#2
Kremlin.ru
October 1, 2015
Meeting of Council for Civil Society and Human Rights

Vladimir Putin held a meeting of the Council for Civil Society and Human Rights.

President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Good afternoon, colleagues,

I would like to begin by thanking you for your extensive and substantive work. We have had a detailed discussion with Mr Fedotov [Presidential Adviser, Chairman of the Council for Civil Society and Human Rights] of your projects, your work, the difficulties you had and what you have managed to achieve. I am happy to say that you covered a broad range of issues in a variety of areas: education, healthcare, environmental protection, human rights and a number of matters pertaining to the judicial and penitentiary systems. I would like to specifically note your efforts to support refugees and ensure their rights. Primarily refugees from southeast Ukraine.

It is important that the Council's activities covered not only the capital and major cities, but small towns and settlements as well. You travel to the regions regularly to get to know the situation there. This gives you an opportunity to have a direct exchange with your colleagues and, most importantly, maintain a live direct dialogue with the citizens.

The efficiency of such an approach is obvious. I suggest that today we discuss the results of this work, the proposals that have come up and consider your further action.

I would like to stress that the state will continue to pay special attention to the development of human rights and civil society institutions. We have discussed financial matters as well. We all know that we have plenty of problems with the economy in general and with the budget. But we will nevertheless try to maintain a number of programmes that have been launched and are working efficiently. This applies to grants in the first place. In 2015, they will amount to 4.2 billion rubles. There are some regional grants, an area where you and your colleagues manage to work directly with the people. We have agreed to work this out with the Finance Ministry.

Following the results of three contests, non-commercial organisations from 78 Russian regions have already received grants, including in new areas of activity. I would like to remind you that starting from 2015, the list of areas where grants are issued was extended to include such spheres as labour rights protection, search and support for gifted children and young people, and assistance to people with disabilities and pensioners.

Overall, it should be noted that the role of socially oriented organisations, the so-called third sector, is growing all over the world. Russia is no exception here. Today we have over 670,000 people working in non-commercial organisations. Given the existing demand, this is not the limit.

This demand does not only come from those who need support or care. Every year a growing number of our citizens join charitable and socially significant projects. Ever more people are trying to become part of various public initiatives. This growing civic awareness is important, of course, and needs to be supported. This support, as we have discussed, should include encouragement and special notice to those who for many years have been setting an example of sincere and dedicated service to the people. With this in mind, we have resolved to set up an annual National Award of 2.5 million rubles for outstanding achievements in charitable work.

Charity, as we all know, is a special type of activity. It does not expect to be rewarded. Overall, this lofty and dignified cause is part of our national tradition, an inseparable part of any civilised society.

However, voluntary help to people around you, the very institution of volunteering and patronage should receive not only broad public acclaim, but also a proper assessment from the state.

The same goes for efforts aimed at protecting human and civil rights and freedoms, at strengthening and developing civil society institutions. Here we have also established a Russian Federation National Award to be presented annually for outstanding achievements in human rights activity and in the same amount as the one for charity.

We are close to implementing another project we discussed earlier and also today with the Council Chairman. This has to do with opening in Moscow of a memorial to victims of political repressions. This is one of the most bitter and difficult pages of country's history. However, it is just as educational as are the victories and triumphs, and it requires fairness and responsibility as it teaches the current and future generations a very important lesson.

The State Museum of GULAG History held a contest, and some of our colleagues from this Council were on the jury. Of 336 projects, different in idea and design, one was selected with a very concise and meaningful title - the Wall of Sorrow. The memorial is to be erected at the crossing of Sakharov Prospect and Sadovo-Spasskaya Street. I find it symbolic that it will be financed not only by the state, but also through donations.

I would like to note that the fact that an enormous number of people are willing to be involved in commemorating the victims of repression confirms the timeliness of this idea. It also shows that the people are not indifferent to preserving our common historical memory.

This is a very positive and essential thing. Respect for one's history, the desire to learn about one's country, to save and create monuments are all evidence of a mature society and state, which means they are capable of further development.

Let us now proceed to our agenda.
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 #3
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
September 28, 2015
Russia's oldest human rights activist is awarded Vaclav Havel Prize
The head of the Moscow Helsinki Group, Lyudmila Alexeyeva, 88, has been awarded the international Vaclav Havel Human Rights Prize.
Yekaterina Sinelschikova, RBTH

Prominent Russian human rights activist Lyudmila Alexeyeva, the founder and head of the Moscow Helsinki Group and a member of the presidential council for civil society and human rights, has been awarded this year's Vaclav Havel Human Rights Prize.

The veteran human rights campaigner was presented with the award by Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) President Anne Brasseur on Sept. 28, at the opening of the PACE fall session in Strasbourg.

Alongside Alexeyeva, this year's shortlist featured The Youth Initiative for Human Rights and the Women for Afghan Women movement. The amount of the prize is 60,000 euros ($67,500).

"I extend my heart-felt congratulations to Lyudmila Mikhaylovna [Alexeyeva] and believe that she is exactly the person who deserves this prize," Russian human rights ombudsman Ella Pamfilova told RBTH, commenting on the news.

She went on to compliment Alexeyeva on the consistency with which she has carried out her human rights work over the years.

"She never seeks confrontation but looks for mutually acceptable solutions, which is very important. She never looks back and never tries to please anyone. I would like to wish to her to continue to defend human rights with the same clarity of mind and energy as she does," said Pamfilova.

The Vaclav Havel Prize was set up three years ago by the Vaclav Havel Library, the Charter 77 Foundation and PACE.
 
Lyudmila Alexeyeva was born in 1927 in Yevpatoria, USSR. She became a rights activist by speaking out against the trials of political prisoners in 1966. For this she was fired from work and excluded from the Communist Party. However, she continued distributing underground publications on human rights.

In 1976 she co-founded the Moscow Helsinki Group, but in 1977 emigrated to the U.S. and returned to Russia only in 1993. She is the author of more than one hundred articles on human rights, the book The History of Dissent in the USSR and her memoirs, The Thaw Generation. She has received numerous awards, among which are the French Legion of Honor (2007), the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany (2009) and the Andrei Sakharov Prize (2009).

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 #4
Business New Europe
www.bne.eu
September 30, 2015
Oil money, conflict and the age of diminished expectations in Russia
Yuval Weber of Moscow's Higher School of Economics

At the mid-June opening of Russia's "military Disneyland" - officially titled "Patriot Park" - President Vladimir Putin took the opportunity to announce that 40 new intercontinental missiles would be added to Russia's nuclear forces and that the theme park itself would be "an important element in our system of military-patriotic work with young people". The declarations fit the mood of "heightened patriotism and military rhetoric" that has come to dominate Moscow since Crimea was wrested from Ukraine following the Euromaidan protests that ousted the pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych and relations between Russia and the West deteriorated to levels unseen since the Cold War.

The announcement indeed harkened back to the Cold War, but not solely to tit-for-tat charges between Moscow and the Pentagon over missile counts. Increasing military spending and ideological fervor in a stressed fiscal environment echoes less the direct superpower showdowns of the 1950s and 1960s, and more the far more conflictual phase of the 1970s and 1980s that started with an energy boom and ended with a political bust - the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Although it seems like a distant universe, the last two decades of the Cold War saw the two superpowers reduce tensions in Europe yet simultaneously conduct a series of proxy wars across the decolonizing countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. The many - but often small and sometimes dubious - conflicts and client states of that era emerged from sustained energy output and high prices that expanded Soviet military capabilities and generated American misperception about Soviet security aims outside of Europe.

The oil money that seriously bolstered the Soviet budget in the late 1960s and early 1970s did not cause foreign policy expansionism directly, but altered political negotiations in the leadership: it empowered "hawks" to prevail over "doves" and pursue an alternative, expansionist foreign policy in the "Third World" at the same time Leonid Brezhnev and Andrei Gromyko were pursuing détente and arms controls with the West in Europe.

Either/or

Unlike conventional considerations of how energy and conflict are related, political scientists do not believe that energy directly causes conflict. Instead, increased energy revenues allow a state to increase capabilities and thus have the ability to pursue more policy choices. Without the difficult trade-off embodied in the classic phrase "guns or butter" in which governments must decide whether to emphasize defense or social spending, energy wealth (and particularly sudden influxes) allows for both: guns and butter. When fiscal realities change (energy prices decline as importers go into recession or reduce their energy usage habits), the once-flush petrostate is then left with increased foreign policy commitments and increased social commitments when it has less money for both.

At that time in the 1970s, hawks in the International Department of the Communist Party, which was formally responsible for relations with foreign communist parties dating back to the 1920s-era Comintern, articulated that the Marxist-Leninist struggle abroad found a natural home in the socialist-oriented national liberation movements in developing countries. As the main thrust of Soviet foreign policy centered over European security and relations with the Western bloc, bringing détente and consumer goods previously unseen in the Soviet Union through greater commercial relations, the developing world figured less important. The oil money seemed to make everyone happy: the top leadership achieved relaxation of tension with the West, hardliners were mollified and continued to support Brezhnev by increasing confrontation outside of Europe, and the Soviet population enjoyed a higher standard of living.

The subsequent decline in energy prices in the late 1970s/early 1980s created the dire economic conditions that led, in part, to Mikhail Gorbachev's bold selection as Party Secretary to try and turn the country around. Hampered by fiscal shortfalls that cut into the ability of the USSR to import goods, inefficient internal production mechanisms that created fiscal overhang of too much money chasing too few goods, a massive military presence in Europe, and the consequences of the previous era's expansionism outside of Europe (including a full guerrilla war in Afghanistan), Gorbachev lambasted his predecessors for leaving him such a short deck. He coined the phrase "Era of Stagnation" to argue that when times were good, Brezhnev satisfied everyone, but those didn't last, leaving the country in an age of diminishing expectations and ruing lost opportunities. As John Maynard Keynes had remarked in 1937, "the boom, not the slump, is the right time for austerity", and the failure of Gorbachev's efforts meant that the Soviet Union ended as a going concern when the money ran out.

Greasing the policy wheels

Contemporary Russia shares aspects of the 1970s and 1980s, albeit with significant departures. Unlike Brezhnev, Putin amassed far greater political control over internal rivals while achieving public popularity by the time the mid-2000s energy boom replenished Russian coffers. That good fortune allowed Putin to direct public spending much more easily than Brezhnev was ever able to, including following orthodox macroeconomic policies such as paying off external debt and investing heavily in public infrastructure, alongside raising living standards through higher pensions and public sector salaries.

It has also permitted vast increases of military spending - first in absolute terms as the size of the federal budget increased in the 2000s, and then in marginal terms following the conflict with Georgia and the insecurity generated by Nato's expansion.

The oil money gave Putin more policy options - increased social spending and increased defense spending - yet the fiscal pressures of a low energy price environment, continued sanctions, and reductions in social benefits as a result of increasing diplomatic commitments to Crimea and separatists in Ukraine (alongside recent moves into Syria to bolster Russia's client Bashar al-Assad) are not easily solved without serious domestic repercussions.

The question facing Putin going forward is not whether the Russian public will accept lowered living standards as a result of recession - that's already happening; but whether increased public support is sustainable in an age of diminished expectations.

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 #5
Russia Insider
www.russia-insider.com
October 1, 2015
IMF Says Russia's Economy Looks Good
Despite many forecasts of doom and gloom the Russian economy is doing much better than expected

The decline in Russia's GDP has been much lower than predicted
Unemployment predicted to be much higher in the EU in future
The ruble still has a higher inflation rate than the euro
Russia still has a massive wad of cash to fall back on if times are tough
 
This article originally appeared in German-Russian Economic News. http://drwn.de/de/iwf-optimistische-russland-prognose/
Translated by Susan Neumann for Russia Insider.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated that the expected decline of the Russian economy for the current year at "only" 3.4 per cent. Against the backdrop of a significantly poorer forecast (minus 4-5 percent) that was made in Russia, the current IMF forecast looks downright optimistic. The IMF expects even a slight amount of growth in Russia's gross domestic product (GDP) in 2016.

As for the cause of the severe recession, the IMF cites the decline in domestic demand, which was in turn triggered by the declining price of oil and the existence of the sanctions. The IMF consultations with Russia and the Eurozone, carried out annually, have been the incentive for the recently published forecasts.

Growth in 2016 expected to again be at the EU level

According to the opinion of the IMF, the growth in the Eurozone for 2015 is - hardly surprising - more favorable.  Interestingly enough, the IMF predicts that in 2016, the growth rate of the Russian economy (1.5 percent) will match that of the Eurozone. That would in effect grant bragging rights to all those who predicted that the economic downturn of the emerging markets was nothing more than a cyclical contraction, and that would - in comparison to the classical industrial states of the so-called First World - not go against the long-term trend of a significantly stronger growth period for these economies.

If the IMF forecasts are correct, Russia will be in a favorable position vis-a-vis the Eurozone in the coming years, even with regard to employment. The unemployment rate should be as low as 6.5 percent in 2015 and 2016, despite the recession. By contrast, the unemployment rate in the Eurozone continues at 10 percent, even for the future. Russia does however receive a minus point in terms of inflation: 15.6 percent in 2015 and 7.5 percent inflation in 2016. These rates are virtually miles away from the 1 percent rate reported for the Eurozone.

Economic performance benefits from the sanctions

The economic war with the West has reflected positively on the current account of the Russian economy. Sanctions, the import embargo and the ruble price increase, as well as the political program of import substitution have reduced the amount of imports. The IMF expects a rise in the Russian current account surplus of US $61 billion in 2015 to $79 billion in the coming year.

The IMF sees the Russian foreign exchange reserves at $360-375 billion until the end of 2016. After the huge outflows in 2014/15, the drain of capital is expected to stabilize in the next year. Investment activity, already stalled before the Ukraine crisis, will continue to remain low. In order for there to be a return to the boom year growth rates prior to 2008, whether they be medium or long term, the variable "investment" will be an all-important deciding factor.

 #6
Valdai Discussion Club/RG.ru
http://valdaiclub.com
October 1, 2015
FIGHTING EVIL SEPARATELY
By Fyodor Lukyanov
Fyodor Lukyanov is Chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Editor-in-Chief, Russia in Global Affairs journal, Scientific director of the Valdai Discussion Club.

There is no doubt that Moscow understands that Syria will no longer be the way it once was, neither in terms of government nor borders. If returning to a pre-war situation is not an option, consultations should take place to determine how the country will be governed in the future.

The first substantive meeting between the Russian and US presidents turned out to be as successful as it possibly could. The two countries have extremely strained relations, and their stances on the most critical issues range from strongly divergent to diametrically opposite. Mutual trust is at an all-time low since the Cold War, and maybe even longer. With all this in mind, what we heard after the ninety-minute talks should be regarded as a sign of progress.

Syria was the only issue on the agenda, or nearly so, that reflects the current state of Russian-US bilateral relations, in which raising a broader range of issues does not make much sense. Overall, the differences are so important that trying to narrow the gap seems like a waste of time. But when a specific issue emerges that is important for both parties, and when the perspectives coincide, be it slightly (as with ISIS, in this case), a business-like discussion is possible.

This has nothing to do with cooperation in fighting a common enemy. The fact that both leaders are speaking about a coalition to combat the Islamic State points to different, not coinciding, approaches, since the two have their own vision of the coalition that should be created.

For the US, the possible coalition would be a group of countries that share the American strategy and agree to follow along the lines the US traces. However, this line is not clear. The main reproach Obama constantly hears is that his Middle East policy is inconsistent, that it is unclear whether it is pursuing a specific objective, and to what extent the White House is committed to achieving it.

When comparing the coalition he would like to see with the anti-Hitler coalition, Vladimir Putin implied that Moscow is ready to lay aside all other divergences for the time it takes to combat ISIS and expects others to do the same. The information center established by Russia, Iran, Iraq and Syria is likely to serve as a blueprint for further efforts. The Russian president invited everyone to join it.

Bashar al-Assad's fate was and still is the main stumbling block. Putin has publicly called for relying on Damascus as a foundation for combatting ISIS, while Obama called the Syrian leader a dictator and once again said that the US expects him to leave power. For many US observers, Obama's bold statements are not so much an expression of his inflexible will as they are an attempt to masque his qualms on this issue. To fight in Syria against ISIS and the al-Assad regime at the same time, which is now the official approach of the US, would mean bringing about increasingly unmanageable and unpredictable contradictions. Renouncing the demand for the Syrian leader to resign seems impossible, since it puts into question the Syrian policy over the last four and a half years. However frightening the prospect of leaving Syria in total ruin may be, this is the most likely outcome of the contradictory approaches advocated by Russia and the US. This could spell the onset of a different, more catastrophe-prone environment in the Middle East. In any event, by taking Damascus, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi would take his bid to create a caliphate one step closer to reality.

There is no doubt that Moscow understands that Syria will no longer be the way it once was, neither in terms of government nor borders. If returning to a pre-war situation is not an option, consultations should take place to determine how the country will be governed in the future. But what comes first? Russia believes that the first thing should be to understand when the advance of the Islamists will stop, if ever, and demarcating the remaining territory. Only after that can discussions on how to run this zone begin. Russia has a negative opinion of the Western-backed opposition. In his statement at the General Assembly, Putin said that only the Syrian government forces and the Kurdish militia are fighting ISIS.

The West insists on the need for diplomatic efforts to establish a coalition government in Syria, even if this means working with the proponents of the current regime, which is a substantial shift, but without al-Assad. Meanwhile, some are becoming increasingly vocal about the fact that al-Assad's withdrawal should be a result, not a prerequisite of the negotiating process.

All disputes that are regularly brought into the public eye could continue alongside military and technical initiatives in the conflict zone. The main outcome of the meeting between Putin and Obama, which was confirmed by both parties, is that the military of the two countries will keep each other updated on the developments on the ground. This is a vital issue, since when two military superpowers are operating in the same space, the risk of unintended tension is much higher. In other words, based on what we know about the results of the meeting, it's possible to draw the conclusion that Russia and the United States agreed, perhaps by default, not to stand in each other's way in Syria. They have at least one common enemy there, and the two capitals agree on how dangerous it is. On all other issues their positions are different. This outcome may be modest, but at this point in time it is nothing short of a success.

This article was originally published in Russian on www.rg.ru

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#7
http://gordonhahn.com
September 29, 2015
Explaining Putin's Counter-Jihadi Coalition Proposal: Russian Interests, Not a 'New Cold War'
By Gordon M. Hahn
Gordon M. Hahn is an Analyst and Advisory Board Member of the Geostrategic Forecasting Corporation, Chicago, Illinois; Senior Researcher, Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies (CETIS), Akribis Group, San Jose, California Analyst/Consultant, Russia Other Points of View - Russia Media Watch; and Senior Researcher and Adjunct Professor, MonTREP, Monterey, California.

At the 70th anniversary session of the United Nations general Assembly in New York, Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated and broadened Russia's earlier proposal for the creation of an anti-jihadi coalition. If earlier the idea was limited to coordinating Russian military assistance with combat operations carried out by the Syrian and Iraqi armies, the Kurdish Peshmerga, and Iranian special forces, now Moscow is proposing a more broad international coalition modeled on the anti-Nazi coalition of World War Two.

Specifically, Putin broached "a broad, international, anti-terrorist coalition," which, "like the anti-Hitler coalition, could unite in its ranks very different forces prepared to decisively resist those who like the Nazis sew evil and hatred of mankind." "(T)he key participants of such a coalition should be Muslim countries," in Putin's view (http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50385). Thus, the new proposal would add a series of other Muslim countries to the forces of the coalition as first proposed. Thus, in addition to those in Iraq and Syria fighting the Islamic State and other jihadi groups could be added Jordan, Egypt, and other Muslim countries that have expressed an interest in fighting the jihadists.

What stands behind Putin's demarche? Some rather unbalanced answers to this question have emerged. Some argue that Putin is solely interested in supplanting American power in the region. 'Challenging American power in the region' is much less important a factor in Russia's intervention in Syria than most American specialists egocentrically think. Others - like neoconservative FOX News commentator K.T. McFarland, who served in national security posts in the Nixon, Ford and Reagan administrations, Anton Shekhovtsov of Russia's Sova Center, and Sam Greene of London's King's College - claim that Putin is inserting Russian military force into the Syrian equation in order to increase the flow of refugees to Europe (https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=10153073100476516&set=a.10150208275601516.312509.750581515&type=3&theater and http://news.rambler.ru/world/31263242/?utm_source=adfox_site_36985&utm_medium=adfox_banner_1401793&utm_campaign=adfox_campaign_495794&ues=1). This claim or hypothesis is of little merit other than its being rather instructive as to the level of irrationality and paranoia towards Putin and Russia gripping much of American rusology (though Greene is a Brit, I believe).

More sober analysis would suggest that no matter who might have come out against the Assad regime's survival - America, Europe, the Saudis, Qataris, and/or other actors - Moscow would have been inclined to oppose such a move. The fact is that failed U.S. policies across the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) during the Barack Obama asministration have created a vacuum of power on the ground that created the crisis on the ground and in world leadership to resolve it. There are in fact fundamental geopolitical, domestic security, and historic-civilizational motivations behind Putin's move in Syria than simply sparring with the U.S. over leadership roles in the region. This does not mean that Putin is not primarily interested in saving Assad, but it does mean that he has multiple motives. At the same time, it is unlikely that Putin would have intervened solely to save Assad and strengthen Russia's hand in the Middle East.

Geopolitical Motives

No doubt, Putin hopes to take advantage of that vacuum in Levant and the larger MENA to bolster Russia's authority and power in the region and globally, but his proposal makes clear that he seeks cooperation with the U.S. and other players. To be sure, key also are Russia's objective geopolitical interests as well more subjective strategic cultural factors formed by a long history of relations in the region and a shorter history of Western military and political actions taken against Russian allies and interests since the end of the Cold War from Yugoslavia to Serbia to Georgia to Ukraine. This post-Cold war record of what are - with the possible exception of the still unfinished Ukrainian crisis - losses for Moscow make it more imperative that Moscow protect its Syrian ally and the military, political and cultural ties to it that connect it with the larger Levant and Middle East. Specifically, the fall of an ally would be another disastrous blow to Russian power and prestige. It would mean the loss of years of investment in the Assad regime and its only, albeit rather small, naval base in the Mediterranean Sea. Moreover, Putin may be concerned that Tehran might move to supplant or subordinate Assad, as it has made him increasingly reliant on its proxy Shiite Lebanese and Iraqi militias and Hezbollah.

