#2
Russia Insider
www.russia-insider.com
November 4, 2015
These Suggestions Won't Fix "Broken" US Intelligence on Russia
You have to get outside the box
By Shellback
Shellback is the pseudonym of someone who started working for a NATO military structure in the Brezhnev years.

Mark Galeotti has just written a piece with helpful suggestions to Washington on how it can be less surprised by what Russia does: "And, let's be honest, Washington has been caught by surprise again and again when Moscow is concerned". Indeed it has and, as I argued on this site, the US is by no means the first country to be surprised by Russia.

His full piece is here so you can read it yourself but, to save you time, here are his four recommendations to repair the "broken" US intel on Russia.
https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/

1. More human intelligence

2. More analysis

3. More creativity

4. More listening to the intel people.

All well and good, but let's home in on number 3 - the creativity part. Now one would assume that Galeotti would consider himself to be "creative" or at least believe he could recognize it when he saw it. But, what do we see in his piece? "[T]he seizure of Crimea"; "The answer was the simplest one - that Moscow was lying - but the period of uncertainty allowed Russia's special forces to seize the peninsula in a smooth fait accompli"; "We do not even know for sure exactly whose advice Putin takes"; "regime"; "like most authoritarian leaders he has over the time become more insulated from reality, more steeped in his own mythology, this is a different man, heading a different team, for a different national purpose"; " If one accepts Clapper's assertion that Putin is "kind of winging it, day to day"; "[Putin's] paranoiac and persecutionist world view". That's creative? No, it's the same old crap: Putin is inscrutable; except that we know he's a deluded, unstable, fantasy-prone, boat-rocker whose actions cannot be predicted but can be predicted to be bad. Everything he does is sui generis and has nothing to do with reality except when he rages against our exceptionalism.

Well, that's a recipe for a lot more surprises.

So let me, with some experience of the NATO intelligence world, make my suggestions to reduce surprise.

-Start respecting Russia and, by extension, Putin and his team. Cut out the bunkum about gas stations masquerading as a countries, Russia doesn't make anything and other feel-good nonsense; stop with Putin's bad posture, Putin's just a thug, bare chest, height and all the rest of the childish epithets. And that includes all the fatuous prejudgments like "paranoiac and persecutionist world view". No wonder Washington is always surprised by someone it's written off as negligible.

-A little modesty wouldn't hurt. Maybe, just maybe, US actions in, say, the Middle East have not been a complete, 100%, unqualified success in every possible way. Maybe the "exceptional power" doesn't always get it completely and entirely right. I know that will be difficult, if not impossible, for the people running America to even begin to imagine, but it would be good - and a first baby step toward not-surprise - to at least imagine the possibility that there just might have been a different approach than the one taken.

-But this is my really revolutionary suggestion and it is, from Galeotti's perspective and those he's talking to, truly creative. In fact it's so creative that it's obviously never occurred to anybody in Washington. And it's simply this. Putin talks a lot; he's always giving interviews and speeches and he holds lots of meetings in which he talks. Hundreds of thousands of his words are to be found on the Presidential website (Dear US Intelligence Community: since you probably can't find this amazing resource, I'll be happy - for a reasonable remuneration - to show you where it is). And, if you can't read Russian, they translate all this stuff into English. So, my creative advice is read what he says, think about it, compare it with what he's said before, watch what he does, see what he says about that and so on. You will be amazed how much you will learn about his intentions and actions.

My three little suggestions will do a lot more to reduce surprise than his four which amount to more of the same but with more money and more people.

But I know that I'm just amusing myself: Washington is far down the rabbit hole.

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 #3
Sputnik
November 4, 2015
National Unity Day in Russia: History and Facts

MOSCOW (Sputnik) - National Unity Day was established in accordance with a federal law amending Article 1 of the Federal Law on Days of Military Glory (Victory Days) of Russia, dated December 24, 2004.

The new state holiday, approved at the initiative of the Interfaith Council of Russia (ICR), was first celebrated November 4, 2005.

National Unity Day was established in memory of the events of 1612, when Kuzma Minin and Dmitry Pozharsky led a people's volunteer army to liberate Moscow from Polish occupation. Historically, it was connected to the end of the Time of Troubles in the 17th century.

The Time of Troubles began at the death of Ivan the Terrible in 1584 continuing until the establishment of the Romanov Dynasty in 1613. A period of a deep crisis caused by the end of the Rurik dynasty, or Rurikids, soon developed into a national and state crisis compounded by a collapse of the united Russian state and the appearance of numerous pretenders to the throne, as well as widespread theft, robbery, bribery and alcoholism.

Contemporaneous accounts describe fears that the ultimate destruction of the "holy Moscow state" was imminent. Power in Moscow was usurped by the Seven Boyars (nobles) led by Prince Fyodor Mstislavsky, who opened the Kremlin gates to Polish troops, hoping to bring Prince Wladyslaw, a Catholic, to the Russian throne.

Patriarch Hermogenes called on Russians to defend the Orthodox Church and drive the Polish invaders from Moscow.

"It's time to give your lives to the House of the Most Holy Mother of God," the Patriarch wrote.

The people responded willingly, joining volunteer units to fight the invaders. The first popular movement was headed by Prokopy Lyapunov, a military governor from Ryazan. The movement dispersed after the governor was killed by Cossacks and noblemen. The anti-Polish rebellion, which began in Moscow on March 19, 1611, was quelled.

In September 1611, Kuzma Minin, a meat trader and a district head in Nizhny Novgorod, appealed to people to join the volunteer troops.

Responding to Minin's appeal, people of Nizhny Novgorod provided one third of their property for the maintenance of the local volunteer corps. But it was not enough, and soon another appeal was made, this time for an additional one-fifth of their property.

Kuzma Minin donated all of his money for the army, and his wife is said to have given her jewelry.

Acting on Minin's exhortation, people appealed to Novgorod Prince Dmitry Pozharsky, then 30 years old, to lead them. But the prince only agreed to become their military leader if the people of Nizhny Novgorod would choose a trusted aide to oversee the public funds. The people chose Minin, which is why the volunteer corps had two leaders, both chosen and trusted by the people.

Minin and Pozharsky rallied a large army including over 10,000 service-class people (bound by obligations of service, especially military service to the Moscow State), about 3,000 Cossacks, over 1,000 Streltsy (riflemen) and many peasants bound by military service obligations.

People from all classes of Russian society and all ethnic groups in the Russian state joined together to liberate their homeland from the invaders.

The Nizhny Novgorod voluntary corps, marching under an icon of Our Lady of Kazan, uncovered in Kazan in 1579, stormed Kitai Gorod (the external walls of Moscow) on November 4, 1612, driving the invaders from Moscow. That victory provided a powerful impetus for the revival of the Russian state. The icon of Our Lady of Kazan became the protector of all Russia.

The liberation of Moscow created conditions for the restoration of state power and the election of a new tsar. In November 1612, the leaders of the volunteer corps sent invitations to all Russian cities to attend a national assembly (the Zemsky Sobor). In late February 1613, the Zemsky Sobor, comprising representatives of all classes of Russian society (clergy, boyar, nobility, Cossack, peasant, etc.), elected Mikhail Romanov, the son of Metropolitan Filaret, as the new tsar, the first of the Romanov Dynasty.

The 1613 Zemsky Sobor ended the Time of Troubles and celebrated the priority of Orthodoxy and national unity.

According to the Nikon Chronicle, a compilation of chronicles for the time, after driving the invading Poles from Moscow, Prince Dmitry Pozharsky placed the icon of Our Lady of Kazan in his parish church of the Presentation of the Virgin in the Temple in the Lubyanka district in Moscow. He donated funds for the construction of the Cathedral of Our Lady of Kazan on Red Square. The now widely accepted miracle-working icon, which Pozharsky brought to Moscow for the battle against the invaders, was moved to the new church in 1636 and remained there for the next 300 years.

The icon was later moved to the Epiphany Cathedral at Yelokhovo in Moscow.

Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich, ruling from 1645-1676, established a holiday to commemorate the liberation of Moscow, the Day of the Icon of Our Lady of Kazan. It was marked as an Orthodox and state holiday until 1917. The day is celebrated on November 4 (October 22 Old Style) as an Orthodox Holiday of Day of the Icon of Our Lady of Kazan, in memory of the 1612 liberation of Moscow.

National Unity Day is not a new holiday but an old tradition recently revived.

On National Unity Day, political parties and public movements around Russia hold demonstrations, marches, concerts, as well as educational, charity and sports events.

The popularity of this holiday grows each year. According to a poll conducted by the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) on October 26, 2014, 63 percent of respondents believe that it is an important holiday, an increase from 57 percent in 2013.

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 #4
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
November 4, 2015
A 'new' National Holiday serves to unite 11 time zones
In a country where more than 130 languages are spoken, the idea of unity is a necessary theme to explore.
By Mikhail Shvydkoi
Mikhail Shvydkoi was the Minister of Culture of the Russian Federation (2000-2004).

On Nov. 4, Russian citizens will celebrate National Unity Day. This is a relatively new Russian holiday, which came into our lives in 2005.

It was brought to life for a number of very obvious reasons. The creation of a new - Russian, not Soviet - nation required new symbols. We had to find an event that was in the vicinity of Nov. 7 [the anniversary of the 1917 October Revolution, the official national day of the Soviet Union from 1918 to 1991 - RBTH] to create a holiday that could replace the Soviet tradition.

However, National Unity Day is not simply a young holiday. The historical roots of this particular date reach back to the beginning of the 17th century and the end of the Time of Troubles (a period of national and dynastic chaos from 1598 to 1613), when Polish troops were expelled from Russia and the new Tsar Mikhail Romanov was crowned. Bulkily named the Day of Moscow's Liberation from Polish Invaders, it was an important and stately holiday but, in my opinion, deprived of any necessary emotional connection to modern Russia.

The newly founded Nov. 4 holiday has yet to earn its place in the hearts of all Russians. I'm sure that there is no holiday in Russia today that can be compared in its unifying power with May 9 - U.S.S.R.'s Victory Day in the Great Patriotic War and World War II.

This war is still embedded in the hearts of all Russian citizens, their fates and human connections. The memory of the war and the pride of victory for their parents and grandparents undeniably unite the new Russian and Soviet histories. And on National Unity Day, these similarities are things we dwell on.

At the same time, Russians are significantly freer in their judgments than the Soviet people. We got all the constitutional rights which they could not dream of in the Soviet Union - the right to freedom of movement, freedom of speech and the right to property. Today's Russia is a capitalist country, where the government is trying to maintain its social responsibility to its citizens, which is very difficult in the current economic situation.

The role of religion in society has changed. Freedom of conscience, as stated in the Russian constitution, has led to the increased development of our country's traditional religions - Orthodox Christianity, Islam, Judaism and Buddhism. But unity can also grow out of this multi-confessionality, even if Russia is a very secular state.

Today, patriotism is quite often, and wrongly, in my opinion, regarded as a kind of national ideology. Such an understanding, ironically, is a threat to our national unity.

Patriotism, in a pure sense, is a normal human feeling - like loving your parents - and is usually not related to the political beliefs of a person. However, it is important for society and individuals to distinguish between patriotism and nationalism.

One should not forget that patriotism is inherent in all people, and should be a unifying emotion even in people of different ethnic backgrounds: in Russians as well as in Tatars, Bashkirs or Chechens [Russia's second, fourth and sixth largest ethnicities, respectively - RBTH].

Certainly, every people has its own language, its intangible heritage - customs, traditions, rules of conduct, art and culture. Not everything matches, even if the peoples belong to the same linguistic group or share a common religion.

Russia is a country where multiculturalism is accompanied with some general civil rules of conduct. I will make no secret of the fact that it is extremely difficult at times to maintain the balance of interests of different peoples living side by side. But this should be the goal of every forward-thinking country.

When celebrating National Unity Day, a decade after its recreation in its current form, Russians will draw upon these themes of multi-culturalism, multi-confessionalism and what it means to be from a country with two intertwined histories: Soviet and Russian.

Certainly our poets and filmmakers and ballet dancers and musicians serve as a common well of culture for Russians to drink from: Whether it's 19th-century classical music or the defining movies of the '90s, we don't need to look too far to find similarities.

As Russians learn to cherish this new November holiday, whatever their ethnicity or political leaning, they can dwell on the unifying glory of Victory Day in the recent past or on the historical Day of Moscow's Liberation from Polish Invaders.

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 #5
Putin to take part in events marking National Unity Day

MOSCOW, November 4. /TASS/. Russian President Vladimir Putin is due to participate in the events on Wednesday dedicated to the National Unity Day, the Kremlin press service has said.

The Russian leader will lay flowers at the monument to Kuzma Minin and Dmitry Pozharsky, the leaders of the militia in 1611-1612 that liberated Moscow from the Polish invaders.

Like in the previous years, the ceremony near the St. Basil's Cathedral on Moscow's Red Square will be attended by the representatives of religions and youth organizations.

Putin will later visit the 14th Church and Public Forum and Exhibition Orthodox Russia. My History. From Great Upheavals to the Great Victory. The exhibition is dedicated to Russia's history between 1914 and 1945.

The president will also honor foreign citizens with state awards for their particular contribution to strengthening peace, friendship, cooperation and mutual understanding between nations.

The National Unity Day holiday was established 10 years ago replacing the Day of Consent and Reconciliation, which had been celebrated on November 7 (formerly Revolution Day) since 1996.

 #6
Russia Insider
www.russia-insider.com
November 4, 2015
Russian National Unity Day: "Stop Quarrelling, Boys!"
A personal reflection on Russia's history
By Alexei Pankin
Started his career in Soviet times as a researcher of the US media at the Institute of US&Canadian Studies. In the 1990-s served as coordinator of EU and OSCE media monitoring missions during national elections in post-communist countries. Was editor and publisher of the Russian-European journalism review Sreda. Founding editor of op-ed page at Izvestia daily. Founded regional press syndicate for RIA Novosti news agency. His columns appeared in leading Russian and foreign newspapers ranging from Izvestia, Vedomosti and Komsomolskay Pravda to the Financial Times, Independent, International Herald Tribune, Die Welt and Die Zeit. For nearly 15 years was a guest media watcher for the Moscow Times.

Up until the year 2005, November 7th was the day the Soviet Union and modern Russia commemorated the October Revolution of 1917. Since then, this observance was replaced with a National Unity Day celebrated on November 4th.

At the beginning of November in 1612, a popular uprising led by a merchant Kuzma Minin and Prince Dmitry Pozharsky, initiated what would result in the liberation of Moscow from Polish invaders. A few months later, in February 1613, Mikhail Romanov was elected Czar, thus marking the beginning of the Romanov dynasty that ruled Russia for more than 300 years. The Time of Troubles, a 15-year period when the country was plunged into chaos by internal disputes and the intervention of the Poles and Swedes was over, and the formation of the modern Russian nation had begun.

Personally, I was glad about the change of the November holiday from the 7th to the 4th because my parents celebrate their wedding anniversary on that day. For ten years now, we have been celebrating our family's holiday on the same day as the public one. From a national unity point of view, it has a deep symbolic meaning to me.

My father was born in Frunze, now Bishkek, the capital of the Central Asian Republic of Kirgizia in 1931. His father had brought the first tractors to the fields of the collective farms being built in Kirghizia. Descending from a peasant family from the Central Volga region, my grandfather went to the city and attended a trade school before the revolution. During the Civil War, he was drafted into the Red Army and became a devoted communist. At the end of 1920s, when his parents were 'de-kulakized' during the collectivization where richer farmers were stripped of their land, cattle and homes  and exiled to the north of Russia, he, as many others, thought it must be a mistake and wrote letters to Stalin asking him to restore justice.

My grandmother on my father's side, belonged to a wealthy merchant family from Orenburg, a city in the southernmost Urals. The first time the bolsheviks ravaged them was immediately after the October Revolution and her brothers, according to family legend, fought in the Civil War on the side of the Whites and later emigrated to the United States. During the period of the New Economic Policy in the 1920s, the family started a business again and prospered but at some point, great grandfather realized that this would not end well. They packed overnight, leaving everything behind and moved in with relatives in Kirghizia. It was there, that my future grandparents first met.

My young relatives at the time, had enough good sense to look for employment where nobody would scrutinize their social origins. After all, Kirghizia was not the most distant place from his native Volga, where my grandfather had plowed the land and built roads.

But his son, my father, was accepted to the Moscow State University School of Journalism without any patronage. Years later, he was appointed chief editor of "Komsomolskaya Pravda", a major national newspaper and later went on to become an ambassador.

His father, who received practically nothing but trouble from the Soviet authorities, retained his faith in communism until the day he passed away. My father however, belonged to that category of Soviet leaders, who became increasingly disillusioned with communism as they moved up the ranks. It was these people who started perestroika, which brought us all our first fundamental, political and economic rights. During the anti-democratic coup that took place in August 1991, my father was the only Soviet ambassador who publicly spoke out against the conspirators.

My mother fully supported him in his actions.

I believe it was not easy for a girl 63 years ago, from an educated Moscow family,  to dare to marry a guy who had nothing. By that time however, baffling her own parents, she had taken to studying Turkish and Farsi at university and devoted most of her life to translating the works of Soviet Central Asian writers into Russian. So she too had a tendency toward making uncommon choices.

None of us forgave Yeltsin for taking the Soviet Union from us, the country we were born and raised in, without asking. With regard to the current leadership, my father and I have differing viewpoints. Whereas Gorbachev is closer to him, I believe Putin is а better leader. "Do not quarrel, boys! It's not worth it", my mother says when my father and I begin to get angry with each other over politics. As I recall, my father's mother used to tell her son and her husband those same words.

When my sister and I were still teenagers, our father taught us the proper mindset in viewing history: "One might not like Soviet rule, but without it, a son of a peasant from Volga and а merchant daughter from Orenburg would have never met in Kirghizia and therefore neither I or you both would exist".

On November 4th, 2015, we will set our holiday table and toast to the health of my parents, who have been together for 63 years now and we will talk about the Great October Revolution that so amazingly stirred the dark and the bright, unchangeable and inescapable past of our family.

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 #7
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
November 2, 2015
Integration still a challenge in Russia
Russian society has yet to accept that mass migration is a fact, which makes it harder for those moving to the country to integrate into society, according to an expert on xenophobia.
By Ilya Krol

The SOVA Center for Information and Analysis is one of the leading nonprofit organizations in Russia examining nationalism and ethnic and religious xenophobia. Founded in 2002, the center regularly publishes material  dealing with the issue of migration. RBTH spoke with the head of the center, Alexander Verkhovsky, about the attitudes  of Russians toward migrants, multiculturalism and the politically incorrect term "assimilation."

