#1 The Unz Review www.unz.com August 21, 2015 Russia and the Depression That Wasn't By Anatoly Karlin [Charts and links here http://www.unz.com/akarlin/russia-not-in-depression/]
Nearly every other day brings another scary headline about Russia's economic apocalypse. Inflation is robbing Russians of buying power and Putin propagandists are denying it. The "wheels are coming off" the regime according to our friends at the RFERL, the end of the regime is nigh according to Bill Browder, and Putin's days are numbered, at least in the creative imagination of Ukrainian nationalist academic Alexander Motyl.
Masha Gessen's friends can no longer get their little Gruyères, the "legendary" (primarily for losing his clients' money) Moscow investor Slava Rabinovich is predicting food shortages, and things are only about to get worse with oil falling to $25 per barrel and the ruble to 125/$1, at least according to the Khodorkovsky-funded Interpret Mag's Paul Goble, who has made something of a professional career forecasting Russia's takeover by Muslims and the Chinese.
Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, the guy who has predicted all twelve of China's past zero recessions amongst other forecasting accomplishments, says that Russia is "in a full-blown depression."
One would think from all the noise that we are looking at some sort of Greece-like depression, or an imminent rerun of the collapse of the post-Soviet economy in the 1990s.
Now for the rather banal reality. Real GDP is expected to contract by around 2.7% this year according to the World Bank, but then recover to 0.7% in 2016 and 2.5% in 2017.
The reasons behind this are likewise pretty banal. They don't have a great deal to do with Western sanctions, which hurt the ability of Russian companies to raise capital but otherwise have had little bite, and they have even less to do with any particular feature of Russia's political system/kleptocracy/lack of economic freedoms that both anti-Russian establishment pundits like Ariel Cohen and pro-Western liberals in Russia like former Finance Minister Alexey Kudrin like to claim as dooming it to economic stagnation. If they were right, then East-Central Europe - most of which is rated as a lot economically freer and less corrupt than Russia on the various indices that proclaim to measure such - would not also have been stuck in a relative economic rut since around 2007.
No, the reason for Russia's recession is quite simple and boils down to the sharp collapse in oil prices from ~$100 in 2014 to ~$50 this year.
Though the Russian economy is about far more than just oil - natural resource rents are 18% of GDP - it is true that oil is the key component of Russia's export basket. So when oil prices collapse, in the absence of massive and unsustainable interventions, the ruble devalues. This is indeed what happened. Imports went down, goods became more expensive, and inflation rose. The Central Bank jacked up interest rates in order to prevent runaway inflation, but at the price of a decline in aggregate demand and consequently a short-run decrease in the GDP. If one is really searching for a comparison, the correct one would be not to Greece (which is locked in a monetary straitjacket by the ECB) nor to the late Soviet Union (wholly irrelevant) but to the Volcker recession in the early 1980s US.
There is now a very substantial output gap. Dependence on Western credit is now much reduced relative to 2013, to say nothing of 2007. Meanwhile, there are active and serious efforts to develop Russia's own financial system, which remains woefully underdeveloped for an economy of its size and scope.
Finally, even if oil prices drop permanently to $50 - which is entirely possible, given the removal of the Iran sanctions, this would not mean the Russian economy would be necessarily doomed to years of stagnation. To the contrary, econometric modeling by Russian economist Sergey Zhuravlev indicates that it would result in a ~1.5 year recession (which began in mid-2013, versus 2012 in his model; but otherwise it remains very relevant) followed by accelerated GDP growth thanks to exports.
Otherwise, macroeconomic indicators remain unremarkable. Corporate debt repayments scheduled for the second half of the year are twice lower than in the first half. The budget deficit is forecast to be 3-4% of GDP for the year and overall state debt levels continue to be very low. (Incidentally, this figure is 20% for Saudi Arabia. Which should put the nail in the coffin of the idiotic conspiracy theory that the fall in oil prices has been orchestrated by them and the US to undermine Russia). . Unemployment has barely budged, not even reaching 6% at its peak. In comparison, it was at 10% throughout much of the 1990s. This is almost entirely an output recession.
Now inevitably when recessions occur, living standards tend to fall, and people have to live more frugally. Reading the Western media, one would think that the recession has led to a tsunami in worker protests, criminality, and elite intrigues against Putin.
But in statistical terms, the real impacts of the downturn have been modest. According to Levada opinion polls, the percentage of people having difficulty buying food and clothing increased to 32% this year from 21% in 2014, but this is still lower than the figure for (pre-crisis) 2012, when it was at 33%, to say nothing of the early 2000s (higher than 50%) or the 1990s (around 80%). The percentage of Russians who spend either "almost all" or "two thirds" of their incomes on food, another measure of poverty, is 26% this year, completely unchanged from 2014, and actually lower than in 2013 (33%) or the 2000s in general (40%-50%), to again say nothing of the 1990s (consistently around 80%). These numbers have been confirmed credible by observers such as Russia Insider's Gilbert Doctorow and Alexander Mercouris, who have personally assessed the situation on the ground, in stark contrast to the New York Times' Masha Gessen's reliance on her "Je suis fromage" liberal Russian friend.
It is deeply unfashionable to say this but Russian living standards have improved astronomically in the 15 years of Putin's rule - more so than the headline GDP figures. As such, even a recession like the current one only kicks living standards back by one or two years.
As such, it is not surprising - if deeply disappointing to the Western elites who want to stir up a color revolution in Russia - that Russia's level of "protest potential" (the percentage of Russians saying they would be willing to participate in protests, or rating the likelihood of protests as being high) is currently near record lows.
Naturally, any such attempts to put the effects of an ultimately modest ~3% drop in GDP into statistical perspective will be met with accusations of callous indifferent to the plight of the Russian people, and the work of Olgino trolls to boot. I have seen this replayed numerous times on the Internet, even when the people making such arguments were Russians living in Russians, whose only sin was to recount their own (generally modest) experiences and impressions of the recession.
Make no mistake - there is a well coordinated media effort in the West to leverage any Russian economic problems to destabilize the Kremlin. Note the chorus of condemnation around the destruction of food illegally imported from the EU in contravention of Russian sanctions, even though the destruction of excess food is routine under the EU's Common Agricultural Policy.
Naturally, this is driven by their altruistic and heartfelt commitment to the wellbeing of the Russian people. Though isn't it just a wee bit strange that those journalists and "activists" who tend to shout loudest about the burning of European food also tended to be the ones who maintained the thickest silence about the burning of Russian people in Odessa in the new European Ukraine.
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#2 The Kremlin Stooge https://marknesop.wordpress.com August 18, 2015 Some Day, We'll Look Back at This, and Laugh. By Mark Chapman [Text with links here https://marknesop.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/some-day-well-look-back-at-this-and-laugh/] And there's no time like the present. It was nice of Al Gore to invent the Internet, because it offers unparalleled comedic opportunities to recapture moments in time when puffed-up and self-important toads made confident predictions which later made them look like the arrogant blowhards they are. And if you write "I am an arrogant blowhard" on your résumé, you will have just doubled your chances of being hired as whatever they are calling a journalist these days, at The Guardian. Exemplary of The Guardian's forecasting where Russia is concerned - and The Guardian never met a Russian it didn't hate, unless they were an oligarch expat, a political dissident or a member of Pussy Riot - is this gem by The Guardian's "Economics Editor", Larry Elliott; "Russia Has Just Lost the Economic War With the West". For those who don't remember when the west's economic war against Russia started, it actually kicked off with a skirmish, in which the USA stopped service in Russia to holders of Visa and Mastercard at certain sanctioned banks in Russia, back in the spring of 2014. Customers found that their cards did not work and their accounts were frozen. Russian media promptly pointed out that American credit-card companies "had a record of bowing to political decisions from Washington"; the government imposed a security deposit fee equal to two days worth of transactions in Russia, which would cost the companies $1.9 Billion (Visa) and $1 Billion (Mastercard), and Morgan-Stanley issued a report which suggested the two credit-card giants would be better off terminating their operations in Russia, where they together had 90% of market share. For his part, the Russian president announced that Russia would develop its own national payment system and greatly reduce its dependence on western credit-card companies. It's hard for me to see that as a western victory. Visa and Mastercard squealed like pigs, Russia introduced a prototype domestic card (Mir) which Mastercard signed on to co-brand, and Mastercard and Visa both humbly signed on to Russia's national payment system, which moves processing to Russia. This results in a huge loss of financial control for the western-based cards, and a bigger one is coming when Russia introduces its national replacement for SWIFT, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication. Western regulatory authorities have long been accustomed to using SWIFT to read other countries' financial mail, and a few years back, the USA pressured the supposedly non-partisan system to shut out Iran. It's unlikely America would have tried that with Russia - especially since European courts ruled that it was illegal - but a couple of big-mouthed American senators started hollering for it to be done, and that was enough. You would think Larry Elliott would have learned something from that, but it is apparent that he did not. He had all summer and autumn to form an assessment of how things were lining up, and he guessed wrong. "The west knows all about the vulnerability of Russia's economy, its creaking factories and its over-reliance on the energy sector. When the introduction of sanctions over Russia's support for the separatists in Ukraine failed to bring Vladimir Putin to heel, the US and Saudi Arabia decided to hurt Russia by driving down oil prices. Both countries will face some collateral damage as a result - and this could be considerable in the case of the US shale sector - but both were prepared to take the risk on the grounds that Russia would suffer much more pain. This has proved to be true." Is that so? Well, at least one insight in that passage was accurate - the damage caused to the U.S. shale industry was considerable. Have a look at this comical piece in The Economist, which is almost as big a failure at presenting the world as it actually is as The Guardian; the anonymous author hedges his analysis so hard that his regular reversals make the reader dizzy. Goodrich Petroleum's debts are six times the size of its market-value equity - but it says it has ample liquidity and may sell some stuff. At the start of 2015, it looked like the slaughter among the frackers would be horrific - but only 5 companies actually went bankrupt. The Saudis (treacherous dogs all) have failed to put Houston out of business - but big services companies such as Halliburton have fallen into losses and small ones are on life support. Here's another, in which The Economist does not make the link: the United States has increased its oil production to 13% of global output - but it supplies only about half its own consumption. It puts a happy face on this by describing its increase in production as far larger than its increase in consumption. That is indeed a bit of good news, but the USA still consumes more daily oil output than something like the next four nations combined (figures are from 2011), and about 20% of the world's output. The global economy is faltering as the World Bank lowers its projections for growth. Saudi Arabia, originally a partner in the effort to crush Russia's economy, has continued to flood a glutted oil market that is now oversupplied by 800,000 barrels per day, and shows no sign of letting up. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and Russia inked 6 new trade agreements in June, one of which will see Rosatom operate up to 16 nuclear reactors in Saudi Arabia. The USA put its head together with its Saudi partners, and worked out a scheme whereby OPEC would administer a short, sharp shock to the energy markets which would tip Putin out of bed - colour revolution successful at last, America gets to pick a new government, we've got momentum, baby! But that's not the way it worked out at all. Who benefits from a weaker ruble? The resource exporters who are a main source of revenue for the Russian government. Putin remains as popular with Russians as he has been since his introduction to upper-echelon politics. Meanwhile, in Europe, Russian sanctions coincided with perfect growing conditions and consequent overproduction to kick the British dairy industry in the slats. The Russian dairy market, by contrast, is surging, with some varieties of artisan goat cheese selling for $14.00 a pound at the supplier level. German cars and car parts exports to Russia fell more than 27% between January and August 2014. The Russian food ban is "a nightmare" for French farmers. Even mighty Apple saw its smartphone sales cut in half in 2014 - although, despite the crisis, Russian smartphone sales overall were up 39%. American car brands joined the plunge as car sales in Russia tanked; however, the ruble began to regain strength in the first quarter and was the best-performing of more than 170 currencies tracked by Bloomberg - bear in mind that this is in the face of deliberate efforts to force it down. The tumble in car sales slowed in July as government incentives began to have an effect - but the gains were all felt by Lada and Asian brands, and the only American car to even get on thev scoreboard was the Chevrolet Cruze. Expect western brands across the board to continue to suffer, as market replacement continues apace. Let us not gild the lily: the economic war against Russia hurt, and for a day or two there was reason for western optimism that their attempt to backstab Putin out of office would bear fruit. But it didn't, and Elliott's brainless rah-rah cheerleading for Washington was torpedoed by Russian resolve and resilience. The west now has the global opponent it thought it wanted, but market replacement and a rejection of western institutions within Russia signifies a decisive turning away from the west that will not easily be reversed, if ever. Vladimir Putin could run over a pensioner with his car on election day and still cruise to victory without breaking a sweat. None of the west's goals of economic warfare against Russia have been realized. Not one. It's still too soon to say whether Russia will weather the storm Washington deliberately set in motion. But there is every reason to be optimistic if you are Russian, and no reason at all to be optimistic if you are one of Barack Obama's foreign-policy drones. And John Kerry might as well just run off a cliff, because he has been an even worse Secretary of State than Hillary Clinton was - a benchmark I did not ever think to see surpassed, never mind so quickly. As a recent Russia Insider article warned, there's no surer way to lose the next war than to live in delusion about your own strength.
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#3 Chess News http://chess-news.ru June 22, 2015 Vladimir Putin, America's Reluctant Foe Monday, 22.06.2015 18:16 By Lev Alburt, Grandmaster
Editorial introduction
Lev Alburt will celebrate his 70th birthday in August. His life was divided in two: the first half passed in the Soviet Union, the second is going on in the USA. In his first homeland, the Odessian GM achieved many successes: he was 3-time Ukrainian Champion, a winner and a prize-winner of numerous international competitions, a repeated participant of the USSR Championship finals which were by then strongest tournaments in the world. In 1979, Alburt, as the saying went, "chose freedom", deciding not to come back from abroad. He has settled down in New York city and has been living there from then on.
As Alburt moved to the USA, he became one of the top American GMs, winning the U.S. Championship three times and representing his country many times at the Olympiads. He is still into chess, being not only a successful coach but also a prolific writer. He is the author of many chess books on various topics, which are being sold in prestigious American and European book shops and could occupy nearly a bookshelf if taken together.
Apart from that, he has devoted a lot of his time to fighting Soviet communism. He spent his first-earned US money on a trip to Washington D.C. for the Sakharov Hearings. Whenever he got a chance, he provided his chess colleagues coming to the West with anti-Soviet literature. He participated in different rallies and forums, knew Bukowski and Amalrik, was in correspondence with Solzhenitsyn. He was also a member of organizations that made no secret of their intentions to change the Soviet regime.
Dramatic acceleration of events in his former country resulting in its collapse was quite unexpected for Alburt, as well as for many others. These days, 25 years after that sharp turn of history, Lev Alburt is still interested in the world political situation. The fate of his former country still worries him, as well as, of course, the fate of his new homeland. We are presenting the GM's point of view on the matters still very important to him.
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American elites are united in their disdain for Russia and their hatred for Russia's President Vladimir Putin. Such unanimity is highly unusual; for instance, when President Carter imposed on the USSR the grain embargo, that action was sharply criticized from both left and right.
Putin=KGB? His choices suggest otherwise.
Putin=KGB; (Boris) Yeltsin=Soviet Nomenclatura; (Andrei) Sakharov= Stalin's H-Bomb. All three statements are true; but, being incomplete, all three are also highly misleading.
In early 1990, Putin entered the service of soon-to-be Leningrad Mayor Anatoly Sobchak, swiftly rising to become Sobchak's First Deputy. What makes Putin's, and Sobchak's, choices so significant was Sobchak's well-deserved reputation as an outspoken anti-communist.
Both Sobchak and Putin firmly opposed the August 19-21 1991 Back-to-Communism Coup, throwing their full support behind Boris Yeltsin. On August 20, Putin demonstratively resigned from the KGB Reserves. Putin's defiant actions could have cost him dearly, especially as KGB head Kriuchkov was the key leader of the Coup.
In 1996 Sobchak lost the mayoralty to his former aide, Vladimir Yakovlev. Putin, for whom loyalty to friends is a sacred virtue, was outraged. Rejecting Yakovlev's offer to stay, Putin preferred to leave Leningrad; in a few months' he'd gotten a middle-level job in the Yeltsin administration. When Sobchak was indicted a year later, Putin smuggled his fallen friend out of the country.
(Commemorating in the spring of 2015 the Armenian genocide, Putin used that forbidden word, genocide - knowing full well this would anger the Turks, with whom Putin had just signed a number of important agreements. Putin did what he thought was right, even at the price.)
As President, Putin brought some normalcy and hope to the embittered, long-suffering nation. He continued to promote the free-market economy, eventually even introducing the 13% flat income tax. State revenues grew and the economy boomed (high oil prices were a big help, of course).
Russo-American Drama: The spurned love and the persistent suitor
Despite all-pervasive communist propaganda, the people of Russia/USSR have always liked the West and considered themselves an integral part of the West. America, they loved. After all, Russians and Americans are much alike in character, geography, and history, Manifest Destiny being a mirror of Russia's own drive toward the Pacific. Americans, too, loved Russian literature, chess, ballet; summits, joint ventures (like Apollo-Soyuz), people-to-people TV-bridges, scientific exchanges. With communism gone, Russians expected Russo-American friendship to blossom. Alas, most Americans forgot Russia as soon as the nuclear threat was no more. For those on the left, there was also a sense of betrayal: a flight to Moscow was no longer a trip into the future.
To please America, Yeltsin's government quickly abandoned USSR's most unsavory clients. Russia even gave the Americans a map of the electronic bugs in the US's Moscow Embassy. In return there was little thanks and even less reciprocity. Symbolic was the case of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment of 1975, which tied US-Soviet trade to the level of Jewish emigration from the USSR. By 1992, emigration from Russia was absolutely free but Jackson-Vanik remained on the books well into the younger Bush's presidency.
Russians of all stripes had been shocked by the rapid dismemberment of Yugoslavia, applauded, even facilitated, by "The West"; by America's treatment of Serbs , Russia's (and America's) truest allies in both World Wars. Not surprisingly, by 2000 the majority of Russians viewed America unfavorably.
Putin was determined to reverse this trend. He believed in a Russo-American commonality of interests, and he personally liked George W. Bush.
Putin was the first to call Bush on September 11, and he offered what America needed: The Northern Alliance to help the US to defeat the Taliban and capture Bin Laden; transit for US and US-allied forces over Russian territory; Russian bases in Central Asia; intelligence; supplies; indeed everything America might need to fight terrorism. All of this and more Putin delivered, ignoring grumbling among his military and intelligence chiefs.
On a personal level, Putin was willing to stand by his friend George - even when this was contrary to Russia's interest. Putin - and Russian elites - loved the ABM treaty, mostly for its nostalgic symbolism of US-Soviet parity. When George W. Bush decided to withdraw America from ABM in order to facilitate the Strategic Defense, most Democratic Senators and even a couple of "arms-control" Republicans opposed it. With Russia's help they hoped to stop Bush.
I remember a TV pundit, openly supportive of the ABM treaty, asking Putin a softball question - if the USA abrogates the treaty, Russia will, of course, strongly react: build more offensive weaponry, undertake some asymmetric actions, all leading to a new wave of the Arms Race. Not so, replied Putin. While we prefer to keep the treaty, America's withdrawal from it isn't a threat to Russia's security - America is our friend. No arms race, no counter-actions. Not surprisingly, the opposition to Bush melted away. Thanks to friend Vlad, Bush got his SDI.
Putin didn't look for a quid pro quo - rather for understanding, friendship, long-term partnership, all based on a commonality of interests. For Bush, however Russia was, and was supposed to remain, a reliable sidekick, a pupil to be taught how to behave. And on a personal level, can you imagine Bush saying, condescendingly, something about seeing a soul - referring to Tony Blair or to Saudi Prince Bandar?
New Cold War may be costlier and more dangerous than the first
Ten years ago a Russian diplomat told me "In our government, there is only one man who still believes that Russo-American partnership is possible, and worth aiming for. Because that man is Vladimir Putin the rest of us follow. But if Putin would ever lose his interest in America, our policies would change overnight."
Putin's patience with US anti-Russian policies - NATO expansion toward the East, despite all assurance that this would never happen; America's support for every country, every politician able to portray itself as an enemy and would-be victim of Russia - began to run thin. No more double standards, he said.
In 2008, the US sold, on credit, some weaponry to Georgia, then at loggerheads with Russia. A few months later, Russia sold weapons to Venezuela, for about the same sum (under a billion dollars). The US government, surprised, protested. Russia's reply: if you can give weapons to Georgia - give, because you would never get a penny back -- why can't we sell weapons for hard cash?
Today, US-Russia relations are in a very dangerous zone. In his latest State of the Union address, President Obama named only one state as an American enemy: Russia. The second enemy was a non-state entity, ISIL. (In an earlier speech there was a third major culprit, the Ebola virus). Obama credited the US-led embargo with Russia's "political isolation" and "economy in shatters," and promised more. Unfortunately, this is purely wishful thinking. Russia's economy is much better than the USSR's ever was. And within a week of the State of the Union, Putin was signing agreements in Turkey and Egypt, and his Defense Minister in India. Even in Latin America Russia has more friends than the USA. If further driven by American hostility, Russia, at some point, will reciprocate in kind, supporting American enemies all over the world, an old Soviet practice.
