Johnson's Russia List
2015-#223
16 November 2015
davidjohnson@starpower.net
A project sponsored through the Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies (IERES) at The George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs*
www.ieres.org
JRL homepage: www.russialist.org
Constant Contact JRL archive:
 http://archive.constantcontact.com/fs053/1102820649387/archive/1102911694293.html
JRL on Facebook: www.facebook.com/russialist
JRL on Twitter: www.twitter.com/JohnsonRussiaLi
Support JRL: http://russialist.org/funding.php
Your source for news and analysis since 1996n0
*Support for JRL is provided in part by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Open Society Foundations to the George Washington University and by voluntary contributions from readers. The contents do not necessarily represent the views of IERES or the George Washington University.

"We don't see things as they are, but as we are"

"Don't believe everything you think"

You see what you expect to see 

In this issue
 
 
#1
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
November 15, 2015
'A monstrous blow to European civilization': Russia reacts to Paris attacks
People in Russia are mourning together with the families and friends of those killed in the terrorist attacks in Paris, voicing their solidarity with the people of France. Russian politicians have urged unity in the face of the threat of international terrorism
ALEXEY TIMOFEYCHEV, RBTH

Both the president and the prime minister of Russia have made robust statements condemning the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks in Paris on Nov. 13, in which at least 127 people have been confirmed killed.

"This tragedy is additional proof of the barbaric nature of terrorism, which is posing a challenge to human civilization," said Russian President Vladimir Putin in a telegram of condolence addressed to his French counterpart Francois Hollande.

Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev said that he shared in the grief and pain of the French people, stressing that "the tragedy in Paris requires all of us to unite in the fight against extremism, and firmly and resolutely rebuff terrorist attacks."

"Russia resolutely condemns these inhumane killings and is ready to render any assistance in the investigation of these terrorist crimes," said Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov.

Ordinary Russians too are expressing solidarity with the people of France. People began coming to the French embassy in Moscow overnight, bringing flowers, candles, and notes bearing words of support. By the morning of Nov. 14, there was an improvised memorial at the embassy gate.

A series of coordinated terrorist attacks took place in Paris late on Nov. 13. According to media reports, the Islamic State (ISIS) extremist group has claimed responsibility for the attacks. Francois Hollande has declared a state of emergency.

Call to unite in fight against terror

One common thread in the statements of condolence from Russian politicians has been the need to join efforts in the fight against terrorism. Konstantin Kosachev, head of the Federation Council's international affairs committee, said that "Russia's political will consists of" proposing to the international community the broadest possible cooperation in the fight against terrorism without any preconditions.

Writing on Facebook, Kosachev described the Paris attacks as "a monstrous blow to our European civilization," adding that "all our thoughts and feelings are now there, in Paris."

Meanwhile, a fellow senator, first deputy head of the Federation Council's defense and security committee Frants Klintsevich, suggested that the international talks on resolving the Syrian conflict in Vienna on Nov. 14 may discuss the idea of "creating a broad anti-terrorist coalition." The Russian and U.S. foreign ministers are already in Vienna.

Speaking ahead of the talks, Russian Foreign Ministry official spokesperson Maria Zakharova said that the events in Paris may affect the atmosphere and the course of the Vienna meeting.

"It is necessary to do everything to show our solidarity for real. Solidarity is the key word today," she said.

Meanwhile, Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov called on the leaders of Muslim countries to unite in the fight against ISIS.

"This evil must be rooted out," he said. "Otherwise, swarms of terrorists, like mud flows, will pour into all the countries and cities of the world. We once again urge the leaders of Arab and Muslim countries to unite their efforts against Islamic State," he wrote on his Instagram page.

Security in Russia stepped up

Following the events in Paris, politicians in Russia also call for tightened security, especially in the light of the recent threats against Russia from ISIS.

"Let's step up the fight in all areas and then you will see a good result. Given what is happening, all security measures must be stepped up to the maximum," the leader of the Russian Communist Party, Gennady Zyuganov, told the TASS news agency.

A member of the State Duma's security committee, Boris Reznik, also said that the Russian authorities should adopt extraordinary measures to tackle the threat of a terrorist attack.

"First, all security and law-enforcement agencies should be put on high alert. All of us too must be vigilant, it is necessary to raise people's awareness, to train them how to behave in crowded places. There must not be any carelessness on the metro, at airports, at facilities representing particular danger," he told the Kommersant FM radio station.

Meanwhile, senator Yevgeny Serebrennikov said that the Federation Council may discuss the issue of introducing additional security measures in Russia during its session on Monday, Nov. 16.
 
 #2
More tragedies to follow Paris massacre if humanity fails to present common front
By Tamara Zamyatina

MOSCOW, November 16. /TASS/. Last weekend's Paris massacre may well have replays elsewhere if the international community fails to present a common front against terrorism, polled experts have told TASS.

The deputy chairman of the international affairs committee of Russia's Federation Council (upper house of parliament), Andrey Klimov, believes that after the Paris shock politicians have developed deeper awareness of the problem of "scattered terrorism" and "sleeping cells" of the Islamic State, but have not derived the proper conclusions so far.

"After 9/11 in New York and last Friday's Paris attacks a great deal was and is still being said to the effect the world has changed. But during the period between these two bloody events radical Islamists staged massacres in Moscow, Volgograd, London, Paris (the raid against the office of Charlie Hebdo magazine), Turkey and Lebanon... But the world has not displayed greater unity in the struggle against terrorist threats," Klimov told TASS.

He believes that number one conclusion the politicians should make today is security cannot be selective. "The West is unable to ensure its security only by maintaining cooperation within NATO. Russia - its president, Foreign Ministry and parliament - have been making calls at all international forums for struggle against terrorism. At this point, with the Islamic State," he recalled.

After the Paris attacks the Vienna talks on a settlement in Syria showed a positive shift towards the understanding that without destroying the Islamic State there will be no peace in the Middle East, Europe or any other part of the world. But towards the end of the latest round of the Vienna talks US Secretary of State John Kerry again raised the issue of Syrian President Bashar Assad's future. But all what he said on that score was utterly out of place.

Don't our US partners distinguish between the real scale of the threat the Islamic State poses to entire humanity and the meager role of one personality in the Syrian conflict?" Klimov asked.

"For devising a system of comprehensive cooperation in resistance to radical Islamism it is essential at the level of the UN Security Council to declare as rouge states those countries which connive with terrorists, provide them with financing, training and medical care and do nothing to upset the operation of their websites. The international community must establish measures for punishing terrorists identical to the Nuremberg tribunals for Nazi war criminals," Klimov believes.

The director of the Political Studies Institute, Civic Chamber member Sergey Markov, believes that in the wake of the terrorist attacks in Paris the West is unlikely to change its attitude to Russia as a possible partner in an anti-terrorist coalition.

"Yet, it is quite possible that the US-led NATO countries will devise an algorithm of coordination between the Western anti-terrorist coalition and Russia. A historical parallel is quite appropriate. During World War II the Soviet Union's western allies in the anti-Hitler coalition - the United States and Britain - opened a second front. And they won together. These days the hope remains that politicians will pool efforts to provide a resolute response to the terrorist challenge to the security of humanity," Markov told TASS.
 
 #3
Valdai Discussion Club
http://valdaiclub.com
November 15, 2015
PARIS EVENTS WILL FURTHER TIGHTEN THE MIDDLE EAST KNOT
By Fyodor Lukyanov
Fyodor Lukyanov is Academic director of the Valdai Discussion Club, Chairman, Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Editor-in-Chief, Russia in Global Affairs journal.

The attacks will almost inevitably lead to an escalation of war in Iraq and Syria, as well as to changes in the balance of forces in the Middle East as a whole.
Although it will take time to truly evaluate the consequences of the November 13 massacre in Paris for the French, European and world politics, some conclusions can be made now.

The attacks will almost inevitably lead to an escalation of war in Iraq and Syria, as well as to changes in the balance of forces in the Middle East as a whole. The French government has been challenged with such audacity that it does not have the right not to respond; Paris has found itself in the same position as Washington after the September 11, 2001 attacks. The millions marching for solidarity in January after the killings at the office of the Charlie Hebdo magazine might have mimicked national mobilization, but the government also cannot avoid launching a major retribution. It might include more intensive attacks on the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, and a clearer and more coordinated allied strategy will certainly replace the rather haphazard attacks. Since France is unlikely to rally enough capabilities, even with the help of major European countries, for an effective response, Europe is likely to appeal to the United States, which has so far preferred to distance itself from the Middle East developments. Or, more precisely, minimized its involvement or limited it to anti-ISIS rhetoric.

It is now time the United States, despite President Obama's reluctance to get drawn into any military action, showed proper leadership and the ability to provide effective and strong support to its allies. It is essential for its own sake, if not so much for relations with Europe - perhaps, primarily for maintaining its reputation in Asia, where it is gradually creating a pattern of competition with China, - and Washington should confirm its own capabilities and reliability to its partners in the region.

The alignment of forces in the Middle East may change. The Gulf monarchies actually seem to believe that Iran's expansion and stronger foothold are more dangerous than the success of ISIS. Until recently, the Syrian conflict largely revolved around the fate of Bashar al-Assad, which meant that his opponents were fixated on regime change in Syria, giving it priority above anything else. At a time when leading Western countries start seeing ISIS as an even more dangerous threat, Saudi Arabia and its allies might be growing increasingly at odds with this belief. Yet, Arab monarchies cannot blatantly dissociate themselves from opposing the Islamists. Suspicions will be further fueled by the results of the investigation which should clarify the identity and background of the attackers. Much will depend on how connected they are to certain forces in that region (if at all). Be that as it may, a new round of the "big game" in the Middle East is inevitable, and if France tried to avoid it, the country would simply lose its reputation in that critical part of the world, probably along with Europe losing its influence there altogether.

As for Europe, it is likely to do a U-turn in its attitude to the refugees and further strengthen its commitment to a police-dominated handling of migration issues; a rise of right-wing sentiment can be expected there.

It so happened that I left Paris on the afternoon of November 13, after asking everyone there on the previous day at informal meetings the same question I had been asking them over the last three years - whether Marine Le Pen could become president. Until then, the answer was always no, no matter how high her popularity. The pragmatic French were unlikely to support her at the elections. This was the first time I heard: "Yes, it is possible." The carnage unleashed the next day will most likely increase this possibility.

The focus of migration policy will now shift to concern about a significant number of active or latent Islamists potentially present in the current flow of refugees wishing to move to Europe - a concern voiced even at the beginning of their flight. Until now, that concern was pushed to the sidelines of public debate and mainly interested the security services. Now the public sentiment can change appreciably. Germany will have to change its approach most dramatically after Chancellor Angela Merkel proclaimed an open-door policy back in the late summer and early fall. The country gradually began shifting away from it several weeks ago, but the Paris tragedy will certainly speed up the revision of this view dramatically. Even if far-right parties do not see a qualitative rise in popularity in leading European countries, mainstream politicians will have to adopt a large part of their slogans to retain the loyalty of terrified voters.

In general, we can say that, firstly, Europe continues to be faced with signs of a systemic crisis of their institutional and political model, and the need for transformation has become ever more obvious. Secondly, the largely familiar concept of "European security" in the OSCE's interpretation is becoming completely meaningless. European security is now inseparable from the crumbling Middle East developments, something that poses problems and dictates actions, something almost impossible to control.

For Russia, it may mean that its operation in Syria, if not a new model to follow, will make much more sense to many in the West. Its impact on the political and diplomatic process around Syria is difficult to predict, but if the United States, France and other participants try to step up the fighting, Russia's logic of choosing a partner on land and joining the fight against their enemies begins to make more sense as well. Until recently, strikes by the Washington-led coalition were not intended to dramatically change the situation in the theater of war, but were rather intended to assert its presence. If they decide to deal a crushing blow to ISIS, they would need to reduce the pressure on Assad, actually acknowledging the fact that the coalition is fighting on his side. Moreover, they would need to involve the "moderate opposition." How it could be done given the resistance of the hardline anti-Assad countries in the region such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey is difficult to say, but the pressure on them will grow. Among Western countries, France is most implacable in its resentment of Assad, but some changes are possible now.

Moscow, at least, has the right to tell the rest of its partners in the Syrian process that the events have confirmed that its priorities are correct. Being the most capable foreign military force in the region, Russia is also quite able to convert that capacity into political influence. Ukraine, until now a major irritant in relations between Russia and Europe / the West, is gradually taking a backseat.

The Paris events will further tighten the Middle East knot, but an attempt to sever it in one powerful stroke, like the one the United States made in 2001 after 9/11, is likely to have the same "success" as that one. The masterminds of the Paris attacks will be rubbing their hands, as bin Laden once was, watching the stone they threw cause an uncontrollable avalanche.
 
#4
www.rt.com
November 16, 2015
Putin: ISIS financed from 40 countries, including G20 members

President Vladimir Putin says he's shared Russian intelligence data on Islamic State financing with his G20 colleagues: the terrorists appear to be financed from 40 countries, including some G20 member states.

During the summit, "I provided examples based on our data on the financing of different Islamic State (IS, formerly ISIS/ISIL) units by private individuals. This money, as we have established, comes from 40 countries and, there are some of the G20 members among them," Putin told the journalists.

Putin also spoke of the urgent need to curb the illegal oil trade by IS.

"I've shown our colleagues photos taken from space and from aircraft which clearly demonstrate the scale of the illegal trade in oil and petroleum products," he said.

"The motorcade of refueling vehicles stretched for dozens of kilometers, so that from a height of 4,000 to 5,000 meters they stretch beyond the horizon," Putin added, comparing the convoy to gas and oil pipeline systems.

It's not the right time to try and figure out which country is more and which is less effective in the battle with Islamic State, as now a united international effort is needed against the terrorist group, Putin said.

Putin reiterated Russia's readiness to support armed opposition in Syria in its efforts to fight Islamic State.

"Some armed opposition groups consider it possible to begin active operations against IS with Russia's support. And we are ready to provide such support from the air. If it happens it could become a good basis for the subsequent work on a political settlement," he said.

"We really need support from the US, European nations, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran," the president added.
 
 
 #5
Huffingtonpost.com
November 15, 2015
Putin's Russia: Claims Versus Reality
By Simon Saradzhyan
Research fellow, Harvard's Belfer Center

When Barack Obama attends the G20 summit in Turkey on November 15-16, he will meet a man who, in the U.S. president's own words, leads "a regional power" that has become "isolated", and "doesn't make anything" with its "economy in tatters" and immigrants shunning it. Some of America's leading policy-shapers share their president's view of Vladimir Putin and Russia. Stephen Kinzer of Brown University believes Russia is "on the brink of economic collapse" while Rajan Menon of the City College of New York maintains that "Russia has been reduced to a regional power." Pulitzer Prize winning columnist Brett Stephens even sees "the beginning of Mr. Putin's undoing" while former deputy U.S. Treasury secretary Roger Altman asserts that "Russia is on the edge." "Its population is small and declining, life expectancy is falling," according to Altman. Jeffrey Gedmin of Georgetown University too sees negative demographic trends in Russia, arguing that "in Mr. Putin's Russia, infant mortality is up and life expectancy is down." But how much do these claims correspond with reality? Let us examine them one by one:

Russia is isolated: While some Western governments do shun the Kremlin over the crisis in Ukraine, others eagerly visit Russia to profess their friendship. India's External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj told her host and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in October that "Russia is India's tried and tested partner and a real friend" while China's ambassador to Russia Li Hui has rowed that "China and Russia are together now like lips and teeth." Both India and China are Russia's partners in the BRICS organization as well as in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). When Vladimir Putin decided to organize back-to-back summits of BRICS, SCO and the Eurasian Economic Commonwealth in Ufa earlier this year, not only all of the participating countries were represented by their leaders at these events, but leaders of India and Pakistan sought and received membership in SCO for their countries. All in all 14 heads of states attended the events in Ufa. Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev is probably exaggerating, but his estimate that 40 countries and unions would like to be partners of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union does cast doubt on claims of Russia's isolation. These July 2015 summits were then followed by visits of Jordanian, Egyptian and Abu Dhabi leaders who came to see what Russian-made warplanes and air weapons would be exhibited at MAKS-2015 outside Moscow in August 2015.

Russia is a regional power: If Russia were a regional power, then what exactly were Russian diplomats doing, helping their American counterparts to secure an agreement to dismantle Syrian chemical weapons in the fall of 2013 and to look for a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Syria in the fall of 2015? And how come America's new chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and his deputy refer to Russia an "existential threat" while NATO's secretary general is calling Russia is a "global actor?" Can the country with the largest number of nuclear weapons that can destroy the planet many times over be described as a regional power?

Russia doesn't make anything: If this claim were true, then whose cruise missiles have recently traversed the Caspian Sea and two countries 1,500 km to hit targets in Syria? Russian companies make and sell enough weapons for Russia to remain the second largest exporter of arms in the world with the portfolio of outstanding orders for Russian-made arms exceeding $40 billion. In the meantime, Russia's nuclear corporation Rosatom reports that its order book consists of overseas projects worth more than $100 million. Not all common Americans might be aware of the Russian weapons and nuclear power plants, but surely at least some of the U.S. policy makers must know that the only way U.S. astronauts can get to and from the International Space Station is ask the Russian space agency to give them a ride in Russian-made Soyuz-TMA crew craft launched by a Russian-made Soyuz rocket. It can also be noted that the Russian RD-180 engines have been powering U.S. Atlas rockets - that the American government relies upon to launch military cargos into orbit - for years while Russian-made nuclear fuel has been used to power U.S. inter-planetary missions. Russia has also held a record for the sharpest satellite imaging of the Earth with a resolution of 121 megapixels.

Russia's economy is in tatters and on the brink of collapse with immigrants are shunning the country: The World Bank's baseline scenario for Russia as of September 2015 does anticipate contractions of Russian GDP by 3.8 percent in 2015 and 0.6 percent in 2016 before the economy recovers to post a growth rate of 1.5 percent in 2017. That's obviously bad news for the Russian economy, which has been battered by decline in oil prices and, to a less extent, by Western sanctions, but not exactly catastrophic, especially if compared to neighboring Ukraine, whose GDP is forecast to shrink by 12% this year. As ex-first deputy chairman of Russia's Central Bank Sergey Aleksashenko, who has no love lost for Putin's ways of managing the Russian economy, notes, the collapse of the Russian economy is not in the cards and it's "more stable than many believe." It is true that the current economic contraction in Russia has prompted many foreign citizens to leave this country, but it would still be wrong to claim that "immigrants aren't rushing to Moscow in search of opportunity" as Mr. Obama has done. Some 2 million foreign citizens are officially registered as residing in Moscow as of 2015, accounting for more than 16% of the Russian capital's population, according to the city police force's estimate. And Russia was second only to US in the number of immigrants living in it as of 2013. U.S. hosted 45.8 million immigrants while Russia hosted 11 million and Germany hosted 9 million that year, according to the United Nations' population division.

Russia's population is declining: While Mr. Altman and others claim that Russia's population is declining and life expectancy is falling, the opposite is actually true. Russia's population grew from 2008 to 2014, which is the latest year that the World Bank' databases offer information on population of Russia as of November 2015. Moreover, Russia also registered the so-called natural population increase in with the number of births exceeding the number of deaths in June - October 2014, if Russia's state statistical service were to be believed. Though this positive trend discontinued in November 2014, but Russia's population nevertheless grew in the first seven months of 2015 thanks to the inbound immigration, according to Russia's statistical service. Neither do Mr. Gedmin's claims -- that infant mortality is up and life expectancy is down in Russia -- hold water. Life expectancy has been growing in Russia since 2004 while infant mortality has been declining since the 1990s. Finally, would you call the population of a country which is in the Top 10 of the world's most populous countries and which is home to 140 million people, "small" as Mr. Gedmin does?

Putin's political end is near: If that was the case, then how come polls conducted by Russia's most respected independent pollster Levada Cente show that the share of Russians who approve of the activities of Vladimir Putin has grown from 61% in late 2013 to 88 percent in late 2015? While the Russian economy is in recession, the World Bank expects it to start growing again in 2017 and Putin's government has accumulated enough hard currency reserves to ride out 2-3 years to pay public servants and pensioners until the economy improves.

Russia's leaders and population are facing a number of long-term adverse trends, including inefficiency of the economy, insufficient quality of governance, pervasive corruption, fragility of demographic improvements, home-grown and transnational terrorism, instability in neighboring countries and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction But the existence of these long-term trends, confluence of some of which, if unaddressed, could eventually come to pose very serious challenges to the Russian statehood, is no excuse for misunderstanding or distorting the current realities in Russia. A sound policy toward any country begins with clear understanding of key facts that characterize it. When crafting policies toward Russia, U.S. and other Western leaders would do well by keeping that in mind.

PS See some of the graphs I have drawn using data from the World Bank to illustrate how wrong could be some of the claims on Russia here:
http://saradzhyan.livejournal.com/55589.html


 
#6
http://readrussia.com
November 15, 2015
Demographic Crisis, American Style
By Mark Adomanis
[Links here http://readrussia.com/2015/11/15/demographic-crisis-american-style/]

Angus Deaton has had himself a pretty darn good 2015. An economist at Princeton, Deaton won the Nobel Prize a little over a month ago. That, by itself, would be a signal accomplishment, a far more impressive achievement than even the best of economists could hope for. But he hasn't stopped there: he recently published an article that, by itself, could very well revolutionize American political discourse.

Deaton doesn't, at first glance, seem the most likely person to spark a political firestorm. A soften-spoken 70 year old Scotsman and career academic, to the extent that he has a reputation, Deaton's is as an extremely careful, thorough, and methodical empirical researcher. That might sound like faint praise or, even a bit redundant as a description for a professor (shouldn't we expect all of our economists to be detail oriented?) but the reality is that most economic models employ sweeping sets of assumptions in order to function. So, in great contrast to the output of famous economists like Friedrich Hayek or Milton Friedman, Denton's work has primarily focused on trying to understand what has happened in the world as opposed to what his models say should happen.

The paper in question, the one that has caused such an uproar, was co-written by Deaton with Anne Case, his wife and fellow Princeton professor. It has the somewhat unexciting title of "Rising Morbidity and Mortality in Midlife Among White Non-Hispanic Americans in the 21St Century."

Although, by the standards of academic publications the paper, at just 6 pages, is extremely short, its findings are nothing less than earth shattering. In contrast to all other groups of the US population, and in even bigger contrast to recent experience in other industrialized countries, Deaton and Case discovered that since the mid 1990's middle-aged white Americans have seen their mortality rate increase substantially.

Even more startling was the cause of this mortality spike. Given recent trends in obesity, it would be natural to assume that Americans were being felled by the maladies that are most often associated with it: heart disease, cancer, and diabetes. As Deaton and Case showed, however, this was not actually the case. Over the past two decades diabetes mortality was essentially steady, while deaths from lung cancer decreased substantially.

Instead, white Americans were dying from a potent brew of social maladies including suicide, drug overdoses, and the chronic liver disease that is associated with alcoholism: they were killing themselves by drinking too much and taking massive amounts of opioid pain medicines. Most tragically of all, the mortality that was increasingly rampaging through the middle-aged white population was entirely preventable.  

If Deaton and Case's list of maladies sounds a bit familiar to Russia watchers it should: it is essentially the exact same social problems that wreaked such horrible havoc on working-age Russians during the 1990s economic collapse. America, where the ideas of equal opportunity, upward mobility, and social progress have long reigned supreme, and where Russia's experience during the 1990s is viewed with equal parts fascination and contempt, must suddenly deal with a new, and very ugly, reality in which a large section of its population is much less healthy than the preceding generation.

Now, just to be clear, the magnitude of the mortality crisis in America is (so far!) much less significant that was the case in Russia during the 90s. Deaton and Case's best proxy for excess deaths (the number of deaths that would not have occurred if the mortality rate among US Whites had stayed the same that it was in 1998) is in the range of 100,000. That is a significant, tragic number, one that should not be understated or minimized. But, as awful as it is, it is far smaller than the best estimates of Russia's excess mortality during the post-collapse years (which are somewhere between 1 and 2 million among a population less than half the size of America's).

Why do I think Deaton's article is so transformative? First because it so clearly puts the idea of "American exceptionalism" on the defensive. Particularly among the political elite, but also among a health section of the press corps, it is simply taken for granted that the US is an example for the rest of the world. At an absolute minimum, the huge deterioration in white Americans' health since the mid 1990's makes this position a bit more difficult to defend. It takes an awful lot to penetrate politicized discourses, but the facts are so ugly (and at such odds with the usually upbeat mainstream narrative) that a bit more humility and circumspection should be in order.

The second reason I think Deaton and Case's article is so important because, with any luck, it will substantially improve the quality of the public discourse about Russia. I know this is a personal concern more than it is an issue with genuinely mass appeal, but American Russian analysis has been badly distorted by the "dying nation" meme, the remarkably widespread idea that any country with an increasing mortality rate is an unimaginable, nightmarish hellscape. It might also get people to think a bit more critically about the issues plaguing Russians. Since white Americans are suffering from broadly similar, if muted, versions of the same maladies, I would suggest that they are unlikely to be directly related to "democracy" or "autocracy." As simple and obvious as that observation might be, there is a pervasive tendency to analyze Russia's mortality crisis through the lens of its unresponsive and hierarchical political system.

