#2
Moscow Times
November 13, 2015
Muscovites Get Keen On Making, Not Buying
By Daria Litvinova

More crafts shops are appearing in Moscow every day, with more young men trading lucrative office jobs for the opportunity to make things themselves.
In recent years, Moscow dandies have been moving away from cafes, barbershops and Internet-related startups toward trades like blacksmithing, printing and woodworking, putting down their lattes and taking on hammers and screwdrivers amid more creative clusters taking off and expanding in the city, attracting more people to the handmade lifestyle.

According to Russian Venture Company, which provides funds to other smaller foundations, in Russia's capital the number of workshops and small "do-it-yourself" centers has been growing in the last three to five years. Moscow is not alone in this trend: The so-called maker movement - which unites people around handmaking things and devices - has been gaining popularity all around the world. Within the last 10 years there have been more than 100 "makers' fairs" held in different countries, during which young people have presented their products.

In Western countries, makers are mostly involved with robotics and innovative IT projects - and are supported by giant organizations like NASA and Intel, which poach the most talented makers and their inventions. In Moscow, however, handcraftsmanship has become one of the most widespread branches of the maker movement.

The demand for handcrafted goods - unique furniture pieces, handmade decorations and the like - has been increasing, with new Moscow restaurants, cafes and other public spaces opening almost every week and trying to create their own style and ambience.

For some it becomes a hobby, for others it becomes an opportunity to share their knowledge and skills with people, and for still others it becomes a chance to leave their office cubicles and start doing the things they've always dreamed of.

For almost everyone it's about self-fulfillment, which seems to have become of the utmost value in the era of the "consumer society," a term that has recently gained strong negative connotations.

"Life in Moscow is much better now, people are earning enough money and have earned their 'status' - they have everything they want, so now they go for self-fulfillment," Andrei Sosykin, owner of a blacksmith's shop, told The Moscow Times.

Strike While the Iron Is Hot

Sosykin, 35, opened his blacksmith's shop in one of the studios of the Flacon design factory in northern Moscow in April, and said the interest in one of the oldest professions in the world grows every day.

"Blacksmithing is a traditional, ancient profession, and everyone can master it. We want as many people as possible to try working in this art," he told The Moscow Times.

Sosykin's shop doesn't produce things - instead, its sole purpose is to give its visitors a chance to try working as blacksmiths, or at least take a tour around the studio and get a glimpse of what the profession looks like.

During three-hour master classes, visitors forge nails and knives themselves, sometimes under the supervision of prominent blacksmiths. "No one leaves the shop unhappy," said Sosykin. "Usually very different people come to us: men, women, children, the elderly, but anyone who enters the shop lights up with interest immediately," he said.

Sosykin himself owns a knife shop, and at first he wanted to open a workshop devoted to making knives. "The smithery existed at Flacon before, it was the first workshop to open there," he said. The project was quickly shut down, though, because its owners didn't have clear vision of what to do with it.

The businessman decided to resurrect it, and plans to develop it in the future. "Currently it's more entertainment, and I would love people to come back and develop their skills," he said. Not in order to obtain a new profession and change jobs, but to be able to make something with one's bare hands, he added.

"Imagine how great it is when you walk into a house and see a hanger made by the master of the house, or a door knob," he said.

He himself learns to forge from the blacksmith who works in the shop, and explores traditional craftsmanship. "We're trying to dig deep into the subject," he said. "For example, we have an ancient French anvil that is more than 200 years old and an English one that is more than 100 years old," Sosykin said.  

The next step for the shop, which can currently accommodate eight blacksmiths during a master class, is to become profitable, the businessman added, "in order to expand its possibilities" and attract more people. At the moment a three-hour master class cost 3,500 rubles ($54).

Printer's Devils in Action

For Sosykin's neighbors Sergei Besov and Yevgeny Perfilyev, owners of the Demon Press printing workshop at Flacon, a hobby - relief printing and linocut prints on high-quality paper with old-fashioned presses - has become a way to earn a living.

Besov, 39, and Perfilyev, 35, opened the workshop three years ago. Before that, both of them used to have different occupations and hadn't yet met. Besov worked as a designer and project manager for several upscale Moscow restaurants and bars, while Perfilyev, an engineer, was working for a company involved in the automation of electricity and oil plants in the southeastern city of Penza.

Nevertheless, their ways to a joint project started identically: they both bought antique printing presses.

"I was looking for ways to make crafted paper bags for one of the restaurants with linocut prints, and during my search found an old printing press on sale," Besov said. After a while he felt the urge to quit the job he said left him no room for development and started the printing business.

Perfilyev bought a small printing press because he has always been interested in printing. After having learned his way around the complex device he started selling prints on the Internet, continuing to work at his regular job for a while.

"I had a good career, but then the crisis of 2008 struck, and we started having fewer assignments, less work, but were still obliged to spend time in the office, and I didn't like that," he told The Moscow Times. At the same time the printing business grew, and Perfilyev decided to take a leap of faith.

Several years later Perfilyev and Besov met and decided to go for a joint project, which is how the Demon Press workshop was launched. Currently it employs some 10 people, but in the very beginning it was just Perfilyev and Besov printing the things customers ordered.

"It's craftsmanship more than production," Besov explained. "We work with artists and create beautiful things," he said.

Both owners of the Demon Press said the main thing they get from their new business is gratification. "I finally get to have material results from my work - I create things I can see and touch," Perfilyev said.

One of the signature Demon Press products is a series of limited edition postcards at 250 rubles ($4) each.

The shop has been working for three years now, and, according to Besov and Perfilyev, brings in enough profit for them to live a comfortable Moscow life. "Of course, it would have been even better if the ruble rate hadn't fallen," Besov told The Moscow Times with a laugh. "But we earn enough to have it [the workshop] as our main occupation," he adds.

Working in Wood

Unlike Besov and Perilyev, the owners of the Wood Deed furniture studio can't claim incredible revenues yet, though it has been in operation for almost four years now - but they believe the best is yet to come.

Alexei Inshakov, 33, who founded the studio together with his longtime friend Artyom Letunov, 30, is one of the rare business owners in Moscow that sees an opportunity in Russia's economic crisis.

"[Thanks to the crisis,] furniture from Europe costs a lot more now, and we finally have the chance to compete with Western suppliers," Inshakov told The Moscow Times with a laugh.

Inshakov and Letunov both worked in merchandising before starting Wood Deed.

"I was working at TsUM [an upscale Moscow department store], and I saw specialists from Italy and Britain helping to organize and remodel the space. At some point I asked: Why are there no Russians doing it? The answer was, 'Russians don't know how to do it.' I wanted to disprove that," Inshakov said.

At first the friends devoted their time to specialized furniture that shops and stores needed, like racks and shelves, but then, step by step, they took on cafe and restaurant furniture, and later home furniture.

"In these almost four years we have learned to work with the wood from the ground up," Inshakov said. "Before starting on our own we hadn't had any experience with wood, except for woodworking lessons at school," he added.  

The studio tries to incorporate elements of Russian traditional style into modern pieces. For example, one of the tables from the new collection will be in the form of the ancient Russian musical instrument the gusli, according to Inshakov.

Currently Wood Deed's team consists of four members. This week they plan to present their first-ever furniture collection that is not custom built.

"Our goal is to make several collections, including one that will be less expensive and therefore available to a greater number of people," Inshakov said. Right now an average table made by the Wood Deed studio costs more than 40,000 rubles ($620).  

Inshakov and Letunov's decision at first elicited a very cautious reaction from their families, but in the end everyone was very supportive, and that's what, according to Inshakov, kept the young people going despite the difficulties.

Perfilyev and Besov from Demon Press printing echoed the sentiment. "Everyone really supported us," said Perfilyev. "After all, that's where we feel content at last," added Besov.

[return to Contents] 

 #3
Interfax
November 13, 2015
Two-thirds of Russians see Russian administration's foreign policy success

Russians' interest in foreign policy increased in the past month from 58 percent in September to 63 percent now, Public Opinion Foundation has reported.

The poll, which surveyed 1,500 people living in 104 populated areas in 53 regions of Russia, was conducted on November 7-8.

Thirty-five percent of the respondents (against 41 percent in September) do not follow Russia's behavior on the international scene.The percentage of respondents who follow politics is the highest among respondents aged 31-45 (80 percent), 46-60 (69 percent) and respondents older than sixty (73 percent), respondents with university degrees (74 percent), with incomes higher than 30,000 rubles (77 percent), residents of Moscow (74 percent), residents of cities with populations of over one million (72 percent), residents of cities with populations of fewer than 50,000 people and residents of the Central Federal District (69 percent each).</P>

The respondents believe successes in Russia's foreign policy have recently outweighed failures (61 percent against 14 percent). Twenty-five percent of the respondents were undecided. In September, 55 percent of Russians noticed successes of the country's leadership on the foreign policy scene, while 19 percent spoke of failures.

Twenty percent of the respondents believe that the Russian administration is now giving too much attention to foreign policy. Seven percent of the respondents believe the opposite. One out of every two respondents (55 percent) believe that the Russian leadership is giving the right amount of attention to foreign policy issues, and 18 percent were undecided.

 [return to Contents] 

 #4
Moscow Times
November 13, 2015
Nearly Half of Russians Fear Terrorist Attack - Poll

Nearly half of Russians fear a terrorist attack or hostage-taking situation in the near future, the Interfax news agency reported, citing data from independent pollster the Levada Center.

Of the 48 percent who fear an attack, 76 percent consider terrorist group the Islamic State as the greatest threat, Interfax reported Friday.

International terrorism as a whole worried 39 percent of Russians polled, while 17 percent were concerned by Russian extremists and radicals. One-third (34 percent) of respondents did not believe in the possibility of a terrorist attack.

The poll was conducted on Oct. 23-26 among 1,600 people in 134 cities and towns around Russia, Interfax reported. No margin of error was given.

The Islamic State terrorist group released an Internet video promising to attack Russia "very soon," the SITE monitoring group reported on Thursday.

The Islamic State has previously called for Islamic fighters to take revenge on Russia after President Vladimir Putin launched an air strike campaign in Syria against Islamic State militants and opposition forces fighting against Syrian President Bashar Assad.

 [return to Contents]

 #5
https://shariaunveiled.wordpress.com
November 12, 2015
ISIS Threatens Russia With Internal Terrorist Attacks in the VERY Near Future (Video)
[Shocking video and text here https://shariaunveiled.wordpress.com/2015/11/12/isis-threatens-russia-with-internal-terrorist-attacks-in-the-very-near-future-video/]

A new video purportedly released by the Islamic State is a gruesome, montage "music video" with a warning for Russians that an attack will take place there soon. It is believed to be directed at Russians because lyrics like "Russia is dying" and "The Kremlin will be ours" are included in the song, known as a "nasheed" or Islamic chant.

The video was released on November 12, 2015 and is titled "Soon, Very Soon the Blood Will Spill Like an Ocean." It includes video clips from various, violent ISIS videos previously released overlaid with the jihadi nasheed.

The video is highly edited and carries the trademark of ISIS' Al Hayat media center. It comes nearly a week after ISIS also released a message directed at Russia, saying that they were responsible for bring down Russian Plane Flight 9268 in Egypt's Sinai Peninsula.

 #6
Kremlin.ru
November 12, 2015
In the run-up to the G20 summit, Vladimir Putin gave an interview to Russia's Interfax news agency and Turkish Anadolu Agency.

Question: During the 2008-2009 global financial crisis, the G20 became a popular format, a platform for solving global problems. Do you think that it still plays the same role? What problems that could really be solved in this format rather than in statements or declarations do you think are the most pressing today?

President of Russia Vladimir Putin: The role of the G20 in the global economic and financial governance is becoming increasingly important. Thanks to the decisions made by the G20, we have managed to create conditions not only for coping with the consequences of the 2008-2009 crisis, but also for enhancing sustainability and transparency of the global financial markets.

However, nowadays, global economy is still unstable and cannot get onto a path towards sustainable and balanced development. In this context, the work that the G20 does is especially needed.

First and foremost, it is necessary to continue improving the international monetary and financial system; to impartially and equally redistribute quotas and voting shares among IMF members in favour of those developing economies that have gained greater weight; to improve the efficiency and legitimacy of the Fund's activities. Besides, we see more often how politically motivated restrictions are imposed on the entry of sovereign borrowers and companies into the global financial markets. We consider G20 to be the main platform for dialogue on all of these issues.

The reform of international tax rules launched at the G20 Summit in St Petersburg is another important issue. The Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Action Plan should be finally adopted in Antalya. The next step is to introduce in practice the new rules in the G20 countries and beyond.

I would like to highlight such an important achievement made this year by the G20 as the development by our countries of investment strategies, which include specific commitments to encourage domestic demand through investment. Thus, the initiatives launched by Russia during its G20 Presidency have translated into practice.

Question: Western sanctions have substantially challenged Russia's ability to attract funds from the Western capital markets. In these circumstances the 'tilt towards the East' seemed reasonable, however, it feels as though the East itself is reluctant to replace the West as a source of external capital for developing Russian economy. Is this notion right?

Vladimir Putin: Let me stress that Russia pursues multidimensional foreign policy. We seek to have as many equal partners as possible both in the West and in the East.

Russia's geography and history determines the Asia-Pacific dimension as one of our foreign policy priorities. Therefore, cooperation between Russia and the Asia-Pacific region is a strategic and long-term one. It is worth mentioning that this region is the linchpin of global economy and politics. The Asia-Pacific region accounts for about 60 percent of global GDP, fifty percent of international trade and direct cross-border investment. Obviously, the role of this region in global affairs will be growing and we do take it into account.

As for the restrictive measures imposed against Russia in March 2014, they have, indeed, complicated the process of attracting investments from certain Western markets. Nevertheless, our domestic banking sector proved its resilience to external shocks. We managed to keep Russian stock market attractive. CEOs of the major multinational companies admit that investing in Russia's economy is promising.

Obviously, cooperation with Asian partners in attracting funds gains special relevance in the current situation. In 2015, approximately 90 percent of investments in the Russian market came from Asia. Several large Russian enterprises are financed by China and we analyse the prospects of public borrowings from China. International investment mechanisms have been developed - the New Development Bank BRICS and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, each with an authorised capital of $100 billion. Pooled funds and investment platforms have been created with China, India, South Korea and the Gulf states to channel foreign investments into the real sector of Russia's economy.

In order to strengthen our cooperation, we are streamlining taxation of profits from project financing in Russia and also propose new promising initiatives. Many opportunities for cooperation are now available under our programmes for developing Siberia and the Far East, which have been presented, among other things, in September 2015 at the first Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, including the creation of Priority Development Areas (PDAs) and a free port in Vladivostok that would enjoy preferential tax and administrative regimes, modernisation of the Trans-Siberian and the Baikal-Amur mainline railways, the revival of the Northern Sea Route, and building the Power of Siberia pipeline.

Question: Did you expect such unanimous negative reaction in the West, in particular, the NATO countries, some of which are major Russian partners, to the start of the Russian Aerospace Forces' operation in Syria, and is it possible that the Western partners' negative reaction would affect the time frame of Russia's military operation in Syria? Is there any risk that Russia could be dragged into a long-term conflict in Syria and how much will the costs of carrying out this operation affect the Russian Federation budget, which has been already cut?

Vladimir Putin: We officially informed the US and NATO leadership of the start of military actions in a reasonable time.

We hoped at least for the natural in such cases close military and expert coordination with the US-led Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, even taking into account all the fundamental differences between the Russian and US approaches to the Syrian crisis.

However, the reaction of the United States and Western partners was quite restrained, although it would seem obvious that ISIL and other similar extremist groups operating in Syria represent a clear common threat to our countries.

We still have not managed to go beyond the joint approval of the Memorandum of Understanding on Prevention of Flight Safety Incidents in the Course of Operations in Syria, and even then with a reservation by the US that by no means such interaction should be regarded as the normalisation of military contacts, which were frozen on the US initiative.

The United States has been also reluctant to respond positively to our proposal to sign a special agreement for the rescue of military aircraft crews, notwithstanding the fact that at the time when the US operation in Afghanistan started, we immediately responded to their similar request.

Neither have we received any response to our request to provide Russia with relevant US intelligence data for planning operations of our Russian Aerospace Forces in Syria, although we have repeatedly asked the United States for such information.

However, in the course of our activities, we are ready to take into account any reliable information on the location of terrorist groups. We have even worked together with the Free Syrian Army (FSA). The Russian aviation has conducted several strikes on the targets identified by the FSA. We excluded areas, which had been indicated by FSA commanders as being under their control. By the way, this fact proves once again that we are not bombing the so-called moderate opposition or the civilian population.

We are ready to cooperate with Washington despite the fact that the US operations in Syria are in violation of international law - without the resolution of the UN Security Council, without the request from the official Syrian government.

As for the time frame of the operation in Syria, a clear objective is set before the Russian forces - they should provide air support for the Syrian army's offensive against the terrorists, that is why the duration of stay of our servicemen will be determined solely depending on the time this objective is achieved.

And the last thing. Our activities in Syria as well as potential risks and consequences have been carefully calculated many times, and all the resources needed for the operation, both financial and technological, have been allocated in advance.

Question: At the G20 meetings with the Western leaders the settlement of the situation in Southeast Ukraine might be touched upon along with other issues. Taking into account the decision of the DPR (Donetsk People's Republic) and LPR (Lugansk People's Republic) to put off local elections until 2016, does it mean that the implementation of other items of the Minsk Agreements would be automatically prolonged as well? Are you concerned that procrastination in implementing the Minsk Agreements could bring about another frozen conflict close to Russian borders similar to the Transnistrian issue? You have repeatedly mentioned that Kiev does not comply with the Minsk Agreements, including its economic part. Does it mean that Russia is now actually responsible for supporting Donbass?

Vladimir Putin: The decision of Donetsk and Lugansk to put off the local elections until next year is a last-choice measure. They could have been held this year, had Kiev fulfilled strictly the Minsk Agreements of February 12 and agreed with the DPR and LPR on organising the elections, and also enacted the Law on the special status of Donbass in its original form.

Now, when a ceasefire in the region has finally been established, it is important that the parties to the conflict start looking for the points of contact together so that they can move on towards their common goal. They need to learn to listen to each other and hear each other. Compromise solutions depend on this.

Given the fact that the hostilities have ceased and cases of shelling are rare, it is unclear why would the US Congress adopt resolutions making it possible to provide Ukraine with lethal weapons. The question arises as to whether there is a desire to spark a war or provoke hostilities.

I would not overdramatize the delay in implementing the Minsk Agreements. Despite some difficulties, they are being implemented and, which is most important, their provisions, principles and logic are not questioned. We are talking simply about technical prolongation of the time frame.

However, the threat of Donbass turning into another frozen conflict is still there. It stems from Kiev's policy, which continues to strengthen the blockade of the Southeast and has stopped the supply of food and money there. Kiev has eliminated the banking system there and is blocking exports.

I would like to recall that, during the talks as far back as in September 2014, the parties to the conflict agreed not only on a ceasefire, but also on the steps to restore livelihoods in the region. It was fixed that a programme for economic revival of Donbass should be adopted. This issue was discussed last February in Minsk, where our partners from the Normandy Four group - Germany and France - agreed to provide technical assistance in the recovery of the banking and financial infrastructure in the conflict-affected areas.

It is fair to say that there is certain progress. The parties restored railway communication, making it possible now to deliver Donbass coal to other regions of Ukraine. Works are underway to restore energy supply. Ways to restore water supply are also being analysed.

Russia, for its part, continues to support Donbass, which is in a difficult humanitarian situation. Since August 2014, more than 50,000 tonnes of humanitarian aid has been delivered there. First of all, we think about people that were abandoned by Kiev authorities and put to the brink of survival. It is our duty to provide them with the necessary assistance.

Question: The US and the EU have imposed sanctions against Russia. But despite Western countries' criticism, Turkey continues to maintain its economic and political ties with Moscow. In this context, what future do you see for Russian-Turkish relations? To what extent do the differences on the Syrian issue affect the bilateral relations?

Vladimir Putin: While the US and the European Union unilaterally introduced sanctions, Turkey took an independent stand. Such an independent policy pursued by Ankara to meet its national foreign policy interests deserves great respect.

Such a pragmatic approach opens up new horizons for the development of Russian-Turkish relations - first of all, their business dimension. Turkey is our major partner in foreign economic collaboration. Last year our bilateral trade exceeded $31 billion. We have been building up industrial cooperation by implementing major projects in construction, light industry, metallurgy and agriculture. We focus primarily on such knowledge-intensive and hi-tech industries as energy - including nuclear power - and telecommunications. Tourism is another important field of collaboration. Last year over 3.3 million Russian citizens visited Turkish resorts. But generally, the potential for our trade and economic interaction is far from being fully unlocked.

It is true that the two countries have different views on the ways to resolve the crisis in Syria. But the important thing is that Russia and Turkey share the same priorities - we both stand for settling the situation in the region and effectively combating terrorism. With this in mind, the existing differences should not hamper our bilateral relations. On the contrary, in looking for the common ground, we draw upon vast experience of constructive cooperation between our countries.

Question: Last December, you made a state visit to Turkey during which, among other things, the launch of the TurkStream project was announced. Since then, no progress in its implementation has been observed, and there has also been certain information that the pipeline capacity would be halved and only two instead of four strings would be built. What are the reasons behind the project's downsizing? Does it have anything to do with some serious political discords between Russia and Turkey, or is it for economic reasons alone?

Vladimir Putin: I cannot agree with your opinion that the TurkStream is slowing down. Such a large-scale project cannot be developed and agreed overnight. There are many legal, technical and economic, technological and organisational issues - including the number of the pipeline strings taking into account the actual need in gas acquisition and pumping volumes - which we have to decide together with our Turkish colleagues. The better we resolve these issues, the faster and with fewer risks and resources we will be able to implement our plans and ensure an uninterrupted delivery of Russian gas directly to Turkish consumers. The main thing is that this project is fully in the interests of both Russia and Turkey. We are one on this with my Turkish colleague Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

We passed our ideas on the bilateral intergovernmental agreement, which should provide legal basis for project implementation, to the Turkish side last July. We expect that the new Turkish government would be able to organise work on the key aspects of the above-mentioned agreement in a short period of time.

The pace of the negotiation process has been definitely affected by the political situation on the eve of the elections in Turkey. We understood that and did not force the events.

It is known that the EU and Bulgaria torpedoed the implementation of the South Stream and did not let us implement this project. Though it was clearly in the interests of Bulgaria and the entire southern Europe. The TurkStream would make it possible to deliver the Russian natural gas to the border between Turkey and Greece, virtually to the border of the EU. European consumers would be able to buy it there. But the countries that refused to take part in constructing the new pipeline would have to count lost profits.

I would like to note that we will continue to be a strategic and reliable energy supplier to Turkey and Europe, and that we have everything necessary for this.

Question: On Syria, Russia maintains that only the Syrian people can determine the future of Syria and Bashar al-Assad. Which road map does Russia propose to settle the Syrian crisis? How do you see the future of that country? Was the resignation of Bashar al-Assad from the post of president discussed at the meeting in Moscow? Did you make an arrangement with the United States to launch the operation in Syria?

Besides, Western countries have repeatedly accused Russia that the aircraft of its Aerospace Forces bomb not only the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra but also other groups in Syria. Do you think that all armed groups currently fighting in Syria against al-Assad's army are terrorists?

Vladimir Putin: Indeed, from the very outset we have insisted, and we still insist today, that it is the Syrian people who should determine its future. It is good to know that at the Vienna talks on Syria on October 30, foreign ministers of seventeen states and representatives of the United Nations and the European Union supported this approach and expressed it in their final statement as their collective opinion.

As for the elaboration of a detailed road map to settle the conflict in Syria, that is not our task. The map should be developed and adopted by the Syrians themselves. Yet, we have a few ideas about how external forces could help the Syrians to defeat the terrorists and resolve the crisis. At present, the Russian diplomacy is actively advancing these proposals. They are not a dogma; rather they encourage the partners to continue a serious dialogue. Its constructive nature would to a large extent determine how successful we would be in translating the proposals into decisive joint actions which would help defeat ISIL and restore Syria as a unified, sovereign and secular state, create safe living conditions for everyone regardless of their ethnicity or faith, and open prospects for social and economic revival of the country. Let me repeat it once again - only the Syrians themselves should choose their future and their government leaders.

We were guided by this very logic - the logic of international law - when receiving Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in Moscow. Let's think how legitimate or ethical would it be if we invited the leader of a friendly state to Moscow and demanded him/her to resign? Syria is a sovereign country and Bashar al-Assad is its President elected by the people. So do we have any right to discuss such issues with him? Of course, we do not. Only those who believe in their exceptionality allow themselves to act in such a shameless manner and impose their will on others.

