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#1
Sputnik
November 17, 2015
Putin Orders Heightened Domestic Security Measures - Kremlin
MOSCOW (Sputnik) - Russian President Vladimir Putin has instructed all law enforcement agencies in the country to take measures in heightening domestic security, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Tuesday.
"During a meeting, the president instructed all of the law enforcement agencies to take measures in heightening domestic security," Peskov told journalists.
London and Moscow shared information on the investigation of the Russian plane crash in Egypt's Sinai, Dmitry Peskov said.
"We have said that an information exchange did take place with British colleagues," Peskov told reporters, answering a question on whether UK experts provided Russia with data confirming that the plane was downed by terrorists.
Russian President Vladimir Putin will visit the country's Defense Ministry Tuesday evening to be briefed on Russian operations in Syria, Peskov said.
"Today at 5 p.m. the president will be at Frunzenskaya Naberezhnaya at the Defense Ministry," Peskov told reporters.
He added that Putin is expected to hold an international phone call later in the day.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has called to hunt down the terrorists involved in the A321 passenger jet that crashed over Egypt's Sinai Peninsula on October 31 killing all 224 on board and officially deemed a terrorist act, Dmitry Peskov said.
"The president has instructed our special services to take measures to reveal everyone who was involved in the organization of this horrendous terrorist act. He has instructed [them] to hunt down these people throughout the world regardless of their geographical location and regardless of how long ago it was, and to destroy all of these individuals," Peskov told journalists.
The date of the meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and his French counterpart Francois Hollande will likely be clear within the next couple of days, Kremlin spokesman said.
"No, there is no specific date yet, the possibility of such a meeting is being worked out. I believe that within a day or two, there may be clarity regarding the schedule," Peskov told reporters.
On Monday, Hollande, who skipped the weekend's G20 summit due to the terrorist attacks in Paris, said he would meet with the leaders of Russia and the United States to discuss joining forces against terrorism.
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#2
Forbes.com
November 17, 2015
Russia Isn't (And Wasn't) Isolated
By Mark Adomanis
In the aftermath of the horrific attacks on Paris, and the equally horrific bombing of a Russian passenger jet in Sinai, there is an emerging consensus that Russia and the West are moving closer together.
Just yesterday the Wall Street Journal noted that the "Russian president was center-stage at the G-20 summit" while even an outlet as famously Russia-skeptic as The Economist admits that "in the face of a common threat from Islamist terror, Russia and the West may be moving closer, if not exactly standing shoulder to shoulder." Other outlets have struck similar chords.
The general narrative that is emerging is something like the following: in the aftermath of its "hybrid war" in Ukraine, Russia was isolated not just from the United States and the more hawkish countries of Central Europe (Poland, the Baltics, etc.) but even from it traditional partners in the EU such as Germany, Italy, and France. Moscow was out in the cold, an international pariah supported by no one of consequences and confronted by an increasingly resolute and determined NATO.
However, over the past few months, a confluence of factors has gradually brought Russia back into cautious engagement with the West. Opinions vary as to the precise weight to assign to each factor, but it is generally agreed that some combination of Russia's domestic economic problems, the slow improvement of the situation in Ukraine and the piecemeal implementation of the Minsk accords, Russia's military intervention in Syria, the rapidly escalating refugee crisis in Europe, and a spate of successful terrorist attacks by ISIS has made the two sides far more willing to negotiate. After Paris, there is even (highly speculative) talk about some kind of "grand coalition" to defeat ISIS. The change in mood is perhaps best expressed by Russia's sudden willingness to renegotiate the payment of a Ukrainian bond, an abrupt transformation of a position which Russia had loudly proclaimed it would never change.
The story, then, is one in which Russia was "isolated" but isn't any longer.
There's clearly something to this. Events over the past few days really do suggest that the West and the Russia are, cautiously and skeptically, moving back into engagement, at least within the highly delineated sphere of counter terrorism.
What the narrative misses is not the ongoing rapprochement between the two sides, but that Russia was never genuinely "isolated" in the first place. Russia is, in economic and demographic terms, a relatively large country, one which spans a significant portion of the globe. It is not, by any means, a "superpower," but it is the world's largest energy exporter, the second largest arms dealer, and a significant (if reduced!) market for the goods numerous large European companies. For good or for bad, Russia matters, and it matters in a way that not many countries do.
Why is it important to note this? Well, given the weak foundation on which the current rapprochement is being built (basically a shared agreement that "ISIS is bad") it will probably not last very long. It is conceivable that some kind of joint Russia-NATO campaign could, within a year or two, lead to an outcome that can semi-plausibly be called a "defeat of ISIS."* After that, the relationship between Russia and the West will, in all likelihood, rapidly deteriorate once again.
If and when that happens, the narrative will once again shift to one of Russia's "isolation." But that won't be the case, because the quality of Russia's relations with the West do not determine its international relevance. Whether it's loved or hated, Russia will maintain positions of significance in global economics and diplomacy. "Isolating" a country as large as powerful as Russia simply isn't possible. The West can inflict harm on Russia's economy, limit the movement of its oligarchs, and even freeze the assets of its largest companies, but that isn't "isolation."
The current, likely brief, rapprochement between the two sides is as good a time as any to remember that.
* this won't be an actual comprehensive defeat of the group but the appearance of one. A kind of "mission accomplished" moment that lets both Russia and the West pretend that they won and then go home
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#3
Moscow Times
November 17, 2015
Russia to Cooperate With West and Syrian Opposition Groups - Putin
Following the G20 summit in Turkey, there has been a decline in tension between Russia and the West in the face of new international threats and challenges, Russian President Vladimir Putin said during the final G20 press conference, Interfax agency reported Monday.
"Life goes forward, things are changing, there are new challenges, new threats, new challenges that are difficult to solve alone ... [we] need to join forces," Putin said.
On the sidelines of the G20 summit, Putin and U.S. President Barack Obama conversed for 20 minutes, which was praised as "constructive" by both Russian and U.S. officials. They spoke mainly on Syria and Ukraine, Putin's aide Yury Ushakov said.
A qualitative breakthrough in bilateral relations cannot be expected from such a brief meeting, Putin's spokesman Dmitry Peskov said, TASS reported Monday.
At the summit, Putin stressed that joint efforts from all G20 members are needed to defeat Islamic State (IS), and that discussion of Syria's political reforms should be put aside for the moment, TASS reported.
Russia is ready to cooperate with Syrian armed opposition groups in fighting IS, Putin said at a press conference following the G20 summit, the TASS news agency reported Monday.
With Russian air support, some Syrian opposition groups are ready to intensify fighting against IS, Putin said. "If that happens, it could be a good basis for further work on a political settlement," he said, TASS reported.
Putin stressed that the main thing now is "to work together to fight the common threat," and said that a broad anti-terror coalition needs to be created to fight terrorism around the world.
The Russian president's proposals were echoed by France's President Francois Hollande who spoke to the French Parliament - both chambers of which gathered at the Versailles Palace for the first time since 2009. Hollande spoke, among other things, of the need to create an anti-terror coalition that would include Russia, the RBC news agency reported Monday.
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#4
Wall Street Journal
November 17, 2015
Vladimir Putin Suggests Russia's Isolation From the West Is Ending
By PAUL SONNE and THOMAS GROVE
MOSCOW-President Vladimir Putin was front and center at the Group of 20 summit in Turkey, where he made his case for deeper international partnerships in fighting Islamic State after the Paris terror attacks.
"We proposed cooperation on antiterrorism; unfortunately our partners in the United States in the initial stage responded with a refusal," Mr. Putin said. "But life indeed moves on, often very quickly, and teaches us lessons. It seems to me that everyone is coming around to the realization that we can wage an effective fight only together."
The Friday attacks have given the Russian leader, who spoke Sunday with President Barack Obama at the summit, a new chance to reduce the isolation that followed his intervention in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea.
The November 13 terrorist attacks in Paris may signify a shift in U.S.-Russia relations as the world tackles the greater task of stopping ISIS. WSJ's Julian Barnes joins Lunch Break with Tanya Rivero. Photo: AP
Speaking Monday before leaving Antalya, Turkey, Mr. Putin suggested Russia's estrangement from the West is ending, noting a clear interest among European officials to renew ties in several spheres and characterizing the summit as less tense than last year's meeting in Australia. Mr. Putin left that summit early
"If our partners think the time has come to change our relations, then we will welcome that," Mr. Putin said. "We have never refused joint efforts or closed doors."
The Russian leader's comments came along with what appeared to be a softened stance on the $3 billion in Ukrainian debt that Russia holds, due for repayment by Kiev next month. Mr. Putin expressed willingness to restructure the debt and asked for a guarantee by the West that Ukraine would make the payments in any restructuring.
Despite Russia's new diplomatic role, the road to a fuller rapprochement with the West-including a lifting of sanctions-is likely to be long. Mr. Putin said Ukraine endured as a topic of conversation at the summit.
A senior Obama administration official cautioned that nothing of substance in the U.S.-Russian relations has changed, and that there was nothing on the table now to suggest that the two countries could join forces in Syria in a meaningful way.
However, John Brennan, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, raised the prospect on Monday of closer counter-terrorism cooperation, saying he had had "several conversations with one of my Russia counterparts over the past several weeks" on the topic.
The Kremlin has long looked at the fight against terrorism as the most promising arena to build closer ties with the West. Mr. Putin was the first world leader to call the White House after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, and his overtures became the basis for a short-lived period of relatively warm relations between Russia and the U.S. in the aftermath.
"We must now look ahead, we must unite our efforts in the fight against a common threat," Mr. Putin said.
Russia's decision to aid Syrian President Bashar al-Assad with an air campaign that kicked off in late September has increased Mr. Putin's diplomatic leverage on an issue that has risen to the top of the priority list for the U.S. and Europe in the wake of the Paris attacks.
But those attacks have also underscored the direct threat to Russia from Islamic State and other militant groups. Two train stations in Moscow were evacuated Monday following what Russian news agencies said were bomb threats. No explosives were found.
Russia has long faced a threat from Islamic militants in the troubled northern Caucasus region, but the rise of Islamic State has created new worries about citizens who have joined Islamic State returning to Russia to carry out spectacular attacks.
Russia's domestic intelligence service, the FSB, says at least 7,000 citizens from the former Soviet Union are among Islamic State's ranks.
The group already has singled out Russia as a target in retribution for its bombing campaign in Syria. Islamic State released a Russian-language propaganda video last week showing executions and beheadings, promising to bring "a sea of blood" to Russia.
"The Kremlin is worried about what happens when they come back-and they're already coming back," said Varvara Pakhomenko, an analyst at the International Crisis Group. "If they wanted to carry out a big attack in Russia, they probably have the resources."
In mid-October, Russian security officials claimed to have foiled a plot to carry out a terrorist attack when they detained 12 members and accomplices of Islamic State, FSB chief Alexander Bortnikov told Russian Gazette, the state newspaper.
Officials also say they have opened criminal cases across Russia against young men and women who have returned to Russia after receiving indoctrination from Islamic State or fighting for the group.
In one case, Varvara Karaulova, a philosophy student at Moscow State University, confessed this month to attempting to join the group, according to the state news agency RIA Novosti. She was detained this summer after returning to Russia after being stopped trying to cross the Turkish-Syrian border with 13 other Russians, Russian news agencies said.
Ms. Karaulova's parents and defense lawyers say she fell in love with a man she met on the Internet who posed as an Islamic State fighter from the Russian city of Kazan, Russian news agencies said. He convinced her to leave her family and join him in Syria. The student is in prison awaiting prosecution and faces a potential sentence of up to 10 years if convicted.
Her family or legal representatives couldn't be immediately reached.
Islamic State recruitment is happening in Russian-language social media as well as in mosques, prisons, dormitories and work sites. A large number of Russian Islamic State recruits hail from the North Caucasus, where Russia has fought for years to contain separatists and militant Islamists on its southern flank.
Many of those attracted to Islamic State from the North Caucasus are new to jihadist violence, according to Joanna Paraszczuk, an analyst on Russian-speaking militants in Syria and Iraq. They "tend to be younger and they tend to be inexperienced," she said.
Dozens have returned to Russia, but their online presence is increasingly hard to track. Ms. Paraszczuk said militants have increasingly taken their activity offline and are less active on VKontakte, a Russian-language social-networking site, for fear of FSB monitoring.
One of the major drivers for young people to join Islamic State is human-rights abuses by law enforcement in the predominantly Muslim region, observers say. A broader crackdown on Islamist groups has taken force since the lead up to the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi, just to the west of the mountainous region.
In Russia's territory of Dagestan on the Caspian Sea, law-enforcement officials have created a watch list of potential jihadists. Though not charged with any offenses, those on the list are repeatedly subject to being detained, fingerprinted and having DNA samples taken, said Tanya Lokshina, an analyst for Human Rights Watch in Moscow.
Police in Dagestan weren't immediately available for comment. Russia's security services saying the methods help prevent terrorist attacks.
"Once you're put on the watch list, your normal life is over, you're repeatedly detained and humiliated," she said.
Added Ms. Lokshina: "Many people see Islamic State, with its violent and flamboyant propaganda, as the only viable alternative to a corrupt and lawless secular state."
-Andrey Ostroukh in Moscow and Philip Shishkin in Washington contributed to this article.
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#5
Financial Times
November 17, 2015
Putin transformed from outcast to problem solver at G20
Alex Barker and George Parker in Antalya and Kathrin Hille in Moscow
Vladimir Putin left last year's G20 meeting in Brisbane early in a huff, tired of being chided by world leaders over Ukraine. Twelve months on, an audience with the Russian president was one of the hottest tickets in town, as western leaders were forced to recognise the road to peace in Syria inevitably runs through Moscow.
Few at the annual summit of world leaders have seen such a transformation in their fortunes, or appeared to enjoy it as much, as Mr Putin moved from a scolded diplomatic outcast to a self-styled problem-solver the west cannot ignore.
Whether it was shifting air strikes to target Isis rather than Syrian rebels, or backing a political settlement in Ukraine and offering a debt restructuring deal, Mr Putin felt he held all the cards as the west came to him for answers.
"I can tell you a secret: I did this [leaving the G20 early last year] for technical reasons, in order not to have to wait in line for departure, that's all," Mr Putin said at his closing press conference at this year's G20 meeting in the Turkish city of Antalya. "There were no problems at all, not then and not now."
He added: "Of course, though, relations were more tense than today. But life goes on, everything changes: there are new problems, new threats, new challenges, which would be difficult to solve for anyone alone. It is necessary to join forces."
As ever with Mr Putin, his rhetoric and assertions are often belied by his actions.
A picture of his impromptu huddle with Barack Obama - tweeted out by Kremlin aides - gave the impression of a return to a businesslike, transactional relationship with the US president, even though it was his first since Russia launched its surprise aerial campaign in Syria.
Yet Mr Obama was careful not to raise hopes of a genuine thaw or imminent political breakthrough in Syria, saying only that "modest progress" had been made on the diplomatic front.
There were "disagreements" with Mr Putin over the future role of Bashar al-Assad, the Syrian leader who is backed by Moscow, Mr Obama said. David Cameron, Britain's prime minister, described the distance between the west and Russia on Assad as "enormous".
And Mr Putin's pledges to unite against terrorism were mixed with characteristic barbs about the success of French counterterrorism policy in Syria, or the impotence of US military action in the region.
Moscow does recognise that it is necessary to nurture a political process in Syria that includes the serious possibility of replacing Mr Assad and engaging with the largest possible number of opposition groups and outside powers in the process.
However, even in government circles there are doubts that Mr Putin will abandon Mr Assad. Officials say the Russian president sees it as a personal issue, linked to his obsession with the idea that the west is bent on regime change, from the Middle East to Moscow.
How might easing tensions between the two leaders affect the US presidential election? The FT's US political correspondent Courtney Weaver explains.
With François Hollande, French president, meeting with Mr Putin in the coming days as part of his attempt to build a "coalition" against Isis, diplomats will be looking closely at Russian actions on the ground in Syria.
While progress this weekend in the Vienna peace talkson Syria has exceeded expectations, it will now enters a fraught period involving shepherding and bringing order to the ranks of more "moderate" rebels in Syria, who would partake in a transition process and unity government.
Until there is official consensus on that, Mr Putin can continue doing what he has been doing: bombing the rebels and at the same time trying to engage and pressure them into talks with Mr Assad. Washington and Moscow may agree on the strategy, said Yuri Ushakov, Mr Putin's foreign policy aide, but on "tactics" they are still far apart.
The depth of mistrust still to overcome with the US was captured by Mr Putin himself. "It is difficult to criticise us when they tell us: 'You are not hitting [Isis]', and we say: Tell us where, name targets', but they don't," the Russian leader said.
