#1
The National Interest
September 25, 2015
Lowdown: What Russian Citizens Really Think of Putin and Why
The stats show that the average bus driver shares sentiments similar to the average academic when it comes to Kremlin policies. Why?
By Robert Legvold
Robert Legvold is Marshall D. Shulman Professor Emeritus in the Department of Political Science at Columbia University, where he specialized in the international relations of the post-Soviet states.
For an outsider, understanding contemporary Russian reality in any season is never easy-one senses, not even for the Russians themselves. They certainly disagree over many of its aspects. I'm in Moscow for much of this fall teaching graduate students at MGIMO and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in a video-connected classroom, as I was last fall-soaking up as much as I can, reading, watching, walking, meeting people.
Things feel different from last fall. The leadership, politicians, businessmen, analysts and the public-to the extent that it rises above its indifference to the political world-appear to have accepted the desiccated, friction-laden, arms-length U.S.-Russian relationship as the "new normal." And it's with something of a shrug. But then that also seems to be happening in the United States.
Television, unlike last fall, is not saturated from morning to night with lurid coverage of the violence in Donbas, although the political fights and protests in Kyiv get plenty of attention. Ukraine has been replaced by the migration crisis in Europe, and now competes with the menace of ISIS. Most Russians who follow current events think Ukraine is sinking into a "frozen conflict"-a ragged ceasefire appears to be holding, and neither Moscow nor the Western countries have any desire to see it collapse. The public, however, as measured in polls in mid-August remain more skeptical. Seventy percent believed renewed military conflict was likely or very likely; only 21 percent thought not.
As for ideas of what to do next or a larger Russian strategic agenda in Ukraine, one well-connected Duma deputy told me they don't exist: Russia is simply sitting back and watching events unfold in Kyiv. It will focus on helping to create and defend functioning social, economic and military institutions in the shattered portions of Donetsk and Lugansk controlled by the separatists. But few expect the provisions in the Minsk II agreement aiming at a political settlement to work, nor do they see Moscow straining to make them work. Maybe Moscow will be minimally unhelpful in economic relations with Kyiv, if Kyiv helps ease Crimea's electricity and water-supply problems. As for public attitudes toward Ukraine, the ratio between "very favorable" and "very bad" has flipped 180 degrees since January 2014 (then 66 percent were "very favorable;" in May 2015, the latest figures, 26 percent; "very unfavorable," in January 2014l 26 percent; May 2015, 59 percent).
Scenes of thousands of desperate refugees besieging Europe and the turmoil in the Middle East, as one senior scholar said to me, provide further support for the Putin regime. (An MGIMO student asked his Fletcher counterparts: "Why do you call it the Putin regime? Do you call it the Obama regime?" They then stressed the widespread public support for the government.) Watching all this distress, the average Russian credits Putin with sparing the country the same, and for most Russians, having been through the 1990s, stability ranks very high. Added to the deepening and spreading sense of nationalism (the "krim nash" ["Crimea is ours"] tee-shirts are less on display, but the sentiment persists and the 85 percent support for the annexation has scarcely budged since March 2014), together with the strong tendency to blame Russian woes on the United States, this sense of Putin's leadership as the best guarantee of continued stability helps to explain Putin's popularity. Many Russians will tell you that it is not really at 83 percent, as the polls show, but almost none doubts that it is genuinely high. The fly in the ointment is that no other politician's ratings are half as high, nor is the government's, nor are those of government policies, although approval of the direction in which the country is headed last month was 55 percent, down nine points from June, but 14 points higher than when Putin returned to the presidency in 2012. (And it might be pointed out, considerably higher than similar polls in the United States and most European countries.)
Thus, if in some U.S. quarters, people look at $40-50 barrel oil, a ruble-dollar ratio of 70:1, negative growth of 4 percent this year, and slow or no growth for at least three more years, with attendant inflation and the erosion of Russians' disposable income, and assume discontent must already be building below the surface, the evidence is difficult to come by. True, some very smart Russian analysts have assured me that something has to give. As one put it, sooner rather later either the lid will blow off with unpredictable consequences or Putin and his colleagues will make a U-turn, and, at least at the level of atmospherics, try to release pressure from Russia-Western tensions. But they are in a minority, and a far larger number, both partisans and critics of those in power, either smugly or in resignation, expect things to stagger on pretty much as they are.
Russia, of course, has a history of appearing stable until it isn't-of looking stolidly immobile, until bunt, that strong Russian word for explosive rebellion, erupts. Maybe somewhere deep in Russia's fraught existence that potential is slowly congealing. Dmitri Trenin, one of Russia's most thoughtful observers, has written that, if Russia does not surmount the current crisis (of the Russian economy) within a crisis (of Russia-West relations), not only the regime, but the country are in peril.
To the outsider, however, the signs are not there yet. This summer, when asked whether mass protests were likely in their city or region over the "declining quality of life and in defense of civil rights," 76 percent of Russians said "no," 18 percent said "entirely possible," 10 points lower than in February 2014, and, if they did take place, 87 percent said they wouldn't join them. When in August asked whether western sanctions were a problem for them, 27 percent said, "yes," and 67 percent, "no." Sixty-eight percent supported ignoring Western demands, and 20 percent favored concessions to ease sanctions. As for the Russian government's counter sanctions on Western food imports, 67 percent supported them, 21 percent opposed them, and 58 percent thought they had worked in gaining Western "respect" for Russia.
That latter proposition is not an insignificant part of what many Russians believe Putin has restored to Russia. Respect, for the average Russian, a sensitive Russian friend said to me, is very important, because "over the centuries they have been denied it: denied it by those who ruled them, denied it by those who bossed them, denied it even by one another, and denied it by the outside world." As Carnegie Moscow Center's Andrei Kolesnikov recently wrote:
"A five-minute conversation with most Russian citizens will reveal that they still feel totally defenseless in the face of pressures from big and small bosses, utility companies, fire and tax inspectors, courts, the police, military draft boards, and even random street patrols by Cossacks. At the same time, the post-Soviet Russian citizen seems satisfied by (or pretends to be satisfied by) a feeling of belonging to something big and faceless, a crowd that shares pride in itself and its leader."
The negative side of this with direct bearing on relations with the United States is how Russians answer the question, "Is the United States using Russia's current difficulties to turn it into a second-rate power and a mere supplier of raw materials for the West?" As of June 2015, 86 percent of respondents agreed, 44 percent of them "entirely," and only 7 percent disagreed. Lest the reader think these results are simply a function of the fog of anti-Americanism dominating contemporary Russian discourse, in 1998, during the Yeltsin period, 75 percent agreed, and 17 percent disagreed. When recently asked whether Russia's relations with the West can be "genuinely friendly" or will "they always be rooted in mistrust," 24 percent selected the sunny choice, 62 percent the other.
The average Russian bus driver, let alone the average villager tending her garden, of course, has even less influence over national politics and the course of Russian foreign policy than the average Boston Red Sox fan or a South Dakota farmer has over U.S. politics and foreign policy. But, if from this obvious fact the U.S. political establishment concludes, as the New York Times columnist, David Brooks, did earlier this year, that the Russian challenge is essentially "Putin, a thug sitting atop a failing regime"-a saltier way of expressing what appears to be a widespread impression in Washington and the national media-the real challenge will go unrecognized. That is so, because the surveys I have been quoting included not just bus drivers and villagers, but a fair portion of the middle-class business community, political elite and no doubt leadership at the top. They may have somewhat more sophisticated and polished responses, but their sentiments break down in basically the same way.
[All of the data I cited are from surveys conducted by the Levada Center, Russia's most professional polling organization.]
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#2
Moscow Times
September 25, 2015
Putin Praises American Qualities in Interview with U.S. Television
By Anna Dolgov
In excerpts from an upcoming American television interview, Russia's President Vladimir Putin said he admired American creativity and open-mindedness - a break from his usual anti-U.S. rhetoric ahead of a planned meeting with U.S. President Barack Obama.
CBS network's "60 Minutes," an American TV news program, posted an interview preview on their website Thursday.
In the transcript correspondent Charlie Rose told Putin that he was a frequent subject of discussion in the U.S., to which Putin said, "Maybe they have nothing else to do in America but talk about me," before laughing.
Putin denounced suggestions that he wields authoritarian power in Russia, insisting his actions are made with the best interests of his nation at heart, and shrugging off the "tsar" descriptor often applied to him.
The name "does not fit me," Putin said, adding: "It's not important how I'm called, whether these are well-wishers, friends or political opponents. It's important what you think about you, what you must do for the interest of the country which has entrusted you with the position as the head of the Russian state."
The Russian president acknowledged he was "curious about what's going on" in the United States given that "America exerts enormous influence on the situation in the world as a whole."
Putin has frequently accused the United States of meddling in other countries affairs and trying to impose its will on Moscow's erstwhile allies, such as Ukraine, and claimed that Western governments seek to "dismember" Russia.
However, when asked during the CBS latest interview about what he admired about the United States, Putin responded: "I like the creativity."
"Creativity when it comes to your tackling problems," he added. "Their openness - openness and open-mindedness - because it allows them to unleash the inner potential of their people. And thanks to that, America has attained such amazing results in developing their country."
Putin will meet with Obama in New York on Monday, when attending the United Nations General Assembly, both Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov and the White House have confirmed, Reuters reported. The meeting marks the leaders' first sit-down conversation in over a year.
Obama canceled a meeting with Putin in 2013 after Russia granted asylum to CIA whistleblower Edward Snowden, and has avoided one-on-one encounters with the Russian leader after Moscow annexed Crimea from Ukraine last year.
Obama and Putin have only crossed paths at international gatherings, such as a D-Day celebration in France in June 2014, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Beijing the following November, and an economic summit in Australia the same month, but conducted no sit-down meetings.
Charlie Rose is a talk show host and journalist who has interviewed numerous celebrities and politicians, including Syrian President Bashar Assad, an interview for which he won a Peabody Award.
Rose's full interview with Putin airs Sept. 27 on CBS.
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#3
www.rt.com
September 25, 2015
Putin: 'Not important how I'm called, only what I do for my country'
It is important what you do for your country, not the names you are being called, Russian President Vladimir Putin told CBS's '60 Minutes,' saying that the nickname 'tsar' does not fit him.
Charlie Rose sat down with Putin to discuss, among other issues, how the world views the Russian leader. CBS has published a preview of the interview.
Rose pointed out that some people have been referring to Putin as a 'tsar.' Putin responded that people call him various names, but added he believes the description "does not fit me."
"It's not important how I'm called, whether these are well-wishers, friends or political opponents. It's important what you think about you, what you must do for the interest of the country which has entrusted you with the position as the head of the Russian state."
When asked what he admires about America, Putin said that what he likes most is "the creativity."
"Creativity when it comes to your tackling problems. Their openness - openness and open-mindedness - because it allows them to unleash the inner potential of their people. And thanks to that, America has attained such amazing results in developing their country," Putin said. "America exerts enormous influence on the situation in the world as a whole."
Putin also discussed Syria, stressing that President Bashar Assad's government is essential to prevent Syria from falling into the same chaos as Libya and Iraq.
"It's my deep belief that any actions to the contrary in order to destroy the legitimate government [of Syria] will create a situation which you can witness now in the other countries of the region or in other regions, for instance in Libya, where all the state institutions are disintegrated. We see a similar situation in Iraq," Putin stressed.
"There is no other solution to the Syrian crisis than strengthening the effective government structures and rendering them help in fighting terrorism. But at the same time, urging them to engage in positive dialogue with the rational opposition and conduct reform."
The Russian leader stressed that US-led coalition partners need to understand that only the Syrian people are entitled "to decide who should govern their country and how."
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#4
Business New Europe
www.bne.eu
September 25, 2015
MOSCOW BLOG: Putin looking limber for his UN Syria leap
Ben Aris in Moscow
Russian President Vladimir Putin will meet with US President Barack Obama on the sidelines of a UN general assembly to be held in New York on September 28, their first meeting since 2013.
The White House said Russian sanctions will be high on the agenda, but the meat of the conversation will almost certainly concern the situation in Syria. Obama has balked at holding a meeting with Putin, afraid it will make him look weak on the domestic stage.
However, with millions of refugees clogging up Europe's borders as they flee from the four-and-half-year-long civil war in Syria, Europe has been thrown into crisis and all parties feel that "something must be done". Russia has inflamed the situation. The military effort of Syria's President Bashar al-Assad has been on its back foot in recent months until the Russians recently decided to increase their military aid. Russia has been supplying Syria with materiel throughout the conflict, but now it is doing so openly.
Putin is playing a tough geopolitical card ahead of his UN speech on September 28: he has shown that he can destabilise Ukraine with impunity and will scupper any reform or regeneration effort in that country until Russia's interests are respected. Now with the increase in Russian aid to Assad he is playing the same card in Syria. The difference is that neither the US or the EU have much in the way of strategic commercial assets in Ukraine and most of the refuges from the Donbas conflict have ironically fled to Russia. However, with well over a million Syrian refugees on the EU border, the European states are feeling the impact of the Syrian crisis directly.
Desperate times - but for who?
There has been a lot of diplomatic manoeuvring ahead of the Putin-Obama meeting. The White House made it clear to the press that it was the Russians who asked for the upcoming meeting, not the US. White House press secretary Josh Earnest told the New York Times that the Kremlin was not just keen on a meeting but "desperate" for one.
The US spin on the meeting is twofold: to prevent Obama from looking weak by meeting with the Russian president, who has been cast as a modern-day Hitler by much of the international media; and to emphasis that the sanctions regime and other pressure on Russia is working, hence by extension to make the White House's policies look effective.
Russia's motives are less clear, even if the Kremlin position is well evident: it wants to have a central say about what happens next in Syria. But beyond that, what Putin hopes to get out of a meeting with Obama remains to be seen.
While the Russian leader has successfully deflected attention from his campaign in Ukraine to focus the international community on the Syrian crisis ahead of his UN speech, the country's economy is feeling a great deal of pain. And although Russia has enough resources and reserves to tough it out for at least another two years, it is also becoming increasingly clear that it cannot keep this up forever. A prolonged Iran-style sanctions regime will seriously hinder Russia's long-term development prospects, which will eventually manifest itself in domestic politics. That is still a long way off, but the Kremlin needs to find a resolution to the showdown eventually.
Syrian opportunity
The Syrian refugee crisis provides a perfect opportunity to begin walking things back from open conflict as the international community, led by the Germans, has now expressly said there is no solution in Syria without Russia's help.
The content of Putin's speech at the UN is fairly easy to predict in this light. Putin will frame his arguments in terms of the international cooperation to fight Islamic extremism and terrorism, but with countries cooperating on a multi-polar basis. He is also likely to stress that Russia remains a natural partner for Europe and indeed has remained open to international business and investment throughout the stand-off with the US since the annexation of Crimea last year.
And probably he will remind the UN that the emerging markets have more or less emerged and increasingly cooperating with each other so that the world's economy has become truly global.
Specifically on Ukraine, Putin will certainly emphasis that the terms of the Minsk II peace deal need to be adhered to. This involves Ukraine making constitutional changes to give more autonomy to the regions, an amnesty for fighters in the East, and ensuring scheduled regional elections are held in October.
Most of this is in motion but the successful completion of these Minsk II terms is not a given. The danger is if Minsk II fails then Russia will be left with a frozen conflict in Ukraine and permanent sanctions on its economy that could condemn it to stagnation for a decade.
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#5
Wall Street Journal
September 25, 2015
U.N. Speech Marks Putin's Return to Center Stage
Kremlin watchers say move in Syria may be bid to get beyond Ukraine crisis
By NATHAN HODGE
MOSCOW-Russian President Vladimir Putin is set to speak Monday at the United Nations General Assembly in New York, marking his first appearance before the world body in a decade and a return to center stage in the wake of the Ukraine crisis.
By sending military assets to Syria, Kremlin-watchers say, Mr. Putin has inserted himself into the world's biggest crisis-the wave of refugees fleeing the Middle East-and made Russia an indispensable player.
"Putin is a great tactician," said Konstantin von Eggert, a Russian political commentator and host on Kommersant FM radio. "He pre-empts the U.S. in one of the most sensitive regions of the world."
Mr. von Eggert said the Kremlin may want a bargaining position to help end Russia's isolation from the West following its annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and the ensuing conflict in eastern Ukraine.
Last November, for instance, the Russian president left the G-20 summit in Australia early after facing rebuke from fellow leaders over Russia's interventions in eastern Ukraine.
"Putin wants to leave New York not as a regional power, but as a big player in the world," said a European official who deals frequently with the Kremlin.
Russia expert Robert Legvold, however, isn't expecting relations between Washington and Moscow to be revived.
"The Obama administration has written off the Putin regime, and is persuaded that nothing can be done as long as either President Putin remains in power, or something like it remains in power," he said. "The basic assumption is: It'll only improve when something basically changes on the other side."
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#6
Research on tsarist family assassination case goes on actively - senior criminal investigator
MOSCOW. Sept 25 (Interfax) - The active stage of the new genetic tests in the assassination case of the tsarist family has begun, senior criminal investigator of the Main Criminal Directorate of the Russian Investigative Committee Vladimir Solovyev told Interfax on Friday.
"Experts are doing very active work. Everything necessary is being done," he said.
The investigative committee resumed an investigation into the criminal case over the assassination of members of the tsarist family. The Russian Investigative Committee said that additional tests are being conducted to confirm the authenticity of the remains of Tsarevich Alexei and Grand Duchess Maria. Their remains are being stored at the Russian State Archives.
The samples of the skulls of Nicholas II and his spouse Alexandra, as well as the samples of the clothes of Russian Emperor Alexander II were taken for a new expertise, Solovyev said.
"We have the genotype of the father, mother and children. All tests will be conducted in Russia," Solovyev said.
"His Holiness Patriarch Kirill asked to do all this from scratch," says Solovyev, who has investigated the assassination case of Nicholas II and his family.
To the question about the possible date of the funeral ceremony of the remains of Tsarevich Alexei and Grand Duchess Maria he replied: "The government will decide on this."
The new genetic expertise on the execution case of the tsarist family will be conducted as quickly as possible, but it is still unclear whether it will be completed before October 18, Solovyev told Interfax on Thursday.
Members of the working group of the Russian government named the date of October 18 for a funeral ceremony of the remains of Tsarevich Alexei and Grand Duchess Maria in St. Petersburg.
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#7
Politkom.ru
September 20, 2015
Arrest of Russian governor shows anti-graft fight 'inevitable", says website
Konstantin Kalachev, leader of Political Expert Group: Under conditions of diminishing resources base and financial flows, heads of regions such as Komi have to be particularly cautious and prudent
Several factors are in operation with regard to the arrest of Komi Governor [Vyacheslav] Gayzer. There is the demand to fight corruption, but there are also situations where people who have no real political protection or else leaky protection fall victim to this fight. Gayzer and [his deputy Aleksandr] Zarubin have been associated with quite different people.
It is obvious that the region has resources and is comparable with Sakhalin Region. It is no wonder that under conditions of the difficult economic situation in Russia, under conditions of a diminishing resources base and financial flows, the heads of such regions have to be particularly cautious and prudent. It is understandable that there is a demand coming "from above" for a "big fish" in the anticorruption struggle. There is a demand "from below" for a struggle against corruption among regional officials. Therefore in the case of the Komi governor we must consider the circumstances as a whole. There is nothing mutually exclusive in two of these reasons for what is happening.
The elites in the republic will be reformed in the direction of greater efficiency. The present complex situation that the Russian economy is experiencing and the external challenges to Russia demand greater responsibility on the part of regional officials and a better quality of power. This can be achieved in various ways - through elections or through thinning the ranks of this very regional elite, some of whose representatives have lost touch with realities and live as though "after them the deluge." There is a clear objective law: The intensification of the struggle against corruption is inevitable. Let us see who will be appointed in Gayzer's place - whether the beneficiary of this business is clear. Kozhemyako's appointment as governor of Sakhalin, for example, did not provide the answers. This was not confirmation of the theories for the previous governor's removal.
Politics is frequently a clearing out of "Augean stables." The motives are frequently noble. This concerns the actions of the Federal Security Service and the Investigation Committee. But somebody may take advantage of the situation. It is possible to study the biography of Gayzer and Zarubin, to remember Lukoil and even Kiriyenko.... In any case, it is possible to resolve a conflict of interests by other means - without proclaiming the entire leadership of the republic's regime a criminal society. There is a demand for the replacement of dominant people, of people who live in the old paradigm.
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#8
Putin Pushing New Social Contract Based on Fighting Corruption Rather than Economic Growth, Petrov Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, September 24 - The recent arrests of governors is part of a broader effort by Vladimir Putin to create a new social contract with the population, Nikolay Petrov says. In the old one, he offered stability and economic growth; now that he cannot offer those things, he is pushing himself forward as the guarantor of social justice.
The head of the Moscow Center for Political Geographic Research argues that "the current year has been rich in surprises in domestic policy." Few expected the arrests of the Sakhalin and Komi governors, and most have tried to explain these cases in terms of the situations in each (daily.rbc.ru/opinions/politics/23/09/2015/5602af909a7947fc7a0a6f7f).
But in fact, Petrov suggests, they represent an effort by Putin to reduce the powers of the governors still further and to use his ability to attack them as the basis for the creation of a new social-political compact with the Russian people.
Until recently, "only three things" were required of governors: "good results in the elections, the carrying out of presidential directives, and relative calm in the region," that is, "of an absence of public sandals." The head of the Komi Republic met all three, but apparently now, this is "insufficient" not only for him but for others.
The recent elections showed, Petrov continues, that the rise in public support for Putin "on the wave of Crimea, the Donbas and military-patriotic rhetoric" has begun to ebb; and consequently, Putin is in the process of changing "the agenda from 'Krymnash' to an uncompromising struggle with corruption."
That means that now "the Kremlin is ready to offer society a new social contract" based not on ever-rising incomes and well-being but rather on "the establishment of social justice." The Komi governor case is "a signal to regional elites" of this change, and now governors follow mayors into "a group of greater risk."
Petrov continues: "If 'Krymnash' and confrontation with the West became possible thanks to a tightening of control over federal elites, then the new legitimacy of Vladimir Putin will make him less dependent on regional elites and allow for a tightening of control over them" as well.
The irony of this is that by making the positions of the governors less secure, Putin almost certainly has made them and their political machines even more interested in gaining as much from corruption as quickly as possible, especially because any fight against corruption will be by definition highly selective.
Thus, Putin's fight against corruption may not only not reduce it as he will be certain to claim but increase it and in places where the population is even more likely to see it and feel its consequences, a pattern that could create more public unhappiness with his regime than exists at the present time.
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#9
www.opendemocracy.net
September 23, 2015
The opposition's last mandate
Deputies of the Pskov regional assembly are attempting to remove a colleague from their ranks-opposition lawmaker and journalist Lev Shlosberg.
By Svetlana Prokopyeva
Svetlana Prokopyeva is a journalist from Pskov, Russia and former editor in chief of Pskovskaya Guberniya.
When the regional assembly of Russia's north-western Pskov region convenes on 24 September, it promises to be well-attended. Dmitry Gudkov, one of the Duma's few opposition politicians, Sergei Mitrokhin, leader of the Yabloko party, and a group of journalists from St Petersburg all plan to travel.
The reason? Item number five on the assembly's agenda: a motion to deprive Lev Shlosberg of his mandate, which would dismiss the Yabloko party politician from his position as deputy.
Rise to the fore
Shlosberg first became a politician on the national stage in December 2012, when he gave an impassioned speech against Russia's controversial 'Dima Yakovlev law' from the rostrum of the Pskov regional assembly. Though the assembly was about to approve the already ratified law, Shlosberg called on colleagues to 'refrain from participating in this cruelty.' 'Anybody who votes for this law,' Shlosberg continued, 'is culpable in the possible death of a child who cannot be cured by the Russian healthcare system.'
