Johnson's Russia List
2015-#202
16 October 2015
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"We don't see things as they are, but as we are"

"Don't believe everything you think"

You see what you expect to see 

In this issue
 
  #1
Moscow Times
October 15, 2015
A Critic Who Raised the Curtain
By John Freedman

I wrote my first article in August 1990 for a newsletter that transformed in 1992 into The Moscow Times. I publish my last article as theater critic of The Moscow Times today.

Between those dates I wrote about 1,600 reviews, interviews, features, op-ed pieces, columns and personal observations for this newspaper's pages.

As I noted in a letter to editor-in-chief Nabi Abdullaev, it sometimes seemed over those years as though The Moscow Times became me, and that I became The Moscow Times. That wasn't true, of course, but it often felt so.

The Moscow Times gave me a niche from which to follow the story of an important, evolving art form at close range, and to bring it to readers who cared.

That is not a statement of bravura. Everyone who writes for a public forum wonders if anyone really cares.

Which brings me to the first, and, perhaps, my most cherished, memory of this job, a letter I received from a stranger, Rachel Rutherford, a director from Seattle, WA, just days after I ran a review of Robert Sturua's brilliant production of "Hamlet" at the Satirikon Theater in Oct. 1998.

Rachel asked if I could help her get tickets to the show because "I've got the plane tickets. It would be awful to get there and not get tickets for the play."

On occasion somebody did care, at least in Seattle, WA.

Theater Is Dead

Throughout the decades there have always been choruses and choirs singing the death of Russian theater. Some Russian critics love to kill what they can't control. Theater, of course, is bigger and messier and more lively than all of us put together.

In the early 1990s everyone cried that there were "no directors." As I tuned that wailing out, I regularly wrote about the scintillating work of Pyotr Fomenko, Kama Ginkas, Valery Fokin and others who are now classics.

A few years later, in the mid-to-late 1990s, the new mantra was that there were "no new writers." This is precisely the period when Olga Mukhina, Oleg Bogayev, Yelena Gremina, Mikhail Ugarov and other major playwrights emerged with new voices and new visions for Russian drama.

By the turn of the century the explosion of new writing for the stage would be designated as the New Russian Drama. But if you read The Moscow Times in those years, you knew about these important artists before the labels were applied.

Much of the story made it into the newspaper. Not all of it did.

Another favorite memory is a chat I had with Misha Ugarov in late 2001. A press conference for the Golden Mask Festival had broken up and Misha approached me with his wife Lena Gremina, both of whom I had known for years.

But Misha didn't look like a friend coming to chat. He was a man on a mission. He launched into a spiel about the problems facing contemporary Russian playwrights.

"We must allow real Russian to enter the language of the stage," Misha stated forcefully. "Don't you think so?! Real people don't talk like characters on stage! Enough literature! Enough contrived language!"

It was a mini-manifesto delivered extemporaneously. But I only realized its importance a few months later when he, Gremina and some other writers and directors opened a tiny basement theater called Teatr.doc. It was to be devoted exclusively to the development and exploration of verbatim texts, or documentary theater.

These shows would be based on interviews, documents, journalism - anything but the flowery imagination of the lonely, suffering writer. "Literature" may have been great in the 19th and 20th centuries. But Teatr.doc sought to banish it from Russia's leading stages.

One of the biggest stories of the last 15 years has been Teatr.doc's journey, beginning as a feisty combatant defending the modernization of Russian stage language, and continuing its mission in recent years of being a forum for free speech and political independence.

The World Stage

It is difficult to believe now how firmly Russian theater bucked western trends in the early 1990s.

These days we routinely attend productions created in Russia by Declan Donnellan, Robert Lepage, Lee Breuer, Robert Wilson, Theodoros Terzopoulos, Romeo Castellucci, Heiner Goebbels and other A-list directors from abroad.

Thus, even as conservative forces in Russia push for increased isolationism, Russian theater not only pushes back hard, but, as we see, with apparent ease.

It was not always that way, which brings me to one of the funniest things I remember hearing on the theater beat.

It was 1993 and the great German director Peter Stein was poised to premiere his all-day production of "The Oresteia" at the Russian Army Theater, whose stage was - and still is - so big you can maneuver tanks on it.

The idea for the show arose in the 1980s but it repeatedly ran into opposition. You see, the Russian Army Theater is nominally headed by the minister of defense. And the last Soviet defense minister was in no mood to turn "his" theater over to a foreigner.

Here's what I wrote in a February 1994 first-page account of the premiere, a piece expertly edited by editor-in-chief Meg Bortin:

"The project was originally banned in 1986 by Soviet Defense Minister Dmitry Yazov, who objected to a German director bringing a Greek drama to a stage belonging to the Soviet Army. In an ironic twist of fate, Yazov is now awaiting trial for his role in the 1991 attempted coup and Stein, 57, one of Germany's best-known directors, is receiving an overdue hero's welcome in Moscow."

I had reported Yazov's original response to the project - one of the purest comical lines I have ever heard - in an interview I did with Stein in late 1993.

"A German will stage a Greek with Russians on my stage," Yazov declared, "over my dead body."

The moral? Art beats politics. Period.

Long Live the Theater

Perhaps the saddest thing I watched in 25 years was the unraveling of the great Taganka Theater. It happened in stages - in the early 1990s, again in the mid-1990s, and then one final time in 2013, when founding director Yury Lyubimov got into such a vicious public argument with his troupe, that he resigned and walked out, slamming the door.

I followed those events closely in the paper, and every article I wrote was akin to stabbing myself in the heart. Lyubimov and the Taganka had created so much greatness, one wanted to celebrate that.

But the reality of life, of theater, and of creative individuals is such that the unruly story running parallel to greatness is often one of pettiness, short-sightedness and bungled opportunities.

Still, throughout the decades I stubbornly wrote primarily about the work, the theater, the art that Russia's theater makers created.

They inspired me. They challenged me. Every show - good or bad - was a new story to tell. A new angle on understanding the world. Russian theater encouraged me to see my surroundings as I had not imagined them. I always felt - and I continue to believe it - that this is the true, lasting story of Russian society and culture today.

Coups. Sanctions. Incursions. Subterfuge. Perfidy. Chicanery. They'll all take their place in the dreary line of political histories, some written by one side, others by another.

But the flesh and blood of the age that we encountered by quirk of birth; the personality, the humanity, the spirit, the passion, the aspiration of a nation seeking to redefine and remake itself - that's all there in its art.

It's been a privilege and a pleasure to share what I witnessed.
 #2
Almost half of Russians don't believe in external threat - opinion poll

MOSCOW, October 16. /TASS-DEFENSE/. About a third of Russians consider Russia's army as the world's most combat-ready, according to the results of a poll published by the all-Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) on Friday.

Almost half the respondents are confident the Russian army's fighting force ranks among the best in the world, the poll suggested.

"The assessment of effectiveness of Russia's armed forces has dramatically changed since the Perestroika [restructuring in the Soviet Union launched by last Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev]," the report said.

"In 1990, 34% of the respondents said the Soviet army was trailing behind the world's top forces and 15% assessed its fighting capabilities at a very low level. These views are attributed to just 12% and three percent in the latest poll," the pollster said.

"Today, as many as 32% of Russians say Russia's army is the world's most effective and combat-ready while 49% of the respondents believe that its fighting force ranks among the finest compared with just 21% in 1990," the pollster said.

Twenty-five years ago, half of survey respondents said money spent on the armed forces was excessive while only just over 35% reckon this true today. The opposite view is held by 52% of voters today compared with 19% in 1990.

"The threat of a military attack in September 2015 - 48% think it exists - is perceived as less real than January's 68% but much more significant than the 13% in 1990. Today, 43% of respondents say they don't believe in an external threat compared with 57% in 1990," the survey website report said.

"The United States was named as a potential aggressor - 53% against 19% in 1990 - while Germany, considered the main enemy 25 years ago by 23%, has not been named as an aggressor by any respondent," the analysis added.
 
 #3
The National Interest
October 16, 2015
Obama's Dangerous "No War, No Peace" Strategy in Syria
"U.S. leaders should respond to Moscow with a combination of strength and pragmatism rather than weakness and inflexibility."
By Dimitri K. Simes and Paul J. Saunders
Dimitri K. Simes is publisher & CEO of The National Interest. Paul J. Saunders is executive director of the Center for the National Interest. He served as U.S. State Department Senior Adviser during the George W. Bush Administration.

President Obama is about to add another dismal chapter to his foreign policy record. He may believe that his administration's "no war, no peace" response to Russia's intervention in Syria will avoid subjecting the United States-or him-to the potential costs of making a choice between two unattractive alternatives. Unfortunately, this posture may well be the most dangerous approach of all for it conveys both weakness to U.S. allies and inflexibility to Moscow, thereby encouraging further assertiveness at America's expense while allowing Syria's civil war to rage and ISIL to gain ground.

Before Russia's intervention in Syria, four years of civil war there had firmly established America's conventional wisdom: the United States has no good options, a view this president clearly shares. Now, after several days of Russian airstrikes and a few cruise missile attacks, a new conventional wisdom is emerging: standing up to Moscow should serve as Washington's defining objective in Syria. But this is in essence a sharply negative foreign policy, one that rests, not on forwarding American interests, but on seeking to stymie the Kremlin. Has the administration or outside advocates thought carefully about how the United States might advance its new aims in Syria--or what unintended consequences might ensue?

It is unfortunate, if predictable, that much of Washington's foreign policy elite would line up behind a confrontation with Russia over Syria. Americans perceive Russian President Vladimir Putin as an autocrat and a bully and are frustrated that he appears to have outmaneuvered the Obama administration. Add in Putin's support for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and you have more kindling for an emotional bonfire to torch the U.S.-Russia relationship. Moscow's bogus claims that it is focusing on attacking the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Syria and that it is not intervening in Ukraine make it only more attractive to cut Putin down to size.

Yet if one considers U.S. key strategic objectives in Syria and globally, a fixation on opposing Putin makes little sense. America's principal objective in Syria must be to prevent ISIL's domination of the country or its establishment of a sanctuary there. In either case, ISIL would have a base for attacks in Iraq and even the United States. Washington's second objective is to oust Assad, who the administration accurately argues has generated far more violent extremists than he has eliminated.

Despite years of effort and billions in expenses, however, the United States and its partners have failed to assemble a credible military force to remove Assad. On the contrary, without ISIL or the al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra and its wider coalition, Syria's anti-Assad forces would essentially be impotent. As a practical matter, this means that the only major army available to fight both Assad and ISIL is al-Qaeda's al-Nusra, which President Obama is appropriately reluctant to support. After the September 11 attacks, that would be a truly remarkable decision. Indeed, despite his butchery and deceit, few have considered Assad a threat to the United States-and he is not responsible for killing 3,000 Americans. Moreover, while Assad's support for Hezbollah has threatened U.S. ally Israel and indirectly killed Israelis, he is likely a safer neighbor for Jersualem than al-Nusra.

The need to fight both ISIL and al-Nusra is one of the reasons that the Obama administration and most foreign policy experts prefer to avoid dismantling the Syrian government and the Syrian army. Both will be necessary, under different leadership, to fight Syria's violent extremists. Avoiding the costly consequences of the Bush administration's mistaken emasculation of the Iraqi government and military is already a component of current U.S. declaratory policy in Syria.

Indeed, from this perspective, Donald Trump is quite right to suggest that if Putin is attacking al-Nusra and ISIL, and helping Assad's forces to gain ground, this is not in itself contrary to U.S. interests in Syria-though there are two important caveats to his audacious statement.

First, Russian strikes on U.S.-trained or supported groups are a blow to U.S. standing and directly undermine U.S. policy, however ineffective it may be absent such attacks. Allowing Putin to look like the architect of a new Syria, with the United States on the sidelines, would be even worse. Second, Assad's indefinite hold on power is an insurmountable obstacle to any lasting solution in Syria and destabilizes the whole region.

However, neither of these caveats precludes engaging Moscow in a meaningful dialogue about destroying ISIL and gradually but certainly easing Assad from power. In dealing with the first, Putin has said that Russia would welcome not only targeting suggestions but also information on whom to avoid attacking. The Obama administration should test Moscow--in both areas--stating clearly that we are experimenting and that attacks on identified U.S. partners would gravely breach our trust. There should be ways to start by providing information that Russia and Assad already have in order to avoid potentially delivering intelligence to Damascus.

Second, neither Russia nor Putin is capable of structuring a comprehensive anti-ISIL coalition or an international diplomatic settlement. In this regard, President Obama has been correct to state that Moscow's actions reflect weakness rather than strength. In fact, Putin himself has said openly that his policy cannot succeed without cooperation with the U.S.-led coalition. Washington can quickly end any speculation to the contrary in Russia by extending judicious assistance to non-extremist rebel forces, including anti-tank missiles but not anti-aircraft missiles.

Finally, Russia's president and foreign minister have stated that Russia's commitment is to the Syrian government, not to Bashar al-Assad. Russia's brash new Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova recently repeated this even more graphically. Putin has also repeatedly said that dialogue and compromise are necessary to a long-term solution. Publicly, Moscow would find it difficult to go much further than this while operating from Syrian bases in cooperation with the Syrian Army. Privately, Russian officials acknowledge that Assad's departure could be a part of a negotiated transition.

Even Assad himself has said that he might resign if the Syrian people want it. Though it is unclear how Syrians could fairly express their views on Assad's future during a civil war or that Assad would accept the verdict as calmly as he implies, Syria's president may be prepared to step down as part of an international agreement that includes Russia and Iran-meaning that Moscow and Tehran would encourage him to do so.  That would be particularly likely if America helps the rebels to stall Assad's Russian-supported offensive.

Looking ahead, Russia's military presence in Syria and Assad's growing dependence on Moscow may provide Russia with unprecedented leverage over Assad and the Syrian government in seeking a negotiated transition, especially if Russia does so in collaboration with the United States. Since Washington and its allies have many more cards to play than Putin, this should be possible to do in ways that reflect U.S. interests and preferences and do not sacrifice any fundamental American priorities.

This does not mean creating any formal or informal alliance with Russia, which would be contrary to U.S. interests and unacceptable to most of our allies and partners, from Brussels to Riyadh. Nevertheless, if we could contemplate working with al-Nusra, which some clearly have, we should be able to hold our noses during limited coordination with Russia to explore whether we can reach a solution that serves U.S. strategic aims. After all, as Winston Churchill said of his own willingness to cooperate with Josef Stalin-who was orders of magnitude more dangerous than Putin-"if Hitler invaded Hell, I would make at least a favorable reference to the Devil in the House of Commons." George Washington similarly cautioned his fellow citizens to avoid "permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular nations."

The lack of credible alternatives only strengthens the argument to test Putin's seriousness. Otherwise, we face a choice between disengaging from our already limited role in Syria-which means allowing ISIL to consolidate its position there, providing semi-permanent employment to President Assad, and cooperating in our own humiliation by Moscow-or escalating our involvement in ways that make an accidental or deliberate military confrontation with Russia increasingly likely over time. One option would look pusillanimous; the other, reckless. Conversely, if we do test Putin and fail, what does the United States lose? Washington would retain all the options it has today--and would be in a considerably stronger position to implement them after having demonstrably clarified Russia's intentions.

In refusing to receive a delegation led by Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev in Washington, the White House seems to have rather casually forgone a chance to advance U.S. strategic objectives in Syria largely in order to reiterate its unwillingness to talk to Moscow. This is an understandable but lamentable disregard of diplomacy. So far, Obama has not demonstrated that by ignoring Putin, who-for likely self-serving reasons-is inviting the United States to have input in his Syrian operations, he can embark upon a road to any satisfactory solutions.

Meanwhile, a variety of neoconservatives and liberal hawks are calling for a no-fly zone or other military options. Some, such as Hillary Clinton, know how risky this could be without Russia's cooperation-she admitted as much at a campaign event in early October, only to conveniently ignore this reality during the first debate among the Democratic presidential candidates, when she had an opportunity to sound tough before a national audience. Others advocate a no-fly zone without describing what they think U.S. fighter pilots should do if a Russian jet entered the zone. Ignore it? Shoot it down? Either move could in a calamity. And what to do about Russia's cruise missile on ships and planes capable of striking from Russian territory? Those calling for this approach likewise avoid considering the potential costs outside Syria-starting with Ukraine-if Moscow chose to retaliate. On top of everything else, turning Syria into a battleground between America and Russia would only further harden public opinion in Russia, where 75% of those questioned in a recent survey described the United States and other Western nations as Russia's opponents. This is not how to help the Russian people hold Putin accountable for his country's severe economic problems.

The war in Syria combines a major regional crisis with international terrorism and a potential confrontation between the two largest nuclear weapons states. In such circumstances, the first requirement of sound policy is to be honest with ourselves. This means acknowledging that while Putin's interference in Syria is unwelcome and contrary to U.S. national interests, it is now a fact of life. It also means recognizing that Moscow's actions were not unpredictable in a situation in which Russia has significant interests of its own. Furthermore, the Obama administration is trying to weaken Russia's economy and isolate its leaders, while the Kremlin sees Russia as a sovereign great power able to act despite U.S. preferences to the contrary. If we want to reject working with governments that have their own agendas in Syria, our list of partners will be quite short and will certainly exclude Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar.

U.S. leaders should respond to Moscow with a combination of strength and pragmatism rather than weakness and inflexibility. By contrast, railing at the world and stalking off like a global King Lear ill befits the sole superpower.
 #4
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's interview with NTV's programme Pozdnyakov, Moscow, October 13, 2015

Why is West unwilling to join Russia-led antiterrorist coalition?

Question: Mr Lavrov, what prevents our Western partners from responding to Russia's proposal to establish a broad-based antiterrorist coalition similar to the anti-Hitler coalition? Are they enraged or discouraged, perhaps, by the fact that a new centre of power has emerged, or stung by the fact that someone has encroached on their exceptionality?

Sergey Lavrov: You know, there are probably several factors and causes. Perhaps, they aren't too pleased by the effective operations of our military, as they compare them to the year-plus operation by the US-led coalition, which carried out, I believe, about 60,000 sorties, half of which were supposed to be operational, without obtaining any positive results on the ground.

On the contrary, Islamic State (ISIS) and other terrorist groups such as Al-Nusrar Front, an Al-Qa'idah offshoot, have only expanded their influence, as well as the territory in which they have proceeded to create a genuine caliphate, organizing people's lives in accordance with their laws. This is a completely new kind of terrorism.

Our colleagues are trying to tell us that ISIS became a reality only because of the drawn-out crisis in Syria, and that Syria is a magnet that attracts all the Sunnis, because, they say, Alawites use force against Sunnis, refusing to give up power. Such statements are dangerous. I told my colleagues - US Secretary of State John Kerry and our European partners - that trying to represent this conflict as a face-off within Islam is unacceptable. We all are fighting terrorism. This was stated by President Putin. Again, if our partners feel embarrassed because they haven't achieved any meaningful results, they still need to make an effort and decide what is more important for them: a misguided sense of self-worth, or ridding the world of the most terrible threat of recent decades.

There is another reason, which we need to look into. I regularly pose this question to my colleagues, foreign ministers of other countries. Perhaps the reason is that the purported goal is not entirely honest? Perhaps, the goal is to change the regime? They keep sticking to their position that a final settlement in Syria is only possible after Al-Asad goes.

Removal of Al-Asad regime will lead to more chaos in Middle East

Question: Do they insist on this?

Sergey Lavrov: Yes. They keep saying that the coalition that has been operating in Syria and Iraq for more than a year now has only been fighting terrorism, primarily ISIS, and doesn't bomb the positions of government troops. Perhaps there are objective ways to determine whether this is true. We are studying the situation. But if they are so apprehensive in fighting terrorism, perhaps they want, as they did before, to use extremist groups in order to degrade the government? This question remains unanswered.

We remember how Saddam Hussein was toppled. After that, Iraq fell into chaos. Things remain complicated there. We remember that in order to overthrow the [Mu'ammar] al-Qadhafi regime, our Western partners and the countries of the region cooperated with the most notorious extremists, who then, like a genie from a bottle, spread across North Africa and even sub-Saharan Africa.
Question: The way I see it, the experts are also saying that if Al-Asad goes, the Greater Middle East will descend into chaos.

Sergey Lavrov: The experts say so, and we say so. We don't want a re-run of the events when, let me say it again, not only did they have no scruples about cooperating with the terrorists, but they actually bet on them directly and armed the extremists. Our French colleagues, who are now loudly talking about the need to respect international law, in the case of the Libyan crisis, despite a resolution banning arms supplies to anyone in Libya, which was adopted by consensus, did supply such arms to al-Qadhafi's opponents and made no secret of this, even showed off saying that they are doing so in violation of the UN Security Council resolution. Then, the terrorists used these very weapons to shoot at the French troops in Africa, in Mali, where France was fighting those who it itself created and armed.

These double standards are obvious, and we all need to decide whether we want to, as a group of countries believe we should, destroy another regime and ruin another state. Ultimately, the problem of terrorism spreading in the Middle East is due to the fact that statehood in Iraq, Libya, and now Syria, is being destroyed. Next thing you know, they'll be taking up Lebanon. There's a saying that history doesn't teach anybody anything. Some time ago, we could accept in good faith things that happened a hundred years ago or so. However, over the past 10 to 15 years we've seen Iraq and Libya, and now it's the Syrian crisis. It's all the same everywhere. So, we must decide, and this is what President Putin calls for.

Russia, US military should coordinate actions in Syria

We suggested that our American colleagues and we should interact through the Pentagon and the Russian Defence Ministry not only in order to avoid incidents in the air, but also to coordinate our actions. They haven't said anything to that yet. Since they are critical of our military operation and are saying that our air strikes are aimed not at weakening the terrorists, but at weakening the moderate Syrian opposition, we asked them to share their information about correct targets, destroying which will cause the most damage to the terrorists in Syria. They ducked our question. Then we said, "Well, if you think that we are weakening the people you are betting on in terms of strengthening the opposition, including fighting ISIS, tell us which targets we should avoid, and which troops on the ground we should spare. Still no answer.

In a recent interview to CBS, President Obama made several notable statements, including on the need to coordinate counterterrorism efforts, including the Free Syrian Army. This is exactly what we are calling for. We've been doing so for more than one day and even more than one week. President Putin spoke in favour of establishing coordination with the US-led coalition, even though it is illegitimate in Syria. No one invited it there, and the UN Security Council didn't adopt any resolutions to that effect. But if President Obama is calling for coordinating efforts with the Free Syrian Army, we are willing to do so as well. It was a long time ago that we asked the Americans, the countries of the region, including the Saudis, the representatives of Qatar and the Turks to point to someone from among those who represent and run the Free Syrian Army whom we can talk with. They promised to give us a list of names, but we are still waiting.

Speaking about coordination, which President Obama calls for, it is much broader than just the Free Syrian Army, because information about it is contradictory. It never stays in one place, periodically breaks up into smaller groups, which then join either Al-Nusrah Front or ISIS, which are both radical groups. Everyone agrees that the Free Syrian Army doesn't have a single military command.

Democratic Forces of Syria

Question: It was announced yesterday that a new coalition, the Democratic Forces of Syria, had emerged.

Sergey Lavrov: Yes, this structure seems to have been created to take over from the Free Syrian Army. You know, people should sit down at the [negotiating] table and talk honestly. The current information muddle with regard to who is doing what and why in Syria only plays into the hands of the terrorists, who always "fish in troubled waters." Those who declare fighting terrorism as their main goal, if they are sincerely making these statements, should come together and address practical tasks. After establishing in Baghdad an information centre involving Iraq, Iran, Syria, and the Russian military, we invited the Americans, the Turks, and any other country that is able and willing to contribute to this fight to join it. If they don't like Baghdad as a venue for this joint work, we are ready to work in any other country or regional capital with all participants in the US-led coalition and to coordinate our actions. The Russian military repeatedly told the Pentagon representatives this, including in the course of a video conference the day before yesterday.

Russian-Saudi talks on Syria

Question: There are several fine points, as I see it. One respectable Western agency reported a few days ago, again with reference to unnamed sources, that a Saudi representative allegedly suggested during his visit to Russia that the latter join the US-led coalition. Is this true?

Sergey Lavrov: No, it is not true. I heard several other pronouncements that Reuters referred to. Allegedly, we were warned that there would be fatal consequences. This is absolutely untrue. The talk was precisely about what I am talking to you about right now. I mean the need to coordinate efforts. It was clearly reaffirmed that we were fighting terrorism, not the patriotic Syrian opposition. On the contrary, we are willing to coordinate our actions with the patriotic Syrian opposition and to help it recapture territories from the terrorists in the way we are helping the Syrian government army win back populated localities after we carry out air strikes on the positions held by ISIS, Al-Nusrah Front and other terrorist groups. We are also ready to help the patriotic opposition, but it should be introduced to us. We are absolutely ready for this.

It seems important for me to say that we had an honest and frank conversation with the Deputy Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia. Our Saudi colleagues' concerns that we had some other aims and that by helping the Syrian army we were saving the regime rather than fighting terrorism were dispelled. We explained our true aims - we are not concealing them - and it seems to me that they understand of our position much better.

No doubt ammunition US sent to Syria will end up in terrorist hands

Question: Just a few hours ago, there was a report that the Pentagon delivered 50 tonnes of ammunition to the Syrian opposition. It was stressed in this context that the opposition had been checked for non-cooperation with ISIS. Allegedly, it was the right kind of opposition that was fighting the terrorists. Are you not worried that these weapons and ammunition might end up in the hands of terrorists?

Sergey Lavrov: I'll tell you honestly that we don't even doubt that a considerable part (as a minimum) of these weapons falls precisely into the hands of terrorists. This is a cause for concern, including in the US itself, where the public and Congress are beginning to ask questions about the previous attempts to support the moderate opposition. In particular, there is a scandal going on in connection with several hundred Toyota jeeps that the Americans let go down the drain by supplying them to the Free Syrian Army. All ISIS thugs are driving these jeeps. They've mounted heavy machineguns on them. They work from the vehicles, feeding their destructive ideas to the masses. It's sad. I saw some TV reports earlier today, on Euronews, I think, which said that the Americans changed their tactics after Russia began its air operation in Syria. They renounced the programme under which they trained the opposition for the fight against terrorists and decided to air-drop weapons to untrained opposition fighters. It's odd. The only thing I can't understand is why they referred to the beginning of our air operation as a pretext for changing their tactics. It seems better to hand weapons over to trained people, and it's very important to screen them.

You said they seemed to report that there was a screening after all. We expect them to respond to our request and say whom we can cooperate with from among the patriotic opposition. There was a report not so long ago that they had given up their training programmes because of the high costs and the impossibility to train everyone properly. They decided to train only company and platoon commanders. Thus, we can see very few concrete things explaining what in particular the Americans are doing in Syria and why so many combat sorties have yielded such insignificant results. With 25,000 combat sorties, they could have ripped the whole of Syria to matchwood.

Question: Some experts view the confrontation against ISIS as an opportunity for Moscow and Washington, and more broadly for Russia and the West, to improve their relations in a kind of a thaw. How probable is a scenario like this?

Sergey Lavrov: Russian President Vladimir Putin raised this issue in his remarks at the UN General Assembly. He made a comparison with the time when the anti-Hitler coalition was created. For the West, the USSR was evil, but when Nazism and Hitler came around and started pushing for the establishment of a new world order, there was no place left for ideological stand-offs between communism and capitalism, between socialist and market economies.

Question: It seems that this time around we didn't have any ideological confrontments.

Sergey Lavrov: Indeed, there are now no differences of this kind. If two opposing systems understood that they were facing mortal danger and were able to unite their efforts in combating a common and very powerful enemy, today, given the extensive experience we have accumulated in working together on many issues, and the experience of the Cold War, we could probably come to the right conclusions and create a coalition despite disagreements on various issues because these disagreements are of a secondary nature.