He added: "Curiously enough, there are reasons and principles for that. And one of them is...that they fear to give us territories which they don't want us to hit, as they fear that we will then strike just there
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#6
Kremlin.ru
November 17, 2015
Meeting on investigation into the crash of a Russian airliner over Sinai
Late last night Vladimir Putin held a meeting in the Kremlin, where Federal Security Service Director Alexander Bortnikov reported on the causes of the crash of a Russian airliner over Sinai on October 31, 2015.
Taking part in the meeting were Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu, Director of the Federal Security Service Alexander Bortnikov, Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Foreign Intelligence Service Director Mikhail Fradkov.
Director of the Federal Security Service Alexander Bortnikov: Mr President, we have studied the passengers' personal belongings and luggage and fragments of the plane that crashed in Egypt on October 31. An expert examination of all these objects has found traces of foreign-made explosives.
According to our experts, a self-made explosive device equivalent up to 1 kg of TNT was set off on board, which explains why the aircraft broke up in mid air and its fragments were scattered over a large area.
We can say with confidence that this was a terrorist act.
President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Let's once again pay tribute to the crash victims.
A minute of silence.
This is not the first time Russia experiences barbaric terrorist crime, usually without any obvious internal or external causes, the way it was with the explosion at the railway station in Volgograd at the end of 2013. We remember everything and everyone.
The murder of our people over Sinai is one of the bloodiest crimes in terms of the lives it claimed. We will not dry our tears - this will remain forever in our hearts and minds. However, this would not stop us from finding and punishing the perpetrators.
We have to do it without any period of limitation; we need to know all their names. We will search wherever they may be hiding. We will find them anywhere on the planet and punish them.
In these efforts, we need to rely on people who share the moral values that lie at the basis of our policy, in this case our foreign and security policy, our counterterrorism policy.
Our aviation should not simply continue military operations in Syria, but enhance them so as to make it clear to the criminals that vengeance is inevitable.
I would like to ask the Defence Ministry and the General Staff to make their proposals. I will check the progress of this work.
I would like the Russian Foreign Ministry to turn to all our partners. We rely on all our friends in these efforts, including our search for and punishment of the perpetrators.
We will act in compliance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which envisages the right of a state to self-defence.
Whoever tries to help the perpetrators ought to know that they would bear full responsibility for any attempts to harbour them.
I would like all our special services to focus on this work.
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#7
Kremlin.ru
November 16, 2015
Responses to journalists' questions following the G20 summit
Vladimir Putin answered journalists' questions after the G20 summit.
President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Good evening, friends, ladies and gentlemen,
Before we start these questions and answers, I want to thank the President of Turkey, Mr Erdogan, and all of our Turkish colleagues for the very professional organisation of the G20 summit. They created a very good, trusting and open atmosphere in which to work and discuss the issues that were the whole point of our getting together.
I want to thank Turkey's people for their welcoming attitude to our work and the help that we received at practically every step.
Question: It would seem that fighting terrorism was one of the summit's main subjects of discussion. We know that there will be no resolving this problem unless we take more effective steps to prevent the financing of terrorism. Were any concrete measures discussed at the summit? What was the line of discussion on these measures, and did you reach any agreements?
Vladimir Putin: Yes, of course, this issue was one of the key issues, the fight against terrorism, especially after the tragic events with the hostage taking and loss of life in Paris. Yes, of course we are well aware that we must cut off the channels used to finance terrorism, and we discussed this.
I gave examples based on our information about individuals financing various Islamic State subgroups in different countries. We have established that financing is coming from 40 countries, including G20 countries. We discussed this issue.
We discussed the need to implement the relevant UN Security Council resolution, which was adopted on Russia's initiative, on preventing financing of terrorism, unlawful trade in objects of art after terrorists pillage museums in the territories they seize, and unlawful sale of oil and petroleum products and earnings from this sale.
I also showed our colleagues satellite images and aerial photographs that show very clearly the scale of this illegal trade in oil and petroleum products. You see columns of refuelling vehicles stretching for dozens of kilometres in lines so long that from a height of 4,000-5,000 metres they vanish over the horizon. It really looks more like an oil pipeline system.
We discussed this issue together, of course, and I hope that we will continue this work, which I think is extremely important for the fight against terrorism.
Question: Mr President, economic issues were always the G20's primary focus. Among the economic issues you discussed with the other leaders, which do you see as particularly important? Another question: You discussed economic matters on the summit's sidelines too and met with the head of the IMF. What did you discuss, what was the outcome of the talks, and what was the nature of the proposals you made regarding Ukraine's debt to the IMF?
Vladimir Putin: Yes, the G20 is primarily an economic summit, a summit for discussing economic matters, and so as well as the fight against terrorism after the recent events and the terrorists' increased activity, we discussed economic issues too, of course. I would highlight investment issues, particularly investment in big infrastructure projects and support for small and medium businesses.
I would also note the issue of fighting tax evasion and illegal reduction of tax base.
A third issue I would highlight is that of older people's involvement in labour activity and labour market issues in general. There are two aspects here: reducing youth unemployment (the G20 has set the objective of bringing the level down to 15 percent over the next few years), and, as I said, employment for senior citizens, the so-called 'silver' economy.
All developed countries have an aging population now. The amount of labour resources is decreasing, the number of people making payments into pension funds is falling, but the number of people who have reached retirement age is increasing. This is a big challenge for the developed countries' economies, and we discussed this issue, of course.
I would also note the climate change issue, which is closely related to economic development issues and ensuring economic growth.
On the IMF, this is one of the biggest problems in our relations with Ukraine right now, and it is a matter we have been discussing actively over these last months with our colleagues from the International Monetary Fund.
Our partners from the IMF have been convincing us that we could accept to restructure Ukraine's debt of $3 billion, which was to have been paid by the end of next month, the end of this year. They say that we could make a concession to Ukraine and defer this payment of $3 billion to next year. They say that this would help Ukraine and would ensure that Russia, as the creditor, receives its payment.
We drew our partners' attention to the fact that our debt is not a private debt, but is sovereign debt that was offered to Ukraine on non-market principles and conditions. But in order to ensure the return of this money, and to avoid putting Ukraine in a difficult situation, we made what I think was an unexpected proposal to our partners. Not only did we agree to a restructuring of Ukraine's debt, but we proposed better conditions for this restructuring than those the International Monetary Fund requested of us.
We were asked to defer this payment of $3 billion to next year. I said that we are ready to accept a deeper restructuring with no payment this year, a payment of $1 billion next year, $1 billion in 2017, and $1 billion in 2018. But our partners are sure that Ukraine's solvency will grow and that we can be sure of receiving $3 billion next year. If this is the case, they see no risk in providing guarantees for this credit.
We have asked for such guarantees either from the United States government, the European Union, or one of the big international financial institutions. We hope that this matter will be settled by the start of December this year, given the International Monetary Fund's work timetable.
I discussed this matter with Ms Lagarde, and also had the chance to have brief exchanges with the President of the United States and the US Secretary of the Treasury. They reacted to our proposal with interest. We agreed with our partners to discuss the details of our proposal very soon.
If our partners are that certain that Ukraine's solvency will improve, persuade us that this is so, and believe this themselves, let them provide guarantees. If they cannot provide guarantees, this means that they do not believe in the Ukrainian economy's future. I think this would not be good for them if this is so, and if they are trying to convince us of something that is not in fact the case, this would not be good for our Ukrainian partners either.
We think that this proposal is a realistic possibility and we see no problems in sharing the risks with our partners.
Question: Mr President, experts have talked extensively about continuity in the Turkish presidency's agenda and the 2013 summit hosted by Russia in St Petersburg. Do you feel this continuity has been proven?
Vladimir Putin: Yes, of course.
First of all, we worked very actively within the framework of the G20 at the expert level back in St Petersburg to implement our suggestions related to preventing tax avoidance and tax base reduction. In Russia, we developed a whole set of measures and even passed a federal law on controlled foreign companies. This was within the framework of the agreements that were reached in St Petersburg.
At the expert level, we worked actively with OECD representatives and developed an action plan on this matter. And we talked about this now as well, noting that we must begin work to implement it. So in this regard, we see continuity in the Turkish presidency, as well as on issues of investments - after all, we were just talking about this, particularly with regard to infrastructure projects.
Question: There has been much talk after the events in Paris that there may be fundamental changes, qualitative changes in the relations between Russia and the West. How do you feel about this? Have you seen any specific proof of this in your meetings, for example with the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom today, or the President of the United States yesterday?
Vladimir Putin: You know, we never renounced good relations with our partners in the East or the West. And the unilateral measures limiting our cooperation in various areas were initiated by our partners, not us. If our partners now feel that the time has come to somehow change our relations, we welcome this; we never renounced joint work or closed our doors. It did seem to me that - at the expert level, at least - at the level of discussing problems, there is clear interest in renewing work in many areas, including the economy, politics, and security.
Reply: Last year, many people stated that you were an outcast at the G20 summit among its leaders. This year, you are a player because of Syria. What do you think about this? Do you agree with this interpretation of the events?
Vladimir Putin: Last year I already spoke about it. Our Australian colleagues created very good working conditions; everything was very good, without any problems. But it seems that somebody wanted to convey this idea you just stated to the public, that Russia was somehow isolated. Nothing like this happened.
As for the fact that I left a little earlier, I can let you in on a secret, I think I already spoke about this: I left due to technical reasons, so as not to wait in line to take off. That is all. It was a 14-hour flight to Moscow, so I simply needed to be the first to get on the plane. I know how the protocol services schedule flights, I would need to wait three hours to leave earlier, that's all.
There weren't any problems then or now, although naturally, relations were tenser than today. You can feel it, it's true. But life goes on, everything changes: new problems come up, new threats, new challenges, that are difficult to resolve on one's own, without others. We need to join forces.
Question: I'll return to the topic of terrorism.
There has been a series of tragic events throughout the world in the last month, in a range of locations: explosions in Bagdad, preparations for bombings and terrorist attacks in Istanbul, a Russian plane crash (I know that there is no official version of what happened, but all the experts believe that the version of a terrorist attack cannot be excluded), and the recent horrible events in Paris.
France launched a massive attack, a military operation in Syria. At every meeting or big gatherings here, every leader spoke of the need to join forces. Do you feel it is possible to create a truly unified anti-terrorist coalition in these conditions? And what would it look like? Because everyone is talking about joining forces, but nobody is actually saying what parameters should be involved and how this coalition should look.
Vladimir Putin: Of course, I think that not only can it be done; it must be done. If you recall, I already spoke about this at the 70th anniversary session of the UN General Assembly. That is precisely what I said. And the tragic events that followed only confirmed that we were right.
As for how this should look: there is nothing difficult about it. We must organise specific work to prevent terrorist attacks and fight terrorism on a global scale. We also suggested engaging in anti-ISIS cooperation. Unfortunately, our partners in the United States initially refused. They simply sent a written note that said, "We decline your suggestion."
But indeed, life moves fast and often teaches us lessons. And I think that now, everyone is becoming aware that the only effective way to fight terrorism is to fight it together.
We never closed the doors to this cooperation. We feel that this cooperation can be established at a political level and at the level of the special services that must work together more actively, exchanging information, helping one another and warning one another of danger.
As for Syria, we must first decide - and the foreign ministers are working on this now - which groups we consider terrorist organisations, and which are simply armed but nevertheless a part of Syria's healthy opposition, and focus our efforts on fighting the terrorist organisations specifically, in order to create conditions for a political settlement of the Syrian conflict.
Question: Mr President, you had a meeting with Recep Tayyip Erdogan on the sidelines of the summit. This was your first contact since the Turkish elections, where Erdogan and his party confirmed the status quo in Turkey's political life. With regard to this, was it harder for you to talk with the Turkish side about, for example, Syria, and what will happen to projects like TurkStream or other energy projects that you agreed upon?
Vladimir Putin: No, there were no difficulties. On the contrary, we can see some rapprochement. The President of Turkey is a straightforward, open person. He is a hard negotiator, but nevertheless, he is a man of experience and clearly strives to find a solution as well. So yesterday, he and I had a long conversation about our bilateral relations and about settling the Syrian crisis.
It seemed to me that we can find some common points that will allow us to achieve common success. First and foremost, this has to do with the fact that the President of Turkey, as he told me directly yesterday, feels that the Syrian crisis can only be resolved by political means, and we must create conditions for promoting this political process.
As for bilateral projects, I do not see any problems in general. We worked in the past, and continue to work on these issues. There are some problems and issues concerning trade, roughly speaking - what came first, the chicken or the egg? What came first, the TurkStream project, its legal registration or the discounts on gas we supply to the Turkish market? Or was it the discounts first and then the legal registration?
In any case, Turkey is interested, as we were told, in maintaining and increasing the sales of our goods on its market, and in this case, we are talking about gas deals. And we looked at various options for resolving the issues that are of mutual interest to us.
Question: I would like to return to Ukraine, especially since you met with Angela Merkel yesterday, and Germany is a member state of the Normandy format. Was the Ukrainian crisis discussed? And are you concerned that while the global community is focused on the topic of fighting terrorism, the conflict in Donbass might reignite?
Vladimir Putin: We believethat there is enough stamina, wisdomand responsibility among all people this depends on. And we are not going to watch the situation in southeast Ukraine getting worse; on the contrary, we will help to ensure that the actual ceasefire we managed to achieve through a great deal of effort is not broken, that it will promote the political process.
As regards the discussion on Ukraine, indeed, I think it is natural and there is nothing strange about it: after the tragic events in Paris, after the crash of our plane, a situation wheremuch remains unclear, we spoke first and foremost about these problems. But nevertheless, Ukrainian issues did not disappear from the agenda. I discussed these issues with practically all my colleagues whom I met in the bilateral format, and this topic has not been forgotten.
Question: Mr President, we frequently hear your western partners accuse Russia's Aerospace Forces of hitting targets in Syria that are not ISIS, but are so-called moderate opposition groups. Did their opinion change over the course of the summit? What were you feeling during the discussions?
And the second part of the question. The US-led anti-ISIS operation did not succeed in degrading ISIS. What difference do you see between Russia's actions in Syria and those of the US-led coalition, from a military standpoint?
Vladimir Putin: In general, this criticism was practically not voiced. It's hard to even criticise us. They tell us, "You're hitting the wrong targets!" Then we say, "Tell us where we should strike, give us the targets!" But they don't give them to us. "Then tell us where we shouldn't hit." And they don't tell us that, either. How, then, can we be criticised?
You know, I don't want to sneer at this. Strangely enough, they have their own reasons for it. And one of them, I will tell you point blank, is that they are afraid to give us a list of territories not to strike, because they fear that this is exactly where we will strike, that we will deceive them. It seems they judge us based on their own notions of decency.
But I can confirm that right now (on the battlefield, so to speak), we have established contacts with some (not all, of course) of the uncompromising, even armed Syrian opposition groups; they themselves asked us not to strike the territories they control. We have reached these agreements and are fulfilling them.
Moreover, this part of the armed opposition believes that it is possible to begin active operations against terrorist organisations - against ISIS first of all - with our support from the air. And we are prepared to provide that support. If this happens, it will mean that President al-Assad's army on one side and the armed opposition on the other are fighting their common enemy. It seems to me that this can become a good foundation for subsequent work and a platform for political settlement.
Indeed, when I was in Paris recently within the framework of the Normandy format, I suggested this idea to President of France Mr Hollande. We made the first steps in this direction and overall, so far, they are positive.
We very much need the help and support of the United States, European nations, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran in order to make this process irreversible. This is another matter that I discussed with my colleagues today in a great deal of detail.
Question: A fair amount of time has passed since the Russian plane crash, and certain complications remain, which you spoke about. When can we expect a final version as regards the reasons for this tragedy?
And second, if I may. In your view, how great is today's threat that what happened in Paris might happen again in Russian cities? What is being done to minimise these threats?
Vladimir Putin: Unfortunately, nobody can be guaranteed against terrorist attacks. For example, France is among the nations that took a rather firm stance with regard to President al-Assad personally. We constantly heard our French friends say that their precondition for the launch of political changes should be an agreement on President al-Assad's resignation. So what - did that save Paris from a terrorist attack? No.
I think we should not push forward issues that are of secondary importance. What we must do is join efforts in the fight against terrorism and terrorist organisations, and based on that agree on political reforms.
As for the plane crash, this is extremely painful for all of us, for all the Russian people, regardless of the cause of the crash. A huge number of people died and this is a great tragedy for all of us. Yes, we are aware of all the possibilities, and all of them are being examined. We will be able to come to a final conclusion after all trials and expert assessments are completed. What expert assessments are those? If there was an explosion, then traces of explosives should remain on the fuselage shell and passengers' belongings. This is certain. And we have enough equipment and good, world-class experts in this domain who are capable of discovering those traces. Only then can we talk about the reasons for this tragedy.
