#2
The Fiscal Times
www.thefiscaltimes.com
October 19, 2015
Brookings Scholar to Vladimir Putin: Fight Me!
By Rob Garver

Washington is full of people who have issued challenges to Russian President Vladimir Putin. He's been challenged by the State Department to justify his invasion of Ukraine, and by human rights activists to excuse his country's demonization of homosexuals and the transgendered. He's been called out by the Defense Department on the Russian military's increasingly aggressive stance toward its neighbors, and by civil society activists for the repression of dissent.

Among all the challenges issued to Putin, however, the one from Benjamin Wittes, a senior fellow and research director in public law at the Brookings Institution, stands out.

Wittes has publicly, repeatedly, challenged Putin to a fight.

"It is real," he said in an interview Monday. "I am prepared to meet him mano a mano any time, any place he lacks the jurisdiction to have me arrested. Everything else is negotiable. The style, the rules. I'll work with the Kremlin on that."

Putin, as anyone who pays much attention to the news probably knows, has crafted a hyper-masculine image in Russia, regularly appearing shirtless in photographs and toting a hunting rifle or riding a horse. He puts on hockey gear and plays against former NHL stars in games where he, mysteriously, scores more goals than anyone else.

And perhaps most frequently, he appears dressed in his judogi, demonstrating his Judo technique against top-rated martial artists.

However, Wittes, who is also the editor-in-chief of the Lawfare blog, has trained as a martial artist himself, and he thinks Putin is a fraud. "He is a phony martial artist who uses these displays of masculinity as a legitimation device of his rule. If you take a close look at any of those videos, what you'll see is that he's not repelling devoted attacks. These are very short clips designed to make him look good. I can't promise that I will kick his ass, but I can promise I won't try to make him look good," Wittes says.

Wittes, who holds a second-degree black belt in Taekwondo, describes himself as "proficient but not especially high-ranking" on the scale of martial arts expertise. "I'm in my mid-40s," he said. "I sit at a desk for a living."

"People are clearly taking a fall for him," said Wittes. "I won't...If he's not prepared to fight a middle-aged legal writer of no particular distinction, maybe he should knock off the machismo."

Wittes is clearly having a little fun at Putin's expense. "When people behave in a ridiculous fashion, ridicule is a proper response," he says. He has no realistic expectation that the President of a world power will step into the ring and duke it out with him. But Wittes says he's also making a more serious point.

In a Facebook post, he wrote, "[Y]es, there is a serious side to all of this. As the great Putin biographer Fiona Hill explained recently on the Lawfare Podcast, these displays of masculinity are important to Putin's image domestically. In my opinion, they are also deeply connected to his aggression against his neighbors, his repression of dissidents, and his grotesque treatment of the LGBT community in Russia.

"So all I'm saying is this: Man up, dude! Either fight a reasonably well-trained but not especially expert middle aged martial artist in a situation in which he's actually allowed to kick your ass without fear of reprisal, or face condemnation worldwide as a wuss."

Wittes has gathered some surprisingly high profile support for his bid to mix it up with Putin. When he has tweeted about it, his remarks have been retweeted by former U.S. Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul. His Facebook post was shared by a senior state department official. And Russian chess grandmaster and noted Putin critic Garry Kasparov tweeted back to Wittes, "Good luck, but keep in mind that Putin's idea of a fair fight is having you beaten by thugs and jailed for assault!"

Wittes recently tweeted a request to Toomas Hendrik Ilves, the president of Estonia, asking if he would volunteer his country to host the match. So far, there's been no reply, either from the potential host or from Wittes' prospective opponent

[return to Contents] 

 #3
Sic Semper Tyrannis
http://turcopolier.typepad.com
October 19, 2015
A few observations by David Habakkuk
David Habakkuk lives in London, and is a former television current affairs producer. After studying economics and history at Cambridge, he lived in Mexico, and then worked on the Liverpool Daily Post newspaper and the Financial Times.  Subsequently he produced programmes for London Weekend Television and the BBC, and as an independent television producer.

A few observations. Russia has always been a land of bizarre constrasts. As Dominic Lieven has demonstrated, it did not defeat Napoleon by throwing 'more peasants at the enemy', but because its leaders outthought Napoleon. On the bicentenary of 1812, the 'Russkiy Mir' website had a tribute to Barclay de Tolly, commemorating his role as founder of Russian military intelligence. The service he created helped Barclay and Alexander I work out the kind of war that Napoleon wanted to fight, and ensure that he did not fight it. As important as the repulse of Napoleon, as Lieven brings out, was the decision by Alexander that Napoleon should not simply be pushed out of Russia, but utterly destroyed, and the spectacular feats of Russian arms in 1813-14. (See http://www.russkiymir.ru/en/publications/139713/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UzElqomAATI .)

The creation of the Red Army was the bizarre joint work of former Tsarist general staff officers, who included figures like Aleksandr Svechin, who were some of the most brilliant military minds in Europe at the time, and erstwhile agitators like Mikhail Frunze who discovered a talent for generalship. (On this, see the chapter by Jacob W. Kipp, then director of the U.S. Army's Foreign Military Studies Office, entitled 'The Origins of Soviet Operational Art, 1917-36', in the symposium 'Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art' published by the Center of Military History of the U.S. Army in 2005. See http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/070/70-89-1/cmhPub_70-89.pdf .) The role of Stalin in all this is quite incredibly mixed. On the one hand, among his many catastrophic actions, his fear of new Bonaparte made him destroy what was, apart from the German, the best command group in Europe, and replace them with inept cronies like Voroshilov and Budyonny. But the military-industrial and mobilisation machine he created - at an astronomic cost in human lives and suffering - made possible the defeat of Germany. And when push came to shove, unlike Hitler, Stalin put competent people in charge. To cut a long story short, and slide over very many complexities, the fact that the Stalinist system had worked during the war created an immense inertia. As the late great Moshe Lewin - a sometime Red Army soldier - brings out in his last work, the 2005 study 'The Soviet Century', already during Andropov's time as head of the KGB, which began in 1967, it was becoming clear to intelligent people in the Russian security services that their system was dysfunctional. Implicit here were questions about the Cold War which would gain increasing force in the years that followed. The notion that the post-war Western strategy of 'containment' was purely defensive is actually BS. Anyone who seriously believes this should read the crucial early Cold War policy papers, in particular NSC 68. Looking at it from a Russian point of view, however, the patent bankruptcy of communism has ambivalent implications.

If you conclude that the West's essential enemy was simply communism, that not only 'rollback' but 'liberation' make sense as strategies, from the point of view of Russians as much as anyone else. If however you conclude that behind the anti-communist rhetoric there is a fundamental anti-Russian agenda, the implications are quite different. In that case, people who take the West's rhetoric of 'liberation' at face value are, as we would say in England, mug punters. Equally, how one answers the question of whether the West's enemy was fundamentally communism or Russia crucially influences one's reading of what was wrong with post-war Soviet military strategy. A complacent view of Western strategy leads naturally to the view that this was simply self-destructive. A narrow military logic, which pointed to an offensive posture in Central Europe, had made enemies of people who would naturally have been friends. If however one concludes that Western emnity was either not, or only secondarily, the product of Soviet policy, all the evaluations change. Already, the process of changing evaluations was apparent with the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Far more critical, however, was the Georgian War. In its aftermath, a leading figure among the so-called 'new thinkers', Sergei Karaganov, wrote an article which began 'Curses fall from my mouth'. The 'key para' as an old English sub-editor would say (I think the American equivalent may be 'money graf'): 'At one time, during the Communist times of the weakening and decay of the USSR, members of the dissident intelligentsia and simply intellectuals were asking the strictly speculative question: what if the country throws off the stranglehold of Communist ideology and the socialist economy and becomes capitalist and free? Most believed that a free and capitalist world would welcome us with open arms. A minority of these unrestrained romantics said that a strong capitalist and economically more effective and free Russia would cause no less opposition than the Soviet Union.' And then, the sentence which lies behind everything which has happened since: 'It appears that the latter came out the ''winners'' in the argument.' (See http://topics.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/03/the-traps-of-a-cold-war/?_r=0 .)

And there was another indication, to which people had they been listening might have paid notice. In the aftermath of the Georgian attack on South Ossetia, it turned out that perhaps the most famous 'Russian' conductor in the West, Valery Gergiev, was not Russian at all: he was an Ossete. And he took his Marinsky Orchestra to Tskhinvali. As the darkness fell in front of the town hall, he played Shostakovich's Seventh Symphony. (See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gKqSTPNCsMM .) It seemed to me likely that there was an allusion intended to the evening of 9 August 1942, the day Hitler had intended would celebrate the fall of Leningrad with a lavish banquet at the city's Astoria Hotel. On that day Lieutenant-General Leonid Gorovov, the artilleryman who a key to the defence of the city, unleashed a bombardment on the German positions, so the hall could be lighted up as Karl Eliasberg conducted his half-starved orchestra. (Apparently Govorov later remarked to Eliasberg that: 'we played our instruments in the symphony too, you know'.) So, the stage was set by the Georgian War for a radical change, in which, among other things, the military again became a far more natural place for young people of energy and ability who want an adventurous and honourable profession.

 [return to Contents] 

 #4
Expert: Russia, US should seek balance of rivalry and cooperation to avoid new cold war
By Tamara Zamyatina

MOSCOW, October 19. /TASS/. Seventy years after the "cold war" term was used for the first time, the United States and Russia have failed to tap the cooperation potential that appeared 25 years ago after the end of the cold war period to promote peace, Deputy Director of the Institute of the USA and Canada at the Russian Academy of Sciences Viktor Kremenyuk told TASS on Monday.

The "cold war" expression was first used by writer George Orwell in an article published in Tribune magazine on October 19, 1945. Scientists have been arguing about the date of the cold war commencement up to now.

"Someone believes the cold war commenced with the speech by Churchill in Fulton, Missouri, on March 5, 1946, in which he urged to counter Soviet expansion in Europe. Other specialists mention the Truman doctrine and the NATO bloc created on its basis in April 1949. However, most experts regard the Berlin crisis of 1948, which played a key role in the split of Europe after its liberation from fascism, as a starting point for the commencement of the cold war," Kremenyuk said.

The expert is the author of the book "Lessons of the Cold War," recently published by the Moscow publisher Aspect Press.

Kremenyuk believes it was a historical mistake that former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and US President George H. W. Bush, who announced an end of the cold war period on Malta Island in December 1989, failed to sign a sort of a peace treaty, although Gorbachev received the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1990 even without this.

"Meanwhile, cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union and eventually Russia developed with variable success during all these years. It will suffice to recall the joint efforts for the struggle against terrorism in Afghanistan, mutual work on the Iranian nuclear program, the nuclear weapons non-proliferation and the joint exploration of outer space," the expert said.

"President of Russia Vladimir Putin and US President George W. Bush sought to develop and expand bilateral relations. In the early 2000s, the Primakov-Kissinger group was at work for three years to develop an algorithm of cooperation but failed to succeed. After that, the Ukrainian crisis and the current differences between the United States and Russia over Syria have pushed the bilateral relations decades back," Kremenyuk said.

However, the scientist categorically disagrees with the experts who say that a cold war between Russia and the West has restarted with the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis in February 2014 and the imposition of anti-Russian sanctions.

"The cold war that lasted 40 years was characterized by ideological confrontation and military stand-off and the aspiration of the USSR and the USA for supremacy in the world order. This no longer exists today, although some elements, such as mutual distrust and even animosity and the arms race that has restarted remind the events of the cold war times," the expert in American studies said.

"Similar to the situation in 1962, when US President John Kennedy and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev found the willpower to overcome the Caribbean crisis that threatened to grow into an armed stand-off between the two nuclear powers, the heads of Russia and the United States are now agreeing on the division of skies over Syria to avoid 'friendly fire' and prevent further deterioration of bilateral relations. But neither Moscow nor Washington will go for direct military confrontation over Syria," the expert said.

"At the same time, there are politicians in most countries of the world who have failed to make conclusions from the past cold war. That is why, the states' funds are spent on new generations of tanks, missiles, aircraft and submarines rather than on rescuing ill children and providing support for the elderly, building roads, schools and hospitals. Someone makes profit from this and someone builds a political career. Despite the undoubted progress of culture and knowledge, humankind continues moving along the closed circle of violence," Kremenyuk said.

"While great powers exist, there will always be rivalry among them for the spheres of influence. This is like in business where the closest partners are always on guard with each other," the expert said.

"However, in order to prevent a repeat of the cold war, Russia and the United States insistently need to strive for searching a balance between rivalry and cooperation. This is what was not achieved by John Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev, George H. W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev, and also the subsequent Russian and American leaders. Nevertheless, the balance of rivalry and cooperation has no alternative and this is what leading US and Russian scientists are saying and writing about," the expert said.

 [return to Contents]

 #5
Moskovskiy Komsomolets
October 15, 2015
Sergey Markedonov: Russia in Conflicts: Is There Logic in the Kremlin's Actions? The Country's Foreign Policy Activism Should Not Be Demonized

Russia's foreign policy activism has squeezed out domestic events in the world media environment. The international community is not particularly interested per se in "what is happening with the Russians back there." It is much more important for it to know what Russia intends to present to the world and how the country should be assessed - as an unequivocal "Evil Empire" or as a partner whose interests should at least be taken into account.

But the world community is much too elevated a level. It would be no bad thing for our country's citizens to also analyse the motives and objectives of the Russian state's foreign policy.

But it is not easy to do so.

Our activism in the Far Abroad comes on top of the country's actions in the post-Soviet area, and they are intertwined. Russia's intervention in the Middle East confrontation is the first attempt since the collapse of the USSR to influence the outcome of a conflict by military means beyond the borders of the former "unbreakable Union." But the influence of the post-Soviet factor can be felt here too. It encompasses both the recruitment of jihadists from the North Caucasus republics and the Transcaucasus and Central Asian countries into the ranks of militants in the Middle East and also the features of the internal regional and ethnic policy of Russia itself and also its neighbours.

In parallel with the attempts to resolve the Syrian headache, a search for "solutions" for the Donbass is also under way. Of course, the intensity of the armed violence in southeastern Ukraine has declined appreciably recently. In addition to "freezing" the conflict, attempts are being made to initiate a political process for settling it. As of today nobody will venture to guarantee their success with 100-per cent certainty. No peace process develops in a straight line, and nobody is guaranteed against a resumption of military confrontation or stagnation in negotiations.

The contradictions between Russia and the West over Ukraine have triggered the biggest confrontation between them since the end of the Cold War. In terms of its impact it has left the "August war" of 2008 in the Transcaucasus away behind. All of these contradictions come on top of existing unresolved ethno-political conflicts.

It is all very complicated, and one of the key roles in all the above-mentioned events belongs to Russia. This is why, I repeat, it is so important to understand whether the Kremlin has some kind of universal scheme or is operating in accordance with individual plans depending on each situation. And what is the logic of this policy, if logic actually exists here?

In for this it is necessary to look to the recent past. Until the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis Moscow's stance with regard to post-Soviet conflicts could be defined as "selective revisionism." Russia displayed a readiness to go against the opinion of the overwhelming majority of UN member countries with regard to Georgia's territorial integrity but at the same time refused to automatically apply this stance to the Dniestr region or Nagornyy Karabakh. The Russian leadership did not have a common approach to either ethno-political confrontations or de facto republics. It is possible to single out three basic Russian Federation stances.

First - its recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. After there was a change of regime in Georgia and Vladimir Putin's most problematic partner - Mikheil Saakashvili - left his post, normalizing bilateral relations became part of the Moscow and Tbilisi agenda. But Moscow restricted this process to "red lines" in the form of the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and Georgian membership of NATO.

Second - its participation in settling the Dniestr region conflict. Here Moscow's stance was based on recognizing the PMR (Dniester Moldavian Republic) as a party to the conflict but not as a separate entity and also on recognizing the Republic of Moldova's territorial integrity and neutrality and maintaining the 5+2 negotiating format (the parties to the conflict plus guarantors and intermediaries).

Third - its role in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In this area Moscow was totally ready to internationalize the process of a peace settlement. Starting from 2009, Russia's presidents, together with the heads of other intermediary states (the United States and France), invariably talked about a consensus over the so-called "Basic Principles" as the foundation for resolving the confrontation. At the same time Moscow did not recognize the NKR (Nagorno-Karabakh Republic). Having lost influence over Georgia, the Russian regime tried to find a balance between Yerevan and Baku. And both sides had an interest in Russian mediation.

All three stances were dissimilar from each other. But they were united by many things. In this way Russia was showing its objection to possible NATO expansion to include former Soviet republics and voicing its attitude towards neighbouring conflicting countries' cooperation with the European Union without taking account of Russian interests in the security sphere. The post-Soviet area was defined as a sphere of our special interests. Ukraine, the biggest CIS country after Russia, was seen as a "priority partner" and a potentially important participant in the integration projects initiated by the Russian Federation.

After this the conflict in the Donnass started to escalate. Despite that, Moscow has to this day refrained from directly recognizing the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics. Most likely Russia sees them as an instrument to exert pressure on Kiev's foreign policy course. Despite all the tenuousness of the parallels, the integration of the LNR [Luhansk People's Republic] and DNR [Donetsk People's Republic] into "mainland Ukraine" would be a kind of analogue of the Dayton agreement on Bosnia and Hercegovina. The southeast would then block Kiev's NATO ambitions and turn the "united land of Ukraine" into a state building its identity on the idea of "flight from empire."

Moscow's actions in the Ukrainian sector triggered a sociopolitical upsurge in the Dniestr region and South Ossetia. These entities were hoping for a repetition of the "Crimean scenario." The South Ossetian parliamentary elections (on 8 June 2014) were won by the United Ossetia party, which consistently advocates unification with North Ossetia under the auspices and as part of the Russian Federation. A somewhat different situation has developed in Abkhazia. Here the leadership continues to maintain an interest in building its own ethnic state reliant on a strategic alliance with the Russian Federation.

Nevertheless Moscow did not follow the path of automatically repeating the Crimean scenario. The "reunification" story has not been repeated in either South Ossetia, the Dniestr region, or - even more so - Abkhazia.

Nagornyy Karabakh, where a significant escalation of violence has been observable in the last two years, is a special case. But hitherto the Russian leadership has not fundamentally changed any of its previous approaches to a Karabakh settlement (the status of the NKR, the role of the Minsk group, and participation in it). Having good informal links with Armenia and Azerbaijan, Russia is exploiting them to maintain the current status quo.

Thus the fundamental changes in Russian-Ukrainian relations have not led to a total demolition of the Russian Federation's previous views of conflicts in other parts of the post-Soviet area. They are still determined not so much by universal schemes as by individual stances. Where Moscow senses a threat to a status quo that is advantageous for it (as was the case in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008 or in Crimea in 2014) it plays a game of exacerbating the situation and resorts to revisionist instruments. Whereas where there is still hope of maintaining the current state of affairs Moscow is in no hurry to change the rules of the game. This is the essence of Russia's logic, which is not proclaimed officially but can be easily discerned if you analyse the conflicts themselves rather than the ideological arguments surrounding them.

A conclusion follows from this. The Kremlin's principal motivation is not some kind of ideological programme or all-embracing geopolitical strategy, but a response to changing circumstances. But no matter how the Kremlin may have planned its diverse approaches, they are united by a fear of being weakened across the expanses of the former Soviet Union, which are still seen as a zone of vitally important Russian interests. That said, the main shortcoming in this very [plan for] protection (which is valid and just to a large extent) is a shortage of strategy and also the priority given to chasing after events instead of working to getting ahead of the game. In this connection the world should not demonize Russia and look for the "hand of the Kremlin" everywhere. Comprehensive consideration of the Russian Federation's interests and mutually advantageous cooperation would be much more practical.

 #6
www.rt.com
October 20, 2015
Kissinger: Let Russia defeat ISIS, its destruction more important than overthrow of Assad

Defeating Islamic State should take precedence over regime change in Syria, Henry Kissinger has argued, adding that Russia's intervention may help re-establish order in the Middle East that was once entirely dominated by the US.

"The destruction of ISIS is more urgent than the overthrow of Bashar Assad," the elderly US statesman, who served as Secretary of State to Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, wrote in the Wall Street Journal on Friday. "The current inconclusive U.S. military effort risks serving as a recruitment vehicle for ISIS as having stood up to American might."

In the commentary, titled 'A Path Out of the Middle East Collapse,' Kissinger argues the region is "in shambles" as non-state movements tear apart countries like Libya, Yemen, Syria and Iraq. He calls the so-called Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIS and ISIL) established in parts of Iraq and Syria an "unrelenting foe of established world order," seeking to replace the international system with an Islamic empire.

Though the US has dominated the region following the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Washington is now at odds with just about every party in the region and at risk of losing all ability to shape events, Kissinger warned. At issue in the Middle East today is "American resolve in understanding and mastering a new world."