So far, Putin resists the temptation, and the urging - of his aides, and of the vast majority of the population - to go tit-for-tat. America should try to diffuse tensions and to reach an understanding with Russia before the current hatreds become fixed and institutionalized as it was during Cold War I.
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#4 Moscow Times August 21, 2015 Nudists in Despair as Moscow Authorities Move to Close Naturist Beach By Daria Litvinova
Moscow nudists may soon lose their best-known and most popular beach in the Serebryany Bor natural park, as city authorities plan to expel the naturists from their traditional hangout in western Moscow and turn it into a regular beach.
"These people [nudists] are depraved. We can't encourage vice. They're completely out of their minds," Moscow City Duma deputy Lyudmila Stebenkova, who is spearheading the crackdown on the nudists, told The Moscow Times in a phone interview last week.
The suggestion to transform the beach, which has been used by nudists for almost 30 years, is in line with a rapidly developing trend of promoting conservative values and banning anything that the authorities, often supported by the Orthodox Church, label as non-traditional to Russian culture, from what officials describe as gay propaganda to erotic scenes in the writings of classic Russian writers.
Stebenkova, a member of the pro-Kremlin United Russia party, launched her anti-nudist campaign on her LiveJournal blog last week.
"Naked people have occupied the Strogino water meadow. ... Their shindigs often end in fights, drinking or sex in public. But the police can't put a stop to this orgy because there are no laws regulating nudism," Stebenkova wrote.
"We will soon discuss this matter in the Moscow City Duma. I don't think beaches like this should exist," she added.
In May, a similar beach outside St. Petersburg was closed by local authorities. It had been a nudist beach since the 1960s, but this year it was labeled by local authorities as harmful to public morals.
No Facilities
Sergei Mityushin, head of the Moscow branch of the national Telord Naturist Federation, admitted in a phone interview with The Moscow Times that Serebryany Bor is not the ideal location for a nudist beach.
"There are a lot of people walking along the shore - old ladies, families with kids - and of course they're not pleased to see naked people," he said last week. "These kind of areas should be guarded and fenced off."
The shore of the Moscow River at Serebyany Bor became spontaneously popular with nudists in the mid '80s, he said. There were no beach facilities there and no fences.
A nearby piece of land surrounded by a concrete fence was later given to the nudists by local authorities in the mid-1990s, Mityushin recalled.
"But inside the fence there were piles of garbage - mostly construction materials. We didn't have the resources to remove the garbage and didn't use the area for several years, so the authorities took it back three years later, and we went back to the old spot," he said.
Mityushin acknowledged that without essential facilities like toilets or trash bins and proper control from City Hall, the beach where the nudists hang out now has become quite a messy place.
"It's very popular with alcoholics and criminals ... They sit there, drink and leave a lot of trash that no one cleans up," he said, pointing out that regular beaches don't have these problems because they are serviced by the authorities.
Mityushin said that if the authorities paid as much attention to the nudist beach, it would be a completely different place.
He suggested Moscow officials wanted to take control of the beach because it is located in a prime location with very expensive development and real estate projects situated nearby.
Looking for Compromise
The leader of the Moscow nudists said their community would gladly consider an alternative place for their naked summer leisure.
"There's a quarry in Lyubertsy [a satellite town in the Moscow region] where some nudists also go. It's a good place, not easy to find for regular people, so if there were a beach with all the facilities, including a fence and guards, it would be great [as an alternative to Serebryany Bor]," Mityushin said.
"But no one from the city administration has ever contacted us or asked us to come and discuss options," he added with a sigh.
There is nothing to discuss, Stebenkova told The Moscow Times last week.
"In my opinion, it [nudism] should be banned for good," she said in a phone interview.
Her colleague in the City Duma, the deputy head of its commission for town planning, state property and land management, Oleg Soroka - also a United Russia member - was less categorical.
"Closing it [the beach] is a radical decision. I think we should decide this in a civilized manner. ... It's a subculture, and if it exists, it's wrong to ban it," he told the Russian News Service radio station in an interview in late June.
The issue should be discussed with Muscovites, Soroka said.
"If the results of the discussion are positive [for the nudist beach supporters], we will start looking for appropriate places for the naturists," he was cited as saying last week by M24 news website.
No Isolated Case
In May, the Dyuny beach located 30 kilometers outside of St. Petersburg and popular with nudists since the 1960s was turned into a regular beach by local authorities, and nudity was outlawed there.
"We should protect our children from some old naked hairy pervert passing by," Vitaly Milonov, St. Petersburg's infamously conservative lawmaker known for his fervent anti-LGBT views, was cited by Russian News Service radio station as saying in April.
The local nudist community was outraged by the decision and threatened to hold a protest in St. Petersburg that would feature busloads of naked Finns, but the promise of Nordic nudists failed to materialize.
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#5 Russia Beyond the Headlines/Rossiyskaya Gazeta www.rbth.ru August 21, 2015 Yevgeny Yevtushenko: Poets must reach out to ordinary people In recent months, Yevgeny Yevtushenko, one of Russia's finest living poets, has toured around 50 cities, giving poetry readings from Moscow to the Russian Far East. Despite being 83, he flew to Germany and Yakutia, and then back to Moscow. On Sept. 19, he will give a reading at the Brooklyn Public Library, and in early October, he will perform at the Luzhniki Stadium in Moscow. Igor Virabov, Pavel Basinsky, Rossiyskaya Gazeta
Rossiyskaya Gazeta: This year has been declared the Year of Literature. This is the state showing that it wants to help Russian literature. But how should we do this?
Yevgeny Yevtushenko: My answer is very simple - we must reach out to ordinary people. Our intelligentsia simply does not understand how detached it is from the general public. I have travelled across Russia giving readings of my own poetry alongside recitals of great works by famous actors, and the venues were packed everywhere.
RG: What was the longest poetry reading in your life?
Y.Y.: In 1963, when I read my long poem, Bratsk Station, in full before an audience of workers. It was a venue for about 800 people, but they put speakers out on the street, and people stood and listened there, too. It was a very chilly day in April. I read for four-and-a-half hours without a break. There were children in the audience as well. That was one of the happiest days of my life. What is any Nobel Prize worth compared to that?
RG: The title of one of your last poems - The state, be a human! - has become an aphorism. This poem is dedicated to the events in Ukraine, but its meaning is much broader. What should we do today, when political hostility has engulfed the whole world again?
Y.Y.: I have always liked the academician Sakharov's thought about the future convergence of the best ideas created by mankind in its history. This is the most correct and purest way: study all the philosophies and take the best out of them. Do not accept mistakes and injustice, learn not to repeat them, and progress to an "ism" that has not yet been named. But perhaps no "ism" is needed - no special definition for this world order - don't you think?
RG: What kind of relationship should poets have with the authorities?
Y.Y.: In my opinion, Pushkin created the ideal image of a poet - both a supporter of the state and a rebel. I think a real statesman should be a bit of a rebel, too - an enemy of bureaucracy, rather someone who panders to it. Peter the Great had this blend of characteristics, for example.
RG: You are sharing the bill with the poet Vera Polozkova at a reading in the Luzhniki Stadium on Oct. 3? Why did you choose her?
Y.Y.: Because, like me, she can hold such a large audience.
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#6 Subject: Running for Office in Siberia Part III Date: Fri, 21 Aug 2015 From: Sarah Lindemann-Komarova <echosiberia@gmail.com> Running for Office in Siberia A series on the District #35 Election for Novosibirsk City Council: Part III: Becoming an Official Independent Candidate By Sarah Lindemann-Komarova [Founder, Siberian Civic Initiatives Support Center 1995 - 2014. Helped to establish this as the hub for the first civil society development support network in the former Soviet Union.] Article with pictures: https://medium.com/@ECHOSiberia/running-for-office-in-siberia-becoming-an-official-candidate-4119419f30bPart II: Next Generation https://medium.com/@ECHOSiberia/running-for-office-in-siberia-959d59bf2737Part I: https://medium.com/@ECHOSiberia/running-for-office-in-siberia-7b426f574249Primary, as in an election during which a political party allows the public to choose who should represent them in a general election, has joined computer, facilitator, Internet and volunteerism in the Russian lexicon of imported words with zero attempt at indigenization. The newness of the word and its obscure meaning to the Russian people is reflected in the minimal turnout in the two party primaries that took place in Novosibirsk this year. One of them, conducted by the "Democratic Coalition", only targeted the regional legislative body election. The Coalition, consisting of five opposition parties, one movement and one public organization, has two leaders. The first is Alexander Navalny who became famous for his anti-corruption work and assigning the party in power, United Russia, the name "party of crooks and thieves". The second Coalition leader is Mikhail Kasyanov who was a Prime Minister during Putin's first Presidential term and whose government service prior to that earned him the nickname Mischa 2%, for his alleged cut on any deal. The purpose of the primary was to identify candidates who will represent the RPR Parnas party on the ballot. The almost impossible to brand or remember name of this party was born of a union between the Republican Party of Russia and the People's Freedom Party. Their Primary model included on-line, in person voting and allowing voters to support more than one person. This approach may explain the absence of clarity in turnout results. According to the Coalition's official site, 2653 people participated. Several other sources, including Navalny's site, said 1104 people voted or .046% of eligible voters. In all counts, three of the 15 candidates collected over 500 votes and were declared the winners. Natalia Pinus decided to take part in the other primary, the "People's Primary", in response to a request from the Alumni Association of Novosibirsk State University. This was the second time United Russia (party in power) conducted a primary in Novosibirsk although it was of greater significance than 2009 because of the unexpected election of a Communist in the 2014 Mayoral election. Like Natalia, most people considered her decision to run for office a logical next step for a community activist. Running for United Russia was a surprise because despite her high profile as an activist, Natalia was not considered political. She explained it this way, "I wanted some experience in the campaign process and the Primary gives me a chance to understand how it works and to see if this is something I can do." Natalia was one of 11 candidates in the District #35 United Russia Primary. Most of the public resistance or lack of enthusiasm for this process was because they did not understand what a primary is. United Russia hung big banners with the date but did nothing to inform people why it was in their interest to show up. The "Democratic Coalition" site included this in their FAQ. The party in power made no effort to explain they were opening up the process and allowing citizens to decide who they wanted to represent them. With not much more than a week for her campaign and a tiny budget, Natalia's did not have time to educate the electorate beyond a few posters and leaflets posted on apartment buildings with her picture. She also actively promoted herself on Facebook and through contacts developed as Director of the Akademgorodok Community Development Foundation. On Primary Day Natalia and some of her supporters were surprised to see her photo missing on the candidate poster at the polling place. She had submitted it along with all other required documentation and received confirmation of its receipt and yet it was one of the four out of 11 candidate pictures missing in several locations. The head of the Commission reported that many people came and assumed the candidates without photos had withdrawn from the race. Natalia took it in stride, "People have asked me why I am participating? Well, to find out and to understand this thing from my own experience before the real battle". Whether incompetence or strategic maneuver by more "powerful" forces in the candidate field, Natalia's grassroots approach proved stronger and she won. Voter turnout in District #35 was tiny, 724 out of an overall 27,000, but she won decisively with 65 votes more than her nearest competitor. Turnout in the Region was higher with 243,000, or 11.4% of eligible voters, participating. Her initial reaction posted on Facebook was "My friends, our actions were victorious, in spite of everything, and still, Hurrah! Now it remains to understand what to do with this happiness." The next day she talked about her victory in a local TV interview and announced that she had two days to decide "what to do with this happiness" meaning whether she would run for United Russia or declare herself as an Independent candidate. The only practical difference was she would have to collect signatures from .5% of the District population (136 people) to run as an Independent. Her Primary experience garnering 204 votes indicated this should not be a problem. Three days after the Primary Natalia met with the General Secretary of the United Russia Party and told him she decided to go Independent. He took the news calmly and respectfully while reminding her about the required signatures. In a newspaper interview she admitted being approached by almost all parties, (LDPR the key exception) and explained her decision, "Party labels do not always correspond to the principles stated in their documents. I am not ready to represent the interests of any particular political power but I am open to cooperate on concrete projects." On Facebook she put it more succinctly, "I am running as an Independent candidate because it reflects my true inner feelings." The United Russia representative may have known something Natalia did not know when he reminded her about the signatures, it turns out even 136 are a challenge. That is the required number but history has shown that when the election commission verifies signatures there are often problems. If more than 10% of your signatures are rejected, your campaign is over. The rule is collect more as insurance against disqualification. Yabloko, the most famous liberal party, and most other potential candidates took the traditional path going door to door. On July 7 Natalia formally launched her campaign on Facebook saying "I have already made clear my campaign will not be typical in many ways. One of those is we decided not to collect signatures the way it is usually done knocking on apartment doors. I don't think it is acceptable to disturb people in their homes. Therefore, I invite you to come spend a few moments in one of three local cafes, I will be happy to share a cup of coffee." She listed time, date and place for the next three evenings along with instructions concerning signature requirements. Later she explained that she felt it was important that her campaign represent how she would serve on the City Council. The key principles being openness, accessible and ready to listen. Reality set in when they collected only 25 signatures the first evening. The signature gathering saga would continue for 10 days and was well documented on Facebook. Each post featured pictures of signees, number of signatures left and information about the next location. After a few days, to increase visibility, she moved to the street in front of the shopping center. She ended up beating the deadline by a couple of days and submitted 147 signatures to the Election Commission. Natalia and her team had great confidence in the signatures authenticity because the whole process was conducted in public, she had personally met with each supporter, had qualified volunteers checking the documents and the entire list was then reviewed by a lawyer. Still, seven signatures were disqualified because the passport numbers did not match the ones listed in the Election Commission database. Natalia, mystified that the professionals who helped her would have made so many careless mistakes, believed the more likely explanation was the Commission data is incorrect. She still had the required number and the Commission authorized her as an official Independent candidate for the September 13 City Council Election. The other Primary party winners from RPR Parnas will not be running in the general regional election. They submitted 11,700 of "the most perfect signatures from the 17,500 collected" according to Coalition leader Alexander Navalny. The required number for people running at the regional level was 10,657. The Election Commission rejected 1,513 leaving them 470 short. While Natalia was launching and conducting her grassroots campaign for the District #35 City Council seat, the Democratic Coalition launched a hunger strike during appeal and rejection by the Novosibirsk and then Moscow Central Election Commissions. The hunger strike was called off and a public meeting "For Honest Elections" held on August 11. A Moscow political operative did most of the talking announcing the official end of the campaign for the Democratic Coalition in Novosibirsk, answering questions and inviting participants to send protest letters to the regional Election Commission. According to the Facebook page, and supported by the You Tube video, approximately 350 people attended. Next week Part IV, Natalia Pinus's "I Love Gorodok" general election campaign.
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#7 Embargoed food destruction backed by 42% of Russians, 38% against
MOSCOW. Aug 21 (Interfax) - Most Russians (83%) are aware of the destruction of embargoed food smuggled into Russia from the European Union, the United States, Australia, Canada and Norway, the Public Opinion Foundation has said.
Russians have mixed feelings about the decision made by the authorities: 42% say the embargoed food needs to be destroyed, and 38% claim the opposite.
Those supporting the destruction of embargoed foods argue that such foods fail to meet sanitary norms, they are of inferior quality, out-of-date and harmful (17%), and that domestic production should be developed and domestic producers should be supported (8%).
Their opponents propose to distribute the food amongst the needy (18%), orphanages or old people's homes (5%). The foundation polled 1,500 respondents in 104 populated localities in 53 regions on August 15-16.
On the whole, 70% of the respondents deem correct the decision of the Russian authorities to ban the imports of certain products from the European Union, the United States, Australia, Canada and Norway. Eleven percent call this decision erroneous, and 19% are undecided.
On August 6, 2015, Russia extended for one year the embargo imposed on food imported from the United States, the EU, Canada, Norway and Australia in August 2014. Meat and meat products, fish and seafood, milk and dairy products, fruit and vegetables from those countries were outlawed.
In late July, the president signed a decree ordering to seize and destroy agricultural products made in the countries, which had backed economic sanctions against Russia, and embargoed by Russia starting from August 6.
As of August 19, Rosselkhoznadzor reported the destruction of 552 tonnes of contraband fruit and vegetables and 48 tonnes of contraband animal products. Embargoed foods are seized not only on the border but also in shops.
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#8 Business New Europe www.bne.eu August 20, 2015 MOSCOW BLOG: Russian ruble tumbles as oil prices tank Ben Aris in Moscow
Russia's ruble tumbled to a six-month low of RUB67 to the dollar and RUB75 to the euro on Thursday, as oil prices dropped yet again to $47 a barrel.
The fall in the ruble adds to the turmoil in emerging markets over the past week sparked by the depreciation of the Chinese renminbi. The ruble is also having a knock-on effect on other currencies. The Kazakh tenge also took a bath after the government moved over to a free floating regime. Other currencies in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) are now likely to feel more downward pressure as most are tied to the fate of the ruble through economic and trade links.
The collapse of the ruble that began in December 2014 has been largely driven by a sustained fall in oil prices. The price of a barrel of the benchmark Brent crude fell to $47.22 per barrel on August 19, its lowest level since briefly touching $38 a barrel in the midst of the 2008-2009 crisis. Then the price of oil quickly recovered but this time round a consensus has emerged that oil will stay "lower for longer" amongst commodity analysts. That is bad news for the ruble.
"The whole point of a petrocurrency is that it follows the price of oil. Petrocurrency issuers are beginning to discover this. Painfully," economist Frances Coppola said in a tweet.
The fall of the ruble should come as no surprise. Russia remains overly dependent on oil for both export and federal budget revenue.
But the Russian government has been wrong footed by the precipitous drop in the ruble, which is now approaching the lower band of predictions on where oil prices would go this year, made during the worst of the ruble crisis in December.
Russian Minister of Economic Development Alexei Ulyukayev predicted that the ruble would stay in the band of RUB50-RUB60 against the dollar "if there are no additional turbulences in the global capital markets", the minister said in an interview to television channel "Russia 24" on July 28.
"We see now that there is a decline [of oil prices]: it is currently at $54 per barrel of our oil, the annual average price is $57," Ulyukayev said during the interview. "If this dynamics is the same, then the exchange ratio will also be about today's levels," he said.
However, on August 20 he told Vedomosti: "The ruble is now near its fair value. It seems to me that it is very likely that oil prices will continue to decline, and that will lead to the continued depreciation of the ruble."
The ruble's saving grace is the federal balance of payments has been holding up fairly well: falling oil prices take a big bite out of Russia's hard currency earnings from exports, but the same fall in the ruble has also roughly doubled the cost of imported goods and imports have collapsed as a result. Further weakening in the ruble will only push imports down further. At the start of this year it looked like Russia would be left with some $60bn in its current account - about half the level of the pre-December currency rout - but Ulyukayev said a week ago that the economics ministry is now expecting a current account surplus of as much as $90bn at the end of this year.
Still, the ruble still is ahead of its exchange rates during the lows of December and part of the ruble's fall is actually because of the rise gains of the dollar, which has rallied strongly this year. In year-to-date terms, the ruble's real effective rate is up by 14.2% as of August 18, gaining 18% since December 2014 to the euro and 4.3% to the dollar.
Light at the end of a very long tunnel?
Russia has been caught in the middle of the price war that has broken out between Saudi Arabia and the US: the Saudis hope to push down the price of oil and bankrupt US shale oil producers in the process. The key issue for Russia is how long this war will go on.
It can't last forever. Saudi Arabia's budget needs oil at about $70 and above to break even and the oil rich kingdom is now borrowing to plug a budget deficit hole that appeared in its national accounts. Likewise, there has been much speculation on at what point does the US shale oil sector start to be unprofitable, with the consensus coming in at about $60 per barrel. Neither side can keep this up forever, but both sides can keep it up for the foreseeable future.
"The dynamics of the energy markets changed notably as shale-oil production came onstream at a market-moving scale in 2013-2014, wrote Mohamed A. El-Erian, the former head of research at Pimco and now Chief Economic Adviser at Allianz, in a recent article.
"With this new source meeting more of world energy demand, particularly in the US, energy users were no longer as dependent on Opec and other oil producers. In the process, they also became less vulnerable to geopolitical concerns."
El-Erian goes on to argue that as the US has replaced Saudi Arabia as the new swing state oil producer, the outlook for oil is more confused as the mechanism for transmitting changes in oil prices down to production and investment are a lot cruder in the US than they are in the highly centralised Arab kingdom, so price adjustments to changes in oil prices will take longer to work their way through. "Such fundamental changes in the supply side of the market naturally drove oil prices lower - a lot lower," says El-Erian.
Moreover, on top of this battle, oil has also been pushed down by a clear slowdown in global economic growth, where the cooling of China's economy and subsequent devaluation of the yuan last week is the most obvious manifestation.
Over time oil prices are bound to bounce back, says El-Erian, as despite the collapse in prices over the last eight months, global demand has been rising steadily since 2008 from about 84mn barrels a day to about 94mn barrels a day as of the end of last year, even if a gap between supply and demand opened up in December.
Low prices will inevitably reduce supply as the US producers cut production. On the other side of the coin, low oil prices will boost economic growth and hence the demand for oil. At issue is just how fast these tectonic forces will work.
