#2
Inozemtsev's Five Reasons Why Russia Unlikely to Become a Democracy Anytime Soon
Paul Goble

Staunton, October 26 - Democracy is a system which allows the population to "choose and replace their government through free and fair elections," Vladislav Inozemtsev says. That is something that is not the case in Russia today, and there are five reasons to think it will not be the case anytime soon.

In an address to the Freedom Games in Lodz nine days ago, Inozemtsev discusses these five factors, provides arguments and evidence for each, and concludes that Russia will have a chance to escape its current undemocratic state only if and when most of the decisions which affect Russia are taken somewhere other than Moscow (snob.ru/selected/entry/99514).

The five factors he points to are as follows:

First, "the personalization of Russian politics and the almost complete hostility to ideology, programs and methods of development," something that means Russians identify with the ruler regardless of what he says or does rather than feel they should select a leader who reflects what they want.

Second, "an attitude toward the opposition as a clutch of traitors and the deeply-rooted denial of its positive importance," the tendency to treat any who oppose the authorities as dissidents with ties to foreigners rather than the articulators of an alternative set of ideas about how the country should proceed.

Third, Russia's status as a raw materials exporter, a country "in which the population in its overwhelming majority does not create wealth but consumes it" and therefore "cannot be democratic." It is no accident, Inozemtsev says, that "the tradition from a participant economy to demands for 'bread and circuses' corresponded to the times of the transition from the republic ot empire in ancient Rome."

Fourth, the perception of Rusisans that they are necessarily an empire that must extend its borders, something that makes "democracy appear impermissibly risky," given that those who extend the borders of the state will be forgiven almost anything (Putin) else and those who lead to their contraction will be viewed as traitors whatever else they may have done (Gorbachev).

And fifth, "the growth of personal freedom in an authoritarian society in the most unexpected way leads to the formation of 'an anti-democratic consensus,'" one in which individuals believe they can best advance their interests through the highly personal means of corruption rather than through collective action.

Because of these factors, Inozemtsev argues that there is little demand for democracy on the part of Russians. "The striving for freedom and autonomy, the feeling of superiority of individual goals over state tasks, an attitude toward the government as an institution for securing public goods and not a sacred symbol, a predisposition for collective action and not individual solutions of systemic contradictions - all these preconditions of a democratic society are largely absent in Russian consciousness." And they are unlikely to emerge quickly.

Only foreign influence can hope to change that when Russia achieves some kind of rapprochement with Europe for which democracy is a key element.  Moreover, given the historical problems he outlines, Inozemtsev says that the required "desovereignization" of the ruler could be realized "only through the desovereignization of the state itself."

In some countries that might be achieved by occupation, but given Russia's size and power, that is impossible. Consequently, there is only one simple path forward: Russia's joining a supranational union "with a single center of power and legislation" not in Moscow but somewhere else.

However bitter this may be, Inozemtsev concludes, he "does not see any basis to suppose that Russia can become a democracy beore the basic legislative, judicial and exxecutiv e decisions cease to be taken in Moscow.  'Real sovereignty' and real democracy in Russia are incompatible," and that is why the path toward democracy is going to be so long and difficult.

[return to Contents] 

 #3
The Daily Telegraph (UK)
October 25, 2015
Russia braced for a long night-time of the mind and soul
Foreign correspondent's notebook: Roland Oliphant reports from Moscow, which has already seen the first snowfall of winter
            
The first snow came a couple of weeks ago, in the form of sugar-like specks borne on the anti-cyclones inside city courtyards and alleyways. It was far too early, and it didn't settle, but it marked the approaching end of what is probably Russia's most important season.

Moscow is at its best in autumn, and this year's has been one of the loveliest in a long time. The air is crisp, the skies (haphazardly) clear, the trees brilliant yellow. In Britain's mild island climate, the cycle of the seasons is a muted, soggy affair. In northern continental climes, it is an urgent, essential fact as solid and stinging as the ice on the Moscow river.

The result is seasonal attacks of intense emotional turmoil. For despite the natural beauty, the fact is that the short summer is over. Dead. Gone. It can never be reclaimed, and ahead lie six months of freezing, sunless, blackness; a night-time of the mind and soul that by March will leave you almost contemplating suicide.

That makes each brilliant yellow leaf on Moscow's poplar trees a token of devastating, premature bereavement, a disorienting cocktail of love and despair that I suspect lies at the root of the myth of the Russian soul.

Perestroika-era rock, in particular, is full of seasonal affective disorder. Yuri Shevchuk's 1992 ballad about the season is still ubiquitous. The late, great Viktor Tsoi was steeped in it: the first two songs on his band's final, album are called Summer will end and Red-Yellow Days. In the latter, Tsoi sings about the pain of parting, and the promise, like summer, that he'll be back.

But Eighties rock is about as relevant to contemporary Russia as Tolstoy's essays on the pre-revolutionary aristocracy. And like jumping into a cold pool, of course, the Russian winter is much worse in legend than in fact. This will be my tenth, and I know from experience it won't be half as bad as my own fearful imagination has it.

Or will it? The forecasters say this year is going to be exceptionally nasty, but they say that every year.

Sergei Sobayanin's profligacy with granite kerbstones may be questionable, but one thing the mayor of Moscow must be praised for is dragging his city kicking and screaming into the era of two-wheeled transport. It is long overdue: Moscow is an ideal city for cycling, with undulations rather than hills, and two decades of insane gridlock has made clear that the love affair with foreign-branded cars is out of control.

But first, policy-makers must prod citizens to make the conceptual leap from seeing a bicycle as a glorified toy to a form of transport. To do so, they've laid cycle lanes around the city centre, and rapidly expanded a two-year old network of what Londoners would call Boris Bikes. I came to them late, but in the past month I have become an evangelical convert. It's quick, cheap, and for the most part a lovely way to explore the capital.

Still, it remains an absurdly high-adrenalin experience. A certain breed of Muscovite driver, often in a black Mercedes, specialises in overtaking at illegal speeds with a clearance of three inches. Terrifying enough for other drivers - deadly on a bike.

The Moscow Times, the capital's long-running English language daily, has announced it is going weekly from the end of the month. People who work for it tell me they fear it is going to be transformed into a lifestyle magazine for expats, and some of its best names are bowing out.

English language rags staffed by inexperienced reporters are easy to ridicule (I know, I was one). But they also play a crucial role. They are a training ground for foreign correspondents, for one thing. But more importantly they are, at their best, a valuable window into daily news that wouldn't otherwise cross the language barrier.

For 25 years, the MT covered the multifaceted, rich and mundane news (weekend murders, corporate raids, show-business scandals - the list goes on) that foreign outlets just can't cover. For non-Russian speakers, it provided an excellent, probably unique, starting point for getting to grips with the ebb and flow of the country's current affairs.

Given the present state of those affairs, its loss is particularly grievous.

 [return to Contents] 

 #4
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
October 27, 2015
But why Russia?
Recent arrival in Moscow, Fraser Young, delves into the myths and legends that help give his adoptive new home such a mysterious allure.
FRASER YOUNG , SPECIAL TO RBTH
Fraser Young is a recent graduate of Leeds University, where he studied History and Russian Language; he is an avid Russophile currently working full-time as an English teacher in Moscow, with a special interest in Russian history.

I started studying Russian four years ago and have recently moved to Moscow to become one of those Brits abroad who, devoid of a plan, become a member of that most stable of professions, the English Teacher. Ever since I started my foray into all things Russian, I have been bombarded with very similar reactions from almost everyone I meet who is unfamiliar with the country. They ask these same four questions, in this very order 95% of the time, so I thought I'd try and answer them fully once for all in order to explain what it is about Russia that keeps me coming back.

1) Isn't it always cold?

In a word, no. Although it is certainly true that parts of Russia during the winter reach mind-bogglingly cold temperatures, this is not true for the whole year. During my year studying in Russia, the coldest temperature I experienced was -25 °C however, summer is an entirely different story with my highest temperature being around 30°C. I also believed this ridiculous stereotype...and ended up being the only person in Gorky Park mopping sweat from my brow wearing heavy full-length jeans that I was convinced would be appropriate.

2) But isn't Russia scary?

Moving anywhere abroad can be scary, you have to deal with a new language, new living conditions and generally acclimatising and that can be a bit daunting. But is Russia itself some sort of post-apocalyptic wasteland where something unpleasant is lurking around the corner? Not in the slightest. I can count the number of times I've been genuinely scared in Russia on one hand, and even they all turned out to be absolutely fine. For example we were once approached by a handful of neo-Nazis in a bar who thought we were German. Our fears were actually misplaced, they wanted to just chat with some real Germans and so with an apologetic and rather deflated salute they retreated to their table and left us alone. It was certainly unpleasant, but these people are no more common than the booze-soaked English Defence League-types you encounter in dingy pubs and bars across the UK.

3) But don't they all hate Westerners?

Once again, no, not in the slightest. The blame for this misconception can be placed squarely on sensationalist media reports looking to get more viewers or sell more papers. When people realise I am British the two most common responses are not, shockingly, "down with the Western imperialists" or "You're not welcome here you American lapdog." Instead they are often the far more mundane, "Oh cool, I really want to visit London" or "Say something, I love your accent." The vast majority of Russians are often interested to hear more about the UK, practice their English or welcome you to their country. Politics can be left to one side and if someone tries to start a controversial debate you'll often hear "Let's leave politics to the politicians, do you want another beer?"

4) But why Russia?

This final question is always rather harder to answer, even for the most committed Russophile. Frequently preceded by a pause and a look of worry that whoever is asking is about to cause great offence. The simple answer is: Why not? The long answer is far harder to put into words. I have always had a keen interest in Russian history, having read Stalingrad by Anthony Beevor at the age of eleven. This interest only grew with hours spent watching documentaries covering everything from Ivan the Terrible to Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. When deciding to study history with a foreign language at university, Russian seemed an obvious choice. But the choice goes far deeper than that. To a Brit hailing from leafy Surrey, Russia represents an entirely different world. The same in many ways, but so very different in so many others, to me Russia presents a unique opportunity and adventure, a chance to view the world from a different perspective. Put simply, an opportunity that was too good to pass up. Russia is very different to home, but this is by no means negative, so why wouldn't you come to Russia? You might hate it, but who knows, you might love it.

 [return to Contents]

 #5
Russia Beyond the Headlines
October 24, 2015
Who to follow: Top 10 Instagram accounts to get to know Russia better
Not following them? You're missing out.
By Ksenia Isaeva
[Photos here http://rbth.com/multimedia/people/2015/10/23/followthem-10-best-rusian-instagrams_533165]

@muradosmann The most popular Russian Instagram account with 3.4 m followers. Globally recognizable photos. Haven't heard about the #followme project? You must live in Siberia with the bears!

@raskalov Vitalyi Raskalov, a famous Instagram blogger in Russia. He became famous for climbing up the star on the main building of Moscow State University and other "Stalin skyscrapers" in the Russian capital. Now Vitalyi Raskalov travels around the world, since he's banned from entering Russia until 2016. His conquests include skyscrapers in China, mountains in Argentina, and the Sagrada Familia in Barcelona.

@darianvolkova What would happen, if a Russian ballet dancer picked up a camera? This Instagram answers that question. The grace, charm and magic of Russian ballet though the lens of Darian Volkova.

@smelov.photo The tourist-magnet St. Petersburg is captured by the talented Ivan Smelov. If you're planning to visit the city, check out his account. The drone photos of cathedrals have gone viral.
      
@surfholidays Everything about surfing with photos from tropical islands and... Russia. Having surfed in St. Petersburg, Kamchatka, the Arctic, Kaliningrad and the Kuril islands, Sergey Rasshivaev knows what he's talking about.
      
@itsbaaat Heard about North Ossetia? It's one of the Russian republics and a magical place of unusual beauty and spirit, with high mountains and relaxed, hospitable people.
      
@zhenyaswan @yaroslav_shuraev This couple did a great job of shooting Russian life and nature in a hip way. This year their trip to Kamchatka culminated in heart-stopping photos of lava fields, seascapes, mountains and... love.
      
@roscosmosofficial The official page of the Russian Federal Space Agency. Cosmonauts are lucky to have the best view of our planet. This Instagram posts space selfies, photos from outer space, showing the northern lights, the starry sky, sunsets and sunrises, technical equipment, and the million colors of our beautiful planet. A must-see.
      
@dcim.ru The most humane Russian Instagram account, made by Russian photographer Dmitry Markov, who received the Getty Images Instagram Grant in 2015. He lives in the north-western city of Pskov, Russia, where he works with disabled children and volunteers for organizations providing support to orphans.
     
@russiabeyond It might be immodest, but RBTH has a wonderful Instagram account with photos of Russia's regions, telling interesting facts about historical moments, showing museums from the inside, sharing uncommon facts and quoting Russian literature. You'll be amazed how good it is.

 #6
Kremlin.ru
October 26, 2015
Working meeting with Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin

Vladimir Putin had a working meeting with Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin. Mr Sobyanin briefed the President on the current state of the city's transport infrastructure and future prospects for developing this sphere, as well as on the situation in the social sector. Attracting investment into Moscow's economy was also a subject of discussion.

President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Mr Sobyanin,

You have been the mayor of our country's capital city for five years now. Moscow is more than just a city, more than just a metropolis. We often repeat this phrase, but Moscow really is Russia's heart. It is the country's heart in all senses of the word, the political heart, and the economic heart. The situation in Moscow is crucial for the rest of the country's wellbeing.

In this respect, I want to thank you, first of all, for your work over these last five years. As always in such cases, there are many questions, of course. Let's discuss the different aspects of what is happening in Moscow now, what issues you have resolved and what tasks you still have ahead.

Of course, we also need to talk about the most sensitive areas of this complex city's life and the impact your and your team's efforts are having on Muscovites' quality of life. We need to look at what you are doing to resolve the big and complicated problems of transport, healthcare, employment, balancing the city's budget, attracting investment and developing infrastructure in the broad sense. What are you doing on the issue of kindergartens, where the situation was still serious only recently and in many regions has still not been resolved? What is the situation with schools and the education they provide? And what are you doing to address the demographic situation?

As you can see, there are plenty of questions, and each of them is particularly important. Let's discuss all of these issues now.

Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin: Mr President, it is true that the transport issue is probably one of Moscow's biggest problems, what with the kilometres-long traffic jams and all the discomforts of public transport. We have worked hard to improve the public transport situation over these last five years. Dozens of kilometres have been added to the metro lines, we have built around 400 kilometres of new roads, flyovers and exchanges, and have developed a civilised parking environment and a smart transport system. The transport situation had been worsening over the last two decades, but we have turned this trend around and things are improving now. Traffic on Moscow's roads is moving 12 percent faster than it was before, and we have more frequent public transport services in place.

These are just the first positive results, but they demonstrate that we can change for the better what had seemed to be a transport situation that was doomed only to get worse, with ever-bigger traffic jams. Some international experts had ranked Moscow the worst city in the world for traffic jams, but we have gone down to fourth or fifth place now. We will do our best to make sure that we do not rise any higher again and will continue in this positive direction.

Let me say again that this is not the end of a job completed, but only the start of a difficult road. We must continue our consistent efforts to extend the metro system and develop commuter services to the suburbs, an issue you have raised on many occasions. We need to continue building traffic exchanges and monitor the traffic situation on the roads.

By the way, I want to thank you for your instructions on developing Moscow's transport hub, because the city cannot resolve this issue all on its own. It is essential to have just as active development in the Moscow Region, develop the suburban railway lines and the airports around Moscow. In accordance with your instruction, we worked together with the Transport Ministry, Russian Railways, and our colleagues in the Moscow Region to bring a new railway line from Zelenograd into operation. This cuts the travel time by nearly half, and another new line cuts the time it takes to get to Tver by nearly a third.

Now, we are working on bringing the Moscow ring railway line into operation. This will essentially link the different suburbs. When it comes to this suburban transport, many projects have not been settled yet, but traffic volumes have already increased 1.5-fold. The suburban transport system is carrying more than 2 million people a day now. This is already comparable to the Moscow metro. This is therefore the first big comprehensive task that we are tackling together with our colleagues in the federal Government, Russian Railways, and Moscow Region authorities.

The second big task is to attract investment into the city's economy. After all, our spending, our prospects and our budget and social capabilities are all dependent on the real economy and on attracting investment.

We do have some results in this area. Investment in Moscow's basic capital has increased 1.5-fold over the last five years. These are the nominal figures, but even when put into comparative terms, there is still clear progress. We feared that investment would start a rapid decline last year, but this has not happened and the latest results for the first nine months of 2015 show that overall investment volumes are not dropping. The figures are roughly the same as what they were last year. Last year's figure, as I said, was around 1.5 times higher than in 2010. In other words, the investment and project dynamic continues and I think that we will not see any sudden drop in the coming years.

To simplify investors' work and attract people not only into developer projects but also into the real economy, we just recently passed a new law offering a 10 to 25 percent tax burden reduction to businesses, industrial companies and innovation ventures that are working steadily, putting land and basic capital to effective use and paying decent wages.

Many investors, including foreign investors, have some jitters and say, "Your economy is unstable and we fear that you might suddenly make decisions that are not in our favour or take our assets from us." There is nothing to justify such fears, but nonetheless, seeking to reassure investors, we passed a law guaranteeing that if the state authorities change the rules in a way that harms investors' interests, we will compensate them from our budget funds for lost income. I think we will be able to hold onto the potential that we built up over this time and the moment will come when we begin to grow again.

Regarding the social sector, despite the budget constraints we face, we continue to fulfil all obligations to senior citizens, people with disabilities, and low-income families. Furthermore, this year, we plan a decision that will mean that after pensions are raised at the federal level in February-March next year, we will index social benefits, not by much perhaps, but by some way at least, so that people receive a more substantial addition to their pensions and social benefits.

Complicated processes have been underway in the healthcare and education sectors over the last year or two, and this has often earned us some fierce criticism, but I think that the most painful stage of the changes is behind us now, and today, we are starting to see the first fruits of the work accomplished.

In the education sector, for example, teachers' wages have increased substantially and the average wage is now more than 70,000 rubles. This is a good wage, quite a bit higher than the average. The quality indicators are also quite good. The number of winners of not even citywide but national educational competitions has doubled. This shows that the reforms and consolidation of schools we carried out has not eroded the quality of education and continues to work for the good of talented students. This is one important aspect, and another is that results in the National Final School Exam have also improved considerably. We see this by the exam results. The Government and the Education Ministry have toughened monitoring of the exam, and we think this is legitimate and help them in carrying this out, but we see even so that the overall exam results are a lot higher and give students the chance to get into a good university. This is very important.

Vladimir Putin: What is the situation with implementation of executive orders in the social sector?

Sergei Sobyanin: As far as the executive orders' implementation goes, we are on target for wages, and we have fulfilled practically all of the orders' demands regarding quality indicators in the healthcare sector, for example, in areas such as infant mortality, women's childbirth-related deaths, and deaths due to heart disease. Cancer rates is the only indicator where we are seriously behind, but there are objective reasons for this, as Moscow, being the federal centre, is the place where cancer patients from all around the country come for treatment.

Vladimir Putin: You've had an increase?

Sergei Sobyanin: Yes, but if we take Moscow residents alone, the situation is not bad overall.

Vladimir Putin: And the demographic situation?

Sergei Sobyanin: The demographic results are stable. People were fearing last year that the birth rate would start to fall, mortality would rise, and our indicators would worsen, but nothing of this sort has happened so far. We have positive demographic indicators, in other words, there are more births than deaths. We had 120,000 children start their first year of school this year. This all places a big burden on the preschool education system, but it is a welcome burden. All children from the age of three and upwards can attend preschool facilities, and now we have lowered the age to two years and eight months and will gradually lower it further so that more children can attend preschool.

Vladimir Putin: Mr Sobyanin, the results are good on the whole, and I ask you to keep up the pace and continue this hard work over the coming period, in the interests of everyone who lives in Moscow, loves this city, and hopes to see effective work from you and your team.

Sergei Sobyanin: Thank you. The post of mayor of Moscow and this capital city status in general are a great honour of course, but come with great responsibility.
<...>

 [return to Contents]

 #7
Counterpunch.org
October 27, 2015
The "War Scare" in the Kremlin, Revisited: Is History Repeating Itself?
By MEL GOODMAN
Melvin A. Goodman is a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy and a professor of government at Johns Hopkins University.  A former CIA analyst, Goodman is the author of "Failure of Intelligence: The Decline and Fall of the CIA," "National Insecurity: The Cost of American Militarism," and the forthcoming "The Path to Dissent: A Whistleblower at CIA" (City Lights Publishers, 2015).  Goodman is the national security columnist for counterpunch.org.

The Washington Post on October 25 published an important story based on a recently-published U.S. intelligence review from 1990 that confirmed Soviet leaders in 1983 believed the Reagan administration was using a mobilization exercise to prepare a nuclear surprise attack. The KGB instituted a sensitive collection effort, Operation RYAN, to determine if the United States was planning a surprise nuclear attack.   I was a CIA analyst at the time, and the incident was known to me and several colleagues as the "war scare" in the Kremlin.  There are lessons from the "war scare" that can be applied to the unnecessary escalation of tension between Washington and Moscow now taking place.

1983 was the most dangerous year in the Soviet-American Cold War confrontation since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.  President Reagan declared a political and military campaign against the "evil empire," although Soviet leaders were looking to break the gordian knot that was hurting the Kremlin.  The intelligence indicated that the Soviet Union was in a downward spiral marked by the quagmire in Afghanistan; the drain of funds in the Third World, particularly in Cuba; the political and military setbacks in Angola and Nicaragua; and the increased cost of competing with the largest peacetime increases in the U.S. defense budget since the end of World War II.  Soviet leaders believed that the "correlation of world forces," Soviet terminology for weighing the international balance, was working against the interests of Moscow and that the U.S. government was in the hands of a dangerous anti-Soviet crowd.

In response to Reagan's references to the Soviet Union as the "focus of evil in the world" and as an "evil empire," the new Soviet general secretary, Yuri Andropov, the former KGB chief, suggested that Reagan was insane and a liar.  U.S. media paid close attention to Reagan's sensational charges, and Soviet media launched a verbal offensive that matched Reagan's rhetoric.  Reagan was compared to Hitler and accused of "fanning the flames of war."  Andropov was portrayed in the U.S. press as a Red Darth Vadar.  Reagan's demonization of Soviet leaders was counter-productive just as Obama's demonization of Putin has been counter-productive.

In addition to the Able Archer mobilization exercise that alarmed the Kremlin, the Reagan administration authorized unusually aggressive military exercises near the Soviet border that, in some cases, violated Soviet territorial sovereignty.  The Pentagon's risky measures included sending U.S. strategic bombers over the North Pole to test Soviet radar, and naval exercises in wartime approaches to the USSR where U.S. warships had previously not entered.  Additional secret operations simulated surprise naval attacks on Soviet targets.

One of the great similarities between Russia and the United States was that both sides feared surprise attack.  The United States suffered psychologically from the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor; it has still not recovered from 9/11.  Yet, the United States has never appreciated that Moscow has similar fears due to Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion in the same year as Pearl Harbor, a far greater nightmare.

Russia's fear of surprise attack was accentuated in 1983, when the United States deployed the Army's Pershing-II missile and land-based cruise missiles in West Europe as a counter to the Soviet Union's SS-20 missiles. The SS-20 was not a "strategic" weapon because of a limited range (3,000 miles) well short of the United States.  The P-II, however, could not only reach the Soviet Union, but it could destroy Moscow's command and control systems with incredible accuracy.  Since the Soviets would have limited warning time-less than five minutes-the P-II was viewed as a first-strike weapon that could destroy the Soviet early warning system.

In addition to the huge strategic advantage from the deployment of P-II and numerous cruise missiles, the U.S. deployment of the MX missile and the D-5 Trident submarine placed the Soviets in an inferior position with regard to strategic modernization.  Overall, the United States held a huge strategic advantage in political, economic, and military policy.

The Pentagon's psychological warfare program to intimidate the Kremlin, including dangerous probes of Soviet borders by the Navy and Air Force, was unknown to CIA analysts.  Thus, the CIA was at a disadvantage in trying to analyze the war scare because the Pentagon refused to share information on military maneuvers and weapons deployments.  In 1983, the CIA had no idea that the annual Able Archer exercise would be conducted in a provocative fashion with high-level participation.  The exercise was a test of U.S. command and communications procedures, including procedures for the release and use of nuclear weapons in case of war.

