Johnson's Russia List
2015-#162
19 August 2015
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"We don't see things as they are, but as we are"

"Don't believe everything you think"

In this issue
 
  #1
www.rt.com
August 19, 2015
Russians fear poverty more than war recent poll shows

Research conducted in August this year demonstrates that the level of anxiety in society is lessening to some extent, and that most Russians fear poverty more than a new world war.

Independent polling agency, the Levada Center, asked Russian citizens to rate how much they fear various possible events, from unemployment to death. On average anxiety levels on a range of issue are down, with the fear of a global military conflict apparently the least worrying.

The biggest angst currently bothering Russians is that their children or relatives could fall ill (3.93 points on a 5-point scale). Anxiety about their own health comes next with 3.28 points, while worry over poverty is down in third place with 3.21 points. Disquiet regards a new world war came fourth with 3.16 points, and the fear of death trailed in fifth with 2,98 points.

Deputy director of the Levada Center, Anatoly Grazhdankin, told the Izvestia daily that the fear of a world war had dropped from second to fourth place in the rating since last year. The researcher said the fall in anxiety might be connected with the change of the political situation near Russia's western borders, with active combat taking place in Donetsk and Lugansk regions in southeastern Ukraine. As the war in Donbass has abated slightly, the fear of war in Russia has also subsided, along with other causes of anxiety.

Grazhdankin added that Russians had more confidence in stability inside the country, compared to 2012 when its street protests perpetuated worries into 2013.

Despite the significant depreciation of the ruble and a hike in inflation, the fear of loss of personal savings was also waning in 2015 compared to 2013 and 2014 (2.58 points versus 2.87 and 2.8). The fear of unemployment was also down to 2.67 points from 2.71 in 2014 and 2.93 in 2013.

Russian state statistics agency Rosstat released its own report on Wednesday saying consumer prices in the country have risen by 9.4 percent since the beginning of the year, compared to a 5.6-percent rise over the same period in 2014. The number of poor people in the country has increased and the number of the rich has decreased, the report reads.

In June this year, Deputy Prime Minister Olga Golodets said in a television interview that the number of people living below the official poverty threshold (9,662 rubles or about $150 per month) had reached a record 22 million. The official called the situation critical but noted the figures could be distorted - of 75 million Russians of working age, only 48 million were registered as tax-paying participants in the labor market.
 #2
The National Interest
August 19, 2015
The Interview: Henry Kissinger [excerpt re Russia]
As we celebrate our 30th anniversary, TNI Editor Jacob Heilbrunn sits down with the former Secretary of State.

The National Interest's editor, Jacob Heilbrunn, spoke with Henry Kissinger in early July in New York...

Heilbrunn: How greatly do you rate the chances of a real Sino-Russian rapprochement?

Kissinger: It's not in either of their natures, I think-

Heilbrunn: Because the Russians clearly would like to create a much closer relationship.

Kissinger: But partly because we've given them no choice.

Heilbrunn: How do you think the United States can extricate itself from the Ukraine impasse-the United States and Europe, obviously?

Kissinger: The issue is not to extricate the United States from the Ukrainian impasse but to solve it in a way conducive to international order. A number of things need to be recognized. One, the relationship between Ukraine and Russia will always have a special character in the Russian mind. It can never be limited to a relationship of two traditional sovereign states, not from the Russian point of view, maybe not even from Ukraine's. So, what happens in Ukraine cannot be put into a simple formula of applying principles that worked in Western Europe, not that close to Stalingrad and Moscow. In that context, one has to analyze how the Ukraine crisis occurred. It is not conceivable that Putin spends sixty billion euros on turning a summer resort into a winter Olympic village in order to start a military crisis the week after a concluding ceremony that depicted Russia as a part of Western civilization.

So then, one has to ask: How did that happen? I saw Putin at the end of November 2013. He raised a lot of issues; Ukraine he listed at the end as an economic problem that Russia would handle via tariffs and oil prices. The first mistake was the inadvertent conduct of the European Union. They did not understand the implications of some of their own conditions. Ukrainian domestic politics made it look impossible for Yanukovych to accept the EU terms and be reelected or for Russia to view them as purely economic. So the Ukrainian president rejected the EU terms. The Europeans panicked, and Putin became overconfident. He perceived the deadlock as a great opportunity to implement immediately what had heretofore been his long-range goal. He offered fifteen billion dollars to draw Ukraine into his Eurasian Union. In all of this, America was passive. There was no significant political discussion with Russia or the EU of what was in the making. Each side acted sort of rationally based on its misconception of the other, while Ukraine slid into the Maidan uprising right in the middle of what Putin had spent ten years building as a recognition of Russia's status. No doubt in Moscow this looked as if the West was exploiting what had been conceived as a Russian festival to move Ukraine out of the Russian orbit. Then Putin started acting like a Russian czar-like Nicholas I over a century ago. I am not excusing the tactics, only setting them in context.

Heilbrunn: Another country that's obviously taken a lead role in Europe is Germany-on Ukraine, on Greece-

Kissinger: They don't really seek that role. The paradox is that seventy years after having defeated German claims to dominating Europe, the victors are now pleading, largely for economic reasons, with Germany to lead Europe. Germany can and should play an important role in the construction of European and international order. But it is not the ideal principal negotiating partner about the security of Europe on a border that is two hundred miles from Stalingrad. The United States has put forward no concept of its own except that Russia will one day join the world community by some automatic act of conversion. Germany's role is significant, but an American contribution to Ukrainian diplomacy is essential to put the issue into a global context.

Heilbrunn: Is that absence a mistake, then?

Kissinger: If we treat Russia seriously as a great power, we need at an early stage to determine whether their concerns can be reconciled with our necessities. We should explore the possibilities of a status of nonmilitary grouping on the territory between Russia and the existing frontiers of NATO.

The West hesitates to take on the economic recovery of Greece; it's surely not going to take on Ukraine as a unilateral project. So one should at least examine the possibility of some cooperation between the West and Russia in a militarily nonaligned Ukraine. The Ukraine crisis is turning into a tragedy because it is confusing the long-range interests of global order with the immediate need of restoring Ukrainian identity. I favor an independent Ukraine in its existing borders. I have advocated it from the start of the post-Soviet period. When you read now that Muslim units are fighting on behalf of Ukraine, then the sense of proportion has been lost.

Heilbrunn: That's a disaster, obviously.

Kissinger: To me, yes. It means that breaking Russia has become an objective; the long-range purpose should be to integrate it.

Heilbrunn: But we have witnessed a return, at least in Washington, DC, of neoconservatives and liberal hawks who are determined to break the back of the Russian government.

Kissinger: Until they face the consequences. The trouble with America's wars since the end of the Second World War has been the failure to relate strategy to what is possible domestically. The five wars we've fought since the end of World War II were all started with great enthusiasm. But the hawks did not prevail at the end. At the end, they were in a minority. We should not engage in international conflicts if, at the beginning, we cannot describe an end, and if we're not willing to sustain the effort needed to achieve that end.

Heilbrunn: But we seem to recapitulate this over and over again.

Kissinger: Because we refuse to learn from experience. Because it's essentially done by an ahistorical people. In schools now, they don't teach history anymore as a sequence of events. They deal with it in terms of themes without context.

Heilbrunn: So they've stripped it of all context.

Kissinger: Of what used to be context-they put it in an entirely new context....
 
#3
Kremlin.ru
August 18, 2015
Answers to journalists' questions

After examining the ancient shipwreck near the entrance to Balaklava Bay in Sevastopol, Vladimir Putin talked to journalists about his submersion on board the bathyscaphe and answered some of their questions.
.
President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Good afternoon.

I would like to congratulate you on the 170th anniversary of the Russian Geographical Society's establishment. It so happened, as I already said today, that we are here in Crimea on this very day, examining a rare object dated by experts to the 10th-11th century.

This is a galleon that sank opposite Balaklava Bay as it carried civilian cargoes - a very interesting object. I believe you have come to hear my impressions.

This vessel is yet to be studied by experts. There are not so many objects of this kind in the northern part of the Black Sea. Although back at the beginning of the century Russian and foreign experts tried to conduct research here, it was the Russian Geographical Society that had the fortune to discover this object, which is very good.

This is particularly interesting because the object dates back to the 10th-11th century, which is the time of the establishment of Russia's statehood and the development of ties with Byzantium and other countries. Therefore, I believe this would be interesting for both experts and the general public, as it would encourage us all to pay greater attention to national history, to studying it, searching for something new and using it for today and for the future.

I will be happy to answer any questions you might have.

Question: I would like to ask a general question, if I may, about your trip to Crimea.

Vladimir Putin: Yes, please.

Question: The Ukrainian President made a statement regarding your visit here, saying it exacerbates the situation. He said Crimea's future lies only within Ukraine. Could you comment on this?

Vladimir Putin: No, I will not comment on anything in this regard, because the future of Crimea has been determined by the people who live here. They voted in favour of reuniting with Russia. Period.

Question: This is not your first submersion, Mr President. What were you looking for under the sea?

Vladimir Putin: As I have already said, this is a very important discovery that allows us to see how the situation developed in the Black Sea area in those ancient times, in the 10th-11th century, and to understand how Russia's relations with its neighbours developed, how the Russian statehood was established. Therefore, I am certain that such research is important both for experts and the general public.

Question: Mr President, could you tell us what the ship looks like? What did you see there?

Vladimir Putin: You know, it is very difficult to see the entire vessel down there. According to preliminary data, because this is all on the seabed and covered (at least whatever is on the surface) with some 40 centimetres of silt, this seems to be a vessel 27-30 metres long and about 13-15 metres wide. There is also a large number of objects, including parts of the ship and many amphoras scattered all over the place there. However, specialists have to carefully study everything they find.

Question: Mr President, do you manage to find time for work during such exciting expeditions? Did you perhaps have a chance to discuss the exchange rate with the Government members in charge of the economy? Unfortunately, the ruble is falling again.

Vladimir Putin: No, we did not go into it during these past few days. However, I do know that the Government is treating this issue as its top priority. We have just discussed this with Mr Medvedev, he stayed here on the boat. We spoke about it, and we work on it every day; however, the trip to Crimea has to do with other matters. As you may have seen, yesterday we were working on the development of tourism, which, I believe, is very important, particularly for regions like the Crimean Federal District, the Caucasus, the Far East, parts of Siberia, and Altai. The second part of the day was dedicated to a meeting with representatives of public organisations, ethnic public organisations and associations. Tomorrow we will have another working day. Together with my colleagues, the leadership of the security agencies, both local and federal, we will discuss issues within their authority.

As for the economy, I would like to repeat that this is something we address every day; however, there have been no special discussions yesterday or today, and none are planned for tomorrow.

Question: Mr President, could I ask another question about the economy? While we were here, there appeared reports that Vladimir Yakunin has been nominated for the post of Senator from Kaliningrad Region.

Vladimir Putin: Is this an economic question?

Question: Yes, I believe this may mean that he will leave his post as head of Russian Railways, and this is a significant part of the economy. Do you support his decision?

Vladimir Putin: It is his choice. Every person sees their future as they believe is right. Mr Yakunin has been working long and successfully as the head of Russian Railways. You are right in saying that this is an important infrastructure company, but we will discuss this with him later, he is on leave now - so we will talk about it when he returns.

Question: Mr President, a question that is not directly linked to today's theme, if I may, though it is generally on the same subject. In autumn, Dmitry Peskov [Presidential Press Secretary] said you were not planning any scientific research, given the complicated international situation.

Vladimir Putin: What kind of research?

Remark: Your press service said there would be no scientific research in autumn or winter, considering the overall tensions.

Vladimir Putin: What kind of research? I do not understand what you are talking about.

Remark: Scientific research.

Vladimir Putin: You know, I am not involved in scientific research yet.

Question: But you went down with the pilot just now and there was all this pseudoscientific work.

Vladimir Putin: Right. This was not actually scientific work; scientists do the real research. This was yet another attempt at alerting our people to our history, to the development of the state and the country's statehood, especially in this region. This was merely participation in events that should promote an interest in this country's history.

Question: Do you think the overall situation is conducive to such trips, to distractions from the main agenda, internationally and locally?

Vladimir Putin: Now listen; you saw that yesterday I met with the heads of public organisations, which is quite important for Crimea, considering the ethnic aspect. As I said yesterday, last year's census showed that 68 percent of the population here are Russians, 16 percent are Ukrainians and about 10 percent - Crimean Tatars. In addition, there are Bulgarians, Greeks and representatives of other ethnic groups living here.

Inter-ethnic accord in the Crimean Federal District is a very important internal policy matter for the Russian Federation in general. Therefore, yesterday we considered these matters, along with the development of such an important branch of the economy as tourism.

Today, on the 170th anniversary of the Russian Geographical Society we are holding events designed to revive an interest in national history. I consider this to be very important for the country.

Tomorrow we will deal with security matters. I believe this is timely and necessary. We are all doing our jobs: the Government is concerned with the economy, as I already said, on a daily and even hourly basis. We are not neglecting anything, so there is no need for concern.

Question: Mr President, going back to the expedition: 80 metres is a technical depth. Could you share your impressions of the depth? Would you ever venture to go that deep on your own, maybe scuba diving?

Vladimir Putin: This is something that should be left to the experts; submerging to such depths is not easy. When you are surfacing, you have to stop at certain points, as far as I remember, the ascent from such a depth should take about 50 minutes or so. This could probably be done, but let us leave that to the experts.

Question: What is your general impression of this depth?

Vladimir Putin: It is interesting. This is a very interesting device, a bathyscaphe.

Question: Were you afraid?

Vladimir Putin: No, I was not. At Lake Baikal, we went down to almost 2,000 metres, over 1,900, using Russian-made MIR devices. This is a different piece of equipment; it is not designed for such depths - only about 300 metres. 83 metres is also quite deep and very interesting, of course.

Question: Mr President, another question, if I may. The Russian Geographical Society has been operating here in Crimea for over a century and a half and they have had many expeditions. Are you planning to go anywhere else here in Crimea? As Chairman of the RGS Board of Trustees, you should be aware of the problems RGS may be having here in Crimea - are there any, does the regional branch need any help?

Vladimir Putin: I believe we should always help regional branches, but today the RGS is doing fine here: they have already conducted 2,000 studies. Our sponsors make it possible for us to invest significant resources into these studies, and not only here in the Black Sea area, but practically all over the globe.

I would like to thank our enthusiasts, in this case these are business people who are investing their own funds not only into such research, but also into restoration.

At the entrance to the bay, you saw a newly reconstructed fortification that was founded by Suvorov back in 1778 and was completely run down in the recent period. Our sponsors invested 800 million rubles to restore it.

We have many plans; they are all open to the public. I am certain that getting to know them would be of use for individuals and for the entire country.

Question: Mr President, where do you like it better: on the ground or underwater?

Vladimir Putin: Home is best, of course. It is best to be on solid ground and among your own people.

Question: Can I ask a question about Ukraine?

Vladimir Putin: Go ahead.

Question: Do you think the Minsk plan has failed? How do you assess the probability of an escalation in the conflict, of large-scale fighting?

Vladimir Putin: Unfortunately, we are observing such an escalation now, and the blame lies not with the Donbass self-defence forces, but with the other side. It is the Donbass militants who suggested withdrawing all military equipment with a calibre of under 100 millimetres.

Unfortunately, the other side failed to do so. On the contrary, according to the data we have, they are concentrating their units there, including those enhanced with combat equipment. I hope it will not come to open, direct large-scale confrontation.

As for the Minsk-2 accords, I believe there is no alternative to a settlement and eventually peace will prevail. Our job is to minimise the losses that this would require.

Thank you very much.
 
 #4
Kremlin.ru
August 17, 2015
Meeting with representatives of Crimean ethnic groups' public associations (transcript continued)
Yalta

While on a working trip to Crimea, Vladimir Putin had an informal meeting with representatives of Crimean ethnic groups' public associations.

Chairman of the Crimean Republican Association of Germans of the Crimea Yury Gempel: Mr President, thank you for giving me the floor.

The ethnic and cultural public associations in the Republic of Crimea have always positioned themselves as an integral part of the Russian world. Thus, we participated actively in the referendum, and the leaders of our ethnic groups were members of the Supreme Council commission for holding the referendum, the commission for writing the Constitution, and many others. We have tried to integrate into the legal field of the Russian Federation fairly quickly and at the end of last year, we registered our regional ethnic and cultural associations - actually, the Presidential executive order addressed this.

In holding cultural events, events pertaining to the cultures of our peoples, last year - and this year too, we are still working on it - we paid special attention to the People's Diplomacy project. Last year, we invited two groups of German citizens to come here, including many journalists, and showed them Crimea. You know, when we met them at the airport, they asked, "Where are the tanks and armed soldiers?" We have everything here, but at deployment sites. We organised for them to meet with the republic's executive authorities, including the leaders of the Crimean State Committee for Interethnic Relations and Deported Citizens (this was a meeting in the Q&A format), with representatives of the public and with local ethnic Germans. When they were leaving, they said, "You know, this is our subjective opinion but 80% of Germans support Crimea's choice and the Russian Federation's policy overall." I thought they were probably joking, but then they sent us a magazine featuring five publications along the same lines. That's why my colleagues, ethnic Bulgarians and Greeks, are also taking part in this kind of People's Diplomacy project.

At the same time, there is are a fairly good understanding within the Republic of Crimea's leadership about the framework project to create an ethnographic village. We studied these projects implemented in other Russian regions and abroad. There are positive experiences, we do not have to reinvent the wheel, but nevertheless, Mr President, in this respect, we would like to speed up the implementation of this project. Moreover, we ourselves are ready to participate in this project financially.

At the same time, we are currently giving particular attention to projects and grantswork, where my colleagues and I are giving particular attention to the integration of Crimean citizens into Russia's legal field. And naturally, these are the projects related to preserving the identity of ethnic groups living in the Republic of Crimea. If possible, we ask that you pay attention to this and provide assistance.

Vladimir Putin: What will this ethnographic village be like? How will it look? Is this a place for people to live or a kind of open-air museum?

Yury Gempel: Mr President, let's say this also involves tourist activity. In general, speaking frankly, this will be an ethnographic commercial project. In other words, our project will give us an opportunity to use our ethnic cultures to make Crimea more appealing in terms of tourism, while at the same we will be able to preserve our ethnic culture. It includes our ethnic cuisine, ethnic souvenirs, and houses of certain architectural styles; so, that is what an ethnographic village would look like.

Vladimir Putin: I see. This will be a tourism centre.

Yury Gempel: An ethno-tourism centre.

Vladimir Putin: How long have Germans been in Crimea? Since the 18th century?

Yury Gempel: The first colony was registered in 1810.

Vladimir Putin: The 19th century.

Yury Gempel: Germans came here following the Manifesto of Alexander I. In 2004, we celebrated its 200th anniversary. Until 1944, we had a fairly large number of German settlements here with German names.

Vladimir Putin: Ok, thank you. I think we will need to help, of course.

Yury Gempel: Thank you.