Putin's intervention in Syria is forcing powers with swagger in the region to deal with Russia and its interests rather than ignore them. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu rushed to Moscow to express Tel Aviv's concerns regarding any advantages that might accrue to Hezbollah or Iranian moves in the Golan Heights as a result of Russia's intervention and any stabilization of the Assad regime and war front in the north. US President Obama has been forced to agree to meet Putin for the first time in over a year as a result at least in part of Putin's Syrian gambit. The Washington rumor mill has it that Obama advisor Susan Rice is tasked with overseeing a recently formed committee of Syria experts in order to develop a formula for coexisting with Assad, and influential European policymakers and opinion makers are thinking increasingly along similar lines (www.businessinsider.com/why-european-leaders-are-lining-up-behind-assad-2015-9). Citing a "senior" Assad advisor, the French AFP reports that Moscow and Washington have already reached a 'tacit deal' on his at least temporary continuation in power pending a transition to a new regime (http://news.yahoo.com/tacit-deal-between-us-russia-end-syria-war-133934478.html). But a challenge larger than getting the Western powers on board is convincing secularist and/or Sunni powers like Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE to join a coalition in which Shiite actors appear to have the inside track.

Russia's Domestic Jihadi Threat and the Global Jihad Revolutionary Movement

In terms of domestic security, it is absolutely incumbent for Putin to combat the growing threat to Russia from the global jihadi revolutionary movement spread along a great arc stretching across southern Eurasia just below Russia's southern borders from Syria in the west to Central and South Asia in the east. The global jihad poses a greater danger to Russia and its sphere of influence and interests in Eurasia than to the U.S. and other regions of the world, with the possible exception of Europe. Both of the global jihad's leading organizations - Al Qa`ida and the Islamic State - have allies or affiliates in Russia's North Caucasus which threaten to spread to other regions of Russia.

The Islamic State (IS) has a direct affiliate in Russia's North Caucasus. The so-called 'Caucasus Vilaiyat of the Islamic State' (CVIS) emerged this year when some 70-80 percent of Russia's global jihadi-oriented local jihadi organization, the Caucasus Emirwte (CE), broke away and declared the Islamic loyalty oath or 'bayat' to IS and its self-declared 'caliph' Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. However, the CE has had indirect links to IS for much longer. In 2012 then CE amir 'Abu Usman' Doku Umarov dispatched a group of amirs to Syria to link up with the jihadists there. One of them, 'Umar al-Shishani' Tarkhan Batirashvili, broke with the main group that formed around these amirs, and joined IS. He rose up the ranks to become the amir of IS's northern front, which carries out combat and terrorist operations in northern Iraq and Syria along the borders with Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan. Batirashvili's brother, Tamaz, is IS's leading financial operative. Tarkhan has always expressed an intent to return to the Caucasus and continue jihad against Russia. Now, with the IS's affiliate, the CVIS, there Batirashvili need not to return in order to orchestrate IS operations there. It can be expected that under the Batirashvilis' influence, IS will devote some significant resources to building up the CVIS's capacity.

The remainder of the CE remains loyal to Al Qa`ida (AQ) and, for example, its ally in Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra (JN). Until several months ago the major unit of foreign mujahedin fighting in Syria, Jeish al Muhajirin wal-Ansar (JMA), was led by the CE's envoy to Syria, Salahuddin al-Shishani. He and his deputy or 'naib' Abdul-karim al-Krymskii (a Crimean Tatar from Crimea) were expelled from the JMA and have their own organization, the Caucasus Emirate in Sham (Levant) or CES. North Caucasian mujahedin remain in the JMA and other groups aligned with JN. These groups at the moment actually pose together a greater threat to the Assad regime than does IS. They carry out operations with other jihadi groups in and around Aleppo, Iblid, and even near Damascus. They also carry out operations near Latakia, not far from which sits the Russian naval base and the small though growing contingent of Russian marines and military equipment now being sent to bolster Assad.

With hundreds of IS and other jihadi fighters returning to the Caucasus from Syria and Iraq, Putin and Russia's security services would be self-destructively negligent if they did not pursue ways to counter this threat. Much like George W. Bush's thinking during his presidency postulated it would be better to fight the jihadists before they came to the homeland, Putin's intervention in Syria might draw more mujahedin away from the North Caucasus south to Syria to carry out jihad and be destroyed by Russian forces before they ever return home. Moreover, Putin can carry out the war against Caucasus mujahedin not alone but with Syrian, Iraqi, Iranian, Kurdish, and even Western partners.

Another important consideration is that IS and AQ pose a growing threat to Russia's neighbors in the former USSR, specially Azerbaijan and the Central Asian states. IS is already devoting considerable propaganda resources targeting Eurasia with the publication of two Russian-language journals targeting the region, as I detailed in a recent article on this site.

Orthodox Christianity and The Civilizational Factor

Historico-civilizationally, the Russian Orthodox Church and Russian state have had deep ties with Eastern Orthodox Church communities throughout the Levant (especially Syria, Lebanon and Israel) for centuries. In the 17th century Russia forced the Ottoman Turks to recognize Russia's right as the protector of Orthodox Christians across the Ottoman empire. In the 18th and 19th centuries this role shaped Russian foreign policy towards both the Porte and its sometimes Western allies. The Crimean War saw Russia come into conflict with Britain, France and the Ottoman Empire over the Russo-French dispute over which power would be official patron and protector of the Ottoman Empire's Christians. During this real first world war, British ships sailed as far north as the Solovetsk Islands near the Arctic Circle and bombed the famous monastery there. Protection of Serbian and other Slavic Orthodox Christians from the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires drew Russia fatefully into World War I.

More thoughtful analysts agree with such an interpretation. Walter Russell Mead noted in The American Interest:

Bitter religious warfare and memories of Islamic persecution are one of the forces that hold Orthodox Christians in the Balkans, Russia and the Middle East together. The long Islamic conquest of the Orthodox world, the destruction of Orthodox empires and kingdoms and the subjugation of Orthodox Christians to alien Islamic rule remains a vibrant memory. It connects the Serbs, the Greeks, the Greek Cypriots, the Russians, Bulgarians and many others - and Czarist Russia's role in breaking Islamic rule and restoring freedom to Christian communities in the Balkans is remembered.

Linked to that memory are memories of Western Christian treachery and betrayal. From the Fourth Crusade, ostensibly sent to protect Eastern Christians but turned into a piratical assault on Constantinople, to memories of how the westerners made their help conditional on Orthodox submission to the authority of the Popes, a history of betrayal shapes the Orthodox political mind in many of these countries.

Today's western support for "democracies" in the Middle East that turn into Islamist states fits into this historical pattern in the view of many people in the Orthodox world. From Serbia and Moscow, the dangers seem much more immediate than the dilettantes in Washington understand. Turkey's 'neo-Ottoman' return to Islamist policies, Islamism rising across the Arab world, short sighted Western policies that stigmatize and oppress Orthodox resisters against the Islamic surge (Serbs in Bosnia and Kosovo, Russians in Afghanistan, Chechnya and Dagestan), or that stab eastern Christians in the back ('unfair' EU austerity in Greece, support for Islamists in Egypt and Syria, the destruction of the ancient Christian community in Iraq following the US invasion): all these revive memories and trigger reflexes that were already old in 1800 (http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/2012/06/03/what-russia-doesnt-forget/).

Broken during the Soviet era, ties to the Christian levant have been renewed in the post-Soviet era, and the Imperial Orthodox Palestinian Society was revived. The IOPS was founded in 1882 as a result of a pilgrimage by members of the Romanov imperial family in response to the death of the Empress Maria Aleksandrovna in May 1880 and the murder of Tsar Aleexander II by socialist terrorists in March 1881. Those Orthodox communities are at risk of a genocide at the hands of IS and AQ.

Christian Orthodox towns in Syria have been depopulated by mass exodus and destroyed by jihadi forces. In April 2013 priest, Metropolitan Pavel of Aleppo was kidnapped and killed by mujahedin near the Turkish border. Metropolitan was the brother of the Syrian Patriarch of Antioch Joann X himself, who has close ties with the Moscow Patriarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church. Other Eastern Orthodox priests have been beheaded in Syria by mujahedin from Russia's North Caucasus.

Conclusion

Therefore, rather than being some grand conspiracy to build a Russian empire and defeat the West in the ostensible 'new cold war,' Putin's actions are actually about defending Russian positions in the region and national security at home. Any failure to realize the latter, real motivations behind Putin's actions and instead favor of a focus on the former, imagined ones is fraught with specter of more gains for the jihadists and the greater likelihood of a world needlessly split apart on this and other key issues. To be sure, Putin's demarche also fits into his larger projects of making Russia central Eurasia's superpower, a global power to be reckoned with beyond Eurasia, and a bridge between the Western, Eurasian, Confucian, and Islamic civilizations. But this is not cold war. By seeking an anti-jihadi coalition that includes the West and Asia, Putin is pursuing both his primary goal of securing Russian national interests and security and his larger strategy of delimiting if not overcoming the Western-Eurasian civilizational rift and forging a broad Western-Eurasian-Confucian-Islamic multipolar world in which a future great Eurasian economic hub - at the center of which stands Russia - will play a central role.

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 #8
Kremlin.ru
September 30, 2015
Meeting with Government members

Vladimir Putin met with Government members to discuss measures to overcome economic recession in 2016. The situation in Syria and the fight against international terrorism were discussed separately.

Excerpts from transcript of meeting with Government members

President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Good afternoon, colleagues,

We will start with an issue that will likely be the subject of much discussion today, namely, my request to the Federation Council on using Russia's Armed Forces beyond our country's borders. The Federation Council has examined this request and approved it.

Syria is the issue here. The only real way to fight international terrorism (and international terrorist groups are creating chaos in Syria and the territory of neighbouring countries right now) is to take the initiative and fight and destroy the terrorists in the territory they have already captured rather than waiting for them to arrive on our soil.

We all know that thousands of people from European countries, Russia, and the post-Soviet region have joined the ranks of the so-called Islamic State, a terrorist organisation that - I want to stress again - has nothing to do with genuine Islam. There is no need to be an expert to realise that if they succeed in Syria, they will inevitably return to their own countries, and this includes Russia.

We all know too that the Islamic State long since declared our country its enemy. Today, a number of countries, including the United States, Australia and France, are using their air forces to carry out air strikes against the Islamic State's positions in Syria.

We have always consistently supported the fight against international terrorism. At the same time, we believe that it must proceed strictly in accordance with international law, in other words, on the basis of UN Security Council resolutions or at the request of the country in need of military assistance. Our partners' operations in Syria have neither of these things as their basis, but we nonetheless think it possible and necessary to unite the efforts of all concerned countries in the fight against international terrorism and base this common effort on the UN Charter.

At this stage, I propose that all countries concerned, in particular the countries in the region, start taking part in the work of the international information and eventually coordination centre in Bagdad.

The only real way to fight international terrorism is to take the initiative and fight and destroy the terrorists in the territory they have already captured rather than waiting for them to arrive on our soil.

We have informed all of our partners about Russia's plans and actions in Syria. Let me repeat: Russia's involvement in the anti-terrorist operations in Syria is in accordance with international law and based on the official request from the President of the Syrian Arab Republic.

I want to stress the point though that the conflict in Syria has deep roots and is the result of many factors. This includes interstate and domestic political factors, and religious and interethnic differences, which have been exacerbated by unceremonious foreign intervention in the region's affairs.

Given these circumstances, we naturally have no intention of getting deeply entangled in this conflict. We will act strictly in accordance with our set mission. First, we will support the Syrian army only in its lawful fight against terrorist groups. Second, our support will be limited to airstrikes and will not involve ground operations. Third, our support will have a limited timeframe and will continue only while the Syrian army conducts its anti-terrorist offensive.

Our view is that a final and long-term solution to the situation in Syria is possible only on the basis of political reform and dialogue between all healthy forces in the country. I know that President al-Assad knows this and is ready for this process. We are counting on his active and flexible position and his readiness to make compromises for the sake of his country and people.

Russia's involvement in the anti-terrorist operations in Syria is in accordance with international law and based on the official request from the President of the Syrian Arab Republic.

To finish with the military theme, let me congratulate our naval personnel, who today, for the first time in the history of the Russian and Soviet submarine fleet, travelled a long way beneath the Arctic ice from Severodvinsk to Kamchatka. The atomic submarine Alexander Nevsky has now begun its battle duty. This is a big event in the navy's life. I want to congratulate everyone - the sailors and the shipbuilders - on this successful work.

Colleagues, while security issues and military development are very important matters for our country's overall development, one of the key areas for ensuring Russia's growth is the economy, especially the social sector, industry, and agriculture.

Along with many of the Government members here today, I held a meeting recently in Rostov Region to review the results of the latest harvest campaign and discuss matters related to agriculture sector development. Yesterday, I discussed the microelectronics sector's development with my colleagues. This sector is also very important for the national economy. Today, we will look at issues of a broader nature, namely, how to address the signs of recession we see in some areas.

Let's begin by hearing from Mr Ulyukayev [Minister of Economic Development] on the work to develop socioeconomic priority development areas in single-industry towns. I know that the ministry has done the necessary work in this area and has already selected several projects.

<...>

Vladimir Putin: Has the final agreement been reached with our Ukrainian colleagues on gas? And incidentally, what is happening there with air services? Please share your comments.

Energy Minister Alexander Novak: Mr President,

In accordance with your instructions to continue consultations between ourselves, the European Union and Ukraine on the reliability of gas transit to Ukraine, as well as the Prime Minister's instructions, I held consultations with our partners on September 25. We were able to agree on the content of the protocol on cooperation in terms of gas supplies from the Russian Federation to Ukraine during the period from October 1, 2015 through March 31, 2015 - the so-called "winter package."

The main stipulations of this agreement are mutual obligations of all sides. First and foremost, obligations by the Ukrainian side to guarantee the continuation of reliable transit of Russian gas through Ukrainian territory to EU countries in the volume that Gazprom provides for transit under existing contracts.

In turn, the Russian side, the Government of the Russian Federation, will consider providing discounts on a quarterly basis based on demand, and will consider gas pricing for Ukraine on a competitive basis, at price levels offered to countries adjacent to Ukraine, such as Poland. I have briefed our partners that on September 24, the Prime Minister signed a corresponding resolution for the fourth quarter of this year.

For the first time, this protocol reflects the obligation of the European Union, the European Commission which represents the European Union, to organise financing for Ukraine's gas purchases through international financial institutions, including the allocation of the first $500 million tranche for Ukraine to purchase gas from Russia in October to fill its underground gas storage facilities and ensure safe passage during the winter period.

Vladimir Putin: How much money are the Europeans giving them?

Alexander Novak: The first tranche is $500 million. At the same time, we agreed that over the course of the entire winter period, they will help and raise funds for Ukraine, including through various financial institutions and banks, since Naftogaz is truly in a difficult position, as is the Ukrainian economy, and they cannot cope on their own.

Vladimir Putin: That's the issue. Because we can pump $500 million of gas into underground gas storage facilities, but they then need to pay for Russian gas supplies throughout the entire winter, and that's close to $3 billion. Where will they get this money without help from European nations? So it is fundamentally important that this agreement includes European obligations to ensure financing.

Alexander Novak: Mr President, it was fundamentally important to formalise this in the protocol.

For our part, we signed this protocol, as did the European Commission. We feel that we have created all the necessary conditions to get through the cold season during the winter period reliably.

Vladimir Putin: Thank you.

And what is happening with air transport services?

Transport Minister Maxim Sokolov: Mr President, this week, Ukraine's aviation authorities - the State Aviation Service - sent notifications to nine Russian airlines on banning their flights to Ukraine, in violation of our interstate agreement's provision on air traffic. This agreement has been in effect for over 20 years, and since 2013 we have full liberalisation in all areas and frequency of flights.

This year, five Russian and three Ukrainian airlines have been providing air transport services. In the first eight months of this year, the overall flow was nearly 700,000 passengers, of which nearly half, or 300,000, flew Aeroflot.

Of course, such actions by the Ukrainian authorities are not only against international law, but also illogical in terms of transport functioning, since 70% of the passengers using Aeroflot were Ukrainians, and 40% of them were simply passing through Moscow on their way to other airports in Europe or other countries. Thus, this measure first and foremost hurts Ukrainian citizens, reducing their air mobility and essentially isolating them from Europe and the rest of the world.

In response we were forced to apply adequate 'mirror' measures. The Russian Federal Air Transport Agency has already sent notifications to five Ukrainian airlines - all the airlines that currently fly to or have permission to fly to Russia - on banning the use of our airspace from October 25 - in other words, from the date stated in the notification from Ukraine's State Aviation Service. Naturally, in addition to the inconvenience to passengers - and I mean all of them - this will lead to significant losses not only for Ukrainian airlines, but first and foremost, Ukrainian airports. For our part, we have already begun to reroute these flows.

Vladimir Putin: We are trying to hold talks with the European Commission and Ukraine on our relations with regard to Ukraine's signing of the Association Agreement with the European Union and trying to find a way out of these rather complicated situations related to inconsistencies in this agreement and our mutual, Russian-Ukrainian obligations within the framework of the CIS free trade zone. Mr Ulyukayev, how will this reflect on the current process?

Economic Development Minister Alexei Ulyukayev: I think the chances of a positive result in this process are now becoming very slim. Of course, this is not the first unfriendly action. We have registered over forty acts by the Ukrainian Rada and Cabinet of Ministers aimed against Russian economic entities, creating discriminatory working conditions, but this, of course, is an extreme - a complete ban.

In our document, which we offered for trilateral discussion, we introduced a section on mandatory elimination of unilateral measures by Ukraine aimed against Russian businesses as a highly important part of the entire agreement. Because it is impossible to agree on improving customs procedures, improving work in terms of technical regulation, etc., while discriminating against our businesses. Now, following these latest events, I think the chances are quite pitiful.

Vladimir Putin: Mr Medvedev, I want to ask you to keep all these processes under control, as they are very important to us.

Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev: Yes, Mr President.

Naturally, we are in constant contact with our colleagues on this matter. I cannot but agree with the Economic Development Minister's comment. All this is making the chances of agreeing on issues under discussion during our dialogue with the European Commission and Ukraine ephemeral. Because this is not just a refusal to seriously discuss the challenges we all face in light of Ukraine's accession to the Association Agreement with the European Union, but also simply a set of unfriendly measures that are essentially directed against Ukrainian citizens.

Vladimir Putin: Ok.

Let's say at least a couple of words about more pleasant topics. We are preparing for Formula 1 Russian Grand Prix in Sochi. Mr Kozak, how is that work going?

Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Kozak: Yes, indeed Mr President, Russia will be holding this most prestigious race in the world for the second time now. As you recall, the Formula 1 races are a leading event in terms of television viewership, next to the Olympic Games and the World Cup.

Last year, over 500 million viewers in 120 nations around the world watched our Formula 1 Grand Prix. This stage, the second stage in the history of Russian auto racing, will be held on October 9-11 in Sochi at the racing circuit that, I want to point out, was recognised the best race track in the world at the Professional MotorSport World Expo in Cologne, and Formula 1 itself, the race, received two prizes as the best track in the world in the Formula 1 2014 calendar.

This year, the approved plan of preparations for the race has been fully carried out. Interest among Russian and foreign viewers is high, and tickets are selling at the same rate as last year. We are absolutely certain that it will be a complete success.

We are currently negotiating extending the duration of the contract, which ends in 2020, and we're also making progress on negotiating rescheduling the races in Sochi from daytime to night-time.

We have noted a great deal of interest from Russian investors in getting involved in this race and financing the license fees we must pay every year to hold this race through non-budgetary funding.

Vladimir Putin: Night-time races?

Dmitry Kozak: Yes.

Vladimir Putin: But then it will be impossible to see anything.

Dmitry Kozak: On the contrary, they will be colourful. In Monaco and Singapore, the races are held at night, and are illuminated. We would start in 2017, because we will need to install additional lighting. TV viewership will also increase, because it will involve bright imagery; it is more beautiful at night than in the daylight.

Vladimir Putin: Very well. Thank you very much.

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 #9
Christian Science Monitor
September 30, 2015
Kremlin launches airstrikes in Syria, despite Russian public's reluctance
The attack near Homs comes as the Russian parliament rubber-stamped the offensive in support of Bashar al-Assad.
By Fred Weir, Correspondent

MOSCOW - Russia's parliament unanimously approved a resolution authorizing the use of force in Syria Wednesday morning, even as the first Russian-piloted warplanes were reportedly already going into action near the Syrian city of Homs.

The scene in Russia's parliament - which gave legal cover to an action the Kremlin had already decided on - was strongly reminiscent of the use-of-force resolution granted Mr. Putin in early March of last year to send Russian forces into Ukraine - several days after the operation had actually begun. In that case official Moscow fibbed volubly about the role of Russian special forces in taking over Crimea until Putin admitted it about a month later.

Asked by CBS's Charlie Rose in an interview aired just last Sunday if Russia was preparing to deploy combat troops to fight Islamic State positions in Syria, Putin answered: "Russia will not take part in any field operations on the territory of Syria or in other states; at least, we do not plan it for now. But we are thinking of how to intensify our work both with President [Bashar] al-Assad and our partners in other countries."

But now it's official. The Kremlin's spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Russian military action would be limited to airstrikes, and that the purpose of the deployment was "to fight terrorism and to support the legitimate Syrian leadership in the fight against terrorism and extremism."

Kremlin officials have also pointed out that Russian assistance was requested by Syria's government, thus making it legal. Moscow has already  complained that US-led airstrikes in Syria, which lack an invitation from Damascus, are not.

"You all know well that in the territory of Syria and Iraq ... a number of countries are carrying out bombing strikes, including the United States. These actions do not conform with international law. To be legal they should be supported either by a resolution of the UN Security Council, or be backed by a request from the country where the raids are taking place," Kremlin chief of staff Sergei Ivanov told journalists Wednesday.

Amid these developments, Russian media have been hammering home the message that there will be "no boots on the ground." That suggests the Kremlin is looking nervously over its shoulder at Russian public opinion, and its well-known aversion to any foreign military involvement since the former USSR's disastrous incursion into Afghanistan.

That may be a well-founded worry. A poll released Tuesday by the Levada Center, Russia's only independent polling agency, found that 69 percent of Russians are opposed to direct military involvement in Syria's civil war, with only 14 percent in favor. More than two-thirds of respondents favored extending diplomatic and political support to the Syrian regime, but fewer than half supported even limited military aid, such as training and advising Syrian forces.

"People are clearly scared that once we go into Syria we might get bogged down," says Alexei Makarkin, deputy director of the independent Center for Political Technologies in Moscow. "They are really afraid of a large-scale war that could involve our military conscripts, and touch upon the lives of their own families."

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 #10
Defensenews.com
September 30, 2015
US, Russia To Deconflict in Syria
By Aaron Mehta

WASHINGTON - US Defense Secretary Ash Carter has ordered his staff to begin communications with Russia to deconflict air operations in Syria.

The news comes as the Pentagon's top Russia expert is preparing to leave the department.

According to Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook, Carter directed senior staff to open lines of communications this morning. He would not say which staffers were running the talks, nor at what level they would be happening, but noted that "we expect the details of those conversations, including the exact timing of those conversations, will be worked out in the coming days."

