Johnson's Russia List
2015-#203
19 October 2015
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"We don't see things as they are, but as we are"

"Don't believe everything you think"

You see what you expect to see 

In this issue
 
  #1
TASS
October 19, 2015
Sergey Ivanov: Don't think the Kremlin always decides everything, sometimes it doesn't
The chief of Russia's presidential staff in TASS special project Top Officials
[http://tass.ru/en/politics/829778]

Interviewed by Andrei Vandenko: Born November 8, 1959 in Luhansk, Ukraine. In 1982, Andrei Vandenko graduated from the Kiev National University of Taras Shevchenko specializing in journalism. Since 1989, he lives and works in Moscow. Vandenko has more than 20 years of experience in the interview genre. He was published in the major part of top Russian media outlets and is a winner of professional awards.

The chief of Russia's presidential staff dwells upon the most acute issues of Russia's politics and society in an interview with TASS.

About Saddam Hussein, refined liberals, the law of the jungle, foreign policy ambitions and lessons of history

- The world learned that Russia was about to go to war against the Islamic State in Syria when you presented the president's request for permission to use the armed forces outside the national territory to the Federation Council (upper house of parliament).  You were the one who broke the news, so will you please tell us: 'Why now?'

- Let's begin at the beginning. Memories are still green of how our US partners and colleagues in the late 2000s were explaining to me in great detail how very important it was to bring democracy to the Middle East. Now they've brought it there... For the whole world to see the results.

The operation Enduring Freedom lasted in Afghanistan for thirteen years. The United States launched it in response to 9/11. It was the longest war the United States had ever fought. Its ultimate goal - victory over the Taliban - remained unachievable.

I don't think I'll have to explain to anybody what the Americans have plunged Iraq into more than a decade of chaos and lawlessness. One should remember that Saddam Hussein hated Al Qaeda and all other terrorists. Take it from me. True, while fighting against them he employed methods one can hardly call democratic. He was sending them to the gallows and he had them shot without inquest of trial. That was his way of settling scores with opponents. As long as Saddam stayed in power, no one ever had the slightest idea some kind of terrorist groups might crop up in the territory of Iraq. But then Saddam Hussein was sent to the gallows himself. With all the ensuing consequences.

Next, to Libya. The country has now been turned into another Somalia. This says it all. The goal of North Africa's and the Middle East's conversion to democracy was again offered as the underlying motif

Or take Egypt. Now it is somewhat outside the spotlight of public attention. Some other trouble spots are far hotter. But just recently, in 2012 the CNN was telecasting hours-long bombastic reports about waking popular masses in Cairo, and at times it came pretty close to presenting the Muslim Brotherhood as refined liberals and democrats... To cut a long story short: but for the courage and far-sightedness of the then Egyptian defense minister, General El-Sisi, the country these days would have been looking very much like Libya. In that situation there might've followed a merciless free-for-all. Mind you, Egypt is the most densely populated country of the Middle East with a population of more than 80 million. It was fortunate history turned it another way...

Now, we have Syria...

- I'm not sure about the 'now' part. The civil war there erupted back in 2011.

- Correct. The conflict there has lasted for several years now. A large territory of the country is under the control of the Islamic State and other terrorist groups. It's a hard fact! All of us have been witnesses to how very successful the international coalition has been in its more than twelve-month-long military campaign against the IS.

- Are you being ironic?

The way I see it, the world is at a turning point in international relations. On the one hand, there are the universally recognized institutions, like the UN Security Council. But for them all of us would've had a really hard time these days. And on the other, there are individual countries which position themselves as benchmarks of democracy and offhandedly defy international law. There is no written law they may agree to recognize. In fact, the sole rule they agree with is: "Might makes right." And that is a real menace. After all, the place where we all live is not the jungle, and nobody should feel free to ruin the established world order.

In a sense, Syria is a litmus test. I won't be retelling now what exactly President  Putin told the UN General Assembly session, or review in detail the background of his request to the Federation Council for permission to use our armed forces to help the government in Damascus. I will just say once again that Russia in this particular case is pursuing no foreign policy ambitions whatsoever. It is crystal-clear that military means alone will never bring about a settlement in Syria. In the final count a political solution will have to begin to be looked for. A future solution will be complex and hard to achieve, but Syria as such is a no simple country. By the way, originally, the idea of an intra-Syrian alliance in the struggle against the Islamic State was not ours: it came from the French President, Francois Hollande. He speculated that the government troops under Bashar Assad and the so-called Free Syrian Army might present a common front. Of course, if the latter does exist in reality, and is not a virtual brainchild of some armchair pundits in the West. Any sensible opposition can be negotiated with and compromises are to be mutual - that's pretty clear.

In the meantime, while this is still a matter of distant future, I would mention one more argument why Russia had to intervene in the Syrian conflict. As you may have heard, there are thousands of Russia or CIS-born people fighting for the Islamic State. So will you advise us to just watch and wait for them to be trained there and then get back home?

Many are still not in the mood of saying certain things aloud. They just don't dare state them outright. But I will... Crowds of refugees from the Middle East are now heading for countries in southern Europe, hoping to cross it to Western Europe. How can one be sure that among the migrants there are no "sleepers" - sleeping agents or undercover terrorists who are on the way to the Old World for the purpose of settling down inconspicuously somehow and waiting for the D-day to come? And on that D-day they will emerge in the forefront again to play the very well familiar role. For instance, of a suicide bomber who is prepared to give up one's life for faith and take as many other human lives as possible? I wouldn't like to utter gloom prophecies, but I personally have no doubts it will happen this way. I am dead certain!

- But aren't we provoking these radicals by getting involved in this war? Didn't the just-prevented terrorist attack in Moscow ring the first alarm bell?

- We will do our utmost to ensure that nobody ever comes to Russia from the Islamic State, that all of them remain in Syrian soil.

- But you haven't answered the question what was the reason for us to join the fight at this particular moment.

- The situation has turned intolerant.

- Some western media have been quoting anonymous sources - traditionally anonymous, I should say - in the Kremlin that President Putin was talked into beginning an air operation in Syria by a trio of Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu, Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev and you. Was that really so?

- I believe I should thank you first for mentioning me in such a good company... I am being ironic again, don't you see, so will you please forgive this habit of mine. Making serious comments regarding such "leaks" is always very hard. But if we are to stay neutral and discuss only the hard facts, I will say this: the mentioned "anonymous sources" got it all wrong. How it all happened was very different.

- So, how did it all happen? Conspiracy theory fans are claiming that Syria is just a decoy operation, launched to switch attention from the east of Ukraine to the Middle East, to push Donbas into the background.

- It's absurd to refute plain gossip. I've already explained why we found it right and appropriate to respond to the request from Syria's legitimate leadership for help in fighting against terrorists of all sorts. What attempts to switch attention are you talking about? Look here, it was not us who staged the anti-constitutional coup in Kiev, right? I am ready to discuss the theme of Ukraine in greater detail, if you wish. Just as our efforts to get out of the so-called isolation no matter what. I love history and I do know that Russia has always been looked at as a threat and with great suspicion, to put it mildly. That was so when Russia was an empire and ruled by tsars, it was so throughout the Soviet years, and we still see the same today. Alexander Solzhenytsin said perfectly well that from time immemorial the West had felt scared of Russia's enormity. Enormity, mind you! We saw sanctions taken against us back during the rule of the Romanov dynasty. There's nothing new about them. Trade barriers were put up and financial obstructions posed again and again... Those measures were far harsher than the current ones. But we managed. We didn't get scared in the past, and we will stay firm this time. The West grossly exaggerates the influence of the latest sanctions on the Russian economy. True, they do pose certain hindrances to us, it would be foolish to deny the obvious, but I will say again and again that in the past we lived through far greater problems.

Attempts to punish Russia are senseless and ineffective. Take the expulsion from the G8. Some must've thought we would get very much upset. But the G8 is certainly not the place where we would like to get back. Honestly! In the 1990s Russia spent much time and effort for the sake of being admitted to this club of select few; it eventually got there only to see for itself that the G8 was no longer capable of addressing any of the fundamental issues humanity was confronted with at the current stage. True, it is possible to get together to talk about the western attitude (western, mind you) to this or that issue, but the world today is very different. The G20 - that's the worthy level. It is there that truly important themes are being discussed and solution mechanisms can be devised. Here is a Syria-related example. The need for eliminating the arsenals of chemical weapons in that country was agreed on within the G20 format, and not the G8 or G7 group. So there no regrets about the demise of the G8, believe me.

As for the procedure employed to make the decision to dispatch a Russian air group (which in the past would've possibly been called a limited troop contingent) to the base near Latakia, there was no haste or anything spontaneous. All steps had been considered well beforehand and agreed with the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. It is common knowledge that the combat aircraft and some special units of the Russian armed forces had been dispatched to Syria well in advance...

- Although we kept denying everything at first.

- We didn't. We neither confirmed nor denied the reports. We merely refrained from comment. That's standard international practice. And quite legitimate, by the way. But let's be realistic: everybody understands that the redeployment of several dozen planes cannot be kept secret. Everything can be seen well from space.

The final discussion on the operation in Syria, with senior military officials taking part, was held at a meeting of Russia's Security Council late in the evening on September 29. We considered all the pros and cons, all strengths and weaknesses once again. The presidential request to the Federation Council followed only after that. I brought the text to the FC building in Bolshaya Dmitrovka Street early the next morning...

- The Americans have already predicted the losses the Russians will soon sustain in Syria. It's clear that there can be no war without losses, but how large is the risk of such developments? What do you think?

- As I've said, we gauged all likely risks.  Our troops will not be involved in clashes on the ground. We declared that from the outset and in very clear terms. The air base from where our planes fly combat missions is inside an area under the full control of Syrian government forces. There is a certain level of protection, and a very serious one. Apart from the air pilots and the maintenance personnel based in Latakia there is a small commando unit responsible for guarding the airbase. That's a natural precaution and any other country would've taken it. So I wouldn't say there is a serious risk of an attack against the Russian air group in Syria. Theoretically everything is possible, but all precautions have been taken.

As for what has been said about the expected losses, we'd prefer to be more tactful and to avoid counting the US Marines who've already lost their lives in Iraq and Afghanistan.
--

About Ukraine, channels of dialogue, sanctions, causes of the crisis, import substitution, good cheeses, pampers and destruction of counterfeit products

- Now about Ukraine, as you've suggested. When he made a trip to Sevastopol in September, Vladimir Putin declared it was necessary to restore full-scale relations. Is it a soluble task against the background of what we can see today?

- Clearly, our relations with the authorities in Kiev have fallen to a record-low. But there are two factors one should keep in mind. That it happened so is no fault of ours. Secondly, Ukraine is a special case. That country remains a home to many of our people. And not in some virtual sense, but in a very specific one: somebody's parents, brothers, sisters, grandpas and grandmas... This illustrates how right and to the point Putin was when he said that in fact we were one people. We have a whole universe to share: mentally, religiously and culturally. The language included.  We are one Slavic people, there's no arguing about that.

- But in Kiev this kind of approach causes strong rejection. People there argue that we are very different and that their language is certainly not a dialect.

- True, it is possible to rewrite history again and again, but that will not change anything. I do believe that sooner or later the day will come when relations between our countries will begin to mend.

- Oddly enough, the "later" part of the formula works far more often than the "sooner" one.

- Far from everything depends on us. If the other side stays reluctant and defiant, compulsion won't help. It takes two to tango...

- That's why I am asking you what you personally do these days for the sake of bringing fraternal peoples closer together? Say, do you contact Boris Lozhkin - your opposite number in the Ukrainian presidential staff  - often enough and what themes do you discuss?

- There are contacts at different levels. Through the Russian government, the Foreign Ministry and the presidential staff... I am not in the position to disclose the details of confidential negotiations that we've had so far and are still having, but I can tell you that at the beginning of the conflict, when active combat operations, in fact, a civil war in the territory of Ukraine, were in progress, we had more frequent contacts in a bid to put an end to the bloodshed and fratricidal clashes. That was before the Minsk Format. Now the situation has changed and there is a new stable channel for a dialogue. Many things have been delegated to the level of contact groups, in which Russia is represented as an equitable partner. But if necessary, I can put a call through to Kiev any moment. Accordingly, Boris Lozhkin feels free to phone me any time. We do contact each other, whenever the need arises. The situation is now better than it was a year ago, thank God. At least there are no active combat clashes in Donbas. True, the problem cannot be resolved without a political settlement and the implementation of the Minsk Accords to the full extent is now in the forefront. The Normandy Quartet has stated that clearly. A direct dialogue between Kiev's officials and the leaders of Donetsk and Luhansk are number one issue on the agenda. The purpose is to determine the modality, the rules of the game, and to eventually hold elections in compliance with Ukrainian legislation to let the people of Donbas feel their rights enjoy steadfast protection, international guarantees and obligations included. After that it might be possible to move on to a final peace arrangement.

- The implementation of Minsk-2 is one of the conditions for the lifting of sanctions from Russia. You say the sanctions caused no big trouble to us, but you would agree there is nothing about them that can makes us happy.

- I'd put it this way:

We will never do anything to harm our national interests just for the sake of seeing the sanctions lifted

. Never ever! It was not us who took those measures, and we are not going to discuss in any format what is necessary for canceling them.

- But peace in Ukraine does not run counter to the interests of Russia, does it?

- Of course, it doesn't. But I would avoid any linkage here. Are you certain that the sanctions will be lifted even after impeccable compliance with Minsk-2? Are there any guarantees? Personally, I have big doubts on that score. There is no reason why we should offer excuses or ask for forgiveness.

Now...

. The sanctions did cause certain losses. The GDP is on the decline, and not on the ascent. We don't deny that. But! The root cause for the Russian economy's slowdown is not sanctions, but the fall in the world prices of oil and gas. I agree that this has demonstrated again our strong dependence on hydrocarbons and how very bad this is. But on the other hand, we've been able to realize the vector of future action to be taken to ease the pressures of the raw materials factor.

- Are you satisfied with progress in import substitution, which is now the focus of attention?

- I would split your question in two. The task of global and effective substitution for certain products that are being imported from other countries can be accomplished in 5-7 years' time at the earliest. Although there may be economic sectors where meeting far tighter deadlines may be possible. For instance, the military-industrial complex. A great deal has been done there along these lines already, believe me. Incidentally, it is Ukraine that has been the hardest-hit as a result. I am saying so in all seriousness, without a shade of irony. Our neighbors have lost their space rocket industry and aircraft and shipbuilding as well. True, they have risen to number one place in the world as the exporter of ... sunflower seeds. I learned that from a piece authored by one of your fellow journalists. If the authorities in Kiev do care about the future of their state, they should do something serious about what is really happening. Once an agrarian-industrial country, Ukraine is being turned into a forsaken backyard - will you excuse me for saying so - a second-rate farm growing agricultural produce with very slim chances of ever finding a buyer who would agree to have it. There's 100-percent certainty the European Union will not have it. I can tell you that right away. Ukraine's another role under the current scheme of things will be that of an exporter of cheap labor to other countries. Don't forget that since the Donbas unrest began three million Ukrainians have fled the country. Where did they go? Right, they went to Russia. More than one million of them are refugees. And the others have full-time jobs here.

Anyhow, it's up to our neighbors to decide what kind of country they would like to live in tomorrow.

Now, let's get back to the theme of import substitution in the Russian economy. In agriculture the changes are not so significant as they have been in the defense industry, although products from domestic manufactures are already taking far more space on the shelves of our supermarkets these days. Far more than just a couple of years ago. Is this good or bad? To me the answer is obvious.

- The dialectics laws seem to fail once in a while. Quantity does not always transform into quality. At least, the Russian agricultural watchdog Rosselkhoznadzor said just recently that nearly eighty percent of Russian cheeses is not cheeses at all, but forgeries containing vegetable fat. A short while later, though, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev asked certain officials not to scare the customers with forgery statistics and they backtracked. But the quality of cheese has hardly improved since.

- I agree that the situation cannot be improved overnight. But, as you understand, we've got accustomed to rely on imports and made no good cheeses of our own for a hundred years or so. So it would be na�ve to think that good cheese will suddenly emerge out of nowhere. It never happens.

But apart from cheese there is poultry, pork and vegetables. We've managed to meet the entire domestic market demand. That's a real chance for our farm producers. I recall saying once that sanctions may end some day, God forbid, and the window of opportunities will be shut down again! We've got to take advantage of the situation and to build up production. There are such plans at the federal level and in many regions, where the climate is favorable for farming. The plan will take time to materialize, or course, but some positive results are already well in sight.

Please, remember, total import substitution is no goal of ours. We have no intention of screening ourselves from the outside world. It would've been ridiculous, if we'd had such plans. Those who are discussing sanctions these days for some reason quickly shift to the theme of Russia's international isolation. What do they really mean? The world is not confined to Western Europe, the United States, Canada and some other states. The other countries and regions are not closed to us. Asia, Africa and Latin America... They are open to holidaymakers and to trade as before.

In a word, we will keep developing normally, stay in touch with each other, and, if need be, find alternatives to products we are still unable to produce ourselves. But spending hard currency on pampers, the way we did just recently, is hardly reasonable today. That's not a precision instrument for a space rocket. I believe that launching the production of such consumer goods in Russia will be no problem.

- Without forgetting about quality, though..

- It goes without saying. We don't need an illusion of the process. We don't need box-ticking, to put it bluntly: no situations where a newly-made commodity proves by far inferior to foreign counterparts. Moreover, in the global economy hardly any producer manufactures products meant for the domestic market only. If something is to be manufactured, then only with a view to exporting the item. Otherwise it will just make no sense. I know that from my own experience with aircraft-building.

- And what would you say about the public destruction of products under sanctions? Not as the chief of the Kremlin staff, but as someone who was born in the city of Leningrad, which experienced the horrors siege and famine during World War II?

- Mine is a very unequivocal attitude. By virtue of my main profession...

- Of a career intelligence officer?

- Right. I've spent many years in the West, and I do know well that any civilized country mercilessly does away with counterfeit products. Be it foods, alcohol, tobacco, clothes, footwear, medicines, household appliances or electronics. Everything is burnt down, crushed by caterpillar tractors - in a word, disposed of in any conceivable way. That's how the civilized world goes about this business. Everywhere!

- In front of TV cameras that film the process  for primetime news?

- I don't insist on that. I'm talking about the principle. There is no other way of fighting forgeries. I have my own experience on that score. When in 2001 I took the defense minister's post, we started bringing the armed forces back to normal. I remember well the moment when I ordered a large naval exercise in the Caspian to check the flotilla's combat readiness. Then we'd just received the new generation ships, the very same ships that on October 7 this year attacked Islamic State positions in Syria with cruise missiles.

- On Vladimir Putin's birthday... By the way, did you congratulate your chief?

- Naturally. Made a morning phone call to Sochi.

- Gave him a birthday gift?

- I did. But I won't tell you what kind of present it was. Also, I'd keep quiet about birthday wishes. They were meant only for him.

...But we've strayed away from the Caspian naval exercise theme somewhat. It was in the early 2000s. When it was all over, the heads of the Astrakhan Region and the Republic of Kalmykia came up to me with words of praise and thanks. At first, I was curious what the two men were talking about. Soon it turned out that sturgeons had reached the spawning grounds upstream the Volga River for the first time in many years! Then it dawned upon me that while conducting the exercise we cleared the Volga River's delta of several dozen kilometers (and that's not a slip of the tongue!) of poachers' fishing nets. We ruined all their criminal business plans! To my recollection, there followed a long discussion of what was to be done to the confiscated black caviar. Under the previous laws, it was to be marketed. That meant that the local police force would have to open retail outlets to sell the confiscated caviar. Thereby creating an ideal environment for corruption. It's hard to think of a better one. The Interior Ministry spent a long while persuading the top authorities to agree to the elimination of poacher caviar on site. The caviar lobby was resisting that for several years for it was about to lose a real bonanza. Putin was firm and all illegal black caviar has been destroyed since 2006. The market was restored to order.

There is no official lobbying as an institution in Russia (which is bad, to tell you the truth), but unofficial lobbying was always thriving. I know what I am saying. I come across it almost every day. So I can say once again it's my firm belief that the elimination of forged foods is the sole correct way. There will be no alternatives, if we are to struggle against corruption effectively enough. As for those who say that senior citizens who survived the siege of Leningrad are unhappy... Naturally, I was born when that war had been over, but my own parents remembered well enough what that siege was for them. Only demagogues can capitalize on this theme. It's very wrong to play with emotions, let alone in such a mean way.
---

About corruption, a conflict of interest, arrests, jailings, the year 1937 and high-profile investigations

- This means that everything again depends on a particular person ... This is what Audit Chamber Head Tatiana Golikova said in a recent interview with TASS: the problem is not even in the absence of budget funds but in the irresponsibility of officials who are required to oversee the rational spending of budget appropriations.

- So, what can I say in this regard? This is absolutely true. It is necessary to fight this state of things by all available means, using both instructive and punitive measures.

Unfortunately, little is achieved in Russia without instructions from "the above" [the upper echelons of power] but these are the problems of mentality rather than logistics or economic schemes. Honestly speaking, budget funds should be spent efficiently not because we have found ourselves in a difficult financial situation. This should be done every time, both during the "fat" years and the years of austerity. This is a general rule, an axiom. Another thing is that during the fat years many officials, above all, regional heads, were accustomed to live with the awareness that there was a "safety cushion" and the central authorities would come to their rescue, if the economic situation deteriorated. They believed the center would have no other way out but to help them because otherwise this would increase unemployment and intensify social tension. They were accustomed to think that the central government would come to help them and give them some more money, even if some program was not implemented on time or was fulfilled inefficiently. Thousands of reasons could be found for an excuse each time as officials are very skilled to find an alibi for themselves and in this regard they are very talented people. You show an official a protocol made five years ago and remind him: "You promised to do this or that and you signed this document!" But the official only shrugs his shoulders: "I can't do anything. The circumstances have changed."

Yes, they are different now. The federal center will no longer assist everyone indiscriminately. A regional head should first explain why the regional authorities have failed to fulfill the obligations they have assumed. The further, the more difficult it is for regional heads to conceal their failures. The All-Russian Popular Front public movement is contributing to this process along with the media and the Internet. However, the Internet is a stick that has two ends: it can do good service but it can also be a real garbage place. In any case, control has become tighter, including from ordinary citizens who find a way to declare violations they have seen.

The heads unwilling or unable to realize that the times have changed are surrendering their powers in one way or another and quitting the scene.

- Actually, only the Kremlin can remove governors. Vyacheslav Dudka [former governor of the Tula Region] and Vasily Yurchenko [former governor of the Novosibirsk Region] have quit their posts as they have lost the president's confidence. Alexander Khoroshavin [former governor of the Sakhalin Region] is under investigation for bribes worth millions of rubles while Vyacheslav Gaizer [former head of the Republic of Komi], as it turns out, organized a criminal group. Will this series be continued?

- Do you want us to arrest someone every week? Or do you believe, perhaps, that every governor in Russia is a swindler and a thief? I personally don't think so. I'm confident that an overwhelming majority of officials, both at the regional and federal levels, are honest and nice people. You can't smear black paint on everyone.

All the necessary anti-corruption legislative acts have been adopted in Russia. Now they have to be strictly observed. For example, government officials have been publishing their income declarations for many years now.  I published my declaration for the first time back in 2000 and it was a completely natural and customary process for me. Another thing is that apart from direct corruption we still have a very unfavorable situation with the so-called conflict of interests. How does this look like in practice? Perhaps, you know the examples when a particular official makes a decision on the distribution of procurement orders for the fulfillment of works financed from the state treasury or under state purchases and it subsequently turns out that the tender contract was surprisingly awarded to a company affiliated with that official. It turns out that the official's daughter is working at this company as its president or his wife sits on the company's board of directors. Such practice is widespread. On October 6, President Vladimir Putin signed a law, which clearly defines a conflict of interest for government officials, ways to avoid it and measures, which an official is obliged to take (precisely what he is obliged to do) in cases when there is a threat of the emergence of a conflict situation. You know, the law started to work even before it officially came into force. I'm head of the presidium of the Anti-Corruption Council under the Russian president and we examine non-publicly in the "Miscellaneous" section the inquiries by officials, including high-level functionaries, who inform us that a conflict of interest may emerge under certain circumstances. Or let us consider a different situation: a person quits government service and wants to continue work in a company, which in the past had relation, say, to the ministry where this official worked. People ask the question: can we accept the invitation? We have a lot of such inquiries. Sometimes, we give our permission but refusals also occur. Everything depends on a particular situation.

And this is very good. Anti-corruption behavior is gradually becoming normal practice. Of course, high-profile probes are always much spoken about and the media likes such cases. One governor was jailed, another governor was removed from his post ... But you want more. Are you calling us into the year 1937 when the revolutionary justice was administered without court proceedings and investigation?

- Why so? This should be done properly, under law.

- Look, there must be weighty arguments to place a person under arrest. Is it clear? For your information, nine governors have been criminally prosecuted over the past few years, both incumbent and those who have left their posts. But I want to say about a different thing. High-profile cases are much written and spoken about and this is perhaps right but you should know that Russian courts annually pass dozens of thousands of guilty verdicts for corruption-related crimes. Dozens of thousands!

- What is the level these crimes are committed at?

- This is what I'm talking about. When a doctor or a school teacher is convicted for a bribe - and this happens in a majority of cases - this seems to be dull and uninteresting. But there is an uproar when the convict is a governor or a minister. The struggle against corruption is not a campaign or a PR-action, with the help of which the authorities try to gain additional points and raise their popularity. There must be no witch-hunt just to please someone. And there can be no selective justice depending on the defendant's post. If there are grounds, charges are brought against a person without a backward glance at the person's post or status. The most important thing is that there are no unpunishable persons in anti-corruption activity. Otherwise, governors would not be arrested and their fate would be decided in a somewhat behind-the-scenes process.

- I recall your interview you gave three years ago to TV Channel One where you said what you knew: people who were previously treated with trust were stealing. But you had to tolerate this and give no sign...

- This was the case about large-scale embezzlement of budget funds from the GLONASS federal program [for the development of the national satellite grouping]. At that time, I had a closed-door meeting with Interior Ministry officers investigating the case. They told me about the details of the probe but it had been going on for a long time and it was important for me not to give myself away so as not to frighten away the suspects. I didn't mention this in the interview but I believe it is clear to everyone that when we learnt about the theft we changed the scheme of the project's financing to exclude the embezzlement of budget funds. This is absolutely obvious! Some eighteen months later, we opened a criminal case and brought charges. Today some of these persons are no longer alive while others are far off, serving their prison term ... You should understand that a suspicion is not yet a proof and the presidential administration is not the Investigative Committee...

- But the corrupt officials submitted tax returns in accordance with the established procedure, in which everything, perhaps, looked fine, but a closer examination would reveal ...

- The laundering of budget funds and their withdrawal into offshore havens are not declared and bank accounts in Cyprus or somewhere on the Virgin Islands are not indicated either. But there is no direct relationship here. Corruption has become very intricate and latent and proofs in corruption cases are obtained quite rigorously and carefully. This means that consistent efforts were taken to look into and find the proofs against corrupt persons.

- There is a widespread opinion that there are files with incriminating evidence on everyone and a particular file is taken out at the right time and put on the president's desk.

- Absolute nonsense! If such files exist and they should be called cases, then these are in law-enforcement agencies. Perhaps, there are such cases there. This is even for sure and not just probably. People are not arrested without reason in our country.

- When did you learn about the arrest of Gaizer, for example?

- When it was reported in news programs. The reports came either from the TASS news wire or TV news. And I don't consider it possible to comment on this case because I haven't seen it and I don't know the details. No one informed me in advance or consulted with me about where to carry out this special operation, if you're talking about this. Don't think that everything is decided in the Kremlin. Much is decided but not everything.