Russia proposes UN-led counterterrorist coalition

Question: Is there a possibility of creating a broad counterterrorist coalition, for example, under the aegis of the UN?

Sergey Lavrov: Yes, completely. Moreover, Russia is now proposing this. In his remarks at the UN General Assembly, President Vladimir Putin said Russia will convene a special ministerial meeting of the UN Security Council, open not just to the 15 Security Council members, but also to all UN members willing to join the debate on the causes behind the recent developments in the Middle East and North Africa, and contribute to devising common approaches to fighting terrorism and resolving conflicts. All these issues are closely related.

It is generally acknowledged that the fact that there are lingering conflicts, including the Israeli-Palestinian issue, plays in the hands of those who recruit extremists. We held this meeting on 30 September as part of Russia's presidency in the Security Council. Over 80 delegations took part in this meeting, with most of them headed by foreign ministers. After the meeting Russia put forward a draft resolution that focuses on the very issues we are now discussing: creating a coalition under the aegis of the UN that would be guided in its operations by the UN Charter and resolutions of the UN Security Council, subject to consent from the countries where military action should take place, and that would regularly report to the UN Security Council on such coordinated efforts.

West refuses to join Russia in fighting terrorism for political reasons

Even though it is difficult to argue against this approach, our Western colleagues have so far been avoiding any serious discussion on this issue, telling us behind the scenes that while they agree with the resolution, they cannot work with us on this issue for political reasons. And what are those political reasons? A legitimate coalition for fighting terrorists in Iraq has already been created, since the Iraqi government has asked for it. However, it has no right to operate in Syria for the same work. That's all there is to it. They think that they do not need to take the issue to the UN Security Council. This way they can decide on their own, without having to talk to Russia, China, Venezuela and some other countries in the UN Security Council, who are not always eager to back their initiatives.

The UN General Assembly has been held. We have prepared and held a UN Security Council meeting on fighting terrorism in full compliance with the UN Charter, respecting the UN prerogatives and the authority of the UN Security Council as the main body responsible for maintaining international peace and security.

USA violates UN procedures

Our American partners have also held a meeting on fighting terrorism at the UN headquarters, although it was not related in any way whatsoever to the UN Charter or the UN rules of procedure. They simply invited those who they wanted to see at the meeting. Russia was also invited to attend and was present at the meeting. A number of considerations arise in this respect. First, why should an event like this be held without regard for the UN General Assembly Rules of Procedure and not be related to the UN in any way except for the venue? My second point is about the invitation list. I'm unable to grasp why some were left off. For example, Kosovo representatives were invited, just like any other UN member state, and had their place at the table with a name plate for their country, which was a big let-down for the Secretary-General, who was invited to deliver opening remarks, and the United Nations in general.

Let me remind you that when we worked in 2008 on overcoming the consequences of Georgia's aggression in South Ossetia, mechanisms were put in place in Geneva enabling Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Georgia, assisted by Russia, the USA, the EU, the UN and the OSCE, to discuss security and humanitarian issues, including refugees. It goes without saying that the discussion was quite complex and difficult, as it took place in the immediate aftermath of a bloody conflict.

Suddenly, Georgia submitted a draft resolution to the UN General Assembly, demanding that all refugees return from Georgia to South Ossetia and Abkhazia where they used to live, i.e. those who fled from the conflict to Georgia from the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Abkhazia and South Ossetia responded by saying that "if you do not want to discuss this issue in the agreed upon place, let us come to New York and present our point of view during the discussion of this draft resolution".

It all depended on whether the United States would grant visas to the representatives of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The US refused to do so. But now, seeking to enable an unrecognised structure called Kosovo to become a UN member, they have abused their status as the host country of the UN headquarters, granted Kosovo representatives visas and brought them to the UN headquarters without applying for a pass with the UN Secretariat. This is reflective of their attitude towards the Organization.

I understand that it is probably easier to invite those who obey any orders and work with them on various solutions, while posturing as representing the will of the international community and an international coalition.

Of course, it is much more challenging to reach agreements in the UN with Russia, China and many other developing countries, who are independent in their foreign policy choices. Of course, this is much more complicated and requires more time. However, compromises and agreements with those who do not necessarily share your views last much longer and are more effective.

Foreign policy risks

Question: Are you sure that you have correctly assessed all foreign policy risks and that in the new geopolitical reality that started on 30 September this year we have 100-per-cent reliable, staunch allies, for example, in the post-Soviet space?

Sergey Lavrov: We have allies in the post-Soviet area, in the CSTO [Collective Security Treaty Organization]. They have an independent foreign policy outside their CSTO obligations. They have a multi-vector foreign policy, just as we do. We are not shutting ourselves off from anyone. The opposite is the case.

Now our partners are starting to understand that their policy in terms of sanctions and attempts to isolate Russia have reached a dead end. Isolation, huh? President Vladimir Putin has just been in New York City. There was not a sign of isolation there; everyone was eager to talk; over 10 meetings took place in a few hours. Even now that our partners are seeing the futility of their present policy, we are not turning away from them. You are not ready to address concrete issues concerning interaction between our agencies (they have frozen all contacts between military and law enforcement agencies; the EU has put on hold virtually all dialogues between Moscow and Brussels), let's address issues that you are ready to address. For instance, High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission Federica

Question: It has even been suggested that there is something like a Washington dictate - judging by remarks by European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, who said recently that relations with Russia should be improved. "It is not sexy but that must be the case, we can't go on like this," he said.

Sergey Lavrov: This morning I was amazed to read a quote from a speech by Bulgarian Prime Minister Boyko Borissov, who said that in the interests of the  United States Bulgaria has abandoned energy projects with Russia, including South Stream, a nuclear power plant and the Burgas-Alexandroupoli oil pipeline project, and now the United States should help Bulgaria to get a visa-free regime and more. Amazing.

Question: And NATO should help Kiev to establish control over Bulgaria's airspace.

Sergey Lavrov: Perhaps. It's just amazing how people are not embarrassed to make such remarks. I personally would be ashamed before the electorate, my people.

Nevertheless, it is impossible to assess all of the risks. Foreign policy should of course be pragmatic and pursue goals that are not destructive but creative. This holds true for any country. However, for a country such as Russia, for any major country that has self-respect, foreign policy should also rely on the principle of dignity, respect for one's people, one's history, respect for one's culture and convictions, as far as possible. We seek to combine pragmatism and a sense of existence as a power, as a country that has always upheld justice. This sense of justice in international affairs, as well as in life in general, is very important. I will say that it is not an impediment to pragmatic results. On the contrary, when people see that you look for some objective benefit, which is necessary for your country, while upholding the principles of equality and justice on the international arena, respect and support for such an approach grows in the world.

European, Baltic states "plagued" by Russophobia

Question: Is the Russia hate plaguing our European, Baltic and other partners a curable disease?

Sergey Lavrov: It is. I think we should simply speak with one another more and not avoid the most contentious conversations. Talking with a person directly, letting him say all the negative things he wants to say, and then responding is always better than to hear Russophobic statements from a rostrum and then to respond through a megaphone from another rostrum. It's always a bad option.

Similarities, differences between Syrian, Ukrainian conflicts

Question: So, it looks like we have two information fronts - the "Syrian" and the "Ukrainian" - open against us. The "Ukrainian front", incidentally, keeps making the news from time to time. As for Syria, crude analogies are drawn between it and Afghanistan: Russia allegedly will get bogged down, quarrel with everyone, etc. A Ukrainian career diplomat, Andriy Melnyk, if I am not mistaken, has repeatedly hinted of late that "Donbass is on the verge of another conflagration".

Sergey Lavrov: Perhaps figures like him are quite eager to see "another conflagration" because in that case they can distract people from developments in the economy and the social sphere and from their inability to curb corruption. Then they won't have to reply to questions about the billions of IMF dollars that disappeared, about the banks that manipulated this money, about the oligarchs who put it in their pockets, or the offshore accounts where it was channelled. Thus, there are people with a vested interest in a "conflagration".

As for us, we want Kiev to meet its commitments and implement all that it agreed to in Minsk via a direct dialogue with Donbass. I am referring to constitutional reform, a permanent special status for Donbass, amnesty and so on. I am also referring to the need to coordinate with Donbass issues relating to local elections in the self-proclaimed republics. They should talk with each other directly.

This is the key to the settlement of the Ukrainian crisis, and as for that matter, to settling the crisis in Syria. There are two information fields but one and the same key to the settlements. The authorities and the opposition should negotiate. The difference between the two cases is that in Ukraine the authorities are seeking to evade direct dialogue and are attempting to force certain decisions, while some Western countries are playing up to them. In Syria, the West is playing up to the opposition, which doesn't want to talk with Bashar al-Asad. However, any conflict is only settled via a direct dialogue.

In this connection, let me remind them - if they believe, as they say, that Bashar al-Asad is a tyrant with the hands stained in blood and they can't sit down with him at the negotiating table - how the Americans have continued working with the Taleban. After the Taleban as an organization and many of its leaders personally were put on the UN Security Council's terrorist list, the Americans, without a moment's hesitation, opened a direct dialogue channel with them - in Doha, I think. When US President Barack Obama was criticized for talking with terrorists, he said: You don't negotiate with friends, you negotiate with the enemies. Thus, this principle is inapplicable to other situations, where the Americans have a different agenda. Here we have the same double standards.

 
 #5
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's remarks and answers to media questions during Government Hour at the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, Moscow October 14, 2015

Colleagues,

First of all, I would like to thank you for this opportunity to speak once again as part of Government Hour in the State Duma of the Russian Federation. Our regular meetings and close interaction between the Foreign Ministry and parliament, the relevant committees of the State Duma and the Federation Council, ensure a synergy of efforts, unity and solidarity at this crucial moment for our country's future. We regard your attention to the Foreign Ministry's activity as a substantial asset in our efforts to effectively advance our national interests and a key to the successful implementation of Russia's foreign policy course that has been approved by President Vladimir Putin.

Recently, President Putin has, on multiple occasions, made comprehensive assessments of the international situation, spelling out our approaches towards key issues on the global and regional agendas. Some instances include the Russian head of state's participation in the general political discussion at the plenary meeting of the 70th session of the UN General Assembly in New York City and his numerous interviews with Russian and foreign reporters. Concrete steps were put forward that, in our opinion, should be taken to resolve the most dangerous conflicts and address global problems.

Russia pursues an independent, responsible policy in international affairs. We feel that this policy is enjoying increasing support and understanding and that our foreign partners are increasingly adopting our arguments. The key tenets of the Russian foreign policy philosophy, such as good-faith compliance with the fundamental norms of international law, the UN Charter, collective methods of resolving international problems and respect for the cultural and civilisational diversity of the modern world, have begun to be adopted by many delegations at the UN and other forums.

Western attempts, led by the US, to stall the objective process of the evolution of a new, more just, polycentric and stable world order, and to continue imposing on other countries recipes for transformation, are leading to greater chaos and anarchy and are encountering growing rejection and sometimes outright renunciation on the part of many states.

Russia will continue to follow an independent, multi-vector foreign policy, responding to its national interests, strengthening its security and consolidating its positions in the modern highly competitive world. Our country maintains its traditional position as a key international player and is playing a major role in ensuring a balanced development of international relations. At the same time, we do not impose anything on anybody, do not try to reduce everyone to the same level and do not force anyone to sacrifice their peace and prosperity for the sake of certain values.

President Vladimir Putin emphasised that we are all different and this should be respected. Nobody is obliged to follow any development model that someone declared to be the only valid option. Therefore, it is necessary to stop using the UN for narrow egoistic unilateral purposes. Positive results are achieved when UN member states, primarily the members of the UN Security Council, pool their efforts and find universally accepted politico-diplomatic decisions.

Today the formation of a global governance system meeting 21st-century requirements is an urgent task. The system can only be created on the basis of a consensus among leading centres of power and influence in the world, a recognition of the diversity of civilisation, the involvement of the broadest possible range of actors, the development of network diplomacy which implies forming flexible structures in the interests of a partnership in international affairs and support for parliamentary, people's diplomacy and the activities of NGOs that are seriously, sincerely interested in settling international problems. Russia is prepared for this work in all areas on the basis of a broad consensus with all partners.

In this process we are consistently advocating collective efforts in a search for effective responses to common global challenges and threats. We suggest that all countries be guided by common values and interests on the basis of international law and pool their efforts to resolve common problems.

Many participants in the UN General Assembly session emphasised that the most serious threat to the international community emanates today from international terrorism and extremism, which has escalated in the Middle East and North Africa on the backdrop of weakening state institutions in several countries in this region, which occurred with external interference. In some countries, the state itself was destroyed. Attempts to use political and geopolitical engineering and overthrow "objectionable" regimes broke down security mechanisms and led to chaos and anarchy.

President Vladimir Putin put forward an initiative to establish a large-scale anti-terrorist front, relying on international legal standards and the UN Charter and operating with the consent and in close coordination with regional states that bear the brunt of the burden in resisting terrorists and extremists. It could unite the most diverse forces in its ranks - all of those who fight terrorists, do not accept their ideology and are prepared to help prevent the implementation of their most dangerous idea of creating an extremist caliphate on a vast territory - from Pakistan to Portugal, according to ISIS ideologists. The need to create such a front was discussed at the 30 September ministerial meeting of the UN Security Council, which was convened upon our initiative. We presented to our partners a draft resolution on coordinating the efforts of all forces opposing ISIS and other terrorist structures. The draft's provisions throw light on the actions of the coalition, thereby ensuring the need to respect the norms of international law and avoid interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states without their consent and a UN Security Council resolution. For the time being, the response has been tepid but we hope for the adoption of practical measures on promoting this idea and a simultaneous advance to the political settlement of crises in the region. The work on this project continues. Several developing countries from among UN Security Council members have expressed their positive attitude towards this idea. For understandable reasons, Western countries do not even get involved in a detailed discussion of it. I think they will simply fail to find arguments against our concept. Nevertheless, we are ready for the closest possible cooperation with all countries, including those that directly face the terrorist threat. In this context I'd like to mention the need to take practical steps towards implementing our tasks. All of us were shaken by the terrorist acts in Turkey. We expressed solidarity with this friendly state and are helping it to prepare more effectively for the struggle against the Islamic State. Our military are establishing direct contact with their colleagues to coordinate our actions.

It's obvious that fighting terrorism is a priority task for everyone. As I said, at the same time we have been working to create conditions for a political settlement of all the regional problems, including the Syrian crisis, and efforts to stabilise the situation in Yemen, Iraq and Lebanon, as well as to root out the causes of the recent rise in extremism.

It's clear that, considering the current instability in global affairs, we should find common ground through persistent political and diplomatic efforts based on real equality and partnership. Russia is willing to do this, all the more so given that the recent developments have reaffirmed the old saying that "little strokes fell great oaks." Joint efforts can bring about progress even in the most difficult and complex cases and problems. The recent examples include the agreement to destroy chemical weapons in Syria and the settlement of Iran's nuclear problem. Alternatively, unilateral efforts to resolve international issues don't bring positive results. We need to revive the political culture of compromise, which some of our partners have lost.

Unfortunately, the United States continues working to maintain US leadership, as they have said time and again, and exceptionalism in international affairs as the only option. They have been trying to clean up the global area to suit the unitised Western standards, if I may say so.

We believe that no conflict can be settled through the use of force. This also concerns the conflict in southeastern Ukraine. We are satisfied with the outcome of the Normandy format talks in Paris on October 2, and primarily our partners' recognition of the importance of full and unconditional implementation of the February 12 Minsk Agreements. The immediate task is to ensure strict compliance with the obligation to tackle all key issues through direct Kiev-Donbass dialogue. The issue concerns local elections, amnesty and a special permanent status for Donbass, as well as constitutional reform.

The current ceasefire has helped create conditions for the return to peaceful life. The next issue on the agenda is to settle the pile of socioeconomic problems, to improve the humanitarian situation, and to foster economic revival and other vital activity in the region.

We hope that progress in the settlement of the internal Ukrainian crisis will remove artificial obstacles to finding common answers to the challenges that all countries are facing. These include the migration crisis in Europe and the creation of a common and indivisible security space in the Euro-Atlantic that would be appropriate for dealing with modern challenges. There is also the objective of creating a common economic and cultural space from Lisbon to Vladivostok, a large-scale strategic project that can provide for the harmonious development of all states, both those that are members of integration associations and those that are not.

Another foreign policy priority is to strengthen cooperation in the framework of multilateral CIS formats in which Russia is involved, including the CIS, the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation. We will certainly keep working to strengthen the Union State of Russia and Belarus and the Russian-Belarusian strategic partnership.

It's difficult to overestimate Russia's strategic partnership with China, with which we have agreed on many global long-term projects such as combining the EAEU development with the Silk Road Economic Belt, which amounts to the start of coordinating our development strategies with a view to giving a powerful impetus to our economic operation in the huge Eurasian region. It is crucial to start the practical implementation of these projects with the involvement of all EAEU countries and the potential of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. We are also committed to strengthening strategic partnership with India, Vietnam and other ASEAN and Asia-Pacific countries, and to joining the growing integration processes in the region in order to use the region's potential, in particular for assisting the further development of Siberia and the Russian Far East. At the same time, I'd like to say that we are willing to resume full-scale cooperation with the EU and the United States after our Western partners abandon their current stance based on a futile policy of ultimatums and illegal sanctions.

Our attention is also focused on strengthening cooperation in the BRICS format, considering its growing importance as a global factor. Speaking at the Ufa summit and the recent meeting of the BRICS foreign ministers, we reaffirmed our commitment to close cooperation between our countries and to spreading it to other spheres of cooperation in accordance with the Ufa Action Plan.

We will continue working to improve and modernise foreign policy instruments, focusing on economic diplomacy, assistance to the Russian companies that are working in foreign markets, and diplomatic support to the strategic projects in which Russia is involved.

We intend to use the soft power opportunities most broadly and effectively. Of course, a vital part of our foreign policy activity concerns the protection of the rights and legitimate interests of Russian citizens and Russian compatriots abroad. These issues will be in the focus of the Fifth World Congress of Compatriots, which will be held in Moscow on November 5−6.

Thank you for your attention. I'm ready to answer any questions you may have.

Question: You aptly closed your presentation, stating that we will soon host a congress of compatriots in Moscow, implying, among other things, the use of "soft power" in our foreign policy. The Finance Ministry has slashed the compatriot-support programme to almost zero. Today, a new head was appointed at the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation, whose sphere of interests is not very close to yours. Is it possible to work with our compatriots, who today make up one of the world's largest diasporas, with the 160 million roubles that were provided for this programme?

Sergey Lavrov: These figures are not quite accurate. If I remember correctly, this year, 310 million roubles were provided through the governmental commission for compatriots living abroad. It is distributed between the Foreign Ministry and Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation, but it is a single programme; it is well-coordinated and there is no parallelism or overlapping areas. I should also note that financially this is not the only channel in our contacts with compatriots living abroad. This subject was addressed in the Government and the Accounts Chamber with a view to choosing the best possible way of doing it - keeping everything in one piggybank and then implementing [the programme] or leaving the relevant projects and programmes to the respective agencies, the Ministry of Education Ministry and the Ministry of Culture, among others. So far, at this point, we have governmental commissions and departmental sectoral programmes, plus an instrument such as the Russkiy Mir Foundation, which also promotes Russian language and culture even though it is more oriented towards foreigners who want to study our language, culture and literature. Nevertheless, on the whole, as far as the budget is concerned, of course, you always want more. Even so, it is not so modest. It is far more than 160 million roubles.

Frankly, ahead of the congress, which will take place on 5−6 November in Moscow, we are actively working with compatriots living abroad. Many are being pressured (especially those who live in Western countries) to decrease their activism in support of Russia, their motherland, as well as in support of fair decisions, be it Ukraine, Syria or elsewhere. However, the overwhelming majority of organisations show fortitude and commitment to principles and would not yield to crude forms of pressure, which are of course inappropriate for civilised nations. They have achieved good results ahead of the congress. We support them in terms of ensuring their legitimate rights in the host countries. There is the Fund to Support and Protect the Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad, which is another 100 million roubles plus. So the picture here is not as gloomy as it might seem if you consider only the Foreign Ministry's budget alone.

Question: Despite efforts by Russian President Vladimir Putin and his statement at the UN General Assembly, where he talked about the need to find ways to fight global terrorism, we are seeing that the situation is becoming increasingly strained. The Democratic Forces of Syria alliance said that Rakka will be in its hands in a matter of weeks. Pro-government forces are also continuing their advance on Aleppo. There is a serious possibility that the two forces will launch hostilities against each other. Are there any specific formats, apart from the UN Security Council, which has already been mentioned, that would enable Russia and the US to combine their efforts in fighting global terrorism?

Sergey Lavrov: Russian President Vladimir Putin has talked about this issue at length, including yesterday at the 7th Russia Calling! Investment Forum. Let me remind you of the sequence of events. When it became obvious that the US-led coalition was not active enough in implementing the objectives it had set for itself, we understood that Russia should heed the request coming from the Syrian Government and help it fight terrorism in Syria. As this decision crystallised, we warned our main partners, including the US, that Russia would like to contribute to implementing the objectives that are relevant for the whole international community, which is to suppress the terrorist threat in the Middle East and North Africa.

As you know, Russian, Syrian, Iraqi and Iranian military bodies established an information centre for sharing intelligence and other information enabling them to better target ISIS and other terrorists in Iraq and Syria. Since the so-called caliphate occupies vast territories in Iraq and Syria, we invited out partners to join the information centre so that everyone would have access to the same, full data, thus helping avoid any misunderstandings. The response was unconstructive. We were asked why the centre had to be located in Iraq, and not somewhere else, since the situation is already quite volatile there. We explained that according to our assessments, the country offers a relatively favourable operational environment for the centre. However, if someone wanted to have a coordination centre at a different location, we were willing to cooperate. After the decision by the Federation Council, we were ready to launch airstrikes against ISIS at the request of the Syrian Government. We warned our US colleagues. It happened during President Vladimir Putin's trip to New York, when he met with US President Barack Obama. The US President replied, and I think that we should no longer make a secret out of it, that they had expected this decision. Immediately after their conversation, we put forward a proposal that Vladimir Putin made public yesterday, which is to have the US send a delegation of military experts to Moscow to agree on a series of joint steps, after which Russia would be ready to send a high-level delegation headed by Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev and accompanied by representatives of military and intelligence services and the Foreign Ministry. This proposal was made during our trip to New York in late September. What came out of it was that the US said it was willing to coordinate operations so as to avoid any unintended incidents in the airspace of the conflict zone. Two conference calls were held on this issue, and I think that the third one is scheduled for today. These measures are currently being coordinated. However, only today we received an official reply (it seems that yesterday's public reminder by President Vladimir Putin prompted the US to respond to our proposals), saying that the US is unable to send its delegation to Moscow or receive a delegation in Washington. Unfortunately, the only thing our US colleagues are interested in is agreeing on steps to avoid incidents. It is important that the Russian and US military operating in the Syrian airspace understand who is doing what, what manoeuvres are being carried out, so that there are no accidents. Vladimir Putin actively supported this initiative. Of course, Russia is ready to go the extra mile and expand this coordination effort to other areas, including for destroying ISIS, which was the objective of the coalition established more than a year ago. The refusal to cooperate in this format is telling.

You have mentioned the Democratic Forces of Syria, a newly created alliance. This structure is on our radar. It includes a multitude of armed groups. We do not consider a number of them, for example, the Kurds or Christian Assyrians, to be a part of any terrorist group. We are ready to work with them, as we were open to cooperation with the Free Syrian Army. However, it seems that this new structure is expected to replace the Free Syrian Army. Our main objective is to persuade those who have any influence over these groups, finances them or arms them, if they really reject extremism and terrorism, help us get in touch with those people, work with them, and help them take over specific regions and locations controlled by terrorists, just as we help the Syrian army. We are ready to lend them the same kind of assistance. Unfortunately, our foreign colleagues, primarily the US, have so far been unwilling to facilitate contacts of this kind, which is indicative of the concrete objectives they are pursuing in Syria when supporting combat units. Russia's take on this issue remains unchanged: we are interested in engaging in full-scale, trust-based and practical cooperation with regional powers, including Saudi Arabia, and we repeat it almost daily to all those who influence developments in Syria. The Deputy Crown Prince visited Sochi last Sunday and met with the Russian President. The Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi was also there. We have regular contacts with Egypt and other regional actors. We feel that they are highly interested in promoting substantive cooperation. Of course, we are also working together with our Turkish neighbour, and all those for whom the ongoing developments in Syria and their consequences are in one way or another a matter of concern.

Question: I would like to thank you for all of the work that you are doing. In recent days, we have seen progress in the coordination of Russian and American experts on military aviation safety issues. Is it possible to identify areas in which cooperation is possible? It is important to know where we are going with our American colleagues.

Sergey Lavrov: This question follows up what I just said. The de-facto agreement reached on military technical measures to prevent air incidents is good, and it will begin working soon. I hope that today we will finally harmonise and finalise all of the details. Next, we will be ready to sit at the negotiating table and look at the maps and discuss where they think the terrorists are and where we think the terrorists are. I am confident that if we are honest, our estimates will coincide in most cases. This is all so messed up. There are different groups that deal with local problems. It is possible that not everyone has information about them, so maybe it is something we need to share. There is information from Jordanians, from Turks, and from other neighbors of Syria such as Iraq. So you just need to start with showing our hands, in all senses, and then confirm our words with deeds - by fighting terrorists. We're not trying to place stake on the possibility that ISIS, which has gained a stronger foothold and expanded its territory over the time the US-led coalition acted there, and Bashar al-Assad's government have wiped each other out, and then, when they are both down, the government will collapse, and ISIS can be done away with. I would not like to think that some of our Western colleagues are guided by this "unpretentious" logic. But if not, then I do not see any reasons why we should not sit down and talk about very practical things that are vital for the region and for all of us.

Question: Some Western countries have recently made a number of unfriendly moves in regard to Russia, such as actions taken by the courts of these countries or decisions by the so-called international courts affecting Russian property abroad, intended to try and blackmail Russia, threatening us with expropriation. In simpler terms, the war against Russia has extended to the judicial sphere. Prior to that, our country adhered to the position of absolute state immunity, which is acceptable from the international law perspective. However, since that time, Russia has signed international agreements giving up absolute immunity in favour of restricted state immunity, which in turn allowed our ill-wishers to file lawsuits against Russia to foreign courts, which initiate proceedings and consider these lawsuits. Do you think it is necessary to take a fresh look at some of the previously signed agreements so as to ensure the more active and more reliable legal protection of Russian property abroad?

Segey Lavrov: I am not aware of any agreements in which Russia gave up jurisdictional state immunities. On the contrary, there is an international convention on such immunities. It works. Most countries have signed it, including the Russian Federation. We also have never deviated from our position that state immunity shall be respected by all without exception. The rulings you have mentioned - the European Court of Human Rights, the Hague Court of Arbitration - are for the most part unjust and we are contesting them in court. Attempts by some overzealous officials in two or three Western European countries to immediately rush to enforce these unjust decisions at the national level, including to seize our diplomatic property or the bank accounts of Russian diplomatic missions, have been curbed. Except in Belgium, where some more efforts need to be made to revoke these measures against Rossotrudnichestvo (Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Cultural Cooperation). We have been assured that the Belgian executive authorities will make these efforts.

So, yes, we are facing some dirty attacks, including unjust decisions by various foreign judicial authorities, but we are not going to ease off. We have our own legal instruments that we already use, such as our companies use when they are hit by the illegitimate US and EU sanctions.

Question: Mr Lavrov, the Foreign Ministry has a clear picture of the challenges and threats of the current world order. One, without doubt, even with the prefix "mega", is international disregard for the rules. Do you believe Russia should take some practical steps such as, for example, proposing that the UN should establish a decade of international law, develop national and international systems of perfecting the globally accepted order?