It is based on the official request from the Syrian government that Russia is carrying out a military operation involving its Aerospace Forces in Syria. Let me repeat once again that the main purpose of this operation is not to support President al-Assad but to fight international terrorism. They are constantly trying to accuse us of bombing the so-called 'moderate' opposition but no evidence was provided so far. Moreover, we are already cooperating with that 'moderate' opposition, including the Free Syrian Army (FSA). The Russian aviation has attacked several targets indicated by the FSA.

To make the fight against terrorism more effective, the global community needs to develop a common framework as to whom to consider terrorists. It is not about the name of an organisation, which can seem quite 'innocent,' it is about whether it uses terrorist methods. So we need to compile a single list of extremist organisations. And Russia has already submitted its suggestions on this account - this was done during the Vienna meeting of the Syrian Support Group.

Question: It is expected that there would be a discussion on combating international terrorism at the G20 Summit under the Turkish Presidency. What do you think of the Turkish Presidency in the G20? What are you planning to put on the Antalya Summit agenda? Has the schedule of bilateral meetings on the sidelines of the G20 Summit been set?

Vladimir Putin: Indeed, at the proposal of the Turkish Presidency, the fight against terrorism and the problem of refugees will be discussed at the G20 Summit. This is not surprising. In our opinion, there is a direct relationship between these issues and the Summit's agenda. Sustainable development, economic growth, global trade expansion, investments, and employment greatly depend on how successful the international community is in responding to today's most urgent challenge - terrorism, and the problem of refugees that stems from chaos and violence. Hundreds of thousands of refugees are already in Europe and other countries, who are trying to save their lives and the lives of their close ones, and still more are on their way.

I am sure that the coming discussion would contribute to the practical solution of these issues and would be backed by a final document reflecting our common approaches to combating terrorism and resolving the refugee crisis.

As for the work of the Summit itself, we propose focusing the G20 on tackling major financial and economic problems, for example, measures for sustainable and balanced economic growth, and strengthening the stability of the financial system.

At the Summit, we will discuss the implementation of what our countries endorsed last year - the Growth Strategies and Country Employment Plans, the reform of international tax rules and promoting investments and decisions on financial regulation.

I expect that in Antalya we will manage to substantively discuss the future of the world trade and existing mechanisms of multilateral trade and economic cooperation. We will exchange our views on the prospects of creating closed integration associations in the Asia-Pacific region and in the Atlantic (I mean the Trans-Pacific Partnership - on October 5, 2015, it was announced that the agreement was reached, 12 countries participate in the Partnership - Australia, Brunei, Vietnam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States - and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership that is a proposed agreement between the European Union and the United States). We are concerned that the process of their creation is not transparent for business circles and for the public both in the member states and in their economic partners. It is in our common interests to make sure that these associations indeed supplement the multilateral trade system, work for the development of all economies in the world and do not produce new barriers and risks.

We have high expectations for the WTO Ministerial Conference that will take place in Nairobi in December. We hope that it will contribute to the strengthening of the multilateral trade system and propose concrete steps to finalise the Doha Round of trade negotiations.

We will focus our attention on sustainable development, as well as climate change. The UN summit for the adoption of the post-2015 development agenda has recently finished in New York. Now, the world is looking forward to the UN Climate Change Conference that will be held in Paris in December 2015 and, hopefully, a new agreement on climate will be adopted.

On the whole, we are satisfied with the Turkish G20 Presidency which managed to preserve the succession in complying with the decisions taken at the G20 summits in Saint-Petersburg and Brisbane, add new ideas to the current agenda, including establishing the Women-20 and launching the World SME Forum.

The first G20 Energy Ministers Meeting in the history of the G20 has become an important Turkish initiative. At the meeting, the ministers discussed access to modern energy in Sub-Saharan Africa, improved energy efficiency and development of renewable energy sources, and most importantly, promotion of investments into energy infrastructure development and introduction of clean technology.

As for the schedule of bilateral meetings, it is now being formed. I intend to meet with the President of the People's Republic of China, presidents of Turkey, the Republic of South Africa and Argentina, the prime ministers of the United Kingdom, Italy and Japan. Before the start of the G20 Antalya Summit, we will traditionally hold an informal meeting of the BRICS leaders where Russia currently holds chair. We will compare notes on the key issues of the G20 agenda and important international and regional problems.

 [return to Contents]

 
#7
Forbes.com
November 12, 2015
Regardless Of Sanctions, Russia Recession Ends In 2016
By Kenneth Rapoza

A customer browses mobile phone contract information inside a Tele2 Russia Telecoms store in Moscow, Russia, on Thursday, Oct. 22, 2015. The company is expanding into Moscow as the economy still shows some signs of life. (Photo by Andrey Rudakov/Bloomberg)

Russia's economy is still contracting, but the recession will end in 2016 if oil stays steady-to-higher from where it is now, Barclays Capital said on Thursday.

Russia's economy was whacked with the double whammy of falling oil prices and Western sanctions, now into their 16th month. Third quarter GDP fell 4.1% from the same period last year, which is better than the 4.6% decline in the second quarter. Russia's third quarter GDP also beat consensus forecasts.

BarCap analyst Daniel Hewitt said he was retaining his forecast of a 4% contraction in GDP this year, but said the recession will end next year providing global oil prices reverse current trends and start to increase. Despite Russian equity beating the MSCI Emerging Markets Index this year, few will want to chase Russian stocks on the way down if oil were to fall below $40 a barrel. January futures are dangerously close, at $43 per barrel. The market expects oil prices to remain relatively stable, rising no more than $10 a barrel over the next two years.

Russia's parliament released their 2016 draft budget last month, but it is based on a dangerously high oil price of $50 per barrel next year.

The contraction in industrial activity lessened, but the services sector continued to suffer from falling consumer demand. Most of this is due to high inflation of around 15%. Credit growth slowed too while the central bank continues its efforts to limit the systemic risk in the banking sector by providing funds when needed to banks with foreign debts. Moreover, Russia's current account surplus shrank in the third quarter of 2015 due to lower energy exports. They are now faced with a primary deficit of 0.6% of GDP compared to a 2.9% surplus a year ago. Russia rarely has deficits.

Sberbank, Russia's largest commercial lender, said it expects the debt burden on households to diminish next year regardless of sanctions and oil. Their base case assumes 12% nominal wage growth next year. It is likely that at some point next year, deleveraging will stop and households will start to borrow again, but at a lower rate.

Many segments of Russia's economy saw a recovery in September. Seasonally and calendar adjusted industrial output and investments increased from August levels. But retail sales appear to have remained unchanged. The agricultural segment posted growth of 4% year over year thanks to sanctions banning import of some European foods.

Sberbank is calling a bottom.

"It seems that September marked the starting point of Russia's economic recovery," bank analysts said in a note last week.

Some signs? Inflation is stabilizing, paving the way for rate cuts next year. Basic sector output fell 4.3% in September instead of the 5.2% drop in August. If these trends continue into the fourth quarter, Sberbank expects to see strong results in 2016, making 2.5% GDP growth in 2016 plausible.

Gerardo Zamorano, a portfolio manager with the $26 billion Brandes Investment Partners firm in San Diego, told FORBES recently that Russia was looking good based on valuation and its impressive resiliency to oil price shocks and sanctions.

"I absolutely believe it is a very interested time to put money into Russia now," Zamorano says.

On Thursday, Bloomberg aired a segment with BlackRock fund manager Amer Bisat saying Russia is in a different place politically and economically than it was a year ago. "I don't want to sugarcoat it, Russia has significant challenges and problems, but cyclically this is a story that is very different today. The cheapening of the ruble has been larger than any other commodity exporter out there. You hear stories of export substitution in Russia that is not happening in any other commodity country out there," he says.

The Market Vectors Russia (RSX) exchange traded fund is up 10.32% year-to-date, while the MSCI Emerging Markets is down 13% and the S&P 500 is up less than half a percent. This year, Russia is even ahead of the Chinese A-shares market, up just around 2% based on the performance of the Deutsche X-Trackers China A-Shares ETF (ASHR).

 [return to Contents]

 #8
http://readrussia.com
November 12, 2015
Don't Look Now, But Russia's Business Climate Is Improving (Maybe)
By Mark Adomanis

For years one of the chief criticisms of the Russian economy was its miserable performance on the World Bank's Ease of Doing Business Index, which attempts to measure a country's overall attractiveness for the private sector.

The World Bank claims that its rating system, which looks across an impressively broad range of building codes, utility regulations, tax laws, and other various forms of regulation, is directly linked to economic growth. Thus it is only simplifying the issue very slightly to say that, according to the bank, if a country follows the "recipe" of strong contracts, efficient courts, and predictable business regulations it will become wealthier. Do well by doing good, in other words.

As a student at a famously finance-driven business school I am absolutely not going to argue against the World Bank's formula. All things being equal, it seems pretty obvious (at least to me) that having clear, predictable, and non-intrusive business regulations is a lot better for economic growth than having opaque, variable, and exacting ones. It's true that a certain amount of skepticism is in order regarding to what extent all things are (or can ever be) equal across countries, in the course of a research project I have spoken with a number of professional investors and their decisions about investing in particular counties are almost never made in a vacuum, but I have no problem believing the World Bank's basic thesis.

As recently as 2010 Russia ranked in a paltry 120th place, behind Ethiopia, Guatemala, and Swaziland, countries that are not exactly bywords for economic dynamism and prowess.

Around that time the Russian government, humiliated by its poor ranking and, in the aftermath of the 2009 economic crisis, desperate to attract more foreign direct investment, did what it is very fond of doing and created a plan. Putin personally decreed that Russia would achieve a top 20 ranking by 2018, something that seemed virtually impossible given its then-current rank.

To say that Putin's promise of a rapid improvement in Russia's ranking was met with skepticism is a pretty serious understatement: among the Western press, it was met with bemusement and contempt, the latest in a long list of madcap Russian schemes that were certain to end in embarrassment and failure.

Flash forward a couple of years, however, and Putin's promise looks an awful lot less farcical. This year Russia clocked in at 51st place, a pretty dramatic improvement from the recent past. Indeed, on a few particular items (according to the World Bank at least!!), Russia is already one of the top performers: both its system for registering property and its contact enforcement placed in the top-10 worldwide. The overall trajectory is clear and, on paper, Russia's business climate has never improved so meaningfully for so long.

Interestingly, the World Bank actually tweaked its methodology in a way that you would expect to further disadvantage Russia by taking into account not just the written law but the quality of its enforcement. For example, when evaluating property registration, the World Bank created an index which "includes 30 points covering the reliability, transparency and geographic coverage of the land administration system and availability of land and property dispute resolution mechanisms."

So, if anything, the index has been getting increasingly rigorous and Russia's performance on the index has improved significantly.

Now that Russia is no longer quite so extreme a laggard on the index, people are starting to point out the many flaws in the system. Chief among the criticisms is the fact that the World Bank tends to evaluate easy-to-measure things (like how long it takes to get a building permit) rather than matters that are a lot more subjective but even more important (such as how likely it is that the law enforcement organs will show up and simply expropriate your business). Leonid Bershidky of Bloomberg was particularly withering in his criticisms of the index, suggesting (with some justification!) that Russia's recent run of good performance is more of an illusion than anything else. There is something to Bershidsky's argument that a ranking of business climate that doesn't survey businesses has a number of glaring limitations.

I'm not sure that I actually agree with Bershidsky though that Russia's rise in the rankings is purely a mirage. As I said before, economic growth and foreign investment are only indirectly related to a country's performance on the World Bank's index. It is entirely possible, and, based on a number of interviews I've conducted, I would go so far as to say quite likely, that Russia's day-to-day business climate has improved at the exact same time that the perception of its business climate among Western investors has deteriorated dramatically.

The world economy is an exceedingly complex construct and "animal spirits" still play a huge role in determining whether markets will head up, down, sideways, or around in circles. So even if Russia's business-friendliness has, as the World Bank's data suggest, marginally improved I don't find it shocking that it is having more trouble than ever finding actual investors.

[return to Contents] 

 #9
Debates on higher retirement age picking pace in Russia
By Tamara Zamyatina

MOSCOW, November 12. /TASS/. Russian authorities have to consider a higher retirement age because of the demographic situation and the shortage of resources in the national Pension Fund, experts polled by TASS said on Thursday.

Their opinions, however, were divided as regards the social indicators necessitating retirement in an older age.

For the readers' reference, the average old age pensions in Russia totals 14,000 rubles (about $ 220) a month versus the subsistence level of 8,500 rubles ($ 132).

On Monday, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev confirmed the inevitability of a higher retirement age. "Longevity is growing all over the world and that's an objective process," he said.

Discussions on raising the retirement age for both men and women by five years started quite some time ago. Ministers of the financial and economic bloc speak for a gradual increase of the pensionable age to 63 years for both men and women while the minister of the social domain object sharply to it.

At present men in Russia can retire at 60 and women, at 55.

Dr. Anatoly Vishnevsky, the director of the Demographics Institute at Moscow's Supreme School of Economics told TASS a higher retirement age could be necessitated by affluent living or problem-ridden living likewise.

"An averaged duration of life - healthy life - in Europe exceeds 80 years now and that's why retirement at 65 to 67 is a good thing there provided the availability of expansive guarantees, an average retiree has a chance to enjoy the hard-earned retirement for a quarter of his or her life then," Dr. Vishnevsky said

"An average lifespan in this country is slightly over 70 years old and that's why it's easy enough to figure out how much time will be left for senior citizens to enjoy their retirement in case the pensionable age is lifted," he said. "And add to this the not-too-high level of our medical services."
"People of intellectual professions are inclined to work longer but I wouldn't envy those who engage in hard manual labor," Dr. Vishnevsky said.

Along with it, the expert confirmed that the current demographic situation in this country points to an ageing population and the resultant problems with social welfare standards for the pensioners.

"The numerous generations of people born after World War II reached senior age in the 2000's and those who're entering the working age were born in the 1990's, the decade marked by a crisis in Russia when the birth-rate was prostrate," he said.

In other words, the correlation between the pensioners and workers now is highly disadvantageous, Dr. Vishnevsky indicated, citing the data from the Russian federal service for Statistics (Rosstat), which suggested that Russia had almost 41.4 million pensioners now, or about 30% of the population.

"The demographic tilt in Russia didn't appear just yesterday and we were to brace ourselves for tackling it," he said. "There's much talk around in the government concerning the importance of transition to a pensions system based on financial defined contribution, under which every worker puts away money at special accounts himself and does not depend on social security."

"The idea is simple and clear but who will guarantee the safekeeping of the accrued savings if they are eaten up by inflation or if the fund goes bust?" Dr. Vishnevsky said. "That's totally unclear."

Dr. Mikhail Delyagin, the director of the Institute for Globalization Problems believes that to extend the retirement age in Russia along the Wester model was akin to building replicas of European airports of reed.

"An eroded system of collecting the social fees is one of the reasons pushing the government towards an increase of the pensionable age," Dr. Delyagin said. "Wealthy Russians pay less in taxes than those who have few means."

"On the face of it, more than 30 million people are working in the shadow sectors of the economy," he said.

"One more case of the pension system crisis is the absence of practical control over the means accrued in the Pension Fund, the budget deficit of which has reached 623 billion rubles or more than $ 10 billion," Dr. Delyagin went on. "Yet it's an open secret it's the Pension Fund that has the plushest office in Moscow, not Gazprom or Sberbank (the largest commercial bank in the country - TASS)."

"The National Affluence Fund was set up sometime in the past exactly for the purpose of making up for the deficit of the Pension Fund but the monies from the latter are spent for any randomly chosen purposes except pensions at this moment," he said.

"I'd like to cite two main arguments against the increase of the pensionable in Russia," Dr. Delyagin said. "First, this measure will take millions of jobs away from the young, which is hit by joblessness the hardest. Second, a considerable part of the male population simply won't live through to the increased retirement age given the rather small lifespan in the country and the high mortality rate among males."

Dr. Leonid Grigoryev of the Supreme School of Economics abides by an opposite viewpoint.

"Most able-bodied Russians, men and women likewise, continue working after they reach retirement age so why should they be paid the pensions? Why do the people clutch at these meager pennies?" he said. "The Russian budget and the budgets of other countries don't endure under such loads."

"And nowhere in the world is the bar of the pensionable age set so low," Dr. Grigoryev said.

"Let's stop that hysteria around the Russian men who allegedly don't live long enough after retirement because that's wrong," he claimed. "Russian men mostly die in the age bracket of twenty to fifty years old from nonlethal guns, road accidents, and in crime-related situations."

"A total of 300,000 so-called unnecessary deaths among men occur in Russia these days and those men who get through to 55 live into their eighties without a problem afterwards, to say nothing of women," Dr. Grigoryev said.

"The Russian government should furnish society with basic information on the status of the pensions system in the country and put this problem up for public discussion," he believes. "Then there will be fewer speculations regarding the higher retirement age and therefore more understanding of the importance of this measure."

 [return to Contents] 

 #10
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
November 12, 2015
What the Russian economy needs to do next to avoid stagnation
RD Interview: Oleg Buklemishev, former assistant to the Finance Minister and the Prime Minister, decodes the Russian economic puzzle and explains what needs to happen if the Russian economy is going to start growing again.
By Alexey Khlebnikov
Alexey Khlebnikov is the Senior Editor of Russia Direct.
[Chart here http://www.russia-direct.org/qa/what-russian-economy-needs-do-next-avoid-stagnation]

It has now been a year since Russia has been forced to adjust to a new economic reality due to economic sanctions, low oil prices and the absence of serious fundamental reforms.

The current situation in Russia might be seen as a last chance to undertake true reforms and rethink the nation's overall economic policy. During a crisis, it is possible to see clearly what one's weaknesses are, and even at the current stage, Russia can actually turn itself into a new and successful economy - provided there is the political willpower at the very top.

Russia Direct sat down with Oleg Buklemishev, associate professor in the Department of Economics at Lomonosov Moscow State University (MGU) and the former assistant to the Finance Minister and the Prime Minister, to talk about the Russian economy after a year of crisis and what actually needs to be done to improve it.

Russia Direct: What do you see as a main trend in Russia's economic development?

Oleg Buklemishev: Frankly, the main trend is the absence of a trend for the time being, just because nobody sees a concrete direction of further economic development. Of course, some sectors continue to fall down, including construction, including consumption, some sectors still are doing better than others, such as agriculture.

Nevertheless, the overall trend is quite different from what we saw in 2008, when the global economic crisis touched the Russian economy in a very peculiar way: We had a so-called V-type crisis.

Nowadays, more and more economists are speaking about an L-type crisis. So, it will be a long stagnation with small ups and downs but nevertheless, the direction is unclear, and this is the problem, in my opinion. Stagnation in certain respects is even worse than a downfall, it is even worse than recession, just because it is  a permanent state that does not incur development.

RD: So, given these circumstances, during the Sochi Investment Forum Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev announced a new Economic Strategy-2030, which is concentrated on four priorities: investment activity, import substitution, the quality of state governance, and budgetary policy. Do you see this new attempt to revise the strategic view of Russian economic development timely? Or is it just empty words?

O.B.: It is both. It is timely but, unfortunately, we cannot see any real signals that these words are going to be implemented into real actions. Actually, sometimes these statements made by the government are quite rational and quite reasonable, and I agree with several statements that were made during the Sochi Forum, especially concerning governance and the public sector.

This refers not only to somewhere in the regions where we have bad management, but also to the higher echelons of power and the fact that the management of the economy currently is very poor. Moreover, the management of overall society, public life, is in a very poor state.

Whatever plans you can imagine or draw up under any slogan or strategy, they fall apart if you do not pay attention to the real needs of people and reestablish a system of feedback between the government and the people. Unfortunately, in my opinion, this system has been broken and further momentum is impossible in the absence of restoring some form of this feedback.

RD: What do you think should be fixed in the Russian economy in the first place?

O.B.: Of course, it is the problem of public management and it should be stated as one of the first priorities for sure. But then when it comes to reelection, I cannot see any further developments which could be considered realistic.

This system of merger between the public and the private sector continues to exist, the dominance of the state-owned companies (inefficient state-owned companies) and inefficient management of the state sector continue to exist, corruption unfortunately continues to exist as well and no one speaks about how to uproot these dangerous developments. So far we hear only words.

Some radical changes are needed in order to improve the situation here.

Speaking about investment and import-substitution, unfortunately, these are not parallel lines, these are perpendicular lines.

Import substitution is impossible in this current environment just because investments are closed. And investments are impossible in the current environment - the private sector does not want to invest in its own assets and in its own economy.

This is the main problem. Sources of such investments are closed because we deliberately closed access to the Western markets, we cannot find proper substitution for this money in the Eastern markets. . That is the picture.

And the key for this is private business behavior. Unless we improve the mood, unless we show the better image of the future Russian economy for the time being, private businesses see it as a mere continuation of the current situation, which is not a very positive picture.

RD: There is an opinion that the government is a bad investor and the Russian government an even worse one. But on the other hand, it is the only guarantor of stability for investors, it provides certain guarantees and security of investments. Why is it so? Do not you see a paradox here?

O.B.: I do not see any paradox here. The state really should be a guarantor but just the fact that it is a poor guarantor of economic activities is one of the main factors why private investment is not flowing in Russia. The fact that the state also tries to contribute a lot to the investment sector, it even pushes out private investors in many spheres.

For example, if Gazprom comes to invest, no other investment is possible in any particular field. Many of such state-owned enterprises have become multisector, multifunctional holdings and they really control the economy. Therefore there is no space for genuine private activity in many spheres: only risky spheres and spheres with no guaranteed results are left for some venture capitalists.

It could work if those fields were for ten percent or five percent of businesses, but if all business is oriented there, business of course prefers not to invest.

RD: Do you see any way out of how to change this balance?

O.B.: I do. This is a strange story. I often recall the discussions which were 10 years ago when I was in the government. And one of the discussions I remember particularly well. It happened in 2001. it was admitted that oil and gas companies control the majority of revenues of the Russian economy.

Nowadays, if I am not mistaken, RBC released a report a month ago that the number was 98 percent of profits for industry was oil and gas only. It means that in order to diversify our economy, in order to make it more efficient, you need for sure to somehow transfer this huge amount of money to non-raw material spheres. And here a simple dilemma comes at play: either you do it through the public sector or via markets. And the decision was made to do it via the state mechanisms.

So, you have a big state with the tax mechanism which extracts extra revenues from the oil and gas sphere. But then to keep some of this money in the reserves, some other part could be invested in other spheres of the economy. This was the initial idea but it did not work.

After almost 15 years, we can definitely say that this idea did not work. Just because the investments made by many of the state-owned companies and investments from the public sector was not as efficient as we assumed.

Now only one alternative is left. Somehow, start to redevelop markets, the banking sector, financial markets, the stock market, with the state as a guarantor to start moving funds from oil and gas to another industry. These funds should be not state funds it should be done in a very different way.

What the state did with that money: it accumulated huge reserves which were spent in half during the global economic crisis of 2008-2009. And because these funds existed, we had no restructure of the industry at all. Other countries survived the crisis but they restructured their internal economies and have become more efficient after the crisis. We just paid for everything. We just compensated for the failures and inefficiencies of the industry and the state itself.

Today another crisis comes and we are running out of funds. What can we do?

We need to deeply restructure the state, its budget and, of course, relations between the state and economy, this strange merger of big business and the state, and, of course, make our private companies also more efficient. This job of adjustment nowadays will be much more painful because in 2008 we did nothing to do that.

RD: There is enough understanding and expertise in the Russian government about what steps should be taken to achieve certain results in economic development of the country. Moreover a group of distinctive experts and economists are consulting our country's leadership on how to better conduct economic policy. Then what are the main obstacles for economic underperformance?

O.B.: It is happening just because of too many redlines which appeared during the previous years. There are redlines, nobody knows where these redlines are, but there are several things which cannot be discussed or they can be discussed but realistically they cannot be improved.

For example, the issue of state-owned companies, the secrecy around them, all attempts to measure their efficiency in a normal way, etc. It just goes without saying that government is absolutely dysfunctional on this arena. This significant part of the Russian economy lives its own life. And as far as I can assume nobody - not even the President - can run this portion of the Russian economy for the benefit of the economy itself and our people.

There are others as well, issues associated with distribution of authority and responsibilities between the regional and federal level, because the regions are blamed for everything but they lack resources, they come to the federal state and the federal state for whatever reason considers it an optimal scheme when they ask us for something but responsibility is at the same time on them. This way of management has become typical and most popular.

What is economic policy? It consists of two things: priorities and principles. Firstly, you set priorities, and secondly, you define principles according to which you go and look at these priorities as your orientation.