Nevertheless, CIA deputy director for intelligence Robert Gates and National Intelligence Officer for Soviet strategic weapons Larry Gershwin turned out several national intelligence estimates that dismissed "Soviet fear of conflict with the United States."  They believed that any notion of a Soviet fear of an American attack was risible, and it wasn't until 1990 that the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board concluded that there had been a "serious concern" in the Kremlin over a possible U.S. attack. Gershwin, who politicized intelligence on strategic matters throughout the 1980s, is still at the CIA as a national intelligence officer.

I believed that Soviet fears were genuine at the time, and Reagan's national security advisor, Robert McFarlane, was even known to remark, "We got their attention" but "maybe we overdid it."  For the only time during William Casey's stewardship as CIA director, he believed his intelligence analysts who argued the "war scare" was genuine, and ignored the views of Gates and Gershwin.  Casey took our analysis to the White House, and Reagan made sure that the exercises were toned down.

For the first time, the Able Archer exercise was going to include President Reagan, Vice President Bush, and Secretary of Defense Weinberger, but when the White House understood the extent of Soviet anxiety regarding U.S. intentions, the major principals bowed out.  In his memoirs, Reagan recorded his surprise that Soviet leaders were afraid of an American first strike.  One of the reasons why Secretary of State George Shultz was able to convince Reagan of the need for summitry with Gorbachev was the president's belief that it was necessary to convince Moscow that the United States had no plans for an attack.  Ironically, Soviet military doctrine had long held that a possible U.S. modus operandi for launching an attack would be to convert an exercise into the real thing.  

Nevertheless, one year after President Reagan conceded that the "war scare" was genuine, he issued a radio warning into an open mike: "I've signed legislation that will outlaw Russia forever.  We begin bombing in five minutes."  Those of us who worked on the war scare were stunned.

Three decades later, history seems to be repeating itself.  Washington and Moscow are once again exchanging ugly broadsides over the confrontations in Ukraine and Syria. The Russian-American arms control and disarmament dialogue has been pushed to the background, and the possibilities of superpower conflict into the foreground.  Pentagon briefers are using the language of the Cold War in their congressional briefings, referring to Putin's regime as an "existential threat." Presidential candidates in the United States are using confrontational language, and promising to go on the offensive to knock Putin on his heels.  President Obama seems to recognize the false security of military power, but he needs to act on his suppositions.

 [return to Contents]

 #8
Next year could be last for Russia's Reserve Fund - finance minister

MOSCOW, October 27. /TASS/. Next year could become the last for the Reserve Fund, Russia's Finance Minister Anton Siluanov said Tuesday. The minister noted that Russia's Reserve Fund will no longer be the main source to finance budget deficit from 2017.

"Our reserves volume [in 2015 - TASS] will decrease by approximately 2.6 trillion rubles ($40.85 bln) - more than half. This means that 2016 is the last year when we are able to spend our reserves that way. After that we will not have such resources," he said.

In the draft budget for 2016, the Reserve Fund is considered as the main source to finance the budget deficit. In particular, it is planned to allocate 2.137 trillion rubles for this purpose.

As a result, in the end of 2016 the fund will shrink to 1.051 trillion rubles ($16.4 bln), or 1.3% of GDP. In the beginning of 2015 the fund amounted to 4.946 trillion rubles ($77.161 bln), or 6.7% of GDP.

According to the 2016 budget draft by the Ministry of Finance, revenues of Russia's federal budget for 2016 are projected at 13.577 trillion rubles ($217 bln), expenses at 15.761 trillion rubles ($252 bln), leading to budget deficit of 2.184 trillion rubles ($34.9 bln).

The cabinet submitted the draft budget to the State Duma, lower house of parliament, on October 23. The State Duma is to consider the document on November 13.

According to the minister the Russian budget will lack 900 bln rubles ($14.1 bln) in 2016 if oil prices and dollar exchange rate remain unchanged.

"If the current oil prices and exchange rates remain the same, and the current oil price is at around $44 per barrels for Urals, and the ruble exchange rate is about 62 rubles to the dollar, we can fall 900 bln rubles ($14.12 mln) short. We really face such risks," the mnister said.

The draft budget for 2016 is based on the forecast of the average annual oil price at $50 per barrel and the average annual exchange rate at the level of 63.3 rubles per dollar.

The draft federal budget for 2016 was submitted by the Government to the State Duma on October 23. According to 2016 draft federal budget published by Russia's Finance Ministry, the federal budget revenues will amount to 13.6 trillion rubles ($218.28 bln), expenditures - to 15.8 trillion rubles ($253.9 bln) while budget deficit will stand at 2.1 trillion rubles ($35 bln), or 2.8% of GDP. The document implies forecasted GDP at 78.673 trillion rubles ($1.26 trillion) and inflation rate not exceeding 6.4%.

Budget for 2016 is fundamentally different from the document prepared in 2014. The government is forming one-year budget for next year, excluding 2017 and 2018. Also, budget rule, which determines the maximum expenditure level based on oil prices [ultimate level of budget expenditures is determined on the basis of income under oil settling price plus 1% of GDP, if oil prices decrease, the settlement price is determined as the average over the past 3 years - TASS], is revoked for 2016. The budget will be submitted to the State Duma (lower house of parliament) later than usual - on October 25 instead of October 1.

[return to Contents] 

 #9
World Economic Forum
https://agenda.weforum.org
October 19, 2015
What digital can do for Russia's growth
By Aleh Tsyvinski and Pavel Demidov    
Authors: Aleh Tsyvinski, Chair of the Global Agenda Council on Russia; Co-Curator of the Digital Russia project; Arthur M. Okun Professor of Economics, Yale University; Pavel Demidov, Member of the Global Agenda Council on Russia; Co-Curator of the Digital Russia project; Adviser to Chairman, Kudrin Foundation

Should a country follow a top-down or a bottom-up economic policy to achieve fast and sustainable growth? Examples of top-down policies create national champions, favourable and selective tax regimes stimulating the adoption of foreign technologies in selected strategic sectors and the creation of special economic zones.

An early and perhaps most impressive case is the Meiji Restoration in Japan in the 19th century. This was the first case when a non-Western country quickly decreased the gap with the leading countries and transformed from a feudal society with a medieval economy into a powerful industrialized nation. Examples of bottom-up policies create competitive and level playing fields, reducing barriers to opening new companies and increasing the flexibility of labour markets. Hong Kong with its super competitive and free economy is one of the most impressive recent cases of fast growth.

One of the most interesting results of recent economic research is that the factors determining the success of policies promoting growth depend on the distance to the technological frontier. Daron Acemoglu, Philippe Aghion and Fabrizio Zilibotti argue that for a relatively poor country that is typically far from the frontier, either the top-down approach or the bottom-up approach may work. When a country closes the technological gap and is closer to the frontier, the bottom-up approach yields much faster growth. The reason is that when the low-hanging fruits of following the leader are taken, a country has to create a new economic environment that is conducive to innovation.

Russia, despite its current economic difficulties, is already a relatively well off and developed country. In a series of three year-long projects conducted by the Global Agenda Council on Russia we argued that the potential of what economists call "catch-up" growth is exhausted. The effects of high commodity prices, a conservative fiscal and monetary policy, and decisions such as the administrative reform which lowered barriers to doing business and thus fuelled high growth in the first decade of the 2000s are no longer present. The main challenge for the country is how to create a new economic model that can lay the foundations of sustainable future growth.

The first in the sequence of the Council's reports, Scenarios for the Russian Federation (2012), outlined a set of political, societal, and economic challenges that Russia would face in the near future. One of these scenarios indicated that regional growth may be an important driver for the national economy. The second report, Russia's Regions Drivers for Growth: 4×4 (2013), built on this insight and focused on the best examples of Russians regions that were successful in fostering economic growth. The third report of the Council, Unknown Russia: Powered by Entrepreneurs (2014), descended to the level of the firms and their leaders and presented successful and innovative Russian firms, the barriers they have to overcome and the strategies in which they manage to do it.

This year we are embarking on the fourth part of the agenda of analysing the potential sources of sustainable growth. In contrast to the previous years, we decided not to focus on the concrete examples of the possible scenarios, successful regions or world-class companies. Instead, our Council commissioned a series of essays that describe the mosaic of changes happening in much less visible and often imperceptible ways. How all things digital are changing the society, culture, norms - and ultimately building intangible infrastructure that will create foundations for what economists call "growth at the frontier".

The Digital Russia project launches on 20 October with the first series of seven essays. In this series, the members of the Council, leading academics, entrepreneurs and public figures argue that this transformation is already happening. These essays show an exceptional diversity and far-reaching implications of these foundational changes; how the digital life of Russian regions became "hyperlocal" and why the internet does not defy the notion of locality; how the social media landscape in Russia is distinct from other countries and how it has profoundly different social effects from other forms of online and traditional media; how one of the Russian regions succeeded in creating a volunteer project teaching thousands of elderly people to use computers; how Russian museums took to sharing art treasuries, cultural traditions and scientific heritage creating frontier digital technologies; how e-governance facilitates changes in the business climate and improves services provided by governmental organizations; and how the digital revolution influences everyday life and cognitive style of contemporary Russian society.

Each week for the next three months we will post new essays on the topics from the key factors of success of Russian internet and e-commerce companies to a new model of digital volunteering. This mosaic of changes unequivocally shows that the "growth at the frontier" is not only possible but actually may be already there.

 [return to Contents] 

 #10
Interfax
October 27, 2015
Foreign Ministry: Russian sub rumors are part of information campaign

Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova has described a number of Western military officials' latest remarks as elements of an information campaign being waged against Russia.

"We have encountered a very large-scale, well-orchestrated and strategically structured information campaign aimed at shaping public opinions. The main goal of this campaign is to create an enemy image. The enemy has been found. It is the Russian Federation," Zakharova told the Rossiya 24 television station.

Zakharova offered her comments on media reports articulating the concerns of U.S. military officials who claim that Russian submarines may damage undersea cables.

The ministry spokesperson also mentioned remarks made by French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian, who accused Russia's air force in Syria of bombing non-Islamic State targets. Islamic State, or ISIS, is a terrorist group outlawed in Russia.

France's defense minister was asked, among others, where exactly, according to Western military officials' information, ISIS sites are located in Syria, she said.

"But this question of ours has gone unanswered. However, we have been regularly told at press conferences and via the media what we have been doing wrong. These are the elements of the information campaign - claims of submarines that will damage some cables there in case of any threat, that we are allegedly bombing the wrong targets, that we are allegedly eliminating civilians, and so on and so forth," Zakharova said.

When speaking about this information campaign against Russia, she also noted that "the stakes in this game are very high."

"A great deal has been put on the line. Generally speaking, what is at stake there is the reputation of the people who for the past few years have been speaking about Russian aggression in different parts of the world, who have been saying that we [Russia] are threatening the whole world, etc.," Zakharova said.

 [return to Contents] 

 #11
Russia Insider
www.russia-insider.com
October 26, 2015
The Next Russia Scare: Their Subs Sailing Too Close to Internet Cables
The Russians are after your internet!!
By Mark Nicholas

He'll take away your Netflix!

The stories of Russian aircraft flying in international airspace but "dangerously close" to US or UK (or Norwegian) airspace (no mention of far more numerous NATO flights on Russia borders) are getting old now so here's The New York Times with a reshuffle:

Now Russian subs (only the Russian?) are sailing "dangerously close" to undersea cables. Gasp! The Russians are sabre rattling again!

The proof:

"Russian submarines and spy ships are aggressively operating near the vital undersea cables that carry almost all global Internet communications, raising concerns among some American military and intelligence officials that the Russians might be planning to attack those lines in times of tension or conflict."

It's a slam dunk! There is concern among "some American military and intelligence officials". What more do you need?

If there is "tension" the Russians may cut your internet!

And while there's no actual proof:

"While there is no evidence yet of any cable cutting, the concern is part of a growing wariness among senior American and allied military and intelligence officials over the accelerated activity by Russian armed forces around the globe."

We all know how the Russians are:

"I'm worried every day about what the Russians may be doing," said Rear Adm. Frederick J. Roegge."

 [return to Contents] 

 #12
Moscow Times
October 27, 2015
Russian Military Spending to Increase by Less Than 1% Next Year
By Matthew Bodner

Russia's defense spending is set to increase by a modest 0.8 percent next year, falling far short of the estimated 10 percent annual budget increases required over the next five years to hit equipment modernization targets mandated by President Vladimir Putin.

Russian military expenditure has been rising since 2011, when the government launched a massive 20 trillion ruble ($700 billion at the time) rearmament drive aimed at modernizing some 70 percent of the Russian armed forces by 2020. But amid an economic crisis that began last year, planned spending on the program has hit an apparent snag.

Going into this year, the State Duma budgeted around 3.3 trillion rubles ($52 billion) for defense. This figure was later curtailed by 5 percent, resulting in an actual 2015 military budget of just over 3.1 trillion rubles - despite the cut, a 26 percent increase in spending over 2014.

In 2016, the increase will be smaller. According to a draft of the 2016 federal budget, "the 2016 budget allocation for national defense is planned at 3.145 trillion rubles ($50 billion)," or about 4 percent of Russia's projected gross domestic product, news agency TASS reported Saturday.

Though this will put Russian military spending ahead of the United States' as a percentage of GDP, the 2016 U.S. National Defense Authorization Act is expected to stand at around $600 billion when approved.

Russia's 2016 budget marks the first time since 2011 that military spending will not drastically increase year-on-year. If the draft budget is approved, defense expenditure will rise by just 25.5 billion rubles ($400 million), or less than 1 percent, according to TASS.

Allocations for investment in infrastructure "for special and military purposes" will be reduced by 48.85 billion rubles ($775 million), but money for military salaries will increase by 40 billion ($640 million), the report said.

It was not clear how the changes will impact military operations such as the massive snap exercises and maneuvers seen since the start of the Ukraine crisis last year, or Russia's ongoing air campaign in Syria.

However, flat military spending is not likely to curtail Russia's intervention in Syria, which Moscow has presented as an anti-Islamic State campaign, but Western officials say is meant to prop up embattled Syrian President Bashar Assad.

That campaign, which features daily bombings by around 30 aircraft and military supply runs to Assad, has cost Russia anywhere from $95 to $140 million since bombing began on Sept. 30, according to data provided to The Moscow Times by defense consultancy IHS last week.

The TASS report did not specify how much of the proposed military budget would be dedicated to buying new military equipment, as mandated by Putin's 2020 rearmament and modernization program, but spending on new equipment is usually two-thirds of the budget.

This year, almost 2 trillion rubles ($32 billion) from the annual defense budget was allocated to military procurement, and IHS analyst Craig Caffrey told The Moscow Times in June that Russia would need to increase these expenditures by 10 percent every year in order to meet Putin's spending targets on new weapons.

If the overall defense budget is not raised, Russian spending on procurements of new weapons will likely remain flat - calling into question the government's ability to complete its 2020 program on time or in full.

However, the defense budget is one of the few items on the 2016 draft that have not been subjected to funding cuts, while funding for education, health care, and other social expenses are expected to be reduced.

"This signals that the Russian authorities are determined to keep the defense industry a priority, and possibly to rely on military leverage in Russian foreign policy in 2016," said Vadim Kozyulin, a military expert at the Moscow-based PIR Center think tank.

"The defense industry will be the last to feel the shortages of the shrinking budget," he said.

 [return to Contents] 

 #13
Pravda.ru
October 27, 2015
FT: Russia can easily afford military operation in Syria despite economic difficulties

For Moscow, the military operation in Syria is affordable, despite the difficult economic situation in the country, The Financial Times newspaper wrote.

According to the authoritative publication that refers to its own calculations, as well as to the data published by IHS Jane's analytical center, even if Russia maintains the current level of air strikes during the year, the country will use less than three percent of national defense appropriations in 2016.

According to leading analyst of IHS Jane's Ben Moores, daily costs on such campaigns may reach $2.3-4 million. Russia's daily expenses on the operation in Syria make up one-tenth of the amount that the United States spends on a similar number of its troops in Afghanistan. Russia saves a lot on fuel by supporting the troops by sea. In addition, the expert said, Russian troops are deployed on one base, rather than on a vast area of the country.

The Pentagon has spent $4 billion in 14 months on the struggle against the Islamic State. This is equal to $10 million a day. Thus, the newspaper concludes, the costs of the Russian Federation on the operation in Syria are inconsiderable compared to Russia's overall defense spending.

 [return to Contents] 

#14
Oilprce.com
October 22, 2015
Is Russia The King Of Arctic Oil By Default?
By Colin Chilcoat

To be king implies preeminence, or lasting rule. In the Arctic, such oil and gas supremacy is still little more than a dream. That dream remains alive in Russia however, and the nation - through an unmatched stubbornness and a decidedly timid field of competitors - is making a strong bid for the throne.

A cursory search of 'Arctic' and 'oil' elicits little in the way of positivity. Certainly, Shell's failure in the Chukchi Sea is notable. Combined with the Obama administration's waffling distaste for future offshore Arctic development, it marks what should be a period of relative dormancy in U.S. waters. Still, it's not indicative of the sector globally, which is seeing progress, albeit at a glacial pace.

The shining example of such development to date is Gazprom Neft's Prirazlomnaya platform. Located nearly 40 miles offshore in the Pechora Sea, the rig is the world's first Arctic oil project involving a stationary platform - though the general concept itself has been employed before (see: BP's Northstar Island).

Gazprom Neft began production at the Prirazlomnoye field in 2013 and reached commercial figures last year, with a total output of roughly 5,000 barrels per day (bpd). With production well number two (of 19) now online, output should reach somewhere between 10,000-15,000 bpd by year's end.

To be fair, several important tests lie ahead for Prirazlomnaya and Russia's Arctic shelf development in general. Chief among them is rapidly addressing its import dependence - one of the primary targets of U.S. and EU sanctions. No more than 10 percent of the equipment applied at the Prirazlomnaya installation is believed to be Russian-made, and this level of disparity is commonplace at both Russia's onshore and offshore fields.

Attention, domestic and international, has been given to the courting of China, India, and other backers - both financial and technological - but all eyes should be on the Russian solution, which will seek to demonstrate its efficacy by 2020.

At the Prirazlomnoye field, the Russian institute Omskneftekhimproekt has begun work on the modernization of the rig's drilling installations, technological equipment, and safety and telecommunications systems. The primary objectives are to boost production capacity (to ~120,000 bpd) toward 2020 and lay the building blocks for the future development of Russian-sourced platforms.

The work by Omskneftekhimproekt mirrors that of several institutes, companies, and universities across the country, rallying around the call for import substitution. However, just how much can actually be accomplished is the billion dollar question.

As Russia moves from ideas to concrete mechanisms (read: any forced Russification of the upstream oil and gas industry), the country's traditionally poor institutions and penchant for corruption will not be easily circumvented - not to mention the stark technical realities of reducing import dependence some 70 percent.

In the meantime - technology be damned - Russia continues to actively and ambitiously position itself across its Arctic geography. The holder of some 58 percent of the entire region's hydrocarbon resources, Russia has several notable projects in the pipeline.

Gazprom Neft's Novy Port, Bashneft and Lukoil's Trebs and Titov, as well as Gazprom Neft and Novatek's Severenergia are three of the most promising Arctic onshore greenfield projects currently under development. Crude deliveries from Novy Port have already hit the European market, and together the three projects could produce as much as 400,000 bpd by the end of the decade.

The Dolginskoye, Messoyakha, and Russkoye fields are further from realization, though they're demonstrative of both Russia's relatively prolific Arctic movements, and its sheer productive capacity.

In the medium-term, competition will be light: arctic crude production in Alaska has slipped noticeably and will continue to decline through 2040; activity in Canada's Beaufort Sea appears dead in the water; and years of exploratory drilling in Greenland have not yielded a single development project.

Eni's Goliat project in the Norwegian Arctic, which is set to come on stream pending final approval from Norwegian authorities, is the lone bright spot for the other four major littoral nations. It differs significantly from Prirazlomnaya, but at its peak, Goliat should deliver 100,000 bpd from its floating perch high in Norway's "manageable" Barents Sea.

To be sure, no one can yet claim supremacy over Arctic oil, but, for the time being, Russia remains its king by default.
 

 [return to Contents] 

 #15
Opendemocracy.net
October 27, 2015
Smooth censorship in Russia
Everybody understands everything, everybody knows everything, and no one says anything aloud.
By Gregory Tumanov
Grigory Tumanov is a Moscow based journalist and blogger. He is a staff correspondent for Kommersant daily, one of Russia's most respected publications. Follow him on Twitter @scumsquad

The history of censorship in Russian media runs for pages and pages. There's little point dealing with Soviet censorship here, but the 1990s, which many people remember as a time when press freedom prevailed, are different. Journalists of the time reminisce about how they used to push bureaucrats' doors open, the public officials scared of them: bureaucrats and politicians had never been so vulnerable.

The media, however, was another part of the country's terrain of political conflict-just as articles could be pulled, so could journalists. Take Dmitry Kholodov, for instance, a journalist for Moskovsky komsomolets who died as he collected a booby-trapped suitcase in 1994. Ministry of Defence officials weren't pleased with Kholodov's coverage of army corruption and, having asked their subordinates to 'shut him up', their subordinates took the order literally.

From 2015, the 1990s appear mythical, legendary. What's different about censorship in today's Russia is the ambiguity surrounding it. 'This text isn't good enough, we're not publishing it' - this is the response you get when trying to publish on a 'sensitive' subject today. And how can you object? Any text can be better. But this is still a policy of silencing: in different situations, a text may well reach the front page if not for certain 'undesirable' surnames or facts.

There's no censorship committee anymore. Instead, there's self-censorship and the political instincts of our media managers. Every publication possesses its own subtle system of checks and balances.

This doesn't mean that sensitive, scandalous or shocking facts can't be published in the Russian media. I can list a few of own texts over the past year that have caused 'bureaucratic dissatisfaction': from my investigation into Ramzan Kadyrov's charitable foundation to my interviews with people involved in the attack on the journalist Oleg Kashin, who gave exhaustive evidence on governor Andrei Turchak. 'Today we write this, but tomorrow we'll ignore that,' that's the position of Russian media, and I don't read publications with a clear pro-state position-everything's already clear as it is.

The means of control are simple: the Presidential Administration has an internal political directorate, and they know all the chief editors. And these officials occasionally do ring up a media manager or member of the board to express their dissatisfaction with a specific publication. What happens next depends on the diplomatic skills of the editor, whether they're able to defend their journalist and their content.

Government officials are the ones who are hard to deal with. Contact with these people isn't advertised. 'Mate, you understand,'  a colleague shrugs, without naming names or positions. Everybody understands everything, everybody knows everything, and no one says anything out loud.

When it's a question of more minor state institutions, then it gets easier. It's not just people in the Kremlin that read the newspapers and websites, it's the ministries, too. And if journalists write on 'sensitive' themes, then ministry officials often begin to scrutinise them intensely. My own experience of encounters with the state demonstrates this easily.

In this case, it was the Interior Ministry, and the first time I encountered active interest in my work came after the violence in Khimki, near Moscow, in 2010.

The government planned to build a high-speed motorway connecting St Petersburg and Moscow, and Khimki forest lay in its path. In protest at the tree-felling operation already under way, an anarchist group threw bottles and fired rubber bullets at a local administration building. I was there, and dictated a report to the Gazeta.ru newsroom.

A few days later, police officers arrived at my parents' house, where I'm registered, in order to interrogate my mother. As it turned out, my telephone had been geo-located in the Khimki area, and the police had set off for the first address they found. The next morning there was a scandal, and the police had to apologise, my colleagues stepped in. Basically, there was maximum solidarity.

The next instance involved an interview with a radical group in 2011-those same anarchists-who set off a bomb near a traffic police stop in the Moscow area. Two days later, and we had a visit from an officer from 38 Petrovka Street (Russia's equivalent of Scotland Yard). The officer wanted to know how I'd managed to find this group, as they'd been looking for them for a while. Here, I was protected by the law on mass media, and I didn't have to reveal my sources.

On an every day level, surveillance and control isn't so terrible. If you work for a national newspaper, then there's always an army of lawyers at your service, ready to attend interrogations with you and defend you in court. Lower down the ladder, there's non-governmental organisations ready to help, such as Agora, which has been helping defend press freedom for activists and journalists since 2005.

What's more dangerous, though, are the new laws that are shutting down the market. At the time, this happens easily, and doesn't even look like expropriation-even though this is what it is. For example, the ban on foreign citizens owning more than 20% of a media outlet, which led to the departure of Regina von Flemming, the director of Forbes Russia, and whose position was one of non-interference in editorial policy. Now the new owner says that Forbes Russia had become 'too politicised', and would now focus on 'articles on the successes of businessmen'. This will happen smoothly, and the average reader won't even notice that this is censorship.