"At the end of the day, no swing producer controls the fate of today's oil prices," says El-Erian. "A sustained price recovery requires a healthier global economy that combines faster inclusive growth and greater financial stability. And this will not occur quickly, especially given the policy shortcomings in both advanced and emerging countries."
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#9 www.rt.com August 21, 2015 McDonald's sent to Siberia
McDonald's Corporation has signed a second franchise deal to open new restaurants in several regions of Russian Siberia.
Under the deal some twenty restaurants will open in the next few years, with an investment of three billion rubles ($44 million), the chief executive of Inrusinvest Yevgeny Zenin who signed the contract, told Russian media on Friday.
The restaurants will be opened in Kemerovo, Novosibirsk, Tomsk and Altai regions. The first fast-food outlet is planned start working in September.
"We are confident that the use of the franchising scheme will be the next step in the successful development of our business and will contribute to a further strengthening of the McDonald's brand in Russia," McDonald's Russia Chief Executive Khamzat Khasbulatov said in a statement, according to Reuters.
The franchise will be the second biggest, since McDonald's first Russian franchising deal in 2012. That saw two fast-food outlets open in Saint-Petersburg's Pulkovo airport.
US fast-food chain McDonald's, has been operating in Russia for 25 years. Prior to the franchising deals, all McDonald's restaurants in Russia were corporate-owned. The chain has more than 500 restaurants in 120 Russian cities and services more than a million customers daily.
McDonald's got its first franchisee partner right after the Russian watchdog Rospotrebnadzor started sanitary investigations over McDonald's restaurants across Russia last August. Several Moscow outlets were temporarily closed but reopened three months later.
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#10 Moscow Times August 21, 2015 Russia's 'Foreign Agents' Risk Losing Right to Run Media By Daria Litvinova
As the crackdown on Russian NGOs continues, the Communications Ministry has suggested forbidding those labeled as "foreign agents" from launching and registering media outlets.
The proposal, part of a bill that the ministry published on a government website for draft laws, stipulates that non-governmental organizations registered as "foreign agents" - a label with strong connotations of espionage in Russia that is applied to organizations that receive funding from abroad and are engaged in loosely defined political activity - cannot be founders of media outlets.
Civil rights advocates fear the bill is a marker of the situation worsening for the "foreign agents," several of which said they were closing this summer after being forced to pay six-figure fines in rubles and having to give up their foreign financing, despite earlier promises that "foreign agents" would not have to close their doors.
Forbidding "foreign agents" from owning media is a direct violation of a Constitutional Court ruling of 2014, according to which this status shouldn't infringe on the organization's rights, said Ilya Shablinsky, a member of the presidential Human Rights Council.
"This bill is the next step after restricting the agents' rights in the electoral legislation [they are already banned from participating in electoral campaigns in any capacity]," he was cited by Vedomosti newspaper as saying Thursday.
"And this is very bad: we have more than 50 organizations on the list [of 'foreign agents'], and for a lot of them, running media outlets is their main area of activity," he said.
Deputy Communications Minister Alexei Volin disagreed, telling Vedomosti that the suggestion doesn't violate any laws, and on the contrary, brings the law that regulates mass media in line with other laws, as well as conforming to existing regulation that restricts foreign ownership of media outlets.
But unlike actual foreigners, "foreign agents" should not be allowed to own even 20 percent of a media outlet, he said.
"We don't recommend having foreign agents among the owners of your media, go find some decent people [instead]," he was cited by the newspaper as saying Thursday.
Free Speech Crackdown
There are some 20 existing media outlets that are owned by NGOs registered as "foreign agents," said Pavel Chikov, head of the Agora human rights association.
For example, elections watchdog Golos, which is currently in the process of getting its "foreign agent" status revoked, runs the newspaper Grazhdansky Golos (Civic Voice), while Memorial, an NGO that advocates the rehabilitation of victims of Soviet repressions, runs Kavkazsky Uzel (Caucasus Knot), one of the most prominent media outlets in the North Caucasus.
"Passing the bill would mean that these media outlets will lose their registration," Chikov told Vedomosti on Thursday. "This law will result in the liquidation of dozens of media outlets," he said.
The crackdown on the media is being carried out in anticipation of the State Duma elections in 2016, said Grigory Melkonyants, co-chair of Golos.
"First the Central Election Commission sent out letters banning 'foreign agents' from delegating election observers to the polls, while most of these organizations actually usually send observers in the form of journalists," he was cited by Vedomosti as saying Thursday.
The bill, according to Melkonyants, would not only seriously infringe on foreign agents' rights, but would also complicate the registration process for other media, meaning existing registration would be revoked from many organizations - especially those whose staff have used their credentials to report on elections.
Morality Check
The bill proposes several other restrictions on the registration of Russian media.
For example, the names of countries would not be allowed to be used in media names without permission from the Justice Ministry, according to the document, along with the names of various organizations and people without their own permission. The names of the outlets will also be checked for "humanness" and "morality," the text of the bill says, without elaborating.
A media outlet can be denied registration at the Prosecutor General's request, the bill states. This is only natural under anti-extremism legislation, Volin from the Communications Ministry told Vedomosti - the Prosecutor General is empowered to determine whether the media outlet is extremist, thus he has the right to deny it registration.
All in all, the initiative currently looks raw and poorly thought through, said Leonid Levin, chair of the State Duma Committee for Information Policy. Formally speaking, forbidding foreign agents from owning media seems reasonable, but on the other hand it can be seen as an infringement upon freedom of speech, the lawmaker added.
"We're not forbidding people who work for foreign companies from expressing their opinion," Levin, a member of the Just Russia party, was cited by Vedomosti as saying Thursday. He also questioned the need for regulation in addition to limiting foreign ownership to 20 percent of a media outlet.
Nevertheless, "all these issues should be discussed, and we're ready to listen to what the ministry has to say," the lawmaker said.
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#11 Interfax August 21, 2015 Over two-thirds of Russians proud of country's state symbols
The majority of Russian citizens recently interviewed by the All Russian Center for Public Opinion Studies (VTsIOM) said that they are proud of and admire Russia's state symbols: 67 percent of respondents said they are proud of the national flag (58 percent in 2014), 69 percent mentioned the coat of arms (57 percent in 2014), and 72 percent the anthem (59 percent in 2014), VTsIOM has said.
Less than 2 percent of respondents voiced their negative attitude to the state symbols, according to the poll results.
The survey was conducted in 46 Russian regions on August 15-16 and involved 1,600 people.
Thirteen percent of those polled said that they have no emotions towards the Russian flag, and 11 percent said they are indifferent towards the country's anthem and coat of arms.
According to the center's sociologists, 82 percent percent of respondents answered the question of what the Russian Coat of Arms depicts correctly, 64 percent of those polled were able to correctly name the colors and their sequence on the flag, 24 percent correctly named the colors but were unable to give their right sequence, and 7 percent of respondents answered the entire question incorrectly.
Forty-one percent of respondents managed to recall the first line of Russia's state anthem, 24 percent of those polled gave the wrong answer and another 35 percent were unable to answer this question.
Russia's State Flag Day was established in 1994 and is marked annually on August 22.
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#12 Russia Without BS http://nobsrussia.comAugust 21, 2015 9 Year Anniversary Extravaganza By Jim Kovpak In honor of the 9-year anniversary of my move to Russia, I present my readers with...This long political rant: Oblivious These days there's this idea that Russians miss the Soviet Union, as though they are Communists, as though this is what they actually wanted. Obviously when given the chance, the Russian people, like people in the other union republics, utterly failed to put up any fight to preserve either the union itself, just as they failed to do anything about the system which had long since ceased to be anything remotely resembling socialism in a Marxist sense. In reality the rising Soviet nostalgia, nurtured by the state media and state-connected organizations, is totally disconnected with socialist politics or even the actual Soviet Union itself. Instead, the Soviet Union has been reimagined as another Russian empire, and the message of the state is that Russian imperialism is just and right. This has great appeal for a population living nearly a quarter of a century under humiliation, especially when post-Soviet Russia shows little capacity for achievement in recent years. Yet while we must not nurture modern Russian fantasies about how the collapse of the Soviet Union wasn't their fault, or that they were wholly unaccountable for what happened next, we also need to stop doing things like what former US Ambassador Michael McFaul did in this tweet today: Tomorrow -- August 21st -- should be a national holiday in Russia, the day in 1991 that the Russian people defeated an anti-democratic coup. - Michael McFaul (@McFaul) August 21, 2015Now I don't mean to sound like Mark Ames here, but the fact is that while Russia and other Soviet republics were already suffering in the throes of Perestroika, the 90's, especially the early 90's, were no picnic for Russia and other former Soviet republics, to say the least. In fact, when Ames talks about the crime, violence, corruption, and prostitution of the 90's, he's not wrong nor lying. The only problem is that he used all that to build a career for himself, and then shits on anyone who wants to deal with Russia's problems now, many of which are rooted in the 90's. I apologize for the digression but the point here is that McFaul's comment is akin to the sentiments of many a clueless Westerner, who expect Russians to celebrate the destruction and humiliation of their country. I am not speaking of the break-up of the Soviet Union here; I'm talking about the literal destruction of the Russian Federation, what can best be described as Russia's "rightful territory" (though that's debatable). Obviously some of these Westerners visited or lived in Russia at the time, and some of them might have been here even earlier, during Perestroika. These types might tell you that "it wasn't so bad," well that might have been the case- for them, and perhaps the well-to-do Russians they knew. The fact is that for millions of ordinary people, it was total chaos. All the while the economic advice from the West was neo-liberal to the core. Privatize everything as quickly as possible. Suffering be damned! Let the market decide everything, even if most of your majority population has little to no knowledge about markets and capitalism. No time to teach them! Then you also have Western politicians and many journalists turning a blind eye to the violence of Yeltsin's regime. I'm not just talking about the organized crime ties of his backers, but literal violence against his own people. For before he initiated a campaign of butchery in Chechnya which would later catapult Vladimir Putin to prominence, he used tanks and snipers against his own people in his own capital, all for the sake of defending his violation of the constitution. By comparison, the police response to the 2011-2012 protests don't even register; they were even more reserved than Berkut during Euromaidan. I could go on with more examples but I think the point is clear. This kind of behavior is precisely one of the reasons why you hear Russians say things like "The West only likes us when we're weak! Better for them to fear us!" It's not a paranoid Russian fantasy that foreign media coverage of Russia seemed to immediately change in tone once Putin was in charge. Putin was trying to project the image of a strong Russia, and the Western media was happy to oblige him, telling us how we should fear what he was doing. The same phenomenon explains the renewed interest in the Soviet Union and Stalin, who has been stripped of his Marxist credentials and made into a Russian Orthodox nationalist. The thing about Russian liberals, almost from the beginning, is that they seemed to love talking about the horrors of "Stalinism" more than anything else. When people were suffering, not knowing where their next meal would come from, when their daughters were disappearing abroad into sexual slavery- the liberals and their foreign backers want to talk about the purges of 1937. It's not hard to see where this leads in a country dominated by the politics of opposites. "If these same people constantly talk about Stalin, then Stalin must be the anti-liberal! He represents everything they hate, and they represent everything we hate! Glory to the Great Orthodox Russian Nationalist hero, YAROSLAV (Just you wait.) STALIN!" This is how rudimentary politics is in these parts; it's not just Ukraine. You attribute certain things to your opponents and then you automatically take on the opposite of everything you perceive to be on "their" side. There's no middle ground, there's no underlying principle or ideology guiding your decisions or choices. Take the outrage at the toppling of Lenin statues in Ukraine. Most Russians don't know jack shit about Lenin, and even less about his ideology or what "Leninism" is (HINT: It's largely related to organizational methods for Communist parties). Many Russians actually curse Lenin as a German agent, even an American agent, who destroyed their wonderful empire. Lenin is blamed not only for things such as the execution of the royal family, but I've even heard Russians claim that he "invented" Ukrainians, and gave them some of the best "Russian" territory. Incidentally, that territory was called "Novorossiya," and if they were going by ethnic maps of the era Ukraine could have been a lot bigger today, including such cities as Voronezh, Belgorod, Kursk, and possibly the Kuban. Incidentally Lenin's nationalities policy that is so-hated by Russian neo-imperialists and vatniks alike today was inspired by the work and arguments of none other than...Josef Stalin, but I'm digressing again. The bottom line is that you have this surreal situation where most Russians think nothing of cursing Lenin for the destruction of their empire, church, etc., but a Lenin monument gets smashed in Ukraine and suddenly their butts emit more thrust than the N1 moon rocket. With Stalin it's a bit different, largely due to the WWII cult, but the fact is that Russian love of Stalin is highly exaggerated. For one thing, the rabidly anti-Communist, anti-Stalin books of Viktor Suvorov (real name: Vladimir Rezun) are easily found in virtually any Russian bookstore, something I've noticed since I first moved here. Other works commonly found in bookstores big and small are the memoirs of various German generals and officers from the Second World War. These books seem to have gained quite a following in Russia, largely because to their audience here they seem like new, forbidden knowledge. I've even found works of the Holocaust denier Joachim Hoffman prominently displayed in some of Moscow's biggest bookstores, including his book honoring Vlassov's Russian Liberation Army. What can explain these bizarre disparities, whereby Russians curse Ukrainians for toppling statues of the man who supposedly created Ukrainians? Simple- Ukrainian nationalists are Banderites, and they hate Lenin and the Soviet Union. Ergo statues of Lenin and Stalin are the polar opposite. Maybe more importantly, they enrage Ukrainian nationalists, who are the only Ukrainians worth considering at all, from a Russian point of view. In fact, you could almost say that this is really just trolling politics. Many Ukrainians only tolerate or wave UPA symbols because they know the reaction it will get from vatniks in Russia. They know nothing of the real history of that organization. By the same token, vatniks know that Stalin and Lenin are tools with which to troll their Ukrainian opponents. Thus the memes go back and forth on the internet, interspersed with numerous pornographic images (I'm not even kidding here). Lastly, one needs to understand that a lot of the darker aspects of Russian politics stem from the kind of ideological garbage that poured into the country from the outside during the 90's. Russian nationalist groups trying to create a synthesis between ethnic nationalism and the Soviet Union as a Russian empire actually pre-date the fall of the USSR, but after that fall, pretty much every reactionary, right-wing ideology or conspiracy theory flooded into the country. Again Westerners didn't help. "Throw off all the vestiges of Communism! Bring back the old Tsarist flag! Yes! More religion! Build more churches! The Communists suppressed the poor persecuted church!" and so on. I've always found it odd how Western writers seem so perplexed about the prominence of far right ideas in Russia and Eastern Europe. Excuse me, but for roughly 40 years we bombarded them with propaganda that portrayed every Nazi-collaborating fascist as a tragic "freedom fighter" who really fought "against Stalin and Hitler," sometimes in the ranks of the Waffen SS, no less! The rush to portray anything and everything associate with Communism and socialism as the ultimate evil also led to people questioning the original ideals of Communism, such as anti-racism, internationalism, secularism, science, and women's rights. If you were led to believe those things were associated with Communism, and Communism is the worst evil imaginable, why would you have any regard for those values under liberal capitalism? Every fascist the world over, from the very beginning, sees such values as creeping Communism. Monument to Nazi collaborator Andrei Vlassov in...New York. Note the symbols associated with the ROA. Keep that in mind when someone tells you that the Ukrainian flag or trident(It's a BIRD, goddammit!) are "associated with fascism." To his credit, Vlassov's army did actually turn on the Germans to help the Czech resistance liberate Prague. Very different from Bandera, whose forces collaborated with the Germans after he had been arrested and imprisoned by them. If Westerners want to actually help the situation, there are a few things we can do in discussions with Russians on these topics: 1. Do not do what McFaul did. Acknowledge that Russia, like many other countries, suffered greatly due to the collapse of the Soviet system. This is not a defense of the system, which was already moribund at that point. It's not about questioning the independence of any former Soviet republic either. The question of the economic and political system is separate from the question of independence of union republics. 2. Don't let Russians off the hook, letting them blame all their problems of the 90's on a handful of "traitors" and the West, but also acknowledge that the West did play a role in the horrors of the 90's. A lot of it was neglect- lack of concern or criticism over Yeltsin's actions, giving him a blank check to do as he pleased. This didn't just hurt Russians. It actually hurt a lot of foreign investors who wanted to do business in Russia. 3. Again, it must be understood that celebrating the humiliation of Russia doesn't mean you can't say it's good that the USSR broke apart. The humiliation in this case was not exclusive to Russia. Sure, today the vatniks long to be feared and to push smaller countries around, but that's because the original humiliation was never solved, in the right way. That could have been solved if Russia had transformed into a proper democratic state, with separation of powers, rule of law, and most of all- a strong welfare state funded by its vast natural resources. The potential of this state would have been immense, and if it existed today I doubt any Russian would give a shit about Ukraine signing an association agreement with the EU or the fact that it had the Crimea, something Russia only gave a shit about in 2014. Countries that do well, whose governments provide their citizens with a high standard of living, generally don't harbor dreams about recovering lost territories. Fight the myth that "The West only likes Russia when it was weak!" First of all, Russia is weak today. Yes, yes it is. It's economy is smaller than that of Italy and falling fast. It has no plan for what to do after Putin, lynch-pin of the system, is gone. Its attempts at sabre-rattling have only led to catastrophic air crashes and billions of wasted rubles. At best it can intimidate its much weaker members, and that's about it. To the rest of the world it's essentially a laughing stock as it babbles on about WWII, "historical justice," and the so-called BRICS alternative while investing even more in US treasury bonds. Second, it's not that people in the West, particularly America, liked or hated Russia during the Yeltsin period- they didn't care. Nobody cared. So much historical revisionism has taken place in modern Russia that they've deluded themselves into thinking there is some 150 year history of animosity between the United States and Russia. This is sheer idiocy that ignores tons of historical evidence to the contrary. Real hostility towards the Soviet Union, apart from Wilson's intervention and a lack of recognition until 1932, didn't begin until after 1945. During the interwar period the USSR was not seen as a threat. How so? Well the two main concerns for the US military during that period were Japan and..."The Red Empire," a military designation for the United Kingdom. Yes, Great Britain. Perfidious Albion. Old Blighty. And I might add that part of the increased hostility during the Cold War stemmed from the fact that unlike the interwar period, the USSR actually gained the ability to strike the USA, and vice versa. Most of all, Russians seem to have totally forgotten that this was an ideological conflict. Sure, plenty of Cold Warriors would sometimes use "The Russians" or "The Russkies" as shorthand for the USSR, but their real animosity was towards Communism. This is why they spent so much time attacking domestic dissidents and opponents as Communists. The House Un-American Activities Committee wasn't trying to determine if people had hidden Russian ancestry, but rather if they were Communists or associated with Communists. Lastly, it was not the US that weakened or humiliated Russia. It was people like Yeltsin and people who benefited from his system. Many Russians were complicit in this. Nowadays its Putin and his elite. 4. Support and spread the truth, that a strong Russia doesn't mean an empire that bullies other countries. Japan and Germany are both "strong" today. So are Norway, Sweden, Finland, or Austria. Strength can be measured in what the country produces, how the government treats its citizens, its living standards, etc. It's hard to say whether we've hit a point of no return here, but Russia still has a potential edge in two fields- IT and space exploration. Imagine where it would be were it not for boondoggle projects like Skolkovo and someone stealing $127 million from the space program. 5. Stop insisting that Russia adopt the new European-contrived (for lack of a more concrete term) version of history. For one thing, it's not accurate and rewriting history is bad no matter who does it. Worse still, it sends a message to Russians that it is perfectly fine to rewrite history to legitimize political goals. To this end, stop looking the other way when countries like Ukraine engage in this practice. Just because someone is the underdog in a fight doesn't mean we should rewrite human history for their benefit. And might I add on that point- if you criticize people like me who prefer Ukrainians to take a particular position on Bandera and the OUN, who are you to insist that Russians adopt every point of your historical narrative? After all, do they not need to build a narrative for the sake of cultural cohesion? In truth the Russian identity isn't that much more solidified than that of Ukraine. Technically there is no "Russia," if you think about it. So is anyone ready to apply Anne Applebaum's logic, that this is fine if it builds national unity, to Russia? I sincerely hope not. 6. Readers and other writers often talk about how shocked they are to see educated, seemingly worldly Russians mouthing the Kremlin's line as of 2014. This is due to numerous factors, but one factor is the complete failure at setting up a real dialog in all these years. From my observation there as been a lot of reluctance to accept any Russian argument (not necessarily pro-government arguments either) on any subject, particularly when it comes to history. This is often contrasted with a willingness to pick up and disseminate some of the most egregious examples of historical revisionism when they come from other countries. The lack of inconsistency and the refusal to actually listen leads to a sense of exasperation: "They oppose everything we say! They must really hate us!" That, in turn, has led many of these people, who are quite valuable, to side with the Kremlin. If it isn't that alone, it's certainly a contributing factor. In short, anyone who's actually interested in supporting democracy and generally improving Russia needs to learn to stop being oblivious to this reality. We cannot get sucked into the politics of opposites, where we choose a camp and any criticism within that camp is taken as treason. Russians, even quite liberal ones, have always complained about being lectured to. And let's be honest, there are some who have certainly been doing a lot of lecturing. So much lecturing, in fact, that they forgot to really explain what the democratic position truly is. This has left many prey to a system that is adept at the tactics of populism.