The goal of the talks, Cook said, are to ensure "that ongoing coalition air operations are not interrupted by any future Russian military activity, to ensure the safety of coalition air crews, and to avoid misjudgment and miscalculation.

"We do not want an accident to take place," he later added. "That is one of the key motivators for moving this forward."

The discussions represent a major step between the two nations, following a sit-down with US President Barack Obama and Russian President Vladimir Putin at the United Nations on Monday. Military conversation between the US and Russia was cut off following the latter's invasion of Ukraine in 2014.

The issue of potential deconfliction has been a concern since Russia began moving military air assets into Syria in mid-September. There are now more than two dozen Russian fighters in the country, according to open source data, and the assumption is that strikes could begin soon.

The question is open as to the target of those strikes. While the US and Russia share a common enemy in the Islamic State group, also known as ISIS or ISIL, Russia is acting to prop up Syrian President Bashar Assad, whom the US has explicitly called upon to step down.

US-aligned forces fighting against ISIL could potentially become the focus of Russian strikes as well.

Asked whether the US would act to protect aligned forces from Russian attacks, Cook said there is concern about "any effort that would be made to harm the moderate opposition forces that are taking the fight to ISIL.

"The reason for this conversation is because of the prospect of future Russian military action ... we're flying already and we want to make sure it's done in as safe a manner as possible and that our coalition effort is not interrupted in any way by the Russian activities," Cook said.

Specifically asked if these deconfliction talks would extend to cover potential operations in Iraq, Cook reiterated that discussions are just getting going but did not rule out that possibility.

Ironically, military talks are opening up between the two sides just as the Pentagon's top Russian expert is expected to leave the department.

Evelyn Farkas, deputy assistant secretary of defense for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia, will be leaving her post at the end of October, a Pentagon spokesperson confirmed. The news was first reported by Politico.

Farkas has previously held a number of top European-focused positions with the department, including senior adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe/Commander, US European Command. She also spent seven years as a staffer with the Senate Armed Services Committee.

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 #11
Moscow Times
September 30, 2015
Putin's Use of Force In Syria Unlikely to Go Beyond Airstrikes
By Matthew Bodner

By providing Syrian President Bashar Assad's military with material and logistical support, Moscow has committed itself to protecting his embattled regime, which has suffered a series of setbacks at the hands of the Islamic State and U.S.-backed opposition forces.

But it remains unclear just how far Russian President Vladimir Putin intends to go in shoring up Assad - his oldest and most important ally in the Middle East. Russian support, currently limited officially to military hardware and logistical support, might not be enough.

The Moscow Times polled analysts on Tuesday to find out what, if any, threshold exists for a broader Russian intervention, assuming that current measures fail to halt the advance of anti-Assad forces and ensure the survival of the current Syrian regime.

Russia is ready to provide Assad with enough military support to survive, but not to gain control over the whole territory of Syria, said Pyotr Topychkanov, an analyst at the Moscow Carnegie Center think tank.

"Such support may go beyond simple military equipment exports to Syria," Topychkanov said. Though the Kremlin may be flexible on Assad's fate, "the option of an Assad defeat seems to be unacceptable for Moscow," he said.

But General Yevgeny Buzhinsky, a military expert at the Moscow-based PIR Center think tank and a former member of the Russian military's General Staff, said nothing would prompt a full-scale military intervention on Assad's behalf - such an action was simply out of the question.

"I don't believe there will be a Russian direct intervention into the Syria crisis, and by that I mean there won't be anything on land," Buzhinsky said. "[At] maximum, air strikes," he added.

Assistance So Far

Media reports in recent weeks suggest that Russia has been busy beefing up its military presence in Assad-controlled territory in Syria. The buildup has so far been limited to an airbase in Latakia, and a small Russian naval facility at Tartus, some 90 kilometers to the south.

Russian officials have denied that Russian combat troops have been sent to Syria to fight on Assad's behalf, characterizing Russian personnel on the ground as military specialists shipped there to instruct Assad's forces on the use of military hardware provided by Moscow.

Meanwhile, Russian aircraft have been spotted on Assad's airfield at Latakia. Top-of-the-line planes such as Su-30 multi-role fighters, Su-25 ground attack aircraft, and Su-24 fighter-bombers have given rise to speculation that Russian pilots are preparing air strikes.

In a recent interview with U.S. journalist Charlie Rose for "60 Minutes," Putin promised that air strikes would be the furthest Russia is prepared to go in facilitating a resolution to the Syria crisis.

"Our military will not directly participate in combat, it will not fight [in Syria]," Putin said, according to a transcript published by the RIA Novosti news agency. Asked if this applied to air strikes, Putin replied, "I mean war, fighting on the ground, infantry, motorized units."

Special Forces

Maxim Shepovalenko, a former Russian military officer and now an analyst at the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST), a Moscow-based defense think tank, said that Russia was not likely to move beyond air strikes in Syria.

"There will be no troops out in the field, only perimeter defense of the Russian air and naval facilities with a limited force," Shepovalenko said. "I suspect that the newly established special forces command will have its say ... but this is very speculative."

The Reuters news agency reported on Sunday that Russia, Iran, Iraq and Syria had established an intelligence and security cooperation command center in Baghdad to coordinate efforts in the fight against the Islamic State.

Though the threshold for a proper intervention is not clear, said Carnegie's Topychkanov, "it would be lower for special operations forces and much higher for a limited contingent of troops."

Theodore Karasik, a senior adviser to Gulf State Analytics, a consultancy, said special operations forces from all sides in the Baghdad command center could be "deployed against extremists throughout the country in coordination with other participant states."

Red Lines

Russia's threshold for a boots-on-the-ground operation could be greatly influenced by an attack on its positions in Syria at the Latakia airfield - in a region that falls regularly under rebel assault - and the Tartus naval facility.

"I think the red line for Putin here is Russian forces in Latakia and Tartus coming under attack," said Yury Barmin, a Russian political analyst focusing on the Middle East.

"By putting a contingent in Assad-controlled territory, Russia in some sense hopes it will deter rebels from advancing any further. But if they get closer to Russian troops then Russia will have to respond accordingly," Barmin said.

But air strikes and material support for the Assad regime may be all that is required to secure the Kremlin's political objectives in Syria - which Putin said in his interview with Rose consists of facilitating a political settlement between Assad and the "healthy opposition."

"I don't see Assad completely collapsing against the Islamic State," said Ben Moores, a senior analyst at international defense consultancy IHS. "But it is highly possible that Assad simply runs out of resources to sustain an organized resistance."

This is where Russian support factors in to the regime's survival. But with this support comes Russian personnel on the ground in Latakia and Tartus, and "there will be Russian units guarding their airfield and crews," Moores said.

But their guard duties may not be so far removed from active combat operations. In recent weeks, video evidence allegedly showing Russian forces already engaging in combat operations with Assad's forces in the Syrian civil war have been posted on the Internet. "So are we not already at the point where Russia has sent in troops?" Moores said.

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 #12
Vedomosti
September 29, 2015
Russian analysts assess, differ on thrust of Putin's UNGA address
Petr Kozlov, Margarita Papchenkova, and Olga Churakova: President of Russia proposes to West combating terrorism together. Expert believes this may be part of strategy aimed at lifting sanctions

The West's refusal to cooperate with the legitimate Syrian authorities in combating ISIL (Islamic State group, a prohibited organization on Russian territory) is a huge mistake, Vladimir Putin declared at the jubilee session of the United Nations General Assembly (the United Nations Organization was established 70 years ago). Aside from the army of President Bashar al-Asad and the Kurdish militia, no-one is really fighting against terrorists in Syria. The president of Russia proposed the establishment of a broad international antiterrorist coalition which - like the anti-Hitler coalition - could unite the most varied forces that are prepared to resolutely oppose those who - like the Nazis - sow evil and hatred.

US President Barack Obama lost out when, two years ago, he attempted to remove Al-Asad and proved unable to do so, a contact in the Russian delegation declared to Vedomosti ahead of Putin's address: "Obama has found himself in a situation where he cannot repudiate the Russian initiative. He will be obligated to support it, otherwise people will not understand him. We should expect a more symbolic result, but this is a positive result nonetheless."

Putin's speech may be part of a political strategy aimed at getting the sanctions lifted; coincidentally, Obama has let it be known that he does not regard Russia as an absolute evil, although it is in breach of international law, political analyst Aleksey Makarkin believes: "The signal from the Russians - the West is to blame for everything by raising a storm in Africa and the East, but let us address the problem together, nobody needs a cold war."

In Makarkin's opinion, Obama does not want to leave this problem for the next president - he needs to deal with ISIL and he is ready to cooperate with Russia on this. The only question, Makarkin believes, is how to turn this into reality, two problems are getting in the way: eastern Ukraine, where Russia wants to freeze the conflict, but the USA is demanding a political solution, and Syria, where Russia is happy with Al-Asad, but the USA is not.

True, in his actual speech Putin mentioned the sanctions once and in passing, among other world economic problems.

Neither the Kremlin nor the government devoted much attention to the economic part of Putin's address, this is more a matter of ritual - the UN platform is not the stage from which this is best addressed, a federal official who is involved in writing such speeches for the president explains. Of course, the speech contains a rebuke to the world for the sanctions, but "lift the sanctions" is not the agenda, Russia needs to have something to offer the world, he believes.

Putin's speech should not be seen in the context of seeking the resolution of the sanctions problem, the political analyst Dmitriy Oreshkin argues. The address to the United Nations had two goals: drawing attention away from the Novorossiya failure - there are insufficient resources to support it and there is a need to back away from it - and to lay responsibility for the situation in Syria on the USA. Obama spoke more about Ukraine, Putin more about Syria, this is a propaganda effort, it could go down well on the internal market but it apparently failed to produce the proper impression on the foreign audience, the expert believes: "The USA is forced to agree to a dialogue, but everyone understands that a coalition on the Syria question is impossible."

Putin's speech was strong, especially against the backdrop of Obama's convoluted effort, the political analyst Nikolay Zlobin believes: "Using simple language, Putin formulated the four or five main problems and offered a very good unification platform: Russia is prepared to unite with anyone in whatever way it takes just as long as it proves beneficial."

For small and medium-sized countries to hear that Russia is prepared to cooperate on the most diverse issues - that is balm for the heart, Zlobin is convinced. "Clearly, the positions of Obama and Putin on Syria diverge because of Al-Asad, but there is a chance they will be able to negotiate themselves a compromise," the expert presumes.

It seems that the Russian president's UN address failed to produce the desired impression on Europeans. "Putin is mistaken if he believes this speech will enable him to recover his place among the world's leaders, much less get the sanctions lifted. We do not lift sanctions because of what is said, we lift sanctions in the wake of particular actions," Vedomosti has been assured by a contact in the Austrian delegation.

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 #13
www.rt.com
October 1, 2015
Putin: Claims Russian jets killed civilians in Syria emerged before airstrikes started

Reports of alleged casualties among civilians caused by Russian airstrikes in Syria emerged even before Russian warplanes were launched for their first combat mission, President Vladimir Putin said, branding such reports 'information attacks.'

"Other nations have been bombing Syrian territory for over a year," Putin told the Russian human rights council on Thursday, stressing that the US-led coalition invades the Syrian airspace with no UN mandate or invitation from Damascus.

"We have such an invitation and we intend to fight against terrorist organizations and them only," Putin added.

The Russian leader also commented on the alleged civilian casualties caused by Russian warplanes in Syria.

"As for media reports claiming that the civilian population is suffering, we are prepared for such information attacks. The first reports about civilian casualties emerged even before our planes got in the air," he said.

Dozens of videos allegedly showing the aftermath of Russian bombings of residential areas in Syria surfaced online on Wednesday, after Moscow announced a bombing campaign designed to help Syrian government forces fight the Islamic State terrorist group.

Russia believes them to be information warfare, and has called on the media and foreign officials to carefully verify information coming from Syria before judging it truthful.

Putin added that the US and Russia must establish a mechanism for sharing information about military action in Syria, which would allow the two nations to root out false reports.

"That's why we are establishing contact between our special services and those of the US, between our military departments," he said. "I hope it will result in the establishing of some permanent mechanism."

On Thursday, the Russian Defense Ministry reported hitting 12 targets belonging to the IS terrorist group since starting military action in Syria. The effort is designed to provide air support to the Syria army, which is struggling to contain the spread of jihadist militants in the war-torn country.

Syrian military provides intelligence on prospective targets for Russian forces in Syria, which is double-checked before clearance is given to deliver a strike, the Russian Defense Ministry reported.

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 #14
http://gordonhahn.com
September 30, 2015
Russian Military Intervention in Syria
By Gordon M. Hahn

Western governments and mass media are putting out reports that Russia's first air sorties in Homs and Hama in Syria "are not targeting ISIS" and that this demonstrates that Putin has no intention of fighting jihadists but has intervened in Syria to prop up the Basar Assad regime. They deliberately are not telling you several things.

First, ISIS (IS, the Islamic State) is not the only jihadist group among the various Syrian rebels. The most prominent and radical non-IS jihadist group is Jabhat al-Nusra (JN). Another important group is the Islamic Front (IF). Neither the JN nor IF is a 'moderate' force (www.voanews.com/content/al-qaida-pursues-longer-term-strategy-than-rival-islamic-state-jihadists-study-says/2984053.html and www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/JN%20Final.pdf).

The other so-called 'moderate' rebel force, the Free Syrian Army (FSA), is dominated in its political wing by the Muslim Brotherhood and often fights side-by-side with JN and IF. A frequent tactic is for JN forces to run reconnaissance, initial contact raids, and suicide bombings to prepare the ground for a joint rebel assault. We know that weapons sent to the FSA by the West and its Arab allies have ended up in the hands of JN and IS. Moreover, both JN and less so the FSA occasionally fight together with IS against Assad government forces. So it is somewhat artifical to separate the groups when it comes to operations against the Syrian army. The bottom line for Putin and Assad is that the FSA is allied against Assad and often sides with (but also at times fights against) the jihadists of JN and the Islamic Front, if not IS.

Second, JN has carried out operations in Homs and Hama seeking to break the Assad regime's hold on those two key cities for rebel troops in the area, specifically FSA forces. Thus, in February 2014 JN seized the town of Morek on the strategic M5 highway extending the jihadi rebels hold on Idlib province south to Hama province and towards Hama city, thereby preventing Syrian army efforts to move north and challenge JN and IS strongholds in Aleppo and Idlib. In August 2014 JN forces massed for an assault farther south near the town of Merhada just west of Hama, but JN was quickly repelled before ti could mount an attack. In April 1914 JN mounted an unsuccessful assault to break the Syrian army's siege of Homs.

Third, the areas of Homs and Hama are two strategic strongholds vitally necessary to hold in order to protect Russia's Tartus naval base and its new base near Latakiya from rebel attack. Each sits on the M5 highway connecting the city with the Mediterranean coast to the west where Tartus and Latakiya are located. M5 is Syria's central artery and is crucial for any force to control. JN has been involved in battles along M5 in the north at Aleppo the Syria's southern city of Dara at the Jordanian border.

So these initial sorties' geographical foci make sense for Russia if it hopes to secure its bases of operations in Syria. Militarily, any initial targeting of the FSA, if it did occur, does not preclude Russian attacks on JN, IF and IS in the near future. For its part, Russia's Defense Ministry has claimed it has destroyed an IS staff headquarters, another command point, and various supply depots, and it has posted three videos ostensibly showing these attacks (http://pda.mil.ru/pda/news_main.htm?id=12059172@egNews).

Again, this does not mean that Putin is not primarily interested in saving Assad, but it does mean that he has multiple motives. It is unlikely Putin would have intervened solely to save Assad and strengthen Russia's hand in the Middle East. As detailed numerous times on this site, both Al Qaida and JN, on the one hand, and IS, on the other, have allies in Russia's Caucasus. The Caucasus Emirate (CE or IK) mujahedin are allied with the former; the Caucasus Vilaiyat of the Islamic State (CVIS of VKIG) with the latter. Putin is equally focused on this battle in both its parts as he is on strengthening Assad and exposing American fecklessness in the region.

So when you hear Russia is not targeting IS, you are being snookered.

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 #15
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
October 1, 2015
4 reasons why Putin and Obama can't agree on Syria
The meeting between Vladimir Putin and Barack Obama during the 70th session of the UN General Assembly has left the main disputed issues raised by the sides unresolved. RBTH presents a list of the principal points that impede the two sides from cooperating in the fight against ISIS.
Nikolay Surkov, RBTH

1. The fate of Assad

This is the main point of contention. There is the impression that for the U.S. removing Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad from power is more important than combating ISIS. Too much political capital and too many propaganda resources have already been spent, first on the fight against Hafez al-Assad and then his son Bashar al-Assad. For America, taking back its demands would mean admitting a mistake and demonstrating weakness.

This is why the U.S. is gambling on the secular opposition and is refusing to cooperate with Bashar al-Assad, whom Obama has officially branded as "a tyrant." The Americans insist that the Syrian president should step down and then the opposition groups will unite with the remains of the army and continue the fight against the Islamist extremists.

During his address to the UN Obama declared, "We must recognize that there cannot be, after so much bloodshed, so much carnage, a return to the pre-war status quo."

Russia, on the other hand, insists that only Assad can be the legitimate leader of Syria, that currently there is no one who can replace him and that it is his army that is truly fighting ISIS.

"We should finally acknowledge that no one but President Assad's armed forces and the Kurdish militia are truly fighting 'Islamic State' and other terrorist organizations in Syria," Putin said.

However, Moscow does not idealize Assad and acknowledges that Syria needs political reforms, although without intervention from abroad. The Kremlin advocates a pragmatic approach: first defeating ISIS, then having the Syrian government negotiate with the opposition.

"We are ready to talk with Assad so that he cooperates with representatives of the moderate opposition and carries out political reforms," explained Putin at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in June.
 
2. The UN's role in resolving the crisis

Moscow has made it clear that it is ready to join the U.S.-led anti-jihadist coalition but demands that it first receive a UN mandate.

"First of all we propose discussing the possibility of passing a resolution on the coordination of all forces that oppose ISIS and other terrorist groups. I repeat, such a coordination must be based on the principles of the UN Charter," said Putin from the UN General Assembly podium in New York on Sept. 28.

This is needed in order to clearly formulate the "rules of the game" and avoid repeating the Libyan scenario, when under the pretext of protecting the civilian population the West bombed Libyan territory and basically ensured Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi´s removal. The Kremlin needs a UN Security Council resolution where the goals of the international coalition and the means of fighting ISIS will be defined.

"Indeed we want to create a certain international coalition to fight terrorism and extremism and it is with this aim that we are consulting our American partners," said Putin in New York.
 
3. The role of regional players

Moscow is making efforts to attract Iran to the fight against ISIS and to the resolution of the Syrian crisis. However, the Persian Gulf monarchies allied with the U.S. oppose this, primarily Saudi Arabia and Qatar, for whom Iran is a competitor for dominance over the region. Actually, the recent developments in the Syrian crisis are in many ways a consequence of the Iranian-Saudi confrontation: Tehran assists Assad, while the jihadists receive financial aid from the Gulf countries.

"I'm getting the impression that someone wants to use ISIS's separate units or ISIS as a whole to 'remove' Assad and only afterwards think of how to deal with ISIS," said Putin in an interview with journalist Charlie Rose for the American TV channels CBS and PBS.

The agreement signed in July on the Iranian nuclear program should transform Iran from an international rogue state, in the eyes of western nations, to a completely acceptable negotiating partner.

Obama said that, "The United States is prepared to work with any nation, including Russia and Iran, to resolve the conflict."

The problem consists in the question of whether the Arabian monarchies will want to search for a compromise with Tehran. For now there are two de-facto competing anti-jihadist coalitions active in the region: The first is under the aegis of the U.S. and Saudi Arabia and the second includes Russia, Iraq, Iran and the Assad government.
 
4. Domestic politics

The presidential race has begun in the U.S. One of the things that the Democrats have been accused of is an indecisive foreign policy. It is important for Barack Obama to be firm and resolute, especially in relation to Russia, which the American mass media is depicting as the new "empire of evil."

For Putin a possible victory in the fight against ISIS means demonstrating to the Russian people that their leader is decisive and can return the status of a great power to the country.

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 #16
The Guardian (UK)
September 29, 2015
Why the west should listen to Putin on Syria
As everyone knows, the only way to stop the slaughter in Syria is for the US and its allies to work with President Assad - and to stop worrying about what looks good
By Simon Jenkins
Simon Jenkins is a journalist and author. He writes for the Guardian as well as broadcasting for the BBC. He has edited the Times and the London Evening Standard and chaired the National Trust. His latest book is England's Hundred Best Views.

Putin is right. Everyone knows Putin is right, that the only way forward in Syria, if not to eternal slaughter, is via the established government of Bashar al-Assad and his Lebanese and Iranian allies.

That is the realpolitik. That is what pragmatism dictates. In the secure west, foreign policy has long been a branch of domestic politics, with added sermonising. "What to do", in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, even Ukraine, has been dictated not by what might work but what looks good. The megaphone is mightier than the brain.
Putin says he can work with Obama despite trading barbs on Syria and Isis

The result of American and British grandstanding at the UN this week - seeing who can be ruder about Assad - is that Vladimir Putin has gathered ever more cards to his pack. Putin has already performed the two primary duties of a Russian leader, bringing stability and pride. He now faces turbulent Russian minorities across his European frontier and a serious menace from Muslim states to his south. He is perforce becoming a player on a wider stage. He has read Iran, India and Syria correctly. He is no fool.

On a visit to London last June, the veteran diplomat Henry Kissinger pleaded with his audience to see Russia as an ally, not an enemy, against Muslim fundamentalism. Russia and the west shared a civilisation and long-term interests, he said. They had to work as one. It is easy for western democracies, centuries in the making, to sneer at Russia's imperfections and at Putin's cynical antics in Ukraine. But the idea that economic sanctions were going to change Moscow's mind or weaken its kleptocracy was idiotic.

Syria is experiencing the most ghastly anarchy anywhere on earth. If ever there were a case for humanitarian "troops on the ground" it must be here. Those who seek this end cannot pick and choose their merchants of atrocity. All sides in war kill innocent people, including western addicts of air bombing (such as Hilary Benn at the Labour party conference yesterday). Russia has accepted that the forcible toppling of Assad - which Britain has predicted since 2011 - is not a realistic path to peace. If he is to go, it will be after his enemies have been driven back, not before.

The true nature of the west's commitment in Syria was revealed in Barack Obama's remark to the UN that "because alternatives are surely worse" is no reason to support tyrants. In other words, American feelgood is more important than Syrian lives. That cosy maxim has guided western policy in the region for over a decade. It has been a disaster. If we have nothing more intelligent to say on Syria, we should listen to Putin. He has.

