#2
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
September 3, 2015
New lessons in economics
Russian parents struggle with school expenses as real incomes fall.
Alexander Bratersky, special to RBTH
 
As Russian students head back to school, the country's continued economic downturn and decline in real income is forcing some parents to make difficult decisions about educational expenses.

Victoria, a single mother of a 13-year-old son, used to make enough money to live comfortably in Moscow and also take a nice vacation every year. Today, however, due to the fall in the value of the ruble, her salary is the equivalent of $920 a month.

This year, she spent 20,000 rubles ($300) on her son's back-to-school expenses. Most Russian schools require uniforms, which can cost between 2,500 and 6,000 rubles ($38-$92).

Students must also have uniforms for P.E., shoes to wear inside the school building (as Russian schoolchildren must leave shoes worn outside on the streets in the coatroom), and pens, notebooks and workbooks.

Victoria says the school expenses have forced her to cut back on the kinds of food she buys.

"Sometimes, I even deny my son his favorite grapes. Previously, I bought them all the time, just like cucumbers and peppers, but they have become much more expensive," said Victoria, adding that she has started to put more of her food purchases on her credit card.

Parents estimate that the cost of school supplies has risen on average by 15 percent compared to last year. Meanwhile, the real wages of Russians declined by 9.3 percent in the first half of 2015, according to figures from the Russian State Statistics Service, Rosstat.

News agency TASS reports that parents living in the Central Federal District, which includes Moscow and the surrounding regions, will spend the most on back-to-school purchases - 25,000-27,000 ($380-$414) rubles on average.

In the Volga Federal District, which includes Russia's third-largest city, Nizhny Novgorod, prices are lower. In the Nizhny Novgorod region, parents spend on average 10,000 rubles ($153). The average salary in the region is also lower, however - 27,000 rubles. Costs are also high in Russia's Far East. In the Khabarovsk Territory, for example, parents will spend 20,000-25,000 rubles, out of an average salary of 36,500 rubles ($560).
 
Big family, big expenses

Costs just go up for parents with several children, even if not all of them are in school. Last year, Muscovites Irina and Pavel had a third child. Although only their oldest son goes to school, education-related expenses take a major chunk from their income, which is about 40,000 rubles ($670) per month.

"The prices of some items have almost doubled," said Irina. "His backpack is already three years old, but we have to postpone the purchase of a new one, to wait for discounts. My son is neat, it is the only thing that saves us."
 
Social help

And the situation is even more difficult for needy families - the number of which has increased significantly with the financial crisis.

The number of Russians living below the poverty level (9,700 rubles or $150) has reached 22 million, Deputy Prime Minister Olga Golodets told the Interfax news agency in July.

Regional authorities are trying to help the poorest citizens to prepare children for school with lump-sum payments at the beginning of the school year; the amount varies depending on the region.

Volunteers also help poor families and families with several children get their kids ready for school. In the town of Smolensk in western Russia, a local priest put a notice on online forums asking for people to contribute money to help needy families or donate school supplies.

"People donate less than last year, but still continue to help - both retired women and even school students bring donations," said Natalia Popova, the officer-in-charge of the church's social service and charity department.

"Now the times are difficult, many hearts have hardened, but we went through a lot and will endure this, too."

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 #3
Vedomosti
August 31, 2015
Poll shows dissatisfaction with Putin strongest among poorest Russians
Aleksey Levinson, leader of Levada Centre's socio-cultural studies department, Where dissenters were hiding. Almost one-fifth of population actively dislike situation in country

In June, the approval rating for Vladimir Putin's activity in the post of president reached an historical peak at 89 per cent and the activity of the government and the State Duma was viewed with approval at that time by 62 per cent and 54 per cent respectively. Now Putin's rating has fallen by 6 percentage points (to 87 per cent in July and 83 per cent in August) and the ratings of the cabinet and parliament have each fallen 7-8 percentage points at a stroke.

Time will show whether this is the beginning of the disillusionment with the authorities and their policy that some analysts are predicting or whether these are merely the fluctuations characteristic of such indicators. But in any event it is worth drawing attention to those people who now disagree with the opinion of the all-approving majority. There is a category of citizens who dislike a lot of things. For example, within the public as a whole the majority (50 per cent) regard the current economic situation as "average" whereas in the category of those who disagree, the majority (58 per cent) regard it as "bad." The situation in the places where these people live is described by them as bad not as often as by everyone who describes it that way (44 per cent) but one and one-half times more often (65 per cent). Furthermore, to a large extent they regard the situation in Russia as a whole not as "favourable, calm" (52 per cent overall) but as "tense, critical" (it is 59 per cent in their group).

And whereas among all Russians 38 per cent expect a worsening of the political situation in the months ahead, among these people the figure is 47 per cent. For the majority the crisis has not yet properly appeared, but for two-thirds of this category it has already developed fully. Overall, 49 per cent consider the material situation of their own families to have worsened over the past year but within this group the figure is 65 per cent. Among the whole population a majority (51 per cent) do not expect changes in the material situation of their families in the year ahead but here 46 per cent expect a deterioration.

When it comes to those people who approve of Putin's activity the figure here is not 83 per cent but 67 per cent whereas among those who disapprove it is considerably higher than among the public as a whole (31 per cent). On the whole, 58 per cent now express confidence in Putin on average (not 64 per cent as it was in June) but within this environment the figure is below half (46 per cent). The government's activity meets with approval there from only 40 per cent (59 per cent disapprove). The present Duma, promoting its own initiatives, seems to want to please them specifically most of all (in addition to the leadership). But among them just 32 per cent approve of the Duma's activity and 63 per cent are dissatisfied with it. And they are least inclined of all to elect One Russia people to the future Duma (24 per cent against an average of 41 per cent).

This category is more active than many in predicting "mass actions by the population against a fall in the living standard" and is most active of all in promising its personal participation in them.

Is it possible that this is the fifth column? Has the State Department really found so many dollars and cookies to bribe almost one-fifth of the entire Russian population? After all, we are talking about a category that over 19 per cent place themselves in. Who are they? Are they the impudent creative classes? Are they the capital's excessively affluent middle class? Oh no. The Duma people and other sleuths are looking in the wrong place for the real opposition. We have been describing the reaction of the poorest section of our society - those people who, in their own words, barely have enough money for food. These people are most numerous in small and middling cities. Over one-half of the population there expect unemployment to increase and the economic situation to worsen.

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 #4
Moscow Times
September 4, 2015
Lack of Manifestos Points to Political Complacency in Russian Regions - Experts
By Ivan Nechepurenko

Only five acting governors taking part in elections in 21 Russian regions next week have published electoral manifestos, the Petersburg Politics think tank said in a report published Thursday.

The lack of manifestos attests to a deficit of clear vision among potential heads of Russian regions - as well as complacency that since they have already been endorsed by President Vladimir Putin, there is no need to persuade voters that they will improve their lives, regional politics and economy experts told The Moscow Times.

All the candidates seeking election were appointed as acting governors by Putin in recent months, and most were nominated and endorsed by the ruling United Russia party.

"Governors don't need manifestos because manifestos will not get them elected, only the Kremlin's endorsement will do that," said Natalya Zubarevich, director of the regions program at the Independent Institute of Social Policy, a think tank in Moscow.

"They don't have a vision of the future of their regions, and furthermore, the federal government and society at large also lack this vision - there is only a desire to cling on to the status quo," Zubarevich said in a phone interview.

The manifestos that have been published are mostly weak, concentrating on previous achievements and promising stability instead of development, the Petersburg Politics think tank found.

"Some of the manifestos are written in such a way as though the candidates have already won the elections," the report said.

While some of the acting governors have been running their regions for years, others were appointed by the Kremlin just a few months before the elections.

One such governor, Veniamin Kondratyev, acting head of the Krasnodar region - one of the most prosperous in Russia - had not responded to a request for comment by the time of publication.

Another, the acting head of the Tambov region Alexander Nikitin, does in fact have a manifesto, it emerged, but it proved impossible to find without the help of his representatives.

"As far as I know he has a manifesto," Vladimir Shunyayev, a spokesman for the Tambov regional administration, told The Moscow Times in a phone interview without elaborating.

Olga Chepurnova, a spokeswoman for the local branch of the United Russia party, said that the manifesto exists and is published on the branch's website. But extensive trawls of the site yielded no results until Chepurnova sent a direct link to it.

In the Kostroma region, gubernatorial aide Alexander Fisher told a regional television station in August that acting governor Sergei Sitnikov is busy with the everyday work of getting schools ready for the winter heating season, and therefore will not have time to campaign.

"The region's residents know Sitnikov's manifesto, it is being implemented every day and its results are evident," said Fisher.

In the Kaluga region, a candidate from the Cossack party, Yury Zhukov, said he was withdrawing from the campaign after finding out that his manifesto was very similar to that of the acting governor Anatoly Artamonov. Aside from the question of why a rival would be granted an advance peek at another candidate's manifesto, Artamonov's program is not in fact finished and has not yet been published, he told The Moscow Times in a phone interview.

"We have a development strategy for the Kaluga region through 2030 and I will also prepare my own manifesto on the basis of local residents' ideas that I am collecting until the end of this week," said Artamonov.

According to Alexander Kynev, a political scientist whose research is concentrated on regional elections, governor manifestos were formerly generally oriented at local elites rather than at average voters.

"The heads of local businesses and enterprises want to know what will happen with local policies and projects, so for them it was important to read a manifesto," Kynev said in a phone interview.

"Today the problem is that there is no real competition. If we had rivalry among candidates, they would have competing manifestos," he said.

Russia reintroduced direct regional gubernatorial elections in 2012 after Putin abolished them in 2004, citing the need to consolidate the country in the face of a terrorism threat. Nevertheless, regional elections remain a formality, the Petersburg Politics think tank said in the report.

Gleb Kuznetsov, a Moscow-based political commentator, said that the gradual disappearance of electoral manifestos is a natural trend in a situation when people rely on the Internet and no longer want to read long and mundane texts.

"For 10 years these programs were drafted mostly as a ritual - every candidate had to have a decent suit and a manifesto," Kuznetsov said in a phone interview.

"Today the economy is in crisis, so there is no need to waste time and resources on this useless atavism," he said.

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 #5
www.rt.com
September 3, 2015
Half of Russians express readiness to vote in 2016 parliamentary poll

Half of Russian voters say they will definitely participate in State Duma elections in September 2016, and 61 percent who have made their choice say they will support the current parliamentary majority United Russia party.

According to the research released by the independent Levada-Center agency on Thursday, 19 percent of responders will definitely participate in the forthcoming Duma elections. Thirty-one percent said that it was very likely.

Twenty-one percent of responders said they were undecided, 12 percent doubt they will make it to the polling stations, and 14 percent said they definitely had no intention of voting.

Levada Center experts noted that the results were very close to opinions registered in August 2011, ahead of the latest parliamentary polls at 60 percent. However, they also said the protest vote could be higher in 2016 due to complex socio-economic conditions.

In the same poll, 41 percent of responders said if the elections took place next weekend they would vote for the centrist conservative United Russia party, currently holding the majority of seats in the Duma. United Russia's popularity among those who had already decided to vote was higher at 61 percent.

Ten percent of all responders said they would back the Russian Communist Party, seven percent promised to support the nationalist-populist LDPR party, three percent said they would vote for the leftist Fair Russia party and two percent back the pro-business Civil Platform party.

The nationalist Motherland party, liberal Yabloko party and the anti-corruption Party of Progress have so far secured about one percent of votes each.

In June, officials from Russia's Central Elections Commission suggested that at least 12 political parties will contest the 2016 Duma elections thanks to the more liberal requirements of a newly amended law. According to the new rules, introduced at the beginning of 2014, political parties who want to contend for State Duma seats must meet at least one of the following requirements: got three or more percent of the vote in previous elections; have its representative elected to at least one regional legislature; or present 200,000 signatures from supporters with no more than 7,000 coming from one federal region. Currently there are over 70 political parties in Russia.

 #6
Interfax
September 3, 2015
Poll shows three parties likely to be elected to next Russian parliament

With one year to go, half of Russian citizens have said they intend to vote in the next parliamentary election in Russia scheduled for 13 September 2016, according to an opinion poll conducted by Levada Centre. Thirty-one per cent have said they are "very likely" to vote and 19 per cent said they will "definitely" vote, the poll shows.

If the election to the State Duma, the lower house of the Russian parliament, were held next Sunday (6 September), 41 per cent of people in Russia as a whole, and 61 per cent of those who have said they will definitely vote, would vote for the ruling One Russia party. The CPRF (Communist Party of the Russian Federation) comes second - 10 per cent and 15 per cent accordingly, and the LDPR (Liberal Democratic Party of Russia) third - 7 per cent and 10 per cent accordingly.

The other parties, according to the poll, would not overcome a 5-per-cent threshold.

Only 3 per cent of people in Russia as a whole are ready to support the parliamentary opposition party A Just Russia and 2 per cent said they would vote for Civil Platform, which was founded by business tycoon Mikhail Prokhorov who has now left the party. Other parties - the Green Alliance - People's Party, the Party of Progress, Yabloko and Motherland (Rodina) - are likely to win about 1 per cent of the vote, while the Kremlin's fiercest critic, Parnas (People's Freedom Party), and the Patriots of Russia are likely to win even fewer votes - under 1 per cent.

The next election to the State Duma will be held in line with the bill passed in 2014 which brought back a mixed electoral system - half of the 450 deputies will be elected from party electoral lists and the other half - in single-seat constituencies. Under the bill, to be elected, parties will have to overcome a 5-per-cent threshold, compared with a 7-per-cent threshold required until now.

Twelve per cent of those polled said they were unlikely to vote in the next parliamentary elections and 14 per cent said they would definitely not take part. One in five (21 per cent) is still undecided.

A total of 1,600 people took part in the poll conducted on 21-24 August in 134 centres of population in 46 regions in Russia.

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 #7
Rossiiskaya Gazeta
August 27, 2015
Bidding Farewell to the Civil War
A nation that has not buried its perished fellow citizens cannot respect itself and move forward
By Sergei Karaganov, Doctor of History, head of the working group on historical memory at the presidential Council on the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights

Many encouraging changes are taking place in Russia's historical memory policy, with all its contradictions, sensations and false sensations. Efforts are being made to restore the memory of the "forgotten war" (WWI), which for many years was referred to as "imperialistic." A monument has been unveiled in Moscow, to be followed by many more, and local museums are setting up relevant exhibitions.