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#13 Russia Beyond the Headlines www.rbth.ru August 20, 2015 TROIKA REPORT: Washington ups the ante with sanctions on Gazprom RBTH presents its weekly analytical program TROIKA REPORT, featuring a look at three of the most high-profile recent developments in international affairs. Sergey Strokan, Vladimir Mikheev 1. Engaging the West U.S. sanctions on Gazprom: Washington ups the ante The recent move by the U.S. administration to restrict exports, re-exports and transfers of technology and equipment to the Yuzhno-Kirinskoye oil and gas field in the Sea of Okhotsk is the most painful blow against Russia so far in the series of sanctions imposed on Moscow by the West to punish it for its role in the Ukrainian conflict. The embargo targets one of the most lucrative and potentially profitable projects intended to boost production of Russian LNG for export.
The move raises the stakes in the ongoing Western campaign of sanctions against Russia. For Russian energy giant Gazprom, the licence holder for the Yuzhno-Kirinskoye field, this means barred access to offshore drilling and liquefaction technologies in possession of Western companies.
No wonder Washington's attack on Gazprom has acquired political significance, with Russian President Vladimir Putin's spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, warning that the new U.S. sanctions would further damage bilateral relations.
This represents the first time that natural gas production has been targeted as part of the so-called U.S. "sectoral sanctions." In the first year of sanctions, Gazprom's long-term contracts and cooperation with European wholesale buyers and partners were never considered a suitable target since the national governments of Europe and the EU leadership felt vulnerable to potential counter-sanctions, given the absence of viable alternatives to Russian pipeline gas supplies.
The U.S. move against the Yuzhno-Kirinskoye field does not provoke concerns among the Europeans because the field is planned primarily as a source base for the production of LNG at the proposed Sakhalin-3 plant (if it comes on stream it will produce 5 million tons a year by the next decade). All gas produced at the field will be sold not in Europe but in Asia, increasing Russia's LNG export potential by 50 percent.
Will these latest U.S. sanctions jeopardize Gazprom's development of its LNG production facilities in the Far East? Mikhail Krutikhin, an energy expert and partner at the RusEnergy company and a reputed critic of Gazprom, had this to say to Troika Report:
"The Yuzhno-Kirinskoye oil and gas field is Gazprom's last hope to expand its presence in the Asia-Pacific market. It contains, according to unconfirmed estimates, one trillion cubic meters of gas, and it can serve as a perfect source of producing liquefied natural gas, or LNG.
"Presently, Gazprom is producing LNG only at its Sakhalin-2 plant, with a volume of about 10 million tons per year. Gazprom hopes to build at least two more plants but it lacks gas. To produce gas from Yuzhno-Kirinskoye, Gazprom needs advanced technologies to work underwater - which are produced only by four companies in the world. All of these are Western companies. If sanctions come into force on this project, Gazprom will not be able to export any additional LNG to Asian countries in the future."
Yet whether the American embargo will be effective enough to completely block work on the Yuzhno-Kirinskoye field is not a given. The U.S. sanctions will also be detrimental to Royal Dutch Shell, which has pegged its growth strategy on developing a full-scale strategic alliance with Gazprom. In June, Gazprom and Shell signed an agreement to enhance the scope and depth of their interaction covering a wide area: exploration, production, sales, and, possibly, asset swaps to strengthen tandem's interlink dependency.
Immediately after the U.S. sanctions were introduced, the British-Dutch company made a public statement. "Shell remains committed to working in Russia and we value working with our Russian partners and colleagues," the company's spokeswoman said. In other words, Shell so far has no intentions of wrapping up its activities in Russia and heading for the exit.
Cynics may say there are certain unspoken motives behind the U.S. sanctions against Russia's most profitable energy sector. In this case, it is aimed at plans by Gazprom and its partners, including Shell but also a number of Japanese companies, to increase LNG production in the Russian Far East.
Asia in general and Japan in particular, not to forget South Korea, Taiwan and even China, are insatiably hungry for LNG. It is worth noting that the price spread between Henry Hub (the American key sales point) and regional premium markets can reach up to $16-17 mBtu. With American LNG producers regarding the import potential of these markets with envy, it is hardly surprising that the U.S. government is doing everything possible to eliminate competitors.
Basically, there is a good argument to be made that sanctioning Gazprom by forcing it either to delay or even abandon its projects in the Far East amounts to the use of political tools and administrative leverages to facilitate access to the regional markets for American business. 2. Globally speaking Iraq: Can U.S. administration afford a new troop surge?
Iraq is back as a hot potato issue for the U.S. 2016 presidential race. Politicians are locking horns on whether or not to get the military involved in the fight against Islamic State (ISIS) militants and make a second stab at installing law and order in a country still teetering on the brink of collapse.
However, any unilateral action is unlikely to succeed given the interdependence of conflicts ravaging Iraq and Syria, and the involvement of local actors such as Iran and Russia.
The debate in the U.S. was reactivated when two prominent candidates, Jeb Bush and Donald Trump, sent up trial balloons calling for the re-deployment of the U.S. military in Iraq - the first such call since the withdrawal of American troops in 2011. Is the unpredictability of the ISIS challenge changing the priorities of the Republican camp?
Former Florida governor Bush blamed the Democrats and personally President Obama for the withdrawal of troops from Iraq after the eight-year U.S. military occupation, calling it a "fatal error." He added that it forfeited the "success, brilliant, heroic and costly," of the 2007 U.S. troop surge.
Then Donald Trump, still the frontrunner in Republican primary polls, said that the United States should send ground troops into Iraq to fight ISIS and seize the oil fields under the control of the radicals. Trump claimed he had the correct solution to the ISIS problem: All that is required is to "take away their wealth, that you go and knock the hell out of the oil, take back the oil. We take over the oil, which we should have done in the first place."
At the same time, a member of the U.S. top brass, General Raymond Odierno, who is retiring as Chief of Staff of the army, also said the U.S. forces should be sent back to Iraq - not to be directly involved in the fight against ISIS, but to provide comprehensive assistance to the American-trained and equipped Iraqi troops.
All of this is a surprising return to the old tune, so popular back in 2003. How likely is a genuine turnaround in U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East? Yury Rogulyov, director of the Franklin Roosevelt Foundation for U.S. Studies at Moscow State University, made this comment to Troika Report:
"If the next president comes from the Democrats, for instance if it is Hillary Clinton, I doubt there will be any drastic changes in the policy towards Iraq. But if Jeb Bush becomes president, it may happen, because in the course of the election campaign he is trying to part with the defensive stance on Iraq. He says it was not a bad idea to 'take out' Saddam Hussein. If Bush becomes president, it may happen because all military experts agree that only air strikes cannot bring victory over Islamic State."
"I think that the United States would not do it alone. They would opt for a coalition; in fact, they are doing it right now."
- Talking about a coalition to fight ISIS. This is exactly what Russia is proposing. Could the changing realities on the ground bring the U.S. and Russian approaches to Iraq closer?
"There is such a possibility, provided Washington takes a more positive attitude towards the Syrian regime."
Basically, and "globally speaking," this is a dilemma of either unilateral or synchronized multilateral action against ISIS. Conflict resolution in the region is hardly feasible without a coalition of the willing. The dangers of U.S. unilateralism cannot be underestimated, and neither the expediency of concerted efforts.
In the hypothetical scenario of a return by U.S. troops to Iraq - but not as part of a wide international coalition - several basic questions need to be answered. Will the White House and the Ministry of Defense attempt to duplicate the success of the much-lauded "troop surge," which has seen the largest accumulation of ground forces overseas since the Vietnam War?
Will military actions on the battlefield be accompanied by a subtle maneuvering by the Americans on the political side? Will they try to make friends and influence people in all three Iraqi communities, namely, the Shiites, constituting the majority of the population, the Sunnis as the disgruntled minority which lost its privileged position it had enjoyed under Saddam Hussein, and the Kurds, disappointed that Obama has given Turkey carte blanche to bomb, hunt down and kill their kin, the militants of the Kurdish Workers' Party?
Would a second U.S. "troop surge" produce tangible results leading to the exhaustion and ultimate defeat of Islamic State? Or will it accelerate the break-up of the complex and composite nation that is Iraq? Will the next U.S. administration - following the simple and naturally appealing call of Donald Trump - be satisfied with placing the Iraqi oil fields under its protection and, subsequently, under its jurisdiction?
Finally, would the full-scale military involvement of the United States in the current Iraqi quagmire, exacerbated by the ISIS factor, eventually enhance peace and stability in the region? Or would it produce an adverse effect? So far, the answer to all of these questions is unclear, as is the likelihood of a fresh deployment of U.S. troops in the Middle East.
And then there is the issue of how the U.S. would interact with Shiite Iran, which has become a major stakeholder in internal Iraqi politics. It all adds up to a sense that solidarity will be required among the international actors opposed to ISIS if they are to have a chance of forging a solid peace in the region. 3. Going Eastward Moscow and Tehran align prior to U.S. Congress vote It is now two months since the landmark deal on Iran's nuclear program was signed, and while U.S. Congress is still due to vote - by September 17 - on approving the accord, Russia is raising its profile with some high-flying diplomacy. The visit to Moscow this week by Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif - his first visit after the deal was signed in Vienna - is a testimony to Russia's desire to capitalize on the positive momentum and multiply its gains.
Tehran's intentions are similar. As Zarif said in Moscow, "We are confident that the Vienna agreement will have an enormous impact on developing ties between our two countries." Russia has no objections.
The outcome of the visit to Moscow was an accord to further cooperation in the high-tech field, with Russian technologies to be used in the future production of stable isotopes at the Fordow nuclear facility. Additionally, Russia will exchange Iran's low-enriched uranium for natural uranium. On top of all this, there could be an additional bonus in the form of new blocs to be constructed at the Bushehr nuclear power plant. This means that Russia will play a key role in the implementation of the Vienna agreement.
Media reports claim that the two sides also discussed the delivery of Russian S-300 surface-to-air missiles.
Yet the lion's share of attention was centered on the intensified diplomatic maneuvers around the fate of the embattled regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. At a joint news conference with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, his Iranian counterpart specifically noted that "our states hold a common position on regulating the Syrian crisis... The Syrians must themselves decide their fate and their future, and foreign states should only make this easier."
This announcement came in the wake of the meeting Lavrov had last week with Syrian opposition leaders while Zarif held talks with al-Assad in Damascus. Defying the West, both sides again dismissed calls for al-Assad to step down as a precondition for the end of the civil war in Syria.
This reactivation of Russian and Iranian diplomacy did not go unnoticed in the United States, where congressmen and senators are expected to vote on the ratification of the Vienna accord. Zarif's visit took place right after a barrage of speculations about an alleged trip to Moscow undertaken in late July by Major General Qassim Suleimani, commander of the Iranian paramilitary elite forces known as Quds. The rumors had an impact: They brought U.S. critics of the deal with Iran to the barricades.
Since General Suleimani is on the persona non grata list, as stipulated in the United Nations travel ban on people linked to Tehran's nuclear and ballistic missile programs, opponents of the Vienna deal declared Russia culpable of violating the sanctions regime, which has not yet been lifted.
However, Moscow denies that Suleimani has set foot in the Russian capital. His rumored visit made little sense, as one local expert explained, since there are two or even three higher rank military commanders, to whom General Suleimani is subordinate, who are not on the blacklist and could freely travel to Moscow.
Speaking at a press conference in Moscow, Zarif dismissed these rumors, linking them to the ongoing battle among political clans in Washington. At the core of the debate is the divergence of views on the crucial dilemma: Who stands to win and who to lose from the emergence of a desanctioned Iran?
While Obama's team has opted for a policy of positive engagement towards Iran in view of a possible alignment when the Ayatollah's rule softens and evolves into a more opportunistic regime, skeptics lambast this approach as illusionary and naïve.
In Moscow, politicians and experts are no less divided on the opportunities offered by the Vienna deal. Igor Morozov, a member of the foreign affairs committee of the Federation Council (the upper house of the Russian parliament) stresses the ambiguity of Moscow's position: On the one hand, there are plenty of benefits in cooperation in nuclear power generation, on the other hand, Iranian oil and gas sweeping the global markets would depress prices, reduce Russia's revenues from energy exports, and have a bearish effect on its national currency.
For Russia, there is also the geopolitical and military dimension of the Vienna deal. Pavel Zolotarev, deputy director of the Moscow-based Institute of American and Canadian Studies, emphasizes the advantages of strengthening strategic stability both regionally and globally. The absence of a nuclear threat from Tehran devalues claims that the U.S. needs to deploy an anti-ballistic missile system in Eastern Europe, close to Russia's borders, on the pretext of establishing a shield against a hypothetical Iranian attack.
Is Moscow's political linkage with Tehran a trump card vis-a-vis the West? Andrei Kortunov, director general of the Russian International Affairs Council, made the following comment for Troika Report:
"One should not limit Russia-Iranian relations to Iran's nuclear portfolio. The two nations are neighbors and have a track record of bilateral relations, complex as they are. Now they share common interests in certain regions: the Middle East, Central Asia, Afghanistan, and the Caspian Sea. This goes beyond the nuclear dossier. It all ties the two countries together. It is no coincidence that Tehran is considering joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. It is a manifestation of the proximity of our national interests."
"I would also like to say that Russia's relations with Iran cannot be based on opposition to the West or to any other group of countries."
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#14 Carnegie Moscow Center August 21, 2015 The Changing Price of Loyalty: What does Vladimir Yakunin's Resignation Signify? By Konstantin Gaaze Konstantin Gaaze is a reporter and political commentator
This week Vladimir Yakunin, the head of Russian railways, political ally and friend of President Putin, unexpectedly announced he was resigning and intended to move to the upper house of parliament, the Federation Council. The news caused a fevered bout of political speculation in Moscow.
To understand the current state of Russia's vast railway company and the fate of its powerful boss, consider the uniquely Russian symbol of the security seal. A heavy disk, once made of lead and now more likely to be a thick plastic tag, it has locked and guarded countless secret sites in Russia over the last century, from Lenin's sealed train to warehouses and prison camps.
The seal--known in Russian as a plomba--has also been an unusually good source of business for Russian Railways. Billions of security seals are used on the railways and the market in them is estimated to be worth half a billion dollars a year. For a long time, the company not only purchased seal locks from the same manufacturer, but instructed all station agents and their subordinates to sell them to all freight shippers and carriers indiscriminately. The sales plan, according to the Kaliningrad Federal Antimonopoly Service, covered 100 percent of the forecast--not even the actual--number of security seals.
Based on Russian Railways' purchase price, according to one participant in the market, security seals yielded the company a revenue of about eight billion rubles (117 US dollars at current rates) annually--not counting the profits of the manufacturer. It is harder to count what it earned from napkins, the non-transparent rental of millions of square meters of warehouse space, gigawatts of energy or banking services for millions of employees.
Russian Railways is imperial in scale. The company generates about three percent of the country's GDP. Its investment budget for 2015 is known to be 414 billion rubles (six billion US dollars). How much corruption it has generated is something that historians may tell us in 50 years.
Since 2005, for the ten fattest years in Russian history, Vladimir Yakunin, President Putin's friend and political ally, has headed the company. Under his management German and Italian high-speed trains started running on modernized lines (although not at their maximum speeds), while railway stations, terminals, and rail cars smartened up, and trains began to run on time.
Yakunin successfully exploited his personal relationship with President Putin to get things done. He also burnished his patriotic credentials by organizing for example for the Holy Fire in Jerusalem's Church of the Holy Sepulcher to be transported to Moscow for Easter.
Yet there was no great overhaul of railway infrastructure in this period. Earlier this year commuter rail traffic was at a virtual standstill, even though Russian Railways had received subsidies for 2015, both for commuter rail and for long-distance passenger trains, worth almost 80 billion rubles.
Russian Railways is losing money: in 2014, it lost 44 billion rubles (645 million dollars), and in 2015 it will lose another 32 billion rubles (469 million dollars), even though it put up its prices by 10 percent-more than other monopolies.
Since the 2008 financial crisis Yakunin has persistently asked the government for assistance. In the last three years officials reported that Putin would refer to Yakunin's "whining," or "moaning" in meetings. In a time of stretched resources, the railways chief was asking for too much.
Prime minister Dmitry Medvedev and his colleagues had been trying to get rid of Yakunin for years. In the summer of 2013, a fake email message briefly fooled Russian media with the news that Yakunin was being replaced by Alexander Misharin, railway executive and former governor of the Sverdlovsk Oblast.
The railway boss was literally saved by a grouse: he was dining with President Putin on a grouse he had shot on a hunting expedition. Yakunin received a text message about his dismissal and read it out aloud to Putin, who stopped the rumor becoming a reality.
But over the last year everything has changed in Russia. The money is running out and the Kremlin has to be coldly rational in its decision-making. The old guard is being replaced by people who are younger than Vladimir Yakunin and don't have appetites as crazy as he does. This is the economic aspect to Yakunin's resignation. The company needs someone who will not ask for an additional 100 or 200 billion rubles every year just so that the trains can run on time.
There is also a political story here. Dmitry Medvedev's team applied the pressure for Yakunin to be removed. That does not mean that his successor will be their choice. There is talk of Misharin, a protégé of Medvedev, who holds the No. 2 position in the company and who was erroneously congratulated on getting the job two years ago.
More important than the name of the man who gets to lead Russian Railways is who will appoint him.
Formally, the candidate will be chosen by Prime Minister Medvedev, who is being tipped to head the United Russia party list in the parliamentary 2016 elections. Having his own man in this powerful position would help the prime minister to organize and finance his campaign. If Putin agrees to Medvedev's candidate, this suggests the prime minister is again turning into a genuine political actor.
On the other hand, if the new appointee is a figure named by Putin with comparable political weight as Yakunin or from the same camp, that indicates that the prime minister will remain a fringe player in both the upcoming elections in 2016 and 2018.
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#15 Russian chief security official warns Kiev against resuming warfare
MOSCOW, August 21. /TASS/. Russian Security Council's Secretary Nikolay Patrushev has warned Kiev authorities against resuming hostilities in eastern regions of Ukraine.
"Both Ukraine and the forces currently governing the country from the outside should realize that the resumption of hostilities leads to further decline in the Ukrainian economy, a greater number of hostilities, destruction of infrastructure and affects negatively the regional and international situation," he told reporters.
Patrushev noted that "the Ukrainian authorities were attempting time and again to resolve the problem of Donbas by force." "The truce in Ukraine signed in Minsk in February is not observed by Kiev," he said. "Kiev uses heavy weapons, which should have long been withdrawn from the line of contact." Patrushev said the solution of the problem by force had no prospects, it "only leads to new victims among civilians."
According to the Secretary of the Security Council, the official Kiev is not trying to find a way out of the situation. Moreover, "it justifies its actions by saying that Ukraine is fighting for its sovereignty and integrity as well as for freedom, democracy and security in the entire Europe." "It is impossible not to notice a characteristic detail - as soon as the progress in the peaceful settlement is in the offing, as soon as a chance emerges to achieve a political agreement, the forces interested in the disruption of the peace process and the continuation of war immediately step up their activities," Patrushev added.
Patrushev pointed out that the Normandy Four should continue efforts on the Ukrainian conflict resolution. "It is necessary to provide the necessary conditions for the fulfillment of Minsk agreements aimed at the step-by-step conflict settlement," he said.
Kiev's grouping of troops built up to 90,000 ahead of offensive
The situation in east Ukraine has escalated throughout the recent weeks.
According to the self-proclaimed Donetsk republic, on August 20 the grouping of pro-Kiev armed units in eastern Ukraine totaled 90,000 men and officers, 450 tanks, 203 salvo artillery units, and five Tochka-U missile complexes. The troops are concentrated in four sectors - Mariupol, Donetsk, Debaltsevo, and Luhansk.
The spokesman for the defense ministry of the self-proclaimed Donetsk republic said on Thursday that the militia have information that the Ukrainian armed forces are preparing an offensive in the Donetsk Region in east Ukraine.
"Information has been received about the plan of forthcoming actions by the Ukrainian army from a source in the Ukrainian General Staff and, no matter how strange this may seem, there are still true officers there who do not want to fight against their own people," Eduard Basurin said at a briefing in the press center of the Donetsk News Agency.
According to Basurin, the Ukrainian military will launch an offensive in the Mariupol and Debaltsevo directions after "artillery shelling of the DPR's positions."
"Kiev plans to deliver two converging blows in the direction of the settlement of Uspenka to defeat the DPR and advance to the border with Russia and subsequently prevent civilians from reaching the Russian territory," Basurin said.
"Along with this, two groupings [of Kiev's forces] are intended to launch an offensive in the Donetsk direction north and south of Donetsk towards Ilovaisk, close the circle around the republic's capital and encircle the city," the spokesman said.
In the Luhansk direction, Kiev's forces are planning to hold separate combat operations against the militia of the Luhansk People's Republic to prevent their redeployment to provide support to the DPR, the spokesman said.
"Further on, active offensive operations will be launched in the Luhansk direction with the aim to advance to the border with Russia," Basurin said.