The vote in favour of the law failed at the first attempt, and Shlosberg's speech was watched on YouTube thousands of times. The authorities realised that, in the right hands, a single deputy acting alone could become a potent weapon for the opposition.
Until then, Shlosberg had enjoyed little political clout. As director of the not-for-profit Renaissance Center for Social Planning and publisher of the newspaper Pskovskaya Guberniya, Shlosberg's influence was minimal. He had run in elections for many years, though without success. The Pskov branch of the Yabloko party won its first seat in the regional assembly only in December 2011.
Then, in summer 2014, Shlosberg strengthened his reputation when Pskovskaya Guberniya became the first newspaper in Russia to publish photographs from the funerals of paratroopers killed, it is believed, in eastern Ukraine. This was, at the time, the first reliable information confirming rumours of Russian military involvement in the conflict in the Donbas. Later that summer, Shlosberg was beaten unconscious by unknown assailants as he returned home. At the moment of the attack, Shlosberg was carrying a flash drive containing yet another revelation-a recording of a conversation with a wounded witness of the conflict in Ukraine.
When Lev Markovich was hospitalised, the acting governor of Pskov region Andrei Turchak, due to face the voters at the time, ordered that Shlosberg be protected and placed the investigation into the attack under personal control. Though kind-hearted and sincere, this gesture helped neither the investigation (the attackers were never found) nor the relationship between the two politicians, which, by this time, was completely ruined-and not only due to the Dima Yakovlev law.
The month before, Shlosberg was prevented from participating in gubernatorial elections (an obstacle that he believes was due to pressure put on deputies by the regional administration). In early 2014, Turchak called Shlosberg as a member of the 'fifth column' due to his position on Crimea. Describing Pskov's Yabloko party, Turchak stated: 'For them, only the interests of the US State Department exist, and they take these interests as instructions on concrete political steps. This is the so-called "fifth column", which, unfortunately, has taken root and exists among us in our region.'
Shlosberg was the only Pskov politician to speak out openly against Russian actions in Crimea, and in a session of the regional assembly, and a column for Pskovskaya Guberniya, Shlosberg hit back at Turchak, calling Turchak and his administration 'the real enemies of Pskov.'
Real existing opposition
A lone voice in the regional assembly can do little to interfere with the parliamentary majority, but Shlosberg uses his status as deputy to the full, sending hundreds of inquiries every year to the chief prosecutor's office and other federal agencies.
Shlosberg regularly describes himself as the 'only real opponent of the governor'. (Leaders of other opposition groups, as it happens, co-ordinate with United Russia, but strongly dispute the accusation.) Understandably, Lev Markovich sees the motion against him, which was introduced by Sergey Belov, Pskov's new regional prosecutor, as an instance of 'targeted revenge'.
What is the essence of the prosecutor's claims? In December 2014, the Ministry of Justice included Shlosberg's Renaissance Center in the list of 'foreign agents', and the centre challenged the decision in court.
As founder and long-standing director of the centre, Shlosberg appeared in court to defend his organisation, considering himself its legal representative. In April 2015, he was recognised as such - but not for long. Examining an appeal on 16 July, the Judicial Board for Civil Cases of Pskov Region decided otherwise.
Shlosberg was reminded that, as a serving deputy working on a permanent basis, he had no right to represent the organisation in court, and was acting as an attorney for the centre rather than its legal representative. The regional prosecutor made sure to inform the regional assembly of this fact.
Conflicting views
Shlosberg sees this case as yet another instance of political pressure. He's sure that the move to deprive him of his mandate before his term runs out comes from the governor's team, and has stated as much in open letters addressed to each of his colleagues from the regional assembly. 'The initiator of this bill is located outside the Pskov regional assembly and will not carry legal responsibility for their actions.'
The regional administration denies this view of events. In a comment to me, deputy governor Maxim Zhavoronkov stated that 'this is a question relating to the legislature's competency, and they, in the legislature, will take their decision independently. No one has asked for our position on this matter, it isn't required.'
The deputy chairman of the regional parliament Viktor Ostrenko confirms this statement: 'This is a matter exclusively for the [regional] assembly itself.' Ostrenko is head of the oversight commission on income and property that first saw the prosecutor's motion. 'Every deputy, by means of the secret ballot, has the opportunity to express their opinion. There's no other way.'
Before taking deputy's seat on behalf of United Russia, Ostrenko was vice-governor of the region. Prior to that, Ostrenko spent a decade working for Shlosberg at the Renaissance Center. He says that it is Lev Markovich's actions that have turned an otherwise formal, internal problem of the regional assembly into a political one. Indeed, though Ostrenko states it is 'very hard to judge' hjust how serious the accusations are, he recommends that Shlosberg confess his guilt, whether it is was on purpose or not, in front of the other deputies. Shlosberg, it seems, should 'demonstrate his open understanding of the problem, which he himself has made for the other deputies.'
While the legal side of this case will be examined separately, Shlosberg believes that the offence in question cannot entail a premature loss of mandate.
Best of times, worst of times
The journalist and politicians due to arrive on 24 September, however, will be concerned with something else. The Shlosberg case is another part of a wider political scandal involving governor Andrei Turchak, who, it was recently asserted, allegedly organised the horrendous attack on journalist Oleg Kashin in 2010. 'They're waiting to see what happens if you try and put a fire out with kerosene,' says Shlosberg.
Indeed, it wasn't the best moment to try and fire your political opponent. As if to spite the governor, business daily Kommersant published an interview with the wife of one of the men accused in the attack on Kashin the day after the regional assembly commission examined the prosecutor's motion. This interview named the Pskov governor as the potential organiser of the attack.
'Whether it was the right time or not,' comments Ostrenko, 'we received the motion on 15 September.' According to the deputy, in launching the examination of the motion against Shlsoberg, the assembly acted strictly according to procedure. No politics whatsoever.
Meanwhile, at 23 Nekrasov street, the location of the regional administration and parliament, this story has taken on an increasingly political tone. On 19 September, the Yabloko party office wrote to Yury Chaika, Russia's general prosecutor, concerning the 'manipulation of the regional prosecutor to deprive regional assembly deputy Lev Shlosberg of his mandate.' On the morning of 23 September, a Change.org petition in support of the politician has more than 3,000 signatures. Members of the St Petersburg city assembly have called on Pskov to abstain from 'lawlessness'.
As Shlosberg put it in a recent column for Pskovskaya guberniya: 'The political organiser of this move to take away my mandate is Andrei Turchak and his group. Those people are really fed up with me, my work in the [regional] assembly, my deputy's requests, my fight against corruption, my control of budget expenditure, my interference in matters which they never wanted to make public.'
Item number five on tomorrow's agenda will be subject to a secret ballot, and the voters won't find out how their deputies will vote. The reputation of the Pskov's parliament, however, will be plain to see.
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#10
Kremlin spokesman says it took several attempts for Putin to reach Elton John by phone
MOSCOW, September 25. /TASS/. Russian President Vladimir Putin has made several attempts to reach British musician Sir Elton John before finally holding a telephone conversation with him, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told journalists on Friday.
Peskov added that the meeting between Putin and John may take place if their working schedules allow that. "Putin decided to call him several days ago, and they could not reach each other. Elton John was somewhere in Brazil and so on. He does not sit in one spot as well. He has an active position, and that is why he travels so much. And you are aware about the president's working schedule as well," Peskov explained.
The spokesman added that "Elton John has his own schedule to keep." "If schedules allow, then such meeting could take place. At least, they both are ready," Peskov confirmed.
Peskov earlier told journalists that it was hard for the Russian ambassador in London to convince Sir Elton John that Russian President Vladimir Putin wanted to talk to him by phone.
"At first he [Elton John] hesitated," Peskov said. "We decided to ask Russian Ambassador to London Alexander Yakovenko to get in touch with the musician and tell him about the phone call. In the beginning, Yakovenko had certain problems to explain to the musician that he was really the Russian ambassador and that the real president of Russia wanted to talk to him," Peskov said adding the ambassador's diplomatic skills helped him to convince Elton John.
Peskov said that Elton John had wished to meet the Russian president.
"In this case, the president deemed it necessary to support his initiative especially after two Russian prankers had goofed on Elton John [two well-known Russian prankers disguised as Putin gave a call to Elton John last week]", Peskov explained.
"The president emphasized that he would be ready to answer any questions that interest Elton John if their working schedules cross," he added.
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#11
Kremlin.ru
September 23, 2015
Federal Anti-Monopoly Service Competition Week in Russia forum
Vladimir Putin took part in the annual international Competition Week in Russia forum, organised by Russia's Federal Anti-Monopoly Service (FAS). This year's forum marks 25 years of anti-monopoly regulation in the Russian Federation.
President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Good afternoon, colleagues and friends.
Let me start by congratulating everyone at the Federal Anti-Monopoly Service on 25 years since a special anti-monopoly agency was first set up in Russia. This was the start of what is today the Federal Anti-Monopoly Service.
FAS thus dates from the same time as the far-reaching transformations that established market relations and entrepreneurship in Russia. Over these 25 years, you have done much to develop the legal base and introduce modern competition mechanisms.
I hope that FAS will continue to play an important and substantive role in carrying out our country's economic policy and forming a favourable climate for business and investment and for entrepreneurial activity in general. I say this all the more that your powers were expanded substantially just recently and you are now responsible for issues related to tariff regulation in many areas too. I signed an executive order on this on July 21, 2015.
Much indeed depends on your competent and professional work and the decisions you make. Healthy competition and entrepreneurial freedom are crucial factors for developing our country and ensuring our national economy's effective and sustainable growth.
FAS dates from the same time as the far-reaching transformations that established market relations in Russia. Over these 25 years, you have done much to develop the legal base and introduce modern competition mechanisms.
Monopolism in all its forms chokes private initiative and acts as a brake on progress. The Russian industrialists of the past, who built up Russia's economic might, understood this well. "We need general competition because it is the road to improvement... Factories with excessive protection will use their profits any way they please and neglect the effort to improve their own goods" - thus spoke Nikolai Putilov, one of the founders of Russia's railways, steel and shipbuilding industries.
Our task today is for Russia's companies and businesses to learn to produce better goods and services than any of their competitors. We realise that this is not a simple task, but we know too that the main incentive here is competition on our own domestic market. This competition must be open and follow clear and transparent rules.
We therefore need to continue creating opportunities for all who seek to win in a fair competitive fight, advance, work hard, find new solutions, and raise the quality of their own goods. The more such people we have in our country, the stronger Russia and its economy will be.
We have been working hard to improve the anti-monopoly legislation over the last several years. This work has been undertaken in cooperation with FAS, of course, and the entire business community and the Strategic Initiatives Agency. With the help of everyone working through these platforms, we have drawn up and approved a roadmap that sets out concrete measures for developing competition in various economic sectors.
Many decisions are already being implemented. Wider use is being made of market tenders now, and rules for non-discriminatory access to the infrastructure of several natural monopolies have been improved. We know, of course, that there is still much work to do, and I stress in this respect that laws and rules the roadmap envisions must be given practical application everywhere throughout the regions. We must make a special effort to develop competition in the regions and municipalities. I am not just talking about putting an end to individual abuses by monopolists and decisions that hinder free trade, but about the need for a general systemic improvement of the business environment.
Colleagues, economic competition has an important general human, social and state dimension. What is a competitive market after all? It is a market in which consumers and buyers can choose products and services of higher quality and, most important, at a fair price.
In this respect, I ask you to continue your active efforts to develop competition in areas particularly important to the public, such as housing and utilities, heating supply, electricity and passenger transport, and keep effective watch on the markets for foodstuffs and medicines. You must exclude the possibility of unjustified tariff decisions and prevent prices from rising. Of course, you need to pay particular attention to developing competition in the social sector.
I ask you to continue your active efforts to develop competition in areas particularly important to the public, to keep effective watch on the markets for foodstuffs and medicines.
Friends, colleagues, economists have been discussing for decades how to ensure a perfect competitive environment, where to let the 'invisible hand' do its work, and where the state should be present, including through the watchdog and regulatory functions that are also necessary. This truly is a field that calls for utmost professionalism. I believe that any decision in this area should take into account the country's interests, the interests of honest business and citizens. I ask you to carry out your work on these principles.
Let me congratulate you all once more on your fruitful and effective work. I know your efforts are effective because I see how prices come down and we save state money and resources following your intervention in this or that case.
I wish you success and thank you once again for your work. Congratulations on this anniversary.
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#12
Moscow Times
September 25, 2015
Russia Plans $3.6 Billion Food Stamp Program as Poverty Rises
The Russian government may spend 240 billion rubles ($3.6 billion) on a national food stamp program to support an estimated 15-16 million Russian citizens whose poverty has deepened amid an economic slump, the RIA Novosti news agency reported Thursday.
To deal with an economic shock that has spurred inflation into double digits and pushed 3.1 million Russians below the poverty line in the first quarter of this year alone, the Industry and Trade Ministry this month submitted a proposal modeled on the U.S. food stamp program to help low-income and out-of-work people.
Deputy Minister Viktor Yevtukhov said on Thursday: "The number of potential program participants, according to our calculations, is in the order of 15 to 16 million people." RIA Novosti quoted him as saying that according to preliminary estimates the plan would require 240 billion rubles - or around 15,000 rubles ($225) per person.
State statistics agency Rosstat said in July that 22.9 million people - about 16 percent of the population - were below the poverty line at the end of March, meaning they had incomes of less than 9,962 rubles ($150) per month.
Yevtukhov said the funds would be drawn from both the federal and regional budgets. The program would provide special bank cards to citizens in need of higher-quality food, and recipients would be restricted from buying imported food and non-food items, RIA Novosti reported.
Yevtukhov said any commercial enterprise was free to participate in the scheme. "The only requirement for retailers is that they must process the transactions through a central processing system administered by one of our largest banks," he said, without specifying which bank.
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#13
Moscow Times
September 25, 2015
Energy Sector Accounts for 98% of Russian Corporate Profits
By Peter Hobson
Oil and gas companies earned 98 percent of all profits made by large Russian firms last year, a new ranking showed, making a mockery of attempts to wean Russia off its reliance on energy exports.
A list by the RBC news agency of the biggest 500 Russian companies - whose combined revenues equaled 77 percent of the country's economic output - also found that their combined net debt rose by almost two-fifths to 15.9 trillion rubles ($283 billion under the exchange rate at the end of 2014), an amount slightly larger than the entire Russian federal budget for that year.
The findings underline the effect on companies of a weaker Russian currency. A significant part of Russian corporate debt is denominated in foreign currency, which banks typically lend at lower interest rates than rubles, while oil and gas are exported largely in U.S. dollars. The ruble fell more than 40 percent against the dollar last year, making both hard currency debts and revenues larger in ruble terms.
The ranking also highlights Russia's failure to diversify its economy away from lucrative energy sales - something the country is now paying for. Russia's economy saw annual growth rates of around 7 percent as oil prices rose during the 2000s. But oil prices have fallen from a high of $115 per barrel last summer to six-year lows of less than $50, causing a deep recession and forcing the government to sharply curb spending.
Three energy companies topped the RBC rating, published this week. State gas behemoth Gazprom, which accounts for some 8 percent of GDP, had revenues of 5.5 trillion rubles ($143 billion at average 2014 exchange rates) last year, seven percent more than in 2013, according to RBC.
LUKoil, a privately run oil firm, saw revenues rise 24 percent during the last year to 4.7 trillion rubles ($122 billion in 2014), while its state-controlled rival Rosneft recorded a rise of 16 percent to 3.7 trillion rubles ($96 billion).
Two more state companies rounded out the top five: Sberbank, with revenues up 25 percent at 2.15 trillion rubles ($56 billion), and Russian Railways, with a 1 percent increase to 1.8 trillion rubles ($47 billion).
RBC found that firms in the energy sector together earned almost 2 trillion rubles ($52 billion), compared to profits of only about 47 million rubles ($1.2 billion) at all other companies combined.
In RBC's ranking of 2013 results, the oil and gas industry accounted for 79 percent of Russian corporate profits. But total profits for the 500 companies that year were also much higher, at 3.7 trillion rubles ($116 billion at the average exchange rate in 2013). Russia's economy slowed to 0.6 percent growth in 2014 from 1.3 percent in the previous year.
Gazprom, LUKoil and Rosneft all saw their profits fall in the latest ranking. From earning almost 2 trillion rubles ($62.8 billion) between them in 2013, their combined profits fell to 688 billion rubles ($18 billion) last year, RBC's data showed.
The single most profitable company in the new rating was Surgutneftegaz, a privately owned oil and gas firm built around enormous energy deposits in Surgut in western Siberia, which recorded profits of 885 billion rubles ($23 billion), largely thanks to a revaluation of its hard-currency cash reserves, according to RBC.
Energy companies have weathered the fall in oil prices thanks to the collapse in the ruble and a tax system that makes the state bear much of the effect of price falls. But the industry still has problems.
Western sanctions imposed over the crisis in Ukraine have cut the access of energy firms to international capital and advanced drilling technology. And President Vladimir Putin this week said the cash-strapped government should look for ways to extract more money from energy companies benefiting from the weak ruble.
Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev on Thursday called again for diversification away from oil and gas, writing in a long op-ed in the Rossiiskaya Gazeta newspaper that energy prices could remain low for a long time and that Russia should find new internal sources of investment.
In 2009, in a similar op-ed published in the online newspaper Gazeta.ru under the headline "Go Russia!" Medvedev wrote: "Achieving leadership by relying on oil and gas markets is impossible. ... Commodity exchanges must not determine Russia's fate."
However, the influence of the oil price is undimmed. Taxes from the energy sector account for around 50 percent of Russia's federal budget. The Central Bank said earlier this month that if oil prices stayed around $50 per barrel, Russia's economy would contract by 3.9-4.4 percent this year and likely shrink again in 2016.
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#14
Oilprice.com
September 24, 2015
How Russia's Oil Companies Are Defying Sanctions and Low Oil Prices
By Colin Chilcoat
Winning and losing is largely a matter of perspective, and that's no different in today's low oil price environment. Still, certain data and metrics can provide a more incorruptible viewpoint on the carnage, or lack thereof. In that regard-and to the surprise of many-count Russia's oil majors among the current winners.
Ranked according to cash flow, profit margins, and share prices, Russian giants Rosneft and Lukoil as well as smaller producers like Gazprom Neft and Bashneft are outperforming Royal Dutch Shell, BP, and Exxon Mobil.
The success is largely attributable to a still-weak ruble and a favorable tax regime that reduces the overall tax burden when oil prices fall. Moreover, Rosneft cites a production cost per barrel nearly five-fold less than what U.S. E&Ps are paying.
Among Russian companies, Rosneft and Lukoil saw the greatest increases in profitability in the first quarter of 2015 versus quarter one of 2014. Exports of both crude oil and refined oil products are up, and the companies are yielding free cash flow at a rate more than two times greater than Shell or BP. After a precipitous drop in 2014, Rosneft's earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) are now approaching pre-collapse levels, and are already well above those of BP and Shell.
Bashneft and Gazprom Neft are no slouches either. Bashneft, recently renationalized, is one of Russia's fastest growing firms by oil output. With production costs well below the global average-roughly $4 per barrel-Bashneft has seen its oil production and operating income grow 12.4 percent and 10.3 percent respectively from a year ago. For its part, Gazprom Neft boosted hydrocarbon production by 20.5 percent compared to the first half of 2014 and EBIT are up 12 percent from the same period.
In Moscow trading, shares of Bashneft, Gazprom Neft, Lukoil, and Rosneft have risen a combined average of nearly 16 percent on the year. Though their growth is more subdued on the London market, they have grown; Shell and BP are down 27 percent and 17 percent respectively.
Adjusting our perspective to a more long-term view however, reveals that future growth aspirations face more than a few hurdles.
While the aforementioned metrics suggest a rosy outlook, revenues are down across the board from a year ago. Production has proved remarkably resilient thus far, and should continue to do well in the medium-term barring any drop below $40/barrel, but Russia expected more from its Arctic and near Arctic reserves to this point. Russia's Arctic ambitions will be delayed.
To date, successes with the Prirazlomnoye field and promising discoveries on the Universitetskaya-1 well have largely been overshadowed by troubles with Sakhalin-2 and Yamal LNG, U.S. and EU sanctions, and a slowing Chinese economy.
Whilst the mainstream media prints scare stories of oil prices falling through the floor smart investors are setting up their next winning oil plays.
At Yamal LNG, majority stakeholder Novatek is believed to be finalizing a deal with a Chinese investment fund for a 9.9 percent, $1.4 billion, stake in the consortium. However, financing troubles leave the prestige project an estimated $15 billion short of its target. Rosneft's Sakhalin LNG project is facing similar troubles. Both will face a grimmer demand situation upon completion.
Further, sanctions and U.S.-made equipment bans have hit the Yuzhno-Kirinskoye field, a key greenfield for Gazprom's Sakhalin-2 LNG project, and will surely stifle development in East Taimyr, a shelf tender hotly contested by both Rosneft and Lukoil.
Equipment, and not financing, represents the larger obstacle to Russian success in the Arctic. In all, foreign machinery and technology is believed to comprise up to 70 percent of the equipment in Russia's oil and gas industry. Offshore, that disparity is even greater - somewhere in the range of 99 percent. There's a push to boost domestic capabilities and Rosneft's Zvezda industrial complex seeks to close the gap, but heavy deficits are expected in the medium-term.
To make matters worse, the Russian government is looking to raise more tax revenue from its energy companies. The decline of the rouble has helped shield Russia's oil and gas companies, but that comes at the cost of the Russian treasury. Higher taxes are just around the corner.
With broader economic diversification appearing unlikely any time soon-non-oil GDP has exhibited shockingly little change since the collapse of the Soviet Union-Arctic oil and gas development takes on added importance. International cooperation is what they need, but isolation and indecision is what they're getting.
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#15
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
September 24, 2015
TROIKA REPORT: Pope Francis may help defuse Russia-West dialogue
RBTH presents its weekly analytical program TROIKA REPORT, featuring a look at three of the most high-profile recent developments in international affairs.
By Sergey Strokan and Vladimir Mikheev
1. Engaging the West
Can Moscow's diplomatic overtures enlarge the anti-ISIS coalition?
A flurry of Moscow-driven diplomatic activities focused on the Syrian crisis this week has placed Russia at the heart of the so far disconcerted efforts to find a settlement in this part of the Middle East.
Just days after the resumption of the dialogue between the United States and Russia on resolving the conflict in Syria, so far limited to the re-activated direct hot line between the Pentagon and Russia's Ministry of Defense, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Moscow for talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin.
The positive comments made by Netanyahu after meeting Putin, which resulted, in particular, in the establishment of close coordination between the military leaders of the two countries, hint that Moscow must have provided guarantees that the hardware it has sent to the Syrian army will not end up in the hands of Lebanon's Hezbollah Islamist militant group.
Putin's statement that Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad's army is in no shape to open a "second front" against the Jewish state, since it is more concerned on preserving Syrian statehood as such, can be read as a signal of Moscow's acceptance of Israel's security concerns. On top of this, according to Al Jazeera sources, Israel has made it clear "that they don't see Russia as a threat" in Syria.
Could these positive corrections in the dialogue between major actors in the Middle East quagmire enable Russia to take a lead role in resolving the conflict in Syria? Could it be a game-changer? Speaking to Troika Report, Andrei Kortunov, director general of the Russian International Affairs Council, dismissed the idea, while adding:
"...but definitely there is potential for a very different approach to the Syrian situation. On top of the international coalition headed by the United States that is fighting ISIS, there is another coalition in the making which would include Russia, Iran, potentially Iraq, maybe some other countries as well. It changes the landscape. It opens new opportunities. But it might also lead to additional risks."