Nowadays we can speak a lot about, say, human capital or whatever, but we have corresponding items in the government budget decreased and the priorities are elsewhere. However, we do not speak about priorities such as the administrative system, security and defense. These are real priorities.

So we give up on our economy and we are for security instead. So, state it openly and do not speak about priorities which do not exist. It destroys the economic policy.

The second principle is that there is no principle that can be untouchable. The Prime Minister of the Russian government wrote an article not so long ago where he states that we should develop financial markets and two weeks later, we see another freeze of the accumulated pension funds. In more realistic words - money was confiscated from people.

According to the law, these people are not the owners of that money but nevertheless this is people's money. Instead of this money being invested in some real sectors of the economy, the government spends the money to finance current expenditures. So, the government already forgot about the priorities stated in the article of the Prime Minister.

This shows an absence of principles, which means there is no economic policy. No principles and no priorities.

RD: It is been already a year since the sectoral sanctions are in place. What are the main changes in Russian economy? Are they negative or positive?

O.B.: Frankly, I cannot see any positive results. To tell you frankly, in my opinion, the main negative effect is a signaling effect. This is a signal that there is a hidden risk in the Russian economy, in Russian assets, in Russian companies.

There is hidden risk because nobody knows who can be under the sanctions next. Anybody, any company and the overall economy could be touched by further sanctions if something happens in Ukraine or Syria. If something happens there might be new sanctions - that is the main message we are sending now to foreign investors and foreign partners. And this risk is embedded in the prices of the assets, in the investment climate.

But at the same time there is a slight upside of this story: nobody believes, realistically speaking, that sanctions are going to be cancelled soon. So it is a strange situation when there is only a downside.

There is no positive result for the Russian consumer who got, thanks to counter-sanctions, a significant decrease of the quality of products and an increase of prices. The few stories we are aware of, there are some Russian companies who managed to fill the niches. But they are very few. But again, nobody knows if tomorrow or day after tomorrow sanctions are released, are these companies in a position to keep those niches? I am not sure.

Of course these companies were eager not only to replace foreign competitors but also to raise prices. So it comes to a point when Russian consumers are getting products of lower quality for higher prices. This is the general picture, nobody can deny it.

RD: In the course of the year the word import-substitution has become something like a mantra of the government's policy. There are different assessments of its effectiveness. How can you describe it: Does our economy benefit from it? Or does it suffer from it?

O.B.: There are several issues here. First of all, I do not see what can be qualified as a successful import-substitution. If it happens successfully it should happen in the normal market environment. So people are ready to invest and import-substitution, if it happens during this period of time, it happens mainly due to a huge national currency devaluation.

Thus, national companies get a boost in competitiveness thanks to this devaluation. But at the same time this devaluation is harmful to the consumer, so this kind of import substitution is probably the worst kind of import-substitution one can imagine.

If you take the defense industry, probably there are good cases, but frankly I am not aware of them, when a company replaces imported parts with domestic parts. But again we have to look into the details: Defense is not a market-oriented sphere and who knows how much it costs now, what is the price difference. Probably we substituted something with our own parts which are again of lower quality and higher price. So, efficiency cannot be measured here. It requires special analysis.

As for other industries, again there are some cases it could work, but nevertheless, the atmosphere in the situation when access to investments is absent and investment is much more expensive than it was previously is that new production lines, new facilities can get investments only from the funds of these same enterprises.

RD: The Russian government has launched its own sort of support program, so it tries to give money to small and medium enterprises.

O.B.: I've heard about that but again we came to the previous point: the government is an investor and it has to choose, because people come to get cheap money, cheap loans. And there are a lot more people than money available. It means the government has to choose and it chooses here not much better in my opinion than in principle.

It is pretty strange when one part of the economy receives cheap loans for a five or six percent interest rate and another part cannot get any funds at all - or gets it at best for a 20 percent interest rate per year. It is very strange "competitive" situation.

RD: In your opinion, how does the Russian military campaign in Syria burden the budget?

O.B.: There are different estimates. But I'd like to draw your attention to another important issue - the growing secrecy of the state budget itself. You cannot analyze the federal budget in a way you could five years ago. Nowadays about a quarter or even more of the budgetary items is secret. You can have one estimation or another, but the fact is that you cannot analyze the figures.

For example, it would be very interesting to see how much money was spent on Crimea and on Donbas. Everyone is interested to see, but no one can really analyze it. Syria, in my opinion, is a minor problem when compared to Crimea or Donbas - it is much cheaper.
RD: To wrap up, could you please summarize the main problems in Russia's economy and what should be resolved in the first place?

O.B.: What should be resolved in the first place is quite clear in my opinion - it is a radical overhaul of policy. Again, what does policy mean? It means priorities and principles, and we live without principles and with wrong priorities.

What we need is to formulate the will that addresses the real needs of the Russian people. Many things which are being done during the current period of time are out of my picture. Although I am not a representative member of Russian society, I feel that people need something different than airstrikes in Syria, than advances in Ukraine.

People do not need closed hospitals, bad schools and high prices - these are the priorities the government should address, not some other fantastic things which are not on the horizon of an ordinary person.

Frankly, I would like to wake up tomorrow in a country that looks at its own problems and somehow this realistic view could be transformed into a policy action.

In a continuation of what I said previously, let me say about some positive sides of the story if compared to the previous periods. We have three reasons to hope.

First of all, we now see what needs to be done: people in the government, people outside of the government see and know what needs to be done. As recently Alexander Auzan said, "Everyone knows what has to be done but nobody believes it can happen."

RD: So it is like a dichotomy between necessity and expectations?

O.B.: Exactly. The path from expectations to necessity could be very short. Frankly, it could happen overnight. Just some preconditions need to be fulfilled, but it could happen overnight.

Secondly, we now have a very different human capital. If, at the end of the 1990s, there were no people to fill even a simple position, a very low position, nowadays the new generation of people knows how a normal market economy works, how democracy works.

People want to work honestly, people want to work in a very different situation from what we have now, and they know how to work. And if you just change the system of promotion and promote people by their merit, not by their connections to certain groups or individuals, very soon you will see that the quality of staff in the state apparatus and private sector as well will dramatically improve.

And third, it is about magic. I often recall the year 1999 when nobody expected that after the 1998 crisis, the Russian economy would start growing the same year, or that the Russian government would achieve a non-deficit budget the same year. Neither the World Bank, nor International Monetary Fund (IMF), nor domestic or external experts, nobody believed.

At that time, a Communist government was in place and it was a disaster: it was a dramatic devaluation, it was a dramatic crisis. The economy was just flattened by that crisis. When the Communist government came to power they understood that it could do nothing and that was the start of the economic miracle that lasted for 10 years - nobody expected that.

I do believe that something similar could happen today. But again, what kicked off that miracle was the deep economic crisis and serious political reshuffle. But it is not absolutely necessary to be hit hard in order to understand something.

 [return to Contents] 

 #11
Vedomosti
November 9, 2015
Russian opposition politician sceptical about economic reform possibility
Doctor of Economic Sciences Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, Reform is unfeasible. Politician and economist Grigoriy Yavlinskiy on how discussion of economic reforms becomes pointless

There are no doubts as to the profound systemic crisis of the Russian economy. In June at the St Petersburg Economic Forum the elites were still trying to pretend it was not so much a crisis as Russia going "its own way". It is true that the company which the Russian president addressed from the platform (the Chinese deputy prime minister, the Myanmar deputy prime minister and Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras) was less than persuasive.

But the autumn forums - in Vladivostok and Sochi and in particular, the Vneshtorgbank forum with the ridiculous title "Russia calling" - were an affirmation of the fact that the preceding years' growth without development has been replaced with a situation in which there is neither growth nor development and that things will no longer be the way they used to be. Confusion and contradictory assessments from functionaries and top managers, the extravagant statements that under present conditions there is no need to support small business (if it survives, then it survives, and if not then it is unviable and can get lost), empty words about how Russia must abandon forever the strategy of catch-up development and finally engage in diversifying the economy...

Hearing and discussing it was of no interest, especially given that the finance minister has announced that the Reserve Fund is about to run out while the Economy Ministry now no longer rules out the possibility of an oil price of about 40 dollars a barrel.

However, there is fundamentally no need now to say anything about economic problems at all.

Politics moves backward and sideways and economy moves forward?

There is nothing strange in discussions about the Russian economy than talk about how "the difficulties will have a sobering effect and compel people to get down to business and engage in real reforms." No-one with the slightest knowledge of what the Russian bureaucracy, business and regime are like will doubt for even a minute that this is impossible.

Institutional and structural reforms in the economy cannot be carried out when there is overwhelming political backsliding in all directions. The concentration of power in one pair of hands with no checks and balances combined with the orientation of the top segment of an irremovable regime towards political (Eurasianism, a "special path") and economic ("import substitution", war and isolation as economic motivators) fantasies are creating a situation in which both reforms themselves and the necessary public pressure with a view to their implementation are becoming utterly unfeasible.

Even limited measures like the repeal of self-imposed food sanctions, the cutting of military expenditure, and the dismissal of the most odious corrupt officials are impossible because self-imposed sanctions and military expenditure are important policy components. And the fight against corruption, as the existing power system wages it, has been and will be primarily an important instrument for controlling the bureaucratic elite.

The Russian economic model that has now taken shape is no longer suited to any kind of "reform" and debates on this subject are no more fruitful than was talk of improving the economic mechanism of the USSR of the period of Soviet government leaders Tikhonov and Ryzhkov.

A systemic transformation is possible only under the influence of a very powerful and protracted political impulse and with the presence of a necessary minimum of economic, social, and external conditions. From the viewpoint of the state of the global economy and the world situation, in the first decade of the 21st century, as a whole, our chance of accomplishing such a transition within a historically sensible deadline looked to be above zero at least. However, Russian authoritarianism let slip the moment which could have turned it into an instrument for modernizing the economy and society, and it acquired the form of an authoritarian system of the stagnant, "demodernized" type. The opportunity for creating a broad coalition in support of reforms with the participation of the authoritarian regime, which had been spoken of in the early 2000s, turned out to be hopelessly lost both as a historical chance and as a potential mechanism for enforced modernization.

Russian authoritarianism and the political system as a whole has demonstrated its deliberate refusal and utter inability to transform its economic basis - peripheral capitalism.

Russian economic system cannot have strategy

The characteristic features of peripheral capitalism are known to everyone: the export of raw material as a key element of prosperity, foreign investments as the chief and almost sole element of technological change, foreign financial markets as the main source of investment funds, a close link between state and business, an exceptionally important role for income from administrative corruption as a configurator of internal financial flows, and so on.

It is Russian capitalism's remoteness from modern economic institutions and accordingly from capitalism's modern world nucleus which determines the special features of the Russian economy: the nature and pace of capital accumulation, the sources and directions of investments, their potential volumes and the nature of relations between business and administrative power, the structure of ownership, sectorial priorities, opportunities for managing economic growth and that growth's objective limits.

The main feature of present-day Russian peripheral capitalism from the development viewpoint is that it does not and cannot have a development strategy.

Of course, tactical variations are possible within its framework - in budgetary, fiscal and monetary credit policy, in programmes for supporting particular industrial segments or incentivizing growth, in the regulation of foreign economic activity and the improvement of individual characteristics of the business environment.

But they do not change the national economy's position in the global system of world capitalism. That is what we have been constantly encountering over the last 15 years in Russian economic political practice, where the active manipulation of the instruments of current economic policy has been accompanied by the government's inability to influence the long-term strategic parameters of the economy. What was conceived and even developed in detail as a long-term strategy for economic development and structural reforms has ultimately invariably come down at best to the maintenance of a few parameters of macroeconomic stability.

The reason does not lie in the personal qualities of developers and executors, but in the fact that the only possible line of conduct within the framework of peripheral capitalism is passive adaptation to the conditions which are being created by the activity of the global capitalist nucleus, the "collective West", and the use of these conditions to obtain current revenue which is grabbed and allocated by the political ruling clique. The emergence of the Russian economy and of Russian society into an orbit closer to the nucleus of present-day capitalism requires the creation of the requisite preconditions, primarily, institutional preconditions. However, throughout the post-Soviet period, attempts to create the institutional conditions for qualitative changes have invariably encountered obstinate resistance from institutions which were formed within the framework of the existing system and which ensure the prosperity of its specific elite.

In the 1990s and early 2000s this resistance was helped by factors like the social weakness of the stratum of supporters of reforms, the lack of political will "from above" to enact them, and the corrosive influence of the external and internal environment into which the stratum of "captains" of Russian enterprise "steering" the bulk of the biggest economic assets in the country had, like the entire "elite", got mired.

The appropriate authoritarian political superstructure, which was formed later as a result of the powerful operation of the laws of a peripheral economy, acted in the role of a factor reinforcing the status quo and cementing features of the system like the absence of the supremacy of the law and of an effective independent judiciary, movable and unclear rules of the game in economic activity, the existence of large-scale and substantial differences between formal regulating acts and actual relations in the economy, broad opportunities for the arbitrary allocation of assets between corporate bodies and individuals dependent on the state, and the notional nature of private ownership of major economic assets.

Economic growth without modernization leads to war

Today, despite the anti-Western rhetoric of the last 18 months, the peripheral essence of the Russian economy is being retained and reinforced. There has been no drastic turnaround, no unilateral initiative to break off every kind of economic contact with the West. And of course that is connected primarily to an awareness of the insurmountable fact that the Russian economy in the form in which it has taken shape over the last 25 years, is a dependent part of the world capitalist economy and cannot exist without it or separately from it. Moreover, it is this type of economy which is a source of enrichment for the authoritarian ruling clique and the bureaucratic and business "elite".

However, economic growth without development, that is in the absence of the political, social, and economic modernization of the country and society, has led to extremely dangerous consequences. The "ruling clique" has formed and has had reinforced exaggerated ideas of its own potential, and its unsubstantiated ambitions have grown out of all proportion. Now, without abandoning peripheral capitalism, they want to gain the right to economic, military, political and ideological dominance on part of the periphery, and the unconditional conservation of their own rules in their own province, whose borders are determined arbitrarily. The material resources, which have grown and had seemed boundless, have enabled them to create docile support groups in society. The underlying de-modernization of the elite and the degeneration and archaicization of public consciousness have occurred and are continuing. Even the small and medium business stratum, which is one of the main and direct beneficiaries in the event of modernizing reforms, under these conditions has not only failed to take shape as a political class, but has turned out to be extraordinarily pliable material for powerful administrative and propaganda influence and brainwashing "from above".

As a result, in the last two years peripheral authoritarianism, relying on an erroneous idea of the size of our resources and the Russian economy's potential and a distorted idea of the structure of the present-day world and of the motivation of the "collective West", has led our country onto a path ending in not even disaster, but in collapse.

Today debate on economic reforms is pointless

If we turn from the personal ambitions and interests which force competing groups of experts to fight for priority funding and accuse each other of incompetence and insist on the need to develop every new programmes, then the discussion of the avenues and paths of potential economic modernization can be considered closed.

The programme for changing the model of Russian capitalism in the direction of bringing it closer to the present nucleus in terms of its main features was defined long ago and is known to many.

It means the liberation and encouragement of entrepreneurial activity in general and in particular in those spheres and fields where it is not theory but practice that reveals the indicators of international relative advantages. It means the creation of a favourable and stable institutional environment for business ready to observe the laws and make its contribution to social responsibility, for which it is essential to ensure the unconditional observance of laws after their careful revision to make them realistic and impervious to corruption. This environment presupposes the presence of feedback between the state and responsible business and the granting to business of the opportunity to take part legally and openly in the country's political life.

It means the creation of as competitive an environment as possible in all spheres except for cases where a natural monopoly is justified. Sensible laws and effective, transparent antimonopoly regulation bodies must be combined with political mechanisms for antimonopoly control rendering impossible concealed pressure and undercover lobbying by groups interested in retaining their monopoly position.

It is clear that the effective operation of these mechanisms requires the utmost transparency in activity and information openness in the state and private sectors.

Everything should be done to encourage saving and investments, to create disincentives to eating up revenue and economic assets. The tax system should be oriented towards fulfilling that task. And for that a system of so-called development institutions must function, their task being to encourage long-term investments and use for these purposes the bulk of the state's revenue.

The problem today is not the absence of programmes and formulas, but the absence of a state able and ready to work in earnest on the implementation of these vitally important tasks. Moreover, the Russian state in its present form and with its present policy is incapable even of putting right the damage caused to the peripheral economy by the complication of its relations with the global nucleus - with the economically developed countries.

When will reforms become possible?

Not tomorrow. To make it clear that this will not be soon, I shall cite just three problems without whose prior resolution there will never be real reforms and everything that is done will be only a hopeless sham.

First, there is the creation of an atmosphere of historical confidence: a) of unconditional European self-identification and b) of continuity with historical Russia through a full and cogent assessment by the state of the period of Communism and Bolshevism and practical steps to surmount Stalinism, including in state management and public life.

Second, there is the legitimization of and full backup for the inalienable rights of private ownership. Economic methods must be used to rectify the pernicious consequences of the fraudulent privatization conducted through vouchers and shares-for-loans auctions. So that the authorities can never again state, for instance, as they are doing now, that "... in the opinion of the Russian Federation the plaintiffs cannot lay claim to any payments because they were connected with the former Yukos owners who in 1995-96 bought shares in the company at auctions in contravention of the law".

Third, there is the cessation of aggression against Ukraine and the determination of Crimea's final status through the mechanism of an international conference and a referendum under international control. Incidentally, we must also be able somehow to get out of Syria and the Middle East, which will now be very difficult.

Russian society now is in such a state that it is not prepared to discuss a single one of these topics properly. It is clear that all this will be possible only after Putin, that is after the replacement of the country's political leadership - the president, government and parliament. Until then, the issue of economic reforms and strategies is closed.

Functionaries are discussing the country's economic prospects at various forums and, with an air of competence, are articulating official forecasts they know to be unrealistic. Businessmen, afraid of unpleasantness like the story involving Vladimir Yevtushenkov, are going to the bosses' forums as if they were going to work and are grinning and bearing it despite their very bad expectations. You can understand them all: it is simply that neither group has anywhere to go. However, the community of scientists and experts and Russian intellectuals have a special responsibility. Despite the serious restrictions they still retain the opportunity to assess the situation correctly without substituting professional diagnosis for pointless discussions, pedantic proposals for resolving the very serious problems that are mounting up and promises to deliver a detailed reforms programmes any moment now.

 [return to Contents] 

 #12
Reuters
November 12, 2015
Putin: If doping claims are true, heads will roll

President Vladimir Putin said on Wednesday Russia needed to conduct its own investigation into allegations its athletes had systematically taken performance-enhancing substances and that someone needed to take personal responsibility for the problem.

Putin, in his first comments since an independent commission from the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) leveled its accusations, said Russia needed to cooperate with international organisations looking into the issue as openly as it could.

"I ask the minister of sport and all our colleagues who are linked in one way or another with sport to pay this issue the greatest possible attention," Putin said ahead of a meeting with sports officials in the Black Sea resort of Sochi.

"It is essential that we conduct our own internal investigation and provide the most open - and I want to underline - the most open professional cooperation with international anti-doping structures."

A judo black belt, Putin, who has built much of his own image on Russia's sporting prowess, said the problem of doping was not only confined to Russia, but said his country had a duty to protect its athletes from banned substances.

"The battle must be open. A sporting contest is only interesting when it is honest," said Putin, adding that if problems were found someone would have to personally assume responsibility for the issue.

 [return to Contents] 

 #13
Moscow Times
November 13, 2015
Russia's Doping Scandal: The Main Allegations

An independent commission by the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) has recommended that the Russian athletics federation be declared "non-compliant" with anti-doping code, and be suspended from track and field competition, the report published Monday said.

The International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) president Sebastien Coe asked that Russia respond to the 350-page report by Friday, at which time the IAAF will convene to discuss a suspension of Russian track and field athletes from international competition. This could mean no 2016 Summer Olympics in Rio de Janeiro for Russian athletics.

"We want to take a serious look at toughening civil penalties, and perhaps even think about introducing criminal ones," Russian Sports Minister Vitaly Mutko said at a press conference Wednesday, RIA Novosti reported.

With Russia set to learn its 2016 Olympic fate on Friday, here is a rundown of the report's main allegations.

Russia's Enhanced Performance at the 2012 London Olympics

Six Russian athletes competed at the London Olympics even though they showed "abnormal" values in their biological passport, a method of using blood samples to track the effect of performance-enhancing drugs.

The athletes benefited from "unexplained and highly suspicious delayed notifications" that allowed them to compete at the London games prior to their suspension coming into effect, the report said.

Two of the six athletes won medals, with race-walker Sergei Kirdyapkin winning gold. The WADA report has thrown suspicion over Russia's London success.

Russia's Widespread Doping Program

Russia has been running a "state-supported" doping program that "may be a residue of the old Soviet Union system, WADA commission leader and International Olympic Committee veteran Dick Pound said Monday.

With the help of coaches and Sergei Portugalov, a veteran sports doctor who chaired the Russian athletics federation's medical commission, Russian athletes routinely took banned substances.

In addition to undercover footage from a German television documentary that showed Russian athletes discussing the effects of coach-prescribed doping products, marathon runner Liliya Shobukhova and Yulia Stepanova provided investigators with e-mails in which Portugalov allegedly prescribed doping products.

The Cover-Up

Such a vast doping program required extensive covering-up. The report alleges that this included the Russian Sports Ministry.

The Russian anti-doping lab's director Grigory Rodchenkov is accused of taking money from athletes to conceal positive tests. He drew criticism for referring to WADA investigators as "idiots," and resigned from his post on Tuesday.

In addition to confidential sources, the Russian athlete Stepanova and her husband Vitaly Stepanov were important sources for the allegations against Rodchenkov.

Russian Security Services' Involvement

Rodchenkov allegedly held weekly meetings with an agent of Russia's Federal Security Services (FSB), and lab personnel believed the lab was bugged.

The agent reportedly went by the name Evgeny Blokhin or Blotkin and was interested in "the mood of WADA."

FSB personnel infiltrated the lab used for the Sochi Winter Olympics last year, the report said, citing anonymous sources.

Although no written document proves government involvement, "it would be naive in the extreme to conclude that activities on the scale discovered could have occurred without the explicit or tacit approval of the Russian authorities," Pound said, The Associated Press reported Monday.

Extortion

Russian officials allegedly demanded money from athletes keen to escape doping bans.

Last year's sports documentary by German network ARD alleged that marathon runner Shobukhova had paid 450,000 euros ($520,000) to Russian officials linked to Valentin Balakhnichev, then head of the Russian Athletics Federation and treasurer of the IAAF.

Some details of the alleged extortion have been withheld as there is currently a criminal probe by French prosecutors, with former IAAF president Lamine Diack among those under investigation. More details on alleged IAAF malpractice is expected by the end of the year.

The IAAF meets Friday to discuss the WADA's report, and Russia is lobbying hard to avoid a ban from international competition.

Russia will not voluntarily withdraw from official competitions such as the 2016 Summer Olympics, Russian Athletics Federation (ARAF) Vice President Tatyana Lebedeva said. She said that Russia "did not deny the existence of a doping problem, and was taking measures to combat it."

"The ARAF president resigned, we hired a new head coach for the national team, older coaches in individual disciplines are also being replaced," Lebedeva said.

 [return to Contents] 

 #14
New York Times
November 13, 2015
Editorial
A Doping Travesty Russia Cannot Duck

A central thrust of Soviet propaganda throughout the Cold War was to portray all Soviet misconduct, however outrageous, as no different from what the West was doing - including the propaganda itself. Accordingly, if the West accused the Kremlin of some gross wrongdoing, it was promptly depicted as another hypocritical attempt to belittle the Soviet Union. To a degree it worked: Many Russians, lacking any direct experience of the West, accepted a moral equivalence between their system and Western democracy - along with an instinctive fear of a world forever scheming against them. Alas, this approach has become an integral part of Vladimir Putin's Russia.

On Monday, the World Anti-Doping Agency released a 323-page report detailing widespread and systematic doping of Russian athletes and extraordinary efforts by top sports officials and secret services to cover it up. That in itself was an echo of the Soviet era, when the state put an enormous premium on sports as a measure of its ideology's superiority and routinely fed its athletes performance-enhancing chemicals. According to Reuters, Mr. Putin said Wednesday that the doping allegations should be investigated. But the general response was described in Neil MacFarquhar's article in The Times on Tuesday. Everybody does it, and this is just another attempt by the West to humiliate Russia.

Such blame-shifting has been the Putin regime's consistent response to criticism. The uprising in Ukraine was an American plot. Charges that Russia's allies shot down a Malaysian jetliner over Ukraine were a deliberate Western concoction. The drop in oil prices was engineered by America to hurt Russia. The accusations of widespread corruption in FIFA, the ruling body of world soccer, are an American ploy to deny Russia the World Cup tournament.