Parliamentary deputies are now discussing how they can make media outlets comparable to 'foreign agents', force them to account for their financing from abroad. The media managers call this behaviour barbaric: information is also a commodity, it's bought on subscription by citizens of many countries, and thus a news agency isn't able to account for every dollar received from abroad. Nevertheless, it looks certain that this new law will be passed.

I wouldn't want to say that it's impossible to work in the Russian media, that to write those texts you think matter is impossible, that Russian journalists are making deals with their own consciences every day. That's not how it is. But the fact is that, as a rule, your average Russian journalist has too many factors to consider that don't have anything to do with his or her work-to find information and present it in an entertaining way.

Thanks go to Tom Rowley for translating this article.

 [return to Contents] 

 #16
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
October 26, 2015
The Russian media's response to Assad's visit to Moscow
Over the past week, the Russian media focused on Bashar al-Assad's visit to Moscow, the 2015 Valdai Club discussions, and new developments in the Syrian crisis.
By Anastasia Borik

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's unexpected visit to Moscow on Oct. 22 was a focal point of the Russian media during the week. In addition, for insights into the future diplomatic direction of the Syrian crisis, the media analyzed the Oct. 23 meeting in Vienna between the foreign ministers of the "Syrian quartet" - Russia, the U.S., Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

Assad's visit to Moscow

Pavel Aptekar, the author of the business newspaper Vedomosti, is ambivalent about Assad's visit to Moscow. He believes that the Kremlin clearly has influence with the Syrian regime, as it was right after these talks in Moscow that Assad mentioned the possibility of changing the leadership of Syria through early presidential elections.

Aptekar believes that Moscow's plan is very questionable, not only because in this war-torn country, it is impossible to hold any full-fledged free elections, but also because Russia was a bit late with its peace initiative. Defending Assad and his supporters, Moscow is depriving itself of the ability to influence the Syrian opposition, which could lead to Russia losing out in the struggle for Syria.

Alexander Bratersky, journalist at the online publication Gazeta.ru, analyzes the reaction of the international press to Assad's trip to Russia. He notes that the world media saw this visit as a challenge thrown to the dormant U.S. administration, as well as a serious bid by Moscow to become a key player in the Middle East. The publication reminded its readers that many world leaders and government officials of major countries voiced a negative reaction to Assad's visit.

The business newspaper Kommersant wrote that Assad's visit caught world leaders by surprise and "dramatically raised the stakes in the Middle East, and in the relations between Moscow and the West."

The publication, quoting a Russian expert, noted that a new diplomatic offensive has been undertaken by Moscow, which explicitly states that without Russia, no settlement of the Syrian crisis is possible, as only the Kremlin is able to have an influence on the Assad regime and its supporters.

The Vienna "quartet" meets on Syria

The Syrian issue has been on the agenda for a long time already, and it appears that its settlement by negotiations within the "quartet" (Russia, the U.S., Turkey, Saudi Arabia) will take a long time, says the Russian press.

Alexei Nikolsky from Vedomosti noted in his article that negotiations simply cannot bring about any tangible results, because there are no serious military preconditions for this to occur - the war continues in full swing. Therefore, to have the current government and the opposition sit down at the negotiating table, as well as agree on the terms of a settlement, is impossible.

Alexander Panov, writer for Novaya Gazeta, also points to the lack of results from this meeting. However, the publication believes that the talks were mainly about Assad, who continues to be supported by Moscow and condemned by Washington. Panov said that we should not expect a diplomatic breakthrough at the Vienna meeting of the "quartet," largely because, in reality, no party has a clear plan for resolving the situation in Syria.

This is especially true of the Obama administration, under great pressure from public opinion, and not able to use any serious military forces in Syria.
Meanwhile, Ekaterina Zabrodina, staff writer for the pro-government Rossiyskaya Gazeta noted that the Vienna talks were "useful," quoting the words of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.

The publication commented on Russia's positions on the main points of the negotiations and stressed that it is the Russian side that insists on expanding the format of the talks, by including such countries as Iran, Egypt, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.

The 2015 Valdai Forum

The Valdai Forum - created in 2004 to bring together politicians, journalists and international experts - was held for the second time in Sochi. The central part of every Valdai Forum is a speech by Russian President Vladimir Putin and his answers to questions from the audience.

Kirill Martynov, staff writer of the opposition Novaya Gazeta, believes that Valdai has shifted focus to foreign policy rather than domestic policy themes, because Putin's speech was entirely devoted to international issues, and apparently was aimed at foreign audiences.

Martynov believes that the true meaning of Putin's message to the world was a signal to drop the Ukrainian question from the agenda. The Russian leader simply ignored Ukraine in his talk. For its Western partners, this is a sign that Russia no longer wants to be the "bad guy" and is open to cooperation. However, the writer emphasizes, the West is not ready to listen to Russia.

Elena Egorova, writing for tabloid Moskovsky Komsomolets, noted that it was logical for the president to lay emphasis on the international component, given the recent Russian successes in Syria. The publication highlighted the number of representatives at the forum, listing the numerous foreign experts and politicians who attended this event. For the newspaper, all this seems a clear indication of the absence of any kind of international isolation of Russia.

Political scientist Grigory Golosov, author of the independent Internet publication Slon, also believes that Syria has overshadowed all the other topics, and this has been a positive thing for Russia. After all, it made it possible to move the irritant - the Ukrainian conflict - into the background.
However, just as their colleagues at Novaya Gazeta, the writer of Slon believe that Putin's message will not be understood or heard by the West, which refuses to understand the logic of the actions being taken by the Russian leader.

Quotes of the Week

Sergey Lavrov, after talks in Vienna dedicated to the future of Syria and President Assad: "Our partners have an obsession with the figure of the Syrian president, but we have confirmed our position."

Eric Schultz, White House spokesperson, on Assad's visit to Moscow: "We view the red carpet welcome for Assad, who has used chemical weapons against his own people, at odds with the stated goal by the Russians for a political transition in Syria."

Davutolgu Ahmed, Prime Minister of Turkey, on Assad's visit to Moscow: "It would be better if Assad would stay in Moscow a little longer, so that the Syrian people get some rest from him."

Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Valdai forum on the reasons for the Syria operation: "Fifty years ago, I learned an important lesson on the streets of Leningrad - if a fight is inevitable, it's best to make the first blow."

 [return to Contents] 

 #17
The National Interest
October 27, 2015
Russia Stumbles in Syrian Air War
By Dave Majumdar
Dave Majumdar is the defense editor for The National Interest. You can follow him on Twitter: @davemajumdar.2015

Russia's pace of air operations in Syria appears to have dropped off slightly from their peak in recent days. While the Russians had flown as many as eighty-eight sorties per day about two weeks ago, more recently that number has dropped off as many U.S. defense officials had predicted.

"In the course of the last 24 hours, the Russian air group carried out 59 sorties engaging 94 terrorist objects in the Hama, Idlib, Lattakia, Damascus, Aleppo, Deir ez-Zor provinces," reads an Oct. 26 release from the Russian Ministry of Defense. "In the course of the last three days, the aircraft of the Russian air group have performed 164 combat sorties engaging 285 terrorist objects."

That means that the Russians have been flying an average of fifty-five sorties per day with their mix of Sukhoi Su-24s, Su-25s, Su-30SM and Su-34s-which is a slower pace than before. But those figures are within the range Pentagon officials had predicted the Russians could fly with the number of jets they have deployed. The Russians are thought to have between thirty-two and thirty-six aircraft at their base in Latakia, which means they could generate with between forty-eight and ninety-six sorties per day with good logistics.

While the Russians initially surprised many with their ability to generate up to eighty-eight sorties per day, most U.S. defense officials predicted those numbers could not be sustained for long. That's because the Russian don't have any recent experience deploying aircraft overseas, nor do they have a well-oiled logical train that could sustain the pace for long. Indeed, most Pentagon officials I had talked to expected that logistics would prove to be the Russians' Achilles' Heel.

Indeed, USA Today reported earlier today-citing an anonymous Pentagon official-that nearly one-third of Russia's combat aircraft and fifty percent of its transports in Syria are grounded at any one time. The harsh conditions appear to be taking a toll on the Russian crews and their aircraft.

My own sources said much the same. However, they said that logistics are probably the biggest factor in the drop-off, noting that Russian aircraft usually fare pretty well in harsh conditions because of their rugged construction. Regardless, the result is that the Russians are not quite matching the performance of U.S. Air Force, Navy or Marine Corps expeditionary forces.

However, there is another factor that could be playing a role. The bulk of the Russian aircraft deployed to Syria are either upgraded but elderly airframes or brand new models that have not yet ironed out all of their various teething issues. Elderly aircraft-even refurbished ones-break down and require a lot of maintenance. That's just a fact of life-and one of the reasons the U.S. Air Force is so eager to replace its oldest fighters (the U.S. Navy's rebuilt F-14D (R) jets are a good case study).

But the same is true of brand-new aircraft. Until maintenance crews learn a jet's quirks and which parts need replacing most often, new aircraft that have just entered service have horrible mission-capable rates. It happened with the F-22 when it was first introduced and it's happening with the F-35 now. And Russia is not immune to the problem. Indeed, Russia's most capable bomber in-theatre, the Su-34-which has been built in boutique quantities like most of the newest Russian jets-has had severe issues with maintenance in previous years due in part to its slow build rate.

It remains to be seen if Russia will use this as an opportunity to revamp its logistical system. But if it does, it is possible that Russia might be able to ramp up its air operations once its crews learn to deal with the deployed environment and the correct spare start flowing in a timely manner. Only time will tell how the Russians will fare.

 [return to Contents] 

 
#18
Sputnik
October 27, 2015
FSA is So Secretive It Has No Idea If Its Members Were in Moscow

The Free Syrian Army is somewhat of a Schrödinger's cat these days: its representatives visited Moscow last week and at the same time FSA leaders deny claims that they went to the Russian capital.

The information regarding the visit was confirmed by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov on Monday. The next day, several senior members of rebel groups linked to the FSA claimed the visit did not take place.

"Nothing of this sort happened on our part as FSA. It is impossible for us to accept going to Moscow, and to have dialogue with it. We don't want their help. ... We contacted our friends in other areas and nobody went," Abu Ghiath al-Shami, the spokesman for Alwiyat Seif al-Sham, told Reuters.

The same duality principle applies to accepting Russian help on the battlefield. On Saturday, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov confirmed that Moscow was ready to cooperate with and provide aerial assistance to FSA-affiliated groups. Some senior members welcomed the move, others flatly refused.

Meanwhile, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov broke the news that Russia finally managed to establish a preliminary contact with representatives of moderate opposition in Syria, adding that it was not an easy task.

"These efforts are ongoing. I hope that the contacts will produce results," the diplomat noted.

This is a major feat indeed. For weeks, Moscow was asking anyone familiar with any group fighting under the FSA banner to share information on the exact location of the moderate opposition. Up until now, repeated attempts to talk to moderate rebels failed.

Whether they will be successful this time largely depends on the Free Syrian Army, which is a loosely-organized entity that lacks single leadership or real presence on the ground. Experts and officials both in Syria and beyond say that the FSA did exist some time ago but has been mostly absorbed by radical groups, including Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra.

 [return to Contents] 

#19
Sputnik
October 27, 2015
Carter: US-Trained Syrian Rebels Not Targeted by Russian Airstrikes

WASHINGTON (Sputnik) - The forces of moderate Syrian opposition that went through US train-and-equip program have not been attacked by Russia during its air operations in the country, US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter said in a testimony on Tuesday.

"Our title 10 forces...they have not come under attack by either Assad's forces or Russia's forces, Syrian Arab coalition and the Kurdish YPG [People's Defense Units]," Carter said at the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing.

In 2014, the United States authorized $500 million to train and equip 5,400 moderate Syrian fighters by the end of 2015. The first round of training yielded fewer than 60 fighters, of which only four or five are now engaged on the battlefield, according to Pentagon.

On October 9, Washington abandoned its $500-million campaign to train the so-called moderate opposition in Syria but decided instead to arm vetted Syrian opposition leaders.

Russia launched an airstrike campaign against terrorist groups in Syria on September 30 at the request of Syrian President Bashar Assad. The United States, the European Union and their Middle Eastern allies have previously accused Russia of hitting "wrong targets" in Syria and allegedly carrying out airstrikes on so-called moderate Syrian rebels.

 [return to Contents] 

 #20
Carnegie Corporation of New York
www.carnegie.org
October 20, 2015
Russia's Interest in Syria is Not Assad
BY SIMON SARADZHYAN
Simon Saradzhyan is a research fellow at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.

When trying to underscore the difficulty of predicting the Kremlin's next steps, many Westerners like to cite Winston Churchill's famous reference to Russia as "riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma." Few however, recall the remainder of that 1939 adage: "But perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest." Careful distilling of statements by Russian leaders and Russia's strategic documents would reveal there are several important national interests of Russia at stake in Syria, including:

(1) Prevention of the complete failure of the Syrian state, which would turn it into a long-term haven for militant Islamists who have vowed to attack Russia and displayed practical interest in acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

(2) Maintaining Russia's military presence in Syria, including the naval facility at Tartus, to ensure, among other things, the permanent presence of the Russian Navy in the Mediterranean Sea, something that Russia's new Maritime Doctrine explicitly calls for.

(3) Preserving access of Russian companies to Syria's market to ensure that the country continues to buy Russian-made arms and machinery, ensuring at least some degree of diversification of Russia's economy, which is largely driven by the oil and gas sectors.

(4) Ensuring that Russia's reputation as a reliable protector of its allies (in the eyes of the latter) is not damaged by a forceful removal of Bashar al-Assad from power.

In addition to these national interests, members of Russia's ruling elite have a collective vital interest in the (5) prevention of a forceful regime change or any kind of revolution, because they fear such events could become precedents for other countries, including Russia.

Bashar Al-Assad has served these interests rather well, but is he indispensable in the eyes of Vladimir Putin, as some of the commentary in the Western press claim? Not necessarily. In fact, time and again Russian diplomats have reportedly hinted that Russia might be prepared to let Assad go. This past July saw representatives of the Syrian National Coalition claiming to have discussed Assad's political fate with Russian officials for the first time. More recently, Russian diplomats have recently asserted in closed-door meetings with Western officials that they are not wedded to Assad's continuing as Syria's president, Foreign Policy reported in September. Also in September Maria Zakharova, the Russian Foreign Ministry's official spokeswoman, asserted that "We are not supporting Assad as a person.  We did not say that he is a good guy or that he is a great leader."  

We all know, of course, that these private hints and public statements were then followed by Russia's direct intervention on behalf of Assad on September 30th. But Russian officials continued to maintain that they are not necessarily wedded to the idea of keeping Assad in power even after sending warplanes to support him. When asked on October 17th whether Syria's next government has to be headed by Assad, Russian premier Dmitry Medvedev replied "No, absolutely not. It's up to the Syrian people to decide who will be the head of Syria. By the way, Syria is a multiethnic, multi-faith and a fairly complex nation. It's up to the people to decide." He was echoed by Putin's powerful chief of staff Sergei Ivanov, who told TASS on October 19th that "one can try to negotiate an agreement with the moderate opposition and compromises would have to be mutual."

These statements indicate that that Russian leaders believe that they can live with a Syria without Assad - as long as (1) his successor(s) is chosen through negotiations, in which Russia has a say, followed by elections rather than through use of force and (2) the new leadership honors Russia's interests.  No matter how many times some commentators claim Putin is a poor strategist, the Russian leader is not so shortsighted as to not realize that the status quo ante cannot be restored.  No matter what gains Syrian armed forces may make on the ground with Russia's air support, the Syrian state stands little chance of survival in its official borders if Assad stays in power. Alawites constitute less than 15% of the Syrian population and they cannot realistically impose their will on the Sunni majority, which would concede to nothing less of a coalition government for what might have to become a federated state.

Either there emerges a coalition government, in which all major religious and ethnic groups, including Alawites, Christian Kurds, but excluding radicals, are represented, or Syria may become completely overrun by formations affiliated with the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, which outnumber and outgun the moderate opposition. There's also a possibility, of course, that the Assad forces will manage to cling on to parts of the so-called useful coastal part where industries and agriculture are concentrated. It might be that such a "smaller Syria" would serve Russia's interests too, but can Russia really then live with the reality  of the rest of the Syrian lands being controlled by the likes of ISIS, which has recruited over 2,000 Russian nationals in its ranks and which claims to have a 'province' in Russia's North Caucasus? I would imagine not.

A negotiated transition in Syria, in which Russia would play a role and which would lead to emergence of a coalition government, would also help to limit damage done to Russia's reputation by air strikes in Syria in the eyes of Sunni leaders and general public. Specifically, it would reduce the number of those Sunnis who may become so aggrieved by some of the inevitable civilian casualties from Russian airstrikes that they would want to stage terrorist attacks against Russia.

While ISIS constitutes a greater threat to Russia than to the U.S. and its Western allies, the Western world is also far from being immune to the threat posed by this and other terrorist groups operating in Syria and Iraq, as I have pointed out in my recent testimony to the U.S. Congress. The Islamic State has drawn some 4,500 nationals from the West into its ranks, according to The New York Times. FBI Director James Comey has been quoted as saying earlier this year that ISIS poses the greatest danger to the U.S. homeland, noting this terrorist organization has formed a "chaotic spider web"  in the U.S.  According to Representative Michael McCaul, Chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, the U.S. foiled over 60 terrorist attacks by "ISIS followers" in 2014 alone. ISIS has also been reported to have planned attacks in Europe and some of its followers, such as Amedy Coulibaly, have unfortunately succeeded in their plans.

As Thomas Graham and I noted in a recent article, neither the U.S. nor Russia can afford to tolerate the existence of a terrorist quasi-state in either Syria or Iraq, especially as ISIS is actively  recruiting and training nationals of their countries while also seeking weapons of mass destruction.

The agreements on Syria's chemical weapons and Iran's nuclear program have demonstrated that Russia's foreign minister Sergei Lavrov and his U.S. counterpart John Kerry and their colleagues can negotiate win-win solutions for their countries on issues of high importance for not only the  U.S. and Russia, but also the entire international community, despite initial skepticism. Perhaps, the upcoming meeting of U.S., Russian, Saudi and Jordanian senior officials to discuss what Kerry has described as "real and tangible options" for a political solution in Syria could become the first step toward achieving such a solution, as well as a step toward joining forces in battling the common threat that ISIS' continued existence within and without Syria poses to the national security of the U.S. and Russia.

 [return to Contents] 

 #21
Rethinking Russia
http://rethinkingrussia.ru
October 22, 2015
Three Scenarios of How Russia's Syria Campaign May End
By Yuri Barmin

The Russian airborne campaign in Syria that kicked off in late September is getting more intensive by the day. Officials in Moscow claim that the operation aims to stabilize the legitimate government in Damascus and is likely to last for up to four months. To this end, however, it is not clear yet how successful the operation is going to be. This ambiguity gives birth to countless speculations as to how and at what point Russia will choose to terminate the operation and return the personnel and military equipment back home, if it will do so at all. There are three major scenarios that outline possible achievements of the air strikes and resulting exit strategies for Russia.

Moscow is forced to withdraw having shown no visible results on the ground

While Russian air strikes are designed to support the Syrian Arab Army's ground operations, so far their effect has been limited. In some areas, such as Aleppo, air strikes against rebel groups created a void shortly taken by the Islamic State fighters. After over two weeks of intensifying sorties reports released by the Russian Ministry of Defense claim to have destroyed a number of ISIS training camps and command centers, eliminated hundreds of fighters as well as disrupted their logistics network. Despite abundant video evidence provided by the Ministry these results cannot be independently verified.

With the Syrian Arab Army exhausted due to incessant fighting and eroded by defections there is no guarantee that the air power provided by Moscow will eventually yield desired outcomes. Using the 32 aircraft stationed at Bassel Al Assad airport in Latakia the Russian Air Force also has limited capacity to deliver meaningful results. The first two weeks of the operation in Syria have likely been designed to help Russian pilots get used to the new operational environment, which is why current results are not at all indicative of the eventual outcome. Yet if air strikes do not prove their effectiveness in the next two to three weeks the Russian Ministry of Defense will have to change its strategy and possibly consider the option of withdrawing from Syria simply to save face.

Russian air strikes force rebels into dialogue with Damascus

By launching strikes against a variety of rebel groups in Latakia, Hama, Idlib and Aleppo Russia hopes to separate those who are ready to cooperate with the Assad government from those who will choose to align themselves with extremist groups, such as the Islamic State and Jabhat Al Nusra. The plan in Moscow is that due to the pressure created by the Russian air campaign some rebels will eventually agree to negotiate with Damascus. For the Russian government they would be "the moderate rebels" that so far have been hard to identify, while others would remain a legitimate target. As Moscow imagines it, these moderate rebels would join the so-called Assad-tolerated political opposition in talks with Assad on the peace process.

In Russia's view the West does not have a comprehensive strategy for Syria that would go beyond getting rid of Bashar Al Assad. Moscow believes that its assertive and in some sense aggressive diplomatic push for talks in Syria would be accepted by the United States and the GCC simply because they have not been able to come up with an actionable plan themselves.

This scenario may result in stronger cooperation between the Russian and US militaries on Syria as well as between the diplomats of the two countries. Just like Washington Moscow insists that the only solution to the Syrian crisis is through political settlement. Neither side wants to get stuck in Syria and keep pouring millions into supporting air campaigns that are not effective enough to defeat the Islamic State.

If Russia's air strikes prompt at least a portion of rebels to negotiate with Assad Moscow will likely be reluctant to withdraw from Syria completely. Intra-Syrian talks will mean that Assad or an alternative faction loyal to Russia would stay in power essentially guaranteeing the Russian military safe presence in Latakia and Tartus, which is the most favorable endgame for Moscow.

Russia builds up its presence in Syria

While the "boots on the ground" option has been continuously rejected by the Kremlin, this scenario is not completely impossible. If there are significant losses among the Russian military personnel in the Syrian conflict Moscow may be forced to boost its presence in the country with ground forces.

Vladimir Putin has ruled out any ground operation by the Russian forces in Syria recalling the negative experience of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The calculation is based on the fact that ordinary Russians would reject any full-fledged invasion in Syria because the memory of the Afghanistan tragedy is still strong in the Russian society. Yet Vladimir Putin may have miscalculated how the Russians feel about the Syria campaign.

With over 70 percent of the population approving of the invasion, Russians are also not ready to see their soldiers die in Syria, the country that neither historically belongs to the Russian sphere of influence nor has any immediate benefits to offer to Moscow. Casualties among military specialists either during sorties or on the ground at the Latakia base that is within reach of rebel missiles may become a red line for Russians that triggers a popular demand to send more troops to Syria to retaliate upon the enemy. The limited military operation in Syria may backfire against the government if Russians start asking questions whether Moscow has done enough to ensure the security of the country's military personnel far away from home. In cases of strong public reaction like this the Kremlin may in fact choose to succumb to the pressure and deploy more troops to Syria.

 [return to Contents] 

 #22
Moskovskiy Komsomolets
October 23, 2015
Experts discuss economic impact of Russia's intervention in Syria
Mikhail Zubov, Body bags and big money: How much will Russia earn on Syria?

On Friday [23 October], Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov will discuss a solution to the Syrian situation with US Secretary of State John Kerry. The talks, to be held in Vienna, will be attended by other interested parties: Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Earlier, Lavrov and Kerry discussed this subject by telephone, at the request of the American side. It is impossible to predict the outcome of the negotiations. Nevertheless, Moskovskiy Komsomolets organized a roundtable at its editorial office with politicians and leading economists in an attempt to understand how far we can get bogged down in this war and whether or not it will become a drain on the country's budget or will allow Russia to benefit financially from a victory.

Iosif Diskin, professor at the Higher School of Economics:

"Economic considerations were the least factors prompting Russia's participation in the antiterrorist struggle in Syria. The main objective there is not to earn money, but promote Russia's national security and strategic stability in the Middle East. But this also brings economic benefits. We have already witnessed the first result earlier this week: the successful negotiations between the energy ministers of Russia and Iran produced huge contracts. You must agree that 60bn dollars is a lot of money for Russia. Once the Middle East has been stabilized, this will predictably mean economic development for our partners. I think that other partners will follow Iran in fully appreciating our efforts. I would not describe the cost of ammunition as a heavy burden on our budget. It would have been blown up anyway during exercises."

Nikita Maslennikov, a leading expert at the Institute of Contemporary Development:

"There used to be such a concept as a military bonus. That is, the war could have pushed the price of oil by 30-40 dollars per barrel. But this is not happening now. Supply on the oil market exceeds demand and military operations cannot influence this. Thus, no major economic benefits are in sight. As for economic losses, I prefer to be cautious in my estimates: everything will depend on the duration of our involvement in the hostilities. At the moment, the result is neutral. The military budget has increased by about R259bn, but this is mainly due to the devaluation effects of the last few months. The currency markets' lightning response to war news may cause pain. The precedent has already been set: as soon as reports appeared about the shooting down of an UAV (the media presented it as being Russian), the dollar "jumped" by 50 kopecks and the euro by more than 70. Half an hour later, when it became clear that it had nothing to do with Russia, things calmed down. Nevertheless, there will be more such cases."