Q: The migrant in modern Russia - who is he or she? Is it possible to draw a typical portrait of such a person?

In Russia, the word "migrant" is used in a way that is far from literal: a "migrant" is not an "immigrant," temporary or permanent, but any person who moves from one place to another if his ethnicity is clearly different from that of the host community.

Technically, Russia's first post-Soviet generation of immigrants are the millions of people who have moved from the former Soviet republics to Russia. Ethnically, many of them are Russian, but few would call them "migrants," although they also had trouble adapting to the new location.

In the 2000s, the term "migrants"  is primarily used for immigrants and temporary labor migrants from Central Asia and the South Caucasus. There are a few from other Asian countries, rarely from Africa. [The term is] also for those who have moved from the North Caucasus to other regions of Russia, if these people are not Slavs.

Q: One of the key indicators of attitudes toward migrants is the level of xenophobia. What is the situation in Russia?

The first wave of xenophobia was in the early 1990s and, of course, it was triggered by the shock of the collapse of the Soviet Union and its dramatic consequences. Then everything somewhat calmed down, and a new abrupt surge occurred at the turn of 1999 and 2000 as a result of the second Chechen war.

Understandably, the Chechens were singled out then, but hostility extended to other "non-Slavs." Between 2000 and 2012, its level was consistently high; about 55 percent of our citizens believed then that the ethnic majority should have privileges: "Russia is for the Russians."

Q: A recent survey by the independent pollster Levada Center showed that the level of xenophobia in Russian society has gone down. What is the reason, in your opinion?

It went down as early as in 2014. By some measures, even below the level of 2012. One of the reasons is the events connected with Ukraine.

The theme of migration as a threat has been replaced by the theme of the crisis of relations with the West and the protection of the Russian-speaking population in Ukraine. It immediately became clear that the real problems related to migration are not so great, since they are easily forced out of the public consciousness by other issues.

Q: Is this a long-term trend or a temporary phenomenon?

It inspires cautious optimism that people have started to answer questions like "What to do with migrants" in a more rational way. Mass migration is always a great social problem, and it is unlikely that it can be resolved smoothly, but if the majority of citizens will switch, finally, from pure alarmism to the discussion of constructive solutions, these solutions will be possible.

Q: Religion, race, different culture- which is the most frequent trigger of ethnic conflict in Russia?

As a rule, it is not economic concerns or security issues - terrorism and so-called ethnic crime - that dominate, but rather what is called "negative perception of cultural distance."

The "others" do everything "in the other way." Appearance is a marker of cultural distance. Everything else, including religion, are less significant markers. The negative attitude does not necessarily translate into actual aggression; it can be latent.

Q: It is believed that xenophobia was practically nonexistent in the Soviet Union - the same Uzbeks, Tajiks or Azerbaijanis who are now coming to Russia as migrants lived with each other and with Russians without any conflicts as Soviet citizens. Is this true?

Polls on such topics certainly did not exist in the Soviet Union. But I was born in 1962, so I remember well that there was xenophobia. For example, the word "Georgian" was frequently used as a pejorative, while people from Central Asia were called the same names as now.

There were also conflicts on the periphery of the Soviet Union. The other thing is that there could not exist an organized nationalist movement of any kind, and now it does. The only consolation is that organizations of nationalists in no way enjoy mass support.

Q: The United States is often cited as an example of a country that has defeated xenophobia, where migrants are really assimilated with the pre-existing population. What is the situation in Russia?

The term "assimilation" is now considered not very politically correct, as it implies the rejection of original ethnic and cultural identity. The preferred term is "integration," which involves the combination of two identities - the ethnic and cultural one in some aspects of life and the general civil in the others. This combination, however, applies not only to migrants, but also to the host population.

So far, integration proceeds with difficulty in Russia, because society is not ready to recognize mass immigration as an accomplished fact. In Russia, migrant workers are even called Gastarbeiter [German for "guest workers"]; in the 1950s, the Germans thought that the workers from Turkey were temporary, too.

But no, mass migration is here to stay, and, as long as society is not ready to accept it, it is not ready to make efforts to integrate migrants. However, more enterprising migrants overcome all the difficulties, learn Russian, create mixed families.
---
A native of Moscow, Verkhovtsev graduated from the Moscow Institute of Oil and Gas Industry with a degree in applied mathematics, but soon found himself drawn to questions of nationalism and xenophobia. He has been the director of the SOVA research center since 2002 and a member of Russia's Council on the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights since 2012.

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 #8
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
November 4, 2015
Moscow creates vast new bank from Post Office
Russia's postal service joined forces with VTB Bank to establish Post Bank, a new retail lender with three times as many retail branches as the current leader, Sberbank.
By Kira Egorova

Russia's government approved the establishment of a massive new bank based on the country's postal service, a move that will eventually create an institution with more retail branches than all other Russian banks combined. The new entity, called Post Bank, is a joint venture between Russian Post and one of the country's largest lenders, state-owned VTB Bank.

Post Bank is being established in part to provide banking services across Russia's far-flung, near-empty regions, and to target pensioners. VTB will fuse one of its subsidiaries, Leto Bank, into the new institution. The partners say the new institution will begin giving out loans as early as January 2016, with a pilot project to be launched in Moscow this fall.

Over the next three years, the bank will open outlets in no less than 15,000 Russian Post offices. After this initial rollout, the bank should start operating in all the 42,000 offices of the national operator. The current leader, Sberbank, has more than 17,000 outlets. Once it is completed, Post Bank will have more retail locations than all other Russian banks combined, according to the Russian banking portal Banki.ru.

Post Bank's Board of Directors will be headed by Russian Communications Minister Nikolai Nikiforov. "The question of the creation of Post Bank has been discussed for 15 years; eventually we came to the conclusion that it would be created in partnership with the VTB Group," Mr. Nikiforov told reporters at a conference in September.

According to the minister, after the renaming of Leto Bank as Post Bank, VTB will keep 50% plus 1 share of the new entity while the rest will be acquired by Russian Post. VTB will invest 16 billion rubles ($246 million) in Post Bank. In turn, Russian Post will assume the costs for modernizing its post offices to accommodate the banking operations.

The government won't back Post Bank up with financial help, social benefits or donations, Leto Bank's press office said, adding the new institution aims to bring more Russians into the banking system.

"Today only 50% of Russia's population [over 18 years old] uses banking services. In China the share is 70%, and in Scandinavian counties it's over 97%. The creation of Post Bank should change this situation", Leto Bank press service said. "The experience of France, Japan and China proves that a bank project like this is relevant and rather successful. Moreover, Post Bank should decrease the share of cash payments and increase the competition in some areas where only one or two banks operate," the bank said.

A social bank

According to VTB chief Andrei Kostin, Post Bank aims to serve as many as 20 million people, half of whom will be pensioners. Post Bank's loan portfolio will grow to 418 billion rubles ($6.43 billion)over 10 years, and its deposit base will reach 577 billion rubles ($8.87 billion), he said. "Post Bank will offer pension delivery with special cards and accounts. Special deposit and credit services will be available for pensioners," Leto Bank press service commented.

The main competitive advantage of such a bank is a broad infrastructure and access to the large customer base of Russian Post, whose regional network covers even the smallest and most remote communities of the vast Russian territory, said Dmitry Monastyrshin, the principal analyst at Russia's Promsvyazbank. According to him, the national operator serves approximately 150 million addressees and has been familiar to the public for many years. "Customer confidence in Russian Post will translate into loyalty to Post Bank," Monastyrshin said.

The success of the new bank will largely depend on how well it combines banking processes with the work of Russian Post, which is broadly considered to be notorious for inefficiency and poor organization, analysts said.

"The low efficiency of Russian Post is largely due to the low cost of the services, which is important to ensure the availability of post services to the broad public," said Monastyrshin. However, he said, the use of VTB Bank's up-to-date banking technologies, coupled with Russian Post's extensive infrastructure and access to its customer base, should create synergies and ensure the profitability of the new group.

"But for all that, a lot will depend on the new bank's approach to the formation of the loan portfolio," Monastyrshin said.

Increased efficiency is a question of time under proper management, said Sergei Deineka, an expert with the BKS Premier bank. "A striking recent example is Sberbank. Even 10-15 years ago, it was considered just as clumsy and ineffective an organization as Russian Post, and was associated exclusively with huge queues by the public," he said.

"After a total restructuring, the situation has changed dramatically, and now instead of the usual Sberbank, we see quite a modern bank, keeping up with the times." Mr. Deineka believes that Russian Post can repeat this success.

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#9
Moscow Times
November 4, 2015
Airbnb Sees Rapid Growth in Russia Amid Recession

The online lodging service Airbnb has seen rapid growth in Russia as the country's economic recession forces more Russians to look for ways to supplement their incomes, the Bloomberg news agency reported Tuesday.

The Russian business of San Francisco-based Airbnb has doubled during the past year, propelling Moscow into the world's top 10 cities with the most bookings, Bloomberg reported.

"The traditional Russian mindset of 'my home is my castle' is changing as more people open up and seek extra income to cope with the economic turmoil," Andrew Verbitsky, head of Airbnb in Russia, told Bloomberg.

In the first half of the year, real wages in Russia fell by 8.8 percent, according to data from the Rosstat state statistics service.

The online platform Airbnb allows owners to rent out entire apartments or single rooms to travelers, charging commission of between 6 percent and 12 percent, depending on the cost of the booking. Airbnb's biggest renters are Paris, London, New York, Los Angeles and San Francisco.

According to Verbitsky, before this year Russians using Airbnb preferred to rent out their entire apartments, while now more people are renting out single rooms.

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 #10
Moscow Times
November 4, 2015
Exiled Kremlin Critic Becomes EBRD Chief Economist

Sergei Guriev, a former adviser to the Russian government who fled the country two years ago, has been appointed chief economist at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the bank said in a statement Tuesday.

Guriev is to take up his post in summer 2016. He will become the first Russian to hold the post at the EBRD, a multilateral lender that disperses funds in former Communist Eastern Europe.

Guriev, 44, left Moscow for Paris in 2013 in fear of arrest as investigators probed his connections with Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the former Yukos owner who was in jail at the time, and Alexei Navalny, an anti-corruption campaigner who has emerged as the most potent opponent to President Vladimir Putin.

Suma Chakrabarti, the current EBRD president, said in the statement, "He brings a huge amount of experience and expertise to the job and to the bank's executive committee."

Guriev currently teaches at Sciences Po university in Paris.

The ERBD stopped lending to projects in Russia last year as part of sanctions imposed on Moscow over its actions in Ukraine by Western European countries, which are the bank's main backers.

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 #11
www.rt.com
November 4, 2015
Putin signs law allowing retaliatory sequestration of foreign property in Russia

Russia's president has signed legislation enabling countermeasures in the case of the wrongful arrest of Russian state property abroad. The law, based on reciprocity, curtails the jurisdictional immunity of the country in question if not agreed otherwise.

The document was published on Russia's official legal information website and therefore has come into effect.

According to the new law, the jurisdictional immunities of a foreign state and its property could be limited on the territory of Russia on the principle of mutuality, in the case that the jurisdictional immunity of Russia has been found to be suffering limitations on the sovereign territory of that country.

The provisions of the law would not be applied if Russia and the other country have reached an agreement to act differently.

The judicial immunity of a foreign entity that has filed a legal action, entered legal argument or has taken any other substantive action in a Russian court will be considered revoked.

The revoking of a foreign country's judicial immunity in any given legal argument is irrevocable and will be applied to all stages of judicial examinations.

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 #12
Russia Beyond the Headlines/Rossiyskaya Gazeta
www.rbth.ru
November 3, 2015
Russian World on the path to consolidation
Russian Foreign Minister explains major tenet of country's foreign policy.
By Sergei Lavrov
The author is the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. This is an abridged version of remarks originally published in Rossiyskaya Gazeta.

The fifth World Congress of Compatriots Living Abroad, to open in Moscow on November 5, is expected to become an important stage in the further consolidation of the Russian World.

The Russian community abroad amounts to approximately 30 million people and is the fourth largest diaspora population in the world. Its formation began in the late 19th and early 20th centuries and occurred in waves associated with momentous events in our national history.

An important milestone in recent years was the first World Congress of Compatriots in 2001. The memory of the collapse of the Soviet Union, which left more than 25 million compatriots outside the homeland, was still fresh then. To find one's place in these new conditions, to preserve ethnic and cultural identity, to ensure the maintenance of ties with the historical homeland - these problems were of great importance for the majority of compatriots. And the country's leaders responded to their aspirations.

Providing full support to the Russian World is the absolute priority of Russia's foreign policy, as recorded in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. As President Vladimir Putin has confirmed on more than one occasion, we will continue to vigorously defend the rights of compatriots, using the entire arsenal of means available under international law.

The Russian World is an important resource to strengthen the atmosphere of trust and understanding in the relations between Russia and our compatriots' countries of residence. We will continue to explain to our partners that the presence of the Russian diaspora in their countries is an important factor for enhancing mutually beneficial bilateral relations in various spheres.

The Russian Foreign Ministry provides full support to the Fund to shore up and protect the rights of compatriots living abroad. Since its establishment in January 2013 it has proved to be a much-needed mechanism for defending their legitimate interests and neutralizing attempts to discriminate against them, particularly in the Baltic States. The Fund makes a useful contribution as a countermeasure against the revision of the results of World War II, the glorification of the Nazis and their accomplices, all forms and manifestations of xenophobia, aggressive nationalism and chauvinism.

The celebration of the 70th anniversary of the Great Victory was a powerful unifying factor for the Russian diasporas. We are sincerely grateful to them for their contribution to the organization of the jubilee, for the fact that they do not forget the heroic pages of our history and are united in the need to defend the truth about the events of those years.

The effectiveness of our efforts is also evidenced by the implementation of the state program to assist the voluntary resettlement of compatriots living abroad to the Russian Federation. More than 367,000 people have moved to Russia under the program.

This process was strongly influenced by the situation in Ukraine; 1.2 million Ukrainian citizens alone have come to our country as a result of the war in Donbass unleashed by Kiev. Overall, the share of Ukrainian citizens amounts to more than half of the total number of compatriots who have come to Russia.

We are not going to rest on our laurels. There is plenty of work ahead, which we discuss in detail during the forthcoming Congress. I am convinced that together we will successfully solve the challenges we face in the interests of the further development of the enormous potential of the Russian World.

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 #13
Los Angeles Times
November 2, 2015
In Damascus, Syrians express a surprising level of optimism
By Patrick J. McDonnell
 
Amid the din of Hamidiya market, Isahak Kraymeen took a break from slinging cups of tamarind juice from a magic lantern-style brass cooler to reflect on the future of his wounded homeland.

"I have hope now that a new sun will soon rise to cover all the destruction," declared the juice man, decked out in a red fez and ballooned pants, a throwback to a time when tourists thronged the storied souk and posed for snapshots with the Ottoman-era-like figure.

Across Old Damascus, in the labyrinthine alleys of the Bab Touma district, Juman Edilbi said he sensed rising confidence among fellow residents of the Syrian capital.

"Each day I get the feeling more and more that people think the worst is behind us," said Edilbi, a bespectacled university student.

Shoppers thronged the famed covered market, stopping at stalls selling everything from women's clothing to copper ornaments to handmade Arabic-style ice cream.

From the outside, the news from civil-war stricken Syria appears devoid of hope, a dismal loop of executions, bombardments, bedraggled refugees on the move and hyped diplomatic initiatives that seem to go nowhere.

In Damascus, however, interviews with residents suggest a tentative sense of optimism, even as the war drags through its fifth year. Rising prices and power cuts remain the norm, rebels still hold sway in nearby suburbs and uncertainty about the future has become a fact of life.

Still, the mood seems cautiously upbeat in the capital, even compared with a visit just four months ago.

Russia's monthlong intervention on behalf of the government of President Bashar Assad has lifted the spirits of many government supporters in the area, Assad's base of power and home to an estimated 5 million people. The capital remains under tight government control. Since the Russian aerial campaign began Sept. 30, loyalist forces have gone on the offensive outside Damascus and to the north, winning back territory.

Even many Syrians opposed to more than 40 years of Assad family rule view the current government as a bulwark against the Islamic militants who have come to dominate the armed opposition.

On Sunday, insurgents in Duma, a rebel stronghold northeast of Damascus, posted video of street scenes featuring caged hostages, identified as members of Assad's Alawite sect. The rebels said the captives were being deployed on the streets as human shields against punishing government and Russian airstrikes that, the opposition said, had killed hundreds of civilians - an allegation denied by Moscow.

"If you want to bomb us and we die, they'll die like us," says an apparent rebel fighter in the video, referring to the Alawite hostages.

Although opposition activists condemn Russia's intervention, pro-government residents are thrilled that a major power has publicly taken their side against a formidable array of adversaries, including the United States and its partners, who do not want Assad to remain in power. Syria's other major ally, Iran, has also stepped up military aid.

"The Russians came to help us as a friend, and we appreciate it, but we must still depend on ourselves and our God - and we will fight to the end," vowed one plainclothes security man in a black leather jacket Monday at a checkpoint. "If need be I will fight with this alone," he added, holding aloft his walkie-talkie, as uniformed troops with AK-47s nodded in agreement.

Last week's declarations at an international conference in Vienna backing the maintenance of Syria's state institutions and the country's "secular character" also appear to have quelled anxieties. A persistent fear in the capital is that Syria will suffer the kind of catastrophic collapse into anarchy seen after the U.S.-backed toppling of authoritarian governments in Iraq and Libya. The Obama administration has said it does not want the Syrian state to fall apart.

"I think it's great that Russia is helping us," said Rascha, 28, a shopper in the Hamidiya souk who asked to be identified by first name only for security reasons. "Really, people are fed up. They want it to end."

Nodding in agreement was her friend, 38, a mother of three who asked to be identified by a nickname, Um Aiman, or mother of Aiman. She said she and her family had recently fled the rebel-held Ghouta area east of the capital, a vast stretch that includes Duma city and is still reported to be home to more than 200,000, despite large-scale destruction.

"It was just getting too hard to live in the Ghouta - food was so expensive, there were shortages, bombings, the armed groups controlled everything," said Um Aiman, seated in a second floor-clothing store overlooking the bustle of shoppers below.

She said her son, Aiman, 17, had died because he could not get proper medical attention for an unspecified illness. "People in the Ghouta can't take it any more," she said.

Any sense of relief in Syria does not extend to embattled places such as the northern city of Aleppo, where renewed fighting has left about 2 million civilians largely cut off from outside supplies. The war has left at least 200,000 people dead and pushed more than 4 million Syrians to leave the country.