Your colleague asked whether the western nations were working effectively or not, whether we are working effectively in the fight against, for example, ISIS or other terrorist organisations. I do not think this is the time to talk about who is working more or less effectively. French planes have now increased the number of combat missions, but if you consider and look at how much our pilots have done recently, then you will understand the intensity of that combat operation.
But I repeat, now is not the time to assess who is better or worse, or look for reasons why the previous steps have been more or less effective. Right now, we need to look forward and join forces in the fight against this common threat. [return to Contents]
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#8
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
November 17, 2015
G20 summit in Turkey: What were the 4 major events for Russia?
Following the G20 summit in Antalya, Turkey on Nov. 15-16, RBTH presents an overview of the four most interesting events and statements concerning Russia made at the meeting of world leaders.
ALEXEY TIMOFEYCHEV, RBTH
1. Unplanned meeting between the U.S. and Russian presidents
Russian President Vladimir Putin and his U.S. counterpart Barack Obama spoke on the margins of the summit ahead of the G20 Leaders' Sessions. The conversation lasted for about half an hour.
According to the Russian leader's aide Yury Ushakov, Putin and Obama discussed the situation in Syria and Ukraine, with more attention being given to the situation in Syria.
Responding to a question on whether the leaders of the Russian Federation and the United States had managed to make progress in reconciling their positions on Syria, the Russian official diplomatically pointed out that Russia and the United States' strategic objectives in the fight against terrorism are very close, but differences remain on tactics.
2. Investigation into Egypt plane crash making progress
On the sidelines of the summit, at a meeting with Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, Putin spoke about the ongoing investigation into the crash of the Russian passenger airliner in Egypt.
"We are at the final stage of studying materials," said the Russian leader.
Concerning the investigation, Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on Nov. 16 that none of the theories regarding the Russian plane crash in Egypt could be ruled out. As Deputy Foreign Minister Oleg Syromolotov said at the same time, no specific data on the causes of the crash of the Russian plane was yet available.
However, it has now emerged that forensic specialists have confirmed the presence of explosive elements on the wreckage of the airliner.
3. Turkish Stream gas project still alive
Gazprom chief Alexei Miller said in Antalya that the Turkish Stream project, involving the delivery of Russian gas to Turkey via a pipeline beneath the Black Sea, could be implemented in a very short period once a corresponding intergovernmental agreement is signed.
However, in July, Russian media reported that the project had been frozen by Gazprom due to disagreements with the Turkish side over the cost of Russian gas. Ankara insists on a 10-percent discount.
The Russian authorities have denied reports the project has been scrapped. In Antalya, Miller attributed the possibility of the prompt implementation of Turkish Stream to the fact that its route is 70 percent identical to the route of the abandoned South Stream pipeline (intended to supply Russian gas to Central Europe via the Balkans - RBTH), where the necessary research had already been carried out.
According to Energy Minister Alexander Novak, the implementation of Turkish Stream was discussed on the sidelines of the summit by Vladimir Putin and his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan. According to Novak, the work on an intergovernmental agreement will continue as soon as a government is formed in Turkey, where parliamentary elections have been recently held.
4. Ukraine-EU association agreement
The issue of the entry into force of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement was discussed "quite extensively" during talks between the leaders of Russia and Germany on the sidelines of the G-20 summit, said Russian presidential press secretary Dmitry Peskov.
"Unfortunately, our contacts with the Europeans and the Ukrainians are not bringing the desired results and the consequences of the entry into force of this agreement still remain negative. Attempts to discuss these issues have not been successful," he said.
Moscow has repeatedly stated that in its present form the association agreement harms Russian economic interests. On Oct. 30, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev said that in response to the agreement's entry into force that the Russian Federation would increase "customs and tariff protection regarding Ukraine" from Jan. 1, 2016.
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#9
The Economist
November 17, 2015
Russia, the West and Islamist attacks
All latest updates
Terror in Paris is pushing Russia and the West closer together
Uneasy bedfellows
IN THE face of a common threat from Islamist terror, Russia and the West may be moving closer, if not exactly standing shoulder to shoulder. The shift in the relationship first became apparent at the G20 summit in Turkey on November 15th and 16th, where Vladimir Putin found himself the centre of attention. At last year's meeting, amid tensions over the crisis in Ukraine, the atmosphere was so frosty that Mr Putin jetted home early. This year, in the wake of the attacks in Paris, the Russian president huddled for private chats with the American president, Barack Obama, and British prime minister, David Cameron.
On November 16th the French president, François Hollande (pictured), announced that he would travel to Washington and Moscow in the coming days to talk to Mr Obama and Mr Putin about joining forces to fight Islamic State (IS). By the following morning, the Russian president and his security chiefs had acknowledged that a bomb brought down the Russian Metrojet flight over Egypt late last month, bringing Russia's position into alignment with that of Western governments.
When Russia first launched its intervention in Syria, Mr Putin spoke of a broad international coalition against terrorism. Senior Kremlin officials suggested that Russia and the West could unite against a common enemy (and, it was implied, forget about Ukraine). Yet Mr Putin's bombs initially did little to win the West's favour. Western governments complained that Russia hit American-backed rebel groups more often than it did IS. Mr Obama called the Russian strategy a "recipe for disaster". Whatever the intentions, Russia's divide with the West only deepened.
But the attacks in Paris have revived talk of a grand coalition. At the end of the G20 meeting, Mr Putin declared that relations had already improved: "Life goes on, everything changes: new problems arise, new threats, new challenges, which would be difficult for anyone to solve alone. We need to join forces." On Tuesday, echoing Mr Hollande's anger after the Paris attacks, Mr Putin promised retribution for the 224 people killed over Sinai. He announced that Russia's bombing campaign in Syria would only be intensified: "We will search for them everywhere, no matter where they are hiding. We will find them at any point on the planet and punish them." Russian commentators drew parallels with the anti-Hitler alliance that brought Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt together despite their obvious ideological differences.
The West appears interested, or at the very least, resigned to the idea that dealing with IS may mean working with Russia. John Brennan, the director of the CIA, says Russia and America ought to share more intelligence. White House officials described Mr Obama's chat with Mr Putin as constructive. Britain's prime minister spoke of "compromise" after his meeting. Mr Putin signalled his own willingness to make a deal, offering a rare conciliatory gesture and ending a long stand-off over Ukraine's $3 billion debt to Russia. Rather than endangering Ukraine's debt restructuring agreement by demanding immediate repayment of the bond, Mr Putin has said he will accept $1 billion per year between 2016-2018.
But despite the apparent surge of mutual goodwill, serious obstacles to co-operation remain. As Vedomosti, an influential Russian daily paper, noted on November 17th: "Discussions of a united front sound pretty as long as they don't concern details or concrete concessions." The two sides have yet to agree on the fate of Bashar al-Assad, the Syrian president and an ally of Moscow, whose continued rule the West opposes. Syrian peace talks in Vienna over the weekend produced a vague road map for elections, but no clarity on Mr Assad's future. Separating an alliance against IS from the situation in Ukraine will also prove tricky. Although a ceasefire has helped reduce tensions in eastern Ukraine, the political elements of the Minsk peace plan have yet to be implemented, meaning that fighting may flare up again. In the past couple of days six Ukrainian soldiers were killed in skirmishes near Donetsk.
Ultimately, partnership requires trust, and after two years of sparring over Ukraine, there is little between Russia and the West. Having a mutual enemy will not bring an end to suspicion and animosity, not least because Mr Putin's standing at home depends on a heavy dose of anti-Americanism. Indeed, the chairman of the Russian parliament's international affairs committee, Alexei Pushkov, suggested that the American-led coalition's foolish stance was responsible for the deaths in Paris. Russian broadcasters portrayed the attacks in Paris as the inevitable result of wrong-headed Western policies in the Middle East. State-run Channel One told viewers that Russia had long warned the West about where its "presumptuousness" in the Middle East would lead. Whatever the strategic imperatives, saying "I told you so" is a poor basis for co-operation.
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#10
Defensenews.com
November 16, 2015
Could US and Russia Enhance Intel Relationship?
By Aaron Mehta
WASHINGTON - The head of the CIA is "determined" to keep conversations open between the intelligence communities of the United States and Russia and wants to see relations between the two nations "enhanced" to prevent future terrorist attacks, particularly from the Islamic State group, commonly known as ISIS or ISIL.
John Brennan also said the "ISIL threat demands" an "unprecedented level of cooperation" among the international intelligence community, mere hours before the Obama administration announced new rules easing the sharing of intelligence with France in the wake of the Nov. 13 Paris attacks.
Speaking Monday at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Brennan broadly addressed the need for greater information-sharing around the globe, but saved his most expansive comments for a partner that may surprise those who have watched the relationship between the US and Russia disintegrate since Russia's invasion of Ukrainian territory in 2014.
Brennan said he has been having ongoing conversations with "my Russian counterpart" over the last year, including several since Russian forces began operating in Syria, the latest flashpoint between the US and the government of Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Those conversations have largely centered on the flow of potential terrorists between Russia and ISIS-controlled territory, a "very real concern" for the Russians, Brennan said. He added that there are between 2,000 and 3,000 Russians, largely from the Caucuses, that are active in the Syria and Iraq region, as well as a handful of Chechens who are highly ranked within ISIS.
"So we've been exchanging information," Brennan said. "I think it needs to be enhanced. But I am determined to continue to work with my Russian counterparts, because of the importance that I think we each can bring to this issue, in terms of our insights, our information, our data and sharing.
"Irrespective of disagreements of policy over Syria, I am determined to work with other country services the best I can in order to prevent successful terrorist attacks," he added.
Hours after Brennan's comments, the Obama administration announced a loosening of rules constraining intelligence-sharing with France.
"Secretary of Defense Ash Carter and Director of National Intelligence Jim Clapper have provided new instructions that will enable U.S. military personnel to more easily share operational planning information and intelligence with our French counterparts on a range of shared challenges to the fullest extent allowed by existing law and policy," Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook said in a statement.
French President Francois Hollande also announced today that his government would be opening trilateral talks with the US and Russia in order to "join our forces" against ISIS. If those talks are fruitful, it could mean Brennan may get his wish for greater information-sharing in the near future.
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#11
http://readrussia.com
November 17, 2015
Russia and the Anti-Terrorist Struggle
By Mark Adomanis
Terrorism is, of course, always a tragedy and the taking of innocent life for political ends always an abomination. But the recent attacks on Paris hit home for me in a way that previous violence hadn't. This isn't because of any particular personal connection with France, but because several close friends from my MBA program were visiting Paris when the carnage started. As the attack was still unfolding there was an hour or so of abject terror as I frantically tried to get in touch with them via text message and e-mail (mercifully, even though they were just down the street from where one of the shootings took place, they were unscathed and safe).
Hopefully this personal connection won't cloud my judgement, but it seems like the sort of thing that an honest writer ought to admit to his readers.
The horrific attacks in Paris, where more than 120 people have been killed and where the final death toll is, as this column is being written, still unknown, came right on the heels of Russia's most lethal aviation disaster, the death of 224 people in the (likely, if not conclusively proven) bombing of a charter flight in Egypt.
The close proximity of these two terrorist attacks, their extreme lethality, and the high likelihood of a common culprit in ISIS at least suggests the possibility that the West and Russia could present some kind of a "common front" against Islamist terrorism.
Certainly many Ukrainians and liberal Russians are terrified of exactly this possibility. Andrei Piontkovsky, a well-known dissident and anti-Putin activist, took to Twitter shortly after the Paris attacks to warn that Ukraine would soon be handed over to Putin in the exact same way that the "anti-Hitler coalition" had given Eastern Europe to Stalin.
Ukrainian activists were similarly active on social media, taking to Facebook and Twitter and begging that, in its grief for the victims in Paris, Europe not forget who the "real terrorists" were.
Are these fears legitimate? Well, on the one hand even way back at the beginning of Putin's reign, before he had dismembered Yukos when he was still broadly considered an economic reformer, anti-terrorism was the one area where Russia and the West were able to cooperate most closely.
From the perspective of today's poisonous political environment it seems impossible, but in the aftermath of 9/11 Putin famously overruled some of the most anti-American "hawks" within his own administration and provided the United States with substantial assistance in its fight against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The importance of this assistance can be overstated, but it was real.
Prior to the invasion of Iraq, in the peak of the "you're with us or against us" mood of the early Bush years, there was a brief period where it seemed that a genuine and lasting Russia-NATO anti-terrorist alliance might actually be possible. If it really was a question of "us" or "them," then it seemed clear to almost everyone that the Russians were, on the whole, much more similar to "us" than they were to Islamist fanatics.
A combination of factors, including but not limited to the invasion of Iraq, the expansion of NATO to virtually the entirety of the former Warsaw Pact, the promotion by the US of "color revolutions" throughout the post-communist world, and an increasingly open conservatism on Putin's part, eventually eroded trust between Russia and the West to the point that, by the end of the Bush years, the anti-terrorist agenda was left a smoking pile of ruins. For all practical purposes, Russia and the West have been waging "wars on terror" totally independently of each other for quite a long time now.
The Russian government has always been quick to express sympathy whenever the West is struck by terrorism (the aftermath of the most recent attack in Paris was no different) and to, at least rhetorically, make the case that Islamist terrorism is a common enemy. These paeans, however, have fallen on increasingly deaf ears, particularly in the aftermath of Russia's annexation of Crimea and its ill-concealed "hybrid war" in Ukraine.
Will this time be different? Will the attacks in Paris be so shocking that they will jolt the Russia-West relationship back into a state of wary cooperation? There's no good reason to think so. Any anti-terrorist campaign would, obviously, have to be waged by the security services and, to a lesser extent, the respective interior ministries. There's little cooperation of any sort between the Russian police and police forces in the West, and to say that the relationship between the FSB and its Western counterparts is "strained" is an enormous understatement.
To put it bluntly, the two sides positively loathe each other. It is true that ISIS is considered a common enemy, but the specific nature of that enemy is interpreted entirely differently in Paris and in Moscow: in Moscow Assad is broadly viewed as part of the solution to the problem, whereas in Paris he is viewed as its primary root cause. Shared hatred of an enemy won't go very far if the two sides have totally irreconcilable visions of how to combat it.
Will there be a temporary improvement in the Russia-West relationship? Yes. Judging by recent experience it seems clear that terrorist violence does have a modestly salutary impact in how the two sides perceive each other. But there's no structural foundation for building or expanding upon this tentative opening, and the actual government organs that would have to cooperate in a common anti-terror campaign (namely the security services) are almost as suspicious of each other as they are of ISIS itself. So expect a modest ratcheting down of the "Russia is Nazi Germany" rhetoric, but, for better or worse, don't expect any real changes.
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#12
Russia Beyond the Headlines/Rossiyskaya Gazeta
www.rbth.ru
November 17, 2015
APEC: Toward open, equal cooperation in the interests of development
Ahead of the APEC summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin calls for regional economic partnership as a way of speeding up economic growth in the Asia-Pacific region.
By Vladimir Putin
On Nov. 18-19, Manila will host a summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum member states. It will be held under the slogan proposed by the host country: "Building Inclusive Economies, Building a Better World."
For a long time, economic growth in the Asia-Pacific and other regions of the world was driven by trade. However, as the effect of tariff liberalization grew smaller, it became clear that additional agreements were required, covering services, investment, nontariff barriers, competition policy and subsidies. Clearly, they cannot be achieved without complex negotiations and mutual compromises.
Building closer regional integration
One possible way out of the current situation could be a deeper regional economic integration. Currently, Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are successfully developing the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Our integration project from the start has sought cooperation with other countries and their associations. In May this year, a free trade zone agreement was signed between the EAEU and Vietnam. Similar agreements are being considered by 40 more countries.
The agreement to align the EAEU and China's Silk Road Economic Belt initiative is an example of transparent partnership. The implementation of this project will make it possible to overcome a number of bottlenecks in transport infrastructure and regulation of trans-border movement of goods and services, and will give a serious impetus to integrating the APEC economies.
We expect to reach mutually beneficial agreements in traditional and renewable energy, emergency response, food security and agriculture at the Russia-ASEAN summit to be held in Sochi next year.
How to liberalize trade and investment
The creation of new free trade zones contributes to developing favorable conditions for the liberalization of trade and investment flows to the Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, the confidentiality that surrounded the talks on establishing the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is hardly conducive to stable development in the Asia-Pacific region.