Nikolay Vardul, Finansovaya Gazeta's editor-in-chief:

"No economic calculations were made before the special operation was launched in Syria. However, I cannot think of a single example (with the exception of the feudal times) when Russia was able to benefit economically from a war. If Russia begins to suffer losses in Syria, then both an economic and a moral damage is obvious. What we saw was that, for the first time in the last few years, the Finance Ministry cut the defence budget by R225bn. This was immediately followed by [a campaign in] Syria, and there is no more talk of any budget cuts. Does Russia need additional military spending to promote economic development? I doubt it."

Mikhail Shchetinin, a member of the Federation Council Committee on Economic Policy:

"I believe that political benefits of our active involvement in Syria are obvious. And I disagree with the colleagues who say that the current events in the Middle East will not affect the price of oil. We can already see the effect. Strikes against terrorists entail an inevitable reduction in the supply of contraband oil on the market and this affects the price component. Thus, we influence both the political situation and trade. The military operations will also cause currency fluctuations. However, the nature and scale of such fluctuations will depend on the success of the military operations on Syrian territory. If the situation continues to evolve according to the current scenario, I think that the economic effect is obvious."

Andrey Nechayev, former Russian economy minister:

"I will begin with a purely humanitarian aspect. We will incur the biggest loss when body bags begin to arrive in Russia. With Russia's involvement in this conflict getting deeper and deeper, losses are inevitable.

We have a weird sense of self-interest, in my opinion. As we know, Syria is not an oil producing country. Our fighting there does not affect the oil market. Nevertheless, we intervene in an extremely dangerous conflict between the Sunnis and the Shi'is on the side of the weaker party, the Shi'is, who are in a minority. We are effectively provoking a direct conflict with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other oil producing Persian Gulf countries. I cannot rule it out that Saudi Arabia may be tempted to repeat the same experiment as in the second half of the 1980s, which became one of the causes of the economic decrepitude of the Soviet Union. Their economy can afford to drop the price of oil by another 15-20 dollars. I do not need to explain what will happen to us in such a case. The growth of military spending may nominally increase GDP, but this will not increase consumption and the standard of living will not rise, but fall."

Mikhail Yemelyanov, first deputy chairman of the State Duma Committee on Economic Policy:

"The campaign in Syria is not based on any direct economic objectives. We will not secure any new oil fields there. However, a politically strong country always wins economically in the end. Trade is always better with loyal regimes. As for the catastrophic consequences being predicted, such a scenario will not happen. Why are the five countries holding negotiations on 23 October? Because none of them wants a serious conflict with us on Syrian soil. Russia is conducting its operation without risking a conflict with the West or the Arabs. We would not have intervened if there had been Western or Saudi troops there. We are not going to move any further. There will be no body bags. Nobody will think of conducting a ground operation in Syria."

 [return to Contents] 

 #23
www.rt.com
October 26, 2015
Battle of Aleppo is a must-win for Russia
By Pepe Escobar
Pepe Escobar is the roving correspondent for Asia Times/Hong Kong, an analyst for RT and TomDispatch, and a frequent contributor to websites and radio shows ranging from the US to East Asia. Born in Brazil, he's been a foreign correspondent since 1985, and has lived in London, Paris, Milan, Los Angeles, Washington, Bangkok and Hong Kong. Even before 9/11 he specialized in covering the arc from the Middle East to Central and East Asia, with an emphasis on Big Power geopolitics and energy wars. He is the author of 'Globalistan' (Nimble Books, 2007), 'Red Zone Blues' (Nimble Books, 2007), 'Obama does Globalistan' (Nimble Books, 2009) and a contributing editor for a number of other books, including the upcoming 'Crossroads of Leadership: Globalization and the New American Century in the Obama Presidency' (Routledge). When not on the road, he alternates between Sao Paulo, New York, London, Bangkok and Hong Kong.

Once again, whatever hangs in the future for Syria on both the political and military fronts depends on the new Battle of Aleppo. The city and its outskirts, with the influx of internal refugees, may be harboring up to three million people by now.
It's always about Aleppo.

Here's what's going on, essentially, on the ground. West Aleppo is controlled by Damascus, via the Syrian Arab Army (SAA).

Some of the northern parts are controlled by the Kurds from the PYD - which are way more engaged in fighting ISIS/ISIL/Daesh than Damascus. The PYD also happens to be considered an objective ally by the Obama administration and the Pentagon, much to the disgust of Turkey's 'Sultan' Erdogan.

East Aleppo is the key. It is controlled by the so-called Army of Conquest, which includes Jabhat al-Nusra, a.k.a. Al-Qaeda in Syria, and the Salafi outfit Ahrar al-Sham. Other eastern parts are controlled by the "remnants" (copyright Donald Rumsfeld) of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), who refused to collaborate with the Army of Conquest.

Across the Beltway, all of the above are somewhat considered "moderate rebels."

The most important recent development in the Aleppo battlefield is that the SAA - with key Russian help - has killed Jabhat al-Nusra leader Abu Suleiman al-Masri, a.k.a. Mahmud Maghwari, an Egyptian who's been on Cairo's kill list for ages.

Additionally, several hundred Iraqi Shi'ite fighters, under the supervision of superstar Iranian Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani, have been transferred from Latakia to Aleppo.

And a roughly 3,000-strong, battle-hardened, armored Hezbollah brigade is also coming.

What is shaping up is a kind of southern offensive. These forces will all be converging not only towards Aleppo but, in a second stage, will have to clear the terrain all the way to the Turkish-Syrian border, which is now a de facto Russian-controlled no-fly zone.

The supreme target is to cut off the supply lines for every Salafi or Salafi-jihadi player - from "moderate rebels" to ISIS/ISIL/Daesh. That's the meaning of Moscow's insistence on the fight against all brands of terror, with no distinction. It does not matter that ISIS/ISIL/Daesh is not the main player in and around Aleppo.

For all practical purposes the whole Syria campaign is now under Russian operational, tactical and strategic management - of course with key Iranian strategic input.

The Russia-Syria-Iran-Iraq-Hezbollah coalition in Syria - also linked with the "4+1" intel center in Baghdad - stands a great chance of winning the next Battle of Aleppo if they fulfill three conditions.

1) Russian air cover coordinating with on the ground intel for all operations (that's a given); 2) Popular support (that's also a given; the Sunni urban population in Aleppo, mostly businessmen, support Damascus); 3) Experienced ground troops numbering at least 15,000 (on the way, considering the input from Iraq and Hezbollah).

In the dark

Predictably, there's another coalition which is not exactly pleased with the way the battlefield is shaping up.

Aleppo's main power station, 25 kilometers east of the city, for the moment is controlled by ISIS/ISIL/Daesh. Demented as it may seem - still, the whole Syria tragedy is demented - there is an informal agreement between Damascus and the fake "Caliphate"; the goons get 60 percent of the electricity, and the government gets 40 percent. After all, everyone, even beheaders, soft or otherwise, needs energy.

So how did the 'Coalition of Dodgy Opportunists' - which includes Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar alongside the US - help in the fight against ISIS/ISIL/Daesh? Well, they bombed the Aleppo power plant a little over a week ago. This means bombing Syria's civilian infrastructure - a blatantly 2003 shock and awe-style crime - whose victims are mostly the "Syrian people" so cherished by 'Exceptionalistan'.

What happens in the battlefield in and around Aleppo in the next few weeks will be essential to define the diplomatic front. As it stands, Bashar al-Assad's got the message from Moscow. He's ready to discuss amendments to the Constitution and is prepared to hold parliamentary and presidential elections. But first the "4+1" need a major fact on the battlefield.

Even US Secretary of State John Kerry, after he talked to Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, has changed his tune; any political solution implies direct involvement from Damascus as well as the "patriotic opposition."

FSA "patriots" though still haven't got the message. Lavrov explicitly committed Moscow to help them - even after they had been weaponized via Turkey and Jordan to fight Damascus - as long as they would be fighting ISIS/ISIL/Daesh. Predictably, those FSA "moderate rebels/patriots" spurned Lavrov's offer.

Other diplomatic absurdity is the absence of Iran at the negotiating table - because of House of Saud acute paranoia. Iranian generals and advisers are a key component of ground operations, analyzing the ground intel, and the whole strategic framework in Syria.

Instead, Washington and Riyadh still insist on increasing support for those invisible "moderate rebels" - after Kerry met with King Salman in Riyadh. The State Department, for once addicted to suspense, did not specify what "support" means. It goes without saying it means more CIA training and more TOW anti-tank missiles, which will hardly be directed against ISIS/ISIL/Daesh.

The diplomatic ballet is bound to continue later this week. Just in time as the crucial Battle of Aleppo picks up.

 [return to Contents] 

 #24
http://gordonhahn.com
October 25, 2015
Russia's Syria Intervention and the Fate of Israel
By Gordon M. Hahn
Gordon M. Hahn is an Analyst and Advisory Board Member of the Geostrategic Forecasting Corporation, Chicago, Illinois; a Senior Researcher, Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies (CETIS), Akribis Group, San Jose, California; and an Analyst/Consultant, Russia Other Points of View - Russia Media Watch, http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has intervened in Syria and in general for good reason from the perspective of Russian national interests. However, the intervention also poses grave risks for Russia, the region, and international security overall.

Regarding Moscow's calculus, first, creating a stalemate on the ground or putting the small moderate faction within the Syrian opposition could force moderates to the bargaining table, and allow Moscow to save Assad or at least ensure that a post-Assad regime allows Moscow to keep its naval base at Tartus, continues to purchase weapons from Moscow, and protects the Orthodox Christian minority as Assad has. Second, Putin is in Syria to counter the jihadi threat that Al Qa`ida (AQ), the Islamic State (IS), and their allies in Russia's North Caucasus, from which more than a thousand jihadists have left and are currently fighting in Syria and Iraq. A thousand more have been killed, and hundreds have returned to Russia to carry forth the jihad. Third, Putin is using whatever opportunities he can find to impress upon Washington that Russia is a force to be reckoned with, not ignored as has been largely the case since the end of the Cold War, as demonstrated by the enlargement of NATO to Russia's borders and other policies detrimental to Russian national interests and security.

But Putin's intervention and supporting coalition are fraught with grave risks and dangers. Regardless of Russian President Vladimir Putin's denials of any Sunni-Shiite aspect to the conflict in Syria and the Middle East, this not so subterranean aspect of the conflict in Syria is real. Russia's support of Assad unwittingly could dangerously strengthen the Iran-Syria-Iraq-Hezbollah Shiite bloc, provoking Sunni counter-steps, escalating tensions in the region. Shiite Iran and Hezbollah perhaps pose no less a jihadist threat to regional and international security than Al Qa`ida (AQ) or the Islamic State (IS).  At present, the Shiite bloc poses a more grave threat to Israel than do the Sunni jihadists in the mid- to long-term.

Regardless of Russian President Vladimir Putin's denials of any Sunni-Shiite aspect to the conflict in Syria and the Middle East, it is quite real. The Saudis, Qataris, and other Sunni Arabs were not supporting Syria's opposition forces because they wanted to bring democracy to Syria. They wanted to destroy Shiite Iran's only allied state in the region. One needs only to read the jihadi literature on Shiism to understand what the Arabs were up to in backing the Syrian opposition's powerful jihadi element. Make no mistake about it; Iran and Saudi Arabia are fighting for dominance in the Persian Gulf and Middle East regions. This can be seen in proxy confrontations between the two in Iraq, Bahrain, Yemen and, of course, Syria.

If Putin is truly unaware or in denial about the Sunni-Shi'a conflict, then he risks empowering Shiite Iran and its proxy terrorist group, Hezbollah. Iran and Hezbollah potentially pose no less a jihadist threat to regional and international security than AQ or IS, and both have engaged terrorism. They simply represent just a different brand of jihadi terrorism - Shiite jihadism and, in the case of Iran, state-sponsored terrorism as well. Indeed, Russia's intervention could spark greater Sunni intervention in Syria and, in an attempt at parallel escalation, also elsewhere aiming at Iranian interests.

Moreover, at present the Shiite bloc poses a more grave threat to Israel than do the Sunni jihadists. Iran already possesses the potential to deliver a dirty bomb attack, and if Iran cheats on the recently signed nuclear agreement, Moscow will bear some of the responsibility for the catastrophic consequences, having provided the diplomatic cover for Iran in beginning the talks and concluding the agreement. Russia's support of Assad already is strengthening the Shiite bloc and has the potential to do so even more. Now there is the risk that Russian weapons flooding into Syria could fall into the hands of Hezbollah. Russia seems to be trying to prevent rockets and other weapons from falling to Hezbollah, but it might fail. Should Russian weaponry find its way to Hezbollah, it likely would use it against Israel, which could create a bigger problem for both Tel Aviv and Washington and further complicate Russian-Western relations.

Although the Shiite bloc poses a greater threat to Israel at present, one cannot exclude that in an effort to outbid it for leadership in the Islamic world and outbid other Sunnis for leadership of the Sunni world, some state or non-state Sunni actor may try to throw over the game board and reset the increasingly heated game by attacking Israel in one way or another.

So Russia must be careful. One hope is Russia, as a cynically realist power, may be temporarily using the Shiites and limit its support for Iran and even begin to counter some of Tehran's more aggressive actions after Moscow's interests have been secured in Syria.

Putin claims Russia holds the moral high ground by promoting state sovereignty as opposed to the West's destabilizing humanitarian interventions and color revolutions; a 'democratic', diverse multipolar world versus a centralized and uniform unipolar world under American hegemony; and a united global front against jihadism versus selective campaigns against some jihadists combined with covert support for others. But in addition to the above-mentioned risks Moscow's support for the Shiites risk repeating the last of the Western mistakes just mentioned: a selective campaign against some jihadists combined with support for others alliance. Moreover, any moral high ground Moscow holds will quickly collapse should Hezbollah's ability to wage violence against Israel be demonstratively enhanced as a result of the Russian intervention.

Putin has demonstrated real support for Russia's Jewish community, has had a reasonably good relationship with Israel, and usually has tried to take Israeli interests into account. For example, Putin conceded to Israeli demands in canceling the sale of S-300 air defense systems a few years ago. In dealing openly with Palestinian leaders, he has refrained from criticism of Israel and its security measures in the West Bank and Gaza. One can only hope that Moscow is keeping in close diplomatic contact with the Benjamin Netanyahu government and Israeli military and intelligence forces in order to prevent and defuse any potential conflicts.

In sum, Putin has taken a grave risk in supporting Iran's nuclear ambitions, whatever they may be. Iran supports a Shiite brand of jihadism that is perhaps no less, malign than Sunni jihadism. The only hope regarding Iran is that with its revolution, now 36 years in the rearview mirror, the elan and religious messianism and apocalypticism will wane enough to produce a real reformer or some other form of fundamental regime transformation.

In siding with Syria, Iran's key regional ally, and joining with the Iraqis, Putin has upped his stake on the Shiites. If not played cautiously, this particular Putin gambit could put Israel at greater risk, further destabilize the region, prove to be the death knell for Russian-Western relations, usher in a real new cold war, seriously complicating Putin's and everyone else's foreign and domestic policy problems.

 [return to Contents] 

 #25
Wall Street Journal
October 27 2015
Russia Goes Online to Win 'Generation Putin' to Syria Campaign
Flashy videos of airstrikes attract loyal following on social networks
By OLGA RAZUMOVSKAYA And  NATHAN HODGE

MOSCOW-The Russian government is waging a campaign at home for hearts and minds over Syria, using social networks to drum up support for its military campaign to back Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.
Since it began its air war on Sept. 30, Russia's military has released a stream of flashy videos online showing warplanes dropping bombs and missiles on ground targets in Syria. Within hours of the first airstrikes, the Defense Ministry had posted footage on Facebook of bombing runs, garnering thousands of shares and likes.

Russia says it is carrying out precision strikes to avoid hitting civilians-Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov on Monday called reports of civilian casualties a "newspaper hoax" meant to discredit Russia, according to state news agencies.

Indeed, the images released show a slick, sanitized vision of war, emphasizing Russia's ability to wage high-tech warfare. The videogame-style footage appears designed to appeal to young, Internet-savvy Russians.

On VKontakte, Russia's most popular social network, users shared the footage and praised Russia for rescuing Syria-and the world-from the threat of the Islamic State extremist group, also known as ISIS.

"Just a couple of more weeks. No ISIS," said a commenter who identified himself as Semyon Chernigov from the city of Engels, about 500 miles southeast of Moscow. "Glory to Russia."

In many respects, the Kremlin's information barrage borrows a page from the Pentagon, which for years has released videos of airstrikes and cockpit footage to showcase the U.S. military's precision weaponry and shock-and-awe tactics.

But the social-media campaign in Russia appears particularly well-suited to reach out to Generation Putin: people under 30 who came of age after the collapse of the Soviet Union and for whom Vladimir Putin has always been Russia's figurehead, either as president or prime minister.

The online comments in many respects echo the youthful patriotism that swept Russia following the Kremlin's annexation of Crimea away from Ukraine in March 2014, when T-shirts of Putin with slogans such as a "Crimea is ours" were popular attire.

Many of the Web pages and social-media user groups that sprang up to support Russia's intervention in Ukraine have now morphed into support groups for the campaign in Syria. Many commenters conflate the two.

Several groups say they support Novorossiya-a czarist-era term for a swath of territory inside Ukraine's south and east-as well as Syria and Mr. Assad.

"Ukrainians, don't be jealous," said a commenter identified as Sergei Orlov, whose profile photo is that of the Grim Reaper dressed in a Ukrainian uniform handing out a draft notice. "We'll destroy ISIS and return to you, our little idiots."

One group, Russians Online Novorossiya Syria, has more than 172,000 followers and reposts footage shown on Russian television. Broadcast media in Russia are state-dominated, and in the weeks ahead of the bombing campaign, channels such as Rossiya 24 and Channel One showed graphic images of Islamic State brutality as well as dramatic battlefield footage from the Syrian government side, sometimes featuring shots that appeared to be taken from a small drone.

In contrast with starchy news conferences Russia held during its brief war in Georgia in 2008, the Russian military is delivering high-tech briefings apparently designed to maximize visual impact, routinely displaying video footage on flat-screen TVs in the room.

Most Russians still receive their news from television. According to the state-owned pollster Russian Public Opinion Fund, 88% of Russians rely most frequently on television for news and other information.

Only 17% of Russians rely on blogs, forums and social networks. In addition, 63% of Russians say they trust TV news more than other sources.

But Internet penetration in Russia is rising, with the Web available to roughly 65% of Russians, compared with roughly 60% in 2014, as estimated by a major statistics site Internet Live Stats. According to a spring survey by state-owned Russian pollster Popular Opinion Fund, 53% of Russians are active Internet users, accessing the Internet at least once a day.

Despite the plethora of online imagery, some analysts have commented on the relative paucity of actual debate about Russia's more-muscular policy in the Middle East, compared with the vigorous arguments over Crimea.

Ordinary, not-so-politicized Russians "have chosen a wait-and-see approach" this time, Lyubov Borusyak of the Higher School of Economics in Moscow and Alexei Levinson of the independent pollster Levada-Center wrote in a commentary in the RBC Daily newspaper.

A poll conducted Oct. 2-5 by the Levada-Center found 46% of Russians approved of the Russian parliament's decision to allow the use of military force in Syria, while 33% were against.

That doesn't mean there isn't any skepticism voiced about Mr. Putin's policy.

"I am not against anybody bombing Islamic State-Islamic State is a very serious threat," wrote a pro-Western blogger, Anatoly Vorobey. "The faster it is destroyed, the better it is for the whole world."

But he said he would pay "special attention to complete lies" from the Putin regime, "as well as the hysterical nature of the propaganda machine."

Despite Mr. Putin's insistence that Islamic State is the main enemy, U.S. and Western officials have said the Russian campaign looks to be designed to prop up the regime of Mr. Assad, whose forces had been suffering serious battlefield setbacks at the hands of more moderate rebels.

Both the Assad regime and Russia generally refer to all regime opponents in Syria as terrorists, a characterization that carries over online among Mr. Putin's supporters.

"If you are a Russian patriot, you must value Russia's interests in the Middle East and rise up to protect Bashar al-Assad in the fight against evil forces," the VKontakte group For Russia and Syria proclaimed.

 [return to Contents] 

 #26
Sputnik
October 26, 2015
Lies About Russia-Caused Civilian Deaths in Syria Stem From US

The Russian defense ministry's spokesman dismissed media claims concerning alleged civilian deaths in Russian airstrikes in Syria. He added that US-based Syrian American Medical Society (SAMS) was the organization that had claimed about casualties among civilians.

"We will carefully monitor and analyze such media hoaxes. First of all, as for the Syrian American Medical Society, this organization registered in the US state of Illinois has something to do with medicine, as well as doctors, no more than ISIL is tied to the international scout movement," Igor Konashenkov said.

He said that since its foundation in 2012 this organization has been primarily used for publishing "evidence" of alleged implementation of chemical weapons against Syrian opposition.

"However, when all that 'evidence' turned out to be fake, this organization started keeping a low profile. The true purpose of such organizations is to spread lies for designated mass media".

Konashenkov reminded:

"Note that the same scheme was been used by similar organizations notorious for accusing us of bombing civilians one week before the actual start of our sorties in Syria."

The spokesman underlined that "before destroying a terrorists' object the information is checked several days and through several channels".

"And only when we get a hundred percent confidence about the ISIL target, the aviation delivers a pinpoint strike with a corresponding high-precision munition."

 [return to Contents] 

 #27
Russian Defense Ministry dismisses allegations of Russian airstrike on Syrian hospital

MOSCOW, October 26. /TASS/. The Russian Defense Ministry has dismissed as "stove-piping reports" the allegations of a number of foreign media that Syrian civilians have been killed as a result of Russian airstrikes on a hospital in the country, ministry spokesman Major General Igor Konashenkov said on Monday.

The official said that a number of English-language media reported on Sunday with reference to some "doctors" of the Syrian American Medical Society that Syrian civilians were killed as a result of a Russian airstrike on a "hospital" in the Sarmin settlement on October 20.

"We have been closely monitoring and analysing such hoaxes. First of all it is necessary to clarify information about the Syrian American Medical Society itself. This organization, registered in the American state of Illinois, has the same relation to medicine and doctors as the IS [Islamic State terrorist organization] to the international Scouting movement," Konashenkov said.

He said that since the moment of its establishment in 2012, this organization has been used above all for making public the "evidence" of the alleged use of chemical weapons against the Syrian opposition.

"However, when it was found out that all this "evidence" was false, this agency quietly holed up. The true task of the agencies that spread such information "is to make anonymous stove-piping reports to be later picked up by the designated media outlets," he said.

"Mark you, the same scheme is used by other agencies of the kind that were accusing us of bombing civilians a week ahead of the beginning of the Russian aviation group's flights in the Syrian skies," the Defense Ministry official said.

He once again said that "before destroying a terrorist facility, we check the related information for more than one day and through multiple channels." "Only when we are 100% sure of the target, our aircraft are sent to deliver strikes on IS infrastructure using the corresponding precision-guided munitions," Konashenkov said.

Russian military operation in Syria

Russia's Aerospace Forces started delivering pinpoint strikes at facilities of the Islamic State terrorist organization in Syria on September 30. The air group comprises over 50 aircraft and helicopters, including Sukhoi Su-24M, Su-25SM and state-of-the-art Su-34 aircraft. Hundreds of terrorist facilities have been hit by Russian aircraft. On October 7, four missile ships of the Russian Navy's Caspian Flotilla fired 26 Kalibr cruise missiles (NATO codename Sizzler) at militants' facilities in Syria. On October 8, the Syrian army mounted a large-scale offensive. Russia does not plan to take part in ground combat operations in Syria.

Since October 10, Russia's aircraft in Syria continued to hit terrorists' targets conducting from 33 to 88 sorties per day. Russian air strikes were performed in the provinces of Raqqa, Hama, Damascus, Aleppo, Latakia, Idlib, Homs, Deir ez-Zor. Since the start of the operation, Russian air raids have destroyed more than 380 IS sites. The last days have shown that IS militants have serious air defence assets. On October 15, Russian warplanes destroyed the air defence system "Osa" at the village of Eastern Guta around Damascus. In northern Syria, the pro-government forces consist of 60,000-strong grouping officially strengthened by Russian military equipment and weapons.

