#2
New York Observer
http://observer.com
August 11, 2015
In Modern Ukraine, People of Color Need Not Apply
Attacks on dark-skinned visitors and Aryan-only pools reveal post-Maidan Ukraine still has some maturing to do
By Mikhail Klikushin
[Video here http://observer.com/2015/08/in-modern-ukraine-people-of-color-need-not-apply/]

In the beginning of the year, the Washington Post ran an opinion piece from AlterNet editor Terrell Jermaine Starr with an eye-catching headline: "A Cop in Ukraine said he was detaining me because I was black. I appreciated it."

According to the Mr. Starr, who visited Ukraine in 2009, back then people with different skin color had routinely faced housing discrimination, police treated them as suspects in drug-smuggling crimes, and occasionally the reporter "encountered young men dressed in black shirts and Doc Martens who would throw up the Nazi salute at my direction." In other words, "racism in Ukraine was much more blunt [than in the US] - always in my face, unabashed and in plain view."

So, how much things have changed in Ukraine with regard to racism since the Maidan revolution supposedly brought to power the first truly pro-West, pro-European, pro-democracy and pro-human rights government?

Zhan Beleniuk, 24, is a contemporary of Ukrainian independence - he was born in 1991, the year of the collapse of the Soviet Union. He shared everything with his beloved Ukraine - including hunger of the 1990s and wild reforms that did not bring much in terms of positive economic change into his family's life - he still lives with his mother in their small one-room Kiev apartment and has to count every hrivnia. And of course, like the rest of his generation, he shared the exhilarating hope for his country to change and become a European state in every sense of the word.

Unlike his peers, he has a very personal reason to want this happen. Zhan Beleniuk is a typical Ukrainian in every way but his skin color. His father, who he never knew, was from Rwanda. He was a student of the Aviation Institute in the Soviet Ukraine and, being a pilot, was killed in action at the time of war in this African country. Zhan's Ukrainian mother, Svetlana, raised him alone.

Zhan knows that there's still wide-spread racism in his homeland. Despite all the changes, he is still considered black first and Ukrainian second and often is asked when he is planning to visit his motherland - Rwanda.

"My motherland is here in Ukraine," is his answer. "Now they [Ukrainian public] talk a lot about joining the EU. But I think that a lot of our folks are not ready for this", he said in the recent interview to the UNIAN, Ukrainian news agency.

As a kid, he was traumatized by racist slurs of his peers, and often had to fight the offenders, but even today he hears insults behind his back from time to time.

Zhan Beleniuk knows how to defend himself - he is a professional wrestler who won the Silver medal at the latest World Wrestling Championship in Baku and dreams of winning the Gold one at the coming Championship in Las Vegas. "Are you Mike Tyson?" he was asked once by a man in the shopping mall, and Zhan's negative answer in his native Russian was most likely the biggest shock of the man's life.

There are others in the country whose looks don't fit the profile of an Aryan Ukrainian, a profile celebrated by Ukrainian nationalists enjoying their moment in a lot of places of power in the country, other much more vulnerable than Zhan, who for different reasons came to Ukraine from Africa and now have to experience racism on the streets almost every day.

In the end of July, a number of Ukrainian newspapers broke the story of 23-year-old Asi, a refugee from the African state of Sierra Leone who came to Ukraine just six months ago. At the bus station at the town of Uzhgorod, which is in West Ukraine, the young woman and her 8-month-old son were trying to board the bus but were violently thrown off by the furious passengers who didn't want to travel in her company because she "was not like them." The violent attack was filmed by the angry crowd that was shouting "Tie her to the fence together with the kid!" The bus driver called police, who upon arrival ... hand-cuffed and took away the unfortunate victim of racial abuse who was hysterically screaming in English, facing the hostile crowd of Ukrainian "Europeans" who couldn't understand her pleas.

This was not the first racial incident in Uzhgorod. The town's local aqua-park denied entrance to the black-skinned students of local university who happened to be from India and Nigeria. The pool's owner, former mayor of Uzhgorod and deputy to the Supreme Parliament, Serhei Ratushnyak, explained his pool's policy by mentioning concern about the public health of the town residents in the face of the danger caused by "syphilitic and tuberculosis Gypsyhood of the area and of the whole world."