<...>

Chairman of the Russian Community of Crimea Sergei Tsekov: We are going through a period when we constantly compare things. We compare what is happening in Ukraine with what is happening in Crimea and Russia. But I want to make a different comparison. If we look at the life of ethnic communities over these 23 years as part of Ukraine, I want to note that over the course of those 23 years, there was not a single meeting with the President of Ukraine - any President of Ukraine - nor a Ukrainian Prime Minister, or deputy prime ministers, or ministers. There was not a single meeting that brought together representatives from all of Ukraine's ethnic communities, including Crimea's Russian community. This, of course, is the evidence of the true attitude to interethnic unity issues we are facing today.

I am certain that for many years, Ukraine mainly sowed discord between us, nominally supporting representatives from the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People (that was the policy) and absolutely did not see the problems faced by ethnic Russians and, by and large, the Slavic part of the population - we have always felt that there was little difference between the Russians and Ukrainians in Crimea.

I think these meetings should become regular. Of course, regular does not mean every year. It could be once every five years. But we should think about this topic, and perhaps, these do not need to be meetings with you, personally, although we would naturally like to meet with you first and foremost, but also other Russian Federation officials.

I also have another suggestion. Over the course of many years, we tried to create an interethnic council in Crimea and raised this issue many times. We even developed regulations on interethnic council. But it didn't work out, particularly due to position of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People.

I generally feel that we should return to the subject of an interethnic council and start a serious dialogue with the Crimean Tatar community over this matter.

Of course, we will have peace and interethnic harmony when we meet one another halfway, but we should not try to lie. You know, people say, "Let's live in peace and harmony." But these words should be backed by real actions. If there are real actions to prove the desire to meet other ethnic groups halfway, then we will build trust.

Mr President, there is another issue that's a little off-topic. We just had a discussion on developing tourism; we discussed it at the State Council. I think Christian Orthodox tourism is a very interesting topic for Crimea. Christian Orthodox tourism should be oriented not only toward Jerusalem, not just Mount Athos, but also Crimea and Chersonesus.

The next point is that we talk a great deal about World War I. Things are clear with World War II, we treat it with respect and honour. And we are back now to the question of World War I, but we are not active enough with regard to the Crimean War while this was actually Word War I on Crimea's territory. We need to fully restore the memory of the Crimean War. In particular, I want to say that we have restored many monuments and memorials.

I think September 9 is Remembrance Day for soldiers that fell in the Crimean War, which we in Crimea have been observing since 1996 (this was our initiative, Crimea's Supreme Council adopted a resolution and this day was marked in Crimea). I feel that this date should be a commemorative one in Russia's history, particularly in the law that defines holidays and commemorative dates.

Thank you, Mr President.

Vladimir Putin: Thank you, Mr Tsekov.

I will begin with the historical memory of the Crimean War. It is a very important page in our national history. You are certainly right, but I cannot say that absolutely everything has been forgotten, the way it was with World War I, where people tried to forget it entirely. Here, this is not the case, but you are right that we have given it little attention.

Next, we certainly need to develop archaeological tourism and everything related to establishing the basis of the Russian nation as it began to form after Vladimir's baptism and the Baptism of Rus. This is certainly very important. We must also make the appropriate decisions at the federal level, so they are implemented the way you suggest. We will certainly do this.

Now, with regard to interethnic council. You need to decide that for yourselves, you should come to an agreement with everyone sitting here. Furthermore, I think it is very important that this should not be done to argue with someone over there. No, it should simply be a matter of resolving your own issues and problems, and not as a confrontation: they said this, but we are of a different opinion. Instead, you should meet like this from time to time to consider everything, just as you did to make a decision on building an Orthodox church and a mosque.

And building upon this positive - I want to stress it - positive joint work, you should address other issues. And if there are any matters under dispute, I think you should not politicise them but instead start with historical and cultural analysis. Because many issues that have become charged at a political or mundane level always have a link to the past.

For example, there was just a discussion about the native peoples of this area. What if it really were the Greeks? Or what if it were the Hazaras? Who knows what were the boundaries of a particular state or kaganate back then. Do you understand how far you can dive into it? This will involve endless digging into history without any practical use. What will be practical is when people sit down over a cup of tea and start discussing current affairs, how to move on, how to create favourable conditions for our children to be happy living together.

I think you are right that such a council wouldn't hurt. But that should be your decision. We will certainly support it if you make that decision.

As for the regularity of meetings, I also agree with you. We should certainly make these meetings regular, give them some sort of systemic foundation. But once every five years is not really regular, we could do it more often, and some sort of regularity in direct communication could be organised and would be quite useful.

Chairman of the Crimean Republican Association of Bulgarian Community Ivan Abazher: Mr President,

I want to support what Mr Tsekov said just now. Crimea's Bulgarian community has established an ethnic and cultural association, and we are aware of the new opportunities now open to us at a new level. There are opportunities now at the national level for us to study the past and its links with the Bulgarians here in Crimea.

I returned from a recent trip to Moscow, during which I learned that in Moscow there is a monument to the heroes of Plevna [a monument to the Russian grenadiers who gave their lives in battle near the Bulgarian town of Plevna during the 1877-1878 Russo-Turkish War]. Seriously, I did not know of this monument before. Previously, we organised several expeditions together with the federal university here and studied the archives in Crimea to find out which regiments and when were sent to liberate Bulgaria, which were sent to Shipka, and so forth. And then we had the idea that the Bulgarians living in the Russian Federation could take responsibility for looking after this monument and take care of its upkeep, so as to give it a dual purpose.

We have more than 20 years of experience as a public organisation here and we put this to use in organising the events we hold. We can make use of people's diplomacy, cultural diplomacy and business diplomacy to bring ideas together in the Black Sea basin and have an influence on the processes taking place, including an information influence.

We were the first here in Crimea to organise a visit by a group of parliamentarians from Bulgaria. We were the first to begin broadcasting video information in regular, systematic fashion via the channel that this party has at its disposal. We broadcast full information on what is happening here, and we can see to what extent the Bulgarians, not just in Bulgaria itself, but throughout the Black Sea region, understand the isolation that our opponents in the West have put us in today. Judging by the information we now see coming from Bulgaria, we are on the right road.

We think it is precisely this kind of people's and cultural diplomacy that can help us live better throughout the Black Sea region and can prevent actions that might arise today in connection with Bulgaria being a NATO member. Working through public organisations and information platforms, we can show that here in Crimea, we have peace and quiet, and that organisations such as ours can meet with the Russian President and we can have a real influence on perceptions that people in Bulgaria and other countries are forming today.

Vladimir Putin: Mr Abazher, as far as Bulgaria's membership in NATO goes, this is something that has already happened and is a fact we must live with. I cannot say that this worries us in any way. I am not sure that Bulgarians themselves are overjoyed about it, but the decision has been taken. This was the Bulgarian people's sovereign decision and we respect it and will work together with Bulgaria, regardless of the difficulties we have had in carrying out some of our projects, including energy sector projects such as South Stream. We believed that this project was in the interests of Bulgaria, its economy and people, but Bulgaria's government has decided otherwise and has essentially abandoned this project. But this does not mean that we will break off our relations with Bulgaria. On the contrary, we consider this country very close spiritually and historically, and we will do everything we can to continue developing our relations in all areas.

As for the Bulgarians who have long since settled here in these lands, they form one of the ethnic diaspora communities and have full rights as citizens of the Russian Federation. This is how we see them. I hope very much that, as you said just now, the Bulgarian community's links to Bulgaria, the historic motherland, will help to develop relations in general between Russia and Bulgaria.

Thank you very much.

To be continued.
 
 #5
The Unz Review
www.unz.com
August 17, 2015
China Overtakes US, Russia Overtakes Germany
By Anatoly Karlin
[Chart here http://www.unz.com/akarlin/china-and-russia-overtake/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=china-and-russia-overtake]
 
At least according to the latest revision of the World Bank's PPP-adjusted GDP estimates.

China has long been expected to overtake the US economy (one economist dated it to as early as 2010), and there had already been a flurry in the media when the IMF claimed the same thing in December last year. The World Bank's new figures just confirm the new reality and scaremongering about a bad night at the irrelevant casino that is the Chinese stockmarket is not going to materially change the fact. Annual growth continues at 7% per year, much the same as South Korea when it was at a similar stage of per capita development in the 1980s.

Russia's PPP-adjusted GDP actually marginally overtook Germany's back in 2013, and it managed to maintain this small lead into 2014 despite falling into recession. Of course with GDP expected to fall by around 3% this year, there will almost certainly be a reversal of this, but not by any radical amount - the hystrionical pronunciations of the Western media regardless - and will likely be temporary anyway import substitution really kicks in.

Financial, military, and cultural power are all ultimately functions, if lagging functions, of productive economic power. Although it would be a bad idea to go overboard with it, the spectacle of the same year (give or take) seeing both Russia overtaking the former biggest economy in Europe, and China overtaking the former biggest economy in the world, is really quite symbolic.
 
 #6
www.opendemocracy.net
Russian press digest (19 August 2015)
EDITORS OF OPENDEMOCRACY RUSSIA

This Wednesday, the Russian press focuses on the departure of Vladimir Yakunin, head of Russian Railways and a close ally of Vladimir Putin.

According to business daily Kommersant, Yakunin called his decision to leave 'a personal one' during a conversation with Vladimir Putin. Meanwhile, Kaliningrad's election commission is processing Yakunin's candidacy to become the region's senator.

Experts questioned by the newspapers state that the reason for Yakunin's departure is still unclear, though there are rumours as to why Yakunin requires a senator's seat. 'For Yakunin, the Federation Council [Senate] is not a respectable pension, but rather a career change, a move to a new political level,' says Grigory Dobromelov. 'He's losing influence in the apparat, and he needs a status position to continue his active political work and access to the president.'

As Kommersant reports, Russia's drunk drivers are back in the news. Tasked by Dmitry Medvedev, the Ministry of Health has developed a draft bill which gives courts the right to send serial drunk drivers for diagnosis, treatment and medical rehabilitation at drug treatment centres. For serial offenders, if the course of treatment is not completed, they will lose their license. Experts consider the bill to be potentially harmful: people shouldn't be sent for compulsory treatment without specialist confirmation of their diagnosis.

Kommersant continues to follow the investigation into the murder of opposition politician Boris Nemtsov. Shadid Gubashev, brother of Anzor Gubashev, has unexpectedly given testimony, telling the investigation about conversations he overhead while living with his brother. Moreover, Shadid Gubashev asserts that his brother, together with his accomplices, told him of their involvement in the killing immediately after Nemtsov's body was found.

RBK reveals the misadventures of Vladimir Kekhman, the 'Banana King' recently appointed as head of the Novosibirsk Opera House following the Tannhauser scandal earlier this year. VTB has started to sell assets remaining with Kekhman's JFC Group, at one time Russia's largest importer of bananas.

RBK also reports on the rise of unpaid wages in the country following a release of information by Rosstat: in August, wage arrears rose by 6.2% to 3.5 billion roubles (�33m). The majority of unpaid wages are apparently due to companies lacking direct funds.

Last but not least: Vladimir Putin's 83-metre descent to the bottom of the Black Sea during a visit to Crimea. This stunt took place as part of the Russian Geographical Society's 170th anniversary.

Rossiiskaya gazeta, the government's newspaper, focused on the descent itself, describing how Dmitry Medvedev called Putin during the dive. Medvedev apparently wished him a speedy return, and made a promise to reproduce the president's exploits.

 #7
Bloomberg
August 18, 2015
Putin Said Ready to Revamp Inner Circle as Ally Yakunin Goes
By Irina Reznik, Ilya Arkhipov, and Olga Tanas

Russian President Vladimir Putin's ready to start replacing long-serving allies in his inner circle after the sudden departure of OAO Russian Railways chief Vladimir Yakunin as head of the country's largest employer.

Putin intends to bring in trusted younger people to shake up his team ahead of the 2018 presidential election as he seeks to drag Russia's economy out of recession, an official said Tuesday, speaking on condition of anonymity because he isn't authorized to discuss appointments.

Yakunin's exit marks "a radical change, a very strong breach in the balance of the inner circle," Gleb Pavlovsky, a former political adviser to Putin, said by phone on Tuesday. It may be "a signal of the high level of instability at the top" of the regime, he said.

Yakunin said by phone that his decade-long tenure as chief executive officer of the state railway operator, the second-largest in the world, was ended at a meeting with Putin. Blacklisted by the U.S. last year over Russia's annexation of Crimea, the former Soviet diplomat was Putin's neighbor in an elite collective of dachas, or country homes, founded in the mid-1990s outside St. Petersburg. He took charge of the rail company in June 2005 after working in the Russian Transport Ministry for about five years.

"Life goes on," said Yakunin, 67, who confirmed plans to seek a place in the Federation Council, the upper house of parliament, representing the Kaliningrad region.

'No Money'

"It was his choice" to leave and become a senator, Putin told reporters during a visit to Sevastopol in Crimea on Tuesday. Yakunin was successful at the company and they'll meet again when he returns from holiday, the president said.

The most high-profile departure from within Putin's inner circle since he returned for a third term as president in 2012 comes as Russia battles its first recession in six years. Wages and disposable incomes are falling amid plunging oil prices and a 45 percent slump in the ruble's value against the dollar in the past year.

"The inner circle has ceased to be a management tool" for Putin to run the country, Pavlovsky said. While the Kremlin previously relied on lavish funding for inefficient state companies, "now there is no money, which means they should be managed better and the railways are a glaring example."
'Loyal People'

State companies may lose more top officials in the fall as the Kremlin seeks to revive the economy by improving their performance, Igor Yurgens, vice president of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, said by phone on Tuesday. "Now they must work and not just be run by loyal people," he said. "Otherwise, the economy will simply become catastrophic."

The need to avert economic collapse by raising efficiency may put "the titans of Putin's circle at risk," Igor Bunin, director of the Moscow-based Center for Political Technologies, said by phone on Tuesday. "He has a generation of younger, more effective people who can replace them."

Even seemingly "untouchable" figures such as Rosneft chief Igor Sechin and Gazprom CEO Alexey Miller are under pressure, Konstantin Gaaze, a Moscow-based political analyst, said by e-mail Tuesday. "If they are too pushy in asking for more help from the state budget, they can share Yakunin's fate," he said.

Regime 'Renewal'

Putin criticized Sechin publicly for the first time on Feb. 4 for changing his position on issues, including oil-tax breaks, since moving from the government as deputy prime minister to be Rosneft CEO. Gazprom may have spent $40 billion on unnecessary projects under Miller, who has led the energy giant since 2001, Vedomosti newspaper reported in July.

Barred from borrowing in the West under sanctions, Russian Railways has been asking for billions of dollars in assistance from the state's $75 billion National Wellbeing Fund. Yakunin said in March last year he was honored to be sanctioned by the U.S. authorities and has also said the measures weren't hurting the company, which has almost 836,000 employees.

Amid worsening tensions with the U.S. and the European Union over the conflict in Ukraine, Putin has shrunk his inner circle from dozens of confidants to a select group of security officials, two longtime associates said in January. The core group includes Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, Federal Security Service head Alexander Bortnikov, Foreign Intelligence Service chief Mikhail Fradkov and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, according to Sergei Markov, a Kremlin-linked political analyst.

Potential Successors

Yakunin's potential successors may include Putin's aide on transportation, Igor Levitin, and Oleg Sienko, CEO of Russian tank maker Uralvagonzavod, according to two people familiar with the situation, who asked not to be identified discussing appointments.

Other candidates may include Russian Railways deputy chief Alexander Misharin and Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich, who chairs its board, as well as the company's former chairman Kirill Androsov, Transport Minister Maxim Sokolov or his first deputy Oleg Belozerov, officials close to the company said.

Residents of the Kaliningrad region, a Russian exclave on the Baltic Sea wedged between Poland and Lithuania, will vote on Sept. 13 in gubernatorial elections, according to the regional administration's website. Acting Governor Nikolai Tsukanov, who is running in the election, has said he plans to nominate Yakunin as a senator should he win, RIA Novosti news service reported.
 
#8
Bloomberg
August 18, 2015
Putin May Be Tiring of His Cronies
By Leonid Bershidsky

Vladimir Yakunin seemed eternal: Nothing he could do appeared to undermine his standing in the system President Vladimir Putin has built to run Russia. Yet now he is leaving the top job at the national railroad monopoly, after 10 years of mismanaging it.

Putin may be realizing that tough economic times require better managers than his buddies, and that to remain in power he needs to distance himself from the oligarchy he has created.

Yakunin, who served for 22 years as a Soviet intelligence officer, wasn't friends with Putin when both were in the KGB. Yakunin's career as a spy went rather better than his future boss's: He ended up in New York at the Soviet mission to the United Nations, whereas Putin achieved only a modest position in East Germany. They became friends in the 1990s, when Putin was deputy mayor of St. Petersburg. In 1996, both men joined Ozero, a cooperative that built a small compound of lakeside country houses near St. Petersburg and is widely considered the chrysalis from which Putin's close circle emerged.

After Putin became president, Yakunin quickly rose in the Russian transport industry. By 2005, he was at the helm of Russian Railways, known by its Russian acronym RZD, the nation's biggest employer (it had 841,745 workers at the end of last year) and operator of Russia's entire sprawling railroad network. In terms of influence and access to funds, the job is bigger than any ministerial post. It also rivals the importance of being chief executive in Russia's other major state-owned companies: natural gas producer Gazprom and oil giant Rosneft, both of which are headed by Putin's friends from his St. Petersburg days.

The network of state companies under Kremlin-friendly management has been the backbone of Corporation Russia, Putin's version of capitalism under which the country's economy is run in the interests of the state -- and, of course, the men who have the nation's best interests at heart. None of the state-owned corporations will ever be studied in business schools as examples of stellar management. Gazprom has seen its market capitalization shrink after wasting billions on unnecessary, politically motivated expansion. Heavily indebted Rosneft faces shrinking production as its chief executive, Igor Sechin, begs his friend Putin to help him out by dipping into Russia's depleted reserve funds.

The railroads under Yakunin have been no exception. The network barely expanded during his 10 years in charge, but the average speed at which freight trains traverse it dropped 5 percent between 2004 and 2014, suggesting poor maintenance. Last year, RZD lost 99 billion rubles ($1.5 billion at today's exchange rate). Yakunin blamed a government decision to freeze rail tariffs for oil companies, which benefited Rosneft and Gazprom, but the real problem was that he had allowed the company's operating costs to almost triple during his tenure, increasing faster than revenue.

The money didn't just go down the drain. Anti-corruption activist Alexei Navalny documented the construction of an enormous estate for Yakunin near Moscow, including a special facility to store fur coats (the Russian name for it, shubokhranilischche, became a popular meme to describe Putin-era corruption). Though Yakunin later denied the existence of the fur storage annex and said he'd sold the house, Navalny continued his pursuit and showed that Yakunin's son, a wealthy hotelier, was doing lucrative business with the railroad monopoly. Again, official denials followed, but plausible explanations of Navalny's facts didn't.