More than 250,000 Syrians have lost their lives in four-and-a-half years of armed conflict, which began with anti-government protests before escalating into a full-scale civil war. More than 11 million others have been forced from their homes as forces loyal to President Bashar Assad and those opposed to his rule battle each other - as well as jihadist militants from Islamic State.

 [return to Contents] 

 #28
www.rt.com
October 27, 2015
Russia to exhume father of last Tsar to solve century-old Bolshevik murder of Romanovs

Russia is planning to exhume the remains of Tsar Alexander III, the father of the last Russian emperor Nicholas II in an attempt to prove the remains of Nicholas II's last two children belong to the slain Tsar's family.
It was requested by Patriarch Kirill, the head of the Russian Orthodox Church.

Forensic experts told Russian media the process is likely to start in the second half of November 2015. However, opening the vault of the Russian Tsar who died back in 1894 may be quite complicated.

"It [the burial vault] contains not only a coffin with the Tsar's body but also a separate grave with the tsar's embalmed vital organs," Marina Logunova, senior research associate at the St. Petersburg State History Museum, told TASS.

Also Alexander III's impressive height - 1.93 meters - could create additional problems, Logunova added.

"It can be assumed that the burial vault is larger than the tombstone, and that can create risks for the nearby graves...."

If the experts prove the remains found in Ekaterinburg are genuine and related to Alexander III, then one more riddle of the slain Tsar family would be solved. At that point, all seven members of the Tsar's family will be buried together.

Nicholas II, his wife and five children, including his only son and heir, Alexey, were killed in 1918 following the 1917 Revolution. Their bodies were thrown down a mine shaft and then quickly buried somewhere near Ekaterinburg in the Urals.

For almost a century no one knew where exactly the Tsar family was buried. However, in 1991 the remains of Nicholas II, his wife and three daughters were discovered in a mass grave near Ekaterinburg.
Two years later, in 1993, investigators opened a case into the murder of the Romanov family to identify the suspected remains of the Tsar's family and their retinue. The case was closed in 1998 "owing to the deaths of the perpetrators of the crime."

However, the case was re-opened in 2007 when new evidence appeared - the remains of Nicholas II's last two children were discovered - daughter Maria and his only son Aleksey who suffered from hemophilia.

Though the Church has declared Nicholas II, his wife and three daughters as saints, it still won't recognize the identities of Alexey and Maria.

 [return to Contents] 

 #29
Wall Street Journal
October 27, 2015
When It Comes to Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump and His GOP Foes Divide
Among Republican presidential candidates, Donald Trump flies largely solo on engaging Russia
By GERALD F. SEIB

Almost unnoticed, a seminal debate is emerging in the Republican presidential primary on one of the most important topics on the planet.

The issue is what to do about the increasingly assertive Russian President Vladimir Putin. Most GOP presidential contenders fume about Russia's new military incursion in Syria and talk of confronting Mr. Putin there before it goes further. They also call for increasing the military pressure on Russia to stop its intimidation of Ukraine, and advocate isolating or even shunning Mr. Putin.

But the current Republican front-runner, Donald Trump, is staking out a quite different position-almost the opposite one, in fact. He essentially welcomes the Russian intervention in Syria, saying Moscow is doing the world's dirty work by fighting Islamic State forces there. He acknowledges that Ukraine is a problem, but says it's largely the problem of Europe, and particularly of Germany. Overall, he says that as president he would have a "great" relationship with Mr. Putin.

These are not small differences. They put Mr. Trump at odds with not just most other presidential contenders, but also with many GOP voters. Yet they also point to the emergence of a distinct anti-interventionist strain within the Republican Party, the strength of which is about to be tested.

The Putin question has been crystallized by Russia's bold military intervention in Syria, where its planes are bombing the foes of President Bashar al-Assad, while other Russian arms are being deployed to save the Syrian leader from an array of internal foes, including but not limited to ISIS fighters. Russia's new assertiveness isn't seen only in Syria; the country also is forging closer ties with the leaders of Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran.

On the Democratic side, Hillary Clinton is trying to strike a tougher posture than President Barack Obama has on this front, stressing that she wanted to intervene more aggressively in Syria's civil war early on and has always cast a skeptical eye at Mr. Putin.

Republican presidential contenders, meanwhile, are pushing for a whole series of tougher actions, arguing that Mr. Putin is intervening in Syria less to stop Islamic State forces than to save its allies in the Assad regime and thereby expand its regional influence while shrinking America's.

Most GOP candidates call for using American planes to enforce a no-fly zone over parts of Syria, to both create more space for more moderate anti-Assad forces to grow and, not coincidentally, limit the freedom of Russian jets over Syria's skies. Others advocate additional steps to make the fight against Islamic State an American one. Sen. Lindsey Graham calls for using American ground forces to take on Islamic State fighters, and Ohio Gov. John Kasich has proposed a new regional army.

Other candidates are calling for broader steps to curb Russian influence. Ben Carson advocates giving Ukraine not just defensive but also offensive weapons to confront Russian-backed separatists, and he has also called for sending armored brigades to the nearby Baltic states to warn Mr. Putin against making trouble there.

Jeb Bush calls for new economic sanctions against Russia. Sen. Ted Cruz and New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie have proposed expanding missile defenses in Europe to counter Russian ambitions. Carly Fiorina talks of "regular, aggressive military exercises in the Baltic states" and sending "a few thousand more troops into Germany"-while also saying she would simply refuse to talk with Mr. Putin.

Mr. Trump, and to some extent Sen. Rand Paul, are moving in a quite different direction. Mr. Trump seems to essentially accept Mr. Putin's contention that he is intervening in Syria because, like the U.S., he wants to stop the rise of Islamic State forces there. And if Mr. Putin is willing to take on ISIS, Mr. Trump argues, that should be fine with us.

"I'm very happy if Russia wants to go knock the hell out of ISIS," he said in a recent television appearance. "Let them do it." Russia may end up in a Syrian "quagmire," he argues, while the U.S. should stay out. "We owe $19 trillion [in accumulated national debt] and, you know what, we're going to get bogged down now in Syria?"

He opposes establishing a no-fly zone there. Meantime, he would not only talk to Mr. Putin but also "get along very well with him."

It remains to be seen how well Mr. Trump's views will go down with Republican voters. In the most recent Wall Street Journal/NBC News survey, 20% of Republican primary voters said they see Russia as an immediate military threat, and 65% as a long-term threat.

But it's also true that many Republicans, like many Democrats, feel burned by 14 years of military intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan. Beyond the sound bites and the horse race, a crucial debate is embedded there, and Vladimir Putin is crystallizing it.

 [return to Contents] 

#30
www.rt.com
October 27, 2015
Oh, those evil Russians! Soviet-era 'plot' advances hawks' agenda
By Neil Clark
Neil Clark is a journalist, writer, broadcaster and blogger. He has written for many newspapers and magazines in the UK and other countries including The Guardian, Morning Star, Daily and Sunday Express, Mail on Sunday, Daily Mail, Daily Telegraph, New Statesman, The Spectator, The Week, and The American Conservative. He is a regular pundit on RT and has also appeared on BBC TV and radio, Sky News, Press TV and the Voice of Russia. He is the co-founder of the Campaign For Public Ownership @PublicOwnership. His award winning blog can be found at www.neilclark66.blogspot.com. He tweets on politics and world affairs @NeilClark66

Not only are the Russians bombing nice, cuddly 'moderate rebels' in Syria - and by doing so strengthening the cause of ISIS - who had been all but defeated due to US air strikes over the past year - but they also planned to destroy London in the 1950s!

In an article subtitled 'Shock Cold War Plot,' Rupert Murdoch's Sun newspaper - of 'Putin's Missile' fame - tells us that "Russia planned to nuke London suburbs and wipe out the capital in the Cold War."

Now if you just read the headlines you'd think that those dastardly Russkies were going to deliberately target civilians sitting in their semi-detached homes in London suburbs, but in fact, the story - which has been widely reported in other outlets too - is not as it first appears.

It's based on the British National Archives' release of a 1954 letter written by William Penney - an atomic expert who helped develop Britain's first atomic bomb, in which Penney warns of a possible Russian 'plot.'

"Instead of using, say, 32 bombs on London, they would probably use three, four or five very powerful ones which would give the same total damage but need not be aimed accurately," Penney wrote to Edwin Plowden, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Authority.

All we've got here is conjecture - there is no evidence that Russia was planning an attack in 1954. In fact, it was the US's detonation of the world's first hydrogen bomb in November 1952 - and the way it upset the balance of power that was behind British fears, rather than any actual intelligence that the Kremlin was planning to nuke Romford.

The British feared that they would be the likeliest target of any reprisal enemy attack, and not the Americans. In 1954, Penney was keen for Britain to develop its own hydrogen bomb - so he had a clear interest in warning of a 'Russian threat'.

But of course, such a nuanced explanation of Penney's letter, putting his allegations into some form of context, wouldn't really go well in the current climate, certainly not in Rupert Murdoch's neocon newspapers. Everything, including past history, must be spun to show Russia in the worst possible light. A theory - put forward by one man- that Russia MIGHT attack is presented as 'Russia planned to nuke London and wipe out the capital in the Cold War'.

It's not only the Murdoch press which has been up to mischief here.

The Independent newspaper ran a piece on the story which was very keen to show a continuum between the alleged 'Russian' plot of 1954, with the policies of Russia in 2015.

The article informs us: "The Russian head of state from 1924 to 1953 was Joseph Stalin, and from 1954 to 1963 it was Nikita Khrushchev."

It then goes on to say:'

'The alleged bombings would have caused "complete destruction" for three miles in every direction because they would have been more powerful than the one used by the US on Nagasaki citizens in 1945, he claimed.'

And then - presto! - the link to today's events.

"Current Russian President Vladimir Putin has begun bombing Syrian opponents to President Bashar al-Assad, who is believed by the US to have used chemical weapons on his own citizens."

So there you have it. Stalin. Khrushchev. Putin. Three rotten apples in the same barrel (and let's bung in Assad and alleged chemical weapons attacks, while we're at it!). It's very important to note how the country that Stalin and Khrushchev ruled is called "Russia" even though it was actually the Soviet Union. This in the past few years has become standard fare - with the Soviet Union/USSR being literally airbrushed out of history to be replaced with "Russia."

There are two main reasons why this is being done. The first is that elites in the West don't want to remind people those successful multinational federations - and in particular successful socialist multinational federations, once existed. It's not just the Soviet Union which gets this treatment.

Yugoslavia was 'abolished' by the West even when it still legally existed - during the NATO bombing of 1999 the country targeted by NATO was routinely referred to as Serbia, even though the official name was still the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

And let's face it: How many articles do you read today about the Middle East reference the United Arab Republic which existed between 1958-71 and under which Egypt and Syria were unified from 1958-61?

Remind people of the UAR and they might get the idea that a new union of Egypt and Syria - including other Arab nations too - would be the best way to protect those countries from aggression from the West and its regional allies - and that would never do, would it?

The other reason why the name 'Soviet Union/USSR' has been dropped is that using the name 'Russia' makes it easier to score geopolitical points in 2015. Russia: Stalin, Khrushchev, Putin - same country, same policies, same kind of leaders. Got the message?

In fact, when it comes to accusing other countries of wanting to launch preemptive nuclear attacks Britain is not really on strong ground.

Last year, it was revealed how Winston Churchill had urged the US to launch a preemptive nuclear strike on the Soviet Union in 1947 when he was leader of the opposition. A memorandum from the FBI archives revealed that Churchill wanted a right-wing US Senator Styles Bridges, a fierce anti-communist and defender of Senator Joe McCarthy, to persuade President Truman to launch a strike which would "wipe out" the Kremlin.

"The FBI document shows Churchill's belligerence towards Britain's former wartime ally ran so deep that he was prepared to tolerate the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Soviet civilians in a nuclear strike," reported the Daily Mail.

Thankfully, Truman did not take Churchill's advice.

Now, if Russian media were to link Churchill's note in 1947 to Britain's invasion of Iraq in 2003; its bombing of Libya in 2011; and it's current threat of air strikes in Syria, the British establishment would I'm sure cry foul and accuse the Russians of going back over old history to score points today.

But in Britain, we're doing much the same thing with the alleged plot to bomb London in 1954.

In truth, there was no Soviet threat to Britain - or indeed to the West generally during the Cold War, as the late Andrew Alexander (a conservative writer and no fan of communism) detailed in his book 'America and the Imperialism of Ignorance'.

"As I researched the diaries and memoirs of the key figures involved, it dawned on me that my orthodox view of the Cold War as a struggle to the death between Good (Britain and America) and Evil (the Soviet Union) was seriously mistaken. In fact, as history will almost certainly judge, it was one of the most unnecessary conflicts of all time, and certainly the most perilous," Alexander wrote in 2002.

The 'Shock Cold War Plot' story presented in such dramatic fashion now by the Sun, clearly serves two purposes for those trying to spin it for political advantage. First, it's a way of getting the public, who might be in danger (heaven forbid!) of seeing Vladimir Putin as a 'good guy' for firmly dealing with terrorists in Syria, to regard Russian actions with more suspicion. "Why they planned to destroy London- the swines!"

It's not just in Britain where this story has been reported in a way to damn current Russian actions.

Ukraine Today reported it under the dramatic headline 'Russia planned to blow up London in 1954.'

"The revelation of the Moscow's 20th century plan comes as tensions between Russia and the West are at their highest since the Cold War following Russia's annexation and invasion of eastern Ukraine, and more recently the Kremlin's military involvement in the Syrian civil war." UT informed its readers.

Planning to blow up London. Annexing Eastern Ukraine. Military involvement in a civil war. That's the sort of thing those evil Russians do!

Of course, Ukraine Today used the name 'Russia' in their story, for reasons I've outlined above. They couldn't use 'Soviet Union' because Ukraine was of course part of the Soviet Union in 1954 and so they'd be accusing themselves of planning to blow up London - as the first commenter on the piece pointed out!

The other way the story has been spun is to help push the case for Trident, Britain's hugely expensive and far from 'independent' nuclear 'deterrent,' which is up for renewal.

Britain's ultra-hawkish Defence Secretary Michael Fallon, in full Cold War warrior mode, warned only last week of "an expansionist Russia" and the "danger that the long-standing consensus will be broken now that Labour has elected a leader who wants to scrap Trident and is not prepared to use it."

A Parliamentary vote on Trident renewal expected around the middle of 2016. Fallon and his fellow hawks will be worried that public opinion is against renewal - and is on the same side as Jeremy Corbyn on this issue.

The anti-Trident momentum is certainly growing: a big Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament march against Trident is planned for 20th February in London. Ian Chamberlain of CND says: "This could be one of the largest mobilizations against nuclear weapons this country has seen since the 1980s."

So how convenient- given how the pro-Trident hawks are losing the arguments- that there's a new story about a 'Russian' plan to nuke London! As the Daily Mail puts it: "The emergence of the Cold War plot comes as the UK's nuclear policy returns to the focus of national debate."

Even the Daily Mirror, a Labour supporting paper - but one which supported the pro-Trident Andy Burnham for the Labour leadership, was keen to make the link between the 'Russian' plot and Trident renewal, posting, underneath the story an aggressive radio interview with Jeremy Corbyn on Trident, in which he said - to his credit - that there were no circumstances in which he would use nuclear weapons.

But will an allegation that Russia planned to nuke London in 1954 be enough for the hawks? What greatly weakens the pro-Trident case- are the lies told to justify the Iraq war. We were told that Iraq was attacked because our leaders genuinely thought it had WMDs - but we're also expected to believe- in the case of Britain that WMDs deter an attack.

And it doesn't help that the most raucous voices in the pro-Trident faction are those who tell us that Iran has no need for nuclear weapons. If Iran doesn't need nukes, then why does Britain need them?

The inconsistencies are there for all to see- and it's clear that the pro-Trident Russophobes don't want us to think too deeply about these issues. Better for them if we focus instead on a dastardly (but unproven) 'Russian' plot of sixty-one years ago, and remember, Russia: Stalin, Khrushchev, Putin- same country, same policies, same kind of leaders.

 [return to Contents] 

#31
Rethinking Russia
http://rethinkingrussia.ru
October 26, 2016
Inaugural Issue of "the Rethinking Russia Journal"
http://rethinkingrussia.ru/en/2015/10/inaugural-issue-of-the-rethinking-russia-journal/

The international analytical center «Rethinking Russia» is honored to present the inaugural issue of its Journal. Quite logically we decided to dedicate this issue of the Rethinking Russia Journal to the events in Syria and Russia's role in this conflict.

On September 30 Russia announced the start of its military mission in Syria, directed against the terrorist threat and at restoring stability in the war-torn country. The mission has been launched at an official request of the Syrian government.

It is quite clear that the international community should join efforts in search of a solution to the Syrian crisis. In fact, this is a point President Putin made in his speech at the 70th session of the UN General Assembly, September, 28. He called for creating an anti ISIS coalition, which would resemble the one that was formed against Hitler half a century ago.

However, as of now the level of cooperation between the world's leading powers leaves much to be desired. The global information landscape is occasionally littered with provocations and doubtful reports, aimed at discrediting the Russian campaign and its foreign policy as a whole.

Being fully aware of how important it is to provide an objective coverage of different states' policies in Syria, we are offering our readers an opportunity to make their own judgement about the goals and objectives of Russia's mission in Syria. This issue is featuring the opinions of some of the most prominent experts both from Russia and from other countries around the globe.

On September 30 Rethinking Russia in coordination with ISEPR Foundation held a roundtable discussion in Moscow dedicated to the 70th UN General Assembly as well as to the start of the Russian operation in Syria. The event titled "Seizing the Initiative: Discussing the Speeches Delivered by the World Leaders at the UN General Assembly," gathered prominent political scientists, experts and journalists. In this issue of the Rethinking Russia Journal we offer you extracts from most interesting speeches and comments.
 

 [return to Contents] 

 #32
Donetsk's northern and western outskirts reportedly shelled

MOSCOW, October 27. /TASS/. Ukrainian forces have shelled Donetsk's Petrovsky district and the settlement of Spartak near the city's airport overnight to October 27, Donetsk News Agency reported on Tuesday citing local administrations.

"Last night the settlement was shelled again from guns and machine-guns. We also heard mines exploding closer to the airport," a resident of the Spartak settlement said.

The local administration of the Alexandrovka settlement in the Petrovsky district also reported shellings overnight. "Explosions were heard on the outskirts but no reports were made by residents. It did not reach residential areas," an administration spokesperson said.

It was earlier reported that Ukrainian forces opened fire from mortars and small arms at the Donetsk airport. No injuries have been reported.

Others towns in the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) - Deblatsevo, Yasinovataya, Dokuchaevsk, Makeyevka - did no register any ceasefire violations overnight. "The night was calm, there were no incidents," Gorlovka's administration said.

The ceasefire was also observed in Telmanovsky, Amvrosievsky, Starobeshevsky and Novoazovsky districts. "There were no shellings," Novoazovksy district's deputy head Anatoly Yanovsky said.

At the meeting of the Contact Group in Minsk on August 26, the participants confirmed their plans to ensure ceasefire in Donbas from September 1. Over the last weeks, only few violations of ceasefire regime were registered in Donbas.

 [return to Contents] 

 #33
AFP
October 26, 2015
'No margin for error': dangerous work for Ukraine's rebel deminers
By Nicolas Miletitch

Donetsk (Ukraine) (AFP) - Pro-Russian rebel Konstantin carefully carried an unexploded shell to a hole in the earth under a tree. Laying a charge of TNT, he then blew it up in cloud of black smoke.

After some 18 months the fighting in east Ukraine has all but ground to a halt as a ceasefire has largely taken hold over the past six weeks, but for Konstantin dangerous work still lies ahead.

Going by the name of "Kot" (Tomcat), the 40-year-old works as a deminer on the separatist side, trying to defuse the landmines, ordnance and booby traps that are scattered in the countryside.

"You make a mistake and you're dead," Konstantin told AFP as he went about his risky work on the conflict-ravaged outskirts of the largest rebel stronghold of Donetsk.

"You have to stay concentrated and not let anything distract you."

Landmines and booby traps have been planted throughout the war zone, around the front line, near trenches in forests and fields and at roadblocks.

Certain death

"The worst one is the OZM 72 anti-personnel mine tied to taut wires on the ground," said Konstantin, referring to a Soviet-made weapon.

"We find a lot of these. When you touch the wire, the mine springs up 90 centimetres (35 inches) before exploding. This means certain death."

Along with fighters and mine-clearers, farmers are the main victims of the scattered landmines and booby traps, according to both the Ukrainian authorities and the rebels.

Tractors have blown up driving over anti-tank mines and farmers ploughing their fields have stumbled upon landmines concealed in the soil.

"The hardest thing for me is when a shell falls into a house," said Konstantin, who did not wish to give his last name.

"Anyone can blow up a shell to destroy it. But finding a way to neutralise it on the spot without it blowing up is more complicated."

Locals occasionally discover rocket fragments from the Soviet-era Grad or Uragan multiple rocket-launchers, calling the deminers onto the scene only to find that the rockets are innocuous.

But not all devices prove to be harmless.

Around 10 children have been killed in eastern Ukraine in the past few weeks when shells uncovered in deserted houses or fields blew up in their hands, Ukraine and the rebels have said.

The UN children's agency UNICEF said in March that at least 42 children had been killed and 109 injured by landmines and unexploded ordnance in eastern Ukraine since the war began.

Ukrainian authorities, rebel leaders and the International Committee of the Red Cross have published brochures and broadcast commercials to warn the population of the deadly dangers of mines and shells.

A loudspeaker announcement at Donetsk's central market urges the population to report any suspicious devices.

Ukraine, along with 160 other states, ratified the 1999 Mine Ban Treaty that prohibits the production and use of anti-personnel mines.

But both sides have large stockpiles of Soviet-made weaponry -- with Kiev saying the rebels received their arms from Russia -- and have not hesitated to use them.

"I will have work for a long time to come," Konstantin said.

The deminer takes pride in a job he says saves lives but recognises that the high-stress environment can take its toll.

"Many mine-clearers drink to relieve stress," he said. "It's dangerous. You can't have unsteady hands in this profession."

A crest on his uniform -- bearing the motto "No margin for error" -- serves as a permanent reminder that in this line of work, blunders kill.

 [return to Contents] 

#34
Ukraine Today
http://uatoday.tv
October 26, 2015
Ukraine should rearm and train while Russia is busy in Syria - military expert

Ukraine's former deputy defence minister predicts Putin will be back with a new plan on Ukraine

Ukraine Today's Viewpoint is joined by Leonid Polyakov, who is the former deputy defense minister of Ukraine and an advisor to multiple Ukrainian and international think tanks.

Q: On the 30th of September Russia has started its airstrikes in Syria. What does it mean for Ukraine?

It means positive development for Ukraine, at least in the nearest time, while Russia is distracted from Ukraine. It is difficult to predict something in the long-term perspective. At the moment Ukraine is not alone to deter Russian aggression, but Ukrainian allies is, naturally, busy in Syria as well, so they are also distracted.

Q: Ukrainian allies were already busy in Syria before Russian presence there?

But not to that extent...Right now they have to take into account Russian activity in Syria, spread of governmental pro-Assad forces against pro-Western rebels, developments in Islamic State, Kurdish interests and Iranian interference and so on. At some point all of them will look at the US for mediation, what we've seen not only in the Middle East, but also in former Yugoslavia, in Ukraine and other places.

Q: So you consider Russia's concentration elsewhere good news for Ukraine?

Of course, now they don't have enough capabilities to fight both in Ukraine and in Syria and keep control over Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Tajikistan, and Armenia - all those place they try to control.

However, it is only the change of strategy. Instead of provoking combat engagements they shifted emphasis to training sabotage units and multiple detachments they send one after another to Ukraine just to wreak havoc and undermine trust of population in Ukrainian authorities.

Q: You think Russia will use these sabotage groups to cause confusion and chaos all over the country or predominantly in the east?

Of course, they intend to inflict as much chaos as they can. Naturally it is easier for them to hide in the areas which are closer to Russian border and the occupied territories...There they can recruit locals, who know the terrain, local population...So we see it more in Kharkiv, Odesa, Donetsk and Luhansk regions where they cross the line of separation very quickly and mine the territory. Every week we have accidents when locals and our military and security personnel step on mines or other explosive devices...

Q: How should the Ukrainian Armed Forces prepare for this shift in tactics?

They can do it in two ways: in the way of training and in the way of rearmament. Now our defence industry is concentrated on supplying what is necessary for our army; and our training grounds are very busy with rotating battalions undergoing training.

Q: Were Russian losses in Ukraine one of the reasons the Kremlin started to adhere to Minsk agreements?  