"During last year," he stated, "we had a 14-fold increase in AIDS cases in town. I demand compensation for all my expenses on buying and building [of the pool complex in case the "Gypsies" are allowed into his aqua-park by the authorities]", he said.

"We let in the residents of Uzhgorod [only], we let in [only] the white people" - these was the explanations given to the reporter by the on duty entrance guard - white blond-haired lady in her forties (on the video here).

Racism in Ukraine is not limited to the western part of the country or directed only against people from Africa. In mid-June, in the city of Kharkov, around a hundred foreign students demonstrated with placards reading "No to Racism!" and "Protect Foreign Students!" The reason for the demonstration was the violent attack by the mob of 40-50 people in black clothes and balaclavas at the students from Jordan - four of them were taken to the hospital with knife wounds and severe head injuries. On the way, the violent mob put four cars on fire and stubbed to death two dogs that belonged to their 'enemies.' The video, taken by a scared foreign student from the safety of his dorm room window, shows the scale of the mob attack and impunity of the attackers.

A day later, a special plane with a medical team aboard was sent by the King of Jordan to take the wounded home. "I'm scared to walk around the city," admitted one of the Jordanian students. "There is no police, no protection, we have a security guard at the dorm - a grandfather of 60 years-old. If the criminals are not found, I am packing my suitcases and going home." The pool's owner, former mayor of Uzhgorod and deputy to the Supreme Parliament, Serhei Ratushnyak, explained his pool's policy by mentioning concern about the public health of the town residents in the face of the danger caused by "syphilitic and tuberculosis Gypsyhood of the area and of the whole world."

Since that was the fourth attack of its kind on foreign students in Kharkov this year, it's hard to be optimistic about Ukrainian police protection with regard to dark-skinned outsiders. And there was nothing encouraging in the official version of the events given by Mr. Valentin Nalivaychenko, then-head of Ukrainian Security Service, who stated on the TV program "Shuster-Live" that the "local gangs might have been provoked and inspired [to beat up the dark-skinned foreigners] by the foreign special services. To put it bluntly - by the Russians." Mr. Nalivaychenko promised full support by his agency in the investigation - so far, almost two months later, no link with Moscow has been established.

Same for the ugly incident with the Sierra Leone woman in Uzhgorod. To this day, there have been no consequences for the perpetrators who threw the hapless young woman off the bus and wanted to tie her to the fence along with her eight-month-old baby.

Zhan Beleniuk, the Ukrainian wrestler who dreams of becoming a world champion, is not optimistic. "I am a patriot. I deeply love Kiev, my dear Podol, I am ready to kiss this land. ... Nevertheless, so far no changes can be seen. More than a year has passed - and not a single change. ... It seems to me that in the East [Ukraine] something fishy is happening. And the guys, real Ukrainian patriots, that are fighting there, they are dying for no reason. In the inner part of the country, here, on peaceful territories, no positive changes have been taking place."

No positive changes in Ukraine toward people of color too, one would add.

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 #3
Ukrayinska Pravda (Kyiv)
August 10, 2015
Ukraine's General Staff says Russian general commands Donbass militants

Russian Col-Gen Aleksandr Lentsov, who had previously chaired Russian group in the Joint Centre on Control and Coordination (JCCC) of cease-fire, now coordinates militants' actions, the press secretary of the General Staff [of Ukraine], Vladyslav Seleznyov, has told Ukrayinska Pravda.

Lentsov is deputy chief of Russia's Ground Troops.

"Lentsov has been dismissed from the JCCC in spring, he knows all locations of the Ukrainian forces because he was in the Joint Centre. Now he unofficially, as a holidaymaker [a nickname for Russian servicemen supposedly serving with separatist forces while "on leave"] is on that side," Seleznyov said.

"He carries out the command from Donetsk, but can move around on the rebel-held territory. This is our operational information. Our intelligence is working," Seleznyov added.

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 #4
Gen. Lentsov refutes his presence in Donbas claimed by Ukrainian General Staff

MOSCOW. Aug 11 (Interfax-AVN) - Russian Ground Forces Deputy Commander Col. Gen. Alexander Lentsov has refuted claims of the Ukrainian General Staff about his alleged presence on the militia-controlled territory in Donbas.

"Statements by the Ukrainian General Staff alleging my presence on the Ukrainian territory are blatant lies. I flew from Moscow to Astrakhan, the Ashuluk range, yesterday for doing reconnaissance and controlling preparations for exercises due in the second half of August," the general said in a program aired by the Rossiya-24 channel on Tuesday.