In Damascus, however, mortar and rocket attacks have subsided. Once-frequent car bombs have all but ceased. Traffic jams and lively markets and streets attest to an atmosphere of normality, even amid the ever-present martial reminders: troops in the streets, rows of concrete blast barriers and the omnipresent checkpoints that clog traffic, but appear to have helped reduce attacks.

In Jaramana, a densely packed southern suburb firmly in government hands, tight security and government advances in neighboring districts have drastically cut down on opposition bombings and shelling strikes. Displaced people from other districts have swelled the population of Jaramana. A heart-shaped monument at a busy intersection features photos of some of the scores killed, including children, in a double car bombing almost three years ago.

"Some friends have come to help us, that is a good thing," said Nader Saloum, a real estate salesman who said he lost two close friends in the bombing commemorated in the monument across the street from his office. "Maybe it will end soon."

To the northwest, in Damascus' upper-middle-class Dumar district, children from a ruling-party scout group were raising Syrian flags and singing patriotic slogans during a school gathering Monday. Two youths held flower-lined photos of Assad and his late father, Hafez Assad.

"There is less fear now, people are coming out to more activities," said Juliette Hasan, 37, the mother of two boys in the ceremony, watching along with other parents, many taking pictures with their cellphones. "We stayed in Syria and I'm happy we did. I think all of those who left will come to regret it."

Special correspondent Nabih Bulos in Athens contributed to this report.

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 #14
Ekho Moskvy news agency (Moscow)
November 3, 2015
Syria regime change could spell global disaster - Russian spokeswoman

Moscow, 3 November. The Russian Foreign Ministry does not think that retaining Bashar al-Asad in the post of Syrian president is crucial, however, a regime change in the country at present could only benefit the terrorist group Islamic State, the activities of which are banned on the territory of Russia. This was announced live on Ekho Moskvy radio by the Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, Mariya Zakharova.

She stressed that for the region in which a number of regime changes have taken place in the recent times, a regime change in Syria cold lead to catastrophic consequences.

"This could become a disaster not only of a local scale and not even of a regional. We see hundreds of thousands of refugees all over the world. This could simply turn the region into a big black hole, like a vortex into which new countries and territories will be sucked one after another. And all this plays into the hands of one force - Islamic State," she said.

"Without a doubt, Syria's statehood is a key moment, inter alia, in the fight against terrorism, because if the Syrian state ceases to exist, there will be no-one to fight terrorists on the ground, this is a given. And another point - the future of the president of the country should be decided by the people of Syria," the Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman stressed.

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 #15
Rossiyskaya Gazeta
November 2, 2015
"Definite shifts" seen in sides stances at Vienna talks on Syria - Russian paper
Yekaterina Zabrodina, They do not look at flags. Lavrov and Kerry assembled implacable opponents on Syria

Only six months ago, it was impossible to imagine that the Russian foreign minister and the US secretary of state would warmly thank one another for their diplomatic participation in the fate of Syria, or that vehement opponents like Saudi Arabia and Iran would find themselves for the first time at the same negotiating table. But this is precisely what happened on 30 October in the multilateral consultations on the Syrian issue in Vienna.

Sergey Lavrov and John Kerry managed to assemble the most impressive "group in support of the Syrian settlement process" in the entire four years of the armed conflict in the country. The powerful "diplomatic landing party" that included the heads of the foreign policy departments of Russia, the USA, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Qatar, Germany, France, Great Britain and Italy and also European diplomacy chief Federica Mogherini, gathered at Vienna's Imperial Hotel. There were 19 delegations in all. There was a surprise in the shape of the arrival in Vienna of the Chinese deputy foreign minister - in this way, the entire "quintet" of permanent members of the UN Security Council were at the gathering and with them, Staffan de Mistura, the UN secretary-general's special representative on Syria.

How far would players with such different, sometimes incompatible, interests in Syria be able to reach agreement? The intrigue was sustained for the entire seven hours that their meeting behind closed doors continued. Rossiyskaya Gazeta's correspondent managed to glance only for a couple of minutes into the conference chamber where the US secretary of state and the Russian foreign minister were sitting next to de Mistura in the "presidium" at the head of the table. Kerry, leaning towards his Russian counterpart, was telling him something energetically. The fact that Iranian Minister Javad Zarif (as Rossiyskaya Gazeta said earlier, his participation was insisted on by Moscow) and the Saudi minister, Adil al-Jubayr, occupied seats on different sides of the table caught the eye - this can hardly be described as a coincidence, bearing in mind the relations between Riyadh and the Shi'i regime of the ayatollahs, which provides powerful support to Damascus. As Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov acknowledged later, "countries of the region between which highly serious contradictions exist" began to talk to one another for the first time in Vienna - and this alone can be regarded as an important achievement.

Despite the "leaks" from "informed" Western sources suggesting that the participants would go their separate ways having achieved nothing, after the completion of the meeting, Lavrov appeared before journalists together with John Kerry and the UN secretary-general's special representative with the agreed text of a joint communique. This did not happen without a curious incident, which appeared symbolic. Lavrov sat de Mistura in the centre, so that the latter found himself directly under the Russian tricolour; Kerry had to position himself under the UN flag, while the Stars and Stripes ended up behind the Russian minister's back. "They have decided to act, without regard to flags," observers joked.

The main and expected result of the meeting was that the participants returned to the obvious idea that Moscow has been repeating all along. Namely - the need to launch the political process in Syria as soon as possible in line with the 2012 Geneva communique, bringing the representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic government and the opposition to the negotiating table. The delegates officially appealed to the United Nations with a request for assistance.

Up till now, the fulfilment of this plan has been hindered by several obstacles. One of them is the extreme position of the group of countries demanding the immediate departure of the Syrian president as a mandatory prior condition for the beginning of inter-Syrian contacts. "I did not say that Bashar al-Asad should go or that he should stay. I said that Bashar al-Asad's fate, like everything that concerns the future development of the Syrian state, should be resolved by the Syrian people themselves," the Russian foreign minister recalled Moscow's position. And it would appear, people are beginning to listen to this position. At the same time, Lavrov, like Kerry, stressed that the "significant contradictions" have not gone away, but that the participants in the meeting "showed a readiness for compromises". In the Russian minister's opinion, "this will allow work to begin in earnest, even though it will no doubt be neither easy nor quick."

All the countries stated their commitment to the "unity, independence, territorial integrity and secular character" of the republic and the safeguarding of its state institutions. One of the key points of the Vienna communique says that an administration that enjoys trust and is inclusive (that is to say, which has the maximum involvement of the sides - RG comment), without confessional preferences" will be created in the framework of the political process, and that this structure will subsequently help prepare a new constitution and hold a general election under the supervision of the United Nations. Rossiyskaya Gazeta has learned from sources in Vienna that an entire diplomatic wrangle broke out around the formula for the new "administration structure". In the upshot, they managed to avoid the term "transitional government". After all, it is a question of an organ that would include representatives of both the Syrian government and the opposition.

Only so far there is no united delegation of the Syrian opposition - this is yet another major difficulty in the way of the inter-Syrian dialogue that was mentioned by Sergey Lavrov in Vienna. Rossiyskaya Gazeta's sources say that the sides are still not managing to agree on lists acceptable to everyone of terrorist groups and of opponents of the regime who have not associated themselves with the extremists. The news arrived from Washington just in time for the Vienna meeting that the United States is unilaterally transferring a detachment of special forces to northern Syria to help the local Kurds opposing the Islamic State group [ISIL] (a group that is banned in the Russian Federation). This is unlikely to have overjoyed Ankara, which continues to describe the Syrian Kurds as terrorists and even threatens to inflict a strike on them without agreement with the Americans - their coalition allies.

All the same, there are important shifts of position. In Vienna, the Russian minister and his Saudi counterpart exchanged their proposals on the composition of the opposition groups that could take part in future inter-Syrian meetings. On Moscow's list are almost four dozen representatives. Rossiyskaya Gazeta's diplomatic sources admit that the experience of Egypt, which also regularly assembles influential Syrian opposition figures in Cairo, could be very handy  in this matter.

"We will be back!", Lavrov said, bidding farewell with the aphorism from The Terminator, by which he lightened the atmosphere in the auditorium. By the way, the "group for the support of Syria" is preparing entirely seriously to meet again in Vienna not later than in two weeks' time.

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 #16
Russia says operation to continue as long as Syria army carries out offensive

KUALA LUMPUR, November 4. /TASS/. Russia's Aerospace Forces will continue the operation as long as the Syrian army carries out its offensive against terrorists, Russian Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov said on Wednesday.

"The operation is limited by the timeframe of the offensive by the Syrian forces against terrorists," Antonov said at the meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) defense ministers and dialogue partners.

Antonov reminded that Russia's strikes with the use of ships of the Caspian flotilla against the targets of gunmen of the banned terrorist groups in Russia, the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra, are absolutely in line with the international law. The operation is conducted at the request of Syrian President Bashar Assad.

Russia's military use the aviation and other means only against the targets of terrorist groups in Syria, Antonov stressed. "No strikes are carried out against any other targets linked, for example, to the units of the so-called moderate opposition," he said.

Russia's aviation has destroyed dozens of control points, a large amount of military equipment and warehouses with ammunition belonging to gunmen, he said. Hundreds of terrorists have been also killed.

The deputy defense minister stressed that international terrorism poses a serious global threat and "the main frontline of the struggle against this evil is in the Middle East today."

Russia calls for the creation of an international anti-terrorism coalition that could unite all the countries concerned based on the international law guided by the United Nations Charter.

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#17
Moon of Alabama
www.moonofalabama.org
November 3, 2015
BREAKING NEWS: Russia's Position On Assad Unchanged Since 2011 - Reuters, BBC
[Graphics here http://www.moonofalabama.org/2015/11/breaking-news-russias-position-on-assad-unchanged-since-2011-reuters-bbc.html#more]

A typical part of propaganda campaigns is to claim that the "villain" has very recently changed his political positions. Then follows "analysis" which interprets the "change" as a sure sign that the villain is under pressure and on the verge of loosing the fight. Often such claims are completely unfounded as the villain only repeated a long standing position. They are only made to repeat, repeat, repeat ... that the villain is or was up to something bad.

When Iran, for example, states again that it does not want nuclear weapons it is repeating a decades old political position. But "BREAKING NEWS" headlines will claim that the position is new "Ayatollah: Iran to refrain from nuclear weapons". This lets people assume that Iran was planing to make nuclear weapons and that it just now changed that position.

Here is a live example of this propaganda technique.

Reuters

BBC

How do we we know that this "BREAKING NEWS" is pure propaganda? Because Russia said over and over again that it is not supporting the person of Bashar Assad but the Syrian state and its people. A few examples:

June 5 2012: Russia says Assad could go in Syria settlement

Russia said Tuesday it was prepared to see Syrian President Bashar al-Assad leave power in a negotiated solution to 15 months of bloodshed that has claimed more than 13,000 lives.
...
"We have never said or insisted that Assad necessarily had to remain in power at the end of the political process," Gatilov told the ITAR-TASS news agency in Switzerland.
"This issue has to be settled by the Syrians themselves."

September 15 2012: Russia says not 'clinging' to Syria's Assad

"We are not clinging to any political figures," Deputy Foreign Minister Gennady Gatilov said in brief comments reaffirming the country's official position.
"And anyone who claims otherwise is distorting the picture," Gatilov told the Interfax news agency.
...
"It is only through the political process -- and not through any decision of the UN Security Council -- that the Syrians should determine the future of their state and its make-up," he added.

December 20 2012: Putin Says Russia Not Wedded to Assad, Wants End to Strife

Russia isn't wedded to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and its main goal is to end the civil war in the country, President Vladimir Putin said.
...
"We aren't concerned about Assad's fate, we understand that the same family has been in power for 40 years and changes are obviously needed," Putin said.
This point was made over the years again and again. It has been Russia's position from the beginning of the Syria conflict and had never changed.

September 15 2015: Russia's Vladimir Putin Says Only Syrian People Can Decide The Future Of President Assad

Russian President Vladimir Putin has said that only Syrian people are entitled to decide who should govern their country and how. He was reacting to the reference of the U.S. coalition partners who want to see Syrian President Bashar Assad leave his office.
Most recently the ever unchanged position was stated on October 30 by Russia's Foreign minister Lavrov in a press conference with U.S. Secretary of State:

Lavrov: As John has said, we have no agreement on the destiny of Assad. Russia believes that it is up to Syrian people to decide within the framework of the political process. It is said in the joint statement that the political process should be done by the Syrian people and belong to the Syrian people, and the Syrian people should decide the future of their country.
...
"Journalist": [...] Russia has said, as you said just a few moments ago, that you do not necessarily believe that Mr. Assad needs to go?
...
Lavrov: I did not say that Assad has to go or that Assad has to stay. I said that Assad's destiny should be decided by the Syrian people, as well as all other aspects of further development of the Syrian state.
So there. Nothing changed in Russia's position from 2011 through 2012, 2013, 2014 up to 2015.

Any journalist who follows the news on Syria knows this:

@DavidKenner Retweeted Reuters World
This is something Russia has said again and again, but will now be touted as some sort of breakthrough.

How then, if not for nefarious reasons, can a restatement of the unchanged Russian position be "BREAKING NEWS" for Reuters and the BBC?

It is not Russia but the U.S. which has been totally inflexible in its position regarding Assad. It arrogantly demands, without having any authority over the issue, that Assad must leave. Since 2012 at least it delivers weapons to jihadists who kill the Syrian people. It is thereby the U.S. which is blocking any solution and prolonging the war on Syria.

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 #18
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
November 3, 2015
Syria war: A turning point in Russia-West relations?
Russia Direct's October think tank roundup: Russia's top experts examine the implications of military operations in Syria, with some suggesting they could help ease Russia's global isolation and others fearing they might undermine internal security.
By Anastasia Borik

In October, Russian think tank analysts scrutinized Russia's operations in Syria, analyzed recent parliamentary elections in Poland, and examined the worsening relations between Russia and the West, which even the common threat of international terrorism is not easing.

Russian military operations in Syria

Starting from the end of September, the Russian military campaign in Syria has kept Russian experts busy, debating not only about the actual goals the Kremlin is pursuing in this conflict and the possible negative consequences for the country, but also about who might eventually join the operation in support of Russia.

Vasily Kuznetsov, expert at the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), focused attention on the possible risks and threats posed by Russia's participation in the Syrian operation. He argues that this military operation will not so much make its main impact on the positions of the Syrian rebels, but on Russia's image in the eyes of the Muslim countries, which are highly ambivalent about the regime of Syrian President Bashar Assad.

"For some, Russia will be viewed as a country, which as usual is defending a dictator and bombing moderate opposition groups and the civilian population, for others it will become a new enemy of the Sunnis," the analyst argues.

Another serious threat to Russia may become the "export of jihad," by which Kuznetsov means the intensification of terrorist activities in Russia. The author believes that the population will not be able to forgive the regime if it undermines internal security, and especially against the background of a deteriorating economic environment.

Alexander Golts of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (CFDP) also focused on the negative aspects of the operations in Syria, noting that, in essence, the goal was solely populist - to make themselves felt on the world stage, and finally to force the West to start talking with Russia. Golts considers this operation not only inefficient, but also rather absurd, which has no good prospects, or even feasible goals.

"It would have been best not to launch this operation. The entire reasoning behind it was to force the Americans, and the West in general, to negotiate with us. Russia is very determined to come out of its international isolation that resulted from its successes in Crimea and the Donbas," says the analyst.

Political analyst Arkady Dubnov at the Carnegie Moscow Center draws attention to the absence of any support for this operation from Russia's immediate neighbors: the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). At the last CIS Summit in October, there was not a single word of approval for the activities of Russia in its fight against terrorism in Syria.

At first glance, this lack of approval seems very strange, because many of the CIS countries, especially those located in Central and Middle Asia, know firsthand what terrorism means. Nevertheless, the silence of CIS leaders is understandable - many of them see this fight against terrorism as a threat to their own internal security, particularly when it comes to the use of the Caspian Sea as a launch site for Russian missiles.

The militarization of the Caspian Sea has long been an issue that concerns many CIS countries, and it became particularly aggravated after Russia launched its cruise missiles exactly from this body of water.

Not all Russian experts are so critical of the Kremlin's operation in Syria. Thus, Andrey Kazantsev of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO-University) considers that the international community underestimates the real motives of the Russian leadership, for which this is not so much about supporting Assad's regime, but about actually fighting against international terrorism, which does pose a real threat to Russia.

In this sense, the expert concludes, we cannot say that an intensification of terrorism will be the consequence of the Russian intervention in the Syrian conflict. On the contrary, the flurry of recent activity shown by Islamist groups in Russia and its neighboring countries is already a reality, and it is to actually fight against this threat that the operation in Syria was launched.

Polish elections

On Oct. 25, Poland held its parliamentary elections, which to the surprise of many ended with a landslide victory of the opposition Law and Justice Party, known for its Euroscepticism and deep hostility towards Russia. One of the founding fathers of this party - Jaroslaw Kaczynski - did not run this time, and handed the reins over to his successor, Beata Szydlo, who just a year ago was little known among the voters. Analysts at Russian think tanks reflected on what impact this victory of conservatives and traditionalists may have on Russia.

An expert at the Moscow Carnegie Center, Maxim Samorukov, believes that the victory of Jaroslaw Kaczynski's party cannot hurt Russia, but Brussels should be worried about the destructive behavior of the new Polish leaders. He said: "Over the past couple of years, all room to maneuver, when it comes to relations with Russia, has completely disappeared. Any attempts at further aggravation of relations are fraught with extremely dangerous consequences. To harshly criticize Russia - this is now commonplace. No one in Poland today is soft in their criticism of Russia."

The criticism of Brussels is another matter, for its ambiguous policies of recent years, especially with regard to refugees. It is in this direction that the new leadership of Poland will see its biggest opportunity for political action, including the possible voicing of populist declarations.

One of the most influential Russian experts - head of CFDP Fyodor Lukyanov - also believes that Russia should have no worries about the coming to power of Kaczynski's conservatives as "any further worsening of Polish-Russian relations, which were wrecked during the Ukrainian crisis, is almost impossible now."
Supporting his colleague from the Carnegie Institute, Mr. Lukyanov feels confident that the new party in power will pose a lot more problems for Brussels and Germany, than for Russia.

Poland "will take over the leadership of the disaffected group of countries that today lack the ability to lead. Then there will be the tough approach to Germany," explains the analyst. In particular, in the near future we can expect to see a review of Poland's position on the refugee quota, which the outgoing government had agreed to.

The possible deterioration in relations between Warsaw and Brussels has also been noted by Vadim Trukhachev at RIAC. He recalled that the previous government that was led by the Law and Justice Party (2000s) was characterized by numerous disputes between Poland and the EU, as well as constant reminders about Germany's past transgressions.