Both Yakunin and Rosneft's Sechin refused to declare their incomes and property last year, after the government demanded that managers of state companies do so. Yakunin even threatened earlier this year to leave RZD for the private sector if the demands persisted. In March, he, Sechin and Gazprom chief Alexei Miller were officially allowed not to publish their income and property declarations, but two months later Yakunin revealed that his salary ranged between 4 million to 5.5 million rubles per month ($61,000 and $83,000) -- not enough for the lavish lifestyle Navalny described.

At the same time, Yakunin is one of the most vocal proponents of anti-Western conspiracy theories that underpin Putin's foreign policy, but which Putin himself is careful to moderate in his public statements. In a recent article on an obscure website, Yakunin denounced globalization as the evil master plan of a supranational financial oligarchy, explaining that lower oil prices were "an element of global financial war recognized by the American establishment." According to Yakunin:

    "The global financial system is a tool of the global financial oligarchy to rob developing nations and create a system of global U.S. dominance."

The rambling text went viral and the website promptly crashed as bloggers ridiculed Yakunin.

The final straw may have come from an embarrassment earlier this month, when Latvia's anti-corruption bureau detained the head of its national railroad company, Ugis Magonis, who is married to Yakunin's niece. RZD said soon afterwards that it was stopping cargo transit to Latvian ports, allegedly due to the poor condition of the Baltic nation's rail network. Latvian Prime Minister Laimdota Straujuma said in an interview that she considered the move a response to Magonis's detention.

In any case, Putin's old friend had become a liability and will now retire gracefully. Yakunin's plan, clearly sanctioned from on high, is to become a member of Russia's do-nothing upper house of parliament.

The choice of a new chief for Russia's rail system will answer an important question: Is Putin still aiming for loyalty first, or has he begun to stress competence? Russia needs to dig in for a long period of low energy prices, which means that tighter cost controls -- including a clampdown on corruption -- will be necessary in the all-important state companies. If Yakunin is replaced by a technocrat without personal ties to Putin, changes at Gazprom and Rosneft will probably be imminent, too. If another crony steps into Yakunin's shoes, that will mean Putin is still cruising without a compass, hoping his propaganda machine will be sufficient to keep him in power, no matter what.

 #9
Rise of new banks helps Kremlin keep Russia's economy afloat
By Oksana Kobzeva and Alexander Winning

MOSCOW, Aug 19 (Reuters) - Four private banks with friendly ties with the Kremlin are emerging as big winners from Russia's economic crisis, helping out dollar-starved companies at a time when large state lenders are hampered by Western sanctions.

The four, FC Otkritie, Promsvyazbank, Credit Bank of Moscow and B&N Bank, were relatively minor players only a few years ago.
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Now they are major beneficiaries of a bank recapitalisation plan and have used central bank foreign currency refinancing tools to win business lending to state energy firms and others needing to meet big overseas debt repayments.

By contrast, sanctions over the Ukraine conflict have closed international capital markets to state lenders such as Sberbank , VTB and Gazprombank and private ones owned by allies of President Vladimir Putin such as Bank Rossiya.

The state banks are also unable to use foreign currency refinancing tools from the central bank for more than 30 days due to risks for Western clearing banks.

"Private banks are carving themselves out a position by increasing lending to large industrial companies, whereas they used to have to wait in a queue behind state banking giants," said Chris Weafer, senior partner at Macro Advisory consultancy.

"We are seeing the emergence of a new banking sector post-crisis," said Weafer, a long-serving financial analyst based in Moscow.

Otkritie, the only of the four lenders whose stock has been listed for some time and is liquid, has seen its shares rise 25 percent in the past year versus an 18 percent rise in the broader MICEX index.

Its assets, a reflection of its loan book, almost tripled to 2.7 trillion roubles ($41.3 billion) over the course of the year leading up to the end of June, Promsvyazbank's assets rose by 30 percent to 1 trillion roubles, Credit Bank of Moscow's by 60 percent to 760 billion roubles and B&N Bank's more than doubled to 570 billion roubles, data from Fitch Ratings showed.

Promsvyazbank said last year it had lent hundreds of millions of dollars each to oil producer Lukoil, energy giant Rosneft and potash producer Uralkali around the time of the sanctions.

STATE-FRIENDLY

The private banks' growth is especially striking because falling oil prices mean overall lending is contracting as the economy shrinks at the fastest pace since the 2008/09 global financial crisis.

"Large private banks have been used more and more as prime channels to finance strategic sectors as the large state banks have been sanctioned," said Vladimir Miklashevsky, trading strategist and economist at Danske Bank.

They have shared in the spoils from a large-scale bank recapitalisation programme costing the state over 800 billion roubles that was agreed late last year.

Otkritie received 65 billion roubles of OFZ government bonds in May, while Promsvyazbank got 30 billion roubles of the bonds in August, Credit Bank of Moscow received around 20 billion roubles of them in June and B&N Bank has been promised a further 9 billion roubles' worth, the banks and the government have said.

Otkritie alone saw the amount it borrowed under repurchase agreements (repos) with the central bank jump over eightfold to 695 billion roubles over the course of 2014, which allowed it in turn to ramp up lending to clients.

The repos were used to help state oil major Rosneft, run by a close ally of Putin, Igor Sechin, refinance large Western debts at the end of last and start of this year, according to an industry source and a banking source.

Anton Lopatin, an analyst at Fitch Ratings, said out of the roughly $32 billion the central bank had lent to Russian banks via forex repo operations, Otkritie owed about $18 billion.

Otkritie declined to reveal the size or limit of its foreign-currency refinancing operations with the central bank or comment on details of its lending to corporates, including Rosneft. It said it was willing to lend in foreign currency depending on its clients' financial condition.

Promsvyazbank and B&N Bank said they were prepared to lend in hard currency to companies with a large share of export revenue. Credit Bank of Moscow declined to comment.

With large debt repayments due from September, attention is turning to how Russian firms will be able to cope given that global capital markets remain frozen for them.

Analysts say private banks could once again help by giving loans to those scrambling for foreign currency. "The main criterion is that the bank should not be under sanctions and friendly to the state," Lopatin from Fitch said.

CONSOLIDATORS

The new rising stars in the banking sector differ from banks such as Bank Rossiya, which belong to some of the oldest and closest allies of Putin, businessmen Yuri Kovalchuk and Nikolai Shamalov. Bank Rossiya was referred to by the United States as "the personal bank for senior officials of the Russian Federation" when Washington imposed sanctions on Russia in 2014.

Oktritie Holding, which controls FC Otkritie, is co-owned by several bankers and industrial groups, all seen as loyal to the authorities but without particularly close ties with them.

They include bankers Vadim Belyayev and Ruben Aganbegyan, oil tycoons Leonid Fedun and businessman Leonid Mamut. A 10 percent stake in Oktritie Holding belongs to state bank VTB.

Promsvyazbank is majority owned by long-established bankers and brothers Dmitry and Alexei Ananyev, known for being close to the Russian Orthodox church.

B&N Bank is co-owned by oil businessmen Mikhail Gutseriyev and Mikhail Shishkhanov, while timber-to-sugar entrepreneur Roman Avdeyev is an owner of Credit Bank of Moscow.

As private banks ramp up lending and receive government support, they are also seeking to expand by snapping up rivals in Russia's overcrowded banking market.

Promsvyazbank said this month it had agreed to buy control in Vozrozhdenie, B&N Bank's shareholders are buying control in MDM Bank, while the owner of Credit Bank of Moscow is looking at buying into Uralsib.

The three targets were among the biggest private banks but were weakened by the 2008/09 financial crisis, as well as the current one.

($1 = 65.40 roubles)
 
 #10
RIA Novosti
August 18, 2015
Putin says no need to worry about Russian economy

Russian President Vladimir Putin has called on Russians not to worry about the country's economy, because the government is monitoring the situation around the clock, RIA Novosti reported on 18 August.

"Everyone is on the job; the government is managing the economy, on a daily and hourly basis. We don't let anything out of sight, so there is no need to worry on that score," Putin said during a working visit to Crimea.

Asked whether his trip to Crimea was diverting him from the current situation in Russia and the world, and the main agenda, Putin said: "You can see, yesterday I met with the leaders of public organizations for who Crimea is a pretty important, I mean from a national point of view."

"We also (dealt with) development of such important economic spheres as tourism. Today, the Russian Geographical Society's 174th birthday, is aimed at reviving interest in national history, tomorrow we will be dealing with issues regarding national security," he said.

Putin said he had spoken today with Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev on economic issues, and said the cabinet would pay the necessary attention to those matters, including the rouble exchange rate, privately-owned Interfax news agency reported.

"I know this is of the utmost importance to the government and it pays the utmost attention to it," he said, adding that there would be no special discussion of economic matters during his stay in Crimea.
 
 #11
Real incomes in Russia decline 2.0% in July, wages down 9.2% - Rosstat

MOSCOW. Aug 19 (Interfax) - Real disposable incomes in Russia fell 2.0% in July compared with the same month last year, the Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) said.

They fell 3.5% in June, 6.4% in May, 4% in April, 1.8% in March, 1.6% in February and 0.8% in January.

Incomes fell 2.9% in real terms in January-July 2015. They declined just 0.8% in 2014 as a whole after growing 4% in 2013.

Nominal per capita incomes grew 9.9% year-on-year in July 2015 to 31,100 rubles.

The average nominal monthly wage due to employees was 34,000 rubles in July 2015, up 5.0% from the same month of 2014.

The real wage due to employees fell 9.2% year-on-year in July and 8.8% in 7M 2015.
 
 #12
New York Times
August 19, 2015
Inflation Robs Russians of Buying Power
By SABRINA TAVERNISE

RAMENSKOYE, Russia - A basic barometer of economic activity in this tidy town south of Moscow is the pirozhok, a small pie filled with cabbage and meat that is a staple of the Russian diet.

In good times they sell briskly, snapped up by hungry commuters at Arina's Hangout, a tiny shop near the train station. But sales are down by almost half, a gloomy reflection of Russia's economic slump.

"There were just physically fewer people," said Irina A. Safonova, the owner of the shop, which on a recent weekday was serving pies to a slow trickle of customers. "We used to have lines. Now look at it."

Russians are experiencing the first sustained decline in living standards in the 15 years since President Vladimir V. Putin came to power. The ruble has fallen by half against the dollar, driven by the plunging price of oil, the lifeblood of Russia's economy. As a result, prices of imported goods have shot up, making tea, instant coffee, children's clothes and back-to-school backpacks suddenly, jarringly expensive.

Making matters worse are the retaliatory bans that Russia placed on food imports after the United States and the European Union imposed sanctions for its actions in Ukraine, a policy that took a turn for the weird this month when the government destroyed thousands of tons of what it said were illegally imported foodstuffs including cheese and peaches.

The reduced supply means that what remains costs more, even if it is locally produced. Russians are paying a third more for sunflower oil, a fifth more for yogurt and three-quarters more for carrots compared with a year ago, according to government statistics. (The Western sanctions have driven up the cost of borrowing for Russian companies, but they have not had a direct role in the inflation that is raiding Russian pocketbooks.)

Inflation has reduced the purchasing power of Russian wages by more than 8 percent in the second quarter, compared with the same period last year, according to figures published by Russia's Central Bank at the end of July. And in a sign that the worst is far from over, the economy contracted by a steep 4.6 percent in the second quarter, compared with last year, and officially entered its first recession since 2009.

"It's horrible," said Elena Shcherbakova, a 47-year-old shoe saleswoman whose income, based in part on commissions, has fallen nearly a third since last year. She says she now shops at discount supermarkets, buys the cheapest kind of sausage and carefully counts containers of yogurt instead of throwing them into her cart by the handful the way she used to.

It is not clear what, if anything, this means for Mr. Putin. The trouble pales in comparison with the turbulent 1990s, when people's wages went down by nearly half. Russians have an immense capacity for stoicism, and ubiquitous home gardens make budgets more flexible. Mr. Putin's popularity ratings have remained high since last year's annexation of Crimea, which was wildly popular among Russians.

Still, the math is proving tricky. In a new draft budget released in July, the Ministry of Finance proposed halting the practice of raising pensions to keep up with inflation, a politically controversial move that would deliver a blow to Mr. Putin's most loyal base. Investment, food for a hungry economy, has collapsed since the Western sanctions, which also blocked Russia's ability to borrow on global markets.

"They have no way out," said Sergei Guriev, a professor of economics at Sciences Po in Paris. "Unless oil prices go up, they are really looking at a dead end." Without further spending cuts and if oil prices remain around current levels, the government will use up its reserve fund, created when the price of oil was high, in about a year, he added.

Mr. Putin's opponents argue that the nationalist talk washing over Russia is being projected by his government to distract attention from the fragile economic situation. They describe it as a battle in every Russian home between the television (the source of government propaganda) and the refrigerator (whose shrinking contents could eventually prompt discontent).

In Moscow, some in the educated upper classes agree.

"All that Ukrainian noise covers up our internal problems," said Maria Novychkova, a manager in a textile company who was walking a foot scooter in a park last month. Her company has put employees on four-day workweeks. She cannot afford to vacation abroad because of the weak ruble. "He says we are an ideal country, but we are not," she said, referring to Mr. Putin.

The crisis in Ramenskoye is like a car crash in slow motion, gradual but destructive. The town has tried to modernize in recent years, with an airport for private jets and a PepsiCo juice factory. It is also a bedroom community for Moscow. Commuters are Arina's main customers.

Ms. Safonova, the owner of the pie shop, first noticed a drop in business last fall. There were fewer commuters, and those who remained spent less freely. Once-packed minibuses emptied out. The checkout clerks at the nearby Kopeika supermarket had their wages cut. Then in March, PepsiCo announced that the juice factory in town was closing, citing the bad economy.

Prices began jumping. Nescaf� went to 389 rubles, about $5.96, from 220 rubles. Ahmad Tea jumped to 319 rubles from 191. Ms. Safonova knew about the sanctions, and that the falling ruble made imports more expensive, but sometimes the logic eluded her. A spike in the price of mushrooms this spring was particularly puzzling.

"I said, 'Why, why?' These are grown near Moscow, right here, not in Europe!"

By summer, the pie shop's sales had dropped by nearly half, and Ms. Safonova had to lay off four of her eight employees. She now works 18-hour days to compensate. She gave up her big kitchen and now mixes dough five times a day instead of 10.

Across Russia, the crisis has prompted a collapse in consumption. International airline travel has fallen almost a fifth since last year, and car sales are down 36 percent in the first half of this year. The production of train cars fell by a third, said Natalia Zubarevich, a researcher at the Higher School of Economics, because fewer goods needed to be transported. In another measure of economic distress, household ruble debt in arrears is up 43 percent since last July, according to the Central Bank.

"The cost of the crisis is being borne by everyone, spread around like butter on bread," said Vladimir Gimpelson, the director of the Center for Labor Market Studies at the Higher School of Economics.

As business shrivels across the country, Moscow remains an economic beacon.

Alexandra Vasilieva, the cashier at Arina's Hangout, is from the province of Smolensk in western Russia, where work had dried up so completely that her husband, a window installer, was making just a small fraction of his previous salary. So they came to Ramenskoye and now he commutes more than two hours each way to Moscow for mediocre money. Her son, an auto service worker in Smolensk, lost almost a third of his salary because fewer cars were being brought in for repairs and servicing.

"In the provinces, the wages are too small to live on," she said. Her monthly salary in Ramenskoye - 20,000 rubles - is sinking in value, worth just $305, down from $416 in May.

As for Crimea, if she thinks about it at all, it is through the lens of economics.

"I'm sick of Crimea," Ms. Vasilieva said. "I'm sad for people," she said, referring to Ukrainian refugees, "but why are they getting all this government assistance?"

Further pinching Russians' pocketbooks are trims the government is making to benefits doled out when times were flush. Pensioners in the Moscow region can no longer ride free on the Moscow Metro, a change that affects more than a million people in one of the most densely populated regions in the country. Apartment owners across Russia must now pay a repairs fee every month, which has prompted protests in some regions.

Lyudmila, 68, a retired accountant who declined to give her surname, said it was no longer worth it for her husband, an artist who works as a designer on housing projects, to commute into the city to supplement his pension - $153 a month.

"If all you have is a pension, you can't afford to buy shoes," she said, sitting on a park bench next to her grandson, who was eating a tall white puff of cotton candy.

Still, the discontent seems to bypass Mr. Putin.

"Honestly, we are so proud he is our president," said Vyacheslav, 75, a retired factory manager, who also refused to give his surname, as he steered a mostly empty grocery cart through a Kopeika supermarket here last week. "Thanks to him, we have all of this," he said, gesturing toward a glass display case of beet and potato salads, fried eggplant and pieces of chicken.

Then he called his wife to tell her that they were out of the cheapest hot dogs.

Alexandra Odynova contributed reporting from Moscow.
 
 #13
Russia's import substitution policy to take years to bring noticeable results
By Lyudmila Alexandrova

MOSCOW, August 18. /TASS/. Russia's import substitution policy announced a year and a half ago needs time to bring noticeable results, Russian experts say, commenting on a report by the Moody's rating agency.

The policy of import substitution announced by Russia is not yielding results in any sector, except food production, Moody's said in its latest Global Macro Outlook. In their previous report released three months ago, Moody's analysts called import substitution in Russia a road to a rebound.

The Russian authorities announced a course towards import substitution in the first half of 2014 amid Western sanctions, which exposed the dependence of a whole number of important sectors on imports.

Renaissance Capital Chief Economist for Russia and the CIS Countries Oleg Kuzmin was quoted by RBC business daily as saying that he didn't share the conclusions made by Moody's analysts.

According to Kuzmin, import substitution has already started to bring its results and a more considerable effect will be seen in coming years.

"Time is needed for the process to go ahead," the expert said.

His opinion was shared by Chief Expert of the Center for Economic Forecasting at Gazprombank Yegor Susin.

"It would be wrong to expect that import substitution will become possible in sectors other than agribusiness within such short time limits," he said.

"Moody's is right: the signs of import substitution manifest themselves concretely and in an accentuated form only in the food industry," Director of the Center for Market Studies at the Higher School of Economics Georgy Ostapkovich told TASS.

"This process is still purely fragmentary in other kinds of economic activity. This cannot be called comprehensive import substitution," he said. "Import substitution by itself takes years, if we consider hi-tech sectors. And, of course, this is a very expensive pleasure," he added.

"Import substitution should proceed in competition with imported goods. If we remove imports from the market and our enterprises make products without competition, we may get into a worse situation. In this case, there will be no competition and they will make products of the quality differing from the quality that would be available, if they operated in a competitive market," Ostapkovich said.

"A comprehensive program should be available. The Industry and Trade Ministry actually has such a program. That is, the process has been launched but it is early to say how much it will be successful. However, in principle, the entire process could have been implemented more actively over the year and a half," the expert said.
 
 Bloomberg
August 18, 2015
Putin Aide Who Called Shock Rate Cut Sees Pause as Oil Nears $40
By Olga Tanas and Evgenia Pismennaya

Andrey Belousov went largely unheeded the last time he forecast a shift in monetary policy. Now President Vladimir Putin's top economic aide is lending weight to a growing consensus that Russia's easing cycle is wearing out.