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#16 Ukraine's Donetsk republic says it has information on Kiev's plans to encircle Donetsk
MOSCOW, August 20. /TASS/. The Defense Ministry of the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) has information that the Ukrainian armed forces are preparing an offensive in the Donetsk Region in east Ukraine, ministry spokesman Eduard Basurin said on Thursday.
"Information has been received about the plan of forthcoming actions by the Ukrainian army from a source in the Ukrainian General Staff and, no matter how strange this may seem, there are still true officers there who do not want to fight against their own people," Basurin said at a briefing in the press center of the Donetsk News Agency.
According to Basurin, the Ukrainian military will launch an offensive in the Mariupol and Debaltsevo directions after "artillery shelling of the DPR's positions."
"Kiev plans to deliver two converging blows in the direction of the settlement of Uspenka to defeat the DPR and advance to the border with Russia and subsequently prevent civilians from reaching the Russian territory," Basurin said.
"Along with this, two groupings [of Kiev's forces] are intended to launch an offensive in the Donetsk direction north and south of Donetsk towards Ilovaisk, close the circle around the republic's capital and encircle the city," the spokesman said.
In the Luhansk direction, Kiev's forces are planning to hold separate combat operations against the militia of the Luhansk People's Republic to prevent their redeployment to provide support to the DPR, the spokesman said.
"Further on, active offensive operations will be launched in the Luhansk direction with the aim to advance to the border with Russia," Basurin said. According to the DPR Defense Ministry, Kiev hopes this blitzkrieg will help it crush the militia and destroy the Donbass republics.
"At the same time, it would be nice to remind these 'wise guys' in the Ukrainian General Staff that the attempts to carry through such 'Napoleon plans' were made before but all this ended in the encirclement of the Ukrainian troops near Izvarino and Ilovaisk where a great number of Ukrainian soldiers died," the DRP Defense Ministry spokesman said.
Thousands have been killed and hundreds of thousands of people have fled Ukraine's embattled east as a result of clashes between Ukrainian troops and local militias in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions during Kiev's military operation, launched in mid-April 2014 to regain control over parts of the breakaway territories, which call themselves the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics.
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#17 Sputnik August 20, 2015 Kiev's Renewed Assault on Donbass to Trigger US-Russian War - Stephen Cohen
There are some worrisome signs emerging that Kiev may be planning a new military assault against Donbass, Professor Stephen F. Cohen notes, warning that a US/NATO involvement in the civil war in Ukraine may potentially prompt a backlash from Russia, leading to a direct standoff between the two nuclear powers.
There are growing signs that Kiev may soon launch an offensive against the two breakaway republics in Donbass, professor of Russian studies at Princeton University and New York University Stephen F. Cohen emphasizes.
"I am convinced that if Kiev, semi-trained as it may be by American and other Western soldiers, launches an all-out offensive on Donbass, that the Kiev army as presently constituted... will either be dramatically defeated or destroyed. There won't be any army anymore. It is no match for thirty thousand rebel soldiers who are defending their territory... who have at their rear their moms, their pops, their kids, their grannies. They are defending their homeland," Professor Cohen underscored.
Stephen F. Cohen emphasized that despite Western media labelling the Donbass independence supporters as Russia's "proxies," trying to deprive them of humanity, the people of eastern Ukraine are not attacking, but defending their homes.
But why is Kiev considering escalating its military operation in the East? There are three possible reasons, according to the scholar.
The first possibility is that the Kiev regime understands that it is in a dire political situation, and a renewed military campaign is seen as the only way reignite support from the country.
The second possibility is that Kiev does not want to follow the Minsk II agreement's provisions under any circumstances. And if it does not want to negotiate, it has to fight. "So it's a way of avoiding Minsk," the professor noted.
"And the third possibility... is that Kiev is being pressed by forces in the West to launch this offensive. And one piece of evidence that might support this is that more and more it appears the US, Canada, Australia and England are sending trainers to Ukraine no longer to train the battalions, the so-called National Guard, but to train the regular army," Professor Cohen highlighted.
The scholar underscored that if Kiev attacks "almost certainly" the Ukrainian army will be crushed by the independence supporters.
"If that is the prospect the danger is that the United States and NATO will step in," the professor warned, adding that the NATO intervention could trigger a domino effect engaging the Kremlin against its own will in the military conflict.
"Then the United States and NATO would need to react and then we would be basically at war with Russia. And 'at war' means two nations who have nuclear weapons... So that is catastrophic possibility," he added.
Professor Cohen noted that he believes that Kiev will not make such an insane move, but there is still a possibility that it will.
And it is really alarming, the professor stressed, since "the consequences of an attempt by Kiev to take Donbass by force could lead to a direct American-Russian war."
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#18 The Vineyard of the Saker http://thesaker.is August 21, 2015 Is an Ukronazi attack imminent? Yes! So what else is new? [Map here http://thesaker.is/is-an-ukronazi-attack-imminent-yes-so-what-else-is-new/] Novorussian officials have called a press conference today to warn about the high risks of an Ukronazi assault on Novorussia in the very near future. I have asked our translation team and friends to subtitle the video of this press conference and I hope to get it in the next 24 hours or less. The press conference was unique in that Edward Basurin, the Deputy Defense Minister and spokesman for the Novorussian armed forces showed a map with what he described as the Ukrainian attack plans: Ukie plan of attack on Novorussia While I don't doubt for one second that the Novorussians have pretty much near perfect intelligence about the situation in the Nazi-occupied Ukraine and the plans of the junta (all that provided courtesy of the Russian GRU), I have to say that what this maps shows is extremely predictable too and not fundamentally different from what the Ukronazis tried last year: surrounding and cutting off Donetsk from Lugansk and taking control of key parts (or even all) of the Ukrainian-Russian border. Basurin also quoted the figures for the junta forces and those are in line with what others, including Cassad, have reported. The Ukronazi force is most definitely numerically large. Basurin also warned that the attack would be preceded by a false flag attack organized by the junta and blamed on the Novorussians. Again, nothing new here. To be honest, we are all getting used to 'cry wolf' about an impending Ukronazi attack. And this is hardly our fault. Such an attack has, indeed, been impending for a long while already and the junta's bellicose rhetoric has only reinforced this sense of imminent danger. Furthermore, the recent visit of the British Defense Minister in Kiev only made things worse as the junta always does something ugly when western dignitaries visit Kiev. Add to this that Poroshenko is scheduled to meet with his German and French counterparts next week and the sense of crisis will be total. And logically so. So while the tensions are real and definitely based in reality, they are also nothing new here, really. You could also legitimately that all this panic is nothing else but business as usual and that it will remain so until the regime of Nazi freaks in Kiev is finally replaced by something more or less civilized. This will inevitably happen but, alas, not in the near future. So we are left with this exhausting and frustrating situation where yet another Ukronazi attack might happen anytime but where it also might not. That is the inevitable consequence of having evil, weak and insecure psychopaths in charge of an entire country. Yesterday a rumor was started indicating that the Novorussians were planning to organize a referendum to join Russia. I still don't know if that rumor is based in reality or not, but I will note that this kind of rumor could also serve as a perfect pretext for a Ukronazi attack. It is clear to me that something has to give, probably soon. The Ukrainian economy is dead, the stocks of basic goods and energy for next winter are empty, the country is in ruins and social tensions are on the raise everywhere. I personally cannot image that regime change could happen in Kiev before at least one more attack on Novorussia. The junta really has nothing left to lose and by massing a large attack force, regardless of how ill prepared this force is, and at least the theoretical such an attack could possibility draw Russia in and, thereby, save the Ukronazi junta in Kiev. Nobody in Kiev is seriously thinking that they can occupy Donetsk or Lugansk or pacify the Donbass. Everybody is pretending otherwise, but that ain't happening. Everybody in Kiev is fully aware of the fact that the Donbass is lost forever. So I will repeat this again: the real purpose of an attack will not be to 'reconquer' Novorussia, it will be to draw Russia into the Donbass. How? Well, in theory, if the junta can launch enough men and armor to overwhelm the Novorussian defenses and if these forces succeed in surrounding Donetsk and Lugansk, Russia will really have no other option than to intervene. Of course, the Russians will easily defeat the Ukronazi forces, in 24 hours or less, but at that point the Nazi regime in Kiev will be saved: it will be able to declare full mobilization, blame every difficulty in Russia, crush any resistance with even more brutality than before and politically force all the US allies to provide aid to the regime in Kiev. The regime itself, by the way, would be safe as, contrary to the hopes of many, the Russians will not push much beyond the current line of contact. At most they will liberate Mariupol and or Slaviansk/Kramatrosk as a "penalty" for the Ukronazi attack. The junta in Kiev will remain safe, at least from the Russians. The real danger for the junta does not come from the Russian military, but from the disillusioned and impoverished Ukrainian people with whom the regime will remain "one on one" unless the Russians intervene. And as long as this situation will remain like this, a Ukronazi attack will possibly at any moment. Starting right now. The Saker.
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#19 http://newcoldwar.org August 20, 2015 Appeal on behalf of two Communist Party members on trial in Dnipetropetrovsk, Ukraine The following is an edited translation of a report appearing on the Facebook page of the Dnipropetrovsk regional organization of the Communist Party of Ukraine, Aug. 14, 2015. Translation and editing by New Cold War.org, with the authorization of the original author. Without a shred of proof except confusing testimony and pieces of evidence planted on the accused (the providence of which is unproven), authorities in the city of Dnipetropetrovsk, Ukraine have applied all sorts of tricks to place and keep two accused members of the Communist Party of Ukraine behind bars. In late 2014, our comrades Sergey Tkachenko and Denis Timofeev of the Dneprodzerzhinsk city organization of the party were detained and placed in jail. They are charged under articles 263 and 110 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, accused of advocating "separatism" in eastern Ukraine by virtue of their antiwar opposition to the government's 'Anti-Terrorist Operation' and of possession of weapons allegedly found in their homes. Since then, several court hearings have been held. Neither prosecutors nor the judge, Tatiana Ivchenko, have been in any hurry to see justice delivered. The holiday season and summer heat were among the latest excuses used to delay proceedings. Meanwhile, our comrades, who have committed no criminal offence, have spent the entire time since their detention in stuffy cells in the detention facility. The point of this long waiting has become clear only now. At the latest court session on August 6, a follow-up date was clearly set for August 13. However, on the 11th of August, Sergei Tkachenko and Denis Timofeev were suddenly taken from their detention centre to Zavodskoy district court of Dnipropetrovsk. Their attorneys, Maxim Kudryavtsev and Alexander Posternak, were not informed. Relatives of the accused also knew nothing of what was happening. Only by chance, at the last moment, did they come to learn of the "urgent" hearing, the reason being that August 11 happened to also be the date of a scheduled meeting in jail of Sergey and Denis with their families. That had been suddenly cancelled. During the rushed hearing, and taking advantage of the absence of lawyers, Judge Ivchenko and Prosecutor Vladimir Belianska pressured our comrades, urging that they renounce their lawyers (who have defended them for almost a year) and instead use free lawyers provided by the state. The prosecutor and the judge alleged that the lawyers of the two have refused to represent them any further. If the suspects would accept state lawyers, they said, the case would be "quickly" reviewed and the sentence would be announced right there on August 11. Tkachenko and Timofeev refused to succumb to these provocations and did not believe that their lawyers had given up their defense. They demanded the presence of their lawyers and their families at the hearings of their case. So the provocation organized by the authorities did not succeed. At the next "scheduled" hearing, on 13 August, violations of the law continued. Firstly, two previous witnesses for the prosecution did not appear. When defense lawyers requested that the witnesses appear, the prosecutor snapped angrily, "We will take as long as we want for our witnesses to appear." Secondly, when the prosecutor began to outline the case against the accused, the judge, in violation of the law, did not allow defense lawyers to make objections when they noticed contradictions in testimony. The remarks of defense lawyers were systematically ignored by the judge, such that the atmosphere in the courtroom became heated as the public in attendance did not hold back its indignation at the behavior of judge. One of the defense lawyers lost consciousness and emergency medical responders had to be called right into the courtroom. After medical assistance was provided, the court hearing proceeded. The unexpected break somewhat cooled the ardor of Judge Ivchenko. She began to behave noticeably more in accordance to the law, no longer avoiding defense petitions about contradictions in the details of the state's case which defense lawyers wished to present. Submitted petitions were reviewed, and some even satisfied. Also reviewed was the preventive detention of the two accused. As before, the prosecutor insisted on detention in isolation, with no attempt to justify such a harsh measure. The judge, as in earlier hearings, ruled that the Communists would continue to be confined in jail. They were denied an application to be held under house arrest and will continue to be detained, for the next two months until October 10. The next hearing in the case is scheduled for September 8. * Background: A full background story to the arrests of Sergey Tkachenko and Denis Timofeev was translated and published on 'Red Star Over Donbass' on Jan. 21, 2015: The Trial of the Communists in Dneprodzerzhinsk, by Andriy Bondarenko. http://redstaroverdonbass.blogspot.ca/2015/01/the-trial-of-communists-in.html
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#20 The Jerusalem Post August 20, 2015 Israeli communist joins Ukrainian rebels to fight 'fascists and neo-Nazis' By Sam Sokol
Eastern European civil wars are usually the last places one would expect to find Israeli citizens, but it is believed that several dozen are currently serving on both sides of the Ukrainian conflict.
One of those foreign fighters is Ina Levitan, a 37-year-old Tel Aviv resident of Azerbaijani origin, who has been fighting on the side of Ukrainian separatists on the front lines near the rebel- held city of Luhansk since late 2014 in order to fight who she calls fascists and neo-Nazis.
While born in Baku, she grew up in Israel and never thought that she would return to the Soviet Union, but when an acquaintance disappeared in eastern Ukraine last September she began investigating the conflict, she told The Jerusalem Post on Thursday.
After a few days she was able to track down her friend's whereabouts but continued researching the conflict, and "after a month and a half I decided to go to Novorossia," she said, using the Russian imperial term for the territories on the north coast of the Black Sea encompassing what is now eastern Ukraine.
She said that she was motivated to join the separatists after learning of "crimes carried out against the civilian population."
In an open letter on the website of the Israeli Communist Party, Levitan said the goal of her brigade is not to enter into conflict with Ukraine or its citizens, but rather to "fight against the fascist, pro-Nazi and oligarchs" and help the people.
She railed against what she called "pro-Nazi activists" using Nazi salutes and symbols who are "torturing and murdering civilians and soldiers of the army of Ukraine who do not share their views."
"I myself saw a man who returned from captivity in the hands of neo-Nazis.
They cut limbs and tattooed his body with swastikas. We are fighting against these atrocities that occur repeatedly and harm civilians," she wrote, accusing the West of ignoring war crimes.
"As an Israeli, I personally, viscerally hate fascists," she asserted.
While many of her fellow fighters are Russians and Ukrainians, there are also Spaniards, Serbians, Italians and Israelis.
Speaking with the Russian media late last year, Donetsk People's Republic foreign minister Alexander Kofman, who is Jewish, asserted that there are dozens of former IDF soldiers fighting in Donetsk.
In February, Spain arrested eight people for serving with the Ukrainian rebels, and Kiev has declared the rebels terrorists. While Israeli law prohibits fighting in foreign conflicts, both the Foreign Ministry and the Justice Ministry declined to comment on the issue when contacted by the Post.
Since last year's Kiev revolution, Russia and the rebels have consistently condemned Ukraine's new government of fascism and racism, claims which have been vigorously denied by local Jewish communities, several of which have become involved in the war effort.
According to media reports and researchers like Vyacheslav Likhachev, who monitors anti-Semitism for the Euro-Asian Jewish Congress, there are neo-Nazis fighting on both sides of the conflict. Despite this, community leaders have said that they are left pretty much alone and that they are more worried about the conflict itself than anti-Jewish activity.
It is a "civic obligation" to defend Ukraine, Asher Joseph Cherkassky, a local Jew who fought in Donetsk on the government's side, told the Post last year. A member of the Dnipro Battalion - which was funded by Dnepropetrovsk's former Jewish regional governor, billionaire oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky - the long-bearded hassidic combat soldier was touted by government officials as a symbol of Ukrainian patriotism.
Many of the Israeli citizens fighting in Ukraine are of Russian and Ukrainian origin, said Rabbi Boruch Gorin, a senior Jewish communal official from Russia.
He accused them of being adventure seekers and said that many serve in support roles, such as training troops.
"I would say [they are] people who are looking for the show, let it be in Ukraine or Sudan, it's no difference," he mused.
"For both sides, the Jewish factor was very important in the beginning of the war. It's less important now but then it was very important to show to both sides that they have the Jews fighting for them [and] the Israelis, and that the Jewish community abroad are their supporters... I think that this is much more PR as usual and there's nothing to talk about."
Levitan, however, disagreed, telling the Post that she saw the conflict as a "huge political game" in which oligarchs are filling their pockets at the expense of the average citizen.
The Western media is distorting the nature of the rebellion in Ukraine, just as it distorts Israel's fight against Palestinian terrorism, she said. "Every Israeli can easily understand that a similar situation occurs in the area of Novorossia."
She has no regrets because she is able to fight for her principles, she continued, adding that being an Israeli and commemorating Holocaust Remembrance Day taught her the importance of standing up to Nazis.
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#21 Sputnik August 17, 2015 Where's My Money? Half of Ukraine's GDP Lost Due to Underground Economy
The size of Ukraine's underground economy has risen to almost 50 percent of the country's GDP, causing the government to lose billions of dollars, Gazeta.ru reported.
During the first quarter of 2015, Ukraine's underground economy increased by another 5 percent and now equals to 47 percent of the country's GDP.
In the past, the Ministry reported that by the end of 2014, the underground economy increased by 7 percent, reaching 42 percent of Ukraine's GDP. At the time, that was an all-time record high since 2007. The 2015 numbers have left last year's record in the dust, Gazeta.ru said.
The above 40 percent index of underground economy is typical for the countries of South America and Africa.
The growth of the informal sector leads to the fact that the country's budget receives fewer taxes, which in Ukraine's case is catastrophic. The country is losing between 2.5 and 3 billion hryvnia a month due to the tax shortage, said Roman Nasirov, the head of Ukraine's fiscal services.
With the start of the heating season in the fall, Ukraine will have to purchase more fuel using its currency which might even further devalue the hryvnia. Afterwards, the country can expect an even more dramatic increase in prices, the source said.
Since the 2014 coup, Ukraine has been on the edge of economic collapse. The country's economy heavily relies on external financial assistance. The overall financial aid package to Kiev amounts to some $40 billion in loans from the IMF, the United States and the European Union.