 
#7
Subject: USRBC Russia Monthly Economic Review
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2015 09:05:00 -0500 (EST)
From: USRBC Updates <update@usrbc.org>

USRBC Russia Monthly Economic Review (US-Russia Business Council/www.usrbc.org)

We are pleased to present the first edition of USRBC's revamped monthly economic review series, offering a snapshot on the Russian economy and some insights into near-term developments. We welcome comments and suggestions in order to tailor this report to meet your needs. Below is an overview of the report, but to read the full edition, please click here >>

Russia Monthly Economic Review
November 2015
Overview

Russia's economic contraction is slowing and the downturn may have bottomed out in 3Q2015. The Purchasing Managers' Index for Manufacturing in October showed signs of tentative growth. That said, the economy's overall performance remains flat and the modest recovery projected for 2016 is likely to be sluggish.

    GDP Likely to Shrink by 4% This Year: Russia's economic contraction slowed to 3.8 percent in September after a 4.6 percent contraction in July and August. The economy shrank by 4.3 percent in 3Q15 after a 4.6 percent decline in 2Q15.
    YOY GDP Growth Unlikely To Exceed 1% Next Year: Falling oil prices and economic uncertainty in China have damped the Russian government's optimism. The Ministry of Economic Development has revised its 2015 economic forecast downward to a 3.9 percent contraction and downgraded its outlook for 2016 to 0.7 percent growth.
    Real GDP Growth More Likely In 2017: The consensus of private economists surveyed recently by Bloomberg was for the 2015 contraction to be about 4 percent and for economic stagnation through 2016.
    Sanctions Cut GDP Growth by 1%: The IMF estimated that Western sanctions would reduce Russia's economic growth by 1.0-1.5 percent in the near-term and 9 percent over the medium-term.
    Central Bank Not Ready For Interest Rate Cuts: The Central Bank declined to cut interest rates at its meeting on October 30 due to high inflation and inflation expectations.
    Ruble Volatility Continues: The ruble continues to be fairly volatile, tracking the swings in the price of oil as energy markets try to find equilibrium.
 
 #8
Russia Insider
www.russia-insider.com
November 16, 2015
How Sanctions Are Strengthening Russia's Financial System
Falling capital outflow suggests deleveraging is ending and with it dependence on Western financial markets
By Alexander Mercouris

As confidence grows that the Russian economy has turned the corner, the Russians have been taking an increasingly hard line on sanctions.

Economics Minister Ulyukaev has said - echoing what Putin's Chief of Staff Sergei Ivanov has also said - that Russia is not asking for the sanctions to be lifted. That is purely a decision for the Europeans.

More to the pont Ulyukaev twisted the knife a little but saying that the longer the sanctions remain in place the less effective they become.

That is true.

The major consequence of the sanctions - the only one that in economic terms matters - is that Russian companies have been unable to borrow in Western financial markets.

The result of that was that during the recession caused by the oil price fall Russian companies were unable to roll over their foreign debts, or increase their debts. Instead they were forced to go on paying them.

One important company - the airline company Transaero - which had over borrowed in Western financial markets - has been forced to close.

As I predicted a year ago, the government has however refused to bail out private companies like Transaero that have found themselves in this position - and neither it should it do so.

The great majority of companies have managed to pay their debts.

The result is that whereas the fall in oil prices would normally lead to a rise in the foreign currency debts of Russian companies, we have actually seen a sharp fall.

Total foreign debt has fallen by around a third, from $730 billion at the time sanctions were imposed in July 2014, to less than $500 billion now.

Meanwhile the sanctions are having a transformative effect on Russia's financial system.

Certain much needed technical steps have been taken.

An alternative interbank payment to SWIFT has been created. A Russian credit agency is being set up. MasterCard and Visa have been obliged to locate transfer hubs in Russia and an alternative Russian card system is being created.

Even more important, the sanctions are changing the financial situation inside Russia.

The sharp fall in indebtedness means that money is increasingly staying within Russia.  

The Central Bank says that total capital outflow will be only $70 billion this year (half the level of last year).  

The bulk of capital outflow - around $50 billion - took place in the first two quarters. It seems in the third quarter there was even a small capital inflow.

The fall in capital outflow is a result of the fall in the level of foreign debt.

What is called "capital outflow" in Russia's case is mostly debt payment.  

The popular image of rich Russians dashing for the exits with suitcases full of money is a myth. That did happen in Russia during the 1990s. However what was different about the crises of 2008 and 2014 is that such capital flight - which should not be confused with normal capital outflow - did not happen to any great degree.  

A lot of people converted their roubles into dollars. However they kept their money in Russia in dollar and euro accounts.

There will be more capital outflow in the last quarter as companies have to pay more foreign debts  during the traditional debt payment period at the end of the year.  However the fact the rate of capital outflow is declining is a further sign that the period of the economy's deleveraging on its foreign debt is drawing to a close.

What that means is that the Russian economy's long period of dependence on foreign capital is finally drawing to a close.  

Russian companies are awash with cash. Instead of having to use this cash to pay foreign debt, they will increasingly keep it in Russia.  Not only will that cause the rouble to strengthen, but it will cause the financial system to strengthen as well.

The Russian authorities meanwhile are taking more steps to strengthen the financial system.

The Russian banking system is seriously unbalanced.

At the top end it is heavily concentrated in a small number of giant largely state owned banks like VTB and Sberbank. These traditionally - and unsurprisingly - find it easier to work with big companies than medium sized or smaller ones.  

It is however precisely more medium sized and smaller companies that Russia needs.  

The trouble is that it is precisely the kind of banks needed to support such companies that Russia most lacks. Whilst Russia does have many private banks, not all of them are financially sound or well run.

Steps are now being taken to sort out this problem and to plug this gap.

Ever since Nabiullina was appointed Chairman, the Central Bank has been cleaning up the banking system by revoking the licences of weaker banks. Hopefully those that survive the cull will be better able to do their job properly.

At the same time the Russian Post is developing a project to offer the population banking services.

This was originally launched in 2013 as part of a plan to reorganise and increase the efficiency of the Russian Post, which has until recently been beset with problems.

If done intelligently this should however also provide Russians with a safe publicly owned banking service alongside VTB and Sberbank .

Since it would be a lot more decentralised than VTB and Sberbank are, it could  in time become - and is probably intended to become - something like the public banking service, which exists in Germany and which is a key provider of credit to the Mittelstand - the small and medium sized businesses that form the core of Germany's economy.

That is for the long term. In the nearer term the improving financial conditions in Russia make it less likely Russian companies will turn to European financial markets once sanctions are lifted to anything like the extent they did before.

Already European financial markets are worrying about a loss of international business. A report just issued frets that the City of London is losing out to New York and to the new financial centres in Asia.

For that the Europeans - and the British especially - have no-one to blame but themselves.  

Whilst Russian business is only a very small part of their business, using financial centres as weapons of economic warfare is a guaranteed way of harming their reputation. In Britain especially it contradicts the City's key principle: that it is always open for business.

As Ulyukaev says, the longer the sanctions remain, the less effective they become. Over time they will be so ineffective they will not matter any more.  

At that point there may even be some hard-bitten old siloviki in Russia who will say they have in fact done their work very well, and that they were imposed on the country just when they were most needed.
 #9
Forbes.com
November 15, 2015
Russia Getting More Money From Asia As Sanctions Scare Europeans
By Kenneth Rapoza

Thank God for China.

The Chinese lead the roost of Asian companies that have been investing in the Russian economy since the Europeans have stepped back on account of Ukraine-inspired sanctions.  At this weekend's G-20 summit in Antalya, Turkey, Vladimir Putin gave the Europeans a little jab in the ribcage when he touted the fact that Asia is now 90% of the foreign direct investment in Russia.

"Cooperation with Asian partners in attracting funds gains special relevance in the current situation," Putin told reporters on the sidelines of the G20 summit. "Approximately 90 percent of investments in the Russian market came from Asia this year," he said.

Russian banks and energy companies were sanctioned in July 2014. Many domestic companies have also been banned from obtaining euro credit from European banks, forcing them to take on Russian double digit yield instead, or abstain from credit. The sanctions were put in place due to Russian involvement in east Ukraine's separatist movements.

Putin can tout Asia, and China, all he wants. FDI in Russia has collapsed over the last several years, based on external sector statistics published the Russian Central Bank. Russian FDI, including equity, reinvestment, and foreign credit to Russian firms, went from $69.2 billion in 2013 to $22.8 billion in 2014. According to the latest stats on the Bank's website, Russian FDI was just $1.3 billion in the first quarter compared to $12.9 billion in the first quarter of 2014.

Russia's biggest European trading partner, The Netherlands, has cut its investment in Russia four-fold. In 2013, FDI from there was $5.7 billion and fell in 2014 to $1.23 billion. In the first quarter of this year, The Netherlands took $526 million out of Russia compared to inflows of nearly a billion dollars in the first quarter of 2014. Germany, Russia's second biggest European partner, put just $335 million to work in Russia in 2014, rising minimally to $349 in 2014. This is down from over $2.2 billion in 2012. Germany has come back somewhat when comparing first quarter 2014 to first quarter 2015.

China's FDI for the first quarter was just $159 million compared to Germany's $585 million in inflows. China inflows into Russia was $1.27 billion last year, making it Russia's biggest source of foreign capital. China's FDI into Russia is nearly double that of the United States.
 
 #10
Russia Beyond the Headlines/Gazeta.ru
www.rbth.ru
November 16, 2015
Russians still buying American despite economic hardships
Despite economic sanctions and the crisis, U.S. companies are continuing to increase their presence in Russia. The cornerstone of American success is the inexpensive fast-food market, which has only grown more popular during the crisis.
AVEL CHERNYSHOV, GAZETA.RU

Companies from the United States are continuing their active expansion into the Russian market.

At the end of the period between the second half of 2014 and the first half of 2015, the share of U.S. brands accounted for 64 percent of the new outlets opened in Russia, according to a study carried out by the company Magazin Magazinov. The share of the United States' nearest rivals (Sweden and Spain) accounted for only 8 percent.

According to experts, 2015 saw a negative trend in Russia's retail sector for the first time - more international stores closed than opened (1,024 outlets closed and 991 opened).

However, this trend did not affect the Americans. Over the year, American brands closed down 165 outlets, but opened 364. Such brands as Carl's Junior, American Eagle Outfitters, Diane von Furstenberg and Wendy's left the market (although Carl's Junior, incidentally, announced its return to Yekaterinburg soon afterward).

However, they were replaced by a whole galaxy of new players. Dockers, Forever 21, Charley's Philly Steaks, Great American Cookies, Magnolia Bakery, Pretzelmaker, Schlotsky's, Twin Peaks, Crate & Barrel and others opened their doors in Russia for the first time.

As specified by Olga Yasko, director of the research department at Knight Frank (Russia and CIS), a total of 14 new American brands entered the Russian market during this period.

As noted in the study, the activity of foreign chains declined due to a sharp drop in retail turnover (minus 7.9 percent, the biggest drop since 1991) and the weakening of the national currency against the dollar.

Another obvious reason is the decline in real incomes of the population, which amounted to 3 percent. The chains hit hardest were those operating in the mid-price segment, which according to the study accounted for almost 90 percent of the outlets that have closed.

Political factors - worsening relations with the West, sanctions, the crisis in Ukraine - these all played their role as well. However, this did not hinder U.S. retailers from continuing to develop their presence on the Russian market.

The list of products that U.S. companies offer to the Russians is quite wide and includes luxury brands. For example, the world-famous jeweler Tiffany opened its first wholly owned retail store in Russia in 2014, though in August this year it announced that it had postponed the opening of a second outlet.

However, the most active is public catering, which, according to Russian analysts, was quite predictable - sales of cheap fast food always go up in times of crisis.

"Relatively high activity was seen in the American fast-food players - Dippin' Dots, Krispy Kreme, Nathan's Famous," said Valentin Gavrilov, director of market research at CBRE.

The top five brands that have shown the most activity consists solely of American fast-food chains (KFC, Burger King, McDonald's, Starbucks, and Baskin Robbins opened the most new outlets in Russia this year).

Burger King and KFC have also been active in continuing their expansion, opening outlets in seven and five new cities, respectively. This is despite the fact that in general, the number of outlets in the cities with a population of one million people has decreased by 15 percent compared to 2014.

"New players will continue to come and test the Russian market for interest in their products," said Gavrilov. "Entrance into the market is quite cheap now, as commercial conditions for tenants have improved significantly compared to the pre-crisis situation."

At the same time, according to Yulia Sitnikova, senior research consultant at Magazin Magazinov, U.S. retailers will maintain their presence in the market despite the political problems.

"It is unlikely that American brands will leave the market completely," she says.

"The Russian market is a big sales market, pretty well developed by them (for instance by restaurant chains). Perhaps, sanctions and complications in the international situation may affect the mood of retailers and somehow restrain their expansion. But they will not by any means exit from the market."

Given current trends, street food and cheap clothes will retain the best positions.

"Most likely, fast-food chains will continue to grow," Gavrilov says.

"As for fashion-retail, development plans will be mostly in the low-price segment brands. The rest are likely to maintain quite a conservative policy of waiting for the stabilization of the population's incomes and retail turnover."

First published in Russian by Gazeta.ru
 
 #11
Bloomberg
November 13, 2015
Half of Russia's Richest People Are Planning to Cash Out
By Alexander Sazonov
[Charts here http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-11-13/putin-s-gilded-cage-russia-s-rich-are-facing-cash-out-conundrum]

It's been a quarter century since the fall of the Soviet empire triggered one of history's greatest wealth transfers. Now bankers are preparing for another as Russia's first generation of capitalists makes way for the next.

Confidential surveys of dozens of millionaires and billionaires conducted since European and U.S. economic sanctions began last year show Russia's wealthy are finding little support within the country's legal framework to pass down businesses. A majority say they're taking the issue of succession seriously for the first time.

"Owners of major enterprises are basically hostages," said Alena Ledeneva, a professor of politics at University College London, who has studied the workings of power networks in Russia for two decades. "They can suggest their kids as hostages to take their place, but only Putin's system will decide whether to incorporate them or not."

Family Dynasties

The result could be a surge in transactions for Russian businesses in coming years, according to Phoenix Advisors, a Moscow-based investment firm that helps entrepreneurs navigate succession and transition planning challenges.

Half of the respondents to a PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP study released in 2014 said they plan to sell their holdings, more than double the global average. More than half the respondents to a survey from the Moscow Skolkovo School of Management Wealth Transformation Centre that was released in February believe that "large Russian companies will not become family dynasties."

The PwC study surveyed 2,484 executives and directors in 40 countries, including 57 in Russia. The Skolkovo survey surveyed 39 Russian business leaders. The center is based in a tech and educational hub in Moscow championed by Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev and supported by billionaires Viktor Vekselberg, Roman Abramovich, Alexander Abramov and Petr Aven, who are part of its affiliated experts group.

President Vladimir Putin's spokesman Dmitry Peskov didn't respond to requests for comment.

Expensive Problem

For the country's richest people it's a pricey problem. The 22 Russians on the Bloomberg Billionaires Index daily ranking of the world's 400 wealthiest people control about $200 billion combined and more than half of that -- $115 billion -- is tied up in closely held or publicly traded companies operating in Russia.

The problem they face is one that's unique to the country's particular brand of capitalism. Russia's tradition of dynastic wealth ended when the Bolsheviks swept to power a century ago, and the post-Soviet economy that has been shaped under Putin favors cultivated personal relationships and a mastery of rules that are for the most part unwritten.

Power Ties

"The combination of an aging generation of entrepreneurs with the tendency to exit rather than pass on to the family is a specific characteristic of the Russian market," said Ilya Solarev from UBS Wealth Management, which manages nearly $500 billion for high net worth individuals.

As a result, the vast majority of wealthy Russians have had to nurture ties to people with various kinds of power -- from lawmakers and tax officials to regulators and other owners -- for years and even decades. This creates a form of "intangible capital" that can't be "automatically transferred to the next generation," the Skolkovo center said.

"The most important thing is law enforcement," one respondent is cited as saying in the survey. "Why earn another billion if the first one will be seized?"
Contrast that with the rest of the world, where the rich have long benefited from legal structures that safeguard the transfer of wealth between generations.

In the U.S., people have used the ever-growing sophistication of the legal system to safeguard the transfer of wealth between generations for decades. Sam Walton, for example, handed ownership of Wal-Mart to his four children in the 1950s, creating the world's largest family fortune. His offspring use charitable annuity trusts to maintain control of the retailer through a family investment vehicle.

One-third of the 400 billionaires on the Bloomberg index inherited the fortunes they control. A quarter of the 125 billionaires from the U.S. in the ranking inherited their wealth while half of Europe's 106 biggest fortunes were passed down at least one generation.

With little of the legal framework in place to protect their assets, at least two wealthy Russian businessmen are attempting to pass their hard-won aristocracy to an heir, including Andrey Guryev, who is currently the only billionaire among the country's richest who has appointed a child as chief executive of his core business.

Political Consequences

A former partner of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, once Russia's richest man, Guryev helped expand Phosagro OAO into Europe's largest maker of phosphate fertilizers, and did so while sitting in the upper house of parliament for more than a decade.

Guryev controls a fortune valued at $4.5 billion. Khodorkovsky, the former main owner of Yukos Oil Co., was convicted of tax evasion, money laundering and oil embezzlement in 2005. He has maintained his innocence, saying the charges against him were retribution for financing political parties that opposed Putin, an allegation the government denies. He spent a decade in prison and now lives in exile in Switzerland.

Guryev declined to comment. Olga Pispanen, a spokeswoman for Khodorkovsky, said he declined to comment.

Passing Control

Guryev quit politics in 2013 as a series of measures designed to force officials to repatriate overseas assets was being debated and passed control of his London-listed company to his son, Andrey Guryev Jr., appointing him to be its chief executive officer. To ensure a smooth transition, Guryev, 55, became deputy chairman to oversee the company's strategy.

"I talk with my father very often," Guryev Jr., 33, who graduated from University of Greenwich in London, said in an interview. "It would be difficult for me if he didn't supervise the company's management."

David Yakobachvili is taking a similar approach. The 58-year-old businessman sold a majority stake he held with three partners in juice producer Wimm-Bill-Dann Foods to PepsiCo in 2010 for $3.8 billion. His son, Mikhail, moved back to Moscow after graduating from New York University last year to learn the nuances of investing from his dad.

Real Life

"The university of real life is the most useful," Yakobachvili said. "The more my son sees, the better."

He said his son helped negotiate the sale of 49 percent of his energy company, Petrocas Energy Group, to state-run Rosneft for $144 million last December.

"I am looking at how my father talks with other people," Mikhail Yakobachvili said at the family's headquarters, where the pair have neighboring offices.

This attempt at a succession strategy is out of step with most moneyed Russians. When asked to identify the critical challenges to their businesses, 61 percent of owners cited "government and regulation," almost double the average in PwC's survey. Limiting property rights is a defining characteristics of "Putin's system," according to University College London's Ledeneva.

There are some 60,000 business owners who will grapple with the transfer dilemma over the next several years, according to Ruben Vardanyan, chairman of the expert council for the Skolkovo center. Vardanyan, who sold Troika Dialog investment bank to state-run Sberbank for more than $1 billion in 2011, created Phoenix Advisors this year to help entrepreneurs navigate ownership changes.

"Few Russian business owners are thinking of transferring their assets to the next generation, so selling is on their agenda," Phoenix Advisors Managing Director Alexey Stankevich said. "We expect this to trigger a surge in M&A."
 
 #12
Russia stands for adopting legally binding agreement at climate change conference

MOSCOW, November 13. /TASS/. Moscow stands for adopting at a climate change conference in Paris of a legally binding agreement for a period after the year 2020, the Russian foreign ministry said on Friday.

"Russia considers the forthcoming 21st session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 21) to the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 11th session of the Meeting of the Parties (CMP11) to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol due to be held in Paris on November 30-December 11 as an international event of milestone importance, which is to outline prospects for sustainable development on our planet," the ministry said. "We stand for adopting a comprehensive legally binding agreement for a period after 2020 that would pool efforts of all countries, first of all, key greenhouse gas issuers, and would be a solid basis for a lasting climatic regime balanced in all its aspects, both ecological, economic and political."

Russia "has been considerably contributing to international efforts to prevent climate change," the ministry said. "We have exceeded the target of the first period of liabilities under the Kyoto Protocol - we have been keeping greenhouse gas emissions at a level that is by a third lower than the basic figure of 1990 for two decades. It compensates for emission growths in other countries and regions of the globe. Thus, emissions from Russia's energy sector have reduced by 37% in the past twenty years, which equals to the five-years' emissions of all European Union states and the United States' emissions in three years."

"Moreover, Russia's GDP has growth by almost 80% in the past 15 years while greenhouse emissions growth, thanks to modernization and regulation, is only 12% It refutes allegations that Russia is only reaping the fruits of the economic slump of the 1990s," the ministry stressed.

Being a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol, over its second period, "Russia will continue to implement all of its liabilities, except quantitative [taking into account its potential signatories, Kyoto Protocol-2 embraces only 13-14% of the entire global greenhouse gas emission, which makes it impossible to solve the climate problem]," the ministry stressed.

Moscow supports the steps of the international community to mobilize financial assistance and technology transfer on climate-related purposes to developing countries. "It is a guarantee of invigoration of their own efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to climate change," the foreign ministry said. "In this context, we attach greater significance to decisions on the financial and technological block of issues, adopted at the climate conferences in Copenhagen, Warsaw and Lima, including measures on the Green Climate Fund."

Legal Framework in Russia

Russia is pursuing a consistent policy towards reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. "Russia has adopted a Climate Doctrine and a comprehensive action plan on its implementation. The normative base includes the presidential decree on measures to enhance energy and ecological efficiency of the Russian economy, the federal law on energy saving, Russia's Energy Strategy for a period till 2030, the presidential decree on reduction of greenhouse gas emissions of September 30, 2013 and the Russian government's resolution on its implementation of April 2, 2014," the ministry noted. "All these measures are called to ensure cumulative reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in a volume of more than 30 billion tonnes of CO2 equivalent by 2020."

"Russian was among the first UNFCCC signatory parties to announce in March 2015 parameters of its possible liabilities for the post-Kyoto period, namely reduction of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions at a level of 70-75% of the 1990 emissions by the year 2030, given the absorbing capacity of forests is maximally taken into account," the ministry added.
 
 #13
Center for Global Interests
http://globalinterests.org
November 10, 2015
Paris Climate Talks Should Include Russia's Lake Baikal
Preserving the Lake Baikal ecosystem is a matter of regional security that must be addressed at the international and grassroots levels
By James Neimeister
James Neimeister is a freelance writer and journalist. He was a Fulbright English Teaching Assistant in Russia from 2013 to 2014.

Following this year's unnaturally dry summer, wildfires of an intensity not seen in decades have roared across the shores of Russia's Lake Baikal. At their peak, they raged across nearly 150,000 hectares of land, an area roughly equivalent to that of the Houston metropolitan area. Greenpeace Russia estimates that over the course of July and August alone, up to 1.5 million hectares burned - that is, over 5.5 thousand square miles.

The image of Siberia burning is deeply unsettling, especially given its reputation as one of the coldest places on earth. Though wildfires in the region occur each year, their recent size and severity reveal broad ecological stress in the region. Of equal concern is Lake Baikal's declining water level, which in early 2015 dropped below critical levels for the first time in more than three decades.

As one of the world's most unique and precious natural wonders, the Lake Baikal ecosystem must be protected as a matter of global obligation. The lake also holds up to 20 percent of the world's unfrozen freshwater reserves, making its long-term security a lynchpin of regional and global stability. But as various competing interests line up to stake their claims to Baikal's resources, securing an equitable future for Baikal and the life it sustains will require international cooperation. After all, nearly half of the Baikal watershed is located in Mongolia.

There are several ways the international community can be involved in protecting the Lake Baikal ecosystem. First, the international community must urge the Russian and Mongolian governments to take their ecological responsibilities seriously. Second, it must make considerable investments in scientific cooperation. Finally, the international community must ensure that Lake Baikal will be a topic of discussion at this year's United Nations Conference on Climate Change (Paris Climate Talks for short), which begin November 30 and where world leaders are expected to make their boldest commitments to new sustainable development goals to date.

Shallow waters mark deepening troubles

Lake Baikal's dipping water levels first came to the world's attention in early 2015, when several major news outlets picked up the story that the water level had reached the designated "critical" 456 meters above sea level. The water level dropped lower in March, to 455.92 meters, a figure not seen since 1982.

Several factors have contributed to this decline in water levels, but few more so than the surrounding region's dependence on hydroelectric power. The four hydroelectric stations situated on the Angara River, the only river flowing out from Lake Baikal, generate 70 percent of the electricity for residents living on the lake's Western shores. Energy demand has kept water flowing through the Irkutsk station's turbines at a constant rate, even as the leadership of the neighboring Republic of Buryatia, on Baikal's Eastern shore, called on hydroelectric companies to stymie the flow of water out of the lake.