Russia, he says, merely stepped into a vacuum left by the conflicting and confused US policies. Moscow's intervention in Syria is driven by geopolitical, rather than ideological concerns. Where ideology does come into play, however, is the conflict between "two rigid and apocalyptic blocs": the Shia backed by Iran, and the Sunni states such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

According to Kissinger, Iran is an imperialist power that seeks to extend its influence by backing the Assad government in Damascus, as well as non-state actors such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen. The Sunni states are pushing to overthrow Assad because they fear Iranian designs more than those of IS.

Meanwhile, Kissinger argued that the US has antagonized its allies by reaching a nuclear agreement with Iran, "widely interpreted as tacit American acquiescence in Iranian hegemony" in the Sunni Middle East.

The nuclear deal should not be compared to the US-China breakthrough in the early 1970s, he warned: While Washington and Beijing had converging objectives at the time, in particular regarding the Soviet Union, the US and Iran remain fundamentally at odds today.

While the Russian intervention "serves Iran's policy of sustaining the Shiite element in Syria," Moscow is not committed to indefinitely backing Assad, Kissinger wrote. In that sense, having the Russians defeat Islamic State without the need for overt Iranian involvement might offer a face-saving solution to the Sunni bloc, so long as the liberated territories are "restored to local Sunni rule." In this, Kissinger sees a role for Egypt, Jordan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

He suggested federalizing Syria after the defeat of IS, as that "reduces the risks of genocide or chaos leading to terrorist triumph." Washington should also be ready to have a dialogue with Tehran about Iran "returning to its role as a Westphalian state within its established borders."

The key role for the US would be to "implement the military assurances in the traditional Sunni states that the administration promised during the debate on the Iranian nuclear agreement," Kissinger wrote.

 [return to Contents]

 #7
Russian, foreign members of Valdai discussion club to meet in Sochi

SOCHI, October 20. /TASS/. Problems of war and peace are destined to become the centerpieces of discussions at the 12th session of the Valdai International Discussion Club that begins in Sochi on Tuesday.

The motto of the meeting is "War and Peace: Man, State and the Threat of a Major Conflict in the 21st Century," Alexey Mukhin, the director of the Center for Political Information said.

"The discussion will most likely center around the situation the world found itself in after an apparent informational conflict had broken out among several countries," he said. "It is important to consider the rules, to figure out the possible scenarios of future events and to bring out the patterns of extricating ourselves from this quagmire with minimal losses."

"It is clear as daylight now there's no escaping losses," Mukhin said adding the prime attention at the conference would be given to developments in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

Yaroslav Kuzminov, the vice-president of the Moscow Supreme School of Economics said the club members would give special focus to the markets of education, science and culture, which unite different countries in spite of political and economic conflicts.

"There are things that make it possible to keep up dialogue even amid a tough confrontation of interests because people remain interested in one another despite the divisions and splits existing between their nations," he said.

The meeting will have four sections 'Does the world need war?', 'Collision of realities in the epoch of total communications', 'The problems of economy in the globally interdependent world', and 'Diplomacy in the 21st century'.

Andrey Bystritsky, the chairman of the Council at the Fund for the Valdai Club Development said earlier the participants hoped for a conference with President Vladimir Putin.

"We hope Russian and foreign scholars will take part in the discussions," he said. "Also, we hope to see Sergey Ivanov, Igor Shuvalov, Sergey Lavrov, and Dmitry Peskov," he said.

All in all, the organizes hope to host some 130 participants, including almost 90 foreign experts from 62 countries and more than 40 Russian experts.
The Valdai International Discussion Club was set up in 2004. Over the eleven years that have elapsed since then, it has brought together more than 900 representatives of the global scholar community.

Participants in the sessions traditionally meet with the Russian President and other top-rank officials.

 [return to Contents]

 #8
Activists of early 1990's marking 25 years since founding Democratic Russia movement

MOSCOW, October 20. /TASS/. Political and public activists of the early 1990's are marking the 25th anniversary since the foundation of the Democratic Russia movement, which played an important role in the milestone political events from 1991 to 1993.

Human rights coordinator Lev Ponomaryov, a former cochairman of Democratic Russia told TASS the activists and founders of the organization were expected to have a gala meeting at Moscow International University.

The movement was set up on October 20/21, 1990, at a constituent congress that brought together 1,671 delegates, many of them the personalities widely acclaimed in Russia and in other republics of the former USSR. A total of 23 of them were People's Deputies (members of parliament) of the USSR and another 104, People's Deputies of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.

At the outset of its history, the Democratic Russia would gather many-thousands-strong public rallies and it was a major force that brought Boris Yeltsin to the heights of state power in Russia.

However, it started losing popularity already after the parliamentary election of 1993 and gradually withdrew backstage.

Most of its leaders either transferred to other political organizations or quitted the political scene altogether.

The currently existing parties and movements with similar names are unrelated to the original Democratic Russia.

[return to Contents] 

 #9
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
October 19, 2015
Russian military in Syria, MH17 report and Russia's "Law on Extremism"
Media roundup: Last week, the Russian media focused on the findings of the Dutch MH17 report and the escalation of Russia's Syrian campaign.
By Anastasia Borik

On Oct. 13, the Netherlands published the results of its investigation into the downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17 over Ukraine, making this the most discussed news item of the week in the Russian media. Other news stories making headlines included the escalation of the Arab-Israeli conflict and, of course, the ongoing Russian military operation in Syria.

The MH17 report

The Russian press actively discussed the published data in the MH17 report, comparing these with the results of the investigation carried out by the Russian military-industrial holding company Almaz-Antey, the company that manufactures the BUK missile systems. This holding company also presented its report on Oct. 13.

The main conclusions made by the Dutch investigators are that the Boeing was shot down by a BUK missile from a series of BUK missile systems in service in both the armed forces of Ukraine and in the separatist militias of Donbas. In addition, they found that, "The moral fault lies with Ukraine, which had failed to close its airspace to passenger airlines during the period of hostilities, as well as having, at the last moment, changed the flight path of the Boeing to a less safe one."

A columnist at the opposition newspaper Novaya Gazeta, Yulia Latynina, said that Dutch experts have uncovered an "open secret," because they submitted nothing new or sensational. The author accuses the Dutch commission of inaction, considering the "pathetic unanimity" of the common positions of the Netherlands and Almaz-Antey, which both suggest that the Boeing was shot down by a BUK missile.

"The Kremlin can break out the champagne," sums up the author, directly pointing out that the results of the Dutch investigation have vindicated Russia of any wrongdoing.

One of the writers of the business newspaper Vedomosti, Nikolai Epple, says that the findings of the investigation are neutral and have nothing to do with sensationalism; then again, the Dutch commission was not charged with such a task. The publication notes that the reference to Ukraine as the main culprit in this disaster is a very significant statement, which now has to be dealt with by the international community, together with positions on how exactly the Boeing was shot down.

The publication also notes that Russia should more actively cooperate with the investigation, to demonstrate its innocence; however, the country has not yet demonstrated such readiness.

A writer for the pro-government newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Maxim Makarychev, says that although the report does not indicate the principal perpetrators of the catastrophe, it nevertheless explains many of the technical details (which side of the aircraft was damaged, what was its probable distance from the explosion, etc.). Moreover, the publication emphasizes, the report on many issues confirmed Russia's position, as well as the conclusions reached by Almaz-Antey.

The newspaper also notes that these conclusions made by the Netherlands have obviously extremely disappointed Kiev, which continues to put forth the idea of holding and international tribunal on the Boeing incident.

The aggravation of the Arab-Israeli conflict

Last week, there was a significant worsening in the relations between the Israelis and Palestinians. After months of calm, the situation in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict zone once again escalated, and a new threat arose in the form of a civil protest started by the Palestinians (known as an intifada). As a result of 23 attacks, seven Israelis were killed and more than 70 were injured. On Oct. 15, the UN Security Council even held a meeting to discuss the recent escalation of the conflict.

Business newspaper Kommersant, with reference to Russian and foreign experts, points to serious contradictions caused by rumors about Israel's intention to stop allowing Muslims to visit the Al-Aqsa Mosque, which had provoked the unrest among the Palestinians, especially among the young people.

The newspaper notes that mutual accusations coming from leaders of the Israelis and Palestinians are clearly not conducive to reaching a settlement, and that the international community, through the UN Security Council, has not taken any concrete measures. There remains a slim hope that John Kerry, who is already planning to visit the Holy Land, will help mediate this situation.

Maxim Artemiev, writer at the independent newspaper Slon, links the aggravation of the Arab-Israeli conflict with the effects of the "Arab Spring" - many secular regimes in the Middle East have fallen, giving way to chaos and proliferation of radical Islamic groups. It is this "radical front" which has now also reached Israel - and the Islamists are actively working with Palestinian youth.

The website of the Echo of Moscow radio station published the words of the President of the Russian Jewish Congress Yuri Kanner, who believes that those Arabs living in Israel and having their representatives in the Knesset, should initiate cooperation with Israeli authorities, in order to prevent any further escalation. Their duty should be to not allow the spreading of extremism amongst the Arab population in Israel.

The Russian military operation in Syria

The ongoing Russian military operation in Syria remains a matter of controversy amongst journalists. This time, the discussions have shifted to the issue of possible cooperation between Moscow and Washington in the fight against terrorism in Syria. For now, the scenario of a sudden warming in relations between Russia and the United States, against the backdrop of operations in Syria, is highly unlikely, according to Russian media.

The tabloid Moskovsky Komsomolets believes that the United States is clearly waiting for the right moment to come to a final decision on its position on Russian operations in Syria. If these are successful, then the Americans could always put aside their differences and start working together against terrorism, but if Russia fails - then they could always say that nothing else was to be expected anyways, and that removing Russia from international isolation is still very far away.

A columnist at the opposition Novaya Gazeta, Kirill Martynov, is convinced that the operation in Syria is the Kremlin's desire to establish, finally, good relations with the West. However, this hope of the Kremlin did not materialize - instead of the lifting of sanctions and a joint fight against terrorism, Russia's moves were condemned by world leaders, who made it obvious that Russia was not fighting the right groups.

The newspaper says that this is a temporary phenomenon, and that in fact the United States and other Western countries are interested in cooperation with Russia on Syria; however, they want to get more concessions from the Kremlin on a wide range of issues.

A writer at the Echo of Moscow radio station portal, Yevgeny Kiselev, is much less optimistic in his assessment - the West categorically does not like the message that Vladimir Putin is sending about Syria, and it is not making any bones about it. World leaders have spoken out against Moscow's operation, accusing the Kremlin of supporting the Assad regime, fighting against the moderate opposition, as well as violating of the territorial integrity of neighboring states. One of the harshest critics, notes the website, has been Turkey, which just recently was considered as an ally of Russia.

Sacred texts and the "Law on Extremism"

On Oct. 15, Vladimir Putin submitted to the Russian State Duma a bill that has the potential to resonate with the Russian population - one that would protect fundamental religious writings from charges of being extremist materials. The need for this bill emerged after a major political scandal - a court on Sakhalin Island found certain passages from the Koran as being extremist materials, which led to a negative reaction from the Muslim community in Russia, and in particular, from one of the most controversial regional leaders - the head of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov.

In a dispute between the protection of religious feelings and court injunctions, the Russian president took the side of the faithful. Maria Ozerova, writer at Moskovsky Komsomolets, reminds readers that discussions about "extremism" and "extremist" have been going on for a long time in society, because their definition in the legislation is extremely vague. The newspaper notes that the new law supplements existing rules, while at the same time protecting the sacred texts of Christians, Muslims, Jews and Buddhists from possibly absurd legal attacks.

The independent-minded Slon is quite positive in assessing the initiative, considering that the "ecstasy of the struggle against extremism will at least have some limits placed on it." The newspaper notes that, of course, it will be very easy to turn even this law against anyone, anywhere - but the very logic of this proceeding is supported by the media publication.

At the business newspaper Vedomosti, they also believe that the bill will have a positive impact on the fight against extremism in Russia, but they are not sure that in real practice of law, these rules will be correctly applied. Experts at the newspaper believe that there are many pitfalls when it comes to definitively withdrawing sacred writings from the list of extremist literature.

VTB Forum "Russia Calling!"

The economic forum "Russia Calling!", organized by Russia's largest financial holding company, VTB Capital, was held last week. The Russian press was not so interested in the panel discussions that took place, or the statements made, as with the total number of major Russian company executives and government officials that were in attendance.

In particular, journalists discussed assurances that there is no economic crisis in Russia, and the appeal made by the head of one of Russia's largest companies - VTB - Andrei Kostin, to reduce credit financing to small and medium businesses.

The opposition Novaya Gazeta believes that such events can no longer cope with their main task - to reassure all economic actors, including the public, by conducting a kind of "verbal intervention." The publication says that the government is too attracted to making questionable statements and is divorced from reality. The situation with small and medium-sized businesses in Russia is already highly distressing, even without this comment, says the newspaper.

The business newspaper Kommersant focused on the speech that Vladimir Putin made at the forum, noting his obvious desire to attract foreign investors to Russia. The publication noted that Putin gave detailed answers to questions posed at the forum by foreign delegates, trying to explain the recent rather complicated economic decisions (including pension reform and issues involving the movement of capital).

The pro-government newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta leads in terms of the optimistic scenario of economic development, voiced by the Ministers of Economy and Finance. The ministers are predicting an annual growth of the GDP of 4.4 percent, as well as the presence of incentives for successful economic diversification. The publication said that, in reality, there was just one thing that top government officials said nothing about - the price of oil. On the world market, the price does not depend on Russia, and the Russian authorities are very optimistically forecasting its level at not less than $55 per barrel.

Quotes of the week:

Konstantin Kosachev, head of the International Affairs Committee of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation, on the Dutch MH17 report: "The most important (and even though this is very little, it is encouraging), is that the report made by the Dutch did not go along the path of political expectations - but rather focused on technical questions, many of which, as before, still remain unanswered. However, there remains one political issue - so what about the sanctions? Who will bear responsibility for this destructive step taken so quickly, and on the basis of unverified data, which during 15 months, even a commission of experts could not confirm? And this is the question, to which I would like to receive an answer as soon as possible."

Dmitry Medvedev, Prime Minister of Russia, on the goals of the Russian Federation in Syria:
"By the way, it does not matter to us, who will be at the helm. Do we not all wish to ensure that ISIS does not rule the Syrian Republic? Is that not right? However, this should be a civilized, legitimate government. These are the things that we need to discuss."

Ramzan Kadyrov, President of Chechnya, on the protection of sacred books from legal charges of extremism:
"Such a decision can be made only by the national leader, showing the same concern for the faithful of all religions, and enjoying the strong support of the entire multinational population of Russia."

Andrey Kostin, Head of VTB, on loans to small and medium business in Russia:
"If today's small and medium businesses are not in demand in the country, seeing that there is no level playing field for them - then what is the point of lending money to them? This will lead to an increase in bad debts. Where there is consumption, there is a demand - and there will be money, and if there is no consumption and demand - why fill the economy with cheap money?"

Opposition leader Alexei Navalny in response to Kostin's statement:
"It would be good to have only Rosneft and VTB operate in Russia. Who the hell needs the others! Then it will be possible to conduct normal business, which is 'in demand in the country'."

 [return to Contents] 

 #10
Half of Russians say toughest days for economy still ahead - poll

MOSCOW, October 20. /TASS/. Nearly half of Russians - 48% - believe that the hardest times for the country's economy are yet to come, suggests polling by the All-Russia Public Opinion Center (WCIOM) on Tuesday.

The figure is 8% higher than in July and 17% higher than in May this year.

The number of the polled who believe that the difficult time is "already over" fell from 33% in May to 19% in September. Some 23% of respondents think that Russia "is undergoing" this period now, compared with 28% in May.

WCIOM polled 1,600 Russians in 46 regions on September 26-27.

 [return to Contents] 

 #11
Wall Street Journal
October 20, 2015
Russian Economy Shows Signs of a Bottom
Capital investment, industrial production are still falling, but at slower pace
By ANDREY OSTROUKH

MOSCOW-Russia's economy contracted again in September but some data indicated a bottom may be near.

While retail sales declined more than 10% in September, capital investment and industrial production fell but at a pace slower than previous months. Capital investment, considered the second-most important economic driver after consumer spending, dropped 5.6% in September from 6.8% in August, and the decline in industrial production slowed to 3.7%, its lowest contraction since March.

"Overall, we interpret these indicators to imply that the economy is near the bottom of its cycle and that the recession will not deepen much further," Barclays Capital said in a research note. "However, they provide no indication of a speedy recovery."

Russian consumers are taking the biggest hit from the economic crisis with inflation close to 16%. The Bank of Russia, meanwhile, has to decide to cut rates now or wait for more signs of stabilization in consumer prices and the ruble exchange rate. The bank has an inflation target of 4%.

Data from the Federal Statistics Service, or Rosstat, showed that retail sales fell by 10.4% in September compared with a year ago after shrinking by 9.1% in August. In the first nine months of the year, retail sales fell by 8.5%.

"Retail sales are now falling at their sharpest pace since 1999," Capital Economics research firm said in a note to clients.

The drop comes as average real wages-which takes inflation into account-fell by 9.7% on the year in September.

The monthly report on Russia's economic conditions underscores the economic crisis, sparked by a rapid decline in oil prices and Western sanctions. The economy ministry sees gross domestic product falling by 3.9% this year, the first contraction since 2009.

But Deputy Economy Minister Alexei Vedev said the economic downturn may have reached its bottom. Though GDP fell 3.5% on the year in September, according to Rosstat, Mr. Vedev said that in seasonally adjusted terms GDP grew by 0.3% on the month.

After downgrading the 2015 economic outlook three times this year, the economy ministry is now "cautiously optimistic" about the economic prospects, Mr. Vedev said.

ING Bank said Monday it expects the Bank of Russia to cut its key rate by 50 basis points at each of the coming policy meetings from 11% now. Credit Suisse said it expects the bank to proceed with monetary easing either on Oct. 30 or in December, cutting the key rate to 10.5% by the end of the year.

 [return to Contents] 

 #12
Moscow Times
October 20, 2015
Foreign Investors Complain About Russia's Unpredictable Laws
By Peter Hobson

Unpredictable lawmaking is undermining Russia's ability to attract foreign investors, the Foreign Investment Advisory Council (FIAC) - a group of the biggest foreign companies working in Russia - told Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev on Monday.

A report by financial services group and FIAC member EY (Ernst & Young) into the group's attitudes published before the meeting welcomed progress in some areas of regulation, but said 77 percent of firms were unhappy with the unpredictability of legislative changes.

According to a document for the meeting cited by the Vedomosti business daily on Monday, foreign companies complained that the government was making unexpected decisions - like new waste disposal rules and measures to incentivize local production - without calculating side effects. Such decisions cost consumer goods makers 1.5 billion euros ($1.7 billion) last year alone, Vedomosti said.

The government has become increasingly preoccupied with "economic sovereignty" following the crisis in Ukraine last year and resulting economic sanctions. The replacement of foreign goods and services with local production has become a key priority, and is a rising topic among foreign investors, Alexander Ivlev, a managing partner at EY Russia who attended Monday's meeting, said in written comments.

EY's report gave a list of negative regulatory changes over the past year, including a law requiring companies to store data in Russia and bans on a range of food imports. One example, a law restricting media ownership by foreign companies to 20 percent, zipped through three sessions of parliament within 10 days of its appearance last fall, and has forced foreign companies including Hearst and Axel Springer to restructure or withdraw from Russia's media market.

The warning by members of FIAC came as overseas investors increasingly question whether Russia is an attractive place to do business amid a deep recession.

Sanctions and counter-sanctions between Moscow and the West following the Ukraine crisis last year and a plunge in oil prices have propelled Russian inflation, weakened the ruble, limited access to debt financing, raised interest rates and curtailed trade with other countries.

Against that backdrop, net foreign direct investment into Russia in the year to July 1 was $2.6 billion: its lowest since 2006, according to Central Bank data.

Set up in 1994 as a forum for foreign business to communicate with senior officials, FIAC has 51 member companies, of which 49 hail from Europe, North America and Japan.

Opening Monday's meeting, Medvedev struck a positive tone, saying that the combined investment in Russia of all the countries represented by member firms was $130 billion. "And it is rising, despite our current problems," he added.

He pointed to the new opportunities presented by the Eurasian Economic Union, which came into force this year and unites five former Soviet countries - Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia - offering easier access to those markets.

But sentiment among member companies was not so rosy.

"Traditional concerns that include unstable regulation and red tape have been aggravated by the unfavorable economic developments, reduced attractiveness of the Russian market, the too complicated business environment and uncertainly over the sustainability of economic measures taken by the government," the EY report read.

EY said that FIAC members - companies like Carlsberg, BP, Siemens and Ford that are among the oldest and largest investors in Russia - were unlikely to pull back from the country.

