#2
Kremlin.ru
October 14, 2015
Russia Calling! Investment Forum. (transcript continued)

Vladimir Putin took part in the 7th Russia Calling! Investment Forum organised by VTB Capital....

Vladimir Putin: You recalled the crisis of 2008-2009. You have also mentioned the Central Bank's decision to introduce a floating national currency, the ruble. We did not do it in 2008-2009. Then we believed the economy was not ready for such steps, such tough measures. Then we really did use up huge reserves to maintain the ruble exchange rate and retained economic stability. However, we did not make the decision to limit the movement of capital, nor have we made it now, and we are not planning anything of the kind in the future.

I believe that the fact that we have demonstrated to all our partners and investors who have invested into the Russian economy that we would not do that is also a reason why we had a direct flow of investment in the third quarter of this year for the first time since the second quarter of 2010. I would like to repeat that we are not planning any limitations on the movement of capital.

As for the introduction of the floating ruble rate, this also has its drawbacks for some participants in economic activity: there are some drawbacks for Russian citizens, of course, for individuals, as this has influenced prices and, consequently, inflation. In other words, this has some negative consequences for the economy and our citizens. However, overall for the country and its economy, and therefore for the citizens of the Russian Federation in the final count, this step turned out to be the right one and a timely one.

Andrei Kostin: Thank you, Mr President.

I remember the meeting you held in 2008 quite well, and this issue was addressed. At the time, I myself suggested limited measures, and you said: this will not happen, that is not why we made all our reforms and changes, to now go back. And since then, I do not recall a single instance when this topic was discussed seriously. I think that here, you are very consistent. But all investors ask: this is one of the main concerns that they have.

Vladimir Putin: You know, there are many possible limitations, from full prohibition to partial prohibition related to reserve requirements, certain volumes of transfers and so on. None of this will work.

Question: Mr President, this spring, after a two-year pause, the second pillar of the pension system started working again as before, with funds being transferred to NPFs. However, in September, there was already talk again about a new freeze. To the outside observer, this risks looking like uncertain decision-making, and that in turn raises question marks about the visibility on other elements of long-term economic policy. In addition, freezing payments would have direct effects on the long-term savings of the economy. In your view, what can be done to ensure that key long-term policy decisions are taken in a consistent manner, and that they agree with the long-term strategy that has already been announced? Thank you.

Vladimir Putin: In the economy, as in many other areas in the life of the state and citizens, this is always a compromise between what is possible and what is desired. First of all, we need to balance the pension system, whose income is not currently as high as we would like. And the extension of this freeze in the pension saving system has to do with this situation and the need to balance the pension system and guarantee that all Russian pensioners will get stable payments and stable income.

You said that something is changing. In this case, nothing has changed, because last year, we also froze these transfers. But I would like to note that we are not cancelling this programme or these plans drastically, and we assume that ultimately, the defined contribution pension system will develop in Russia in the future.

In this respect, I would like to note that I and many of my colleagues would like for these pension payments - much as in the United States and many other nations - to not only be used by our colleagues in the Finance Ministry, who take this money from the market and convert it into securities, but for it to truly be channelled into the economy. We need to resolve this issue.

If there are significant accumulations, then essentially, enormous reserves are created, but we need this money to be guaranteed for future pensioners, protected absolutely while working effectively in the economy. We will need to deal with all these elements and, in addition to everything else, we will need to ensure the safekeeping of these funds. All this, together - the first, second, third, fourth and fifth issue - when we achieve all of this, and I think that it will be done, then the pension system will continue to develop.

I repeat again, we are assuming that, A, it will be preserved, and B, we will invest funds into in the future to develop it.

Question: The set 5% inflation target seems to have been pushed back once again. And I think that's somewhat understandable given the events of the past 12 months. But I think it's worth bearing in mind what other countries have suffered as they've deviated from these targets and the difficulties they've had regaining control of such metrics. Could I ask you, relative to other priorities, such as restoring economic growth, job creation, reserve building, etc., how important is achieving the inflation target?

Vladimir Putin: Naturally, all these macroeconomic parameters, as I already said many times - as, I'm sure, have all of my colleagues here - there is already a kind of stamp, we will strive to abide by these macroeconomic parameters. But one of them should not contradict another. Just now, Mr Kostin stated that even here, on stage, when our colleagues spoke, they had disagreements amongst themselves. But you could also say that there are disputes constantly when we gather for various meetings.

Today, we have another meeting with the Government members, and I'm almost certain these questions will come up again. What is more important? To maintain a macroeconomic parameter like inflation, as the Finance Minister states, through the Central Bank, or to reduce federal budget expenditures with the hope that more money will flow into the economy? This is the question, but it does not have a clear answer - whether this will happen or not. But in general, it's hard not to agree with.

 On the other hand, the Economic Development Ministry always demands more resources for specific projects, for supporting the real sectors of the Russian economy, and says that it's okay if the inflation parameters are a little bit higher. We were planning for 3% next year? No, 6%; that means, the subsequent years will be 4-5%. It's clear that for developed economies, 2-4% inflation is optimal. Of course, we will strive for this. It's hard for me to say now how quickly we will achieve this parameter. By 2017-2018?

Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina: By 2017.

Vladimir Putin: By 2017 we expect somewhere around 5-6% - what is your estimate?

Elvira Nabiullina: Four percent.

Vladimir Putin: We're even hearing four. God bless the Central Bank. (Laughter.)

But you see what the problem is? It's that the Central Bank can regulate the volume of money supply and influence the national currency exchange rate. But if we analyse the situation, I was just looking at some fact sheets before coming here on how much the Central Bank has issued and the volume of money supply in our economy, as well as the inflation we had - this year, if I remember correctly, the Central Bank added the least money supply to the economy, while inflation was higher. This is only one of the parameters. So we need to give more attention to other factors, the most important of which, a fundamental one, is diversifying the economy, reducing dependence on energy resources and our so-called traditional exports, reducing bureaucracy in our economy, creating reliable conditions for investors and ensuring normal functioning of the judicial system and administrative structures. We are working on all of this. But these are issues that take longer than a year to resolve - and longer than two, or even five years - but we know that we need to do this, and we will follow this path.

Question: Over the weekend, US President Obama called into question your leadership over Syria. He said that you are propping up an ally rather than going after ISIS. He also said you are running down the economy here. Can I ask you, how do you respond to President Obama's comments and what would you say to international investors who are dissuaded from putting money into the Russian economy because of such remarks? Thank you.

Vladimir Putin: You know, as we say in Russia, everything has been thrown into one pile. What does the situation with ISIS in Syria have to do with investments in Russia? Although, of course, everything in the world is interconnected. There is no direct connection, but ultimately, of course, everything is interconnected.

First of all, I do not want to debate with anyone right now, but I will note that we are not striving for some sort of leadership in Syria. There can only be one leader in Syria: the Syrian people. We strive to make our input in the fight against terrorism, which is dangerous for the United States, Russia, European nations and the entire world, without any exceptions.

I will point out that all our actions, as I have said before, are in strict compliance with the UN Charter and international law - unlike our colleagues from the so-called international coalition led by the United States, which is acting without UN Security Council resolutions and without invitation by the Syrian authorities. Over this time (operations by international forces headed by the United States - or if we put it simply, the actions by the US - have been underway by over a year), they have engaged 11 nations in bombing, with over 500 strikes on Syrian territory, spending half a billion dollars, and that's only officially, to train Free Syrian Army fighters to fight against ISIS. We know the result: there is none, there's no result.

Now, it has been reported that the Free Syrian Army is being supplied with ammunition via aircraft. Where is this Free Syrian Army? If they simply discharge or dump the ammunition and weaponry somewhere from the air, how can we know that it won't all get into the hands of ISIS, as this happened during training of the Free Syrian Army personnel and arming it - what are the guarantees? After all, this was just done, this just happened, and just now, the United States admitted that the action failed. And now, they are simply throwing ammunition somewhere. To whom? This is not a rhetorical question.

Now, we often hear that our pilots are bombing the wrong targets, not ISIS. First of all, we briefed US leadership in advance, although the United States has never done this. We were the first to do this out of respect and a desire to establish a working relationship. Now they tell us, "No, first, we are not ready to cooperate with you, and second, you are bombing the wrong targets." We said at the military level, appealed and asked, "Give us the targets that you are 100% certain to be terrorists." The replied, "No, we are not ready to do that." So then, we thought about it and asked another question: "Then tell us, where shouldn't we be bombing?" No response there either. So then, what should we be doing? This is no joke, I did not make this up, this is what happened. Just recently, we said to the Americans, "Tell us the facilities we should strike." There was no response. How can we work jointly then? Do you have an answer? I don't have one either, yet.

I think that some of our partners are simply confused and do not have a clear understanding of what is really happening on the ground, nor what goals they want to achieve. But we will insistently work to ensure that the efforts in the fight against international terrorism are joint efforts, and the result is clear, expected, and aimed at fighting international terror, to eliminate this threat for all of us.

As for investments, as I already said, I do not feel the two are related, but when I was just telling you about how these events occurred; I had said from the very beginning that nobody ever warned against such actions. Whereas we did. This speaks to the fact that we want to work together, and whoever wants to work with us in the spheres of security, counter-terrorism and economics is welcome.

Andrei Kostin: Shall we get back to pensions?

Question: Vadim Sobolevsky from Finisterre Capital in London. Sorry, just to continue the Syrian theme just for one more second. Can you give a few words on how you see the relations between Russia and Turkey going forward? There seems to be some tension on the Turkish side about the recent developments. Is there a dialogue with Turkey? Where do you see this going forward?

Vladimir Putin: Turkey is one of our priority partners and good friends. We have had very good relations with Turkey for many years now; this is one of our major trade and economic partners. Take our construction market, where Turkish companies have spent about 12 billion, I believe, over the past years. We supply large volumes of energy resources to Turkey. We have large joint projects in energy and agriculture. Turkey has significantly increased exports of its agricultural products to our market, which actually meets the interests of the Turkish economy and Turkish people.

We need to understand how we can develop relations on the anti-terrorism track. Here Turkey has many concerns in connection with the Kurds and with fighting terrorism. We see these concerns and are ready to take them into consideration in the course of our joint work. Even now, we have contacts between our military agencies. I hope they would lead to better coordination between us. We have to arrange this work on a political level, just as with the United States.

Question: Thank you, Mr President. My name is Richard Lamb and I work at Lloyds of London in the UK. The Bank of Russia has started implementing the plan to create a national ratings agency. The requirements of such an agency are clear - to protect the national financing system against the risk of losing the services currently provided by the international rating agencies. However, do you not think that the appearance of such an agency, supported by the Government and the prominent business groups, could damage the chances of competing Russian rating agencies and correspondingly limit the competition in this important sector? Thank you.

Vladimir Putin: Can limit what? The agency's competition? How? It does not exist yet. When it is created, there will be more competition for structures of this kind. I believe there is nothing wrong here. This will only be good for this sphere of activity in the world at large and here in particular.

I am sure you remember how nervous our European partners were a few years ago when they though that international (actually American) rating agencies were knowingly assessing the European economy and individual companies in a way that would reduce the competitiveness of the European economy with regards to their American competitors. Such fears were voiced not only by experts, but also regularly expressed at government level.

Therefore, I believe the implementation of the project to create a national rating agency will not aggravate the situation in this sphere, but, on the contrary, improve it. The main thing is to ensure that this rating agency is highly professional and independent in every sense. With this in view, we expect that all the participants in this project will hold no more than 5 percent of the equity; we intend to attract a maximum number of participants specifically from private companies, rather than companies with public ownership.

Naturally, all the work on such a structure should be free of lobbying of any kind based on any national principle or other motive. I expect the governing bodies of this agency to be made up of world-class experts. In this sense, their nationality does not matter.

To be continued.

[return to Contents] 

 #3
Valdai Discussion Club/Lenta.ru
http://valdaiclub.com
October 15, 2015
Valdai 2015: The Environment For Dialogue Has Changed. (interview with Fyodor Lukyanov)

The 12th annual meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club, which will be held in Sochi on October 19-22, will focus on adjusting the rules of the game to the new balance of forces in the world and on various aspects of armed confrontation.

Lenta.ru talked with political analyst Fyodor Lukyanov, Academic Director of the Valdai Club, on the themes of the upcoming meeting, whether politicians listen to the opinions of club participants, and if such events are necessary.

Q: The topic of this year's conference is Societies Between War and Peace: Overcoming the Logic of Conflict in Tomorrow's World. In the Russian language, the word "мир" has two meanings: peace and society. Which of them is your choice for this year's conference?

Both. We had an ambitious idea, which turned out to be in tune with recent events, that is, to talk about the European events of 200 years ago -- the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the Vienna Congress, which created a relatively balanced system of relations in the Old World for several decades. We believe there are similarities between what happened 200 years ago and current events. These similarities are relative, as there are quite a few obvious differences. But we are talking about the development of a multipolar world, which needs regulatory systems and institutions. In the 19th century, Europe was a multipolar world in miniature. The system, which was created in 1815 and remained effective for nearly hundred years, did not set strict boundaries but offered methods for restoring peace in crises.

Q: But conflicts happened nevertheless.

Yes, there were the Crimean War, the Franco-Prussian War and the Balkan Wars in the 19th century. After each of them, a diplomatic conference was convened to adjust the rules of conduct with due regard for changes in the balance of forces. We need a similar mechanism now. It's unclear what it should be like. Two centuries ago, periodic challenges were followed by the settlement of differences at diplomatic conferences. This is hardly possible now, but we do need something like it.

When we decided on the theme for this year's conference, we also had in mind one of the most important novels in Russian literature, Leo Tolsoy's War and Peace, which describes Europe's overhaul in the early 19th century. Tolstoy was not only a great writer but also a philosopher who noticed and put down on paper the events that changed the course of history and what he described as the motive forces of history. By the way, following the reform of Russian orthography the novel's title acquired more than one meaning, bringing the novel closer to the writer's idea. The current word "мир" is a combination of the pre-reform "миръ" as the absence of war and "мiръ" as society. Like Tolstoy, we are interested in the influence of war on peace and society. This year's Valdai Club conference will focus on the way war, brute force and militarism have influenced society over the past 200 years since the early 19th century.

Q: What other issues will the conference address?

Of course, we will discuss the topical issue of information warfare and the perception of conflicts. The economic plenary session will discuss economic interdependence as a way to contain conflicts or to aggravate them. Another panel will be devoted to the possibility of a new "golden age" of diplomacy similar to the one it experienced in the 19th century. And there will be a special session on the Middle East.

Q: It appears that the theme for this meeting, war and peace, was chosen a long time ago. Have the recent events such as Russia's involvement in Syrian conflict influenced the conference agenda?

No, they haven't. On the contrary, they showed that we were right to choose the theme of war and peace. Actually, war and peace has long become the governing theme in the modern world, what with conflicts that flared up in the Middle East years ago and a war in Ukraine. But the Syrian issue has increased tensions and will be discussed at all panel meetings, as well as at a special session.

Q: Creating a new system for adjusting the rules of the game is a challenging goal. Will politicians take into account the results of discussions on the Valdai platform? Will the decision-makers who can change these rules listen to the opinion of the Valdai experts?

Some decision-makers attend the Valdai Club conferences. Vladimir Putin usually addresses the closing plenary session. He has done so 11 times, and we hope he'll do it this year too. I don't know if the Valdai Club discussions influence Putin's views or policy, but it's a fact that he knows about the issues on our agenda.

Q: Do the Valdai experts' opinions carry weight beyond Russia?

People beyond Russia are most of all interested in the president's address. However, the Valdai Club has changed over the past two years. Before that, our discussions were like Russia's presentation to the world, an attempt to explain what happens in Russia. It was not so much a presentation of Russia's world outlook, as the presentation of Russia as a country. Our goal has changed over the past two years: the Valdai Club has positioned itself as an analytical center dealing with global processes and informing the public around the world about Russia's view of these processes. An example of this is Putin's address at the club in 2014, when he spoke in detail about the possibility of formulating new rules. I don't know what Putin will speak about this year, but I can assume that he will also touch upon hostilities and the use of military force.

Q: Valdai is an international club. Has the deterioration in Russia-West relations over the past 18 months affected the club's format of experts? Do you have more Eastern than Western experts now?

I wouldn't say so. There's a core group of experts who have attended the majority, if not all Valdai Club meetings. Sometimes some of them miss a meeting for objective reasons, but the core group hasn't changed much. At the same time, we tried to expand the number of contributors without tilting East. But the number of Chinese experts has increased from the past year.

Q: Have relations with foreign experts changed amid the worsening ties with the West?

The Western interest for contacts has not changed. It has even increased in some cases. But the essence of our relations has changed dramatically. The environment for dialogue is different. Our relations have become polarized, with an increased share of ideology. It's either official statements and the exchange of familiar arguments, or a unidirectional discussion when our expert is invited as the defendant.

Q: What does this mean?

The invited expert from Russia is bombarded with the Western grievances against Moscow and urged to make excuses for his country's actions. This may be interesting, but it is mostly a senseless undertaking. We've had this kind of thing before, but not as often as we do now. Moreover, as I know from my personal experience, after such discussions foreign colleagues thank us for an interesting discussion and say that they needed to hear a dissenting opinion, adding that we are right in many things. But they say so off the record, while very few dare support a Russian colleague in the open. The Valdai Club is an exception to this rule, as its events are held on a parity basis, with different opinions presented in equal share, which makes our discussions more productive.

This interview was originally published in Russian on www.lenta.ru

 [return to Contents] 

 #4
www.rt.com
October 14, 2015
Negative attitude of Russians to US policies hits new record high

Over 70 percent of Russians have a negative view of the role played by the US in international politics, while only a mere 4 percent view Washington's current course positively.

According to the results of the latest research conducted by the independent polling organization the Levada Center, 71 percent of the Russian public think that the United States currently plays a negative role in the world. The researchers noted this was the highest figure ever since it started to carry out this poll eight years ago.

The previous peak in negativity towards the US was in 2008, after a brief war that erupted after Georgia, backed by Washington, attacked the self-proclaimed republic of South Ossetia, which was protected by Russian peacekeepers under an international agreement.

Back then 53 percent of Russians said that they were against the United States' international politics and 12 percent assessed it in positive way.

According to the Levada Center, 29 percent of responders think relations between the United States and Russia could be described as hostile, while a further 45 percent think relations are tense.

Only 4 percent said the relations were "calm and normal," while under one percent described them as "neighborly and good."

In addition, 75 percent of pollsters said that all major industrialized nations were hostile to Russia and wanted to solve their domestic problems at Moscow's expense. Seventeen percent admitted that countries like the United States, Britain, Germany and Japan had common goals with Russia, in countering terrorism, crime and environmental challenges, as well as in humanitarian and cultural spheres.

Over the summer, the Levada Center conducted a similar poll, which showed the attitude of Russians towards the US, the EU and Ukraine had slightly improved, but was still at a very low level, mainly due to the various anti-Russian sanctions imposed by the West.

In mid-May another Russian polling center, the VTSIOM released the results of its research, which showed that the US and President Barack Obama are seen as enemies of Russia by the Russian public. Other entries onto the list were the EU, the Kiev government and Islamic terrorists.

Speaking to RBC, the Levada Center's deputy director Aleksey Grazhdankin said the Ukraine crisis was one of the main reasons for negative attitude of Russians towards the US.

"The negative sentiments towards America are caused by several factors, like Donbass, armed clashes and bloodshed, which has become possible due to Kiev's operations, which have been supported by the US. This is what the public thinks," the researcher told reporters.

 [return to Contents]

#5
Interfax
October 15, 2015
Poll: Russians adjusting to crisis, buying less expensive goods, food

Russians have had to adjust their consumer behavior to the ongoing economic crisis. Some 62 percent of them have switched to buying cheaper food and goods (against 58 percent in January), the Russian Public Opinion Study Center (VTsIOM) said.

The number of people who have been buying fewer goods and spending less on their entertainment or have stopped doing so at all more than six months ago has markedly grown (from 21 percent in January to 37 percent in September), VTsIOM said, presenting a poll of 1,600 individuals held in 130 populated localities in 46 regions on September 26-27.

Another 20 percent said they had been acting in that manner for the past six months, and 7 percent began to spend less on food, goods or entertainment or stopped making some purchases in the past month (23 percent in January).

The percentage of respondents who set no limits to their consumption of goods and services has been stable, 34 percent both in January and in September.

Thirty-eight percent of Russians make food reserves, and 36 percent grow more vegetables and fruit in their vegetable gardens and make their own jams and preserves. Thirty-five percent are looking for higher pay or extra jobs.

About a third (31 percent) are spending their savings on daily needs, 24 percent borrow money from banks, 26 percent borrow from their acquaintances and 23 percent accept gratis aid from their families. Only 9 percent are making hard currency savings and 5 percent are selling valuable property.

 #6
Business New Europe
www.bne.eu
October 15, 2015
Investors warm to a lukewarm Russia
Ben Aris in Moscow
[Charts here http://www.bne.eu/content/story/investors-warm-lukewarm-russia]

The political rhetoric between the Kremlin and the West remains fraught since the start of the Russian bombing campaign in Syria, but investors have started to warm to Russia as an investment destination; Russian bonds are the best performing in the world year to date and Russian-dedicated funds saw their first big inflow for a year at the start of October

The most important factor driving this modest interest in Russian assets is the growing possibility of an end to hostilities in Ukraine and easing of the sanctions regime on Russia at the end of this year.

A tiny crack in the regime alreadt appeared in October when the EU actually lifted the sanction on Russian hydrazine - a rocket fuel used by Europe in satellite launches - to facilitate cooperation between Roskosmos and the European Space Agency. More could come if hopes for a long-lasting peace are borne out after a "Normandy Format" meeting of heads of state took place in Paris on October 2. The meeting thrashed out the details and commitments on both the Ukrainian and Russian sides to implement the Minsk II peace deal terms.

Some significant progress has already been made to meet the Minsk II terms signed at the start of this year to bring the conflict between Russia and Ukraine to an end; many of the 13 points in the plan have been fulfilled, but a few remain problematic.

The pullback of heavy weapons was achieved on time, although there has been intermittent fighting since, where some heavy weapons were brought back up to the front line. However, the ceasefire has more or less held.

What has changed recently is that as the Kremlin got ready for its campaign in Syria, fighting in Ukraine not only fell off dramatically, but fighters are now being withdrawn from the front line too.

All the points 1-4 are now in place, but there is still work to do on the rest. The special status law forthe Donbas region was put in place within the 30 days after the signing of Minsk II, but the law grants this status only for three years and the point 11 change to the constitution has yet to be completed. That will be hard, as many in Kyiv see granting Donbas pseudo-autonomy would be caving into Kremlin aggression. To make the point, someone threw a grenade into a crowd protesting against the Ukrainian government's first attempt to change the constitution in September, killing four policemen and injuring 100 others.

An amnesty law has yet to be passed and probably won't be: Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko admits this will be hard to get through a Rada vote and has suggested that amnesties will be granted on a case-by-case basis - an approach that will displease Moscow. Social payments are not being made in full either. But both of these points can be done. The return of control of the border only comes at the end of the process, so that means everything hangs on organising acceptable local elections in Donbas and making the required changes to the constitution on the status of the region.

For its part, Russia has not stopped supplying the rebels and presumably there are still Russian military personnel "holidaying" in Donbas as winter closes in. The Kremlin will clearly not halt is military meddling until Kyiv has ticked off the remaining points on the Minsk II list. Given the political problems of completing the last two points, it now appears almost certain that the Minsk II deadline will be extended beyond December 31.

Russia bonds bloom

Still, even the incomplete process in Ukraine looks a lot better than at anytime in the last year. Most importantly, the fear of expanding sanctions has turned to hope of fading sanctions.

On the flip side, the Kremlin has given up on the idea that Asia would emerge as an alternative source of financing for the Russian economy. At VTB Capital's sixth annual "RUSSIA CALLING!" Investment Forum in Moscow in October, the audience was predominately US-based fund managers who posed most of the questions to Vladimir Putin during his session. The Kremlin has said throughout this crisis that all the problems are political and it remains open to Western investment.

The fear of the EU and US extending their sanctions list made all Russian assets toxic for most of the last year. While the number of banks and companies named on the financial sanctions list is relatively short, the possibility that a company or individual's name could be added was enough for international compliance and risk management departments to nix any Russian deal. That has changed now after several companies started issuing the first Eurobonds in a year in October. And at the start of October, Deputy Finance Minister Sergei Storchak suggested the Russian government could also return to the international market for $3bn if the mood was right.

Moreover, investor appetite for these high-yielding Russian bonds is strong in a world where most governments have cut interest rates to next to zero; Russia's bond market has been the best performing in the world this year, returning 17% year to date, according to Bloomberg. Franklin Templeton excluded Russia from its portfolio in the summer and missed out on the rally, but money managers at Aberdeen Asset Management and Ashmore Group both say there is still more upside in Russia's bonds, according to Bloomberg.

Russian equities see green shoots

Russian stocks have also joined the party, with the Market Vectors Russia ETF yielding 15% this year, the best performance among 776 US-domiciled tracker funds.

Equities remain deeply discounted, but that is the appeal for investors. If the political tensions cool, then the market should bounce from its current deeply discounted position and Russian equities have already risen 11% year to date as of October 14 and the dividend yielding stocks even more than that. The dollar-denominated RTS index is at about 875, but still way off its all-time high of over 2600 set in May 2008. However, both the RTS and the ruble-denominated Micex index remain largely range bound; the equity rally has not begun.

As the first green shoots appear, a few companies are talking about IPOs. The billionaire owner and chairman of Russian oil refining company Russneft, Mikhail Gutseriev, may merge his business with the Neftisa oil company and then carry out an IPO of 25% of the resulting company, he said on October 13. Earlier in October, Gutseriev said the merger would only be possible if the oil price exceeds $50/barrel (oil was $49 on October 14), while the IPO would also be conditional on high oil prices.

And Russia took in $100bn of inflows in the first week of October - a 23-week high, according to Gazprombank. "The worst is over for emerging markets," Gazprombank said in a note. "The staunching of EM equity outflows illustrates that weak US payroll/dollar-weakness was the best news for EM/commodities/resources complex."

Macro picture bad but not black

Sentiment on the political future is driving the Russian investment story, but Russia Inc.'s slowly improving economic context is helping the story along.

Widely regarded as a petro-economy, Russia suffered a heavy blow from the collapse of the oil price in December, which engendered a swathe of "Russia is doomed" commentaries. Most prominently Swedish professor Anders Aslund predicted that the Russian economy would contract by 10% in 2015 and its reserve funds would be exhausted: the economic contraction was actually 3.9% year to date by September, while reserves were beginning to rise again and were $370bn as of October 1.

The oil price recovery in the last few months has done a lot to underpin the growing optimism: after plunging to around $40, oil had staged a 26% recovery in the year to date to October. Likewise, Putin proudly cited the first capital inflow in well over a year during his speech at the VTB conference after a net $5.8bn arrived in September. On top of that, capital flight is expected to fall to some $45bn this year - much of it going to pay off corporate international debt - after several years of $100bn-plus a year capital outflows.

Much of the reason for this pink blush on the economy's face is thanks to the beneficial effects of the ruble devaluation. Raw material producers still earn revenues in dollars, but have costs in devalued rubles. Likewise, retailers of domestic products like food have been largely unaffected by the devaluation. In general, corporate profits in ruble terms soared to their highest level since 2008, according to the Bank of Finland, as traditional foreign import competitors were effectively cleared from the market at a stoke.