Of even greater concern is the potential fallout from a proposed dam system to be built on the Selenga River in Mongolia. The Selenga supplies up to 50 percent of Lake Baikal's water supply and is vital to various species of endemic wildlife. Damming the Selenga would further restrict the flow of water to Baikal and displace many unique varieties of species, such as the Baikal Omul, that only spawn in this specific delta. Preliminary research also suggests that the flow of water from the Selenga is what keeps the deepest parts of the lake oxygenated and clean. Marianne Moore, an environmental scientist and biology professor at Wellesley College, urged caution about the proposed project, noting that "If those dams are constructed... that could affect deep water ventilation" with potentially disastrous consequences. Both Baikal and the Selenga Delta are listed as UNESCO World Heritage sites due to the biodiversity they sustain. As Anson Mackay, a scientific researcher and professor at University College London emphasized, "75 percent of the life that lives there lives nowhere else." Disrupting these ecosystems would be inadmissible.

Industrial activity in the region has also taken its toll. Both Moore and Mackay point to mining operations in the region that may be polluting Lake Baikal with heavy metals, such as mercury. Additionally, tourist operations along the lake's shores lack proper sewage systems, dumping waste directly into the lake. This, according to Moore, is the primary culprit behind the invasive algae spirogyra that has recently flourished in the lake's shallow coasts. Oleg Tymoskhin, a senior researcher at the Baikal Liminological Institute who has been studying the "disgusting black slime" that is now washing up on Baikal's shores because of a mysterious sponge disease, told the Siberian Times that the human factor is largely to blame.

The recent wildfires could multiply the many issues the Lake Baikal ecosystem already faces. For one, there will be less forested area to capture and filter water into the lake and smaller habitats for forest-dwelling creatures. Svetlana Budashkaeva, who helped organize and coordinate volunteer firefighters through the group SoS Buryatia, gave a vivid example of the wildfires' early effects by pointing to what is currently happening to the bear population:
"They have been running from flames instead of storing fat for the winter; they're raiding villages," she said. "The locals have no other choice but to shoot them. And even if they didn't, they would die from starvation." According to the volunteer firefighter Solbon Sanzhiev, not only has the bear population suffered, but "as we got closer to the fires, you could see the birds and lizards escaping the flames." The effects of this depopulation promise to ripple throughout the food chain.

This encapsulates one of the more disturbing elements of climate change and prolonged anthropogenic stress on the biosphere: failure to act inevitably condemns plants, animals, and even human beings to desperation and death. By the time the consequences of inaction become abundantly clear, it is often already too late to act.

Responding to wildfires on the ground

Despite the dire consequences of inaction, local policymakers in Russia are often slow to address environmental issues. For one thing, they lack the knowledge and tools necessary to decipher environmental problems and the many layers of causation which bring them about. For another, when immediate threats such as wildfires arise, there are scarce resources to allocate towards putting them out. Local policymakers tend to drag their feet and often downplay the size of the wildfires in hopes of rain or intervention from the federal government. Such hesitation only allows wildfires to grow and spread.

This was certainly the case with this year's wildfires, as the Federal Ministry of Emergency Situations and civil society organizations stepped in to respond where regional authorities could and did not. Even then, Minister of Emergency Services Vladimir Puchkov promised to have the wildfires "liquidated" within two and a half days after arriving in Siberia. When that did not occur, his statement was promptly removed from the Internet.

Volunteer organizations ultimately provided crucial support on the ground. Svetlana Budashkaeva of SoS Buryatia said that "the situation is such that even the federal services lack proper equipment." In addition to sending their own volunteers to help put out forest and peat fires, "we helped feed emergency workers, clothe them, and do their laundry." Some 400 people donated funds and essential supplies to send to firefighters in the region through the group, Budashkaeva said. Their group has also stood alone in its efforts to put out peat fires, which have been particularly bad in the region this year since the lower water levels caused bogs and wetlands to dry out and catch fire.

However, within days of forming their group, the organizers of SoS Buryatia were contacted by officials from the Ministry of Internal Affairs on suspicions of "fraud." Though there was no further investigation (fortunately the group's leadership includes several well-known local personalities), this more or less exemplifies local authorities' skepticism towards grassroots initiatives in the current, post-sanctions political environment characterized by heightened paranoia and siege mentality. There is no small irony to it either, as Budashkaeva said: "personally, I support working within the system... planning protests or actions might attract attention in the short-term, but to create qualitative change we must work with the system we have."

The story of SoS Buryatia raises an important question for the role of the international community in protecting Lake Baikal. How should the international community cooperate with partners in Russia in an atmosphere where any outside influence, no matter how interested in the common good, is viewed with distrust and even outright hostility?

Towards an international response: helping to balance competing interests

Citizens, local authorities, businesses, civic organizations, and national governments all have a role to play in protecting Lake Baikal, but each actor has competing interests and varied levels of responsibility. A prudent approach to securing Baikal's future would first encourage Russia and Mongolia to reconsider damming the Selenga River and stop pollution. After addressing the immediate threats to the lake's ecosystem, the international community should focus on promoting avenues for scientific cooperation and ensuring that Lake Baikal is a topic of discussion at the Paris Climate Talks.

According to Marianne Moore, the Selenga River dam, benthic eutrophication (the scientific cause for algae growth), and sponge problems are the most serious immediate problems facing the lake. To address these threats, the United States and the European Union should use their significant leverage with the Mongolian government and the World Bank to propose a renewable alternative to current plans to dam the most important source of water for Lake Baikal.

Regarding the growth of algae and spread of sponge diseases, Marianne Moore explains that the problem has to do with a lack of accountability. Cities, towns, and tourist operations on Baikal's shores lack proper sewage treatment facilities, and local authorities lack the resources and motivation to enforce regulations. When outside forces press change on Russia, they are often met with considerable pushback and accusations of hypocrisy. Therefore, tackling the dam issue at the national level while supporting grassroots-level calls for more accountability would be an effective strategy to secure Lake Baikal's ecosystem in the immediate present.

Scientific research initiatives are invaluable avenues for promoting long-term international cooperation while simultaneously addressing threats to Lake Baikal's ecosystem. During the 1990s, international scientific cooperation had a considerable effect on present-day climate research. As Anson Mackay shared, "Baikal brought together lots of people, stimulating a whole field of paleoclimate research in lakes, and it helped develop the technology... It was massively influential." However, funding for research and monitoring efforts in Lake Baikal has largely dried up. Restoring such programs and cooperating on conservation efforts would contribute to securing not only Lake Baikal's future, but the future of other environmentally critical areas.

Finally, in the context of multiple international conflicts dividing Russia and the West, it is all too easy to lay aside seemingly peripheral issues like Lake Baikal. However, it is worth remembering that the Syrian crisis was precipitated by widespread drought and massive spikes in food prices. In the long term, preventing future resource conflicts will prove to be a prudent and proactive security policy. The upcoming Paris Climate Talks are an opportunity for world leaders to make environmental commitments towards this goal. As one of the world's oldest lakes, home to a unique ecosystem currently threatened by negligent human action, it is imperative that Lake Baikal be a part of the conversation.
 
 #14
RFE/RL
November 15, 2015
Putin's Pioneers: Push For Russian Youth League Stirs Debate, Doubt
by Andrei Shary

As a youth growing up in Leningrad in the 1960s, Vladimir Putin was one of the few children in his school class who was not a member of the Soviet Young Pioneers. Now he seems determined not to let future generations of Russian children face such a fate.
 
On October 29, the 97th anniversary of the founding of the Soviet Komsomol youth organization, Putin signed an executive order on the creation of a national "public-state children's-youth organization" under the name the Russian Movement of Schoolchildren.
 
The vague decree seems to fit into a pattern of restoring Soviet-era social regimentation that Putin's government has pursued in recent years. However, it remains unclear to what extent the new organization can resurrect Soviet models.

"You can be nostalgic about such things, but it's impossible to restore the past," says Aleksandr Adamsky, head of the Evrika education-policy institute in Moscow. "Our life has completely changed and children are completely different. You can force children to study in school and you can force them to participate in after-school groups -- although I can hardly imagine how this could be done! -- but you have to have something to attract them."
 
Under the Soviet system, the ruling Communist Party created a ladder of organizations for children, beginning with the Little Octobrists, informal groups in which children aged 7 to 9 prepared to become Young Pioneers. The Pioneers -- officially called the All-Union Pioneer Organization Named For Vladimir Lenin -- was created in 1922 for children aged 10 to 15. Taking the official Pioneer oath, the children promised "to passionately love my fatherland and to cherish it as well as I can, to live, study, and fight as the Great Lenin instructed, as the Communist Party teaches me, and always to carry out the laws of the Pioneers of the Soviet Union."

At its peak, the Pioneers counted 25 million members in 118,000 chapter groups. The organization ran 40,000 summer camps that hosted 10 million children annually.
 
Next came the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League, or Komsomol, which, although formally independent, was considered "the helper and the reserve" of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union -- the only legal party and the one that ruled the country. It was for people aged 15 to 28. It was considered a pathway to Communist Party membership and -- since only a minority of Soviet citizens were in the party -- had a much smaller membership than the Pioneers, which was nearly universal.
 
Education specialist Adamsky is skeptical that Putin's decree will result in anything as massive and universal as what was seen in communist times. He says those who pushed for the decree don't agree among themselves as to the "values" the new organization should promote and an ambiguous organization will be unable to attract a mass membership.
 
"And that's not even considering resources," he adds. "To create such an organization covering the entire country would demand enormous sums [of money]. Remember the enormous resources that were poured into the Pioneer organizations, beginning with the Pioneer Palaces and ending with the Pioneer camps. And I'm not just talking about [prominent national camps like] Artek or Orlyonok. There were such camps in every oblast."

Mikhail Barannikov, on the other hand, is heartened by the decree. Barannikov is the editor of the children's newspaper Pionerskaya Pravda, the heir to the official Soviet-era organ of the Pioneer movement.

Barannikov recalls how his newspaper hosted a meeting in 2005 with Lyudmila Shvetsova, who headed the Soviet Pioneer movement in the 1980s.
 
"The children asked her what she thinks about the creation of a single public organization for children in the country," Barannikov recalls. "Shvetsova said, 'It isn't time yet.'"
 
"But now the conditions are right for uniting the public movement for children into one big organization," Barannikov adds. "Naturally, it won't be the same organization that existed in Soviet times."
 
Barannikov remembers his own days as a Pioneer and a Komsomol member as "a very good, nice, and positive experience."
 
He says he hopes Putin's new organization will be based on "children's desire to do good things for the organization and their country" and on "the struggle for good and for justice."
 
"Of course, today's youth organizations -- unlike the Komsomol -- didn't build the Baikal-Amur Mainline railway or the Magnitigorsk steelworks, but in Russia even now there are young people who are ready to come together for the sake of good, necessary, and useful projects," Barannikov adds.
 
He sees the new youth organization as only the beginning.
 
"The all-Russia children's organization will be something useful and necessary for society," he says. "But in creating such a children's organization, you must understand that children grow up. In the Soviet Union, there was a definite vertical: A child first became a Young Octobrist, then a Pioneer, then he joined the Komsomol, and then they entered the adult world. Now we need to define what will happen to a child when he grows out of his membership in the new organization."
 
 #15
Forbes.com
November 13, 2015
U.S. Clobbers Russia In Asking Facebook For User Info
By Kenneth Rapoza

If you want to know just how bad censorship of the internet is in Russia, you'll have to ask the owners the country's biggest social network Vkontakte and not Facebook. Based on Facebook's Government Requests Report, released on Friday, Russian authorities asked Facebook only once between January and June 2015.

By comparison, U.S. law enforcement reached out to Facebook 17,577 times, leading the company to look into the accounts of 26,579 users. Roughly 80% of the time, user data was turned over to authorities for further review or as evidence in police or official investigations.

When governments believe something on Facebook violates their laws, they contact social media and other web-based entities and ask them to restrict user access to specific content. Facebook says that whenever it receives a request, it is scrutinized to determine if the specified content does indeed violate local laws. If they determine that it does, then Facebook makes it unavailable in the relevant country or territory.

For example, Holocaust denial is illegal in Germany so if a user is posting content on that topic to their personal webpage, it can be washed by Facebook under German law.

Russia has 28 restrictions on its books, while the U.S. has none. But despite those restrictions, the majority of the locals are okay with internet censorship, according to polls.

Check this out on Russian netizens:

The All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM), said that 49% of respondents supported censorship of the interwebs. Some 42% of Russians are online junkies while another 38% are say they're never plugged in.

Seventy-three percent of respondents said "negative information" about state employees should not be published on the internet (read: government officials, as in Vladimir Putin), while 42% said that foreign governments were using the web as a means to sell propaganda to Russians. Forty-five percent said they support the idea of blocking the websites of foreign media outlets.
 
 #16
Wall Street Journal
November 16, 2015
Barack Obama, Vladimir Putin Agree on General Path for Syria, U.S. Officials Say
Obama also 'noted the importance of Russia's military efforts in Syria,' officials add
By CAROL E. LEE

ANTALYA, Turkey-President Barack Obama and Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed on a broad process for achieving a political resolution to the civil war in Syria, White House officials said.

Mr. Obama also "noted the importance of Russia's military efforts in Syria" focusing on Islamic State, a White House official said. The tone is a change from the U.S. position that Russia's airstrikes in Syria are "counterproductive" because they have focused broadly on any opponents of the Assad regime, rather than narrowly on Islamic State.

The shift comes as Mr. Obama is seeking to intensify the international military approach to Islamic State and mount a response to Friday's terrorist attacks in Paris.

The 35-minute meeting between Messrs. Obama and Putin took place during the Group of 20 summit in Turkey, where the crisis in Syria had dominated the discussions. It was the first time they have spoken since Russia began airstrikes in Syria in September.

The leaders "noted diplomatic progress" on a political transition in Syria, citing the outlines of a plan that was agreed to Saturday in Vienna.

"Specifically, President Obama and President Putin agreed on the need for a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political transition, which would be proceeded by U.N.-mediated negotiations between the Syrian opposition and regime as well a cease fire. as the diplomacy continues," the White House official said.

Mr. Obama also expressed his condolences for the downed Russian passenger jet in Egypt, which killed 224 people. A bomb suspected to have been planted on the plane by Islamic State is believed to have caused the crash
 
 #17
Bloomberg
November 15, 2015
Putin Goes From G-20 Pariah to Player at Obama Turkey Talk
By Ilya Arkhipov

The sidelines of summits are full of talks between leaders, their ministers and aides, but the huddle between Barack Obama and Vladimir Putin at the Group of 20 in Turkey Sunday was heavy with significance.

The meeting on Syria lasting more than 30 minutes was the first since the Russian president surprised his American counterpart in September by sending in his warplanes to prop up Bashar al-Assad, the Syrian leader the U.S. wants deposed. Since then, Islamist terrorism has taken over the global agenda and provided common purpose.

"We have all seen the horror that took place recently in Paris and we sympathize with the affected people," Putin said in the Turkish coastal resort of Antalya before he met with Obama. "We are always in favor of joining efforts to deal effectively with the terrorist threat. Of course it is necessary to act in strict accordance with the United Nations charter."

After leaving last year's G-20 summit in Brisbane early following a berating from world leaders over stoking conflict in Ukraine, Putin arrived in Turkey with a narrative of collaboration over his vision for ending the Syrian war and tackling terrorism. His deputy foreign minister overseeing U.S. relations talked earlier on Sunday of how the atrocity in Paris can shift priorities in Washington, while another Russian official said ties with the west already have strengthened in recent days.

Russian Military

Since Putin and Obama last met, militants linked to Islamic State have bombed Ankara and Beirut and were blamed for downing a Russian passenger jet. In multiple attacks in Paris on Friday evening, they slaughtered 129 people.

Obama welcomed efforts by all nations to confront Islamic State and noted the importance of Russia's military efforts in Syria focusing on the group, a White House official said after the meeting with Putin. Both leaders endorsed a plan for a political transition in Syria forged by diplomats in Vienna Saturday who were galvanized by the Paris attacks into reaching a deal.

Both the U.S. and Russia are increasing their military activity in Syria, raising concerns the war may morph into a proxy fight between the two powers reminiscent of Cold War conflicts. Putin's intervention shifted the balance of power, forcing the Obama administration to reassess its strategy of supporting Syrian opposition fighters who are battling Islamic State and Assad's military.

In their talks, Obama and Putin agreed on the need for a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political transition, which would be preceded by UN-mediated negotiations between the Syrian opposition and regime as well a ceasefire, according to the White House official. The international meeting in Vienna on Friday yielded agreement on a Jan. 1 deadline for talks to start between Assad and his opponents.

Still, core disagreement over the Russian support for Assad remains. While the two leaders agree on the strategic goal of combating Islamic State, they differ on the tactics, Putin's foreign policy aide, Yuri Ushakov, said Sunday, according to state news service RIA Novosti.

Assad's Future

When Putin met Obama at the United Nations General Assembly in New York in September, he discussed with his U.S. counterpart whether there is a candidate to replace Assad. Obama didn't have an answer, further bolstering the Russian leader's resolve to back Assad, according to two people who heard Putin's personal account of the meeting.

The rise of Islamic State has become a defining foreign policy challenge for both Putin and Obama. An Islamic State affiliate claimed it blew up a Russian airliner that crashed in Egypt on Oct. 31, killing 224. The group has beheaded Americans and continues to take territory and recruit fighters despite daily airstrikes by a U.S.-led coalition.

The Paris killings have raised the stakes further.

Speaking at the G-20 summit as the attacks overshadowed scheduled meetings on the economy and trade, European Union President Donald Tusk said Russia should focus its force more on jihadists.

A dinner of leaders in Antalya took place later on Sunday with terrorism, the Syrian war and refugees the official topics of conversation. Susan Rice, Obama's national security adviser, underscored the new tone with a Russian official.

He'd left a gift bag behind after the meeting, and it was handed to the U.S. by the Turkish organizers. "Normally, we would steal this," she laughed. She returned it "in the interests of mutual cooperation."
 
 #18
Reuters
November 15, 2015
U.S.-Russia cooperation key to fighting Islamic State in Syria: EU
By Jan Strupczewski and Lidia Kelly

BELEK, Turkey (Reuters) - The United States and Russia must cooperate in fighting Islamic State in Syria, the president of the European Council said on Sunday, stressing Russia should focus its military actions there on the radical Islamists and not the Syrian opposition.

At a news conference on the sidelines of a summit of world leaders in the Turkish coastal province of Antalya, Donald Tusk said that Russian bombing of President Bashar al-Assad's opponents was only increasing the wave of refugees to Europe.

"It should be our common aim to coordinate our actions against Daesh and for sure the cooperation between the United States and Russia is a crucial one," Tusk said, referring to the Arabic acronym for Islamic State.

"But we need not only more cooperation, but also more good will, especially from Russian action on the ground in Syria. It must be focused more on Islamic State and not - because we cannot accept it - against the moderate Syrian opposition," Tusk said.

Europe is facing an inflow of 1 million refugees from the Middle East and Africa this year alone as a result of the Syrian conflict, which pits the forces of Islamic State, Assad and the Syrian opposition against each other.

Russia joined the conflict a month and a half ago with air strikes in Syria, but has been targeting mainly areas controlled by forces opposed to its long-term ally Assad, rather than by Islamic State.

"We have no doubt that from actions against the Syrian opposition the only result will be a new wave of refugees and we have started seeing that, in fact it has started," Tusk said.

"This is why the cooperation between Russia and other countries, especially the United States, is so important also in this context of the refugee crisis," he said.

Russia, the United States and powers from Europe and the Middle East outlined a plan on Saturday for a political process in Syria leading to elections within two years, a day after gunmen and suicide bombers from Islamic State went on a rampage through Paris, killing 129 people.

Tusk said that after attacks in Paris, the G20 had to step up efforts to cut off financing to terrorists.

"Terror networks cannot plan or operate without the money that moves through the financial systems of many countries. Only if we fully cooperate on exchange of information about suspicious transactions, will we be able to stop this threat effectively," Tusk said.
 
 #19
U.S., West begin to understand intl problems cannot be resolved without Russia - Matviyenko

MOSCOW. Nov 16 (Interfax) - The United States and the European Union are beginning to realize the impossibility to disregard the Russian standpoint on world problems, Federation Council Chairperson Valentina Matviyenko has said.

"They are beginning to understand both in Europe and in the United States that the efficient resolution of any international problems is impossible without the participation of Russia," Matviyenko said in an interview published by the newspaper Izvestia on Monday.

In her words, the events in Ukraine and Syria and the need to coordinate efforts in the fight against international terrorism are the best proof of that.

Concerning the forthcoming presidential election in the United States, the Federation Council chairperson said that, "irrespective of who, either a republican or a democrat, wins, the understanding that they cannot try to stalemate Russia and it is impossible to disregard our standpoint on every complex international affair will be rising."

"It just seems it is already hard for the incumbent U.S. president to make any drastic change. Time will show whether our relations will become warmer and better. But I am confident that the pointless confrontation will not escalate," Matviyenko said.

The fact that there are candidates in the United States openly declaring their wish to be friends with Russia "reflects the opinion of certain U.S. population strata" because "neither candidate will express one's personal view unless it is shared by his voters to one degree or another," the chairperson of the Russian parliament's upper house said.

Many severed relations between Russian and Western military and diplomatic agencies are now being restored, and interaction between our countries is growing, she said.

"So, the first step has been made to resolve the communication impasse. We call for the soonest abandonment of any mutual claims and for beginning to listen to and understand positions of each other," she added.

"It is an illegal and, most importantly, unpromising way to pressure Russia and to achieve a modification of our principled position by sanctions. The West is slowly beginning to realize that. There are rather many sober-minded people there, in particular, amongst politicians and diplomats. The number of those wishing to resolve disputable issues in dialogue, personal communication is especially large amongst parliamentarians," Matviyenko said.

In her opinion, "the cooling period will come to an end and common sense will win. This process is already underway."
 
#20
Lowy Interpreter
November 13, 2015
www.lowyinterpreter.org
Russia's Syria operation reveals significant improvement in military capability
By Dmitry Gorenburg
Dmitry Gorenburg is a senior research scientist in the Strategic Studies division of CNA, a not-for-profit research and analysis organization, where he has worked since 2000. In addition to his work at CNA, Dr. Gorenburg is the editor of the journals Problems of Post-Communism and Russian Politics and Law and an associate at Harvard University's Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies.

Although relatively small in scale, Russia's military operation in Syria has highlighted some major improvements in Russian military capabilities.

Compared to the 2008 Georgia War, which was the last time the Russian Air Force operated in a combat environment, the Russian military appears to have made great strides in increasing operational tempo and improving inter-service integration. It has also made significant advances in its ability to carry out expeditionary operations and showcased its recently developed stand-off strike capability.

The initial air strike campaign successfully targeted weapons and equipment depots that opposition forces had captured from government forces earlier in the conflict. Once these targets were eliminated, Russian air forces then coordinated with Syrian and Iranian forces conducting ground operations against opposition forces in the northwestern part of the country.

The operation has highlighted advances in Russian weaponry, but also the limitations of these new capabilities. During this operation, Russian aircraft have used precision-guided munitions (PGMs) in combat for the first time. But only about 20% of strikes have used such modern weaponry, while the rest have been carried out with older unguided bombs. The operation has allowed the Russian air force to test its new capabilities, including both PGMs and the ability to carry out nighttime sorties, and to highlight their existence to potential opponents.

At the same time, the Russian military has sought to limit the amount of new weapons expended because these munitions are expensive when compared to unguided bombs and because the air force has limited quantities of PGMs in its arsenal and does not want to expend them on targets where the use of such weapons is not necessary.

A similar calculus was evident in the land-attack cruise missile strikes against Syrian targets launched from relatively small missile ships in the Caspian Sea, which were primarily intended as a demonstration of this capability to potential opponents. They were not necessary for the success of the operation, which could have been carried out perfectly well by Russian aircraft already present in Syria. The real goal was to show military planners in NATO member states and Russia's other neighbours that Russia could threaten targets in their countries from ships that could not easily be destroyed by enemy forces.

The operational tempo of Russian air operations in Syria has been quite high, with an average of 45 sorties per day in October carried out by a total of 34 fixed-wing aircraft and 16 helicopters. Furthermore, the pace of the operations increased over time, rising from approximately 20 sorties per day at the start of the operation to around 60 per day at its peak later in October. It has since declined, most likely because the easiest and most obvious targets have all been hit already while opposition forces have adapted to Russian air attacks and are not operating out in the open as much as they were in September and October. The high operational tempo was especially surprising considering the rash of crashes Russian military aircraft suffered earlier in 2015, which had been blamed by many experts on the strain put by an increase in operations on an aging fleet of aircraft.

The operation in Syria has highlighted advances in integration among Russia's military services. This was one of the goals of the military reform undertaken after notable failures in this area revealed during the war in Georgia. While the air force is carrying out the active combat operations in this effort, it has shown an ability to work with both other services and with foreign forces.