Sergey Lavrov: Respect for international law is in the cornerstone of our foreign policy. This position remains unchanged. It is permanently confirmed by President Putin and the Foreign Ministry. The International Law Commission is active in the UN, which means that we have a special body, whose agenda is dedicated to the progressive development of international law. I believe that this issue is quite topical.

How realistic is it to announce a decade of international law in the UN? We should look at the calendar of events and at what we can fill this decade with. Just call people to meet commitments at every corner - we need to do this, perhaps, as many people on numerous occasions, including Ukraine, wishing it or not, forget about their commitments. But the main thing is to look what legal step we can take to ensure the fulfillment of the existing legally binding obligations. If the State Duma, including such respectable lawyers as Vasily Likhachev, has detailed ideas, we will certainly consider them, see each other and consult each other. Some initiative may spring up.

Question: Mr Lavrov, Russia has shot for the south. Russian aircraft are working well in Syria. We know that the Iraqi government is talking about possibly asking the Russian Aerospace Forces to take part in the fight against ISIS. But ISIS covers North Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia. Are there any other requests and invitations for our aerospace forces? What will be our response to them?

You have announced the principle of dignity in foreign policy. Opponents immediately put forward the ideology of "better to be humiliated but wealthy than proud but poor." What is Russia's approach as far as this is concerned?

Sergey Lavrov: I expressed my opinion regarding the second question yesterday. I am convinced that in a country like Russia we should not be ashamed of our history, our past, apologise to someone or, moreover, make a well-fed life the main factor in human fate - we are a different nation. Do you remember, there was a conversation about the siege of Leningrad on a well-known TV channel? The overwhelming majority of Russians never face such a choice.

As for the struggle against ISIS, we hear what our Iraqi colleagues are saying, what they say in Afghanistan, where they are also worrying about ISIS taking root. There was no formal appeal to us. But if it comes, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief will decide on this with the participation of the professional authority - the Defence Ministry. The Foreign Ministry will also take part in this work one way or another.

The main thing for us, in my opinion, is not to look where else we can help someone but form a frontline - we will not manage alone; neither will Americans. The threat is such that, as President Putin said when speaking at the UN General Assembly session, we have to remember the anti-Hitler coalition experience. We should lay aside all other ideological disagreements, the more so as they do not exist at present.

Question: Mr Lavrov, judging from media reports, primarily foreign media, having seen the efficiency of the Russian air forces in Syria, our foreign policy opponents have decided to change international public opinion in one go by reporting that Russian airstrikes are primarily directed at the facilities of the moderate armed Syrian opposition rather than ISIS. What is the Foreign Ministry doing in cooperation with the Defence Ministry to bring to the international public objective information via diplomatic channels and the media?

Sergey Lavrov: This is what we are doing. We are trying to reply immediately to any provocative reports based on disinformation. We noted that soon after our air forces launched their operation, Western media published synchronous reports about certain units of the moderate patriotic opposition in Syria, about which few people heard before. It was reported that in their struggle these units are uniting with terrorists and even have to cooperate with them under certain circumstances because, as these authors write in their reports, they find it difficult to survive Russian airstrikes. So these moderate members of the opposition are compelled to rely on terrorists. They mention Jabhat al-Nusra, for instance. Many Western analysts qualify it as a terrorist structure that is "not too bad" and believe that after certain "rebranding" it will be possible to rely on it in laying the foundations of Syria's future. But Jabhat al-Nusra is blacklisted by the UN Security Council as a terrorist structure. Its "rebranding" is ruled out - we won't let it happen. This terrorist group is blacklisted by many states, including European countries. Disinformation will continue. This is inevitable. We see this and also see that this wave of disinformation was triggered by our resolute actions but maybe this is for the better - at least now no one is dodging the question: "Where are these members of the patriotic Syrian opposition with whom it is possible to talk and fight terror? Now everyone has to reveal their views. Maybe in the next stage all interested parties will meet and clearly define who is fighting in Syria for terrorist ideals and who wants his country to be peaceful and prosperous.

Question: We have seen extensive changes in international relations this decade. It occurs to me sometimes that they affect the entire range of international relations based on principles that had been in place for the previous three or four centuries. I am an economic expert and focus attention on economic - geo-economic, to be precise - aspects of international relations.

I took part in the recent Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok. Soon afterwards, we heard news that we found rather discouraging. The upcoming establishment of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the world's largest trade alliance to involve 11 countries and about 40 percent of the entire world's commerce, was announced. It is rumoured that with the planned Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership America will get about 75 percent of world trade under its control and apply its domestic regulations to it to leave us in the margins of the global geo-economy.

What is the Russian Foreign Ministry doing, or what does it intend to do, to prevent such developments?

Sergey Lavrov: That was what President Vladimir Putin meant in his address to the UN General Assembly, when he warned against the destruction of the multilateral trade system under the WTO auspices. The latest round of talks in the WTO framework has come to a halt, while it was meant to reach an accord on a wide range of problems which WTO norms do not cover as yet. The talks made no progress for years mainly because the so-called "developing economies" were working to enhance consideration for their rights, and for a just treatment of their situation in the world markets while the Western countries, which held control over these markets, harshly beat back these efforts. That was why the attempt to suchwise  liberalise the world market failed.

Then the Western countries, led by the United States, chose to switch to regional initiatives and opened talks about the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which quite recently took the form of a document laying the basis for further work. As has been announced, both will be closed-end alliances with prospective membership requiring personal invitation. The European Union has been invited to join the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. As for the Trans-Pacific Partnership, no one will be admitted to it except the countries selected by the United States. Talks on both partnerships are secretive. Information about them does not reach the public of the concerned nations and even major businesses sure to be affected by the prospective agreements. We regard this secrecy as extremely undesirable and even destructive to the existing multilateral and all-embracing trade system.

 There are certainly hazards, because the issues, which we had been negotiating for 18 years and finally  came to a settlement as we joined the WTO, are being complemented with certain new obligations of some WTO members who are considered to be members of a select club.

We have to search for a way out of the predicament. First, we have allies in the Eurasian Economic Union as it is taking shape. Whatever problems it might encounter now, everybody is confident that, in the long-term, it promises major gains to all its members. Then, an understanding has been reached, which I have already mentioned, to start coordinating Eurasian integration with the Silk Road Economic Belt on advanced by China.  Indicatively, China has not been invited to the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Those who launched the project probably mean to confront and deter that country.

Such is the current situation. However, we have reserves and resources in the form of the Eurasian economic integration, which promises to expand and be conjugated eventually with the Silk Road Economic Belt through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and by other ways. All this makes us highly competitive, and I am confident that we should use our opportunities to the greatest possible effect.

Question: For over one and a half years, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation has been providing assistance to people in the Donetsk and Lugansk people's republics due to the humanitarian catastrophe in the area. So far, 42 humanitarian aid convoys weighing over 5,000 tonnes in total have reached the republics. Article 9 of the Minsk Agreements stipulates that the Ukrainian Government regain full control of the state border along the conflict area. With the current officials in Kiev, fulfillment of this term may result in a complete blockade of the DPR and LPR territories, similar to the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic, and lead to numerous victims among civilians as well as mass repressions against militia and their family members. How can Russia help southeastern Ukraine in these circumstances? Could you also comment on the situation with the shot-down Boeing?

Sergey Lavrov: The Russian Federation will not allow this hypothetical scenario in southeastern Ukraine to happen because the Minsk Agreements state the sequence of actions very clearly and they are impossible to distort. Before the Ukrainian Government may regain full control along the entire Russian-Ukrainian border, Kiev will have to fulfill a number of very serious conditions. First of all, Ukraine must ensure Donbass is given an actual permanent special political status. It is all written in the documents. No more persecution of the participants in the events, special rights for Russian-speaking people, the right to appoint prosecutors and judges, the right to a people's police and special economic relations with Russia. All these terms are spelled out in the Minsk Agreements. First, the special status must be introduced on a permanent basis and included in the laws and the Ukrainian Constitution. The Minsk Agreements include this condition. Second, full amnesty must be provided, followed by free elections, the format of which the Ukrainian officials must agree with Donbass. Third, the economic blockade must be lifted, supplies to the region must be restored, and the humanitarian crisis must be resolved. The parties must trade prisoners of war and so on. Only after these reforms are complete and there is a new constitution that will permanently ensure Donbass' special status can the Ukrainian officials speak about regaining control of the entire Russian-Ukrainian border. Our task is to make sure that President of Ukraine Petr Poroshenko fulfills his obligations. When all these conditions are in place, those living in southeastern Ukraine will have guaranteed security, political, cultural and other rights.

As for the MH17, we will study the final report released yesterday. We have had many questions from the very beginning, but we haven't heard any answers.

Today, I heard that Prime Minister of the Netherlands Mark Rutte urged Russia to show regard for the report. We always treat other opinions with respect, but we expect this to be mutual. Nobody respected or even asked for our opinion. We repeatedly suggested that Almaz-Antey, the manufacturer of the missile that allegedly shot down the aircraft, be fully involved in the experiments, give clarifications and answer questions. None of this happened. As you know, Almaz- Antey conducted its own simulation and made public the results. It was promised the results would be taken into account.

Besides mutual respect, I would remind our Dutch colleagues and everybody included in the group of five countries investigating the incident that they should also respect the UN Security Council resolution of July 2014 that requested an objective, impartial investigation in line with international regulations. And those state that the ICAO was supposed to be a full participant in the probe rather than be offered a jump seat. None of that happened. Another requirement in the resolution concerned updating the UN Security Council on the investigation's progress. This didn't happen, and I don't know why. We raised this issue and suggested sending a UN Security Council mission to the crash site. Our Western partners also refused. With respect to technical conclusions, the Federal Agency for Air Transport and Almaz Antey presented data that speaks for itself. I believe experts understand the specifics.

Question: As early as last year, when the Turkish Stream pipeline construction project was announced, it was clear that Turkey could change its point of view at any moment because of its close ties with the US, its NATO membership, and its strong intention to join the EU. Given the difficult situation in Syria and our differences on this issue, Turkey is reported to claim that it will buy gas from Iran. Where does Turkish Stream stand now and what is the Russian Government going to do to revitalise the project?

Sergey Lavrov: The situation is taking its course. Turkey will soon hold elections. So far there is no permanent government and accordingly there are no persons authorised to sign documents requiring coordination for putting the Turkish Stream project on the practical track. The political understandings remain in force. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was in Moscow on September 23 to attend the opening of the Moscow Cathedral Mosque. He met with President Putin and confirmed this fact. Later, the Turkish foreign minister, Mevlut Cavusoglu, paid a visit to Sochi and our Turkish colleagues confirmed this as well, as did Energy Ministry experts.

Let's wait for the elections and the formation of a government authorised to take binding decisions.

Question: Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria... What else should we expect in the line of US national interests?

Sergey Lavrov: You failed to mention Ukraine for some reason. You must have implied it as well.

We talk frankly with US representatives. I regularly meet and have long discussions with Secretary of State John Kerry. President Putin had a very open and detailed conversation with President Obama.

We know full well that the great powers must cooperate. Properly speaking, this is a principle underlying the UN Charter. After World War II, it was clear to everyone that if the great powers (including the victorious powers) came to terms among themselves, this was reliable, stable and implementable. The veto power enshrined in the Charter was invented precisely for this purpose. When the five permanent members work as one body, respect each other's views without trying to reject these views or provoke a partner to use the veto, and seek to find a compromise in line with the balance of interests of all states, then everything turns out as it should. But when our US colleagues decide that the UN process is too lengthy and "these uncooperative Russians" want them to take into account too many Russian proposals (which the Americans don't like), and China, too, occasionally puts forward its own ideas that don't tally in all respects, then there is a temptation to circumvent the Security Council in order to launch an operation quickly, which at some concrete juncture seems necessary to the US state.

Iraq, Libya - it was NATO that took the decision on Libya, but it's clear that NATO can't decide anything without the US... Now Syria... The situation in Yemen is very difficult as well. You mentioned Afghanistan, where, like in Yemen, the latest government agencies have been formed in a fairly specific way. Afghanistan held elections, but the vote count lasted for several months and then they decided to recount the votes. When they did, they declared as president a different person, not the one everyone thought would win, but they didn't specify the number of votes cast for each candidate. In general, the Afghans had to accept a structure that we support out of the wish for Afghanistan to be stable, but it doesn't work because it has largely been dictated from the outside.

It is the same in Yemen. An agreement, it seems, was reached a couple of years ago, but it was forced on the Yemenis, who weren't allowed to find something more in tune with the interests of each local group. This is why the question you asked can be covered ad infinitum. We are just trying to demonstrate with examples, including recent examples, how evil it is to act hotheadedly, on one's own, without calculating the consequences and, most importantly, without taking into account the interests of other states, which can and do really influence the situation. Only a collective effort is needed, and this is something we have been constantly calling on the Americans to realise.

Question: In August, during a State Council Presidium meeting, it was noted that inbound tourism can have a substantial impact on economic development. President Vladimir Putin referred to the positive experience of introducing visa-free travel for Israeli citizens. As a result, the number of people travelling from Israel to Russia has doubled. When Russia eased visa requirements for Chinese tourists, over a million Chinese tourists took group tours to our country, and naturally, they spent their money here, buying goods, food, paying for accommodation, and thereby making a significant contribution to Russia's development. This issue is also important for the Bologna Process so that young Russians can travel abroad and study there, while foreign students can come here. At the State Council meeting, President Putin issued an instruction to look into the issue of easing visa requirements as a way to foster economic growth. What is the Foreign Ministry doing to promote this initiative?

Sergey Lavrov: I think there has been a lot of progress in this respect. Russia has entered into agreements with over 80 countries to remove visa requirements or substantially ease them.

You've mentioned the Bologna Process. Let me tell you right away that it depends on the position of the European Union. You are well aware of its stance on the visa-free agreement that was drafted a long time ago. Roughly speaking, the EU has put it on the back burner. Moreover, they were opposed to this project long before the Ukraine crisis broke out, so we did not have any illusions in this respect. A small and aggressive minority within the EU called for refraining from signing the visa-free agreement between Russia and the EU while similar deals are not made with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. These requirements were openly stated, despite the fact that everything was ready for the deal with the EU in practical and technical terms. Russia has fulfilled its requirements in all four blocks for switching to visa-free travel. We did everything. This is to say that we are not the ones responsible for this outcome, as we said back in 2003.

As for other countries that have yet to enter into visa-free arrangements with Russia, we are conducting negotiations, primarily with countries with a substantial potential in terms of inbound tourism. There is even an idea to introduce visa-free travel unilaterally, without requiring the other side to do the same, and such proposals can be heard within the Government. However, reciprocity is an essential principle of international relations and diplomacy. There was a time when Ukraine introduced visa-free travel with the EU unilaterally. It is our belief that this would not be the right thing to do, if we take into account how we view the country we live in, whether we believe that we are equal to other leading powers or that we are dependent.

There are many countries that have come forward to offer visa-free travel for Russian nationals. When this happens, we always make the offer to enter into an intergovernmental agreement and to reciprocate.

Let me mention a specific issue. There has been a lot of discussion on granting 72 hours of visa-free transit through Russian airports and seaports. An experiment is currently underway in the Kaliningrad Region, with federal authorities and the regional government working together. This pilot project has been extended until 2016. All in all, I strongly believe that we can achieve progress with almost any partner on this issue if we proceed on a reciprocal basis.

Sergey Lavrov: First of all, thank you very much for your support. What the KPRF representatives said describes our general foreign policy course. This is of paramount importance for the strengthening of the country's positions, especially under such difficult circumstances.

I will not comment on the recommendations that were made or the questions that were asked. Our colleagues said they will submit an official query. I already have answers to it, but I will not take up your time.

In conclusion, I would like to make one point. As we were sitting here, a report came in, to which I feel compelled to draw your attention. As you know, in connection with the Russian Aerospace Defence Forces operation in Syria, our American colleagues continue asking us whether we are truly fighting terrorism. It seems to them that we are not exactly fighting terrorism, but defending the [Assad] regime. President Vladimir Putin has touched on the issue.

Yesterday, as you heard, our embassy in Damascus came under fire. Two mortar shells fell, one near a sport facility and the other on the roof of a residential building. Thank God, there were no casualties. In such situations, wherever that might happen, we always issue brief statements at the UN Security Council condemning such terrorist attacks. We circulated a standard text that the UN Security Council has used on multiple occasions, regarding terrorist attacks in Europe, Africa and other parts of the world. Unfortunately, our American colleagues who are interested to know whether we are really fighting terrorism refused to endorse it as it was, an act of terrorism, and proposed writing instead: "we condemn the shelling attack and reaffirm that the responsibility for the security of embassies and consulates lies with the host country, i.e., the Syrian government."

They, as well as we and everyone else, know very well that rebels, including those from organisations comprising known terrorist groups, have dug in in the suburbs of Damascus. It is regrettable that in this case, our American colleagues are in effect not on the side of those fighting terrorists and condemning terrorism. Again, we are faced with double standards.

On the whole, Mr Naryshkin, I would like once again to thank you for this opportunity. It is always useful to feel the mood in parliament regarding concrete aspects of a particular foreign policy situation. This is helpful to us. We hope to continue our cooperation.
 
 #6
www.breitbart.com
October 14, 2015
U.S. Secretary of Defense: Russian Aggression 'Here to Stay'
By Edwin Mora

WASHINGTON, D.C.-Russian "aggression" in Europe and now the Middle East is a "new reality" for the United States that is "here to stay," said U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter.

While delivering keynote remarks at an Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA) event Wednesday, Carter identified Russia as a "serious challenge" for America, along with Islamic terrorism, and the large wave of migrants currently fleeing the Middle East.

Carter indicated that he, along with a number of U.S. defense officials, are no strangers to Russian belligerence, having some experience with the Cold War.

The Pentagon chief did note that dealing with recent Russian hostilities will require a new playbook.

Carter has urged U.S. NATO allies to dispose of the Cold War playbook and think of new ways to counter new Russian threats.

Military officials should be thinking about "a different kind of campaign to deter Russian aggression in Europe," said the Pentagon chief on Wednesday, adding that it "is now obviously an unwelcome development that I wish would change, but I frankly don't expect it to change any time soon so we have a need... [for] a different playbook."

Russian aggression in Europe and the Middle East is going to be a long-term problem for America and its allies, predicted Carter.

"We'll take all the necessary steps to deter Russia's malign destabilizing influence, coercion, and aggression," he said at the AUSA event. "This is a new reality for us strategically, But it looks like it's here to stay."

Highly ready forces that can quickly move and respond to developing threats are essential components of the new playbook that must be used against Russia, according to Carter.

The new strategy needs to rely on forces prepared for traditional combat but also for the hybrid warfare employed by Russia in Ukraine, which The Associated Press (AP) has described as "a combination of military force with a degree of deniability, sleek propaganda and political and economic pressure."

Under the new playbook, forces need to be enabled in space, cyber, and other new capabilities, said Carter.

The U.S. has begun investing in national security space programs, accusing Russia of "developing space weapons that threaten our satellites."

Under the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal 2015, the defense secretary was required to "report to Congress assessing the ability of the United States to deter and defeat any adversary's act of aggression in outer space."

On Wednesday, the defense secretary accused Russia of using "political, economic, and military tools to undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighboring countries."

Russia has "destabilized the European security order by attempting to annex Crimea and continuing to fuel further violence in eastern Ukraine," said Carter.

Carter also touched on Russian President Vladimir Putin's air campaign to prop up his ally, Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad. Russia began bombing Syria late last month, claiming it was targeting the Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL), the Syrian al-Qaeda offshoot al-Nusra Front, and other terrorist groups.

"Instead of engaging in a political transition in Syria, which is needed in that long suffering, Russia has chosen to double down on their long standing relationship with Assad, committing additional military hardware and capabilities and personnel," said the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) chief.

"Now the Russians originally said they were going ISIL, al-Nusra, and other terrorist organizations," noted Carter. "However, within days of deploying their forces [to Syria], Russians began striking targets that are not any of these groups. This is a fundamental strategic mistake - one that will inflame and prolong the Syrian civil war, fueling the very radicalism that Russia says it fears and I think it has reason to fear."

Unless Russia drops its "misguided strategy" of providing support to Assad, the U.S. "will not agree to cooperate" with Russia, declared Carter.

Nevertheless, he added that the two nations are "concluding an agreement on air crew safety and professionalism in view of the fact that we're both operating on airspace above Syria."

He accused Russia of unprofessional military behavior in Syria.

"We'll continue to need the [U.S.] Army's posture and presence in Europe, reassuring allies and reminding adversaries of our unmatched capabilities, strength, reach, and readiness," said Carter.

The United States has deployed hundreds of soldiers from the Army's 173rd Airborne brigade to train Ukrainian national guard troops.

 #7
Wall Street Journal
October 16, 2015
Is Russia an 'Existential Threat'?
By STEPHEN SESTANOVICH
Stephen Sestanovich, a professor at Columbia University and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, is the author of "Maximalist: America in the World From Truman to Obama." He is on Twitter: @ssestanovich.

The Senate Armed Services Committee held a hearing on Russia last week to address this question: How should we think about Russian actions in the Middle East and Europe? Having been invited to speak, I found that one theme of my testimony stirred up an argument-among other witnesses, senators, staff, and even (in follow-on e-mails) administration officials. This back-and-forth captures U.S. policy confusion as we adjust to a new phase of relations with Russia.

Here's the gist: My opening statement argued that it was a mistake to respond to Vladimir Putin's new activism by calling Russia an "existential threat," as some officials have done. When Russians hear us saying that we feel they threaten our existence, their nationalist hysteria grows. They conclude that our countries are on a collision course toward war and that Washington must be preparing for it. We sound as crazy as they do.

Misleading Russians is just part of the problem. We mislead ourselves too. The term "existential threat" makes sense only because Russia, like the United States, has a large nuclear stockpile. That is a threat, but it's there even when bilateral relations are good. Although the problem can't be brushed aside, it's not really greater now than it was last month or last year.

I got some pushback on this point from senators and other witnesses. Russian behavior, they said, challenges U.S. interests and threatens global stability. They want to wake people up to the growing danger.

On this need, I agree completely. But overheated language can make it harder to fashion an effective response. It may paralyze, not energize, U.S. policy.

After the Cold War, U.S. policy makers and experts paid less attention to the risk of nuclear war with Russia-for a good reason. That risk had gone way, way down. But we weren't always clear about why. When the U.S. acted militarily, as in the Balkans or Iraq, Americans didn't worry that Russia might respond in kind. Now that we see Russia taking the initiative, how will the U.S. respond? Some will say inaction is the only way to avoid confrontation.

Russia's reckless moves-from Ukraine to Syria-create problems that can't be solved by brandishing the U.S. nuclear arsenal or by total passivity. To respond effectively, we have to start by recognizing the new situation we face. Washington needs policies that can work precisely because they are not limited by the "existential threat" that Russia poses.

 #8
Washington Post
October 16, 2015
Stop swooning over Putin
By Fareed Zakaria
Fareed Zakaria writes a foreign affairs column for The Post. He is also the host of CNN's Fareed Zakaria GPS and a contributing editor for The Atlantic.

Vladimir Putin has the United States' foreign policy establishment swooning. One columnist admires the "decisiveness" that has put him "in the driver's seat" in the Middle East. A veteran diplomat notes gravely, "It's the lowest ebb since World War II for U.S. influence and engagement in the region." A sober-minded pundit declares, "Not since the end of the Cold War a quarter-century ago has Russia been as assertive or Washington as acquiescent."

It's true that it has been a quarter-century since Moscow has been so interventionist outside its borders. The last time it made these kinds of moves, in the late 1970s and 1980s, it invaded Afghanistan and interfered in several other countries as well. Back then, commentators similarly hailed those actions as signs that Moscow was winning the Cold War. How did that work out for the Soviet Union?

Washington's foreign policy elites have developed a mind-set that mistakes activity for achievement. They assume that every crisis in the world can and should be solved by a vigorous assertion of U.S. power, preferably military power. Failure to do so is passivity and produces weakness. By this logic, Russia and Iran are the new masters of the Middle East. Never mind that those countries are desperately trying to shore up a sinking ally. Their clients, the Alawites of Syria, are a minority regime - representing less than 15 percent of the country's people - and face deadly insurgencies supported by vast portions of the population. Iran is bleeding resources in Syria. And if Russia and Iran win, somehow, against the odds, they get Syria - which is a cauldron, not a prize. The United States has been "in the driver's seat" in Afghanistan for 14 years. Has that strengthened America?

In the 1870s and 1880s, Europe's major powers were scrambling to gain influence in Africa, the last unclaimed land on the globe. All but one nation: Germany. Its steely-eyed chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, believed that such interventions would drain Germany's power and divert its focus away from its central strategic challenges. When shown a map of the continent to entice him, he responded, "Your map of Africa is all very fine, but my map of Africa lies in Europe. Here is Russia and here is France, and we are in the middle. That is my map of Africa."

Imagine if today's interventionists had their way and President Obama escalated force and the Assad regime fell. What would be the outcome? Here are some clues. Washington deposed Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq (Syria's next-door neighbor, with many of the same tribes and sectarian divides). It did far more in Iraq than anyone is asking for in Syria, putting 170,000 soldiers on the ground at the peak and spending nearly $2 trillion. And yet, a humanitarian catastrophe has ensued - with roughly 4 million civilians displaced and at least 150,000 killed. Washington deposed Moammar Gaddafi's regime in Libya but chose to leave nation-building to the locals. The result has been what the New Yorker calls "a battle-worn wasteland." In Yemen, the United States supported regime change and new elections. The result: a civil war that is tearing the country apart. Those who are so righteous and certain that this next intervention would save lives should at least pause and ponder the humanitarian consequences of the last three.

In Niall Ferguson's intelligent and sympathetic biography of Henry Kissinger's early life, I was struck by how today's mood resembles that of the 1950s. We now think of that decade as the United States' high-water mark, but at the time, the country's foreign policy elites were despairing that Washington was passive and paralyzed in the face of Soviet activism. "Fifteen years more of [such] a deterioration of our position in the world," Kissinger wrote in opening his 1961 book "The Necessity for Choice," "would find us reduced to Fortress America in a world in which we had become largely irrelevant." A few years earlier, in the book that launched his career, "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy," Kissinger had advocated the tactical use of nuclear arms to have some way to respond to Soviet activism. And Kissinger was one of the most sober-minded and intelligent of the lot.

The 1950s abounded with what seem in retrospect deeply dangerous proposals designed to demonstrate U.S. vigor - including deposing Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser, military confrontations in Hungary and the use of nuclear weapons over Taiwan. Pundits were outraged that North Vietnam and Cuba had gone communist while the United States just sat and watched.

In the midst of this clamor for action, one man, President Dwight Eisenhower, kept his cool, even though it sank his poll numbers. (The Kennedy/Johnson administration ended the passivity, notably in Cuba and Vietnam, with disastrous results.) I believe that decades from now, we will be glad that Barack Obama chose Eisenhower's path to global power and not Putin's.
 #9
Carnegie Moscow Center/Gazeta.ru
October 16, 2015
Frozen Russia
Russian consumers are increasingly unhappy, but their discontent is being frozen in depression rather than manifested in social protest.
By Andrei Kolesnikov
Senior Associate and Chair Russian Domestic Politics and Political Institutions Program
In Russia, a proverbial battle is being fought between the refrigerator and the television set: people's living conditions vs. state propaganda.

As we know, television is winning. Even the young woman giving the weather forecast on Russian television is talking about Syria. The Russian consumer forgets that he hasn't eaten yet; his stomach fills with pride at Russia's bombing campaign, which is a substitute for missing food imports.