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 #17
The Unz Review
www.unz.com
September 30, 2015
Finally some clarity about the Russian plans about Syria
By The Saker

A lot has happened in the last few hours. Putin spoke at the UN, the Russian Parliament has approved the use of Russian military forces in Syria and Sergei Ivanov has given the Russian media a detailed explanation for the reasons which made the Kremlin request such an authorization. The picture has finally become much clearer.

What will not happen:

There will be no " Most Anticipated Showdown in Recent History ": no Russian ground operation, no Russian imposition of a no-fly zone (especially not against the US or its allies!), no MiG-31s, no Russian Airborne Forces, no Russian tanks on the frontlines, no Russian SSBN (nuclear weapons carrying) submarines and probably no significant Russians military presence around Damascus. In fact, there will be no Russian unilateral military operation of any kind. All that nonsense can now finally be put to rest.

What will happen:

The Russian military operation will be legal on all levels: the Russians have received a formal request for military assistance from the Syrian government, the Russian Parliament has given its authorization, and Russia will seek a UN Security Council authorization. The Russian military operation will be officially limited to air operations including bombings and close air support. The main hub of the Russian operation will be in Latakia. Crucially, Russia will act as a part of a broad coalition.

It would be a mistake to focus primarily on what will happen next. I would argue that what has already happened is far more significant.

What has already happened:

Putin has basically forced the USA to accept the Russian plan. Kerry has told CNN that the US policy for Syria will be "adjusted" - in other words the US is giving up on the notion of ousting Assad, officially temporarily. NATO has declared that it would welcome a positive role for Russia in Syria. The Pentagon has followed the Israeli example and has decided to open a special communications channel to coordinate Russian and US operations. Considering the above, I suppose that the US will give its Bulgarian colony the order to stop closing its airspace to Russian aircraft.

Finally, I will make some guesses as to what might happen next.

What might also happen:

First, I would not be surprised if the Russians did declare that it was their standard operating procedure to protect their military installations with air defense systems. And then would finally bring in their S-300s (I am aware of rumors that the S-300s are already there, but I have seen no confirmation so far). I would expect the Israelis to feel particularly miserable about that, and I would not be surprised if the Russians offered guarantees that these systems would remain exclusively under Russian control. What is already certain is that Netanyahu did fly to Moscow to address issues of Russian-Israeli is not "cooperation" then at least "non-interference". I would add here that Moscow has no hostile plans towards Israel whatsoever and that, by all accounts, the Russians and Israeli officials get along famously, if only because both sides are smart and pragmatists (they don't need a love fest, they need responsible behavior).

Second, the official Russian military presence in Syria will give the Russians the perfect cover for all sorts of covert efforts including the delivery of equipment, joint intelligence operations and even direct action missions. I don't think that this will be a major part of the Russian effort, but now the option is definitely here.

Third, and this is admittedly 100% my own speculations, I believe that the entire Russian military effort will be a cover for something else: a larger Iranian and Hezbollah involvement. Why? For one thing, there is only that much any air operation can achieve. There is no reason to assume that a very small Russian Air Force contingent will significantly change the course of the war. The total failure of the NATO airforces over Kosovo has proven that air operations are, by themselves, of very limited capability, and, unlike the NATO in Kosovo, Russia will send a rather small contingent of aircraft. However, the presence of the Russian Air Force in the Syrian skies could conveniently "explain away" any sudden military reversals for Daesh, especially if the real reason for such reversals would be a beefed up Iranian intervention. Again, I have absolutely no information confirming any of that, but I personally expect a sharp rise in the Iranian and Hezbollah efforts to bush back Daesh.

Evaluation:

In purely military terms this is a rather minor development. Yes, the Syrian Air Force badly needs some modernization (the fact that they are using helicopter-dropped 500kg barrel bombs is a proof that they don't have enough aircraft to deliver guided or even unguided 500kg aerial bombs) and the Russians will be bringing some very capable aircraft (SU-24s and SU-25s for sure, and in some specific cases they could even use Tu-22M3s and SU-34s). But this will not be a game changer. Politically, however, this marks yet another triumph for Vladimir Putin who has forced the US Empire to renounce its plans to overthrow Assad. Because, and make no mistake here, the Russians are now there to stay: a limited Russian military presence will now turn into a major Russian political commitment. Furthermore, not only will Tartus continue to serve a fairly limited but not irrelevant role for the Russian Navy, the airbase in Latakia will become a hub of Russian military operations and, in effect, a forward operating base for the Black Sea Fleet.

Conclusion: a game changer after all?

Yes. But not because of some Russian military move. Consider this: for the United States the main purpose of Daesh was to overthrow Assad. Now that the US is declaring that they "don't plan to arm the Syrian rebels at the moment" and that Assad will not be overthrown, the utility of Daesh to the AngloZionist Empire has just taken a major hit. If the Empire decides that Daesh has outlived its utility and that it has now turned into a liability, then the days of Daesh are counted.

Of course, I am under no illusions about any real change of heart in the imperial "deep state". What we see now is just a tactical adaptation to a situation which the US could not control, not a deep strategic shift. The rabid russophobes in the West are still out there (albeit some have left in disgust ) and they will now have the chance to blame Russia for anything and everything in Syria, especially if something goes really wrong. Yes, Putin has just won another major victory against the Empire (where are those who claimed that Russia had "sold out" Syria?!), but now Russia will have to manage this potentially "dangerous victory".

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 #18
The National Interest
October 1, 2015
Moscow's War in the Air: Russia Sends a Message in Syria
For better or worse there is no questioning that right now, the Kremlin has taken control of the narrative when it comes to Syria.
By Nikolas K. Gvosdev
Nikolas Gvosdev is a contributing editor at The National Interest and co-author of Russian Foreign Policy: Vectors, Sectors and Interests (CQ Press, 2013). The views expressed here are his own.

The start of Russian airstrikes in Syria-two days after Vladimir Putin listened to Barack Obama's UN General Assembly speech, which warned against Russian action in defense of the Bashar al-Assad regime (and then had such warnings reinforced in their one-on-one meeting)-is the Kremlin's answer to the questions that have been posed about Moscow's true intentions and interests.

First, the choice of targets in the first wave-with reports that the strikes hit non-ISIS Syrian opposition groups, including some affiliated with the Free Syrian Army and those who have been deemed credible to receive Western aid-is a message to the region as a whole that while Russia is prepared to use deadly force to defend its interests and to defend its clients, those who have accepted Western patronage will not enjoy such support. The fact that some Russian outlets have also begun to take the line that there is no such thing as a "moderate opposition"-only groups that have varying degrees of support for and affinity to the Islamic State of Syria and Iraq (ISIS)-suggests the promulgation of a narrative that the conflict in Syria is now binary and one is either with Assad or "with the terrorists" and groups that continue to fight against Assad are de facto allied to ISIS. (On a separate note, it will be quite interesting to watch how the Russians deal with the Syrian Kurds, who have fought ISIS, but have often reached an apparent modus vivendi with the Assad regime to be left alone to enjoy a de facto autonomy).

Second, the speed at which the strikes have started is meant to convey to other countries in the region as well as to the Europeans that Russia can move quickly and with determination, in contrast to the Hamlet-like indecision exhibited by the United States. Having identified its interests, Moscow is willing to act and to take risks. Just as Russia intervened in Ukraine last summer to prevent the eastern rebels from being overwhelmed-and created "new facts" on the ground leading to the Minsk-II agreements-the gamble here may be that Russian action could stabilize the Assad regime and force other players in the region, starting with Saudi Arabia and Turkey, to negotiate with Moscow over Syria's future.

The image of Russian decisiveness stands in contrast to the takeaway from the anti-extremism summit convened by Obama in New York on Tuesday-where, as Margaret Warner noted, leaders of the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition "couldn't say they have achieved much...almost none could point to a real accomplishment. Then they didn't have any frank discussion about the fault with their own strategy and what they should do."

Finally, the timing of the strikes-within hours of Putin's return from New York-is meant as a slap in the face to President Obama and to the United States as a whole. U.S. presidential candidates may outdo each other in calling Putin a thug, a gangster, a criminal or a dictator; they may give long eloquent speeches about how Russia is on the wrong side of history-but Putin believes he can create facts on the ground that challenge the U.S. narrative. The implications of the Iraqis joining with Iran, Syria and Russia to form an intelligence coordination unit and Iraq's decision to allow Russian overflights of its territory-after all the funds spent to train and equip Iraqis-suggests that Putin believes that things are breaking his way.

Of course, it is early days yet. Russia may be risking being sucked into a Middle Eastern quagmire by its actions in Syria, and further straining a weakened economy. But there is no question that right now, the Kremlin has taken control of the narrative.

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 #19
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
September 30, 2015
Why Russia faces an uphill battle in forming an anti-ISIS coalition
With Russia having started its first airstrikes against ISIS in Syria, creating a global anti-ISIS coalition of the type envisioned by Russia is out of the question, for the simple reason that each country perceives the threat differently.
By Alexey Fenenko
Alexey Fenenko is an associate professor at the Faculty of World Politics of the Moscow State University. Previously, he was a leading researcher at the Institute of International Security Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (2004-2013), a project coordinator at the Academic Educational Forum on International Relations and a co-editor for ˝International Trends˝ magazine (2004-2011). He has a Doctorate in History (2003).

Russia has conducted its first airstrikes against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Greater Syria (ISIS), which once again confirms the Kremlin's intention to play a greater role in creating a new coalition against Islamic radicals.

Speaking at the UN General Assembly on Sept. 28, Russian President Vladimir Putin focused the world's attention on combating terrorism in the Middle East, above all the threat posed by ISIS.

To counter the "caliphate," Russia proposed the establishment of a broad international anti-terror coalition, similar to the "anti-Hitler coalition." Its key members should be Muslim countries, primarily Syria, Iraq and Libya, which urgently need assistance to restore their statehood.

Putin called the refusal to cooperate with the Syrian army a "profound mistake," and reasserted that the only forces genuinely opposing ISIS in Syria are the Assad government and the Kurdish militia.

However, the UN session clearly demonstrated the lack of consensus among the "great powers" over the threat posed by ISIS.

ISIS not yet perceived to be a global threat

ISIS - with a helping hand from U.S. President Barack Obama - has entered the world's media narrative as a "global threat to humanity." A year ago, on Sept. 15, 2014, Paris hosted an international conference on combating the militant group, but the talks failed to produce an anti-ISIS coalition.

A year on, the UN General Assembly has just witnessed a second attempt to establish such an alliance. The great powers are discussing Russia's involvement in anti-ISIS operations and potential cooperation with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

It poses an interesting question: "If ISIS is so dangerous, why has it not been eliminated yet?" The barbarity of ISIS (ranging from public executions of hostages to the genocide of the Yazidis and the destruction of museum cities such as Palmyra) beggars belief.

The problem is that each country perceives the threat in its own unique way.

Viewed from Damascus, Baghdad or Ankara, ISIS is certainly dangerous. However, from the safer distance of Moscow, London or Washington, the question is not so straightforward. ISIS is not considered a global threat - not even in Tehran, Riyadh or Tel Aviv. Putting together an anti-ISIS coalition with a common set of goals will be no easy task.

What is the ISIS threat?

ISIS is essentially a radical Islamist group that arose from the flames of the civil war in Syria. According to official data, what is today known as Islamic State was created in the fall of 2006 by radical Iraqi Sunnis, headed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. In the Syrian conflict it has positioned itself as one of the main anti-Assad forces.

The congress of the Syrian opposition in Doha (November 2012), at which the Arab League (with British support) took the decision to sponsor any opposition to Assad, was seemingly instrumental in the rise of the militant group.

The documents made no mention of financing ISIS per se, but the statement about funding any opposition to Assad prompted speculation. On Jan. 9, 2013, the group starting calling itself "Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria" or "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant," which indicated its increasingly secure foothold in the region.

A split in the Syrian opposition occurred in the fall of 2013. Under the influence of the Geneva agreements on Syria's chemical disarmament, the European Union and the United States once again recognized Assad as a participant in the political process.

The radical and implacable ISIS tried to create a base in Iraq, including the "Sunni Triangle" - the bulwark of the country's anti-U.S. resistance in 2004. After winning its first military victory, on June 29, 2014, ISIS proclaimed the creation of an "Islamic caliphate" with a view to uniting all Sunni Muslims.

Its subsequent campaigns, however, revealed the group's limitations. ISIS failed to take Baghdad Airport and build on its success in the southeast. Iraqi Kurds stopped its advance to the north. Nor did ISIS make any headway in Libya - the unsuccessful siege of Sirte in February 2015 demonstrated its limited capabilities.

Its successes have largely been confined to Syria, where the group has eliminated most of the moderate Islamist organizations. The civil war in Syria has essentially become a fight to the death between the Assad regime and the ISIS-led radical Islamists.

Yet the latter's military potential remains low. U.S. and British military experts say that ISIS armed groups number around 40-75,000 people. That represents only about 3-5 divisions of the armed forces of any of the world's leading military powers.

ISIS has no military industry of its own and no mobilization base to speak of. Its corps of trained fighters hardly compares to the regular armies of the leading powers. By WWII standards, the elimination of a group such as ISIS would have been the task of a single army division.

That said, ISIS enjoys three major advantages that make up for its relative military weakness. The first is the reluctance of the great powers to suffer large human causalities.
Second, ISIS has no such qualms about sacrificing personnel for its cause.

Third, ISIS has a common empathy with a sizeable number of radical Islamists in the Middle East.

It is this latter, internal factor that makes ISIS such a threat to neighboring states in the region.

Who is really threatened by ISIS?

The past year has thrown up another problem: none of the great powers has the stomach to field a proper armed unit against ISIS. The U.S. effort, for instance, is limited to localized air strikes and assistance to Iraqi forces in the defense of Baghdad Airport. And after some vacillation last October, Britain decided not to send in ground troops or Special Forces.

Lacking military might of their own, the Gulf monarchies and Jordan rely solely on U.S. assistance.

The Israeli government, too, remained on the sidelines - either for fear of stoking a new Arab-Israeli war or of completely destabilizing Syria.

Iran found itself in a trickier position. Last fall it seemed like the White House had hopes that Tehran would stand up for Iraq's Shias. U.S. media regularly served up scenarios of an Iran-ISIS conflict on Iraqi soil.

However, the Iranian government not only declined to send in boots on the ground, but also did not even provide significant military support to the Iraqi Shia. Tehran was loath to get involved in a major war with the Iraqi Sunnis (and potentially with the Sunni monarchies of the Persian Gulf), or simply did not rate ISIS as a clear and present danger. Either way, in November 2014 the question of Iranian intervention against ISIS was closed.

Turkey is in a tight spot. ISIS is no less a problem for Ankara than it is for Syria, Iraq or Lebanon. In terms of numbers, equipment and combat training, the Turkish army surpasses the militants by an order of magnitude.

But since 2007 Turkey has seen the Islamist movement grow stronger inside its own borders, raising questions about its existing secular state model. Ankara has every reason to fear that, in a conflict with ISIS, elements of Turkish society could side with the latter.

For Turkey, the Kurdish problem is equally critical. A war with ISIS would turn the country into an ally of Iraqi Kurdistan, which since 2007 the Turkish authorities have viewed as the greatest threat to the stability of southeastern Turkey.

Ideally, the government of Turkish President Recep Erdogan would like to "mop up" ISIS and Iraqi Kurdistan together. But on July 28, 2015, at the NATO summit in Antalya, the United States and the European Union both rejected the proposed Turkish operation against the Kurds, whereupon Ankara had to wind up its 3-day-old military operation against Syria and Turkey.

The Russian factor

Russia's possible intervention in the conflict is unlikely to radically shift the balance of power. Western media are full of unsubstantiated information about the presence of 1,700 Russian troops in Syria - roughly the size of about one regiment.

Moscow could certainly supply a certain amount of military gear to the Syrian (and perhaps eventually the Iraqi) army. But a large-scale buildup is unlikely owing to the lack of a common border between the two countries, as well as the highly exposed supply lines via the Bosporus and Dardanelles (Turkey) or Gibraltar (Britain).

Russia's military mission could perform two tasks. The first is to shore up the naval base at Tartus in the event of ISIS claiming victory in the Syrian conflict. The second is to help the Syrian government ensure that the first task remains a precaution.

Assad's army is perhaps the only force able to withstand ISIS in the region should the major powers be unable to commit to a ground war. That is the point that Russian diplomats tried to hammer home on the eve of the UN General Assembly.

Coalition prospects

A global anti-ISIS coalition looks unlikely in the present circumstances. For the United States and its closest partners in the Middle East, the 2012 agenda is still top of mind: How to remove Assad? Meanwhile, the fall of 2015 saw a new conundrum: Assad or ISIS?

The Obama administration seems split over which is the lesser evil. In the meantime, the task of dealing with ISIS rests with the regional powers: the Syrian government under Assad, Turkey, Israel, the Kurds and the government in Baghdad.

But the gaping divisions between them rule out a collective alliance against ISIS. And that is despite the fact that Assad's departure would almost certainly guarantee the fall of Damascus to the Islamists.

As if that were not enough, a new threat is emerging. The United States and Britain (recently joined by France) have spent the last year striking Syria from the air without permission from the Assad government. The appearance of Russian military hardware in Syria increases the risk of an unintended clash between the protagonists.

The Obama administration has repeatedly stated that it would oppose Russian aid to Assad. In the current context, that means indirectly helping ISIS. Are Washington, London and Paris really willing to defend the Islamists against President Assad and his Russian military instructors?

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 #20
Russia Insider
www.russia-insider.com
October 1, 2015
The Politics Behind Russia's Air Campaign
Russia creates a coalition to fight militant jihadism and the Islamic State. The US however remains obsessed with overthrowing Assad, and will do everything it can to be obstructive
By Alexander Mercouris

The start of Russian air attacks on rebel positions in Syria clarifies some of the uncertainties of the previous weeks.

It is now clear that the earlier reports that the Russians were already in action were - as we said - untrue, and was disinformation that was being spread deliberately.

We speculated that the purpose of this disinformation was to discredit a Russian diplomatic initiative to revive Kofi Annan's 2012 Geneva Peace Plan, which called for the setting up of a transitional government and negotiations between President Assad and his opponents.

That does seem partly true.  Such a diplomatic initiative is indeed underway.  Putin referred to it again at a government meeting on 30th September 2015, shortly after confirmation of the air strikes.  His words were as follows:

"Our view is that a final and long-term solution to the situation in Syria is possible only on the basis of political reform and dialogue between all healthy forces in the country. I know that President al-Assad knows this and is ready for this process. We are counting on his active and flexible position and his readiness to make compromises for the sake of his country and people."

It seems however that the main purpose of the disinformation campaign was to turn public opinion against Russia's plan - coordinated with President Assad's government and with the governments of Iraq and Iran - to launch air strikes in support of the Syrian army.  The US of course knew that this was Russia's plan, because the Russians told them.

This proved a major miscalculation.  It turned out that instead of rallying to oppose Russian action against the Islamic State and the other jihadi militant groups in Syria before it took place, Western public opinion supported it (see for example here and here).

It is the Western public support for Russia's actions that has left Western governments baffled and uncertain what to do.

Western governments are nonetheless furious about what has happened.  Anyone who doubts this need only look at the sour comments they are making, and the angry - though baffled - response of the Western media.

This anger is to a great extent because - as has become obvious over recent weeks - for Western governments it is the overthrow of President Assad rather than the defeat of the Islamic State that is the priority.

To the extent that Russia's actions secure President Assad's position, Western governments are therefore openly hostile.

Beyond this however is the deep sense of humiliation felt in Washington (and in Paris and London) that it is Russia which in Syria has captured the initiative.

As I discussed in an article for Sputnik, for the "exceptional country" (ie. the US) the idea that Russia might wrest leadership from the US on a key international issue is simply intolerable.

The result is that we do not have a single international coalition fighting militant jihadism and the Islamic State in Syria.

What we have are two entirely different coalitions working at cross-purposes and in rivalry with each other.

One is a US led coalition, which is acting illegally, and whose ultimate objective is the overthrow of President Assad.

The other is a Russian led coalition, which is acting legally (since it is doing so at the request of the Syrian government), and which is seeking the defeat of the Islamic State and of militant jihadism in Syria.

The Russian led coalition includes Iran, Iraq and Hezbollah.  The Saker is surely right that the Russian air strikes are being closely coordinated with these powers, and that Iran and Hezbollah are involved on the ground.

The Russians have made it clear that their role is purely to provide technical assistance and air support in support of the ground offensive being carried out by the Syrian army with the support of Syria's regional allies.

Putin said this quite clearly at the government meeting on 30th September 2015:

".......(W)e naturally have no intention of getting deeply entangled in this conflict. We will act strictly in accordance with our set mission. First, we will support the Syrian army only in its lawful fight against terrorist groups. Second, our support will be limited to airstrikes and will not involve ground operations. Third, our support will have a limited timeframe and will continue only while the Syrian army conducts its anti-terrorist offensive."

Criticism from the US and its allies that the initial Russian air strikes did not target places actually controlled by the Islamic State seem on the basis of previous reports to be not merely untrue, but ignore what Putin said the Russian military's mission is: to provide air support to the Syrian army (for a well-informed discussion of the Russian strategy see this report on the Moon of Alabama blog).

Naturally the Russian aircraft (SU24 fighter bombers judging from the film released of the air strikes) therefore attacked positions close to the front line, which are in the path of the pending offensive by the Syrian army.

Much has been written about the prospects of the Russian air campaign, with many making the point that US air strikes on the Islamic State have proved almost completely ineffective, and that the number of aircraft the Russians have sent to Syria is insufficient to make a decisive difference.

The key difference however with the US bombing campaign is that the Russian air strikes are being coordinated with the Syrian military.  Unlike the US strikes, they are happening in support of the primary force that has so far successfully held the line in Syria against militant jihadis and the Islamic State: the Syrian army.  

That at least creates a possibility that they might achieve more success than the US strikes have so far done.

Against that is the fact that the US will do whatever it can to make this operation fail.  

Though it is currently boxed in by the Western public's reaction (consider this extraordinary comment overheard being said by a Pentagon official), the US is fundamentally unreconciled to what Russia is doing.  It will be looking for ways to discredit and obstruct it even as this piece is being written. 

 [return to Contents] 

 #21
PBS Newshour
www.pbs.org
September 30, 2015
Are Russia's military priorities in Syria cause for concern?

How do Russian military actions affect the conflict in Syria and American operations against the Islamic State? Judy Woodruff speaks with Steven Simon of Dartmouth College and Andrew Weiss of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

JUDY WOODRUFF: Late this evening, Secretary Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov came out together and agreed to military talks.

We get a closer Russian - look at Russia's military moves in Syria with Andrew Weiss. He was the director of Russian, Ukrainian, and Eurasian affairs at the White House National Security Council during the Clinton and George H.W. Bush administrations. He's now with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. And Steven Simon, he's a visiting lecturer at Dartmouth College. He served on the National Security Council staff during the Obama and Clinton administrations.