The central bank may pause its interest-rate cuts after five decreases this year if oil prices fall to $40 a barrel, Belousov said in an interview on Tuesday. Traders have started to predict a rate increase, with forward-rate agreements signaling borrowing costs will rise by 18 basis points in the next three months, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

"Given that we have no other comments from the central bank, Belousov's statements should be taken seriously"

"If the situation on the foreign-exchange market changes as a result of a significant drop in oil prices -- to $40 a barrel, with fluctuations between $40 and $45 -- then the central bank will probably halt the process of cutting the rate," Belousov said by phone.

Oil's decline of more than 30 percent since June is rippling through the recession-hit economy of the world's biggest energy exporter, forcing policy adjustments as the ruble trades at a six-month low. The central bank, led by Governor Elvira Nabiullina, has lowered its benchmark by a cumulative six percentage points to 11 percent this year after an emergency increase in December.

Belousov, a former economy minister who replaced Nabiullina as Putin's aide after she took charge of the central bank in 2013, was among the first officials to broach the possibility of a rate cut in January. Days later, the Bank of Russia shocked traders and analysts alike with a decrease that was among the most abrupt policy reversals by major central banks since 1990.

'Taken Seriously'

"Given that we have no other comments from the central bank, Belousov's statements should be taken seriously," Alexey Pogorelov, an economist at Credit Suisse Group AG, said by e-mail.

The ruble is moving into the forefront of policy concerns after the world's worst performance in the past three months with a 25 percent drop against the dollar. It weakened 0.5 percent to 65.84 against the U.S. currency in Moscow on Tuesday.

Brent crude, used to price Russia's main export blend Urals, slipped 12 cents to $48.62 a barrel on the London-based ICE Futures Europe exchange.

The slump in oil, which has traded in a bear market since last month, is straining Russia's budget, threatening to reignite inflation and further destabilize the ruble. Crude, along with gas, accounts for about half of the country's budget revenue.

'Utmost Attention'

The government is giving its "utmost attention" to the ruble's exchange rate and monitoring the situation almost daily, Putin said on Tuesday in Sevastopol.
Not everyone in the government is resigned to a pause at the central bank's next policy meeting on Sept. 11.

The Economy Ministry, for one, still sees "significant" potential for further monetary easing because real rates remain high when measured against expected inflation of 7 percent in 12 months, according to its e-mailed response to questions.

The Bank of Russia didn't respond to a request for comment.

The economy, which contracted for two quarters on an annual basis, will shrink through 2017 if oil remains at $40, the central bank said in June. Policy makers have said they may worsen their forecast for a 3.2 percent slump this year.

Only Tool

The key rate is the only instrument at the central bank's disposal to affect the ruble, Belousov said on Monday, according to state-run news service RIA Novosti. That's because Russia can't afford to conduct interventions on the currency market given the current level of its reserves as well as the central bank's free-float policy, he said.

The Bank of Russia shifted to a free-floating exchange rate ahead of schedule in November and last month halted its foreign-currency purchases to replenish reserves. It spent about $88 billion propping up the ruble last year amid a slump in oil prices and capital outflows stoked by sanctions imposed over the conflict in Ukraine.

"I'm not inclined to believe that Belousov sets the direction for the central bank's decisions," said Vladimir Tikhomirov, chief economist at BCS Financial Group in Moscow. "His words reflect reality."


 
#15
Lay-offs to leave Hermitage without security police as of November - museum head

ST. PETERSBURG, August 18 /TASS/. Police will stop guarding the State Hermitage Museum in St. Petersburg in November because of the forthcoming lay-offs at the Russian Interior Ministry, Mikhail Piotrovsky, president of the Russian Museums' Union and the Hermitage museum director-general, said on Tuesday.

Piotrovsky believes that other Russian museums are likely to face similar problems. This has prompted the Russian Museums' Union to organize joint training and work out measures to protect expositions from hooliganism with the help of their own security services or private security companies.

"We have received a letter, which says that all security police are going to leave the Hermitage museum as of November 1," Piotrovsky told the Ekho Moskvy radio station in St. Petersburg. "There is a short list of cultural institutions where security police will remain," Piotrovsky said adding he was not sure what institutions were on that list.

"I have written several letters to all the ministers asking them for explanations. I have not received any reply as of yet. For the moment, the only thing we know is that they (police) are leaving," the Hermitage director-general said.
 
 
 #16
Vedomosti
August 9, 2015
Russian paper weighs pros, cons for opposition barred from regional elections
Andrey Sinitsyn editorial, Non-elective campaign for the opposition. Causes and effects of opposition parties being barred from regional elections

So representatives of parties of the non-system opposition have been barred from the regional elections. The democratic coalition under the RPR-Parnas brand has been barred in all three regions where it had planned to participate: Magadan, Kostroma, and Novosibirsk regions. In Kaluga Region the coalition pulled out of its own accord, having discovered a large number of bogus signatures collected by "toxic" collectors. The Civil Initiative party has been barred from two regions where it had planned to run - Magadan and Kaluga.

The authorities are clearly worried about control over social and political processes - specially in a situation of ongoing economic crisis, whose bottom is not even yet in sight. The authorities are figuring that the opposition will have far more topics for conversation with society in a year or two. In this situation even "managed" or "sovereign" democracy has likely been deemed by the Kremlin's political management to be too costly and risky licence. It is easy to imagine also some new trade between the regional elites and the administration: the lack of resources hits primarily the regions, they are required to execute the social plans released by the Kremlin under the conditions of a fall in revenue - as payment for this the governors are asking to be spared needless worries at the elections.

It may be assumed that in the crisis situation the Kremlin needs stricter control locally: oppositionists getting elected to the legislative assemblies could be dangerous should social contradictions intensify; the citizens would have some levers of influence on the authorities. This peaceful political instrument is scary since the authorities have lost the art of availing themselves of it.

Political analyst Yekaterina Shulman believes that there's no special order for the barring of the opposition: the system itself works to minimize risk. There will be no repercussions for the local authorities for the non-admittance, admittance has to be sanctioned upstairs. The system is in a state of stress owing to the crisis, we are observing processes of the self-preservation of power under the conditions of a reduced resource base.

Being barred from the elections contains the following pluses for the opposition: it acquires public attention and trains supporters. Constantly maintaining supporters' activity without a positive result is hard, but general political turbulence spares disappointment. The situation changes all the while, the tasks and conditions change - this prevents both the participants and observers of the elective process from becoming bored. Something else, other than postponement of the date, could occur even with the elections to the State Duma in a year's time. Given the manipulation of the elections such as is occurring in Russia, what is most important happens not at the elections but after. This was the case in Russia in 2011. This was the case also in many other instances of controlled campaigns in authoritarian countries.

The minimal experience of victories and work in office potentially reduces the name recognition and popularity of the opposition for the voter. On the other hand, amassing professional political points in the present system is impossible - elections are not a political elevator. But the opposition retains its moral authority, which is in demand in a crisis.

 
#17
Komsomolskaya Pravda
August 10, 2015
Sergey Vladimirov, Democratic Coalition unlikely to last until next year. Nonsystem liberal opposition unable to register a single list in four regions

The most intensive stage of the regional elections, the campaigning stage, is launched in the country on 15 August. However, some parties covered themselves in shame even at the stage of putting forward their lists [of signatures]. Specifically, the Democratic Coalition headed by the Parnas [People's Freedom Party] demonstrated an acute cadre famine and close to zero support in the regions. With this "baggage," participation by the liberal democrats in the 2016 elections would look bizarre, experts note.

Last Saturday [8 August] the Parnas list was rejected in Kostroma Region (348 invalid signatures), and previously a ruling on Novosibirsk Region was announced by the Central Electoral Commission (466 fake signatures). There was also a rejection in Magadan, while in Kaluga Region the Democratic Coalition deemed 2,500 of the 6,300 signatures collected to be invalid and decided not to run in the elections.

The failure could have been avoided with a more serious attitude towards the electoral process, experts argue. "The percentage of signatures depends on the skills of the campaign staff. It is inexperienced collectors who are responsible for the biggest number of rejects," Novosibirsk spin doctor Sergey Kozlov explains. "Therefore the chief of the campaign staff and the team leaders should maintain all-around monitoring of the collection of signatures and qualified lawyers should scrupulously verify each one. The Democratic Coalition did not have high-quality selection, it lacked professionalism." As a result the Internet filled up with collectors' complaints about refusals to hand over the concluded contracts and the money earned, and some complaints about bribing voters actually ended in cases brought by the Investigations Committee. There were also obvious provocations. Thus, in Kaluga the Democratic Coalition announced the collection of 2,000 signatures without having a team of collectors. And in Kostroma the activist Andrey Pivovarov attempted to persuade a police officer to sell him the FMS [Federal Migration Service] databases. In an attempt to make the electoral commission register the Parnas list, candidates and campaign staff members in Novosibirsk, headed by their leader Leonid Volkov, resorted to a hunger strike.

"By means of such actions during the primaries and the signature campaign the Democratic Coalition drew attention to itself and increased its recognition factor, but it certainly did not improve its own image," Novosibirsk political expert Aleksey Osipov says.

Back at the start of the primaries a number of regional politicians refused to cooperate with the association, offended by the Muscovites' tactics and the "obliteration" of local activists. The standoff resulted in a split in the regional branches, and in Kaluga in the departure of Tatyana Kotlyar, human rights activist and leader of the local Parnas branch, to join another party. The primaries were a failure - only just over 1,000 people turned out to vote for the nominated Muscovites in Novosibirsk, which has a population of a million, and a few hundred each in Kaluga and Kostroma. The attempt to shape programmes in the regions amounted almost to zero (the activists from the capital knew nothing about specific regional features or the citizens' real problems). The lists were also a parody - the ratio between Muscovites and local candidates was approximately 5:1, analysts say.

"No ideas, no mechanisms, no concrete content, no coherent programme - nothing effective was proposed by the candidates from Moscow. So people were not interested in them," Kostroma political expert Grigoriy Volkov emphasizes. In the expert's opinion, in the case of the Democratic Coalition "unprofessionalism has been the trend for many years." "Neither Parnas nor the other similar parties has the potential to conduct a good campaign. Nor do I see any prospect for them in the future. We will not hear anything vitally important from them either in terms of cadre composition or in terms of ideology even in the State Duma elections," he believes.

Another expert from Kostroma, political expert Nikolay Rassadin, commented that "the Democratic Coalition is hardly likely to get as far as next year." "The probability of a breakup is great. The association is situational and its activists' interest are too different," he observes.

Aleksandr Pozhalov, research director at the ISEPI [Institute of Socioeconomic and Political Studies] Foundation, notes that this year the opposition did not have sufficient resources "even for four small regions, although everyone who was ready to support it was mobilized." Next year, apart from elections in 38 regions, there will be the elections to the State Duma, "which is what the Moscow opposition is clearly geared towards." "But what we have seen puts all subsequent electoral ambitions both for Parnas and for the Democratic Coalition into the category of 'bizarre,'" he says. "Without properly working regional branches, ideology, programmes, and the ability to work with real and not virtual voters, all the opposition's electoral chances will amount to zero."
 
 
 
#18
Daughter challenges refusal to question Chechen leader over Nemtsov death

MOSCOW, August 19. /TASS/. Zhanna Nemtsova, the daughter of murdered Russian opposition politician, has challenged the refusal of the Russian Investigative Committee to interrogate Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov in connection with the case, her lawyer has told TASS.

Lawyer Vadim Prokhorov said he filed a complaint earlier on Wednesday asking the Russian court to rule that the refusal of an investigator to question Kadyrov and four other Chechen officials over the murder of Boris Nemtsov is "illegal and unfounded."

"We also ask the court to declare illegal the inaction of the Russian Investigative Committee officials who have distanced themselves from finding the contractors and organizers of the murder," the lawyer said.

A spokesperson for the Moscow-based Basmanny court, Anna Fadeyeva, said the court has received the complaint that will be considered in line with the established procedure.

The complaint says that Kadyrov personally knew the suspects in the Nemtsov murder case, Zaur Dadayev and also Beslan Shavanov, who blew himself up during the detention in Grozny.

The plaintiff says "taking into consideration the statements of Kadyrov and also the old-time history of his conflict with Nemtsov, the head of Chechnya may have information not only on the perpetrators of the murder, but also on the organizers and contractors."

The complaint says Nemtsov's long-time aide and press secretary Olga Tikhomirova and journalist Alexander Ryklin who knew about the threats against Nemtsov from Kadyrov have already given their testimony.

The daughter of the murdered politician and her lawyer say all this constitutes grounds for the interrogation of a number of high-ranking Chechen officials as witnesses as part of the criminal case.

The lawyer said earlier a petition had been sent to the Investigative Committee for the interrogation of six people, which was met mostly with refusal. The investigators however satisfied a motion to question another Chechen citizen, Ruslan Geremeyev, whose whereabouts are still unknown.

Co-chairman of the Parnas opposition party Boris Nemtsov was shot dead in downtown Moscow on February 27. Zaur Dadaev whom investigators consider the killer, Khamzat Bakhaev, Anzor Gubashev, Shadid Gubashev and Tamerlan Eskerkhanov have been arrested over Nemtsov's murder.

Earlier this month, the Russian Investigative Committee extended the investigation of Nemtsov's murder till November 28.
 
 #19
http://readrussia.com
August 14, 2015
What Siberia Needs Is a Cosmopolitan
By James Pearce

Foreigners and native Siberians view one another as a distant, dark and cold people from a strange inconceivable land. Yet when they visit each other's location, this begins to change. Siberia is no longer a wasteland of poverty and industry, and any fears of the gulag evaporate into a distant memory.

Whether you step off the train after several hours or spend a comfortable business class flight into the mysterious land, it instantly transforms into a place of rich cultural diversity where the past is fast decaying and the new foundations are not quite set. For the foreign investor or global citizen, this is an oasis of opportunity; for cities in Central and Eastern Russia, this is their ticket onto the world stage.

With the amount of young and educated people either emigrating or moving westward, it is leaving those who chose to stay behind in a pit of great unpredictability. Russians who are migrating do so from fear of economic collapse (something not entirely inconceivable) and its deeper consequence or fewer future prospects.

This leaves the door wide open for foreigners with knowledge and expertise to inject a different kind of cosmopolitan feeling to that in Moscow. The growing shift in Russia toward business, starting from the education system, is only encouraging them to start looking East. The conditions for creating a new kind of Siberian cosmopolitan city are riper than ever.

The middle class, in general, is not properly developing yet since wealth is hard for the average person to establish. The rise of living costs and meeting ones needs is more difficult than a year ago; long term planning is impossible for many. Plus, the focus primarily being on European Russia creates this huge gap.

Moreover, the next ten-fifteen years is due to witness those born and bred in the Russian Federation make their grand entrance into current affairs and these young people have different and exciting views, keen not to repeat the instability of the 1990s. All they need is the training and guidance of those who hail from a consumer driven society and have experience of a genuine cultural centre.

Firstly, Siberia already has the diversity and vast ethnicities to create such a cosmopolitan hub. For the entering foreigner, this creates a window of opportunity to channel this into the establishment of unique institutions. This does not merely mean having an opera house or literary caf� where examples of this diversity can be displayed for entertainment purposes; Moscow does this already.

What it means is grouping those native Siberians together and creating a unique concept and feeling unmatched anywhere else in Russia. Foreign experts ought to tap into the brains of the Siberian population and vice versa to show off what this great land has to offer the world besides some beautiful untouched nature. In addition, to show them that Russia is more than the palaces of St. Petersburg and the grey buildings of South Butovo.

The sharing of ideas among the vast ethnicities of Siberia combined with the new foreign arrivals will lead to the attraction of people from all parts of the globe and stamp such a place on the map. Although for this to happen, those from outside of Russia need to feel attracted to the idea of Siberia; something that foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, has toyed with.   

The governor of Novosibirskaya oblast, Vladimir Gorodetsky, admits that the hotel sector of Novosibirsk and other cities is taken care of. Naturally, those staying need a little something extra to leave feeling their visit had a touch of greatness; why a Siberian city as opposed to Moscow, London or Paris?

Gorodetsky is considering the installation of a waterpark as one example. There has, after all, got to be something new, unattempted and different bringing people East. But naturally, foreigners remain the key as Russians are not yet experienced in such endeavours.

If foreigners begin to believe in Russians eastward, it will gradually create a pipeline of home grown experts who will be best suited to exporting the idea of a cosmopolitan Siberia. Not only this, but at a time where Russia is short of some good press internationally, a show of diversity in the economy and the population could provide a helping hand in bettering international relations.

The only unanswered question remaining is where?

Novosibirsk would be the favoured choice since it is the capital, although just too clich�. The former 'city of exiles', Chita, looks promising. First explored by Cossacks in the 1820s, Chita is situated along the Trans-Siberian Railway and is a hidden historic gem which meets much of the criteria.

Among the different peoples are Russians, Ukrainians, Evenks, Tartars and a Yiddish speaking Jewish quarter. There are plenty of sports teams, two universities and a huge absence of development (and foreigners). In 2007, an estimated 3% of travellers to Russia visited Chita, who certainly does not lack the feeling of being in Russia, unlike other Siberian cities. Chita Oblast is also only one of twenty federal districts in Russia to have a positive natural population growth.

Perhaps I am optimistic, but despite the political climate, Siberia has much unexplored potential and possesses endless opportunities Moscow and St. Petersburg cannot fulfil. Life in this part of the world has and will continue to be difficult, but this is not a land of barbarism. Quite the contrary. If enthusiastic foreigners are looking to invest or stay in Siberian towns and have properly prepared for the challenge, it can only start to achieve the potential.
 
 #20
Russia Beyond the Headlines/RBC Daily
www.rbth.ru
August 18, 2015
Which countries have benefited from Russia's food embargo?
Some nations have seen exports boom thanks to Moscow's ban on Western food imports.
Anna Deryabina, Yelena Malysheva, RBC Daily
 
Just over a year ago, Russia announced an embargo on Western food imports in retaliation for a series of U.S. and EU sanctions imposed on Moscow over its role in the Ukrainian conflict.

Russia has not fully succeeded in substituting the imports of foodstuffs banned under the embargo with supplies from other countries, although back in the fall of 2014, the plan was to boost imports from South America and Asia. Yet, according to statistics, some countries have benefited from the Russian food embargo: Pakistan, Belarus, Serbia, and Chile (see infographic).

"The rate of the decrease in the import of embargoed food is comparable with the rate of the decrease in overall imports. This is, most likely, indicative of the fact that - against the backdrop of the crisis - domestic consumption has shrunk, especially as far as imported goods are concerned, which have become more expensive because of the falling ruble," said Vladimir Salamatov, head of the Moscow-based International Trade Center.

The country that has shown the biggest increase in its supplies to Russia since the latter banned certain food imports from Western countries is Belarus. In the first five months of 2015, Minsk exported 916,400 tons of food products whose supply from certain countries is banned, compared with 568,300 tons in the same period last year.