We are convinced that the APEC's strategic path consists not only in increasing the number of free trade zones but also in jointly developing and implementing best practices in liberalization in all member states, taking into account each other's positions and interests. In that sense, we should continue to strive to increase the APEC's role as a coordinator of various integration initiatives aimed at developing a common, open market in the region, free of any discrimination and bloc barriers. Hence the particular significance of the Roadmap for APEC's Contribution to the Realization of the Free Trade Area of Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), adopted in Beijing in 2014.
Keeping abreast with a changing world to tap regional potential
To realize the development potential of APEC countries it is not enough just to agree rules of the game as regards today's flows of goods. It is also necessary to develop joint approaches to the establishment and regulation of emerging "new economy" markets based on digital technologies; to form institutions and rules ensuring additional opportunities for businesses in our countries to create modern, promising products and quality jobs.
For its part, Russia is taking an active part in the work of new financial institutions in the region, the BRICS Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. I am convinced that they will not only promote development in the Asia-Pacific region but will also contribute to strengthening the stability of the global financial system.
At the national level, we consistently seek to create the best possible business climate. These efforts have been recognized internationally: Over the past four years, Russia has risen 69 points in the World Bank's Doing Business ranking, from 120th to 51st place.
We are paying particular attention to developing the potential of the Russian Far East. This year, we have started creating so-called advanced development zones, economic zones with a mix of tax breaks and other incentives that is unprecedented for Russia. A special law has been adopted, making the port of Vladivostok a free port. We plan to extend the same treatment to other key ports in the region. Far Eastern ports, the Northern Sea Route, and an upgrade of our railways should become a factor in developing interconnectivity in the Asia-Pacific region, an important infrastructure link between the region and Europe.
The APEC has shown a lively interest in Russia's proposals to form a common education space in the region. Today, when the Asia-Pacific region is confidently establishing itself among the world's leading technological centers, it is becoming increasingly more topical to join efforts in creating major research platforms and centers. I would like to note that Russia's initiatives in this sphere have received recognition from partners and our country, together with Peru, has been entrusted with chairing a meeting of APEC education ministers to be held in Lima in 2016.
Energy and climate challenges
High economic growth cannot be achieved without ensuring energy security in the Asia-Pacific region and a fair long-term settlement of climate issues. Russia supports the APEC's efforts aimed at creating favorable conditions for investment in a regional energy transportation system, developing integrated energy markets, increasing the share of environmentally friendly and renewable sources of energy, and ensuring access to low-carbon technologies.
Very soon, in December, Paris will host a UN Climate Change Conference which will attempt to reach a global agreement on reducing greenhouse gas emissions. We want this work to succeed and have already presented a report on Russia's contribution to these efforts at the national level.
The scope and diversity of the tasks facing the APEC are truly impressive. I am convinced that we shall succeed in resolving them on the basis of the fundamental principles of partnership and acting for the benefit of our nations and in the interests of making progress towards establishing a common Asia-Pacific family.
Originally published by Rossiyskaya Gazeta. Translated by RBTH.
The author is the President of Russia.
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#13
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
November 17, 2015
Russian plane crash in Egypt: Terror in the sky and its impact on Kremlin
The Russian security services confirm that the crash of the Russian passenger airline in Egypt is a result of terror attack. To what extent will this be successful in intimidating the Kremlin?
By Artem Kureev
Artem Kureev is an expert from the Moscow-based think tank "Helsinki+" that deals with protecting interests of Russians living in the Baltic countries. Kureev graduated from Saint Petersburg State University's School of International Relations.
The crash of the Russian passenger airline in Egypt is a result of terror attack, Director of the Federal Security Service Alexander Bortnikov said on Nov. 17. Yet a review of significant terrorism events involving civilian airliners over the past 85 years indicates that hijackers and terrorists have rarely been successful in intimidating national governments.
Oct. 31 turned out to be a black day for Russian aviation. The biggest plane crash in the history of Russia claimed the lives of 224 people. Although the investigation into the causes of the crash is not yet complete, the actual actions that Russia has taken - evacuating its tourists from Egypt - is eloquent proof that the terrorist attack scenario is the most probable.
However, the 85-year history of terrorism against aviation shows that it is difficult to intimidate national governments as well as the international community.
A short history of explosions in the sky
The first-ever terrorist attack against aviation occurred on October 10, 1933 in the United States. A Boeing 247 exploded in the air and fell to the ground near the town of Chesterton, Indiana and 10 people were killed. The investigation concluded that the cause of the accident was the explosion of a nitroglycerin time bomb, located in the luggage of the passengers.
Twenty-two years later, on November 1, 1955, also in the United States, a DC-6 airliner with 44 people on board exploded near Longmont, Colorado. There were no survivors. This was the first major aviation incident investigated by the FBI. The perpetrator was found. He was the son of one of the passengers, who wanted to cash in on the life insurance policy of his mother.
A similar accident occurred on May 22, 1962, when an explosion in a Boeing 707-124 killed 45 people near the city of Centerville, Iowa. This time, a bomb was deliberately carried in the luggage of a passenger who had taken out a large life insurance policy.
Arthur Hailey used these cases at the bases for his famous novel called Airport, which tells the story of the everyday life of an American airport in the early 1970s. Hailey, a social novelist, in his work pays attention to how easily a terrorist with explosives or a stowaway could get on board an international flight; after all, preflight inspections at the time were carried out only by customs officials.
Hijacking planes
At the same time, even before the Second World War, another type of aviation terrorism appeared - the hijacking of airliners. There is information that the first hijacking was carried out in Peru on February 10, 1931, when rebels seized an airliner and demanded that its pilot fly them to the republic's capital, so they could join other terrorists.
Some hijackings also occurred in the U.S.S.R. and other Soviet bloc countries, where the development of small aircraft took off due to the vast expanses of the Soviet Union. Most of these, such as the first hijacking in 1954 in Novosibirsk, were unsuccessful, and the hijackers themselves were caught and received long prison terms, or were even sentenced to death.
At the same time, there were a few successful cases, such as the hijacking by terrorists of an AN-24 airplane to Turkey. Ankara refused to extradite them to the USSR, and after spending four years in a Turkish prison, they moved to the United States, the ultimate motive for their hijacking.
In May 1973 there occurred a black day in the history of Soviet aviation. Trying to steal a Tu-104 airliner and fly it to China, the hijacker, while trying to defuse the bomb he was carrying, accidently set it off - killing more than 80 people.
The role of extreme terrorist groups
At the same time, until the end of the 1960s, hijackings and bombings in aircraft were not carried out for political reasons. The goals of the hijackers were attempts to steal the aircraft, destroy competitors, or collect on insurance policies.
This situation changed with the emergence of radical extremist groups, both nationalist and from the extreme left. The most famous of these was the massive seizure of aircraft and passengers as hostages by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine in September 1970. The terrorists seized 3 of the 4 aircraft with passengers that they were planning to hijack, and were able to get, in exchange for the release of hostages, a number of their demands met.
However, any concession to terrorists demonstrates the weakness of the state that makes these concessions. Therefore, already in 1976, Israel demonstrated how one had to talk with terrorists. On June 27, 1976, members of two Palestinian militant groups seized an Air France airliner flying from Tel Aviv to Paris, with 260 passengers and crew.
The plane was then flown to Uganda, where the country's dictator, Idi Amin, allowed a base to be organized for the terrorists at a military airport near the country's capital city. On July 4, 1976, during an unprecedented assault - Operation Entebbe, Israeli commandos killed all the terrorists guarding the airport and most of the Ugandan Air Force.
They failed to rescue only four hostages. Although Israel was condemned by several countries for violation of the sovereignty of an independent state, in the future, all states adopted the policy of "no talks on political issues with terrorists."
Nevertheless, hijackings of aircraft continued, but most of these had nothing to do with political terrorism. However, various extremist organizations then turned to blowing up planes. The main purpose of such crimes was to intimidate citizens and governments by threatening to continue to blow up airplanes.
On Oct. 6, 1976, off the coast of Barbados, Cuban exiles/terrorists blew up a Cuban Airlines plane with 73 passengers and crew. On June 23, 1985, Sikh extremists blew up a Boeing 747 of Air India over the Atlantic Ocean, on board of which only the crew and three passengers were Indian nationals. This attack killed a total of 329 people.
In November 1987, a South Korean Boeing 707 blew up over the Andaman Sea, South and North Korea made mutual accusations against each other for committing this act of terrorism, but it was Seoul the presented irrefutable evidence in the form of an arrested female terrorist - an employee of the secret services of North Korea.
One of the most famous terrorist attacks was the bombing of an aircraft flying over Lockerbie, Scotland. This destruction of a Boeing 747 led to the deaths of 270 people. The subsequent investigation showed that it was arranged by Libyan intelligence. Tellingly, no suicide bombers were involved in all these catastrophes. The bombs were placed into registered luggage of passengers, or placed into planes while they were at the airport.
Why did the terrorists choose planes?
Why did these terrorists specifically pick planes to attack? There are two reasons - the effectiveness of such an attack and the fear it causes. A small explosive device is all that is needed to destroy an airplane in flight. On the ground, a similar bomb, in the best case for the organizers of the attack, would kill just a few people. A large number of victims that cannot be saved from a crashing airliner is a good way to create panic in society.
Numerous hijackings and explosions gradually forced states and air carriers to increase security measures. Thus, the Soviet Union was the first to install metal detectors in airports in 1972, but the hijackings still kept taking place. Strengthening of inspection meant an increase in staff expenses for the airlines, and extra time for boarding of passengers onto aircraft. Therefore air carriers, airports, and law enforcement agencies worldwide, were naturally reluctant to implement tougher security measures.
The events of September 2001, when a group of suicide bombers with knives seized several aircraft and turned them, in fact, into guided missiles launched against the Twin Towers in New York, made it necessary to fundamentally review the rules.
Responding to terror attacks in the sky
Thus, in most airline companies, pilots, unless absolutely necessary, cannot leave the plane's cabin, which is now closed with metal bulletproof doors. In case of an attempt at hostage taking, the pilots must try, despite the demands of terrorists, to land the plane immediately.
New security measures have appeared - X-ray inspection machines carefully check all passenger baggage. However, terrorists continue to take advantage of the human factor.
Thus, on Aug. 24, 2004 in Russia, just one minute apart, two female suicide bombers blew up two planes travelling on domestic flights, killing 89 people. The investigation showed that for small bribes, these criminals were able to buy tickets without a passport and go on board, bypassing the pre-flight inspection.
This tragedy has forced Russian authorities to further tighten security at airports, which can now be considered as being among the safest in the world. Moreover, additional measures to protect Russian airports were taken after Jan. 24, 2011, when a suicide bomber, having lost hope of making it onto the airplane, blew himself up in a crowd at the arrivals section in Moscow's Domodedovo International Airport.
Defensive tactics admittedly are far from the best solution. Nevertheless, they are proving successful. Security measures at leading airports around the world are such that terrorists today do not have much of a chance to plant a bomb on a plane, or have a suicide bomber come onboard.
At the same time, unfortunately, airports in many developing countries are still rather vulnerable. Of course, the Egyptian government, being interested in maintaining a flow of tourists, tries to comply with all requirements set by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in terms of security measures, when it comes to the inspection of passengers and their luggage, which have been tightened even more in 2013
However, the general poverty of the population, social and political problems of the country, and many other reasons, often hinder the carrying out of thorough background checks of all employees at Egyptian airports. The traditional Egyptian corruption, as well as the social importance of family ties, may well lead to the hiring at the airport of individuals associated with terrorist groups.
The Oct. 31 terrorist attack in the sky is not beneficial to either Russia or Egypt. Recognizing the crash as a terrorist attack means that Moscow have to admit the deaths of its citizens were linked with the Russian military operations in Syria. As for Cairo, it would completely lose tourists, because radical Islamists are opposed not just to Russia, but also to almost all the countries of the West, as indicated by the terror attacks in Paris on Nov. 13.
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#14
Wall Street Journal
November 17, 2015
Russia Launches Airstrikes Against Islamic State's Syrian Stronghold
Pentagon confirms Russia notified U.S. before starting airstrikes in Raqqa
By GORDON LUBOLD
WASHINGTON-U.S. defense officials said Tuesday that Russia had begun an aggressive air campaign against sites in Raqqa, Islamic State stronghold in Syria, following Moscow's acknowledgment of evidence confirming a bomb downed a Russian airliner over Egypt last month.
The Russians used sea-launched cruise missiles and long-range bombers to target Islamic State in Raqqa, according to a senior defense official.
The airstrikes represents the first significant effort by Russia to target Islamic State after announcing over the summer that it would fight the extremist group when it entered the fray in Syria.
There was no immediate comment from Moscow on the airstrikes.
The U.S. has been suspicious of Russian motives in Syria for months, watching as it conducted operations designed to prop up the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad even while naming Islamic State as a prime target.
On Tuesday, Moscow confirmed that it had evidence that a bomb had brought down the Russian jetliner that exploded over the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt last month, killing all 224 people. The new Russian airstrikes in Raqqa Tuesday suggest Moscow is tightening its focus on Islamic State.
Defense Secretary Ash Carter has expressed hope in the past that Russia would change its focus in Syria. As evidence mounted that Islamic State was responsible for the crash of Metrojet Flight 9268, U.S. officials acknowledged privately that such a finding could be a catalyst for Russian President Vladimir Putin to align his strategy in Syria better with the West.
Speaking at The Wall Street Journal's CEO Council Monday evening in Washington, Mr. Carter expressed hope that Russia would change its focus in Syria.
"It's possible... that they can get on the right side of things here, which is promoting a political transition in Syria," Mr. Carter said of the Russians.
Pentagon officials confirmed that Russia had notified the U.S. before beginning the strikes in Raqqa. The U.S. and Russia had hammered out a basic agreement last month that aimed to prevent air mishaps as each nation's military conducted air operations inside Syria.
Despite the significance of the document, which came after a series of awkward video teleconference meetings, the fact that Russia has been largely operating in other areas of Syria, and not targeting Islamic State in the eastern region of the country, meant there was little chance of a mishap.
But Moscow notified the U.S. of its intentions to strike Raqqa through an air operations center in Qatar.
"While we do not coordinate or collaborate in any way with Russia on its activities in Syria, I can confirm that the Russians did provide us notice before conducting these strikes" the senior defense official said. "The notification was intended to help prevent accidents and ensure safe separation during operations in Syria."
The official said the U.S. hasn't canceled any of its own operations due to Russia's targeting of Raqqa.
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#15
No ground forces take part in Russia's military operation in Syria - Kremlin
MOSCOW, November 17. /TASS/. Taking part in the military operation in Syria are only Russian planes, but no ground forces, Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov has said.
Asked about further operations by Russian military in Syria he said: "President Putin has said more than once that Russia will confine itself to the air component. A ground operation is ruled out."
"I would like to recall that Russia's air group supports the Syrian Armed Forces in their offensive," Peskov said.
He avoided answering the question if Putin had notified the G20 leaders about Russia's plans for stepping up air strikes against terrorist positions in Syria and earned their support.
"I can't answer your question," he said.
The topic of struggle against terrorism was one of the central ones at the G20 summit in Antalya on November 15-16. Putin attended the forum and held a series of bilateral contacts with foreign leaders on the sidelines of the event.
The spokesman said Russia has been taking and will take further anti-terror efforts in strict compliance with international law.
"Russia has been taking all of its anti-terror efforts in strict compliance with the norms and principles of international law. We will keep to this principle in our further efforts - this is the cornerstone principle," Peskov told journalists.
He said President Vladimir Putin, who spoke at a meeting with law enforcers late on Monday about inevitability of punishment for those responsible for the terrorist attack on the Russian passenger jet that had crashed in Egypt in late October, "mentioned Article 51 of the United Nations Charter in this very context."
He refrained from answering the question whether Russia would hold a special operation abroad to expose those who had been behind the terrorist attack on a Russian passenger plane in Egypt. "I said all I had to say," the Kremlin spokesman underscored.
"We will act in strict compliance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter that guarantees the right to self-defense to all states," Putin said at the meeting.
An A321 passenger jet of Russia's Kogalymavia air carrier (flight 9268) bound to St. Petersburg crashed on October 31 some 30 minutes after the takeoff from Egypt's Sharm el-Sheikh. It fell down 100 kilometers south of the administrative center of North Sinai Governorate, the city of Al-Arish. The plane was carrying 217 passengers and seven crew members. There were four Ukrainian and one Belarusian nationals among the passengers. None survived.
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#16
Christian Science Monitor
November 16, 2015
Will Islamic State attacks bolster prospects for political solution in Syria?
The West and Russia are closer than ever to agreeing to implementing a peaceful end to Syria's civil war. But key differences remain, including over the future of Bashar al-Assad.