"The Ashuluk range is over 600 kilometers away from the Russian-Ukrainian border," he said.

The Ukrainian General Staff had written on Facebook quoting 'operative information' that "Deputy Commander of the Russian Ground Forces Col. Gen. Alexander Lentsov was staying" on the militia-controlled territory and "his activity was linked to coordination of actions" of the militia.

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 #5
The Guardian (UK)
August 10, 2015
Ukraine rebel republics are united by football's separatist derby
A match between the breakaway republics of Donetsk and Luhansk achieved its goal of offering local people a brief return to normality
Jack Losh in Donetsk

As the likes of Chelsea, Everton and Manchester United returned to the football turf this weekend at the start of the new season, thousands of people in the rebel-held city of Donetsk, in Ukraine, took their seats for a match that in their eyes far surpassed the antics of the Premier League.

Teams from the war-torn country's two self-proclaimed people's republics, Donetsk (DNR) and Luhansk, kicked off the first "separatist derby" as locals indulged in a brief and somewhat self-conscious return to normality.

Last year the outbreak of war between pro-Russia and pro-Ukraine factions blew the whistle on the beautiful game as the fighting and chaotic border checkpoints prevented any professional sports being played. The 50,000-capacity Donbass Arena, owned by the steel magnate Rinat Akhmetov, Ukraine's richest oligarch, hosted matches during Euro 2012 but has stood empty for more than a year.

Shakhtar Donetsk, the city's biggest team, which played its home games at the Donbass, moved its matches to Lviv on the opposite side of the country. The team's local merchandise shops are boarded up, and the home of the city's main hockey team has also been ruined by fighting. The noise of shelling and gunfire echoes across the city on a daily basis.

But on Saturday afternoon about 3,500 people - from off-duty soldiers and regime officials to young families, teenagers and pensioners - streamed into Metallurg Stadium for the inaugural and eagerly awaited clash between Donetsk and Luhansk.

Both squads had each already played a match against Abkhazia, a breakaway republic also once at the centre of a war between Russia-backed forces and a sovereign nation- in this case Georgia - in the 1990s. Zak Novak, an expatriate from New York who claims to have fought alongside the Serbs during the Bosnian war and now works for Donetsk's rebel authorities, strode around the ground in military fatigues, waving a Russian flag. "It's like a fairytale," he told the Guardian. "Bombs are still falling but everyone wanted to see the game."

Heavily armed soldiers lined the route to the stadium, the former home of the city's second most successful club, Metallurg Donetsk. An extravaganza dominated by jingoism and Soviet kitsch awaited. Scores of flags displaying the colours and emblem of Donetsk flapped on the stands and the anthems of the breakaway republics boomed out from speakers as the teams lined up in baking 35C heat.

Following an entertaining 90 minutes of slide tackling, shirt pulling, scrappy defending and opportunistic goals, the home team secured a 4-1 victory, scoring three times in the first half, once more in the second and conceding one in the final moments.

Amid an atmosphere of friendly rivalry, a particularly boisterous pocket of supporters alternated between chants of "Novorossia!" and "D-N-R! D-N-R!" before rushing to the sidelines after the final whistle to embrace the home team, who were clad in their statelet's colours of blue, black and red.

The two teams were made up mostly of local men, but one player stood out. Perez Agong, a Nigerian footballer playing for Donetsk, was an unexpected sight in this white-dominated and often xenophobic enclave. But there was a distinct lack of the racist taunts heard during matches elsewhere in the region. Agong enjoyed cheering and applause as he slotted in the third goal.

After the game ended and plastic replicas of the World Cup were dispensed, Denis Pushilin, the head of the DNR, hailed the match as "the first sign of the revival of this great sport in the Donbass region". Striving for an even more optimistic note, Mikhail Mishin, the rebel state's minister of youth, sports and tourism, said: "The people here finally have a reason to just talk about pleasant things. The city has returned to normal."

Mishin added he hoped the DNR could compete in what he dubbed a "World championship of unrecognised states". Spectators were split on whether the game represented a tantalising hint of peace to come or a politicised extravaganza to divert them from the grim reality of war. One local businessman left before half-time after failing to distract himself sufficiently from the threat of shelling. "It feels like a circus," said Andrey, a man in his late 30s who refused to give his last name due to security concerns. "This crowd seems just the right target for an attack - I have no interest in being here when that happens."