The problem remains, though, that domestic investment continues to shrink and Russia will not return to health until domestic and foreign investors can be persuaded to start putting money back into the economy. And that is going to take awhile. Investment in the bond and equity markets is welcome, but currently this is almost exclusively "hot money" looking to make a fast buck on the rerating of Russian assets after the country's risk profile goes from "insanely dangerous" to merely "appalling".

For any sort of sustained rally to occur, the government will have to tackle the deep structural reform issues head on and do a deal with the West that ends the financial sanctions. Putin made a lacklustre presentation to a room full of international investors at the VTB conference, but his impassioned defence of Russia's actions in Ukraine and Syria made clear that the government will not be interested in economic reforms until it wins its geopolitical game of chicken with the US. How long will that take? Who knows? But most of the delegates at the conference are getting ready for several years of gloom.

 [return to Contents]

 #7
Forbes.com
October 15, 2015
Russia's 'Import Substitution' Isn't Working
By Mark Adomanis
[Chart here http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2015/10/15/russias-import-substitution-isnt-working/]

Ever since the West slapped sanctions on Russia's economy in the aftermath of the annexation of Crimea and the barely-disguised intervention in Eastern Ukraine, the Kremlin, and the large number of Kremlin friendly media outlets, have struck a bold and defiant tone.

According to the Kremlin's (obviously self-interested) interpretation, European and American sanctions would backfire. Instead of harming Russian business, they would actually give domestic entrepreneurs a chance to seize market share. The Kremlin even dusted off a nearly forgotten term from the annals of development economics ("import substitution") to describe what would take place. Basically, Western sanctions, along with a healthy depreciation of the ruble, would be a good thing because they would spark domestic industry.

How's that working out so far? Not very well! As the ruble has swooned, crippling the purchasing power of Russian households, imports really have declined. Here, from Rosstat, is what has happened to inflation-adjusted imports over the past several years:

RussiaImports2012-15

From the second quarter of 2014 through the second quarter of 2015, the ruble value of Russia's imports decreased by almost 30% (the ruble value of exports, meanwhile, actually increased). That's actually not terribly surprising. When a currency depreciates as much as the ruble has over the past year you would expect imports to take a significant hit.

But what has happened to domestic manufacturing? Has Russian business stepped into the space vacated by Western goods that are no longer affordable to many Russian consumers?

So far, at least, the answer is a definite no. Official Rosstat data show that through the first half of 2015, Russian manufacturing actually shrunk by about 2.8%. The only sectors of the economy to show any growth were agriculture (up 2.4%), natural resource extraction (up 2.4%), and public administration (up 0.7%). The areas of the Russian economy where private business predominates, particularly consumer retail, have been absolutely walloped, with the overall retail sector shrinking by almost 9% over the past six months.

So far, then, the crisis has not made Russia's economy any more flexible, entrepreneurial, or dynamic. It has instead made it even more dependent on the old growth model, which was based on government and natural resources. One of the few areas of agreement in Russian society is that the old model is exhausted and in desperate need of replacement, but exactly the opposite is occurring right now: it is being further bolstered and institutionalized. Russian business isn't rushing to fill the space left by Western firms, it's suffering amid a broad-based downturn in virtually all areas outside of oil, gas, and government.

Some very intelligent people saw this coming a long way off, accurately predicting that heightened tensions with America and the European Union would empower precisely those areas of the Russian economy that the West wants to see weakened.

The dynamics outlined above aren't going to play out indefinitely. At some point, the ruble's devaluation will spark a resurgence in industrial production. But it seems obvious that Russia's economy is suffering genuine pain, and that the government's optimistic delusions about "import substitution" have not been born out in reality. Much deeper and more painful reforms, reforms that will hit the pocketbooks of a lot of politically-connected insiders, are necessary before Russia can take advantage of its newly-cheap currency.

No Russia's economy is not "imploding," but its performance to date suggests that its most deep-seated problems, particularly weak property rights and a general aversion to investment, have not been ameliorated, much less resolved. The Kremlin can pretend this isn't the case, of course, but reality has other ideas.

 [return to Contents]

 #8
Russia's Energy Ministry foresees risk of oil production decline in 2017

MOSCOW, October 14. /TASS/. Russia's Energy Ministry foresees risks of oil production decline in 2017, Energy Minister Alexander Novak told reporters on Wednesday.
He also said that the increase in oil production in 2016 will remain on this year level. "This year we expect production to grow by 1.3%, respectively 532-533 million tonnes.

Our companies confirm, that almost similar level can be achieved next year. But given the withdrawal [funds withdrawal to the federal budget as mineral extraction tax - TASS], there are risks of production decline in 2017," Novak said.

Earlier Novak said that in 2015 oil production in Russia would grow to 533 mln tonnes.

The Economic Development Ministry's forecast for oil output was on the level of 530.5 mln tonnes in 2015, 528 million tonnes in 2016.

On Tuesday, Economic Development Minister Alexey Ulyukayev said that the forecast for Russia's oil production in 2016 had been increased by 5 mln tonnes to 533 mln tonnes.

The energy minister also noted Russia's oil exports will amount to 237 mln tonnes in 2015 and 2016.

"Next year the export will be on the level of this year, which is 237 million tonnes," he said.

[return to Contents] 

 #9
Moscow Times
October 15, 2015
Exiled Russian Economist Reportedly Joining European Development Bank

A prominent Russian economics professor who fled the country two years ago is to be appointed chief economist of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), news agency Bloomberg reported Wednesday, citing two people familiar with the matter.

Sergei Guriev has lived in self-imposed exile in Paris since 2013. He left Russia fearing arrest, as investigators probed his links to Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the former oil executive who spent a decade in prison, and support for opposition firebrand Alexei Navalny.

A liberal economist and former adviser to Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev's Cabinet, Guriev was dean of Moscow's prestigious New Economic School before leaving Russia. Since then, he has taught at Sciences Po in Paris.

The 43-year-old will be the first Russian to head the EBRD, a development bank set up by Western European governments in 1991 to invest in former Communist Eastern Europe. The EBRD halted new lending to Russia last year as part of sanctions following Moscow's annexation of Crimea from Ukraine.

Andrei Kolesnikov, an analyst at the Moscow Carnegie Center, told Bloomberg that Guriev had an "incredible knowledge of modern economic theory" and had been a trailblazer in his role as a free-market adviser to the Russian government.

 [return to Contents] 

 #10
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
October 14, 2015
Innovators bring the startup revolution to Russia, but business development lags behind
Russian hi-tech startups are growing rapidly in number, but to implement their inventions a revolution in the big business sector is also needed.
Victoria Zavyalova, RBTH

Russia is pursuing its innovation dream. Over the past eight years, 12 new science parks housing 775 startups were established in the country. The range of research is ambitious, covering IT and aerospace, as well as biotechnology and the food industry.

Next year, Russia will host the 33rd World Conference on Science Parks and Areas of Innovation, which is organized by the International Association of Science Parks (IASP). Its president, Jean François Balducchi, revealed to RBTH that one of the reasons Russia was selected to host the event was the country's rapid growth of new science parks, as is especially evident outside the capital.
 
Betting on regional startups

Russia's innovation geography seems to be expanding. In 2014, new science parks were opened in Tolyatti (South Russia) and the Sverdlovsk region (Ural mountains). In 2015, another park was opened in the city of Nizhny Novgorod. Dominique Fache, founder of the Sophia Antipolis science park in France, said this is the way to go because innovations should originate in regional scientific centers such as Tomsk, Kazan or Novosibirsk.

"Major projects initiated by the government are not sufficient,'' Mr. Fache said. ``You can't spur innovation by controlling it from the capital.''

Next year promises to become the year of startups for Russia. The Open Innovations Forum, scheduled for the end of October, is a government sponsored event that usually sets the development trends for the subsequent year, and this time it will mostly revolve around startups. Experts hail this as a very positive development for the country.

"Throughout the world SMEs drive economic development and job creation,'' said Edward Crawley, president of the Skolkovo Institute of Science and Technology (Skoltech). "It is essential that a strong SME sector develop in Russia. In order to strengthen this development, we need to educate and enable entrepreneurs, provide better contacts between industry and science, and develop sources of venture capital that have a longer horizon for return".

Russia's primary challenge is creating an environment that fosters startup development. "What Russia needs is to encourage their growth and their ambitions,'' Mr. Balducchi said. ``The problem is that Russian startups must strive to become international, to open to the rest of the world.''

Accessing the global market, however, is more difficult for Russian startups because of the country's sheer size. "The bigger the nation, the more difficult it is for entrepreneurs to see themselves as a part of the world," Mr. Balducchi added.
 
'Big companies are like slow-moving elephants'

One of the most important issues that Russia faces is not the absence of interesting inventions, but rather the implementation and commercialization of these inventions, said Mr. Fache, who spent over two decades as the head of Russian offices of various major energy companies, including Schlumberger and Enel.

"The big companies like Russian Railways or Gazprom are Russia's advantage, but on the other hand big companies are very much like slow-moving elephants,'' Mr. Fache told RBTH. ``Since they are not too receptive towards innovations, they have trouble cooperating with small startups. So I decided to create an organization to deal with the technology transfer, to search for and implement the latest inventions. We already signed contracts with several Russian energy companies.''

Mr. Fache added that Russia's large businesses should reconsider their total spending on R&D. "Schlumberger was a market leader precisely because they invested about 5% of their revenues in innovation," said Mr. Fache.

In contrast, most of the biggest Russian companies fail to invest enough in research, which makes them more vulnerable to Western sanctions. Some of Russia's oil rigs are 90% made of imported components, Mr. Fache added. Russia will be able to replace the foreign technology, but it will take time, he concluded.

Russia truly needs to reform its economy, but not for short-term import substitution reasons. Rather, it should strive to become a full-fledged force on the global innovation market, Edward Crawley believes.

"Russia has the intellectual and capital assets to make this transformation in the next decade," Mr. Crawley said.  "It requires a good relationship between business and science, a better understanding of domestic and international markets, and adequate capital. All of this can be accomplished."

 [return to Contents] 

 
#11
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
October 15, 2015
Instant messaging apps: Social resource or security threat?
Is tighter government regulation of instant messaging apps using encryption really needed? Where is the line between user friendliness and national security threat? Internet expert Anton Merkurov reflects upon the matters for RBTH.
 
Anton Merkurov is an internet expert and representative of Open Garden (the developer behind FireChat)

While young, the instant messaging software market already boasts some impressive figures, like the 800 million users of WhatsApp, the 600 million users of the Chinese-developed QQ or the 250 million users of Viber. The messaging apps' functionality is expanding - you can find gaming, media, magazines and even money transfer services there. Messaging apps are the new social networks. Unsurprisingly, they have attracted attention from security services, as well as terrorists and revolutionaries.

When the United Kingdom was hit by riots motivated by racial and social tensions in 2011, a lot of observers claimed Blackberry Messenger - a built-in instant messaging system on the eponymous phones - played a key role in spreading the unrest.

Pavel Durov, founder of the popular Russian social networking site VK and Telegram Messenger, has recently had to face criticism due to the actions of certain would-be terrorists in Australia and even those of the very real terrorists from Islamic State (ISIS). Both groups have used Telegram to coordinate their actions.

U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron went as far as to virtually demand that all messaging services disable encryption in the name of vaguely defined national security concerns - a request later echoed by FBI director James Comey. However, these loud statements - criticized by Pavel Durov, among others - have so far remained just statements.
 
Don't shoot the messenger

The right to communicate freely is something that is not easy to take away from people. And in the case of instant messaging services, intelligence agencies - being unable to ensure mass surveillance - have to act more selectively.

Those who criticize messengers love to shift the blame from short-sighted politicians and incompetent security services to the developers of communication tools. But it is extremely important to understand that messengers don't have any special functions that make it easier to commit a crime - it's not like they offer their users to "click here to get a revolution" after all. What those critics tend to overlook is the underlying causes that drive students to smash shop windows in London or compel Islamists to capture new victims.

Similar attempts to control communication in encrypted messengers are being made in Russia, too. Back in August, Nikolai Patrushev, former head of the country's security service, the FSB, and current secretary of the Security Council of Russia, said Russian officials should not use popular instant messaging services to discuss government matters. His reasons? The threat from foreign intelligence agents. As for the fact that officials using such services can also keep their dealings hidden from the public eye, this somehow wasn't mentioned.
 
No alternatives

Nevertheless, Russian officials have nothing to worry about at the moment. Firstly, they do not have any government-approved alternative communication methods anyway. Secondly, separating discussions of official matters and informal socializing in messengers is problematic. Even now, you can find Russian state ministers, presidential administration employees and numerous other officials among the users of Telegram.

Still, Patrushev's initiative is a concern for ordinary Russian users, since they fear it will be extended to them. Intimidated by the revelations of Edward Snowden, the ubiquitous surveillance and the omnipresent cyber threats, users simply want to communicate in a reliable and secure way. And since messengers provide this by technical, rather than political means, authorities everywhere have no chance of prevailing. Controlling the way we communicate is unacceptable, and that's all there is to say about that.

 [return to Contents] 

 #12
Moscow Times
October 15, 2015
Russian Antarctic Expedition Halts Research Due to Lack of Funds

Russia's state-funded Antarctic expedition has had to halt its research due to a lack of funding, the TASS news agency reported Wednesday, citing one of the scientists involved in the expedition.

"It's not yet clear how long the research will be suspended for," Ruslan Kolunin told TASS. He said that work on drilling a borehole in the ancient Lake Vostok has also been suspended. "The borehole is frozen at the moment, no work is under way there right now," he was cited as saying.

The only research being carried out in the Antarctic as part of the expedition this year is a meteorite project by the Ural Federal University, Kolunin said. "That is financed by sponsors and the university, though," he added.

Earlier this year, the expedition's head Valery Lukin said that scientists wouldn't be able to continue researching Lake Vostok during the next season, which lasts from December 2015 to February 2016, due to decreased funding, TASS reported.

The expedition, Lukin said, is financed directly from the federal budget. In 2015 it was allocated 1.18 billion rubles ($18 million), but in 2016 that will decrease to 1.061 billion rubles ($16 million), which he said was not enough to continue work at the lake.

Lake Vostok lies buried beneath a 3,769-meter layer of ice. Locating it and accessing its relict waters is considered one of the main discoveries of the expedition so far, the report said.

 [return to Contents] 

 #13
United Russia primaries candidates must take part in debates - Medvedev

MOSCOW. Oct 15 (Interfax) - All United Russia primaries candidates must take part in election debates, and it is wrong not to do so, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev said at a joint meeting of the party's supreme and general councils on Thursday.

"The candidates must participate in the debates, maintain a position of their own and be able to defend it. The refusal to participate in primaries debates is a very big mistake that leads to defeat," he said.

Medvedev asked party members to take the primaries seriously. "This is also an election, but a preliminary one," he said.

"I would like to emphasize there will be no agreed upon lists in regions. Neglecting the confidence of voters by putting on party lists totally unelectable but handy people rather than candidates enjoying respect and support is not just bad, this is also leads to defeat," said Medvedev, who is also the United Russia chairman.

He recalled earlier attempts to rewrite primary outcomes. "This is wrong, and the party has expressed its opinion," he said.

The party must be prepared for the 'black PR' targeted against it, Medvedev said. "There will be free access to the primaries debate floors, but this does not mean we will allow violation of ethical norms, moreover norms of law," he said.

 [return to Contents] 

 #14
www.rt.com
October 15, 2015
Putin: I don't get how US can criticize Russian op in Syria if it refuses dialogue

Washington's decision to obstruct Russia's call for diplomatic engagement on Syria is unconstructive and apparently shows a lack of will to negotiate, Russian President Vladimir Putin said.

"I don't really understand how our American partners can criticize Russia's counterterrorism effort in Syria while refusing direct dialogue on the all-important issue of political settlement," Putin explained.

Putin was commenting on the refusal by the Obama administration to receive a Russian delegation headed by Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev to discuss the differences the two nations have on the Syrian crisis. The US said it would not talk unless Russia followed Washington's lead and stopped helping the Syrian government of President Bashar Assad.

"I believe this position to be unconstructive. The weakness of this position is apparently based on a lack of agenda. It seems they have nothing to discuss," Putin said at a meeting with the Kazakhstan president in Astana.

He added that by obstructing Russia's invitation to negotiate the US undermines itself, as it voices criticism of Russia's actions in Syria, but doesn't seek ways to resolve its concerns.

Russia this month launched a bombing campaign targeting terrorist forces in Syria at the invitation of the Syrian government. The goal is to curb the violence sufficiently for a political dialogue to start in the war-torn country.

Washington wants the Syrian government to fall, hoping that so-called 'moderate rebels' will fill in the vacuum. It accuses Russia of bombing those supposed moderate forces instead of hardcore jihadists, an allegation that Moscow denies

 [return to Contents] 

 #15
Valdai Discussion Club
http://valdaiclub.com
October 15, 2015
Assumed Rivalry Prevents US-Russia Cooperation on Syria
By Andrey Suchentsov
Andrey Sushentsov is political analyst and international relations scholar at Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO-University), Research Fellow, Valdai Club Foundation.

This week Washington turned down Russia's proposal to join efforts in battling ISIS in Syria. Moscow was prepared to send top-level negotiators with Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev at the head to discuss the matter. American officials privately raised issue of distrust towards Russian initiative. However, the move seems to indicate unwillingness of the White House to participate in what is seen as strengthening of Russian posture in the Middle East.

Moscow's proposal to talk was not the first gesture urging U.S. cooperation on Syria. In an interview to Russia One Channel over the weekend, President Putin claimed that Russia informed Washington of its military activities prior to their beginning. Later Putin and Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu openly discussed possibility of uniting efforts of Syrian government with the Free Syrian Army against ISIS.

Speaking at the investment forum in Moscow on Tuesday Putin criticized the U.S. over unwillingness to cooperate: "If we want to be effective, if we want not to simply shoot and make missile strikes, but reach a political settlement, then we need to motivate the forces inside the country for joint work between various forces on Syria's territory".

By now, these efforts bear no fruits. Washington is leaning toward its previously stated aim of ousting Bashar al-Assad and declines cooperation with Russia that is not purported to the same goal. However, the U.S. are not eager to press for this solution militarily and are reluctant in supporting Syrian opposition. Moreover that the latter tends toward radicalization. It seems that Washington does not want to join efforts with Russia assuming this would mean allying with Iran and Syria, while simultaneously strengthening Russia's presence in the region. Fight against ISIS is lost somewhere in the policy elaboration process.

 [return to Contents] 

 
#16
Christian Science Monitor
October 14, 2015
Why isn't Russia singling out ISIS in Syria? Because it never said it would
Many in the West have criticized Russia's intervention in Syria for not targeting IS. But Russia does not view 'moderate' rebels as any better than their IS counterparts.
By Fred Weir, Correspondent

Moscow - The videos posted almost daily by the defense ministry show Russian strike fighters in action over Syria, hammering "terrorist infrastructure" with precision-guided munitions. Meanwhile, Russian media reports speak of major gains by Syrian armed forces advancing behind a firestorm of Russian air support.

But there is growing controversy over what the Russians are actually accomplishing with their two-week-old intervention in Syria's bitter and multi-sided civil war, and what their actual war objectives may be.

Western sources argue that most Russian air strikes have been directed not at the generally acknowledged enemy, the self-declared Islamic State, but  against "moderate" rebels. Those forces have been fighting to overthrow the minority-led dictatorship of Bashar al-Assad for almost four years, with assistance from the CIA, Turkey, and Persian Gulf states. The US Central Command has even alleged that Russian air strikes are actually enabling IS to gain ground by weakening other rebel formations that are opposed to the extremists.

Russian sources insist that they are hitting IS hard. But more importantly, they say that they never made any promises to avoid attacking other rebel groups. They argue that while the US and its allies are fighting an ineffectual two-front war against IS and Assad, Russia's strategy has always been to bolster Assad's forces from above in a bid to turn the tide of the rebellion.

"Russia isn't playing this game of distinguishing between 'good' terrorists and 'bad' ones," says Yegeny Satanovsky, president of the independent Institute of Middle East Studies in Moscow, and a strong backer of the Kremlin campaign. "For Russia, the only way to do this is to back Syria's existing central government, which is the force that has boots on the ground, and put an end to this rebellion."

"It's not that we love Assad," Mr. Satanovsky says, "but that we've already seen what happens when central governments get destroyed: monsters come rushing into the vacuum. If Damascus should fall, it won't be gentle pro-Western rebels who come marching in, but the genocidal maniacs of IS and Al Qaeda."

Russia all in for Assad

Since suddenly launching its air war over Syria, Russian planes have flown hundreds of sorties against a variety of rebel targets, so far with no announced casualties. The operation seems a relatively small one, with about two dozen Su-24 and Su-25 ground attack fighters, plus a handful of helicopter gunships and Su-34 strike fighters. The defense ministry announced this week that an undisclosed number of advanced Su-30 air superiority fighters will be joining the contingent, to "escort" ground attack planes to their targets.

There is some unease among Russian security experts over whether the strategy can work.

"In the West, they seem to be aware that it will be impossible to reconstruct Syria as long as the Assad regime is in place. We are putting all our eggs in that basket," says Alexander Konovalov, president of the independent Institute for Strategic Assessments in Moscow. After four years of fighting, he says, the Syrian Army is nearly exhausted and is little more than a "virtual reality" force. "They will not be able to launch any credible, sustained offensive," he says.

The forces Russia has deployed to the region are insufficient to take on highly mobile rebels on the ground, Mr. Konovalov adds. "What do we do if, at some point, we realize it's not working?"

'The choice is stark and ugly'

In an extensive interview with state TV this week, Vladimir Putin explicitly ruled out any Russian ground operation in Syria. The pro-war Russian media blitz, with its US-style bomb-sight videos and glowing accounts from embedded reporters, appears to have turned Russian public opinion from initial reluctance about intervention to a majority in favor. But experts say the "Afghan syndrome" is still a major factor, and public opinion may quickly sour if Russians start coming home in body bags.

However, most Russian experts deride Western claims that there is any "moderate" opposition still on the ground in Syria. Satanovsky says the CIA-backed Free Syrian Army may have been a force when the rebellion started, but various extreme jihadist factions now present the only alternative to the Assad regime.

"The Americans have to maintain this fiction because their various allies, like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey, have invested heavily in all those extreme Islamist forces with the aim of destroying the Assad regime," he says. "The Russian intervention has exposed the absurdity of that notion. The middle ground has long since been scorched out, and the choice in Syria is now stark and ugly."

And no one will venture an opinion about where things go from here.

"What Russia is doing is basically the same as NATO's game plan in Libya a few years ago. We are providing close air support to forces on the ground, in this case backing the government against rebels, but the same idea," says Fyodor Lukyanov, editor of Russia in Global Affairs, a leading foreign policy journal. "Everything depends now on the ability of the Syrian Army to win victories with our help. If they can't, Russia will be in trouble."

 [return to Contents] 

 #17
Moscow ready to maintain contact with Free Syrian Army if it gets in touch with representatives - Bogdanov

MOSCOW. Oct 15 (Interfax) - Moscow is trying to get in touch with representatives of the Free Syrian Army and is ready for communication with them, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov has said.

"If we find it, they are welcome to come here," he told a press conference on Russian-Turkish relations organized by the Russian Council for International Affairs on Thursday.

"We will gladly meet both in Moscow and on any other platform, they just need to tell us where they are," Bogdanov said.

A Russian diplomatic source told Interfax on October 12 that Moscow was attempting to get in touch with any representatives of the Free Syrian Army and would be grateful to Western partners if they helped establish contacts.

"Russia seeks representatives of the Free Syrian Army and we would be grateful if Western partners forwarded Russia information about this organization," the source said.

However, the source also said that for the time being, the Free Syrian Army is an "ephemeral entity."

The Western-backed Free Syrian Army opposes Syria's president Bashar al-Assad. Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov earlier said that Russia does not consider the Free Syrian Army as a terrorist organization, is ready to establish contacts with it and has asked Washington to provide information about it

 [return to Contents] 

#18
AP
October 15, 2015
Syria air campaign on, Putin may already seek exit strategy
By VLADIMIR ISACHENKOV

MOSCOW (AP) - With Russia's air campaign in Syria now in its third week, Vladimir Putin has raised his nation's global profile and proven its capability to project military power far from its borders. Now the Russian president could already be on the lookout for an exit strategy to prevent his gains from turning into a liability.

Putin certainly realizes that some 30 Russian combat jets won't be able to change the course of the war, and allow Syrian President Bashar Assad's forces to win. His apparent goals are more modest: to show all players that they will not be able to unseat Assad by force; to help cement the Syrian government's grip on the territory it controls; and to foster political talks that could allow Moscow to protect its interests in the region.

Another key task for Putin is bring Moscow and Washington together in a security dialogue, which he hopes would make Russia appear as an equal and eventually lead to improved ties with the West that were wrecked by the Ukraine crisis.

Even though the air campaign in Syria, the first Russian military operation outside the former Soviet Union since the Cold War, hasn't yet put any significant additional burden on Russia's crisis-stricken economy, there are strong reasons for the Kremlin to avoid long-term involvement in the conflict.

Putin has said that Russia's military action, which began on Sept. 30, will last as long as it's necessary to support the Syrian army's operations. While Assad's troops have launched a new offensive in central and northwestern Syria under Russian air cover, their effort is unlikely to significantly change the situation on the ground.

Protracted Russian military action without any visible gains by the Syrian army would quickly erode the propaganda effect Putin has achieved with his bombing blitz. On the other hand, broader military involvement - let alone ground action - would strain Russia's financial and logistical resources to the limit and could quickly sap domestic support for the Syrian campaign.

And while the air raids have shown Russia's military muscle, they also have stirred up a hornet's nest of powerful interests, angering key regional players. The Kremlin may feel strong pressure to map an exit strategy to avoid further straining ties with Saudi Arabia, Turkey and others who have made unseating Assad their top priority.

The main challenge for Moscow is a peg to claim victory and get out. A notable Syrian army battle victory or at least a modest sign of progress in negotiations on settling the conflict could provide a good excuse.

Since June, Russia has played with the idea of a political transition that would envisage setting up some sort of interim government, talking to the U.S., Saudi Arabia, the Syrian opposition and others. Moscow's diplomatic efforts have brought no visible results so far, but Putin has insisted that a political solution for Syria remains his top goal despite the military action.

On Sunday, Putin discussed the situation in Syria with Saudi Deputy Crown Prince and Defense Minister Mohammad bin Salman. The unexpected encounter was their second meeting since June, signaling shared interest in a compromise.

Putin used the talks to assuage Saudi fears about Moscow teaming up with Tehran. Saudi Foreign Minister Adel Al-Jubeir said after the meeting that Russia assured Saudi Arabia that its action in Syria doesn't mean an alliance with Iran, the Saudis' arch-enemy in the region.

If the Kremlin can reach agreement with Saudi Arabia, which has pushed strongly for Assad's ouster since the start of the Syrian conflict in March 2011 - and has been the principal supporter of various opposition groups - it could help jumpstart the stalled peace talks.

Parallel to that, Moscow also has sought to alleviate the concerns of Turkey, a major economic partner and the second-biggest importer of Russian natural gas after Germany. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan sharply criticized Russia for targeting moderate rebels and warned Moscow that Ankara could turn to other gas suppliers if it doesn't revise its policy in Syria.