By Sara Miller Llana, Staff writer Fred Weir, Correspondent
PARIS AND MOSCOW - After multiple major attacks in less than two weeks - including the alleged bombing of a Russian jetliner over Egypt, a double-suicide bombing in Lebanon, and Friday's deadly attacks in Paris - a resolution to the Syrian conflict and the threat of the Islamic State has become top priority for Europe's major powers.
Perhaps most crucially, the West and Russia have moved closer than at any time in the past four years toward a political solution in Syria, which many believe is central to fighting IS-inspired terrorism.
"There is a new pragmatism emerging in Europe to work with Russia and Iran, and other European partners, and to try and work towards a political solution," says Eugene Rogan, director of the Middle East Centre at the University of Oxford.
But the obstacles to a Syrian solution remain high, amid Western reticence about further military involvement there and unresolved differences between the Kremlin and the West over the future of President Bashar al-Assad.
"This is a very critical junction for where we go from here," says Sajjan Gohel, a London-based international security director for the Asia-Pacific Foundation. He says the declaration of "war" by French President François Hollande, and the support by President Obama and British Prime Minister David Cameron, amid other heady talk, must be followed by action. "Otherwise [IS] are going to believe they can get away with it again.... This can only be a game-changer if the West does something meaningful."
A political solution
Speaking on the sidelines of the Group of 20 summit in Turkey, Mr. Obama joined with President Hollande in calling the Paris attack a pivotal moment. "We will redouble our efforts, working with other members of the coalition, to bring about a peaceful transition in Syria and to eliminate [IS] as a force that can create so much pain and suffering for people in Paris, in Ankara, and in other parts of the globe," he said.
US-led efforts to eradicate IS were complicated after Russia intervened six weeks ago, with an expeditionary force of about 50 attack aircraft and supporting troops. But there is a growing consensus, given the reach and sophistication of IS terror, that Russia has helped change the diplomatic conversation, especially the idea that overthrowing Assad is an impossible immediate goal.
"It is dawning on everyone that the only way out of this is a political solution that takes into account the Assad government and the large numbers of people it represents. It hasn't survived for four years, with all the forces arrayed against it, without strong social roots," says Sergei Karaganov, a senior Russian foreign policy expert. "It's also clear that Russia will have to be a part of that solution. The old US approach of just getting together a bunch of like-minded 'friends of Syria' to decide things is finished."
The terror attacks in Paris will add to the sense of urgency, at least for Europeans, who have already felt increasing pressures from the growing refugee crisis to move on a negotiated solution for Syria, experts say.
Talks in Vienna on Syria have already made more progress in the past 10 days than in the previous four years, says Andrei Klimov, deputy chair of the international affairs committee of the Federation Council, Russia's Senate. A rough draft of a transitional program lays out a path to a ceasefire, a new Syrian constitution, and fresh elections within 18 months. Crucially, this was jointly announced by Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov and US Secretary of State John Kerry in Vienna on Saturday.
"A lot has happened rather quickly in the wake of Russia's intervention, and it's pleasant to note that our initiatives are finally getting some traction," says Mr. Klimov. "But peoples' minds are also being focused by the victories the Russian-backed Syrian forces are gaining in the field, and by the terrible tragedies from recent terrorist strikes in Turkey, Lebanon, and now Paris. We do see movement, and we are hopeful."
One agreement made at the Vienna talks that the Russians say is key is the general consensus that any government that succeeds the Assad regime must be "secular." That will exclude most of the Syrian rebels opposed to Assad, if implemented, they say.
The limits of military might
At the same time, the US and Europe are weighing what the next steps are in their own military involvement. France ordered its fighter jets to carry out a massive bombardment Sunday night on Raqqa, the Syrian city that IS claims is its caliphate, as part of a growing global momentum to stop the spread of terrorism.
The US has said it plans to step up its efforts but that it won't put boots on the ground for now. "The further introduction of US troops to fully re-engage in ground combat in the Middle East is not the way to deal with this challenge," said Benjamin J. Rhodes, the president's deputy national security adviser, said Sunday.
Unlike France and the US, Britain has not conducted airstrikes against Syria, amid a public wearied by British involvement in the Iraq war of 2003, politicians skeptical of the efficacy of bombing there, and a nation generally looking inward.
But Mr. Cameron has stirred the debate, warning the population that the new degree of planning and coordination - as well as ambition for mass causalities - seen by IS in Paris makes the UK more vulnerable.
British Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond said Monday, according to local media reports, that his government will try to win anew parliamentary support for airstrikes in Syria. But Mr. Rogan in Oxford says it will be an uphill battle to convince politicians that joining a bombing campaign will not squander their diplomatic potential, which many see as the more important role for Britain in Syria.
Some have even called for NATO's Article 5 to be invoked, which declares that all members join forces if one NATO member is attacked. But Sven Biscop, the director of the Europe in the World program at the Egmont - Royal Institute for International Relations in Brussels, a think tank associated with Belgian Foreign Affairs ministry, says there is no need to put a "NATO flag in the Middle East," he says. "It will contribute to image of this being a crusade."
Instead he says that long-term plans from Vienna and private talks between the West and Russia and allies is where the solutions will be found. This will help bolster support for more troops from countries in the surrounding region as well as help garner pressure on issues like Saudi Arabia financing. "This is where we need the acceleration," he says.
What about Assad?
There are still concerns that the US-Russia rivalry in Syria could scuttle diplomacy and turn Syria into a cold war-style proxy war.
The issue of Assad, and whether he might be allowed to run in new elections, remains the key obstacle. The US and all its allies insist that while Assad may be allowed to play some sort of transitional role, he must leave soon. The Russians say they are not wedded to Assad, but remain vague on when and how he might relinquish power.
That might stymie forward movement in the peace process, since most Syrian rebels have insisted they will never deal with Assad. "One of the problems at Vienna is that we still don't have any definition of 'moderate' rebels. Everyone will agree that IS and Al Qaeda must be excluded. But there are many rebels who took up arms to depose Assad, that is why they are in the field," says Sergei Strokan, international affairs columnist with the Moscow daily Kommersant.
"It is urgently necessary to drop all the polemics, and identify those forces who might be ready to stop shooting, sit down at the negotiating table, and then participate in a provisional government. This sort of thing has happened in many places, at many times, and it's perfectly possible for Syria. But none of these groups is going to engage with Russia and come into the process until there is clarity about Assad. It's time for the Russian government to seriously address this issue," Mr. Strokan says.
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#17
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
November 17, 2015
Syrian solution demands truly inclusive compromise
Russia's ambassador to the UK, Alexander Yakovenko, argues that the impasse over any role President Bashar al-Assad plays in the future of his country must not be allowed to derail peace talks after three years of bloody fighting.
Alexander Yakovenko is Russian Ambassador to the United Kingdom. He was previously Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Upon Russia's insistence, a truly inclusive multilateral process was launched in Vienna on Oct. 30 to help find a compromise solution to the Syrian crisis. Iran, a major player, took part for the first time, as well as China. All agreed to the U.S., Russia and the U.N. co-chairing the meeting.
Heated exchanges took place on the issue of President Bashar al-Assad's future. As was the case three years ago, this could derail the entire process. But ultimately it was agreed to disagree on that issue. Lack of agreement on this subject resulted in three more years of bloody impasse. We should know better than that this time. All the more so that those are the differences between the outside players. Why not leave it to the Syrians to decide?
A joint statement was adopted by consensus. The middle ground agreed included such major principles of the outside world's approach to the Syrian settlement as independence, territorial integrity and secular nature of the Syrian state; the preservation of state institutions, protection of the rights of all the Syrians irrespective of ethnicity and religion; humanitarian access and intensification of diplomatic efforts to put an end to the armed conflict.
The extremist approaches failed to win the support of the majority of the participants. The Geneva Communiqué of June 30 2012, backed by the U.N. Security Council, will serve as a basis for political process. It means the opposition and the government will have to agree on Syria's future. Mutual agreement is key to any political settlement as opposed to a military solution and a solution that's imposed from outside. As the examples of post-war Germany and Japan show, imposed solutions mean a military defeat, a long foreign occupation and a total commitment by major outside powers, including the provision of long-term economic and financial assistance. Short of that, a compromise looks the only viable option.
The second meeting in Vienna, held in the aftermath of the atrocities committed by terrorists in Paris, reflected in its statement a growing sense of unity in the face of this terrorist threat that went global. It is now agreed that the inter-Syrian talks will start under U.N. auspices by Jan. 1. The two parties will have to agree an inclusive mechanism of governance, a new constitution and elections. The latter will be prepared under UN control, including help for all the Syrians to take part.
It is envisaged that, with the launch of the political process, a ceasefire will come into force for all of the participants. The current military action will continue to suppress terrorists, who have tried to hijack the cause of the legitimate opposition. Terrorism is the single most important factor that has distorted the Syrian conflict from the beginning, when many had bet on a foreign intervention like that in Libya.
The past four years have provided enough experience for a sober and realistic assessment of the situation by all. This experience, paid for in blood and destruction, human misery on an immense scale and the proliferation of terrorism, should not have been in vain. Like in Egypt, it provided a glimpse of a future based on conquest rather than negotiated solution. After all, why not trust the wisdom of the silent majority who never outsourced their choice to people making their point with guns?
What is critical now is the compilation of the two lists of the opposition groups to make up a united delegation at the talks with the government and for the terrorist organisations to be proscribed by the U.N. Security Council. This is the only way to make something coherent out of the mess that the Syrian situation has degenerated into with all outside players acting at cross purposes.
It is for the Syrians to decide their future. The most the outside world can do is to come up with a clear-cut common position. That is the promise of the Vienna talks.
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#18
Antiwar.com
November 17, 2015
Is Putin Our Ally in Syria?
by Patrick J. Buchanan
Patrick J. Buchanan is the author of Churchill, Hitler, and "The Unnecessary War": How Britain Lost Its Empire and the West Lost the World.
Among the presidential candidates of the Republican Party and their foreign policy leaders on Capitol Hill the cry is almost universal:
Barack Obama has no strategy for winning the war on ISIS.
This criticism, however, sounds strange coming from a party that controls Congress but has yet to devise its own strategy, or even to authorize the use of U.S. military force in Syria.
Congress has punted. And compared to the cacophony from Republican ranks, Barack Obama sounds like Prince Bismarck.
The President's strategy is to contain, degrade and defeat ISIS. While no one has provided the troops to defeat ISIS, the U.S. is using Kurdish and Yazidi forces, backed by U.S. air power, to degrade it.
And recent months have seen measured success.
The Kurds have run ISIS out of Kobani, captured much of the Turkish-Syrian border, and moved to within 30 miles of Raqqa, the ISIS capital. Yazidis and Kurds last week recaptured Sinjar in Iraq and cut the highway between Mosul and Raqqa.
The terrorist attacks in Paris, the downing of the Russian airliner in Sinai, the ISIS bomb that exploded in the Shiite sector of Beirut, are ISIS's payback. But they could also be signs that the ISIS caliphate, imperiled in its base, is growing desperate and lashing out.
Yet consider the Republican strategies being advanced.
In Sunday's Washington Post, Mitt Romney writes:
"We must wage the war to defeat the enemy. ... [Obama] must call in the best military minds from the United States and NATO ... and finally construct a comprehensive strategy that integrates our effort with the Kurds, Turks, Saudis, Egyptians and Jordanians."
The Kurds excepted, Gov. Romney ignored all the forces that are actually fighting ISIS: Russians, Hezbollah, Iran, Bashar Assad, the Syrian army.
Mitt urges instead an alliance of countries that have done next to nothing to defeat ISIS.
The Turks are instead hitting the Kurds in Turkey, Syria and Iraq. The Saudis are bombing the Houthis in Yemen, not ISIS in Raqqa. The Egyptians are preoccupied with their own homegrown terrorists.
"Now is the time, not merely to contain the Islamic State," says Mitt, "but to eradicate it once and for all." But why did he not mention Russia, Iran, Assad and Hezbollah, all of which also wish to eradicate ISIS?
We partnered with Stalin in WWII. Is Vladimir Putin an untouchable?
Sens. John McCain and Lindsey Graham want U.S. ground troops sent into Syria and Iraq. But as Turkey has an army of 500,000 next door and Assad's army would happily help wipe out ISIS, why not let Arab and Turkish boys do the fighting this time?
"America must lead," is Jeb Bush's mantra, and he wants U.S. boots on the ground and a no-fly zone over Syria.
"We should declare war," says Bush.
Why then does Bush not call up Speaker Paul Ryan and Majority Leader Mitch McConnell and dictate the war resolution he wants passed?
And whom does Jeb propose to fight? Why declare a no-fly zone when ISIS has no air force? Does Bush plan to shoot down Syrian planes flying over Syria and Russian planes flying in support of Assad?
Has Jeb, like his brother, not thought this through?
If we declare a no-fly zone over Syria, or establish a "safe zone," we risk war not only with Syria, but Russia, Iran and Hezbollah.
None of these allies of Assad will meekly stand aside while we take military action to deny the Syrian regime and army the right to defend itself and survive in its war against ISIS, al-Nusra and other assorted jihadists and rebels.
Having invested blood and treasure in Assad's survival, and securing their own interests in Syria, they are not likely to submit to U.S. dictation. Are we prepared for a war against both sides in Syria?
Who would fight Russia, Iran, Hezbollah and Syria alongside us?
Yet New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie is ready to rumble.
"Well, the first thing you do is you set up a no-fly zone in Syria, and you call Putin, and you say to him, 'Listen, we're enforcing a no-fly zone, and that means we're enforcing it against everyone, and that includes you. So, don't test me.'"
And if Russia violated his no-fly zone? "Then you take him down," said Christie, meaning we shoot down Russian jets.
But what vital interest of ours has ever been so engaged in Syria as to justify a major war in the Middle East and a military clash with a Russia with a nuclear arsenal as large as our own?
In any war it is usually wise to enlarge the roster of one's allies and reduce the roster of enemies. If ISIS is the implacable enemy and must be annihilated, we should welcome all volunteers.
As for those who decline to fight, but claim a veto over whom we may ally with, we should tell them to pound sand.
If Putin wants to enlist in the war against ISIS, sign him up.
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#19
Wall Street Journal
November 17, 2015
More Sympathy for Paris Attack Victims Than Russian Terror Victims?
By STEPHEN SESTANOVICH
Stephen Sestanovich, a professor at Columbia University and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, is the author of "Maximalist: America in the World From Truman to Obama." He is on Twitter: @ssestanovich.
Like all terrorist attacks (indeed, like murders everywhere), the killings in Paris raise questions about why we react with greater outrage to some acts of violence than others. In Lebanon, people ask about the mild Western response to last week's bombing in Beirut. Russians note that twice as many were killed when a commercial flight crashed over Sinai last month than were murdered in Paris on Friday. (And after the Oct. 31 crash, Russians asked why President Barack Obama didn't call to convey his condolences.)
The complainers have a good point. There is no basis for a different human reaction to these cases. Personal connections to the events may, of course, shape your response. Do you have more friends in Paris or Beirut or Moscow? Do you fly a lot? I'm more likely to have known someone on the Russian plane than at the Paris rock concert, but that shouldn't change anything. All this violence involved equally terrible killers and hundreds of equally innocent victims.
Still, if politics is getting in the way of our normal human reactions, we ought to ask why that is. Russian propaganda will see the answer in residual Cold War attitudes and Russophobia, but the truth is a lot more interesting. It involves what political scientists call "soft power"-above all, the confidence that others have in the way you do things. Russia has experienced a drastic loss of soft power in recent years-a deficit that shows up in at least three ways when it comes to fighting terrorism.
First, other leaders hesitate to stand shoulder to shoulder with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who always tailors his moral stands to his political advantage. (Remember, this guy still hasn't told the truth about the Malaysian plane shot down over eastern Ukraine last year.)
Second, Western governments are unsure that a shared aim-opposition to Islamic State-really makes Russia an ally. When Mr. Putin announces a bombing campaign against ISIS and then bombs every Syrian group but ISIS, he puts the legitimacy of Russian policy more deeply in doubt.
Third, Western governments wonder about the means Russia uses even when its aims are the same as ours. Mr. Putin echoes other European leaders when he says that he worries about jihadists among Russia's Muslim minority. Yet we remember how he answered that problem: by leveling Chechen cities and imposing a brutal local dictatorship.
When Mr. Putin shreds his own soft power, Russia pays a price-and so do we. We find it harder to express sympathy than we should, and harder to act in a common cause.
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#20
CNN.com
November 16, 2015
Why Paris attacks won't transform U.S.-Russia cooperation
By Olga Oliker
Olga Oliker is a senior adviser and director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The opinions expressed in this commentary are hers.
