"Fixed assets are already stretched to capacity and, if the Russian economy is to grow and increase its productive capacity, then a huge amount of investment is needed," said Irackly Mtibelishvily, chairman of banking for Citigroup in Russia. "Local funding can only stretch so far; it is absolutely clear that the country needs international capital markets. There has to be some return to normality."
He thinks sanctions have not dented long-term appetite for Russian corporate Eurobonds, and pointed to the two big deals in October - one from Norilsk Nickel and the other from Gazprom, both of which were heavily oversubscribed - as proof that many investors are still lurking on the sidelines for when other corporates return.
"A market of this size cannot just disappear," said Mtibelishvily. "As the biggest economy in the region and the biggest issuer of bonds - at least in past years - Russia is and always will be extremely important to international investors."
FALLING RELIANCE
Much will depend, however, on how quickly sanctions are lifted. Russia's external debt peaked at US$732bn last June. With capital markets largely closed and the Russian financial system adapting to the new reality, reliance on external capital is falling. By September, external debt had fallen to US$521bn.
"We would hope that sanctions will be lifted soon since they provide no effect anyway," said Morozov. "But we can make no assumptions and so can't be reliant on the possibility of international capital markets reopening. We have to have alternative financing."
Some companies say that even if they were able to do a deal right now, such is the low cost of funding within Russia - even under sanctions - that it would make little sense.
"When you factor in the price of swaps and hedges, issuing in the Eurobond market doesn't make any sense right now," said Sistema CFO Rozanov. "The terms are much less appealing that those on bilateral loan deals being pushed by many Russian and foreign banks."
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#16
Sputnik
November 20, 2015
No Space Without Moscow: US Buying Once Sanctioned Russian Rocket Engines
Washington continues to purchase rocket engines from Moscow, as the US has removed them from the list of sanctioned materials, Russia's trade representative to the United States told RIA Novosti.
MOSCOW (Sputnik) - According to Alexander Stadnik, the rocket engines were initially sanctioned by the United States, but Washington removed them from the list.
"They must have understood that they needed this Russian equipment for development of rocket equipment, otherwise they would have to limit themselves in a series of expensive projects. It is evident that this is the reason the supplies of our engines were continued."
Stadnik noted that the sides were continuing cooperation with previously signed contracts.
In January, Russian rocket producer Energia signed a $1 billion contract with US Orbital Sciences Corporation for the delivery of 60 RD-181 engines. The contract also includes a provision on a range of services including flight training, installation of the engine and engine testing.
In the late 1990s, the Russian Energomash company won a contract with United Launch Alliance to supply RD-180 engines for the Atlas rockets. This contract, valued at about $1 billion, remains in place.
The West, led by Washington, has been imposing sanctions on Russia since 2014, when a military and political crisis in Ukraine escalated, with the US and the EU alleging Russia's involvement.
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#17
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
November 20, 2015
Why the Doing Business ranking is so important for Russia
The World Bank report is seen as a key indicator for reforming the business environment.
By Alexei Lossan
Alexei Lossan is the RBTH Central Desk editor for business
In November 2015, the World Bank released its annual Doing Business ranking, in which Russia managed to rise to 51st place. For the Russian economy, this ranking has a particular significance because the government has selected it as a universal indicator for reforming the business environment.
When the Russian authorities set a goal of increasing foreign investment into the country, they realized that it was important to show investors that there was a significant change in the business environment. The Doing Business ranking was selected as benchmark.
In 2011, Russia was 120th on the list. Unlike other similar instruments, the World Bank rating is far removed from politics. It analyzes specific indicators, such as how many days it takes to obtain a construction permit or how many papers need to be submitted to connect a new shop to the power grid. The methodology used to calculate points is extremely transparent and makes it possible to assess the amount of red tape in the business environment of a particular country on the strength of specific examples.
This is why in May 2012, Vladimir Putin signed a special decree aiming to improve Russia's ranking by 100 points, so-called "100 steps." Under that decree, Russia should rise from the 120th position in 2011 to the 20th place in 2018, with the interim target being 50 in 2015. The interim target set by the president has been practically achieved.
To improve its standing in the Doing Business ranking, Russia undertook a broad range of activities. A new development institution, the Agency of Strategic Initiatives (whose head was selected in an open competitive process from more than 1,000 candidates), has become fully operational. The agency has begun to carry out so-called spot checks. Representatives of foreign investors visit different regions, to check how convenient it is to work with the local authorities there.
Another key new development has been the National Entrepreneurial Initiative, a program for developing roadmaps for reforming specific sectors. As a part of this initiative, areas for reform were identified by business representatives themselves, who later assessed how effective the reform was and evaluated the work of state institutions. In line with proposals from entrepreneurs, laws and regulations in Russia were adjusted, government resolutions and presidential decrees issued. Thanks in part to this initiative, it has become possible to simplify the procedure of getting connected to a power grid and to reduce the associated costs to less than a quarter of what they used to be, from 9,500 rubles ($147) to 2,100 rubles ($32.5) per 1 kW. As a result, in the Getting Electricity indicator, Russia rose from the 143rd to the 29th place, an absolute record in the history of the World Bank ranking.
Skeptics point out that Russia has managed to improve its Doing Business ranking mainly due to methodological changes. In 2014, the World Bank introduced several changes to how it calculated the ranking. Firstly, for 11 countries with a population of over 100 million, data began to include figures for the countries' second biggest city as well. Thus, in addition to Moscow, World Bank analysts began to use data for St. Petersburg, where the quality of the business environment has been traditionally higher than in the capital. Secondly, scope was expanded for three indicators: Resolving Insolvency, Protecting Minority Investors, and Getting Credit. As a result of these and other changes, Russia rose from the 92nd to 64th place in one go, and through improvements in some indicators managed to secure the 62nd rank a year ago.
Despite a certain amount of skepticism, Russia's improved ranking cannot be attributed to a change in methodology alone. In the Enforcing Contracts ranking, Russia is in the 5th place, and in 8th place for Registering Property. In fact, is it just one position away from the interim target set in President Putin's decree. The Economic Development Ministry describes Russia's improved ranking as a rare example of applying a project-management approach to addressing a task. Furthermore, no one could suspect the ranking compilers of any bias.
The Doing Business ranking also reveals the weakest areas in the Russian business environment: mainly, construction and export-import operations. In the Dealing with Construction Permits topic, Russia is in the 119th position (compared with the 156th a year ago). Whereas in the Trading Across Borders topic, in 2015 it even slipped from the 155th to the 170th place, the worst result ever. Experts attribute this poor result to the need for a far-reaching and comprehensive reform of the country's customs authority.
Russia's positions also suffered because the scope of this indicator has been expanded to include transportation of goods not only by sea, but also by air and rail. Which means that Russia has problems in processing goods passing through all types of checkpoints. For instance, the Doing Business ranking takes into account how electronic systems are used, how long a cargo is kept at the border, how much the paperwork costs. In all these parameters, so far Russia has no progress to report. By way of comparison, in OECD countries, documentary compliance takes a maximum five hours and costs $36, whereas in Russia the figures are 43 hours and $500. According to World Bank calculations, border compliance costs Russian exporters $1,125, while in Kazakhstan, a fellow member of the Customs Union, the figure is $574.
To become one the top 20 countries with the best conditions for business by 2018, the Russian government still has a lot of work to do. However, a solid foundation for large-scale reforms has already been laid. In 2015, Russia became one of the world's top five countries in terms of the number of reforms. They were conducted in five out of the 10 areas being assessed by the World Bank.
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#18
Moscow Times
November 20, 2015
Gazprom's Miller Tops Russia's Best Paid Executive List With $27 Million
Russia's highest-paid executive last year with earnings of $27 million was Alexei Miller, the head of natural gas producer Gazprom, according to a ranking published by the Russian edition of Forbes magazine on Thursday that showed a sharp fall in the incomes of many of Russia's top corporate bosses.
Miller, 53, bucked the trend. A longtime associate of President Vladimir Putin who was appointed to run Gazprom - a state-controlled company that accounts for some 8 percent of Russia's economic output - in 2001, he increased his earnings last year by $2 million from the year before, according to Forbes.
Runner up was Andrei Kostin, 59, the head of state banking group VTB, who earned $21 million last year, down from $37 million in 2013, according to Forbes.
Igor Sechin, the 55-year-old head of the government-owned oil firm Rosneft and another old ally of Putin, rounded out the top three with income of $17.5 million, Forbes said. Legal action by Sechin prevented Forbes from publishing his income in 2013, but the magazine said his earnings had fallen last year.
Rosneft denied the $17.5 million figure on Thursday, though it gave no number of its own.
In total, the 25 figures on the Forbes list, which included Sberbank chief German Gref (who earned $13.5 million last year) and former head of Russian Railways, Vladimir Yakunin ($11 million), collected $242 million in 2014, a decline of 17 percent from the previous year.
That was likely due to last year's economic turmoil: 2014 was marked by Moscow's annexation of Crimea from Ukraine and resultant economic sanctions on Russia; a steep fall in the value of the ruble and of oil, the country's most important export; and the start of a deep economic slump that has worsened this year.
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#19
www.opendemocracy.net
November 19, 2015
Why climate change is not on Russia's agenda
In Russia, global climate change has already had serious economic, environmental and social impact. A heady mix of conspiracy and inertia is to blame.
By Marianna Poberezhskaya
Marianna Poberezhskaya is a lecturer in International Relations at the Department of Politics and IR, Nottingham Trent University. She received her PhD in Politics and International Relations from the University of Nottingham, and recently published Communicating Climate Change in Russia: State and Propaganda (Routledge).
In March 2015, Russia became one of the first countries to submit its 'intended nationally determined contributions' (the actions a national government intends to take under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change). In preparation for the COP-21 in Paris later this year, Russia announced that it is 'likely' to reduce its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 25-30% of its 1990 levels by the year 2030 (if all countries share climate responsibilities and Russia's forest reserves are taken into consideration).
This generous figure immediately provoked a sceptical reaction amongst the international community and national environmental NGOs who pointed out that this commitment might not require Russia to implement any purposeful reduction of its emissions levels.1 On the contrary, this reduction target might actually accommodate a slight increase in emissions.
Once again, Russia's participation in global climate politics is causing controversy.
Regulating climate
Russia has one of the most carbon intensive economies in the world, making the country an important player in global climate politics. But Russia's commitment to seriously tackling climate change has always been questioned.
For example, following the economic collapse after the Soviet Union's disintegration, Russia's GHG emissions fell well below the permitted levels as stipulated in the Kyoto Protocol. Yet Russia took a total of six years to agree to sign and ratify the Protocol which was supported by a very limited number of climate related initiatives at the national level and subsequently did not have a substantial effect on the country's GHG emissions.
In 2009, beginning with the acceptance of the Climate Doctrine and culminating with the signing of a presidential decree on reducing emissions, Russian climate policy started to become more proactive and coherent. This positive turn in Russia's climate policy is perhaps due to Russia's realisation of its extreme vulnerability to anthropogenic climate change.
Russian climatologists stress that global warming is taking place at least 30% faster in Russia than in the rest of the world and its negative consequences can already be seen in the increased number of extreme weather events, which have resulted in serious economic and human losses. Another more powerful motivation behind changes in Russia's climate policy can perhaps be attributed to its understanding of the potential economic benefits that come from tackling climate change through energy efficiency policies.
Whatever Russia's reasons for taking these positive steps may be, they were still not deemed sufficiently important to adopt a stricter GHG emissions reduction commitment.
Silencing climate
Russia's overall weak climate policy can be explained by a number of factors: the prioritisation of economic development over environmental protection; the close connections between the state and the energy sector; the weak position of environmental institutions; and the low level of awareness and concern about climate change among the public.
The latter factor presents a particularly interesting case and helps explain why it has taken Russia so long to even begin talking about climate change.
For years, the topic of climate change was barely part of the public discourse. When it finally entered the debate, climate change was often presented either as a positive development for Russia and Russians (in the form of lower electricity bills and an overall softening of the climate) or as a secondary concern to other more pressing social problems (unemployment financial crises, military conflicts).
Despite a minimal increase in coverage, in comparison to other countries, climate change still receives relatively little attention from Russian media. For example, a comparative study of Russian and US newspapers showed that US media outlets covered the Kyoto conference of 1997 over 20 times more frequently than their Russian counterparts. The Copenhagen conference of 2009 was mentioned 15 times more frequently by US media than Russian media. A further study, which compared the climate media coverage in 27 different countries, discovered that Russian media had the third least mentions of climate change.
On the rare occasions that climate change makes it onto the Russian media's agenda, it is presented in such a way that it corresponds with the state's official policy. At times, national TV programmes and newspapers have even perpetuated conspiracy theories about the origins of climate change and international policies designed to combat it.
Conspiring climate
The Russian internet is filled with climate conspiracies. Here, climate change is either dismissed altogether as a myth or as a western plot designed to undermine the economic growth of developing states. Its causes are explained away as 'simple' modifications in the planet's natural movements.