Others appeared more sanguine. Ludmilla Tsakova, 54, the mother of the DNR squad's head coach, said: "Today was a lovely day. There was a great atmosphere of friendship." Luba Tyeshulka, a 57-year-old librarian, was among the last of the departing fans as they left the stadium at twilight. She said: "It was just wonderful. It reminded me of peace."

As if on cue, however, a commander barked an order and his cohort of police officers and soldiers, armed with submachine guns and bolstered by a handful of muzzled Alsatians, marched past. The military curfew, and another night of shelling, were imminent.

 #6
Washington Post
August 10, 2015
Editorial
Putting Ukraine in an untenable position

NEARLY SIX months after Russia agreed to an immediate cease-fire in eastern Ukraine, its forces continue to shell and rocket Ukrainian positions on a daily basis. Far from pulling back heavy weapons or withdrawing its troops as required by the agreement, it has built military bases and deployed 9,000 troops inside Ukraine and stationed another 50,000 just outside the border, according to Ukrainian and NATO officials. Ukraine's national security council warned last month that Moscow had completed preparations for a new offensive in three different directions from the territory it currently controls.

How are Western governments responding to this aggression? Last month the Obama administration slightly tightened existing sanctions on Russia, and the Pentagon announced that training of Ukrainian special forces would be extended to regular army units. Mostly, however, the United States has joined with France and Germany in applying heavy political pressure - on the government of Ukraine.

Since a meeting in May between Secretary of State John F. Kerry and Russian President Vladi­mir Putin, U.S. officials have been leaning on the democratically elected and pro-Western administration of Petro Poroshenko to adopt constitutional changes and authorize elections that would legitimize the authorities Russia installed in eastern Ukraine and grant the areas they occupy a special legal status. Last month Ukraine's parliament reluctantly gave preliminary approval to the changes after Mr. Poroshenko warned lawmakers Ukraine would have to face Russia without allies if it did not adopt them.

The political formula was imposed by Russia as part of what is known as the "Minsk 2" agreement in February. Germany, France and Ukraine agreed to the deal in a desperate effort to stop an escalating military conflict. The shooting diminished, but never stopped; Russia and its proxies have never respected the cease-fire. Yet now the German and French governments have enlisted the help of the Obama administration in seeking unilateral Ukrainian compliance with Minsk 2's onerous political terms, which if fully implemented would implant a Russian-controlled entity inside Ukraine's political system.

U.S. officials say Ukrainian steps toward compliance put pressure on Russia and deprive it of a pretext for launching another full-scale military offensive. But Moscow's aggressive propaganda apparatus relentlessly portrays Ukraine as violating the deal; and Mr. Putin hasn't needed a legitimate pretext for his previous aggressions. Even if Russia respected the cease-fire, the terms it seeks for reincorporating the areas it holds into Ukraine would cripple the country's democracy and independence - which is Mr. Putin's goal.

Rather than legitimize Russia's puppet entity, Ukraine would be better off leaving it isolated and forcing Moscow to sustain it, as it does similar enclaves in Georgia and Moldova. The Obama administration, for its part, ought to be doing more to bolster Ukraine's defenses, so that Russia will be deterred from the offensive it is threatening - and it should tell European allies that the political solution they are trying to force is unworkable as well as wrong.

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 #7
Washington Post
August 9, 2015
Former president of Georgia seeks to free Ukraine from Moscow's orbit
By Michael Birnbaum
Michael Birnbaum is The Post's Moscow bureau chief. He previously served as the Berlin correspondent and an education reporter.

ODESSA, Ukraine - In Ukraine's last-ditch battle to stamp out official thievery and wrest the nation from Russia's orbit, an unlikely leader is heading the charge.

Mikheil Saakashvili, the crusading ex-president of Georgia, is trying to upend Ukraine's most lawless region as the new governor of the smuggling stronghold of Odessa. A man who led his tiny nation into war with mighty Russia has taken up a new fight in a high-profile appointment in a fellow post-Soviet state that was a slap at the Kremlin. Western officials say that Saakashvili's anti-corruption assault will be as crucial in the effort to break Ukraine free from its ex-Soviet masters as the country's shooting war with Russian-backed rebels - and that the hot-headed Georgian has just months to get it done.