Let me repeat again: the presidential administration, indeed, analyzes the income declarations of officials, above all, top-level persons. We check the correctness of data indicated in such declarations. Apparently, I'll speak separately on this topic at the end of the year to inform how many cases we have revealed among officials submitting untrue data, which served as the ground for their dismissal due to the loss of confidence. But this does not mean that they are criminals and you shouldn't confuse different things.
---

About work "in the field," spymania, the government's fear, the split of elites, the yacht of Andrei Melnichenko, sad Roman Abramovich and the prospects of Transaero airline

 - You referred to your previous service, as if unintentionally, already twice. I mean the special service. Does this experience help you in your current work?

- Perhaps, not very much now. When did I quit the service? This was in 2000. After that, I worked as defense minister, and the first vice-premier. I know a saying, although, that there can be no former intelligence officers... Yes, indeed, I spent the larger conscious part of my life in the Foreign Intelligence Service. Twenty-five calendar years are no joke. The past experience undoubtedly offers some help, for instance, when international issues are discussed, thanks to a good command of the English language.

-  I'm talking about a different thing, about the mind-set and a peculiar view on the world.

- Maybe. The ability to switch from one thing to another and the quick reaction...

- And what about the saying: "trust but verify?"

- Ah, you're talking about this. You know I was engaged in political intelligence and largely worked in the field and finished the overseas part of my service as a resident. This is how it was: I had to trust comrades blindly because there were no possibilities to verify. You can't suspect your comrades because this is even worse and more dangerous.

. Another thing is that you should read people well and know whom you can rely on.

- But a weak link may not reveal itself immediately. Incidentally, the West imposed sanctions against Russia in the hope of the elites' split. It expected that the close circle of Vladimir Putin would be discontent with the infringement of its freedoms and ... Has this plan worked, in your view?

- Yes, but only in a mirror-like manner. It seems to me that the elites have split abroad rather than in our country. You, perhaps, analyze the western media. Haven't you noticed that when officials - ministers, speakers and, all the more so, presidents or the heads of governments - speak, they criticize Russia unmercifully with a frown on their faces and a quivering voice. It follows from their speeches that we're wrong in everything and everywhere, in Ukraine, Syria and wherever else. But when politicians who have left the upper echelons of power for various reasons start to speak, the tonality of their speeches changes dramatically. Foreign and defense ministers and other reputable persons who have left their posts suddenly begin to openly show solidarity with our position on many issues. What does this suggest? This suggests that you are obliged to talk this way and no other way while you are in power. It is only after you resign that you can express your own thoughts and views. This is not forbidden but only for ex-officials and not for persons holding posts. Those who return to power, start to criticize us with a new vigor. I have long grown accustomed to this. And look at it with humor.

- And what about our elites?

- What do you mean? Give the examples.

- One part of the business elite has been hit by sanctions due to friendship with Vladimir Putin and is deprived of the possibility to go to Europe and use its money and real estate there. Meanwhile, the world's largest yacht worth over $400 million is set afloat in Germany for [Russian billionaire businessman] Andrei Melnichenko. Also, [Russian billionaire] Roman Abramovich has been rejoicing at the successes of his FC Chelsea in London for many years.

- This is a provocative question. Where is the conflict? I don't understand. First of all, about the elites. I have said on many occasions that I dislike this word very much. To my mind, this word can be used for those who have done something useful, necessary and tangible for the home country in the course of several generations. Too many volunteers in our country award themselves with this title without sufficient grounds for that. This is the first general remark. Excuse me for departing from the theme.

Now, let me speak to the point. What is the name of the yacht's owner, as you say?

- Melnichenko.

A: Where did you get the information about the vessel's cost?

- This is an expert estimate. The yacht was built at the German shipyard Nobiskrug...

- I strongly doubt that this figure is true but there is another thing that matters. The question is whether Mr. Melnichenko acquired this yacht with legally earned funds. This is the main and the sole thing that matters for me. I understand that wealthy and successful people are disliked and even hated in our country, unfortunately. But if a man buys something with his earned money, this is his personal matter.

- I asked not about a specific yacht but about the relations between those who can go abroad and those who are deprived or, to be more exact, limited in their freedom of travel across the world.

- Yes, some representatives of the business circles (but not elites) have suffered from the sanctions, as you put it. But everything is relative. I believe, although I do not assert, that [Gennady] Timchenko or [Arkady and Boris] Rottenberg [the Russian billionaire businessmen hit by the western sanctions] also have yachts. No one has taken these yachts away from them. This is point No. 1.  They are still free to travel aboard their yachts everywhere they want. Let me repeat again: the globe is not limited by the Old and the New World. This is point No. 2. So, don't bother much about them. As for Abramovich, his FC Chelsea has made an unfortunate start in the English Championship and holds a place at the bottom of the tournament standings. This can hardly please the club's owner. This is point No. 3. But the key question again is the money with which Roman Abramovich bought the London team many years ago. If the money is legal, then the theme is closed for me.

 As for how some businessmen look at others and how, it is better to address this question to them. I believe that no problems arise in interpersonal communication there and everything is understandable to everyone. But this is my presumption. Strictly speaking, in the context of the influence of sanctions on business, it is more appropriate to talk not about the freedom of travel across the world but, say, about the restricted access to the capital market, which, indeed, has serious economic consequences for companies included in the sanctions lists.

- Let us switch from yachts to aircraft to reduce the heat of our discussion. Let us talk about private rather than personal planes. Airline Transaero has gone bankrupt. Will Aeroflot become the monopoly on the market after its departure? Please, answer me as the person who oversaw the transport sector in the government for a long time. Is it good or bad?

- There will be no monopoly. Even if Aeroflot had included Transaero in its balance sheet, as was planned, its share would have been from 48 to 52 percent on the market. But the deal fell through. The government is now considering other options. Transaero managers are largely to blame themselves: they were wrong with the business strategy, took planes on lease for foreign currency and then the ruble plummeted and they got into this situation. It isn't the state that is to blame for this. We supported Transaero as a national airline for a long time and now it is important that passengers and, of course, the airline's staff - pilots, stewardesses and ground personnel - should not suffer from this. Meanwhile, the enlargement of companies is world practice. Perhaps, you know that the Dutch KLM is now part of Air France while the Scandinavian SAS has been merged into Lufthansa while the Spanish Iberia failed to live through the previous crisis. Weak operators are taken over or swallowed up. This happens everywhere.  But Aeroflot surely won't be the sole player on the domestic market.

- But no one encroaches on the monopoly of Russian Railways (RZD). It is true, though, that RZD Head Vladimir Yakunin who seemed to hold his post firmly had to resign.

- As far as I know, the resignation was discussed for some time and was no surprise for Yakunin. As for his plans to become a senator and then his decision to give up these plans, this is his personal matter.

Oleg Belozyorov became the RZD head in August and recently informed Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev that the company planned to reach a breakeven point in suburban railway communication in 2015. For the first time ever! Earlier, billions of rubles were spent in subsides from the federal budget on this.

There are a lot of problems in the sector. Railway carriage tariffs remain very high and I would say excessively high. As a result, we have huge imbalances. Businessmen try to transport any cargo by road. It comes to absurdity when metal and coal are transported by trucks to a distance of several hundred kilometers. This is because you don't have to pay for the operation of highways and everything is for free. Now we'll finally start collecting a fee from trucks with a weight of over 12 tons. They damage the roadbed very much!

 Incidentally, I recollected that in the early 2000 we discussed a proposal in the government on introducing toll highways. There were so many heated debates. The question was about whether it was necessary to charge a fee from drivers. Most of the Cabinet members did not support me. I had to explain and prove everything. Did you ride in Sheremetyevo along the new section of a future Moscow-Petersburg toll road? It takes you just five minutes to arrive. Now each person is free to choose: either to pay 100 rubles for the speed and convenience or move slowly in traffic jams. We live in a free country...

- Incidentally, about the airports. What caused your criticism in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatski when you lashed at the heads of Dalspetsstroi [the Far Eastern branch of the Federal Agency for Special Construction] as you talked before TV cameras. Were you so struck by the disruption of the local port reconstruction?

- Everything can be understood in comparison. I remember that I used to fly to Vladivostok as the defense minister when the aerodrome belonged to the Pacific Fleet. You couldn't look without tears at it: a shed and a bad landing strip made of concrete plates. And look at the airport built now there. Or in Yekaterinburg. In Sochi, Novosibirsk. I'm mentioning the facilities from memory. This list can be continued. As far as I remember, we have invested over 380 billion rubles in the reconstruction of airports in the past ten years, including large aerodromes. Of this sum, about 250 billion rubles were invested from the budget.

It is not the money that is a problem in Kamchatka. The funds for the construction of the second strip were allocated in full. The new takeoff and landing strip was built a year ago but planes can't take off or land because there is no flight control tower there. The schedule of finishing the construction work was delayed by about eight months. When I learnt about this in Petropavlovsk, I decided to look into the matter. In general, the problem is typical and it repeats in miniature what is happening at the construction site of the Vostochny cosmodrome. Budget funds were allocated, contractors received assignments but one of them took the money and disappeared on the vast expenses of Russia or even perhaps left the country.

So I had to reprimand them, to put it delicately. And now I receive reports every ten days on the pace of construction. Dalspetsstroi is completing works in the building of the flight control centre. In early November, specialists of Almaz-Antey company will start installing modern technological equipment for air traffic control. The equipment has been purchased and only has to be installed.

As a result, after a one-year delay, Kamchatka residents and, I hope, most Russians who want to get to these beautiful places will be able to use the new airport. I like Kamchatka very much and consider it one of the world's wonders.

- Will you go to accept the works?

- Probably. But at first I'll wait for a report that everything is finished and ready for operation.
---

On general shoulder straps, retirement at 47, the snows of Kilimanjaro, traitor Gordievsky and human weaknesses

- Speaking about transport and roads... do you have a car?

- I don't need one. Honestly, I am using an official car. I gave up driving long ago when I became a subject of state protection in 1999.

But I liked driving. I had a Volga Gaz 24 made for export and coated with lead oxide. A good car! And I put many kilometers on that vehicle, some 300,000. Once I took a drive from Moscow to Petrozavodsk. Without refueling. I had a hybrid Volga car using both petroleum and natural gas. You know, those special tanks in the trunk? I could drive halfway with gas and then easily switch to petroleum and drove for another 500 kilometers casting superior glances at long lines at a few petrol stations. I had the right to feel fair pride. Eventually I honestly earned money to buy the Russian car-making marvel while serving the Motherland abroad.

 - Mr. Ivanov, I've noticed that you almost never wear military uniform. But on May 9 this year you suddenly appeared in colonel general's jacket...

I have worn uniform in public twice in my life. I am stressing - in public. The first time was in 2000 when the 55th anniversary of the Victory was celebrated. I served as Russian Security Council secretary at that time. And the second time was last May as you just noted. Victory Day is a sacred holiday for me, as for many our compatriots. As I had a direct attitude to service, although it was not army service, I deemed it possible to wear uniform.

I've been retired since 2000. When I was Security Council secretary Vladimir Putin said my candidacy was considered for the post of defense minister. At that time I was a special service general and told the president I deemed it wrong. In my opinion, an intelligence officer, a serving one, not a retired one, cannot head the armed forces.

- And what's the problem?

- Can you imagine a police general come and start commanding the foreign intelligence service (SVR)? I cannot picture this. We have written and unwritten rules, some ethics of relations between representatives of different services and troops. It's hard to explain this to a civilian.

- But Sergey Shoigu, the Emergencies Ministry's General of the Army, moved to Arbat Square and that's fine.

- After leaving the Emergencies Ministry, Sergey Shoigu suspended service. He worked as the Moscow Region's governor for six months and only then became defense minister. All is logical.

So, back in 2000 I had no doubts that a special services officer should not head other 'institution of force'. And I am still convinced in this. Therefore, I told President Putin then that I'd like to retire for the sake of soonest adaptation at my new position. Vladimir Putin agreed with this logic and signed my resignation, because, as you know, he had also worked for the foreign intelligence service.

So at the age of 47 I became a military retiree and I still am and even getting good retirement benefits. Along with my salary of a presidential staff official.

I've now turned to past and recalled a conversation with George W. Bush when he came to St. Petersburg in the early 2000s. We were taking a river cruise along the Neva, standing on the deck and I pointed at the famous "Big House" on Liteiny avenue, the former KGB headquarters in Leningrad and the current FSB headquarters. I told him, "See the window on the seventh floor? It's the office where Putin and I started our professional career as young operatives."

- Did you share one office?

- Neighboring ones.

And Bush said in reply, "Sergey, you must know that my father was a CIA director for a long while and then became US president. So the father always told me that Langley, not the White House, was the most interesting period in his life."

- Are you ready to subscribe to these words?

- Fortunately, I have nothing to do both with the White House and Langley, but I enjoyed my intelligence service. And I think I was doing well. But it's better to assess from the outside.

- Once you quoted Kissinger in this regard...

- He said that every decent guy should start career with army or secret services. I started with second. Kissinger is a giant of a man, a very interesting interlocutor and I do respect him endlessly. Before I was banned entry to the US over sanctions, I met him there many times and Kissinger even invited me to his New York apartment. And when the former secretary of state visits Moscow, I try not to miss a chance to meet with him.

But of course, we don't talk about intelligence work.

- Mr. Ivanov, you have a perfect surname for a spy, which makes it easy to mix with the crowd.

- I'll tell you a funny story. When I served as Russian defense minister in the early 2000s, I often came to London and British journalists always told me, "But you were deported from England!" I was really surprised. And then I learned that some Ivanov Sergey Borisovich had been deported, indeed. But he was born in 1952 and I was born in 1953. My namesake got in a mess in Britain. Such an odd coincidence!

As for my surname, Ivanov is my father's. My mother's surname was Petukhov.

So, I've confessed everything.

- And why won't you stubbornly name the countries where you served?

- Of course, this is no big secret today but no one has canceled certain ethics. Under the law all intelligence secrets can be disclosed only after 75 years. My time has not come yet.

- I can quote your interview given 15 years ago, "I saw Kilimanjaro but I won't tell you from which side." Just try to guess - from Kenya or from Tanzania.

- And I can repeat it now. But I'll add that I saw the mountain from both sides... As you see, I don't reject what I said and don't deceive anyone.

- Did you follow in Hemingway's footsteps to the snows of Kilimanjaro?

- I was not a tourist, I was working there. But I sometimes think of those places, indeed. They are worth visiting. East Africa - Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda - are known for their amazing national parks where predators and other animals live in their natural habitat and walk at large while people are watching them from a respectful distance. Those sights are sealed in memory forever.

But where and how I worked is not for the media, I'm sorry. Of course, some things are well known as I didn't conceal them. I've already told you that political intelligence was my specialization and I was focused on the West. I ended my service abroad as a KGB resident and then worked as first deputy head of the SVR European intelligence department.

- Once you've mentioned that you faced betrayal which affected your career. What's it all about?

- I can tell you now... I knew a man named Gordievsky. If he can be called a man, of course. I cannot say that his shameful betrayal and recruitment by the British intelligence service broke my life but I got certain problems at work. Roughly speaking, Gordievsky turned me in. After that, I had some foreign assignments but in other locations.

Since then I feel a great aversion to treasons. There were traitors in intelligence in the early 1990s. If you remember, a group of sleeper agents has suffered recently... It is fair to say that CIA and FBI also had defectors to our side. Secret services never sleep.

You know, you've asked what marks my previous job left on me. I don't like long, ponderous and off-the-point answers to simple questions. Intelligence work requires precision and specifics. And I am a quite pragmatic person by nature. There is much work to do, why would I waste my and other people's time? When a person is making a long and monotonous speech about something for half an hour and you can understand nothing of what he's saying, you unwittingly get irritated. Why just don't admit that you don't know the answer and, therefore, keep drawing circles in the air?

Nobody can know everything. I have never been afraid of telling a professional that he knows the subject better. There is nothing shameful about it. It's normal! Teaching fish to swim will never come to my mind. Or giving advice to the coach how he should train the team ahead of a decisive match.

- Well, yes, Mr. Ivanov, you are a sports lover.

- What does "lover" mean? As a normal Soviet child, I played football, hockey, volleyball, handball and once even tried to play water polo, which almost killed me. That's a horsey sport, excuse my French. One should be very strong to endure such loads. And I was not even in my best years. I tried to play golf later but it didn't go well. Everything needs time, no success comes at once. I was playing basketball for a while and even achieved certain results but suffered an ankle injury and had to become a fan long ago.

- An ardent one. You even remember Chelsea's table position, as far as I know.

- I don't follow the English championship intentionally but if I flip through Sport Express daily in the car I look at the results. But I am a CSKA fan. In all sports - football, hockey, basketball.

And, of course, the Russian team led by Leonid Slutsky has made my day. We broke through to Euro 2016 when all chances seemed to be lost. I was at the Otkritiye Arena to support the team at the match with Montenegro when the stadium was full.

- How shall we divide Leonid Slutsky between the national team and the club?

- The coach is neither a wardrobe, nor a sack of potatoes... Slutsky is an unusual coach. I guess no one already doubts his professionalism. Remember those clamors against the combination of positions. And two months later CSKA are evident leaders of the Russian football championships and the national team won four straight victories and qualified for the French tournament without play-offs. What other reasons are needed? Before the end of the Russian championships, the national team has to hold two short gatherings and play friendly matches. That's all! What is the problem? I've already expressed my opinion: I think Slutsky should stay at CSKA by the end of the season and then the Russian Football Union should agree on Leonid's contract bailout. More reasoning will follow. But it's up to Vitaly Mutko.

- CSKA President Yevgeny Giner said that Slutsky's contract is worth a billion dollars.

- One should understand jokes! I hope Vitaly Mutko will come to terms with Yevgeny Giner... Giner is a reasonable and sound person, although he can be tough and shrewd. This is normal. That's his character. When someone says he has no faults, it's alarming. It means he is mistaken or wants to hide something. A suspicion situation, don't you think?

 #2
Government.ru
October 17, 2015
Dmitry Medvedev's interview with Vesti v Subbotu (News on Saturday) programme by the Rossiya television network

Dmitry Medvedev spoke with Vesti v Subbotu host Sergei Brilyov on the situation in Syria.

Transcript:

Sergei Brilyov: Mr Medvedev, thank you for taking a few minutes to talk with us. I'm aware that you came here straight from a meeting of the Presidium of the Presidential Council for Economic Modernisation and Innovative Development.

Dmitry Medvedev: Yes, the meeting has just finished.

Sergei Brilyov:Unfortunately, my question is not about anything modern, but rather, the well-known archaic developments that are happening in world politics. I'm referring to the United States refusing to accept the Russian delegation, led by you, especially as you have good personal relations with President Obama. Were you surprised? What was your reaction?

Dmitry Medvedev: I think that personal relations don't have anything to do with it. National interests always prevail. What happened? A major conflict has broken out, and it must be addressed. However, the current US administration has reacted in a fairly strange manner. By the way, it is routinely blamed for things that it can't afford to allow itself, such as weakness, indecision and incompetence. On top of this, it is blamed for not taking appropriate measures to uphold its priorities. I'm not sure if this is the case, it's up to them to decide. But judging by the statements that were made this week, including by some White House clerks, it seems to be true.

Let me give you a quick recap of the Syrian events. A conflict began there in 2010-2011. Our initial position was to refrain from taking any decisions aimed at undermining the authority of the current Syrian government. Next, the "Islamic State", or ISIS, became a problem. The Americans proposed dealing with this evil jointly. We said yes, we think it's the right thing to do, and we are willing to do it. The question is how. After ISIS began to spread like a cancer throughout the Middle East, we told them that we were willing to join the combined anti-terrorist efforts. However, to do so, we need a mandate from the Syrian government. Our country obtained such a mandate in the form of a corresponding request by Syria's President al-Assad. Therefore, we have the necessary legal grounds to fight terrorism in that country. But how should we go about this fight? In order to fight anyone, you need to understand who the target is. In a collaborative effort with the Syrian leaders, we have identified several targets. The Commander-in-Chief made an appropriate decision, and the armed forces began their operations. The Americans are disgruntled. They are telling us that either the strikes or the targets are wrong. To our legitimate requests to provide us with the correct targets, they say they won't do that. We say okay, but then at least show us which targets we should not attack, and they come back with the same answer. What kind of cooperation is that?

The Russian President decided to come up with a proposal to hold consultations with them. The fact is, our US colleagues keep telling us that this problem should be addressed in a comprehensive manner, and that it's imperative that we agree on Syria's future, discuss the fate of President al-Assad and resolve the situation politically. We have no objections to that - hence, the idea of a political delegation including specific members. Such a delegation would be in a position to discuss a variety of issues, ranging from the military all the way to political angles, focusing on a national dialogue and settlement. This seems to make sense. However, the US administration came back with a counterintuitive response, saying that they don't need it, because Russia is behaving incorrectly, and such a dialogue is impossible. This is the situation.

Sergei Brilyov: When was Russia's proposal to send a delegation led by you to the United States made public?

Dmitry Medvedev: It was quite recently, soon after the start of the corresponding phase of the military operation.

Sergei Brilyov: Not in New York during the consultations?

Dmitry Medvedev: No, not in New York. We behaved like partners in this sense. The President spoke with his opposite number, and consultations were held at the level of foreign ministers. But this message was sent after the military operations had begun.

Sergei Brilyov: I'm going to ask you a somewhat unrelated question. We have never discussed it with you before. You are originally from Leningrad, now St Petersburg. I hope you like the movie Pokrovsky Gates which is set in Moscow?

Dmitry Medvedev: I do, just like any other good Soviet film.

Sergei Brilyov: There's a line where the main character - Kostik - asks someone to describe his feelings. He says, "What do these people make you feel?" Wait, I've even copied this line from the script to make sure I got it right.

Dmitry Medvedev: Well, it's a classic of Russian film, so quoting it is appropriate.

Sergei Brilyov: Yes, here you go. Here's what he says, "Is it frustration, sympathy, compassion, or, perhaps, fondness?" And I'd add, perhaps, disappointment?

Dmitry Medvedev: Are you talking about the US actions ...

Sergei Brilyov: Your attitude towards the Americans.

Dmitry Medvedev: You know, I'll put it this way: I think it's foolish behavior. By making such decisions or refusing to talk, the Americans are simply showing their weakness. After all, everyone can see that their activities in this region to combat ISIS have amounted to practically nothing, and ISIS continues to spread. Only Russia's involvement has changed the situation. Still, they say that they won't talk with us. This, I believe, is a shortsighted and weak position, because strong and responsible leaders and states accept offers to hold talks even in situations where the parties may see things differently. In any case, we never avoided talks. Let's wait and see. As our President said, we are open to discuss any issues, and I'm here to say it again.

Sergei Brilyov: Here's my last question about this. There was a feeling that the people with whom you were supposed to go to Washington - representatives of the General Staff and the Defence Ministry - were going there to discuss purely military matters. However, since the delegation was to be led by you, you were bound to discuss ways to achieve political settlement. Is that right?

Dmitry Medvedev: That's exactly what our US colleagues said in a surprised tone, "So, you want to discuss political issues?" Indeed, Russia, the United States, and all other states that have a stake in seeing peace in this region and in Syria, and a strong government, too, should be discussing precisely political issues. It doesn't really matter who will be at the helm. We don't want ISIS to run Syria, do we? It should be a civilised and legitimate government. This is what we need to discuss.

Sergei Brilyov: So, it doesn't have to be Bashar al-Assad? Russia is often accused today of protecting not itself, but Bashar al-Assad.

Dmitry Medvedev: No, absolutely not. It's up to the Syrian people to decide who will be the head of Syria. By the way, Syria is a multiethnic, multi-faith and a fairly complex nation. It's up to the people to decide. At the moment, we operate on the premise that al-Assad is the legitimate president. I may be one of the few who was in Syria before the war, and saw what Syria was like before the war. I can tell you that it was a strong and quite modern state...

Sergei Brilyov: Well, not without authoritarianism, but peaceful.

Dmitry Medvedev: Yes, a peaceful state, absolutely right. Monuments were not destroyed there, and the economy was good. Now, it has become a mess. This is the most unpleasant outcome of the recent developments. So, of course, we are not fighting to back specific leaders. On the one hand, we are defending our national interests. The President said that if we don't destroy these terrorists there, they will come to Russia. On the other hand, we received a request for help from legitimate Syrian authorities. This is where we proceed from.

Sergei Brilyov: So, we'll be waiting for the Americans to come to their senses?

Dmitry Medvedev: We'll see what kind of decisions they are going to make. Anyway, I reiterate: Clearly, our country has made the first step in this area, and we are open to dialogue.

Sergei Brilyov: Thank you, Mr Medvedev.
 
 #3
Al Jazeera
www.aljazeera.com
October 16, 2015
Putin shows his realism in Syria
A lack of moderate Syrian opposition forces has forced Washington to give tacit consent to Russian intervention.
By Anatol Lieven
Anatol Lieven is a professor at Georgetown University in Qatar and a visiting professor at King's College London.

The Russian government has a number of different motives for its intervention in the conflict in Syria. Among these are the desire to help an old ally, to be seen once more as a great power on the world stage, and establish a position that will force US and European leaders to treat Russia's views with greater respect, especially over the Ukraine crisis.

Russia's strategy, however, also stems from a particular analysis of the situation in Syria based on a mixture of hard-headed realism and the experience of over two decades since the fall of communism. The Russian analysis is that the US strategy of arming and building up the Syrian "moderate opposition" never stood any chance of success and has now been recognised by the Pentagon as a failed strategy. Also, under these circumstances, if the Baath state in Damascus is overthrown, the result will be, at best, long-term anarchy; and at worst: a takeover by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and al-Qaeda.

Reminiscent of Western tactics

Moscow has, therefore, decided to provide the Syrian state and its Hezbollah and Kurdish allies with a Russian air force, in the same way (in the view of Russian officials) the US provided an air force for the Libyan opposition in 2011, the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan in 2001, the Kosovo Liberation Army in 1999, and the Croatian army in 1995.

This Russian decision came when it did because Syrian state forces seemed to be crumbling in the face of ISIL attacks, and also because the state of US policy and interests have made it highly unlikely that the US would do anything to block Russia's actions.

On the last point, Russian analysis has already been shown to be entirely correct. This is because US officials are now faced with an interlocking set of seemingly impossible dilemmas in the Middle East. For obvious reasons, ISIL has now joined al-Qaeda, by the US' thinking, as posing by far the greatest threat of terrorism against the US and Europe. In Iraq, this has led to what amounts to US-Iranian cooperation in supporting the Shia-dominated Iraqi government against ISIL. This has also contributed to the Obama administration's nuclear deal with Iran.

The US' inability to block Russia's new strategy is also because, in private, considerable parts of the security and intelligence communities in Washington and other Western capitals essentially agree with Russian analyses: that the moderate Syrian opposition is not developing as a serious military force.

In the kind of simple strategic calculations beloved by international relations students (and which actually happened on occasions during the Cold War), the US would simply move over towards an alliance with Iran, Hezbollah and the Syrian state in the region. But this is obviously impossible for multiple reasons: It would cost the US its alliance with Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States and Turkey - with dangerous implications for the wider struggle against terrorism.

Washington is, therefore, left with a set of essentially contradictory interests and policies in the region. Indeed, and very largely because of past US actions, the Middle East has developed such complex and heavily-armed conflicts that no stable hegemony over the region is currently possible.

Tacit consent

The US' inability to block Russia's new strategy is also because, in private, considerable parts of the security and intelligence communities in Washington and other Western capitals essentially agree with Russian analyses: that the moderate Syrian opposition is not developing as a serious military force.

Under these circumstances, to destroy the Syrian government and army would risk playing disastrously into the hands of ISIL and al-Qaeda. These analysts fully recognise the odious record of the Syrian state - but the concept of "our son of a b***h" is no more alien to the CIA than it is to the KGB.