Angus Deaton, the British economist who was awarded this year's Nobel Prize in Economics "for his analysis of consumption, poverty, and welfare," advanced the idea that happiness is an important factor in economics. That fits with the current state of Russia: as long as one can find happiness on the TV screen, one can get by with decreasing amounts of food.

Some new polling data from the Levada Center suggests that the public is not exactly content. Seventy-seven percent of the population agrees that the country is in crisis. A total of 38 percent "absolutely agree" with that characterization-a 10-point increase since March of this year.

A poll conducted over the summer by the Institute for Social Analysis and Forecasting (ISAF) and published in September found that 72 percent of the respondents have concluded that there is a crisis. Those most likely to characterize the situation in this way are the elderly, the highly educated, and those living in industrial regions and large cities where the service sector is now beginning to decline.

Consumer demand is falling across the board. Racketeers in the shadow economy who offer "protection" to businesses can't get enough money from their clients. There are no statistics on families that live only on Grandma's pension (including in families where the other adult is a single mother), but Russia clearly has many of them and these households are cutting back their demand as well.

The number of pessimists is steadily growing. According to the Levada Center poll, 23 percent of respondents now expect "a protracted crisis, whose consequences will be felt for a number of years."

But people still tend to blame the West for the crisis, rather than their own government. Thirty-four percent of Russians blame their problems on external factors. Most believe the government is doing an "average" job, not many describe its performance as bad.

Overall, people are in no mood to protest. Understanding that the country is in crisis, and that there is nothing he can do about it, the average Russian chooses to sit and wait, to buy popcorn (a new trend in consumer behavior, incidentally) and stare at the TV screen.

As recently as this spring, according to the ISAF survey, the same person was much more active, looking for a second job, acquiring new skills, calculating survival strategies. But now he is frozen in immobility. This freezing game is quite consistent with the perennial condition of the Russian labor market: a part-time working week, frozen or reduced salaries, and declining productivity-but low official unemployment statistics.

How will the situation develop? Over the long term, we will most likely witness the erosion of Russia's social pyramid. Those below middle class-who constitute the social and electoral base of the current regime-will decline into poverty. They will not rebel, however-the ruling class will hand out some goodies during the next election campaign in exchange for their votes.

The middle class will move a notch down: people will stop traveling abroad, work just to feed themselves, cut corners to pay for housing and utilities, and hold onto their old cars. How can they protest against the regime that once allowed them to prosper? That would show lack of respect. Besides, they'd rather think about how to make a living than run around the streets and squares waving some placards that no one understands. They'd better vote for the hand that feeds them or there might be nothing to eat at all.

The upper classes are quite comfortable and have no plans to lose what they enjoy. Unlike other parts of the economy, the raw material sector that they've been traditionally clinging to for their sustenance is breaking even and sometimes even making a profit.

One can live in a state of depression like this for years. And we are not talking just about economic depression, but about political depression, social depression, and most importantly a state of mind.

If Russia's leaders only left the country alone and stopped imposing all their initiatives and regulations, it would gradually emerge from the crisis. That was what happened in 1998-99, when the country was run by the fear-stricken government of Yevgeny Primakov, which is now, ironically, remembered as the most liberal one in the country's history. But there is little hope of that happening. So keep your eyes on the contents of the refrigerator and the television.
 
#10
RFE/RL
October 15, 2015
Containing The Putin Syndicate
by Brian Whitmore

The signs of the times are everywhere.

Estonia is erecting a 2.5-meter-high metal mesh fence reinforced with barbed wire along much of its border with Russia -- and backing it up with high-tech drones, sensors, radars, and cameras.

Neighboring Latvia has also announced plans to build fences along its eastern frontier. Poland plans to build new state-of-the art watchtowers on its border with Russia's Kaliningrad exclave.

And, of course, Ukraine has floated plans to build a wall along its Russian frontier.

A new era of containment, it appears, has begun.

Russia's neighbors, wary of polite little green men appearing to stir up new nondeclared hybrid wars, are building walls and becoming vigilant.

And some leading Western commentators are calling for a revival of the spirit of George Kennan's Long Telegram and Mr. X article, which comprised the philosophical basis for the Western policy of containing an expansionist Soviet Union.

Writing in Foreign Affairs in November 2014, Rutgers University-Newark professor Alexander Motyl called on the West to "develop a serious, steady, long-term policy response to Russian expansionism. And that, of course, means containment."

Likewise, James Goldgeier, dean of the School of International Service at American University, wrote in Slate that "a revived strategy of containment is necessary to counter Russian aggression."

Soviet-era defector Aleksandr Goldfarb made a similar argument in a recent blog post.

So, to paraphrase Kennan, can a newly aggressive Moscow "be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers" of Russian policy?

Weaponizing Globalization

NATO's moves at last year's summit in Wales -- setting up military facilities in the Baltic states, Poland, and Romania, rotating troops through countries on the alliance's eastern flank, and establishing a new rapid-response force that could assist endangered members within two days -- certainly seem like steps in that direction.

In a speech this week, U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter said Washington "will take all necessary steps to deter Russia's malign and destabilising influence, coercion, and aggression."

But 1947 this isn't. And any serious attempt to contain Vladimir Putin's Russia -- which unlike the Soviet Union is deeply integrated into the global economy -- will bear scant resemblance to its Cold War antecedent.

This is because unlike the Cold War, when the world was divided into two hermetically sealed systems, today's conflict between Moscow and the West comes comes at a time when Russia is very much embedded in the West and has proven adept at exploiting its transparency for nontransparent ends.

And unlike the Soviet Union, today's Russia isn't an ideological power seeking global hegemony through military expansion. It is essentially a crime syndicate masquerading as a state.

Putin and the made men who make up his inner circle deploy corruption as a tool of statecraft in order to perpetuate their rule, expand their reach, and enrich themselves.

In a 2012 report for Chatham House, James Greene noted how Putin used "the corrupt transnational schemes that flowed seamlessly from Russia into the rest of the former Soviet space - and oozed beyond it" -- to extend his "shadow influence beyond Russia's borders and develop a natural, 'captured' constituency."

Toward this end, Moscow has used everything from shady energy deals, to webs of shell companies, to hot money in the City of London, to the financing of extremist political parties in Europe.

And its success in doing so raises the economic cost of conflict, reduces resolve to resist Moscow, and gives Russia a ready-made lobby in Western capitals.
The Kremlin has effectively weaponized globalization.

Rather than an Iron Curtain with armies facing off across the Fulda Gap, the main fault line of the current conflict is between a Western zone of transparency and a Moscow-dominated sphere of corruption.

Containment 2.0

Any containment policy, therefore, needs first and foremost to limit Russia's sphere of corruption and extend the Western zone of transparency.

"The front lines of containment are the non-Russian states in the potential path of Russian expansion. Seen in this light, a divided Ukraine occupies the same role in today's containment strategy as a divided Germany did in yesterday's," Motyl wrote in Foreign Affairs.

"Ukraine should therefore be the recipient of similar financial, political, and military assistance."

Georgia and Moldova, likewise, fall into this category.

But any true containment of today's Russia must go beyond this. It also needs to include a rollback of Russia's ability to exploit and abuse the dynamism and transparency of Western economies.

Part of this is in place with sanctions that deny Russia access to credit from Western banks. Part of it would require shedding light on the web of shadowy shell companies and structures Russia has established in Europe to launder money and stealthily buy influence, as well as bringing more transparency to things like London's property market.

It would also involve, as Motyl notes, "constraining Russia's ability to use energy as a weapon." This includes halting the South Stream pipeline, reducing Europe's dependency on Russian natural gas, and the EU strictly enforcing its antitrust legislation vis-a-vis Gazprom.

And a key weapon in reserve, of course, includes banning Russia from the SWIFT network, which manages secure financial transactions worldwide.

The thing about a crime syndicate is that it needs a legitimate economy to feed off. And denying Putin & Co. this would go a long way toward containing them.

NOTE TO READERS: Be sure to tune in to this week's Power Vertical Podcast, where I will discuss the issues raised in this post with guests James Sherr of Chatham House and Daniel Drezner of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.
 
 #11
Voice of America
October 15, 2015
Russian Pollster: Kremlin Nurtures Rising Anti-Americanism
by Victor Vasiliev

Russians continue to characterize their country's relations with the United States negatively. The latest survey by Russia's biggest remaining independent polling organization, the Levada Center, found that a majority of the population believes U.S.-Russia relations are either "tense" (45%) or "hostile" (29%).

The poll was conducted in early October 2015 among 1,600 people in 46 of Russia's 85 regions.

Anti-American sentiment in Russia has been rising steadily, according to the Levada Center.  "The view that the United States plays a negative role in the modern world has always prevailed among the (Russian) population, but it is higher now compared to the 'pre-Ukraine' indicators: 71 percent in October 2015 compared to 50 percent in September 2013," it noted on its website.

Only a fifth of the respondents departed from this unambiguous assessment of the United States, calling U.S. actions "sometimes positive, sometimes negative."

Views of the European Union were also negative. Forty-two percent of respondents said they believe that Russia-EU relations are "strained," while 32 percent described them as "cool." However, the number of those giving a "hostile" assessment of the EU was almost two and a half times lower than those who negatively assessed the U.S. role in the world.
 
Voice of America discussed the survey with The Levada Center's director, Lev Gudkov.

Victor Vasiliev, VOA: What is mainly responsible for the negative attitude of Russians toward the policies pursued by the United States?

Lev Gudkov: Above all, the propaganda conducted over the last several years. This trend began with [President] Vladimir Putin coming to power, and increased notably after 2007 following his speech in Munich when the path toward confrontation with the West was clearly taken.

It received a new impetus after the emergence of a mass protest movement (in Russia), with the Kremlin's response to a drop in support for Putin, growing irritation and frustration with him, the president's loss of a significant portion of his legitimacy, the loss of confidence and so on. It was precisely then, in late 2012, that a number of laws against civil society, the opposition and the free press were adopted.

VOA: What is the main aim of this policy?

Gudkov: The discrediting of all the basic values of democracy - freedom of speech, freedom of information, judicial independence, rule of law - which were shared by a very large part of the population. It has been the priority task of the Kremlin's spin doctors and propaganda, and efforts to implement it acquired an incredible intensity after the Ukrainian Maidan (protest movement).

That was when, first of all, independent channels of information were suppressed, and secondly, extremely aggressive and demagogic propaganda was unleashed, which basically repeated the old main points, but (this time) in relation to Ukraine.

At the same time, they tried to focus the audience's attention on the threat allegedly coming from the United States. Strictly speaking, anti-American notions never fully disappeared; they survived from the Soviet era in a "nascent" state. So it's not a random thing and, of course propaganda would not be so effective in the country were this (anti-Western sentiment) not constantly present.

VOA: What about the West so annoys Russians?

Gudkov: The fact is our perception of the West is extremely ambivalent. On the one hand, the West is a somewhat utopian embodiment of everything that Russians themselves would like to have: freedom of movement, social protection, a high standard of living, welfare.

But, at the same time, people understand that is simply not possible under the current regime. Therefore, the deep frustration with this is transformed into the need to defend themselves and to remove the source of attraction. This is precisely what propaganda plays on.

VOA: To what extent does a policy of building anti-Americanism into a cult meet the national interests of Russia?

Gudkov: It is in the interests of the regime that is represented and personified by Putin. A corrupt, authoritarian regime is trying by all means to retain control over society, blocking any sources of information, any criticism, suppressing the opposition (and) independent civil society organizations. In short, it is neutralizing anyone trying to speak their own voice, anyone who wants to express their discontent with the policies of the Kremlin.
 
 
#12
Forbes.com
October 10, 2015
Russian Ruble Stabilizing, Might Even Get Stronger If Oil Cooperates
By Kenneth Rapoza

People walk past an exchange office sign showing the currency exchange rates in Moscow in Moscow, Russia. The Russian ruble is expected to stabilize in the near term, says the country's central bank governor. (Photo by Pavel Golovkin/AP)

Russia's ruble is done with the 70s, according to the Central Bank governor Elvira Nabiullina. While she didn't give a target range for the ruble, she said this weekend on Rossiya-24 TV that the ruble would not devalue much in the near-term.

Much of this depends on oil's direction. With oil futures pushing into the $50s of late, the ruble has gone from the high 60s to 61 rubles to the dollar on Friday's close. A stronger ruble is good for Russian local currency bond holders who get the high yield plus a pop in the currency as it strengthens against the greenback. Those who believe the ruble will strengthen may want to consider Russian fixed income.

Over the last two weeks, fund flows have returned to emerging markets. But Russia is the laggard for capital flow due to Western sanctions, a negative political perception, and more importantly, the loss of investment grade status - which keeps funds that are mandated to buy investment grade debt only - far from Russia's bond market.

Last week, Barclays said that it expects the Russian Central Bank to lower interest rates next year. This is potentially good news for equities, and for current fixed income holders. Investors holding onto higher yielding Russian debt today will see their bond prices rise as yields compress. BarCap said it expects inflation to fall by more than 50% next year from 15% now to 7% in 2016.

Then on Saturday, Nabiullina told reporters during a trip to Lima that inflation will fall another 50% by 2017.

"We are retaining our goal at 4% for 2017. For the following year our [inflation] forecast is 5.5-6%. We think that this goal is achievable without excessive downward pressure on the economy," Nabiullina told reporters. Her goal is still not on par with the official numbers released on Wednesday by the Russian Ministry of Economic Development. They reduced the baseline forecasts for inflation for 2016 and 2017 to 6.4% and 6% respectively. The Russian economy has been in recession all year, expected to contract by 3.5% in 2015. Global oil prices and sanctions have not helped. The ruble has lost over half its value over the last 10 months and consumer sentiment is near an all time low.

 
 #13
Moscow Times
October 16, 2015
Standard & Poor's Lowers Russian Growth Forecast
By Peter Hobson

Standard & Poor's has cut its growth forecast for Russia, predicting that lower and more volatile oil prices will make it harder for the country to emerge from recession.

The ratings agency said Thursday that the Russian economy would contract by 3.6 percent this year and grow by only 0.3 percent in 2016. It had earlier predicted a 2.6 percent contraction for this year and 1.9 percent growth in 2016.

"The change reflects our expectations of a more prolonged weakness in domestic demand due to lower and more volatile oil prices, and tighter fiscal and monetary policies through end-2016, compared with our previous assumptions," a press release quoted Standard & Poor's senior economist Tatyana Lysenko as saying.

Consumer spending has fallen sharply since Russia's economic slump began in 2014, but S&P had expected it to begin to recover this year thanks to a stabilization of the oil price and ruble exchange rate, slowing inflation, and falling interest rates.

However, the price of oil, Russia's most important export, fell by about one-quarter during July-September, causing the ruble to weaken and reviving inflation fears.

The lower oil price has also reduced budget revenues, forcing the government to propose limiting spending on pensions and public-sector wages, measures that are also likely to further depress consumer demand in the short term, S&P said.

The agency is still more optimistic than Russia's Central Bank, which said last month the economy would contract by 3.9-4.4 percent this year and likely shrink again in 2016.

Oil prices are at their lowest in six years due to a supply glut, which the International Energy Agency this week said would continue through next year. Brent oil, the international benchmark, cost about $50 per barrel on Thursday, down from a peak of $115 in summer 2014. Russia is one of the world's top three oil producers.
 
#14
Business New Europe
www.bne.eu
October 15, 2015
Fitness training for dinosaurs
As austerity begins to bite, Russia's state-owned firms are facing growing pressure to shape up.
Chris Miller in Moscow

Though Vladimir Yakunin was sacked from his post as head of state-owned Russian Railways back in August, the shock is still reverberating through Russia's biggest and most powerful companies. A long-time friend of President Vladimir Putin, Yakunin was thought to be one of the most influential people in Russia. But Yakunin is now out of favour and out of power.

Rumours are swirling as to the cause of Yakunin's downfall, which Russian media reports linked in part to his son's decision to take British citizenship. That may have been one step too far at a time when Russia is focused on confronting the West. Yakunin himself felt compelled to deny publicly any relationship between his firing and his son's citizenship.

Yet part of Yakunin's problems appear to stem from his management style, or lack thereof. Yakunin's method of running the railways incurred many enemies, and allegations of corruption swirled around him. Those familiar with Russia's state-owned firms will not be surprised to hear claims of rigged procurement contracts and money laundering. Whether fairly or not, such allegations seemed to stick to Yakunin more than to others.

State-owned firms are on the defensive as the political winds shift against them. Yakunin's downfall sent a message to all of Russia's state-owned firms, especially as Yakunin was not the only casualty. Evgeny Dod, former CEO of RosHydro, an electricity company, was also pushed out in September, again following allegations of poor performance.

This provided a political opening for Russian leaders who want more efficiency and less state capitalism. In a series of high profile speeches in recent weeks, key economic officials have argued for a new wave of policy changes to cut waste at state-owned firms, reducing their drain on the budget. For example, former finance minister Alexey Kudrin, who has long been a trusted advisor to the president on economic questions, recently argued that Russia faces a "problem of large state companies, whose interests are dominant" in the economy. That should change, Kudrin believes.

Kudrin's calls for reform of state-owned firms has been echoed by other top leaders, including Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, Minister of Economic Development Alexey Ulyukaev, and Finance Minister Anton Siluanov, who declared: "We have a state economy, in essence, and we are now supporting this state economy through the budget, which is absolutely wrong."

The economic bloc in the government has been advocating cuts to the state sector for a decade with few tangible results. But Siluanov's statement illustrates why that may now be changing. When oil prices were high, and the budget was flush with cash, it was easy for the government to ignore when state-owned companies - often run by the president's friends - wasted money. Now, however, the government is struggling to keep its 2016 budget deficit below 3% of GDP, a target that will require painful choices. Efficiency at state-owned companies is no longer a choice - it is a matter of financial stability.

Russia's leaders have previously made grand claims about efficiency, but state-owned firms often avoided real change. Will this time be different? In several important ways, it already is.

Balancing the books

Take investment policy. After Western sanctions cut off many large, state-owned firms from international capital markets, they turned to the country's National Wealth Fund to finance their investment. The total requests to the fund were far higher than the fund's resources. Yet most of these requests were denied. Even state-owned firms run by influential figures, such as Rosneft's Igor Sechin, failed to attract significant new financing from the sovereign wealth fund. The government's message to these firms is that in a time of austerity, they need to help balance the books.

Now the government is pushing state-owned firms to use e-procurement methods, which reduce the scope for corruption or rigged contracts. Ministers are redoubling efforts to make state-owned firms sell minority stakes on the stock market or to shed non-core assets. The government is also hiking taxes on the oil and gas sector in a manner that will place the heaviest burden on Gazprom, the natural gas export monopoly. In the past, Gazprom got tax favours from the government; now it is being asked to carry more weight.

Indeed, even Russian Railways - Yakunin's former fiefdom - faces demands for greater efficiency. The Ministry of Economic Development proposed splitting Russian Railways into two separate companies. President Putin himself has backed moves toward change, declaring that the question of "de-monopolizing rail transport is overdue".

Whether and how that comes to pass, of course, will depend on much political manoeuvring. And the state-owned companies are masters of Moscow's political games. But no amount of political clout can sidestep the fact that the budget deficit needs to be reduced and spending needs to be cut. So long as state-owned firms keep drawing big government subsidies, waste money and underpay on their taxes, they will find themselves in the spotlight. As austerity begins to bite, Russia's state-owned firms are facing increasing pressure to shape up.

 
 
 
#15
Holy books in Russia to be immune from extremism charges
By Lyudmila Alexandrova

MOSCOW, October 15. /TASS/. Russia's traditional religions will soon be legally immune from prosecution on extremism-related charges. Russian President Vladimir Putin has submitted a bill to the State Duma outlawing "extremism" label in reference to the content of holy books and quotes from them. The bill mentions the Bible, the Quran, the Jewish holy scripture, the Tanakh, and the Tibetan Buddhist canon, the Ganjur. Experts say this is a step in the right direction, adding that it would help prevent utterly unnecessary conflicts in society.

Just recently, a court in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk declared as extremist some quotes from the Quran and for that reason imposed a ban on the book entitled Dua (Calling Out) to God: its Role and Place in Islam. The Council of Russia's muftis disputed that decision and Chechnya's leader Ramzan Kadyrov angrily slammed the judge and the prosecutor as "shaitans (devils) and national traitors."

The chairman of the council of Russia's muftis, Ravil Gainutdin, said the court's attempt to outlaw some surahs (chapters) in the Quran exposed the lack of a competent expert community of Muslim theologians in Russia and ignorance regarding the fundamental text of the Islamic religion.

In a comment on the presidential bill Kadyrov said on his page in the social network VKontakte that Putin had taken "an exclusively important and historic step" towards the consolidation of Russian society.

Federation Council (upper house of parliament) member Frants Klintsevich said it was an example of instant response to the realities of life. "As a matter of fact, law provides protection for common sense, centuries-old wisdom of peoples contained in the texts of the Bible, the Quran, the Tanakh and the Ganjur. That's foolproof protection of the holy texts," Klintsevich said.

The legislator believes that the bill will finally contribute to bolstering the security of the state and prevent conflicts that all of a sudden may erupt out of nowhere.

The complaints were addressed not to only Muslim holy books, the first deputy president of the Centre for Political Technologies, Alexey Makarkin, has told TASS.

"As far as the Bible is concerned, there has been an attempt by a private person to ask a court to look for traces of extremism." He believes that the prerequisites for going to a court of law can be found there, of course. "The Bible is a book written in a very different era, in a very different culture, where there are many things a modern person will hardly find acceptable. The history of events described in the Old Testament looks harsh, indeed. The ethical rules of those years were very different from the current ones. The Old Testament is a book that to a great extent tells the stories of wars. Finding extremism-looking features in it will be very easy."

Makarkin recalls there were attempts at initiating probes at whether the Jewish book the Tanakh agreed with Russia's anti-extremist legislation.

The expert described the bill as "absolutely correct," because "everything can be reduced to absurdity." He quoted some instances in which law enforcement agencies confiscated whole libraries of extremist organizations. "Then the library goes to a court of law. The experts who are invited to pronounce their judgements are often people without a proper theological education, for instance, teachers from a local university. One should remember that one can come across negative comments about people of other faiths in many holy books. So these experts may conclude: "This book is capable of inciting religious discord." Then the judge declares all books extremist. But there can be both extremist books and books containing some quotes from the Quran. All that is indiscriminately declared extremist."

Makarkin believes that alongside such bans certain rules should be introduced regarding works of art.

This should be done "to prevent situations in which some people may feel like going to court to file lawsuits against museums to demand certain exhibits should be removed display. There must certainly be foolproof protection," he added.


 
 #16
Spiked
www.spiked-online.com
October 16, 2015
THE WESTERN MEDIA HAVE LOST THE PLOT IN SYRIA
Commentators slam Russia's interventions while ignoring the West's.
By Tara McCormack
Tara McCormack is a lecturer in international politics at the University of Leicester. She is author of Critique, Security and Power: The Political Limits to Critical and Emancipatory Approaches to Security, published by Routledge.

It is extraordinary to look back at Western Cold War propaganda; the scaremongering posters and films in which America is under attack from a vast alien force abroad and undercover agents at home. Very few intelligent people today would accept this propaganda as an accurate representation of reality. It is
easy to see in hindsight that much Cold War propaganda was designed to create a climate of fear domestically and drum up support for overseas militarism.

Nevertheless, one of the most profoundly depressing things about the British press today is how uncritically it parrots the official line when it comes to foreign policy. Since the Ukrainian crisis, the British media seem to have killed off their critical faculties and burned the remains for good measure. Even intelligent analysts and commentators have forgotten the lessons of the Cold War and have so easily slipped back into a pale imitation of a Cold War narrative.

When it comes to the coverage of Russian bombing in Syria, however, the British media have surpassed themselves. The reporting on Russian airstrikes in Syria has ranged from the idiotic to the dishonest to the frankly astonishing. A headline in The Times a few weeks ago read 'Putin defies the West!'. Clearly, Putin didn't get the memo that Russian foreign policy is now controlled in Brussels and Washington.

Putin has been presented as a cross between Professor Moriarty, Fu Manchu and Joseph Goebbels - a master strategist and evil genius using smoke and mirrors to befuddle the West as he carries out his inscrutable campaign. 'What is he up to in Syria?' is the constant refrain. Recently, I debated journalist and former US diplomat James Rubin at the Cheltenham Literature Festival, and he kept remarking on how inscrutable Putin was. No wonder a kind of grudging admiration for Putin occasionally creeps into the commentary.

The problem is that this is utter nonsense. First of all, consider the claim that we have no idea what Russia is up to. This has been a running theme since the Ukraine crisis, but this is an outright lie. Russia's motives in Ukraine and in Syria are well known. They are well known not because we've got a team of Kremlinologists scrutinising Russia's obscure statements and mysterious behaviour, but because, as a representative of his government, President Putin has consistently told the West his intentions.

Now, we may not agree with Russia's motives, but that is an entirely different point. The fact of the matter is that Putin is not hiding his intentions. And yet the media have never reported on it. Noam Chomsky once argued that, in a democracy, things are often hidden in plain sight - this is a very good example.

Similarly, it is simply not true that we do not know what Russia's aims are in Syria. Russia is a long-term supporter of Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad, but is by no means averse to a post-Assad Syria; its main aim is to stop Syria from collapsing.  This has all been openly stated by Putin - at the UN, for example, that little known secret forum, in an interview with CBS. We may not agree with it, but to present Russian intervention as some kind of fiendish, unfathomable plot is simply laughable.

What's more, consider the heated debate about the impact of Russia's intervention on Syria. Who knew the British media were so concerned about the malign effects of bombing a foreign country?  You certainly wouldn't have guessed it from the coverage of the US and its allies' own year-long bombardment of Syria. Nor do you get this impression from the media discussion of the British government's desire to join in on the Western bombing.

The British media have completely ignored the disastrous effects of Western intervention in Syria. The West has been attempting to bomb Islamic State positions while, at the same time, supporting jihadi groups such as the al-Nusra Front. Our new 'allies' in Syria have links to al-Qaeda. Have we totally taken leave of our senses? More to the point, why isn't this frontpage news? And let's not forget the US's $500million plan to train up fighters - of whom about four or five remain. The Free Syrian Army is more or less a fiction, with little existence outside of the imagination of the State Department and the Foreign Office. At the same time, the West is allowing one of the most disgusting and shameful acts of this crisis to go on unchallenged - that is, Turkey's bombing of the truly heroic Kurdish forces, the only coherent, pro-West political and military force in Syria and Iraq that is attacking IS.

Where is all the coverage of the utterly useless, dishonest and misguided Western campaign in Syria? If this had a tenth of the coverage given to Russian bombing I think the public and political discussion in Britain would be very different. The British media present Russian political elites as out of control and crazy, but anyone looking at Western foreign policy over the past 20 years would see that the West has been the single most destabilising force in world affairs since the Cold War. We hear an awful lot about the biases of Russian state media, but the Western media have little self-awareness of their own failings.
 
 #17
All Russian drones in Syria either at airbase or on mission - Russian General Staff

MOSCOW. Oct 16 (Interfax) - The head of the Main Operations Directorate of the Russian Armed Forces General Staff, Col. Gen. Andrei Kartapolov, has dismissed media reports that Turkish military had shot down a Russian drone in their territory, and suggested that the military attaches accredited in Moscow think for themselves whose drone it might have been.

"I hereby declare absolutely responsibly that all our drones are either in mission areas or at the airbase," he said at a briefing for foreign military attaches and journalists on Friday.

He said he had specifically verified this information before the briefing.

"Whose this downed drone is, you either guess or find out yourselves," the general said.

The Turkish Air Force on Friday shot down an unidentified drone in the country's airspace close to the border with Syria, the Turkish general staff said.

"Today an aerial vehicle of unknown nationality was discovered in our airspace close to the Syrian border, and when it continued moving, despite our three warnings, our aircraft which were on patrol near the border, shot and downed the vehicle within the current rules," the Turkish general staff said on its website.