Another major step in recreating a comprehensive picture of Russian history was taken in August 2015 when the federal government, on orders from the President, adopted a concept of state policy for perpetuating the memory of the victims of political repressions. The document was drafted by government agencies and public organizations, above all, by the presidential Council on the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights (SPCh).

As is often the case in our country, the document did not come easy. Almost five years ago a group of enthusiasts associated with the SPCh initiated and presented a program for commemorating the victims and restoring historical memory. We were driven by several principal convictions.

First, a nation that has not buried its perished fellow citizens cannot respect itself, stand tall and go forward. Likewise, a person who has not buried his beloved ones does not deserve either self-respect or respect of other people.

Second. For all its achievements, the 20th century was one of the most terrible periods in the history of Russia. World War I, the fratricidal Civil War, and the Great Patriotic War claimed dozens of millions of lives. Plus repressions that killed not just many millions of people, but the best men and women of the country, members of the gentry, the clergy and intelligentsia - the keepers of historical memory and national identity - as well as peasants who were the backbone of the nation. They were followed by many intellectuals, administrative cadres and members of the military. Entire peoples were deported. Traditional values, faith and morals were destroyed. In point of fact, the best citizens and the best in country`s soul were systematically eliminated for several decades. Russia must part with that period.

Third, a considerable part of national history, the basis of the people's identity, was either expurgated or distorted in their minds. Restoring the memory of the victims is part of the work to be done to recreate history in its entirety.

Our document at first drew strong opposition from part of society and was attacked in mass media which for some reason called it a program of de- Stalinization even though I and my colleagues made it clear that it was a program to restore identity through respect for the memory of the fallen. Besides, we did not think it right to hold only Stalin responsible for many fellow citizens who had plunged the country into the revolution and repressions.

But the attack, obviously supported by someone influential, judging from its intensity, helped rather than harmed by making the idea more popular. It was sad though that young people, a new creative class, did not support the program four years ago. Apparently, it did not excite them. But thousands of people and about a dozen of public organizations familiar with the project, above all the International Memorial, worked with unprecedented selflessness and energy. About 800 local monuments have been erected across the country, and dozens of books and articles were published. The work of our group helped to unite many separate historical memory movements. I still cannot help smiling when I recall the first meeting we helped to organize between the heads of Memorial and the Butovo Shooting Range, who also represented the Orthodox Church. Until then both sides had commemorated their victims separately. Now they do it together. Philanthropists' donations allowed us to launch and operate the website www.istpamyat.ru, which has consolidated many sources of information concerning victims of repressions. We also drafted a commemoration program which then served as the basis for the present concept. We thought the country needed a sign of state support for the goals and objectives declared in the program that would send a signal to both bureaucrats and society.

The concept sends such a signal to all of us. There is no need to describe it here, for it can easily be found on the Internet. I will only mention its underlying principles: recognizing the continuity of the historical development of the country; acknowledging the tragic consequences of the societal split that triggered the turmoil of 1917, the Civil War, and mass political repressions; admitting the need for an objective analysis of the Soviet period's achievements and tragic chapters, including mass repressions; condemning the ideology of political terror.

At one of the meetings with the President in 2013 we suggested building a national monument to the victims of political repressions in Moscow. The President supported the idea that had been too long in coming. A contest of designs was organized, and about 300 projects were submitted. The winner will be announced soon, and the construction will start at the site selected by the Moscow city authorities at the intersection of Sakharov Avenue and the Garden Ring road. The federal government will meet part of the costs, for our state is the legal successor of the one that prosecuted and killed people. The rest will come from people's donations as a sign of personal grief for the fallen and recognition of the responsibility born by our fathers and grandfathers for the repressions they carried out.

The big and modern GULAG Museum will open in Moscow on October 30 designated as Day of Remembrance of the Victims of Political Repressions. The project was initiated by the Moscow city government. The Garden of Memory has been set up at the Butovo Shooting Range, and its museum will get a new building to expand its exhibitions. Work on a bill fully rehabilitating the victims of political repressions is in its final stage.

In another encouraging development, people united in the "Last Address" public movement have installed memorial plaques on several dozen houses in Moscow and St. Petersburg to commemorate those who had lived there and been killed during repressions.

But there are still many dangerous voids in Russian historical memory. One of them is how society and the state perceive the Civil War precipitated by the split of society and its elite, its incapability and loss of responsibility for the country, with all the tragic consequences that followed. A quarter of a century ago, the majority of people in the country supported the Reds, then the Whites. It's time to understand that both were wrong by allowing the split and starting a fratricidal war. Now society is divided again, even though differently, and needs to be reminded of the dramatic results of the previous spilt and irresponsibility of elites. But most importantly, that the country and Motherland are above personal convictions and individual fates.

Spain is an example of how to bid a dignified farewell to a civil war, which was also tragic but not as disastrous as ours. It built a large memorial complex where people from both warring sides were laid to rest. On top of the memorial are a cross and an epitaph reading "They loved Spain."

It's time we put an end, at least a symbolic one, to our own Civil War that started almost a hundred years ago, in 1917. I think there should be a monument too. I visualize it quite clearly: Mother Motherland is bestowing forgiveness on the knelt White officer and the Red commissar wearing a budyonnovka. One of them had failed to defend the old Russia and died ignominiously abroad; the other one had won to perish in repressions. This is a hard issue for national conscience. But it is time to bid farewell to the Civil War through discussion, at least deep within us, and fill this void in history.

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 #8
Moscow Times
September 4, 2015
Russians Must Open Up and Think Long Term
By Ivan Sukhov
Ivan Sukhov is a journalist who has covered conflicts in Russia and the CIS for the past 15 years.

Russian media could not ignore the recent survey by state-run pollster VTsIOM measuring Russians' attitudes toward the United States. The headlines in almost every pro-Kremlin and even opposition publication declared that Russians consider the U.S. an immoral and unspiritual country.

However, the survey results that were sent to news commentators across the country actually showed that only 15 percent of respondents hold that view. Though that is clearly more than felt that way 20 years ago when enthusiasm over the fall of the Iron Curtain was at its highest, it is hardly a figure that justifies such categorical headlines. Only 15 percent of those questioned consider the U.S. immoral and unspiritual - not all Russians, and nowhere close to a majority.

The results from even Russia's major sociological research centers such as the pro-Kremlin VTsIOM and the more independent Levada Center no longer inspire confidence. Even their staffers admit that the quality and accuracy of their work has fallen lately. And one reason for the decline is that fewer Russians agree to respond to their surveys.

Field workers must now knock on approximately seven times as many doors as before to find a home whose residents are willing to answer their questions. Nobody - not sociologists, government officials or fellow Russians - know what those reticent citizens are thinking.

The result is that any diagnosis of Russian society involves so much guesswork that Western sociologists no longer put any faith in the "big data" coming out of this country.

Even the idea that 86 percent of the population supports President Vladimir Putin and 14 percent opposes him is little more than a theory that has gained currency in both domestic and foreign media through the force of repetition, but that lacks any grounding in empirical data.

Even the survey on attitudes toward the U.S., although it seems like an attempt to either confirm or deny a certain sociological hypothesis, is based on nothing more than a propagandistic ploy.

Many might believe just the opposite, that Russians are even more anti-U.S. than popularly reported and that most residents in single-industry towns hardest hit by the current crisis, and who now earn the equivalent of $120 per month at the current exchange rate, would gladly jump into the cockpit of a tank or fighter plane to combat hostile U.S. imperialism.

However, too much evidence exists to the contrary.

For example, "sources familiar with the situation" occasionally claim that Russia has 50,000 volunteers in the Donbass. However, that is ridiculously few from a country of 145 million that is inundated with anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western propaganda day and night.

Also, hundreds of thousands of people must resolve the practical task of protecting their incomes and savings as the value of the ruble declines. Most who convert their money into dollars and euros have never visited Europe or the United States. Perhaps they watch the state-controlled Channel One, vote for Putin and believe that Russia's actions in Crimea are absolutely right.

But at the right moment they shake off the cobwebs of propaganda and pragmatically opt to buy U.S. dollars so as to purchase that new furniture set before the ruble price goes through the roof.

The very fact that Russians are wondering what to do with what little savings they have shows that the economic culture has changed from what it was even 10 years ago. Sociologists have identified some of those changes in attitude, but not all, in part because they did not always know which questions to pose.

The only thing we can say with certainty about Russian society is that it differs significantly from the picture painted of it by state-controlled television.

If to look only at television reports, it is very difficult to shake the feeling of impending disaster. It even seems strange that the street is not full of columns of angry uniformed men carrying torches and marching to the attack.

There is no official data to indicate just how universal this sense of disaster is. That feeling might be confined to people interested in political science and modern political history, or the general population might feel it also. Any chance conversation with Russian people - at a moment when they are not watching televised state propaganda - reveals the true level of frustration over the current crisis and uncertainty in the future.

The tendency among many Russians to expect the end of the world stems from modern and recent Russian history. It is a tragic story with millions of war victims, exile, famine and prison camps. However, other countries have also experienced such tragedies. The difference is that Russia has not yet come to terms with its most tumultuous upheavals.

Historians relate the events of 1917, the Russian Civil War, the purges of the 1930s, the war with Nazi Germany and the Soviet collapse in 1991, but the deeper reasons for them and their psychological and social consequences have yet to find a place in the national consensus. The result is that Russians see their past as a vaguely horrific time, and because its underlying causes and effects remain so little understood, Russians have a vague dread that the same events might repeat themselves in the future.

That is why an increasing number of Russians are trying to escape impending disaster by taking flight - either by moving abroad, or for those without means, by moving away from the capital city.

However, the more people leave, the less chance remains to avert a disaster.

It is possible to reverse the negative trend. Russians need to understand their history and know themselves. They - we - sit in our Moscow apartments and plan our escape because we fear the people on the street below. We are alienated from each other. It is as if the Middle Ages never ended.

Our experience shows that our fears are not unfounded. But it also shows that those fears might be exaggerated.

The only way to find out how things really stand is to get to know and build bridges between each other. That is much simpler than rethinking national history. What's more, it does not require any special effort.

When a person gets cold, he can warm himself by focusing his thoughts away from the cold and taking long, deep breaths. In the same way, Russians need to shift their thoughts away from some impending disaster and take a longer-term approach to life than a focus on the opening and closing ruble exchange rate each day.

It helps to get into that broader rhythm now, at the start of the school year. I, for example, started school in 1983, in the post-Brezhnev period of the Soviet Union at the peak of the Cold War. I graduated in 1993, in what had become a completely different country and a radically changed world.

Hundreds of thousands of Russian children started school on Sept. 1. They will also graduate in what will be a completely different national and international environment. Even now, Russia is not the country we see portrayed on state-controlled television.

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 #9
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
September 3, 2015
TROIKA REPORT: Negotiations on Ukraine are a marriage of convenience
By Sergey Strokan and Vladimir Mikheev

1. Engaging the West
Negotiations on Ukraine: a marriage of convenience amid new crisis
 
A stormy session in Ukraine's parliament this week while debating the proposed decentralization of governance in the eastern Donbass region, followed by a bloody riot in Kiev, signaled a new round of the political turmoil in Ukraine this week.

The unrest presents a serious risk of another change of government and the ousting of Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko. This could bury the Minsk peace accord hammered out by Ukraine, Germany, France, and Russia in February.

The violence in Kiev has accentuated the crucial importance of international mediation and could give new impetus to Russia's participation in talks on the resolution of the crisis. With Ukrainian radicals vehemently opposed to any form of autonomy for the rebel regions in the Donbass and the ruling coalition in danger of collapse, Poroshenko has little room for maneuver, and, willing or not, has to rely on the support of Berlin and Paris.

Last week the leaders of France and Germany took the initiative into their hands by conducting trilateral talks with Poroshenko with the apparent aim to accelerate the implementation of the Minsk agreements. Russian President Vladimir Putin was pointedly not invited to the talks.

In the aftermath of the meeting, called in the wake of a new upsurge in violence in eastern Ukraine, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President François Hollande phoned Putin to tell him that the elections planned by the rebels would endanger the Minsk peace process. In return, Putin voiced his concern over what he alleged was a massive Ukrainian army build-up on the borders of the self-proclaimed republics of Donetsk and Lugansk.

Skeptics claim there is no chance of the Minsk accords being implemented by December. Is such pessimism justified? Prominent political analyst and public figure Sergei Stankevich, a senior expert with the Anatoly Sobchak Foundation, made this comment for Troika Report:

"The most important recent development was that the essence of the conflict has changed. Previously, it was a conflict with separatists. Now it is a conflict with "autonomists" since the leaders of Donetsk and Lugansk have declared as their goal to become autonomous republics or an autonomous region within Ukraine.

"This means that a critically important political compromise is possible. It means no secession, no separatism. The key topic of negotiations will be the volume of autonomous rights. Russia should now concentrate the talks on this issue: the amount of autonomous rights."

"The European powers, Germany and France, should approach Poroshenko and promote this idea of an autonomous status of Donbass inside Ukraine. President Poroshenko cannot insist on this solution without serious external support because of very serious internal opposition. Radical nationalist forces oppose any special status for the self-proclaimed republics of the Donbass."

Despite growing criticism of the effectiveness of the Minsk peace process, which is being supervised by four negotiating parties, this format of conflict resolution has not yet passed its expiry date. Why are the leaders of Germany, France and Russia reluctant to abandon this model? Sergei Markedonov, associate professor at the Russian State University for the Humanities, offered his explanation to Troika Report:

"First of all, this situation is paradoxical. Until now, the Minsk agreement is the only document which incorporates different views. Russia and the Western states refer to this agreement as the basis of conflict resolution. But the warring parties are pursuing divergent goals that are incompatible; what's more, they want to maximize their gains.

"However, neither of them have the appropriate resources to achieve these goals. This is another reason why Russia and the two Western powers are pinning their hopes on the Minsk accords. There is a faint chance that a compromise could be reached but the warring parties might still disrupt the peace process in pursuit of their interests."

- We are witnessing a relatively sustained ceasefire, or at least the absence of large-scale armed clashes in the Donbass. Can this be assessed as a minor achievement of the peace talks?

