#2
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
September 22, 2015
Poll: Most Russians do not want to live in Moscow
According to a poll conducted by the All-Russia Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM), only 13 percent of Russians would like their children to live in Moscow. The most popular option among those polled (23 percent) would be to live in a small town. According to another poll, the Siberian city of Tyumen rates highly among Russian urban areas.
Marina Obrazkova, RBTH

Moscow is no longer the most desirable place for Russians to live. The largest number of those polled (23 percent) would like their children to live "in a small town"; 19 percent, in a large city (other than Moscow); 12 percent, in the country; 12 percent, abroad; 11 percent, in St Petersburg. Moscow ranks in the middle with 13 percent of those polled preferring their children to live in Moscow.

At the same time, respondents pointed out that Moscow had recently seen numerous improvements: new recreation areas have been set up, courtyards and roads have been renovated and there are more cultural venues and sports facilities. Yet, respondents are most of all concerned by the state of the environment in Moscow: 43 percent of city residents say it has deteriorated over the past five years. Another concern high up on the agenda of those polled is the Russian capital's traffic congestion.

A year ago, the recruitment portal Superjob polled Russians in 22 cities about where they would like to live. The first place went to the Siberian city of Tyumen (1,714 kilometers from Moscow).

The second place on that rating (91 percent) went to the southern city of Krasnodar (1,196 kilometers from Moscow), with the third place (90 percent) shared by the cities that hosted the 2014 Winter Olympics and the 2013 Summer Universiade, Sochi and Kazan (1,362 and 719 kilometers from Moscow respectively).

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 #3
Irrussianality
https://irrussianality.wordpress.com
September 22, 2015
THE LIMITS OF KREMLINOLOGY
By Paul Robinson
Paul Robinson is a professor in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa. Paul Robinson holds an MA in Russian and Eastern European Studies from the University of Toronto and a D. Phil. in Modern History from the University of Oxford. Prior to his graduate studies, he served as a regular officer in the British Army Intelligence Corps from 1989 to 1994, and as a reserve officer in the Canadian Forces from 1994 to 1996. He also worked as a media research executive in Moscow in 1995.

As I struggle to complete an article about Russia's objectives in Ukraine, one of the problems I confront is that we have only a slight understanding of how decisions are made in the Kremlin. British academic Richard Sakwa comments that Russia has a dual power structure: on the one hand, there are the formal institutions of the state; and on the other hand, there are the informal contacts and mechanisms through which many decisions are actually made. To a certain extent, this is true of all states, but the division between the two structures is probably wider in Russia than in most Western countries, and because the informal system is hidden from sight we have only the faintest idea what is going on.

To make up for this deficiency of knowledge, analysts resort to a modern form of Cold War style 'Kremlinology' - that is to say, they draw sweeping conclusions from little facts which they think reveal something about the goings on behind the scenes.

Last week, for instance, police raided the apartment of Egor Prosvirnin, editor of the nationalist Russian website Sputnik i Pogrom. As Anatoly Karlin explains, Prosvirin has been a fervent supporter of the rebellion in Donbass. He is also vehemently 'anti-Putin' and has repeatedly claimed that Putin is preparing to betray the rebels. The raid on his apartment can thus be seen as proof that the Kremlin is clamping down on the rebellion's supporters within Russia. This in turn can be interpreted as showing that Prosvirnin is correct - that the Russian government is distancing itself from the rebels and preparing to abandon them. As Karlin says,

"If that is indeed the plan, to decisively close up the Novorossiya project, try to make amends with the junta, and hope they and the Western 'partners' forget and forgive Crimea, this is pretty much what I'd be doing in Putin's place: Harassing and seizing the computers of Novorossiya supporters, using that to build criminal cases against them, discrediting them in the media, and sending them off to prison."

But then again, Karlin admits, the 'likeliest scenario is that both Prosvirnin and I are overanalyzing things, that the case against Egor is just what it says on the tin (alleged hate speech in one of SiP's articles), and that nothing particularly radical is happening.' In other words, the event doesn't actually tell us anything about the Kremlin's policy towards Ukraine at all.

Here we confront an immediate problem with Kremlinology - it rests on the assumption that the Kremlin is behind everything which happens, and that even small events thus contain hidden truths about state policy. But this isn't necessarily true. Sometimes an investigation into hate speech is just an investigation into hate speech - nothing more.

Another problem with Kremlinology is revealed by a different case which caused some excitement a couple of weeks ago: the dismissal of the speaker of the parliament of the rebel Donetsk People's Republic (DPR), Andrei Purgin, and his replacement by Denis Pushilin. Some Russian nationalists view Pushilin as the stooge of important Kremlin functionary Vladislav Surkov, who supposedly leads the 'doves' within the Russian government. For instance, former rebel commander Igor Strelkov claims that 'Pushilin fulfills all Surkov's instructions', while Surkov himself is allegedly doing all he can to stab the rebellion in the back and betray it to the Ukrainian government. For Strelkov, Purgin's ouster is proof that the Russian government is preparing to sell the DPR down the river.

New York University's Mark Galeotti has a different explanation. He links the event to a shifting power balance in the Kremlin between Surkov and Putin's deputy chief of staff, Vyacheslav Volodin. According to Galeotti, the Purgin story:

"may also thus signal not just a change in policy but also another swing of the pendulum as authority for the 'Donbas adventure' is exchanged between the more straightforward and bullish Volodin and the more subtle, if sometimes too smart for his own good Surkov. ... I suspect we are seeing another step towards the 'Transniestrianisation' of the Donbas."

Here we see the second problem with Kremlinology: the facts being analyzed are so scanty that the same event can be interpreted in entirely different ways - in this case, either as evidence that the Kremlin is preparing to surrender the rebels to the Ukrainian government, or as evidence that the Kremlin is preparing for 'Transniestrianisation', which is a very different outcome. And neither may be right. The Purgin-Pushilin story may just be another example of the apparently interminable power struggles within the Ukrainian rebellion, and have nothing to do with Moscow at all.

Kremlinology is like reading tea leaves. Its value as an analytical tool is very limited. But, given the lack of transparency in Russian government, we are probably stuck with it. We wish to understand events, and so clutch at whatever fragments of information we happen to find which might help us to do so. I don't propose that we abandon Kremlinology entirely. But analysts (including myself) need to be rather less categorical than they often are, and should be clearer in separating fact and opinion in their analyses, while also highlighting just how speculative the opinions actually are. The reality is that we don't actually know what is going on.

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 #4
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
September 21, 2015
The cleansing of the Russian elite and another opposition rally in Moscow
Media Roundup: The Russian media focused on the potential implications of a new political corruption scandal, Greece's snap parliamentary elections, Europe's refugee crisis, and reports about Russian troops in Syria.
By Anastasia Borik

This week, the Russian media focused on a corruption scandal in the northern Komi Republic - an event that is being viewed as yet more evidence that the Kremlin is engaged in a "cleansing" of the Russian elite. In addition, the media turned its attention to the burgeoning Syria crisis, which now seems to be on the brink of direct military involvement by Russian troops.

Corruption scandal in the Komi Republic

On Sept. 19, the Investigative Committee of Russia announced the detention of Vyacheslav Gayzer, head of the Komi Republic, and 18 of his close associates, on charges of organizing a criminal group and fraud.

Gayzer, who has led the Komi Republic since 2010, was taken into custody and his membership in the ruling United Russia party was suspended. Russian media speculated on what was really behind the charges being laid against the head of this region.

The business newspaper Kommersant, quoting Russian experts, wrote about the need for high-profile anti-corruption cases to improve the image of the current government. The publication noted that everyone had long known about the existence in Komi of a "regime with authoritarian traits," but only after serious failures in the fight against corruption did the federal government decide to implement strict measures against certain particularly offensive politicians.

The independent Slon investigated various versions of what happened, but remains convinced that the only theory that can be dismissed for certain is the story of a fair and impartial investigation that "suddenly" revealed violations in the work of one of the most important Russian regional politicians.

The popular newspaper Moskovsky Komsomolets writes about the massive "cleansing" happening in the ranks of Russia's elite, noting the recent high-profile resignations of the heads of the Novosibirsk, Sakhalin and Bryansk regions.

Gayzer was regularly included in lists of the most effective leaders of the regions; however, as the publication emphasizes, previous achievements can hardly help him now.

Early elections in Greece

On Sept. 20, snap parliamentary elections were held in Greece, which were initiated in August by Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras who was not able to gain full support from the previous government for the agreements he signed with the EU on the issue of Greece's national debt.

As a result, the Syriza Party won once again, according to the final results, with 35.47 percent of the vote. Meanwhile, the center-right New Democracy Party gained 28.07 percent of the vote.

Coming in third place was the ultra-right Golden Dawn, which received 6.98 percent of the vote. The Independent Greeks party (ANEL) entered parliament with 3.69 percent of the votes.

The pro-government newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta wrote about the apathy and lack of interest among the Greek population, which was being called out to vote for a third time this year. The publication says that the ruling Syriza party has come out the winner, although it has lost some seats, giving up some of them to the conservative People's Democracy (which is in favor of the European vector for Greece).

One way or another, the author noted, the Greeks will face hard times, and potentially a new government crisis and new elections as early as 2016.

The independent media publication Slon believes that, in every sense, Tsipras came out the winner in these elections - first, Syriza will consolidate its victory, and second, a split in the party in August helped Tsipras get rid of the most radical party members, who in turn, formed the National Unity Party.

The article's author believes that without this wing, Syriza has become a much more acceptable partner for European leaders.

The business newspaper Kommersant, on the other hand, is not confident in Syriza remaining victorious, pointing to the falling approval ratings of the party. The publication says that the main intrigue of the election is an agreement on the future composition of the government coalition, because no political force in Greece will be able to control enough votes to implement independent policies.

Refugees in Europe: a perspective from Russia

There has been a simmering discussion on the issue of refugees coming from the Middle East, the flow of which has increased significantly since late summer of this year.

Moskovsky Komsomolets published an interview with human rights activist Bakhram Ismayilov, who believes that the measures taken by the EU are ineffective because they are directed against the symptoms of the problem rather than the causes. The human rights activist also believes that the current situation will inevitably lead to changes in the policy of Brussels, which is likely to make significant changes to its legislation on refugees.

The expert also refutes the popular thesis postulated in Russia that the closing of borders within the EU represents a violation of European standards, explaining that in cases of an emergency, the EU states are allowed to independently manage their affairs.

The opposition-minded Novaya Gazeta said that the Russian pro-government media, which has a tendency of trying to divert attention away from domestic problems, has artificially inflated the refugee migration topic. The newspaper dispelled the "myths" about Syrian refugees in Europe, believing that their numbers and the danger they present to European countries is greatly exaggerated.

The pro-government Rossiyskaya Gazeta reported on possible conflicts erupting between the inhabitants of Germany and all the new arrivals, in particular, because of the festival that will be held in Munich soon - October Fest, which attracts great numbers of nationalist-minded youth.

Rumors of Russian troops in Syria

The Russian media is discussing the possibility of sending Russian troops to Syria to help Assad's regime in its fight against militants from the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS). Official sources are heating up interest in this topic, hinting that such a possibility exists, but it is too early to talk about it today.

Last week, a surge of interest in this subject arose after President Vladimir Putin's Press Secretary, Dmitry Peskov, stated that Russia is ready to provide assistance to Syria if that country asks for it, and information was received from anonymous sources of the press that Russian contract soldiers were already being sent to Syria.

The business newspaper Vedomosti believes that the Kremlin is implementing a deliberate policy to reorient all attention from Ukraine to Syria, in order to increase its influence and try to restore its image. The paper feels confident that on Sept. 28, when Putin will speak at the United Nations, he will not talk about Ukraine or the "Russian World," but will announce new initiatives on Syria.

The website of The Echo of Moscow radio station gave a voice to Middle East expert Alexander Shumilin, who believes that Russia is playing a complex political game, trying to reach an agreement with key players on the Syrian issue - particularly with the United States.

According to the expert, the question of Russian participation or non-participation in Syrian affairs also very much depends on Moscow's unwillingness to put pressure on Assad.
Moskovsky Komsomolets quoted Middle East expert Gumer Isayev on the problems of Russia's participation in operations in Syria. The expert believes that this will be painfully received by Russian society. Moreover, the current situation that the Assad regime finds itself in is very depressing, and there is a risk of being dragged into a hopeless war on the side of a weakening regime.

Opposition rally in Moscow

On Sept. 20, opposition forces held a rally in Moscow to demand a "change of government." The opposition was saying they were expecting a turnout of about 40 thousand, but in fact, according to various estimates, only 4 thousand to 7 thousand people attended.

The greatest outrage for the opposition came from the decision as to where they were allowed to hold their rally. That's because Moscow City Hall "evicted" the opposition from the city center to its outskirts.

The opposition TV channel Dozhd conducted a live broadcast from the event, and also published the full closing speech made by opposition leader Alexei Navalny, who said that the main struggle in Russia is between those who want changes and believe in them, and those who do not want changes.

The opposition-minded Novaya Gazeta noted that the rally was rather sluggish and poorly organized (the opposition leaders' speeches were hard to hear), and people marched with similar banners and posters that were distributed to them by the rally's organizers.

The pro-government media, including Rossiyskaya Gazeta and TV network Channel One mostly ignored the rally, limiting themselves to reporting on the number of participants.
Moskovsky Komsomolets believes that the reason for the low turnout at the rally was the unattractive political agenda, as well as the absence of any additional emotional factors (such as the murder of Russia's most prominent opposition activist Boris Nemtsov provided this past spring).

Quotes of the week:

Andrey Andreyev, parliamentarian of the Komi Republic (Communist Party) on the detention of Gayzer: "So, if they are claiming that this kind of a group has existed for about ten years, then why, in spite of the government's fight against corruption over the years, its activities were not stopped? This is the first time that the Komi Republic has been shaken by such a scandal."

Viktor Orban, Prime Minister of Hungary, on reasons for closing the country's border to refugees: "In the end, there will be more of them than us. This is simple mathematics."

Dmitry Peskov, on the possibility of sending Russian troops to Syria: "If there is a request [from Syria], within the framework of bilateral contacts, in bilateral dialogue, of course, this possibility [sending Russian troops to Syria] will be discussed and considered."

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 #5
Bloomberg
September 21, 2015
A Loyal Governor Feels Putin's Wrath
By Leonid Bershidsky

Russia has never seen a corruption case like this. The successful governor of the Komi Republic, who was faultlessly loyal to President Vladimir Putin, has been accused of leading a criminal organization that allegedly included a number of his region's top officials. As cheap oil forces Russians to tighten their belts, however, there probably will be more crackdowns, and local elites are being told they can't keep stealing as freely as before.

By all formal parameters, Vyacheslav Gaizer was a model governor. Unlike many other local leaders, who were picked by Putin to administer regions they barely knew, he was born in the Komi Republic, a vast, resource-rich territory with a population of 2 million in Russia's European north. He worked for one of Russia's first private banks and opened its Komi branch. He joined the local government in 2002 and had a relatively quick rise: In 2010, President Dmitri Medvedev appointed him governor. After gubernatorial elections were reintroduced, he was elected to the post in 2014, winning 78 percent of the vote. In the pro-Kremlin "Governors' Efficiency Ranking," published by the Civil Society Development Foundation, he was ranked fourth. And he was a member of the leadership board of the pro-Putin United Russia party.

Yet now, the Investigations Committee -- Russia's equivalent of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation -- calls him the leader of a "criminal community" that allegedly included the speaker of the regional legislature, a vice-governor and a number of other officials and local business executives -- 15 people in all for now. The bureaucrats' offices and homes were searched, and the investigators discovered expensive watches, offshore company documents and other familiar trappings of Russian superwealth. The officials are accused of illegally appropriating state-owned lumber, milk, poultry and other companies.

One of Gaizer's lieutenants is charged with forcing the bankruptcy of a lumber yard, which he then allegedly handed to a St. Petersburg investment company. That episode tipped off the investigators: they had been looking into the investment company because of connection to a Defense Ministry corruption scandal. Other deals of a similar nature -- intentional mismanagement, then appropriation or state-guaranteed loans and subsidies to companies controlled by the group -- soon came to light.

There's nothing particularly novel about this backstory: Russian governors have a record of corruption. This year, for example, the governor of Sakhalin island was arrested for accepting a bribe. Usually, however, this only happens after repeated quiet warnings, and there's usually an unspoken political angle to the cases: the unlucky governors are usually a hindrance to United Russia's electoral performance.

There is no sign that Gaizer had heard so much as a whisper that Moscow was unhappy, and he'd been diligent in helping United Russia win elections. He even led the party in the legislative vote just a week ago, securing a United Russia victory with 58 percent of the vote. Besides, this is the first time a governor's entire team has been apprehended. Describing a local elite as a "criminal community" could be risky: If the Komi Republic's administrators could operate for years, mimicking an effective bureaucratic team, perhaps such networks are operating in other regions, which could mean the entire system is hopelessly corrupt -- something Putin would hate to admit.

Yet the Russian president allowed the extraordinary crackdown. Putin likes using arrests and criminal investigations to lay down new rules. In 2003, he brought the oligarchs to heel by jailing Russia's richest man, Mikhail Khodorkovsky. In 2013, an investigation against functionaries of the Skolkovo innovation center signaled the end of Medvedev's policy of government support for long-shot tech projects. Now, he's sending a signal to governors.

Komi also has natural gas, coal, bauxite and a limitless supply of timber. Yet last year, 21 percent of its budget consisted of subsidies from Moscow, and it still had a deficit. That, of course, is partly the fault of Russia's overcentralized budgetary system, but Komi could have done much better. Now that oil is cheap, the government is discussing ways to curb spending. Putin knows, however, that widespread graft is one of Russia's biggest resource drains.

The anti-Putin commentator Olga Romanova has likened the Gaizer case to the recent firing of Putin's friend Vladimir Yakunin as head of the Russian railroad monopoly. "A limit of inefficiency has been reached beyond which it makes no sense to hold on to a loyal ally," she wrote. "You can't fill the budget with loyalty, this is the wrong time for that."

Even pro-Putin commentators seemed to echo Romanova's judgment. "It's extremely important to understand that political support or a high rank will be no help in a case that involves the embezzlement of state property or corruption-related crimes," said Konstantin Kostin, head of the Civil Society Development Foundation.

Gaizer's arrest is meant to keep governors and other bureaucrats on their toes and compel them to temper the demands they make of the central government. In this environment, winning local elections isn't much of an achievement. Bringing in more money -- or at least taking much less of it -- is now the more desirable result.

 #6
Moscow Times
September 22, 2015
Russian Senator Introduces Bill Criminalizing Pro-Stalin Propoganda
By Anna Dolgov

A high-ranking Russian senator has sought to combat the increasing promotion of Soviet dictator Josef Stalin in the country by introducing a bill that would criminalize attempts to justify the dictator's totalitarian regime and political purges, state-run TASS news agency reported Tuesday.

The bill introduced in the State Duma would equate advocacy of Stalin's purges with "extremism," making it illegal in Russia, the report said. The bill was presented by a deputy chief of the constitutional law committee at the Federation Council, the upper chamber of parliament, Konstantin Dobrynin, a senator from the northern Arkhangelsk region.

"Recent years have brought increasing propaganda among the population of an idealized, one-sided [and] removed from historic reality image of Stalin's era" - propaganda that "inflicts tremendous harm on the Russian state and society," Dobrynin said, TASS reported.

The bill would also ban Russian authorities from naming streets, metro stations or other places in honor of people who had been "involved in the crimes of Stalin's totalitarian regime," the bill was quoted by TASS as saying.

Dobrynin argued that Russia needed to curtail attempts to "rewrite history," independent Ekho Moskvy radio reported Monday.

The bill comes on the heels of several monuments to Stalin being unveiled in regions throughout Russia. The nation's response to the monuments has revealed a growing rift over the dictator's role, with liberal politicians and activists harshly denouncing commemorations of Stalin, while Communist Party members and their allies applaud his increased popularity.

A number of former Moscow allies - including Ukraine, the Baltic nations and countries in eastern Europe - have passed laws banning the public display of Soviet and Nazi symbols.

Russia adopted a law last year criminalizing attempts to "rehabilitate Nazism," but Moscow officials have been presenting an increasingly white-washed, glorified version of the country's own totalitarian past.

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 #7
Moscow Times
September 22, 2015
Attitude to Stalin Reveals Russia's Considerable Divide
By Vladimir Ryzhkov
Vladimir Ryzhkov, a State Duma deputy from 1993 to 2007, is a political analyst.

It is ironic that the monument to the victims of Stalin's terror - which the country has been waiting for since the former Soviet dictator died on March 5, 1953 - will be erected in Moscow at the order of President Vladimir Putin, a man who once called the collapse of the Soviet Union "the greatest geopolitical disaster of the 20th century."

Not only that, but Putin is reviving Stalinist symbols and practices one after another - the Stalin-era anthem, ultra-patriotic P.E. programs, basic military training in schools, pompous military parades on Red Square and the blue cap brims worn by modern security service officers. These are all meant to reaffirm "the greatness of the state" but not to advance the prosperity of the people - the country's greatest asset.

What's more, the human rights organization Memorial explains that for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the country once again has political prisoners under Putin.

Just the same, the monument will soon go up in the very heart of the city. It will be located not at Lubyanka, under the windows of the sinister NKVD-KGB building where the Solovetsky Stone now stands, but not so far from there either - at the corner of Prospekt Akademika Sakharova and the Garden Ring.

That links the name of Sakharov, the great physicist and dissident, with the names of millions of victims of Stalin's terror. In addition, the monument will be visible to the millions of people who drive on the Garden Ring every year. According to Memorial head Arseny Roginsky, the spot is not perfect, but isn't bad and is highly visible.

What's more, the first full-fledged Gulag Museum will open in Moscow on Oct. 30. The city of Moscow allocated a large building with a separate territory and funds for the reconstruction of a historic building. The museum will feature a wealth of exhibition materials and advanced multimedia. This is the first time that a full-fledged monument and museum will appear in Moscow - the former nerve center of Soviet state terror.

Furthermore, Putin directed the government to develop a concept for a policy to perpetuate the memory of the victims of political repression, a document signed into force by Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev on Aug. 15. That is major news when considering that the era former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev began in 1985 of opening archives and rehabilitating the millions of victims of repression practically ground to a halt in 1997.

The Human Rights Council (HRC) under the president and Memorial played an active role in developing that concept. The document states that the establishment of a state based on the rule of law and respect for human rights and freedoms is a prerequisite to the perpetuation of the memory of the victims of repression. It also states that it is unacceptable to deny the historical fact of mass repressions or to justify political terror.

The concept calls for memorializing the repressions by creating an entire infrastructure - monuments, museums, books listing the names of the victims, memorials at execution and burial sites, etc. - throughout the country by 2017. That year marks the 100th anniversary of the Russian Revolution and the 80th anniversary of Stalin's Great Terror that reached its horrible peak in 1937.

The monument, museum and policy concept are the product of many years of effort by Andrei Sakharov, Dmitry Likhachev, Yury Afanasyev, Lyudmila Alexeyeva, Sergei Kovalev, Arseny Roginsky, Memorial and the Association of Victims of Illegal Political Repression. The Human Rights Council headed by Mikhail Fedotov as well as the HRC Standing Committee for Historical Memory headed by Sergei Karaganov played a major role in recent years and accomplished a great deal of practical work.

An impressive 336 different entries were submitted for the open competition to design the Moscow monument. Of those, a distinguished jury of historians, public figures and specialists selected 10 top designs and then narrowed it down to three finalists. The winner will be announced in the coming days.

Most importantly, the monument's construction is financed by contributions from individual Russians. The task before the designers and jury is to create a world-class memorial that fully expresses the tragedy people experienced and that will communicate at an emotional level with future generations.

Of course, finally erecting a monument in the capital to the victims of mass state terror does not mean that Russia has overcome its tradition of state violence and legal abuses or an end to people's feelings of helplessness and fear that the state itself has cultivated. Russia is still a very long way from accomplishing that. But the monument and state museum will be of great educational and cautionary value. That is why the long-awaited monument is both important and necessary.

Paradoxically, a second and parallel process has started of putting up monuments to the chief executioner himself - Josef Stalin. They have been going up all over Russia, most recently in Penza, Lipetsk and Vladimir, bringing the total number of Stalin monuments to more than 40.

Such actions were impossible under former Soviet leaders Nikita Khrushchev, Leonid Brezhnev and Gorbachev, as well as former President Boris Yeltsin. They were all consistent and tough anti-Stalinists. Glorifying Stalin only became possible under Vladimir Putin.

Of course, it is absurd to erect monuments to the victims of repression while simultaneously raising monuments to the very person responsible for their death. That is not a sign of reconciliation and tolerance, but an open manifestation of deeply conflicting values. It reflects the deep split in modern Russian society, the mixing of absolutely incompatible things and a fundamental failure to distinguish between good and evil.

It means that it remains impossible to reach a public consensus on such fundamental principles as the inalienable rights of the individual and the proper relationship between ordinary citizens and those in power. Unfortunately, the simultaneous erection of monuments to a bloody executioner and his defenseless victims indicates that the civil war that began in Russia in 1917 still continues 100 years later.

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 #8
Putin calls situation in Russian economy "complicated but not critical"

NOVO-OGARYOVO, near Moscow, September 22. /TASS/. The current situation in the Russian economy is knotty but not critical, Russian President Vladimir Putin said Tuesday.
"You and I know perfectly well the situation in our economy is fairly complicated but not critical," he said at a conference on the draft budget for 2016.

"We need the economic levers to fully enact Russia's own economic capabilities," Putin said. "We have absolutely everything for this."

"It's important to lay down new research groundworks and professional competences, to assimilate up-to-date systems of professional standards, and to improve the quality of human resources, particularly in the engineering sphere," he said. "Appropriate funds should be allocated from the federal budget."

Putin asked the government to prepare a package of measures in order to overcome recession in the economy.

"It is particularly important in current conditions to provide a package of measures in order to overcome recession in the economy and to maintain the role of the federal budget as one of the leading development tools," the head of state said at the meeting.

Budget-funded projects should stimulate economic growth and private investments, the president said.

"This primarily refers to import substitution programs in industry and agriculture. I ask the government to provide smooth financing in these areas and exercise special control over efficiency of such expenses," Putin added.

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 #9
Sputnik
September 22, 2015
Russian Economy Worthy of Investment Grade: Fitch Ratings Boss

Fitch Ratings senior analyst Charles Seville told the German press that he doesn't see justification for the 'junk' rating Russia was issued by two other ratings agencies, and that the worst of the country's economic troubles have passed.

Russia's economy has emerged from the worst of its financial troubles, and doesn't deserve to be given a junk rating, said a senior analyst with Fitch Ratings agency, Charles Seville, on Monday.

"We assess the capability of a country to fulfil its debt obligations. Russia has a low level of debt, a strong external trade balance, state financial assets, and international reserves in the Central Bank and Finance Ministry's reserve fund," said Seville in an interview with Deutsche Welle.

Seville explained why Fitch decided to lower Russia's sovereign investment rating from BBB to BBB- in January 2015, the agency's lowest investment-grade rating. Other countries with the same rating include Turkey, Romania, India, Uruguay and Morocco.

Following Fitch's assessment, in January Standard and Poor's cut Russia's credit rating to BB+, a 'junk rating,' which denotes speculative investments. Ratings agency Moody's followed suit in February, and downgraded Russia's rating to Ba1, the highest non-investment grade.  

"At the beginning of the year, we lowered Russia's rating, with a negative outlook. That reflected the considerable risks there were, and which remain. They are connected with sanctions, the price of oil, and financial instability."

"In addition, there is a danger for international reserves: the private sector has to make large payments on its debt obligations under conditions of insufficient access to international financing. All these factors had an effect on the rating."

"However, we also see Russia's strengths. For example, the change to a floating exchange rate has helped it withstand the current crisis. I think the most negative predictions have failed to materialize."