Local media reported that the drone had flown three kilometers deep into the country's airspace before being shot down by fighter jets.

For its part, the BBC said that drones are also used in this area by troops of the U.S.-led coalition, Syria and Russia.
 
 #18
Sputnik
October 16, 2015
Russian Warplanes Have Destroyed 456 ISIL Targets in Syria Since Sept. 30

Russian warplanes in Syria have destroyed a total of 456 ISIL targets since the operation began on September 30, the Russian General Staff said Friday.

Over the past week, they have carried out 394 sorties, destroying 46 command and communication posts, 6 explosives manufacturing facilities, 22 warehouses and fuel depots, along with 272 militant positions, strongpoints and field camps, Colonel-General Andrei Kartapolov, head of the Main Operations Directorate of the Russian General Staff, told journalists during a briefing.

"Most armed formations are demoralized. There is growing discontent with field commanders, and there is evidence of disobedience. Desertion is becoming widespread," Kartapolov told reporters.

Around 100 extremists cross the Syria-Turkey border each day, Kartapolov said citing intelligence data, adding that evidence suggests the militants are leaving combat zones through refugee routes.

"I would like to point out once again, our aircraft carry out strikes against the militants infrastructure based on data provided through several intelligence channels as well as intel supplied by the information center in Baghdad," Kartapolov said, referring to accusations that Russian warplanes had hit targets other than ISIL.

"We only attack targets held by internationally-recognized terrorist groups. Our warplanes do not operate in the southern regions of Syria where, according to our intel, units of the Free Syrian Army operate," Kartapolov said.

Kartapolov said some of the airstrikes carried out by the US-coalition target civil facilities.

"It is against our principles to advise our colleagues which targets to strike. However, on October 11 a power plant and an electrical substation were destroyed by coalition warplanes in the vicinity of Tell-Alam," he told foreign military attaches and journalists attending the briefing.

"It looks like someone is deliberately destroying the civilian infrastructure in population centers making them unfit for habitation. Because of that civilians are fleeing these towns and contribute to the flow of refugees to Europe," Kartapolov noted.

At the same time, he stressed that Russia had repeatedly asked coalition members to share intelligence on ISIL positions, but none of these requests were met.

"When we didn't receive the ISIL forces coordinates, we requested our partners to provide us data about regions held by moderate opposition. Unfortunately, our partners didn't provide a coherent answer to any of our questions," Kartapolov said.

"So we went ahead and created a comprehensive map of areas controlled by ISIL, based on our intel and on data provided by the information center in Baghdad," he went on to say.

He added that Russia and US are about to sign an agreement to provide for the safety of their aircraft over Syria. "All the technicalities have been agreed on. Russian and US lawyers are checking the text which we hope will be signed soon," Kartapolov said.

Moreover, Russia has already established a direct link with Turkey "to ensure safety of flights near the Turkish border and prevent midair incidents", and a hotline between the air force control center at the Hmeymin base and the Israeli Air Force, he added.

Russia started precision airstrikes against ISIL targets in Syria on September 30, following a request from Syria's internationally recognized government. The Russian airstrikes hit targets that are chosen based on intelligence collected by Russia, Syria, Iraq and Iran.


 
 #19
Moscow Times
October 16, 2015
Russia Says Fewer Air Strikes in Syria
By Howard Amos

Disarray among the Islamic State terrorist organization has prompted a decrease in the number of sorties being flown by Russian jets in Syria, the Defense Ministry said Thursday.

Russian planes flew 33 missions during the last 24 hours, according to the Defense Ministry, a sharp drop from the high of 88 sorties recorded just two days earlier.

"The intensity of flights by our military aircraft has fallen slightly during the last 24 hours. This is because the result of an active offensive by Syrian forces has been the transformation of the line of contact with the Islamic State terrorist group," the Defense Ministry said in a statement.

The scaling down of the aerial bombardment came amid reports that the Syrian army was launching fresh attacks against rebel groups that have wrested much of Syria from President Bashar Assad's control since the start of the country's bloody civil war four years ago.

Experts said that in recent days, Russian planes in Syria have come close to the intensity of missions flown by Western jets during the bombing of Serbia in 1999.

"If there is an offensive, there are new targets and successes need to be developed," said Yevgeny Buzhinsky, a former Russian lieutenant general now at the PIR Center, a Moscow-based think tank.

On the first day of Russian air strikes in Syria, jets flew 24 sorties: a daily total that did not change much for the first week of attacks. But the apparent success of the bombings appeared to push Russia to increase the intensity, and on Oct. 7, cruise missiles were launched from Russian warships in the Caspian Sea and the tempo of sorties was stepped up.

"The intensity of strikes will grow," Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu told President Vladimir Putin that day.

In the second week of bombing, the daily sortie tally was usually three times higher than the first week - Thursday's number of 33 was the only time the figure dipped below 40.

Putin said when he announced the beginning of air strikes that they would be ceased once the Syrian army went on the offensive.

Any explanation for the ebb and flow of the Russian air strikes is likely to be found by studying the situation on the ground, according to a defense expert and former U.S. soldier who requested anonymity to speak freely.

"Maybe this is a short-term offensive," he said.

Assad's troops launched an offensive Thursday that looks set to push toward strategic rebel-held towns north of the city of Homs, the Reuters news agency reported. There have also been reports that Damascus has recruited Iranian fighters to help in an attack on the port city of Aleppo.

Western officials have said that Russia is targeting moderate insurgent groups in an attempt to bolster Assad's position. Russia insists it is only hitting Islamic State infrastructure and equipment.

"The [rebel] fighters are retreating and trying to equip new positions and change existing logistics systems for the delivery of ammunition, weapons and materials," Russia's Defense Ministry said Thursday in a statement about the situation.

State-owned Russian media has been keen to portray the success of Russian air strikes. Within days of the beginning of the operation, state television channels claimed that there was "panic" among Islamic State militants, while details of a Syrian army ground offensive have been given significant airtime.

Russia's air power in Syria is only big enough to allow Assad's forces to make modest tactical gains, according to experts, who also said that without more information on the number of pilots or knowing how many of the sorties were air strikes and how many were reconnaissance missions, it is difficult to predict Russia's precise capabilities.

The Russian planes are ruggedly built, which means they can stand more daily wear and tear than their Western equivalents, but they are slightly less capable in the air, U.S. news website The National Interest reported Wednesday, citing former U.S. military pilots.

Russia has about 50 aircraft in Syria, including Su-24M and Su-34 bombers, low-flying ground attack Su-25CM jets and multi-role Su-30CM fighters, as well as Mi-24 attack helicopters and multi-role Mi-8 helicopters. They are launching attacks from an airbase outside the coastal city of Latakia.

Experts also warned that ground forces could quickly become accustomed to working with support from the air. "Any time ground forces get used to seeing air support they are going to want to see more of it and are not going to want to see it go away," said the defense expert and former U.S. soldier.

 
 
#20
AP
October 16, 2015
NATO: Russia more interested in shocking, intimidating

BUCHAREST, Romania - A senior NATO official says Russia would prefer to shock and intimidate rather than have a predictable relationship with the military alliance.

NATO Deputy Secretary-General Alexander Vershbow said Friday that the alliance would assess its relationship with Russia to find ways to "restore predictability and transparency," at NATO's summit in Warsaw next year.

Vershbow, a U.S. diplomat, said Russia appeared to be "more interested in shocking, surprising and intimidating than in calming and building confidence."

Touching on Romania's neighbor Moldova, which has a large Russian minority, Vershbow said NATO was helping the former Soviet republic with defense reforms and a strategic assessment of national security threats. It is also helping Moldova with cyber security and professional military education and training.

Moldova is a member of NATO's Partnership for Peace program.
 
 #21
Valdai Discussion Club
http://valdaiclub.com
October 16, 2015
WAR IN SYRIA: TWO COALITIONS, TWO APPROACHES
By Grigory Kosach
Grigory Kosach is a Professor in the Modern East Department of the Faculty of History, Political Science and Law at the Russian State University for Humanities.

The general outline of the Russian-American competition will be similar to Soviet-US conflicting relations during the Cold War that were engendered not only and not so much by the Arab-Israeli strife, as by the tough confrontation between Arab "conservative" and "progressive" regimes.

The domestic situation in Syria has changed the structure of relations between the external players involved in it. It led to the emergence of two coalitions with two contrary approaches: rejection or support of the official regime. Proceeding from the need to combat their common enemy - the "Islamic State" - both coalitions are striving to reach one and the same goal: to preserve the immutability of the state and territorial arrangements that the Middle East inherited from the post WWI-era. The spheres of their actions overlap only partially. The US Air Force (in cooperation with the aviation of its Arab allies) is bombing mostly Iraqi territory while Russia is dealing strikes on Syrian territory. Despite the appeals by some Iraqi Shia politicians (which are adamantly rejected by the Kurds and by Sunni politicians in Iraq) to extend Russian strikes to Iraqi territory, the borders of the spheres of actions remain unchanged for the time being.

In the absence of a UN Security Council mandate, appeals merely to the agreements and requests of the Iraqi and Syrian governments (the former enjoys full international recognition, while the latter, even though recognized by the UN and two permanent members of its Security Council, has no relevance for the Arab regional community) raise doubts about the legitimacy of the actions by both coalitions. Moreover, both coalitions have been brought into life not only and not so much by the current US-Russian rivalry as by the Arab Spring, which has destabilized the Middle East and enhanced the opportunities of regional forces and local non-government actors.

Russia's appearance as an active non-regional force is defined by its efforts to coordinate military-political steps with Iran. Russia's assistance to the Assad regime, which is "fighting against the Islamic State," merely attests to its desire to promote cooperation with Tehran. The formation of the contrary coalition, which required "the overcoming of US self-isolation," is interpreted by Riyadh as a success of Saudi diplomacy, which is currently trying to alleviate the consequences of the agreement on Iran's nuclear program reached with Washington's participation. Non-regional forces (which are naturally also striving to protect their own interests) merely entered the field of Saudi-Iranian regional confrontation when their struggle against ISIS transformed into the background against which this confrontation was deepening.

Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies, rather than the United States, are fighting against the Assad regime under the pretext of opposing Lebanese Hezbollah ("an instrument of Iran's expansion") and the units of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards that are operating in Syria. The Saudis are providing financial and logistical support to the "moderate" opponents of the regime. They have become tougher critics of Russia's air strikes on Syrian territory than Washington. Meanwhile it is not the United States but Iran that is fighting against ISIS, following in the steps of its Saudi "strategic enemy" as regards the Iraqi army and welcoming the formation of the Russian-Iraqi-Iranian Coordination Center in Baghdad.

The Saudi-Iranian conflict does not seem exhausted today. Perhaps this primarily and fully applies to the positions of Riyadh and Tehran on the Assad regime and the Haider Al-Abadi Government. Each of these regional powers will continue to increasingly involve its allies (either Russia or the United States) into confrontation around Syria and try to extend it to Iraq. Both Riyadh and Tehran will be allergic to the actions of the major non-regional players aimed at coordinating their efforts in the struggle against ISIS, making the proclaimed goal of its destruction largely hypothetical.

The only result of such developments will be the growing transformation of the Middle East into an arena of Russian-American competition. The general outline of this competition will be similar to Soviet-US conflicting relations during the Cold War that were engendered not only and not so much by the Arab-Israeli strife, as by the tough confrontation between Arab "conservative" and "progressive" regimes.
 
 #22
Salon.com
October 14, 2015
Putin might be right on Syria: The actual strategy behind his Middle East push - and why the New York Times keeps obscuring it
There's actually common sense and historical vision behind the Putin plan. Not that our media covers it honestly
By Patrick L. Smith
Patrick Smith is Salon's foreign affairs columnist. A longtime correspondent abroad, chiefly for the International Herald Tribune and The New Yorker, he is also an essayist, critic and editor. His most recent books are "Time No Longer: Americans After the American Century" (Yale, 2013) and Somebody Else's Century: East and West in a Post-Western World (Pantheon, 2010). Follow him @thefloutist. His web site is patricklawrence.us.

One sentence in a news report the other day on Russia's assertive new campaign to subdue Islamic extremists in Syria simply will not leave my mind. It was written by Michael Gordon, the State Department correspondent at the government-supervised New York Times. American officials, Gordon reported, are "confident" that Moscow will fail as it tries to return some semblance of order to what is now the world's most tragic nation. This failure would be a good thing, we are to understand.

Will you think this through with me, please? We want a big-picture look, from the altitude of, say, a Russian jet now flying sorties against one or another terrorist formation operating against the Assad government in Damascus. And we strip out all the names so our minds are free of the limitless propaganda Washington buries us in by way of clerks and gofers such as Gordon.

What are we looking at? What is the thought buried in that sentence?

Very simply, we have one secular nation helping to defend what remains of another, by invitation, against a radical Islamist insurgency that, were it to succeed, would condemn those Syrians who cannot escape to a tyranny of disorder rooted in sectarian religious animosities. And we have the great power heretofore dominant in the region hoping that the insurgency prevails. Its policy across the region, indeed, appears to rest on leveraging these very animosities.

Now we can add the names back in.

In the past week Russia has further advanced its support of Bashar al-Assad with intensified bombing runs and cruise missiles launched from warships in the Caspian Sea. Not yet but possibly, Russian troops will deploy to back the Syrian army and its assorted allies on the ground. This has enabled government troops to begin an apparently spirited new offensive against the messy stew of Islamist militias arrayed against Damascus.

It was a big week for Washington, too. First it pulled the plug on its $500 million program to train a "moderate opposition" in Syria-admittedly a tough one given that Islamists with guns in their hands tend to be immoderate. Instantly it then begins to send weapons to the militias it failed to train, the CIA having "lightly vetted" them-as it did for a time in 2013, until that proved a self-defeating mistake.

The fiction that moderates lurk somewhere continues. Out of the blue, they are now called "the Syrian Arab Coalition," a moniker that reeks of the corridors in Langley, Virginia, if you ask me.

In Turkey, meantime, the Pentagon's new alliance with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan government starts to play out just as the Turkish prime minister intended. All the persuasive signs are that the government was responsible for bombs that killed more than 120 people in Ankara last weekend as they protested Erdoğan's renewed violence against Turkey's Kurdish minority. The Middle East's crisis has just spread into another country.

Since Russia reinvigorated its decades-old support for Damascus last month, the vogue among the Washington story-spinners has been to question Putin's motives. What does Putin-not "Russia" or even "Moscow," but Putin-want? This was never an interesting question, since the answer seemed clear, but now we have one that truly does warrant consideration.

What does the U.S. want? Why, after four years of effort on the part of the world's most powerful military and most extensive intelligence apparatus, is Syria a catastrophe beyond anything one could imagine when anti-Assad protests began in the spring of 2011?

After four years of war-never truly civil and now on the way to proxy-Assad's Syria is a mangled mess, almost certainly beyond retrieval in its current form. Everyone appears to agree on this point, including Putin and Sergei Lavrov, the Russian leader's foreign minister. There is no putting this humpty-dumpty back on any wall: The Russians readily acknowledge this, acres of groundless journalism to the contrary notwithstanding.

In the meantime, certain realities are essential to recognize. The Assad government is a sovereign entity. Damascus has the beleaguered bones of a national administration, all the things one does not readily think of as wars unfold: a transport ministry, an education ministry, embassies around the world, a seat at the U.N. In these things are the makings of postwar Syria-which, by definition, means Syria after the threat of Islamic terror is eliminated.

Anyone who doubts this is Russia's reasoning should consider the Putin-Lavrov proposal for a negotiated transition into a post-Assad national structure. They argue for a federation of autonomous regions representing Sunni, Kurdish and Alawite-Christian populations. Putin made this plain when he met President Obama at the U.N. last month, my sources in Moscow tell me. Lavrov has made it plain during his numerous exchanges with Secretary of State Kerry.

Why would Russia's president and senior diplomat put this on the table if they were not serious? Their proposed design for post-Assad Syria, incidentally, is a close variant of what Russia and the Europeans favor in Ukraine. In both cases it has the virtue of addressing facts on the ground. These are nations whose internal distinctions and diversity must be accommodated-not denied, not erased, but also not exacerbated-if they are to become truly modern. Russians understand the complexities of becoming truly modern: This has been the Russian project since the 18th century.

In the past week Washington has effectively elected not to support Russia's new effort to address the Syria crisis decisively. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter's latest phrase of the moment is "fatally flawed." If he said it once he said it a dozen times: The Russian strategy is fatally flawed. We heard you the third time, Ash.

As to Obama, he rejects any notion that Washington has effectively ceded leadership on the Syria question-with potentially wider implications-to Moscow. In his much-noted interview with 60 Minutes last weekend, he found Putin foolhardy for risking the lives of Russian soldiers and "spending money he doesn't have."

Say what?

Whose strategy in Syria is fatally flawed, Mr. Carter? I assume there is no need to do more than pose the question. (Memo to SecDef: Get a new scriptwriter, someone who allots you more than one assigned phrase a week.)

As to Obama's remarks, one wishes he were joking. We are $5 trillion into the mess that began with the invasion of Iraq a dozen years ago, and we are counting the fatalities one side or the other of a million. There are roughly 4 million Syrian refugees by the latest count. And Putin's at fault for risking lives and blowing money? Who puts a smart guy like you up to this, Mr. President?

A lot of interesting people, hailing from unexpected quarters, now come out against the Obama administration's fateful choice in Syria. One is Lawrence Wilkerson, a retired colonel who served as Colin Powell's chief of staff when the latter was secretary of state. Earlier this month Wilkerson delivered a speech entitled "The Travails of Empire," in which he listed all the signs that the U.S. is an imperial power in rapid decline: an insistence on the primacy of military power, overreliance on mercenaries, disproportionate spending on perceived threats, ethical and moral bankruptcy.
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It is a moment, surely, when someone such as Wilkerson, who now lectures on government at William and Mary, starts to sound like the late and great Chalmers Johnson. Watch the video of Wilkerson's presentation here.

Tuesday's Times carried a remarkable piece called "A Road to Damascus, via Moscow" on the opinion page-remarkable, not least, for appearing in the Times. "Moscow's intervention in Syria may offer the first glimmer of hope for ending the quagmire," argue Gordon Adams and Stephen Walt, two noted professors of international affairs. "American officials must end their table-thumping about Russian intrusion, recognize that we are passed the Cold War, and get down to the business of statecraft."

Clear-eyed, rational, devoid of ideology. Read the piece here. I would remind the two professors of Boutros-Ghali's mot in the memoir he wrote after Washington bullied him out of the secretary-general's office at the U.N.: Diplomacy is for weak nations, he wrote. The strong have no need of it.

Here is another way to put our question: Why will the views of insiders such as Wilkerson and smart heads such as Adams and Walt go unheeded? As they will, that is. I see two answers.

One, the world has just been advised that any kind of post-Manichean, straight-ahead rapprochement with Russia, as Kerry and a few others at State plainly advocate, is out of the question. We are beyond Bush II's biblical references to Gog and Magog and the end-times battle with evil, but only by way of vocabulary.

I will resort to the New Testament myself on this point: He is not defiled who is offended by others. It is our offenses of others that defile us. That is Matthew 15:11. Translation: We can demonize Putin, Russia, Iran, Assad or anyone else we like. We lose in the end, because we destroy our capacity to see and think clearly. What we are doing in Syria today is Exhibit A.

Russia and its leader as Beelzebub is an old story. Obama, after his fashion, has simply bought into it. This is now irreducibly so, and the implications refract all over the place: Ukraine and the prospects for a negotiated settlement, Washington's long-running effort to disrupt Europe's extensive and complex interdependence with Russia. The unfolding events in the Middle East weigh heavily against any constructive turn in American policy on such questions.

The second explanation as to why Washington holds to a patently destructive course in the Middle East is more sinister than our practice of modeling foreign policy on the plot of a John Wayne movie. The argument here is that turning the Middle East into a violent anarchy of ethnic and religious rivalries renders the nations wherein these occur weak and incapable of serious political action-in effect, no longer nations. The chaos before us is exactly Washington's intended outcome.

I do not know where I stand on this theory. It is not new but is now emerging into the light, and there is considerable documentation in support of it. Thomas Harrington, a cultural studies professor (Trinity College) and a frequent political commentator, cites policy papers going back to the 1980s. These include this document from 1996, which argues (among much else) the strategic use of deposing Saddam Hussein and destabilizing Syria; Richard Perle and Douglas Feith, intellectual poseurs during the Bush II administration, are among the co-authors.

"The U.S. strategic goal in Syria is not, as your faithful mainstream media servants ... might have you believe, to save the Syrian people from the ravages of the longstanding Assad dictatorship," Harrington wrote in a comment CounterPunch published Monday, "but rather to heighten the level of internecine conflict in that country to the point where it will not be able to serve as a bulwark against Israeli regional hegemony for at least a generation."
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It is a teleological argument to say the strategy worked and is therefore authentic. But Syria is as we have it, and it is impossible to say how long it will be before Damascus is able enough to advance such ordinary things as a foreign policy, or a position on the Palestine question. We do have reports now, it must be noted, that Israel is rushing to fill the Golan Heights with settlers, West Bank-style, to take advantage of Syria's near-total incapacitation.

This line of thinking causes me to reflect on two other questions arising from the Syria conflict.

One concerns the migration crisis combined with incessant insistence that there is, somewhere and the CIA will find it yet, a moderate opposition in Syria. It is time to reconcile these two phenomena.

Were there refugees in any number before the rise of the Islamist anti-Assad formations? Where are the refugees going now that they number in the millions?

Answers: No. As Gary Leupp, a historian at Tufts, argues in a superb piece of commentary CounterPunch also published recently, "The bulk of peaceful protesters in the Syrian Arab Spring want nothing to do with the U.S.-supported armed opposition but are instead receptive to calls from Damascus, Moscow and Tehran for dialogue towards a power-sharing arrangement.... What pro-democracy student activists and their allies fear most is the radical Islamists who have burgeoned in large part due to foreign intervention since 2011."

Thank you, professor. Now we know why the flow of refugees runs toward secular, democratic Europe and not areas of the nation Assad has lost to rebel militias. The former represents the refugees' shared aspirations, while the latter fight not as Syrians but as religious fanatics and/or CIA clients. As a friend wrote the other day, "There are likely moderate Syrian forces, but you will I think find them mostly in the coffee shops of Istanbul."

This brings us to Turkey, a newly significant factor in the Syrian crisis. I cannot help viewing the eruption of sectarian and communal violence since the Erdoğan government signed a cooperation agreement with the U.S. last July in the light of the above-suggested American strategy: Make a mess and keep it messy.

Erdoğan is heir to a singular tradition in Middle Eastern politics. Ataturk, faced with the same religious, ethnic and historic fractiousness as Syria and much of the region today, countered it with a modern notion of citizenship and belonging. It held for three-quarters of a century and its mark remains, obviously. Erdoğan comes along and sees political advantage exactly where Washington sees strategic advantage: in social, religious and cultural division.

Another dimension to the Middle East's many-sided tragedy. This is Erdoğan's Turkey, and he has our blessing. I would say Erdoğan is a strange bedfellow except that he does not seem to be.

I am with Lawrence Wilkerson on the nature of our moment: The veil is pulled back, and we witness decline in progress, real time. What is supposed to be "fatally flawed" is the only "glimmer of hope," and what is supposed to be considered and humane is reckless and cynical.

We all live through history, always. This is by definition. But there are not many passages as fraught as this one. Our leadership thrashes about in desperation. It is dangerous-this by definition, too.
 
 #23
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
Why the Kremlin should be concerned about ISIS terrorist acts within Russia
With Russia's direct military involvement in the Syrian campaign against ISIS, there are increasing concerns that the radical Islamist organization might export terrorism to Russia.
By Sergey Grachev
Sergey Grachev is director of the Center for the Study of National and International Security, professor of Applied Policy Analysis and Modeling at the Institute of International Relations and World History at Lobachevsky State University of Nizhni Novgorod, a Doctor of Political Sciences and an Army Colonel.

As Russia steps up its military campaign in Syria, reports are beginning to circulate in the national media about the heightened risks for a terrorist attack on Russian soil.

For example, on Oct. 11 the National Anti-Terrorist Committee (NAC) announced the arrest of a terrorist cell in Moscow allegedly planning an attack in the Russian capital. During the arrest, security forces discovered and defused an improvised explosive device (IED). Speaking at a visiting session of the NAC in Nalchik on Oct. 12, Federal Security Service (FSB) Director Alexander Bortnikov remarked that, "20 terror attacks had been averted in the past year."

This latest incident involved the detention in Moscow of a group of Russian citizens, all members of the international terrorist organization Islamic State of Iraq and the Greater Syria (ISIS). They are accused of plotting IED attacks on public transport facilities. Among the detainees was Baysultanov, who had arrived from Syria to mastermind the operation.

The export of terrorism from Syria onto Russia soil by ISIS-trained and combat-hardened Russian citizens is not some distant threat. According to experts, the return of foot soldiers from Islamic hotspots will cause further radicalization of Muslims in Russia.

A similar phenomenon occurred in Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries when members of the mujahedeen returned to their home countries after the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, bringing with them absolute intolerance of any ideology other than their own.

Besides the ideological component, one must consider the economic and financial factors at play. The simple truth is that terrorism can ensure a comfortable future.

In fact, in today's world terrorism is rapidly becoming a well-paid, in-demand profession. To date, the Russian security services are aware of 2,719 Russian citizens fighting for ISIS.

Governments, however, are often guilty of double standards, pursuing policies that simultaneously "weaken countries where terrorists reside, while creating the conditions for those very terrorists to thrive."

National security experts today are doubly active, since the new reality is that Russian citizens returning from hot spots are being used to inspire anti-government movements and terrorist operations.Mokhmad Mezhidov, a man suspected of plotting a terrorist attack in Moscow, sits in a defendants' cage in a court room in Moscow, Russia, Tuesday, Oct. 13, 2015. Security officials said the suspects arrested Sunday were trained by the Islamic State group and had planned a terror attack on the Moscow public transport system.

Moreover, the leader of ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, has declared himself the supreme caliph and stated that the main enemies of ISIS are the United States and Russia. This, alongside other factors, was the cue for Russia's aerial operation against terrorist bases used for training and ideological purposes.
The ISIS leadership is bound to respond [this week it declared a jihad against Russia - Editor's note]. The events of Oct. 11 in Moscow, and the 20 thwarted attacks this year, are proof of that.

The number of attempted terror attacks in Russia is set to rise, and not only in the major cities. The security services and law enforcement agencies will undoubtedly beef up their operations as a consequence.

But leaders of the anti-terrorist campaign on the ground, i.e. regional governors, should also be concerned, since for them preventative anti-terror activity is often a formality. But in war (and the fight against terrorism certainly is a war) there are no formalities, and the 2,719 (or more) Russian citizens in ISIS are nothing other than a fifth column.

What's more, despite not being openly conducted, such activity encourages various international players to step up their claims against Russia, no matter how far-fetched they might be and regardless of the fact that "terrorism is a threat to all countries even outside the ISIS context."
 
 #24
www.rt.com
October 16, 2015
Putin: 7,000 people from ex-Soviet republics estimated to fight alongside ISIS

There are 7,000 foreign terrorists in Syria who went there from Russia and several other former Soviet nations to join Islamic State (IS, formerly ISIS), Russian President Vladimir Putin told the heads of those states in Kazakhstan.

"There are an estimated 5,000 to 7,000 fighters from Russia and other CIS member states fighting for ISIL," Putin said referring to IS by its former name. "We certainly cannot allow them to use the experience they are getting in Syria on home soil."

Putin was speaking to leaders of the CIS, a regional union of a dozen former Soviet republics. He reported details of the Russian bombing campaign in Syria targeting the jihadists and assured that there was significant progress in defeating IS.