"Basically, I agree. Neither of the conflict parties has the resources to achieve an undisputed victory. It compels them to seek a settlement through negotiations."

"But it is necessary to discuss in parallel with conflict resolution in Donbass the basic principles of European security. I suppose that the engagement of Russia would be a good chance to ensure a stable and predictable security situation (in Europe).

"The legacy of the Cold War calling for 'Russia - out!' is not effective, and the crisis in Ukraine has proved it... Russia does not believe in European security based solely on NATO and NATO enlargement towards the East. Russia wants to be part of the security arrangements in Europe. It we want a fundamental settlement over the Donbass, we should focus on European security in general."

- Do you suggest that Russia and other European nations should discuss the future security architecture on the continent?

"Yes, European crises - the conflict in Donbass and the conflict over the status of Crimea - were the consequences of a vacuum in security arrangements. Europe was perceived as a stable and predictable region but this was not true. The war in the Balkans demonstrated this. Just like the enlargement of NATO, the war in Georgia in 2008, and the protracted conflicts in the Caucasus and Moldova. This time it is the crisis in Ukraine which showed the vulnerability of Europe.

"In my mind, it is mandatory to resolve the conflict in Ukraine within a broader context. Or else we will have a repetition of such crises... It would be sensible to realize two goals: tactical - the resolution of the conflict in Donbass, and strategic - ensure European security in the long-term perspective."

Troika Report shares the view that Moscow, Berlin and Paris seem to be putting aside their differences, having consented to a "marriage of convenience," and are continuing to make concerted efforts to prevent a return to open hostilities in the Donbass, at least, and, hopefully, facilitate the gradual return of Ukraine to normality. As diplomats say, it gives ground for "cautious optimism."
 
2. Globally speaking
WWII: What does failure of Allies to attend Beijing ceremony mean?
 
China's grand celebration of the 70th anniversary of the final victory in World War II could have become a moment of truth and unity for world powers, but it did not.
At the biggest military parade in the history of China on Sept. 3 the seats reserved for Western leaders were empty, just like in May in Moscow. Among the 30 dignitaries, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, there was not a single Western leader in attendance representing the Allies.

Why? Could this be a sign that divergence of interests and goals among the major world powers is contributing to a growing instability in regional and global affairs? The time-dishonored historical rivalries have surged forth once again, thus threatening the gradual progress of the nations of northeast Asia toward more civilized societies and orderly inter-state relations.

The tense territorial disputes around the South China Sea, plans to amend the peace-focused constitution of Japan, China's challenge to the ownership of the Tokyo-controlled Senkaku Islands, the build-up of the U.S. military presence in the region - all of these adverse developments give grounds for anxiety. Taken in historical context, it runs counter to the spirit of cooperation and search for compromises that triumphed for a short period of time in the aftermath of WWII.

Could the lessons of WWII be overlooked and willingly neglected without retribution from history, which is known to be such a rigid schoolmaster?

For Russia and China, the casualties of WWII remain an irretrievable demographic damage to be felt through many generations yet to come. Just for the record: while United Kingdom and United States lost fewer than one million (450,900 + 418,500) during the conflict, the death toll suffered by the Soviet Union and China is appalling in its scale: 25-28 million and almost 35 million, respectively. The price of freedom for the USSR and China was far too great to forget.

Does the legacy of WWII have the same impact on other major players in world politics? Was absence of Western leaders in Beijing a sign that the founding fathers of the post-war world order stand more disunited than ever? Yury Tavrovsky, professor of the Moscow-based Friendship University and a well-known Russian expert on China, made this comment for Troika Report:

"I think it's a great mistake of the West and, in particular of the United States, to stage this boycott of the celebrations in China. It is the first time that the Chinese are celebrating their victory. It's a turning point in the mood in society. The Chinese for 70 years remembered the war as a victim nation. They would remember the 300,000 people killed in Nanjing, the 35 million who died during the war.

"But a couple years ago the Chinese started to talk about themselves as a victor nation. They did not capitulate as the French did. For 14 years they were fighting off the Japanese troops. They won the war. The absence in Beijing of the leaders of the Allied nations is a great insult for the Chinese, and a big mistake."

The symbolism of Russian President Vladimir Putin standing side by side with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping on Tiananmen Square will not be lost on the Western powers which have chosen the policy of "containment" of both nations, emphasized Tavrovsky. This solemn public appearance by the two leaders will underline the present strategic partnership, without turning it into a formal alliance, and bring the two nations even closer.

Yet, neither the personal chemistry of the two leaders, nor the enhanced cooperation and the upward trend in bilateral relations are projected on creating an environment of trust and understanding across northeast Asia that would pave the way to setting up something of a regional security mechanism.

Today, the Pacific Rim is not only the driver of global growth but also the scene of political discord and an arms race of unprecedented proportions. The multiple controversies over islands in the South China Sea have a global dimension since about a third of global crude oil and half of global liquid natural gas trade passes through these waters.

While more assertive Beijing pressures Tokyo over the Senkaku Islands (claimed by China), conservatives within the political class in Japan insist on revising the constitution to enable the armed forces to conduct "overseas" operations. However, in an unprecedented display of public protest, tens of thousands of ordinary folk in Japan have been demonstrating in the streets under slogans such as "War is over!" Opinion polls show that 70 percent of Japanese citizens are against a proactive military doctrine.

The escalation of the build-up of armed forces in Asia is worrisome and detrimental to efforts to set up an effective system of checks and balances in the region, which is prone to heightened tensions and, lately, has been balancing, in the case of the two Koreas, on the brink of an open military conflict. Hopefully, this worrying disregard of the lessons of the past, resembling a kind of collective amnesia, will not produce a sequel to WWII.
 
3. Going Eastward
Moscow seeks full integration into Asia, but what can it offer?
 
Three months after the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum saw Russia attempting to build bridges with European partners despite Western sanctions, the Eastern Economic Forum is being staged in the city port of Vladivostok. Aimed at opening windows of opportunities, the forum, in a wider context, is meant to flesh out and inject life into Russia's widely proclaimed but not yet substantiated policy of its "pivot to Asia."

The Vladivostok forum is being positioned as a twin to the St. Petersburg event. Is this a well-grounded comparison? What are the stakes for Moscow in the context of its "pivot to Asia"? Dmitry Mosyakov, an expert in regional affairs and head of South East Asia section of the Institute of Oriental Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences, made the following comment for Troika Report:

"The comparison is justified, although the forum in St. Petersburg is already a well-established and widely acclaimed platform while the Vladivostok gathering has still all the characteristics of a start-up. Nevertheless, the latter is gaining momentum and credibility. Above all, it has the potential to turn into an effective mechanism for bringing together partners from East Asia and Southeast Asia.

"The initiative of putting together the Vladivostok platform of business dialogue has the advantage over previous enterprises due to a key element: For once, discussions and negotiations on the sidelines of the forum directly involve local, small and medium size businesses, meaning those registered and operating in the Russian Far East. It should be noted that the main drivers of growth in Northeast and Southeast Asia are clusters of small and medium-sized enterprises. Finally, Russia and its business are entering well-chosen and lucrative niche markets."

Mosyakov placed high emphasis on the still hidden appeal of the so-called Advanced Development Territories in the Russian Far East. These territories are expected to play up to the expectations of low-risk investors keen to capitalize on the preferential treatment guaranteed by the Russian government. This will hopefully amount to a traditional set of attractive terms and conditions for doing business under a foreign jurisdiction, including tax holidays, moderate basic production costs, facilitated repatriation of revenues and profits, etc.

Nevertheless, the expert community in Moscow has conflicting views on the apparent opportunities opening up in the Far East. Since the early 1990s, Russia has been attempting to attract investors and partners from Asia's economic powerhouses, but to little avail. Will the Vladivostok forum deliver anything more than upbeat declarations and vague promises? Andrei Fedorov, former First Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia, voiced careful skepticism in an interview with Troika Report:

"Everything depends on what Russia can offer to potential investors. I was in Japan not long ago and talked to businesspeople who complained that there are still too many legislative problems."

"I am rather skeptical of the concept of the Advanced Development Territories, which is still merely a project not backed by a legal framework. It is an attempt to attract investors but the concept is still underdeveloped."

True enough, the huge challenge is to complement the current long-term deals for the supply of primary resources like oil, gas, metals, coal, etc. to customers in Asia with delivery of goods with high added value, joint R&D and production, and also not commodity-based but services-focused trade.

The prospects of a soft and swift integration into Asian markets are being dimmed by the current turbulence affecting the Russian economy, especially the volatility of the ruble's value against other currencies. This is epitomized by the dramatic downturn in economic interaction with China. Trade turnover crashed through the floor in the first half of 2015 with a 30 percent drop while Chinese exports nosedived by 36 percent. Tellingly, Russia is no longer one of China's top 10 trade partners.

Statistics for 2014 provide a basis for moderately optimistic forecasts - industrial production in the region surged by 5.3 percent and agriculture production by 18.7 percent, both the highest growth rate in the Russian Federation. However, much has changed since then, and for the Russian Far East, which has been relatively disregarded for too long, a lengthy "catching up" period is inevitable.

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 #10
Wall Street Journal
September 4, 2015
Russia Says Economy Recovery Slow in Coming
Finance Ministry predicts return to growth only late this year or early next
By ANDREY OSTROUKH

MOSCOW-The Russian government acknowledged on Thursday that the country's economy is going to take longer to recover than it previously expected, weighed down by the slump in the value of the ruble.

Russia's Deputy Finance Minister Alexei Moiseyev said Thursday that the economy, also battered by a drop in oil prices and Western sanctions, will return to growth no earlier than in late 2015 or next year.

The latest forecast from the finance ministry follows a recent drop in prices for oil and gas, Russia's key exports. Oil prices have tumbled to levels not seen since March 2009 with prices of other industrial commodities on which the country is reliant, such as nickel, also on the slide. Despite calls from many quarters to diversify away from commodities, Russia has made little progress over the years.

Previously, the finance ministry said the economy might start recovering in mid-2015. Moscow's new pessimism contrasts with claims that the worst of the economic and financial crisis was over, made by President Vladimir Putin and other top officials in May when oil prices returned to nearly $70 per barrel.

Deteriorating economic indicators suggest more downside risks for the economy which shrank 4.6% in the second quarter compared with the same quarter year ago.

The end of the economic recession is nowhere in sight, said Higher School of Economics, a Moscow-based think tank. The firm's composite leading ondicator, or CLI, fell to -4.4 in August from -3.6 in July, remaining in negative territory for the ninth month in a row.

"Dynamics of the CLI suggest that Russia's economic output will fall behind last year levels, while the weak domestic demand will be hampering the economy's return into the growth trend for a long period," HSE said in a report.

Surveys of Russian purchasing managers also showed this week that manufacturing and services sectors contracted in August, buffeted by the weak and volatile ruble.

The ruble has lost 45% of its value over the past year, amid Western sanctions, imposed after Russia's annexation of Crimea last year, and weak oil prices. In turn, these forces have curbed investment activity and dented consumer demand, while spurring inflation.

The mix of high inflation and economic recession poses a conundrum for the central bank, which is now seen leaving interest rates unchanged at its board meeting on September 11 after slashing the cost of borrowing five times so far this year.

Data showed this week that consumer prices rose slightly in late August on a weekly basis, something of a surprise as prices usually go down in summer when supplies of fruit and vegetables are plentiful. At an annual rate, inflation is running high, up at 15.7% in August from 15.6% in July. Given all this, the Bank of Russia is unlikely to cut rates again next week, Raiffeisen bank said in a note to clients.

Mr. Moiseyev said that his ministry is waiting for oil prices to stabilize at some level for at least a few weeks before it will be able present forecast for the ruble exchange rate, which still has chances to recover in the first half of 2016.

In the afternoon trading on the Moscow exchange, the ruble weakened 0.7% to 67.56 versus the dollar, heading toward its weakest ever closing level of nearly 71 rubles per dollar hit last week.

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 #11
US sanctions against Russia as weapon of economic warfare
By Lyudmila ALEXANDROVA

MOSCOW, September 3. /TASS/. US sanctions against Russia are not just a tool of political pressure on Russia, but also a weapon of economic warfare, many Russian analysts say with certainty. It is not accidental that the industries that have been most successful in competing with their US counterparts on the world market are the hardest-hit.

Reports of ever more US sanctions against Russia have been pouring in with amazing regularity. On Wednesday, the United States declared sanctions against five Russian manufacturers within the defence-industrial complex. This time for reasons other than the situation in Ukraine. Washington accused them of violating US nuclear non-proliferation legislation. The arms exporter Rosoboronexport, the Instrument Engineering Design Bureau in Tula, the manufacturer of optical-electronic equipment Katod, aircraft corporation MiG and the military-industrial corporation NPO Mashinostroyeniya are suspected of selling military items on the prohibited list. Alongside Russian companies their counterparts in Iran, China, North Korea, the United Arab Emirates, Syria, Sudan and Turkey have come under restrictions.

On the same day the news arrived the US Department of Commerce specified the earlier adopted sanctions over the conflict in Ukraine to have spread them to the subsidiaries of Rosneft and a number of other companies.

The chairman of the council of experts at the research ideas support fund Eurasian Ideas' Workshop, Grigory Trofimchyuk, says some very competitive enterprises have been selected.

"It was done in order to put pressures on Russia on the international market of military hardware," the portal Aktualnyie Kommentarii (Topical Commentaries) quotes him as saying.

Trofimchyuk sees no chance sanctions may be lifted from Russia in the foreseeable future.

"This process will keep going on and on," he said.

All these sanctions are very serious and they are bound to last, the editor-in-chief of the Odnako.Eurasia portal, Semyon Uralov agrees. "It is enough to take a look at the companies the restrictions are targeted against," the Svobodnaya Pressa (Free Press) portal quotes him as saying. "There are very many names in arms manufacturing and machine-building. It's a trading and economic war, launched with the aim to hamstring high value-added industries. Sanctions are just another name for the "good old" trading and economic wars and blockades, which have in fact never ceased since the trading and financial capital emerged in the 16th century."

"The defence industry cluster is well-expected target for sanctions. It represents one of the most capital-intensive industries of all," assistant professor at the presidential academy RANEPA, Kira Sazonova, told TASS.

Europe's stance on the issue is more reserved. Its economic losses resulting from the introduction of Russia's counter-sanctions are way above those of the United States, she said.

