Johnson's Russia List
2015-#177
11 September 2015
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In this issue
 
#1
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
September 11, 2015
New research shows the Arctic is warming faster than previously believed
Russian scientists have found about 700 "methane holes" in the Arctic shelf. The scale of emissions shows that the permafrost has degraded severely, and researchers think the thawing is irreversible.
Yana Pchelintseva, special to RBTH
 
A team of Russian scientists spent over 20 years examining thermokarst lakes - bodies of water formed by permafrost thawing. These lakes are sources of carbon dioxide, and recently they've begun to grow rapidly in size. Some are difficult to recognize on satellite imagery compared to a few years ago, and in certain areas the coastline has shifted by 70 meters in just two or three years. The question of carbon emissions in the Arctic continental shelf, however, is an even more serious issue than the thaw lakes.

Millions of tiny lakes

For decades, researchers at Tomsk State University (TSU) have been studying the West Siberian subarctic, an important natural zone of the Northern Hemisphere. Their main research facility is the Khanymey scientific station, located in a small village of Russia's Yamalo-Nenets region in the Arctic Circle. The size of local wetlands surpass those of Scandinavia, Canada and Alaska by several times.

"The soil organic carbon, also known as peat, transforms into carbon dioxide the fastest while in water," said Sergei Kirpotin, head of TSU's BioKlimLand research center. "Over 80 percent of subarctic Siberia is covered by thermokarst lakes, but the scale of the carbon dioxide flow still has not been evaluated by anyone, and neither has the chemical composition of the water. We are currently working on it together with our colleagues from Sweden and France as part of the Siberian Inland Waters international initiative."

Researchers discovered that smaller lakes with a surface area under 100 square meters, which are virtually undetectable by satellites and do not show up on any maps, emit several times more greenhouse gases than bigger lakes. There are millions such tiny lakes in the Siberian tundra, and due to their negligible size until recently they were not taken into account within existing carbon exchange models.

Because of the increasing permafrost thawing in West Siberia, the bigger thermokarst lakes could soon break up into numerous smaller ones. "This could lead to a tenfold increase of greenhouse gases and dissolved organic carbon emissions into rivers and the Arctic," said Kirpotin.  
 
Arctic continental shelf will determine the future

An even more serious problem than the thermokarst lakes are the processes that occur within the Arctic continental shelf. Carbon emissions in the form of methane and carbon dioxide are already having a significant impact on Earth's climate.  

"Five years ago we discovered that the massive methane emissions that occur in the seas of the western Arctic are about two times larger than emissions in all the world's oceans," said Igor Semiletov, a geochemist at the Pacific Oceanological Institute and Tomsk Polytechnic University.

In 2014, an international research team led by Semiletov set sail to the Arctic Ocean on the Oden icebreaker science vessel. The researchers were the first to closely examine the waters of the outer West Arctic continental shelf at depths below 50 meters, and it turned out that carbon emissions in the shelf zone are much more intense than expected. Up to several hundred grams of methane per square meter are emitted daily, which shows that the underwater Arctic permafrost has been degrading severely. About 700 such "methane holes," each up to a kilometer in diameter, have been found in the shelf.

"We are finding more and more evidence confirming our hypothesis about the leading role of the Siberian continental shelf in changing Earth's methane balance at the present time and for at least the past 400 years," said Semiletov. "We are now experiencing what is called an interglacial period, during which sea levels rise." 
 #2
www.rt.com
September 11, 2015
Moscow must remain capital city, most Russians tell pollsters

Some 80 percent of Russian citizens reject the idea of moving the national capital, yet only 13 percent admitted that they'd prefer their children to choose Moscow as their place of residence.

According to research released by the state-owned agency VTSIOM on Friday, only 5 percent of Russians would definitely support the transition of the capital from Moscow to some other city. A further 7 percent answered that they were not opposed to the idea, while 8 percent said they were undecided.

The remainder of respondents - 80 percent - said they'd definitely prefer Moscow to remain the capital of the Russian Federation.

The idea to move the capital from Moscow was more popular among residents of the city itself along with denizens of Russia's second-largest city and former capital St. Petersburg. Among people with strong political allegiances the idea was more popular with supporters of the Communist Party and the non-parliamentary opposition.

At the same time, only 13 percent of Russians said they would prefer their children to live in Moscow permanently. Some 11 percent said St. Petersburg was the best city for their offspring and 23 percent answered that if they could choose the place of residence for their children it would be some small Russian town. Twelve percent liked villages best and another 12 percent said that if they could choose they would send their children abroad.

VTSIOM's director for communications, Aleksey Firsov, commented on the poll results by saying that Russians have started to associate big cities with stress, high cost of living and bad environment. At the same time he noted that the plan to move the Russian capital from Moscow which is voiced from time to time by various politicians apparently has very weak public support and that the idea of antagonism between provincial and capital residents was an exaggeration.

The general director of the agency, Valery Fyodorov, told Kommersant newspaper that the majority of Russians think of Moscow as a "sacred capital" and not as of a place that capitalizes on the poverty and misfortune of other places.

The plan to move the capital from Moscow to somewhere in the center of Russian Federation has been voiced, among others, by the current Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu (who comes from the Siberian region of Tyva) and radical nationalist politician and writer Eduard Limonov (who grew up in the Ukrainian industrial city of Kharkov).

The current Mayor of Moscow Sergey Sobyanin has repeatedly opposed the idea and said that losing 'capital' status would cause a real economic disaster both in the City of Moscow and the Moscow Region.
 
 
#3
Russia Beyond the Headlines/Lenta.ru
September 11, 2015
World Travel Awards: St. Petersburg best travel destination in Europe    
City beats out competition from Paris, London - and Yorkshire.

St. Petersburg has been named the best tourist destination in Europe by the prestigious World Travel Awards Europe, according to the organization's site.

The key factors in the city's success were century-old traditions, a rich history and its great tourist potential.

Amsterdam, Paris, Barcelona, Venice, Lisbon, Florence, Edinburgh, Istanbul, London, Porto, Berlin and the UK county of Yorkshire were all competing this year for the award.

All the winners of the organization's European travel prizes will participate in the World Travel Awards world final in Morocco on Dec. 12.

The World Travel Awards has been honoring organizations and companies that excel in the development of the tourist industry for 22 years.

First published in Russian in Lenta.ru
 
 #4
Moscow Times
September 11, 2015
Russian Regions Prepare to Vote After Campaign of Tricks, Complacency
By Daria Litvinova

On Sunday, the governors of 21 Russian regions and more than 1,300 heads of small city administrations will be elected, together with deputies for 11 regional parliaments and 25 city legislatures.

The nationwide elections, known as unified election day, are considered by some analysts to be a final rehearsal for the State Duma elections in 2016 in which tactics and methods are being tested accordingly.

The main question is whether the opposition will be able to gain any ground, but chances are slim, say pundits.

"The Kremlin fears elections at all levels," Dmitry Oreshkin, an independent political analyst, told The Moscow Times, commenting on vigorous efforts in some regions to eliminate the opposition at the candidate registration stage.

The campaign has seen several tactics employed that have raised eyebrows among political commentators.

Securing the Seat

This year nine regional governors resigned before their terms officially ended in order to participate in the elections in September. Most of them still had another two years left in office, though some had just a few days left of their terms.

Mikhail Ignatyev, head of the republic of Chuvashia, handed in his notice in June, two months before his office was due to expire, according to the independent election watchdog Golos. Rustam Minnikhanov, head of the republic of Tatarstan, proved the most impatient: He resigned just a day before his term ended on March 24 this year.

Under Russian legislation, if a sitting governor resigns before their term expires, elections are scheduled for the closest unified election day. Critics say this tactic is used by pro-Kremlin governors to secure their seat for another five years.

The technique was piloted by Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin, who resigned unexpectedly in June 2013 and was re-elected in September after winning a tough battle against Russian opposition firebrand Alexei Navalny, who almost forced Sobyanin into a second round of voting.

Among the benefits of the sudden summer resignation, analysts named the fact that it caught the opposition off guard, while Sobyanin was able to plan the campaign for as long as he thought necessary, since he knew he would resign.

The official reason most of the governors give President Vladimir Putin, who has to accept their resignation for the race to go forward, is their desire to become elected governors - most were instead appointed before gubernatorial elections were reinstated in 2012 - and be held accountable by their electorate.

Stymieing the Opposition

This year, Navalny and his allies are actively participating in the race as part of the Democratic Coalition, which consists of Navalny's Party of Progress, Parnas and several other parties.

The coalition put forward candidates for the regional parliaments of Novosibirsk, Kostroma, Magadan and Kaluga, but only succeeded in registering them in Kostroma.

To eliminate the opposition, election commissions used the so-called signature filter that proved effective in 2014. In order to register, campaigners are required to gather a certain number of signatures from potential voters in their support and submit them to the election commissions. These commissions frequently declare some of the signatures invalid on various grounds, and deny the candidates registration.

This tactic has proved to be easier and less risky than falsifying the results of the actual votes, said Andrei Buzin, co-chair of the council of Golos. After widespread fraud accusations following the State Duma elections in 2011, the authorities made the decision to minimize ballot fraud during major elections, he said, as it generates a major media backlash. Now they prefer to use another technique to get rid of the opposition: cutting it off at the registration stage.

In addition to failing to enter the race, some of Navalny's allies suffered collateral damage. His longtime supporter Leonid Volkov, who ran a campaign in Novosibirsk, is currently under investigation and faces up to six years in prison for allegedly breaking a microphone belonging to a LifeNews tabloid reporter.

Andrei Pivovarov, the opposition campaign manager in Kostroma, is on trial for an alleged attempt to steal personal data. Georgy Alburov, an investigator at Navalny's Anti-Corruption Foundation and a candidate in Magadan, was attacked by unidentified thugs while campaigning.

After his allies were pushed out of most of the regions they had stood in, Navalny announced a rally in Moscow on Sept. 20 and called on his supporters to come and express their protest against the elections he says are unfair.

Foreign Funding

A number of United Russia candidates running in gubernatorial elections were spotted receiving foreign funding for their campaigns in direct violation of election laws by the independent election watchdog Golos.

The largest donations from abroad were received by candidates from the ruling United Russia party and by the party itself, Golos revealed in research published last month on its website.

The usual scheme for concealing foreign sources of donations involves two Russian intermediaries, the report said. The Russian company that officially donates money to the candidate must be owned or controlled by another Russian company, which in turn is owned or managed by a foreign entity.

In many cases, the funding came from offshore companies registered in Cyprus or the Virgin Islands that are stockholders of Russian enterprises.

This year at least two United Russia candidates - Viktor Nazarov in the Omsk region and Vasily Golubev in the Rostov region, both incumbent governors - received foreign funding through intermediary Russian companies, the report said.

Spokespeople for Nazarov's campaign claimed the money was returned to the donor as soon as it became clear that it had come from abroad, the Kommersant newspaper reported last month.

No Manifestos

Only five acting governors - of the Arkhangelsk, Kaliningrad, Leningrad, Sakhalin and Jewish autonomous regions - have published original electoral manifestos, the Petersburg Politics think tank said in a report published last week.

The manifestos that have been published mostly focus on previous achievements and promise stability instead of development, the think tank found.

"Some of the manifestos are written in such a way as though the candidates have already won the elections," the report said.

All the candidates seeking election were appointed as acting governors by Putin in recent months, and most were nominated and endorsed by the ruling United Russia party.

The lack of manifestos was explained by pundits as down to a deficit of clear vision among candidates and complacency that since they have already been endorsed by Putin, there is no need to persuade voters that they will improve their lives.

"Governors don't need manifestos because manifestos will not get them elected, only the Kremlin's endorsement will do that," said Natalya Zubarevich, director of the regions program at the Independent Institute of Social Policy, a think tank in Moscow.

Senator Castling

Gubernatorial elections this year could result in a few changes in the Federation Council, the upper chamber of the Russian parliament. Last month Vladimir Yakunin, the notorious head of the Russian Railways state monopoly and a close friend of Putin, raised eyebrows by announcing his decision to leave the lucrative job for a senator's seat.

Yakunin was put forward as a candidate for the Federation Council by Nikolai Tsukanov, the acting governor of the Kaliningrad region, who is taking part in Sunday's elections and who, if he wins, will be able to delegate a senator to the upper chamber of parliament.

But Yakunin, accused by his detractors of making Russian Railways highly unprofitable, seems confident of his backer's success: He has already left the state rail monopoly and has been replaced by one of its top managers, Oleg Belozerov.

The seat of senator for the Arkhangelsk region could be taken by Viktor Pavlenko, the current mayor of Arkhangelsk, known for suggesting a local gay parade could be held on Paratroopers Day, which is notorious for its drunken violence.
 
 #5
Running for Office in Siberia: Part VI: The Home Stretch
A series on the District #35 Election for Novosibirsk City Council
By Sarah Lindemann-Komarova
[Founder, Siberian Civic Initiatives Support Center 1995 - 2014. Helped to establish this as the hub for the first civil society development support network in the former Soviet Union.]

With pictures:
https://medium.com/@ECHOSiberia/running-for-office-in-siberia-the-home-stretch-cf48c93bd9c2

Much of the post-debate handshake goodwill among the District #35 Novosibirsk City Council candidates blew away in a blizzard of campaign flyers that appeared two weeks before the election.  Even without polling data it is clear the field of possible winners is down to four and one of them is Natalia Pinus.  Construction businessman Galitarov is another and the one name you can't forget along with his face because it is everywhere (except for answering questions at the debate or other public events) in all sizes and on all surfaces.  The other two still in are Science man (with support from the Siberian Academy of Sciences and the nationalist Rodina and Communist parties) and the Head of heating- water monopoly enterprise/former KGB Man.   The intensity of the race brought concerns about the integrity of the vote and influence of money on the whole process.  This was exacerbated with the announcement that instead of one District #35 polling station, all 15 would be open for early voting from 4-8PM.  Increasing opportunities to maximize voter turn-out is great, but it also increases opportunities for falsifying results. Natalia Pinus posted a note on Facebook asking for volunteer observers and inviting anyone interested to a training, she organized in cooperation with the four other debate candidates.  
 
Thirty volunteers, mostly young, gathered in a coffee house as an election observer trainer described what they needed to look out for, what to do if it happens and how to keep it from happening.  He explained the norm would be 2-4 people a day showing up.  Therefore, if you notice 50 people entering the polling station from a bus and they are all teachers from one school with the same excuse for why they will be unavailable to vote on September 13, call the volunteer coordinator and if you can't reach him, call the lawyer.   At the end of your shift, ask the election representative to let you sign the outside of the envelope with ballots (gel pen only as they are sure to smudge if tampered with) and at the start of the session ask to see the previous days envelope and signature. If they don't let you do this, sign two copies of a declaration describing their refusal and submit it to the electoral commission.  The volunteers were told to think of themselves as "the opposition". I always thought of observers as "neutral" since anyone who agrees to spend their free time this way is already primed for vigilance.   This aggressive need to practice democracy as an endless confrontation, "expect the worst, prepare for the worst", has been hard wired into Russian post-Soviet political life.   This most sacred expression of freedom in Russia was first articulated to me in a 1992 poem about democracy written by a student of mine at Novosibirsk State University:

"Oh Freedom! Oh, its sweetest taste
To be Against, Against, Against!"

This reminder of the Russian predilection towards negativity and cynicism made me think about why I was interested in Natalia's campaign in the first place. It represented something different, being for something, the big dare, seeing if a qualified, grassroots candidate running a wholly positive campaign without institutional support could succeed.    As the final week of the campaign began Natalia's commitment to a civil, issues based competition met its first big challenge when a blog appeared comparing her appearance as a candidate to that of the famed character  in "Charley's Aunt", the British satire that became a classic Soviet television film, "Hello! I am Your Aunt!".  The allusion to the wealthy, flamboyant drag queen is the nicest thing in the blog alongside three levels of charges. The first was aimed at her as a woman, how did a 20 year old get to run a company in the 90's?  Another, screamed poseur lying about being a graduate of the prestigious State University (NSU) when she really went to the Pedagogical (I have seen no evidence of this). Lastly, Natalia was presented as a closeted opposition candidate with connections to Aleksei Navalny. This would be the ultimate stealth candidacy considering she ran in and won the United Russia primary. Natalia posted a link to the blog on her FB page with the following comment:

"I want to tell you that I am calm about these types of publications. I expected something like this and realize it is an inevitable part of the process in which I am participating. In fact, the emergence of such articles tells me  I'm on the right track. How to react? Just go and vote on September 13. Thanks to all who are with me!"

She was right it was an indication of her perceived strength as a candidate by one, if not more of her opponents.  Several days later the attacks appeared off-line.  A young woman planted herself on the main street with signs asking, "Pinus, why do you take credit for things done by others" and "Why do you lie and say you went to NSU?".   She was there in front of the building where Natalia was conducting her "Citizen Mandate Conference".   The conference was not well attended but it did attract more than the 25 person quorum established by the "Mandate Conference Law".  Novosibirsk is one of six regions in Russia that have this legislation providing citizens a process that forces elected officials to formally consider their demands.  Even if she loses the election, Natalia's program of mandates that pass tonight will have to be considered by the winning Deputy.

Two other candidates were in the auditorium.  The no chance candidate sat quietly in the back while Heating/KGB Man sat down front along with three women supporters who also work for the enterprise he heads. They express surprise there are so few people compared to the 60 who showed up at their similar event over the weekend.  Natalia is elected Conference President and two others to count and register votes before her mandates appear one by one on a big screen for discussion and voting.  There are 44 of them representing a comprehensive development strategy for the District that evolved on the basis of sociological surveys, interviews and her courtyard campaign meetings.  Natalia was reading mandate #1 when a Heating/KGB Man supporter interrupted questioning her competency and asking for more details.  Natalia thanked her for the question and tried to respond but the interruptions continued as the Heating/KGB candidate slipped out.  The pattern was set, the trio would challenge everything, Natalia would politely respond until members of the audience would tell the women to shut up and ask Natalia to take a vote.   Meanwhile, there was non-stop patter between two female pensioners sitting behind me as each mandate passed:

#29 Moving to a cleaner water source for the District , "Clean water? Why not? Everything depends on water".  
#30 Comprehensive program for the elderly, "Ugh, elderly" she laughs, " God, we'll all be dead soon, ok, let's vote".  
#38 A bicycle path throughout the District, "Why not?".

For 90 minutes Natalia kept her cool responding to every question and charge from the trio but the audience became increasingly pointed in their frustration towards the disrupters.   The crescendo of this opera came with the choreographed storming out by each member of the trio.  When the last was gone and the voting continued Natalia reacted to the silence and accord by saying, "It's kind of boring without them" and everyone laughed.  

As the final week grinds on you can't help but wonder what it is like for Natalia running non-stop around town to meetings, often accompanied by at least one of her three children and surrounded by advertisements for her more flush competitors. I decided to quantify the situation and the billboard count represents what I assume are the current betting odds but for the absence of Natalia:

Nikita Galitarov (Construction businessman): Six billboards covering main roads AND railroad track.  He is also street level on a poster next to young people distributing a newspaper with his response to the question, "Why are you running in Akademgorodok when don't live or work here?".  Beyond confirming that he does not live or work here, nothing in his answer makes sense.  According to Nikita his qualifications are he is young, he is spending lots of money to prove he is honest (I assume the source is his father, founder of the building company) and everything in life is still ahead of him.  His endless budget is supporting a game of whack-a-mole as campaign stickers reappear as soon as they are torn down throughout the neighborhood.  However, this quantity of printed matter may be generating a backlash, at least among the next generation.  A friend told me her 9 year old son asked her not to vote for Galitarov, "I am sick of all this paper, I feel sorry for the trees".  

Sergei Lavroshev (Science Man): Three billboards, stickers, numerous street level signs and a couple of pavilions manned by young people handing out newspapers with his program.

Gennadi Sokoltsov (Heating/KGB Man): Four billboards, some stickers on apartment buildings

Pavel Semenykhin is billboardless and out of the running as an individual candidate because he does not live or work in the District AND has no money. His campaign does prove the value in party backing.  The social democratic A Just Russia party publishes newspapers presenting all their candidates, provides some individual stickers and, the most flashy display by any candidate so far, flag wavers standing next to posters at busy intersections during rush hour.    A close second is a lifelike cardboard figure but it is a candidate running in the regional election.  

The dirty tricks against Natalia peak just before the "day of silence" (no campaigning is allowed the day before the election). A mock version of her newspaper is being distributed calling her "the new fighter on our team" alongside the names of major figures associated with the economic policies in the 90's that lead to the impoverishment of most while creating an oligarchy and posting stickers of this on cars so they are immune to the no-campaigning regulation.  This is a well funded take down effort targeted solely at her, there is no public evidence of dirty tricks against the other candidates.  

Does she doubt the wisdom of saying "no" to running for United Russia after winning the primary when she drives under the billboard for their candidate in the next District?    She continues to display the patience of Job responding to attacks with calm understanding  and there is no indication of regrets about her choices or lessened belief in the value and importance of the path she has chosen as an independent, grassroots candidate. Maybe she realizes that her legacy is secure regardless of election results because she provided the good people of District #35 with a real choice. As the fake newspapers are being stuffed into post boxes Natalia hosts the presentation of a new sculpture at the duck pond.  She soldiers on billboardless but her accomplishment is well documented in the hundreds of photographs taken daily by parents as their children feed the ducks in the pond that never would have been there if Natalia Pinus had not decided to become an activist five years ago.  

Final Chapter coming soon: And the winner is.....


 
 #6
Carnegie Moscow Center
September 8, 2015
Return of the Russian Tandem
By Tatyana Stanovaya
Tatyana Stanovaya is the head of the analytical department at the Center for Political Technologies in Moscow.

The "tandem" is back-that was how Russians reacted when President Vladimir Putin's and Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev's made a strange televised trip to the gym together at the end of the August.

Rumors of Medvedev's imminent political demise have circulated ever since Putin began his third presidential term in 2012, while his old friend became prime minister. But the man who both succeeded and preceded him as president is now being presented to us again as his close ally and even his successor.

The public workout was a classic special operation with messages both for the elite and the Russian general public. These messages suggest Russia has entered a different political reality from the one it has been living through for the past four years.

At the end of his presidential term in 2011, Medvedev surrendered his claim to be an independent politician and the well-known Putin-Medvedev "tandem" ended. A wave of conservatism and a backlash by the siloviki and new strongmen then destroyed practically the whole of Medvedev's legacy as president.

Many expected that Medvedev would not be able to bear this humiliation, that he would slam the door and maybe even become the head of a new opposition. But in April 2012 Medvedev suddenly disowned his own reputation. He declared that "he had never been a liberal in his convictions" and called himself "a person with conservative values."
 
This about-turn raised the question, "Who is Mr. Medvedev?" Putin's shadow? A cunning intriguer, who knows how to outwit his enemies through patience?

Over the past four years, we have actually encountered three different Medvedevs.

The Medvedev of 2011-2013 was a "political victim." Prime ministers in modern Russia are usually divided into the "political" (those of the Yeltsin period, as well as Mikhail Kasyanov) and the "technical" (Mikhail Fradkov, Viktor Zubkov). Medvedev fitted into neither category.

Medvedev was "technical" in that he was expected to forfeit the right of second-in-command in making decisions regarding policy and staff appointments to the presidential administration. He was also a political prime minister. He had after all been president of Russia for four years with all the accompanying electoral legitimacy, political mandate and direct involvement in world politics.

In September 2011, Medvedev's independence began to decline rapidly, as he was publicly lambasted for the performance of the government.

The Putin-Medvedev relationship-dry and somewhat cool-was based on the model of boss-employee. Putin criticized ministers in public, threatened to "take measures" and to take matters into his own hands. Reports of Putin's strong irritation with Medvedev's government were leaked to the media, which broadcast anti-Medvedev documentaries-"The Lost Day" (about the war in Georgia) and "Playing to Lose" (accusing Medvedev of pre-Western policies).

This phase in which Medvedev was cut down to size as a politician lasted almost two years. In the fall of 2013 speculation peaked about the likelihood of his resignation.

But in early 2014, as the Ukrainian crisis escalated and the economic situation in Russia worsened, a model of cooperation with Putin resumed. The president began defending the prime minister and cabinet and taking political responsibility for painful decisions they made.

In January 2014, Putin announced that he would meet with Medvedev every two weeks to discuss the development of the country. This sent a clear signal to the elite: From now on, keep your hands off the prime minister. Stability was more important. The country had entered a zone of turbulence, and no one was allowed to rock the boat. Medvedev was required to be a technical prime minister in the full sense.

And now, from August 2015, we again have Medvedev as a political prime minister. There were at least three signs of this before it was confirmed by the public work-out with Putin.

Firstly, Medvedev's prot�g�s in government, such as Sergei Donskoy and Alexander Novak, have been unshackled and given more power.