And we welcome you both back to the program.

Let me start with you, Steven Simon.

Is this an occasion for the U.S. to be pleased that it has a partner in going after ISIS or alarmed that the Russians are in Syria helping their friend President Assad?

STEVEN SIMON, Dartmouth College: I think, on balance, there's cause for some satisfaction and the presence now in Syria of a powerful military player with a serious strategic stake in defeating ISIS.

It's really the only, I would say, tacit partner. It's certainly not an explicit or de jure partner of the United States in this battle against ISIS. So, at least the United States has a partner, even if it's not official. On the other hand, it does mean that there is a serious friend of the Assad regime also present in Syria, and this is undoubtedly a cause for concern for the administration.

JUDY WOODRUFF: Well, let me turn to you, Andrew Weiss.

More cause for concern or a cause for some satisfaction?

ANDREW WEISS, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: I think the cause for concern here is that Russia is plunging headlong into a military adventure in a part of the world where it's been absent for the better part of the last two decades.

So, I defer to my friend Steve Simon about the impact on the ground. It certainly looks like this is a big shot in the arm for Bashar al-Assad. The question is, have the Russians thought two or three moves ahead? This to me looks suspiciously like what happened in Ukraine, where what seemed like a good idea, a very pressurized decision by the Russians to unleash aggression against Ukraine, has backfired quite badly.

And so when I hear Secretary of Defense Carter today saying that he thinks this is ultimately going to basically be something that is doomed to fail or that is going to hurt Russia, I have very little reason to doubt that.

JUDY WOODRUFF: What do you mean? Come back to you, Andrew Weiss. What do you mean it looks like what happened in Ukraine?

ANDREW WEISS: Well, people like to talk Vladimir Putin as if he is this great master strategist.

In fact, what he is someone who is fairly impulsive. And so the intervention in Ukraine was done very spur of the moment. And now what we're seeing - and we have had about three weeks or so of a steady drip of Russian military buildup in and around the Western Mediterranean coast of Syria, and now he's plunging into a military adventure.

There's no domestic Russian political support for foreign military activity of this type. And I think there's a real question, which is, he is basically now putting a target on the back of every Russian soldier and many Russian civilians, including inside Russia itself.

So, he's creating a recruitment boon, I think, for the global local jihadist movement, and he's putting Russia at the center of that, as opposed to the United States or other Western partners.

JUDY WOODRUFF: Steven Simon, why was it so difficult today to figure out who the Russians were targeting?

STEVEN SIMON: Because the situation on the ground is, in fact, confused, and there is no geolocation of the attacks that are publicly available yet.

The information available to me is that they struck targets affiliated with al-Nusra, which is another Islamist group. But, as a practical matter, the first priority for the Russians right now is protection of the regime and the survival of the regime and its viability. So, they're going to attack the targets that they and the regime have decided are most threatening to the regime right now, and then move on to targets that are less immediately threatening.

So, whoever was knocking at the gate right now was going to get the first Russian blow. The other thing, of course, is that the Syrians will be encouraging the Russians to be attacking ISIS targets the United States has thus far refrained from attacking because they're politically sensitive. If there's a target that looks as though its destruction would be mostly of benefit to the regime, rather than to the Syrian people at large, then the United States will save its ammunition, keep its powder dry, and strike other targets that are less ambiguous, if I can put it that way.

So, that would be - that will be the Soviet - the Russian priorities.

JUDY WOODRUFF: Well, Andrew Weiss, for any American or anybody listening to this, it sounds like a very confusing situation to keep track of who is up and who is down and who is being targeted.

I mean, how should we - how should Americans view this? Do we wait and withhold judgment until we see what the Russians do over the next few days?

ANDREW WEISS: Well, I think President Obama's been quite reluctant to get the U.S. more involved militarily, and that's been going on for some time now. So, I think the idea that the U.S. is either going to stand up to the Russians and tell them to knock it off, all that, I think is misplaced.

The real question, I think, for us, as the U.S. and other Western partners in the fight - and the regional partners in the fight against ISIS, is whether we're going to bump into the Russians in some sort. And the Russians up to now had talked a good game, saying, oh, we want our militaries talking, this is really important.

But they have plunged ahead without getting that coordination mechanism locked in, and I think there's a real risk here that the Russians, who don't have the same level of experience, don't have the same kind of intelligence backbone to support their operations, could be doing things that are either dangerous or that put Western pilots and others at risk.

JUDY WOODRUFF: Steve Simon, why isn't that a big worry? I mean, there was a sense that we were led to believe ahead of time the Russians were going to give the West, the U.S.-led coalition, more advanced notice. It sounds like they barely had an hour's word ahead of time.

STEVEN SIMON: Yes, I think it is problematic.

And we have got to get those mil-mil talks going and there needs to be better coordination. But, as a practical matter, the Russians are going to be striking in sectors of Syrian territory and Syrian airspace that lie outside of the areas that the United States has focused on, which are mainly targets that are close to the Turkish border in the north.

So, as a practical matter, I think the risk of a collision are low.

JUDY WOODRUFF: Let me just quickly conclude asking you both, what are you looking for in the next few days to tell you whether this is a positive development or not?

Andrew Weiss?

ANDREW WEISS: I think the immediate question is how the Russian people will react.

I have no doubt that there's great sense of celebration inside Assad's inner circle, and frankly in Tehran, but I don't think the Russian people were prepared for any of this. This has all been thrown at them with maybe two or three weeks' notice. It plays to Putin's domestic agenda, which is to say Russia is a big, great power, it can thrust itself into the international stage at its own - a time of its own liking and a place of its choosing, but there's no one I think at home who is really enthusiastic about this whole activity.

JUDY WOODRUFF: All right, we are going to have to leave it there.

Andrew Weiss, Steven Simon, thank you both.

 [return to Contents] 

 #22
Consortiumnews.com
September 28, 2015
The Power of False Narrative
By Robert Parry

Exclusive: "Strategic communications" or Stratcom, a propaganda/psy-op technique that treats information as a "soft power" weapon to wield against adversaries, is a new catch phrase in an Official Washington obsessed with the clout that comes from spinning false narratives, reports Robert Parry.

In this age of pervasive media, the primary method of social control is through the creation of narratives delivered to the public through newspapers, TV, radio, computers, cell phones and any other gadget that can convey information. This reality has given rise to an obsession among the power elite to control as much of this messaging as possible.

So, regarding U.S. relations toward the world, we see the State Department, the White House, Pentagon, NATO and other agencies pushing various narratives to sell the American people and other populations on how they should view U.S. policies, rivals and allies. The current hot phrase for this practice is "strategic communications" or Stratcom, which blends psychological operations, propaganda and P.R. into one mind-bending smoothie.

I have been following this process since the early 1980s when the Reagan administration sought to override "the Vietnam Syndrome," a public aversion to foreign military interventions that followed the Vietnam War. To get Americans to "kick" this syndrome, Reagan's team developed "themes" about overseas events that would push American "hot buttons."

Tapping into the Central Intelligence Agency's experience in psy-ops targeted at foreign audiences, President Ronald Reagan and CIA Director William J. Casey assembled a skilled team inside the White House led by CIA propaganda specialist Walter Raymond Jr.

From his new perch on the National Security Council staff, Raymond oversaw inter-agency task forces to sell interventionist policies in Central America and other trouble spots. The game, as Raymond explained it in numerous memos to his underlings, was to glue black hats on adversaries and white hats on allies, whatever the truth really was.

The fact that many of the U.S.-backed forces - from the Nicaraguan Contras to the Guatemalan military - were little more than corrupt death squads couldn't be true, at least according to psy-ops doctrine. They had to be presented to the American public as wearing white hats. Thus, the Contras became the "moral equals of our Founding Fathers" and Guatemala's murderous leader Efrain Rios Montt was getting a "bum rap" on human rights, according to the words scripted for President Reagan.

The scheme also required that anyone - say, a journalist, a human rights activist or a congressional investigator - who contradicted this white-hat mandate must be discredited, marginalized or destroyed, a routine of killing any honest messenger.

But it turned out that the most effective part of this propaganda strategy was to glue black hats on adversaries. Since nearly all foreign leaders have serious flaws, it proved much easier to demonize them - and work the American people into war frenzies - than it was to persuade the public that Washington's favored foreign leaders were actually paragons of virtue.

An Unflattering Hat

Once the black hat was jammed on a foreign leader's head, you could say whatever you wanted about him and disparage any American who questioned the extreme depiction as a "fill-in-the-blank apologist" or a "stooge" or some other ugly identifier that would either silence the dissenter or place him or her outside the bounds of acceptable debate.

Given the careerist conformity of Washington, nearly everyone fell into line, including news outlets and human rights groups. If you wanted to retain your "respectability" and "influence," you agreed with the conventional wisdom. So, with every foreign controversy, we got a new "group think" about the new "enemy." The permissible boundary of each debate was set mostly by the neoconservatives and their "liberal interventionist" sidekicks.

That this conformity has not served American national interests is obvious. Take, for example, the disastrous Iraq War, which has cost the U.S. taxpayers an estimated $1 trillion, led to the deaths of some 4,500 American soldiers, killed hundreds of thousands of Iraqis, and unleashed chaos across the strategic Middle East and now into Europe.

Most Americans now agree that the Iraq War "wasn't worth it." But it turns out that Official Washington's catastrophic "group thinks" don't just die well-deserved deaths. Like a mutating virus, they alter shape as the outside conditions change and survive in a new form.

So, when the public caught on to the Iraq War deceptions, the neocon/liberal-hawk pundits just came up with a new theme to justify their catastrophic Iraq strategy, i.e., "the successful surge," the dispatch of 30,000 more U.S. troops to the war zone. This theme was as bogus as the WMD lies but the upbeat storyline was embraced as the new "group think" in 2007-2008.

The "successful surge" was a myth, in part, because many of its alleged "accomplishments" actually predated the "surge." The program to pay off Sunnis to stop shooting at Americans and the killing of "Al Qaeda in Iraq" leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi both occurred in 2006, before the surge even began. And its principal goal of resolving sectarian grievances between Sunni and Shiite was never accomplished.

But Official Washington wrapped the "surge" in the bloody flag of "honoring the troops," who were credited with eventually reducing the level of Iraqi violence by carrying out the "heroic" surge strategy as ordered by President Bush and devised by the neocons. Anyone who noted the holes in this story was dismissed as disrespecting "the troops."

The cruel irony was that the neocon pundits, who had promoted the Iraq War and then covered their failure by hailing the "surge," had little or no regard for "the troops" who mostly came from lower socio-economic classes and were largely abstractions to the well-dressed, well-schooled and well-paid talking heads who populate the think tanks and op-ed pages.

Safely ensconced behind the "successful surge" myth, the Iraq War devotees largely escaped any accountability for the chaos and bloodshed they helped cause. Thus, the same "smart people" were in place for the Obama presidency and just as ready to buy into new interventionist "group thinks" - gluing black hats on old and new adversaries, such as Libya's Muammar Gaddafi, Syria's Bashar al-Assad and, most significantly, Russia's Vladimir Putin.

Causing Chaos

In 2011, led this time by the liberal interventionists - the likes of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and White House aide Samantha Power - the U.S. military and some NATO allies took aim at Libya, scoffing at Gaddafi's claim that his country was threatened by Islamic terrorists. It was not until Gaddafi's military was destroyed by Western airstrikes (and he was tortured and murdered) that it became clear that he wasn't entirely wrong about the Islamic extremists.

The jihadists seized large swaths of Libyan territory, killed the U.S. ambassador and three other diplomatic personnel in Benghazi, and forced the closing of U.S. and other Western embassies in Tripoli. For good measure, Islamic State terrorists forced captured Coptic Christians to kneel on a Libyan beach before beheading them.

Amid this state of anarchy, Libya has been the source of hundreds of thousands of migrants trying to reach Europe by boat. Thousands have drowned in the Mediterranean. But, again, the leading U.S. interventionists faced no accountability. Clinton is the frontrunner for the Democratic presidential nomination, and Power is now U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations.

Also, in 2011, a similar uprising occurred in Syria against the secular regime headed by President Assad, with nearly identical one-sided reporting about the "white-hatted" opposition and the "black-hatted" government. Though many protesters indeed appear to have been well-meaning opponents of Assad, Sunni terrorists penetrated the opposition from the beginning.

This gray reality was almost completely ignored in the Western press, which almost universally denounced the government when it retaliated against opposition forces for killing police and soldiers. The West depicted the government response as unprovoked attacks on "peaceful protesters." [See Consortiumnews.com's "Hidden Origins of Syria's Civil War."]

This one-sided narrative nearly brought the U.S. military to the point of another intervention after Aug. 21, 2013, when a mysterious sarin gas attack killed hundreds in a suburb of Damascus. Official Washington's neocons and the pro-interventionists in the State Department immediately blamed Assad's forces for the atrocity and demanded a bombing campaign.

But some U.S. intelligence analysts suspected a "false-flag" provocation by Islamic terrorists seeking to get the U.S. air force to destroy Assad's army for them. At the last minute, President Obama steered away from that cliff and - with the help of President Putin - got Assad to surrender Syria's chemical arsenal, while Assad continued to deny a role in the sarin attack. [See Consortiumnews.com's "The Collapsing Syria-Sarin Case."]

Upset over Iran

Putin also assisted Obama on another front with another demonized "enemy," Iran. In late 2013, the two leaders collaborated in getting Iran to make significant concessions on its nuclear program, clearing the way for negotiations that eventually led to stringent international controls.

These two diplomatic initiatives alarmed the neocons and their right-wing Israeli friends. Since the mid-1990s, the neocons had worked closely with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in plotting a "regime change" strategy for countries that were viewed as troublesome to Israel, with Iraq, Syria and Iran topping the list.

Putin's interference with that agenda - by preventing U.S. bombing campaigns against Syria and Iran - was viewed as a threat to this longstanding Israeli/neocon strategy. There was also fear that the Obama-Putin teamwork could lead to renewed pressure on Israel to recognize a Palestinian state. So, that relationship had to be blown up.

The detonation occurred in early 2014 when a neocon-orchestrated coup overthrew elected Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych and replaced him with a fiercely anti-Russian regime which included neo-Nazi and other ultra-nationalist elements as well as free-market extremists.

Ukraine had been on the neocon radar at least since September 2013, just after Putin undercut plans for bombing Syria. Neocon Carl Gershman, president of the U.S.-government-funded National Endowment for Democracy, wrote a Washington Post op-ed deeming Ukraine "the biggest prize" and a key steppingstone toward another regime change in Moscow, removing the troublesome Putin.

Gershman's op-ed was followed by prominent neocons, such as Sen. John McCain and Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Victoria Nuland, urging on violent protests that involved firebombing the police. But the State Department and the mainstream media glued white hats on the Maidan protesters and black hats on the police and the government.

Then, on Feb. 20, 2014, a mysterious sniper attack killed both police and demonstrators, leading to more clashes and the deaths of scores of people. The U.S. government and press corps blamed Yanukovych and - despite his signing an agreement for early elections on Feb. 21 - the Maidan "self-defense forces," spearheaded by neo-Nazi goons, overran government buildings on Feb. 22 and installed a coup regime, quickly recognized by the State Department as "legitimate."

Though the fault for the Feb. 20 sniper attack was never resolved - the new Ukrainian regime showed little interest in getting to the bottom of it - other independent investigations pointed toward a provocation by right-wing gunmen who targeted police and protesters with the goal of deepening the crisis and blaming Yanukovych, which is exactly what happened.

These field reports, including one from the BBC, indicated that the snipers likely were associated with the Maidan uprising, not the Yanukovych government. [Another worthwhile documentary on this mystery is "Maidan Massacre."]

One-Sided Reporting

Yet, during the Ukrainian coup, The New York Times and most other mainstream media outlets played a role similar to what they had done prior to the Iraq War when they hyped false and misleading stories about WMD. By 2014, the U.S. press corps no longer seemed to even pause before undertaking its expected propaganda role.

So, after Yanukovych's ouster, when ethnic Russians in Crimea and eastern Ukraine rose up against the new anti-Russian order in Kiev, the only acceptable frame for the U.S. media was to blame the resistance on Putin. It must be "Russian aggression" or a "Russian invasion."

When a referendum in Crimea overwhelmingly favored secession from Ukraine and rejoining Russia, the U.S. media denounced the 96 percent vote as a "sham" imposed by Russian guns. Similarly, resistance in eastern Ukraine could not have reflected popular sentiment unless it came from mass delusions induced by "Russian propaganda."

Meanwhile, evidence of a U.S.-backed coup, such as the intercepted phone call of a pre-coup discussion between Assistant Secretary Nuland and U.S. Ambassador Geoffrey Pyatt on how "to midwife this thing" and who to install in the new government ("Yats is the guy"), disappeared into the memory hole, not helpful for the desired narrative. [See Consortiumnews.com's "NYT Still Pretends No Coup in Ukraine."]

When Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 was shot down over eastern Ukraine on July 17, 2014, the blame machine immediately roared into gear again, accusing Putin and the ethnic Russian rebels. But some U.S. intelligence analysts reportedly saw the evidence going in a different direction, implicating a rogue element of the Ukrainian regime.

Again, the mainstream media showed little skepticism toward the official story blaming Putin, even though the U.S. government and other Western nations refused to make public any hard evidence supporting the Putin-did-it case, even now more than a year later. [See Consortiumnews.com's "MH-17 Mystery: A New Tonkin Gulf Case."]

The pattern that we have seen over and over is that once a propaganda point is scored against one of the neocon/liberal-hawk "enemies," the failure to actually prove the allegation is not seen as suspicious, at least not inside the mainstream media, which usually just repeats the old narrative again and again, whether its casting blame on Putin for MH-17, or on Yanukovych for the sniper attack, or on Assad for the sarin gas attack.

Instead of skepticism, it's always the same sort of "group think," with nothing learned from the disaster of the Iraq War because there was virtually no accountability for those responsible.

Obama's Repression

Yet, while the U.S. press corps deserves a great deal of blame for this failure to investigate important controversies independently, President Obama and his administration have been the driving force in this manipulation of public opinion over the past six-plus years. Instead of the transparent government that Obama promised, he has run one of the most opaque, if not the most secretive, administrations in American history.

Besides refusing to release the U.S. government's evidence on pivotal events in these international crises, Obama has prosecuted more national security whistleblowers than all past presidents combined.

That repression, including a 35-year prison term for Pvt. Bradley/Chelsea Manning and the forced exile of indicted National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden, has intimidated current intelligence analysts who know about the manipulation of public opinion but don't dare tell the truth to reporters for fear of imprisonment.

Most of the "leaked" information that you still see in the mainstream media is what's approved by Obama or his top aides to serve their interests. In other words, the "leaks" are part of the propaganda, made to seem more trustworthy because they're coming from an unidentified "source" rather than a named government spokesman.

At this late stage in Obama's presidency, his administration seems drunk on the power of "perception management" with the new hot phrase, "strategic communications" which boils psychological operations, propaganda and P.R. into one intoxicating brew.

From NATO's Gen. Philip Breedlove to the State Department's Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy Richard Stengel, the manipulation of information is viewed as a potent "soft power" weapon. It's a way to isolate and damage an "enemy," especially Russia and Putin.

This demonization of Putin makes cooperation between him and Obama difficult, such as Russia's recent military buildup in Syria as part of a commitment to prevent a victory by the Islamic State and Al Qaeda. Though one might think that Russian help in fighting terrorism would be welcomed, Nuland's State Department office responded with a bizarre and futile attempt to build an aerial blockade of Russian aid flying to Syria across eastern Europe.

Nuland and other neocons apparently would prefer having the black flag of Sunni terrorism flying over Damascus than to work with Putin to block such a catastrophe. The hysteria over Russia's assistance in Syria is a textbook example of how people can begin believing their own propaganda and letting it dictate misguided actions.

On Thursday, Obama's White House sank to a new low by having Press Secretary Josh Earnest depict Putin as "desperate" to land a meeting with Obama. Earnest then demeaned Putin's appearance during an earlier sit-down session with Netanyahu in Moscow. "President Putin was striking a now-familiar pose of less-than-perfect posture and unbuttoned jacket and, you know, knees spread far apart to convey a particular image,' Earnest said.

But the meeting photos actually showed both men with their suit coats open and both sitting with their legs apart at least for part of the time. Responding to Earnest's insults, the Russians denied that Putin was "desperate" for a meeting with Obama and added that the Obama administration had proposed the meeting to coincide with Putin's appearance at the United Nations General Assembly in New York on Monday.

"We do not refuse contacts that are proposed," said Yuri Ushakov, a top foreign policy adviser to Putin. "We support maintaining constant dialogue at the highest level." The Kremlin also included no insults about Obama's appearance in the statement.

However, inside Official Washington, there appears to be little thought that the endless spinning, lying and ridiculing might dangerously corrode American democracy and erode any remaining trust the world's public has in the word of the U.S. government. Instead, there seems to be great confidence that skilled propagandists can discredit anyone who dares note that the naked empire has wrapped itself in the sheerest of see-through deceptions.

 [return to Contents] 

 #23
Huffingtonpost.com
September 28, 2015
Stop Being Scared, You Live In The Safest Time In Human History
By Joshua Ostroff
Joshua Ostroff is a senior editor for HuffPost Canada.
[Video of talk and interview with Paul Robinson here
http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2015/09/29/canada-election-security-safe_n_8039394.html]

I remember where I was on 9/11 and how scary it was to witness on TV.

Most of us do.

That's likely why, during Monday's Munk debate on foreign policy, Stephen Harper invoked the 14-year-old terror attack while defending his government's decision to strip Canadian citizenship from Toronto 18 mastermind Zakaria Amara.

"A few blocks from here, he would have detonated bombs that would have been on a scale of 9-11," Harper said, defending the government's new Bill C-24 . "This country has every right to revoke the citizenship of an individual like that."

Later, while defending his even more controversial anti-terror legislation Bill C-51, Harper said, "The threat we face today is not CSIS, it's ISIS."

Then, when questioned about sending Canadian soldiers to the Middle East, he warned that ISIS wants to slaughter "hundreds of thousands" and launch terror attacks "against this country."

Obviously, that sounds scary. But here's the thing. I also remember growing up in the 1980s under the threat of global thermonuclear war.

More of us should.

I went on 100,000 people peace marches in Vancouver with my parents, hid under the covers after watching "The Day After" on TV and submitted a Grade 4 book report on nuclear war. For the cover art, I pasted maps of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. and drew nukes flying between them.

Maybe my childhood fear that stray bombs would land on my house was unjustified, but it's hard to argue a hijacked plane, sabotaged subway, or crazed gunman possess an equal threat to a nuclear holocaust.

"We've forgotten all that amazingly quickly. It's like it never happened. As you remember in the mid-1980s with Reagan and so forth, people were seriously worried," University of Ottawa professor Paul Robinson tells The Huffington Post Canada.