The development of this kind of thinking in the West brings these analysts closer to an underlying feature of Russian analysis ( also shared by many others in Beijing, Delhi and elsewhere), that in many parts of the world, states - not regimes, but states - are far more fragile entities than most Western thinking has assumed. Very often, regimes and states are one and the same thing, so that if you bring down one, you also destroy the other. The consequences of this - especially in an era of international terrorists seeking safe havens in ungoverned territories - may be much worse than leaving a dictatorship in power.

This thinking has its roots in historical memories of past periods of chaos in their own countries. It is close to the old saying - in its different forms - that: "A day of anarchy is worse than a hundred years of tyranny". In the view of Moscow, the examples of Afghanistan since 1992, Iraq since 2003, and Libya since 2011 have proved this argument so definitively that no further discussion is necessary.

A certain mood is, therefore, growing in Washington to let Moscow pursue its intervention in Syria and garner all the resulting risks and unpopularity, while, perhaps in the wider scheme of things, also serving long-term US interests. Among these risks for the Russian government are that the Russian people themselves may turn against this intervention, which - according to opinion polls - they seem to view in a very different light to Moscow's strategy in Ukraine. If Washington had a real and viable choice in the matter, this might well be described as a dreadfully cynical US approach. But does Washington have a choice?
 
 #4
The Independent (UK)
October 19, 2015
Putin's aim is clear: to restore the principle of sovereignty to international affairs
The Russian President has two messages - one for his audience at home, one for the West
By Vladislav L Inozemtsev
Vladislav L. Inozemtsev Ph.D. (Econ.) is Senior Visiting Fellow with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington (DC) and Professor at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow

Contrary to received wisdom, Russia's military action in Syria poses no big threat to the existing global order. It was pure Vladimir Putin, of course: preceded by the lack of any military build-up, discussed secretly with Western leaders, and later approved by the parliament in minutes. In fact it may, under some circumstances, even help sustain it.

What distinguishes Russia's actions in Syria from those undertaken in Crimea and in the eastern parts of Ukraine, is above all its institutionalized character. Whatever may be said about Mr Putin's long-term goals, the current situation looks perfectly clear: a country (Russia) being asked by a foreign government (Syria) that has be�en con��sidered legitimate for decades and that is represented in the UN and other international organizations, to provide military assistance, for an ailing regime. Anysuggestion that the Russian airforce hit not so much the Islamic State's militants but Bashar al-Assad's political antagonists are senseless: they are doing exactly what the Syrian dictator is asking for, and not something else. Russians believe that Mr Assad's enemies are their targets, since Moscow and Damascus are allies - and this is sufficient grounds for the involvement.

But what is the real cause of Russia's engagement in Syria, the deeper reason for Mr Putin to send his servicemen overseas? There are two elements of the answer: on the one hand, he shows his fellow citizens that Russia may act in different parts of the world, it is strong and powerful, and may constrain terrorists; on the other, he wants to send a signal to the West.

It's crucial that the West carefully reads what this signal means - because global politics for the foreseeable future will depend on how that message is decrypted. I would argue that the most widespread explanation - that Mr Putin wishes to strike a new deal with the US and Europe, the one under which he will help the West to fight Isla�mic extremists in exchange for forgetting about Ukraine - may be misleading. Of course, the Kremlin is not so na�ve as to believe that the major powers will become accustomed to the existence of an unstable Ukrainian state, plagued by Russian-led separatists, on Europe's borders. Mr Putin's message seems to address another is�sue, quite different from the establishment of Cold-War-like "spheres of interests" in the 21st-Century world.

However provocative it may look, it's all about the foundations of the current global system, and first of all, about the principles of sovereignty and non-inter�ference. In my view Mr Putin is actually concerned by one is�sue alone - that of his own position as Russia's lifetime paramount leader. He cares mo�re and more about the global order in which, as he sees it, the principles of so�vereignty are no longer respected. He realises that in recent years the West made a huge advance towards Russia's borders byenlarging NATO and the EU; that it either destroyed some autocratic regimes or seduced them to become more co-�op�erative; that the US is building new "coalitions of the willing" which may topple any political leader they choose.

What Russia is defending in Syria is not actually Bashar al-Assad's regime. Nor is it fighting the global terrorist network. Moscow is to�day attempting to re-establish its own notion of sovereignty that was the common one just se�veral decades ago. Taking this into account, the West perhaps ought to rethink its strategy to�wards Russia, trying to smooth relations but stopping short of engaging in a series of trade-offs with Moscow.

In recent decades both the West and Russia made strategic moves that were not welcomed by theother side. The US and NATO backed the secession of Kosovo in 1999, and then recognized the break-up province as a sovereign state. The Russi�ans actually did exactly the same in 2008 in Georgia, using the very same rheto�r�ic of humanitarian intervention. These two cases were highly disruptive for the current international regime - but no one called for an international conference or convention on debating, and finally legitimizing, humanitarian involvement. In 2003, the US organized a coalition for waging a war against Iraq, saying that this state developed a chemical weapons program - a claim that was not proved later; sin�ce then, similar coalitions were organized in support of anti-government forces in both Libya and now Syria. Russia believed this was a complete destruction of the traditional notion of state sovereignty - and in some part it became an excuse for neglecting the sovereign powers of a country in trouble.

In the case of Crimea in 2014, Moscow acted in ways similar to the West - but while the Western powers decided to topple the governments of unstable nations, Russian leaders preferred to occupy (formally or not) some parts of their territory. Of course, Russia's acti�ons were a rude violation of international law, but the Western interventions could hardly be called legitimate either. And now something should be done to stop this race toward the complete destruction of the international order.

To reiterate, many politicians believe, that Mr Putin wants to exchange some concessions in Syria for the same in Ukraine: e.g., Russia stops supporting Bashar al-Assad, and the West agrees with Russian occupation of Crimea. In this case, however, the result will be only the legitimation of illegitimate actions in different parts of the globe, attributed to some great power's "sphere of interest". In return for better concessions, the West should change the agenda completely.

It should agree that the traditional sense of sovereignty must be respected, and therefore Mr al-Assad might be considered Syria's legitimate ruler, and some ter�ritories of his state might be seen as violently annexed by either the Islamic State or some other rebel groups. The territorial integrity of Syria should be proclaimed indivisible, and the West ought not only to support Russia's actions, but propose to builda coalition under Russian leadership (since everybody now should acknow��ledge that the Russians are doing their job in Syria quite effectively).

All this may happen, of course, only if Moscow rethinks its actions in Ukraine. If Russia wants to keep Bashar al-Assad in power, the West could reconsider its support for anti-go�vernment forces in Syria, but subordinate this to the withdrawal of Moscow's ba�cking for the Donbass separatists.

Such a new deal might be put forward in a very clear form: the US and Europe agree that Syria should be rebuild under the current ruler, whatever the human rights consequences may be (they cannot be much worse than they are today). So, the global powers confirm the sovereign rules are superi�or to the people's right to revolt and to humanitarian considerations. In exchange the West asks Russia to fully stop its support for Donbass guerillas, making it clear that an international military involvement in Donbass if the Ukrainian government asks for would be as legitimate as Russia's actions in Syria. So the deal may not be so much "Russia cedes Syria to the West, but the West cedes Ukraine to Russia", but more like "The West recognizes al-Assad as the ruler of Syria and helps to crush his opposition, if Russia recognizes Kiev's sovereignty over the whole Ukra�ine and allows the regular army to rid the western provinces of guerillas". Such a proposal will either be turned down or spoiled by the Kre�mlin, and it will indicate that Russia doesn't want any kind of order to be resto�red in international relations.

If, however, Moscow would like to negotiate such an option (that actually wo�uld lo�ok very reasonable for the Kremlin), a real breakthrough may be achieved. Both sides may develop a broad agenda of issues to be debated and solved - from the previously mentioned sovereignty to the humanitarian interventions, use of for�ce, defence of minorities, and so on. Of course, all this will not make our world more democratic and free but it definitely will turn it into a safer place, where the great power politics looks much more predictable - and, I would argue, today it seems the best possible result that may be actually achieved.

To repeat: the Russians are doing nothing in Syria that may be considered as a violation of international order. Therefore the West should either stay aside and wait for the outcome of Russia's risky undertaking, or signal that it got Russia's message, has understood it, and is ready to negotiate. The second option is definitely better, particular if it gives global powers the chance to look after their own interests, while debating the fundamental issue of sovereignty.
 
 #5
The Independent (UK)
October 19, 2015
Everyone wrote off the Syrian army. Take another look now
All this is only the beginning of Mr Putin's adventure in the Middle East
By Robert Fisk
Robert Fisk is The Independent's multiple award-winning Middle East correspondent, based in Beirut

While the world still rages on at Russia's presumption in the Middle East - to intervene in Syria instead of letting the Americans decide which dictators should survive or die - we've all been forgetting the one institution in that Arab land which continues to function and protect the state which Moscow has decided to preserve: the Syrian army. While Russia has been propagandising its missiles, the Syrian military, undermanned and undergunned a few months ago, has suddenly moved on to the offensive. Earlier this year, we may remember, this same army was being written off, the Bashar al-Assad government said to be reaching its final days.

We employed our own army of clich�s to make the case for regime change. The Syrian army was losing ground - at Jisr al-Shugour and at Palmyra - and so we predicted that the whole Assad state had reached a "tipping point".

Then along came Vladimir Putin with his air and missile fleets and suddenly the whole place is transformed. While we huffed and puffed that the Russians were bombing the "moderate" rebels - moderates who had earlier ceased to exist according to America's top generals - we've been paying no attention to the military offensive which the Syrians themselves are now staging against the Nusra Front fighters around Aleppo and in the valley of the Orontes.

Syrian commanders are now setting the coordinates for almost every Russian air strike. They were originally giving between 200 and 400 coordinates a night. Now the figure sometimes reaches 800. Not that the Russians are going after every map reference, of course. The Syrians have found that the Russians do not want to fire at targets in built-up areas; they intend to leave burning hospitals and dead wedding parties to the Americans in Afghanistan. This policy could always change, of course. No air force bombs countries without killing civilians. Nor without crossing other people's frontiers.

But the Russians are now telling the Turks - and by logical extension, this information must go to the Americans - their flight coordinates. Even more remarkable, they have set up a hotline communications system between their base on the Syrian Mediterranean coast and the Israeli ministry of defence in Tel Aviv. More incredible still is that the Israelis - who have a habit of targeting Syrian and Iranian personnel near the Golan Heights - have suddenly disappeared from the skies. In other words, the Russians are involved in a big operation, not a one-month wonder that is going on in Syria. And it is likely to continue for quite a time.

The Syrians were originally anxious to move back into Palmyra, captured by Isis last May, but the Russians have demonstrated more interest in the Aleppo region, partly because they believe their coastal bases around Lattakia are vulnerable. The Nusra Front has fired several missiles towards Lattakia and Tartous and Moscow has no desire to have its air force targeted on the ground. But the Syrian army is now deploying its four major units - the 1st and 4th Divisions, Republican Guards and Special Forces - on the battle fronts and are moving closer to the Turkish border.

Russian air strikes around the Isis "capital" of Raqqa may or may not be hurting Isis, although the Syrians like to boast that they have plenty of intelligence coming to them from the city. Interesting, if true, because Isis personnel are specialists in torturing to death "agents of the regime" and it would be a brave man to pass on information to Damascus. Yet travellers' tales can be true. There's a regular civilian bus route from Raqqa to Damascus - buses have an odd habit of crossing front lines in most civil wars - and if passengers prefer not to talk to journalists, they will talk of what they have seen when they get home.

All this is only the beginning of Mr Putin's adventure. He is proving to be quite a traveller to the Middle East - and has already made firm friends of another pillar of the region, that President-Field Marshal who scored more than 96 per cent at the polls and who currently rules Egypt. But the Egyptian army, fighting its little war in Sinai, no longer has strategic experience of a major war. Nor, despite their dalliance in the air over Yemen, Libya, Syria and other targets of opportunity, do the present military authorities in Saudi Arabia, the Emirates and Jordan have much understanding of how a real war is fought. Libya's own army is in bits. Iraq's military has scarcely earned any medals against its Islamist enemies.

But there is one factor which should not be overlooked.

If it wins - and if it holds together and if its manpower, which is admittedly at a low level, can be maintained - then the Syrian military is going to come out of this current war as the most ruthless, battle-trained and battle-hardened Arab army in the entire region. Woe betide any of its neighbours who forget this.
 
 #6
Moscow Times
October 19, 2015
Foreign Investment in Russian Commercial Property Hits 7-Year High
By Anastasia Bazenkova

Foreign investment in Russian commercial property has hit a seven-year high as the weak ruble has made the market more attractive for international companies, the RBC newspaper reported Friday, citing a recent market study.

Foreign capital accounted for 42 percent of investment in the commercial real estate market in the first nine months of the year, the highest rate since 2008, when foreign capital was used in 77 percent of the deals over the same period, a report by real estate agency Cushman & Wakefield showed, according to the newspaper.

Out of $2 billion invested in commercial property in Russia between January and September, foreign investors put up $848 million, the report said.

Cushman & Wakefield's analysts attribute the increased interest from foreign investors in Russian commercial real estate to the devaluation of the Russian currency, which has lost more than 40 percent of its value since the beginning of last year.

For foreign companies, the ruble's fall was a positive signal to conclude deals, Mikhail Mindlin, a member of Cushman & Wakefield's board of directors in Russia, told RBC.

While foreign investors in the Russian real estate market are active as ever, the total amount of investment in commercial property this year has been much lower than last year.

Investment in commercial property in Russia dropped by 44 percent in the first nine months of the year compared to the same period in 2014, RBC cited the report as saying. The sharp overall decline is caused mostly by a drop in investment from Russian companies, Cushman & Wakefield data showed.

In the first nine months of the year, Russian investors spent $1.2 billion on commercial real estate in the country, $1.8 billion down from the same period last year. They are waiting for the market to hit the bottom and are in no hurry to purchase property, Mindlin told RBC.

The most attractive segment for commercial real estate investors is office space, where 47 percent of the total amount of investment was seen in the first five months of the year, the Kommersant newspaper reported last week, citing data from real estate consultancy Colliers International.

#7
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
October 19, 2015
Russian nationalists in retreat as government applies pressure
A temporary ban has been imposed on the sole large association of Russian nationalists, with the prosecutor's office demanding that it be recognized as extremist. RBTH asks activists and observers what is happening with the nationalist movement in Russia, and why it is now calling itself the government's "new enemy."
Yekaterina Sinelschikova, RBTH

Two years ago it seemed as if the Kremlin and Russia's various nationalist groups were, if not a happy couple, then at least content to be in the same room. Their shared conservative values and staunch championing of all things "Russian" made them natural allies. But ever since the crisis in Ukraine first began in early 2014, the relationship has been unraveling.

In August this year the Moscow Prosecutor's Office temporarily suspended the activity of the Russkiye ("Russians") nationalist movement, demanding that the court recognize it as extremist and ban it in Russia.

The reason for the suspension is that, according to the prosecutor's office, the documents illustrating the movement's plans are "aimed at exciting enmity" towards people based on their nationality and "contain calls for a national liberation fight to create a Russian national state."

Russkiye leader Dmitry Demushkin, against whom a lawsuit has been filed, told RBTH that he is waiting to be arrested "for some fictitious act" and Alexander Belov, another nationalist leader, is waiting to be sentenced to a jail term.

While the nationalists believe that their ranks are being purged, experts are inclined to call this a "progressive decline" and note that the nationalists have been unable to recover from the inner schism that divided the movement over the conflict in Ukraine that began in 2014.

As a result of the split, a significant part of the association proclaimed its support for the pro-Russian rebels in eastern Ukraine's Donbass region, but another part sided with Kiev under the slogan of Russian-Ukrainian Slavic unity. During the 2014 Russian March, a now-traditional annual rally for Russian nationalists organized in major cities across the country, they divided themselves into two columns.

However, experts say that it was not Ukraine alone that generated the crisis within the movement.
 
A decline or a threat

The fact that the Russian nationalist movement is in profound decline today is something that not only detached observers believe - even the movement's ideologists agree.

"The movement doesn't have any political perspective, practically the entire field has been burned and the security forces are finishing off the wounded," said Demushkin, who believes that the authorities decided to mop up the nationalists "just in case." According to Demushkin, the government is afraid that radical nationalists may join forces with anti-government protesters.

"In themselves, it seems, they do not represent a danger. They've become rather silent. But when they return from the Donbass to Russia, this is a potential threat," said Alexander Verkhovsky, director of the Sova analytical center and an expert on nationalism and xenophobia.

According to Verkhovsky, several thousand nationalists went to fight on the side of pro-Russian rebels in eastern Ukraine and are unlikely to be pleased with the fact that the conflict in the Donbass is coming to a close.

"It cannot be ruled out that upon returning to Russia they will want to adhere to some kind of radical policy, which is why the government is trying to suppress all types of radical groups, including those inspired by Stalin," he said.
 
Left without an agenda

Yet observers say that the contradictions related to the Ukrainian issue are not capable of destroying the nationalists as a force.

"What's changed in the last year is that the movement has stopped articulating a constructive agenda," said Sergei Prostakov, a collaborator at the Center of Ethno-Political Studies.

According to Prostakov, even though over the previous 10-15 years "the government would just steal their slogans," the movement still used to create something new, right up until the events of 2014, which seemed to disorient the majority of Russian nationalists.

"They realized that their interests for the first time corresponded to government policy. This is the accession of Crimea, that is, the idea of the restoration of the Soviet Union and the protection of Russians in the Donbass," said Prostakov.

However, he pointed out, this did not give the nationalists any political points: They were simply used as extras.

Verkhovsky agrees: The systemic nationalists, such as the pro-government Rodina Party, the Anti-Maidan Movement and the Great Fatherland Party, have been left without any political perspectives.

"Obviously, they are not under any pressure but it seems that the government is not really helping them. You can tell by their pitiable results at the regional elections," said Verkhovsky.
 
The new enemy

Dmitry Demushkin sees another, significant change in the Russian nationalists' position: Now they are part of the opposition.

"Until 2010 the Russian nationalists inclusively were never against the government,@ he said. "But then our organizations were banned (the Slavic Union and the Slavic Force groups are recognized as extremists - RBTH) and lawsuits were filed against the organizations' leaders, first just one-time cases, now more and more often.

"Now the nationalists have turned away from the Kremlin and this is exclusively the government's fault. It has created an enemy for itself," said Demushkin.
Looking forward, none of the observers interviewed by RBTH were unable to say exactly what will become of the sapped nationalist movement in the future.

"Russian nationalism is going through a heavy crisis, but all crises end in something. It is unlikely to die a sick man's death, this is impossible," said Alexander Verkhovsky, who believes the radicalization of the movement is inevitable.

Meanwhile, Sergei Prostakov believes that November's Russian March will be a key yardstick for evaluating the current state of the movement.

"Last year the demonstration gathered a minimal number of people [1,500, according to the police - RBTH], even though in better times the march would gather about 10,000 people," he said.
 
 #8
Bloomberg
October 18, 2015
Russia's Ailing Consumers Keep Door Open for Rate Cuts
By Ott Ummelas and Anna Andrianova

There may be a silver lining for the Bank of Russia in another batch of grim consumer data.

While Governor Elvira Nabiullina has set a course for monetary easing to match slowing inflation, policy makers last month paused their easing cycle for the first time in 2015. The scales may be tipping in favor of another cut this year as Russia's consumer economy continues to weaken. Wages adjusted for inflation fell for an 11th month in September and retail sales contracted the most in 16 years, the Federal Statistics Service in Moscow said Monday in a statement.

"There are strong disinflationary trends, including falling retail sales, vehicle sales, wages, and household debt," Per Hammarlund, the chief emerging-markets strategist at SEB AB in Stockholm, said by e-mail before the data release. "This weakness will give plenty of room for the" central bank "to cut rates, as long as oil prices hold up."

Russian policy makers have struggled to concoct the right policy mix to steer the country out of its longest recession in two decades. A fresh bout of ruble weakness forced the central bank to hold off on easing policy after it already rolled back most of a December emergency rate increase. With international sanctions and low oil prices shackling the economy of the world's largest energy exporter, Standard & Poor's last week forecast a deeper contraction as it predicts private consumption will remain weak next year.

Ruble Decline

Since last month's rate decision, the ruble has gained 10 percent against the dollar amid a revival in emerging-market risk appetite. The ruble has depreciated about 35 percent against the dollar in the past 12 months, the second-worst performer behind the Brazilian real among 24 emerging-market currencies tracked by Bloomberg. It traded 1.5 percent weaker at 62.2630 rubles per dollar at 4.08 p.m. Monday. Forward-rate agreements are signaling 40 basis points of cuts in borrowing costs during the next three months, the biggest bets since July.

September real wages declined 9.7 percent from a year ago after a revised 9 percent drop in August, the statistics service said. The median estimate of 14 economists surveyed by Bloomberg was 9.8 percent. Retail sales dropped 10.4 percent, the most since August 1999, and disposable incomes shrank 4.3 percent.

VTB analysts Alexander Isakov and Petr Grishin said in a note Oct. 15 that "further proof of demand weakness," including unemployment approaching 6 percent, an annual decline in real wages closer to 11 percent or an accelerating decline in investments is needed to shift the balance toward a 50 basis-point rate cut at the central bank meeting on Oct. 30. Other conditions include the ruble trading at about 62 against the dollar and the budget stance being kept tight, they said.

The unemployment rate unexpectedly declined to 5.2 percent from 5.3 percent, compared with the 5.4 percent median estimate of 12 economists. Fixed-capital investment dropped 5.6 percent last month, the 21st consecutive negative reading, making it the longest such stretch since at least 1995, when Bloomberg started compiling the figures.

"We now anticipate a weakness in private consumption to extend into 2016, and an only marginal recovery in capital spending next year, helped by improved corporate profit margins and a slowdown in deleveraging," S&P senior economist Tatiana Lysenko said in a report on Oct. 15. The credit evaluator now sees Russia's economy contracting 3.6 percent this year, followed by 0.3 percent growth in 2016, she said.
 #9
Kremlin chief of staff: Russia to do nothing against its interests to get sanctions lifted

MOSCOW, October 19. /TASS/. Russia will do nothing that could harm its interests in order to get the western sanctions lifted, Sergey Ivanov, the chief of Russia's presidential staff, said in an exclusive interview with TASS.

"We will never do anything to harm our national interests just for the sake of seeing the sanctions lifted. Never ever! It was not us who took those measures, and we are not going to discuss in any format what is necessary for canceling them," Ivanov said.

He said the lifting of anti-Russia sanctions should not be linked with the restoration of peace in Ukraine.

"I would avoid any linkage here. Are you certain that the sanctions will be lifted from us even after impeccable compliance with Minsk-2? Are there any guarantees? Personally, I have big doubts on that score. There is no reason why we should offer excuses or ask for forgiveness," Ivanov said.

He admitted that "the financial and economic situation in the country is really grave."

"The sanctions did cause certain losses. The GDP is on the decline, and not on the ascent. We don't deny that. But! The root cause for the Russian economy's slowdown is not sanctions, but the fall in the world prices of oil and gas," he said.

"I agree that this has demonstrated again our strong dependence on hydrocarbons and how very bad this is. But on the other hand, we've been able to realize the vector of future action to be taken to ease the pressures of the raw materials factor," Ivanov added.

West exaggerates consequences of sanctions, no regrets for G8

Moscow has no regrets for the expulsion from the G8, while the influence of sanctions on Russia's economy is exaggerated by the West, Sergey Ivanov went on to say.

"The West grossly exaggerates the influence of the latest sanctions on the Russian economy. True, they do pose certain hindrances to us, it would be foolish to deny the obvious, but I will say again and again that in the past we lived through far greater problems," Ivanov said.

"Attempts to punish Russia are senseless and ineffective," he said. "We saw sanctions taken against us back during the rule of the Romanov dynasty. There's nothing new about them."

"Trade barriers were put up and financial obstructions posed again and again... Those measures were far harsher than the current ones. But we managed. We didn't get scared in the past, and we will stay firm this time," Ivanov said.

"Alexander Solzhenytsin said perfectly well that from time immemorial the West had felt scared of Russia's enormity," he added.

Ivanov stressed that the G8 is certainly not the place where Russia would like to get back.

"In the 1990s Russia spent much time and effort for the sake of being admitted to this club of select few; it eventually got there only to see for itself that the G8 was no longer capable of addressing any of the fundamental issues humanity was confronted with at the current stage," he said.

"The world today is very different. The G20 - that's the worthy level. It is there that truly important themes are being discussed and solution mechanisms can be devised," Ivanov added.

"Here is a Syria-related example. The need for eliminating the arsenals of chemical weapons in that country was agreed on within the G20 format, and not the G8 or G7 group. So there no regrets about the demise of the G8, believe me," he concluded.

Sanctions against Russia led to split of elites but in West

According to Sergey Ivanov, the sanctions against Moscow have led to the split of elites not in Russia but in the West.

"It seems to me that the elites have split abroad rather than in our country," Ivanov said.

"Haven't you noticed that when officials - ministers, speakers and, all the more so, presidents or the heads of governments - speak, they criticize Russia unmercifully with a frown on their faces and a quivering voice," he said.

"But when politicians who have left the upper echelons of power for various reasons start to speak, the tonality of their speeches changes dramatically. Foreign and defense ministers and other reputable persons who have left their posts suddenly begin to openly show solidarity with our position on many issues," Ivanov added.

"This suggests that you are obliged to talk this way and no other way while you are in power. It is only after you resign that you can express your own thoughts and views. This is not forbidden but only for ex-officials and not for persons holding posts," he said. "Those who return to power, start to criticize us with a new vigor. I have long grown accustomed to this. And look at it with humor."

Ivanov also said he disliked the word "elites". "To my mind, this word can be used for those who have done something useful, necessary and tangible for the home country in the course of several generations," he said.

"Some representatives of the business circles (but not elites) have suffered from the sanctions," he added. "But everything is relative. I believe, although I do not assert, that [Gennady] Timchenko or [Arkady and Boris] Rottenberg [the Russian billionaire businessmen hit by the western sanctions] also have yachts. No one has taken these yachts away from them."

"As for how some businessmen look at others and how, it is better to address this question to them. I believe that no problems arise in interpersonal communication there and everything is understandable to everyone. But this is my presumption," Ivanov said.

"Strictly speaking, in the context of the influence of sanctions on business, it is more appropriate to talk not about the freedom of travel across the world but, say, about the restricted access to the capital market, which, indeed, has serious economic consequences for companies included in the sanctions lists."
 
 #10
The Jordan Times
www.jordantimes.com
October 18, 2015
Are Sanctions Saving Russia?
By Richard Werver and Vladimir Yakunin
Richard A. Werner is Professor of International Banking at the University of Southampton and author of New Paradigm in Macroeconomics. Vladimir I. Yakunin is Chair in State Policy at Lomonosov Moscow State University, Founding President of the World Public Forum, and former Chairman of Russian Railways.

MOSCOW - The economic sanctions imposed on Russia by the West in March 2014 have undoubtedly been painful. But they have so far failed to achieve the goal of weakening Russian President Vladimir Putin's position. In fact, they may have the opposite effect, leaving Russia - and its president - even stronger than before.

European Union countries are estimated to have lost about $100 billion in trade with Russia, hitting the likes of Bavarian dairy farmers and eastern German industrial exporters. Russian GDP, which grew modestly in 2014, contracted by 4.6% in annual terms in the second quarter of this year. The ruble lost more than half of its US dollar value in the second half of last year, fueling inflation, which increased by 15.6% year on year in July.

But inflation now seems to have peaked, and the effects of the drop in oil and gas prices were mitigated by the US dollar's appreciation, so that the value of Russia's foreign reserves actually increased, reaching $362 billion in June (13% of which is in gold). And despite belt-tightening in Russia, Putin is more popular than ever.

The rationale behind economic sanctions is straightforward: free trade and free markets deliver growth (and thus political support for the government), whereas restrictions choke off growth (and thus erode support for the government). This emphasis on free trade and free markets was a central tenet of nineteenth-century British classical economics. It remains a core message of today's dominant neoclassical school - embodied in the so-called "Washington Consensus," adopted across the world under the International Monetary Fund's advice - which claims that the key to economic development is to open up, deregulate, liberalize, and privatize.