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#22 http://newcoldwar.org August 20, 2015 Collapse of Ukrainian exports to Russia and Europe in first six months of 2015 'To the shame of the once powerful industrial republic of Ukraine, in 2015, the country's main export commodity has become corn.' [Clearer text and charts here http://newcoldwar.org/collapse-of-ukrainian-exports-to-russia-and-europe-in-first-six-months-of-2015/] Enclosed are three recent news articles from Ukraine reporting on statistics of the economic performance of the country during the first six months of 2015. The numbers have been published by the state statistics bureau of Ukraine. The main article of the three is the second one enclosed here. It is a comprehensive analysis of Ukraine's economic performance since the Maidan counter-revolution, written by Сергей Арбузов, a columnist at Forbes Ukraine. He titles his column 'Corn republic', referring to the high risk of degradation of agricultural production in Euromaidan Ukraine. The country is losing its industries, including food processing, and is in danger of becoming a simple exporter of agricultural and other raw materials. From the column: Is there a way out? Sure there is. Besides the obvious need to stop the war in the Donbas and the resumption of normal trade relations with Russia, it is the search for new markets. These markets, above all, can be Asia. As can be seen from the statistics, the economy is already on the way to feeling out the Asian subcontinent. But in order to export not only corn, funds are needed for modernization and promotion of Ukrainian goods. And here the role of government should be to attract investment, including public investment, especially in the now most vulnerable high-tech production... --- 1. Exports to the EU decreased by 35.6%Eurointegration.com.ua, Friday, August 14, 2015. Translation by New Cold War.org. In the first half of this year, Ukrainian exports to the EU fell by 35.6% over the same period last year. This is according to figures released by the State Statistics Service of Ukraine. Ukraine's exports to Europe, in USD, first half of 2015 (Ukraine is colored yellow on the map) Ukraine's exports to Europe in USD, first half of 2015. The list in red on the left is the percentage decline of exports by country. The largest declines are Cyprus (82%), Belgium (56%), Hungary (51%), Great Britain (49%), and Finland (48%). The graph bars in blue show the only two increases recorded: Malta (697%) and Slovenia (41%). Exports to Europe decreased by 36% and to Commonwealth of Independent States by 54 %. Ukraine is colored yellow on the map. Total exports of goods to EU countries amounted to $6,062,800,000, representing 32.7% of total exports. At the same time, imports from EU countries to Ukraine decreased by 25.7%. In general, according to the State Service statistics, imports from EU countries amounted to $7,389,900,000, or 42.8% of the total. Compared to the first half of 2014, total exports by Ukraine decreased by 35.0%, to $9.988 billion; imports decreased by 38.5%, to $ 10,827,500,000. During January-April this year, Ukrainian exports to the EU fell by 34.4% compared to the same period of last year. But in the coming months in Ukraine, it is expected that exports to Europe will be restored. 2. Corn republicWhere it Ukraine going in its economic ties to Europe?By Сергей Арбузов, columnist, Forbes Ukraine, August 18, 2015. Original in Russian here. [ http://forbes.net.ua/opinions/1400298-kukuruznaya-respublika] Translation to English by New Cold War.org. Just over a year ago was signed the economic part of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU. This event was preceded by months of confrontation on the streets of Kiev, political crisis and a change of government, even though there was no significant controversy between the government of the time and the opposition about European integration. The difference was in the details - in the speed of the process and the assessment of the risks that carried European integration to the economy. However, replacing the voice of a professional discussion, our opponents forced upon society their point of view. Now, after a year and a half, under conditions of war and political instability, it is difficult to give an objective assessment of the choice made by Maidan. However, this period is already quite sufficient to assess the validity of many forecasts and statements. Expectations The main and generally indisputable argument, expressed by the supporters of European integration, was the need to modernize the Ukrainian industry. At the same time, according to the "Euro-optimists", the signing of the EU Association would speed up this process many times thanks to European investment, new technologies and transition to more advanced standards. This, in turn, would help to increase the export of industrial products with high added value, and enter our country in the club of prosperous European states. It was near-to peremptorily stated that after the establishment of a free trade zone with the EU, Ukraine will be able to increase exports in almost all commodity groups. At the same time, our opponents unofficially considered the EU market as a main resource for the Ukrainian economy to reduce dependence on Russia, whose economy they saw as geopolitical threat. Our government, based not on political preferences but economic facts, considered Russia primarily as a major trading partner. At the end of 2013, exports to Russia and the CIS countries accounted for 36% of Ukrainian exports while exports to the EU countries were only 26%. This imposed certain limits on the rhetoric of the government and on the actions that it could take. But, most importantly, unlike our opponents, we did not perceive the Russian factor as a problem. We believed cooperation with the Russian economy was advantageous for Ukraine for many reasons. Last but not least, because Ukraine supplied goods to Russia with a higher added value than it did to other countries. The main commodity groups of Ukrainian exports to Russia in 2013 Title The volume of exports, $ mln Share,% Machinery, equipment and vehicles 5934.2 37.6 Metals and products from them 3425.0 21.7 Foodstuffs and agricultural 2012.7 12.7 Chemicals 1653.9 10.5 Wood and pulp and paper products 955.2 6.0 Mineral products 819.6 5.2 Source: Federal Customs Service of Russia The main commodity groups of Ukrainian exports to the EU in 2013 Title The volume of exports, $ mln Share,% Ferrous metals 4 061.0 24.5 Cereals 1 719.3 10.4 Electrical machinery and equipment 1 492.2 9.0 Ores, slag and ash 1 714.9 10.3 Power supplies 1 047.3 6.3 Seeds and fruits of oil-yielding plants 1 247.6 7.5 Source: Ministry of Finance of Ukraine Top ten Ukrainian exports of goods in 2013 Product Name The volume, $ mln The main buyer Steel semi-finished products 5274.8 Turkey Corn 3833.3 Egypt Iron ore and concentrates 3739.1 China Sunflower oil 3281.3 India Rolled steel with a thickness of 600 mm 2763 Turkey Wheat 1891.5 Egypt Merchandise wagons 1331.4 Russia Fertilizers 1133.5 Turkey Turbojet engines, turbines 1058.6 Russia Corundum, alumina 615.5 Russia Source: HPS Ukraine This structure of exports and the inability to quickly reorient the export of labor-intensive and high-tech products to other countries forced on our government a balanced approach to the issue of cooperation with Russia. We could not allow European integration at the cost of losing the Russian market, knowing that it would lead to irreparable loss to the country. As subsequent events showed, this position was not unreasonable. Reality After creating an association with the EU, our opponents were expecting a significant increase in exports from Ukraine not only to the European Union but also to other foreign markets. According to the calculations carried out in 2013 by the Kyiv School of Economics and actively disseminated in the press, it would increase the share of high-tech products in total exports to 28-29%. At the same time, in the first year, Ukrainian exporters were promised a chance to put on the foreign market $9-10 billion more goods in comparison with the existing trade regime. However, things turned out differently. In 2014, compared with 2013, Ukrainian exports fell by 13.5% - from $ 63.3 billion to $ 54 billion. During the first seven months of 2015, Ukraine sold goods for $21.7 billion. Such a catastrophic collapse occurred because of the losses of the Russian market, which, in spite of this, still remains the main market for Ukraine. According to the State Statistics Service, in 2014, Ukraine reduced export of goods to Russia by 33.7%. In the first half of 2015, exports fell by another 59.4%. All exports to the Russian Federation for the first six months in 2015 amounted to only $ 2.3 billion. Moreover, almost a third are old contracts in the machine construction industry, many of which come to an end this year. This and the continuing significant level of political tension suggest that in the second half of 2015, exports to Russia will continue to decline, to reach $5 billion by year end - a record low for Ukrainian-Russian trade. Thus, contrary to the reassuring statements of our opponents, the EU market could not even partially compensate the losses the country has suffered in Russia and CIS country markets. And it is not the fault of the European partners. On April 23 came into effect the EU autonomous trade preferences under which Ukrainian producers were able to export goods to the EU without paying customs duties. But the producers are not able to take advantage of this opportunity, including because of the evident technological backwardness and a mismatch of industry standards. For the year 2014, exports of goods to the EU countries amounted to $17 billion, or 31.5% of total exports, an increase compared to 2013 of only $ 431.2 million, or 2.6%. At the same time, in 2013, before the signing of the association and the start of the preferences, the increase was 26.6%. In 2015, the situation has worsened. For the six months of this year, the volume of Ukrainian exports amounted to $6 billion, or 32.7% of the total, a decrease compared to the first half of 2014 by 35.6%. It is of no less concern than the decline in exports are causing a change in the structure of exports, which does not benefit Ukraine. We supply less and less machinery and equipment - the most science-intense products - that has caused the crisis in the leading enterprises in Eastern Ukraine. Meanwhile, for Russia, which accounted for the lion's share of supply, decoupling is a lot less painful. With the ability to attract capital, Russia is building new facilities, upgrading old ones and replacing Ukrainian products. The main commodity groups of Ukrainian exports to Russia in 2014 Title The volume of exports, $ mln Share,% Machinery, equipment and vehicles 3 485.2 32.4 Metals and products from them 2 336.3 21.7 Chemicals 1452 695.5 13.5 Foodstuffs and agricultural raw materials 1 005.6 9.4 Mineral products 896.9 8.3 Wood and pulp and paper products 797 787.8 7.4 Source: Federal Customs Service of Russia The main commodity groups of Ukrainian exports to the EU in 2014 Title The volume of exports, $ mln Share,% Ferrous metals 3 891.4 22.9 Cereals 1 805.4 10.6 Electrical machinery and equipment 1 649.7 9.7 Ores, slag and ash 1 582.1 9.3 Power supplies 1 030.4 6.1 Seeds and fruits of oil-yielding plants 919.0 5.4 Source: Ministry of Finance of Ukraine Ukraine has not found new markets in the EU. Products which we sold in Russia, as one could expect, are not needed in the EU. As a result, in the last 1.5 years, heavy machinery products have completely disappeared from the top ten export products of Ukraine and the proportion of metallurgical industry has fallen significantly. In first place now are agricultural products. To the shame of the once powerful industrial republic, in 2015, its main export commodity became corn. From the beginning of the year, more than $2 billion worth has been sold. In second place of exports for Ukraine is - sunflower oil.[1] Products with a high degree of processing, such as machine building, chemical and food industries, are reduced to less than 10%. Ukraine has de facto turned into a raw materials appendage of the Asian and African countries. Only the absence of banana production separates Ukraine from the new title of "banana republic". The main commodity groups of Ukrainian exports in first seven months of 2015 Title The volume of exports, $ mln Share,% Ferrous metals 5062.9 23.32 Cereals 3092.8 14.2 Fats and oils 1861.386 8.57 Ores, slag and ash 1395.3 6.43 Electrical machinery and equipment 1107 5.10 Reactors, boilers, and equipment 1049 4.83 Wood and timber 641.9 2.96 Ferrous metal products 575.3 2.65 Source: HPS Ukraine Top 10 most purchased Ukrainian goods for first seven months of 2015 Product Name The volume, $ mln The main buyer Corn 2099.9 China Sunflower oil 1747.2 India Steel semi-finished products 1555.3 Egypt Iron ore and concentrates 1334.6 China Rolled steel with a thickness of 600 mm 979.2 Turkey Wheat 798.5 Egypt Ferroalloys 570.7 Netherlands Rods and steel bars, unwrought. 538.3 Iraq Byproducts from production of vegetable oils 455.3 France Corundum, alumina 269.6 Russia Source: HPS Ukraine Against this background, official statements about reducing dependence on Russian market do not sound very convincing. In the same way as statements of leveling the trade balance. A slight trade surplus which appeared lately is of little help against the backdrop of an enormous outflow of foreign investment; rather, it indicates serious problems in the economy. Falling imports are due to both the reduction of consumer goods demand, due to the impoverishment of the population, and the reduction in imports of components parts, which are simply not needed under conditions of a collapse of industrial cooperation with Russia and with the CIS. A trade surplus reached at such a cost is no cause for joy. Problem in 2016 Unfortunately, the bad news for the Ukrainian economy does not end there. And the source of the bad news, again, promises to be the association agreement with the EU. Next year, thelist of losers will be supplemented by enterprises serving the domestic market. On January 1, 2016, the agreement on a free trade zone between Ukraine and the European Union comes into force. It provides for the abolition or significant reduction of about 95% of tariff duties. This means that we will drop protections from European consumer goods and Ukrainian producers will have to compete with the Europeans not only externally but also domestically. The result of such competition in conditions of the complete cessation of credit and a lack of investment to modernize production is easy to predict. It's safe to say that for the sake of signing the association with the EU, the country made considerable sacrifices. And it may be that many of them were made to no purpose. According to the document signed last year, Ukraine is given from four to ten years to synchronize to EU standards the production, storage and transportation of goods. There is no doubt that in the current circumstances, domestic business does not have the money for that. This means that Ukraine will have to revise the terms of the association, and the enforcement of many regulations will be postponed to a later date. In fact, Ukraine will have to do what our government proposed to do in 2013. Is there a way out? Sure there is. Besides the obvious need to stop the war in the Donbas and the resumption of normal trade relations with Russia, it is the search for new markets. These markets, above all, can be Asian countries. As the statistics show, the economy is already on the way to feeling out the Asian subcontinent by itself. But in order to export to there not just corn, funds are needed for modernization and promotion of Ukrainian goods. And here the role of government should be to attract investment, including state investment, especially in the now most vulnerable science-intense industries. Another source for economic growth and exit from the crisis could be the internal market. But Ukraine would have to agree to negotiate the postponement of the introduction of a free trade zone with the EU for at least another year, and also seriously address the need for growth in domestic demand, starting with income growth. All the measures in question are not compatible with the policy pursued by the present government under the leadership of the IMF. Therefore it is obvious that the implementation of an anti-crisis plan will need radical solutions, and not just solutions to the long-standing problems with cadres. The future of our country depends on whether the president and Rada deputies will be able to make these very difficult decisions. Note by New Cold War.org: [1] Ukrainian farmers know very well that corn and sunflower are two crops which strip soils of nutrients and require high fertilizer inputs. An opening of the floodgates to plantings of these crops by an expanding agro-industry in Ukraine is not good news for ecologically aware agriculture in the country. A correspondent in Ukraine writes, "Collective farms in Soviet Ukraine usually planted no more than 10-15 per cent of the land with corn and sunflower. Rotation of the plantings of these crops was carefully adhered to. Nowadays, as I travel through Ukraine, I see almost everywhere fields of corn and sunflower. There is a risk that the rich, 'black' soil of Ukraine will be quickly exhausted. And today's farmers cannot afford expensive fertilizers." 3. Ukrainian exports: Has the bottom been reached?Yury Panchenko, Eurointegration.com/ua, August 17, 2015. Translation by New Cold War.org. Ukrainian exports have gone through a year of falling. If we recall that the rapid reduction of the Ukrainian economy (as well as exports) started in the middle of last year [2014], the statistics for the first half of 2015 are the best illustration of a "bottom" being reached. In the first half of this year, Ukrainian exports declined 35% (to $ 8.5 billion). Imports declined even more rapidly - by 38.5%. As a result, foreign trade surplus for the year has more than tripled - from $408 million to $ 1.25 billion. Fresh statistics for the first six months of 2015 from the State Statistics Service shows the new economic reality of Ukraine. First of all - a sharp reduction of deliveries to Russia and CIS countries. The overall drop in trade with the CIS countries was 54% - to $ 3.78 billion. Taking into account that exports to the EU in the same period totaled $ 6.06 billion, it turns out that the European market is 1.5 times more than that of the CIS countries. The fall in exports to the CIS was expected. At the same time, decreases of exports to the EU were 36%. In the next quarter, we expect gradual improvement in the statistics. However, the reason for this is primarily an effect of the change of the base of statistical comparison, because now we will compare this year's results with the period of the beginning of the rapid fall of the Ukrainian economy. Recall that according to the results of the first half of 2014, the growth rate of exports to the EU were 14.9%. But decreases began in the third quarter of the year. This is largely due to the military conflict in the Donbass, which strongly affected exports of Ukrainian metallurgy products. Until recently, these were a key article of Ukrainian exports to the EU. In the coming months, Ukraine may face new challenges. We can predict significant sales of agricultural products beginning in September. This additional inflow of foreign currency into the country would be able to stabilize the hryvnia exchange rate, but the current world price for wheat is 15% lower than last year! What may further facilitate the entry of Ukrainian goods to the EU? Recall that in our relations with Europe we now have a regime of preferences in which Ukrainian producers do not have to pay customs duties when exporting to the EU. But even in this situation, Ukrainian exports to the EU continue to fall! On the optimistic side, a significant number of new Ukrainian companies have begun in recent months to reach into European markets. According to the Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting, from the early April 2014 till the end of that year, 5,302 enterprises which had not before exported to the EU market began to do so. However, another 2,299 enterprises which were exporting to the EU previously ceased doing so. The problem is that it was large enterprises that exited European markets, including those from Donbass region. It was smaller companies, instead, which began entering EU markets. However, the very large number of new companies, which started to work in the EU, gives a hope for a rapid growth in exports. Traditionally, economic progress can be expected by the second year of entering a new market. That is why those Ukrainian companies that entered the European market last year are gradually adapting to the new environment and beginning to compete in the new market more effectively. Until that began happening, the main buyers of Ukrainian products were so-called "third world countries", not least because access to these markets does not require from enterprises such changes as compared to exporting to the EU. These [third world country] markets cushioned Ukrainian exports from an even larger fall. In particular, Ukraine's export to Iran grew up by 30,9%. Given the fact that sanctions against Iran have been lifted, this country can quickly return to oil and gas markets, becoming thus a very promising product market for many countries. Also, there is a slight increase of Ukrainian exports to China (0.5%) and South Korea (2.6%). Two important markets for Ukraine - Turkey and Egypt - are now showing a fall of about 20%. This drop is due to the numerous restrictions for Ukrainian exporters which government officials have not had the time to resolve. In sum, Ukrainian export recovery depends on the speed of adaptation of Ukrainian business to the terms of EU trade and on the government's assistance to companies operating in eastern markets. Progress in these areas should protect the Ukrainian economy from the new restrictions imposed by Russia. How successful this will be will be shown to readers of Yevropravda [European Truth, a Ukrainian media] in the coming months in our new infographics of foreign trade.
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#23 Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Russian foreign minister answers media questions in Crimea Text of report "Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov answers media questions following the Russian Security Council meeting, Sevastopol, 19 August 2015"
Meeting of Ukrainian, German and French leaders
Question: How does the Russian side assess the forthcoming round of the Normandy format talks, which is planned to be held without Russia's participation?
Sergey Lavrov: This meeting is not part of the Normandy format, but a trilateral meeting of the leaders of Germany, France and Ukraine. We are closely following the preparations for this meeting. Likewise, we will closely watch how it ends. We strongly believe that Kiev needs an additional prod to persuade it that the arrangements and commitments made in Minsk on 12 February must be complied with. The Normandy format is a parallel process. It does not apply to trilateral relations between Berlin, Paris and Kiev.
With regard to the Normandy format, there is an understanding that our German colleagues will have a meeting with the participation of legal experts from four countries tomorrow. Several days ago, I spoke with German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, who put forward this idea. I asked him what these legal experts from Germany, France, Russia and Ukraine would discuss. He said that they need to discuss the progress of constitutional reform, to which I, of course, replied that, with the Minsk agreements in place, such issues must be discussed with the participation of Donetsk and Lugansk. Kiev, under the Minsk-2 agreements, is supposed to agree the constitutional amendments, which involve specific issues related to the decentralization of power in favour of the proclaimed Donetsk and Lugansk republics, which will be part of Ukraine but enjoy a special status, directly with these republics. Mr Steinmeier confirmed that the Minsk agreements remain immutable, and Germany continues to work to ensure full compliance, and the legal experts' meeting in Berlin, which he suggested holding on 20 August, will serve precisely this purpose. In this context, we are not opposed to such contact, and it will take place tomorrow.
I was surprised by a statement issued by the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, though, which says (I'm not sure about the exact wording) that the experts are meeting to explain to the Russian representatives that President Poroshenko's proposal to amend the Constitution, which was adopted by the Verkhovna Rada [Ukrainian Supreme Council], does not violate the Minsk agreements. Then, it also said something to the effect that such amendments are the prerogative of the Ukrainian state, and no one can interfere in them in any way; therefore, the wrong interpretation by the Russian side of the Minsk agreements should not be taken into account. Leaving aside the rollicking tone of this statement, I can say that this statement, of course, represents an absolute lack of diplomatic expertise, as the Minsk agreements are available, they are not some kind of fiction, and they've been approved by a resolution of the UN Security Council, so they are binding. I'm confident that tomorrow's meeting of the experts in the Normandy format will dot all the i's and make it clear to everyone that the Ukrainian side is not fulfilling its obligations. We also expect that on August 24, when Chancellor Merkel, President Hollande and President Poroshenko get together for a scheduled meeting, Germany and France will do their best, as compliance guarantors, to ensure the unconditional fulfilment of the Minsk agreements. That would make sense, as two days after the Berlin trilateral summit, on 26 August, the Contact Group and its working groups will meet as planned.
Question: Can the tripartite meeting then be called disciplinary to a certain degree?
Sergey Lavrov: I hope that this will be the case.
US concerns over Russian-Iranian ties
Question: What do you say to US statements that it plans to examine the agreements on supplies between Russia and Iran for compliance with the US sanctions against Iran?
Sergey Lavrov: The US sanctions are none of our concern. We comply only with our international obligations. In regard to penalties, they include, above all, the ones approved by the UN Security Council's resolutions. We have no interest in any third-party restrictions that were introduced in circumvention of the Security Council and in violation of the universally recognized norms of international law. So, our American colleagues can go ahead and examine them. Perhaps, it would be useful for them to learn that not everything is amenable to their understanding of international law.
Putin to go to UN General Assembly, "will consider" meeting Obama
Question: You mentioned the United Nations. Has Russia decided already whether President Putin will attend the 70th session of the UN General Assembly?
Sergey Lavrov: President Putin plans to participate in the 70th session of the UN General Assembly. This is a big event in the life of the UN. This year, we celebrate the 70th anniversary of this forum, which was created after the victory in the Great Patriotic War and World War II. A record number of heads of state and government are expected to come. Our President also plans to participate in this event.
Question: Is a bilateral meeting with President Obama possible?
Sergey Lavrov: Our American colleagues are sending us signals that they are willing to continue maintaining contacts with us. If there is such a proposal on their behalf, I think President Putin will consider it in a constructive manner. Notably, the UN General Assembly will not be the only forum this autumn, where the presidents of Russia and the United States plan to participate. In addition to meetings during the 70th anniversary of the UN, there will be a G20 summit in Antalya, Turkey, and an APEC summit in the Philippines in November.
No "Normandy Four" summit planned
Question: Are there any plans to hold Normandy Four meetings at the highest level yet in the near future?
Sergey Lavrov: No one has yet come up with such a proposal.
Russian Railways chief's diplomatic rank
Question: Could you please clarify if Russian Railways President Yakunin was granted ambassadorship?
Sergey Lavrov: No, I can't. We have much paperwork going on in that department, so there's nothing specific that I can tell you as of this moment.
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#24 www.rt.com August 21, 2015 Russians & Ukrainians not brothers, Ukrainian president claims
President Petro Poroshenko dismissed the notion that Russians and Ukrainians share a brotherly tie. However, ethnic Russians are the largest minority in Ukraine, comprising at least 17 percent of its population.
Talking to a senior retired Ukrainian diplomat, Yury Shcherbak, who acted as Ukraine's ambassador to the US, Canada and Israel during his career, Poroshenko agreed that the brotherhood of Ukrainians and Russians is "a mythology of [Russian President Vladimir] Putin's."
"You've hit nail on the head. We don't have any brotherly peoples in this current war. There are united Ukrainian peoples on their way to Europe and then there the Russian people, who are in a deep crisis," the Ukrainian leader claimed on Thursday, as cited on the presidential website.
Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians are three closely related Slavic peoples sharing centuries of common history and life in a common country. In Russia, Ukrainians are considered brothers - often with the implication that Russians are the "elder brother" in the family.
The notion, however, is rejected by many nationalist Ukrainians, who believe that Russians have historically subjugated and oppressed Ukrainians, denying them statehood. After the nationalist-driven armed coup in Kiev last year, the secession of predominantly-Russian Crimea and the uprising of rebel forces in the East, many of whom are ethnic Russians, the nationalist agenda was pushed to the top of political discourse in Ukraine.
Poroshenko's scathing remark came after a recent comment by Putin that Ukraine was currently under foreign governance and that it was humiliating to the Ukrainian people. The Russian leader was referring to a significant number of foreign nationals holding key position in the Ukrainian government.
According to the latest 2001 census, more than 8.3 million people in Ukraine, or over 17 percent, identified themselves as Russians. Some demography experts believe the actual figure may be higher, citing an unexpectedly sizeable 3-million decrease in the figure since the 1989 census and the fact that roughly a third of Ukrainian citizens considered Russian as their native language.
Among the figures who promulgated the "we are not brothers" idea in Ukraine after the Maidan protests was the young poet Anastasia Dmitruk. A video of her reading her poem "We will never be brothers" praising Ukrainians and scorning Russians, has scored over 2.7 million views on YouTube since its publication in March last year, while a music video to the lyrics has surpassed 5.8 million.
The sense of threat from Ukrainian nationalists felt by ethnic Russians was a key factor in prompting people in eastern Ukraine to defy Kiev and take up arms. The civil war that followed has claimed more than 6,000 lives, according to a UN count in March, and is likely higher, considering that both parties downplay casualties.
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#25 Bloomberg August 21, 2015 U.S. Told Ukraine to Stand Down as Putin Invaded By Josh Rogin and Eli Lake
As Russian President Vladimir Putin's forces took over Ukraine's Crimean peninsula in early 2014, the interim Ukrainian government was debating whether or not to fight back against the "little green men" Russia had deployed. But the message from the Barack Obama administration was clear: avoid military confrontation with Moscow.
The White House's message to Kiev was advice, not an order, U.S. and Ukrainian officials have recently told us, and was based on a variety of factors. There was a lack of clarity about what Russia was really doing on the ground. The Ukrainian military was in no shape to confront the Russian Spetsnaz (special operations) forces that were swarming on the Crimean peninsula. Moreover, the Ukrainian government in Kiev was only an interim administration until the country would vote in elections a few months later. Ukrainian officials told us that other European governments sent Kiev a similar message.
But the main concern was Russian President Vladimir Putin.
As U.S. officials told us recently, the White House feared that if the Ukrainian military fought in Crimea, it would give Putin justification to launch greater military intervention in Ukraine, using similar logic to what Moscow employed in 2008 when Putin invaded large parts of Georgia in response to a pre-emptive attack by the Tbilisi government. Russian forces occupy two Georgian provinces to this day.
Looking back today, many experts and officials point to the decision not to stand and fight in Crimea as the beginning of a Ukraine policy based on the assumption that avoiding conflict with Moscow would temper Putin's aggression. But that was a miscalculation. Almost two years later, Crimea is all but forgotten, Russian-backed separatist forces are in control of two large Ukrainian provinces, and the shaky cease-fire between the two sides is in danger of collapsing.
"Part of the pattern we see in Russian behavior is to test and probe when not faced with pushback or opposition," said Damon Wilson, the vice president for programming at the Atlantic Council. "Russia's ambitions grow when they are not initially challenged. The way Crimea played out, Putin had a policy of deniability, there could have been a chance for Russia to walk away."
When Russian special operations forces, military units and intelligence officers seized Crimea, it surprised the U.S. government. Intelligence analysts had briefed Congress 24 hours before the stealth invasion, saying the Russian troop buildup on Ukraine's border was a bluff. Ukraine's government -- pieced together after President Viktor Yanukovych fled Kiev for Russia following civil unrest -- was in a state of crisis. The country was preparing for elections and its military was largely dilapidated and unprepared for war.
There was a debate inside the Kiev government as well. Some argued the nation should scramble its forces to Crimea to respond. As part of that process, the Ukrainian government asked Washington what military support the U.S. would provide. Without quick and substantial American assistance, Ukrainians knew, a military operation to defend Crimea could not have had much chance for success.
"I don't think the Ukrainian military was well prepared to manage the significant challenge of the major Russian military and stealth incursion on its territory," said Andrew Weiss, a Russia expert and vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment, told us. This was also the view of many in the U.S. military and intelligence community at the time.
There was also the Putin factor. In the weeks and months before the Crimea operation, Russia's president was stirring up his own population about the threat Russian-speakers faced in Ukraine and other former Soviet Republics.
"They did face a trap," said the Atlantic Council's Wilson, who was the senior director for Europe at the National Security Council when Russia invaded Georgia in 2008. "Any Ukrainian violent reaction to any of these unknown Russian speakers would have played into the narrative that Putin already created, that Ukraine's actions threaten Russian lives and he would have pretext to say he was sending Russian forces to save threatened Russians."
The White House declined to comment on any internal communications with the Ukrainian government. A senior administration official told us that the U.S. does not recognize Russia's occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea, and pointed to a series of sanctions the U.S. and Europe have placed on Russia since the Ukraine crisis began.
"We remain committed to maintaining pressure on Russia to fulfill its commitments under the Minsk agreements and restore Ukraine's territorial integrity, including Crimea," the senior administration official said.
Ever since the annexation of Crimea in March, 2014, there have been a group of senior officials inside the administration who have been advocating unsuccessfully for Obama to approve lethal aid to the Ukrainian military. These officials have reportedly included Secretary of State John Kerry, his top Europe official, Victoria Nuland, Defense Secretary Ashton Carter, and General Philip Breedlove, the supreme allied commander for NATO.
Obama has told lawmakers in private meetings that his decision not to arm the Ukrainians was in part due to a desire to avoid direct military confrontation with Russia, one Republican lawmaker who met with Obama on the subject told us. The U.S. has pledged a significant amount of non-lethal aid to the Ukrainian military, but delivery of that aid has often been delayed. Meanwhile, Russian direct military involvement in Eastern Ukraine has continued at a high level.
Even former Obama administration Russia officials acknowledge that Ukraine's decision last year to cede Crimea to Moscow, while making sense at the time, has also resulted in more aggression by Putin.
"Would a devastating defeat in Crimea serve the interest of the interim government? Probably not," said Michael McFaul, who served as ambassador to Russia under Obama and is now a scholar at Stanford University's Hoover Institution. But nonetheless, McFaul said, the ease with which Putin was able to take Crimea likely influenced his decision to expand Russia's campaign in eastern Ukraine: "I think Putin was surprised at how easy Crimea went and therefore when somebody said let's see what else we can do, he decided to gamble."
The Obama administration, led on this issue by Kerry, is still pursuing a reboot of U.S.-Russia relations. After a long period of coolness, Kerry's visit to Putin in Sochi in May was the start of a broad effort to seek U.S.-Russian cooperation on a range of issues including the Syrian civil war. For the White House, the Ukraine crisis is one problem in a broader strategic relationship between two world powers.
But for the Ukrainians, Russia's continued military intervention in their country is an existential issue, and they are pleading for more help. While many Ukrainians agreed in early 2014 that fighting back against Russia was too risky, that calculation has now changed. The Ukrainian military is fighting Russian forces elsewhere, and Putin is again using the threat of further intervention to scare off more support from the West. If help doesn't come, Putin may conclude he won't pay a price for meddling even further.
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#26 New York Times August 21, 2015 Editorial Putin vs. Parmesan
In the Soviet era, the political joke was the first line of defense against the machinery of repression. The jokes are cropping up again, many over Vladimir Putin's zany crackdown on European flowers and food imports, like the satirical video "Death of a Parmesan," in which the destruction of foreign cheeses becomes a ballad about a heroic military campaign. "This song is about the unusual stupidity of today's Russia," reads the caption.
The crackdown began with Mr. Putin's decree on July 29 ordering the destruction of all food brought into Russia in violation of a ban on food imports from Western countries participating in economic and travel sanctions against Russia over the annexation of Crimea. That resulted in the well-publicized destruction of mountains of meat, vegetables and cheese.
This week, the big news was a huge police raid on an "international criminal gang" peddling illicit cheese, prompting the latest round of jokes. At the same time, Russian agricultural inspectors have begun destroying piles of Dutch flowers, purportedly because they carry insects, but really to dissuade the Netherlands from pursuing an investigation into the downing of a Malaysian jetliner over Ukraine, in which most victims were Dutch.
The politicization of food is not new in Mr. Putin's Russia: Polish meat, Georgian and Moldovan wines and Ukrainian chocolate are among the products banned at one time or another, usually under trumped-up health concerns, to score political points.
That looks like cutting off the nose to spite the face, especially at a time when Russians are experiencing the first sustained decline in living standards in the 15 years since Mr. Putin first came to power. But Mr. Putin's instinctive response to any problem is usually to blame the West and its "agents" in Russia.
The message he apparently wants to get across is that Russia is standing up to the perfidious West, whether by bravely destroying its food or blocking its bugs. A subsidiary hope is that restricting imports will bolster Russian production and reduce the resources spent on fancy foreign goods that flowed into the country in better days, and have continued to flow courtesy of smugglers and corrupt officials.
It is difficult to measure the effectiveness of the measures or their political impact, but Mr. Putin still appears to be enormously popular with the masses. Equally clearly, there is an educated layer of the population that doesn't buy into the Western conspiracies or Ukrainian adventures and sees Mr. Putin's war on food for the propaganda gimmick it is.
The fact is that the Russian economy is being battered by low oil prices and Western sanctions: The economy contracted by 4.6 percent in the second quarter compared with the same period last year, and inflation is sapping the purchasing power of Russian wages and pensions. Encouraging self-sufficiency makes sense in these conditions, but it is a slow process, and in any case is not likely to seriously reduce smuggling.
Fooling his people may buy Mr. Putin time, and Russians are famously capable of sacrifice. But time and sacrifice will be useful only if Mr. Putin starts to come clean with his people, instead of feeding them propaganda, and begins to look for real solutions to the mess in Ukraine instead of inventing Western conspiracies.
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#27 RFE/RL August 20, 2015 Unlike Stalin's Show-Trial Victims, Russia's Political Defendants Don't Back Down by Robert Coalson
There are, of course, many differences between the infamous show trials of Josef Stalin's Great Terror and the politically convenient prosecutions of the political adversaries of Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Stalin liked to try his victims in huge mass productions on blatantly political charges and then march them off for summary execution almost before the ink dried on the foreordained verdict. Putin often prefers apparently nonpolitical charges like tax evasion and is content with prison sentences upon conviction. He even sometimes grants early release to targeted individuals, whereas Stalin's victims had to wait decades for posthumous rehabilitation.
But another big difference is the tone and content of the defendants' closing speeches. The defiant, impassioned, and principled closing speech -- despite usually being impromptu -- has become a new literary genre in Putin's Russia.
Bolshevik leader Grigory Zinoviev was convicted and executed in August 1936, despite giving a closing speech that opened with: "I want to say once again that I admit that I am fully and completely guilty. I am guilty of having been an organizer of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc, second only to Trotsky, a bloc that set itself the aim of assassinating Stalin...and a number of other leaders of the party and the government.
"My defective Bolshevism became transformed into anti-Bolshevism, and through Trotskyism, I arrived at fascism." "I did not shrink from terrorism or from agreement with the fascists," said Valentin Olberg, a defendant in the same trial.
Bolshevik Nikolai Krestinsky, who was convicted and executed in March 1938, was something of an exception. On the first day of his trial, he said: "I do not recognize that I am guilty. I am not a Trotskyite....Nor have I committed a single one of the crimes imputed to me."
The next day, following a night in the hands of Stalin's secret police, he made a stunning about-face: "Yesterday, under the influence of a momentary keen feeling of false shame...I could not bring myself to tell the truth. I could not bring myself to say that I was guilty." Bolshevik ideologist Nikolai Bukharin likewise confessed, saying that in prison he had realized that "everything positive that glistens in the Soviet Union acquires new dimensions in a man's mind. This in the end disarmed me completely and led me to bend my knees before the party and the country." He was convicted on March 13, 1938, and executed two days later.
After Stalin, the fear of the Soviet government eased up and defendants in political trials were more forthright.
Writer Yury Daniel, who was convicted of "anti-Soviet activity" in a 1967 trial with fellow writer Andrei Sinyavsky, confessed to harming the Soviet Union by publishing his stories abroad but rejected the accusations that his books were "anti-Soviet." In concluding his final statement, he said: "I want to say that no criminal charges, no accusations can prevent us -- Sinyavsky and myself -- from feeling that we are human beings who love our country and our people. That is all. I am ready to hear the verdict."
In Putin's era, the defendants in political trials have uniformly defied the courts and spoken openly about the manipulation of the legal system and the perversion of justice in Russia.
Here are excerpts from the closing speeches of the defendants in the most prominent political trials since Putin took office.
Mikhail Khodorkovsky, April 11, 2005 " Everyone knows that I am not guilty of the crimes of which I am accused. That is why I have no intention of asking for clemency. It will be a shame for myself and for my country if the prosecutor's direct and unabashed deception of the judge is accepted as legal.
"I was in shock when the court and my lawyers explained it all to me. It will be unfortunate if the entire country comes to know that the court is acting under the influence of bureaucrats in the Kremlin and prosecutors.... I believe that my country, Russia, will be a country of justice and law. That is why this court must pronounce a verdict in accordance with justice and the law."
Mikhail Khodorkovsky, November 2, 2010 "I am not exaggerating, your honor, when I say that millions of people around the country and the world are following this trial. They are following it with hope that Russia will nonetheless become a country of freedom and law, where the law is above the bureaucracy. Where the support of opposition political parties will not be a cause for repression. Where the security services will defend the people and the law, instead of defending the bureaucracy from the people and from the law. Where human rights will no longer depend on the mood of the tsar, whether it is good or bad. And where, on the contrary, the government will genuinely depend on the citizenry and the court, only on the law and God or, if you prefer, call it your conscience. I personally believe this will come to pass.
"I am not an ideal person, but I am a man of ideas. And it is hard for me, as for anyone, to live in prison. And I do not want to die here. But if that is necessary, then I will not hesitate. My faith is worth my life. I think that I have proven that."
Pussy Riot defendant Maria Alyokhina, August 8, 2012
"The people of our country have ceased to feel that the territory of our country belongs to them -- the citizenry. People have ceased to feel that they are citizens. They simply feel like automated masses. They don't even think that they own the forest that grows near their homes. I even doubt that they recognize that they own their own homes.
"Someday a bulldozer could pull up to their door and someone could say: 'Excuse me, you need to evacuate; we are going to tear down your home now. Here is going to be the home of a bureaucrat.' These people would quietly gather their things, pack their bags, and go into the street. And they will sit there until the government tells them what to do next. They are completely amorphous, and this is very sad. Having spent almost half a year in jail, I have understood that prison is just Russia in miniature."
Pussy Riot defendant Nadezhda Tolokonnikova, August 8, 2012 "All of the witnesses for the defense testified as to the absence of any manifestations of hatred or enmity [in our performances]. Moreover, in addition to all the other assessments, I ask you to consider the results of the psychological evaluation I underwent at the request of the remand prison. The experts said that the values that I uphold in life are justice, mutual respect, humanism, equality, and freedom. This was said by an expert, a man who does not know me, and most likely the prosecutor would have wanted this expert to write something else. But apparently there are still people who love and value the truth. The Bible is right about this.
"And in conclusion, I would like to quote a song by Pussy Riot because, as strange as it would seem, all of them have turned out to be prophetic, including our prophecy that the head of the KGB and the main saint would lead the protesters under guard to prison -- that is about us. But the one I want to quote now is this: 'Open all the doors and take off your epaulets, and breathe with us the scent of freedom.' That's all."
Aleksei Navalny, December 12, 2014 "I want to call on everyone to stop living by lies. I want to say that I am absolutely certain that if they isolate me, if they imprison me, someone else will come and take my place. I didn't do anything unique or complicated. Everything that I have done, anyone can do. I am certain that the Fund Against Corruption will somehow find the people to continue exactly the same as before regardless of what this court decides."
Aleksei Gaskarov, August 4, 2014 "I do not want this trial to follow any political goals that were imposed on it from outside -- and in the case materials, there is plenty of that. Instead, I want us to be judged for what we really did. But if the path to freedom in this country passes through prison -- we are prepared to walk it."
Aleksander Byvshev, July 7, 2015 Byvshev is a poet convicted of extremism for his poem titled To Ukrainian Patriots and sentenced to six months of labor and a ban on working as a teacher. July 7, 2015: "I say once again that I fulfilled my duty as a poet and a citizen and I am not ashamed of a single word that I have written. My conscience is clean and I have nothing to apologize for. I am an honest person and I can look people straight in the eye. Let history judge us."
Oleh Sentsov, August 19, 2015 "There is yet another part of the Russian population that knows perfectly well what is going on. That does not believe in the tales of your agitprop. That understands what is happening in the world -- what horrible crimes your leadership is committing. But these people are afraid of something. They think that nothing can be changed. That everything will continue as it is. That the system cannot be broken. That they are alone. That there are few of us. That we will all be thrown into prison. That they will kill us, destroy us. And they sit quietly as mice in their holes.
"We also had a criminal regime, but we came out against it. They didn't want to listen to us -- we beat on trash cans. They didn't want to see us -- we set tires on fire. In the end, we won. The same thing will happen with you, sooner or later. I don't know what form it will take and I don't wish to see anyone suffer. I simply wish for you to no longer be governed by criminals."
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#28 The Hill August 20, 2015 Pentagon chief: Russia is a 'very significant threat' By Kristina Wong
Defense Secretary Ash Carter is calling Russia a "very, very significant threat," agreeing with an assessment made by top military officials.
A chorus of top military officials have said recently that Russia is the top threat to the U.S.'s national security in comparison to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.
At a Pentagon press conference, Carter said he agreed with their assessment that Russia is an existential threat to the U.S., "by virtue simply of the size of the nuclear arsenal that it's had."
"Now, that's not new," he added. "What's new -- and I think also that they were pointing to and where I agree with them -- is that for a quarter century or so, since the end of the Cold War, we have not regarded Russia as an antagonist.
"Vladimir Putin's Russia behaves, in many respects, as -- in some respects and in very important respects, as an antagonist. That is new. That is something, therefore, that we need to adjust to and counter," Carter continued.
He also laid out the Pentagon's strategy in countering Russia -- an approach he called "strong and balanced."
"The strong part means we are adjusting our capabilities qualitative and in terms of their deployments, to take account of this behavior of Russia," he said.
"We are also working with NATO in new ways, a new playbook, so to speak, for NATO... more oriented towards deterrence on its eastern border and with hardening countries [on] the borders of Russia, NATO members and non-NATO members, to the kind of hybrid warfare influence or little green man kind of influence that we see associated with Russia in Ukraine," he said.
The so-called little green men refer to Russian forces in green military uniforms acting in Ukraine.
However, Carter said the U.S. would continue to work with Russia on areas where both countries' interests align.
"The balanced part is we continue to work with Russia because you can't paint all their behavior with one brush. There are places where they are working with us: in counterterrorism in many important respects, in some respects, with respect to North Korea, in some respects with respect to Iran and elsewhere," he said.
"So where Russia sees its interests as aligned with ours, we can work with them and will continue to do that," Carter added.
Russian troops last year invaded Ukraine and annexed the Crimean peninsula, prompting the U.S. and Western allies to impose several rounds of sanctions on Moscow.
Despite a ceasefire was negotiated late last year, Ukrainian forces are locked in heavy battle with the separatists, who U.S. and Western officials say are armed and trained by Russian forces.
"We'll continue to hold open the door so that if either under Vladimir Putin or some successor of his in the future, there's a leadership that wants to take Russia in the direction that, I believe, is best for Russia," Carter said.
He said a new direction would be "not one of confrontation with the rest of the world and self-isolation, which is the path they're on now, but better economic and political integration with the rest of the world."
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#29 Vice.com August 21, 2015 The US Army's Top General Points a Spear at Russia By Ryan Faith
"We know the Russians are getting ready for something. We just don't know where."
General Raymond Odierno, then the top general in the US Army, said this to me a week before he retired on August 14. We were at a military exercise in the Mojave Desert, and Odierno was watching through a night-vision scope as Special Operations soldiers from the 75th Ranger Regiment touched down in tilt-rotor Ospreys and seized and cleared a runway several hundred feet away. This was Operation Dragon Spear, the last major military exercise Odierno observed before his retirement.
The scenario in the exercise centered on the trials and tribulations of America's put-upon allies, the Atropians, and their jerkwad neighbors to the north, the Donovians. In Atropia, pro-Donovian forces known as the Bilasuvar National Freedom Movement, along with their armed wing, the Bilasuvar Freedom Brigade, were in cahoots with the CASTRO criminal-terrorist network, and were up to all manner of naughty stuff. This was especially bad news, what with Atropia's valuable reserves of the nerve-gas antidote Atropine.