At the same time, Trukhachev believes that Moscow should also expect a tough Polish stance in relations with Russia, due to the Ukrainian issue. According to the expert, "The already difficult relations with Russia may yet get worse."

Once again, fears of a "Cold War"

Against the background of Russia's intervention in the Syrian conflict, the Russian expert community has started talking about a possible reconciliation between Russia and the West. The two sides now have an obvious common enemy - international terrorism.

However, optimism faded rather quickly: almost immediately after the start of operations in Syria, it became clear that the West does not intend to support Russia's initiative. Representatives of various Russian think tanks discussed this very topic in October.

The head of the Carnegie Moscow Center, Dmitri Trenin, believes that relations between Russia and the West, particularly the United States, remain in "a stable confrontational condition," which has been established in the last few years. The expert believes that this confrontation cannot be broken by any common current problems, including that of terrorism.

It is possible, emphasizes the analyst, "that there will be some periods of attenuation or stabilization of tensions. However, this is - the stabilization of hostility. That is, if we look at the issue of Syria today. We are not talking about two large friendly powers, the United States and Russia, working together in resolving a crisis, but rather about ensuring that during the intervention by both countries in this conflict, where there exists a common enemy, these two do not accidently bomb or kill each other."

Trenin says that problems in relations are too serious - there is deep mutual mistrust, and hence to eliminate it will take time and effort.

Ivan Timofeev, program director at RIAC, also believes that the relations between Russia and the West have reached a kind of critical point - all the surprises and unpredictability are behind us now, and ahead lies clear and routine confrontation. The expert stresses that after such unexpected actions by Russia in Ukraine and then in Syria, the Kremlin has returned to a predictable foreign policy agenda.

Timofeev highlights several key features in Russia's future foreign policy. These include the continuation of confrontation with the West, a sharp reaction to any attempts by the West to interfere in the affairs of countries in the post-Soviet space, emphasis on the development of alternative international institutions (including the BRICS), and maintaining a dialogue with the United States on the most pressing issues.

Georgy Bovt of CFDP argues that the Russia's operations in Syrian have not become a new starting point in the dialogue between Russia and the West, which the Russian establishment had been hoping to see. On the contrary, the attacks on ISIS positions have become a new source of anger and discontent for Russia's Western partners. The expert believes that there is a real threat that the war in Syria will escalate into a "proxy war" between Russia and the United States.

"Moscow's actions were perceived as a challenge to the U.S. policy in the region", stressed Mr. Bovt, which can seriously degrade the already disastrously poor relations between Russia and the United States, as well as Russia and the West in general.

Gleb Pavlovsky, a political analyst and an author for the Carnegie Moscow Center, believes that the confrontation between Russia and the West is a logical result of the new Russian policy of revisionism, which Russia has recently announced. Revisionism, says Mr. Pavlovsky, for the Kremlin is a kind of containment strategy against the West, as well as any other forces that Moscow considers as posing a threat to Russia.

In this sense, we should not expect any thaw in relations with the West, because the revisionist ideology is too ingrained in the minds of not only the establishment, but also in the minds of the Russian people.

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 #19
The National Interest
November 4, 2015
Shock and Awed: Yes, Russia Can Still Fight a War
Newsflash: Russia is not some tinpot third-world basket case with a make-believe army, but rather the nation with the third-highest military spending on the planet.
By Michael Peck
Michael Peck, a frequent contributor to TNI, is a defense and historical writer based in Oregon. His work has appeared in Foreign Policy, WarIsBoring and many other fine publications.

The world was astounded. Russian planes dropping smart bombs on Syrian rebels! Russian cruise missiles blasting rebel targets from hundreds of miles away!

How could this be? Whatever happened to the hapless Russian military, the bumblers that embarrassed themselves in Chechnya and Georgia?

Actually, here's the better question: Why is anyone surprised that Russia knows how to fight a war?

There has been plenty of media attention on Russia's use of advanced weapons in Syria, such as cruise missiles, and laser-and satellite-guided bombs. Some have questioned how many smart bombs Russia has used or is able to use, but the overall tone is one of shock and awe at Russian capabilities.

Why the shock?

The weapons themselves are not that impressive. Cruise missiles? The U.S. has been launching them for 25 years, ever since Tomahawks pounded Baghdad in 1991. Laser- and satellite-guided bombs? America and NATO have used them in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and Serbia.

If Zimbabwe had launched cruise missiles, this would have been impressive. If Iran was dropping smart bombs, that would have raised an eyebrow. But Russia is a former superpower, with vast experience and skills in designing advanced weapons.

The T-34 tank demoralized the German armies in 1941. Soviet anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles surprised Israeli forces in 1973 and American aircraft over Vietnam, while Russian tanks today are equipped with advanced active protection systems to defend against anti-armor missiles. Critics wonder whether Russian jets like the Su-30 will blast America's best planes out of the skies.

"What continues to impress me is their ability to move a lot of stuff real far, real fast," Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, the commander of United States Army forces in Europe, told the New York Times.

Why American commanders are impressed is baffling. Britain successfully dispatched an entire amphibious strike force 8,000 miles to the Falklands in 1982, despite operating on the thinnest of logistical shoestrings. Russia is only sending a small amount of troops, along with thirty planes or so, just 2,500 miles to friendly bases in Syria. For Ecuador and New Zealand, this would be an achievement. For a large and powerful military power like Russia, it is not a remarkable feat, certainly not compared to the hundreds of thousands of troops that the U.S. sent to Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan.

This is neither to praise nor denigrate Russia's military capabilities, nor to compare them to American and Western technology. This is simply to point out that Russia is not some tinpot third-world basket case with a make-believe army, but rather the nation with the third-highest military spending on the planet. After lavishing billions on its armed forces, shouldn't the expectations for Russian military prowess be a little better than "they didn't screw up"?

If Russian military prowess is being extolled because Syria has not turned into a fiasco like Chechnya and Georgia, then consider the state of the U.S. military after Vietnam. Or the invasion of Grenada in 1982, where U.S. troops struggled to overcome the mighty Cuban construction engineers. Imagine how it would have felt if China expressed surprise and admiration for the American military because it was not defeated by Saddam Hussein in 1991.

Perhaps there is also a touch of envy at work. As NATO struggles to handle a newly aggressive Russia in Eastern Europe, one wonders whether nations like Britain or Germany could even send a couple thousand troops and a few dozen warplanes without American help.

Russia is a major military power. It should be treated as such.

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 #20
http://gordonhahn.com
November 3, 2015
Russia is Targeting Jihadi Terrorists in Syria Including the Islamic State and Russians Approve of Putin's Military Intervention Against ISIS: UPDATE
By Gordon M. Hahn

The misrepresentation of Russia's stated objectives in Syria and the Russian population's reaction to President Vladimir Putin's decision to intervene militarily in the war-torn country continues in U.S. mainstream media and think tanks. One of the most absurd comes from Clint Watts of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, who wrote: "Last month, Russia moved from the shadows and into the forefront with their military build up. The Russians talk of targeting terrorists, but the pattern of their airstrikes speaks otherwise. Most sorties have aimed their missiles at Syrian rebel groups including Jabhat al Nusra leaving the Islamic State mostly to the American-led coalition" (http://www.fpri.org/geopoliticus/2015/10/russia-returns-al-qaeda-and-islamic-states-far-enemy?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=New%20Campaign&utm_term=%2AMideast%20Brief). In this gravely erroneous rendering, Jabhat al-Nusra, Al Qaida's affiliate in Syria and a group known for beheradings and other atrocities, is not a terrorist group! The author and his employers should take a long look at the list of international terrorists and terrorist organizations of the U.S. State Department (which ironically has issued similar distoritions of Russia's Syria intervention. Jabhat al-Nusra is on the list and is a terrorist organization. In other news....

Numerous sources, not just 'Moscow', have reported that Russian air strikes hit IS targets in recent days in addition to earlier reports of earlier Russian attacks on IS targets ("Russian air strikes hit Syria's historic Palmyra region: Moscow," AFP, 2 November 2015, http://news.yahoo.com/russia-says-air-force-hit-palmyra-region-syria-160126911.html). The recent reports note strikes on IS targets in historic Palmyra and elsewhere near Homs.

For example, both Rami Abdel Rahman, head of the Britain-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, and "Khaled al-Homsi, an activist from Palmyra" said that Russian planes had targeted Palmyra with strikes on Monday, November 2nd. Moreover, the Syrian Observatory also reported at least 10 people had been killed and more wounded in apparent Russian strikes on Al-Qaryatain, an IS-held town in Homs province.

This at least partially confirms statements from the Russian Defense Ministry's November 2nd briefing, which claimed Russian Su-25 fighter jets destroyed "a fortification, an underground bunker and anti-aircraft artillery" in Palmyra and also hit targets of the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda affiliate Al-Nusra Front "terrorist groups" in the Homs, Hama, Latakia, Damascus, Aleppo and Raqa provinces. Specifically, Moscow said it hit a training camp for foreign fighters and an improvised explosive device production plant in Aleppo provonce and destroyed two armoured vehicles in Hama province. Russia's military said it also struck a key Al-Nusra Front command post on a strategic hill in the coastal Latakia region.

Syrian state television said in early October that Russian warplanes had struck IS targets "in and around" the city ("Russian air strikes hit Syria's historic Palmyra region: Moscow," AFP, 2 November 2015, http://news.yahoo.com/russia-says-air-force-hit-palmyra-region-syria-160126911.html).

These reports show that at least some of the Russian Defense Ministry's claims about hitting IS targets are verified by other sources, including those close to the Syrian opposition that is antagonistic to Moscow.

How U.S. Media Propaganda 'Works' Regarding Syria and Everything Else

I have my doubts it really does work or at least as well or as long as its users might think. Nevertheless, the technique is worth looking at. The 'Headline-the American public cannot read' technique. Recently deployed by former U.S. ambassador to Moscow Michael McFaul it follows the U.S. media's long-time practice of placing false or misleading headlines atop the typically slightly less false or misleading articles to sway opinion in favor of liberals and leftists. Here is how on October 29th McFaul appears to have deployed the technique, writing on Facebook and commenting on a Moscow Times (MT) article he links to: "So 90% of Russians support Putin, but only 50% support his foreign policy? I don't get it. How to explain? Can anyone out there ever think of such a gap between individual approval rating and a policy at any time in history (in Russia, US, or anywhere)?"

The calculation that lies behind the use of this media technique is that many readers who take in this headline will not read or will simply skim the text, leaving the impression that "only 50% support this foreign policy." Readers will likely infer that if 'only' 50 percent support, then 50 percent are opposed. Also, most readers are unlikely to parse the text and therefore will interpret it through the prism of the distorted picture the introduction or headline creates.

Here is what The Moscow Times article actually said and what the Levada Center survey actually found (please read, don't skim):

Levada Center poll showed that Russians were not unified behind Putin's intervention in Syria. Instead, the number of respondents both supporting and opposing government policy in Syria rose sharply following the start of the air strikes, while the number of people saying they were undecided fell by half.

The poll, conducted from Oct. 23-26, found that 53 percent of respondents approved of Russian policy in Syria, up from 39 percent a month earlier, before the bombing began. Those who said they did not approve doubled to 22 percent from 11 percent.

Meanwhile, the percentage of respondents who said they either did not care or did not know about Russia's actions in Syria fell to just 24 percent in October from 50 percent in September (www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/russians-increasingly-polarized-by-syria-intervention-poll/540772.html).

In other words, it is just as accurate to say that only 22 percent oppose Putin's policy. And is it really that unusual that a president with a 89.9 percent approval rating is opposed by 22 percent of the population on one particular issue? I think not, especially if this is in regard to a somewhat risky, brash and bold policy. Although most Russians mostly agree with Putin on most issues, 'Russia's Putin' certainly faces some disagreement on some issues.

Similarly, MT gave the article a somewhat biased or at least misleading headline: "Russians Increasingly Polarized by Syria Intervention - Poll." If polarized means that 50 percent are 'for' and 50 percent are 'against,' then the new poll potentially shows increased polarization. It showed the percent of Russians supporting the intervention rose from 39 to 53 percent, the percent of those who did not approve rose from 11 to 22 percent. This means that among those respondents who were supportive now constituted 71 percent of those who had decided as opposed to 78 percent earlier. However, both of these figures show that a solid majority of decided respondents support Putin's Syria intervention policy.

In fact, several weeks ago I wrote about the distorted coverage of the first poll (http://gordonhahn.com/2015/10/08/russians-strongly-approve-putin-military-intervention-against-isis-less-so-in-support-of-assad/):

A much cited Levada survey conducted in September has been misrepresented by Western media and various anti-Russian activists. For example, the very anti-Putin, former editor of the English-language Moscow Times, Michael Bohm, has been making the Russian television and radio talk show circuit citing the survey in a one-sided fashion (that's right, you heard correctly, I said an American anti-Putin editor of a Western-owned newspaper published in Moscow is a regular guest on fascist Russia's mass media). Even the Levada Center itself reported that the September survey found that "69 percent of Russian citizens were against direct military support of the Syrian leadership" (www.levada.ru/08-10-2015/uchastie-rossii-v-siriiskom-konflikte). In reality, the survey found that more approve than disapprove: 39 percent approved (11 percent fully approved, 28 percent mostly), 11 percent disapproved (8 percent largely disapproved, 3 percent definitely disapproved), and 33 percent expressed no interest (www.levada.ru/28-09-2015/voina-v-sirii-vnimanie-otsenki-igil). Therefore, one could just as fairly report the results as follows: 72 percent are not against Putin's Syria intervention.

Since I published this, Levada has corrected its claim that "69 percent of Russian citizens were against direct military support of the Syrian leadership" and changed it to "69 percent of Russians were against direct military support of the leadership of Syria and as of the leadership of the DNR and LNR in 2014."  They also changed the link from (www.levada.ru/08-10-2015/uchastie-rossii-v-siriiskom-konflikte) to (http://www.levada.ru/2015/10/08/uchastie-rossii-v-sirijskom-konflikte/).

Our institutions are melting down. Incompetence and corruption reign. Government and media are either engaged in wishful thinking or perpetually conjuring up false scenarios and distortions that fit their agenda, which is often careerist or domestic-political in nature. So be very careful about what you read.

As the CNBC presidential debate demonstrated for the world to see, journalism and much else in America is dead.

P.S. One possible answer to Ambassador McFaul's question might be found in the phrase 'the teflon president'. Read up on it. (Liberals and leftists are exempted. I would not want to cause them any more discomfort.)

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Gordon M. Hahn is an Analyst and Advisory Board Member of the Geostrategic Forecasting Corporation, Chicago, Illinois; a Senior Researcher, Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies (CETIS), Akribis Group, San Jose, California; and an Analyst/Consultant, Russia Other Points of View - Russia Media Watch, http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com. Dr Hahn is author of three well-received books, Russia's Revolution From Above (Transaction, 2002), Russia's Islamic Threat (Yale University Press, 2007), which was named an outstanding title of 2007 by Choice magazine, and The 'Caucasus Emirate' Mujahedin: Global Jihadism in Russia's North Caucasus and Beyond (McFarland Publishers, 2014). He also has authored hundreds of articles in scholarly journals and other publications on Russian, Eurasian and international politics and wrote, edited and published the Islam, Islamism, and Politics in Eurasia Report at CSIS from 2010-2013. He has taught Russian politics and other courses at Boston, American, Stanford, San Jose State, St. Petersburg State (Russia), and San Francisco State Universities as well as the Middlebury Institute for International Studies at Monterey, California. Dr. Hahn has been a Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (2011-2013) and a Visiting Scholar at both the Hoover Institution and the Kennan Institute.

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 #21
Asia Times
November 1, 2015
Russia's growing muscle in the Middle East
By Manish Rai
Manish Rai is a columnist for Middle-East and Af-Pak region and Editor of geo-political news agency ViewsAround (VA) can be reached at manishraiva@gmail.com

After nearly a month of conducting daily air strikes, Russia is beginning to unveil its political calculations and strategic intent in Syria. A new round of talks in Vienna on a political solution for the Syrian conflict is underway in which Russia is about to play a major role. There is a growing sense in Moscow, and among diplomats and politicians in some countries in the Middle East and the West, that Russia has a better chance than others to combine its increased influence over Assad with its military muscle in Syria's skies to broker a deal that ends the Syrian conflict.

The hard reality is that Russia currently has a greater opportunity than any other power to control the political process that leads to a Syrian solution. But it's not just about Syria. Russia has big ambitions in the region and entering into the war on the side of Bashar al-Assad is just a small piece of Russia's new grand strategy for Middle East. Until now, Russia has been frustrated by American strategic dominance in the region. To counter this and establish Kremlin as a potent force, President Putin has chosen the Syrian theater to flex his muscles.

The Obama administration has been weak and passive in the face of Russian intervention. It's basically allowed Russia to set the terms of a proposed solution. Russia, step by step, is increasing its influence by forging alliances with every key player in the regional arena. Let's look at some of recent regional alliances that Russia has made:

Israel- Israel has discovered Russia and its growing sphere of regional influence in the region. That realization is what sent Netanyahu to Putin a month ago and brought about the visits of high ranking Russian army officers to Israel. It appears Israel doesn't want to be left outside the equation now that Russia is increasingly involved in Syria. This is especially since Iran is solidly placed on the other side of the equation. This is the rationale behind the joint mechanism Israel has set up with Russia.

Iraq-Iraqi government apparently believes it hasn't been receiving adequate assistance from the US and the European Union to ward off the Sunni Islamic State (ISIS). It's turned to Moscow for support and is now receiving Russian aid under an intelligence and security cooperation agreement.

Egypt-The Arab world's most populous country, is actually supporting Russia's actions, notwithstanding the fact that Saudi Arabia is Egypt's top paymaster. The reality is that, although most Arabs don't like what Russia is doing in their region, they admire the way Mr Putin has been able to pinprick the Americans. Egypt has also sought Russian military assistance after being turned down by US.

Iran- The Syrian civil war has dramatically improved ties between Russia and Iran. It could lay the foundation for lasting Russian-Iranian ties in the region. Tehran also sees Moscow's resurgence as a  chance to ensure its own lasting influence in the region. Iran has been at odds with Sunni Saudi Arabia, which along with other Arab countries, is concerned about Shite's Iran outreach.

But by employing military force in the region, Russia's earned some Middle Eastern enemies as well. Turkey and Saudi Arabia are furious with Mr Putin, largely because Russia's intervention now complicates both these countries' strategic objectives in the region.