On a conciliatory note, Putin said this week that the Kremlin understands Turkish concerns about the Kurds and vowed to take them into account. Syrian Kurdish forces are fighting the Islamic State group, while Turkey's Kurdish rebels have battled the nation's security forces.

Russia also responded quickly to Turkish protests against violation of its airspace by Syria-based Russian jets, setting up a military coordination panel to avoid such incidents in the future.

Prior to launching his air campaign, Putin agreed with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to establish a similar coordination mechanism between the nations' militaries.

While working to soothe the worries of regional powers, Moscow has energetically pursued its efforts to engage the U.S. in a dialogue on Syria.

By launching air strikes, Putin effectively forced the U.S. to start military-to-military talks on avoiding clashes between the two nations' combat planes over Syria. The Pentagon and the Russian military have had several rounds of discussions on a set of rules to prevent any such incidents.

But Putin also kept pushing for broader political and military talks. At last month's meeting with President Barack Obama on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly, he proposed sending a delegation led by Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev to the U.S. for broader discussions on Syria.

When the U.S. refused, Russia quickly made it public and Putin slammed the U.S. for lacking an agenda in Syria.

The Russian president also sought to fend off U.S. criticism of Russia for targeting moderate opposition groups instead of IS - its declared primary target - saying that Washington has refused to share information on IS targets in Syria.

Putin said the U.S. refused a Russian request to name targets it considers legitimate, and when Moscow asked what targets it shouldn't strike, Washington also refused.

That prompted a mocking response from Putin: "It seems to me that some of our partners have mush for brains and lack a clear understanding of what's really going on there, and what goals they want to achieve."
 

 [return to Contents] 

 #19
www.dailybeast.com
October 12, 2015
Syria Rebels Plan Suicide Attacks on Russians
The Homs Liberation Movement, a Free Syrian Army faction close to al Qaeda, plans to infiltrate the Syrian military to find where the Russians are-and blow them up.
By Austin Bodetti and David Axe

After more than a week of Russian aerial attacks, Syrian rebels plan to hit back with double agents and suicide bombers.

"First, we will endure the violent aerial bombardment, then move to weaken Russia by all means available, such as recruiting agents in the ranks of the regime to provide us with the movements of the Russians and the regime," Capt. Rashid al-Hourani, from the rebel Homs Liberation Movement, told The Daily Beast by telephone.

The Homs Liberation Movement-a division of the U.S.-backed Free Syrian Army-seems ready to use tactics associated with ISIS. "We will conduct martyrdom operations carried out by dissident officers," al-Hourani said, using a euphemism for suicide attacks.

Though this may not be all that surprising. The Movement is an Islamist faction known to be a close military ally of the official al Qaeda franchise in Syria known as Jabhat al-Nusra. According to Genevieve Casagrande, an analyst at the Washington, D.C.-based Institute for the Study of War, "The relationship between Nusra and Tahrir Homs with regards to governance was thought of as 'uneasy' when Nusra first started to assert itself (and it's strict version of sharia) in Homs, however, they have likely grown closer as time has gone on and probably are currently participating in joint rebel governance structures together." Al-Nusra has already warned Russia that it will face another Afghanistan in Russia.

Also, the Movement is in a desperate situation. Its bases are in al-Rastan, Talbiseh, and other cities in the rebel enclave between Hama and Homs in western Syria, an area encircled by the Russian-backed Syrian army-and a main target of Russian bombing and cruise-missile attacks that kicked off in late September.  

Russia has deployed at least 35 warplanes plus helicopters and hundreds of military advisers to Syria.
The Movement's territory bisects a highway linking Damascus with Latakia, where the Russian military has its Syria headquarters. For the Syrian government to link up with the Russians and secure arguably its most important supply route, it must clear out the rebels north of Homs, including al-Hourani's fighters.

The battle will involve more than planes, tanks and infantry. The media are also a weapon.

The Syrian government and its Iranian and Russian allies portray all rebels, including the Free Syrian Army, as terrorists. The Movement has a plan to defend itself against potentially demoralizing propaganda. "We will create a unified media outlet to carry news of our victories over both the Russians and the regime to strengthen morale and enthusiasm among the fighters," al-Hourani said.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has suggested that the FSA should join the Russian and Syrian militaries in battling ISIS, but al-Hourani said that Russian airstrikes have only succeeded in unifying Syria's squabbling rebel factions against Moscow and Damascus. In early October, 41 rebel units announced that they would begin targeting Russian forces. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and Saudi clerics have called for anti-Russian jihad.

But al-Hourani said he rejected holy war. "We are neither secular nor Islamic," he said. "We represent Syrian society-a tolerant, moderate state."

To be fair, even American-trained "secular" rebels have fought alongside al Qaeda, refused to oppose it, surrendered to it and armed it with American-made weapons. But the Movement says it wants to be an American ally in Syria. "There is no relationship between the Homs Liberation Movement and America," al-Hourani told The Daily Beast, "but we would like there to be one."

Al-Hourani said he hoped the Americans would arm his unit, as it has done for other FSA brigades. The United States had two separate programs to train and equip Syrian rebels-one run by the CIA, which targets Assad regime forces, plus another, less secretive effort that managed to deploy just a handful of fighters, tasked with only fighting ISIS, at a cost of $500 million. The White House canceled the latter program last week, after The Daily Beast showed how U.S.-provided materiel was last seen in the hands of a rebel commander who had gone rogue and denounced the Pentagon program. The White House said it would soon launch a new train-and-equip effort.

But the rebel officer said he wants different weaponry than the United States has provided other rebel brigades. "The weapons provided by the United States are defensive rather than offensive, requiring those who receive them to fight political battles according to implemented procedures," al-Hourani said. "The factions armed by America cannot conduct any operations by themselves."

Left to its own devices, the Homs Liberation Movement won't bother trying to fight like the Americans do, according to Al Hourani. Instead, the rebel group will borrow a page from ISIS-and infiltrate, then suicide-bomb, the Russian-regime coalition.

 [return to Contents] 

 #20
Valdai Discussion Club
http://valdaiclub.com
October 15, 2015
Russians in Syria: Obvious Risks
By Vasily Kuznetsov
Vasily Kuznetsov is Research Fellow, Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences.

Through its efforts to step up its activities in Syria and to become directly involved in the armed conflict there, Russia has created new opportunities and also serious risks within and beyond its borders.

The most obvious risks are related to Russia's image. While attempts to blacken Russia's image in Western media have been rather commonplace in recent years, its image in Arab and Islamic media has been much more nuanced. In the past four years, some TV networks relentlessly criticized the Kremlin for supporting Bashar al-Assad, while at the same time other broadcasters cheered Russia's anti-American stance.

The situation has changed.

Even if the Syrian operation could, under certain circumstances, have a positive impact on Russia's relations with the West, it seems that the status quo in the media is built to last. Some people will thus view Russia as backing a dictator (as usual) and carrying out airstrikes against the moderate opposition and civilians, while others will portray it as a Sunni enemy. This image will haunt Russia regardless of the true nature of the opposition, the actual targets of its airstrikes or the fact that almost 20 million Sunnis live in Russia.

Its image in the media has always been Russia's weak spot, since its propaganda machine is less geared toward foreign audiences than the home-front. Meanwhile, blunders from official sources (such as reports concerning the crushing defeat of the Islamic State near Homs, which never saw any ISIS forces) do little to improve the situation.

However, its deteriorating image is not the main issue for Russia, which faces far more serious risks domestically and abroad.

There are three main domestic political risks.

The first risk is the rising terrorist threat from two primary sources. On the one hand, it emanates from IS sympathizers in Russia for whom the Syrian operation is a fight against true Islam. On the other hand, the jihadists who are pushed out of Syria, first to Iraq, and then on to other countries, could also be a threat for Russia. The Kremlin's engagement in the Syria issue is underpinned by the idea of preventing hundreds or thousands of seasoned fighters integrated into global terrorist networks from returning to Russia.

The logic of IS's development makes it inevitable that the "romantics of jihad" will be gradually driven from the territory they now hold and start exporting their struggle. It goes without saying that Russia's southern regions will be among their first destinations.

The second risk in terms of domestic policy is the unpredictable public response to the losses that are inevitable in combat engagement. When the ISIS captured a Jordanian pilot and burnt him in a metal cage, thousands in Amman took to the streets to protest the country's involvement in the war against the ISIS. How will Russians respond to similar developments remains to be seen, especially taking into account that the public perception of Russia's prior military campaigns in the south has clearly been negative.

That said, the weakening social cohesion in Russia and the poor adhesion to liberal values and a civil consciousness make Russian society almost immune to human casualties.

Finally, the third domestic policy risk is related to the economic consequences of the Syria campaign. Regardless of its cost for the budget, the country is going through tough economic times, making it hard to explain why people have to tighten their belts once again   to pursue unclear geopolitical interests in a remote and unknown country, not even a brethren people.

This risk will become increasingly relevant as the operation drags on. A serious negative response from Russians could be avoided if it will be completed within several months, while making a political victory.

However, there are also external risks.

Until recently, Russia's Middle East strategy has been described by Western observers as the "art of being friends with everyone." But this tradition has been broken. Russia has supported the Syrian government and established an Information Center in Baghdad, short of creating a Shia coalition in a mostly Sunni region.

The consequences are clear - opposition from Sunni Arabs headed by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, a cooling of relations with Turkey and, possibly, Egypt, which depends economically on Saudi Arabia.

Although these countries no longer have sufficient clout to wage a full-blown economic war against Russia (low oil prices have also taken a toll on the Saudis), they are still central to the region and important players in the Islamic world. There is no way the region can be reformatted or stabilized without them.

There could be several ways to mitigate this risk.

First, while waging a military operation against the jihadists, Russia should promote a political settlement in Syria taking into account the interests of Gulf states. Bashar al-Assad should be pressured into making serious concessions to the moderate opposition. At the same time, dialogue with the West and Gulf states should continue to consolidate and strengthen this moderate opposition and make it a real partner of the Syrian government.

Second, if it becomes clear as the situation unfolds that keeping Syria within its initial borders would be impossible, the option of establishing a Sunni state in the east of Syria with the support of Gulf powers should be propounded.

Third, the Kremlin might benefit from the serious contradictions between Sunni countries. For instance, while dependent on Saudi Arabia, Egypt regards its relationship with it as a burden and would be pleased to have Moscow as an alternative partner. The Kremlin could create a Moscow-Cairo-Algiers axis as a counterweight to the Shia alliance in North Africa. Smaller Gulf states are not always eager to back the Saudis in their anti-Iranian stance, and Russia is a major economic partner of Turkey, which is mostly focused on Kurdish separatism.

Finally, Moscow could step up its initiatives on the Palestinian issue by giving a new impetus to the settlement process, thereby demonstrating its commitment to making a positive difference in the region.

However, Russia's rapprochement with Iran on the Syria issue should not be regarded as a guarantee of a lasting alliance. It seems that Iran, tired of its pariah status, will be more inclined to establish closer ties with the West, making the Russia-Shia alliance fragile.

The last risk is related to the global, not regional, dimension of the Syria crisis. Although Moscow's and Washington's strategic objectives in the region are not contradictory, and despite the fact that efforts to combat jihadists could serve as a foundation for normalizing, to some extent, Russia's relations with the US, there is a danger that the two countries will start projecting their existing contradictions on the Middle East. In this case, Syria will become a battleground between extra-regional actors playing a zero-sum game. Although this scenario seems unlikely, it is, of course, the most dangerous one and could pave the way to an escalation of the global stand-off.

 [return to Contents] 

#21
The National Interest
October 15, 2015
Yes, Putin Does Have a Strategy in Syria
Russia is doing quite well for itself in the Middle East...
By Dov S. Zakheim
Dov S. Zakheim was the under secretary of defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer of the U.S. Department of Defense from 2001 to 2004. He is vice chairman of the Center for the National Interest and serves on the Advisory Council of The National Interest.

It appears that a significant portion of the Washington policy community is dismissing Russia's Vladimir Putin either as merely a tactician, rather than a strategist, or as President Obama would have it, a fool who has injected his forces into a quagmire. Neither assertion reflects the reality that is Russia's position in the Middle East today.

While everyone acknowledges that Putin wants to retain Russia's presence in Syria, few realize that Moscow is in a considerably stronger position in the Middle East than the Soviet Union ever was. Certainly, Syria was not the only friend of Communist Moscow. Saddam Hussein long enjoyed a close relationship with the Soviets, who backed him to the hilt right up to the day the USSR collapsed.

On the other hand, relations with Iran were not particularly close, even after the fall of the overtly anti-Communist Shah. During the course of the Iran-Iraq War, Moscow's support for Saddam became increasingly overt, with the Soviets eventually providing active support to Iraq until the war's end in 1989. The Soviet Union's relations with Egypt were even worse; Anwar Sadat had expelled 20,000 Soviet military advisors in 1972 after which Cairo allied itself firmly with the West. Finally, despite its recognition of Israel soon after it declared independence, Moscow broke off relations with the Jewish state after the 1967 War and never reestablished them during the remaining years of the USSR's existence.

The situation is far different today. To begin with, Iran and Russia are now Bashar Assad's primary bulwarks, both of them determined to preserve an Alawi regime, if not Assad himself. Russia maintains its cordial relations with Iraq, which are becoming increasingly stronger as Iraq continues to fall under Tehran's influence. Russia has strengthened its ties with Egypt, both economically and in what both Putin and the government of President Abdel Fateh al-Sisi call the "fight against terrorism." The two presidents have exchanged state visits over the past two years.

Lastly, Russia has excellent ties with the most powerful state in the Middle East, namely Israel. Moscow and Jerusalem have become increasingly close. When he was foreign minister, Avigdor Liberman was a "frequent flyer" to Moscow and continues to maintain a direct line to Putin. As with Egypt, trade between the two countries continues to increase, including trade in armaments. Indeed, Jerusalem is so sensitive to Moscow's desires that it cut off military sales to Georgia during the 2008 Russo-Georgian conflict and has not renewed them ever since. Indeed, there seemed to be some truth to allegations that Israel had supplied data-link codes to Russia to disable Georgian drones prior to the 2008 war. Israel has also hesitated to sell drones or other arms to Ukraine, specifically as a result of Putin's personal request to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

All of these developments explain why Putin is in a much stronger position regarding Russia's intervention in Syria than might otherwise have been the case. Iran and its Lebanese puppet Hezbollah are providing boots on the ground in support of Assad; Russian forces are reputedly joining them, in addition to Moscow's air strikes against anti-Assad rebel forces. Iraq has joined with Russia and Iran in creating a coordination center in Damascus. Egypt, for its part, has openly supported Russian intervention in Syria. As Egypt's Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry stated just two days after Russia launched its first airstrikes against the Syrian opposition, "Russia's entrance, given its potential and capabilities, is something we see is going to have an effect on limiting terrorism in Syria and eradicating it."

Lastly, and significantly, due to Netanyahu's visit to Moscow prior to the first Russian air strikes, the two leaders agreed upon what Netanyahu termed a "joint mechanism" to assure de-confliction between the operations of Israeli and Russian forces. In effect, the agreement gave Moscow a free hand in Syria, while Israel would not face any Russian objections to its retaliating against Hezbollah or anti-Assad forces launched from Syrian territory.

Putin has essentially covered all his flanks in the Middle East, other than Jordan and the Gulf states, but none are likely to have any negative impact upon his pro-Assad intervention. Jordan has studiously avoided getting enmeshed in the war and has instead focused on maintaining order in the face of an influx of a million Syrian refugees. While the Gulf states are still providing funds to the Syrian opposition, they are themselves caught up in the Yemeni conflict. In particular, Saudi Arabia, the most powerful southern Gulf state, is in no position to do much about the Russian intervention. It is caught up in a quagmire of its own, in Yemen, faces an increasingly challenging fiscal crisis, and may also be wracked by dissension within the royal family.

Finally, Syria may not prove to be the "quagmire" that President Obama seems to hope it will be. Unlike Afghanistan, where the Soviets faced opposition from most Afghans, regardless of ethnic background, Putin knows that the Alawi community, which comprises some ten per cent of the population, will back him to the hilt, since its very survival may otherwise be threatened by the Syria's majority Sunni Arabs. So too will Syria's dwindling Christian and Druze minorities, which long were protected by the Assad family and who likewise have much to fear from both the Islamic State (IS) and the al-Nusra front that is linked to Al Qaeda. Finally, the Syrian Kurds, who have inflicted the most damage on Islamic State forces, certainly would prefer a weakened Assad to Islamist forces of any kind ruling from Damascus.

Putin has every, if not more, reason to fear the IS than does America. Russian Muslims are joining IS forces in greater numbers than those of the United States. The restive Muslim republics inside Russia are fertile ground for Islamic State expansion, which is at the heart of IS theology and policy. At some point Putin may turn his forces against them in Syria, but he first has to ensure that the Alawis remain in power elsewhere in that country.

In sum, it appears that Vladimir Putin has a far better handle on the Middle East than his American counterpart. His position is stronger than it ever was under the Soviets. Russia's increased presence has enhanced, not diminished, its influence in the region. He is seen as standing by his allies, to the point of committing human and material resources to defend them.

With forces actively engaged in on the ground in Syria, as well as air power based there and missile that can be, and have been, launched from outside the country, he is in a position to launch an attack on the Islamic State once the preservation of an Alawi regime is assured.

In the meantime, Washington wrings its hands, issues schoolmarmish reprimands to Moscow that Russia blithely ignores, cannot even reach any sort of arrangement with the Russians that would permit creation of a viable safe zone for Syrian refugees, and has failed to develop a practical program to support the Syrian opposition. Crucially, America continues to be seen as abandoning its friends-whether looking the other way as the Shah fell, calling for the removal of Hosni Mubarak, overriding Israeli apprehension about the terms of the Iran deal, or contemplating withdrawal from Afghanistan despite President Ashraf Ghani's pleas to the contrary-in their time of need. It is not a pretty picture. Unless there is a turnaround in American policy, whether toward reaching an understanding with Russia regarding Syria's future governance, providing more than rhetorical reassurance to Israel that Iran will never acquire a nuclear capability, and ensuring a continuing and meaningful military presence in Afghanistan, that picture can only get worse.

 [return to Contents] 

 #22
Time.com
October 7, 2015
A Way Forward for Obama and Putin in Syria
The Iran deal offers lessons to address the crisis
By Eugene Rumer
Eugene Rumer is a Senior Associate and Director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

The crisis in Syria has become a standoff between the U.S. and Russia. Each side is blaming the other for it. Moscow charges the Syrian tragedy is the direct consequence of U.S. unilateral, delusional pursuit of democracy in the Middle East. Washington insists that Russian support for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is the cause. The most the two seem to be able to agree on is to talk about de-conflicting their air operations to avoid a mid-air collision between their planes. With no solution in sight, it is time to resort to what has worked in other seemingly unsolvable crises: the P5+1 mechanism.

The P5+1-the U.S., Russia, France, Great Britain, China, all U.N. Security Council permanent members joined by Germany-is a unique forum where the key parties can come together to seek a way to solve the Syrian crisis. In addition to the major powers, the P5+1 format has the advantage of being able to engage Iran, a critical actor in Syria without whom no solution can be found. The trust built up between the P5+1 countries and Iran in the course of the negotiations about Iran's nuclear program, and the success of those talks make for a unique basis to address the Syrian crisis. The U.S. and Russia can ill afford to squander it.

For Russia, President Vladimir Putin's deployment of air assets to Syria was a clever tactical move that reasserted Russia's power. Getting into Syria was easy for Putin. Getting out of it may be harder. Air strikes alone will not end the conflict. Even though some in Moscow have hinted that Russian "volunteers" may go to Syria to fight ISIL and other enemies of Assad, Putin said he has no plans to put Russian boots on the ground in Syria. The Russian public is opposed to sending troops there. Many voices in Moscow have sounded the alarm about getting bogged down. P5+1 talks on Syria would offer Putin a way out. And as in nuclear talks with Iran, this format guarantees Putin a seat at the big powers' table.

Unlike other powers, Iran, an important Russian ally, has boots on the ground in Syria. Iran's client Hezbollah has been deeply involved in the war, and Iranian troops have been reported fighting in Syria as well, backing Assad. Through its involvement in Syria, Iran, too, has positioned itself as a key party to any future resolution of the Syrian war. It has the ability to undermine any agreement reached without it. It should have a seat at the table.

For Europe, scrambling to deal with Syrian refugees, ending the conflict is top priority. European leaders have yet to offer any comprehensive solution to the crisis other than appealing for all parties to end the fighting. Anything that offers a way out of the crisis is better than nothing.

For the U.S., the P5+1 format would bring some advantages as well as a measure of compromise. It would insulate the U.S. from the charge of unilateralism and create a real coalition to deal with the crisis whose legitimacy under the U.N. umbrella would be unassailable. It would impose the P5+1 framework on what otherwise is Russian unilateralism and could potentially harness Russian military presence constructively on behalf of the coalition. If this was not accepted by Putin, the U.S. could expose his bluff and open him to the charge of unilateralism.

The P5+1 format would require that the U.S. put aside the condition that Assad must step down prior to or as a result of the settlement talks. In fact, recent U.S. statements suggest there is some flexibility in the U.S. position on this issue. U.S. willingness to stop insisting on Assad's departure and agree to address this issue in the future would open the possibility of creating a real coalition to defeat ISIL and a political solution for the Syrian war, which are the key U.S. goals, shared by Russia, Iran, Europe and-yes-Assad.

Other parties to the conflict-Turkey, Saudi Arabia, other Persian Gulf States-may complain about Iran's role and Assad remaining in power for now. But in all the years of the war in Syria, they have offered no solution to the crisis, and no way to stop the bloodshed. They should have a voice, but they should not be in a position to block the talks.

Finally, for the Syrians themselves, the P5+1 involvement would offer the reassurance of the international community's support and involvement in any future settlement in Syria. For the beleaguered Syrian opposition, it would be a commitment by the P5+1 countries that they will not be abandoned to the mercy of Assad's troops after the conflict is over. For Assad and his supporters, Russia's and Iran's presence would serve as a reassurance and hold out the possibility of an orderly transition instead of a defeat or endless conflict.

This is neither the perfect nor a guaranteed solution to the Syrian war. But insisting on the perfect and ignoring the good is not an option while thousands of Syrians are dying

 [return to Contents] 

 #23
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
October 14, 2015
How will the war in Syria affect the Russian economy?
While developments in Syria will not have a great effect on the world's oil market, if Russia remains involved for long it may stand to lose serious economic support from the Gulf monarchies and could see Ankara driving a hard bargain on the Turkish Stream gas pipeline from Russia to Turkey.
Sergei Alexashenko, special to RBTH
Sergey Alexashenko is a non-resident senior fellow at Brookings Institution (Washington D.C.) and served as the first deputy chairman of the Central Bank from 1995-1998.

Like any other war in the Middle East, the war in Syria has its economic background, because it is a war taking place in the region directly adjacent to the world's largest oil and gas fields; in the region, where multiple oil and gas pipelines are located or planned. Therefore, the war in Syria itself and Russia's involvement in it will inevitably create short- and long-term consequences for the country.

Syria itself is not a major player on the global hydrocarbon market. Even in the most prosperous years in the early 2000s, Syria was producing a little more than 520,000 barrels of oil per day, slightly more than 0.6 percent of world production.

Since the beginning of the civil war in Syria and the introduction of European sanctions, oil production in the country began to fall rapidly. By the beginning of this year, according to official statistics, it was a little over 30,000 barrels per day.

Gas production in Syria is also not large by world standards - about 5.5 billion cubic meters per year at present (compared to 9 billion cubic meters in 2010). In this context, we can safely say that no matter how war events unfold in Syria, no matter who wins the civil war, any development of the situation in the oil and gas industry in this country will not have a serious impact on the global oil market.
 
Knock-on effects for Russia

Much more serious economic consequences for Russia may be caused by its direct interference in the Syrian crisis. Although Russian officials claim that the Russian air force is bombing the positions of ISIS militants, numerous sources in the region say that the main target of these attacks is the "moderate" Syrian opposition fighting against the forces of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

Given that the key states in the region - Turkey and Saudi Arabia - support the Syrian Sunni opposition, then the longer and larger the Russian armed forces' involvement in the Syrian civil war, the more political and economic problems will arise for Russia in the region.

For example, the Russian Direct Investment Fund has announced the creation of investment partnerships with the sovereign wealth funds of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. As part of these plans, these funds have expressed willingness to invest, respectively, $10 billion and $7 billion in projects in Russia.

In a situation in which western financial capital markets have effectively been closed to Russian banks and companies, the capital from the Gulf countries was considered by the Russian authorities as one of the possible and desirable alternatives. Obviously, in the case of a protracted military operation of the Russian army in Syria, the probability of the realization of these plans will fall sharply.
 
The gas issue

Turkey, due to its geographical position, is beginning to play a key role in the construction of transport infrastructure between Europe and Asia. By all appearances, the country will start the construction of several pipelines in the coming years, which would be able to deliver gas from Iran, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to Europe.

In addition, the pipelines may be laid to Turkey through Syria from Israel and Qatar. But if the Israeli project provides for the construction of the offshore gas pipeline outside the territorial waters of Turkey, the pipeline from Qatar must inevitably pass through Syria.

It is clear that as long as there is civil war in Syria, the construction of a gas pipeline on its territory is out of the question. In theory, this situation could be to the benefit of Gazprom, which is heavily promoting its Turkish Stream project, but is faced with serious constraints in access to the Turkish market and big problems in relations with its Turkish partners after lame statements by representatives of Gazprom on the active involvement of Greece.

However, Gazprom cannot seriously expect that the inability to get gas from Qatar will make Turkey softer in negotiations with the Russian company, since the country's gas needs will be satisfied without restriction in any case.

In addition, it seems that the Qatari gas pipeline to Europe has already moved to the front of the line. To start a cost-effective supply of gas through Turkey, the ability to pump 15-20 billion cubic meters a year is needed, and that amount of gas is already there (Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, Turkmenistan) - these countries could increase production while the pipeline is being built.

As a result, the Russian military operation in Syria, in the short term, neither holds any significant losses (expenses) for Russia, nor promises any significant gains. At the same time, in the event of a more serious and long-term involvement in the civil war in Syria, Russia may face significant economic losses.

 [return to Contents] 

 #24
New York Times
October 15, 2015
Russian Military Uses Syria as Proving Ground, and West Takes Notice
By STEVEN LEE MYERS and ERIC SCHMITT

WASHINGTON - Two weeks of air and missile strikes in Syria have given Western intelligence and military officials a deeper appreciation of the transformation that Russia's military has undergone under President Vladimir V. Putin, showcasing its ability to conduct operations beyond its borders and providing a public demonstration of new weaponry, tactics and strategy.

The strikes have involved aircraft never before tested in combat, including the Sukhoi Su-34 strike fighter, which NATO calls the Fullback, and a ship-based cruise missile fired more than 900 miles from the Caspian Sea, which, according to some analysts, surpasses the American equivalent in technological capability.

Russia's jets have struck in support of Syrian ground troops advancing from areas under the control of the Syrian government, and might soon back an Iranian-led offensive that appeared to be forming in the northern province of Aleppo on Wednesday. That coordination reflects what American officials described as months of meticulous planning behind Russia's first military campaign outside former Soviet borders since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Taken together, the operations reflect what officials and analysts described as a little-noticed - and still incomplete - modernization that has been underway in Russia for several years, despite strains on the country's budget. And that, as with Russia's intervention in neighboring Ukraine, has raised alarms in the West.