"This is really a balance of positive and negative factors. But if we compare Russia with other countries, I think it doesn't look like country with a non-investment rating."

Regarding the economy's future, Seville said the worst decline has passed, but Russia's return to good economic health will depend on a number of factors.

"In the next year, the population's buying power will remain low, so consumption is unlikely to be a source of economic growth," said the analyst.

Rather than consumer spending, said the analyst, growth should come from the private sector, by exploiting the benefits of the ruble's devaluation to increase investment, and enable longer term growth.

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 #10
Moscow Times
September 22, 2015
After the Boom: Moscow Malls Struggle With Fewer Customers

Twenty-eight percent fewer customers are walking through the doors of the average Moscow shopping center than two years ago, according to data from market researchers Watcom cited by the Kommersant newspaper.

The slump in visitor numbers comes after years of expanding consumer spending in Russia as an oil boom fueled an emerging middle class. But Russia's economy began to slow in 2013, and a collapse in oil prices in the past year and sanctions over the conflict in Ukraine caused a deep recession, contracting retail spending by 9.1 percent in August compared to the same month in 2014.

That is bad news for real estate developers, who committed to major projects during the boom. Europe's largest mall opened in Moscow last fall, and six more new shopping centers with a combined area of 343,000 square meters opened in Moscow in the first half of the year - a record for the Russian capital, according to data from real estate consultancy Colliers International.

Watcom's Shopping Index found that footfall had declined fastest in these larger malls.

Shopping centers with retail space exceeding 40,000 meters saw the 16 percent fewer visitors in August compared to the same month last year, Kommersant cited the index as saying.

By contrast, the number of consumers at smaller shopping centers with 5,000-20,000 meters of retail space dropped by 3 percent over the same period, according to the report.

The 28-percent average slump in custom over the past two years is dramatic, but the worst could be over, Watcom's chief, Roman Skorokhodov, told Kommersant. "The drop may continue, but in a certain sense we have hit the bottom," Kommersant quoted him as saying.

Moscow is still understocked with retail space by international standards. "In Moscow we have 434 square meters of shopping centre space per 1,000 residents. In big European cities the volume of shopping center retail space per 1,000 residents is 600-700 meters," Olesya Dzyuba, head of research Colliers International Russia, told The Moscow Times in July.

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 #11
Sputnik
September 22, 2015
Russian Economy Needs to Lower Dependence on Oil Prices - Putin

NOVO-OGARYOVO (Moscow Region) (Sputnik) - Russia's economy needs to lower its dependence on oil prices, the country's President Vladimir Putin said Tuesday.

"It is necessary to ensure the balance and sustainability of public finances, significantly reduce the budget's dependence on oil prices, [financial] quotes," Putin said during a budget meeting.

The Russian leader assessed the economic situation as challenging but not critical and called on economic policymakers to preserve the role of the federal budget as the leading instrument of development.

"In the current circumstances it is particularly important to have a package of measures to overcome a recession in the economy," Putin addressed the heads of the Presidential Administration, Federation Council, State Duma, and ministers of the government's economic bloc.

Also Russian leader stated that Russia's budget deficit must stand at under 3 percent of GDP in 2016.

The planned budget deficit for next year should not exceed 3 percent of GDP. This is one of the most important reference points for the government in the budget process," Putin said.

"To reach this level, I ask you to very carefully look at the budget's revenue, improve the administration, and the collection of taxes," the president added.

Russia's economic performance has experienced a slowdown since mid-2014, largely attributed to global oil prices that have more than halved due to market oversupply.

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 #12
Passions run high over need for virtual money in Russia
By Lyudmila Alexandrova

MOSCOW, September 18. /TASS/. The idea of virtual money in Russia has caused controversy in the country. This idea is opposed by many Russian officials, first of all, due to the potential danger of its use in dubious financial operations. Russia's Central Bank is maintaining a cautious line on this issue while experts say the specific project that is currently under discussion is not a very good idea.

Russia's Qiwi payment system will start issuing bitrubles next year, using the technology for the creation of bitcoins, the most popular cryptocurrency today, Qiwi CEO Sergey Solonin said recently.

Qiwi is the first company trying to launch its own virtual currency into circulation in Russia. Today the bitcoin is mostly used in the world as a cryptocurrency, which Internet users can buy with ordinary money or earn.

Russia's financial ombudsman Pavel Medvedev characterized Qiwi's plans as a crime. "This is absolutely illegal and such technical hooliganism is absolutely illegitimate. The Constitution says it is the prerogative of the Central Bank to print money. The ruble is the sole currency in Russia. All other monies are illegal and such wrongdoing is criminally punishable," Medvedev said in an interview with Moscow Speaking radio station.

The Russian Central Bank and Prosecutor General's Office warned in January 2014 that virtual money could be used for terrorism financing and money laundering and, therefore, settlements with cryptocurrencies would be regarded as dubious operations. Russia's Finance Ministry published a bill in October 2014 imposing penalties for the use and spread of virtual money but it was criticized by the Economic Development Ministry. As a result, the bill was not even submitted to the State Duma, the lower house of Russia's parliament.

Central Bank Governor Elvira Nabiullina said at a forum in Kazan on Thursday that the regulator was studying this issue because this topic could not be ignored. "We're not banning cryptocurrencies, we're studying them," she said, adding unintentionally in a slip of the tongue that surrogate money was banned in Russia after all. "The regulators of virtually all countries do not know what to do with this," she said, noting that the Russian monetary regulator had grown accustomed to be the issuing monopoly center. "Somewhere it [surrogate money] is banned for use by corporate entities while private individuals are allowed to use it while somewhere taxes are levied on operations with it and so on, i.e. there is no world standard," she said.

"It seems to us as professionals in this area that this is not the thing that should be banned," Sberbank CEO German Gref said. Gref admitted he owned a small amount of bitcoins.

"If Qiwi wants this to be the rubles, the money guaranteed by the state, they will, of course, need the Central Bank," Board Chairman of the Electronic Money Association Viktor Dostov said in an interview with Kommersant FM radio station.

"They can issue it themselves because there is no formal ban on bitcoins, blockchains and the like in the country, even though Russia has a cautious attitude to bitcoins. But as far as I understand, the idea is ambitious and is precisely linked with the work of the Central Bank," he added.

In the expert's opinion, the emergence of bitrubles will most likely stay out of the population's sight. "Now the population uses credit cards, electronic money, Internet-banking and another instrument will appear."

"It seems to me that this is more needed for Qiwi than for the population or for some financial structures," Professor of the Higher School of Economics Alexander Abramov told TASS.

"As far as I understand, the talk is about some form of borrowing money from the population through the issuance of this virtual currency," the expert said, calling this idea "a somewhat risky experiment."

"I'm not categorically against bitcoins as an idea," the expert said. "We see that the bitcoin is living through a difficult period of evolution in the world and no one bans it categorically. But Qiwi's specific project amid strong instability in the banking system and the great demand from individuals and organizations for funds causes some doubt and suspicion that a different product like a promissory note or a bond, instead of a really alternative currency, is sold under the guise of another product."

Even if it is presumed that Qiwi's currency will be similar to the classical bitcoin, there is great danger that a good idea may turn simply into a method of "grey financing" of an organization by mass investors, Abramov said.

This theme will encounter tough resistance from the Tax Service, the expert said.

"Despite [Central Bank Chief] Nabiullina's liberal position, I believe that this will be a strong irritant for the Central Bank because it will not tolerate any rival to the ruble. The Central Bank is trying to make the ruble stable and any mechanism, which is introducing an alternative currency that somewhat affects this stability, will be limited by the regulator, as it seems to me," he said.

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 #13
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
September 21, 2015
Home comforts: Russians learn to love the staycation
Holiday trends: A fall in outbound tourism by almost 34 percent was the steepest for 20 years, according to the Russian Travel Industry Union. RBTH takes a closer look at the figures.
Bryan MacDonald, special to RBTH

During the economic boom of President Putin's first two terms, which had long periods of double-digit growth, Russian visitors were a familiar sight in many parts of Europe. But some destinations were more popular than others.

For the Russian elite, London and the Côte D'Azur reigned supreme. The middle class preferred more affordable resorts in Spain and Turkey. Indeed, there's little doubt that the Russian surge compensated for diminished inter-European tourism after the financial crash.

Cannes has long been the playground of movie stars and royalty. But in the past decade, it wasn't the Aga Khan or Hollywood stars making waves, it was the nouveau riche of Moscow. In 2015, the local view is that the number of Russian visitors has nosedived spectacularly.

Russian-owned cars are less obvious, but Moscow-registered Toyota Land Cruisers and St. Petersburg Porsche Cayennes can still be found. A Mini Cooper with Archangelsk plates was parked on the Croisette earlier this month. But the number of "RU" vehicles now pales in comparison with their German and British counterparts.
 
Litmus test

The Russian shops in Cannes are perhaps the best barometer of the resort's popularity. The Russian store in the Californie district is so authentic that it could be mistaken for one in Krasnodar. Owner Marcel admits business is down. "I'd estimate by about 30 percent. The number of visitors has dropped hugely this year. However, there is a large permanent Russian population in Cannes, and they will always need this service," he says.

Marcel is also pretty sure where his missing clients have gone. "Sochi. They are mostly in Sochi. After all, this is what Putin wants," he says. "Maybe we will move there and open a French shop," his wife Tanya quips.

It's not just the prosperous south of France that's suffering: Russian trips to Turkey are down from two million to 1.4 million; visits to Germany have fallen by 30 percent; and Greek holidays have slumped by 54 percent. Even cheap Bulgaria has seen numbers drop by 36 percent. Further afield, in places such as Vietnam and Azerbaijan, there are reports of masses of empty hotel rooms formerly occupied by Russians. Turkey's figures are especially interesting. The 600,000 fall in Russian visitors has been partly offset by a 200,000 rise in Germans. This suggests that even wealthy Germans can't compensate for the loss of business from Turkey's giant Eurasian partner.
 
The big spenders

In Spain, a year-on-year decline in Russian visitors of 41 percent has been almost cancelled out by a 40 percent jump in Americans. Nevertheless, this does not compensate for a huge drop in spending. The average Russian spends $180 a day, twice the figure for the Americans. Some countries have tried to box clever. Egypt, which has had troubles of its own in recent years, has suggested allowing Russian tour operators to pay in roubles rather than dollars. Cairo's move to protect the lucrative Russian market has seen the country replace Turkey as the most popular with Russian visitors.

Italy, hit by a 31 percent fall in Russian visitors, is also fighting back. The Italian embassy in Moscow has launched a Russian-language website, called La Tua Italia (Your Italy), which informs prospective Russian tourists about Italian destinations. Parts of the site are dedicated to the Expo world fair in Milan and low-cost flights. There are also some discounts. But it all seems to be of little help; and some industry players are quite pessimistic.

"My average of Russian clients is still the same, but it is easy to recognise all over town that it is not the way it was in the past," Tuscan hotelier Salvatore Madonna told The Guardian. "Friends with shops and restaurants are talking about it. From what I have heard from the Italian government, there are almost 80 percent fewer Russian clients than there were."

"The decline in tourist traffic in Europe is even greater if we look at the data of the countries not in the European Union," says Russian Travel Industry Union (RTIU) spokeswoman Irina Tyurina. "In particular, the decline in Norway was 37 percent, Switzerland 28 percent, Montenegro 14.5 percent, and Serbia 11 percent."
 
Historic decline

The RTIU figures confirm the evidence, both anecdotal and official. The Russian travel industry has never seen such a sharp decline in business. Not even in 1998 when the country defaulted on foreign debts or in 2009, when the world economy collapsed. The falls in those years were 24 percent and 23 percent respectively. Mostly because of enduring visa restrictions, travel agencies remain popular in Russia. The Ryanair-style concept of DIY holidays has yet to catch on to any great extent so the current crisis threatens thousands of jobs.

Meanwhile, domestic Russian destinations report bumper years. Vladivostok and Sochi are welcoming people who once insisted on the beaches of Thailand and Marbella.

"People have begun to travel around their own country and found that it's not as scary as they thought", says Irina Schegolkova of the government agency Rostourism. At the same time, Crimea is enjoying a relatively busy summer, considering that the peninsula is in effect closed to its former markets in Ukraine and the EU. The "Golden Ring",  historic sites route, that surrounds Moscow has also benefitted from the trend as patriotic Russians shun beaches for cultural tours.

Another problem for tour operators is that from Sept. 14 all Russians have to submit fingerprints before they can get Schengen visas. This will not help struggling European resorts either. And the Kremlin has told security officials not to travel abroad. The ruble crisis means that Russian spending power abroad has more or less halved. If western anti-Russian sanctions continue and global oil prices do not rise, it might be a long time before Russian tourist numbers return to pre-crisis levels.

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 #14
Russia nominates Mikhalkov's Sunstroke for Oscar

MOSCOW, September 22 /TASS/. Russia has nominated "Sunstroke", a film by Nikita Mikhalkov, for an Oscar in the best foreign film nomination, Vladimir Menshov, the head of the Russian Oscar Committee, told TASS.

"We have chosen Nikita Mikhalkov's 'Sunstroke'," Menshov said.

"Sunstroke" is a project by Nikita Mikhalkov based on the story "Sunstroke" and the book "Cursed Days" by Russian writer Ivan Bunin. The idea of making such a film appeared in the early 1980s. However, Mikhalkov and his colleagues got down to writing the script only in 2010. Sunstroke's world premiere took place in Belgrade, Serbia, on October 3, 2014. The film's Russian premiere was in Crimea. Sunstroke appeared on screens on October 9, 2014. Mikhalkov's picture won the Golden Eagle Award in the best film 2014 nomination in January 2015.

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 #15
Moscow Times
September 21, 2015
Moscow's Amfest Film Festival Goes Off the Beaten Track
By Andrei Muchnik

Amfest, the American film festival organized by the Cool Connections agency with the support of the U.S. Embassy, is once again taking over the halls of the Formula Kino Gorizont theater. This is the festival's 10th year in Russia.

The festival prides itself on showing movies that have never been shown before in Russia and are not the usual blockbuster fare shown at the big movie theaters. The team at Cool Connections follows prominent film festivals, such as Sundance, Tribeca and New York Film Festival and selects those films that they think might be of most interest to a Russian audience.

"At Amfest we try to broaden the moviegoers' impression of what American cinema is, to expand their horizons beyond the films that you usually see at the movie theaters," said Alexandra Karyakina, Cool Connections' PR manager. "At the same time we don't avoid such big names as James Franco and Jesse Eisenberg because these are the actors a lot of viewers associate American cinema with."

Of course, the main attraction this year is "Black Mass," a retro gangster flick based on a true story starring Johnny Depp playing infamous Boston mobster Whitey Bulger. Benedict Cumberbatch plays the mobster's brother, senator William Bulger. With two leads that are insanely popular in Russia, this movie is sure to be a hit.
Amfest

"Black Mass" is a bit of an exception to the usual Amfest lineup. It will be released in Moscow theaters in late October. The other Amfest premieres might never find a wide release in Russia. For example, Amfest will show the winner of this year's Sundance Film Festival - "Me and Earl and the Dying Girl." It's a comedy-drama about a high school crowd-pleaser and amateur director, whose world is turned upside down when he befriends a girl who was just diagnosed with leukemia. The director and the lead actors are all relative newcomers, but judging by their performances and the standing ovation they received at Sundance, we'll be seeing more of them in the future.

"The End of the Tour" is another film at Amfest based on a true story. It chronicles the book tour of the writer David Foster Wallace, the author of "Infinite Jest" who achieved cult status even before he committed suicide in 2008. The film revolves around the relationship between the writer, played by Jason Segel of "How I Met Your Mother" fame, and Rolling Stones journalist David Lipsky, played by Jesse Eisenberg. The movie is based on Lipsky's memoirs, "Although of Course You End Up Becoming Yourself," written in 2010 about his five-day meeting with Wallace in 1996. Directed by James Ponsoldt, the film got rave reviews in the U.S. for its superb acting.

One of the most interesting premieres at this Amfest is "Mistress America," the latest movie by indie director Noah Baumbach. "Mistress America" stars Baumbach's muse Greta Gerwig, who also co-wrote the script, and the rising star Lola Kirke, the lead actress of popular Amazon series "Mozart in the Jungle" and a sister of Jemima Kirke, one of the Lena Dunham's "Girls." Gerwig and Kirke play stepsisters-to-be that decided to meet when they find out their parents were getting married. Then a familiar brand of Baumbach comedy ensues - an eternal story about quirky young people trying to find a place in the sun in today's world.

Formula Kino Gorizont. 21/10 Komsomolsky Prospekt. Metro Frunzenskaya. 800-250-8025. Tickets 400 rubles. Check coolconnections.ru for the full schedule.

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 #16
TASS
September 21, 2015
Valery Gergiyev: Sometimes people think they are holding a magic wand
Artistic and general director of the State Academic Mariinsky Theater in TASS special project Top Officials
[Complete interview here http://tass.ru/en/society/822350]

In TASS special project Top Officials, artistic and general director of the State Academic Mariinsky Theater Valery Gergiyev speaks about rivalry with Bolshoi Theater, his love for football and attitude towards Crimea and Ukraine.

About tight timetables, sound mind, rivalry with Moscow's Bolshoi and Viktor Chernomyrdin's millions

- I've taken a look at your timetable...

- My lifetime's timetable? It has remained practically unchanged over the past 35 years. Possibly, it's still tighter now. I spend much time on the road, touring cities and countries.

- That's my point. Don't you ever feel like making a stop and looking back?

- I work with several music companies - in St. Petersburg, London, Munich and some other places. Mine is a conductor's job. I have large orchestras to guide. That's an excellent way of changing activities. And of taking an outsider's look at what you are doing.

- When you wake up in the suite of yet another hotel, do you recall at once where you went to sleep the day before?

- I do hope that I am still of sound mind and disposing memory... If you wish I can recall in the proper order the cities and countries I toured over the past few months. Mind you, the list is going to be a long one: Russia, Finland, Kazakhstan, Britain, Germany, Monaco, Japan, Sweden, China, Italy and Switzerland... In the middle of September, Rotterdam hosted my 20th jubilee festival, this time devoted to Sergey Rakhmaninov. More than 12,000 listeners visited my concerts... Wherever we may be playing we perform at 100-percent capacity. That's a must. The audience that has gathered to hear a famous orchestra under a famous conductor is entitled to getting the maximum pleasure. For that we must always move forward.

Even the 1990s were fruitful and successful for us. Instinctively I tried to turn the theater into an equivalent of the Vatican, a miniature state with its own Constitution in order to be immune from external risks. We do remember the no easy time the country was living through and the turmoil in the economy, and not only in the economy.

- Does that mean you proclaimed yourself the Mariinsky Theater's Pope?

- That's a figure of speech. Of course, I could not build a fortress wall around the theater. The square is open all around. The theater has twelve entrances. You can use any of them top get in... It was my strong wish the theater had a chance to live by its own rules, and I demanded obedience to the internal, corporate rules. Whenever some abused the code of conduct or fell out of step, I instantly froze relations with that person. I needed close associates whom I would be able to rely on. Some tried to use the Mariinsky Theater as a springboard, to perform on its stage several times for the sole purpose of clinching a second-rate contract in Dusseldorf, Vienna or London. I never used force to keep people, but I severed all further contacts with them. All of my thoughts were not about defectors, but about those who preferred to stay, about preserving the company, about survival. We managed. The 2000s were a little bit easier. Now I've had to confront new challenges. But I am certain that we will cope with them with honor and dignity.

- What makes you so dead certain?

- That's what I am telling you. We gained much strength in the previous hectic years. Apparently, I am not bad as a crisis manager. We wouldn't have been worth a dime, had we allowed external factors to upset the theater's work.

True, it is far easier not to give concerts in dozens of cities across Russia every year, not to roam the world, to take my time at the country home near Leningrad, to rehearse, mediate, reflect on the future of civilization and spend time with my kids...

- You called the city Leningrad. Was it a slip of the tongue?

- The city's name is part of my life. I graduated from the Leningrad Conservatoire, as a student I went to recitals to the Leningrad Philharmonic Society's hall, and my job was at the Leningrad Opera and Ballet Theater named after Kirov... I believe that somewhere deep inside Leningrad there always remained St. Petersburg, just as in today's St. Petersburg there still remains a great deal of Leningrad. I am not in the position to judge if it is good or bad. It depends on the angle you are looking from. In the autumn of 1962 the great Stravinsky arrived in his native city after spending half a century away from home. Asked what was it he liked about Leningrad the most, Stravinsky was remarkably brief and meaningful: "St. Petersburg." That city has no reason to be ashamed of any period of its history. Today's Mariinsky Theater is deservedly considered as a legal successor of the Kirov Theater and its traditions. Suffice it to recall that in the Soviet era the term Kirov Ballet was a synonym of perfection.

- Yet it never rose above Bolshoi.

- Either theater invariably retained its unique, incomparable style. When Galina Ulanova left for Bolshoi, her decision was just another fact in the great ballerina's biography, but it by no means caused the St. Petersburg's school of ballet to collapse. Later, many other performers repeatedly changed theaters. Svetlana Zakharova moved to Moscow to be instantly engaged in lead roles. Ulyana Lopatkina and Diana Vishneva preferred to stay and I don't think they've lost anything. Naturally, rivalry between these two schools is a reality. It's a fact of history, but there is no point in making a fuss about that. The leading opera and ballet performers from the Bolshoi and Mariinsky theaters always appeared on each other's stages and no one has ever regarded that as an act of treason. One may recall Fyodor Shalyapin, who during one week managed to sing consecutively in Moscow and St. Petersburg. In the meantime, there was nothing like today's high-speed Sapsan express trains connecting the two cities. Only ordinary rail services.

- And much earlier, in the Russian Empire, the royal companies were doing pretty well.

- That is true. But twenty years ago both Bolshoi and Mariinsky companies were on the brink of survival. As soon as the opportunity offered itself, I contacted Russia's Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin in person. I was asking him to support the two giant theaters to save Russian opera and ballet. The situation was critical. I am not exaggerating it. It does Chernomyrdin credit that he turned an attentive ear to us and realized what measures should be taken first thing.

I went to the white marble building of the Russian government overlooking the Moskva River together with Irina Arkhipova, the renowned mezzo-soprano, holder of People's Artist of the USSR and Hero of Socialist Labour titles and no end of awards, represented the Moscow Bolshoi, and yours truly (in those days a relative young artistic director) the Mariinsky Theater. At first Chernomyrdin was talking exclusively to Arkhipova. Both were born in the South Urals. First they discussed their native places. Then Arkhipova gently steered the conversation to the Glinka contest of vocalists, which was in dire need for fifteen thousand dollars. Chernomyrdin, who got little bit sentimental after recalling his birthplace and younger days, easily agreed: "No problem. Surely, you'll have the money," and instantly issued instructions to his aides. Arkhipova, beside herself with joy, was already saying good-buy. The meeting with Chernomyrdin preceded a session of the Cabinet. During the fifteen minutes I had spent in Chernomyrdin's office I did not say a word. Perfectly aware that we will be asked to bow out the next minute I dared violate the protocol and addressed Chernomyrdin with something like this: "Let me introduce myself. I am from the Mariinsky theater." Chernomyrdin looked surprised: "Are you? I'd thought you are together with Irina... I reckon you must be having the same sort of problems?" I had to object: "No, my problems are worth much more than the fifteen thousand for the vocal context. Ten million this year are a matter of life and death..." A moment of dead silence followed. Then I went on: "It's too bad we are so pressed for time, but we've got to remember that it was neither me nor you, Sir, who built the Mariinsky and Bolshoi theaters, and it is not us who are destined close them. Unless resolute steps are taken to rescue the national cultural shrines, far more efforts and funds will have to be spent some day to revive them." Chernomyrdin replied in his own unique way: "Where do you think I should go to look for the ten million?" Then I dared drop a remark that did not sound politically correct at all: "The war in Grozny is probably devouring much more every single day. Or every single hour." Let me remind you that our meeting was taking place at the beginning of 1995, when the first Chechen war was in its acute phase. Chernomyrdin surely did not like what I was telling him. He looked somewhat strained. Yet, he managed to keep his emotions at bay and asked: "Is something wrong with the buildings? Some repairs needed?"

"Repairs, yes," I replied. "But the main problem is somewhat different. We may be doing a little bit better, but the state of affairs at the Bolshoi couldn't be worse. Problems are many - from the organization of tours and ticket sales, the latter being in the hands of organized crime, to repertoire and the condition of performing companies. The great veterans are retiring on pension while talented youth prefer to leave for the West, where they get paid properly.

- What did Chernomyrdin say?

- The dialogue turned very emotional, to say the least.

- On both sides?

- It so happened... But at the key moment I uttered a phrase that turned the tide. I asked. "When did you go to the Mariinsky Theater last time?" Chernomyrdin, who at once got less formal, only smiled: "What kind of theaters are you talking about, man? So many chores around to attend! Do you think I have a spare minute to go out? I am a gas worker by profession. Toiling away is my hobby. Do you know the way our industry is run? You appoint a manager. The guy proves worthless. What do you do? Kick him out and appoint another one... No time to wait. But you've persuaded me. Next time I am in St. Petersburg, I promise to drop in. Now, go ahead. I am listening." We returned to the table and spent another 40 minutes talking business. Chernomyrdin's aides were taken to tasks for poorly briefing their boss before the meeting. I told him about meager salaries our top stars and musicians were being paid, the frozen waiting list for new housing and the appalling condition of technical infrastructures...

- Did Chernomyrdin come to your theater in the end?

- Honestly? We met several times at the Moscow Bolshoi, at various gala meetings and shows on the occasion of important dates. Also, we met several times in St. Petersburg, and also in Kiev, where he served as Russia's ambassador to Ukraine. I was even invited to his dacha-type home in the countryside and introduced to his wife... Over years our relations became friendly, I would even say, cordial.

- And still, you did not answer my question.

- I presume that Chernomyrdin has not seen a single stage production at our theater, but he kept the promise he gave me in 1995 to allocate $10 million to support the Bolshoi and Mariinsky theaters. In those days it was an impressive financial infusion, indeed! As a result at that critical point we managed to retain our wonderful young talents - Netrebko, Borodina, Galuzin and Putilin, who made the opera company a whole lot stronger. Noticing talented vocalists at the right time is one of my strengths, believe me. The state of affairs in the ballet company was about the same.

In a word, Chernomyrdin's personal intervention and his firmness played a positive role in the history of Russia's modern musical theatre. At least, I will always remember that.
- You've always managed to find supporters and sponsors...

- Please, don't think it's so simple and easy for me. I believe it is important to explain at any cost to the two government ministries concerned - the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Culture why music lessons should be restored to the standard curriculum of secondary schools. Or possibly the ministries will have to be forced to do so under the pressure of public opinion. So far all of my attempts have failed...

What's the point of ruining what was well established and worked perfectly well? We all attended singing classes in school. Each school had a choir. What was so wrong about that, may I ask? Breaking something apart and then putting the pieces together again seems to be our favorite pastime... We have now managed to create Russia's grand national children's choir. The boys and girls there are really wonderful, but that's a drop in the ocean. It is surely not enough!....

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 #17
Interfax
September 22, 2015
Moscow concerned by plans to modernize U.S. nuclear weapons in Germany

Moscow is troubled by plans to modernize U.S. nuclear weapons in Germany, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova has said.

"Such plans on the part of the U.S. cause our concern," Zakharova said in an interview with Germany's ZDF television station. The text of the interview was published on the Russian Foreign Ministry's website on Sept.22.

"Let me remind you that in the 1990s, Russia reduced its arsenal of non-strategic nuclear means by four-fold, made them non-deployable and concentrated them in central storage facilities within its national territory," she said.

"At the same time, deployed tactical nuclear means of the U.S. remain in Europe - not only in Germany, but also in Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy and Turkey. Americans are modernizing their nuclear air bombs, while European members of NATO [are modernizing] airplanes that carry such weapons," Zakharova said.