First, their ambitions were destroyed. Instead of Novorossiya from Kharkiv to Odesa, they had to go open with Russian military presence. We managed to stop even Russian regular troops. We lost some part of our territory, but we could have lost a lot more.

Watch also Novorossiya project has failed - Ukrainian analyst

Q: Do you think that Russia's Novorossiya programme has failed?

Yes, at the moment. However I have doubts that Putin and his regime completely refused from this idea. I am sure that in a longer term, after they manage to reach their goals in Syria they will be back with a new plan. That is why they wanted so much to have an aircraft base in Belarus, they continue their sabotage in Ukraine, they concentrated their better organised proxies in Donetsk and Luhansk region, they build up their contingent in Crimea, and recently rotated their troops in Transnistria, we have to remember about that.

 [return to Contents] 

 #35
Business New Europe
www.bne.eu
October 27, 2015
KYIV BLOG: Local elections in Ukraine pave the way for parliamentary crisis
Sergei Kuznetsov in Kyiv

Local elections in Ukraine, held on October 25, predictably demonstrated a decline in public support for pro-Western political forces headed by the current president and prime minister. This outcome could trigger manoeuvring among other political players, including members of the ruling coalition, aimed at forcing snap parliamentary elections. However, President Petro Poroshenko and leading politicians from his Bloc appear prepared for such a scenario.

Visiting a polling station with his wife in Kyiv, Poroshenko told journalists that the local elections should complete the "reload" of the country's authorities, who took power after the Euromaidan protests in Kyiv in 2014 brought the ouster of former president Viktor Yanukovych.

"It is important to form pro-Ukrainian coalitions in local councils, preserving the principle of political competitiveness at these elections," Poroshenko added. "We shouldn't give a single chance to the aggressor [Russia] to destabilise the situation from inside the country. I am confident that the Ukrainian nation is wise enough and Ukrainian politicians are responsible enough to form these pro-Ukrainian coalitions."

Are these words an attempt to put a brave face on a sorry situation? Undoubtedly.

According to exit polls published by the Petro Poroshenko Bloc on October 26, the party is suffering from a 5-10% decline in its popularity in Ukraine's southern and central regions compared with the results of last year's parliamentary elections. In eastern regions it is often unable to compete with the pro-Russian Opposition Bloc and Vidrodzhennya party, which is supported by oligarch Ihor Kolomoyskiy.

Even more importantly, the People's Front, headed by Prime Minister Arseny Yatsenyuk, did not participate at all in the local elections due to a collapse in its ratings over the past year. Instead, its politicians sided with the Poroshenko Bloc on the ground, under agreement that Yatsenyuk's party will get up to 25% of places in the Bloc's elections lists.

However, just one year ago, the parties of Yatsenyuk and Poroshenko jointly secured almost 45% support during parliamentary elections. When now, for instance, the Poroshenko Bloc gains around 20% in many central and southern regions (according to its exit poll), many Ukrainian experts interpret this as a decline of more than 50% in the tandem's popularity.

With the political forces of Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk losing so much ground, other parties seize the opportunity to declare that the composition of the current parliament does not meet the moods of society, and that radical changes are needed through new elections. Batkivshchyna (Fatherland), the party headed by former prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko, looks ready to become one of the main driving forces of this process. "This parliament has no right to exist, because it does not serve the people, it does not feel responsibility [for the country]," Tymoshenko said in an interview with Inter TV in July.

"They are already rocking the boat," Ihor Kononenko, a 50-year-old businessman and first deputy head of Poroshenko's Bloc in parliament - and is regarded as a 'grey cardinal' for his leading role in unofficial negotiations with other parliamentary factions - told bne IntelliNews on election night, pointing to the behaviour of other members of the ruling coalition.

"Catastrophe"

"Our [the Poroshenko Bloc's] ratings are lower today. It's true," says Kononenko, who was responsible for the party's local campaigning. "The authorities are in the hardest position, because they come under criticism, especially when Ukraine is in such a difficult situation: the country is in a state of war and the economic situation is very serious. It's more comfortable to be in opposition."

Politicians who want to trigger political crises and snap parliamentary elections are, according to him, "absolutely irresponsible", while early elections will be "a catastrophe for the country". "That is why we [Poroshenko's Bloc] will do everything possible to prevent them."

Kononenko believes a new parliament will be "worse" than the existing one. "The ability to negotiate within the parliament, its ability to vote for reforms, will be much lower. The next parliament will be more populist and less workable," he adds, pointing out that the current parliament, in which the pro-Western coalition has enough votes to pass necessary bills, has only been able to adopt some laws "with difficulty".

One of the latest examples of "difficulty" came in September, when the Samopomich (Self Reliance) party headed by Andriy Sadovyi, the reform-minded mayor of the western city of Lviv, refused to support amendments to the country's constitution proposed by Poroshenko and his party. A political scandal erupted in Kyiv as Sadovyi accused the authorities of exerting unprecedented pressure on the party's members in order to obtain their votes.

"Reformatting" the government

While possible early parliamentary elections remain a distant prospect for now, especially if Poroshenko and his allies are successful in opposing the idea, there is a more immediate threat of possible political destabilisation in Kyiv: Yatsenyuk's cabinet may be in for a reshuffle in the aftermath of the local elections.

"I am convinced that the current government should be reformatted with the aim of speeding up reform. Nobody is satisfied with their pace, and it is the government that is responsible," Kononenko tells bne IntelliNews, adding that the president supports plans to selectively reshape the government.

"We should do it after the elections as the heat of the political struggle will pass away, and it will be possible to form a government without political emotions," adds Kononenko, who was one of the first business partners of billionaire Poroshenko. "How long is it possible to play games? It is necessary to carry out reforms."

In late September, Poroshenko declared that Yatsenyuk's cabinet had "immunity" from reshuffling until December 11, when one year will have passed from the parliament approving its programme of reforms.

Meanwhile, on October 22, Poroshenko said that Ukraine at last has a chance to begin serious reforms. "I have never talked about this and did not want to speak before the election, but I will tell you that immediately after the elections we will have four years without elections, without populism, when finally we will be able to demonstrate decisive steps for the development of our country," the president said.

 [return to Contents] 

 #36
Ukraine goes back to feudalism instead of federalization - Ukraine's former prime minister

MOSCOW, October 26 /TASS/. Ukraine's local elections held on October 25 hit a record by the number of violations. They also brought the country back to feudalism, Mykola Azarov, Ukraine's former prime minister, said in an interview with LifeNews television channel on Monday.

"I do not remember anything like that in my living memory...Honestly, they did not even manage to organize the election rigging to make these polls look more or less decent," Azarov said noting that the Ukrainian Electoral Commission had inflated the turnout almost by half to 46% and a split had occurred in the ruling coalition.

"Instead of federalization of which we had talked so much we have found ourselves on the verge of miserable feudalization when every region had been placed in the hands of certain feudal lords who organized the elections," Azarov stressed.

Elections to Ukraine's local self-government bodies took place on October 25. The polling stations never opened in the cities of Mariupol and Krasnoarmeisk, eastern Ukraine, because of problems with voting bulletins. Now, Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada (parliament) will have to amend the legislation to enable the two cities to hold a revote on the day when the second round of elections takes place in the rest of Ukraine.

 [return to Contents] 

 #37
Atlantic Council
October 26, 2015
Ukraine Goes to the Polls: Kolomoyskyi Is King Again
BY BRIAN MEFFORD
Brian Mefford is a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council's Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center. He is a business and political consultant who is based in Kyiv, Ukraine.   

As the ballots are counted in Ukraine's October 25 local elections, early returns and exit polls indicate some surprises. The big story is that oligarch Ihor Kolomoyskyi came out on top. Kolomoyskyi, former governor of Dnipropetrovsk who was dismissed in March by Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko for his overreach, backed candidates who look set to win in Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, and Odesa. If successful, Kolomoyskyi will control the mayor's office in the country's three largest cities outside Kyiv, and gain bragging rights in his ongoing war with Poroshenko.

Overall, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe assessed the local elections as "competitive and well-organized" but noted that there is "need for further reform." Voting was canceled at the last minute in Mariupol and Krasnoarmeysk because of disputes over ballots.

Ukraine's new election law mandates a runoff election if no mayoral candidate receives a majority in cities with more than 90,000 people, and are likely in Kyiv and Dnipropetrovsk.

Final results are not expected until October 28, but here's how things look in Ukraine's five largest cities that held elections:

1. Kyiv - Incumbent Mayor Vitali Klitschko leads decisively but is short of a majority. There's a tight race for second place: Samopomich's Serhiy Gusovskiy, independent MP Boryslav Bereza, Fatherland's Volodymyr Bondarenko, and former Mayor Oleksandr Omelchenko are within two percent of each other. "The Shuster Live" exit poll put Klitschko at 38 percent, Gusovskiy at 9 percent, and Bereza and Bondarenko less than one percent behind Gusovskiy. Bottom line: the boxer-turned-politician is a clear favorite for reelection but will face a second round next month.

2. Odesa - Observers reported carousel voting, multiple voting lists, exit poll workers agitating for candidates, and another suspiciously slow vote count. Incumbent Mayor Gennadiy Trukhanov leads in the exit polls with 47 percent, and local observers expect him to end up as the first-round winner once the votes are tallied. Oblast Governor Mikheil Saakashvili's candidate, Sasha Borovik, is in second place with around 30 percent; former Mayor Eduard Hurvits trails in third place. MP Serhiy Kivalov is pulling around 4 percent, preventing Trukhanov from a first-round victory at the moment. Still in flux.

3. Kharkiv - Incumbent Mayor Gennady Kernes obliterated all opponents by taking close to 60 percent of the vote according to exit polls and early returns. In addition, Kernes's association with oligarch Ihor Kolomoyskyi's Renaissance Party appears to have given the party an outright majority on the city council. Kernes's nearest opponent, Samopomich's Taras Sytenko, performed better than expected and surpassed former Deputy Governor Yuri Sapronov and Solidarity's Oleksandr Davytyan.

4. Lviv - Samopomich's Andriy Sadoviy is the clear leader. The "Shuster Live" exit poll put Sadoviy within 1.5 percent of a majority, and a first-round victory for Sadoviy is still a possibility. But if a runoff takes place, Sadoviy will square off against Svoboda Party's Ruslan Koshulynskiy. Sadoviy and Svoboda have long been rivals, so a runoff will add some intrigue to this longstanding clash. Polls put Koshulynskiy at 14 percent and Civic Position's Volodymyr Hirnyak trails in third at 12 percent. Poroshenko's two candidates, Yuri Dobrodomov and Oksana Yurinets, won't make the runoff. With or without a runoff, Sadoviy is likely to win a third term as Lviv Mayor.

5. Dnipropetrovsk - Ukrop Party candidate Borys Filatov performed better than expected. He's leading Opposition Bloc's Oleksandr Vilkul 42 to 32 percent according to early returns and exit polls. Polls prior to Election Day showed the candidates running neck and neck. With Kolomoyskyi's allies controlling the city's administrative resources and Filatov's surprisingly strong results in round one, the runoff is now a tossup.

 [return to Contents] 

 #38
Washington Post
October 26, 2015
Day of 'disillusionment' as voters in Ukraine go to the polls
By Andrew Roth
Andrew Roth is a reporter in The Post's Moscow bureau.

KIEV, Ukraine - Voters across Ukraine went to the polls Sunday to elect regional leaders amid widespread frustration over a sagging economy and stalled reforms nearly two years after a revolution here in the capital.

Exit polls showed low turnout, estimated at about 36 percent early Sunday evening, in a vote seen as a referendum on the leadership of President Petro Poroshenko. Elections were scrapped entirely in Mariupol, a major port city on the Sea of Azov, because the local election committee said the ballots had been printed by a regional oligarch who backs an opposition party.

"The main theme of the day is disillusionment," said Balazs Jarabik, an expert on Ukraine and a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "No one is voting."

Large street protests in Kiev prompted by anger over corruption overthrew the government of then-President Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014. Poroshenko, a billionaire confectionery magnate, and Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk headed a self-described "kamikaze government" that promised to carry out extensive reforms at a breakneck pace.

Ukraine's conflict with Russia last year dominated headlines. Russian President Vladi­mir Putin annexed the Crimean Peninsula in March 2014 and backed separatists in a conflict with government troops in Ukraine's southeast that has left 8,000 dead and hundreds of thousands displaced.

But at polling stations in Kiev on Sunday, voters were most concerned with rising prices, the devaluation of the national currency and persistent corruption, which some say is worse than before.

At a polling station on the city's outskirts, Nadezhda Sokolova, 57, said she voted for the Opposition Bloc, seen as a successor to Yanukovych's party, to "send a message" to Poroshenko.

"What good is freedom if you can't buy bread?" she asked rhetorically.

Dissatisfaction is also high among the activists who led the 2014 revolution, called the Euromaidan for short, of whom more than 100 were gunned down in the street days before Yanukovych was overthrown.

Yegor Sobolev, an activist and now head of the anti-corruption committee in parliament, said Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk had maintained corrupt systems and dallied on reforming the Ukrainian prosecutor's office.

"Corruption is an even greater danger to this country than Putin," he said.

Yatsenyuk, in particular, has been battered by accusations that his close political allies are corrupt. His party, the People's Front, was polling so poorly ahead of the elections that it decided to skip them.

In an interview in his office, Lev Partskhaladze, the first deputy chairman of the Kiev regional administration and a political ally of Poroshenko, said reforms were moving ahead but would take time to be completed.

The Kiev regional government did not have enough money to pay large salaries to new employees, he said, and it was not realistic to fire everyone who served under the former president.

Opposition parties, many representing the interests of Ukrainian oligarchs, were acting "unconstructively" without presenting reasonable alternatives, he added.

"You can either be a populist or you can be a realist," said Partskhaladze, who was leafing through glossy fliers detailing school reforms and other new programs. "Populists never last long in power."

Despite setbacks, some said the elections marked a step forward for Ukraine.

"The elections are healthier and are more transparent," said Serhiy Leshchenko, an investigative journalist who was elected to parliament with Poroshenko's party, citing greater public outrage over vote manipulation ahead of the elections. "Of course, the process is not finished."

A liberal registration process allowed an overwhelming 132 parties to take part in the vote, Ukraine's election commission announced. In Kiev, voters could choose from one of 40 parties for the regional government and one of 29 candidates for the city's mayor.

"It's just kasha," meaning a mess, said one young voter, Oleh, 26, who did not give a surname. Kasha is the Ukrainian word for buckwheat porridge.

Elections did not take place in the regions of Ukraine controlled by separatists. Hundreds of thousands of people who fled to other regions of Ukraine did not vote.

Natalie Gryvnyak contributed to this report

 [return to Contents] 

 #39
Kyiv Post
October 26, 2015
Opposition Bloc wins big in Kramatorsk city council amid low turnout
By Stefan Huijboom

KRAMATORSK, Ukraine - The city that was once seized by Russian-separatist forces has voted overwhelmingly for the Opposition Bloc, the political force made up of former allies of ex-Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych. The Opposition Bloc looks set to get roughly half the votes in the Donetsk Oblast city of 160,000 people.

The turnout during the elections was low though, however, some 40 percent.

Not all votes have been counted yet.

In contrast to the Opposition Bloc's support, Kramatorsk Mayor Andrey Pankov, a self-nominated candidate not affiliated with any part, is set to be re-elected. He has led the city since its liberation by the Ukrainian army in July 2014.

Pankov had 50 percent of the votes by 9 a.m. this morning.

As was expected in Kramatorsk's local elections, the Opposition Bloc has received a little over 50 percent of the votes to lead the city council. The Opposition Bloc will get 24 deputies, Nash Kraj 10 Solidarnost 5 and Pensioner's Party 3.

Two other parties that will take part in the new city council are Nash Krai with 19 percent and Solidarnost, the party of Petro Poroshenko that received 11 percent of the votes. Samopomich and the Pensioners Party, who also took part in the elections, didn't make it to the city council as the parties didn't reach the threshold of 5 percent.

Armed men secured the city council, fearing for what representatives of the local Opposition Bloc called "provocateurs." Next to the city hall was a small press center set up where local election officials shared their views and information if there were any violations or cases of fraud.

Member of the local election commission Sergey Tkachenko called the elections a "success" as there weren't cases of election fraud detected yet. However, he called the turnout of 40% a disappointment and that the results doesn't represent all of Kramatorsk.

"The local elections in Ukraine are as important as ever. Reforms, new law, new rules, will be introduced the upcoming years -- 60 percent in Kramatorsk decided not to use their civil right. We don't know if they support the results, but the results don't represent the large majority in Kramatorsk, despite what the percentages show," Tkachenko said during a press briefing on Oct. 26 in Kramatorsk.

The city is full of young people, and some of them don't understand why the post-EuroMaidan Revolution bloc of President Petro Poroshenko didn't gather many votes.

In front of the city council, the colors of the Ukrainian flag are painted.

Families have gathered on a nice autumn day in front of the building, where a few musicians play violins. Some children are chasing flying pigeons. Nothing recalls of war or the day after the city's most important local election in history: that of wanting to reform and grow stronger.

Artem Koshmal, an 18-year-old student, is riding his bike with some friends, stopping in front of what was once the Lenin statute. Lenin is no more and has been replaced by the Ukrainian flag, but for Koshmal and many other residents in Kramatorsk, the statute is still a symbol. A symbol of hope to make Kramatorsk better and stronger than ever.

"The youth is what makes Kramatorsk hopeful," Koshmal said. According to him only the youth can push through reforms in the city. "It's not even a question whether there are pro-Russians in Kramatorsk. Obviously, there are. Many of them support Opposition Bloc for example. But, they don't want reforms. They want to go back to the Soviet times. The future is that of the youth, and many of us weren't even born in the Soviet Union. We want to have a European future, and that means reforms. I've read everywhere in the news in cities like Odessa that young people are appointed to important positions, because only young people can do that. We, the young people, are the future," Koshmal told the Kyiv Post.

Telling Koshmal about the results, he reacted shocked.

"The current mayor has been good for Kramatorsk since we were liberated. I think that's the only good thing about these elections," he said.

Koshmal voted for Poroshenko's party Solidarnost because he thinks that's the only party that can make Kramatorsk stronger.

On Apr. 13 Russian-separatists took over the police station in Kramatorsk in their attempts to create the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic. On May 11 a status referendum was held to declare their so-called republic. Kramatorsk, then, became officially a city in the Donetsk People's Republic. What followed was months of fighting between Russian proxies and the Ukrainian army. Eventually the Ukrainian army recaptured Kramatorsk on July 5.

A walk through the small town still gives the impression that some residents sympathize with the separatists in Donetsk. On some billboards in the center, graffiti supports the separatists while some apartment complex walls are painted with separatist colors.

Now, Kramatorsk has chosen its local government push through reforms locally.

Some people also are skeptical about reforms, such as 43-year-old shop owner Nikolai Mazhurenko.

"Since the protests in Kyiv everyone's been shouting the word reform. Meanwhile, we haven't seen anything. And, let's not forget the corruption accusation against the government in Kyiv. They force us to do things, but they can't keep their promises. That's one reason why I would never vote for Poroshenko's party," Mazhurenko said. He didn't want to mention what party he did vote for.

Time will tell how Kramatorsk will look like in a few years. The only certainty is that Vladimir Lenin, the symbol of communism and Soviet tyranny, is gone but evidently his spirit is not forgotten.

 [return to Contents] 

 #40
Kyiv Post
October 26, 2015
Politicians exchange accusations, as residents outraged at no vote in Mariupol
By Oksana Grytsenko

The members of Mariupol election commission sit inside the printing house, so that no one can take the ballots with mistakes to the polling stations in Mariupol on Oct. 25.
© Anastasia Vlasova

MARIUPOL, Ukraine -- There were many angry shouts heard in eastern Ukrainian port city of Mariupol on Election Day.

"My outrage has no limits," lamented a 64-year-old Lydmyla Lenshyna after she couldn't vote at her polling stationon Oct. 25 as there were no voting ballots. "It's the first time when the elections are disrupted in Mariupol."

The election officials at the polling station located at school No 9 were trying to placate the tempers,despite they also felt embarrassed. They didn't receive the voting ballots on the day before because the Mariupol Election Commission found some grave mistakes in them and so refused to accept them.

Mariupol, the city of almost 500,000 residents in Donetsk Oblast, located just miles from a war zone, has become a scene of the fierce stand-off between the candidates for the post of mayor.

The main rivals are Vadym Boychenko, one of the top managers at the local Illich steel mill, owned by oligarch Rinat Akhmetov, and Yury Ternavsky, who owns a local milk factory.

Despite both candidates run as independent, Opposition Bloc, a political party formed from the former allies of the ousted President Viktor Yanukovych, supports Boychenko, while the post-Maidan parties endorse Ternavsky and other alternative candidates.

The first scandal erupted whenthe Mariupol Election Commission took a decision earlier this month to order printing of voting ballots at the Akhmetov-owned printing house Pryazovsky Robochy, which led to suspicions that the ballots might be falsified.

When the election officials arrived at the printing house on the eve of polling day, they found that some of the ballots were lying on the floor, and the name of one mayoral candidate,a long-standing current mayor Yury Khotlubey, was indicated twice there. They also found some violations in packing the ballots and sealing of the printing house.

So the majority of the commission, 11 out of 16 members, refused to accept the ballots and stayed at the printing house overnight to protect them from distribution to the polling stations.

Tempers were high inside of the printing house in the morning, where the tired election officials andcandidates were clashing at times with journalists and among themselves. Some of them wore camouflage.

"We don't mind if Opposition Bloc wins. But let it be the fair elections," Kateryna Chernyuk, the member of Mariupol Election Commission from President Petro Poroshenko party, told the Kyiv Post.

Chernyuk was charging her cellphone after the night spent at a printing house. She showed the Kyiv Post a text message from Iryna Yurina, head of Mariupol Election Commission, with demands to hand the ballots over to the polling stations, threatening thecommission's members with criminal charges otherwise.

Yurina, who represents the New Country party, formed from the former members of now banned Communist Party,called her colleagues' behavior a "sabotage."

"Those ballots that were prepared to be taken to the polling stations were normally packed and they were not defective," she said.

Up to 100 supporters of post-Maidan parties gathered near the printing house to make sure the ballotswon't be taken away. People were listening to the patriotic songs by popular Ukrainian rock bands and preparing to stay for long.

Meanwhile, the candidates were exchanging accusations of disruption the vote.

Ternavsky shared the pictures of ballots with errors on his Facebook page, accusing the Opposition Bloc of disruption the vote.

"Opposition Bloc with Akhmetov atop of it wants to take a revenge in Mariupol," said a candidate for mayor Igor Reshetnyk, also present at the printing house. "There is a lot put on a map for Metinvest (Akhmetov's company) here," he said, adding that by his information the company spent some $7 million for the campaign in Mariupol.

Boychenko, a candidate of Metinvest, claimed he spent for his campaign no more than $35,000, paying for all out of his own pocket.

Speaking with the Kyiv Post at his office at Illich plant he said the forged ballots were secretly brought to the printing house by the representatives of post-Maidan parties. "Three videocameras were filming the printing process day and night," he said.

Vadym Boychenko, a top manager of Mariupol Illich steel mill, owned by billionaire Rinat Akhmetov, is viewed as one of the favorites in local mayor's elections.

Boychenko dismissed the accusation of his critics that Metinvest company campaigned and pressured his workers to vote for him. "I've never met with the workers over the period of my campaign, I swear," he said. There are some 40,000 people working at Akhmetov's plants in Mariupol.

The residents, who arrived at the polling stations, split in putting the blames for disrupted elections. In Mariupol, a former stronghold of pro-Yanukovych's forces, there is strong support for both the Opposition Bloc and post-Maidan candidates.

Lenshyna, who came to vote together with her several also senior friends, said it was probably done by the Opposition Bloc.

But Yulia Sheykina, who came to the polling station together with two small kids, accused both the Central Election Commission and the post-Maidan parties of disrupting the elections."These parties behaved the way it was comfortable for them," she said.

Mykhailo Okhendovsky, head of the Central Election Commission, who was appointed to this post by Yanukovych'sparty ticket, demanded the election officials in Mariupol to hold the elections anyway, threatening them with up to 7 years in jail otherwise.

But the officials of Mariupol Election Commission claimed they were not going to hand over the "falsified ballots" to the polling stations. "Okhendovsky isn't the final authority,"Chernyuk said. "How can we accept the rigged elections?"

President Poroshenko called on the parliament to hold an extraordinary meeting and decide the new date of elections in Mariupol.

Boychenko, the candidate, said he would win the elections anyway. "I don't see any other options."