The internet also doesn't pull its punches against environmental activists, especially those working for major international organisations. Activists are often labelled as 'eco-fascists' who contribute to the global 'eco-hysteria', whilst international NGOs such as Greenpeace are compared with the Taliban and presented as an extension of the American Satanic Church.
The power of conspiratorial online discussions is in their definitive nature, which does not allow for engagement with other explanations for climate change. The arguments against conspiratorial ideas only further cement the authors' opinion that they are right, making it almost impossible to refute their assumptions.
Changing climate
Climate change conspiracies are by no means exclusive to Russia. However, the conspiratorial approach to climate change in Russia signifies a number of very important issues.
First, by allocating the blame for climate change on extra-terrestrial forces or on the 'evil west', conspiracy theorists remove the responsibility to tackle climate change from the Russian people. Second, it signifies the resurgence of a Russian climate scepticism that had only recently started to disappear from the official discourse.
Despite these negative trends in Russia's climate change debate, there is still a stubborn commitment from the environmental community to push climate change into the spotlight. Here, the internet is used in order to promote climate discussions, attract the attention of the traditional media and influence people's behaviour and perceptions about climate change. For example, the Russian-language branch of the 350.org climate movement uses a range of platforms: web pages, Facebook and VKontakte.ru groups, Twitter accounts, and YouTube.
Another successful example of Russian climate change online communication is the 'interactive portal' clicr.ru (promoted by Oxfam-Russia), which aims to unite various actors in the fight against climate change and also maintains an active presence on multiple platforms with hundreds of followers, group members or readers. Whether such efforts can launch climate change firmly onto the Russian agenda is still to be seen.
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#20
www.opendemocracy.net
November 20, 2015
There's something in the air in Russia
Russia's cities are choking. If we're going to change the state of air pollution in this country, we need to open up data, monitoring and public engagement.
By Angelina Davydova
Angelina Davydova is an independant environmental journalist based in St Petersburg.
According to global statistics, Russia's air pollution levels are slightly higher than the European average, but much lower than in China and India. These overall figures do not, however, take into account Russia's particular conditions.
For a start, its people are very unevenly distributed over its enormous territory, with more than two thirds living in European Russia. They are also heavily concentrated in urban areas - 15 cities have more than a million inhabitants - where high population density means a greater threat to the environment. Some heavily industrialised Russian cities, including, for example, Norilsk in remote Siberia, regularly feature in lists of the most polluted cities in the world.
World Health Organisation (WHO) statistics for 2014 show Russian particle pollution (also called particulate matter or PM) of fine particles up to 2.5mm in diameter at an annual 22mg, and coarse particles (between 2.5 and 10mm in diameter) at 30mg per head of population. The corresponding figures for China are 40mg and 90mg; for the UK 14mg and 20 mg.
According to Aleksei Yablokov, a member of the Russian Academy of Sciences' Environmental Research Council, about 14% of the Russian land mass is defined as being of environmental concern, with 67m people living at the limit of permissible levels of atmospheric pollution; 27m at five times the limit and 12m at 10 times the limit. 'In Moscow alone air pollution accounts for 5,000 extra deaths a year,' Yablokov tells me. 'That's twice as many as the number of road deaths.'
Public ignorance
In Moscow, St Petersburg and other cities in European Russia, more than 80% of atmospheric pollution is caused by traffic. These are, however, not the most polluted parts of Russia." Those are far from the capital, situated in seemingly idyllic natural areas such as Siberia and the Urals which are where the country's mining, chemical and other heavy industries are concentrated.
'Air quality is a big issue here,' says Aleksandr Kolotov, an environmental expert from Krasnoyarsk, Siberia's third largest city. 'We regularly have to go into "black sky mode", when industrial plants are recommended to drop their emissions levels because of bad weather conditions. Every public discussion of our general environmental situation includes the problem of atmospheric pollution.'
The Russian public is, however, mostly unaware of the worrying statistics collected by both scientific experts and government bodies. Only a fifth of regions have their own pollution monitoring systems, and half of their checks on air quality are not carried out to an acceptable standard. It is impossible to obtain statistically sound data from them.
The other 80% of regions have to pay for reports from the environmental watchdog Rosgidromet, which has 600 observation posts in 225 towns and cities, but many regions can't afford this service. So neither the regional authorities, nor their populace have any information about the quality of the air they breathe.
Even in those cities and regions where monitoring is carried out reasonably well, whether by either Rosgidromet or the local authority, the picture is still far from clear. Often, figures are compiled as an average for the given area over a given period, with no account taken of individual locations and times.
Locally collected data may also contradict Rosgidromet figures. Monitoring posts are set up in a variety of sites (Rosgidromet officers are often critical of local authorities for putting them in untypically 'clean' areas: parks, riverbanks, edges of towns, where lower pollution levels will be found) and measure different indicators differently, so the data collected is contradictory and incomprehensible to the public.
Can you trust the data?
Some attempts are, however, being made to improve not only monitoring but also industrial practices. The city of Dzerzhinsk, 250 miles east of Moscow, has been a major centre of the chemical industry since the Soviet era and featured for many years in the list of dirtiest cities on the planet. In 2014, however, it finally dropped off the Environmental Ministry's 'Thirty Most Polluted Cities' chart.
As the regional Dzerzhinsk Times wrote: 'The city authority puts the improved figures down to a combination of increased attention to environmental safety in industrial plants and improved environmental monitoring, while excluding the existing cumulative environmental damage from the data.' Local environmentalists and journalists believe, however, that 'the officials used a bureaucratic trick to massage the figures.'
Since mid-2014. Russia's regulations on formaldehyde levels in the atmosphere have been relaxed, lowering the apparent level of this substance more than twofold in many cities, including Dzerzhinsk, wrote the weekly. Rosgidromet figures, by contrast, show an overall rise.
Another example is the city of Vladikavkaz, the capital of North Ossetia in Russia's North Caucasus, whose inhabitants have to pay an outside organisation to monitor their air quality. According to local environmental scientists, one of the region's main polluters is the Elektrotsink metallurgical plant, but Rosgidromet reports show that no monitoring takes place in the district where the plant is located.
Other districts of the city are monitored, but incompletely - three times a day, six days a week. So average annual indicators show acceptable emission levels, although some measurements indicate higher than permitted levels of sulphur dioxide, nitrogen peroxide and nitrogen oxide.
Environmental experts accuse Elektrotsink of releasing toxic substances into the atmosphere at night. Concerned residents point out that no one apart from the company itself has access to information on this subject; no other laboratories monitor overnight emissions and there is no system for warning residents about possible hazardous discharges, so all they have to go on are their own perceptions.
In 2012, a group of Vladikavkaz residents and civic activists raised money for an independent assessment of soil and air quality in the residential areas around the plant by specialists from the St Petersburg Centre for Expertise and Research, revealing that the permitted levels of numerous toxic substances are exceeded frequently.
Public protest
Given the lack of access to information about air quality, public protests against air pollution in Russia generally concentrate either on companies known to be pollutants and new infrastructure projects such as motorways, or the protection of threatened green zones.
In Moscow, for example, current protest campaigns include opposition to the building of a stadium on the site of the existing Park Druzhby (Friendship Park); a road to be built across the 18th century French style Kuskovo Park, regarded as one of the most beautiful in all of Russia and the felling of trees in Kokoshkino, a village incorporated in the recent expansion of the capital known as 'New Moscow'.
Further east, in the Siberian town of Krasnoyarsk, a group of environmental specialists and local residents is currently fighting for the survival of a wood inside the city limits. The wood is threatened by plans for the Universiade Krasnoyarsk 2019, a worldwide student winter sports competition. Another group has won its campaign against the construction of a ferroalloy plant, thanks to protest actions and a media campaign that led to a referendum on the issue. It has now started a new campaign against a planned nuclear waste burial site outside the city.
Lower eco-activity in industrial areas
Large industrial centres and company cities dependent on one plant (monogorodki) are a separate issue. Residents are reluctant to protest against the region's main employer whose activities are crucial to the local economy, even though they are aware of the risks to their health.
For instance, the US-based NGO Pure Earth (formerly the Blacksmith Institute) and the International Green Cross include the Siberian city of Norilsk in their top ten list of worst polluted areas in the world, as well as being the most polluted place in Russia. The main source of pollution is Norilsk Nickel, the world's largest nickel and palladium mining and smelting company. Recently the company has been modernising its facilities (in 2014, for example, it announced the closure of its oldest nickel processing plant), but the level of atmospheric pollution is still ten times higher than the Russian average (and 25 times higher than in Moscow).
Nevertheless, Natalya Paramonova, an environmental journalist who has spent several months investigating Norilsk's problems, tells me that, 'despite the terrible air pollution, there are no protest meetings or attempts to sue the company, and the locals just don't want to talk about the issue. Over the years that Norilsk Nickel has been here, the city and its inhabitants have been absorbed into the company, so it's difficult to talk about serious protests.'
As a result, most expressions of discontent are to be found online. Local resident Anastasia Garipova writes on VKontakte, a popular Russian social network: 'Everybody knows that the plant is poisoning Norilsk. The gas has killed off all the local forest, and there are no plants growing on the tundra around the industrial zone. People don't even want to think about their health; they just ignore the cloud hanging over the city: it's like "gas again", like you might say "rain again" or "a traffic jam again" - it's a nuisance but it's not fatal.'
'If you go outside on any given day, there's a 30-40% chance you can taste sulphur dioxide or other toxic gases in your mouth,' resident Roman Melnikov told the online newspaper Polar Star. 'In fact you don't even need to go outside: if you open a window it comes into your home. And the gas isn't the only pollutant affecting the environment and our lungs: there is also the dust that pours out of the mine ventilation shafts and settles everywhere.'
Some improvement, but more needed
Over the last few years the Environmental Ministry has been looking at Russia's environmental protection legislation, amending old laws and passing new ones. Among them is a law passed in 2014, designed to stimulate the adoption of best available technologies (BAT), including those relating to clean air.
By 2017,the Ministry plans to have monitoring devices installed at all large sources of industrial pollution, with the data collected available not only to government bodies but to the public as well. This monitoring should in theory put an end to unlawful emissions (overnight discharges, for example) whose sources can be difficult to establish - this is a regular occurrence even in Moscow.
Most environmental specialists are fairly positive about the reforms, including those on air quality; their main caveats are about their implementation across the regions. In cities where several large companies play an important role in the local economy (or have close links with the local authorities), the regulatory bodies might turn a blind eye to obvious breaches, or the company might simply pay them off or choose to pay endless small fines. Another important factor is the need to take air quality into account during planning discussions, something few cities do at present.
Environmental specialists see the third element in future developments as the involvement of local residents and organisations in decisions on issues and priorities for future urban planning. The present system of public councils and hearings tends to be a purely formal one.
'The right of citizens to take part in the decision-taking process on planning issues was officially established many years ago', says Artyom Alekseev, a lawyer at St Petersburg's Bellona environmental protection centre, 'but their opportunity to do this is limited by the very authorities that run the public hearings: they do not provide proper information; they fulfil the formal demands of the law but where possible they exploit its weaknesses, abuse their administrative resources and falsify results.'
A new source of pollution
Traffic fumes are an ever growing source of air pollution in most large Russian cities. Some cities are beginning to introduce restrictions on types of vehicle and fuel that don't meet certain environmental standards, to develop pedestrian and cycle facilities and to modernise their public transport systems, but is a slow process and is resisted but certain population groups (mostly motorists).
While motor traffic in cities has long been a controversial issue in the West, for Russia it is a new and growing health problem. According to Boris Revich, an environment and public health specialist at the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of Economic Forecasting, the concentration of small airborne particles from petrol and diesel engines cause about 40,000 extra deaths in Russia each year, and are a particular risk to people living near major roads.
Aleksei Yablokov puts it even more clearly, citing Novosibirsk as a city where there is a direct correlation between the air quality and death rates. 'The more polluted the air, the higher the rate,' he tells me. 'On average, 300 additional cars give one extra death every three months.'
At the same time, Russian cities still lack a 'critical mass' of citizens whose strong 'green' views could stand up against the well organised motorists' lobby, which wins all the planning arguments on things such as parking facilities and the pedestrianisation of city centres.
Mikhail Blinkin, director of the Institute of Transport Economics and Transport Policy at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, says that for many Russians, car ownership is still a status symbol; the market is still far from saturation point. 'Many Muscovites living in cramped rented flats on the outskirts of the capital and working eight to ten hour days in their offices in central Moscow, literally "live" in the comfortable cars where they spend two to four hours daily. It's comfy there; they listen to their favourite music and enjoy their own space - which they don't have anywhere else.'
The planning specialist believes that the only way to change these habits is to develop comfortable, fast and convenient public transport (the famous Moscow Metro is already overstretched). In contrast to the city authorities, who still tend to think that the way out is to build yet more roads, Blinkin argues for the gradual introduction of disincentives on urban traffic, such as paid parking, which Moscow has already begun to implement and St Petersburg is about to.
Many specialists are now supporting the idea of restrictions on cars in cities, while environmental organisations and groups have been calling for improved public transport and facilities for pedestrians and cyclists - and have been successful in some cities.