Public disillusionment with Ukraine's new leaders is building amid a rising sense that last year's wave of protests delivered little but fresh misery. Citizens say they still face demands for bribes nearly every time they encounter a government official. Many fear that Ukraine's leaders will fail altogether and that the country will fall back into Russia's sphere.

"Ukraine is a big revolution, and in my way I am a revolutionary," Saakashvili said in an interview in his office, which is decorated with a bust of Ronald Reagan, the man often credited in Eastern Europe with taking down the Soviet Union.

With old habits holding firm, many of Ukraine's international partners, including the United States, are reconsidering the amount of assistance they can provide if the nation cannot help itself.

That gives an outsize importance to Saakashvili's effort, which Western diplomats say they are treating as a test case for whether reforms can take hold. Saakashvili has given himself until the end of the year to overhaul Odessa, said a Western diplomat who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to comment on internal discussions. If Saakashvili fails, the diplomat said, "the window closes for 10 years" on domestic support for Ukrainian reforms.

The Obama administration sees the Odessa efforts as so vital that it has committed up to $2 million in direct assistance and has sent numerous top State Department officials to visit Saakashvili. U.S. money is going to foundations that hire top Saakashvili associates to implement changes. U.S.-paid lawyers are studying the structure of the crime-ridden port. Officers from the California Highway Patrol are training new police officers to replace the detested old ones.

"Ukraine today is fighting two wars. One is the war with Russia," the U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, Geoffrey R. Pyatt, said last month. "The other is the war against corruption, the war for reform, the war to move Ukraine towards the standards of modern European democracy that the Ukrainian people have sought."

The region of Odessa "in many ways is the front line for that second war," Pyatt said.

Crusade against corruption

Saakashvili, a brash Columbia University-trained lawyer, rose to power in Georgia in 2003 and shook his Caucasian nation out of a post-Soviet stupor with a crusade against corruption that rocketed the country to the top of international ratings for transparency. His ravenous appetite for politicking is Clintonian.

But after he launched into war with Russia in 2008, his country suffered a catastrophic defeat within days. Critics say he became increasingly intolerant of dissent. He lost power in 2013 and fled the country to avoid charges of abuses of power that he says are politically motivated. Saakashvili swooped into Odessa at the end of May, taking over a Russian-speaking region of 2.4 million residents whose alliances are split between Kiev and Moscow. The surprise appointment provoked feverish warnings that he was there to stoke hatred of ethnic Russians, although he has tamped down his old fiery anti-Kremlin rhetoric and has won grudging support from members of the ethnic Russian community who detest corruption as much as ethnic Ukrainians.

If Saakashvili fails, Ukraine could soon boomerang back into Russia's orbit - with gloomy consequences for Georgia, which is feeling the same competing tugs.

"Before if you were involved in governance, you were involved in corruption. It's very difficult to be dry when you're in the sea," Saakashvili told a crowd this past week in Kominternivske, riling them in staccato but fluent Russian. Many in the town of 7,000 said that such a high-ranking official had never bothered to listen to their concerns before, much less travel there by marshrutka, the shuddering, packed minibuses that are the main public transit in rural Ukraine.

At the sweltering open-air conclave, held in a dusty square under whispering plane trees, Saakashvili listened while dozens of residents detailed their daily struggles with public officials who sounded more like marauding bandits than civil servants. He quickly won over the crowd with his enthusiastic denunciations of their detested officials. The event was unusual in Ukraine, where politicians typically steer clear of such unvarnished back-and-forth with constituents.

"To get a child in kindergarten, you have to pay a bribe. If someone dies, you have to pay even more," Saakashvili told them, describing the corruption that has driven Ukrainians to twice overthrow their leaders since 2004.

One farmer's fields were stolen through a feat of paperwork. A mother had to pay bribes for a day-care spot for her son. A soldier on crutches watched his disability benefits drop into the pockets of the officials charged with passing them on to him.

"I thought we had some mistakes in the system and we could fix the mistakes, and we'd be okay. It turns out the whole system is a mistake," said Yulia Marushevska, 25, a Saakashvili deputy and a political novice who rocketed to international attention for her dramatic video dispatches last year from the Maidan, the central Kiev square that was the focal point of pro-European protests.