(CNN)The outpouring of global solidarity in the face of the horrific attacks in Paris has raised hopes for improved cooperation between Russia and the United States, France and their partners in the fight against ISIS in Syria. Yet despite some encouraging words even before Friday's attacks, the challenges that have hampered effective teamwork in the past remain. And they won't be easy to overcome.
Russia has long said it is willing -- even eager -- to cooperate with the United States in combating global terror. Indeed, in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks, Russian President Vladimir Putin was the first world leader to call then-U.S. President George W. Bush to offer support.
Fast forward to the wake of the Paris attacks: Almost immediately Russian officials urged greater unity against ISIS and other Syrian jihadi groups, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry held a joint press conference on Saturday calling for ever-stiffer resolve in the fight. These remarks followed Putin's comment Friday -- before the Paris attacks took place -- that he was open to working with the United States and had worked with the U.S.-backed Free Syrian Army.
With all this in mind, and as the flowers pile up at the French Embassy in Moscow, there seems to be new hope that Russia will work more closely with the U.S.-led coalition, especially as evidence mounts that the recent explosion of a Russian passenger aircraft en route home from Egypt was also an ISIS operation.
But things might not be that simple -- there are several challenges to effective cooperation, both in the field in Syria and between capitals, that will need to be overcome if there is to be more meaningful cooperation.
One sign of this is Putin's own statements. Even when talking about Russia's willingness to cooperate with the United States, the Russian President could not resist having a dig at Washington, pointing out that Russia's involvement would come despite the absence of either a U.N. mandate or the support of the Syrian government for U.S. action.
Another problem is that fighting ISIS is merely one component of Russia's Syria operation (and, if its targets to date are any evidence, far from the most important). Tactically, Russia is working to support Bashar al-Assad's government in Syria, and it may well have judged that the best way to do that is to weaken the more moderate opposition, rather than attack ISIS.
True, Saturday's discussions in Vienna resulted in the promise of a meeting between Assad and the opposition by January 1, which could be seen as a win for Moscow. And while it leaves Assad's future far from resolved, if it enables Moscow to increase pressure on ISIS, it's likely a victory for others at the table, too.
Strategically, however, Russia also appears to see Syria as an important opportunity to stand up to the United States and demonstrate the ineffectiveness of Washington's support for anti-authoritarian movements in Syria and more broadly. This presents a significant challenge, one that rhetorical unity between Moscow and Washington (and Paris) can't just wipe away.
If Russia does take fighting ISIS more seriously, there is room for more information-sharing, more synchronization of efforts, and more collaboration. But even here, another set of challenges must be overcome.
Over the past decade and a half, U.S.-Russian efforts to work together to fight terrorism have been limited by mutual distrust and differing approaches to information collection and analysis. The United States has tended to question data provided by Russia, while limiting the sensitive information it has been willing to share with Moscow. In the Syrian context, this mistrust is exacerbated by Russia's relationship with Iran; with Russia and Iran fighting on the same side in Syria, it is difficult to believe anything Washington shares with Moscow does not run a strong risk of ending up in Tehran. As a result, actual coordination on target sets, intelligence sharing, and war-fighting can only go so far.
Of course, none of this means that U.S.-Russian collaboration is impossible, but it does mean that expectations must be tempered, and that larger successes can only be built on small ones.
If there is clear evidence that Russia is fighting the same fight, up to a point, as the United States and its partners, then the United States will be more willing to work with Russia. And if Russia feels it is getting a voice and credit, it is probably more likely to support at least some U.S. efforts.
Ultimately, though, optimism is probably best tempered, because Moscow's desire to challenge Washington, Washington's fundamental distrust of Moscow, and the continuing and substantial differences in interests between the two mean that this will most likely remain an effort of fits and starts.
The world was united in horror at what took place in Paris. But that doesn't mean Washington and Moscow see everything quite the same way.
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#21
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
November 17, 2015
The Middle East after the Arab Spring, more divided than ever
Experts at the Institute of Oriental Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences presented an analysis of conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa. The main causes of these conflicts appear to be deeply divided local societies rather than external factors.
By Grigory Kosach
Grigory Kosach is professor and chairman of the Modern East Department of History, Political Science and Law at the Russian State University for the Humanities.
The article is first published in Russian by the Russian International Affairs Council.
In a collective monograph entitled "Conflicts and Wars of the 21st Century", the Institute of Oriental Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences examined the development of conflict situations in the Middle East and North Africa.
The authors looked at the age-old conflicts (the situation in Lebanon and Iraq, the situation around the Western Sahara, the Islamic factor in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict), as well as the issues behind the formation and evolution of new hotbeds of new tensions, born as a result of the Arab Spring. These latter conflicts include Libya, Syria, Egypt, Yemen, Algeria, and two sub-regional situations - in the Persian Gulf and the Maghreb countries.
The monograph presents a multi-faceted picture of the Middle East situation after the Arab Spring. This is evidenced by the very logic of the layout of this book, which is composed of three sections - "Regional and Global Picture," "A New Dimension to Long-Standing Armed Confrontations," and "Birth of the Arab Spring."
The study also raises issues related to the economic impact of the Arab Spring and the "archaization" of Middle Eastern and North African societies.
Middle East and North Africa: What is the essence of the conflict?
In comparison with earlier works by the Institute of Oriental Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences, this edition not only looks at materials across a longer period of time, but also includes new themes and twists.
The first section analyzes the economic implications of the transformations that have taken place in the Middle East. According to Alexander Filonik, author of the chapter "The Arab Economy: External Threats and Internal Challenges," the detonator of the current Middle East conflict was economic imbalances, the economic vulnerability of "capital-deficient countries" (the most striking example is Syria), and only in the last instance - "the provoking of conflicts by outside forces."
Another idea that seems indisputable is that of Irina Zvyagelskaya ("Archaization and Conflicts in the Middle East") about the imposing of "rules, which are able to deprive a state of its raison d'être... replacing real goal setting by myths and pseudo-historical nonsense, to fragment any society and lead it to disaster."
The quality of this monograph rests, in particular, on the analysis of two sub-regional situations, which previously have not been studied in depth. At the same time, demonstrated is both the stability of the monarchical regimes in the Persian Gulf region and the instability generated by the Arab Spring (Elena Melkumyan). There is also consideration of the reasons for the fundamentally different responses to regional and international challenges in the Maghreb countries - Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco (Vasily Kuznetsov).
The first section also includes chapters by Vitaly Naumkin ("Islamic Radicalism and External Interference in Deeply Divided Societies of the Middle East") and Dina Malysheva ("Conflict in the Middle East, in the Context of the Changing International Political Environment").
The main thing that should be emphasized is the unity of the group of authors in their efforts to show the internal causes of conflicts and wars. Of course, this does not mean that in the book they ignore external influences as factors that have promoted socio-political conflagrations in the Middle East and North Africa.
Nevertheless, most authors believe that these factors were not the root cause of the Arab Spring, but were only superimposed on the more significant internal circumstances - the deeply divided local societies.
According to Naumkin, "The level of violence during internal conflicts, the extent of radicalization and the potential of the Islamist movement is higher in the Middle East... in those societies that can be considered as deeply divided and had become the objects of... outside interference." This view is also expressed by Malysheva.
Conflicts in countries, conflicts around countries
It would seem that this subject of long-standing conflicts in the regional areas of the Middle East and North Africa by now could be considered as exhausted. The contribution made to the description of these conflicts is actually reduced to the introduction into circulation of new facts confirming their continued state of stagnation.
However, this is at first glance. In reading the monograph by the Institute of Oriental Studies, one learns that some of these conflicts are still insufficiently described by historians. A realistic analysis of the situation in the region is offered by the authors of chapters included in the second section of the book: Alexey Sarabyev ("The Situation in Lebanon"), Ildar Minyazhetdinov ("Balkanization of Iraq"), Sergei Serebrov ("Revolution and Conflict in Yemen"), and Maria Volodina ("Western Sahara").
Moreover, in the chapter "The Islamic Factor in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," Alexander Demchenko offers his take on a key element in the Arab-Israeli conflict, which is often not analyzed in detail by other researchers.
The third section of the monograph is devoted to the countries where the Arab Spring took place. These include chapters by Irina Mokhova (on the change in the position of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt), Alexey Podtserob (on the intra-Libyan conflict after the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi), Boris Dolgov (on the Syrian conflict) and Vladimir Akhmedov (on the armed Islamist opposition in the Syrian uprising). This section also includes a chapter, written by Mr. Dolgov, on the conflict between the government and the Islamist opposition in Algeria in the 1990s.
The absence in this section of a chapter on Tunisia is fully compensated for by the "Tunisian" conclusions, which can be found in the chapter by Kuznetsov. The presence of two Syrian articles is justified by the fact that they deal with different aspects of the crisis, but then again, the inclusion of an Algerian chapter seems rather artificial. We believe that this would have been more appropriate in the first section of the monograph, but only if it were presented in a theoretical context. Moreover, some articles of the third section, like in the preceding one, raise some questions.
Reflections and objections
Formed under the influence of many factors, Russia's view on the situation in Iraq comes from the fact that the only reason for the continuing violence in the country was the American-led military intervention in March 2003. This view, on the whole, is shared by Minyazhetdinov. Undoubtedly, the entrance of U.S. Armed Forces, and their subsequent actions as the "occupying power," subsequently destroyed the balance of power that existed in Iraq, opening the possibility for new competition arising between ethnic and religious groups, and their representative parties and movements.
Nevertheless, the author of the article also stresses that at the time of the American invasion (and much earlier), Iraqi society was composed of a diverse ethno-confessional clan and tribal structure, and government bodies were imposed over the traditional clan and tribal system and tribal institutions. In other words, during the existence of the Iraqi state, a unified "national" social bond was never formed in society, and an external force took advantage of this to solve its own problems.
If numerous warring Iraqi elite had been unable to reach consensus on the future of their country, if their actions (even after the withdrawal of U.S. troops) had Balkanized Iraq, if during the period of external control, each of these groups fought for favors of the "occupation administration," what should be viewed as the root causes of the continuing anarchy and instability? In any case, the cause was not the U.S. invasion, even if the "occupation administration" had really made countless mistakes.
It is worth noting that all of the authors of the third section (except Podtserob and Dolgov) were only interested in certain aspects of the Arab Spring events, although, of course, these were important. Analysis of their development in various country-specific versions makes no sense. This approach is justified - and works have already been written on Egypt, as well as on Syria, concerning the emergence of local revolutions. However, the question that immediately arises: Do the authors really believe that these events can be considered as revolutions?
Mokhova (who wrote about the evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood in "post-revolutionary" Egypt) has a positive answer to this question, and the roll back of the revolution to its original point becomes obvious. She writes about the political transformation of Egypt, which, even if it did not return back to the era of the Republic of Egypt under Hosni Mubarak, still put an end to the expectations and hopes of 2011.
Moreover, the most important conclusion of the author is this: "The actions of the Brotherhood and of the military showed there was an absence of 'political pluralism' in Egypt, a country that, in comparison with other countries of the Arab world, took almost the longest time to complete the path to modernization."
Mokhova posed an even more important question: To what extent can the Western model of democracy be applied to non-Western societies with different political cultures, traditions, and worldviews? From this, it follows that the time after 1952, when in Egypt, also as a result of a military coup, Gamal Abdel Nasser to power, was an era of archaism, which radically changed society, its behavior and political leanings.
Neither Podtserob nor Dolgov (in his "Syrian" chapter) lean towards a positive answer to the question: Can we consider the events in Libya and Syria as revolutions? Podtserob notes that these "Arab Troubles" destroyed "the once prosperous Jamahiriya". Again, according to Dolgov, even though there are internal problems present in Syria, the main reasons for the continuing crisis are external factors - namely, the "support provided to armed anti-government groups by outside forces that are trying to use the Syrian internal conflict for the realization of their own strategic goals."
This view is derived from the current Russian position on the situation in Libya and Syria. However, does it correspond to the idea of a deeply divided society? If we consider the interference of external forces as being the main factor in internal conflicts and wars, then why in this connection, for example, we do not consider the role of other external actors in Syria, including Iran and pro-Iranian forces? Why not analyze the Syrian direction of Russia's foreign policy? However, the bias towards "external forces" is successfully compensated for by the thoughtful analysis of the situation in Syria made in the chapter written by Akhmedov.
We have to admit that the authors of this study were not fully able to convey the principle of internal factors as being primary in causing the wars and conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa. Now, is the reason behind the actual conflicts themselves? Probably not, because the authors have shown their own, not always coinciding, preferences that determine their views on the issues that they have analyzed.
However, this does not mean that the quality of that monograph is placed into question, especially since unanimity in any scientific work is impossible and even dangerous. On the contrary, the absence of this unanimity makes this new edition, put out by the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, worthy for a wide range of readers.
Today, it not only gives the most complete picture of the situation in North Africa and the Middle East, but also makes one think, and challenges the views of its authors on the issues that are of fundamental importance for the whole world.
The article is first published in Russian by the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC). Grigory Kosach is an expert at RIAC.
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#22
Carnegie Moscow Center
November 16, 2015
Exorcising Chechnya: Kadyrov and the Islamic State
By Alexey Malashenko
Alexey Malashenko is the chair of the Carnegie Moscow Center's Religion, Society, and Security Program.
Despite his harsh rhetoric, Kadyrov now takes a pragmatic view of the Islamic State's influence on the situation in Chechnya and is committing himself to "exorcise" would-be recruits or returnees from the Middle State rather than merely destroying them.
Never shy of putting himself center-stage in the big issues of the day, Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov is offering to lead Russia's fight against the so-called Islamic State, with both force and persuasion.
For Kadyrov, the war against Islamic State is crucial for two reasons. First of all, fighting the self-proclaimed Caliphate provides the Chechen leader with another opportunity to demonstrate his loyalty to Russian President Vladimir Putin. Last year, Kadyrov did the same at the height of the Ukraine crisis, when he dispatched thousands of Chechens to fight there.
In similar fashion Kadyrov has said he is ready to deploy the Chechen battalions subordinate to him to win a swift and decisive victory over Islamic militants in the Middle East. Meeting members of the Chechen Terek rapid response battalion, Kadyrov boasted that they could "quickly tear apart" Islamic State.
In this way, Kadyrov, who long ago rose to be a leading figure in Russia's domestic policy, also aspires to a role in Russia's foreign policy.
But fighting against Islamic State is also a domestic issue for Kadyrov, as he seeks to maintain stability in Chechnya and consolidate his own power. The movement has proclaimed that it is ready to stage an uprising in Chechnya and "liberate" it from Russia-and therefore from Kadyrov. It has offered 5 million dollars for Kadyrov's head. The combined "value" of his twelve closest associates is 25 million dollars.
No one can say how many Chechens sympathize with Islamic State and how many have gone to the Middle East to fight-and how many have returned. Estimates have ranged as high as 7,000-although Kadyrov on November 15 put the number of Chechens at 480, [http://sputniknews.com/military/20151116/1030163434/isil-chechens-karydov.html] of whom he said 200 had been killed and 47 had regretted their decision and returned.
In 2014, Kadyrov said that "terrorists cannot be cured, they can only be destroyed," but lately his approach looks to be more pragmatic.
Talking about Islamic State recruits, Kadyrov has used his favorite term of abuse, calling them "shaitans" or devils. If devils have taken over a person or a place, they need to be exorcised, and Kadyrov also seems to be favoring state-sponsored exorcism. Kadyrov and his state-sponsored clerics are meeting with the relatives of individuals who are reported to be interested in moving to the Middle East, individuals who are recruiting young Chechens, and individuals who have tried and failed to join the Islamic State, all in the name of prevention as a type of cure.
Kadyrov increasingly refers to Islamic State sympathizers as "lost souls" and calls upon them to repent. He appeals to the families of Chechens who have left or plan to leave Russia and continuously reminds these relatives of their responsibilities for their sons and younger brothers.
This is not a new tactic. In the last decade, the authorities have targeted the families of men who have absconded to join the Islamist rebel insurgency and even destroyed their houses. These punitive actions by the Chechen authorities were a clear violation of the Russian constitution and the subject of justifiable criticism from human rights activists. But they seem to have support amongst much of the Chechen public, who are proud that their republic is an orderly place.
During my last trip to the Chechen capital, Grozny, I noticed that my driver did not always lock the car and sometimes did not even close the windows. When I expressed surprise, he simply said, "Cars aren't stolen here anymore, this would be a disgrace for the entire clan; such is the way of our people."
Clearly my driver was not the only Chechen to hold this opinion.