Meanwhile, Brazil, which a year ago was described as "perhaps the main beneficiary" of the Russian food sanctions, has not lived up to these expectations. Despite last year's agreement on dairy supplies and expectations to double poultry supplies, in reality Brazilian exports to Russia have not only failed to increase but in the first five months of 2015 even went down, to 164,000 tons from 167,700 tons in January-May 2014.

China too has cut supplies of foods to Russia, from 418,000 to 390,000 tons, although last year Chinese businesses were planning to replace European fruits and vegetables on the Russian market. Last year, the then-Russian agriculture minister, Nikolai Fyodorov, also spoke of Chinese pears and apples replacing fruit from countries subjected to the Russian ban.

New Zealand has reduced its food exports to Russia by 69 percent. Last year, the Russian authorities declared their desire to increase imports from the country, however New Zealand producers were wary of the prospect of boosting "food" ties with Moscow. They were not sure that Russia would not punish their country as it had the other states that had introduced sanctions against Moscow.

First published in Russian by RBC Daily
 
 #21
Putin plans to take part in UN General Assembly session - Lavrov

SEVASTOPOL, August 19. /TASS/. Russian President Vladimir Putin is planning to take part in the work of the session of the United Nations General Assembly, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov told reporters.

"The president is planning to take part in the session of the UN General Assembly. This is a great event in the life of the organization. This year we mark the 70th anniversary of this forum, which was created after the victory in the Great Patriotic War, in World War II. A record number of heads of state and government is expected to attend the session. Our president plans to take part in this event too," Lavrov said.

In recent years, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has been leading the Russian delegations to the General Assembly sessions. President Dmitry Medvedev addressed the UN in 2009.

Vladimir Putin attended the opening of the General Assembly session in 2005 when the organization turned 60 years old.
 
#22
Subject: Response to to Dr. Mark Galeotti's article on Russia Strategy (JRL#152. August 7)
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2015 23:14:07 +0000
From: Simon Saradzhyan <[email protected]>
 
Simon Saradzhyan's Response to Dr. Mark Galeotti's article on Russia Strategy in Foreign Affairs.
[Simon Saradzhyan is assistant director of the U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism and a fellow at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center.]

It's with great interest that I have read Dr. Mark Galeotti's article, which is entitled "Time for a New Strategy in Russia. The Current Sanctions Regime Has Failed-Here's What to Do Next" and which Foreign Affairs published on August 4th.  After all, there has been quite a heated debate underway on what strategy U.S. and its allies should pursue vis-a-vis Russia in the wake of the Ukrainian crisis, given that return to the return to pre-Crimea status quo ante is highly improbable, if not impossible. While some of Dr. Galeotti's proposals for such a strategy are quite reasonable, others I cannot agree with because they will lead to a dangerous escalation of the military stand-off between NATO and Russia, rather than achieve the outcome, which the author of the Foreign Affairs article desires and which he has formulated as ending Russia's interference in Ukraine in the short-term, and forcing the Kremlin to accept and abide by the accepted norms of international behavior in the longer-term. Let me begin by reviewing some of the sticks in the sticks and carrots approach - which Dr. Galeotti suggests.

Having US/NATO's Ballistic Missile Defense Target Russian ICBMs is Like Aiming Unloaded Gun at Fully Armed Gunslinger

The one recommendation that I find most counterproductive is the author's suggestion that "Washington's current plan to create a Europe-wide missile defense system by 2018 could be oriented away from a notional focus on Iran... to explicitly include Russia."  It is worth recalling that throughout the administration of President Barack Obama and his Republican predecessor, a number of top U.S. defense officials and diplomats have repeatedly emphasized that U.S. has neither intent nor capability to intercept Russian ICBMs with any of the planned components of the U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems. And even some of Russia's own generals - who tend to inflate the U.S. BMD threat - acknowledge that America's European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) will acquire some limited capability to chase Russian ICBMs only when SM-3 Block IIA interceptors are commissioned.

So what would proclaiming the intent in the absence of capability (which is what Dr. Galeotti essentially recommending) accomplish?  Clearly, it won't protect Western Europe or United States from a Russian ICBM attack. In fact, Dr. Galeotti f acknowledges that himself. It is more difficult, but not very difficult to gauge how Russia would respond to such a retargeting of EPAA. Military stratefists have to plan for worst-case scenario and planners at the Russian General Staff are no exception.  Therefore, while knowing that EPAA cannot pose a threat to Russia's second strike capability for now, they still have to plan for the times, when EPAA's capability to target Russian ICBMs may match the intent to do so. The retargeting of EPAA would give them a solid excuse to ramp up preemptive measures, including, possibly putting nuclear warheads on Iskanders in western Russia to target EPAA assets and withdrawing from the INF treaty to officially extend the range of these missiles. Russia could also adopt a more aggressive first-use nuclear posture in what would increase probability of an accidental nuclear exchangecaused by a false alarm, especially given that Russia currently has no early warning satellites in orbit. The more your opponent beefs his ballistic missile defenses, the more you become concerned that he may first stage a surprise nuclear attack and then shoot down whatever is left of your nuclear arsenal when you try to retaliate.   It is one thing for NATO to beef up conventional defenses and rattle the sabre, as much as Russian military does or more, to prevent repetition of the Crimean scenario in the Baltics (though I would argue that granting citizenship to all members of the Russian diaspora in these countries and ensuring they are no discriminated against would achieve more in that respect). But targeting Russian ICBMs with a system that is not made to do so is quite another. Dr. Galeotti's proposal to have EPAA targeting Russian ICBMs with a system that is not designed to shoot such advanced missiles is another. I would be tantamount  to pointing an unloaded gun at a fully-armed gunslinger in an open stand-off.

Imposing Sanctions Before Minsk-2 Deadline Would Backfire

Another recommendation of Dr. Galeotti's is to expand sanctions against Russia. Specifically, he calls for adding "many more names" including "names of spouses and children to the lists" of sanctioned individuals.  It should be noted that the U.S. has already started to do so by adding Boris Rotenberg's son Roman and some of Gennady Timchenko associates  to the list of sanctioned individuals.  Western countries can, of course, add many more to that list, but such individual sanctions could hardly change Putin's stance anytime soon.  In the meantime, such sanctions could also make more common Russians dislike West rather than Putin as the sanctioned individuals will inevitably pass on at least some of the costs incurred by the sanctions to people that their companies employ.  Even in the case of Iran, the West has spent over a decade, escalating individual and sectoral sanctions those before they began to significantly impact Tehran's willingness to negotiate in earnest. But even in the longer-term Iran-style sanctions won't have same impact on Russia as they did on Iran, given the greater size, resilience and diversity of the Russian economy and its economic ties. As economists Clifford Gaddy and Barry Ickes rightly note in their treatise of futility of Western efforts to coerce Putin through sanctions: "The only kind of sanctions that might have a deep enough impact to force Russia to abandon its strategic objectives are ones that we would never implement." Clearly, expanding lists of sanctioned individuals, which Dr. Galeotti recommends,  falls short of such 'impossible sanctions,' while those punitive measures that can somewhat alter Russia's behavior, such as exclusion of Russia from SWIFT payment system, can cause Russia to retaliate in other areas, where Western nations' vital interests hinge to a certain extent on productive relations with Russia (such as combating international proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism).

What Elements of Comprehensive Strategy toward Russia Could Look Like

But if neither of these two 'stick' measures - that Dr. Galeotti has proposed and I reviewed above -- will achieve the outcome, which he desires, then what about the carrots that he offers?   I very much agree with the author's idea to "restart the U.S.-Russian Bilateral Presidential Commission, a bid to reengage Russia in a multi-track negotiation process that emphasizes key areas, from the fight against the Islamic State to nuclear security, in which the two countries share real common interests." But though it is in Russia's interest to revive the work of that commission, Russian leaders would still reject that offer if it is accompanied by such measures recommended by Dr. Galeotti, as having U.S. BMD target Russian ICBMs. I believe U.S. and its European allies should find a way to ensure that competition between them and Russia in areas, where their vital national interests diverge, is civilized, while cooperation in areas, where these interests converge, is revived and sustained.

One instant measure - that I would recommend - is for all sides to push for implementation of all provisions of Minsk-2 ad verbatim rather than take half-hearted measures that fall short of their committments while blaming the other side. Until this conflict, in which more than 6,500 people have died and which has no military solution, is resolved, efforts to reverse the dangerous slide into a New Cold War will continue to feel. Once (and if) Minsk-2 is implemented, it could become possible to start unfreezing military-to-military contacts between NATO and Russia, so that the sides can work together to prevent further escalation in general and to limit possibility for dangerous incidents, such as collisions of warplanes and submarines during patrols. When doing so, U.S. and its NATO allies should also consider heeding a recent call by Fiona Hill and Steven Pifer to negotiate with Russia  transformation of  U.S.-Russian Dangerous Military Activities Agreement and Prevention of Incidents at Sea Agreement into NATO-Russian agreements so that they "cover all NATO and Russian military forces operating in Europe and the North Atlantic area."  This issue could be discussed by arms control and military cooperation working groups of the bilateral presidential commission as well as by the NATO-Russia Council if work of either is unfrozen. U.S. and its allies should also continue to engage Russia on DPRK's nuclear programs, cooperate with Moscow to prevent other nations from acquiring nuclear arms and long-range delivery system; secure nuclear weapons and materials. The sides could also revive nuclear scientific exchanges and continue implementation of remaining nuclear security cooperation agreements in and with Russia. In the short-term Western countries and Russia can also pave way for strengthening of their cooperation against the Islamic State (IS) by negotiating a transition of power in Syria.

Further down the road, U.S. and Russia could work to strengthen the economic foundation of the bilateral relations so that it could mitigate impact of political differences on the overall relationship (and that would require mostly steps on Russia's side to improve investment climate).   More important, Western countries and Russia should also make a serious effort to rebuild Europe's collective security system, failure of which lies at the root of the latest conflict. Neither America nor Europe nor Russia could be content with the current state of this system.   If it didn't become clear after the Balkan wars and Russian-Georgian war of 2008 that this system looks broken and in great need of major repairs, then surely the conflict in Ukraine had driven that point home in the European capitals as well as across the Atlantic Ocean. But if both West and Russia believe that the European collective security architecture is indeed broken, then how do we go about rebuilding it?

One way to proceed would be for OSCE members to negotiate  a new security treaty, which would give all of them a say in whether and where military-political alliances can or cannot expand.If such a provision applies to not only NATO, but also to the Collective Security Treaty Organization (with the exception of official candidate nations), then, perhaps, non-aligned nations of Central Europe and South Caucasus would not perceive it as lop-sided in favor of Russia.  Russia would welcome such a provision if only because it would give a say in whether NATO expands. In fact such a provision would echo a provision,which Vladimir Putin's then successor Dmitry Medvedev included in the European Security Treaty that he proposed in 2009. Back then I was among those urging Western countries to give the idea a serious consideration, warning that otherwise the existing European collective security system could generate another massive failure, but such calls went unheeded. Perhaps, this idea could be given more attention now. Such a constraint on expansion of NATO's would give Russia a stake in honoring the treaty, which should also, of course, unequivocally reaffirm all signatories' respect for each other's territorial integrity and commit them to refrain from covert or over use of force  and to resolve all of the existing disputes peacefully. The treaty could also reintroduce at least some of the conventional arms control measures that were enshrined in the adapted CFE, which Russia has suspended participation in. The provisions of the treaty would help to ensure that the brightest of the red lines, which West and Russia have drawn vis-�-vis each other - repetition of Crimea scenarios in NATO countries and unconditional expansion of this alliance respectively - would have greater chance of being respected. Such an agreement would, therefore, help to treat at least some of the underlying causes and contributing factors behind the ailment of Europe's collective security organism, rather than selectively deal with some of the symptoms.
 
 
 #23
http://readrussia.com
August 18, 2015
Why Russia Is Not an Existential Threat for the West?
By Mark Galeotti

The crescendo of alarmist talk about Russia as a serious, even pre-eminent threat to the USA continues to grow, to massive and even ludicrous proportions. According to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey, "Russia presents the greatest threat to our national security." The other service chiefs agree: Russia is "the biggest threat" according to Air Force chief Deborah James, for example.

Indeed, we have even the "e" word coming in: Russia apparently poses "an existential threat to the United States" (Army Chief of Staff Mark Milley - his predecessor Gen. Odierno merely called Russia "the most dangerous" threat to the USA). Special Operations Command chief Gen. Votel hedges slightly, saying Moscow "does, could pose an existential threat."

This has culminated in a piece in the Daily Beast - increasingly the venue of choice for over-the-top and poorly-informed Russophobia - that leads off with unnamed US "defense officials" warning that they had serious qualms about their capacity to head off a Russian attack on NATO. In fairness, after the clickbait headline ("Pentagon Fears It's Not Ready for a War With Putin"), much of the article is then spent walking back from its early assertion that "The U.S. military has run the numbers on a sustained fight with Moscow, and they do not look good for the American side." Nonetheless, given that - when Russia is discussed at all in Washington (despite what Gen. Dempsey may suggest, ISIS and cyberattacks seem much higher on most people's agendas) - this "big, bad bear" thesis is getting more airtime, it is worth spending a little time exploring it.

Boys and Toys

The raw numbers are only part of the military power equation, but a useful place to start. How about numbers of soldiers? Russia has some 700,000 under arms in the military (there are also the Border Troops, Interior Troops and the like, but they really would only matter in defensive and security operations). The USA has more than 1.3 million active duty personnel and NATO as a whole over 3 million.

Of course, NATO has commitments away from Europe, but unless it is willing to strip the Chinese border and the Caucasus, so has Russia, especially while thousands of its best troops are either in the Donbas or else recovering from tours in that scrappy, undeclared war. Besides which, raw numbers aside, a greater proportion of NATO troops are professionals rather than conscripts.

How about the quality of equipment? NATO outspends Russia by a factor of around ten times, and has done so for years. Ten times. According to NATO's own figures, the alliance spent $943 billion in 2014 and planned to spend $893 billion this year, although that may actually turn out to be an understatement. Conversely, even if we are generous and ignore both the collapse of the ruble and also subsequent quiet revisions downwards of the defense spend, in 2015 Moscow was planning to spend $81 billion.

Considering the widely-reported inefficiencies and corruption bedeviling Russian procurement - yes, there is corruption, poor decision-making and porkbarrel purchasing in the West, too, but not overall on the same scale - then one would hope that the alliance spending, let's just repeat this, more than ten times as much would have bought at least equivalent kit. If not, then a large number of Western generals, officials and politicians deserve to be sacked, if not tarred and feathered.

As things stand, much Russian military equipment is good enough, not leading edge but adequate for most purposes. Fine for chewing through Ukrainian or Georgian forces, and even - most of the time - able to make it across Red Square without breaking down. But as Saddam Hussein's Iraqi forces discovered (and let's not forget that they were armed with pretty recent Soviet kit and reckoned to be among the more professional and battle-hardened troops in the Middle East), "good enough" may well not actually be good enough when facing the most advanced militaries around, with highly-skilled soldiers deploying the latest systems.

Sure, the new T-14 Armata is an interesting and potentially-powerful design, albeit hardly the "15-20 years ahead of the West's" cited by Deputy Premier Dmitri Rogozin, the defense-industrial complex's pom-pommed cheerleader-in-chief. But Russia has none in service now and will not for at least a couple of years. Furthermore, caught between the scissor blades of cost overruns and budget cuts, the order is likely to be cut down significantly in size.

This is a general pattern. Russia has all kinds of grand plans, but here and now it is still essentially deploying legacy Soviet forces, sometimes with the addition of a few more modern subsystems such as optics and reactive armor. Even in the air: the latest Su-35 fighter, for example, is really a heavily-developed version of the Su-27 - a plane that first flew in 1977. It's a very good airframe, for sure, and has a considerable advantage in being an evolution of a tried and true plane rather than genuinely leading-edge, with all the development headaches that often entails. (Consider that gold-plated white elephant, the F-35 jet: it remains to be seen if it will be one of the most expensive money pits ever or a truly formidable plane.) But it does not mean that even most Russian weapons are up to taking on the most advanced military alliance in the world.

(Necessary caveat: not all NATO members' militaries are the best in the world. But the point is that most of the best militaries in the world are in NATO.)

Battlespace

Of course, capabilities are also a function of the battlefield. Tanks don't do well in mountains, nuclear missiles aren't that helpful fighting guerrillas. As the presumed aggressor in the kind of scenarios generating the Washington rhetoric, Russia has the advantage of being able to pick the time and the place for any attack. There are battlefields where it would be difficult to prevent initial Russian advances, especially were they able to strike with surprise, such as the Baltic states, the strategic Swedish island of Gotland or Norway's Svalbard archipelago. Also, Russia does have certain capabilities such as anti-shipping and anti-air missiles that at the very least would deny NATO the Black and Baltic Seas.

But then what? Despite some concerns, especially voiced from the other side of the Atlantic, there is little real reason to suspect NATO would not hold together in the face of such open aggression. Once able to bring its economic, human, military and technological forces to bear, it is hard to see how Russian forces could prosper, especially as the defender generally has the advantage and, as Moscow should know full well, there is a big difference between seizing territory and controlling it. The Balts and the Scandinavians can be relied upon to make the experience as painful as possible, even behind the Russian lines.

Russia has no meaningful long-range power-projection capacity, nor is its navy up to forcing waters against its NATO counterparts. Its Black Sea Fleet, for example, currently has a cruiser, a destroyer (dating back to the late 1960s), two frigates and four diesel attack submarines, along with various smaller and support ships. By contrast the Italian navy alone has two small aircraft carriers, four destroyers, fifteen frigates and six submarines.

Why?

So why the chorus of alarm in Washington? To an extent, it reflects certain intangibles about the Russian challenge. Modern states are very casualty averse: consider how the 18 US deaths in the 1993 Second Battle of Mogadishu (immortalized in the film Black Hawk Down) essentially drove a complete reversal of policy, for example. It does mean that there must be a concern that Moscow, as an essentially authoritarian state led by people willing to ignore (or simply conceal) higher levels of casualties will be able to substitute will and ruthlessness to make up for a certain lack of battlefield firepower.

Beyond that, though, it may be politics at work, not least the usual quest for even more money to buy even more shiny toys and hire - or in this case keep - enough boys and girls to use them. After all, at present the government is planning to reduce force strength by 40,000 and no bureaucracy stays quiet for cuts. Hence, the need to present US forces as stretched to their breaking point and at risk.

There may also be a desire to keep the spotlight on the Russian challenge precisely because it is being out-vamped by Islamic State, cyberthreats, even the froth and fervor of the impending presidential campaigns. Nothing like a little panic-speech to cut through the summer silly-season nonsense.

And in part that is exactly what generals ought to do, to consider all potential threats and worst-case scenarios, to do their best to counter natural tendencies towards complacency and head-in-the-sand optimism, as well as to champion their sectional interests.