- There are plenty of allegations that the continuous technical assistance to Bashar al-Assad regime, and the current modernization of a military base in Latakia could lead to Russian "boots on the ground." Some claim that Russia is heading for a repetition of its involvement in Afghanistan in the late 1970s. What is your take on that?
"First of all, in terms of legitimacy, it depends on whether you recognize the regime in Damascus. If you consider the regime legitimate, then any request to any foreign country from Damascus for military assistance is also legitimate since it is exercising its sovereign right. And vice versa. I am sure that Russia will demonstrate restraint. Its engagement will be very fine-tuned. I hope there will be no escalation of Russian military involvement in the Syrian crisis."
- Could the decision of the White House to restart cooperation with Kremlin on the Syrian dossier be interpreted as a major diplomatic victory for Russia?
"I think it is too early to judge. But if Putin meets Obama on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly session in New York, it would be an important step forward. It would not be a concession on the part of the United States. It would mean that both sides understand that they have many common interests and they should resume the dialogue.
"However, it does not mean that the disagreements on the Ukrainian crisis are going to disappear. However, even amid sharp contradictions, both sides cooperated on pushing forward the Iranian nuclear deal."
The Kremlin is attempting to convince the United States that for the time being the decision on the fate of Assad's regime should be postponed until later on. But if this tactic fails, could we see some unilateral action by Moscow? Alexander Konovalov, president of the Institute for Strategic Assessments, strongly warns against such an arrogant move. Here is his comment for Troika Report:
"If Russia tried to get engaged in this conflict without close and direct consultations, and cooperation with the U.S.-led alliance, it would be a big mistake.
"There are many parties engaged in the conflict, with different interests. It is necessary to be extremely cautious when taking decisions on actions on the ground."
Yet changes are in the air. What new factors could be affecting the correction in U.S. foreign policy in respect to the civil war in Syria and the fight against ISIS? Ivan Konovalov, director of the Center for Strategic Trend Studies in Moscow, provided this comment for Troika Report:
"For the last few years, the situation on the ground in Syria has been in a stalemate for all the warring parties. The surge of Russian military-technical assistance tilts the balance in favor of Bashar al-Assad's regime. Assad is completely unacceptable for the United States and its allies, while Russia is convinced that he is the only force capable of cementing resistance to the advancing radical Islamists."
Due to the unbridgeable differences between Washington and Moscow in their approach to the future of Bashar al-Assad, the incorporation of Russia into the existing anti-ISIS alliance is extremely unlikely, says Konovalov. He is more inclined to forecast that a new coalition to fight ISIS will soon be formally announced - a group that already consists of Russia, Iran, and Syria. There will then be the possibility of some kind of interaction between the two coalitions, says Ivan Konovalov.
Furthermore, the U.S. is apparently quietly revising its current strategy, having realized that the training and arming of the Syrian "moderate" opposition has been nothing short of a fiasco. The emphasis seems to be shifting toward the Syrian and Iraqi Kurds - an adjustment that has already placed Washington's NATO ally, Turkey, in an awkward position because of the separatist sentiments of the Kurdish community in Turkey itself.
In any case, the diplomatic strategies applied by the regional and extra-regional players in the Middle East appear to be in flux. Whether Moscow's fresh calls to engage the West in cooperative joint action will be heeded is another question, but the situation is being watched closely in many places, especially in the Middle East.
2. Globally speaking
Could Pope Francis help defuse Russia-West tensions?
The landmark visit by Pope Francis to Cuba followed by his tour of the United States and address to the UN General Assembly may have a direct bearing on the current tug of war between Russia and the West.
At a time when relations between the two sides, crippled by distrust, have reached their lowest point in decades, there is a desperate need for an honest broker. This is where the pontiff can step in, calling on warring parties around the world to bury the hatchet of violence, distrust and animosity.
The Pope's credentials as a world leader with a special status were confirmed by the fact that U.S. President Barack Obama met him on the tarmac of the Andrews Air Force Base, although U.S. presidents rarely welcome any foreign dignitaries at the airport.
While the welcome afforded to the Argentine-born pontiff could have been aimed at pleasing the United States' devout Hispanic community, which is steadily growing in numbers and political weight and the support of which is crucial during the ongoing U.S. presidential pre-election campaign, the more likely reason is the more assertive role being played by Pope Francis in global affairs.
This was proved by the pontiff's visit to Cuba, the bone of contention between the Cold War rivals that provoked the Missile Crisis of 1962. Addressing thousands and thousands of the faithful in Havana, Pope Francis appealed for national unity of all the Cubans, irrespective of their political leaning and past grievances, sending a clear signal to Miami-based immigrants.
Judging by the most cordial welcome the Pope received from Cubans, who are basically atheist and loyal to the Communist ideology, this represents a formidable success for the Holy See that can be capitalized on during the visit to the United States.
This assessment and forecast is supported by Father Yanes Sever, a priest from the Moscow-based Society of Jesus, who spoke to Troika Report:
"Pope Francis always tries to open channels and not close them. He has helped the rapprochement in the relationship between Cuba and the United States. What is interesting is what his message would be in the United States. They are having an election next year, and each party would want him to be on their side. But he is not a person who will pick one side or another. The Pope will follow his own course."
As a symbolic gesture of reconciliation, the Pope shook hands with Fidel Castro and held a 40-minute informal meeting with the revolutionary who shook the Western hemisphere by seizing power in 1959 and establishing Communist rule in Cuba. While visiting the "Island of Freedom," the nickname often given to Cuba, Francis also used this extraordinary platform to persuade the Colombian government and the Marxist-Leninist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to conclude their negotiations, currently being held in Havana, sign an agreement facilitating the rehabilitation of the guerrillas, and thus put an end to South America's longest-running conflict.
Earlier, in June this year, Pope Francis urged Bosnians to preserve the still shaky ethnic and religious harmony in a composite country devastated by the 1992-1995 war which pitted Bosnia's Croats, Serbs and Bosniak Muslims against each other. The painfully brokered peace accord, emphasized the spiritual leader of the world's Catholics, showed that "even the deepest wounds can be healed by purifying memories and firmly anchoring hopes in the future."
In June, when Western sanctions against Russia were prolonged, hurting its economy and tarnishing its image, Pope Francis had an hour-long meeting with President Vladimir Putin at which they discussed the crisis in Ukraine, sending the message that the Vatican does not take sides.
In total, Pope Francis has enhanced his reputation of a peace broker with the moral authority to compel opponents to engage in dialogue rather than war.
How justified is this assessment of the foreign policy of the Holy See and of Pope Francis, which comes at a time of grave challenges to global order? Is it really as assertive as it appears?
Father Igor Chabanov, secretary of the Apostolic Nuncio to the Russian Federation, shared his views on the Pope's visit to Cuba with Troika Report:
"The Pope's visit to Cuba, followed by his visit to the U.S. and the address to the UN General Assembly, are being watched with keen interest in Russia, and there is good reason for that.
"In this respect, we may recall how exactly two years ago Pope Francis addressed President Putin with a letter dedicated to the subject of peace in the world, and in Syria in particular. He insisted that the leaders of the main powers must 'overcome the conflicting positions and lay aside the futile pursuit of a military solution,' calling this "the moral duty of the governments."
Perhaps the Pope considers President Putin not only as the leader of one of the global powers, but also as a figure of moral principles, for at the end of his letter, unusually for diplomatic correspondence, the Pope asked Putin to pray for him.
One may say that the Pope may be seen as a potential honest broker by some in Russia. And Mr. Putin who is building his policy on the conservative values may become his natural counterpart in the strife for peace."
Father Igor Chabanov, asked by Troika whether the Vatican can mediate in any way in the Ukrainian crisis, pointed to the need to improve relations between the Roman Catholic and Russian Orthodox churches, which may facilitate reconciliation.
All in all, the message of the Gospel and the personal appeals of Pope Francis resonate with the aspirations of war-torn and conflict-burdened nations. In this respect, the Holy See can be seen as a credible and robust mediator in conflict resolution and cooperation with major international actors, including Russia.
3. Going Eastward
Moscow working to seal its Central Asian backyard
In the wake of a series of military training exercises this summer with ex-Soviet republics in Central Asia, Russia has staged by far the largest maneuvers this year, bringing on board this time Kazakhstan as a member state of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).
While media observers suggested the drills were intended as a demonstration of muscle-flexing and a signal of defiance toward the West and NATO in particular, others see it as an attempt to seal its southern backyard off from the threat of terrorism.
To prove this point, the official scenario of the joint military exercises, codenamed Centre 2015, was defined as fighting paramilitary units of various extremists in Central Asia.
This year, Russia plans to end up with more than 4,000 military drills. Yet Centre 2015 is outstanding by any yardstick. The maneuvers took place on 20 training grounds, and involved 95,000 servicemen, some 7,000 military vehicles, 170 jets, and 20 vessels.
The official aim of Centre 2015 was described as "localizing an armed conflict and eliminating illegal armed formations in the Central Asian region." The Kazakh troops were involved within the CSTO's legal framework.
In fact, Centre 2015 may have been the largest but it was not the only significant drill. The Russian navy was recently engaged in exercises with China in the Sea of Japan. There were also combined sorties by air force squadrons of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Rapid Reaction force of the CSTO staged its own "war games."
In relation to the Centre 2015 maneuvers, there was no shortage of assumptions bandied about that Russia and the Central Asian republics were training because they are scared stiff of the eastward spread of the Islamic State (ISIS) radical militant group, engulfing Afghanistan.
A more daring hype amounted to suggestions that Russia and its allies have Syria on their mind. This does not look altogether exotic and far-fetched, given the recent rumors that Damascus is ready to beg Moscow for direct military assistance, involving sending troops to the war-torn country, which is losing ground to ISIS.
What is it all about? Do these maneuvers have the ambitious goal of eventually building new security architecture in the Eurasian region? Or is it just a show of force? Dmitry Polikanov, a member of the board of the Center for Policy Studies in Russia, a Moscow-based independent think tank, provided this comment to Troika Report:
"The maneuvers actually demonstrate that Russia is ready to play a more active role in maintaining Eurasian and Asian security. This is emphasized by military units from Kazakhstan participating in the drills. Russia and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) have been reiterating lately that they are ready to face the threat of Islamic extremism and oppose Islamic State (ISIS) in particular."
- What kind of a threat is Islamic State for the moment for Central Asia?
"They have to take into account the expansion of Islamic State. We may also witness soon the emergence of ISIS militants in Central Asia. That is the reason why the scenario of the military exercises was focused on the 'localization' of the conflict. The basic idea was that Russian and Kazakhstani units together are trying to prevent the escalation of an international conflict. This is directly related to the uncertainty over the developments in Afghanistan and some other parts of Asia."
- There are plenty of rumors that the Centre 2015 maneuvers were in fact training exercises for a possible military operation not so much in Central Asia but in Syria. What's your take on these allegations?
"I would say that it is too early for Russia's military involvement in Syria... Any involvement in Syria would mean a radical change of Russia's policy. I do not think the Russian leadership is ready for such a radical change."
- What about the CSTO? Is it a one man show? Many believe that other nations are still making a meager contribution, while the main burden is being shouldered by Russia. Is this changing or not?
"The burden is still on the shoulders of Russia. But such exercises are important to ensure that there is interaction between Russian units and the units of other Central Asian republics. Here the situation is not very stable; so much is at stake to have operational coordination between the CSTO member-states."
Meanwhile, China is closely watching all the military activities in the region. The comment on the Centre 2015 drills by the Xinhua News Agency, which is a ministry-level department subordinate to the central government, quotes experts of the Chinese Academy of Sciences.
A recent report concluded that the gradual deterioration of the security environment inside Afghanistan and around it endangers stability in Central Asia. Beijing views the CSTO doing training and shooting through this prism, noting that the region is challenged by terrorism, extremism, drug trafficking, transnational crime, and illegal migration.
In this context, Moscow could count on cooperation with Beijing to counter the spillover of violence from Afghanistan, should Islamic or any extremist groupings start a "crusade" towards Central Asia. Since this region is viewed by Russia and China as their strategic backyard, the CSTO could become a crisis management tool. Whether or not it is apt for handling such a responsibility remains to be seen.
The opinion of the writers may not necessarily reflect the position of RBTH or its staff.
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#16
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
September 24, 2015
Syria is now in the middle of a new, more dangerous Cold War
RD Interview: Professor Emeritus of Columbia University Robert Legvold argues that Russia and the U.S. are in the second phase of a new Cold War that has the potential to exacerbate the situation in Syria and become another missed opportunity for cooperation.
By Pavel Koshkin
Russia and the United States are moving into the second phase of a new Cold War, one where they accept hostility and confrontation as the new normal. This promises more problems than solutions. The two countries are "not in a good place," said Robert Legvold, professor emeritus of Columbia University, during a Carnegie Moscow Center discussion on Sept. 22.
"We are learning to live with what is effectively a new Cold War-different as it is from the original Cold War-and neither side expects much to change any time soon," he said.
In the process, Legvold argues, U.S.-Russia relations "are losing the guidance or limits developed during the original Cold War," when some kinds of rules existed. In addition, there is little respect for one another. Mutual disrespect, unlike during the original Cold War, marks relations today.
According to Legvold, neither U.S. nor Russian foreign policy is guided by longer-range strategic thinking. Neither appears to have either the ability or inclination to integrate short-term policy with long-run goals. Nor are new rules for conducting their intensified competition likely to emerge until, alas, events force them into being. In this respect, the derailing of U.S.-Russian relations is more dangerous than the original Cold War.
Syria and the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Greater Syria (ISIS) are going to be added to the long list of missed opportunities for U.S.-Russia bilateral cooperation, he told Russia Direct in an interview.
He also discusses the odds of a clash between Russia and the U.S. in the Middle East as well as the reasons why Russia should be more active in contributing to the Syrian refugee crisis in Europe.
Russia Direct: There are numerous reports that Russia is going to increase its troops in Syria. In addition, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitri Peskov says that Moscow is ready to provide military assistance to Syrian President Bashar Assad to fight ISIS. Amidst these events, what are the chances that Russia and the U.S. find common ground in Syria?
Robert Legvold: The Syrian crisis is a good illustration of what I call a new U.S.-Russia Cold War. In principle, the two countries should find common ground: Both Russia and the United States have a strong interest in fighting ISIS and destroying that force within Iraq and Syria. But the United States is opposing the Assad regime, insisting that his exit is the prerequisite for a political settlement, while the Russian side is supporting Assad. When Russia provides military assistance in Latakia and Tartus, the U.S. has worked to block it.
Hence, rather than seeing Russian assistance to the Syrian side as, in part, Russia's contribution to the war against ISIS, Washington views it as fueling the civil war and intensifying the migration crisis. In the absence of progress toward a political settlement of the Syrian civil war, the two sides will find it very difficult to find a way to cooperate in the war against ISIS.
RD: So, what is going to happen in the future?
R.L.: The Russians have now said that they are supplying by air and by sea Syria's armed forces, building up a new base in Latakia that will accommodate 1,500 troops. More than 200 marines have been deployed. They are beginning to introduce more advanced armament, such as the BTR-82A armored personnel carrier.
So, the U.S. is opposing that. It tries to deny it by blocking air space, successfully in the case of Bulgaria. But they are not likely to succeed in blocking Iraqi or Iranian airspace, which Russia uses as a way to bring assistance in.
I don't think the U.S. will go beyond that. But in the context of the new Cold War there will be implications for bilateral relations. The effect will be an increasingly negative attitude of Washington and the Obama administration towards Russian President Vladimir Putin.
And, in the meantime, the Russian side is going to see the U.S. as a country sticking to an anti-Russian policy, a policy designed to pursue U.S. strategic interests in the region in the way that is destabilizing and creating problems within the Middle East.
RD: How do you assess the odds of Russian and American soldiers clashing in Syria, as some warn?
R.L.: There is a small risk. However, something like a military encounter could happen. If it happens, it would be because the area - where the fighting is taking place- is, basically, a very narrow strip in the western part of Syria between various opposition forces and Syria's armed forces.
In addition, there is a very large part of neighboring territory controlled by ISIS. If the United States bombs in the areas that are very close to Latakia, where the Russians are operating, there might be some risks: American air forces could attack where Russian advisors and soldiers are present. That would be fairly unlikely, but it can't be ruled out. This is likely one of the key subjects in the new direct talks between Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter and Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu.
RD: It seems to have stemmed from that fact that Russia and America are going to create two different coalitions to fight the Islamic State. So, why don't Moscow and Washington team up to fight ISIS?
R.L.: On Monday at the UN, President Putin is expected to propose a Grand Coalition to fight ISIS, one that includes all the major players, including Iran. In that form, the idea is almost certainly going to be unacceptable to the Obama Administration. The key question is whether Washington will feel there is enough in Putin's initiative that warrants engaging Moscow in the search for a workable common position.
Even then, however, as I said, the obstacle posed by the absence of progress toward a political settlement or mitigation of the Syrian civil war will make cooperation difficult. And progress toward a political settlement will not begin until the United States abandons Assad going as a precondition and Russia abandons its unconditional support for the Assad regime.
RD: What do you think about the Syrian refugee crisis in Europe? After all, some call Russia for being more rigorous in resolving or, at least, alleviating this problem?
R.L.: It is very unlikely that Russia will begin receiving the flows of migrants that are coming out of Syria and North Africa. But it is the responsibility of most of the major developed countries, not only in Western Europe, but also, my country, the United States, which agreed to take a small number of refugees: 10,000.
As a matter of ethics and principles, it would be very good if Russia were able to assist what in reality is an international migration crisis. It is not just a Western European crisis, it is a human crisis; and any country that is able to assist should.
RD: To what extent could Russia's contribution to alleviating the Syrian refugees crisis be a game-changer in improving its image abroad?
R.L.: Given that Russia is viewed negatively by much of the outside world, her contribution to mitigating this human tragedy, the European migration crisis, cannot help but have a positive effect on Russia's image. Still, the sources and nature of this negative image are large enough that it will not turn around tomorrow.
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#17
New York Times
September 25, 2015
White House Says President Obama and Vladimir Putin Will Meet Next Week
By PETER BAKER and MICHAEL R. GORDON
WASHINGTON - In case anyone had doubt, the White House wanted it known on Thursday that it was President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia who asked to meet with President Obama, not the other way around.
Mr. Putin was not just eager for a meeting, said Josh Earnest, the White House press secretary, but in fact "desperate" for one.
The emphasis on who wanted to meet more underscored the sensitivities and risks of the meeting, which the White House officially announced on Thursday. Mr. Obama has not seen Mr. Putin in nearly a year, and the two have not had a formal sit-down meeting in more than two years, before Russia annexed Crimea and intervened in eastern Ukraine.
"It is fair for you to say that based on the repeated requests we've seen from the Russians, that they are quite interested in having a conversation with President Obama," Mr. Earnest said. Ultimately, Mr. Obama decided "that it was worth it at this point to engage with President Putin in a face-to-face meeting to see if the interests of the United States could be advanced."
The meeting, to be held in New York on Monday, where both will be attending the annual session of the United Nations General Assembly, presents a challenge to Mr. Obama. Aides said Mr. Obama would press Mr. Putin to live up to a cease-fire in Ukraine and test his intentions in Syria, where he has recently dispatched combat jets, tanks and other military equipment.
Officials said they hoped to explore a settlement of Syria's four-year-old civil war without leaving in power President Bashar al-Assad, a longtime Russian ally. But they said Mr. Putin's deployment to Syria seemed to be an effort to make himself a player again on the international stage and change the subject from his encroachment in Ukraine.
"It's a tough one for Obama," said Fiona Hill, a former national intelligence officer on Russia who is now at the Brookings Institution. "He has to meet with him given the circumstances. But it's not very clear what we're going to get out of it. The Russians have made their position crystal clear: They want to have a central say about what happens."
The announcement ended a debate inside the administration about whether a meeting might reward Mr. Putin for disruptive behavior. In the end, officials indicated, Mr. Obama decided to take that risk in part because Mr. Putin is the only real decision maker in Russia and any resolution in Ukraine or Syria depends on him.
But the White House seemed to go out of its way on Thursday not to show deference. At one point during his daily briefing, Mr. Earnest noted Mr. Putin's habit of slouching while meeting with counterparts, pointing to a recent photo of him with Israel's prime minister.
"President Putin was striking a now-familiar pose of less-than-perfect posture and unbuttoned jacket and, you know, knees spread far apart to convey a particular image," he said.
White House officials said the core message of the meeting would be Mr. Obama's insistence that Russia live up to the terms of the cease-fire in Ukraine negotiated in Minsk, the capital of neighboring Belarus. But Mr. Earnest said the meeting would not undermine international solidarity against Russian actions in Ukraine. "That's not going to change because of one in-person conversation," he said.
The Kremlin has continued to provide military support to separatists in eastern Ukraine, and few observers expect the Minsk peace agreement to be fully put in effect in the coming months.
Benjamin J. Rhodes, a deputy national security adviser to the president, said the meeting would also allow Mr. Obama to assess whether the two sides could collaborate against the Islamic State terrorist group in Syria, also known as ISIS or ISIL.
"President Obama will seek to understand what the Russian government means when it states it is enhancing or increasing its military involvement in Syria in order to enhance efforts to counter ISIL," Mr. Rhodes said.
The last time Mr. Obama and Mr. Putin had a formal, scheduled meeting was in June 2013 in Northern Ireland on the sidelines of a meeting of the Group of 8 powers. Mr. Obama canceled a summit meeting with Mr. Putin that fall after Russia gave shelter to Edward J. Snowden, the former National Security Agency contractor who leaked documents.
After Russia's intervention in Ukraine, it was kicked out of the Group of 8, and Mr. Obama's contacts with Mr. Putin were limited even further to occasional telephone calls and passing encounters, such as brief words they exchanged on the sidelines of two international economic summit meetings last November in China and Australia.
But through it all, Secretary of State John Kerry has remained in regular contact with his Russian counterpart, Foreign Minister Sergey V. Lavrov, and American officials credited the Russians with playing a mostly helpful role during multinational negotiations that led to the recent nuclear accord with Iran.
Russia's decision to begin a military buildup in Syria at an air base south of Latakia, including the deployment of Su-25 Frogfoot ground-attack planes, has increased the Kremlin's leverage for a potential political settlement.
Russian diplomats have asserted in closed-door meetings with Western officials that they are not wedded to Mr. Assad's continuing as Syria's president. Obama administration officials hope that they can eventually persuade Moscow to withdraw support for Mr. Assad and encourage a political transition in which he would leave power. But the effort to elicit Moscow's cooperation on Syria, including a May meeting between Mr. Kerry and Mr. Putin in Sochi, Russia, has yet to bear fruit.
Mr. Putin left his bottom line unclear in an interview with Charlie Rose for "60 Minutes" on CBS. "There is no other solution to the Syrian crisis than strengthening the effective government structures and rendering them help in fighting terrorism," he said. "But at the same time, urging them to engage in positive dialogue with the rational opposition and conduct reform."
The doubts in the administration were voiced on Thursday by Defense Secretary Ashton B. Carter, who said he remained unsure whether American and Russian interests truly converged on Syria.
At a news conference with the Ukrainian defense minister at the Pentagon, Mr. Carter expressed worry that Russia may use its military buildup to indiscriminately attack Syrian rebels who oppose Mr. Assad, a move he compared to "pouring gasoline" on the war there.
"We will continue to work with Russia on issues where our interests overlap," Mr. Carter said. But he added, "It is possible but not yet clear that such an overlap might exist in Syria."
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#18
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
September 24, 2015
Russia and U.S. will have to come to agreement on Assad's future
As Moscow and Washington continue to debate how to resolve the Syrian crisis, RBTH asked several Russian experts how realistic a compromise is between the two powers and what potential scenarios await Syria.