In late October, a group of seventeen to twenty Chechens who were reportedly planning to go to the Middle East was detained in Moscow. The young men were brought to Grozny, where they appeared before Kadyrov. Their encounter was aired on national television channels.
The Chechen leader did not threaten them, but rather sought to explain to them the error of their ways. His oft-repeated argument is that the Islamic State fights against Muslims and is actually bankrolled by Western special services. However, one of his statements deserves particular attention: "Why fight for some unknown entity when there is still so much to do in Chechnya?" Kadyrov is confident that potential transgressors can ultimately be "guided back onto the right path." If that is his ambition, he has a lot of work to do. Law enforcement sources believe that two groups of Chechens are already en route from Moscow to the Middle East.
Whether he succeeds in this mission or not, Kadyrov is evidently backtracking from his previous assertion that "terrorists cannot be cured" and trying to rehabilitate former Islamic State fighters as well and lure some of them to work with him.
This modus operandi is reminiscent of the way Vladimir Putin once operated with regard to Chechnya itself, through his policy of "Chechenization," in which he moved to co-opt some of the Chechen separatists and above all Kadyrov's clan.
Kadyrov's efforts to stop the recruitment of Muslims to the Islamic State may have another effect, and increase his standing with the rest of the Muslim community in Russia.
Of course, the experience of Chechnya cannot be directly translated to other republics of the North Caucasus, to the Volga area or to other regions of Russia. However, Kadyrov's new approach of combating the Islamic State by working on their relatives and friends and offering assistance to returnees, deserves close attention. There is every sign that some Russian Muslims will continue to join extremist Islamist movements around the world and this problem shows no sign of letting up any time soon.
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#23
www.opendemocracy.net
November 16, 2015
Stalin's back
With new monuments and museums afoot, Russians are warming again to Stalin's legacy. But is there any communist content to post-communist nostalgia?
By Dmitry Okrest
Dmitry Okrest is a former staff writer with The New Times and currently works as an independent journalist.
In this year alone, Russia has seen the appearance of a new Stalin museum in Tver Region and a monument to the 'Big Three' (Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin) in Crimea in memory of the participants of 1945 Yalta conference. Statues to the Generalissimo have been unveiled across the entire country-in Lipetsk, Mari El, North Ossetia, Stavropol, Vladimir and in the Kuban region.
In Yekaterinburg, the designer of the city's new sculpture of Stalin also designed a monument to the Tsar's family, executed by the Bolsheviks in the very same city. In Luhansk-capital of a self-declared republic in south-eastern Ukraine-promises have been made to erect a statue of Stalin by the end of December. Although, in the words of local activists, its placement 'depends on many external political factors'.
Recently, United Russia's youth wing, the Young Guard, held a fashion show in which models decorated themselves with immense medals on their chests. A procession in full regalia was later held in Ramenskoye, a town just outside of Moscow, where children led Germans prisoners through the streets. The 70th anniversary of the Soviet victory in the Great Patriotic War has given carte-blanche to present the 'era of Stalin', as the American writer Anna Louisa Strong called it, in a more positive light.
'The reason for this large number of new monuments this year is obvious,' Aleksandr Shubin, a leading researcher at the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of General History, tells me. 'Its the 70th anniversary, so this year naturally saw glorifcation of the victory of 1945 hit a certain peak, and I don't think it will be the last. As commander-in-chief, Stalin is a symbol of that victory. Whether you like him or not, that's a fact. Few people can say anything new about Stalin. But obviously, as a historian, I must be ready to defend both Marxists, even though I'm not one, and Stalin from baseless accusations. Yes, he was responsible for many tragedies and crimes. But, as they say, he didn't eat children.'
Shubin has authored hundreds of academic and encyclopaedic articles dedicated to theories of socialism and the history of Soviet social movements.His more famous works include 1937: Stalin's Anti-Terror and Leaders and Plotters: Political Battles in the USSR in the 1920s and 1930s. Shubin is an active member of the Confederation of Anarcho-Syndicalists, one of the most popular left-wing mass movements of the perestroika-era Soviet Union (another famous member of the organisation is the current deputy chairman of the State Duma Andrei Isayev).
'Tourists don't ask about the repressions'
'Our museum takes a stand against the rabid campaign being waged against Stalin and other distinguished people in our country's [history],' says Vladimir Vtorov, director of the Republic of Bashkortostan's Stalin Museum in the city of Ufa, discussing the purpose of the museum's establishment. 'The people who served us have been transformed into cruel, wicked men. To deprive a society of its heroes is to deprive a society of its memory.'
In this museum, there's a plaster bust of the general secretary himself, binders of old newspapers, veterans' medals, early Soviet-era posters and modern books about Stalin with catchy covers.
The exhibition is organised to show gratitude for the fact that Bashkiria (the former name of Bashkortostan) was the first autonomous republic within Soviet Russia. It has since become a 'powerful, blossoming region with industrial growth'.
The modest and publicly-funded museum was opened in December 2011 under the same roof as the offices of the local branch of the Russian Communist Party, a party some communists criticise for its stagnation and dogmatism, others for its co-operation with the authorities.
'The Bashkir Republic was the first founded in Soviet Russia by a sovnarkom [Council of People's Commissars] document signed by Lenin and Stalin. Why is the museum dedicated only to him, and not to the entire Soviet people?' says Vtorov. 'All in all, because the [merits of] the Soviet authorities have been conflated with those of the people, while Stalin's own merits have gone unacknowledged. We're not saying that it was all Stalin and nobody else. But thanks to the economic system which he founded, we were able to rise from the ruins of the first world war and the Russian revolution and became-for a short time-a first-rate power.'
In the meantime, the Communist Party wants to start working with schools, where they will offer elective courses, and activists from Yevgeny Fyodorov's National Liberation Movement have become interested in the museum. Its members believe that the Russia's post-Soviet constitution was written at the behest of the USA, and that the document must be amended to provide the president with power without any oversight from the State Duma or the constitutional court.
Much of the modest collection was gifted to the museum by sympathisers. The communists return the favour by providing them with intensive courses on Stalin's youth. The guided tour commences with a half-hour film, followed by an inspection of the exhibition, and finally a lecture on the current political situation.
'We don't have anything about the cult of personality-what the radio and newspapers harp on about is more than enough,' says Vtorov, in a tone which brooks no objection. 'It all began with [Nikita] Khrushchev, who was the first to remove one of the bricks from the foundation on which the entire communist movement rested. At the time, neither China nor Albania or North Korea accepted [such a step]. Of course, we do discuss the repressions, we explain why they happened. It's clear that those people who lost their plants and factories weren't going to be paid for them, after all. So, they resisted by all means possible-and were helped by the west, just as they are today. Usually visitors do not ask about the repressions, but about our lives today: why the Soviet Union collapsed, why our utilities are so expensive, why we have got used to constant price rises or why wars break out.'
'Supporters of popular Stalinism don't just want rule with a firm hand'
'This creeping rehabilitation activates a popular Stalinism which emerged during the [Khrushchev-era] Thaw,' says Ilya Budraitskis, coordinator of the Russian Socialist Movement, one of the country's leading socialist organisations. Budraitskis is certain that today's Stalin is a figure cleansed of communist connotations and historical details-a figure excluded from serious political discussions.
'At the time, contrasts were made between the unpopular leadership and a golden age from which they were distancing themselves. Memories of the Stalinist era declined, and colourful details increased.'
The Russian Socialist Movement was founded in 2011 after several left-wing organisations, primarily Trotskyist, merged, hence the critical attitude towards Stalinist experiments. Other prominent participants of the movement are the poet Kirill Medvedev and Yevgeny Babushkin, editor of the journal Snob (owned by the oligarch Mikhail Prokhorov).
'Stalin has become part of a myth embodying anti-democratic values. Stalinism itself was the rejection of such politics, when it was forbidden to act together. The main thing for the authorities now is to inscribe in every historical epoch the legitimacy of today's rulers. That is why we display gold-plated busts [of Stalin] stand while we also shed tears for the Tsar's family,' says Budraitskis.
'But supporters of popular Stalinism don't just want rule with a firm hand, but one based on [their] understanding of justice. This dissonance is part of today's growing social inequality. The contradictions here should be self-evident, but the government constantly glosses over them in an attempt to appeal to the general public: "we have a great history", "we feel a connection to our ancestors". The government uses these Soviet attributes while around [us] is paid education, closed health clinics and the boorish refusal to index wages during a period of crisis. At the same time they constantly repeat, "we have a market economy", "everybody for themselves" or "think for yourself where to find money".'
Budraitskis says that under such circumstances it can be very difficult to be on the left-one must fight supporters of the authorities who use Soviet phraseology as well as liberals who continue to blame Marxist ideas above all else.
For his part, Shubin believes that such conditions-in which the government adopts Soviet symbolism-are not completely hopeless. 'Personally, I'm quite comfortable being on the left,' begins the historian. I am a supporter of an entirely different tradition of socialist movements, based on self-management-not paternalistic statehood. People I speak with are interested in finding out more about the traditions of the narodniki [Russian populist, socially conscious movement of the 1860s and 1870s], of Herzen, Lavrov, Bakunin and the Socialist Revolutionaries-about new trajectories in socialism which take a post-industrial perspective [...] a socialism adapted to the problems of the 21st century.'
Stalin versus Lenin
Budraitskis used to work as a researcher at Russia's State Central Museum of Contemporary History, the National Centre for Contemporary Arts and Leninskiye Gorki, which incorporates Lenin's dacha, and is now a museum. His collaboration with the latter eventually fell through-the left-wing activist proposed to examine why the place was famous, but the management wasn't interested.
'Despite the wide variety of exhibitions about Vladimir Ilyich [Lenin], for the museum's administrators, Lenin, a complex historical figure, was simply a redundant symbol of the past, uninteresting and dusty-a bag of old Soviet rubbish. They wanted to organise horse rides for children and fill the park with young couples with prams, strolling among granite monuments romantically reminiscent of an incomprehensible Soviet past,' writes Aleksandra Simonova on her experience working at Leninskie Gorki.
Simonova, a graduate student of the European University of St Petersburg, adds that 'these new, effective managers don't really know who Lenin was, nor what the museum really is. The final conversion of Leninskiye Gorki into a cemetery came with the construction of an Orthodox church right outside the entrance to the museum entrance.'
So how has Stalin, leader of the nation, come to overshadow Lenin, the leader of the international proletariat? Budraitskis believes that while the Russian authorities use Stalin's image, Russia today cannot offer a single idea that could be deployed by other countries of the world against the existing model of global capitalism.
Furthermore, Budraitskis notes that the figure of Lenin, thanks to whom Stalin came to power, is gradually sinking into oblivion. 'The authorities don't want to disturb the historical consensus on Lenin and Stalin, but to ignore it any further will prove difficult. Lenin is now a mischief-maker, a destroyer, while, on the other hand, Stalin both restored the empire and expanded it.'
'The story of why Stalin is more popular than Lenin came up on the Name of Russia show,' Aleksandr Shubin tells me. 'Not only revolutionary Lenin, but statesman Stalin are both symbols of social justice and the defeat of the bourgeoisie for parts of Russian society. This is important given the extremely strong social stratification in our society. For another electorate, Stalin signifies a strong state. These two electorates, communist and state-nationalist, can unite under the figure of Stalin, not Lenin.'
In 2008, Russian television decided to repeat the UK's experience of 100 Greatest Britons with Name of Russia. In the first half of July, Stalin led in the polls, followed by Soviet-era musician and actor Vladimir Vysotsky, then Lenin. In August, the results of the previous vote were annulled, and the third round of voting had to be held again, citing hacking attacks and flashmobs. At the end, the votes were distributed as follows: in first place came the old Russian price Aleksandr Nevsky, followed by Pyotr Stolypin, the late Tsarist prime minister, and then Stalin. Lenin took sixth place.
'Today, a popular Stalinist can be either a striking worker, or the police chief who subjugates them. Both will find a justification in their own mythological Stalinism,' declares Budraitskis. 'We need to talk to them about the present day: should we support the authorities in everything and knock around our neighbours or do we need, for example, justice or nationalisation. There's no need to resort to quasi-historical disputes based on figures or certified documents. The level of education has fallen significantly and society has forgotten how to read ambiguous, equivocal books [on the subject]. And that's why popular historical books such as those of Nikolai Starikov sell so well.'
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#24
Sberbank assesses current situation in Russia's banking sector as massive crisis
MOSCOW, November 17. /TASS/. Russia's top lender Sberbank is assessing the current situation in the banking sector as a massive crisis, its Chief Executive Officer Herman Gref said on Tuesday.
"What we're facing now is a massive crisis. Zero profits, growth of reserves while the Central Bank is involved with financial recovery procedure. The next year will not be simple as well," he said.
According to Gref, the financial recovery procedure will take another several years due to tightened requirements to capital and from the viewpoint of introducing state-of-the-art technologies, transparency and risk management.
Meanwhile, Central Bank First Deputy Chairman Alexey Simanovskiy said on Tuesday there are no signs of banking crisis in Russia. "I can hardly see any signs of crisis," he said.
German Gref forecasts that Russia's economic growth will be close to zero in 2016, while global oil prices will at the same time be above $50 a barrel next year.
"Situation in the economy will be about zero. More factors are in favor of a small decline so far but it is fairly possible to achieve [economic] growth next year", Gref said.
Everything will depend on oil prices next year and certain other factors, for example, quality improvement of economic policy, Sberbank CEO said.
"We may have 0.5-0.6% [growth] next year," he added.
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#25
Interfax
November 17, 2015
Russia ready to support global emissions' halving by 2050 at Paris Climate
The 21st Conference of UNFCCC member countries will be held in Paris in December 2015.
Russia hopes to agree on halving greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 at the Paris Climate Change Conference. It is ready to finance the transfer of technologies reducing greenhouse gas emissions to developing nations, the Russian president's climate change advisor Alexander Bedritsky has said.
"Developed and developing countries may have different commitments and contributions but all of them need to be included in a single international document, i.e. to be legally binding," Bedritsky said on Tuesday at an international conference titled 'Global Climate Challenge: Dialogue between State, Society and Business'.
"We support as the goal of the agreement a temperature growth limited to two degrees and, if we manage to reach this agreement, the 50 percent reduction of global discharges by 2050, compared to the reference year," he said.
The agreement to be adopted at the conference should declare the role of boreal forests in the absorption of CO2, the presidential advisor said.
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#26
RFE/RL
November 16, 2015
EU Mulls Direct Talks With Russian-Led Economic Bloc, Angering Some EU Members
By Rikard Jozwiak
EU diplomats, expecting rocky times ahead in their immediate dealings with Russia, are considering extending an olive branch.
Moscow could be in for some bad news regarding its efforts to see changes to the EU-Kyiv trade pact that is set to go into effect in January. An extension of EU sanctions against Russia over its role in the Ukraine conflict is also likely when that issue comes up in December.
As Brussels considers ways to lessen the blow, a handful of diplomats tell RFE/RL, the idea of conducting direct talks with the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) has gained some traction.
The idea is that, by opening up avenues of discussion with the trade bloc, Brussels can keep open the possibility of future cooperation with Russia on other issues. Chief among them: combating terrorism in the wake of the Paris attacks, and battling the Islamic State group in Syria.
The prospect of Brussels dealing directly with an economic bloc that aims to rival the European Union, is considered a tool for Moscow to exert political and economic influence on its neighbors, and which has been described as an effort to recreate the Soviet Union has raised some alarms, however.
"There were always, always doubts, about this dialogue [between the EU and EEU] for many reasons, and I believe today is not the best timing, frankly speaking," Lithuanian Foreign Minister Linas Linkevicius said on November 16. "The idea of those who suggest something in order to appease; again, that is the wrong idea.
One EU diplomat who spoke on condition of anonymity expressed concerns that direct talks with the EEU would send the message that the only way for Central Asian states and non-EU states in Europe to do business with Brussels would be to join the EEU.
The EEU, which currently brings more than 180 million people into a single market, was officially established in 2015 and includes Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. To this point the European Union has avoided direct dealings with the EEU, while negotiating with some of its members.
Economic Pressure
Russia was widely seen as having placed economic pressure on prospective members, including Armenia, which had been set to sign an association agreement with the EU but backed out in 2013 after pressure from Moscow. Trade with Ukraine, which Russia envisioned as an EEU member, came under threat in 2013 amid Kyiv's discussions on an association agreement with Brussels.
Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych walked away from the deal with the EU after Russia offered both cheaper gas and the purchase of $15 billion of Ukrainian government bonds, sparking street protests that eventually brought down Yanukovych and sparked the current conflict in Ukraine.
After Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea in March 2014, the EU imposed economic sanctions against Moscow. Kyiv and Brussels subsequently signed their association agreement, but the trade aspects of the deal were delayed due to Moscow's concerns.