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 #18
TASS
September 21, 2015
New Russian ICBM missile to be shown to US inspectors in November - source

Moscow, 21 September: A group of US inspectors will see the latest Russian intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) RS-26 Rubezh with their own eyes for the first time at the Votkinsk machine-building plant in Udmurtia in November, a source at the Russian Defence Ministry told TASS today.

"Under Article 5 of the protocol to the START-3 treaty on inspection activities, the demonstration of the latest strategic missile RS-26, which belongs in the category of non-deployed ICBMs, will be staged for a group of US inspectors at the Votkinsk machine-building plant in November. It will be the first demonstration of the missile to US inspectors," the source told the agency.

He explained that the US inspectors will be provided with data on the difference between Rubezh and the missiles in active operation, above all Topol-M and Yars. If requested, photos of the RS-26 will also be provided to the specialists from the USA. Furthermore, the US specialists will visu! ally examine the missile and measure it to confirm the accuracy of the declared data.

The source noted however that certain restrictions will be in place during the demonstration: the Americans "will not be able to touch the missile or take pictures of it with the use of film or photographic equipment or mobile phones". "Moreover, they will only be shown the missile itself but not its launcher," the source added.

The demonstration will be held on a single day. Under the START-3 treaty, US inspectors are no longer permanently present at the Votkinsk plant as was envisaged under START-1 (in force until the end of 2009).

In spring [2015], Roskosmos [Russian Federal Space Agency] announced a tender for staging a demonstration of the RS-26 to inspectors from the USA. According to documents posted on the state purchases website, more than R11m [about 170,000 dollars] was to be allocated for the demonstration of the latest missile at the Votkinsk plant. The event! will be organized by the Centre for the Operation of Space Infrastructure Facilities; the contract runs until 25 November. [Passage omitted: this will cover inspectors' travel, hospitality and so on.]

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 #19
Valdai Discussion Club
http://valdaiclub.com
September 21, 2015
Russia and the U.S. in the Arctic: A New Confrontation or Damage Limitation?
By Alexander Sergunin and Valery Konyshev
Alexander Sergunin is Professor is Professor of St. Petersburg State University, Department of International Relations, School of International Relations. Valery Konyshev is Professor of St. Petersburg State University, Department of International Relations, School of International Relations.

With the start of the Ukrainian crisis the U.S. policy-making and academic communities with a vengeance began to accuse Russia of militarism and expansionism not only in East Europe but also in the Arctic. These accusations revived old charges related to the planting of the Russian titanium flag on the North Pole in 2007, resumption of naval and air patrols in the region and military modernization programs of the Russian conventional and nuclear forces deployed in the Far North.

On the other hand, the U.S. right-wing politicians and military experts resumed their favorite discourse on the 'Arctic window of vulnerability' and the U.S. inferiority in the High North. Pseudo-arguments, such as the lack of deep-water ports on the U.S. Arctic coastline or a proper icebreaker fleet (the U.S. has only one heavy diesel icebreaker while Russia has a fleet of nuclear-powered and diesel icebreakers and it is building new ones) were again floated.

Some U.S. analysts expected that in the wake of the Ukrainian crisis Moscow would dramatically increase its military activities and presence in the Arctic as well as accelerate its military modernization programs in the region. For example, American experts paid attention to the fact that, for the first time, the new version of the Russian military doctrine (December 2014) has assigned to the Russian armed forces the protection of Russia's national interests in the Arctic in peacetime. Moreover, Russia's new maritime doctrine (July 2015) has identified the Arctic (along with the North Atlantic) as a priority area for the Russian navy.

However, these alarmist expectations were not fulfilled. First of all, there was no any substantial paradigmatic shift regarding the Kremlin's vision of the military power's role in the Arctic. As before, Moscow's military strategies aimed at three major goals: first, to demonstrate and ascertain Russia's sovereignty over the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (AZRF), including the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf; second, to protect its economic interests in the High North; and third, to demonstrate that Russia retains its great power status and has world-class military capabilities. In a sense, Russian military strategies are comparable with those of other coastal states (especially the U.S. and Canadian ones).

Still, some impact of the Ukrainian crisis could be seen in the increasing number and scale of the Russian military exercises in the Arctic. For example, in March 2015 President Putin ordered to inspect the Northern Fleet for combat readiness. 38,000 soldiers, 3,360 vehicles, 41 naval vessels, 15 submarines and 110 aircrafts were involved in the inspection. In August more than 1,000 soldiers, 14 aircraft and 34 special military units took part in drills on the Taymyr Peninsula (northern Siberia).

However, it should be noted that March combat readiness inspection was a response to the NATO's preceding drill in Norway which involved 5,000 troops, the largest military exercise on the NATO northern flank since 1967. As for the August exercise, according to the Northern Fleet Commander Admiral Vladimir Korolev, this exercise was purely defensive as it was done more than 3,000 km away from the Norwegian border and directed to protect economic security of the AZRF (to prevent poaching, smuggling, illegal migration as well as to conduct search and rescue operations) rather than to plan any offensive moves.

According to Andreas Østhagen, an Arctic policy expert with the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies, so far, Russia has responded to NATO's moves with more rhetoric than action in the Arctic.

In contrast with the Baltic Sea region where the NATO-Russian tensions have obviously increased over the last year, "the situation in the High North is close to normal compared to the activity the last years," the head of the Norwegian Joint Command Headquarters, Lt. Gen. Morten Haga Lunde believes. "This is in spite of the tense situation that has evolved between Russia and NATO."

According to official numbers from the Norwegian Joint Command Headquarters, there had been 43 scrambles and 69 identifications in international air space outside the coast of Norway in 2014. In 2013 there were 41 scrambles and 58 identifications, and in 2012 there were 41 scrambles and 71 identifications. The numbers are considerable lower than during the 1980s, when there could be as many as 500 to 600 identifications per year.

There was no dramatic increase in Russia's naval and air patrolling the North Atlantic and Arctic in 2014-2015. Moreover, after two catastrophes with the Tu-95 strategic bombers (summer 2015) their flights were suspended for a while.

Russia's military modernization programs in the Far North were implemented according to schedule. However, some Western military analysts tried to represent the deployment of the Pantsir S-1 short-range air defense system on the Kola Peninsula, plans to replace S-300 long-range air defense system by a more advanced S-400 «Growler» system, tactical training for fighter jet pilots in Arctic conditions, sea trials of nuclear submarines (most of which are designed for the deployment to the Pacific Fleet), plans to establish 16 deepwater ports, 10 search and rescue stations, 10 air defense radar stations, and 13 airfields along its Arctic periphery as an evidence of Russia's growing military ambitions in the High North.

These experts tend to ignore the fact that the Soviet-time military machine in the Far North has significantly degenerated in the 1990s and early 2000s and the Russian conventional and nuclear forces badly needed modernization to effectively meet new challenges and threats.

To reorganize in a more efficient way the Russian land forces in the Western part of the AZRF there were plans to transform the motorized infantry and marine brigades located near Pechenga (Murmansk region) to the Arctic special force unit, with soldiers trained in a special program and equipped with modern personal equipment for military operations in the Arctic. The Arctic brigade should be operational by 2016. There were also plans to create another Arctic brigade somewhere in the Arkhangelsk region. All conventional forces in the AZRF should form an Arctic Group of Forces (AGF) to be led by the joint Arctic command (which should be initially established in 2017).

However, the Ukrainian crisis as well the U.S. military plans for the Arctic have made adjustments to Russia's military planning. Moscow was especially concerned about the U.S. plans that were described in the U.S. Department of Defense Arctic Strategy (2013) and the U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap for 2014 to 2030 (2014). According to these documents, Washington plans to increase its readiness to conduct maritime and air patrol and interception operations; to exercise and assert its navigation and overflight rights and freedoms in the region; to ensure its access to global commons in the Arctic; to expand its power projection capabilities, etc.

As far as the configuration of the Russian land forces in the AZRF are concerned two Pechenga-based brigades were left in place, while the Arctic brigade was surprisingly created ahead of the schedule (in January 2015) and deployed in an unexpected location - Alakurtti which is close to the Finnish-Russian border. Another surprise was that given an 'increased NATO military threat' in the North, President Putin has decided to accelerate the creation of a new strategic command 'North' which was established in December 2014 (three years ahead of the schedule). It was also announced that the second Arctic brigade will be formed in 2016 and will be stationed in the Yamal-Nenets autonomous district (east of the Ural Mountains in the Arctic Circle).

Another interesting structural change is an ongoing reorganization of the Russian Coast Guard - part of the Federal Security Service (FSS). Now the Coast Guard has a wide focus the Arctic: in addition to the traditional protection of biological resources in the Arctic Ocean, oil and gas installations and shipping along the Northern Sea Route are among the agency's new top priorities. For this purpose, the FSS has established two new border guard commands: one in Murmansk for the western AZRF regions, and one in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky for the eastern Arctic regions.

There are plans to equip the Coast Guard in the AZRF with the brand new vessels of project 22100. This the Okean-class ice-going patrol ship, the Polyarnaya Zvezda (Polar Star), is currently undergoing sea trials in the Baltic Sea. Vessels of this class can break up to 31.4 inch-thick ice. They have an endurance of 60 days and a range of 12,000 nautical miles at 20 knots. They are equipped with a Ka27 helicopter and can be supplied with Gorizont UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles).

The attention which Russia pays now to the Coast Guard and its new missions is in line with what other coastal states do (especially Norway and Denmark).

To conclude, serious international experts do not see any particular alarming trends in Russia's military behavior in the Arctic in the aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis. According to ex-Commander of the U.S. Coast Guard and current U.S. Arctic Ambassador admiral Robert Papp, "Everything we have seen them doing so far is lawful, considered and deliberative. So we'll just continue monitoring it and not overreact to it". Papp noted that all countries have a responsibility to be able to provide search and rescue (SAR) capabilities and navigation assistance in the area and Russia seems to be investing in that.

Moreover, as the recent international Conference on Global Leadership in the Arctic: Cooperation, Innovation, Engagement and Resilience, otherwise known as GLACIER (August 30-31, Anchorage, Alaska), demonstrated, the Obama administration is keen on cooperation with Moscow on 'soft security' issues in the Arctic. Being a chair of the Arctic Council for 2015-2017, the U.S. needs support from other Arctic nations to successfully implement its presidential program that focuses on environmental issues, SAR and indigenous peoples' well-being. In other words, military confrontation is not on the agenda; other, more cooperative content, is in the focus of Arctic politics now.

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 #20
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
September 18, 2015
25 years after reunification, Germany must make tough choice about Russia
The Ukrainian crisis has aggravated Russian-German relations. This impacts negatively not only the situation of Russia but also the status of Germany in international politics.
By Alexei Fenenko
Alexey Fenenko is an associate professor at the Faculty of World Politics of the Moscow State University. Previously, he was a leading researcher at the Institute of International Security Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (2004-2013), a project coordinator at the Academic Educational Forum on International Relations and a co-editor for ˝International Trends˝ magazine (2004-2011). He has a Doctorate in History (2003).

Among the big anniversary dates of this year, one date went almost unnoticed: the last week's 25-year anniversary of the reunification of Germany. On September 12, 1990, Moscow brought together representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, also known as West Germany), the German Democratic Republic (GDR, or commonly known as East Germany) and the victorious powers of the World War II. They signed the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany.

However, the treaty did not provide a definitive solution to the "German question," which is concerned with a complete restoration of Germany's sovereignty and its relations with other countries.

The heritage of the Moscow Treaty determines up to day the character of Russian-German relations, which have been impacted recently by the Ukrainian crisis.

The Moscow compromise on German sovereignty

In the mid-1990s, the situation around the reunification of the two German states was not so simple.

There was no unanimity on the "German question" among the four victorious powers. French President François Mitterrand opposed the reunification of the GDR and the FRG.
The British cabinet of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher advocated the "4+2" formula, with the Soviet Union, the U.S., France and the United Kingdom working out conditions for the reunification of the two Germanies. London insisted that it should be a confederation of the GDR and the FRG.

The United States, which did not wish to quarrel with their European allies, kept aloof from solving the "German question." The White House's only desire was to preserve the unity of NATO.

The Soviet Union's interference changed the situation. Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev advocated the "2+4" formula, with the two Germanies working out the conditions of their own reunification and the victorious powers joining their decision.

At a meeting in the city of Zheleznovodsk in July 1990, Gorbachev supported German Chancellor Helmut Kohl's position on the reunification of the GDR and the FRG. The U.S. supported readily the Soviet initiatives. Britain and France had to comply with the "2+4" formula.

However, the Sept. 12 Moscow Treaty was essentially a compromise. Moscow, Washington, London and Paris agreed to the reunification of Germany within the boundaries of the GDR and the FRG as of January 1, 1990. The victorious powers agreed to full restoration of Germany's legal personality in both foreign and domestic affairs, thus relieving it of the vestiges of occupation status.

At the same time, four of the restrictions on Germany's sovereignty introduced by the Bonn Treaty of 1952 remained in place.

Firstly, some restrictions were imposed on the development of the German armed forces: Bundeswehr. Over the next four years, the FRG's armed forces were to be reduced to a level of 370,000. Germany reaffirmed its renunciation of the manufacture, possession, and control of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as stated in the Paris protocols of 1954. The use of the German armed forces was allowed by the consent of the UN only.

Secondly, the ban for Germany on holding any referendum on military-political issues was continued. Those obligations introduced in the FRG's Constitution of 1949 were confirmed, first, by a special letter by Chancellor Kohl to the President of the U.S.S.R. of September 12, 1990; and, secondly, by a special declaration by Kohl of September 12, 1990.

Thirdly, the Moscow Treaty maintained indirectly the mechanism of mandatory consultations of Germany with the victorious powers on foreign policy issues introduced by the Bonn Treaty of 1952. The Bonn Treaty was terminated with the signing of the Moscow Treaty. However, that restriction was imposed on the FRG pending the signing of a peace treaty.

Lacking the legal status of a peace treaty, the Moscow Treaty retained that clause in force. As noted in the preamble, the document was signed "having regard to the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers relating to Berlin and to Germany as a whole, and the corresponding wartime and post-war agreements and decisions of the Four Powers."

Fourthly, the ban on the FRG demanding withdrawal of foreign troops from the German territory until the signing of a peace treaty remained in force. That obligation was also introduced by the Bonn Treaty of 1952. However, the Moscow Treaty did not establish any term for the withdrawal of the victorious powers' troops from Germany; neither it specified a procedure for a possible claim from Germany regarding this problem.The Soviet Union withdrew the Group of Soviet Forces on a voluntary basis. The restrictions introduced referred only to the deployment of the armed forces of the NATO countries within the territory of the former GDR.

The Soviet Union went further than the other victorious states. In the fall of 1990, the Treaty on Good Neighborliness, Partnership, and Cooperation between the FRG and the U.S.S.R. was signed in Bonn.

Such a pro-German position of the Kremlin was not accidental. Judging by openly available publications, Gorbachev realized that after the "velvet revolutions" the days of the Warsaw Pact were numbered. Therefore, along with the reunification of Germany, he tried to launch an all-European process.

The Charter of Paris for a New Europe signed in November made provisions for the creation of a "bloc-free Europe."

Rapprochement with Russia brought dividends to Germany

Since that time, two essential foreign policy parties formed in the German establishment. The first of those (to which Kohl and Gerhard Schröder loosely belonged) advocated extension of cooperation with Russia. That process should lead finally to the revision of the Moscow Treaty and full restoration of Germany's sovereignty. However, even failing that, the model of "privileged partnership" with Russia brought Germany considerable dividends.

Firstly, a privileged dialogue with Russia automatically raised the status of Germany in the system of European international relations.

The Balkan crisis, the export of Caspian energy resources, Iran's nuclear program - each of these problems Berlin discussed as an equal with a nuclear superpower and a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. Germany started being perceived as ranking with Russia and the U.S. rather than with Italy and Sweden, although those were "more sovereign" that the FRG.

Secondly, that dialogue widened the area of Germany's economic influence. German companies invested in the development of Russian industry. Germany stands as Gazprom's leading partner in the domain of transit and distribution of gas for consumers in the EU countries.

Each Russian-German agreement on the construction of a pipeline or a gas storage facility gives Berlin instruments for influencing the other EU members. Germany's energy policy fell in the same weight category as the energy policy of Russia or the whole of the European Union.

Thirdly, the special relations with Moscow enhanced the role of Germany in the context of transatlantic relations. A majority of the NATO countries are valuable to Washington for their territories and political support, while German diplomacy made available to the U.S. its experience of constructive work with Russia.

Fourthly, the dialogue with Russia helped Germany become a major military power. After 1991, the German armed forces have participated in wars outside Germany. As a victorious power, Russia could have pointed out the inconsistency of such actions with the Moscow Treaty. Instead, Russia always emphasized that it was glad to see Germany a participant of the global anti-terrorist coalition.

Estrangement from Russia weakens Germany's global role

In contrast, the other party maintained the precedence of the economic development of Eastern Europe. Chancellor Angela Merkel, who came to power in 2005, loosely belonged to that party. The stepping up of German economic expansion into Eastern Europe became the priority of her policy.

Germany was establishing itself as the leader of the new EU countries, a process that fortified its position within the European Union. However, such a strategy led Berlin automatically to a conflict with Russia about dividing the Baltic-Black Sea region.

That strategy was embodied in the EU's program, the "Eastern Partnership." Its proclaimed goal was to sign treaties on the association of EU with six former Soviet republics: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.

Such a prospect opened wide opportunities for German business. But it also necessitated drawing a real boundary between the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and the partners of the EU.

At the same time, the problem of the status of the unrecognized states that did not seek association with the European Union aggravated. It is no accident that already in the summer of 2010 the Merkel Cabinet tied up the talks with Russia on European security with the solution of the Transnistria question.

The problems aggravated in the fall of 2012 when Germany's Parliament Bundestag carried a resolution criticizing the policies of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Chancellor Merkel criticized Russia's domestic policy at a session of the "St. Petersburg Dialogue" on November 16, 2012 and during Putin's visit to Hannover in April 2013.

All through 2013, the proponents of a tougher policy towards Russia in the German elite were gaining ground. Suffice it to recall Federal President Joachim Gauck calling for leaving Germany's "comfort zone" in relations with Russia and ex-Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer urging not to fall out with other NATO countries over Moscow.

The Ukrainian crisis and the EU's sanctions war against the Kremlin was the point beyond which Berlin started countering Moscow's policy with its own line in the post-Soviet space.

Against that background, a new round of rapprochement between Germany and the U.S. occurred. Already during his visit to Berlin on June 19, 2013, President Obama declared his intention to improve U.S.-German relations.

Still, the main sensation was caused by the Munich conference on security in February 2014. Federal President Joachim Gauck, Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen and Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier spoke of "the new role of Germany" brought on, among other things, by the inability of Washington to solve all international problems.

The representatives of the U.S., Secretary of State John Kerry and Defense Minister Chuck Hagel, have supported such a trend in the German leadership. The problem is that turning Germany into a privileged junior partner of the U.S. weakens, rather than strengthens, its positions in Europe.

The Ukrainian crisis highlighted a new line in American policy - that of eroding the system of a Russian-German partnership. A falling out with Russia will deprive Germany of its privileged position within NATO as a mediator country in talks with Moscow. France has started assuming gradually that role.

Russia is becoming more stringent in regard to Berlin's attempts to create precedents of broadened interpretation of the Moscow Treaty of 1990. Germany's role as the energy center of the European Union is in the balance, too.

The situation is all the more disagreeable to Germany because in 2010, a "French-British tandem" (a system of privileged military-political partnership between London and Paris) formed in Western Europe.

The Ukrainian crisis eroded the system of Russian-German partnership. When on amicable terms with Russia, Germany was perceived as a great power, a mediator between Russia and the U.S. In contrast, a Germany leading an anti-Kremlin policy will be perceived as just another "ever-aggrieved" country of Eastern Europe.

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#21
The Unz Review
www.unz.com
September 18, 2015
Russian Mouse Threatens U.S. Elephant
By Eric Margolis
Eric S. Margolis is an award-winning, internationally syndicated columnist. His articles have appeared in the New York Times, the International Herald Tribune the Los Angeles Times, Times of London, the Gulf Times, the Khaleej Times, Nation - Pakistan, Hurriyet, - Turkey, Sun Times Malaysia and other news sites in Asia.

The Russians are coming! The Russians are coming!" So echoed the cry this week from the Pentagon, the US media and Republican candidates for president.

How silly. It seems the Russians have sent six tanks to Syria, some medium artillery and a bunch of military technicians to two bases on Syria's coast near Latakia. According to Republican warmongers, the wicked Soviets...ooops, sorry, Russians...are intervening militarily in the five-year old Syrian War and planning new bases in the strategic Mideast nation.

Talk about the pot calling the kettle black. The United States has about 800 bases and military installations around the globe. Russia has only a handful of small bases near its borders.

The exception is in Syria where Russia has had a small naval supply/repair facility in Tartus and an electronic listening post for almost 50 years. Moscow has long been Syria's principal foreign ally and arms supplier.

While the US ruled almost the entire Mideast - what I call the American Raj - Syria was regarded as a limited Soviet/Russian sphere of influence. No more.

Washington ignited Syria's civil war by infiltrating anti-government forces from Lebanon and Jordan. Over the past five years, the US, along with Israel, France, Britain and Saudi Arabia, has armed, financed and directed Syria's anti-Assad regime rebels. The Saudis unleashed their secret weapon against Damascus, the Syrian-Iraqi Islamic State movement.

The West's objective in Syria was to overthrow its government, because it is closely allied to Iran, Lebanon's Hezbollah and Russia. President Bashar Assad's secular government in Damascus is just managing to hold off the rebels and mobs of fanatical jihadists sent by the Saudis and Washington - which pretends to be fighting the Islamic state. In fact, the Islamic State, or IS, is a tacit American ally.

Astoundingly, it appears that few in Washington's power circles appear to have imagined that US machinations in Syria would eventually provoke a Russian response.

Republican candidates like Marco Rubio, Ted Cruz, and Carly Fiorina appeared to be itching for war with Russia. They are creatures of America's chief neocon, casino mogul Sheldon Adelson. Most non-Americans must have been horrified to observe such warmongering and pandering to Israel's far, far right.

One wonders if these amateur strategists could name more than one Syrian city. Or if they understand that Syria is as close to Russia as New York is to Columbus, Ohio? Does anyone remember that in the 19th Century Russia claimed to be defender of Mideast Christians? This week, President Vladimir Putin re-asserted this claim, saying he wanted to protect the Levant's 2 million Christians who are now gravely threatened by IS.

Why can the US have military bases in places like Djibouti, Okinawa, Diego Garcia, Uganda, Somalia, Qatar, Afghanistan, South Korea, Bulgaria, Japan, Italy, Romania, Pakistan, Iraq and Spain, to name a few, while it's a big no-no for Russia to dare have a very small base in Syria?

Because the Empire says no.

Russia's military budget is one tenth that of the United States. Combined with its rich allies like Europe and Japan, the US accounts for 70% of world military spending. The only real threat Russia poses to US security will come if Washington's ham-handed blundering in Syria, Iraq and Ukraine provoke a direct clash with Russia's military forces. The West is fortunate to have the cautious, sober Vlad Putin in the Kremlin. He has already averted a US-Russian war in Syria and is calling again for direct US-Russia talks on the growing crisis.

But did anyone really think that the very tough Putin would do nothing while the US and its allies tore Syria apart?

How stupid and arrogant was this. Imperial hubris married to arrant ignorance.

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 #22
Russia, US to create precedent for interaction over Syria, struggle with IS
By Tamara Zamyatina

MOSCOW, September 21. /TASS/. Washington and Moscow are about to start the search for a joint approach to settling the Syrian crisis and the struggle against the terrorist organization calling itself the Islamic State, thereby creating a precedent for tighter interaction to advance common interests in the Middle East, the director of the Institute for US and Canada Studies under the Russian Academy of Sciences, Sergey Rogov, has told TASS in an interview.

Over the past two weeks US Secretary of State John Kerry has had three telephone conversations with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. And last Saturday Kerry asked Russia and Iran to use their influence on Syria's President Bashar Assad to persuade him to enter into political negotiations for a settlement of the conflict in his country. Kerry said that although the United States remained adamant Assad should step down, at the same time it was not expecting the resignation should happen overnight.

Kerry was speaking the next day after US Secretary of Defence Ashton Carter and Russian Defence Minister Sergey Shoigu spent nearly an hour discussing the situation in Syria by telephone.

"It looks like despite the divergence of views within the US Administration President Barack Obama supports Secretary of State John Kerry and Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, who tend to cooperate with Russia in the Syrian settlement and the struggle against the terrorist Islamic State. This explains the frequent contacts Kerry and Lavrov had of late, as well as Carter's decision to break the 'vow of silence' which the Pentagon chief has observed since his appointment and to talk to Shoigu at last," Rogov said.

"I believe that official statements by both sides to the effect Carter and Shoigu stated the similarity of their countries' stances on Syria were pretty close to the reality.

Alongside the agreement over the Iranian nuclear program there is emerging another precedent of tighter interaction by Moscow and Washington in advancing their common interests in the Middle East and in fighting against the common threat - the Islamic State."

Rogov believes that the latest reports US and Russian secret services had contacts regarding joint steps that might be taken to fight against the Islamic State were mostly confined to exchanges of information about likely attacks against terrorist bases, their command centres, armed groups and munitions depots.

"Another aspect of the latest contacts between the two countries' secret services is the prevention of incidents that may result in casualties among advisers and military specialists as a result of 'friendly' fire. It is not accidental the Pentagon has started using a new term - deconflictization - in relation to possible actions by the United States and Russia in Syria. This term implies both sides will be informing each other about their current operations and plans for future steps in that country. But it is very unlikely such delicate matters will be ever discussed in public," Rogov remarked.

"In a sense the Islamic State terrorists are a unique enemy for Washington and Moscow. It is hard to imagine a different situation where Russian and US interests would be practically the same. So the absence of any cooperation by Russia and the United States on that score could not but raise many eyebrows," he said.

At the same time Rogov used the adjective "adamant" to describe Washington's stubborn insistence Syria's President Bashar Assad should be promptly removed from power. "In the meantime, Syria's government troops remain the main obstacle to IS militants. The so-called moderate Syrian opposition has demonstrated its weakness and inability to resist Islamic terrorists. The United States' failure to train combat-ready troops for the Syrian opposition has ended in failure, although a hefty $500,000 million has been spent on that program," Rogov recalled.

In the current situation in Washington, he said, not only the Republicans, but many members of the Democratic Party are reluctant to vote for a resolution that would empower the president to use US troops against the Islamic State. "The US Congress surely does not want to see a rerun of 2003, when the corresponding resolution on Iraq was used by the George W. Bush's Administration for the invasion of Iraq and its occupation. Obama himself does not look very enthusiastic about the idea the US might launch a ground operation in Syria," he recalls.

"In this context Russia's readiness to step up military assistance to Syria has drawn a mixed response from the United States. On the one hand, Washington fears that Russia may gain a much firmer foothold in the Middle East against the backdrop of ineffective US policies. On the other hand, the arrangement that resulted in the elimination of Syria's chemical weapons is about to be replicated again. The Obama Administration then preferred to cooperate with Russia in eliminating these arsenals," Rogov pointed out.

"Does that mean that the United States is withdrawing its demand for Assad's resignation? Very unlikely. But Washington looks prepared not to push ahead with this demand for the time being. At the same time Russian officials have been hinting that support for the Syrian government at the moment does not imply Assad will certainly stay in office in the foreseeable future. Various options are possible: Assad may be replaced by some of his associates, if the issue of forming an interim government incorporating all of the Islamic State's opponents is put on the agenda. But one should not be in a hurry to jump at such hasty conclusions for now," Rogov warned.

"The latest shifts in Washington's and Moscow's policies regarding Syria indicate that Russian-US relations may get more balanced in defiance of the sanctions, and that some sort of balance of cooperation and rivalry may be established. Although at the current phase confrontational attitudes prevail, Russian-US cooperation over Syria may play a positive role, preventing a further worsening of another Cold War," Rogov believes.