But most experts and researchers still tend to think that to change the trend-to persuade drivers to accept restrictions on owning and using cars, and to slow down the growth in sales of new cars-will be a long and slow process, and will demand a dramatic change in the public mindset.
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#21
Russian Track and Field Federation will do everything it can to enable Russia athletes to compete at 2016 Rio Olympics - Butov
MOSCOW. Nov 20 (Interfax) - Russia's Track and Field Federation will make every effort to provide Russian track and field athletes with an opportunity to take part in the 2016 Summer Olympic Games in Brazil, the federation's Secretary General Mikhail Butov has said.
"I would like to stress once again that our absolutely priority is to give an opportunity to our athletes to compete at the Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro under the Russian flag. We will do everything we can to make this a reality," Butov was quoted as saying by the federation's press service.
The Russian Olympic Committee's executive committee made a decision at its session on Wednesday to establish a temporary committee of the Russian Olympic Committee to coordinate interaction with the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) and ongoing reforms at the Russian Track and Field Federation, he said.
Gennady Alyoshin, one of Russia's most experienced sports functionaries and co-chairman of the Russian Committee of National and Non-Olympic Sports, has been appointed to head the temporary committee. Alyoshin also represents Russia in managing the UNESCO anti-doping fund.
"The new structure will act as a coordinator. Acting President Vadim Zelichenok and I represented our federation at the session of the Russian Olympic Committee executive committee. We presented our action plan and spoke about our vision of this problem and the anti-doping measures that had already been taken, including even before the WADA (World Anti-Doping Agency) commission's report was published," Butov said.
The provisional committee will not substitute the federation's management, Butov said. Rather, its task is to help the Russian Track and Field Federation to implement its reforms and take steps to return to the IAAF on the basis of the principles outlined in the IAAF's press release, which was published on Thursday.
"The committee will cooperate with the commission established directed by the Russian Track and Field Federation. We will discuss the criteria for situation assessments by the IAAF commission at a session of the IAAF Council on March 26," Butov said.
On Thursday, the IAAF published the principles that would govern an inspection of the Russian Track and Field Federation by a specialized commission. In particular, the inspection will assess how accurately and promptly disciplinary measures are taken with regard to track and field athletes, coaches, teams' staff, doctors and other persons found in breach of anti-doping roles. Furthermore, the IAAF demands the establishment of a transparent, effective and time-efficient system to crack down on doping and wants the contract system for coaches to be changed and measures to be taken to reduce the incentives to use doping.
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#22
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
November 20, 2015
Russian doping scandal: 3 possible scenarios for the future
The IAAF's decision to ban Russian track and field athletes from participating in international competitions was a big blow for Russian sports. What are the possible outcomes of the situation? RBTH analyzes three potential scenarios
By Timur Ganeev
On Nov. 13 the Council of the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) decided to ban Russia from competing under its aegis, after the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) published a report confirming that a system of concealing track and field athletes' doping violations had existed in Russia for a long time.
Now the track and field athletes risk missing the upcoming 2016 Olympic Games. Additionally, Russia has been deprived of the right to hold large competitions such as the leg of the World Race Walking Cup in Cheboksary and the World Junior Athletics Championships in Kazan, which is planned for 2016.
What is likely to happen now? Here are three possible scenarios.
1. Russia will quickly take steps to redress the situation and the national team will be rehabilitated
WADA chief Dick Pound has stated that Russia could be allowed to participate in the 2016 Olympics if it quickly resolves the violation. After the shock of the IAAF decision events in Russia started unfolding very quickly.
Grigory Rodchenkov, director of the Moscow laboratory that WADA accused of destroying 1,417 doping-positive tests, was immediately dismissed. Since then the Russian Sports Ministry has been saying every day that the Russian Athletics Federation (RAF) management will almost entirely be replaced.
"We have already formed a commission to investigate the doping cases in Russian athletics, which will cooperate with IAAF and WADA," said Valentin Maslakov, RAF's vice president. "The Russian Olympics Committee (ROC) has already developed the roadmap suggested by WADA. It guarantees that reforms will be conducted in the RAF and that everyone involved in the anti-doping violations will be punished."
2. Russian athletes will not be allowed to participate in the Olympics and they will instead perform under the Olympic flag
Russian athletes are unhappy about the IAAF's decision. In particular, pole vaulting world record holder Yelena Isinbayeva wrote an open letter saying that it is unfair to deprive clean athletes of the right to participate in the Games because of someone else's violations.
However, if they are disqualified from the 2016 Games, Russian track and field athletes can still perform under the Olympic flag, a rule that is indicated in the Olympic Games Charter. Russian Sports Minister Vitaly Mutko has already spoken about such a scenario. International Olympic Committee President Thomas Bach, however, has called this possibility "complete speculation."
Russian TV commentator Olga Bogoslovskaya performed under the Olympic flag together with other athletes from the former USSR republics at the 1992 Olympics in Barcelona, winning a silver medal in the 4 x 100 meters relay.
"When you hear the anthem not of your country and you see the Olympic flag rising, as prestigious as it is, it is not yours and the emotions are different," said Bogoslovskaya. The former athlete is "95 percent sure that the situation will be resolved long before the Olympics" and the biggest punishment that awaits Russian athletes is missing the indoor world championships.
3. The Olympics in Rio will not have track and field at all
WADA has prepared a second part of the report, which the committee plans to publish in December. This will focus not on the Russian violations but corruption in the upper echelons of the International Association of Athletics Federations. According to member of the WADA independent committee Richard McLaren, the IAAF's activity may be suspended and track and field may not be represented at the Olympics in Rio de Janeiro at all.
Sports lawyer Valery Fyodoreyev believes that this scenario is possible: "If the president of an international federation accepts bribes to cover up positive doping tests, he can take them not only from Russia [former IAAF chief Lamine Diack was arrested for allegedly taking bribes from athletes for freeing them from doping persecution - RBTH]."
According to Fyodoreyev, the entire anti-doping system is in need of reform and the harsh measures now being taken by the international organs may make athletes from other sports think twice before taking illegal drugs.
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#23
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
November 19, 2015
Putin skips APEC meeting - but is Russia's 'pivot to Asia' still on track?
Media observers were quick to note Russian President Vladimir Putin's decision to send Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev in his stead to this week's Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in Manila - what is the significance of Putin's absence, and does it send a message about Russia's changing priorities toward Asia?
SERGEI STROKAN, VLADIMIR MIKHEEV, SPECIAL TO RBTH
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting held this week in Manila added to the ongoing debate on whether the fast-growing economies of the non-Western world, currently passing through a zone of turbulence, remain the locomotive of global growth and whether the concept of the 21st century as the age of "rising Asia" is still valid. It also evoked fresh speculations on the ups and downs of Russia's "pivot to Asia" policy.
The APEC summit came hard on the heels of the G20 summit in Turkey and was illuminated by an array of world leaders, including U.S. President Barack Obama, President Xi Jinping of China, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan, and more than a dozen other national leaders. Yet Russian President Vladimir Putin chose to abstain from the APEC summit, raising eyebrows on whether the reason for his absence could have been something more than just a tight schedule.
Although the terrorist attacks in Paris propelled the issue of religion-based terrorism to the forefront, economic issues dominated the essential agenda - and for good reason: The APEC accounts for almost 50 percent of global trade and over 50 percent of world gross domestic product (GDP). To be part of the grouping is not only a matter of prestige but of economic rationale.
Unlike other APEC nations, Russia has little to boast in terms of macroeconomic performance. Inflation in Russia at the beginning of November reached 9 percent compared to the 1.8 percent average for the APEC. Imports in the period from January to October plummeted year on year by 37.9 percent, while the APEC average recorded a growth of 2.4 percent.
Nevertheless, Moscow claims that its focus on integration with the APEC is well on track, citing such examples as granting Vladivostok, the maritime gateway to the Russian Far East, the status of free port and "Territory of Advanced Development"; reserving a big say in managing the BRICS Development Bank and the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank; linking up the Chinese concept of the new Silk Road and the Russia-led integration process within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), and pointing out that the free trade zone agreement signed between the EAEU and Vietnam is to be complemented with a similar concord with Singapore.
In the meantime, experts in Moscow keep locking horns over whether Russia's much-talked-about "pivot to Asia" has been a success or a disaster. The APEC meeting invigorated the debate. Troika Report sought the opinion of known Kremlin critiс Georgy Kunadze, who served as deputy foreign minister under President Yeltsin, and was responsible for Asian policy.
"At the start of the APEC process the USSR, almost at its end, was looking for a definite role to play in the new project of regional integration. Now, two and a half decades later, it is evident that Russia's search for its Pacific identity has been a failure. Let's face it, except for its natural gas, crude oil and timber, Russia has nothing to offer the countries of the Pacific in terms of development. With the emergence of the Trans-Pacific Partnership project Russia has drifted to a position of odd man out in the region."
- Some claim that the decision by Vladimir Putin not to attend the APEC summit was a snub, while others believe that what really matters is substance of the multilateral interaction and not diplomatic protocol, and that Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev is not merely an errand boy. Where do you stand in this dispute?
"Having become an outcast in Europe as a result of its 'adventures' in Ukraine, Russia has announced its 'move East,' seeking a strategic alliance with China. So far, this move has not been successful either. Nevertheless, Russia, short of allies and friends as it is, has to be very cautious not to alienate China. Thus constrained, Russia can contribute little if anything at all to regional economy or regional security.
"Under such circumstances, to my mind, President Putin has made a sensible decision not to attend the APEC summit meeting lest he should be relegated to a second-class status. Russian Prime Minister Medvedev will do just fine."
Does it really matter who of the two top officials, Putin or Medvedev, is better placed to represent Russia at the APEC summit? Gleb Ivashentsov, a former ambassador and now member of the Russian International Affairs Council, discussed the issue with Troika Report.
"There are so many events around the world that it is difficult for the national leader to be present at all of them. Two days ahead of the APEC meeting the G20 summit was held. In the wake of the terrorist attacks in Paris, measures should be worked out to protect Russian citizens from the same threat. Besides, Prime Minister Medvedev is visiting countries neighboring the Philippines: Cambodia and Malaysia. Moreover, the APEC summit, unlike the G20 gatherings, is focused on the economy and not on politics plus economics. In Russia, traditionally it is the Prime Minister who deals with economic issues.
"The absence of Vladimir Putin at the APEC summit can hardly be viewed as an offense to the hosts. After all, U.S. President Obama shunned the APEC summit in Vladivostok. A number of world leaders were also missing at the summits held in Jakarta and in Beijing."
- Critics argue that these summits are nothing more but "photo opportunities" and that they lack substance. How do you assess the APEC and what is your comment on the current summit in Manila?
"We see the mineral resources of Russia and the financial resources of China. If we take into account the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank and the BRICS Development Bank, there is the source of financing such major projects as the Trans-Siberian Railroad, the Baikal-Amur Railroad, and the Northern Sea Route. In total, it opens new vistas in developing cooperation in the Asia-Pacific and establishing a direct link with Europe."
The two Russian diplomats clearly differ in their assessment of the viability and progress achieved by Russia's "pivot to Asia" and of the engagement between Moscow and Beijing, as well as regarding Vladimir Putin's possible motives for not attending the APEC summit.
Basically, the divergence of views is testimony to the still unfinished search for Russia's "Eurasian identity" and the continuous debate within the country between two different schools of thought and policy-making.
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#24
The National Interest
November 19, 2015
Georgia's Democracy Test
"Our international partners must demand the conditions required for better governance, while the citizens of Georgia are allowed to opt for the best government."
By Tedo Japaridze
Tedo Japaridze is chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of Georgia. He was Georgia's ambassador to the United States. He was also national security adviser to Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze and was Mikhail Saakashvili's first Foreign Minister. The views expressed in this article do not necessarily correspond to those of the Georgian government.
Georgia is heading towards legislative elections. Ideally, of course, political debates should be heated but not inflammatory. Elections are supposed to be about issues such as the economy and foreign policy. When it comes my own country, Georgia, it will be a consolidated democracy when political parties cease trying to obliterate opponents morally, claiming the laurels of a revolutionary.
Since the coming to power of Georgian Dream (GD) in 2012, we habitually speak of "the first-ever peaceful transfer of power." The transfer was indeed peaceful; the campaign and the debate were brutal. Former President Mikhail Saakashvili conceded defeat, which is one of the reasons why the United National Movement (UNM) is the first party in Georgia to survive an electoral defeat, retaining electoral support, resources, and media presence.
But the problem with our "first peaceful transfer of power" is that none of us knows yet how to win-but not everything-to be able to lose-but, once again, not everything. Building a democracy in which that is routine is our shared responsibility.
The UNM has been lamenting rather than arguing, engaging in anecdotal conspiracy theories (and entangling into that conspiratorial net their foreign partners and sympathizers) rather than piecing together a narrative of what the UNM stands for, and for whom. As the first not "constructive" opposition, arguing policies and drafting a program would not just be a great service to the UNM, but indeed to Georgia's political culture, setting a valuable precedent. In my opinion, however, the UNM missed the opportunity to define the role of the opposition.