But Turkey needs Russia more than Russia needs Turkey. Mr Erdogan is also very aware that all the Russians need to do is start supporting the Kurds in Syria to make Ankara's strategic situation miserable. The Saudis have also been muted in their criticism. This is because they too hope for an accommodation with Russia. Russia has used these openings to neutralize its critics in the region. But one key thing the Russians have overlooked in this power play is that by entering the Syrian and Iraqi conflicts with troops and advisers, Moscow is adding to the allure of jihadism rather than tamping it down. Dozens of Saudi clerics have reportedly issued edicts for Sunnis to fulfill jihad, a pillar of Islam, by fighting not only Alawites and Shiites - but also Russians as infidels just as they successfully did in Afghanistan during the 1980s. Russia shouldn't look to a repeat of the Afghan jihad that cost many Russian lives and caused it to leave Afghanistan in disgrace.

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 #22
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
November 3, 2015
Will extremists unite to fight against Russia and the West?
The al-Qaeda leader has urged Islamist groups to overcome internal divisions and join forces to oppose the West, Russia, Syria and Iran. However, it raises the question of whether extremists can forget their differences and act as a united front.
ALEXEY TIMOFEYCHEV, RBTH

The call to unite Islamist forces was voiced by al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. As reported by Reuters, his audio recording was released on November 1 on one of the sites linked to the terrorist organization.

"The Americans, Russians, Iranians, Alawites, and Hezbollah are coordinating their war against us - are we not capable of stopping the fighting amongst ourselves so we can direct all our efforts against them?" Zawahiri said.

It was not clear when the recording was made but references to the Russian Federation suggest it was made after Russia launched a military operation in Syria on September 30.

The question of how realistic the prospects are for extremists to unite together has no clear answer.

On the one hand, the ranks of radicals in the Middle East have been shaken by internal conflicts in recent years. On the other hand, al-Qaeda is changing the format of its activities, while maintaining its significant potential and attractiveness in the eyes of the members of other extremist groups. This could contribute to the consolidation of radical Islamists around its cells.

'Appeal to nowhere'

The unification of radical groups in the Middle East is hindered by competition for the control of financial flows, which has especially intensified in recent years against the backdrop of the economic crisis.

Another factor is that Islamists also have considerable ideological and religious differences. Speaking to RBTH, Yelena Suponina, an expert on the Middle East from the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, described the al-Qaeda leader's call as an "appeal to nowhere" considering the current set of circumstances.

At the same time, the call to fight against the U.S., Russia and the rest of the "infidels" is nothing new. As noted by Sergei Demidenko, a Middle East expert from the Institute for Strategic Studies and Analysis, according to radical Islamists, Western countries and Russia are so-called lands of war, against which permanent jihad, or a holy war, should be waged. This is the line that Islamists adhere to in relation to all their opponents.

Mobilization of al-Qaeda

There is, however, a view that Zawahiri's call is just another al-Qaeda attempt to "score points" in its competition with the extremists of the Islamic State. It could be seen as al-Qaeda's way of reacting to the statements of ISIS members who claim that it was they that shot down the Russian airliner over the Sinai Peninsula.

"Al-Qaeda is trying to mobilize itself, come to the fore of the struggle and earn some points," Alexander Shumilin, the director of the Center for the Analysis of Middle East Conflicts at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies, told RBTH.

The danger for Russia

The concern of experts about the constant adjusting of al-Qaeda's format was seen recently. According to Vladimir Sotnikov, a senior researcher at the Institute for Oriental Studies, the organization has been transformed in recent years into a less centralized structure, with the autonomy of its regional branches growing. This allows these branches to more actively create situational alliances, including with ISIS, making al-Qaeda's regional structures a serious threat to all opponents of extremists, including Russia.

Sotnikov believes that clandestine cells associated with al-Qaeda already exist in Russia.

"Some resources come to radical Islamists in Russia, especially in the North Caucasus, through Afghanistan and Pakistan," Sotnikov said.

He stressed that the attack could be carried out by extremists already in Russia, suggesting that it not be necessary for militants to be sent from somewhere else.

Sotnikov recalled the double attack in Volgograd in December 2013. The perpetrators in that terrorist incident were believed to be linked to an Iraqi terrorist group.

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 #23
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
November 3, 2015
The US eyes Central Asia as a new front in the battle against ISIS
The U.S. will help Central Asia do battle against Afghan terrorists - but will they succeed without Russia's assistance?
By Galiya Ibragimova
Galiya Ibragimova is a consultant at the Moscow-based PIR Center, a Russian think tank. Her research interests include regional security in Central Asia, information security and international relations.

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, for the first time in seven years since the Democrats have been in power, visited the countries of Central Asia, where he discussed threats to regional security in connection with the intensification of Islamist terrorist activities in Afghanistan. Kerry promised American assistance in maintaining stability in the region.

Central Asian experts interviewed by Russia Direct believe that the degree of threat coming from Afghanistan for the region is rather exaggerated. Meanwhile, their Russian colleagues are sounding the alarm, and calling for the start of serious preparations to deter threats to Central Asia coming from northern Afghanistan.

Moreover, all experts agree that Afghan problems are not of the greatest concern to Washington today, and thus the U.S. interest in Central Asia is more of a signal rather than a substantive change in policy.

The Central Asian states became seriously concerned about the threat of radical Islamist penetration into their region after the Taliban captured the city of Kunduz in northern Afghanistan on Sept. 28. A few days later, the Afghan Army, with the help of U.S. troops still stationed in the country, recaptured this city from the Taliban. Nevertheless, the situation on Afghanistan's borders with Tajikistan and Turkmenistan remains tense.

Tajik President Emomali Rakhmon, during a working meeting with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin on Oct. 8 in Sochi, said that, "Battles were being fought along 60 percent of the Tajik-Afghan border."

Due to the sharp intensification in the activity of Islamist groups in Afghanistan, at the Summit of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in Kazakhstan on Oct. 16, the participants agreed to establish border services groups to counter terrorists.

In mid-October, Turkmenistan's Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov visited the U.S. to discuss the situation on the Turkmen-Afghan border, where since March of this year, there have been clashes with radical groups.

Officially, Ashgabat denies that clashes have been occurring. John Kerry's visit to Central Asia between Oct. 28 and Nov. 3, in which among other important issues, the situation in Afghanistan was discussed, marked the return of U.S. attention to this region, lost since the international military campaign in Afghanistan ended.

Waiting for real political moves from the U.S. in Central Asia

In Samarkand, during a meeting with foreign ministers from five Central Asian States, the U.S. Secretary of State announced that the political dialogue between the United States and Central Asia would continue. The meeting resulted in the creation of a new interaction format - the C5+1, that is, the five states of the region (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) and the United States.

Raising the level of interest in Central Asia in U.S. global strategy, within the context of events taking place in the Middle East, "will entail geopolitical implications, even if Washington does not pursue any geopolitical goals," assured Farhad Tolipov, an Uzbek political analyst and director of the Caravan of Knowledge Center in Tashkent.

The creation of political dialogue between the United States and five Central Asian countries, according to the expert, could lay the foundations for a regional Central Asian policy for America.

"Before this, the countries of Central Asia have already been faced with the negative consequences of the destabilization and fragmentation of Afghanistan, and so the current worsening of the situation is not something new for them, in terms of security," says Rustam Burnashev, professor of the Kazakh-German University.

Moreover, the Kazakh expert believes that the current situation in Afghanistan "is much more favorable for Central Asia than the one that existed in the 1990s - early 2000s."

Burnashev regards Kerry's visit to Central Asia as a "technical move," showing that the U.S. remains interested in the region, in terms of its "collective potential." Drawing conclusions as to the effectiveness of the C5+1 format will be possible, according to the expert, "when something concrete is proposed, in terms of realpolitik, rather than diplomatic agreements of the second level."

Russian experts are convinced that Washington, unlike Moscow, does not have any military infrastructure deployed in Central Asia that is capable of fighting back Islamic radicals in case of their breakthrough into the region.

"The Russian military base in Kant, Kyrgyzstan, and the Air Group in Tajikistan can help in countering any potential Afghan threats," said Vladimir Yevseyev, head of the SCO Department at the CIS Institute.

However, he warns that, "The Russian military infrastructure currently in the region cannot be used effectively until full-fledged military bases are deployed, which would include military aircraft."

The expert questions the ability of the Central Asian countries on their own to confront threats coming from Afghanistan. He calls on the countries in the region, which have a common border with Afghanistan, "not to flirt with the West, and clearly seek help from the state that is in a real position to help."
Central Asian experts do not agree that the countries of the region must make a choice between Russia and the West, when it comes to countering threats coming from Afghanistan. Military-technical assistance coming from both Washington and Moscow could strengthen the defense capabilities of the Central Asian countries in case of an emergency, but for now, these countries independently cannot counter the threats coming from Afghanistan. On this point, Burnashev and Tolipov agree.

What happens if ISIS, al-Qaeda and the Taliban combine forces?

The Russian Defense Ministry, during an international conference on Afghanistan in October, provided information showing that presently in northern Afghanistan there are a number of training camps, where militants coming from Central Asian republics and Russia are undergoing military training. Chief of Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Army General Valery Gerasimov, said that, "Currently in Afghanistan, there are 50,000 fighters, composed into 4,000 units and groupings of various kinds."

The movement of terrorists from the south and east of Afghanistan to the north began simultaneously with the withdrawal of foreign troops from that country.

"This was triggered by the large-scale operation conducted by Pakistani troops to evict all militants that moved into Pakistan after they were driven from Afghanistan by the Americans. Now these are once again returning to Afghanistan," says Omar Nessar, director of the Center for Studies of Modern Afghanistan.

Field commanders of the Northern Alliance, which had served as a buffer shielding Central Asia and Russia, have all been practically destroyed.

Andrey Kazantsev, director of the Analytical Center at the Institute of International Studies at MGIMO-University says that, "Special supplies corridors have been created for the transfer of terrorists from the central and southern parts of Afghanistan to the north."

"Some of the terrorists are Russian-speaking émigrés from the North Caucasus and the Volga Region, and the rest come from Central Asian countries, as well as the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (Xinjiang) of China, but all are closely associated with ISIS [the Islamic State of Iraq and the Gretaer Syria] and al-Qaeda," says the expert.

Not all fighters in Afghanistan who have declared themselves as being supporters of ISIS actually have something in common with that group, but experts do not exclude the possibility that soon the forces of Taliban and ISIS may unite.

"The Taliban has always actively supported international terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda. This provoked the invasion of Afghanistan by the Americans after 9/11, when the Taliban was harboring terrorists that blew up the Twin Towers," says Kazantsev.

Russian experts believe that al-Qaeda is still a major player in Afghanistan, and the funding of ISIS, al-Qaeda, and the Taliban are intertwined.

"This factor has created the effect of interaction between field units associated with the Taliban, ISIS, and al-Qaeda," says Kazantsev.

If the Taliban in southern Afghanistan really is opposed to ISIS and clashes between them are taking place, in northern Afghanistan, the Taliban and militants who called themselves ISIS, have the same sources of funding.

Another serious problem, which experts have noted, is posed by the terrorist networks that are now active in the entire post-Soviet space.

"These networks are not only used for the recruitment of terrorists, but also to directly commit terrorist acts," said Kazantsev.

Moreover, the preventive arrests of underground terrorist groups taking place in Russia today indicate that state structures of the country are monitoring this threat, and fighting against it.

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 #24
Irrussianality
https://irrussianality.wordpress.com
November 3, 2015
MAKING THE SOVIETS LOOK GOOD
By Paul Robinson
University of Ottawa

I have mentioned before the reports issued by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), John Sopko, who is the official responsible for auditing the $110 billion which the United States has spent on aid to Afghanistan. They tell of enormous waste and few, if any, tangible benefits. The latest report is typically woeful.

According to SIGAR, the US Department of Defense (DoD) spent $43 million building a compressed natural gas (CNG) filling station in the city of Sheberghan. This was despite the fact that there is no demand for such stations in Afghanistan. Converting a car from petroleum to natural gas costs $700-800. The average annual income in Afghanistan is $690. SIGAR comments that, 'the U.S. government paid for the conversion of over 120 Afghan vehicles to CNG so that they could use the filling station: ordinary Afghans simply couldn't afford to do it. Not surprisingly, SIGAR found no evidence that any other vehicles were converted to CNG.' The project, SIGAR concludes, 'produced no discernable macroeconomic gains.'

That, however, is not even the worst of it. According to SIGAR, 'a 2005 CNG station feasibility study conducted by Pakistan's Small and Medium Enterprise Development Authority concluded that the total cost of building a CNG station in Pakistan would be approximately $306,000 at current exchange rates. In short, at $43 million, the TFBSO [Task Force for Business and Stability Operations] filling station cost 140 times as much as a CNG station in Pakistan. To date, DOD has been unable to provide documentation showing why the Sheberghan CNG station cost nearly $43 million.'

This story caught my attention because the Sheberghan gas field, which this project was meant to promote, was the product of aid provided by another great power, the Soviet Union, in the mid-1960s. As I described in my book Aiding Afghanistan, in 1963 the Soviets and Afghans signed an agreement for the development of the gas industry in Afghanistan, after which the Soviets provided funding, specialists, and equipment to start gas production at Sheberghan. By 1967, the gas field was up and running, and the Soviets built a 101-kilometre pipeline to transmit four billion cubic metres of gas a year from Sheberghan to the Soviet Union. In 1968, they also built a 88-kilometre pipeline to Mazar-i-Sharif to provide gas for the power station and fertilizer plant there. I haven't been able to determine the exact cost of these projects, but between 1963 and 1968, the Soviets provided around 70 million rubles of credit to Afghanistan ($63 million at the then official exchange rate of 0.9 rubles to the dollar), so the cost must have been something less than that, given that the credits also covered other things. In other words, (ignoring inflation) for around the amount that the Americans spent on a worthless gas station, the Soviets constructed an entire gas production plant, two pipelines, a power plant, and a fertilizer factory.

All of these were profitable. By the mid-1970s, the Sheberghan gas field was bringing in annual profits of around 1.7 billion afghanis a year, while the Mazar-i-Sharif fertilizer plant was making profits of 70-100 million afghanis. In the 1980s, natural gas production provided the Afghan government with about 40% of all its revenues. The contrast between the Soviet success and the dismal American failure is striking.

And this is not the only example. In a report earlier this year, SIGAR noted that USAID had spent $335 million on the Tarakhil power plant, which theoretically services Kabul. According to SIGAR, 'from February 2014 through April 2015, the plant exported just 8,846 megawatt hours of power to the Kabul grid, which is less than one percent of Tarakhil's production capacity during that period.' Furthermore, the 'underutilization of the plant has apparently already resulted in the premature failure of equipment ... and "could result in catastrophic failure."' Compare this with the Naghlu hydroelectric plant, completed by the Soviets in 1966, which continued to pump out electricity for Kabul during the Taleban period, and was successfully restored to full operation a few years ago by the Russian company Technopromexport for a mere $32.5 million.

As I point out in my book, Soviet economic aid to Afghanistan failed to promote sustained economic growth in that country. Still, by comparison, the aid provided by the United States (and I am sure also its Western allies) is stunningly, awfully, extraordinarily, incompetently managed.

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 #25
Subject: New Task Force on U.S. Policy Toward Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia
Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2015
From: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace <chogan@carnegieendowment.org>

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Chicago Council on Global Affairs Launch Task Force on U.S. Policy Toward Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia
Former Deputy Secretary of State and U.S. Senator to Co-Chair Bipartisan Effort

WASHINGTON-The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and The Chicago Council on Global Affairs have launched a task force on U.S. policy toward Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia co-chaired by former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and Senator Chris Murphy of Connecticut.

The task force aims to increase understanding of Russia's foreign policy and its implications for regional order in Europe and Eurasia. It will produce a report recommending general principles for transatlantic policy toward the region.

"We can't afford to neglect or underestimate the long-term challenge posed by Russia," said Ambassador William J. Burns, president of Carnegie. "American interests demand a better understanding of the pressures facing the post-Cold War order in Europe and Eurasia and a more rigorous assessment of the policy options before us."

Specifically, the task force will:

Identify U.S. and Western interests in this complex and diverse region;
Assess the strengths and weaknesses of U.S. and Western policy toward Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia since the end of the Cold War;
Prepare an analytically rigorous assessment of U.S. and Western policy challenges in the wake of the Ukraine crisis and the rise of a more assertive, unpredictable Russia under President Putin; and
Offer a set of guiding principles for a durable U.S. policy framework while sustaining and promoting transatlantic unity.

"What's missing from the discussion about Russia, Ukraine, and the broader region today is analysis that looks beyond the frantic daily news cycle," said Ambassador Ivo H. Daalder, president of the Council on Global Affairs. "It's also clear that challenges facing Europe and Eurasia can only be confronted effectively through the combined efforts of multiple stakeholders, from governments around the globe to multinational businesses to experts in diplomacy and security. The task force reflects that dynamic."

Task force members include:

Ambassador Richard Armitage, Task Force Co-chair; President, Armitage International; former Deputy Secretary of State
Senator Chris Murphy (D-CT), Task Force Co-chair

Ambassador William J. Burns, President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; former Deputy Secretary of State
Ambassador Ivo H. Daalder, President, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs; former U.S. Ambassador to NATO
Madeleine Albright, Chair, Albright Stonebridge Group; former Secretary of State
Gen. (Ret.) James Cartwright, Harold Brown Chair in Defense Policy Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies; former Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Derek Chollet, Counselor and Senior Advisor for Security and Defense Policy, German Marshall Fund; former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
Senator Jeff Flake (R-AZ)
Michèle Flournoy, CEO, Center for a New American Security; former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Richard Fontaine, President, Center for a New American Security
Robert Kimmitt, Senior International Counsel, WilmerHale; former Deputy Secretary of the Treasury
Klaus Kleinfeld, Chairman and CEO, Alcoa; Chairman, U.S.-Russia Business Council
John McLaughlin, Distinguished Practitioner-in-Residence, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies; former Deputy Director and Acting Director of the CIA
Franklin C. Miller, Principal, Scowcroft Group; former Special Assistant to the President and Senior NSC Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control
Meghan O'Sullivan, Jeane Kirkpatrick Professor of the Practice of International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School; former Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan
Senator Rob Portman (R-OH); former U.S. Trade Representative and Director of the Office of Management and Budget
Adm. (Ret.) James Stavridis, Dean, the Fletcher School, Tufts University; former Supreme Allied Commander Europe

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 #26
www.rt.com
November 3, 2015
On The Washington Post and fear of RT
By Margarita Simonyan
In 2005, at 25 years old, Margarita was named Editor-in-Chief of RT, the first Russian round-the-clock English-language news channel. Later on, after the launch of RT in Arabic (Rusiya Al-Yaum) and RT in Spanish, she became Editor-in-Chief of the whole multilingual television news network. Margarita Simonyan is also the first Vice-President of Russia's National Association of TV and Radio Broadcasters (NAT).