But the theory is fundamentally flawed. No economic power has ever developed solely on the basis of laissez-faire policies. The economic rise of the United Kingdom, for example, was heavily dependent on strategic protection, industrial policy, tariffs, and non-tariff trade barriers.

The UK's industrial prowess originated with the textile industry. The country's leaders realized that the export of raw materials, mainly wool, would be inadequate to spur economic development. For that, England would have to move up the value-added ladder, by importing raw materials and exporting finished goods.

So England's leaders devised an industrial policy, which entailed bringing in Flemish textile weavers to provide know-how to British firms. Moreover, they erected trade barriers: By banning the export of raw wool and the import of finished wool products, Indian textiles, which were often superior and cheaper, could not compete with domestic output. They adopted navigation laws that restricted foreign ships' access to British ports and even enacted a demand-boosting law requiring the dead to be buried in woolens. Ultimately, the mechanization of the textile industry ushered in the Industrial Revolution, and mass production and exports underpinned the development of the world's largest maritime fleet.

In the mid-nineteenth century, the German economist Friedrich List highlighted the role that such policies played in the UK's development. In line with his advice, the United States, Germany, and Japan employed judicious trade protection and industrial policies, while working actively to support nascent sectors - a strategy that enabled them to develop rapidly and even overtake Britain.

Restrictions also proved effective to spur economic development: In 1812, when the UK declared war and imposed a trade embargo on the US, import substitution caused American manufacturing to flourish. When the embargo was lifted and trade tariffs were reduced, US manufacturing floundered - until 1828, when new British tariffs boosted US manufacturing again. Likewise, during World War I, a British trade embargo spurred the development of German high-tech industries due to the demand for substitutes.

Of course, embargoes can have a devastating effect when a country lacks the resources needed for import substitution. That is why economic sanctions were so damaging for Iran and, earlier, for Iraq's population.

But, for a country like Russia, with its abundant natural resources, technological expertise, and skilled workforce, sanctions can have the opposite effect. The Soviet Union struggled to capitalize on these factors, owing to communism's weak incentive structure. Today, by contrast, Russia has a capitalist system that offers considerable benefits to those who adapt best to the restrictions.

In short, Russia has all it needs to thrive, despite - or because of - the sanctions. But turning opportunity into reality requires Russia to pursue an economic transformation.

Neoclassical trade theory is based on the concept of comparative advantage: countries should capitalize on their relative strengths, from technological prowess to resource endowments. But, as English leaders knew and as the experience of many African and Latin American countries has shown, simply exporting raw materials is inadequate to propel development. Historically, the most effective development policy has centered on government intervention to establish higher-value-added domestic industries. In previous decades, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and China have all taken this path.

For Russia, moving up the value-added ladder should not be difficult; it has all it needs to manufacture the finished products that it previously imported. In fact, import substitution has already increased productivity in several key sectors: engineering, petrochemicals, light industry, pharmaceuticals, and agriculture. Annual exports of high-value-added goods rose by 6% in the first quarter of this year.

Furthermore, Russia's leadership has accelerated cooperation with the other BRICS economies (Brazil, India, China, and South Africa), and Putin recently announced ambitious plans to boost domestic demand.

The West's sanctions against Russia may not only fail to change the Ukraine situation; they may well spur the country's long-awaited structural transformation. If Russia successfully replicates the credit-guidance regime used by East Asia's economies, while increasing managerial efficiency, yet another economic miracle is possible.
 
#11
http://readrussia.com
October 16, 2016
Russia: a Taxi Driver's Version
By James Pearce

When last in the UK, I got off the train into a taxi for the short drive to my childhood home. My driver, Ardashir, asked were I'd come from. "Russia". "Russia?! Wow, I love your president, he's a smart man who is doing the right thing and loves his country."

Of course, I'm not Russian by birth, but I must admit how refreshing it was to hear this in the UK; a country not credited for a great deal of knowledge about Russia or devoting much affection to the country as a whole.

Putin isn't my favourite politician, but being constantly lectured about how evil he is every time I go home gets rather dull. So I played along, and the discussion eventually developed onto Syria. I'm glad it did because Ardashir was from Iran, and had a completely different viewpoint to most from my hometown.

He had a natural empathy for Syrians, himself being a Shia Muslim, and told me outright "Assad is not evil. You know, more people have died because of ISIS than because of him. In Iraq too, more people die today on the streets than in Saddam's time. This crisis is their [the west's] fault."

Ardashir believed that if it wasn't for Russia's interference in the Middle East, then it would be made up of robotic puppet states; that you cannot force groups of people, with no concept of a nation state, into geopolitically imagined lines they cannot comprehend; that asking them to give up their practices in favour of ways totally alien is unrealistic and never going to be the solution.

Moreover, he believed that it is about time Russia can finally 'solve' the situation, because Syria and the west simply can't. Many political observers may recall in the last two month's that Putin has met with many Middle Eastern leaders and held talks regarding the crisis. It shows there is a diplomatic bone in the Russian body. Though let's save the discussion on 'Russia the guardian of democracy' for another day.

For Ardashir, Russia has a common value shared among many Middle Eastern countries; "[we] don't just believe our ways are better. It's that western ideas cannot be applied to our society-Putin gets it, because Russia is the same... together, we show solidarity and want the world to see that no amount of force or intimidation will make us back down".

As the conversation continued, we were no longer speaking English. I came to learn that Ardashir lived in Russia back in 1996 and worked there for two years. Some might say he got out at the right time since in 1998 the economy hit the railings hard and life for the majority of the population became unbearable. He insists he had a great time never the less.

The compliments kept coming; Ardashir claims he had never met nicer people than the Russians. That "you [Russians] are a caring and principled people". I took this opportunity to ask him something personal:

"But surely, you must have encountered discrimination at some point?" I certainly have (not that it causes me any sleep loss). His response was remarkable:

"Listen, no amount of racism or xenophobic comment took away the immense beauty of the country and the passion of its people. In England, people call me a paki; it just shows how empty the culture as a whole is and how idiotic they are. At least after Russians call me 'ponayekhali', they return to their copy of Solzhenitsyn or Pushkin. English people fall out of my cab drunk, insult their best friend at the bar when they're in the toilet and then lecture the world on how to live."

You may then wonder why he lives in a country like England at all. In his own words: "money talks and bullsh*t walks."

So I finally arrived home and asked him how much? Let's just say he gave me a generous discount. Being Russian certainly had its benefits.

But what Ardashir shows, is that there is no one truth to any story. Often, to understand the other's viewpoint, one must climb up onto their pillar and see the world in the same way as them; does this happen with the case of Russia often?

The fact is, there are many like Ardashir across the Middle East and, indeed, throughout Russia, who simply feel like their lives are being intruded upon. That their situation is being deliberately misunderstood for somebody else's personal gain.

We can have a healthy debate on Russia's actions in global conflicts, but she has supporters East and West on every continent. Many of whom, feel the same sense of pressure and intimidation by western countries to go along with their status quo.  

Like many in his profession, Ardashir was a worldly gentleman who has been around the block a few times. Being dropped home by him instead of a toothless cockney with controversial views on immigration, made for a better welcome home.
 
 
 #12
Huffington Post
October 14, 2015
No Russian Quagmire in the Middle East
By Sarwar Kashmeri
Adjunct Professor PolSci-Norwich University; Fellow-Foreign Policy Assoc.

Criticism of Russia's projection of force into Syria is often laced with predictions of an impending Russian quagmire, in the fashion of the Soviet misadventure of the 1970s in Afghanistan. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Mr. Putin has made a strategic, well calibrated and thought out move on the Middle East chessboard and will soon reap significant geopolitical rewards from it.

The massive soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was aimed at occupying the country and crushing an internal Afghan rebellion against the Soviet supported government. Afghanistan's rugged mountainous terrain, coupled with the legendary Afghan hate for foreign occupiers, and the stealthy provision of sophisticated U.S. arms, put an end to that. Russia's objectives from its military thrust in the Middle East, on the other hand, are far more limited and achievable; which is what makes them of such strategic consequence.

Mr. Putin's calculations are based on five facts on the ground:

First, the United States has worked itself into a quagmire in the Middle East. It has publically declared that "Assad must go," and has promised to "degrade and destroy the Islamic State," without committing the military forces to achieve either outcome. Predictably, Mr. Assad is still there and the Islamic State has grown bigger and stronger. Mr. Putin knows there is no appetite in the United States for a robust military engagement, in a part of the world where America no longer has any vital national interests.

Second, Mr. Putin is keenly aware of the damage being wreaked in Europe by the unending tide of refugees that now threaten European economies and the cohesiveness of the European Union. The Europeans realize a permanent, long term solution to their refugee nightmare lies in making the war ravaged Middle East safer for its citizens, not in building fences.

Third, Russia's client, Syria's President Bashar al-Assad has been steadily losing ground in Syria's civil war, a situation that threatens land-locked Russia's only foreign naval base and its Middle East intelligence operations, a situation that Russia is obliged to correct.

Fourth, Mr. Putin recognizes the attraction of the Islamic State for radicalized citizens in the Muslim Republics of the Russian Federation, thousands of whose citizens now fight with the Islamic State and will someday return to direct their battle-hardened skills against Russia.

And finally, the dire strait of the Russian economy, that relies almost completely on global energy prices which have been in free fall for over a year. The collapse in Russia's main income stream is magnified by Western economic sanctions which have cut off Russia's access to outside capital.

Putin has put all of this together and come up with a plan to, at once, offer a way out to the dithering Americans, resolve the pressures on quivering Europeans, save Russia's alliance and its military/intelligence interests in the Middle East, destroy the Islamic State, and entrench Russia into the Middle East's power equation.

Russia has entered the Middle-East fray in alliance with Iraq and Iran, and with sufficient military power to seriously damage the anti-Assad forces and those of the Islamic State. My forecast: Mr. Putin will achieve significant success on the battlefield within 30-60 days. He will then offer to join forces with the U.S.-led coalition to destroy what remains of the Islamic State, and, significantly, to help set up "safe-zones" in Syria, in which Syrian and other refugees can find a haven until conditions in their homelands improve and they can return home. The idea of safe zones in Syria has already been floated in the United Nations by the Europeans but had been deemed impractical because of Russian opposition.

For Americans and Europeans the Russian offer will be a lifeline they cannot refuse. Europeans will jump at the opportunity to shunt the flood of refugees away from Europe; while the U.S. will jump at the opportunity to destroy the Islamic State without committing its ground forces, and to finally wind down a fruitless and seemingly endless military commitment that is costing American taxpayers millions of dollars a day.

In return, Mr. Putin will demand a seat at the table to help determine the region's future; he will also demand that the future of Syria and Mr. Assad be left to Russia, and oh yes, economic sanctions relief. The U.S. may balk at sanctions relief, but European pressure will ensure that Mr. Putin gets it.

Hardly a Russian quagmire!
 
 #13
The Unz Review
www.unz.com
October 18, 2015
Week Two of the Russian Military Intervention in Syria
Options for Daesh, the Empire and Russia
By The Saker

The Russian offensive in Syria is still very much in full swing and it is hard to make sense of what is really happening or how effective it has been. According to the Syrians, 40% of all the infrastructure of "Daesh" (meaning ISIS+al-Qaeda+all the hundreds of smaller groups fighting together against the Syrian government) has been destroyed. Russian sources are less enthusiastic and speak of a rather slow and hesitant Syrian offensive. So far, no major victory has been reported, but since all sides agree that the Russian air campaign is devastatingly effective and highly disruptive for Daesh, I think that there is a good probability that the Syrians will soon achieve a major success. If not, then the Iranians most definitely have the capability to truly tip the balance. So this might be a good time to look at what options Daesh will have.

How Daesh can adapt to the new circumstances

First, up until now, Daesh basically could move around at night with total impunity because the Syrian Air Force simply did not have the technology to detect and engage Daesh units at night. This has now changed since all the Russian aircraft (rotary and fixed wing) engaged in the current campaign are fully night capable. This is a major problem for Daesh which will now have to operate in an extremely dangerous environment 24 hours a day. The solution? Camouflage and dispersal. Daesh forces will have to learn to pay much more attention to avoiding detection, including radio detection, and they will have to avoid as much as possible any detectable concentrations. Not an easy task, for sure, but one which has been successfully learned by others in the past.

Second, Daesh forces will have to adapt to guerrilla-style 'hit and run' kinds of attacks. Until now, both sides were willing to engage in a bizarre kind of "trench warfare" in which each side would dig in and shell the other. Now that Russian bombers and close air support aircraft can be called in by the Syrian frontline commanders, this will become very dangerous for Daesh, probably forcing them to switch to faster, ambush warfare.

Third, most sources agree that currently Daesh controls roughly 80% of the land and 20% of the population. This is mostly due to the size of the Syrian armed forces which are stretched too thin to hold on to lightly populated areas. Daesh can use that to its advantage and try to move around any attacking Syrian forces and then ambush any units whose flanks and supply routes are not secured. The Syrians will have to be very careful not to fall into a "cauldron" trap like the Ukrainians in Novorussia.

Fourth, if things become really ugly for Daesh, they can start using the Turkish, Iraqi, Lebanese and Jordanian borders to hide from the Syrian/Iranian forces and enjoy the kind of safe heaven the Afghans had in Pakistan during the Soviet invasion.

Fifth, Daesh might do what the Ukrainians have done and organized a 'Russian atrocity' false flag, maybe the bombing of a pediatric clinic or hospital. They could even try a "Russian chemical attack in feeling refugees". The corporate media will be more than happy to pick up and spread the story, no matter how ridiculous.

Finally, we can be absolutely certain that if the Syrian military is "too" successful, at least from the point of view of the Empire, then all the "friends of Syria" will join forces and demand a "peace conference" whose main purpose will be to save Daesh from complete destruction. This is the strategy used by the West with the Minsk-1 and Minsk-2 peace talks to save the Ukronazi junta from military defeat.

The world has seen numerous examples of Daesh-like forces (in military, not political, terms) adapting to a technologically superior enemy. Right now, the government's superiority is primarily in the skies (thanks to the RuAF) and in intelligence (thanks to the OsNaz GRU units on the ground and the Russian "eyes and ears" in the sky and in space). With time, however, Russian could bring in new equipment (modern multiple rocket launchers, TOS-1 heavy flame-throwers, newer armor and artillery systems) which can make a real difference but at the end of the day, it will be 'boots', in the sense of infantry, which will decide the outcome. Will the Syrians and Kurds be enough to break Daesh or will the Iranians make a move? I honestly don't know, but my bet is on Iran and Hezbollah moving in. As for a Russian intervention, Putin has now totally excluded such a possibility.

Options recommended by US politicians

US politicians have come up with two suggestions to help their "moderate terrorists": supply advanced anti-air missiles to Daesh and impose a no-fly zone. I consider both of these suggestions highly impractical and very dangerous.

Delivering advanced anti-air missiles: which ones?! Daesh already has man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) like the US Stingers and Russian Iglas. These are fine missiles, but they don't have the reach to hit Russian aircraft which mostly fly at 5000m. True, they can hit a low flying target like a SU-25 on a close air support mission or a Mi-24 helicopter. Both of these aircraft have been heavily modified during and after the wars in Afghanistan and Chechnia and they are well-protected against such attacks. Still, sooner or later a Russian aircraft will get hit by such a missile and it is even possible that it will be downed. Daesh already has this capability and sending them more MANPADs just makes no sense but is very dangerous considering the kind of use any terrorist group can make of them against civilian airliners. Syria is not Afghanistan and we are not in the 1980s. MANPADs are simply not likely to make a major difference in this war, especially not against the kind of aircraft the Russians are currently deploying.

A no-fly zone: against whom, Russian aircraft? For one thing, this would be insanely provocative and the potential consequences of the US shooting down a Russian aircraft are truly terrifying. But this also begs the question of where such a zone would be created. Hillary and the other Neocon crazies are suggesting a no-fly zone over northern Syria. Okay, what if in response Russia declares another no fly zone over the rest of the country? Then what? Setting aside the insanity of actually threatening to attack Russia in military terms, in legal terms the Empire has no mandate to declare such a zone while Russia is standing on 100% legal grounds should she declare one. And if the Empire really goes crazy and declares that it will impose a no-fly zone over all of Syria you can be absolutely certain that S-300s will "suddenly" show up in sufficient numbers to make that an extremely dangerous exercise. By the way, at that point, the Russians can declare that all the S-300s in Syria are manned exclusively by Syrian personnel and are under Syrian command and thus they will be able to shoot down US aircraft in total impunity (as they already have in the past in Vietnam and Lebanon).

A no-fly zone makes sense against a defenseless country, but against one armed with semi-modern or modern air defenses this is a very dangerous proposition. I want to believe that there are enough mentally sane men in the JCS and Pentagon to reject any plan which can end up triggering a nuclear war between Russia and the USA.

The "sulking superpower"

Right now, the USA appears to be completely clueless. First, they accused the Russians of bombing the "wrong" terrorists. The Russians then replied "okay, give us a list of "bad terrorists" targets and we will destroy them". The Americans refused. Then the Russians told them, "okay then, in this case at least give us a list of "good terrorist" targets not to bomb, and we will not hit them". But the Americans refused again! At this point, the Russian began making openly fun of the Americans and Putin even declared that his American "partners" have "mush for brains".

Furthermore, the USA have also refused a Russian invitation to send military specialists to the Russian General Staff and now they have apparently even refused to receive a Russian military delegation headed by Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev himself! I don't think I have ever heard of a "sulking superpower" but that is what we are apparently observing right now. How long Uncle Sam will continue to pout in his corner is anyone's guess, but this is clearly not a sustainable policy. In fact, it is no policy at all.

I see no sign of the USA having the courage to look at reality and act accordingly. Not only is the Obama Administration at an absolutely unprecedented level of incompetence and intellectual mediocrity, the upcoming Presidential election is just making things worse: with bona fide psychopaths like Hillary, McCain or Fiorina making irresponsible statements on an almost daily basis, the White House must constantly dodge accusations of being "too soft on Russia". And since no US politician can afford to tell the American public the basic truth that the US is not omnipotent, US politicians are stuck in a never ending race to prove how "tough" they are on "defense". As for the Europeans, they probably have the brains to see all of the above, but what they lack is the spine to say anything to their American overlords.

Just like in the Ukraine, the West has made created a total mess and now is completely clueless as to what to do about it.

Russian options

Contrary to the impression given by the western media, the Russian force in Syria is still a very small one. The main reason for that is that the airfield near Latakia simply cannot accommodate a larger Russian force. As far as I know, there are no other locations in Syria where Russia could deploy more aircraft. True, the number of sorties flown by the Russians has baffled USAF experts who could never have achieved that kind of figures with US aircraft and pilots. Still, the Russian force is small and vulnerable. Of course, one option for the Russians would be to expand the airfield near Latakia, but that would take time and more resources and my understanding is that they want to consolidate their current airfield first. However, as a stop-gap measure, the Russians could use Russian-based bombers. If Iran allows Russia to conduct in-air refueling in Iranian airspace or if Iran allows Russia to use Iranian airbases, then many more SU-34/SU-35SM or SU-34/SU-30SM "air force packages" that could be engaged in Syria. In theory, Russia could even provide her Tu-22M3 to deliver gravity bombs, her Tu-95MS to deliver cruise missiles and her Tu-160 to deliver either one or both. I don't think that there is any military necessity to use these strategic bombers right now, but it might be a good idea to do so for political reasons - just to flex some more 'military muscle' and show the Neocons that Russia is not to be messed with. Submarine launched cruise missiles would also work, especially if launched by a Russian sub in the Mediterranean which the USN did not detect. What is certain is that after the first volley of Russian cruise missiles the US withdrew its only aircraft carrier - the Theodore Roosevelt - from the Persian Gulf.

[Sidebar: some Russian observers have suggested that the first volley of Russian cruise missiles included 26 missiles because the 26th President of the United States was Theodore Roosevelt, the name of the only carrier which was in the Persian Gulf, and that this was a subtle message to the USA. Dunno. Maybe so. Maybe not. But if it is a coincidence, it is a neat one. What is certain is that for the first time in a very long while there are no US carriers in the Persian Gulf]

The main problem with any military escalation or increased Russian involvement is that Putin would have to sell it to the Russian public which, at least so far, has been totally supportive, but which is generally weary of "mission creep" and open ended military commitments (for example, most Russians oppose an overt Russian intervention in the Donbass). So far, the Kremlin has done a superb PR job explaining that Daesh is a direct threat to Russia and that it was better for Russia to "fight them over there than over here". This logic, however, is predicated on the idea that a very limited Russian intervention can tip the balance. There is a very fine conceptual line between tipping the balance and fighting someone else's war and that is something the Kremlin is acutely aware of. Hopefully, this line will never be crossed.
 
 #14
Middle East Eye
www.middleeasteye.net
October 16, 2015
Obama won't admit the real targets of Russian airstrikes
No one is discussing the reality that the Russian offensive is targeting the biggest militant threat to the Assad regime
By Gareth Porter
Gareth Porter is an independent investigative journalist and winner of the 2012 Gellhorn Prize for journalism. He is the author of the newly published Manufactured Crisis: The Untold Story of the Iran Nuclear Scare.

The US response to Russia's new Syrian military campaign in support of the Assad regime has struck a pose of moral superiority by arguing that the Russians have not been targeting the Islamic State but rather the non-ISIS Syrian opposition to the Assad regime.   

That US response is superficially accurate but deliberately misleading. Although the Russians are not focusing on targets in ISIS-controlled territory, there is a very good reason: it is not ISIS but the forces aligned with al-Qaeda's Syrian franchise, Jabhat al-Nusra or al-Nusra Front, that pose the most immediate threat to the very existence of the Assad regime.

In a series of statements on the Russian military campaign, the US Defence Department has hammered the Russians for not targeting ISIS as Moscow initially claimed - later on the Russian rhetoric shifted to "terrorists".  The US statements strongly implied that it was the US-backed "moderate" Syrian groups opposed to the Assad regime that are being attacked.

Major news media have taken the same line in covering the Russian offensive. In an Associated Press story on 13 October, for example, Ken Delanian described the CIA as supplying "so-called moderate rebels to oppose Assad" for more than two years, along with its "Arab allies" and that American officials "have watched in recent days as the Russian bombs and missiles have targeted those groups".   

Delanian even quoted Jeffrey White of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), the think tank supporting Israeli interests, who complained that the United States had abandoned its moderate allies. "We've aligned ourselves to these guys, we trained them and paid them and sent them off to battle, and when the going gets tough, we're not there," said White.  

But this framing of the issue fundamentally mis-represents the situation in Syria by conjuring up a non-existent powerful US-backed "moderate" force while diverting attention from the real threat posed by al-Qaeda's Syrian franchise. The Russians are not hitting some imaginary set of "moderate" Syrian armed groups opposing the Assad regime; they are overwhelmingly focused on targeting the military command in which al-Nusra Front is the central strategic force.  

The maps pinpointing the locations of the Russian strikes since 30 September published in various newspapers and on the website of the Institute for Study of War - the original source for the other maps - all show very clearly that they are overwhelmingly concentrated in Idlib province, the adjoining Hama province, and areas of Latakia province near Idlib. But that fact does not take on significance unless it is recalled that the al-Nusra Front - al Qaeda's franchise in Syria - and the "Army of Conquest" linked to it, unexpectedly took control of Idlib province in a major military offensive in March.

That victory in Idlib was widely reported at the time to be the biggest turning point in the Syrian war in well over two years and to represent by far the most serious challenge to the Assad regime since the beginning of the war. And although a number of smaller commands were involved in the Idlib offensive, al-Nusra Front's 3,000 troops represented the majority of the forces involved in the fight. And according to a well-informed source, al-Nusra and its close jihadist ally Ahrar al-Sham accounted for 90 percent of the troops.

We now know, moreover, that the Idlib campaign was the direct result of a policy decision by Saudi Arabia and Qatar, with US approval, to support the creation of the "Army of Conquest" and provide it with new military hardware that was a crucial factor in that campaign: the TOW anti-tank missile. Liz Sly of the Washington Post revealed in a story on 11 October that TOW missiles had been delivered to Syrian armed groups under a programme coordinated between the CIA and the Saudis. Sly further notes that the CIA-supplied TOW missiles were so important to rebels who made "gains in northwest Syria" that they have called the missile the "Assad Tamer".

"It is no accident," Sly reported, "that the first targets of Russian airstrikes in Syria were the locations where rebels armed with TOW missles have made the most substantial gain and where they most directly threaten Assad's hold on power". That is an obvious reference to the forces that took over Idlib province in March. But Sly never refers to the "Army of Conquest" victory in Idlib or acknowledges that al-Nusra Front was the main benefactor of the CIA programme. Her story quotes a proponent of the programme, former US ambassador Robert Ford, as assuring us that the system prevented the missiles from "falling into extremist hands," and that he was aware of only two TOW missiles having been obtained by al-Nusra.

Sly reported a very different story in March, however, after the dissolution of Harakat Hazm, the main CIA-supported "moderate rebel group" remaining in the north, following its complete defeat by al-Nusra Front. The victorious al-Nusra announced publicly, according to Sly's report, that it had seized the TOW anti-tank missiles the CIA had supplied to Harakat Hazm when it occupied the groups headquarters near Aleppo. Moreover, the Saudis reportedly had ownership of TOW missiles, and they and the Qataris had already been funneling arms to al-Nusra Front, as Vice-President Joe Biden revealed in October 2014.

It is astonishing that at this late date, anyone in the media could still be seriously suggesting that the CIA somehow managed to turn the "moderate" Syrian rebels into a powerful offensive force threatening the Assad regime in the north. Since the Idlib victory, it is generally understood that the primary threat to drive the Assad regime from power comes from al-Nusra Front and the forces allied with it, and not from the Islamic State - and certainly not the mythical "moderate rebels".

It is easy to understand why the Obama administration is not interested in talking about the role of al-Nusra in the present Syrian political-military situation. According to Sly's source, the covert operation to provide the TOW missiles to the Army of Conquest was aimed at putting "sufficient pressure on Assad's forces to persuade him to compromise but not so much that his government would precipitously collapse and leave a dangerous power vacuum".

The Obama administration strategy on Syria assumed a degree of control that is so obviously unrealistic that it was inherently risky to the point of recklessness. That is why no one in the administration or the news media is discussing the reality that the Russian offensive is targeting the biggest jihadist threat to the Assad regime.
 
 #15
Project Syndicate
October 15, 2015
Testing Putin in Syria
By Richard N. Haass
Richard N. Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, previously served as Director of Policy Planning for the US State Department (2001-2003).

NEW YORK - There has been no shortage of scrutiny of what Russian President Vladimir Putin is up to in Syria and why. Much of the analysis, though, has been narrowly focused on the short term and may be too negative in assessing his actions' likely long-term consequences.

What we know is that Putin has decided to come to the aid of Bashar al-Assad's embattled regime. Russian bombs and missiles are now raining down on an array of armed groups that have been fighting Syrian government forces, which has given the regime the breathing space that Russia's intervention was intended to provide.

As bad as the Assad government is, and as much as it has to answer for, this outcome is arguably preferable in the short run to the regime's collapse. The painful truth in Syria today is that a government implosion would most likely lead to genocide, millions more displaced people, and the establishment of the Islamic State's so-called caliphate in Damascus.

Putin's motives are a matter of speculation, but it would appear that he did not want to see Russia's long-term ally in the Middle East fall. Moreover, he never misses an opportunity to remind the world that Russia remains a major power, able and willing to act on behalf of its perceived interests. It is also possible that he sought to distract domestic attention from a shrinking economy and the rising cost of intervention in Ukraine. Putin's high approval ratings suggest he may well be succeeding.