And the most outrageous, delivered last weekend by Dmitry Kiselyov, the Kremlin's propagandist on television: It's not impossible that the United States could have made a deal with terrorists to shoot down the Russian jetliner over Sinai (double-negative insinuations of this sort, without a shard of evidence, were a fixture in the old Soviet propaganda).

Given Mr. Putin's total control of Russian television, the primary source of news for at least three-quarters of Russians, the doping accusation might simply be brushed off as another lie manufactured by the West to humiliate Russia. But there's a way to keep that from happening. And that's for the doping agency to impose penalties so strong that every Russian citizen will know that the actions of the government were not only wrong, but carried out on a scale and at an official level few countries could dream of matching.

Among the extraordinary recommendations of the World Anti-Doping Agency is to suspend Russia from track and field competition at the next Olympic Games. It should be. It would be a proper punishment for such cheating, and it would drive home to Russian athletes and the Russian public that their state sports machinery didn't simply get caught doing something everybody does. Instead, it was revealed to have systematically and deliberately undermined the very notion of fair competition, thus rendering every one of its medals suspect.

 [return to Contents] 

 #15
Spiked
www.spiked-online.com
November 12, 2015
RUSSIAN OLYMPIC SCANDAL, OR DOPEY WESTERN STUNT?
By Mike Hume
Mick Hume is spiked's editor-at-large. His book, Trigger Warning: Is the Fear of Being Offensive Killing Free Speech?, is published by Harper Collins.

According to this week's top-level report from a World Anti-Doping Agency commission, Russia has been guilty of running a 'state-supported' doping programme in athletics, and its drug-fuelled athletes and bribery 'sabotaged' the 2012 London Olympics. Dick Pound, chairman of the WADA commission, wants the All-Russia Athletics Federation kicked out of next year's Rio Olympics. The ruling body of international athletics is due to pass sentence on Friday.

The head of the US Anti-Doping Agency, Travis Tygart, has now stoked the fire higher, declaring that 'the Olympic dream and the Olympic values, including fair play, have been reduced down to a nightmare by the Russian Athletic Federation'.

Oh, those Russians, as Boney M warned us long ago. To judge by the bellicose language being directed against them over the doping scandal in the Western media, some might think that the Russian authorities deserve not just to be banned, but bombed.

However, it surely does not require any expert report to see that Russian athletes and coaches are far from the only players up to no good here. Behind the lofty talk of 'Olympic values', there are some dodgy double standards on display in Western attitudes towards Russian sport. And the high-minded invocation of the 'Olympic dream' of 'fair play' looks like a cover for the US and the West to play some low political games, staging a sort of sporting Cold War to demonstrate their moral superiority over the eastern barbarians.

The double standards applied to Russia over alleged doping should be obvious to all. No doubt there has been rule-breaking among some Russian athletes and coaches, as even the authorities there concede. Why that should be an excuse for kicking Russia out of the Olympics is quite another matter.

Nobody who is not under the influence could suggest that doping is unique to Russia. Tygart, the US athletics' anti-doping crusader, is the same official who got champion American cyclist Lance Armstrong banned for life for doping. Yet so far as I recall, there was no international chorus demanding that all Americans be kicked out of international cycling or sport because of what Armstrong did. So why should the unearthing of some alleged Russian Lance Armstrongs spark high-level demands to send Russian athletics into sporting exile?

Nor is Russia alone in being accused of an official cover-up of doping by its athletes. We are all now supposed to forget, for example, how the American athletics establishment covered up 114 positive tests on top athletes between 1988 and 2000 - and then denied doing so until the evidence was overwhelming. Among the beneficiaries of this official largesse was sprinter Carl Lewis, the multiple Olympic gold medallist depicted as the champion of fair play against the convicted drug cheat Ben Johnson. We now know that Lewis failed three US drug tests in the run-up to that infamous 100m race at the 1988 Olympics. Asked if it was unfair that the American authorities allowed him to compete anyway, Lewis later insisted that 'there were hundreds of people getting off. Everyone was treated the same.' So that's all right then.

As for the suggestion that those cheating, chemically enhanced Russians almost single-handedly 'sabotaged' the London Olympics in 2012 with their doping antics? If success at those games really was all about drugs, one can surely only conclude that other states must have had as good or better chemists than the Russians. Their men won only two athletics golds - in the high jump and the, err, 50km 'walk' - which was one fewer than each of Britain, the US and Jamaica. Russia's women originally won six track-and-field golds - the same number as the US - one of which, for the 3,000m steeplechase, has since been withdrawn over a later failed drug test. All of their medallists, as the Russians pointed out this week, passed the UK's stringent testing regime in London.

That tale of the London Games illustrates a point that spiked writers have consistently made in relation to these issues: that there is always a powerful air of moral panic surrounding discussions of drugs in sport, which usually bears little relation to reality. Contrary to the impression often given, pills are not magic potions that can turn clod-hopping no-hopers into Olympian thoroughbreds; the line between those supplements deemed legal and illegal is thin and constantly shifting; and there is no such thing as 'pure' athletics in a world where all countries and competitors will use every new material, training method, trick and treat they can get their hands or feet on to gain that all-important extra hundredth of a second.

Whenever the everyday, complicated matter of drugs in sport suddenly gets turned into a major black-and-white issue of Good v Evil, it is generally safe to suspect that there is a political agenda involved. Does anybody seriously imagine that it is merely a coincidence that the new crusade to have Russia kicked out of international sport has emerged at a time of headline tensions between the West and President Vladimir Putin in world affairs?

Putin's Russia has emerged once more as the bête noire of the Western powers, blamed for everything from war in the Ukraine to conflict and plane crashes in the Middle East (even when its own airliners are the ones exploding). The US, the UK and their allies are keen to strike principled poses against Putin and assert themselves on the international stage.

However, that is easier said than done in the real world of geopolitics and power, where the West lacks the authority to boss or control events from Eastern Europe to the Middle East, and cannot even decide, for example, whether it should really be for or against Russian military intervention in Syria. How much easier, then, to stage some political games over international sport and give the Russkies a pious lecture about 'fair play' on the games field!

We are left with a sort of recreational version of the Cold War, a poor man's Berlin Wall being erected across the athletics track. That is probably more a reflection of the petty weakness of the Western 'hawks' than any malign power of the 'Russian bear'.

The pretext might be transparently false, but the consequences are real enough. This sort of grandstanding helps to stoke up genuine global political tensions. And it can only intensify public cynicism about the excitement of sport, sucking a little more joy out of life.

Ever since the birth of the modern Olympics and international competition, it has been naive to imagine we could 'keep politics out of sport'. We might still, however, make an effort to keep sport out of politics, and object to the inspirational Olympics being reduced to another grubby tool of great power games.

How about a little less cynicism about the 'corruption' of Olympic athletics and sporting excellence, and a bit more criticism of the politicisation of sport?

 [return to Contents] 

 #16
Bloomberg
November 13, 2015
Editorial
Russia's Promising Peace Plan for Syria

The U.S. and its allies have reason to be skeptical of Russia's new plan for peace in Syria. The proposal has arrived, after all, just as Russian airstrikes have begun to help President Bashar al-Assad to his first military successes since they began. Nevertheless, the plan contains some ideas that could help end a conflict that's killed 250,000 people and sent millions of refugees as far as Europe.

What's most encouraging about the eight-point plan is that it reflects some change in thinking about the Syrian rebels. No longer does Russia dismiss all of Assad's armed opponents as terrorists. Now it is asking the diplomats who will gather in Vienna on Saturday to draw up two lists, one that designates terrorist organizations in Syria and another that identifies legitimate opposition groups that can take part in peace talks.

Such a strategy is probably the only way to unwind Syria's complex proxy war, though it isn't proving easy for the sides to agree on which groups are which. Russia wants the terrorist list to be long, so it can attack as many of Assad's opponents as possible. Saudi Arabia and Turkey want it to be short. The U.S., too, wants to be sure that no militias it has been supplying with weapons are designated as terrorists.

Any breakthrough for Syria would also require an end to the deadlock over Assad's future role. That can be achieved if the Syrian side, backed by both Russia and Iran, can accept a less important role for the current president, by coming to a temporary acceptance of the soft partition of Syrian already in place.

Syria's president cannot simply be put back in charge of people he's been attacking for the past four years -- not even after an 18-month constitutional transition, as Russia suggests. Russian President Vladimir Putin may hope he can ensure that happens by continuing the war on Assad's side. The U.S. should help prevent that prospect by building safe zones and strengthening support for the rebel militias it works with.

Equally, however, Assad cannot simply be removed. That would invite institutional collapse and potential catastrophe for the roughly 12 million people still under his control, many of them religious minorities who have reason to fear Syria's Sunni rebels.

If the diplomatic process in Vienna is to have a productive future, the U.S., Russia and all other players must accept that, during Syria's inevitably long transition, local security is best left in local hands, allowing Assad to remain in place without threatening people in rebel-controlled areas. Syria has already broken into sections, and putting the country back together will take time. Russia's plan isn't enough to achieve peace or unification, but it can make a start.

 [return to Contents] 

 #17
www.rt.com
November 13, 2015
Putin: Free Syrian Army shares intel on ISIS targets, US reluctant to cooperate

Russia has been cooperating with the Free Syrian Army (FSA), which shared their intelligence on Islamic State (IS, formerly ISIS) positions targeted by Russian airstrikes, said President Vladimir Putin in an interview on Friday.

In an interview with the Interfax and Anadolu news agencies published on Friday, Putin said Russia has been considering any "reliable" information on the terrorists' location in Syria.

"We have even worked together with the Free Syrian Army (FSA)," he said. "Russian aviation has conducted several strikes on targets identified by the FSA. We excluded areas, which had been indicated by FSA commanders as being under their control."

He stressed this "proves once again that we are not bombing the so-called moderate opposition or the civilian population."

'Russia repeatedly calculated potential risks & consequences of Syria op'

Putin said all "potential risks and consequences" of  Russia's airstrikes in Syria have been "carefully calculated many times" and "all the resources needed for the operation, both financial and technological, have been allocated in advance."

The Russian president also said the duration of Russia's airstrikes in the Arab republic will depend on the Syrian Army's offensive against terrorists.

"A clear objective is set before the Russian forces - they should provide air support for the Syrian Army's offensive against the terrorists, and that is why the duration of stay of our military will be determined solely depending on the time this objective is achieved," he said.

'US lukewarm about Russia's cooperation proposals'
He expressed Russia's readiness to cooperate with the US-led coalition's military efforts in Syria, despite Washington bypassing a UN Security Council resolution that authorizes military action. The US also received no request from the official Syrian government to start the strikes.

"We are ready to cooperate with Washington despite the fact that the US operations in Syria are in violation of international law," Putin said.

The Kremlin officially informed the US and NATO of the start of military actions in "reasonable time" beforehand, he said.

"We hoped at least for the natural close military and expert coordination in such cases with the US led 'Global Coalition to Counter ISIL' [IS, former ISIS], even taking into account all the fundamental differences between the Russian and US approaches to the Syrian crisis," he said.

Despite the common threat posed by terrorists and extremist groups in the region, the "reaction of the US and Western partners was quite restrained," Putin said.

"We still have not managed to go beyond the joint approval of the Memorandum of Understanding on Prevention of Flight Safety Incidents in the Course of Operations in Syria, and even then with a reservation by the US that by no means such interaction should be regarded as the normalization of military contacts, which were frozen on the US initiative."

The cooperation deal reached on October 20 is aimed at preventing incidents and providing for the smooth operation of the two nations' aircraft, and for mutual aid in critical situations.

However, Washington has been "reluctant" to respond to Moscow's proposal to sign an additional agreement regarding the rescue of military aircraft crews, he added. This comes despite "the fact that at the time when the US operation in Afghanistan started, we immediately responded to their similar request."

"Neither have we received any response to our request to provide Russia with relevant US intelligence data for planning operations of our Russian Aerospace Forces in Syria, although we have repeatedly asked the US for such information," Putin concluded.

 [return to Contents] 

 #18
European Leadership Network
www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org
November 13, 2015
Aligning Western Values and Interests in Syria: Time to Learn from Putin
By Ian Kearns
Director, ELN

Russia is pursuing a twin-track policy in Syria. Its airstrikes are continuing at a high tempo, and continue to hit a wide range of anti-Assad forces on the ground. At the same time recent reports suggest a Russian backed Syrian peace plan is circulating at the United Nations. The two elements of the policy are linked. Russian warplanes are being used to demonstrate that Assad will not be allowed to fall but also to strengthen his constituency's hand in the peace talks to follow. The west should now learn from what Russia is doing and apply greater military pressure of its own while biting the bullet on negotiating with Assad.

If western leaders are to do this, however, they will have to accept some hard truths. Their policy on Syria to date has been tragically misguided and strategically incoherent. It has not helped the people of Syria and is now generating side-effects that are a major threat to European and wider western interests.

For over two years, the west has argued that Assad must go before there can be meaningful negotiations. At the same time it has refused to commit the necessary military power to remove him. It has argued that to negotiate with Assad, a butcher who has killed thousands of his own people, would be an affront to the people of Syria and to western values. Yet the biggest threat to the Syrian people is the continuation of the war. And the biggest threat to western values now comes not from Assad but from inside Europe, where commitment to solidarity is collapsing and intolerant populist movements are thriving on the back of the flows of refugees escaping the conflict.

The west badly needs a new policy. This policy must more thoroughly align interests with values. To achieve that aim it must consist, at a minimum, of the following four elements.

First, it must radically increase military aid to the moderate opposition in Syria and provide air support to their operations on the ground. There are risks in this policy, particularly in relation to US led coalition forces coming into conflict with the Russian military but the recent deal on de-confliction makes these risks manageable. As with Russia's actions, the application of greater western military power must be for political effect. It must demonstrate to Assad, Putin, and the Iranians that diplomacy is possible but total defeat for the moderate opposition is not. Nor will they be left to negotiate from a position of weakness.

Second, the west must be willing to create safe areas inside Syria so people do not have to flee to Europe to save their own lives. Western air power should be used to enforce no fly zones over these areas and opposition fighters should be given everything they need to defend them on the ground.

Third, the talk of increased EU aid to African countries and additional conflict prevention measures, audible ahead of this week's Malta summit, is to be welcomed, but the west must also increase economic support to Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon. The challenge to the economic, social and political stability of each of these countries from massive refugee flows is enormous. Should any one of them become destabilised to the point of collapse or serious internal strife, the effect would be to deepen the current humanitarian crisis in the region, and to further increase refugee flows to neighbouring countries and to Europe.

Fourth, and on the basis of the other three measures, the west must drop its insistence that Assad must go and make clear its willingness to negotiate an end to the Syrian war. Whether Assad personally survives a deal or not, any negotiated settlement is going to have to acknowledge the existence of the constituency of opinion he represents. It is also going to have to acknowledge the fact that Iran, having recently joined discussions on the issue, must be involved.

There are many who oppose this plan of action but in their commitment to current policy, they are now undermining the very values they say their position is designed to reflect.

To pursue the course suggested would not be to abandon a commitment to universal human rights or to choose between those values and western interests. It would be to align the greater use of western military power with a political strategy to end to the war.

It would be to do what is necessary to lift the Syrian people out of the nightmare into which their country has fallen and to act to prevent further loss of life.

It would be to make clear, through significant military support to the opposition, that the west will not allow what remains of the Arab Spring in Syria to be totally extinguished and in fact will do what is required to make sure it influences the future direction of the country.

And it would be to act to stem the flow of refugees to Europe and in doing so, to prevent populists from destroying the historically transcendent commitment to cooperation, solidarity, and tolerance that seven successful decades of European integration represents.

It would be, in other words, to align western interests and values, and to act in defence of both.

The opinions articulated above represent the views of the author(s), and do not necessarily reflect the position of the European Leadership Network or any of its members. The ELN's aim is to encourage debates that will help develop Europe's capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time.

 [return to Contents] 

 #19
The Economist
November 14, 2015
Russia and terrorism
Tolerance for casualties
Russians' stoicism gives Vladimir Putin time to work out a response

SHORTLY after Vladimir Putin became prime minister in 1999 Russia was hit by a string of apartment bombings that killed over 300 people. An enraged Mr Putin promised to "waste the terrorists in the outhouse". By comparison, his response to the Metrojet crash in the Sinai peninsula has been curiously subdued. There have been no impassioned calls to avenge the 224 dead, only a brief televised offer of condolences.

Yet the consensus that terrorists brought down the airliner grows stronger each day. It is no longer just British and American officials who are saying it. Evidence from the flight recorder, the exit holes in the fuselage and the burn injuries sustained by passengers all point to a bomb. The main suspect is the Sinai Province of the Islamic State, the group which initially claimed responsibility.

Judging by Mr Putin's decision last week to cancel flights to Egypt and evacuate some 80,000 Russian tourists, he too gives credence to the terrorism scenario. Nonetheless, his chief-of-staff insists that a bombing is "just one of the versions" and that the investigation will take months. The Kremlin refuses to accept any connection between the crash and Russia's military operations in Syria.

On television, Russian viewers have been treated to a series of obfuscations. Experts have offered various technical explanations. Anger has been redirected at Charlie Hebdo, the French satirical weekly, which caricatured the crash. In his Sunday broadcast Dmitry Kiselev, Russia's propagandist-in-chief, blamed the crash on a secret pact between America and Islamic State.

The Russian leadership may be genuinely reluctant to jump to conclusions, but it is also clear that Mr Putin has not decided on a line. Maria Lipman, a political analyst, says the government is buying time: "The farther away from the actual shock and grief, the easier it becomes to package it in a way that serves the Kremlin's interests."

In the meantime, the authorities face no public pressure for answers. Russians have responded to the tragedy with a stoicism born of experience. Collective grief in Russia is intense but dissipates fast, says Lev Gudkov, director of the Levada Center, an independent pollster. Russia's experience of terrorism resembles Israel's more than it does Europe's or America's. In the past 20 years Russians have seen aeroplanes, airports, buses and metros bombed, and hostages taken in theatres and schools. The Sinai victims were touchingly mourned, but society has quickly moved on, giving the government space to calibrate its response.

Mr Putin is due to deliver his yearly address at the beginning of December. With the aid of television, the crash can be used to fuel further "patriotic mobilisation", Ms Lipman says. If Russia acknowledges terrorism as the cause, winding down its military operation in Syria might be more difficult; Mr Putin cannot allow such an attack to go unpunished. But, as the West has learned the hard way, the urge for military payback in the Middle East can have unexpectedly painful consequences.

 [return to Contents] 

 #20
www.rt.com
November 13, 2015
'Are you really journalists?' Moscow slams Reuters for biased bombshell on Syria

Moscow has condemned Reuters for its "exclusive" report which ignored a detailed statement from the Russian Foreign Ministry, in favor of the narrative predetermined by a "draft document" coming from an unnamed source and comments by anonymous officials.

In its "exclusive" story published on November 10, Reuters claimed it had obtained a "draft" of Russia's plan for a "constitutional reform process of up to 18 months," prepared for the multilateral talks on Syria this week.

The Reuters News Agency requested a comment from the Foreign Ministry, which it was given, but then decided to ignore it in their report.

"The [news] agency indeed contacted us prior to writing this information," Maria Zakharova, spokesperson for the Russian Foreign Ministry told reporters on Thursday. "[Reuters'] Moscow correspondents have received extensive comments that this information does not correspond to reality."

The Foreign Ministry confirmed to Reuters that Moscow is in contact and in consultation with its partners, but emphasized that there was "certainly" no such document in the works.

"After an hour-and-a half, the report, which widely spread throughout the world's media, was published without a relevant comment from Russian Foreign Ministry," Zakharova said, pointing out that at the same time, Reuters did not hesitate to quote some of its "unnamed sources."

"Thus the central media with a long history has opted for the publication of perspective from unnamed sources, while they had been given an official comment by Russian Foreign Ministry," Zakharova said.

The Ministry had to press the news agency to include Russia's official statement in the report, which was eventually added in the third update of the article sent out to subscribers, almost four hours after the initial version was published.

"As you may understand, no one cared, because the 'international sensation' [had] already spread," she said.

When asked how it could have happened that the statement provided by Russia on Reuters' own request was ignored, the news agency's representatives in Moscow pointed the finger at their colleagues in London.

"I have a legitimate question to the Reuters news agency, which is represented in Moscow by some 50 correspondents: Are you really journalists?" Zakharova wondered. "If you are not working and [don't cover] Moscow's comments, if everything is being written for you in London, what are you even doing in Moscow in such numbers?"

The Ministry's spokeswoman pointed out that the controversial report coincided with Washington's initiative to organizing three "working groups" on Syria in Vienna on November 12-13. Russia was informed of this "improvisation" via an email from the US embassy, which came as a surprise as the initiative was never discussed with Moscow.

"We are considering US actions on forming working groups as an unsuccessful experiment," Zakharova told reporters, stressing that Russia is in favor of "collective work" in Vienna without separating the participants into "those who are leading and those who are being led."

"We have collectively outlined a plan in Vienna, which was agreed with all participants. We should adhere to agreements [we] reached," she said, referring to the previous meeting in Vienna on October 30, which laid the basis for a coordinated work without "improvisations, rushing forward and undue haste, which only harm the cause."

 [return to Contents] 

 #21
Russia Direct
www.russa-direct.org
November 12, 2015
Will the BRICS be part of the new wave of globalization?
Russia Direct organized a round table on the future of the BRICS, bringing diplomats, investors, experts and academics together at the Russian Embassy in Washington to discuss the new challenges facing the world's developing economies.
Pavel Koshkin and Ksenia Zubacheva

One of the most relevant questions for developing economies around the world is to find an alternative to Western financial and economic institutions, which are not always responsive to their interests and developmental needs, especially during times of crisis. Can global groups like the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) contribute to addressing current and future economic challenges?

This was one of the problems discussed at the Russia Direct event "BRICS 2.0 and the Metamorphosis of Globalization," which took place on Nov. 12 in the Russian Embassy in Washington, D.C. The event brought together high-profile diplomats, officials and investors such as Russian Ambassador to the U.S. Sergey Kislyak, who described the BRICS as "a phenomenon on the international economic scene" that aims at promoting "cooperation between our countries" and "the stability of these countries in the future."

During the event, the participants of the discussion discussed the current and future agenda of the BRICS, as well as their relationship with the West and, particularly, with the United States.

Even though the BRICS attracted a great deal of global attention and brought about much excitement in 2010, now it is not the case. There is more indifference from the West toward this group of countries, Marcos Troyjo, professor at Columbia University and co-founder and co-director of BRICLab, said during the discussion.

"Today, in the West and, particularly, in the United States, [the concept of] BRICS is from Mars," said Troyjo.

The West's disappointment in the BRICS probably comes from the overhyped excitement about this group five years ago, when Brazil, Russia, India and China "adapted very well to the period of deep globalization" after the end of the Cold War and, in fact, were good "inhabitants of that ecosystem."

However, the dramatic global changes after the 2008-2009 crisis resulted in more restrictions and trade protectionism. "The ecosystem of deep globalization has been replaced by a more restricted atmosphere," said Troyjo, who describes this as "the period of de-globalization."

Given the domestic problems facing countries such as Russia and China, for the BRICS to be successful economically, they will have to adapt to a new geopolitical environment, which Troyjo describes as "an era of re-globalization." According to him, the BRICS countries will have to adjust to a new framework of global affairs, the new geopolitics.

To what extent this new re-globalization will be effective depends on the BRICS' ability to find common ground and adopt new trade frameworks, shaped by the new geometries of the U.S.-initiated Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Adapting to the age of talent, with its emphasis on creativity, innovation and intellectual capital, is also important for the BRICS to succeed, according to Troyjo.  

During the discussion, Cynthia Roberts, associate professor at City University of New York and adjunct associate professor at Columbia University, made the point that the BRICS are "suffering" from the protectionism of many developing countries and their fellow countries as well.

Roberts argues that the U.S. is dismissive toward the BRICS because of its concern about the rise of China and other emerging countries. However, the world's financial institutions should adjust to the new reality despite all the difficulties and challenges that the multipolar world, with its numerous multilateral institutions, presents.

Meanwhile, Aleksei Mozhin, executive director for Russia at the International Monetary Fund (IMF), believes that the bonds between the BRICS countries are so strong, they have nothing to do, but to cooperate in the current situation, regardless of the fact many in the U.S. (including journalists) tend to present the BRICS in a very pessimistic light.

"It's not the matter of whether we like each other or not - we simply have no choice but to cooperate with one another," he said, adding that the 2008 global financial crisis severely undermined credibility and trust in the wisdom of international financial institutions and the economics profession in general, in the capability of rich countries to tackle the crisis.