Secondly, the heads of state-owned enterprises are stepping down: railways chief Vladimir Yakunin, whom Medvedev had twice attempted to fire without success, Evgeny Dod (RusHydro), and very likely Oleg Budargin (Rosseti).

Thirdly, it was announced that Medvedev will head United Russia's electoral list in the 2016 parliamentary elections. His political role is being mapped out for the future.

The joint trip to the gym was a public formalization of the new model. Putin is giving Medvedev back his political capital, which can then be used for a variety of purposes.

Why is Medvedev making a comeback ?

This is not all about Putin's cunning plans, as many people imagine. Times are changing and resources are diminishing. Strong political players with their ambitions and insatiable appetites are no longer so welcome. Men like Yakunin and Rosneft chief Igor Sechin have suffered defeats. This is a time for second-rank figures, for "technocrats."

Does this mean the return of the famous "tandem" under which Russia lived during the Medvedev presidency? We should not rush to conclusions.

Medvedev is being rehabilitated. He is useful to Putin as someone who has proven his willingness still to play ball, despite having suffered humiliation.

This is not enough for us to talk about a new tandem. It does however demonstrate Putin's need to delegate--not his authority, but responsibility for the direction of the country. It is important to understand that for Putin at the moment the question of who will be his a successor has become a technical issue. Everyone is in the same boat, threatened by the same storm. This is a time for everyone to work together and "toil like galley slaves."
#7
Vedomosti
September 7, 2015
Putin creates "team of new young favourites" - newspaper
Konstantin Simonov, general director of the National Energy Security Fund: Hello, young tribe. Vladimir Putin may be starting to form team of new young favourites

The external factor is having a serious impact not only on Russia's foreign policy, but also on its domestic policy. The system of governing the country is being slightly retuned. And it is not only a matter of limited resources because of the sanctions. Vladimir Putin is obligated to spend a significant proportion of his time on tackling foreign policy issues. This gives the elite groups some scope for trying to convince Putin that they are right. Putin himself cannot afford a process of arbitration involving too large a number of participants. This is why certain questions are left hanging and why there is a desire to restrict the communication circle. After all, it is easier to communicate with a limited range of people involved in decision-making. The system of manual control functions better that way.

This also lies behind the idea of amalgamating ministries and departments. Often there is no logic in the amalgamation - other than bureaucratic logic. In this context the clans attempt to strengthen their representatives' influence by widening their powers. We have already seen the merger of the Federal Antimonopoly Service and the Federal Tariff Service, which made no economic sense. Many people saw the uniting of the tax and customs services as a prototype for a ministry of revenue, whose chances of being created will rise in proportion to the intensification of negative economic trends. The merger of the Finance Ministry and the Ministry of Economic Development currently looks like the outsider among the rumours, but it confirms the trend. No doubt there will also be other ministerial mergers.

However, to view Putin as a hostage to some kind of narrow grouping would be a severe exaggeration. Alongside the amalgamations, Putin has also continued another curious process. He is adding new players, who are beginning to change the apparatus landscape. In this respect the replacement of Vladimir Yakunin with Oleg Belozerov [as new president of the state-owned Russian Railways company] is very interesting. The media are speculating about what kind of person he is. In fact the clans can recommend various people to Putin. But they themselves must have been personally memorable to Putin for some reason or other. And they will listen only to him, not to the clans. On the contrary, representatives of the young generation of Putin administrators, who are guided not by Putin but by strong figures in his entourage, are punished. Yevgeniy Dod [head of RusGidro] is an example.

Putin may be beginning to form a team of new young favourites - who were not linked to him in the early stages of his career because of their age and who were introduced to Putin only after he became president. They will owe their career rise exclusively to Putin. Their loyalty to the president will be even higher than that of the older generation of Putin's entourage - if only because, by virtue of their youth, they are hoping to run the country after Putin's departure from the presidency. Thanks to Putin they have already secured significant positions in the state, they simply need to hold onto those, and after Putin's departure there will be a chance of advancing even further.

Maybe they will compete with young managers of a different kind: the children and other younger relatives of people in Putin's entourage, who are being actively placed in high posts in state business. These people will also be property owners, which adds to the excitement. So it is not going to be boring.
 
 #8
Levada.ru
September 10, 2015
Military might and stability Putin's main achievements - poll

Russia's increased defence capability, overall stability and the stable political situation in the country are amongst President Vladimir Putin's top achievements, according to poll results published on Russian independent polling organization Levada Centre's website on 10 September.

The poll was conducted on 21-24 August 2015 amongst 800 respondents over 18 years of age in 134 settlements across 46 regions of Russia.

The combined survey results of the questions "What was Vladimir Putin's main achievement over his years in power" and "What else has he achieved?" revealed that 33 per cent of the respondents viewed the president's main accomplishment was in strengthening the country's military might. This category received its highest ranking by far over the whole 10 years the poll has been conducted. Only 14 per cent of respondents said the same in 2007, when Putin's main achievement was thought to be strengthening Russia's international ties.

Bringing the country to order and developing international ties ranked second, with 27 per cent of respondents viewing this as Putin's main accomplishment.

At the same time, 29 per cent said Putin's biggest failure was in fighting corruption and bribery. With 17 per cent of respondents' votes, failure in the country's economic development ranked as Putin's second-biggest mishap, one of the highest-ranking categories the poll had in the last decade.

When asked who was to blame for Russia's economic problems and growing prices, 45 per cent said the government and the ministers were responsible while 29 per cent put the heat on Prime Minister Dmitriy Medvedev, up from 25 per cent in August 2014. Just 44 per cent said the country's leader was responsible for the economic troubles, down from 65 per cent in 2014 and 58 per cent a year earlier.
 #9
Novaya Gazeta
September 1, 2015
Sociologist says Putin's rating is independent of economic factors
Interview with sociologist Aleksey Levinson, chief of the Levada Centre Sociocultural Studies Department, by Irina Timofeyeva: Aleksey Levinson: 'During the Crisis We Will See Not the "New Poor," But the Old Poor"'

The well-known sociologist says that the president's rating in Russia does not depend on the state of the economy, and talks about why you cannot compare the victory in the Great Patriotic War with the annexation of Crimea.

According to Vice Premier Olga Golodets, 22 million Russians found themselves below the poverty line in July 2015. According to the figures of the Federal Service for State Statistics, the number of Russians living below the poverty line has increased by 3.1 million since the beginning of 2015 - to 22.9 million. The reason is the fall in the rate of the rouble, price hikes, and the rise in the subsistence level. The "new poor" is the name given to Russian citizens who have suffered as a result of the economic crisis. But not all experts agree with this definition. Aleksey Levinson, chief of the Levada Centre Sociocultural Studies Department, believes that there have not been any processes of the mass impoverishment of any groups of the population in Russia in recent months, and therefore there are no "new poor," or people who were rich and who suddenly became poverty-stricken.

[Levinson] During the first decade of the 21st century, the financial situation of Russian society improved. Between 5 per cent and 15 per cent of our adult citizens moved from the category of poor to the category of people with somewhat more prosperous living conditions. Some representatives of the middle class moved into the wealthy category. Most importantly - people who thought of themselves as the poorest strata started feeling that they could be slightly freer with their money.

During the crisis, a movement in the opposite direction will occur. That is why we will see not the "new poor," but the old poor, those who had improved their situation to some extent during the "fat years," and today are returning to their previous situation. I think that that is what the mass processes will be like.

Of course you cannot rule out the emergence here and there of "new poor" in individual cities, settlements, and families, and in individual sectors and individual cases.

[Timofeyeva] Some working people in Russia are categorized as poor. How does sociology explain this paradox?

[Levinson] Yes, this is a serious problem. It has been recorded by our economists. Back in the previous crisis, the perspicacious researchers from the Higher School of Economics V. Gimpelson and S. Kapelyushnikov noted that, unlike in other countries, where a large number of people are dismissed during a crisis, and live on unemployment benefits, in our country enterprises try not to dismiss staffers. Primarily for political reasons. The administration of a Federation component, for example, gathers employers and recommends to them to keep people in jobs so that they do not go out on the streets. There are also reasons of a humanitarian nature. We feel sorry for people, and we are going to help them. These Russians are formally in employment. They receive not wages as such (they could not earn them), but other forms of payments - advances and benefits. This approach can be called paternalistic. But we must understand that this is not so much a question of the authorities' concern about the citizens as these authorities' fear of possible unrest, and even more so, of trouble from higher-up authorities.

But an open form of unemployment also arises. It too has its own special features. Those registered as unemployed in Russia include a lot of citizens from the "grey" sector of the economy, the sphere of informal employment, in which, as our leaders have admitted, tens of millions of people work. I would not say about such people that they are unemployed, since they do something for two days, for example, and rest for three days a week. Either they do not have further opportunities or the inclination.

Today Russians of all categories have perceived that life has become more expensive. And the poorer the people are the more acute is their reaction. It is generated by two circumstances. These people have fewer savings. Or any kind of supplies, including cereal products or other types of food. For them a price hike is an immediate deterioration in nutrition. Second. Cheap grocery segments go up in price faster than expensive ones.

[Timofeyeva] Around 15 per cent of poor people in Russia are young people. Why?

[Levinson] There are two groups at greatest risk in the country. They are, first, pensioners living on their own, and second, young families with infants. Furthermore, the second group, as a rule, is made of people who are living on this week's wages and have nothing to fall back on. For them, a delay in their wages, and particularly the loss of work, is a very serious hardship. This family cannot allow itself, or more precisely, allow its child, to go hungry. Only a disaster can make parents restrict their child's diet. And in a young family with children, often there is only one parent working, while the other looks after the children.

Young people who are not yet married do not fall into the category of those types of poor people who are forced to go without basic necessities. But this category has a different problem. It is particularly acute for those who have graduated from higher educational establishments. This is the problem of finding employment, and it has escalated during the crisis. It has always been hard for a young person without work experience in their specialty to find a job. (In the end people end up doing something that has nothing to do with what they studied). An employer prefers a person with experience to a young worker with no experience. Even unskilled jobs are decreasing during the crisis. That is why it has now become particularly hard to find a decent job after graduating. These people are forced to agree to do work that they consider to be bad, because of the earnings, which they consider to be not good enough. Or not agree to it and be a burden on their parents.

[Timofeyeva] Poor Russians had started to live better, but today are hard up again. Does this mean that poverty in our country has become chronic for some of our citizens?

[Levinson] Indeed, it appears that in our country hotbeds of chronic poverty are appearing. But fortunately there are not many of them at present.

By and large, what we should call chronic poverty is a state from which a person or a group of people can never break out. This means life in conditions from which there is no way out, other than a stroke of luck. They are poor from birth to death, and they give birth to children who will be just as poor. Thank God, our country is not like countries in tropical Africa or Central Asia, where millions of people live in these circumstances. In our country it is generally not like that. Those who became poor at the beginning of the 1990s later improved their circumstances to some extent, as we have said.

[Timofeyeva] How has the economic crisis affected the president's ratings, if it has at all?

[Levinson] Yes, the president's rating has fallen slightly in the past two months. It is now at a level of 83 per cent. Tell me, in what other country in the world is a crisis marked by such support for the leader? Seriously, for the time being there is a duality in effect, which Russian public awareness has been enduring since the beginning of sanctions. Our patriotic position and support for our leaders is one thing. The way we live, the bread we eat, and how much of this bread we have is another matter. The two things are independent of each other.

There is a popular idea that in the hearts and minds of the Russians there is a "war between the television and the refrigerator" going on. But it seems to me that the idea of economic determinism in general and specifically is not valid for contemporary Russia and the current state of mind of its citizens. Russian history does not corroborate the rule that when a people have enough to eat they love the authorities and when they are starving they rebel. Rather even a more serious deterioration in the economic situation than we have today can lead to greater consolidation of society around the authorities. The experience of poor Latin American countries shows that this can happen. We are not poor, but something like this may perfectly well happen in our country.

[Timofeyeva] But the poor Latin American countries generated the image of Che Guevara - the world legend of the fighter for justice.

[Levinson] Right now, at least, we should not think that the poor will grab pitchforks and storm the authorities. Take Russia's poorest regions, for example the Republic of Tyva. I do not think that the people there will rise up. There is no connection like that. The revolutions in Latin American had a different background. I would look more closely at countries closer to us. For example, the republics that were part of the USSR. Poverty in the majority of these is worse than in Russia. Even if colour revolutions did take place there, these were connected with other - political - factors. The unrest on Bolotnaya Square was not connected with economics either. At that time the rouble and price situations were far better.

More intriguing, in my opinion, will be the development of public feelings in connection with the situation that has come to a standstill in Ukraine, not in connection with poverty. The source of the rise of our patriotism in the form of the annexation of Crimea will not give public awareness anything more, we are not achieving any more victories, and maybe we will not achieve any more. The question is what the rating will do. It shot up not because of economic successes and it will fall not because of economic failures. It went up because of specific political circumstances, and they are changing today. It is very interesting thinking about what will happen in this connection, but to make any forecasts is a very risky business, because all in all we are in a period of events for which a precedent is hard to find in our history, and indeed in the history of other countries. We (my colleagues and I) do not understand the mechanisms of public awareness well enough to be able to predict precisely how it will behave in a month or in three months. In the opinion of my colleagues, the most likely scenario is a gradual return to the situation that existed in the period of President Putin's first or second term.

[Timofeyeva] Could a sociological portrait of the majority that are supporting the authorities be outlined?

[Levinson] The majority (the 83 per cent) is essentially equivalent to the country's population. Its portrait is the portrait of contemporary Russia. And Russia - with a very small, albeit important exception - is demonstrating a desire for unification around several symbols. This  means first and foremost our victories, our greatness as a state. That is what unifies the majority. Our greatness yesterday was the victory in the Great Patriotic War. Our greatness today, in our own opinion, is that we (symbolically) have conquered the current foe - America. Conquered in the sense of we did not obey them. We did what we wanted. And our will was expressed in the actions of our authorities. We took Crimea. "Crimeaisours [currently popular hashtag]." They told us that we cannot do this, but we did it. The delight of the fact that we acted in this way is cementing the majority. But this is not very strong cement. The Victory in the Great Patriotic War is one thing. The fact that it continues to be a unifying factor for so many peoples for so many years is understandable: So much blood was shed, such ordeals were suffered, the risk of losing the country was so great, the enemy was so strong. This explains the significance of the Victory. You cannot equate the  annexation of Crimea with this Victory, as some people have been doing in the heat of the moment. Out of respect for the memory of those who brought us Victory in the Great Patriotic War, we should be more precise with our words, so as not to insult this memory. Of course a successful military and political operation deserves the attention of specialists. It may go down in military textbooks. But we need to distinguish between a nationwide Victory being won and a bold act being carried out. These things are of different categories.
 
 #10
The Economist
September 12, 2015
Russia's opposition
Lonely but not lost
A Russia after Putin is hard to imagine right now but one man is trying

ALEXEI NAVALNY, Russia's most conspicuous opposition politician, would not look out of place on the presidential campaign trail in America, with his strident speeches and polished manner. But in a country where politics is mostly bland bureaucracy, Mr Navalny, a 39-year-old with broad shoulders and bright blue eyes, cuts a striking figure-when he is allowed to speak. At a rare public appearance in the Kostroma region, 300 kilometres (188 miles) north of Moscow, he banters with old ladies, takes selfies with teenagers and spars with hecklers. In his stump speech he attacks local officials ("the mafia") and Vladimir Putin's ruling party ("crooks and thieves"). He implores voters in local elections on September 13th "not to be silent" and to cast their ballots for a largely unknown party, RPR-Parnas.

The Kremlin has tried to bar Mr Navalny from politics. He is not allowed to hold office because the Kremlin gave him a criminal conviction on trumped-up charges. His own party, called Progress, was disqualified. Yet in the real world of Russian politics, rather than the Kremlin simulacrum, Mr Navalny is a professional politician who has had a greater impact on the country's future than any member of parliament or leader of a "licensed" political party outside government in recent times.

He first gained recognition as the main leader of a series of street protests in 2011 when he rallied parts of the urban middle class against the Kremlin. His stated aim of building a modern state with European characteristics appealed to many who had once voted for Mr Putin. In 2013 he received 27% of the vote in the Moscow mayoral election despite being in and out of jail, and having almost no access to state television. This rattled the Kremlin. Yet it realised that putting Mr Navalny in jail would only have boosted his popularity.

Instead, Mr Navalny was discredited as a crook and agent of foreign influence. "In the popular imagination I am that guy who wants America to enslave Russia," he says. The Kremlin contrasted his alleged pro-Westernism with its own narrative of imperial nationalism that culminated in the annexation of Crimea.

Paradoxically, says Mr Navalny, Russia's drift towards war and isolation has made his position less hopeless. A few years ago talk of a genuine opposition taking part in elections was fanciful. Putin supporters as well as liberals were able to argue that any possible replacement would probably empower darker forces, unleash a war or lead to attempts to resurrect the Soviet Union. "Now Putin has done it all himself," says Mr Navalny.

And just as Mr Putin has shifted, so has he. Once a blogger and street protester, Mr Navalny has become the leader of a democratic movement. He helped to consolidate parts of a fractious opposition and form a coalition with Mikhail Kasyanov, who served as prime minister during Mr Putin's first term as president.

Middle-class warrior

His perseverance seems almost irrational given Mr Putin's approval rating of over 80%. But Mr Navalny argues that the constituency that came on the streets in 2011 and voted for him in Moscow in 2013 has not disappeared, even if it is demoralised. "Russia is a country of large cities where at least 30% of the population supports our views," he says. It is the same constituency that formed Mr Putin's original support base when he entered politics: the urban middle class. "I actually represent the interests of a large number of the Russian population," he says.

The Kremlin seems to think that contention is at least plausible. It barred Mr Navalny and his allies from running in local elections in two cities with large proportions of educated voters, Novosibirsk and Kaluga. Some activists went on hunger strike, putting public pressure on the Kremlin, which in the end agreed as a sop to let RPR-Parnas run in the Kostroma region, encompassing some of the country's most rural and depressed areas. Mr Navalny seized the opportunity. Dozens of volunteers have manned street stands handing out flyers, while candidates travel to small towns to meet voters.

They have made corruption a central issue in the campaign. Many see it as the organising principle of Mr Putin's government, as well as its biggest vulnerability. "There may be convinced Stalinists in Russia, but there is nobody in Russia who supports the idea of a state official owning a palace," Mr Navalny insists. Mostly excluded from the airwaves, in just three weeks the RPR-Parnas team has nonetheless lifted its voter recognition from 25% to 50% in the city of Kostroma, and from 15% to 40% in the surrounding region.

For Mr Navalny the main goal of participating in regional elections is to show that an opposition party can clear the 5% legal threshold necessary to win representation. He hopes such a feat will revive popular interest in politics and revitalise the democratic electorate, not least ahead of the parliamentary elections in 2016. To this end he is conjuring up somewhat far-fetched next steps. "First we get into parliament, then we form an important faction and afterwards form a government through a coalition agreement," he says.

Next for Mr Navalny is a further evolution of his public image. He aims to assume the mantle of the eastern European protest leaders who won power in Soviet satellite states in 1989, eventually leading their people into the European Union. He recently spent three days conversing with Adam Michnik, a Polish historian and former dissident, comparing the experiences of Poland and Russia for a book to be published in Russian in October, followed by an English translation.

The tone of the conversation is very different from the self-deprecating ease of 1990s liberalism and centres around a people's craving for status. "My task is to create a new type of patriotism without Russian tanks going into Czechoslovakia, Poland or Ukraine. If Russia needs an expansion, it has to be a cultural and scientific one," he tells Mr Michnik. "My main motivation is to prove that Russians are no less suited to democracy than any other people."

Where Mr Navalny differs most obviously from post-Soviet liberals is in his hard-man attitude to politics. He doubts that economic reform ideals will ever be sufficient to turn Russia into a modern European country. The entire political system needs overhauling. "I am a politician, not a philosopher, and I am fighting for power," he says.
 
 #11
Business New Europe
www.bne.eu
September 11, 2015
Explaining Russia's 'new normal'
Chris Weafer of Macro-Advisory
Chris Weafer is a founding partner of Macro-Advisory, which helps investors cut though the noise & focus on underlying trends, real political risks, & opportunities in Russia/CIS, Eurasia Union, & Mongolia. Follow him on @ChrisWeafer

One of the slogans now regularly deployed to describe Russia's current economic condition and what comes next is the "new normal". The casual interpretation of that phrase simply means that growth in the future will be less than it has been in the past. That of course is true, and hardly comes as a major revelation. Russia's economy grew at an average in excess of 7% annually between 2000 and 2012 because of a combination of rising oil and gas wealth, trickling down to the population and into state programmes, set against a very low starting point. The value of the country's economy at the start of 2000 was just under $200bn and over the following dozen years hydrocarbon export earnings exceeded $3tn. Hence, a major reason why the value of the economy exceeded $2tn by 2012.

Clearly that strong growth was always going to slow down as the economic base broadened and especially as the trickle-down oil and gas wealth was not used to create new industrial drivers, but went mainly into state sector industries and into consumption. Hence a shift to lower growth was inevitable. Something similar is currently taking place in China's economy as annual growth of close to 10% has given way to slower, but still a world average beating, 6%-plus. That's hardly a "new normal" - it is simply maturing.

"New normal" is something different. It is more than just maturing or getting bigger; it represents fundamental change in how an economy is managed and how businesses and investors need to look at opportunities and risk.

The cynics will be tempted to conclude that any talk of change is simply a temporary reaction to the current slowdown that will (again) fade when the oil price recovers. No doubt, if that option were still on the table, then it would likely be taken. But that is not the case. The graph below shows the trend in quarterly GDP growth through 2012 and 2013. Growth started to slow sharply from mid-2012 and, in 2013 GDP grew at only 1.3%. That was less than one-third the growth of two years earlier and was despite the fact the price of Urals crude averaged $109 per barrel and there were no geopolitical issues. The clear message from that graph is that an oil price recovery alone is not going to save the economy or push asset prices higher.

So, in practical terms, what might the "new normal" look like for businesses and investors? We can break the impact into a number of risk and opportunity categories.

More competitive Russia

This crisis has already brought a significant change in monetary policy and a greater awareness that the country needs to create a more competitive environment with which to encourage manufacturing and service sector growth. In 2012, 66% of exports were oil and gas. An additional 15% was made up of other minerals and metals, while another 10% was accounted for by grains and defence equipment. Approximately only 10%, or $50bn, was made up of other goods and services. At the same time over 50% of imports, or $170bn, was made up of consumer goods and services. The hydrocarbon wealth had made the country lazy.

Now that balance has to change. It means there must be a greater effort to promote industrial growth and to cut imports of products and services that are capable of being sourced inside the country. There has been a lot of discussion about import-substitution, or localisation, and the evidence is that this policy is to be at the core of the government's post-crisis recovery and longer-term growth strategy. This is at least a more realistic and achievable strategy compared to the often vague reform agenda talked about in the past.

To give the policy a realistic chance of success, the Central Bank of Russia (CBR), undoubtedly with Kremlin persuasion, has completely changed its ruble stance and will now pursue a weak ruble policy. We have already heard from the CBR that, should the oil price rally, it will sanitize surplus oil revenues at a ruble-dollar rate of RUB55 and rebuild foreign exchange reserves. Through August we also saw that the CBR has no intention of using financial resources to try to prevent the ruble from weakening with a falling oil price. We may see some modest intervention in the future if, for example, oil were to collapse further, but only to avoid the risk of a panic contagion and not to halt the decline. If the price of Brent were to test its 2009 low of $42 per barrel, then we should expect to see the ruble-dollar rate trade at RUB75.

Apart from the monetary policy change, we have also heard from the Ministry of Finance that the budget will no longer provide for automatic real wage growth in the public sector, which accounts for almost one in five workers employed in the country. This is also a positive move, as rising state sector salaries previously forced private sector employers to compete and pay high wages.

That combination of strong ruble and rising real wage growth greatly contributed to the reliance on imported goods and services, and the lack of competitiveness in the economy. Bringing an end to these two factors should help permanently cut imports and encourage investment into manufacturing business focused not only on the domestic market, but on exports also. It means that many foreign businesses which had made a lot of money exporting to Russia may not be able to recover that market or to a much less lucrative extent.

Sector rotation

Import-substitution and the new monetary backdrop, ie. weaker ruble, will also have some impact on earnings growth for individual sectors and will create more opportunities for investors. As mentioned, it is not realistic to assume that post-crisis, and even assuming an oil price recovery, life will return to normal. The days of large numbers of free-spending Russians roaming Western cities are gone, or at least will change radically, and Western exporters will not return to an uncrowded market as they had previously.

The weaker ruble policy, in combination with lower average wage growth, will mean less foreign travel and a growing demand for internal tourism and leisure spending. The restriction on a large number of state officials from travelling overseas, assuming it lasts for several years, also adds to this opportunity.