But they may not be willing to endure a downturn for ever. Global Counsel, a Britain-based advisory group, told The Financial Times on Monday that some of the biggest foreign investors in Russia could curtail their activities in the country if economic conditions did not stabilize during the coming 18 months.

According to Global Council, which analyzed the financial statements of 46 multinational groups working in Russia, the most pessimistic were banks and oil and gas firms, while health care companies were more confident. The financial and energy sectors have been targeted by Western sanctions on Russia and directly hit by the fall in the oil price and parallel devaluation of the ruble.

Russia's economy is expected to contract by around 4 percent this year, and the decline is expected to continue well into next year.

 [return to Contents] 

 #13
Business New Europe
www.bne.eu
October 19, 2015
Multinationals pessimistic on Russian market
bne IntelliNews

Large investors are pessimistic about the outlook for the Russian market, according to a report by Global Counsel, which shows that some are reducing their exposure.

Although some groups are holding their options open, and some are even seizing counter-cyclical opportunities, unless the business environment improves more groups will step back from the Russian market, the London-based strategic consultant said on October 19.

The report asks 46 of the biggest international investors on how they perceive the turbulent 18 months since the beginning of 2014, in which sanctions have been imposed, oil prices fallen and Russian policy has been volatile.

Six times as many correspondents view the Russian market negatively than those viewing it positively, making a "bleak assessment", driven by both structural and cyclical factors.

Nevertheless, there are twice as many companies committed to expanding its presence in the Russian market as those planning to reduce it. Still, the largest group of respondents are either holding still or not reporting any changes.

Across sectors, healthcare had the most optimistic assessments of the market, while the financial and the energy sectors are the most pessimistic.

While the comments on Russian policy were hard to obtain, Global Counsel notes that those collected concerned mostly the food embargo and the policies affecting the financial sector.

At the same time a number of large players are "doubling down" and expanding their operations despite the pessimistic outlook, but the authors of the report are not sure whether such strategies will be sustained, given the uncertainty stemming from the external environment and internal policy.

"The next 18 months are likely to be critical in determining whether more international investors double down or pull back from the Russian market," commented Gregor Irwing, chief economist of Global Counsel.

If the external environment does not improve then the number of foreign firms reducing their exposure to Russia is likely to increase.

While Russia has always been a tough place to do business, if often a profitable one, the combination of sanctions, low oil prices and volatile public policy is now testing the nerve of "even the most seasoned foreign investors", Irwing concludes. 

 [return to Contents] 

 #14
Interfax
October 19, 2015
Russian economic development minister says "no crisis" in Russia

There is no crisis in Russia's economy, Economic Development Minister Aleksey Ulyukayev has told veteran TV host Vladimir Pozner in the "Pozner" programme on state-controlled Channel One TV channel. His remarks were reported by privately-owned Interfax news agency on 19 October, ahead of the interview's transmission in European Russia.

"In short, I think that there is no crisis," Ulyukayev said.

This, however, does not mean that there are no problems in the economy, he added. "Today, both citizens who suffer from high prices and manufacturers who cannot find markets for their products are hurting, even bankers who unexpectedly get unrecoverable loans are hurting. But this is not the point. Crisis is when the old model of development is depreciating and a new model emerges instead, allowing one to move forward," he noted.

According to Ulyukayev, the decline in Russia's economy reached it lowest point in June and started to grow slightly in September.

"I am strongly convinced that we will not be falling any more, the question is how quickly or slowly we are going to get on our feet. For the time being, it feels like we are going to get up very slowly," he said.

Ulyukayev also noted that, in his opinion, the prime causes of the problems in Russia's economy lie in its structure, investment deficit and absence of trust between the subjects of the economy. Direct consequences of the events in Crimea and Ukraine "are ripples on water in economic sense", he added.

In response to a question about Russia's current budget, Ulyukayev said its structure was aimed at short term goals and did not solve economic development issues.

He noted, as quoted in a separate Interfax report, that the authorities had not, as required, used the eight years of high oil prices to change the structure of the economy. "We have failed to find answers to the questions raised by life on time. How did we develop during these eight years? We produced oil, oil advanced in price, the obtained resources were partly spent on economic development, partly on boosting of citizens' social standing, they showed demand in products and everything was getting along. You know, as they say, a dancer dances as long as the music plays. And now the music has stopped playing and the dancer does not know what to do because we have failed to create the mechanisms that would turn our national savings into national investment. This is our main mistake or fault, if you like," Ulyukayev said.

He went on to say that the Russian budget is focused on non-production expenses, which means that "we want to live short-term, for a day". "[We want to] fulfil today's commitments and are not ready to fulfil future obligations," Ulyukayev noted.

 [return to Contents] 

 #15
Moscow Times
October 20, 2015
Moscow's American Center Moves to U.S. Embassy From Library
By Daria Litvinova

A month after news broke about the American Center sponsored by the U.S. Embassy being shut down in Moscow's Library of Foreign Literature, the embassy announced its resurrection - this time inside the embassy.

"The American Center will continue its work at new premises in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Visitors will be offered a wide range of cultural and educational events, as well as access to print and online outlets devoted to the United States," said a statement posted Sunday on the embassy's Facebook page.

"We are developing our program calendar and preparing our new home to accommodate visitors," said a statement on the center's website.

The news that the American culture center sponsored by the U.S. Embassy in Moscow was closing down after 22 years rattled Muscovites in late September.

Ambassador John Tefft was the first to break the news in a statement published on the embassy's website, warning that the Kremlin was eroding ties that the two countries had managed to preserve even during the Cold War.

The administration of the Library of Foreign Literature said back then that the center would continue to work, and insisted that voiding the agreement with the embassy was just a technicality and that a new contract would be agreed.

The library had offered the Americans the chance to work out a "new scheme of contract relations," Vadim Duda, the library director, said at the time, adding that the library was "willing to support [the center's] activity even without financing from the American side."

When it voided the agreement with the embassy, the library eliminated the embassy's role in leading the center's activities, replaced the American director of the center, and eliminated the agreement that allowed for embassy financial support of the center and its staff, embassy spokesman Will Stevens told The Moscow Times in written comments Monday.

"The U.S. Embassy tried to negotiate with the library to continue supporting cultural and educational programs in the center and drafted a new agreement, but the library did not accept this agreement," he said.

The library canceled the agreement with the embassy just five months after the embassy had completed an extensive renovation of it, Stevens added.

"As a gesture of goodwill from the people of the United States to the people of Russia, the embassy donated to the library all of the books, materials, furnishings and much of the equipment that had been a part of the American Center," worth a total of about $500,000, he said.

Duda, the library's director, was unavailable to comment on Monday.

The library's website currently has a section devoted to the Center of American Culture. "The Center of American Culture provides library and information services and is also a space for cultural programs," the center's page on the library website says.

"The Center of American Culture dates back to 1993," it says, without mentioning any connections to the embassy.

 [return to Contents] 

 #16
Interfax
October 19, 2015
Poll: Russians blame U.S., Middle East authorities for migrants' exodus to Europe

Most Russians are favorably disposed to refugees from the Middle East and blame the authorities of the United States and Middle East countries for the migrant crisis, the Russian Public Opinion Study Center (VTsIOM) said, referring to a poll of October 10-11.

According to the poll, most respondents (86 percent) are more or less aware of the influx of Middle East migrants to EU countries. Only 12 percent have never heard about the migrant crisis, and 2 percent were undecided.

Practically half (49 percent) of respondents said the hostilities and bombardments in the migrants' home countries forced them to move. Ten percent said that people were looking for a better life, and seven percent dubbed poverty and the need to earn money as the main motivation.

In the opinion of 6 percent of respondents, U.S. aggression and political problems had caused migration of people from the Middle East to the European Union. Four percent mentioned unemployment, terrorism and the wish of migrants to save their lives.

Only 3 percent of Russians think that the migrants wish to get an allowance in European countries and to become dependents, and 1 percent said that the situation was engineered to destabilize neighboring countries. Seventeen percent found it difficult to answer the question.

Most Russians blamed the United States (36 percent) and the authorities of Middle Eastern countries (16 percent) for the exodus of Middle East residents. Nine percent pointed the finger at world politicians, and six percent put the blame on the European Union.

The respondents also mentioned ISIL and terrorists in general (5 percent), refugees themselves (2 percent), NATO, the western coalition and people who triggered that war and created an appropriate environment (1 percent) in each category. Two percent said the hostilities were the cause of the crisis. Practically a quarter (24 percent) was undecided.

The respondents were free to give an unlimited number of answers to the questions about reasons for the influx of refugees to EU countries and culprits behind the exodus from the Middle East.

Sixty-one percent of Russians said they sympathized with the refugees, and 21 percent said they did not care. Five percent said they respected the migrants, and 4 percent either liked or disliked them. Three percent condemned persons who fled their home countries, and 1 percent felt malicious joy. Five percent said they had other sentiments and 5 percent were undecided.

Twenty-nine percent of Russians said they respected countries that took in refugees. Twenty-two percent were indifferent to those countries, and 22 percent said they felt sorry for the countries that opened their borders to refugees. Eleven percent expressed their liking for countries taking in refugees, and 7 percent condemned the actions of European authorities. Four percent of respondents admitted that they disliked EU countries admitting refugees to their territories, and 2 percent felt malicious joy. Four percent gave other answers, and 8 percent were undecided.

The respondents were free to give no more than two answers to the questions about their feelings towards refugees and host countries.

The sociologists polled 1,600 persons in 132 populated localities in 46 regions.

 [return to Contents] 

 #17
Lawmaker: Russia's operation in Syria won't last long, time frames depend on results

GENEVA, October 19. /TASS/. Russia's operation in Syria will not be lingering, and its time limits will depend on the results of the fight against terrorists, speaker of Russia's Federation Council Valentina Matviyenko told a news conference on Monday.

"We do not think that the air force operations will last long, their time limits will be defined by the results of the fight against Islamic State [a terrorist group banned in Russia -TASS] and international terrorism. It is crucial to deal the final blow to this world's evil in its lair, preventing the spread of Islamic State and international terrorist groups to other countries, other regions, including Russia," she noted.

Russia's Aerospace Forces launched surgical strikes against Islamic State targets in Syria on September 30. The military operation is conducted at the request of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The Russian air group in Syria comprises more than 50 warplanes and helicopters, including Su-34 and Su-24M bombers and Su-25 fighter bombers and Su-30SM fighters. On October 7, four missile ships of the Russian Navy's Caspian Flotilla fired 26 Kalibr cruise missiles (NATO codename Sizzler) at militants' facilities in Syria. On October 8, the Syrian army passed to a large-scale offensive. The Russian Federation does not plan to take part in ground operations in Syria.

 [return to Contents] 

 #18
Moon of Alabama
www.moonofalabama.org
October 19, 2015
Why Is The U.S. Silently Bombing Syria's Electricity Network?

The Aleppo power plant is a 1,000 megawatt thermal plant in five units build by Mitsubishi Heavy Industry in 1995-1998. It is situated some 25 kilometers east of Aleppo city center.  During the fighting around Aleppo various electricity distribution stations were damaged and electricity in parts of the city has become scarce and unpredictable. But the main power station had so far not been hit.

The plant is in the hands of the Islamic State but there is an informal agreement between the government, which controls the distribution network, and those who hold the power generating station:

"[T]he agreement of understanding pertains to the division of the electricity supply between the parties, whereby ISIS will receive 60% of the quota and the Syrian regime will receive 40%."

Both sides will have some electricity and the civilian as well as fighters on both side will be better off than without electricity. No side has a motive to destroy that plant.

But last night the U.S. coalition bombed the Aleppo thermal power plant and destroyed parts of it:

"A military source told SANA that warplanes of the Washington alliance violated Syrian airspace and attacked civilian infrastructure in Mare'a, Tal Sha'er, and al-Bab in Aleppo countryside on Sunday.

"The source added that the warplanes attacked the biggest electric power plant that feeds Aleppo city, which resulted in cutting off power from most neighborhoods in Aleppo city."

Just a week ago U.S. air attacks had attacked another power station and a big distribution transformer al-Radwaniye also east of Aleppo.

The electricity generation and distribution system is civil infrastructure. It is used and useful to everyone no matter what side of the conflict. After the first U.S. attack on a power station a week ago the Russian president Putin was asked about the strikes. He called them "strange":

"On Sunday, the American aviation bombed out an electrical power plant and a transformer in Aleppo. Why have they done this? Whom have they punished there? What's the point? Nobody knows," the president said at a meeting with the Russian government members."

The Russians and the Syrians are sure that it were F-16 planes from the U.S. coalition that bombed the power infrastructure even though the coalition reports do no mention the attacks. Why are these bombings not mentioned in the U.S. coalition reports?

The U.S. claims it is only fighting the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. It accuses Russia of not only attacking ISIS even though Russia, and Putin himself, always said that ISIS is not their sole target but that supporting the Syrian government against all its enemies is the overarching aim. The Russian just snuffed out a 16 vehicle ISIS convoy. Something that the U.S. somehow never manages to do. The U.S. itself, by the way, has killed and kills some non-ISIS "moderate rebels". All its complains against the Russians are just nonsense.

But why would fighting ISIS or this or that "moderate rebel" terrorist necessitate the destruction of valuable infrastructure which serves all sides of the Syrian society?

Without the plant Aleppo city, with some 2-3 million inhabitants and refugees, as well as the surrounding areas in Aleppo governate have no electricity. The damage the U.S. bombing caused will make sure that any repair will take a long time. This will make life for people on every side of the war more unbearable and more people will leave to seek refuge in foreign countries.

Is that the purpose of the U.S. bombardment of electricity infrastructure in Syria? If not what else is this supposed to achieve?

Posted by b

 [return to Contents] 

 #19
Pubic Radio International (PRI)
October 19, 2015
The US may not like Russia's involvement in Syria, but Russians are good with it
By Charles Maynes

On Russian state television, the Russian military campaign in Syria is portrayed as one success after another - terrorists targets destroyed through precision airstrikes, the Syrian army counterattacking against ISIS, and ever new surprises up Moscow's sleeve.

While American officials have disputed the accuracy of those strikes, Vladimir Ryzhkov, a prominent opposition politician, says the Russian campaign, which began in late September, is in fact showcasing effective military reforms carried out under Putin in recent years; this is the new improved Russian army.

"Russian military officials are clearly showing the Americans that we have the same planes, the same smart bombs. We can carry out the same military campaign as you," Ryzhkov says,

And at least publicly, Russia has laid out the same objectives: To destroy the threat of ISIS and bring peace to Syria.

But the US and its Western allies suspect Putin has another goal: Propping up the government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad - Moscow's ally and best chance to reassert influence in the region.

According to western reports, Russia has been concentrating its air power on anti-Assad forces, rather than ISIS, though Putin rejects that narrative.

Speaking at a forum in Moscow a week ago, Putin accused Western leaders of having "mush for brains" when it came to their strategy against the ISIS.

"They tell us they don't want to cooperate with us and we're bombing the wrong targets," Putin said. "Well then we say give us the targets where there are only 100 percent terrorists. Again they say no. Well then we asked them to give us targets where we shouldn't  bomb. Again no answer," he added to applause.  

Recent polls suggest Russians are firmly behind Putin's airstrikes , with 70 percent backing the campaign. One pensioner in Red Square named Natalia Nikolaevna said "[President Putin] is doing everything right. He's raised Russia from its knees."            

The Kremlin says it has ruled out putting troops on the ground in Syria. Yet several prominent politicans, including Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov, have called for Russian "volunteers" to join the Syrian army in the fight against ISIS.

Such arguments are reminsicent of Russia's actions in Ukraine, where the definition of "soldier" and "volunteer" have often blurred at Moscow's convenience.

But Valentina Melnikova of the Soldiers Mothers Committee says nevermind Ukraine: The Syrian operation reminds her of what Kremlin authorities once said about the Soviet invasion of Aghanistan in the 1980s - and that decade-long war cost the lives of thousands of Soviet soldiers and nearly a million Afghans.  

"In Afghanistan, the authorities also talked initially of a campaign 'limited in scope,'" she says.

Alexey Skorobogatko was one of nearly a million Soviet soldiers who cycled through the Afghan war. "A life within a life" is how he describes two intense years at war. He says back then soldiers like him received a simple explanation:

"All countries near the Soviet Union should be pro-Soviet.  In other words, a security buffer. If Soviet soldiers didn't go into Afghanistan, then the Americans would send theirs in first."

Skorobogatko says, for now, he's withholding judgment on Russia's current Syrian campaign, but he hopes the Afghanistan experience taught Russia's leadership important lessons about the risks of foreign wars in that part of the world.   

Even if not, he adds, they can always look at what's happened to the Americans.

 [return to Contents] 

 #19a
AP
October 20, 2015
Russians support airstrikes in Syria, despite Afghan legacy
By Katherine Jacobsen

KUBINKA, Russia - A vast workshop that upgrades warplanes of the kind Russia is using in Syria is this town's lifeblood, and support for the Syria campaign is strong.

"We've extended a helping hand and that's how it should be," said 70-year-old Tamara Vlasenko, a resident of the town 65 kilometers (40 miles) outside Moscow. "Those who started the conflict will pay handsomely, as they should."

Like Vlasenko, more than 70 percent of Russians support President Vladimir Putin's decision to begin airstrikes, which Russia says are directed against the Islamic State extremist group, according to a poll from the independent Levada Center.

Although many Russians are still unsettled by the grisly and humiliating Soviet involvement in Afghanistan in the 1980s, the new foreign military campaign doesn't faze Kubinka's people.

"I don't think Syria will turn into another Afghanistan for Russia," said Tatyana Okhapkina, 43, bouncing her 7-month-old granddaughter on her lap. "I'm not too worried it will affect my grandchildren, or even my children. I really believe in our president. He knows what he is doing."

Only about 14 percent of Russians are against the airstrikes in Syria, according to the Levada Center poll, which was conducted Oct. 2-5 nationwide and has a margin of error of 3.4 percentage points.

An opposition-organized protest against the Syria campaign on Saturday in Moscow attracted about 250 people. Among them was Alexandra Bukvaryova, 29, who said she feared Syria would become a second Afghanistan.

"I am disappointed that so few people are here," said Bukvaryova, who works for a non-governmental organization. "Because our people don't understand that this will affect them. As it was said here (at the rally), their children will die in Syria. And it is not clear for what."

Russia's aerial campaign in Syria has necessitated military-to-military dialogue between Russian and the Western coalition that is running a separate campaign against IS, while simultaneously driving a wedge between the two sides. The coalition, which includes the United States and France, has accused Russia, a longtime ally of Syrian President Bashar Assad, of conducting "indiscriminate military operations against the Syrian opposition" under the pretext of eliminating terrorist threats in Syria.

Putin reaffirmed that the Russian bombing blitz against the Islamic State group and other radicals in Syria, which began Sept. 30, will continue "for the period of the Syrian troops' offensive operations against terrorists."

Around lunchtime on weekdays, the main street in Kubinka becomes animated as a stream of employees pours out of the airplane parts factory. Vasily Perets, who has worked in the factory for 30 years, said Russia's vigilance in the Middle East was necessary.

He dismissed concerns that Russia's airstrikes would prompt retaliatory terrorist acts at home, saying extremist sentiment has long been brewing.

"Haven't you seen the news about Central Asia?" he said, referring to recruits from former Soviet republics fighting for IS. "The threat is already on its way."

To buoy public support for military intervention in Syria after long decrying Western intervention, the Russian government, in tandem with the media, began presenting the distant threat of Islamic State as something more tangible for Russians: radicalized fighters returning home to Central Asia and the North Caucasus region in southern Russia.

Last week in Kazakhstan, Putin said that between 5,000 and 7,000 citizens of Russia and other former Soviet republics were fighting alongside Islamic militants.

Perets, the Kubinka factory worker, said he felt safe, but Russia "needs to destroy evil before it comes here to us."

 [return to Contents] 

 #20
www.rt.com
October 20, 2015
'West must use Russian door to resolve Syrian crisis'

With the Russian intervention in Syria, the tide is moving and now everyone wants to salvage whatever political gains they think they can, Syrian political activist Ammar Waqqaf told RT.

RT: Moscow's previous proposals to discuss the situation in Syria with the White House were ignored. Why the change of heart now?  

Ammar Waqqaf: The Russian intervention has brought some sense to everyone, in the sense that their strategy was to push the Syrian government to make as much concessions as possible via military pressure with the threat that the "regime," so to speak, could be overthrown at any moment. But the Russian intervention, and apparently a very carefully planned military offensive by the Syrian Army in parallel with the Russian intervention, has put everyone into a halt. The tide has been moving the other way around. And so everyone now wants to salvage whatever political gains they think they can. And we probably are heading to 'Geneva Version 2.' In a sense, they might think of a different sort of transition without saying "Assad must go," or this or that faction might be on the table; probably a more softened and realistic sort of transition.

RT: John Kerry is still saying that support for Syria's President Assad will fail and lead to "more bloodshed, more extremism and more jihadists." So what is there to discuss with Russia?