Yekaterina Chulkovskaya, RBTH
The beginning of the fall has become an intensive period of consultations between Moscow and Washington on the Syrian issue. Not only diplomats but also military officials are participating in the talks. For now they are not discussing a joint fight against ISIS but rather how to prevent possible incidents.
A source from the Russian Foreign Ministry has said that Washington may be given all the necessary information on Moscow's collaboration with Damascus through the restored communications channel between the U.S. and Russian defense ministries.
However, the main issue of contention remains unresolved - the fate of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The U.S. wants him to stand down, arguing that he bears responsibility for the entire conflict by waging war on his own people, while Russia insists that the Syrians themselves must decide the fate of their leader, without external involvement.
Meanwhile, news of Russia's military cooperation with Syria has alarmed Israel. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu immediately flew to Moscow on Sept. 21, bringing with him the heads of the country's military.
His meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin resulted in the sides agreeing to the creation of a group that will develop a mechanism for coordinating actions in the "air, sea and electromagnetic spheres," for minimizing unintended clashes and other incidents in Syria.
Is Washington softening its position?
Experts interviewed by RBTH believe that the settlement of the Iranian nuclear problem and Moscow's more active role in Syria could help extricate the situation from the impasse in which it is currently lodged.
Georgy Mirsky of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations at the Russian Academy of Sciences, believes that recently there have been perceptible changes in Washington's rhetoric on Assad. Even though the White House continues to insist that Assad must leave, it makes no mention of the framework for his "departure" and does not exclude sitting down with the Syrian leader at the negotiating table.
"We're prepared to negotiate. Is Assad prepared to negotiate, really negotiate? Is Russia prepared to bring him to the table?" said U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry.
Mirsky links the changes in Washington's approach to the Syrian leader first and foremost to the agreement on Iran's nuclear program.
"After the deal was reached with Tehran on the Iranian nuclear program, Assad ceased to be an ally of the enemy," he said.
In his opinion, the main opponent for the U.S. in Syria is now ISIS, not Assad: "If the ISIS extremists come to power in Syria, it will be a blow to the security of the whole region. And Obama will go down in history as the American president who surrendered Damascus to the terrorists," he said.
Three scenarios
Concerning Syria's future, experts see at least three scenarios: resolving the conflict with Assad, reaching a settlement without him, or the protraction of the conflict.
"The scenario in which Assad remains is the least likely because the U.S. has already spent a lot of resources on his overthrow and will not admit to defeat," said Tatyana Tyukayeva, a professor at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations and expert at the Foreign Policy Analytical Center.
"For the U.S. Assad is a lesser evil if compared to ISIS," said Georgy Mirsky. "But if Obama decides to leave Assad in place, he will be severely criticized."
A more preferred scenario, according to experts, is one in which the Syrian regime remains but Assad leaves.
"The option of the regime formally remaining is more preferable. But the positions of influential regional players such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar will hinder the realization of this option," said Tyukayeva.
"The most probable outcome is the protraction of the conflict, in the course of which Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar will attempt to wear out the regime through loyal Islamist groups."
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#19
www.rt.com
September 24, 2015
Upper House: No request from Putin to dispatch troops in Syria
Russian Upper House officials and the Kremlin spokesman have dismissed media reports about an alleged request to sanction the use of Russian military forces in Syria, adding that such document never existed even in preparatory stage.
"I know nothing about this, I have seen no documents on this issue. I cannot explain where this information could be coming from," Vladimir Putin's press secretary Dmitry Peskov told reporters on Thursday when facing the question if media reports about the request to the Federation Council to sanctions the use of the Russian military forces in Syria were true.
"Currently there are a lot of speculations in various mass media. An overwhelming majority of these reports have nothing in common with the reality. I think it would be counter-productive and silly if I started commenting on all such news," Peskov added.
The head of the Upper House Committee for Defense and Security, Viktor Ozerov, has also said that he had no information about the document. "There is no such address in the Federation Council and, to my awareness, it is not being prepared," Ozerov told RIA Novosti.
The comments came after US news agency Bloomberg reported, quoting its own unnamed sources, that Vladimir Putin's administration had already prepared the request for the Federation Council's license to send troops to Syria. The US journalists went further to suggest that Moscow planned to start an independent campaign against ISIS in the Middle East if no agreement with Washington is reached.
Russian law requires that the presidential decision to send military forces abroad should be sanctioned by the Upper House of Parliament, the Federation Council. However, in 2006 Russian senators passed a set of amendments to Federal law that allow president to send special forces in foreign countries without such sanctions as part of anti-terrorist operations.
"In theory, the fight against the Islamic State falls under the definition of fight against terrorism but last year's events showed that despite these amendments and possibilities Vladimir Putin chose to address the Federation Council with a request to sanction the use of Russian military forces in Crimea," Senator Ozerov told reporters.
On March 1, 2014 the Federation Council unanimously approved Vladimir Putin's request to use Russian military forces in Ukraine in order to settle the turmoil in the split country. However, the actual troops deployment has not taken place and in June 2014 Putin asked the senators to repeal their decision in order to help the beginning of the three-party talks aimed at peaceful resolution of the conflict in Donbass.
Russia currently has a small number of military specialists in Syria, most of them technical staff advising government troops on the use of Russia-made weapons.
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#20
Council on Foreign Relations
www.cfr.org
September 24, 2015
Syria: Let Putin Bleed
By Steven A. Cook
Steven A. Cook is Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR).
Early September brought the news that the Russians were deploying military forces to Bassel al-Assad International Airport near Latakia on the Syrian coast. The Aviationist website recently reproduced satellite imagery showing twenty-eight combat aircraft, including four Sukhoi Su-30SM multirole (air-to-air and ground interdiction) fighters, twelve Sukhoi Su-25 attack planes, and twelve Sukhoi Su-24 attack planes. In addition, the Russians have deployed fifteen helicopters, nine tanks, three missile batteries, cargo planes, refueling aircraft, and about five hundred soldiers to the same airfield. The Obama administration has not said much about the deployment, only that it was seeking clarification from Moscow. Pentagon officials were generally mum last Friday after Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter called his Russian counterpart, Sergei Shoigu, saying only that they are watching the situation closely. The administration's critics and supporters have responded to these developments in ways one might expect-howling criticism or over rationalization justifying why the presence of Russian forces in Syria is actually no big deal. They both have it wrong, though. Of course, the Russian buildup is a very big deal and marks a new, even more complicated and potentially dangerous phase in the Syrian conflict, but that is precisely why we should welcome it.
Over the weekend I heard former British Foreign Secretary David Miliband explain that the Russian deployment was a function of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's weakness, of which Moscow has become all too aware. Under these circumstances the deployment should be seen as an elaborate Russian maneuver to improve its negotiating position in the inevitable diplomatic solution to the Syrian crisis, which, while not including Assad himself, will have to include "regime elements." In Miliband's estimation the Russians are ready to dump Assad in return for American flexibility on the nature of the post-Assad ruling coalition.
Miliband is hardly an outlier. I have heard or read variations of these claims on any number of occasions, and each time they ring hollow. They are interesting reflections of what we think the Russians would be doing if the Russians were us. It reminds me of late February 2014 when all the smart kids were saying that Russian President Vladimir Putin would not be so stupid as to take over Crimea and that he merely sought to pressure and manipulate Ukraine from the outside. Those might be things that we would do, but they were never part of Putin's playbook. Even as that big, creepy, crying bear was being pushed around the closing ceremony of the Sochi Olympics and I was being told that the Russians were full of bluster and not much else, they were gassing up the tanks. More directly, Moscow has been fairly clear about its intentions in Syria, no? According to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Russia's growing military presence in Syria is intended to combat the self-declared Islamic State and defend the Syrian state. Two caveats are in order here. First the Russians could be lying, but they really have no reason to dissimulate, confident that the United States is going to accept the Kremlin's fait accompli just as it has in Ukraine. Second, Miliband may be correct; Russian statements have referred specifically to the "Syrian state" and not the Assad regime, which Kremlinologists of yore might interpret as an implicit nod to the confluence of Russian and American interest in a unitary Syrian polity. We'll see.
All this is a long wind up to the idea that while the West should not exactly learn to love Russia's intervention in Syria, the United States, Europeans, and the Gulf states might actually come to like it. Moscow may think it is somehow calling Washington's bluff in the fight against the Islamic State, but folks should separate out the Russian bluster and the political posturing of Obama administration opponents and supporters on Twitter and consider the serious implications of the Kremlin's move. The Russians just put themselves squarely in the middle of an extremely nasty, brutish civil war featuring a grab bag of extremist groups that includes the Islamic State, which would likely love to take a shot at the Russian military. If the reports of large numbers of Chechens filling the ranks of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's forces are accurate, it is payback time. Those jihadists are arrayed against Moscow's allies, a nefarious group that includes Hezbollah, Assad's militias, what is left of the Syrian military, and agents of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps. If the risks to the Russians in this environment are not clear, they should be. They are no longer an indirect party to the conflict, they have a huge target on their backs, and they are going to have a serious fight on their hands that does not seem to favor Russian forces. Sure, Syria in 2015 is not Afghanistan in 1979, and one would think that the Russians have learned lessons from their painful past, but Putin seems to have drawn all the wrong lessons from the late Soviet period.
This is not to suggest that Washington should continue to wash its hands of Syria. There seems little chance that the Obama administration or the next one will commit (beyond general rhetoric) the United States to bringing about the end of the Assad regime, but they should do everything to help the refugees fleeing Syria's hellish conflict. There seems to be no reason to match the Russians militarily there, however. Everything in foreign relations is linked, and it is precisely because Russia is a major strategic threat and because of the Kremlin's adventurism in Ukraine, which threatens NATO allies like Poland and the Baltic states, that I welcome Moscow's coming entanglement in Syria. Let Putin bleed.
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#21
Russia's Federal Migration Service ponders over possibility of accepting Syrian refugees
MOSCOW, September 25 /TASS/. The Russian Federal Migration Service and its fellow-colleagues from other CIS countries are discussing the Syrian refugee problem and a possibility of accepting them in the territories of Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Yekaterina Yegorova, the state secretary and the first deputy director of the Russian Federal Migration Service, told TASS on Friday.
According to her, Russia is unlikely to face such huge refugee flows from Syria as Europe. "I believe there is little probability that refugee flows into Russia will be that huge. But this is my personal point of view. On the other hand, we are discussing this problem and a possibility of receiving Syrian refugees with our CIS partners," Yegorova said.
She noted that the Federal Migration Service had enormous practical experience in accepting refugees in Russia. In 2008, it received refugees from Abkhazia; in 2014, Russia had to deal with huge refugee flows from Ukraine's war-torn Donbas region.
She said the absence of normal and effective regulation of the problem was the root cause behind Europe's refugee crisis. "The EU countries are failing to agree on how they should act," Yegorova emphasized.
According to her, an attempt to erect walls on the borders with European countries is showing the impotence and inefficiency of their migration policies.
"If Europe is the target, then these people will get there anyway," Yegorova said.
"Russia is less attractive for Syrian refugees than Europe. We received 1,100,000 refugees from Ukraine and the influx was much stronger. But did you feel that? Did you see any kind of collapse? The state bodies reacted efficiently. A legislative base was formed very quickly. The state promptly allocated the funds and the receipt was well organized.
There was no concentration of refugees in border areas," Yegorova concluded.
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#22
Asia Times
September 23, 2015
Saudi-Russia alliance in the offing?
By Salman Rafi Sheikh
Salman Rafi Sheikh is a freelance journalist and research analyst of international relations and Pakistan affairs. His area of interest is South and West Asian politics, the foreign policies of major powers, and Pakistani politics.
While it seems a bit easier to contend that Saudi Arabia is playing the 'Russia card' to keep the US under pressure, a closer look would suggest that Saudi Arabia and Russia, too, have a lot to gain from Riyadh making such a move.
However, it cannot be said that Saudi Arabia, forced by its own tactical mistakes in the Middle East, has been forced to change its course of action at global level.
Regardless of Saudi Arabia's central involvement in crushing oil prices in 2014 partly to put unbearable pressure on Russian economy, Moscow has shown its partial willingness to reverse the trend.
While Saudi Arabia and the US have certainly failed to materialize their objectives via-a-vis Russia, it is quite evident that Saudi Arabia's oil war was not just directed against Russia or Iran; it was equally directed against the US shale oil companies too.
With Saudi Arabia increasingly walking into its trap by not being able to force shale oil companies into bankruptcy, the best option left for them is, perhaps, to turn towards Russia and reverse the oil market's current trend to achieve its objectives against shale oil producers.
In one of the previous articles on Saudi-Russia alliance, I had argued that countries that want to develop an "alliance" have to have mutual interests.
With oil prices continuously falling and hurting Saudi Arabia's economy a lot and with Russian economy, too, depending heavily on stable oil prices, both countries seem to be developing the kind of "interest" necessary for converting their relationship into an alliance.
A few questions, however, remain unanswered. The most important of them is this: Although Saudi Arabia and Russia are on the verge of establishing an "alliance for oil", will they still be able to reconcile their conflicting views with regard to Iran and Syria and forge a durable alliance?
A lot depends upon how Russia and Saudi Arabia transcend this conflict. While Moscow and Riyadh do share an interest in the form of a stable oil market, they certainly are not on the same page when it comes to Iran-nuke deal, Assad's regime in Syria or Houthis in Yemen.
That Saudi Arabia and Russia are forging an "alliance for oil" was confirmed by Igor Sechin, CEO of Russia's state-owned Rosneft, in an interview with Financial Times.
He was reported to have said that Saudi Arabia is seeking a formal market-share agreement with Russia, even going so far as offering Russia membership in OPEC, to stabilize global oil markets. Whether Russia would accept this offer is, however, yet to be seen.
Frustrated by failures, Saudi Arabia's offers are, in fact, also an indication of Russia's strong position. In the same interview, Sechin said the strategy of US and its allies for crushing oil market has backfired.
Although Russia has certainly been hit by low prices, the cost of production has also fallen, he added, to less than $3 a barrel due to the drop in value of the ruble, down from around $5 a barrel last year.
He also expressed confidence that Rosneft would be able to manage its debt pile. As of the end of June, Rosneft had $10.9bn of debt maturing this year and a further $15bn in 2016. The Russian ruble lost more than 50% of its dollar value by January 2015.
Oil prices similarly fell from $103 a barrel in September 2014 to less than $50 today. But Russian oil production costs are calculated in rubles, not dollars. So, as Sechin states, the dollar cost of Rosneft oil production has dropped dramatically from $5 a barrel before the sanctions to only $3 a barrel, a level similar to that of Arab OPEC producers like Saudi Arabia.
This being the case, there is no way the Saudis can price the Russians out. On the contrary, they both can certainly do a lot of damage to shale oil producers.
Such a situation, if it ever becomes a reality, certainly reflects Saudi Arabia's failure in establishing its own hegemony in the global oil market, and the central reason(s) for Saudi Arabia's renewed quest for bettering its relations with non-OPEC oil producers, especially Russia.
While Sechin, in his interview, chose such words to indicate possible Russian rejection of Saudi Arabia's offers, an agreement, if ever signed, would certainly amount to a big boost to Russia's own international standing.
Not only would this mean availability of markets for Russia out of the current US-EU war zones, Russia would also be able to acquire a better negotiating position via-a-via the US and EU regarding sanctions imposed upon it in the wake of the conflict in Ukraine.
In addition to it, such an agreement with Saudi Arabia also allows Moscow to maintain oil quotas to fix the current price-fiasco.
With the US shale oil producers out of the way, Russians would work with the Saudis to support the oil price by agreeing with the Saudis' future output levels, while dividing the market with them at the same time.
On the other hand, with Russia as a member of OPEC, Arab Kingdoms would acquire the position to reap benefits from the Sino-Russia alliance and China's 'One Belt Silk Road' projects.
With West Asian petro-economies coming together in China's Silk Road, the political map of the world, dominated as it was by the US since the end of the Second World War, could transform to a great extent.
The unfolding economic boom coming out of Silk Road has already started to attract a several (oil and gas producing) states from Central Asia -Russia's "under-belly."
Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union states have recently agreed with China to integrate the rail route development of both. The development of huge new sea ports in Myanmar and other sites around Eurasia and the Indian Ocean will directly link the Gulf countries to Eurasia's booming new economic market and beyond.
It was in May that China and Russia signed a joint declaration "on cooperation in coordinating development of EEU and the Silk Road Economic Belt."
Moscow and Beijing declared a goal to coordinate the two projects to build a "common economic space" in Eurasia as a means to further expand their markets in "other parts" of the world.
The central link in this "grand alliance" is certainly China, which was, until recently, the biggest importer of Saudi Arabia's oil.
Although Russia has taken over Saudi Arabia as the biggest importer of oil, the former continues to have vital economic interests in China; and it is China -and China alone - that can play a vital role in bridging the gap between Russia and Saudi Arabia and help them transform their relations into much more than an "alliance for oil"- a term that itself tends to place certain limits on their relationship.
With China importing oil from Russia and Saudi Arabia, it can certainly help them permanently settle the question of quota and distribution. Most probably, it is these very questions that continue to cast shadows over the formation of Russia-Saudi Arabia alliance.
The central issue is that if Russia were to become a member of OPEC, what would be its share in the production as well as distribution of oil in the world oil market? Unless this issue is effectively resolved, clouds of uncertainty would continue to prevail.
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#23
www.penguinrandomhouse.com
The New Tsar
THE RISE AND REIGN OF VLADIMIR PUTIN
By STEVEN LEE MYERS
Hardcover PRE-ORDER $32.50
Sep 29, 2015 | 592 Pages
ABOUT THE NEW TSAR
The epic tale of the rise to power of Russia's current president-the only complete biography in English - that fully captures his emergence from shrouded obscurity and deprivation to become one of the most consequential and complicated leaders in modern history, by the former New York Times Moscow bureau chief.
In a gripping narrative of Putin's rise to power as Russia's president, Steven Lee Myers recounts Putin's origins-from his childhood of abject poverty in Leningrad, to his ascension through the ranks of the KGB, and his eventual consolidation of rule. Along the way, world events familiar to readers, such as September 11th and Russia's war in Georgia in 2008, as well as the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, are presented from never-before-seen perspectives.
This book is a grand, staggering achievement and a breathtaking look at one man's rule. On one hand, Putin's many reforms-from tax cuts to an expansion of property rights-have helped reshape the potential of millions of Russians whose only experience of democracy had been crime, poverty, and instability after the fall of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Putin has ushered in a new authoritarianism, unyielding in his brutal repression of revolts and squashing of dissent. Still, he retains widespread support from the Russian public.
The New Tsar is a narrative tour de force, deeply researched, and utterly necessary for anyone fascinated by the formidable and ambitious Vladimir Putin, but also for those interested in the world and what a newly assertive Russia might mean for the future.
PRAISE
"Steven Lee Myers coherently, comprehensively, and evenhandedly tells the story not only of Putin's glory years, but also of his hardscrabble childhood in Leningrad, his checkered academic career, his undistinguished work as a KGB agent in East Germany, his remarkably loyal service to the mayor of post-Soviet St. Petersburg, and his reluctant but speedy climb through President Yeltin's ministries in the late 1990s."
- The Christian Science Monitor, "10 Best Books of September"
"Combining skilled story telling, psychological examination and political investigation, Steven Lee Myers succeeds brilliantly in this biography of Vladimir Putin. Explaining the dangers that Putin's Russia may and does pose, Myers effortlessly and expertly guides the reader through the complexities of the Russian Byzantine governing style and the country's politics and identity. In the end, the book provides one of the most comprehensive answers to a puzzling question: Despite all the changes that Russia has gone through during communism and post-communism, why is it still an empire of the tsar?"
-Nina Khrushcheva
"Such an understanding of Putin's early life and the evolution of his leadership is lacking. [Myers's] methodology is sound and, I believe, the only way to capture such an intimate understanding of Russia's iron man."
-Ian Bremmer, author of Superpower
"Personalities determine history as much as geography, and there is no personality who has had such a pivotal effect on 21st century Europe as much as Vladimir Putin. The New Tsar is a riveting, immensely detailed biography of Putin that explains in full-bodied, almost Shakespearean fashion why he acts the way he does."
-Robert D. Kaplan
"The reptilian, poker-faced former KGB agent, now Russian president seemingly for life, earns a fair, engaging treatment in the hands of New York Times journalist Myers... [who] clearly knows his material and primary subject... Putin used the perks of power to create a complex system of cronyism and nepotism. Myers shows how Putin convinced everyone that this way of operating was part of the Russian soul and how he perpetuated it through an archaic form of Russian corruption... Myers astutely notes how Putin's speeches increasingly harkened back to the worst period of the Cold War era's dictates by Soviet strongmen... A highly effective portrait of a frighteningly powerful autocrat."
-Kirkus (starred review)
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#24
PBS Newshour
September 23, 2015
Why Putin is prepared to fight for Ukraine
In "Imperial Gamble," journalist Marvin Kalb argues that Russian President Vladimir Putin has won in Ukraine. Chief foreign affairs correspondent Margaret Warner sits down with Kalb to discuss Putin's world view and game plan.
JUDY WOODRUFF: Now: another addition to the NewsHour Bookshelf.
In March of 2014, Russia annexed the Ukrainian territory of Crimea. In the last year-and-a-half, Russia also has encouraged and supported militarily separatists in Eastern Ukraine.
The motivations behind these actions, as well as the response of the West, particularly the United States, is the focus of a new book by veteran diplomatic correspondent Marvin Kalb, "Imperial Gamble: Putin, Ukraine and the New Cold War."
He spoke with Margaret Warner.
MARGARET WARNER: Marvin Kalb, welcome.
MARVIN KALB, Author, "Imperial Gamble: Putin, Ukraine and the New Cold War": Thank you.
MARGARET WARNER: Now, in this book, you say Putin has won his gamble. You also recently wrote, Putin has won Ukraine.
Is that where we are?
MARVIN KALB: I think that what he has done from the very beginning was have a far more limited goal in mind than what a number of people felt at the very beginning, when this all started.
He never wanted all of Ukraine. He wanted for historical purposes to take Crimea. He did. Then he wanted a part of Ukraine that he could always use to advance Russian interests. And he is now at a point where nobody in the West is shouting, hey, stop. Give us back Crimea. It's all accepted. And so he has won.
MARGARET WARNER: And you write that the U.S. and the West grossly miscalculated, have even been shocked that he made this play for Crimea, violated international borders.
MARVIN KALB: There is no question he violated the borders. There is no question he's used to getting his way.
We had in the West a very romantic vision of Russia back in 1991, when the Soviet Union died and whatever is Russia began to emerge. And we began to think of it as a democracy. We're going to bring it into the West. All is going to be wonderful.
That was never in the cards.
MARGARET WARNER: So what was at the root of this for Vladimir Putin himself, in his spirit and in his world view?
MARVIN KALB: Vladimir Putin is a Russian czar. He's kind of a mix of Peter the Great and Stalin. He's got both in his veins. And he looks out first and foremost for the national security interests of Russia. He accepts that, in Eastern Europe, that is a Russian backyard, that is a Russian sphere of influence. Ukraine lives most uncomfortably and unhappily in a Russian backyard.
If anything good is going to emerge out of this, it's going to be the result of an acceptable modus vivendi between Ukraine and Russia. The two of them will have to get together at some point. It is going to be a result that many people in the West will not like, because Russia, as the bigger power, is going to get the better of the deal. So, a lot of people will say, that's appeasement. That's this - that - it's reality.
MARGARET WARNER: Sounds it like you're speaking to the West and to the United States when you say things like that.
MARVIN KALB: Very much so.
MARGARET WARNER: And that the U.S. should, what, step back and let Ukraine fend for itself with Russia now, settle it among themselves?
MARVIN KALB: Every nation at the end of the day must fend for itself.