Part of this column appeared in "Letters to the editor" section of the Washington Post on November 2, 2015.

It started as a whisper, now it's a scream. David Kramer's Op-Ed is just the latest jab thrown in a seemingly endless anti-RT barrage in certain sections of the US media and body politic.

This has manifested itself in various forms, from John Kerry dubbing RT a "propaganda bullhorn" to Andrew Lack, briefly CEO of the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), throwing the network in with ISIS as a "challenge" to the US because he was bothered by our particular "point of view," to a stream of less-than-rigorous publications simply inventing facts about the channel.

A few days ago in The Washington Post, Kramer, of John McCain's eponymous Institute for International Leadership, launched into a tirade of anti-Russia vitriol. He reserved particular contempt for RT, extolling the virtues of freezing its assets. Ostensibly, this would punish Moscow for two court rulings "involving the multibillion-dollar Yukos oil company." Two birds, one stone.

The former George W. Bush-era apparatchik starts off by confusing RT with the separate Rossiya Segodnya (formerly RIA Novosti) news agency, which is a rather elementary error for a supposed Russia "expert" (thankfully, the editors eventually corrected that error after we contacted them). Kramer then suggests that the US government seize RT's assets in the US as compensation for Yukos, a former Russian oil company. Given that RT's property is not Russian state property, this would be highly illegal, as RT, while publicly-funded, is not state-owned. But why bother with facts or legality? When silencing RT and punishing Russia are at stake, anything goes.

Ironically, calls to restrict RT often come from the same quarters that exalt the virtues of diversity and democracy. Now, they wish to silence a rare voice that dissents from their favored delineation.

It has long become apparent that individuals selected to write about Russia in the mainstream US media are measured on their willingness to attack the country. If such rhetoric was confined to fringe websites or late night talk radio, it mightn't matter a great deal, yet published in an institution such as The Washington Post these pronouncements have the potential to greatly influence policymakers. It is alarming that it is precisely these kinds of voices that are increasingly dominating American foreign policy discourse where Russia is concerned - those itching for a confrontation, rather than understanding.

Why do certain elements in the American establishment fear RT so much? Could it be because RT doesn't take the pronouncements of the State Department at face value, unlike virtually every other organization operating in the US media space? I cast my mind back to 2003, when George W. Bush and Tony Blair were planning the invasion of Iraq. The mainstream US media failed to offer rigorous analysis of their foundation for war. RT was not yet around, so we can't take credit for what we could have, or would have, done - but now all of us can see what happens when the establishment view remains unchallenged.

In 2011 and 2012, RT was up and running - and, while our mainstream media colleagues were celebrating the "victory of democracy" amidst a wave of Middle East uprisings, we reported on the risks posed by the destabilization. Fast-forward to the present day, and the dangers posed to the entire world by Islamic State, a terror organization that grew out of precisely that destabilization.

Perhaps if, instead of spending their energy on inventing preposterous impediments to RT's broadcasting, the western establishment actually listened to what we have to say, Tony Blair wouldn't have to apologize, as he did last weekend, for "mistakes" that contributed to the rise of ISIS. RT, fundamentally, is here to help. It's time the US elite realized this.

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 #28
National Public Radio (NPR)
November 2, 2015
Gen. Philip Breedlove On How NATO Should Deal With Russia

NPR's Steve Inskeep talks to General Philip Breedlove, the NATO Commander for Europe, about what some are calling its biggest military challenge since the end of the Cold War: How to confront Russia.

STEVE INSKEEP, HOST:

Let's listen to an American general whose job is to keep an eye on Russia. Philip Breedlove is the supreme allied commander Europe, the head of NATO forces. His job has existed since the aftermath of the Second World War.

I'm remembering things that I have read about General Eisenhower, the first man to hold the job that you now hold.

PHILIP BREEDLOVE: I still sit in his desk, by the way. Ergonomically, it's a horrible desk. But it is really a privilege to sit in the very same desk that he sat in.

INSKEEP: Same chair as well?

BREEDLOVE: No, the chair is different. In fact, I keep banging my knees because of the chair.

INSKEEP: The job was created to coordinate Europe's defenses against the Soviet Union. When the Soviets collapsed, many people asked what the point of NATO was. But few ask that now, as Russia demands General Breedlove's full attention. Breedlove has watched Russia's seizure of Crimea, then its aid to Ukrainian separatists and then its intervention in Syria. And in the general's mind, it's all connected. Breedlove says Russian warplanes went to Syria partly as a distraction.

BREEDLOVE: I think that the - Russia is there to take the vision away from Ukraine. Look at what we're doing in Syria. Never mind what's happening over here in Ukraine, much like they wanted people to forget talking about Crimea and the fact that they occupied a Ukrainian peninsula. And so I think, partially, this is to deflect attention of what continues to go on in Ukraine.

INSKEEP: General Breedlove sees many reasons that Russian President Vladimir Putin sent forces to Syria, in fact. And fighting ISIS is at the bottom of the list. Of course, that's the priority the United States cares about the most.

Do you think you understand, in a broad sense, what Putin wants?

BREEDLOVE: So I have said several times before - and I'm sure that some learned folks would challenge my concept - but I really don't think anyone truly understands what Mr. Putin is about. And I'm suspect when someone walks up to me and says, Mr. Putin wants this or Mr. Putin wants that. We watch the capabilities and the capacities that he builds in these places. And from those capabilities and capacities, we can deduce what he might want to do. And so we looked at the force he built up when he went into Crimea. We look at the force that he has built up in Syria. And we take a look at that and deduce that he can take the following actions or make the following influence. And that's how I try to determine where Mr. Putin might be headed.

INSKEEP: So when you try to figure out what Russia's doing in Syria, you start with several dozen warplanes and work out from there, in effect.

BREEDLOVE: Right. Well, and it's - as you know, it's more than several dozen warplanes. He did a pretty good job of laying in the infrastructure in order to support that effort - housing, putting in air defense capabilities and building up the capability to try to sustain that effort.

INSKEEP: Meaning they intend to be there for a while.

BREEDLOVE: At least now it looks like they do because they are continuing to resupply the effort.

INSKEEP: So on what level is Russia really cooperating with the United States right now?

BREEDLOVE: Cooperation is not the word that I would use. I would not use that word. We are not cooperating. We have developed a safety regime with them to ensure the de-confliction of our aircraft, et cetera, in the sky. But cooperation is not the word.

INSKEEP: OK, so safety regime, that is some way - although the details have not been released - of keeping each other informed of where each other's planes are so that you don't accidentally shoot somebody down.

BREEDLOVE: What I would say is that we have developed the regimens and the procedures to allow us not to come into contact and when we do, how we handle that, how we communicate, how we operate, the things that we do and don't do to be - so as to not look bellicose.

INSKEEP: Once you get past that problem, there is the question of where each side's bombs are landing and missiles are landing and whether that makes sense or they're at cross purposes. Are you remotely close to agreeing on who you should be attacking in Syria and who you should be leaving alone?

BREEDLOVE: Well, we clearly know who we're attacking. We're attacking ISIL. As you know, Russia announced when they went in that they were attacking ISIL. But we saw that their rhetoric was not matching their actions. I have seen Russia's own publicly categorized data on this. One could derive that they're hitting about 80 percent non-ISIL targets. I actually think the number is higher than that. But the bottom line is that clearly their main effort is not against ISIL. Their main effort is against the moderate opposition. And in effect, that provides a little bit of de-confliction in the area anyway. We are bombing ISIL where ISIL is. And they're bombing the moderate opposition where the moderate opposition is.

INSKEEP: I'm trying to suppress a cynical laugh. That actually sounds rather horrible. I mean, it's dismaying. What is the worst-case scenario that you feel you have to be prepared for?

BREEDLOVE: The thing that worries me is a snap exercise or an exercise that turns into an invasion. Remember that for almost two decades, we have been trying to make partners out of Russia. And what we realize now is that we do not have a partner in Russia. And so now we have to refocus our intelligence and redevelop those indications and warnings that make sure we don't get surprised.

INSKEEP: General Breedlove, thanks very much.

BREEDLOVE: Thank you very much.

INSKEEP: General Philip Breedlove is the head of the U.S. European Command and NATO's supreme allied commander.

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 #29
The Daily Cardinal (University of Wisconsin)
November 3, 2015
Rethinking Putin's Russian government
By Ben Miller
Ben Miller is a freshman studying political science.

Patriotism. A word that inspires hope, respect and a willingness to forever defend one's nation. The often forgotten emotion it inspires is the fear to criticize the American government. People criticize the government all the time but only when it's doing something "un-American." Suppressed are the criticisms against the government for doing something that has become synonymous with patriotism: "spreading democracy and freedom." Even worse is suggesting something that is "non-American" that may, in fact, be right.

In the eyes of many Americans, Russia is the definition of "non-American." Due to history, Russia has become synonymous with communism, which some claim to be the ultimate evil. By extension, Vladimir Putin, Russia's leader, is viewed as the embodiment of all that is anti-Western. As a result, it is difficult to admit that Putin may be right, and America may be wrong.

Specifically, I would like to focus on the Middle East. Although opinions are finally beginning to change, many Americans were in support of action in the Middle East after the bombing of the World Trade Centers. In the aftermath of the tragic terrorist attacks that forever changed American history, citizens called for revenge against those that committed these horrible acts. The United States military began the War on Terror in an attempt to spread democracy and freedom. American citizens saw themselves as great liberators. Putin disagreed.

American disagreement with Putin is primarily a result of differing views on government. The Western view is that every person around the globe wants freedom and democracy. This has led to the U.S. attempting to overthrow what Americans see as cruel dictatorships with the hope that these countries will adopt democracy. This was the theory behind the execution of Saddam Hussein and, more recently, attacks against Bashar al-Assad in Syria. However, America doesn't take action when business elites would be badly hurt, such as in Saudi Arabia where ties with Saudi royalty has given America easy access to oil.

Putin sees government as reflective of the people, and not vice versa. Not all people are homogeneous when it comes to the view of an ideal government. In areas where democracy and freedom are highly valued by the population, democracies are formed. In areas where the population values order, authoritarian dictatorships are formed. In the latter areas, overthrowing a dictator does not lead to a democracy but an equally cruel dictatorship. Recent studies on human behavior actually point toward Putin as being right about people's response to government.

In the eyes of Putin, the destruction of a brutal but stable government only results in chaos and death. In 2003, America collapsed the regime of Hussein. Twelve years later, Iraq is in the middle of an ongoing civil war. In Syria, the U.S. demanded the end of the Assad regime after claims Assad used chemical weapons on his own people. The United Nations later determined the U.S. was wrong. Chemical weapons were used by the American-backed rebels rather than the Assad government. The result has been massive bloodshed in the ongoing Syrian Civil War. It's nearly impossible to say the people of Iraq and Syria are in a better situation today than before American involvement. Putin was right. People in the Middle East don't equally value democracy as Western nations do. Thus, democracy cannot prevail. Overthrows in the name of democracy and liberty lead to misery rather than freedom.

Putin is calling us out on it. When asked about hostile relations between Russia and the U.S., Putin remarked, "We have only two military bases abroad ... U.S. bases on the other hand are all over the world. And you are telling me that I am the aggressor? Have you any common sense?" The U.S. has overstepped its boundaries, and Putin isn't afraid to stand up against us. Americans must realize the hypocrisy of the United States government.

Intervention by the U.S. has caused the deaths of millions of Arab civilians and U.S. troops. Rather than solving anything, the U.S. has only made matters worse. America has not only sparked anti-Westernism in the Middle East but has thrown gasoline on the flames. This anti-Western ideology, when combined with Islamic extremism, is the exact reason America faces threats such as ISIS. ISIS resulted from failed American intervention. No matter what the government says, allowing the deaths of millions of innocent people in the name of liberty is not patriotic. Under the constant threat of attack, Arabs have less liberty now than they did before.

It's time the U.S. listens to what Putin has to say. He is right. By working against Russia rather than with them, America continues to only make matters worse. Putin states, "We want to work together with you ... so long as you want that too." It's about time America does.

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 #30
Politico.com
November 2, 2015
Inside the Pentagon's Fight Over Russia
How the victors of one of America's most celebrated battles are facing off on the future of the Army.
By MARK PERRY
Mark Perry's book on William Oates and Joshua Chamberlain, Conceived In Liberty, was published in 1997.

For those villagers eagerly snapping pictures on the side of a road in the Czech Republic in late September, the appearance of the line of U.S. "Stryker" armored fighting vehicles must have seemed more like a parade than a large-scale military operation. The movement of some 500-plus soldiers of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment from Vilsack in Bavaria to a Hungarian military base was intended to strengthen U.S. ties with the Czech, Slovak and Hungarian militaries and put Russia's Vladimir Putin on notice. Dubbed "Dragoon Crossing," the tour traced a winding 846- kilometer tour that featured airdrops and simulated bridge seizures to show America's Eastern European allies that the U.S. military could respond quickly to any threat. "We are demonstrating operational freedom of maneuver across Eastern Europe," Col. John V. Meyer III told a reporter for the Army's website, "and that is having the strategic effect of enabling our alliance, assuring our allies, and deterring the Russians."

But not everyone is convinced. "This Stryker parade won't fool anyone in Moscow," says retired Army Colonel Douglas Macgregor. "The Russians don't do many things well, but they have been subverting, destabilizing, invading and conquering their neighbors since Peter the Great. And what's our response: a small unit of light armored trucks."

Vladimir Putin has done more than make headlines with his aggressive military moves from Ukraine to Syria, along with displays of force on the high seas and in the air. The Russian leader has also escalated an intense debate inside the Pentagon over the appropriate response to the Kremlin's new, not-so-friendly global profile-and over the future of the U.S. Army. And now the debate has spread to Capitol Hill: later this week the Senate Armed Services Committee will hold a hearing addressing the same issue.

Ironically, this Washington war of ideas has pitted against each other two brainy career Army officers who fought together in one of the most famous battles of modern times.

On one side is Macgregor, an outspoken and controversial advocate for reform of the Army- whose weapons he describes as "obsolescent," its senior leaders as "self-interested," and its spending as "wasteful." Viewed by many of his colleagues as one of the most innovative Army officers of his generation, Macgregor, a West Point graduate with a Ph.D. in international relations ("he can be pretty gruff," a fellow West Point graduate says, "but he's brilliant"), led the 2nd Cav's "Cougar Squadron" in the best-known battle of Operation Desert Storm in February 1991. In 23 minutes, Macgregor's force destroyed an entire Iraqi Armored Brigade (including nearly 70 Iraqi armored vehicles), while suffering a single American casualty. Speaking at a military "lessons learned" conference one year later, Air Force General Jack Welsh described the Battle of 73 Easting (named for a map coordinate) as "a stunning, overwhelming victory."

In the wake of the battle, however, Macgregor calculated that if his unit had fought a highly trained and better armed enemy, like the Russians, the outcome would have been different. So, four years later, he published a book called Breaking The Phalanx, recommending that his service "restructure itself into modularly organized, highly mobile, self-contained combined arms teams." The advice received the endorsement of then-Army Chief of Staff Dennis Reimer, who ordered that copies of Macgregor's book be provided to every Army general.

But Macgregor is still fighting that battle. In early September he circulated a PowerPoint presentation showing that in a head-to-head confrontation pitting the equivalent of a U.S. armored division against a likely Russian adversary, the U.S. division would be defeated. "Defeated isn't the right word," Macgregor told me last week. "The right word is annihilated." The 21-slide presentation features four battle scenarios, all of them against a Russian adversary in the Baltics - what one currently serving war planner on the Joint Chiefs staff calls "the most likely warfighting scenario we will face outside of the Middle East."

In two of the scenarios, where the U.S. deploys its current basic formation, called brigade combat teams (BCTs), the U.S. is defeated. In two other scenarios, where Macgregor deploys what he calls Reconnaissance Strike Groups, the U.S. wins. And that's the crux of Macgregor's argument: Today the U.S. Army is comprised of BCTs rather than Reconnaissance Strike Groups, or RSGs, which is Macgregor's innovation. Macgregor's RSG shears away what he describes as "the top-heavy Army command structure" that would come with any deployment in favor of units that generate more combat power. "Every time we deploy a division we deploy a division headquarters of 1,000 soldiers and officers," Macgregor explains. "What a waste; those guys will be dead within 72 hours." Macgregor's RSG, what he calls "an alternative force design," does away with this Army command echelon, reporting to a joint force commander-who might or might not be an Army officer. An RSG, Macgregor says, does not need the long supply tail that is required of Brigade Combat Teams - it can be sustained with what it carries from ten days to two weeks without having to be resupplied.

Macgregor's views line him up against Lt. General H.R. McMaster, an officer widely thought of as one of the Army's best thinkers. McMaster fought under Macgregor at "73 Easting," where he commanded Eagle Troop in Macgregor's Cougar Squadron. McMaster, however, had more success in the Army than Macgregor, is a celebrated author (of Dereliction of Duty, a classic in military history), and is credited with seeding the Anbar Awakening during the Iraq War. Even so, McMaster was twice passed over for higher command until David Petraeus, who headed his promotion board, insisted his success be recognized. McMaster is now a lieutenant general and commands the high-profile Army Capabilities Integration Center (called "ARCINC"), whose mandate is to "design the Army of the future." David Barno, a retired Lt. General who headed up the US command in Afghanistan, describes McMaster as an officer "who has repeatedly bucked the system and survived to join its senior ranks."

For many, McMaster is as controversial as Macgregor, with comments about him spanning the spectrum from condemnation to praise. "H.R. is an excellent officer and a good friend," a senior JCS officer says, "but you don't get to three stars by being an outsider, and you don't get to head ARCINC by bucking the system." Retired Brigadier General Kimmitt waves away claims that McMaster has traded his ideals for promotion ("clichéd nonsense," he says) and describes McMaster as "a giant in a land of midgets. He's the one true intellectual in the Army's corporate culture. He's smarter than almost any of them."

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 #32
Voice of America
November 3, 2015
Russian Propaganda: 'The Weaponization of Information'
By Molly McKitterick

When a Russian news outlet edited the U.S. ambassador into a picture of an opposition rally, the U.S. Embassy countered by editing the ambassador into a series of improbable photos - for instance, on the moon and at an ice hockey rink.

The idea was to show that the original photo was propaganda, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Benjamin Ziff told a Senate subcommittee in Washington on Tuesday.

The ploy worked. "This tweet was retweeted extensively within Russia," he said.

But Ziff went on to tell senators that responding in a similar manner to every lie or phony situation "is counterproductive, because it is reactive and you are always behind the curve."

Modern Russian propaganda is no longer concerned with censorship. Rather, it is widespread and prolific, filling up the media space to such an extent that people sometimes can't tell what is right and what is not.