Many fear that Russia's latest activism will not only prolong Syria's brutal civil war, but also strengthen the Islamic State. This could well turn out to be the case, as hatred of the Assad regime is a major recruiting tool. And, thus far at least, the Islamic State seems to be a low priority for the Russian military, which appears to be attacking mainly other anti-Assad groups.

Indeed, there have been reports of the Islamic State moving into areas that others have abandoned following Russian attacks. Russia seems to be playing the same cynical game as Assad: framing the war as a binary choice between the Islamic State and a regime that, however flawed, still deserves the world's support.

Some also fear that this demonstration of Russian assertiveness presages a new wave of such interventions, even a new Cold War. But this is unlikely, if for no other reason than that Russia lacks the economic and military means to sustain such efforts on multiple fronts. It is also not clear that the Russian people are prepared to pay a high price for such a foreign policy.

So it all comes down to Putin, who enjoys a degree of autonomy in Kremlin decision-making not seen since the Stalin era. Putin is widely known to be a martial-arts enthusiast, and his action in Syria is entirely consistent with many of the discipline's principles, including the importance of the decisive thrust that neutralizes the opponent's strengths and exploits his weaknesses.

But force has its limits. Russia's intervention in Syria cannot succeed if success is defined as enabling the Assad government to regain control over the bulk of the country's territory. Putin's policy can, at most, establish a relatively secure enclave.

Even this modest aim will prove costly, because the Islamic State is also becoming stronger. And it could prove expensive to Russia itself: it is only a matter of time before suicide bombings (such as the recent attack in Ankara) occur in Moscow.

The real question, then, is whether Putin sees bolstering the Assad government as an end in itself or as a means to an end. If it is the latter - if Putin is thinking in terms of chess, the preferred game of many Russians, and planning several moves ahead - a diplomatic process, in which Assad is removed at some point, is conceivable. Russia might support such a process; after all, Putin is not known for his sentimentality. Indeed, he might embrace a political process that enabled him to demonstrate Russia's central role in shaping the future of the Middle East.

In the meantime, the United States and others should pursue a two-track policy. One track would channel steps to improve the balance of power on the ground in Syria. This means doing more to help the Kurds and select Sunni tribes, as well as continuing to attack the Islamic State from the air.

Relatively safe enclaves should emerge from this effort. A Syria of enclaves or cantons may be the best possible outcome for now and the foreseeable future. Neither the US nor anyone else has a vital national interest in restoring a Syrian government that controls all of the country's territory; what is essential is to roll back the Islamic State and similar groups.

The second track is a political process in which the US and other governments remain open to Russian (and even Iranian) participation. The goal would be to ease Assad out of power and establish a successor government that, at a minimum, enjoyed the support of his Alawite base and, ideally, some Sunnis.

Such a process might well confer prestige on Putin. That would be a price worth paying if it contributed to a dynamic that over time reduced both the suffering of the Syrian people and the danger posed by the Islamic State.
 
 #16
www.rt.com
October 17, 2015
Why Russia had to intervene in Syria
By Dr Alexander Yakovenko, Russian Ambassador to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Deputy foreign minister (2005-2011).

Combating international terrorism has long been one of the top priorities of Russia's foreign policy. We have been consistently advocating genuinely global efforts in countering this evil.

The fight against terrorism must be conducted on a universal legal basis, starting with the UN Charter. That is why Russia has been unable to join the US-led "global coalition" against Islamic State (IS, formerly ISIS/ISIL). The coalition was established in circumvention of the UN Security Council, and its operations in Syria violate the sovereignty of that country.

The fight against IS can gain legitimacy only through a UN Security Council mandate. So far the Security Council has been blocked by attempts of a group of states to impose an ideological approach to this direct common threat. The Russian draft resolution on combating terrorist groups in the Middle East, while respecting the independence of countries of the region, remains on the table.

Russia calls for establishing a broad counter-terrorist front. Addressing robustly the threat of IS and other terrorist groups in the region, requires a joint and coordinated action by all those who are already fighting ISIS on the ground. Those include the Syrian and Iraqi armies, the Kurdish and Shia militias, and groups of patriotic opposition in Syria. The recent meetings at the UN General Assembly have shown that nobody is enthused at the prospect of destruction of the regional architecture and replacement of secular states with an extremist "caliphate".

While those diplomatic efforts are gaining momentum, Russia remains the only international player whose military actions in Syria has a legal basis in the form of the request of the government in Damascus. Our air strikes in Syria are solely focused on the elimination of the terrorist threat in that country. As regards the choice of targets, the Russian Defence Ministry has shown an unprecedented openness, providing comprehensive and detailed information on every single operation of the Russian Air Force, on a daily basis. Yet any information that our partners can share regarding potential IS targets to be hit, will be highly appreciated. So far our respective requests have not been responded to.

Russia's actions are already bringing tangible results on the ground. Several hundred air strikes have significantly degraded the command and logistical infrastructure of IS. This is in stark contrast with the widely recognized and admitted inefficiency of the US-led coalition. After more than a year of bombing, IS ranks have swollen, their control over some regions has strengthened, and financial flows have been steady.

The accusation that IS is a product of Russia's "insistence" on keeping President Assad in power is absolutely untenable. What is true is that the weakening of the Syrian authorities caused by the outside interference has led to vacuum and vast zones of anarchy throughout the country, which were filled by terrorists. The so-called moderate opposition was led to believe that a Western military intervention would engineer a "regime change," that somebody would fight for them. Consequently, as civil war raged, polarization left little room for those misled groups.

Indeed, while solving the problem of terrorism, we certainly must facilitate the launch of a UN-led focused and comprehensive political process based on the Geneva communiqu� of 30 June 2012. Defeating terrorists will help create the right conditions for a lasting political settlement. It will be the best way to put an end to the civil conflict and achieve а "peace without victory", something that the Entente powers couldn't stomach in 1918.
 
#17
Moscow Times
October 17, 2015
One-Third of Russians Think Russian Military Is World's Best
By Matthew Bodner

Almost one-third of Russians think their nation's military is the most powerful in the world, according to a new poll published by the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) on Thursday.

The survey comes two weeks after Russia began air strikes in Syria that have dominated television news coverage - most of which have presented the campaign as a resounding success.

It showed that Russians are more confident about their nation's military power than in the final years of the Soviet Union, when the country was a recognized global superpower.

Thirty-two percent of respondents to the poll published Friday said Russia's military was the strongest in the world, compared to only 5 percent in 1990. Another 49 percent said in Friday's survey that the Russian armed forces were among the planet's most powerful, compared to 21 percent in 1990.

In 1990, almost half of Russians said the Soviet armed forces either lagged behind the rest of the world or were flat-out weak.

In part, the change in attitudes reflects a massive modernization drive over in recent years. President Vladimir Putin has overseen a 20 trillion ruble ($326 billion) rearmament program, begun in 2011, that is aimed at reversing nearly two decades of decline in the armed forces.

The program is already yielding results. Russia's air force and navy in Syria has successfully conducted modern combat operations, sometimes using advanced precision weapons. But analysts agree that in most areas the country's military technology significantly lags the U.S., as well as Britain, Germany and France.

This year, Russian military spending is expected to hit a post-Soviet high of 3.1 trillion rubles ($50.5 billion), or around 4 percent of the country's gross domestic product. Asked if this was too much to spend on the military, just 35 percent of respondents to Friday's poll said yes, while 52 percent said the government isn't spending enough.

The survey was conducted from Oct. 10-11 and polled 1,800 people across Russia. The margin of error did not exceed 3.5 percent.
 
 
 #18
Irrussianality
https://irrussianality.wordpress.com
October 17, 2015
Lifestyle and Identity
By Paul Robinson
University of Ottawa
[Chart here https://irrussianality.wordpress.com/2015/10/17/lifestyle-and-identity/]

The Levada Centre has just issued the results of a new survey. According to this poll, a majority of Russians (53%) do not feel that their value system and self-identity align at all with those of the West. In addition, 45% regard the 'Western lifestyle' (which was not defined) negatively, and only 30% regard it positively. The results are shown here.

TO WHAT DEGREE DO YOU CURRENTLY FEEL THAT YOUR VALUE SYSTEM AND SELF-IDENTITY ALIGN WITH THOSE OF WESTERN CULTURE?
          Feb.93            Oct.08       Sept. 14      Sept. 15
I feel this way at all times     1     3     2     2
This is fairly important to me     5     7     12     10
This is not very important to me     16     32     37     28
I don't feel this at all     50     54     43     53
It is difficult to say     28     5     6     7

OVERALL, HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT THE "WESTERN LIFESTYLE": POSITIVELY OR NEGATIVE
      Oct.08     Sept. 14     Sept. 15

Positively     46     34     30
Negatively     30     42     45
It is difficult to say     25     25     25

The survey also found that 5% of respondents would definitely like to move to the West to work, and 18% would probably do so if they could, while 30% probably wouldn't and 36% definitely wouldn't (the rest didn't know). These figures are almost unchanged from 2008. The primary reasons given for wanting to move to the West were economic (better living conditions being the most commonly cited) rather than political. Younger people (18-29), those with university education, and those who spoke foreign languages and travelled regularly abroad were generally more positively inclined to the West and more likely to want to live there.

Looking at all this, I suspect that the answers to the 'lifestyle' question are rather less significant than those to the more general 'self-identity' question, in large part because, as the charts above show, they have changed much more over time and so may be more reflective of current political differences rather than deeply-held beliefs. They may therefore be more likely to change again in the future.

Russian views about what they imagine the 'Western lifestyle' to be have in effect flipped 180 degrees over the past seven years: 46% positive and 30% negative in 2008, but 30% positive and 45% negative in 2015. A dislike of Western foreign policy might well be a factor in this change, as might a feeling that the West has become decadent and excessively liberal, while Russia has retained a more conservative outlook. Nevertheless, I am not convinced that this apparent divergence of values is a lasting phenomenon. The current level of international tension does not have to be permanent, and the values differences are, I think, overblown. Most Russians seem very happy to indulge in Western-style consumerism if given the chance, and Russian popular culture is not obviously any less 'decadent' than that of the West. I strongly suspect that if Russian-Western relations were to improve, answers to the lifestyle question would switch rapidly back to where they were seven years ago.

The same can't be said of Russians' failure to self-identify as Western. The 53% whose self-identity is 'not at all' Western is an almost identical figure to the 50% who felt that way in 1993 and the 54% who did so in 2008. It seems that there is a long-standing sense among a majority of Russians that they are distinct from the West. This sense is not just a product of current international tensions, and it is likely to persist.

One of the paradoxes of globalization is that in some cases it may actually accentuate perceptions of cultural difference. Lifestyle and identity have to be separated. What the Levada poll suggests to me is that the fact that Russians are adopting certain Western ways of living doesn't necessarily mean that they will grow to feel more Western.
 
 
#19
Russia & India Report
http://in.rbth.com
October 17, 2015
Moving away from a West-centric outlook
The western media is not likely to change its negative approach towards Russia anytime in the near future. It's time for Russians to stop caring.
Ajay Kamalakaran, RIR

Before writing this column I would like to make it absolutely clear that I am not anti-West, and there are a lot of things about western countries that I absolutely admire.  However, I find this need among many influential people in Russia to have western approval absolutely cringe-worthy.

Over the last two and a half decades, the American film and television industry has managed to completely capture the Russian market. It's incredibly difficult to find a Russian film being screened in Moscow. The cinema halls mostly show dubbed Hollywood pictures. This domination of the Russian cultural space by the U.S. and its allies has led to many Russians seeing their own country through a western prism.

While there may be some justification for calling St Petersburg the 'Venice of the North, why is Vladivostok called the 'Russian San Francisco?' The list goes on with some smaller regions in the Caucasus being labeled the 'Switzerland of Russia.' As nice as Venice, San Francisco and Switzerland are, they have their plus and minus points just like any other place on earth. The problem with many Russians is that they blindly accept the hype over places in the West and try overly hard to equate their own cities with benchmarks set in Europe and the U.S.

This lack of self confidence and need for approval from the West were the direct result of perestroika and the losing of superpower status.  It has however been almost a quarter of a century since the USSR collapsed.  Over this time, Russia has managed to revive and reinvent itself.  The country is blessed with so much natural beauty and some of the most charming cities in the world. It's time to develop thick skin and no longer care what the West thinks.

I take the example of a country like India that is constantly under siege from the western media and its local 'sepoys.' No article published by a western newspaper or wire service on India's achievements would be complete without a mention of the country's poverty. Whether it's the space program or some massive infrastructure project, somewhere or the other, there will be a line about the percentage of people living below the poverty line in the country. The same goes with western news agencies and their photo desks. A poor person, a cow or some sign of poverty is an essential part of a photograph of India.

As India continues to grow economically and takes the right steps to eradicate poverty, an increasing number of Indians just do not care about biased media coverage from the West. The prevailing wisdom in the country is on the lines of 'let them wallow in their own ignorance.'  While there are those in cities like Udaipur, who call their city, 'the Venice of the East,' the decision-makers in the state of Rajasthan are more keen to promote their beautiful culture than falling prey to such silly comparisons.

Russians need to develop thick skin and have a similar attitude towards western negativity. Over the last decade, there has been a clearly visible improvement in infrastructure and standards of living across Russia. But we'll never read about this in any western publication. If something unusually negative happens in a Siberian village, it has a great chance of making headlines around the world.

It's amazing how Europeans have the reasoning and logic to separate American foreign policy from culture, but still jeer at Russian performers at the Eurovision contest. For many in the West, the aggressive American military adventures do not equal American people, but different yardsticks get easily applied to Russia. Of course, this is the result of years of very effective brainwashing.

Russia has tremendous goodwill in Asia, the Balkans, Africa and Latin America. It's time to capitalize and build on this. Many people in these regions want to see Russians have the same kind of confidence in their country as they did in the heyday of the USSR.

The first step on the road to building this confidence is de-hyphenation with the West. Let us stop the comparisons with Venice and San Francisco (and the free publicity these cites keep getting) when we talk about St Petersburg and Vladivostok. Russia needs to create it own tourism brand distinct and free of the West.  Of course, it would be nice to have more western tourists in Russia, but the world is certainly not just the West. This is precisely what some decision-makers in Russia need to understand.

Tailpiece:

Given all the restoration and redevelopment going on across the country, Russian cities will be at their best when the country hosts the 2018 FIFA World Cup. The sporting carnival is Russia's best opportunity to showcase itself to the world. No amount of negative media coverage will be able to offset what football fans from around the world will see with their own eyes.

 
 #20
Financial Times
October 17, 2015
God's TV, Russian style
By Courtney Weaver
Courtney Weaver is the FT's deputy Moscow bureau chief

On a sunny afternoon in Moscow, the Russian tycoon Konstantin Malofeev is holding court in the studios of his newly launched television channel Tsargrad TV, dressed in a designer suit, a blue silk handkerchief peeking from his breast pocket. Above him is a makeshift cathedral cupola weighing in at half a tonne. Behind him are 24ft-high windows through which the Kremlin's red towers are visible, their glass communist stars glistening.

Malofeev, who has the cheeks and figure of a man who likes a good meal, is in a buoyant mood. In a sign of his growing clout, he has just had lunch with two of the richest oligarchs on the Forbes list. Yelena Mizulina, a leading conservative senator, who has come to Tsargrad's offices, is patiently waiting for the businessman to fit in a t�te-�-t�te before he departs on his summer holiday.

Over the past few years, Malofeev, 41, has morphed into one of Russia's most influential businessmen and lobbyists, in part thanks to his devout Russian Orthodox faith and conservative values, now back in vogue during Vladimir Putin's third term. As the founder of private equity firm Marshall Capital Partners, Malofeev accumulated substantial personal wealth, largely through an investment in the Russian telecoms giant Rostelecom. (His friend Igor Shchegolev, a fellow Russian Orthodox and now Putin adviser, was telecoms minister at the time.) Now he is paying it back as a self-styled Christian philanthropist and one of Putin's loudest ideological supporters.

It is as part of this next act that Malofeev has launched Tsargrad TV, his own Russian Orthodox TV channel, which aims to put a conservative yet modern spin on global news. In June, Tsargrad began broadcasting daily on Spas, a religious channel run by the Russian Orthodox Church, in addition to an online platform. According to Malofeev, Tsargrad's closest international equivalent is Fox News in the US, making him something of a Russian Roger Ailes.

"When Fox News entered the American market in around 1996 to 1997, they were very different from CNN and ABC. Fox talked about things that people would discuss among themselves in their kitchens but which other channels were too scared to say, or didn't want to say on air," Malofeev says excitedly. "In many ways Tsargrad is similar to what Fox News has done. We started from the idea that there are many people who adhere to traditional values and they absolutely need a voice."

The nod to Fox is not accidental. To get Tsargrad TV up and running, Malofeev hired Jack Hanick, one of Fox News's founding producers, whom he met when they were both speakers at a Moscow conference on morality in the media. "They put us all in the room and I thought, another speaker, great," Hanick says. "He seemed like a very humble guy. I had no idea he had a lot of power or political pull. I'm still not sure what he has."

Born in the Moscow suburbs in 1974, Malofeev studied to be a lawyer but switched to investment banking as capitalism took hold towards the end of the 1990s. By 2005, at the age of 31, he had founded his private equity firm Marshall Capital Partners. It was at university that he says he found God, and throughout his business career he has cultivated an image of a man of the Russian Orthodox Church.

Connecting Malofeev to leading Russian and western conservatives is like playing a far-right, Orthodox version of Six Degrees of Kevin Bacon. In Kremlin circles, the tycoon mingles with Shchegolev and Vladimir Yakunin, the former chief of Russia's state railways company. In the west, he has been linked with France's Marine Le Pen and is acquainted with US presidential candidate Rand Paul. Panos Kammenos, the former Greek defence minister, has been a guest at his country estate.

Malofeev gained further notoriety during the Ukraine conflict in 2014, after he emerged as one of the key figures linking pro-Russia forces in east Ukraine with the Moscow political establishment. One of his former employees, Alexander Borodai, was at one point the self-declared Donetsk People's Republic prime minister; another, Igor Girkin, briefly served as the pro-Russian rebels' chief military commander. The connections landed Malofeev under EU and US sanctions last year. Ukraine's interior ministry has accused him of financing "illegal armed groups" and branded him a "sponsor of terrorists".

Malofeev has denied the allegations, which have played well for him domestically. According to Sergei Markov, a well-connected pro-Kremlin analyst, the claims have actually boosted his standing as a successful lobbyist and ideologue: "Malofeev ended up in the middle of all these news events accidentally enough, I think. But when he did, of course he was happy about it. It meant that all of his money hadn't been spent in vain."

The new TV channel is the latest example of Malofeev doing what he does best: leveraging his Orthodox credentials and wealth to catapult himself into the zeitgeist of Russian politics. While some oligarchs who tried to get involved in TV in the early 2000s were exiled or jailed under Putin's new regime, Malofeev is so far enjoying carte blanche with his channel, which he boasts is even more patriotic than the Kremlin's own state-run TV stations. "We've always stuck to our Orthodox, patriotic, imperialist positions. The mainstream hasn't."

Tsargard's primary goal, Malofeev insists, is a proselytising one. "There are a lot of people who wear crosses, identify as Christians but at the same time don't go to church, or go to church just once a year for Easter. Our job is to reach out to these people and pave the way to the cathedral for them."

At the same time, the channel has adopted a clear anti-western geopolitical stance on the news that can make Russian state TV look tame by comparison. In a segment about migrants this summer, one of the channel's correspondents suggested that Europe's refugee crisis had been the deliberate work of either George Soros or the Rothschild family. "The Rothschilds are called the masters of money," the anchor told the audience calmly. "Their resource is money and their goal is world domination."

In another segment, the topic of Russian interest rates was used as a launch pad for discussing the questionable morals of US monetary policy. A news item about Planned Parenthood turned into a cautionary expos� on "American Satanists" who "openly supported the killing of children".

The mastermind behind Tsargrad's editorial ideology is Alexander Dugin, a rightwing ideologue who, since 1997, has called for Russia to rebuild a Eurasian empire, "constructed on the fundamental principle of the common enemy" - primarily the US and its exported ideal of liberalism. A Dostoyevskian figure with piercing eyes and a long, greying beard, Dugin says that many Russians are turning to conservatism after being disillusioned with the liberalism promoted by Boris Yeltsin in the 1990s.

"Liberalism has been strongly discredited by the west's politics," Dugin says. Tsargrad, he claims, reflects the opinion of this silent majority. "Our goal is to take patriotic discourse out of the ghetto it was kept in during Soviet and liberal times...When people aren't often given a chance to speak, they forget how to talk so they grunt or make faces. It's very important to give these people a language."

One of the main demographics to identify with this swing towards conservatism is younger Russians, Dugin says. One of them is Andrei Afanasiev, a 26-year-old Tsargrad news anchor. Though he used to work for the English-language channel Russia Today, speaks fluent English and has travelled widely, Afanasiev says his experience of studying abroad in Spain left him disillusioned about the west. "The lifestyle and values of the young people I saw there weren't close to mine. It was sick hedonism: consumerism, entertainment. Everything was very vulgar."

With Tsargrad, Afanasiev says he has found a whole new group of people who share his Orthodox beliefs and conservative values. "The concept of our channel is that we're all like-minded. It's great!" he says. "You can envy me: for the past year as a journalist, I have not once gone against my heart."

I first got a glimpse of how Tsargrad's internal ideology was shaping up during a visit to the studio, on Moscow's main drag, in late April, before its official launch. Hanick, the former Fox News executive, was in town and helping the other producers prepare for an interview that evening with Alexei Vaits, a leader of the Night Wolves, a pro-Putin motorbike gang that has become one of the symbols of the new brand of Russian nationalism. The atmosphere was pandemonium.

While Hanick has the r�sum� of an experienced TV producer, he lacks the Russian language skills. "Zhen, could you light this up?" he said to a non-English-speaking employee, gesturing up at the image of Christ hanging above the set. "How do you say, 'Cupola! Lights! Pozhaluysta?'" he asked somewhat rhetorically, dousing the Russian word for "please" with a heavy New York accent.

The cupola in question is the work of Ivan Glazunov, a prominent Russian Orthodox artist. As the producers prepared for the interview, Glazunov oversaw one of his assistants painting a plywood column to make it look more like an Elgin marble. When it was time to shoot, the two painters were brusquely shooed from the set. "For the artist, this is the compromise," Glazunov said drily.

The studio's concept, as Hanick, puts it, is "Byzantium meets the 21st century". The space's lofty windows and natural light are not the easiest fit for broadcast television. "Anyone who wanted to do a TV station would say that this is a nightmare," Hanick says. But he notes that the natural light adds a certain touch of holiness to the production.

Hanick was raised Catholic but says he and his wife now hope to baptise their son in the Russian Orthodox Church, so inspired have they been with their experience at the channel. On one of his first trips to Russia, Hanick said that he had been shown around several churches in Moscow. "It was February and miserably snowing and every church was packed," he says. "People were standing outside in the snow and listening on speakers. And I was thinking, you'd never see this in America."

Russia has a complex relationship with the Orthodox Church. During the Soviet period, religion was officially banned, and all church property was seized. Between 1917 and the Soviet Union's fall, more than 300,000 church workers were killed or imprisoned by the Soviet secret police and security services. But since the fall of the Soviet Union, Orthodoxy has become not just popular but fashionable, says Geraldine Fagan, author of Believing in Russia - Religious Policy after Communism. Well-heeled Muscovites have started wearing crosses round their necks. Most restaurants in Russia's big cities now offer Lenten menus.

Under Putin's third term, Orthodoxy has taken on the additional role of a political tool, used to unite the mostly Christian population against western liberalism, seen as the cause of the 2012 anti-government protests. In the wake of those protests, the Kremlin pushed for a 2013 law banning so-called gay propaganda to minors, and jailed the punk group Pussy Riot for a 2012 protest concert in a Moscow church, while pushing a more nationalist agenda on state TV.

The main concern now for the Russian Orthodox Church is that "religious, ideological, nationalist dialogue" will replace faith, says Georgy Mitrofanov, a St Petersburg priest. "Modern Orthodox Christians in Russia are not so much religiously motivated by church life as they are searching for a new authoritarian ideological system," he warns.

At Tsargrad, there are signs that the channel's ideology is attracting a broader group of supporters. Yuri Grymov, a leading Russian producer, recently signed on as director after working at Dozhd, Russia's sole opposition TV channel - and other Dozhd employees are following suit. "I was a producer on Dozhd for a year-and-a-half, but we parted ways because we realised we were different," Grymov said. "I'm friends with people of different confessions, I work with people of different confessions. It's just that recent experience has shown me that people who go to church are different than atheists in a way that's for the better."

For Malofeev, this is all good news and largely down to one man. "Under Putin 25,000 churches have been built. Can you believe it? Twenty-five thousand churches!" Malofeev exclaims. "In addition, 800 monasteries were restored, and this Easter 1.5 million people in Moscow went to church - a new record. This is all happening before our eyes. Putin has become a historical leader, the best that Russia has had in 100 years, since before the revolution. We got very lucky."
 
 #21
Public Books
www.publicbooks.org
October 15, 2015
Russia, Today: Part 1
Eliot Borenstein and Carine Cl�ment

October 15, 2015 - Amid the annexation of Crimea, the frozen conflict in eastern Ukraine, and an emerging proxy war in Syria, many commentators have proclaimed the beginning of a new Cold War between Russia and the West. But as ideologues on either side spread their messages through international organizations and news media, it has become increasingly difficult to understand these crises and their origins. To the West, the actions of Vladimir Putin's corrupt regime are eroding the foundations of the postwar nation-state and plunging the world further into chaos. From the Kremlin's vantage, a hypocritical, decadent West has precipitated a coup in Ukraine and expanded NATO to Russia's doorstep. Freighted with irreconcilable narratives, disinformation, and misleading historical analogies, scholars and observers alike seem to lack a vocabulary to adequately describe the West's ongoing drama with Russia.

Our second collaboration between Public Books and the French online journal La Vie des Id�es / Books & Ideas seeks a path beyond this intellectual impasse. Over the space of six articles, published in three parts, our contributors examine the forces that have led to a renewed era of global uncertainty. In this first pair of essays, American slavicist Eliot Borenstein examines Russia's love-hate relationship with the West, while French sociologist Carine Cl�ment analyzes the system that sustains Putin's domestic power. In our November 1 issue we will publish a second pair of articles by Princeton historian Ekaterina Pravilova and French philosopher Michel Eltchaninoff, followed on November 15 by two final pieces by American legal scholar Monica Eppinger and French sociologist C�cile Lef�vre.
---

CAUGHT IN A BAD ROMANCE: WHAT AMERICA MEANS TO RUSSIA
Eliot Borenstein
Eliot Borenstein is Professor of Russian and Slavic Studies at New York University. He is the author of Men without Women: Masculinity and Revolution in Russian Fiction, 1917-1919 (2000) and Overkill: Sex and Violence in Contemporary Russian Popular Culture (2008). A 2009 Guggenheim recipient, Borenstein is working on a monograph entitled "Plots Against Russia: Conspiracy and Fantasy after Socialism." He is also the editor and developer of "All the Russias," the blog site and web portal for the NYU Jordan Center for the Advanced Study of Russia.

Russia fares poorly in the headlines, and not just because the news is so often bad. The Anglo-American world's limited knowledge about its culture and history saddles Russia with painfully obvious clich�s, often involving the words "red" and "revolution." But the banality prize must go to the inevitable "From Russia, with Love."1 It has been almost 60 years since Ian Fleming published a James Bond novel by that name (and more than 50 since the movie was released), yet the phrase, like Bond himself, does not seem to be headed to retirement any time soon.

But it is time for our complacency about the nature of the ties between the two countries to be shaken, if not stirred. Fleming's story features two Russian women trying to make contact with Britain's top super spy; one wants to kill him, the other takes him to bed. With just a few small adjustments (such as swapping out Bond for an American), the two extremes could be applied to many Russians' feelings about the United States, feelings that, as is often the case in cross-cultural relationships, are mutually misunderstood.