The most important accomplishment of the 2012 elections is that nobody is was afraid o speak out in contrast to life under the previous regime. Pick your index: Reporters Without Borders, Freedom House, or the East Partnership Civic Forum. Every media monitor will attest to the fact that Georgia has not simply "progressed" since 2012, we are in another league, surpassing several EU member states. That's a fact, but it is not campaign material. Media freedom is not "an issue." It should be taken for granted, or counted upon.
But there are problems. In October 29, for example, a Ukrainian website published two audio conversations between the current leader of the UNM, Giga Bokeria, the director of Rustavi 2 TV, Nika Gvaramia, and the former President, Mikhail Saakashvili. Bokeria and Gvaramia have acknowledged the authenticity of these recordings. During the Saakashvili-Bokeria conversation, the former President demands the channel's fortification and specifies that "there must be kicking, punching and blood, and if they shoot, so be it." In his second Saakashvili-Gvaramia conversation, the TV manager is instructed to find gunmen - "boeviks" - "because all this will end up by shooting." Having set the stage, Saakashvili then worries about the audience and asks Bokeria "what about these foreign idiots," to which Bokeria answers "the State Department will issue a big statement tomorrow." In sum, Saakashvili seeks an extra-constitutional road to return to power, and "useful idiots" to make that happen, in Georgia and abroad. For many of us, this is obviously Georgia's past.
What is at stake is not media pluralism. As Transparency International notes, between 2002 and 2012 Rustavi 2 has changed hands 20 times, always between members of Saakashvili's entourage, retaining the same editorial line. However, in 2015 things did change. And what didn't happen is as politically important as what did happen.
Special Forces did not raid Rustavi 2 studios and transmission was not suspended, as in the case of Imedi TV Channel in 2007. What did happen is that a Tbilisi City Court decided to return the ownership of Rustavi 2 TV to a former owner, who had allegedly been forced to sell under duress. That decision can and has been appealed.
Meanwhile, the Constitutional Court ruled that the Tbilisi City Court judgment should not be enforced provisionally until it would have decided on the constitutionality of provisional enforcement. But the Tbilisi City Court appointed an interim manager anyway, a move that puzzled some international and domestic observers. In response, Georgia's High Court issued an unusual public statement to specify that the care-taking management appointed have no mandate over the Rustavi 2 editorial line.
But just yesterday the Tbilisi City Court judge again opened the due process by repealing partially his own ruling and disallowing an interim manager to take over the company's management until the appeals court delivered its final decision on this question. In the meantime, the Constitutional Court has been considering different aspects of that case. Obviously, that makes a difference: it's been implemented through the due process and not been decided by one phone call from the high offices, as was once the case.
Our government makes a difference insofar as it delivers on its promises: a humane detention system, rule of law, free media, and fair elections. We must do away with "more," "better," "freer" and "fairer" relativisms. These are the concerns of international monitors. We are supposed to serve our constituents and owe it to them to adhere to European standards. The UNM does not set the bar; our promises do.
This Government, as I said above, came peacefully to power, and to leave peacefully from power, when Georgian citizens decide it is time for it to go. It's obvious that politicians should unequivocally and unconditionally denounce all forms of violence and contribute to civil accord. We, in Georgian Dream, have done so unilaterally, but as a political system we have some way to go. Are we perfect? No. But we are committed to become a better functioning democracy in our part of the world.
Meanwhile, I would humbly ask our friends and foes equally for even-handed monitoring and political facilitation. Our international partners must demand the conditions required for better governance, while the citizens of Georgia are allowed to opt for the best government. No doubt, there is strenuous work to be done, but we have, as I admitted above, the commitment required. In this context alone, it is worth putting things in a comparative perspective. Georgia is becoming the kind of neighbor and partner the Eastern Partnership instrument set out to create. When it comes to reforms, we own the conditions, endorse the objectives, deploy the resources, take in the feedback, fine tune, and deliver.
The reason for this is that the people of Georgia overwhelmingly endorse this path and have little patience or tolerance for anything less, over and beyond their partisan differences. We need our partners to take that into account. As facilitators, our partners can help us achieve that objective. The way to address this challenge is together, government and opposition, with our partners, and the time is now.
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#25
RFE/RL
November 18, 2015
Can Putin Come In From The Cold?
by Brian Whitmore
He wasn't ostracized. He wasn't isolated. And certainly nobody threatened to shirtfront him.
In the space of a year, Vladimir Putin has gone from being the pariah of Brisbane to being the star of Antalya. The contrast between last year's G20 summit in Australia and this year's in Turkey couldn't have been sharper.
Then, Putin was browbeaten by Western leaders for annexing Crimea and supporting separatists in Donbas. Now, everybody wants to talk to him about teaming up to fight Islamic State militants.
Then, Putin's humiliating early exit from the summit made international headlines. Now, everybody is talking about that photo of him huddling with U.S. President Barack Obama.
At the Brisbane summit, which took place months after the downing of Flight MH17, the vibe was all about tension between Russia and the West. At the Antalya summit, which came just days after IS's terror attacks in Paris, it was all about unity.
"Putin has changed the G20 agenda from being dominated by Ukraine to having been taken over by Syria," Anders Aslund, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, wrote recently.
"A number of Western powers now want to fight with Russia against ISIS, ignoring everything else about Russia's policies. That Russia has escalated its military aggression in Ukraine in the last weeks apparently does not matter much to the West."
So is Putin about to get what he has always wanted? Is he now a step closer to forging that "broad international coalition against terrorism" he called for in his speech to the UN General Assembly in September?
Revive 1945, Bury 1991
In his UN speech, Putin invoked the spirit of World War II, calling for an alliance "similar to the anti-Hitler coalition" that united "a broad range of parties willing to stand firm against those who, just like the Nazis, sow evil and hatred of humankind."
He also invoked the Yalta conference, which laid "a solid foundation for the postwar world order." And he lamented that the end of the Cold War left the world "with one center of dominance."
And all this was no accident.
Putin wants to relive 1945 and exorcise 1991. He wants to resurrect the glory of the Soviet victory in World War II; and he wants to bury the humiliation of the Soviet defeat in the Cold War.
He wants a temporary alliance of convenience with the West in Syria, one that will end Moscow's international isolation and get sanctions lifted.
Then he wants a modern version of the Yalta conference, in which Russia and other great powers will divide up the world into spheres of influence.
And of course he wants a free hand in the former Soviet space.
"Russia's war with the West will not end as long as these new principles are not introduced by 'internationally binding commitment,'" Slawomir Debski, editor in chief of Intersection, wrote in a recent column.
A Window Of Opportunity
Putin clearly thinks that the November 13 Paris attacks give him a window of opportunity to advance these goals.
As political commentator Leonid Bershidsky noted in a recent column, a month ago French President Francois Hollande said Putin "is not our ally" in Syria; but now he is calling for Moscow and the West "to unite our forces."
It is probably no accident that just days after the Paris attacks, and shortly after Hollande's call for unity, Moscow finally acknowledged what it had been denying for weeks: that the October 31 Metrojet crash in Egypt was an act of terrorism.
Putin pledged to pursue those responsible "everywhere, no matter where they are hiding," adding that Russia was "counting on all of our friends during this work, including in searching for and punishing the criminals."
And right on cue, speaking at the APEC summit in Manila, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev said: "The terror attacks that Russia and France have just faced affected the whole world. The terrorism expansion is indeed a global challenge. And it requires a united response."
The Moscow punditocracy is also on message. Political analyst Aleksei Arbatov told the daily Kommersant that the Paris attacks will alter relations with the West "in the direction of greater mutual sympathy."
All of this has opponents of the Putin regime duly alarmed.
A Russo-Western alliance in Syria would be "morally repugnant, strategically disastrous, and entirely unnecessary," self-exiled Russian opposition leader and former world chess champion Garry Kasparov, author ofthe book Winter Is Coming: Why Vladimir Putin And The Enemies Of The Free World Must Be Stopped, wrote in The Wall Street Journal.
"President Obama and other Western leaders desperate to resolve the conflict in Syria should keep in mind that the enemy of your enemy can also be your enemy," Kasparov wrote.
A Limited Detente
So far, Moscow's rapprochement with the West has been been confined to Syria -- and mostly confined to optics and rhetoric.
French and Russian warplanes have conducted air strikes in the IS stronghold of Raqqa and Putin has ordered the commander of the battleship Moskva to treat France as an ally.
But huge differences remain over the future of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and other Western powers have not exactly been rushing into Moscow's arms.
And despite fears in Kyiv that Ukraine might would get thrown under the bus, there is no evidence of the West softening its stand against Russia's annexation of Crimea and intervention in Donbas.
There have been no moves to lift -- or even ease -- sanctions. And there has certainly been no indication that anybody is prepared to give Russia a free hand in the former Soviet Union.
"A Western alliance with Putin against Islamic State, if it ever comes to pass, won't be much more than a situational military alliance. There will be no political detente," Bershidsky wrote.
"In that sense, the recent terror attacks haven't changed much: The West still has to decide whether to ally itself with a lesser evil to defeat a bigger one."
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#26
Kyiv Post
November 19, 2015
Editorial
Two years of failure
Nov. 21 marks the second year since the EuroMaidan Revolution started on Independence Square in Kyiv. Called to action by then Ukrainska Pravda journalist and current lawmaker Mustafa Nayyem and others, dozens took the streets to protest against the government's rejection that day of a landmark political and free trade deal with the European Union.
Over the course of three months, the protests grew into a popular uprising that led to the oustter of President Viktor Yanukovych. The movement demanded a better life and a government free of corruption and oligarchs that have impoverished the Ukrainian people.
Yanukovych's administration reacted harshly. According to prosecutors, they hunted down activists, distributed firearms to hired thugs, trampled on civil liberties and violated countless constitutional laws in vain attempts to crush the Maidan tent city. Events came to a bloody climax on Feb. 20, after nearly 100 civilians were killed by law enforcers, mostly by sniper fire. The victims are called the Heavenly Hundred. Prosecutors' official version of events states that only 77 civilians and 13 police officers were killed.
Nobody has been convicted for the massacres. According to a series of press briefings by prosecutor Serhiy Horbatiuk, no one has been convicted of any of the 2,000 crimes committed from November 2013 to February 2014. "More than 270 suspects have been held criminally responsible," Horbatiuk said vaguely.
We understand that the authorities have had a tough time investigating the Maidan crimes. Key evidence, such as the firearms used, has never been recovered, and official documents were destroyed. Many of the riot police who allegedly killed protesters, especially the ones who gave orders, have fled to Russian-occupied Crimea, Donbas or abroad. Others refuse to cooperate. Some investigators are surely sabotaging the process, while judges who sanctioned illegal arrests are still working.
Clearly, the investigations are a colossal failure.
President Petro Poroshenko, through his appointment of two incompetent or corrupt prosecutors general - Vitaly Yarema and Viktor Shokin - has shown he isn't interested in serving justice. He hasn't learned the lessons of his tainted predecessors, that by not confronting its past, including solving high-profile crimes, the country cannot make progress.
By ignoring murder, graft and nepotism, Poroshenko is firmly on the path to leaving a legacy similar to his predecessor. This is tragically disappointing, more so because the president seems to be oblivious to how badly his popularity is sinking at home and abroad.
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#27
Kyiv Post
November 20, 2015
Frustrations high at EuroMaidan killings hearing as violence erupts
By Johannes Wamberg Andersen
With investigations stalled into a raft of crimes committed during the EuroMaidan Revolution, tensions are running high.
Those tensions erupted into a violent encounter at a parliamentary hearing when Volodymyr Parasyuk, considered a EuroMaidan hero by some activists, kicked Vasyl Pisny, an officer of the Security Service of Ukraine in the head.
Parasyuk, now a member of parliament, faces charges for assaulting the official.
His foot to the head, however, is representative of society's frustrations as a whole with the lack of progress in bringing criminal prosecutions for crimes ranging from murder to assaulting demonstrators who helped drive President Viktor Yanukovych from power on Feb. 22, 2014.
On the eve of the two-year anniversary of the Nov. 21 start of the EuroMaidan Revolution, lawyers representing the families of dozens of protesters killed asked why those responsible still haven't been brought to justice.
The Prosecutor General's Office and the Interior Ministry ignored the meeting, where they were called to give a progress report on the investigations.
Yegor Sobolev, the head of the Anti-Corruption Committee, threatened that "the public would take action" in light of such disrespect by the authorities.
Briefing the committee on obstructions in the EuroMaidan investigation, Vitaliy Tytych, head of the law firm Tytych & Partners, said that investigators looking into the killings during the protests were being pressured from the old guard in the Prosecutor General's Office. "The investigators feel threatened, as if they are under suspicion," he said.
A special EuroMaidan investigative branch was set up, although Tytych said it lacked computers and was understaffed. Tytych represents two of the victims who were shot dead during the protests.
Preliminary findings released by the prosecution's investigators showed that at least 77 protesters were killed during the 95-day winter uprising, while 185 were wounded by gunfire and more than 1,000 others suffered wounds.