Ziff said the Russians have "a sophisticated $1.4 billion-a-year propaganda apparatus." They claim to reach 600 million people across 130 countries.
"It's skillful, it's flexible and it's adapted to the geography of the audience," said Leon Aron, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, a public policy research group, and a member of the Broadcasting Board of Governors that oversees VOA.

'Complete fake'

The impact of all that Russian disinformation on Western democracies "appears paltry," Aron testified, adding that the main reason is a highly competitive media environment that exposes people to a wide range of facts and interpretations.

But he said the situation is "grimmer" going east to countries that were formerly part of the Soviet Union. Here, the effectiveness of Russian propaganda is greatly enhanced for two reasons: "First, the presence of ethnic Russian minorities, some of whom nurture grievances. And second, the existence of far fewer alternative sources of credible information."

Here, Aron said, "the weaponization of information occurs" when it provokes strong negative emotions leading to hatred and worse.

Both Aron and Ziff told the Foreign Relations Committee's subcommittee on Europe and regional security cooperation that the answer is to empower local communities to develop a rich and uncensored media environment.

Aron gave an example, citing a report aired on Russia's most widely watched television channel. A terrified woman identified as a refugee from the territory controlled by the Ukrainian government said she witnessed Ukrainian soldiers publicly executing the wife and son of a pro-Russian separatist: "The child was crucified on a bulletin board in the center of the city, while the woman was allegedly dragged behind a tank until she was dead."

"Complete fake," said Aron, and it was exposed by the website stopfake.org, run by alumni and students of the Mohyla School of Journalism in Kyiv. Students tracked down the woman's family. She had done the interview for money after her husband joined the pro-Russian separatists, leaving her with no means of support.

No value to truth

"If there is one key theme that runs through the Kremlin's thinking, it's cynicism," testified book author Peter Pomerantsev of the Legatum Institute, a public policy think tank. It is a cynicism, he added, that makes no distinction between democracies and authoritarian regimes, between truth and lies.

"So it doesn't matter if Vladimir Putin says one day there are no Russian soldiers in the Crimea and a few weeks later says, yes, there are, because what they are saying is there is no value to the idea of truth," he said.

Pomerantsev said he worked with focus groups in Eastern Europe among the 90 million Russian speakers outside Russia. "They were like, ... 'We don't believe anybody anymore but the Russians tell such an emotional story. It is so cinematic and entertaining that we go with the Russians.' "

Pomerantsev said it is too soon to know whether this trend is just a momentary thing or if it is something more long term and frightening. But if the dream of the social media age was to bring people together across borders, Russia "is the avant garde of making the information age into the disinformation age."

Yet Pomerantsev has not given up on the idea of social media that unite. "The Instagrams and the Facebooks of these very tragic victims of this terrible plane crash - the Russian plane that exploded over Egypt - you look at their lives, you realize, 'My God, they are no different than kids in Wichita [Kansas]."

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 #33
Labour migrants from Ukraine benefit Russian economy
By Lyudmila Alexandrova

MOSCOW, November 3. /TASS/. The number of guest workers from Ukraine in Russia will be dwindling, although for the Russian economy it would be a whole lot better if they decided to stay, experts believe. Many argue that temporary residence permits should be issued to all those who may apply for them regardless of any quotas.

The lax migration rules most Ukrainian citizens in Russia have enjoyed since the beginning of hostilities in Dobnass expired last Saturday. The 90-day period of their presence in Russia without proper registration will not be prolonged any more. Those of them who have spent more than three months in Russia will now have one month to legalize their status in Russia. Exceptions have been made for refugees from the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine. The rules of presence in Russia and the automatic prolongation of their stay will remain unchanged. Those who fail to formalize their status by December 1 will be faced with administrative measures applied to all illegal migrants, ranging from administrative punishment to expulsion and subsequent ban from entering Russia.

There are about 2.6 million Ukrainian citizens in Russia at the moment, says the deputy chief of the Federal Migration Service, Vadim Yakovenko. More than one million of them are from Ukraine's southeastern regions, and more than 600,000 others are in breach of the migration rules.

Since April 2014 404,000 Ukrainians have asked the Federal Migration Service for temporary asylum or refugee status, and another 265,000 for temporary residence permits.

In the meantime, experts at the Alexey Kudrin-led Civil Initiatives Committee have authored a survey of Russia's migration policy and migration problems saying that relations with migrants from Ukraine are number one problem. As a labour resource, they have many competitive edges over their counterparts from Central Asia. Migrants from Ukraine are qualified and need no adaptation, but under the current state of affairs they may be forced to leave, the Civil Initiatives Committee says.

The committee's experts argue that Russia has not yet managed to use the labour potential of refugees from Ukraine effectively enough. They are distributed among Russia's territories regardless of their professions and skills. "Experienced engineers and technical specialists have to work as cargo handlers or builders to earn a living for their families and to pay for temporary accommodation," the survey says.

"Of course, the number of migrants will get smaller," leading research fellow Yulia Florinskaya, of the Russian presidential academy RANEPA, has told TASS. "They will have to either update their licenses and pay big money, something they are not in the habit of doing, or pack their bags. Some of them, the most skilled ones, will leave."

She agrees that the potential of Ukrainian labour migrants is being used not to the full extent: "All experts have suggested giving temporary residence permits to Ukrainians without any quotas."

"We are interested in keeping these people here. Ukrainian migrants play a tangible role in our economy, particularly so at a time when the number of migrants from Central Asia is on the decline. Should these people get up and go, there will be no chance of ever luring them back. This is very bad strategically. Besides, we do have the vacancies for them. Our own able-bodied population has been shrinking by 900,000 to 1,000,000 a year."

RANEPA academy Professor Alexander Shcherbakov agrees that the number of labour migrants from other regions of Russia will keep going down. "They are accustomed to having certain benefits," he told TASS. "Although the profitability of their trips to Russia is rather high and the abolition of benefits will not reduce that profitability to nothing, certain disincentives will emerge in the end and some guest workers will not come again."

The influx will ease. Many Ukrainian guest workers here are outside the legal space, the director of the migration policies centre at the RANEPA academy, Viktoria Ledeneva, has told TASS.

The labour potential of Ukrainian migrants remains underused, she agrees. "But they wish to stay in Moscow and other large cities in Central Russia, and not move to some remote regions. True, their professional competences should be taken into account, but the state does have its own interests, too. It would be wrong to say that the government is to blame because it is unable to accommodate them. The situation is to be looked at comprehensively."

Ledeneva believes that in last year's extraordinary situation and the heavy flow of migrants from Donbas the Federal Migration Service did a rather good job and worked really fast.

"It goes without saying, though, that it could have been more efficient in some respects," she added.

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 #34
Wall Street Journal
November 4, 2015
Ukraine Rapped Over Conditions in War-Torn East
Council of Europe says people denied key services, assistance
By LAURENCE NORMAN

BRUSSELS-Ukrainian authorities are failing to meet the basic needs of millions of people from the country's conflict-ridden east, a report said Tuesday, with those living in the region unable to access key services, facing major constraints on free movement and vulnerable to graft.

The report, published Tuesday by Nils Muiznieks, Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, also raps separatist forces in the region for hindering access to humanitarian aid. The Council of Europe is an international organization with 47 member governments, including Ukraine and Russia, that promotes democracy and human rights.

Mr. Muiznieks was in Ukraine from June 29-July 3-weeks before a Sept. 1 cease-fire that significantly reduced fighting between Kiev and pro-Russian separatists. He spent only 24 hours in rebel-held areas and was unable to discuss in-depth allegations of forced disappearances, the targeting of civilians and arbitrary detentions by rebel forces, he said Tuesday.

Conditions in eastern Ukraine have been a constant source of friction between Ukraine and Russia. Moscow has repeatedly accused Kiev of failing to take measures to improve conditions in eastern Ukraine, where much of the population is Russian speaking. European countries, including Germany, have also pressed Kiev to resume key services to people living in and around rebel-held areas, a commitment it pledged to meet in February's ceasefire accord.

Presenting the report in Brussels, Mr. Muiznieks warned that the lack of services in conflict areas and the suspension by Kiev of pensions and other social benefit payments for residents in rebel-held areas is creating an increasingly "isolated" region. That risks, he said, creating a permanent frozen conflict zone cut off from the rest of Ukraine, like the breakaway region of Transnistria in Moldova.

"I think that we must all help Ukraine to prevent that from happening," he said.

The report documents a series of major problems affecting people in the east. It says that approximately five million individuals in Ukraine urgently need assistance to meet basic needs and says access to clean water is a problem for 1.3 million people.

It says fighting, which started in spring 2014 after Russia annexed the Ukrainian region of Crimea and separatist militias began battling Ukrainian forces, has resulted in extensive damage to schools and medical facilities, leaving the local population increasingly dependent on outside aid.

Russia denies western charges that it supplied, supported and stoked separatists forces in Ukraine's east. The conflict has cost some 8,000 lives and delivered a powerful blow to the economy and Kiev's finances.

The report says the Ukrainian government must do more to help the 1.45 million people that it lists as have been internally displaced by fighting. The report says many lack durable housing or job opportunities, with one in five households threatened by eviction from rented accommodation and many families lacking hot and cold running water, heating and waterproofed buildings.

The report documents significant hardships for those living in or around rebel-held areas. It describes a lack of basic medical supplies from blood-pressure pills to anti-polio vaccines. With social benefits cut by Kiev for those living outside government-controlled areas, the report says more than half a million people received payments from local pension funds in the Russian currency in July, a clear sign of rebel-held areas drifting out of national control.

The report says that separatist officials in Donetsk lodged complaints that children in rebel areas were unable to receive birth certificates, passport and school certificates, creating the risk that thousands of children born since the conflict began could become stateless. Mr. Muiznieks said he also received "alarming" information about "dire conditions" in local orphanages.

"All sides should undertake without further delay proactive and pragmatic steps to facilitate humanitarian access to conflicted affected communities and other vulnerable groups," Mr. Muiznieks recommends. "There is a need to establish dedicated humanitarian corridors."

The report also urges Ukraine's authorities to minimize constraints on freedom of movement for those living in the conflict zone. Ukrainian authorities have restricted public transport and the movement of goods across the contact line between rebel-held and government-controlled areas.

The report says an absence of access points, risk of shelling and reported incidents of corruption at checkpoints along the contact line mean significant numbers of people prefer traveling to government-controlled areas via Russia. At the minimum, the report says, current limits should be regularly reviewed.

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 #35
Bloomberg
November 4, 2015
Ukraine Failing to Probe Pro-Russia Protester Deaths, Panel Says
By Daryna Krasnolutska and Kateryna Choursina

Ukrainian authorities are failing to adequately investigate 48 deaths, including of 42 pro-Russian protesters, in the Black Sea port of Odessa in May 2014, according to an international panel set up by the Council of Europe.

The demonstrators clashed with football fans and participants in a pro-government rally as the military conflict in Ukraine's easternmost regions erupted following Russia's annexation of nearby Crimea. Most of the deaths occurred after a building in which the protesters had barricaded themselves was set on fire.

"Despite the lapse of some 18 months after the events, not a single charge has been brought in respect of the deaths," the panel said Wednesday in an e-mailed report. The body is tracking the investigation to check it meets the requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights.

The report is another blow to President Petro Poroshenko and his government as the U.S, the European Union and Ukraine's own citizens demand more progress on promises of reform and a crackdown on corruption. Ukraine's rulers have also failed to convict those responsible for more than 100 killings in the Kiev street protests that swept them to power a year and a half ago.

There's evidence "revealing a comparable lack of confidence in the adequacy of the investigations and in the ability of the authorities to bring to justice those responsible for causing or contributing to the many deaths and injuries" in Odessa, said the panel. The investigation in Odessa, like the probe in Kiev, has "serious deficiencies in independence and effectiveness," it said.

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 #36
AP
November 3, 2015
Attacks on black fans show rising tide of fan racism amid Ukraine's turmoil
By JAMES ELLINGWORTH, AP Sports Writer

KIEV, Ukraine (AP) - Instead of being one of the biggest sports events of the year in troubled Ukraine, Dynamo Kiev's game against Chelsea in the Champions League turned into a public display of the country's struggle to contain violent racists.

Echoing past decades of European football violence, at least eight people were brutally beaten at the game, including a 21-year-old African student.

While clashes between rival fans are comparatively common at Ukrainian league games, racist attacks on such a large scale are rare. This comes at a time when the country's small black population is under pressure.

"Around the 25th minute, I started to take photographs on my phone," the student told The Associated Press. "When I picked up the phone to look at the photographs I'd taken, I was hit. I fell down some stairs and felt almost as if I had lost consciousness."

The Congolese student, who asked not to be identified for fear of reprisals, spent almost a week in hospital with a head wound and injuries to his nose which required surgery. A keen football fan who attended games in his previous home in a provincial Ukrainian city, he now says he cannot face going to the stadium again.

"For me, if I go to a game another time, it would be as if I didn't get the hint," he says.

UEFA sent its security chief Mark Timmer to Kiev on Monday, where he criticized Ukrainian officials over the behavior of security personnel at the game and the federation's outdated safety procedures, according to an account of the meeting posted by the Ukrainian Football Federation, whose executive director Volodymyr Heninson said the case was Ukrainian football's "last yellow card" before serious sanctions.

It is far from Ukraine's first case of football racism. In March, UEFA punished Dynamo with a fine and partial stadium closure over racist fan behavior in a game against Everton, while FIFA punished the Ukrainian national team in 2013 over racist chanting at a World Cup qualifier against San Marino."

When Ukraine hosted the 2012 European championship with Poland, fears of racist attacks largely failed to materialize, but now, with Ukraine in political and economic turmoil, far-right hooligan groups are gaining prominence.

Over the course of approximately 15 minutes in the first half of Dynamo Kiev's Champions League game against Chelsea on October 20, hooligans launched a wave of attacks in one corner of the Olympic stadium.

Most of the victims were black, while three were white, some attacked after trying to protect black victims. There is no evidence that the victims had been supporting Chelsea.

Their attackers hunted in packs, sending some members around to cut off their victims' escape route, says Mykhaylo Smolovoy, a Ukrainian fan who witnessed the attacks.

"It reminded me of when you watch Discovery sometimes, or National Geographic, and tigers are chasing a gazelle," he told the Associated Press. During one beating, he said he heard shouts of "white power."

In one incident, captured on video by Ukrainian TV, a group of around five young men appear to launch a vicious beating on an unidentified white man, one stabbing repeatedly downwards with a wooden crutch. As this goes on, one of the attackers spots a young black man several rows away and leaves the fray to chase after him.

Anti-discrimination group Fare, which sends observers to monitor racism at major European games, captured video of four black men being chased through the crowd. They try to escape but some are caught and beaten, as are white men who try to assist them. Stadium security does not intervene.

Such videos have become evidence in an investigation by European football's governing body, which could force Dynamo to play future home games in an empty stadium or deduct points from the team.

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 #37
DPR to launch combat actions if Ukraine breaches truce - Zakharchenko

DEBALTSEVE. (Donetsk region). Nov 4 (Interfax) - The self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) will launch combat actions at a place they will find necessary, if Ukraine breaches the truce, DPR leader Alexander Zakharchenko said.

"The ceasefire is notional, yesterday I heard and saw how the silence regime is being implemented and watched the gunfire on Pesky and the frontline positions of our battalions, which are staying there," he told reporters on Wednesday.

"There are two ways - to bring back our territories in the political way, I will be saying about this, unless this comes out or we understand that this cannot be done. If the ceasefire is violated by Kyiv, we will allow ourselves to launch combat actions at a place we will find necessary. Perhaps, there is no ceasefire as such," Zakharchenko said.

"We and Ukraine have different interpretations of Minsk [Minsk agreements]. If we realize that it is impossible, Minsk [process] will end," he said.

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 #38
Carnegie Moscow Center
November 3, 2015
Ukraine After Local Elections: Putting Out Fires
While local elections proceeded peacefully, the fires are still burning around Kyiv.
By Balázs Jarábik
Balázs Jarábik is a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where his research focuses on Ukraine and Eastern Europe. Jarábik worked with Pact, Inc. in Kyiv, Ukraine to build its presence as one of the largest international nongovernmental organizations in Eastern Europe. He currently serves as a project director for Pact, based in Vilnius, Lithuania.
 
In recent months, dozens of peat fires have simmered around Kyiv, sometimes coating the capital with a thick smog. The day before the October 25 local elections, the authorities announced that they had managed to contain the fires. Their success was eerily similar to the way election campaigns and politics actually work in Ukraine: lots of last-minute firefighting, as opposed to searching for long-term solutions.

The voting was peaceful and more or less transparent. The real hotbeds of reported violations were Dnipropetrovsk, which has a long history of clan wars, and Odesa, where a newcomer was trying to dislodge a former Yanukovych ally. Still, a calm vote does not a pristine election make. Earlier this year, the country adopted its most complex electoral law yet, which mandated a top-down structure within parties and a nonlevel playing field among them. It failed to fully mandate open-list voting, which means that candidates for district, city, and regional councils were selected by party leadership, not voters. It also neglected to place limits on campaign financing, a move that gave a big advantage to major parties that enjoy extensive business connections.

The law is basically a short-term measure that suppresses the symptoms of the problem, rather than its causes. It allowed the government to limit the competitive power of its rivals, rather than address the sources of the electorate's rising dissatisfaction. Those challenges arise from the Poroshenko administration's continued failure to crack down on corruption or deliver on some of the most far-reaching reforms on its agenda on the one hand and from growing economic hardship on the other.

This firefighting approach was evident in the last-minute cancellations of elections in Mariupol and Krasnoarmiysk, which appeared suspiciously like a ploy to prevent a potential opposition victory in two of the largest Donbas cities that Kyiv still controls. Authorities also failed to ensure voting rights for Ukraine's 1.5 million internally displaced persons and for the 526,000 citizens stuck in insecure communities near the front lines.

Since the regime by all appearances was trying to blunt the opposition, the key question to ask is did it succeed? Commenting on the results, President Poroshenko noted with understandable satisfaction that there had been no major gains by the opposition. He was right, but only up to a point. The populist former prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko failed to make inroads with the vote, largely due to a lack of resources. Yet the Svoboda party performed better than in recent years-a reminder that a fair number of disgruntled Ukrainians remain willing to vote for the radical Right to fight those in power, literally. And in a sign of both the continuing strength of oligarchs and deep disillusionment with post-Maidan leaders, former Yanukovych allies led in key races in the southeast.