Pundits in the West anxiously wring their hands over the rise of Russian "anti-Americanism," a notoriously vague term whose main effect is to make Americans feel besieged. Russia has become the latest focus for the naive question we never get tired of asking: "Why do they hate us so much?" In this case, though, the hostility towards America comes from a place of love. Angry, spurned love.

Enemies: A Love Story

Russia's love of America is an old story, one that is worth recalling precisely when relations have gone so sour. Like Humbert's Lolita, America had a precursor (she did, indeed she did): an older, and still simmering, affair with Western Europe in general and France in particular. But in the twentieth century, Russia was preoccupied with modernity and with the future. An infatuation with America was inevitable.

To those who lived through World War II, America was the Lend-Lease program. To the generation who came of age in the 1960s, America was the enchanted kingdom that gave birth to jazz (broadcast on Voice of America for years), Ernest Hemingway, Kurt Vonnegut, and blue jeans. For most people, this love was political only to the extent that turning one's attention to the "enemy" was a politicized gesture. The appeal was not the United States' economic system or democratic institutions; US boosterism to the contrary, Russians were not seeking "freedom" or the "American Dream." They were simply charmed.

We liked to think of Soviet citizens as virtually isolated from the rest of the world, imagining their naive delight when finally confronted with the wonders of Western culture and technology. But the naivet� was really ours. Reports of shortages and long lines led many to assume that the USSR, rather than being an industrialized, modern country with a capacious social welfare system, was more like a godforsaken island whose inhabitants couldn't wait to start a cargo cult. The novelist Vasily Aksyonov, stripped of his citizenship in 1980, recalls how excited his new American landlord was when he heard that the Aksyonovs were from the USSR: he took them to a magic room that went up and down from floor to floor, depending on the buttons pressed. Aksyonov was too polite (and too amused) to tell him that the Soviets had long since mastered the secrets of the elevator.
If we accept that US-Russian relations are at least in part about love, then America is the ultimate bad boyfriend.

Still, there was one gap in their knowledge about America that would prove disastrous: the Soviets did not know that their love for America was unrequited. And, really, how could they? The conflict between the two superpowers defined the entire era, and the limited contacts between them nearly always involved American scholars, diplomats, or activists who were emotionally or intellectually invested in Russia (and wouldn't have bothered, otherwise). This is not to say that Russia and the Soviet Union played no role in the American psyche. The ideological divide allowed for a reductive, functionalist approach to Russia and its culture, turning the Soviet Union into something of a totalitarian Disneyland for the American media/entertainment complex. Soviets made great movie villains. What else could Russia have to offer?

Russia has a long history of preoccupation with its image on the world stage. America, on the other hand, is notoriously self-absorbed, indeed, self-satisfied. We do, of course, get involved in foreign wars, but, really, our relationship with the rest of the world is one of benign neglect punctuated by the occasional recollections that we're not alone; then, like a guilty but dutiful child picking up a Hallmark card on Mother's Day, we remember to send a drone.

America was briefly infatuated with Russia and the Soviet Union during Gorbachev's perestroika, a period that proved as anomalous for the US as it did for its home country. The damage, however, was done: for at least five years (late perestroika through 1993), citizens of the (former) Soviet Union could justifiably convince themselves that we were actually concerned about their well-being. We sent them McDonalds and Pizza Hut, and eventually humanitarian aid in the form of chicken ("Bush legs," as Russians called them) and leftover Desert Storm MREs. More ominously, we sent our "experts" to reform/ruin the national economy, and acted as indefatigable cheerleaders for the country's new democratic institutions (even when Russia's president disbanded and then shelled the country's parliament in 1993).

And, by the end of the 1990s, we more or less forgot about them. If we accept that US-Russian relations are at least in part about love, then America is the ultimate bad boyfriend.

Love Will Tear Us Apart

In retrospect, the turn against America should have been predictable. When we put our stamp of approval on a neoliberal, "democratic" regime that saw incomes plummet and crime run rampant, we became complicit in its failures. Even this could have been remedied, but we added insult to injury through neglect and lack of respect. Rather than seeing Russia as a partner (or even an antagonist-at least enemies get attention), we moved in the international arena as if Russia didn't matter at all.

The 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia was a well-known turning point for Russia, when the media and popular opinion portrayed the Serbian people as victims of an overreaching predator. Russia's then-Prime Minister, Yevgeny Primakov, was flying over the Atlantic on an official visit to the US when he heard that NATO had commenced its bombing; he briefly achieved cult hero status by ordering the plane to turn around. The move was quickly dubbed "Primakov's Loop," an ironically appropriate term for a decision made because of the information loop from which Primakov had been excluded.

Russia's anger over the bombings was cast, both internally and for export, in terms of the longstanding brotherly ties between two Orthodox Slavic nations. But these ties were only (re)discovered in the 1990s; in other words, the Russian media and political elites emotionally reinvested in Serbia precisely when Yugoslavia was collapsing. The implicit homology between Serbia and Yugoslavia on one side and Russia and the Soviet Union on the other meant that Serbia's struggles were seen as a proxy for Russia's. What the American media cast as a human rights and European security problem was, in Russia, presented as a test case for America's plans for Russia itself.

It was after the bombings that anti-Western conspiracy theories started to move from the margin to the center. First came the revival of Russian �migr� Grigory Klimov's warnings about the sinister "Harvard Project," an American/Jewish plot to use mind control and genetic manipulation to transform Russia into a nation of debased, predatory homosexuals. Long a fixture of the Russian far right, it spawned S. Norka's dystopian Inquisitor trilogy about Russia's near future, when the Harvard Project is challenged by a new Orthodox inquisition and a strong president who brings order to the land.

The Harvard Project would soon be eclipsed by the "Dulles Plan," repackaged from a villain's monologue in a 1970s Soviet spy thriller and attributed to Eisenhower's CIA chief. What in the 1970s was, at best, a future threat to be avoided now looked like a plan that had already come to fruition: American pop culture turning people into idiots, "switch[ing] out their values for false ones and mak[ing] them believe in these false values." Who knew that dubbed-over reruns of Santa Barbara could be so destructive?

One need not be a die-hard Freudian to see that loving and hating America are two versions of the same libidinal investment; either way, America retains an outsized importance that haunts the current proclamations of Russian spiritual superiority. And in a time of increased state control over media outlets, presenting a hostile United States hits the sweet spot between preexisting public sentiment and state propaganda. As in most of the cases in which Russia's well-curated state media carefully drive a particular message home, it is not simply a matter of an authoritarian government telling its compliant population what to believe; rather, it is a sophisticated media operation that confirms and extends beliefs that already hold a fair amount of currency.

Since 2006, the Russian media and blogosphere have been claiming that former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright lamented the injustice of Russia's share of the world's oil and mineral wealth (Siberia should therefore be under international control). Albright herself has denied saying any such thing, while Putin has managed to have it both ways ("I'm not familiar with this quote by Madame Albright, but I know that such thoughts wander through the minds of certain politicians").2 This fake quote is part of a perfect feedback loop, reinforcing both the rapaciousness of Americans (and particularly the Clinton administration, responsible for the bombings in Serbia) and the greatness of Russia itself. It is the familiar politics of ressentiment, harnessing public pride and humiliation in the service of the elite's agenda.

Given how much of contemporary Russian paranoid political discourse revolves around homosexuality, perhaps psychoanalysis does provide some useful insights. Klimov's fantasy of a gay Jewish American cabal trying to lure Russia onto the path to debauchery looks almost prescient: the current anti-gay hysteria posits homosexuality as not simply an internal danger to the body politic, but as a disease deliberately exported by America and Europe (or as Russian homophobes prefer, "Gayrope"). A recent episode of the reliably rabid documentary/talk show hybrid "Special Correspondent" (which airs on prime time on Russian state television) followed a short film called "Sodom" about the excesses of tolerance in the US and Europe with a discussion of "what this is all really about." America and Europe are using accusations of Russian homophobia as the pretext for their next round of "humanitarian" bombings, while the State Department is relentlessly pursuing the gay agenda at the expense of all else. Even the Supreme Court's marriage equality decision (like the US prosecution of FIFA officials) gets spun as an anti-Russian act.

The rabid homophobia in Russia's contemporary public sphere is clearly about more than just disdain for same-sex love. To hear Russian defenders of "traditional values" tell it, there is nothing so fragile as heterosexual desire. The assumption seems to be that, as soon as a young boy or girl hears about homosexuality, they're going to want to be gay (because, apparently, heterosexual sex must be a terrible drag). Homosexuality has come to stand in for the whole spectrum of "Western" (and particularly American) values that could seduce Russia's youth.

Freud, in one of his more dated moments, argued that paranoia is rooted in a denial of homoerotic feelings: "I'm attracted to him" transforms into the more acceptable "He is persecuting me." Meanwhile, the Russian legislature has rediscovered the joys of repression; it is a rare week without a news story about some new bill to ban something. Most famous, of course, is the "gay propaganda" law, making virtually any positive statement about homosexuality grounds for possible prosecution (to save the children from mythical predators who want to "convert" them). Again, America is inevitably brought into the discussion.

But perhaps the anti-American homophobes protest too much. The latent homosexuality of the homophobe is something of a clich�, but it suggests something about the geopolitical preoccupations of the guardians of Russia's morality. They are, I would argue, trying to forget the sins of their youth, when they experimented with Americanism. That is the new love that dare not speak its name.


 

 #22
https://ukrainecomment.wordpress.com
October 15, 2015
DID KYIV SILENCE UKRAINE'S BIGGEST OPPOSITION NEWSPAPER? PART 1
By Brian Milakovsky
Severodonetsk, Ukraine
Brian Milakovsky, a volunteer with refugee aid organizations in Kiev, Kharkiv and the Donbas. Brian Milakovsky first traveled to Ukraine in 2009 with the Fulbright program, and for the past five years has worked in Russia as a forest ecologist. This year he returned to eastern Ukraine for three months to volunteer with refugee aid organizations and learn more about the humanitarian crisis there. He is author of "Time for a Lousy Peace in Ukraine" published on the National Interest.
[Graphics, links, and Vesti excerpts here https://ukrainecomment.wordpress.com/2015/10/15/did-kyiv-silence-ukraines-biggest-opposition-newspaper-part-1/]

The specter of a crackdown on free speech in Ukraine was raised this spring by the murder of opposition journalist and intellectual Oles Buzina and the arrest of Ukrainian journalist Ruslan Kotsaba, who was charged with undermining the draft. Yet a showdown between the government, radical activists and Vesti, the country's largest opposition paper, has largely slipped by unnoticed by western commentators.

It came to a head in July of this year with the resignation of its editor-in-chief Igor Guzhva, who was likely forced out by the paper's owner, former Yanukovich ally and oligarch-on-the-lam Aleksandr Klimenko. Strict oversight was imposed on the paper, politically sensitive material withdrawn and a focus on "affirmative topics" announced.

In a series of posts we will argue that this was the commencement of a 15 month campaign by Kyiv to intimidate one of its harshest critics into silence, and not, as opponents of the paper insist, a much-belated defensive strike against a channel of Russian propaganda and separatism.

Background

The Vesti media holding, which includes Ukraine's most popular daily newspaper ("Vesti"), the most popular talk radio station (Radio Vesti), the magazine Vesti.Reporter and the television channel UBR burst onto the scene in 2013 under the leadership of media veteran Igor Guzhva. With the help of anonymous financial support he poached his staff from other major papers, including "Sevodnya," from which he had been fired a year before for refusing to pull pictures of President Yanukovich's absurdly luxurious estate Mezhgorye.

Guzhva's strategy to distribute the paper for free in large cities seems to have succeeded - by the time of the Maidan revolution Vesti was the country's most popular daily. But opponents have pointed to the free distribution as proof of a darker agenda - without oligarchic or Kremlin backing, who could possibly afford to hand out hundreds of thousands of free papers every day?

Covering Maidan

Vesti's coverage of the revolution was restrained, but showed growing alarm at the violent radicalization of the protest and the increasing brutality of the government forces. The paper's coverage of the unfolding chaos earned it the ire of many Maidan supporters. Later a frontpage image of a balaclava-clad, club wielding protestor with the headline "Day of mayhem" would be cited as proof of Vesti's bias and its role as "mouthpiece of the Kremlin".

But others respected its reporters' willingness to report from the thick of the conflict. One of these reporters, Vyacheslav Veremii, was murdered in the last days of the revolution when he attempted to photograph a band of armed thugs who were preparing to attack the protestors. For this reason the paper maintained the loyalty of some portion of the protestors, including Maidan Self-Defense activists who would come to the aid of Vesti reporters months later when they were being intimidated by a surly mob led by radical Maidan activist (and victim of a brutal kidnapping and torture by tituskhi thugs) Igor Lutsenko.

Vesti gave extensive coverage to the protestors and their demands but also to their opponents (including, strikingly, the notorious Berkut riot police). They followed with alarm the violent radicalization of the protest and the increasing brutality of the government forces. In the 2015 Vesti book "Revolution Diary," a collection of Vesti's articles about Maidan, the balance and spread of the reporting is striking. The paper published the points of view of barricade activists next to Berkut commanders, and opposition party leaders next to the pro-Russian MP Oleg Tsarev, who would later flee to Russia and become a leader of the unsuccessful "Novorossiya" movement.

Covering the "Russian Spring"

In the aftermath of the revolution Vesti began extensive coverage of the Crimea annexation and the growing crisis in the Donbas region. Its journalists, including Russian writers, reported directly from the eastern cities seized by the separatists. They wrote of the dangerous levels of alienation towards the new Ukrainian government:

"Many people truly hold these convictions, and it's not worth simplifying everything by saying that what's happening in the Donbas is exclusively the work of the Russian security agencies. Their influence is likely there, but it's not Russian citizens protesting on the main squares and joining the self-defense forces. It's much more serious than that."  (Vesti.Reporter April 18, 2014)

Three articles published in Vesti.Reporter in this period would later be the basis for a criminal investigation into the media outlet by the Ukrainian Security Agency (SBU) on charges of "undermining Ukrainian sovereignty." These articles contain extensive quotes by pro-Russian activists and separatist supporters, which demonstrate both the sincere, comprehensible anger of the easterners and the dubious causes they had seized hold of to vent it: "protecting the Russian language," Orthodox militarism, revival of the Soviet past. The tone of the articles is not sympathetic towards either the pro-
Russian or pro-Kyiv side, but rather they convey a reserved agony at their mutual incomprehension and mythmaking.

Tragically, no means was found to offer a political outlet for this eastern discontent, to peel off those who wanted Kyiv listen to the east from the active core of the separatist movement. Although many Ukrainians would disagree with such an opinion, we believe that a genuinely inclusive political process initiated before the violence erupted could have diverted many future supporters of the "Peoples Republics" from this radical path, and at least weakened the strength of the separatist cause. It is a signal tragedy of the Ukrainian crisis that Vesti's calls were not heeded and no such attempt was even made.

Covering the war

And so Vesti's reporters began covering the war in the Donbas. In this period the long-form articles of Vesti.Reporter particularly stand out of their agonized, clear-eyed assessment of events. Russian writer Marina Akhmedova described the journal's mission as "journalistic diplomacy:" We simply show all the horrors of this war from both sides, with one goal - to drive it out of our hearts. Only once that happens will "fragile ceasefires" become concrete.

In this blog we will publish a series of our translations of Vesti.Reporter's best frontline reporting. But for readers of Russian we offer direct links here:

Легкость войны     Мы мира хотим любой ценой      Завод и город на границе двух миров    Линии жизни Донецка   Дневник протоиерея Георгия Гуляева   Две истории одной войны

Several of these pieces played a crucial role for the editors of Ukraine Comment in forming our understanding of the war in the Donbas. The personal experience we then accumulated in the region only served to reinforce the sense of mutual tragedy communicated by Vesti.Reporter's writers.

The daily Vesti also extensively covered the war, reporting on high civilian casualties from the very beginning of the "anti-terrorism operation." This editorial stance soon won Vesti many opponents. Together with headline we cited above about mayhem on Maidan, a stark frontpage with the words "Massive civilian deaths in the east" and an iconic photo of residents of Stanitsa Luhanska fleeing their burning home would later be cites as proof of the paper's bias and "distortion of facts".

The frankly critical reporting of Vesti from Maidan and the frontlines of the Donbas War earned it enemies from both the new government in Kyiv and from the street. In the next post in this series we will describe the showdown between the media holding, the Ukrainian Security Agency and radical activists that would last more than a year and a half.


 
 #23
https://ukrainecomment.wordpress.com
October 17, 2015
DID KYIV SILENCE UKRAINE'S BIGGEST OPPOSITION NEWSPAPER? PART 2
By Brian Milakovsky
Severodonetsk, Ukraine
Brian Milakovsky, a volunteer with refugee aid organizations in Kiev, Kharkiv and the Donbas. Brian Milakovsky first traveled to Ukraine in 2009 with the Fulbright program, and for the past five years has worked in Russia as a forest ecologist. This year he returned to eastern Ukraine for three months to volunteer with refugee aid organizations and learn more about the humanitarian crisis there. He is author of "Time for a Lousy Peace in Ukraine" published on the National Interest.
[Graphics here https://ukrainecomment.wordpress.com/2015/10/17/did-kyiv-silence-ukraines-biggest-opposition-newspaper-part-2/]

In our last post we described how its critical, conservative view of the Euromaidan revolution, the new government's reaction to the so-called Russian Spring and the conduct of the Donbas War earned it the Ukrainian newspaper Vesti the deep distrust of the authorities and the moniker "Mouthpiece of the Kremlin" among many Ukrainians.  Here we will describe how the paper came under pressure from both the government and "activists" (re: radicals) over the past year and a half.

According to former editor-in-chief Igor Guzhva, in April 2014 the holding was approached by figures within the new government who proposed that Vesti hand over part of its shares, free of charge, as means to avoid conflict. This was refused, and in May began a series of investigations, searches and official denunciations of Vesti by high ranking officials.

First the paper's offices were raided and trashed by uniformed men claiming to be tax authorities, although they did not present any identification. They seized the paper's servers. The next day a press conference was held by the Cabinet of Ministers, where the allegedly shady financial scheme of the newspaper was presented to assembled reporters. However, Vesti journalists were denied access to the press conference, supposedly because they did not have "accreditation".

The government then alleged that Vesti laundered 93.6 million hryvnia ($4.2 million) through a complex shell game of companies in Crimea supposedly linked to the exiled Kharkiv oligarch Sergey Kurchenko. On the basis of these findings the accounts of both the newspaper and Guzhva were temporarily frozen, but after several weeks the case appeared to be shelved.

Then in September an entirely new accusation was raised by the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU), when it alleged that four articles published by Vesti threatened Ukraine's territorial integrity and inviolability. The SBU conducted another raid of the paper's offices and prevented any employees from leaving or making phone calls. Servers, laptops and personal notebooks were seized.

Raid

Officers of the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) confiscating servers, laptops and personal notebooks of reporters during a raid on the offices of Vesti newspaper in September, 2014. The paper was accused of threatening Ukrainian sovereignty. Source: vesti-ukr.com

The content of the four articles reveals that the SBU's definition of treasonous content is exceedingly wide. In our first post we described the tone and content of three of the articles, published in the longf-form journal Vesti.Reporter. They bluntly display the alienation and rage that swelled in the Donbas after in March and April of 2014, and which Russia would soon tap into with its separatist project. But by no means is the reader encouraged to agree with them, or, for that matter, to disagree with them. Just to listen.

The fourth article, published in the daily, details accusations by soldiers and volunteer activists about the sale of military supplies and the withholding of pay and discharge papers. The piece presents the point of view of the soldiers, notes that the army refused to comment and puts forward a partially dissenting view by army veterans.

The raid and court case earned the condemnation of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which called on Kyiv not to pressure critical journalists. This investigation too was shelved when the government's key witness, a forensic linguist, confirmed the lack of an inflammatory content in the four articles.

Not long after this, Radio Vesti won an appeal against a decision by the National Commission on Radio and Television not to permit the holding to broadcast in 26 cities where it had purchased radio stations. The Commission had not offered any reason for its refusal, and many observers saw it as another "front" in the growing confrontation between the government and the critical media empire.

The court of public opinion

Meanwhile pro-government activists targeted the paper, peacefully and otherwise. The Civil Sector of the Euromaidan movement held frequent anti-Vesti demonstrations in the capital. As one protest organizer shouted through a megaphone:

"This mouthpiece of the Kremlin is mean to destroy the consciousness of Ukrainians, deceiving them about the events going on in the east and inciting civil war in our country. We believe that the articles in this newspaper kill no less than bullets."

Regular pickets were organized near the points outside of metro stops in Kyiv where Vesti is handed out for free every morning. Young people would hold signs calling on passerby not to take in the paper's "Kremlin propaganda." Frequently they would dress as zombies, insinuating that Vesti zombifies its readers with misinformation.

These protests soon escalated. In June a crowd of masked youths jeered and threatened participants in a Constitution Day celebration organized at the paper's offices. Their leader, radical parliamentarian Igor Lutsenko warned  "This is our last peaceful demonstration about Vesti. We won't have any more patience if they don't change their editorial policy." Only the intervention of Maidan Self-Defense activists who had maintained good relations with the paper prevented the youths from physically assaulting the event participants or lighting up the flares that Vesti reporters claimed they had brought in backpacks.

A week later a larger mob of balaclava-clad youths smashed the windows of Vesti's offices, threw in flares and badly beat a security guard. The video shot by the paper's security camera shows the abandon and vicious glee that of a mob convinced of its total license.

Oles Vakhnii, the leader of the notorious nationalist and skinhead organization Chestnoe Slovo ("Honest Word") took responsibility for the attacks. When Vesti approached him about this he said "Accepted moral norms don't need to be applied to you. It's acceptable to beat you on the head with clubs, poison you with gas." Vakhnii earlier spent five years in jail for organizing an attack on the offices of the League of Ukrainian Voters (allegedly for its US funding), then two years in jail for racist incitement. He is yet to be arrested for the Vesti attacks despite the fact that he posted a filmed confession on Youtube, although now he is under house arrest for allegedly beating a Kyiv city prosecutor who had opened a different case against him.

In spring of 2015 Vesti activists of the notorious Right Sector organization blocked Vesti delivery trucks at two Kyiv metro stations and seized 45000 copies of the paper, which they sold for scrap to buy patriotic school textbooks. They claimed "We are fighting an internal enemy, the propaganda newspaper Vesti... which stands for everything that our brothers are dying for in the East."  Later the organization's press secretary commented that "The main thing is that we are not for censorship, but for journalistic standards and objectivity."

The video includes a fascinating altercation between the "Pravoseki" and a group of senior citizens who had come to get their free morning paper. The elderly Ukrainians begin haranguing the head activist:

-Who decided that these papers should be confiscated?
-The courts.
-What court? When and where?
-The People's court.
-What, you're "the People's court" now?
-Yes, I'm the People.
-Huh! Just one! And the rest of us, we're not the People?
-You are too.
-Well we want to read that paper!
-Go read something other than pro-Russian papers that support separatism! And why don't you speak Ukrainian?

The pensioners continue to argue with him (many of them switching to Ukrainian) and angrily crying out "lawlessness!"

Just as was the case with the earlier sacking of the Vesti offices, the government could not make a case even with a filmed commission of the crime.

Guzhva alleged that the SBU recruits radicals to attack government critics in exchange for staying out of jail themselves. In a detailed piece in Vesti one of his journalists quoted a representative of Chestnoe Slovo, the radical organization which took responsibility for the July attack on his paper: "Together with the SBU we work against separatism and the opposition, who wish to undermine national security and discredit the government." In the organization's offices there is a citation of appreciation from SBU head Valentin Nalivaichenko for "significant contributions to the maintenance and strengthening of national security."

The article's accusations proved particularly ominous when the controversial anti-Maidan journalist and commentator Oles Buzina was murdered a few days later, allegedly by extreme nationalists serving in one of the volunteer brigades in the east. In response to public shock at Buzina's death a well-known battalion leader wrote on Facebook that he was surprised people would doubt that the journalist was killed by "patriots":

I find these people interesting who just a little while ago shouted 'Oy, boys come back from the front and put things in order here!' [but now are shocked by Buzina's death]. What else did they have in mind by 'putting things in order?' At the front they don't teach you to waste your time sitting in court hearings or writing complaints.

Guzhva claimed that a smear campaign had been ongoing against Buzina for the past year, led by "a pack of hysterical, intolerant media instigators who call for reprisals against anyone who, in their opinion, has an incorrect point of view. Because of them the offices of Vesti were trashed and our distributors attacked. And possibly Buzina was killed because of them."

End game

On Journalism Day (June 5) at a press conference about freedom of the press President Poroshenko claimed that it is not his job to order that some media outlet or another be shut down. But he then added "... If the tax authorities prove the non-transparency of Vesti's financing, there should be no doubt that the country will defend itself..."

Three days later the Tax Authorities called in 242 current and former employees of the paper for questioning, essentially anyone who received their salary electronically. Some employees claimed that the authorities aggressively badgered them, threatened them and their relatives while convincing them to come down to the station.

This was soon followed by yet another raid on the paper's offices by uniformed men offering no i.d. They claimed to have a court order to search the premises of "Vesti Mass-Media LLC" even thought that company isn't located in Vesti's newspaper offices. They did not allow journalists or newspaper's lawyers onto the premises, gave the offices another thorough trashing and once again, confiscated the servers. Around 500 people gathered outside of the Verkhovna Rada and Tax Authority to protest the raid.

The culmination of the 15 month standoff was at hand. Guzhva left the country on vacation, and from abroad suddenly came the news that he had had sold his shares in the media holding to his partners and stepped down as editor-in-chief.  Ukrainian media watchers quickly circulated the version that Vesti's majority owner, exiled oligarch Aleksander Klimenko, had bargained his way back into Ukraine by forcing the overly critical Guzhva out of the paper. Anonymous sources within the paper's staff claimed that overseers from the presidential administration would be installed to filter out any improper materials. The new spokesman for the paper, Klimenko's common law wife, announced a new focus on "affirmative topics."

Guzvha returned from abroad and was immediately summoned to court on charges of tax evasion, which purportedly were based on evidence from the latest raid. The judge denied the prosecutor's request for a massive 17 million hryvnia ($727,000) bail, imposing a more standard 1 million ($45,000). He also forbade Guzhva to leave Kyiv without explicit permission from the court.Guzhva in court

At the present time the former editor is preparing his defense. He claims that the Tax Agency, lacking the basis for a real case after a year of investigation and raids, manipulated the facts in order to create the illusion of a crime. In his complicated explanation, the paper took returnable financial assistance from a firm in Sumy in 2013, but was unable to return the sum in time because the firm's accounts were frozen during the initial investigation of Vesti in May of 2014. According to Ukrainian law, the paper must now wait for the expiration of the statute of limitations (three years), and then include this sum in its gross income and pay income tax on it. "But the tax authorities decided on direct forgery. They chose to regard the financial assistance we received as irrevocable and demand that we should have included it in our gross income and paid income taxes on it in 2014. And since we didn't do that, they have a formal occasion to present to us the charges of tax evasion."

The "new" Vesti

The holding cut ties with all Russian writers and journalists, who made up a significant contingent on Radio Vesti and in Reporter (including Marina Akhmedova, author of some of the journal's most powerful war journalism from Donetsk). The editor-in-chief of Vesti.Reporter, Gleb Prostakov, described the changes thus: "we will try to look at broader trends and not run around after the latest newsmakers.... More reporting form the regions, more emphasis on urbanism. But we won't shy away from strong opinions, we've kept our teeth."

But it soon became clear that Guzhva's exit posited real changes in Vesti's tone and editorial stance. An already printed issue of Vesti.Reporter was held back from distribution, which sources within the paper attribute to an article about the intricacies of Poroshenko's inner circle and competition with the "Georgian court" of exiled reformers led by Mikhail Saakashvili.  Several copies made their way into the hands of media commentators, who published scanned versions online. The journal itself was soon reprinted and distributed without the touchy article.