Sometimes, it needs help. And Ukraine deserves all the help in the world. I'm very sympathetic. But I'm also a realist. I think President Obama would love to help. I think Chancellor Merkel of Germany would love to help.
But there are realities governing what they can do. And Ukraine cannot live with the false image that somehow or another the West will come and rescue her. It's not going to happen.
MARGARET WARNER: Go back to Vladimir Putin. There was one interesting point I thought you made in the book, is that he is...
MARVIN KALB: Just one?
MARGARET WARNER: Many.
(LAUGHTER)
MARGARET WARNER: The key is really, he didn't just spring out of nowhere, but he's very much in the tradition of many Russian leaders, not just Peter the Great and Stalin. What do you mean by that?
MARVIN KALB: He was the man in the Kremlin at the moment. He feels a personal responsibility to reconstitute Russia in his image, which is that of a czar, which is that of a nation that has an empire.
Russia can never be an empire unless it is in control of Ukraine.
MARGARET WARNER: And that has to do with the very close historical ties between the two...
MARVIN KALB: Exactly.
MARGARET WARNER: ... which we in the West also didn't really grasp.
MARVIN KALB: Well, we have got to understand, for example, Russia is an orthodox Christian nation. So is Ukraine.
That happened in 988 in Crimea, a place called Kievan Rus, which was the Russia around Kiev at that time. It's 1,000 years ago, but, to a Russian, it's yesterday.
MARGARET WARNER: Yes.
Let me ask you finally about a phrase that you use in your subtitle, and you call it "The New Cold~ War."
MARVIN KALB: Yes.
MARGARET WARNER: In terms of the broader relationship between the West and Russia, is it really that dire?
MARVIN KALB: It is not the same as a cold war, and I didn't in the subtitle have the ability to stretch it out.
But I was trying in the book to say that we are dealing with a return to what might be a far more normal relationship between the West and Russia. Russia is what it is that we see. It's not dressed up in its birthday costume. It is what it is. It regards its national interests as important enough to fight for.
And the difference on the whole Ukraine situation is that the Russians are prepared to fight for their position on Ukraine, and the West is not.
MARGARET WARNER: So, finally ending back up with Putin yet again, if this scenario you stretched out, which would be Ukraine and Russia getting together and finding this modus vivendi, if that doesn't happen any time soon, what should we - what do you expect next from Putin?
MARVIN KALB: That's a rough question.
He is so totally unpredictable. The answer - and it's not ducking - the answer is that which satisfies the immediate national security interests of Russia.
MARGARET WARNER: As he sees it?
MARVIN KALB: As he sees it. And he is a despot, and he's a very good despot. And he will see things in a narrow way. What is good for Russia? That is what he will do. If that's represented by a move toward the Baltic, that would be very dangerous, but he would do it, on the assumption that he would ask himself the question: I am prepared to fight for Estonia. Is the United States? Is Germany? Is Britain, France?
And the answer in his mind would be no. That doesn't mean he's going to do that.
MARGARET WARNER: But it's all thoughts in his head perhaps.
MARVIN KALB: It's very much up in the air.
MARGARET WARNER: Marvin Kalb, author of "Imperial Gamble," thank you so much.
MARVIN KALB: Thank you.
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#25
The Ripon Forum
www.riponsociety.org
September 2015
Is Time Working for or Against Putin?
By WILLIAM POMERANZ
William Pomeranz serves as deputy director of the Kennan Institute at the Wilson Center. Any opinions expressed here are the author's own.
he renewed clashes in eastern Ukraine in mid-August confirm once again that the Russia-Ukraine crisis is anything but frozen. Indeed, while the level of violence stabilized in the aftermath of the February 2015 Minsk II agreement, the shooting and dying on all sides never stopped.
The new round of fighting raises the immediate question whether the region is witnessing an escalation of the crisis, or if sufficient flexibility and restraint exists amongst the parties to return to the Minsk II process, unsatisfactory as it is. Yet while the clock is ticking on multiple fronts, it is Russian president Vladimir Putin who potentially faces the most significant time pressures.
Putin has relished being unpredictable throughout the conflict, but even he, by now, realizes that the Ukraine crisis has not gone according to his timetable. There has been no decisive military victory, as occurred in Georgia in 2008. Moreover, unlike the 2009 economic crisis, the price of oil has not dramatically recovered, nor does Russia possess the same deep financial reserves to prop up the ruble and prevent a dramatic drop in living standards. Finally, no U.S. politician generously has offered Putin a reset; instead, he has to deal with U.S. and EU sanctions.
Putin has relished being unpredictable throughout the conflict, but even he, by now, realizes that the Ukraine crisis has not gone according to his timetable.
So this current crisis differs significantly from the most recent ones. At the June St. Petersburg Economic Forum, Putin glossed over Russia's financial problems, but his economic advisors - past and present - openly expressed their concerns about Russia's future direction. And even though Putin faces no political opposition, he is presiding over a troubled economy that would keep any politician up at night.
What ails the Russian economy? Take your pick. Up until now, Putin has always made sure that pensions keep pace with inflation and are paid in full. Now, because of the collapse in the price of oil and deep recession, that type of money is simply not available. Putin risks alienating Russian pensioners - perhaps his most loyal group of supporters - by no longer providing pensions that are linked to the rate of inflation.
The regions are broke. Indeed, it has been reported that as many as 20 regions technically are in default. Regional governments are responsible for numerous public and social services, and now the federal government will have to pick up the tab at a time of shrinking resources.
Utility rates are going up, naturally hitting poor Russians the hardest. Since Putin is always looking over his shoulder for colored revolutions and potential social unrest, he obviously knows that the recent protests in Armenia were sparked by a rise in utility rates.
The list of problems goes on. The car market was down 30 percent in June, while mortgage lending was down 40 percent during the first five months of 2015. Both reflect a dramatic decline in domestic investment, manufacturing, and consumer demand. Most analysts anticipate at least a 3 percent decrease in GDP in 2015, and the final number may be worse. In June the EU extended its sanctions for another six months, thereby denying Russia access to western financial markets. And Belarus, Russia's erstwhile trade partner and ally, recently asked for another $3 billion loan to tide it over during difficult times.
Indeed, one has to look hard to find bright spots in the Russian economy. At the St. Petersburg Economic Forum, Putin touted the rise in domestic cheese, butter, and other dairy production, but this increase only occurred because of the food counter-sanctions imposed by Putin in 2014 against western agricultural products. Indeed, Putin has introduced a program of import substitution that sacrifices the principle of comparative advantage - the bulwark of the post-WWII system of international trade - and instead relies on Soviet-style notions of self-sufficiency.
Individually, the above economic problems are not necessarily fatal to the regime, especially since Putin faces no serious political challengers. Nevertheless, a toxic mixture of factors - inflation, declining pensions, a weakening currency, failing regional governments- is currently brewing that could boil over at any time. Putin would have to address any negative public reaction with dwindling economic resources. Moreover, his alternative financial backer - China - is in the midst of its own stock market crash and economic slowdown that may severely limit its ability to come to Russia's rescue.
Putin risks alienating Russian pensioners - perhaps his most loyal group of supporters - by no longer providing pensions that are linked to the rate of inflation.
Yet despite all these worries, Putin continues to display a high level of confidence. Is this hubris, or does he truly believe that time is on his side? He still is sitting on approximately $350 billion in hard currency reserves to throw at these problems. Those reserves, however, are down significantly from the start of the crisis and will be tapped again to cover the anticipated 2015 budget deficit. He also is a firm believer that what goes down must go up. So there is always the possibility that the price of oil will recover, thereby creating a significantly sunnier economic outlook.
The Ukraine crisis presents other opportunities for Putin as well. The extension of EU sanctions requires unanimity, and he will no doubt continue to sow divisions within Europe to possibly overturn the present sanctions regime when it is next considered in January 2016. Putin would love nothing more than to break the united front between the EU and the United States, and this remains a real possibility the longer the crisis drags on.
Yet to achieve this goal, Russia essentially has been put on a wartime footing. The anti-U.S. rhetoric in the Russian media is pervasive and unrelenting. Military spending remains one of the few areas not subject to budget cuts. The new law on "undesirable" foreign organizations makes it significantly easier to go after the domestic opposition (what little is left of it). Even the import substitution policy is driven by national security concerns and the need for Russia to be free of any dependency on foreign technology and products.
Putin can't back down from any of these policies without losing face and considerable political leverage, so in the short-term, Putin appears unlikely to change course. Putin admittedly can probably live with the poor implementation of the Minsk II agreement - the low-level military confrontation has created sufficient uncertainty to prevent major foreign investment and Ukraine's economic revival. Putin also could raise the ante and increase the level of violence in eastern Ukraine, as recently occurred. Such actions, however, run the risk of re-starting the clock on sanctions, something Putin wants to avoid.
So Putin is keeping his options open, probing and provoking to see what comes next. The problem is that as Putin plays for time, time is also working against him, especially on the economic front. And therein lies his dilemma.
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#26
The National Interest
September 25, 2015
Why the 'Normandy Four' Summit Is a Big Deal for Ukraine
It is in everyone's interest, including Russia's and the Donbas region's republics', to see that the Minsk II ceasefire agreement is held up.
By Nicolay Pakhomov
Nikolay Pakhomov is political analyst and consultant in New York City. He is a Russian International Affairs Council expert. You can follow him on Twitter @nik_pakhomov.
The announcement that the "Normandy Four" summit on Ukraine will be held in Paris on October 2, 2015 gives the best possible evidence that the four leaders not only have issues to discuss, but that decisions will be made during these meetings: Russian diplomacy is a consistent successor of Soviet diplomacy with its "no summits without meaningful decisions" principle. More proof of this is the "Normandy Four" foreign-ministers meeting in Berlin on September 12-the ministers are working on decisions to be made by the leaders in Paris. And their preparatory work will continue on the margins of the UN General Assembly in New York in late September.
The nature of the "Normandy Four" format is very mysterious. Since the Ukraine crisis is a highly emotional topic for the public in Russia, Ukraine, Europe and the United States, it is no wonder that the leaders prefer to discuss the current situation, their positions, and agreements behind closed doors. It is better for their countries' respective domestic politics. Despite the enigmatic nature of the "Normandy Four" talks, we can still evaluate the current state of the Ukraine conflict and the various options available.
First, we must acknowledge that the aforementioned emotional feelings of the public and aspiration of both media and "experts" to sensationalize the issue to garner public attention make understanding of Ukraine conflict very difficult. We ought to remember how intense the war buildup was in the media at the end of August 2015. Several times a day, reporters and "experts" promised the renewal of hostilities. One could read daily about tens of thousands of troops on both sides, about their strategies and tactics. It seemed that everybody knew the "secret" plans of offense and reported "unprecedented" movement of the troops.
...Yet, nothing happened.
The reason for this is simple: In reality, nobody is interested in a renewal of hostilities. Neither Ukraine nor Donetsk and Lugansk can win militarily, or even significantly improve their positions. To find an assessment of the state of Ukrainian forces, we can simply cite President Poroshenko. During his recent interview on Ukrainian TV, he explained why Europeans and Americans refused to provide weapons to the Ukrainian army citing three reasons. The first: "you [Ukraine] do not have an army"; the second and third were connected to the presence of Russian agents in Ukraine and Ukraine's corruption. Obviously, it is hard to fight without an army.
Furthermore, it is difficult to see how Ukraine can get efficient military forces quickly. Since the beginning of the conflict, there have been six waves of mobilization in Ukraine. The pure fact that there were six of them means that first five were not enough. The result of the sixth wave was not impressive: even according to the Ukrainian General Staff, the mobilization brought only a maximum of 60 percent of the necessary personnel.
But to create an army, even from these recruits, Ukraine needs money. And here the situation becomes even more difficult. Currently, Ukraine is spending about 5 percent of its GDP on defense; the military budget for the next year is $4 billion, a $1.6-billion increase from this year. And this budget is being passed while Ukraine continues to ask for bailouts from foreign creditors, and there is not even enough money in the budget to cover the costs of vaccination needs during a critical time when polio has resurfaced in Ukraine.
The chances are even smaller that an offensive campaign will come from the Lugansk and Donetsk People's Republics. What would be goals for these campaigns? Would it be to defeat the fifty to seventy-five thousand Ukrainian forces? Or, to take Dnepropetrovsk, Kharkov, Odessa? Kiev? One can argue that these goals are reachable, but nobody can prove it will be easy.
Even this brief analysis shows that the renewal of hostilities is the last thing on Kiev's, Lugansk's and Donetsk's agendas. But this does not mean that both sides will find ways to reconcile. With each day, the conflict resembles the Cold War-a competition between a pro-Western government in Kiev and the leaders in Lugansk and Donetsk, who pledged their allegiance to the "Russian World." Of course this competition is not about the amount of weapons and sophistication and attractiveness of ideology, but about how those conflicting sides present their populations with at least minimally functioning state.
If Ukraine becomes a prosperous and democratic state, safe for its citizens, respectful of its cultural diversity, and fully integrated with Europe, the "Russian World" will lose its appeal to the populations of the Lugansk and Donetsk Republics. And vice versa-if the east-Ukrainian republics are able to provide their populations with natural gas, fuel, electricity, jobs and social services when Ukraine is plunging into economic and political turmoil, no number of volunteer and oligarch-sponsored battalions (even with the best Western weapons) will be sufficient to stop the populations of territories closer to these republics from switching loyalties from Kiev to pro-Russian formations. (Especially, when these battalions are needed in Kiev to prevent another Maidan or fight for power.)
Understanding the current state of conflict in Ukraine as a mostly nonviolent competition of two sides gives us a good premise to analyze the "Normandy Four" talks.
First of all, it is obvious that the Normandy format is missing the United States as the chief supporter of the current regime in Ukraine. In the spring, Ambassador Tefft claimed that the United States was not invited. However, several questions remain unanswered. Will the members of "Normandy Four" refuse President Obama's participation if he asks to be involved? Is President Obama ready, not only to sit for hours of strenuous talks, but also to accept that the situation is a bit more complicated than officials in Washington portray it (that the democratic Ukraine is successfully fighting Russian aggression and developing its economy while Western sanctions against Russia also work successfully)? Furthermore, is President Obama ready to take the full responsibility for the results of such talks and their implementation?
Second, chances are high that sooner, rather than later, the leaders of the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics will be part of the "Normandy Four" negotiations. Clearly, it will be hard for President Poroshenko to be at the same table with politicians he considers to be terrorists. But he can understand the advantages such talks may bring, especially when they result in a stable ceasefire and further steps in the implementation of the "Minsk-II" agreement. This will mean that Russia and the West are negotiating and looking for long-term solutions with their proxies. Again, it is hard to refrain from Cold War parallels of two competing proxy-states that existed in Germany, Vietnam, Yemen and on the Korean Peninsula. At that time, conflicts between these proxy states were to a significant degree regulated by Moscow and Washington. Today, the conflict in Ukraine is dealt by Moscow and the Western capitals.
Third, Russia has been and is in a better position to support the east-Ukrainian republics than the West is able and ready to support Kiev. Russia not only has a geographic advantage and provides humanitarian aid to the populations of the Lugansk and Donetsk People's Republics, but it also supplies them with electricity and natural gas, finances their budgets and helps construct a functional state apparatus. According to Aleksander Khodakovsky, the secretary of the DNR Security Council, Russia provides about 70 percent of the Donetsk People's Republic's budget.
The winter is coming, and natural gas from Russia will be necessary not only for Donetsk and Lugansk (leaders of which can count on Russia), but also for Ukraine. The last winter was mild, and Ukraine received help from its other neighbors sanctioned by Berlin, Brussels and Paris. But this time around, the coordination between Brussels and other EU member-states to provide support to Ukraine will be complicated. On the one hand, the EU needs to pay closer attention to the situation in Greece; on the other, the showdown between Western European and Eastern European members on refugee quotas is getting fiercer. With those issues unsolved, the crisis in Ukraine will remain on the back burner, more so if large combats do not resume.
For the "Normandy Four" talks, such a situation means that Russia will be in no rush to make new decisions, thus significantly changing the situation in eastern Ukraine-as dire as the economic situation in the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republic is, they have Russia's back, and Ukraine lacks sufficient help from the West, still stranded with its own bigger problems.
In conclusion, we can state that the October talks in Paris will be significant because both sides of the conflict acknowledge the "Minsk-II" agreement. We can expect that in Paris, the future of "Minsk-II" will be decided. What could be the results of these talks? There is no reason to expect any crucial or substantially new decisions because neither the United States, the chief patron of Kiev, nor leaders of the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics will be represented in Paris. Regardless, all sides are interested in making sure that "Minsk-II" is being implemented. The latter means that most likely several benchmarks and deadlines for the implementation will be agreed upon in Paris to extend the life of "Minsk-II." And this particular development will be in Russia's interest, since the more time passes, the stronger the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics become.
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#27
Valdai Discussion Club
http://valdaiclub.com
September 24, 2015
History and Prospects of Ukrainian Crisis Settlement
By Mikhail Pogrebinsky
Mikhail Pogrebinsky is Director of the Kiev Centre of Political Studies and Conflictology.
The fragile truce in Donbass lasts for over two weeks. Sporadic shelling happens, but the focus of authorities of the unrecognized republics is persistently shifting to peaceful life. How stable will peace in the Southeastern Ukraine turn out to be this time? Towards what final status is the situation in Ukraine and beyond pushing the DPR/LPR?
There are hardly any unambiguous answers to all these questions today. Too much depends on hard-to-predict factors prima facie unrelated to the situation in the Southeast of Ukraine. Will Putin and Obama manage to reach an agreement on coordination of actions in Syria? How cold will the upcoming winter be? Will Europe succeed in elaborating a common migration policy?
But there are also quite conspicuous factors that pave the way to high-precision forecasts of some directions in the development of the situation around the Ukrainian crisis. For example, the economic life of the unrecognized republics is becoming ever more independent from Ukraine - most industries based on intra-Ukrainian orders are reorienting towards Russia and other CIS countries. The monetary system has become almost completely detached from the Ukrainian field and switched to the ruble zone.
On the other hand, the majority of members of Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada are not ready for any compromises with the DPR/LPR. President Poroshenko, whether he wants to fulfill the Minsk Agreements or not, lacks the resources to steamroll bills needed for their realization through the parliament.
The failure of the US campaign in Syria and Putin's taking the lead in the fight against ISIS creates a positive backdrop in searches for a compromise on the Ukrainian crisis between the White House and the Kremlin. The refugee avalanche that hit Europe is complementing the picture, rather bolstering Putin's plans to "pacify" the Southeast of Ukraine on his own terms. Although the conditions are not quite clear, some assumptions about the short-term course of the events can be made. Two stages may be outlined in our story.
Stage one. Europe holds the initiative.
The times when the Ukrainian crisis was only in the beginning, which, in my opinion, started their countdown the moment the Eastern Partnership project was launched, with all the ensuing plans to sign the Ukraine-EU Association, the initiative entirely belonged to Europe. Moscow's attempts to join the process to protect its interests bumped into arrogant disregard. As though Moscow had no part in bilateral agreements between Ukraine and the EU and its attempts to interfere were unacceptable. Consequently, rational considerations drew Russia to trade negotiations between Ukraine and the EU. At the same time, the best Moscow managed to achieve was to postpone the implementation of the Ukraine-EU trade regime, which was in line with the conditions of the Association Agreement.
Since the mass demonstrations in Kiev, after Yanukovych's refusal to sign the Association, Europe has been propping up the Euromaidan: condemning only Yanukovych but not denouncing use of force by the protesters, playing the decisive role in Yanukovych's concessions, threatening him with sanctions. In the end, the EU developed the document to reconcile the government and the protesters and acted as the guarantor of its implementation, yet it became simply one of the instruments of Euromaidan's total victory. Moreover, Europe did not condemn the breach of the "reconciliation" and the forced takeover of power by the protesters.
Such outcome was quite satisfying for Europe, because the initiative to put Ukraine into the field of its exclusive influence (snatch it from the clutches of the Russian "bear") was triumphant! All that was left was to legitimize the regime through off-year presidential and parliamentary polls and that was it - the anti-Russian face of Ukraine was completed, which was done under Europe's moral support and in full disregard of the manipulative elections, with forced cleansing of the field from competitors and so on. The mission of the Eastern Partnership project initiated by Sikorski and Bildt five years ago was accomplished - Ukraine's multi-vector policy has been done away with.
There is a Russian saying: "It was smooth on the paper, but they tripped over the gully."
When the crisis started revving up, but before the mass military actions, PACE passed a resolution entitled "Recent developments in Ukraine" on April 9, 2014, where the 9th point stated: "The Assembly strongly objects to any notion of a federalization of Ukraine and any outside pressures to pursue federalization in future..." It was obviously dictated by Ukraine and its friends. Before that, the idea of federalization in Ukraine had been criminalized, and people had been prosecuted for calling (!) for federalization.
Instead of shifting the discussion to the plane of a federalization model guaranteeing preservation of Ukraine's territorial integrity, Europe basically backed criminalization of the notion of federalization. The rest of the story is clear - Ukraine lost Crimea and is losing Donbass.
De facto, Europe was backing the military solution of the Donbass problem, because it was not stopping Ukraine's offensive in July - early August and changed its position only when it became clear that Ukraine could not win.
Second stage. Putin takes the initiative.
After Ukraine's offensive had been smothered, apparently not without the help of "polite people", the idea of Minsk Agreements appeared, and Merkel took up the burden of convincing Obama to back them. Formally, she succeeded, in my opinion, because Americans did not even care to carefully read the document. Otherwise, they would have probably not voted for it at the UN Security Council. Obviously, complete fulfillment of the Complex of Measures ("Minsk II") allowed Moscow to influence Kiev's policy through the Donbass autonomy, which would have broken the one-vector policy of Ukraine. While Europe, hemmed-in between several crises simultaneously (Greece, migrants), put up with having to reckon with Moscow's interests in resolving the Ukrainian crisis, the US in fact continued playing its game, basically bearing out the imitation of Kiev's fulfillment of the Minsk Agreements. On the other hand, Europe did not resolve to explicitly voice Kiev's blocking the Minsk process, it exerted influence on Poroshenko surreptitiously. Can the US position change because of the need to reckon with Moscow over the failure of Washington's tactic in Syria is uncertain to us, but I will venture to suggest that the American tactic in the Ukrainian crisis may be adjusted.
It stands to mention that the intra-Ukrainian situation is shifting towards chaotization of the political field amid aggravating problems in the economy and social policy, rising crime rate. The camp of victors is breaking into groups at war with each other and with the president and government, resembling bellum omnium contra omnes. That is what should be expected as soon as the first signs of a more or less stable truce appear. The president is losing the little support he had at the beginning of the year and which was largely motivated by the need to consolidate around the power during the war. The prime minister's approval rating is indiscriminative on the background of the survey's margin of error.
So, where are the developments taking them? I assume that forecasts could be made after the situation around the conflict over the local elections in Donbass clears up. Though unlikely, realization of "Morel's Plan", which stipulates conduct of elections in Donbass according to a special law, should not be ruled out. It is a subject of negotiations of the Trilateral Contact Group. If the elections take place and gain Europe's recognition, the situation will change dramatically, Donbass will form a legitimate government, and Kiev will have to enter into a dialogue with it. That will be a moment for an intelligible choice: Kiev will either give the (special) autonomous status of Donbass a go-ahead, according to the Minsk Agreements, or the territories will start tearing away from Ukraine's jurisdiction.
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#28
UNICEF.org
September 24, 2015
A community centre in eastern Ukraine offers respite for vulnerable families
By Sven G. Simonsen
A community protection centre in Kharkiv, eastern Ukraine, is a hub of support for displaced families. Dedicated volunteers like Jana keep the spokes moving.