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 #23
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
September 22, 2015
Build a coalition to save Syria
The current East-West crisis is the worst of all options in the face of the ISIS threat.
Dmitry Babich, special to RBTH
Dmitry Babich is a commentator for Sputnik.

With Europe going through the most acute refugee crisis since the Second World War, European governments are contemplating various "military options" for easing the situation in Syria. The French prime minister Manuel Valls announced France had launched reconnaissance flights over Syria, to better see which targets "could be hit". Influential German diplomat and chairman of the annual Munich Security Conference, Wolfgang Ischinger, said Europe's "strategy in Syria could only inspire trust if backed up by the possibility of military action". It is in this context that talk of Russia's "growing military presence in Syria", as the West sees it, sets Moscow on a collision course with both the EU and the U.S..
 
Moscow moves

But is President Bashar al-Assad really the source of all evil in Syria? Russian president Vladimir Putin says "the refugees are fleeing the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, or ISIS), not Assad." Speaking to the leaders of countries from the post-Soviet Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Putin said that Russia would continue sending arms and instructors to the Syrian government, because Assad is ISIS's enemy and "without our help, the situation in Syria would have been even worse". In Libya, which the West left to its own devices after helping to remove Colonel Gaddafi, the civil war is even more protracted than that in Syria.

Moscow's pro-Assad position raises the stakes in the dispute with the U.S. The Pentagon said it had satellite images of an airbase being built near Latakia in western Syria that it claims may be used by the Russians in future. The Pentagon also noted Russian-made T-90 tanks guarding the future airbase. Russia denied that it planned to "occupy" Syria, claiming it was only fulfilling existing contracts for arms deliveries signed with the Syrian government before the civil war started in Syria in 2011-12. While denying Russia had "boots on the ground", foreign minister Sergei Lavrov admitted that Russian instructors were arriving in Syria with the weapons. Lavrov also said western air strikes against ISIS were "ineffective" without co-operation with the main ground forces fighting the Islamist extremists - Assad's army and the Kurdish militias.
 
Lack of trust

Western media reports suggest the Kremlin has already confirmed Russian "military involvement in Syria's civil war". In fact, Putin's comments were much more cautious. On Sept. 4, 2015, in Vladivostok, he said: "American air strikes are dealing certain blows [to ISIS]. Their effectiveness is not high. But to say we are ready to do this [to send Russian servicemen to Syria] - this is still premature."

He added: "We are already providing Syria sufficiently serious aid: with equipment, with the training of its servicemen, with arms. We signed major contracts with Syria five or seven years ago, we are now fulfilling those contracts."

It was not enough for the American administration. The next day, Sept. 5, U.S. secretary of state John Kerry called his Russian counterpart, Lavrov, saying that if the information about "Russian involvement" was true this could lead to a "further escalation of the conflict". On Sept. 7-8, NATO members Greece and Bulgaria closed their airspace to the Russian planes that Moscow said it was using to deliver humanitarian aid to Syria.

The gap between Moscow and Washington over Syria grew day by day, reflecting the general lack of trust between Russia and the West at large. On Sept. 11, U.S. President Barack Obama pressed on with the issue. In a speech to servicemen in Fort Meade, Maryland, Obama said that he had already "had a conversation" with the Russian president about Russian aid to the Syrian government "four or five years ago". His message then had been that helping Assad "was a mistake, it would make things worse". Obama added that Putin "did not take my warnings, and as a consequence things have gotten worse".

However, Obama did not exclude Russia's participation in the fight against ISIS - but it had to be on American terms, without co-operating in any way with the Syrian government.

"If they [the Russians] are willing to work with us and the 60-nation coalition we put together, there's the possibility of a political settlement in which Assad would be transitioned out and a new coalition of moderate, secular and inclusive forces could come together to restore order in the country", Obama said.
 
Deep divisions

Obviously, there is a huge rift in understanding between Moscow and Washington. A personal meeting could help. At the end of September, the Russian president plans to visit New York City to attend the 70th meeting of the UN General Assembly. No meeting with Obama is scheduled - something Russia's foreign ministry has made clear was a U.S. decision. Putin has officially voiced the idea of an anti-ISIS coalition, which could include not only Russia, the West and Iran, but even such opponents of Assad as Saudi Arabia and Jordan. In fact, Putin's suggestion appeared to get some backing from Saudi Arabia, its relations with Russia having improved of late following the promise of $10bn in investment from the oil kingdom. But Russia's plans have been given the cold shoulder in Washington.

On Syria's post-war future, Russia and the U.S./EU alliance also differ. Both Russia and the West talk about an "inclusive" future government for Syria. But Russia says such a government could be formed both from elements of the Syrian government and "healthy" groups among the Syrian opposition, while the West insists on Assad's removal as a precondition for any political settlement. The end result is that Russia and the West act in Syria not as allies, but as competitors, thus allowing ISIS to tackle its foes one by one. In a recent interview on Russian television, Lavrov bemoaned the West's refusal to co-ordinate its strikes against ISIS with the Syrian authorities, which he says, "are fighting ISIS on the ground".

Russia has long objected to what it sees as biased western media reports on its activities in Syria. Back in 2012, NBC News accused Russia of sending troops to support Assad; no sign of these "Russian troops" ever appeared on the frontlines of the Syrian civil war. In the same year, Turkish fighter jets forced a Syrian Air passenger plane on a flight from Moscow to Damascus to land in Istanbul, where it was searched for weapons by Turkish authorities. No weapons were ever produced in public.

The Russian public is divided over reports of Russian involvement in Syria. But the major tone is one of regret: that Russia and the West cannot agree a common front even in the face of such an obvious threat as ISIS. And that the longer the West chooses to confront Russia, the stronger ISIS becomes.

"On June 22, 1941, Churchill had enough common sense to make an alliance with the USSR, because the alternative alliance with the Third Reich was even less appealing than the one with Moscow," observes Maxim Sokolov, a popular Russian political commentator. "But John Kerry is obviously no Churchill. He has a different style of thinking."

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 #24
Russia Beyond the Headlines/Rossiyskaya Gazeta.
www.rbth.ru
September 21, 2015
Lack of common cause risks handing Syria to ISIS
Political analyst Fyodor Lukyanov discusses why there is no united front in the struggle against ISIS.
The author is chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy.

An official representative of the US administration has warned Russia that it risks being isolated if it continues supporting Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria. Other western leaders are also concerned, albeit rather vaguely - no one has a clear idea of what should be done in the crisis zone. The two camps fall broadly into those opposed to Russian troops entering the conflict and those who think they might just achieve what hand-wringing and western air strikes have failed to.

If we distance ourselves from the ideological preconceptions that colour all views of Russia, we may understand why there is no united front in the struggle against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), even though all agree such an approach is desperately needed.

There are a range of basic discrepancies, either stated or implicit. First, ISIS is seen as a terrorist group, which is why everyone is speaking about an anti-terrorist campaign. This is not the right definition.The problem can be traced back to the beginning of the 2000s when the international fight against terrorism, declared by the Bush administration, stimulated processes that culminated in the current chaos.

Also, even if the world is now confronted by terrorism, ISIS represents a new type and level of terrorism. The Islamists headed by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi are overrunning and destroying the institutional structure of the Middle East, intent on rebuilding not only the ideological but also the national and political order.

ISIS deserves to be countered by the most serious measures using the most modern arsenal that countries have at their disposal. The West continues viewing ISIS through the prism of familiar concepts of the fight against terrorism, while Russia is inclined to take up measures that are usually characteristic of interstate wars.

Ideas about Syria's future also do not correspond. The West's obsession with Assad is related to the question of who will manage Syria after the conflict. Here, the original meaning of the talks on sharing powers with the opposition, the renewal of the Geneva process and so on, come into focus.

Russia supported the Geneva and the Moscow processes, albeit with its own agenda, but now it is convinced that the challenge is much more acute. The problem is what will happen to the Syria that existed before. The country has practically been divided into zones of control (or lack thereof) and it is difficult to imagine the reconstruction of former statehood. Now, the question is: where will it be possible to dig in to stop the advance of ISIS?

It is clear that the issue of power in a reformatted system, whatever it may be called in the future, will arise. No doubt power will have to be shared, but first it is important to understand what exactly will remain.

As for the present, many in Moscow reasonably believe that a coalition in the conditions of a massive external attack is good only when the various forces, having set their differences aside, sincerely unite against a common enemy. That is not the case in Syria. Both the government and the opposition's level of obstinacy is close to absolute. And to use force to impose co-operation in such a situation (theoretically external players can try to achieve this) means condemning the coalition to immediate failure with a clear result: the enthronement of ISIS in Damascus.

So despite the above-mentioned divergences, is it possible for the leading players to reach an agreement on joint actions in Syria? The inflows of refugees to Europe and its complete inability to do anything about it is quickly changing the public's mood in the Old World. Now the mood is dominated by the opinion that, to stop the situation, Europe should do everything possible and not on its territory.

The American position is dictated by a tangle of various motifs, but in general it is no longer monolithic. Public declarations and real views do not always correspond, while opposition to Moscow is determined not by the desire to remove Assad, but by fears that Russia will strengthen its position in the region. But this is an issue of a rational balance of interests, which is always easier to solve (though still very difficult) in comparison to when the situation concerns ideological preferences.

It is clear that by initiating the anti-ISIS campaign and getting more involved in Middle Eastern intrigues, Russia is taking risks. Besides the threat of material and, more importantly, human losses (which cannot be denied, especially considering the inhumane enemy that will be opposed), there are always doubts related to reaching the objective.

There are no guarantees of success, especially in this complex situation where everyone is fighting multiple enemies, and so-called allies are stabbing each other in the back. Russian public opinion must prepare itself for various scenarios.

It should also be recognised that Russia's decision to participate more actively in the Syrian battle is informed by its past experience. In international politics, it is action and not criticism that is valued above all else.

Although it is action that wins points and elevates status, the opposite may occur. However, without risk there is no "Big Game".

First published in Russian in Rossiyskaya Gazeta.

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 #25
Rossiyskaya Gazeta
September 18, 2015
Russian experts, politicians comment on Syrian president's interview
Report by Konstantin Volkov and Vitaliy Petrov, carrying comment by Russian experts and politicians on Syrian President Bashar al-Asad's recent interview with Russian media: Do not allow 'domino effect'

We have to defeat terrorism, not just ISIL. That is what Syrian President Bashar al-Asad said in an interview he gave on 17 September to the newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta and other Russian media. In his opinion, the West views terrorism "as a trump card that can pulled from the pocket from time to time."

We can see the results of such a policy: the actions of the international coalition against ISIL are not just failing to produce any visible results, but, on the contrary, are contributing to the deterioration of the situation in Syria. On Thursday [17 September], at a hearing in the US Congress, a representative of the Pentagon admitted that the programme of military training of the moderate Syrian opposition had failed completely. However, as Bashar al-Asad said in the interview, if Western countries change their policy, "they have to realize that terrorism is like a scorpion - if you put it in your pocket, it will certainly sting you".

Will President Al-Asad become the West's ally in the fight against the terrorist threat? After all, militants from more than 80 countries of the world are fighting in Syria? Will he manage to organize a dialogue between political parties and bring about an intra-Syrian settlement? We have asked Rossiyskaya Gazeta experts to answer these questions.

Fedor Lukyanov, chairman of the presidium of the Council for Foreign and Defence Policy:

"On the one hand, the situation in Syria has become utterly confused because everybody is fighting against each other, but, on the other hand, it has become extremely straightforward. Judging by his interview with Rossiyskaya Gazeta and other Russian media, the country's president, Bashar al-Asad, holds the latter view. The only acceptable position is to engage in an all-out conflict with the terrorists, a common enemy, and after the victory to decide how relations will be built within Syrian society and with neighbours and partners. Today, when the country is fighting for survival, this is all that matters, with everything else having to make way. And it is especially inappropriate to engage in bargaining over terms, rights, and powers....

"For public consumption, this is quite an obvious position, and there probably can be no other one. But it is a question whether this can be a genuine political course, given that modern-day Syria, or rather, the space it formally occupies today, is not homogenous at all.

"Damascus is facing a task of enormous complexity. It needs to push back ISIL, which threatens the country with physical extermination. Or, to be more realistic, it needs to stop it and prevent it from expanding its area of control further. But at the same time, it needs to work on consolidating society and the territory under the official government's control, especially as that is where the majority of the population lives.

"It is most likely that the Syria that Hafiz al-Asad bequeathed to his son no longer exists and will never do. The Middle East has entered a period of rapid and violent transformation and its political map will not be the same as the one drawn in the 20th century. It means that a responsible leader needs to weigh up various options, including the possibility of another configuration for his country and another model of governance. The experience of Middle East democracy has proved to be devastating, but a return to the 'good old' authoritarian systems is not possible either. The whole world is now dealing with the same task, irrespective of the social and political system or the country, which is how to combine working institutions with strong personal leadership. Without the second element, both would stall and be ineffective. But finding the balance is proving elusive.

"Naturally, the Middle East and, above all, Syria, which is at war, are quite a special case. But that is precisely why war alone is insufficient. It is vital that we create things that will be there after the victory. It is not by chance that the talks on the future structure of the world began in the middle of World War II when it was not quite clear yet when and how it would end. The universal and undeniable nature of the threat did not stop diplomatic bargaining taking place in advance. And those fighting together against Nazism realized that at the next stage there would be no unifying threat and a 'game of thrones' would start again."

Konstantin Kosachev, head of the Federation Council Committee on International Affairs:

"Reading Bashar al-Asad's interview, I was again convinced that those demonizing the Syrian president and his government have definitely chosen the wrong target. Of course, Syria is a country with its own internal development problems, and no-one is idealizing the state of affairs in it. On many issues, Al-Asad's government deserves criticism, and quite severe criticism, and I know that such criticism can be heard, including as part of our bilateral contacts at various levels. But Bashar al-Asad is a responsible leader who is carrying out the mission of national leader entrusted to him by voters. In this sense, his efforts to support law and order and protect the constitutional system should not be raising questions. He acts within his powers as head of state.

"Western countries questioning the legitimacy of Al-Asad's regime and wanting him to be removed from power by force, perhaps not openly, but definitely covertly, view the ISIL extremists and militants as their allies in the task of ousting the head of Syria. This is a very dangerous situation because the West definitely sees ISIL as its assistant. But ISIL acts according to its own script and increasingly this script cannot be controlled by anyone - neither those who created this organization nor those who are encouraging its activities. If this trend continues, the case will certainly not be limited to the fate of Bashar al-Asad's regime. This will have a domino effect that will initially impact other countries in the region and eventually reach Europe, Russia, and the United States. We are resolutely fighting such trends, which includes our using all available legitimate methods to support the existing system in Syria."

Vladimir Isayev, professor at the Institute of Asian and African Studies of Moscow State University, orientalist.

"Judging by what Syrian President Bashar al-Asad said in his interview, Syria will continue to confront the terrorists from ISIL and other groups that are fighting official Damascus. It should be noted at the same time that the Syrian president raised the possibility of talks with the moderate opposition, especially stressing in this connection the role of the Moscow summits, specifically the meeting of the Syrian opposition held in the Russian capital in spring this year, so-called Moscow 2, as well as Moscow 3, which is currently being planned.

"It should also be noted that Syria is a patchwork that is currently on the brink of not surviving. A significant part of the country has been seized by various terrorists, field commanders, and armed opposition groups, which, of course, makes it very difficult to establish order in the country.

"Of course, there is a widespread view in the West that Al-Asad should go and everything will then be sorted out and peace will arrive after more than four years of civil war. However, I do not believe that the resignation of the current president will lead to such changes. To emerge from civil war is generally a task that is far more difficult than it may appear to be from outside. In this connection, I would like to note that there are two approaches to a settlement in Syria. The American approach is simple: Al-Asad is the problem. As soon as he leaves, all the warring opposition groups will unite and attack the terrorists of ISIL, Jabhat al-Nusra, and the like.

"The Russian approach is different: Moscow is proposing that a coalition be established to fight the radicals. This coalition should include all countries that are, in one way or another, affected by the conflict in Syria, that is Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Jordan and so on. Only after that should Syria organize extensive democratic processes, such as elections and a nationwide referendum. The Syrian people will then decide who should lead the country. It seems that the Russian approach is far more realistic than the one being proposed by the United States and its allies.

"It should be noted that Al-Asad's immediate departure would be a huge problem, and not just for Syria, but also for the whole world. Look at who is confronting ISIL today? This is primarily the Syrian army and Kurdish units known as Peshmerga. And the Syrian army fights, among others, for Al-Asad. Soldiers go into battle for him. If Syria loses its current president, this will lead to the army being demoralized and, consequently, the stepping up of attacks by the militants, who, in this case, may very soon penetrate neighbouring Jordan and Lebanon. As for the role that Bashar al-Asad's interview with Russian media can play, it is unlikely to influence the decisions of Western politicians. They are involved in a double or triple game, so you cannot catch them out with things like this. But the interview can show the international community that there is a viewpoint different from the one being promoted by the West."

Oleg Peresypkin, director of Oriental studies at the Russian Foreign Ministry's Diplomatic Academy:

"The question of Bashar al-Asad remaining president was and will in the future be decided by the Syrian people. If the Syrian opposition does not like him so much, it should not be complaining to the governments of other countries, but should instead agree to stand in elections in Syria. If the majority supports it, it means that the opposition is right. If not, it means that people do not support its demands. I would like to note that in his interview with Russian media, Al-Asad spoke of an uncompromising struggle only against the terrorists of ISIL and similar organizations that are not Syrian. As for the opposition, even the armed opposition, throughout the past few years Damascus has been proposing that they get down to the negotiating table and reach peace agreements.

"As far as the current influx of refugees into Europe is concerned, Al-Asad said in his interview that 'the West is crying for the refugees while supporting the terrorists from the very start of the crisis'. And those fleeing the war will return if there is peace. But the trouble is that the West does not give the Near and Middle East the chance to live peacefully."

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 #26
Moscow Times
September 22, 2015
Why Russia Is Expanding Its Naval Base in Syria
By Matthew Bodner

The Russian military is expanding its tiny naval facility at Tartus on the Syrian coast to handle bigger warships and transport vessels amid a general buildup of Russian forces in territory controlled by Syrian President Bashar Assad, the Kommersant newspaper reported Monday, citing military sources.

The news broke as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu flew with his military and intelligence chiefs to Moscow on Monday to meet with President Vladimir Putin and discuss ways to prevent accidental clashes of Russian and Israeli forces operating in Syria.

Russia in recent weeks has wrong-footed Israel, the U.S. and Europe by beefing up its supply of military hardware to the Syrian government. News reports have alleged that Russia has deployed forces such as Su-30 fighter jets, tanks, armored vehicles and troops to a government-controlled airfield in Latakia.

To better sustain and supply both its own forces and the Syrian government's, Russia has deployed some 1,700 military specialists to its small naval repair station at Tartus, 90 kilometers to the south of Latakia - a dramatic increase in personnel at a facility that until recently was staffed by a handful of military men and civilian contractors, Kommersant reported.

"They are outfitting and guarding the facility, and are restructuring the dock," an unidentified soldier stationed at Tartus told Kommersant, adding that the specialists should be rotated out of Syria in three months.

This was confirmed by an unidentified source in Russia's General Staff, the military's highest command authority, Kommersant reported. The General Staff source said that the expansion of Tartus into a full-scale naval base was not connected with any imminent Russian intervention in Syria's civil war.

Instead, after its expansion, "[Tartus] will simply be able to accommodate first- and second-rank ships from the Russian Mediterranean flotilla," the source said, referring to the Russian designation for ships ranging in size from large cruisers to destroyers and large landing ships and transports.

This points to a two-pronged vision for the future of Russia's Syrian naval outpost - currently Russia's only pit-stop in the Mediterranean, said Dr. Theodore Karasik, a UAE-based military and geopolitical expert.

"The Russian port in Tartus, although small, is a main entry point for Russian equipment to support the Syrian government," Karasik said. "[However], Russia seeks to expand Tartus not only because of the required throughput necessary to help the Syrian government, but also to increase Moscow's presence in the eastern Mediterranean."

Historical Foothold

As the destination of the so-called Syrian Express - a Russian naval supply route from the Black Sea Fleet headquarters in Sevastopol - Tartus has long served as a kind of beachhead for Russian arms and equipment deliveries to Syria.

Moscow has since 1956 supplied weapons to the Syrian government, and by 1991, the total value of Soviet arms deliveries to Damascus had reached $26 billion, according to Kommersant. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, arms sales have continued, though their value is unclear.

Heavy equipment such as Bastion coastal defense missiles, T-80 battle tanks, and Su-27 fighters have been delivered to the Syrian government since 2010, Kommersant reported, citing an unidentified source at state arms export agency Rosoboronexport.

Tartus has been an entry point for Russian arms deliveries to Syria since 1971, when it was leased to Moscow, but the base was doubly significant for serving as a home away from home for the Soviet Mediterranean flotilla.

But this ended with the fall of the Soviet Union, when the Russian military was forced to retrench, and the 1990s saw the scale of operations at Tartus drastically diminish.

"It hasn't been used much, nor has it been properly renovated," said Yury Barmin, a Russian expert in the Middle East arms trade and politics. "Tartus can't accommodate any of the major Russian warships, which is why upgrading it makes sense."

By the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Tartus was manned by only a handful of Russian military servicemen and civilian contractors, and the single remaining floating dock could only receive the smallest of Russia's ocean-going vessels.

Russia has been looking to rebuild its presence at Tartus since at least 2010, when the former head of the navy Vladimir Vysotsky unveiled plans to equip the facility to handle ships as big as Russia's aircraft carrier the Admiral Kuznetsov.

That work was meant to be completed by 2012, and be carried out in two phases - first, establishing a military base, and then expanding the naval facilities. The breakout of the Syrian civil war stifled these plans, and only now that Russia is stepping up support for Assad's regime have they been dusted off.

"The base would offer Russian military equipment easy access to Syria, because right now Russian landing ships primarily use the port at [nearby] Latakia, a province under constant rebel offensive," Barmin said.

Russia's decision to overhaul the Tartus facility and expand it into a naval base for larger vessels speaks not only to Moscow's intention to provide significant levels of military aid to the Syrian government, but make good on its promise to project power into the Mediterranean.

In July, Russia announced updates to its national naval doctrine that called for a return to more frequent patrols and operations in areas such as the Mediterranean, where the Soviet Union once had a formidable presence.

But in order to support these operations, which will be conducted by the Black Sea Fleet out of Sevastopol, with occasional support from the Northern Fleet, Russia needs ports in the Mediterranean to dock ships for refueling and maintenance.

"Expanding the Tartus facility and turning it into a naval base would provide the Russian fleet with a logistical advantage sparing it constant trips back to the Black Sea through the Bosphorus," Barmin said.

Although Tartus appears to be the primary focus, it isn't the only place that Russia is looking to base its ships, Karasik said.

"Already, the Russian Defense Ministry is deep into making plans for other ports around the Mediterranean, notably in North Cyprus, but also maritime access in Egypt, in Libya under a new national government, Greece and perhaps Italy," Karasik said.

"Clearly, the Kremlin seeks a maritime hub system in the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Oman," Karasik added.

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 #27
The Unz Review
www.unz.com
September 20, 2015
Syrian Civil War 101
By Anatoly Karlin
[Graphics here http://www.unz.com/akarlin/syrian-civil-war-101/]

I admit to not having been following the Syrian Civil War anywhere near as closely the war in the Donbass.

But with recent rumors of stepped up Russian involvement now being confirmed by videos - and even talk of China possibly sending troops (crazy, but a year ago you'd have said the same of Russians) - it is well past time to remedy this.

The first thing I like to do when it comes to getting up to speed on some conflict or other is studying maps. Just looking at them for an hour or two. Wikipedia has a very impressive data gathering operation that gets updated in real time. In combination with this article listing the military histories for all the major cities and towns you can get a very good idea of the ebb and flow of the conflict through time. Arguably, this is far more useful than reading any number of editorials on the subject.

Some patterns immediately jump out.

(1) The pattern of regime, FSA/Al-Nusra and ISIS control correlate exceedingly well with the ethnic and religious composition of the geographic areas in question. The coastal Alawite heartlands of Tartus and Latakia, corresponding to the old borders of the eponymous state, are near totally secure. Shi'ite and Christian minorities, such as the Druze, Assyrians, and Armenians, correlate with pockets of regime support - even the Armenian pocket around Deir es-Zor in the desert each of the country, still holding out despite being completely surrounded by the Islamic State. In contrast, Palmyra fell to ISIS this year despite being more than 150km from the nearest area of ISIS control at Kabajeb. Suweida, populated by Dzuze and other minorities, is under Assad's control in the far south, while neighboring Daraa - entirely Arab Sunni - is held by the FSA.

All this just goes to show the extent to which this is an ethnic, tribalistic war, where the "normal" rules of military theory - where force concentrations are king, and surrounded pockets get liquidated fast - don't apply as they do even in the Donbass War. I suspect and nothing I've read about Syria contradicts this that this is ultimately due to the very low combat effectiveness of Arab armies. Unlike Europeans or East Asians, who have a long tradition of nation-statehood and conscript armies, the Arabs as a people only fight well for clan and God. A dictator like Saddam Hussein or Assad can force them to fight, but not very well or enthusiastically, while a democracy can barely do anything at all - see how ISIS once steamrolled their way to the outskirts of Baghdad, even though the Iraqi forces are armed with modern US equipment that the Syrian Arab Army can only dream about). This has the effect of depressing the value of conventional military power, with the result that warfare becomes a lot like urban gang warfare, just with much fancier military toys and more rape and ethnic cleansing. In this kind of "4GW" confrontrations, the fact that rebel groups and ISIS are much more enthusiastic, more combat effective (due to fighting for clan and/or God instead of a country whose lines were drawn by the French and British), and have the option of blending in with the civilian population in areas where they enjoy support allows them to level out the military capital (tanks, artillery, etc.) superiority of the SAA. Even the SAA has over the past few years bowed to these realities and become much more of a homogenous (primarily Alawite) force and come to rely less on unmotivated conscripts and more on the locally-rooted National Defense Forces.

(2) The pattern of control also tallies very well with support for Assad in opinion polls (to a large extent this will of course be an ethnic/religious confound). No area in which Assad has more than 60% support is there a very serious rebel threat. In areas where he has less than 40% support, there is either very intensive fighting or the area is entirely ruled by an opposing faction. Aleppo, the "Stalingrad" of the conflict, registers 39% support for Assad; Idleb, in between Aleppo and Alawite Latakia - and the scene of major rebel successes this year, with just a small regime garrison continuing to hold out in the Shi'ite villages around Fu'ah - registers just 9% support for Assad. Nowin fairness, opinion polls have to be treated with some caution in Syria, because none of the warring factions is exactly very nice to visible dissenters. Still, the fact that Assad registers 27% support in ISIS ruled territories, while the FSA registers 15% in areas held by the government - as opposed to near 0% in both cases - does imply that the fear of speaking one's mind at least privately is far from total throughout Syria.

(3) More generally, many Western media propaganda/neocon talking points immediately become hollow through this simply map-viewing exercise.

For instance, the idea that Assad isn't interested in fighting ISIS, or even that he is in some sort of alliance with them. Where the areas under Assad's control and ISIS border each other, there is intense fighting, e.g. an entire frontline on the approach to Al Salamiyah behind which lie Homs and Hama, and the struggle to relieve the surrounded Kweiris airbase. But by far the biggest challenges the legitimate Syrian government faces right now lies in the areas of Idlib and Aleppo, which apart from being large territories under JaN and FSA control also splinter SAA forces and constitute a conduit for Turkish arms supplies to other rebel formations throughout the country. Focusing attention on this area is just military common sense - and its not like there is any cardinal moral difference between Al Nusra and ISIS anyway (Al Nusra just doesn't act axe-crazy for the cameras).