Following the playbook

Many of Saakashvili's recruits are similarly young, Western-educated activists who have no previous political experience. He says he has no idea what the more than 800 employees of his regional administration do, and he has vowed to fire half of them, along with most of Odessa's hated police force, which he says is "basically a criminal syndicate." And he has promised to clean up the crime-ridden ports of the city of Odessa, a hub for smuggling, drug trafficking and bribery.

He has taken on some broadly popular issues. He took a bulldozer to knock down an illegally constructed wall that blocked off a portion of a public beach at a property owned by a former lawmaker. On national television, he chewed out the head of Ukraine's national airline, who was quickly fired amid charges of corruption. He has vowed a new police force by next month.

But critics say that although Saakashvili has made grand promises, he has so far done more to change the tone than the substance of the system. Some question whether he will stay long enough to make sure that his reforms actually stick. Others say that his team is too inexperienced to take on Odessa's formidable entrenched groups. And he can do little to boost the miserly pay that leads government bureaucrats making $80 a month to seek bribes just to survive.

"He wants to build dreams, but he doesn't have the instruments," said Irina Medushevskaya, an Odessan political commentator.

At an Odessa police training academy one morning recently, 200 new police recruits were practicing handcuffing each other under the watchful eye of two trainers who had been flown in from the California Highway Patrol, one more marker of U.S. involvement in the region. A total of 400 new trainees, none of whom have law enforcement experience, will hit the streets next month after just seven weeks of practice. The efforts, led from Kiev by a Georgian who was once a top official in Saakashvili's presidential administration, mirror those of the first years of his rule there.

Many recruits said they are motivated by a desire to build clean new institutions.

But a Ukrainian trainer said low salaries could lead to problems.

"You should pay enough so that a person doesn't think about how to feed their families," Stepan Kostev said.

For now, Saakashvili says he will keep following the Georgian playbook to reform his new country.

"There's a general perception that you cannot transplant politicians. They get rejected by national organisms, like a heart or a liver," he said. "But we have matching DNAs."

Natalie Gryvnyak contributed to this report.

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 #8
Wall Street Journal
August 10, 2015
Georgian Ex-President Mikheil Saakashvili Vows to Tackle Corruption in Ukraine
Former nemesis of Russia now serves as governor in Ukraine's main port of Odessa
By LAURA MILLS

KOMINTERNIVSKE, Ukraine-For residents of this small town in southern Ukraine, the new regional governor's inaugural visit was surprising: He came not in an official motorcade, but on a cramped minibus.

Mikheil Saakashvili, the recently appointed governor of Odessa oblast, had squeezed into the cheap van, paying the roughly $1 fare from Odessa to attend a town-hall meeting on Tuesday. Seeing a regional governor on humble public transport is an unusual sight in any part of the world. But even more strikingly, Mr. Saakashvili is a former head of state.

From 2004 to 2013, Mr. Saakashvili was the president of Georgia, the small republic on the eastern edge of the Black Sea. After losing power in his native country, Mr. Saakashvili relaunched his political career in his adopted home of Ukraine, where he has capitalized on his reputation as a maverick post-Soviet reformer and vowed to root out pervasive corruption.

The appointment of Mr. Saakashvili to run one of Ukraine's most notoriously corrupt regions has become a litmus test for the Kiev government, which has struggled to overhaul governance amid the continuing conflict with Russia-backed separatists in the country's east. But the former Georgian president's crusade has set him on a collision course with some of the most powerful stakeholders not just in Odessa, a port city of about one million on the Black Sea coast, but also in the capital itself.

Informal, town hall-style meetings are a novelty for many in Ukraine, where political rallies usually feature stiff speeches and senior officials keep ordinary people at arm's length. Mr. Saakashvili's minibus trips, like the one to Kominternivske, have become a signature piece of political theater, recorded by his office and posted on YouTube.

In Kominternivske, Mr. Saakashvili worked the crowd like an evangelical preacher, threatening hellfire for corrupt and incompetent bureaucrats. The governor then fielded dozens of questions, putting one disgruntled audience member on the phone with his chief of police, and delightedly agreeing when someone in the crowd suggested he run a bulldozer over a developer accused of seizing a public beach.

Initially skeptical, the crowd responded with rumbles of approval. "That's right!" exclaimed several elderly women sitting in the front row.