Demand for domestically produced goods and services is also bound to rise, especially as the state is also supporting this with procurement legislation, and that should also help boost revenues and profits for businesses, either locally or foreign owned, with a domestic location. Transport logistics, packaging and distribution, and warehousing are amongst the sectors that should gain from this rotation towards domestic originated goods and services. Longer term, the ports and rail companies will gain from the expected increase in exports of goods outside of extractive industries.

Financial services is another sector that should benefit from this crisis as an automatic resumption of previous relationships and ways of providing financial services is most unlikely. Russian companies will need to rely more on domestic services, as Western regulators and risk managers are likely to retain a poor perception of risk for many years beyond the end of sanctions. The major boost to this sector will, however, come when the state finally starts to address the question of pension reform. Not only is this long overdue in terms of budget adjustment, but it will also eventually create a pool of domestic investment capital which, at least in theory, should help create more entrepreneurial opportunities.

The main sectors to benefit from import-substitution will be in those sectors already targeted as priorities by the Kremlin. These are agriculture, food processing, medicines and healthcare, machinery and parts manufacturing. Companies in these areas should expect to get clearer state support, administrative and financial, and will benefit from the domestic-sourced preference shift.

On the flip side, extractive industry sectors are likely to continue to suffer from poor Russia risk perception for a long time post-sanctions. These sectors are too closely associated with the state and with the so-called "Asia-pivot", which to many investors smacks of desperation rather than optimal expansion. Utilities are also expected to suffer from lower tariff growth as the state tries to keep inflation pressure as low as possible for the post-crisis recovery years.

By now it has also become clear that the banking sector needs a radical overhaul. There are still far too many licensed banks in the country, probably a surplus of 500 at least, so consolidation will need to pick up a pace. Most likely that will require a change in how risk is recognized and all banks will need to boost capital. When done, the sector will undoubtedly be in better shape and the major banks should attract a better valuation because of both the growth opportunities from Russia's expected new economic direction and also because risk uncertainties should be reduced.

The other EU

The Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) is also part of the "new normal" for businesses. The core principles include the free movement of people and goods, and an improvement in the regulation of financial markets. It means that businesses can opt to locate their factory or services centre in any one of the other EEU countries and still qualify as "domestic" under Russia's localization policy.

If Kazakhstan is seen to be successful from its planned more aggressive plan to reform its business and investment climate, ie. if it starts to attract more businesses setting up and using the country as their base to work within the EEU, then pressure will increase on Moscow to replicate those changes in order to compete.

Politics

There is no doubt that the deteriorated relations between Russia and the West is set to remain for a long time even when tensions over Ukraine and sanctions start to ease. Also, while there is a hope that the bulk of sanctions can start to ease once a deal covering the future of eastern Ukraine is agreed, the sanctions associated with Crimea will stay indefinitely.

Russian officials have been very clear that they wish to make a distinction between politics and business, and that the country is not only open for foreign investment but is actively encouraging inward investment and joint ventures. For foreign businesses, the fact that some sanctions and poor political relations will hang in the background means they will have to be more careful of exposure in Russia and will have to conduct a higher level of due diligence with potential trade partners and other local investment or business partners than was the case pre-2014.

Political issues could continue to disrupt markets and sustain volatility in capital markets, because in the future even after a calming in eastern Ukraine, the legacy of the events of the past two years will mean less trust and more frequent disputes between Moscow and Western governments

Stronger state means slower recovery

The state sectors have become more important in the economy over the past two years and, according to rough estimates, now account for almost 60% of the total economy. The share accounted for by small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is reported to have fallen to approximately 20%, down from 30% in early 2012. The fact that SMEs have all but been locked out of accessing new debt and/or the cost of servicing existing debt has risen so much, has squeezed the sector badly.

It means that, despite the monetary policy changes and the greater commitment to creating a more competitive domestic base in order to encourage import substitution, the recovery in headline growth will be slow. There cannot be a return to previous high annual average growth rates until growth starts to emerge in sectors such as food and machinery, etc. and the financial services sector is restructured. Some sectors, especially in the still fast growth areas such as IT, e-commerce and some other consumer-oriented activities will continue to deliver strong double-digit growth. But headline growth will be impacted by the less efficient and dominant state sectors for a long time to come.

The forecasts in the table below assume that the weak ruble policy remains for at least five years and that financial sector sanctions start to be removed from the second half of 2016. But even with those conditions and assuming a more determined effort by the Russian government to push ahead with such programmes as import-substitution, it is likely that the economy will not return to 3%-plus growth until early in the next decade. Such is the scale of the transformation that needs to take place.

 
 #12
Central Bank in baseline scenario expecting oil price at around $50 per barrel in next 3 years

MOSCOW. Sept 11 (Interfax) - The Central Bank of Russia updated the forecast that was made earlier on the average annual price for oil and now is considering it being close to $50 a barrel in the next three years as the baseline scenario.

"Going forward, the economic situation will depend on the global energy prices and the economy's ability to adjust to external shocks," the Central Bank said.

At the end of July, the Central Bank said that the scenario of oil prices remaining at levels no higher than $60 per barrel had become more likely.

In June the Central Bank announced several scenarios of Russia's economic development, the main distinction of which are the assumptions concerning the movement of oil prices. The first scenario envisaged the gradual growth of prices for Urals oil to $80 a barrel in 2018. The second scenario expected oil prices at about $60 a barrel during 2015-2018. Both of these scenarios were consider equally likely by the Central Bank.

In the stress scenario, the decline of oil prices to $40 per barrel and prices staying at this level in the medium term is envisaged.
 
#13
The National Interest
September 10, 2015
Russia's Financial System: How Vulnerable?
Collapse is not in the cards
By John Richard Cookson
John Richard Cookson is assistant managing editor of The National Interest

Is the Russian economy going to collapse? Do sanctions matter? These are the two questions most often asked today about the Russian economy said Sergey Aleksashenko, the former first deputy chairman of Russia's Central Bank and a former deputy finance minister. At the Center for the National Interest on Thursday, Aleksashenko explained what the fall in oil prices, the decline of the ruble, the rise in inflation and the impact of U.S. and Western sanctions have wrought in Russia.

A year ago, oil was trading at near $100 a barrel; today it is less than half that. The IMF's most recent data project the Russian economy will contract by 3.4 percent this year (it was growing by the same amount as recently as 2012). Russia is in recession, its longest since 1997. But collapse is not in the cards, said Aleksashenko, who has also served as the chairman and CEO of Merrill Lynch Russia. His lapidary verdict: the Russian economy is "more stable than many believe."

But Aleksashenko in no way tried to sugarcoat developments in Russia. Quite the contrary. He explained that his overall forecast for the Russian economy is "rather gloomy." Sanctions have hurt Russia's economy, but their impact has shifted in the last year. Financial sanctions were responsible for about 50 percent of the impact of the downturn in December 2014, when the ruble's value fell by a third in a matter of weeks, Aleksashenko said. Another 30 percent of the downturn was due to the dip in oil prices and the remainder due to central bank mismanagement. Now, however, a level of stability has returned and the impact of sanctions has been reduced. The price of oil has become more important, he said, and is now responsible for 45 percent of economic problems, with sanctions at 40 percent--and the remainder coming from mismanagement by the government.

While the impact of financial sanctions on the Russian economy will be smaller going forward, Aleksashenko said, its impact on the Russian government's budget is becoming more apparent. Sanctions have closed the option of Russia funding its budget through borrowing, Aleksashenko said, nor is further privatization a likely option. The remaining option is to fund deficits by drawing from its reserves-yet even this option is limited by the expectation sanctions will be long lasting and reserves should therefore be sustained as long as possible. At the exact moment public spending should be increased to offset the slack in private consumption, Russian budgets are being cut, said Aleksashenko. Moreover, the cuts hit investment hardest (immediate social spending is favored), diminishing future growth prospects. Starting next year, Russian military spending may feel a squeeze as well, with cuts focused on the country's navy, which is dependent upon western technology.

The decline in the ruble has been, according to some, a silver lining for the Russian economy as it has allowed exports to remain stronger than they otherwise would have been without devaluation. But according to Aleksashenko, the truth is more complicated. Russian businesses, especially exporters of oil and raw materials, are "price takers" not "price makers." Exporters are prepared to sell at whatever the international market demands-and this physical demand is far more influential in the health of Russia's export-driven part of the economy than quarterly fluctuations. Few exporting companies in Russia would be permanently hobbled by lower profits. Russian oil companies, he points out, can produce oil at prices of $30 a barrel. "It's not an issue of profitability. It's an issue of getting cash," Aleksashenko said.

Moreover, the next largest component of exports after raw materials, arms sales, is politically driven rather than profit driven. On the prospects of a stronger Eurasian economic union, or even of introducing a common currency within that union, Aleksashenko was less than sanguine. The main obstacle, he says, is that interests are at odds. For smaller countries the impetus for further integration or for a common currency is primarily economic, fed a desire for access to Russian markets and Russian largess. For Russia, however, the main reason for such a union would be political, to keep a sphere of influence; any access to new markets would be marginal, not sufficient on its own to entice Russia toward further integration.

Over a year or two, a downturn can be weathered by moderately drawing from reserves. But if oil prices remain low over five or seven years, Aleksashenko notes, he expects the Russian government to borrow directly from the central bank to finance its budget. All indications of current head of the Russian central bank, Elvira Nabiullina, are that, while maintaining some constitutional autonomy, she is also "very keen to provide money to the government one way or another" to finance any future federal budgets, Aleksashenko said. And monetary finance, "definitely leads to inflation, sooner or later," he added.

The structural problems in the Russian economy today cannot be solved by economic policy alone, Aleksashenko said. Higher or lower interest rates, larger or smaller deficits, more or less government involvement-each of these is eclipsed by what Aleksashenko calls the biggest problem in Russia's economy at the moment: the lack of property rights protection, and the consequential decline of investment. This, he adds, is political policy: "It's independent courts. It's political competition. It's the rule of law. It's fighting corruption."

What does this mean for President Putin? Social unrest is unlikely, said Aleksashenko. The deal between Putin and the majority of Russian society now is to prioritize the country's status as a great power over an increase in living standards, Aleksashenko said. Sanctions are expected to remain in place for some time. Russians are "ready to adjust" to economic conditions, said Aleksashenko. According to him, Russia is an absolute monarchy with Putin as the sole decision-maker on political and economic matters. Yet there is no designated heir apparent. The real question, then, is how-whenever the day arrives-a transition will be managed from Putin to his successor.
 
 
 #14
Moscow Times
September 11, 2015
Skoltech Strives to Repatriate Russia's Lost Scientific Talent
By Matthew Bodner

Four years after the Skolkovo Institute of Science and Technology (Skoltech) was founded, the startup university has finally moved into its own purpose-built campus, and has succeeded in luring accomplished Russian diaspora scientists back to Russia after periods of up to 20 years abroad.

Some of them say they have returned for love of the country they left behind, and an opportunity to shape its scientific and technological future. They have also been enticed by the goals of the Skolkovo project, which are nothing less than to create a Silicon Valley-type ecosystem in a quiet Moscow suburb.

One of the most prominent scientists to be lured back to Russia by the Skoltech project is Artyom Oganov, who specializes in computational materials discovery, which he describes as "a revolutionary field promising major technological innovations and discoveries in materials science."

Oganov's story is a classic example of Russia's scientific diaspora. After receiving his master's degree from the prestigious Moscow State University, he left Russia for University College London in 1998 "because at that time there was no future in science, no prospects, no possibilities to work on the cutting edge of modern science," he told The Moscow Times.

After 16 years, Oganov is back to teach and conduct research at Skoltech. Asked why he returned after so many years, Oganov said he "wanted to try this opportunity to work in my own country.

"Now science is again a major priority in Russia, science again attracts the best students, there is state of the art equipment and a desire to excel in science and technology. It is a very interesting time here," he said.

Russia's Silicon Valley

Skoltech is just one part of a larger project known as the Skolkovo Foundation, launched in 2010 by then-President Dmitry Medvedev as part of his initiatives to modernize Russia's oil- and gas-dependent economy.

In an interview (page 5) with The Moscow Times at the new campus, Skoltech president Edward Crawley explained the university's mission as an educational and research hub designed to infuse the ailing Russian economy with cutting-edge science and technology.

"Skoltech isn't just a new university, it's a different kind of university, one where the three acknowledged missions of all universities are present: teaching, research and innovation and industrial development. But here the latter role is the primary mission," Crawley said.

Read the Full Interview: 4 Years of Innovation: An Interview With Skoltech President Edward Crawley

The institute was launched from humble beginnings in 2011 as something of a virtual university hosted by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in partnership with the Skolkovo project.

Four years on, Skoltech has grown from a small program with 20 students and a handful of dedicated professors to a university boasting some 60 professors and a few hundred students.

While Crawley estimates that 20 to 25 percent of the institute's faculty are foreign like him, the remaining 75 to 80 percent of the faculty are Russian-born scientists, he said.

"Fifteen to 20 percent of the faculty were hired in Russia, and the remaining 60 percent are diaspora who have returned. So we really have attracted a significant slice of the faculty back to Russia," Crawley said.

Reverse Brain Drain

Russia's scientific diaspora numbers several thousands, Crawley estimates. This leaves Skoltech with a large pool of talent to recruit from, but also begs the question of how many of these Russian scientists are even interested in returning to their native country after establishing themselves abroad - often in the United States and Western Europe.

Skoltech has worked since 2011 with the Russian-American Science Association (RASA) to increase interaction between Russian diaspora scientists and the community they left behind. Crawley said he is scheduled to speak at RASA's annual conference in early November.

According to the U.S. professor, there are two types of Russian diaspora scientists: those who for various reasons are not looking back, and those that are interested in the possibility of returning, and Skoltech is actively recruiting from the latter category.

The halls of the newly christened Skoltech campus are now home to Russian scientists who have in the last few years accepted offers from the institute to return to their country of origin to help work on the engine of innovation.

"I came back to my home country about a year ago to build a new kind of university," said Albert Nasibulin, who received his Ph.D. in physical chemistry from Kemerovo State University in Siberia in 1996, but left for Finland in 1999 and spent 15 years there, most of it at Aalto University.

Nasibulin, who cofounded a company in Finland specializing in commercializing carbon nanotubes, said he was enticed to come to Skoltech by its mission "to promote the commercialization of scientific results," he told The Moscow Times.

"Another reason to return to my home country was to teach my children Russian culture," he said, adding that they are able to speak perfect Russian, but were born abroad and "can hardly be treated as Russians."

Knowledge Application

Vasili Perebeinos left Russia for the U.S. in 1997 to complete his Ph.D. in physics, after which he worked on advanced materials and nanostructures for electronics at IBM's T.J. Watson Research center.

Asked why he left his career at IBM behind, Perebeinos said that Skoltech was a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity "to actually apply the knowledge I acquired abroad and influence how it is applied in the future."

Dzmitry Tsetserukou, head of Skoltech's Intelligent Space Robotics Laboratory, studied robotic technologies at the Belarussian-Russian University in Mogilyov, Belarus, but followed his mentors abroad to France and Japan, where he spent 10 years.

"In Japan I made a successful career and highly appreciate the time I spent there, but it is time to bring my expertise to a country that needs it more, there are a lot of opportunities to develop and apply new technology here in Russia. This is my new challenge," said Tsetserukou.

Philipp Khaitovich, a Moscow State University-trained biologist who left Russia 20 years ago to do his Ph.D. in the United States, echoed Tsetserukou's words, saying he decided to come to Skoltech "to use my experience to help build up a strong modern research and education base in Russia.

"I also missed Russian food," he added.
 
 
#15
Moscow Times
September 11, 2015
4 Years of Innovation: An Interview With Skoltech President Edward Crawley
By Matthew Bodner

Launched under the leadership of then-President Dmitry Medvedev in 2011, the Skolkovo Institute of Science and Technology (Skoltech) was intended to be a beacon of hope for Russia's scientific community. The idea was to create a new university in Russia to attract domestic and foreign talent into the fields of science and technology and serve as an engine for the country's economic modernization.

Skoltech's president is U.S. aerospace engineer Edward Crawley, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology who has been actively involved in education entrepreneurship and, in his capacity as an expert in the field of aerospace and spaceflight, was a senior adviser on several NASA advisory committees.

The Moscow Times sat down with Professor Crawley to talk about the project and his involvement in it.

Q: Why are you leading this project, and what skills did you bring to the table?

A: I think there are three aspects of why I came to Russia. One is that I was very interested in Russia. I've been coming here since I was an undergraduate student, I studied in Leningrad [now St. Petersburg] in 1975. One of the main reasons I've been interested in Russia - both in my career and in my personal life - was an interest in the Soviet and then Russian space program, and an interest in the opportunity to work with them.

The second reason is that I am deeply interested in education. Over the past 15 years or so I've started five academic programs, including one university: the International Space University in Strasbourg.

I also founded an international education program called CDIO [Conceive, Design, Implement, Operate] which has actually been broadly incorporated into the reform of engineering education in Russia.

The third aspect of why I am here is an interest in founding things. I believe there are founders and then runners, and both are important. You need people to found institutions and then people to run them well. I like to think of it as the guys who make the trains run on time, and the guys who put down the tracks: I'm a guy who puts down the tracks, and [Skoltech] was a marvelous opportunity in that regard.

Q: When you arrived in Russia to lead Skoltech, what were your major goals? Where did you envision this project going?

A: The blueprint for Skoltech was first developed by MIT and implemented in the first year of our partnership with that university. It envisioned by 2020 a university with 200 professors, 1,200 students, and around 350 researchers and post-docs.

The research conducted by the university is focused in areas that were aligned with then-President Dmitry Medvedev's goals for the reform of the Russian economy, such as biomedicine, energy, information technology and what we call smart machines - things like spacecraft and robots. So we have pretty much focused on these areas while inventing this new university.

What we try to do is attract professors and students from Russia and around the world with a deep passion for not only developing new science, but applying new science - and that's really the difference. We are introducing market pull into the operation of a university. We are trying to invite people from the market to come here and help pull our technology toward their needs.

Q: Have you faced any backlash from other universities in Russia or abroad who might look at this project and say "this is a skewed educational model, we don't like it?"

A: No, actually one of the surprising things was just how supportive other universities in Russia have been of Skoltech. One of the reasons for this is that there is a general acceptance among the leadership of higher education in Russia that the system needs a lot of change.

Having institutions like Skoltech can help catalyze change. It gives other rectors something to point to and say there are other models possible in Russia other than the traditional model that has evolved basically from Stalinist roots.

So Skolkovo is a generation, not just a building. We are small, with only 60 professors and a couple hundred students, but even at that size we are trying to reach out to the other universities around Russia and be a transformative agent in the Russian ecosystem.

Q: How is Skolkovo funded - is it all Russian government funding?

A: No, not all of it. We actually have a very strong program to attract funding from sources other than the Russian government - I mean, not from the Skolkovo Foundation, because in Russia a lot of money is state money one way or another.

We have also succeeded in attracting funding from private companies, such as Yandex, and other non-government sourced funding. We have some international funding, including European Union grants. So Skoltech will really grow.

What the Russian government is doing is really what governments should do. That is priming the pump - helping us to build the facility, equip it, and get through the first few years of operating expenses. The expectation will increasingly be that government funding will be a smaller and smaller fraction of total funding.

Now having said that, in no place in the world is the university really independent from the government. I suppose there are a few business schools and private schools that really do just pay the bills from tuition [fees], but even in the U.S. the vast majority of schools get state funding.

Q: Skolkovo's reputation has benefited greatly from [Prime Minister] Medvedev's attachment to the project. Have you felt any change in attitude from the government toward Skoltech as Medvedev's star has been perceived as rising and falling over the past few years?

A: No, I think that the Russian government under both Medvedev and [President] Vladimir Putin has been totally committed to innovation in the country. I mean, there is just no other way to reform this economy, especially in view of the vast investment and vast depth of capability of science and technology in Russia.

There's a little bit of nuance going on [with regard to] exactly how you do it, whether one program has all the spotlight and everyone else plays second fiddle, or if you have many centers ... but we continue to have very strong support from Medvedev, and the Deputy Prime Minister [in charge of science and innovation] Arkady Dvorkovich. And we also have strong support from the presidential administration - [former deputy head of the presidential administration] Vladislav Surkov is a member of our board - so I have not felt any fallout or any change in our relationship.
 
 #16
Irrussianality
https://irrussianality.wordpress.com
September 9, 2015
STREAMING NONSENSE
By Paul Robinson
Paul Robinson is a professor in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa. Paul Robinson holds an MA in Russian and Eastern European Studies from the University of Toronto and a D. Phil. in Modern History from the University of Oxford. Prior to his graduate studies, he served as a regular officer in the British Army Intelligence Corps from 1989 to 1994, and as a reserve officer in the Canadian Forces from 1994 to 1996. He also worked as a media research executive in Moscow in 1995.

One of the declared purposes of this blog is to analyze irrational decision making processes in foreign policy. Rationality can be defined in many ways, but one is in terms of coherence of aims and means. Setting yourself an objective and then pursuing a policy which undermines that objective is not what most people would consider rational. Take, for instance, the goal of energy security. As I wrote in my Dictionary of International Security, this 'implies guaranteed access to a reliable source of energy at a reasonable price.' Opposing measures to improve such access, and preferring instead to preserve an unreliable source of energy supply, would not be a rational means of reaching that goal.

Yet this appears to be the European Union's (EU) preferred method. For years a significant proportion of the natural gas Europe consumes has been bought from Russia and delivered via a pipeline running through Ukraine. This has proven not to be a 'reliable source of energy.' Continuous disputes between Russia and Ukraine over price and non-payment of debts, alleged siphoning off of gas, and so on, coupled with political tensions between the two countries, have resulted in Russia cutting off supplies to Ukraine on several occasions, threatening the supply of gas to the EU. A rational EU energy security policy would, therefore, not merely seek a cheap alternative source outside Russia (if that is possible), but also endeavour to bypass Ukraine so that any gas which is bought from Russia is not at risk of similar disruptions.

Given this, the North Stream pipeline which links Russia directly with Germany is entirely in keeping with the objective of European energy security. So too was the idea of South Stream, which would have delivered gas to Europe via the Black Sea and Bulgaria. But far from supporting these initiatives, the EU resolutely opposed them, and in the case of South Stream it eventually succeeded in forcing Russia to abandon the project. Now it is preparing to oppose a second North Stream pipeline.

Last week, as the Russian newspaper Kommersant reports:

"Russia's gas giant Gazprom signed a binding shareholders' agreement with European energy companies for the construction of the Nord Stream-2 pipeline from Russia to Germany. ... Gazprom will own a controlling stake, while Germany's E.ON and BASF/Wintershall, Austria's OMV and Royal Dutch Shell will receive 10 percent each, while France's Engie will receive 9 percent. ... The largest power companies in the UK, France, Germany and Austria signed the project, whose implementation will minimize the transit of gas through Ukraine ... However, the agreement is contrary to the position of Brussels; according to Vice-President of the European Commission Maros Sefcovic , there is no need for any gas pipelines bypassing Ukraine."

'I hope those companies [who signed the deal with Gazprom] understand their responsibility for the overall security of supply for the whole of Europe, not only for parts of it', Mr Sefcovic said. Polish president Andrzej Duda also opposed the deal, which he says 'completely neglects Polish interests.' 'The insecurity in this context stems from the egoism of some nations and their complete disregard for the interest of other nations,' Duda said. 'That makes it hard to believe in Europe's unity.'

I find Duda's statement a little hard to understand. At present, while some gas comes from Russia via Poland, the Ukrainian route goes through Slovakia. Diverting gas from Ukraine to North Stream-2 doesn't mean less money for Poland, or even a less secure supply. Likewise, the EU's position as a whole doesn't make much sense. The EU says that it would prefer to continue using Ukraine, but upgrading the pipeline there would require huge investments and given the turmoil in that country nobody is prepared to spend the money required.

The only explanation I can come up with for the EU's position is that this is actually a matter of geopolitics. Russia is the current 'b�te-noire', which must be isolated. Projects which strengthen Russia are therefore a bad thing per se. Ukraine, by contrast, must be supported. According to one account, 'Brussels is worried that cash-strapped Ukraine would be hard hit if it lost crucial income from transit fees in the events of Russia shifting its gas to other routes.' Propping up Ukraine, it seems, is considered more important than having a cheap and reliable source of energy. Thus, if Sefcovic and Duda have their way, under the guise of 'energy security', Europeans will end up paying more for their gas. Whatever else it may be, this isn't a rational energy policy.
 
 #17
Valdai Discussion Club
http://valdaiclub.com
September 11, 2015
Russia - US: Confrontation in the Arctic Expanses?
By Robert Legvold
Robert Legvold is Marshall D. Shulman Professor Emeritus, Columbia University.

Like the grim hulk of the Flying Dutchman in Wagner's opera, the specter of trouble and conflict on the world's newest frontier, the Arctic, looms in the headlines of the world's press and the speeches of world leaders. So, from here on, one should expect to be treated to a flow of commentary on how the Arctic is becoming a new Cold War staging area, how the United States is falling behind in the race to equip itself for the contest, how rapidly Russia is building bases and brigades in the High North, and how recklessly and regularly it is harassing the aircraft and borders of the other Arctic states.