Robinson, who also served as an officer in the British Army Intelligence Corps from 1989 to 1994 and as a reserve officer in the Canadian Forces in the '90s is flabbergasted. "I heard a quote by John McCain who said 'the world is more dangerous now than any time in my lifetime.' You were born before the Second World War! And captured and tortured in Vietnam! How could you possibly say that?"

This is not to say there aren't dangers - the war in Syria has created a refugee crisis, ISIS continues its reign of terror and the first anniversary of the Parliament Hill shootings is coming up right after the Oct. 19 election. But according to Robinson, we actually live in the safest time period in human history.

There are fewer wars, less crime, and even less risk of terrorism than ever before.

While in Toronto to speak at the IdeaCity conference earlier this summer, Robinson sat down with HuffPost to explain why we don't know this already, and warn of the real danger posed by the fear of fake danger.

Q&A follows these stats on homicide, war and terrorism

Q: So if everything is better, why do people think it's worse?

A: It's very complex phenomenon. It has to do with human psychology. The way the human brain operates is not a purely rational computer model. It works on shortcuts and has cognitive biases. These predispose human beings to be very bad at risk assessment and fear things that don't need to be feared.

People will attach much more significance to things that are easy to remember versus things that are not easy to remember. A big event will be easier to remember that many small events. So we worry a lot more about terrorism than we do about car crashes even though we're way more likely to die from car crashes.

But a terrorist attack is more easily retrieved because it's out of the ordinary.

Q: What role does the media play?

A: The media does paint a distorted picture of the world. It will seize on certain stories and develop them out of proportion. So we had the shooting in Ottawa, and it was very tragic, but it got pages and pages and pages of coverage, there was almost nothing else in the newspaper for a week. But actually one man died and, however tragic that is, by giving it that much publicity you make it seem far more significant than it really is.

Q: What else?

A: Some people have an interest in making the world seem less safe than it is. When the crisis in Ukraine came up, you could almost see the glee at NATO headquarters because they could go on about the Russian threat and it gives them a justification for their existence.

If we talk about the military industrial complex, it's not like there's some secret conspiracy sitting in a smoke-filled room where the military are in bed with Lockheed Martin to make us all afraid of the world. But in an amorphous way there is this conglomeration of interests which get money and power and influence by making the world appear more dangerous than it is.

Q: It does feel like those mass shootings are happening more and more, though.

A: I don't have statistics on rampage shootings, but overall homicide rates have declined significantly since the mid-1970s. So we have Harper saying we must build more prisons but crime is significantly down. If your friend is burgled or you are burgled, that makes you think crime is up whereas the drip, drip, drip of crime not happening makes no impact on you emotionally.

Q: Why do you think the politicians do it?

A: They are susceptible to the same cognitive biases as everybody else. Secondly, they're subject to pressures from lobby groups and interest groups. And also, of course, there is a political interest for them.

They need to cover their asses.

If the decision is wrong, the cost will be diffused among a whole lot of people. It will cost $10 billion to fight a war we don't win in Afghanistan, but no Canadian is actually going to notice that because it's divided among 30 million Canadians over a 10-year period. There is little cost for the politician.

But there is a cost if they don't take these measures and something happens. Doesn't matter how unlikely that something is. If they are a politician who is later shown to not have done something which could've stop something from happening, however unlikely it was, they'll get in trouble for it.

Q: What about during elections?

A: There can be political benefits to scaring people. Whereas there doesn't seem to be the same benefit in saying "everything is OK, don't worry about it."

Q: What is the negative impact of this unfounded fear?

A: Although threats are less than they used to be, I think they could be less still. I do not see how invading Iraq, the war in Afghanistan, or the bombing in Libya have done Canadians the slightest bit of good. So we've spent billions of dollars and we probably made ourselves less safe. It's very hard to prove this stuff and there are many, many, many factors which cause domestic terrorism but the shooting in Ottawa, he made it very clear that this was related to the bombing of Iraq.

And by giving increased power to the security services, we restrict our liberty.

Q: Why is domestic terrorism treated differently than Islamic terrorism?

A: I was actually in London the day the bombs went off in 2005. I was about 200 yards away from the bus that blew up. Fortunately, I had a building between us and the bus, but it's not as if it was completely unique. There have been IRA bombings in London and the Guildford bombing, the Birmingham bombing and the rest of it in the '70s. There have been many mass terrorist attacks.

But if you look at the amount of press the July 2005 bombings got compared with the IRA bombings, it's extraordinary. The coverage was vastly in excess of what previously would have been done. I don't know if that's the nature of the enemy - Muslims as opposed to Irish people - or if there's something changed in the way the media treats these things. But we treat the current Islamic threat far more seriously, and give it way more coverage and publicity, in a way we wouldn't have done in the past.

Q: So how do we convince people that world is not as bad as they think it is?

A: It's very difficult to because essentially it's a negative story - crime that isn't happening, wars which are not happening and so on and so forth. But when things do happen, they need to be treated more responsibility and less hysterically.

And we need to be less self-centered. We tend to assume everything is about us. So if there's a war in Iraq with ISIS, it's about us, we are threatened. A lot of these local things are local. And we need to be more modest about believing that doing something about it will actually make it better. Often we make these things worse.

Q: So what would change if people realized the real state of the world?

A: I think it would reduce the pressure to engage in silly policies. We would spend less on defence. We would be less involved in military adventures overseas. We would be more willing to talk with people we don't like, say the Iranians or Russians. We would be disliked less overseas. We would have a reduced security state. The current fashion for incarcerating people, there would be less of that kind of policy.

And it's not just that you're spending this money, it's that you're not spending it somewhere else that would have so much more benefit.

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#24
Consortiumnews.com
September 30, 2015
More Anti-Russian Bias at the NYT
By Jonathan Marshall
Jonathan Marshall is an independent researcher living in San Anselmo, California.

Exclusive: The anti-Russian bias of the New York Times is hard to miss as it consistently puts Moscow's actions and intentions in the worst possible light, in stark contrast to the warm glow that usually surrounds military actions by the U.S. and its "allies," as Jonathan Marshall observes.

Someone at the New York Times forgot where the opinion pages are, and not for the first time. When it comes to hot-button foreign issues such as Russia and Syria, too often Official Washington's opinions and hostile spin get propagated as fact on its news pages.

Consider the Sept. 30 edition of the Times and its contrasting coverage of U.S. bombing in Afghanistan and Russian bombing in Syria. On Afghanistan, the paper's approach is factual: The Times story leads with "American warplanes bombarded Taliban-held territory around the Kunduz airport overnight, and Afghan officials said American Special Forces were rushed toward the fighting." Lacking much depth, the article does not address, much less question, U.S. motives, which by implication are simply to help beleaguered government forces resist Taliban advances in Kunduz and northern Afghanistan.

In contrast, the main Times story on Russia's first bombing raids in Syria leads with an assumption of Russian motives related as fact: "President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia suddenly escalated the stakes in his contest with the West over influence in the Middle East on Wednesday, as Russian pilots carried out their first airstrikes in Syria." Not until the fourth paragraph do we find that Moscow claims that its goal is to "fight Islamic State militants."

Later in the story, the Times' Moscow correspondent Neil MacFarquhar omnisciently insists instead that Putin's real motives for "interfering" (love that spin!) in Syria are to "restore Russian influence as a global power," "force an end to the diplomatic and financial isolation the West imposed after Moscow seized Crimea," "maintain control over Russia's naval station at Tartus, in Syria," and "draw attention away from the Ukraine conflict and the troubles it has caused." In other words, the Russian bear is big, bad, and on the move.

By the fifth paragraph of the story, MacFarquhar has looked into his crystal ball and confidently predicts that "Russia's intervention will most likely prolong and complicate the war, as it could keep Mr. Assad in office and adds Russia to the already complicated patchwork of forces deployed there."

In case you don't believe his message, an accompanying "news" story, by Helene Cooper and the reliably hawkish national security correspondent Michael Gordon, insists that Russia's ominous "military buildup in Syria" (consisting of just 32 tactical jets) "could further inflame - and lengthen - the conflict" by "frustrating already-dwindling hopes for a diplomatic resolution." Their sources range all the way from current U.S. and Saudi officials to former U.S. officials and an expert at the hawkish Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Of course, Russia's stepped-up intervention could prolong the conflict by preventing an Islamist victory. Left unsaid is that Russia's support for Assad could just as easily shorten the conflict by bringing some non-jihadist opposition groups to the bargaining table to work out a power-sharing government with Assad, which they have hitherto resisted. Contrary to the Times' spin, no one knows.

The fact that two Times stories on the same day draw the most dire conclusion stands in contrast to the paper's more even-handed assessment in July of stepped up U.S. bombing in Afghanistan: "The airstrikes could undermine the Taliban's willingness to negotiate with the Afghan government and could indirectly strengthen the group's legitimacy to an Afghan public that widely loathes the American airstrikes. Or, the airstrikes might give the Afghan government more leverage in negotiations."

On Wednesday, Cooper and Gordon make much of the fact that confronting the Islamic State "is not necessarily Moscow's priority," as evidenced by the fact that "the very first warplanes that Russia sent to Latakia were four SU-30 Flanker air-to-air fighters. Such aircraft, officials said, would be useful in expanding Russia's military reach in the Middle East and perhaps in dissuading foes of Mr. Assad from even contemplating the establishment of a no-fly zone over Syria. But they have little utility against a ground force like the Islamic State."

Those unnamed "officials" apparently didn't read Secretary of State John Kerry's Sept. 22 news conference, at which he said "it is the judgment of our military and most experts that the level and type [of Soviet deployment] represents basically force protection, a level of protection for their deployment to an air base, given the fact that it is in an area of conflict."

Funny thing, when the U.S. moved forces into a Turkish air base this summer, a Pentagon spokesman quoted by Military Times said the U.S. military's first priorities were "force protection and things like that." Nobody at the Times cited anonymous sources who found that suspicious.

Cooper and Gordon also offer no balancing perspective from Moscow. A spokeswoman for Russia's Foreign Ministry explained earlier this month that "Russian military specialists help Syrians master Russian hardware, and we can't understand the anti-Russian hysteria about this. We have been supplying Syria with arms and military equipment for a long time. We are doing this in accordance with existing contracts and in full accordance with international law."

As Putin noted in his United Nations address, Russia is aiding the internationally recognized regime in Damascus, unlike illegal intervention by the U.S., Gulf states, France and other countries on behalf of various Islamist rebels.

So what we're left with is familiar Cold War imagery of a Russian bear on the move to set the world aflame - presumably unlike humanitarian U.S. bombing of Afghanistan, Syria, Libya (and, going back a few years more, Iraq, Serbia, Panama, etc.).

I, for one, still respect the New York Times as our country's - and perhaps the world's - single best news source on a wide variety of topics. That's why I feel betrayed when it lets down the profession's best standards by internalizing Official Washington's group think as "news" rather than opinion or spin.
 

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 #25
Wall Street Journal
October 1, 2015
Ukraine, Russia-Backed Rebels Agree on Weapons Pullback
Deal to withdraw small arms from front line is part of broader peace deal
By LAURA MILLS

KIEV, Ukraine-Ukrainian negotiators and Russia-backed rebels in the country's east agreed to withdraw small-caliber weapons from front-line positions, in the latest potential step toward ending a conflict that has claimed almost 8,000 lives.

According to the agreement, reached late Tuesday in the Belarusian capital of Minsk, both sides would have to withdraw small-caliber weapons from the so-called line of contact. That would be another step toward implementing a peace deal signed in the same city in February, which began with a cease fire and the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

The fighting in eastern Ukraine has ebbed in recent weeks as Moscow escalates its military involvement in Syria. The last recorded death from fighting of a Ukrainian soldier was on Sept. 8.

Both sides, as well as the international community, have hailed the recent progress-although past attempts to halt the fighting have eventually fallen apart.

"It is my hope that this is a step toward peace, normalization, and stabilization," said Etrugul Apakan, head of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's monitoring mission in the region, said of the latest agreement.

Vladislav Seleznev, a spokesman for Ukraine's armed forces, said the government was certainly interested in de-escalating the conflict in the east.

"But we understand clearly that the war will only end when all the points of the Minsk agreement are implemented," he said, "including giving back control of the Ukraine-Russia border."

Under the February agreement, Kiev must devolve greater autonomy to the rebel regions, while the rebels have to hold fair local elections and give Ukraine back full control over its border with Russia.

Each side has balked at certain elements of the plan, and have often pointed the finger at the other side in justifying delays.

Ukraine says it will only put forward a final vote on amending the constitution to grant more power to the regions at the end of the year, while rebels have said they are pressing ahead with plans for local elections that Kiev has condemned as illegal.

Dmitry Peskov, a spokesman for Russian President Vladimir Putin, called the agreement positive and said Moscow viewed it with "cautious optimism," according to Interfax news agency.

"This could mean the end of the war, in my opinion," rebel leader Denis Pushilin told Interfax. But Mr. Pushilin condemned what he called the lack of progress toward a political resolution of the conflict, which he said "could drag on for decades."

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 #26
Putin hopeful crisis in southeastern Ukraine will be resolved, yet still long way to go

MOSCOW. Oct 1 (Interfax) - There is still a long way to go to the resolution of the crisis in southeastern Ukraine, but there is hope it will eventually be resolved, Russian President Vladimir Putin has said.

"Unfortunately, there is still a long way to go to its resolution. Yet there are things inspiring confidence that this crisis can be overcome. Most importantly, guns are silent and we may count on positive dialogue between these republics [DPR and LPR] and the Kyiv authorities and the fulfillment of the main condition of any compromise. And this main condition is direct dialogue," Putin said at a meeting of the Presidential Human Rights Council.

"We will insist on this and hope for goodwill of both sides," the Russian president said.

There is a provision in the Minsk agreements saying that "the special status law shall take effect 30 days after the agreements were signed," Putin said.

"There is a law. Thirty days have passed, there is a law but it has not taken effect. To sign an amnesty law. This law exists, and all that needs to be done is to put the [Ukrainian] president's signature under it, but there is no signature. And there are lots of other issues," Putin said.

The political settlement is the key matter of the resolution of the crisis in eastern Ukraine, he said.

"Most important in this political settlement is amendments to the [Ukrainian] constitution. But it is written [in the agreements] that this needs to be done in coordination with Donbas. There is no coordination. The most pressing matter is elections. What do the Minsk agreements say? Under Ukrainian law, which is coordinated with Donbas. Donbas has sent its proposals thrice, but there is no dialogue. The Rada passed the law, but it said, 'do not hold the elections in territories of the LPR and the DPR'. What shall they do? They said they would hold [the elections] on their own," Putin said.

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 #27
Russians don't want Donetsk, Luhansk to be part of Russia - poll

MOSCOW, September 30. /TASS/. Russians believe that support for the people of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk republics must go on, but a tiny 18% suggest admitting them to the Russian Federation, as follows from an opinion poll by the national pollster VTsIOM, published on its website.

"The possibility that among the Donbas militias there may be more Russian volunteers than Ukrainians is mentioned these days more often than a year ago: whereas in July 2014 only 5% said so, in September 2015 the group of those who thought so was up to 15%. Yet a majority of the polled (66%) are certain that most of the militiamen in the Donetsk and Luhansk republics are residents of the two regions and also of other regions of Ukraine (in contrast to 88% in July 2014), the poll said.

One in three Russians (31%) advises the authorities to stay neutral, without taking sides with Kiev or Donetsk and Luhansk. One in four (26%) is certain the territories' independence must be recognized. A large majority of the polled are certain that peace talks and a freeze of the conflict would benefit Russia, even though they may be achieved at the cost of concessions and financial losses, while 10% of the polled believe the "war to the bitter end is acceptable."

The VTsOIM poll was conducted on September 5-6, 2015. The sociologists polled an audience of 1,600 men and women of age in 46 territories of Russia. The statistical error margin did not exceed 3.5%.

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 #28
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
September 29, 2015
Obama vs. Putin: Mutual finger-pointing deepens ideological clash
The recent speeches made by Vladimir Putin and Barack Obama at the 70th UN General Assembly clearly show that Russian and American leaders are once again locked in a global ideological confrontation of the type once witnessed during the Cold War.
By Ivan Tsvetkov
Ivan Tsvetkov is Associate Professor of American Studies, International Relations Department, St. Petersburg State University. He is an expert in the field of historical science and contemporary U.S. policy and U.S.-Russian relations. Since 2003, he has been the author and administrator of the educational website "History of the United States: Materials for the course" (http://ushistory.ru)

The unusual excitement preceding Russian President Vladimir Putin's trip to New York seemed fully understandable. This was the first time in ten years that the Russian leader had come to speak at the UN General Assembly and his first full-fledged meeting with U.S. President Barack Obama since the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis.

Moreover, there were hopes for overcoming the deadlock over Syria, as well as hopes for forming effective international mechanisms to confront the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS) terrorists.

And yet, especially after all the scheduled meetings and performances had already taken place, it is hard to escape the feeling that most people are unwilling to believe that a pair of beautiful speeches and an hour and a half conversation behind closed doors can interrupt the course of history.

This indicates just how desperate the situation really is, and that there is an absence of any kind of real prospects for the normalization of international relations. All that is left is to hope for a miracle.

Of course, in history, one can find examples of such "miracles." Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and his American counterpart Ronald Reagan began their dialogue in the mid-1980s, which quite quickly led to a significant reduction in international tensions.

However, the situation back then was quite different. The Soviet Union, clearly losing in its ideological and economic confrontation with the United States, was represented by a leader desiring to cut the Gordian knot of problems he had inherited from his predecessors.

In addition, both Gorbachev and Reagan were great idealists, who believed in the possibility of rapid change for the better, which enabled them to easily find a common language.

Obama and Putin, expounding at the UN General Assembly their views as to the main reasons behind current international problems and ways to solve them, are nothing like Reagan and Gorbachev. This also applies to the countries that they represent today - these are not the Soviet Union and the United States of the mid-1980s.

Russia, which Washington insists on classifying as a "regional power," actually does lack the potential for "power projection," which the U.S.S.R. possessed in its heyday. And bilateral agreements between the Russian and American presidents, on any issue whatsoever, will not be able to change overnight the vector of world development.

U.S. claims to world dominance, which current Russian propagandists are pointing to with even more fervor than their Soviet predecessors did, have been recently severely toned down as well. Obama's foreign policy ideology and his approaches to solving the world's problems have little to do with the political practices of previous American administrations.

Nevertheless, despite the obviousness of such an assertion, many people in Russia and abroad are still counting on a miracle, and are hoping that the challenges of the twenty-first century will be decided by politicians and great powers using old proven recipes.

In reality, we see that the U.S. and Russia are using the constantly growing pile of problems to support their own sense of righteousness, thus building a new ideological dualism, to replace the confrontation between communism and capitalism that perestroika swept away.

Obama vs. Putin

Obama, in his speech, laid out the traditional American ideological postulates, and applied these to the current political situation. According to the U.S. president, the root of all evil is the absence of freedom and democracy, the seizing and holding of power by strong leaders who seek not only to suppress opposition within their own countries, but also to use the old proven ways of applying coercive pressure on their neighbors.

Among other things, Obama accused the "strong leaders" of undermining the ideals of the United Nations.

"There are those who argue that the ideals enshrined in the UN charter are unachievable or out of date - a legacy of a postwar era not suited to our own," Obama said. "Effectively, they argue for a return to the rules that applied for most of human history and that pre-date this institution: The belief that power is a zero-sum game; that might makes right; that strong states must impose their will on weaker ones."

When one of the most famous of these "strong leaders" - Putin - came to the podium, he, also without naming names, immediately voiced the well-known thesis of "dominance by a single power and its disregard of UN institutions."

This part of the speeches made by the Russian and the American presidents left everyone with an especially strong feeling of hopelessness: The two opponents accused each other of the same sins, and neither showed the slightest desire to repent for having committed them.

However, later on, Putin offered his own explanations for the Middle East and the Ukrainian crises, which had all the characteristics of a coherent ideological formulation. According to Putin, at issue here is not a lack of democracy, but the contempt of national sovereignty and legitimate authority. If not for outside interference, the legitimate governments (no matter if these were democratic or authoritarian) would have been able to carry out the necessary reforms, revolutions would not have occurred, and terrorists would not have filled the political vacuum.

Putin agreed that freedom is needed to achieve development - but, in his opinion, the source of this freedom does not come from the rights of the individual, but from state sovereignty. The Russian president has once again shown that he does not believe in the "universal values of democracy," which Obama called "self-evident". For Putin, it is more important that each nation have the right to choose its own destiny.

"We are all different," said Putin, as though directly objecting to Obama, when he said during his speech that, "The people of our United Nations are not as different as they are told."

Such a sharp exchange of opinions between the Russian and American presidents has an entertaining component: In the end, it is a good thing, when a discussion is conducted at such a good intellectual level, and the parties seek weighty arguments, not lowering themselves to old propaganda clichés.

Obama, as an experienced speaker with two presidential election campaigns under his belt, on the whole, managed in his speech to the General Assembly to present a more logically consistent and compelling ideological framework.

However, we can consider that Putin achieved success in the fact that he has managed, over the 15 years of his time in office, to move from "pinpoint" criticism of U.S. foreign policy, to a developed coherent ideological concept of "freedom, legitimacy and sovereignty."

Implications of mutual finger-pointing

However, the trouble is that such an explicit postulation of ideological preferences by the leaders of the U.S. and Russia are not bringing us any closer to the normalization of Russian-American relations, or to resolving acute international crises.

In this new, more ideologically driven system of international relations, such figures as Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and the former president of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, are being turned into highly symbolic figures. Their overthrow or preservation in power is not only an international political concern, but also an ideological issue.

Can we expect Putin to "surrender" Assad, or the United States to recognize the newly changed borders of Ukraine? Both of these are possible only if Russia and the United States turn down their ideological postulates, explicitly voiced at the UN General Assembly. However, to do this is much more difficult than simply taking a step back during backroom negotiations.

The results are disappointing: After the speeches were made at the General Assembly by the leaders of the U.S. and Russia, even though they emphatically sought to avoid making personal attacks, grounds for a compromise were not created, and the existing gap between them was only deepened, expanding the current political conflict by clearly expressing opposing ideological positions.

In such a situation, calls for the creation of a new anti-terrorist coalition, a diplomatic solution, as well as the assurances made by the parties as to the usefulness of negotiations - look like common "smokescreens" - created for public opinion, under the cover of which the White House and the Kremlin will continue to implement their former political strategies.

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 #29
The Nation
www.thenation.com
September 29, 2015
Obama and Putin Meet in New York, Agree on Nothing
The US establishment doesn't understand that Russia's foray into Syria is more than an imperial gamble.
By James Carden
James W. Carden is a contributing writer at The Nation and the executive editor for the American Committee for East-West Accord's EastWestAccord.com. A Washington, DC-based journalist focusing on US foreign policy, his articles and essays have also appeared in The American Conservative and The National Interest.