"France's fiasco in the Mistral amphibious assault ships affair and the payment of a considerable compensation is a clear sign the Europeans sometimes have to pay dearly for the benevolent attitude of their overseas partners," Sazonova said.

"The US sanctions are a tool the United States has been using to press for its national interests, and its interests are both political and economic," says the director of the Centre of Political Studies, Sergey Markov. "The economic ones prevail. Therefore the sanctions are in the first place expected to oust Russian arms manufacturers from the world markets. This is the end aim. I suspect that US military-industrial complex tycoons have been using the available lobbying leverage to the full extent to ensure Russian competitors should be blacklisted whenever there is the slightest suspicion."

Markov agrees that the latest measures are a clear sign "no cancellation of sanctions against Russia is due."

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 #12
http://gordonhahn.com
September 2, 2015
Putin Achieves Political Draw in Sanctions War with Europe
By Gordon M. Hahn
Gordon M. Hahn is an Analyst and Advisory Board Member of the Geostrategic Forecasting Corporation, Chicago, Illinois; Senior Researcher, Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies (CETIS), Akribis Group, San Jose, California Analyst/Consultant, Russia Other Points of View - Russia Media Watch; and Senior Researcher and Adjunct Professor, MonTREP, Monterey, California.

In November the European Union's (EU) policy towards Ukraine helped spark the greatest international crisis in Europe since World War II. EU refusal to coordinate its eastward expansion with Moscow, especially to Ukraine, gave greater impetus to the already intensifying Western-Russian 'great game' for hegemony over that divided country and the remaining non-aligned states in Eastern Europe and to Russia's south. The watershed in the winner-takes-all game for Eastern Europe was made inevitable by NATO expansion begun in 1997 and destined to come in Ukraine, with its geostrategic importance, significant population, market, natural resources, and long-standing ties with Moscow. The Ukrainian showdown was made even more inevitable, if you will, and imminent by the 2008 NATO summit's declaration that Ukraine and Georgia would one day become NATO members, followed months later by the Georgian-Ossetiyan/Russian war and Russia's route of the NATO-trained Georgian army.

By supporting an illegal seizure of power spearheaded by neo-fascists groups within the larger Ukrainian pro-Western opposition and potentially revolutionary movement and in clear violation of a Russian-EU brokered transition pact to resolve the regime crisis, Washington and Brussels through down the gauntlet before the Kremlin. With this, Russian President Vladimir Putin had little choice but to salvage Russian interests and annex Crimea - home to its Black Sea Fleet and a population 80 percent ethnic Russian in favor of reunification with Russia - in answer to Washington's Kiev demarche. For similar strategic and ethnopolitical reasons Putin also had little choice but to back the Donbass revolt against Kiev.

Effectively countered as in the 2008 Georgian debacle, the West could ill afford another geopolitical defeat at Russia's hands or direct military conflict with Moscow. Therefore, the West changed tactics and initiated economic sanctions directly against Russia.  Moscow responded with lesser sanctions against the West; the war evolved into a semi-frozen conflict after two Minsk ceasefire agreements, and there we stand.

The problem with any set of sanctions is that it prevents two, not one, from tangoing. Any trade relationship is a two-way- street. Stop one party from trading, and that party's trade partners suffer no less. The comparative advantage lies in the potential that the target country of any sanctions regime suffers from each denied or cancelled contract, while the pain on the other side is divided up among many countries.

However, in the case of the sanctions against Russia, Europe is carrying the brunt of the regime implementation. It has more trade with Russian than any other entity implementing the sanctions. By contrast, the promoter of sanctions against Russia, the U.S., has very little trade with Russia. The American industry with the largest percentage export to Russia is the chicken industry, exporting 8 percent of its produce to Russia, the industry's second largest buyer.

The EU's economy might be seen as divided into 28 separate economies, but that reality went out the window with the EU's formation. Europe has created a common market and political union, and therefore the strain of implementing the sanctions regime settles in good part on the EU, not the individual EU member country level.

It is well-known that Russia has suffered from Western sanctions, though most economists, east and west, agree that the brunt of the hit on the Russian economy has not been the sanctions but rather the fall in oil prices. Less well-known is the shambles Ukraine's economy has been left in as a result of the civil war and Ukraine's declining volume of trade with its closest trading partner - Russia. Even less well-known is the substantial cost of sanctions to Europe's economy. There were dire warnings from reputable economic and trade analysts that mutual sanctions could spark a global recession. ""The worst case scenario could be very dark-surging energy prices, crumbling stock prices, and much weaker trade and foreign direct investment," said Mark Zandi, chief economist at Moody's Analytics, in 2014 (www.newrepublic.com/article/117139/sanctions-against-russia-could-cause-global-recession-ukraine).

The Boomerang Effect

Der Speigel called the hit on Germany's economy taken from the sanctions' "boomerang effect," but it is really more like cutting a bungie cord held by two people; it snaps back on both sides to hit both of the people holding it on the nose. What has been the effect of the West's sanctions on Russia on the EU's economic performance? Regarding the former, almost all economists agree that the bulk of the Russian economic downturn is due to falling price of oil and indeed that the decline began in 2012 - before the Ukrainian crisis - with the fall in the oil price.

Similarly, while there other factors contributing to Europe's economic deceleration - bureaucracy, the Greece crisis, falling Chinese demand - a major cause is the set of mutual sanctions between Russia and the West intensely involving the EU. By 2014 most of Europe's largest industrial sector (manufacturing, energy, high technology) companies were experiencing contract cancellations, planned cancellations of contracts or projects with Russian companies, and declining Russian demand as a result of the Western-imposed sanctions. Companies included: Adidas, Siemens, EagleBurgmann, RhineMetall, Fraport, Daimler, retailer MetroAG (www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/07/us-ukraine-crisis-companies-idUSKBN0G70OR20140807). The list shows (all but Adidas are German companies) that the driver of the EU economy, Germany, was perhaps the most exposed, conducting a disportionate share of EU trade with Russia.

Sweden reported losses of 1.5 billion crowns in just the first quarter of 2015 as a result of the sanctions, including the rejection of 89 applications for export to Russia, including coal mining, construction, and lumber industry as a result of Russia's retaliatory sanctions and broader effort to rely on its domestic market through an aggressive import-substitution policy.  (http://eer.ru/a/article/u123253/03-08-2015/33601).

Russia's Agriculture Sanctions

By far, the most serious consequences of Russia's reverse sanctions have been felt in European agriculture. In August 2014, Russia embargoed several categories of food products from the European Union, the United States, Canada, Australia and Norway, including dairy, beef, lamb, pork, vegetables, and fish. Prior to Russia's ban, EU agriculture held 80 percent of Russia's dairy market. EU Agriculture Commissioner Phillip Hogan said in August that Russia's ban on imports on EU dairy had led to a slump in demand and sharp drop in payments to EU dairy farmers (www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3212177/How-Russia-hurts-UK-dairy-farmers.html). French pig farmers estimate that Russia's embargo has led to a loss of almost a billion euros. Germany's large agricultural sector is taking a hit; German cheese prices have hit a six year low. Eastern Europe's largest economy, Poland, has been hit by Russia's agricultural produce embargo. Warsaw saw its control of Russia's apple import market completely eliminated, prompting Polish officials to accuse France of undermining European solidarity over Paris's then planned sale of two Mistral warships to Russia and other trade arrangements. That issue was 'resolved' when Russia decided to cancel the warship deal and demand return of $ 1.2 billion euro payment.

The Dairy and Milk Crises

A general milk crisis has been sparked, though theRussian embargo is not the only factor in its making; EU milk deregulation and overproduction and declining exports to China are also factors. Deregulation through the lifting of national quotas for milk production has created a common but declining milk industry in combination with Russia's dairy embargo. The German Farmers' Union estimates that the Russian embargo accounts for 20-30 percent of the recent decline in global milk prices to a 30 year low.

Less diverse and powerful EU economies have been hit even harder. Radio Sweden warned last month of a global milk crisis, noting that "the current crisis is regarded as one of the most serious in the last 40 years." The current price of 2.65 krona (about 30 cents US) is below the 3.60-3.70 krona (41-42 cents) necessary for Swedish dairy farmers to make a profit, and four out of five may face bankruptcy if the situation does not improve over the next six months. In Denmark, 86 percent of farmers are facing a "similar" "critical situation" to those in Sweden, according Association of Swedish Farmers Jonas Carlsberg, who complained it was wrong "that farmers must pay for political decisions." Sweden's milk producer Arla reported 1 billion Swedish crowns in losses in August 2014 alone (http://eer.ru/a/article/u123253/03-08-2015/33601).

Czech dairy farmers have lost export of 500 tons of butter and 1,500 tons of powdered milk to the Russian market. The Baltic states' entire dairy industry could collapse. Estonia has seen a 30 percent decline in producer prices, with its milk exports falling by 17 percent in the first quarter of 2015. Lithuanian agriculture has faced a 30 percent year-on-year decline in exports in mid-2015. Local experts warn Lithuania may be forced to reduce the production of dairy products by 50 percent in the near future. The hits taken by individual EU members can redound to the EU as a whole. Thus, Vilnius is set to appeal to the EU Agriculture Commissioner for 32 million euros to bolster its agriculture industry. In general, Lithuania is the country most vulnerable to Russian sanctions, where exports of the Russia-banned agricultural products comprise 2.5% of the country's GDP (http://marketrealist.com/2014/08/russian-sanctions-impact-businesses-positively-negatively/).

Conclusion

When sanctions began, the EU estimated that by themselves its Russia sanctions, initiated well into 2014, would take 0.2-0.3 percent points bite out of EU economic growth that year alone. Therefore, they should take at least 0.3 percent points in 2015 (no estimate available yet). Add in Russia's sanctions against the EU, and we should be talking about a full one percent hit on the EU economy in 2015 (www.wsj.com/articles/eu-projects-impact-of-sanctions-on-russian-economy-1414583901). A recent EU projection sees its own economic growth for 2015 at an anemic 1.7 percent. This is a dismal outlook and not so very far from recession.

At the same time, the EU projected Russia's growth rate would fall by 0.6 percentage points from the expected growth rate to 1 percent growth in 2014 and fall by 1.1 percentage points producing 2% economic growth in 2015 as a result of EU sanctions alone (www.wsj.com/articles/eu-projects-impact-of-sanctions-on-russian-economy-1414583901). By more recent estimates, the Russia's GDP is set to contract by 3.6 percent, the median forecast of 40 economists in a Bloomberg survey, and grow by 0.5 percent in 2016 (Anna Andrianova and Olga Tanas, "Russia Faces Reality With Prediction of Deeper Economic Slump," Bloomberg, August 25, 2015). But again, much of this is the result oil price decline, not Western sanctions. It is also a result of the boomerang effect from its own sanctions against the West.

In June, the Russian government extended the embargo until August 2016 in response to the EU's extension of sanctions against Russia. Ukraine's depression, Russia's recession, anemic European and American growth, war across the Muslim world, and now China's economic crisis are all effecting energy demand and consequently oil prices. In particular, the Ukraine-centered Russian-West sanctions war is playing a key role in falling energy demand, further hitting the Ukrainian and Russian economies. This requires more Western bailouts for Ukraine and threatens more Russian sanctions against the West and so on and so on.

In sum, although the West appears to have been hit less by the sanctions regimes tha has Russia, it has taken a significant hit, particularly in Europe and some its weakest economies. So the West has scored a technical win. Ultimately, however, the sanctions have produced a political draw - recall Putin's astronomical approval ratings - that is hardly able to force the Kremlin to surrender Russian national interests and security in Ukraine.

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#13
Christian Science Monitor
September 3, 2015
Putin showcases Russia's pivot to Asia as he visits China for WWII parade
As he visits for China's World War II 70th anniversary military parade Thursday, the Russian president hopes to stabilize a relationship roiled by economic problems in both countries.
By Fred Weir, Correspondent

MOSCOW - President Vladimir Putin is in Beijing to help China mark victory over Japan in World War II with a huge military parade that is being largely boycotted by Western leaders, just as Russia's own VE Day extravaganza was last May.

For Mr. Putin, it is another opportunity to showcase Moscow's "pivot to the east" in the face of Western sanctions and opprobrium over his Ukraine policies. His point: that Russia has economic alternatives and belongs to a wider geopolitical community of nations that is increasingly at odds with Western global leadership.

But as he made clear in an extensive interview with TASS before embarking for China, one of Putin's key goals will be to stabilize the relationship with Beijing at a turbulent moment when Chinese stock markets have crashed and economic slowdown looms, prices for Russian energy exports are tanking, and Russia's own economic troubles are posing unexpected challenges even for willing Chinese investors.

"The current outlook is not good," says Alexander Gabuyev, an expert with the Carnegie Center in Moscow. "In particular, Russian hopes of attracting lots of investment from China in a fairly short period of time are not going anywhere."

Trade between Russia and China has fallen by about a third this year, and seems unlikely to reach the $100 billion goal announced by Putin and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang just a year ago. Hopes that a 30-year, $400-billion deal inked last year to pipe Russian gas from the far east to China would be finalized during Putin's current visit to Beijing have dimmed, while a second pipeline project from western Siberia appears to have been shelved over pricing disputes.

Still, Chinese thirst for Russian energy has been growing nonstop, and increased by 20 percent over the past summer.

"The problem is that while the volume of our oil exports to China has gone up, the income we get from it has fallen by a third due to depressed global prices," says Mr. Gabuyev. "And nobody knows where that's headed, so a lot of talk about pipelines, and Chinese investment in Russian oilfields as well, is on hold."

The energy price issue has been a major sticking point in getting these big projects off the ground, even when - barely a year ago - oil prices were over $100 per barrel. Now, as prices have slumped, it's increasingly a buyer's market.

The postponements in energy deals with China must be particularly galling for Putin, who last year ordered a review of Russia's China policy. That led to removing several former "taboos," such as allowing Chinese investment in big Russian infrastructure projects and strategic resources like oilfields, and accepting the need for Russia-China cooperation in former Soviet Central Asia. Yet due to economic uncertainty in Russia, the plunging ruble, and now China's economic worries, the hoped-for Chinese gold rush is not happening.

One idea to unblock energy negotiations, reportedly under discussion, would be to decouple Russian energy exports from global prices - which are denoted in US dollars - and sell oil and gas to China in yuan, with with prices tied to domestic rates.