All this chatter will not be without basis. The Arctic political landscape is changing, and a situation that before seemed basically tranquil, if rather languid and remote, no longer does.  NATO Arctic states are speaking uneasily about what appears to them to be a new Russian aggressiveness and Russian officials are describing a growing security threat from the north. The Obama Administration admits that the long-standing concerns of the U.S. Coast Guard over the country's growing inability to meet the security and safety challenges raised by the melting waters of the Arctic are real. Russia's decision to refurbish ten military airfields, deploy three brigades in upgraded bases, and alter naval doctrine to stress again the Arctic and Atlantic regions obviously isn't business as usual. Nor is the tripling and quadrupling of the times Norwegian, Canadian and U.S. fighter aircraft scramble to intercept Russian aircraft intruding into their airspace.  

But these shifting currents and the excitement they stir should not obscure the two fundamental realities at the base of these roiling currents: first, the underlying risk they contain, and, second, the lost opportunity they reflect. On the first score, the risk: Russia and NATO-Arctic states are not inexorably on the path to confrontation. The United States, as evident in Obama's September trip to the Arctic, the first by a U.S. president, continues to make climate change and the protection of indigenous peoples its priority in the region, not a military competition. Russia, while putting a new emphasis on military security has not ceased to cooperate within the Arctic Council on practical steps to deal with threats to the environment and with the new Arctic Economic Council for promoting business-to-business ties.

Yet, slowly rising in the background is the risk that the Arctic could become a prisoner of the new Russia-West Cold War and an extended theater of the remilitarized Central European front. Russia's last two major military exercises in March and May, were no longer only or primarily about security of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and of Russia's economic interests in the region. They were integrated into Russian preparations for fighting NATO anywhere from the Baltic to the Black Sea. And Dmitri Rogozin, the deputy prime minister who heads the new Arctic Commission that presides over all Russian activity in the Arctic, speaks the language of Cold War. At least that is the way it comes across to outsiders when he declares the Arctic as "Russia's Mecca," growls that Russia knows how to protect its interests in the Arctic, and warns that Russian "tanks do not need visas." His counterpart is more Stephen Harper, the acid-tongued Canadian prime minister, than any senior U.S. official. In short, the fact that confrontation does not currently characterize Arctic international relations does not mean that Russia and the NATO Arctic states could not get there. The seeds are already in the ground.

Even if confrontation and cold war have not yet-and, one hopes, will not-engulf the Arctic, the other reality, the lost opportunity, is no less tragic. In the early post-Cold War years, pristine as the Arctic was naturally, so was it politically. The opportunity existed to make it a building block-indeed, a model-in creating the inclusive Euro-Atlantic security community reaching from "Vancouver to Vladivostok" that Russian and Western leaders pledged to construct from the 1990 Charter of Paris on a New Europe through every OSCE summit including the last one in Astana in 2010. Hence, the historic opportunity was not merely to foster cooperation in addressing the immense technical, ecological, economic, and social challenges posed in developing the region's vast hydrocarbon reserves, but cooperation to a grander end.

This was not merely the pie-eyed vision of reality-removed political idealists. In 2012 the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative , a commission chaired by former Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger, and former Senator Sam Nunn and whose members included senior ex- government and business leaders from North America, Europe, and Russia, proposed precisely that. They then laid out an agenda pointing in that direction. It included, first, urging member states in the Arctic Council to do more than monitor exploratory and drilling activity by producing "effective protocols regulating the development of hydrocarbons commensurate with the level of environmental vulnerability in the Arctic." To make this possible they also urged strengthening the authority of existing institutions, including the Arctic Council, permitting them to "create an action agenda and enforce agreed-upon regulations."

Second, they stressed the need for the states that would be developing the hydrocarbons to begin now "collaborating on technologies that would be adequate to deal with oil spills" and shipping accidents in the region. Given the complexity and difficulty of coping with an oil spill in the icy conditions of the Arctic, no country alone had the capacity to deal with such an emergency-nor does any yet. Third, in what today sounds like a prophetic appeal, they called for members of the Arctic Council to "launch a dialogue about the military measures each is taking to protect its interests in the region, including protection of the North and Northwest passages, with the aim of achieving mutual security and avoiding military competition." Knowing that the United States unwisely opposed raising the issue in the Arctic Council, they suggested that this "dialogue might well be under the ultimate auspices of the NATO-Russia Council."

Finally, they urged the Obama Administration to go forward with its stated intention to secure Senate ratification of the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea, arguing that "apart from U.S. self-interest, it is important that all Arctic nations, of which the United States is one, operate under the rules of this convention."

Needless to say had governments heeded their call, today's conversation about the Arctic would not contain the alarm that it does. For the moment this is water over the dam. The lost opportunity can only be lamented. At some point, however, if Russia and the West wish to begin digging themselves out of the cold war into which they have sunk, and do so before it utterly contaminates the Arctic's future, they may wish to revisit the wisdom of this group.
 
 #18
Interfax
September 10, 2015
Senior senator says Russia to be thorn in US side while it sticks to exclusivity

The head of the Russian Federation Council's International Affairs Committee, Konstantin Kosachev, has said that he believes that a Russia that challenges the American theory of exclusive leadership will always be a problem for the USA, privately-owned Russian news agency Interfax reported on 10 September.

Russia to be problem for USA for as long as it sticks to its exclusivity idea

"For the Americans, a Russia that challenges the American theory of exclusiveness and exclusive leadership, this kind of Russia will always be a problem for the USA," Interfax quoted Kosachev as saying.

This was Kosachev's comment on media reports that US presidential candidate Hillary Clinton had said that she believed that after the election the new American leader would face such threats as Islamic State terrorism, Russian President Vladimir Putin's policies and pandemics such as Ebola.

"There is nothing new in this statement by Clinton and I suspect that on these assessments there are currently no fundamental differences between the Democrats and the Republicans," Kosachev said.

"When it comes to evaluation of Russia, both the Democrats and the Republicans are quite close. These are policies aimed at preventing that Russia's positions in the world become stronger and not allowing Russia to become another centre of power," Interfax further quoted Kosachev as saying.

According to Kosachev, "the Americans are clearly irritated by any claims of any states, any groups of states to independence, self-sufficiency, let alone leadership".

"We are definitely not competing with the Americans for leadership. This is not a subject of the stand-off of the times of the Cold War. It is a different matter - we are not accepting the American ambitions and claims to exclusive leadership in the world. We believe that there should not be any kind of exclusive leadership in the world," Kosachev said.

According to Kosachev, any exclusive leadership in the world "will always be a destabilizing factor, will always be destructive for the international community".

"In this sense, for the USA, Russia probably is and will be a problem and a challenge for as long as in all its national doctrines the USA will be stating, without hiding it in any way, the tenet of its exclusiveness, its exclusive leadership. Russia will never agree with this. And I think that the overwhelming majority of countries in the world will not agree with this," Interfax further quoted Kosachev as saying.

Russia ready to resume cooperation with USA

According to another Interfax report on the same day, Kosachev also said that Russia was ready to resume cooperation with the USA in a whole range of areas. He added though that, in his opinion, for the time being Washington holds a short-sighted position on relations with Moscow.

"I am convinced that Russia is ready to resume cooperation with the USA in a large number of areas, but we cannot do this without the American side's agreement, we are not imposing ourselves on anyone," Interfax quoted Kosachev as saying.

Kosachev also said that he believed that there "definitely are" prospects for relations between Russia and the USA.

"There is only one alternative to what is happening now: to resume cooperation, to understand that, even if we disagree on something, these disagreements should not hinder our cooperation in the areas where these interests coincide," Kosachev said.

"For the time being the Americans hold the opposite position: if we disagree with Russia on something, we shall not cooperate with it on anything. This position is short-sighted, dangerous. This is a position which works not against Russia, but against the USA and against collective security interests," Kosachev said.

Kosachev also said that while Russia and the USA could not understand, hear each other and start cooperating, the forces which were in the end common enemies of Russia, the United States and entire mankind were taking advantage of this. For example, it is the case of international terrorism and organized crime.

"We can ascertain with regret that time is working against us all," Kosachev said.

He also said that at the moment contacts with American colleagues have been suspended, although there were occasional meetings with them. "I had a meeting with American congressmen in St Petersburg in the middle of August. But this is rather an exception to the rule and I can only express regret in this connection," Interfax further quoted Kosachev as saying.

Middle East, Europe suffer from US "mistakes"

RIA Novosti (part of the state-owned International News Agency Rossiya Segodnya) reported on the same day that Kosachev had also said that he believed that both the Middle East and Europe suffered from US "mistakes". He added that when the USA gives itself the right to install governing regimes in other countries, hundreds of thousands of refugees go to the European Union.

Kosachev also expressed bewilderment over publication in the Russian mass media of a blog of the press secretary of the US embassy, William Stephens, who accuses Russia of support for extremist forces in Syria. Kosachev recalled that he was once himself an embassy's press secretary and knew this job only too well.

"If I had allowed myself to publicly comment on the policies of the country of my posting and, even more so, accuse that country of supporting extremism, there would have been many people wanting to ask me to leave that country within 24 hours. Because an embassy's press secretary is empowered to explain actions of their own country, and in no way to teach another one, even more so, from mentoring positions," RIA Novosti quoted Kosachev as saying on his Facebook page.

Kosachev pointed out that the blog of the press secretary of the US embassy in Moscow was published on the website of Gazprom-owned, but editorially independent Ekho Moskvy radio with the following headline: "Russia's role in settling the Syrian conflict". "It is clear that he expresses not his own point of view, but the State Department's position. Judging by the text, the role that is being ascribed to us is exclusively destructive: 'Russia is rendering support to the regime, whose continuing atrocities against its own people contribute to a growth in extremism' and 'The support that Al-Asad's regime receives from its main sponsors allows him not to look for a constructive solution of the conflict by way of talks," Kosachev said.

"Once again: a foreign state has given itself the right to head some forces within another country, believing that this is completely appropriate and natural. One very much wants to ask - who are you?", Kosachev wondered.

According to RIA Novosti, Kosachev is convinced that there is a chance for Syria, there is a chance for the Middle Eastern region, there is also a chance for Europe, which is overwhelmed by the flow of refugees. "But the world needs this chance to be given, by delivering it from new American mistakes," Kosachev said.
 
 #19
www.rt.com
September 11, 2015
Russia backs Syria's fight against ISIS, not Assad's regime - Lavrov

Moscow is set to continue supporting Syria in its fight against Islamic State and provide Damascus with military supplies, Russia's foreign minister said, stressing that the drills of the Russian Navy near Syrian shores fully comply with international law.

"We support the fight of the Syrian government against so-called Islamic State, which neither represents Islam, nor happens to be a state," Sergey Lavrov said Friday.

Russia will not hesitate to continue maintaining Syria's defensive capacity to counter the terrorist threat, Lavrov said.

"I can tell you once again, that our servicemen and military experts remain there [in Syria] for the maintenance of Russian [military] hardware and assisting the Syrian army in using this hardware, there's training under way," Lavrov said, stressing that military hardware supplies will continue.

In fighting terrorism, Moscow has always supported "teamwork based on international legislation," the foreign minister said.

Germany has said it welcomes more Russian engagement in the fight against Islamic State.

"I think we would welcome the Russian Federation and the Russian president ... getting actively involved in the fight against ISIS, given the dangers arising from Islamist terrorism," Reuters cited German Foreign Ministry spokesman Martin Schaefer as saying, speaking at a regular government news conference in Berlin on Friday.

Lavrov also reiterated that the anti-ISIS coalition should start cooperating with the Syrian government and army on the ground.

"The most effective and powerful ground force to fight Islamic State is the Syrian army," Lavrov said, adding that coordination is necessary to avoid "unintended incidents."

Moscow has been calling on to the US-led anti-ISIS coalition to team up with the Syrian army from the very beginning of airstrikes against Islamic State one year ago.

"Better late than never," Lavrov said.

"If battling terrorism is a priority, than all opportunistic considerations, like a regime change in Syria, should be put aside," he added.

Moscow fully supports the revival of contacts between the Russian and American military, Lavrov said.

"If Washington, like [US Secretary of State] John Kerry reiterated, is ready to unfreeze such contacts, than here's our welcome," Lavrov said, recalling that when the contacts, now suspended on the US initiative, were in place, they were extremely stable and trustful.

"We always back up professional dialogue of the militaries, they understand each other well," Lavrov said. "It's important to preclude undesired and non-deliberate incidents," Lavrov said.

As for the naval drills conducted in the Mediterranean, Lavrov said he had no exact information about the schedule of the drills, but confirmed that they take place on a regular basis.

He also insisted that any training of the Russian Navy in international waters is conducted in full compliance with international law.

Russian authorities have warned that national naval training is taking place east of Cyprus and will last till September 17.
 
 #20
Western obsession with toppling Assad hinders struggle against Islamic State
By Lyudmila Alexandrova

MOSCOW, September 8. /TASS/. Both the West and Russia are aware of the terrible threat the extremist Islamic State poses to all, but they are greatly divided as far as the tactics of struggle against it is concerned, analysts say. For the United States and the leading European powers the ousting of the Bashar Assad regime remains number one aim, however horrible the terrorists may be.

Tensions inside Syria and around it have been soaring to new highs. The United States has urged Greece to close its airspace to Russian planes delivering relief supplies to Syria. Several days before that US Secretary of State John Kerry in a telephone conversation with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov voiced concern over media reports Moscow might step up its military presence in Syria. The media and social networks have been discussing rumors about the possibility Russian military might take part in the struggle against the Islamists side by side with Syrian government forces.

The Russian authorities have said many a time the question of sending Russian military to Syria to fight the Islamic State, let alone participation of Russian aviation in strikes against the terrorists, is not on the agenda. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova on Monday said Lavrov in his conversation with Kerry "drew the US Secretary of State's attention to the comment Russian President Vladimir Putin made in Vladivostok to the effect that discussing the possibility of Russia's participation in military operations in Syria was premature for the time being." Lavrov, Zakharova said, pointing out that Moscow had never made a secret of its "supplies of military hardware to the Syrian authorities for fighting with terrorists."

The leading European countries have grown increasingly active. France is beginning reconnaissance flights over Syria on Tuesday in the first step to join the international coalition against the Islamic State. The British Parliament in October will consider Prime Minister David Cameron's proposal for launching a military operation in Syrian territory. Cameron linked the solution of the migrant crisis in Europe with the need for dealing air strikes against Syria, where, in his opinion, the Bashar Assad regime and the Islamic State are destabilizing the situation.

"Certain changes in the policies of all players follow the Islamic State's expansion. There has been growing awareness this is a serious threat," the deputy president of the Russian Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Irina Zvyagelskaya, has told TASS. "It should be recognized that the Russia and the Western countries differ in their approach to the general situation: we believe that Bashar Assad and his government is objectively fighting against this evil. In the meantime the Western countries argue that if Assad goes, everything will get well overnight."

Apparently some intermediate option should be identified and a transitional government set up, because nothing will work without that dialogue says Zvyagelskaya. "Assad enjoys certain support from the population. His regime is far from ideal, but minorities were living a rather calm life under the Assads. For the time being there is no political alternative or other institutions. One has to admit that objectively Assad is fighting against this terrible evil."

The US request to Greece for not letting Russian aircraft through its airspace is evidence of Washington's "political shortsightedness," Zvyagelskaya believes. "We are in a very confrontational context. Regrettably, it impairs our cooperation there where it is necessary."

There is no Russian military presence in Syria as such, but weapons supplies under the effective contracts are going on, senior research fellow Boris Dolgov, of the Arab Research Centre at the Oriental Studies Institute under the Russian Academy of Sciences, has told TASS. "There is a possibility these weapons are being delivered with Russian military advisers and specialists present at the moment of the handover; besides the same specialists are expected to train Syrian military under the contract terms. Also, there are some Russian military specialists at the Russian Navy's logistics facility. This is not exactly one may call growing presence, though."

The fuss in the western media is part of the propaganda campaign, Dolgov said. "After the Assad regime's hypothetical fall the terrorists' rise to power will be unavoidable," he warns. "After the four-year-long fighting the Syrian army is still capable of conducting large-scale operations against IS militants."

As far as the migrant crisis in Europe is concerned, after Assad's fall which Britain and France are so eager to see, it will turn from bad to worse. "Syria will fall apart and many more millions of refugees will flock to Europe's doorstep. That policy is suicidal for the European countries."

"Russia's stance on Syria remains unchanged," an adviser to the director of the Russian Institute of Strategic Studies, Yelena Suponina told TASS. "Assad's resignation as a precondition for the beginning of negotiations is not on the agenda.

The operation by the US-led coalition against the Islamic State has continued for more than a year now. But the IS is still there, and it is growing stronger, Suponina said.

"The Americans tend to confuse struggle against terrorists and efforts to overthrow Assad. This explains why Russia is absent from that coalition. Moscow is well aware that today the United States may be talking about struggle against terrorism, but tomorrow it may turn out that in reality it seeks another replacement of the regime. The effects of this will be far more grave," she warned.
 
 #21
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
September 10, 2015
Russia raises the stakes in Syria
The Kremlin appears to be stepping up its role in the Syrian crisis, possibly laying the groundwork for a new strategy against ISIS in the region.
By Yury Barmin
Yury Barmin is a strategic risk consultant based in Moscow. He holds an MPhil Degree in International Relations from the University of Cambridge. His interests include Russian foreign policy and the politics of the Gulf. Follow him on Twitter at @yurybarmin.

The news of Russian troops appearing across Syria has appeared in numerous media outlets around the world in recent days. Some suggested that just as in previous years, Russian specialists are merely training Syrian President Bashar Assad's army to use Russian equipment that Moscow keeps sending to Syria, while others went as far as to suggest that newly-arrived Russians are fighting on the front lines alongside the Syrian army.

Only a few months ago, a variety of reports suggested that Russia could have been changing its Syria strategy and was about to abandon Assad. Several Arab newspapers, for instance, reported in late spring that Russia withdrew its diplomatic staff from Damascus and stopped honoring its agreement with Syria to maintain Russian-made fighter jets.
Read Q&A with Carnegie Moscow Center's Alexei Malashenko: "Russia faces tough choices on what to do with Syria and ISIS"

The two facts offer a very different perspective on what Vladimir Putin's intentions with regards to Syria are. So what is Moscow really doing in Syria and are Russian soldiers really fighting for Assad?

Despite a handful of reports claiming that Russian troops were seen taking part in action in Syria, engaging in direct fighting is off the table for the Kremlin, at least for now. First, Moscow can't afford another major deployment of troops, both financially and politically. After Ukraine, Moscow knows the price of such a policy all too well.

The U.S. reaction to initial reports of Russia boosting its presence in Syria was quite harsh. White House spokesman Josh Earnest suggested that Russia's involvement would lead to an escalation in the conflict and even to direct confrontation with the coalition taking on the Islamic State of Iraq and the Greater Syria (ISIS). Direct involvement in this crisis is also risky due to Western sanctions that theoretically could be toughened over Syria.

In order to achieve meaningful results on the ground, Russia would need to send thousands of well-trained troops to Syria as well as a significant amount of military equipment. Presently there are well less than one thousand of Russian personnel operating in the country, and judging by recent images of Russian landing ships crossing the Bosphorus, only a handful of trucks and armored personnel carriers. The financial burden of engaging in fighting in order to help Assad's army regain ground without any guarantee would be extremely heavy on the Russian budget.

But probably the most important reason why Russia would think twice before sending its troops into battle in Syria is that it would certainly be used for PR purposes in Russia's North Caucasus by ISIS to recruit new Russian-speaking fighters. But it would be even more detrimental to the Kremlin if ISIS captured a Russian soldier in Syria whose brutal execution would set large groups of Russians against the Kremlin's irresponsible strategy.

What is Russia's goal in Syria?

There is no denial that in recent months Russia has slightly intensified arms deliveries to the Assad government. In fact, the latest data shows that in the first 8 months of 2015 Russian southbound landing crafts passed the Bosphorus 39 times, compared to 36 times in the same period of 2014. The reason why these deliveries are making so much noise this time is that the cargo on these ships is being transported on the top deck, most times under covers but sometimes even out in the open.

The Russian Foreign Ministry also confirmed that Moscow continues to provide military equipment per previously signed contracts; in addition, Moscow continues to send Russian military specialists to train the Syrian army to use this equipment. Maria Zakharova, the spokesperson for the Russian Foreign Ministry, also noted that if more Russian support for the fight against ISIS in Syria were needed, Moscow would be ready to consider providing it.

Some reports suggest that most equipment that Russia delivers to Syria these days is intended for the military base in Latakia. According to some sources, Russia and Syria reactivated the 1980 "friendship" treaty that sees Moscow taking over the Latakia air base.

Russia has reportedly delivered its newest BTR-82A armored personnel carriers (APCs), Ural trucks and shipments of firearms to the Syrian government. It has also allegedly started assembling prefabricated buildings for 1,000 military specialists in Latakia. As well, Russia could be setting up a mobile air traffic control unit.

If true, Russia's decision to take over the air base in Latakia could be interpreted within its attempts to establish a broad anti-ISIS coalition that would include both the Syrian government and Iran. While it is still unclear what the outcome of the negotiating process is, Moscow may be taking steps to prepare the ground for a possible joint operation against IS. The Russian-controlled air base could be used by the coalition to launch air strikes against ISIS or as a stopover. This way, at least publicly, Western governments would have to deal with Russia instead of Assad.

By increasing its military presence in Syria, Russia may also be raising the ante in the ongoing negotiating process, in which so far Moscow's sole strength was its amicable relationship with the Assad government. By setting up a fully operational air base in the Alawite stronghold of Latakia Russia hopes to match U.S. military capabilities in Syria and boost its standing by having actual military specialists on the ground.

It is highly misleading to say that Russian forces take part in fighting in Syria or that Moscow's strategy is something out of the ordinary. Russia has been continuously delivering cargo to Syria, both humanitarian and military.

While the frequency of deliveries likely increased in recent weeks, it was probably done intentionally ahead of Vladimir Putin's visit to the UN General Assembly later in September. While it's not yet clear what statements regarding Syria he might make at the UN, Vladimir Putin may propose a new format for the U.S.-led coalition in which Assad would have a role to play and Russia would provide logistic support.
 
 #22
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
September 10, 2015
Migrant crisis: European Union will have to adapt to a new reality
The current wave of migrants arriving in Europe from the Middle East and North Africa poses a serious test of the European Union's will and unity, with a lack of preparedness resulting in a confused and divided approach to the problem. Could the crisis lead to greater cooperation with Russia on global issues?
Vladimir Zorin, special to RBTH
Vladimir Zorin is Deputy Direct of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology at the Russian Academy of Sciences and a member of the Presidential Council of International Relations.

Russian society and experts are attentively following the situation in Europe concerning the flows of refugees, since currently migration processes bear a global nature, and in Europe they have affected basically every country.

For Russia this is a topical issue because it has involved the country in three aspects: as a host, transit and departure country. We have just experienced a wave of migration when we received almost one million refugees from Ukraine, a crisis that is similar in dimension to the one increasing in Europe.

It must be said that the migration problem is not new to Europe. In the last years flows of refugees and illegal migrants have been growing due to the economic crisis and the political instability on the periphery of the EU. But the appearance of ISIS (Islamic State) and the escalation of the conflict in the Middle East have led to an outright disaster.
 
Caught unprepared

It is obvious that Europe was not prepared for such a strong surge in migration. Firstly, despite the fact that all the necessary documents had been drawn up and the Council of Europe determined the measures, the procedures were very slow. Secondly, there are very complex bureaucratic mechanisms of agreement and decision-making. Thirdly, there is an absence of will among a certain part of the establishment. Additionally, there is a conflict of different points of view concerning the future of the EU - from extremely liberal to Eurosceptic.

As a result, European countries are unprepared for making joint decisions and bearing joint responsibility. This unpreparedness has led to confusion within the EU administration. Now each country is trying to save itself individually. Russian experts have been particularly surprised by the fact that this Euroskeptic tone is being set principally by the countries of Eastern Europe.

In my opinion, what Europe currently needs is a series of measures that are directed both inward and outward. If we were to speak about internal efforts, it would be necessary to review the Dublin Convention, which determines the country that is responsible for examining applications for granting asylum. It is also necessary to unify the regulations and procedures for examining these applications.

On a foreign policy level it is necessary to adopt force and administrative measures for strengthening borders. For example, it is essential to bolster the patrol of sea borders and the fight against traffickers in order to avoid human deaths. And obviously, it is important to help the countries of exodus in order to reduce the number of potential migrants. The EU and the UN need to help the migrants accumulated in Libya, the majority of whom are located on the coast.

Of special significance would be diplomatic efforts focused on stabilizing the situation in the Middle East, particularly in Syria and Libya.
 