Later, Mr. Saakashvili said straight talk is the only effective approach. "You cannot fool them [Ukrainians] by pouring out slogans and building them another hospital," Mr. Saakashvili said. "They know that they can't get anything good from the government, so they're asking to be left alone-'Don't ask us for money, don't ask us for all these documents.'"

Overhauling Ukraine's notoriously corrupt customs regime is a priority for Mr. Saakashvili as he takes responsibility for a region that contains the country's main ports. Entrepreneurs here complain that bribery is endemic at customs, where government inspectors often tack on heavy fees by overvaluing goods in transit.

"You create very tough requirements, then you impose an unduly high duty rate on goods," said a regional customs expert, describing what he said was the general approach. "Then someone comes and says, 'Do you want to import cars? No problem. You still have to pay 50% in terms of a tax, but I will allow you to declare the car for $5,000 rather than $50,000.' "

Yury Kovbel, the deputy director of a local company that produces goat cheese, said a bribe is usually expected in return for lower rates. When recently trying to import special storage units to preserve his cheese, Mr. Kovbel said he was told to either pay import duties that would double his costs or risk waiting for days.

In the end a bribe wasn't needed, Mr. Kovbel added: After he threatened to take his grievances to the new governor, his request was pushed through customs in record time. The experience bolstered his faith that Mr. Saakashvili might have a chance of solving a decades-old problem.

The Odessa-based European Union Border Assistance Mission, which monitors cross-border activity in the region, estimates that customs officials perform hands-on checks on between 30% and 50% of cargo that arrives in Odessa's ports, creating greater risks for foul play. The organization is pushing for lower duty rates in line with EU practice.

Even if Mr. Saakashvili succeeds in rooting out corruption locally, though, he still faces a major uphill struggle in ensuring that a fair share of legitimate customs revenues, which are sent directly to the central government, make their way back to Odessa's coffers.

"With the powers he currently has, he can't change the situation," said Viktor Berestenko, the leader of a local freight-forwarding trade union that has actively called for customs overhaul. "He doesn't even have the power to appoint regional heads of the fiscal service, the prosecutor's office, or the customs office."

Some Ukrainian political observers also question whether Mr. Saakashvili is the right man for the job. As president of Georgia, he presided over his country's humiliating defeat in a 2008 war with Russia. The appointment of Mr. Saakashvili-who attended university in Kiev with Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko-is also controversial in Odessa, a predominantly Russian-speaking city where street fighting between pro-Ukraine and pro-Russia activists left 48 people dead in a single day last year.

Meanwhile, in his native Georgia, Mr. Saakashvili faces charges for abuse of office, which he says are politically motivated and unjustified.

Mr. Saakashvili says he hopes to one day return to his native country, but declines to put a time limit on his stay in Odessa or in Ukraine. He dismisses suggestions that he is a liability for Kiev in predominantly Russian-speaking Odessa, where tensions remain high and small-scale bombings still occur amid Ukraine's continuing separatist crisis.

"I am here to avoid provocation by Russia," Mr. Saakashvili said. "Corrupt bureaucrats-I know how to deal with them. I don't know how to deal with Russian tanks; that has never been my strong point and it never will be."

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 #9
www.opendemocracy.net
August 6, 2015
Georgia's healthcare privatisation stands as a warning to Ukrainian reformers
Ukraine's government is eager to overhaul the country's ageing healthcare system. Following Georgia's example may be tempting, but is not without risk.
By Kathleen Weinberger

Since the fall of the USSR in 1991, policymakers across the post-Soviet space have struggled to reform newly independent healthcare systems in the face of skyrocketing mortality and illness rates.

However, change does not always produce positive results. Following the introduction of Georgia's health reforms in 2003 and again in 2007, uptake of health services continues to be dangerously low due to the combination of corruption and the high costs associated with medical services and treatments, while basic indicators of effective health provision, such as the maternal mortality rate, show a disappointing lack of progress.

One of the most disturbing aspects of Georgia's reform model is the possibility of its export, specifically to Ukraine. In March 2015, the Ukrainian government accepted a $215m loan from the World Bank in order to improve its medical system.