In a report this month for the European Council on Foreign Relations, Gustav Gressel argued that Mr. Putin had overseen the most rapid transformation of the country's armed forces since the 1930s. "Russia is now a military power that could overwhelm any of its neighbors, if they were isolated from Western support," wrote Mr. Gressel, a former officer of the Austrian military.

Russia's fighter jets are, for now at least, conducting nearly as many strikes in a typical day against rebel troops opposing the government of President Bashar al-Assad as the American-led coalition targeting the Islamic State has been carrying out each month this year.

The operation in Syria - still relatively limited - has become, in effect, a testing ground for an increasingly confrontational and defiant Russia under Mr. Putin. In fact, as Mr. Putin himself suggested on Sunday, the operation could be intended to send a message to the United States and the West about the restoration of the country's military prowess and global reach after decades of post-Soviet decay.

"It is one thing for the experts to be aware that Russia supposedly has these weapons, and another thing for them to see for the first time that they do really exist, that our defense industry is making them, that they are of high quality and that we have well-trained people who can put them to effective use," Mr. Putin said in an interview broadcast on state television. "They have seen, too, now that Russia is ready to use them if this is in the interests of our country and our people."

Russia's swift and largely bloodless takeover of Crimea in 2014 was effectively a stealth operation, while its involvement in eastern Ukraine, though substantial, was conducted in secrecy and obfuscated by official denials of direct Russian involvement. The bombings in Syria, by contrast, are being conducted openly and are being documented with great fanfare by the Ministry of Defense in Moscow, which distributes targeting video in the way the Pentagon did during the Persian Gulf war in 1991.

That has also given officials and analysts far greater insight into a military that for nearly a quarter-century after the collapse of the Soviet Union was seen as a decaying, insignificant force, one so hobbled by aging systems and so consumed by corruption that it posed little real threat beyond its borders.

"We're learning more than we have in the last 10 years," said Micah Zenko, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, noting the use of the new strike fighters and the new cruise missile, known as the Kalibr. "As it was described to me, we are going to school on what the Russian military is capable of today."

The capabilities on display in Syria - and before that in Ukraine - are the fruits of Russia's short, victorious war in Georgia in 2008. Although Russia crushed the American-trained forces of Georgia's government, driving them from areas surrounding the breakaway region of South Ossetia, Russia's ground and air forces performed poorly.

The Russians lost three fighter jets and a bomber on the first day of the war that August, and seven over all, according to an analysis conducted after the conflict. Russian ground forces suffered from poor coordination and communication, as well as episodes of so-called friendly fire.

In the war's aftermath, Mr. Putin, then serving as prime minister, began a military modernization program that focused not only on high-profile procurement of new weapons - new aircraft, warships and missiles - but also on a less-noticed overhaul of training and organization that included a reduction in the bloated officer corps and the development of a professional corps of noncommissioned officers.

Russian military spending bottomed out in the mid-1990s but has risen steadily under Mr. Putin and, despite the falling price of oil and international sanctions imposed after the annexation of Crimea, it has surged to its highest level in a quarter-century, reaching $81 billion, or 4.2 percent of the country's gross domestic product, a common measure of military expenditure.

The Russian advancements go beyond new weaponry, reflecting an increase in professionalism and readiness. Russia set up its main operations at an air base near Latakia in northwestern Syria in a matter of three weeks, dispatching more than four dozen combat planes and helicopters, scores of tanks and armored vehicles, rocket and artillery systems, air defenses and portable housing for as many as 2,000 troops. It was Moscow's largest deployment to the Middle East since the Soviet Union deployed in Egypt in the 1970s.

"What continues to impress me is their ability to move a lot of stuff real far, real fast," Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, the commander of United States Army forces in Europe, said in an interview.

Since its air campaign started on Sept. 30, Russia has quickly ramped up its airstrikes from a handful each day to nearly 90 on some days, using more than a half-dozen types of guided and unguided munitions, including fragmentary bombs and bunker busters for hardened targets, American analysts said.

Russia is not only bringing some of its most advanced hardware to the fight, it has also deployed large field kitchens and even dancers and singers to entertain the troops - all signs that Moscow is settling in for the long haul, American analysts said.

"They brought the whole package," said Jeffrey White, a former Middle East analyst with the Defense Intelligence Agency now at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. "It showed me they could deploy a decent-sized expeditionary force."

For now, Russia's focus in Syria is mainly an air campaign with some 600 marines on the ground to protect the air base in Latakia. Mr. Putin has excluded the idea of sending in a larger ground force to assist the Syrians.

Michael Kofman, an analyst with the CNA Corporation, a nonprofit research institute, and a fellow at the Kennan Institute in Washington who studies the Russian military, said that the operations over Syria showed that Russia has caught up to the capabilities the United States has used in combat since the 1990s. That nonetheless represented significant progress given how far behind the Russians had fallen.

"Conducting night strikes, with damage assessments by drones, is a tangible leap for Russia into a mix of 1990s and even current Western combat ability," he said.

The Russian Air Force suffered a series of training accidents over the spring and summer - losing at least five aircraft in a matter of months - which Mr. Kofman described as "teething pains" as pilots increased operating tempo under Mr. Putin's orders. Even so, Russia's aviation is "often painted in the West as some sort of Potemkin village, which is not the case."

He and others said that the biggest surprise so far has been the missile technology on display. The cruise missiles fired from Russian frigates and destroyers in the Caspian Sea were first tested only in 2012. With a range said to reach 900 miles, they had not been used in combat before, and despite the loss of four cruise missiles that crashed in Iran in one salvo, they represent a technological leap that could prove worrisome for military commanders in NATO. He noted that the advances in missile technologies improved the precision and firepower even of aging Soviet-era ships or aircraft.

"This is an amazingly capable new weapon," he added.

Russia's state television network boasted on Monday that from the Caspian, they could reach the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Peninsula and the "entire Mediterranean Sea." It went on to note that trials of the missiles were underway aboard two ships in the Black Sea, which is bordered by three NATO allies: Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania.

The Moskva, a guided-missile cruiser that is the flagship of Russia's Black Sea Fleet, based in the newly annexed Crimea, has also deployed with other ships off the coast of Syria, providing air defenses for the aircraft and troops Russia has deployed. Those missiles effectively protect the skies over Syrian territory under control of the government from aerial incursions, and all but block the establishment of a no-fly zone in Syria, as many have called for.

American officials say Russia has closely coordinated with its allies to plan its current fight. Maj. Gen. Qassim Suleimani, the head of Iran's paramilitary Quds Force, went to Moscow in late July in an apparent effort to coordinate on the Russian offensive in Syria, and he is also spearheading the Iranian effort to assist Iraqi militias. "The broad outlines were decided months ago," said Lt. Gen. Richard P. Zahner, formerly the Army's top intelligence officer in Europe and in Iraq.

American officials, while impressed with how quickly Russia dispatched its combat planes and helicopters to Syria, said air power had been used to only a fraction of its potential, with indiscriminate fire common and precision-guided munitions used sparingly. It is clear the Russians are already harvesting lessons from the campaign to apply to their other military operations, said David A. Deptula, a retired three-star Air Force general who planned the American air campaigns in 2001 in Afghanistan and in the gulf war.

"Essentially," he said, "Russia is using their incursion into Syria as an operational proving ground."

 [return to Contents] 

 #25
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
October 14, 2015
What 'non-interference in internal affairs' means for Russia now
Russia's principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries is continually being tested, first in Ukraine, then in Syria. And now, in Venezuela, Russia faces a number of difficult decisions of who to support.
By Eugene Bai
Eugene Bai, expert in USA, Latin America and international relations, contributor to Politcom.ru, The New Times, World and Politics magazine.

In a recent interview with Venezuelan television, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov proposed excluding from the international community any country, in which its president came to power in a way that was not constitutional, such as by means of a coup d'état. In particular, he proposed discussing at the UN the possibility of adopting a declaration that would clearly affirm the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

"Given that the attempts of such loose interpretations of the principle of non-interference occur at regular intervals, including in the context of the Syrian crisis, we would like to discuss with all UN member states the possibility of adopting a declaration that would clearly affirm the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries," Lavrov said.

He also added that "any country, in which the transfer of power was carried out by unconstitutional means" such as a coup d'état cannot be "a normal member of the international community - as such methods are considered an unacceptable change of power."

However, this idea proposed by the Russian foreign minister led to some skeptical responses from several representatives of the expert community in Russia, who believe that in the past, Moscow has not always adhered to this rule, and it is unlikely that the Kremlin will follow it in the future.

The fear of "color revolutions"

Some Russian experts saw in Lavrov's appeal the Kremlin's hostility to all kinds of "color revolutions" in the post-Soviet space, as well as towards the threat of forcible removal of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. To follow such logic, the Kremlin tries to find a way to prevent certain states from interfering in the domestic policy of other countries.  

However, many political experts saw a considerable amount of guile in Lavrov's proposal. As Anton Nosik, a well-known Internet activist, points out - in the mid-1960s, there were five coups d'états in Syria, and the current Alawite government (which Moscow is now supporting) also came to power in the country via a military coup.

"With a few exceptions, such as the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, all Arab regimes of the Middle East, including the already overthrown (in Iraq and Lybia), and those still reigning, came to power as a result of armed coups," writes Nosik.

Now let us turn to the post-Soviet space. Tatiana Stanovaya, head of the Analytical Department at the Center for Political Technologies, gives several examples of how Moscow "surrendered" government leaders in favor of revolutionary opposition in the post-Soviet space.

In November 2003, the then Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov flew to Georgia, where he said that he did not consider the revolutionary actions of the opposition as a "coup d'état," claims Stanovaya.

"He went to a rally in the city center, talked to revolutionaries of Nino Burjanadze, and met with Mikheil Saakashvili [who became the third Georgian president since 2004]," writes Stanovaya. "Afterwards, the next morning, he went to the residence of the then President Eduard Shevardnadze, after which the Georgian leader announced his resignation. Soon afterwards, Mikheil Saakashvili was elected as the new president, who made his first foreign visit to Moscow, as recognition of Russia being the priority foreign policy direction of his government."

Another example, which Stanovaya mentions, is connected to the events that happened in Ukraine in 2013-2014. In the Crimea and eastern regions of Ukraine, "Russia's own mini-revolutions were instigated, which brought to power pro-Russian forces - and this was not very legitimate or very peaceful," she argues.
Meanwhile, Moscow places the main blame on America for the events that took place in Ukraine, believing that Washington was behind the unconstitutional overthrow of President Viktor Yanukovych's government.

Russia's willingness to sacrifice Assad

In this context, the fate of Assad is interesting. After Russia began attacking the positions of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Greater Syria (ISIS) to support the Syrian leader and the current regime in the country, it would seem that this step shows the intentions of the Kremlin to support Assad, and not to leave one's friend in a lurch.

However, many Russian political analysts believe that Assad might suffer the fate of Yanukovych.

"Russia is not interested in Assad, but in strengthening its influence on the coast of Syria and in its vicinity," argues Fyodor Lukyanov, political analyst and head of the Russian Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (CFDP).

At the same time, Stanovaya assumes that Putin might "put up for sale" the figure of Bashar Assad, as implied by the UN speech of the Russian president.

"And the issue here is not whether Moscow will surrender Assad or not. The issue is exclusively at what price," she wrote. "Thus, when commentators quote the leaders of France, Germany or the United States, who do not want to have any dealings with the current Syrian regime, as a position opposite to that of Moscow, we should not look at this as a given certainty. Putin is ready to discuss Syria after Assad's departure, but on the condition that Russia is no longer isolated, the current sanctions are removed and NATO stops treating Russia as a bogeyman. Thus, Assad is just a stage in the path, which will soon be passed."

Venezuela threatened by a coup

Curiously enough, Lavrov proposed to punish countries where coups d'états have been carried out in an interview with a TV station in Venezuela. This country - which after the death of the popular leader Hugo Chavez and the transfer of power to Nicolas Maduro, a leader who does not enjoy support from Venezuelan society or the political elites - is on the verge of a military coup.

According to the latest public opinion polls, 70.4 percent of people in the country have extremely negative opinions about the president's performance, with 46.1 percent believing that Maduro is personally responsible for the severe economic and social crisis that has seized the country.

The main problems in Venezuela are a severe deficit of all types of food products, rapid growth in the cost of living, and rampant street crime. Meanwhile, forecasts for the near future are completely dismal. Independent Venezuelan economists believe that by the end of this year, inflation could reach 200 percent.

Unprecedented is also the "spread" between the official exchange rate of the local currency, the bolivar, against the U.S. dollar, and quotations on the "black market". Officially, one dollar is worth 6.3 bolivars, while "on the street," one can get over 700 bolivars for a dollar.

It is not surprising that more and more people are ceasing to trust the authorities. According to the surveys of the Dataanalisis Sociological Center, if parliamentary elections were held next Sunday, 57.7 percent of the voters would support opposition candidates.

Elections for the National Assembly have been scheduled for Dec. 6. Opposition leader Henrique Capriles says that he is "absolutely certain that opponents of the current government will come out victorious in these elections."

What can Maduro's government do under these conditions? Foreign observers, writes the Spanish newspaper El Pais, have every reason to fear that, in the absence of international supervision over the election process, the results may be completely falsified.

However, in Venezuela, there is a third force, which has the power to intervene in the course of events. This is the military. Last year, 45 former officers and generals in Venezuela issued a statement in which they accused the Maduro government of having "severed the constitutional thread." They also claimed that, "Military action against the regime, aimed at restoring democracy, was justified by the constitution of the country."

Murmurs of discontent about the government have been coming for a long time from the Venezuelan Army. However, before this, the army leadership could not oppose the voluntarist politics of Chavez, who enjoyed wide popularity among the population. And any dissatisfaction Chavez was able to squash with the help of petrodollars, generously showering them on his party's activists in the armed forces. However, now the situation has changed.

"The authorities have done nothing to increase oil production or to improve the performance of the entire oil sector, Diego Moya-Ocampos, analyst IHS Global Insight, told Russia Direct. "And there is no other place from where to get the needed money. Maduro is stymied. Everyone can see that he is an extremely weak leader, unable to solve the acute social and economic problems that the country is facing. However, as his position becomes steadily weaker, the influence of the army leadership in the country keeps steadily growing."

Is the Kremlin ready to punish its ally?

Will the Kremlin be willing to punish its chief ally in Latin America if the military stages a coup d'état? Russian oil companies have been active in Venezuela for many years already. In May of this year, Maduro, after meeting with the Rosneft President Igor Sechin, announced that Russia and Venezuela have agreed to invest $14 billion into oil and gas projects in this South American country.

Moreover, Venezuela is the world's largest buyer of Russian weapons. The volume of agreements already implemented, and future deliveries of Russian military equipment to Caracas in 2012-2015, has been estimated at $3.2 billion. Russia has granted Venezuela export credits worth over $5 billion.

It is doubtful that Moscow would demonstrate a desire to punish its key ally in the event of coup in Venezuela. It is possible that in case of a sharp destabilization of the situation in the country, Russia will prefer to play - together with Cuba - the role of mediator in finding a peaceful solution to the crisis, with the participation of opposition forces. That is, to use the experience that it has gained in the post-Soviet space.

 [return to Contents] 

 #26
The Conversation
http://theconversation.com
October 14, 2015
What are Russia's grand designs in Central Asia?
By David Lewis
Senior Lecturer, Politics, University of Exeter

While international attention has focused on Russian military operations in Ukraine and Syria, Moscow has also been involved in a flurry of diplomatic and security initiatives to address the growing instability in northern Afghanistan.

But its moves to bolster regional security are more than just a response to local security concerns. Russia has a broader strategy that could leave it as the dominant security actor across much of Eurasia.

Even before the shock of the Taliban occupation of Kunduz in late September, Russian officials were concerned about the fragile security situation in northern Afghanistan, including the rise of Islamic State in northern Afghanistan and its potential spread to Central Asia and thence to Russia's large Muslim community. As if to emphasise the domestic threat, on October 12 Russian police announced that they had uncovered a terrorist plot in Moscow apparently involving a group of Central Asian militants.

Insecurity in Afghanistan may pose a potential security threat for Moscow, but it is being seized upon as a major geopolitical opportunity. Against a backdrop of failed Western policies across much of Russia's southern flank, Moscow is moving quickly to fill a security vacuum in the region. It is strengthening existing alliances to consolidate its hold over former Soviet republics in Central Asia and reshaping the security dynamics of the region around its own favoured security groupings - the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).

The first step has been a series of meeting with Central Asian leaders, all on the front line in case of renewed Afghan insecurity. A meeting between Russian president Vladimir Putin and Emomali Rakhmon, the president of Tajikistan, led to promises of more attack helicopters to bolster the existing Russian military based in the country, which has become the hub of a well-developed defence system against cross-border infiltration.

Crisis and opportunity

Putin also took time out of his birthday celebrations in Sochi to meet Almazbek Atambayev, the president of Kyrgyzstan, a country that has become the linchpin of Russia's security strategy in the region. Until 2014 Kyrgyzstan hosted a US airbase, but as I explored in a recent paper, Russia has been remarkably successful in ousting the Americans and turning Kyrgyzstan into a dependable ally in the region.

If Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are relatively relaxed about an enhanced Russian military presence, the Uzbek president, Islam Karimov, is instinctively allergic to talk of renewed Russian influence and pulled out of the Russian-led CSTO in 2012.

Now the northern Afghan crisis offers an opportunity to bring Uzbekistan back into Moscow's embrace. A delegation from the Russian MOD, led by deputy minister Anatoly Antonov, has recently paid the country its first high-level visit since 2007.

There was no coverage of the Russian visit in Uzbekistan's heavily censored press. Instead, the newpapers led on a summit with neighbouring Turkmen president, Gurmanguly Berdymukhamedov. The two presidents both have serious security concerns about Afghanistan, but both want to manage them without Russian assistance. Both states have appalling human rights records, limiting the potential for Western aid, and it may be hard to refuse Russian offers of help if unrest grows along their borders with Afghanistan.

Friends reunited

Afghan officials have also been in Moscow, seeking assistance. Vice-president and Uzbek warlord, Abdul Rashid Dostum, has sought to revive old ties during a recent visit, also paying a side visit to the influential Chechen strongman Ramzan Kadyrov, to share experiences of "fighting terrorism". If the Afghan situation worsens significantly, Dostum offers the potential for Moscow to build up a further band of loyal forces in the north of Afghanistan, in an effective re-run of its Taliban-era support for the Northern Alliance.

Other Afghan government officials attended a conference of SCO members and observers on Afghanistan in Moscow. The chief of Russia's general staff, first deputy defence minister, Valery Gerasimov, took time out to give a speech that highlighted the failure of US policy in the Middle East, leaving little doubt that Moscow now sees Afghanistan through the same geopolitical prism as it frames Syria. Russian intelligence officials regularly claim that IS is part of a broader US plot to destabilise Central Asia and Russia from the south.

Still, there is no appetite for Russia to get involved in Afghanistan in the way it has in Syria. There are still bitter memories of the humiliating Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. But an anti-IS stance in the region provides Russia with the opportunity to consolidate its presence in Central Asia and become the centre of new alliances in the region - with SCO partners such as China, and with Iran - and to sponsor anti-Taliban and anti-IS forces in northern Afghanistan.

More intriguingly, some Russian officials see Moscow's new strategic initiatives in Syria and Afghanistan as a chance to carve out a significant role in a wider region. State Duma speaker, Sergei Naryshkin, has been talking of a "Greater Eurasia", linking Russia not only to former Soviet republics, but more widely to a range of allies in Syria, Iran, India and China.

This may be just another of Russia's historical spatial fantasies for now, but in a rapidly changing international environment, Moscow will try to use its dominance in Central Asia as a first step towards shaping a new regional security order.

 [return to Contents] 

 #27
Most Russians Want War, Always Have and Always Will, Nevzorov Says
Paul Goble

Staunton, October 15 - Just as pornography can produce an erection but cannot do anything about the size of a penis, so too Russian state propaganda about the hostility of the surrounding world and the need to fight it can intensify those feelings but in no way create them, Aleksandr Nevzorov says, arguing that Russians indeed are predisposed to want war.

In an interview with Radio Poland's Artem Filatov, the former host of the Russian television program "600 Seconds" says that it would have been impossible to "zombify" 86 percent of Russians into supporting Vladimir Putin and his aggressive policies if they weren't predisposed to those positions in advance (radiopolsha.pl/6/248/Artykul/224943).

"People belief only that which they insanely want to believe," Nevzorov says, pointing out that "a pornographic magazine can lead to an erection, but it is not capable of making a penis larger." Thus, such journals "erect that penis which always was, is, and I suspect, will be" the case.

Kremlin propaganda intensifies the feelings Russians have about enemies and war, he continues, but its impact should not be "overrated. Russians wanted to believe that there are fascists in Ukraine. Did Russians want war? Yes, they do. They need an enemy; they need someone to hate."

The reason is simple: "hatred is the only thing that allows the unification and experience of an all-national orgasm in Russia given the absence of science and culture. Anger alone unifies the academician and the policeman, the apple polisher and the geneticist," the Russian commentator argues.

There is a small group of people in Russia, some two to three percent, who are not so programmed and redisposed, but the overwhelming majority goes along as the regime plays to its feelings.  That majority, Nevzorov says, can reverse itself on many things "in the course of twelve hours," but propaganda cannot change its fundamental predispositions.

Nonetheless, he argues, foreign broadcasting of the kind Estonia and Poland have promoted "for the same reason that it made sense to sell jeans even when the obkoms of the party said that wearing jeans is practically state treason. Ultimately, jeans win," and "Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic and all EU countries" offer Russia an alternative.

The Kremlin has acted quite wisely in the way it has dealt with the minority of Russians who want that alternative now and continue to exist in "reservations like Snob or Ekho Moskvy, he says. There such people are given the chance to occupy themselves with what they want" because they do not have any effect "on the 86 percent black hundreds patriotic society."

 [return to Contents] 

 #28
Fort Russ
http://fortruss.blogspot.com
October 11, 2015
State Propaganda? Realities of the Russian Media Landscape
By Nina Kouprianova
[Photos and graphics here http://fortruss.blogspot.com/2015/10/state-propaganda-realities-of-russian.html]

The trope of 'Russian state propaganda' in mainstream Western media is a persistent one, especially as of late. This continued focus expresses one's own loss of control as older cable-news models are in decline, the media landscape becomes more diverse, and various web platforms allow younger savvy users to locate alternative information sources. This kind of repetitive finger-pointing is also simultaneously meant to delegitimize Russia's foreign-language broadcasting and to explain the support for Putin domestically.
The notion in question relies on a number of related assumptions:

    that Western countries do not have state media;
    that corporate media is impartial;
    that state media cannot feature opposing points of view and is thus inferior to its corporate counterpart;
    that media consumers, the general and even the educated public, are incapable of critically analyzing the information they receive.

Let us address the inconsistencies in these assumptions issued by those, who consider themselves the paragon of accurate journalism, fit to set and criticize reporting standards for all. Then, we will proceed to examine the domestic Russian media landscape, focusing on political, economic, and social (i.e., non-entertainment) issues. Let us also agree to define "propaganda" as not simply sharing information that promotes a particular view point-no one is immune to that-but, rather, as sharing information that is deliberately misleading, one that may include purposeful omissions, especially when counter-facts are readily available.

First, the Western world most certainly owns and operates state, that is, taxpayer-funded, media, some of which specifically targets audiences abroad and predates the likes of Russia's RT-the usual scapegoat of the aforementioned accusations-by decades. Britain's BBC, Canada's CBC, Germany's Deutsche Welle, as well as America's PBS and, well, Voice of America are some of the most obvious examples. Thus, the argument about 'state-owned propaganda' that is contextually meant to contrast the 'free' West with 'authoritarian' Russia contradicts itself from the onset. After all, if the assumption about lacking pluralism only pertains to state media, as such, then it affects the aforementioned European and American networks as well.

Second, the notion that large corporate entities spend billions on media without having a stake in content, narrative, ideological slant, and advertising defies the very purpose of being a for-profit organization. In fact, in the last few decades, the number of companies owning and operating major networks and publications in the U.S., specifically, decreased from 50 to 6. This means that the same corporations are pushing the same interests, or even personal views of its owners, across a misleading diversity of platforms.
Third, the content and analysis in non-state Western media about the subjects of geopolitics or international relations not only sound like each other, but also like the official narrative from Washington and Brussels. Take the increase in demonizing Russia, in general, and Putin, specifically in the last number of years. Whereas, the 'Russia is finished' narrative has consistently appeared since Putin's first presidency, the country's return to world politics after 1990s collapse, especially with brokering the chemical-weapons deal in Syria in 2013, has increased the unjustifiably critical and, sometimes, comical information onslaught exponentially.

Then came the needless tarnishing of the Sochi Olympics, Ukraine's Maidan-as-a-peaceful-protest coverage, Crimean 'occupation' despite the referendum, Russia's weekly invasions of Ukraine, blaming Putin for the MH17 crash minutes after it occurred, and, as of this moment, criticizing the Russian anti-terrorist operation in Syria upon that government's invitation.

Of course, some of this coverage gets refuted later, but the initial impact is meant to cause the maximum informational damage possible.

The echo-chamber effect does not necessarily mean that Western-media journalists are cooperating with the government, though sometimes it does, as was the case with the Julian Assange interview with 60 Minutes in 2011.

What it does mean is that sometimes corporate and state interests coincide-when U.S. Vice President Joe Biden's son joined the board of a Ukrainian gas company, for instance-or simply that journalists are operating within the same ideological milieu. Of course, that is not an excuse to leave out easily accessible pieces of information that would affect one's narrative, not know the language of the country, where one claims his supposed expertise, or, for that matter, never travel there.

Now, let us have a look at the Russian media landscape, addressing the so-called opposition first. Echo of Moscow (Ekho Moskvy) radio; TV Rain (Dozhd); Novaia Gazeta, Gazeta.Ru, Grani newspapers, among others are some of the most obvious examples of ideologically Liberal media mimicking mainstream Western opinion, sometimes as a hyperbole.

Certain celebrities and media personalities, like Ksenia Sobchak, currently of TV Rain, push similar agenda through social networks to hundreds of thousands of subscribers. These platforms continually feature content that is near-identical to that of Russia's current demonization in the West-from the 'invasion' of Ukraine to 'not bombing ISIS' in Syria. Some are affiliated with Western state-funded sources, like theVoice of America in the case of Grani and TV Rain.

These platforms represent the opinions of less than 10% of Russia's population, specifically young affluent urbanites. Yet it is they that get over-represented and idealized in the Western media.

At the same time, there are other kinds of media opposition, or, at least, those, who question some of the Kremlin's key decisions, whose opinions are never heard in the West. This includes, for instance, a traditionalist, socially conservative newspaper Zavtra and its TV channel Den', known for its criticism of the ideologically Liberal aspects of post-Soviet Russia. In the early 1990s, West's 'democratic' darling Yeltsin went as far as to ban the older version of this publication.

Today, it supports what it describes as the patriotic trajectory. However, that does not necessarily coincide with the Kremlin's actions. Some of its contributors pushed for a military intervention in Ukraine to overthrow the post-Maidan Kiev government-after the latter attacked Donbass-contrary to Moscow's efforts with Minsk-1 and Minsk-2 agreements. Thus, the Western media over-represents one kind of opposition-one that parrots its talking points-and completely ignores another.