Risks for Europe

If we are to speak about the near future, then it can be expected that Europe will take those migrants that have already arrived. But this has serious risks. Firstly, this may lead to the threat of terrorism, since potential extremists may be hiding among the migrants. There may also be international conflicts, for several reasons: due to the various groups of migrants, a part of whom were recently on opposite sides of the barricades; to the hostility that the local population may nurture toward the migrants; and to the crisis of Europe's multiculturalism policy. Radical moods may grow within the host nations.

The current wave of migrants is a test for the EU. There are actually doubts being voiced about the rationale for preserving the Schengen border-free zone. Common European values are being questioned.

However, we can be sure that the European Union will resist. It will not become different, politicians will sober up. They will understand that there are things that must be taken into consideration.

It is possible that the current situation will also make the EU administration reflect on whether or not the position they adopted towards Russia is correct. They will understand that Russia is not a competitor but an ally when it comes to solving many problems, in particular to regulating the crises in Syria and Ukraine.
 
 #23
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
September 10, 2015
TROIKA REPORT: King Salman balancing between Obama and Putin
RBTH presents its weekly analytical program TROIKA REPORT, featuring a look at three of the most high-profile recent developments in international affairs.
Sergey Strokan, Vladimir Mikheev, special to RBTH

1. Engaging the West
Russia and the West: Do populist politicians offer a real alternative?

The meteoric rise of left-wing iconoclast Jeremy Corbyn, the favorite in the leadership contest for Britain's Labor party, raised the question: Where is Labor, and Britain too, heading? Corbyn, if he ever wins the premiership, would be allegedly the most sympathetic British leader to Russia in history. This would be unprecedented, because Britain, as proclaimed by conservative Russian politician Vladimir Zhirinovsky, has been Russia's "most formidable enemy" since the 19th century.

In contrast, Corbyn is adamant in his foreign policy pronouncements, and he believes in what he says. He lambasts NATO and blames the West for instigating the Ukrainian crisis. But does he really epitomize a true alternative? And is he one of the new breed of politicians who are now making waves, or a throwback to the past?

A growing number of statements in the West favoring improved relations with Russia have accumulated in recent months, bolstered by acts of defiance of the common EU and U.S. stance in regard to Moscow's foreign policy. This was manifested by the visit of French parliamentarians to Crimea and a similar move planned by a group of their Italian counterparts. Moreover, the political debate in Europe and to a lesser extent in the United States, partly due to pre-election campaigns, has acquired a fair degree of criticism of governments' standpoint on dealing with Russia.

This no longer looks like "one-off" soundbites. The demand for a "reset" is coming from politicians of various political leanings, from both the right and the left. From frontrunner in the Republican nomination race Donald Trump in the U.S. to Jeremy Corbyn in the UK; from Marine le Pen, leader of France's National Front, with a strong bid for the presidency, to Matteo Salvini, leader of Italy's Northern League; from President of the Czech Republic Milos Zeman to Prime minister of Greece Alexis Tsipras.

Yet, Jeremy Corbyn's opponents consider the British maverick a "dinosaur" of left-wing politics, having spent 33 years at Westminster. However, this has not deterred the support of the trade unions and the 10,000 volunteers who promoted his candidacy. It all points to a clear desire in certain sections of the public for change. Although Corbyn has warned not to take him for "an advocate" of Russian President Vladimir Putin, he calls for bettering relations with Russia.

Foreign policy has unexpectedly soared close to the top of the agenda of election campaigns, compelling politicians to define their views regarding the current global situation. It has also contributed to the ratings of those public figures that are suggesting an alternative, like Trump, who claims he could do a better "jaw-jaw" with Putin than Obama.

Approached by Troika Report, Nadezhda Arbatova, head of the Center of European Political Studies within the Institute of World Economy and International Relations at the Russian Academy of Sciences, offered her viewpoint on the mainstream parties losing ground to yesterday's outsiders:

"The Corbyn phenomenon is not new. Populists of all kinds are always in demand when ordinary citizens in EU countries are facing economic recession, uncontrolled immigration and an ensuing feeling of insecurity..."

"...international terrorism, and when they are dissatisfied with their own leaders and with Brussels. So, there is nothing new. Populists in the EU countries come up with criticism, which is often justified in many aspects. But their recipes and recommendations for how to cope with the enormous economic and security problems are unrealistic."

- What about the "Russian connection"?

"As for Russia's affiliations with the so-called Euroskeptics, it came as a result of Russia's alienation in international affairs due to the Ukrainian crisis. Therefore, Russia is looking for allies, and the Euroskeptics are regarded as such. However, the countries with euroskeptical leaders, like Hungary and the Czech Republic, cannot be viewed as Russia's strategic allies. As long as they remain members of the EU and NATO, there won't be any radical changes in relations with these countries."

- Why would politicians as different as Trump, Tsipras, Le Pen, Corbyn, etc. criticize the political establishment in their countries for conducting what they deem as an incorrect policy toward Russia?

"These forces are marginal and are looking for allies abroad. In this respect, Russia is a good choice for them. A big country with its own foreign policy, so they are playing the Russian card."

Among those who are allegedly "playing the Russian card," Marine Le Pen of the France's National Front is quite visible: She calls for tighter energy and military cooperation with Russia, and once invited Germany to jointly create a Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis. Then there is the UKIP leader Nigel Farage, who has called on the European Union to stop interfering with the Ukrainian crisis and engage Russia to form a united front against the Islamic State (ISIS) militant group, which is conducting a war of terror in the Middle East.

Earlier, back in December 2013, Matteo Salvini, leader of Italy's Northern League party, made a complimentary statement: "People in Italy still know little about Russia, although in my opinion Russia represents the future."

In Berlin, Alexander Gauland, the leader of the Alternative f�r Deutschland (AfD) Party, argues that 19th-century chancellor Otto von Bismarck was correct in insisting on close ties with Russia, because each time Germany abandoned Bismarck's paradigm it headed toward defeat, most notably after 1914 and 1941.

In Moscow, conservative political groupings held a forum in March, inviting 11 like-minded political parties from Europe. Among those present were senior figures from Greece's controversial Golden Dawn and the Austrian Freedom Party. The get-together marked attempts to establish a sort of "right-wing international" but the outcome was more style than substance, much like the hopes of staking much on marginal politicians like Jeremy Corbyn.

Nevertheless, the Corbyn phenomenon and similar offshoots of the counter-elites in Greece, Italy, France, Germany, and the Netherlands, not to forget the U.S., has revealed the latent demand among many of the public for a viable alternative to the mainstream politicians and policies which have ceased to meet the high expectations of the people.

The bottom line is: Never underestimate an anti-establishment maverick during the "lean years" of frustration and despondency. Even though it might boil down to nothing more than 15 minutes of glory and razzamatazz.
 
2. Globally speaking
Russia enters debate on European refugee crisis

Last week Moscow unexpectedly stepped into the debate over the European refugee crisis amid the deepening calamity that has pitted Eastern Europe against Western Europe, with Russian President Vladimir Putin suggesting resolving this conflict of interests by addressing its root causes. Meanwhile, his diplomats hinted at Russia getting involved in the efforts to diffuse the avalanche-like crisis.  

The Russian leader spoke of the necessity to assist the countries turned into unwilling "donors" of migrants, and focus on rebuilding their economies and social spheres "to convince terrified people to move back." He emphasized that in the Middle East this would be possible only if, firstly, ISIS is defeated and, secondly, if outside sponsors act "with full respect for history, culture and local traditions."

In some way, Putin echoed the decision taken by the EU in July to tackle the core roots of the crisis. That decision was based on the premises that war-torn and hunger-stricken, destabilized nations serve as breeding grounds for extremism of all kinds, making way for the emergence of violent religious fundamentalists who preach by the sword and live by hatred. Nation-building and restoring the fractured societies of these countries is vital.

In late August, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov suggested Russia and the EU could interact in handling the refugee crisis. Moscow is awaiting concrete proposals from Brussels, said Lavrov. Concurrently, diplomatic sources revealed that "informal" consultations on the subject with the EU have been going on for some time already.

Russia seems to be eager to share its experience, having had to accommodate those who fled from neighboring Ukraine in large numbers in a short time span. In 2014 alone, right after the outbreak of hostilities in eastern Ukraine, more than 950,000 Ukrainian citizens fled to Russia, more than a third of whom requested "refugee status."

Also for the record: Since the start of the civil war in Syria, some 5,000 refugees have fled to Russia, and many of them have applied for permanent residency status.

While pointing at the "reckless" politics pursued by Western powers in the Middle East and North Africa, which triggered off the exodus of refugees, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova has proposed substantial cooperation with the EU in handling the crisis.

Could Russia really assist the European Union in handling the consequences of the migrant crisis? If so, could it become another focus point of positive interaction between Russia and the EU in dealing with a trans-border issue? The Moscow-based academics have slightly divergent views on whether Russia should "do its bit" and what are the limits to its good will and contribution.

Timofei Bordachev, head of the Center of European and International Studies at the Higher School of Economics, believes that everyone has to accept their own mistakes, and that there is no common responsibility for the EU and Russia. Here is what he had to say to Troika Report:

"First, from the perspective of international politics, Russia has no obligations to pay for the mistakes of the European leaders, namely France and Britain, as well as the United States, which they made in the Middle East and which is the core reason for the refugee crisis. Second, Russia is also suffering from an influx of refugees from Ukraine, [which is] going through a crisis to which the Europeans have contributed.

"However, if viewed from the humanitarian perspective, Russian bears a reasonable amount of responsibility for the plight of the refugees, namely from Syria. Moreover, Russia can provide military assistance to the forces in Syria fighting against Islamic State. As for the refugees who have already made their way to Europe, it is the duty and responsibility of the European Union to help them."

On the contrary, Alexander Rytov, an expert with the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences, opted for a more proactive policy and suggested a two-track approach for Russia's involvement in the pan-European refugee crisis. Here is his comment for Troika Report:

"I believe that Russia should be more active in this field because the flow of refugees is huge. It is evident that the 'buffer zones' in Libya, in the Maghreb countries, and in the Middle East, ceased to exist after the Arab Spring. There are conflicts going on in Iraq, Syria, and Libya. Russia is interested in a settlement in these countries. Henceforth, it must pursuit, in my opinion, a two-track policy.

"Firstly, assist the refugees, help them to settle down, permanently or temporarily if they choose one day to go back home - they would then be grateful to Russia. Secondly, make efforts to form a united front to fight in Syria and Iraq against ISIS, now the main opponent of the civilized world."

In any case, the goodwill gestures made by top Russian officials signal the desire of Moscow not just to keep channels of communication open but to cooperate with the European Union in a meaningful and effective way, and deal with a problem that spans across three continents and has not a regional but a global dimension.
 
3. Going Eastward
King Salman balancing between Obama and Putin

Moscow missed the opportunity to welcome Saudi Arabia's new monarch, King Salman, in August prior to his first official visit to Washington this week. Nevertheless, it makes little difference since the new visible corrections in the foreign policy of the desert kingdom counterbalance Riyadh's former leaning toward the West.

There is no doubt that for decades Saudi Arabia has appreciated the "special relationship" with the former main provider of security in the region, the United States. The 9/11 drama was a watershed: The allegations of the close ties of the terrorists to Saudi Arabia derailed everything. These accusations in the American media led Saudi business and sovereign funds to withdraw some $200bn as portfolio investments from the U.S. stock markets.

Damage control was applied, and things returned to the way they were for a while - until the U.S. strategists, enthusiastic about becoming energy self-sufficient and less dependent on Middle Eastern oil, shifted their foreign policy emphasis and focused on engaging Iran. The Vienna deal on the country's nuclear program set the course of events toward lifting the sanctions from Tehran, seen by Riyadh as its arch-rival in regional affairs.

Feeling betrayed, the oil-rich kingdom has apparently opted for a "diversification" of its foreign policy partners and started the process of rapprochement with Russia. Are we witnessing a balancing act of Saudi diplomacy? Sergei Filatov, commentator with the Moscow-based International Affairs journal, made the following comment for Troika Report:

"Saudi Arabia is trying to find new ways of handling international politics. For decades Riyadh was a close friend of Washington. Now that the two sides share a serious 'misunderstanding,' the Saudis are looking for new international partners, including Russia.

"After his coronation, King Salman chose not to go to the United State,s since its policy toward Saudi Arabia has changed. Why? This is another question. Now King Salman has gone to see President Obama after receiving an invitation to come to Moscow. His visit is due in fall. Meeting with Obama will enable King Salman to assess what the U.S. has to offer. This is a preparation for the visit to Moscow."

"We are very different countries with contradictions, in particular, related to the past developments in the Caucasus region. Nevertheless, Moscow understands that Saudi Arabia could be if not a friend then a good partner."

"Russia can help resolve problems because Moscow can speak to anybody: to Israel, Palestine, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, etc. We are open to such a dialogue. In the region, there is plenty of animosity. That is why Russia can have a role to play."

"We can help them to resolve their problems and to find a new consensus in the Middle East."

Originally, King Salman was expected to attend MAKS, the international aviation and space show held annually near Moscow in the town of Zhukovsky. The monarch missed the occasion. Instead, he headed toward Washington. Is this some sort of a diplomatic chess game being played by Riyadh? Maxim Suchkov, an expert with the Russian International Affairs Council, shared his view on the intricacies of regional mentality and behavior with Troika Report:

"There is an element of a game in the Saudis' behaviour, in how they are balancing relations with Moscow and Washington. However, the context is that they are extremely concerned over the challenges that they face in the immediate neighborhood. It forces them to act more pragmatically than they did before.

"As for Washington, the two sides will cover five problem areas: Syria, Yemen, Egypt, the energy issue and, of course, the Iranian deal. On all of these issues Riyadh and Washington have serious disagreements. But the deal with Iran will dominate the agenda. Obama wants to ease the Saudis' concerns over the deal, and get, if not support for it, non-resistance to its implementation.

"The Saudis, in their turn, want more physical guarantees from the U.S. to secure their own regional standing and prevent Iran from gaining regional dominance. I would not expect any breakthrough, at least at this point in time. Both parties will most likely reaffirm their positions and ensure that they do not further fray the relationship."

- What is store for Russia if - or rather, when - King Salman finally pays his promised visit to Moscow?

"The Saudis are trying to diversify their contacts with Moscow and Washington. As we know, Prince Mohammed bin Salman attended the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum this summer, and the two parties allegedly clinched a very lucrative arms deal.

"This might be the reason why King Salman missed the MAKS event: the Saudis did not want to show that they are way too cooperative by having two visits in a row, one in June, another soon afterwards, in August. If King Salman showed up at the MAKS, it would have been too much: He did not want to antagonize Washington. Later this year, they will come to Moscow and talk over the same agenda, but most probably more over Syria than Iran."

It would be premature to expect a full-fledged cooperation between Moscow and Riyadh, given the multitude of divergent views and interests. The House of Saud is too careful and pragmatic enough not to rupture its close ties with Washington.

Yet, the current restructuring of the whole situation in the Middle East, driven by the gradual strengthening of Iran and the entrenchment of ISIS, which already controls 70 percent of Syria and a large chunk of Iraqi territory, forces Saudi Arabia to seek, if not new allies, then new partners of convenience to deal with the existential threats.
 
 #24
Moscow Times
September 10, 2015
Fasten Your Seat Belts for a Bumpy Moscow Theater Season
By John Freedman

As we prepare for the new theater season, a note of alarm can be heard in the air.

Consider the titles of three of the season's biggest new shows - "The Suicide," "Russian Blues" and "Who Lives Well in Russia?"

But beyond that clear, thematic hum of consternation, there is a quieter, less evident aspect of uncertainty to the new season. Six of the city's major houses are closed for renovations, some of them moving into their second or even third years of reconstruction.

Add to that another key venue - the Gogol Center - which is experiencing serious financial problems, and you get a picture of a theater community that is very much in flux.

Reconstruction would normally be a sign of growth and expansion. And that may yet prove to be true in regards to the Taganka Theater, the Satirikon, the Sovremennik, the Maly Theater, the Hermitage Theater and the Contemporary Play School, all of whose home stages are boarded up while their performance spaces are being reconfigured.

But in troubled economic times, you can't help but question if the road to the future will remain rosy for all of them.

The Gogol Center, closed part of last season for renovations, is having a difficult time pulling out of a financial hole. It recently received good news when Oleg Tabakov of the Moscow Art Theater promised to pay some of Gogol Center's debts, but stability still appears to be a distant goal for this popular, innovative playhouse.

Meanwhile, the Stanislavsky Electrotheater, which reopened spectacularly in January after 18 months of renovations, recently learned that construction on its planned small stage and so-called outdoor "theater yard" has been delayed significantly, forcing numerous changes in the venue's plans for the coming season.

All of the closed theaters will continue to perform some of the time on borrowed or rented stages. But how good, for example, can Yury Lyubimov's old productions for the Taganka really look in the cavernous, boxy confines of the Theater Kinoaktyora?

The good side of all this is that Moscow theater is nothing if not resilient and resourceful. Despite closed doors at many venues around town, we have a plethora of new shows opening over the next month or so.

The Gogol Center, for instance, has taken the high road during its time of troubles. It will unveil not one, but two major new productions by Kirill Serebrennikov on its main stage.

"Who Lives Well in Russia?" is expected to be an innovative interpretation of one of the most famous poems by Russia's great civic poet Nikolai Nekrasov -"Who Lives Well in Russia?" Nekrasov's narrative poem looks at the hard life of Russian peasants, but Serebrennikov apparently will use that as a springboard to tell a bigger story cutting across eras. It plays Tuesday, Wednesday and Sept. 17.

"Russian Fairy Tales," opening Sept. 19 and 20, reaches back to a famous collection of folk tales compiled in the mid-19th century by Alexander Afanasyev. Working with a team of young directors, Serebrennikov explores some of Afanasyev's most famous tales as a source of Russian attitudes to freedom and individuality.

The Yermolova Theater will attempt to give Moscow its second major production of Nikolai Erdman's classic tragicomedy "The Suicide" in as many seasons, starting Sept. 17 and 18. A production of the play last spring at the Studio of Theatrical Art was a highlight of last year's offerings.

At the Yermolova, young director Denis Azarov applies a contemporary point of view to Erdman's play about a simple man in hard times who is besieged by people who want him to kill himself to further their own particular causes. The production stars Alexander Kudin and Kristina Asmus, who impressed mightily last season in the Yermolova Theater's production of "The Inspector General."

Dmitry Krymov, arguably Russia's most celebrated director today, unveils his production of "Russian Blues: Hiking for Mushrooms" at the School of Dramatic Art on Oct. 8, 9 and 10. This episodic piece, written by Krymov himself, is visually spectacular, a feast of colors and images. Ostensibly following a family going out into the forest in search of mushrooms, it actually tells the story of several Russian tragedies, absurd and real, including toilets backing up and the sinking of the submarine Shch-207 in 1943.

The Satirikon, while closed for reconstruction, will perform its entire repertoire next door at the KVN Planet complex. Its first premiere of the season should be exciting - a dramatic rendition of the famous Yakov Protazanov silent film, "The Man From the Restaurant."

Directed by Yegor Peregudov, and opening Oct. 21 to 23, it will surely invoke some ghosts.

Protazanov's 1927 film starred the legendary actor Michael Chekhov as a harried waiter in a restaurant full of crude customers and fellow workers. Peregudov cast the great Konstantin Raikin in Chekhov's role, giving us reason to hope for one of Raikin's most memorable outings in recent years.

The Stanislavsky Electrotheater continues its series of collaborations with major European directors when it unveils Heiner Goebbels' production of "Max Black" from Oct. 7 to 11.

Goebbels, a German composer and director, compiled "Max Black" from a few texts by Paul Valery, Georg Christoph Lichtenberg, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Max Black, the Russian-born American philosopher. It communicates, however, primarily through music and visuals.

Another show with a musical basis will be Vladimir Pankov's interpretation of Alexander Vampilov's classic 1970s play "Duck Hunting" for the Et Cetera Theater. This drama about hard choices in the Russian provinces opened two weeks ago and next plays Sept. 24.

Fans of playwright Ivan Vyrypayev have double reason to celebrate, as he has plays opening in two theaters almost simultaneously. Viktor Ryzhakov's production of "Illusions," a tale of two interconnected married couples, opens Sept. 19 at the Moscow Art Theater. At Praktika Theater, Vyrypayev's own production of his newest work, "Unbearably Long Embraces," premiered last week and will next be seen in mid-November.

For all this, however, Moscow's busiest and fastest-moving theater remains Teatr.doc.

Kicked out of two spaces by Moscow authorities last season, Teatr.doc now opens its first full season in its newest digs on Maly Kazyonny Pereulok. As managing director Yelena Gremina promised when the theater took up its new home in late June, the repertoire this year features a whopping 12 new shows.

Productions like "24 Plus," "Actors," "Beyond Theater: What If I Don't?" "Lear Kleshch," "Silence on a Given Theme," and "Plato's Symposium" all explore the place of the individual in contemporary Russian life.

In the case of "Lear Kleshch," acted by Marina Kleshchyova, that place may be in prison, or, as in "24 Plus," it may be in bed with multiple partners.

Finally, Theater of Nations kicks off its new season with a show that opened at the tail end of last year - "Pushkin's Fairy Tales." Directed by American master Robert Wilson, it imagines Pushkin as no one ever has before. The show plays in September from Wednesday to the 19th.
 
 #25
Will West take softer line as Belarusian presidential election draws near?
By Lyudmila Alexandrova

MOSCOW, September 10. /TASS/. Everybody agrees Belarus's 2015 presidential election race is very different from all the previous ones, although analysts are certain that the outcome of the voting due October 11 is predetermined and Alexander Lukashenko will stay in office for a fifth term in a row. Whether the West takes a better attitude to Minsk depends on the world community's recognition the forthcoming election will agree with the existing international standards. In the meantime, the Belarussian leader needs normalization of relations with the West for financial reasons: should western loans become available again and sanctions be lifted, it will be much easier to better the complicated economic situation in the country. At the moment some 200 Belarusian officials, including Lukashenko himself, and two dozen companies are under EU sanctions.

Nevertheless, many pundits are certain the West will not recognize the election in Belarus as democratic anyway, while trying to further mend relations with the Belarussian leader and drive a wedge between him and Russia.

The West has already appreciated the Belarusian leader's attempts to make his own contribution to settling the Ukrainian crisis and last August's release of six opposition figureheads, whom human rights campaigners regard as political prisoners. European Parliament President Martin Schulz has hailed this move, adding, though, that it was not enough yet for revising relations with Belarus. The European Union will not consider the issue of lifting sanctions from Belarus, European officials said following Wednesday's meeting of the EU foreign ministers in Luxembourg.

"Against the backdrop of the events in Ukraine Lukashenko has developed the feeling he may attain an impeccable victory," the deputy director of the CIS Studies Institute, Vladimir Zharikhin, has told TASS. "As the election campaign proceeds, he will find it rather easy to demonstrate his achievements: 'Take a look at Ukraine. Take a look at the living standards there and here. And take a look at the order we have here and the chaos there.'"

The head of the Centre for Current Politics, Sergey Mikheyev, argues that all steps to liberalize Belarus's internal affairs are taken for the sole purpose of making the election returns legitimate in the eyes of the West. "As a matter of fact the domestic policies remain unchanged," he told TASS. "The way I see it, this is a tactical move, not a strategic one. Although it is not ruled out that under the influence of events in neighboring Lukashenko may agree to give the opposition greater freedom so as to avoid fanning tensions."

At the same time Mikheyev is skeptical this will help Lukashenko gain a more favourable attitude of the West. "I am certain that whatever may be done, the West will keep saying no matter what the election was undemocratic."

"The West will not recognize this election as democratic and legitimate this time, too, but there will be far less criticism than on all previous such occasions," the first deputy president of the Center for Political Technologies, Alexey Makarkin, told TASS. "For the West Russia is number one annoyance, so Lukashenko will be hearing far less criticism."

Makarkin believes that the West is rather interested in arranging relations with Lukashenko somehow and "will try to pull him away from Russia."

"Lukashenko will be using this to his own benefit, of course, but he will never agree to venture too far away from Russia," he said.
 
 #26
Kyiv Post
September 11, 2015
Russians at YES conference say Russia's economic weakness likely makes it less threatening
By Brian Bonner

Over lunch at the 12th annual Yalta European Strategy in Kyiv, two Russians at the conference sketched out the optimistic scenario for the West and Ukraine to capitalize on Russia's current economic weakness.

Yevgenia Albats, editor-in-chief and CEO of The New Times in Moscow, said that the situation in Russia is going "from bad to worse" with the two-fold decline of the ruble in the last year because of lower oil prices, Russia's prime export.

"How are they going to sustain the budget? It's not clear how the Russian state is going to pay for loyalty from population and security forces," Albats said. If the decline in oil prices continues, "the Russian government will be lacking funds" and may be "too concerned about economic situation to look outside."