The Russian Navy, for example, has not only provided sealift for the operation, but is also responsible for providing long-range air defence with the S-300 system based on the Black Sea Fleet's flagship Slava-class cruiser Moskva. Having a ship-based long-range air defense system allows Russia to provide defence against potential attacks by Western strike aviation operating in the area while avoiding tensions with Israel, which would be unhappy if Russia provided such systems to Syrian forces.

Although Russian ground forces have played a relatively limited role in the conflict so far, they have been important for defending the air base. More significantly, the Russian air force has shown an ability to coordinate its operations with Syrian and Iranian ground forces units, which have begun an offensive against opposition positions with the Russian air force providing air support.

Until September, most analysts (including myself) argued that Russia was not capable of conducting a military operation away from its immediate neighborhood because its military lacked the ability to transport significant numbers of personnel or equipment to remote theatres of operations. The Russian military was able to transport the necessary equipment and personnel by pressing into service the vast majority of its large transport aircraft and almost all of the naval transport ships located in the European theatre. Furthermore, it reflagged several Turkish commercial cargo vessels as Russian navy ships and pressed them into service to transport equipment. While it remains the case that Russia remains almost completely dependent on its rail network for military transport, the operation in Syria has shown that it has sufficient sealift and airlift capability to carry out a small operation away from its borders and that it can increase that capacity in innovative ways when pressed to do so.

Beyond its purely geopolitical goals, Russia's operation in Syria has been designed to test improvements in Russian military capabilities that have resulted from the military reform carried out over the last seven years and to highlight these improvements to potential adversaries. While the jury is still out on how successful the operation will be in helping the Syrian government turn the tide against its various opponents, it has already shown that the military reform has resulted in a significant increase in Russia's warfighting capability.
 
 #21
The Unz Review
www.unz.com
November 15, 2015
Week Six of the Russian Intervention in Syria: a First Major Success for the Syrian Armed Forces
By THE SAKER

Finally. After weeks of grueling combat the Syrian armed forces have liberated the Kuweyres air base in northern Syria. This is a huge victory for the Syrians because during the 2.5 year long siege of the airbase it had become an important symbol of the Syrian determination to resist the Takfiris in general and, especially, because Daesh which had deployed its best fighters to maintain the siege of the base and prevents its liberation. In fact, the Takfiris did resist with everything they had up to the last moment. For those of you interested in video and photos of the combats and liberation of Kuweyres I would recommend the site of Colonel Cassad and specifically these posts: (in Russian)

http://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/2472071.html

http://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/2470426.html

Many of these images and videos are for a "mature audience" only, but they do convey the sense of victory for the Syrian side and I highly recommend watching them. Up to this moment all the succeses of the Syrian armed forces were limited in importance whereas the liberation of Kuweyres not only represents a huge moral victory for the Syrians, but it also has an "operational significance" meaning that it actually changes the shape and dynamic of the front (click here for a high resolution map of the area). Put simply: the Syrian have now seized the initiative from Daesh and they are now on the offensive. As for Daesh, they now have to allocate their forces to prevent the Syrians from further exploiting their success in Kuweyres. Most observers, including myself, were hoping for, or even expecting, such a development, but now it has finally happened. This is very, very good news.

There was, by the way, an interesting if little noticed side story to this event: according to the Russian military, the "moderate opposition" gave key intelligence to the Russian to target the "terrorists" around the airbase. Here is what RT reported about that:

Syrian government forces received intelligence on terrorist positions around the besieged Kweires airbase from opposition sources, which helped them lift the two-year blockade, the Russian Defense Ministry has revealed. "This airfield had been surrounded by ISIS [the former name of the Islamic State terrorist group] for two years," Major General Igor Konashenkov, spokesman for the Russian defense ministry, said in a daily briefing. "Intelligence on the locations of the terrorist fire positions and support points around Kweires was provided by the Syrian opposition and cleared by the communication center in Baghdad." Lifting the siege on the airbase in Aleppo provinces has been one of the biggest victories for Damascus since Russia started providing air support for Syrian government forces. The opposition also provided data to help target a big weapons depot of the Nusra Front, the Syrian branch of Al Qaeda, near the village Mheen in the Homs province, Konashenkov revealed.

For one thing, as far as I know, the so-called "moderate opposition" is mostly a myth, and to the degree that it does exist, it is in Turkey and in London. Furthermore, I don't remember the so-called FSA playing any major role around Kuweyres. So what is going on here?

Well, maybe the Russians just made up this putative intelligence sharing in order to show that they are working hand-in-glove with the "moderate opposition" or, which is far more likely, some folks associated with Daesh felt that the tide was turning and decided to re-brand themselves as "moderates" and gave the Russians some intel in exchange for money and life. This kind of sudden "coat turning" is typical of the Takfiris and the Russians saw plenty of that in Afghanistan. If my guess is correct, then this further goes to show that Daesh is beginning to seriously hurt under the combined effects of the Russian and Syrian offensives. Again, this is very good news indeed.

Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary General of Hezbollah, also immediately declared that the liberation of the Kuweyres airbase shows the "resilience, strength, determination, and vigor of the soldiers and officers of the Syrian Arab Army". He is right.

There is no overstating the heroism of the Syrians who fought and refused to surrender even though they had no meds and minimum food and supplies But then, since they would not surrender, their only options were to fight to the end or die. And they fought, alone, for over two years. This is why the first Russian reporter who got into Kuweyres wrote "У сирийцев теперь есть свой Сталинград" (the Syrians now have their own Stalingrad).

Having taken Kuweyres, the Syrian army continued its offensive and, according to the latest reports, the Syrians have no also liberated the towns of al-Hader and al-Heis. Following this latest Syrian victory, a Takfiri commander blamed it on the Russian Air Force and declared "The heavy aerial bombardment of Al Hader and the surrounding area gave us no choice but to retreat, but these are to-and-fro battles, where we win ground one day and the next day we lose it". Maybe.

Still, it is way too early to celebrate. Following weeks of intense fighting and only tactical victories, the Syrians have now achieved their first operational breakthrough, but they will need several more before they can contemplate a strategic offensive against Daesh. This is something which the USA and, even more so, Turkey and Qatar are going to try to prevent with everything they have got. Here again, it is important to repeat, that the very small Russian force in Syria does not have the means to, for example, prevent Turkey from moving its forces into Syria.

At this point in time, I would judge Turkey and Qatar as even more dangerous than the USA. Why? Because they both put way too much prestige and, especially, money into ousting Assad and building a pipeline across Syria to link their two countries and they know that as long as Assad or any other secular regime remains in power in Damascus they can forget about it. In fact, if the Russian-Iranian-Syrian-Iraqi-Hezbollah alliance is successful in flushing out Daesh from Syria, were will all the Takfiri freaks go? The risk here is not only for Turkey, but even for the Saudis!

In contrast, Obama will soon be gone anyway and its not like the USA has a real national strategic interest in Syria (unless you assume that pleasing AIPAC is such a vital goal). Yes, it would be humiliating for the "indispensable nation" to miserably fail only to have a "local power" like Russia brilliantly succeed, but this humiliation can always be blamed on the outgoing Administration and used to get more votes. As for the US "deep state", it knows that it can work with Assad only because it used to work with him very nicely before it decided to dump him (Assad even tortured "rendered" suspects on behalf of the CIA!). So keeping Assad in power might be humiliating but not much more than all the other humiliation the AngloZionst Empire already had to suffer at the hands of Putin.

Speaking of Putin, he made an important statement this week: while initially Russian officials had declared that the Russian military operations would last approximately 3 months, Putin has now declared that "the duration of stay of our military will be determined solely depending on the time this objective is achieved". This could indicate a far longer Russian involvement.

I might be mistaken, in fact, I hope that I am, but I don't see how Daesh could be defeated without an increase of the size of the Russian military force in Syria and, especially, an increase in the number of Iranians supporting the Syrians on the ground. Nobody will be happier than me if I am proven wrong, believe me.

Final event this week: it appears that the Russians are further digging in and that they have now deployed S-400 missile system on their base in Khmeimim. Depending on how you look at it, this either doubles the air defense capabilities of the Russian naval task force off the Syrian coast, or frees the guided missile cruiser Moskva for other tasks. Curiously, Russian officials have denied that S-400s are deployed in Syria. Either way, this is good news as the the deeper the Russian dig in into their positions, the harder it will be to threaten them. All in all, a very good week for the resistance to Empire and there is real possibility that the next couple of weeks will see even bigger progress.


 
 #22
Analysts: NATO unlikely to change strategy even if it agrees to cooperate with Russia
By Lyudmila Alexandrova

MOSCOW, November 16. /TASS/. There is a great deal of hope that the terrorist attacks in France entail a rapprochement in relations between Russia and the West, but it is very unlikely such cooperation may last long enough to become strategic, analysts say.

The Russian Foreign Ministry hopes that NATO countries will revise their priorities after the terrorist raids in the French capital, says Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov.

"We do hope that the events in Paris will put everything in its proper place and change the scale of priorities our counterparts in Washington and other NATO capitals prefer to adhere to," he said.

In the meantime, the former commander of NATO's forces in Europe, James Stavridis, has pointed to the need for changes, in particular, to enhancing cooperation with Moscow for struggle against terrorists in Syria.

The head of the European security section at the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of Europe, Dmitry Danilov, sees certain reasons to expect NATO's priorities will be revised in favour of cooperation with Russia, and not of confrontation with it.

"It is clear to the naked eye that such threats are on the top of the list and resistance to them must be common, despite the existing fundamental differences on other issues. But it is of the essence to discuss the specific parameters of future interaction. For the time being nothing of the sort is in sight. Nobody cares to lifts a finger."

"For now I see no prospects for a fundamental change in NATO's stance, although as 9/1 showed, such stunning shakeups require fundamental reconsideration of political approaches. Russia demonstrated precisely this kind of attitude in 2001, when it proposed assistance and cooperation to the United States. These days Putin is offering assistance to France. This is the political basis that may come in handy for starting a dialogue on joint resistance to terrorism."

"Russia is NATO's strategic opponent. These are the strategic concepts that have existed starting from 1991, Professor Vladimir Shtol, of the presidential academy RANEPA, told TASS. "But at certain moments in history, when the West in general and NATO, in particular, are having a hard time, they may turn to Russia for assistance and solidarity. That's what happened in 2001, when the US saw a terrible tragedy. But now, that everything is more or less calm and bright, Russia is number one opponent for the West again. Moreover, just recently the US president mentioned us as a threat on the same list with the Islamic State."

Aware that in the struggle with terrorism concerted action by secret services and armed forces is essential, the West has made it clear that it counts on cooperation with Russia in this respect, Shtol said. "But I have very big doubts that such cooperation may last. True, cooperation is crucial and there is no sound alternative to it. But it would be wrong to regard it as a long-term development and a change in NATO's strategy. Everything will remain unchanged by and large."

"We had rather constructive cooperation with NATO before the Ukrainian crisis," recalls the head of the situation analysis section at the Russian Academy of Sciences, Sergey Utkin. "There was the Russia-NATO Council and there were ad-hoc groups. So it is to be hoped that the implementation of the Minsk Accords will help achieve a political settlement format. This is a prerequisite for putting the relations on the original track, possibly, without restoring the levels of trust that existed in the past, though. Syria and the Islamic State are common concerns and they surely provide extra arguments why normalization should not be delayed any more."


 
 #23
www.rt.com
November 14, 2015
Wake up, Europe: Russia is not the enemy
By Danielle Ryan
Danielle Ryan is an Irish freelance journalist and media analyst. She has lived in the US and Germany and is currently based in Moscow. She previously worked as a digital desk reporter for the Sunday Business Post in Dublin. She studied political reporting at the Washington Center for Politics & Journalism in Washington, DC and also has a degree in business and German.

In the aftermath of the slew of horrific terror attacks in Paris last night, European nations must come to admit that, with their continuous and blind support of US foreign policy, they are sowing the seeds of their own demise.
For more than a year and a half, Washington, with little concern for consequences, has used Europe as a tool in its futile attempts to batter Russia into submission. First in Ukraine, now in Syria - and each time Europe has sided with Washington against its own interests, it has suffered for it.

That US-driven rift between Europe and Russia must not be allowed to widen any further. The risks to Europe now are far too great for Paris, Brussels and Berlin to be squandering allies in favor of fickle friends - and Friday's attacks in the French capital highlight the total absurdity of the West continuing to treat Russia as its enemy in the face of such a menacing common threat.

Threat of an overreaction looms

Naturally, the focus today remains on grief, anger and confusion. But as the dust settles over this latest tragedy, Europeans will continue to question the wisdom of foreign policy that results in this kind of bloody blowback in their capital cities. Whether their leaders can listen to reason is another question entirely.

Threats like IS cannot be dealt with until we are honest with ourselves about how they evolved, and the role we played in that evolution. There is, as we will no doubt hear many times in the coming days, no excuse for terror. That is true, but it is also unfortunately a simplistic and idealistic mentality - and when spouted from the mouths of missile-happy Western politicians, there is an almost macabre hypocrisy to it. It's a mentality that makes us feel better in justifying our own terror and violence, in the name of combating the terror and violence of others - and it is a vicious circle.

Terror attacks like these allow the worst instincts of the Western establishment to rise to the surface. The collective fear and trauma caused by such horror is cynically harnessed by governments to shift public opinion towards supporting more war and violence, which results only in more fear, more death, more destruction and more terrorism. This cycle has become the new normal.

French President Francois Hollande's first comments after the Paris attacks demonstrate as much: "We will continue to lead the fight, and it will be merciless," he said. It's sentences like that which should give Europeans even more reason to fear where this will all lead.

Attacks shift agenda at Vienna talks

As another round of multilateral talks on Syria begins in Vienna today, the agenda will surely be affected by this latest string of attacks. But there is an opportunity here for European nations, including France, to go against their worst instincts and orders from Washington, and to more seriously consider Russia's recent eight-point plan for a Syria peace deal.

The alternative - supporting Washington's failed policy of arming, training and aiding "moderate" rebel groups - has clearly not been in Europe's best interests.

We have seen knee-jerk overreactions which exacerbate violence all before. We know where they lead. France's response should not focus on exacting some sort of American-style 'shock and awe' revenge, but should be about doubling down on its efforts to achieve a peace deal in Syria. That must involve a broad reassessment of its strategy in the war-torn country and a serious reconsideration of Russia's proposals - or at least a greater openness to cooperation with Moscow. Russia has not put forth its plan as an iron-clad ultimatum. It is open to suggestions.

The pressure from the US side however, might be too great. The Obama administration has demonstrated, for whatever reasons, that cooperating with Russia on an equal footing is not something they feel they can lower themselves to. Washington will attempt to seize the moment and dominate the Vienna talks. The fact that Barack Obama yesterday evening took to a podium to comment on the Paris attacks while the siege was still ongoing - and before even the French president himself had spoken publicly - is evidence enough of that.

But as Europe deals with the blowback that the US has avoided thus far, the balance may tip out of Washington's favor. The French people are focused on mourning today, but soon they will begin asking questions. They will question the sanity of the government which flirted with radical groups in Syria at some other nation's beck and call. They will question the competence of the security and intelligence services, which despite monitoring the hundreds of French citizens returning from Syria, still did not see this coming. They will question Europe's open-doors policy to migrants and refugees, fearing justifiably, that among the mostly normal humans fleeing terror, there will be those intent on doing them harm.

The root of the problem

Of course, the roots of this go much further back than Syria. The US handed the EU the pen to sign its own death warrant when George Bush invaded Iraq and paved the way for a group as horrifically barbaric as the Islamic State to rise from the carnage and destruction.

Terrorism is a global threat. The heinous attacks in Paris prove that nowhere is safe from this menace. Not a small concert venue on a Friday night. Not a friendly football game between neighboring nations. Not an inconspicuous Cambodian restaurant in a Parisian neighborhood.

There is a lesson for France from last night's horrible events. You cannot simultaneously publicly battle against extremism and cozy up to the worst extremists of all as a matter of foreign policy. Nor can you, to serve selfish geopolitical interests, pick and choose which terrorists are bad and which ones are good. It doesn't work like that.

The US foreign policy class has an aversion to learning from its mistakes - whether that is intentional or not is a discussion for another day. Either way, Europe must not follow in its footsteps any longer.

Truth be told, no one knows how to deal with ISIS. Not Washington, not Paris and not Moscow. There isn't a rulebook - but there is certainly a list of tried and tested failures that can inform our decision making. What is also clear is that this threat does demand solidarity among nations who should be able to put their minor differences aside to face a common threat.

To allow Washington to fan the flames of a useless rift between Europe and Russia is pure insanity. The longer Europe remains blind to this reality, the longer we treat Russia as an enemy rather than a partner in dealing with IS, the longer we must prepare ourselves for endless violence - in Syria and in our own front yards.
 
 
 #24
www.rt.com
November 16, 2015
Most Russians still support govt's policies on Syria, poll shows

An overwhelming majority of Russian citizens are closely following events in Syria and over half of them support the current anti-terrorist operation or even call for greater Russian involvement, according to the latest research.

A poll conducted by the Russian state-run agency VTSIOM found that 69 percent of the Russian public remain very interested in the current situation in Syria and in how the Russian air operation against the Islamic State terrorists is developing.

Fifty-three percent of respondents said they supported the Russian government's course, including 15 percent who said that they would not mind if Russia got more actively involved in the conflict. Forty-five percent said that they supported the authorities' course in general, but would like it to take different forms. Of these, 22 percent said that the campaign against terrorists in Syria should be slowed down and 13 percent said that Russia should halt any participation in the Syrian conflict.

VTSIOM general director Valeriy Fyodorov said in comments in the agency's report that the current situation is being caused by the modern character of Russian operation in Syria. "Combat casualties are non-existent," he said. "The war has assumed a high-tech form, we see no blood or victims. Besides, the opponents are very clearly marked as terrorists and any attempts in the West to present Russia as an aggressor and an enemy of the Syrian people have no support in our country or in the world as a whole."

Fyodorov also said that Russian society was not making a direct link between the Syria operation and the recent crash of the A231 passenger jet over the Sinai Peninsula, as all reports of possible terrorist involvement were merely rumors and speculation when the poll was conducted.

When a similar poll was conducted in early October, over 70 percent of Russian citizens expressed support for the Russian Air Force operations against ISIS terrorists in Syria. Forty-seven percent of respondents said that Russia should support Syrian President Bashar Assad in his fight against both Islamic State and the armed opposition. Twenty-eight percent said that it would be better for Russia to stay out of the Syrian conflict, while 8 percent said Russia should join the Western coalition and begin fighting against ISIS and the Syrian government.

Before Russia started its campaign of airstrikes against ISIS the share of people who backed support for President Assad was lower. In late September, 39 percent of respondents approved of Moscow's support for the Syrian government, with the share of those who disapproved at 11 percent.

 
 #25
Vedomosti
November 11, 2015
Russian public said adapting to threat of terrorism in post-A321 situation
Andrey Kolesnikov, programme director of Moscow Carnegie Centre: Terror becomes everyday routine

The combination of the letter A and the figures 321 should have become for Russians a symbol analogous to 9/11. But despite the almost official recognition by the Russian authorities of the terrorist act theory, far from even a weak suspicion concerning a link between the operation in Syria and revenge for it in Egypt has arisen in the mass consciousness - on the contrary, something like the transformation of terror into an everyday routine is occurring.

The presumed fact of the terrorist act itself evokes no surprise. The blame lies [in the public perception] with the employees of the airport and the Egyptian security services, who are slovenly, like typical southerners, and prepared to be easily corrupted. As if petty everyday corruption were not a way of life and a cultural dictate in Russia itself.

The evacuation itself began only after a semantically convincing construct like "the recommendations of the FSB [Federal Security Service]" had been presented to the public - it at once became clear who the highest authority in our country is. But before this, the "responsible elites" had assessed, for example, the concern of the British authorities for the safety of their citizens as a method of trolling a Russia that had already taken offence at something in advance.

Terrorist acts cannot threaten the safety of Russia's elites. And this is perhaps the main reason that they apparently underestimated the threat of terrorist acts as a direct result of the Syrian bombings. They had summed it all up excellently: No oligarch from the security services, no minister, and no representative of the president's innermost circle has suffered even once as a result of terrorist attacks. In view of the security measures, which outline, as it were, a magic chalk circle, forming yet another bullet-proof "boulevard ring" around several hundred people in the country, this is perhaps even technically impossible.

And for the undefended citizens, the usual methods remain: shifting the blame (for example, onto the careless Egyptians), television whispers and cries, the stepping up of "security" inside the besieged fortress with the equation of internal opposition to terrorism and discussions of human rights to jihadism, and the preparation of the corresponding restrictive legislative measures (no Duma-smoke without fire [there is a play on words in Russian between dyma (smoke) and Duma]). And of course, the continuation of hybrid bombings in response to the requests of temporarily fraternal peoples.

The mass consciousness has become accustomed to a background war and adapted to background inflation and even to that gastronomic oxymoron, "Egyptian Maasdam" [Maasdam is a Dutch cheese; as a result of the sanctions war, it has been replaced on Russian shelves by homemade and, apparently, Egyptian varieties]; it is adapting to terror as well. This "backdrop" on the Russian political stage greatly enhances mobilization and a suspicious attitude to everything foreign.

The authorities should not expect outrage from the "post-Crimea majority." In a situation of an economic crisis, it does not protest, but waits for Supreme High Command to supply its provender - and who bites the hand that feeds them, which is splendidly clad in an iron sleeve? Exactly the same applies to security - [people think that] they should simply passively endure a difficult period.

The mass public consciousness has descended another rung down the ladder, refusing with its last ounce of strength to see the connection between policies and crisis, between political actions and threats to security. The fixation of psychological damage is occurring - everything around is once again the new normal. Reduced expectations, movement with the current of the mainstream. Simply in the hope that it does not lead to plunging into a waterfall.

 
 
 

#26
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
November 16, 2015
Obstacles for Russia-West anti-ISIS cooperation after Paris attacks
The Paris attacks have shocked the globe and left world leaders stunned. But the small step needed to unify Russia and the West in the fight against ISIS might prove to be too much of a giant leap.
By Ivan Tsvetkov
Ivan Tsvetkov is Associate Professor of American Studies, International Relations Department, St. Petersburg State University. He is an expert in the field of historical science and contemporary U.S. policy and U.S.-Russian relations. Since 2003, he has been the author and administrator of the educational website "History of the United States: Materials for the course" (http://ushistory.ru)

In the wake of the terror attacks in Paris, it is becoming a moral imperative in the eyes of almost all normal people that the civilized world must unite in the fight against radical Islam. However, in the cold light of day, this quite understandable emotional outburst runs into formidable obstacles when it comes to Russia's complex relationship with the West.

Obstacle #1: Ukraine, Crimea and sanctions

What is hindering the formation of a new "anti-ISIS" coalition? Lots of things, unfortunately. From the Russian perspective, the most obvious is Western sanctions over Ukraine. However, many people in Russia think that there has never been a more opportune moment to overturn them.

The "reason will prevail" sentiment is gathering momentum across the Russian ideological spectrum. If the Kremlin feels that Europe is indeed close to decisive action, it is possible that Moscow will try to nudge its partners in the right direction by abolishing Russian counter-sanctions, for instance, or demonstrating solidarity in some other way.

However, if fear of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Greater Syria (ISIS) and desire for revenge are to overpower the European political elite's sense of self worth, something more than the Paris attacks needs to happen. It appears that the EU's principled stand and condemnation of Russia's actions in Ukraine will not become a bargaining chip in the fight against ISIS.

In any event, politicians who are constrained by past rhetoric and unable to change tack without severe reputational damage cannot use this strategy. This means that only Russian President Vladimir Putin can initiate a drastic reversal in Russia-EU relations.

Putin's key advantage is that he is far less tightly bound by postulated principles and moral sermonizing than the Europeans. During his tenure, the Russian president has constructed a political reality in which he himself defines what is moral and what is amoral, where the line between good and evil lies, and what Russia's national interests are.

Therefore, only Putin has the capacity to change the modus operandi of Russia-Europe relations by sacrificing some asset - like a chess grandmaster who sacrifices a piece before unleashing a devastating combination (indeed, Putin has a reputation for unexpected "gambits").

However, there are limits here too. Moscow will not return Crimea to Ukraine for the sake of anti-ISIS unity, even if terror attacks rage across Russia from Kaliningrad to Vladivostok.

Obstacle #2: NATO's reluctance to wage war against ISIS

Another aspect to the problem of creating an anti-ISIS alliance is the situation inside NATO. This situation is no less complex than the one surrounding Russia-EU relations. A large question mark hangs over U.S. leadership and willingness to lead its allies in a ground operation against ISIS. A major new military campaign in the Middle East is certainly not how U.S. President Barack Obama would like to see out his presidency.

Incidentally, the climate change conference due to be held in Paris in late November (which until recently was high up the U.S. foreign policy agenda) is now also in jeopardy. If one recalls the wait-and-see attitude that Obama has adopted in all previous international crises, it is difficult to suppose that this time he will behave any differently.