Some activists expressed doubt about these figures, however, insisting that hundreds had been killed. Representing that view was protester-turned-lawmaker Yuriy Tymoshenko.
"I saw tens of people being shot and beaten to death on Feb. 18 (2014) in the Kriposnyi Lane alone," he said. Tymoshenko also reiterated earlier claims that crematories had been burning corpses on a massive scale to cover up the killings.
Tymoshenko's claim of a higher number of deaths than reported couldn't be confirmed. But prosecutors provided proof that the authorities had the means for such a crackdown. Security forces were provided with live ammunition for their Kalashnikov assault rifles as early as February 10, 2014, head of the prosecution service's investigative unit Serhiy Horbatyuk said at a separate briefing.
The authorities had planned a violent crackdown on the Feb. 18 demonstration, including with the use of live ammunition, according to the prosecution. Ten were confirmed killed that day alone Horbatyuk said.
It was also confirmed that government agencies had hired thugs and petty criminals to battle the protestors. These so-called titushki were provided with more than 408 Kalashnikovs and no less than 90,000 rounds of live ammunition.
Although a number of individuals are under investigation, Tytych lamented the fact that the cases hadn't been solved yet.
Tytych claimed that the groups of security forces responsible for the bulk of the killings weren't taking orders from their usual commanders. He explained that members of the special police team Alfa seemed surprised when they discovered that other units were killing protesters on Feb. 20.
"They are taking people down!" the Alfa officers said in a video recording of the events.
According to Tytych, the killing squads were operating independently as terrorist groups.
Moreover, he said, the persistent escalations on the side of the authorities throughout the protest period were aimed at radicalizing the uprising, which the then authorities thought would turn Ukraine's east and Crimea against EuroMaidan, justify an armed intervention by Russia, and fit with Russian propaganda picturing the leaders of the uprising as a violent "junta."
Tytych's interpretation was partly collaborated by the lead investigator Horbatyuk, who said that the mass killings were a last resort for the authorities, as other forms of intimidation hadn't brought about the desired effect. A total of 274 officials were under investigations for their role in the violence.
Tytych criticized the fact that a number of officials were only to be indicted for abusing their authority, when in fact they should be wanted for murder. Tytych also said it was wrong that several Interior Ministry officials accused of wrongdoing during EuroMaidan hadn't been suspended but had kept on working in high positions - allowing them to obscure evidence.
"Imagine if the French authorities said that they would come up with something on the Paris terrorist attack in a couple of years?" Tytych asked rhetorically, talking to the Kyiv Post. "In a more normal country, these cases would have been solved by now."
The angry reaction came quickly as Parasyuk jumped up from his seat and assaulted a security service official by kicking him in the head. The outburst came in response to a remark by the security service official, Vasyl Pisny, who said he had done more for EuroMaidan than Parasyuk had.
Pisny is a deputy head of the State Security Service's central anti-corruption and organized crime department, representing the only government body to appear before the committee that day.
Parasyuk accused Pisny of corruption in Lviv, saying "Everybody in Lviv know who that man is."
The Kyiv Post witnessed how Parasyuk, a 28-year-old non-party affiliated member of parliament, made several attempts to resume the scuffle. A close political ally of Parasyuk, member of parliament Boryslav Bereza, held him back.
Parasyuk later apologized for his violent outburst, but many saw a wider issue that highlighted the public anger over the continued impunity among officials despite the EuroMaidan's demands for rule of law in the nation.
Echoing comments from a number of leading lawmakers, Volodymyr Viatrovych, the director of the Institute for National Remembrance, wrote on his Facebook page that the authorities would keep losing its monopoly on violence if it didn't actually use that right in the pursuit of justice.
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#28
Interfax-Ukraine
November 19, 2015
Ukrainian prosecutors have no evidence Russian snipers shot at Maydan protesters
Ukrainian investigators have no evidence that Russian snipers were shooting at antigovernment protesters in central Kiev in February 2014, Serhiy Horbatyuk, the head of the department for special investigations at the Prosecutor-General's Office, has said.
The Interfax-Ukraine news agency at 1001 gmt on 19 November quoted him as telling a briefing: "There is no information in the case about the Russian snipers' work. This information has not been confirmed, but, let me say again, it is not being discarded."
But Horbatyuk added that the Prosecutor-General's Office had at its disposal evidence indicating that some Russian citizens influenced how the events on Independence Square, also known as Maydan, unfolded, the Ukrainian news agency UNIAN reported at 1001 gmt on the same day.
"Investigators at the Prosecutor-General's Office are investigating issues related to the involvement of Russian representatives and their influence on the events that happened, and there is information that there was influence," he noted.
UNIAN at 1014 gmt quoted Horbatyuk as saying that Russia had delivered to Ukraine special gear and weapons that were used by riot police to disperse the protests.
"This special equipment was provided by Russia free of charge as humanitarian aid," he said, adding that Ukraine had received a "huge amount" of stun grenades, tear gas and other gear.
Horbatyuk said that the investigators suspected the Kiev unit of the now disbanded Berkut riot police of killing 46 and wounding 48 protesters, Interfax-Ukraine reported at 0943 gmt.
"During the investigation, we established that this was the special unit of Berkut's Kiev branch, whose fighters are suspected of committing this crime. They used firearms against the protesters," he said.
Interpol, however, refuses to put the Berkut suspects on its wanted list, security official Anatoliy Dublik told the same briefing,
Interfax-Ukraine at 1023 gmt quoted him as saying: "We sent a request to this effect, but they are not on the international wanted list and the refusal is under the article saying that this is political persecution."
He added that 18 Berkut fighters were on Ukraine's wanted list and were hiding in Poland, Belarus, Crimea, Russia or the self-proclaimed republics in eastern Ukraine.
Horbatyuk also said that those in power in 2014 planned to disperse a rally near the parliament building on 18 February in order to create grounds for a massive crackdown, Interfax-Ukraine reported at 1136 gmt.
"There were plans to disperse with firearms a peaceful march to the Supreme Council [parliament] on 18 February and in this way increase the degree of confrontation between law enforcers and protesters in order to create so-called grounds for an antiterrorist operation which, as the investigators established, had been planned since January," he said.
At 1052 gmt, Interfax-Ukraine quoted Horbatyuk as saying that the investigators had not yet identified those who set the Trade Union Building in Independence Square on fire in February 2014.
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#29
Kyiv Post
November 20, 2015
Experts: Time running out for government to fulfill EuroMaidan goals
By Mark Rachkevych
The EuroMaidan Revolution was successful in terms of ousting disgraced ex-President Viktor Yanukovych and his cronies, and shifting Ukraine back toward the path of European integration, according to a significant majority of 31 experts polled this month by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation policy center.
However, two years later, the revolution's other goals have not been achieved, namely eradicating systemic corruption and punishing those guilty of crimes.
These failures could lead to the undoing of the current government, led by President Petro Poroshenko and Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk, because public trust in them is low, Iryna Bekeshkina, director of the Democratic Initiatives, said at a roundtable to discuss the expert poll's findings in Kyiv on Oct. 20.
Authorities haven't brought one conviction related to crimes committed during the Maidan, including killings of protesters, torture, police brutality, abuse of power, Ukraine's prosecutor's office announced this week in a series of briefings.
The situation reminded Bekeshkina of the aftermath of the Orange Revolution in 2004, a peaceful uprising that reversed a rigged presidential election that favored Yanukovych. Afterward, Freedom House elevated Ukraine's status to being a "free country," yet the nation remained extremely corrupt, according to Transparency International.
Ukraine is in the same precarious position today, Bekeshkina said. More than 70 percent of Ukrainians believe the nation is heading in the wrong direction, Social Monitoring found in a separate nationwide public opinion conducted earlier this month.
"This (current) regime isn't sustainable. They must act fast because what's needed is painful and it will affect their close ones, their relatives and friends," she said of the urgency to combat corruption. "(Public) trust towards government is falling rapidly, this is very dangerous, but it is still not that high as during the Maidan."
What also is needed is for parliament to pass legislation in line with the revolution's goal of "democratization," Kyiv Mohyla Academy political science professor Oleksiy Haran said at the discussion.
"We need a 'Maidan' in parliament to pass the necessary laws, that's the path we need to take...we need civic activists who can write specific laws related to sectoral changes and then lobby them to fruition," Haran said, who was one of the experts polled.
He lamented that that civic activists from the revolution didn't form their own party in the movement's aftermath and instead joined existing parties.
"They did this for pragmatic reasons because they feared the new party wouldn't have passed the 5-percent threshold" in the October 2014 parliamentary election, Haran said.
A new political nation is emerging following the revolution, the poll found among its positive outcomes, in addition to "growth of national consciousness" and heightened civic activity and volunteering.
On the negative side, Russia's aggression and war against Ukraine was the most frequently mentioned by experts, including the loss of "territorial integrity."
Experts were roughly divided in half on whether a third mass uprising, or Maidan III, could erupt in the near future.
Foremost among the reasons given for another popular uprising to occur is the "lack of progress with the implementation of essential reforms and corresponding tangible changes in the lives of ordinary citizens."
To this end, according to Haran, thanks to changes brought on by the revolution, "no branch of government can ignore pressure from civil society or the public (anymore)...this is revolutionary."
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#30
Politico.eu
November 19, 2015
The politics of corruption in Kiev
Ukraine's ex-spy chief sounds an alarm.
By MAXIM TUCKER
Maxim Tucker is a freelance journalist in Kiev.
KIEV - The former head of Ukraine's state security service, Valentyn Nalyvaichenko, arrived in Washington D.C. Thursday to deliver his scathing assessment of the country's post-revolutionary law-enforcement to the U.S. Congress.
Sources close to Nalyvaichenko say the visit is part of a bid to win American backing for a challenge to President Petro Poroshenko at Ukraine's next elections.
"There's still a lot of time until the elections," the silver-haired former spymaster said with a smile when asked about contesting the presidency in an interview before his trip to the U.S. He chose his words carefully, a reminder that he left a career in diplomacy to join the SBU, Ukraine's KGB successor. "Before I run for any office I want to win the trust of Ukrainians."
Prior to his first stint with the security service under former President Viktor Yushchenko's Western-friendly "Orange" government, Nalyvaichenko was Ukraine's ambassador to Belarus. When the Kremlin-backed Viktor Yanukovych came to power in 2010, he moved into the opposition. In 2012 he was elected to Parliament as a member of heavyweight boxer and current Kiev mayor Vitaly Klitschko's party, then returned to head the SBU for 16 months in the immediate aftermath of Yanukovych's February 2014 departure.
"Now I'm running an NGO, communicating with ordinary people, activists, volunteers, trying to better understand their problems," Nalyvaichenko said. "If I go back to politics, I will do this based only on their mandate and support."
But it's not just the support of the Ukrainian people he's after. While in the U.S., his team plans to meet with House Speaker Paul Ryan, Ambassador Daniel Fried, the U.S. State Department's coordinator for sanctions policy, and senior staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Ukraine's next presidential vote isn't due until 2019, but two years after the massive protests that led to the ousting of Yanukovych, widespread discontent is simmering once more. Frustration at the slow pace of change is threatening the present government's stability. Its approval ratings have plummeted, allowing oligarchs to dominate at local elections held last month.
Nalyvaichenko said he shares that frustration. Voted chief of the SBU by Parliament before Poroshenko's presidency began, he was tasked with combatting corruption - while simultaneously fighting a bloody Moscow-sponsored insurgency in eastern Ukraine.
"I remember our first conversation after [President Poroshenko] was elected. He told me 'Valentyn, I would like to stop corruption in the Parliament - no dirty money, no shell companies used by MPs," Nalyvaichenko said.
"Unfortunately there was no will to go to the end, to prosecute really corrupt officials at the top."
The security chief privately accused the president's choice of prosecutor general, Viktor Shokin, of stifling investigations, triggering a protracted feud between the two lawmen.
According to Nalyvaichenko, government lawyers continue to sit on evidence of a plot between Ukrainian and Russian security services to slaughter protesters during the final days of the "Maidan" revolution against Yanukovych's rule.
"An official letter from me, signed and sent to the general prosecutor, clearly established that three groups of Russian FSB generals arrived in Kiev during Maidan times - that means December, January and February [2013-2014]," he said, going on to suggest that Vladimir Putin's personal aide, Vladislav Surkov, masterminded the crackdown.
"They have witnesses, casings or boxes from the snipers' rifles, evidence of Surkov's arrival - he spent several nights at a special SBU facility with the former head of SBU. They've talked to one ex-SBU general arrested by us in November last year."
Nearly two years later, no Ukrainian officers have been jailed for their role in the deaths of more than 100 protesters. Nalyvaichenko blames both prosecutor and president for dragging their feet when it comes to investigating government officials.
"I was blocked at the top. Not only by the prosecutor general himself but I regularly reported to the President with evidence of dirty shell companies and other crimes, constitutional court members involved in corruption, high-ranking officials from ministries, government officials. I got no response from the president or the prosecutor general."