But at the same time, they may also be playing a dangerous game. First of all, sometimes they run the risk of sounding ridiculous. In the Daily Beast piece, for example, Gen. Odierno was quoted as saying that "One of the things we learned [from recent exercises] is the logistical challenges we have in Eastern Europe. For example, Eastern Europe has a different gauge railroad than Western Europe does so moving supplies is a more difficult. So we are learning great lessons like that." He went on to warn that "only 33 percent" of Army's brigades are sufficiently trained to confront Russia.

If the Pentagon, through the decades of the Cold War and the subsequent incorporation of various post-Soviet and Warsaw Pact nations into NATO, failed to notice that Russia applied its wider gauge to its subject states, then that suggests a shocking incompetence. And is Odierno really suggesting that only a third of brigades of soldiers who go through ten weeks basic training and then further Advanced Individual Training - 14 weeks for an infantryman, for example - are not up to fighting Russian units heavily manned by conscripts who have gone through a total of a 12-week accelerated training course?

Secondly, they miss the point of the Russian challenge. Moscow is hardly unaware of the massive Western preponderance of forces, and so it uses its military largely as a political and propaganda instrument. As I explore elsewhere, the real dangerous are to be found in its ability to disrupt, distract, and divide the West and also undermine the international system.

Finally, such rhetoric plays to Putin's narrative. It helps support his notion that a hostile West is treating Russia like an enemy. On the day Dempsey was confirmed in his new position, I watched Vremya TV news lead with a package of stern, uniformed American generals talking about the Russian "threat" interspersed with footage of US soldiers in Europe, tanks rumbling and guns blazing. It also actually vests Moscow with much more power and weight than it deserves. To a considerable extent, Putin's foreign policy is one of bluff and bluster, and the more American generals puff up the Russian bear, the better Putin's hand at this game of geopolitical poker.

Arguably, treating Russia as some kind of wayward but darkly amusing comic operetta wannabe power - hard as that might be so long as Moscow's men and munitions are causing mayhem in Ukraine - might actually be a much more appropriate response, and give the Kremlin rather more sleepless nights.
 
 #24
Interfax
Russia ready to discuss new CFE treaty with NATO - Foreign Ministry

Moscow, 18 August: Russia is ready for dialogue with NATO on new parameters of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) if the alliance's proposal answer present-day realities, Mikhail Ulyanov, director of the Russian Foreign Ministry's Department for Arms Control and Nonproliferation, has said.

"In principle, we are ready to discuss the parameters of a mechanism to control weapons in Europe which answers contemporary realities," he said, answering a question by Interfax on Tuesday [18 August].

According to Ulyanov, for Russia the current version of the CFE "is history but we are not refusing to talk on the subject," he said.

"We will need to consider and study their proposals; we will be ready for a conversation on this subject. But the conversation will not necessarily result in an agreement because we have fundamental differences," the diplomat said.

According to him, a dialogue is needed to come up with fundamentally new parameters for the CFE; however, Moscow believes it would be pointless to put forward its proposal under the current conditions. [passage omitted]
 
 #25
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
August 18, 2015
Inside the latest Russian maneuverings on Iran deal
A month after the signing of the Vienna agreement on the Iranian nuclear program, the foreign ministers of Russia and Iran met in Moscow to discuss the actual implementation of the plan.
By Galiya Ibragimova
Galiya Ibragimova is a consultant at the Moscow-based PIR Center, a Russian think tank. Her research interests include regional security in Central Asia, information security and international relations.

Even after jointly signing the historic agreement on the Iranian nuclear program, the United States and Russia continue to engage in subtle diplomatic maneuverings that could impact the eventual implementation of the plan.

For example, at the August 17 press conference following talks with Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov commented on U.S. accusations related to Russia's relationship with Iran.

In late July, says the U.S., Iranian Major General Qasem Soleimani, who is on the UN Security Council's list of military and political officials banned from leaving Iran, paid a visit to Moscow. In addition, Washington announced that it suspects Russia of violating the UN sanctions regime against Iran. It threatened to raise in the UN Security Council the implications of General Soleimani's alleged visit to the Russian capital.

However, Lavrov stated that Soleimani's visit was just a "rumor." His deputy, Sergei Ryabkov, also raised the issue with Russian experts at the Center for Energy and Security Studies during a discussion of the prospects for implementing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on the Iranian nuclear program (INP). Ryabkov said that, "Soleimani did not come to Moscow."

Washington's accusations are unlikely to jeopardize the plan to implement the Vienna agreement. The JCPOA will enter into force in 90 days following approval by the UN Security Council. But there are still opponents of the deal in Iran, the United States and elsewhere in the Middle East. That creates obstacles.

"Iran is home not only to moderates, but also spiritual leaders and institutions that oppose the deal and its possible consequences for the unaligned image of the regime," said Yulia Sveshnikova, policy analyst at the Islamic Renaissance Front in Malaysia.

"One problematic scenario is if opponents of the deal inside the political elite decide to stretch their nuclear ambitions slightly more than the agreement provides for, having naturally taken all necessary precautions in advance. We could well see provocation from outside with a view to accusing Iran of violating the agreement and to wrecking the deal. There are plenty of potential saboteurs, starting with Israel and the Gulf states, headed by Saudi Arabia."

Looking ahead to the US vote on the Iran deal

One of the main tests for the document is to gain a future vote of approval in the U.S. Congress, where the Republican majority opposes the deal with Iran.
Despite the intensity of the debate in the United States over the advisability of approving the JCPOA, Ryabkov is sure that the document adopted by the P5+1 and Iran is the only possible model for settling the long-standing and politicized issue of the Iranian nuclear program.

"The main trouble for opponents of the Vienna agreement is that they are finding it hard to collect materials to attack and criticize the document," said Ryabkov.

"In drafting the text of the JCPOA, we tried to avoid ambiguities and inaccuracies. Neither Iran nor the 'six' could allow the newly drafted document to be attacked by critics as vague and ambiguous."

The Russian Foreign Ministry is not inclined to dramatize the upcoming vote on the INP in the U.S. Congress. Ryabkov remarked that, "Opponents will not be able to gather enough votes to outweigh a hypothetical presidential veto."

The most important issue, in his diplomatic view, is how consistently and responsibly the United States and the European Union carry out the arrangements set out in the JCPOA.

At the same time Ryabkov expressed satisfaction that the JCPOA had been achieved in the summer of 2015 rather than the fall, when it would have been hampered by the official start of the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign.

Andrei Baklitsky, director of the "Nuclear Nonproliferation and Russia" program at the PIR Center for Policy Studies, believes that, "The deal on the Iranian nuclear program will be approved in the United States, since the Republicans do not have the required two-thirds majority in either the Senate or the House of Representatives to overcome a presidential veto."

The expert predicts what will happen in the U.S. Congress, which is due to vote by September 17.

"The Republicans will reject the deal. Obama will use his veto. And they will not be able to overcome it," says Baklitsky.

Is the Iran deal good for Russia?

Russian diplomats and experts are still debating the question of how beneficial the Iran deal is for Moscow.

In the run-up to reaching an agreement in Vienna, some commentators said that Russia had nothing to gain from it, especially with regard to oil prices, which will fall even further if sanctions are lifted from Tehran. But speaking at the Center for Energy and Security Studies, Ryabkov stated that such logic is groundless.

"If Russia had not taken part in the Iranian nuclear program talks, a deal with Tehran would have happened anyway, but perhaps on far worse terms for our country," said Ryabkov. "Even assuming that Moscow could have boycotted the negotiations, the result would have been the same in terms of oil price dynamics - or even worse."

Russia's deputy foreign minister also noted that, "Sanctions against Iran have not yet been lifted, and the country's export potential cannot be restored in just a few months." Besides, Iran's oil refineries need to be upgraded and refitted with modern equipment.

Ryabkov underscored that Russia's main interests in the talks are to prevent a new conflict in the Middle East, normalize the situation in Iran by diplomatic means, and restore full-fledged cooperation with the country.

"The JCPOA strengthens the nuclear nonproliferation regime and confirms the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons' central position in the system of international security and the International Atomic Energy Agency's role as the promoter of the peaceful atom," said Ryabkov.

Moreover, Anton Khlopkov, director of the Center for Energy and Security, believes that, given Russia's proximity to Iran's borders, a diplomatic solution to the INP issue is the most effective method of conflict resolution.

Ryabkov also stated that going forward "Russia will not allow a single sanctions resolution against Iran through the UN Security Council."

"At the turning point of 2011-2012, following the publication of the International Atomic Energy Agency's report in November 2011, the crisis was close to evolving from the political and diplomatic phase to the military phase," Khlopkov told Russia Direct.

"Back then it was feared that an accidental incident at sea between Iranian and Western naval forces could escalate the nuclear issue into a full-blown military crisis. That was not in Russia's interests in light of the chaos that is gripping Middle East."

Russia supports a WMD-free zone in the Middle East

After reaching the INP deal, Lavrov stated that, "The Iranian agreements create the preconditions to continue work to convene a conference on the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the Middle East."

At the meeting in the Center for Energy and Security Studies, Ryabkov also said that Russia would continue to work in this direction and expressed hope that the deal with Iran would facilitate the process.

Until recently Iran has generally tried to avoid participating in consultations on convening such a conference. Now, when significant progress has been made on the Iranian problematic, Tehran could become an active player in support of convening it.

Khlopkov notes that, "The initiative to establish a WMD-free zone in the Middle East belongs to Egypt and Iran, which proposed it back in 1974. Tehran had actually come up with the idea for a WMD-free zone in the Middle East even earlier. Given the historic importance of the matter for Iran, post-Vienna it could once again become an active lobbyist for the conference."

What are the advantages of the Iranian nuclear deal for Russia?

Both the Kremlin and the White House prefer to focus on the benefits of the Vienna agreement on the Iranian nuclear program.
 
In particular, Moscow and Tehran are in talks on how to remove eight metric tons of low-enriched uranium from the country. The removal of excess uranium from Iran is stipulated in accordance with the JCPOA on the Iranian nuclear program of July 14.

As for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) at the Arak heavy-water reactor (which under the Vienna agreement is also to be removed from Iran), Russia will not take it.
"Russia can accept SNF from reactors only of Soviet and Russian manufacture. Any other kind is forbidden by law," underlined Ryabkov, speaking at the Center for Energy and Security Studies. He also believes that the upcoming U.S. Congress vote on the deal with Tehran will not be overwhelmingly negative.

The conversion of the Fordow plant and the production of stable isotopes for medical purposes (as per the JCPOA) are other areas of Russian-Iranian cooperation. The parties are in talks on cooperation at Fordow and discussing the timeline for bringing medical isotopes on stream.

"The time frame to the start of production is several years," noted Ryabkov, who represented Russia in the P5+1 negotiations with Iran.

In accordance with the Vienna agreement, an international consortium will oversee the conversion of the heavy-water reactor at Arak. Its members are not yet known, but Moscow hopes that responsibility for converting the reactor will lie with the consortium.

Russia will participate in this process on equal terms with others, but, according to Ryabkov, "Because the reactor at Arak is not of Russian origin, Moscow should not be in charge of the operation."

With respect to military-technical cooperation (MTC) with Iran, a permissive regime will exist for five years to replace the pre-JCPOA embargo. Supplies of arms to and from Iran that fall under one of the seven categories of the UN Register of Conventional Arms are to be approved by the UN Security Council.

"It is clear that there is an emergency brake, and states opposed to normal MTC with Iran can always use it. But using it is fraught with political costs and will require motivation and explanation," summed up Ryabkov.
 
 #26
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
August 19, 2015
High-level Iranian and Saudi visits to Moscow raise speculation
Recent visits to Moscow by the Iranian and Saudi foreign ministers, alongside talks with representatives of the Syrian opposition, have raised speculation that Russia could be acting as a mediator between Iran and Saudi Arabia as the lifting of sanctions on Tehran leave the situation in the Middle East in a state of flux.
David Narmania, Nikolay Surkov, RBTH

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and his Iranian counterpart Javad Zarif recently met in Moscow to discuss the development of relations between the two countries in the new international environment, following the signing of an agreement between Iran and the P5+1 major world powers.

On the eve of this visit to the Russian capital, the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, and representatives of the Syrian opposition also came to Moscow for meetings. However, opinion is divided on whether Moscow is acting as an unofficial mediator between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

The meeting between Lavrov and Zarif was held on Aug. 17 in fundamentally new international circumstances, when the signing of an agreement between Iran and the P5+1 major world powers (the U.S., Russia, China, Britain, France, plus Germany) has led to the creation of conditions for the lifting of longstanding Western sanctions against Tehran.

One of the main topics of the talks concerned the implementation of the Plan of Action on Iran's Nuclear Program. As it was stressed at the press conference, Russia will be playing a key role in the implementation of the plan.

In particular, Russia will remove Iran's stockpiles of low-enriched uranium in exchange for natural uranium, as well as assist in developing the production of stable isotopes at the Iranian nuclear facility in Fordow. The Russian Federation will also build another eight nuclear reactors in the Islamic Republic.

"This is a very promising and significant direction, which will increase the supply of energy in Iran, while at the same time ensuring full compliance with non-proliferation, and also respecting Iran's right to have a peaceful nuclear program," said Sergei Lavrov.
 
Syria in the spotlight

One of the main topics of the meeting was the situation in the Middle East. Asked about Russia's position as to the future of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, Lavrov said that his country's position remains the same as it was at beginning of the crisis, and that the fate of the Syrian president must be addressed only after the crisis is resolved.

"We have always advocated that the fate of Syria should be decided by the Syrians themselves - without outside intervention, without any preconditions, without any quick fixes being imposed by external players, from anywhere in the world," said Lavrov.

Javad Zarif noted that the positions of Iran and Russia coincide on this point. "The only way to solve the Syrian crisis is through political dialogue," he said.
 
Backroom deal with Saudi Arabia?

Shortly before Zarif's visit, (on Aug. 11 and 14, respectively) Moscow was visited by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia Adel al-Jubeir and representatives of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces. This gave grounds to rumors of a possible mediation role being played by Moscow, which has repeatedly stated its desire to reduce tensions in the region arising due to events in Syria.

Nevertheless, some Russian experts do not agree with this take on the situation. Yevgeny Satanovsky, president of the Institute of the Middle East, told RBTH that "the fact that Sergei Lavrov met with the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia and Iran, as well as with the head of NCSROF in just six days - is pure coincidence."

According to him, Saudi Arabia is simply unable to agree on anything with the Iranian Shiites due to religious differences, and hence, in principle, Russia cannot act as a mediator.

However, Andrei Baklanov, former Russian Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, and now deputy chairman of the Association of Russian Diplomats, did not rule out the possibility that Moscow is trying to ease tensions in Saudi-Iranian relations. Nevertheless, he believes that Russia currently does not have sufficient resources to act as an intermediary between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

"Yes, in the future, under certain circumstances, this should be possible, but the required conditions for this do not exist at the moment," said the former diplomat.

He added that Russia would certainly like to see a reduction in the level of tensions in the region: "Russia proceeds from the point of view that relations between the two key players in the region should not be directed at confrontation - and so our country's leadership is taking the appropriate measures.

"The results so far have not been impressive, since, as the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia Adel al-Jubeir clearly stated - 'the positions of Iran and Russia on Syria differ from the position of Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, the general background of relations in the region could improve if we continue to work in this direction.'"
 
 #27
www.rt.com
August 19, 2015
Americans are not enemies of Russia - Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zakharova

Despite attempts by the Washington administration to impose anti-Russian views on ordinary people in the US, the American nation is not the enemy of Russia, says Maria Zakharova, the Foreign Ministry's official representative.

In a recent interview with popular Russian daily Komsomolskaya Pravda, Zakharova said that in her opinion the United States as a nation was not hostile to Russia. "The USA is not Obama. The USA is the people who populate the country. The problem lies in the fact that the current US authorities are trying to impose anti-Russian sentiments on their people," she said. "But the USA as a nation and Americans as a people are not our enemies."

Reporters also asked Zakharova to comment on Barak Obama's statement that the Russian economy was in tatters, made in the State of the Union Address in January this year.

"I am very surprised by the fact that the head of a state, who considers himself a civilized person, is proud of doing harm to other people. I have always thought that we should be proud of doing good to people," Zakharova answered. "This is the first time I've ever seen something like this in the history of modern diplomacy," she added.

Russian officials have already commented on Obama's controversial statement about the dire state of the Russian economy. In January, Russia's deputy PM in charge of the weapons industry called the US president 'a dreamer' in a Twitter post, hinting that the effectiveness of the anti-Russian sanctions was much lower than the policy's initiators had hoped for.

Russian MP Frants Klintsevich, of the parliamentary majority United Russia party, has said that Obama's statement revealed the true attitude of the US ruling elite towards Russia, as well as America's plans of global dominance. He added that he didn't think it a coincidence Obama made this statement at a historical moment, when Russia has found its place in the global political and economic system, understood its interests and learned to defend them.

Maria Zakharova was appointed director of the Russian Foreign Ministry's Information and Press department in early August this year and became the first woman in history to assume the post.
 
 #28
AP
August 17, 2015
Alaska village seeks to reunite with Russian relatives
By Rachel D'Oro, Associated Press

ANCHORAGE, Alaska - Across the Bering Strait, Robert Soolook can easily see the looming hulk of the neighboring Russian island where some of his relatives used to live before they were forced to relocate to the Soviet mainland at the start of the Cold War.

"It's always a reminder, each and every day," Soolook, an Inupiat Eskimo, says of the view from Little Diomede Island. Less than 3 miles away is Big Diomede Island, but it might as well be thousands of miles from his village, Diomede, because it is strictly off-limits, patrolled by Russian border guards.

Now Soolook and other residents from his tiny village want to resurrect ties with their relatives or at least connect with their descendants, thanks to National Park Service grants totaling more than $83,000.

Before World War II, indigenous people from both sides traveled freely between the two rocky islands for hundreds of years. Soolook had not been born yet when many indigenous people living in Russia's nearby Chukotka region had to abandon settlements like the one on Big Diomede.

Soviet authorities ordered the 25 to 30 remaining inhabitants to move to the Yup'ik Eskimo village of Naukan in Chukotka in 1948, when the so-called political ice curtain was put in place. That new community was closed a decade later as the Soviets shut down more sites nearest to the Soviet-U.S. border. The former Big Diomede residents were forced to move again, dispersing among various communities.

Today, all that remains on Big Diomede are Russian meteorologists and troops staffing a border guard station established on the island in 1941, the year Russia entered World War II.

It's been more than 20 years since Soolook, 49, visited several long-lost cousins as part of two separate expeditions to Chukotka accomplished after U.S./Russia relations began to warm in the 1980s. He hopes to be among those going again.

The latest attempt to visit is being coordinated by a travel company, Anchorage-based Circumpolar Expeditions, which focuses on western Alaska and the Russian Far East. One of the main goals is to travel to Chukotka communities with Diomede elders next year to visit relatives, according to company president Tandy Wallack. Another goal is to invite the Russian relatives to ultimately travel to Little Diomede for a reunion either next year or in 2017, according to Wallack, who envisions festivities featuring traditional dancing, storytelling and Native foods.