The opening of the 70th session of the UN General Assembly on Monday featured major addresses by, among others, US President Barack Obama and Russian President Vladimir Putin. The speeches showcased the stark, seemingly unbridgeable divide between the two world leaders over the fate of the Assad regime in Syria.

Later in the day, to the surprise of absolutely no one, a much-anticipated meeting between Putin and Obama produced little in the way of agreement. The AP pool reporter covering the meeting called it "95 minutes of Nyet."

This would come as no shock to those who tuned in to Sunday's 60 Minutes interview with the Russian president.

Facing off against Charlie Rose, Putin was upfront about what he sees as a sacrosanct principle in the conduct of foreign affairs: respect for national sovereignty. In one of the only important exchanges during the mostly lackluster conversation, Putin stated, "We support the legitimate government of Syria. And it's my deep belief that any actions to the contrary in order to destroy the legitimate government will create a situation which you can witness now in the other countries of the region or in other regions."

With regard to Syria, it must be recognized that Putin's plan to buttress Assad via airpower, if history is any guide, is doomed to fail. Insurgencies are rarely, if ever, beaten back by air power alone (and please spare me the Kosovo precedent, the settlement of which had far more to do with Russian diplomacy vis-à-vis the Serbs than with Wesley Clark's inept and immoral aerial-bombing campaign).

If Putin is serious about saving Assad's skin, and his call at the UN for a broad international coalition to combat ISIS indicates he is, then he will need to contemplate the use of Russian ground forces, which, if our own Middle Eastern experiences are anything to go by, would lead to disaster. And Putin seems to realize this, telling Rose that "Russia will not participate in any troop operations in the territory of Syria or in any other states. Well, at least we don't plan on it right now."

And yet circumstances (which Edmund Burke sagely noted "are what render every civil and political scheme beneficial or noxious to mankind") are different for Russia than they are for the United States. It simply boils down to geography. Whether ISIS runs roughshod over large segments of the Levant is-in terms of overall US security posture-negligible.

Israel, Turkey, Egypt, and the vicious yet obscenely wealthy Gulf state tyrannies all have the wherewithal, should they decide to act, either alone or in concert, to quash ISIS's Islamic fundamentalist hordes. At the UN on Monday, in a direct challenge to President Obama's refusal to even consider supporting Assad, Putin was blunt: "We think it's an enormous mistake to refuse to cooperate with the Syrian government and its armed forces who are valiantly fighting terrorism face to face."

Russia, unlike the United States, borders the Middle East and, as such, has legitimate national security interests in the region. Further, Russia has a population of 15 to 20 million Muslims, perhaps tens of thousands of whom make up a sizable and restive contingent in the North Caucasus. According to Putin, "More than 2,000 fighters from Russia and ex-Soviet Republics are in the territory of Syria. There is a threat of their return to us." He added that "in general, we want the situation in the region to stabilize."

And here we get to a second leitmotif of Russian foreign policy under Putin: the quest for regional and global stability.

In his UN address, Obama noted, "We cannot stand by when the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a nation is flagrantly violated." The irony is that this formulation came from the mouth of an American president who has bragged about bombing no fewer than seven countries in six years. The problem is that the United States, far from "standing by" when threats to sovereignty materialize, actually produces the very instability it proclaims to abhor because of its dangerously naive belief in the efficacy of military might when conjoined with the ideology of democracy promotion.

As opposed to Obama's confident assertions that the nebulous "international community" led, of course, by the United States, can and should bend the arc of history to its will, Putin expressed a humility born of failure. As Putin told the UN Assembly: "We also remember certain episodes from the history of the Soviet Union. Social experiments for export, attempts to push for changes within other countries based on ideological preferences, often led to tragic consequences and to degradation rather than progress."

That is only too true. And Putin's frank admission should (but likely will not) spur American leaders to pose similar questions with regard to our own "social experiments for export." Might we benefit from asking whether it was Russia or the United States who aided and abetted the "color revolutions" in the Caucasus and Ukraine? Was Ambassador Robert Ford the representative of the American or the Russian government when he was lending encouragement to the Syrian opposition prior to Assad's violent crackdown?

The point of Russia's foray into Syria, much like its foray into the the Ukrainian Donbas, is, given its geography, driven by a desire and a need for stability. As Putin put the question to the UN Assembly with regard to longstanding Western support for the anti-Assad forces, "I cannot help asking those who have caused the situation, do you realize now what you've done?"

If reports of the Obama-Putin meeting are anything to go by, the answer, sadly, is apparently not.

And so, the idea that Putin's foray into Syria is little more than one of a series "imperial gambles" is to grossly misunderstand the Russian president's motives, to say nothing of the multiple foreign-policy dilemmas facing the Russian state.

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 #30
Brookings
www.brookings.edu
September 30, 2015
Why a new Cold War with Russia is inevitable
By Andrej Krickovic, Assistant Professor, National Research University - Higher School of Economics in Moscow, Russia
and Yuval Weber, Assistant Professor, National Research University - Higher School of Economics in Moscow, Russia

This is a critical moment in U.S-Russia relations. The civil war in Ukraine is settling into a mutually hurtful stalemate; a workable nuclear deal with Iran has been concluded; and Russia is ramping up its presence in Syria, which increases the danger of confrontation with the United States but also opens up the potential for cooperation against the Islamic State (or ISIS). Before a more hawkish U.S. administration comes to power-and before anti-Americanism becomes further entrenched in Russia as evidenced by the latest Levada Center public polling data-perhaps there is an opportunity for Washington and Moscow to overcome their current impasse.

This is our hope. But theory and evidence point to a sobering conclusion: Neither side can make the concessions necessary to resolve their current differences and prevent relations from deteriorating even further.

Commitment anxiety

The chief concern of those calling for negotiation between the United States and Russia is that while the current relationship is beset by a number of serious differences, the downside of an openly hostile relationship is even worse. These voices argue that without an updated European security framework to resolve some of the worst tensions (and implicitly to update the post-Cold War settlement), a new Cold War between the two camps will emerge.

The competition would not be as encompassing as before, but it would make cooperation on vital issues outside of Europe-including Iran, ISIS, and Syria-unsustainable and lead to an inherently more unstable international order. In turn, they advocate for a mutually acceptable framework for regional order to avoid future conflicts from arising in other areas of the post-Soviet space.

A larger "grand bargain" to regulate the structure of international and regional relations based on mutual accommodation is a worthy goal. Nevertheless, we are skeptical that such a grand bargain can be reached, because it would suffer from acute commitment problems. Russia would have to convince the United States and its allies that it would not push for even greater revisions to the status quo. The United States would have to demonstrate to Russia that it would stick to any bargain and not go back to the policies that threaten it.

Impossible concessions

Among the insights of bargaining theory is that states can overcome commitment problems by accepting costly concessions that signal their resolve to abide by agreements. What hypothetical concessions could both sides make to make the grand bargain stick?

Russia could atone for its actions in Crimea-which Washington and other Western capitals see as a grave breach of international law and order-by either reversing the annexation or by using economic and other inducements to get Kiev to recognize the new status quo. The United States could address Russia's fears of encirclement by NATO, either by agreeing to the formation of a pan-European security organization with authority above NATO's (as Dmitri Medvedev proposed during his presidency). Or, it could formally abrogate NATO's right to enlarge its membership and recognize the neutrality of the post-Soviet states on Russia's Western borders.

While these concessions could conceivably make a bargain work, we believe that the domestic political costs of trying to implement such agreements would be too high for leaders of both sides. Any demand for the return of Crimea to Ukraine (as many Western voices have implored) is a non-starter for Russia. The Kremlin has invested so much in the "Return of Crimea" discourse that even minor concessions on this issue would shake the regime's legitimacy to its very foundations (and perhaps even threaten a nationalist revolt).

The alternative-inducing Ukraine to recognize de facto the loss of Crimea-is also problematic, with severe domestic blowback almost certain to befall any government in Kiev that made the deal. Moreover, given its current economic difficulties, Moscow may not be able to deliver the economic inducements necessary to win Kiev's compliance.

On the other side, any concession that would give Russia a de facto veto over NATO's policies would be rejected outright by the alliance's members. The more moderate option, the abrogation of NATO enlargement and the recognition of Russia's sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space, is unacceptable to American leaders and publics. It would validate a realpolitik understanding of international relations that is fundamentally at odds with their views of international relations-in which every state should be free to choose its alliances.

A downward slide?

As things stand now, neither side can make the concessions necessary to make a grand bargain work. As a result, both now find themselves sliding towards a new Cold War that neither really wants.

We hope that statesmen on both sides will prove us wrong by finding the courage and foresight necessary to overcome these commitment problems. But it is difficult to be optimistic given the current political climate, as talk in both capitals is dominated by the sort of Russia- and America-bashing, which prevents either side from developing an appreciation of the other's security concerns.

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 #31
http://gordonhahn.com
September 28, 2015
Is Putin a Great Strategist?
By Gordon M. Hahn
Gordon M. Hahn is an Analyst and Advisory Board Member of the Geostrategic Forecasting Corporation, Chicago, Illinois; Senior Researcher, Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies (CETIS), Akribis Group, San Jose, California Analyst/Consultant, Russia Other Points of View - Russia Media Watch; and Senior Researcher and Adjunct Professor, MonTREP, Monterey, California.

Some, especially many of his compatriots, acclaim Russian President Vladimir Putin is a strategic (and tactical) genius. By contrast Western observers presuppose less competence. The most said by the latter is that he is a kind of evil genius or that he runs circles around US President Barack Obama.

Putin may not be a strategic genius, but he is strategically competent. He is also tactically unpredictable, even brilliant. Let's look at the record.

Putin as Foreign Policy Strategist

The first thing that needs to be stressed is that Putin has no grand strategy, no less one to 'reestablish the Tsarist or Soviet empire.' Such claims are delusions, paranoia, and/or well-compensated stratcomm. His goal is to ensure Russia's status as a global power, one of several great powers in Eurasia writ large, and the indispensable country for any other pursuing a presence in central Eurasia - the former USSR.

But there is no sure-fire strategy for achieving this goal other than that established before Putin's rise to the Russian presidency by then Russian Foreign Minister, the late Yevgenii Primakov. The 'Primakov doctrine' or strategy was the pursuit of a multipolar world through a 'multi-vector' or multi-directional foreign policy that took seriously the Russian state emblem of the double-headed eagle looking both east and west.

Putin continued and developed Primakov's line, but he did not devise it. The robustness of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership and the Kremlin's own 'Asian pivot' is certainly Putin's work as well, but was a logical direction under 'multipolarism' and a strategy of necessity given growing tensions with the West.

Indeed, Putin has developed effective, flexible strategies for pursuing and deepening Russia's presence in every region of the world. His multilateral strategies possess geographical multi-directional and functional multidimensional aspects and growth potential. BRICS - with a country on each continent - is a strategic achievement and perhaps Putin's most innovative. Although increasingly Sino-centric, it was Putin who proposed the BRICS idea, and he has persistently pursued its geographical and functional expansion. The organization is positioning itself as the foundation for an alternative global financial and trading system to that presently dominated by the US, EU, IMF, World Bank and other players.

The Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) is Putin's variation on the failed CIS and his multipolar strategy for the Eurasian region within the larger global multipolar strategy. It has much less to do with imperialistic Eurasianist geostrategic thought than with an economic development strategy for Eurasia in which Russia becomes a transportation and trade hub for this mega-region, which is also intended to be a bridge between the Asian Pacific region and Europe. Russia's geographic comparative advantages make this a sound strategy.

That this has nothing to do with empire-building and everything to do with developing trade links across the Eurasian continent is clear when we look at EEU efforts such as offering free trade zones with countries far afield from central Eurasia. In October 2014 Syria requested talks on a FTZ, to which Moscow and the EEC responded positively. In April 2015 Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev offered Thailand a FTZ with the EEC. In May Vietnam became the first country to sign a FTZ agreement with the EEU. At the EEC summit on July 6th Russian presidential aide foreign policy Yuri Ushakov announced that India and the EEC had agreed to create a working group for exploring an India-EEC FTZ. A recent Kazakhstani report indicates that more than 30 countries - including Zimbabwe, Jordan, Mongolia and Albania - have applied to the Eurasian Economic Commission for a FTZ with the EEU (http://en.tengrinews.kz/politics_sub/Over-30-countries-interested-in-signing-free-trade-agreement-261289/).

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) started out as a joint Sino-Russian project enthusiastically backed by Putin as an economic integration forum for economic cooperation and development in the eastern, Asian parts of Eurasia. When relations with NATO irretrievably soured and southern Eurasia became increasingly threatened by the Arab winter and the global jihadist and Islamist revolutionary movements, Putin increasingly supported SCO's gradual 'securitization', which now includes a counter-terrorism center, a rapid reaction forces, and frequent military maneuvers.

Putin as Foreign Policy Tactician

Putin has demonstrated considerable tactical brilliance in foreign affairs, responding quickly to changing circumstances in often surprising ways that have caught friends and foes off guard. He is very good at adjusting to, and taking advantage of changes in the international environment. For example, in the wake of the Arab winter and disenchantment throughout the Middle East with American policy, Putin has parlayed this dynamic through aggressive diplomacy, developing new relationships and deepening old ones across the Arab world. Recently, Putin has moved in on American 'allies' like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, deploying Russia's considerable energy and defense industries to woo such embattled Arab leaders. More recently, a parade of Arab leaders came to the Kremlin to pursue similar deals. In June and August the United Arab Emirate's (UAE) Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed abu Niyah visited Moscow. In the wake of substantial growth in the two countries' trade volume over the last three years, this summer's visits led to joint deals on developing oil projects in Siberia, infrastructure projects in Russia, Cuba, and Africa, and food security programs for Africa. In late August along with the UAE prince, King Hussein of Jordan and Egyptian President Sisi visited Putin in the Kremlin. In addition to trade, these visits included talks on what to do about the growing strength of ISIS in the Levant.

The West's ineffective, some would say feckless and even destabilizing policy in Syria has provided another opening for Putin. Probably as a result of his talks with UAE and Saudi sheikhs and Egyptian President Sisi, Putin has proposed a new anti-ISIS coalition for Syria and Iraq. First, Putin's plan is to bring together the armies of Syria and Iraq and the Kurdish Peshmerga militia and inflict a more concerted ground war on the Islamic State. Second, the countries funding Syrian opposition groups should be persuaded to coordinate their actions with the Syrian-Iraqi-Kurdish coalition.

Putin is also good at turning setbacks into victories or at least draws. Thus, as the regime Russia's semi-ally Syrian President Bashar Assad seemed on the verge of being overrun by rebel forces in 2013 and US President Barack Obama was preparing to perhaps deliver the coup de grace with an air war on Assad in response to Assad's alleged use of chemical weapons against civilians, Putin stepped in offering to negotiate the removal of all of Assad's chemical weapons out of Syria. The implementation of this plan appears to have resolved the chemical weapons issue and given the Assad regime a new lease on life.

Similarly, Putin was able to wrest victory of sorts from the jaws of defeat, when he suffered what appeared to be a major strategic setback in Ukraine after the illegal seizure of power by anti-Russian elements in Kiev in February 2004. This threatened the loss of a more or less friendly regime next door and of the naval base for Russia's Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, Crimea. At the same time, the Maidan revolution's neofascist element posed the real risk of violence against ethnic Russians in Crimea and Donbass. Putin killed all these 'birds with one stone', when he stealthily occupied and annexed Crimea. So far his efforts to support Donbass's anti-Kiev rebels have not ended in a final decision, but the Donbass population has been somewhat protected from Kiev's brutal anti-terrorist operation and neofascist-dominated volunteer battalions, who have wreaking more havoc in Kiev and central and western Ukraine recently than in eastern Ukraine.

The August 2008 Georgian-Ossetiyan war followed a similar pattern, but with a better outcome for Moscow. Putin rescued victory from the defeat that would have resulted if Mikheil Saakashvili's offensive into South Ossetiya ended in Georgia's reestablishment of control over the breakaway region. Not only would Moscow have been proven of being incapable of protecting an ally it had sworn to protect when ultra-nationalist Georgian leader Zviad Gamsakhurdia repressed that region and Abkhaziya and Ajariya as well. Moscow would have had to deal with its Ossetiyans from North Ossetiya streaming over the border to help their ethnic compatriots in the south in the insurgency that would have inevitably developed, with or without Russian assistance. The likelihood that a success in South Ossetiya would have prompted Saakashvili to repeat the action in breakaway Abkhaziya would have produced the same threat dynamic for Russia's interests and hence Putin's authority, for the Abkhaziyans were also under Russian protection and have several fraternally ethnic fellow-Circassian nationalities just north over the border in Russia's North Caucasus republics of Adygeya, Kabardino-Balkariya, and Karachaevo-Cherkessiya.

Both the Georgian and Ukrainian episodes reflect Putin's tactical effectiveness, but not strategic brilliance or even sound strategic planning in difficult, albeit, dilemmas. South Ossetiya and Abkhaziya had been left in vulnerable positions with limited effort to deter Saakashvili from his adventures. Thus, Putin had no grand strategy for 'recreating the Soviet Union'. Instead of seizing Tbilisi or much larger chunks of Georgian territory, such as the Poti seaport, Putin took limited action protecting the Ossetiyans and Abhkaziyans (and Russia's and his own prestige in the bargain, to be sure).

Similarly, in Ukraine Putin has not 'marched on Kiev' or 'forged a land corridor from Crimea to Transdniestr, as many hysterically predicted. Why Putin has not even encouraged the Donbass rebels or use the Russian army to seize even all the territory of Donetsk and Luhanks Oblasts for the Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk People's Republic to seize. Thus, as in Georgia, Putin's support for the rebels and surgical use of small incursions by Russian military was a spur of the moment defensive reaction and innovation undertaken to salvage victory when defeat was imminent. Even the apparent stroke of genius that was his Crimean revanche can be brought into question, given that the Russian General Staff must have had contingency plans for such operations in the event developments - such as war or chaos in the relevant regions - necessitated Russian action. Nevertheless, we do not know if he first broached the idea or someone else, and how much of the stealth tactical approach can be credited to a design of his own.

In both the Georgian and Ukrainian cases, Putin seems to have overreacted tactically in order to ensure the success of his strategy of maintaining Russia's hegemony in the post-Soviet space. In Georgia, he could have gotten by without recognizing the independence of South Ossetiya and Abkhaziya. A heavy military presence in both breakaway republics would have been enough to deter another Georgian gambit. This would have left Putin with bargaining chips for the future. In Ukraine, Putin could have won the moral high ground by simply occupying Crimea until a settlement had been reached based on the broken February 20th agreement. Using this card, stationing tens of thousands of troops along the Russian-Ukrainian border along the Donbass, and appealing to the UN for negotiations on, and peacekeepers to help enforce a new grand bargain in Ukraine would been a better strategy.

The 'new cold war' (a clumsy term) that emerged from the Ukrainian crisis has sharply reduced but not eliminated Russia's opportunities in the Western vector. Nevertheless, Putin has left the door open for a 'detente' with the West while pursuing opportunities in energy trade and other spheres by taking advantage of, and attempting to create rifts in Europe. He has plied existing inroads such as approaching European countries with which Russia has long-standing historical and cultural affinity such as Slavic roots (Serbia, Bulgaria, and Slovakia) and Orthodox Christian heritage (Greece and the aforementioned Slavic countries). He also has cleverly courted political outliers from the European liberal consensus such as Hungary and Austria and conservative and even some nationalist elements across the continent.

Putin as Domestic Strategist

Putin has demonstrated less strategic competence domestically. Successes include the creation of Russia's Stabilization Fund, sound fiscal and currency policies, and considerably successful development of Russia's comparative advantages in energy and the defense industry to fill the coffers. These policies have helped Russia through two global economic crises and the present sanctions, but they have not produced a breakthrough in the formation of a robust manufacturing or high technology sector or overall free market economy. The original goal of creating giant state-owned national energy conglomerates like GazProm and RosNeft was to produce revenues to fund other branches of the economy so Russia would not continue to be a mere energy and natural resource 'faucet' for other economies. This restructuring transition never occurred, except in farming and agriculture production - not a big money maker.

Politically, Putin has been more successful tactically than strategically, in my view. Putin's strategy from the start was to strengthen the state even at the expense of democratization. Stability would create a platform for reform. While I have disagreed with his domestic goals - the downsides of which are usually exaggerated by the Western media - there is no doubt that initially he had a strategy that seemed to be a kind of neo-Stolypinism.

The idea, which I will develop in a later article, was that Putin would be a modern day Pyotr Stolypin, the Tsarist era reform-minded Prime Minister assassinated in Kiev in 2012, whom Putin mentioned frequently in his first few years as president in the early 2000s. Putin would be tough on terrorists and radical opposition activity but would also implement a gradual reform program to modernize and liberalize Russia's economy. There was some emphasis on the need even avoid foreign entanglements, as Stolypin and his predecessor Sergei Witte urged.

Unfortunately, Putin's domestic policy soon evolved into 'Stolypinism' without the liberal component. Pressure was exerted not just on radical opposition activity but opposition forces with radical ideas or just ideas radically different from Putin and his inner circle.

Economic reform has been minimal in comparison with Stolypin's ambitious plans, and Putin has in fact increased the state's role in the economy, which has only strengthened corruption's grip on Russian state and society. Putin's failure to avoid foreign entanglements was never a promise he made, and he could not be blamed for breaking it if he had, for Western policies (such as NATO and EU expansion, among others) and developments such as the Arab spring and China's rise have forced him to take assertive and sometimes aggressive foreign policy measures.

Putin as Domestic Tactician

Given his goals, Putin has demonstrated tactical effectiveness, even brilliance in domestic affairs. He has deployed liberal economic and financial specialists in government to good effect in monetary and fiscal policy. Putin has been able on occasion to co-opt moderate political liberals into government - such as former Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin, leading members of liberal democratic 'Yabloko' party, among others. He has set up specialized institutions (the Public Chamber, the Presidential Council on Human Rights, and public councils attached to government ministries) to co-opt liberals into 'constructive' activity and provide a mechanism from societal and opposition groups. He has been able to do this while cracking down on liberal democratic parties, limiting but not eliminating their rights and opportunities to engage in politics.

The liberal interregnum between Putin's second and third terms under the presidency of his close associate Dmitry Medvedev was a successful tactical not a strategic shift, at least in its ultimate outcome if not necessarily in its original intent. Some of us would have preferred it was a strategic shift towards liberalization and democratization. Alas, as former Prime Minister, the late Viktor Chernomyrdin, once said: 'We wanted things to be better, but they ended as they always do.'