Another common talking point that has been raised especially since Russia stepped up its involvement is the claim that Assad's forces have killed far more Syrians than ISIS. The aim is quite transparent: Since ISIS has so ably demonized itself, associating Assad with them by way of quantitative comparison should be pretty easy to do. And I think it mostly works. I see a lot of people in comments sections raising this point in in that really smarmy, pretentious way that the more intelligent American imperialists adopt to come off as "smart" and "balanced." Entirely absent of course is context:

-That the SAA is fighting long, grinding campaigns primarily in the heavily built up, urbanized areas of the North-West, while ISIS specialized more in blitzes, typically moving in when its adversaries become mutually exhausted. The latter type of warfare will inevitably produce fewer civilian casualties, regardless of the mass executions and slave markets that ISIS sets up afterwards. But its certainly not account of any greater moral superiority or legitimacy; quite the contrary, in fact.

-That there is no chance of the SAA getting "smart weapons." Meanwhile, its relative preponderance in military capital - artillery, tanks, helicopter gunships, etc. - is the one thing it has going for it. Since the average SAA soldier is far less motivated and combat effective than his Al Nusra or ISIS counterpart (see above) and since they cannot blend into the civilian population as the various rebels can, of course the SAA has no choice but to make use of its superior firepower so as to least keep up with if not overwhelm the enemy. Not doing so would not only be criminal towards its own soldiers, many more of whom would otherwise die. The question would also quickly become entirely moot since if the SAA was to go soft it would also be quickly defeated, with tragic consequences for the Shi'ite and Christian minorities it is still heroically protecting.

-The not completely irrelevant point that ISIS openly and proudly commits all sort of atrocities harkening in spirit all the way back to the methods of the Assyrian Empire. In contrast, the great bulk of SAA "casualties" are collateral damage from military actions, and even when it comes to the dirty but necessary task of rooting out Islamist sympathizers - who would otherwise tell SAA coordinates to ISIS or Al Nusra, or suicide bomb themselves to ease their advance - it is something that the Syrian regime does in shadowy basements, where any such actions properly belong. For those who still want to play the numbers game, in what way in particular is this different from, say, US methods in Vietnam? (With the exception that it was a voluntary intervention, whereas Assad is merely defending his own country.

Now in fairness I do know that the neocons have a narrative to keep up and so do their shills in the media, like Michael Weiss who is constantly agitating for aggressive actions to overthrow both Putin and Assad and enjoys huge influence in the media despite having zero knowledge of either Russian or Arabic. Same goes for their dupes and bots on the comments sections. But anyone else seriously arguing that Assad is on a level with ISIS has all of this to address first.

(4) A single, 153km road separates Palmyra from Kabajeb, the nearest ISIS-controlled area to Palmyra prior to the month-long offensive in July 2015 that led to its capture and other tragic consequences. This area looks like it could be used to film a Mad Max sequel. It should also be exceedingly easy for anyone with a competent airforce with air superiority to make mincemeat of any attack along this route. To the contrary, the kind of out-in-the-open, logistically challenging, and lengthy ISIS operation that should have been one of the easiest to forestall went on right ahead, successfully.

So why didn't the US with its vaunted air campaign against ISIS do anything?

Because ultimately it is entirely fine with ISIS making advances when it is at the expense of the regime. This is not too surprising, since ISIS is after America's baby and destabilizing Assad is its entire raison d'etre - as declassified Pentagon documents, Wikileaks, and the intuitions of Syrians themselves have proved over the past few months.

Plus, ISIS is better than Assad anyway. Look at all the hundreds of articles making this point they can't all be wrong.

The US has an air campaign that is supposedly fast "degrading" ISIS, but there is no evidence of it making any kind of dent in its military capabilities. From its unconditional demands to have Assad step down to its attempts to pressure its NATO allies to block airspace to Russian planes carrying military aid to Syria (Bulgaria obliged, Greece didn't) the US cannot be considered a sincere partner in wishing peace upon Syria. And that will remain the case so long as the US continues to be ruled by the neocon agenda, even if the actual neocons are now mostly out of power.

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 #28
The National Interest
September 20, 2015
Russian Involvement and a Redirection of Policy on Syria
By Paul R. Pillar
Paul R. Pillar is Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University and Nonresident Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution.  He is a contributing editor to The National Interest, where he writes a blog.

The recently increased Russian involvement in Syria ought to be viewed as an opportunity, more so than as a threat or as something that needs to be countered. Although Moscow's current involvement is only an extension of its longtime relationship with the Syrian regime, it represents just enough of a change to serve as the closest thing we are likely to have to a peg on which to hang some needed rethinking about the Syrian conflict. The need for such rethinking is reflected in the fact that everyone, including the Obama administration, seems to recognize that the current trajectory of this civil war is unpropitious, notwithstanding disagreements over what to do about the situation.

The most important principle in any revision of policy toward the war needs to be that the untoward effects of this war will be ameliorated only insofar as peace is established in Syria, or as close as Syrians and the international community can come to establishing something passing for peace. It is the continuation of the war, much more than any particular outcome of the war or any particular political configuration of Syria, that is the source of most of the trouble that is worth worrying about.

This is true of at least three major types of trouble. One is the possible spread, quite possibly inadvertent, of instability and combat beyond Syria's borders. The war has, for example, increased the chance of a new war between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah, given Hezbollah's substantial involvement in the Syrian war and Israel's reactions to Hezbollah activity in Syria.

A second problem is the increase in violent extremism, as represented chiefly but not entirely by the so-called Islamic State or ISIS. It was the outbreak of the Syria war that enabled ISIS to spread its activity, suddenly and significantly, beyond its birthplace in Iraq. This should not be surprising; physical chaos and power vacuums have long been favorable ground for terrorist and other extremist groups.

A third problem, which has become the chief crisis of the day for Europe as well as an issue for the United States, is the surge of migrants fleeing the war for the West.

The needed focus on tamping down the war, rather than trying to tilt the outcome of it at the risk of further escalation, requires getting away from at least three unhelpful patterns of thought that have prevailed in discussion and debate about Syria. One is the dictum that "Assad must go." Note that the aforementioned varieties of trouble stem not from the mere existence of the Assad regime but instead from the war that emerged from confrontation between the regime and its opponents. That is true of any spillover of armed conflict across international borders. It is true also of the expansion of ISIS outside Iraq, which occurred only after the Syrian war got under way. And it certainly is true of the migration of refugees. However much the migrants coming from Syria may have disliked the regime, it was only the physical danger and disruption of war that motivated any significant numbers of them to undertake perilous journeys to Europe.

The Assad regime certainly has many undesirable and even despicable characteristics-but so do many other regimes elsewhere in the world, and despicability alone is not grounds for escalating an internal war to try to influence the result. We also should note that some of the most despicable things this regime has been doing are, again, part of the war itself and do not predate the war. Before the war began, the regime was not indiscriminately barrel-bombing civilian neighborhoods.

Those who are especially solicitous about Israel should also note that Israel had enjoyed decades of relative stability along the Golan front with the devil the Israelis know, the Assad regime. It is only with the war in Syria and the loss of regime control of parts of that front that significant and immediate security questions related to Syria have more recently arisen for Israel.

The perpetuation of the Assad-must-go mentality is rooted in notions, found most conspicuously in neoconservative and liberal interventionist thinking, about democratization and liberalization being one-way processes and likely to result from any stirring of a political pot. This thinking has come to be applied especially to the Middle East because of the vain hopes attached to the neocon project known as the Iraq War and because of more broadly held hopes of what would come from the Arab Spring. Another root, given the alliance between Damascus and Tehran, is the idea that anything associated with Iran must be bad. Neither of these roots provides a realistic basis for formulating policy toward the Syrian war.

The one respect in which one could plausibly argue that the very character of the Assad regime is a basis for instability and the border-crossing consequences that can result from it is that the sort of authoritarian rule the regime represents will never be the foundation for political consensus in the way that Western liberal democracies know it. But that is a long-term consideration. Right now there is a fire to be contained; discussion of what sort of political arrangements might be kindling for fires in the future is, for the time being, a digression.

Probably the one possible development that is most likely to make the chaotic Syrian situation even more chaotic, as some members of the U.S. Congress evidently have come to recognize, would be a collapse of the regime with an ensuing political and administrative vacuum. A similar recognition may underlie recent comments from the Obama administration suggesting that, although the administration cannot bring itself to abandon the Assad-must-go formulation, the timing of his departure is negotiable.

Another unhelpful pattern has been persistence of the unfounded faith in developing a "moderate" opposition with enough unity and armed clout to be the nucleus of a force that would defeat both the regime and ISIS. If earlier events had not been enough to do away with that faith, then surely it ought to be dispelled by the embarrassing acknowledgment the other day by the top U.S. military commander for the region that the number of fighters that the United States has been able to put into the fray for this purpose can be counted on the fingers of one hand. The reason for this result is not perverse foot-dragging by the administration. One reason for it is the unresolved tension between the objectives of fighting the regime and fighting ISIS. Another reason is the inherent difficulty of vetting "moderates" amid a civil war, the waging of which is an inherently immoderate act. (And if some fighter who had passed through a U.S.-supported vetting, training, and equipping program were later, say, to be involved in a terrorist attack against a U.S. target, some U.S. critics pushing now to expand such programs more rapidly would not hesitate to lambaste the administration for that terrorist result.) Assertions of a woulda coulda shoulda variety, as one finds in the incessant drum-beating about Syria by the Washington Post editorial page, that if only a program to develop a moderate force had been implemented earlier with more gusto the result today would be better, is cheap talk that is unsubstantiated either by the experience of either this civil war or other ones.

With the latest Russian moves another unhelpful thought pattern comes into play, which is the tendency to view any Russian activism or extension of influence abroad as undesirable and something to be countered. This tendency is firmly rooted in old Cold War habits and has infused much thinking about other matters involving Russia, including in Europe. A corrective to this tendency, as far as the Middle East is concerned, is to reflect on how vastly different the Cold War circumstances were from what prevails today. Beginning with the financing of the Aswan high dam in the 1950s, the USSR was making major inroads in the Middle East, not only in Syria but in Egypt, Iraq, Libya, South Yemen, and elsewhere. The Soviet activity had implications for strategic postures as well the global ideological competition. That activity was worth worrying about, and worth countering. But today Russia is not a superpower, there is not a global ideological competition with Moscow, and the Russian presence in Syria pales in comparison with the much broader U.S. posture, including military posture, in the Middle East.

There has been much speculation about Vladimir Putin's motives underlying the latest Russian moves in Syria. Of course we should not necessarily take what his government says at face value, and of course not all of the Russian motives are congruent with U.S. interests. But the situation regarding Syria is not zero-sum, and the United States needs to be open to ways in which the Russian posture, even with underlying motives divergent from our own, may help to bring closer possibilities for ameliorating the Syrian mess.

One thing that enhanced Russian involvement in Syria means is that Russia will be absorbing more of costs, and more of the opprobrium associated with collateral damage, from efforts that involve at least in part the containment of ISIS. To the extent this shifts some of a burden from the United States, that is a good thing. Russian aims are surely not purely anti-ISIS aims, but Russia has at least as much reason to worry about the group as the United States does. The United States has no equivalent to the concentrated, predominantly Muslim populations of the North Caucasus.

Another thing the Russian involvement means is that Moscow, to limit the extent and duration of its own costs, has that much more of a stake in stabilizing Syria and in tamping down the conflict sooner rather than later. A further implication is that greater Russian support for the Assad regime may yield greater Russian leverage over that regime with regard to any moves toward peace.

An overall conclusion is that the Russian moves mark an appropriate occasion for U.S. policy toward Syria to pivot away from feckless attempts to engineer a particular military outcome on the ground and toward greater emphasis on multilateral diplomacy aimed at finding a political resolution of the conflict. Russia will necessarily be heavily involved in any such effort. Talks between U.S. and Russian defense ministers for purposes of military deconfliction on the ground are fine, but talks between the foreign ministers will be even more important. Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Iran also will necessarily be fully involved. None of this implies that the prospects for a political resolution of this war any time soon, even apart from the ISIS problem, are very bright; they aren't. The apparent intractability of some of the positions taken by rebel groups, even as they accept in principle a political solution, are discouraging. But exploring every opportunity for diminishing the current fire in Syria is more likely to ameliorate the problems this conflict has caused than will adding more fuel to the fire.        

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#29
http://readrussia.com
September 18, 2015
Why Russia's Intervention in Syria Is Doomed to Failure
By Mark Adomanis

Ever since Syria exploded into violence in the aftermath of the "Arab Spring" (which despite the enormously high hopes it initially generated has spawned precisely one democracy and double the number of vicious civil wars) the Russian government has spoken endlessly of the ills of intervention. Bombing Syria, the Russians said, would only further splinter the already weak foundations of the Syrian state, and make a Hobbesian war of all against all a virtual inevitability.

Yes there was some naked self-interest contained within these missives, there is always some degree of naked self-interest in government pronouncements, but on the whole the Russian arguments seemed much more compelling than the hawkish, Western ones. I still can't quite understand how, after Kosovo, Iraq, Libya, and a host of other "humanitarian interventions," the lessons hasn't yet sunk in, the but track record is crystal clear: if your goal is to bring order, peace, and stability, to a particular country, the use of military force is one of the very worst options.

Hawks now claim that Libya was a disaster not because Europe intervened in a conflict it didn't understand and, ultimately, didn't care that much about, but because it "ignored" it (if dropping that quantity of ordnance on Libya was "ignoring" it, what would qualify as paying attention?). It's the sort of rhetorical trick often played by socialists and radical leftists: the only reason our policy failed is because it wasn't really tried.  

Other disastrous interventions are not even recognized as such: Kosovo is still almost universally considered a "success" in elite foreign policy circles because the Serbs left quickly and because NATO didn't suffer any casualties. If Kosovo was actually a success, though, someone forgot to tell the Kosovars: almost two decades after being saved by the West, they are fleeing for Europe in record numbers and their homeland remains crippled by poverty, corruption, and pervasive government dysfunction.

The unfortunate reality is that armed interventions, even the "successful" ones, have everywhere left a trail of chaos and disorder. Part of this is due to the nature of armed force itself. Bombs are pretty good at blowing stuff up, much less so at building lasting political institutions.

It is also partly because, due to technological advancement, the West has increasingly been able to intervene in armed conflicts without taking any real risks. Fifty years ago, even a campaign of "limited airstrikes" carried genuine dangers for the side doing the bombing. Now, in an era of stealth planes and smart bombs, NATO countries face little credible threat from the air defense forces of second and third-rate militaries. This means that the West finds itself party to conflicts in which it doesn't have any real interest but in which it feels it can "do something" with little or no cost.

This is all a somewhat long-winded way of saying that recent experience shows that the Russian government's previous position of skepticism regarding the efficacy of military force is largely the right one. Perhaps there is a possible case in which war would quickly and cheaply make a situation better, but in the real world it seems that military intervention makes already-serious problems even worse.

There is no reason whatsoever to expect that the above rules will not apply to Russia's escalating intervention in Syria! Russia's position on intervention was right not because it was Russian but because...well, because the balance of the evidence supported it. Now that the Russians have adopted precisely the opposite position, they are just as wrong as the West was before. Intervening in Syria is bad when the Saudis do it, it's bad when the Turks do it, and it's equally bad when the Russians do it.

There are times where one looks at Russian statecraft and imagines that, at some point over the past two years, there was a meeting in the Kremlin at which the leadership came to a collective decision "to just say screw it." After vociferously arguing against intervention in Syria for the better part of three years, the Russian Foreign Ministry will now have to, at a moment's notice, defend precisely the position that they previously attacked. Somehow the Kremlin has deluded itself that such an abrupt volte face won't make them look like total morons.

Even if it wanted to fundamentally alter the course of the war (the actual goal seems to be the creation of an Alawite-dominated rump state on the Mediterranean coast) Russia completely lacks the means to do so. It can only exacerbate a situation that borders on the nightmarish.

Let me as blunt as I can: Russia's intervention in Syria is doomed to failure. The only question is how much money will be wasted, how many Russian servicemen will die, and how much worse an already-disastrous situation becomes before the Kremlin realizes this.

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 #30
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Russian diplomat interviewed on proliferation and arms control

Text of "Director of the Foreign Ministry Department for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Mikhail Ulyanov's interview with the Rossiya Segodnya International Information Agency, 18 September 2015" in English by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website on 21 September

Question: What can you say about US statements on the missile defence issue in Europe after the Vienna agreements on Iran's Nuclear Programme (INP)?

Answer: This is total guile based on mala fide, unconvincing arguments. Judging by the regular statements of US officials on this issue, Washington is out to convince the public in the world and especially in NATO countries that there is no link between the settlement on the INP and the US missile defence programme and that the latter should continue to be carried out in full.

The idea is completely unjustified. To begin with, we remember well that, speaking in Prague on April 5, 2009, US President Barack Obama said: "If the Iranian threat is eliminated, we will have a stronger basis for security, and the driving force for missile defence construction in Europe will be removed." Now the emphasis is being misplaced and we hear that the US leader had in mind not only nuclear but also missile aspects of the issue, which are not covered by the INP agreements. However, the real missile threat to Europe, about which Washington is talking, could have only existed in conjunction with weapons of mass destruction - nuclear, chemical and biological arms.

Meanwhile, Iran is a bona fide participant in conventions banning chemical and biological arms. Nobody, including the United States, has any grievances against Iran in this respect. As for nuclear arms, as the US Administration is rightly saying itself, any related threats are effectively removed by the INP comprehensive accords. Hence, there are no dangers linked with weapons of mass destruction.

Using missiles with conventional warheads against European countries would be an absolute military absurdity. Moreover, no one can explain the reasons for the apprehensions about Iran's potential missile strikes on European capitals. It is abundantly clear that Tehran does not have the slightest motives in this regard. This is why this issue is carefully avoided and "Iran's missile threat" is presented as an axiomatic fact that does not need any justification.

Furthermore, Iran does not pose any threat to Europe even for purely technical reasons. The maximum range of Iranian missiles does not exceed 2,000 km and there is no indication that Iran plans to extend it. Even if Iran had such intentions, it would not be able to implement them without outside assistance.

It would be appropriate to mention in this context that for many years sanctions against Iran have envisaged a de facto ban on the transfer of missile technology to it. The sanctions will be lifted in several months, but serious restrictions in this area will remain under the INP comprehensive agreements.

In the next eight years, supplies related to missile technology will only be allowed by a separate resolution of the UN Security Council, and always on a case-to-case basis. There is no doubt that if Iran applies for any supplies that may help it boost its missile potential, the United States will not hesitate to use its right of veto.

Considering all of these circumstances, we have solid grounds to assume that these insinuations on the issue of "Iran's missile threat" are merely a cover-up for implementing a project, the real aim of which is to undermine Russia's nuclear deterrence and to involve European allies in long-term confrontation with Russia, which, in all probability, meets US interests.

Question: What can you tell us about the role of the IAEA in implementing the Iran agreements? How does Russia interact with the agency in this matter?

Answer: The IAEA has been assigned a key role in the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to settle the Iranian nuclear programme issue. The Agency is entrusted with a priority task - to guarantee the absence of undeclared nuclear material and nuclear activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran, and thus to confirm the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. We have always advocated using the agency to do this rather than the Six or someone else, because of the IAEA's unique expertise, history of experience and recognized authority. It's important that this approach has been set forth in the JCPOA.

The IAEA will have several objectives including monitoring Iran's compliance with its obligations within the JCPOA and interacting with the Joint Commission of the Six plus Iran. They will regularly report to the agency's Board of Governors and send the reports to the UNSC. The agency's reports and conclusions will be the basis for lifting the sanctions against Iran.

It is of considerable importance that Tehran has agreed to apply an additional protocol to the guarantee agreement and the so called modified code 3.1 which are, as we used to reiterate, key to confirming the exclusively peaceful use of Iran's nuclear programme. Apart from that, the number of agency inspectors who will remain at the nuclear facilities on a permanent basis has been increased. Furthermore, they will be equipped with the latest monitoring and verification technology, like, for example, electronic seals and uninterruptable electronic systems for monitoring enrichment levels.

The agreement also includes additional control measures by the IAEA that will cover the total nuclear fuel cycle in Iran starting with uranium ore extraction and through processing.

Moreover, an effective mechanism has been set up for settling disputes related to the agency's access to certain facilities in Iran where hypothetical activities could be underway that are contrary to the JCPOA. This means that in practice, that whenever any reasonable doubt arises in the IAEA regarding the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme, any impediments will be removed to allow the inspectors to access the facilities they need to. The procedures for access authorisation will take less than a month.

It's also significant that Tehran has agreed to clarify with the IAEA any remaining issues relative to Iran's supposed military nuclear research before the end of the year. This will be based on the road map simultaneously signed by Iran and the IAEA under the agreement. So, this issue will also be resolved. All the "white spots" in the history of Iran's programme will be cleared in a satisfactory manner; so both the IAEA and the international community will have a comprehensive and accurate picture as it progresses.

All of these measures will ultimately enhance trust between the Six and Iran in ensuring the complete implementation of the agreement, and will provide a reliable guarantee that any hypothetical efforts by Iran to secretly develop nuclear weapons will be duly recorded by the agency. The purpose of Iran's nuclear programme will be completely understandable and controllable.

Russia is a member of the IAEA, its Board of Governors, as well as a signatory of the JCPOA, and as such, Russia will render the agency any appropriate assistance on the Iranian issue.

Question: What are the prospects for the agreement on the Iranian nuclear programme?

Answer: The prospects for implementation will directly depend on how conscientiously all the parties - and I mean, all the parties, not only Iran - fulfil the obligations they have assumed. We have no reason to doubt that all the parties intend to act in the most responsible manner.

The agreement itself means the political choice in favour of a negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear programme has now been made. Sure, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action's mechanism will take some getting used to, and it will take time for all its parts to adjust to each other and work as an integrated whole. It is understood that there may be setbacks and difficulties. Yet, we are confident that the political will to seek a compromise shown by all participants will mean an efficient effort in solving the possible difficulties during the implementation of the agreement.

Question: Earlier, Russian Ambassador-at-Large Grigoriy Berdennikov said the issue of the Iranian-Russian agreement on sending low-enriched uranium to Russia remains open as the experts work on it. When do you think this agreement will be signed? Could it take place by the end of the year?

Answer: I would not want to comment on the current negotiations on this issue. This would be wrong. I can only say that the work in this regard by Rosatom State Nuclear Energy Corporation and the Atomic Energy Organization in Iran is rather intense. There is a common understanding that the exchange of Iran's low-enriched uranium for natural uranium from Russia is a rather complicated process in terms of the technical and logistics aspects. We do agree with Iran on the approach in terms of what needs to be done to implement this project. These steps are being taken.

As for the specific terms, I can only say that we are making every effort to reach an agreement as soon as possible. There are certain technical aspects though that have to be worked out to make the cooperation go smoothly.

Question: Reports have surfaced in the media saying that some Iranian nuclear experts have visited a number of facilities in Russia to discuss converting the Fordo facility into a production facility for stable isotope. Have these meetings indeed taken place?

Answer: Under the comprehensive agreement on the Iranian nuclear programme, Russia will assist Iran in organizing the production of stable isotopes at the Fordo facility. In this regard, the Iranian specialists arrived in early September to work out the process. We've informed the committee for sanctions about this as required in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. This is all absolutely legal and very much needed as it is an integral part of the deal. The process is underway.

Question: Can we expect further visits by Iran's specialists to Russia?

Answer: I think, as regards our national contribution to the deal, there will be constant contact both in Russia and in Iran. There are several complicated issues. As far as I can see, they are being solved primarily by nuclear industry specialists through Rosatom on our side and the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran in Iran. Apparently, this contact must be maintained as it involves complicated technical issues and some commercial issues.

Question: What is the status of the consultations on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action? Are any dates set for the ministerial P5+1 talks on Iran during the UN General Assembly?

Answer: It is expected that expert consultations in Vienna will take place on September 22. The ministerial P5+1 meeting with Iran's participation has been scheduled for September 28 in New York. The dates could still change.

Question: This summer, the media published excerpts from a report by US General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, according to which there is a possibility of Washington placing land-based missiles in Europe. Russia said it would analyse the information. What conclusions have been made?

Answer: Indeed, we are paying very close attention to the situation around the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) since it is a cornerstone of the current nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.

In this regard, it should be noted that we haven't seen General Dempsey's report but its presentation by the media contains an important condition. Potentially, the US could develop and place the strike systems there if the treaty is no longer valid. US officials publicly claim they are still adhering to the INF. We are in the same position and continue to fulfil our obligations to the letter. So we can't speak accurately about some unspecified US plans or build any apocalyptic scenarios in this context.

Unfortunately, in general, Washington has been trying to lay the blame on somebody else when it comes to the INF. For over a year, we have been under accusations of breaching the treaty while there is no evidence presented either publicly or through diplomatic channels. At the same time, the US is working themselves up about it and ruminating on a possible reaction to our "violations" and "the deployment of prohibited missiles" - basically, a reaction to something that didn't and doesn't exist.

Meanwhile, it is the US that has serious problems with fulfilling the obligations, and these issues have been thoroughly documented. Let me remind you that we are concerned with the trials of ballistic target missiles that imitate intermediate- and short-range missiles; the manufacture and wide use of offensive operations drones that are legally and functionally land-based intermediate-range cruise missiles, as well as the placement of Mark 41 Vertical Launch Systems at the European anti-missile bases that are almost identical to those used by the US Navy to launch Tomahawk cruise missiles. We are constantly raising these issues but our counterparts refuse to discuss them. The US doesn't see it as a violation, full stop. The Americans haven't provided any explanation - specifically, on the launch systems.

Every once in a while, the US returns to "megaphone diplomacy" and publicly accuses Russia of breaching the INF. Last time it happened, twice, at the May conference on nuclear non-proliferation in New York. Both times we gave a pretty harsh response and we will continue to do so, if necessary.

Question: Is Russia implementing any major new arms control initiatives?

Answer: Well, I can tell you, for example, about our initiative on strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).

The Convention, which became effective in 1975, was the first international treaty to prohibit an entire category of weapons of mass destruction. Since then, 173 countries have signed it. But unlike the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the implementation of which is monitored by the contribution of such powerful international organizations as the IAEA and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the BWC is very weak institutionally. It has a small Implementation Support Unit (ISU), which is only staffed by three technical employees based in Geneva. But aside from the organizational aspects, the BWC's terms and processes have not been adjusted to changing realities. No major steps have been taken over the past 40 years to strengthen the Convention apart from the coordination of several confidence-building measures, which many signatory countries don't' follow.

Attempts to change this were made in 1991to 2001, during multilateral talks on drafting a legally binding additional protocol to the BWC, which Russia attended. But progress was stopped by the US in the final stages. The US blow was so strong that it demoralized all the other countries, which became disillusioned and basically withdrew from the talks.

While progress on international treaties stalled, new biotechnologies with a dual potential were being created.

In this situation, Russia has assumed leadership and proposed holding new talks to strengthen the Convention. We've proposed focusing on aspects where consensus achievement is possible. Taking into account the interests of all countries, we have drafted the mandate of the talks, which is a document that outlines the framework and contents to proceed. The Russian delegation submitted this draft at a BWC States Parties' Meeting of Experts in Geneva in August this year.

Our initiative has stirred considerable interest in the member states and the non-governmental expert community. Additional discussions have been scheduled for a BWC States Parties meeting to be held in Geneva on December 14 through18. We plan to submit the final wording of the mandate for the approval of the VIII BWC Review Conference in November 2016. So far, we have been working with all sides concerned to upgrade our initiative in order to gain the broadest possible support for it.

We hope that all the BWC States Parties will use the opportunity offered to them in November 2016 to strengthen this Convention that is vitally important for the biological security of all states and to approve a decision to begin new talks. Russia will participate in these events and promote the earliest possible development of a package of measures to strengthen the Convention and hence to strengthen its own and global biosecurity.