This follows a similar trend of reducing the so-called civil society in Russia to pro-Western ideological Liberals and overlooking socially conservative Orthodox, monarchist, and Cossack groups, because they do not fit the required narrative.

Much of the Russian media is indeed state-owned or affiliated. As such, it adheres to the general trajectory of Kremlin's politics. But we have already seen that corporate media effectively functions in the same manner. Also, let us not forget that these politics are supported by an overwhelming majority of Russians, fluctuating at over 80% since 2014. More important, this does not mean that opposing view points remain unheard, or that political talk-show hosts have no freedom of expression.

To the contrary.

Diverse opinions are aired on a daily basis on the biggest political programs in prime time and, often, live, that is, with little-to-no editing. Compare that approach to the partial censorship of Putin's recent interview to the U.S. media. Contributors to Russian state television include journalists, opinion-makers, and even political officialdom from the United States, Germany, Czech Republic, Finland, Poland, Greece, Turkey, the Baltic states, Ukraine, and Syria, not to mention the ideologically Liberal opposition beloved in the West.

Some represent their national interests, others-views that harshly oppose those of the Kremlin. Want to witness Syrians debate the country's political situation? How about Donbass representatives argue with political scientists from Kiev? Channel 1 or Rossiia are happy to oblige.

Here is a small selection of foreign contributors to Russian state television, many of whom are quite critical of the Kremlin, over the past year.

Political scientist Nizar Bush (Syria) debates Al Hayat journalist Raed Jabr (Syria) on Time Will Tell (Vremiia Pokazhet), Channel 1:

Robert Pszczel, acting director of NATO's information office in Moscow, often appears on Sunday Evening (Voskresnyi Vecher) with Vladimir Soloviev, Rossiia Channel:

Simon Shuster (U.S.), Time magazine, makes an appearance on Sunday Evening (Voskresnyi Vecher) with Vladimir Soloviev, Rossiia Channel:

Ulrich Heyden (Germany), Der Freitag, appears on Politics (Politika), Channel 1:

Alexei Venediktov, an ideologically Liberal journalist with pro-Western views, host at Echo of Moscow, appears on Norkin's List (Spisok Norkina), NTV Channel:

Fuad Abbasov, Ihlas news agency (Turkey) appears on Time Will Tell (Vremiia Pokazhet),Channel 1:

Michael Bohm (U.S.), Moscow Times, Al Jazeera, Echo of Moscow, et al, appears on the Right to Be Heard (Pravo Golosa), TVC Channel (Photo: Korotchenko) [these too are pro-West or pro-US publications - .ed] :

The following tweets are from the Russian military expert Igor Korotchenko and his television appearances over the past month alone.
Michael Bohm appears on Time Will Tell (Vremiia Pokazhet), Channel 1, "bashing Assad," Korotchenko adds:

Boris Nadezhdin, an ideologically Liberal politician and commentator with pro-Western views, on his way to Sunday Evening (Voskresnyi Vecher) with Vladimir Soloviev, Rossiia Channel:

Nikolai Zlobin (left), a Russian-American political scientist at Center on Global Interests, Washington, D.C., appears on Sunday Evening (Voskresnyi Vecher) with Vladimir Soloviev, Rossiia Channel:

Michael Bohm and Czech journalist Jiří Just appear on Time Will Tell (Vremiia Pokazhet), Channel 1:

Michael Bohm and Ukrainian political scientist Vyacheslav Kovtun, a supporter of the current Kiev regime, at Ostankino television.

Vyacheslav Kovtun on Vesti.doc TV show, Rossiia Channel:

Olesya Yakhno, Ukrainian political scientist and a supporter of the current Kiev regime, appears on Time Will Tell (Vremiia Pokazhet), Channel 1:

It is important to note that many of these and other contributors make regular-weekly, if not daily-appearances on Russian state television beyond this small selection. Now, how often do you see the equivalent-officials, opinion-makers, and journalists-on Western television, particularly those that represent the mainstream Russian point of view?

Evgenii Poddubnyi of Rossiia Channel, Syria, September 2015. Source: Instagram @epoddubny.

When it comes to direct information, Russian journalists travel abroad. Well-known war reporters like Dmitrii Steshin and Sasha Kots of Komsomolskaia Pravda newspaper or Evgenii Poddubnyi of Rossiia Channel have broadcast from just about every conflict zone in the Middle East, North Africa, Central Asia, and Ukraine. This was once the professional norm everywhere. Recently, however, things changed. Take the Ukrainian conflict, for example. For months, most Western news agencies based their information on government reports coming out of Kiev-as was involved in a military operation against its own citizens in Donbass-instead of traveling there directly. And when they did, most chose to stay in the comfort of their hotel, hiring local stringers to do their dirty work, according to Sasha Kots:

"In Donetsk, an entire hotel is packed with Western journalists, whom I have never seen outside, that is, at the front, at militia's positions. Their principle is as follows: they find local stringers that go off somewhere to do the shooting, bringing back some kind of footage. [These journalists] then portray someone else's emotions as their own."

Sasha Kots and Dmitrii Steshin, Komsomolskaia Pravda, February 2015, Debaltsevo, Donbass. Source: Instagram @sashakots.

Of course, foreign relations and geopolitics are not the only subjects, contrary to what some would have you believe.

Indeed, some of the biggest political talk shows, such as the aforementioned daily Time Will Tell (Vremiia Pokazhet) often splits its air time 50% / 50% with a news segment in between. From the rising commodity prices, certain failures of school education, and quality of medical care to the crackdown on yet another corrupt governor, dozens of experts and audience members exchange fiery commentary, in between a barrage of statistics.

Time Will Tell (Vremiia Pokazhet), Channel 1, criticizes regional officials for excessive budget spending on airfare.

Writing from abroad? All of this programming is available at one's fingertips to either view directly on the country's television websites 1TV.ru, NTV.ru, and RUSSIA.tv, among others, or on Youtube from the comfort of one's home in just about any part of the world. Draw your own conclusions as to why many Russia-focused commentators in the mainstream Western media leave out crucial pieces of information regarding the country's media landscape.

And what of Russian media consumers that some Westerners portray as incapable of critical thought?

First, this country consistently ranks as one of the top places with the highest college-education levels.

Second, its citizens are prone to question the media, per se, with their history of living behind the Iron Curtain. Although we should note that when it comes to the USSR, it was not that the disseminated information was not factual, but that it was often accompanied by a very particular, at times, inapplicable, ideological reading.

Third, younger Russians are web-savvy, and many speak foreign languages. Of course, there is a number of popular platforms that translate foreign content for those, who do not. These platforms, InoSMI (foreign media) and InoTV (foreign TV), include many less-than-favorable Russia-specific articles and videos, in light of the current toxic anti-Russian climate in the official West. Now, how much Russian content does the Western media regularly translate in order to disseminate another point of view?

Russian media is not perfect. Yet its overall landscape represents a real diversity of social, economic, and political content, most of which is actually found on state-owned channels.

Indeed, the country's citizens are likely better aware of Western opinions than Westerners of those in Russia. To some, this might come as a surprise, but only if they missed the fact that over the past two decades, the Kremlin has chosen the path of not just persuasion over staunch censorship, but also that of healthy debate.

 [return to Contents] 

 #29
Wall Street Journal
October 15, 2015
The Leader Russia Deserves
Hundreds of years of history-especially the experience of the Soviet century and the trauma that followed-have made Putin inevitable.
By JOSHUA YAFFA
Mr. Yaffa, a journalist based in Moscow, is a contributor to the Economist and the New Yorker, among other publications. He is also a fellow at New America.

IMPERIAL GAMBLE
By Marvin Kalb
Brookings, 287 pages, $29

Vladimir Putin is perhaps the most puzzled over and least understood world leader. It's hard to resist the temptation to psychoanalyze him-the Kremlin's inclination for ever-tighter control at home and its brash behavior abroad surely must be rooted in Mr. Putin's desire to protect his apocryphal $40 billion personal fortune, or perhaps in his theatrical sense of vanity, which has produced famous images of him descending in a mini-submarine or riding shirtless on a horse.

Much of what passes for Russia analysis in the United States is, in fact, Putin analysis: What does the man tell us about the country? This has it backward. The right question to ask is: What can the country tell us about the man? Hundreds of years of Russian history-especially the experience of the Soviet century and the sense of collective trauma that followed-have made the emergence of a leader like Mr. Putin almost natural. Russia's past, its geography and its social and political culture have created an environment that makes him less an aberration than inevitable.

Untangling that history and its relation to the present is the intent of "Imperial Gamble: Putin, Ukraine, and the New Cold War," an informed yet ultimately underwhelming book by Marvin Kalb, who spent some heady years in Moscow in the 1950s and '60s, first at the U.S. Embassy, then as a correspondent for CBS. He went on to a long career with the network and has now settled into various positions at Washington think tanks and universities.

"Imperial Gamble" is ambitious, corralling more than 1,000 years of shared Russian and Ukrainian history into a svelte 250 pages. Recounting Mr. Putin's childhood in rough-and-tumble postwar Leningrad, as others have done, may be of limited utility in understanding why, for example, he launched a covert war in Ukraine last year. But it's not clear that a short history of the 1773 Pugachev Rebellion, in which Cossacks rose up against Catherine the Great, a story retold by Mr. Kalb, is of any more help.

Yet the author's historical perspective is useful in its muddying of the overly simplistic narrative of Ukraine as a pro-Western nation with a long democratic tradition, trying to break free from Russian control. Mr. Kalb narrates Ukraine's fleeting experiments with statehood and nation-building; the horrors of the fight against Germany during World War II, which exacted an inhuman toll on both Russians and Ukrainians, albeit in different forms; the bewildering collapse of the Soviet Union and how, from this wreckage, two deeply imperfect states were given shape.

Corruption and misrule have defined politics in Kiev for two decades. More than Russia or Mr. Putin, Mr. Kalb notes, "Ukraine is Ukraine's bigger problem." This doesn't mean the author excuses Russian behavior, which he sees as paternalistic and driven by old paranoias. In Moscow's thinking, Mr. Kalb argues, Ukraine seems "a wayward, misguided cousin, the victim of Western shenanigans out to subvert its independence, absorb it into NATO, and undo its historic ties to Russia."

The author's most useful corrective is to present Mr. Putin not as an out-of-touch madman, chasing goals that seem to cut against his own interests-annexing Crimea, for example, ensuring his own isolation and some form of Western sanctions for a generation-but as a leader paying back decades of slights, perceived and real. In the understanding of Mr. Putin, the Soviet Union did not collapse because it was rotten and untenable, but because it was outsmarted by the U.S.-a loss Mr. Putin is loath to repeat. Mr. Kalb paraphrases the Russian view: "Russia was treated like a defeated power, though we did not see ourselves as defeated."

Mr. Putin's revanchism is something real and heartfelt. The strength of this conviction was evident in his triumphant speech to the Duma last March to mark the annexation of Crimea. "If you compress a spring all the way to its limit, it will snap back hard," he said. This sense of grievance may not make sense to policy makers in the West, the victors in the Cold War, but it does to Mr. Putin and to no small number of ordinary Russians, who are still casting about for a way to explain their disorienting, post-Soviet lives.

Over the past year, the West has proved to be some combination of disinclined and unable to do much of anything about Mr. Putin's highly risky project. "We are now in the post-appeasement phase of the Ukraine crisis," Mr. Kalb writes gloomily. Crimea is Russian land, and although the West may not recognize it as such for years to come, that fact is unlikely to change. A series of flimsy cease-fires in eastern Ukraine have in effect lopped off a chunk of the country's territory, and more important, created a sore for Kiev that Moscow can irritate as it likes.

After reading Mr. Kalb's book and digesting the history, it's not hard to understand why Mr. Putin cares more, and is thus willing to risk more to determine the ultimate fate of Ukraine than the leaders of the U.S. and Europe. Mr. Kalb insists that U.S. policy makers should admit that this is the case.

Yet beyond that call-itself surely heretical in Washington circles-Mr. Kalb offers few specifics. In this regard, his book suffers from an ailment endemic to the think-tank community: Arguing that policy makers should think more seriously about an issue doesn't constitute real policy. It's a way to avoid coming up with specific or forceful proposals.

Mr. Kalb suggests that the ultimate resolution of the crisis in U.S.-Russian relations will be determined in Ukraine. But Washington's sense of urgency has since shifted to Syria. The ghastly mess of U.S. policy toward Syria has presented Mr. Putin with another opening. Russian bombing raids may not ultimately yield the intended result of helping Bashar al-Assad win back territory, but they have made Russia an undeniable force in Mideast politics, and however grim or cynical, ensured Mr. Putin a voice in Syria's future. First in Ukraine and now in Syria, Mr. Putin has shown daring and an ability to create chaos so as to make himself essential in managing or ending it. The spring, as Mr. Putin might put it, has snapped back.

 [return to Contents] 

 #30
www.rt.com
October 15, 2015
Moscow doubles down on Washington
By Pepe Escobar
Pepe Escobar is the roving correspondent for Asia Times/Hong Kong, an analyst for RT and TomDispatch, and a frequent contributor to websites and radio shows ranging from the US to East Asia. Born in Brazil, he's been a foreign correspondent since 1985, and has lived in London, Paris, Milan, Los Angeles, Washington, Bangkok and Hong Kong. Even before 9/11 he specialized in covering the arc from the Middle East to Central and East Asia, with an emphasis on Big Power geopolitics and energy wars.

History may eventually decide the 'New World Order' started on September 28, when Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Barack Obama had a 90-minute face off at the UN in New York.

Irrespective of spin - "productive" according to the White House, "tense" according to a source close to the Kremlin - facts on the ground accumulated almost immediately.

Putin did press Obama for the US to join Russia in a real grand coalition bent on smashing ISIS/ISIL/Daesh. The Obama administration, once again, relented. I detailed here what happened next: an earth-shattering game-changer in the 'New Great Game' in Eurasia, straight out of the Caspian Sea, that caught the acronym fest of US intelligence - not to mention the Pentagon - completely off-guard.

So this was Putin's first message to Washington, and the Pentagon/NATO combo in particular; your fancy ideas of stationing tactical nuclear weapons or expanding missile defense to Eastern Europe, or even Asia-Pacific, are just a mirage. Our cruise missiles are capable of wreaking real effective havoc; and soon, as this piece argues, there will be more hypersonic, high-precision long-range missiles added to the mix.

Old habits don't die hard - they remain in a coma forever. The Pentagon's response to the facts launched from the Caspian Sea was to conduct an airdrop of light weapons to "a select group of vetted leaders and their units," as in those famously non-existent Syrian "moderate rebels." The weapons will inevitably be captured by assorted Salafi-jihadi goon outfits in no time.

Then the British government was forced to deny a Murdoch-controlled Sunday Times "report" that British Tornadoes in Syria are now armed with air-to-air missiles to counter potential Russian aerial "attacks."

And to top it off, the proverbial "military experts" infesting US corporate media started spinning that we are only 30 seconds from World War III.

The Glazyev nuclear plan

A still apoplectic Pentagon will take time to absorb the new military facts on the Syrian ground - and skies. That will add to the utter desperation displayed by the 'Masters of the Universe' in the Washington/Wall Street axis - itching to break the China-Russia strategic partnership by all means necessary. Quite a feat when the Pentagon is still fighting World War II, with its weapons, ships and monster aircraft carriers displayed as sitting ducks against Russia's new batch of missiles.

But then there's also Putin's second - silent - message to Washington, which didn't even have to be delivered in person to Obama. US intel though may have a hint about it, as they closely follow Russian media.

It's about Sergey Glazyev's (presidential aide) plan for Russia's immediate economic future here is a summary of the plan, in Russian. The plan was formally proposed to Russia's Security Council. Here is a very good summary on how Russia's Security Council works.

There are at least three absolutely key points in Glazyev's plan. We may summarize them like this:

1. If the emerging trend of freezing private assets of Russian legal entities and individuals continues, Russia should consider full or a partial moratorium on the servicing of loans and investment from the countries involved in the freezing.

2. The amount of foreign currency assets of the Russian Federation located in the jurisdiction of NATO countries accounts to more than $1.2 trillion, including short-term debt of about $800 billion. Their freeze may be partially offset by retaliation against NATO assets in Russia, which amounts to $1.1 trillion, including over $400 billion long-term. So this threat would be neutralized if Russian monetary authorities organized a timely withdrawal of Russian short-term assets in the US and the EU.

3.  Glazyev is adamant that the Russian Central Bank continues to serve the interests of foreign capital - as in the financial powers in London and New York. He contends that the high interest rates practiced by the Russian Central Bank led Russian oligarchs to borrow more cheaply from the West, making the Russian economy dependent, a debt trap which the West used to slowly squeeze Russia. Then the rigged Western oil and ruble collapse increased the pressure as debt service in ruble cost and interest doubled.

So what Glazyev proposes, essentially, is that Moscow must gain total control of its Central Bank, preventing speculators to move their credit around for non-productive purposes; Moscow should also establish currency controls; and must create a central organization of technological research to replace the loss of Western technology, imitating the US methodology of rolling out from its centralized military research those technologies that can be commercialized for the consumer market.

The fact is Russia has lost access to Western credit and cannot roll over its debt with the creditors. So Russia will have to pay the principle and the interest as it comes due. That is a trillion dollars plus interest. Russia also cannot import anything from the West without paying double for it.  So arguably the country may be now in the very position it will be if Moscow opts for default. Thus, Russia would have nothing to lose by a default - as the damage is already done.

A shock to the system

Essentially, once again, a Russian default on a $1 trillion-plus debt to private Western parties remains a possible scenario discussed at the highest level - assuming Washington will persist in its anti-Russia demonization campaign.

It's clear the squeeze Russia is feeling has less to do with sanctions than the grip maintained by Western financial powers over the Russian Central Bank. The Russian Central Bank did create a debt trap by maintaining high interest rates in Russia while the West was lending at low interest rates.

Needless to add, such a default, if it ever happened, would collapse the entire Western financial system.

One should never forget the Big Picture; the Syria/Ukraine/sanctions saga runs in parallel to Russia-China and closer BRICS integration shifting the balance of geopolitical power. For the 'Masters of the Universe', this is beyond anathema. Enter, for instance, the use of cash settlement through their Wall Street proxies to raise the A shares of China to hysterical highs and then try to crash their entire stock market by a reverse cash settlement rig as in 1987.

China is moving toward their own SWIFT payment system, not to mention a whole new Chinese-led set of international institutions independent of US control. Russia, for its part, recently passed a bill that would allow the seizing of foreign assets if Russian assets in the West are seized. As Glazyev pointed out, investment in Russia by the West are more or less equivalent to investments of Russia in the West.

The 'Masters of the Universe' may keep insisting on using financial weapons of mass destruction. Russia, silently and with a few key facts in the Caspian Sea, is letting them know it's ready for whatever scenario they can come up with.

A less apocalyptic ending may be healthy. So here's a popular joke in Moscow nowadays, as told by William Engdahl. Putin is back in the Kremlin after his meeting with Obama in New York. He tells an aide he invited Obama for a game of chess. And then he tells it how it works: "It's like playing with a pigeon. First it knocks over all the pieces, then it shits on the board and finally struts around like it won."

 [return to Contents] 

 #31
Business New Europe
www.bne.eu
October 15, 2015
All creditors bar Moscow back Ukraine debt restructuring
bne IntelliNews

Private creditors have voted in favour of Ukraine's $18bn debt restructuring deal, while Russia - which holds a $3bn bond due in December - refused to vote, Kyiv's Finance Ministry said in a statement published on October 15.

"The ministry is pleased to announce that all sovereign and sovereign guaranteed bonds, with the exception of the December $3bn bond, passed an extraordinary resolution approving the proposed restructuring," the statement reads.

The vote on October 14 finalises the country's seven-month marathon aiming to secure an $18bn debt restructuring deal with a group of investors represented by US investment firm Franklin Templeton. In late August, Ukraine agreed with its creditors a 20% writedown of the face value of its Eurobonds.

With the restructuring deal, Kyiv meets the conditions of the current bail-out programme agreed with the country's main creditor, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in March 2015. At the same time, Russia reiterated that it expected the $3bn debt to be repaid in full.

"Settlement of the exchange offer for the 13 series of bonds which yesterday approved their respective extraordinary resolutions would result in the restructuring of around $15bn of Ukraine's external debt, achieve a 20% debt reduction for Ukraine (around $3bn) and allow Ukraine to avoid payments of any of the previously scheduled $8.5bn of principal falling due under such bonds during the next four years," the finance ministry underlined in the statement.

The 'Russian' bond dilemma

According to the ministry, an adjourned bondholder meeting will be held in London on October 29 in relation to the Russia-held $3bn Eurobond, issued by former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych's government in late 2013, "as the quorum was not reached at the initial meeting".

"At this meeting the holders of this bond - today the only holdouts - will have a final opportunity to join all of Ukraine's other external bondholders in supporting Ukraine's debt restructuring," the ministry added.

According to the ministry, headed by US-born Natalie Jaresko, the final decision on settlement of the entire exchange operation will be taken by the finance ministry "immediately" following the adjourned meeting.  "If the decision is taken to proceed, it is anticipated that settlement will occur and new securities will be delivered to bondholders mid November 2015," the statement reads.

Meanwhile, Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatseniuk told journalists on October 15 that "as was expected", Russia is the only country that did not take part in the vote."If they think that they are unique, we are ready for a judicial examination of the case with the Russian Federation," Yatseniuk said.

Moscow's default plan

Earlier, on October 13, Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov said that Moscow would regard Ukrainian's failure to repay a $3bn Eurobond in December as a sovereign default. According to him, the Russian government is preparing "a particular plan of action" for Ukraine's possible default.

Siluanov added that if Kyiv refused to pay off its debt, Moscow would turn to international arbitration courts and directly to the IMF.

The minister underlined that the Russian government would present the response plan to President Vladimir Putin, who said on the same day that the IMF should provide an additional $3bn loan to Ukraine in order to ensure the repayment of its debt to Russia.

"You could speak with colleagues; it seems to me it's easier to add $3bn to Ukraine [loans] so that it could pay [the debt] off ... because after changing those rules in favour of one country requests may follow to change those rules for other states as well," Putin underlined.

On October 10, Russia's VTB Bank chief Andrei Kostin said that IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde was supporting Russia's classification of the debt as "inter-governmental", while neither Lagarde nor other IMF officials issued a comment on the matter. This statement triggered speculations that the IMF might allow Ukraine to default on the $3bn bond.

 [return to Contents] 

 #32
Russia's position on Ukraine's $3 bln debt unchanged - Finance Ministry

MOSCOW, October 15. /TASS/. Russia's position on Ukraine's $3 billion debt remains unchanged and Moscow expects Kiev to repay the loan in full in December this year, Assistant to the Finance Minister Svetlana Nikitina told TASS on Thursday.

"Russia's position has not changed. [Finance Minister] Anton Siluanov outlined it on many occasions, including at the talks with the finance minister of the Ukrainian government [Natalia Yaresko]. Ukraine's $3 billion bonds bought by Russia in December 2013 using its National Welfare sovereign fund are not subject to restructuring as compared with commercial debts," she said.

Russia insists that Ukraine's debt to Moscow represents Kiev's sovereign liabilities and a decision on spending money from the National Welfare Fund on the bonds' acquisition was made by the Russian government and the debt was not re-assigned.

"Also, the funds were provided on non-market terms. Let me remind you that the bonds carry a coupon of 5% while the Ukrainian Eurobonds' yields totaled about 9-10% in December 2013," Nikitina said.

 [return to Contents] 

 #33
Wall Street Journal
October 15, 2015
Ukraine Threatens Russia With Legal Action Over Debt
Prime minister gives Moscow two-week deadline to restructure $3 billion bond
By LAURA MILLS

KIEV, Ukraine-Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk said the government will file a lawsuit against Russia if Moscow doesn't agree to restructure a $3 billion bond in the next two weeks.

Ukraine's private creditors, who hold the bulk of the country's sovereign or sovereign-guaranteed $19 billion of external debt, have agreed to a restructuring plan that includes a 20% write-off and an extension on repayments, the Finance Ministry said Thursday, eliminating fears that holdouts could obstruct the deal by trying to bargain for better terms. But Russia has refused to restructure the $3 billion debt, which was handed to a pro-Russian president in 2013 who fled weeks later amid street protests.

Ukraine has repeatedly said that it won't give Russia better terms than any of the other creditors.

"On Oct. 29 we will propose again that Russia make a choice, either they want to receive the same conditions as the other creditors, or they think they are unique," said Mr. Yatsenyuk. "If they think they are unique, we are prepared for a court case against the Russian Federation....Russia will not be given any other conditions."

Ukraine's restructuring plan is part of a $40 billion program from the International Monetary Fund, including $17.5 billion from the emergency lender, to shore up Ukraine's economy after more than a year of conflict with Russian-backed separatists in the country's east. But current IMF policy only allows member states to miss payments to private creditors, meaning that if Ukraine defaults on the Russia loan in December, it could risk falling out of the program.

Russian officials, including President Vladimir Putin, have repeatedly said they expect to be repaid in full.

"They should return the money to us," Mr. Putin told a government meeting Tuesday in comments carried by Interfax news agency. He said the IMF could lend the money to Ukraine to repay Russia.

 [return to Contents] 

 #34
http://readrussia.com
October 13, 2015
Ukraine: Life at the Front
By Jim Kovpak
Jim Kovpak is the founder of Russia Without BS.

Avdiivka, or Avdeevka as it's called in Russian, is about as close to the front as one can get in Ukraine without falling into a foxhole or getting shot. In fact, it's not merely on the front line. It occupies a salient, though a shallow, angular one pointed toward rebel-held Donetsk. Thus Russian artillery ranges the entire town, including the massive coke and chemical plant that serves as the town's main employer and, during the winter, its lifeline.

Getting to Avdiivka isn't nearly as easy as traipsing around towns like Kostiantynivka or Slovyansk, so I had to do a lot of research prior to my trip. One of my close friends, a veteran correspondent, strongly advised me to skip Avdiivka on account of the daily, or more accurately, nightly shelling that the city endures. He explained that apart from a few issues with some rebel checkpoints, Donetsk would be far safer than Avdiivka. But when the Donetsk rebels' press service stopped responding after I'd followed their instructions for accreditation, Avdiivka was my best shot at getting the kind of story my colleague was looking for. After all, everyone I'd talked to had warned me of the danger. How could I not go? I found an NGO that would lend us body armor and helmets, brushed up on the procedure for responding to indirect fire, and started making arrangements.

From what I had gathered, one key point was getting a driver who was not only willing to go, but who also knew the proper route to take. Otherwise, there'd be a risk of getting fired on as the front line doesn't show up on your basic GPS navigator. We did get lost a couple times, but apart from the numerous checkpoints the ride was uneventful. This part of Ukraine is characterized by rolling hills and seemingly endless fields of sunflowers. If you didn't know why the Ukrainian flag is blue and yellow, just look out the window in these parts. The beauty of the scenery is somewhat marred, however, by the horrible condition of the road itself.

Our first stop in the town was at the massive Metinvest coke and chemical plant to meet with our contact. Younger Americans, especially those who aren't from the Rust Belt, would find this massive installation quite alien. With its own cafeteria, hospital, and a shop out front, it seems like a miniature city in its own right. The analogy isn't too far off the mark either - during the winter the plant sheltered numerous civilians who were without water or heating, or whose flats had been destroyed outright.