AW: First of all, there is a bit of a smokescreen here: the real support for the Syrian government comes from a large proportion of the Syrian people. And as long as that support is there, and I can definitely tell you that it has increased in the past few weeks. With a bit of hope and Syrian Army advances there is not going to be any solution that is imposed from the outside saying "the Syrian government must go" or "the regime must go." So, at the end of the day what they are trying to achieve is to say: "Okay, we could probably accept that, for example, President Assad stays there for a six- month period or three-year period, whatever it is, but we need to have a certain transitional body with certain powers."  And what the group of nations that are being brought to the table symbolizes is that there are regional players who may have interests and who may have spent a lot of money to destabilize the Syrian government and they need to have a say. Again, we are probably heading towards 'Geneva Version 2.'   

RT: Do you envisage Washington talking to Assad in any way to try to destroy ISIS?

AW: I don't think ISIS has ever been a measured concern or an imminent threat, so to speak, to the Americans. They just needed to contain them lest they spill over to Jordan, to Saudi Arabia. But they have been, in my understanding, and a lot of people would actually agree, they have been using ISIS to pressure the Syrian government. Whenever ISIS was going westwards, like Palmyra, even now in their... clashes that are taking place, nobody is intervening from the Western side. So I don't think talking to President Assad vis-à-vis dealing with ISIS is an issue.

They just want a political change in Syria whereby or through which they might have better influence. And they know because of their stance, because of their confrontational and adversarial stance against the Syrian government, they are not going to achieve that... by talking to President Assad, and by talking to the Syrian government which is a shame, because I think that ISIS is a real threat to everyone in the region and the Americans and their allies in the region, too, have a lot of leverage on stopping this disease, this cancer. And it's an ideology it is not a group. So, they should talk to the Syrian government and the way they see it at the moment, because they've cut all ties and there is no way back for them, they have to go through the Russian door, which is again a shame because the Syrian government is there and obviously the Russians and the Iranians are huge allies and they are standing for their own interests there. But at the end of the day, this sort of ideology needs to be engaged first hand, not through proxies.

 [return to Contents] 

 #21
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
October 20, 2015
Russia's Syria campaign is no panacea
Despite the reported success of Russia's first airstrikes against ISIS and the morale boost for the Syrian army, it remains to be seen how long the Russian campaign in Syria will be viable.
By Artem Kureev
Artem Kureev is an expert from the Moscow-based think tank "Helsinki+" that deals with protecting interests of Russians living in the Baltic countries. Kureev graduated from Saint Petersburg State University's School of International Relations.

Russia's aerial operation in Syria, ongoing since Sept. 30, has thus far been a triumph for the Russian military. The actions of Russia's pilots, the unexpected use of pinpoint cruise missiles, and the coordination with Syrian ground forces are all contrasted in the Russian press with the protracted and ineffective campaign waged by Western allies against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Greater Syria (ISIS).

The West is up in arms, so to speak, over Russia's intervention, and is reluctant to agree to even a minimal level of cooperation. Moreover, since the early days of Russia's military involvement in the Syrian civil conflict, both Moscow and the West have been engaged in a major information war.

While the Kremlin tries to demonstrate the combat readiness of its troops, most Western politicians and media continue to question Russia's involvement and chances of success. In any event, it is still too early to judge whether Russia will be able to restore stability in Syria and dislodge ISIS.

In the meantime, the contours of the parallel information war are emerging, and the seemingly illogical actions of Western and Middle Eastern politicians can also be mentioned. At the same time, the tactics of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his allies in Tehran and Moscow have become clear.

The reasons behind the timing of Russia's Syria campaign

For Moscow, direct intervention in the Syrian conflict was a forced measure. Having lost control of his country's oilfields, and without external support, Assad was doomed. Even substantial military aid from Russia and Iran was not enough to reverse the situation in which he found himself.

Even though infighting broke out among his opponents, it did not help his army regain control of many key regions. Syrian government troops suffered heavy losses and saw their territory shrink.

Although all eyes are on the flood of migrants into Europe, it should not be forgotten that even more Syrians are internally displaced in their own country, and that the Assad government has to feed about 3.5 million victims of the humanitarian catastrophe. Victory for the Syrian government will help to return at least some of them to their homes.
Also read debates: "Is there a way to reconcile interests of the US, Russia in Syria?"

Why Russia's campaign in Syria is deemed a success so far

Whenever the Russian Defense Ministry reports a success in Syria, the question arises as to how such a relatively small force can achieve this. Why was the West unable to do the same in Iraq and Syria?

The answer is simple: the West is not operating on friendly soil. In Syria, NATO has no real support. And Iraq, driven by internal strife after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, is a poor ally even when it comes to liberating its own territory.

Meanwhile, it is clear that the Russian military operation in Syria is based on data received from the intelligence agencies of Damascus and Tehran, which is also actively involved in supporting Assad militarily. In the past few months, Syrian and Iranian intelligence have gathered a vast amount of information on ISIS strongholds as well as bases and industrial enterprises under Islamist control.

What's more, Russia's allies have had time to coordinate the ground operation. Thus, in contrast to the demoralized Iraqi army, both the Syrian military and their Iranian allies from the Revolutionary Guard Corps (Tehran officially denies the latter's involvement) know precisely what (and why) they are fighting.

After several weeks of powerful air support and engagement of Russian attack aircraft in the ground operation, forces loyal to Assad are now regaining control of their country.

Another reason for Russia's aerial success is its superbly trained pilots and modern weaponry, particularly air-to-ground missiles.

The planes themselves, however, are not Russia's best. The SU-34 and the SU-30SM, whose initial involvement in the operation was not foreseen, belong to the generation of aircraft that began to be developed during the Soviet era.

For the SU-34, which is set to replace the SU-24 in the medium term, Syria is a showroom environment, since unlike other pieces of Russian aerial hardware, it has been engaged in combat only once before. [Russian Air Forces Mi-24 helicopter flying over the Hmeimim airbase. Photo: RIA]

Thus, the quality of pilot training and high-precision weaponry is one of the reasons behind the successful operation. At the same time, Russia has had an opportunity to test upgraded versions of various high-precision missiles in combat conditions and demonstrate their effectiveness to the world.

With that in mind, most experts believe that the launch of a long-range SS-N-30A Kalibr missile from the Caspian Sea was intended to show that Russian projectiles are in no way inferior to the U.S. Tomahawk, and, more importantly, to demonstrate the ability to coordinate the flight path of multiple missiles on route to a single target.

Losses will not stop the Kremlin

Despite the risks, any losses (downed aircraft or captured Russian pilots) are unlikely to halt Russia at this stage. For the time being, the operation appears to be going according to plan. The Syrian army has retaken Mansura and Lahai, is displacing militants from the suburbs of Damascus, and is preparing to storm Aleppo.

Clearly, Russia's ultimate goal is to allow Assad to regain control over at least some of Syria's oilfields and to expand the government-controlled section of the Syrian-Turkish border. That will enable Damascus to start selling oil again, something it has long been unable to do.

It should be noted that ISIS currently controls not only oil rigs, but also numerous refineries built under Assad's father. The militants sell oil products at below-market prices, exporting them by road through Turkey and other countries.

Russia's military campaign in Syria undoubtedly puts this lucrative business in jeopardy, which was even reflected in a rise in oil prices in the first half of October. However, as long as there is a chance of returning the oil facilities to Damascus, the option of bombing them is not on the table.

In any case, an attack on ISIS-held oil facilities would provoke a wave of indignation in the West, which would immediately blame Russia for causing an ecological disaster and killing civilians forced to work for ISIS to feed their families.

But the Russian military might hear such accusations anyway. After all, the Islamists would not give up their oil installations without a fight, and if forced to retreat they would surely try to blow them up. That could be followed by claims that the Russian Air Force had destroyed the infrastructure at huge cost to the environment, paving the way for the army of the "dictator Assad."

The implications of Russia's Syria campaign on the refugee crisis

One of the most serious problems for Moscow in its effort to assist Damascus is the lack of support its faces not only in the West, but also in Syria's neighbors, although one might have expected the latter to welcome any concrete steps to stabilize the situation in the region.

As noted above, not all refugees are streaming into Europe. That is a distant and expensive destination. Most have settled in Turkey, which is now home to more than 1.8 million, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Damascus, Riyadh, Ankara and Amman have all had to provide the necessities of life for millions of people.

A successful offensive by government troops in Syria could solve the main task of restoring supply lines and returning at least some of the migrants home, which would significantly relieve the burden on the Assad regime and the economies of its neighbors.

Moreover, if sending Europe-bound refugees back proves problematic, at least some of those currently in refugee camps near the Syrian border will, perhaps, be able to return home of their own accord.

According to Middle East expert and assistant professor of St. Petersburg State University Alexander Sotnichenko, in the context of the refugee crisis the position of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan seems odd, since he had previously supported the moderate Islamists in Syria, hoping to reel Damascus into Ankara's sphere of influence.

All the political groups with which Turkey has so far collaborated have effectively departed the political scene in Syria. Radical Islamists, who have already bombed Turkish cities and pose a risk to the country's wider stability, now threaten Turkey's borders. That being the case, Ankara's condemnation of Moscow and threats to freeze economic ties with Russia sound very strange, says Sotnichenko.

Russia's operation entails significant economic costs

For all that, Russia's operation is no panacea. Even if one assumes that with Moscow's support Assad can regain control over the country by military and diplomatic means within the next 12-18 months, Syria has already lost much of its industrial infrastructure, and no one knows how much more will be destroyed as the fighting goes on. Estimates of the damage done to the Syrian economy vary significantly. The Assad government tends to downplay the losses, while the opposition prefers to overstate them.

Meanwhile, the World Bank's damage assessment comes to around $170 billion. In any event, the fight to regain control of Syria will entail enormous devastation, including the destruction of refining and agricultural infrastructure.

Assad will hardly be able to restore the economy without outside assistance, primarily from Moscow and Tehran. At best, the Russian operation will restore some degree of order and stability in the war-torn areas of Syria.

It will take many years before Syrians can once again live and work in peace. Probably no more than half, if that, of those who have fled the country will go back. Most likely they will become a burden to Europe's social security system. The problem, however, is that Russia will now share the blame with Western countries for the rise in the number of refugees, regardless of its success in stabilizing the situation in Syria.

Anticipating such an outcome, Moscow was never counting on the support of Brussels and Washington anyway. Regrettably, the wellbeing of millions of Syrians, which would be much easier to ensure through cooperation, has been sacrificed on the altar of political ambitions on both sides.

 [return to Contents] 

 #22
Real News Network
http://therealnews.com
October 18, 2015
Who Are the Targets of Russian Airstrikes in Syria?
Russians claim to be targeting ISIS while United States says the strikes are hitting pro-Western rebel forces, but London Metropolitan University's Sami Ramadani says these two groups are practically one in the same

Sami Ramadani is a senior lecturer in sociology at London Metropolitan University and was a political refugee from Saddam Hussein's regime. He is a frequent contributor to the Guardian and other publications.

JESSICA DESVARIEUX, PRODUCER, TRNN: Welcome to the Real News Network. I'm Jessica Desvarieux in Baltimore.

The civil war in Syria is now in its fifth year. The UN estimates that 220,000 people have died in the war, and more than 4 million Syrians have left. But now the war seems to be at a tipping point, with Russian forces participating in a bombing campaign alongside U.S. forces waging air strikes. The Russians say that they are specifically targeting ISIS forces, while the United States says that in reality Russia's campaign is harming Western-backed so-called moderate Syrian rebel forces.

Here to help us get beyond this fog of war and make sense of all of this is our guest Sami Ramadani. He's a sociology senior lecturer at London Metropolitan University. Thanks for joining us, Sami.

SAMI RAMADANI: You're welcome.

DESVARIEUX: So Sami, let's get right into it. Is the American accusation that the Russians are only bombing non-ISIS anti-Assad forces accurate?

RAMADANI: I don't think it is, for a couple of reasons. ISIS is very anti-Russian. Amongst its fighters there are people from Chechnya and so on, and so Russia has a deep-seated animosity towards ISIS, number one. Number two, the positions that Russia is bombing in Syria are [inaud.] positions because there is cooperation on the ground between various armed groups. And the two main armed groups in Syria today, opposition armed groups, are ISIS and Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda in Syria is known as Jabhat al-Nusra, the Al-Nusra Front. And these two organizations, these two military forces, control much of the areas that are outside of government controls.

The other armed groups have become diminished, much smaller. And most of them affiliated or went into an alliance with Al-Qaeda, with Jabhat al-Nusra, and they formed a bloc called the Army of Conquest, the Jaish al-Fatah. And some of these groups have been getting direct U.S. support. And for the past six months to a year there has been a process of rehabilitation of Al-Qaeda, in Syria at least, in terms of media, media coverage, mainstream media coverage, in terms of the way Qatar and Al Jazeera TV have rehabilitated Jabhat al-Nusra. And ISIS has become, if you like, the force which we should not deal with, while really on the ground there are no more so-called moderate forces. And Russia has gone bombing all positions that are either ISIS or ISIS in cooperation with Al-Nusra Front, Al-Qaeda, and its other friendly organizations. So there are no real moderates left in this bitter, bitter war.

DESVARIEUX: So Sami, what's the immediate objective for the Russians, then, in these bombings? And do you see them standing by Assad no matter what? And if not, why not?

RAMADANI: Okay, several issues to sort out there. Number one, the immediate objective, I think, was to stop the formation of a so-called safety zone, which in practice would have been a no-fly zone and potentially a NATO war, maybe, down the line against the Syrian air force and forces. A bit like Libya, because it started with a so-called no fly zone and degenerated into a full scale, not NATO war, on Libya. A similar scenario was being pushed very strongly by regional powers, especially Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. Qatar being small but financially very significant within a Syrian context.

So Russia, if you like, feared that the United States was giving serious attention to this idea. Because the United States was cooler on that, because launching a big war on Syria has its very dangerous ramifications for the region, for Iran, for relations with Russia, and so on. But in the few months just before Russia started that attack, there were some circles in the United States suggesting that this idea is being now revived and seriously looked at. And the debate in Britain, as well, kicked off with the British government wanting to enter the fray in terms of bombing raids in Syria.

So this is, if you like, the immediacy. Secondly, Russia is a very close ally of Syria. This alliance has been going on for several decades. From the old Soviet Union days, and there's a formal treaty of friendship between Syria and the Soviet Union, then obviously Syria and the Russian Federation. And there are specific promises of military aid and cooperation in all spheres. So Syria is the only other country left with such a strong formal alliance with Russia. Russia has a naval base in Tartus, the only naval base in the Mediterranean for Russia. They have military facilities in Latakia and so on nearby.

So Russia is interested in Syria as a state. And this is often glossed over in the mainstream media, whereby it's all personalized, Assad this, Assad that. For Russia it is Syria, the Syrian state, and any future government in Syria. Russia does not want it to be turned into an enemy of Russia. So this is the strategic underlying motive of Russia.

DESVARIEUX: Okay, so Sami, let's kind of delve into the realm of predictions here, then. So what do you see transpiring, now that it seems like the war's really at a tipping point?

RAMADANI: Well, only on the military front. It's really very difficult to describe it as a tipping point, because we've gone through this before as well in the last few years, whereby Assad was predicted to fall within weeks, then months, then within a year and so on. And since this government in Syria, this regime in Syria, has got a powerful base within the military, within the national minorities, religious minorities, Christians, the middle classes of Damascus and other Syrian cities, do not sympathize with the armed opposition. So you don't have a really tottering, very weak state, which is going to disintegrate and collapse.

But certainly if Saudi Arabia and Turkey and Qatar have their way, then Syria will be open to fall to ISIS. I have very little doubt about it. It will be a big fight between ISIS and Al-Qaeda as to who will control Syria if the Syrian army is to be defeated on the ground. But I don't envisage that, really, in the immediate future. So a political settlement is very difficult to envisage in the near future.

DESVARIEUX: I was going to say, do you see a political solution, then, being the only way out of this?

RAMADANI: Political solution is the only way out of it. And if we want to look at the region itself, the two biggest stumbling blocks are Turkey and Saudi Arabia. And if you can add Qatar to that you have a triangle there, especially Saudi-Turkey, who are adamant that Syria must fall and that it should become part of the sphere of influence of Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Especially with the new king in Saudi Arabia who replaced the old king, who died in January. This new king has rebuilt relations with Turkey, with Qatar, with the Muslim Brotherhood. Quite significantly Muslim Brotherhood. Has forces in the opposition, Syrian alliance with Al-Qaeda. And Saudi Arabia has not shifted on the question of Syria.

And it seems the United States is happy to see that situation continuing, otherwise it would have put greater pressure on its allies the Saudis, Turkey, and Qatar.

DESVARIEUX: All right, Sami Ramadani joining us from London. Thank you so much for being with us.

RAMADANI: You're most welcome.

DESVARIEUX: And thank you for joining us on the Real News Network.

 [return to Contents] 

 #23
Novaya Gazeta
October 18, 2015
Kirill Martynov, Russia really 'just wants to be friends'

Russia is persistently seeking to become America's military ally in the Syrian crisis. For the moment the American elite, on the eve of elections, are putting off this issue.

Time magazine has published a big article devoted to the Syrian crisis. Simon Shuster's headline is: Russia Just Wants to Be Friends. The journalist notes that although the official reason for the military aid to al-Assad's regime from Russia is the fight against world terrorism, the real reasons for this step by Moscow should be sought "closer to home": Russia started to withdraw from the conflict in Ukraine in September.

Sceptics inside Russia, as well as the most radical observers outside the country, were not ready to agree with such assessments. In their opinion, Russia is not seeking an alliance with the West in Syria but is continuing to develop the risky militaristic and populist strategy started in Ukraine. This strategy is apparently designed to duplicate the scenario of the cold war and global confrontation with America or, at the very least, to unthinkingly and irrationally defend the regime of our "friend al-Assad", effectively against the entire world.

Both the lack of clarity over the aims of the Russian operation in Syria and the agenda suggested today by propaganda for the domestic market have encouraged such an interpretation of events.

The aim of "making peace with the West by offering it the status of ally" could, of course, never have been stated by Moscow officially, since the actual proclamation of such an aim would have made it unacceptable. Propaganda inside the Russian Federation is working with an audience roused by the war in Ukraine, and it will not be easy for us to switch from the rhetoric of a "county that is a besieged fortress".

It will have to be explained to Russians for a long time still to come that it is now not Obama but the Islamists who are our worst enemies and that everything has changed since the time of the "Kyiv junta" story. Incidentally, the "junta" has disappeared not only from the television screens but also from the minds of our fellow citizens. Internet search statistics show that the "junta" no longer exists, since approximately July.

It is now becoming more and more difficult even for consistent sceptics to deny the Kremlin's obvious aspiration to normalize relations with the West.

Russia, although it does operate independently, still seeks persistently to coordinate its actions with the forces of the Western alliance stationed in the region. In response to accusations of air attacks by "moderate rebels", Russia demands from its Western allies lists of "the correct targets" and suggests that they reach agreement on who we will definitely consider terrorists in Syria. When such a list was not presented, the Russian military conducted negotiations on at least drawing up a list of targets that it was not advisable to attack.

The first result of direct military negotiations between Russia and America was the delimitation of the air space over Syria -in order to rule out the possibility of an accidental clash. As soon as this objective had been achieved Russia immediately requested an agreement on mutual assistance and cooperation during air strikes. This proposal has so far been rejected by the Americans.

Perhaps the position of Washington, where they are not only unable to bring themselves to cooperate too openly with the Russian military but they have also refused to receive a delegation headed by Prime Minister Medvedev, has actually helped us to finally satisfy ourselves that Russian really "just wants to be friends". Russia probably did not expect such a turn of events and the Kremlin is now further softening its rhetoric in addition to seeking new contacts.

Let us stress: when President Putin apparently by accident said at the Russia Calling forum that dialogue should continue, that Russia understands the importance of such dialogue, and is willing to discuss general problems at the highest level -for example, with the help of Medvedev's special delegation -this was quite an obvious appeal for the cessation of confrontation and the start of negotiations on the entire range of problems and not only on the Syrian question.

When they encountered a refusal, the Kremlin did not interrupt the diplomatic mission -and this is significant. People there understand that they will have to talk in any event.

Medvedev gave a special interview to the Russia-1 (Rossiya 1) TV channel, in which he made a big statement: it is not fundamental for Russia that Bashar al-Assad remained in power in Syria. Russia is defending its own national interests in Syria and not specific figures, the prime minister explains.

Thus, one obstacle for continuing the negotiations was removed.

The ball is clearly in the court of "our overseas partners".