As China moves toward market prices for domestic users, this move might also serve the political goal championed in Moscow and Beijing of weaning their trade from dependence on the dollar, says Alexander Salitsky, an expert with the Institute of World Economy and Economic Relations, the Russian government's main foreign policy think tank.

"People are pointing to the fact that deals aren't being finalized this week as a dire sign," he says. "But Putin is going back to China in October, and all these issues are very much still on the table. There's no reason the pricing issue can't be solved to Russia's satisfaction, and it seems that China would very much like to be able to buy oil and gas in yuan. They have a strategic aim of internationalizing their currency, and doing this would stabilize the energy prices with Russia."

Key deals still on track

Aside from energy, big infrastructure projects that have been agreed to between Russia and China still appear to be on track. They include a Chinese commitment to help finance a Moscow-Kazan high speed rail link in time for the Russia-hosted 2018 soccer World Cup. The line might eventually be extended all the way to Beijing, lowering the rail time between Moscow and the Chinese capital time from six days to 36 hours.

Another big project, under construction, is a superhighway from China to Europe, crossing Kazakhstan, Russia, and Belarus. Yet another, still in the talking stage, is a joint venture between Russia's United Aircraft Corp. and China's Comac to develop a wide-bodied passenger jet to compete with Boeing and Airbus in far-flung Asian markets.

"All political rhetoric aside, the basic idea of greater political and economic integration between Russia and China is a still a perfectly sound one," says Mr. Salitsky. "It's starting to happen, even if immediate results are not what was advertised."
 

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#14
Wall Street Journal
September 4, 2015
Putin Pitches for Foreign Investment in Russia's Far East
Russia turns to China to develop its remote but resource-rich region, despite recent market turmoil
By NATHAN HODGE

VLADIVOSTOK, Russia-Russian President Vladimir Putin made a pitch Friday for greater investment in his country's resource-rich Far East region, despite a slowdown in the Chinese economy that has shaken global markets.

Speaking at the Eastern Economic Forum in the port city of Vladivostok, Mr. Putin said the Russian government would create the "best conditions for domestic and foreign investors to conduct business-so that in performance and return on capital, the Russian Far East can successfully compete with leading business centers."

In May, Mr. Putin ordered the creation of the forum to encourage new investment in the region. Russian officials say they want to attract investors from China, Japan and South Korea to develop the region's economic potential and deepen trade ties with the Asia-Pacific region.

"The Far East is open for everybody who is ready to cooperate," Mr. Putin said.

The Russian president followed his speech with a visit to a showpiece project, the under-construction Primorsky Aquarium, with members of a Chinese delegation and the actor Steven Seagal in tow.

The Kremlin's economic pivot to Asia comes as Russia's economy continues to contract, battered by Western economic sanctions and plummeting oil prices. The U.S. and Europe sanctioned Russia last year for its intervention in Ukraine, and the country's economic crisis has deepened, with gross domestic product shrinking 4.6% in the second quarter compared with the previous year.

Russia's finance ministry now expects the economy will not return to growth until late 2015 or next year.

The Russian government has already made economic ties with China a centerpiece of its plan to reduce its dependence on energy exports to Europe, a major customer for Russian gas. Russia has also pinned its hopes on China for another reason: Moscow's relations with the West have been at a post-Cold War low since the annexation last year of Crimea.

Russia has traditionally been reluctant to allow Chinese firms to take stakes in strategic hydrocarbon deposits. But ahead of the forum, Russian state energy giant OAO Rosneft announced that state-owned China Petrochemical Corp. would take a stake in two oil fields.

Russia's Far East-a major producer of oil, gas, coal and timber-shares a lengthy border with China. It also accounts for around 70% of Russia's fishery reserves, according to Russia's Federal Agency for Fishery.

"A market of this potential size doesn't exist anywhere else, in terms of the size of the territory or natural-resource potential," said Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yury Trutnev, Mr. Putin's emissary to the Far Eastern Federal Region, ahead of the forum. "There isn't anything else like it on the planet."

Mr. Trutnev said attendees at the forum would discuss investment projects with a total estimated value of around half a trillion rubles, or $7.5 billion.

The Russian government is already planning the construction of new roads and rail links to facilitate development in the Far East. The port at Vladivostok will be offering a simplified visa regime and streamlined customs procedures to attract businesses and investors.

Alexander Levintal, the acting governor of the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, a Far East territory originally demarcated in the 1930s as a settlement for Soviet Jews, said work was under way on a railway bridge linking his oblast with China.

"Our contacts with China are huge," he said. "But we'd like to diversify and widen with Japan, Korea ... and other countries."

The Russian Far East covers 2.4 million square miles-36.4% of the country's total landmass-but it is sparsely populated, with only 6.4 million inhabitants, just under 5% of Russia's total population. Mr. Putin said in the forum he would back legislation to attract new inhabitants by distributing land in the region to Russian citizens.

Analysts, however, are skeptical that the Far East, which is several time zones away from Moscow, has the infrastructure needed to bring raw materials to market across vast distances.

"The level of isolation is high, both politically and economically," said Andrey Movchan, head of the economic program at the Carnegie Moscow Center.

Mr. Movchan said China is a natural buyer of commodities from the Russian Far East, but added that China was a monopolistic buyer of in the region, enabling it to set prices.

"China is a very pragmatic partner, and I wouldn't expect any special conditions from them," he said.

Clifford Gaddy, a specialist on the Russian economy at the Brookings Institution, said the expectations for investment in the region would have to be tempered by China's weakening economy.

"Russia was already deeply dependent on the Chinese boom because of the way it drove demand for commodities," he said. "So that effect is real and serious."

Added Mr. Gaddy: "Russia is not the only country now paying the price for illusions about China. Investors everywhere pinned too many hopes on unlimited Chinese growth."

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 #15
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
September 3, 2015
Russian think tanks turn attention to instability in Asia
China's financial and economic instability, as well as the escalation of tensions between North and South Korea, attracted a great deal of attention from Russian think tanks in August.
By Anastasia Borik

In August, Russian analysts focused on topics such as the crisis in the Chinese economy and the deterioration of relations between North and South Korea. As well, they explored the traditional issues in international relations between Russia and the West.
China's growing financial crisis

Perhaps the central theme in August was the unexpected financial problems developing in China, which began in July. In early August, the People's Bank of China began a gradual devaluation of the yuan, which further increased global interest in China.

Russian experts, analyzing the situation, do not agree in their forecasts - some of them believe that China is falling and pulling down with it the global economy, while others say that "writing off" the Chinese economy is too early.

Among the former are representatives of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (CFDP), and among the latter are the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), and the Carnegie Moscow Center.

Mikhail Delyagin, an expert of RIAC, considers that the world had too much confidence in the Chinese economy, and that the Chinese economy took a huge responsibility upon itself to keep its growth increasing. Now, says the analyst, economic growth in China is slowing down, posing a threat to the economies of all countries.

"China, removing the world from its overworked shoulders, will now push it into a new Great Depression, which in many respects will be more terrible than the last one, which began in 1929," says the expert. "A few years from now, it will be dangerous to walk under skyscrapers - one could get hit by a falling banker."

The head of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (CFDP), Fyodor Lukyanov, is also cautious when speaking about the prospects of China, although he believes that, "The specter of a growing 'dragon' largely determines the atmosphere of the world, stimulating interest in the non-West. If this specter begins to melt, it can also lead to a change in these global sentiments." But still, he is not convinced that it is time to throw in the towel on China's development.

Stanislav Tkachenko, an expert of CFDP, explains in detail the causes of the crisis in China by analyzing the actions of the government and the People's Bank of China. Tkachenko concludes that China's economy can really pull down the world economic system; however, this point is still very far away.

"Today, China's economic growth accounts for 30 percent of entire global economic growth," said the expert. "The crisis in this country will have adverse effects on various segments of the global economy, including the commodity and currency markets. However, it is too early to talk about this today."

Alexander Lukin from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO-University) believes that pessimistic talk about China's economy is rather premature, pointing to the existence of a certain "safety cushion" in the country.

"China's economy, as a whole, retains its strength, and a seven percent annual growth rate gives the country all the chances for a bright future," says Lukin.

Alexander Gabuyev  of Carnegie Moscow Center provided not only an appraisal of the current financial problems faced by the Celestial Empire, but also reviewed the impact these problems will have on Russia. Mr. Gabuyev is confident that the economic slowdown in China, for now at least, does not threaten Russia, as the connections between the two countries are not that strong, being exclusively on the level of commodity-trade relations.

"Convergence certainly exists, but for the moment, the Chinese factor in the Russian economy -is more at the level of expectations and emotions," notes the analyst.

The worsening situation on the Korean Peninsula

North Korea and South Korea had some sharp verbal and non-verbal exchanges in August, once again reminding the world about how fragile and illusory is any final peace between the two Koreas. In early August, two South Korean border guards stepped on a mine, presumably set by North Korean saboteurs.

In response, South Korea launched a new propaganda campaign via loudspeakers on the border with North Korea. Pyongyang ordered the destruction of these speakers, resulting in an exchange of shelling between the two sides (there were no reported injuries).

Both sides agreed to enter negotiations after a great deal of recriminations and threats were exchanged. As a result of the talks, North Korea expressed its regrets about the incident with South Korean military personnel, and South Korea shut down broadcasts from loudspeakers.

Russian experts believe that we should not expect an escalation of this conflict in the future.

Andrey Lankov, an author of Carnegie Moscow Center's website, says there is no need to panic. The analyst notes that regular crises on the Korean Peninsula no longer scare regional experts and analysts because "this is nothing more than a specific form of diplomacy, a kind of military-diplomatic ballet, in which both sides follow unwritten, but quite clear rules."

Lankov says that the current crisis developed according to the laws of all Korean crises during the past 25 years, and its main consequence was an exchange of views between delegations from Pyongyang and Seoul.

The Korean expert feels confident that no serious hostilities will occur on the peninsula, as the elites in both South and North Korea are not interested in starting an open and large-scale military conflict.

Konstantin Asmolov, an expert at CFDP, also believes that it is highly unlikely that this incident can escalate into a full-blown military conflict.

"Of course, this incident has raised the degree of tensions on the peninsula, but the probability of it developing into a sharper conflict is questionable," says the analyst.

Asmolov also points to the fact that the most ardent supporters of using military force in North Korea and in South Korea are kept in balance by moderate politicians. Moreover, the U.S. helps to keep the hot heads in Seoul in check.

Dmitry Streltsov from MGIMO-University noted that incidents at the border would continue, being followed by periods of relative calm. Mr. Streltsov feels confident that we will not see any change in the position of Pyongyang, and that North Korea has once again demonstrated its standard modus operandi - "start out with tough rhetoric, and then retreat." Colleagues from the Carnegie Center and CFDP also share this view that no one in Pyongyang is interested in having the border conflicts escalate into a large-scale war.

Russia-West relations

In August, the raging debates about relations between Russia and the West continued. This time, the discussion of experts moved to the plane of ideas and scenarios.

Thus, an analyst at RIAC and CFDP, Alexander Goltz, believes that the confrontations between Russia and the United States are increasingly filled with absurd scenarios and initiatives. The most recent example of this are calls made by a number of major Russian politicians to transfer the headquarters of the United Nations from the United States to Europe (Switzerland), after a "limited" visa was issued to Valentina Matvienko, speaker of Russia's upper house of parliament.

Goltz notes with regret that, "The idea of transferring the headquarters of the UN seems to be quite acceptable to Russian diplomacy, which seems to have exhausted the entire range of threats and accusations against Washington."

Professor Tatiana Shakleina of MGIMO-University also focused her interests on the problem of different rationales among the key actors. The analyst believes that relations between Russia and the West, and particularly the United States, are far from being settled amicably, because the parties not only adhere to different paradigms, but also even have different views on the same paradigms.

Shakleina stresses the ambivalence of the ideological position of the U.S. and its allies on such basic issues as war, peace, sovereignty, and world order - all of which are the result of selective adherence to the principles of a paradigm that the West has chosen for himself. The expert believes that, given such a scenario, Russia needs an ally, and this ally should be China, which can balance the potentials of both the U.S. and Russia.

Denis Volkov, an author of Carnegie Moscow Center's website, focuses on the growing view of the U.S. as an enemy of Russia, as well as the root cause of all possible troubles and tragedies. This trend is particularly evident in the example of the Ukrainian conflict.

"According to the majority of Russians, the West created Euromaidan, advised Kiev to begin anti-terrorist operations in the east of the country, is provoking Ukrainians to sabotage the Minsk Agreements, is interested in the continuation of the conflict (three-quarters of respondents are convinced of this) - and all this is being done to take advantage of the current situation, in order to weaken and humiliate Russia."

This is also used to explain the reasons for the introduction of Western sanctions," said the expert.

Volkov says that such points of view are the result of a deliberate propaganda campaign by the Kremlin, which is increasingly being drawn into conflict not only with a neighboring country, but also into a large-scale confrontation with the West.

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 #16
www.rt.com
September 4, 2015
EU refugee crisis 'absolutely expected' - Putin

Russia has frequently warned of major problems which Europe would face as a result of Western policies in the Middle East and North Africa and jihadist groups terrorizing people, so the current refugee crisis in the EU doesn't come as a surprise, said the President of Russia.

"I think the crisis was absolutely expected," President Vladimir Putin told journalists at the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok.

"We in Russia, and me personally a few years ago, said it straight that pervasive problems would emerge, if our so-called Western partners continue maintaining their flawed ... foreign policy, especially in the regions of the Muslim world, Middle East, North Africa, which they pursue to date," said Putin.

According to the Russian president, the main flaw of Western foreign policy is the imposition of their own standards worldwide without taking into account the historical, religious, national and cultural characteristics of particular regions.

The only way to reverse the refugee flow streaming into Europe is to help people resolve problems at home. And the first step should be by creating a common and united front against jihadist groups such as Islamic State (IS, formerly ISIS/ISIL) and fighting them at their core.

"We really want to form some kind of an international coalition, therefore we conduct consultations with our US partners," Putin said, noting that he spoke about it with President Obama.

However it is premature to discuss "direct" Russian involvement in military actions against ISIS, needless to say joining the US-led coalition, as Moscow is currently considering "other options," said Putin.