"By carrying out airstrikes on targets chosen in coordination with the Syrians, our troops have produced significant results. Dozens of command points and depots, hundreds of terrorists and a large number of military hardware have been destroyed," Putin said.

Putin reiterated that Russia's operation in Syria has a definite timeframe and would not last longer than the offensive operation of the Syrian government troops, which get air support from Russia.

He added that Russia stands for the creation of "as big a coalition to fight the extremists and terrorists as possible and is working with major regional and international partners" like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Jordan and Israel.

Vladiir Putin also reiterated that Russia is acting in compliance with international law in Syria.

"The operation of the Russian Air Forces supported by the ships of the Caspian Fleet are in full compliance with the international law and absolutely legitimate, since we are conducting it at the formal request of [Syrian] President [Bashar] Assad," he said.

The Russian leader said CIS members should be on guard for possible retaliation from the terrorists and ramp up cooperation between their national counterterrorism and border guard agencies.

Putin also spoke on the security situation in Afghanistan, saying it is rapidly deteriorating.

"The situation is becoming critical. Terrorists of all flavors are gaining influence there and don't hide their plans to expand," he said. "One of their targets is Central Asia. We have to be prepared to respond to this contingency."
 
 #25
Russia Insider
www.russia-insider.com
October 16, 2015
What to Do in Syria, Mr Obama?
With friends like Turkey and Saudi Arabia the US does not need enemies in its struggle against ISIS
By Edward Lozansky
Dr. Edward Lozansky is the President and Founder of the American University in Moscow. He also founded the U.S.-Russia Forum, an annual event held in the U.S. Congress since 1981.  

So many good folks in America, Europe, even the world over are wondering what's going on out there in the Middle East, and particularly, in Syria?

The most concise and accurate answer is that it is a mess, semi-officially described as controlled chaos.

There is an obvious catch though. There is chaos all right, but what about control? The 'elephant in the room' question is whether there is any control at all, at least on the USA's behalf? The next obvious question to ask is how some degree of order can be established there, assuming that this is even America's objective?

Washington's canned response to such questions are well known: "Let's help the moderate opposition topple President Assad's secular regime and everything will be fine and dandy. Freedom, democracy, human rights, reform", and more such feel good buzz-phrases without a doubt.

This may seem to be a reasonable strategy, were it not for America's past record.

We helped Iraq's opposition hang Saddam Hussein. Result: Years of internecine strife and an astounding rise in terrorism, culminating in the emergence of an entire terrorist quasi-state known today as ISIS.

We then helped our moderate Libyan opposition allies to lynch another dictator, Muammar Gaddafi, and what do we have now? Two competing regimes at each other's throats and countless fanatical terrorist hordes spreading terror toward neighboring countries like Egypt.

With such hindsight it can safely be assumed that the victories of armed opposition groups, whether moderate or fanatical, will not bring any semblance of order to the Middle East. America now finds itself in the schizophrenic position of wanting to oust Assad and siding with ISIS, whom we are supposed to eradicate, to achieve this.

It's a shambles, without any doubt.

One of this unholy muddle's most ghastly abominations is the conception of the so-called "moderate opposition". The notion of an armed, moderate opposition is surely an oxymoron. What can be moderate about taking up arms against a legitimately elected president and government? Especially with funding, weaponry and personnel being supplied from outside the country, by states such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey and some 80 other countries?

Some wag said that a difference between moderate and immoderate opposition exists - the former cuts throats from right to left whilst the latter does it from left to right. Or vice versa.

Our administration casually denotes terrorist groups it intends (or claims) to want to eradicate as "moderate", simply because these groups temporarily serve its interests by, for example, removing a legitimate foreign leader it dislikes. Would Bin Laden qualify for "moderate" status today? Quite possibly.

Sadly, this "moderate" opposition business is clearly a sham and the conclusion is obvious. Let's stop racking our brains for ways to dislodge Assad. Fighting ISIS, that fountain-head of a terrorist pandemic, is a far more pressing priority. ISIS are driving hundreds of thousands of refugees toward  Europe and who can tell how many of them are trained terrorists? Who knows how many of them will eventually disembark in America?

To crush ISIS we need allies on the ground, and it looks like our search for them is becoming rather  desperate. Sure, the Kurds could make a staunch and reliable ally for wiping out ISIS, except for one more complication to the already convoluted mess out there, namely: Turkey. Turkey, a NATO member and thus supposedly on our side, is using the fight against ISIS as a pretext for bombing the hell out of the Kurds. Who needs enemies with friends like that?

Turkey can not be much of an ally if we are to be earnest in our desire to defeat ISIS.

However, we do have a strong potential ally - and you know who I mean - an ally who is willing to join forces with us to defeat an obvious, absolute evil. The obvious question is, why not? Why the hell not shake the proffered hand?

There are problems, of course. This ally has a poor democracy record. Their leader has a displeasing tendency to occasionally claim that his own country's interests do not quite mesh with those of the USA. He is definitely not a Washington yes-man.

Within the framework of this cruel world's realpolitik, it would inadvisable to cite democratic values at every turn because, if this were done, fingers will instantly point at US allies and partners such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar, both countries where people are regularly stoned to death or have limbs publicly severed for committing legal transgressions.

Against this backdrop, we would do well to recall that Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill (no angels themselves - Ed.) had no hesitation in sitting down at a round table to discuss weighty matters with Stalin, a man with rather imperfect democratic credentials who nevertheless played a prodigious role in crushing Nazism and Japanese imperialism.

Obama has now been afforded an opportunity to salvage his legacy by forging a similar alliance with Russia to destroy ISIS and other Islamist radicals. Pressing issues such as the illicit trade in nuclear materials, drugs, climate change and other similar challenges facing the world today could also be discussed.

Should Obama fail to take this vital step, the only legacy he will be remembered by is this:

For the first time in history a Nobel Peace Prize winner - Obama - has had to apologize for bombing another Peace Prize Laureate - M�decins Sans Fronti�res. An unenviable distinction to be remembered by.
 
 #26
Top Russian MP welcomes US extending presence in Afghanistan

MOSCOW, October 15. /TASS/. The US extending its military presence in Afghanistan is a strategically important and positive move, the first deputy chairman of the Russian upper house's international affairs committee said in comments on a statement by US President Barack Obama.

"I see this as a positive move. In this case Americans will be able to play a positive role: prevent Taliban from moving north to the southern borders of the Commonwealth of Independent States," Vladimir Dzhabarov said, noting that he supported the decision.

Earlier on Thursday, Obama said the US would keep the current number of US military, 9,800, in Afghanistan for the most part of 2016, and their mission would remain the same.

President Obama said the troop extension could "make a real difference" for Afghanistan and Afghan security forces, which he said were "not as strong" as they needed to be.

The Federation Council's parliamentarian believes it is a purely military decision connected with Islamic extremists' growing activity in the region.

"The situation has not stabilized as of yet, and Mr. Obama understands that it is easier to have a contingent there not to let this situation develop under a negative scenario, than to have to then launch a new military operation," the parliamentarian said.

He said he did not see any other "covert political background" in the decision of the US president.

In March, Obama suspended the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, although earlier he had pledged that half of them would return home by the end of this year, and that in a year's time American military would stay only on the territory of the US Embassy in Kabul.

On Thursday, the president said the US would keep 5,500 troops after 2016 that would be stationed in four locations - Kabul, Bagram, Jalalabad and Kandahar.
 
#27
In These Times
http://inthesetimes.com
October 14, 2015
Anderson Cooper's Claim About Bernie Sanders' Soviet Union Honeymoon Was Redbaiting and Deceptive
Cooper's implications were dishonest.
By Timothy Lange

This post first appeared at Meteor Blades.

In his follow-up question to Bernie Sanders Tuesday night, after the candidate had explained what he views as "democratic socialism," CNN's Anderson Cooper returned to the matter of electability and noted, "You honeymooned in the Soviet Union."

This despicable red-baiting was a means of suggesting that Sanders is a commie without actually saying the word. Here's a guy, the implication runs, who's a secret Bolshevik-so in love with America's arch-enemy that he took his new bride to the USSR instead of Niagara Falls or the Bahamas for their honeymoon. It was a rancid attempt to gin up outrage and do Republicans' dirty work for them. It's also deceptive.

The honeymoon story began at Breitbart in late May, then moved on to other right-wing venues, finally getting play in George Will's August 7 column in the Washington Post. Most of his column was devoted to praise for ex-communist Robert Conquest, who had written about the prisons and other atrocities of the Stalin era and had just died at age 98. Will concluded:

"Conquest lived to see a current U.S. presidential candidate, a senator, who had chosen, surely as an ideological gesture, to spend his honeymoon in the Soviet Union in 1988. Gulags still functioned, probably including some of the "cold Auschwitzes" in Siberia, described in Conquest's 'Kolyma.' The honeymooner did not mind that in 1988 political prisoners were-as may still be the case-being tortured in psychiatric "hospitals." Thanks to the unblinking honesty of people like Conquest, the Soviet Union now is such a receding memory that Bernie Sanders's moral obtuseness-the obverse of Conquest's character-is considered an amusing eccentricity."

Will, of course, is a decidedly unamusing eccentricity. His "surely as an ideological gesture" implied-given the context of the rest of the column-that Sanders is a sneaky supporter of gulags and politically motivated famines and other Stalinist depredations. But in fact, Sanders' trip to the Soviet Union was part of his official duties as mayor of Burlington, Vermont.

In 1956, President Eisenhower launched the program that a decade later would be called Sister Cities International, a program still in existence today. The idea was to promote peace and understanding through connections between cities in the United States and, at first, Western Europe. The program soon spread. In 1973, Seattle became a sister city of Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan, then under Soviet rule. Other U.S.-Soviet sister cities soon followed despite the tensions of the Cold War.

In 1988, Burlington sistered with Yaroslavl, a city 160 miles north of Moscow. That was the same year Sanders married his second wife, Jane. In fact, the day after they married, they headed out to Yaroslavl. So, one could call it a honeymoon, and the pair have both done so, but jokingly or sarcastically. The reason for that is that they didn't go alone. There were 10 other people from Burlington who went with them. It was a trip dotted with diplomacy, official meetings and numerous interviews. Not most people's idea of a honeymoon getaway.

As the Tampa Bay Times Pundit Fact feature reported:

    In a 2007 interview, Jane Sanders also recalled the peculiar timing: "The day after we got married, we marched in a Memorial Day parade, and then we took off in a plane to start the sister city project with Yaroslavl with 10 other people on my honeymoon." ...
    Will made it sound as if Sanders was visiting to condone Soviet torture practices, but the Burlington trip was more of a dialogue-building exchange program. The Vermont weekly newspaper Seven Days reported in 2009 that the sister-city relationship "helped local residents who sought to ease tensions between the United States and Soviet Union by initiating citizen-to-citizen exchanges with a Russian city." ...
    Participation in the Burlington-Yaroslavl program has waned over the years, though it was viewed as a "glamorous endeavor" by many in Burlington at the time, program leader Howard Seaver said in 2009.

George Will is a hopeless case of arrested political development, stuck unbudgingly in a past era. But why did Anderson Cooper slip this sneak attack with its bogus implications into the early minutes of the first Democratic debate? Sloppy research? A bogus attempt to prove journalistic toughmindedness? Or malice aforethought?


 
 
 #28
Antiwar.com
October 14, 2015
The New McCarthyism
Neocon Cathy Young gives us a blast from the past
By Justin Raimondo
Justin Raimondo is the editorial director of Antiwar.com, and a senior fellow at the Randolph Bourne Institute. He is a contributing editor at The American Conservative, and writes a monthly column for Chronicles.

Cold War II is upon us. Once again, to write the phrase "the Kremlin" is to evoke images of an Oriental despotism both ominous and inscrutable, only slightly less sinister than the Dark Tower. Russia, once thought to have been liberated from its Soviet chains, is now the new Mordor. And, of course, Vladimir Putin is the new Sauron: cunning, amoral, inhumanly ruthless, he is routinely likened to Joseph Stalin, the Soviet dictator who murdered millions and imprisoned many more in the gulags.

Not that Putin has murdered millions, or even as many as a dozen, but the ethics of the new McCarthyites - yes, they're back - aren't overly punctilious. Their polemics are even less exacting than their forebears' for the simple reason that Communism, as an organized international movement with its epicenter in Russia, is dead, and will doubtless remain so. Furthermore, "Putinism," if such an ideological creature can be said to exist - a problematic proposition - is not a global movement, let alone an international conspiracy: there are no "Putinist" parties outside of Russia, assiduously subverting the moral and political foundations of the West and harboring the 21st century version of the Rosenbergs. No Whittaker Chambers will emerge to reveal the dark secrets of these saboteurs of democracy and shine a bright light on their moral espionage - but never fear, because we have Cathy Young.

A columnist for various and sundry outlets, and long associated with Reason magazine, Young  - born Ekaterina Jung - came to the US when she was 17 and became a naturalized citizen in 1989, the year her book, Growing Up in Moscow: Memories of a Soviet Girlhood was published. The book, which details life under the totalitarian rule of the Communists, might have ensured her a career as a defected Soviet dissident, perhaps a female version of Natan Sharanksy, but - alas - the Soviet Union fell before such promise could be fulfilled and she had to find another ideological niche, eventually zeroing in on the absurdities of radical feminism in her second book, and promoting a movement known as "Women Against Feminism."

With the rise of anti-Russian sentiment in the Washington, however, she has taken up the rhetorical cudgels against her old motherland with a vengeance. Like many embittered Russian �migr�s - Julia Ioffe, Masha Gessen, Miriam Elder of Buzzfeed- she has been prominent in the ideological offensive against alleged Russian "imperialism," warning that Putin is Stalin reincarnated and that the Muscovites are about to march on the Baltics. Her career as a leading voice of the new McCarthyism has been enhanced by her latest for the Daily Beast, a prolific outlet for feverish Russophobia, which zeroes in on the American Committee for East-West Accord (ACEWA), the first paragraph of which serves as an object lesson in  the methods and style of the new McCarthyism:

"It is, most would agree, a worthy goal: to promote 'open, civilized, informed debate' on Russian-American relations and bring about 'a conclusive end to cold war and its attendant dangers.' But there are reasons to believe that the American Committee for East-West Accord, which is having its formal launch with a Capitol Hill event scheduled for November 4, may be involved in a less admirable mission.

Yes, folks, hiding behind that inoffensive - even benevolent - fa�ade is a sinister conspiracy, the nature of which might be discerned by the title of this jeremiad: "Putin's New American Fan Club?" Don't be misled by the question mark, because to ask such a question in the current atmosphere is to answer it. It's the kind of conspiracy theory our political class approves of.

So what's the evidence for the existence of a Putinist cabal in our midst? Hiding behind the respectable front of a board of directors that includes a stunning array of formers - U.S. Senator Bill Bradley (D-NJ), Jack Matlock, former US ambassador to the Soviet Union, and retired Procter & Gamble CEO John Pepper - are the two principal conspirators: Stephen Cohen and Gilbert Doctorow. Cohen is described as a historian of Russia who "earned a certain notoriety last year with his dogged defense of Putin at the height of the Russia-Ukraine conflict." The link, which is supposed to document this "notoriety," goes to one of her own Daily Beast tirades, entitled "Meet Stephen F. Cohen, Vladimir Putin's Best Friend in the American Media." So the source of Cohen's "notoriety" is none other than the author herself. Circular reasoning is really the essence of the new McCarthyism, just as it defined the older version. If you protest against the witch-hunting ad hominem attacks of the McCarthyites, then that is proof positive you're part of the Conspiracy.

Key to understanding the smear tactics of the New McCarthyism is the central role played by the personalization of the alleged "threat." Just as the Iraq war was popularized by the demonization of Saddam Hussein - a third-rate Third World tyrant, no more threatening to us that Robert Mugabe or Nursultan Nazarbayev, the Supreme Leader of Kazakhstan - so the new cold war is advertised as a crusade against a man characterized by his enemies as a leader with the cunning of Stalin and the appetites of Attila the Hun. It's much easier to drum up a hate campaign against an individual than it is to demonize an entire nation.

In the tradition of their intellectual ancestors, the new McCarthyites are proud of their abilities as dogged researchers, and Young documents - through a common mailing address - the ties of the Committee to the family of Katrina vanden Heuvel, editor of The Nation and Cohen's wife. In the course of this Young reveals that the Committee's total annual budget is a meager $30,000 - a paltry sum compared to the neoconservative thinktanks that are pouring millions into the hate campaign directed at Russia, but hey, the failure to find Moscow's gold behind this Putinist conspiracy doesn't deter our Cathy. Because this is a conspiracy of ideas, which must be exposed and stamped out, no matter how cheaply they're promoted.

Another technique favored by the neo-McCarthyites, akin to the circular reasoning noted above, is that they "document" their charges by referring to each other's work. Thus we get this:

"Cohen's views have been widely described as pro-Putin and "Moscow-friendly," labels he has hotly disputed. Similar charges have been leveled at other people and organizations linked to ACEWA; the March 2015 World Russia Forum in Washington, D.C., where Doctorow made a pitch for the Committee, was skewered by The Daily Beast's Jamie Kirchick as 'a gathering of Kremlin apologists, conspiracy theorists, and other assorted nut jobs.'"

That Kirchick, a gay version of Norman Podhoretz, is now considered an authority on who is a "nut job" is a real head-scratcher: here is a neocon who is truly a caricature of the species, a Roy Cohn for our times who has accused everyone from Edward Snowden to Ron Paul of being in part of a Vast Putinist Conspiracy. And if you follow the links in the above cited paragraph, you land on a screed by Jonathan Chait which references ... Jamie Kirchick and indulges in the same evidence-free smears of Cohen. For further proof of the Putinist Conspiracy, Chait gives us as one of his star witnesses one Rosie Gray, another neoconservative propagandist masquerading as a "reporter."

Alongside this is a link to a site called "kremlintrolls.com," which assures us that "fascist elements remain sidelined in Kiev" and states its mission on its masthead: "Regarding the activities of Kremlin agents, assets, trolls, allies, fellow travelers, dupes, useful idiots, bots, and whoever else attracts my attention." The sheer kookiness of this anonymous obsessive is truly a sight to behold: here is his diagram of "problematic social networks" of alleged "Kremlin agents." One imagines he stayed up all night working on it, crouched over his computer, his eyes gleaming with fanatic energy, only taking a break to watch episodes of "I Led Three Lives" on YouTube

Another link is to a New York Times piece by Polish writer Slawomir Sierakowski defending Svoboda, the Ukrainian neo-Nazi party, and smearing anyone who points to its ideological origins as a pawn of Moscow. Young also links to a piece by Carl Schreck, a former journalist at the Moscow Times, now a US government employee with Radio Free Europe, the US government propaganda outlet that functions as the American version of "Russia Today." Schreck's article is devoted to characterizing Cohen as beyond the pale, "arguably the most divisive American public intellectual commenting on the crisis today": he links to Sierakowski and also to Julia Ioffe, perhaps the bitterest of all the �migr� Russia-haters, whose piece for The New Republic is entitled "Putin's American Toady at 'The Nation' Gets Even Toadier."

There is, to be sure, a certain Soviet flavor in all this anti-Russian propaganda: in its over-the-top vituperation, it recalls Stalinist imprecations hurled at "Trotskyite wreckers." You can take the Russian out of Russia, but apparently a rhetorical residue remains.

Young's piece makes no real arguments, aside from implying that the founders of ACEWA are agents of a foreign power. She is miffed that Doctorow is not sympathetic to expatriates like herself who have turned on their motherland with unseemly viciousness, calling for "regime change" and openly campaigning for NATO to take on the Russians. Yet she never confronts the actual case made by ACEWA, and other critics of the new cold war: she neglects to tell us why she thinks NATO pushing up to the gates of Moscow isn't a provocation. Never engaging her opponents, she only seems capable of challenging their motives, darkly implying they are part of some subversive "Moscow-friendly" network devoted to poisoning the precious bodily fluids of the West.

This is typical of the methods of the new cold warriors: like the red-baiters of the past, they are mainly concerned with closing down debate rather than actually winning it. They don't make any real arguments because there is no rational argument for starting World War III with nuclear-armed Russia. So they resort to the familiar McCarthyite memes in the hope that no one will notice the huge vacuum at the center of their polemics.

Young and her neoconservative allies are living in a time warp. The dead giveaway is when they utilize the old cold war phraseology - "Moscow-friendly," "Kremlin apologist," etc.  Consciously or unconsciously, they are conjuring up the 1950s, when J. Edgar Hoover was busy chasing down "Communist agents" - i.e. anyone who ever questioned Washington's war on American dissidents - and the House Committee on Un-American Activities was hauling half of Hollywood before it in the American version of the Moscow Trials.

Do we really want to relive that era of repression, scare-mongering, and ideological conformity? Or can we have a real discussion about what a rational policy toward Russia ought to look like?


 
 #29
NEW FROM ZEPHYR PRESS
Contact: Leora Zeitlin: [email protected] / J. Kates: [email protected]

ANATOMICAL THEATRE
by Andrei Sen-Senkov
Translated from the Russian by Ainsley Morse & Peter Golub 208 pages bilingual (Russian/English) * $16
ISBN 978-0-983297-02-4 (paper)

Winner of the 2015 PEN Center USA Prize in Translation, Anatomical Theatre takes the reader on a tour of Andrei Sen-Senkov's restlessly curious imagination, where every encounter with the world provides an opportunity to play with language and meaning. Born in Tajikistan, Sen-Senkov lives in Moscow, where he writes prolifically, regularly participates in literary festivals and collaborations, and maintains a medical practice as a doctor. Few subjects escape Sen-Senkov's interest, but he has a particular affinity for those as disparate as current political events, early Christian martyrs, film, popular culture, and human anatomy, which he explores with wit and a physician's eye in the "Anatomical Theatre" poems toward the end of the book. Playfulness is a critical component of his poems, yet they are often simultaneously deeply sad and serious.

Sen-Senkov has published more than ten books of poetry, prose and visual poems, and has three times been short-listed for Russia's prestigious Andrei Bely Prize. His work has been translated into numerous languages, and poems have appeared in English in Aufgabe, Interim, Jacket, Zoland and anthologized in Crossing Centuries (Talisman 2000). Anatomical Theatre is his first full book to appear in English. It is the latest in a series of books of contemporary Russian literature published in translation by Zephyr Press.

Ainsley Morse co-translated (with Bela Shayevich) I Live I See: the Collected Poems of Vsevolod Nekrasov (Ugly Duckling Presse, 2013) and is working on an anthology of Lianozovo poets, a collection of contemporary Russian experimental prose, and ongoing translations of 20th-century Yugoslav authors.

Peter Golub is a Moscow-born poet and translator who edited the New Russian Poetry feature for Jacket Magazine in 2008, and is currently working on a selection of poems by Boris Pasternak. In 2007 a bilingual edition of his poems, My Imagined Funeral, was published by Argo-Risk. He is a translation editor at The St. Petersburg Review.

For more information: http://zephyrpress.org/new.php#anatomical and https://penusa.org/2015-award- winners-finalists.
 

 #30
The Guardian (UK)
October 16, 2015
Polio in Ukraine: nationwide vaccination campaign needs to start straight away
With two WHO-confirmed cases of polio in Ukraine in September, vaccinating the country's 1.8 million children needs to start as soon as possible
By Giovanna Barberis
Giovanna is Unicef's representative in Ukraine

Next week a nationwide polio vaccination campaign should start in Ukraine. I say should because we've been here before. The campaign should have actually started weeks ago.

Ukraine's ministry of health and the World Health Organisation (WHO) confirmed two cases of circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus on 1st September. Both children, aged 10 months and 4 years, were not vaccinated against the disease. They live in Zakarpatska province in south-west Ukraine, close to the country's borders with Romania, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia.

The virus is very good at detecting the weakest in society, particularly young children
Internationally agreed guidelines state that a response, using an oral polio vaccine (OPV), needs to start within 14 days, given that one polio case is considered an outbreak.

It's now more than six weeks since the confirmation and not one child has been protected in response. In Ukraine, 1.8 million children are at risk of paralysis or death because they are not fully protected against polio. The virus is very good at detecting the weakest in society, particularly young children.

Over time, a number of factors have led to the low levels of children immunised against polio and other vaccine-preventable diseases in the country. Local and vocal anti-vaccine groups, insufficient vaccine supply and the conflict in eastern Ukraine all complicate the situation. However, a recent Unicef survey showed that 70% of Ukrainian mothers are aware of the benefits of vaccination to protect their children. Now is the time to give these mothers the opportunity to do just that.

The good news is that it looks like the campaign is finally set to go. The ministry of health is mobilising its resources and by this time next week children, form newborns to six-year-olds, should be visiting clinics across the country to receive their first two drops of OPV. At least three rounds are necessary to ensure that the disease is stopped in its tracks.

Unicef and the WHO are supporting efforts as much as we can. Thanks to generous funding from the government of Canada, Unicef procured 3.7m doses of OPV. This procurement is in the country and will cover the first round, but more support is needed to provide all the necessary vaccines for the additional two rounds. Health workers are being trained and information is being distributed across the country on where to go, and on how the vaccine is administered.

With the conflict in the east, amid tough economic times, Ukraine's children need all the protection they can get. It's critical to make sure that this campaign doesn't just happen but that it's effective and reaches every child possible across the country. Only then can we ensure that this debilitating disease is contained and the health and wellbeing of Ukraine's children, and those further afield, is protected for the benefit of all.
 
 #31
Wall Street Journal
October 16, 2015
Ukraine's Bumper Crops of Wheat Are At Risk
Amid record crops, Ukraine's wheat farmers are struggling with a weak currency, high interest rates
By KATHERINE DUNN and  LAURA MILLS

TOVSTOLUH, Ukraine-Farmers Natalia and Yury Berezovsky have enjoyed two years of record wheat harvests. Now, they have one priority: Stay in business.

Ukraine has weathered war and tough times to deliver its biggest wheat harvests since the fall of the Soviet Union. But the country's farmers are increasingly squeezed by a weakened currency and bank interest rates near 30%, making it tough to afford essential imports, such as fertilizer, seeds and new machinery.

The pressure is threatening to end a series of bumper harvests that made the country the world's sixth-largest wheat producer this year-with potentially significant consequences for world markets.

"Our first priority is to stay afloat," said Mr. Berezovsky, a 45-year-old farmer who used debt to expand his farm from 40 hectares (98.8 acres) in 1994 to 4,000 today. "We don't have any thoughts to grow."

Wheat is a crucial staple and politically sensitive export crop in markets around the world, and Ukraine is a major player.

Sunny weather and ample rain have helped the country produce its largest haul of wheat since 1990. Once billed as the breadbasket of Europe, Ukraine will export a record 15 million metric tons (a metric ton equals 2,204.62 pounds) in 2015, almost 4 million tons more than in 2014, according to estimates from the U.S. Agriculture Department's Foreign Agricultural Service. That accounts for more than 9% of global wheat exports, and the surge has contributed to a more than 8% drop in Paris-traded wheat prices over the past three months.

Amid the glut, Ukraine's weakened currency has made the country a tough competitor, along with Russia, against the world's biggest producers: the European Union and the U.S.

"They are the cheapest on the market, they are winning most of the tenders, and this is really putting pressure on the global price," said Stefan Vogel, head of the agriculture commodity research team at Rabobank.

This month, a ton of Black Sea wheat is selling for between $174 and $189, depending on the quality, according to the International Grains Council. French wheat sold for $190, and U.S. wheat sold for between $218 and $222. The spread between prices for Black Sea and U.S. wheat has tripled since May.

Since July, during harvest, Ukrainian wheat has won five of the 12 tenders held by the Egyptian state grain buyer, the world's largest wheat importer.

U.S. producers, hampered by a strong dollar, have failed to win any.