There, meanwhile, it is the campaign season, which traditionally makes it difficult for any strategic decisions to be taken by Washington. The Obama administration is not hurrying towards a high-profile and contentious rapprochement with Russia, which may be used against the Democrats in the elections. At the same time experts in America mentioned in the same article in Time by Simon Shuster are openly arguing that they will still have to accept Russia's help -due exclusively to pragmatic considerations. Without Russia as an ally in Syria, the West will not solve the problem of ISIL (a terrorist organization banned in Russia, also known as Islamic State, ISIS or IS) and in addition it will have less influence on the Kremlin's policies. This is fundamentally disadvantageous to the American political establishment and it understands this well.

The fact that Russia was no longer named among "America's main enemies" during the Democratic Party's recent campaign debates was a good sign. It seems that this conversation will be continued at a new level -at the very latest in November next year, after the next American presidential election.

 [return to Contents] 

 #24
www.news.com.au (Australia)
October 20, 2015
US contemplates failure in the Middle East as Russia rises
By Charis Chang

RUSSIA'S power play in Syria appears to be paying off with the superpower making inroads against Islamic State and other extremist groups, leaving its American rivals looking ineffective and highlighting US failures in the region.

When Russia decided to involve itself in the war in Syria, American officials accused it of "pouring gasoline on the fire" in Syria and being "unprofessional" for only giving the US an hour's notice of its intention to launch air strikes.

But just weeks later, Russia's provocative move seems to be paying off.

Professor Clive Williams of Macquarie University's Centre for Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism told news.com.au that Russia's support had helped Syrian armed forces make advances in some contested areas and "clearly it has made a difference for them".

Earlier this year, commentators were writing off the Syrian army and suggesting that the government's days were numbered.

With Russian air support, Syrians have been able to hit back against Islamic State in central and north-western regions, in a war that has stretched out for four years under the US's watch.

The US is opposed to the Syrian regime headed by brutal President Bashar al-Assad and has so far refused to help its troops, but Prof Williams said it was better for the Assad regime to be in power, than for the likely alternative of jihadist groups Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra to prevail.

"We know what Islamic State is capable of, they are obviously ruthless and clearly have an agenda to dominate other opposition groups," he said.

He said Russia's success highlighted the US's lack of strategy.

"America doesn't really have a strategy but Russia's is clear cut," he said, adding that Russia aimed to support Assad's regime and its own strategic interests.

While the US's aim was to support Iraq and counter Islamic State, Prof Williams said what it was doing "was not really making much of a difference on the ground".

This was partly because the US did not want to put American boots on the ground and was limited in what it could achieve through air strikes.

Iraqi forces backed by the US had corrupt leaders and were poorly motivated, and seemed to be militarily incapable of making advances against Islamic State.

"They rely mainly on the Kurds to do the ground fighting and they are really only interested in establishing their own state," Prof Williams said.

HAS AMERICA FAILED?

Earlier this month, US President Barack Obama admitted that his efforts to help resolve the Syria crisis had so far failed, but defended his strategy and dismissed assertions that Russian President Vladimir Putin was now the dominant world leader.

"I didn't say it was going to be done in a year," Obama said in a US 60 Minutes interview. "Syria has been a difficult problem for the entire world community. What we have not been able to do so far - and I'm the first to acknowledge this - is to change the dynamic inside of Syria."

But this week former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger argued in The Wall Street Journal that Russia's military action was the latest symptom of the "disintegration of the American role in stabilising the Middle East order".

He said the geopolitical alliances in the region were now in "shambles" and that four countries - Libya, Yemen, Syria and Iraq - had ceased to function.

"American policy has sought to straddle the motivations of all parties and is therefore on the verge of losing the ability to shape events," Kissinger wrote.

"The US is now opposed to, or at odds in some way or another with, all parties in the region: with Egypt on human rights, with Saudi Arabia over Yemen, with each of the Syrian parties over different objectives."

He said the US wanted to remove Assad but had been unwilling to generate effective political or military leverage to achieve that aim, or to put forward an alternative political structure to replace him. This had allowed Russia, Iran, Islamic State and other terrorist organisations to move into the vacuum.

When asked whether America had failed, Prof Williams said: "I don't think its strategy in the Middle East is very effective".

"It has involved itself in the war between Shia and Sunni Islam without understanding the dynamics of the situation.

"In the longer term whatever America does isn't going to be very effective."

He said the US needed to rethink its approach more generally in the Middle East, including its relationship with Israel and Saudi Arabia, and whether there was a more effective way to counter Islamic State, by supporting Iranian and Shia militia forces in Iraq, for example.

Overall if you looked at American involvement in the Middle East since the 1990s, Prof Williams said: "it has all been pretty disastrous in terms of long term outcomes".

Rather than having a clear objective, he said America seemed to "jump in" to conflicts in the Middle East and South Asia before pulling out after a few years.

"I'm not sure whether Western involvement in the Middle East against Islamic State is really the answer," Prof Williams said.

"The situation in the Middle East is complicated and I think we need to step back and think about what sort of strategic outcomes we want and how best to achieve them."

He said that America's best move to combat Islamic State could actually be to withdraw from the conflict and let regional countries sort out what is essentially a regional problem.

"If we weren't involved, Islamic State would also be less of a problem in Australia. They are attacking us at the moment because we are involved in attacking them," he said.

"We could pull out and let the Saudis and Iranians get on with it. The Saudis are fighting through proxies and so is Iran. Maybe there's not much to be gained by us from being involved in that situation."

IS RUSSIA THE REAL WINNER?

Last month Russia announced an intelligence-sharing agreement with Syria, Iran, and Iraq in their fight against Islamic State, a move The New York Times says caught US officials completely off guard.

"It was another sign," Michael Gordon wrote, that Russia "was moving ahead with a sharply different tack from that of the Obama administration in battling the Islamic State ... by assembling a rival coalition that includes Iran and the Syrian government".

On Monday, US Secretary of State John Kerry said the US would meet with Russian, Saudi and Turkish leaders to seek an end to the conflict in Syria.

Allowing Syria to become a haven for terrorist operations would not benefit any of the nations, including Russia, which would be concerned that the influence of the extremist groups could reach into Muslim regions along its southern border.

When asked whether Russia would be the winner in Syria, Prof Williams said it was in a much better position to be there in the longer term than the US.

He said Russia had been accessing a naval base in Syria since the 1970s and was there at the invitation of the Syrian regime. The naval facility in Tartus has been in use since 1971, and it was Russia's only spot in the Mediterranean where warships could stop for repairs and replenishment. This year Russia also established a forward air base nearby, in Latakia.

"It's not like they suddenly appeared on the scene to make life difficult for the Americans," Prof Williams said, adding that Russia had an enduring strategic interest in Syria.

"If it wants to be seen as a world player it needs access to foreign bases, access to the port in Syria is very important in that context."

Ultimately, he said Russia would probably be more effective against Islamic State because it had a clear mission to protect its military assets and support the Assad regime.

 [return to Contents] 

 #25
www.rt.com
October 20, 2015
Dr. Strangelove is naked
By Pepe Escobar
Pepe Escobar is the roving correspondent for Asia Times/Hong Kong, an analyst for RT and TomDispatch, and a frequent contributor to websites and radio shows ranging from the US to East Asia. Born in Brazil, he's been a foreign correspondent since 1985, and has lived in London, Paris, Milan, Los Angeles, Washington, Bangkok and Hong Kong. Even before 9/11 he specialized in covering the arc from the Middle East to Central and East Asia, with an emphasis on Big Power geopolitics and energy wars. He is the author of 'Globalistan' (Nimble Books, 2007), 'Red Zone Blues' (Nimble Books, 2007), 'Obama does Globalistan' (Nimble Books, 2009) and a contributing editor for a number of other books, including the upcoming 'Crossroads of Leadership: Globalization and the New American Century in the Obama Presidency' (Routledge). When not on the road, he alternates between Sao Paulo, New York, London, Bangkok and Hong Kong.

The whole Global South is now informed about how the Russian campaign in Syria has swiftly smashed all of 'Exceptionalistan's' elaborate plans for a "Greater Middle East."

These plans span everything from the Wolfowitz Doctrine to Dr. Zbig "Grand Chessboard" Brzezinski's categorical imperative of preventing the emergence of a strategic competitor across Eurasia.

But the subtext is even more intriguing: The Pentagon never saw it coming. And they are absolutely terrified of the inevitable consequences.

The panic was palpable, as relayed by Dr. Strangelove, sorry, NATO's top commander Gen. Philip Breedlove, a.k.a. Breedlove/hate, the man who announces every week Russia is invading Ukraine.

Although proverbially handicapped in his geopolitical analysis - Russia wants to hinder US and "coalition" operations in the region - Breedlove/hate is clearly puzzled by the new, unforeseen, intricate layers of Russia's defense network.

In his own words: "We're a little worried about another A2/AD bubble being created in the eastern Mediterranean."

In Pentagonese, A2/AD means anti-access/area denial.

Translation: a mix of surface-to-air missiles and anti-ship missiles that can be deployed to prevent any player from entering or crossing a certain area.

Breedlove/hate goes as far as to admit this is Russia's "third denial zone" around Europe. The first is in the Baltics - via the Kaliningrad base. The second - based in Crimea - covers the Black Sea. In his own words: "Their cruise missiles range the entire Black Sea, and their air defense missiles range about 40 to 50 percent of the Black Sea."

He is convinced the deployment of these "very sophisticated air defense capabilities" is not about purging Syria from the Salafi-jihadi constellation. It's about "something else."

And the point about "something else" is that the Pentagon knows it, but cannot possibly admit it publicly. Neocons and neoliberalcons at best can transform their apoplexy into vociferous demands for a mega-upgraded Pentagon budget, or to force Obama into keeping troops in Afghanistan indefinitely - as if any informed observer would doubt there would never be an exit.

Here is just a sample of how the battlefield has been completely redrawn.

But the real game-changer, once again, has been the show-stopping performance of the 26 Kalibr-NK cruise missiles launched by the Russian Caspian fleet against 11 Salafi-jihadi targets 1,500 km away, destroying them all.

Breedlove/hate cannot possibly admit the Caspian cruise "message" was directed at NATO. The Kalibr-NK flew over both Iran and Iraq, at a maximum altitude of 100 meters - not to mention speeding by a US drone.

Translation: this spells out the absolute irrelevance of all - multibillion - elaborate plans for missile defense deployed in Eastern Europe. Remember, those US missiles which would be deployed against the "Iranian threat".

NATO is also terrified that all its state-of-the-art C4i software - command, control, communications, computer, intelligence - has been totally jammed by Russian technology, all across Syria and southern Turkey. Essentially, reduced to sitting ducks. Imagine a similar, much amplified scenario in a hypothetic war on European soil over Ukraine which neocons never cease to itch for.

We have A2/AD too

No wonder these military breakthroughs translate, in terms of public opinion, into fabulous PR for Russia. Just check Putin the Hajji in Iraq. Incidentally, if one really wants to know how 'Exceptionalistan' destroyed Iraq in the first place - creating the conditions for the rise of Al-Qaeda in Iraq and then ISIS/ISIL/Daesh - might as well ditch Claire Danes in Homeland and check out: Iraq Year Zero, by Abbas Fahdel, which hits the screen in France next year.

As for the non-stop uproar in US corporate media, if this is the best  American 'Putinologists' can come up with it, the Kremlin certainly does not need enemies.

Meanwhile, in the economic front, Russian domestic oil demand is growing. What this means is Russia is slowly but surely shifting from an import economy to a manufacturing center, replacing US and EU imports, moving towards self-sufficiency and focusing on domestic credit expansion for productive investments. The military breakthroughs are a "don't mess with us" message inbuilt in a complex economic transformation process.

In addition, Chinese oil imports grew 8 percent for January through September year over year - especially in the petrochemical and transport sectors, outweighing any apparent slowdown in the use of industrial oil. Next week comes the crucial announcement of the next Chinese five-year plan. No, China is not crashing, as much as the China-Russia strategic partnership keeps expanding.

Beijing is following in close detail the "messages" sent by Russia in Syria. And don't forget that in the A2/AD department, China has its own set of messages, including the bunker-busting DF15B, the DF-16 with a 1,000 kilometer range, and the DF-21D "carrier killer" - 2,500 kilometer range and capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.

Expect many a naked lunch between Dr. Strangelove and his masters in the Beltway.

 [return to Contents] 

 #26
www.opendemocracy.net
October 19, 2015
Ummah: Islam in the post-Soviet world
oDR introduces a new series devoted to reporting and comment on Islamic life in the post-Soviet space.
Editors of OpenDemocracy Russia

The Ummah, the worldwide community of Muslims, comprises millions of members across the post-Soviet space. The inhabitants of five republics in Central Asia-Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan-have enthusiastically embraced their ancestral faith (a mean feat following seventy years of state socialism). Azerbaijan and several regions in Russia, notably the North Caucasus and Volga regions, have seen similar trends. A Pew poll in 2011 estimated Russia's Muslim population at just over 16 million people, or 11.7 per cent of Russia's total population. By 2030, this figure is expected to rise by 13 per cent.

Russia's capital alone is home to over two million Muslims, and labour migration from the periphery of the former Soviet Union has led to large Muslim communities in many of the country's regional cities. Designated as one of Russia's five 'traditional religions', Islam matters.

Yet so does the post-Soviet legacy. For many Muslims in the region, Islam can often serve as a marker of ethnic difference-as in Bashkortostan or Tatarstan-rather than a guide to daily life. The state atheism of the Soviet Union severed many links to the religious practices of the past, though certain customs and festivals such as circumcision and Muslim-origin given names persisted. Meanwhile, the post-war introduction of 'spiritual management' in the Soviet Union paved the way for institutionalised Islam.  

Pre-Soviet Islam was far from monolithic; Jadids in Central Asia and Tatarstan pioneered a new modernising approach to Islamic religious practice, while Nashqbandi Sufi orders held sway in religious communities in Chechnya and Dagestan. The institutionalised Islam of settled, agrarian populations did not hold among nomads in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, who continued to practice syncretic, pre-Islamic traditions. The last paranji, the heavy horsehair veils of Uzbek Muslim women, may have disappeared from the streets of Tashkent in the 1960s, but many Muslim women are now choosing to wear a veil: the hijab.

Indeed, the leader of Chechnya Ramzan Kadyrov has declared himself a defender of 'traditional Muslim values', instituting a public dress code for women in flagrant violation of the constitution of the Russian state to which Chechnya appears to tenuously belong. Religion, whether Orthodox Christianity or Islam, is once again a source of and object for the legitimisation of state power.

In the North Caucasus, Islam had previously served as a unifying factor against the Tsarist Russian invader, but it did not immediately emerge as a salient factor in the several conflicts that rocked the region after 1991.

Implausible thought it would now seem, the first constitution of self-declared independent Chechnya in 1992 made scant reference to any religious role in the state. Similarly, while Muslim mujahideen from Afghanistan served on the battlefields of Nagorno-Karabakh, facing Soviet-made tanks freshly painted with the occasional cross, the conflicts were largely national in nature, facilitated by the Soviet state's institutionalisation of ethnicity and allocation of resources to defined national territories. Few serious commentators would claim a religious motivation to the Nagorno-Karabakh or Chechen-Ingush conflicts, whatever the confessions of the warring sides.

In a world with rising Islamophobic sentiment, refugee crises and brutal conflict in the Middle East, attitudes to Islam-or rather Muslims-are of paramount importance in Russia. The constant flow of beatings and murders of Central Asian and Caucasian men in urban Russia during the mid-2000s was shocking (371 murders, 2006-2010). Thankfully, it seems that attitudes following two Chechen wars, a series of terrorist bombings and attacks and a rising 'patriotic' sentiment are changing for the better, with far less attacks reported-their final destination remains unclear. (For more informaton, see the Sova Center's new map of hate crimes here.)

The conflict in eastern Ukraine has propelled Russian ethnic nationalism to new heights of legitimacy in the public sphere - and in multicultural, multiconfessional Russia this is a dangerous game to play. Two of Russia's most influential regions-the autonomous republics of Chechnya and Tatarstan-have taken very different paths towards maintaining degrees of quasi-independence from Moscow since independence, despite Putin's moves to centralise. Can Russia's leaders please the nationalist sentiment they have unleashed while assuring Muslims of their continued place in a multi-ethnic society?

The shadow of Islamic State has also been cast over the Caucasus and Central Asia, although data show that-sensationalist media reports aside-radicalisation in the region has been exaggerated. Russian-speaking militants from the region are fighting with IS in Iraq and Syria, most notoriously Tarkhan Batirashvili, a Georgian Kist operating under the nom de guerre Abu Umar Al-Shishani. But beyond several figures in the IS leadership, our imaginations are free to run wild following the absence of accurate numbers on who is operating where.

In the 2000s, the US War on Terror gave leave to the region's autocrats (among other leaders) to suppress civil liberties under the guise of counter-radicalisation. It is a potent tool in the wrong hands: collective judgement of marginalised Muslim communities cannot contribute to their integration and acceptance in post-Soviet societies. Instability has also risen in Tajikistan, where Emomali Rahmon has censured Central Asia's sole remaining legal Islamic party, reneging on the peace agreements from the country's vicious civil war in the early 1990s.

While its involvement may, as our contributor Greg Forbes writes, be an attempt to 'preserve the key to the hallowed halls of international relevance', Russia's recent military engagement in the Syria has only raised the significance of Russia's ties to the wider Muslim world. With Russia's majority Sunni Muslim population, there are concerns that Putin's intervention on behalf of Assad, seen to represent the Alawite Shia, could backfire in the form of further alienation.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian state's search for its rightful place in the world- or wrongful, depending on taste-has inched towards the subaltern in the Muslim world. Azerbaijani-Russian political activist Heydar Dzhemal, for example, held a 1999 conference to call for a strategic union between Orthodox Christian and Islamic civilisations against American imperialism. A handful in the Muslim world have heeded the call. Others - given Russia's actions in Chechnya in the First and Second Chechen Wars, and more recently against the Crimean Tatars - have been less convinced. The Tatar Muslim national communist Mirsaid Sultangaliev once hoped that the Soviet Union would serve as a 'red lighthouse' for the oppressed Muslim masses of Arabia, Persia, and Turkey. It would seem that Russia must convince its own Muslim population of the veracity of its political project first.

In recent months, oDR has looked at several themes concerning the Ummah in the post-Soviet space. These have examined the Kadyrov regime's attempts to combat IS recruitment, the decline of the Caucasus Emirate with the rise of Islamic State, the place of ethnic Georgian Muslims in Georgian society, traces of the vanished Muslim communities of Armenia, and asked whether Islamic state is really in Kyrgyzstan. In 2012, we ran a series of articles on women's lives, tradition and patriarchy in the Muslim-majority regions of Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia in the Russian North Caucasus.

oDR thus takes a wider look at the Muslim community in the region in light of recent developments, published every day this week:

1) Russian journalist Nadezhda Kevorkova on the political ramifications of the reopening of Moscow's central mosque (translated and republished with kind permission of KavPolit).

2) Azerbaijani blogger and journalist Arzu Geybulla-on Islam in Azerbaijan-asks whether the Aliyev regime is playing with fire in attempting to simultaneously co-opt and repress it.

3) A Crimean Tatar journalist uncovers how Muslims on the peninsula have come to terms with the realities of Russian annexation, and the resulting schisms in Crimean Tatar Islamic institutions.

4) Researcher Inga Popovaite reflects on the need for informed CVE strategies in Georgia's Pankisi Gorge, the origin of several Chechen and Kist fighters with IS. Does sensationalist media coverage only alienate these communities and compound the problem?

5) Franco Galdini investigates the diversity of Islamic life in Kyrgyzstan, a country which has witnessed an Islamic revival since the late 1980s, before arguing vis-à-vis the extremist threat that Kyrgyzstan's weak state is the real problem facing the country.

 [return to Contents] 

 #27
Putin Regime Will Disappear Only as Result of Military Defeat Abroad, Illarionov Says
Paul Goble

Staunton, October 20 - Neither sanctions, nor international isolation nor the domestic opposition will lead to the fall of "the harshly authoritarian and semi-totalitarian regime" that is Vladimir Putin's, according to Andrey Illarionov. It was pass from the scene only "as the result of a military defeat abroad.

After such a defeat, "the chances for the replacement of the regime will increase sharply," and in support of his argument he points to a series of cases in Russian history ranging from the Time of Troubles in the early 17th century to the defeats in the Afghan and Cold wars at the end of the 20th (golos-ameriki.ru/content/fatima-tlisova-illarionov-interview/3009058.html and kasparov.ru/material.php?id=5625CFF20F6B2).

Today, the Russian analyst continues, "the level of support for the regime by Russians remains significant and the opposition has been marginalized," a reflection of the fact that regimes like Putin's "operate above all on effectively functioning mechanisms of propaganda and terror."

As long as those "machines" continue to work - "regardless of the situation of the economy, social sphere, education, health or anything else - the regime will maintain a high level of stability. Now in Russia," Illarionov continues, "both these machines work almost without any problems."