The emergence of the BRICS in 2009 was in part a response to the world's economic and financial challenges, according to Mozhin. Likewise, Roberts agrees that the global financial crisis and the U.S. played a role in spurring the growth of the BRICS. According to her, the emerging economies did not receive adequate representation in the voting power of the world's main financial institutions.

Meanwhile, echoing Troyjo's idea of re-globalization, David Dollar, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, believes that the BRICS might bring about a new wave of globalization and more trade, but they have to tackle one challenge: their economic differences and misbalances, which might create tension within the BRICS.

These countries are "different from each other" on many ways. One of the major misbalances in the BRICS is the size of China's economy, he said during the round table. The rest of the BRICS participants, including "the fast-growing India," are much smaller economically. This is important to keep in mind, given China's initiatives to integrate trade and investment in Eurasia: the Silk Economic Road and the One Belt - One Road project.

Given the fact that Chinese economic influence is disproportionate as a result of its intensive growth strategy, this does create some tensions inside the group, Dollar warns. However, with the economic slowdown, recent turbulence in China's financial markets and consequent drop in import demand, China's growth appetite is diminishing.  

Drew Guff, managing director at Siguler & Guff, a multi-strategy private equity investment firm that invested in the BRICS markets, looks at the BRICS economic challenges in the context of the changes in the energy market.

With China's economic slowdown, the drop in oil prices has affected the BRICS and brought about more challenges. For example, China has decreased demand for imports and energy, which weakens China's positions and contributes to resolving the problem of imbalances among the BRICS members.  

In addition, Guff points out the advantages of the BRICS market, which he describes as "incredibly concentrated." It is less expensive to invest in the BRICS market, he said, making it attractive to some Western investors.

 [return to Contents] 

 #22
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
July 10, 2015
The BRICS may be non-Western but they are not anti-Western
RD Interview: In the aftermath of the 2015 BRICS summit in Ufa, Fyodor Lukyanov, head of Russia's Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, discusses how the BRICS are evolving in response to changing geopolitical conditions.
Pavel Koshkin

The recent BRICS Summit, which took place in Ufa, Russia on July 8-9, attracted significant commentary in both the Russian and Western media about the expanding role that Russia and other BRICS nations - Brazil, India, China, and South Africa - hope to play in the world.

While it would be overstating matters to say that the BRICS are creating an alternative geopolitical architecture for the world - recent steps such as the launch of the New Development Bank and a reserve currency pool suggest that the BRICS are taking steps to assert greater control over future geopolitical developments.

With that in mind, Russia Direct interviewed Fyodor Lukyanov, an influential Russian foreign policy analyst and the head of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, for his take on the potential role that the BRICS might play in the world. As Lukyanov explains, the BRICS are fundamentally non-Western, but that does not imply that they are anti-Western.

Russia Direct: What are the most important results of the 2015 BRICS Summit and what are their implications, especially for the West?

Fyodor Lukyanov: There is so far no reason to speak about the implications from the summit: There will be no direct implications. The BRICS is a process - not even an organization, but rather a sort of union that is emerging, along with its gradual development.

Every year the summit brings together BRICS leaders who confirm their intentions and commitments to work together and add something new to the agenda, but it is not necessarily a specific decision.

Yet, there was indeed a big shift in the BRICS during one of the previous summits one year ago, when the leaders decided to create the Development Bank and currency reserve pool. And this became a big step forward, because for the first time BRICS moved in the direction of creating alternative international institutions. But the BRICS won't make such moves every year, because it is a very gradual process. That's why there will be only attempts to understand this situation in the near future.

Regarding the importance of the results and meetings, I would say that the influence of the BRICS is another sign of the gradual weakening of the West's influence in the world. Particularly, such unhealthy attention that the BRICS attracts from the West indicates that the West is aware of its own weaknesses and is concerned that there will be alternative institutions.

But they are emerging much slower than they could be. Nevertheless, the Western countries properly understand this trend. And they are not satisfied with this trend.

RD: While the BRICS as a complex, self-developing bloc is gradually adjusting to the current geopolitical situation, do current conditions really favor its further development?

F.L.: Despite obvious differences between countries, the current state of affairs favors the BRICS, but it doesn't necessarily mean that a new [geopolitical] architecture is emerging before our eyes. Again, this process is very slow and depends on different circumstances.

RD: You said that the West is becoming aware of its weakening influence in the world, but it doesn't actually see the BRICS as a serious threat and doesn't exaggerate the importance of the BRICS, as Russia does.

F.L.: So far, nobody is seriously defying the West. The country participants of the BRICS - except Russia, which is more impatient because of certain reasons - don't want to produce an impression that they are coming together against the West, but again the problem is not whether they challenge the West now, but it rather stems from the fact that there is a gradual process of the West losing its monopoly in the world and it is accompanied by the same gradual process of emerging the counties which can theoretically fulfill the functions of [alternative institutions].

RD: How do you assess the possibility of other countries such Pakistan or Iran joining the BRICS?

F.L.: It is hardly likely because, first of all, the BRICS is not an organization in which it is possible to join and get a formal membership. It is a sort of club that mostly resembles the G7, a club that brings together countries that have common interests.

The BRICS is a collective "non-West," not the "anti-West," but non-Western nonetheless. Although officially there are no specific criteria, in fact, there is one criterion. It means that these countries have full sovereignty, which includes two components: The first one is the capability to conduct independent policy, I mean, non-involvement in any alliances, which impose certain restrictions; on the other hand, it is a sufficient economic potential in order to implement independent policy.

If we look at the situation from these two standpoints, there are few countries in the world that meet these relative criteria to join the BRICS countries. The rest of the countries either don't have full sovereignty or if they have - like European countries - their sovereignty is restricted to a point by certain circumstances. So, it is very difficult to find a good candidate [to join the BRICS].

RD: What are the chances of the BRICS reforming the international financial system, from your point of view?

F.L.: If alternative institutions started emerging, I think they would develop further and increase their financial influence and presence. But it is not a matter of replacing current institutions (the World Bank or International Monetary Fund), it is the matter of an alternative and the creation of additional opportunities.

RD: The Kremlin hopes that the BRICS will be able to replace the West to boost its weakening economy, which is isolated from Europe, the United States and some other countries. Some even talk about the so-called technological alliance of the BRICS. Do you believe in it?

F.L.: Well, the idea of a technological alliance of the BRICS requires a very serious and large-scale work. As a motto, it works well, but in practice, it does not. Even though if it could be possible to implement in some fields, again, it will require very painstaking work, for example, the search for common markets that could bring together joint intellectual and technological efforts.

And it won't be easy because, unlike Russia, which is restricted from the West's technologies, the rest of the BRICS participants are not and they have a bigger space to maneuver, I mean, Russia will have to persuade them that it [the technological alliance] is really necessary for them.

RD: Who can be the leader in the BRICS, given the fact it brings together several big regional powers that might compete in Eurasia for geostrategic influence?

F.L.: The BRICS cannot have any leaders by definition. If a leader appears there, there will be no such organization. Each BRICS participant doesn't find it acceptable to obey somebody else. So, there should be a kind of system where everybody has an opportunity for a free self-fulfillment, not regulated by somebody else.

RD: What about difference within the BRICS and different interests of its participants that might contradict each other? After all, the recent visit of the Brazilian president to the U.S. or the Chinese prime minister's trip to Europe was interpreted by some as a weakness of the BRICS, showing that there is no ideal unity and both Brazil and China will prefer collaboration with the West.  

F.L.: Again, nobody [from the BRICS countries] says that they will reject collaboration with the West. It is counter-productive to put the question in this way. And Russia, likewise, won't do it despite the current situation. And we don't say that we boycott the West, and none of the BRICS will reject the West as well, because they have very close ties with it.    

RD: But can't these close ties between some BRICS countries and the West lead to a split in the union, if, for example, there will be pressure from the West and, again, different interests, priorities?

F.L.: The Western countries naturally will exert pressure, because every BRICS participant is a big regional power that has a very important position, which the West takes into account. And it is normal for international relations.

Yes, it might weaken unity in the BRICS - or it might not. Actually, it is a matter of the capability to establish good relations. But, again, we should base this on the fact that these countries are located not in a vacuum, but in the real world. And if somebody in Russia sees the BRICS as a sort of anti-Western alliance, where Russia will be a leading power, it won't happen. Nobody needs such a BRICS.  
       
RD: Some economists express warnings that the BRICS won't work and describe it as "a false hope" because of structural flaws in the economy, the asymmetry in living standards, growth, development and, most importantly, uneven distribution of the population. In this regard, what are the major challenges for the BRICS?

F.L.: The biggest challenge for every BRICS country is its own development, so everybody will care about acquiring new opportunities and if it is able to give these opportunities, it will develop quite well.

 [return to Contents] 

 #23
Interfax
November 13, 2015
Most of investments into Russia in past year come from Asian market - Putin

Around 90 percent of the investments made into Russia in the past year are the resources of the Asian market, Russian President Vladimir Putin said in an interview with the Interfax and Anadolu news agencies on Friday ahead of the G20 summit in Antalya.

"Obviously, cooperation with Asian partners in attracting funds gains special relevance in the current situation. In 2015, approximately 90 percent of investments in the Russian market came from Asia," Putin said.

"Several large Russian enterprises are financed by China and we analyse the prospects of public borrowings from China," said the head of state.

 [return to Contents] 

 #24
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
November 13, 2015
Russia to focus on economics, security at EAS summit in Kuala Lumpur
Russia's will look for promote the Russian Far East as an investment destination at the upcoming East Asia Summit in Malaysia.
ALEXEY TIMOFEYCHEV

Economic and investment cooperation will be high on Russia's agenda at the 10th annual edition of the East Asia Summit (EAS), which will take place in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on November 21-22. Moscow is also expected to pay attention to security issues in the Asia-Pacific.

Today, the EAS is one of the most representative forums in the Asia-Pacific region, bringing together 18 countries, including Russia, the US, China, India and Japan. The summit was established in 2005 as a platform for the ASEAN leaders to discuss strategic issues of trade, energy and security.

Russia joined the EAS in 2011, together with the United States.

Moscow sees the Asia-Pacific as the region of the future, at least in economic terms.

As a part of the EAEU (Eurasian Economic Union), Russia is trying to conclude agreements on a free trade zone with individual countries in the region. Earlier this year, the EAEU signed a free trade agreement with Vietnam.

At the EAS summit in 2014, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev said that plans were on to sign free trade agreements with other Asian countries.

However, analysts say Russia's strategy in the region is neither about joining the existing integration projects nor launching its own projects. The focus is on the development of the Russian Far East. "Moscow wants to integrate into the Asia-Pacific region through its Far Eastern regions," said Lukin.

The authorities are working vigorously in this direction. Earlier this year, the Vladivostok free port zone was established and laws were adopted to establish territories of accelerated development (TAD) in the Russian Far East to attract investment from Asia.

Russia's proposals on security in the Asia-Pacific
Apart from the economy, the EAS will also discuss security issues. At a meeting in 2014, Medvedev said he hoped that the 2015 EAS summit would adopt a security plan for the Asia-Pacific region. This concept, which is being promoted by Russia and China, was prepared about five years ago.

The security concept essentially calls for the respect of the territorial sovereignty of all Asia-Pacific countries and for a team approach to solving disputes.

Analysts say the proposal has little chance of being implemented. It is widely believed that the plan lacks arrangements similar to the Helsinki Agreement, which was finalized in 1975 to guarantee the inviolability of the European borders existing at that time.

Leonid Gusev, a researcher of the Center for East Asian and SCO Studies at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, says it is impossible to implement such a plan because of the serious conflicts between countries in the region. Major problems in the area include territorial disputes in the South China Sea, the status of Taiwan, and tensions in the Korean peninsula.

 [return to Contents] 

 #25
Washington Post
November 12, 2015
6 reasons not to worry about Russia invading the Baltics
By Robert Person
Robert Person is an assistant professor of international relations and comparative politics at the United States Military at West Point. He specializes in the foreign and domestic politics of Russia and the post-Soviet states.

At the beginning of November, Politico reported that U.S. military planners are worried that the Baltics might be the next targets of Russian military aggression, be it a replay of Russia's hybrid warfare in Ukraine or a conventional lighting strike that could be executed before NATO could react.

Fear of these "nightmare scenarios" is nothing new. The ink had barely dried on Vladimir Putin's signature annexing Crimea on March 18, 2014, when people on both sides of the Atlantic began sounding the alarm. Just as Putin had invaded Crimea (and later eastern Ukraine) to "protect" ethnic Russians, they said, so too would he soon target the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

Since then, the warning has been repeated in recent months by the news media, by Baltic government officials, by E.U. officials and by U.S. and NATO military officials.

Here's why observers are worried that Russia will roll into the Baltics.

The fear of Russian military intervention in the Baltics is based on two tempting but flawed analogies with the conflict in Ukraine.

First, like Ukraine, the Baltics have large ethnic Russian minorities. Latvia's population is approximately 26 percent Russian, while the corresponding figures for Estonia and Lithuania are 24 percent and 6 percent, respectively. Furthermore, these Russian populations have a long history of grievances over language, citizenship and cultural policies that excluded them from political and economic life after the Baltics gained independence in 1991.

Second, just as the annexation of Crimea secured Russia's access to its Black Sea Fleet headquarters in the Crimean city of Sevastopol, so too might Putin want access to Russia's exclave in Kaliningrad.  The province is part of Russia but is separated from the Russian "mainland" by Latvia, Lithuania and Belarus.  More importantly, Kaliningrad is the headquarters of Russia's Baltic Fleet.  Many fear that Putin might try to cut through Poland or Lithuania with the support of his Belarusian ally, Alexander Lukashenko, and seize a transit route to Kaliningrad.

But don't worry. Here's why.

So could the Baltics be next? I don't think so, for six reasons.

1. Vladimir Putin can't keep the Baltics out of NATO or the E.U.

International relations scholar John Mearsheimer has made a provocative argument that Russia's invasion of Ukraine was provoked by NATO expansion in the 1990s and 2000s. Whether or not you agree, the Baltics made it into the club before Russia had the capacity to stop them. Some experts have argued that one of the main reasons Russia provoked conflict in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine in 2014 was to effectively veto NATO membership for those countries - because NATO would be unlikely to let in new members with open territorial disputes.

Invading your neighbors may be a good strategy for keeping them out of NATO or the E.U., but it's not so useful once they're already members, since it would guarantee a catastrophic war between Russia and NATO.

2. Russia will never have a seat at the table in Baltic politics

In my previous post on the Monkey Cage, I argued that Putin's key strategic objective in Ukraine was to install a government in Kiev that would give Moscow a say in making Ukrainian foreign and domestic policy.

But that couldn't happen in the Baltics. Ever. The historical antagonism is too strong. My previous research on national identity in the Baltics shows that the Soviet occupation of the Baltics during WWII remains central to national memory and identity. Russia is seen as the imperial "other" against which the Baltics define themselves, and would never be allowed to interfere in domestic politics.

What's more, Putin has so far failed to achieve his strategic objective of installing a pliant pro-Russian government in Kiev. Even if he imagined it possible, there's little reason to believe he would be any more successful in the Baltics.

3. The Baltics don't have the same symbolic meaning as Ukraine and Crimea

Ukraine has deep symbolic meaning for Russia. Citizens of both countries consider the ancient empire of Kievan Rus (and its capital, Kiev) to be the cradle of eastern Slavic civilization. Kiev's Prince Vladimir the Great brought Orthodox Christianity to his subjects in 988, during a golden age of Slavic civilization that was the foundation for later achievements by Muscovy and the Russian empire. In fact, they just installed the cornerstone for a massive new monument to Prince Vladimir near the Kremlin in Moscow.  Parts of modern-day Ukraine had been part of the Russian empire since the 16th century; Crimea became part of Russia in 1783.

This deep historical connection of civilizations has long made Ukrainian independence hard for Russia to swallow.

Putin once famously remarked to George Bush: "You have to understand, George. Ukraine is not even a country." And for most of Russia's history, he's right: Ukraine only became a country in 1991 after centuries as the borderland of the Russian and Soviet empires.

That Ukraine took Crimea with it only made things worse, as the peninsula was only "gifted" to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic by Nikita Khrushchev in 1954, a transfer that many Russians saw as illegitimate both before and after the Soviet collapse.

Ukraine is special for Russia. The Baltics are a different story. My research has traced the territorial evolution of Russia in the Baltic region. While the Baltics became part of the Russian empire through the partitions of Poland in the 18th century, the Tsars were sufficiently "hands off" to allow strong national identities to flourish that opposed Russian domination.

What's more, the Baltics were independent between the world wars. When the Soviet Union forcibly annexed them again in 1940, Baltic citizens saw it as an illegitimate foreign occupation - and continued to resist for the next 51 years. Even as Gorbachev struggled in the dying days of the USSR to hold together some kind of union, he knew that it would not include the Baltic Republics, and left them out of his proposed treaty salvaging what was left of the Soviet Union.

Russia and Russians have long recognized that the Baltics are culturally and historically distinct from Russia, according to surveys and interviews I've conducted across Russia and Latvia. Whether the historical and cultural importance of Ukraine was a motivation or just a justification for Putin's actions in Ukraine, comparable symbolism is absent in the Baltics, making them less likely targets for Russian interference.

4. Russian access to Kaliningrad is not threatened. For now.

Throughout its post-Soviet history, Ukrainian leaders used the Russian naval base in Sevastopol, Crimea, as a bargaining chip with Russia. After the Orange Revolution of 2004-5, pro-Western President Viktor Yushchenko announced that Ukraine would not renew Russia's lease of the base after 2017. Though his successor, the ill-fated Viktor Yanukovych, reversed that decision, many have argued that permanently securing access to the base was a key strategic objective of Russia's invasion of Crimea. Annexing the peninsula solved the strategic problem of where to locate the Black Sea Fleet once and for all.

By contrast, no Baltic or Western government has ever made serious attempts to block Russian access to the exclave of Kaliningrad, though Lithuanian officials have recognized their theoretical ability to do so. But actually following through on the threat to cut railways, roadways and utilities to Kaliningrad would almost certainly provoke a Russian military response and guarantee a dangerous escalation with potentially nuclear implications. So no country even tries.

Yes, Kaliningrad could conceivably emerge as a flashpoint, especially if Russia uses it for an aggressive anti-access/area denial strategy. Russian missiles based in Kaliningrad could keep NATO naval and ground forces from reaching the Baltics in the event of a Russian attack, isolating the three countries from the rest of the alliance at a critical moment. But as long as Lithuania allows Russians access to the region, war over Kaliningrad is unlikely.

5. Baltic Russians are not Crimean, Donbas or Russian Russians

Much of the talk of a Russian invasion of the Baltics has centered around the ethnic Russians living there. As one reporter in Riga put it, "If Putin felt justified in his actions against Ukraine, where 17 percent of the population is ethnic Russian and 24 percent Russian-speaking, Latvia's allegedly endangered minority would seem to provide him with a convenient pretext for action."

One social activist in Latvia warned about what many observers fear: "Military aggression in the old style - tanks crossing the border - is not likely here. ... But what they call a hybrid offensive - provocations, a media war - that is very possible and hard to defend against."

Hybrid warfare combines conventional and unconventional modes of warfare, bringing the battle to new battlegrounds. As retired Col. John McCuen writes, "the decisive battles in today's hybrid wars are fought not on conventional battlegrounds, but on asymmetric battlegrounds within the conflict zone population, the home front population and the international community population."

Thus, many have speculated that the Russian minorities of the Baltics could offer Russia a sympathetic target population to use as its launching pad for a hybrid invasion, just as it used the native separatist movements in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine as cover for hybrid warfare.

I don't think that's likely. I recently wrote in the Moscow Times that the Baltic Russians are not particularly amenable to Russian hybrid warfare. Though they have many lingering grievances over language, cultural and citizenship policies, these grievances have not translated into separatism.

More and more ethnic Russians have gained citizenship in the Baltic States and increasingly seem to hold the view of Nils Usakovs, the ethnically Russian mayor of Latvia's capital city, Riga: "I was born here. ... I'm a Latvian national; a Russian-speaking Latvian who is a patriot of my country." This attitude is especially prevalent among the younger generation of Baltic Russians, who increasingly see themselves as European and enjoy the benefits of living in the European Union.

Even the older generations who still feel a stronger connection to Russia can see the contrast in living standards between Russia and the Baltics.  Katri Raik is the director of Narva College in Estonia, which caters to Estonia's Russian population, and compares Narva with the Russian city Ivangorod that sits just across the river:

What would happen if Narva were to hold a referendum? Would its residents want to live in Estonia or in Putin's Russia? Anyone with any common sense ... would want to live in Estonia. Because life here is better, more stable, the pensions are higher, we have social welfare. People in Narva know what they would choose because they often travel to Ivangorod.

Research by Ammon Cheskin confirms this point. While Baltic Russians maintain a close cultural affinity with Russia, Russia's political and economic attraction is much lower.

In an effort to leverage that cultural affinity, Moscow has used a variety of strategies, including support for pro-Russian parties in the Baltics, aggressive propaganda in the Russian media that most Baltic Russians watch, and mass mobilization strategies to try to instigate separatism. These efforts haven't persuaded Baltic Russians yet. Nevertheless, Estonia recently launched a Russian-language TV station to better integrate its Russian population and to counter Moscow's influence.

6. A Russian hybrid attack wouldn't stay secret for long

By definition, hybrid warfare combines conventional and unconventional means. Even if Vladimir Putin chose to ignore the five reasons above that he shouldn't launch a hybrid war in the Baltics, a hybrid strategy would require the eventual use of conventional Russian forces.

Sooner or later, the world would have clear evidence that "little green men" in unmarked uniforms could be traced back to the Russian armed forces - direct military aggression against a NATO ally. Though it took a while to find conclusive proof of Russian troops in Ukraine, the proof eventually came.

Given that there are some U.S. and NATO forces stationed in the Baltics, Russian military intervention would probably be detected much more quickly.

NATO would face a choice: fulfill the purpose for which it was founded, or accept a fait accompli and cease to be relevant in the 21st century. The United States and Europe still hail NATO as a "cornerstone of global security." So there is good reason to believe that the alliance would put up a fight.

A fight with NATO is one that Vladimir Putin cannot afford. If he is the skilled strategist that many, including Stephen Walt, have said he is, he will understand the incredible cost of provoking a war with NATO.

Waiting to exhale

These six reasons tell us why Russia is unlikely to make the Baltics the next target of military aggression. But unlikely is not the same as impossible. History has offered up bigger surprises before.

Russian aggression in the Baltics would no doubt be a strategic disaster for Moscow in the long run. In the short to medium run, though, Moscow will surely continue to cause trouble for the Baltics and their NATO allies, using propaganda and provocative military exercises to keep everyone off balance. But these measures, however troubling, should not be confused with the opening phase of a Russian invasion.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, DOD or the U.S. government.

 [return to Contents] 

 #26
Meduza
https://meduza.io
November 12, 2015
'Putin's tactics may be brilliant' 'Meduza' interviews Celeste Wallander, one of Barack Obama's top advisors on Russia

Since the beginning of Russia's latest military intervention in the Middle East, Syria has become the new focal point of US-Russian relations. The West accuses Moscow of using the battle against ISIL as a pretext to aide Bashar al-Assad's regime, while Russian officials insist that the airstrikes are focused on eliminating terrorists now threatening to overthrow the country. Meduza's own Konstantin Benyumov recently met with Celeste Wallander, the US National Security Council's senior director for Russia and Eurasia, to discuss the goals and effectiveness of Russia's actions in Syria, as well as the general state of affairs between the Kremlin and the White House.

Celeste Wallander is an American expert in international relations with a focus on Russia. She is currently Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Russia and Eurasia on the National Security Council. From May 2009 until July 2012, she served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia/Ukraine/Eurasia in the US Defense Department. Wallander was also an adviser to Barack Obama during the 2008 Democratic primary campaign.

Q: Let's start with an article that recently appeared in Politico, which said oddly enough that there is a rift within the Obama Administration because of Russia's actions in Syria, claiming that some people within the Administration want a bolder response from the White House to whatever Russia is doing, and the text actually names you as one of the people who would prefer a bolder response.

Whenever there's an issue of the United States' response to any kind of international event or policy challenge, there's always a range of views. We're a democracy, there are different agencies of the US government, we have different ranges of expertise and experience, and so there are always different views. And it's through debate and the diversity of views that we end up-I think-in the end with the most well-grounded, best thought-through, and strongest policy.

We're not like other countries, where one person from the top simply decides and therefore can blunder into strategic mistakes. We do make mistakes at times, but I think that diversity of views and that give-and-take actually ends up crafting a better policy. So, yes, there are different views among different officials in the US government about exactly how to deal with the challenge of Russia's intervention in Syria-just as there was a variety of views on Russia's intervention in Ukraine.