Question: Is the dismantling of the remaining Syrian chemical weapons production facilities making any headway? Information on the number of dismantled hangars differs. What information does Russia have on this? It's rumoured that the experts' access to the facilities slated for destruction has been hindered. Is safety the only reason for this?

Answer: The removal of Syrian chemical weapons facilities is monitored by the OPCW Technical Secretariat. According to the latest data, the OPCW has confirmed the destruction of 10 of the 12 facilities, including all five of the underground facilities and five of the seven aircraft hangars. I'd like to add that all of these were abandoned facilities where special equipment was dismantled in 2013.

Access to the remaining two hangars is complicated because they're in a zone of hostility. This is the only reason they haven't been destroyed yet. And it's impossible to say, for obvious reasons, when it will be possible. Moreover, additional amounts of explosives are necessary to complete the destruction. The international organizations that were to provide them have acquisition problems. Unfortunately, this is the reality of working in Syria amid the ongoing armed conflict. The Damascus government cannot be held responsible for this.

I'd like to add that the chemical demilitarization of Syria will be considered complete when all weapon components and precursors that were removed from the country in 2014 are eliminated under OPCW control. Only one per cent of chemical weapon agents remain to be destroyed. Unfortunately, US commercial company Veolia ES Technical Solutions LLC, which won the OPCW tender and funding, has been unable to complete the process for almost a year, citing technical problems. I have to say this, because the United States used unprecedented pressure against Damascus to hurry the removal of chemical weapon components agents, refusing to take into account any objective difficulties that faced the Syrian government due to the hostilities. But now that the US is lagging behind schedule, it doesn't feel any discomfort, which is more evidence of a double standards policy.

Question: Are there any plans to hold Russian-US consultations on the elimination of chemical weapons production facilities on the sidelines of the anniversary session of the UN General Assembly and on the latest Islamic State chemical attacks?

Answer: As you know, the practical work to ensure the chemical demilitarization of Syria is being conducted under the auspices and with the assistance of the OPCW, a specialized international organization created to eliminate chemical weapons in the world. We are in talks with the United States and other participants in this process within the OPCW framework. There is currently no need to hold additional consultations on this issue at the UN General Assembly session in New York, especially since the chemical demilitarization of Syria is almost complete, and any remaining issues are basically technical.

As for the second part of your question, I can say that we had warned our Western partners long ago about the chemical threat posed by the militants. But they dismissed our warnings and repeatedly blocked our attempts to raise the issue of the need for an international response at the UN Security Council. Now they are finding it more difficult to maintain this stance. Recently, other reports concerning the use of toxic agents as chemical weapons by Islamic State militants and those from other terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq are being received from various sources, including the government sources of various countries.

The use of "chemical weapons" by the Islamists during hostilities has become pervasive, systematic and trans-border, and it's being elevated to a higher technological level. According to current reports, they have already started using chlorine and war gases, including mustard gas (yperite).

The terrorist use of chemical weapons is likely to spread outside Syria and Iraq and, in a worst-case scenario, all over the Middle East. Obviously, the UN Security Council and the OPCW can no longer shy away from the issue of trans-border terrorist activity involving the use of chemical weapons. Thus, we have drafted a Security Council resolution on spreading the mandate of the incipient joint OPCW-UN mechanism for investigating the possible use of chemical weapons in Syria to Iraqi territory. It's likely that this draft document will be needed soon.

Question: What do you think about the current situation with Euro-Atlantic media coverage?

Answer: I see it as an information war against Russia. They are using any pretext to accuse us of any impropriety. By the way, when it turns out that there are no reasons for accusations, they simply let the issue pass in silence.

Here is a new example. In April this year, a British fishing trawler caught a large underwater object off the coast of Northern Ireland. The object did not surface and identify itself in any way. The British press immediately published stories that a Russian submarine had been caught.

However, the British Ministry of Defence told the national Parliament about ten days ago that, judging by the results of an investigation, a British submarine was actually caught after violating certain safety regulations. To the best of my knowledge, unlike in April, it appears that the British press was less interested in the incident this time around.

This is how the Western public is being purposefully persuaded that Russia is allegedly an aggressive and unpredictable country. There are many such examples. So, by all indications, a return to normal relations in the Euro-Atlantic region and the restoration of more or less acceptable mutual trust will be a somewhat long and difficult process.

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#31
BBC
September 22, 2015
Ukraine health officials fear big polio outbreak
By David Stern
BBC News, Kiev

Health officials in Ukraine are gripped by fears of a major polio outbreak, after it was announced this month that the disease had paralysed two children in the south-western region of Trans-Carpathia.

Concerns that the virus could cut a deadly swathe through the country has mobilised officials to launch a national immunisation campaign that would embrace all children up to 10 years old.

The threat has also mobilised international organizations, as well as Bill Gates, whose foundation promotes increased vaccinations worldwide and who spoke to President Petro Poroshenko about the polio danger last week.

Olga and Anatoly Makarenko demonstrate the potential obstacles the campaign could face. They have decided not to vaccinate any of their children - Dima, seven, Ksenia, five, and Varvara, one.

And despite knowing something of polio's effects and reading reports that the virus may have already reached Kiev, they won't change their minds.

Dima, Olga points out, has already suffered a bout of whooping cough. But it was just a bit longer-lasting than a regular cough - showing, she claimed, there were no negative consequences.

"The vaccinations are much more dangerous than the illnesses that they treat," said Olga on a late summer day, as her children joyously romped in a nearby playground.

"Nobody knows how the vaccines were stored," she continued. "No-one knows if the expiration dates were changed. Vaccines are a serious thing. There are conditions for transporting, storing and producing them."

Forgotten disease

They are not alone in their views. Stories abound among the Ukrainian public that children have fallen ill or even died after being immunised.

The fact that some diseases have disappeared from public memory also means that a large number of people are unfamiliar with polio's lethal consequences.

As a result, Ukraine's vaccination rates are the lowest in Europe and the former Soviet Union, and are among the lowest in the world. Less than 14% of one-year-olds have been immunised against polio.

Health experts say that Olga, her husband and other anti-immunisation activists, some of whom include local doctors, are flat-out wrong. There is absolutely nothing wrong with the vaccines used in Ukraine, they say.

"In general, they depend on myths about vaccination," said Dr Tatyana Petrovskaya, head physician at the Our Doctor private health clinic. "These are based on the idea that a child should build up his or her immunities in a natural environment, that the immune system should work itself out by being exposed to illnesses.

"They don't understand how serious these diseases are."

Obstacles to vaccination

The possibility of a major polio outbreak, amid a largely unprotected population of children, has raised the alert among local and international health workers, who say they don't have a moment to lose.

"The situation is really alarming," said Dr Dorit Nitzan, the head of the World Health Organization's Ukrainian office. "We have an outbreak in the country. And every day that passes without vaccinating the children, the risk is getting higher that more and more children will get sick."

The campaign would be both massive and ambitious. Some five million children will be immunised, with those under six years receiving three doses of the oral polio vaccine. In all, more than 11 million vaccinations will need to be administered.

This would be a challenge for most countries under the best of conditions. Ukraine, in contrast, is currently fighting a war against Russian-backed insurgents in its eastern regions and suffering a severe economic depression.

Adding to this is a health system riddled with corruption and decay, a government often hampered by political infighting and a weak, post-Soviet distribution structure.

Schools require all students to be immunised in order to be admitted, but many parents also pay bribes to falsify their children's documents. Officials say they don't know the true figures of how many children have in fact been vaccinated.

As a result, the vaccination campaign - which should start this week - could face difficulties and even fall short. And the virus could then spread beyond Ukraine's borders to regions in Europe where immunisation rates are also low.

"If you do it really timely - three to six months - the country, the children will be saved," said Dr Nitzan. "But this calls for real leadership, a real concentrated and focused effort. Everyone should join hands."

"Otherwise, Ukrainian children and many other European children will be at high risk."

What is polio?

    An infectious disease caused by a virus which invades the nervous system and may cause irreversible paralysis
    It can strike at any age but mainly affects children under five
    Polio vaccine, given multiple times, can protect a child for life

'Situation is tragic'

The WHO and other international groups are calling for Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko to draft a law declaring polio a public health emergency in order to boost the fight against the virus.

This would strengthen Ukrainian officials' hands in dealing with any resistance to the programme. It could also help speed up the purchase of vaccines since, at the moment, only around a third of the needed amount has been obtained.

Ultimately, more cases of polio are inevitable, experts say. The hope is that, with a rapid response, a full-blown crisis can be averted. But given Ukraine's catastrophically low immunisation rates, the chances of a major outbreak at some point are high - maybe inevitable.

"The situation is tragic, whichever way you look at it. If it's going to be now, tomorrow or next month, it's coming," said Dr Nitzan. "And it's coming big time, because children in Ukraine are not immunised against polio and against other diseases.

"We don't have time, so we are going to tell them the truth: 'You are risking your children'," she said, turning again to the specific danger presented by polio.

"Look at your child now," she said. "He might look different for the rest of his or her life."

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#32
Reuters
September 22, 2015
Ukraine rebels offer to postpone local vote: separatist website

KIEV-Pro-Russian rebels proposed on Tuesday postponing the date of local elections in separatist parts of east Ukraine to February 2016 in an effort to lift peacemaking out of "stalemate," according to a statement posted on separatist website LITs.

Under terms of the much-violated Minsk peace agreement, reached in February, local elections were meant to be held in the separatist regions in tandem with the rest of the former Soviet republic this autumn. But the Ukrainian government has since said they cannot take place due to security and monitoring concerns.

The separatists, who have unilaterally declared their own mini-republics, instead scheduled their own ballot for October and November, angering Kiev which said it would not recognize the results.

Vladislav Deinego, the separatist envoy to peace talks, said that to "get the process out of stalemate" rebel officials were prepared to push back the date of elections to Feb. 21.

The statement was posted online before a meeting between representatives of the separatists, Ukraine and Russia, under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

On Monday, President Petro Poroshenko criticized separatist plans for independent local balloting in October and November. "These aren't elections, they're not free, they will not meet the standards of the OSCE. This directly and severely contradicts the Minsk agreements," he said.

It was not clear from Deinego's statement whether the new elections proposed by the separatists would be carried out under Ukrainian supervision. Kiev says this is necessary for them to be valid.

In the past, Ukrainian and rebel forces have blamed each other for repeated ceasefire breaches but both sides are now broadly respecting a truce that took effect on Sept. 1, according to OSCE monitors.

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 #33
Wall Street Journal
September 22, 2015
NATO Expands Cooperation With Ukraine, Support for Its Armed Forces
Ukrainian officials make clear the country intends to pursue membership of the western alliance
By JULIAN BARNES

KIEV-The head of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization signed agreements here Tuesday to expand cooperation with Ukraine and support for its armed forces, but senior Ukrainian officials made clear they want even closer ties and intend to pursue membership of the western alliance.

Jens Stoltenberg, the secretary-general of NATO, conducted a two-day visit to Ukraine where he was repeatedly met by Ukrainian officials insistent on their desire to overhaul their armed forces and combat corruption in the name of integrating with Europe.

In one sign of the intense interest in Mr. Stoltenberg's visit, more than a hundred Ukrainian journalists crowded into the Presidential palace to watch NATO and Ukrainian officials sign a series of technical documents designed to increase the alliance's work with Kiev.

On Tuesday, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, the Ukrainian Prime Minister, said explicitly that Ukraine wants full NATO membership, a move that would extend the promise of allied collective defense to Kiev.

"Our course to full-fledged membership of NATO is unquestionable," said Mr. Yatsenyuk, speaking through a translator. "Our membership in NATO and our struggle for our freedom is part of the struggle of the free world."

Mr. Yatsenyuk tried to frame Ukraine's war with Russia and Moscow-backed separatists as the front-line defense of Europe, and an argument that his country deserved the support of NATO members.

"Ukraine has stopped Russia's army," he said. "We at the same time protected the border of the European Union."

Moscow's annexation of Crimea and move into Eastern Ukraine was driven in large measure because of a fear of Ukraine's integration with the European Union and NATO. Moscow has used its occupation of areas of Ukraine and Georgia to block discussion of extending alliance membership to these countries.

The Russian delegation to NATO didn't respond to the comments from Ukrainian officials or react to Mr. Stoltenberg's visit to Ukraine.

NATO officials have tried to coordinate Mr. Stoltenberg's visit carefully, to show alliance support of Ukraine, but without leaving the impression that the alliance is ready to extend membership to Kiev.

The documents signed by NATO officials are technical in nature, designed to improve the Ukrainian military, improve the country's defense industry and counter Russian propaganda. They also enlarge the NATO office in Kiev and give the officials there the same immunities as international diplomats.

Ukrainian officials were eager to call the office an "embassy," although alliance officials insist that NATO doesn't have embassies or ambassadors. Officially the head of the NATO office is just a director, alliance officials said.

Still, as he did during his visit to Georgia, Mr. Stoltenberg both tried to thank Ukraine for its contribution to NATO missions and emphasize that the partnership would continue.

"NATO can rely on Ukraine, and Ukraine can rely on NATO," Mr. Stoltenberg said.

Mr. Stoltenberg is also trying to carefully calibrate the alliance's approach to Moscow. While he said he doesn't believe the alliance is back in the Cold War, he said he was equally sure the era of strategic partnership with Moscow is over for now.

"We are in a situation that is different," Mr. Stoltenberg said in a brief interview with The Wall Street Journal. "We have to be able to do two things at the same time: both respond with a firm predictable policy, with increased investments in our collective defense but at the same time keep the channels for political dialogue open."

Mr. Stoltenberg said the cease-fire in Ukraine was an encouraging sign, and pushed Moscow to continue to embrace the next steps of the Minsk peace agreement.

"There is a lot of uncertainty but at least we should welcome and try to build on the positive signs we have seen," he said.

Mr. Stoltenberg wouldn't link the cease-fire by Russian backed separatists with Russia's decision to build up its forces in Syria. Although he said he encouraged Moscow to help with the fight against Islamic State, he urged them to end their support for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

"It is very hard to see that any support for the Assad regime will be any sort of constructive contribution to a solution to the problem in Syria," Mr. Stoltenberg said. "Assad is very much part of the problem."

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 #34
Current Politics in Ukraine
https://ukraineanalysis.wordpress.com
September 20, 2015
PEACE AT LAST IN UKRAINE? ANALYZING RUSSIAN GOALS
By David Marples
Distinguished University Professor, University of Alberta, Canada

As we await the form of the local elections in the areas of the Donbas occupied by the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics (the DNR and LNR), there is much speculation in the Western media whether the Minsk agreement will be upheld. Much revolves around Russia's intentions, as well as the attitude of the militant separatist leaders who wish to use the elections to remove their fiefdoms from Ukraine.

Over the past days according to the reports of the OSCE and other sources, overt conflict in the separatist regions seems to have ended and some of the separatist leaders have either been removed or else appear to have migrated-at least for now-to the Russian Federation. Vladimir Putin is reluctant to remain involved in a war that is going nowhere, but costing Russia sorely in terms of commitment of weaponry and manpower, and even more in terms of alienation from Europe and the United States.

Some observers have noted a sustained buildup at Tartus, Russia's military base in Syria in support of the forces of President Bashar Al-Assad. Predictably, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov denies any increase in Russian forces and maintains that it is little changed from earlier.

Nonetheless, that Russia has increased its commitment to Syria while reducing that to the territories of 'Novorossiya' in the Donbas is evident. It is unclear whether in the event of a Ukrainian attempt to regain its former territories there would be much opposition in the Kremlin. Rather, as almost occurred in the summer of 2014, Russia might prefer to abandon the separatist regimes and leaders to their fate.

How can such a move be equated with the apparent commitment to Ukrainian separatists and the construction of 'Novorossiya'?

Some reasons can readily be dismissed, such as the decisive impact of Western sanctions. Sanctions have had some effects, but there is no indication that they have had a serious impact on Putin's popularity or Russia's ability to withstand prolonged recession.

Instead, more important are the following. First, the annexation of Crimea has proven extremely costly, and has become more a symbolic triumph than an act of wise statesmanship. True, many Crimeans may have supported it. But providing services to Crimea is difficult, and the peninsula, other than providing bases for the Russian Black Sea Fleet, has little to offer.

Second, the militants, unsurprisingly given their dearth of ideas and commitments, have failed to attract support of he populations in the areas they control. A case in point is Aleksandr Zaharchenko, the leader of the DNR, who continues to make bellicose statements as the peace process makes advances. Though there are many important distinctions between the DNR and LNR, both require conflict to make advances rather than periods of stability. Both require the continued investment of Russian troops, equipment, and personnel that Moscow is no longer prepared to offer given the remote chance of long-term success.

Third, and related, ethnic Russians in Ukraine and Russian-speaking Ukrainians outside the small separatist enclave have no interest either in joining Russia or supporting a prospective full-scale Russian invasion. Even Sergey Aksionov, the appointed leader of Crimea, would make little headway in a free election, as was evident in the last pre-annexation elections when his party achieved less than 5% of the vote. When pro-Russians failed in their attempted takeover of cities like Kharkiv in the late spring of 2014, it was evident that Vladimir Putin had misinterpreted the signs of support in Ukraine.

In short, opposition to Euromaidan did not signify pro-Russian sentiment or separatism. Most opponents of the protests in Ukraine would, given the choice, put up with the new government, particularly if it secured economic stability, just as they endured the turbulent years of the Yushchenko presidency, or for that matter the corruption of the Yanukovych years. Insofar as the concept of 'Novorossiya' existed, it was limited to a small coterie of gunmen and Russian idealists who for a time had the backing of the Kremlin.

Fourth, Russia has moved on. One of the few identifying aspects of the Putin leadership, as with his personal image, is the need for instant triumphs without sustained commitment, images over concrete achievements. That requires foreign policy maneuvers that might enhance the prestige of the regime and allow it to maintain profitable contacts with the Western world. Rhetoric aside-and there has been much of it-Moscow prefers to keep the lines open to the markets of the West while adopting the role of a major player in international affairs.

As far as Syria is concerned, perhaps the logic is that by maintaining Assad in power, Russia can persuade the West that it is better to keep it as a partner rather than an adversary. Just as in 2001, Moscow and Washington can join forces against terrorists, in this case the Islamic State. That is not to say that such a policy will receive much sympathy in Washington, which perceives such intervention as exacerbating the conflict.

Another theory is that by intervening in Syria, Russia will bring the West to the negotiating table, with an agreement that if the Russians keep out of that conflict, they might be given a free hand in Ukraine. But as argued above, that is not what they are seeking at present. Rather the goal is to be recognized as a significant power-in short, it is alienation that rankles rather than sanctions. Russia would like to return to the G8 and believes that there is a possibility of doing so.

Where does that leave Ukraine? Over 8,000 have died in the Donbas conflict to date and over a million residents have left the region. Analysts in the West continue to debate whether there is a civil war or a Russian war in Ukraine. The correct answer is probably a little of both. But the fact remains that the rebels would not survive for long without Russian support. Once they lose it, and given the Kremlin's current acceptance that an invasion would be highly unpopular both in the area and at home, the likelihood is that DNR and LNR will once more come under Ukrainian control.

None of the above should lead to a conclusion that the Russian government recognizes the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Rather it prefers to wield influence from afar, to ensure that in terms of security interests, both Ukraine and Belarus are in the Russian sphere. A new accommodation with the West would then, in theory lead to the return of economic growth, decreased commitment of military personnel and equipment, and assurance that there should be no further buildup or expansion of NATO.

There is also herein an assumption that there must be some logic to Russia's latest policy moves, an apparent commitment to the peace processs of Minsk as well as to the government of Syria. In reality such moves may be no more than feelers to elicit the reaction of Western powers. Still, Russia is clearly dissatisfied with the status quo, in Ukraine and elsewhere. And that is bad news for the leaders of the DNR and LNR.

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 #35
Fort Russ
http://fortruss.blogspot.com
September 21, 2015
Sakadynsky: "Things are worse in Ukraine than in the 1990's"
Lugansk Information Center
http://lug-info.com/comments/one/zhurnalist-sergei-sakadynskii-v-ukraine-khuzhe-navernoe-ne-bylo-dazhe-v-1990-ykh-334
Translated for Fort Russ by J. Arnoldski

The famous social activist and independent journalist from Lugansk who now lives in Kiev, Sergey Sakadynsky, discussed the systemic political, economic, and social crisis totally affecting the Ukrainian government and Ukraine's economy and society in an interview with Lits. Previously, Sakadynsky was a leading editor for a number of local and regional media, and for a few years after 2011 was the chief editor of the internet portal "Politics 2.0"

It is impossible to call him a support of the LPR. Sakadynsky left for Ukraine has having spent three and a half months in the cellars of the "Batman" gang. This undoubtedly influences his perception of reality. More valuable is Sakadynsky's independent opinion about what is happening in Ukraine today.

"How do you appraise the current political situation in Ukraine?"

It just so happens that each new Ukrainian government claims more than the previous one. The activities of Yanukovich and his entourage, of course, were on the reasons for the Maidan and all subsequent events. However, Yanukovich came to this after a few years. Poroshenko has managed to alienate his former supporters in just a year. Today, the country has no confidence in the current government and no one trusts those who claim to be the opposition. There is a serious political crisis even more profound than the one in 2013.

"Could another parliamentary crisis lead to a reshuffling of authorities?"

A reshuffle is inevitable, but it will not lead to a stabilization of the situation. Because a viable, third force has not appeared in the country. Against the background of falling ratings for the current ruling party, the ratings of the political forces which were removed from power before are growing. But, in fact, they're all the same people, so re-elections will not fundamentally change anything.

"How serious is the issue of 'disgruntled armed men returning from the front?'"

Every third man is ready to take up arms and go to Kiev. In fact, there are no leaders who could win over the unsatisfied masses. However, if someone has a machine gun in the attic, he will sooner or later shoot it. The events in Mukachevo and the grenade outside of the Verkhovna Rada are direct proof.

"Is the breakdown of the situation to the point of a chaotic war 'of all against all' possible?"

This is the main danger. There are a huge number of military "orphans" in the country, who were removed from the front and are dissatisfied with the government. In addition, there are a lot of impostors under the branding of volunteer battalions. Getting a weapon is no problem. There is a temptation to use these troops in inner squabbles.
"What is your forecast of the political situation?"

Stabilization of the situation is impossible for the current composition of the Verkhovna Rada and government. Therefore, after local elections, there will inevitably be re-elections of people's deputies and probably a president. If this doesn't happen peacefully, then there will inevitably be another Maidan. And, as follows, there are two options: to disperse protestors with the cancellation of elections in general and the introduction of martial law, or a change of government by force.

"What is the economic situation in the country?"

In Ukraine, it is perhaps worse than in the 1990's. It is significant that, in the entire history of the Ukrainian currency, never was it devalued twice in such a short period of time. Actually, from the introduction of the hryvnia in 1996 to 2013, it has fallen against the dollar four times. In the past year, the hryvnia fell three times. No matter what was said, the Ukrainian economy is dollar-dependent. Therefore, prices rose in proportion, despite the fact that wages have not increased. As a result, living standards have fallen by several times.

"What are the reasons for this?"

The government has blamed the war and the previous government. But one needs to understand that the economy of Ukraine was systematically killed by Yushchenko and Yanukovich, and nothing is being done today to stabilize the situation. Many budget-forming enterprises are stopped, loans are stolen or spent on plugging holes in the social sphere. Nothing has changed, but has only worsened, and there is no reason for things to become better.

"Was there in fact a technical default and is a real default with hyperinflation likely?"

Actually, for the past eight years, Ukraine has been stable in a pre-default state. And only a huge reservoir of the shadow economy can stay afloat. That is, there is no money, but the economy continues to survive at the expense of the shadow economy. But this resource is not unlimited and, if current trends continue, the erosion of the money supply may lead to the paralysis of the economy in general.

"What is your forecast of the situation?"

Western partners have no interest in a default, as this would lead to a complete destabilization of the situation in Ukraine which will inevitably affect the situation in Europe in general. Therefore, further debt relief and lending is likely. This actually leads to a complete loss of economic independence, but allows the economy to stay afloat. Of course, there can be talk of any kind of economic development in this situation.

"How is the current life of Ukrainian society?"

Little has changed in daily life in the regions unaffected by the war. They began to earn less so, accordingly, they began to buy less. The fall of living standards is more noticeable in the periphery than in the big cities.

"What are the main causes of the falling standards of living?"

I outlined them above: the war and the devaluation of the hryvnia. In addition, the flawed economic model in which all money is accumulated and deposited in Kiev.

It turns out that in order to earn a learning, people are compelled to move to the capital. But, as they say, "Kiev is not rubber," and the cost of living here, like in any big city, is much higher and eats up a larger part of earnings. Decentralizing the economy was needed earlier, but all governments wanted to maintain absolute control over money flows. Kiev has always worked like a pump, sucking money from the regions. As a result, we have more and more of an impoverished periphery and a center happily fattened at their expense.

"What major problems do immigrants from the Donbass republics to Ukraine face?"

The main problem is that the government doesn't need immigrants, therefore the government is doing everything to squeeze them back to Donbass. If problems are solved, then it's only thanks to the strength of the immigrants themselves or thanks to the aid of private foundations and organizations. The majority of people done't have the possibility to live normally, as they've lost work and housing. The only assistance from the state is a benefit of 442 hryvnia (884 hryvnia for the disabled), which officials cynically call "help for the rent." But what kind of dwelling can be paid for by this sum if, for example, in Severodonetsk the rent of an apartment starts from 1,000 and, in Kiev, 4,000 hryvnia. And finding a properly-paid job is difficult even for locals, not to mention visitors.

"And what is your forecast?"

I  believe that it won't come to food riots. But the flow of immigrants from Ukraine to richer countries will grow. I personally know people who left for Poland and Germany by different methods, and aren't planning on returning. There is a steady trend towards further reducing the population through emigration.

"How do you believe, if it's possible to say, that the situation of "neither piece nor war" works against Kiev?"

In the short-term this situation, on the contrary, is advantageous to the Poroshenko-Yatsenyuk government. On the one hand, there is no risk of another Ilovaysk happening, getting involved in a large-scale military campaign. On the other hand, with an unresolved situation in the east of the country, it's possible to continue to write off political and economic problems and beg for more loans and so on. But in the long term, the absence of certainty in this matter leads to an increase in internal and external contradictions. This includes a split in Ukrainian society and a loss of confidence in the actions of the current government.

"How do you appraise the relationship and prospects of 'Donbass republics - Ukraine?"'

On paper, it's possible to formally agree about anything. But in practice, I have absolutely no idea how people who just yesterday were shooting at each other will peacefully coexist in one country. How will Plotnitsky go to Kiev and shake hands with Poroshenko? How will the residents of Western Ukraine come to restore the Donbass which was destroyed with their participation? After one year of fire and blood, it looks like some kind of surrealism. Reconciliation is a very long and complicated process.

"What are your predictions and hopes in general?"

A stabilization of the political and economic situation in Ukraine is impossible without: a) the settlement of the conflict on Donbass; b) real decentralization; c) holding re-elections to the Verkhovna Rada and president in the nearest time. However, there is the danger that we will get a frozen conflict in Donbass and decentralization will be carried out only on paper. With regard to re-elections, as in the interest of many political forces, they will be held next year.

In fact, there are too many problems to be solved by another round of elections. For this, political will and the desire of the elites is needed. Unfortunately, they still strive to satisfy their private interests at the expense of the state. The country had practically returned to the beginning of the '90's, and it will take another ten years to return to the pre-war level.

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 #36
MSNBC.com
September 19, 2015
In war-torn Ukraine, a ghost town begins to rebuild
By Yulia Gorbunova
Yulia Gorbunova is the Ukraine researcher at Human Rights Watch.

It's September, the beginning of a new school year, but the children of the small village of Nikishine in eastern Ukraine no longer have a school to go to.