Thus, he says, "the replacement of the current Russian regime hardly will take place as a result of the crisis, a growth of social tension, a decline in the price of oil, foreign sanctions or a coup in the ruling hierarchy. The replacement of such regimes if it happens at all is the result of defeat abroad."

To a certain extent, Illarionov says, "the Kremlin regime suffered defeat both in Georgia and in Ukraine" if one compares the Kremlin's goals and what Russia achieved. "However from the point of view of a large part of the Russian population, these were not defeats," but something else entirely.

Illarionov's argument recalls those of some of the early theorists of totalitarianism who suggested that such regimes could keep themselves in power more or less indefinitely unless they were defeated in a foreign war.  Many of these later changed their minds, suggesting that economic change could force regime change as well.

But there is one more reason to be certain that the Putin regime will eventually disappear. Putin is not, despite what some of his supporters appear to think, a god; and he will not live forever.  And there seems little chance that even he can create a system that will replace him after his death with someone who will rule in just the same way he does.

 [return to Contents] 

 #28
Public Books
www.publicbooks.org
October 19, 2015
PUTIN, PATRIOTISM, AND POLITICAL APATHY
By Carine Clément
Carine Clément is a research professor at the Andrew Gagarin Center for the Study of Civil Society and Human Rights and the Faculty of Liberal Arts and Sciences at Saint Petersburg State University.

Vladimir Putin's popularity ratings among his fellow Russians are record-breaking, reaching 89 percent according to a poll conducted in June 2014 by the Levada Center. Some say the poll was rigged and call it manipulative propaganda, others lament the Russian people's incorrigible authoritarianism. Yet what if Putin quite simply enjoys the support of a large majority of the Russian population? There are several reasons for believing this may be the case. There is the revival of national pride following Russia's annexation of the Crimea; the Kremlin's firm position in the face of repeated rebukes on the part of the Western powers; the country's relative calm compared to Ukraine's instability; and unrest in Armenia and elsewhere. Next, it is widely believed that there is no real political alternative, an insight based on the reasoning that "Putin may not be ideal, but everyone else is a lot worse."

These are the central components of what I call "Putinism," a political system that is strongly centered and focused on the person of Vladimir Putin. This focus is not simply the result of the carefully orchestrated propaganda that credits Putin with every political success and blames failure on undisciplined subordinates. It is also the consequence of Russians'-including the opposition's-impression of the outsized role that Putin plays in the country's affairs. "Putinism" refers, finally, to a system of ideas and practices associated with the current government-a blend of conservatism, traditionalism, patriotism, and populism.

Research that I undertook with colleagues in 2014 on the origins and meaning of apoliticism in particular socio-professional categories3 sheds light on the logic of this political support, including that of the Russians who, in 2011-2012, marched in the mass demonstrations under the slogan "for honest elections." Some of those who had protested electoral fraud, and even professed personal "hatred" of Putin, declared in 2014 that they approved of his Crimean policy and recognized "the government's greater attention to the needs of ordinary people." Other studies4 suggest that some of those who joined the protest wave of 2011-2012 are now tired and disillusioned. The interviews abound with testimonials of the following kind: "I participated in most demonstrations, at first, but nothing happened; there were no results," and "I'm fed up with abstract slogans, protest for protest's sake, and wanted to do something concrete." Some of the erstwhile protestors have since come out publicly in favor of Putin, who, they now think, "isn't so bad." An anarchist who is an experienced and well-paid programmer and system administrator-the epitome of the anti-Putin demonstrator of 2011-2012-went so far as to declare in 2014 that "In fact, if I were in power, if I were in Putin's shoes, I'd do the same thing." Should we see this as a sign of resignation? Of fear?

Though repression has increased significantly, fear is rarely mentioned as a reason for renouncing activism. Far more than political repression, the fear of jeopardizing one's job or career is often a factor. But the crux of the problem lies in the sense of the protests' futility-the fact that they "accomplished nothing." Yet the so-called "Putin opposition" movement of 2011-2012 did in fact achieve results: in particular, they led to an easing of the requirements needed to register political parties seeking to participate in elections and a partial return to the election of regional governors, which had been abolished in 2004. A number of local elections that were widely discussed in the media also contributed to the impression that a liberalization of sorts was underway. This was particularly true of the 2013 municipal elections.

At the same time, this partial liberalization was accompanied by measures that tightened the state's grip on civil society: one law required NGOs receiving foreign funding and engaging in "political activity" to register as "foreign agents"; another penalized "propaganda promoting non-traditional sexual relations aimed at minors"; penal sanctions were introduced against public activities deemed "offensive to religious sentiments"; the repression of public demonstrations increased, legally and in practice; a law on "undesirable" foreign and international NGOs was passed; and Russia retaliated against European sanctions directed against its involvement in the eastern Ukrainian war with its own counter-sanctions. All these measures arose from the same conservative and nationalist mindset: defending Russia's "traditional values," thwarting the efforts of hostile foreign powers to destabilize the country, and proclaiming-at least at a symbolic level-the sovereignty of the Russian state.

Arbitrary Repression

The Western media and international human rights organizations speak of heightened repression in Russia. Many activists who are deemed "opponents" to Putin's regime, or threats to the "public order," have been incarcerated. Among the most well-known scandals is the Bolotnaya affair, named after the square in central Moscow where clashes between demonstrators and the police occurred on May 6, 2012, following Putin's reelection to the presidency. A total of 28 people were charged. More than a dozen remain imprisoned, including Sergei Udaltsov, the leader of the Left Front, and Alexey Gaskarov, an anti-fascist activist who had already been convicted for his participation in the campaign to save the Khimki Forest (he was later completely acquitted of those charges). Other leaders of the 2011-2012 movement who became known in the media are free but under surveillance, notably Alexei Navalny, who was placed under house arrest following his success in the elections for Moscow's town hall. The famous chess player Garry Kasparov and State Duma member Ilya Ponomarev have sought refuge abroad. The fate of another renowned anti-Putin opposition figure, Boris Nemtsov, who was assassinated near the Kremlin in February 2015, is, sadly, well known. Consequently, there remain few media celebrities who are still active in Russia, even among those involved in public opposition to Putin.

So does this all make the "Putin regime" a repressive system? Repression is not occurring on a massive scale. Many independent initiatives that are critical of current authorities still operate in broad daylight. One of the most troubling problems is that there are no clear criteria for gauging the risks involved in opposing the regime: where does the boundary lie that must not be crossed if one is to avoid persecution? This boundary, which, until recently, was perfectly clear to most people, has since disappeared amidst the increasing chaos that seems to characterize the policies pursued by Russia's political leaders.

We can distinguish between three types of repression. First is the repression of the political opposition, which is mostly symbolic and media-oriented. It is directed against leaders and well-known establishment figures. Harsher repression, resulting in actual prison sentences, is aimed at political newcomers. The goal, in this case, is most likely to discourage ordinary people from getting mixed up in politics. A third form of repression targets activists for social causes that are not directly political, but which interfere with specific financial and economic interests. The repression targeting these organizations tries to prevent them from doing harm while denying them publicity. This is especially visible in the repression of labor activists and employees who are simply trying to defend their rights.

It is hard to measure the impact of such repression on public opinion. Based on polls, it's not something most Russians worry about (only 3 percent of those polled in February 2015 considered repression to be a "major threat"). Declining living standards, rising poverty, and the economic crisis are seen as far more troubling. In a society that has abandoned the democratic illusions and the rousing, abstract slogans about human rights that it embraced in the 1990s, these priorities are not terribly surprising. This is particularly true given that the public is largely unaware of this repression and that, in some instances, it is widely supported by public opinion, as seen with the incarceration of the oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky (at least initially) and, to a lesser extent, the singers of Pussy Riot, whose irreverent behavior towards Orthodox beliefs and places of worship was denounced by many. Finally, for many Russians, if repression means avoiding instability, civil war, and blood baths, it can be tolerated.

The Roots of Putin's Support

The support that a majority of Russians offer Putin is primarily tied to jittery fears of chaos and instability, which they associate with the 1990s and the rule of the first post-Soviet president, Boris Yeltsin. Much of the population views these years as a dark period, when they concentrated on survival as factories closed, salaries went unpaid, and inflation was rampant. Yet it was precisely during these years that the media, politicians, and intellectuals preached the triumph of democracy and human rights. It is hard not to conclude that this is one of the main reasons these values have lost their legitimacy, and one finds an eagerness to challenge democracy as a system that is unjust and contemptuous of the "people."

In the 1990s, parents and grandparents skimped to feed their children even as, on television, they watched unscrupulous individuals make fortunes through small or big-time fraud. And while most of the impoverished simply did their best to work and get by, they were often mocked by the media as the "losers" of the reforms, as "maladjusted," and even as "nostalgic for bygone communism." I personally experienced this contempt for the "masses," the "people," and the "ordinary folk" while conducting my initial research in Russia between 1994 and 1999. The "ordinary folk" were hard-working and conscientious, Soviet citizens who were neither over critical nor overzealous who, in the flash of an eye, had lost their nation, their ideological compass, and their values, income, and savings. Why wouldn't these people identify with Putin's populist rhetoric, which recognizes their importance and respects and acknowledges their demand for a socially progressive state, rather than scorning their purported sense of entitlement and preference for paternalism? Why wouldn't they support patriotic discourse that finally gives them a reason to be proud of their country, which their ancestors defended, but which has since been allowed to decline?

Sufficient consideration is not always given to the traumatic character of the Soviet Union's brutal dissolution, when families suddenly found themselves strewn across different countries. Nor do we take full measure of what, for the ordinary Russian, the day-to-day experience of democracy means when it is associated with poverty and oligarchy, or of human rights when they are paired with unpaid salaries and pensions. And what is freedom of speech, which Russian intellectual and Western circles see as having experienced its golden age in the 1990s, when the voices of workers and other impoverished groups were almost never heard in public debates, other than to be belittled and scorned?

While I did not find these concerns articulated as such in my interviews from the 2000s, they are nonetheless implicit in most of the studies of groups lying beyond the political, economic, intellectual, and cultural elite. Consequently, mass support for Putin doesn't strike me as irrational, strange, or symptomatic of a "Russian" affinity for authoritarianism. To the contrary, it seems to a logical result of the social disarray and the political ostracism that afflicted most Russians in the 1990s. Whether or not this is tied to Putin himself seldom matters. He is associated with a return to economic growth and paid salaries and pensions. Thanks to him, Crimea now belongs to the Russian Federation and the wounded pride of several generations of Russians resulting from the dissolution of the Soviet Union has been healed. Thanks to him, the "ordinary citizen" and the "people who work" and "love Russia" (to quote Putin's speech at the rally held on February 23, 2012 at Luzhniki Stadium in Moscow against the "for honest elections" movement) once again have something resembling a social and political status.

In these ways, Putin's popularity is rooted in the connection between democratic disenchantment and profound social disarray. Such conditions, as Pierre Rosanvallon has explained, give rise to a demand for populism, which is Putinism's base. Putin's populism addresses the aspirations of the "little people" for greater recognition far more than the opposition's "anti-Putin" populism, which celebrates the "people" for the sole purpose of uniting the masses against the enemy that is Putin. Putin's brand of populism plays on the rejection of elites and oligarchs. It is also a form of plebiscitary democracy, in which a people becomes "the people" through the mediation of a leader. It does not correspond to the procedural democracy of the "for honest elections" campaign. Rather, this populism is a response to the crisis of democracy, in which the people, in particular the "social people," have lost their place. At the same time that it puts the people first, by becoming their spokesperson, Putinism deprives the people of their sovereignty.

An Opposition Cut Off from the People

The "opposition," whose successes and reversals of fortune are avidly followed by experts, draws support primarily in Moscow and several other major Russian cities from the highly educated upper-middle classes, intellectuals, and independent or freelance workers. Even if the image of opposition leaders is partly shaped by propaganda from pro-Kremlin media outlets, they are in fact far removed from the concerns of the "hard-working and patriotic common folk" whose interests the current regime claims to defend. Generally speaking, the opposition, which in the Western media is described as "democratic" and "liberal," is primarily focused on Putin himself. The problems that preoccupy most Russians-poverty, housing, education, and health-do not appear as priorities in the discourse of the opposition, which focuses on laying bare the corruption, "dishonesty," and "thievery" of the Putin regime.

An incident recounted to me by one of my interviewees perfectly illustrates the way in which the opposition is perceived. Lyudmila is a professor who participated in several protest marches against electoral fraud in Saint Petersburg in 2011. She spoke at length of an incident that illustrates her relationship to politics. In 2013, she joined other residents in nearby buildings who regularly walked their dogs in a local square to fight the "dog killers" who were poisoning the neighborhood's pets. They formed a committee and sent a delegation to the Municipal Council, which took several measures as a result of this meeting. But Lyudmila mostly remembers another incident. One of the "dog walkers" was a "nice" young man who was "fascinated by politics." He advised her to go to the local offices of Yabloko, one of the oldest democratic parties, now considered part of the opposition. She recalls: "I arrived at the local office. Young people, proper in every respect, were sitting around. They asked what I wanted. I explained, but all they could say was: 'Yes, of course, we see the problem. But tell us, how are we going to fight the regime?' I exclaimed: 'What regime are we fighting? I came to talk to you about a dog problem!' And the girl replied: 'I understand what you're saying, but it's a political problem. It's political. We need to show the regime that people are in revolt!' But I replied: 'Miss, thank you, but I'm not a part of your audience.' And I left. You understand. Was that about politics? No ..."

This story is symptomatic of the divide between an opposition obsessed with fighting the "regime" on the one hand, and people with everyday concerns and personal problems on the other. Alexei Navalny is probably an exception, as he is genuinely popular in Moscow. Part of this is presumably explained by electoral platform, as he emphasized problems that concern most Muscovites-corruption, transportation, and housing-as well as the large percentage of immigrants, whom Navalny, a liberal and a nationalist, wants to regulate and control more strictly than the current regime. With the exception of Navalny and perhaps a few other figures, the opposition thus reinforces as much as it counters the depoliticization of society. Even the large marches of the "for honest elections" movement, despite the fact that they were directed in part against the "current regime," were not really political demonstrations so much as a form of self-representation that declared: we're here in the street; there are lots of us; we exist. The interviews conducted by the Laboratory of Public Sociology make clear how much the protestors reject any ideological or partisan affiliation other than that of being "united against Putin."

A Paradoxical Apoliticism

As numerous studies have shown, many of the "newly mobilized" of 2011-2012 have turned to local struggles, forming groups that reflect a trajectory from the general to the particular. There is indeed another form of politicization, arising "from below" and rooted in local concerns and the realities of daily life. In this way, people come to believe in collective action and reconnect with the feeling of being able to impact their own milieu; they rediscover themselves, at least to some degree, as the agents and subjects of their own lives.

Local mobilization, which emerged beginning in 2005 during Putin's second term and under the impulse of liberal social reforms, continues to flourish. From the first stirrings of the "for honest elections" movement, large local mobilization illustrated the power of this kind of activism: in Saint Petersburg in January 2013, several demonstrations mobilized thousands of participants against the closure of a hospital for children suffering from cancerous diseases. Battles fought in Moscow sought primarily to defend schools that were in danger of being shut down or "fused" with others, and to oppose "densified" constructions (in apartment building courtyards, sports fields, and green spaces). In the Voronezh region, the residents of threatened areas have, since 2012, mobilized against a project to start mining the region's copper-nickel deposits. The movement, which has been around for over three years, attracted support from across the region and beyond, including such divergent groups as the Cossacks-who are generally more conservative and loyal to the existing order-peasants, and small business owners.

Also sprouting up across the country are "initiative groups," the most popular form of autonomous organization in Russia. They are leading struggles in the realms of housing, ecological issues, urban planning, and social and medical infrastructure. Since 2007, labor disputes are back, despite legislative reforms from the early 2000s that make strikes almost impossible to organize legally. The economic recession that began in early 2015, which resulted in lower income, salary arrears, and layoffs, led to a proliferation of conflicts, less in the form of strikes than rallies, demonstrations, petitions, road blockings, work slowdowns, and hunger strikes. Protest actions are underway throughout the country, affecting every sector, including industry and transportation but also teaching and medical employees.

Conclusion

"Putinism" is thus a distinct form of state populism that is a response to the expectations of the majority of the population who self-identify as "the people" by way of its leader. Paradoxically, it is strengthened by the political opposition, which focuses on personal attacks against Putin while neglecting the aspirations and social demands of those who are fed up with elite contempt. Support for "Putinism," as for the opposition, is a political posture that contradicts the purported apoliticism of the Russian population, even if this form of politicization is paradoxical and limited. Social mobilization "from below," even when it declares itself apolitical, is especially political when emphasizing the demand for social justice and acknowledging the agency of actors who are disinclined to self-identify as such. What limits the politicization is the narrowness of a politics that boils down to either supporting or opposing Putin, leaving little room for a political understanding of the problems of daily life that trigger such mobilization. It seems to me, however, that a (re)politicization-a recovery of cognitive, emotional, and practical bearings-has no choice but to follow the tentative paths of mobilization "from below."

Translated from the French by Michael C. Behrent.

Correction: October 19, 2015
The article has been updated to reflect the acquittal of the activist Alexey Gaskarov on charges related to his participation in the campaign to save the Khimki Forest.

 [return to Contents] 

 #29
Moscow Times
October 20, 2015
Yekaterinburg: Russia's Next Capital of Culture
By Galina Stolyarova

If you ask the average person what comes to mind when they think of Yekaterinburg, they'll probably say that it's a highly polluted industrial city and the site where the Romanov family was executed.

But the truth is quite different. This town in the Urals has established itself as a cultural and artistic destination, where music and art curators put on the kind of programs that their colleagues in Moscow and St. Petersburg would envy.

Eurasia Music Festival

The Third International Eurasia Music Festival, which was held in October, was conceived of in 2011 as a way of exploring the musical influences between East and West - a natural niche, considering the city's location on the virtual border between Europe and Asia. Held just three times so far, it has evolved into an arts event that pushes cultural boundaries and brings new meanings and energy to the word "dialogue."

This time, the event showcased arts rarely seen in Russia, such as a performance of the members of the Sufi order Al-Tariqa Al-Gazoulia (Egypt); a solo recital of the French pianist Lucas Debargue, who created a sensation at the 2015 Tchaikovsky Competition; or the concert of the European early music ensemble L'Arpeggiata, which creatively blends traditional Mediterranean songs and jazz improvisation. The festival's musical landscape covers two continents and bridges centuries, as it skillfully fuses together works of Beethoven, Bartok, Ligeti, cutting-edge modern Japanese composer Toshio Hosokawa, and contemporary Russian composer Anton Batagov.

Through diversity, the festival's concerts create a vital sense of unity between the audience and the multi-ethnic performing crowd. In this context, Eurasia becomes more than a geographic region. It is a cultural community where both the performers and the listeners belong in equal measure. Members of the Sufi order, who delivered a hypnotizing performance on Oct. 10 in the Sverdlovsk Philharmonic, were not professional musicians. The ensemble is made up of workers, doctors and writers, and the concert in Yekaterinburg was only their second public performance before a secular audience (the first one took place at the Salzburg Festspiele in July 2014). After the first half of the concert, many members of the audience found themselves nodding their heads along with the performers on stage. This ecstatic amateur performance underscored the spiritual power of music.

The festival offered up a wealth of new works. It opened on Oct. 6 with the world premiere of Anton Batagov's "I See Your Dream, You See My Dream," which was commissioned by the festival. Works of Toshio Hosokawa had their Russian premieres during the event. "What we see at this festival is way beyond the dialogue of styles or epochs. Rather, it is a dialogue between different worlds," said Yekaterina Biryukova, classical music editor with the Colta.ru cultural magazine.

Multipolar Culture

"Yekaterinburg is trying to build up a reputation as the capital of the Urals region, and this ambition is shared by both the residents and the authorities," said Gyulara Sadykh-zade, the program director of the festival. "This means that the city is creating direct connections with the outside world, bypassing Moscow. Business-wise, Yekaterinburg is already a well-established Russian city that hosts the prestigious annual industrial exhibition INNOPROM. For the city, each international arts festival is a chance to launch a spiritual dialogue with the world - something that the city needs very much."

Importantly, this vision is shared by the city's business community. Andrei Bril, chairman of the board of Korin IT& Management holding and the authorized representative of the Guild of Managers and Developers in the Yekaterinburg and Sverdlovsk region, said the city's superb and well-traveled Yekaterinburg Philharmonic Orchestra is a cultural brand in its own right, and international music festivals help promote this image.

"We are so proud of this orchestra," Bril said. "One important question that the city of Yekaterinburg is facing today is its public reputation. It is high time that Yekaterinburg moves on from its "tsar-killing image" and develops a cultural brand that has much more to do with its current achievements, in addition to the history that we can be proud of. The philharmonic orchestra is brilliant and enthusiastic. It feels a bit like having a great sports team that plays in the Champions League."