The private feud between the head prosecutor and SBU boss finally boiled over into a public spat this summer. On June 9, an enormous oil depot erupted in flames outside Kiev, killing four people. In the wake of the blaze, Nalyvaichenko announced that although the depot had been run illegally, the prosecutor's office had actively prevented police intervention.
"One of the deputy prosecutor generals actually provided a 'roof' - illegal protection for this business - for several years with no questions, no limitations from law enforcement," he explained. Two weeks after his announcement, Nalyvaichenko was pushed out the door. President Poroshenko forced a vote for his resignation through Parliament.
In September, Nalyvaichenko's allegations against the prosecutor general were echoed by U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt in a cutting address that illustrated the extent of Washington's frustration with Ukraine's lack of corruption convictions. Ambassador Pyatt's statement added to a growing clamour for Shokin's resignation.
Then, just as the chief prosecutor's popularity had reached its lowest ebb, a sniper fired three shots at his office as he held a late night meeting. A military prosecutor investigating the attack said the shooter had used a thermal imaging scope to target the law chief in the dark. He had only been saved, the investigator said, because the bullets were stopped by bulletproof glass.
Experts scorned that account, highlighting that thermal sensors cannot penetrate glass, which gives off its own heat signature. Nalyvaichenko appeared to suggest that the assassination attempt may have been staged in a twisted PR effort to rehabilitate Shokin's tattered reputation.
"Everybody knows that office has special windows. They are bulletproof and even protect against rockets. So the question is - what was the reason to shoot?" he said.
"It's very suspicious when six hours beforehand [the government] announced a potential threat to his life and nobody did anything. The perimeter of a building such as the prosecutor general's office is searched and secured - every window, every rooftop, every basement within the perimeter is under the control of the SBU."
Since Nalyvaichenko departed the SBU, critics say that corruption has gone unchecked within the service. The president replaced him with Vasyl Hrytsak, the head of Poroshenko's private security detail between 2010 and 2014. Hrytsak swiftly began to unravel his predecessor's changes.
"During my last month in the office I fired all the leadership of this special anti-corruption department because they got simply no results. There was operational information about their involvement in corruption and contraband activity," said Nalyvaichenko. "What happened after I left? They were all brought back to the office."
Last month two journalists were assaulted by guards as they filmed secret car-parks used by SBU bosses to hide their luxury cars. The agency initially promised an investigation into the attack, but instead tried to get the journalists' program pulled by threatening legal action.
Nalyvaichenko's own criticism of the government has also earned unwelcome attention. He has been accused by the president's party of serving the interests of oligarchs. His family has been accused by Ukrainian media of accepting gifts on his behalf. Yet he has persevered, establishing an NGO whose avowed purpose is to investigate and expose government graft.
Nalyvaichenko said that he wants to share his investigations with U.S. law enforcement. He also wants to warn Ukraine's U.S. backers that he believes President Poroshenko is not the right man for the job, and that, in his opinion, the President's apparent focus on appointing loyalists rather than genuine reformers is undermining the country's democratic aspirations.
"Each and every place and every position is occupied only by people he can trust and only by people loyal to him," Nalyvaichenko warned. "It's becoming a very closed circle."
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#31
Huffingtonpost.com
November 19, 2015
Ukraine: Stop Harassing Us Over Oppressed Minorities --- We're Too Busy Fighting Russia
By Nikolas Kozloff
Nikolas Kozloff is a New York-based writer who conducted a research trip to Ukraine last year. .
Though it's not commonly known, Ukraine's LGBT community played a significant role in the Maidan revolution which toppled the unpopular government of Viktor Yanukovych some two years ago. Careful not to upset or alienate conservative nationalist elements at the Maidan, LGBT protesters made a tactical decision not to promote their cause openly. According to EU Observer, the LGBT community refrained from brandishing its own slogans and banners lest it provoke homophobic violence. The Observer remarks that "during the revolution, the LGBT community behaved courageously, but also pragmatically: it didn't champion the rights of the gay minority in order not to split Maidan into liberal and illiberal factions."
In the wake of Maidan, however, many within the LGBT community feel betrayed by the very revolution which they helped to spearhead. In Ukraine, all the current talk is about repelling Vladimir Putin and Russian-backed separatists, rather than adhering to liberal-minded values. It's a rather ironic coda to the Maidan, which was initially driven forward by pro-Western and progressive aspirations. Judging from recent events, however, it would appear that Maidan's liberal credo was rather superficial and merely skin deep.
Recently, many conservative Ukrainians seem to be falling back on a common refrain: don't resort to criticism of our country's internal politics, for such "divisive" tactics will only serve to embolden Vladimir Putin. Though these claims rely on a dubious and false equivalency, such arguments seem to be gaining some traction, as my own experience may attest. What is more, political elites have desperately sought to outmaneuver the LGBT community by playing the nationalist card.
"We Don't Have Time" for LGBT
It's bad enough when right wing nationalists espouse homophobic views, but arguably even worse when such sentiments are sanctioned at higher levels. According to activists, authorities have told the LGBT community that the government is unable to introduce significant hate crime or discrimination legislation right now due to Ukraine's "critical situation of conflict with Russia." A recent National Public Radio report reinforces the sense of such retrograde forces at work. The report quotes one activist who declares "the public discourse [in Ukraine] has said, 'Look, you are not important right now. We cannot discuss gay issues...Stop talking about it.' It's all about the war."
Ukrainian excuses on the LGBT question reached ridiculous new heights in advance of a planned Pride march in Kiev this past summer. Prior to the event, activists sought to meet with Mayor Vitaly Klitschko in order to secure vital police protection. Outrageously, Klitschko refused while concocting absurdist far-fetched explanations. It wasn't the right time to hold Pride, the mayor claimed, since Ukraine was in the midst of war and the public didn't have a clear grasp of homosexuality.
Providing police protection to the Pride march, the mayor said, would furthermore represent a needless "provocation" toward Russia, a country which has very strict anti-LGBT laws. In making such pronouncements, Klischko echoes the mindset of other conservative politicians. For some time, Russia has pushed its own anti-Western propaganda which focuses on Europe's so-called tolerance of "sexual perversions." Indeed, Kremlin media even refers to Europe as "Gayropa." Rather than criticize or lambaste such primitive rhetoric, Ukrainian authorities have reacted defensively. Apparently, Kiev is concerned lest it draw attention to LGBT rights which would only serve to help Russian separatists whilst alienating domestic conservative groups.
Gay Pride Fiasco
For the LGBT community, securing armed protection is hardly some type of unnecessary or idle pastime. In 2012, the local authorities similarly withdrew their promise to protect participants at Pride celebrations. Later, organizers were obliged to cancel the parade out of security concerns. The following year, Pride went ahead but only under heavy police guard and the proceedings lasted a mere hour. In light of the adverse security environment, Klitschko moved to cancel Pride in 2014.
While concerns over public safety are surely warranted, the mayor failed to demonstrate any understanding of the LGBT community, remarking that the parade essentially amounted to a mere "entertainment event" rather than a vehicle designed to promote human rights. With no support emanating from the mayor's office, and fearful at the prospect of far right street violence, organizers were similarly forced to cancel their parade.
It looked like history would repeat itself once again, but at long last security was provided this year when Klitschko relented and agreed to provide a 1,500 police escort. Even so, the parade took place within an atmosphere of fear and intimidation. Feeling anxious, LGBT activists distributed flyers on how to protect oneself from beatings and gas attacks during Pride. It turns out such fears were not unfounded: unidentified assailants threw stones and smoke bombs during the event. After attackers hurled nail-studded firecrackers, one policeman was sent to hospital. In the end, the march only lasted a mere 20 minutes. It seems likely the assailants were affiliated with so-called Right Sektor, a group which had threatened to provoke hostilities prior to Gay Pride.
What's Causing Homophobia?
On the surface at least it's pretty easy to point the finger at right wing street toughs, the group which is most directly responsible for homophobia in Ukraine. Indeed, attacks on the Pride march were hardly an isolated incident, with anti-LGBT violence committed by nationalist groups recently increasing. Since the Maidan revolution such groups have grown ever more powerful. It's reportedly gotten so dangerous for LGBT activists that some have even sought diplomatic asylum in the U.S.
A video experiment conducted in Kiev illuminates the depths of the problem. In an effort to test the waters, two gay men strolled down the streets in broad daylight, hand-in-hand. The pair then sat down on a bench on Khreschatyk, a central street near Maidan square. Rather ominously, a gang of young men quickly encircled the two and asked the men if there were patriots. Moments later, the gang squirted pepper spray in the gay men's faces and kicked the couple.
As if that were not enough, it also seems that right wing nationalists were responsible for launching an attack on the Zhovten or October Theater in November, 2014. Zhovten is Kiev's oldest theater and a favorite among art buffs. During the annual Molodist film festival, Zhovten opted to show a new French film about a married man who dresses up as a woman. About a hundred members of Kiev's LGBT community showed up for the screening. Twenty minutes into the movie, a loud noise like exploding firecrackers --- probably an incendiary grenade --- sent people scrambling into a panic. Though fire engines later showed up, much of the theater was destroyed in a blaze.
Fortunately, there were no casualties but the incident sent a chilling message to the LGBT community. Later, two men were apprehended and admitted that they had aimed to disrupt the event out of contempt for gay people. Two days later, Right Sektor again tried to shut down another LGBT film screening. Though certainly troubling, these incidents are hardly isolated: as early as 2009, prior to the Maidan revolution, Kiev art gallery Ya was set on fire following the presentation of a gay literary anthology.
Lackluster Police
While no one is letting right wing nationalists off the hook, blaming these groups for the rise in homophobia misses the point. Gay rights activists, in fact, have questioned police commitment to keep them safe. Though the security forces captured arsonists involved in the Zhovten blaze, officials were unable to prosecute the individuals for hate crimes since Ukraine lacks legislation which specifically protects people based on sexual orientation. In the event, the authorities wound up prosecuting the perpetrators based on mere hooliganism.
Moreover, in the wake of this year's Gay Pride fiasco, police failed to bring all suspected attackers to court. Some have expressed doubt that the official investigation will yield any positive result, and LGBT activists have even floated the idea that law enforcement might have been complicit in the attacks, noting that right wing toughs display an uncanny knack of locating gay pride marches at the spur of the moment, despite last minute changes.
Role of Political Elites and Orthodox Church
Meanwhile, Kiev's political elite has been reluctant to criticize the far right which is seen as patriotic in the fight against Russian-backed separatists. Members of the LGBT community argue that politicians have helped to foster an air of "impunity" toward right wing extremism which has only served to embolden fringe elements. Take, for example Mayor Klitschko, a former hero of the Maidan revolution. When asked how he would respond to the Zhovten attack, Klischko answered blandly that human rights were a good thing but he would not "stand up for gays and lesbians."
It's not just politicians who are stoking tensions, gay activists say, but also the Orthodox Church. Ominously, Right Sektor has warned that "gay propaganda is destructive and doing harm to our Christian nation, we can't allow that." Such sentiments were born out by left wing political activist Denis Gorbach. Speaking to me last year in Kiev, Gorbach commented that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church has displayed backward and retrograde ideas. "They have their own agenda which is socially conservative, racist against blacks and all non-Slavic peoples [though they wouldn't have any big problems with Germans or British], anti-Semitic and homophobic," Gorbach said.
Still Not Fully European
Recent developments, including attacks on Gay Pride and the Zhovten Theater in Kiev, have left a bitter taste with many LGBT veterans of the Maidan. Though one of the goals of the revolution was to promote a more egalitarian society, many Ukrainians continue to exhibit deep prejudice against gays and lesbians. Rather jarringly, Maidan even compares negatively to Turkey when it comes to treatment of LGBT people. In fact, during popular protests in Gezi Park against the government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, participants openly embraced LGBT groups.
It would appear that Ukraine likes the idea of being a part of Europe, but is reluctant to embrace many underlying Western European values. "It's worth recalling," notes EU Observer, "that the Euromaidan began because the former regime declined to sign an association treaty with the EU and was about to somersault Ukraine into the Russian world." Nevertheless, Ukrainian politicians are only willing to move the country so far. A recent article in Foreign Policy magazine quotes one gay man who remarks "there are some people who just want to join 'Europe' without changing their values and without understanding what it all means. But if people really want to change our country, the change has to start within them and their relationship to others."
Going to Extreme Lengths to Preserve Prejudice
Not only is Ukraine opposed to LGBT equality, but the country's political elites will go to great lengths to preserve homophobia. Though the new government has placed great importance on joining the so-called Schengen zone [a club of EU nations which allows for visa and passport-free travel], the Ukrainian parliament recently scuppered any such eventuality when it blocked legislation which would have banned discrimination against LGBT people in the workplace.
Previously, the EU had warned Ukraine that it must amend its own antiquated labor code which failed to prohibit discrimination against gay folk. In the Ukrainian parliament, only 117 legislators voted for changes demanded by Brussels, while nationalists and populists resoundingly defeated the measure with 343 votes. The vote sent a chill through the local LGBT community, which already feels threatened and abandoned. In a recent survey, a whopping 65 percent of Ukrainian gays said they faced infringements on their rights, including verbal abuse, intimidation and loss of employment or even direct physical violence.