"We haven't had an Egypt tender within $20 in nine months," said Scott O'Donnell, a Minneapolis-based grain broker at Frontier Futures. U.S. wheat is coming in fourth place on the world market, after Australia, he said.

According to a report from the Agriculture Department, Ukraine is gaining business even in traditional U.S. markets. In one sign of the dominance of Black Sea prices, Russian and Ukrainian wheat is now being imported into Mexico.

Despite the collapse in the Ukrainian economy, farming has boomed to this point, with 138 new farms this year, according to the country's statistics service. The conflict has hit some of the most industrialized parts of Ukraine but has affected only a small portion of the agricultural land. Ukrainian wheat doesn't depend on Russian markets, which have all but closed to other Ukrainian produce since Kiev's fight with pro-Moscow separatists escalated following Russia's annexation of Crimea last year.

But one of the factors that helped Ukrainian wheat sell cheaply, its battered currency, is now hurting farmers. The hryvnia has lost 40% of its its value against the dollar in the last 12 months. The USDA estimated that by June, fertilizers sold in Ukraine were around 15% more expensive this summer than the previous year.

Costs are rising broadly. The World Bank estimates the country's core inflation rate will hit 50% this year. In response, Ukraine has kept its key interest rate high. It was lowered last month-to 22%-having spent six months parked at 30%.

For family farms that relied on relatively affordable credit in the past to expand, those sorts of interest costs are proving hard to bear. Recently, the Berezovskys turned down a loan of 2 million hryvnia ($94,400) at an interest rate of 27%, concerned that the debt-servicing cost would eat too deeply into their profits.

"Our whole lives we've bought credit and then paid it off," said Ms. Berezovsky, who jokes about her husband buying a tractor before he bought a car.

This year's bumper crop of seven metric tons of wheat per hectare is what is keeping the farm in the black, the couple said.

Even bigger farms with good credit histories are struggling. Agroprodservis, which employs 1,300 people and cultivates 40,000 hectares in western Ukraine, said it has struggled to get credit this year due to the cost. The company was being offered rates of 22% to 23% for loans with maturities of between one and five years.

"Our biggest tragedy is that there isn't any money," said Andrei Baran, director and co-owner of Agroprodservis.

That means that the farm has canceled plans to expand its pig-feeding complex and a soya storage facility.

Ukraine's economy increasingly depends on agriculture. According to the World Bank, the sector's share of gross domestic product grew from 7.9% in 2008 to 11.8% in 2014-about four times the global average.

"High interest rates on credit...truly create a significant problem for small and medium-sized producers," Oleksiy Pavlenko, the country's agriculture minister, said in an email.

Tighter credit could result in a cash shortages and bankruptcies at some farms by this spring, according to Mike Lee, an independent agronomist who specializes in the former Soviet Union. That, along with weakening yields due to cutbacks on fertilizers and acreage, could push up world wheat prices, Mr. Lee said.

"If Ukrainian agriculture catches a cold, the world takes notice," he said.
 
 #32
Conditions created in Donetsk republic for beginning withdrawal of weapons - DPR envoy

MOSCOW, October 16. /TASS/. Conditions have been created in the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) for beginning the second stage of weapons withdrawal from the contact line, DPR parliament speaker Denis Pushilin said on Friday.

"I can attest that the necessary conditions have been created for pulling back military equipment, and we will deal with the violations that we see now during a Skype conference call in the near future. But in general the situation is quite favorable," Donetsk News Agency quotes him as saying.

The supplement to the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements of February 12 concerning the withdrawal of tanks, artillery pieces with caliber under 100 mm and mortars with caliber under 120 mm was initialed on September 29 during the talks of the Contact Group in Minsk, Belarus. On September 30, the document was signed by heads of Donetsk and Luhansk republics Alexander Zakharchenko and Igor Plotnitsky.

The self-proclaimed Luhansk People's Republic (LPR) began withdrawing tanks from the contact line on October 3. The DPR Defense Ministry said it would begin pulling back weapons after October 18 in accordance with the agreement reached, if the ceasefire is observed.

Date for local election in DPR not final

The date for local election in the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) set for 20 April 2016 is not final and can be changed depending on Kiev's next steps, DPR envoy to Contact Group Denis Pushilin went on to say.

"The date is rather conditional and approximate. The final [date] will be confirmed proceeding from how well Kiev fulfills its commitments and to what extent guarantor countries - Germany, France - can influence Kiev," Donetsk News Agency quoted Pushilin as saying.

On October 6, after the meeting of the leaders of the "Normandy Quartet" (Russia, Germany, France and Ukraine), DPR and LPR (self-proclaimed Luhansk People's Republic) agreed to postpone local election from October 18 and November 1 respectively to 2016 under the condition that Kiev implements all political points of the Minsk Agreements.

The new dates for elections in Donbas are April 20 in DPR and 21 February 2016 in LPR.

Postponing election in Donbas will create favorable conditions for starting discussion on the political settlement, Russian Foreign Ministry's official spokesperson Maria Zakharova said earlier.

"The Contact Group continued working on October 6 in Minsk looking for a solution to practical issues of settlement in Ukraine, including with consideration of the summit of the 'Normandy Quartet' [Russia, Germany, France and Ukraine] that took place in Paris on October 2," she noted. "The statement of DPR and LPR [self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk republics] about postponing elections until September is very important," Zakharova said.

"We hope that this step will create favorable atmosphere for starting discussions on key problems of the political settlement. This will allow to find not only common ground, but also win-win solutions of the problem," she added.
 
 #33
Extending implementation of Minsk peace deal for Ukraine depends only on its sides' political agreements - source

MOSCOW. Oct 16 (Interfax) - A possible decision to extend the implementation of the Minsk peace agreements for Ukraine into 2016 will not require any specific judicial procedure, a Russian diplomatic source told Interfax.

"The Package of Measures is not an international treaty. Rather, it is a political agreement. And prolonging [the implementation of] its provisions into next year is not a prerogative of international law. Rather, it is the political will of the sides reaching this agreement," he said.

The source offered his response to a question about whether or not any specific judicial procedure may be required to prolong the 'Minsk-2' peace deal.

In February 2015, in the Belarusian capital Minsk the leaders of Russia, France, Germany and Ukraine held marathon talks, which continued for almost 24 hours and helped agree upon the Package of Measures to implement the September 2014 Minsk agreements and the 'Normandy Four' leaders' declaration in support of these accords.

In particular, the Package of Measures gives the sides until the end of 2015 to complete the implementation of the Minsk agreements.

Nevertheless, recently representatives of the 'Normandy Four' countries at different levels have not ruled out the possibility of extending the validity period of the Minsk accords into 2016.
 
 #34
Politkom.ru
October 7, 2015
Russian pundit says breakaway republics seek reintegration into Ukraine
Aleksandr Gushchin, associate professor at the Russian State University for the Humanities: Luhansk and Donetsk People's Republics Set Sail for Reintegration into Ukraine

[Aleksandr Gushchin article argues that the leaders of the rebel Donetsk and Luhansk people's republics (DPR and LPR) are now seeking a "compromise" with Kiev and "reintegration" into Ukraine; argues that an important role in this process is played by the former regional elite from the Party of Regions, who are experienced in political dealings with Kiev and who will find it easy to reintegrate; however, the process of reintegration might lead to conflict with Moscow, who will wish to push forward its own candidates for the regional elections, "hoping to use its control over the reintegrated Donbass to get leverage over the Ukrainian domestic political playing field."]

We are now observing a certain compromise on the Donbass even though back in summer it looked that the issue of the elections would be particularly controversial. Then French diplomat [Pierre] Morel proposed his plan and an agreement was drawn up on the basis of that plan. Despite the unresolved issues over amnesty for certain persons, the parameters of the Ukrainian election law, and the border, what has been achieved in Paris can still be seen as a breakthrough. It does not, however, guarantee a solution to the crisis.

Another matter is that the situation in Ukraine is firmly inscribed into the global context, although the theory that Ukraine has been exchanged for Syria does not hold water. The Middle East track has its own significance. All specific issues to do with the elections will be settled within the framework of the Contact Group. Whatever is said about Ukraine refusing to negotiate, the process is under way. Ukraine will insist that all the political parties take part in the elections. The question arises as to what should be done with right-wing parties.

On the other hand, the self-proclaimed republics will demand that all the characters from their side be able to take part in the elections. It will be possible to reach certain compromises through the Contact Group. It all depends on which version of the Ukrainian election law will be adopted. One cannot say ahead of time that it is impossible to hold elections in the Donetsk and the Luhansk people's republics under Ukrainian law.

The republics' leaders have set sail for reintegration. The former elite still plays a crucial role in the Luhansk and the Donetsk people's republics - the Party of Regions knows very well what the Opposition Bloc is about and continues to maintain contacts with the Kiev elite. They will not find it hard to reintegrate.

Another matter is that Moscow will try to have their candidates elected, hoping to use its control over the reintegrated Donbass to get leverage over the Ukrainian domestic political playing field. However, this strategy is not fireproof, because the Ukrainian elite is quite agile and their pro-Russian orientation is rather relative. Thus, one can expect struggle for the alignment of compromises inside the elite with the participation of such characters as Rinat Akhmetov.
 
 #35
Levada.ru
October 15, 2015
More Russians oppose giving Crimea back to Ukraine - poll

Most Russians are against giving Ukraine a gas discount and returning Crimea, as is evident from the results of a poll published on Russian independent polling organization Levada Centre's website on 15 October.

The poll was conducted on 2-5 October 2015 amongst 800 respondents aged 18 and above in 134 settlements across 46 regions of Russia.

When asked what they felt about a possible "considerable discount" on the price of gas for Ukraine, 75 per cent of respondents said their attitude was either rather negative or strongly negative.

At the same time, 58 per cent said they were strongly against the idea of giving Crimea back to Ukraine while only 3 per cent of respondents were undecided on the issue. In September 2014 the figures were, respectively, 51 and 8 per cent.
 
 #36
Kyiv Post
October 16, 2015
Poroshenko, Yatsenyuk slammed over prosecutors
By Johannes Wamberg Andersen and Oleg Sukhov

President Petro Poroshenko and Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk are accused of keeping the nation's prosecutorial service staffed with loyalists who are poorly paid. The combination ensures more corruption and less rule of law, critics said.

"If there are no new people, there will be no renewal," Olena Sotnyk, a lawmaker from the Samopomich party, told the Kyiv Post. "They'll just change the names but the essence will remain the same."

The reluctance of Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk to surrender political control of the criminal justice system is becoming a major obstacle for Deputy Prosecutor General Davit Sakvarelidze, who wants to hire new prosecutors, cut the current staff size and pay higher wages to attract competent prosecutors.

Justice Minister Pavlo Petrenko dismissed the accusations, telling the Kyiv Post that wages had been increased for some categories of prosecutors last month. He also blamed the Verkhovna Rada for delaying major increases in prosecutors' wages.

Poroshenko ally and lawmaker Oleksiy Mushak defended the president, saying Poroshenko understands the need to overhaul the prosecutor's service.

Sviatoslav Tsegolko, a spokesman for Poroshenko, and Olga Lappo, a spokeswoman for Yatsenyuk, said they could not immediately comment. Andriy Demartino, a spokesman for the Prosecutor General's Office, was not available.

Along with corrupt judges and police, the nation's prosecutors are blamed for Ukraine's poor rule of law and endemic corruption. High-profile investigations or accusations against lawmakers or current and former top officials often go nowhere, even as enemies of those in power have ended up in prison.

Moreover, while estimating the corruption in the era of ex-President Viktor Yanukovych as high as $40 billion, no cases have gone to court against the ousted leader or his allies. Meanwhile, Ukraine has been accused of obstructing foreign investigations into suspected wrongdoing by powerful officials or ex-officials. The impunity extends to those who gave orders and shot some 100 EuroMaidan Revolution demonstrators.

All of this leaves prosecutors who are distrusted by most Ukrainians and seen as serving powerful, corrupt interests rather than justice.

Sakvarelidze, who is in charge of prosecutorial reform, has accused Yatsenyuk's Cabinet of Ministers of sabotaging his work by cutting the wages of prosecutors. Sakvarelidze said the Cabinet has cut the payroll from Hr 2.5 billion to Hr 2.4 billion recently.

Instead of boosting wages with money saved by layoffs, Sakvarelidze said the Cabinet set wages for the heads of local prosecutors' offices at only $116 (Hr 2,500) per month - a sure-fire recipe for encouraging bribe-taking.

"There is a miraculous Cabinet order that contradicts the prosecutorial law," he said. "Everything we are doing now may just go to hell. I can't imagine how one can survive on that wage. If the state doesn't provide for bureaucracy, bureaucracy starts providing for itself."

In addition, Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin has the final say over who gets appointed as new prosecutors, according to Sotnyk and Vitaly Shabunin, executive director of the Anti-Corruption Action Center.

More than 100 lawmakers seeking to oust Shokin accuse him of stalling major investigations and scuttling reform. Having him appoint rank-and-file prosecutors is an anathema to true reformers. Shokin has never responded to the accusations against him.

A presidential appointee, Shokin gets to appoint four of the seven commission members who select the heads of local prosecutorial offices. Parliament appoints the other three members.

Sotnyk wants independent civil society representatives to staff the commissions. Instead, the legislature chose lawmakers from the Bloc of President Petro Poroshenko and ex-Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko's Batkyvshchyna party.

"The presence of lawmakers on the commissions ensures political influence," Sotnyk said. "The president has a majority in each commission."

Shokin also chooses among the three candidates for each position nominated by a commission. "This gives Shokin not one but two ways to sabotage reform," Shabunin told the Kyiv Post.

Sakvarelidze acknowledged the risks, but said they could be overcome. "There are problems, and there may be controversial decisions made by commission members appointed by the prosecutor general," he said.

Shokin has also stipulated that new rank-and-file prosecutors should have prosecutorial experience.
Sotnyk said that this measure violated the law on prosecutorial reform and would ensure the preservation of old cadres at the prosecutor's office.

Sakvarelidze noted that renewal would take place as a result of job openings emerging in the future, in which case people without prosecutorial experience will be eligible.

Making changes to regional prosecutors' offices, scheduled for early 2016, is expected to be even harder because personnel at that level have more influence, according to Sakvarelidze.

"They have a history behind them and protection at the Prosecutor General's Office," he said.
Another obstacle is that Sakvarelidze's reform office is small and understaffed. He said his General Inspection Service, which investigates prosecutors' crimes, has few employees and cannot keep track of everything. He also said there was a lot of resistance within prosecutors' ranks to the General Inspection Service.

Sakvarelidze confirmed reports that the criminal cases against investigators subordinate to him and Deputy Prosecutor General Vitaly Kasko still exist. The cases were opened after Kasko, Sakvarelidze and their investigators arrested top prosecutors Oleksandr Korniyets and Volodymyr Shapakin on suspicion of bribery in July and were seen by critics as efforts by Shokin to cover up their alleged corruption.

"These cases will exist as long as there are people (at the prosecutor's office) who have friendly relations with the people we arrested," Sakvarelidze said.

Korniyets and Shapakin, who have been released on bail, often visit the prosecutor's office and may even put pressure on investigators, Sakvarelidze said. Under the current rules, they can easily leave the country, he added.

Watchdogs appeared to have scored a victory when procedural oversight in cases against top officials was given to Sakvarelidze last month. But all high profile corruption cases had been transferred to other prosecutors just before Sakvarelidze was given the new powers, he said. In the upcoming months Sakvarelidze will be deprived of the new authority when cases against top officials are transferred to the chief anti-corruption prosecutor.
 
 #37
Russia Insider
www.russia-insider.com
October 16, 2015
As Predicted Dutch Safety Board Produces Inconclusive Report on MH17
Report fails to take technical advice from Almaz-Antey into account and leaves key questions unanswered.
By Alexander Mercouris
Alexander Mercouris is a writer on international affairs with a special interest in Russia and law.  He has written extensively on the legal aspects of NSA spying and events in Ukraine in terms of human rights, constitutionality and international law.  He worked for 12 years in the Royal Courts of Justice in London as a lawyer, specializing in human rights and constitutional law. His family has been prominent in Greek politics for several generations.  He is a frequent commentator on television and speaker at conferences.  He resides in London.
[Text with links here http://russia-insider.com/en/politics/predicted-dutch-safety-board-produces-inconclusive-report-mh17/ri10509]

In the weeks leading up to the publication of the Dutch Safety Board's report into the MH17 tragedy, the drum beat from the Western media was that it would say MH17 was shot down by a BUK surface to air missile launched from militia controlled Snezhnoe.

In the event, when the report was published, it confirmed that MH17 had been shot down by a BUK surface to air missile, but failed to identify the precise launch point.  

It instead identified a huge area extending over 320 square kilometres, from any part of which it said the BUK missile could possibly have been launched, whilst admitting that more forensic tests were needed to confirm this.  

Whilst Shezhnoe lies just within this area, at the time of the tragedy the area was a bitterly contested war zone, and it is simply impossible to infer that it was definitely the militia who launched the missile from this area, if it was indeed from this area that the missile was launched.

Almaz-Antey, the BUK missile system's manufacturer, continues to insist - as it did previously - that the launch point was not in this area at all, but was at Zaroshchenskoye, a settlement 7 kilometres south of Shakhtorsk, which was controlled at the time by the Ukrainian army.

To those of us familiar with the Western media, the disappointment at the failure to pinpoint the launch point was obvious.

The report received little coverage, and was quickly relegated to the back pages.  By the following day as a news story it was dead.

Tjibbe Joustra, the chair of the inquiry, was so obviously embarrassed that after delivering the report he refused to take questions.  

Instead he spoke to some Dutch journalists in the corridors of the Dutch parliament building where - away from Russian journalists - he did say the BUK missile was launched from militia controlled territory.

In doing so Joustra went beyond what is in his own report.

What happened that prevented the report giving a precise answer to this critical question?

It is not in fact difficult to reconstruct what happened, though one has to go to Russian sources to do it.

The Russian aviation agency Rosaviation says the first draft of the report did identify Snezhnoe as the launch point.  

When the Russians were provided with the first draft, they vigorously complained that their input was being ignored.  According to some reports, they took their complaints directly to the head of the International Civil Aviation Organisation(the "ICAO").

It seems that as a result the report was watered down, leaving the precise launch point unidentified.

In the process the Dutch Safety Board has hidden behind the claim that under ICAO rules it lacks the authority to determine the precise launch point.  This is a claim it has made before, and which is often made by its defenders.

Supposedly its report is a purely forensic report limited to the question of what caused the crash - a BUK missile or some other malfunction or object - and which is not concerned with who launched the BUK missile and from where it was launched.

This claim is based on a misreading of Annex 13 to the Convention on Civil Aviation, which sets out the rules and procedures for air accident investigations.

Annex 13 prohibits an air accident inquiry from apportioning blame or liability, and says that these are questions that need to be dealt with separately.

That however reflects the fact that an air accident inquiry conducted under Annex 13 is set up to establish how an accident happened.  

It is not a court of law, able to decide legal questions.  

Blame and liability are legal questions, which only a court of law, not an accident inquiry, can determine.  

Annex 13 in no way limits an accident inquiry from carrying out a full and thorough investigation of an air crash to establish how it happened.  On the contrary it requires it.  

Nor does Annex 13 prevent an accident inquiry from interviewing witnesses.  On the contrary paragraph 5.4 of Annex 13 specifically provides for it.

Nor does Annex 13 say an accident inquiry cannot identify persons whose actions might have led to the air crash.  As it happens the report does identify some of the persons who were responsible for the MH17 air crash, namely the Ukrainian authorities, who it says failed to close the air corridor through which MH17 was flying as they should have done since the air corridor lay over a war zone.

The report avoids using witness evidence, with responsibility to obtain such evidence being passed to the Joint Inquiry Team ("JIT") that is carrying out a parallel criminal probe.

This brings to the fore the precise relationship between the Dutch Safety Board, whose inquiry was conducted under Annex 13 and whose report has just been published, and the JIT.

The Dutch Safety Board's inquiry originates from UN Security Council Resolution 2166, passed immediately following the tragedy, which requires "a full, thorough and independent international investigation into the incident in accordance with international civil aviation guidelines" (ie. Annex 13).

Resolution 2166 makes no reference to an investigation undertaken by a body like the JIT.  That investigation was set up independently soon after Resolution 2166 was passed, without reference to the Security Council, by a group of states including the Netherlands, Belgium, Australia and Ukraine following private discussions between each other (Malaysia joined several months later).

The setting up of a second inquiry under a veil of secrecy before the "full, thorough and independent international investigation" set up by the Security Council had even begun its work is extraordinary and points to the error made by Australia's inexperienced foreign minister Julie Bishop when she proposed Resolution 2166.

She failed to realise that an inquiry set up by the Security Council under "civil aviation guidelines" would mean an inquiry in which the Russians had a say.  

That is why the Russians - to Bishop's surprise - voted for Resolution 2166 and why a few weeks later, probably following angry recriminations behind the scenes, an entirely different inquiry independent of the Security Council and not bound by "international civil aviation guidelines" and from which the Russians were excluded, was hurriedly set up.

What that has meant in practice is that the Dutch Safety Board has decanted responsibility for the more difficult work it ought to have done to the JIT.  In order to justify doing that, it is hiding behind a narrow interpretation of Annex 13.

As it happens so far from being prevented by Annex 13 from identifying the launch point the report discusses the question at length and even solicits technical advice about it.

If it was Russian intervention that knocked the inquiry off its intended course, have we nonetheless learnt anything from its report?

It is now clear beyond doubt that MH17 was shot down by a BUK surface to air missile.  

Those who have persisted with the SU25 theory need now to accept this fact.  The shrapnel evidence is conclusive, and they are arguing with Almaz-Antey - the BUK missile system's manufacturer - not just with the Ukrainians and with the Dutch Safety Board.  That is a hopeless position to take, and those taking it risk losing credibility and becoming marginalised in any further discussions about this tragedy.

We also now know that the BUK missile used to shoot down MH17 was an older version of the missile, still used by the Ukrainians, but not apparently by the Russians.

The report has accepted Almaz-Antey's first claim that the BUK missile was of a type the Russians stopped making some time ago.

Based on further analysis Almaz-Antey now says the BUK missile was an even older variant than they originally thought, which stopped being made as long ago as 1986 (ie. before the USSR broke up).

Regardless of which variant of the BUK missile was used, if it is indeed the case that both of these types of BUK missile are no longer used by the Russian military, then the Russian military's direct involvement in the tragedy becomes extremely unlikely and can for practical purposes be excluded.

The report has not adopted Almaz-Antey's latest finding on the age of the missile, possibly because it came too late for it to be included in the report or - more probably - because the Ukrainians reject it.

The information that the BUK missile that shot down MH17 was an early generation missile no longer in service with the Russian military does not however prove that MH17 was shot down by the Ukrainian military.

It leaves open the possibility the militia captured the missile from the Ukrainians, as some reports suggest and as the German intelligence agency the BND apparently believes, or that it was taken out of a reserve stock of old missiles held somewhere in Russia and was smuggled across the border.

The report casts doubt on the claim the militia captured an operational BUK missile launcher at a Ukrainian military base.  The Ukrainians say the launcher the militia captured was not operational.  Western intelligence sources appear to agree.

As for the claim that the claim that a BUK missile launcher was smuggled across the border, that claim remains completely unsubstantiated, and we now know from the report that despite the size of the BUK missile system Western intelligence had no information before the tragedy that the militia possessed such a system (see below).

The report shows how busy the air corridor through which MH17 flew was at the time of the tragedy.  It seems a large proportion of the aircraft using the corridor were Russian, which argues against the Russians supplying the militia with a BUK system, which might put their own aircraft at risk.

To conclude, the fact the BUK missile that shot MH17 down was an old version of the missile apparently no longer used by the Russian military does tend to point to the Ukrainian military, but does not conclusively prove their involvement.

In all other respects the report is unsatisfactory.

It does not identify the precise launch point.

It makes no mention of the US satellite imagery US Secretary of State Kerry in an interview given 3 days after the tragedy said the US has in its possession.  

The report does not even say whether or not this evidence even exists or whether the Dutch Safety Board has asked to see it.  

There are suggestions this evidence is so highly classified it cannot be disclosed or even discussed.  

The report however refers - albeit at second hand - to radar evidence from NATO AWACS aircraft provided to the Dutch Safety Board at its request by the NATO command.  That evidence presumably is also classified.  

There may be a good reason why the NATO AWACS evidence has been declassified to the point where it can be discussed in the report, whilst the US satellite evidence has not been declassified so that it apparently cannot be discussed or even mentioned in the report.  However if so we do not know what that reason is.

The elephant in the room that the report refuses to see is however the Ukrainian BUK missile launchers we know from Russian satellite imagery were present in the area at the time of the tragedy.  

Attempts to discredit the Russian images of these launchers have been made by the Ukrainian authorities and by Bellingcat.  They have ended in abject failure.  The presence in the area at the time of the tragedy of these launchers is incontrovertible.  

The report in fact admits that the Ukrainians were known before the tragedy to have had anti-aircraft systems capable of shooting down MH17 in the area.  The report does not however say that some of these were BUK missile launchers.

The report makes no reference to these launchers though their relevance to the question of how MH17 was shot down is all too obvious.

The silence about the Ukrainian BUK missile launchers contrasts oddly with the report's lengthy discussion of the anti-aircraft systems the militia was believed to possess before the tragedy took place.  Inconclusive speculations about militia anti-aircraft systems were apparently considered more worthy of inclusion in the report than incontrovertible evidence of the presence of Ukrainian BUK missile systems, despite the fact that it was a BUK missile that shot MH17 down, and despite the fact the Ukrainians have a previous history of shooting down civilian airliners with such missiles.

As it happens the report confirms that neither the Dutch nor it seems the intelligence agency of any other Western power believed before the tragedy that the militia possessed anti-aircraft systems capable of shooting MH17 down, even though other Ukrainian aircraft had been shot down in the previous days over the same area, and even though the area was under the close observation of Western intelligence agencies.

The silence in the report about the Ukrainian BUK missile launchers continues the pattern of Western silence about these launchers that has been evident ever since the Russians first revealed them in their intelligence presentation of 21st July 2014.  It is doubtful that more than a tiny fraction of the Western public knows about them.  If it did it would radically alter the Western public's view of the tragedy.

However the single greatest flaw of the report is its failure to take heed of the Russian technical advice - specifically that of Almaz-Antey - even though it is the properties of a Russian weapons system - the BUK missile of which Almaz-Antey is the manufacturer - which is being discussed.

In the case of Almaz-Antey insult is added to injury by the way its advice is misrepresented in the report so as to make it seem that Almaz-Antey has corroborated the Dutch Safety Board's view that the missile was launched from within the 320 square kilometre area the Dutch Safety Board identifies as the probable launch area.  Almaz-Antey actually pinpoints the launch point as being outside this area, but the report makes no mention of the fact.

Even if Almaz-Antey's objectivity as a Russian state company is doubted, its expertise as the BUK missile's manufacturer ought to grant its opinion a measure of attention and respect.  It should at the very least be the subject of comment and discussion, even if it is in the end rejected.

One senses that the Dutch Safety Board was intimidated by Almaz-Antey's expertise and was afraid to take Almaz-Antey directly on, but could not accept Almaz-Antey's advice because it contradicted the Dutch Safety Board's pre-formed opinions about the tragedy.   It therefore simply ignored the advice.

The result is an incomplete and inconclusive report, just as I predicted.

What happens now?

Now that the Dutch Safety Board has released its report, the focus shifts to the criminal probe being undertaken by the JIT.

Since this probe is being conducted under a veil of secrecy - with Ukraine having a veto on release of any information - we know very little about it.  Supposedly it will report some time next year, with the suggestion that this is taking longer than was originally anticipated.