All the residents polled by the Kyiv Post said they were ready to come to the elections on the other day, no matter when they would be assigned.

 [return to Contents] 

 #41
www.thedailybeast.com
October 26, 2015
They're Brawling at the Polls in Ukraine
A large segment of the country couldn't participate, and other parts didn't dare. But for all the uproar, a faint scent of peace is in the air.
By Anna Nemtsova

It was better, at least, than fighting in a war. The balloting in Ukraine's local elections on Sunday was messy and sometimes violent. Candidates and voters lost their tempers, smashed each other's faces, fractured digits and twisted arms at polling sites in Melitopol, Kharkiv and Odessa as tensions lingered in badly bloodied eastern Ukraine.

Most of the towns of the Donbass region, with its population of over 3 million people, were not able to vote because the territory remains in the hands of pro-Russian militants. Overall, more than five million Ukrainian citizens out of 45 million were unable to vote because of the lingering effects of the two-year conflict. But the momentum has gone out of the rebellion, a ceasefire has been holding, and Moscow has turned its attention elsewhere.

Russian independent experts believe that, after his popular seizure and annexation of Crimea, President Vladimir Putin did not have a well developed plan for Donbass other than to turn it into one more shadowy separatist territory, similar to Transnistria in Moldova or Abkhazia in Georgia. So the Kremlin never announced the end of the conflict in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions of Ukraine. Rather, one day last month Russian mainstream media simply stopped talking about the war in Donbass, entirely, and began to cover the Syria war instead.

But that's not all good news for Kiev. What the local elections showed is that even outside of Donbass the Ukrainian electorate remains torn between the pro-Russian east and the pro-Poroshenko center. According to preliminary vote counts, Poroshenko's Solidarity bloc was leading with 24.15 percent, the nationalist Svoboda party came second with 12.74 percent, and former Prime Minister (and political prisoner) Yulia Tymoshenko's Batkivschyna garnered 11.46 percent.

As the voting proceeded, some brawls broke out. An ambulance took one candidate, Roman Dundnik, to a hospital with a bruised chest and broken finger. His impromptu sparring partner, another candidate named Anatoliy Demyanenko, ended up at a police station.

A political struggle with the richest man in Ukraine, Renat Akhmetov, boiled over in the city of Mariupol, on the line of control with rebel-controlled territories. There, the election process failed completely. Not one of the city's more than 200 polling sites was able to open on Sunday morning, as more than 600,000 ballots remained in sealed boxes.

The ballots became the final issue, officially, but to local pro-Ukrainian activists the cancellation of the election was a victory in a big local war against the billionaire Akhmetov. The post-revolutionary generation of candidates were upset the ballots for the elections were printed in a shop that belonged to Akhmetov, a figure also tied to one of the political parties of the pro-Russian Opposition Bloc.

"That makes our society doubt the legitimacy of these elections," the head of the Mariupol regional administration said on Sunday. Activists of several pro-Kiev political parties demanded to postpone the election. "The Opposition Bloc made an attempt to take the election under their control, but we did not allow that to happen," a local activist and politician, Galina Odnorog, told The Daily Beast.

Two more towns, Krasnoarmeysk and Svatovo, had to cancel the balloting. As a result, the pro-Russian opposition felt angry and frustrated. On Monday, the Kiev-based political scientist Mikhail Pogrebinskiy concluded that at the moment Ukraine is not able to organize legitimate elections in the eastern regions, even apart from Donbass. "Authorities blocked elections in Mariupol, as they realized that pro-Kiev parties could not win in the region," Pogrebinsky said.

Ukrainian nationalists from the Right Sector battalion, who have been asserting a larger role in Ukrainian politics now that the war is winding down, dragged grenade launches and machine guns to the country's main square, Maidan Nezalezhnosti, and set up a tent "for people to come over and hold the weapons."

"In spite of all the hard and sometimes violent moments we still have much more transparency now," said Mustafa Nayem, an influential member of parliament. By 6 p.m., many regions had more than 30 percent turnout. Ukrainians were voting for 10,700 local councils and city mayors in elections.

One of the heroines of the hustings, this time around, was former prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko. Her party, Batkivshchyna, was doing better this year than many of her rivals. Not many Kiev politicians expected Tymoshenko's return to politics. But in the midst of the war, economic crises and internal fights between powerful clans and revolutionary political figures, many Ukrainians have started to see Tymoshenko as a high-profile figure, needed at this confusing times.

Batkivshchyna's popularity grew during this election campaign, falling only one percent behind President Petro Poroshenko's party. She promised not to allow anybody to throw Ukraine back to the past, when one oligarch decided the fate of elections, but to be an independent self-sufficient country. On election day, Tymoshenko praised the chance Ukrainian had to choose their leaders "in a peaceful, non-revolutionary way."

Maybe in Ukraine, at a time when men still use their fists to settle political disputes, a woman's presence is a welcome touch.

 [return to Contents] 

 #42
www.rt.com
October 26, 2015
Ukraine votes in local election amid confidence crisis & fraud allegations

Ukrainians are going to the polls to elect new local authorities on Sunday. However, the campaign has been marred by allegations of foul play and a failure to open polling stations in several cities, as well as other irregularities.

The election is widely viewed as a vote of confidence for the current government, which has seen a plunge in popularity over its 20 months in power, as Ukraine continues to suffer from an economic slowdown and continued conflict in the east of the country.

This week Prime Minister Arseny Yatsenyuk declared that he does not care about his own or his government's approval rating. His party, People's Front, scored over 22 percent of votes in last year's parliamentary election, on par with that of President Petro Poroshenko. Now the party's rating is in single digits and it did not even bother to launch a campaign.

Poroshenko's own party, BPP, remains among the favorites, but is facing strong competition from Batkivshchina (Fatherland) of the former Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko and Smopomich (Selfreliance) of the Lvov Mayor Andrey Sadovyi. In eastern parts of the country, the Opposition Block, which includes politicians from the now-defunct Regions Party of ousted President Viktor Yanukovich, is hoping to score a landslide victory.

There is great uncertainty about how the results will turn out, as an opinion poll conducted by the respected Democratic Initiatives Foundation this month showed that only a third of voters have decided who they will cast their ballots for. There is also confusion about new election rules, with only 12 percent of Ukrainians saying they understand them clearly, according to the same survey.

The campaign was marred by cases of foul play, like buying votes, according to the Committee of Voters of Ukraine (CVU), a watchdog, monitoring democratic institutions in the country.

"Unfortunately we saw the old problems with the current campaign. There is the buying of votes and the police did not do anything, failing to launch even one prosecution case against those responsible," the CVU's head Aleksey Koshel said.

He added that the Ukrainian criminal code fails to bloc semi-legal ways of vote manipulation like using a formally independent charity or an NGO named after a candidate or a party to distribute money and food to voters.

"Prosecuting such things is really very hard," he acknowledged.

On Sunday, the committee identified 20 cities in Ukraine, where voting was poorly organized. In Cherkassy about 20 percent of polling stations failed to open on schedule because ballots were not delivered on time. None were opened in Krasnoarmeysk.

In Vinnitsa, no booths were available at dozens of stations, compromising the secrecy of the voting process. In Zaporozhye, two sets of ballots were sent to stations, one of them valid and the other not, sparking confusion.

One of the biggest cases of foul play happened in Mariupol, an eastern port city with some 455,000 residents, where polling stations have not opened on Sunday. The city's election commission said late on Saturday that the ballots printed for Mariupol were flawed and that the election must be postponed until November 15.

Poroshenko's BPP party accused the Opposition Block of orchestrating the crisis, claiming that the ballots were printed at a factory secretly owned by one of the opposition politicians. The block in turn accused BPP of using its leverage in the election commission and a pretext to derail the election.

"If the authorities in Ukraine cannot organize elections in the territory under their control, how do they plan to organize it in the areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions that are not," the opposition party said in a statement.

The question refers to the rebel-held parts of the country, which wanted to hold their own local election independently from Kiev. However, they have been postponed until March 2016 after vocal protests from the Ukrainian government.

The local elections in the rebel-held areas are part of the so-called Minsk agreement, a roadmap to peaceful resolution of the Ukrainian conflict that was sponsored by Russia, Germany and France.

Kiev called the rebels' plan a blatant violation of the deal as it insists that it should organize the election on their own terms and only after taking back the territories. The deal also unambiguously states that the election must take place before Kiev would be allowed to put its guards along the border between the rebel-held areas and Russia.

 [return to Contents] 

 #43
http://newcoldwar.org
October 25, 2015
Ukraine PM pulls his 'party' from Oct 25 regional and municipal elections as support withers

The Financial Times reported on October 22 that Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk has yanked candidates of his political machine from the municipal and regional elections that are taking place across Kyiv-controlled Ukraine today, October 25. The reason for the decision is to avoid inevitable, embarassingly-low results.

Support to Yatsenyuk's "People's Front" has sharply withered. Two polls recently published (IFIS and IRI) show very low support for Yatsenyuk himself among Ukrainian political leaders. Just one year ago, the "People's Front" won the most votes of all the "party" slates in the legislative (Rada) election-22 per cent. Yatsenyuk was able to hold onto his position as prime minister thanks to those results. But that support has since evaporated due to the calamitous state of Ukraine's economy and due to the highly unpopular civil war that Yatsenyuk and his government are waging in eastern Ukraine.

Kyiv has been obliged by its European Union and IMF masters to more or less observe a ceasefire since September 1. But its economic blockade against the rebellious eastern regions continues. Kyiv refuses to talk to the duly elected political leadership of the Donetsk and Lugansk people's republics and find a political settlement to the conflict. This is in defiance of the Minsk-2 ceasefire agreement which Kyiv signed on Feb 12, 2015 (and which was ratified by no less that the UN Security Council five days later!). And it is urging the EU and North America to continue their threatening and hostile policies towards Russia.

Kyiv is trying to set an "example" of continued hostility to Russia by refusing landing rights on its territory for air passenger travel emanating from Russia. Russia has been obliged to respond in kind by banning landing rights for Ukrainian airlines. Ukraine's air travel ban officially commences today.

The Financial Times is one of the very few Western media outlets to report the story of Yatsenyuk's decision to withdraw from today's elections. The newspaper reports on Oct 22:

"Judging by the reaction of Petro, 32, a city worker in Kiev, who - until recently - was serving on the eastern front, Mr Yatsenyuk's party will not be missed on Sunday. 'He did the right thing by not running in this elections. They have lost trust,' said Petro, who had been called out to fix a broken water main that left a gaping, muddy hole. 'Where are the reforms?'"

The aforementioned poll by IFES (the International Federation of Electoral Systems) reports that only 20 per cent of Ukrainians think the country is headed in the right direction to improve its economy and social conditions. Fifty six per cent say it is not.

Sixty per cent of Ukrainians have little confidence or none at all in President Petro Poroshenko. Only 20 per cent express any confidence in Yatsenyuk. One year ago, Poroshenko scored a 69 per cent positive rating and Yatsenyuk scored 60 per cent.

By far the largest issue of concern in the country today is the civil war campaign of the government in the east of the country (83 per cent of respondents in June 2015, 70 per cent in September 2015). And yet, the government continues with its hostilities there.

Concerning the original goals of the 'Euromaidan' movement of 2013-14, today, only 14 per cent of IFES respondents think it has improved democracy in Ukraine and only five per cent think it has limited the power of the despised class of tycoons ('oligarchs').

In a genuine democracy, such deep unpopularity of a government and its leaders would be cause for alarm and change in political course. In many Western democracies, it would at least prompt a semblance of concern. But not in Euromaidan Ukraine. A spokesman for Yatsenkyuk told the Financial Times that his boss is "perfectly aware" of what he faces and is "not concerned by temporary political party ratings".

The Financial Times is one of the few Western media outlets to report the polls by IFES and IRI. No Western media at all is reporting the polls rather frequently conducted and published by Ukrainian pollsters. That's because the all the polls flatly contradict the Western media's propaganda line of Russian "interventions", "invasions" and so on as being determining factors in Ukraine's political situation.

Western media likewise self-censors its reporting of the very seriously degraded state of democracy and civil rights in Ukraine.

 [return to Contents] 

 #44
Valdai Discussion Club
http://valdaiclub.com
October 26, 2015
Elections in Donbass: The Devil Is in the Details
By Arnaud Dubien
Arnaud Dubien is Head of the French-Russian Analytical Center "Observatory".

Overshadowed in recent weeks by the Russian military intervention in Syria, the Ukrainian crisis has entered a decisive phase. The cease-fire in effect since September 1 has been respected, and a new agreement on the withdrawal of weaponry of less than 100mm caliber was signed and has begun to be implemented.

Especially, the "Normandy format" summit which was held on October 2 in Paris led to a new momentum in the political part of Minsk agreements. Local elections in the Donbass territories controlled by pro-Russian separatists are now at the center of negotiations: this issue is indeed the key to the crisis, since it determines the next steps, i.e. granting a special status for these territories, returning the control of the Ukrainian-Russian border to Kiev and lifting the European sectoral sanctions against Russia.

Before October 2, extreme positions were taken on the issue of local elections in Donbass. The Ukrainian authorities had prohibited any ballot, while the separatists had unilaterally decided to hold votes on October 18 and November 1. The European Union reacted strongly, calling on Russia to put pressure on its protégés and suggesting that if elections were to be held, it could lead to a new wave of sanctions. Blowing hot and cold, Moscow had expressed its "understanding" vis-à-vis the separatist approach, tirelessly stressing the need for a direct dialogue between Kiev, Lugansk and Donetsk.

In the end, the compromise that is emerging is rather favorable to Russian interests. Certainly, Lugansk and Donetsk have acceded to demands of the Kremlin and will not hold votes on October 18 and November 1. Vladimir Putin inexpensively proved his good will to François Hollande and Angela Merkel. Overall, the meetings in Paris confirm the impressions that prevailed in late September in the chancelleries and among informed observers. It is indeed the "Morel Plan", named after the French diplomat who is driving the OSCE subgroup on political issues in Minsk, which served as a basis for discussion. But this plan, parts of which were leaked in the Ukrainian media, is generally unfavorable to Kiev - just as the Minsk agreements it is supposed to enforce. The pill is bitter for P. Poroshenko. There will be a special status for Donbass and an amnesty for the rebel leaders (even though the Ukrainian president repeatedly denied it in public); and albeit the elections in the territories controlled by the rebels will take place "in accordance with Ukrainian law" and the letter of the Minsk agreements, the ad hoc text to be adopted by the Rada confirms the specificity of Donbass compared with the rest of the country.

However, several questions and potential obstacles remain. The first concerns President Poroshenko's ability to have the Rada vote an ad hoc electoral law as well as a constitutional reform ratifying the de facto autonomy of Donbass (a 2/3 majority is required). The riots that took place on August 31 in front of the Parliament and the reluctance of the political and media elite in Kiev leave little space for optimism. In addition, the terms of the elections in Donbass are not clear: among the pending issues, the possibility for Ukrainian parties to participate (can one, other than in purely theoretical terms, imagine that Svoboda or the Radical Party will campaign in Donetsk?) and the voting of displaced persons (one million in Ukraine) and refugees (as many in Russia?). Moreover, Kiev insists that the Ukrainian press should be able to work freely in separatist-controlled territories and require prior disarmament of the pro-Russian groups. This last point will result in new battles of interpretation: annotations to Minsk agreements provide the creation of a "People's Police", which one can think will recycle most of the rebels. The withdrawal of foreign troops will be difficult to carry out, since it would require checking identity papers of all armed men in Donbass.

At this stage, discussions are taking place within the framework of the OSCE political subgroup in Minsk. Confronted by a barrage of fire coming from most political and media forces in Kiev, P. Poroshenko is attempting to minimize the extent of the concessions to be made and to empty the "Morel Plan" of its substance. Ukraine is seeking to change the sequence defined in the Minsk agreements (elections, special status, regaining control of the border). The dominant feeling in Kiev is that it is better not to hold elections in the Donbass than to hold elections that would legitimize "anti-Ukrainian" forces and pave the way for the lifting of sanctions.

In this context, France and Germany's positions will be decisive. Now both countries seem determined to move ahead and hold elections (even should they be "imperfect") in the Donbass. A certain "tired of Ukraine" mood is spreading across Europe, while other major challenges (Syria, migrants) have arisen lately. The question is: what game will the United States play? According to well-informed sources in Paris, at the end of September, President Hollande's diplomatic adviser Jacques Audibert called Susan Rice, Obama's adviser for national security, to complain about Victoria Nuland's behavior. According to the Élysée, the No. 2 of the U.S. State Department "is setting people against Minsk-2 in Kiev".

 [return to Contents] 

 #45
Washington Post
October 27, 2015
Ukraine and Russia sever ties in the skies, throwing travelers for a loop
By Andrew Roth
Andrew Roth is a reporter in The Post's Moscow bureau. He previously reported on Russia and the former Soviet Union for The New York Times.
 
MOSCOW - Before the war in southeast Ukraine, Alexander Martynov, 37, could hop in his car and drive five hours across the Ukrainian border to Krasnodar, Russia, where he keeps warehouses stocked with produce for local supermarkets.

But as the conflict between Russia and Ukraine persisted over the past year and a half, Martynov's commute became more complicated.

When the city where he lives, Donetsk, was seized by pro-Russian separatists in April 2014, he fled to the Ukrainian capital, Kiev. From there, the businessman said, he could catch a flight to Krasnodar with a short layover in Moscow.

Then his situation got worse.

On Sunday, Ukraine and Russia cut direct air travel in tit-for-tat actions that are expected to affect 680,000 passengers each year, most of them Ukrainian. The flight ban drives yet another wedge between two countries with centuries of historical and familial ties.

Passengers aboard the last flights from Moscow to Kiev on Saturday were particularly angry at moves that would likely have little political impact but cause massive headaches for travelers who shuttle between the two countries.

When Ukraine's Boryspil airport, the country's main air hub, opened during the Soviet era, the only destination available was Russia. As of Sunday, flights were going everywhere except Russia.

"It is total nonsense," said a furious Martynov, heavyset and bald, in Moscow on Saturday. During an interview in the passport line, he described himself as a "Ukrainian patriot" but said that he wanted normalized relations with Russia.

"Ask anyone here. We are all hostages of the politicians," he said.

Kiev announced the ban on flights in late September as part of a package of sanctions imposed on Russia for its annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and its subsequent steps to take control of the peninsula.

In response, Russia announced it would likely block Ukrainian flights starting on the same day.

Alexei Makarkin, a Moscow-based political analyst, said Ukraine was doing all it could to cut itself off from Russia.

"Tension on the front lines is reduced," he said in a telephone interview, referring to a lull in fighting between Russian-backed separatists and government troops in recent months in Ukraine's southeast. "But the psychological tension is stronger than ever."

Last-minute negotiations between the Russian and Ukrainian governments last week failed to break the stalemate over the airline flights. The ban took effect early Sunday, striking at businessmen, families visiting their relatives, the occasional tourist and transit passengers.

For many passengers, the decision in Kiev to ban Russian airlines came as a shock.

"Strategically you would have expected it a year ago, not now," said Oksana Timchenko, a lawyer from Odessa, Ukraine, dressed in a sable-fur coat, diamond earrings and leather boots with stiletto heels on Saturday.

She was taking Ukraine International Airlines' penultimate flight from Moscow after visiting family, she said, but would often fly through Russia en route to Miami and New York.

"Turkey's going to make a lot of money," she said, explaining she would likely schedule her future flights through Istanbul.

She called the flight ban "window dressing" by the Ukrainian government, which she said was more interested in brinksmanship with Russia than in tackling corruption and other domestic problems.

Oleg Panteleyev, head of the Russian aviation information agency AviaPort, said that the airline ban would affect an average of 680,000 travelers between Ukraine and Russia each year. Panteleyev said that the ratio of Ukrainian to Russian passengers on the flights was at least 2-to-1, or even 3-to-1.

According to Russia's Federal Aviation Agency, more than 800,000 people have flown between Russia and Ukraine in the first eight months of 2015. The agency does not release statistics by nationality of the passengers.

Maya Lomidze, the executive director of Russia's Association of Tour Operators, said that tourism travel from Russia to Ukraine dropped steeply after the February 2014 revolution that ousted Ukraine's pro-Russian government.

"It's at zero," she said.

Most of the passengers traveling Saturday were visiting relatives. Many Ukrainians have family in Russia because people moved freely between the two countries when they were part of the Soviet Union.

On Saturday, Sergey Turumsubayev, a 31-year old mechanic from Boryspil , Ukraine, was returning home from his grandparents' home in Moscow.

"I'm not for either side," he said. "I'm happy to say I'm apolitical."

Turumsubayev's family offers a good example of the interconnectedness under the Soviet Union.

His father, a Soviet military officer, was deployed from Russia to Boryspil and married a woman who grew up in the town. Turumsubayev's paternal grandparents live in Moscow. Others relatives live in Saratov and Belgorod, cities in Russia. Another of his grandfathers is from Kazakhstan, another former Soviet republic.

Others on Saturday's flight were also visiting relatives. A young woman named Olga was traveling to her aunt's funeral in Odessa. A 58-year-old woman was flying back to Odessa after visiting her mother's grave in the Moscow region.

Lyudmilla Temirsalina, a television producer who lives near Kiev, said she was in Russia to film a reality television show called "Battle of the Hair Salons."

With the flight ban in effect, she said, the cast and crew would have to take a 30-hour train ride from Saratov back to Kiev. The flight from Moscow lasted just under an hour and 20 minutes.

Asked about the decision to ban flights, she said, "I think everyone is a little bit disappointed."

 [return to Contents] 

 #46
Disruption of air links is part of big game to tear Ukraine away from Russia
By Tamara Zamyatina
Author profile

MOSCOW, October 26. /TASS/. Kiev-initiated termination of regular air links between Ukraine and Russia, effective since Sunday, is part of a big game aimed at disrupting all connections between the two countries and peoples, polled analysts have told TASS.

Last September the Ukrainian authorities declared that Russian air carriers operating flights to Crimea were in breach of Ukrainian legislation. There followed a decision to prohibit all Russian airlines from making flights to Ukraine starting from October 25. In response, Russia took symmetrical countermeasures to close Russian airspace to Ukrainian airlines starting from the same date. The mutual sanctions came into force at 00:00 on October 25.

Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev said on his page in Facebook Kiev's idea to outlaw Russian flights to Ukraine was "another bright example of how Ukrainian officials are waging a war against their own people." According to the Russian civil aviation authority Rosaviatsiya Ukrainian citizens account for three quarters of the passenger traffic between Russia and their home country. The termination of air links will strip Ukrainian air carriers of 20% of their profit. Russian Transport Minister Maksim Sokolov estimates the overall losses of Russian and Ukrainian airlines from the ban on flights at 7-8 billion roubles a year ($100-120 million).

The director of the CIS Studies Institute, Konstantin Zatulin, believes that the termination of air links between Ukraine and Russia at Kiev's initiative has dealt a hard blow on the old-time fraternal, historical, cultural, economic and social ties between our peoples. "The issue in focus is not something impersonal, such as curtailment of trade and cooperation in the defence and aircraft-building industries, but Kiev's wish to minimize or even disrupt people-to-people contacts. This will have a rather painful effect on family ties, friendships and business relations between Russians and Ukrainians," Zatulin told TASS.

"One cannot but feel sympathy for the nearly three million Ukrainians who have to earn a living in Russia. More than 1.1 million of them are from the southeast of Ukraine, until just recently a scene of combat operations where there are no jobs for civilians," Zatulin said.

"Rumours of the forthcoming abolition of air links between Ukraine and Russia instantly pushed train ticket prices up 50%. This surge is very sensitive for those in the low income brackets. A air journey to Kiev through Belarus or the Baltic countries is far longer and costlier, not to mention Kiev's plan for letting western air carriers increase the number of flights to open a roundabout way to Moscow via European cities," Zatulin said.

Kiev's latest demarche, aimed at severing ties with Russia, will surely anger a large share of Ukraine's population and cause opposition sentiment to soar. "Last Sunday's local elections in Ukraine demonstrated a very low turnout, in some regions no greater than 30%. In two cities close to the area of recent hostilities - Mariupol and Krasnoarmeisk - the elections were disrupted. In many regions the results are not in favour of the presidential Pyotr Poroshenko Bloc. And Prime Minister Arseny Yatsenyuk's Popular Front party, aware of the disastrous slump in its popularity rating, decided to stay out of the election race altogether, thereby pronouncing a verdict to itself," Zatulin said.

The director of the Political Studies Institute, Sergey Markov, says Kiev's idea of closing the sky over Ukraine to Russian air carriers will hit Ukrainian economic entities in the first place. "Some Ukrainian airlines have asked Russia's Rosaviatsiya to do something for the sake of preserving regular flights between Russian and Ukrainian cities. But the authorities in Kiev have left no chance for them, which may cause a number of Ukrainian air carriers to go bankrupt and out business," Markov told TASS.