I'm not going to talk in public about my advice. That is an internal, private debate. But I certainly expressed my best advice to my bosses, because that's my job. That is my responsibility. And I wouldn't be contributing to a strong US foreign policy, if I didn't. And I really respect and admire our process and the fact that everyone has strong views and brings them to the table.

Q: So whatever frustrations you may or may not be having, we're not going to hear about them right now.

This is an ongoing crisis, and we're in it for the long run-just like with Ukraine. This is something where, when you agree to serve in the US government, you have to be willing to be part of a team. And that means, on any given day, your advice might not be perfectly followed, but your responsibility and your commitment is to be part of the team and to make the end result better. And so, if on a given day my specific advice isn't followed, that doesn't lessen my responsibility to get up and work the next day, as well.

Q: There have been reports that "Putin's campaign in Syria has broken any momentum Obama had after sealing the nuclear deal with Iran." Do you think that foreign policy is a fight and a struggle for global influence, and do you worry that Russia is winning somehow, or the US is losing?

I don't think foreign policy is first and foremost a struggle for influence. Influence is based on the foundations of power, on which the United States is very solid. Our economy is strong; the Obama Administration has gotten the fundamentals of the American economy back on track after the horrible crisis of 2008-2009. Power is also a function of the obvious elements of power: military power and hard power. But it is also very much, President Obama believes and the Administration believes, part of our ability to work in partnership with like-minded countries, whether those are allies or partners on different issues.

And on all those counts, US foreign policy is stronger under President Obama than it has been for a long time. So we're not feeling on our back heels, and we certainly do not define American power in terms of Russian power. We do not see US-Russian relations in zero sum terms. Now, it's a challenge when Russia casts our relationship in zero sum terms, but you don't adopt the views and the interests and the strategic objectives of the other side. That's how you get off track.

So we don't at all see American influence in light of what kind of influence Russia may be pursuing under President Putin. Now, that isn't to say that how President Putin has chosen to execute Russian foreign policy hasn't created enormous challenges for the United States. It has. Especially in Ukraine, because of the challenge to the European security order. But that's different than saying that we compare our influence to Russia's. That's just the wrong frame for understanding how we make decisions.

Q: It's said that the developments in Syria caught the US Administration completely off guard. There's also a perception that Russia's desire to reinstate its status as a global power is nothing new. Are recent developments just a continuation of something Russia has been doing for the past 25 years?

What Russia has chosen to begin and execute in Syria did not take us completely by surprise. Uninformed commentators often claim that the United States was taken by surprise. That analysis is wrong. Sometimes you just have to listen very carefully to what President Putin says. He pretty clearly laid out what he was going to do in Syria. He gave a speech in Dushanbe [Tajikistan], and laid it out quite clearly that Russia saw-that he saw-the need for Russia to intervene to save the Assad regime. And that's how he frames the Syria crisis, in terms of saving the Assad regime: stability and preventing color revolution, and preventing regime change. You just need to pay attention sometimes to what he says.

Q: Does that mean Russia's official line that it's actually fighting ISIL has no grounds at all?

I think that the Russian leadership and the Russian public is genuinely and rightfully concerned about ISIL. We actually do share that concern and we do share interests in ISIL being defeated and for ISIL not to be able to operate and to threaten people in the Middle East and even to spread their ability to work elsewhere. I do think there is evidence that Russian military forces in Syria have occasionally struck targets that belong to ISIL. But the vast bulk of the targets that Russian forces have struck and the vast weight of Russian military operations are not in areas where ISIL is operating or is in control.

Q: Do you see this getting out of hand and becoming a proxy war between Russia fighting through Assad forces and the United States fighting through the so-called "moderate opposition"?

No, because President Obama made it clear that he rejects the frame of a proxy war. This comes back to my point about not letting someone else define your strategic objectives. That's how you make mistakes. Our strategic objective in Syria is, first, to defeat ISIL, and, second, to help to facilitate a peaceful resolution to the civil war. And with those strategic objectives, somehow turning this into a proxy war with Russia would be absolutely counterproductive.

Q: Do you think it makes sense to join efforts against ISIL?

As Secretary Kerry has made clear, and as President Obama has also made clear when he has spoken to this issue, the United States would welcome a sincere willingness and effort on the part of the Russian government to join in the counter-ISIL coalition and to coordinate with us, to actually strike ISIL targets.

Q: But, so far, you're not seeing that sincerity?

So far, we're not seeing that.

Q: In terms of strategy, there are two widespread views. One is that Vladimir Putin is a cold-hearted strategist who plays a game of chess and is winning. The other view is that he's merely reacting to challenges as they emerge. As someone who's been watching Russia's foreign policy for nearly three decades, which point of view do you support?

I think President Putin has objectives in his foreign policy overall and in specific instances. So those who say he has no strategy misunderstand him, I think. Where I believe you see Russian foreign policy failing repeatedly is that, to have a good strategy, you have to understand your strategic environment. So you can't just know what you want to achieve; you have to have good information about how to achieve it. And in both Ukraine and in Syria, I think what you see is a Russian leadership that is failing to fully understand the strategic environment in which its operating. And therefore it fails to make good choices on its policy. So the tactics may be brilliant, except the tactics aren't getting them to their strategic objectives because they're not understanding.

Let me give you an example of what I mean: the Russian leadership really seemed to have believed that, by fomenting uprisings and building-takings and the narrative of Novorossiya in the Donbass, that it would be just like Crimea. But they didn't understand that the conditions in Donetsk and Lugansk were not the same. And they also didn't understand that, while the Ukraine military wasn't in the position to be able to defend Crimea (just because of the nature of the terrain, the fact that it's a peninsula, the fact that the Russians have the Black Sea Fleet, and [the Russians] have the advantage of surprise), that the military situation in Donetsk and Lugansk was going to be entirely different. The Russians didn't have the advantage of surprise, they did not have the same level of support in the population, and the military objectives were entirely different than the easy task of taking hold of a peninsula. And it was in that misunderstanding that the Russian leadership made a serious strategic error.

Q: And so you believe that something similar might happen in Syria?

I do think that something similar is happening. I think there is evidence that the Russian military operations are not going as well as expected. That there is stiffer resistance. The Russians may have overestimated the capabilities of their allies on the ground, and thought that all it would take would be a little bit of air power to be able to support ground operations on the part of their local allies. Once again, it looks like they've made an error and they're going to come to regret it.

Q: It sounds like something the the United States learned the hard way, and the Russians didn't pick up on the lesson?

I think it's partly that we've learned-certainly the United States has learned through various defense and security operations-how to understand local terrain and local political conditions (who your partners are, who your allies are). But I also think it's more fundamental. I think that it's the advantage of being a democracy over being an authoritarian system. In the United States, we're constantly getting feedback on our choices, and we're constantly getting information that helps. Sometimes it's a little bit frustrating, but actually it's really useful. We do not want to stop the information critiques about what our policies are, because they let us learn from mistakes and learn from past experience.

In the Russian system, if you stifle dissent, if you make it difficult to bring bad news to the boss, you're going to make strategic errors again and again and again.

So it's not just that we've learned in the United States from past experience; it's also that our system, for all its weaknesses and frustrations, is actually fundamentally stronger. We have that ability to get the kind of information you need to make good choices.

Konstantin Benyumov.

 [return to Contents] 

 #27
National Public Radio
November 11, 2015
Intelligence Community Rethinks Strategy After Russian Military Moves
By JACKIE NORTHAM

RENEE MONTAGNE, HOST: And in both Syria and Ukraine, Russia has surprised the U.S. and other Western nations with the speed and scale of its military operations. As NPR's Jackie Northam reports, that is raising concerns about lapses in intelligence gathering.

JACKIE NORTHAM: In late August, Russia began sending aircraft and troops into Syria, claiming it was helping fight the self-proclaimed Islamic State. In just a few weeks, the Russians ramped up operations and were carrying out hundreds of airstrikes. The rapid military buildup caught many off-guard, much as Russia's takeover of Ukraine's Crimea region did last year. Gen. Philip Breedlove, NATO's supreme commander, says there is a dearth of good intelligence on Russia.

PHILIP BREEDLOVE: I've identified that we have a lack of ability to see into Russia, especially at the operational and tactical level.

NORTHAM: During the Cold War, the U.S. devoted vast intelligence resources to Russia. Michael McFaul, a professor at Stanford University and a U.S. ambassador to Russia from 2012 to 2014, says, nowadays, those resources are geared towards China, the Middle East and counterterrorism.

MICHAEL MCFAUL: And that's a function of things that happened after the end of the Cold War, September 11. Intelligence resources were diverted to other priorities. And that just meant less budgets for Russia.

NORTHAM: McFaul says it's vital to focus again on Russia. He says the country today represents a serious threat to security concerns around the world.

MCFAUL: I think this is a fundamental pivot away from Russia's cooperation with Europe and the West. And I think we have to, A, first understand that, and then, B, respond to it, both in terms of new policies, but in terms of, also, new attention to Russia.

NORTHAM: Paul Pillar, a former senior CIA officer, says the U.S. may have scaled down its intelligence resources in Russia over the years, but it still keeps a close eye on the country. He says it's all a matter of degree.

PAUL PILLAR: Russia is and, I expect, always has been, even since the collapse of the Soviet Union, a major policy and thus major intelligence interest to the United States, even if the particular concerns and threats and perceived threats have changed over the years.

NORTHAM: Pillar, now with Georgetown University, says he's not privy to any classified documents but feels it's unlikely the intelligence community was surprised by Russia's move into Syria, given Moscow's close ties with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. He says U.S. intelligence may not be able to predict with any kind of precision a particular military move, but it tries to assess Russia's long-term objectives.

PILLAR: There's an important distinction between having a strategic understanding of what a government is up to and is interested in and being able to predict a particular move by that same government.

NORTHAM: NATO's Gen. Breedlove says the lack of tactical intelligence about Russia's movements in Syria and Ukraine has shaken up the intelligence community, what he calls the IC.

BREEDLOVE: The IC has already made some fairly dramatic changes in the last several months about how we use our analysts. And they're beginning to look at re-prioritizing assets as well.

NORTHAM: Breedlove would not give any details. He just described changing the focus of the intelligence community like turning a supertanker. Now, he says, the nose is gently turning in the right direction. Jackie Northam, NPR News.

 [return to Contents] 

 #28
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2015
From: Eliot Borenstein <eb7@nyu.edu>
Subject: Plots against Russia (Book and Blog)

A brief announcement:  I'm posting the first draft of  my new book project, Plots against Russia: Conspiracy and Fantasy after Socialism, as a blog.  This is while I write it, in real time.  

I explain the idea behind the project here: http://jordanrussiacenter.org/news/new-book-new-blog-plots-russia/#.VkPdLbcq2rV

The blog/book's site is plotsagainstrussia.org.  The preface can be found here: http://plotsagainstrussia.org/eb7nyuedu/2015/11/11/preface

New posts should appear weekly, starting Monday.  Anyone interested can subscribe to the blog by following the simple instructions on the website's sidebar; subscribers will receive updates every time a new post goes live.

Eliot Borenstein
Collegiate Professor
Acting Chair, East Asian Studies
Professor, Russian & Slavic Studies
New York University           

 Editor, All the Russias
The Jordan Center for the Advanced Study of Russia
jordanrussiacenter.org
 
Blogs:
plotsagainstrussia.org
jordanrussiacenter.org/all-the-russias/

 [return to Contents] 

 
#29
Counterpunch.org
November 13, 2015
Perpetrators Honoring Their Victims, or An Incomprehensible Logic Concerning Donbas "Terrorists"
By HALYNA MOKRUSHYNA
Halyna Mokrushyna is currently enrolled in the PhD program in Sociology at the University of Ottawa and a part-time professor. She holds a doctorate in linguistics and MA degree in communication. Her academic interests include: transitional justice; collective memory; ethnic studies; dissent movement in Ukraine; history of Ukraine; sociological thought.  Her doctoral project deals with the memory of Stalinist purges in Ukraine. In the summer of 2013 she travelled to Lviv, Kyiv, Kharkiv and Donetsk to conduct her field research. She is currently working on completing her thesis. She can be reached at halouwins@gmail.com.

A monument to the insurgents and civilians who died in the war with the Ukrainian army in 2014-15 was solemnly opened on November 4, 2015 in Debaltsevo, a small city on the territory of the Donetsk People's Republic. The ceremony was presided by the leaders of the DPR, the head of the Debaltsevo city administration and deputies to the DPR legislature. Many hundreds of local citizens took part.

Alexander Zakharchenko, the head of the DPR, gave an address to the ceremony in which he stated that the Donetsk People's Republic should honour those who defended with arms their city and their children. A solemn liturgy was served by the provost of the Alexander Nevski Orthodox Church of Debaltsevo. He stated, "We are gathered here, on the Day of Our Lady of Kazan, for a prayer to honour our dead warriors who sacrificed their lives for our land."

The plaque on the monument reads: "Eternal memory to the brothers and sisters who gave their lives for the liberation of Debaltsevo from Ukrainian aggressors, 2014-2015". The news is reported by the Donetsk News Agency (DAN). It refers to Debaltsevo as a "hero city" for having resisted an "occupation" by Ukrainian aggressors, a title reminiscent of the Soviet tradition of bestowing the title on cities that became centres of active fighting against Nazi invaders during WWII.

The pro-Ukraine information agency OstroV, which publishes analysis of events in Donetsk and Lugansk in Russian language, published a short item on the November 4 ceremony which was taken from DAN. OstroV calls DAN a "separatist" agency. The item on OstroV's website has a telling title: "The height of cynicism! Ringleaders of the "DPR" opened in Debaltsevo a monument to civilians that they themselves killed brutally". Then the agency proceeds to explain that while "liberating" (its own quotation marks) Debaltsevo from the Ukrainian army, the rebels shelled the city with heavy weaponry, killing a large number of civilians.

Quoting U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power, the OstroV agency explains that about 500 corpses of civilians were found in basements of Debaltsevo. The victims were said to be seeking cover from the shelling of their "liberators" (quotation marks by the agency), that is DPR forces. OstroV does not say when Power made this claim, nor on what occasion. It also quotes her as saying that civilians were risking their lives by either hiding in basements or fleeing the city because roads were also shelled by the "terrorists" of the DPR. One wonders why OstroV does not quote Ukrainian sources and instead relies on the US representative for finding out what is happening in Ukraine.

The short OstroV short article states that the leaders who spoke at the solemn opening of the Debaltsevo monument on November 4 "traditionally shifted the responsibility for their crimes onto Ukraine".

"The monument... is located in a public promenade adjacent to the occupation 'city administration' of Debaltsevo", informs OstroV. Again, quotes around the "city administration" and the qualification "occupation" clearly show the agency's interpretation of the DPR as "terrorists" who took Debaltsevo by force and hold now all the citizens as hostages. Not only do the terrorists blame the Ukrainian army for their crimes, they purportedly shell their own positions because they do not give a damn for the lives of civilians! These terrorists are so wicked and cynical in their perfidity that they even erect a monument to their own victims!

The authors of the OstroV website report did not bother to explain why the DPR "ringleaders" would engage in such an act of commemoration. Indeed, why did they stage a commemoration?

When and where in human history have perpetrators erected monuments to their victims? There are innumerable instances of commemoration of victims by their relatives, social groups representing the victimized strata of the population, or the state claiming to represent them. But I have never heard of an instance where an executioner would erect a monument to his own victims, going so far as to call them "brothers and sisters"! But these Russia-backed terrorists from the DPR are so evil that their cruelty is inhumane and transcends our common understanding of human motivation. Or so we are expected to believe.

That is the only plausible explanation of the DPR leaders' act from the OstroV point of view. The publication does not spell this out, but it is easily discernible from the way in which it presented the news.

The aforementioned title of the OstroV report strikes me as yet another example of the dehumanization of Donbas residents by the Ukrainian government and much of the country's media. I analyzed this phenomenon in some detail in my presentation at the 2015 annual conference of the Canadian Association of Slavic Studies and at the inaugural conference in Winnipeg in September 2015 of the Geopolitical Economy Research Group (GERG) at the University of Manitoba in Winnipeg in September 2015. You can read my presentation here at the GERG conference website.

Pro-Western, "civilized" Ukrainians deny the DPR insurgents their humanity. It is made crystal clear in Ukrainian media interpretations who is the good and who is the bad. Pro-Western Ukrainians who claim to respect human life and freedom of opinion cannot accept any suggestion that the DPR leaders and the population of the DPR sincerely mourn their fellow combatants and citizens who died in the civil war in Donbas. People on all sides died from the shelling of the Ukrainian army and, yes, also from shells fired by DPR forces. This was a war in which casualties were unavoidable, tragic as that was. But it is exceedingly rare to find reported in Ukrainian media that this civil war was unleashed by Kyiv government and brought to the Donbas homeland precisely because Euromaidan Kyiv could not tolerate dissenting opinion there.

OstroV's coverage of the opening of a monument in Debaltsevo is an example of such blindness and non-respect of the Other. It cannot see that the DPR is a legitimate expression of political self-determination, not a "terrorist" project imposed on the population by "Russia-backed rebels". OstroV does not mention that some 500 people were present at the November 4 ceremony in Debaltsevo, and that after the opening of the new monument, the procession then went to the Memorial of Eternal Glory consecrated to those who died in the Great Patriotic War. On that day, for the first time in many years, the Eternal Flame was relit thanks to the efforts of the local authorities. The head of the DPR, Alexander Zakharchenko, spoke and gave thanks to the veterans still alive and those who died for passing to the generations that follow them the spirit and strength with which they fought in the Great Patriotic War.

The speech by Zakharchenko is but one of numerous official proclamations of the DPR which trace a continuity between the present-day combatants of Donbas and their grandfathers and great grandfathers who defeated Nazi Germany in the Great Patriotic War. As the Soviet army fought 70 years ago, today the DPR army is fighting against Ukrainian extreme nationalists who were Nazi allies in the past and who now want to invade Donbas and to destroy its historic memory. Present-day civilians and insurgents to whose memory the monument in Debaltsevo is dedicated died for victory in this fight.

In today's Maidan Ukraine, celebrations of the Soviet victory in WWII are fading away. In the memory politics of the new Euromaidan Ukraine, the notion of the Great Patriotic War is increasingly called a myth. And yet, this "myth" remains a fundamental building block of the collective identity of millions of Ukrainian citizens. The heroism and patriotism of Soviet Ukrainian soldiers, praised in history manuals and glorified in song, is now dissolved into an interpretation of Ukraine as having been caught between twin evils -Nazi Germany and the Stalin-led Soviet Union (read present-day Russia). New commemoration rituals have being created in Ukraine which are copied from European habits with little or no bearance on Ukrainian history. This year, in addition to marking May 9, traditional Victory Day in Ukraine, May 8 was officially marked for the first time in Ukraine's history as a day of WW2 memory and reconciliation.

I doubt very much that this new commemoration date can assist reconciliation for a country that is divided not only by the memory of the past but also by divergent visions of the future. Donbas does not want to integrate into Europe, as many in the rest of Ukraine seemingly want. And for that dissenting opinion, pro-European Ukraine is dehumanizing Donbas. As long as the Ukrainian political and intellectual elite refuse to recognize Donetsk and Lugansk residents as human beings with views and values different from their own but no less authentic, there will be no peace in Ukraine.

Notes:

(1) Debaltsevo is a small city, population 25,000, in the east of the Donetsk oblast of Ukraine, near the border with the Luhansk oblast. It is a strategically vital road and railway junction. The city became the location of very heavy fighting between Ukrainian armed forces and militias and the DPR insurgency in the summer of 2014. Ukraine succeeded in capturing it for a time. In January of 2015, after Ukraine had renewed a military offensive against Donetsk and Lugansk, its forces became vulnerable after they had overextended themselves in and around Debaltsevo. A counteroffensive by DPR forces succeeded in recapturing the city on February 18, 2015, destroying the occupying Ukrainian forces who suffered hundreds of casualties. This fight became known as the Battle of Debaltsevo.

(2). It is stated on the OstroV website that it is funded by the National Endowment for Democracy, the Media Development Fund of the US Embassy to Ukraine, and the International Renaissance Foundation, whose founder and sponsor is George Soros. It is part of the Polish-Canadian Program of support for democracy, co- financed by the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Polish Republic and the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development of Canada.

 [return to Contents] 

 #30
AFP
November 12, 2015
Initial ICC probe says no crimes against humanity at Ukraine's Maidan
[ICC report here https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-PE-rep-2015-Eng.pdf]

A preliminary probe suggests Ukraine's security forces used "excessive and indiscriminate" force in the 2014 Maidan protests but are not guilty of crimes against humanity, the International Criminal Court's chief prosecutor said Thursday.

Fatou Bensouda has opened a tentative investigation into Ukraine's conflict, sparked by a November 2013 uprising at Kiev's Maidan Square that eventually toppled the pro-Russian government of former president Viktor Yanukovych.

"While these considerations tend to indicate that alleged crimes do not amount to crimes against humanity, the Office notes that serious human rights abuses did occur" at Maidan, the Hague-based Bensouda said in a newly-released report.

"Ukrainian security forces frequently used excessive and indiscriminate force against protesters and other individuals, such as journalists covering the event," she said.

The demonstrations that turned the square into a battleground began after November 21, 2013 when Yanukovych sank a political deal with the European Union, turning instead to the Kremlin for support.

Pro-western demonstrations gathered pace throughout the winter, reaching a climax around mid-February last year with a failed crackdown by authorities leading to the death of more than 100 protesters.

Bensouda said although the attacks on the protesters constituted an "attack directed against a civilian population" there was "limited information... to support a conclusion that... it was either widespread or systematic."

Crimes against humanity -- one of the world's most serious and investigated by the Hague-based ICC -- had to conform to this criteria, Bensouda said in the 65-page report.

She said the ICC's preliminary probe elsewhere in the country also continued, including in the Crimea and the war-ravaged east, where Ukranian armed forces had been battling pro-Moscow separatists.

Bensouda added she was "closely following the progress and findings" of investigations into the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 over eastern Ukraine last year.

Some 298 passengers and crew died when the jetliner was shot down with a BUK surface-to-air missile in mid-July 2014 while on a routine flight between Amsterdam and Kuala Lumpur.

Ukraine is not a state party to the ICC's founding Rome Statute, but its parliament has accepted the court's jurisdiction to probe crimes committed on its territory from November 2013 onwards.

 [return to Contents] 

 #31
Facebook
November 12, 2015
Re ICC Report
By Ivan Katchanovski
University of Ottawa

As it was expected, the International Criminal Court has suggested that it won't investigate the Maidan massacre and other cases of political violence during the "Euromaidan" because they did not constitute crimes against humanity. Independent investigations of the Maidan massacre are now unlikely, while the official investigation in Ukraine is openly falsified in order to promote the politically convenient version of the massacre. The AFP story again attributes the massacre to the government forces. But even results of ballistic expertise by the Ukrainian investigation that for the first time were made public during the Berkut trial on November 12 have confirmed my study findings that the protesters were massacred from the Maidan-controlled locations, in particular, the Hotel Ukraina.

 [return to Contents] 

 #32
Ukraine Today
http://uatoday.tv
November 11, 2015
Special ops on trial for killing Euromaidan activists
Evidence points to Russian involvement in killing of protestors in central Kyiv on February 2014

To mark the upcoming anniversary of the start of Euromaidan Revolution, Ukraine Today launches a series of interviews with politicians who came to the parliament after participating in the uprising.

On Ukraine Today's Viewpoint, Volodymyr Solohub is joined by the lawyer Mr Markiyan Halabala to talk about the legal action against the perpetrators of the killings in central Kyiv during the Euromaidan revolution.

Watch also UT's Viewpoint with Oksana Syroyid, Deputy Speaker of the Ukrainian parliament, speaking about the parliament's recent failure to adopt certain amendments to the labour code, that would have paved way to th EU visa liberalisation, and about the 'fresh faces' in the Verkhovna Rada.

Volodymyr Solohub: Mr Halabala, you are representing the victims in one of the two cases which finally reached the courts proceedings, and this is by far the largest case. You are representing the families of 39 victims, activists who were killed during the Euromaidan revolution. Can we talk a little bit with you about the case and about the defendants? Who are the defendants in this case, and what is their main line of defence?

Markiyan Halabala: There are two defendants in that case, it's Mr Abroskin and Mr Zinchenko. They were policemen in a special police unit called Berkut. And during events on the 20th of February 2014, there were part of the big team who murdered the protesters in Instytutska Street.

V.S.: Are they alleged to be part of these special ops which were running across Instytutska Street, in a video that the whole world saw when the police force was shooting directly at the protesters?