Since we know so little about this investigation it is impossible to assess the quality of the evidence it possesses.  It does not so far seem to include the witness evidence of the political and military leaderships of the two sides, or of the personnel of the various military units, or the log books and communications records of the various military units involved, which look to me essential if a successful prosecution is to be brought.  There is no information of this evidence being collected, as there surely would be if it was.

Certainly a successful prosecution would have to rely on evidence significantly stronger than the vague conclusions about the launch site in the Dutch Safety Board's report, and the social media images and the probably in large measure fabricated radio intercepts beloved of Bellingcat and Elliott Higgins, to stand any real prospect of success in any remotely impartial or independent court.

Assuming there is enough evidence to bring a case, to which court would it be brought?

Since the alleged crime was one that is supposed to have taken place on Ukrainian territory, if a prosecution is brought, the courts with jurisdiction to try it are the Ukrainian courts.

No one takes that possibility seriously.  An attempt to set up an independent tribunal was however blocked in the UN Security Council by the Russians, who were never consulted about the setting up of the JIT and who consider it a device to undermine the inquiry set up by Resolution 2166, which they voted for.  

In a recent Crosstalk programme for RT in which I participated, the scholar and writer John Laughland suggested that moves might be underway to conduct the prosecution before the International Criminal Court in the Hague.

Whilst that is a possibility, there would be significant legal difficulties.   The Rome Statute under which the International Criminal Court was set up does not give it jurisdiction to try crimes committed during internal conflicts.  

A way round this might be found, but there would be a risk that in that case that might lead to calls for crimes committed during the conflict by the Ukrainian government to be put under the International Criminal Court's scrutiny as well.  Needless to say that would not be something the Western powers would welcome.

There must also be some people in Washington uncomfortable with the idea of treating the accidental shooting down of a civilian airliner over a war zone as a crime, given that it is something the US has done in the past itself and could conceivably do again.

The uncertainty about which court would try any case the JIT brings - assuming such a case is ever brought - is a reflection of the hurried and secretive way in which the JIT was set up, with no one thinking the implications through.

There must be some people in Washington and Brussels who are by now wondering whether bringing a case is worth the trouble, given how thin the evidence is likely to be, especially at a time when efforts are underway to de escalate the Ukrainian conflict.  

The fact that assurances have to be given repeatedly to reassure the Western public and the families of the victims that the resolve to bring the perpetrators to justice remains unchanged, is a sure sign such doubts exist.  

One way to get round the difficulty - and to avoid the embarrassment of simply dropping the case - might be to bring charges against lesser people on the grounds that the more important people who were supposedly responsible are either dead or beyond reach.  

It is anyway inconceivable that the Russians - who have repeatedly made it known that they will never extradite anybody - will surrender anyone accused of a crime to the JIT or to any court considering a case brought by it, and that fact alone makes it unlikely a trial will ever take place.

Regardless of what happens to the JIT, one case is already underway.

This is the case Almaz-Antey is bringing before the European Court of Justice against the sanctions the European Council has imposed on it.  

As of now, on the basis of Almaz-Antey's presentation and in light of previous precedents, that case looks undefendable.  

It will be interesting to see if the lawyers who advise the European Council are of the same view, and if they take any steps to settle it.

There is a third case that is now round the corner.

Prior to the shooting down of MH17 the Ukrainians claimed the Russians had shot down two of their aircraft: an AN26 transport and an SU25 ground attack bomber.

These aircraft were flying in the same general area in which MH17 was shot down.

The Ukrainians say these aircraft were flying at an altitude of more than 6,000 metres, much higher than short range man portable anti aircraft missiles ("MANPADS") of the sort known to have been possessed by the militia could reach.

The Ukrainians claimed these aircraft were shot down by the Russians using either a Pantsir surface to air missile or an air to air missile launched by a MiG29 fighter.

Those claims are almost certainly untrue.  

As the report says, examination of the wreckage of the AN26 suggests it was shot down at a much lower altitude than the Ukrainians say, almost certainly by a MANPADS missile.

The Ukrainians however refuse to retreat from these claims.  

By doing so they have hoisted themselves on their own petard.

By claiming some of their aircraft were shot down from a much higher altitude than a MANPADS missile can reach, the Ukrainians have opened themselves up to criticism in the report that they should have closed the airspace through which MH17 was flying to commercial aircraft.

This criticism almost certainly exposes the Ukrainians to claims in negligence from the victims' families.  

It is likely Western governments, who the report says were given this information by the Ukrainians but who also failed to warn their aircraft to stay away from the area, are now exposed to claims in negligence as well.

There are difficulties of sovereign immunity and jurisdiction in the way of bringing such claims.  Ways round these obstacles however almost certainly exist.  It is a certainty there are lawyers looking for those ways as I write this.

If or rather when claims in negligence are brought, it will be interesting to see if Almaz-Antey is called as an expert witness.  If that happen then the situation will become, as the lawyers say, very interesting.
 
 #38
Dances With Bears
http://johnhelmer.net
October 16, 2015
DUTCH REPORTS ON MH17 HAVE MISTAKEN BUK MISSILE MODEL, WARHEAD TYPE - THE FOOTNOTE WHICH PUTS THE BOOT TO BUK
By John Helmer, Moscow
[Footnotes, links, and photos here http://johnhelmer.net/?p=14340]

The Dutch Safety Board (DSB) conclusion on the missile detonation which caused the crash of Malaysian Airlines MH17 is based on a report of the Dutch National Aerospace Laboratory (NLR), based in Amsterdam. The 66-page NLR report can be found as an appendix to the main DSB report. Combined in their release this week, the two Dutch organizations and the two Dutch reports claim that a Russian-made Buk missile of the 9M38 model series, armed with warhead type 9N314M, was fired at MH17, exploding to the left of the aircraft at about two metres from the cockpit. The blast and shrapnel spray from this detonation, the two Dutch reports claim, caused the break-up of the aircraft in the air, and the deaths of all on board.

From the evening of the crash day, July 17, 2014, western government officials and media reporters have blamed Russia for manufacturing the missile, ordering it fired, and causing the crash. They are now citing the Dutch reports as proof of the initial assignment of blame. This is despite the DSB's reluctance to do so in its report; and despite the refusal to date of Australian and Dutch police, coronial investigators and pathologists to release the detailed autopsy evidence they have gathered of the shrapnel which struck the aircraft and the bodies of those on board. According to the DSB report, shrapnel killed the crew in the cockpit, and three pieces of shrapnel, characteristic of warhead type 9N314M , were found in the bodies of the pilot and co-pilot. No crew member or passenger in the aircraft, outside the cockpit, was struck by this shrapnel, according to the DSB.

On these three pieces of metal hangs the case for a Buk missile detonation as the cause of crash; the cause of death; and Russian culpability for the shoot-down. But a search through the DSB records, and through the technical reports of shrapnel impact and blast simulation on which the DSB has based its conclusions, together with interviews with spokesmen for the Dutch investigations, finds that the only evidence for the source of the three metal fragments turns out to be a classified military secret of the Dutch Ministry of Defence.

Questioned today for the source of its evidence for the firing of the 9M38 or 9M38M1 model missile , and for the detonation of the 9N314M warhead, NLR spokesman Jan Venema said the NLR will not disclose how, and from what source, it had obtained the missile and warhead data for its detonation and shrapnel testing, and for the conclusions it has reported. According to the LNR text [1], LNR relied on an Almaz-Antei "representative" for the information that "only the 9N314M warhead contains bowtie fragments".

Almaz-Antei has reported several times in public this week that the 9N314M warhead cannot be operated from the 9M38 missile series. The two cannot be connected electronically, according to the missile manufacturer. In addition, Almaz-Antei has confirmed that in the warhead types containing the distinctive shrapnel - the Russians are calling this "I-beam", the Dutch "bowties" and "butterflies" - there are approximately 7,800 elements in total. Of this number, not less than a third, or 2,600 fragments, are of the bowtie type, again according to the manufacturer. If the DSB, LNR and TNO are all telling the truth, the identification of just three in the cockpit crew's bodies, and one other fragment in the cockpit wreckage, is inexplicable. Almaz-Antei says [2] its computer modelling, as well as its physical blast simulation, make this impossible.

NLR cites Almaz-Antei in its report for a description of the characteristics of Buk missile models, warhead types, and shrapnel composition of the warheads. This is NLR's tabulation of what it claims to have been the combinations:

Source: http://cdn.onderzoeksraad.nl/documents/appendix-x-nlr-report-en.pdf [1]

Asked today to explain how the evidence of Almaz-Antei that the missile model and the warhead type cannot be combined operationally and fired together, Venema said NLR is prohibited from answering questions by an agreement with the DSB.

Venema claimed in a telephone conversation that NLR has "the experience and expertise" to analyse the evidence of the MH17 aircraft wreckage. In the past, has NLR had experience of testing Russian-made missiles and aerial munitions, Venema was asked. He refuses to say. "I can't go into the detail of the study." According to Venema, NLR has an agreement with DSB that "all questions have to be answered by them."

A third Dutch report [3] by the Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific Research (TNO) [4], a semi-government operation, has been published as an appendix to the main DSB dossier. The TNO claims it simulated the missile warhead detonation against a Boeing airframe by computer modelling, according to a programme called AUTODYN version 14.5. TNO reports that "in consultation with the DSB, the modelled warhead is type 9N314." No explanation for selecting that warhead has been provided by TNO.

Monique De Geus is the spokesman of TNO. She was asked to say whether the simulation reported by TNO was done by three-dimension computer modelling only, or involved physical testing, and what was TNO's source for the warhead data. De Geus interrupted the question halfway, saying: "we are not allowed to answer any questions about this. You must refer to the DSB." When asked if the question might be asked in full before TNO answered, De Geus allowed the question to be read out on the telephone: was the simulation computerized or physical? and from what source were the parameters of the simulated warhead obtained? De Geus refused to answer, and hung up her telephone.

In addition to the DSB "consultation", the TNO reports [5] "this study uses classified data as described in the Wet Bescherming Staatsgeheimen [State Secrets Protection Act] . The text of this report has been inspected and released for publication by the Netherlands Ministry of Defence". A footnote to a description of the warhead at the end of the TNO report cites "Jane's Defence Land-Based Air Defence 2009-2010, 22nd edition." In short, the only sources for TNO's conclusions about a Buk missile warhead blast is a NATO military secret, plus a five-year old commercial publication from London.

The TNO conclusions on the detonation have been cited by the NLR for substantiating its conclusions on the missile which brought MH17 down. NLR's conclusions are the substantiation which DSB cites for its conclusions for the cause of the crash. So the DSB spokesman, Sara Vernooij, was asked from what source did the DSB obtain the parameters of the missile and warhead which have become the evidence for the DSB's determination that a Buk missile was the sole cause of the MH17 crash. Vernooij said the DSB will not answer. "If it's not in report, it is not to be released," Vernooij said.
 
 #39
Consortiumnews.com
October 15, 2015
NYT Plays Games with MH-17 Tragedy
By Robert Parry
Investigative reporter Robert Parry broke many of the Iran-Contra stories for The Associated Press and Newsweek in the 1980s.

Exclusive: There was a time when The New York Times showed some skepticism toward the words of the U.S. government but those days are long gone, as the Times sinks even deeper into the propaganda swamp with an editorial playing games with the Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 tragedy, writes Robert Parry.

In its single-minded propaganda campaign against Russia, The New York Times has no interest in irony, but if it had, it might note that some of the most important advances made by the Dutch Safety Board's report on the shoot-down of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 came because the Russian government declassified sensitive details about its anti-aircraft weaponry.

The irony is that the Obama administration has steadfastly refused to declassify its intelligence information on the tragedy, which presumably could answer some of the key remaining mysteries, such as where the missile was fired and who might have fired it. While merrily bashing the Russians, the Times has failed to join in demands for the U.S. government to make public what it knows about the tragedy that killed 298 people on July 17, 2014.

In other words, through its hypocritical approach to this atrocity, the Times has been aiding and abetting a cover-up of crucial evidence, all the better to score some propaganda points against the Russ-kies, the antithesis of what an honest news organization would do.

In its editorial on Thursday, The Times also continues to play on the assumed ignorance of its readers by hyping the fact that the likely weapon, a Buk surface-to-air missile, was "Russian-made," which while true, is not probative of which side fired it. Ukraine, a former Soviet republic, is armed with Russian-made weapons, too.

But that obvious fact is skirted by the Times highlighting in its lead paragraph that the plane was shot down "by a Russian-made Buk surface-to-air missile," adding: "Even Russia, which has spent much of those [past] 15 months generating all kinds of implausible theories that put the blame ... on Ukraine, and doing its best to thwart investigations, has had to acknowledge that this is what happened."

Though some misinformed Times' readers might be duped into finding that sentence persuasive, the reality is that Russia has long considered it likely that a Buk or other anti-aircraft missile was involved in downing MH-17. That's why Russia declassified so many details about its Buk systems for the Dutch investigation - something governments are loath to do - and the Russian manufacturer issued a report on the likely Buk role last June.

But the Times pretends that the Russians have now been cornered with the truth, writing that Russia "now argues that the fatal missile was an older model that the Russian armed forces no longer use, and that it was fired from territory controlled by the Ukrainian government." Yet, much of that information was provided by the Russian missile manufacturer a long time ago and was the subject of a June press conference.

Blinded by Bias

If the Times editors weren't blinded by their anti-Russian bias, they also might have noted that the Dutch Safety Board and the Russian manufacturer of the Buk anti-missile system are in substantial agreement over the older Buk model type that apparently brought down MH-17.

Almaz-Antey, the Russian Buk manufacturer, said last June that its analysis of the plane's wreckage revealed that MH-17 had been attacked by a "9M38M1 of the Buk M1 system." The company's Chief Executive Officer Yan Novikov said the missile was last produced in 1999.

The Dutch report, released Tuesday, said: "The damage observed on the wreckage in amount of damage, type of damage, boundary and impact angles of damage, number and density of hits, size of penetrations and bowtie fragments found in the wreckage, is consistent with the damage caused by the 9N314M warhead used in the 9M38 and 9M38M1 BUK surface-to-air missile."

Also on Tuesday, the manufacturer expanded on its findings saying that the warhead at issue had not been produced since 1982 and was long out of Russia's military arsenal, but adding that as of 2005 there were 991 9M38M1 Buk missiles and 502 9M38 missiles in Ukraine's inventory. Company executives said they knew this because of discussions regarding the possible life-extension of the missiles.

Based on other information regarding how the warhead apparently struck near the cockpit of MH-17, the manufacturer calculated the missile's likely flight path and firing location, placing it in the eastern Ukrainian village of Zakharchenko, a few miles south of route H21 and about four miles southwest of the town of Shakhtars'k, a lightly populated rural part of Donetsk province that the Russians claim was then under Ukrainian government control.

The area is about three miles west of the 320-square-kilometer zone that the Dutch report established as the likely area from which the missile was fired. In July 2014, control of that area was being contested although most of the fighting was occurring about 100 kilometers to the north, meaning that the southern sector was more poorly defined and open to the possibility of a mobile system crossing from one side to the other.

Almaz-Antay CEO Novikov said the company's calculations placed the missile site in Zakharchenko with "great accuracy," a possible firing zone that "does not exceed three to four kilometers in length and four kilometers in width." However, Ukrainian authorities said their calculations placed the firing location farther to the east, deeper into rebel-controlled territory.

Thus, the importance of the U.S. intelligence data that Secretary of State John Kerry claimed to possess just three days after the plane was shot down. Appearing on NBC's "Meet the Press" on July 20, 2014, Kerry declared, "we picked up the imagery of this launch. We know the trajectory. We know where it came from. We know the timing. And it was exactly at the time that this aircraft disappeared from the radar."

But the U.S. government has released none of its evidence on the shoot-down. A U.S. intelligence source told me that CIA analysts briefed the Dutch investigators but under conditions of tight secrecy. None of the U.S. information was included in the report and Dutch officials have refused to discuss any U.S. intelligence information on the grounds of national security.

In the weeks after the shoot-down, I was told by another source briefed by U.S. intelligence analysts that they had concluded that a rogue element of the Ukrainian government - tied to one of the oligarchs - was responsible for the attack, while absolving senior Ukrainian leaders including President Petro Poroshenko and Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk. But I wasn't able to determine whether this U.S. analysis was a consensus or a dissident opinion.

Last October, Der Spiegel reported that German intelligence, the BND, concluded that the Russian government was not the source of the missile battery - that it had been captured from a Ukrainian military base - but the BND blamed the ethnic Russian rebels for firing it. However, a European source told me that the BND's analysis was not as conclusive as Der Spiegel had described.

Prior to the MH-17 crash, ethnic Russian rebels in eastern Ukraine were reported to have captured a Buk system after overrunning a government air base, but Ukrainian authorities said the system was not operational, as recounted in the Dutch report. The rebels also denied possessing a functioning Buk system.

Who Has These Buks?

As for whether the 9M38 Buk system is still in the Ukrainian military arsenal, government officials in Kiev claimed to have sold their stockpile of older Buks to Georgia, but Ukraine appears to still possess the 9M38 Buk system, based on photographs of Ukrainian weapons displays. In other words, Ukrainian authorities appear to be lying about this crucial point.

It should be noted, too, that just because Russia no longer deploys the outmoded Buks doesn't mean that it might not have some mothballed in warehouses that could be pulled out and distributed in a sub rosa fashion, although both the Ukrainian rebels and Russian officials deny this possibility. According to the Ukrainian government, the rebels were only known to have shoulder-fired "manpads" in July 2014 - and that weapon lacked the range to destroy a civilian airliner flying at 33,000 feet.

Yet, rather than delve into this important mystery, The New York Times' editorial simply repeats the Western "group think" that took shape in the days after the MH-17 tragedy, that somehow the rebels shot down the plane with a Buk missile supplied by Russia. The other possibility that the missile was fired by some element of the Ukrainian security forces was given short-shrift despite the fact that Ukraine had moved some of its Buk batteries into eastern Ukraine presumably to shoot down possible Russian aircraft incursions.

As described in the Dutch report, this Ukrainian concern was quite real in the days before the MH-17 shoot-down. On July 16 - just one day before the tragedy - a Ukrainian SU-25 jetfighter was shot down by what Ukrainian authorities concluded was an air-to-air missile presumably fired by a Russian warplane patrolling the Russia-Ukraine border.

Thus, it would make sense that the Ukrainian air-defense forces would have moved their Buk batteries close to the border and would have been on the lookout for possible Russian intruders entering or leaving Ukrainian air space. So, one possibility is that a poorly organized Ukrainian air-defense force mistook MH-17 for a hostile Russian aircraft high-tailing it back to Russia and fired.

Another theory that I'm told U.S. intelligence analysts examined was the possibility that a rogue Ukrainian element - linked to a fiercely anti-Russian oligarch - may have hoped that President Vladimir Putin's official plane was in Ukrainian air space en route home from a state visit to South America. Putin's jet and MH-17 had very similar markings. But Putin used a different route and had already landed in Moscow.

A third possibility, which I'm told at least some U.S. analysts think makes the most sense, was that the attack on MH-17 was a premeditated provocation by a team working for a hard-line oligarch with the goal of getting Russia blamed and heightening Western animosity toward Putin.

Obama's Secrets

But whatever your preferred scenario - whether you think the Russians or the Ukrainians did it - the solution to the mystery could clearly benefit from President Barack Obama doing what Putin has done: declassify relevant intelligence and defense information.

One might think that the Times' editors would be at the forefront of demanding transparency from the U.S. government, especially since senior U.S. officials rushed out of the gate in the days after the tragedy to put the blame on the Russians. Yet, since five days after the shoot-down, the Obama administration has refused to update or refine its claims.

Earlier this year, a spokesperson for Director for National Intelligence James Clapper told me that the DNI would not provide additional information out of concern that it might influence the Dutch investigation, a claim that lacked credibility because the Dutch investigation began within a day of the MH-17 crash and the DNI issued a sketchy white paper on the case four days later.

In other words, the initial U.S. rush to judgment already had prejudiced the investigation by indicating which way the United States, a NATO ally of the Netherlands, wanted the inquiry to go: blame the Russians. Later, withholding more refined intelligence data also concealed whatever contrary analyses had evolved within the U.S. intelligence community after Kerry and the DNI had jumped to their hasty conclusions.

Yet, The New York Times took note of none of that, simply piling on the Russians again and hailing a dubious online publication called Bellingcat, which has consistently taken whatever the U.S. propaganda line is on international incidents and has systematically screwed up key facts.

In 2013, Bellingcat's founder Eliot Higgins got the firing location wrong for the sarin gas attack outside Damascus, Syria. He foisted the blame on Bashar al-Assad's forces in line with U.S. propaganda but it turned out that the missile's range was way too short for his analysis to be correct. [See Consortiumnews.com's "The Collapsing Syria-Sarin Case."]

Then, earlier this year, Higgins fed Australia's "60 Minutes" program wrong coordinates for the location of the so-called "Buk-getaway video" in eastern Ukraine. Though the program treated Higgins's analysis as gospel, the images from the video and from the supposed location clearly didn't match, leading the program to engage in a journalistic fraud to pretend otherwise. [See Consortiumnews.com's "A Reckless Stand-upper on MH-17."]

But the Times' editorial board simply gushed all over Bellingcat, promoting the Web site as if it's a credible source, writing that the Dutch report "is consistent with theories advanced by the United States and Ukraine as well as evidence collected by the independent investigative website Bellingcat.com, which hold that the fatal missile was fired from territory controlled by Russian-backed rebels in eastern Ukraine."

The Times then distorted the findings of the Buk manufacturer to present them as somehow contradicted by the Dutch report, which substantially relied on the declassified information from the manufacturer to reach roughly the same conclusion, that the missile was an older-model Buk.

However, without irony, the Times writes, "This fact is not something Russians are likely to learn; Russian television has presented only the Kremlin's disinformation of what is going on in Ukraine and, for that matter, Syria. ... Creating an alternative reality has been a big reason for President Vladimir Putin's boundless popularity among Russians. He sees no reason to come clean for the shooting down of the Boeing 777."

Yet, the actual reality is that Russia has provided much more information and shown much greater transparency than President Obama and the U.S. government have. The Dutch report also ignored one of the key questions asked by Russian authorities in the days after the MH-17 shoot-down: why did Ukraine's air defense turn on the radar used to guide Buk missiles?

But the Times remains wedded to its propaganda narrative and doesn't want inconvenient facts to get in the way. Rather than demand that Obama "come clean" about what the U.S. intelligence agencies know about the MH-17 case, the newspaper of record chooses to mislead its readers about the facts.
 
 #40
Council on Foreign Relations
www.cfr.org
October 2015
Crisis Over Ukraine
Contingency Planning Memorandum Update
By Steven Pifer
Steven Pifer is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and former ambassador to Ukraine

In early 2014, Russia began supporting armed separatist forces in the eastern-predominantly Russian-speaking-part of Ukraine. Subsequent fighting was halted in September 2015 by a cease-fire agreement known as Minsk II. But, despite ongoing diplomatic efforts, few other aspects of the agreement have been implemented. Heavy fighting could resume and precipitate an even deeper crisis between Russia and the West. As a 2009 Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Contingency Planning Memorandum "Crisis Between Ukraine and Russia" argued, a major Ukraine-Russia confrontation has significant implications for the United States.

New Concerns

Aside from the recent cease-fire in eastern Ukraine, Russia has done little to implement the Minsk II provisions. As of September 2015, Russian military personnel and heavy weapons remain in the eastern Donbas region, while major questions persist about Russia's support for other aspects of Minsk II. The likely prognosis is a frozen-or not-so-frozen-conflict, which will pose substantial risks for Europe and U.S. interests.

Moscow could choose to escalate tensions in eastern Ukraine by applying additional military pressure in an effort to further destabilize Kiev, force the West to relax its sanctions on Russia, and/or distract the Russian public from a deteriorating economic situation at home. Fighting in the Donbas could also be ignited by local separatist forces seeking to change the status quo.

The unsettled conflict makes it more difficult for Kiev to pursue reforms and turn around the faltering Ukrainian economy. Gross domestic product is expected to decline by more than 10 percent this year, and domestic politics have become more complicated as the public becomes increasingly frustrated with austerity measures and the slow fight against corruption. Meanwhile, right-wing political forces oppose Minsk II and a negotiated settlement. A new political crisis in Ukraine would hinder Kiev's ability to pursue reform. It could also tempt Moscow to make further efforts to weaken Kiev's position at a time when Ukrainian public opinion toward Russia has hardened and Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko is less free to maneuver. The crisis also continues to complicate U.S.-Russia relations, which are at their lowest point since the Cold War. Russian military activity near North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) borders has also markedly increased, raising the risk of a deadly accident or miscalculation.

Policy Implications

The absence of a political settlement in Ukraine will continue to affect the prospects for cooperation with Russia on a range of challenges, such as counterterrorism, nonproliferation, and the deteriorating situation in Syria. Increased tensions with Russia could also strain U.S. relations with those European Union (EU) countries that may oppose further sanctions and increased assistance to Ukraine, especially while they remain burdened with the ongoing migrant crisis. Meanwhile, other European countries, especially in the Baltics and central Europe, will be looking to the United States for further reassurance about their security. The 2016 NATO summit will likely review the alliance's stance toward Russia and consider new defense requirements in the Baltics and central Europe. The emergence of another frozen conflict in Ukraine will make it harder to resolve the festering situations in Transnistria, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia. The Crimea problem will also remain. While Kiev has wisely postponed that question, the post-Cold War order in Europe, based on the fundamental principle that force should not be used to change borders, has been undermined and needs to be reinforced.

Recommendations

The more the West can bolster NATO's conventional deterrence and use economic sanctions on Russia and assistance to Ukraine-and other "in-between" countries such as Moldova and Georgia-to constrain and reduce the Kremlin's ability to interfere, the more likely that there will be a productive dialogue with Moscow. The United States should aim to support Ukraine, assure nervous allies, and sustain unity with Europe, while leaving the door open for broader discussions with Russia if it changes its Ukraine policy. Specific recommendations for Washington include the following:

    -Press the Ukrainian government to avoid political infighting and move faster on reform-particularly on deregulation, anticorruption measures, and liberalization of the energy sector-by offering the carrot of greater Western financial assistance. Washington should counsel Kiev to do all it can to implement Minsk II, so that if the agreement is seen to fail, the blame rests on Moscow and the separatists. (This step could prove fundamental to keeping Europe on board with implementing sanctions.)
    -Continue close coordination with EU nations-Germany in particular-on how to support Ukraine, including with additional U.S. and EU financial aid (about $5 billion to $7 billion), and persuade Russia to change its course. This will require continued transatlantic unity on sanctions. The United States should also work more directly in the settlement negotiation process if it seems that such involvement could make a difference.
    -Work with NATO to bolster conventional defense capabilities in the Baltics and central Europe to deter Russia and to assure allies. This includes a larger rotational presence of alliance ground forces, with a goal of maintaining three hundred to six hundred NATO ground troops in each of the Baltic states and Poland.
    -Work with individual NATO allies, such as Poland, Britain, and Canada, to provide greater military assistance to Ukraine. Doing so would allow the Ukrainian army to drive up the costs of any further Russian or separatist offensive actions in the Donbas.
    -Work with NATO to seek a military-to-military dialogue with Russia on reducing the risk of accidents or miscalculation between armed forces. In addition to building on arrangements such as the 1989 Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities agreement, NATO should explore updating the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's (OSCE) 2011 Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures. This could lower the threshold for prenotification of military exercises, which would be useful given the increasing frequency of exercises on both sides.
    -Work with Germany, which assumes its chairmanship of the OSCE in 2016, and other allies to reestablish an accord between the West and Russia on the security rules for Europe. U.S. and European officials will need to decide the timing, circumstances, and venue to discuss this issue with Russian officials.

Continue to press Moscow to change its policy and facilitate a settlement of the crisis by stressing the importance of restoring a broader dialogue between the United States/West and Russia.