Before the war, 58 children attended the village school. Now, the ruins of the building look eerie in the blazing summer heat. There are gaping holes instead of windows, and huge chunks of the roof are missing. Inside the school, pieces of chairs and desks, mangled world maps and books are strewn across the floors, mixed with broken glass, half buried under piles of rubble. Classroom doors are shattered or torn off. Broken lights are hanging by the thread. The walls that are still standing are pockmarked by shrapnel and shell fragments.

A man is resting on a pile of broken bricks in the middle of a small classroom. His name is Sergey, he says, and takes a drag of an unfiltered cigarette. Many years ago he went to this school. He has lived in Nikishine his whole life and in recent years worked as the school's handyman.

Now, he and a couple of local teenagers have taken on the Herculean, if futile, task of cleaning it up. The boys take out the trash and the rubble and pile it onto a rough-hewn wooden platform attached to a decrepit motorcycle. When they can pile no more, one of them rides off on the bike and returns for another round.

I'm not sure whether it's safe to go up the staircase, but Sergey says it's OK and leads the way, pointing to the destroyed classrooms on the second floor. "This used to be a library," he says. "And this is where they taught Russian literature." He steps over a shell fragment, stuck in a pile of torn notebooks and broken computer screens, and we continue on to the third floor. Sergey and I are now standing under the open sky because the roof is missing.

Before the war, Nikishine, a village about 90 kilometers from Donetsk, had a population of over 800 people. With residents fleeing the fighting, it has now been reduced to 300, but more people have been coming back since May. Three more families have returned just last week, according to the village administrator.

A year ago, Ukrainian forces were desperately trying to hold onto Nikishine, as part of the effort to stop rebel forces from taking the strategically important town of Debaltseve close by. Between August 2014 and February 2015, Ukrainian forces and the rebels, backed by Russian forces, engaged in fierce, practically nonstop fighting. It was hell, local residents say, and all but a dozen Nikishine villagers fled. The fighting killed five local men and a woman and practically razed the village to the ground: 150 houses were burned down and 80 were severely damaged - a total of 70% of the houses in the village, which is now under rebel control.

The school was stuck right in the middle of the fighting. It is also the highest point in the village and was used by rebel fighters to exchange fire with the Ukrainian forces.
The school building is beyond repair and has been written off, the village administrator said. The plan now is to restore the Nikishine kindergarten, less damaged by the shelling. Hopefully, when it re-opens, there will be room for the other school-age children who returned to the village after the fighting stopped - 19 at this point, but more will probably return soon, together with their families.

The International Committee of the Red Cross had provided building materials in June, she said, but the rebel authorities did not allow the materials to be brought in, and they are stuck somewhere on Ukrainian government-controlled territory. In the meantime, the children in Nikishine have to start the school year at the Petropavlivka village school, 12 kilometers away. No one is providing transport, leaving parents, impoverished by the war, to get the children to school and back every day.

Deploying military forces in and near schools can put students at grave risk - in violation of the laws of war - and expose important education infrastructure to damage and destruction. In eastern Ukraine, government and rebel forces alike have not given schools the protection they deserve, given their importance for the children of the area. The conflict in eastern Ukraine has already been incredibly hard on civilians. It should not also deprive their children of education, whether during the hostilities or afterward.

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 #37
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
September 22, 2015
Russia refuses to accept 'restructuring' of Ukrainian debt
The Kremlin is refusing to accept proposals by Kiev to restructure $3 billion worth of bonds and demands full payment on the debt. Experts point out that this is an economic as well as a political issue and it could become a bargaining chip in the ongoing negotiations over a bilateral gas deal.
Tatyana Glazkova, special to RBTH
 
A new squabble is brewing between Russia and Ukraine after Moscow announced that it would not accept proposals by Kiev to restructure a $3-billion debt in bonds.
"Russia's position remains the same: Ukraine must make full and timely payment on the bonds acquired in December 2013 with money from the National Wealth Fund," reads a statement posted on the Russian government website on Sept. 17.

Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk earlier said that unless Russia accepts the terms of restructuring Ukraine's debt, it will not get anything.

"Russia has refused to take part in the creditors' committee and has not agreed to the restructuring deal, it wants the debt to be repaid in full. I would like to say once again that there will be no better offer. Either accept these terms or there will be no better terms offered to Russia," Yatsenyuk said at a session of the Ukrainian parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, on Sept. 17.
 
Moscow stands firm

The issue concerns $3 billion worth of Eurobonds that mature in December 2015. These were issued by Ukraine in December 2013 with a coupon rate of 5 percent per annum, placed on the Irish Stock Exchange and bought by Russia with funds from its National Wealth Fund. So far, Ukraine has been paying on these bonds: In June 2015, it made a timely transfer of a coupon yield of $75 million.

Ukraine insists that its debt to Russia should be written off because, among other things, Kiev reached an $18 billion debt restructuring deal with its private creditors in August. They are expected to write off 20 percent of the principal and grant a four-year deferral for repaying the remaining amount.

As repeatedly said by Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov, Moscow will not be following other creditors' suit and will not be discussing debt restructuring with Kiev. If Ukraine does not pay up, Russia intends to take the matter to court, in which case Ukraine may be ordered to pay penalties and to cover legal costs.
 
Debt conflict

Experts point out that the debt issue is not only an economic but a political matter too.

"It is very likely that Kiev will refuse to repay the debt, this is what we hear from Ukrainian politicians daily," said chief economist with ING Bank for Russia and the CIS Dmitry Polevoi. As regards the financial side, given assistance from the IMF, Ukraine should have the funds to repay the debt.

At the same time, the debt issue may affect the gas deal that needs to be signed by the end of September.

"Ukraine has already admitted that it does not have money to buy gas, so Kiev's debt could become a bargaining chip in the gas issue," said Polevoi.

According to him, relations with Ukraine may become even more complicated, all the more so since starting from January 2016, Ukraine intends to start implementing the economic section of its association agreement with the EU.

"Ukraine wanted Russia to reach a consolidated position with the other creditors on deferring or partially writing off the debt. Russia, like any other creditor, does not have to be guided by the other creditors, it can have its own independent (in this case tough) position," said Dmitry Orlov, head of the Political and Economic Communications Agency.

"The money came from the National Wealth Fund and it is more valuable than money from traditional sources. This 3 billion is required for infrastructure projects. It is also a matter of principle: Russia did not allow for the possibility of repayment by instalments either during the talks on granting the loan or at any later stage," he said.

According to Orlov, in the 1990s and 2000s, relations between Moscow and Kiev were better and deferrals were agreed, but it would be wrong to extrapolate that situation to the present one.

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 #38
Antiwar.com
September 21, 2015
Ukraine's 'Democratic' Dictatorship
They're banning journalists, books, movies, and even actors
By Justin Raimondo
Justin Raimondo is the editorial director of Antiwar.com, and a senior fellow at the Randolph Bourne Institute

The media narrative about Ukraine - that the "Maiden revolution" was a democratic European-values oriented revolt against a tyrannical Russian-controlled puppet - has always been  a fairytale, largely perpetrated by the Western media in complicity with the US State Department and the European Union. Yet now that same media is being forced to reexamine their bias in the wake of the Ukrainian government's banning of 34 journalists and seven bloggers from entering the country. The list of the banned includes journalists from Britain, Switzerland, Israel, Slovakia, Germany, Spain, Kazakhstan, Hungary, Estonia, Bulgaria, Germany, Latvia, Moldova, Macedonia, and Serbia.

Unlike most of the rest of the English-speaking news media, the Committee to Protect Journalists is reporting that the list of banned journalists represents but a portion of a larger blacklist consisting of 388 individuals and over 100 organizations forbidden from entering the country on the grounds of "national security" and an alleged threat to Ukraine's "territorial integrity." Here is the complete list (in Ukrainian). The Guardian is reporting that the list also includes businesspeople and journalists from the United States.

After an uproar - not over the existence of such a list, but over the fact that three BBC reporters were included, along with two Spaniards who have been captured by the Islamic State in Syria, and a German writer - the six Western journalists everyone was making such a fuss about were removed from the list. The rest remain.

In his statement defending the ban, "President" Petro Poroshenko averred that the move to censor the international media was taken "in coordination with our partners from the European Union, the United States of America and other countries." Which explains why we haven't heard a word about this - not a peep of public protest - from the US State Department, or the EU, who authored the coup that brought Poroshenko to power in the first place.

I don't know if I'm on the list, as I don't read Ukrainian, but I have to say I'll be very much disappointed to discover that I'm not - and I'll be working assiduously to ensure that I'll be added.  Hopefully this column will serve to wake the Ukrainian authorities up to the fact that I represent a threat to their dictatorship.

For a dictatorship it is: in a statement accompanying the ban, Poroshenko made it clear the move was "in response to the rebels' plan to hold local elections in October and November in territory they control. 'This adventurism and irresponsible decision requires our exact, coordinated reaction to the threat that has been created to the Minsk (peace) agreements.'"

Shorter Poroshenko: We don't want the international media covering those elections.

And of course the Minsk agreements, both of them, call for local elections to be held in the disputed eastern part of the country, as well as a reasonable degree of autonomy for the rebellious region.

When the Western-backed coup overthrew the democratically-elected government of Viktor Yanukovich, I warned that - in spite of the Western media narrative depicting the "Maiden" rebellion as "democracy"-loving liberals - Ukraine was headed for authoritarian rule. My prediction has been borne out several times over. The media crackdown in Ukraine is nothing new: the television journalist Ruslan Kotsaba was arrested on "treason" charges last year - for making a video opposing Ukraine's conscription law. His story was ignored or buried in the Western media, and as far as I can tell he's still in detention - facing a possible death penalty.

Speaking of the death penalty, the prominent writer Oles Buzina was murdered in cold blood recently, along with several opposition figures who - we were told - simply committed "suicide." Not one word of protest was heard from those ubiquitous "democracy"-promoters in the West. People have been rounded up and jailed for their political views routinely in Poroshenko's "democratic" utopia, and the silence in the West was deafening - until, that is, a couple of BBC journalists were banned from the country.

The irony is that BBC coverage of the Ukrainian civil war has been decidedly pro-Kiev, and at pains to take the Ukrainian government line that what is in fact a civil war is really a Russian "invasion." Are the Ukrainians just stupid or did they get wind that one of the banned BBC'ers used to work for Russia Today, and was that a factor? We'll never know, but I'm betting on the stupidity factor, never a loser when we're talking about the Kiev coup leaders.

And it isn't just journalists, bloggers, and NGOs who are being banned from Ukraine: actors, singers, movies, books - nothing and no one is safe from the prying eyes of the censors. (And it's spreading here, in Canada and the United States.) Yet we in the West have heard very little about this - now why do you suppose that is?

The reason is because the US government and its European sock puppets have installed a friendly regime in Kiev, and are determined to subsidize and even protect the oligarch Poroshenko from his own people by military force - all under the guise of resisting "Russian aggression." The reality is that the only real aggression taking place in Ukraine is the Kiev government's directed at Ukrainian citizens, in the western provinces as well as in the east. Tens of thousands of young people are fleeing the country in order to avoid being conscripted into Poroshenko's slave army, while the few remaining independent media outlets are being shut down by government decree.

And the worst is yet to come. Radical right-wing nationalists are gathering their swelling forces in a bid for power. Angry that the Europeans, led by Germany, are insisting on Poroshenko's adherence to the Minsk accords, they are accusing the Kiev coup leaders of "betraying the revolution," and have been staging violent protests in Kiev and around the country. The specter of fascism - real fascism, complete with neo-Nazi symbols and skinheads wielding truncheons - looms large over Ukraine.

Meanwhile, US "trainers" are in Ukraine, putting the neo-Nazi Azov battalion through their paces, and the Pentagon is dusting off war plans designed to confront nuclear-armed Russia.

This is utter madness. We have no business supporting the Ukrainian dictatorship and the idea of going to war with Russia is Strangelovian, to say the least. It is nothing short of criminal that Washington is provoking a showdown with Russia in the interests of a regime in Kiev that is as outright authoritarian as our own cold warriors imagine Russia to be.

Ukraine is on a path to unabashed fascist rule - and its rulers are taking us on the road to war. Who will stop this craziness before it's too late?

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 #39
AP
September 22, 2015
Ukraine's Richest Man Plays Both Sides of War's Frontline

KRASNODON, Ukraine - In this town deep in eastern Ukraine's rebel heartland, about a quarter of the population works in the coal mines owned by billionaire Rinat Akhmetov, Ukraine's richest man. Here and elsewhere in territory controlled by the separatist insurgency, the tycoon keeps the lights on and people clothed and fed, with a mixture of jobs, electricity and aid.

At the same time, Akhmetov operates factories on the other side of the frontline, powering Ukraine's economy and pouring hundreds of millions in taxes into government coffers. His steel products, which are finished in rebel territory, are then shipped to the West - where they bring in billions in revenue for Akhmetov that then indirectly props up the separatist government.

The billionaire is able to straddle the frontline by using his fortune and business empire as leverage. His companies provide more than 300,000 jobs across Ukraine, most in the rebel-held east. Meanwhile, his control over utilities that provide electricity and heating to both sides allow him to dictate terms to the government as well as the rebels. Cracking down on Akhmetov's factories in government territory would threaten Ukraine's depressed economy, while a collapse of utilities in the east would undermine the rebels' grip on power.

It makes for a striking picture of economic cooperation between enemy areas: Coal produced in Krasnodon mines, on rebel territory, travels to the Avdiivka coking plant on the government side. Coke is then shipped back to rebel lands, to a metals smelter in Yenakieve, and the metals produced there are transported to government territory on the Azov Sea - for shipping to the West.

Meanwhile, Western purchases, which account for the most of Akhmetov's profits, are helping to keep the rebel territory afloat by fueling economic activity. Akhmetov's Metinvest metals and mining holding posted revenues of $1.8 billion in the first quarter of the year, a 6 percent increase over the previous year, with Europe accounting for 35 percent of sales and North America for 3 percent. Steel works in rebel-controlled Yenakiyeve accounted for a quarter of the company's steel output in the first quarter.

After separatist leaders occupied parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, the Ukrainian government said anything that is produced there should be classified as contraband. But Kiev gave the green light for Akhmetov's empire - which stretches from coal mines and metal smelters to power plants - to trade with the rebel-held areas and export its products just as it did before the war.

When the insurgency erupted in 2014, the Ukrainian government set about shutting down Ukrainian businesses in the east, and most private businessmen fled. The war has killed more than 8,000 people, but also erected barriers between suppliers and customers. Only Akhmetov - worth $6.7 billion according to Forbes magazine - has been allowed to operate on both sides.

Neither Akhmetov nor the rebels acknowledge that he is propping up the separatists. But there is little doubt that his factories, and the back-and-forth of trade over the frontline, are critical to the rebel regime. Admitting any cooperation with the rebels would be the end for the 48-year-old billionaire: His company would be in violation of international law and shut out of Western markets.

Metinvest and Krasnodonugol, Akhmetov's coal company, say they neither pay taxes to the rebel government nor directly finance the separatists.

"We tell them that right now we cannot comply with the demands that the (Luhansk separatist) republic is putting forward because complying with them would mean the enterprise would have to shut down," Krasnodonugol director Alexander Angelovsky told The Associated Press.

Earlier in the conflict, Krasnodonugol came under attack from the rebels, a mine employee told The AP. Its director was briefly arrested, and a separatist fighter with a live grenade in his hands stormed into a meeting room, threatening to blow up the place unless the rebels were allowed to take a firing position on the grounds. Now residents in the separatist areas speak about a sense of order, installed by Russians, which has replaced the chaos and anarchy of the first months of the separatist movement.

When asked about cooperation with separatist leaders, Angelovsky said he does not deal with fighters but rather with "new official bodies" made up of the same officials who were in charge under the Ukrainian government. The only difference, he said, is that they have "raised the new flag."

A few blocks away from Krasnodonugol, the office of the former Ukrainian tax inspection now handles rebel taxes. Staff would not comment publicly, but a senior official, who was not authorized to speak to the media, said every business in town, about half of the 4,000 that were here before the war, is now registered to pay rebel taxes. Asked about Krasnodonugol, he chuckled and said: "We are working on it."

Enrique Menendez, a well-connected Donetsk businessman who closed his advertising firm to launch a humanitarian effort, does not believe Akhmetov is supporting the rebels in any direct way. But it's clear, he said, that the insurgents need Akhmetov, who is originally from the east but now lives in Kiev.

"It's one thing when you wag a finger and vow to fight an oligarch regime," Menendez said of the rebels. "It's another thing if you decide to declare war on (Akhmetov). If he shuts down his energy assets now, ahead of the heating season, what are they going to do?"

Akhmetov is also the largest provider of humanitarian aid in rebel territory, since the separatists will not allow Ukrainian government aid, and Western organizations are having difficulties delivering their own.

The tycoon's Shakhtar FC arena, which hosted the 2012 European football championships, now serves as a warehouse for the relief effort. Last winter, when Ukraine suspended pensions and benefits to those living in rebel-held areas, and before the rebels began paying their own benefits, food packages delivered to the Shakhtar arena helped the city's poorest residents survive. Akhmetov's charity fund says it has now given away more than 4.3 million food packages.

In Donetsk, the capital of the insurgency, Akhmetov is not just a businessman but a father figure. When a methane blast killed 33 miners at the Zasyadko coal mine in March, he offered to pay compensation to the injured and to the families of the dead, even though he did not own the mine.

For its part, Ukraine is dependent on Akhmetov for taxes, power generation and the coal mined in rebel lands. His energy company DTEK provides half of all coal produced in Ukraine and runs three giant power plants on separatist-held territory.

Akhmetov's holding company, System Capital Management, told The AP by email that it "will continue to operate in the territory of sovereign Ukraine where is possible to do so, despite the operational challenges, and we applaud the hard work and loyalty of our employees who have continued to work in these tough conditions to ensure that business and essential services such as electricity continue to be delivered, despite hardship and risk." Like Metinvest and Krasnodonugol, the company denied allegations that it may be paying taxes to anyone other than the Ukrainian government.

Radical Ukrainian politicians tend to call everyone operating in the separatist area a collaborator - and many are calling vociferously for a stop to Akhmetov's operations in the east. The reality is much more complicated: Most big companies in the region are registered to pay taxes to Kiev, with more than 90,000 companies and 150,000 individuals in rebel-held areas - including Akhmetov's - registering anew this year to do so, according to Roman Nasirov, chief of the Ukrainian Fiscal Service.

Authorities, however, cannot help but suspect them of paying off the rebels: "We realize that in reality they have to pay some fees in the occupied areas," Nasirov said. "You may call them taxes or extortion money."

Meanwhile, Akhmetov's privileged status does not make him immune from the effects of the war, or restrictions imposed by Ukraine.

Five of Akhmetov's mines in Krasnodon had to stand idle from January to June as they waited for a permit to transport coal to their main client, the coking plant in Avdiivka, on the government side.

Earlier this month, rebel leaders threatened to suspend all coal supplies to the rest of Ukraine. Akhmetov's DTEK energy company, however, said this week that it still sends coal to Ukrainian power stations; and Krasnodonugol told AP that it is still selling coal to eastern and central Ukraine.

The Avdiivka operations are also feeling the brunt of the war. On a recent visit to the Avdiivka plant, electricity workers were busy repairing power lines cut down by the previous night's shelling, which is nearly a daily occurrence.

Ironically, the shells fly in from Krasnodon area which supplies Avdiivka much of its coal.

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 #40
Business New Europe
www.bne.eu
September 22, 2015
Commander-in-Chief Poroshenko's shipyard to play key role in rebuilding Ukraine's navy
Graham Stack in Kyiv

A shipyard owned by President Petro Poroshenko, commander-in-chief of Ukraine's military, is taking on a major role in rebuilding the country's decimated navy, as the defence sector gears up to meet the Russian challenge.

The Poroshenko-owned shipyard and engineering plant Leninska Kuznya is taking the first step in rebuilding Ukraine's navy, which was decimated by Russia's annexation of the Crimean peninsula where Ukraine's now-captured naval forces were formerly based.

The Kyiv riverside plant is set to complete two small Gyurza-class gunboats by the end of 2016, marking the first new vessels to be received by Ukraine's navy since 80% of its navy got stranded in Crimea.

A further eight such new vessels will join the fleet by 2017, with a total of 20 to be completed by 2020, according to recent statements by head of the navy Serhiy Haiduk. Analysts put the cost of the vessels at $5mn-15mn each, according to the level of equipping, making the minimal order volume $100mn through 2020, a substantial sum for Ukraine's cash-strapped military. "We do need these gunboats, we have to rebuild the navy from scratch," military commentator Yury Butusov tells bne IntelliNews.

Navy spokesman Oleh Chubuk declined to comment on the plans to bne IntelliNews because "it verges on politics".

Not all the vessels will be constructed by Poroshenko's own shipyard due to capacity limitations, with some of the order likely to be placed in the south Ukraine port city of Mykolaiv, according to an analysis in Ukraine's Defence Review journal.

However, Poroshenko's yard has a head start over state-owned competitors, say analysts, since it is the only one with experience in building such vessels, having already provided two such vessels to Uzbekistan for waterway patrols in 2005 and is now nearing completion of another two.

Previous plans

The current production plans in fact predate the loss of Ukraine's fleet to Russia and Poroshenko's election as president in 2014: they date back to Poroshenko's year as economy minister in 2012, in the administration of ousted president Viktor Yanukovych. During Poroshenko's tenure as economy minister, his Leninska Kuznya shipyard won the order for the first two in a planned series of nine such gunboats, with keels being laid at the end of 2012. After Poroshenko joined the opposition in 2013, Yanukovych cancelled the order, with government inspectors claiming the work had been performed shoddily.

But the plans lay ready for a speedy revival after Poroshenko gained power in May 2014, despite the dramatically changed circumstances regarding Ukraine's naval power. And while Leninska Kuznya lists potential roles for the boat as combating smugglers and poachers, the next vessels will have their armaments sexed up and enough space to act as an infantry landing craft, according to navy plans.

The small size of the gunboats has one big strategic advantage for Ukraine, say military strategists: they can be shipped by rail and road to Ukraine's imperilled Azov Sea outpost of Mariupol, on the eastern outskirts of which are entrenched Russian-backed separatist rebels. Russia controls the entrance to the Sea of Azov, meaning that the only option for Ukraine to strengthen its coastal patrols to counter the rebel threat is for any ships to be moved there over land.

The scaling down of Ukraine's naval aspirations epitomised by the new boats is also shown by one potential source of funding for the acquisition: the planned sale of Ukraine's ill-fated naval cruiser Ukraine, announced by Naval Forces Commander Sergey Gaiduk during joint US-Ukraine Seabreeze exercises in mid-September. Construction of Ukraine was started in Mykolaiv in Soviet times, but was never finished. According to Gaiduk it has no future operational role in Ukraine's scaled-down fleet, and could be sold to another navy or for scrap.

Beyond building the gunboats and selling Ukraine, further plans for Ukraine's navy remain opaque: even the navy section of the defence ministry website is "under construction". "We are still waiting for the publication of key defence policy documents regarding the navy," says Oleksiy Melnyk, defence analyst at the Kyiv think-tank Razumkov Centre.

Poroshenko the industrialist

Poroshenko's hand in rebuilding Ukraine's navy is a reminder that he is not just "Ukraine's Willy Wonka" - as styled in the media with reference to his Roshen confectionary concern. Along with finance and media assets, he is also an industrialist in the automotive and shipbuilding sectors. As president he is now eyeing Ukraine's sprawling defence sector as a potential source of economic growth, according to a number of policy speeches, with defence spending currently at 5% of GDP - more than many Nato members manage to spend.

Formally, Poroshenko says he has handed control of his assets over to investment company Rothschild to be readied for sale. He has also said that he sold his stake in the Bogdan Corporation, Ukraine's second largest car assembler, to his partners following the economic crisis in 2009. Bogdan headquarters are in the Kyiv premises of Leninska Kuznya.

Poroshenko has notably now put Bogdan boss and owner Oleh Gladkovsky in a top defence sector post. Gladkovsky took charge of the inter-departmental state commission for defence sector cooperation and export control in 2014, and in February Poroshenko named him first deputy secretary of the National Defence and Security Council, Ukraine's highest security body.

Given that Ukraine's automotive industry has collapsed - August was the first month since independence that not a single car was assembled in the country - the Poroshenko-linked plants are now also diversifying into the defence sector wherever possible.

At the opening of Kyiv's major arms fair "Arms and Defence 2015" on September 22, Bogdan wowed the crowds with a presentation of a new multifunctional light armoured vehicle, the Bars-8, intended for Ukraine's hard-pressed military as well as for export. Bogdan is also producing Hyundai all-wheel drive trucks with dual civilian and military use, the company said earlier.

Leninska Kuznya also displayed its new military vehicle designs at the arms fair: an amphibious armoured personnel carrier Baran designed for use by Ukraine's National Guard, and an amphibious multi-purpose armoured vehicle with attack capabilities, Triton.

Triton will be equipped with Leninska Kuzna's first weapon design, the UAG-40 automatic grenade launcher. Originally intended for export to Africa, Asia and Latin America, the weapon entered production in 2015.

The grenade launcher could also become an export hit, although the plant declined to disclose any sales information to bne IntelliNews. According to documents recently leaked to press by Ukraine's former security service head, Valentyn Nalyvaichenko, controversial Armenian arms broker Mosston Engineering paid €275,000 to a British Virgin Isles firm Intraco Management in June. According to journalist investigations, Intraco is in turn connected to Ihor Kononenko, a co-owner of Leninska Kuzna and a grandee in the Petro Poroshenko Bloc in parliament, although he has denied the connection.

The documents do not specify the purpose of the payment, but, according to its website, Mosston Engineering specialises in trading small arms, ammunition, mortars and light artillery, meaning the UAG-40 weapon could have been the traded item. Mosston Engineering did not respond to enquiries.

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#41
Sputnik
September 21, 2015
Russian PM Approves Railroad Which Bypasses Ukraine

GORKI (Moscow Region) (Sputnik) - Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev said Monday that he had signed a document on the construction of a railway line to allow Russian trains to circumvent Ukrainian territory on their way to the country's south.

Currently, several short stretches of rail lines linking Moscow to southern Russia cut through Ukrainian territory several times, exiting and reentering the Russian regions of Voronezh and Rostov.

The new railway line will be constructed between Zhuravka railway station, in Russia's Voronezh Region, some 20 miles from the Ukraine border, and the town of Millerovo, in the Rostov Region.

"This is a document on the procedure of construction of the railway line Zhuravka-Millerovo... it is an offshoot signed to bypass the territory of Ukraine," Medvedev said at a meeting with the deputy prime ministers.

Medvedev stressed that the new railway line is important both for civilian life and trade and cargo transportation.

The document signed on Monday will allow the railway authorities and local government to make the necessary decisions to ensure the construction of the railway section, Medvedev said.

"Obvious advantages" associated with the construction project include the development of housing, as well as social infrastructure near the new line and the creation of additional jobs, the prime minister stressed.

Following the reunification of Crimea with Russia in March 2014 and an escalation of the Ukrainian crisis later that year, Moscow's relations with Kiev deteriorated. Ukraine authorities have blamed Russia for interfering in its internal affairs, the allegations Moscow had repeatedly denied.

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 #42
http://newcoldwar.org
September 21, 2015
UN special rapporteur on torture issues sharply critical report on Ukraine

Enclosed is the full report dated September 18, 2015 of Christof Heyns, who is the United Nations' Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions. His report is titled Ukraine: Lives lost in an accountability vacuum. [Text of report here http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16460&LangID=E]

Heyns conducted an official visit to Ukraine from September 8 to 18, 2015. He is a professor of human rights law in Pretoria, South Africa. In contrast to the most recent report of the United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU), released in early September, Heynes' report provides the outline of a comprehensive overview of the human rights situation in Ukraine. The result is a rather damning portrait of the governing regime in Kyiv.