The issue of rebuilding local economies and social spheres to convince terrified people to move back would only arise after terrorism is rooted out, Russian President said. But international support for rebuilding the statehood of the countries which have suffered at the hand of ISIS should only occur with full respect for history, culture and local traditions.

"But if we act unilaterally and argue about the quasi-democratic principles and procedures for certain areas, that will lead us to an even greater impasse," Putin concluded.

The Russian leader emphasized that he was being critical to figure out "what is happening, and what to do next," rather than to tease or to point out that Western policies were "shortsighted."

Putin noted that the US is not facing a refugee crisis of the same magnitude as the EU, which has been "blindly following American orders."

Prior to Putin's speech, the Russian Foreign Ministry said that the EU could actually learn something from Russia in terms of offering proper living conditions to those fleeing conflict zones.

Reminding Brussels of Russia's experience in dealing with the influx of civilians fleeing Kiev's so-called "anti-terrorist operation" in neighboring Ukraine, the ministry's spokeswoman, Maria Zakharova said that hundreds of thousands of refugees who fled to Russia were provided with "shelter, food and aid."

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 #17
Carnegie Moscow Center
September 4, 2015
Turmoil in Kiev: Ukrainian Society and Decentralization
By Maksim Vikhrov
Maksim Vikhrov is a Kiev-based journalist who previously worked in Donbas

This week saw the worst violence in the Ukrainian capital since the Maidan protests at the end of 2013. On August 31 radical oppositionists accused the government of treachery for pushing through legislation in the Rada on decentralization aimed specifically at the war-torn Donbas. They threw rocks, smoke flares, and even hand grenade at the police. Two people were killed and more than 130 injured.

Now observers are asking how much support the opponents of President Poroshenko's decentralization strategy enjoy and whether they are strong enough to undermine his government.

The president's main argument is that Ukraine has to live up to the Minsk Agreements to avoid a full-blown war with Russia. To that end, he has been a consistent proponent of decentralization--a policy of granting more powers of self-administration and language rights to the eastern strife-torn regions of Donetsk and Luhansk. His plans have the support of Ukraine's Western allies, prime minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk and the largest faction in the Rada.

He is certainly powerful enough to get the legislation he wants through parliament. The Rada has already approved his bill granting an amnesty to those who fought in the spring of 2014 and his bill granting special status for the separatist-controlled areas of Donbas. Opposition deputies complaining of arm-twisting and procedural violations during the vote carried out in the worst traditions of the Yanukovych regime.

But opposition to decentralization in Ukraine now extends beyond the most vocal fringe groups. The country now has a powerful "anti-Minsk" coalition. In the Rada it consists of "Samopomich" (Self-Reliance), "Batkivshchina" (Fatherland), and Oleg Lyashko's Radical Party.

"The Minsk Agreement is a tactic the Kremlin uses to buy time," says former prime minister and head of Batkivshchina. "It's a time bomb," agrees Oleg Lyashko.  "The agreements are illegitimate," claims the military commander Semen Semenchenko of Samopomich.

Several regional legislatures, such as the one in Ivano-Frankivsk, also oppose the Minsk agreements. As the current government loses its popularity, radicals may gain some ground during the upcoming local elections. While the local elections will not change the balance of forces in the parliament, they may impact the president: his predecessor suffered from the attempts of regional legislatures who were trying to impeach him.

However, the street radicals pose the most serious threat. Right Sector activists recently burned tires on the streets of Kiev, demanding that the government renounce the Minsk Agreements and resume the offensive in Donbas. No one was hurt on that occasion. But then came the explosion of violence on August 31.

According to Ukraine's interior minister Arsen Avakov, a volunteer fighter on leave from the front was behind the grenade-throwing incident, which killed a national guardsman. Although the grenade thrower and other protestors were quickly arrested, there can be no guarantee that incidents like this will not be repeated, especially as Ukrainians are divided on this incident.

The street violence comes against a background of tiredness and disappointment with the authorities across Ukrainian society. Militant patriots resent the fact that the summer offensive did not result in a glorious victory. For the past year they have been trying to convince the public that the Donbas republics could have been eradicated back in August 2014. "It's still not too late to do it, in a day or in a matter of months," they say. "But the traitors in Kiev do not give their go-ahead and drag the country into the Minsk trap instead."

Just as a year ago, about 30 percent of Ukrainians are in favor of military intervention to liberate the occupied territories. True, the closer you get to the actual front-line, the less militant people become. While 35 percent support the war in Ukraine's western and central regions, only 15 percent and 20 percent hold the same views in the south and east.

Moreover, six draft campaigns have also depleted the bellicose sentiments in western regions known for strong nationalism. Only 41 percent of eligible draftees were enlisted in the six draft in Ternopil. In Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk regions, the numbers are 47 percent and 44 percent, respectively. Across the country, only 60 percent of the target number were drafted across the country. The General Staff plans to make up the shortfall in numbers by employing contract soldiers.

Most Ukrainians (57 percent) still want to see a peaceful resolution of the conflict. But they are also dissatisfied with the lack of tangible results at the negotiating table. Thirty six percent of Ukrainians believe that Kiev is doing too little to solve the Donbas problem and 33 percent think it is doing nothing at all.

The president gets a disapproval rating of 67 percent of Ukrainians, while 84 percent are unhappy are with the prime minister and the Rada. As their fatigue increases, a growing number of Ukrainians is ready for compromise. Almost half of them agree that Russian can become an official language if it helps to end the war. Thirty three percent are ready to permanently give up on Crimea. The same number is willing to abandon the European integration project, and an even greater number can live without NATO membership.

Opinion polls also suggest that about 19 percent of the Ukrainian public is prepared to recognize the independence of Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics, while 26 percent support their autonomous status inside Ukraine.

The surveys suggest that time isn't on the side of the Ukrainian authorities. As long as the Donbas region remains in its current "neither peace, nor war" state, public discontent is bound to increase--from all sides of the political spectrum. With three years until the next presidential and parliamentary elections, the country is already teetering on the brink of political crisis and there is complete lack of confidence in its government.

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 #18
Kyiv Post
September 4, 2015
War, weapons mix for deadly politics
By Oleg Sukhov

Only 19 months after the end of the EuroMaidan Revolution, protests have become bloody again with the deaths of three National Guardsmen on Aug 31.

They and other police officers standing guard outside parliament faced the wrath of protesters over constitutional amendments approved by lawmakers that could grant broader autonomy to Russian-occupied areas of the eastern Donbas.

Measures to devolve more power and functions to regional and local governments are essential elements of the tattered Minsk II peace agreements designed to end Russia's war.

In addition to the three deaths, the protests led to at least 141 people, mostly law enforcement officers, being injured.

The violence triggered political anxiety over whether President Petro Poroshenko and Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk will be able to keep a majority coalition in parliament.

It also sparked fears about the possibility of more incidents in what has become a heavily armed nation at war.

The suspect accused of killing the three National Guardsmen by throwing a grenade is Ihor Humeniuk, a member of the Interior Ministry's volunteer Sich Battalion, which is connected to the right-wing Svoboda Party that lost its seats in parliament last fall. Humeniuk fought in some of the toughest areas of Russia's war against Ukraine, including Pisky and the losing battle to hold the territory of the ruined Donetsk Airport.

If Humeniuk is found guilty, some say, so is the Ukrainian government for failing to care properly for the post-traumatic stress disorders that soldiers bring back to civilian life from the war that has claimed 7,000 lives since its start in February 2014.

The attacks also exposed rising anger with the government over its failure to deliver justice since the EuroMaidan Revolution that toppled President Viktor Yanukovych last year.

And it could also have stemmed from the government's failure to communicate its agenda to the public and coalition partners, particularly on the status of the Russian-held eastern territories.

While there are hopes that this will be an isolated incident, the clashes reflected the militarization of Ukrainian politics and the links between volunteer units, such as Sich, and the nationalist parties, such as Svoboda, that use them for their political ends.

It also exposed how a growing arsenal of illegal weapons being smuggled back from the war front could pose fatal dangers to society and lead to unexpected crime waves.

"They have a civilian wing and military wing," Taras Berezovets, head of political consulting firm Berta Communications, said by phone, comparing Ukrainian parties to Ireland's Sinn Fein and its military arm, the Irish Republican Army.

According to the police, Oleh Tyahnybok, leader of the nationalist Svoboda Party, went to the war zone before the clashes to meet with fighters of Sich in what some see as an effort to rile them up and rally them to his cause. There are videos showing Tyahnybok and other senior party members attacking police at the Aug. 31 rally.

In such a volatile environment, political analyst Vitaly Bala told the Kyiv Post that politicians should be more careful with their words and actions. "Politicians don't understand that we're living in wartime, when people die and when everything is perceived more sharply," Bala said.

Other Ukrainian political parties are also linked to volunteer units.

The Right Sector group has its own Ukrainian Volunteer Corps. In July, Right Sector members took part in a shootout with what they say were the private security detail of a lawmaker and local police in the city of Mukacheve in Zakarpattya Oblast in which four people were killed.

The Azov Regiment is linked to the Patriot of Ukraine, an ultranationalist group, and the St. Mary Company is the Bratstvo far-right group's military wing.

Berezovets said Svoboda, the Right Sector and Oleh Liashko's Radical Party, which left the ruling coalition in the aftermath of the constitutional vote and violence, lost credibility with the public.

Svoboda blamed the clashes on a government-orchestrated provocation. Others saw a Kremlin plot but had no evidence to support the claims.

Yet others say a deeply disturbed soldier, described by friends as a skilled fighter and patriot, may simply be to blame - along with a government that hasn't taken proper care of its military force.

"What happened is the result of inaction in terms of helping soldiers adapt to society after the war," Leonid Ostaltev, head of Kyiv's Desnyanska Association of War Veterans, told the Kyiv Post.

However, Artem Shevchenko, a spokesman for the Interior Ministry, and Vladyslav Seleznyov, a spokesman for the General Staff, told the Kyiv Post that the authorities have rehabilitation programs and centers.

It would not be the first time that veterans became so used to war and killing that they started applying military principles to civilian life, treating their political opponents as enemies.

"A spiral of violence is being started," Berezovets said. "The function of using force is one that belongs to the government. It's not fulfilling that function. As a result, vigilantes emerge who begin to fulfill it."

He compared the Aug. 31 clashes to the Mukacheve shootout, which has been attributed to a dispute over smuggling between the Right Sector and lawmaker Mikhailo Lanyo. Analysts argue that the government's inability to prosecute smuggling and foster the rule of law precipitated the event.

The pro-presidential forces' failure to properly explain its rationale for the constitutional changes and cooperate with other members of the government coalition could also have contributed to the bloodshed.

Viktoria Voytsytska, a lawmaker from the Samopomich party, told the Kyiv Post by phone that the Poroshenko Bloc and Yatsenyuk's People's Front had been unwilling to engage in dialogue on constitutional changes with their coalition partners - Samopomich, Batkyvshchyna and the Radical Party. Poroshenko's approach has been heavy-handed, she argued.

The constitutional commission was established by presidential decree despite the fact that it is a parliamentary prerogative, she said. Moreover, the text of the amendments was hastily drafted on the day before the vote, and Samopomich received it at the last moment, Voytsytska added.

Poroshenko's spokesman, Sviatoslav Tsegolko, was not immediately available for comment.

"We should look for a consensus," Voytsytska said. "We should respect each other without accusations or clichés like 'Kremlin agent.' This is the moment of truth. The events exposed the need for a full-fledged dialogue between the coalition partners."

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 #19
Kiev does not implement conditions of political settlement - Putin

VLADIVOSTOK, September 4. /TASS/. The four key conditions of political settlement in Ukraine are not implemented by Kiev, whereas the proposed changes are of a purely declarative nature, Russian President Vladimir Putin said Friday.

"The four principal conditions of political settlement are unfortunately just not implemented by our colleagues in Kiev," Putin told journalists.

"As regards these tragic events [in front of the Verkhovna Rada in Kiev], I believe it is in no way connected with amendments to the Constitution, because all proposed as changes there today is absolutely declarative and in essence does not change the structure of power in Ukraine," he said.

"Amendments to the Constitution are used exclusively as a pretext to intensify the struggle for power," Putin said.

Further events in Ukraine, he said, depend on how long the country's people will tolerate the situation. Putin said agreement of amendments to the Ukrainian Constitution between Kiev and Donbas is "the most important and principled thing".

"If we speak about the Minsk Agreements, I will recall: amendments to the Constitution should be coordinated with Donbas; the law on elections to local self-government bodies should be coordinated with Donbass; the law on amnesty should be adopted - it is not; and the law on a special status of these territories should be enacted - it has been adopted, but its enactment has been postponed again," the Russian head of state said.

Speaking of Ukraine's further fate, Putin said the country has been put under external control.

"All key posts in the government and in key regions are held by foreigners - I think it is an insult to the Ukrainian people," he said. "Does Ukraine not have honest people and competent government officials?"

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 #20
Sputnik
September 4, 2015
Ukraine'Great Ukrainian Wall' Rides Roughshod Over People's Interests - Report

Kiev is building a barrier wall on its border with Russia, a move which will add significantly to locals' hardships, according to the Ukrainian news website vesti-ukr.com.

The ongoing construction by Ukraine of a barrier wall on its border with Russia is almost sure to bring new misery to ordinary people living nearby, the Ukrainian news website vesti-ukr.com reported.

Earlier this year, the Ukrainian authorities approved a major new program to isolate their country from Russia by constructing an enormous barrier, equipped with anti-tank ditches and remote-controlled weapons stations.

The plan includes a project that Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk initially called "the Wall" and later renamed "European bulwark". Currently, it is referred to as "the Line of Dignity," and is estimated to be worth 4 billion hryvnias (about 200 million dollars). Ukraine's attempts to play with the wall's name are reminiscent of East Germany's name for the Berlin Wall, the "Anti-Fascist Protection Rampart".

The project stipulates that more than 2,000 kilometers of the country's actual border with Russia should be protected with anti-tank (anti-transport) trenches measuring four meters wide and two meters deep, as well as 17-meter tall metal watchtowers, observation posts, alarms, retaliatory weaponry and special border check-points.

Meanwhile, the construction process is in full swing; the wall's ditches are currently being laid along sections of the border, according to vesti-ukr.com.
Some fortifications are expected to be constructed on the territory of vegetable gardens owned by residents of border villages in north-eastern Ukraine's Sumskaya and Kharkov regions.