M.H.: Absolutely. There are even video proofs that, for example, Mr Abroskin was shooting in the crowd of protesters, because his face was open, and so it was possible to identify him. He also had a special bag on his body, so it was easy for experts to identify him.

V.S.: There is a lot of video of these events, the events of the 20th of February, when more than a hundred people were killed in central Kyiv. Has any of these videos been introduced into the evidence in the court?

M.H.: Absolutely. These videos are part of this very case, but still new videos are coming to investigators, and for example, our attorneys-at-law try to add these brand new videos to that court case. And for sure there are a lot of video proofs of those events. Because of that, for the investigation it was, I wouldn't like to say, the easy way to prove the guilt of those policemen, and it helped a lot.

V.S.: Mr Halabala, I would assume that the lawyers for the defendants are challenging these videos. Is this indeed the case? And can you tell us about the overall line of defence?

M.H.: The main problem in this case is that there are no proofs that, for example, some protesters were killed from that very gun that was used by those policemen, because those guns were destroyed, were lost. So the investigation has no proofs of the connection between the gun and the bullets. We and the prosecution office have the proofs that those Berkut policemen were in that very place, they were shooting at the crowd. And so they can accuse the both policemen of a group crime.

V.S.: But for you as the lawyer of the victims, how easy or how difficult would it be to prove the guilt of these people, because as correctly indicated, there is no proof that these individuals in fact killed someone. Even if there is a video of them shooting into the crowd, you will not be able to prove that this very person killed someone.

M.H.: Absolutely. And in my opinion, there is no necessity for their guilt to prove that very connection. It's enough to prove to the court and to the judges that they used their arms in the direction of the crowd, because it was already not legal.

V.S.: Then you qualify their crime as improper use of firearms? Instead of killing?

M.H.: It's one of the articles [under which] they are accused of. For example, they are suspected of using not legally their firearms, they are accused of killing.

V.S.: It seems that it will be extremely difficult for you to prove that they killed someone.

M.H.: Absolutely. It will be not an easy way.

V.S.: The punishment for improper use of firearms is not obviously as harsh as for the murder. How do you see their punishment from realistic standpoint?

M.H.: It's hard to make some forecasts, because we are still working in that direction. For example, a new video may come [up], a proof that there is connection between the shooting and the killed victims.

V.S.: But do you realistically expect to see a video which will show that a particular person is shooting at another person and that person falls dead?

M.H.: Maybe just for part of the victims. For sure we will not gather all the videos that will show that very connection. It is not an easy process. It's not an easy process to find those person guilty. And the prosecution in the court says, yes we have no proof that Mr Abroskin or Mr Zinchenko has killed this or that victim. But it's necessary that they were part of an organised group. For example, if a thief comes to your flat, and his friend is just looking that nobody will come to that flat...

V.S.: He is basically the accomplice.

M.H.: Yes, absolutely. The main argument for the prosecution and also for the court...

V.S.: Is that they were the accomplices in these crimes.

M.H.: Yes.

V.S.: Mr Halabala, several week ago there were reports in the press by the former head of [the Security Service of Ukraine] SBU Mr [Valentyn] Nalyvaichenko who claimed that he had undisputed evidence of the so-called 'Russian trace' in the shootings of Maidan, meaning that he has proof that the Russian special forces, Russian police or whoever, because this evidence has never been disclosed, were responsible for this horrendous crime which was committed in central Kyiv. Do you have access to this evidence? And what do you think about this?

M.H.: There is strong evidence that [Russian President Vladimir Putin's Advisor Vladislav] Surkov and his 'group' came to Kyiv for three times. And there is a strong evidence that the public officers of [Russia's Federal Security Service] FSB were present during the Euromaidan events. And there are indirect proofs that they were engaged in that process of killing the protesters.

 [return to Contents] 

 #33
Ukraine Today
http://uatoday.tv
October 16, 2015
No proof yet of Russian traces in Maidan massacre - Ukraine's Prosecutor General

UNIAN: The Prosecutor General's Office has no confirmation of information provided by former Head of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) Valentyn Nalyvaichenko on the Russian trace in the shooting of the Heavenly Hundred Heroes, Ukrainian Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin said in an interview with Ukrainian newspaper Fakty.

"If you remember, former SBU Chief Valentyn Nalyvaichenko said that a Russian official arrived in Kyiv in winter 2014 and ordered the law enforcers to shoot at protesters. I asked Nalyvaichenko to provide at least some documents proving it. We don't have them until now. That's why, I have no proof that there is a Russian trace in the shooting of the Heavenly Hundred Heroes. It is impossible to make such a conclusion on the basis of the materials, which we have now. Not because we cannot or do not want to prove it, we just have no reason to talk about it now," Shokin said.

Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, during his speech at a ceremony of presenting state awards to the families of the Heavenly Hundred Heroes (as those who were killed by snipers on the Maidan are called in Ukraine) said that the SBU had plenty of evidence from Alpha special task force fighters as to the involvement of Adviser to the President of the Russian Federation Vladislav Surkov in the massacres on the Maidan in February last year, in particular in setting up teams of foreign snipers.

In April, Ukraine's State Security Service (SBU) said that they could confirm that Russian presidential adviser Vladislav Surkov had visited Ukraine during the operation of the security forces against the activists of Euromaidan.

"I can confirm that Surkov and other high-ranking officers of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation arrived in Ukraine during those days when the extremely harsh actions against Maidan protesters took place," Nalyvaichenko said.

Nalyvaichenko also said that Surkov on February 20-21 last year was not just in Kyiv, but also stayed with former SBU Chairman Oleksandr Yakymenko at an official SBU residence, and visited the Presidential Administration.

 [return to Contents] 

#34
Ukraine Today
http://uatoday.tv
February 20, 2015
President Poroshenko says Russia was involved in shooting Euromaidan protesters

Ukraine says foreign snipers on Maidan were supervised by aide to Russian president Vladislav Surkov

Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko has said that his country's security services have found that Russia was directly involved in the killing of protesters on Kyiv's Indepdendence Square last year during mass pro-EU demonstrations.

Petro Poroshenko, President of Ukraine: "The General Prosecutor's Office and Ukraine's Security Services have found a direct link to Russia's part in the shooting of Maidan protesters. Now investigators have access to the records of phone conversations between former President Yanukovych and Russia's Federal Security Service. Together they planned the shootings."

Poroshenko's comments came on Friday during a ceremony to commemorate the demonstrators who lost their lives. He also said that foreign snipers operating on the square were supervised by Vladislav Surkov, an advisor to Russian president Vladimir Putin.

Poroshenko's comments came a day after the head of the Ukrainian Security Service said the crimes during Euromaidan last year were not commited by Ukraine's former government alone. Nalyvaichenko said three groups of Russian Federal Security Service generals were invovled.

Valentyn Nalyvaichenko, Ukraine's Security Service Head: "In terms of the criminal proceeding we have the positions of those people, their surnames, copies of their passports, dates of arrival and departure how they communicated and where they were. We also know how and when Surkov, an assistant to President Putin, supervised them in Kyiv, when they visited Yanukovych."

Vladislav Surkov, the man implicated by Ukraine's Security Services, was Deputy Chairman of the Russian Government from 2011 to 2013.

 

 [return to Contents] 

 #35
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
November 12, 2015
EU and Russia remain hostage to Ukrainian crisis as progress stalls
After modest progress made this fall on organizing elections in eastern Ukraine and the withdrawal of weaponry from the frontlines, talks on resolving the conflict in the Donbass region have again run into trouble, with the timeline for implementing the Minsk peace agreements to be extended into 2016. Where does this leave the peace process and is there a risk of the region sliding back into conflict?
SERGEI STROKAN, VLADIMIR MIKHEEV, SPECIAL TO RBTH

The latest meeting by the Russian, Ukrainian, French and German foreign ministers on diffusing the Ukrainian crisis, which took place in Berlin on Nov. 6, produced rather controversial results. Despite an upbeat assessment by German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier that the talks had "exceeded expectations," it became evident that there was no chance whatsoever of finalizing the implementation of the Minsk agreements before the fixed deadline, the end of 2015.

On top of this disappointment came a strong statement by the European Union, laying the blame on Russia for the failure to implement in full the peace plan on resolving the conflict between government forces and Russian-backed rebels in eastern Ukraine. Consequently, Donald Tusk, the Polish politician who is now President of the European Council, made it clear that the economic sanctions against Russia will be once again prolonged after the end of the January deadline.

The provisional results of how both warring parties, the government in Kiev and the unrecognized rebel republics in eastern Ukraine, are moving forward in accordance with the letter and spirit of the Minsk agreements are largely disappointing. Nevertheless, the official statement by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs has punctuated the consent of Kiev and the rebels, hammered out at the last meeting in Berlin, to adhere to the timeline for the withdrawal of heavy weaponry from the line of contact, as well as removing landmines throughout the Donbass region.

Meanwhile, despite the recent agreement made on holding elections in the mutinous republics of Donetsk and Lugansk, recent reports from eastern Ukraine do not bode well for complacency. Kiev and Donetsk-Lugansk are accusing each other of violating the ceasefire agreement. Kiev claims the rebels have been firing mortars at the entrenched government forces, while the rebels assert that the Ukrainian army has recommenced artillery shelling of civilian targets.

Amid confusing signals from the Donbass and the stuttering progress of peace negotiations, and with the European Union and the United States unwilling to relax sanctions against Russia, is there any indication of which direction things are likely to head in?

Sergei Markedonov, an associate professor at the Russian State University for the Humanities, provided his insight for Troika Report:

"First of all, the positive statements come as a surprise. The West has repeatedly stated that sanctions against Russia would be lifted only after a 'breakthrough' in the Minsk peace process is achieved. What qualifies as a breakthrough is mainly Kiev regaining control over the Ukrainian-Russian border and the re-incorporation of the Donbass into Ukraine. Unless this happens, there will be no cancelation of sanctions, either totally or even in part.

"As for Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin in general, I think they will want more concrete guarantees from Ukraine and the West that Kiev will not transform the country into a bastion and stronghold against Russia. In terms of control over the Ukrainian-Russian border, for Moscow this would be acceptable only after a comprehensive resolution of the conflict, just as it has been spelled out in the Minsk-2 agreement."

- Let's explore the EU's tough stance on Russia. Modest progress on the ground within the mandate of Minsk-2 has apparently been achieved due to Moscow's flexibility and persuasive power vis-a-vis the rebel republics of Donetsk and Lugansk, although they have an agenda of their own and inherent specific interests. Why is the EU reluctant to make a goodwill gesture, say, by lifting some of the sanctions? Such a move would meet the approval of the segments of European business hit by Moscow's counter-sanctions.

"The European Union is not a single entity. It encompasses different policies towards Russia in the context of the Ukrainian crisis. But it abides by the rules of the union, which command discipline. This is presented as 'solidarity.'"

"Then there is the external factor: The United States is playing a crucial role in the European security architecture. We have to take into account the position of the U.S. The U.S. is not ready to make serious compromises in respect to Russia, especially not on the eve of the presidential election campaign."

Judging by this stern verdict, with the slow progress on the Minsk-2 peace roadmap and with the confrontation between the government in Kiev and the rebel republics in the east of the country still unresolved, it is challenging to identify an encouraging timeline for the abandonment of the war of sanctions and the restoration of a workable relationship between the European Union and Russia.

 [return to Contents] 

 #36
Politco.eu
November 12, 2015
Journalists can save Ukraine
The war against corruption is a war for information.
BY SERGII LESHCHENKO
Sergii Leshchenko, a former investigative journalist, is a member of Ukraine's Parliament from the Poroshenko Bloc.

KIEV - Wide ranging and massive corruption, censorship, lies, and an atmosphere of impunity - this is what Ukrainian politics looked like two years ago. And it almost buried the country in the mass grave that was the Eurasian Union under the ruby star of the Kremlin.

There is a group of members of the corrupt Party of Regions in Ukraine that I like to call "the faithful of the Church of Treason." They see everything that happens in the country in a bad light.

Yet casting aspersions on everything and everyone would be unfair. True, the pace of reform in post-Yanukovych Ukraine often resembles turtle racing. But as a journalist I have witnessed the country's press make huge strides over the past decade - it has become a bright spot that promises to help root out corruption.

Today, developments in Ukraine may escape the attention of ordinary citizens, but not of journalists, who have new tools at their disposal to keep officials in check, like open registers of property and land as well as registers of beneficial owners of companies. A registry of vehicles will be introduced before the end of the year. This level of transparency is rare, even in most European countries. When I investigated corruption cases in Ukraine, I could only dream of such a treasure trove of information.

Journalists are the main weapons in the fight against corruption. This was the case in Germany when President Christian Wulff was forced to resign; it was the case with Watergate in the U.S., just as it was when the Recruit scandal erupted in Japan. Their work often becomes the groundwork for criminal investigations, as was the case here in Ukraine with Mezhyhirya - President Yanukovych's vast and lavish estate. They are also the ones who keep investigations from getting swept under the rug, as we saw with the case of several allegedly corrupt prosecutors in Ukraine.

Sooner or later, oligarchs will lose their monopoly on information. Ukraine is now witnessing the birth of public television. What was recently an unheard-of audacity is now a reality on the national state-owned channel, which broadcasts stories on how Roshen, Poroshenko's confectionery business, acquires land lots near Kiev, or how duty-free shops in the country's main airport were taken over by people close to Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk.

The income declarations of MPs, lists of their aides, transcripts of their official inquiries - all this information is now in the public domain. Any citizen can come to the balcony of the Verkhovna Rada and watch the parliamentary proceedings in person - another European practice that is now commonplace in Ukraine.

The fight against corruption has become an integral part of political competition. In Yanukovych's time, there was a "conspiracy of silence" regarding misconduct. Everyone knew about the schemes oligarchs like the Klyuyev brothers, Dmytro Firtash, or Kurchenko, employed but - with the exception of investigative internet sites - everyone kept their mouths shut. Today, politicians appear to throw as many accusations of illegal dealings at each other as they can. Ukrainian society is clamoring for a purge, and any politician involved in shady deals is doomed.

Of course, it's not enough only to write articles or make public accusations. Indictments need to be filed by appropriate agencies. The National Anti-Corruption Bureau was created specifically to fight high-ranking corruption. The Bureau took more than half a year to establish: an independent review panel vetted candidates before Head of the Bureau started to hire staff and 70 detectives were sworn in. We are now at the last stage - electing the first anti-corruption prosecutor. The European Union demanded that controversial members appointed under the quota of Viktor Shokin, the discredited prosecutor general, be removed.

These technicalities are of little interest for the Ukrainian public. They live at the speed of Facebook and assume that passing a law is not much more complicated than posting on social media. But of course that's not the case. Ukraine's new police force is the perfect example that it's better to spend time to create something from scratch than to try and reform an old system that was rotten to the core.

After more than a year in the legislative trenches, I remain optimistic. I believe that, one way or another, we will launch an anti-corruption bureau that will be just as effective as Romania's, where high-profile figures face bribery charges on a regular basis. In the latest case to gain widespread coverage, the mayor of Bucharest was detained while collecting a kickback of $25,000. Former Prime Minister Victor Ponta, who resigned Wednesday following widespread civil protests, is also currently under investigation.

Another step that will help reduce corruption is the regulation of political parties' financing. The law would require transparency both for political party funding and expenses; introduce a penalty for illegal payments; and  provide support for honest parties from the state budget. This will help to cut the channels that funnel oligarchic cash into politics.

Corruption is currently a far greater threat to Ukraine than the war in the East. It weakens the economy; destroys the army; and makes the country an easy prey for Russian aggression. A hybrid war will not be effective against corruption. This war should be waged by openly naming names. It is a battle that must end in complete victory.

 [return to Contents] 

 #37
Wall Street Journal
November 13, 2015
Ukraine to Receive Third Billion-Dollar Loan Guarantee From U.S.
Treasury Secretary Jack Lew praises Kiev's reforms, but says more work is needed
By LAURA MILLS

KIEV-Ukraine will receive a third billion-dollar loan guarantee from the U.S. in the coming months as it continues to stick to a tough reform agenda, U.S. Treasury Secretary Jack Lew said in a visit to Kiev on Friday.

Mr. Lew praised economic and fiscal reforms undertaken by the new government in Kiev, but said more work still had to be done.

"The progress made in the past two years is very real, it has lent credibility to the effort that makes the case for support very strong," he told journalists in his second visit to the country this year. "But it's important that progress continues to be made, and it's important that the possibility of going in the other direction be strongly resisted."

The U.S. has provided $2 billion in loan guarantees to Ukraine this year, and in September Mr. Lew said the program might be expanded by another billion, pending tough reform action by Ukraine.

Ukraine has largely stuck to the terms of a $40 billion bailout package from the International Monetary Fund, implementing controversial increases in energy tariffs and macroeconomic reforms. But those and other efforts have been undermined by persistent claims of corruption and by an increasingly volatile parliament, where parties have made political gains by opposing aspects of the reform agenda.

The IMF, which arrived in Ukraine this week for further negotiations, delayed issuing a third tranche of bailout cash last month, saying that Kiev needed more time to flesh out policy particularly in the area of fiscal reform.

Mr. Lew also discussed a $3 billion loan that Ukraine is due to pay Russia in December, saying the U.S. has "strongly urged Russia to participate along with other bondholders" in a restructuring deal between Kiev and its international private creditors.

Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk repeated Ukraine's claims that Russia wouldn't get preferential treatment.

"If Russia doesn't agree, the government will implement a moratorium on the debt," he said.

 [return to Contents] 

 #38
Forbes.com
November 12, 2015
Fitch Ratings Hints Ukraine Bankruptcy Close As Kyiv Defaults
By Kenneth Rapoza

Our guy Yats is failing miserably. As predicted.

The government of Arseniy "Yats" Yatsenyuk now holds the coveted credit rating of D in the capital city Kyiv, which means a default on some of its foreign debt is now imminent. Major global fund managers Templeton Asset Management, holds billions of Ukrainian bonds. It is unclear who owns Kyiv debt. B

It is unlikely Ukraine will be paying them back. On Thursday, Fitch Ratings lowered Kyiv's credit rating from triple C to D, the default rating. The national sovereign debt is still CCC-. The downgrade shows just how fragile the economic situation is in the country following nearly two years of political crisis.

Kyiv failed to carry out payments on $250 million in eurobonds on Friday. Kyiv introduced a temporary moratorium on debt on November 6, 2015. The default includes another payment of $300 million, which the capital city will miss.

Ukraine's government recently failed to convince Russia to restructure a $3 billion loan. The two former political and cultural allies have parted ways since the 2014 ousting of Russia friendly leader Viktor Yanukovych and the subsequent secession of Crimea, now part of Russia.

Meanwhile, the nation's sovereign debt is in what Fitch calls "restricted default" after it missed a $500 million payment due Sept. 23. Ukraine's currency, the hryvnia, is down 30.9% year-to-date. It is currently surviving on European and IMF bailout packages.

 [return to Contents] 

 #39
Pre-default Ukraine to double military spending
By Lyudmila Alexandrova

MOSCOW, November 13. /TASS/. Ukraine's plans for a major increase in defense spending next year are quite logical and fit in well with the logic the country's current authorities prefer to follow these days, Russian experts say. Once it has declared Russia as the "arch foe forever" and been pushing ahead with plans for regaining control of the restive south-eastern areas, Kiev cannot but put more muscle into its armed forces, hoping that financial assistance from the West will let it do so even in the gravest economic situation on the brink of default.

Ukraine's National Defense and Security Council under President Petro Poroshenko on Wednesday advised the government to ensure the spending on national security and defense next year should be no smaller than 5% of the GDP. The defense sector is to get no less than 3% of the GDP. Government financing of the defense budget will be no less than $4.4 billion. Certain sums are to be attracted from "special funds" and in the form of borrowed resources "against government guarantees." Poroshenko said those estimates were based on a relatively optimistic forecast of the situation in the east of the country. Should it change, the spending may be increased.

In a word, military spending is to double in contrast to that in the outgoing year.

"Poroshenko's motives are very clear," Professor Andrey Manoilo, of the political science department of the Moscow State University, has told TASS. "Ukraine is pushing ahead with preparations along two lines. Firstly, Kiev has not given up the idea of handling the Donbas issue from the position of strength. It still hopes for gaining an upper hand. For this it will need money to purchase hardware and pay the mercenaries and contractors. Also, money will be crucial to pay for the loyalty of nationalist volunteer battalions."

The Ukrainian regime is well aware that at a time when the economy is in a near-default state and winter time is near while there is no money to pay for gas, the people's patience may wear thin. "Should protest demonstrations follow, they will have to be suppressed by force. In other words, the authorities are getting ready to wage a war against their own people not just in the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk republics. They do not rule out the possibility angry popular protests will have to be suppressed in other regions of the country," Manoilo said.

"Although the economic situation is getting from bad to worse, the budget is in crisis and only external donations still keep the Ukrainian economy afloat, the increase in military spending looks quite logical and agrees well with the current Ukrainian authorities' general mode of action," the leading research fellow at the Russian presidential academy RANEPA, Sergey Bespalov, has told TASS.

Ukraine's military spending has been growing steadily since the February coup of 2014, he said. "On the one hand, this is quite explainable, because throughout the post-Soviet years Ukraine kept saving on its armed forces. By 2014 the national armed forces had been downgraded to the state of utter decay.

It is clear that any state should feel obliged to revise its defense policies. But it should be remembered in what context this is happening. Ukraine's military spending in 2014-2015 kept growing as the so-called 'anti-terrorist operation' - in fact, civil war in the east of the country - went on, but the Ukrainian army scored no decisive successes."

"Besides, Russia is portrayed as Ukraine's arch foe. It's official ideology in Kiev and the belligerent rhetoric in fact obliges those who use it to increase military spending although the economy's condition is really disastrous. Ukraine is getting major external support from the International Monetary Fund, the European allies and the United States. This external assistance allows for increasing military spending, but it is very clear that the heavy pressure on the feeble Ukrainian economy will be getting stronger."

"There is no other way out for them," the deputy head of the world economy and world politics department at the Higher School of Economics, Andrey Suzdaltsev, has told TASS. "The current Ukrainian state's number one goal is ethnic nationalism. For this it is to have a major foreign enemy. This explains why the national security doctrine says that Ukraine is an outpost of the West, which will not abandon its allies, and that there is an ever-lasting threat from 'aggressive Russia'. In this context the proposed military spending growth looks absolutely logical. Naturally, it is expected that in view of Ukraine's anti-Russian warmongering zeal the West will not leave Kiev alone and keep financing it."

As for the risk of popular discontent, Suzdaltsev does not expect any major outbreaks in the future.

"The people are literally brainwashed. A powerful propagandistic campaign is underway and alternative sources of information have been muzzled. The more so, since the argument is simple: Russia is to blame for all," he said.

 [return to Contents] 

 #40
www.rt.com
November 13, 2015
EU urges Russia not to impose food embargo on Ukraine

The European Union has asked Moscow not to ban Ukrainian goods after 1 January 2016, when the economic part of Kiev's Association Agreement comes into force. Kremlin says it's considering customs tariffs, not embargo.

According to EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmstrom, Brussels is doing everything possible to prevent a food embargo against Ukraine. She said the EU is holding frequent meetings with Russia to mitigate the consequences for Kiev.

Ukrainian industry has estimated the losses from a Russian embargo on its products could be $140-205 million.

Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev insists the Kremlin plans introduction of customs tariffs, not sanctions against Ukraine. The tariffs will be introduced because Ukraine will no longer be part of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) free trade zone. Moscow is also concerned that without such a barrier, Kiev could illegally supply embargoed European goods to Russia.

"We're not talking about sanctions, which our partners imposed against Russia. But such a trade environment, of course, would have very serious economic consequences for Ukraine," said Medvedev.

If the Kremlin decides to introduce customs tariffs on Kiev's products, the Ukrainian economy will lose $167-239 million.

Russia and Ukraine are currently trading in accordance with the free trade agreement between the CIS countries. Moscow has said that Kiev could lose both the tariff-free preference and food exports to Russia.

Russia's Economic Development Minister Aleksey Ulyukaev says this could be done to protect the Russian economy, if Europe doesn't implement an additional agreement that would remove the risks for Moscow posed by the Association Agreement.

However, the Kremlin sees no need for additional sanctions against Europe if the situation doesn't deteriorate, he added.

Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseny Yatsenyuk said sanctions by Russia are almost inevitable, adding that Kiev's ready for that.

 [return to Contents] 

 #41
Washington Post
November 13, 2015
Ukraine isn't unified yet. These 4 charts explain.
By Grigore Pop-Eleches and Graeme Robertson
[Charts here https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/11/13/ukraine-isnt-unified-yet-these-4-charts-explain-how/]

Could this be the moment Ukraine finally turns the corner?