Of course, Albats said, the alternative is that Russia could continue seeing external enemies to blame - such as the West and Ukraine. At the same time, she said, there is even less political pluralism domestically in Russia than there was in the Soviet Union.

During Soviet times, she said, the Communist Party and KGB shared power. In Russian President Vladimir Putin's Russia, only the KGB holds power. She said that the late Russian President Boris Yeltsin missed his chance to conduct lustration and destroy the repressive institutions such as the KGB.

Now, she said, the KGB exploits the insularity of Russians, the vast majority of whom -- more than 90 percent -- have never been abroad. And many of those abroad have only gone to Turkey and Egypt. "The majority of Russians don't have experience of anything European," Albats said.

Vladimir Inozemtsev, director of the Center for Post-Industrial Studies in Moscow, said that - regardless of Russia's threatening behavior - the West has fewer reasons to fear the Kremlin's might.

"Do not think Russia will change anytime soon," Inozemtsev said. "The Russian economy is in constant decline. This year, due to falling oil prices, Russia will fall out of top 10 global economies."

Russia's weakness gives the West more options for containing Putin, he said.

"The West should be much more free vis-a-vis Russian Federation," Inozemtsev said. "I would not fear a more acute confrontation with Russia. "If Mr. Putin wants another Cold War you can allow it to happen. It will be much easier to win this containment than it was in the 1970s and 1980s."

The third Russian in the discussion, Ruslan Grinberg of the Russian Academy of Sciences, took a more pro-Kremlin line. He blamed the return of the KGB in Russia on Russian liberal policies of the 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Others on the panel, including former Austrian Chancellor Wolfgang Schussel, former NATO Secretary General Javier Solana and former Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt said the West should do more to help Ukraine transform itself from an ex-Soviet republic to a prosperous democracy with strong institutions.

Schussel, in particular, said the West's economic sanctions against Russia have delivered a strong blow to its economy.

Strobe Talbott, the president of the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C., said from the audience that "Ukraine deserves much more support than it is getting from my country and Europe. Thwarting Putin's designs on Ukraine is very important, but it's not enough. Ukraine has to have financial, material resources to build on reforms under way today."
 
 #27
Time.com
September 7, 2015
Inside Vladimir Putin's Circle
The dangerous rise of Kremlin hard-liners
By Simon Shuster

Gleb Pavlovsky arrived for work as usual that day in the spring of 2011, walking up to the clock tower of the Spassky Gate, which serves as the entrance to the Kremlin fortress. This had been his routine during the first two terms of Vladimir Putin's presidency, when Pavlovsky had served as a top adviser on matters of domestic politics and propaganda. But on that April day, Pavlovsky discovered that his security pass would not open the gate.

"They just locked me out," he recalled this spring at his personal office, a shamble of books and papers on the top floor of a crumbling apartment block in central Moscow. Pavlovsky was hardly alone-in the years since his dismissal, many others have been discarded from Putin's staff in the same way, especially the more politically liberal members of the ruling class, the ones who wanted to stop Russia from tumbling backward into another Cold War with the West. For them the past few years have been a period of setbacks and humiliations-"a shriveling up," is how one Kremlin consultant put it-while the hard-liners in Putin's circle have seen their influence steadily expand.

Known in Russia as the siloviki, or "men of force," this coterie of generals and KGB veterans has come to fully dominate political life in Russia in the year and a half since the war in Ukraine ruptured Moscow's relations with the West. Their rise has contributed to what several current and former advisers to the Kremlin describe as an atmosphere of paranoia and aggression. Officials seen as sympathetic toward the West have been mostly sidelined and discredited, limiting the voices Putin hears on matters of national and global security. The result is a regime in Moscow that looks increasingly antagonistic to the West and appears prone to ill-considered and dangerous decisions. "Sometimes the old instincts kick in," says one of Putin's senior counselors, referring to the Cold War backgrounds of the officials who now dominate the Kremlin. "I'd say there is the danger of going backward."

That's bad for an increasingly isolated Russia, but it's dangerous for the entire world. Against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine, where Russian-backed militants have taken control of large patches of territory, both Russian and Western forces have dramatically ramped up their military exercises in Eastern Europe. The outcome "has been a game of Russian-instigated dangerous brinkmanship which has resulted in many serious close military encounters between the forces of Russia and NATO," said a report published on Aug. 12 by the European Leadership Network, a think tank that monitors security threats in the region.

Should a mistake happen, it is far from clear that cooler heads would prevail in the Kremlin-for the simple reason that there aren't many of them left in Putin's entourage. Sergei Naryshkin, a close Putin ally and speaker of Russia's lower house of parliament, suggested in a newspaper article on Aug. 9 that the U.S. is trying to goad Russia into war. In a warning to President Barack Obama, he wrote that it "wouldn't hurt the current and latest 'war-time' President of the USA to remember: if you sow the wind, you will reap the storm." Nikolai Patrushev, the head of Russia's Security Council and a 17-year veteran of the KGB, was even more direct in an interview published in late June. "They really want Russia to cease to exist as a nation," he said of the U.S. "Because we have enormous wealth, and the Americans think we have no right to it and don't deserve it."

Patrushev did not respond to numerous written requests for an interview with TIME, and most members of the siloviki have not spoken to the foreign media for years, which makes it difficult to properly gauge the opaque inner workings of the Kremlin. Yet watching these changes from a distance, Pavlovsky, like many other more liberal ex-Kremlin members, finds it hard to recognize the place where he worked just four years ago. Back then the Kremlin's staff had a far more diverse makeup-liberal economists, dowdy intellectuals, bureaucrats with Western bank accounts and children studying in Europe or the U.S. Taken together, their influence balanced the more bellicose men of the siloviki, whose persistent warnings of the American menace are now the only voices Putin hears. Says Pavlovsky: "We have a situation where the person who does not immediately raise his voice to a scream is seen as suspicious."

By the spring of 2012, when Putin began his third term as President, Kremlinology-the esoteric discipline of studying Russian power politics-needed an overhaul. Among the first attempts to address the system's opacity came in the fall of 2012, when a well-connected Moscow political expert named Evgeny Minchenko, who has consulted for Putin's party, United Russia, created a diagram of the ruling class titled Politburo 2.0. His most recent one, published last fall, resembles a spider's web with Putin at the center. Clustered around him are various oligarchs, generals, spymasters and technocrats, their influence denoted by their proximity to Putin. Over the past year, he says, "the main trend has been an undeniable spike in the influence of the siloviki."

What unites most members of Putin's Politburo are the personal bonds they developed with Putin years ago in their hometown of St. Petersburg. As he rose to power in Moscow-first to the leadership of the Federal Security Service (FSB), the KGB's successor agency, in 1998, then to the post of Prime Minister in 1999, and finally to the presidency in 2000-Putin brought his friends along. "He maintained that healthy sense of being one of the guys," said Anatoly Rakhlin, Putin's childhood judo coach. "He didn't take the Petersburg boys to work with him because of their pretty eyes," Rakhlin told the Izvestia daily in 2007, "but because he trusts people who are tried and true."
 
During Putin's first term as President from 2000 to 2004, the Kremlin was still full of holdovers from the administration of President Boris Yeltsin, and most of them were devoted to free-market reforms of the economy and collaboration with the West. Chief among them was Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, who held the keys to Russia's budget. But over time, Putin's team from St. Petersburg took over the levers of power in Moscow, Kasyanov says. "By the time I left [in 2004], they were really divvying things up," he adds.

Most of the top jobs in the security services, the government and the powerful state corporations went to the members of Putin's St. Petersburg circle, which came to form the core of what Minchenko calls the Politburo 2.0. The structure of this body differs drastically from its Soviet incarnation. Whereas the old Communist Party bosses met regularly to decide the affairs of the state together, Putin keeps his circle divided into clans and factions that seldom meet all at once. This helps prevent any groups from creating a coalition against him, and it also "makes Putin indispensable as the point of balance," says Minchenko. "Without him the system doesn't work, because everyone is connected through him personally."

But there are major drawbacks. As the rival factions compete for Putin's attention, they tend to exaggerate the threats that Russia faces. The intelligence services, for instance, might overstate the threat from foreign spies, while the oil and gas tycoons might play up the danger of competitors in the energy market. When Putin meets separately with each of these factions, "he hears from all sides that there are threats everywhere," says the political consultant Kirill Petrov, who has worked with Minchenko in mapping the elites. "It's not a healthy atmosphere."

One of the figures in Minchenko's diagram, the senior counselor to Putin who spoke on condition of anonymity, concedes that this informal system of relationships breeds paranoia. But the system's bigger flaw is its total dependence on just one man. "It is power without institutions," says the adviser. "It means we have no solid ground beneath us." The state is Putin, and Putin is the state.

But if those closest to Putin are dedicated to their President, they're also dedicated to the spoils that come with power. And that's why Western sanctions imposed in response to the Crimean land grab have not only isolated the Russian economy but also personally targeted Putin's close associates, banning them from traveling or doing business in the West.

The logic of that punishment was simple. Most members of the ruling class in Russia-liberal or not-send their children to study in the West. They keep their fortunes in Western banks. They ski in the Alps, sunbathe in Miami and go shopping in Milan. For many of Putin's allies, it is not worth risking such privileges for the sake of any extraterritorial ambitions in Ukraine, says Kasyanov, the former Prime Minister. "Of course this makes people question their loyalties," he says. "Their lifestyles are at stake."

That would seem to be especially true for influential tycoons like Gennady Timchenko, a wealthy oil trader from Putin's St. Petersburg circle, whose personal wealth fell from $11 billion to about $4 billion last year, according to the Bloomberg index of billionaires. (The extreme drop in oil prices-now less than half what they were a year ago-has also weighed on many Russian tycoons.) But like many of his fellow oligarchs, Timchenko has supported Putin's policies despite the pain. "It's naive to think these methods can scare us, make us retreat," he said in an interview last summer with the state news agency Itar-Tass. "We'll bear it all and find a way out of these sanctions."

Far from peeling off Putin's allies, the sanctions have allowed him to tighten his grip on power. For the past few years, Putin has urged elites to store their fortunes in Russia instead of stashing them in offshore bank accounts. Many of them were slow to comply before the sanctions put their Western assets at risk of being frozen. Now the fortunes of the elites are tied that much more closely to Russia-which means they're tied to Putin.

So if Western leaders were hoping Putin's allies would mount a palace coup, they will likely be disappointed. The culture of suspicion has only intensified amid the standoff with the West. While the influence of the siloviki has grown, so has the number of subgroups vying to be recognized as the most loyal, the most effective at fighting Putin's enemies. The only way a new leader could emerge from among them is if Putin himself starts to groom a successor.

He has no need to do that anytime soon. The 62-year-old Putin is expected to run again when his six-year term in office ends in 2018. Among the "men of force" rumored to be possible successors are Sergei Ivanov, his long-serving chief of staff and fellow alumnus of the KGB, and Sergei Shoigu, the Minister of Defense, who has played the most visible role, apart from Putin, in Russia's military interventions in Ukraine. But in a system where all institutions have been eclipsed by one personality, there is no way to know what happens when he's gone.

Of course, not even Putin is immortal. But while the Communist Politburo would meet to elect a new leader when the incumbent passed away in Soviet times, "in the current system, Putin has no answer to the question of what happens if he has a heart attack," says the President's counselor. He knows that a struggle for control would then break out among the factions in the Kremlin, and in the process, "some of his friends could be torn into slivers of flesh," the adviser says. "So I don't think it's out of cleverness that he's made everybody afraid of his departure. It's just that he doesn't know how to do it any other way."

 
 #28
New York Times
September 11, 2015
The Russia I Miss
By David Brooks
Op-ed columnist

St. Petersburg, Russia - People who came of age after the end of the Cold War may not realize how powerfully Russia influenced Western culture for 150 years. For more than a century, intellectuals, writers, artists and activists were partly defined by the stances they took toward certain things Russian: Did they see the world like Tolstoy or like Dostoyevsky? Were they inspired by Lenin and/or Trotsky? Were they alarmed by Sputnik, awed by Solzhenitsyn or cheering on Yeltsin or Gorbachev?

That was because Russian culture had an unmatched intensity. It was often said that Russian thinkers addressed universal questions in their most extreme and illuminating forms.

In his classic book, "The Icon and the Axe," James H. Billington wrote that because of certain conditions of Russian history, "the kind of debate that is usually conducted between individuals in the West often rages even more acutely within individuals in Russia."

Russian influence was especially strong in America. There were certain mirror image parallels. Both nations didn't quite know what to make of the sophistication and polish of Western Europe. Both countries had Eurocentric elites who copied Parisian manners, and populist masses who ridiculed them. Both nations had mental landscapes defined by the epic size and wild beauty of their natural landscapes.

But Russia stood for something that America has never been known for: depth of soul. If America radiated a certain vision of happiness onto the world, Russian heroes radiated a vision of total spiritual commitment.

"The 'Russian' attitude," Isaiah Berlin wrote, "is that man is one and cannot be divided." You can't divide your life into compartments, hedge your bets and live with prudent half-measures. If you are a musician, writer, soldier or priest, integrity means throwing your whole personality into your calling in its purest form.

The Russian ethos was not bourgeois, economically minded and pragmatic. There were radicals who believed that everything should be seen in materialistic terms. But this was a reaction to the dominant national tendency, which saw problems as primarily spiritual rather than practical, and put matters of the soul at center stage.

In the Middle Ages, Russian religious icons presented a faith that was more visual than verbal, more mysterious than legalistic. Dostoyevsky put enormous faith in the power of the artist to address social problems. The world's problems are shaped by pre-political roots: myths, morals and the state of the individual conscience. Beauty could save the world.

Even as late as the 1990s, one could sit with Russian intellectuals, amid all the political upheaval in those days, and they would talk intensely about the nature of the Russian soul. If it was dark in the kitchen at night, they wouldn't just say, "Let's replace the light bulb." They'd talk for hours about how actually the root problem was the Russian soul.

Many of Russia's most charismatic figures were on a lifelong search for purity. For the elder Tolstoy, you could live with material abundance and rot inside, or you could live the pure, simple rural life of the peasant. Solzhenitsyn wrote, "It makes me happier, more secure, to think ... that I am only a sword made sharp to smite the unclean forces, an enchanted sword to cleave and disperse them."

All of this spiritual ardor, all of this intense extremism, all of this romantic utopianism, all of this tragic sensibility produced some really bad political ideas. But it also produced a lot of cultural vibrancy that had an effect on the world.

While the rest of the world was going through industrialization and commercialism and embracing the whole bourgeois style of life, there was this counterculture of intense Russian writers, musicians, dancers - romantics who offered a different vocabulary, a different way of thinking and living inside.

And now it's gone.

Russia is a more normal country than it used to be and a better place to live, at least for the young. But when you think of Russia's cultural impact on the world today, you think of Putin and the oligarchs. Now the country stands for grasping power and ill-gotten money.

There's something sad about the souvenir stands in St. Petersburg. They're selling mementos of things Russians are sort of embarrassed by - old Soviet Army hats, Stalinist tchotchkes and coffee mugs with Putin bare-chested and looking ridiculous. Of the top 100 universities in the world, not a single one is Russian, which is sort of astonishing for a country so famously intellectual.

This absence leaves a mark. There used to be many countercultures to the dominant culture of achievement and capitalism and prudent bourgeois manners. Some were bohemian, or religious or martial. But one by one those countercultures are withering, and it is harder for people to see their situations from different and grander vantage points. Russia offered one such counterculture, a different scale of values, but now it, too, is mainly in the past.
 
 #29
The Kremlin Stooge
https://marknesop.wordpress.com
September 9, 2015
The Weaponization of Ignorance: the West's Go-To Experts
By Mark Chapman

Brute Force and Ignorance,
Just hit town,
Looking like survivors,
From the Lost and Found.

Brute Force and Ignorance,
Have come to play,
A one-night stand at eight o'clock,
Then they'll be on their way.

From, "Brute Force and Ignorance", by Rory Gallagher

Whooo! Rory Gallagher - remember him? Don't be surprised if you don't, because he was probably the best blues guitarist you never heard of.  Born in Ballyshannon, County Donegal just before the nineteen-fifties and rock & roll took off like a scared cat, a teenage Rory Gallagher stayed up late to listen to Radio Luxembourg because he couldn't afford records. He played entirely by ear, couldn't read a note, but he could play anything that had strings on it. In 1971, influential British music magazine Melody Maker voted him International Guitarist of the Year, ahead of Eric Clapton, with whom he shared both influences (Big Bill Broonzy, Leadbelly, Muddy Waters) and a soulful blues style. In 1995 he was dead in a London hospital, of liver complications, when he was just 47.

Anyway, this post isn't really about Rory Gallagher, except perhaps in the sense of what a prophet he was. Because we have entered - are firmly established, in fact - into an age in which a significant group of people in the English-speaking world are proud to be ignorant. George W. Bush was the first president who routinely cited his low academic standings - because he thought it made him sound folksy and one of the little people - and a startling proportion of the general public is now apparently quite happy to be misled by "experts" who don't know what the hell they are talking about.

It's still important to the decent, hardworking people who constitute The General Public that they support Doing The Right Thing. The deceitful and manipulative folks who run some of the world's most powerful countries know this, and so The Things They Want To Do for their own reasons are pitched to The General Public as Doing The Right Thing. Since the world's leaders only speak directly to the electorate when they're looking for your vote and perhaps once a year for a State Of The Union Address, they use selected "experts" and analysts to softball-pitch their selected narrative to The General Public - which must be called deliberately ignorant to a large extent, because it unquestioningly accepts the narrative just as if it had never been lied to before, and never will be again. Doing The Right Thing makes them feel good, and they're proud of it.

In order to be Doing The Right Thing, it is necessary for you to believe Russia is an isolated and reviled international pariah which has invaded its neighbour - Ukraine - with heavy armor, artillery and hundreds of thousands of uniformed soldiers in the country on state orders, and which shot down MH-17 so that it could blame it on innocent Ukraine (among other wild justifications). It is a country which makes nothing and is totally reliant on energy exports; backward, barbaric, uncultured and unlettered, deceitful and underhanded.

An excellent example to start off with is Forbes, featuring the clownish oaf Paul Roderick Gregory. Mr. Gregory was one of the first to latch on to the scoop that Russia had inadvertently published the figures of its dead in the "Eastern Ukrainian Campaign", in a small, innocuous business newspaper called Delovaya Zhizn (Business Life). Then, the story goes, the government frantically deleted the information, but not before some sharp-eyed truthseekers hasd pounced on it and exposed it to the world. Yahoo - staunchly Russophobic in its news content - jumped on it as well. Social media dismembered it in hours and revealed it as a fake, while the purported representative of Business Life claimed the site had been hacked from a Kiev-registered IP on August 22nd, and the bogus data inserted long enough to be captured, then erased. The excitement the story caused in the media was something to see, and the Twitter storm - led by luminaries like Michael McFaul drawing attention to it for all they were worth - was furious while it lasted. Once it was exposed as a fake, the story just kind of...went away. Nobody said sorry.

No western news story on Russia or Ukraine is complete without the insertion of the phrase "Russian aggression" like a trademark, and an assertion that Russia has large numbers of military troops in Ukraine although it cynically denies it. News sites regularly claim there is "pretty overwhelming evidence" that Russia and Putin are lying, but none of them ever cite any, and the United States refuses to release any satellite imagery confirming the purported troop movements or transit of armored columns. It must be sensitive about Putin's feelings, and is protecting him. Ha, ha.

Here's another comical one - Amanda Taub, at Vox, says a video clip showing Putin and Medvedev working out together showcases Russia's "fear and insecurity", which compel Putin to reassure the nation that he is still physically at the top of his game. It includes a gratuitous swipe at Putin's sweatpants as "unflattering"; Putin is 63, and Ms. Taub, a former human-rights lawyer who appears to have little to crow about in the unflattering department, looks to be about 30 years younger than that. One wonders what she will look like in sweatpants in 30 years. Putin's popularity is "slipping", Ms. Taub would have us know - yes, only 72% of Russians said they would vote for Putin in a current election (the poll was in August), and his approval rating is only 83%!! Thus the he-man stunts: Putin must show Russians that he's still tough enough to bully people, and hopefully get his cratering ratings back on the upswing. To put that in perspective, Barack Obama's approval rating for the same period was 46% , and David Cameron's ratings as PM are about the same.

The EU Observer cites Pavel Felgenhauer as a "Russian military expert" who is dicing with death just speaking with a western magazine, since he could be construed as "aiding and abetting the enemy". Pavel Felgenhauer, once a regular columnist at The Moscow Times, has thoroughly earned the low opinion in which he is held by other analysts, many of them skilled bullshitters themselves. His golden moment came when he successfully predicted the 2008 war in Georgia. Few remember that he also said that it might not happen until 2010, and that Georgia would win it. Outside this one shining moment of prescience, Pavel Felgenhauer is an affable idiot who loves attention, and what he knows about the Russian military you could put in your coffee without noticing any change in the flavour. In 2011, he argued that the MISTRAL assault carriers Russia was buying from France would be employed to guard the Sea of Okhotsk to keep it safe for nuclear submarine operations against the U.S. Pacific Fleet. He claimed to have learned this from "A high-ranking source in the General Staff". Of the Angolan navy, perhaps - Russian staff officers know better than to discuss anything with Felgenhauer, who will only balls it up anyway. But all his sources are like that: "Oh, a little bird told me", wink-wink, implying Cosmic Top Secret information, keep it under your hat, old man, when in fact it is pure fantasy. Felgenhauer simply thinks of something that would be an exciting development, and then pretends someone told him about it.

It is only and exclusively in the field of political analysis - with perhaps the occasional exception for "Does this suit make me look fat?" - that leaders will pay someone to tell them exactly what they want to hear, regardless of whether there's any truth to it. Nobody would pay an auto mechanic to tell them whatever they wanted to hear: say, Sonny - if I put aluminum-alloy wheels on it, will it increase my horsepower? Absolutely, Mr. Obama. How about an accountant? I was wondering, Tiffany; if I withdraw $15,000.00 from my RRSP to gamble in Las Vegas, will it count toward my taxable income for this year? Certainly not, Mr. Cameron; you go on, now, dear, and have fun. As if.

CNN's "Banned! 10 Things You Won't Find in Russia" is, unsurprisingly, horseshit. The law forbidding "gay propaganda" does not "mean anyone campaigning for LGBT rights or equating straight and gay relationships can be prosecuted. " It is quite specific that it may not be pitched to minor children, but the United States has become so chuffed with itself over how gay-friendly it is that it seems to think nobody is too young to learn how to do it the gay way. How about three - is three too young, do you think? Thinking about sending your gender nonconforming three-year-old son to Crossdresser Camp? I wonder if the other boys in his class - when he's, say 12 - are going to be as supportive? Gay adults can do as they please in Russia, as they always could, and homosexuality was legal in Russia ten years before the USA got around to saying it was okay to be gay.

Anonymous blogs are illegal - oh, dear. That should be of great concern to the civil libertarians who are sharing their phone conversations with the NSA, have been for some time before it was revealed, and the NSA refuses to stop, while the government refuses to make them. National security, you know. Think about that next time you're discussing your hemorrhoids with your doctor on the telephone.

Western food is banned; quite a lot of it, anyway. Why is that, CNN, again? Because of sanctions imposed against Russia. Why? Well, because the Russians shot down MH-17, of course! And before anyone calls tit-for-tat sanctions "childish", yes, they are. But you're talking to the country that changed the name of the American street on which the Soviet Embassy was located to "Andrei Sakharov Street", just for spite. The Wall Street Journal called it "simple but inspired". They were half-right: it was simple. Stay tuned for the U.S. Embassy to be on "Edward Snowden Boulevard".

Foul language is banned from films and television. Oh, no. How could anyone sit through a movie in America if it was not non-stop swearing from start to finish...kind of like conversation is in the USA. Ridden a city bus lately? Honestly, America has become the proverbial caricature of itself, so obsessed with slagging off the Russians in an attempt to humiliate them that it portrays being The Sopranos from sea to shining sea as some kind of virtue.

Drug related websites. The mind reels. Where is I gonna get my hit on, iffen I can't fin' my on-line dealer? CNN....man, I just don't know. I used to think, when I still watched CNN, probably about 10 years ago, that Wolf Blitzer was the worst thing about it. But now you is on a ho' notha level. Freedom...is drug-related websites.

Lacy underwear. Yes, that's the money shot, isn't it? Now the CNN "newsroom" guys can snigger and poke each other as they share jokes about neo-Soviet maidens in their CSMVPvoluminous bloomers.

In fact, lacy feminine undergarments are not banned at all. As the article points out, material that is next to the skin must be at least 6% cotton. Doesn't mean it has to be all cotton, and the rest can be any material. You can get lingerie in Moscow. You just can't get it in this size.  There...ummm... doesn't seem to be any significant demand for it. Another benefit of banning western food.