Securing funding for a festival with a large international component is a challenge, especially in the context of the plummeting ruble. "We have had to make cuts from the original program due to financial limitations. For example, in addition to the performance of Italy's RAI orchestra, we had planned to bring in Poland's Sinfonia Varsovia and the Lion Symphony Orchestra," Sadykh-zade said. "It helps that the ensembles are willing to help us find solutions. For example, the Hong Kong Youth Orchestra and the members of the Sufi order came to the festival at their own expense, and RAI managed to link the performance in Yekaterinburg with performances in Moscow and St. Petersburg, which helped lower costs."

Multisectoral Funding

Financial obstacles notwithstanding, Alexander Kolotursky, the director of Yekaterinburg Philharmonic, is nurturing a plan for the philharmonic's next big step - a brand new modern concert hall. The Yekaterinburg Philharmonic Hall has around 600 seats, and the orchestra performs to full houses all year round. During the festival the demand for the tickets is much higher, which means that many people can't get in. It is estimated that about 2.6 billion rubles is needed to build a new modern venue.

Importantly, the philharmonic has not planned to ask the Russian government for money. "We really see this project as a joint effort, and we decided to start with ourselves," Kolotursky said. So before calling for a crowd-funding campaign, the philharmonic management, staff and musicians began collecting donations among themselves. They have already raised about 800,000 rubles.

"For culture to flourish, infrastructure is essential," Sadykh-zade said. "Culture will never be spread more evenly around the country, if adequate infrastructure is not created."

Over the years, the Yekaterinburg Philharmonic has raised a dedicated audience that many classical halls can only dream about: curious, sensitive, compassionate and enthusiastic. After every concert of the Eurasia festival, the main foyer was filled with people queuing up to thank the soloists, who always come out to meet the audience; that's one of the festival's traditions. And an audience that comes to listen and learn is as admirable as the festival itself.

 [return to Contents] 

 #30
Facebook
October 19, 2015
Maidan massacre
By Ivan Katchanovski
Ivan Katchanovski teaches at the School of Political Studies and the Department of Communication at the University of Ottawa. He was Visiting Scholar at the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard University, Visiting Assistant Professor at the Department of Politics at the State University of New York at Potsdam, Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto, and Kluge Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Kluge Center at the Library of Congress. He received his Ph.D. from the School of Policy, Government, and International Affairs at George Mason University.

In her NTV interview, Olesia Zhukovska confirmed her position and the direction of her entry wound. They along with Maidan eyewitnesses cited in my APSA paper (p. 56) indicate that she was shot from the Main Post Office building, the Right Sector headquarters. This female medic "was wounded, and another protester standing in front of her was shot on Maidan itself near the Kozatsky Hotel at 11:43am. This happened during a speech by Oleh Liashko. They both were likely hit from a hunting rifle, since a single gunshot shot is heard at 1hour and 18 minutes in the live broadcast recording, which starts at 10:23am, and an expanding bullet was found in that spot. Eyewitnesses and the direction of the entry wound indicate that this shot was made from the Main Post Office building, which was occupied by the Right Sector. This shooting case attracted big attention from the Ukrainian and Western media, but like all shootings of protesters, journalists, and the police on the Independence Square, government snipers were blamed and investigation results remain undisclosed." Zhukovska even met with President of France.

I was invited to participate in this prime-time NTV program concerning the Maidan massacre. But like other such requests I declined this invitation because I did not want to participate in instrumentalization of my academic research and because now interviews to Russian media can be used to launch various political, personal or even criminal charges, as was the case with a Western Ukrainian journalist. The NTV report did not mention my research and its findings, including the Right Sector link to the Zhukovska shooting. It is noteworthy that the concern in Ukraine and the West is primarily with a political instrumentalization of the Maidan massacre in Russia and not with an incomparably more important issue of the involvement of the far right and oligarchic organizations in this mass killing, which led to seizure of power in Ukraine by them, and therefore contributed to a civil war and a conflict with Russia, and constituted one of the gravest human rights violation in independent Ukraine and contemporary Europe.

Instrumentalization of the Maidan massacre by the Ukrainian and Western media and governments is generally taken for granted even though it relies on misrepresentation of this mass killing and has much larger scale and much bigger consequences, compared to the Russian instrumentalization. Google News searchers show that not a single report has appeared in the mainstream media in the West about the recent investigation of Svoboda leaders for their involvement in the Maidan massacre. Similarly, not a single report in the Western and Ukrainian mainstream media since the Maidan massacre has linked the wounding of Zhukovska to the Right Sector.

Расстрелы на Майдане: следы палачей привели к националистам «Свободы»
На Украине снова заговорили о зимних трагических событиях на Майдане, случившихся в 2014 году. Тех, кого называют «небесной сотней», похоже,...
NTV.RU|BY АНДРЕЙ СУХАНОВ

 [return to Contents] 

 #31
Interfax-Ukraine
October 20, 2015
PGO denies that FSB was involved in Maidan shootings, calls ex-SBU chief Nalyvaichenko in for questioning
 
Prosecutor General's Office of Ukraine (PGO) has said it has no information which proves the involvement of officers of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) in the shooting of Maidan protesters during the Revolution of Dignity in response to the allegation of former chief of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) Valentyn Nalyvaichenko.

"Nalyvaichenko continues to insist that he gave the PGO all data that indicates that FSB representatives controlled snipers on Maidan. It's not the way as it is," chief of the PGO special investigations directorate Serhiy Horbatiuk said in Kyiv on Tuesday.

Horbatiuk has called Nalyvaichenko in for questioning as a witness to provide evidence to substantiate his allegation.

"In order to prevent any rumors, we are inviting Nalyvaichenko for an interrogation as a witness and then he could demonstrate and explain, with all supporting documents, where he could see the evidence," Horbatiuk said.

Still, the detectives of the Ukraine's PGO, who are investigating the Maidan events, do not exclude any versions including possible involvement of any individuals or security services in the events and this information is being verified and studied attentively, Horbatiuk revealed. "But such unsubstantiated allegations, which look like PR actions in favor of certain politicians in the first place, they by no means facilitate, but impede the investigation into the events on Maidan," he said.

However, Horbatiuk stressed that according to the information possessed by the Prosecutor General's Office of Ukraine, several officers of the Russian security services were present at the time on Kyiv's Maidan, but "for information purposes" only.

"These people arrived during December and January, received information from SBU officials in relation to current developments in Maidan. That is, their first priority of interest was the course of events, the way in which Maidan was created, how it was financed and other things concerning the protests groups: how they interacted," Horbatiuk said.

Meanwhile, the mere fact of their presence in Ukraine is not a crime for they had legally entered Ukrainian territory and legally left it, he said.

Nonetheless, a probe was launched into the fact of the handover of the information by SBU officials to Russia's FSB and a number of Ukrainian security officers were notified of suspicion. "I won't tell the details as the case is being probed by the Main Military Prosecutor's Office," Horbatiuk said.

 [return to Contents] 

 #32
Sputnik
October 20, 2015
Nuland Tries to Bend the Truth Behind Maidan Snipers Case

The Prosecutor General's Office of Ukraine (PGO) released a statement that Russia wasn't involved in the killing of Maidan protesters, Former Ukrainian Prime Minister Mykola Azarov said.

Immediately after the statement, the US Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland announced that she wants to get rid of the PGO and replace it with a new judicial institution, Azarov said.

Something fishy is going on in Ukraine right now: has Nuland decided to eliminate the PGO because it couldn't find evidence that Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officers weren't involved in the shooting of protesters during the Maidan Revolution in Kiev?

"It seems that someone is very keen on "hiding the evidence" of the investigation of killings on Maidan square," the former Prime Minister wrote on his Facebook account.

Azarov is convinced that all killings were orchestrated by leaders of the current political regime in Ukraine. That's why a proper investigation into the case of the killing of Maidan protesters by unknown snipers will never happen.

"It's unclear to me why investigators never questioned Turchinov, Pashinsky, Parubiy [all three closely involved with Ukraine's National Security and Defense Council]... It's unclear why nobody examines numerous videos that recorded the moments of the killings," Azarov continued.

Furthermore, according to Azarov, former chief of Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) Valentyn Nalyvaichenko and Minister of Internal Affairs Arsen Avakov must be held accountable for spreading false information, wrongly accusing Russia's FSB of killing Ukrainian protesters.

It was found out that the sniper fire at Maidan protesters came from the upper floors of hotel "Ukraina." One of the snipers was likely on the 11th floor of the hotel, which at that time was controlled by pro-Maidan activists. Therefore, it means that some Maidan activists were responsible for the shooting of their own comrades in the back.

The mass killing of protesters was done to bring chaos to the streets of Kiev and force ex-Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych out of office, Ukrainian journalist Igor Guzhva explained Vesti.ru.

"For a long time, Yanukovych didn't want to make concessions [to Maidan protesters], but the mass killings of protesters was what brought down Yanukovych," Guzhva explained.

The political crisis erupted in Ukraine in November 2013, when the Cabinet of Ministers announced halting the country's European integration. The so-called Maidan protests started on Kiev's central square and spread across the country, resulting in violent armed clashes between radicals and police, leading to around 100 deaths.

Following weeks of mass rallies, Ukraine underwent a regime change in February when the Ukrainian parliament backed by far-right movements ousted president Viktor Yanukovych, amended the country's constitution and scheduled early elections for May 25.

 [return to Contents] 

 #33
New York Times
October 20, 2015
Recent Quiet in Ukraine Offers Hope for a Peaceful Resolution
By CELESTINE BOHLEN

PARIS - Once Russian warplanes started bombing targets in Syria on Sept. 30, the world's attention shifted away from Ukraine, a development that in the view of some analysts may have been part of the Kremlin's calculations all along.

Whether this was the intention of President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, it is certainly true that the tenuous cease-fire in eastern Ukraine and the tense negotiations underway in Minsk, Belarus, to find a political solution are no longer in the news, not in Russia and not in the West.

When the four signatories of the agreement reached in February in Minsk held a summit meeting here in Paris on Oct. 2, the headlines were all about Syria. In fact, the leaders of France, Germany, Ukraine and Russia spent five hours talking about the future of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions now under the control of Russian-backed separatists.

None of this is entirely settled. Last week, separatist leaders pushed back the deadline for the withdrawal of weapons by another week, and negotiators are still trying to figure out how separate elections in Donetsk and Luhansk can be held under Ukrainian law, a major stumbling block.

But the guns have been silent for six weeks now, no small matter in a region where 8,000 people have died and two million have been displaced over the past 18 months.

This cease-fire may still collapse, as have others, but for now Russia seems committed to making it stick.

President Petro O. Poroshenko of Ukraine said last month that the truce effectively proves what Moscow has long denied: The separatists are under Russian control. "That's why when Putin gives an order to make a cease-fire, they do it," he said, in a Washington Post interview published on Sept. 28.

Does all this mean Russia is looking for a way out of the mess it has helped create in Ukraine? Certainly, Moscow now seems to have "dialed down" the conflict, said Dmitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center.

But Fiona Hill, director of the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution, based in Washington, prefers to call the lull in fighting a "temporary armistice," akin to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk signed before the end of World War I by the young Bolshevik government.

"It is a response to circumstances which have not been propitious for Putin," she said in an interview. Other analysts, both in Russia and in the West, have also concluded that Russia's aggression in eastern Ukraine is regarded by the Kremlin as a disappointment, if not an outright failure.

The local population did not prove to be as enthusiastic as the Crimeans about either joining Russia or declaring independence; the Ukrainian Army put up a better fight than expected; and despite Moscow's best efforts, the United States and the European Union have remained united in imposing economic sanctions against Russia.

"It didn't go as planned," Ms. Hill said. "It has been costly in terms of resources, and the sanctions have clearly hurt."

Russia's gamble in Syria did not prompt its decision to take a step back in Ukraine, but, Ms. Hill said, "it didn't hurt that Putin had another card to play."

"He's hedging his bets," she said. But, she added, this is not a sign that Russia has abandoned its goals in Ukraine: The country remains fragile, and Moscow's grip on the Crimean Peninsula seems unshakable, no small factor in Russia's newly-flexed geostrategic reach.

Still, the recent quiet on the Ukrainian front offers some hope for a resolution in Minsk, not by the December deadline but maybe in 2016.

So far, the negotiations have inched forward at an awkward, painful rate, causing public debate only in Kiev, but the next few months will be crucial.

 [return to Contents] 

#34
Swiss federalization experience useful for Ukraine - Naryshkin

GENEVA. Oct 19 (Interfax) - Russian State Duma Speaker Sergei Naryshkin has said it would be useful for Kyiv to familiarize itself with Switzerland's experience as a federal republic.

"It seems to me that the experience of state-building in Switzerland would be useful for our Ukrainian colleagues as well. At least they could learn not to be afraid of this word, the term 'federalization' and not to pursue some of their citizens, not to prosecute them in the criminal sense of this word for having once uttered this word," Naryshkin said.

He said that during his working visit to Geneva he is planning to hold a number of meetings in the Swiss parliament on Tuesday.
 

 [return to Contents] 

 #35
Ukraine completes first stage of withdrawal of tanks from contact line in Donbas

KIEV, October 20. /TASS/. Ukrainian forces have completed the first stage of withdrawing tanks in the Artemivsk direction in the Donetsk Region, Ukrainian governmental press service said on Tuesday.

"Ukrainian Armed Forces completed withdrawal in the Artemivsk direction. This is the first stage of tank withdrawal by ATO [Kiev's military operation in east Ukraine] forces in accordance with the Minsk Agreements," the press service added noting that artillery and mortars are planned to be withdrawn as well soon.

"OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] mission representatives have verified the vehicles. In particular, they compared the numbers of vehicles with lists declared earlier," the press service said.

Ukrainian forces are "withdrawing weaponry in the remaining part of the Luhansk Region - in the Popasnyansky district," military operation's press service head Ruslan Tkachuk said.

The supplement to the Package of measures on implementing the Minsk Agreements from 12 February 2015 was agreed upon on September 29 at the negotiations of the Contact Group in Minsk. The supplement envisages withdrawal of tanks, artillery weapons of less than 100mm caliber, and mortars of equal to or less than 120mm caliber to a distance of 15 kilometers from the contact line in Donbas. On September 30, the document was signed by DPR head Alexander Zakharchenko and LPR head Igor Plotnitsky.

In accordance with the reached agreement, tanks are withdrawn first, followed by artillery weapons of less than 100mm caliber and mortars. The first stage should start two days after the complete ceasefire and finish in 15 days. The second stage will take 24 days to complete. The withdrawal will start in the "North" sector on the LPR territory and will continue in the "South" sector in DPR. The whole process of withdrawal is expected to take a total of 41 days.

 [return to Contents] 

 #36
Kiev forces attempt to launch offensive near Donetsk - DPR defense ministry

MOSCOW, October 20. /TASS/. Kiev forces have made an attempt to launch an offensive at the positions of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic (DPR), DPR defense ministry spokesman Eduard Basurin said on Tuesday.

"Around 11:40 am today, two units of Ukrainian forces made an attempt to launch an offensive at our positions. The attack of the enemy was countered," Donetsk News Agency quoted Basurin as saying. The spokesman added that several militiamen were injured.

He said earlier that Ukrainian forces violated ceasefire regime 8 times over the past 24 hours.

11 Ukrainian tanks at frontline in Donbas

Basurin said the local intelligence has spotted 11 Ukrainian tanks near the contact line in Donbas.

"Our intelligence spots concentration of tanks at the contact line. Five tanks were spotted arriving to the settlement of Novosyolovka, in eights kilometers from the contact line. Six tanks were also registered in the settlement of Andreyevka, in 17 kilometers from the contact line," Donetsk News Agency quoted Basurin as saying.

"Ukrainian commanders thus deliberately do not lower the intensity of shellings, using mortars and small arms, trying to provoke DPR to react," he noted.
DPR has started withdrawing weaponry of less than 100mm caliber from the contact line in Debaltsevo today.

At the meeting of the Contact Group in Minsk on August 26, the participants confirmed their plans to ensure ceasefire in Donbass from September 1. OSCE's Special Representative in Ukraine Martin Sajdik said that it is necessary for ensuring security at schools along the contact line. Over the last days, only few violations of ceasefire regime were registered in Donbas, with the most serious case registered overnight to September 5, when one civilian was killed and two others injured.

 [return to Contents] 

 #37
rt.com
October 20, 2015
Moscow ready to negotiate with Kiev over flight ban

Russia has sent Ukraine three proposals for consultations on providing air corridors between the two countries after October 25. This Sunday all flights between the two countries will be stopped.

Last week, Ukraine banned all flights from Russia from Sunday in the latest tit-for-tat spat between Kiev and Moscow.

"We have sent three proposals: two proposals are from the Ministry of Transport, and one is from Rosaviatsia [Russian Federal Agency for Air Transport], that are concerned with the agreement on air corridors. If the Ukraine responds to such a proposal [to hold consultations], then we are ready to hold consultations anywhere and at any time," Russian Deputy Transport Minister Valery Okulov told journalists on Tuesday.

Ukraine's Ministry of Infrastructure said the ban on Russian flights will run until Moscow lifts its ban on Ukrainian carriers.

It's still possible that at least one carrier from each country will be allowed to continue flights; a source told Russian media Lenta.ru, adding that Russian state-owned Aeroflot's low-cost subsidiary Pobeda is planning to make flights to Kiev and Odessa this winter.

According to Rosaviatsia, 800,000 passengers flew between Russia and Ukraine in the first eight months of 2015.

 [return to Contents] 

 #38
www.rt.com
October 20, 2015
Ex-president sues Ukraine in European Court of Human Rights

Ukraine's deposed president, Viktor Yanukovich, has filed a case against the country he used to rule with the European Court of Human Rights, saying his rights had been "repeatedly breached".

According to a press-release by London-based Joseph Hage Aaronson LLP, the law firm representing Yanukovich, the former president is asking the court to "declare violations of his rights under the European Convention on Human Rights, including the right to a fair trial (Article 6), the right to an effective investigation of attempts made upon his life and the right to protection (Article 2), and the right not to be discriminated against because of his political status and opinions (Article 14)."

In the accompanying statement, the firm's chief lawyer, Joe Hage, says "it is clear that the Ukrainian authorities are determined to bring prosecutions" against Yanukovich, having initiated "unfair trials which infringe his basic human right to be present and to defend himself against allegations which President Yanukovych vigorously denies."

Some of the allegations that have been made by Ukrainian prosecutors are "constructed to provide a basis for the EU sanctions listing against President Yanukovich," Hage adds.

A representative of the ECHR has confirmed Yanukovich's claim has been received and registered as case 507744/15 "Yanukovich v. Ukraine." A review date has not yet been set.

Yanukovich was deposed and forced to leave Ukraine and flee to Russia during a violent coup in February 2014 that instated the current authorities in Kiev. A slew of criminal cases were immediately opened against him by the new regime.

The charges leveled against Yanukovich by Kiev's current authorities include complicity in the killings on Kiev's central Independence Square (widely known as the Maidan) during the February uprising, as well as embezzlement and abuse of power. He was also accused of trying to subvert the constitutional system of Ukraine after a giving a speech shortly following his flight to Russia, in which he said he was still officially the president of Ukraine.

He is also accused of having illegally changed Ukraine's constitution in order to usurp power in 2010, when he was elected President.

A number of European countries have imposed sanctions on Yanukovich. In January 2015, the former president was put on Interpol's wanted list. However, the search for him was suspended in July, as the data that was provided by Ukrainian authorities upon which Interpol had based its arrest warrant, was found "questionable."

 [return to Contents] 

 #39
http://newcoldwar.org
October 19, 2015
New IRI poll: Ukrainian government program supported by only 11 per cent of the country

By the International Republican Institute, Oct 14, 2015 (original title: ' IRI Ukraine poll: Interest is high in October 25 local elections amid pessimism about pace of reforms') [http://www.iri.org/resource/iri-ukraine-poll-interest-high-october-25-local-elections-amid-pessimism-about-pace-reforms]

KYIV- A new poll released by IRI has found high voter enthusiasm [sic] ahead of the upcoming October 25 local elections, continuing frustration over the pace of reforms and a troubling lack of understanding about the reforms being pursued.  The poll also found increased public support for NATO membership.

Interest is high in October 25 local elections

On October 25, Ukrainians across the country will go to the polls to elect mayors and, regional and city councils.  These elections are critical as newly-elected officials will see increased authority if Parliament passes the proposed decentralization law that is central to President Poroshenko's reform  efforts.

Seventy-five percent of respondents said they were either very likely or somewhat likely to vote in the elections, a ten percent increase since IRI's July poll.  Voter enthusiasm is highest in western Ukraine, though strong majorities in eastern and southern Ukraine also intend to vote (70 percent and 69 percent, respectively).

Continuing frustration with pace of reforms

As in IRI's previous poll, Ukrainians continued to express frustration with the pace of change in their country.  Sixty-eight percent believed that things are going in the wrong direction, and only 11 percent approved of the job that parliament is doing.