Needless to say, some locals are upset with all of this, and fear that they will not be able to make both ends meet after they are deprived of their vegetable gardens.

A resident of the village of Sopych was quoted as saying that some families are already bracing for the construction crews to arrive, when "their miserable two or three hundred square meters of land will be taken away."

"So where will they obtain food after this? The authorities pledged to compensate for the loss of land, but they declined to elaborate. We fear that they will not deliver on their promise," he said.

Lawyers said that under Ukrainian legislation, the authorities are obliged to compensate people for property seized through eminent domain or grant them new plots of land with similar characteristics.

Meanwhile, a source in Ukraine's State Service for Geodetic Surveying, Cartography and Cadaster has been quoted by vesti-ukr.org as saying that the issue of returning the land to its owners has yet to be put on the government's table.

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 #21
Eastward expansion secures undisputable strategic advantages for NATO - Russia's mission

MOSCOW, September 4. /TASS/. NATO's eastward expansion has brought military infrastructure closer to the Russian borders and secured undisputable strategic advantages for the Alliance, the analytical report "Russia-NATO: Facts and Myths" prepared by Russia's Permanent Mission at the Alliance said on Friday.

"In case of a military conflict, vital facilities on the territory of Russia's European part will be under threat of NATO air attacks," the document said. "The so-called approach time has reduced by half. Activities launched in 2008 on adhering military facilities of the Baltic States, Romania, Poland and Bulgaria to NATO standards makes it easier to solve such problems," the report added.

The document draws attention to the fact that the United States plans to considerably strengthen the military potential of its Eastern European allies in the framework of bilateral cooperation by supplying them modern equipment, in particular, JASSM air-launched cruise missiles. "This will allow NATO countries' tactical aviation to strike targets deep into the Russian territory without entering the area covered by our missile defense system," Russian experts explained.

Since the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis, NATO continued to consistently increase its military presence near the Russian borders under the pretext of countering "Russia's expansion", the document said. "NATO's current actions on strengthening the 'Eastern flank' fan tensions and weaken military security in the recently calmest European region in military terms," Russia's Mission at the Alliance said. "Risks of dangerous accidents are also increasing with growing military activity," the document added.

Changing emphasis in the issue of US missile defense system in Europe after reaching a deal with Iran and linking the system with Tehran's missile programs reveal its true aim, the report continued.

"It is very indicative that the agreements on Iranian nuclear program reached in 2013 in Geneva and this year in Lausanne have not affected US plans on the European segment of its global missile defense system, though in 2009 US President Barack Obama said in a speech in Prague that there will be no need for missile defense system in Europe if the 'Iranian threat' is eliminated," the document said.

Washington and Brussels "just shifted emphasis saying that the agreement on Iranian nuclear program is not final, and they note Iranian missile programs which allegedly present a threat for Europe and also arms proliferation in general," the analytical report continued. "Such 'adaptability' of arguments raises additional concerns about the real aim of the missile defense system created by the US - both its European segment and global [structure]," Russia's Permanent Mission at NATO noted.

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#22
Moskovskiy Komsomolets
August 31, 2015
Mikhail Rostovskiy, At the United Nations, Khrushchev banged his boot. What will Putin do? Why VVP's voyage to America will be more extreme than the descent in the bathyscaphe

Less than two weeks ago, after Vladimir Putin plunged to the sea floor in a bathyscaphe, I expressed a doubt: Do VVP's [Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin's] aides really have enough creativity to come up with some original extreme journey for their chief? After all, everything has already been tried: They flew with white cranes, they dived for amphorae, they even piloted a Lada-Kalina.

The time has come to admit: I was wrong. In the physical sense, Putin's voyage to the UN General Assembly's jubilee session, which he will complete in September, will be the most ordinary presidential visit: a plane, then a car, then the session, his speech, and handshakes, then the car and plane again. But if we switch to the language of symbols, we will see a quite different picture:

Putin bursts into "Uncle Sam's cabin" without an invitation and coolly jerks this symbol of American statehood by his streaky thrum beard. Putin enters the lion's cage with a firm tread, coolly thrusts his head between its jaws, and then leaves the cage again with a firm tread.

These are just some of the images that entered my head at the thought of VVP's voyage to America. Putin's visit to a country where he has been publicly and at the highest level declared an "enemy of mankind" cannot, by definition, be a routine event. We are in store for a most interesting political show - a show that, in its tension and drama will be only a little inferior to Nikita Khrushchev's famous visit to the United Nations in the fall of 1960.

"We live on earth not by divine grace and not through your grace, but by the strength and reason of our people... You will not manage to drown out the voice of the people, the voice of truth, which is heard and will be heard" - Putin and Khrushchev can be described as absolutely different, in some ways even diametrically opposed politicians. The emotional and easily carried away Nikita Sergeyevich took Crimea away from Russia. The cold and calculating Vladimir Vladimirovich restored Crimea to Russia.

If, however, you set aside the phrase "we live on earth not by divine grace," which is archaic by the standards of contemporary Russian politics, the core content of VVP's speech at the United Nations will correspond 100 per cent to the excerpt from Khrushchev's speech in the same hall quoted above.

Of course, the Kremlin speechwriters will do everything to ensure that direct analogies look out of place. The politician who allegedly banged his boot right there at the session of the UN General Assembly - sources differ as to whether this happened or not - is not an example that should be imitated. But Putin will still not be able to get away from the thesis: "You knock us down - but we grow stronger! We grow stronger - because we are right!" I say this with such confidence, because I am convinced: No other thesis is capable of explaining the sense of Russia's foreign policy in its post-Crimean guise. If Putin does not go on the attack at the United Nations and aggressively prove his rightness, then he - read, Russia - will be crushed, trampled underfoot, and branded.

Does all this have a real significance? In a certain sense, no. The UN General Assembly is, above all, one big talking shop. Especially meaningful decisions are not adopted here. Here only speeches are delivered, the sense of which, as a rule, is very quickly forgotten. The main UN forum is above all a global "vanity fair" - and only then, all the rest.

But in this world, everything has its intended purpose - even a political "factory for pouring water from one empty vessel into another empty vessel and back again." In diplomacy, there is the following concept - "to show the flag," to demonstrate one's presence. The forthcoming session of the UN General Assembly is not simply a place where we are obliged to "show our flag." It is a place where we are obliged to demonstrate our presence at the highest of all possible levels.

In 1945, our country in its then form became one of the five "founding fathers" of the United Nations - the initiators of a new world order. Seventy years later, they are trying to turn us into a pariah, this petty-minded palace hooligan, the malevolent infringer of this same new world order. You can have whatever opinion you like about Vladimir Putin's foreign policy - you can like it very much, or dislike it very much. But Russia must oppose the attempts described above - using all the resources at its disposal. And the most important of these resources of ours in New York will be Putin - or, to be more correct, his rhetorical capabilities and ability to persuade.

One should not raise the "bar of expectations" too high. Whatever VVP may say at the United Nations, Obama and Poroshenko will definitely not throw themselves on his breast and declare through sobs: "We were wrong! Help yourself to Crimea!" Putin has no chances of convincing either the United States, or the EU, or Ukraine of his rightness in New York. In point of fact, this is not even required of the Russian president in America. But what is required of him is a structured and logical explanation of Russia's actions beginning from the spring of 2014 - an explanation that, if it cannot be accepted, can at least be understood.

The order of speeches at the jubilee session of the General Assembly is already known, in point of fact. The "jus primae noctis" has been given to Brazil. Obama will speak second. Poland's representative will speak third. China's leader - fourth. Jordan's representative - fifth. Putin - sixth.

I am confident that Obama will find "affectionate words" to describe Russia's behaviour. And that the envoy of Poland, which is so "friendly" towards us, will be even more "tender" than the US President. Putin will have to answer all this - answer persuasively and to the point, but at the same time, without turning the discussion into a slanging match.

"All the world is a stage!", William Shakespeare once wrote. I will not argue with the great dramatist. But I cannot fail to remark that some "stages" are far more important than others. You can boldly give the majority of political speeches - even at presidential level - a miss. But Putin's speech in the United Nations will definitely be worth hearing.

I think of VVP's coming appearance in New York as a kind of examination for the master of the Russian political space: How good is the form that he is in? How will he look in contrast to an indisputably super-talented speaker like Obama? Will Putin feel out of his element in New York, or, on the contrary, will he feel at home? Will Vladimir Vladimirovich manage during the short time of his speech to "make contact" with a partially hostile, partially indifferent audience? Whatever happens within the walls of the United Nations, "VVP's measurement" will definitely be taken there.
 

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 #23
http://readrussia.com
September 3, 2015
What Foreigners Hear from Russians?
By James Pearce
James Pearce studied History and Intercultural Communication at Anglia Ruskin University, Cambridge. His interests include Western and Russian perceptions of Russia, Russian politics, culture and Russia in the wider world. He now writes for The News Hub and teaches in Moscow.

The unique and sometimes awkward relationship that Russians have with foreigners has been discussed many times. Foreigners to Russians, are superior, yet inferior. They live better, but they are not better because Russians are Russian and are more 'spiritual'. Foreign workers are desired but at the same time despised.

Be that as it may, as an expat in Russia, there appears to be a list of pre-approved questions and phrases used by the populous when talking to foreigners. Most of which come up at the first meeting. Naturally, it makes you wonder why?

1) Otkuda?: Every foreigner has at least once been asked this by a taxi driver, cashier or drunken stranger in the bar. They overhear a language that is not Russian or detect an accent of some kind. If you are white, it can sometimes be rather confusing. Never the less, this conversation cannot and will not progress until they know where exactly you are from. Your answer will then determine the next 25 questions.

2) Why Russia?: The old joke that Russians simply do not understand why foreigners want to live in Russia may just be true. This links back to the introduction; is Russia superior or inferior? Are we just crazy to want to come here? Few answers truly satisfy, although knowing you have a certain level of affection for Russia is much appreciated.

3) Do you like Russia?: Following on from the above point, the answer 'yes' is often misunderstood. We came here, so something about Russia must be ok. But it often crosses one's mind what would happen if we said 'no'? Not just no, but 'no, we hate Russia so much we cannot wait to leave at the next available opportunity and start writing for Yahoo news about how awful it is here'. Naturally, things are not perfect here and Russia is not the same as home. So maybe it is comforting to hear from a foreigner that things are not so bad.

4) It's Russia!: This phrase is used to legitimise, justify and explain the logic and reasons why certain things happen here. This phrase contains intellectual credibility and is, in itself, factual knowledge. Should something rather obscure happen, this is the answer you will get because no other logical explanation exists. Moreover, it needs no further clarification, because, it's Russia! There is no English word for 'pochemuchka' and it's Russia, vsyo! Perhaps it could be that foreigners will simply never understand the way of life in Russia, and therefore, is a helpful way of visualising the country as a whole.

5) Anglichanin: Or your national demonym. Names are simply just too much hassle, it is far easier to just remember what passport they possess. For instance, everyone at my gym knew who I was the day after I signed up. Word got around that an 'anglichanin' (Englishman) had joined. Just this week, whilst showing a potential client around, the manager introduced me 'nash anglichanin' (our Englishman) as part of a list of facilities at the gym. A European foreigner attending this gym makes it a quality place (apparently). Who cares about James when we have an Englishman?

6) We are hospitable: Well, yes, they are. It is also true that this is downplayed in the West since Russians are still depicted as villains in western movies. When you make a Russian friend, you will have them for life. Results of this hospitality mean that you should never refuse food or drink (even when you are on the verge of exploding) and receiving a nice pair of slippers to wear. In England, you might offend someone if you take your shoes off as it is seen as being 'too comfortable'.

7) Drink tea: It is not quite Windex, but tea is the cure for all illnesses. Whatever your problem, tea will fix it. But preferably without milk and with a centimetre of sugar in the bottom of the mug. Many Russians also believe that sitting by an open window will make you sick, yet see no contradiction in leaving it open 24 hours a day. Should you sit by the window, however, a nice hot cup of tea will rid your body of the many infectious diseases that it invites. Coming from a nation of tea drinkers, I still cannot get my head around this.

8) I don't practice my English often:  We know this. How do we know? Roughly the 300th person has told us this today. To the English teacher in Moscow, the feeling is often along the lines of 'well, do you want my business card or not?' As I've said before, Russians are very pleased just to speak with a native speaker, as the experience is a rarity. We have been nice enough to speak to them, a complete stranger as well. They can be forgiven for not knowing that for us, this occurs on a weekly basis.

9) The life story: Usually this comes after speaking in English for around 10-15 minutes. In fact, it happened to me only yesterday at my swimming pool. The time before this, was in a restaurant after a couple of newlyweds overheard our conversation. Once Russians have realised you are 1. Not Russian 2. Feel they have all the necessary information about you, it is now the perfect time to explain their life to you. Russians are just that friendly and hospitable. It can be overwhelming, but this is not a nation of barbarians by any means.

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 #24
The Guardian (UK)
September 4, 2015
BBC Russian's Seva Novgorodsev: 'The facts are the last thing they think of'
The veteran World Service presenter on how his homeland has changed under Putin, his 38 years with the BBC, and why news needs a 'human face'
By Kevin Rawlinson

He is the man credited with introducing rock'n'roll to people living under the Soviet regime. On Friday, nearly four decades after he first went on the air, Seva Novgorodsev will finish the final edition of his BBC World Service programme.

The last broadcast of BBSeva will come from the London home of Russian culture, Pushkin House. There will also be a specially commissioned television documentary and a live conversation on the BBC Russian Facebook page.

As he prepares to sign off for the final time, the man who introduced Queen, David Bowie and Deep Purple to Soviet audiences decries what he says is a lack of cultural stimulation in his homeland, but tells the Guardian that a cultural movement is still going, underground.

"There are a lot of activists who risk life and limb," he says. "There are people who, because they are artists by temperament, disregard the authorities. They are in the minority but, still, they are present and they make themselves known. Whatever is left of the independent media notice and support them."

But, Novgorodsev says, "the tonality of Russian media has gone down tremendously. It is all patriotic in a hysterical way and the facts are the last thing they think of."

He adds: "Putin panders to the lowest common denominator. The propaganda says that, of course, Britain is in cahoots with America and all they think about is to downgrade Russia, destroy it, change the government etc. It reached a fever pitch, whereby logic and common sense [were] no longer present and that is a dangerous situation."