Just to be clear - and to avoid shouts of "No blood for Atropine!" - the military made up all of that for the exercise. But it wasn't mere playtime; there are some very important reasons why hundreds of US soldiers jumped out of perfectly good airplanes in complete darkness to defend a fictional country from a non-existent enemy.
And it all has to do with Odierno's extremely unusual comment.
* * *
Six or seven hours before paratroopers were scheduled to jump, Odierno and General Joseph Votel, commander of US Special Operations Command, gave a short briefing to the assembled press, explaining some of the reasons behind Operation Dragon Spear. Planning for the exercise - it was intended in part to demonstrate the close working relationship and integration between Special Forces and conventional soldiers - began about a year ago, Odierno said.
About a year ago was also when the conflict in Ukraine started to rapidly widen. Surface-to-air missiles were being deployed in earnest by the separatists as direct Russian involvement ratcheted up. The US State Department issued a release condemning Russian involvement and escalation on July 14, 2014, the same day a Ukrainian military transport was shot down; three days later, Malaysian Airlines flight 17 was shot down, killing everyone on board; on Sunday, July 27, the US State Department released satellite photos showing Russian artillery firing from Russian soil into Ukrainian territory. This was a pretty good sign that the Kremlin wasn't content to leave the fighting in Ukraine as a completely "independent" - wink, wink - insurrection, and had ticked over into a straight-up military invasion.
It was, as Western military planners were beginning to take note, a hybrid war - an "all of the above" way of fighting that encompasses everything from street-level criminal activity, to insurgency, to Special Forces operations, to advanced multi-million dollar conventional weapons systems. It includes both good ol' fashioned propaganda and bleeding-edge cyber attacks.
Thus, it's reasonable to surmise that Odierno and Votel sat down over some brewskis - or whatever it is that four-star generals have whilst deciding the fate of the world - and agreed the US should conduct an exercise showing that the military could both fight back against another country's heavyweight military and face down a hybrid threat. Successfully doing so would deter Russia, reassure NATO allies, and prove that the US Army could actually operate in this Brave New World. It would also knock some rust off of the military after more than a decade of focusing on fighting insurgents. Thus, Operation Dragon Spear was born.
This is not to say that Dragon Spear was modeled on a US intervention in Ukraine. It was, however, almost certainly modeled directly on a hypothetical intervention in the Caucasus. Judging by Army materials VICE News reviewed, Dragon Spear was adapted from an earlier exercise initially planned in response to events in the Republic of Georgia in 2008, when the country was being partially annexed and quasi-invaded by Russia.
The conflict in Ukraine six years later was in many ways a live-fire Georgian War Re-enactment. Then, as now, Moscow was breaking off a couple chunks of a former Soviet Republic, carving out frozen states - countries established on territory occupied during a conflict and not granted full legitimacy by the international community - like South Ossetia in Georgia or the Donbas People's Republic in Ukraine.
It's not news that Dragon Spear was intended, in large part, to send a direct deterrent signal to Russia and reassure NATO that the US is prepared to respond should Russia try to expand its Georgian War Re-enactment into a traveling road show, with possible stops in other former Soviet states - like NATO members Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia.
All of this basically syncs up with conversations VICE News had with a variety of officers at Dragon Spear. The US is capable of fighting as a heavyweight, but after more than a decade of preoccupation with counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army had let its conventional war-fighting capabilities atrophy a bit. Thus, it needed to reboot and refresh its capability to fight high-intensity conflicts against peer and near-peer opponents. The officers with whom we spoke generally said that this did, in fact, specifically mean Russia.
And China. And Iran. And North Korea.
"There are a multitude of scenarios around the world where there are neighbors in conflict with one another, and one neighbor is stronger than the other, and that stronger neighbor [is] fomenting an insurgency," Colonel Joe Ryan, commander of the 2nd brigade of the 82nd airborne, told VICE News. "So we replicate that scenario in everything from the capability that an enemy might have - capabilities that that enemy either has intrinsically or that the enemy might gain in direct combat with that neighbor - that we might have to fight against. Think about [the Islamic State] in Iraq and the Syria area. Think about a North Korea/South Korea potential scenario.... Ukraine's another great example. A near peer threat that is fomenting an insurgency, in a nation that is, perhaps, on better terms with the United States, where we're clearly in support of one outcome there, which is the deterrence of aggression by the near peer threat."
The officers clearly didn't want any potential adversaries feeling like the US Army was exempting them from the list of Countries Who'd Better Not Get Any Bright Ideas - but the officers also spoke about how Dragon Spear was very distinctly geared toward training against a hybrid threat like the ones seen in Georgia and Ukraine.
This also tracks pretty closely with what Odierno said in his final press conference last week.
"In the last 18 months, we have really started to train for what we call hybrid warfare, which [is] actually the warfare I consider Russia is, in fact, conducting," he said. "We are in the process of increasing our capabilities to do this."
Odierno also explained that the military is shifting from more than a decade of counterinsurgency operations, and needs to revisit its broader skill set.
"We're not where we need to be," he said. "I think I've said we've got about 33 percent of our brigades right now who can... operate at that level. And we need to - my goal is we should have about 60 percent."
* * *
Public demonstrations and exercises almost always refer to fictional countries, even when the fiction is pretty clearly just a fig leaf. America's Cold War training exercises usually called the opponent forces the "Red" team, rather than Soviets. Meanwhile, the association of specific planning documents with specific countries is usually classified, even if it's an open secret. Everyone knows OPPLAN 5027 is about war on the Korean peninsula, but the fact that it's a plan for fighting North Korea is still technically considered a secret.
Although exercises are messaging tools, the Department of Defense is not the State Department; it can't just go out and conduct independent foreign policy. So when asking what country is supposed to take the hint, or who the hypothetical adversary is supposed to represent, you're almost always going to get answers like the ones that most officers were giving: the Army is inclusive in its saber-rattling, and they fervently hope that nobody is left feeling undeterred by the show of force.
Odierno wrapped up his career in the military less than a week ago, so it's reasonable to think that he was open to stepping outside of regular protocol to mention a few concerns, particularly if he thought they are of critical national importance. Odierno is considered and thoughtful when he speaks, so if he sought to raise awareness, he probably attempted to do so without setting off alarms that would spark partisan debate. That's probably a smart move given the way that some of the reporters at his final press conference jumped on specific remarks, trying to tie them to pre-existing political sideshows.
Thus, as Operation Dragon Spear unfolded, it became increasingly apparent that the traditional target of Army deterrence - "everyone" - wasn't the target audience for this exercise. More to the point, per Odierno's remark, the exercise was very specifically intended to deter Russia, because somewhere deep in the bowels of the Pentagon, someone is getting concerned that Russian President Vladimir Putin might be up to no good. And nobody - especially nobody senior - ever violates bureaucratic etiquette and calls out a specific country for conventional deterrence.
Bearing this in mind, I reviewed some of Odierno's earlier remarks, as well as those made in the week and a half between Dragon Spear and his last day in the Army.
During the exercise, Odierno mentioned that part of the exercise was intended to show some leadership to Europe, a point highlighted by the recent start of huge airborne assault drills in Europe involving the US and its NATO allies. He noted that the US sometimes has to get out in front of NATO in order to get other members to move. Thus, even though there were no foreign participants in Operation Dragon Spear, part of the audience for the exercise was European military leaders. The Army wanted to convey the idea that NATO needs to step up its game to fight a hybrid war, which is an essential task if NATO is going to deter Putin from pulling any fast moves.
Recent polling suggests that people in more than a few NATO member states needed to be reminded of their obligations: A Pew poll released in early June showed that in three of eight NATO countries surveyed - France, Germany, and Italy - a majority of people were in favor of sitting out a war with Russia if the Russians attacked another NATO country. In only two NATO member countries - the US and Canada - did more than half the respondents say that they thought their country should meet its longstanding obligations to militarily defend a NATO ally if it comes under attack.
People in almost all the countries surveyed appeared pretty certain that the US would come to the aid of any NATO ally under attack. In other words, there are a hell of a lot of people in Europe who have no interest in defending an allied nation attacked by Russia, but pretty much everyone in Europe is happy to let the US do the fighting and dying for them.
Beyond the remarkable cynicism of such a stance, that outlook delivers a terrible blow to the goal of deterrence. However, it does mesh nicely with something Odierno said in his final press conference when asked about whether he was concerned that Russia might try to gnaw off a chunk of a NATO member.
"Russia is constantly assessing the reaction of NATO to any of their actions," Odierno said. "And based on how - what I worry about is miscalculation - that they perceive that, maybe that NATO... might not be as concerned, and they make a mistake and miscalculate, and do something that would violate Article V of our NATO agreement. So, that's something that greatly concerns me."
In other words, Odierno is concerned that Putin might convince himself that the US would simply roll over if Russia got grabby with a NATO ally.
You may be wondering why "Don't mess with NATO" isn't conventional wisdom, and why Odierno would be so concerned with relaying that message. In an article in the Daily Beast, entitled "Pentagon Fears It's Not Ready for a War With Putin," the former commander of the US Army in Europe, retired Lieutenant General Mark Hertling, said:
We were beating the drum of Russia in 2010, and we were told [by Washington officials], 'You are still in the Cold War.' All the things we predicted would happen, happened, but it wasn't at the forefront of the time.... This gets to a lack of trust between the government and the military. We were monitoring Russian movement and they were increasing not only their budget but their pace of operation and their development of new equipment. They were repeatedly aggressive and provocative even though we were trying to work with them.
If the Army expressed concern over what happened in Georgia in 2008, but were then told to hush, it would explain why it had a Georgia-like scenario in Operation Dragon Spear sitting on the shelf.
To be fair, this is a lot to read into a handful of remarks by military bigwigs. Who knows, maybe Odierno is just a Cold War relic trolling the international community. Regardless, it's exceedingly likely that from Moscow's point of view, Dragon Spear is pointed directly at them.
* * *
Unfortunately, sending a message to Russia could backfire. Some argue that the mere conduct of exercises serves to make conflict more likely rather than serving as an effective deterrent. But that's been a standard knock on military exercises for ages.
The more interesting idea is that Putin truly sees himself not as the strategic aggressor, but rather as the victim. A recent article in the Daily Beast quotes Russian political analyst and former Kremlin adviser Stanislav Belkovsky as saying, "Putin is ready to fight with NATO, as he seriously believes that the US wants to occupy Russia."
From that viewpoint, Operation Dragon Spear could be the rehearsal for a US invasion, using a manufactured threat to an allied country as a pretext, much in the same way that the Germans staged an "invasion" of Germany by the Polish army as a pretext for invading Poland in 1939.
And so the attempt to deter Russia may be a real-life example of what political science nerds call a "security dilemma," in which the actions of one state to make itself more secure can end up making other states uneasy, which in turn prompts them to do stuff to bolster their own security, thus creating a sort of feedback cycle of escalation.
But is it better to fail at deterrence (as ended up happening in Georgia and Ukraine) than to risk escalating tensions?
Taking all the various omens, portents, and signs together, I would guess that shortly before the public demonstration of Operation Dragon Spear kicked off, the Russians did something that was interpreted by US intelligence as being very similar to something they did in advance of the incursions into Georgia, Ukraine, or both. This grabbed the attention of senior Pentagon leadership and of Odierno, who found themselves with a happy coincidence and golden opportunity, in Dragon Spear, to send a warning to Putin about getting too gutsy.
But before anyone starts digging fallout shelters, let's have a reality check: There is almost certainly no real-deal intel about, say, Russian tanks massing on the Lithuanian border. If it were something that imminent, President Barack Obama would be ringing the alarm bell loud enough to wake the dead. And even if Obama didn't, the Lithuanians sure as hell would.
"The more you sweat in peace, the less you bleed in war." That quote is variously attributed to many people, countries, and eras. But if a specific piece of deterrence works in preventing conflict, it's almost impossible to know if it, in particular, worked. All one can do is hope that by sweating in the Mojave Desert while defending Atropians from the intrusive fiddling of their Donovian neighbors, the US Army won't have to shed blood defending a real place from a real threat.
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#30 NATO airborne forces' military exercise produces resounding effect in Russia By Lyudmila Alexandrova
MOSCOW, August 20. /TASS/. The largest exercise of NATO's airborne troops since the end of the Cold War has produced a resounding effect in Russia, with military analysts and politicians differing in their assessments of the event.
While some believe it makes manifest NATO's desire to go to war against Russia or size it up as an element of supporting Kiev's plans in the period of heightening tensions in Donbas, others warn against overestimating the significance of the war games that involve 4,800 military from eleven countries. "This exercise is just one item in a chain of military events under the US and NATO auspices this year, as war games in Ukraine are yet to be held," the internet publication Vzglyad quoted Gen Leonid Ivashov, a former Chief of the Russian Armed Forces' General Staff.
"The whole range of events and exercises aimed at a buildup of military capability testifies to the ongoing preparations for something more serious on the part of NATO and especially the US, which is seeking to provoke Russia," Gen Ivashov said. "What we see now is the showcasing of strength and a battle of nerves."
NATO war games look like a covering operation to divert attention from the use of force by the Kiev government in the southeast of Ukraine, said senator Konstantin Kosachov, who chairs the foreign policy committee in the upper house of Russian parliament. "There can't be a more erroneous moment (for holding the exercise - TASS) out of a multitude of erroneous options," he wrote on Facebook."
"We're evidencing a new surge of tensions in Donbas," Kosachov said. "The sensation that Kiev has braced itself up for a yet another attempt to settle its problems in the east through the application of military power is getting increasingly strong."
"I don't see any immediate military threat to Russia in these war games because it's a scheduled event by and large although it's definitely linked to the conflict in Ukraine," TASS was told by the military analyst Viktor Murakhovsky, the editor-in-chief of the Arsenal Otechestva (The Arsenal of the Fatherland) magazine.
"A decision to enhance combat readiness of rapid deployment forces was taken after Crimea's reunification (with Russia - TASS) and the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine," he said.
"NATO built up its grouping in the Baltic area and now it's boosting the institute of exercises, the frequency of which has gone up 50% to 100%," Murakhovsky said.
"This is a token of a dragged-out hysterical reaction to the events in Ukraine that's going on for about a year and a half by now," TASS heard from Alexander Khramchikhin, a deputy director of the Institute for Political and Military Analysis.
"That's an element of psychological support for the countries of Eastern Europe that feel apprehensive of NATO's potential inability to defend them against Russia," he indicated.
Sergei Mikhailov, a senior research fellow at the Russian Institute for Strategic Research said in a TASS poll of experts that NATO has several reasons for holding these maneuvers.
"First of all, by nodding at Russia it has found a business for itself to engage in and a justification for its existence as it's citing the so-called Russian threat," he said.
Besides, the countries located on NATO's eastern flank - Poland and the Baltics - are pushing larger member-states towards making emphasis on the development of the pact's military infrastructures precisely on their territories, as this would bring more revenues to local budgets, Mikhailov warned against overestimation of the current maneuvers.
"Well, suppose they hold the war games now and we'll reciprocate later on," he said. "It would mean something if they were deploying some strike missile complexes there."
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#31 www.rt.com August 21, 2015 Kissinger: 'Breaking Russia has become objective for US'
Former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has hit out at American and European Ukraine policy, saying it ignores Russia's relationship with its neighbor, and has called for cooperation between the White House and the Kremlin on the issue.
"Breaking Russia has become an objective [for US officials] the long-range purpose should be to integrate it," the 92-year-old told The National Interest in a lengthy interview for the policy magazine's anniversary that touched on most of the world's most pertinent international issues. "If we treat Russia seriously as a great power, we need at an early stage to determine whether their concerns can be reconciled with our necessities."
The diplomat, who is most famous for serving in the Nixon administration, and controversially being awarded the 1973 Nobel Peace Prize, for negotiating the Vietnam ceasefire, accused the West of failing to recognize the historical context in which the fallout occurred between Moscow and Kiev.
"The relationship between Ukraine and Russia will always have a special character in the Russian mind. It can never be limited to a relationship of two traditional sovereign states, not from the Russian point of view, maybe not even from Ukraine's. So, what happens in Ukraine cannot be put into a simple formula of applying principles that worked in Western Europe."
Kissinger lays the blame for sparking the conflict at the door of the EU, which proposed a trade deal in 2013, without considering how it would alienate Moscow, and divide the Ukrainian people.
"The first mistake was the inadvertent conduct of the European Union. They did not understand the implications of some of their own conditions. Ukrainian domestic politics made it look impossible for [former Ukrainian president Viktor] Yanukovych to accept the EU terms and be reelected or for Russia to view them as purely economic," said Kissinger.
Once Yanukovich rejected the deal in November 2013, the EU "panicked", Russia became "overconfident," the US remained "passive" as "each side acted sort of rationally based on its misconception of the other" and "no significant political discussions."
For Kissinger, the wheels of the stand-off between Moscow and the West were already set in motion during the subsequent Maidan street protests - heartily endorsed by the West - which demanded the toppling of the pro-Russian Yanukovich, an aim that was eventually achieved.
"While Ukraine slid into the Maidan uprising right in the middle of what Putin had spent ten years building as a recognition of Russia's status. No doubt in Moscow this looked as if the West was exploiting what had been conceived as a Russian festival to move Ukraine out of the Russian orbit."
With the armed conflict in Ukraine still showing no signs of resolution, Kissinger repeated his previous proposal for Ukraine to become a buffer, or mediator state between Russia and the West.
"We should explore the possibilities of a status of nonmilitary grouping on the territory between Russia and the existing frontiers of NATO," he told The National Interest. "The West hesitates to take on the economic recovery of Greece; it's surely not going to take on Ukraine as a unilateral project. So one should at least examine the possibility of some cooperation between the West and Russia in a militarily nonaligned Ukraine."
While Kissinger insists that he believes that Ukraine's territorial integrity, including Crimea, which joined Russia last year, should have remained unaffected, he called for the West to stop backing Kiev at all costs, even as the victims of the conflict pile up.
"The Ukraine crisis is turning into a tragedy because it is confusing the long-range interests of global order with the immediate need of restoring Ukrainian identity," summed up the veteran diplomat.
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#32 The National Interest August 21, 2015 We Asked John Mearsheimer: What Should Be the Purpose of American Power? "Maintain U.S. dominance in the Western Hemisphere and prevent China from achieving regional hegemony in Asia." By John J. Mearsheimer
Editor's Note: The following is part of TNI's special 30th anniversary symposium. We asked twenty-five of the world's leading experts: What is the purpose of American power? You can find all of their answers here. [http://nationalinterest.org/feature/tni-symposium-what-should-be-the-purpose-american-power-13613]. You can also find our exclusive interview with Henry Kissinger here. [http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-interview-henry-kissinger-13615]
The purpose of American power is to keep the United States safe so its people can prosper economically and live in relative freedom. There is little agreement, however, on how to achieve that goal.
Since the Cold War ended, and especially since 9/11, the ruling elites in Washington have believed that the best way to protect the United States is to dominate the world and remake it in America's image. They have relied upon military power and other forms of big-stick diplomacy to topple unfriendly governments and promote democracy. Thus, it is unsurprising that the United States has fought seven wars since 1989.
Unfortunately, this strategy has led to a string of disasters and is the main cause of the growing instability around the globe.
Take the greater Middle East. The George W. Bush administration initiated unsuccessful wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that cost many thousands of lives, destroyed the regional balance of power and helped create the Islamic State. The Obama administration has foolishly prolonged the war in Afghanistan and launched a war against the Islamic State that it cannot win. It also helped topple Muammar el-Qaddafi in Libya, which produced a failed state, and its policies have helped prolong Syria's devastating civil war.
In Europe, Washington and its European allies precipitated a major crisis with Russia by trying to peel Ukraine away from Moscow's orbit and make it a Western bulwark on Russia's doorstep. The key ingredients of this boneheaded policy were NATO and EU expansion, coupled with democracy promotion, which effectively means installing pro-Western leaders in countries like Ukraine-and maybe even Russia itself. Not surprisingly, Russia has fiercely resisted the West's efforts to win over Ukraine, which is now engulfed in a civil war.
Trying to dominate the globe and push democracy on other countries does not work, as the United States has proved over the past twenty-five years. It is also unnecessary. The United States-because of geography, its sheer power and its nuclear arsenal-is remarkably secure. There is no need to pursue global domination, much less try to manage the domestic politics of other countries.
There is one meaningful threat to the United States: the appearance of a potential hegemon in Asia or Europe. The purpose of American power should be to ensure that the United States remains a hegemon in the Western Hemisphere, and that there is no regional hegemon in Eurasia. This rationale led the United States to help prevent Imperial Germany, Imperial Japan, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union from becoming regional hegemons in the twentieth century, and it remains relevant today.
Regional hegemons are dangerous to the United States, because dominating their own neighborhood would give them freedom to intervene elsewhere, just as the American military is free to roam the planet today. The great danger is that a distant hegemon would eventually start to meddle in the Western Hemisphere, which could present a serious threat to the United States.
Fortunately, there is no potential hegemon in Europe, but there is one in Asia: China. Accordingly, the principal purpose of American power should be to maintain U.S. dominance in the Western Hemisphere and prevent China from achieving regional hegemony in Asia.
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