Russia joined discussions with Ukraine and the European Commission over the trade aspects, known as the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), in May 2014. The three-way talks resulted in the implementation of the trade deal being postponed until January 1, 2016.
Resistance to the idea of dealing directly with the EEU, one of Russia's pet projects, is particularly strong among eastern EU members that object to rewarding Moscow while EU sanctions remain in place against Russia
One diplomat from an eastern EU member state told RFE/RL that the "EU showed goodwill and understanding when it invited Russia to talks about a trade deal concerning only the EU and Ukraine, but that we should not appease them even more."
Lithuanian Foreign Minister Linkevicius expressed doubt that extending Russia an olive branch would bring positive results.
"Who can guarantee that that will happen?" he said. "I am always doubting when trade-offs are taking place in such a matter. We are doing nothing wrong, we are doing nothing against these countries, and are issuing no restrictions with regard to Russia. Why should we do something else in order to please?"
Skeptical Diplomats
Nevertheless, several diplomats who spoke to RFE/RL said direct talks with the EEU could become reality in the near future, although details are still being ironed out. The European Commission would likely be the EU body that would deal with the Russian-led bloc because it deals with foreign trade.
When asked who was behind the idea, one diplomat said only that it was "the usual suspects."
Another source noted that it is possible that the idea will be pushed further during Germany's one-year chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which starts in January 2016
Several top EU politicians, including European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, have on numerous occasions stated that there won't be another postponement to the DCFTA. Three-party talks including Russia are set to resume on December 1, and will likely be the last before the EU-Ukraine trade deal is implemented.
EU diplomats familiar with the talks have told RFE/RL that they are skeptical that any deal would be reached that would allay Russian fears over the Ukrainian free trade pact
Russia's concerns about trade with Ukraine after its deal with the EU is implemented are centered on customs issues, technical barriers to trade, and food safety.
Brussels and Kyiv have expressed reluctance to alter the text of their deal despite Russian threats to impose trade embargos on Ukraine in early 2016 unless changes are made to accommodate Russian concerns
Russia banned some Ukrainian imports in 2013, and Ukrainian cheeses and confectioneries have been badly hit. Earlier this year Moscow threatened to halt all food imports from Ukraine at the beginning of 2016, a scenario that the EU estimates could cost Ukraine 1.5 billion euros ($1.6 billion) annually.
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#27
Moscow Times
November 17, 2015
Operatic Account of Russia's Yukos Drama to Premiere in Vienna
An opera about the decades-long dispute between former oil tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Russia's President Vladimir Putin will premiere at a Vienna opera house on Friday.
The production, titled Khodorkovsky (Chodorkowski in German), will open at the Sirene opera house, and is billed as a "royal drama," according to the theater's website.
Khodorkovsky's website described the production as a "historical drama," an account of his dealings with the Russian president from 1989 to 2013.
Besides the drama between the two protagonists, the libretto by Kristine Tornquist also focuses on the turbulent events and major changes in Russian business and government during that time, according to the Sirene theater website.
Khodorkovsky, the former head of the now defunct Russian oil firm Yukos and once the richest man in Russia, was arrested in 2003 in what was widely viewed as a politically motivated case. His former oil empire was carved up and sold off while the former tycoon spent a decade in jail, before Putin pardoned him in a surprise announcement in late 2013.
Following his release, Khodorkovsky has worked as an opposition activist, calling for political freedoms and human rights in Russia, while living outside the country. It is widely believed that he would face renewed prosecution should he return to Russia.
Much of the opera's libretto was written in 2013, therefore, Khodorkovsky's release is not included in the production - which "leaves the ending of the story open, but gives hope for the future," the Khodorkovsky website said.
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#28
Moscow's offer to restructure Ukraine's $3 bln debt means only start of uneasy talks
By Lyudmila Alexandrova
MOSCOW, November 17. /TASS/. Russia's offer to restructure Ukraine's $3 billion debt maturing in December and accept repayments over the next three years is just the beginning of difficult talks with an uncertain outcome, experts say.
In any case, it is obvious that Ukraine won't be able to repay the debt on its own and the only question is whether international lenders would want to shoulder responsibility in this situation.
Russia has offered Ukraine to repay its $3 billion debt by $1 billion annual installments in 2016-2018 against the guarantees of the United States, the European Union or a reputable creditor, President Vladimir Putin said after his talks with IMF Head Christine Lagarde on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Turkey on Sunday.
"We have not only agreed to restructure the Ukrainian debt but we have offered better terms than the International Monetary Fund asked," the Russian president said.
As an alternative option, the IMF intended to discuss amending its lending rules in late November to allow Ukraine to get the Fund's next loan tranche, even if Kiev defaulted on its sovereign bonds sold to Russia.
However, experts said this move could have created a precedent for countries that were earlier denied IMF loans due to their overdue liabilities.
"Putin's proposal is attractive for the IMF as the Fund won't have to finance a bankrupt country," Vzglyad online newspaper quoted analyst Anna Kokoreva with Alpari brokerage as saying.
"The point is that Ukraine is on the brink of a default but Russia has given it a chance to repay without a scandal," the analyst added.
The expert said she didn't believe that Ukraine would be able to cope with the debt repayment on its own.
"The economy has shrunk by 7% and it will be a good scenario, if this decline slows down to at least 2-3% next year," she added.
The expert said she didn't rule out that the issue of a sovereign default might resurface for Ukraine in a year.
All the same, Russia actually has no chances to have its loan repaid on time, macroeconomic expert, Associate Professor at the Russian Presidential Academy of the National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA) Sergei Khestanov told TASS.
"Ukraine is in a difficult economic situation and the hopes that it will repay the debt on the terms the loan was provided are unrealistic. In these conditions, a creditor normally agrees to a compromise but it is achieved over a long period of time and in a painstaking process," the expert said.
"That is why, Russia's offer should be considered simply as the first move in lengthy and uneasy negotiations. Most likely, there will be more proposals, counterproposals and options," he added.
Normally, the discussion period for such debts "is measured by years rather than by months," the expert said.
"Most likely, the terms should be further eased due to the state of the Ukrainian economy," he added.
The Ukrainian debt is more a political than an economic issue, leading expert of the Development Center Institute at the Higher School of Economics Sergei Pukhov told TASS.
"The offer is appropriate because Ukraine would have failed to repay on time in any case while judicial proceedings would have lasted long. But the process of reaching an agreement will also be long. Russia needs to get debt repayment guarantees while international financial institutions will proceed from Ukraine's ability to repay its liabilities," the expert said.
"They are afraid of giving guarantees even under gas contracts as no one knows what will happen to the Ukrainian economy," he added.
Most likely, Ukraine will be unable to get out of the crisis on its own, without the IMF's assistance in the next three years, the expert said.
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#29
US Naval Institute
http://news.usni.org
November 16, 2015
CSIS Panel: Russia Still Dangerous in its Decline
By John Grady
Although "Russia is not a rising power . . . even in military terms," Moscow can still "disturb and do harm," one of the nation's leading scholars on strategy told attendees at a Center for Strategic and International Studies forum Friday.
Walter Russell Mead, of Bard College, said at the Washington, D.C., event, "Declining powers are dangerous powers" because they "do not feel that time is on their side."
Regimes such as President Vladimir Putin's in Russia "feel an urgency to act" and see themselves as gamblers willing "to take less favorable odds," as Robert E. Lee did for the Confederacy in the American Civil War, and still act.
"We are not always swift to move," he said of the West. "Putin can move more quickly than we do" as he did in Crimea and Ukraine.
Mead said Putin sees three circles of opportunity for action. The first lies in the "post-Soviet space" where "he is surrounded by a belt of weak states" such as Moldova and Ukraine. Like his Soviet predecessors, he intends to move on them. The second is in the European Union, where he sees the tensions that exist between the wealthier northern nations and the less well-off south as a situation that can be exploited to Russia's advantage because unanimity is required in the union for action. "The process of accession and integration has not worked equally well."
The third circle comes in the Middle East, which has devolved "into complete bloody chaos" at the same time as the United States is withdrawing large forces from the region. Mead sees Russia developing a bloc with Shi'ia countries, such as Iran, Iraq and Syria that can act as a counter against Sunni extremism that threatens Moscow itself.
This bloc could drive a wedge in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries that would send oil prices higher, generating more revenue for the Shi'ia countries and Russia. That "may not be out of his reach."
Ways to counter Putin's moves would be a commitment by the West to rebuild Ukraine to "make it look a little more like Poland" gradually and over time and double down on strengthening the transatlantic alliance and the European Union.
Use "the power of international organizations and the law to grind [Putin's regime] down." He added, "We should be looking for ways to make law-breaking expensive."
"We didn't mean to fail Russia" when the Soviet Union collapsed. In the future in dealing with a more democratic Russia than Putin's, the West needs to be wiser in its approach to Moscow than just saying "no."
Earlier in the day, CSIS sponsored panel discussions on where Russian and Western relations stand now. What are the differences between 1946 (the beginning of the Cold War) and the second decade of the 21st century?
Unlike the containment policy for the Soviet Union that diplomat George Kennan outlined in his "long telegram" of 1946, today's Russia has no clear ideology much beyond regime survival and Putin's insistence that Moscow is a great power on a level with the United States and possibly China.
That was the view of Ulrich Speck, of the Transatlantic Academy, during a discussion that preceded Mead's address.
He said Putin "needs a narrative of success," as happened in Russia after his seizure of Crimea.
As Mead pointed out, Putin is trying to "rebuild a sphere of control" over its immediate neighbors such as Ukraine and the Baltic states, create a sphere of influence in the European Union by emphasizing its status as a nuclear power "and re-establish itself in the Middle East" as it is trying to do in backing Bashar al-Assad in Syria.
Speck said Putin and the political elite around him "are pushing back against liberal democracy" on its borders and in the homeland.
Marek Menkiszak, of the Centre for Eastern Studies in Warsaw, said, the Russian elite's view of the world is very different from that of the West. In part, it comes from Putin's and others' background in the secret services.
The members of the elite believe that "the United States organized the Color Revolutions," such as the "Orange" in Ukraine, as a means to overthrow their regime in Russia. They believe that has been U.S. policy since the break-up of the Soviet Union. They also see a threat to the regime in the work of a number of non-governmental organizations in Russia and the Internet in penetrating their control of society.
"Power in Russia is increasingly personalized" and becoming more autocratic than authoritarian, he said.
Olga Oliker, director of CSIS's Russian and Eurasian programs, said, even with these changes inside Russia the governing elite does believe it is possible to work with the United States in certain areas. Future United States policy "calls for hedging, not containment."
Speck said Ukraine can serve as a model for that future policy. The West showed it was still willing to act in collective defense; sanctions "signaled to Moscow the West's" concerns about its backing of separatists; even in the Ukrainian crisis the West kept diplomatic channels open even while showing support for Ukraine and other nations bordering Russia; and the West's realization the Russian challenge will continue.
"We need to be clear with what we want," he said.
Oliker added it was "not enough to signal; the signal has to be understood"-and that's the value of keeping diplomatic channels operating.
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#30
Institute of Modern Russia
http://imrussia.org
IMR to Participate in 47th Annual ASEEES Convention in Philadelphia
The Institute of Modern Russia will participate in the 47th Annual Convention of the Association of Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies (ASEEES), which will take place from November 19 to 22 in Philadelphia. This is the Institute's fourth time participating in the convention, and it will host two panels and a roundtable discussion.
ASEEES is the leading U.S. scholarly organization dedicated to the advancement of knowledge about the countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern and Central Europe. Every year more than 2,000 scholars, professionals, and graduate students participate in the organization's annual convention. The theme of this year's convention is "fact," chosen in connection with the "information wars" being waged in Russia and across the European continent. Participants will discuss these politically charged battles, their impact on social trust and debate, and the process by which baseless "facts" acquire authority.
IMR's first panel is titled "The Russian World in Contemporary Europe: A Push for Greater Influence?" and will cover Russia's efforts to expand its influence in Europe. The panel participants are:
Péter Krekó, Director, Political Capital Institute: "Revealing Kremlin Connections in European Institutions"
Alina Polyakova, Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center Associate Director, Atlantic Council: "Putinism and the European Far-Right: A Mutually Beneficial Agreement?"
IMR researcher Boris Bruk will chair the panel and the discussant will be Mitchell Orenstein, professor of Central and East European Politics at the University of Pennsylvania. The panel will be held on Thursday, November 19, from 5:00 p.m. to 6:45 p.m. in Grand Ballroom Salon G.
The following day, IMR will host a roundtable discussion focused squarely on this year's theme, titled "Information as a Weapon of the Kremlin's Battle." The roundtable participants are:
Mark Galeotti, Professor of Global Affairs, New York University
Ekaterina Mishina, Visiting Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan
Michael Weiss, Editor-in-Chief of The Interpreter, Senior Editor at The Daily Beast
IMR president Pavel Khodorkovsky will serve as roundtable chair. The event will take place on Friday, November 20, from 1:45 p.m. to 3:30 p.m. in Grand Ballroom Salon L.
On Saturday, IMR will hold a panel on digital democratic initiatives in Russia titled "Russia's Democratic Practices Online: Myths, Facts, Threats, and Opportunities." The participants are:
Boris Bruk, IMR Researcher: "E-Participation from Below: Russia's Experience"
Denis Volkov, Sociologist, Levada Center: "The Limits of Social Networks to Mobilize and Recruit People for Protest Activities"
IMR director Lidiya Dukhovich will serve as chair and Olga Khvostunova, IMR analyst and editor-in-chief of Imrussia.org, will serve as discussant. The panel will take place on Saturday, November 21, from 10:00 a.m. to 11:45 a.m. in Grand Ballroom Salon L.
IMR encourages all ASEEES participants to attend these informative discussions.
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#31
Institute of Modern Russia
The Interpreter
www.interpretermag.com
November 16, 2015
Moscow Chief Beneficiary of Paris Terrorist Attacks, Ukrainian Security Analysts Say
Staunton, November 12 - While there is as yet no direct evidence of Moscow's complicity in the Paris terrorist attacks - and if those were well-organized by its special services, no one would expect there to be - Moscow is clearly the chief beneficiary of those acts of violence, according to the Kyiv Center for Research on the Army, Conversion and Disarmament.
Analysts there told Kseniya Kirillova "the tragedy in Paris fits perfectly into the strategy of 'a multiplicity of conflicts' which Moscow is methodically conducting. 'The maximum destabilization of the situation in the EU will increasingly shatter European and Euro-Atlantic solidarity.'"
Mikhail Samus, the deputy director of the Center, points out that "in fact, of course, there is no evidence of the direct involvement of Russia in the terrorist actions in Paris, and this is natural. All such things are the work of the special services, and they do not publish their 'business plans.'"
However, the way in which Russia has discussed these horrific actions, he continues, shows that "the Kremlin is trying to use the tragedy in Paris in its interests to the maximum extent possible." Some Moscow commentators have suggested that "'if the French have any pride,' they'll vote for Putin's well-known friend Marina Le Pen."
Others have suggested that the European Union should work with Russia against ISIS "but for this...first remove the 'junta from Kyiv.'" And still others, including the Russian Foreign Ministry, have said Moscow expects NATO to "change its priorities" after Paris and cooperate with rather than seek to contain Russia.
Moreover, there has been an increase in the number of Russian commentators who argue that Europe should stop listening to and following the United States vis-à-vis the world and start "listening to Russia instead." Europeans, these writers say, need to think about their own national interests and "the lives of their citizens" rather than "the interests of American elites."
Ukrainian military experts are "not the only ones who have warned about such a tactic" on Russia's part, Kirillova observes, noting that already in September, the Mensk Center for Strategic and Foreign Policy Research published a report suggesting the same thing. (On that, see here.)
According to Samus, one might have expected such a propaganda campaign in the wake of a terrorist action to prove counter-productive especially after Russia's Anschluss of Crimea and aggression elsewhere in Ukraine. But "the West has not been capable" of recognizing that Islamist terrorists and "pro-Russian radical Orthodox terrorists" are much the same.
The two represent "a similar threat to global security," the Ukrainian analyst argues. "Both the first and the second, without thinking, kill tens, hundreds, even thousands of peaceful Europeans in the name of their ideological postulates. Both the first and the second throw challenges to the civilized worlds...and both consider Europeans 'perverted corrupt creatures.'"
Samus says that the world will not be able to defeat terrorism "'selectively'" as it is trying to do now. "Only a total war and unconditional destruction" of all terrorists and their backers, regardless of their "gas or oil resources" will work. Failing that, he says, European capitals will be exchanging expressions of sympathy after new attacks in the future.
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