In light of many of the historic failures of the Maidan, many within the LGBT community may wonder if and when another revolution will eventually spearhead the protection of their own rights.
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#32
Moscow Times
November 20, 2015
Ukraine Rebuffs Putin's Offer to Restructure Russian Debt
Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk has rejected Russia's restructuring proposal for the repayment of Kiev's eurobond debt, and said the "aggressor state" should accept the same terms as other bondholders.
The "basic conditions" that must be included in any debt restructuring plan include a 20 percent reduction on the face value of the loan and a four-year average maturity extension, Yatsenyuk said in an interview Thursday with Ukraine's First National television network.
He also threatened a moratorium on repaying the $3 billion debt to Russia, unless Moscow agreed to those terms, media reports said.
His snappish interview aired a day after Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev said Ukraine should "stop acting out" and pay up, according to comments carried by the RBC news agency.
Creditors have accepted Kiev's restructuring terms for 13 of Ukraine's 14 eurobonds, Bloomberg reported on Nov. 13.
Russian President Vladimir Putin, however, proposed this week that Ukraine pay down its eurobond debt in installments of $1 billion, starting in 2016.
The proposal was an easing of Moscow's previous demand that Ukraine repay the loan in full by the end of this year.
Putin praised his new proposal, saying, "we have offered better conditions than the International Monetary Fund was asking of us," the TASS news agency reported.
But Yatsenyuk scoffed at the Russian president's suggestion that his offer was more generous than Kiev's restructuring plan - which along with the 20 percent write-down and a four-year extension includes raising average interest payments to 7.75 percent on the new bonds, according to Bloomberg.
"I have stated [to Russia]: You aren't getting any different terms from other creditors," Yatsenyuk said, the RIA Novosti Ukraina news agency reported.
The terms of Ukraine's bonds stipulate that the Russian government cannot be awarded better financial terms than have been given to other investors, RBC reported Tuesday.
Yatsenyuk threatened a moratorium on repaying the debt to Russia on Nov. 13 - just days before Putin came out with his new proposal.
Speaking on the sidelines of the G20 summit this week, Putin said he had discussed Ukraine's debt repayment with U.S. President Barack Obama and IMF President Christine Lagarde, Russian media reported.
In addition to seeking special terms for Ukraine's debt repayment, Russia also asked that the United States or "one of the reputable international financial institutions" guarantee its loan, the RBC news agency reported Tuesday.
Russia provided the $3 billion to Kiev in late 2013, during the rule of Ukraine's former, Moscow-backed President Viktor Yanukovych. Some said the money was issued to dissuade Yanukovych from signing an association agreement he had been contemplating with the European Union.
Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko said the money was intended to ensure Yanukovych's loyalty to Moscow, and called the payment a "bribe," according to an interview with Bloomberg in June this year.
Yanukovych backed out of the planned agreement with the EU, prompting pro-Western Ukrainians to take to the streets in massive protests that forced Yanukovych from power in February 2014.
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#33
Bloomberg
November 20, 2015
Russia Pushes IMF for Response, Won't Send Debt Offer to Ukraine
By Olga Tanas
Russia, which has previously refused to negotiate with Ukraine over restructuring its $3 billion Eurobond, is waiting for the International Monetary Fund to respond to its proposal to change the terms on the debt and expects the cash-strapped country to initiate new talks if it's unable to pay in full on Dec. 20.
The impasse can only be resolved "in the framework" of the IMF-led program of assistance for Ukraine because the nation lacks the financial means to pay, Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov's aide, Svetlana Nikitina, told reporters in Moscow Friday. "Until a conceptual solution to the problem is found, we still expect the debt to be repaid," she said.
The countdown is on for the Dec. 8 deadline given by Russia after it offered to change the terms and spread out payments by Ukraine over the next three years. Ukraine, which in August agreed to a restructuring deal with creditors that didn't include Russia, has insisted that all bondholders should be treated equally in its $18 billion debt overhaul to meet IMF conditions for a financial lifeline. Russia has refused to accept the terms, insisting the bond is a loan between governments rather than commercial debt.
"We haven't sent and aren't supposed to send any formalized proposals to the Ukrainian side, because the Russian Federation in this case is acting as a creditor," Nikitina said. "According to international practice, a debtor should should come up with negotiation proposals on the debt if it realizes it is unable to repay on time."
Putin's Offer
After months of refusal to negotiate with Ukraine over restructuring the Eurobond, sold by Ukraine's ousted leader Viktor Yanukovych in 2013, Russian President Vladimir Putin made the proposal this week at a Group of 20 summit in Turkey, which followed his bilateral meetings there with U.S. and European leaders as well as IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde.
Russia is ready for broader talks on restructuring the debt if its offer to change the payment terms is accepted by Dec. 8, Siluanov said Wednesday. Ukraine hasn't received Russia's restructuring proposal, Finance Minister Natalie Jaresko was cited as saying the same day by Interfax.
IMF Lifeline
An agreement on the notes Russia bought in December 2013, two months before Yanukovych was ousted, would remove questions about Russia's status as a creditor that could have hindered payments from the IMF's bailout. The program is propping up the country's economy after a conflict with pro-Russian separatists in its easternmost regions drained reserves and plunged it into a recession.
Russia proposed letting Ukraine pay back $1 billion annually from 2016 to 2018 and asked for guarantees from the U.S., the European Union or a large bank, according to Siluanov. While Ukraine's interest payments over the restructured debt are subject to negotiations, Russia expects it to make a $75 million coupon this year if the proposal is accepted, he said.
Russia had earlier refused to take part in debt talks that led to an accord with creditors led by Franklin Templeton It's still unclear if Ukraine can accept the deal under the conditions of its debt restructuring, which prevent it from giving holdouts better terms than those agreed to by other bondholders.
The restructured notes, which started trading last week, dropped for a second day, with the yield on the 2025 securities rising 10 basis points to 8.59 percent by 2:11 p.m. in Kiev. The hryvnia was down 1.3 percent to 24.055 versus the dollar. It's lost more than 34 percent against the U.S. currency this year.
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#34
Carnegie Moscow Center
November 20, 2015
A Debt Deal for Kiev?
By Anton Tabakh
Director for regional ratings at "Rus-Rating", associate professor at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow
A new proposal to extend repayment of a Russian intergovernmental loan to Ukraine may ultimately suit all parties.
At the G20 summit in Antalya, Russian President Vladimir Putin not only startled the world by meeting with U.S. President Barack Obama, but also grabbed attention by addressing a key problem in Russian-Ukrainian relations, Ukraine's $3 billion debt to Russia's National Wealth Fund.
Putin said that Russia would be willing to push forward the December 2015 deadline and allow Ukraine to pay off the bond in three $1 billion installments in December of 2016, 2017, and 2018.
On the one hand, Putin's proposal (along with a statement by Russian Minister of Finance Anton Siluanov a day earlier) is an interesting offer to Ukraine and a real start to debt negotiations. On the other hand, Ukraine itself had not made any official restructuring proposals-if one doesn't count Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk's threats of a default-so Putin's initiative reflects Russia's starting position in negotiations rather than an agreed-upon option. The proposal outlines a scenario that may be acceptable to all parties involved-although perhaps not to Internet trolls, radical politicians, and patriotic economists in both countries.
At issue is a Eurobond bought by Russia in December 2013, while President Viktor Yanukovych was still in power. Three quarters of Ukraine's creditors had agreed to a debt restructuring, but Russia held out.
Russia refused to agree to the terms accepted by the private creditors: higher interest rates, but a 20 percent reduction of the principal and a four-year deferral on all repayments, which makes a bigger difference for short-term debt than for long-term debt.
Russia's Ministry of Finance cannot lose face and write off a chunk of the principal. This would go against Moscow's position that the debt is an intergovernmental one. The markets and the IMF view intergovernmental debt as inviolable and shielded from write-offs. Intergovernmental debt is forgiven according to very different criteria from those that apply to private debt.
The main question is: Why was an intergovernmental loan processed as a market bond, even though no one was selling it? If it had been registered as a traditional loan, there would be no problem.
The Ministry of Finance cares less about due dates and interest rates than private lenders who worry about every dollar and euro that they invest. After all, Russia (and not just Russia) regularly spends decades repaying debt. Moscow also understands that Ukraine does not have the cash to pay off the debt, the IMF won't just hand over the money, and a lawsuit has little chance of success.
The Kremlin knows that many in Kiev would be in favor of rejecting the bond altogether. A default might allow Russia to make life difficult for Ukraine, but this wouldn't be of much use. It would be better to reaffirm the right to the repayment and at least get something.
In strict financial terms, stretching out debt repayment to three years gives Russia a certain advantage over private creditors on bonds due in 2015. To really even things out, the deferral should be about four years at a 5 percent interest rate (as on existing bonds) or closer to five years at the rate Kiev offered private investors. The restructuring agreement signed with private creditors includes a clause requiring pari passu treatment (the same terms for everyone), a condition the IMF also insists on. This would give Ukraine an opportunity to press Russia for a longer deferral. Ukrainian government securities are not particularly valuable in our opinion and the Russian Ministry of Finance definitely will not be interested in them.
Russia is also seeking EU and U.S. guarantees for this agreement, which is quite logical. Given the parlous state of Ukraine's budget and reserves, money for servicing the debt will come from the IMF, the United States, or the EU. Ukraine has already received a sovereign loan guarantee from the United States for a previous bond issue.
This time, Kiev is unlikely to obtain a formal guarantee, although it may get unspecified promises of funds when time comes for repayment. Kiev will be more accommodating if it knows that ultimately the debt will be repaid by foreign creditors and not from the Ukrainian budget. In similar fashion, promises of IMF money sped up negotiations with private creditors in the summer of 2015.
The new proposal on debt restructuring could allow all of the parties involved to achieve their goals. Moscow would save face and reaffirm its right to be repaid, even if in installments. Kiev would eschew the adverse consequences of a default. The IMF would be able to announce that its requirements have been met.
The repayment schedule is likely to be extended to avoid discriminating against private creditors, and the payments will probably be scheduled for every six months. If a deal is struck, the debt question will finally be crossed off the Russian-Ukrainian agenda-leaving the two countries more time and energy to quarrel over many other issues such as gas, trade, and air transit.
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#35
Russia's food embargo on Ukraine aims to protect domestic market
By Tamara ZAMYATINA
MOSCOW, November 19. /TASS/. Russia's upcoming food embargo against Ukraine aims to protect the domestic market from the penetration of foodstuffs from third countries under the guise of Ukrainian goods, experts polled by TASS said on Thursday.
Russian Economic Development Minister Alexey Ulyukayev announced on Wednesday about the government's decision to impose a food embargo against Ukraine from January 1.
Director for International Development at the Institute for Contemporary Development (INSOR) Sergey Kulik said that the economic part of Ukraine's Association Agreement with the European Union would come into force from January 1, 2016.
"This agreement stipulates gradual measures to set zero customs rates in trade between Ukraine and the EU. That is why, Russia justifiably intends to protect its market from European goods that may arrive under the guise of Ukrainian products," Kulik said in an interview with TASS.
In the expert's opinion, Kiev signed the free trade deal with the EU in the hope to find sales markets for Ukrainian goods in Europe.
"The EU primarily views Ukraine as an agrarian country, which boasts 50% of the world's black earth. Perhaps, cheaper Ukrainian agricultural produce would have found its niche in Europe. But the EU agrarian lobby is even stronger than financial lobbyists. It is enough to recall mass protest actions by European farmers staged near government buildings and ministries with the demands to support the agrarian sector. That is why, Kiev won't be able to supply its products to the EU without Brussels' political decision," Kulik said.
At the same time, Kiev can hardly count on any favor from Brussels, the expert said.
"No less than a third of the EU budget until 2020 has been set aside for paying compensations to the agrarian sector and these allocations amount to hundreds of billions of US dollars. East European rivals also suffering from Russian counter-sanctions would hardly agree to share these huge funds, all the more so with Ukraine," the expert said.
"After the Russian markets are closed for Ukrainian goods, Kiev will be forced to search more actively for an alternative in third countries - the Pacific region and South-East Asia. Ukraine counts on China where a program has been adopted for switching to imported eco-friendly foods. But even in China, Kiev will be confronted with rivals from Eastern Europe," the expert said.
The loss of the Russian food market will cost Kiev much, the expert noted. Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk has calculated that Ukrainian suppliers may fall short of about $600 million in 2016 from Russia's food embargo.
"The Russian consumer may also feel losses from the embargo on the deliveries of Ukrainian meat and dairy products. The delivery of alternative foreign goods to the Russian market and the so-called substitution of imports with domestic products lead to higher prices. But Russia's and Ukraine's losses are incomparable owing to the different scope of their economies," the expert said.
Director of the Institute of Globalization Problems, Doctor of Economic Sciences Mikhail Delyagin also believes that Russia's upcoming food embargo on Ukraine primarily aims to protect the national agrarian market and is a forced measure.
"Despite the termination of military and technical cooperation and air communication initiated by Kiev, our country has not yet imposed any economic measures against Ukraine in response to Kiev's support for Western anti-Russian sanctions," the expert said.