KHARKIV, Ukraine, 24 September 2015 - "I always bring some food," laughs Jana, as she places apple pie in front of us. "I have many children, so it seems to me that everybody is always hungry, and I must feed them."
Volunteering is of second nature to Jana. We've met her at a UNICEF-supported community protection centre in Kharkiv, where she has quickly become a valued contributor to activities and services offered for internally displaced persons and permanent residents, alike.
A hub of support
The city of Kharkiv is currently home to more than 102,000 internally displaced people, including more than 13,000 children, as of 3 September 2015.
The community protection centre, which is operated by the NGO Ukrainian Frontiers, is one of 16 that UNICEF supports in Ukraine. It is intended to serve as a hub of social opportunity and support.
Over the past two weeks, the centre has had nearly 500 child and adult visitors, says Zhenia Levinshtein, the manager.
Families who visit the centre find a child-friendly space, complete with toys - and even an animator. They can take classes in English language, computer skills and entrepreneurship. The centre hosts such events as literature readings and film screenings with discussion.
Also on offer are legal advice and psychological support. "Every day a psychologist comes here, and every day the slots are filled," says Ms. Levinshtein.
Viktoria Bulavina, a programme manager, sees firsthand the results the centre's services can have. "We find that educational and arts programmes work very well for people in crisis," she says.
According to Ms. Levinshtein, the centre is oriented towards internally displaced persons. "But we think it is helpful for integration that also permanent residents participate," she adds.
Today, among the volunteers at the centre, half are from Kharkiv. The other half are, like Jana, themselves internally displaced.
Craft and master class
It's been almost a year since Jana's family first came to Kharkiv. They came from the city of Antratsyt, in what is now a non-government-controlled part of Luhansk region, so that Jana could give birth to her baby girl.
"By then, we could already see that the situation was getting worse back home," she says. "So we only returned briefly to collect our belongings."
At one time, Jana studied aviation engineering here in Kharkiv. Since the family relocated, she has been too busy with her children to take on a full-time job. She has worked part-time with her handicraft, Japanese kanzashi, which is making decorations from textile bands.
And, as soon as the community protection centre opened its doors, she started volunteering.
"Volunteering is part of my personality - I cannot not do it," she says. "I have always thought that we should be helping people. And these days, there are more people who need help."
She gives master classes in kanzashi. "I'm making myself available wherever people ask me to," Jana smiles.
Volunteer among volunteers
At this point in our conversation, every person around the table has helped her- or himself to a piece or two of Jana's apple pie.
In addition to feeding the other volunteers at the centre, Jana prepares food for the volunteers working at Station Kharkiv, a joint initiative by several organizations to receive displaced people at the Kharkiv railway station and address their most immediate needs.
"Jana is an inspiration to all of us," says Yulia, another volunteer at the centre. "She has so many commitments, with her big family and everything. We understand that if Jana can find time to do all these things, then we can surely do something good, too."
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#29
The Economist
September 26, 2015
Editorial
Progress in Ukraine
Look west, Maidan
The revolution in Ukraine is being smothered by corruption and special interests
YOU would be forgiven for thinking that the crisis in Ukraine is past its worst. Although the Minsk agreements are honoured in the breach and artillery fire still echoes across the Donbass, there has been little real combat for months. The separatists have given up extending their territory, Russia has given up sending them heavy reinforcements, and Ukraine has given up trying to defeat them. A chance to resolve lingering disagreements will come on October 2nd when the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France and Germany meet in Paris.
Although Western powers are surely tempted to turn their attention elsewhere, that would be a mistake. The shooting war was never the only conflict in Ukraine-nor even the most vital one. The Maidan revolution was an attempt to replace a corrupt post-Soviet government with a modern European-style one based on the rule of law. Ordinary people challenged Vladimir Putin's vision of a distinct "Russian World" unsuited to liberal democracy. What is at stake in Ukraine is thus the future of the entire post-Soviet region.
Get clean, Ukraine
As yet, Mr Putin does not have much to worry about. Ukraine's reformers have tried, but their war on corruption is not going well (see article). The Ukrainian state, like the Russian one, still resembles a giant mafia. It administers the country (reluctantly), but its main purpose is to generate graft and it governs largely by dishing out the proceeds. Oligarchs and their political cronies still dominate Ukrainian life. Should the government do too much to fight corruption, the oligarchs may use their private armies to stage a coup. Should the government do too little, angry Maidan veterans might stage one themselves. That could leave Europe with a failed state on its borders contested by rival militias-a European Syria.
What Ukraine requires is more direct help from outside. The government has already brought in technocrats from across central and eastern Europe, and members of the Ukrainian diaspora. The West should urgently send more. The notion that foreigners can solve a country's corruption problems sounds dubious, but it has worked elsewhere-in Guatemala, for instance, a UN-sponsored agency staffed by expatriate lawyers has brought justice, even indicting the country's former president. Ukrainian civil-society groups are begging for outside help. Western donors now propose to top up the salaries of Ukrainian officials in an attempt to curb the temptation to take bribes. Some officials will take both the top-up and the graft. Better still to send in outsiders.
Information is needed, too. Mr Putin's vision reaches Ukrainians through Russia's slick television channels. Ukraine's stations, mostly owned by oligarchs, are dreary by comparison. The budgets of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and the BBC World Service have been cut since the cold war; their Ukrainian- and Russian-language services now need beefing up.
Ukraine's other needs, such as infrastructure, are more expensive-though less so than coping with the cost of a failed state. But liberal democracies have a stake in Ukraine's success. To bring down their president in the winter of 2013, roughly 100,000 Ukrainians braved gas canisters and bullets not because they wanted war with Russia, but because they wanted to live in a "normal" country. The Maidan demonstrators wanted a reasonably non-corrupt, reasonably effective, liberal democratic system like the ones they saw in Europe. So far they have not got what they sought. If liberal democracies cannot help such people realise their dream, then they should not be surprised when the discontented masses conclude that liberal democracy has nothing to offer them.
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#30
Analysts: Ukraine's Right Sector strong enough to stage coup
By Lyudmila Alexandrova
MOSCOW, September 24. /TASS/. The organization of Ukraine's radicals Right Sector is a menace to the current authorities in Kiev, so President Petro Poroshenko, well aware of that, has been trying hard to have the nationalists integrated with the official establishment by hook or by crook, analysts say. They also believe that the risk ultra-nationalists and their organizations may stage a march on Kiev and a government coup is rather high. Particularly so, if their idea garners overseas support.
The Right Sector and religious schismatics have seized an Orthodox church of the Moscow Patriarchate in the Ternopol Region. The Right Sector is involved in the food blockade of Crimea and agrees to let trucks carrying foods cross the border into Crimea only in exchange for a thousand dollars...This extremist Ukrainian group, outlawed in Russia, and its leader Dmitry Yarosh invariably remain in the focus of mass media. The Kiev authorities' "honeymoon" with the movement of ultra-nationalists, whose support they used during and after the Maidan street protests, is long over. Of late, the relations between them grew strained and exchanges of direct threats were frequent.
Just recently, the Right Sector warned it might stage an armed march on Kiev, if its supporters, who continue to be detained by police, are not released within 48 hours. Yarosh addressed his men with a call for getting ready for civil disobedience actions with the aim to "liquidate the regime of internal occupation and achieve the national statehood of the Ukrainian people."
In this context the breaking news of recent days was Yarosh's statement to the effect Right Sector militants will join the Ukrainian security service SBU's crack unit Alfa. Experts are certain that this decision by Kiev will merely put more muscle into the radicals who are pressing for Poroshenko's resignation.
"In fact, the SBU will incorporate a group that has officially proclaimed the ousting of Poroshenko and his entourage," the on-line media resource VZGLYAD (GLANCE) quotes the director of the Ukrainian Centre for Eurasian Research, Vladimir Kornilov, as saying. "But everybody is perfectly aware that either the authorities will arrange for a 'night of long knives', or the militants will come calling and do away with the current authorities. Their clash is imminent."
The Right Sector does have all the necessary resources for staging a coup, Professor Andrey Manoilo, of the Moscow State University's department of political science, has told TASS. "Alongside the so-called Ukrainian Volunteer Corps, well-armed, having a previous record of fighting in Donbass, and obeying no one but for its own ringleaders, Yarosh has done a great deal to consolidate all other territorial volunteer battalions, many of them outspokenly nationalist. The Right Sector numbers some 10,000 men - an equivalent of a full-scale army division. For Yarosh it is more than enough to take Kiev ten times.
He really meant it when he warned if Poroshenko kept ignoring the opinion of Ukrainian nationalists, these forces would be revoked from Donbass and sent to Kiev with the aim to "restore order." "Of late, Poroshenko went to great lengths in his attempts to somehow disperse the volunteer battalions and to do something about the Right Sector. He tried to make the battalions part of the national guard or armed forces, to subordinate them to a common command and then to gradually replace their commanders and 'dilute' the personnel for the sole purpose of getting rid of this organized armed group."
The idea of including the militants into the Alfa unit pursues the same aim. But it remains to be seen who will gain the upper hand," Manoilo said.
"There may be one more thought on the Americans' mind. For the United States the right-wing radicals may come in handy, should Washington decide time is ripe for ousting the regime that has hopelessly lost credibility. More economic upheavals will follow and Poroshenko will have to be removed from office. It would be ideal to have him replaced not through an election, but another spate of Maidan demonstrations. Only Yarosh and his men can do that," he believes.
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#31
Sputnik
September 23, 2015
Ukraine Likely to Face Civil War in West of the Country - German Media
The EU-funded government in Kiev is about to collapse. The Party of oligarch Yulia Tymoshenko is supporting far-right groups in the country, which are seeking to overthrow the current government, DWN wrote.
A new civil war may break out, but this time in the Western Ukraine, the newspaper reported. The situation within the ruling coalition is destabilizing shortly before the local elections on October, 25.
Following the withdrawal of the Radical Party from the coalition, representatives of All-Ukrainian Union "Fatherland" ruled by Yulia Tymoshenko also started to publicly criticize the decentralization plans of the current government.
Last week, Tymoshenko accused its coalition partners of surrendering to Russia and strictly opposed the attempts to promote the federalization of the country, Russian media reported.
The initial coalition included Petro Poroshenko Bloc, People's Front under Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk, All-Ukrainian Union "Fatherland" ruled by Yulia Tymoshenko, the Radical Party and the "Self Reliance" Party.
The Radical Party left the coalition in early September due to its disapproval of the government's federalization plans and autonomy for the Eastern Ukraine.
It remains unclear how long the government will be able to control the situation in the country. Ukraine, who is dependent on Western loans and unable to pursue efficient policy, has caused discontent among the local population and Western politicians.
According to DWN, the situation in the country is highly explosive and is inching towards a new civil war which may break out in the nearest future in the Western regions of the country.
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#32
Russia hopes for compromise on weapons withdrawal in Donbas - Foreign Ministry
ST. PETERSBURG, September 24. /TASS/. Moscow hopes to reach a compromise agreement on withdrawal of weapons with calibre less than 100 mm in Ukraine's south-eastern Donbas region, which will promote deescalation of the situation, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said on Thursday.
"The ceasefire agreement is observed by the parties, which promotes settlement, creates prerequisites for more substantial work not only on the military, but also on other aspects of the Minsk agreements," she said. "Attaining the agreement on the withdrawal of weapons with calibre less than 100 mm is in line with the de-escalation task. Unfortunately, the sides have again failed to do this on September 22."
"Nevertheless, the search for a compromise continues," Zakharova said. "We hope it will be promoted by proposals of the Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to Ukraine put forward for discussion at meetings of the Contact Group [on the Ukrainian crisis settlement]."
On September 12, in Berlin, foreign ministers of the Normandy Four (Russia, Germany, France, Ukraine) discussed settlement of the conflict in Ukraine. Despite the lack of evident progress, the parties were positive about the talks. Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said he had a positive impression from the talks. "There have been certain arguments concerning the order of steps regarding the constitutional reform, the necessary actions from Kiev's authorities in providing a permanent special status for Donbas, but the arguments we had, I believe, have been heard."
Germany's Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier said "as before, it was not easy, however, I can say with relief that there was less confrontation than before. We have been able to move forward on some issues," he said. The talks also showed "how difficult every step forward was. What we have achieved today was a result of hard work and must be implemented by the Contact Group." "There is hope that today's meeting will contribute to defusing tensions in eastern Ukraine and also that it was part of preparations for the Four's summit on October 2," the German foreign minister said.
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#33
The Economist
September 26, 2015
Rule of law in Ukraine
Mr Saakashvili goes to Odessa
A Georgian reformer tackles Ukraine's real public enemy number one: corruption
IN THE spring of 2014, as the war in eastern Ukraine's Donbas region was breaking out, deadly clashes wracked the elegant port city of Odessa. On May 2nd pro-Russian separatists shot at pro-Ukrainian demonstrators from behind police lines. The riot ended in a fire that killed 46 separatists. The city has been largely quiet ever since.
Yet over the past few months Odessa, now governed by Mikheil Saakashvili, a former president of Georgia, has become a battleground in a less visible sort of war. This pits the corrupt post-Soviet system that has ruled Ukraine for nearly a quarter of a century against the law-based state that was promised by the Maidan revolution in Kiev nearly two years ago.
It was Ukrainians' aspirations for a modern Westernised country that spurred Russia's aggression against them in the first place. But while the war has turned Ukraine against Russia, cost 8,000 lives and battered Ukraine's economy, it has not created a functional state. All too often, the conflict has been used by the government as an excuse for its failure to change.
Only 3% of Ukrainians are satisfied with the pace of reforms. None of the officials who pillaged the country under its prior government and were responsible for the deaths of demonstrators in Kiev has been prosecuted. Despite a few fresh faces in government, the old elite continues to dominate, showing little interest in investigating the scams they once ran-and in many cases still do. A new anti-corruption bureau set up a year ago has been stymied. "The government is killing the spirit of Maidan," says Yulia Mostovaya, the editor of Zerkalo Nedeli, an independent weekly.
It is this spirit that Mr Saakashvili is now trying to revive in Odessa. Lacking a responsible Ukrainian political elite, the president, Petro Poroshenko, has recruited foreigners into his administration. An ideological corruption fighter, Mr Saakashvili is trying to replicate in Odessa the reforms he successfully implemented in his native Georgia between 2004 and 2013.
Fighting corruption is a critical struggle throughout the post-Soviet region, and Mr Saakashvili's administration has attracted a clutch of Georgian, Ukrainian and even Russian reformers. They include Maria Gaidar, daughter of Yegor Gaidar, the liberal who served as Russia's first post-Soviet prime minister. She believes she can do more for Russia's future in Odessa than she could in Moscow, where she helped lead the anti-Putin protests in 2011. "Putinism is based on the idea that there can be no alternative to his model of governance," says Ms Gaidar. "What we are trying to do here is to create this alternative."
The ceasefire in eastern Ukraine has shifted the focus from war to reform. For the first time in 18 months, nobody is dying in Donbas. Russian state television channels, whose programming is a good predictor of Kremlin intentions, have stopped showing images of combat and turned to upbeat footage of separatist leaders visiting kindergartens. "The situation in the east of Ukraine has reached an impasse," says Dmitry Trenin, head of the Carnegie Moscow Centre, a think-tank. Rather than escalating the conflict and risking further Western sanctions, Mr Putin is counting on political turmoil to destabilise Ukraine.
The biggest threat to Ukraine is now not a Russian invasion, but corruption so pervasive that it long ago ceased to be a disease of the post-Soviet system and became the system itself. Police and prosecutors are in effect commercial structures used to gain wealth and power. And while in Mr Putin's Russia security and law-enforcement agencies are controlled by one clan, in Ukraine the privatised state is divided between several oligarchic groups, providing a measure of pluralism (if not democracy). The attempt by Viktor Yanukovych, the former president, to monopolise corruption was one reason for his overthrow.
Although Maidan started as a popular movement against corruption, it was supported by the oligarchs, who put their own politicians on the stage. Getting rid of Mr Yanukovych did not end corruption; it merely decentralised it. "Instead of rebuilding the system, [the new government] is redistributing assets and spheres of influence," says Victoria Voytsitska, one of the young members of parliament swept in by the revolution.
Rule by bribe
Russian aggression empowered the oligarchs further. Unable to rely on its corrupt, ill-equipped police and army, the new government appointed several oligarchs as governors of the country's most vulnerable regions. Ihor Kolomoisky, a billionaire with interests in banking, oil, television and an airline, took charge of Dnepropetrovsk. He financed a private army, topped up police salaries and put a bounty on every separatist's head.
Having stemmed the Russian-backed secessionists, the oligarchs felt entitled to continue profiting from state firms. Aivaras Abromavicius, the Lithuanian-born minister for economy and trade, says there is not a single state enterprise in Ukraine that has not been usurped by one clan or another.
Mr Kolomoisky soon tried to expand his influence to Odessa, installing a business associate as its acting governor. But after a stand-off over control of state energy firms, Mr Poroshenko fired Mr Kolomoisky as governor of Dnepropetrovsk and appointed Mr Saakashvili as governor of Odessa. Mr Poroshenko saw it as a way of consolidating power; Mr Saakashvili sees the president as cover for reform.
Odessa's new governor faces much resistance. When he tried to clean up the customs department, the national government lowered tariffs at Ukraine's other ports and sucked away 80% of the Odessa port's business-to ensure a cut of the bribes would continue to flow up the chain of command. Exasperated by the sabotage, Mr Saakashvili went on national television to accuse the prime minister, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, of being in the pocket of the oligarchs. He also attacked the head of the civil aviation authority for restricting competition in favour of Mr Kolomoisky's airline. The government was forced to drop the differential tariffs, sack the head of the aviation authority and put him under house arrest.
Mr Kolomoisky vowed revenge. "When a dog without a muzzle bites someone, we need to punish both the dog and, more importantly, its owner," he told Ukrainian journalists. The oligarchs, says Ms Mostovaya, see Mr Poroshenko not as an independent arbiter but as one of their own who is trying to squeeze out the rest. Observers say the oligarchs hope that regional elections, due on October 25th, will allow them to establish control in Ukraine's east and force early parliamentary elections.
Mr Saakashvili argues that the only way to dislodge the oligarchs is to enlist the public. Whereas Georgia had a pro-reform economic elite, "In Ukraine, there is no such elite, but there is a strong civil society," he says. "Ordinary people take much greater interest in politics here than they did in Georgia."
To rally support, Mr Saakashvili has staged a series of publicity stunts. With the cameras rolling, he turned up at seaside mansions to smash walls and free up beaches illegally commandeered by tycoons. "If I tried to do it by sitting in my office or appealing to the courts, it would just never get done," says Mr Saakashvili. He has promised a badly needed road from Odessa to the Romanian border and a Georgian-style one-stop office to cut through red tape for official documents.
Odessa's young reformers look out of place in the regional administration's concrete Soviet-era building. Mr Saakashvili's 25-year-old deputy, Yulia Marushevska, is familiar to many Westerners as the face of Maidan: in February 2014 she recorded an English-language video from the demonstrations entitled "I am a Ukrainian", and drew 8m views on YouTube. After a few months of working in Odessa's government, she says: "I feel like sitting down and rewriting this country from scratch."
But the key, as Mr Saakashvili knows from his experience in Georgia, is control over law-enforcement agencies. One of his biggest victories so far is the appointment of a Georgian former prosecutor as the head of Odessa's prosecutor's office.
On the brink of chaos
With winter approaching and electricity shortages looming, time is short. "We have two to three months at most to show some results," says Mr Saakashvili. Poorly remunerated public services are on the brink of collapse. The population is growing poorer-and more radical. Meanwhile, Ukraine is brimming with weapons and thousands of militiamen, angry with a corrupt and listless government they feel has hijacked the revolution.
In Odessa a pro-Ukrainian volunteer force called "Self-Defence" boasts 300 men (many of them armed) and 400 more in reserve. Vitaly Kozhukar, one of its leaders, says he and his men are disappointed that Mr Saakashvili does not rely on them. "We expected more radical steps from him," says Mr Kozhukar. "We will give him a couple of months before we start asking questions. And if he tells us that the problem is in Kiev, we will go to Kiev."
Given the weakness of law enforcement, it might not take much for a militia battalion to move into Kiev and stage a coup. Many of the paramilitary groups are financed by oligarchs. Were they to overthrow the government, the country could collapse into regional factions-a prospect relished by Russia.
To tame the militias, the state must grow strong enough to establish a monopoly on violence. Yet law enforcement agencies are so discredited that reformers have turned to creating parallel structures. New "patrol police" departments have been set up in cities including Kiev and Odessa. Recruits are put through a vigorous selection process to weed out bad apples, trained by police instructors from California, and paid triple the salaries of the old departments to avoid temptation.
One day last month, Eka Zguladze, a former Georgian official serving as Ukraine's deputy interior minister, stood at the top of the steps where Sergei Eisenstein filmed the famous baby-carriage scene in his masterpiece, "Battleship Potemkin". Ms Zguladze was swearing in the first cadre of Odessa's newly established patrol police. "We must show that our dream of the rule of law is not a Utopia. The battle taking place is not about east and west, north and south," she told them. "It is a battle for law against lawlessness."
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#34
Interfax-Ukraine
September 25, 2015
Poroshenko approves new military doctrine calling Russia current military threat to Ukraine
Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko has signed a decree which brought into effect the September 2, 2015 decision taken by the National Security and Defense Council on the new version of the Ukrainian military doctrine.
The document names Russia as an actual military threat for Ukraine today over the country's actions in Crimea and the situation in Donbas.
Meanwhile, the doctrine holds that the threats are the build-up of Russian military might in the immediate vicinity of the Ukrainian state border, 'militarization' in Crimea, the presence of the Russian military contingent in Transdniestria and the intensification of reconnaissance activity in Ukraine.
The activity in Ukraine of armed units not envisioned by the law which seek to destabilize the domestic socio-political situation is also defined as a threat.
The doctrine determines military and political challenges which may grow into a threat of use of military force against Ukraine, the first of which, according to the doctrine's authors, is interference in Ukrainian domestic affairs by Russia.
Some scenarios are also defined under which threats to the military security of Ukraine may be realized, the first of which, as the doctrine's authors believe, is "a full-scale armed aggression" by the Russian side.
The military doctrine envisages that the key tasks of creating conditions for the restoration of state sovereignty and territorial integrity in Ukraine are: comprehensive reform of the national security system up to the level acceptable for membership of the EU and NATO; the formation of an effective sector of security and defense.
The development of the Ukrainian Armed Forces under Western standards and the attainment of compatibility with the armed forces of the NATO states are also set as a goal.
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#35
Ukraine reforms national security sector for future membership in EU, NATO - military doctrine
KYIV. Sept 24 (Interfax) - Kyiv considers as a priority task the deepening of cooperation with NATO and the attainment of full compatibility between the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the relevant forces of the alliance's states by 2020. This is determined by the new version of the Military Doctrine, the text of which was posted on the official website of the Ukrainian president on Thursday.
For instance, according to the document, Ukraine believes that each country has the right to ensure its security through integration in such security structures which meet its interests most of all.
"After the refusal from the non-aligned policy Ukraine is working out new approaches to ensure national security, giving priority to participation in the improvement and development of Euro-Atlantic and European collective security systems. For this Ukraine will integrate into the European political, economic and legal space in order to acquire membership in the European Union, as well as to expand cooperation with NATO to attain criteria required for membership in this organization," the document said.
With this in view, the doctrine said that the priority task for deepening cooperation with NATO is the attainment of full compatibility between the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the relevant forces of the NATO states by 2020.