"I think the concept is a really good one - reuniting people, sharing information about how they're connected," said Janis Kozlowski, manager of the National Park Service's Shared Beringian Heritage Program.

Wallack said the idea first emerged when she was working on another Little Diomede project in 2008. A resident asked if she could help find relatives connected with Big Diomede.

"My first thought was, how could I say no?" Wallack said. She told the resident she would do what she could and asked her to send a list of what relatives she knew about.

After the Soviets established control over Big Diomede in the 1920s, most of the inhabitants moved to the smaller island, leaving behind only about a dozen people. Most were members of one family headed by a man who went by the name of Agayeghaq. That tiny population had more than doubled by the time of the Cold War displacement, according to an account by Smithsonian Institution anthropologist Igor Krupnik.

In a phone interview, Krupnik said the Diomede reunion project might have been more doable two years ago, before U.S. and Russia relations cooled. Taking a large contingent of people to Chukotka will require a substantial level of Russian cooperation, a necessity that's difficult to predict, according to Krupnik. But Little Diomede residents are running out of time.

"The youngest person who may remember life on big Diomede is now 75 years of age, and there are very few elders of that age in Chukotka," Krupnik said.

The project has been slow in materializing since the first grant was awarded in late 2013. It involves the time-consuming process of obtaining official permissions to travel from the two countries, as well as passports for Little Diomede residents. It also involves matching old Native names with modern families and arranging for Russian interpreters for those who no longer know the common Native language once shared by the Diomeders on both islands.

From Soolook's point of view, reconnecting with his Russian relatives would be a way to honor his late mother as well.

"That would help her in heaven," he said.

Associated Press writer Lynn Berry in Moscow contributed to this report.
 
 #29
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
August 17, 2015
How Russia views Donald Trump's presidential bid
While Donald Trump has established himself as a presidential front-runner, the Russian expert community might soon begin to view him as the American analogue of Vladimir Zhirinovsky rather than the savior of U.S.-Russian relations.
By Eugene Bai
Eugene Bai is an expert in Latin America and an experienced international journalist, contributor to The New Times, Novaya Gazeta and Expert magazine.

The U.S. presidential campaign is attracting keen interest in Russia. However, it seems that Russian experts are often too hasty in their predictions, focusing only on public opinion polls without looking at the inner workings of U.S. policy.

According to Russian Americanists, the controversial billionaire Donald Trump seems to be the only viable candidate in the race for the Republican presidential nomination.

"Trump attracts audiences as a renegade and self-promoter," says Yuri Yudenkov, a lecturer in politics at Moscow State University. "Trump is not a politician, but a public businessman. Trump is all about books, speeches, lectures, and money."

The only presidential candidate to support Russia?

Yudenkov is very surprised by Trump's position on Russian policy, which he voiced during the first televised debate for Republican presidential candidates.
 Also read: "The US, Russia may be closer together politically than many people think"

"In this great debate Donald Trump was the only one of the ten participants who spoke out in support of Russia," says the expert. "Trump said that Obama's policy is wrong, and that he would reach an agreement with Putin. Many spoke out against, many remained silent, but Trump was the only one openly in favor."
However, Donald Trump has merely reversed his rhetoric. Last year he criticized President Obama for his policy on Ukraine, calling on him to "be a man" and stand up to Vladimir Putin, insisting at the same time on tougher anti-Russian sanctions.

"Putin has shown the world what happens when America has weak leaders. Peace Through Strength!" wrote the billionaire in April last year on his Facebook page.

The statement about an imagined agreement with Putin seems to be just one of many outlandish statements made by Trump. Another is his promise to build a wall on the border with Mexico, since "the United States has become a dumping ground for Mexico," which is a "tremendous infectious disease" that "is pouring across the border." He has also made crude remarks about female adversaries, whom the presidential candidate has called "slobs," "disgusting animals," and "fat pigs."

The Russian leadership has repeatedly made it clear that it is sick and tired of Barack Obama and has lost all hope of ever returning to the negotiating table. At the same time the Kremlin has intimated that it would prefer to deal with a Republican president, who would be more predictable and straightforward, Moscow believes.

However, Obama fatigue alone can hardly explain the Kremlin's haste to heap praise on this eccentric candidate, who despite his unexpectedly high ratings at the early stage of the race, has little chance of becoming the Grand Old Party's actual nominee, according to no-nonsense U.S. analysts. It would also seem an exaggeration to talk about the New York real estate developer's excessive influence over Congress.

Trump: The American Zhirinovsky

"Trump is very rich and can seriously alter the balance of power in the Republican primaries. But I don't think he's aiming for the presidency, rather the vice-presidency. He knows full well that money can do a lot, but not everything," says Russian political scientist and Americanist Areg Galstyan.

He does not rule out that if the Republican nomination goes to Jeb Bush or Scott Walker, the winner could ask Trump to share the ticket with him.

"It would add political balance: Trump is a radical, while Bush is considered a moderate," surmises Galstyan. "Trump has a lot of influence over Congress, and I think that Bush or Walker would want a guy like that in their administration."

Most U.S. analysts express a diametrically opposite view. Washington Post columnist Eugene Robinson writes that after the first debate, "the GOP establishment confidently predicts that the Donald Trump phenomenon is over, done with, finished, kaput."

Another well-known columnist, George Will, calls Trump a "counterfeit Republican." "When Trump decided that his next acquisition would be not another casino but the Republican presidential nomination, he tactically and quickly underwent many conversions of convenience (concerning abortion, health care, funding Democrats, etc.). His makeover demonstrates that he is a counterfeit Republican and no conservative," writes Will.

The rise of Trump has become a kind of aberration in U.S. public opinion - a significant number of voters are simply protesting against the more traditional candidates who all seem alike, and are flocking to support the extravagant outsider who loves to shock the nation.

In Russia, that role in politics has long been played by the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party, Vladimir Zhirinovsky. However, no serious analyst has ever considered him as a candidate for the top job. As for Trump, most U.S. experts assert that his political sun will set so rapidly that not only will the tycoon not be invited into the next president's team (if the Republicans win), but, according to Galstyan, will not even be able to raise his voice in support of another candidate.

A blinkered foreign policy debate

Rather than sifting through the 17 Republican presidential candidates for the one who has the kindest word to say about Putin, the Russian expert community should heed the fact that the last debate paid very little attention to foreign policy issues. Yet 2016 has been dubbed the "foreign policy" elections due to the abundance of complex global problems that the next occupant of the White House will face.

"The debate also lacked regional balance, focusing almost entirely on the Middle East, the Iran deal, and ISIS. These issues are not unimportant, but other major topics went unaddressed. Russia got limited talk time, while China - arguably America's most important diplomatic relationship - was not even discussed," writes Emma Ashford of the CATO Institute, a Washington DC think tank, in her article, "A Blinkered Foreign Policy Debate."

One cannot but agree with this observation. None of the presidential runners in the debates has shown him or herself to be a strategist with a passable grip on world politics. And whoever wins the upcoming primaries will find it difficult to compete with the Democrats' shoe-in candidate, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. It can be assumed that if the chaos in the Republican house continues, the Kremlin will have to forget about Democrat fatigue and try to rebuild relations with Barack Obama's party after all.
 
 
#30
Washington Post
August 19, 2015
Is Donald Trump an American Putin?
By David Ignatius  
David Ignatius writes a twice-a-week foreign affairs column.

He promises to restore his country's greatness, without offering a specific plan. He uses crude, vulgar expressions that make him sound like an ordinary guy, even though he's a billionaire. He's a narcissist who craves media attention. And for all his obvious shortcomings, he's very popular.

Whom am I referring to? Russian President Vladimir Putin, of course. But the parallels with a certain American politician known as the "The Donald" are obvious.

Donald Trump is in some respects an American version of Putin. Like the Russian leader, he seeks to reverse his country's losses and return its former glory. He promises a restoration of power and prestige without trifling about the details.

"We have no victories," Trump complained to NBC's Chuck Todd on "Meet the Press" on Sunday. "As a country, we don't have victories anymore. And it's very sad."

Trump's official slogan is "Make America Great Again!" It's a line borrowed from Ronald Reagan's acceptance speech at the 1980 Republican convention, when the Gipper promised a "crusade to make America great again." But really, this kind of talk is the mainstay of politicians around the world who campaign on a platform of national restoration. Their message is as much psychological as political.

"Chuck, it'll work out so well," Trump enthused to Todd. "You will be so happy. In four years, you're going to be interviewing me and you're going to say, 'What a great job you've done, President Trump.' You're going to say, 'You've done one of the great jobs.' It's going to happen."

The appeal of such politicians is partly their brash self-confidence. They don't explain the mundane details of national revival; they just assert it. Think of the character Harold Hill in "The Music Man." He promised to give River City a marching band, even though he couldn't play music.

Putin, like Trump, seems to understand that power and showmanship are inseparable, especially for a nation that is traumatized by military and economic losses. It's a confidence game. "Within the system, Mr. Putin has developed his own idealized view of himself as CEO of 'Russia, Inc.' In reality, his leadership style is more like that of a mafia family Don," write Fiona Hill and Clifford G. Gaddy in their book, "Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin."

Gleb Pavlovsky, who was one of Putin's key advisers during his rise to power, confided to the Guardian in 2012 that Putin was one of an "unseen, unrepresented layer of people" in Russia who dreamed of a revanche that would recover past glory. "By revanche , I mean the resurrection of the great state in which we lived, which we became used to," Pavlovsky explained.

Putin laid out his vision of revival in a December 1999 speech that became known as the "Millennium Message." He stressed the importance of building a strong state that could restore national self-confidence: "Russia has [just] experienced one of the most difficult periods in its many centuries of history....She faces the real danger of becoming not just a second- but even a third-tier country. To prevent this from happening, we need an immense effort from all the nation's intellectual, physical and moral forces."

Trump is more nakedly self-promoting than Putin, with a vanity and braggadocio that would embarrass a Russian (or, indeed, almost anyone). Trump's Web site promotes him as "the very definition of the American success story," gliding over his four corporate bankruptcies. He seems to enjoy it when commentators deride him as an uncouth lout and rabble-rouser, underestimating the power of his message. His blunt comments speak to a nation that's sick of political double-talk.

Trump's tirades about illegal immigration, his loudest campaign theme, are part of a long and ugly story in the United States. Within 70 years of the republic's founding, a party aptly dubbed the "Know-Nothings" was bashing immigrants, especially Catholics. Over subsequent decades, nativists were attacking every new thread of the American quilt - Irish, Italian, German, Slavic, Jewish, Chinese and African, as John Higham explains in his landmark history, "Strangers in the Land."

What's surprising about Trump is that he has attracted such a wide following. He's Reagan without Reaganism, running a campaign nearly devoid of ideas. Americans have had flirtations with demagogues, from Father Charles Coughlin in the 1930s to Sen. Joseph McCarthy in the 1950s. But the bullying authoritarian personality - the Putin style - usually doesn't work here. This summer has been an exception, but history suggests that it won't last.
 
 #31
Belarus Digest
http://belarusdigest.com
August 17, 2015
Lukashenka's 2015 Election Strategy
By David Marples and Uladzimir Padhol
David Marples is Distinguished University Professor, Department of History & Classics, University of Alberta. Uladzimir Padhol is Belarusian political scientist and journalist, editor and publisher of Narodnyi televisor

On 4 August, Belarusian president Aliaksandr Lukashenka met with journalists of non-government media to discuss a wide range of topics. In particular he focused on the preelection campaign and the conflict in Ukraine, stressing that Russia will not go to war with Belarus and no Russian planes operate on Belarusian territory.

This paper examines two aspects of the president's policies: responses to events in Ukraine and his position on the economic downturn. It posits that the links between the two events form a pivotal part of his platform and that he exploits the ramifications of the conflict to explain and trivialise the fall in living standards.

Belarusian president faces two overriding concerns during the approach to the new presidential election campaign: the conflict in Ukraine and the economic downturn in the country. Opposition candidates could highlight both issues in their platforms. Registration of candidates starts only after 21 August, but already the president's speeches concentrate on the impact of the war on Belarus and the need to avoid any form of commitment.

The Fear Of War

Lukashenka uses the events in Ukraine as a negative example, periodically frightening Belarusian residents with the theory that the Maidan civil uprising represents the equivalent of a protest in "the square" (signifying October or Independence Square, the location of previous demonstrations after elections) and could lead to war.

On this question, the president declared in the interview that he opposes any conflict in Ukraine, Russian or otherwise. He reiterated that no attack on Ukraine will come from Belarus and has informed Ukrainian Parliamentary Speaker Oleksander Turchynov of the same on 4 August.

Lukashenka cannot remain strictly neutral on Ukraine with an electorate largely committed to the Russian side

Still, according to surveys conducted by Andrei Vardomatsky in July 2015, 62.3% of Belarusians do not consider Russia responsible for the bloodshed in Ukraine and 63% support Russia's position on Crimea. In a recent paper, Anton Shymanski notes that most residents of Belarus receive information from TV channels whose policies are formed mainly by the Kremlin. Virtual space in Belarus is simply part of Russian space.

The perceptions of the Ukrainian leadership disseminated in Russia (neo-Nazis, Banderites, etc) enjoy widespread backing in Belarus. Thus Lukashenka faces a complex situation: he cannot remain strictly neutral with an electorate largely committed to the Russian side and believing Ukraine to be the embodiment of chaos.

On the other hand, as sociologist Aleh Manayeu of the National Institute for Social-Economic and Political Studies (IISEPS) has observed, the hierarchy of critical issues for Belarusians has changed, and in place of the former social-economic problems come problems of security and protection.

Thus Lukashenka offers reassuring platitudes that no one can forget the "30 million losses" in the Second World War, and that eventually the Donbas will return to the Ukrainian fold. In the meantime, Belarusians enjoy security under his protection and avoid participation in the conflict.

Explaining The Economic Downturn

Despite the switch in priorities, the economic downturn persists, particularly in terms of wages and purchasing power. Gone is the past "social contract" with citizens and promises-as in 2010-of a monthly wage of $1,000 per month. That figure has now fallen to $500, and instead the president talks about job security and protection from the conflict to the south.

His own role is that of a stern overseer, warning the managers of enterprises that he will regard a failure to support economic goals as an act of sabotage and use Special Services to ensure cooperation. They must maintain jobs and labour collectives, sell what they produce, and wait out the crisis.

If we are living better under Lukashenka, it means that it is thanks to Lukashenka
His language on the economy uses military metaphors . On 6 August, he commented during a meeting with Prime Ministr Kabiakou that "The economy is in a state of war," "we have entered an economic war, a military situation." Yet people do not anticipate something "supernatural." They understand that 80% of the problems originate outside Belarus, and "therefore we are not to blame."

The country in the meantime must seek alternative markets and resolve most of its problems in the course of 2015. Thus official policy is one of evasion: we did not cause the economic decline and thus eventually will return to past practices. Manayeu describes public thinking as follows: "If we are living better under Lukashenka, it means that it is thanks to Lukashenka." And if not, the fault lies elsewhere.

The Popularity Of Lukashenka

Opinion polls conducted by the National Institute for Social-Economic and Political Studies (NISEPI), Vardomatsky (Belarusian Analytical Workroom), and others indicate that the popularity of the president is currently falling, though it stands at around 40% of respondents, falling from 45% earlier. Though perhaps a concern, it is far from the historic lows during his 21-year presidency. According to NISEPI, these were 26.5% in 2002 and 20.5% in 2011, when the world recession reached its peak in Belarus. Thus Lukashenka does not yet face serious danger.

Lukashenka's activities as a peacemaker praised in the West irritate the Kremlin and lack support of the population

Yet his sources of support appear to be narrower than in the past, when he relied on "simple" country people and urban workers. Small and middle entrepreneurs hold different views on economic progress. They make up, together with their families about 1 million people, or roughly one quarter of the electorate. Lukashenka continues to rely on the support of state officials, the KGB, and the army, none of which have any serious economic input into the development of society.

Open rifts have emerged between certain sectors. Those who want economic reforms and private businesses, clash with state bureaucrats content to remain under an "administrative-command" system. The official stance is retrogressive: one opposed to change, mild adherence to Russian-lead structures, and open to foreign loans from Russia, China, and other partners.

Yet weariness with Lukashenka and concern about problems do not offset Lukashenka's advantages: the protracted conflict in Ukraine and the fear Belarusians have of becoming embroiled.

Ironically his activities as a peacemaker, which produced praise from the West, are not particularly helpful to his campaign, irritating the Kremlin and lacking support of the population, which largely accepts the Russian perspective of events.

The watchword remains stability, the suggested course the same as in the past; the grim alternative depicted as a replica of the mayhem taking place in Ukraine.
 
 #32
Financial Times
August 18, 2015
Fear Vladimir Putin's weakness not his strength
It would be rash to equate the president with Russia and declare new cold war
By John Thornhill
FT's deputy editor and former bureau chief in Moscow

It is hard to find a more spirited supporter of Russian president Vladimir Putin than Konstantin Malofeev, the so-called "Orthodox businessman" who has been outspoken in his backing of the separatists in Ukraine.

In Mr Malofeev's telling, Mr Putin's accomplishments have been to crush the oligarchs, reassert the Kremlin's authority across the country, revive the economy, bolster the Orthodox church and re-establish Russia as an independent geopolitical actor.

"Russia is not Belgium. Russia can only exist as an empire," he told my Moscow colleagues and me earlier this year in his offices resplendent with tsarist regalia. "Putin is a historic leader. The best leader in the past 100 years."

But when asked about whether Mr Putin had succeeded in creating a system of governance that would outlast him, the voluble Mr Malofeev expressed some uncharacteristic doubts. "Finding another Putin is very difficult. I am not sure this system can continue after Putin," he said.

Mr Malofeev's hesitation touches on the cardinal sin of Mr Putin's rule that should be considered by western policymakers dealing with Moscow. Mr Putin has consolidated the Kremlin's power by stripping all rival institutions of authority and legitimacy. Over the past 15 years, he has neutered parliament, the regional governors, the free press, the opposition and the law courts. From any longer-term perspective, the striking feature of Mr Putin's Russia is not its strength but its alarming brittleness.

For the moment, Mr Putin may convey the impression of being the master of all he surveys, leading a resurgent Russia and intimidating her former Soviet neighbours. If anything, western debates about Russia tend to exaggerate the country's cycles and its politicians are shivering at the prospect of a new cold war. But before long, Russia may have slipped again into a cyclical downturn, leaving the west to fret about the dangers of economic and social chaos, virulent nationalism and nuclear proliferation. A weak Russia may be even more worrying than a strong one.

It is not only Mr Putin's political model that looks outdated. Russia's economy appears equally threadbare. Under the strains of lower energy prices, western sanctions and massive capital flight, Russia's economy contracted 4.6 per cent in the second quarter of 2015 compared with the same period the previous year. Real incomes are falling for the first time in Mr Putin's rule.

The Soviet Union once vied with the US for economic supremacy; now, America's gross domestic product using purchasing power parity is five times larger than Russia's. If, as some suggest, we have reached "peak demand" for oil then Russia's economy looks vulnerable given its failure to diversify. It has no new model for growth.