One possible explanation is the lack of information on the contents of the government's reform packages. When asked to evaluate their knowledge of the decentralization/local governance amendments to the constitution, only 12 percent of respondents believed they were well informed of the reform contents. Similarly, only 12 percent believed the reforms would improve the situation in Ukraine, compared to 15 percent who believed it would worsen and 46 percent who believed it would not change anything.

"As with IRI's July poll, this new poll underscores the fact that Ukraine is at a critical juncture," said Stephen Nix, director of IRI's Eurasia programs. "People's frustration continues to grow with the pace of and lack of information on reforms. If the government is going to succeed in passing the reforms that so many demanded on the Maidan, they must do more to reach out to voters and explain the reform package to citizens."

In contrast to the confusion over the contents of decentralization reform, the poll indicated overwhelming support for the police reforms, with 75 percent supporting the introduction of new police in the cities of Kyiv, Lviv and Odesa. "This is one of the first reforms that Ukrainians can see and it is a clear example of how positively people respond to reforms when they see them take effect in their communities," said Nix.

Increased support for NATO membership

IRI's poll saw the highest level of support for NATO membership in any survey the Institute has conducted.  When asked whether they would vote for Ukraine to join NATO in a referendum, 48 percent of respondents said they would-a seven point increase since IRI's last survey-while only 28 percent said they would vote against this decision.  In addition, a strong majority (57 percent) continue to support Ukraine's integration with the European Union.

Methodology

The poll was conducted in all regions of Ukraine (with the exception of Crimea and occupied regions of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts) from September 7-21, 2015, with an oversample in the Zakarpattia region (see poll presentation for methodology).  The national survey had a randomly selected sample of 1,200 permanent residents of Ukraine aged 18 and older and eligible to vote.  The margin of error does not exceed plus or minus 2.8 percent, and the response rate was 63.9 percent.

The survey was conducted by Rating Group Ukraine and was funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development.
--

Latest polling has the party of Prime Minister Yatsenyuk at one per cent

Pravda Ukraine, Friday, October 16, 2015, translation by New Cold War.org

If an election were to take place this month to the Verkhovna Rada, the 'People's Front' party of Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk would score only one per cent of the vote and fail to return to Parliament.

This is one of many significant findings in an extensive poll released by the sociological survey group Rating Group Ukraine and published on its website.

The poll show that in the hypothetical Rada election scenario, Bloc Poroshenko would garner 13 per cent support, Fatherland, Self Reliance and the Opposition Bloc would each win 11 per cent, the Radical Party of Oleg Lyashko, Right Sectorand Svoboda Party would gather seve, six and five per cent, respectively.

Other political forces would not reach the five per cent barrier needed to win Parliamentary representation. In the Parliamentary election on year ago, Yatsenyuk's 'People Front' electoral machine topped the result with 23 per cent.

 [return to Contents] 

 #40
Atlantic Council
October 19, 2015
Ukrainians Eager to Go to Polls
BY BRIAN MEFFORD
Brian Mefford is a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council's Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center. He is a business and political consultant who is based in Kyiv, Ukraine. Follow his analysis on his blog http://www.brianmefford.net/blog/

In less than a week, Ukrainians go to the polls to elect mayors, city councils, and regional councils, and they're eager to do so. A recent poll carried out by the International Republican Institute found that 75 percent of Ukrainians are very likely or somewhat likely to vote on October 25. A new law requires a runoff election if no mayoral candidate receives a majority in cities with more than 90,000 people, which adds an element of suspense. Runoff elections are slated for November 15, and analysts expect second rounds in approximately 35 cities, including Kyiv, Odesa, and Dnipropetrovsk. Here's the latest on races in Ukraine's five largest cities holding elections:

1. Kyiv - Incumbent Mayor Vitali Klitschko remains the front runner but a runoff is likely. In Kyiv, the question is who will face Klitschko in the second round. With a surprisingly resilient electorate of older voters, former two-term Kyiv Mayor Oleksandr Omelchenko has pulled into second place. Omelchenko, who was Klitchko's political mentor, is staging a comeback after being out of office since 2006.

But it's a crowded field. Samopomich's Serhiy Gusovskiy failed to gain momentum and he is competing with the Movement for Reform's Serhiy Dumchev, Ukrop's Gennady Korban, independent MP Boryslav Bereza, and Motherland's former MP and Kyiv Appointed City Head Volodymyr Bondarenko for third place.

Expect Klitschko to hold a solid lead over Omelchenko on election day but fall short of a majority.

2. Odesa - Odesa elections are always complicated and this race is no exception. Current Mayor Gennadiy Trukhanov faces a rematch with former Mayor Eduard Hurvits. Trukhanov tends to attract pro-Russian voters while pro-Western voters prefer Hurvits. But both face challengers in the first round: Solidarity's Sasha Borovik will take votes from Hurvits, while MP Sergiy Kivalov's zombie campaign will siphon 7-10 percent from Trukhanov. Kivalov entered and then dropped out. However, Kivalov's paperwork was submitted too late to remove him from the ballot, so while he's no longer campaigning, he's still on the ballot. Expect a runoff between Trukhanov and Hurvits.

3. Kharkiv - Incumbent Mayor Gennady Kernes is poised to win without a runoff. The controversial mayor's 60 percent approval rating has lifted oligarch Ihor Kolomoyskyi's Renaissance Party into first place in the polls for city council. A breaking court decision allowed the Opposition Bloc to run candidates for the city council, which are likely to ally with Kernes after the election. In spite of Kernes's astronomical numbers, don't write off the Kharkiv race yet: Kernes's pending criminal charges may mean a very short term; he may be removed after New Year's. Businessman and former Deputy Governor Yuri Sapronov and Solidarity's Oleksandr Davtyan compete for a distant second place, but they're really preparing for a spring runoff should Kernes go to jail.

4. Lviv - Mayor Andriy Sadovyi looks set for a third term. In spite of his growing profile as a national politician and leader of the Samopomich Party, Sadovyi has maintained local support. Polls put him close to an outright win in the first round. If Sadovyi falls short of a majority, he is almost certain to win in the runoff. His main opponent is Poroshenko faction MP Dmytro Dobrodomov with the People's Control Party. Dobrodomov, a local journalist, is a rising star in Lviv, but polls put him in the low teens. Civic Position's Volodymyr Hirnyak trails Dobrodomov. Solidarity's Oksana Yurinets, also a Poroshenko faction MP, and Svoboda's Ruslan Koshulynskiy will help their parties cross the five percent threshold for representation on the city council, but they've failed to connect with voters. Bottom line: Sadovyi gets a third term.

5. Dnipropetrovsk - Former Governor Ihor Kolomoyskyi's momentum in his hometown is moving against him. Opposition Bloc's Oleksandr Vilkul pulled ahead of Kolomoyskyi's candidate, Ukrop's Borys Filatov. Polls put both candidates in the 30s, so a runoff is certain. Voters say that Kolomoyskyi may have overestimated his popularity, and many businessmen perceive Vilkul as "easier to do business with." However, Filatov's campaign maintains more levers of administrative resources which can counter Vilkul's momentum. The entry of a third candidate, Dagestani businessman Zahid Krasnov with the Community Strength Party, may play a key role in the runoff. Krasnov's approximately 15 percent of the vote will likely go toward Filatov in the second round. Solidarity's Maksim Kurachiy, a Poroshenko Bloc MP, is expected to finish fourth but perform well enough to keep his political future alive. Kurachiy's voters may back Vilkul in the runoff in an effort to clip Kolomoyskyi's wings. At the moment, the only certainty is that there will be a runoff with Vilkul and Filatov as the likely opponents.

 [return to Contents] 

 #41
Newsweek.com
October 19, 2015
Denied in Attempts to Rule the Galaxy, Darth Vader Targets Ukraine
By  Damien Sharkov

Ukraine's President Petro Poroshenko will be forced to discuss whether to appoint Darth Vader as Prime Minister of Ukraine after a petition to install the Dark Lord as head of the cabinet earned more  than 25,000 signatures on the Presidential administration's website.

The petition, put forward by a person under the name Master Vladimirovich Yoda in support of the fictional Star Wars villain, gathered 25,256 signatures by Monday morning, surpassing the threshold required for the President to give it his attention. Its status is now listed as "under review."

Vader is a frequent participant in Ukrainian politics and ran in the parliamentary elections last October. In a much publicized campaign, he toured constituencies with his running mate Stepan Chewbacca, a group of Stormtroopers and other characters from the Star Wars universe in a similarly-themed van.

During the parliamentary election and the mayoral election for the city of Odessa, which took place in May last year, Vader made many memorable public pledges, including the introduction of "free WiFi for all" and a promise to regain control over annexed Crimea.

Commenting on the news regarding his petition Vader expressed disappointment that his master Yoda had submitted it without his knowledge, but said that he had already "packed his bags" to move to the Prime Ministerial residence.

"We are building a country with the rule of law and the President's word is sacred to me," Vader wrote on his Facebook page. "Thank you to everyone who signed and thanks to the President for the incoming decree."

The e-petition feature was introduced by the Presidential administration in August and despite Vader's confidence and comedic appeal, which has earned him exposure on many Ukrainian TV shows, it is unlikely Poroshenko will favor him instead of incumbent Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk.

In September a similar petition passed the 25,000 signatures threshold, nominating former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, currently heading Odessa region, to take Yatsenyuk's place. Saakashvili ruled himself out and there has been no public attempt to oust Yatsenyuk and put the ex-Georgian leader in his place.

Vader's Internet Party did not manage to cover the 5 percent vote threshold in the last parliamentary elections, while Yatsenyuk's People's Front was the second most popular party, winning 21 percent. Only the President's Petro Poroshenko Bloc won more votes.

Ukraine's Central Electoral Committee has previously reported that the candidate known as Darth Vader shares the identity of an electrician called Viktor Shevchenko, though he changed his legal name to Darth Viktorovich Vader in March.

 [return to Contents] 

 

 [return to Contents] 

 #43
Antiwar.com
October 19, 2015
The New Cold War and the Death of the Discourse
Russophobia compromises the media and academia
By Justin Raimondo
Justin Raimondo is the editorial director of Antiwar.com, and a senior fellow at the Randolph Bourne Institute. He is a contributing editor at The American Conservative, and writes a monthly column for Chronicles

The truth is often ignored, at first, and when that becomes impossible, truth-tellers are often punished. As two incidents starkly reveal, this is certainly the case when it comes to the civil war in Ukraine and Washington's unfolding cold war with Russia.

The first illustration of our truth-telling principle occurred after the "Maidan revolution" had already captured the imagination of the Western media, which was busy promulgating the official view as given expression by US government officials. According to this narrative, the "protesters" were heroes, the government of "Russian-backed' Viktor Yanukovich was a coven of devils, and the catalyzing incident that led to Yanukovich's ouster, the shooting of protesters in the Maidan, was the work of the Berkut, the Ukrainian government's militarized police.

There's just one problem with this story: it isn't true. A leaked phone call between Estonian Foreign Minister Urmas Paet and European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs Catherine Ashton, revealed that the protesters were shot by their own leaders - the radical nationalists who had military control of the Maiden. In the course of their discussion, Paet discusses one Dr. Olga Bogomolets, who was in line to become the new Health Minister, and at around eight minutes into the recording Paet drops this bombshell:

Paet: "All the evidence shows that the people who were killed by snipers from both sides, among police men and people in the street, that they were the same snipers killing people from both sides."

Ashton: "Well that's, yeah..."

Paet: "And [Bogomolets] also showed me some photos and she said that has medical doctor, she can say that it is the same handwriting..."

Ashton: "Yeah..."

Paet: "Same type of bullets... and it's really disturbing that now the new coalition, that they don't want to investigate what exactly happened. So that there is now stronger and stronger understanding that behind the snipers, it was not Yanukovich, but it was somebody from the new coalition."

Ashton: "I think they do want to investigate, and I didn't know... pick that up - gosh."

Ashton's main concern seemed to be that this would get out and discredit the new government "from the very beginning."

Oh, but not to worry: it didn't get out, at least not in the United States. There were oblique mentions of the recording in the mainstream media, but only weeks afterward and then without any specifics: two months after the fact, the Los Angeles Times referred to it in the vaguest terms, only to dismiss it as a "conspiracy theory." The New York Times didn't cover it: neither did the War Street Journal, Time magazine, or any of the other usual suspects. The Daily Beast, typically, served as a mouthpiece for the official Washington-Kiev account, citing Dr. Bogomolets as claiming her conversation with Paet was a "misunderstanding." Yet Paet didn't cite her as his sole source: he said "all the evidence." No doubt the Estonians have their own sources in the country, and it's improbable the Foreign Minister would have made such an assertion based on a single person's testimony.

In any case, the story was pretty much buried here in the US, with the exception of this space and a few other alternative news sources.

But in Europe, it was a different story: the German public television station ARD carried a report which threw the identity of the Maidan shooters into serious question. And more recently the BBC produced a documentary, "The Untold Story of the Maidan Massacre," in which eyewitnesses assert that the Berkut were fired on from positions controlled by the ultra-nationalist Svoboda Party, which, along with the neo-Nazi "Right Sector" organization, ran Maidan security.

Still, the story was ignored in the US, but that may not be possible much longer, and the reason springs from an unlikely source: the current Ukrainian government of President Petro Poroshenko.

Last week Ukrainian police raided the homes of Svoboda Party leaders Oleksandr Sych, who served as Deputy Prime Minister in the post-Maidan government, and Ole Pankevich, whose 2013 appearance at a neo-Nazi memorial event provoked the ire of the World Jewish Congress. The Ukrainian prosecutor's office confirmed that the raid was conducted as part of an investigation into the Maidan shootings:

"The court warrant for the raid on the apartment of Pankevich, a former MP and the ex-head of Lviv regional council, explicitly referred to a BBC documentary on the subject, according to a copy of the warrant  ... In the documentary, journalist Gabriel Gatehouse spoke to an opposition nationalist rifleman who had acknowledged having fired on riot police in the morning of February 20."

The warrant, posted online,

"[A]lso refers to video footage that showed a rifleman firing out of the Hotel Ukraina, situated on Maidan. The room from which he fired was occupied at the time by Pankevich, according to the court warrant.

"Police also raided the apartment of Sich, vice-prime minister in the immediate post-Maidan government in 2014, also in connection with shots fired from the same hotel, where he was also staying on February 20.

"An assistant to Ukraine's prosecutor general, Vladislav Kutsenko, confirmed to the Ukrainian TV channel 112 that searches of the Svoboda leaders' apartments were linked to an investigation of the February 20 events."

So the Ukrainian government is admitting that their previous narrative is false - and that the ultra-rghtist Svoboda and Right Sector, who were the military arm of the Maidan protesters, provoked the incident that led to Yanukovich's overthrow.

Why this stunning turnaround?

Both Svoboda and Right Sector have declared war on the Poroshenko regime and are calling for a "national revolution" - one that would install them in power. The ultra-nationalists are opposed to the Minsk agreement, brokered by the EU, which makes concessions to the east Ukrainians. The far right is accusing Poroshenko of "betraying the revolution." They scoff at the ceasefire as a "sellout" because they want the civil war to continue: and as Poroshenko makes draconian cuts in the government budget in order to mollify Ukraine's creditors, and to ensure the flow of Western funding, the rightists are gaining ground politically. And they are getting increasingly violent, staging a riot in front of the parliament building in which three officers were killed by a grenade hurled at policemen: 130 cops were injured. The rightists were protesting the decision by the parliament to grant the eastern rebels some small degree of autonomy. This incident followed a series of shoot-outs with the armed rightist gang known as Right Sector, which played a key role in the Maidan protest movement.

That the Poroshenko government, which had previously stonewalled any serious effort to investigate the shooting deaths that sent Yanukovich packing, is playing this card now is an indication of the regime's desperation in the face of a challenge from the ultra-right. For to upend the official narrative - one that is fully supported by their Western sponsors, and their amen corner in the media - is to subvert the very foundations of the post-Maidan order. If the truth comes out, the ultra-nationalists may be finished - but so may the government that exposes their murderous role.

Yes, the truth may very well come out: but what of the truth-tellers? They often suffer in any case. One such example is what happened to Stephen F. Cohen, a professor of Russian history at Princeton and New York University, and the author of the definitive biography of Nicolai Bukharin, as well as several other well-received books. He is married to Katrina vanden Heuval, editor of The Nation, where some of his work appears, and he has been outspoken in his criticism of US policy in Ukraine, and the launching of a new cold war against the Russians. Almost alone in the scholarly community, Cohen has been a voice of reason, speaking out against the Russophobic hysteria in every venue that will grant him access: for this he has been pilloried by the neoconservative and "mainstream" media, called "Putin's toady" and "apologist" in a campaign of vilification that, ironically, has a certain Soviet air about it.

The smear campaign took on a particularly vindictive and personal tone when the proposal to name a graduate study program funded by Katrina vanden Heuval's KAT Charitable Foundation named after Cohen and the late Robert C. Tucker, his mentor, was rejected by the Board of the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies (ASEEES). Cohen and vanden Heuval had offered to fund a fellowship program that would fill the gap left by State Department cuts in its Russian studies outlays. The first disbursements would have totaled $415,000, with more to come when the program took root. ASEEES was already sponsoring a KAT-funded Dissertation Prize, named after Cohen (and Tucker), and all seemed well until some members of the Board objected.

On what grounds their objections were founded was never made explicit, since the whole procedure was carried out in secret, but it was clear from the beginning that Cohen's eloquent attacks on Washington's headlong plunge into a confrontation with Russia had provoked opposition from some Board members. So the Board came back to Cohen and vanden Heuval with what they termed a "compromise": they'd take their money, but Cohen's name had to be stricken from the program.

It was an outrageous slap in the face, and Cohen and vanden Heuval were rightly outraged: they reluctantly withdrew their generous offer.

But that wasn't the end of it. When rank-and-file ASEEES members - scholars at colleges and universities throughout the world - caught wind of this, a rebellion ensued. A letter circulated by David Ransel, the Robert F. Byrnes Professor Emeritus of History at Indiana University, a former editor of the American Historical Review, and a former President of ASEEES, wrote a scathing letter to the Board demanding that they reverse their decision, apologize to Cohen and vanden Heuval, and proceed with the fellowship under the previously agreed on name: the Stephen F. Cohen and Robert C. Tucker Dissertation Fellowship. Seventy-five scholars in the field co-signed the letter, and 25 more were soon added. The ASEEES Board issued a "clarification," which clarified only that they didn't understand what free academic discourse means, and Professor Ransel came back at them with another letter exposing their hypocrisy and asking that the program be reinstated, with apologies to Cohen and vanden Heuval.

To make a long story short, the ASEEES Board backed down, made excuses, and restored the program to its original form, with the only change being that ASEEES alone would vet the fellowship participants. Cohen's name will stay, Ms. vanden Heuval's generosity will benefit students - and the witch-hunters have been defeated.

This time, that is...

That an effort to target a scholar whose public statements contradict those of our all-knowing government officials was defeated is a victory for free speech and against political correctness - the PC of the new cold war, which seeks to marginalize anyone who advocates a rational foreign policy toward Russia as "Putin's toady." Indeed, even the US government-funded Radio Free Europe ran a long polemic attacking Cohen, entitled "Stephen Cohen, Preeminent Scholar, Now Seen as Putin Apologist"! That your tax dollars are paying for a smear campaign against one of the most prominent Russia experts should tell us everything we need to know about who and what is behind the Big Chill in the foreign policy discourse as it applies to Russo-American relations.

And make no mistake: there is a chill. And that icy wind, while it didn't succeed in freezing out Cohen, is taking its toll on lesser known figures. I am told by someone familiar with the Cohen brouhaha that the Russophobic party line is being enforced with a vengeance in academic circles. One young university scholar of Russian studies at a California state university was so intimidated by all the pressure that she dropped out of a panel discussion on the Ukrainian crisis because the paper she submitted didn't comport with the US-EU version of events. The paper was circulated to some of the other panelists, and she started to receive threats: frightened, she dropped out, citing the damage done to the career of one of her friends for crossing the invisible - but all too real - ideological line. The very senior chair of the panel tried to get her to change her mind, but nothing could dissuade her: she didn't show up at the conference.

The irony of this ideological campaign to silence critics of the new cold war is that it largely consists of Soviet-style epithets hurled at anyone who challenges the official US-EU narrative. "Toady," "apologist," "dupe," "stooge" - this is the lexicon of Pravda, circa 1932. And when this kind of language is deployed in academia - where government funding plays such a decisive role - the danger to free discourse is all too obvious.

Telling the truth, when the air is filled with government-generated lies, can get you into trouble: it can ruin your career, it can even get you on the FBI's watch list. But in this day and age, when communications are instantaneous and video cameras are everywhere, the truth is more than likely to come out eventually. The trick is to stay alive until it does.

 [return to Contents]