The expansion of this cooperation envisions: the development of multilateral relations within modern NATO mechanisms, particularly the joint policy of security and defense with the EU, the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine, the Partnership for Peace Program, the NATO Operational Capabilities Concept, the Planning and Review Process of the NATO forces and Mediterranean dialogue; reliable implementation of partnership commitments, the assumption of a proportionate share of responsibility in joint operations with NATO, unbiased and transparent analysis of the reforms of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to introduce NATO standards, ensuring the mobility of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the operability of their deployment, provision of the training of the personnel, technical compatibility of weapons, military and special hardware, as well as operational compatibility between the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the NATO states, the document said.
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#36
US Department of Defense
www.defense.gov
September 24, 2015
Carter Reaffirms U.S. Commitment to Ukraine
By Terri Moon Cronk, DoD News
WASHINGTON, September 24, 2015 - The United States will continue to back the Ukrainian military's right to defend itself when Russian-separatist forces attack its positions, Defense Secretary Ash Carter said today.
In a joint news conference with Ukrainian Defense Minister Col.-Gen. Stepan Poltorak following their meeting during Poltorak's first visit to the Pentagon, Carter reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to Ukraine and praised his counterpart for his leadership and fortitude "at a critical time for the security of his country, the region and the world."
Ukraine has made "a genuine effort to live up to its Minsk commitments, and has shown considerable restraint in the face of provocations and attacks," the secretary said, referring to a February ceasefire agreement.
Carter said the U.S. message to Russia stands firm as the United States is "adjusting its posture and investments to deter Russian aggression, and working with NATO and other security partners to do the same."
The Defense Department will continue ongoing U.S.-Russia military talks on issues in Syria and countering the extremist Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, where mutual interests overlap, he said. But those talks will neither take away from the strong U.S. condemnation of Russian actions in Ukraine nor change U.S. sanctions and security support in response to destabilizing actions, he added.
Productive Meeting
The two leaders met previously at the recent NATO defense ministerial conference and discussed their nations' strong defense relationship, Carter said.
"Today, we had a productive meeting and built on that discussion in Brussels [to find] ways to sustain and strengthen those commitments, including ongoing security assistance to Ukraine's armed forces and border guard service," the secretary said.
"[Poltorak] described to me today the very admirable steps he's been taking to strengthen the Ukrainian armed forces, and I was very impressed," he added.
While recent reports of a general reduction of violence in Ukraine are encouraging, the secretary said, the United States still sees a failure to fully uphold the Minsk commitments by Russia and the separatists. "That's why we're committed to helping Ukraine safely and effectively operate, secure and defend its border, and preserve and enforce its territorial integrity," he said.
The secretary noted the United States has provided Ukraine with more than $244 million in equipment and training, including Humvees, counter-mortar radar, night vision gear, body armor and medical equipment, and he said strengthening Ukraine's training capacity will strengthen its defense capability. And by the end of November, he added, "we will have trained 900 Ukrainian national guard personnel, and we are commencing training the regular Ukrainian armed forces.
Grateful for Support
Thanking all the nations that support Ukraine during what he called "a difficult time, Poltorak emphasized the particular importance of U.S. support as his country fights for its democracy.
The minister described the U.S.-Ukraine relationship "as good as ever before," and said he invited Carter to visit his country and see the many changes made to its economy and its armed forces and how the nation is "building a Ukraine that will be a European country with democratic values in which its people are treated as [the] first priority."
The United States and Ukraine must stand together going forward "to overcome all the challenges we're facing right now," the minister said.
"I'm very happy the United States and other countries ... are supporting us," he added. "Together, we will win."
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#37
Kyiv Post
September 24, 2015
NATO deepening cooperation with Ukraine, but membership far away
By Johannes Wamberg Andersen
YAVORIV, Ukraine - NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg didn't bring promises of anti-tank weapons or a membership action plan to Ukraine during his first visit to the war-torn country Sept. 21-22.
Instead NATO offered symbolic support of solidarity and pledged other types of aid.
While some still call for more NATO involvement in the face of Russian aggression in Ukraine, experts agreed with President Petro Poroshenko that any Ukrainian rapprochement with NATO would be a long and gradual process.
Denis Vasilev, a national security expert with the Reanimation Package of Reform group, was one of those who saw Stoltenberg's visit as an important first step, even if a lot more still lie ahead. "We have to move towards the European security system if we don't want to be absorbed by Russia," he said. "The third way - being none affiliated in between - turned out to be a dangerous illusion covering up Russian preparations for armed aggression."
Following Stoltenberg's visit, the NATO offices in Kyiv are to be strengthened into a consolidated and enhanced representation with diplomatic status. "Now they can begin practical work on providing assistance to Ukraine, as opposed to the seminars they have held in the past," Vasilev said, explaining the changing role of the alliance in Ukraine.
NATO would also help upgrade technical standards in the armed forces. Out of a total of 1,300 NATO standards, Ukraine currently only complies with three, Vasilev said. "The military is still suffering from an outdated Soviet style of management, and Soviet equipment, and at the current pace it could take us decades to comply," he said. In contrast, with the newly announced assistance from NATO, significant progress could be made "in a year's time," he said.
One type of assistance that NATO has already been providing for a year is a strategic communications program that aims to overhaul the way government bodies communicate between each other, and to the general public.
Long-term prospects aside, Vasilev stressed the immediate political importance of Stoltenberg's visit. "It's a diplomatic victory for (Ukraine's) president, providing much needed support for Ukraine on the eve on the debate in the United Nations General Assembly," where Russian President Vladimir Putin is set to deliver a key speech on Sept. 28.
"NATO is taking its corporation with Ukraine much further with this visit," Vasilev said.
Meanwhile, President Poroshenko said that "Ukraine isn't ready for NATO, and NATO is not ready for Ukraine," at the opening of a joint NATO-Ukraine disaster emergency exercise at the Yavoriv military training ground in western Ukraine, which he attended together with Stoltenberg. Poroshenko's comment came in a response to a question from the Kyiv Post on whether it had been a mistake by the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008 to leave Georgia and Ukraine in a precautious situation with no Membership Action Plan but with a vague promise that they "will become members of the alliance."
Some have argued that Putin, in response to that statement, proceeded to invade both Georgia and Ukraine in order to secure Russian influence over the countries.
Poroshenko's answer about the lack of current readiness implied that Ukraine also wasn't ready for NATO in 2008, making speculation moot as to whether Ukraine could have been saved from Russian invasions by a NATO Membership Action Plan.
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#38
Fort Russ
http://fortruss.blogspot.com
September 25, 2015
Donbas is the reason Ukraine can't join NATO
Алексей Верхоянцев for SVPressa
http://svpressa.ru/politic/article/132528/
Translated for Fort Russ by Paul Siebert
"If Ukraine will start to prepare a referendum on joining NATO or other procedures, DNR will immediately withdraw from the Minsk agreements and proceed to cleaning up the entire territory of Donbas occupied by the regime in Kiev", - announced the head of the Donetsk People's Republic Alexander Zakharchenko.
"The statements of Poroshenko and his representative at Minsk talks Kuchma about the necessity for Ukraine to join NATO are aimed at disrupting the Minsk Agreement", - said Zakharchenko.
Zakharchenko also expressed confidence that in this case other regions will leave Ukraine.
NATO's Secretary General Stoltenberg was visiting Ukraine on September 21-22 at the invitation of President Petro Poroshenko.
Also in September Poroshenko announced the signing of a joint declaration on strengthening the military and technical cooperation between Ukraine and NATO. He said that today Ukraine and NATO are closer than ever. However, he admitted that Ukraine is not ready yet to become a member of NATO just like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is not ready to accept this country.
In any case, the statement made by Zakharchenko was in sharp contrast to "peaceful assurances" made until recently by DNR and LNR politicians.
Does this mean that Donbas is ready to take a tough uncompromising stance on the fundamental differences with Kiev?
- DNR and LNR are the last lever of the Russian influence on the situation in Ukraine, - says a writer and political analyst of the Center for coordination of the 'South-East' movement Alex Anpilogov. - Therefore, the statement of Zakharchenko should be regarded primarily as a statement made in the interests of Russia.
It is clear that Ukraine's accession to NATO would radically change the geopolitical position of Russia. NATO would have a huge advantage for combat operations with Russia. This is not the Baltics, where it is possible to throw enemy units into the sea in a short period of time.
Moreover, even in the peaceful conditions Ukraine's membership in NATO will cause a serious problem for Russia in its interaction with its allies in the Middle East and other parts of the world. It is noticeable already.
Therefore, the preservation of the DNR and LNR is very important for Moscow as it helps keep Kiev in suspended state.
However, one should not underestimate the abilities of NATO. This organization is already using Ukraine as a bridgehead. Take the joint exercises of the Ukrainian and NATO military near Lvov. It is possible that in the foreseeable future a NATO base will be created in this "independent" country.
- In other words, the Kremlin can be satisfied with a situation when the Donbas republics having no certain political status, prevent Ukraine from joining NATO? How long can such a situation last? We know that in the Donbas republics there is a growing frustration because so far they have been unable to become a part of Russia?
- With regard to NATO, the preservation of the DNR and LNR definitely plays into the hands of Moscow. Ukraine even before the overthrow of Yanukovych had undertaken considerable efforts to solve all the existing issues related to territorial disputes regarding the islands in the Sea of Azov and the Black Seas. Now it cannot relinquish the Crimea and the Donbas considering the radical public opinion on these issues. This means that Ukraine will not join NATO without officially giving up these territories.
However, viewed in the broader geopolitical terms, Russia has lost Ukraine, at least, for a long time.
How long the suspended state of the Donbas republics will last - I think that long enough. This is due to the weakness of Ukraine in the first place.
Yes, the residents of Donbas seem to be more and more frustrated. The vast majority of ordinary people who voted on May 11, 2014 for the sovereignty of the republics were hoping for a quick entry into Russia, as happened with the Crimea.
In addition, the Donbas does not have a national factor as, for example, in South Ossetia, which would not exist as part of Georgia. Donbas is populated mostly by Russians and Ukrainians. Most of them have traditionally been focused on Russia. But as a result of the current position some people of Donbas are of the opinion that it would be better to be in Ukraine than the way it is now.
Nevertheless, most likely, this situation with the "suspended" status of the DNR and LNR will last quite a long time. And this, of course, will not have a positive impact on both the political and economic life of the republics.
I think that it was a timely statement made by Zakharchenko - says a political scientist, representative of the DNR in the Rostov region, Eduard Popov. - Now Europe is in a difficult situation due to the influx of refugees from the Middle East. It has no time for Ukraine. This situation should be used politically by the Donbas republics to the full.
Kiev has repeatedly threatened the DNR and LNR, that it does not recognize the elections if they are held not by Ukrainian laws. Despite the fact that these laws deprive the republics of any serious autonomy. The situation in the Donbas now is as it was six months ago - the party that starts a large-scale fighting first will be accused of disrupting the Minsk Agreement and of aggression. Therefore, Zakharchenko made the right move warning Ukraine about the consequences of its steps to join NATO.
- Are the Donbas republics really able to free the territory within the administrative borders of Donetsk and Lugansk regions?
- Yes, they are. Moreover, I think, if the offensive begins it will not stop at these borders. In Donetsk, the issue has been repeatedly raised that the DNR considers itself a successor of the Donetsk-Krivoy Rog republic that existed in 1918, which included a large area in addition to Donbas.
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#39
www.rt.com
September 25, 2015
Kiev should 'walk away' from $3bn debt to Moscow - US senator
The US and other countries should do everything to grant Ukraine the legal right to shrug off its $3 billion Russian debt due in December, said US Senator Chris Murphy of the Foreign Relations Committee in an interview with the Sputnik news agency.
"The international community should make it clear that we should take whatever steps necessary to give Ukraine the legal cover it needs to walk away from that debt...I don't think Ukraine should be obligated to pay Russia back a dime," said the Connecticut senator to the agency on Thursday.
The US has been "treating Russia with kid gloves on this question of the debt that Ukraine owes it," Murphy added.
On September 30, the Senate committee will meet IMF chief Christine Lagarde to discuss Kiev's debt.
In late August, a creditor committee led by Franklin Templeton (which owns about $7 billion of Ukrainian bonds) agreed a 20 percent write-off of some $18 billion worth of Eurobonds. Repayment of the remaining amount will be transferred from 2015-2023 to 2019-2027.
Russia has refused to accept Ukraine's haircut, saying it takes no part in "the so-called debt operation" and recommended that Kiev pay in full and on time to avoid "both litigation costs and penalty interest for overdue payments."
Ukraine's government on Tuesday started restructuring public debt and suspended payments from September 23 on a number of liabilities that will be restructured. The restructuring, in particular, applies to the Russian $3 billion Eurobonds. However, the debt to Moscow was not included in the list of non-payments.
In March, the IMF approved a $17.5 billion loan to Ukraine as part of a four-year bailout plan in exchange for austerity measures. The lack of an agreement with Russia thwarts unlocking the funds.
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#40
Business New Europe
www.bne.eu
September 25, 2015
Ukraine's seamy coal trade learns to vault the frontlines
Graham Stack in Kyiv
Ukraine "should provide for transparency in coal purchases in the anti-terrorist zone [rebel-territories in East Ukraine] and abroad," US ambassador to Kyiv Geoffrey Pyatt has warned amid growing attention to the shadowy lucrative trading that continues across the front line of the armed conflict.
Pyatt, quoted by Interfax during a panel discussion on energy diplomacy on September 22, was referring to Ukraine's sourcing of coal for state-owned power plants, both from international suppliers such as South Africa as well as from coalmines in East Ukraine's rebel-held Donbas region.
Murky deals through which Ukraine now obtains its coal are adding to the woes of the government in Kyiv, which came to power on an anti-corruption platform after a Russian-backed insurgency in the Donbas cut off Ukraine from its strategically vital coalfields, causing reserves to dwindle. "The situation in the energy sector is disastrous," Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseny Yatsenyuk said in July during a trip to Kharkiv.
Ukraine's thermal power plants face mounting problems as energy companies' stocks of anthracite coal decline. According to Deputy Energy and Coal Minister Alexander Svetelik, by August available reserves had fallen to around 1.5mn tonnes of the 2.7mn tonnes required to be stockpiled. By July, the country had extracted about 15.5mn tonnes of coal in 2015, or half the amount of the previous year. Several power plants responded by cutting coal-generated exports to cover domestic demand as coal production hit its lowest level since World War II.
Dark dealings
Underlining the coal supply crisis in the power sector, the giant company at the heart of many allegations of financial impropriety, the Ukrainian power generator Centrenergo, said on September 22 that it would have to import 160,000 tonnes of coal from South Africa, 465,000 tonnes from rebel-held eastern areas, and 480,000 tonnes directly from Russia to meet consumer demand in the winter.
Around $100mn worth of the coal will be acquired via a shadowy Cyprus intermediary with unknown beneficiaries that was selected without a competitive tender in February, journalists revealed in August, accusing the energy ministry of trying to hush up the deal.
This immediately followed the police's uncovering of a black market scheme for selling coal from the rebel-held territories to Centrenergo, according to court documents. Under the scheme, Centrenergo signed a contract with a trading company registered in Ukraine for coal supplies, but around $1mn of payments ostensibly for coal apparently went to three 'fictive' companies registered in Kyiv and the Kyiv region, according to media reports and court documents, fuelling suspicions that these funds flowed to corrupt law enforcement officials.
On the day Pyatt delivered his warning, Ukraine's interior ministry reported that it had uncovered an illegal scheme for supplying coal from the Russian-backed rebel-territories in East Ukraine.
According to the ministry, 210,000 tonnes of coal mined on rebel-held territory were shipped by rail to government-controlled Ukraine using falsified documents and supplied to state companies. This therefore constituted stealing and laundering state company funds, the ministry said in a statement, without specifying which state companies were involved.
Border-hopping shipments
Even without the corruption component, Ukraine state purchase of coal from mines in rebel-held East Ukraine is highly controversial, since the mines are directly controlled by the rebels, and thus the funds go to financing the rebel forces, which still attack Ukrainian government forces on a daily basis.
In an attempt to reduce the amount of coal sourced from rebel-held Donbas, Ukraine has stepped up purchases of coal directly from Russia as well as from South Africa. The purchases from Russia are only slightly less controversial for obvious reasons - it is Russian backing for the East Ukraine rebels that has cut off Ukraine's traditional coal-rich region from Kyiv. But even attempts to acquire coal from South Africa have been mired in controversy due to accusations and counter-accusations of corrupt schemes and mark-ups via intermediaries, which have been hard to prove but hard to dispel.
Ukraine buys mostly rare anthracite coal from the rebel-held territories, on which around half of the country's coal-fired power plants depend, and which is far more expensive and difficult to import than thermal coal.
Where does the anthracite coal mined in the rebel-held territories go? Numerous reports say that it is exported to Russia, with observers from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe witnessing whole truckloads of coal being moved across the border. What happens to it then is unknown, but another criminal case that went to trial in August in Odesa suggests at least some of the coal moved to Russia is then re-exported via Ukraine as a transit cargo for export to the West from Odesa. This means the initial sale to Russian entities is something of a formality, and implies some complicity with Ukraine authorities, say analysts.
Private sector hands in the mix
While Ukraine's state-owned energy sector is mired in shadowy schemes to source coal, privately owned power generation, dominated by Ukrainian oligarch Rinat Akhmetov's DTEK concern, is also reliant on an ongoing partnership between mines and enrichment plants in rebel-held areas and power plants located deep in government-controlled Ukraine.
The bulk of DTEK's mines are in rebel territory, but they supply coal to power plants for Ukraine's largest cities such as Kyiv and Dnipropetrovsk. Officially DTEK says it makes no payments to the rebel authorities for operating its mines and steel plants on the rebel-held territories, since this would result in the imposition of international sanctions against them.
The rebels seem happy to have the mines working, however, possibly partly because of the employment they provide. There is also a degree of interdependency: the DTEK-owned Schastye power plant is for instance located on the Ukrainian side of the demarcation line in North Luhansk. But it supplies power to rebel-held Luhansk itself, while in turn being supplied with coal from DTEK mines in rebel-held districts of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions.
Akhmetov's Metinvest concern operates steel and coking coal facilities on both sides of the demarcation line between rebels and government forces. Here there is also a high level of mutual dependency, since steel plants such as the Enakievo Steelworks in the rebel-held Donetsk region depend on supplies of coke from the Avdeevka coke plant on the other side of the demarcation line. Avdeevka in turn is supplied with coking coal from a mine in rebel-held Krasnodon.
Meanwhile, prizing Akhmetov's hands off the coal trade will be tough if anyone tries, for he is regarded as a kind of "father figure" in the eastern region, where he is also the main provider of humanitarian aid to the population. In March, when a methane blast killed 33 miners at the Zasyadko coal mine, Akhmetov offered to pay compensation to the injured and to the families of the dead, even though he did not own the mine.
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#41
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
September 24, 2015
Crimean Tatars blockade border posts over political discrimination
For the last several days Crimean Tatar demonstrators have been refusing to allow trucks with Ukrainian goods into Crimea and are putting forward political demands, calling for an end to discrimination by the peninsula's Russian authorities.
Yekaterina Sinelschikova, RBTH
The import of Ukrainian goods into Crimea is currently at a standstill as Crimean Tatars blockade checkpoints on the Crimean-Ukrainian border in protest at discrimination against the ethnic minority by the Russian authorities on the peninsula.
In response to the incident, Crimean Prosecutor Natalya Poklonskaya, with the support of the peninsula's Information Ministry, has sent the mass media of the peninsula, which was controversially seized by Russia in March 2014, a clear signal to avoid using the name of the Mejlis, the supreme representative body of the Crimean Tatars, claiming that the organization does not exist.
In her statement, Poklonskaya strongly recommended" the Crimean mass media not to use the word "Mejlis" or the phrase "Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People" in their material. This organization is not registered on the Crimean territory and is non-existent, claims the Information Ministry letter that the Crimean and Sevastopol media offices received.
The chief prosecutor's recommendation arrived at the ministry on Sept. 21, a day after the former and current presidents of the Mejlis, Mustafa Dzhemilev and Refat Chubarov, organized the blockade on the Ukrainian side of the border checkpoints, thus preventing Ukrainian commercial trucks from entering the republic.
Deputies from the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada, representatives of the Right Sector nationalist organization, civil activists and special forces are helping the Tatars with the blockade. Already two rows of "defense" have been raised. A line of trucks stretches out from the checkpoints with their documents prepared. Some have decided to turn back to save the products from going to waste. Those who do not want to go back have pitched camp.
Relations between the Crimean Tatars and Russia are historically tense due to the deportation of the entire community of 230,000 to Central Asia by Joseph Stalin in 1944. Today the Crimean Tatars represent just 13 percent of the population of their historical homeland.
What do they want?
Vice President of the Mejlis Nariman Dzhelyalov told RBTH that the demonstration is indefinite and its aims have been laid out to Moscow in five demands."
These include the release of Ukrainian political prisoners," who are being held in Russia, "the removal of illegal impediments to the work of Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian mass media" in Crimea, "the cessation of the groundless persecution of Crimean Tatars," changes to the law on the "Crimea" Free Economic Zone (a designation introduced by Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev to legalize and facilitate trade with the peninsula) and the creation of transparent trading schemes.
"So that they can trade not like they are trading today, when in most cases the goods enter as contraband making profits for officials and businessmen both in Crimea and Ukraine," said Dzhelyalov.
He also added that officially the Mejlis, which is composed of 30 people, did not decide to organize the blockade, and those Tatars who are in Crimea are in no way linked to the demonstration. The blockade was organized by Tatars who are "constrained to be or are voluntarily in Ukraine," he said.
Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko has given the demonstration his support, saying that it will help the quick restoration of Ukrainian state sovereignty over the peninsula.
According to Poroshenko, Ukrainian border guards and the Interior Ministry have received an order to guarantee law and order and the absence of provocations.
The Mejlis considers the Crimean prosecutor's recommendations to the mass media a response to the blockade, calling them "childish pranks." "The Crimean mass media never spoke about us in a positive light anyway, that is why we are rather indifferent to it," said Dzhelyalov.
The Mejlis also does not intend to register in Russia as a social organization (in Ukraine it has had the status of a national representative body since March 2014).
"This is a fundamental moment. The Mejlis and our Kurultai national congress are representative bodies of an entire people. The right to establish such structures is written in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People," said Dzhelyalov.
A gamble on substitution
Meanwhile, Vice President of the Council of Ministers of Crimea Ruslan Balbek says that no one on the peninsula intends to react to the demonstration with the trucks, and the only thing that the Crimean authorities plan to do is substitute the Ukrainian goods with Russian ones.
"Crimea is not dependent on Ukrainian products. Only 5-6 percent of products come from Ukraine. For Crimea this scheme has more of a political nature, for its economy there will be no damage," said Balbek, adding that it will be bad for the economy of the neighboring Kherson Region (Ukraine), whose market was closely tied to Crimea (mostly for tomatoes, zucchini, cucumbers, etc.).
Ruslan Grinberg, director of the Institute of Economy at the Russian Academy of Sciences, is not as optimistic as the Crimean government.
"The goods are being substituted but any blockade provokes more inflation. The relation here is obvious. Prices will increase," he said.
However, there are still no feelings that the blockade will continue for long, according to Vadim Karasev, director of the Ukrainian Institute of Global Studies.
"This is not interesting for the Ukrainian government, for the Russian and above all for the Crimean government. Ukraine does not have a clear perception of this demonstration," he said.
Karasev is convinced that the main goal of the Crimean Tatars is to return the issue of Crimea to the radar of international politics, from which it was quietly disappearing, and push Kiev toward more decisive action.
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#42
Crimea ready for electricity turn-off by Ukraine
SEVASTOPOL, September 25. /TASS/. Crimea's utilities system is ready for implementation of Ukraine's threats to limit energy supplies to the peninsula, Russia's Deputy Construction and Utilities Minister Andrey Chibis told journalists in the federal Russian city of Sevastopol.