The HRMMU report earlier this month is a litany of 'he said, she said' anecdotal testimonials strung together in such a way as to leave the reader with the impression that human rights crimes are being perpetrated equally by both sides in the civil war in Ukraine. While Heyns borrows some of the same language, a reading of his report clearly shows that it is the Kyiv regime alone which is guilty of systematic and widespread human rights violations. The accusations cited by Heyns against the rebel regions of Donetsk and Lugansk may or may not be true, but they pale in numbers and scope compared to what Heyns documents on the Kyiv side.

Heyns says that the official investigations by Kyiv into the two large massacres which took place in Ukraine in 2014 are seriously failing. These are the investigations into the Sniper Massacres of Feb 18-20 at Maidan Square in Kyiv, which killed more than 100 police and protesters, and the arson attack in Odessa on May 2 in which at least 48 people perished.

Concerning the Snipers Massacre, there is no mention by Heyns of the video and other evidence being compiled and released by University of Ottawa researcher Ivan Katchanovski and others showing that sniper fire at Maidan Square was directed by extreme-right forces masquerading as part of the Maidan protest itself. But he does make a one-word reference acknowledging doubts about the official government line on events-that the Berkut police of the government overthrown several days later were responsible. That official line has been repeated near universally by Western governments and mainstream media. Heyns writes in his report, "I am concerned that more than 100 people were killed as a result of the firing, allegedly by Berkut and other law enforcement officers of live ammunition at participants. In addition, thirteen police officers were also reportedly killed." The operative word here is "allegedly".

Officials in the people's republics of Donetsk and Lugansk did not meet with Heyns during his official visit. This is no doubt due to the biased record of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights with which his office is associated. Concerning the Ukrainian side, Heyns concludes, "Many officials whom I met-particularly in the SBU [Security Service of Ukraine]-simply denied that there was any wrongdoing and pointed to the fact that there are laws in place that meet international standards. There is little hope for progress where this is the approach."

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 #43
Kyiv Post
September 22, 2015
Paper chase: One US businessman's story shows a lot has yet to change in post-Maidan Ukraine
By Denys Krasnikov

The EuroMaidan Revolution was supposed to change Ukraine for the better, cutting corruption and bringing the country into line with standards in the rest of Europe.

But if any such changes have been made, U.S. businessman Bruce Crowe hasn't noticed them. Indeed, Crowe said for him things have only gotten worse since the new government came to power.

"I think it would make a very good case study on all that is still wrong with the bureaucratic beast, specifically those killing the private sector - small businesses like ours," Crowe says. "After EuroMaidan they've tried to cling to their chairs even harder. This needs to be exposed if Ukraine is going to seek more outside investment, especially those who don't want to operate under old Soviet principles."

Crowe, a father of eight children who moved to Ukraine seven years ago, opened a café called The Lighthouse in 2013 in Rzhyshchiv, a town located about an hour's drive south of Kyiv on the banks of the Dnipro River.

The family-friendly café was to serve pizza, coffee, and non-alcoholic drinks, but bureaucracy and corruption virtually delayed the project.

Having bought a two-story residential building to live in and house the business, Crowe noticed the odor of gas and called the gas company to come and check for leaks. But as soon as the gas men arrived, they shut the gas off. The reason? Gas can't be supplied to a residential building for the purposes of running a business, unless you have a package of permits, which Crowe didn't.

The gas has now been disconnected for two years. That took the pizza off the café's menu, as the expensive ovens Crowe had bought to prepare them in were left without any fuel to run them with. Now they're gathering dust on the second floor of his building.

Crowe can't make a profit from a café by selling only coffee. After paying bills and wages, the business loses $700 a month. It's too expensive to re-equip the business with electric ovens to cook pizza, Crowe says.

On top of the regular monthly loss, Crowe has spent $6,000 collecting the documents he needs to get the gas hooked up again - so far to no effect.

"It's OK, every businessman does it, so I started gathering signatures," Crowe said. "Eventually, it appeared to be impossible to get all of them legally in Ukraine. As you go to the local authorities, you find out that more and more documents are required."

Crowe holds out a huge folder stuffed with documents - the results of his two-year bureaucratic paper chase. "It seems they keep remembering missing (documents) all the time, and don't have a real list of requirements," he laughs.

After fighting the system for some time, and unwilling to bribe the bureaucrats, Crowe hired two full-time employees, Nataliya and Olexiy Kurylko, to do the paperwork for him.

They haven't had much luck either.

"An inspector came to examine the premises last month," Kurylko says. "He asked that we provide him with yet another batch of documents, and send one more inquiry to the Kyiv Oblast authorities, but he promised it would be the last stage."

Volodymyr Evlakh is an engineer at regional gas supply company Kyivoblgaz. He is in charge of hooking up businesses to the gas supply network in Rzhyshchiv.

Evlakh blames blames the delay on Crowe, not the bureaucrats.

"The reason the project has taken so much time is the owner's irresponsibility - once they disappeared for almost six months, when there were (just) a couple of documents to sign," Evlakh told the Kyiv Post. "There was a clear algorithm to go through: First, rebuild the house according to safety requirements for cafés. Second, as they had bought foreign equipment, it had to be double-checked. Third, draw up a new plan of the building to be examined by (the planning) commission."

Kyivoblgaz's press center told the Kyiv Post that there was a list of documents required for cases such as Crowe's, but one of the company's public relations specialists, Anna Glyatsevych, said the list might change depending on the circumstances.

"The actions that need to be taken could be varied - there should be a list of requirements, but it could change. It depends on the type of private business," Glyatsevych said.

Money has to be paid to check building plans, the building itself, pipes and equipment, she said. But she couldn't say how much, as experts have to work that out on a case-by-case basis.

Meanwhile, Crowe hopes that his battle with the bureaucrats is coming to an end. But he says the attitudes of local officials in Ukraine are going to have to change if not just his business, but the country itself is to have a chance of succeeding.

"The future of democratic Ukraine is with honest small business," said Crowe. "Until folks like those in charge of gas get a clue that their job should be to help (business) and not hurt it, the economy will continue to spiral downward and the little guys will just give up. That means no new business, no new jobs, and no economic engine."

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#44
Australian Broadcasting Company
www.abc.net.au
September 21, 2015
Russia's foreign legion: Hundreds of fighters join pro-Russian rebels in eastern Ukraine
By Nicholas Lazaredes in Ukraine

In a field in eastern Ukraine, young recruits to the rebel army of the Donetsk People's Republic are busy attaching photographs of Ukraine's president Petro Poroshenko to the backs of empty ammunition boxes.

"Our beloved president is a war criminal," one of them declares, before firing rapidly at the portrait of Mr Poroshenko with his AK-47 for target practice.

These men accuse Mr Poroshenko and his pro-Western government in Kiev of turning against the Russian-speaking east. In return, Mr Poroshenko's government accuses Russia of being behind an imperialist war aimed at splitting Ukraine.

According to one of the recruits' instructors, Sergei, Donetsk is now part of a region where the divisions of World War II and the Cold War have re-emerged.

"NATO continues to encircle Russia from all sides. The Cold War is not really finished because the United States continues its aggression against us," Sergei says.

"Since the collapse of Soviet Union, Ukraine has been a totally corrupt society where the police and the government are just like a mafia that controls the country."
Rebel army instructor Sergei emigrated to France but has returned to Donetsk to "defend" his "homeland"
Photo: Rebel army instructor Sergei emigrated to France but has returned to Donetsk to defend his homeland. (Matt Marsic)

The Donetsk People's Republic likes to portray its fight as a war against fascism - and it is an ideological definition that has drawn hundreds of foreign fighters eager to take up arms for its cause.

One of the more unusual recruits is American Russell Bentley, a 56-year-old convicted drug smuggler from Texas..

He has become a poster boy for the rebel cause.

"I finally decided that there was no other place in the world that I could be," he says.

"What we've done here in Donetsk has really thrown a wrench in the years of the plans of the fascists."

Mr Bentley, who is known here as Tex, tells Foreign Correspondent he spent the first few months of this year fighting for the rebels as they re-took Donetsk's embattled airport.

"Every day here there were gunfights with thousands and thousands of rounds from each side," he recalls.

Not just another 'junior Rambo wannabe'

As an American, Tex says he was not taken seriously when he first arrived.

"A lot of the Russian soldiers, they thought you know, just another American tourist, junior Rambo wannabe," he says.

"But my work spoke for itself here and I've won the respect of some good, hard, brave soldiers. It's the proudest thing I've ever done in my life."

Tex has a colourful past. He spent several years in a US federal prison after being convicted of smuggling 500 pounds of marijuana across the Mexican border, but says that is all behind him now.

"You know there's a good guy and there's a bad guy, and we're the good guys here," he says.

Tex is not the only foreigner putting his life on the line for the so-called Donetsk People's Republic.

"We've already got many guys from Finland here," he says.

"We have Spaniards, we have guys from Colombia, India, Italy, France. I'm not the only American here either. There are also many Serbian fighters. The Serbians especially, feel part of this conflict because they experienced it themselves back in the '90s under Clinton when the US attacked Yugoslavia."

The new French Foreign Legion

In recent months, hundreds of foreign volunteers have reportedly joined the rebel ranks, and have been assembled into a new fighting unit known as the Novo Russian Foreign Legion.

Tex claims the new unit is "going to be equally tough as the French Foreign Legion".

"There are some great people here and we really want more people to come here," he says.

The rebel Foreign Legion's chief instructor, Sergei, emigrated from Ukraine to France and was trained by the French army before going back to Donetsk this year.

"I want to return to France and to continue living there, but right now I must fight for my homeland," Sergei says.

After more than a year of fighting, the success of the rebel separatists in retaining their grip on eastern Ukraine has been put down to the support of Russian troops and weapons flowing across the porous border.

But Sergei denies that is the case.

"There aren't many of us, and we're almost always outnumbered by the Ukrainians," he says.

"The new recruits don't know much yet and we can't provide really high-quality training, but they compensate through their extreme bravery in combat."

The 'best' and the 'bravest' are joining the rebels

On the outskirts of Donetsk, Tex takes us to observe a group of newly-arrived volunteers from Finland undergoing intensive training before heading off to take up positions on the frontline.

"The best people in the world are coming here now," he says.

"I mean the bravest, the ones who understand that this is a war for the future of humanity.

"It's not just a fight for you know, from here to the Russian border. It's a fight against fascism here, and as goes Donetsk - so goes the world. If we lose here, then fascism takes over the world."

For more than a year Donetsk's suburbs have been the frontlines of a bitter conflict that has killed thousands of civilians and displaced more than 1.5 million people.

Since early September there has been a small respite, as a new ceasefire agreement appears to be holding.

Finnish volunteer Evon says he was motivated to join the rebels after watching TV news reports about the war.

"When I saw what was going on here, I decided to come and help these people, and it was first right decision in my life," Evon says.

"I'll do what I can, I'm not a superman, I'm just one small man, but I can fight."

Donetsk was once the most populous city in eastern Ukraine but now it is a shadow of its former self.

The tree-lined boulevards of the city centre are mostly empty.

In some ways Donetsk seems like it is caught in a Soviet time warp - there are propaganda posters everywhere and most people here refer to their republic as Novo Russia, or new Russia.

But the Donetsk People's Republic is an entity not recognised by any state, including its sponsor in the Kremlin.

None of that bothers Tex, who said he will never return to the United States.

"I'm not going back. I am a patriotic American," he says.

"I love America. I love the American people. But I'm not going back.

"They might kill me here but they're not going to capture me, here or there."

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 http://newcoldwar.org/PZM Magazine (Israel)
The Israeli mother who went to fight Nazism in Ukraine

By Alon Reznik. published on PZM Magazine (Israel), Sept 3, 2015. Original article here. http://www.mako.co.il/pzm-magazine/Article-252ce7b733e8f41006.htm&partner=switch
Translation to English by Joshua Tartakovsky.

Thousands of innocents killed, East versus West, neo-Nazis against the Communists - the civil war in Ukraine is a bloody and tough battle scene, although it is almost unheard about from the media. One Israeli, a mother of two, became aware of the horrors taking place in the east of the country and decided to go and help the separatists in Ukraine. "How could I respond differently to the phenomenon of Nazism that is thriving here"?

"They arrested a civilian in one of their check points and cut off all his internal organs. I saw with my own eyes a fighter who returned from captivity with his nose cut off, an ear severed the tongue amputated, without one eye, and when he took off his clothes, when he undressed completely, his entire body had carvings of swastikas . These cases speak for themselves, even though the Israeli media does not talk about them."

When one first hears these things, one can imagine that this was a testimony of someone returning from Iraq or Syria and saw the horrors of ISIS. But these difficult words were uttered by Inna Levitan, an Israeli citizen of the age of 37, a mother of two girls, who left everything behind and went to the front of the civil war in Ukraine. She joined the pro-Russian separatists, not to fight Ukraine but  to combat the phenomenon of Nazism growing in the country. "I came to destroy fascism. Not Ukraine."

From Tel Aviv to Ukraine

Until a year ago, Inna, a native of  Azerbaijan, did not know what was going on between Russia and Ukraine. "I  knew that something was happening there, as most Israelis," she says. We are carrying out the conversation with her while she is in the East of Ukraine, at the heart of the conflict.

"One day, someone I knew very well told me that he is going to Ukraine. My immediate reaction was - 'for what?'. He started to explain to me about the neo-Nazis there, but I did not listen to him so carefully. The man left and disappeared, although he promised to stay in touch every day.  I decided to find out what's going on there and searched online for information from both directions."

The information Inna discovered online shook her to the core. She read about severe cases of abuse of innocents, of innocent citizens who were left without a shelter after their homes were bombed and entirely destroyed, of a difficult economic situation and of entire villages existing in primitive conditions, all following the aggressive actions of the Ukrainian army. As a result, she decided to pack a few of her belongings and get on a plane in an attempt to find the same friend. At first she arrived in Russia and was told that he was killed, but finally she went to the center of Ukraine and managed to locate him.

After two weeks, she returned to Israel with her heart restless. After a month and a half, she decided to return to Ukraine, this time to the east and for an unlimited period of time. "I wanted to see for myself what is really going on here. If everything said about the Nazis and their actions was indeed the truth".

"I am unable to kill"

Inna joined a Communist brigade by the name of "Prizak" (Ghost), which fights in the eastern city of Lugansk and contains between 100 to 120 soldiers who are citizens of Ukraine, Russia and other countries. She says that they purchase by themselves the improvised uniforms in stores, unlike weapons and ammunition, whose origin she understandably refuses to disclose. "I'm not fighting with weapons, absolutely not. I am also unable to kill," she said when recounting succinctly about her job in the front as a gatherer of intelligence.

"You have no idea in what conditions people live here here. Before I came I did not imagine that it was possible. It is a level where an old woman needs to calculate whether she can afford herself to buy sugar so she can have sweet tea, and finally comes to the conclusion that she has no such option," she says when explaining the difficult conditions."By the way, I gave to that  woman whatever was left of my money, but we are not discussing here just one woman, it's an entire nation."  Moreover, she also talks about the good people who surround her, her friends at the brigade: "many people were gathered here from many places in the world. Here no one regards your nationality or religion and every person accepts the other as he is. For example, they know I do not eat pork and try to get myself kosher food, as much as possible ".

If there is one thing which she is determined about, it is the claim about assistance of Russian military forces on the front - which she says has no connection to reality. "There's no Russian army here. There are some people here, some of whom never served in a military, who do not accept that any financial consideration and they arrived there just the principle," she explains.

In all the conversations with her, she reiterates and emphasizes that she did not go to fight against Ukraine but against fascism and Nazism. She tells of cases of horrific atrocities to which she exposed, which awaken the most difficult feelings: "I talked to a woman who told me about how she received the body of her 14 years old daughter in a wooden box, she was raped by a group of Nazis, underwent torture (it was clear from viewing the body) and after that her genitals were filled with foam of concrete. I do not know where this woman is now, I do not know if she is even alive, I just know that this was not an isolated incident. I heard a lot of things, also from people who are with me and who witnessed such cases."

It should be noted that the evidence of similar horror stories, can be found in a wide range of horrific images running online.

Swastikas sponsored by the Ukrainian army

Nazism in the Ukrainian army, for example in the Aydar Battalion, is a familiar phenomenon. The same fighters wave Nazi flags and have swastikas tattooed on their bodies, and you can easily find an endless number of photos and videos of them making the Nazi salute. They are not concerned and do not even try to hide the fact that they are Nazis, which clearly signifies their burning hatred for the pro-Russian separatist communists, and the other way around. We shall note that in recent weeks, the Internet is full of disturbing news about the intensification of the phenomenon - we hear about neo-Nazi summer camps, and run into shocking videos as the one seen this week in which a little girl is making the Nazi salute and is holding an enormous knife.

However, even though they boast of being Nazis, those "Ukrainian patriots" do not hesitate to accept into their ranks Islamic militants - and even Israeli Jews. A year ago, the Israeli media exposed the story of a former Golani fighter, who was drafted to the same extreme right-wing brigade and did not even hide his identity.  In the interview, he recounts the horrors committed actually by the Russian opponents, who rob, rape and murder civilians. He also described how his friends in the battalion respect him despite his identity and how they worship the Israeli army and wish to hear more about it. The combat background of the same Golani fighter  - himself of Russian origin - is the reason he receives respect from these fighters and not due to their love of Israel. In the Ukrainian army, which takes on major hits in the battle with the separatists, there are also Arab Muslim fighters, and the Israeli soldier recounted in the same interview that they are also respected as they are. It would be interesting to see what kind of treatment they would have received if they were not wearing the Ukrainian uniform.

The Aidar battalion was recognized as part of the Ukrainian army only in August 2014, when its fighters received uniforms and more sophisticated equipment. Earlier, it was a volunteer unit composed of Ukrainian right-wing extremists who wanted to fight the Russian invasion of their country. The same patriotic battalion which was financed by one of the world's richest people, who, it must  be said, is a Jew, is accused by human rights organizations of committing violent war crimes. Despite this, when the same Russian-Israeli-Ukrainian individual heard accusations regarding this and regarding a severe violation of human rights, he explained that in a war, everything happens and that they, the extremist right-wing battalion, earned their good reputation because they are lethal.

The global media does not discuss too much, if at all, the horrors that Inna describes. These horrible crimes, unlike those committed by ISIS, are not done in front of the camera in order to create a PR effect, but quietly, apparently even in chilling spontaneity.

Inna recounts that only in the past several days did foreign journalists begin to enter the conflict zone, and a Russian channel even interviewed her by Skype. After the full interview was put on YouTube, she encountered Israelis online who responded with threats: "Just come back here, whore", one of them wrote, while others sent her private messages and wanted to know where her daughters are located. "One of them wished me I will be left without a hand and a leg, and that I will live as a crippled person all my life," she says.

"I also got a message where I was told that surely I must know that once I get back,  they will break my arms and legs. With these people I lived for 25 years? It this the Israeli people?"

'People here are very simple but with very different ideologies'

When delving deeply into what is taking place in Ukraine, one understands that at its core, the confrontation does not necessarily stem from a conflict over territory or due to national or ethnic differences, but also, and perhaps especially, it is an ideological war which hatred and racism only accompany it.

Alexei Marko (Dobri), one of the founders of Prizrk brigade which Inna joined, argues that the war is not even being waged between Russians and Ukrainians, as most of the world believes. "Many people think that the war here is being waged between Russia and Ukraine, but it is far from the truth. On both sides there are very simple people, but with very different ideologies. The war being waged here is between a Western pro-Nazi and pro-Fascist ideology and a Eastern pro-socialist and Communist ideology, even though there are Russians, Ukrainians, Jews, Arabs, and even Armenians, Italians and Hispanics on both sides. "

According to Inna, the goal is not to destroy, but to build. "I did not come here to kill. I believed that just as Israel was built from scratch at the time, it is possible to build here too a more fair state."

You have two daughters at home. Are you not afraid that something may happen to you? "Some of my friends were killed, mostly by mines, but I do not even think about such things. I went through many crises in my life, ever since childhood, but I always had complete faith that everything will be alright in the end. Here too - I have within me the same faith.

I grew up and was raised in Israel. You tell me as an Israeli, after all, I'm sure you commemorate the Holocaust every year on Holocaust Day by standing when the siren is played, I stand, everyone stands, why did they educate us in this way? For beauty? How could I react differently to the phenomenon of Nazism that is thriving here?"

But beyond her iron principles, behind which she stands one hundred percent, very difficult personal concessions accompany the challenging step she took. Following her decision to leave for Ukraine, she basically lost almost everyone dear to her in Israel. "The most heavy price paid is the connection to my daughters. I lost contact with my family and friends. They do not understand and do not support me".

Finally, Inna requested just one thing: "I will be more than happy if you manage to open people's eyes. Then they will forget eating fast food and watching reality TV for a moment and begin to think for a moment for themselves."

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 #46
New Eastern Outlook
http://journal-neo.org
September 18, 2015
American Risks Life, Limb and Citizenship to Fight Fascists in Ukraine
By Henry Kamens

The People's Army of Donbass is fighting the West and Kiev at the front. Americans hear a lot about this conflict from various sources, but most know little about what is in effect a proxy war with Russia because they don't hear from people on the front line.

Well here is one American who's been there and done it, and is still doing it. Russell Bentley has seen enough of what is going on the world to know a good cause when he sees one. As he says, "The Russian-hating fascistic junta which seized power in Kiev, and is terrorising the people under the command of NATO and criminals it has imported from other countries where it did the same, will not be satisfied until Ukraine is destroyed and much of the region, including Europe, destabilised." He decided to do something about it, and here is his account of this conflict.

Q: Can you provide some background about why you are in Ukraine?

First, I am not the only American fighting Fascism in Donbass. There are several I know of, and have met, but I am the only one I will be talking about today.

My name is Russell Bentley. I was born in Austin, Texas, in 1960. My call sign in the Novorussian Army is "Texas".

I came to Donetsk on 7th December, 2014, joined the Vostok Battalion on Dec 14th and went to the battlefront on December 31st. I came here to fight Fascism and help the heroic people of Novorussia create a new nation.

I am a Communist and an Anti-Fascist. The US government is truly a fascist government. Mussolini said "Fascism should be called "corporatism", because it is the merger of government power". According to Mussolini"s definition, and the 14 Defining Elements of Fascism by Lawrence Britt, the USA has a fascist government.

It is clear to any reasonable person that the US government fits both definitions given above. It is Fascist, so I fight against it.

Q: What have you been doing since you arrived?

My first day of combat was January 1st, 2015. I served with the Essence of Time combat unit from January to June, at Donetsk Airport and at Spartak. When the unit was transferred from the Vostok Battalion to the Khan Battalion in July, I was made a press officer in their information centre.

I was invited to join DONi News in July and accepted their offer. I am currently the Director of the DONi Press Centre. We do counter-propaganda work and help international journalists and visitors who come to Donetsk see the truth for themselves.

Q: What is life like at the front?

Whatever people imagine, it is different in practice. If you read the accounts of people who have joined the French Foreign Legion these will give you a pretty good idea of what to expect. But things are still different in the real world.

We are a Special Forces unit of a real Army fighting a real war. It is tough and dangerous here. People get killed. We are fighting a ruthless and powerful enemy. But we are winning.

We work a minimum of 12 hours a day, 6 days a week, usually more. As in any army, we are expected to follow orders and do our jobs to the best of our ability. Trust and respect are not given here, they are earned.

The most important thing to do here is LEARN RUSSIAN. There are people here who speak English, Spanish, German and Italian, but the more Russian someone knows, the better. They do not have to be fluent, but how much they know when they get here is a good indication of their abilities and dedication.

Volunteers also have to bring AS MUCH MONEY AS THEY CAN with them. They may or may not be paid, and even if they are it is not be much by Western standards. The people here fight for a just cause, not for money.

Volunteers are provided with food, uniforms and a place to stay. Their needs are met, including medical care, and internet access is available, but no one should expect a luxury hotel or vacation lifestyle here. We ask volunteers to have a MINIMUM of $1,000 with them when they arrive in Donetsk, and 3 times that is recommended. They also need to bring one camouflage uniform and a good pair of boots, along with a few civilian clothes and toiletries.

WE DO NOT ACCEPT PEOPLE WHO COME HERE THROUGH THE UKRAINIAN LINES. THEY MUST COME THROUGH ROSTOV. We do not trust people who come from the Ukrop side, whether 'volunteers', 'journalists' or 'tourists'. We expect people to come from the Russian side with visas containing two entry permits.

The Russian visa process can be daunting and somewhat expensive. You have to pay around $300 or $400 to get your visa expedited. It is not cheap, but it is worth it. A one-way ticket is sufficient to get here, but it would be foolish for someone not to have enough money for a return trip if needed.

Volunteers generally fly to Moscow and then take a train or plane to Rostov-on-Don. From there they get a bus to Donetsk. Crossing the border from Russia into Novorussia is not a problem. We tell people to tell the border guards they are going to Donetsk to visit friends. They know what is meant, and let people through.

Q: What sort of people are joining your army?

Most of our volunteers come from various regions of Russia and from abroad. When they arrive in Rostov they are given contacts, then go to the address they are sent to for identification and wait with others to be able to get to the front as a group.

For every 100 people who say they are coming, maybe one actually does. It may not be easy to get here, but it is actually the easiest part of the process.

If someone cannot figure out how to get here on their own they are probably not qualified to be an XAH soldier. But there are other options - other military units are not as demanding, and some people are accepted there even if they do not qualify for the XAH Battalion. There are also many opportunities to help the DNR and LNR in humanitarian areas.

People become members of our army when they get on our official transport near the border. Volunteers are sent to different parts of the front, depending on combat need assessed by military experts. Movement through all parts of the republics is not always possible, but people can be given rides to some parts and they can still use public transport in some others.

Q: What sort of people do you need right now?

We only accept adult men at the front (we send women from time to time but most are returned). They must have a passport, and a military ticket if they can get one.

We have the most need of BMP tank drivers and other technical specialists. People with medical and media experience are very useful here, as are people with computer and other technical skills.

If you come here, you will be welcomed and appreciated, and we will help you find the best place to contribute to the future of Novorussia. But people should not join if they are trying to avoid national service, are wanted by the police or need to pay off a bank loan. Some people think we can help with these matters, but we can't.

We don't have a full system of military training in place right now. We do not have the facility to offer this in all places. In certain parts of the front at quiet periods we can offer adequate training, but if there is intense fighting volunteers have to rely on civilian level training. That's why we only accept people who we think are ready to fight and can handle it physically, technically and emotionally.

We have a sort of a training centre in St. Petersburg which gives locally recruited volunteers short but intensive training before they can go to Donbass. We accept donations of money for the running of this centre but the training itself is free, paid for by the Donbass command centre.

There is no fixed length of service in our army, but we expect people to stay for at least 3 months and do not accept people who only want to fight in the holidays. Decisions about who leaves and stays are made by the commanders at the front. Going from one group to another and leaving the front without permission are punished.

Many volunteers come to Rostov without any equipment and think they will be given everything at the front, but we do not have enough equipment at the front. We ask all prospective volunteers to bring all they can with them. We are getting more equipment now, but this is mainly going to Donbass-based soldiers who have no money.

We expect Russian and foreign volunteers to buy their own equipment as they have greater opportunity to do so. Many people can't bring armaments, vests and ammunition with them but they should at least have personal items, underwear, camouflage, ankle boots, shirts, spare socks, gloves, a knife, a flask and a helmet. If funds permit, it is desirable to bring a second set of everything: clothes, and especially shoes, wear out quickly. We also expect people to bring their own medical items, such as PPI, water disinfection filters, activated carbon, aspirin, band-aids, chlorhexidine, cold treatments (Teraflu, etc.). Basic medical kits, with medicines, can be obtained from tourist shops catering for people travelling abroad.

Q: Can people provide for their families by joining your army?

If people think that they can make money out of fighting with us they have got the wrong idea. Everyone who is here is fighting for Novorussia at their own expense. You don't make a profit and you can be killed. But we are here to fight Fascism, as most of Europe once did, and that is what matters.

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