Underlying this economic fragility is a demographic disaster. Russia's population has fallen to 142m, smaller than that of Bangladesh. Many of its best brains are quitting the country, or are being forced to do so. A recent Russian report into the country's demographic trends concluded: "If the situation does not improve the country can expect problems in the economy, international competitiveness and, in a long-term perspective, geopolitics too."

Abroad, Russia has few reliable allies. The Eurasian Union it has cobbled together to rival the EU is a palace built on sand. Moscow has made much of its partnership with China but the relationship is wildly lopsided and Beijing has been adept at exacting a high economic price for its political goodwill. In a pre-nuclear age, China would have surely annexed Siberia by now.

Russia's projection of soft power looks no more promising in spite of the expansion of state-backed English-language media outlets. A report published this month by the Pew Research Centre into the attitudes of 45,000 people in 40 countries found that Russia and Mr Putin were held in low regard around the world. "Favourable opinion of Russia trails that of the US by a significant margin in most regions of the world," it found. A median of 58 per cent in each country outside Russia held a negative opinion of Mr Putin.

Considering all these weaknesses, one liberal Russian friend compares Mr Putin to the monster cockroach in the children's poem by Korney Chukovsky. For a while, the cockroach, with his ugly threats and fearsome moustache, throws all the larger animals on a picnic into a panic.

"Into the fields and woods they dash -

Terrorised by the Roach's moustache!"

But then a sparrow swoops down and snaps up the cockroach, leaving the animals to wonder why they were ever afraid in the first place.

Mr Putin's fate remains uncertain and Russia's future wildly unpredictable. Calibrating a response is difficult. The west carries more weight when it is united and strong. It has surely been right to sanction Mr Putin's regime for trampling over Ukraine's sovereignty. It is right to bolster the defences of Nato member countries that border Russia.

But it would be rash to equate Mr Putin's regime with Russia and reinforce it by declaring a new cold war. To the limited extent that it is possible, the west should make clear to the Russian people that it has no wish to isolate them. It should leave the door to Russia ajar in case any future leader wishes to walk back through it.
 
 #33
The Times (UK)
August 9, 2015
The last days of an oligarch
By Mark Franchetti

Boris Berezovsky died bankrupt and almost certainly by his own hand. As the battle over what remains of his estate hots up, Mark Franchetti, with access to close family and friends, charts his extraordinary downfall

When he walked into the restaurant of the Four Seasons hotel in Park Lane, London, shortly after 5pm on Friday, March 22, 2013, Boris Berezovsky, Russian oligarch par excellence and the Kremlin's public enemy No 1, had just 16 hours to live. Dressed in an old, black turtleneck, a jacket and the same pashmina police were to find around his neck the next day, the former multibillionaire strolled past Arab businessmen doing deals as the restaurant pianist played.

Shadowing the Russian was Avi Navama, his loyal ex-Mossad bodyguard, the solitary security detail of what had once been an impressive armed force of former French Foreign Legionnaires. Waiting for Berezovsky was a reporter who had flown in from Moscow to interview him - but the former oligarch had already changed his mind. He curtly asked the journalist to switch off his tape recorder and warned he would only talk off the record. The man once dubbed the Godfather of the Kremlin had become a shadow of his former self. Gone was his unmistakably manic manner of speech. He seemed absent, spoke slowly and at times his hand was shaking.

He told the stunned reporter, Ilya Zhegulev, that at 67 he had no idea what to do with his life and hinted that he wanted only to be allowed back to Russia. An obsession with removing the Russian president from power had consumed Berezovsky - and part of his fortune - ever since he fled Moscow for exile in London in 2000. "I've lost the meaning of life," he told Zhegulev. "I should never have left Russia." His return, however, would depend on his arch-enemy, Vladimir Putin.

When Zhegulev pressed Berezovsky on how he had gone from being worth �2bn to the verge of bankruptcy in little more than a decade, he looked uneasy, and cut short the interview, saying he was running late for a meeting. "His state made a strong impression on me," recalls Zhegulev. "He seemed very distressed, a broken man. I couldn't believe how he'd changed."

The next morning, in a Costa Coffee in Earl's Court, the reporter met Yuli Dubov, a close friend of Berezovsky of 41 years, who also lived in exile. He told Dubov he thought Berezovsky could be suicidal. "I was dismissive," recalls Dubov. "I told him not to worry, that Berezovsky liked playing things up. I said that Boris was down in the dumps, but was a fighter. He'd bounce back."

Unbeknown to the two Russians, Berezovsky had already been dead since 9.30am. His bodyguard, Navama, found him at 3pm that day, at the �20m mansion near Ascot, Berkshire, that belonged to Berezovsky's second ex-wife. The oligarch had been a guest there for eight months, since his staggering financial problems had forced him to sell the Surrey mansion that had been his home since 2001. Navama had spent the morning running errands that Berezovsky had given him the previous evening. "He looked at me with low, tired eyes. Like he doesn't know what to do," Navama later said of the last time he saw his boss alive. When he went looking for Berezovsky after he failed to turn up for lunch the next day, he found his mobile phone by his bedside table with several missed calls. Alarmed, Navama checked the en-suite bathroom but found the door locked from inside. "Mr Boris?!" he called, but after receiving no answer, dialled 999 and kicked down the door.

Clad in a black T-shirt and tracksuit bottoms, Berezovsky's cold, stiff body lay on the floor. A torn length of his favourite black pashmina was tied around his neck. His face was a deep purple. There were no signs of a struggle or forced entry. When a paramedic responded to Navama's call his radiation alarm went off, triggering fears of a repeat of the polonium murder in 2006 of Alexander Litvinenko, a former KGB officer and Putin critic whom Berezovsky had employed. But the device was found to have a battery fault and extensive tests detected no radioactive substances. Police found a fingerprint on the shower rail that they were unable to match. Nonetheless, Scotland Yard believes Berezovsky's death was a suicide and a pathologist ruled out murder.

A German forensic scientist hired by the dead man's family told the inquest that the strangulation marks were inconsistent with suspension, and that the oligarch's purple face was something he had "never seen before" in a suicide hanging. He suggested that several assailants had killed the former billionaire and staged the hanging. The coroner dismissed this theory, saying he had heard "compelling evidence" to suggest the Russian had committed suicide, but that, in view of the German's distinguished reputation, he had to record an open verdict.

Elizaveta Berezovskaya, the oligarch's daughter from his first marriage, told the coroner that she could not believe her father had taken his own life, but confirmed earlier statements she had made that he had spoken of suicide and that she had feared that he would kill himself. "But the more I thought about it the more doubts I had. My gut feeling is that he was poisoned," she said. "I can think of many people who were interested in my father's death." Asked by the coroner if she knew who these people were, she replied: "Yes, I think we all know," hinting at the Kremlin.

It is only fitting that conspiracy theories should linger around the premature death of a figure so controversial, flamboyant and murky as Boris Abramovich Berezovsky. His name continually popped up, indirectly, during the lengthy public inquiry into the murder of Litvinenko, which came to an end last month. As well as keeping Litvinenko - who had become a paid MI5 and MI6 source - on his own payroll for years, the oligarch had also had many dealings with the ex-KGB spy's alleged killer, Andrei Lugovoi, a security consultant. Traces of polonium allegedly left by Lugovoi were found in Berezovsky's Mayfair office. One theory is that Russia's security services ordered Litvinenko's death to frame the oligarch. To this day, Moscow accuses Berezovsky of killing Litvinenko, but has never provided a shred of evidence to back its claims.

So how did the epitome of the Russian oligarch lose his fortune and meet his own end?

The former Soviet mathematician's single greatest political mistake was helping Putin to the presidency. His second was thinking he could take him on when the two fell out. Both miscalculations were down to hubris and ego, and his determination to involve himself in politics.

Badri Patarkatsishvili, his closest friend and business partner, ran their empire, which spanned oil refineries, car plants, media and Aeroflot, the national airline. "Boris was useless with money," says Yuli Dubov. "He didn't know how to earn it, but was brilliant at blowing it. He was an ideas man, not a manager. Badri was in charge of the cash and the books; Boris strategised. When he needed funds he asked Badri."

From the early 1990s, Putin and Berezovsky enjoyed friendly relations and the oligarch reportedly contributed to his presidential campaign. Crucially, he gave Putin the support of his media empire. He revelled in his image as the Kremlin's grey cardinal. The honeymoon was short-lived as the new president quickly sought to end the oligarchs' political influence. Berezovsky began to publicly criticise Putin, attracting a string of fraud and embezzlement investigations into his businesses.

In 2001, facing arrest, Berezovsky fled Russia and eventually settled in Britain. To the Kremlin's fury, he was granted political asylum in 2003. He and Patarkatsishvili, a larger-than-life Georgian, lived lavishly. At the height of the oligarch's flamboyance and notorious womanising, there were reports of him spending �1m a week and of Patarkatsishvili sending his private jet to Georgia to fly takeaways from local restaurants to Britain.

Berezovsky would spend the next 12 years boisterously seeking to oust Putin. A tongue-in-cheek photograph of the oligarch taken in his Mayfair offices a year before his death shows him straight-faced, dressed in a Batman costume and holding Russia's flag. "That's how Boris liked to see himself in exile, as a superhero - Batman on a mission to save Russia," says Rafael Filinov, a friend, former trouble-shooter and business associate of the oligarch.

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Berezovsky's downfall began on February 12, 2008, when a massive heart attack killed Patarkatsishvili, at the age of 52, at his mansion in Surrey. The pair had never signed any papers to regulate their multibillion-pound fortune. Deals were verbal, gentlemen's agreements that, according to Berezovsky, split all their assets equally.

But the Georgian left a disputed will and scant information about where he had hidden his assets away from the eyes of Russian investigators. For Berezovsky, years of expensive asset searches and litigation with Patarkatsishvili's estate and widow followed. "It caused a lot of problems," Berezovsky told me in 2012. "Badri controlled all our business. When he died, it turned out he didn't protect me. I was shocked by the mess he left. I never expected him to die before me."

Friends and relatives unanimously believe that Berezovsky would still be alive today had Patarkatsishvili not died prematurely. "He was lost without him," says a source close to both billionaires.

To raise funds in 2009 Berezovsky sold his �200m superyacht, Darius, which had seven decks, two swimming pools and a military water cannon powerful enough to sink a boat 100 yards away. But his coffers were hit the following year by a record �100m divorce settlement with his second wife, Galina. Next, the combative oligarch embarked on one of his most ill-judged battles: taking to court his former prot�g�, Roman Abramovich, the billionaire owner of Chelsea Football Club, in a record �3.2bn lawsuit.

"Almost everyone told him not to go to court, but Boris couldn't be swayed once he'd made up his mind," says Egor Schuppe, Berezovsky's former son-in-law. Schuppe, a London-based businessman, was one of the last of Berezovsky's confidants to speak to him, and the first to publicly break the news of his death. "He was absolutely sure he'd win the case," Schuppe tells me, in his first interview about Berezovsky's death.

"Getting money from Abramovich was important, but it wasn't the main point," says Yuli Dubov. "Boris relished the chance to inflict pain on the Kremlin. He thought the revelations from the court case would embarrass Putin. This would be his triumph."

The oligarch spent a few days in Israel before the court passed its verdict. Before flying back to London, Berezovsky, an orthodox believer, went to church in Jerusalem to pray for victory. "After church, he also went to pray at the Wailing Wall and then asked me, as a Muslim Tatar, to do the same in the city's main mosque, to have the three main religions covered," recalls Filinov. "That was classic Berezovsky."

The judge who heard the case didn't hear Berezovsky's prayers and ruled against him. In a devastating blow for a man who had spent years and millions trying to build up his reputation in Britain, she described him as "an inherently unreliable witness" whose evidence was at times "deliberately dishonest", and who regarded truth as "a flexible concept".

Berezovsky later told me that he was "astonished" by the ruling and "most of all by the personal attack the judge launched on me". "The reputational damage - far more than the money - is what hit him hardest," says Schuppe. "From then on, it was downhill. He was like a fighter pilot who'd been blown out of the sky."

Everyone who was close to the former billionaire - even those who do not believe he committed suicide - agree that he "changed radically" and became deeply depressed after losing the case.

"It happened at once," Katerina Sabirova, 25, a model and girlfriend of the oligarch at the time, tells me. "He said that he didn't know how to go on living. We stopped going out, he didn't want to see anyone. He hardly ate and suffered from insomnia. He'd stay in bed until 1pm and often didn't want to get up. He lost weight and would smoke several packets a day."

The financial consequences of the case were disastrous. He was also saddled with a �100m legal bill for both sides. Desperate to raise cash, he sold Wentworth Park, his Surrey estate, for �25m.

Sabirova recalls once asking him for cash to go shopping in London with a friend. He said he was cash-strapped and that they had to be careful with money, as he gave her �1,000 in cash. "Usually he'd give more," she says. "I said we should save, that I should put some of that �1,000 aside. He said, 'No, next time I'll think of something.'"

Adding to his financial woes, Elena Gorbunova, the oligarch's long-standing girlfriend and mother of his two youngest children, began suing him, leading to the freezing of his few remaining assets. "Her suing was a knock-out blow for Boris," says his former son-in-law. The oligarch's debts are estimated to have reached nearly �300m - �46m of them owed to the British taxman.

Berezovsky's estate was declared insolvent last year. But his many creditors are locked in a battle to try to recoup some of their losses from a few assets the oligarch is thought to have still had. Insiders say there is a row hotting up between his ex-wife Besharova and his girlfriend Gorbunova, over a multimillion-pound property on the C�te d'Azur that was seized by French authorities. "The whole thing's a mess, and given the dire state of his financial affairs it's all a bit unseemly," said a source familiar with the dispute.

After the Abramovich case, relatives say Berezovsky began to spend days in his room with the blinds drawn, and was treated for clinical depression in Israel and Britain. He rejected in-patient treatment and was dismissive of counselling. For a while he took antidepressants, but stopped when they caused him severe liver problems. The change is thought to have contributed to his wild mood swings.

"He could be really down in a dark hole one moment, and the next be his old self - energetic and full of plans," recalled Schuppe, who is deeply critical of the way the oligarch's ex-wife and girlfriend took him to court over money - effectively cutting off his cash flow. "He lost his confidence. Worst of all was his loss of status, not being a player any more. It paralysed him and he wasn't capable of looking after his own interests any more."

Friends and relatives also say Berezovsky became bitterly disillusioned with the West and felt betrayed by the British legal system. He suspected an improbable political conspiracy to appease the Kremlin was behind the scathing verdict in the Abramovich case.

Three months before his death, he reportedly wrote a letter to Putin asking for forgiveness, conceding he had been wrong and pleading to be allowed back to Russia. After Berezovsky died the Russian president confirmed receiving it, but some of those closest to the oligarch still doubt he penned such a letter. Other sources claim it was passed to Putin by Roman Abramovich and another intermediary.

"He often talked with me and many others about taking his own life," Navama, the bodyguard, told British authorities investigating his boss's death. On one occasion the oligarch stood with a steak knife in his hand, asking: "Where should I cut?" On another occasion he asked: "What is the best way to die?" The tycoon asked both his son and his bodyguard to demonstrate how he could choke himself. Schuppe recalls his father-in-law once asking him from a fourth-floor balcony if a fall from that height would kill him.

In early March, Berezovsky changed his will, cutting out his two ex-wives. In a sign that he thought he would not live much longer, he added his 88-year-old mother, who had been diagnosed with terminal cancer.

Yet, in the last few days before his death his spirits seemed to improve. He spent much of Monday, March 18, 2013, planning a 10-day trip to Israel with his model girlfriend, Sabirova, which he had been due to take two days after he was found dead. He spoke to Schuppe, who paid for his and Sabirova's tickets - she was to join him from Moscow. Schuppe, a wealthy web entrepreneur, told him he would pay for his bodyguard and other expenses until the end of the month, then he could no longer afford to support him.

The same day, Berezovsky called his friend Filinov in Moscow to ask him to lend him $3,000 in cash to give to Sabirova as travel money. "Is she looking good?" he asked. He also phoned a former business partner in Latvia, asking him to join him on the Dead Sea, as he had an idea he wanted to share with him. Berezovsky spent the next day at home. He spoke with Dubov, who says his mood seemed to have improved.

On Wednesday, three days before he died, Berezovsky was driven into London by his bodyguard to meet Vladimir Gusinsky, formerly one of Russia's most powerful oligarchs, who also fled Russia after falling out with Putin. In the 1990s the two tycoons had been both allies and bitter foes. Sources say that Gusinsky had agreed to lend the beleaguered Russian money and the two men were to meet again in Israel. "He felt he was no longer in the game and had lost his way... but he said he was ready to fight," Gusinsky said later.

Berezovsky spent much of his last day - Friday, March 22 - at his ex-wife's Berkshire mansion. In the morning he spoke to Mikhail Cherney, an Uzbek-born tycoon living in Israel, who had lent him several million pounds to help fight the Abramovich case. He asked Cherney to book a hotel. "He was going to stay in Tel Aviv for three days, then Jerusalem, then the Dead Sea. He said he was coming," Cherney said.

After lunch, Berezovsky was driven to the Four Seasons to meet the reporter Zhegulev. Following their conversation, the Forbes reporter accompanied him to his Mercedes. "'Don't let me down,' he said to me," recalls Zhegulev. "'I'm not one of your friends,' I quipped back. Given his state, I worried I'd been too tough on him and texted him to say so. 'Good luck,' is all he messaged back."

On his way back to Ascot, Berezovsky spoke on the phone to his ex-wife Besharova. He is also thought to have spoken to Gorbunova, with whom he had recently had a deeply upsetting row over their daughter's decision to study in America, which Berezovsky opposed.

He then called his daughter Ekaterina - Schuppe's ex-wife - to congratulate her on her 40th birthday. He sent her flowers, but did not go to see her. That evening he made several other calls. One was to Annika Ancverina, 25, a Russian student living in London and a long-standing mistress who had spent part of Thursday with him in and around the capital.

Schuppe was on a business trip in Kiev when he last spoke to his father-in-law via Skype, less than 10 hours before he died and long after the former oligarch had retired to his bedroom after giving his bodyguard his errands for the next morning. Berezovsky was lying on his bed. The two spoke for more than an hour, about the Israel trip, and how whistleblower websites were empowering ordinary people against governments. "He was absolutely normal. We had a stimulating conversation," said Schuppe. "He was in the mood of someone about to leave for a trip to Israel. I had seen him at rock bottom, when I'd really feared for him. But now I thought that maybe we'd seen the worst and we'd manage to pull him out of it."

Hours later Michael Cotlick, Berezovsky's assistant, and Navama called Schuppe in Kiev to tell him that Berezovsky was dead. Schuppe flew back to London and drove straight from the airport to the morgue to see Berezovsky's body. "I had to say goodbye and I had to see him with my own eyes, because I just couldn't believe it. I know Boris could have taken his own life, but two years later I still don't know if he really did. I still can't get my head round it."