Multiple commentators have been heartened by the diversity of winning candidates and parties, even in Donbas. Yet whether this diversity is truly a sign of progress is debatable. To some degree, it simply reflects the fact that Ukraine's most prominent oligarchs have divided the country into their respective fiefdoms. While pro-Western parties did better than expected in the southeast, this was largely because the remnants of Yanukovych's Party of Regions have been fractured, with some being absorbed into the ruling Solidarity coalition. Others have split into competing groups-one of which the presidential administration quietly supported. And in some cases, the diversity of Sunday's winners reflects popular disenchantment. The new crop of city council deputies includes a Star Wars character named Emperor Palpatine, who won a seat in Odesa on a protest vote.

Moreover, the fact that most of the 132 parties-a record number-that fielded candidates employed strikingly similar campaign tactics argues against an overly optimistic interpretation. Most candidates relied on a well-practiced formula: a lack of transparency about their funding or their ambition combined with rhetoric that mixed patriotism, fearmongering, and paternalism. Only 3 percent of the candidates to Kyiv's City Council-all from one party, Samopomich-made public income disclosures. OSCE/ODIHR's preliminary report is telling: "Voters had a wide array of parties and candidates to choose from," yet funding from "wealthy donors and associated business interests dominated mayoral and regional council races," and "only three registered parties were granted meaningful editorial coverage."

The 46 percent turnout was not disastrously low-in fact, it was only 2 percent shy of the turnout for the last local elections. Yet the vote showed that Ukrainians are fed up with the country's ruling classes. Young people who had high hopes for reform after Maidan were noticeably absent from the polls. This is largely because the overwhelming advantages enjoyed by oligarchs and other vested interests made it difficult for parties representing the middle class-essentially, those embodying the values of Maidan-to compete effectively.

A potential reshuffle of the government may now be largely cosmetic. While Prime Minister Yatsenyuk's position is weak, due in part to his extremely low approval ratings, the opposition simply did not win big enough to exert meaningful pressure on the ruling coalition. But the elections also showed the ruling class that a snap parliamentary vote could bring unpredictable results. Saturday's arrest of Kolomoyskyi ally Hennady Korban suggests that while the regime may often be reluctant to move against corrupt oligarchs, it is willing to make an exception for those who overplay their hand. While Korban won a meager 2.6 percent of the vote in Kyiv's mayoral race, a candidate from his Ukrop party came in second in Dnipropetrovsk, and will now contest the November 15 run-off. Ukrop campaigned on highly-charged patriotic rhetoric that aimed, arguably, to undermine the regime. By arresting the party's head, Kyiv may hope to weaken a potential rival and pad its anti-corruption credentials at the same time.

Since Maidan, the West has been willing to overlook numerous glitches in Ukraine's reform process, portraying them simply as wrinkles that the country's new democratic momentum is supposed to iron out in due course. The acute threat posed by Moscow made it all the easier to argue that (any) criticism of Kyiv was unfair or misplaced. Yet the threat of Russian aggression has receded in recent months, revealing the partial weakness of the authorities' pro-reform credentials. No less than U.S. Ambassador Geoffrey Pyatt remarked before the elections: "No reform - no money."

Going forward, the West needs to be as honest as possible with the Ukrainian elite and push for real reforms with particular focus on anticorruption and decentralization. Effective reform advocacy will require not only lobbying the government and keeping tabs on its progress but also engaging with regular citizens. Recent polls suggest most Ukrainians have no idea what the decentralization package, a key requirement of the Minsk agreements that parliament plans to vote on soon, contains. Yet they have highly emotional opinions about it.

Rather than address this issue head-on, the Poroshenko administration seems to be opting for potentially shortsighted solutions. The first parliamentary reading of the decentralization package is a case in point: the presidential team tried to cobble together enough votes to pass the measure by hinting that it would not be fulfilled anyway. Yet this approach did not make the opposition more amenable to supporting the package. Indeed, some are now calling for the Minsk agreements to be scrapped entirely in order to contain the "virus of separatism."

It is too early to tell if the renewed pressure on Kolomoyskyi will prove similarly counterproductive. Kolomoyskyi seems to have overplayed his hand by being far too aggressive and flamboyant in his rhetoric and campaign tactics. But for many Ukrainians it is Kolomoyskyi and Korban who are the true patriots for their remarkable contributions to the war effort in Donbas, while Poroshenko has made a few deals too many with former Yanukovych allies (for example, Kharkiv Mayor Hennadiy Kernes).

For the time being Kolomoyskyi's clan is reacting carefully, decrying Korban's arrest as politically motivated, and calling for dialogue. As the Ukrainian journalist Serhiy Rudenko notes, Kolomoyskyi has the capability and wherewithal to mount a serious battle against Poroshenko, but Ukraine will be the most likely loser from any such conflict.

So while local elections proceeded peacefully, the fires are still burning around Kyiv.

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#39
http://readrussia.com
November 3, 2015
Unbent, Unbowed, Unbroken
By Mark Adomanis
[Chart here http://readrussia.com/2015/11/03/unbent-unbowed-unbroken/]

In comparison to Russia's highly centralized and hierarchical system of government, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine's has been much less authoritarian. Even during the worst of the Yanukovych years, the Ukrainian state was much "softer" than its Russian counterpart. At the same time however, the Ukrainian state was even more corrupt and less effective than the Russian. This is because, during the 1990's, the Ukrainian state was effectively captured by a group or "clan" of oligarchs.

Now these oligarchs were, on the one hand, not a terribly cohesive or unified group. They came from different parts of the country, from different ethnic groups, and differed strongly in terms of how close a relationship they wanted with Russia, Europe, and the United States. They also varied in terms of how they viewed Ukraine's Soviet past and where, ultimately, the country ought to head.

But while these oligarchs could (and did!) differ in terms of specific political issues, they tended to be unified in wanting to maintain their collective control over the political system. There was competition, in other words, but it was of a highly constrained and limited variety. No one dared tinker with the fundamental building blocks of the system, namely the oligarchs' continued control over the commanding heights of the Ukrainian economy.

This equilibrium was very good for the oligarchs, but it was a lot less good for Ukraine's citizens who experienced a lack of economic dynamism and growth that is shocking even by the less than stellar standards of the Former Soviet Union:

In case that graph leaves anything to the imagination, Ukraine's per capita GDP has never recovered to its previous Soviet-era peak. Given the grievous damage that Ukraine's economy suffered over the past year and a half, it could take the better part of a decade simply for the country to get back to where it was when communism collapsed.

If Ukraine is ever going to genuinely change, if it is to become a "normal" European country like its current leaders have repeatedly and publicly promised, it will need to rid itself of the oligarchs and the political power that their overawing economic power inevitably purchases.  

The Maidan uprising was proximately about the failure to sign an association agreement with the European Union. But in a larger sense, the people out on the Maidan were there because of a general disgust with the oligarchic status quo. Unfortunately for Ukraine, though, while the Maidan succeeded in kicking out Yanukovych, it ultimately led to the election as president of perhaps the canniest and most politically savvy oligarch of them all: Petro Poroshenko.

Despite his reformist bluster, Poroshenko is very much a creature of the old system. In the past, Poroshenko has served as secretary of the national security and defense council, the minister of foreign affairs, and the minister of trade and economic development. The last post is particularly interesting, as it came during the rule of a certain Viktor Yanukovych. That's right, Poroshenko served in the government of the person whom he now calls a "hated dictator."

The point is not that Petro Poroshenko is a uniquely horrible politician or that he is particularly deserving of scorn. He isn't and he doesn't. By the standards of the Ukrainian system, Poroshenko is actually reasonably honest and effective. The point is that for all of the never-ending public declarations of "transformation" and "reform," the current government of Ukraine is run by someone who is entirely a product of the old, corrupt system. And, as a creature of that system, Poroshenko seems to be in an extremely poor position to do anything to fundamentally transform it.

I still can't quite believe it, but a number of Western specialists somehow managed to convince themselves that an oligarch would lead a campaign to destroy the oligarchs. I've not seen anyone present an even minimally plausible theory of why Petro Poroshenko would suddenly and deliberately destroy his own wealth and power, just a blanket assertion that "things are different this time."

Now that the shooting has (mostly) stopped in Donetsk and Lugansk passions seem to be cooling and people are starting to look at the issues a bit more dispassionately. The recently-concluded regional elections, which even the usually optimistic European Council on Foreign Relations admitted were replete with "old-style deals with oligarchs and local power brokers," seem to have reminded everyone just how little has fundamentally changed since Yanukovych was kicked out of office. Turnout was low, Russian-style "political technology" was liberally employed, and accusations of fraud and vote-buying were legion. In other words, elections in the "new" Ukraine looked, felt, and sounded very much like Ukrainian elections have for the past twenty five years.

Perhaps another wave of public anger will succeed in driving the oligarchs into hiding or exile. Stranger things, certainly, have happened. But at the moment, Ukraine is experiencing a simulacrum of political change as opposed to the real thing. That will continue to be the case so long as a tiny, privileged economic elite continues to monopolize political power.

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 #40
Reuters
November 4, 2015
Ukraine Risks Losing Foreign Support Over Reform Delay, PM Says

KIEV - Ukraine risks losing the support of its Western backers if squabbles between the government and parliament delay or derail its reform efforts, Prime Minister Arseny Yatseniuk said on Wednesday.

Ukraine has promised to revamp its tax system under an International Monetary Fund-led bailout programme. But a failure to agree the size of tax cuts has delayed the submission of a draft budget for 2016 and therefore held up the disbursement of the next $1.7 billion tranche of IMF loans.

"We now have many allies in the West and these allies will stand with us so long as we show political will, responsibility and the unchanging nature of our goals and values as we carry out reform," Yatseniuk said in government meeting.

"The president, the government, parliament - we must all speak in one language," he said.

The delays are threatening just as Ukraine's economy shows sign of reviving. Analysts polled by Reuters expect inflation will fall to 12.3 percent in 2016, about a quarter what it is expected to reach in 2015. Gross domestic product should grow 1.9 percent in 2016, after shrinking by 11 percent in 2015.

On Monday, lawmakers said parliament and the finance ministry were close to deadlock over planned tax cuts.

Discussions between the government and parliament on tax have not started yet. Commentators said they were reluctant to make potentially unpopular budget decisions before Oct. 25 local elections.

"The elections are over ... We must fulfil all the criteria and indicators set out in our reform programme which amount to the commitments Ukraine has made to our international partners," Yatseniuk said.

The lack of a complete draft budget is holding up not only the disbursement of the IMF cash, but also $2.3 billion from the United States and European Union for this year.

The tax row centres on the proposed level of taxation for the 2016 budget: lawmakers want steep cuts that the finance ministry says are not sustainable.

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 #41
RFE/RL
November 3, 2015
Five Questions: The Arrest Of Ukrainian Oligarch Hennadiy Korban
by Anna Shamanska

The arrest of a close associate of one of Ukraine's most powerful oligarchs has pundits and the public wondering whether President Petro Poroshenko is finally cracking down on corruption or merely trying to silence political opponents.

Hennadiy Korban, the head of the anti-Poroshenko UKROP party, was initially arrested at his home on October 31 before being released and re-detained on November 3.

The speaker of Ukraine's parliament has formally asked the country's prosecutor-general and the head of the national security service to explain to lawmakers why Korban was arrested.
Who Is Hennadiy Korban?

Korban hails from the eastern industrial city of Dnipropetrovsk, where in the 1990s he became a business partner of Ihor Kolomoyskiy, a banking, energy, and media tycoon. Korban said his interest was "redistributing the wealth of some to others."

Forbes estimates Korban's worth at $55 million.

When Kolomoyskiy was appointed governor of the Dnipropetrovsk region in 2014, Korban was named a deputy governor. He lost the post when Kolomoyskiy resigned under a cloud of suspicion in March.

In June, Korban became the leader of the radical opposition Association of Ukrainian Patriots (UKROP), and he has reiterated that the party stands in opposition to Poroshenko and the government.

In an interview with RFE/RL's Ukrainian Service published last month, Korban suggested he was being hounded by Ukrainian authorities.

What Happened On October 31?

Korban was arrested during dramatic raids targeting UKROP offices across the country, involving some 500 security officers. At one point Korban yelled at the Ukrainian Security Service troops on his doorstep to take him into custody, "I defended you on the front lines!"

Searches were also carried out at the offices in Dnipropetrovsk of the nonprofit organization Fund For The Defense Of The Country, where Korban served on the supervisory board.

Members of the NGO said computers and stacks of documents were seized during the raid. "Papers were taken without any kind of documentation. They simply grabbed files and that was it," the group's deputy director, Oleksiy Anhurets, said, according to RFE/RL's Ukrainian Service.

Security troops also searched the Dnipropetrovsk offices of Boris Filatov, a businessman and UKROP member of the Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine's parliament.
Filatov wrote on his Facebook page that police had "burst into his home."

Why The Arrest?

Ukrainian authorities say that Korban, 45, was detained on suspicion of involvement in organized crime, embezzlement, and kidnapping.

Specifically, he was accused of stealing $1.7 million from the National Defense Fund, whose funds are earmarked for Ukrainian soldiers fighting pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine.

Ukrainian officials have denied that politics is involved. "There is no politics in the detention of Korban. It's not related to the elections, and the Prosecutor-General's Office will prove it," prosecutor Vladyslav Kutsenko said.

But Isn't It Really Just Political?

Poroshenko has denied that the arrest is politically motivated, telling three Ukrainian TV stations on November 1 that Korban's arrest was just "the start" of the fight against corruption in Ukraine.

"The fight against corruption and to restore order will continue," he said, vowing that "no one will enjoy immunity,... neither representatives of the new dispensation nor representatives of the old regime."

But Kolomoyskiy, reportedly a financial backer of UKROP, has alleged that Korban's arrest is linked to UKROP's "big success" in local elections in most of Ukraine on October 25. (Korban ran unsuccessfully for mayor of Kyiv in those polls but fell short of enough votes to reach the second round.)

A co-founder of banking chain Privatbank, Kolomoyskiy was once a key ally of the central government's, reportedly arming and financing militia groups to hold off pro-Russian separatists in the east. Poroshenko signed off on his dismissal as Dnipropetrovsk governor in March after accusing Kolomoyskiy of setting up a private militia and trying to take over a state-affiliated oil company.

Now What?

Stepan Bozhylo of the Prosecutor-General's Office said Korban was detained again on November 3 based on new information related to his possible involvement in a series of crimes that was obtained on November 2.

He did not elaborate.

Some 500 Korban supporters rallied in front of the parliament building and pretrial detention center in Kyiv on November 3, demanding his immediate release.
Filatov said that with the arrest of Korban, Ukraine was being split politically. "In our country there will soon been only two political parties: the party of collaborators and the party of resistance," Filatov wrote on his Facebook page on October 31.

Analysts speculate that the Korban arrest is part and parcel to the feud between Poroshenko and Kolomoyskiy. Serhiy Rudenko is one of several observers to note that Kolomoyskiy has the "financial, organizational, and media" interests to take on Poroshenko.

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 #42
Russia and Ukraine agree upon preliminary terms of uranium supplies in 2016

MOSCOW, November 3. /TASS/. Russia's International Uranium Enrichment Center (IUEC) affiliated with Rosatom and Ukraine's State Concern Nuclear Fuel agreed upon preliminary terms of uranium feedstock supplies from Ukraine to Russia in 2016, commercial director of the Russian company Gleb Efremov told TASS on Tuesday.

Ukraine sends its Uranium to Russia for enrichment and further production of nuclear fuel for its nuclear power plants. Russia's TVEL is the main fuel supplier for Ukraine's nuclear power sector.

"We held the first round of negotiations concerning organization of supplies in the next year. Ukraine showed interest and we currently await their formal confirmation of intensions, providing us with grounds to start working over a contract already," Efremov said.

The Ukrainian side assured the Russian side cooperation in 2016 will continue using the model employed in previous years, Efremov added.

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 #43
Atlantic Council
November 3, 2015
The Motivations Behind Poroshenko's New Anticorruption Drive
BY JOHN E. HERBST
John E. Herbst is Director of the Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center at the Atlantic Council. He served as US Ambassador to Ukraine from 2003 to 2006.

Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko's government appears to have launched a new anticorruption drive with the October 31 detention of Gennadiy Korban, a close associate of oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky and the leader of Ukrop, a political party funded by Kolomoisky. The authorities arrested Korban following an investigation that began last year into the assault on government official Serhiy Rudyk and the poisoning of Dnipropetrovsk Prosecutor General Roman Fedik. In addition, the Prosecutor General's Office arrested Mikhail Koshlyak, a senior aide to Boris Filatov, who is another of Kolomoisky's associates and the Ukrop candidate for Mayor of Dnipropetrovsk. Koshlyak was arrested in connection with the murder of an officer of the Security Service of Ukraine (the SBU).

While Ukrainian civil society has spent months criticizing Poroshenko for his lethargic response to corruption, the reaction to these steps has been decidedly mixed. There is little sympathy for Korban, who has a reputation as Kolomoisky's chief lieutenant in the oligarch's forcible seizure of commercial assets. Still, some wonder why nothing has been done to go after close associates of ex-President Viktor Yanukovych. And while the Prosecutor General's Office and the SBU stress that there is nothing political to the action, others see selective justice.

An analyst sympathetic to Poroshenko's political troubles notes that this is selective justice, by necessity. Poroshenko's favorability ratings have dropped precipitously in the polls to 27 percent, and his failure to move on corruption is one reason. Euromaidan activists would like to see corrupt officials from the Party of Regions be prosecuted, especially those responsible for the use of force against protesters there. Poroshenko needs to do something to show that he understands the importance of the issue, but his majority in the Rada is not very stable, and investigating corruption in his own coalition could lead to the loss of his parliamentary majority.

Poroshenko has also tried to use this investigation against Korban to solve a serious problem on his team: the hostility between SBU Chief Vasily Hrytsak and Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin. This antagonism was the result of a successful anticorruption operation that the SBU Chief conducted earlier this year against staff in the Prosecutor General's Office, including some of Shokin's close aides. The Prosecutor General was reportedly seeking the dismissal of Deputy Prosecutor General Vitaliy Kasko, who cooperated with the SBU in the move against corrupt officials in his office. Poroshenko likely hopes that in making Shokin and Hrytsak partners against Korban and Kolomoisky, the Prosecutor General will forget, or at least pay less attention to, his grievance against the SBU Chief.

It is also likely that Poroshenko hopes that by giving Shokin a high-profile role in the investigation and likely prosecution of Korban, he will tamp down the increasingly loud calls for Shokin's removal. This hope will not be realized. Indeed, Shokin's presence as Prosecutor General is one of the reasons reformers do not view the prosecution of Korban as a strong step against corruption. And if Shokin manages to fire Kasko while prosecuting Korban, the reformers' cynicism will be amply justified.

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