All that can be expected from the present U.S. administration is a strengthening of security measures, new supplies of arms to the anti-Assad opposition in Syria, and words of encouragement for Europe in its fight against ISIS. That, incidentally, could correspond to the objective interests of the United States, since in contrast to the September 11 attacks on New York's world trade centers in 2001, the country is not at the epicenter of events.

NATO members unlikely to team up against terrorism

Are Europe's NATO allies capable of organizing an anti-ISIS operation without the direct involvement of the United States, similar to the Libyan campaign of 2011? Russians are inclined to think that the Europeans not only can, but must - and in cooperation with Russia at that. However, on closer examination, such a scenario looks fanciful, to say the least.

First, the operation in Libya was not of an anti-terrorist nature. To eliminate ISIS (if indeed that is possible through military intervention) requires very different resources, including boots on the ground. Despite the shock of the Paris attacks, not even France is wholly ready to start an all-out war, not to mention those European NATO members that have not yet suffered a direct attack.

Second, to organize a ground operation against ISIS, a common language somehow has to be found with the current Syrian government, led by President Bashar al-Assad. NATO's European partners, especially without the direct involvement of the United States, will never be able to agree on a military operation that would effectively re-colonize the Middle East and establish a NATO protectorate over the territory of Syria or northern Iraq.

Third, Russia's military presence in Syria hinders rather than helps any potential anti-ISIS consolidation, muddying the waters and making the situation almost unsolvable.

Moscow's underlying idea - to return everything to the way it was before the U.S. intervention and the "color revolutions," to restore the Assad regime's control over Syria, and to support the government of Iraq so that it can fight the cancer of ISIS by itself - is like trying to put toothpaste back in the tube.

New solutions are needed, for which something extraordinary needs to happen. The great powers had better forget about their old assets in the Middle East and start the game from scratch, believing ISIS, and more broadly Islamic terrorism, to be the common and only real threat.

Taking the first step towards reconciliation

The ISIS terror attacks are a clarion call for leaders of the civilized world to come to their senses and unite. The explosions and shootings are not so much attacks by a foreign enemy as symptoms of the internal disease that plagues the West.

Russia, having evolved throughout its history as the eastern edge of this huge civilizational space, finds itself in the strange and awkward position of being at once the opponent of Western civilization (trying to split U.S.-European unity, rejoicing at the political failure of Western leaders, attacking the West's "low values") and its last hope and savior in the face of the threat of radical Islamism.

Russia is wholly unsuited to both roles, and neither offers the country hope or promise. Regrettably, there is nothing else available at present in the international picture.

The unanswered question here is whether the leaders of Russia, the United States and Europe have the wisdom to recognize that it is not the particular interests of individual countries, peoples and political elites that are at stake, but the interests of Western civilization, to which they all still belong.

Someone has to take the first step forward, but it remains to be seen which side will take that crucial first step.

 #27
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
November 14, 2015
Paris attacks: Lessons not learned
All those who consider themselves to be a part of the civilized world should not only understand where we have gone wrong over the past 15 years in the fight against terror, but also create new forms of joint and coordinated action.
By Georgy Bovt
The author is a political scientist and a member of the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, a Moscow-based independent think tank.

Friday, Nov. 13, 2015 will be considered France's 9/11. This is exactly what ISIS terrorists have already declared. International terrorists have demonstrated their ability to carry out a whole series of simultaneous terrorist attacks in several public places in a large city.

Although France has strict gun control laws, the terrorists not only had explosives at their disposal, which is "usual" for such kind of attacks, but Kalashnikov assault rifles as well.

Some people recently pointed fingers at the Egyptian security services for failing to stop a bomb from being planted aboard a Russian passenger aircraft in Sharm el-Sheikh. Today they have to admit that a democratic country with well-equipped and well-trained security services may turn out to be helpless when faced with such a large-scale attack. In order to totally prevent something like this from happening again, society itself needs to be changed, along with the political system. Martial law should become a way of life. Although even this is unlikely to totally guarantee security!

Terrorist attacks are not just the price that humanity pays for people being different. They are also the price we pay for the fact that the current international system of economic and political relations is sadly not conducive to rooting out terrorism either in individual countries - most often those that have fallen victim to "import of democracy" - or globally.

Now when the whole world is feeling sympathy and solidarity with the French, we are yet again repeating the appeals to unite in the fight against the global threat of terrorism. How many times have these appeals been heard since September 11, 2001? Yet, where are the results? Al-Qaeda appeared to have been beaten when its leader was killed. However, the fact is that the group has grown newer and even more fanatical and barbaric cells. Stability in the Middle East has been undermined. We already see a whole terrorist quasi-state on the territory where, according to starry-eyed plans, the tyranny of dictators like Saddam Hussain and Bashar al-Assad should have been replaced by electoral democracy. Except that "the electorate" in these countries is increasingly voting more in favor of terror against Western civilization, while at the same time, thousands of volunteers leave Western countries to fight for ISIS. They fight for a new world order, as designed by barbarians and murderers. It is their idea of "justice" against the backdrop of their rejection of the injustice of modern capitalism and the true "liberty, equality and fraternity" that have never taken hold.

It recently became clear that a large-scale terrorist attack in Europe was imminent. First, there was the crash of the Russian airliner in Sinai, which many gloatingly interpreted as "revenge for Putin's adventure in Syria." Then, just two days ago, there was the double terrorist attack in a Shia neighborhood in Beirut, in which dozens of people were killed. There, clearly, terrorists from ISIS or similar groups were taking revenge on the Shia group Hezbollah for fighting on Al-Assad's side in Syria. The international community shuddered but, of course, the impact was not like that from these latest attacks in France. Indeed, those blasts occurred in "someplace like Beirut," on the periphery of "the civilized world." And there was hardly any international reaction when a day before the Paris attacks there was an explosion in a Shia mosque in Yemen. And now it once again turns out that we all are on the same "periphery," that we all live on the frontline in the war against terrorism. And if the murderous fanatics who killed people in Paris were shouting "This is for Syria!" (France has recently joined the anti-terror coalition, conducting airstrikes against ISIS), it does not mean that, say, the UK, which for the time being has refrained from joining in US air strikes, won't be the target of a similar attack.

No doubt, the first reaction that Europeans, and France in particular, will have to the attacks will be to close their borders and frantically tighten security. Many will recall the recent warnings voiced in connection with the influx of refugees from the Middle East flooding Europe to the effect that there was a suspiciously large number of young, strongly-built, single men among them. They said that there were up to 25,000 Islamic militants among the nearly million of refugees that had arrived in Europe. This threat was also recently cited by the head of the Kremlin administration, Sergey Ivanov.

President Putin, in his address to the UN General Assembly, referring to the instability in the Middle East resulting in hundreds of thousands of refugees, asked Western leaders: "Do you realize what you have done?"

9/11 has happened again. All those who consider themselves to be a part of the civilized world should not only understand where we have gone wrong over the past 15 years in the fight against terror, but also create new forms of joint and coordinated action.

Russia and the West need to put all other disagreements aside. This includes Syria and even, however unacceptable some may think it, Ukraine, since it was largely the latter that has recently provoked the very same policy of double standards that has prompted many to forget that we all belong to a single Judeo-Christian civilization, which is now facing its most serious challenge in modern history.

So far, however, one has to admit that the terrorists are acting in a far more consolidated and systematic manner than the whole of the so-called civilized world.

 #28
The Independent (UK)
November 16, 2015
Paris attacks: No security can stop Isis - the bombers will always get through
Only the total destruction of the terrorist group, through US air support for Assad's ground forces, can keep Europe safe
By Patrick Cockburn
Patrick Cockburn is an Irish journalist who has been a Middle East correspondent since 1979 for the Financial Times and, presently, The Independent. He was awarded Foreign Commentator of the Year at the 2013 Editorial Intelligence Comment Awards.

The "Islamic State", as Isis styles itself, will be pleased with the outcome of its attacks in Paris. It has shown that it can retaliate with its usual savagery against a country that is bombing its territory and is a power to be feared at a time when it is under serious military pressure. The actions of just eight Isis suicide bombers and gunmen are dominating the international news agenda for days on end.

There is not a lot that can be done about this. People are understandably eager to know the likelihood of their being machine-gunned the next time they sit in a restaurant or attend a concert in Paris or London.

But the apocalyptic tone of press coverage is exaggerated: the violence experienced hitherto in Paris is not comparable with Belfast and Beirut in the 1970s or Damascus and Baghdad today. Contrary to the hyperbole of wall-to-wall television coverage, the shock of living in a city being bombed soon wears off.

Predictions of Paris forever trembling in expectation of another attack play into the hands of Isis.

A further disadvantage flows from excessive rhetoric about the massacre: instead of the atrocities acting as an incentive for effective action, the angry words become a substitute for a real policy. After the Charlie Hebdo murders in January, 40 world leaders marched with linked arms through the streets of Paris proclaiming, among other things, that they would give priority to the defeat of Isis and its al-Qaeda equivalents.

But, in practice, they did nothing of the sort. When Isis forces attacked Palmyra in eastern Syria in May, the US did not launch air strikes against it because the city was defended by the Syrian army and Washington was frightened of being accused of keeping President Bashar al-Assad in power.

In effect, the US handed Isis a military advantage which it promptly used to seize Palmyra, behead captured Syrian soldiers and blow up the ancient ruins.

The Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said at the G20 meeting in Turkey that "the time for talking is over" and there must be collective action against "terrorism".

This sounds like an impressive Turkish stand against Isis, but Mr Erdogan has explained that his definition of "terrorist" is wide-ranging and includes the Syrian Kurds and their paramilitary People's Protection Units (YPG) whom the US has found to be its best military ally against Isis.

Mr Erdogan's enthusiasm for attacking Kurdish insurgents in Turkey and northern Iraq has turned out to be much stronger than his desire to attack Isis, Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham.

There is little sign that the G20 leaders gathered in Turkey have understood the nature of the conflict in which they are engaged. Isis's military strategy is a unique combination of urban terrorism, guerrilla tactics and conventional warfare. In the past, many states have used terrorism against opponents, but, in the case of Isis, suicide squads focusing on soft civilian targets at home and abroad are an integral part of its war-making strategy.

When the YPG captured Isis's border crossing into Turkey at Tal Abyad in June, the group retaliated by sending fighters in disguise to the Kurdish city of Kobani where they slaughtered over 220 men, women and children.

When Russia started its air campaign against Isis and extreme jihadists on 30 September, Isis responded with a bomb planted on a Russian plane leaving Sharm el-Sheikh that killed 224 passengers.

Another mistake made by G20 leaders is to persistently underestimate Isis. David Cameron said it should not be dignified by the name "Islamic State", but unfortunately it is a real state and one which is more powerful than half the members of the UN, with an experienced army, conscription, taxation and control of all aspects of life within the vast area it rules.

So long as it exists, it will project its power through suicide operations like those we have just seen in Paris. Because the potential target is civilian populations as a whole, no amount of increased security checks or surveillance is going to be effective. The bomber will always get through.

The only real solution is the destruction of Isis: this can only be done by a US and Russian air campaign against it in partnership with those on the ground who are actually fighting it.

The US Air Force has done so effectively with the YPG, enabling them to defeat Isis at Kobani, and with the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga, who captured the city of Sinjar last week. But the US baulks at attacking Isis when it is fighting the Syrian army or the Shia militias in Iraq. Given that these are the two strongest military formations fighting Isis, America's military punch is being pulled where it would do most good.

Given the international sympathy for the French after the massacre in Paris, it is inevitable that there is almost no criticism of France's muddle-headed policy towards the Syrian conflict.

Earlier this year, in an interview with Aron Lund of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, one of the leading French experts on Syria, Fabrice Balanche, who is currently at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, said that "in 2011-12 we suffered a kind of intellectual McCarthyism on the Syrian question: if you said that Assad was not about to fall within three months you could be suspected of being paid by the Syrian regime".

He noted that the French foreign ministry took up the cause of Syrian opposition, while the media refused to see the Syrian revolt as anything other than the continuation of revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt. They were blind to sectarian, political and social divisions which meant that there were always two sides to the Syrian civil war.

With the state bureaucracy, army general staff and security services packed with Alawites, it is almost impossible to get rid of Mr Assad and his regime, whose leaders come from the Alawite community, without the state collapsing, leaving a vacuum to be filled by Isis and its al-Qaeda counterparts.

Despite the latest terrorist attacks, there is still no long-term policy to prevent it happening again.

 
#29
Washington Post
November 15, 2015
Russia is a new front for militant Islam
By Leon Aron
Leon Aron is the director of Russian studies at the American Enterprise Institute.

As Russia deepens its involvement in Syria, it risks more than a military quagmire. Its intervention exacerbates a growing domestic threat, one that could destabilize the whole country. A new brand of radical Islam is rising in Russia, fueled by Russian fighters eager to perpetrate acts of terror at home.

Even a decade ago, the scope and depth of this emerging terrorist network would have seemed inconceivable. While Russia has suffered its share of domestic terrorism, those crimes were largely perpetrated by Chechen fighters based in the North Caucasus region. When Moscow declared victory in Chechnya in 2009, it suggested that the threat of radical violence had been largely contained.

But militant Islam didn't disappear. In fact, the fundamentalist teachings have spread from Chechnya throughout central Russia. They're propagated by Russian imams trained in the Middle East and are finding new audiences among the country's native Muslims, as well as Central Asian migrants in Moscow. Even some younger and seemingly long-assimilated believers are becoming radicalized. Like their counterparts across Europe, they're turning to Internet videos and social-media messages aimed at arousing anger at Western "crusaders."

This is a real danger for Russia. The country has become a new front in the war against militant Islam, a battle that Europe's largest Muslim country is largely unprepared to fight.

Russia is no stranger to Muslim radicalism. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Chechen independence movement became more militant, propelled by a growing belief in Islamic fundamentalism.

Moscow responded harshly. In 1999, newly appointed Prime Minister Vladi­mir Putin launched a scorched-earth campaign that made the Chechen capital, Grozny, look like the ruins of Stalingrad. Chechen fighters struck back, often with spectacularly gruesome terrorist attacks, such as the 2002 seizure of a Moscow theater and the 2004 attack on an elementary school in North Ossetia. But this didn't derail Moscow. After a decade of brutal fighting (accompanied, often, by massive human rights violations), the Kremlin ended the antiterrorist operation in 2009.

Since then, the number of terrorist attacks from the North Caucasus has dropped precipitously. But that's not because Russia's Muslim radicals have been wiped out. Militant Islam's center of gravity has simply begun to shift to the Russian heartland.

Today, an estimated 20 million Muslims (including 6.5 million migrants from Azerbaijan and Central Asia) live in Russia, up from 14.5 million in 2002. While the vast majority of these men and women are peaceful, a small but growing number follow the fundamentalist teachings of Salafism and Wahhabism, ultra-conservative movements within Sunni Islam. In many cases, these ideas are spread by Russian-born imams (numbering in the tens of thousands) who trained in the Middle East.

The impact of that radicalization is already apparent in central Russia, home to the Tatars, Russia's largest Muslim ethnic group (there are about 5 million). Imams who share Wahhabi views are said to preach and serve in dozens of the 1,000-plus mosques in Tatarstan. In 1999, one of their adherents, Irek Hamidullin led several Tatar families to Afghanistan. That group went on to start Uighur-Bulgar Jamaat, an al-Qaeda offshoot reportedly set up with the direct participation of Osama bin Laden, which waged attacks on Russian troops in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Soon UBJ refocused its energies. Encouraged by al-Qaeda leadership, it worked to create a network of cells throughout Russia. In 2006, one such cell was founded in the autonomous republic of Bashkortostan. Its mission: attack critical infrastructure and law enforcement in the region. The group's leader, a 36-year-old ethnic Russian convert named Pavel Dorokhov who reportedly trained with the Taliban and al-Qaeda, was killed by Russian special forces in August 2008; nine UBJ members were eventually arrested.

The crackdown did not stem the UBJ's violent efforts. In July 2012, affiliated terrorists attacked the chief mufti of Tatarstan and his deputy, both moderate clerics who had opposed what they saw as the spread of Salafism and Wahhabism, and who had fired imams and madrassa teachers whom they thought nurtured radical Islam. The deputy mufti was fatally shot, and in a separate attack, the mufti was badly injured by a car bomb. Later that day, a cavalcade of cars under the black-and-white banners of global jihadists raced through the city. The UBJ also was also likely behind a November 2013 rocket attack on a major oil-refining facility in Tatarstan.

In May 2013, another group of radicalized Muslims was captured by anti-terror forces in an apartment building outside Moscow. They were accused of planning bomb attacks on the capital. They were ethnic Bashkirs, Russia's second-largest Muslim ethnic group; it was the first time an act of terrorism was allegedly plotted in Moscow by Muslim extremists who were not from the North Caucasus.

Tatars have joined the international jihad as well. Six of the nine Russian nationals held at Guantanamo Bay were ethnic Tatars. The first Taliban officer tried in a U.S. civilian court, Hamidullin, is from Naberezhnye Chelny, the most radical of Tatarstan's large cities and a focal point for Salafism in the region.

There are other forces at work, too. Russia hosts millions of guest workers, most of them from Muslim Central Asia. An estimated 2 1 / 2 to 5 million Uzbeks, 1 million Tajiks and 1 million Kyrgyz reside in Russia today, up from 360,000 migrants in 2002. There are an estimated 1.5 to 2 million Muslims in Moscow alone, making Russia's capital the largest Muslim city in Europe.

These men live in the shadows, often without work permits. They are culturally and ethnically marginalized, and often subject to abuse, extortion and occasional racist violence. According to one recent poll, 40 percent of Russians have a negative opinion of Islam.

In the face of this, some understandably turn to the faith of their grandparents as a means to sustain dignity. As a result, some Tajiks, Kyrgyz and Uzbeks who would not have known the way to the nearest mosque in Dushanbe, Bishkek or Tashkent have become zealous Muslims in Moscow. At least some fall under the influence of radical clerics.

International terrorist organizations have taken notice and have begun to ramp up their activities in Russia. Moscow has become the base of operation for an estimated 300 to 500 Islamic State recruiters. According to reports in the Russian media (much of which is controlled by the government), most Islamic State fighters from Central Asia have been recruited at construction sites in Moscow, including an estimated 300 ethnic Uzbeks. Nusrat Nazarov, the leader of Tajiks fighting with the Islamic State, was radicalized during his working stints in the Russian capital. (He was quoted saying there are 2,000 ethnic Tajiks under his control in Syria; in June, the Tajik Interior Ministry put the number of Tajik fighters in Syria at 500.) The secretary of the Security Council of Russia, Nikolai Patrushev, admitted recently that the authorities lack the means to stem the flow of volunteers.

The Russian Foreign Ministry estimates that there are 5,000 people from Russia and the former Soviet Union fighting alongside the Islamic State (independent observers put the number as high as 7,000). Today, Russian is the third-most-popular Islamic State language, after Arabic and English. Russian graffiti reportedly seen in Darayya, Syria, reads: "Today Syria, tomorrow Russia! Chechens and Tatars rise up! Putin, we will pray in your palace!"

The Russian authorities appear to be waking to the danger. Putin's chief of staff, Sergei Ivanov, said many of the Russians who have fought with the Islamic State have returned home, presenting a direct threat. In his speech at the U.N. General Assembly in September, Putin declared that, having "tasted blood" in Syria, fighters will come back to Russia to "continue their evil doings."

But Russia's security services are used to fighting terrorism in the relatively small, sparsely populated and largely rural North Caucasus. They are not ready to take on radicalizing Tatars and Bashkirs, disaffected Central Asians in large cities and the Islamic State's growing penetration of their homeland. The task is especially challenging because the new jihad is geographically vast (Russian media outlets have reported arrests of militants as far as Eastern Siberia) and far more urban. As a result, terrorist networks will have an easier time organizing and hiding.

Putin has further multiplied the risks of terrorism by casting his lot against Sunnis in Syria, though the overwhelming majority of Russian Muslims are Sunnis. Already, 55 Saudi Wahhabi clerics have called for a jihad against Russia for its military intervention in Syria. On Thursday, the Islamic State released a video threatening attacks against Russia. "Soon, very soon, the blood will spill like an ocean," a narrator says in Russian, according to the SITE Intelligence Group. And of course, there's mounting consensus that a bomb planted by Muslim extremists brought down a Russian charter jet last month over Egypt, killing all 224 people on board.

These actions need to be taken seriously. The threat of a Russian-wide jihad is now clear and present.
 #30
Carnegie Moscow Center
November 16, 2015
The First Strike Trap
By Alexey Arbatov

A first strike with nuclear weapons in a conflict between the great powers is bound to be catastrophic. At a time when speculation on nuclear weapons use has increased Russia and the United States should restate their commitment to the nuclear war prevention on which they had agreed in the Cold War era.
President Vladimir Putin uttered a memorable phrase last month at the Valdai Forum, saying, "I learned one rule on the streets of Leningrad fifty years ago-if a fight is inevitable, strike first."

Putin was making a point about the war against terrorism, where the "strike first" principle can certainly be justified. Many states, including Russia and the United States, have hit at terrorists preemptively, both on their own territory and overseas. A first strike may sometimes make sense in conventional conflicts: in 1967 Israel won a brilliant victory over its three Arab neighbors by striking them first, even though they had a clear advantage in weapons and manpower and planned an attack on Israel.

But a "first strike" is not an absolute principle, and it is completely unacceptable when it comes to the use of nuclear weapons in conflicts between nuclear-armed states, foremost Russia and the United States-even though their military doctrines do allow for this option under some rare circumstances.

The nuclear war issues came back on people's minds in the context of the Ukraine crisis, as references to the possible use of nuclear weapons have returned to Russia-NATO relations and become part of the discourse of officials and analysts for the first time since the Cold War ended a quarter of a century ago.

Since then and up until the Ukrainian crisis it seemed to be commonly accepted that any first use of nuclear weapons carried a tremendous risk of escalation resulting in an exchange of massive nuclear strikes, which would be a catastrophe for both sides and for the whole world. Even if they recognize the suicidal implications of a deliberate nuclear attack, political leaders may fall in a trap of believing that a first strike is a lesser evil if war is inevitable. However, in actual fact it is the first strike that makes nuclear war absolutely inevitable. Any information the leaders may receive on what the adversary is doing could be incorrect. For instance, it is almost impossible to differentiate as to whether an adversary is deploying nuclear forces in preparation of a first or a retaliatory strike. Even satellite and radar data on an incoming missile attack may be a false alarm, as has happened several times in the past. This kind of mistake could be fatal if the big powers' nuclear forces are put on a hair-trigger alert in a crisis.

An understanding of this danger is the basis on which the leaders of the United States and the USSR have concluded many special agreements and joint statements since 1972. They declare that the parties "will do everything possible to avoid military confrontations and prevent a nuclear war" (1972), that "nuclear war would have devastating consequences for mankind" (1973), and that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought" (1985). Moreover, Washington and Moscow signed seven strategic arms limitation and reduction treaties between 1972 and 2010. At their core is the concept of "strategic stability" reflected in the Soviet-American Joint Statement of 1990, which stipulates that the desired stable strategic relationship must guarantee the removal of incentives for a first strike.

All of a sudden, Putin has touched on the nuclear theme and referred to this history of agreements at the Valdai Forum, in remarks which strangely enough did not attract much attention from either the Russian or foreign media. In particular, the Russian president said, "With the appearance of nuclear weapons, it became clear that there can be no winner in a global conflict. There can be only one outcome-guaranteed mutual destruction... By the way, for the world leaders of the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s and even the 1980s, the use of armed force was an exceptional measure. They behaved responsibly, weighing up all the circumstances and possible consequences."

Talking about the present day, Putin said that the notion that "the victory of one party in a world conflict is again possible without irreversible, unacceptable...consequences for the winner" is an "illusion" that dangerously devalues the concept of nuclear deterrence.

Not for the first time, he named as potential threats the latest "high-precision long-range non-nuclear weapons" and the deployment of missile defense systems by the United States and its allies.

Most probably, the reason for Putin's addressing this subject at the recent Valdai Forum was a growing concern specialists and public in Russia and abroad that whether these fundamental realities are no longer being remembered. Do the high-ranking government officials, who engaged in nuclear bravado during the Ukrainian crisis, still have the same understanding of the terrible consequences of any use of nuclear weapons? Do they still adhere to the notion that such a step can only be justified as a last resort in response to a nuclear attack or large-scale conventional aggression that threatens the very existence of a state (such as the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941)?

Of course, it would be helpful if the Kremlin articulated a clear and unequivocal position on this issue, instead of referring to the virtues of past leaders and blaming their current successors abroad for their alleged intentions. Likewise, the threat of new long-range conventional weapon systems and ballistic missile defenses to the robustness of nuclear deterrence seems largely exaggerated. Still even indirect messages from Putin are quite timely. They are a reminder that, despite large cuts in nuclear arsenals during the last quarter century, the underlying nuclear realities have remained unchanged since the Cold War and still require world leaders to display the same high level of responsibility.