"Moreover, Moscow is offering Kiev gas price discounts and has agreed to restructure Ukraine's $3 billion debt. Official Kiev's Russophobic sentiments evidence that the Ukrainian authorities are living outside economic logic," Delyagin told TASS
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#36
Sputnik
November 19, 2015
Study in Contrasts - The Different Way Russia and West Respond to Violence
By Alexander Mercouris
Confirmation that the Metrojet airliner that crashed in Sinai was brought down by a terrorist bomb will surprise no one.
The episode however highlights the contrast between the way the Russians and the West going about doing things now.
Following the crash of the Malaysian airliner MH17 over Ukraine last year the West rushed out accusations within hours of the crash. The result was that the investigation was from the outset skewed to fit a theory.
By contrast after the crash of the Metrojet airliner the Russians refused to speculate on the cause until a proper investigation was done.
The result was that the investigation was conducted openly, in contrast to the secrecy that has surrounded the MH17 investigation.
Importantly, the Metrojet investigation consulted the proper experts: the aircraft's French manufacturers.
By contrast the MH17 investigation excluded the relevant experts - Almaz Antey, manufacturers of the BUK missile the investigation says shot down the aircraft - whose opinions were not heeded or even mentioned in the report.
Since the investigation into the Metrojet tragedy was conducted in an open and objective way, it has produced a conclusive finding within weeks of the tragedy taking place.
By contrast after more than a year the MH17 investigation has produced an incomplete and in parts contested report.
In the meantime there is an astonishing contrast in the reaction to the two recent terrorist attacks - the Metrojet crash and the Paris attacks - that have recently taken place.
In the case of the Metrojet crash the Western reaction was marked by large scale indifference.
While Russians have rushed to show sympathy and support for the people of France following the Paris attacks, there was no like rush from the Western public to show sympathy and support for the people of Russia following the Metrojet tragedy.
There have even been some appalling claims - extending apparently to officials of the US government - that by supporting the government of Syria Russia somehow brought the Metrojet tragedy down on itself.
In the case of the Paris attacks, alongside proper and legitimate feelings of grief for the victims, Western officials have responded with blind fury and elements of panic, with talk of war and a stampede to impose ever more draconian restrictions on Western society, but with no coherent plan of what to do.
This contrasts with the calm and purposeful way that - amidst feelings of intense grief - the Russian authorities and people responded to the Metrojet tragedy.
It should be said clearly that it makes no sense to say that by supporting the Syrian government Russia brought the Metrojet tragedy down on itself, any more than it makes sense to say that by opposing the Syrian government France brought the Paris attacks down on itself.
Such rationalisations of terrorism are both wrong and immoral.
It is however legitimate to say - as President Putin said in his recent speech to the UN General Assembly - that attempts to manipulate terrorists to achieve geopolitical objectives are both wrong and immoral - and also extremely dangerous.
If Western governments want to respond properly to the Paris tragedy, then acknowledging that is a good place to start.
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#37
Interfax-Ukraine
November 19, 2015
Russian commando says Ukrainian investigators used torture during questioning
Kiev, 19 November: The officer of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the Russian Armed Forces, Yevgeniy Yerofeyev, has said that he was tortured and pressured during the interrogation after his arrest, which was recorded on video, and that there are no video recordings of the interrogations in the case materials in which he says that he is a serviceman of the so-called LPR [self-proclaimed Luhansk People's Republic].
"There are pauses in the video, and it is unknown what is happening during those pauses. I can say that those were torture and pressure," Yerofeyev said during the sitting of Kiev's Holosiyivskyy district court on Thursday [19 November], after the court demonstrated a video showing him being questioned.
Yerofeyev said that those who interrogated him had clarified their questions, giving advice on how to answer correctly, and then resumed video recording, according to a correspondent of the Interfax-Ukraine news agency.
He also noted that the case materials contained no video of him being questioned in which he claimed to be an LPR soldier.
Special-purpose officer Aleksandrov and Yerofeyev were detained in the ATO ["antiterrorist" operation] area, not far from the town of Shchastya (Luhansk Region) on 16 May, when they attempted to capture a strategic bridge. As a result of an engagement, one Ukrainian serviceman was killed and three were wounded. One of the detained commandos was injured in the arm and the other in his leg. The detainees were transferred to the Main Clinical Hospital Ministry of the Defence Ministry in Kiev. On 29 May, they underwent elective surgeries.
On 19 May, Ukrainian investigators notified the detained persons that they were suspected of committing crimes under Article 258-3 of Ukraine's Criminal Code for taking part in terrorist activities of the so-called LPR, and then Kiev's Shevchenkivskyy district court ruled they should be put them into remanded in custody as a measure of restraint.
[The Holosiyivskyy district court will resume the hearing of the Aleksandrov and Yerofeyev case at 1230 gmt on 23 November 2015; according to Interfax-Ukraine news agency, 1538 gmt 19 Nov 15]
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#38
Not all heavy armaments pulled back from disengagement line in Donbas - OSCE
KIEV, November 19. /TASS/. Not all heavy armaments have been withdrawn from the disengagement line in east Ukraine, Deputy Chief Monitor of the Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Ukraine Alexander Hug said Thursday.
Hug told a briefing that explosions registered by SMM monitors were caused by heavy armaments' fire. He added that the ceasefire regime in the area of Kiev's military operation is very unstable.
The SMM deputy chief monitor said that last Sunday, 250 cases of ceasefire violations were registered near Donetsk Airport. On November 18, he said, 107 explosions occurred for the period of 19 minutes; these figures show not all armaments were withdrawn from the security zone.
Hug also called on the sides to "stick to commitments on armaments pullback."
He said he is asking both sides to respect commitments taken in February - withdraw all heavy armaments from the disengagement line. The official also underscored the sides should allow the SMM to register and verify the withdrawn armaments, as well as provide the list of withdrawn armaments.
In line with the Package of Measures on implementation of the Minsk Agreements of February 12, artillery systems with calibers of 100 millimeters and more should be withdrawn from each other by 50 kilometers, multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) by 70 km, Tornado, Uragan, Smerch MLRS and Tochka missiles by 140 km.
In line with the September supplement to the Package of Measures, guns with calibers up to 100 mm, tanks, mortars, including with 120-mm caliber, were to be pulled back by November 12.
The Package (Minsk-2) was signed on February 12, 2015 in the Belarusian capital Minsk by participants of the Contact Group on settlement in Donbas.
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#39
DPR prepares new draft amnesty law that will take into account conditions of prisoner exchange on both sides
DONETSK. Nov 20 (Interfax) - Darya Morozova, human rights ombudsman in the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR), said that the law on amnesty adopted by Ukraine does not suit the conflict in Donbas and that the DPR is working on its own version.
"The republic is not blackmailing anyone, but insists on the fulfillment of the sixth point of the Minsk memorandum, which talks about exchanging all for all. Those exchanges that take place don't suit us because the criminal cases against the people who have returned are not being closed," Morozova told reporters on Friday.
"A person is given a written promise not to leave the country [to sign] and he is put on the wanted persons list in Ukraine, he is considered a runaway. Exchanging all for all is not working, and it is not working on the Ukrainian side. [Ukrainian human rights ombudsman] Herashchenko said that the bill on amnesty was adopted on October 16, 2014, it was a regular draft law on amnesty, which passes in any country once in every four years, and it does not suit the conflict in Donbas," she said.
She said everything that Ukraine adopts has to be approved by representatives of certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and the DPR is now working on its own bill.
"We are working on a bill on amnesty. This law should be [passed] upon approval, which we are now trying to do in Minsk. I think it will be ready and will be presented by the political subgroup in the nearest future," Morozova said.
According to earlier reports, Ukrainian human rights ombudsman Iryna Herashchenko after the latest meeting of the Contact Group in Minsk accused the DPR and the LPR of speculation over POWS who are in the territories controlled by the republics.
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#40
Washington Post
November 20, 2015
Editorial
Russia opens fire on Ukraine again as the West stands by
IN THE six months after a cease-fire in eastern Ukraine was supposed to have taken effect this year, Russian-backed forces kept up a low-level barrage of sniping and shelling along the front lines, killing dozens of Ukrainian soldiers while avoiding censure from the Western governments that brokered the deal. Then, on Sept. 1, the guns fell silent - just as Russian forces began streaming into Syria. For two months, the cease-fire held and international monitors reported progress in implementing agreements on the withdrawal from the front lines of heavy weapons.
Now the Russian guns are firing again. In the past week there have been dozens of incidents daily in which the supposedly withdrawn weapons, including heavy mortars and Grad rockets, have been fired at Ukrainian positions. Nine Ukrainian soldiers have been reported killed. Having proved in September that he could switch off the shooting in Ukraine when it suited him, Russian President Vladimir Putin has now, at a minimum, allowed it to resume. It's a development that Western governments contemplating an alliance with the Russian ruler in the Middle East cannot afford to ignore.
Why would Russia have broken the calm in Donetsk and Luhansk provinces, where it controls a force of some 40,000 fighters armed with advanced tanks, artillery and electronic warfare systems? Some Ukrainian officials speculate that Mr. Putin might be seeking to disrupt free-trade and visa-liberalization agreements between Ukraine and the European Union, which are due to take effect shortly. Others believe the military pressure is meant to induce Ukraine, Germany and France to capitulate to Moscow's demands in ongoing negotiations over a political settlement in the region.
What's clear is that Mr. Putin has not given up his objective of restoring Russian control over part or all of Ukraine. He still seeks to undermine the pro-Western government in Kiev; this week the Kremlin announced a ban on Ukrainian food imports. Through the peace talks, Mr. Putin is attempting to force Ukraine to accept the authorities he installed in the territories captured by Russia and to rewrite the constitution to give them special powers. Meanwhile, he uses his military forces to probe and pressure.
Ukrainian officials suspect that Mr. Putin's offer to ally with the West in the Middle East may be part of this game. The price for cooperation with France and the United States in Syria, they worry, may be concessions on Ukraine - such as the lifting of E.U. sanctions imposed on Russia after its invasion, which will lapse in January if not renewed. European officials have said the sanctions will remain in effect until the peace agreement, which calls for Russian forces to withdraw, is fully implemented. But that was before the terrorist attacks in Paris and French President François Hollande's decision to reach out to Mr. Putin.
The resumed shooting by Russian forces in Ukraine does not appear to have slowed Mr. Hollande's initiative. It should. If Western governments ally with Russia in Syria even as its forces attack Ukraine, they will be tolerating and even encouraging Mr. Putin's aggression.
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#41
Kyiv Must Seek Collapse of Putin Regime, Not 'Restoration of Ukraine's Territorial Integrity at Any Price,' Portnikov Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, November 20 - Ukrainian commentator Vitaly Portnikov argues that the goal of the Ukrainian government should not be "the restoration of territorial integrity at any price but rather the undermining of the economy of the aggressor country and the collapse of Putin's political regime" (rus.newsru.ua/columnists/19nov2015/voprossroka.html).
Western media say that the EU and the US "do not intend" to lift their sanctions against Russia "in exchange for cooperation in the struggle with international terrorism. This is completely logical: Russia was sanctioned in response to its annexation of Crimea and the occupation of the Donbas," he says.
Thus, these sanctions against Russia will be extended at the upcoming EU summit. But the real question is "for how long?" And Ukraine has a vital interest in that question.
The Kremlin understands all this perfectly well, Portnikov says. It assumes that sanctions will be extended for several months, and consequently, it plans to use that time to "show that Ukraine itself is not fulfilling the Minsk agreements" while Moscow is doing everything necessary so that the sanctions won't be extended again.
Instead, the West will increasingly view both Russia and Ukraine as being to blame and therefore there will be calls not to punish only one side, something that will contribute to pressures to lift the sanctions against Moscow and push for "a final resolution of the conflict and the restoration of the territorial integrity of Ukraine all together."
Given that "the crisis in the Donbas could be solved in 24 hours if Putin ended the occupation and support of the militants," that is Moscow's position, the one it is "discussing with representatives of the pro-Russian lobby in the West," Portnikov says. And that reality should dictate Kyiv's approach and negotiating goals.
"Kyiv's chief task must be the extension of sanctions against the aggressor for the maximum extent possible [now] and work for their further prolongation" when more decisions are made in the future, he argues.
And he says that Ukrainians "must remember that our goal is not the restoration of territorial integrity at any price but the undermining of the economy of the aggressor country and the collapse of the political regime of Russia. Only this - and nothing else - will secure us long-term security and normal development in the future."
Portnikov's position on this will infuriate many in Ukraine but even more in Moscow and the West, both of whom have made the issue of the restoration of the territorial integrity of Ukraine, albeit defined in entirely different ways and to be used for entirely different purposes, the centerpiece of their policies.
But Portnikov's realism on this point is likely to spark new debates on how Kyiv should proceed especially now when many in Moscow are demanding and many in the West are considering an easing of the sanctions regime imposed on Russia because of its actions in Ukraine in the name of cooperation between Russia and the West in the war against ISIS.
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