Novgorodsev's shows brought in Russian figures unpopular with the regime, such as Alexander Litvinenko and Anna Politkovskaya, both since murdered. However, his airtime has been much reduced in recent years and, after the closure of the Russian radio service in 2011, restricted to just a downloadable podcast.

He says media organisations such as the BBC have "a lot of work to do" to combat the gulf between Russian and British perceptions of each other. "It needs to be explained on a human level because you cannot fight facts with facts because they distort them the way they like," he says.

"I grew up in Leningrad, [now] St Petersburg, which is part of me - it is part of my DNA. But what is left is just architecture - buildings - and few friends. The people who inhabit the city are different. I don't recognise them as people who I used to know.

"There was an influx of people from some other places and the intelligentsia of Leningrad left. And people who I meet, they are slightly shrivelled up. Somehow, life makes them smaller.

"It is not as civil as it used to be - it is cruder, it is rougher and you have all sorts of people who you would never see before in Leningrad."

Novgorodsev, born Vsevolod Borisovich Levenstein, was awarded the MBE for services to broadcasting in 2005. He became a British citizen in 1984, after leaving the USSR in 1975 and first making his way to Italy. A well-known jazz musician in his homeland, he was recognised by a BBC staff member, who convinced him to seek a job with the corporation.

"Fate chose me, I didn't plan," he says. "I was destined to go to Canada and work, probably, in the merchant fleet."

After a year's delay while his travel documents were first lost, then found again by the Italian authorities, he arrived in London in 1977 to start his broadcasting career.

He began presenting BBC Russian's pop music programme from London, , which he used as a vehicle to introduce British and American music back in the USSR.

He also developed the informal, informative style for which he became known. "I started in a very simple way," he says. "If there was 22-second intro to a song, I had 20 seconds to fill - an ordinary DJ style. But when letters started to arrive, they wanted something different. They didn't want just an ordinary top 10 programme, they wanted information, background, what was happening and why is this and why is that.

"Slowly, we progressed to this huge literary-style series - about 55 programmes on the Beatles or six hours on Jethro Tull and 12 hours on Led Zeppelin. Luckily, by the mid-1980s, the books started to arrive, so someone had done the basis for me. I was serialising them and it became quite popular."

He fronted the weekly music and chatshow Sevaoborot from 1987 and, since 2003, he has had the daily live current affairs programme BBSeva.

"The moderate success that befell me was that I talked to people like friends do, then you get through," he says.

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 #25
www.rt.com
September 4, 2015
The Cold War and end of certainty
Sam Gerrans for RT

Life was simple during the Cold War. Mutually Assured Destruction was horrific, but you knew where you were with it. Following the fall of the Berlin Wall the old certainties fractured, and the new enemy moved from outside the camp to within it.

I grew up in the 1970s. This was the tail end of the Cold War. Things were simple back then. The Soviets were the Reds - and red was bad.

I'm not sure what color we in the West were, but it can't have been red. Perhaps it was blue. But whatever color it was, we were the good guys.

International relations were straightforward. The world then was like living in Manchester, a city where everyone supports either United or City. There was a certain tension, but there was also equilibrium and clarity. Everyone knew where he stood.

The evil Reds were ruled by Brezhnev. You would see him on the news being half-carried out onto the roof of Lenin's Mausoleum once in a while where he would shake his hand and look like a constipated pontiff. Most families in the UK only had black and white TV back then so all of this seemed even drabber to us than it probably was in real life.

Brezhnev was often presented to the British public kissing other men on what looked like grey carpets in front of grey airplanes. None of our politicians kissed each other. They didn't even seem to like each other very much.

We had some very strange teachers. One - Mr. Bradbrook - would take young girls into the storeroom and remove his toupee and show them his bald pate. It was not exactly illegal, but it was definitely odd. But when you are very young you think all the weird stuff adults do is normal. It's only later that you look back and wonder why you never told anybody.

Mr. Bradbrook liked to talk to us about the Russians. I gleaned a working knowledge of Marxism from him equal to anything a boy of nine might need as he monologued during calligraphy classes (most of what we learned from Mr. Bradbrook was calligraphy - he didn't care much what you wrote as long as it looked nice).

Mr. Bradbrook enjoyed telling us about the Soviets' nuclear arsenal. According to him, much of it was targeting our school. I think he thought he was frightening us into becoming better people. But most of us just thought it was cool that the Soviets wanted to bomb our school the same as we did.

Mutually Assured Destruction was part-and-parcel of living in Britain in the seventies. Like trade unions, flared trousers or the Bay City Rollers it was something you accepted as part of the scenery. We were taught to prepare for it in the same matter-of-fact way we were trained to do everything else, from long division through to learning how to spell words like 'tough'.

Surviving a nuclear first strike on a school day was done by dropping to the floor, turning the desk onto one side and crouching down behind it. Whatever the Russians could throw at us, it was no match for the business end of a British comprehensive school desk.

The Swiss - as everyone knew - had nuclear fallout shelters. But then they were Swiss and therefore neat and well organized. We didn't have nuclear shelters in the UK. We only had bus shelters, and most of those were not very good.

What we did have which the Swiss didn't was Peter Sellers. And while the politicians talked about the bomb and groups like CND protested about the bomb, it was Peter Sellers who explained to my generation what the bomb was and how to live with it. The film Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb (1964) in which Sellers starred made it all clear.

The message was simple: obviously, nobody wants the world to end as the result of all-out nuclear war. But it might still happen. If it happens it will probably be the result of a cock-up of some kind. Or perhaps because of a rogue lunatic. But then again it might not happen. But if it does, it will be quick - better that than a long and painful disease. But there is nothing you can do about it so there isn't much point worrying about it. And then again, it might not happen. Or it might.

This may sound confusing, but it seemed to make sense and that was enough.

Although nuclear war - or the possibility of it - made forward planning an act requiring amnesia rather more than will, planning was still possible. And since the dynamics of such a war were predicated on a clear them-and-us situation, whatever existential conundrums MAD forced you to deal with, things were still reassuring and somehow cozy. It was like mumps: you might not like it, but you knew where you were with The Instantaneous End of All Life on Earth. And like mumps, it was not the sort of thing you could catch twice.

As the seventies gave way to the eighties, life began to get more complicated. I hit adolescence which resulted in a pole shift in my priorities from whatever they had been before, to finding out about girls. I also realized that Formica desk tops were no defense against nuclear blasts.

The Moscow Olympics happened. This revealed that life in Russia not only happened in black and white, it could happen in color as well. And before we knew it, Gorby and Maggie were making out in Technicolor on a beautiful red carpet, and people were lighting candles and singing Kumbaya and pulling bits off the Berlin Wall.

It looked like war was over.

But, of course, it wasn't. The Taliban had been installed in Afghanistan to fight the Soviets - ensuring the later emergence of such NWO change-agents as Al-Qaeda, and then ISIS.

War wasn't over; it was just being managed and migrated to a new operating system by people like Zbigniew Brzezinski - from a polarized conflict restricted to professionals, to a generalized one which might suck in anyone.

Fast-forward thirty-plus years and the new enemies are the Muslims. Unlike in the Cold War with the Soviets, we've imported millions of our supposed enemies and given them citizenship. This means that instead of our guns and our suspicions just pointing outward, they are pointing inward as well.

The narrative has gone from 'Reds under the bed' to the notion that since nineteen Arabs armed with box-cutters brought down the Twin Towers and Building 7 and made a big hole in the Pentagon, anything 'Big Government' chooses to do to clamp down on those who pay for it is justified.

This new war has no goal and no definition of success. It just is - with no beginning, middle, end or shape - and it follows you about like muzak round a shopping center.

In the post-Cold War world the old certainties are gone. The rise of the internet means that anyone who hasn't spent the last twenty years in a shoe box knows that the conflicts we have rammed down our throats by the media as right and good serve geopolitical purposes which work against us almost as much as they do those who are currently catching the bullets.

By now so many people know governments take their orders from a globalist cabal that you won't shake anyone's world by saying so. Unlike in the Cold War when we thought Mr. Bradbrook was right and the Soviets really were aiming nukes at our school, hardly anyone believes the official 9/11 narrative or much of what follows it, except perhaps some producers at the BBC and Fox News.

Conflict has been repositioned. It is less of a direct confrontation and more of an organic and viral event. This means we get to feel vulnerable in a way we never did under MAD. With evil cast now as an amorphous, ill-defined baddy rather than a sudden cataclysmic event, the worry is not so much that it will kill you, but that it will get you and then keep you alive.

We were trained to understand goodies and baddies. But we have baddies and 'worsies'. Something is wrong.

But we know it. The tactics the ruling elite uses to manage us are openly ridiculed and debunked within a few feet either side of the flaccid, supine narratives much of the mainstream media occupies itself with.

But our knowledge doesn't seem to make any difference. Like the mythical Cassandra, those who take an interest in realpolitik are condemned to know the future but be unable to do anything about it. The resultant tension renders us - like Pavlov's dog - salivating in the corner for a meal we know is never coming. Our noble souls cry out for order and clarity. But we get fed contradiction and chaos.

Nothing is straightforward anymore. While the lines which divided East and West are gone, they are also back with NATO's push into Ukraine and US sanctions against Russia. While we are equal under political correctness and tolerance, we all know that we are not. While Muslims are the enemy, they are also our friends and we should invite millions of them to live with us. While communism has been defeated, the planks of the Communist Manifesto are openly promoted across the supposedly free West. While China is a communist country, it is the future of capitalism. And while we believe in diversity, if you don't conform to our standards, we will destroy your country.

It is insane. It is meant to be. The ruling elite do not talk of 'order out of chaos' for nothing. Chaos is the new order, and the sooner we learn to work with it, the better.

It is easy to pine for the past. And perhaps it shows how far gone we are that a time spent under the persistent threat of all-out nuclear holocaust now seems like the good old days.

I am not blandly or foolishly optimistic, but chaos cuts both ways. If all bets are off, then those who can keep a cool head and stay focused on the big picture will consider paradigms which were unthinkable before.

And it is just possible that one - or some - of the disaffected micro-tribes which will inevitably rise out the ashes of the former certainties will generate a new cohesion and vision - if not for all, then at least among their own members.

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 #26
Moscow Times
September 3, 2015
What Trump as U.S. President Would Mean for Russia
By Ivan Nechepurenko

Donald Trump might hope that he will have a great relationship with President Vladimir Putin if he gets elected into the White House, but the problem is that Russia's relationship with the United States is driven by political elites in the two countries who have their own divergent interests, Russian America-watchers told The Moscow Times on Wednesday.

Trump is the front-runner in U.S. public opinion polls for the Republican Party nomination, but it is unlikely that he will win it and become president, experts agreed. Even if the Republican Party nominates him, he will be constrained by its long-term policies and the power of the U.S. Congress, they said.

"He doesn't have a team, he is not connected with the establishment and he has already made many enemies," said Yury Rogulyov, director of the Franklin Roosevelt U.S. Policy Studies Center at Moscow State University.

"He talks about finding common language, but this is not enough. Nobody will allow him to make a U-turn in U.S. foreign policy - President Barack Obama said many things too [during his election campaign], but the political elite did not allow him to do much," he said in a phone interview.

Trump and Putin share many traits - they are direct, outspoken and like to make deals based on pragmatic interest. Putin is often credited with restoring a sense of pride in his country among Russians, while Trump's campaign slogan is "Make America Great Again!"

Both are anti-mainstream and self-confident people who don't feel constrained by political correctness. Both belong to closely knit systems: Putin is a graduate of the Soviet security apparatus, Trump belongs to the American corporate world. Both want to be portrayed as genuine men who are not part of the establishment.

Radiating confidence on every policy point he wants to pursue, Trump has already said multiple times that he will have a "great relationship" with Putin. It was the U.S. that made Putin "the world leader," by not showing leadership itself, he claimed.

"I would be willing to bet I would have a great relationship with Putin," Trump told Fox News in June, shortly after announcing his campaign.

Trump didn't specify how he would build this relationship, saying that his confidence is based on a "feeling."

Moreover, the relationship would be so good that Putin would hand Edward Snowden over to the U.S., Trump told CNN in July.

"Look, if I'm president, Putin says [to Snowden] 'Hey, you're gone.' I guarantee you this," Trump said in a televised interview.

Snowden is a former U.S. National Security Agency contractor who turned into a global surveillance whistle-blower and obtained temporary political asylum in Russia in 2013.

As an attempt to start building bridges, Trump has already offered Putin some praise.

"Putin has no respect for our president. He's got tremendous popularity in Russia, they love what he is doing, they love what he represents," he told Fox News.

According to Ivan Kurilla, a professor at the European University in St. Petersburg, the truth is that what Trump says about Putin is actually directed at Obama.

"While Russia has become an apparent failure for the Obama administration, Trump says that he can deal with Putin, just like during the last election when Obama was proud of the 'reset' in the U.S.-Russian relationship and Mitt Romney was calling Russia the main geopolitical foe. He was doing it in order to criticize the White House, not Russia," Kurilla said in written comments.

"The Kremlin is hoping that the future U.S. president, whoever it will be, will change policy toward Russia and I am confident that Moscow is ready to deal with him or her. But it remains a question whether the new American leader will be ready for such a turn. The election rhetoric will tell us nothing about it," he said.

Trump has promised that he will impose harder sanctions on Iran in order to make a deal "from strength," meaning that Iran's oil will not hit the market, increasing the chances that the price of oil - Russia's main export - will go up.

In addition, Trump said he would want to put more pressure on China, including an imposition of a tariff on its exports into the U.S.. This could empower Russia in the eyes of the Chinese leadership and drive the two closer together.

Trump has also promised to crush militants of the Islamic State militarily. Given Russia's concern about the spread of terrorism south of its borders, this would be well received by Moscow.

Russian columnist for Bloomberg View Leonid Bershidsky has compared Trump with "brash, showy businessmen," and Yevgeny Chichvarkin and Boris Berezovsky in particular. The two fled Russia for London in order to avoid what they said was politically motivated criminal prosecution at home. Putin eats such people "for lunch," according to Bershidsky.

"Eventually, however, even Trump would come to understand that he was being mocked and manipulated, the Putin behavior that Obama can't stand. Trump's disappointment might produce an even more bitter confrontation than the one between Putin and Obama," Bershidsky wrote in a column published at the end of July.

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