This is even more relevant when, in contrast to the Cold War era, Moscow and Washington have shared security interests and common enemies, in the form of international terrorism and religious extremism. The world has been once again reminded of these threats by the tragedies of the Russian airplane crash in Sinai and terrorist attacks in Paris. Now more than ever, Russia and the West need to genuinely cooperate in a fight against such foes-however serious their political controversies are at the global and regional levels.
 #31
Wall Street Journal
November 16, 2015
Russian Track Official Hopes to Have Team Restored in Three Months
Track's governing body suspended nation amid an alleged doping scandal
By THOMAS GROVE

MOSCOW-The head of the Russian Athletics Federation said on Sunday he hoped to restore Russia's membership in track and field's international federation within three months to allow the country's athletes to compete in the 2016 Summer Olympics.

The International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) suspended Russia from international track and field competitions indefinitely on Friday after a report that alleged an intricate state-sponsored doping program.

"We would like to restore (our membership) in the ranks of the IAAF in the course of three months. Our main goal is to secure the participation of our sportsmen in the Olympic Games and restore the reputation of Russian track and field," said the acting president of the All-Russia Athletics Federation Vadim Zelichyonok, Interfax reported.

The Russian Olympic Committee said on Saturday it wants to reform the country's athletics federation to give Russian athletes a chance to participate in the Games in Rio de Janeiro.

"The Russian Olympic Committee is ready to take upon itself the initiative of reforming the Russian Athletics Federation and bringing it in line with the IAAF and antidoping laws," Interfax reported the ROC's President Alexander Zhukov as saying.

Mr. Zhukov didn't clarify what steps would be taken, but said he wanted them implemented in time for the next Summer Olympic Games.

The suspension is likely to be announced officially during a Nov. 26-27 meeting of the IAAF in Monaco.

As is the case when a country is suspended from international competition, IAAF will set the terms for what Russia must do to have the suspension lifted.

The Russian federation can appeal the ban during the next month, with a ruling coming shortly after that. The federation could also take its case to the international Court of Arbitration for Sport.

The IAAF has set no duration for the suspension, which means the All-Russia Athletics Federation can apply for reinstatement once they have satisfied the world governing body that they are on the road to fixing their doping problem.

Russian officials had complained that the ban would punish clean athletes who weren't named in the report or implicated in previous doping scandals. But the conspiracy appears to have been so widespread that antidoping officials said it was nearly impossible to discern which Russian athletes may or may not have cheated.

Sports Minister Vitaly Mutko expressed hope Sunday that those athletes that weren't guilty of doping could compete under the auspices of the Russian Olympic Committee.

"We will propose to our Olympic Committee and together will try to approach the International Association of Athletics Federations and the IOC [International Olympic Committee] with a proposal that our clean athletes compete in various tournaments under the ROC aegis in the next three months," Mr. Mutko said.
 #32
PONARS
www.ponarseurasia.org
November 2015
The Code of Putinism
By Brian Taylor
Brian Taylor is Professor of Political Science in the Maxwell School at Syracuse University.
[Chart here http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/code-putinism]

Is Vladimir Putin a pragmatist or an ideologue? And if he is an ideologue, then what exactly is Putinism? Putin seems like an unlikely founder of an -ism, and for many years, experts tended to depict him as a pragmatist. Recently, however, especially since the domestic tightening of the screws from 2012, the 2014 annexation of Crimea, and the subsequent war in Ukraine, Putin is said to have gone ideological.

This memo argues that "Putinism" does indeed exist and that it has for some time, but that it is a mistake to see it as a coherent ideological scheme. Rather, Putinism is best thought of as a "code." A code is both more and less than an ideology; more, because it involves not just ideas but other stimuli for action, and less, because it is not a coherent and encompassing system of thought. Further, although it would be a mistake to see Putin as a pure ideologue, it would be equally mistaken to reduce Putin's actions to simple pragmatism. Rather, as the sociologist Max Weber observed long ago, rational self-interest is not the only motive for human action. In addition to what Weber called "instrumental rationality," other important motives for human behavior include values or ideas ("value rationality"), emotion ("affect"), and habit ("tradition"). I refer to this combination of motives that fall outside the realm of instrumental rationality-habit, emotions, and ideas-as a code.

This memo can only provide a rough outline of the contents of this code, a sketch rather than a portrait, with little nuance and limited evidence. My goal is to suggest a way to think about Russian behavior that gets beyond the pragmatist-or-ideologue distinction. This code is not Putin's code, but the code of Putinism, which means these beliefs, emotions, and habits are shared to a large extent by other members of Putin's team. Although he is obviously the most important person in the system and its central decisionmaker, he has surrounded himself with people who share similar backgrounds and beliefs. Further, this code took some time to develop and show itself, becoming readily apparent in the aftermath of the Beslan terrorist attack of September 2004 and Ukraine's Orange Revolution in December 2004. Although somewhat dormant during the Medvedev interregnum, the code of Putinism has returned in full form since Putin's return to the presidency in 2012. The basic components of the Putinist code are shown in the following table.

[Not here]

Perhaps the most fundamental component of Putin's thinking is that he is a statist (gosudarstvennik). In his first major statement as ruler, in December 1999, Putin declared that building a strong state was "the key to the rebirth and rise of Russia." But what kind of state does the Putinist code envision? The evidence suggests that, contrary to initial claims that the state must be democratic, the Putinist code gives the state primacy over the individual. The Putinist state is a traditional Russian "service state"-not one that provides services to its citizens, but one that expects citizens to serve it.

Putin is not only a statist, but a great power statist (derzhavnik). He said in 2003, "All of our historical experience shows that a country like Russia can live and develop in its existing borders only if it is a great power. In all periods when the country was weak-politically or economically-Russia always and inevitably faced the threat of collapse." Russia should be a great power not only so it will not be pushed around globally, but also so it can resist infringements on its sovereignty and stand up to those lecturing Russia about the deficiencies of its domestic political system-hence the concept of "sovereign democracy" propagated in 2006-2007 by Putin's deputy chief of staff Vladislav Surkov.

The need for a strong state internally and externally, and for forceful resistance of Western pressure, is connected to another core Putinist idea, that of anti-Westernism in general and anti-Americanism in particular.

This anti-Americanism has been evident from at least 2004, when after the Beslan attack Putin blamed outside forces who "want to cut from us a tasty piece of pie"; two years later he attacked "Comrade Wolf" who "knows who to bite and doesn't listen to anybody." According to Russian leaders, the United States developed the technology of "color revolutions" as a form of political warfare against Russia, most importantly during Ukraine's 2004 Orange Revolution and 2014 Euromaidan. As Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev put it earlier this year, "The Americans are trying to drag Russia into an inter-state military conflict, using the Ukrainian events to bring about a change in power [in Russia] and in the final analysis dismember our country."

A final ideational attribute of Putinism is what might be called conservatism but is more properly seen as anti-liberalism. Philosophically, liberals tend to stress the importance of individual rights and freedoms, and have a generally positive view of human nature and the possibility of rational progress. Conservatives, in contrast, tend to stress the group over the individual, be more skeptical about human nature, and prioritize order and tradition over change and reform. In 1999 Putin stressed that Russia was historically very different from liberal America and England, contending that "collective forms of life have always dominated over individualism" in Russia and that the Russian people look toward the state and society as a whole for support rather than believe in their own efforts. This collectivist and statist orientation is decidedly conservative. Putin's embrace of conservativism has become more explicit in his third term as president, with his defense of traditional values and spirituality.

Putinist Habits

It is common in political analysis to attribute someone's behavior to things they believe; it is much less common to claim people act politically based on things they do without really thinking. Referring to this as "habit" is in a certain sense misleading, because the issue is not whether someone smokes or bites their fingernails. Rather, when Weber emphasized the importance of "traditional" behavior "determined by ingrained habituation," he was referring to an "almost automatic reaction" without reflection or deliberation.

One key impulse of Putin and his team which fits our understanding of a habit is the desire to establish control. This includes a distrust of spontaneous action. For Putin and many of his close associates, this habit is at least in part an attribute either acquired or strengthened by time working for the Soviet secret police, the KGB. As Russian sociologist Olga Kryshtanovskaya put it in 2007, "What is 'disorder' in the eyes of a man in uniform? It's the absence of control. If there is not control, there is the possibility of independent influence. And the siloviki [people with backgrounds in the security services, law enforcement, and the military] perceive the presence of alternative centers of power in the country as a threat to the country's integrity."

Closely related to this attitude about control is a commitment to order. Putin and most of his closest associates made their careers as bureaucrats, not as politicians, and are therefore used to hierarchical organizational structures. This habitual orientation was evident in the first slogan adopted by Putin to explain his goals as president, the "vertical of power." It is also apparent in Putin's obvious distaste for revolutions, which he sees not as spontaneous domestic uprisings brought on by popular dissatisfaction but as events instigated by someone, often outsiders, particularly the United States.

Habits favoring control and order also lead into a preference for unity, or what more politically might be called anti-pluralism. Ideationally, this is connected to conservative and anti-liberal ideas that stress the importance of national unity and downplay the importance of individual freedoms and expression. Putin maintained in 2003 that it would only be possible for Russia to achieve its "strategic goal" of returning to the ranks of the great powers through "consolidation...mobilization...[and] the uniting of forces." Dmitry Medvedev, at the time head of the presidential administration, went further, arguing in 2005 that "if we cannot consolidate the elite, Russia could disappear as a single state."

There is a general connection between habits favoring control, order, and unity and ideas that are statist, anti-liberal, and anti-Western. Putin has repeatedly emphasized the need to unite against foreign and domestic enemies for the good of the country. This continual linking of domestic critics and foreign adversaries represents a return to a traditional "besieged fortress" image of Russia, a tendency that resonates naturally with the Putinist team.

Another habitual tendency that has marked the Putin era is personal loyalty. A St. Petersburg journalist described Putin in an interview as "a friend to his friends," which is both a "strong and weak point" of his personality. Loyalty to "the guys" and sticking together was a key part of the social code in Putin's childhood milieu. Putin's demonstration of loyalty to his two key patrons, former St. Petersburg mayor Anatoly Sobchak and former president Yeltsin, played a crucial role in his rise to the top. Loyalty is not just a personal characteristic, however, but a more general feature of the system, with loyalty to the "clan" or "team" being seen as a key practice.

The final habit that is part of the code of Putinism is hyper-masculinity. Even the most casual observer of Russian politics is familiar with Putin's penchant for macho displays: demonstrations of his judo prowess, fishing and riding horseback bare-chested, tranquilizing a tiger, hanging out with a biker gang, and so forth. These are not just stunts, according to a different St. Petersburg journalist, but the realization of Putin's "childhood dreams." Putin also has a tendency to use criminal slang to emphasize his toughness. Although this tough talk and behavior is clearly in part a public relations construction and legitimization tool, it also seems to reflect habitual tendencies that affect how the Russian leadership sees the world.

Putinist Emotions

Emotions, like habits, are often disregarded by social scientists trying to explain political behavior, especially that of elites.[1] Feelings are things to be ignored or suppressed or controlled, to allow the rational part of the brain to do its work. Psychological research, however, show that emotions are fundamental to decisionmaking.

The first emotion of central importance to the Putinist code is respect. More specifically, the Putinist elite feels that it has been disrespected, offended, even humiliated, in particular by the West. In February 2000, Putin emphasized the danger of disrespecting Russia, declaring: "Anyone who offends us will not last three days." This feeling of having been disrespected has intensified in recent years, with the Russian economist Igor Yurgens observing in 2014 that "both Putin and his closest circle are overcome with feelings of humiliation and betrayal." Similarly, foreign policy analyst Sergei Karaganov has noted a "feeling of humiliation and a desire for revanche" on the part of "a significant part of the elite and the population as a whole." The political commentator Stanislav Belkovsky, emphasizing the importance of emotion to decisionmaking, stated that Putin felt that he had "tolerated humiliation from the West for many years" and that the annexation of Crimea was not so much a pragmatic defense of Russian interests but the "redemption of his own humiliation."

Closely related to this feeling of disrespect is the emotion of resentment. The fancy/pretentious way this emotion is discussed in academic literature is to use the French term ressentiment, a feeling experienced when one group takes another group as an example or model but then feels angry and frustrated when it is unable to meet the standards, whether objectively or subjectively, of the exemplary unit. Multiple Russian scholars have highlighted the importance of ressentiment, including PONARS Eurasia members Sergey Medvedev and Eduard Ponarin.[2] The political scientist Olga Malinova notes the inherent tension between Russia's position of "pupilhood" vis-à-vis the West in terms of building democracy and capitalism in the 1990s versus its perceived status as an equal great power. Resentment was all but inevitable under the circumstances.

A final emotion that is an aspect of the Putinist code is vulnerability or even fear. This claim probably sounds dubious, given the amount of power wielded by Putin and his government and the degree of popularity Putin has enjoyed over the last 15 years in Russia. But close observers of Putinism insist that this feeling is genuine. Former Kremlin insider Gleb Pavlovsky has described among the elite "an absolute conviction that as soon as the power center shifts, or if there is mass pressure, or the appearance of a popular leader, then everybody will be annihilated. It's a feeling of great vulnerability." Further, Pavlovsky maintained that Putin believed that Russia was not ready for an elite rotation of power without score-settling: "Putin always said, we know ourselves, we have not reached that stage yet; we know that as soon we move aside, you will destroy us. He said that explicitly: you'll put us up against the wall and execute us."

Implications

Is Putin a pragmatist or an ideologue? He is both and neither, sometimes one and sometimes the other. His politics and decisions are motivated by a combination of circumstances, rationality, ideas, habits, and emotions. He has a mentality and certain goals, but not a detailed road map. He is, in short, a human being.

Importantly, these elements can reinforce one another. The idea of Russia as a strong state at home and abroad is connected to habits of control and order, as well as feelings of resentment and disrespect. The overlap and blurring between the elements is what makes it a cohesive code or mentality. Reducing the motives of Putin and his ruling team to just one thing-whether rationality or ideology-misses a lot of the story.

Outside observers and foreign interlocutors need to resist the tendency to dismiss the code of Putinism as either a product of irrationality or propaganda and instead understand how it shapes Russian government behavior at home and abroad. For the Kremlin, Russia's domestic and international situation is quite precarious and the West is out to get Russia and makes common cause with Russia's domestic opposition; as a result, strongly centralized "manual control" is necessary to hold the state together.

Russia's besieged fortress mentality is real. The impact of this code has been captured well by pro-Kremlin Russian journalist Dmitry Babich: "Living without enemies and having a besieged fortress mentality is indeed stupid. However, living in a besieged fortress and not having a besieged fortress mentality is downright idiotic." Putin and his team are not idiots. Rather, their life experiences (including feelings, habits, and values) reinforce this fortress mentality.
 #33
www.culturalvistas.org
Alfa Fellowship Program

The Alfa Fellowship Program is a distinguished professional development program placing accomplished young professionals in work assignments at leading organizations in the fields of business, economics, journalism, law, public policy, and related areas in Russia.

The program accepts up to 18 American, British, and German citizens per year. The program includes intensive Russian language training, seminar series, and extended professional experience. Fellows receive a monthly stipend, language training, coverage of all program-related travel costs, housing, and insurance.

The Alfa Fellowship Program aims to expand networks of American, British, German, and Russian professionals, develop greater intercultural understanding, and advance knowledge of Russia in the West.

Program Benefits

Drawing upon extensive contacts throughout industry, media, public, and nonprofit organizations in Russia, the Alfa Fellowship Program works together with the fellows to identify suitable work placements at leading institutions.

The Alfa Fellowship Program endeavors to secure positions that meet the interests of both the fellows and host institutions. Fellows' progress is closely monitored by the Fund for International Fellowships and Cultural Dialogue in Moscow.

In addition to individualized professional assignments, the Alfa Fellowship Program includes:

Four-month Russian language tutoring program in the U.S., U.K., or Germany
Four-month Russian language course in Moscow
Orientation seminar in Washington, D.C., with accommodation and roundtrip travel
Housing in Moscow for the duration of the program
Moscow seminar program
Generous monthly stipend
Three regional excursions throughout Russia and one to a neighboring country
Limited international health, accident, and liability insurance

Eligibility

Candidates for the Alfa Fellowship Program must meet the following eligibility requirements:

U.S., U.K., or German citizen
25-35 years old at the application deadline
Russian proficiency is preferred; qualified candidates with fluency in another second language may be considered
Graduate degree or equivalent training in business, economics, journalism, law, public policy, or a related field
At least two years of relevant work experience; candidates without a graduate degree must demonstrate extensive and equivalent professional experience in their field, approximately six years, in order to qualify for the Alfa Fellowship Program.

Application Deadline

December 1, 2015 for the 2016-2017 program year.

For more information, please visit: alfafellowship.org or email: alfa@culturalvistas.org.

 

 #34
Kyiv Post
November 15, 2015
Avakov: Terrorist attacks expected in Ukraine's largest cities in 'next few days'
By Mark Rachkevych

Interior Minister Arsen Avakov warned terrorist acts are expected in the "next few days" involving "firearms and explosives" in Ukraine's largest cities of Kyiv, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, as well as other, according to a public announcement he made on his Facebook page.

An identical announcement was published on the Interior Ministry's website at 10:45 p.m. Kyiv time.

Following meetings with Ukraine's Security Service, or SBU, Avakov said that in the -"upcoming days...we shall have to live through several attempts by destructive, anti-Ukrainian forces to destabilize the situation in the country."

Based on the intelligence he received, Avakov said he has placed law enforcement "structures in beefed-up security mode."

He urged citizens to be "attentive in public gathering places and immediately inform law enforcement bodies about people who behave suspiciously or items, weapons, left-alone baggage," and to call the emergency number of 102.

Avakov added that there is enough "strength, knowledge and responsibility."

"I'm certain that each of us has the responsibility, everyone in their place, won't allow provocations and attacks to destabilize the situation in the country and in the next few days we will able to eliminate all threats from the anti-Ukrainian forces known to law enforcement."
 #35
Euromaidanpress.com
November 15, 2015
Russian trace in Paris bombing theory not as crazy as you might think
By Mychailo Wynnyckyj
Mychailo Wynnyckyj, Associate Professor of the Department of Sociology and Kyiv-Mohyla Business School, Director of the Doctoral School, National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy.

Tonight the world mourns the victims of the IS ("Islamic State") attacks on Paris. Meanwhile, seemingly as proof of the degree to which Ukraine is peripheral to global public opinion, the resurgent conflict in Ukraine's Donbas goes unnoticed (as do the bombings in Beirut two days ago). In Ukraine, this morning's news broadcasts reported intensified artillery and small-arms fire along the entire length of the front in the east. Apparently the "separatists" (aka Russian mercenaries and "military advisors" from the Russian Federation) have resumed shelling of Ukrainian army positions from tanks, and supposedly withdrawn (according to the Minsk/Paris accords) heavy artillery. Tonight's news broadcasts have reported 7 dead and 8 injured among Ukraine's defenders.

I haven't written my "Thoughts from Kyiv" for a while. That's not to say I've stopped writing, just not in this genre. My previous "Thoughts" have been described by some as "analytical", but by many others as "long" and/or "alarmist." If you feel the latter labels are appropriate, stop reading now - you won't enjoy the text anyway...

Incidentally, the label "alarmist" was first applied to me after a series of articles I posted in March-April 2014 in which I tried to warn anyone who would listen that Putin's aggression in Crimea and the Donbas were not a limited action, but part of a much broader expansionist strategy. Later, in October 2014, I warned of the possibility of aerial bombardments of Kyiv, and even though US General Breedlove (Supreme Allied Commander, Europe) reiterated the same warning several days later, the "alarmist" label stuck to me, not him. So now, I'm gun shy: in this article I'll present scenarios rather than predictions. I am not Vladimir Putin's psychotherapist, and so have no idea what course of action his sick mind will decide to take up in the immediate future. I also have no doubt that rational choice is not a forte of the Russian President - at least not the same way "rationality" is understood by most intelligent people educated in a post-Enlightenment western paradigm. Nevertheless, he has made his intentions clear in several public addresses, and has backed these up with action - alas few have listened...

As I write these words, my Facebook newsfeed is filled with speculation written by Ukrainians searching for a "Russian trace" in the Paris attacks. Although I am generally wary of conspiracy theories, the logic of several of these posts gives one pause. Take for example, the list of rhetorical propositions presented by Channel 5 journalist Vitaliy Haydukevych who asks "whose interests are served by the Paris attacks?":

1. In the wake of an IS attack on Paris, anti-Islamic sentiment in France (and Euroscepticism in other EU member states) inevitably will rise, likely to the political benefit of the radical right Front National (and equivalent parties in other European countries). Who finances Marie Le-Pen?

2. The universally accepted notion of Europe as being secure and prosperous has been shaken - particularly among those in Eastern Europe (e.g. eastern and central Ukraine) who have become recent converts to the cause of Eurointegration.

3. The French security apparatus (apparently) knew that a terrorist threat existed, but were powerless to avert the attacks - this meme is particularly popular among Russian media outlets, coupled with the message "don't travel outside of Russia, it's not safe."

4. In the span of the past 2 weeks IS has attacked both the French and the Russians (downing the MetroJet flight over Egypt). Apparently their terrorist threat is universal, and an alliance between Paris and Moscow in the war in Syria will be a logical consequence (BTW: allies don't impose economic sanctions on one another).

Incidentally, Russian MP and political analysts Sergey Markov (believed to have Putin's ear) posted several messages on his FB page today calling upon France to now lead a "global anti-terrorist coalition, with the participation of the US and Russia, to crush the IS terrorist threat in Syria, Iraq and Lybia." As an aside Markov urges the West to urgently end its conflict with Russia over Ukraine, to "replace the (Kyiv) junta with a technocratic government, rewrite (Ukraine's) Constitution... The Kyiv junta is one of the main obstacles to joint action by the US, EU and Russia against terrorism." No mention of Crimea - obviously.

At the Valdai Discussion Club in Sochi on 22 October 2015, Markov's paradigm was formalized by Vladimir Putin, who reminded his audience that during his previous speech at the UN General Assembly on 28 September (3 days before the start of Russian aerial sorties in Syria), the Russian President called for the creation of a global anti-terrorist coalition, "but our American partners ignored this proposal." According to Putin, the only way to ensure victory over Islamic terrorism is for the US, EU and Russia to view each other as allies against a common enemy. Furthermore (Markov's words are clearly an echo of the boss's thoughts): without the direct involvement of the US and Europe, finding a resolution to the conflict in the Donbas will not be possible - Kyiv is not prepared to change its constitution without external pressure.

And so we return to the perennial question: what is Putin after? If only people would listen - he's quite clear in his statements. Take the following quotes from the Russian President's Valdai address (Oct 22, 2015):

1. "Competition between states is a natural condition in geopolitics"
2. "In the modern world, unipolarity is not healthy"
3. "The US treats its European allies as one would treat vassals, punishing European companies for violating sanctions regime against Russia"
4. "American strategists understand fully that their missile defense system (in Europe) is aimed at neutralizing the nuclear threat from Russia - i.e. at reducing the geopolitical power of Russia. This is precisely why we see this as a threat. If one country puts up a nuclear umbrella and protects itself against nuclear threats, then that country will be free to use its power to pursue its interests anywhere through any means."
5. "Russia and the West have different civilizational worldviews" (answer to question alluding to Huntingdon's classic work). Apparently, the West is pragmatic whereas Russia's "soul" is idealistic. And incidentally, "I don't see the Russians and Ukrainians as separate peoples," said Putin.

From the above, one can deduce: a) Putin wants to return Russia to its "rightful" position as a global superpower - a balance/alternative to US global hegemony; b) Russia's nuclear arsenal is a key instrument of the Kremlin's geopolitical ambitions, and anything that threatens the perpetuation of the Cold War doctrine of MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) is seen as a direct threat to Russia's geopolitical interests; c) In order to (re)establish Russia's "rightful" place (and in order to formalize his "sphere of influence"), Putin craves a "new Yalta" - a meeting between the US and Russia (possibly with the participation of China) aimed at carving up the globe.

During the Valdai discussion Putin (apparently) digressed from his prepared remarks during the Q&A, and recalled having recently read archived transcripts of conversations held in 1990 between a former leader of the German Social-Democrats and the Soviet leadership on the eve of unification. According to the Russian President, during the taped conversation, the German politician bemoaned the fact that the two sides had not "decided the fate of Europe" prior to unification, pointing out to his Soviet interlocutors that the lack of a deal between the new/old great powers would lead to continued conflict on the continent.

Having watched a video of Putin's performance at the Valdai Discussion Club 3 weeks ago, having then observed the extremely muted reaction to the bombing of Metrojet Flight 9268 over the Sinai Desert a mere 9 days later, and now having watched the Kremlin's rapid response to the IS terrorist attacks on Paris, I am beginning to give some credence to the conspiracy theorists who would find a trace of the Russian President behind every recent incident of violence on or near the European continent. In Sochi, Putin ominously declared: "There's one thing I learned in my youth on the streets of Leningrad: if a fight is unavoidable, one should hit first." Is this exactly what he has been doing lately?