Initially we spoke to the official in charge of the plant, as its owner and his delegate were away on business when we arrived. We discussed a little about the plant's history and its capacity, before being given a long safety briefing about the procedures to follow if we were to take a tour of the facility. However, there was a decision we'd have to make- according to our original plan, which could best be characterized as "get out before the shelling starts," we could either tour the factory or see the town itself to survey the damage. For us the latter was the obvious choice. Thus we packed into a company van with our guides and started down the road toward the residential part of the town. As we were in a hurry, we'd left our body armor and helmets with our original driver.

It didn't take long to notice the damage from direct hits on some industrial buildings that flanked the road into town. Another key indicator of artillery bombardment was the lack of windows. They were boarded up, covered with plastic, or just plain gone.  Despite this, however, what we could observe on the streets looked rather ordinary. People walked about with their groceries or rode bicycles. In spite of the daily shelling, people weren't darting about from cover to cover Sarajevo-style.

After a short trip we arrived in a neighborhood consisting of five-story Khrushchevka buildings, not significantly different from the one in which I spent five of my nine years in Russia. They took us to a particular building that had obviously sustained considerable damage and was in the process of being restored when we arrived. We were allowed to go inside, though we had to dodge the busy workmen left and right. We carefully headed up the stairwell and I noticed that two flights of stairs had been damaged so that they seemed to sag in the middle. The last flight of stairs was gone, so workers had replaced it with long wooden planks. On the way up, we saw metal doors bulging outward. I inspected flats which had suffered hits to their kitchens and bathrooms, their floors covered with debris.

While we were in the stairwell we had a chance to interview one of our guides from the factory to learn a little more about how people dealt with the war. He explained that he actually had a flat in rebel-controlled Donetsk. Like many people in Avdiivka, he had acquaintances, friends, and neighbors on the other side of the line, and people on both sides kept in contact via phone or internet to share warnings about possible shelling or to check up on their property. Like many workers with families in Avdiivka, our guide had sent his wife and children to a nearby, safer town, where he could see them on weekends.

On the topic of safety, I was getting a bit concerned about the time. We'd arrived in Avdiivka at least an hour late due to an unplanned stop and getting lost on the way. The sun was starting to go down, and it seemed to me a sort of ticking clock. Time was important because we had another site to visit. In this case it was a restaurant called Café Brevno.

We had been told about the restaurant earlier, at the factory, when our guides mentioned that it had been hit by a shell which killed three of the staff. The restaurant's grill was outdoors, and its tables were located inside little huts, presumably intended for private get-togethers. This layout reminded me of the Biblos restaurant in Artemivsk. We first chatted with a middle-aged soldier who was drinking a beer alone by an outdoor table, and then we spoke to Yana, the rather young-looking manager of the establishment. With her smartphone she showed us a photo of the damage the establishment had sustained. The shell had hit the grill area, which explained why the victims had been members of the staff. Yana said that she herself had been in the same area twenty minutes earlier, but had left to get something when the place was struck.

As it was getting late, our guide from the factory offered to let us spend the night in their bomb shelter, a bunker I'd heard about from another journalist who'd visited the town. She took us back to the courtyard outside the plant's admin building and asked us to wait while she made the arrangements. As we milled about in the little park-like area, I noted an odd, cylindrical metal object which had shattered the curb encircling one of the lawns. Radiating out from this object was a splash pattern of indentations in the asphalt. Given that plus the diameter of the object, and the damage to the façade of the nearby admin building, it was clear that this was an exploded rocket, most likely BM-21 Grad, a popular multiple rocket launch platform descended from the WWII-era BM-13 Katyusha. In WWII and some other 20th century conflicts, the ability to launch massive rocket barrages against large enemy formations was ideal. In the 21st century, where populations are far more urbanized, these rocket launchers with their ability to plaster entire grid squares in the space of a few seconds become murderous. As it got darker outside, the remains of the rocket served as a reminder that we were not safe; they could hit us here too.

Our guide reemerged from the admin building to deliver some bad news - the bomb shelter had no room for us. We'd be staying in the factory's hospital, nearby. The front of this narrow, multi-storied building faced the town, so theoretically the rebels could put a shell or rocket right through one of its windows or through the walls as they were not reinforced. The head nurse, who was now living in the hospital as she'd been bombed out of her flat, led us upstairs and introduced us to an officer in charge of a contingent of Ukrainian soldiers who assisted in security around the plant. I don't remember seeing a single one in uniform.

As an odd aside, we ended up watching TV with some of the Ukrainian soldiers, and the experience was surreal. All the channels were Russian outlets. We saw some of Interni, a medical-themed comedy series starting Ivan Okhlobystin, who apart from his raving homophobia had also once expressed extremely violent opinions towards Ukrainians. Next we saw the news from Russia's POV on Rossiya 24, and finally we caught a glimpse of rebel TV on a network called simply Novorossiya, which was showing The Devil Wears Prada. After we'd cleared out of the break room, we headed back to the ward that served as our accommodations for the night, and I fell asleep on an incredibly hard hospital bed situated next to an ultrasound machine.

The night passed uneventfully, at least for us at the factory, and in the morning we headed over to the town council building to see them give out humanitarian aid and plastic to replace broken windows. Apparently while the factory had been spared shelling that night, the town had not. Residents, mostly elderly, came in to report how many windows they'd lost and the city workers would cut the plastic sheets from a large roll.

Minutes after we arrived I was standing outside the building, maybe a couple kilometers from the frontline positions, and I began to hear the crackle of small arms fire, followed by what sounded like heavier caliber machine guns. So far nothing I hadn't heard before. Then the tempo quickened and the small arms were joined by explosions and much heavier weapons. So this is what battle sounds like. After missing out on the experience in the army, here I was experiencing it as a civilian. What is more, after living over 9 years in Russia I was now in the sights of Russian artillery. The irony.

The feeling was a bit strange. I expected to feel fear, excitement, something, but instead I felt as though I had to coax myself into being concerned. It was all so...normal. The behavior of the town's residents certainly reflected that mood. These weapons were being aimed at live people, and given our position they were theoretically aimed at us as well. The rebels knew exactly where the town council building was and had hit numerous buildings around it multiple times. Therefore putting a shell into that parking lot was well within their capabilities. In spite of that, I could only perceive the danger in an intellectual sense. It just didn't feel real enough, as if I couldn't grasp the severity of the situation. Looking back I think there was something exhilarating about it, but it wasn't what I expected and it wasn't fear. Perhaps it would have been different if I'd witnessed a shell exploding nearby, but fortunately none did. The battle continued as we went upstairs and interviewed the Ukrainian colonel who served as the military authority in the city alongside the civilian mayor. He explained that fighting during the day was a rarity these days. As he was doing so, there was an extremely loud boom from outside, almost as if on cue. He gestured toward the window and said, "Well there, you see?"

We had a walk around the city to observe the damage, mostly shattered balconies and windows, during a lull in the fighting. In the process, we ran into Yana from Brevno with a couple of her young staff outside a closed shopping center. After saying hello we continued on our way and came across a bizarre scene: At the end of a heating pipe was a sort of shanty town made of boxes and pet carriers. Cats and kittens scurried about. Inside one of the cat carriers we saw a mother cat nursing a litter of kittens whose eyes had probably opened very recently. As we approached, more animals gathered, including two puppies. My colleagues began petting the cats and puppies as two elderly residents came up and explained how the townspeople had pitched in to build this shelter for the homeless animals and to feed them. It was built on the pipe for warmth in the winter. As this was going on, the battle started again. As before it began with small arms and graduated to heavy artillery. All the while, we photographed and played with the kittens and puppies.

Later on when the battle had died down again, the colonel invited us to lunch at the factory's cafeteria, and then he drove us as close to the front lines as we could go, showing us the last Ukrainian checkpoint. Once again we didn't have our body armor with us, but at this point we asked ourselves why we should wear it if nobody else had armor. The most notable landmark near the front was a pair of residential buildings, their broadsides facing the front line, which had been ruined by rebel artillery. He explained how the buildings had been pounded with artillery roughly a month before we showed up and the whole thing had been captured on video and posted to Youtube. Hallmark of a 21st century war.  

We had been invited to stay another night in Avdiivka, this time in the town itself, but a change in my colleague's schedule meant that he had to cut the trip short by a day. Spending time talking to the ordinary people, as well as the public servants, one couldn't help but feel some sort of survivor guilt. They experienced sleepless nights in basements, power blackouts, lost their water supply, and yet we were able to just hop in a taxi and go back to Kostiantynivka and relative peace. One thing I remember hearing from several people, including the mayor, was how nice the town had been before the war. One worker invited us to come back when Avdiivka once again had peace.

And that may be where the guilt comes from. Since the beginning of a new ceasefire on 1 September, Avdiivka has had peace. The school year started as usual and the remaining children in the town attend their classes as they did before the war. The better things get for the people of Avdiivka, the less interesting it is for journalists. Thus the city will go from the headlines back into obscurity. I doubt any of the residents will regret that, however.

 [return to Contents] 

 
#35
Kyiv Post
October 15, 2015
Svoboda, Right Sector march streets to mark Oct. 14 Defenders' Day holiday in Ukraine
By Katrina Poulsen, Olena Goncharova

Theodor Dyachun walks slowly on Mykhailivska Square, looking over thousands of Ukrainians who gathered on Oct. 14 in honor of Defenders Day, a newly recognized holiday honoring those who have been fighting for the country's independence.

Dyachun, an 88-year-old Ukrainian Insurgent Army veteran from Ternopil Oblast, says it important for him to be on a square today.

He joined the event basically to commemorate the 73rd anniversary of the UPA, which fought against Nazi and Soviet troops in 1942 to 1954. Dyachun was arrested back in 1950; he was forcibly deported to Kazakhstan where he spent more than 10 years before returning to Ukraine.

A national anthem tune on his old cell phone interrupts his thoughts.

"Nation was born finally and people began to understand that," Dyachun says after the pause. "Once (Mykola) Khvylovy, (Ukrainian writer) said that we need to go away from Moscow. Our people (in power) still don't get it."

Even though the new holiday aims to commemorate all fighters for Ukrainian nation, for Dyachun it's still a day when he recalls his fellow soldiers with the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, known as UPA.

Several Ukrainian right-wing groups, including Svoboda nationalist party and Pravy Sektor, made it to streets, waving Ukrainian and party flags. There were also protesters who carried flags of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists.

Meanwhile, Oleh Tyahnybok, Svoboda party leader, said from a stage that this holiday is a great chance to remember not only fallen Ukraine's heroes, but all those activists who are kept behind bars.

Tyahnybok called on rally supporters to join the march to Lukyanivske detention facility, where two suspects of involvement in the murder of journalist Oles Buzyna are being held. They both are Svoboda activists.

"They (in power) are afraid of the (real) patriots, this regime is the same as (former president Viktor) Yanukovych one," Tyahnybok said.

The event was used as a platform for agitation as well. Svoboda leader says that nationalists groups will unite in their fight for nation without "corrupt elements" and will also go together for the future parliamentary elections.

However, not all the attendees share Tyahnybok's ideas.

Andry Kuktenko, 19, believes the holiday shouldn't have nationalist pretext.

"To be honest I do not agree with (the idea of) this demonstration," Kuktenko told the Kyiv Post. "It is nationalist only and I don't agree that Ukraine is only for Ukrainians. Ukraine must be democratic, not nationalistic."

Since the EuroMaidan Revolution that overthrew President Viktor Yanukovych last year, Svoboda party has found itself increasingly marginalized, after deadly anti-autonomy clashes between nationalists and riot police erupted outside parliament on Aug. 31.

Tyahnybok still blames the police for "negligence" during the rally that killed three National Guard servicemen and left more than 100 people injured.

When asked about security at the rally, Tyahnybok said they have talked with the activists in advance and will hold a "peaceful march as they always did."

Some 5,000 police officers were brought to streets to patrol the city.

However, the Interior Ministry reported that some 10 people were detained during the rally carrying knifes, tear gas spray and brass knuckles.

"Police even took away some wooden flag poles from the activists," Valeriya Burlakova, a member of Azov Regiment, told the Kyiv Post.

Burlakova, who spent her last year fighting in Donbas against combined Russia-separatists forces, says she tries not to miss any nationalist rally.

"It's also a good way to show the guys (suspected Svoboda members in Buzyna's murder) who are kept in detention facility that we remember them," Burlakova told the Kyiv Post.

Many of the activists also called for the release of several men who were arrested for involvement in clashes with police outside the Ukrainian parliament in August.

"Idiot power prosecute patriots," the marchers chant while walking to the building of Lukyanivske jail.

Police report that the rally was peaceful with a single smoke bomb thrown during the demonstration.

Originally, the new holiday replaces the former February 23, Defender of the Fatherland Day, which was of Soviet origin.

Victoria Dnipruk, a middle-aged woman, who took part in the rally, says now it turns into a real "celebration of the Ukrainian army."

Dnipruk, dressed in red skirt and white fur jacket in colors of Ukraine's traditional costume, joined the rally together with her little son. "'My son goes with me to every celebration. Before it was only a celebration of the Soviet history. Now we are independent, this day is very important for us.'

See video of the march here http://www.kyivpost.com/multimedia/video-2/ukraine-today-ukrainian-nationalists-rally-on-defenders-day-video-399980.html
and photos here http://www.kyivpost.com/multimedia/photo/supporters-of-nationalists-parties-march-in-kyiv-to-mark-ukrainian-defenders-day-399984.html

 [return to Contents] 

 #36
http://gordonhahn.com
October 13, 2015
The Darkening of 'Color Revolutions' 2.0: Maidan Regime Investigates Its Founders for Mass Murder
By Gordon M. Hahn
Gordon M. Hahn is an Analyst and Advisory Board Member of the Geostrategic Forecasting Corporation. He is also Analyst/Consultant, Russia Other Points of View and Senior Researcher, Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies (CETIS), Akribis Group, San Jose, California.

Many years ago I wrote a piece on the darkening of so-called 'color revolutions', including Ukraine's original 'revolution' - the so-called Orange revolution (Gordon M. Hahn, "Colored Revolutions Darken," Russia: Other Points of View, 18 April 2008, www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/2008/04/the-darkening-o.html#more). The latter really was not so much a revolution as an intra-elite power struggle won by way of a coup backed elements in society mobilized temporarily so that one elite group could defeat another. That Orange intra-elite revolt opened the way for Ukraine's ultra-nationalists and their ideology to become mainstream. The big news from Ukraine in recent days reveals the something eerily similar but even more disturbing.

Judging by mass media the big news over the last week would seem to be two-fold: (1) progress on Minsk 2 with the DNR and LNR's decision to postpone holding elections outside the Ukrainian state's jurisdiction and (2) the Dutch Aviation Board's report on the MH17 shootdown. However, far more important than certainly the latter piece of news is a third that will get little attention in the U.S. and Western media. The Maidan Kiev regime's suddenly is turning around on the veracity of its February 2014 revolution's founding myth - the 20 February 2014 Maidan snipers' massacre - and thus exposing just how dark the Maidan revolution has been.

The Maidan Myth

The Maidan myth is as follows: Dastardly Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich ordered special forces' and police snipers to fire on peaceful demonstrators killing nearly a hundred and wounding even more. This led to the storming of government buildings and the overthrow of the Yanukovich regime. Valentyn Nalyvaichenko, head of Ukraine's equivalent of the KGB or FSB, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), until May 2015, said in February 2015 that Russian President Vladimir Putin's advisor Vladislav Surkov coordinated the massacre (http://gordonhahn.com/2015/02/20/another-rusological-fail-u-s-experts-continue-to-lie-about-russia-and-ukraine/). After a committee hearing in Ukraine's Supreme Rada, Nalyvaichnko was forced to walk his unproven claim back. He was soon fired, presumably for ineffective strategic communications or propaganda. Now the Maidan regime appears ready to revise the history of the Maidan revolution of February 2014 in the proper direction.

The Maidan Reality

As I have argued and as Ottawa University Professor Ivan Katchanovski has led the way in demonstrating empirically, the reality was almost the precise reverse (Ivan Katchanovskii, "The 'Snipers' Massacre' on the Maidan in Ukraine (Revised and Updated Version)," Academia.edu, 20 February 2015, www.academia.edu/8776021/The_Snipers_Massacre_on_the_Maidan_in_Ukraine and Gordon M. Hahn WORKING PAPER: "Violence, Coercion and Escalation in the Ukrainian Crisis: Escalation Point 6: The 'Snipers of February," Gordonhahn.com Russian and Eurasian Politics, 8 May 2015, http://gordonhahn.com/2015/05/08/violence-coercion-and-escalation-in-ukraines-maidan-revolution-escalation-point-6-the-snipers-of-february/). The neo-fascists among the demonstrators actually initiated and undertook most of the shootings - often with hunting rifles - firing first at police (hence, the some 20 officers shot at the time) and then at demonstrators. Only later in the morning did police begin to return fire and only after contacting the leaders of the demonstrations and the heavenly hundreds' Parubiy. Some SP and RS members who were heavenly hundred fighters became snipers. These neo-fascist demonstrator-snipers are the SP and RS neo-fascists whom US Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland, numerous Obama administration pocket 'analysts', and Ukrainian neo-fascism apologists claim do not and did not exist and/or were not among the Maidan demonstrators.

The Maidan Regime's Investigation of the Maidan's Neo-Fascists' Snipers

On October 12 police announced they had searched the apartments of three deputy heads of the SP. On 13 October 2015, Ukraine's General Prosecutor's Office (GPO) announced that a search of the offices of several SP people's deputies was being carried out in connection with evidence that on 20 February 2014 SP members fired on police from a window in the Hotel Ukraine adjacent to the Maidan demonstrations and location of many of the sniper shootings. Specifically, Maidan Ukraine's GPO is now investigating "information about a possible shooting from Hotel Ukraine on February 20, 2014...given by people's deputies on the Maidan events." This comes not from Putin's 'troll machine' but from chief of the PGO Special Investigations Department Serhiy Horbatiuk at a briefing in Kyiv on October 13th. Searches were conducted in the offices of "deputy heads of Svoboda All-Ukrainian Union: former deputy prime minister of Ukraine Oleksandr Sych, former MP Oleh Pankevych, and head of the party court Ihor Yankiv." All three have been summoned for questioning at the GPO on October 16th. Assistant Prosecutor General of Ukraine Vladyslav Kutsenko confirmed that the searches are related to the investigation into the events of Euromaidan in February 2014. One of the deputy-witnesses, Pankevych, said that during the search he was shown an original of the video of events which occurred on February 20, 2014 filmed from the window of a Ukraine Hotel room (Graham Stack, "Ukraine investigates nationalists over Maidan shootings," Business New Europe, 12 October 2015, http://www.bne.eu; "Obshuki u kerivnikiv VO 'Svoboda': podrobitsi vid Olega Pan'kevicha ta Igorya Yankiva," Golos Svobody, 12 October 2015, www.youtube.com/watch?t=6&v=4qhzgJAUZC8; "GPU pereviryae versiyu pro strilyaninu po Maidanu svobodivtsi prohodyat' yak svidki," Ukrainskaya pravda, 13 October 2015, http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2015/10/13/7084711/; and "PGO verifying info on shooting of Maidan activists from Hotel Ukraine," Interfax-Ukraine, 13 October 2015).

The investigation supposedly was prompted by a BBC documentary released about a year ago showing evidence of gunfire coming from a window in Room 1132 on the 11th floor of the Hotel Ukraine. On October 13th Sergei Leshchenko, a Rada deputy of President Petro Poroshenko's Petro Poroshenko Bloc (PPB), suddenly stated knowledge that the three aforementioned Rada deputies whose apartments and offices were searched had shared that very room in the Hotel Ukraine at the time of the shooting. Leshchenko added that Yankiv is "a Master of Sport and a shooting instructor" ("Obyski u svodovtsev iz okna odnogo iz nikh rasstrelivali Maidan," Vesti-Ukraine, 13 October 2015, http://vesti-ukr.com/strana/118884-obyski-u-svobodovcev-iz-okna-odnogo-iz-nih-rasstrelivali-majdan).

Investigation: Epiphany, Collapse, Administrative Resource and/or Warning Shot?

There are several possible interpretations of the Maidan Ukraine regime's turnaround. First, the least likely explanation, though one perhaps operating among some, is that the regime has experienced an epiphany driven by altruism or self-interest with the understanding that a regime built on a lie cannot last long. Second, the regime is collapsing and infighting has brought one faction to use the investigation against another. This explanation may overlap with the third and fourth. Third, the timing of the Maidan regime's sudden shift indicates it is ready to use its 'administrative resources' (state powers) in order to sacrifice its founding myth and thereby preserve the regime's survival in the wake of a mounting threat from its neo-fascist co-founders. The investigation of the neo-fascists' role in the Maidan snipers' massacre comes in the wake of repeated attempts in recent months by neo-fascist RS and SP to spark a Maidan 2.0 by all appearances; attempts and violence that have led to the killing and wounding of police and security servicemen. With the renewal of the war against Donbass now unlikely, given the recent progress on Minsk 2 and the authority such would impart to the neo-fascists, the latter are gearing up in anger to challenge Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, his supporters, and allies. The RS has repeatedly called for a nationalist revolution against the present regime. On Thursday the RS, SP, and likely other like-minded groups plan to march through Kiev in commemoration of 'Defenders of Ukraine Day' and of the sometimes Nazi-allied Ukrainian fascist organization of World War II: Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) (http://pravyysektor.info/news/announce/972/pravi-sili-na-pokrovu-provedut-u-stolici-marsh-geroyiv.html). OUN members and UPA perpetrated pogroms killing thousands of Jews and tens of thousands of Poles during World War II. Fourth, the Maidan regime or a faction within it seek to rein in the neo-fascists; thus, the initial steps towards an investigation hinting at SP involvement in the snipers' massacre amount to a shot over the neofascists' bow.

Fortunately for Maidan regime, its announcement of the investigation has some information cover provided by the Western mass media's preference to play up the MH17 report and Russia's air attacks against 'only non-ISIL and anti-Assad forces'; another distortion I have addressed several times on this page. These stories will bury the snipers' massacre investigation news.

None of the above should be taken to diminish the MH17 investigation's results or the apparent progress towards implementing Minsk 2 and towards a peaceful resolution of the Ukrainian crisis. Regarding the latter, the Donbass rebels' postponement of the election is a very positive sign that the DNR and LNR seek a peaceful resolution, and the compliance in withdrawing weapons by both sides registered by the OSCE is encouraging with regard to both sides' intent at least for now. (A pessimist might say that neither side wants fighting to restore in winter and each needs to do too much in order to ensure that its population is kept warm and fed through winter given the economic calamity on both sides .

Regarding MH17, thought from the start that it was more likely that the Donbass rebels shot down flight MH17. They had successfully shot down two Ukrainian air force planes in the previous month, and the evidence available more or less showed that a Buk system had been fired from rebel-controlled territory. However, this tragedy was neither terrorism nor even a crime. The rebels clearly shot down the plane, mistakenly taking it for a Ukrainian military aircraft. Videos show the rebels who arrived at the scene of the crash shaken by it, and audiotapes of the rebels discussing the crash show them to be unhappy about the mistake. Contrary to the MH17 firing, the Maidan snipers' massacre was carried out intentionally. The same is true of the RS's pogrom and burning alive of 48 people in Odessa on 2 May 2014, a terrorist attack that has received absolutely no attention in the Western media.

It seems the West needs to get its priorities in order in assessing the gravity of certain political crimes and acts of terrorism a opposed to lesser acts of negligence. A good place to start would be the Maidan snipers' massacre. Kudos to Professor Katchanovski.

 [return to Contents] 

 #37
www.foreignpolicy.com
October 14, 2015
Can Poroshenko Control Ukraine's Right Wing?
The Ukrainian leader's newest opponents are in his own parliament.
BY JOHN HUDSON, REID STANDISH
 
With a shaky cease-fire between Ukrainian forces and Russian-backed rebels appearing to hold, one of Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko's most immediate challenges may come from nationalist parties within his own government, and not from his erstwhile opponents in Moscow.

In the coming months, Ukraine's parliament is expected to vote on legislation to transfer power away from Kiev - a key component of the Minsk II cease-fire agreement brokered by Germany, France, Ukraine, and Russia in February. Under the terms of the accord, Kiev is required to grant more autonomy to eastern Ukraine, many of whose residents seek closer ties to Moscow, while Russia is required to withdraw its military hardware and volunteer fighters.

The problem is that Poroshenko currently does not have the votes to amend the Ukrainian Constitution due to opposition from nationalist groups like the Radical Party, Right Sector, and now even political parties beyond the radical fringe, which fear that the legislation will undermine the country's sovereignty and independence.

The impasse threatens to erode the Minsk peace deal and reignite violence between the warring sides. And that impasse may not be disappearing anytime soon. In an interview, Ukraine's new ambassador to the United States said the only way to break the deadlock would be for Russia to withdraw militarily from the conflict - a step that many doubt Putin will take.

"If we see real progress on the withdrawal of troops and weapons, then the pace of [constitutional reform] will go very quickly," Ukrainian Ambassador Valeriy Chaly said in a wide-ranging interview with Foreign Policy at the Ukrainian Embassy in Washington. "Ukraine goes further and further with difficult political compromises, but there has been no major progress on the withdrawal of weapons."

Kiev's insistence that Moscow move first has worried some experts because it appears to be laying the groundwork for Ukraine to use Russian intransigence as an excuse to delay needed reforms.

Matthew Rojansky, a Ukraine expert at the Wilson Center, said Poroshenko faces real constraints in his parliament. Still, Rojansky noted, "in Ukrainian politics, playing the Russian card has always been less a recipe for action than a substitute for it."

Others say Ukraine has every right to slow-roll reforms given the sustained presence of Russian troops along the Ukrainian border and heavy artillery in the hands of rebels. "Until Russia does serious implementation of Minsk, Ukraine shouldn't be required to make constitutional reforms," said John Herbst, a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine and a director at the Atlantic Council.

Chaly, who assumed his post in Washington in July, is a close confidant of Poroshenko and previously served as his foreign-policy advisor. A quick and witty conversationalist, he differs in style from his predecessor, Oleksandr Motsyk, a more reserved old-school emissary appointed by now-ousted President Viktor Yanukovych.

In acknowledging Poroshenko's difficult political challenges at home, Chaly noted that his boss's decentralization legislation has grown increasingly unpopular in Ukraine. "Last year, the majority of Ukrainians supported the political compromises of Minsk," he said. "But this year, less and less Ukrainians support this process because they see that Russia can stall and keep leverage on Ukraine."

Decentralization was brought forward in the aftermath of the Maidan protests in 2014 and was proposed as a measure to boost the country's fledgling democratic reforms. Momentum stalled, however, after the outbreak of fighting in eastern Ukraine and when the shakiness of the second Minsk agreement became apparent, decentralization became tied up in the wider political debate about the status of the rebel-held territories. That, in turn, has further linked Ukraine's reform agenda to the security situation in the Donbass and has left Poroshenko to balance between an increasingly disenchanted electorate and Western governments eager for progress in eastern Ukraine.

"Special status for occupied areas was imposed on Ukraine in Minsk and looks like a reward for Putin. Many Ukrainians see it as appeasement of Putin from the West," said Olexiy Haran, a professor of comparative politics at Ukraine's Kyiv-Mohyla Academy.