Conclusion

In sum, Putin is a competent, even very good strategist, bot not a great one. Putin expanded, deepened and improved upon Primakov's multipolar doctrine. In a logical response to the West's attempt to isolate Russia, Putin has energetically and somewhat deftly intensified Russian diplomacy in the other regions of the world. No genius in this, but considerable competence. Domestically, Putin's strategy is mediocre at best; better in economics than in politics. In economics he has achieved stability through a strategy of frugality, energy development, and 'saving for a rainy day.' In politics, Putin unfortunately has followed a long Russian pattern of overreacting to instability and excessively centralizing power in Moscow as opposed to taking a federative approach. Functionally, he has concentrated power in the executive branch, denuding the parliament and the judiciary. This has rarely achieved the desired result in Russia. In time corruption, stagnation, ossification render the state unable to respond effectively to international developments and internal challenges, leading to destabilization, palace coups, revolutions, and the like.

Tactically, Putin is very good, even superb. He is able - within the framework of his goals and strategy - to employ effective tools in the implementation of tactical responses to challenges and setbacks in foreign relations. He often turns seeming strategic defeats into tactical even strategic victories. In domestic politics, although his goals and strategy display a failure to draw the proper conclusions from Russian history, his tactics show some learning from history. He effectively uses liberal economists and ministers in economics and democrats in quasi-state public bodies.

In all these ways, Putin can be considered the hybrid regime's or the new authoritarianism's penultimate practitioner. However, this does not mean that the system and methodology he has designed holds out anything more than meta-stability and mid-term life expectancy. In order to get beyond this limitation, another tactical or strategic shift to domestic liberalization is called for. In foreign policy, staying the course while avoiding excesses (S-300 sales to Iran and indiscriminate nuclear technology sales) and overreactions should be the strategy.

 [return to Contents] 

 #32
Politico.com
September 30, 2015
The Real Story Behind Putin's Syria Strikes
Inside the Kremlin rivalry that radicalized Russia's strongman.
By Steven Lee Myers
Steven Lee Myers is a correspondent for the New York Times. He is the author of The New Tsar: The Rise and Reign of Vladimir Putin, from which this article has been excerpted.

The roots of Russia's bold intervention in Syria-which began in earnest on Wednesday with airstrikes against opponents of President Bashar al-Assad's government near the city of Homs-extend to the beginning of the Arab Spring in early 2011, when Vladimir Putin served as prime minister nominally under his protégé and hand-picked successor, Dmitri Medvedev. Many in Russia and beyond had placed in Medvedev their hopes for a steady, if slow, political transition away from Putin's authoritarian instincts during his two terms as president. Putin seemed even to have retreated from the day-to-day business of the state, especially in foreign affairs. The uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East, however, disturbed Putin profoundly. So did Medvedev's handling of yet another American-led military operation in the region. Russia's abstention from the United Nations Security Council vote authorizing the use of military force to stop the slaughter in Libya in 2011 forced Putin's hand and set the stage for his return to the presidency the next year-and a far more confrontational posture to the United States and Europe, one that resonates in the Russian bombs exploding in Syria today.

Only days before his trip to Davos in January 2011 for the annual conference there, Dmitri Medvedev had pushed a new nuclear arms agreement he had negotiated with Barack Obama through the Duma. It was a sign that the "reset" in relations that the Americans had sought with Russia was beginning to bear fruit in the three years in which Medvedev had served, formally at least, as Russia's most powerful official. While in Switzerland, he pledged to revive the talks to enter the World Trade Organization that his temperamental predecessor, Vladimir Putin, had upended unexpectedly in 2009 after negotiators had nearly cinched the deal. With the election of a new parliament scheduled for the end of the year and the presidential election three months after that, Medvedev increasingly presented a competing path for the future, and the insiders in the Kremlin and the government gravitated either toward his or toward Putin's.

The first question Medvedev faced at the Davos conference was one he had not addressed in his remarks-and one that would prove decisive. It was about the Arab Spring, which had begun in Tunis in December 2010 and inspired protests that swept through the Arab world, toppling Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and threatening Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi in Libya. Medvedev replied not only that he recognized the democratic aspirations of the thousands who had poured into Tunisia's streets to protest corruption, poverty and lack of political rights, but also that governments had a responsibility to address those grievances. He went on to emphasize the importance of the relationship between governed and government in ways that could have applied equally to Russia, where the will of the people had been managed out of the electoral process. "When governments fail to keep up with social change and fail to meet people's hopes, disorganization and chaos ensue, sadly," Medvedev said, apparently warming to the theme. "This is a problem of governments themselves and the responsibility they bear. Even if governments in power find many of the demands made unacceptable they still must remain in dialogue with all the different groups because otherwise they lose their real foundation."

The protests in the Arab world had galvanized Russia's beleaguered opposition, at least in the still safe space of the Internet, and Medvedev's remarks sounded sympathetic to things that Putin feared most. Medvedev, while hardly endorsing protests at home, sounded irresolute. The American vice president, Joseph Biden, even had the audacity to quote him during a speech at Moscow State University in March 2011, in which he declared that Russians should have the same rights as anyone else. "Most Russians want to choose their national and local leaders in competitive elections," Biden said in what amounted to an endorsement in the undeclared campaign taking shape. "They want to be able to assemble freely, and they want a media to be independent of the state. And they want to live in a country that fights corruption. That's democracy. They're the ingredients of democracy. So I urge all of you students here: Don't compromise on the basic elements of democracy. You need not make that Faustian bargain."

Behind the scenes, Biden used his visit to press Medvedev to support a United Nations Security Council resolution to authorize a military intervention in Libya, where peaceful protests had turned into an armed insurrection against the country's dictator, Muammar al-Qaddafi. The United States, its NATO allies, and some Arab nations wanted to establish a "no fly" zone over the country to prevent the bloody suppression of the rebels. Medvedev agreed, persuaded by the humanitarian case for intervention, despite the opposition of the Foreign Ministry and other security officials who saw the prospect of a NATO-led campaign outside its border as an extension of American hegemony to another part of the world. He had drifted dangerously far from Putin's path, making a confrontation seem inevitable.

Only weeks before, Putin had warned that the uprisings in Libya and other countries would fuel the rise of Islamic extremists allied with al-Qaeda, aided and abetted by shortsighted sympathizers in the West trying to overthrow autocratic leaders. He was not wrong about the rise in extremism, which would later consume Libya and exacerbate a grinding civil war in Syria, a far more important ally of Russia in the Middle East. Putin's support for the autocratic dictators of Libya and Syria was widely viewed through the prism of Russia's geopolitical interests, including energy projects and a contract to build a railway linking Libya's coastal cities (negotiated by Putin's friend, Vladimir Yakunin), massive arms sales and, in the case of Syria, Russia's only military base outside the former Soviet Union. In truth, his wariness ran much deeper. There existed a dark association in his mind between aspirations for democracy and the rise of radicalism, between elections and the chaos that would inevitably result. "Let's take a look back at history, if you don't mind," Putin said in Brussels in February. "Where did Khomeini, the mastermind of the Iranian revolution, live? He lived in Paris. And he was supported by most of Western society. And now the West is facing the Iranian nuclear program. I remember our partners calling for fair, democratic elections in the Palestinian territories. Excellent! Those elections were won by Hamas." Reflexively, instinctively, he imagined the uprising in Libya as simply another step toward a revolution being orchestrated for Moscow.

Perhaps it was because he was younger, perhaps because he never served in the security services, perhaps because of his convivial nature, but Medvedev did not share this bleak distrust of the West, of democracy, of human nature. He had spent the first three years of his presidency wooed by Barack Obama's administration, and now not only the United States but countries with much closer relations to Russia, including France and Italy, were appealing to him to help prevent a slaughter of civilians in Libya. And so, on his instruction, Russia abstained when the Security Council voted on United Nations Resolution 1973 on March 17, authorizing the use of military force to stop Qaddafi's forces from moving on the insurgents' stronghold in eastern Libya.

Medvedev's decision provoked a revolt among Russia's diplomats and security officials. Russia's ambassador to Libya, Vladimir Chamov, sent a cable to the president warning against the loss of an important ally. Medvedev fired him, but the ambassador returned to Moscow and declared publicly that the president was acting against Russia's interests. When NATO launched its first airstrikes two days later-a far more punishing initial barrage to destroy the country's air defenses than many expected-Medvedev seemed to many in Russia to be complicit in yet another American-led war.

One of the prime minister's closest advisers later claimed that Putin had not read the Security Council's resolution before the vote, deferring to the president and being preoccupied as he was with "economic diplomacy" rather than foreign affairs. Once the bombing started, however, Putin understood its import; the unstated goal of the NATO air war was not merely the protection of civilians caught in the crossfire, but rather the overthrow of Qaddafi's regime. He believed that Medvedev had been duped. "Putin read through the text of the resolution and saw that some countries could use the rubbery language to act the way they did," the adviser said. As NATO bombs rained on Libya, Putin spoke out. Touring a weapons factory, he denounced the United Nations resolution as "flawed and inadequate." "If one reads it, then it immediately becomes clear that it authorizes anyone to take any measures against a sovereign state. All in all, it reminds me of a medieval call to crusade, when someone calls upon others to go somewhere and free someone else." He compared it to the American wars of the previous decade, the bombings of Serbia, Afghanistan and, under a fabricated pretext, Iraq. "Now it's Libya's turn."

Putin's spokesman said he had merely expressed a personal opinion, but with Medvedev already facing criticism for the resolution, it was an unmistakable rebuke. Medvedev promptly assembled the Kremlin's press pool at his dacha outside Moscow to defend Russia's abstention and, at least obliquely, to criticize Putin. He wore a leather bomber jacket with a fur collar, zipped up tight. Appearing stern and a little uncomfortable, even nervous, he said the Security Council's action had been justified in light of Libya's actions. He sounded defensive. Russia's decision not to veto the resolution had been "a qualified decision" to help find a resolution to the exploding conflict. "Everything that is happening in Libya is a result of the Libyan leadership's absolutely intolerable behavior and the crimes that they have committed against their own people." Even as he expressed concern about the extent of the allied bombing campaign (which would continue for eight more months), he warned that Putin's language would not help end the fighting. "I think we need to be very careful in our choice of words. It is inadmissible to say anything that could lead to a clash of civilizations, talk of 'crusades' and so on. This is unacceptable."

As his term wound down, Medvedev redoubled his efforts to make liberalizing reforms in the economy, as if his time were running out. In one instance he decreed that government ministers could no longer serve on the boards of the state corporations that Putin had made a centerpiece of his economic policy. Medvedev himself had served on Gazprom's board while chief of staff and later deputy prime minister, but the move to bar officials from wearing two hats was an effort to weaken his chief rival in Putin's camp, Igor Sechin, who had served as deputy prime minister and chairman of Rosneft. (Putin ultimately agreed to the measure, but exempted Gazprom, where Putin's close ally and former prime minister Viktor Zubkov remained in place.) Medvedev's desire to remain as president for another term was palpable, though he could not risk openly declaring it. He and Putin may have been fighting a primary of sorts, but the only vote that mattered was Putin's, and Medvedev knew it.

In May, after three years in office, Medvedev held his first press conference, the event that Putin had used each year to great effect to demonstrate his mastery of politics and government. Medvedev's was a pale imitation of Putin's performances, though, and coming so late in his term, it seemed an act of political desperation. He held it at Skolkovo, the still evolving technological center he hoped would one day become a new Silicon Valley. Although he professed allegiance to Putin and praised their mutual commitment to the country's interests, he said he did not think that relations with NATO "were that bad," despite the war in Libya, and declared that Ukraine had every right to pursue its integration with Europe, something that Putin had viewed as a cataclysmic threat. In response to a question about replacing regional governors, he seemed to allude to the perpetuity of Putin's power, saying that leaders should not cling to office for too long, but rather make way for a new generation, as was happening in Tunisia and Egypt. "I think this is important because no one can stay in power forever," he said. "People who harbor such illusions usually come to a rather bad end, and the world has given us quite a few examples of late."

As the war in Libya dragged on, however, Medvedev's handling of the presidency became an open target for criticism in the media, signaled no doubt by Putin's own moves. In May, Putin announced the creation of a new organization, the All Russia People's Front, which was intended to expand the political coalition at the heart of his power and to distance him from the "party of swindlers and thieves." Within days, hundreds of organizations, unions, associations and factories were rushing to join. The sole point of the project was to make Putin, not the country's sitting president, the "national leader" who would unite them. Medvedev pressed ahead with his proposals to reform the economy, freeing up capital and innovation, but he was losing ground. He met privately with 27 of the country's leading businessmen-the oligarchs who like everyone else awaited the resolution of the presidential "primary" with growing alarm. He implored them to support his proposals, and by implication his candidacy, or to accept the stagnant status quo. Some of those in attendance interpreted Medvedev's remarks as an ultimatum for them to choose, but his message was so muddled that the participants could not be sure of his desire-or his ability-to fight to hold office. Afterward, they mocked his appeals, according to one of those who attended: "Have you already decided?"

In June, in an interview with the Financial Times, Medvedev acknowledged for the first time that he wanted to return for a second term, but then he had to admit that it was not his decision alone. "I think that any leader who occupies such a post as president, simply must want to run," he said. "But another question is whether he is going to decide whether he's going to run for the presidency or not. So his decision is somewhat different from his willingness to run. So this is my answer."

If Medvedev wanted to assert real political independence, he did not show it. He could have used any of his appearances or interviews to openly declare his intention to run, perhaps even against Putin himself, presenting a real choice to voters. Instead, he was left awkwardly not answering the question that by the summer of 2011 seemed to have dragged the country into a prolonged political crisis. Unnatural disasters unfolded, like sad symptoms of the country's paralysis, including the sinking of a ferryboat on the Volga River in July that drowned more than 120 people and the crash of an airplane carrying the players and coaches of one of the country's professional hockey teams, Lokomotiv Yaroslavl. Medvedev was scheduled days later to hold a conference in the team's hometown, Yaroslavl, and it seemed a terrible omen.

By then, even senior ministers were afraid to attend these conferences lest it be seen as an endorsement of Medvedev over Putin. Putin's steely charisma, his absolute determination, his ability to remain above the trials of Russian life, shielded him from blame when tragedies like these struck. Medvedev, though, looked overwhelmed as president. Perhaps by design, public blame for the sinking and the crash flowed toward him.

Putin's prominence in state media suddenly surged noticeably, an orchestrated campaign that seemed to highlight the personal, even physical, differences between the two men. Putin appeared at the summer camp of the youth group Nashi; he prayed at one of the holiest sites of Russian Orthodoxy; he dove in the Black Sea to the ruins of an ancient Greek city and, behold, surfaced clutching two amphorae. That his spokesman, Dmitri Peskov, later acknowledged that the "discovery" was staged was an unnoticed footnote to the televised image of a man in a tight wetsuit, still fit and very much in his prime.

By the time United Russia's delegates gathered in September for a party congress ahead of parliamentary elections in December, there remained a shivering uncertainty, even bewilderment, as another political transition approached. Even as they drafted their party platform for the elections, then only 10 weeks away, no one-not even the party leaders, or the closest aides of Putin or Medvedev-knew whether a choice had been made or whether the excruciating limbo ahead of the 2012 presidential campaign would continue. Inside the stadium on that Saturday morning, the delegates listened to speeches extolling the stunning transformation of an ideological empire that had rotted and collapsed and now risen again, presided over, it was made clear, by one man: Putin. Boris Gryzlov, the Duma's speaker, looked like an apparatchik of old, his face stern and pinched as he read the party's platform, droning on about pledges of prosperity and competence.

Eventually, the lights dimmed and the crowd hushed. From the wings, lit like rock stars, Putin and Medvedev entered the congress, striding side by side, their shoulders swaying in tandem. Putin had a look of utter assuredness, which is what his supporters have said the country always craved, not the shamed visage of a cowering leader of a diminished power. Putin spoke first, adhering to the protocol of political rank. He began by referring to "the most pressing challenges facing our nation," and then addressed the most acute question on the delegates' minds with an elaborate tease. He stopped short of revealing what exactly the answer was-just as he had done in the private councils he had held with his various aides in the preceding days. "I am aware that United Russia members, supporters, and the delegates of this conference are expecting the Russian president and prime minister to voice proposals on the country's power configuration and government structure after the elections," he said. "I want to tell you directly that we have long since reached an agreement on what we will be doing in the future. That agreement was reached several years ago. However, following this debate as observers, both Mr. Medvedev and I said that it is hardly the most important thing: who will do which job and occupy which position. What's more important is the quality of work, what results we achieve, and how our people perceive our efforts, what their reaction is to our proposals for the nation's future development and whether they support us."

Putin's words spoke volumes about his understanding of democracy: It is not for society to decide its leaders through some semblance of an electoral campaign, but to ratify those already chosen. He announced that Medvedev would, according to a "tradition" not even a decade old, head the party's ballot in the parliamentary elections in December and thus "guarantee its anticipated and honest victory." The applause that followed seemed rote; Putin had not yet clarified the fate of either man in the tandem.

Medvedev then followed him to the dais. "Naturally, it is a pleasure to speak here," he began, smiling awkwardly. Even after four years in office, he had not yet mastered the art of political speech. "There is a special energy in this room. It is simply charged with emotions." He praised Russia's democracy and the "new level of political culture" that it had achieved, but he went on to warn that "excessive formalism and bureaucracy" posed a danger to it. The delegates listened unemotionally; his relevance seemed to dim with each word. "They lead to the stagnation and degradation of the political system," he said. "And unfortunately, we have already witnessed this in our country's history." He outlined an eight-point political agenda, all of which he had promised for nearly four years and not yet delivered: modernizing the economy and industry; ensuring salaries, pensions and health care, all precarious still; fighting corruption; strengthening the judiciary and criminal justice systems; combating illegal immigration while protecting the country's "interethnic and interreligious peace"; establishing a "modern political system"; building the nation's police and armed forces; and forging a strong "independent, sensible foreign policy."

With those words, he accepted Putin's nomination to head the party's list, and at last he addressed the agreement Putin had alluded to having reached years before. Medvedev spoke like a man reading his own political obituary; it was, in fact, one of the most bizarre resignation speeches in history. He was articulating and defending his vision for the country, even as he relinquished the post that might have made it achievable.

"I propose we decide on another very important issue which naturally concerns the party and all of our people who follow politics, namely the candidate for the role of president. In light of the proposal that I head the party list, do party work, and, if we perform well in the elections, my willingness to engage in practical work in the government, I think it's right that the party congress support the candidacy of the current prime minister, Vladimir Putin, in the role of the country's president."

In the end, perhaps, it was not a surprise. Medvedev's political stock had been sinking day by day for most of the year. Yet the shock was audible in the cavernous stadium, a collective gasp that soon turned to thunderous applause, wave after wave of it. Putin had succeeded in creating suspense and then releasing it at the moment of his choosing. He stood in front of his seat in the audience, basking in the spotlight, his eyes sparkling though his smile was tight, wry and fleeting. He did not raise his arms in triumph or otherwise act like a candidate offered the chance to seek higher office. He simply nodded knowingly, as if his return to the presidency was preordained.

After Medvedev finished speaking, Putin strode to the dais a second time and delivered a lengthy, richly detailed, policy-laden address that outlined his plans to support veterans and farmers, doctors, teachers, scientists, soldiers. It was the nuts and bolts of governance, what the Russians had come to expect over years of watching him insist upon the right policy, the right decisions, on behalf of the people. He vowed to overcome the nagging hardships of the global economic crisis, the roots of which, he pointedly noted, again, "were not in Russia." He barely mentioned Medvedev's nomination to head the party list or his own return to the presidency, which in one sudden moment had become inexorable. "We have already entered a lengthy election cycle. The elections to the State Duma will take place on December 4, to be followed by the formation of its committees and government bodies. The presidential election is scheduled for next spring. I'd like to thank you for your positive response to the proposal for me to stand for president. This is a great honor for me." He spoke as if he had not decided everything himself.

The agreement was reached several years ago, Putin had explained. Medvedev suggested as much as well, though in fact it had not happened that way. Medvedev had nurtured the hope to return for a second term at least until the beginning of September, when his public demeanor started to suggest that it might not happen. He had only learned the details of Putin's final decision the night before during a late-night meeting at Novo-Ogaryovo. When the printers printed the ballots for the delegates to use to elevate Medvedev to the head of the party, the space for his name had been left blank, filled in only after the announcement. According to one account, Putin would not even let Medvedev tell his wife until the decision had been made public. If Putin had known all along that he intended to reclaim the presidency, no one else in the government or in his inner circle had been allowed to know, let alone influence the outcome of his deliberations. He made the most momentous decision of his political career with his own counsel alone. One of Medvedev's loyalists, Arkady Dvorkovich, reacted with anguished sarcasm even as the events at the congress unfolded. In an interview the year before, Dvorkovich had acknowledged that Medvedev's plans-and really his entire presidency-had faced opposition from "those who thrive on the old system, on budget inefficiency and a resource-based economy." He never named names, but he clearly referred to those arrayed around Putin. "Now," he tweeted from the floor of the party's congress, "it's time to switch to the sports channel."

Putin never bothered to explain his reasons for returning to the presidency, to the Kremlin. He could have remained the paramount leader, even with Medvedev serving another term as president. Perhaps there was no reason but the obvious one, though according to his most ardent supporters, he felt that his successor had not been a strong enough leader. In the days and months after the announcement, the same supporters set about demeaning Medvedev for the weaknesses he showed during the war in Georgia and failing to stop NATO's war in Libya. Even the anecdote about keeping Medvedev from telling his wife was laced with the insinuation that he was hardly man enough to trust his wife not to insist that he run again. These explanations sought to justify Putin's move, but they did not explain his motive. He never felt he had to. The position was his if he wanted it, which was, in his mind apparently, explanation enough.

When protests erupted in Moscow and other cities after the parliamentary elections in December 2011 and Putin's own reelection in March 2012, it seemed for a time that the revolutionary fervor that had swept the autocracies of the Arab world was spreading north. Putin, restored to the Kremlin for a new six-year term (and the constitutional right to run for another after that), responded forcefully. The police and prosecutors suffocated the protest movement with a wave of arrests and criminal cases. Putin's Kremlin quickly undid many of the reforms Medvedev's had pursued. A steady diet of nationalistic rhetoric and policies coincided with increased spending on the military. Russia now blocked resolution after resolution at the United Nations that sought to condemn the escalating conflict in Syria, throwing its diplomatic, economic and military support behind the Assad government. As Libya descended into chaos, and Syria's civil war created the vacuum that led to the rise of the Islamic State there and in swaths of Iraq, Putin felt vindicated. As he said in his confrontational address to the United Nations on Monday, the interventions by the United States in the region (from Afghanistan in 2001, to Iraq in 2003 and Libya in 2011) spawned the turmoil whose consequences are now manifested in hundreds of thousands of deaths and the largest tide of refugees since World War II. He was drawing his own line in the sand. Putin, by forcefully intervening in Syria, was declaring that Russia would be the bulwark against a further deterioration. The question now is how long it will endure.

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