Tonight, volunteers embedded with the Ukrainian Army's 53rd brigade near Avdiyivka (the closest point on the front line to the city of Donetsk) report intense fighting with the use of heavy artillery by both sides - apparently Ukrainian forces quickly brought their equipment forward to the conflict line in response to an intense enemy attack on their defensive positions. Are the "separatists" simply taking advantage of the world being distracted by the Paris bombings, or are we witnessing an expansion of Russia's theatre of operations. Putin can't fight a war on two fronts (i.e. both in Syria and Ukraine) simultaneously, can he?

In the long term (I am convinced), this question will matter little - except to historians. For those (like me) who believe World War Three began with the annexation of Crimea, and that it will end with the disintegration of Russia (along the lines of WWI beginning in the provincial city of Sarajevo, but resulting in the disintegration of the Habsburg Empire), the Paris bombings, tonight's escalation in the Donbas, and the inevitable intensification of military action in Syria - inevitably to be followed by more IS bombings in the West in the future- are all events in a continuous narrative that humanity has been dragged into by a little madman in the Kremlin. Clearly IS is an autonomous actor in this war, but as was the case in previous global conflicts, adversarial lines are rarely two dimensional - Russia is an antagonist for whom the destruction of US hegemony and a weakened EU are means to its own perceived (re)assertion as a global actor, and for whom the use of IS terrorists as instruments for achieving these goals is an absolutely legitimate strategy of geopolitical realpolitik. For those of us in Europe this is a somewhat uncomfortable position. However, to seek comfort in an alliance with one's ultimate enemy would clearly be shortsighted.
 #36
Donetsk republic reported 80 ceasefire violations by Kiev troops over past week

MOSCOW, November 16. /TASS/. As many as 80 ceasefire violations by Ukrainian troops have been reported by the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) over the past week, DPR defense ministry spokesman Eduard Basurin said on Monday.

"Over the past week, Ukrainian troops committed 80 violations of the ceasefire regime," the Donetsk News Agency quoted him as saying. "As many as 250 mines of the 120mm and 82mm caliber were fired at DPR settlements and positions of the DPR army, as many as 13 episodes of shelling from tanks were reported."

The ministry also said there were 23 ceasefire violations over the past 24 hours.

The bulk of shelling episodes occurred in the nighttime "in a bid to conceal provocations from the OSCE mission," he said.

According to the DPR defense ministry, the situation in the republic has aggravated, with increased shelling opened by Ukrainian troops at the DPR territory. Earlier reports said that Ukrainian troops had shelled Donetsk and its suburbs overnight to Monday.

The Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine comprising senior representatives from Russia, Ukraine and the European security watchdog OSCE on February 12, 2015, signed a 13-point Package of Measures to fulfil the September 2014 Minsk agreements. The package was agreed with the leaders of the Normandy Four, namely Russia, Germany, France and Ukraine.

The Package of Measures, known as Minsk-2, envisaged a ceasefire between Ukrainian government forces and people's militias in the self-proclaimed republics of east Ukraine starting from February 15 and subsequent withdrawal of heavy weapons from the line of engagement. The deal also laid out a roadmap for a lasting settlement in Ukraine, including local elections and constitutional reform to give more autonomy to the war-torn eastern regions.

In line with an agreement reached in Minsk at a meeting of the Contact Group on settling the situation in east Ukraine, a complete ceasefire was established from September 1 at the disengagement line in Donbas. Still, the DPR regularly registers separate instances of shelling on the part of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

 
#37
Moscow Times
November 16, 2015
Topless Femen Activist Calls Kiev Mayor Klitschko a Pimp

A topless activist from the feminist art protest group Femen accosted incumbent Kiev Mayor Vitaly Klitschko at a polling station in a local election, accusing him of being a "pimp" for allegedly running protection rackets for local brothels.

Klitschko was casting his ballot Sunday in a mayoral election, which he was expected to win by a wide margin.

The activist accosted the mayor, brandishing her bare torso with the words: "Stop Klitschko the Pimp" written in English across her chest, according to Ukraine's Ukrinform news agency and photographs published by the feminist group.

She was escorted away by security guards, Ukrinform reported.

Femen activists allege that Klitschko has been campaigning for the legalization of prostitution in Ukraine, and accuse the mayor of running a "protection racket" for illegal sex industries, according to the Femen website.

Shortly after polls closed, exit polls showed that Klitschko has been reelected as mayor. An exit poll conducted by the Kiev International Sociology Institute indicated the incumbent may have received more about 65 percent of the vote, Ukraine's TSN television and news agency reported Sunday.

Voter turnout during Sunday's run-off election was 28 percent, compared to more than 41 percent in the first round of the balloting, media reports said.
 #38
Another Georgian native gets Ukrainian citizenship, high post in Ukraine's national police

KYIV. Nov 15 (Interfax) - Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko has signed a decree giving Ukrainian citizenship to Giorgi Grigalashvili, who previously headed the Georgian patrol police.

"You have demonstrated a result in the reform of the Georgian law enforcement system, you have to demonstrate it in Ukraine, too. I hope for your professionalism and decency," Poroshenko said while signing the decree, the Ukrainian presidential press service reported on Sunday.

According to the presidential administration, Grigalashvili will head up the internal security department of the Ukrainian national police, which will detect violations by the police and react to them, and also fight corruption in the National Police.

Khatia Dekanoidze, who has recently been appointed head of the Ukrainian National Police who was present at the meeting, said: "Our main task is to pass the experience we have accumulated to Ukrainians." She said all people who will be subsequently appointed to the agency she leads will be Ukrainian.

Dekanoidze called Grigalashvili the driving force of Georgia's law enforcement system reform and one of the people who created the National Police in Ukraine. He led the Tbilisi patrol police in 2004-2006 and led the Georgian patrol police in 2006-2012.

"I am confident that the Ukrainian police will be regarded one of the best in Europe in several years," Grigalashvili said.

Khatia Dekanoidze, former education minister of Georgia, was appointed head of the Ukrainian National Police on November 4. Dekanoidze was 24 when she started working in the team of reformers of Mikheil Saakashvili, who was then president of Georgia, and led the admiration of the Georgian Security Council. Later she was appointed education minister and also headed a police academy. She was an adviser to Interior Minister Arsen Avakov in Ukraine before being appointed head of the National Police.
 #39
Campaign against Minsk peace accords continues in Ukraine

KEIV, November 15. /TASS/. A campaign against the Minsk peace agreements has been developing in Ukraine. On television, many speakers say it's unacceptable to agree with terms imposed on Ukraine, and which only two months earlier were proudly referred to as "Poroshenko's Plan" of settling the crisis in Donbas.
"The Verkhovna Rada (parliament) should express the public opinion: we do not need terms imposed by Germany or France in Minsk. We should quit Minsk, we need Budapest-2," former legislator Inna Bogoslovskaya said in People. Hard Talk programme on 112. Ukraine television channel.

On the same television channel, Nikolai Siryi of Ukraine's Institute for State and Law expressed a similar opinion. Many experts say about a necessary "Budapest process" and talks of the Budapest Memorandum parties plus the US and the UK. Saying so, those experts claim Russia is "violating the Budapest Memorandum."

In early March, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stressed that the signing of the memorandum only signaled that Russia, the US and the UK were committed "not to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine and not to threaten to use them."

"This was done in exchange for Ukraine's voluntary abandonment of the nuclear arsenals of the former Soviet Union. Russia took no other commitments and neither did the other countries that signed the memorandum," Lavrov said.

The Budapest memorandum did not oblige Russia to agree to the coup in Ukraine in February 2014 and to the actions of the Ukrainian radicals that undermined the sovereignty of the Ukrainian state, Lavrov said.

Several days earlier, Kiev's international institute for sociology research conducted a survey about the situation in Donbass and ways to settle it. The results show 78% of the polled Ukrainians supported the peaceful settlement of the conflict.

Minsk accords

The Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine comprising senior representatives from Russia, Ukraine and the European security watchdog OSCE on February 12, 2015, signed a 13-point Package of Measures to fulfil the September 2014 Minsk agreements. The package was agreed with the leaders of the Normandy Four, namely Russia, Germany, France and Ukraine.

The Package of Measures, known as Minsk-2, envisaged a ceasefire between Ukrainian government forces and people's militias in the self-proclaimed republics in Donetsk and Luhansk starting from February 15 and subsequent withdrawal of heavy weapons from the line of engagement. The deal also laid out a roadmap for a lasting settlement in Ukraine, including local elections and constitutional reform to give more autonomy to the war-torn eastern regions.
 
 #40
G20-Russia's Putin says offers Ukraine better terms to restructure debt
By Denis Dyomkin and Lidia Kelly

BELEK, Turkey, Nov 16 (Reuters) - President Vladimir Putin said on Monday Russia had made a surprise offer to restructure Ukraine's debt, telling Kiev it would accept an annual debt repayment of $1 billion over three years if the West provided guarantees.

Russia has until now refused to restructure the $3 billion Eurobond on Ukraine's terms, saying the debt cannot be considered commercial. It has threatened to take Ukraine to court if it fails to repay the bond in full and on time next month.

But Putin, speaking to reporters on the sidelines of the Group of 20 (G20) summit in Turkey's Antalya, said Russia had made Ukraine an offer that was "better" than what the International Monetary Fund had been suggesting.

Moscow had made the proposal to try to ensure full repayment and "not to put Ukraine in a difficult situation," said Putin, adding he had asked Western partners and the IMF itself to guarantee debt repayment.

"If the West cannot give a guarantee, it means they do not believe in the future of the Ukrainian economy," Putin said, adding that the matter should be decided by December.

He said he had held talks "in passing" with U.S. President Barack Obama and Treasury Secretary Jack Lew on the debt deal on Monday.

"The proposal was received with interest," Putin said.

Ukraine's finance ministry said on Monday it had not received "any direct information" on an offer by Putin.
 #41
Wall Street Journal
November 14, 2015
Ukraine Separatists Feel Abandoned as Moscow's Attention Shifts
Eastern region becomes gray area, part of Ukraine but economically cut off
By JAMES MARSON

DONETSK, Ukraine-This separatist-held city is staggering back to its feet after a two-month lull in fighting, the longest in a 19-month conflict between government forces and Russia-backed rebels in the industrial east.

But as Moscow's strategic focus shifts to Syria, people here are wondering what comes next for them.

The fighting has left deep scars, and the city is in an uneasy limbo: Separatist dreams of a rapid annexation or recognition by Russia have faded, and a return to Ukrainian authority seems distant.

"Russia doesn't need appendices," said Valentin Venglovsky, a 48-year-old former scrap-metal merchant who is now a major in the separatist army. "And too much blood has been spilled to go back to Ukraine." Asked what he would do if Ukraine regained control, he drew his pistol from a belt holster and held it to his head. "It will be easier to shoot myself," he said.

Mr. Venglovsky joined small anti-Kiev protests here in April 2014 that morphed into an armed conflict that has cost some 8,000 lives.

A peace deal signed in February foresees the area returning to Ukraine with additional local powers and properly elected leaders. Still, fighting around Donetsk, the largest city under separatist control, raged through the summer, with both sides trading heavy shellfire.

Both sides now say they have pulled back their big guns and some other hardware, including tanks. But the dynamic really shifted perceptibly after Russia in late September began a bombing campaign in Syria. While clashes have increased in recent days, they are still well below levels seen in the summer.

Some here now say the Kremlin is intent on using the region as a bargaining chip, possibly in the hopes of lifting Western sanctions imposed after Moscow annexed Crimea last year or to hobble Ukraine's attempts to integrate with the West. Many feel they are in a gray zone.

"Most people don't care if it's Russia or Ukraine," one restaurant owner said. "They just want it all to end."

On the front lines around Donetsk airport, where gunfire flares occasionally, some rebels are disgruntled with the stalemate.

"I'm sick of it," said a rebel fighter in his mid-30s who goes by the name Gnome. "What's the point of this? The guys are tired. We sit in concrete cellars: damned cold, no electricity, no television, no girls and not much to eat."

In town, a tenuous normalcy has returned. A furnace at the steel mill has fired up again, saturating the air with a familiar, pungent smell. Restaurants are filling up again with patrons other than armed men in camouflage, and the opera house recently opened its winter season.

Mr. Venglovsky, who works for the separatist security service, said the situation with looting was improving.

But dangers remain. The restaurant owner said he sold his SUV after another businessman was snatched by unidentified gunmen and held until he handed over the keys to his car. Another local entrepreneur recently paid a ransom to gunmen who had kidnapped his 7-year-old daughter, the restaurateur said.

The economy is limping, and many residents are living from hand to mouth. Ukraine has limited most cargo entering separatist regions. Goods are cheaper in government-controlled territory, but getting back home means waiting in lines of cars several miles long at de facto border checkpoints.

Owners of large factories here still pay taxes in Ukraine to avoid legal problems, but the rebel leaders allow them to keep operating-and paying salaries-to head off discontent.

The Russian ruble is now the main currency, but businessmen complain that Moscow has been slow to open up trade. Many downtown shops have closed because of lack of demand, security issues or impossible logistics.

"It's more circuses than bread," said Sergei Baryshnikov, a history professor and doyen of the tiny separatist movement that existed in Donetsk before the conflict.

Mr. Baryshnikov is one of several local ideologues and independent-minded military commanders who have been gradually purged from leadership positions. He was fired as dean of the university just as he had been appointed last year: by a rebel government minister flanked by two men with automatic rifles.

"They tossed out the ideas people," empowering more malleable satraps, he complained.

Russia's influence is pervasive. The Kremlin has plenty of experience managing frozen conflicts on former Soviet territory, including separatist territories in Georgia and Moldova.

Donetsk is developing the trappings of those zones, such as television channels mixing propaganda with entertainment, a porous dividing line with semi-legal flows of goods, and a nascent banking system created with the help of another largely unrecognized region, South Ossetia.

Separatist leaders head across the border to the nearest large Russian town of Rostov-on-Don for consultations. Posters are still plastered across the region advertising elections of mayors and local councils that were canceled last month after Russia held talks with Western leaders.

On a road into Donetsk one recent day, 50 trucks marked "Humanitarian aid from the Russian Federation" rumbled toward the city. Along another road from the east, a dozen new Kamaz trucks with young, professional-looking soldiers in fresh uniforms without insignia headed toward Donetsk.

The peace deal obliges the separatists to hand control of the border with Russia back to Ukraine, but many here say that would mean the end of their venture.

"We will die without the support of Russia," said Mr. Venglovsky, the rebel army major.
 
 #42
Bloomberg
November 15, 2015
Ukraine Exits 18 Months of Recession to Face Meager Recovery
By Daryna Krasnolutska and Kateryna Choursina

Ukraine's economy exited 1 1/2 years of recession last quarter, reaching a milestone toward what officials predict will be a drawn-out recovery.

Gross domestic product rose a preliminary 0.7 percent in July-September from the previous quarter, the State Statistics Office said Monday, buoyed by a modest industrial revival and relative peace in the nation's east. The annual decline eased to 7 percent from 14.6 percent in the second quarter and as high as 17.2 percent in the first. That's less than the 9.5 percent median forecast in a Bloomberg survey of five economists.

A cease-fire in Ukraine's 19-month conflict with pro-Russian militants has allowed companies to boost production and eased pressure on the hryvnia, this year's fourth-worst performer against the dollar. While the government is trying to turn the economy round with help from a $17.5 billion International Monetary Fund loan, growth may only rebound by 1 percent to 2 percent in 2016, according to investment bank Dragon Capital.

"Consumption, investment and exports will improve slightly," Olena Bilan, Dragon's chief economist, said by phone from Kiev on Friday. "Reform progress next year will determine Ukraine's future growth model -- whether it embarks on a sustainable, investment-driven growth path or remains a volatile economy driven by consumption and exports."

The central bank is a little more optimistic, forecasting economic expansion of 2.4 percent in 2016 after this year's projected 11.5 percent contraction. Industry is one bright spot, with Metinvest, the nation's biggest metals producer, reporting that output at its iron and steel plant in Mariupol, on the edge of the conflict zone, jumped 16 percent from the previous three months in the third quarter.

Reform efforts, including a crackdown on corruption, are key to the flow of aid from the IMF and other ally governments such as the U.S. and Japan. U.S. Treasury Secretary Jack Lew reiterated Friday to reporters in Kiev that assistance in the form of loan guarantees hinges on progress to revamp Ukraine's economy and institutions.

"The more we do, the more we'll get," Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk told the same news conference.

 #43
Washington Post
November 16, 2015
Ukraine's civil (service) war
By Jackson Diehl
Deputy editorial page editor

ODESSA, Ukraine -The grim, Soviet-era concrete block that houses the regional government here has sprouted an unlikely appendage: an airy glass box crammed with gleaming new workstations and a team of lawyers. Its purpose is to field the complaints of the deeply frustrated people of this historic Black Sea port, which belongs to Ukraine but which Vladi­mir Putin considers a rightful part of Russia. In its first three weeks, it was swamped with 3,500 cases.

The author of this experiment in responsive government is a still more unlikely figure: Mikheil Saakashvili, the revolutionary-turned-president of Georgia, whose decade-long drive to consolidate a pro-Western regime in that former Soviet republic made him the nemesis of Putin and a polarizing figure in Western capitals. Driven out of Georgia after a lost election, Saakashvili has installed himself and a multinational team in the middle of Ukraine's turbulent effort to fend off Putin's military invasion and create an economy and political system purged of Putin's corrupt authoritarianism.

That struggle appears to be reaching a tipping point. Ukraine's pro-Western leaders seem confident they have, for now, blunted Putin's bid to capture by force the territory he calls "Novorossiya," including Odessa and much of the rest of southeastern Ukraine. They seem to have stabilized the economy. But their attempt to free the country from the grip of Russian-style oligarchs and endemic thievery is making halting progress, at best. Western governments that have, barely, kept the country financially afloat are growing impatient. So are Ukrainians, who are telling pollsters they are ready to repeat the street revolution that ousted the previous, pro-Putin government.

Saakashvili and his cadre have provided some of the few visible signs of progress. One Georgian has created entirely new police forces for Odessa and Kiev; another is helping to create a n anti-corruption agency. In Odessa, the revamping of public administration is being overseen by Maria Gaidar, a prominent Russian opposition activist (and daughter of Boris Yeltsin's reformist prime minister) who concluded that the best way to fight Putinism was to help build an alternative in Ukraine.

Saakashvili, however, is far from satisfied. On the contrary: Over a dinner of salads and grilled meats with a delegation I joined from the German Marshall Fund last week, he repeatedly warned that Ukraine was on the brink of another meltdown. "Ukraine defeated Russia militarily," he declared. "Now the question is whether Ukraine will defeat itself. We are at the stage where either we move very fast to change for the better, or there will be a very fast change for the worse."

Like most people in Kiev, Saakashvili is less focused on the 40,000-man army Putin still keeps in eastern Ukraine, where a shaky cease-fire prevails, than on the political battles of Petro Poroshenko, the businessman-turned-president who befriended Saakashvili decades ago when they were students in Kiev, and invited him back to the country last year. Dependent on a fractious parliamentary alliance, Poroshenko has struggled to pass reform measures demanded by the European Union in exchange for trade and visa concessions - such as an anti-discrimination measure protecting gay rights that was rejected several times before finally winning approval last week.

Meanwhile, Poroshenko has shrunk from a full-scale assault on the oligarchs and corrupt civil service. Only a handful of Ukraine's 8,000 judges have been removed, though thousands are known to be corrupt. The president has infuriated Western officials by refusing to replace the prosecutor general, who has been blocking key investigations, and by maneuvering to control the appointment of an anti-corruption prosecutor, without whom the new anti-corruption agency can't begin operating.

EU officials seem to hope that Poroshenko and Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk can be slowly and painstakingly pushed into further reforms. Saakashvili, clearly not content to limit his attention to Odessa, has another idea: a radical government shake-up. "The way out of this is that we should have a reset of government," he says. He would rapidly privatize state-owned companies - there are still more than 3,500 - and completely replace the civil service, which he calls "hopeless."

"We have to realize the depth of Ukraine's corruption," he said. "It's so deep, it's so pervasive, that the only way to address it is to create new products of administration." The new complaints center in Odessa, and an adjacent "public services center," are meant as pilot projects to model a nationwide transformation.

Few in Ukraine dispute Saakashvili's analysis. In fact, there is talk in political circles that he could or should somehow be installed as prime minister. Saakashvili denies that that is what he means in calling for a shake-up; he points out, correctly, that he lacks a political base in the parliament. The government's Western minders sound horrified by the idea. Yet if Ukraine is to win its war against itself, something here clearly needs to change - and soon.
 #44
Ukraine's PM asks EU to set up fund for Ukrainian officials to drive them off corruption

KIEV, November 16. /TASS/. Ukraine has called on the European Union to set up a special fund to pay premium to Ukrainian government officials to drive them off corruption.

"We need a helping hand in uprooting corruption. We would need an incentive fund for government officials to be set up in a span of two years," Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk said on Monday.

In his words, the fund will be used to "make extra payments to prosecutors, judges, government officials, customs officers who would carry out reforms and who would stay away from corruption schemes."

He said the root of the corruption among Ukrainian government officials was in their low wages. "If a government official is paid a wage of $100 we will never be able to do away with corruption," Yatsenyuk said at an anti-corruption conference.

He suggested an international anti-corruption mission led by representatives of the European Union and the United States be set up in Ukraine.

"Our suggestion is that our partners from the European Union and the United States delegate FBI investigators and EU law enforcers who would help Ukraine's police to counter corruption and investigate corruption-related crimes," he said.
 #45
Meduza
https://meduza.io
November 13, 2015
The Donbass War. Assessing the Aftermath How the 'Russian Spring' came to an end in eastern Ukraine
By Pavel Kanygin
Correspondent, Novaya Gazeta

The war in eastern Ukraine has ended, or at least finished its phase of peak intensity. Unresolved questions include control over the border with Russia, local power, the disbanding or legitimization of armed groups, and - finally - the status of Donbass territories still beyond Kiev's control. The juridical chaos in disputed regions is compounded by the catastrophic fall in the living standards of the local people. Having worked in the region for the entire period of the armed conflict, Pavel Kanygin, a special correspondent for the independent newspaper Novaya Gazeta, reviews for Meduza the results of the war.

In terms of prosperity and the quality of life, prewar Donbass was essentially on par with Kiev - significantly surpassing other Ukrainian and most Russian regions. Donetsk had one of the three biggest airports in all of Ukraine. Skyscrapers of glass and concrete housed the offices of international companies working directly in the region (rather than remotely through offices in the capital). The city was home to many expats. Local trams and buses offered wireless Internet, even beating the Moscow Metro by a few years.

In 2012, the city hosted the European Championship for football. Looking at Donetsk today, it seems impossible to believe that this was all in the recent past.

In the span of a few summer months in 2014, the financial and industrial capital of eastern Ukraine was transformed into a ghost town. The empty central streets conveyed only military trucks and desperate taxi-drivers with reporters in tow. To the north, to the west, and even in the center of the city, shells exploded every day. Several neighborhoods were destroyed entirely - down to their very foundations. Throughout the province, dozens of towns and villages were burned, annihilated.

Many Donetsk residents - service companies, bureaucrats, foreigners, local hipsters, and intelligentsia - were already leaving by the summer of 2014. And yet the overall population of the provincial center dropped very little; people from the devastated surrounding areas were drawn into Donetsk. Now they make up the new face of the city.

The war has come and gone, leaving behind poverty and pain. The buses and trams have been stripped of their wifi routers. High-voltage cables smashed in the shelling have been sold for scrap. Half-empty shelves in the stores have become customary. The city's Petrovsky district still has many living in the bomb shelter of the local mine, fearing renewed artillery strikes. The nearby municipal psychiatric hospital has become home to fighters for the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic (DPR). Already last winter, I joined volunteers taking food and medicine to the neighborhood, where typhoid plagued people crowded in basements. What goes on now in Petrovsky and other areas around Donetsk is virtually unknown. This fall, DPR authorities banned volunteers from bringing in medicine and equated NGO activity with espionage.

Below, I have assembled some figures and observations by which readers can judge the current state of affairs in Donbass.

Pensions and education

According to estimates by volunteer organizations, around 900,000 people now live in Donetsk (the official population prior to the war was a little over a million). During the months of heaviest fighting the population dropped to 600,000. People of working age with their families made up a large portion of those who fled.

With the beginning of the truce, however, also began the partial return of displaced residents. In addition, people from other parts of Donbass, including those who lost homes due to the war or are simply searching for work, have resettled in Donetsk.

Universities, grade schools, and kindergartens still function in the DPR. Education is based on Ukrainian state standards, with schools permitting instruction in one of two languages based on the preference of children and parents. As of now, two-thirds of students are schooled in Russian, and the remaining third study in Ukrainian. Diplomas and certificates from the DPR are recognized neither in Ukraine, nor in Russia. Some universities in the DPR are negotiating with Russian counterparts to present diplomas by their standards.

Some 250,000 pensioners live in Donetsk. Regular payment of their benefits began in the spring of 2015. Before that, from the creation of the DPR government in May 2014, their pensions were paid just three times.

In the neighboring self-proclaimed Lugansk People's Republic (LPR), centralized payments went out only twice.