A decentralization bill passed a first reading in Ukraine's parliament in late August, but only served to highlight the difficult path forward for fully implementing the Minsk agreement. During the boisterous parliamentary session, Poroshenko came under fire from both the opposition and his own pro-European coalition, which accused the president of caving to Russia. After the vote, protests outside led by the ultranationalist party Svoboda left four members of the National Guard dead.

To be ratified as a constitutional amendment, the decentralization bill will need to pass a second and final reading with at least 300 of the parliament's 450 deputies voting in favor - up from the 265 who voted on the first reading. How - and if - Poroshenko can corral the necessary votes remains to be seen.

"It's not impossible," said Steven Pifer, a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine and a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. "It will require lots of legwork by Poroshenko, and it's going to be a very tough political fight."

Decentralization in the Donbass has become so fraught in part because neither side has fully taken the first step in implementing the Minsk peace deal. From Moscow's viewpoint, Ukraine is not living up to its promises on autonomy; from Kiev's viewpoint, Russia has endangered the agreement by refusing to reduce its military presence in the east.

"One of the key problems with Minsk II is that it does not specify how some steps are to be sequenced," said Pifer.

As part of Minsk, Ukraine is demanding the withdrawal of Russian military forces, military hardware, and volunteer fighters from Ukraine; the pullback of artillery from the eastern front; free access for cease-fire monitors sent by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE); and restored Ukrainian control over its southeastern border with Russia.

Meanwhile, Moscow has been advocating for "federalizing" Ukraine throughout the 18-month crisis, a move that would give the rebel-held regions of Donetsk and Luhansk increased autonomy from Kiev, including the power to conduct foreign and trade policies. Ukraine has vehemently opposed the idea and has instead pushed for decentralization, a different model that would give the country's regions increased local decision-making authority and more revenue-sharing from the central government.

Kiev insists that decentralization upholds its obligations under the Minsk agreement, but major gaps remain before any progress can be made.

Another looming issue is elections in the rebel-held territories. The Ukrainian government maintains that elections cannot take place until weapons are pulled back from the front line and control over the Ukraine-Russia border has been entirely restored. Kiev says that elections will be recognized only if they are held according to Ukrainian law and are deemed to meet international standards by OSCE monitors. According to Chaly, without control of the border, it will be difficult to ensure that the elections are fair and that Russia is not interfering.

Over Kiev's objections, rebel leaders announced plans to hold their own elections on Oct. 18 and in early November. The announcement triggered strong condemnations from the Ukrainian government and risked derailing a renewed truce between Kiev and the rebels that has managed to take hold. The elections were eventually postponed after a meeting in Paris among Poroshenko, Putin, French President François Hollande, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel.

"We have a sustainable cease-fire for the first time in over one and a half years, and it's an opportunity for real progress," Chaly said.

How Kiev will take advantage of the relative quiet remains unclear.

"Things would be a lot easier if Russians were making significant strides, but the biggest driver of uncertainty is the fracturing of the political coalition that has supported Poroshenko up to now," said Andrew Weiss, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "This is the most complicated domestic political challenge for Poroshenko than at any previous point in his presidency."

 [return to Contents] 

 #38
Analysts say Kiev authorities in fact team up with Islamic State
By Tamara Zamyatina

MOSCOW, October 14. /TASS/. Publication of personal data about Russian air pilots participating in the operation against the Islamic State in Syria on Ukraine's Mirotvorets (Peacemaker) website in fact signifies that those behind the provocation have teamed up with IS terrorists, polled experts have told TASS. The provocation's mastermind is Anton Gerashchenko, an adviser to Ukraine's interior minister. Just recently he issued a call for publishing the personal data of Russian pilots operating in Syria on the Internet.

The next day the Peacemaker website published information about nine Russian military officers, their ranks ranging from lieutenant to major-general, in three languages - Russian, English and Arabic. It is noteworthy that earlier the same website gained notoriety by disclosing the home addresses of Ukrainian journalist Oles Buzina and Ukrainian parliament member Oleg Kalashnikov. Both would soon be killed near their homes.
Gallery 11 photo

The president of the association providing social support for retired military Otechestvo (Fatherland) Air Force Major-General Aleksandr Tsalko, is very articulate and to the point, just as a career military should be. He has told TASS that the call for making public personal data of Russian air pilots in Syria was an "act of meanness," and that Gerashchenko was a "rascal who will surely wind up badly." Russia's Investigative Committee has already launched criminal proceedings against Gerashchenko under the article of the Criminal Code setting punishment "for making public calls for terrorist activity or for public justification of terrorism," Tsalko recalled.

"Gerashchenko and those Ukrainians who publish in the Internet personal data about Russian pilots who are fighting against terrorists in Syria in fact identify themselves as IS militants, put an equation mark between themselves and the terrorists, and consider the latter as almost their brothers. It is not accidental that Ukraine's President Petro Poroshenko in a recent interview to the BBC in fact put in a word for the Islamic State militants, saying that Russia's operation was shaking loose global security. Such statements indicate that the authorities in Kiev connive with terrorists," Tsalko believes.

He remarked, though, that the Ukrainian 'informants' - Gerashchenko and his likes - have no reason to rejoice, for their idea has not reached its aims. "Russia is capable of ensuring the safety of its military servicemen. The Defense Ministry had taken precautions in advance to ensure my colleagues - military pilots who have been dispatched to Syria - and their families should feel protected from any threats," Tsalko said.

"Russian air pilots and their families reside in guarded garrisons. When I was on active service myself, I was in charge of such a garrison for a sometime. A stranger had not the slightest chance of getting inside. When I was on an assignment in Afghanistan in the 1980s, the Taliban first declared a standard award for my capture or my death - $10,000. Then the reward started growing fast to eventually reach $8 million. I am a very 'valuable' person, but there have been no attempts on my life in Russia," Tsalko said.

Yet the Russian media and society are anxious how come the personal data of Russian pilots flying combat missions in Syria have ended up in the hands of Ukrainian hackers.

Russia's former high-ranking intelligence officer, General Yuri Kobaladze, believes the risk of leaks of personal information about Russian military is extremely low. "That's really hard to believe. Air pilots never mention their names in radio exchanges. It is very unlikely that they may mention the numbers of their military units or home addresses in the social networks either. It may turn out the whole affair is just a phony," Kobaladze told TASS.

"If one imagines that the Russian pilots' personal data published on the Ukrainian websites are real, then it's an act of outrageous meanness - to expose people who are performing their duty and fighting against a menace that threatens the whole world," Kobaladze said.

And the president of the National Strategy Institute, Mikhail Remizov, believes that the legislation of many countries leaves no room for connivance with terrorism. "This call by an adviser to the Ukrainian Interior Ministry for publishing personal data of Russian air pilots in Syria and the reaction of social networks' members that followed need close scrutiny by human rights activists. Such action deserves the international community's condemnation," Remizov told TASS.

 [return to Contents] 

 #39
Interfax
October 14, 2015
Crimeans not to be forced to renounce Ukraine's citizenship - pro-Kremlin leader

Simferpol, 14 October: The need to notify the Russian Federal Migration Service [FMS] about second citizenship, which comes into effect for the residents of Crimea and Sevastopol from 1 January 2016, is not aimed at forcing regional residents to renounce the Ukrainian citizenship, the republic's head Sergey Aksenov [Serhiy Aksyonov] has said.

"We know anyway that all residents of Crimea before Crimea's merger with Russia had Ukraine's citizenship. Many have property in Ukraine as well. No-one intends to seize Ukrainian passports from citizens," Aksenov told journalists in Simferopol on Wednesday [14 October].

He also said that the regional authorities together with the FMS directorate for the republic of Crimea would identify the procedure of notification about second citizenship which does not require visiting the migration authorities. "We will find a format, how to notify [the authorities] about second citizenship without queues and welter," Aksenov said

 [return to Contents] 

 #40
The Independent (UK)
October 14, 2015
Viktor Yushchenko: 'Every politician in Ukraine who turns to the West is in danger'
The former Ukraine president, who survived a poisoning attempt in 2004, tells Kim Sengupta in Kiev why he thinks Western nations underestimate the dangers of a resurgent Russia, which he hints was behind the attack on him

The poisoning of the Ukrainian opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko in 2004 was a shocking act. Images of his face, disfigured by lesions and blisters, were seen across the world. And the fact that the attempted assassination had taken place while he was running in an election in a European state added to the sense of astonishment.

Ukraine has experienced damaging turbulence since that attack 11 years ago. The vicious civil war and the annexation of Crimea by the Kremlin has left a society fractured, on the frontline of a new Cold War between Russia and the West.

The scars Mr Yushchenko bears have, to an extent, faded. But he believes that the threat to those who hold his pro-Western views has not. Other leaders too can become targets, he believes. "Every politician in this country and neighbouring countries who turns towards the West is facing that kind of danger," he said. "My poisoning took place because I had started taking steps towards the European Union. We have a neighbour who does not want this to happen."

He added: "What happened to me was a matter of surprise because it took place when things were meant to be peaceful. But we are in such a risky situation now that violent acts directed against individuals may still cause outrage, but should not come as a total surprise."

After his poisoning, Mr Yushchenko went on to win the presidential election. His chief opponent, Viktor Yanukovych, denied allegations that he was responsible for the administration of TCDD, the most potent dioxin and contaminant in Agent Orange, which resulted in Mr Yushchenko having to campaign with his face half paralysed and a catheter inserted into his back to inject painkillers into his spine.

The original vote had been won by Mr Yanukovych, but this was mired in widespread allegations of fraud and after 13 days of street protests - the "Orange Revolution" - the Supreme Court ordered a run-off, with Mr Yushchenko emerging victorious by 52 per cent to 44 per cent.

Mr Yanukovych won the next election in 2010, but his presidency came to a dramatic end with the Maidan uprising last year. He now lives in Russia, while he is wanted in his home country for alleged crimes committed in the suppression of the protests.

Mr Yushchenko obviously takes care of his appearance. He spoke to The Independent at his office in Kiev wearing an elegantly cut blazer and lilac tie and pocket handkerchief. The former President said he preferred not to say openly who would want to silence those who try to bring their country into the West.

He added: "There are no detailed plans on how to deal with Russia, so Russia gets more and more bold. There are sanctions in place, of course; but they may be eased, or even dropped in the next six months. It will be a big mistake if that happens: just look at the way the Russians are behaving in Syria."

 [return to Contents] 

 Fort Russ
http://fortruss.blogspot.com
October 13, 2015
Russian intelligence veteran: World Government and Russophobes in Ukraine.
An interview with expert Leonid Reshetnikov on the creation of Russophobia in Ukraine - it's recent origins and use by the US.

www.novorosinform.org
http://www.novorosinform.org/comments/id/766
Translated for Fort Russ by Paul Siebert

Director of the Russian Institute of Strategic Studies told our correspondent if there is a world government and why anti-Russian forces won in Kiev.

Leonid Reshetnikov is a retired Lieutenant General of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, Head of the unique Russian Institute of Strategic Studies. Its founder is the president of Russia. Can you imagine the level on which the recommendations of the Institute's analysts are studied?

We work on demand of the Presidential Administration, - says Leonid Petrovich, and also conduct research on our own initiative. Our staff consists of 210 highly experienced experts.

Novorosinform.  - For many people the events in Ukraine were a shock. Meanwhile, your institute warned repeatedly that such a scenario was possible.

- Even when I was a head of analytical research in our intelligence service we were writing a lot about this. Our Institute was trying to convey the idea that Ukraine was drifting towards the West. By leaps and bounds under Yushchenko, on hands and knees under Yanukovich - but always in the same direction.

- Why no one listened to you?

- It is not quite the case. We had the Kharkov agreements, the signed treaties regarding our naval base in Sevastopol, our loans. But here it was necessary to take a cue from the Western world. They work with all political forces that might be useful to them. And we relied only on the Party of Regions, although there were a lot of pro-Russian organizations there - from the Socialist Party of Vetrenko to the Orthodox Church organizations. This is our tradition since the Soviet time - we prefer not to work with the opposition. Therefore they beat us.

In addition, very little attention was paid to propaganda - to the moral, spiritual, and informational influence.

- When was this anti-Russian process launched?

- Strictly speaking, when the Soviet Ukraine was created. Citizens in embroidered shirts should be praying to the portraits of Lenin, but these ungrateful citizens are throwing him from pedestals.

I am from Kharkov myself, and I am convinced that Ukraine is Russia, except for the western part, where there are many cultural and ethnic peculiarities. More than half of the population in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (over 20 million people) considered themselves Russian. But at the same time I remember as in 1968 I was invited to the Ukrainian radio. I said that I did not speak Ukrainian properly. "Then we should not be doing this!", - was their reply to me. At school we were taught the classics of the Ukrainian literature. But in fact, Ukraine did not have its classical writers. None at all! Lesia Ukrainka, Ivan Franko - they were all beginning writers who tried to create something in the language of the so called Little Russia, which was only being formed.

In the 60-ies a member of the Ukrainian Politburo Petr Shelest was actively engaged in Ukrainisation. And in the 80-ies my country relatives spoke directly to me: "We feed Muscovites with our bread!". It is not clear why the Russians live better now than their "breadwinners" who broke away. Therefore, the contradictions were building up a long time ago. And now we have to disentangle this mess.

- There is an opinion that the probable overthrow of President Poroshenko by the Nazis could be even useful. The West would not support them and they would not last long. And with the new authorities we would manage to find a common tongue.

- The fact of the matter is that under any leaders Ukraine can exist only as a hostile state to Russia, or as ... no state as such. Because if Russia is not made an enemy of, the question inevitably arises: why are we not together? We have the common history, common culture, practically common language. Everything here was built and arranged by Russia. Then why should Ukraine be alone?! Therefore, history is rewritten. It is like Macedonians who for a hundred years have been trying to show that they are not Bulgarians. In Skopje there are monuments to the Roman Emperor Justinian, to Alexander the Great. They sincerely believe they are the descendants of Alexander the Great! 50 years ago they would have laughed at it, but by now they have become used to this.

- But the Ukrainian nationalists believe they will become a member of the European Union!

- You only have to look at what is going on - the very existence of the EU is uncertain. Who needs them there? Even the western part of Ukraine that is mentally close to Europe. In addition, the civil war is not over yet.

- You accurately predicted in April that in summer a cease fire between the UAF and Donbass militia would be on the verge of collapse. What can we expect now?

- According to my estimates, in the coming months there should be no escalation. But, unfortunately, everything can change very quickly. If we fail to reach an agreement with the West on Syria, the United States in retaliation could ignite the situation in the East of Ukraine. After all, Poroshenko is completely under their control.

How long will it last? How long, in your opinion, russophobes will remain in power in Kiev?

- Unfortunately, it can last long enough. The generation of 25-30 year olds has been inoculated with Russophobic sentiments. Even in my native Kharkov, 40 percent of the residents are at the crossroads - propaganda has done its part. But in my opinion, left-bank Ukraine will recover from it in two or three years. But Kiev will need at least ten or even twenty years. However, the sobering is inevitable. Any artificial idea is doomed to death.

- You said that the CIA is not about intelligence. In fact, this is a classic machine whose main goal is the organization of coups and assassinations. Who is the next target - Tsipras, who won the elections?

- For the USA, Greece is not as relevant as Ukraine and the Middle East. As the Balkans: they have put the squeeze on Bulgaria, which is very important for us in economic and political terms. Now they are pressuring Serbia. But I'm sure that for every relevant country they have a plan of a coup and elimination of leaders. And Tsipras is no exception.

- Do they have a plan for Putin?

- The main objective of the US in relation to Russia is the elimination of Putin. And there are different scenarios. Including physical assassination. But it is very difficult to pull it off. Thus, the priorities include the organization of disorders such as Maidan and color revolutions.

- The security chief of Boris Yeltsin - Korzhakov once explained why he always opened the limousine's door to his boss. In order for the enemies not to smear car handles with poisonous substance.  And how do they plan to get to our leader?

- Recall that dim story with the downed Boeing. I would not dismiss the possibility that the target was not the Malaysians, but the plane of the Russian President. At the time Putin's airliner was in the air and even crossed paths with Boeing 777 at the same flight level and height. It was an ideal opportunity for special services - it would be extremely difficult to prove their involvement.

- Leonid Petrovich, you are a former intelligence agent and, therefore, an informed person. How true are the conspiracy theories about the world government? For example, there is a theory that the competing clans of the Rockefellers and the Rothschilds are behind everything that happens in Russia. One clan brought about the revolution of 1917, the other one was responsible for Perestroika ...

- When someone speaks ironically about conspiracy theories I always say: "Look, the whole world history consists of conspiracies!".  But you should not be carried away with only these two names. There are influential people who are trying to make the world more manageable. National states are destroyed. Now they are tackling Europe. I consider this flow of refugees very suspicious - it is organized artificially. These flows consist primarily of young 30 year old men. Strong men! This is no coincidence. Europe is in for a fun ride.

- Who are these influential people?

- Financiers, industrialists, heads of multinational corporations. People without nationality, cosmopolitans. They are very ideological as our Bolsheviks or the French revolutionaries. You need to keep this in mind to understand their motives. Even profit is not the main thing for them. They are the Antichrist.

Do they serve "black mass" ?!

- Perhaps, but not necessarily. What is important is that they are trying to destroy the traditional world, attitudes and values. They are consciously fighting with God.

In our country, many people call themselves atheists, but, in fact, they are not. They do not go to the church, but they have, as they say, the fear of God, they believe they are not allowed to do as they please. But those people we are talking about - they really think so. They deem themselves to be above everyone else, they are the rulers of the world and of the universe. They are the chosen ones. And God is no authority for them. All evil and negative characters on the world stage over the past three or four hundred years are of their making.

- Some people believe that England is behind all the troubles of the world. There is even an expression - "the Englishwoman shits".

- There is certain truth to this. A lot of bad stuff originated there. They were the first to renounce the Church creating their own Anglican church for the sake of another king, Henry VIII, to make it possible for him to marry his mistress. All sorts of secret societies and so on. Their former colony - the United States - adopted many such things. But it is not a matter of countries anymore. I am sure that Democrat Obama and Republican Bush are patriots of their country. They are even believers. But the people whose interests they represent do not care about the interests of the United States. If it seems to them that the world system is no longer effective, they will break it easily. They will sacrifice America for their interests.

- Who are the members of this anti-Christian Politburo?

- They are always in the shadows. You know, I have met people whose names you never see in the Forbes lists. But their fortunes are in the hundreds of billions. Bill Gates is a child compared to them. It is extremely difficult to fight those who are in the shadows. But we have to be honest, to bravely and consistently defend our principles and our country. And we will win!

 [return to Contents] 

 #42
New York Times
October 15, 2015
Editorial
Russia's Fictions on Malaysia Flight 17

After an exhaustive, 15-month investigation, the Dutch Safety Board affirmed on Tuesday what has long been generally known or suspected - that Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 was shot down over eastern Ukraine on July 17, 2014, by a Russian-made Buk surface-to-air missile.

Even Russia, which has spent much of those 15 months generating all kinds of implausible theories that put the blame for the crash and its 298 victims on Ukraine, and doing its best to thwart investigations, has had to acknowledge that this is what happened. But it now argues that the fatal missile was an older model that the Russian armed forces no longer use, and that it was fired from territory controlled by the Ukrainian government.

The five-nation team led by the Dutch Safety Board did not assign responsibility. That will be the job of Dutch prosecutors. But the board's minutely detailed report is consistent with theories advanced by the United States and Ukraine as well as evidence collected by the independent investigative website Bellingcat.com, which hold that the fatal missile was fired from territory controlled by Russian-backed rebels in eastern Ukraine.

In one key detail, the Dutch report undermined Russia's competing claim. The Russian corporation that manufactures Buk missiles, Almaz-Antey, held its own news conference on Tuesday at which it said it had detonated a warhead of the sort used to arm the Buk missile identified by the Dutch alongside a decommissioned Russian jetliner to demonstrate that this explosion would pepper the plane with bowtie-shape shrapnel, which it said was not found at the crash site. But in fact, the Dutch board said it had discovered fragments of that exact shape, including some in the bodies of the cockpit crew.

This fact is not something Russians are likely to learn; Russian television has presented only the Kremlin's disinformation of what is going on in Ukraine and, for that matter, Syria. Propaganda works: A public opinion poll taken in July by the Levada Center found that 44 percent of Russians believe the plane was downed by the Ukrainian military, 17 percent thought it was by the United States, and only 3 percent believed it was the work of separatists.

Creating an alternative reality has been a big reason for President Vladimir Putin's boundless popularity among Russians. He sees no reason to come clean for the shooting down of the Boeing 777. At the same time, Ukrainian authorities should also give some credible responses to the Dutch board's criticism that Ukraine failed to close the air space over eastern Ukraine even though Ukrainian military aircraft had been shot down by Russian-backed rebels in the weeks before the downing of Flight 17.

Against Russia's shameless deception, the Dutch, who lost the largest number of people in the tragedy, must be commended for the thoroughness and integrity of their investigation. The criminal investigation should be as clear and independent, no matter how hard the Kremlin tries to derail or mislead it.

 [return to Contents] 

#43
New York Times
October 13, 2015
Why Russia's Alternate History of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 Matters
By JULIA IOFFE
Julia Ioffe is a contributing writer for the magazine.

On Tuesday, the Dutch Safety Board issued its long-awaited report on what brought down Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 in eastern Ukraine on July 17, 2014. Speaking at Gilze-Rijen Air Base in the Netherlands, Tjibbe Joustra, the safety board's chairman, announced that after meticulous study - including the plastering the charred scraps of the plane onto a skeleton model of the Boeing 777, which sat behind him as he spoke - the board concluded that the plane was brought down by a missile from the Russian-made 9M38 series, fired from a Buk surface-to-air missile system in eastern Ukraine. It exploded less than a yard from the left side of the plane's cockpit. The high-energy fragments flung out by the missile perforated the plane's nose and caused it to tear off, leading to the breakup and crash of the plane about a minute later, which killed all 298 passengers onboard.
Stories from Our Advertisers

The report didn't tell us anything we didn't already know or strongly suspect: that the cause of the crash was a Russian-made missile fired from an area hotly contested between Russian-backed separatists and the Ukrainian military, killing hundreds of people who had nothing to do with the conflict. Though the report didn't specify who fired the missile, Joustra said it was launched from rebel-held territory. This was, again, what we already suspected - and a scenario for which independent outfits, like the citizen-journalism website Bellingcat, have rustled up much convincing evidence.

A lot, however, comes down to who "us" is here. We in the West saw the presentation of one report, while Russians saw another: Almaz-Antey, the Russian state corporation that produces the Buk systems, held a competing news conference on Tuesday in Moscow, featuring its own report. Almaz-Antey's accounting of the incident, which included footage of an exploding missile near the nose of a decommissioned Russian plane, reached subtly different conclusions. Sure, it was a Russian-made Buk that downed the plane, Almaz-Antey's director Yan Novikov said, but those missiles have not been in use in Russia since 2011. Moreover, Novikov said, it was fired not from Snizhne, in rebel-held territory, but from near Zaroschenskoe, which was held by the Ukrainian Army. Novikov's conclusion? Those 298 people were killed not by Russians, but by Ukrainians.

There's a lot riding on this conclusion - for instance, the costly Western sanctions imposed on Russia in the wake of the crash. And so, from the day the pieces of the plane rained down on Ukraine's sunflower fields, Moscow has advanced its own theories about what brought down Malaysia Airlines Flight 17. From early claims that it was a Ukrainian attempt to bring down Vladimir Putin's presidential plane to later, more technical explanations, the Russian media and Almaz-Antey have acted like defense attorneys in a criminal trial, deliberately muddying the waters, fastidiously creating as much reasonable doubt as possible to lead the scent away from their client.

The Dutch report implicitly fingers the Russians, but Kremlin-friendly newspapers have seized on stray details, like the report's criticism of the Ukrainian government for not shutting down airspace over the conflict, and the big question it chose not to directly answer: Who fired the missile? (Determining ultimate responsibility, the authors of the report said, "falls outside the mandate of the Dutch Safety Board.") The evening news across Russia showed not the Dutch news conference but the Moscow one, in which the reporter concluded that the Western version of events "doesn't hold water."

Given that 94 percent of Russians consider television their main source of news, and that 67 percent consider it a source of useful and objective information, it is no surprise that Russians have a radically different picture of what happened to the plane than their Western counterparts.

Polled in the days after the catastrophe, 46 percent of Russians said Flight 17 was felled by a Ukrainian antiaircraft system, and 36 percent believed it was the work of a Ukrainian jet - both versions that were heavily pushed by the Russian media in the immediate wake of the disaster. Only 3 percent believed it was shot down by separatists. A year later, that picture hasn't changed much. Forty-four percent believe it was shot down by the Ukrainian military, 17 percent by the Americans. Again, only 3 percent blamed the separatists. That is, the version of events that is generally accepted in the West is shared by only 3 percent of Russians.

Put another way: Propaganda works. Putin has understood that from Day 1. Fifteen years ago, one of his first acts as president of the Russian Federation was to seize control of television and bring it under the authority of the state. (The saga is masterfully detailed in "Kremlin Rising," the 2005 book by Susan Glasser and Peter Baker.) Controlling the television screen means controlling the reality that his subjects inhabit, and it has proved to be the most important bulwark of Putin's hold on power. A week ago, when Russia began its air campaign in Syria, only 14 percent of Russians supported military intervention. A week of intense television programming later, only 28 percent oppose it.

Most Russians live in a reality parallel to the West, and this presents a serious political challenge. Sanctioning Moscow for downing a plane most Russians believe the Ukrainians shot down only makes them rally behind a leader they believe is unfairly targeted by Washington and Brussels. It has also made it easy for Moscow to blame Russia's cratering economy not on its own bad management and metastatic corruption but on unjust Western sanctions.

Washington going after Putin for attacking non-Islamic State rebels in Syria only plays into Putin's hands: If Russian citizens believe that Moscow is bombing the Islamic State, but that Washington is against it, does that mean that Washington is behind the Islamic State? Not surprisingly, versions of this theory have also blanketed the Russian media. It is also why Putin continues to enjoy such deliriously high approval ratings. They may be inexplicable to a Western audience, which uniformly sees Putin portrayed as a latter-day Bond villain, but to a Russian viewer who sees only the strength and sagacity of Putin splashed across his screen every night, what's not to like?

Western Cold Warriors understood the importance of getting their own version of events to Russians, which is how Radio Free Europe and Voice of America were born. But today, those outlets are widely seen as ineffective, shrill government propaganda, even by that receptive 3 percent of westernized Russians who think that Russian-backed rebels brought down Flight 17. This is supposed to be the age of fragmented, unfiltered, self-tailored information, and yet Putin still manages to hold his people's gaze - and practically remove them from the political decision-making process - through one of the most traditional media. The West can't seem to puncture Russian television's hermetic seal, or understand what Putin has always known: The boob tube is the key to the kingdom.

 [return to Contents] 

 #44
Russia Ministry of Foreign Affairs
October 14, 2015
Briefing by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova. (excerpt).
 
Developments in the inquiry into the MH17 Malaysia plane crash

Regrettably, I have to say that we have entered yet another period of "information aggression," which we have discussed with you more than once. I'd like to share my personal impressions with you. In the morning, I watched the Euronews coverage of the report into the MH17 Malaysia plane crash, which was published yesterday.  