"The Ukrainian authorities' decision to harm their own airlines was a deliberate one. It was part of a big game by the regime in Kiev to tear Ukraine away from Russia. In fact, it was precisely for this purpose that the US-led West supported last February's government coup in Ukraine and brought Ukraine's Russophobic politicians to power," Markov concluded.

 [return to Contents] 

 #47
www.rt.com
October 27, 2015
Yatsenyuk threatens moratorium on $3bn debt to Russia

Kiev will suspend payments on Russian debt if Moscow does not agree to restructure the loan due in December, said Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseny Yatsenyuk in an interview with Handesblatt. The Kremlin has repeatedly said it's not interested.

If Moscow doesn't make concessions by October 29, Ukraine will refuse to pay the loan, said Yatsenyuk.

"This $3 billion was in reality a bribe from Russia, so that President Viktor Yanukovich would stop the Association Agreement with the EU," he added.

Ukraine has repeatedly said that its debt to Russia is private. The current IMF policy only allows member states to miss payments to private investors. Kremlin insists that Kiev's debt is a state one and is ready to go to court if Ukraine fails to pay in December.

The question of Russian debt is crucial to Ukraine, because the country's possible default would put into jeopardy a $17.5 billion loan promised by the IMF.

However, according to Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov, the IMF is ready to change the rules especially for Ukraine. Officially, the IMF's decision is motivated by a general change in the rules of the organization's funding, but "it is clear that this is done exclusively in order to freeze payments to Russia," Siluanov said.

In 2013, Russian President Vladimir Putin and then Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich agreed Moscow would buy $15 billion in Ukrainian bonds. After the first $3 billion, Russia decided not to buy the remaining $12 billion following the Maidan events, that resulted in the overthrow of Yanukovich's government.

 [return to Contents] 

 #48
Opendemocracy.net
October 26, 2015
Has Ukraine's 'Revolution of Dignity' left women behind?
Ukraine's Euromaidan revolution called for dignity and justice, but almost two years later gender equality is not a priority on the Ukrainian political agenda - not even for female lawmakers.
By Francesca Ebel
Francesca Ebel is a freelance reporter focusing on Ukraine, Russia and the former Soviet Union. She has contributed to The Independent, The Guardian and The Kyiv Post.

In 2010, former Ukrainian Prime Minister Mykola Azarov enraged women across Ukraine when he declared "conducting reforms is not women's business." Today, Svitlana Zalishchuk is one of the newly elected female lawmakers proving him wrong.

With her cascade of blonde hair and sapphire eyes, Zalishchuk is a striking figure. Recently described as one of "the most honest and toughest anti-corruption lawmakers", her gentle, measured manner can be deceptive: she is a fighter, driven towards her vision for an accountable, transparent and stronger Ukraine.

She insists that we meet on Maidan after a vigil held for Georgiy Gongadze - a journalist kidnapped and brutally decapitated in 2000; one of Ukraine's most shameful emblems of corruption and rotten governance. It's a fitting setting given Zalishchuk's important role as a coordinator in the Euromaidan revolution as well as her impressive career as a political activist, journalist and initiator of a number of civic campaigns, including "Stop censorship!" and 'Chesno' - an organisation advocating for greater political transparency.

Zalishchuk was elected as a deputy of Ukraine's parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, in November 2014 alongside 47 other women - making up 11.1% of the Rada's total composition. This set a record in the political history of Ukraine, along with the election of the first female Deputy Chairman of Parliament, Oksana Syroyid.

Despite this progress, the gender imbalance within the Ukrainian political framework is still evident.

"The Rada was historically created to be a man's world," Zalishchuk explains "there was one time, for example, when I had an argument with a male politician - he said very vulgar, sexist things to me."

This behaviour in the main chamber is not a rare occurrence, echoing comments made by Yanukovych during his presidential election campaign when he declared that his female opponent, Yulia Tymoshenko, should "go back to the kitchen." In April 2013 the far-right party Svoboda, then in opposition, registered a bill that would have criminalised abortion even in cases of rape. Svoboda member, Oleksandr Sych, who in February 2014 briefly became one of the vice ministers to the Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine, was widely quoted as saying that rape "cannot be proved" and that women should "lead such a lifestyle so as to not be exposed to the risk of rape. In particular, [they should not be] drinking alcoholic beverages in questionable company."

Displays of hyper masculinity and sexist prejudice towards women dominate the Ukrainian political scene. There is a tradition of fist-fighting in the main debating chamber, children are barred from the premises, and politics remains the only profession that does not allow maternity leave. Several female lawmakers have spoken out about the impossibility of juggling family duties with the pressures of political life.

But Zalishchuk is trying to change things: "Yesterday we actually registered a petition to allow children into the Rada and for the installation of a baby changing room - we are constantly lobbying for the introduction of 30% female quotas in the make up of deputies.

"We need voting reform: we need to bring more women into politics."

Throughout Ukraine's history of women's rights there has been a lack of coherency between a projected, progressive image and a deeply conservative reality - often framed by the superficiality of the propaganda of the time. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, for example, introduced female suffrage in 1917 and became the first state to legalise abortion in 1920 along with the rest of the USSR - seemingly one of the most radical regimes of the past century. Alongside it's vibrant strand of feminist literature, including the celebrated works of Marko Vovchok, Lesia Ukrainka and Olha Kobylianska, Ukraine is also the birthplace of two extremely influential and radical feminist organisations: the Ukrainian Women's Union of the 1920s and FEMEN, who tellingly, have since moved to France and abandoned their actions in Ukraine saying that they fear "for their lives and freedom".

Dafna Rachok, a gender studies expert at the Central European University, highlights this inconsistency: "Though it is sometimes stated that the USSR emancipated Ukrainian women and that the post-socialist regime pushed them back into the kitchen, there's very little evidence to support this claim. Certainly, a number of progressive changes were made in the USSR of 1920s, but some of them were later suppressed in 1930s - homosexuality, for example, was re-criminalised in 1933 and remained a criminal offence until 1991. In any case, these changes didn't really free women from the double burden of having to take on work and domestic chores. It is also unclear whether these changes were ever really understood and supported by general public."

The same discrepancy can be seen between the reputation of Ukrainian women at home, and how they are regarded internationally.  At home, women are respected as long as they are fulfilling their traditional roles as strong, moral, centre-pieces of the family and society, while just a quick Google search will reveal the depressing, foreign stereotyping of Ukrainian women: advertisements for "mail-order brides" and dating sites promising to introduce you to the "beautiful, sexy, submissive lover of your dreams" flood the results. Sex tourism continues to be a chronic issue in Ukraine - often, as Rachok mentioned, blamed on the break up of the Soviet empire, which forced women, faced with no income or opportunities, into sex work or the pursuit of richer, Western partners.

If women's current position within the public sphere is bad, aspects of the private realm are worse. The bloody conflict in Ukraine's east and Crimea has aggravated women's immediate position in society, with the majority of IDPs made up of women (66%) and children. According to recent reports, there has also been a spike in rates of domestic and sexual violence, often stemming from soldiers suffering from PTSD returning to their wives and families from the front. Displacement has also led to an increase in the number of women now turning to sex work and vulnerable to human trafficking.

Ambassador Madina Jarbussynova, OSCE Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking, elaborated on the effects of war: "experience shows that large scale and uncontrolled movement of people in a conflict situation creates a favourable environment for organised criminal activity and increases the risk that people will fall into situations of human trafficking. This includes forced participation in military activities, sexual and labour exploitation, organ removal, recruitment into criminal activity and even forced recruitment of child soldiers."

In an interview, Natalia Karbowska, Chair woman of the Ukrainian Women's Fund, explains that these problems are exacerbated by Ukraine's culture of silence.

"The main challenge with this violence is that it's still a taboo issue in Ukrainian society: everything that happens at home, stays at home."

Karbowska says that this culture was strengthened by Soviet propaganda and now, by the government's failure to act.

"Soviet society was supposed to be perfect, so imperfections and problems were talked about in private. Women never even thought you could discuss it. Today, we hear about this violence all the time - but there is no data, the government is not collecting it and ignoring it."

The economic crisis has also had a particular impact on women, whose pay is already lower than that of their male counterparts. And with the collapsing currency, they are now earning much less than before.

Despite the gravity of the situation, gender equality, and provisions for vulnerable women, is not a priority on the political agenda.

When quizzed about her feelings towards this, Zalishchuk shrugs: "It cannot be any different. There are bigger, primary challenges like reform and tackling corruption which need immediate solutions and we do not have rich resources."

Indeed, Karbowska claims that little-to-no government funding is being channelled towards women's issues.

"I saw the draft of UN Resolution 1325 - which acknowledges the disproportionate and unique impact of armed conflict on women and girls - which Ukraine recently announced it would implement. But there is 0% funding in state budget - this is an indication of lack of interest by the government. It's all words and no action..."

Karbowska hopes that the new wave of politicians will see the bigger picture - she sees political and social equality as issues of national security:

"When vulnerable women are being neglected - even by people who look and act like feminists - this means we are not living in a real democracy or a progressive society."

Despite the lack of urgency, Karbowska is still optimistic: "Every crisis is an opportunity. Women are now more visible in society: in civic society, politics, journalism and even as female soldiers. More women are making decisions, and I think this conflict has opened up opportunities for women... There are even women making reforms now - they really are proving Azarov wrong."

 [return to Contents] 

 #49
www.foreignpolicy.com
October 23, 2015
How Ukraine Is Forgetting Its Most Desperate Citizens
Life was already hard enough for those Ukrainians fleeing war in the East. But now they're even being deprived of the right to vote.
By Lolita Brayman
Lolita Brayman is a US-based immigration attorney.

As victims of persecution and war, refugees are an extremely vulnerable population - but at least they fall under an internationally recognized protected category. What about those forcibly displaced people who do not fit under this legal definition? In Ukraine, where armed conflict between the military and pro-Russian separatists in the occupied east continues despite ceasefires, massive displacement is quickly leading to a major humanitarian crisis. What's more, Ukraine's displaced people have lost not only their homes but also many of their civil rights (including, most ominously, the right to vote). This is grim news for the country's fragile democratic transition.

Here, the uprooted go by a different name. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are not, strictly speaking, refugees, because they do not cross international borders. Due to Ukraine's conflict, they have been forced to move to other parts of their home country. Since only eastern Ukraine is considered insecure or dangerous, Ukrainians are not eligible for asylum or any kind of temporary protection in the United States or Europe. Those who try to fight for this status almost inevitably lose their legal battles and are sent back home.

International standards also dictate that because IDPs remain local, it is their own state that is responsible for protecting and assisting them.

This rationale assumes that Ukraine is willing and able to take care of all of its citizens. In fact, it is struggling to do so. According to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the government's response towards its displaced population has been inadequate. Since the 2014 Euromaidan revolution, newly elected officials have been busy trying to tackle corruption and economic instability - and efforts to provide shelter and humanitarian aid for the growing population of IDPs have not kept pace. Ongoing fighting, including rocket attacks and shelling in the Donbas, has caused civilian casualties and destroyed homes and the infrastructure of many cities, leaving the government struggling to come up with substitute housing. As a result of the authorities' inability to provide services, IDPs depend on local volunteer groups and non-governmental organizations for shelter, food, medical supplies and services, and access to information.

Last October, a resolution passed by Ukraine's Ministry of Social Policy and State Emergency Services allowed IDPs to gain access - in theory - to government assistance and free housing for up to six months. But, in practice, the registration process has been disorganized and confusing. Reception centers are under-resourced and overwhelmed. Officials have informed many displaced citizens that they are not qualified to register, or have turned them away citing a limited capacity to process applications. Limits of expertise and resources are indeed a serious problem, but such failures also raise serious questions about Ukraine's political will to ensure that its democratic reforms extend to all its citizens.

Since Russia's annexation of Crimea in March 2014, over 1.4 million people have been registered as IDPs in Ukraine. Approximately 20,000 journalists, pro-Ukrainian activists, and Tatars escaped Crimea to western Ukraine because of threats, intimidation, or discrimination due to their ethnicity or political opinions. The remaining majority of IDPs fled fighting in Donetsk and Luhansk but remain concentrated in Ukrainian-controlled areas of the Donbas region. (The photo above shows a displaced mother and child in a refugee center in the eastern Ukrainian city of Slavyansk in March.)

Internal displacement is a relatively new phenomenon in Ukraine, but within a year it has become one of Kiev's biggest hidden challenges. Afraid of besmirching their country's human rights record, officials continue to downplay the severity of the situation rather than raising national awareness. The government continues to declare lower numbers of IDPs than official UN estimates. International humanitarian principles require Kiev to develop policies that minimize the problems caused by displacement. But many of the government's decisions are having the opposite effect. The country's IDPs, who have already been through so much, now find themselves politically disenfranchised as a result.

Some residents of separatist-controlled areas who might otherwise have stayed put have found themselves compelled to relocate because of misguided resolutions passed by the Cabinet of Ministers. In response to Russia's support for separatists in the Donbas, Ukraine has closed government offices and branches of the central bank, as well as halting funding for distribution of pensions in rebel-held cities. As a result, pensioners and older citizens were forced to move out of their communities and register as IDPs in Ukrainian-controlled areas in order to withdraw money and collect social services that are often their only means of subsistence. Similar "anti-terrorist" policies, which limit the delivery of humanitarian assistance in separatist-controlled areas, have also caused people to relocate for food and medical supplies. The Brookings Institution estimates that amendments to these resolutions could reduce the number of IDPs by 20 to 30 percent.

In July, Ukraine's parliament approved a law that restricts IDPs from voting in the local parliamentary elections scheduled for October 25.

IDPs are dispersed all over Ukraine, but they can register to vote only in their hometowns. The procedures to register as an IDP - or to vote - are heavily influenced by Soviet traditions, which required people to maintain internal passports. This system, known as propiska, links a person's legal status and access to social services to their registered place of residence. Since IDPs live outside of their registered homes, their documents don't allow them to vote in their new places of residence. Some officials are pushing to give IDPs voting rights based on where they currently reside. An alternative approach is to create separate polling stations in areas with many IDPs, but allow each person to vote based on their previous registration. But despite promises to create a simplified voting procedure, lawmakers haven't been able to reach a decision on how to resolve this bureaucratic hurdle.

The right to vote is one the most critical freedoms an individual has in a democracy. But with elections quickly approaching, a sizable share of the Ukrainian population - the country's most vulnerable people - have been left without a voice in a democratic process that affects their lives and ability to support or reject policies related to them.

Many IDPs are stigmatized in their host communities as Russian sympathizers, since they come mainly from the more pro-Russian east of the country. They are blamed for allegedly having welcomed Russia's invasion. And many activists believe that President Poroshenko's party is scared to let IDPs vote for precisely this reason - on the assumption that they would vote for the pro-Russian opposition rather than for Ukraine's new, pro-Western leadership. Officials rebuff these accusations, placing the blame on lawmakers and a parliamentary committee for not preparing the draft laws on time.

Ukraine faces many urgent problems, but developing legislation that helps integrate IDPs within society would boost stability and a smoother transition towards democracy. It shows a commitment to reform and helps the country tackle international criticism. Ensuring voting rights would also acknowledge the possible long-term effects of displacement, which remains unaddressed by the government causing additional tension among all citizens. Without more national recognition of the IDP situation, Ukraine's democratic revolution, which claims to uphold Western values and human rights, will have been futile.

 [return to Contents] 

 #50
Human Rights in Ukraine
http://khpg.org
October 27, 2015
Russian military intelligence officers captured in eastern Ukraine change story
By Halya Coynash
 
One of the two Russian spetsnaz officers captured in eastern Ukraine in May this year is now denying that he was a serving Russian officer, and the other, whose family has just hired a different lawyer, may be planning to do the same.   Any claim now that they were pressured by the Ukrainian authorities into giving a different account fails to explain why they freely gave the same story to OSCE representatives, a Russian journalist and to a member of Russian President Vladimir Putin's Human Rights Council.

The two men - Aleksander Aleksandrov and Yefgeny Yerofeyev were captured on May 16 near Shchastya in the Luhansk oblast.   Both were injured and Aleksandrov has undergone a serious operation which, according to the doctors, enabled them to save his leg.  They were held in a military hospital before being transferred to a SIZO or remand prison.  Their trial on charges of terrorism is to be held in the Holosiyivsky District Court in Kyiv, though no specific date appears to have been set. .   

Russia's Defence Ministry, after initial silence, claimed that the men had left the military at the end of December 2014.   The position that at least Yerofeyev has now taken - that he had left the Russian military, and was working as a free agent for the so-called 'Luhansk people's republic' ['LNR'] militia, was that pushed by Moscow, but denied by both men.  Western reports are inclined to report only Kyiv's assertion, and Moscow's counter-claim, however the men's story was clearly expressed not only in the taped questioning by Ukraine's Security Service.

They were visited in hospital on May 20 by representatives of the OSCE Monitoring Mission who point out that they spoke to them "without the presence of Ukrainian authorities".

"Both individuals claimed that they were members of a unit of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. They claimed that they were on a reconnaissance mission. They were armed but had no orders to attack. Both of them said that they came under fire, got injured and were captured on 16 May 2015 at the contact line near Shchastya. ... Both of them said they had been to Ukraine "on missions" before".

Sergei Krivenko, a well-known Russian human rights activist and member of the Human Rights Council, then spoke with them on June 1.  In his report on the visit, he stated that Sergeant Aleksandrov and Captain Yerofeyev had denied Russia's claim that they were no longer in military service and had asked for help in contacting their families as all phone numbers that they had were either blocked, or didn't answer.

He wrote that their conditions were good, and that both men categorically denied that they had been subjected to any form of torture or physical pressure, as had been claimed by Russian television.  Their main concern, he said, was that they were being prevented from contacting their families, and they were asking Krivenko and the Human Rights Council to help.

Pavel Kanygin from the Russian independent newspaper Novaya Gazeta first spoke to the men on May 22, then visited them again at the end of the month.  On the earlier occasion, he specifically mentions that he visited them after OSCE, the Red Cross, psychologists and a lawyer, and that he was able to talk to them one to one.  They expressed the same concern as to Krivenko, and in Kanygin's presence tried yet again to contact their families.  Aleksandrov was also devastated by an interview which his wife gave to TV Rosssiya 24 in which she repeated the Defence Ministry's line.

All of this was similar to other cases seen, for example, in Pskov last year, where the families of young soldiers killed in Ukraine were placed under heavy pressure to not talk to the press or even to pretend that the person is still alive.

Later in the summer Kanygin actually visited Aleksandrov's parents, who were initially antagonistic, accusing him of working for Ukraine and the USA, but then mellowed, and were grateful for the contact, albeit via an intermediary, with their son.

Russian human rights activist Zoya Svetova reported in the summer that 73-year-old Yury Soloshenko had finally been allowed to see the Ukrainian consul after being held incommunicado for almost a year.  This was as part of a deal because Moscow now needed access to the two Russians captured during a battle on Ukrainian territory.  

It was around that time that Yerofeyev was reported to have changed his stand completely.

Now Kanygin has published a new interview, this time with Konstantin Kravchuk, the Ukrainian lawyer provided by Kyiv and up till now representing Aleksandrov.  Kravchuk has just lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights, asserting that Aleksandrov should not have been transferred to a SIZO after the two months in hospital.  He will continue on that application, but says that Aleksandrov's family has hired a private lawyer Yury Hrabovsky. Asked how this will change the line of defence, Kravchuk points out that Yerofeyev is now denying all testimony given before, asserting that it was given under duress. "At the trial Yerofeyev will probably say that he is a member of the 'LNR' people's militia.  And there is a suspicion that Aleksandrov with this new lawyer will take the same line."  This, he notes, will mean that the two men will be charged with terrorism and face life sentences.

Kravchuk believes that the two men are convinced that whatever they say, they will be part of an exchange, and that this line will kill two birds with one stone: they'll drag the trial out until that exchange can be organized, and will take the line demanded by Moscow.

It is certainly easy to understand the men's dilemma.  They want to return to their families, and cannot expect to be patted on the head for emphatically asserting a position that Russia has so adamantly, if with little credibility, denied.

Kravchuk himself rubbishes the video where the men are being questioned, saying that nobody would take the testimony of a person with a serious gunshot wound in a near comatose state seriously.

This may well be true of the first few days, and indeed, as he suggests, there would be scepticism if the only testimony were on a video recorded by the Security Service.  As noted above, this is not the case here.

Ukraine's SBU, according to Kanygin, calls Yerofeyev's lawyer Oksana Sokolovskaya an "agent of the Kremlin".

Whatever the reasons, Yerofeyev is now insisting that he gave testimony "under threats to his life".  It remains to be seen what Aleksandrov with the new lawyer does.

Kravchuk;s position is to remain silent throughout, and let the investigators dig themselves into a hole.  He fairly openly suggests that all the publicity here, and in the case of Nadiya Savchenko have actually impeded a swift exchange.  He hints that Russian Major Vladimir Starkov who was caught with a truckload of ammunition and sentenced to 14 years may have already been exchanged.

The story with rumours about an exchange remains unclear, as of course, are any behind the scenes negotiations.   Russia is currently holding at least 11 Ukrainians prisoner on overtly trumped up charges, and the priority must be to obtain their release.  It is completely clear why Russia, via the consul and through other means, would have been pushing for the two intelligence officers to say that they were fighting on the militants' side on their own initiative.  It is much less obvious, if they both take this line, why they should assume that Russia would get them home.  Their experience so far, and that of other young men sent to fight in Donbas, makes any illusions difficult

 [return to Contents] 

 #51
Politico.com
October 27, 2015
EU suffers major court defeat on Ukraine sanctions
Judges rule that putting Andriy Portnov on blacklist was based on flimsy accusations.
By NICHOLAS HIRST

The General Court of the European Union on Monday annulled European sanctions against a Ukrainian oligarch, harshly criticizing the evidence relied on by European countries and delivering a blow to the bloc's fledgling sanctions regime.

The court struck down a March 2014 decision by the Council that froze the assets of Andriy Portnov and imposed an EU travel ban. The judges blasted the EU for relying solely on accusations from the Public Prosecutor's Office of Ukraine, without corroborating the charges.

The letter from the prosecutor, the court noted, failed "to provide any details concerning either the facts alleged against Mr. Portnov or his responsibility in that regard."

The ruling is more symbolic than anything because Portnov, an advisor to former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych, was removed from the sanctions list in March. Still, the consequences of the ruling could be far-reaching.

Like Portnov, other blacklisted oligarchs have appealed to EU courts, complaining they have been sanctioned solely based on a recommendation from Ukraine's public prosecutor.

One of them is Mykola Azarov, Ukraine's prime minister from 2010-2014, who has challenged his inclusion on the EU sanctions list. His lawyer, Alexander Egger of the Austrian law firm Lansky, Ganzger + partner, said the ruling will have "consequences on other pending cases" and that the EU institutions needed to "study their cases more carefully."

The EU's sanctions regime is a major plank of its efforts to contain the Russian-inspired violence in eastern Ukraine.

The judgment could strain relations between Europe and the U.S. government.

The U.S. government is "increasingly concerned about weaknesses in the European sanctions mechanism," Anthony Gardner, the U.S. ambassador to the EU, warned in July. In a speech earlier this year, Gardner expressed concern that Brussels had yet to develop "records that will withstand rigorous judicial scrutiny."

The Council had justified including Portnov on the list last year by describing him as "subject to criminal proceedings in Ukraine ... in connection with the embezzlement of Ukrainian state funds and their illegal transfer outside Ukraine." But the court concluded Portnov was at the time only the subject of a preliminary investigation.

Monday's judgment elicited praise from Oleksandr Klymenko, Yanukovych's minister for taxation, who was also included on an EU sanctions list following accusations of embezzlement. He is appealing.

The Council "has relied solely on information from the Ukrainian Prosecutor General with no transparency, no evidence, no hearings, no due process, no presumption of innocence," said Klymenko. He accused EU governments of "lending a hand to the political-cleansing of Ukraine by the current administration."

Monday's ruling is the latest in a string of defeats for the EU over sanctions. Judges have annulled sanctions leveled against Hamas, an EU-designated terrorist organization, the Tamil Tigers, a Sri Lankan militant group also listed as a terrorist organization, and, earlier this month, the Belarusian owners of Dynamo Minsk football club.

The Commission recalled that Portnov had been removed from the EU sanctions list in March and said it and the Council were "studying carefully the ruling."

"They will reflect on the options open to them and will, in due course, decide on any appropriate remedial action," said a Commission spokesperson.

 [return to Contents]