Moreover, pension installments and humanitarian aid from Russia never made it to many towns in the Lugansk region. In December 2014, hungry elderly residents of the 40,000-person city of Pervomaisk formed lines for bread. The "people's mayor" Evgeny Ishchenko, even then accused of stealing from the aid convoys, had organized a handout (half a loaf per person). In January 2015, Ishchenko was killed by unknown assailants. Warehouses controlled by his people were found to hold large shipments of foodstuffs, clothing, and fuel.

Today, pensions in the LPR and DPR are distributed on the basis of prewar Ukrainian norms, but in a ruble equivalent based off of a 1 hryvnia to 2 rubles rate. The actual market exchange rate, however, is closer to 1-to-3. (The fixed rate is applied only for communal services and public transportation fares.) By way of an example, the minimum pension in Donetsk of 1,000 Ukrainian hryvnia corresponds to in-hand payments of 2,000 rubles. The same 1,000 hryvnia traded in cash at an exchange booth, however, would be worth closer to 3,000 rubles.

Consumption

In 2013, the gross regional product of Donbass made up around 15 percent of Ukraine's GDP, roughly equivalent to the role of Moscow in the GDP of Russia (17 percent). According to data from the Ukrainian Central Bank, the region's economy has fallen by two-thirds since the start of the war. Both Ukrainian and international business started leaving Donbass en masse, freezing anything - factories, equipment, or real estate - that couldn't be carried away. Once the second richest city in Ukraine, Donetsk now sits near the bottom even among the cities in the eastern part of the country.

The major retailers and car dealerships closed up and left Donetsk. Not a single major electronics store remains in the city. Following several incidents of armed robbery, there are still no mobile phone stores open in Donetsk.

Banks are also not functioning (with the exception of First Republican Bank, which operates solely in the DPR and the breakaway Georgian republic of South Ossetia). Neither are cash machines, insurance companies, or brokerage firms.

The entire retail sector in Donetsk now consists of food and cleaning products. The blockade notwithstanding, there are still Ukrainian-made products on store shelves. Their delivery to the DPR and LPR passes by the checkpoints - either through corrupt Ukrainian customs and border officials or through Russian territory.

The costs of corruption and additional transport expenses (like the detour through Kharkov region) significantly inflate the price of Ukrainian goods, yet their ultimate market price still remains lower than goods brought in from Russia.

Dairy products, sunflower oil, alcohol, cigarettes, and some groceries come in from the Rostov region in Russia. As a rule, this involves goods from the lowest price segment. Still, according to Human Rights Watch, local residents complain about the high cost and low quality of Russian products.

Over the last six months the price of essential commodities has risen 50-60% on average; this while the real mean income in the region has fallen by 65-75%. Now it stands near 2,500 rubles per month.

These high prices in the LPR and DPR are resulting in swings in "grocery migration" of people into territory controlled by Kiev, where the same goods cost three-fourths to two-thirds as much. Thousands of people daily complete trips back and forth across the blockposts. Human Rights Watch reports that people sometimes spend several hours in lines, often having to spend the night on the road since the checkpoints close at 6 p.m.

In spite of the conflict, however, some Donetsk restaurants still serve oysters. In one establishment called Shato, employees explained that they are brought in at the request of "high-level guests of the restaurant from Moscow." Who these guests are and how they ended up in the frontline city, Shato refused to disclose.

Media censorship

For quite a while the DPR authorities were favorably disposed towards foreign reporters and tolerant of criticism. The leaders of "Novorossiya" (a common nickname for the rebel-controlled territories meaning "New Russia") agreed to interview requests without any conditions or preliminary discussion of questions. Without regard to the tone, separatist were satisfied with the material because it allowed them to speak their mind.

The mood started to shift after the publication of Novaya Gazeta's article about the "Buryat contract soldier" (a serviceman from eastern Russia who was wounded and captured fighting in Ukraine in February 2015). The interview with "special forces officers in the GRU" (Russian Military Intelligence) - Captain Erofeev and Sergeant Aleksandrov - proved to be the last straw for Donbass leaders. I felt the changes personally; in June 2015, members of the DPR security services lured me into a setup in Donetsk, where they beat me and listed my articles that had displeased separatist leaders.

The local media within the DPR and LPR started strict censorship even earlier. Some publications were closed by their owners at the beginning of the "Anti-Terrorist Operation" (as Ukrainian officials have dubbed the conflict), evacuating their editorial staff to territory controlled by Kiev. But the majority of media outlets willingly changed their editorial policy in line with the expectations of the leaders and overseers of the unrecognized republics. Events are reported and interpreted in an exclusively pro-Russian vein.

Foreign journalists working in the region and critically reporting on what goes on can be expelled from the unrecognized republics. Local media representatives acting independently run the risk of ending up in the dungeons of the Ministry of State Security.

Over the last half year, reporters from many independent western and Russian media organizations - including Novaya Gazeta, Kommersant, the Moscow-based tv channel Dozhd, The Independent, The Times, Newsweek, and others - have been banned from the DPR.

During his last trip to Donbass, Dozhd special correspondent Timur Olevsky nearly ended up in prison; separatists gave him two hours to get out "the good way." I got it the bad way; I was removed from the DPR by force, accused of working for the CIA, sabotage activity, and using twelve kinds of narcotics.

In 2015 alone, five local reporters have been arrested in the LPR, and three more in the DPR. Meanwhile work permits have been given to Russian state television channels and the newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda. The former Radio Liberty writer Andrei Babitsky ran an internet-tv station in Donetsk for a short stretch. The journalist left Radio Liberty in summer 2015 after declaring that the station refused to published his material on atrocities committed by the Ukrainian army, and he moved to Donetsk.

Censorship and questions on the proper presentation of news are handled by the deputy head of the Ministry of Information and the Press of the DPR, Igor Antipov (before the war, general director of Komsomolskaya Pravda's Donetsk publisher). Two printing houses are now active in Donetsk.

Novaya Gazeta sources say that before going to press, newspaper pages are sent in PDF format for Antipov's review.

Subsequent proofreading and approval of the pages is done by a group of censors under his leadership. In addition to their own material, each paper also prints several columns recommended by officials.

There are also so-called blacklists, which include names and topics that are not to be mentioned.

As in Russia, the tv channels LifeNews and Rossiya-24 play a particular role. Cable providers in the republic are obligated to keep these stations in their listings. Ukrainian and several foreign channels are banned in the self-proclaimed DPR. As before, the main Moscow tabloid newspaper, Komsomolskaya Pravda, is printed daily.

There have also been multiple attempts at armed raids on the local office of the newspaper Moskovsky Komsomolets.

Only the involvement of the paper's head editor, Pavel Gusev, and Moscow overseers of the unrecognized republics stopped these DPR attacks.

Civil society organizations

At the beginning of June 2015, DPR leader Aleksandr Zakharchenko signed a decree banning foreign social organizations. As Zakharchenko explained, "these organizations are used in part as cover for reconnaissance and sabotage activities to the detriment of state security."

Among others, the ban applied to the International Rescue Committee, the Red Cross, and Doctors Without Borders.

Last week, DPR officials accused Doctors Without Borders of espionage and smuggling psychotropic substances. Only the Red Cross was later able to obtain accreditation to work in the DPR.

The charitable foundation of the Ukrainian oligarch Rinat Akhmetov - who remains influential in the region - has also been banned in the self-proclaimed republics. Until recently, Akhmetov's organization "Pomozhem" (We'll Help) was the only group providing medicine and other aid to the LPR and DPR in multi-ton shipments - aside from the Russian "humanitarian convoys." Now the foundation's trucks cannot cross the DPR checkpoints.

Volunteer organizations previously cooperating with Akhmetov's fund have faced harassment. "Responsible Citizens," for example, the largest volunteer group in Donetsk, is also being accused of sabotage and spy activity.

According to volunteers, Donetsk hospitals have encountered medication shortages after civil society organizations ceased to operate.

Journalists with local publications are forbidden from mentioning Akhmetov's philanthropic activity.

Any community initiatives are required to go through approval procedures with the DPR government.

Human rights

Several organizations are involved in monitoring in this sphere - UN representatives, OSCE, and Human Rights Watch. Judging by their reports, the legal system in the LPR and DPR can be described as a quasi-military dictatorship. Institutions of civilian authority, including the judiciary and police, function de jure in the unrecognized republics. But this means little in practice, as residents have no access to such institutions.

Once, while photographer Pyotr Shelomovsky and I watched, in the center of Donetsk, an intoxicated fighter from the armed group "Oplot" killed a passerby as he left a store with his purchases. The man was talking with somebody on the phone, and the soldier thought he had a background with the yellow and blue colors of the Ukrainian flag on his screen. "You ukrop [a slang pejorative for Ukrainians]!" the fighter yelled. "Go work for them, bitch!" With one strike he knocked the man off his feet, and the impact of his fall broke his neck. Somebody called an ambulance out of habit. But first a minibus with tinted windows and no license plates arrived and whisked the "Oplot" fighter in an unknown direction. Then the ambulance removed the body. After an hour the DPR police showed up, and one of them said with frustration: "Fuck, why did we [even] come?"

The ranks of the DPR police are made up of essentially the same people who worked in Donetsk region police before the "Russian spring" (as the revolt of eastern Ukrainian separatists has been labeled). As before, the influence and authority of official law enforcement remains negligible.

Disputes, especially of the business variety, are resolved with the use of "protection" from among the armed brigades. The need to have "protection" has become an indispensable condition of making commercial deals. "Fixers" and leaders of various armed groups have set themselves up in place of judges and law enforcement. Moreover, they are established in the very power hierarchy of the unrecognized republics, carrying out security and policing functions, administering punishment and tax oversight.

Citizen initiatives on the territory of the republics have been reduced to practically zero. After an antiwar demonstration on June 16, 2015, Aleksandr Zakharchenko demanded that the organizers be found and "an end be put to [such] subversive activity." Since then Donetsk residents are afraid to gather in sizable groups. The DPR Ministry of State Security and its LPR analog monitor activism among the population. These are the heir organizations to the disbanded SBU (Ukraine's intelligence force) for the Donetsk region, from which many agents swore allegiance to "Novorossiya" in the summer of 2014. The Ministry has its own detention facility, which locals simply refer to as the "basement."

Human Rights Watch activists have received reports about the absence of access to medical assistance or the insufficiency of medical supplies. In addition, information is still coming in about arbitrary arrests and disappearances of citizens. Ukrainian authorities report dozens of political prisoners in the DPR, including journalists, pro-Ukrainian activists, university instructors, officials, and judges. The DPR Ministry of State Security does not deny having these prisoners, but it calls them "diversionists" and "spies."

Government

With the end of hostilities, the breakaway territories of the Lugansk and Donetsk People's Republics plunged into internal conflict.

"Boss wars" - that's what locals call the jostling among the leaders of the separatist republics.

Speaker of the DPR People's Council and one of the ideologues of the "Free Donbass" movement, Andrei Purgin, was relieved of his post amidst a scandal. His removal has been rumored to be the work of Russian presidential aide Vladislav Surkov, often considered the main "curator" of the rebel territories. Surkov purportedly decided to swap a particularly ideologically-driven separatist in Purgin for a more careerist functionary in Denis Pushilin (former coordinator of the infamous MMM financial pyramid in Donetsk).

In the LPR, the "coal minister" Dmitry Lyamin was recently arrested. His interrogation, accompanied by beating, was recorded on video and circulated online. The incident has been linked to the growing influence in the region of billionaire Sergei Kurchenko, linked to the family of ousted President Viktor Yanukovich and holding large stakes in the Donbass energy sector. In Lugansk, they say Lyamin interfered with Kurchenko's schemes to extract coal and petroleum products within the LPR. Kurchenko and his family are hiding from the accusations of Kiev authorities in Moscow. Meanwhile, Kurchenko is doing business in eastern Ukraine, and letting the new authorities in Donbass know he has Kremlin backing and should be given necessary leeway.

The reallocation of markets and spheres of influence among the region's new bosses, equipped with tanks and anti-aircraft artillery, has been protracted. In Donetsk, Kurchenko's people are opposed by Aleksandr Zakharchenko. The head of the DPR and leader of its largest armed contingent, the "National Guard of the DPR, Zakharchenko was also formerly the trade representative of the poultry producing company Gavrilovsky Chickens. In Lugansk, the armed conflict between local security groups and the former fire inspector - now LPR head - Igor Plotnitsky has not subsided.

Economy, borders, and taxes

A year has passed since Ukrainian authorities introduced an economic blockade of the DPR and LPR. Territories beyond Kiev's control are formally cut off from all domestic business. No trains or scheduled buses go to Donetsk or Lugansk, and Ukrainian business owners are forbidden from trading with separatist territories or delivering their cargo. In actuality, the uncompromising brigade remains mostly on paper. Corruption is flourishing at the blockposts of the Ukrainian forces.

Separatists also profit from transporting Ukrainian goods, imposing on merchants their services their "accompaniment on the territory of the republic." The "protection" of smuggled goods is considered the main source of income for the second most powerful person in the DPR, Aleksandr Khodakovsky (head of the Vostok regiment and head of the DPR Security Council).

The blockade has made life inside the DPR and LPR significantly more expensive. Meanwhile the border with Russia is open, but only a few are taking advantage. The above-mentioned Aleksandr Khodakovsky has been frequently sighted by journalists in the Russian city of Rostov-on-Don. The DPR Foreign Minister, Aleksandr Kofman, seems to be living in Moscow full-time. That's also where the "people's governor" of Donetsk region, Pavel Gubarev, spends his vacations. Workers in the Russian state media arrived in the region via Rostov region, which borders Donbass (automatically incurring a ban for future work in Ukraine). Others got there legally (as defined by Ukrainian law), entering via territory controlled by Kiev, and thus preserving the possibility of reporting on both sides of the conflict.

The blockade has also created an energy crisis in the region. No fuel is delivered from the Ukrainian side, while supplies from Russia were monopolized by groups linked to businessman Sergei Kurchenko. In October 2015, Donetsk and Makeevka were left without gas for several days as a result of conflict between Zakharchenko's people and a distribution company owned by Kurchenko.

In the DPR, commercial operations and deals worth more than $10,000 must gain the approval of people in Zakharchenko's circle. The separatists have also established their own system of tax obligations in the territory. Private enterprises are liable for taxation in one of two chosen forms - either 20 percent of net profit or 2.5 percent of gross revenue. Citizens are required to pay an income tax at the rate of 13 percent of their salary. From September 1, 2015, the ruble is considered the official currency of the DPR and LPR.

The assets of Ukraine's richest businessman, Rinat Akhmetov, remain untouched. He still holds coal mines, power plants, retail chains, hotels, and the battle-damaged Donbass Arena - all on territory outside of Kiev control. Taxes on these assets continue to flow into the Ukrainian budget. Sales from these companies' products in Ukraine are also arranged in circumvention of the blockade.

Pavel Kanygin
Moscow

 #46
The Geopolitical Economy Research Group (GERG)
http://gergconference.ca
De-humanizing the Other: Retrograde, Soviet Donbas as an anti-hero of progressive Euromaidan Ukraine in the discourse of Ukrainian political elites and media [excerpt]
By Halyna Mokrushyna
University of Ottawa
[Complete text here http://gergconference.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Mokrusyna-Halyna-De-humanizing-the-Other.pdf]

Based on analysis of articles, blogs, comments in the social media, this paper argues that in spite of many honest attempts to understand what Donbas identity is, the representation of Donbas in the discourse by "democratic", pro-Western Ukrainian elites and media often focuses on depicting Donbas as a "depressive" region with a retrograde Soviet mentality. Such pejorative stereotyping has existed since the early 1990s, but intensified in the political crisis of 2004, and particularly in 2013, during "Euromaidan revolution". Donbas is seen as the antipode of Euromaidan Ukraine: retrograde, dark, paternalistic, pro-Russian, while Euro-Ukraine is modern, bright, free, and democratic. The snobbish-condescending cliché of Donbas as a land of lowbrow lumpen-proletariat, Homo Sovieticus, who strive for a strong ruler and cheap food and drinks and do not care about history, language, and culture, dehumanizes Donbas residents, transforms them into slaves that need to be "civilized" by the "democratic" Ukraine no matter the cost. The discourse of current Ukrainian political and media circles regarding Donbas follows the logic of the "civilizational" mission of European colonialism which cost millions of lives to those who "enlightened" Europeans wanted to civilize against their own will. Ukrainian colonizers refused to negotiate with Donbas that articulated its own grievances in response to Euromaidan Ukraine which was perceived by Donbas as violent and anti-Russian. As long as Ukrainian political and intellectual elite refuse to recognize Donetsk and Lugansk residents as human being with views and values, different from their own, there will be no peace in Ukraine.

Since the beginning of the Ukrainian independence in 1991 Ukrainian elites set course to the integration with Europe. There was only one civilizational way for a country that wanted to get rid of its Soviet "totalitarian" past - a European democracy with its individual freedom, social security net, and market economy. According to the foundational myth of Ukrainian nationalist historians, the Ukrainian nation carried out a national-liberation fight from the Russian, and then Soviet occupation, for over 350 years (since signing in 1654 in Pereyaslav of the treaty of unification of Ukraine with Russia by hetman Bohdan Khmelnitsky and emissaries of the Russian tsar Alexis - http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/451403/PereyaslavAgreement). Finally, in 1991 Ukraine was free. In the referendum of December 1, 1991 90.3% of Ukrainians said "yes" to an independent Ukraine. In Donetsk region, where 76.73% of voting
population participated in the referendum, 83.9% voted in favor of the independence. In Lugansk oblast, where over 80.65% voters came to the precincts, 83.86% supported an independent Ukraine (https://translate.google.ca/?hl=en&tab=wT&authuser=0#en/ru/precinct ).

These are rather surprising results for a region where the large majority of the population speak Russian and where the Ukrainian nationalism and culture have always been marginal. However, it is surprising only at a first glance. One needs to remember the massive miners' strikes in 1989-1991 to understand Donbas' support of the Ukrainian independence.

By the end of perestroika the socio-economical situation in Donbas was rapidly deteriorating. The investments in the infrastructure of the coal-producing complex were scarce. The depreciation of fixed assets in the coal industry reached 44%, while in the ferrous metallurgy this figure was 75%. The coal production fell drastically, from 181.3 million tons in 1975 it went down to 170 in 1987. In 1989 the whole Ukraine produced 170 million tons of coal. The market prices rose sharply, while the availability of food and goods was limited. By 1990 the majority (over 60%) of the population in miners' cities and towns of Donetsk region became deeply disillusioned with the results of perestroika. People lost trust in the party's leadership of the Soviet Union and of the Ukrainian SSR and in their ability to lead the country out of economic and political disarray (Adamovych, p. 10)....

 #47
New Eastern Outlook
http://journal-neo.org
November 14, 2015
Will Western Ukraine Become the new Northern Ireland?
By Konrad Stachnio
Konrad Stachnio is an independent Poland based journalist

On 15.10.2015, a "March of heroes" was held in Kiev to mark the Day of the Defender of Ukraine, a holiday established by President Poroshenko which falls on the anniversary of the founding of the UPA. During the march, Nazi symbols were seen on display. In this context, the sociological research group "Rejtynh" reported that in Ukraine more and more people are perceiving the genocidal UPA formations as heroes. For the first time in the history of the UPA, supporters are more than mere opponents. I talk with Dr. Andrzej Zapałowski, a Polish State Security expert, historian and lecturer, about how the situation in Ukraine is likely unfold.

Q: Why does the Ukrainian nation have this great desire to cultivate parts of their criminal history, such as the OUN and the UPA, for example?

I would like to emphasize one thing - if we refer to the issue of genocide, we must identify clearly that we are talking about Ukrainians, but only those from Western Ukraine. This matter does not concern Central and Eastern parts of the country. We cannot perceive the whole of Ukraine through the prism of what Ukrainians did in Western Ukraine. Another thing which is very important is that the UPA leadership, which in the earlier incarnation of OUN, collaborated with Germans in 1942, actively participating in the genocide of the Jewish population. They practiced their killing skills on their Jewish neighbours, and a year later used this knowledge to kill Polish nationals in Volyn. So this primary element in this community is very worrying. Today, the youth in Western Ukraine are unable to understand that the matter of the struggle for national liberation is one thing and another is referring to the tradition of the original murder of their neighbours. The first were the Jews. This is a legacy that really brings this community closer to some primitive reflexes rather than to a civilized society.

Q: Ukrainian nationalists are increasingly speaking about Poles as their friends, saying that currently they are 'new Banderovites' and they 'like' Poles. Is this true?

The situation Right Sector is in at present, it has no choice but to take a tactical stance in relation to Poland. Currently, their main enemy is Russia and so Poland is now a friend. Why? Because Poles naively, selflessly fight for the interests of Ukraine, incurring only the cost of the aid. Today, nationalists in Western Ukraine are looking for a strategic friend. It turns out that, because of border issues, only Poland is likely to be their ally, as Hungary definitely cares more about the rights of the Hungarian minority in Ukraine. The Hungarian State clearly expresses its anti-Bandera attitude. What happens when, for example, in the event of federalization, western Ukraine secures very high autonomy? If Russia takes control of people's minds in Ukraine, then it will want to push out Western Ukraine from the area of its influence because they no longer want Western Ukraine. So Western Ukrainians have only one way out, and this is Poland. Therefore, at this point they need to edit out all territorial claims in relation to Poland from their political programme, along with any anti-Polish statements. Because in the end it may turn out that Poland is the only neighbour through which they can have some cooperation with Western Europe. For some time now, I have watched feigned gestures from Right Sector in relation to Poland. They want to drop anchor here, on the basis of cooperation with some Polish national organizations. These nice gestures are purely a technical action on their part.

Q: Right Sector enabled a recent attack on an institution which issues Ukrainian documents. As a result, 8000 Ukrainian identity documents fell into the hands of ISIS. Will Ukrainian nationalists therefore cooperate with ISIS?

At the time of the annexation of Crimea, representatives of these Tatar organizations, which in Russia were recognized as terrorist organizations, fled from Crimea. A substantial group of these people were given premises and stopped in Lviv, in Western Ukraine. Chechens also fought on the side of Ukrainian nationalists, and were really were involved in terrorist attacks in Moscow or Budyonnovsk. Besides, as one of the leaders of this organisation boasted, twice he crossed the Polish border illegally to get to meetings of the group in Denmark. This could not be done without the organizational support and perhaps even administrative support in Western Ukraine. So it is clear that this cooperation has been active for over a year, and especially at this time it will further develop as a result of the fact that Russia has started to intervene in Syria.

Q: Do you allow for a scenario in which Ukraine experiences something like a revolution?

In the event of an outbreak of a social revolution in Ukraine, nationalists will definitely want to take over these movements. Please note that there is an estimated hundred thousand automatic firearms in Ukraine, outside the control of the State, and which is likely to be under the control of the nationalists. Approximately sixteen thousand soldiers have deserted from Donbas to the Ukrainian side, and most of them took a gun with them. So there is potential in Ukraine for a public uprising on the social background. The worst case scenario, which I fear is likely to happen, is that there will be a civil war and a real threat in the form of penetration or attempts to create logistics for some radical movements in Poland. People who remain in Ukraine with nothing to live on and with weapons will become involved in organized crime.

Q: Are Ukrainian nationalists able to take over the governments in Kiev?

In Ukraine, as it is today, there is no chance of this. Why? It is the only country in Europe where about a hundred oligarchic families govern the entire State. These people treat Ukraine as their area of influence, which they can divvy up as in business if they have to. The seizure of power by Ukrainian nationalists in any form would be associated with what nationalists say in their political programs. First of all, these are social circles, so they want to get wealth back and socialization of the means of production. Therefore nationalists beyond certain limits of influence will be the enemy of the ruling oligarchs. For this reason, I don't predict this to happen in the whole of Ukraine. Since the oligarchs can simply tactically begin to cooperate with Russia, and Russia absolutely does not wish for morbidly and fanatically anti-Russian circles to hold a substantial part of power over Ukraine.

Q: Can Western Ukraine break away from Ukraine, considering this part of Ukraine is definitely pro-Bandera?

I fear that the process of forcing out Western Ukraine will continue. Please remember that in February 2014, years before the constitutional assassination in relation to President Yanukovych, Lviv authorities publicly declared that if Yanukovych remained in power the whole region of western Ukraine would leave Ukraine and strike for independence. There, such an awareness exists. Up until the Eighties, the chief adviser to the cell of CIA was Mykoła Łebed. This is the person who was in the government of Ukrainian nationalists. He was one of those people who took a political decision on the genocide of Poles in Volyn and later worked for the US government. The United States use Ukrainian nationalists in the fight against Russia. For me, Ukrainian nationalists coming to power is only possible in western Ukraine - should they fall into the process of becoming autonomous or completely exit from Ukraine, and I am afraid that this process of pushing out western Ukraine will continue. The area around the Ukrainian-Polish border may then become territory where various terrorist groups will penetrate. Assassinations could take place. In the event of any action by oligarchs against nationalists, armed groups in the framework of escape can penetrate frontier areas in order to hide. Here you can list an entire catalog of threats to national security. We will have to deal with the development in western Ukraine of a situation we had in Northern Ireland. So that means a creeping conflict which is very real and this conflict could spread to the entire border area.