The Independent (owned by a Russian oligarch - oops! "Tycoon", I meant, which is how western newspapers sucked up to Poroshenko the Billionaire after he took over the presidency of Ukraine) reports, completely gratuitously, that Moscow is "the world's unfriendliest city"; so designated by a survey conducted among the readers of Travel & Leisure Magazine! Which had a total circulation, in 2011, of just under 971,000. Ha, ha!! Jesus, listen to yourselves, will you? More than twice as many people read Rolling Stone, Bon Appetit and Golf Digest as read Travel & Leisure. Take a flying leap at a rolling doughnut, Travel & Leisure! Who gives a toss what you think? We'll see all 971,000 of you in Galway, Ireland (rated the "friendliest" city), and you'd probably all fit.

Timothy Snyder, eminent historian and defender of the Maidan, tells whoever will listen that Kiev is the only bilingual capital in Europe. Mind you, he also says Ukraine is a country of 50 million people, when he's actually spotting them about 10 million. Ukraine lost around 3 million people in 2014 - and you know where they went - and the population currently stands at just under 43 million according to the state statistics service. But what's a couple of million more or less? We routinely hear how a million or two well-educated and talented people rush for the exits in Russia every year, but by some miracle the population is increasing! The babushkas must be knitting new Russians in the basement at night, like the Keebler elves.

There's no need to dissect Snyder's embarrassing knowledge deficit further - my colleague, Paul Robinson, does a wonderful job of that - but suffice it to say Kiev is far from the only bilingual capital in Europe. More importantly, Snyder is playing up the distinctive nature of Ukrainian as if being able to switch between Russian and Ukrainian is an accomplishment on a par with speaking French and English. Russian and Ukrainian are both East Slavic languages descended from a common root - the language of the medieval Kievan Rus - and are mutually intelligible; that is, the two have sufficient common elements that if you can speak one fluently, you will be able to understand much of the other.

Get the picture? Western leaders, through the western media, rely on feted "experts" who do not know if their ass is bored or punched, but who nonetheless blather whatever their paymasters want to hear - and what they want to hear, pretty consistently, is that Russia is barbaric, weak and surly, reeling from sanctions which are wringing its economy like a dishrag. They want to hear that its population is steadily declining, thanks to its increasingly unpopular and unstable president. Timothy Garton Ash regularly paints a bloodcurdling - if you're a Russian - picture of a tottering giant about to topple. Edward Lucas, narcissistic British bonehead, rails against Putin's non-existent determination to bring the Baltics under his dictatorial command. Craaazzzy Annie Applebaum, Mrs former-Polish-political-wunderkind, snaps at her own entrails in a Russophobic delirium. Julia Ioffe. Luke Harding. Shaun Walker and Roland Oliphant. Simon Ostrovsky of Vice News. Rainbow-Brite Hater Jamie Kirchik of The Daily Beast. Too many to name them all, each pumping out soporific smoke that reassures westerners of their ongoing moral superiority and perspicacious judgment. All of it totally manufactured nonsense, delivered with a straight face in an atmosphere in which nobody wishes to challenge their accuracy, because it just feels so good to let go and believe.

I'm not arguing this so the west will come to its senses and try to repair the damage it has done to international relationships, entirely owing to society's own myopic stupidity and epic eagerness to be fooled. It's much too late for that; Russia has reached the realization that it cannot be a partner to the west so long as Russia insists upon making its own decisions and following its own policies. Consequently, it is decisively turning away from the west and reordering its markets, its institutions and its partnerships. Some business relationships might recover, but the west will not be trusted again for a generation at least. Because you can't trust someone who will not listen to reason.

I'm arguing it because the rest of the world is looking aghast at the west as if it had gotten drunk at their kids' birthday party and made an ass of itself, and it's embarrassing.
 

 #30
Bloomberg
September 11, 2015
Russia Sees Ukraine Peace-Pact Extension Chance as Shelling Ends
Ny Daryna Krasnolutska and Anton Doroshev

Russia said the deadline to implement a peace accord between Ukraine and the Kremlin-backed separatists it's battling may be extended, as the conflict's first day in 18 months without shelling raised hopes of progress.

The suggestion contradicted the message from Ukrainian officials as President Petro Poroshenko and his foreign minister both said the pact, sealed in February after all-night talks in the Belarusian capital of Minsk, must be completed by year-end. While a renewed cease-fire initiative has taken hold, sticking points remain over local elections and autonomy for the rebel-held lands in Ukraine's east.

"We need to concentrate on fulfilling the Minsk agreements in the agreed terms by the end of the year," Yuri Ushakov, a foreign-policy aide to President Vladimir Putin, told reporters in Moscow on Friday. "After that, if something isn't complied with for various reasons, the leaders may agree on some extension. We're not discussing this in concrete terms yet."

A push to follow through on the Minsk commitments is intensifying, with Germany and France, which helped broker the deal, stepping up diplomacy. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said Thursday that he's "encouraged by the fact that we have seen a renewed effort to respect" the peace accord. The war has devastated Ukraine's economy, turned the hryvnia into one of the world's worst-performing currencies and prompted the government to restructure $18 billion of foreign debt.

Still Tense

Recent talks that included Germany, France and Russia "strengthened my feelings of cautious optimism," Poroshenko said Friday in a speech in Kiev. "The cease-fire is in place for almost two weeks and is not a dream anymore."

The four nations' foreign ministers will meet Saturday in Berlin and their leaders plan to convene in Paris next month. The conflict, whose death toll is approaching 8,000, is "far from being defused," according to German Foreign Minister spokesman Martin Schaefer.

"A cease-fire has been holding to some extent since Sept. 1," Schaefer told reporters in Berlin. "Still, the situation in eastern Ukraine remains tense politically and militarily."

The European Union and the U.S. have imposed sanctions on Russia, which they accuse of fueling the war in Ukraine through support for the separatists. It's too early to speculate on lifting the penalties, German government spokeswoman Christiane Wirtz said Friday.

Result Needed

Some conditions of the Minsk agreement have caused unrest within Ukraine. A Kiev policeman died last month in clashes with protesters during a demonstration against giving more power to the rebel regions. Even so, the former Soviet republic's leaders say the deal is the only way to end the conflict and must be completed on schedule.

"We need a result, we need to proceed so that by year-end Minsk is fulfilled and we've regained control over the border" with Russia, Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin said. "If we do not have such a task, we're lying to ourselves."
 
 #31
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
September 10, 2015
The paradox of the Minsk Agreements
Everybody seems interested in observing the Minsk Agreements on Ukraine. At the same time, however, no side wants to fully comply with them for fear of displaying weakness or admitting failure
By Sergey Markedonov
Sergey Markedonov is an Associate Professor at Russian State University for the Humanities based in Moscow (Russia). From May 2010 to October 2013, he was a visiting fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington, DC, USA). In April-May 2015 he was a visiting fellow at the Center for Russia and Central Asia Studies, Institute of International Studies (IIS), Fudan University (Shanghai, China).

One year ago, in September Minsk saw the conclusion of Trilateral Contact Group (Russia-Ukraine-OSCE) consultations and the signing of a protocol on a ceasefire in the two Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk.  However, the armed conflict in the Donbas has not stopped. Along the way there have been ups (the period from January-February 2015 and July-August 2015) and downs (February-June 2015).

Attempts were made to quell the rising violence through a package of measures on the implementation of the Minsk accords, which was also signed in the Belarusian capital and labeled "Minsk-2." But according to the UN data as of September 8, 2015, the armed conflict in the Ukraine had claimed the lives of 7,962 people (including civilians, Ukrainian security officers, rebels and 298 passengers aboard Malaysian flight MH17), with 17,811 injured and more than 2.3 million refugees, most of whom are now in Russia.
So why did last September's ray of hope not light the way to peace, or at least stem the tide of Europe's largest conflict since the collapse of Yugoslavia?

Attempts made to quell the military conflict in Ukraine

To answer this question, we need to analyze all the attempts made to stop the armed violence in southeastern Ukraine, of which there have been many since the Ukrainian authorities declared an anti-terrorist operation in April 2014 in response to the proclamation of the People's Republic of Donetsk.

Literally days after the Ukrainian military operation commenced, a US-EU-Russia-Ukraine meeting was held in Geneva, where a special statement on the disarmament of all illegal armed groups and the release of previously seized administrative buildings was adopted. It seemed to have all the angles covered, yet the conflict only intensified.

The next gathering was on June 23, when a tripartite commission met with representatives of the self-proclaimed republics of Donbas. A ceasefire agreement emerged four days later. That too failed. Later, in July, the foreign ministers of Germany, France, Russia and Ukraine agreed on a declaration on the settlement of the conflict.

The plan proposed granting OSCE inspectors access to checkpoints on the Russian-Ukrainian border and the establishment of a contact group to develop specific mechanisms to overcome the crisis. The initiatives looked good on paper. But the non-involvement in the negotiation process of the United States, which had become an important factor in the Ukraine crisis, devalued any arrangements.

The conflict entered a new phase, and the negotiation process saw a dangerous lull. Attempts were made to fill the gap during the anniversary celebrations of Operation Overlord in Normandy (where Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Ukrainian counterpart Petro Poroshenko met for the first time). Peace initiatives from the Russian and Ukrainian presidents ensued, followed by Minsk-1.

But the slight abatement of military activity in the run-up to New Year was supplanted by an escalation of violence, peaking in February. Minsk-2, which unlike its predecessor stipulated political and legal mechanisms for settling the conflict and was not limited to ceasefire, disengagement and prisoner exchange, was intended to break this negative trend. But the confrontation continues to this day, although without major frontline offensives.

The search for a compromise solution amenable to all sides

As such, all attempts to halt the violence have come to naught. But the problem is not that the proposals have been flawed. After all, there is no such thing as a perfect peace plan. Any initiative is about concessions and compromises. That last word is key.

This year, as before, the warring parties (Kiev and the self-proclaimed republics), in addition to Russia and the West, have systematically failed to develop a conciliatory approach toward each other. The United States and its NATO allies see Moscow as the main transgressor of international law and European state boundaries (which is true from a legal standpoint, but does not reflect the full scope of the political problem, in which the West is no less responsible).

Russia fears that Ukraine could be transformed into an outpost for NATO incursions into the post-Soviet space and its zone of exclusive interests. Kiev, on the other hand, seeks to maximize Western aid to escape Russia's influence, while the unrecognized republics of Donbas apply the same logic in respect of the Ukrainian state and Kremlin support.

Add in the fact that the Ukraine crisis is not a "thing unto itself," but a reflection of the general post-Cold War crisis in European security and the affirmation of unipolarity, which Moscow rejects. Hence, a Donbas settlement cannot be limited to the withdrawal of heavy equipment and weapons. It needs to be part of the overall transformation of security in Europe.

Otherwise, the parties will continually renege on obligations, considering unilateral concessions as the first step toward defeat. Whereas Russia is afraid of a repeat of the Balkan scenario as it was for Serbia (the loss of de facto states aligned to Belgrade), the West and Ukraine fear the transformation of the former Soviet Union into "Russia's backyard."

Consequently, both Minsk 1 and 2 were worded so as not to allow one side to claim victory. As a result, the priority for Kiev (and its Western backers) is Ukraine's territorial integrity and no mention of "independent people's republics," while for Moscow it is the need for constitutional reform to be agreed upon with regard to the "separatist regions" of southeastern Ukraine.

Russian officials maintain that the agreement contains no provisions on Russia's responsibility for the "separatists" and their political actions, and that the ceasefire pertains to Ukraine's armed forces and volunteer militia (formally, of course, Russia and Ukraine are not at war and diplomatic ties are not severed).

As a consequence, there are different interpretations of the Minsk agreements, on which basis specific political initiatives are put forward (in particular on the issue of extending or even tightening sanctions). This October the problem could come to a head. If the two "people's republics" do not hold local elections under Ukrainian law, then Russia could face additional sanctions for violation of the Minsk accords.

But how can they be imposed if Moscow's responsibility for the actions of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk people's republics is not stipulated, and Russia is not a de jure party to the conflict? Ukrainian decentralization, as declared in Poroshenko's proposed constitutional reform, does not solve the underlying problem of the Donbas conflict, specifically the model of relations between Kiev and the unrecognized republics, which can be ignored only if defeated militarily, which the Ukrainian army attempted last summer. It was after this failure that Minsk-1 was signed.

A paradoxical situation arises whereby everyone wants peace, yet no one wants a peace that favors the other side. The idea that the Minsk agreements can satisfy all interests is wishful thinking. As a result, an intensification of reconnaissance operations designed to test both the military and diplomatic capabilities of the opposing side cannot be ruled out.

It is a rhetorical question as to when "reconnaissance fatigue" will set in and discussion can start of the root causes of the Ukraine crisis, which is at the core of the most serious confrontation between the West and Russia this side of the Cold War.

Will European security be ensured by involving or marginalizing Russia? How to organize cooperation between Moscow and the West and how to prevent the post-Soviet space from turning into a large gladiatorial arena? The only hope of resolving the conflict in Donbas lies in finding answers to these questions. Otherwise, the road to peace will be littered with broken "Minsks."
 
 #32
Kyiv Post
September 11, 2015
When will life get better in Ukraine? Soon, Poroshenko says
By Brian Bonner

Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko gives the opening speech at the Yalta European Strategy on Sept. 11.

When will the fight against corruption begin in earnest?

Soon, President Petro Poroshenko said on Sept. 11.

When will the billionaire businessman sell his assets, as he pledged to do when he became president 15 months ago?

Soon, Poroshenko replied.

When will the war be over?

Soon, Poroshenko hopes.

And so it went at the opening of the 12th annual Yalta European Strategy, opened by Poroshenko in Kyiv's Mystetskyi Arsenal.

Poroshenko also struck a defiant tone on Sept. 11, saying his faith in the Minsk peace process is being vindicated by reduced fighting - no shelling in the last 24 hours -- and progress toward a diplomatic settlement, with talks set for October again.

"I was an optimist when everyone was a pessimist. Where are your voices now?" Poroshenko challenged.

The president said that, despite attacks on him for launching decentralization of political power and constitutional reform, he will stick with the Minsk agreements - which he said must be completed by the end of the year, including Russian withdrawal of troops and heavy weapons as well as the return to full control of the borders to Ukraine.

He said that he would not support delay of the peace process into 2016, but didn't say how he could prevent it.

"We have cease-fire and we have peace and this is real evidence we should follow the way of the Minsk agreement," Poroshenko said. "There is no any other alternative."

Poroshenko said that Ukrainians living in Russian-occupied areas of the eastern Donbas no longer believe the Russian propaganda that the separatists "are defending them from a Ukrainian junta." He said that because of the "disastrous humanitarian conditions," he set up stores near the war front where civilians can buy essential goods at subsidized prices.

The president, however, hedged his predictions, admitting that Russia still had tens of thousands of heavily armed troops who could launch a full-scale invasion of Ukraine if President Vladimir Putin wanted to do so.

"The drama is still far from being over," Poroshenko admitted, but said he's proud of having built "one of the strongest and bravest armies in Europe."

Poroshenko spent less than an hour on stage of the conference, organized and funded by billionaire Victor Pinchuk, who introduced him. The president then answered a half-dozen questions from Gideon Rachman, the chief foreign affairs columnist for The Financial Times.

He then held a brief conference outdoors mainly for Ukrainian news media.

None of the questions asked by Rachman delved into any complexities of Ukrainian corruption, such as the failure of the prosecutors to launch any trials against suspects in multibillion-dollar theft from Ukrainians.

Poroshenko said that anti-corruption agencies would become "operational in the nearest future."

But the answer did not address criticism of Poroshenko for keeping Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin, who has failed to obtain any convictions of high-level defendants and who has actually been accused of obstructing justice.

Rachman asked Poroshenko why, after more than 15 month in power, the billionaire businessman still hasn't lived up to his pledge to sell his assets, which many critics say pose a direct conflict of interest to his presidential duties.

"This is very difficult to sell anything in a country in the state of war. If anybody can help me doing that, you are welcome. My Russian assets are under arrest," Poroshenko said. "I am absolutely confident in a very short period of time we will have news."

He admitted that Ukrainians are dissatisfied with the slow pace of change.

"The Ukrainian people are thirsty for reform and will not forgive even a minimal delay," Poroshenko said.

He cited creation of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau and another national agency for corruption prevention as proof that he's making headway in the corruption fight. He said the "symbol" of progress "is the new police you can see on the streets of Kyiv, Lviv, Odesa and in the nearest time on the streets of other cities."

Poroshenko said the new anti-corruption agencies "will get operational in the nearest future, equipped with adequate tools."

Critics believe that the developments represent cosmetic, rather than a substantive fight against Ukraine's endemic corruption, and that these bodies will still remain subservient to politicians and not truly independent.
 
 #33
UA: First TV (Kyiv)
September 10, 2015
Ukrainian president says hostilities in east "Russian aggression", not civil war

Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko has said that the military action in the country's east is not a civil war, but aggression by the Russian Federation.

Poroshenko was speaking in an interview with Prime Time programme hosted by Voice of America journalist Myroslava Gongadze, which was aired on the Ukrainian public TV channel UA: First on 10 September.

"It is not an internal conflict and I will not negotiate with the leaders or chiefs of militants and terrorists, as some home-brewed politicos advise, because thus we would accept what Russia wants, accept that this is a civil war, that this is an internal conflict and that Russia has nothing to do with it. It is not. It is Russian aggression against the free, independent state of Ukraine," Poroshenko said.

The president added that at the very beginning he suggested "an absolutely unique format" in order to prevent the distortion of the events that were taking place in Ukraine. "Therefore, the following format was built: Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE as a mediator. This format is called the tripartite contact group," Poroshenko emphasized.
 
 #34
Past 24 hours sees no casualties, shoots for first time ever - Poroshenko

KYIV. Sept 11 (Interfax) - The past 24 hours were the first day in the past 18 months that saw no casualties and heard no shooting in eastern Ukraine, the country's President Petro Poroshenko said.

"I want to say that today is the first day in the past 18 months on which there were no casualties and no shooting during 24 hours. I congratulate you on that," Poroshenko said at the annual meeting of the Yalta European Strategy (YES) meeting in Kyiv on Friday.
 
 #35
Christian Science Monitor
September 10, 2015
Georgia ex-President Saakashvili makes play to be prime minister - in Ukraine
Mikheil Saakashvili came to Ukraine to be Odessa's governor at President Poroshenko's request. But now he's picking a very public fight with PM Yatsenyuk.
By Fred Weir, Correspondent

MOSCOW - Mikheil Saakashvili has never been shy about picking fights.

As president of Georgia, he fought his country's notorious corruption, but using an authoritarian style of governance that has left him wanted on criminal charges in his homeland.

He also sparked a war with Russia in 2008 by attempting a military takeover of the Moscow-protected breakaway territory of South Ossetia.

And when he came to Ukraine earlier this year to serve as governor of the corruption-infested Black Sea port of Odessa, he squared off publicly with the region's most powerful oligarch, Igor Kolomoisky.

But last week, Mr. Saakashvili picked a fight with an opponent that no one expected - Arseniy Yatsenyuk, Ukraine's prime minister - with an apparent eye towards replacing him.

Saakashvili, a staunch supporter of Ukraine's Maidan Revolution, was one of several foreigners brought in to help Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko's reform the war-torn and corruption-ridden country earlier this year. In May he was given the job of governing Odessa region, a hotbed of organized crime and pro-Russian sentiment.

A Ukrainian-speaker who studied in Kiev as a young man, Saakashvili has made waves by firing the head of Odessa's port authority, slashing bureaucracy, and sparring with Mr. Kolomoisky. Most experts say the jury is still out on the effectiveness of the former Georgian leader's barely three-month-old tenure in Odessa.

But last week on the Channel Five TV station, which is owned by President Poroshenko, Saakashvili launched a withering verbal assault of Mr. Yatsenyuk, accusing him of undermining reforms, protecting corrupt officials, and siding with oligarchs like Kolomoisky.

"We're talking about sabotage by central government," Saakashvili said, directly fingering the cabinet headed by Yatsenyuk. "Now the government is paralyzed. There must be a total reset of the Ukrainian government on all levels."

Within days a petition appeared on the president's official website asking Poroshenko to fire Yatsenyuk and appoint Saakashvili in his place. It now has thousands more signatures than the 25,000 that would require the president to officially consider the issue.

A mixed record

Controversy is not new to Saakashvili. His sweeping reforms as Georgian president are widely agreed to have curbed Georgia's notorious corruption, but also attracted widespread criticism for alleged human rights violations.

He left Georgia two years ago after his party was defeated in parliamentary elections, and last year Georgia's top prosecutor filed charges against him for "abuse of power" - charges he insists are politically motivated.

As governor of Odessa, he has pledged to quickly make the region into a beacon of progress to inspire all Ukrainians. That hasn't yet happened, and his complaints of "sabotage" suggest he may have run into serious headwinds in what is one of Ukraine's most politically complex places.

"Saakashvili has delivered no successes in Odessa. He's a master of PR, and he's certainly raised the expectations of the local people," says Vadim Karasyov, director of the Institute of Global Strategies in Kiev. "But as for actual results that would give him genuine political weight, there are none so far."

Opportunism ... but whose?

Ukrainian experts are divided on whether Saakashvili is really making a bid for higher office, or is simply being used by Poroshenko as attack dog against the president's main rival, Yatsenyuk.

"I think this is all Saakashvili's initiative," says Ruslan Bortnik, director of the independent Institute of Analysis and International Politics in Kiev. "He made it clear he didn't want to get stuck in Odessa. He sees that Ukrainian political forces are rapidly realigning, Yatsenyuk's approval rating has practically dropped off the radar screen, "and he thinks it's a good moment to aim for a higher position." he says.

Mr. Karasyov argues that Poroshenko is using Saakashvili as a "battering ram" to cow Yatsenyuk, but not to drive him from office.

"The ploy is to tie Yatsenyuk more closely to the president. If he was fired, his party might leave the president's parliamentary coalition, and that would be quite destabilizing. This idea of bringing in foreigners to do things is not a viable solution for our problems. Ukrainians play by different rules."

Yatsenyuk's party, running at barely 3 percent in the polls, has declined to take part in next months regional elections, and declared it will back Poroshenko's bloc in the voting. In a scathing article for Ukrainskaya Pravda this week, Saakashvili argued that "when the prime minister's party refuses to take part in elections, it can only lead to the de-legitimization of power."

Amid growing turmoil in Kiev and a widespread hunger for fresh leadership, Saakashvili may sense political opportunity. A comprehensive poll on Ukrainian public opinion, conducted by the International Republican Institute in July, found that 72 percent of Ukrainians think the country is going "in the wrong direction" and only 3 percent are "satisfied with the pace of [positive] change." Less than a third are willing to endure more economic pain in hopes of a better tomorrow, and nearly two-thirds have an "unfavorable" view of Poroshenko. Nearly 85 percent disapproved of Yatsenyuk.

"Saakashvili was clearly given a green light to attack Yatsenyuk. Whatever else happens, I don't seem many prospects for Yatsenyuk and his party in the next five years," says Mr. Bortnik.
 
 #36
Business New Europe
www.bne.eu
September 10, 2015
Ukraine reform guru urges more powers for Saakashvili after 100 days in office
Graham Stack in Odesa

47-year-old Sasha Borovik is one of the most colourful and controversial of Ukraine's new team of radical reformers parachuted in to revamp the country's corrupt and dysfunctional institutions. In early 2015 he broke off a high-flying career abroad as an IT lawyer with Microsoft and other multinational giants to join Ukraine's government. But three months as first deputy economy minister ended in controversy in May, when the government not only fired him, but claimed he had never been formally appointed to the post. Leaked emails showed that Prime Minister Arseny Yatsenyuk had called for his head, fearing his radical ideas were a sign of mental instability.

Borovik was immediately snapped up by Mikheil Saakashvili when the former Georgian president was sensationally appointed governor of Odesa region in May. Odesa is a strategic historic port location with some pro-Russian sympathies, making it a crucial swing constituency for Kyiv's still fragile pro-Western administration.

With 100 days gone since he took up the post, Saakashvili has left hurriedly for Kyiv to request extra powers, lest the reform drive founder, Borovik tells bne IntelliNews. "We cannot effectively prevail against corruption in Odesa region unless we have influence over the relevant agencies," Borovik explains, reeling off a list of most of the central government 'power agencies' where Saakashvili wants to see his people installed at the regional level: prosecutor, anti-corruption bureau, tax service, customs service and the state security service SBU.

"The constitution does not allow us to control these agencies in the region, but we want to nominate our people to occupy the top posts," Borovik says.

Under the constitution, appointments of half of these posts is the prerogative of PM Yatsenyuk, with whom not only Borovik, but also Saakashvili, is at loggerheads. Borovik says Saakashvili already used his influence to block Yatsenyuk's plans for a speedy privatisation of Odesa Port Plant (OPP), Ukraine's largest chemicals plant, valued at up to $1bn. "The government was looking to privatise OPP over three months - thus making it impossible for foreign investors to conduct due diligence. It was obvious there was a plan to sell the plant to oligarchs," Borovik says, echoing Saakashvili's recent prime time TV attack on Yatsenyuk. "The same applies to government plans to sell off the ports before the end of the year."