Next in line was sensational reporting by reporter Svetlana Kriukova on the early elections in the northern city of Chernihiv. Gennady Korban, a corporate raider and ally of the country's most prominent oligarch (Igor Kolomoisky) balloted against President Poroshenko's handpicked candidate. From the first days of the campaign it became clear that this would be an extraordinarily ugly election. "I was made aware that this piece would never get published in Reporter while I was still on assignment," Kryukova told the editors of Ukraine Comment. "I was traveling with [candidate] Korban and at one point I turned to him and said 'I hope this story will be good, because I'm gonna lose my job for it'."

In her piece Korban was shown to be a crude populist, earning the humorous internet nickname "Marshal Buckwheat" after sewing support by giving out free buckwheat kasha to the poor and elderly. Many voters were shown to be in such desperate economic straits that their vote was virtually the only saleable resource at their disposal.

More damningly, the president's candidate Berezenko liberally used various schemes to purchase those votes outright. At one point in the piece Korban's campaign team surrounds a locked car in which they have been told Berezenko's vote buyers are located. The two men inside are observed tearing up sheets of paper and eating them. After a multi-hour standoff they are hustled away by the police but a search of the trunk reveals 500 envelopes stuffed with 400 hryvnia each ($18) and an entire arsenal of firearms. Later one of the apartments is described where city residents can come to collect their $18 after they show a picture of Berezenko and promise to vote for him.

When it became clear that the piece would never see publication in the "new" Vesti, Kryukova resigned and took her work to the competing paper Ukrainska Pravda. It proved to be one of the most hotly discussed pieces of political journalism in post-Maidan Ukraine.

Several newsroom veterans followed Guzhva and Kryukova out of the paper, including one writer who claimed that the new management forced the news staff to remove even the smallest mention of Igor Guzvha's court case from the paper. Vesti.Reporter's chief war correspondent Inna Zolotukhyna quit, claiming "The concept of Reporter was changed. Now they don't write about the ATO [anti-terrorism operation] there. And I continue to think that in a country where there's a war on, that should be topic number one." And in October Zolotukhyna was followed out by the journal's editor-in-chief, Gleb Prostakov.

Muzzled

The extraordinary pressure exerted on the Vesti media holding over the last fifteen months should raise serious questions about whether the exit of its editor-in-chief was more than the result of mere newsroom and boardroom politics.

It appears that Kyiv jettisoned its cruder strategy to silence the paper - the accusations of separatist support and associated raid - after it earned the condemnation of the OSCE. But removing Guzhva while leaving the paper largely intact to continue publication is a low-risk neutralization strategy. It has not caught the attention of Kyiv's western backers, who claim they will hold Ukraine to high standards of democratization. As US ambassador to the UN Samantha Powers stated in June, "Ukraine should zealously protect freedom of the press, including for its most outspoken and biased critics - indeed, especially for its most outspoken and biased critics - even as the so-called separatists expel journalists from the territory they control, and even as Russia shutters Tatar media outlets in occupied Crimea."

Gennady Korban, well-experienced in corporate raiding and Ukrainian politics, described what had occurred thus: "I have a simple, inexpensive and effective method for privatizing freedom of speech. You need to do just two things - get the support of the presidential administration, and then slap any newspaper you want with fines for financial violations. After that they'll put out a warrant for the editor and you've got freedom of speech in your pocket... This recipe was first cooked up in Russia after Vladimir Putin came to power. By this method he had his way with freedom of speech in his homeland."

The question now is if Vesti's various media outlets begin to blunt their criticism of the president, avoid contentious issue and "focus on the affirmative," will international organizations and the western press recognize that Ukraine's biggest opposition paper was muzzled?

In our next post in this series we will discuss in more detail what Vesti's fate means for freedom of the press in today's Ukraine.


 
 #24
Moscow Times
October 19, 2015
Poroshenko Pressures TV Channel to Keep Putin Handshake Off-Air
By Anna Dolgov

A Ukrainian television channel has published a statement by its former producer, claiming officials from President Petro Poroshenko's administration banned the channel from broadcasting footage of a handshake the Ukrainian leader exchanged with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin at a recent meeting.

The handshake took place at the start of a meeting in Paris on Oct. 2, but when television channel 112 Ukraina was preparing a report about the gathering, it received a "barrage of calls" from the presidential administration and security services "about the unacceptability of showing the handshake on the air," former producer Viktor Zubritsky said on his Facebook page Sunday.

"So, Poroshenko shook Putin's hand, but did not want Ukrainians to known about it," Zubritsky said. "And somehow strangely, all of Ukraine's television channels did not notice that event."

The television channel reprinted the post in full on its website, without adding any comment. It also included a photo, credited to France's Foreign Ministry, of Putin and Poroshenko shaking hands.

Zubritsky also accused the Ukrainian president of putting pressure on 112 Ukraina, and linked a recent court warrant to search the channel's offices to the channel's refusal to shelve the footage of the handshake.

"Poroshenko, with the help of his cohorts ... has been using the usual arsenal of a tyrant - threats of opening or closing criminal cases, threats of revoking the digital [broadcasting] license," Zubritsky said.

The channel is under investigation on suspicion of money laundering, Zubritsky said, describing the case as punishment for 112 Ukraina's critical coverage of the president.

"This final refusal to 'not show his handshake' has led to a Ukrainian court approving on Friday, Oct. 16, a warrant to search within a month the offices of 112 Ukraina television and to seize all computers, digital data-storage devices and so on," Zubritsky said. "In other words - to carry out technical moves toward terminating the television channel's work."

The 112 Ukraina channel has received several government warnings this year for supposedly violating the terms of its broadcasting license, Russia's RBC business news agency reported.

Putin and Poroshenko, along with French President Francois Hollande and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, met in Paris on Oct. 2 in an attempt to bring peace to eastern Ukraine, where Moscow-backed separatists are fighting Kiev government forces.


 
 #25
Gazeta.ru
October 13, 2015
Anton Linnik, Poroshenko Controls Only Kiev. Who Will Win in Ukraine's Cities With More Than Million Inhabitants

The elections in Ukraine, which are just over two weeks away, will produce lots of surprises. [Ukrainian President Petro] Poroshenko's team will take control only of Kiev, where victory is being predicted for [Vitaliy] Klitschko, the present mayor. In other regions an active struggle is being waged among regional leaders, with whom Poroshenko will not find it that easy to reach agreement. Propresidential forces may make use of the administrative resource, and experts are naming Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk as hot spots.

An active struggle for voters has begun in Ukraine: billboards throughout the country bear the faces of potential candidates for local organs of power, stalls and playgrounds with dedicatory inscriptions are being set up in house yards, and campaigners are actively handing out leaflets. All this attests that a serious struggle is brewing among the political forces, and President Petro Poroshenko will find it hard to take control of the country's key cities - Kiev, Lviv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, and Odessa.

The toughest rivalry is traditionally over the right to lead the capital. About 30 people, including many famous names, are now aspiring to the post of Kiev mayor. The following have advanced their candidacies - ex-Prime Minister Yuriy Yekhanurov, professional soldier Volodymyr Ruban, legal expert Tatyana Montyan, ex-political prisoner Dmytro Pavlyuchenko, ex-battalion commander Boryslav Bereza, restaurateur Serhiy Husovskyy, and others. But the real struggle will get under way among Vitaliy Klitschko, ex- Kiev Mayor Oleksandr Omelchenko, and Hennadiy Korban, ex-deputy governor of Dnipropetrovsk Region.

"According to our forecasts, Vitaliy Klitschko and Oleksandr Omelchenko, who arouses nostalgia in many Kiev residents, will get through to the second round. But victory will still go to the present mayor, who enjoys the support of one in five residents of the capital," a source in the Kiev administration said. The propresidential political force is also counting on a majority on the Kiev Council.

According to our interlocutor's information, Hennadiy Korban is not even reckoning on becoming mayor but is just preparing for the parliamentary elections jointly with Ukrop, a new political force. All important votes that are put to the Supreme Council attest to the coalition's imminent collapse. For example, the draft law making changes to the constitution was adopted only with the help of the Opposition Bloc, whereas Self-Help, the party of Lviv Mayor Andriy Sadovyy (a member of the coalition), refused to support the important document. It is the tense situation in parliament that enables some political analysts to assume that new elections of people's deputies may be scheduled as early as next spring.

Difficult to reach agreement

The biggest chance of winning in Lviv belongs to Andriy Sadovyy, the local mayor. About 10 candidates wish to compete with him. But they have no chance. According to research carried out this summer by the Razumkov Centre, 42.5 per cent of Lviv residents are prepared to support Sadovyy for the post of mayor. Self-Help will also get a majority of votes on the local council. The right PR strategy helped the mayor to achieve such a good result: Lviv's mayor is urging all the major IT companies, whose offices are now being searched en masse by representatives of the law enforcement organs, to move to the capital of Galicia. Such activeness is yielding fruit: The flow of tourists to Lviv will increase 10-15 per cent this year, and the city has already started to overtake Kiev in terms of growth of business activity. A source in the president's administration said that Poroshenko is unable to find mutual understanding with Sadovyy, who does not conceal his presidential ambitions. "Andriy Sadovyy is a real aspirant to the post of head of state," Gazeta.ru's interlocutor explained.

The situation in Odessa, where more than 40 people will fight for the post of mayor, is more unpredictable. For example, the following intend to advance their candidacy - Eduard Hurvits, ex-governor of Odessa Region; Hennadiy Trukhanov, the present mayor; and also Sasha Borovyk, a representative of the Petro Poroshenko bloc. The struggle is so tough that on 10 October, following an explosion near his home, People's Deputy Serhiy Kivalov dropped out of the election race.

In the opinion of representatives of the city council, Trukhanov, the present mayor, has the best chance now, but the Opposition Bloc will take the majority on the city council. Governor Mikheil Saakashvili will find it hard to find a common language with the winners of the local elections, and this could have a substantial impact on his programme for reforming the region. For example, Saakashvili has already promised his support to all who wish to invest in Odessa. But how is this to be realized now in practice, for he is responsible for the development of the region, not the city?

Hot Spots

Experts name the elections in Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk as the most problematic ones. This is connected with the fact that Hennadiy Kernes, the present mayor, against whom criminal proceedings have been instituted for separatist statements, enjoys the greatest support among the people of Kharkiv. But the official himself associates the prosecution with his stance. "I am in opposition to the regime, I mean the current regime, because I do not understand what is happening now - people's impoverishment, what tariffs, and so forth," Kernes declared.

Volodymyr Fesenko, president of the Penta Centre for Applied Political Studies, does not rule out the possibility that the elections may be wrecked. The expert presumes that Kernes may be the winner, but a court verdict on him will emerge after the elections - which will make it possible to neutralize him.

The most complex situation is being observed in Dnipropetrovsk, where Oleksandr Vilkul, a representative of the Opposition Bloc, has a good chance of winning. Andriy Zolotaryov, leader of the Third Sector centre, confirmed that the region centre will essentially become one of the hot spots. "It is not a question there of a struggle of parties, it is a question there of a struggle of clans. The campaign in Dnipropetrovsk has been full of conflict from the outset, and there is a great risk that the city may end up a destabilization point by the time of voting," he believes. The region centre is of huge significance to the country's economy, and victory for a representative of the Opposition Bloc could lead to the emergence in the city of another self-proclaimed republic. Obviously, this fact scares President Petro Poroshenko most of all.

For the parliamentary parties the results of their participation in the 25 October local elections could be unexpected, Vitaliy Bala, leader of the Situations Modelling Agency, believes.

"This will be a shock," he said. According to him, the "heavyweight parties" were counting on "preserving" themselves in power based on the upcoming election results. But sociological research shows that in local elections people are more inclined to support parties that are geared to local leaders and to people with authority in the region. Local political projects are squeezing out the major parties in the east of the country, Vadym Karasyov, director of the Institute of Global Strategies, believes.

"In a number of regions in the east and south of the country either representatives of the Opposition Bloc or representatives of new political forces connected with local elites - Our Land, Revival - will win the elections," Volodymyr Fesenko added. This is connected with the fact that the big political parties have devoted very little time to the regions.
 
 #26
Stratfor.com
October 14, 2015
Stratfor: a Grand Bargain remains elusive in Ukraine

Summary: Stratfor provides a status report on the Ukraine civil war, a festering boil in the heart of Europe and spark that hawks on both sides are using to restart the cold war. These conflicts usually end in diplomacy; that point seems far away.

Forecast

Because of political considerations, Kiev will not fully submit to separatist and Russian demands for amnesty and "special status" powers in eastern Ukraine.

Europe will encourage the Ukrainian government to be accommodating, but the United States will push for a hard-line approach.

Russia will keep its options open and will not abandon the possibility of ramping up militant activity if Kiev and the West are uncooperative.

Analysis

After a year of slow-burning conflict in eastern Ukraine, the relationship between Kiev and Moscow seems to finally be improving. Fighting on the ground has dissipated, there have been positive developments in talks over the past few weeks and both sides began to pull heavy weaponry back from the line of contact in early October. Moreover, Russia and Ukraine have agreed on a temporary natural gas deal and will begin direct negotiations on Kiev's terms of repayment for a bond that matures in December. And in a major concession to Kiev and its Western backers, the separatist territories of Donetsk and Luhansk announced Oct. 6 that they would postpone local elections.

These developments signal progress toward ending the standoff between Russia and the West over Ukraine. However, a broader settlement will still be difficult to achieve and is unlikely to be reached before the end of the year.

Glimmers of Compromise

Tension between Russia and the West over Ukraine mounted during the first eight months of the year. Both government troops and separatists regularly violated the cease-fire signed in February as part of the Minsk agreement. And casualties steadily increased, reaching nearly 8,000 since the start of the fighting in April 2014. In the meantime, Russia and NATO built up security and increased the tempo of military exercises along the Russia-Ukraine border. The United States and European Union also intensified sanctions against Russia, while Moscow responded with its own economic restrictions on the West.

The Ukraine - Russia conflict

However, things began to change in September. The month began with what was supposed to be a one-week cease-fire to coincide with the beginning of the school year. Instead, the cessation of fighting has held for over five weeks with relatively few violations and no deaths. This calm on the battlefield has lent momentum to the efforts to implement the Minsk protocols at a tactical level, seen most tangibly with the pullout of heavy weaponry from the line of contact by Ukrainian forces beginning Oct. 4.

This withdrawal, in turn, prompted the rebels to start removing their heavy weaponry, and on Oct. 6 representatives from Donetsk and Luhansk announced that they would postpone their local elections until 2016, a move made with the tacit approval of Moscow.

Negotiations between Russia and Ukraine have progressed on other issues as well. On Sept. 26, the two reached a natural gas agreement, which as of Oct. 12 ended a cutoff in place since June. The deal is temporary, meant to last through winter - similar to last year's agreement. Nonetheless, the final accord was the result of a compromise on the price by both sides.

There has also been movement on another contentious issue: the maturation of a $3 billion bond Ukraine was set to pay off to Russia by December. Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov announced Oct. 5 that he plans to meet with his Ukrainian counterpart this week to discuss the bond repayment. This will be the first time such formal talks have been held. Up to this point, Kiev has insisted that it will not make the repayment unless it is restructured in a way similar to an August debt relief deal with Western bondholders.

Russia has so far refused the request, but direct talks on the issue may open the way for yet another compromise between Kiev and Moscow, though talks could also strengthen Moscow's hand against Kiev in areas such as Ukraine's negotiations with the International Monetary Fund.

Obstacles to Resolution

The recent compromises and engagement have given rise to speculation that a grand bargain may be taking shape among Russia, Ukraine and the West. Moscow is newly cooperative because of its dramatic economic contraction and because of the political and military limits of extending its push into eastern Ukraine. Several EU countries are also interested in de-escalating the conflict, especially those whose economies have been hurt by European sanctions and by Russian countersanctions.

Despite the gains made in the past month, a broader settlement likely will not be reached before the end of the year for several reasons. First and foremost, the path outlined by the Minsk protocols is open to interpretation. There is no clear definition of what the "special status" given to the separatist territories actually is. The rebels say the status gives them long-term autonomy over issues such as defense and foreign policy, while Kiev insists the status is only temporary and applies only to areas such as budgetary policy and cultural affairs.

Upholding the cease-fire will pave the way for further negotiation, but coming to final terms will be far more difficult. Second, the issue of amnesty for separatist fighters has not been settled. Militants are calling for a blanket amnesty while the Ukrainian government insists amnesty should only be granted on an individual and selective basis.

Third, even if the Ukrainian government and the separatists are able to agree on a way forward, Kiev's domestic situation will cause problems. While Russia and the separatists increase the pressure to grant greater political concessions in eastern Ukraine, ultranationalist groups, particularly Right Sector and Svoboda, have pushed in the opposite direction. These groups oppose any compromise with separatists and, as a violent September rally in Kiev against constitutional amendments showed, they are able to destabilize the political system. This leaves Kiev in a difficult position - favorable moves toward either side could lead to blowback by the other.

Finally, the United States could pose another obstacle to resolution. Certain European countries, including Germany and France, are interested in de-escalating the conflict, but the United States has maintained an aggressive posture toward Russia. Washington has increased financial assistance, held more frequent military trainings and mulled an increase in defensive weapon supplies to Ukraine. The United States has less to lose by maintaining sanctions against Russia and has less of an interest in easing them than does the European Union.

A grand bargain would need to include the United States, but Washington is uninterested in a deal that does not include a complete pullout of Russian troops from eastern Ukraine. Russia has attempted to use issues such as its growing role in the Syrian conflict to bring the United States to the negotiating table, but so far it has been unsuccessful.

These obstacles do not preclude progress in negotiations between Russia, Ukraine and the West, and all of them are subject to change. But though talks may well lead to more room for compromise over certain military, political and economic issues, a comprehensive settlement will be elusive for the near future.
 
 #27
Kyiv Post
October 18, 2015
Return to Volnovakha: Nine months after 13 civilians killed in Russian-separatist attack, loyalties still divided
By Stefan Huijboom

VOLNOVAKHA, Ukraine - Her stylish blonde hair and high heels turn the heads of Ukrainian soldiers as she descends the bus, one soldier checking her passport at the checkpoint that leads to the small Ukrainian-controlled city of Volnovakha, some 40 kilometers south of Russian-separatist territory.

The woman, 24-year-old Anastasia Reva, is on her way to her parents, who still live in Volnovakha and who never have left the city during Russia's war against Ukraine. Reva does respect the actions of the Ukrainian army in her native city of 23,000 people.

"For some residents here it feels like a bunch of west Ukrainians are occupying them," she said.

Volnovakha made headlines on Jan. 13, when Russian proxies fired missiles towards a highway checkpoint, hitting a civilian bus and killing 12 innocent passengers.

Russian-separatist authorities initially admitted the attack that "successfully hit a Ukrainian blockpost," but after they found out that missiles hit a civilian bus, they withdrew their statement and denied any involvement, saying the Ukrainian army was behind it. This "act of terror," as both the Ukrainian government and the Russian-separatists described it, remain fresh in the memories of the residents of Volnovakha.

"My mother goes once every two weeks to Donetsk to visit my younger brother who lives there. When I heard the news of the bus attack, my body felt paralyzed, fearing for my parents. It simply meant that wherever you are, you are never safe," Reva explained. "Since the attack my parents started to dislike the Ukrainian army even more. Many in this town feel alienated with some soldiers from west Ukraine, whom they just can't sympathize with. I don't have statistics, but my bet is that the majority in this town would prefer separatists to 'liberate' it."

Tensions remain as Ukrainian army soldiers patrol the streets.

One soldier, only giving his first name Anton, says that Volnovakha is a stronghold for spies and saboteurs that aid the Russian-separatists in Donetsk.

"We're in the biggest town from the south before entering the enemy-held territories. The enemy also operates here, in the shadows," Anton explained

He urges outsiders not to walk outside in the night because of gangs linked to the separatists.

"You won't be the first that will be kidnapped from who we'll never hear back something again."

Anton talks about last June when the head of the Volnovakha traffic police, known by his guerilla name "Zombie," was arrested because he actively aided Russian-separatist forces, giving out information of Ukrainian positions, organizing delivery of weapons and coordinating escape routes of sabotage groups.

Donbas has always been known by its variety of criminal gangs. It seems that some of these gangs have chosen side for the Russian combined separatists.

On March 21, Security Service of Ukraine officer Victor Manzyk was murdered in Volnovakha. In Dnepropetrovsk advanced weapons such as grenade launchers and rocket launchers were found in an apartment of one of the suspects.

After the incident, Interior Minister Arsen Avakov disclosed that a total of 11 suspects were arrested linked to different participating criminal gangs in the Donetsk area. Four of them were directly involved in the incident, making them the main suspects, according to Avakov.

Mayor Sergey Demchenko, an ally of ex-President Viktor Yanukovych, didn't want to talk to the Kyiv Post.

The deputy mayor of Volnovakha, Igor Seydamovich, was willing to talk though.

"All suspects are still in custody," he said.

He didn't want to speak, though, of any details about the progress of a criminal case and how many were in pre-trial detention. "That's a matter for the prosecutor's office and the SBU. I don't know anything about that."

Seydamovich acknowledged that support for the separatists is a "problem" in Volnovakha.

Anton claims that the shootout was welcomed by a group of Volnovakha civilians as well.

"It's no secret that many here have pro-Russian views, and wish Volnovakha would be part of the separatist-territory. Civilians that heard about the murder saw it as a sign that our, the Ukrainian, control was shrinking," he explained.

Outside a small kiosk, a middle-aged woman puts some of her groceries in her large plastic bag.

Food is scarce in Volnovakha, and the kiosks on the deserted streets profit from the largely empty supermarkets.

Valeria Beletsky, 54, complains to the cashier of the kiosk. "Two months ago you were selling me water for two hryvnia less!" she shouted at the young woman at the counter after thoroughly reading her receipt.

"Damn the Ukrainians," she mumbled.

Beletsky was born and raised in Volnovakha.

She's seen Russia's war against Ukraine from the start, and doesn't support the Kyiv government.

"They're thieves! I've seen bombs, grenades, dead people, and why? Because that government in Kyiv didn't respect the Donbas people's desire to not become European, or whatever!" she kept shouting, becoming emotional. "They're talking Ukrainian to me. I don't understand that. It's as if a bunch of strangers occupy us here in Volnovakha. Make them leave!"

Asking if Beletsky wants to move and live in Donetsk, oddly, she answers the question with a firm "no" without any further explanation.

Fortunately for the Ukrainian soldiers in Volnovakha, there's people who actively support them. One of them is 21-year-old Vitaliy Volyanik, who walks up front to a group of soldiers that stand smoking a cigarette in front of the Volnovakha train station. "Glory to Ukraine!" Volyanik said, as the soldiers respond: "Heroes don't die!"

Volyanik, a native from Donetsk, explains his support for Ukrainian soldiers. "They're here to protect us. Anyone that thinks that Ukraine is occupying Volnovakha should move to the real occupiers themselves. I'm from Donetsk and I've fled my hometown, because it was occupied. And I thank these brave soldiers who are here to protect me."

 
 #28
World Affairs
www.worldaffairsjournal.org
October 16, 2015
A Cautionary Note: Reintegrating the Donbas
By Alexander Motyl
ALEXANDER J. MOTYL is professor of political science at Rutgers University-Newark

The fighting in the Donbas may be winding down, but Ukraine's war with Russia will continue as long as Vladimir Putin believes that Ukraine must become his subject.

Now more than ever Ukraine's survival as a democratic Western state depends on the continued strengthening of Ukraine's military capability and the acceleration of reform.

An ostensibly peaceful Russia wedded to imperial expansion is no less of a military threat to Ukraine than an openly hostile Russia wedded to imperial expansion. The West is too preoccupied with its own problems and too indifferent to Putin's destruction of the post-war international order to save Ukraine.

Only Ukraine can protect itself from further Russian predations by acquiring a first-class military able to deter all but the craziest of Russian leaders. Meanwhile, a first-class military is impossible without a strong economy, which in turn is impossible without serious, sustained reform.

As difficult as introducing reform has been, it's about to get much harder-for two reasons.

First, the seeming end to fighting will incline some Ukrainian policymakers to conclude that the Russian threat has waned and that they can relax.

Second, it now looks like Ukraine may actually have to reintegrate the Donbas enclave sometime in the near future. I've been arguing ad nauseam that Ukraine would be infinitely better off by keeping the enclave on the other side of a high wall. Alas, my argument may be about to become moot, as-or if-Minsk-2 is implemented.

Signed in February 2015, the Minsk-2 accords propose a series of steps-a cease-fire, an exchange of prisoners, a constitutional amendment regarding the Donbas enclave's status, Russian withdrawal, local elections, and Ukrainian control of the enclave's border with Russia-that are supposed to end the war and usher in peace. The problem with the deal is that Ukraine expects Minsk-2 to lead to its reassertion of sovereignty, that Russia expects it to produce Ukrainian subservience, and that the separatists expect it to reinforce their rule.

It's therefore perfectly possible that Minsk-2 will break down, as all sides realize there is no way to finesse their incompatible demands. The result could be a frozen conflict, with the added advantage that Russia might be reluctant to renew hostilities and incur sanctions. Were that to happen, Kyiv should formally declare that the Donbas enclave is occupied territory that falls under the purview of the occupying power, Russia.

If Putin's proxies are less strategically daft than he is, they might push for reintegration and thereby put Ukraine in the hot seat. As absolutely everyone knows, the enclave-and indeed the whole Donbas, even the part occupied by Ukrainian forces-has been and still is ruled by criminal clans, criminal oligarchs, criminal mafias, and-the latest twist-criminal separatists and criminal warlords. Most of the population is unremittingly hostile to everything the new Ukraine stands for. The economy is in ruins.

If anyone knows how Ukraine is supposed to reintegrate this cancerous region without infecting itself in the process, please tell me.

The challenge would be enormous even if Ukraine defeated the Russian separatists and occupied the territory. And Ukraine has not defeated the rebels. Nor will it ever occupy the enclave and impose its will without reigniting the war.

Instead, Ukraine will have to reintegrate an unreconstructed and unreconstructable region. That's what Minsk-2 mandates. And that's been the declared goal of the Ukrainian political establishment.

As they say, be careful what you wish for. It may come true.

There's only one way for a potentially reintegrated Donbas enclave to wreak minimal damage on Ukraine.

Kyiv should quarantine the territory and its thugs by giving it, and them, almost complete sovereignty within a confederal relationship with Ukraine.

Neither Kyiv nor the enclave would interfere in each other's internal or external political affairs. Both sides would pursue their own economic policies, refrain from subsidizing each other, keep all the taxes they collect, and pursue trade with whomever they desire. Each side would be responsible for law and order, speak whichever language it desires, remember what it wants to remember, and honor whomever it wants to honor. Other issues would be stickier (Would there be one army or two? Would the enclave pursue its own foreign policy? Would there be one president or two?), but not immune to creative solutions.

Russia and its separatist thugs-along with France, Germany, and the United States-would be hard-pressed to say nyet to such a deal, while Kyiv and Ukraine's hotheads could claim victory and declare that Ukraine is whole again.

Do confederations work in the medium to long term? Rarely, unless, as in the case of the Swiss, there are special circumstances that overcome the centrifugal forces built into them.

If the Ukrainian confederation works, great. Ukraine proper will reform, while the enclave goes to the hell of its choice. If the confederation doesn't work and both sides agree to go their own way-perhaps like the Czechs and the Slovaks-what's not to like?
 
 #29
Moscow Times
October 19, 2015
What's Next for Russia and Ukraine?
By Jean-Marie Guehenno
Jean-Marie Guehenno is president and CEO of the International Crisis Group.

The most acute phase of the 18-month-old Ukraine war is over, at least for now. But nothing is settled yet.

After spending a week in Kiev and Moscow with a delegation from the International Crisis Group, it is clear that Russia is sliding deeper into economic crisis and political uncertainty. Ukraine, meanwhile, has resolved none of the issues that led to its crisis boiling over into armed conflict.