Everything started with a detailed quotation and a video sequence of Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte's statement making an appeal to Russia to fully cooperate in the inquiry and so on. Euronews followed by quoting other experts, politicians and officials. It presented the positions of all sides with the exception, of course, of the Russian Federation, although yesterday the Foreign Ministry's official website published two comments, one of which was directly related to Mr Rutte's statements. We do not understand the motives of the Euronews directors. Respectable and simply decent media always allow all sides about whom they are speaking to set forth their positions when preparing coverage on such a sensitive issue. Let me emphasise again that this was the case despite Russia's reaction to the issue during the second half of the day yesterday. We hope that the TV channel will have a constructive attitude towards everything that we are saying. We are open to cooperation. To be honest, we no longer understand how to bring information to the media. Probably we should use "pigeon express"? Maybe it will work?

In this context, I'd like to repeat again on-the-record our reaction to Mr Rutte's statements. We consider his appeal strange; all the more so as Russia expressed its readiness to cooperate on the inquiry mentioned by Mr Rutte from the very beginning. However, we were prevented from taking part in it under various pretexts. It is equally strange that Russia's cooperation became a requirement immediately after the publication of the Dutch Safety Board's report with "ready" conclusions. Where were they all before?

As for Russia's reaction, the report is now being reviewed by experts, as we said yesterday. As you know, today at noon, Deputy Head of the Federal Air Transport Agency Oleg Strochevoi will hold a news conference at the Rossiya Segodnya International Multimedia Press Centre dedicated to expert opinions on this score.

I cannot but note the response of our colleagues from the State Department. In part, I'd like to quote a statement made by Deputy Department Spokesperson Mark Toner during a regular briefing. When asked why the United States blamed the crash on Donbass self-defence fighters, although the report does not blame anyone directly, he said:  "...that's our belief and that remains our belief." Having admitted that the report does not assign blame, he repeated: "But we said it's - we believe it supports our overall argument that we've made..."

All of this mess that we see in the media every day is aimed at confusing the public and shaping public opinion and this is called propaganda.

I'd like to recall that the United States hastened to inform the public of its opinion about the reasons behind the tragedy in the first days after it happened. US Ambassador to the Russian Federation John Tefft told a Russian newspaper that the United States knew who was to blame and was simply waiting for the results of the report. Regrettably, the dovetailing of convictions and the results of the investigation are already becoming routine and not only in this particular case.

I will reiterate our position and say that, from day one, Russia has called for an objective, comprehensive and transparent investigation into the crash of the Malaysian Boeing. Right from the start, we have sought to participate in the work of the expert group in a constructive manner, making the maximum contribution to it, naturally in the expectation that our specialists will receive full access to the information at the group's disposal. Russia was a co-sponsor of UN Security Council Resolution 2166, setting requirements for the investigative procedure. Unfortunately, all of our proposals, in particular that the investigation should be transparent and that the UN Security Council mechanism should be utilised to that end, were ignored. Likewise, our calls for compliance with the said resolution were ignored. Contrary to the resolution, the UN Secretary-General did not submit to the Security Council comprehensive proposals on measures to facilitate the investigation. Our questions concerning the investigation, which were disseminated at the UN Security Council in September 2014, also ended up in limbo. Russian experts were not given access to all of the materials pertaining to the investigation. We understand that the conclusion regarding the crash that was made by specialists at Almaz-Antey, the chief developer of the Buk system, was ignored. Our Dutch colleagues also did not respond to our invitation to come to Russia to study Almaz-Antey's materials on the Boeing crash.

I would like again to explain and point to certain inconsistencies. We invited the Dutch side (the experts and specialists who they choose) to come to Russia so that we could share our findings with them and submit some additional information to them on the ground. Unfortunately, our Dutch colleagues did not respond to the invitation. Then, the day the report is released we are urged to cooperate. It doesn't work that way: Either we cooperate, and then we respond to an invitation and participate in the work, and our experts are given access or we practice deception, when international attention is focused on the report and at this crucial moment they claim that Russia is not cooperating. To reiterate, Dutch specialists and experts were invited to come to Russia to share additional information and work on the issue. They refused.

The importance of the work conducted by Almaz-Antey, as well as by the Federal Air Transport Agency, who have repeatedly submitted critical comments to the investigation group, is evident from statements by Almaz-Antey and the Federal Air Transport Agency. We still have serious doubts that the real goal of the Dutch investigation is to establish the true causes of the air disaster, not to substantiate the charges that were made earlier.

We also should not fail to note that our demands that the Ukrainian side submit to the international community a record of exchanges between military air traffic controllers, as well as information regarding the heightened activity of Ukrainian air defense forces in the area, were ignored.

We have also noted the strange fact that, all of a sudden, a year after the investigation began, it was reported that fragments of the missile that purportedly destroyed the airplane were discovered and that a new expedition of Dutch experts was sent to the crash site to collect the remaining fragments of the aircraft. This despite the fact that it was announced long ago that all of the debris had been collected.

Now a large number of statements will be made. You can go to the Russian Foreign Ministry's official website and see that, since the moment of the crash, the ministry's official spokesperson has repeatedly - in this hall, among other places - highlighted the strange fact that the wreckage had not been removed in full. We urged everyone who participated in the investigation to pay the most serious attention to this. We were told that everything that had to be collected from the crash site had been collected. A year later, it turns out that that there are new details and fragments which were included in the investigation.

Everything that I mentioned are only some of Russia's questions to the investigation. Obviously, the way that it was conducted could not but have affected its results. At the same time, there is no getting away from the fact - and it was confirmed by the commission in no uncertain terms - that Ukraine is directly responsible for failing to close its airspace to civilian flights.

A way out of this situation could be to continue a duly adjusted investigation with the full participation of those states that have materials that can shed light on the disaster. Needless to say, we are ready for such work.

 [return to Contents] 

 #45
Dances With Bears
http://johnhelmer.net
October 13, 2015
AUTOPSY OF THE MH17 CRASH - DUTCH SAFETY BOARD REVEALS 3 POSSIBLE PIECES OF BUK SHRAPNEL IN THE BODIES OF THE COCKPIT CREW, AND CHEMICAL EVIDENCE IT CANNOT SUBSTANTIATE - AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE ISSUE PUBLIC REJECTION OF AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT ALLEGATIONS
By John Helmer, Moscow
[Graphics, footnotes, and links here http://johnhelmer.net/?p=14322]

The Dutch Safety Board (DSB) reported yesterday that its evidence for concluding that a single ground-to-air Buk missile caused the crash of Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17 was an explosive blast of sound on the cockpit voice recorder lasting 2.3 milliseconds; a spray pattern of damage to the cockpit area of the fuselage; three distinctively shaped metal fragments (lead image) found in the bodies of the cockpit crew; a chemical analysis of explosive residues missing 2 out of 3 warhead explosives; and a match of paint samples collected up to 4 months apart.

The fine arithmetic of this evidence has convinced the Dutch to pinpoint the source as a Buk missile type 9M38, with a warhead model 9N314M. The larger arithmetic of the area from which the DSB has calculated the missile was fired - 50 square kilometres of crash area; 320 square kilometres of launch area - has proved to be inconclusive for a judgement of who fired the missile, and thus who is responsible for the crash and for the deaths of the 298 crew and passengers on board. That said, aviation lawyers close to the MH17 case now believe there is no evidence of a crime - a war crime, a crime against humanity, or a crime of terrorism - that would meet international prosecution standards. For what lawyers have done, or not done, to examine the case for evidence of a crime, or evidence of civil negligence, read this [1].

Just how circumstantial and inconclusive the newly reported Dutch results turn out to be was revealed two days before the release of the Dutch report, when the Australian Federal Police (AFP) released unusual criticism of Australian Government officials. According to the AFP, public Australian Government interpretations of the crash evidence and assignments of blame cannot be supported by the evidence the AFP's officers had collected themselves at the crash scene in Ukraine, in the autopsy process in The Netherlands, and in the subsequent forensic testing of what was found in the bodies of the MH17 victims.
In the 279 pages of the DSB report [2], released yesterday, just 3 pages provide the autopsy evidence on which the conclusiveness of the fresh identification of the missile model and warhead type depends. The crucial autopsy evidence, according to the Dutch agency, comes from the bodies of the three cockpit crew - the Captain, the First Officer, and the Purser. They, the DSB has concluded, "sustained multiple fatal injuries associated with the impact of metal fragments moving at high velocity". The DSB report says there were "hundreds of metal fragments" in the Captain's body; "over 120 objects (mostly metal fragments)" in the First Officer's body; and "more than 100 objects" in the Purser's body.

This is new evidence. Earlier reporting of what Lailatul Masturah, sister of MH17 flight captain Wan Amran, said she saw of his body, and was told at the Hilversum Army base when his body was released to her, suggests nothing of the sort. Read her testimony here [3].

The DSB report now concludes there were no shrapnel wounds or metal fragment impacts in the "majority of the occupants of the cabin". They died from decompression and related effects of the break-up of the aircraft, after the cockpit had been severed from the cabin fuselage. Although the DSB doesn't say so, its report corroborates findings published in November and December of last year by the Victorian State Coroner Ian Gray and Australian pathologists working in The Netherlands. Read their testimony, before it was recently classified [4].

Eight pages of the DSB report - pages 88 to 95 - focus on the metal fragments. The number of these starts at "over 500 recovered from the wreckage of the aeroplane, the remains of the crew members and passengers." Many, apparently most, of these fragments turned out to be "personal belongings, aeroplane parts or objects that originated from the ground after impact." According to the DSB, "many were metal fragments that were suspected to be high-energy objects." Of these just 72 were investigated further because they were "similar in size, mass and shape." 43 of this 72 were "found to be made of unalloyed steel". The term "shrapnel" may be a synonym for "unalloyed steel fragments", but the word doesn't appear at all in the DSB report. According to the DSB, "no unalloyed steel fragments were found in the remains of the passengers".

Of the 43 steel fragments investigated thoroughly - all of them recovered from the bodies of the cockpit crew or in the wreckage of the cockpit - 20 were found on analysis to include layers of aluminium or glass. The DSB's explanation is that the external explosion of a missile warhead had propelled these fragments through the cockpit windows and aluminium panels of the fuselage, fusing with the glass and aluminium before striking the three crew members in the cockpit at the time.

The DSB conclusion is that these fragments came from a missile warhead, but not conclusively from a Buk missile warhead type 9N314M. The evidence for this Buk warhead comes, the DSB reports, from 4 - repeat four - fragments. These, "although heavily deformed and damaged, had distinctive shapes; cubic and in the form of a bow-tie". The DSB's exact count is two cubic shapes, two bow-ties. One bow-tie was recovered from the cockpit wreckage; one from the body of a cockpit crew member. Both cubic fragments were found in the bodies of the crew members.

Because Buk shrapnel is understood to have such cubic and bow-tie shapes, there are just four fragments to substantiate it. If the autopsy evidence is regarded as the only source that could not have been contaminated on the ground, or in the interval between the crash and the forensic testing in The Netherlands, there are just three fragments which fit the Buk bill.

DSB ANALYSIS OF MISSILE SHRAPNEL
Source: http://cdn.onderzoeksraad.nl/documents/report-mh17-crash-en.pdf [2] -- page 92

In addition, the DSB says it has examined chemical residues of the warhead explosive, and paint particles from the surface of missile parts reportedly recovered from the ground. Exactly where, when, and by whom the purported missile parts were found the DSB does not identify. In Section 2:12:2:8 of the report, the DSB says that "during the recovery of the wreckage, a number of parts that did not originate from the aeroplane and its content were found in the wreckage area. The parts found appeared to be connected with a surface-to-air missile. The parts that were suspected to be related to a surface-to-air missile were transported to the Gilze-Rijen Air Force Base [in The Netherlands; also reported as the Hilversum Army Base] in the same way as the aeroplane wreckage was. On arrival the parts underwent the same examination as the pieces of aeroplane wreckage." By failing to identify the location of these parts, the finders, or the dates on which they were sent to Holland, the DSB does not rule out that this evidence may have been fabricated. At page 53 the DSB admits that "many pieces of the wreckage" were either not examined physically "until four months after the crash", or not recovered for examination for up to nine months after the July 17, 2014, downing.

DSB ILLUSTRATION OF A BUK MISSILE
Source: http://cdn.onderzoeksraad.nl/documents/report-mh17-crash-en.pdf [2] -- page 81

The final DSB conclusion on missile parts is: "the shape and form of the parts recovered is [sic] consistent with a 9M38 series surface-to-air missile." This, according to international legal sources, is circumstantial, inferential, indirect - and for a courtroom, inadmissible.

The DSB acknowledges also that its chemical evidence of explosive residues and paint is unlikely to be admissible because it is likely to have been contaminated on the ground. A total of 126 samples were reportedly swabbed from parts of the plane wreckage. Just 30 of these tested positive for two types of explosive - RDX and TNT.A "few" are now reported to have shown traces of the explosive PETN. However, on the missile parts which the DSB claims to be proof of Buk, "traces of RDX was [sic] found. On the missile part [sic] TNT or PETN could not be identified."

The significance of the missing explosive evidence is left unexplained. But the DSB report concedes that "the objects from which the swab samples were taken had been exposed to the elements for a long period of time." Just how long from crash to recovery the Dutch don't say. "The possibility of contamination during transport and by the fact that the wreckage lay in an area of armed conflict is a concern for the explosive residue analysis." This Dutch concern is an understatement.

As for the paint matching, the DSB says it tested "missile parts found at the wreckage area" with "fragments recovered from the aeroplane". It concludes : "the paint samples taken from missile parts could not be distinguished from those found on the foreign objects extracted from the aeroplane". How and when the two sets of samples were found, and by whom, is left unsaid.

The inconclusiveness on the part of the Dutch officials has been clarified by officers of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) who were assigned to both the victim identification process and to the forensic operations of the Joint Investigation Team (JIT) of Dutch, Ukrainian, Malaysian, Belgian and Australian investigators. For more details of the Australian participation in the JIT, read this [5]. A Dutch spokesman for the JIT said [6] just hours before the DSB released its report that no report on the criminal evidence is scheduled in the next four months; and it is "still too early for any final conclusion."

On October 11 and 12 the AFP released direct interviews and a video clip in which officers who had worked at the crash scene in Ukraine and at the autopsies and forensic analysis in The Netherlands criticize the version of the crash publicly promoted by the former Australian Prime Minister, Tony Abbott, and the current Foreign Minister, Julie Bishop. An AFP source confirmed yesterday that the material published this week by a Sydney newspaper has been authorized. Four AFP officers were confirmed by the source as participating in the official information release: Detective Superintendent Andrew Donoghoe, who has headed the AFP team in The Netherlands for two tours over the fifteen months since the crash; Senior Sergeant Rod Anderson who is still serving in The Netherlands; Dr Simon Walsh, the AFP's chief forensic scientist and head of the agency's disaster victim identification (DVI) team; and Dr Sarah Benson, who succeeded Walsh in The Netherlands [7]. Benson has a PhD in chemical criminalistics [8]. Detective Sergeant John Giles has also been confirmed as participating "at the head of the Australian line" during the body identification and autopsy process [7].

AFP lead investigator Donoghoe, in AFP film clip, contradicts Australian Government on crash site, Ukraine conflict.
Source: http://media.smh.com.au/video-news/video-world-news/afp-forensics-team-at-work-in-the-hague-6892745.html [9]

In their presentation of what they saw, did, and have concluded, the AFP officers are now saying they have no evidence the Novorussians at the crash scene either claimed responsibility for the shoot-down; or acted improperly to withhold or manipulate the crash scene evidence; or stole the victims' belongings. The AFP is also expressing its "irritation" at public claims of the cause of the crash and the conduct of the Novorussians by the Australian Prime Minister at the time, Tony Abbott. In their presentation to the media, the Australian officers "go out of their way to acknowledge and to defend the humanity of the Ukrainian rebels who were accused of bringing down the aircraft."

In an unprecedented declaration of its independence from the Australian Government, the AFP's official version of the investigation of the MH17 crash and the ongoing investigation in Holland has appeared in two reports released this week by a local newspaper - the first on October 11 [10]; the second on October 12 [11]. No police, prosecutors, or forensic investigators from any of the other national teams working on the MH17 case in Ukraine and The Netherlands have said so much on the record. The only Dutch pathologist to make a public reference to the evidence, Dr George Maat, was fired by the Dutch government for doing so. For Maat's case, read this [12].

The AFP's decision to go public this week contrasts with Victorian Coroner Gray, who has closed the evidence the AFP collected, apparently on advice from Australian government officials. Gray's spokesman has announced [13], also this week, "the current state of the investigation is such that [the court] has determined that the report is not for release." For more on the Australian evidence Gray is trying to suppress, read this [12]. Australian lawyers plan to challenge Gray, who also holds a judge's rank, for violating the law in concealing the MH17 evidence gathered from the bodies of the Australian victims.

Anderson now says: "The Ukrainians were not uncaring people. It was as much a tragedy for them as for the victims. There was a lot of talk of disrespect for the dead because of the fighting - that was not the case...They were searching within 20 minutes of the crash and recovering remains - that's a good response, a good job ... it was done fairly well ... with the level of expertise and equipment that they had, the locals did the best they could do." According to Donoghoe, "the victims were treated with respect and dignity in difficult circumstances." Walsh has added: "there was no evidence to suggest otherwise".

According to Walsh's version of the behaviour of the Novorussian troops at the crash scene, "what we have established since is that so many victims were successfully identified on the basis of what [the Ukrainians] had collected, and subsequent searching did not reveal huge amounts of human remains that they had missed. The original [Ukrainian] work was done to a high standard in terms of the victims' human remains being treated with respect and dignity." Walsh dismisses media reports of looting. "There were cases of the jewellery being present. I can't say if the presence was high or low; and there were cases of no jewellery, but not sufficient to substantiate claims of a high or extraordinary amount of looting."

Asked if the Novorussians had behaved as humanely as the victims' families would have expected, Walsh said [15]: "From what I've observed, that's a fair assessment."

 [return to Contents] 

 #46
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
October 14, 2015
Manufacturer of BUK missiles disagrees with Dutch official report on MH17
The Dutch Safety Board has finally released its long-awaited report on the MH17 disaster. According to the findings, the Malaysia Airlines jet was shot down by a BUK 9M38M1 missile. However, the maker of the BUK rockets, the Almaz-Antey company, has published its own document with different findings.
Alexei Timoshenko, Nadezhda Ustinova, RBTH

Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 was destroyed by a Russian-made BUK surface-to-air missile, according to the results of the long-awaited Dutch Safety Board investigation into the shooting down of the passenger jet over the Donbass region of eastern Ukraine in July 2014, which were announced on Oct. 13.

On the very same day, Almaz-Antey, the state-owned producer of Russian anti-aircraft systems, including BUK missiles, presented its own "report" into the disaster, the release of which appeared to be timed to coincide with the publication of the Dutch dossier.

Flight MH17 was brought down on July 17, 2014 over eastern Ukraine while en route from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur, killing all 298 passengers and crew, most of whom were from the Netherlands, Malaysia and Australia.

While Dutch specialists, who carried out detailed analysis of the wreckage of the plane for their investigation, during which missile parts were found at the crash site and inside the remnants of the cockpit, say that the plane was hit by a BUK 9M38M1 missile, the Almaz-Antey developers claim it was an older 9M38 missile [both were withdrawn from the Russian armed forces].

The Dutch report does not say who fired the missile.
 
Airspace should have been closed

According to the Dutch report, the missile detonated on the left side of the plane, a meter from the cockpit. Parts of the missile were found in the pilots' bodies, noted Chairman of the Dutch Safety Board Djibbe Joustra during the presentation of the results.

The Dutch report says that airspace over eastern Ukraine should have been closed to civil aviation, since military activity was taking place in the territory and several military planes had been shot down a day earlier.

"The Ukrainian government did not pay enough attention to the possibility of a civilian airplane being shot down at cruising altitude," wrote the authors of the report.

The report does not mention where the shot came from - from the territory controlled by the Ukrainian army or that controlled by the rebels of the self-proclaimed republics in the Donbass. The missile is said to have been launched from a sector of land anywhere from 20 to 62 square kilometres in size. Joustra added that to have a more precise idea of the place from where the missile was launched further investigation is needed.

A map attached to the Dutch report shows the area from which the missile is estimated to have been launched, including the town of Snezhnoye, which at the time of the disaster was controlled by pro-Russian rebels. It was from there, according to the Ukrainian government, that the missile was launched.

The Russian Foreign Ministry reacted by calling the Dutch report biased. According to Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, the Netherlands did not conduct a comprehensive and unbiased investigation of the tragedy that would have taken into consideration information "that Moscow possesses."
 
The Almaz-Antey experiments

During the presentation that was given on the same day by Almaz-Antey, the company's management rejected assertions that the launch could have taken place in the vicinity of Snezhnoye, though the estimates of the area from which the missile was launched in the Almaz-Antey document roughly correspond to those in the Dutch report, as well as to information provided by Ukrainian experts.

By carrying out several experiments, among which was the detonation of a BUK missile near an airplane cockpit, specialists from Almaz-Antey claimed that they had been able to determine the missile type, and that the launch took place in the settlement of Zaroschenskoye, which according to the mass media, was in possession of Ukrainian forces in July 2014.

Almaz-Antey claimed it had been able to identify the kind of missile used by analyzing the pattern of damage caused by BUK rockets, though its experiments were carried out on the fuselage of an Ilyushin Il-86 airliner since the company had no access to a decommissioned Boeing 777.

"The results of the experiment completely invalidate the results of the Dutch committee on the type and place of launch," said Almaz-Antey's general director Yan Novikov. "Today we can unambiguously say that if the Malaysian Boeing was shot down by a BUK missile, the missile was a 9M38 from the direction of Zaroschenskoye."

He underlined that the missile's striking elements do not have an I-beam form and that these missiles were withdrawn from the Russian army in 2011.
 
In search of common ground

According to Viktor Murakhovsky, editor-in-chief of the Russian magazine Arsenal Otechestva (Arsenal of the Fatherland), the place of the launch is just one of several details where the Almaz-Antey presentation does not agree with the conclusions of the Dutch experts, even though "in principle they [the two reports] do not contradict each other."

Murakhovsky notes that the Dutch experts have outlined "a rather broad" zone for the launch, which includes both "competing places."

Alexander Khramchikhin, deputy director of the Moscow-based Institute of Political and Military Analysis, also believes that the Dutch report and the Almaz-Antey presentation are essentially similar in their conclusions. He says that the only difference is that the Russian presentation "definitively concludes who is to blame, while the Dutch document does not make any conclusions."

Khramchikhin added that "the situation is such that it is impossible to determine who the culprit is," since it is "impossible to establish in retrospect whose launching system shot at the Boeing."

In the opinion of Russian military observer Pavel Felgengauz, both reports served as confirmation that the plane was shot down by a BUK missile.

"It was clear immediately that it was not a plane but a heavy BUK missile with a powerful warhead. Considering these accounts, we can forget about talks that it could have been something else," said Felgengauz.

Russian media had earlier released a number of reports claiming that MH17 had been shot down by Ukrainian fighter jets.

 [return to Contents] 

 #47
Counterpunch.org
October 15, 2015
Dangerous Skies: MH17 and the Culpability of Civil Aviation
By BINOY KAMPMARK
Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He lectures at RMIT University, Melbourne. Email: bkampmark@gmail.com

It shows a degree of poor sight from a civil aviation perspective, but disturbingly, the refusal on the part of Ukrainian authorities to heed concerns that the airspace in the eastern part of the country should have been closed to civilian aircraft prior to the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 last year was always a telling point. The reality of military losses inflicted by surface to air weapons systems was already a pressing reality.

The release of the Dutch Safety Board report at the Gilze-Rijen air force base by Tjibbe Joustra capped off a day of duelling theories, though these did not dispute the role played by a missile in the destruction of MH17. Hours prior, the state-owned Russian arms manufacturer Almaz-Antey had given its own, heavily simulated variation about what it claimed took place. Yan Novikov, the company's director, suggested that, "The results of the experiment completely dispute the conclusions of the Dutch commission about the type of rocket and the launch site."

Earlier, Mikhail Malyshevky claimed that MH17 was "definitely" downed "by a 9M38 from the area of Zaroshchenske village," making the missile one of older vintage that had been decommissioned by the Russian forces in 2011. The Safety Board report suggested that the projectile was a later 9N314M BUK.

Despite Russian consternation at disputes over the missile system used, and the contested suggestions that it was launched from rebel-held territory, the overwhelming sense here was that such commercial airliners should not have been flying over eastern Ukraine at the time. Even at the time MH17 was shot down, publications such as Der Spiegel noted how crowded that particularly route was. According to Joustra, there were 32 countries still sending their airliners through the airspace. "MH17 was one of the 160 flights that operated there."

The Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, also cited by the Dutch Safety Board report, makes it clear that responsibility for aviation safety is the preserve of the sovereign state in question. As the chief executive of the International Air Transport Association, Tony Tyler, explained last year, "Airlines depend on governments and air traffic control authorities to advise which air space is available for flight, and they plan within those limits."

Ukrainian aviation authorities were certainly not going to restrict commercial flights, which provide overflight fees exacted similar to road tolls. The cash incentive, one made more pronounced by Ukraine's poor finances, tended to take precedence over airline safety.

The other obvious point here is the commercial airline industry itself. Judgment here was deferred to decisions made by Ukrainian authorities, despite mounting evidence that increasingly powerful weapons were being deployed in the conflict. The same guidelines had been also approved by the International Civil Aviation Organisation and the IATA - a closure of that airspace to commercial flights was never encouraged.

This did not stop flight thresholds from being used, an implicit admission that the threat was real. These were lifted from 26,000 feet to 32,000 after the downing of a military cargo jet at 21,000 feet. Evidently, some airlines heeded this as a dire warning, and were conspicuously absent on the routes. "During the period in which the conflict in the eastern part of Ukraine expanded into the airspace," noted the DSB, "neither Ukraine nor other states or international organisations issued any specific authority warnings to civil aviation about the airspace above the eastern part of the Ukraine."

The onus was on the Ukrainian authorities to take measures that simply never eventuated. "The weapons system mentioned by the Ukrainian authorities in relation to the shooting down of these aircraft can pose a risk to civil aeroplanes, because they are capable of reaching their cruising altitude. However, no measures were taken to protect civil aeroplanes against these weapon systems."

Instead of acknowledging that aspect of the report, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko did what sides in this conflict have done from the start: politicise tragedy. Joustra had made it clear that allocating blame was "outside the mandate of the safety board", though this restraining feature of the findings did not deter the government in Kiev. "The missile was launched from the territory occupied by Russians. Dutch investigators cannot reveal the surnames of criminals. It should be done by the international tribunal."

For Poroshenko, the downing of MH17 never had anything to do with the insufficiency of Kiev's warnings or concerns over a conflict zone - it was an act of presumed Russian criminality. Any contrary assertion has been dismissed.

In this attitude, he keeps company with such individuals as former Australian prime minister Tony Abbott and Dutch prime minister Mark Rutte. On Tuesday, Rutte simply stated what to him was an obvious, if prematurely judged assertion. "We must do the utmost so the people who did it will not avoid... punishment." To even attribute a mixed regime of responsibility for the deaths of 298 people has proven too much to stomach in this most polarising of conflicts. But the words of the Board still ring true for future reference. "Operators cannot take it for granted that open airspace above a conflict zone is safe."

 [return to Contents]