One unstated reason for Saakashvili to put the brakes on privatisation is perhaps a nod to public opinion: 83% of the local population oppose privatisation, Borovik says, with crucial regional elections looming on October 25. The current mayor of Odesa is a former ally of ousted Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych, and formerly pro-Yanukovych forces have majorities in both the municipal and regional assemblies.

There is little sign this will change after the elections. With the first 100 days of Saakashvili's tenure gone, 54% of locals say they see no changes for the better, 41% say poverty and unemployment are the biggest problems they face, while only 18% are prepared to tighten their belts somewhat for the cause of reforms, Borovik quotes polls as saying. At the same time, 53% say battling corruption should be a priority.

Borovik defends his team's record, pointing to the launch of a modern police force, and moves to create a one-stop shop for all citizens' paperwork. Saakashvili has also announced grandiose investment plans for Odesa region - the construction of a new motorway to Bucharest, and a second terminal for Odesa airport. But Borovik is coy about where the funding for these projects will come from, considering Ukraine has only narrowly escaped bankruptcy. "Central budget funds, in part, and the motorway could be built as a concession," he says.

Meanwhile, the local population doubt that Saakashvili means to stay in Odesa long - and Saakashvili said himself in a recent interview that he would stay a maximum of two to three years. But he has vehemently denied reports that he is aiming to replace Yatsenyuk as prime minister in the coming months.

Borovik likewise denies that Saakashvili is planning on returning to Georgia if his Georgian opposition party, the United National Movement, is successful in upcoming elections. "This will not happen, because we know that if Saakashvili returns to Georgia, Putin will simply cut Georgia in two," Borovik says.

Straight talker

Borovik, who addresses public events in a tennis shirt, is a straight talker quick to correct interlocutors, perhaps the reason behind his personality clash with Yatsenyuk.

At a recent Odesa investment conference, he interrupted a Kyiv region official's presentation on creating a sponsorship fund for bonus payments to local officials: heads of regional departments currently earn only UAH2,800 a month (€115), meaning the only reason for anyone to do the job are bribes. "We don't need to throw more money at the bureaucracy," he interjected, "we need to slash it and reduce state functions."

Likewise, he publicly rebuked panel participant Russian opposition MP Ilya Ponamarev, an ardent Ukraine supporter, for using the Russian equivalent of 'the Ukraine' to refer to his country, instead of the correct form of simply 'Ukraine'. And anyone calling him by his original Russian name of Alexandr, instead of the naturalised version Sasha, reminds him of being scolded as a child, he jokes.

Borovik's childhood is part of the controversy surrounding him. He grew up in West Ukraine's Lviv region, in a Russian-speaking family of a high-ranking local KGB official, who Borovik says targeted corrupt officials, not dissidents. Borovik himself was recruited by the KGB due to his intellectual capacities and studied at the Higher School of KGB in Moscow in the late 1980s.

But during his studying he became disillusioned with the Soviet system, and fell under the influence of Western rock music, particularly Pink Floyd. One night full of doubt in Moscow, after hugging a tree and listening to the 1971 album "Atom Heart Mother", he resolved to flee the country, crossing the border to the Czech Republic in 1990, where he began a stellar career in law. He is now a German citizen.

It was only the coming to power of pro-reform forces in Ukraine in 2014 that prompted him to return to his homeland. Much has changed since he left, but one thing has stayed the same - his love for Pink Floyd. "I would die to see them perform the 'The Wall' here in Odesa," he says, eyes lighting up.
 
 #37
www.foreignaffairs.com
September 9, 2015
Forcing Kiev's Hand
Why Russia Won't Accept a Frozen Conflict in Ukraine
By Samuel Charap
SAMUEL CHARAP is a Senior Fellow for Russia and Eurasia at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Follow him on Twitter @scharap.

Viewed from Washington, the conflict in Ukraine's east seems to have reached a plateau. Despite several cease-fire agreements, fighting along the frontlines has never ceased completely. Yet the intensity of the violence has markedly decreased, and the Russian military and its separatist allies have not launched a major offensive in over six months. Since Russian President Vladimir Putin seems unwilling to withdraw his forces from the east, some now hope that the conflict will freeze-that is, that the bloodshed will come to an end even in the absence of a formal political settlement-allowing Kiev to move on with reforms, economic recovery, and European integration. Such an outcome, the German Bundestag member Rolf M�tzenich argued in a February essay for Foreign Affairs, should satisfy the West.

This hope has induced a potentially dangerous complacency about the crisis. A frozen conflict is actually the least likely medium-term outcome for Ukraine. Far more likely is that Russia will use force to achieve a settlement on its terms, involving a reincorporation of rebel-held Donbas into Ukraine that would endow the country's Russophile regions with a disproportionate influence over national politics. Rather than pushing for a frozen conflict scenario that will likely never materialize, then, the United States, the European Union, and Ukraine should do all they can to minimize the economic and human costs of this more probable outcome.  

THE RUSSIAN ENDGAME

It is easy to see how a frozen conflict scenario might appeal to the current government in Kiev. Such a scenario would effectively separate rebel-held Donbas from the rest of the country, turning the conflict's current frontlines into a de facto border. As a result of this separation, the Donbas would lose its influence in Ukraine's national politics, thus drastically reducing Moscow's sway over Kiev. Russia, meanwhile, would be forced to foot the bill for the massive reconstruction effort needed to prevent the socioeconomic collapse of its new protectorate.

This scenario is unlikely, however, because a frozen conflict is unacceptable to Moscow. Russia's objective is to empower the Russophile regions of Ukraine in a new constitutional structure in order to institutionalize its influence in Kiev; severing those regions from the rest of the country would thus be tantamount to accepting defeat.

Indeed, Moscow has taken a number of steps to avoid that outcome. Russia's late January offensive in the Donbas, for example, led not to a land grab but instead to the so-called Minsk II agreement, which put the Ukrainian political transformation desired by Moscow at the center of the conflict resolution process. The accord called for local elections in the Donbas; for the restoration of economic ties between rebel-held areas and the rest of Ukraine; and for constitutional reform, negotiated with the separatists, that would grant rebel-held territories wide-ranging autonomy inside Ukraine. According to the terms of the agreement, the most significant Russian concession-Moscow's return of control over the Ukrainian-Russian border to Kiev-is conditioned on Kiev's implementation of this constitutional change.

Thus far, the political process called for in Minsk II has not progressed as Moscow had planned. Local elections, for example, have not been held; instead, Kiev passed a provision on March 17 that effectively made such elections impossible to conduct. The new measure conditioned greater local autonomy and elections on the removal of illegal armed groups (presumably including the separatists themselves, along with Russian regular forces) from Ukraine.

Moreover, Kiev did not consult with the separatists on local elections, as stipulated in Minsk II, and it defined the area of enhanced local autonomy  along lines that did not reflect separatist gains made this winter, notably around Debaltsevo. Although Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko has called for nationwide local elections on October 25, he has said they will not be held in the separatist regions. The separatists, meanwhile, have announced plans to hold their own elections a week before.

Nor have the economic concessions Kiev made in Minsk II materialized. Ukraine has instituted an economic blockade on rebel-held areas and refuses to provide pensions and other social services to those living there; on June 11, Poroshenko announced that economic ties with separatist-held areas would not be restored until Ukraine regained full control over its external borders. And on June 17, Kiev went further, tightening the blockade of rebel-held Donbas so that only humanitarian supplies could enter.

The political process called for in Minsk II has not progressed as Moscow had planned.

Constitutional reform has likewise failed to proceed as Moscow wished. The reforms Poroshenko announced on July 1 included provisions for nationwide decentralization, including the devolution of a range of powers-such as budgetary oversight and economic development planning-to local officials. Yet the proposed reforms' only reference to rebel-held Donbas was that enhanced autonomy there would be determined by a separate law, which had been passed in September 2014. Furthermore, the Ukrainian authorities did not consult with the separatists on the reforms. The bill passed an initial vote on August 31, amid a nationalist backlash; a final vote will be held later this year.  

The United States and the EU have supported the Ukrainian government's position that it cannot negotiate with the separatists until legitimate elections are held and the cease-fire is fully observed. And both Washington and Brussels have lauded Ukraine's proposed constitutional reforms as a demonstration of Kiev's commitment to Minsk II. Yet the West's appraisal means little. Russia's assessment of Ukraine's policies is the most important factor in determining the future of the crisis. By all accounts, that assessment has been negative: the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has denounced the proposed constitutional amendments, and Putin has demanded that Kiev hold direct talks with the separatists even in the absence of recognized elections and a full cease-fire.

REFORM THROUGH FORCE

Given Moscow's evident discontent with the outcome of the Minsk II process, it will likely take action to change the status quo. The only question is the form this action will take. Two broad possibilities exist, both of which involve the use of force and would come at a significant economic and human cost to the Ukrainian people.

The first scenario is a prolongation or moderate intensification of the violence: neither war nor peace, but a calibrated, simmering conflict without major escalation. Under such a scenario, fighting would absorb much of the Ukrainian government's political capital, leaving Kiev unable to proceed with crucial economic and political reforms. Moscow would use economic measures such as sanctions and gas cutoffs to ensure that the Ukrainian economy would remain in disarray, and few investors would venture back into the country. In this scenario, Russia would calibrate its military activities so as not to trigger a more forceful Western response, in the form of either additional sanctions or military assistance to Kiev, and would likely count on the EU sanctions breaking down over time. In short, this would be a war of attrition-one that Moscow would eventually win.

That scenario assumes Moscow's confidence that time is on its side and that Russia has the strategic patience required to wait for an eventual victory. But observers should not count on cooler heads prevailing in Moscow-the Kremlin's track record since the start of the crisis has been marked by rash behavior, as in its invasion of Crimea only a few days after the ouster of former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych. A major escalation of military activity should therefore be considered as a second possible scenario.

Escalation has proven a successful tactic for Russia twice since the crisis began: in late August 2014 and again in late January 2015, Moscow heavily increased its support for separatists in the Donbas, and both times Poroshenko was forced to sue for peace, resulting first in the Minsk I agreement and then in Minsk II. To be sure, escalation has its risks: the West, for example, could strengthen its sanctions regime or provide lethal military assistance to Ukraine. But Moscow has paid little heed to such risks since the crisis began, and it is certainly plausible that it would act similarly in the future.

The long-term outcomes of these two scenarios are quite similar. Should either materialize, Ukraine would be forced to reintegrate the Donbas on Russia's terms. Kiev, in other words, would have to make concessions, such as granting autonomy to the separatist regions and ending the blockade up front, and Russia would withdraw only after becoming confident in the durability of the settlement. The key difference between the two scenarios is time: in the first scenario, the endgame could take months or even years to materialize; in the second, it would happen as soon as Putin gives the order. In either case, Ukrainians will suffer: there will be further death and destruction in the east; the Ukrainian economy will continue its downward spiral; and Kiev's pledges to reform and clean governance will increasingly seem like empty words.

FINDING COMMON GROUND

Because Moscow's endgame in either case is the implementation of Minsk II on Russian terms, and because it seems willing and able to achieve this outcome by force, it would be prudent to consider negotiating that outcome now in order to avoid additional suffering and destruction. In practice, this would entail Kiev lifting its blockade of rebel-held territory; agreeing to terms for local elections; and implementing enhanced autonomy for rebel-held regions. And government representatives would have to hold direct talks with the separatists.

This would be a difficult pill for any government to swallow. Moreover, the riots in Kiev at the end of August, which came in response to the first-round vote on Poroshenko's proposed constitutional reforms in parliament, were a reminder that such a policy could undermine the government and perhaps even lead to a nationalist coup d'�tat. Yet this need not be the case. Poroshenko and Western officials could limit the potential for a domestic backlash by adopting a different public discourse about the conflict.

Ever since Yanukovych was ousted, U.S. and European officials have emphasized legitimate but nonetheless maximalist objectives for Ukraine's future by, for example, calling for the complete restoration of Ukraine's territorial integrity and vigorously condemning Russian aggression. Poroshenko and senior Ukrainian government officials tend to be even more extreme, referring to the separatists as terrorists and even comparing separatist territories with Mordor, the seat of evil in J. R. R. Tolkien's fantasy novels. It's no wonder that many politically active Ukrainians believe that they do not need to compromise; no major public figure has yet made the case for it. Yet a majority of Ukrainians still favor a negotiated settlement of some sort, and both the West and Ukraine can be confident that the pursuit of such a settlement, although a concession in the short term, would help preserve their long-term advantages. Indeed, Russia's relative strength is exclusively on the battlefield, so once the fighting is over and the competition moves to the political and financial realms, the relative soft-power advantages of Ukraine and of Europe will become evident. A change in rhetoric might not completely remove roadblocks to such a compromise, but without it, such a compromise would be impossible.

Even so, far more than Western military assistance or Ukrainian reforms, the factor that will determine the immediate future of the conflict in Ukraine's east is Russia's behavior. That behavior, in turn, will be determined by the extent to which Moscow believes the situation on the ground is moving toward its desired outcome. With this in mind, the United States and its European partners should focus on finding common ground between Kiev and Moscow. Should they fail to do so, the consequences for Ukraine could be devastating.
 
 #38
Sputnik
September 11, 2015
Fueling the Fires: Pentagon to Start Training Ukrainian Military

The US military will soon start training Ukrainian military forces, said a Senator who recently visited Ukraine - despite yearlong accusations from Washington that Moscow has been fueling unrest in the country.

Senator Jack Reed, the top Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee, said on Wednesday that US Army paratroopers are training Ukraine's National Guard forces at a base in western Ukraine, and will soon begin working with Ukraine's regular military, The Hill reported.

"The transition was underway to train defense units, regular military units. The National Guard finishes training within a week or two and then it'll be their formal military's that's being trained," said Reed, of Rhode Island.

The Obama administration has provided Ukrainian forces with more than $200 million in non-lethal military assistance, but has been reluctant to fulfill Kiev's requests for lethal aid.

Reed, though, said he supports providing Ukrainian forces with lethal aid, and outlined three steps to do so, according to the Hill:

One step that should be explored, Reed said, is taking Ukrainian forces outside the country and training them on the provided weapon systems, "so they're ready."

"Second is the possibility of transferring some of these systems from other countries into Ukraine, which doesn't raise quite the visibility of the transfer."

"And then there's the possibility of taking some of our systems and beginning to... deploy them to training areas particularly so that they can train on them and have them ready to move into areas of conflict."

Since 2014, the US and its western allies have imposed a series of sanctions on Moscow over its alleged involvement in the conflict in Ukraine, spurring the deterioration of relations between Moscow and Washington, with the latter accusing the former of meddling in Kiev's affairs.

Moscow has repeatedly warned Washington that its interference in the Ukrainian civil war will only make matters worse. 
 
 #39
Vice.com
September 9, 2015
Intolerance and Violence Against LGBT People Is on the Rise in War-Torn Ukraine
By Jane Lytvynenko
[Photos here http://www.vice.com/en_uk/read/in-war-torn-ukraine-there-is-no-time-for-lgbtq-rights]

When I asked how to find Kiev's only queer community center, a man outside blowing cigarette smoke nodded, grimaced, and pointed at the unmarked entrance without a word. The only hint for potential visitors is a printed sign saying "queer home" taped to the inside of a window. The entrance is a heavy metal door and the stone steps leading into the basement space are worn down and uneven. This is what serves as the capital's only permanent gathering place for the LGBTQ community, discreetly hidden away for safety.

In Ukraine, activists and allies have been steadily fighting for LGBTQ acceptance. But as visibility grows, so does intolerance and violence. Activists try not to let the threat of getting beaten up or killed get in the way, but the government and police are overwhelmingly indifferent to LGBTQ issues and unwilling to help.

Ksysha, sitting on the steps of the center waiting for it to open, said she moved to Kiev from Crimea right after the 2014 referendum to join Russia. In Crimea, like in Ukraine's capital, the LGBTQ community had gatherings and dances but for her there is more to do here. The community center has events almost every night and there are more people to talk to.

"I don't know if there's more negativity here, I ignore them, I don't give a shit," she says. "There are no huge problems for me-boys have bigger issues.

"I can walk down the street with my girlfriend and sometimes I'll get yells and profanities but it's not a constant problem. But if boys do the same they could get beaten up or worse. In terms of public displays of affection, it's more difficult for them. I don't think people give much thought about what boys do in private, I think they just like yelling the word 'pidoras.' I think they just want to hurt someone's feelings."

That word, pidoras, is hard to translate. It's a gay slur used to wound both LGBTQ people and any heterosexuals who deviate from the norm in the way they speak or dress. Pidoras is the go-to homophobic insult that has become a part of life for the community, just like death threats.

Vladimir Naumenko, manager of regional growth of the Ukraine Gay Alliance, says they're thinking about hiring a private security firm as violence against the LGBTQ community rises with its visibility. Last month, a Ukrainian parliamentary committee on constitutional reform, under pressure from Ukrainian churches, declined to study the possibility of classifying violence and discrimination against LGBTQ people as a criminal offense. Gay marriage and civil union are out of the question in Ukraine, and the situation is getting worse.

Alexander Zinchenkov has been working for Our World LGBTQ Centre since 1997. He and his partner used to live in Luhansk, a territory now under Russian occupation. He has lived in Kiev for 12 years but has never seen violence against LGBTQ people so bad. "Those who visually stand out almost always risk aggression," he says.

A recently released video of a gay couple in downtown Kiev getting assaulted in broad daylight proves his point. So does an alleged brutal beating of two young men by former parliamentary candidate Oleg Kytserib.

Kytserib wrote a Facebook update (since deleted) about beating up a gay couple sitting in front of his home at night. According to the post, he told them, "Have you gone crazy, pidoras, bitches, being cute here? There's a war going on, and you're here relaxing? This is not Gay-rope, especially beside my home."

When, according to the post, they replied, "Are you jealous that we love each other?" he went home, woke up his almost 18-year-old boxer son, took a wooden stick left over from the days of Maidan, and together they beat up the two men. "Two pidoras and the two sympathizers [sitting beside them] will be in the hospital for two weeks." He wrote that the only damage he suffered was a torn jacket and a hand hurt where it "hit pidoras' teeth."

Alexander said he has been trying to find the victims by calling hospitals, but they haven't turned up. In the last six months to a year, he has seen a huge increase in violent cases reported to his organization. Part of the problem is Ukraine's police, who are often unwilling to do anything about the assaults-at most, charging perpetrators with disturbing the peace. Still, he wants to tell authorities about those potentially beaten by Kytserib.

"I'm going to write a police report, but I'm not sure whether the police will be careful with information about where I live," said Alexander. "I don't know that these right-wing activists won't show up at my door. I will write the report, but I still feel in danger."

According to both Alexander and Vladimir, the conservative and violent right-wing movement sprung from the revolution. Ukrainians have a complicated relationships with those groups. On one hand, they are active in conflict zones and served as security during Maidan. At the same time, they are not accountable to anyone.

Those who attacked the Kiev March for Equality in June associated with the movement but received little, if any, punishment. Right-wing activists also burned down a historic movie theater in Kiev that played a gay film. They were only charged with disturbing the peace.

While violence against individuals has grown, some politicians began showing support for Ukraine's queer community for the first time. Two politicians marched with the activists during a pride parade in June and president Petro Poroshenko voiced his support. But Vladimir says he might just be playing politics as no concrete changes are made.

"The government doesn't see this as a priority right now, which is dangerous," he says, referring to the war in the country.

Aleksander also points to the war as the reason for increasing violence.

"Homophobia in society is a reflection of the larger feeling in Ukraine," he says. "There's a lot of unrest and negative attitudes.

"About ten years ago, LGBT people were not noticeable both in the newspapers and in the streets. But now LGBT activists are more vocal and the issues are more visible. An anti-LGBT movement has formed and it's fairly influential. Many Ukrainian politicians and churches are homophobic and have a big influence on society."

For Vladimir and Gay Alliance Ukraine, death threats have become a part of routine procedure. When they had a help line, funded by the Canadian Embassy, brutal threats of violence were just a part of the job. They have tried reporting them but nothing comes of it. Police say they can't do anything until physical harm takes place. "By then it might be too late," says Vladimir.

He has faced those threats and uses them to fuel his work. Gay Alliance Ukraine has opened community centers across the country, organized activities for queers, and sends volunteers on skills exchanges to other countries. He hopes, one day, for acceptance in the country.

"As an individual, I would want change the entire infrastructure," he said. "I would burn it down and build a new one. As an activist, I just want our government to notice what democracy is and that every person is important. That society is made up of minorities."

I asked him how he brings himself to keep going in this climate. After a minute of silence, he says, "I don't know." After another minute he adds, "If we don't keep going, nothing will change."
 
#40
Haaretz (Israel)
September 10, 2015
50% Jump in Immigration From Ukraine Over Past Jewish Year
By Judy Maltz

The past Jewish year has seen a dramatic increase in immigration to Israel from Ukraine.

According to figures published Wednesday by the Jewish Agency and the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption, the number of immigrants who have arrived in the country from Ukraine since last Rosh Hashanah totaled 6,900 - a 50 percent jump from the previous year. The exodus has been attributed to the political turmoil in the country.

Another 5,900 immigrants arrived in the country from Russia - 23 percent more than the previous year.

It is noteworthy that the many of these immigrants from the former Soviet Union are not defined as Jewish by religious law and therefore cannot marry in the country without undergoing an Orthodox conversion. To be considered Jewish under religious law, or halakha, an individual must either be born to a Jewish mother or have undergone an Orthodox conversion by rabbis recognized by the Chief Rabbinate in Israel. It is sufficient for an individual to have at least one Jewish grandparent or a Jewish spouse to be eligible to immigrate to Israel under the Law of Return.

France was the leading source of immigrants to Israel over the past Jewish year, although the rate of increase from that country was less dramatic. The number of new arrivals in Israel from France since last Rosh Hashanah totaled 7,350 - up 10 percent from the previous year. A combination of a bad economy and rising anti-Semitism explain the sharp rise in immigration from France in recent years.

Altogether, the number of new immigrants arriving in Israel during the Jewish year of 5775 was 29,500, representing an increase of 13 percent. Almost half of the total number came from Ukraine and France. The top destination for these newcomers was Tel Aviv, with Netanya coming in a close second, followed by Jerusalem.

Based on these figures, Minister of Immigrant Absorption Ze'ev Elkin predicted that the total number of immigrants arriving in Israel in 2015 would reach somewhere between 30,000 and 35,000 - a record for the past decade. "This is a window of opportunity that the State of Israel cannot miss," he said.

Jewish Agency Chairman Natan Sharansky noted that in recent years, the majority of new immigrants to Israel have been coming from democratic Western countries. "These immigrants' free choice to live in Israel, and their preference for Israel over other countries, is the true triumph of Zionism," he said.

Immigration from North America was steady at about 3,600 (less that half the number of arrivals from France). Another 690 new immigrants arrived in the country from the United Kingdom (up 13 percent), 400 from Italy (up 30 percent) and 290 from Belgium (steady).

Altogether, immigrants from 97 different countries arrived in Israel over the past Jewish year, with one immigrant arriving from each of the following places: Andorra, Angola, Namibia, Paraguay, the Philippines and Slovakia.

 
 
 #41
Sputnik
September 11, 2015
Russia Ready to Give Ukraine Gas Discount for Two Quarters

MOSCOW (Sputnik) - Russia is ready to give Ukraine a gas discount for two quarters, and the price will be comparable to that of gas deliveries to Poland, Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak said Friday.

Earlier in the day, the Russian energy minister held talks on gas deliveries to Ukraine with Vice President of the European Commission Maros Sefcovic.

"We believe we have managed to reach an agreement on a so-called winter package from October 1 to March 31," Novak told reporters following talks with EU energy chief.

Russia will make a final decision on a Ukraine gas discount taking into account spot gas prices in the European Union, he said.

The European Union receives around one third of its gas from Russia, over 40 percent of which the bloc receives via Ukraine.

Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak is going to meet with Maros Sefcovic, Vice President of the European Commission, to discuss future gas deliveries to Ukraine on September 11.

"As before, our side is ready to provide a gas discount for the fourth quarter [of 2015] and for next year's first quarter... with the aim of creating a price on the same level as for Ukraine's neighboring countries, such as Poland," Novak added.

In late June, trilateral talks on Russian gas supplies to Ukraine convened in Austria a day before second quarter deliveries, priced with a $100 per 1,000 cubic meters discount, were due to expire.

Ukraine ceased all purchases of gas from Russian energy company Gazprom after Kiev and Moscow were unable to reach an agreement on gas deliveries for the third quarter of 2015 despite a Russian proposal for a new gas price discount.

A new round of gas talks between Ukraine, Russia and the European Commission could be held at the end of September, according to the Russian Energy Ministry.