On Sunday, Oct. 25, Ukraine marked the end of the first year since new elections returned a parliament with a solid "pro-European" majority. With support in parliament, the government has embarked upon a series of reforms, which promise to eliminate the old corrupt Ukraine.

It also increasingly looks like the shooting part of the war in eastern Ukraine might finally be over. After the deaths of at least 8,000 people, the Minsk cease-fire seems to be holding. Talk on the ground in the self-declared Luhansk and Donetsk People's Republics has turned from independence and even expansion to the conditions for reintegration into Ukraine. Just as significantly, Russian officials also seem ready to move past an unwinnable war and re-engage with the West while moving on to Syria.

The experience of war, observers agree, has changed Ukraine in profound ways. This is not the same country as before the revolution, either in its boundaries or its population. Some observers even claim that President Putin has inadvertently become a great nation-builder in Ukraine, prompting a country that had been deeply divided to develop a unified Ukrainian identity and a solid pro-Western majority.

But what is the reality on the ground across Ukraine? To find out, we are conducting a series of cross-sectional and panel surveys in Ukraine. We began our surveys in December 2012, before the revolution, and completed a second round in August 2015.

Our initial results are not very encouraging. While we found some evidence of changing identities, the deep divides that marked Ukraine after the Orange Revolution of 2004-5 are still very much in evidence.

To examine this, we follow the standard approach of breaking down our results into the four "macro-regions" of Ukraine: west, south, center and east. We couldn't survey the breakaway territories of eastern Ukraine, including its largest city, Donetsk, since those are not under government control. We make no claims about those areas and eliminate Donetsk, Luhansk and Crimea from our analysis. Instead, we focus on the remainder of eastern Ukraine, comparing opinion in the same localities in Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia and Kharkiv regions that we surveyed in 2012.

1. Have the revolution and the Russian war given Ukraine a stronger national identity?

Yes, there's some evidence that this is true.

In 2012, we asked respondents across Ukraine what country was their "homeland." Almost all respondents in the west of the country said Ukraine was their homeland (92 percent). Numbers were lower in the central provinces, and considerably lower in the south and the non-Donbas east, where more than a quarter of respondents gave other answers.

By 2015, however, more people in each region now gave Ukraine as their homeland. The regions' national identities had become somewhat more similar than different.

2. Are Ukrainians uniting around one national language?

Sort of. More of them (not a lot, but some) say they're more often speaking Ukrainian, and fewer say they're speaking only Russian. This is potentially important in a country that consists of a mostly Russian-speaking east that has traditionally favored closer ties to Russia and a predominantly Ukrainian-speaking west, where the levels of Ukrainian nationalism are much higher.

But there are meaningful differences by region.

Western Ukraine was already speaking Ukrainian, almost exclusively, and there's been no change there. But in central Ukraine, the proportion of people who reported speaking mostly Ukrainian at home increased from 55 percent in 2012 to 63 percent in 2015.

In the non-Donbas east, fewer people say they're mainly speaking Russian: the proportion who say they do fell from 62 percent to 55 percent.

But interestingly, there was no corresponding increase in those who spoke primarily Ukrainian; in fact, that share actually dropped slightly, from 20 percent to 17 percent.

It would be an exaggeration to say that this language shift suggests a massive surge in Ukrainian identity, but the gap between Ukraine's west and the rest of the country is narrowing.

3. Have Ukrainians changed how they view the rest of the world?

Somewhat, but not radically.

Attitudes to Russia have hardened across the board. That's reduced the striking pre-Maidan differences between the west and the rest of the country. In 2012, only westerners were clearly opposed to a proposed customs union with Russia and Belarus. By 2015, overwhelming majorities in the west and center and large pluralities in the east and south shared that view.

However, significant minorities in the south (33 percent) and the east (23 percent) still favor union with Russia. Almost no one in the west does (3 percent).

But there is considerably less agreement about joining Western institutions like the European Union or NATO.

In 2012, there was minority support for E.U. membership in the east and the south, with more enthusiasm from the center and west. By 2015, the west and center were more supportive, but attitudes hadn't changed in the south and east.

Here, at least, the revolution and war seem to have increased rather than decreased the differences between east and west.

The country's just as divided about NATO membership. In western Ukraine, support for joining NATO has almost doubled since late 2012; in central Ukraine, it's grown more than fourfold. While support has also doubled in the south and east, that doesn't mean much; support was pretty low in 2012. Only a fifth of people in the non-Donbas east and south say they support of joining NATO; more than half are opposed.

4. Do Ukrainians want to use military force against Russia?

Here's where we find a lot of differences among the regions. While 70 percent of respondents in the west of the country want military force used to reintegrate the eastern provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk, that drops to only 47 percent in the center, 40 percent in the south and 28 percent in the east.

The regions also have very different attitudes toward the military draft that the government instituted in an effort to build its standing army up from 6,000 battle-ready troops to a target of 250,000.

There have been stories of draft dodging in the news before, but our data suggest very weak support for it, particularly in those regions closest to the front.

In the west, 59 percent support a draft, compared to 38 percent in the center, 26 percent in the south and only 23 percent in the east. Even in the supportive west, some 81 percent of respondents described concerns about the draft as being common, a proportion very similar to that reported in other regions.

So here's the takeaway.

What these data show is that, despite the talk of a new Ukrainian nation, there are still sharp and profound divides between regions - and remember, this doesn't include the breakaway territories, just those that remain subject to Kiev.

Ukraine's earlier revolution, the Orange Revolution in 2004, foundered precisely on the new regime's inability to bridge the concerns of Ukraine's different regions and forge a common agenda out of a disparate coalition. The Orange government was never able to gain support from the populous, industrial eastern regions and truly unite the country.

The lesson of our survey is that the current revolution has, so far, also failed to bridge Ukraine's deep regional divides, making the job of creating a new national identity and of implementing major reforms extremely difficult.

Grigore Pop-Eleches is an associate professor of politics and international affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University, and author of From Economic Crisis to Reform: IMF Programs in Latin America and Eastern Europe (Princeton University Press 2009).

Graeme Robertson is an associate professor of political science at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and author of The Politics of Protest in Hybrid Regimes: Managing Dissent in Post-Communist Russia (Cambridge University Press: 2011).

 [return to Contents] 

 #42
Kyiv Post
November 12, 2015
Editorial
Meaning of equality

Those watching Ukraine's parliament struggle to pass anti-discrimination legislation this week would be forgiven for thinking they were watching Russia's State Duma, where it's acceptable to promote violence against gays.

In the end, Ukrainian lawmakers on Nov. 12 passed the bill supported by President Petro Poroshenko and the European Union, legislation that prohibits discrimination in the workplace. But it took them three sessions to pass it, and throughout the entire process, homophobia was on full display.

It was passed in six attempts, and only aftrer the speaker promised the legislation wouldn't lead to same-sex marriages.

The bigotry and homophobia on display in the legislature was reminiscent of Russian lawmakers Vitaly Milonov and Elena Mizulina, who authored the anti-LGBT legislation that has officially sanctioned violence against gays.

With its reluctance to pass this crucial legislation, Ukraine showed that it is still plagued by the same Soviet bigotry as its backward and belligerent neighbor.

Once adopted, social media was full of joyful proclamations such as, "Yay! The LGBT activists weren't attacked at the protest (in front of parliament)!"

Consider the implications of this: Ukrainian society is so overrun with bigotry that people are simply used to lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender activists getting attacked. They feel compelled to cheer when they don't get attacked.

Accustomed to a Soviet mentality in government, the public must express thanks when lawmakers pass a bill that would have been passed without hesitation in most Western countries.

The worst part is that lawmakers seemed genuinely oblivious to what equality actually means.

While the amendment has found strong support among gay rights activists, it is about much more. It's about equality as a whole - for all genders, races, religions, ethnicities, ages and much more. It guarantees that people from all walks of life will be entitled to the same rights.

And yet somehow, in the puny minds of certain lawmakers, this bill was distorted to mean gay marriage was right around the corner. To them, equality is an alien concept. And now that the international community has seen this, it will be harder to believe that Ukraine really wants progress and growth.

But hey, at least no one was violently attacked while speaking out for equality.

 [return to Contents] 

 #43
Ukraine Today
http://uatoday.tv
November 13, 2015
Meeting on decommunisation in Ukraine's Kharkiv ends in mass brawl as tempers flare

Activists say local authorities tried to rig vote on getting rid of Soviet-era street names

There's almost 2,000 seats here at the Kharkiv concert hall but that was not enough to accommodate everyone who wanted to take part in the discussion on plans to give streets new names instead of the Soviet ones they now have. The session comes as part of Ukraine's programme of decommunisation launched earlier this year.

The local authority representative began to speak Russian but was quickly drowned out by the crowd demanding he speak Ukrainian. But there was something else causing alarm among many activists. They say a list of some 200 streets, which were to have their Soviet names cancelled, has been cut in half by the authorities, and that proposals from civil society groups have been ignored.

The speaker tries to push on with proceedings and start voting on name changes but he can barely heard: "This activist says: the authorities have to listen to the people, they cannot falsify the voting. They're trying to rig the vote, they haven't even chosen a board to count the ballots."

Meanwhile, a fight breaks out in the hall and angry activists try to take the stage - a representative from the local authorities brings the session to a close saying that it has become too dangerous. On Ukraine's path to decommunisation meetings like these carry no legal weight. They can only make recommendations. Ultimately decisions on decommunisation, including changing Soviet-era street names, must be taken by deputies on the city council.

 [return to Contents] 

 #44
Ukraine Today
http://uatoday.tv
September 15, 2015
Ukraine's Decommunisation Progress: Residents of 'Bolshevik' village aren't ready to rename hometown

Ukrainian government has vowed to dismantle and rename streets to purge itself of Soviet past

Residents of this Ukrainian village, located just 100 km from Kyiv, are up in arms over local authorities' plans to rename it from Bolshevik to something more European-sounding and less connected to the country's communist past.

Monuments celebrating Soviet soldiers' victories during World War II litter the small village, which has a population of a little more than 300 people. Local residents say such monuments are part of their village's history and should be kept.

The village's name, Bolshevik, refers to members of Vladimir Lenin's Communist part in Revolutionary Russia. Residents want to keep that too.

Maryna, Bolshevik resident: "If it wasn't for the communists this village wouldn't exist. It was founded by Bolsheviks. I can't even imagine renaming this village and what it would be called otherwise."

Watch also Relics of the Soviet Union: Ukraine's plan to create a museum of totalitarianism

One of the residents says she is against renaming the village because she doesn't want to go through the process of changing all of her documents.

Local resident: "I'll need to change my documents. It's my time and money that I'll spend. It's not done for free nowadays."

The controversy in the village comes as the Ukrainian government continues to push ahead with its plans to take down communist symbols and rename streets as part of a package of laws on decommunisation.

 [return to Contents] 

 #45
Politico.eu
November 13, 2015
A Ukrainian mongrel
Welcome to Surzhyk, the lingua franca of a people who now shun Russian.
By VIJAI MAHESHWARI
Vijai Maheshwari is a writer and journalist. His novel "White God Factor," about Moscow in the 1990s, was published by London's Coptic Press. He also publishes a magazine, B.East, about trends in the East, and was editor-in-chief of Playboy Russia.

KIEV - The convenience store opposite my apartment in this city's historic center is run by people from western Ukraine who make no secret of their disdain for the Russian language. When I order my cigarettes or beer in Russian, they're churlish, and often claim not to have any change for my large bills. When I throw in a few words of Ukrainian, however, a smile lights up their faces, and they even offer to bag my purchases for me.

What I didn't realize until recently is that my attempts to curry linguistic favor has its own name, whose history goes back centuries. A good quarter of Ukraine's 40 million-strong population speaks Surzhyk, a mash of Russian and Ukrainian that came into vogue during the Russification of the region in the late 18th century. As Russian became the lingua franca of the industrialized cities in Ukraine's heartland, peasants began mixing Russian words into their speech to communicate with city-dwellers - and a form of Ukrainian creole was born.

"The word 'Surzhyk' originally meant flour made from low-quality grains," says Larissa Masenko, a linguistics professor at the prestigious Kyiv-Mohyla University. Masenko, who has even written a book about the Surzhyk language, emphasizes that the "language developed in the Ukrainian-speaking villages and small towns, where speakers lacked a formal education." Even today, she says, the language is still spoken in many of the towns surrounding Kiev, including Borispol, home to the city's international airport.

Masenko, who is strongly pro-Ukrainian, believes that the mongrel language would have died a natural death had there been more pro-Ukrainian politics in the post-communist era. However, far from fading away, the creole language is experiencing a revival in the wake of the revanche of the Ukrainian language in the post-revolutionary era. As more Russian speakers from the cities attempt to speak Ukrainian to fit in with the zeitgeist, they unwittingly end up speaking a reverse form of Surzhyk.

"It's very frustrating," says Bogdan Melnik, who works for a travel agency in Kiev. "We used to speak Russian in the office, but now our boss has decided that we must speak Ukrainian. The result is that many of us, who come from Russian-speaking homes, end up speaking Surzhyk."

A recent article in Ukraine's leading paper, Korrespondent, even alleged that the vast majority of Ukrainians now speak Surzhyk. It even claimed that with so many Ukrainians mixing the two languages, only around 20 percent of the population now speaks either "pure" Ukrainian or "pure" Russian.

While the paper's opinions are open to debate, a wander around Kiev on a busy day supports their eye-catching claims. Kiev was until recently a Russian-language city, where most residents spoke Russian, and Ukrainian was even frowned upon. Now I rarely hear pure Russian; instead, even Russian-speakers pepper their dialogue with Ukrainian words. A good friend of mine, who once worked for the former President Victor Yanukovych, now butchers his beautiful Russian with badly pronounced Ukrainian words in an attempt to appear patriotic.

This daily mishmash of the two languages reminds me of being in a large office in Delhi or Mumbai, where workers communicate in "Hinglish," a mix of Hindi and English.

Like Hinglish, Surzhyk is a funny-sounding language that's been fodder for comics, even during the Soviet era. The Soviets were quick to exploit the rough-hewn sounds of Surzhyk to discredit the Ukrainian language in general. The hugely popular communist-era comedy from the 1950s and 60s, Tarapunka and Shtepsel - a version of Laurel and Hardy - had the intelligent Russian-speaking Shtepsel constantly outwitting his primitive Surzhyk-speaking partner Tarapunka.

More recently, Verka Serduchka, a flamboyant drag queen who won second place in the Eurovision Song Contest in 2007, hosted the popular "SV-show" in the early 2000s, where he spoke Surzhyk with various visiting celebrities. He even produced hit songs in the Surzhyk language, taking it from low-brow culture into the realm of high-brow public discourse. Many common Ukrainians loved Serduchka's use of Surzhyk, seeing him as a kindred sprit who was accessible and understandable.

Their fondness for Serduchka is no accident: Many Surzhyk speakers from the villages and small towns of Ukraine were discriminated against during the post-Soviet era. My girlfriend's mother, who has spoken Surzhyk from her childhood, recalls being snapped at when she asked for directions in Kiev a few years ago. "Speak proper Russian, lady, if you want to be understood," admonished the tram conductor. Conversely, natives of Lvov, Ukraine's cultural capital, labeled her a "Moskal" (a derogatory Ukrainian word for Russians) upon hearing her Russian-sounding Surzhyk.

Serduchka, who became a poster-boy for the Surzhyk language, had his show canceled after a backlash over the popularization of the language. Popular handbooks like "Let's Avoid Russianisms in the Ukrainian Language! A brief dictionary of Anti-Surzhyk for everyone who wants their Ukrainian language not to resemble the language of Verka Serduchka!" called for the use of a "purer" Ukrainian language unsullied by Russian.

Though other popular TV shows like Kvartal 95 (Quarter 95) still occasionally poke fun at Surzhyk, they are now going against the grain of contemporary Ukrainian culture. With the rise in patriotism since the revolution, and the elevation of the Ukrainian language to the primary tongue of the country, it's not PC anymore to joke about its creole versions. The memories of the Soviet attempt to denigrate the Ukrainian language through Surzhyk still run deep. Instead, everyone's brushing up on their Ukrainian, and trying to speak like those in western Ukraine, whose speech is hailed as the "gold standard."

There are now fewer than a dozen Russian-language schools left in Kiev, many having been closed down after the revolution. Masenko, the linguistics professor, believes that within a generation most Ukrainians will only speak Russian as a second language.

"With the current pro-Ukrainian politics, the Russian language will cease to be part of public discourse in 20 years," she predicts.

However, with a majority of Kiev's residents still speaking Russian at home - as does Ukraine's President Petro Poroshenko - this paradigm shift toward the Ukrainian language is not going to be without surprises. As Russian speakers switch to speaking Ukrainian, they are bound to mash up the language, and introduce their own neologisms. A converse form of Surzhyk - Russian speech mixed with Ukrainian words - is certain to develop in the meantime. You can already hear this post-revolutionary idiom in the cafes of Kiev these days.

It's possible that Ukraine might yet embrace its bilingual identity, and Russian speakers might not feel compelled to switch over to speaking Ukrainian. But don't bet on it. Expect Surzhyk to remain the unofficial lingua franca of Ukraine for at least another generation.

 [return to Contents] 

 #46
Voxukraine.org
November 10, 2015
The Economics of Rebellion in Eastern Ukraine
By Yuri M. Zhukov, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan
[Charts here http://voxukraine.org/2015/11/10/the-economics-of-rebellion-in-eastern-ukraine/]

From a policy standpoint, the economic roots of the Donbas conflict should be seen as good news. Despite the ethnocentric media coverage of this war in Russia and the West, the data show that attempts to divide Ukraine along ethnic or linguistic lines are likely to fail.

In April 2014, angry mobs and armed men stormed administrative buildings and police stations in eastern Ukraine, waving Russian flags and proclaiming the establishment of "Peoples' Republics" in Donetsk and Luhansk. At the time, some observers predicted that the "pro-Russian" uprising would spread to other parts of southeast Ukraine, throughout the vast territory Russian President Vladimir Putin referred to as historical "Novorossiya".

Contrary to these forecasts, the rebellion remained surprisingly contained. No region outside Donetsk or Luhansk experienced large-scale armed conflict or fell under rebel control. Not only were separatists unable to realize the project of a greater "Novorossiya" stretching from Kharkiv to Odesa, they failed to consolidate their grip even within the borders of the Donbas. Not more than 63% of municipalities in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts were under rebel control at any time during the first year of the conflict, and less than a quarter of these territories showed resistance to government forces during Kyiv's attempt to liberate them.

What explains local variation in rebellion? Why is rebel violence more intense in some areas than in others? Why have some towns in eastern Ukraine remained under government control while others fell to the separatists?

The most common answers to these questions have fallen into one of two categories: ethnicity and economics. The first view expects rebellion to be more likely and more intense in areas home to large concentrations of ethnolinguistic minorities - in this case, Russians or Russian speaking Ukrainians. According to this logic, geographically concentrated minorities can overcome some of the collective action problems associated with rebellion - such as monitoring and punishing defectors - while attracting an influx of fighters, weapons and economic aid from co-ethnics in neighboring states. Among others, Vladimir Putin too has cast the Donbas conflict as a primarily ethnic one: "The essential issue is how to ensure the legitimate rights and interests of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in the southeast of Ukraine".

An alternative explanation for rebellion is economic opportunity costs. According to this view, as income from less risky legal activities declines relative to income from rebellious behavior, participation in rebellion should rise. As Maidan and the Revolution of Dignity proclaimed adherence to European values and set the path towards Europe and away from the Custom's Union with Russia, the opportunity costs of rebellion declined in the Donbas. As a heavily industrialized region with deep economic ties to Russia, the Donbas was uniquely exposed to potential negative economic shocks caused by trade openness with the EU, austerity and trade barriers with Russia. A rebel fighter with the Vostok battalion summarized this view: "Many mines started to close. I lost my job. Then, with what happened during the spring, I decided to go out and defend my city".

In an article forthcoming in the Journal of Comparative Economics, I evaluate the relative explanatory power of these two perspectives, using new micro-level data on violence, ethnicity and economic activity in eastern Ukraine. I find that local economic factors are stronger predictors of rebel violence and territorial control than Russian ethnicity or language. Ethnicity only had an effect where economic incentives for rebellion were already weak. Separatists in eastern Ukraine were "pro-Russian" not because they spoke Russian, but because their economic livelihood had long depended on trade with Russia and they now saw this livelihood as being under threat.

The economic roots of the pro-Russian rebellion are evident from new data on violence and control, assembled from incident reports released by Ukrainian and Russian news agencies, government and rebel statements, daily 'conflict maps' released by both sides, and social media news feeds. The data include 10,567 unique violent events in the Donbas, at the municipality level, recorded between then President Viktor Yanukovych's flight in February 2014 and the second Minsk ceasefire agreement of February 2015. Figure 1 shows the geographic distribution of rebel violence and territorial control during the first year of the conflict.

To explain variation in the timing and intensity of violence and control, I considered the proportion of Russian speakers residing in each municipality, and the proportion of the local labor force employed in three industries, differentially vulnerable to post-Euromaidan economic shocks. These included machine-building, which is heavily dependent on exports to Russia, highly vulnerable to Russian import substitution, and currently lacks short-term alternative export markets. At the other extreme, there is the metals industry, which is less dependent on Russia, and a potential beneficiary of increased trade with the EU. Finally, I considered employment in the mining industry, which had grown dependent on Yanukovych-era state-subsidies, and became highly vulnerable to IMF-imposed austerity measures. Given the relative exposure of these industries to post-Euromaidan economic shocks, one should expect the opportunity costs of rebellion to be lowest in machine-building towns and highest in metallurgy towns, with mining towns falling in the middle. Figure 2 shows the spatial distribution of these variables. I also accounted for a host of other potential determinants of violence, like terrain, logistics, proximity to the Russian border, prewar electoral patterns, and spillover effects from rebel activity in neighboring towns.

A statistical analysis of these data reveals that a municipality's prewar employment mix is a stronger and more robust predictor of rebel activity than local ethnolinguistic composition. In municipalities more exposed to negative trade shocks with Russia (municipalities with high shares of population employed in machinery and mining), rebel violence was more likely to occur overall, and was more intense. For a median Donbas municipality, an increase in the machine-building labor force from one standard deviation below (4%) to one standard deviation above the mean (26%) yields a 44% increase (95% credible interval: a 34%-56% increase) in the frequency of rebel violence from week to week.

These municipalities - where the local population was highly vulnerable to trade disruptions with Russia - also fell under rebel control earlier and took longer for the government to liberate than municipalities where the labor force was less dependent on exports to Russia. On any given day, a municipality with higher-than-average employment in the beleaguered machine-building industry was about twice as likely to fall under rebel control as a municipality with below-average employment in the industry.

By contrast, there is little evidence of either a "Russian language effect" on violence, or an interaction between language and economics. The impact of prewar industrial employment on rebellion is the same in municipalities where a majority of the population is Russian-speaking as it is where the majority is Ukrainian-speaking. Russian language fared slightly better as a predictor of rebel control, but only under certain conditions. In particular, where economic dependence on Russia was relatively low, municipalities with large Russian-speaking populations were more likely to fall under rebel control early in the conflict. The "language effect" disappeared in municipalities where any one of the three industries had a major presence. In other words, ethnicity and language only had an effect where economic incentives for rebellion were weak.

The seemingly rational economic self-interest at the heart of the conflict may seem puzzling, given the staggering costs of war. In the eighteen months since armed men began storming government buildings in the Donbas, over 8000 people have lost their lives, and over a million have been displaced. Regional industrial production fell by 49.9% in 2014, with machinery exports to Russia down by 82%. Suffering heavy damage from shelling, many factories have closed. With airports destroyed, railroad links severed and roads heavily mined, a previously export-oriented economy has found itself isolated from the outside world. If local machinists and miners had only known the scale of the destruction to come, the economic rationale for rebellion would surely have appeared less compelling. Yet when choosing between a high-risk rebellion to retain one's economic livelihood and an almost certain loss of income, many people chose the first option.

From a policy standpoint, the economic roots of the Donbas conflict should be seen as good news. Despite the ethnocentric media coverage of this war in Russia and the West, the data show that attempts to divide Ukraine along ethnic or linguistic lines are likely to fail. These results can also explain why the conflict has not spread beyond Donetsk and Luhansk. Home to a large concentration of enterprises dependent on exports to Russia, highly subsidized and traditionally shielded from competition, the Donbas became exposed to a perfect storm of negative economic shocks after the Euromaidan. No other region in Ukraine, or the former Soviet Union, has a similarly vulnerable economic profile. Without a compelling economic motive, a pro-Russian rebellion is unlikely to occur elsewhere in Ukraine.

 [return to Contents]