"We assess any threat as a serious one. The issue of life support of citizens is extremely important. The current package of measures for any scenarios is clear to us, Crimean colleagues are ready for that. I am not authorized to comment on it, disclosing all details and secrets," Chibis said.
Earlier, Sevastopol Governor Sergey Menyailo said Sevastopol, in case power is turned off, will be able to do without rolling blackouts, connecting over 270 backup power supplies.
Menyailo recalled that two thermal power plants are being built in Crimea: in Sevastopol and Simferopol, each 470 megawatts. The first unit of the Sevastopol plant is to be commissioned in September 2017.
On September 23, Ukrainian deputy Refat Chubarov, leader of the Crimean Tatar people's Majlis, said power cuts to the peninsula could be the next stage of Crimea's blockade.
On September 20, supporters of former Crimean deputy premier Lenur Islyamov, Verkhovna Rada deputy Mustafa Dzhemilev and leader of Crimean Tatars in Ukraine Refat Chubarov went on a so-called food blockade of Crimea, restricting movement of trucks with goods across border checkpoints. They were also joined by members of the Right Sector extremist group banned in Russia.
Crimean leader Sergey Aksyonov compared Ukraine's blockade of the peninsula with a comedy, as goods from the neighboring state account for no more than five percent of the Russian region's market.
Aksyonov said there is no deficit of foodstuffs or growth of prices for goods due to restriction of supplies from Ukraine to Crimea. The cargo traffic of Russian goods to the peninsula via the Kerch ferry crossing over the past three days grew by 15%.
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#43
Russian gas price for Ukraine will be at level of neighboring EU states - PM Medvedev
MOSCOW, September 24. /TASS/. Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev has signed a decree on the export customs duties for Russia's natural gas supplies to Ukraine, the government's official website said on Thursday.
"Under the decree, the gas price for Ukraine has been set at the level of gas prices for the countries of the European Union adjacent to Ukraine," the statement said. This concerns the supplies from October 1 to December 31, 2015.
On Friday, Brussels will host another round of trilateral gas talks between the EU, Ukraine and Russia. The discussion will focus on the so-called "winter package" or the price for the Russian gas between October 1 and April 2016.
The talks will be attended by Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak, Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller, Vice President of the European Commission Maros Sefcovic and Ukrainian Energy Minister Vladimir Demchishin.
Russia expects to sign the gas agreement with Ukraine at the talks, Novak said on Thursday. The discount for Ukraine will be clear after the government decree is signed by the end of the month, he added.
Ukraine's energy giant Naftogaz refused to buy Russian gas starting from the third quarter of 2015, although the price for 1,000 cubic meters was at least $20-30 less than the prices for Ukraine in Europe.
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#44
Kyiv Post
September 24, 2015
Soldiers enter politics to seek big changes
By Allison Quinn and Alyona Zhuk
With local elections coming on Oct. 25, more war veterans are moving into politics. Experts are divided about whether the trend will bring positive changes or just good PR for political parties.
Yevgen Shevchenko, a volunteer fighter who served mainly with the Donbas Battalion during Russia's war, has announced plans to run for office in Kyiv after gaining fame from his social media dispatches on the war.
Shevchenko told the Kyiv Post he decided to get involved in politics because "we have two fronts - one in Kyiv and one in the east."
"The system of (ousted pro-Kremlin President Viktor) Yanukovych still remains, unfortunately, and has even gotten stronger. The same people have come into power, they're just holding different flags now. There's no point in waiting for new solutions from them," he said.
His decision to get involved in politics was prompted by what he described as a chance to "build a new country" with the Samopomich party.
But Vladimir Sheredega of the Dnipro-1 Battalion, another fighter popular on social media, is more skeptical. .
After posting on his Facebook page that he'd give permission to his friends to "spit in his face" if he ever decided to run for office, he explained his thinking to the Kyiv Post.
"If you want to do things honestly (in politics), then there's no benefit to doing it at all. And even if you go into politics to make money in some illegal way, I don't see the point," Sheredega said, adding that his friends warned him that some parties wanted to try to recruit him.
But the entire election campaign, he said, is "like a sale."
"Volunteers do things that are really helpful, and then later it develops into a pre-election campaign," he said, noting that the truly good deeds get hijacked for PR campaigns.
"There are some, of course, who have been involved for a long time, and I trust them. But when right before elections everybody starts to wear traditional embroidered Ukrainian shirts and become patriots, helping the families of soldiers killed out east, that irritates me. A lot of people just play on the rhetoric of the warzone, using the memory of the dead," Sheredega said.
Late last year, when elections to the Verkhovnaya Rada were in full swing with many war veterans, political expert Alexander Paliy warned that political parties enlisting soldiers may have more to gain from the soldiers themselves.
While saying veterans could prove to be great lawmakers, Paliy told the Obozrevatel news website that the trend could prove to be positive only if seasoned politicians "don't try to block (the veterans) from making the really important decisions."
Political analyst Vitaly Bala of the Situations Modeling Agency expressed support for the move when it happens at the local level, but said he'd rather see soldiers creating new parties instead of joining old ones.
"It's the right move for the most part, especially for those who have experience from the east. But the real issue is that they always join old, long-established political parties, when really they should be creating new political parties," Bala said.
"I hope that new parties with new outlooks will be created by the next elections," he said, adding that he was highly critical of those soldiers who run for parliament.
"For me, it's astonishing when a person who has never worked in the sphere of legislation or developing complex solutions to social issues joins the parliament only to complain that he needs a bunch of assistants to help him," he said.
Sociologist Irina Bekeshkina said the move could prove to be positive for society - if the soldiers-turned-politicians boast strong, useful experience.
"It depends on each individual. There are some who can really help turn things around, but there will always be others who put their ambitions first and are really doing it to create a political career, and in that case they may be exploited," she said, noting that the trend was waning now that the conflict in the east has died down.
Olga Aivazovska of the OPORA election watchdog told the Kyiv Post that it's too early to tell how many soldiers who have returned from fighting in the Donbas had decided to join the race, since the registration process runs until the end of the month.
Hanna Stetsko, who served out east as a machine-gunner and military psychologist in various battalions, said she had joined local elections with the UKROP party out of a genuine desire to change things for the better.
"I've been watching the situation shaping up in our country very closely, monitoring how politicians work. And I want things to change. After a year-and-a-half in service, I see now that if you don't change something yourself, it will never change at all," Stetsko told the Kyiv Post.
"I wanted to get into politics myself and then got an invitation from likeminded people (in UKROP). So I agreed. And UKROP is a young party with ideas similar to mine," she said, adding that even local elections were crucial to changing the country for the better.
As for concerns about political parties using veterans to boost their image, Stetsko said she didn't think this would be an issue, because the public has already seen "who is who" and doesn't unconditionally trust veterans like they used to.
Volodymyr Nazarenko of the Kyivska Rus Battalion, who has decided to run for Kyiv City Council on Svoboda's ticket, says soldiers' value systems are different.
"A person who has gone through the hell of the east has different moral principles. We call it the syndrome of a heightened sense of justice," he said.
"Each soldier who goes into politics needs to be asked whether he feels like he's been bought, or is the political party he's joining really going to help him formulate policies and defend his principles," Nazarenko said.
Bala said only time would tell whether soldiers-turned-politicians would succeed in changing the system before it changes them.
"Right now there is a tendency for soldiers to come in as musketeers, the good guys, but then, unfortunately, they join parliament and turn into the bad guys, the guardsmen," Bala said, referencing the Alexandre Dumas novel "The Three Musketeers."
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#45
Chicago Tribune
September 24, 2015
Ukraine making comeback, finance minister says
Natalie Jaresko, who grew up in Wood Dale and Chicago, took over as Ukraine's finance minister last year.
By Florian Willershausen
Late last year, Chicago native Natalie Jaresko left her Kiev-based investment job to accept Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko's offer to become Ukraine's finance minister. Her task: to fix an economy in tatters, and to do it while Ukrainian troops waged war with pro-Russian separatists in the country's eastern provinces.
The turmoil continues amid a tenuous cease-fire. But Jaresko, who grew up in Chicago's close-knit Ukrainian-American community, has made some headway improving the country's economic outlook. This summer the country's main creditors agreed to write off 20 percent of Ukraine's $18 billion in foreign debt, a restructuring that likely will help stabilize the country's wobbly economy.
Jaresko appeared at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs this week to discuss her country's ongoing reform efforts, and afterward she sat down with the Tribune for an interview. Here are excerpts:
Q. If you ask ordinary citizens in Ukraine, they tell you many things have changed in legislation, but nothing has improved. How would you answer them?
A. We're turning to economic growth next year, of course with new jobs. A Japanese company just invested in Ukraine to create 3,000 jobs. We eliminated the volatility of the currency. We have a much more stable exchange rate now. We got about 50 bad-performing banks under control to take away the risk of insolvency from the customers. And there are improvements apart from the economic situation: The new national police ... really serve and protect like in the U.S. The Ukrainians will see social justice, and they'll be equal under the law. There are changes, but yes, we need more of them and we need them faster.
Q. How could the West help Ukraine to keep the pro-European sentiments alive, despite the economic downturn of the country?
A. We are very thankful for the aid we already got. The European Union has been very supportive, and (it is) important that the West maintains sanctions against Russia until the Minsk agreements are fulfilled completely. But, yes, we would like to see more economic support from the international community in general. The country needs real economic growth. And that requires investment, which could be in a form of loans or equity. It could be raised by public banks like the European Investment Bank. So beyond support for our budget and our reserves, we now need to invest in airports, roads, water systems, we need support for individual businesses.
Q. But many foreign investors left your country. How do you try to get them back?
A. After the reforms we have done up to today, we are a very competitive European market. Starting from Dec. 1, the free trade agreement with the European Union gets full implementation. That means that if Ukraine has to offer competitive goods, we get access to the European market. Our businesses have a lot of work to do, but they are getting ready to enter new markets. And it's not about only being able to export to European markets, but being able to meet the EU's standards gives us access to export other markets like the Middle East or Africa. Once we've met these high standards; we can bind up to additional foreign markets.
Q. Ukraine is still at war with Russia and their anti-Ukrainian separatists. But apparently the intensity of warfare is going down; violence is reportedly on its lowest level since the cease-fire agreement in February. Do you think that this war is going to end soon?
A. We are definitely in the midst of a cease-fire, in the last 24 hours no soldiers have been killed. We have implemented every part of both cease-fire agreements reached in Minsk, including putting back our equipment through a demarcation line. The Ukrainian people want peace more than anything. I can't predict the future, but we will continue to do everything possible to fulfill the Minsk agreements.
Q. To what extent does it help you that you're still a citizen of the United States, and probably well connected in Washington, D.C.?
A. What definitively helps is my negotiating experience. I was in business and had to negotiate quite a bit; that led to a critical skill set. It was also helpful to have support from the U.S. Treasury and the (International Monetary Fund). But I think we didn't get that support because of who I am but because of what Ukraine is doing. The IMF would never support a person, but they support institutions and reforms.
Q. The agreement with the international lenders is your personal achievement. Now that your mission is accomplished, there are rumors that President Petro Poroshenko might push for a new government and you might be forced to step down.
A. I came to do a job. Yes, Ukraine has stepped away from the financial precipice, but I still have a lot of work to do. There will always be differences of opinion in the political sphere between individuals. In the end it's a decision of the president, the coalition government or the parliament if somebody has to step down. If they ask me to leave, I'm going to leave. But right now it would be important to focus on work.
Q. You are one of the most progressive ministers in Kiev, somebody who really implements reforms. But some oligarchs seem to be unhappy with reformers like you. "Big Business" always wants to control governments in Ukraine. How could you get rid of them?
A. I don't want to get rid of oligarchs. I want to get rid of the power of large businesses that use or abuse the political system. I have nothing against big businesses, but I want them to be part of a competitive environment and within the rule of law. There's nothing wrong with large companies that are competitive, that employ people, respect the rule of law and pay their taxes. What everyone in Ukraine wants an end to is big business that abuses its economic power in politics and corruption.
Florian Willershausen is the chief international reporter for WirtschaftsWoche, a leading German business publication. He has joined the Tribune for a two-month fellowship through the Arthur F. Burns program.
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#46
Brookings
www.brookings.edu
September 23, 2015
The unending saga of Ukrainian reforms
By Steven Pifer
Steven Pifer is director of the Brookings Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative and a former ambassador to Ukraine.
There could hardly be a better or more depressing symbol of Ukraine's parlous state than discussions at the Yalta European Strategy (YES) conference, held every year in September. The gathering, launched in Yalta in 2004, was intended to highlight Ukraine's growing sophistication and European vocation in one of the country's most beautiful settings in Crimea. In the intervening years, Ukraine has been beset by domestic corruption, political strife, and ultimately foreign invasion by Russia. Now, a conference named after Yalta has to be held in Kiev because Russia has occupied and illegally annexed Crimea.
Against this troubling backdrop, the question of creating a reformed Ukraine that can stand up to Moscow was front and center for the Ukrainian politicians and senior officials, as well as foreign participants, at this year's YES gathering. Overall, the conference revealed that, while there has been some progress on reform, much remains to be done, there remain many troubling political divisions within Ukraine, and Russia continues to be a wild card.
Reform, in fits and starts
On the state of reform in Ukraine since the Maidan Revolution in early 2014, whether the glass is half empty or half full turns partly on whether one inclines toward pessimism or optimism. President Petro Poroshenko and Prime Minister Arseniy Yatseniuk can cite big achievements: free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections; the most reform-minded cabinet in Ukraine's history; the gradual improvement of the army despite an ongoing conflict with Russia; and the adoption of some tough economic and financial reform measures.
But much remains on the to-do list. Ukrainians want faster progress in curbing corruption, including sacking and bringing to trial crooked officials. This remains a key benchmark by which many Ukrainians judge their government's performance, and so far they are unimpressed. While deregulation has made progress, business still faces a morass of red tape. The rule of law is weak in practice, the judicial system remains largely unreformed, and many question the objectivity of prosecutors.
The art of the possible
The post-Maidan honeymoon is over. The pro-government coalition that formed 10 months ago has come under increasing pressure as varied groups express concern about the impact of austerity measures and lack of progress in fighting corruption. Oligarchs continue to play an outsized and unhealthy role in the country's politics.
Right-wing political forces oppose the Minsk II agreement, brokered by the German and French leaders in February to settle the conflict in the Donbas. Passage of a new constitutional amendment on decentralization-something Poroshenko agreed to in Minsk-provoked a sharp division within the pro-government coalition and a violent demonstration that left three National Guardsmen dead.
Some politicians are turning to populism. Former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko has proposed indexing wages to inflation. Kiev cannot afford this type of measure, and its adoption would cause the International Monetary Fund to suspend its assistance program. Tymoshenko's approval rating has climbed above 20 percent, rivaling Poroshenko's.
More broadly, attitudes in Ukraine toward Russia have hardened. That limits Poroshenko's political space to cut a deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin...if Putin wants a deal, which is not apparent. For example, in summer 2014, Poroshenko talked about taking NATO off the table-while this should have been of interest to a Kremlin that seeks a binding prohibition against Ukrainian membership in NATO, the Russians did not pick up on it. Poroshenko no longer talks in those terms, and opinion polls show that, for the first time ever, a majority of Ukrainians favor NATO membership. Being invaded by another country will do that.
All this combines to create a complicated political milieu, though one bit of good news came on September 17: Legislation to approve Ukraine's debt rescheduling deal passed with more than 300 yes votes. U.S. diplomats and key Europeans had urged the Rada (parliament) to approve the package, as failure to do so would have thrown the country into financial chaos.
The debt-rescheduling vote hopefully shows that, on big questions, the government can persuade members of parliament to set aside politics and do the right thing. More such victories will be needed as the government seeks to garner support for its reform program-to make the reform glass two-thirds full instead of half.
The fragile Poroshenko-Yatseniuk relationship
By all appearances, the key relationship between Poroshenko and Yatseniuk is fragile. Yatseniuk is seen as the driver of austerity measures, and his approval rating has collapsed as a result. Supporters of the prime minister worry that the president has not visibly backed reforms as he should. That brings up bad memories of the disconnect between President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Tymoshenko after the 2004 Orange Revolution. Former Georgian President Mikheil Saakhashvili, now governor of Odessa, has jumped into the political fray and could prove an unpredictable factor in Ukraine's internal politics.
Poroshenko and Yatseniuk appear to understand that, for now, they need one another. If their relationship breaks down, the parliamentary coalition will lose its majority. As it struggles to accelerate economic reforms, conduct local elections, and deal with Russia's aggression, Kiev cannot afford a political crisis. That's why U.S., German, and other European officials have so strongly urged the president and prime minister to stick together.
Russia, the perpetual wild card
The good news from the Donbas is that the cease-fire prescribed by the Minsk II agreement in February finally seems to have taken hold. Cease-fire violations, which ran at the rate of 200 per day in August, declined to less than 100 per week in early September. The question is whether the cease-fire can be sustained and other Minsk II measures-withdrawal of heavy arms from the line of contact, free access for observers from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and withdrawal of Russian military personnel-can follow.
As the cease-fire took hold, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on September 10 said that local elections in the occupied parts of Donetsk and Luhansk should be held on October 25 in accordance with Ukrainian law, as mandated by Minsk II. That triggered speculation as to whether the Russians had begun to look for a way out of the mess that they have made in the Donbas, or whether it was just a tactical shift.
Unfortunately, early evidence suggests this is just a tactic to soften international opinion about Putin before his appearance at the United Nations General Assembly and to undercut support among Western governments for maintaining economic sanctions on Russia. On September 16, "Donetsk People's Republic" leader Aleksander Zakharchenko said local elections would be held on October 18 instead of October 25 and according to local rules, not Ukrainian law. The "Luhansk People's Republic" leadership subsequently said it would carry out local elections on its timing and by its rules. Had Lavrov been serious, the Kremlin certainly had the muscle to deliver the separatists on the timing and procedures for elections.
So, optimists can hope for Moscow to change its course, but a healthy dose of skepticism appears to be in order. Officials in Kiev watch the refugee crisis in Europe and Russia's decision to involve itself militarily in Syria and worry that the crisis over Ukraine may be slipping off of the West's radar screen. They could use assurance that the West will remain united in supporting Ukraine and pressuring Moscow, including continued sanctions, until there is a genuine change in the Kremlin's policy.
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#47
Fort Russ
http://fortruss.blogspot.com
September 24, 2015
Pravy Sektor raids churches and beats up parishioners as churches are violently turned over to Ukrainian Patriarchate
Channel One
http://www.1tv.ru/news/election/292787
Translated from Russian by Tom Winter
A church belonging to the Moscow Patriarchate is now being blockaded by men in masks. Though this is the most recent occurrence, it is not the first time.
Emotions were running high as parishioners tried to get to their church, which is surrounded by people in camo uniforms with the Pravy Sektor insignia, an extremist organization banned in Russia. This is going on in the village of Ternopil, of the Konstantinovka region. Police - as usual in conflicts involving radicals - are not stopping them. This episode came to a brawl.
In the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, they are calling it a raid to take over the church. But they are especially angered by the fact that radicals openly acted with the regional administration, and later they began to help them, as law enforcement officers blocked the entrance to the church.
"Sadly, it wasn't just representatives, supporters of the Kiev Patriarchate, but also the police, the right sector and even as we speak, representatives of the battalion "Ternopil" were barring the way. In the melee, 15 people have been beaten, two of them are still hospitalized with serious injuries," said the managing director of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, Metropolitan Anthony.
According to Metropolitan Anthony, the victims do not see the point of it all, and are afraid to go to the police because nationalists from the Pravy Sektor threaten them, go to their homes, even rap on their windows. Onufry, the Metropolitan of Kiev, has written a letter to the head of state Peter Poroshenko, with a request to intervene with the situation in Ternopil region and to prevent this in other Ukrainian regions.
"In a letter to Pyotr Poroshenko his Beatitude emphasized the inadmissibility of violence in settling religious conflicts, as well as the involvement of radical forces in these conflicts," it says on the website of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.
According to representatives of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate, 30 churches were taken over in just the last year, mostly in the West. Radicals take them and turn them over for the use of the priests of the Kiev Patriarchate.
So it was in the village Kolosovo, despite the fact that the parishioners of the Moscow Patriarchate went to court to protect their right to their church. And in one of the parks in the very center of Kiev Patriarchate, a priest, with the support of people in camouflage uniforms, insisted on tearing down the icon rack.
"All of these inappropriate actions go beyond anything reasonable. This, that is going on, is utter lawlesness. And what's more, finally, the regime is contributing to it", said Viktor Chernshev, head of the information-education center "Hope".
Takeovers of temples of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Moscow Patriarchate, began almost immediately after the Maidan. Radicals threatened the priests, accusing them of having links with the Antimaidan. The Prosecutor's Office on the basis of these charges has opened proceedings, but many clergymen, fearing for their safety and the safety of their family members, have left Ukraine.
According to the church leadership they have repeatedly spoken to the president and the prime minister about the pressure on priests and raids on their churches. But there is no reaction.
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#48 http://newcoldwar.org/Jacobin September 24, 2015 Who was Stepan Bandera? By Daniel Lazare, published in Jacobin www.jacobinmag.com Lionized as a nationalist hero in Ukraine, Stepan Bandera was a Nazi sympathizer who left behind a horrific legacy. When Western journalists traveled to Kiev in late 2013 to cover the Euromaidan protests, they encountered a historical figure few recognized. It was Stepan Bandera, whose youthful black-and-white image was seemingly everywhere - on barricades, over the entrance to Kiev's city hall, and on the placards held by demonstrators calling for the overthrow of then-president Viktor Yanukovych. Bandera was evidently a nationalist of some sort and highly controversial, but why? The Russians said he was a fascist and an antisemite, but Western media were quick to disregard that as Moscow propaganda. So they hedged. The Washington Post wrote that Bandera had entered into a "tactical relationship with Nazi Germany" and that his followers "were accused of committing atrocities against Poles and Jews," while the New York Times wrote that he had been "vilified by Moscow as a pro-Nazi traitor," a charge seen as unfair "in the eyes of many historians and certainly to western Ukrainians." Foreign Policy dismissed Bandera as "Moscow's favorite bogeyman . . . a metonym for all bad Ukrainian things." Whoever Bandera was, all were in agreement that he couldn't have been as nasty as Putin said he was. But thanks to Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe's Stepan Bandera: The Life and Afterlife of a Ukrainian Nationalist, it now seems clear: those terrible Russians were right. Bandera was indeed as noxious as any personality thrown up by the hellish 1930s and '40s. The son of a nationalist-minded Greek Catholic priest, Bandera was the sort of self-punishing fanatic who sticks pins under his fingernails to prepare himself for torture at the hands of his enemies. As a university student in Lviv, he is said to have moved on to burning himself with an oil lamp, slamming a door on his fingers, and whipping himself with a belt. "Admit, Stepan!" he would cry out. "No, I don't admit!" A priest who heard his confession described him as "an übermensch . . . who placed Ukraine above all," while a follower said he was the sort of person who "could hypnotize a man. Everything that he said was interesting. You could not stop listening to him." Read the full article and view the accompanying photos at Jacobin, here: https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/09/stepan-bandera-nationalist-euromaidan-right-sector/* Daniel Lazare published a vital review in Jacobin in 2014 of historian Timothy Snyder's 2010 book 'Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin'. The review is titled 'Timothy Snyder's Lies'. Lazare argues in the book review that the highly successful 'Bloodlands' is part of the contemporary wave of historical writing which downplays the crimes of the German Nazis by making an "equivalency" argument with the political repression that marked the political rule of Joseph Stalin in the Soviet Union during the 1930s. * More information on Grzegorz Rossolinski-Liebe's 2014 book 'Stepan Bandera: The Life and Afterlife of a Ukrainian Nationalist' is here in the 'recommended books' section of the New Cold War.org website. |
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