Russia's intervention in eastern Ukraine has been a disappointment to Moscow. The Ukrainian army has fought better than expected, and the West has been more united in imposing sanctions than anticipated.

President Vladimir Putin now seems to be downplaying any separatist project for eastern Ukraine. He stresses support for the February 2015 Minsk talks, is reining in his eastern proteges and has abandoned the Novorossia project that would have created a territorial continuum all the way to the self-proclaimed republic of Transdnestr. The people of Donetsk and Luhansk may dislike the authorities in Kiev, but the majority does not embrace Russia, and sustaining eastern Ukraine is as costly a proposition for Russia as it would be for anyone else.

None of the fundamental issues that led to a war that has killed well over 8,000 people have been resolved. Twelve months of half-hearted efforts to reform Ukraine have not reversed 25 years of corruption. There is an admirable generation of young Ukrainians energetically committed to European values, shaming contemporaries in Western Europe who take their democratic inheritance for granted, but the judiciary remains subservient to power and money, there is only a kernel of reformed police and oligarchs still rule the roost. Kiev's disregard for its citizens in the rebel-occupied zones in the east will further complicate any future reintegration.

Above all, Ukraine's dysfunctional state makes it an easy target for meddling and manipulation. Kiev fears that Russia will not abandon its pressure, but will simply shift from the military to the political - funding and promoting traditionally pro-Russian politicians keen to capitalize on public dismay at rising prices and disillusion with their leaders.

In Russia, the crisis is no less severe. It started before the war in Ukraine, and before the collapse of oil prices and the ruble. The non-diversification of the economy and deep demographic decline - Russia has the lowest life expectancy of all developed countries - have taken a serious toll. Russia needs a long period of far greater economic growth to catch up with Western Europe. Right now growth is negative, with devastating impact on the budget: pensions will not match inflation, and tens of millions of Russians face a significant reduction of their income.

The basic contract of the last few years - an authoritarian regime in return for a modest improvement in basic living conditions - is being replaced by a new one in which national pride substitutes for material satisfactions.

State propaganda, which dominates the media, is back to Stalinist tropes: a Russia surrounded by enemies, the West fomenting revolutions of all colors, and Islamists as part of a wide Western conspiracy against Russia, which has the biggest Muslim population in Europe.

Moscow's policy of bombing Islamists in Syria and supporting Syrian President Bashar Assad thus addresses what it sees as a real threat to its domestic interests, and at the same time sends a message of resolve to Western powers. In short, Russia has gone beyond dissatisfaction with the status quo to become a revisionist country.

At this point where trust between the two sides is close to zero, shared points of reference and common projects are vital to ensure changes occur legitimately, without any renewed use of force. And there is much the West can begin to do to stabilize the conflict.

First, make financial support to Ukraine, on rigorous conditions, a much greater priority. The painful reforms that Ukraine needs to conduct will be less painful if there is more financial support from the EU.

Second, prioritize justice, rule of law, and anti-corruption in technical support to Ukraine.

Third, maintain a united front on sanctions so long as the Minsk agreement is not fully implemented.

Fourth, explore with Russia areas in which some common work could be done. This could be judicious EU engagement with the Russia-dominated Eurasian Union, or the necessary "de-conflicting" of military operations over the skies of Syria, or exploration of the contours of a Syrian settlement, in which Russia, despite its current defiance, will inevitably play a part.

The West should be tough on both its allies and adversaries. Support for Ukraine should only be sustained if Kiev pushes through reforms, particularly against high level corruption, as its people demand. And, while engagement with the Kremlin is imperative, the West should stress that a true dialogue on crucial international issues can only be possible once Moscow acts on the Minsk peace plan and pulls out of eastern Ukraine.
 
 #30
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
October 16, 2015
8 reasons why the Dutch got the MH17 report incomplete
The report published by the Dutch Safety Board on the Boeing 777 Malaysia Airlines disaster cannot be definitive because it largely ignores the findings of Russian experts.
By Vladimir Evseev
Dr. Vladimir Evseev is Director at Center for Social and Political Studies. He has military experience for twenty years, his research interests include regional aspects of the international security, nuclear non-proliferation and ballistic missile defense.

On Oct. 13, the Dutch Safety Board presented its final report on the downing of the Boeing 777 Malaysia Airlines passenger plane (Flight MH17) over the Donbas region on July 17 last year. The report was presented by the head of the investigation, Tibbe Yaustra, at the Gilze-Rijen military base in the Netherlands.

One of the main causes of the disaster was identified as Ukraine's failure to close its airspace to passenger planes, despite the hostilities in the Donbas region involving surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). Russian experts agree with that finding, but note that both sides in the conflict employed air defense systems.

Some of the blame for what happened was apportioned to Malaysian Airlines, which was "aware of the potential risks of flying over the conflict zone." When the tragedy occurred, there were three passenger planes in the sky above the hotspot. That fact cannot be argued with, but foreign airlines had no information about what altitude was deemed safe.

SAMs generally do not go higher than 2.2 miles (3.5 km) if fired from a portable air defense system, so an altitude of 6.2 miles (10 km) is considered safe for civil aviation (which is why, for example, passenger aircraft continued to fly over Afghanistan during the armed conflict there). But Kiev knew that more powerful anti-aircraft missiles had been deployed in the conflict zone, primarily its own, but did not inform foreign airlines in advance.

Who is to blame?

There is a wide divergence of opinion on that question. For example, the international commission set up to investigate the accident (which for some reason excluded not only Russia, but also the International Civil Aviation Organization) reached the conclusion that the Boeing 777 had been hit by a Russian-made BUK missile fired from the settlement of Snezhnoe, which at that time was part of the militia-controlled Donetsk People's Republic (DPR).

According to the investigators, an anti-aircraft missile struck the cockpit on the left side, which caused the head of the plane to separate from the fuselage, killing all passengers and crew almost instantaneously. It omits the fact that this type of missile targets the middle of the aircraft to ensure annihilation. The cockpit is usually hit by pilots firing from aircraft cannons.

A different view is held by Russian experts. First of all, they noted that the international commission did not provide evidence that the body of the plane displayed the characteristic mark of a BUK missile (a butterfly-shaped hole). And one of the photographs submitted by the commission depicts part of a BUK system that could not have remained wholly intact on being fired.

Second, the report on MH17 was submitted to the Russian side as a fait accompli, which meant it could not be amended. Moreover, it leaves out most of the comments previously made by Russian experts.

Third, the Dutch authorities did not permit Russian experts to inspect the crash site. Even a month after the disaster, not all the bodies had been removed (shrapnel wounds could have been vital clues for the international investigation). And contrary to established practice, a substantial part of the wreckage was left where it fell, which hampers the conduct of a full-scale study.

Fourth, there was no thorough analysis of the instructions of the Ukrainian air traffic controllers who "led" the Malaysian plane into the conflict zone and then inexplicably altered its flight level.

Recall the incident on March 17, 1994, when a C-130 military transport aircraft carrying Iranian embassy personnel was shot down over Nagorno-Karabakh near the town of Stepanakert, killing all 19 passengers, including 9 children, and the crew of 13. According to sources, the Azerbaijani air traffic controllers intentionally diverted the aircraft by about 100 km (62 miles) into the combat zone, where it was shot down by an Armenian SAM.

Fifth, the commission's report did not consider the possibility that Flight MH17 was intercepted by a Ukrainian jet, even though there was one in the immediate vicinity. It would have been capable of both killing the crew with aircraft cannon and "backing up" the air defense system (usually two SAMs are launched simultaneously in case one is off target; in this instance an air-to-air missile could have been the reserve option).

Sixth, on July 2, 2015, the Almaz-Antey joint stock-company, the manufacturer of the BUK system, submitted documents to the international commission on the first phase of a full-scale study using a scale model of a Boeing 777.

It showed that the aircraft could have been shot down by a 9M38M anti-aircraft missile, which is no longer in service with the Russian Armed Forces. However, the commission ignored the documents.

The second phase of the experiment, held on Oct. 7, involved a decommissioned IL-86 plane. It was confirmed that the Malaysian Boeing 777 was shot down from an area controlled at the time by the Ukrainian Army - 2.2 miles (3.5 km) south of the village of Zaroschenskoe. Had it been fired from Snezhnoe (as stated by the international commission), no submunition could have entered the plane's engine, which is in fact what happened.

Seventh, the United States did not provide the international commission with data from satellites that were above the combat zone at the time of the incident.

Eighth, there was no investigation of Ukraine's air defense systems, including, for instance, their location at the time of the incident and a physical inventory of their anti-aircraft missiles.

Will Russia and the West agree on the causes of the crash?

For the reasons outlined above, the Dutch Safety Board report may not be conclusive. It does not take into account the totality of the available data, and appears subjective and politically motivated. The "meticulous" investigation did not take 15 months - that time frame was merely a delaying tactic when conclusive evidence about Russian involvement could not be verified.

Unfortunately, when it comes to airline disasters, Ukraine has not been entirely blameless. In October 2001 a Russian Tu-154 passenger aircraft was hit by a Ukrainian S-200 anti-aircraft missile over the Black Sea, which had been launched during a military exercise in Crimea. There were no survivors among the 66 passengers and 12 crewmembers. It cannot be ruled out that something similar may have happened in the skies above Donbas.
 
#31
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
October 16, 2015
The Malaysian Boeing saga is far from over
The "final" MH17 report shows that there is still a long way to go in determining what actually happened in Ukraine.
By Ivan Tsvetkov
Ivan Tsvetkov is Associate Professor of American Studies, International Relations Department, St. Petersburg State University. He is an expert in the field of historical science and contemporary U.S. policy and U.S.-Russian relations. Since 2003, he has been the author and administrator of the educational website "History of the United States: Materials for the course" (http://ushistory.ru)

The long-awaited final report of the Dutch Safety Board into the MH17 disaster revealed answers to many important questions. After studying the published materials, no one, for instance, is likely to continue to promote the air-to-air missile theory.
But the report also shows that the final end of this tragedy is still a long way off. Even if the "truth" can one day be established, doubts will linger all the same.

A never-ending story

The international and political scale of MH17 means that it can never be filed away, no matter how many "final" reports are produced. Its impact on international relations already has been far more serious than all previous incidents of civilian deaths involving military missiles.

The debate surrounding the investigation of the tragedy has long moved on from simple finger-pointing. At stake are the very foundations of the existing world order. Options to circumvent Russia's veto on the UN Security Council and to grant new powers to the International Court of Justice are on the table.

According to the Dutch Safety Board, there is still no answer to the key question of the precise location of the BUK launch site, which means that a further "criminal" investigation is needed.

No doubt at this stage the topic will become even more sensitive and require not only expert but also "strong-willed" political decisions. If the political will is there on all sides, it will not be too difficult to explore the suspected regions and gather the necessary evidence.

Experts assert that even in the war-scorched earth of Donbas soil samples could help locate the launch site. But will forensic experts be allowed to take them?

The Russian view of MH17

On the same day as the Dutch Safety Board published its report, the Almaz-Antey joint stock-company, which manufactures the BUK missile system, announced the results of a repeat experiment to recreate the conditions of the catastrophe.

In contrast to their Dutch colleagues, Russian experts considered the available data to be sufficient to determine the launch site with reasonable accuracy. Using mathematical modeling techniques, they pinpointed a small area that in July 2014 was under the control of the Ukrainian Army.

Moreover, based on the damage to the hull of the downed Boeing (in particular, the shape of the entry holes), Almaz-Antey's team of experts concluded that the missile that destroyed the plane was long ago decommissioned by the Russian Armed Forces (but oddly enough is still in use with the Ukrainian military).

It was a repeat of what has happened on countless occasions since July 2014: In response to the disclosure of evidence pointing to Russia's guilt, the Russian side produces its own evidence that shifts the blame onto Ukraine.

Some have grown utterly weary of this tug-of-war, yet many participants in the debate in Russia continue to believe that the country is being tried in absentia, with global public opinion as the presiding judge.

That being the case, the final verdict will depend on the persuasiveness of the parties' arguments. Let the trial continue for as long as necessary, since everyone is interested in the same thing - establishing the truth and punishing the guilty.
What's wrong with the Russian version of the MH17 story

But the logic of a trial in which the judge is public opinion differs from traditional cases, even those involving juries. It is evident that the MH17 disaster has caused great damage to Russia's international reputation already.

And it will continue to inflict damage until the headlines disappear from the pages of the world's newspapers. It is not the verdict, but the trial that is the real penalty. But it seems that much of the Russian political elite and expert community would prefer to flatly reject any accusations.

What makes people remember one tragedy and quickly forget another? Why in some military conflicts are mass civilian casualties written off as collateral damage, and the attention of international observers diverted elsewhere, while other tragedies, such as MH17, remain on the political agenda for years on end?

For many Russian experts today, the answer to this question is obvious: Russophobia. Hostile forces in the West have seized the opportunity to humiliate Russia and once again present the country in a highly unfavorable light.

The only way to resist, as they see it, is to persistently defend their position by providing persuasive evidence that Russia is being slandered and attacked by foes on all sides.

But it turns out in practice that each new "irrefutable" argument put forward by self-righteous and politically motivated Russian experts only prolongs the proceedings, which have long since acquired the traits of a political spectacle.

If one seriously considers Russia's national interests in the MH17 case, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that chief among them should not be to prove the country's innocence, but to bring the process to an end whatever the result.

There is no doubt that if on July 17, 2014, the pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine had acknowledged that they had mistakenly shot down flight MH17, believing it to be a Ukrainian military transporter, Russia would have been spared one of worst episodes of international condemnation in its history.

Of course, Russia's reputation would have suffered anyway - but who in 2015 would still be debating the issue and dreaming up ways of bypassing Russia's UN Security Council veto?

But it is too late to start back-pedaling now. The war of words has to be waged to the bitter end, and to gain the upper hand it seems that less talk about entry holes and a more resolute and even more adventuresome foreign policy is required.

The Kremlin seems to be counting on its operation in Syria to resolve MH17.
 
 
 #32
Russia Insider
www.russia-insider.com
October 18, 2015
MH17 Final report is Not a Final Report; It's Just a Limited Hangout
It tells as much of the truth as it has to. But no more.
By Patrick Armstrong
Patrick Armstrong received a PhD from Kings College, University of London, England in 1976 and retired in 2008 after 30 years as an analyst for the Canadian government, specializing in first the USSR and then Russia. He was a Political Counselor in the Canadian Embassy in Moscow from 1993 to 1996. He has been a frequent speaker at the Wilton Park conferences in the UK.
[Links here http://russia-insider.com/en/mh17-final-report-not-final-report-its-just-limited-hangout/ri10575]

"Limited hangout" is spy jargon for a partial admission of the truth to attempt to control the exposure of a clandestine operation. The hope is that the partial truth will satisfy the questioners and they will look no further. The phrase came into popular awareness during the Watergate scandal in 1973 as the cover story unravelled. The Dutch Safety Board report on the MH17 disaster is an example. It's a partial statement: something very important is left out; but it is not completely left out because there may be a later need for "reconsideration".

The sources and abbreviations I use are below.

    -Russian MoD briefing July 2014 (MoD) (English)

    -Dutch Safety Board Final Report October 2015 Video (DSBV) Text (DSBT)

    -Almaz-Antey First Report June 2015 (AA1) (Video) (Almaz-Antey is the manufacturer of the Buk family of SAM systems which has been in service in many countries since 1979. Over the years, as is common with evolutionary Soviet and Russian weapons systems, there have been several different rockets and warhead designs.)

    -Almaz-Antey Second Report October 2015 (AA2) (Slideshow in English)

In August I published a piece at RI named "Questions a Real MH17 Report Would Answer". The DSB report fails my test but it fails it in an interesting way: in a limited hangout way, in fact. I said there were four vital points that must be addressed:

    1. The "black boxes" will tell us where MH17 was when it was hit, what direction it was going in, what speed it was travelling.

    2. Analysis of the damage pattern of the wreckage will show where the missile was when it detonated.

    3. Backtracking from that point will show from where it was launched.

    4. Lethal fragments will show what weapon hit it.

The report deals with 1 satisfactorily, there is a question about 4 but it is in its answer to numbers 2 and 3 that we see the limited hangout.

The report was delivered by its Chairman, Tjibbe Joustra, [quondam the Netherlands' National Antiterrorism Coordinator - is that significant? You decide, Dear Reader - and Chairman of the DSB since February 2011] who stated that it was not the DSB's job to assign blame. The DSB's conclusion was that MH17 was brought down by the explosion of 9N314M warhead as carried on 9M38 series Buk surface-to-air missile (SAM) (DSBT-9); other scenarios were considered, analysed and excluded. It offers an area from which it believes the missile was launched.

The Flight Data Recorder (both "black boxes" were in good shape) showed MH17 flying at 33,000 ft heading 115� at 293 kts (542kph). The recording stopped at 13.20:03 UTC at 48.12715N 38.52630538E (DSBT-47).

I begin with my principal conclusion that the DSB report is a "limited hangout".

By ignoring the damage to the port wing and port engine, the Board was able to shift the approach route of the missile away from Kiev-held territory south of MH17's route to rebel-held territory in the south-east.

The importance of leaving out the wing and engine

The Dutch Safety Board did not take into account the damage to the port wing and the port engine (see below). While it did provide a photo of the damaged port engine intake ring at DSBT-50, there is no other discussion of damage to the engine and I believe that the inclusion of the photo provides the DSB with an "out" should there be a need for a later "reconsideration" of the evidence. To summarise (see below): the DSB established a point at which the detonation occurred; the DSB understood the blast pattern of the warhead (DSBT-130 but see a better representation at AA2-35). But it ignored the fact that the existence of damage to the port wing and port engine proves that the missile had to have come from the side of MH17 and not from in front of it. That is the key point: everything up to that point in the analysis of the destruction of MH17 (leaving aside the rather small number of "bow-ties" - see below) is closely reasoned. The sleight of hand occurs when the wing and engine are forgotten. Concentrating only on the damage to the cockpit allows the path of the missile to be twisted from the south to the south-west as is required by the "rebels did it theory". A launch point from the south rules that possibility out.

This is illustrated at AA2-21. Both Almaz-Antey reports calculated the firing point as being near Zaroshchenskoye while the DSB calculates it as being near Snezhnoye. AA2-21 shows a damage comparison: a Buk fired from Zaroshchenskoye damages the port wing and port engine, a Buk fired from Snezhnoye does not. The damage to the cockpit is similar in each scenario.

Because the damage to the port wing and port engine was ignored by the DSB report, they were able to make the approach line of the missile closer to the direction MH17 was heading, which allowed them to calculate the launch point so as to include rebel-held territory. Had they included the port wing and port engine damage, they would have been forced to accept a launch point farther south into Kiev-held territory.

In short, they told as much truth as they could without compromising the required answer. A "limited hangout" indeed.

But there are some other - less significant, to be sure - points that should be considered.

Missing Radar Data

The first point worthy of attention is the radar data or, rather, its absence. We are told that "The Ukrainian civil primary radar stations in the area were not functioning at the time of the crash due to scheduled maintenance. The military primary radar stations were also not operational. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defence stated that this system was not operational, because there were no Ukrainian military aircraft in the sector through which flight MH17 flew" (DSBT-38). NATO had an AWACS aircraft in the air but that said MH17 was out of its range (DSBT-44). Thus only limited radar information was available from Ukraine and nothing from NATO.

This is not believable. Ignoring the "scheduled maintenance" stuff, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence statement that there were no military aircraft in the area is contradicted when DSBT-185 informs us that Kiev claimed that a military aircraft was fired at in the Donetsk area on that very day. That is less than 40 kms away from MH17. As to NATO, it is absurd to think that NATO had an AWACS aircraft up that was not looking at the fighting area. The DSB accepts these statements without comment.

Russia also provided limited radar information because, it said, as the crash occurred outside of Russian territory, it did not record the primary data (DSBT-42). The report spends some time chiding Russia for this.

Flight Path

Another of the points that I made in my RI piece was the change in the flight path as recorded in the FlightAware website. No mention whatsoever is made of that in the DSB report. I did notice, however, that the flight plan as shown at DSBT-212 shows a slight turn to the left at the Germany-Poland border and a slight turn to the right at the Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan border. If we remove this slight deviation, we have a straight line flight path that goes over the Sea of Azov as the earlier routes did before they were changed on FlightAware.

I still believe that this is a point that has been insufficiently discussed and I remind readers of the screen shots taken of the FlightAware tracks showing previous routes well south of the track taken that day by MH17 shown here and here. I remember noticing the change at the time and thinking that the flight path of 17 July was the first question that had to be answered. Again, the DSB makes no mention of any other routes taken by this daily flight.

Fighter planes

As to the fighter plane story the flat statement is made that there are no aircraft shown on the Ukrainian radar tracks except MH17 and two other commercial flights (DSBT-114). No mention whatsoever is made of the Russian presentation (MoD 9th illustration) that showed a fighter plane close to MH17. (But note the careful statement that there is nothing on the Ukrainian radar tracks. Perhaps the DSB is leaving space for a later "reconsideration".) The report rules out cannon fire because 1) there are too many holes in the fuselage for a limited number of cannon rounds; 2) the presence of "bow-tie" fragments (see below); 3) there were no military aircraft in the area (DSBT-126). It returns to the issue at DSB-131 where it argues that all penetrations of MH17 came from a single point.

Personally I do not find this very convincing and I do not believe that the presence of a fighter as well as a SAM is excluded, although it is clear that the SAM was sufficient to bring the plane down and kill the cockpit crew. But the DSB ought to have said something about the Russian statement that there was a fighter plane nearby. And certainly there are many holes in the wreckage that look as if they may be caused by cannon fire. And then there are the numerous claimed eyewitness statements of fighters in the area. All this should have been discussed and, if rejected, rejected with serious arguments and evidence.

The reconstruction and the damage

We now come to an analysis of the reconstructed aircraft. Or - and this is a point of great significance - the partly reconstructed aircraft. DSBV gives a good view of the reconstruction at 22:44. We see that the cockpit and part of the lower forward passenger section is all that has been constructed. Missing are the port wing and port engine. This is the key to the limited hangout.

DSBT-55 begins a long section detailing what parts were recovered and from where they were recovered. Everything is accounted for except - an important exception - missile parts consistent with an Buk 9M38 missile (DSBT-80). No location is given for them and there is no chain of custody given. Are these the parts reported to have been found only as late as August 2015? We are merely informed they were found "in the wreckage area". Photographs appear at DSBT-82.

A long section analyses the sounds from the Cockpit Voice Recorder and establishes a source outside the the upper port side of the cockpit (DSBT-112) This is assumed to be the location of the centre of the explosion. This location is verified by analysing the holes (DSBT-124). All this is perfectly convincing.

About 75 fragments were found in the human remains. Some of these are argued to have come from outside through the aircraft skin; some photos at DSBT-89. Two of these (three?) are claimed to be "bow-tie" shaped (DSBT-92). These two - or is it three or four? - "bow-tie" shaped fragments are conclusive as far as the DSB is concerned: their assertion that it was a Buk warhead type 9N314M completely depends on these two or three or four fragments. John Helmer has argued that there is a suspicious amount of secrecy and national security about these vital pieces.

This is a point of contention with Almaz-Antey's reports which maintain that the Buk used did not have a "bow-tie" warhead. AA2, which used a static test of a Buk with "bow-tie" (Almaz-Antey calls them "I-beam") shaped particles in its warhead, argues that the resulting destruction pattern shows bow-tie/I-beam shaped holes (AA2-27) (which DSBT does not) and many more bow-tie/I-beam fragments - there are more than 2000 in that particular warhead design - in the wreckage than two or four. From this Almaz-Antey concludes that the warhead used was not the 9N314M (which has bow-ties/I-beams) but the B9N314 which does not. Their point is that this is the type of Buk in Ukrainian service but no longer in Russian service.

Launch point of the missile.

DSBT-144 gives the estimated launch point for the Buk. It chooses a rather large area to the east of Torez more-or-less in front of MH17. In that area is a smaller one it claims to have been provided by Almaz-Antey and a still smaller one provided by the Kiev authorities. Therefore a missile fired from any of these positions would have been approximately head-on to MH17 (from directly head-on to about 30�). This is one thing to which I will return, but I must say I do not understand what the DSB is talking about when it includes an Almaz-Antey estimate of the launch point in this area: neither Almaz-Antey presentation gives an origin in that area. As we saw above, Almaz-Antey gives an estimated firing point that would place the missile launch point much more to the right of MH17 - at roughly 60� from its course. Which brings us back to the key point: ignoring the damage to the port wing and port engine allows the DSB to make the missile track more to the front of MH17's course. Such an origin is impossible if the damage to the wing and engine are taken into account. The DSB report elides the issue altogether but does provide an "out" by showing a photo of the engine damage.

Conclusion

There are a number of questions that can be raised about the report: the lack of primary radar data from Ukraine and NATO is just not believable and the authors should not have blandly accepted it: there were Ukrainian fighters in the air and no one should possibly believe that NATO assets weren't watching the area.

The report airily ignores the Russian MoD claim of a fighter plane near MH17 (although leaves itself an out by saying the Ukrainian data showed nothing).

The "flight route question" is completely unaddressed.

Too much hangs on the very small number of bow-tie/I-beam pieces.

By the main thing is that, because it has ignored the damage to the port wing and port engine (although leaving a photo of the latter in the report so as to provide an out), it is able to shift the approach line of the missile away from Kiev-held territory to the south of MH17's route to rebel-held territory in the south-east.

So what happened?

I agree that we will probably not know until the regime in Kiev collapses or some Edward Snowden reveals something. (Although, as it now appears that the Kiev regime is actually questioning the official "heavenly hundred" sniper story, discussed here by Gordon Hahn, who can say what's next?).

I would suggest the following possibilities.

    The Kiev forces deployed Buks because they had convinced themselves that Russian aircraft were shooting their aircraft down (DSBT-183).

        -They thought they had a target and fired and hit MH17 by accident,

        -Or, while practising they shot it down by accident.

        -(It should be recalled that Ukrainian air defence forces shot down a passenger aircraft in 2001 and lied about it until they could lie no more.)

    It was shot down on purpose so as to create an atrocity that could be blamed on Russia.

        -By order of the Kiev government,

        -Or, by some entity not under Kiev's control,

        -Perhaps, either way, by suggestion of some agency in the USA

        It should be recalled that the USA in 1962 did seriously entertain a scheme to shoot down a passenger plane and blame it on Castro. ("It is possible to create an incident which will demonstrate convincingly that a Cuban aircraft has attacked and shot down a chartered civil airliner..." Admittedly, the plan called for no passengers to be killed).

The media dog is no longer barking

I would draw the reader's attention to the media coverage. A media campaign blaming the rebels and Russia began almost immediately after the crash; on the other hand, the media has been very silent about the DSB report. The Daily Mail can serve as an example of both: "Anything to confess, Putin? Russian president in church as world leaders warn him you can't 'wash your hands' of MH17 disaster" 18 July 2014 ("Amid growing evidence that the flight was hit by a sophisticated surface-to-air missile, launched from areas controlled by pro-Russian rebels in the separatist eastern regions of Ukraine, fingers have increasingly been pointed at Russian president Vladimir Putin, who denies involvement.") and "Russian missile killed pilots and cut jet in half but passengers could have been conscious for up to a minute as plane plunged, reveals official report into MH17 downed over Ukraine" 17 October 2015 (rather neutral coverage full of "he said, she said"). And the story seems to have disappeared. A cynic might be excused for wondering if some central agency puts out the story line. I find this suggestive.

To watch

As for further developments I recommend Alexander Mercouris' piece on RI - there are some legal cases coming up that may prove interesting. I also recommend John Helmer's writings on the subject at his blog Dances with Bears. The story appears to be unravelling in several places at once. He also goes into more details on the tiny number of bow-tie/I-beams on which the DSB hangs so much of its case.

Stay tuned, there may be more to come.