There is no doubt that Ukrainian healthcare requires invasive surgery: Soviet-style planning means that the system is extremely inefficient, while lack of oversight has resulted in Third-World levels of hygiene and infrastructure in some regions. At the same time, the influence of Saakashvili-era Georgian ministers, such as former Ukrainian Health Minister Aleksandr Kvitashvili, means that Georgia's mistakes could very well be repeated, leaving Ukraine worse-off than reformers found it.

Attempts at reform

Ukraine has attempted healthcare reforms in the past. Former president Viktor Yanukovych attempted to redesign Ukraine's medical model in a series of disorganised, half-realised steps across 2011-2013-from intentions to test a new funding and organisational model to the signing of a law addressing 'Emergency Medical Assistance'.

These reforms have been heavily criticised due to their poor planning. For example, take Yanukovych's pilot programme, which launched in Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk and Vinnytsia in January 2011, with the intention of extending it nationally in 2013. In Donetsk alone, successful implementation required the training of 400 family doctors, a requirement that may be described either as naive optimism or organisational negligence, when one considers that the region has produced 500 new doctors in the past 5 years.

Georgia's reforms also involved the introduction of a Family Medical System. During the Soviet period, both Georgia and Ukraine operated according to the Semashko system, in which patients relied on polyclinics staffed with specialists for their medical needs.

Under this system, healthcare was provided through hospitals, and resources were concentrated on providing the maximum number of hospital beds. Under the Family Medical System, patients instead use a family doctor as their first point of contact, who may then issue referrals, thus avoiding excessive hospitalisation.

While the aim in both cases is laudable, the devil is in the details: in order to meet the demands of the reforms, large numbers of doctors require retraining. Meanwhile, other pressing human capital issues, such as Georgia's poor distribution of doctors outside of Tbilisi and a critical shortage of nurses, have been overlooked.

Such an overt focus on medical system organisation, rather than operation, appears again as a key theme when considering reforms regarding hospital infrastructure.

A second inefficiency of the Semashko system is the emphasis on high numbers of hospital beds, and thus in-patient treatment, rather than patient-specific planning. During the 1990's, both countries undertook campaigns to reduce the number of hospital beds; however, Ukraine's efforts were far from sufficient, and it remains one of the countries with the highest number of hospital beds in the world.
 
For budgetary planning and efficiency, following Georgia's example in this case would reduce the amount of Ukrainian resources wasted on Soviet-style planning.

Yet focusing reform around budgetary concerns risks letting the more pressing issue of simple infrastructural sufficiency remain unrealised. Many of Georgia's medical centres, especially in rural areas, lack necessary equipment, or else have significantly aged stock. As a result, a large number of clinics are not able to perform diagnostics or provide sufficient treatment. In Ukraine, the situation is equally, if not more dire: according to a 2010 report (pp. 83-84) by the European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 6.8% of medical facilities do not meet minimum sanitation and hygiene standards, while little over half (59.5%) have hot water.

Improvement of this aspect of the healthcare system requires a direct confrontation with the serious problem underlying reform efforts in both countries - corruption. Insufficient oversight, coupled with institutionalised systems of informal payments, means that funding put towards improvements in building quality, the purchase of better equipment, and even water availability is at risk of being used to line pockets and gain favours.

Corruption affects individual patients as well: although the informal nature of such payments means that official figures are not registered, a study by the European Observatory estimated that the informal cost to citizens in Ukraine might in fact be as high as formal expenditures.

Without seriously addressing this issue, health care reforms aimed at bolstering financial prudence cannot be considered with any degree of seriousness, while efforts to improve quality of care and patient access will necessarily fail.

Failures in practice

The most dangerous contagion from the Georgian case, however, is the degree to which the system was privatised and the effect that this has had on patient access. Georgia's reforms were introduced in the wake of a very real economic issue: the completely unfeasible Social Health Insurance programme that was implemented during 1995-2004, in which the economically weak state government was made responsible for providing basic medical coverage to all citizens.

The predictable failure of this model opened the door for a campaign of stringent privatisation that resulted in a healthcare system which receives one of the lowest percentages of expenditure from public sources in the world. In 2009, the amount of government spending as a percentage of total spending on healthcare was only 18.4%-the lowest in the WHO European Region. This underfunding, combined with the very low rates of health insurance coverage, means that the slack must be taken up by patients themselves. In 2009, individual expenditure in the form of out-of-pocket payments accounted for 70.9% of the country's total expenditure on health.

It is not surprising that, due to these costs, Georgians at nearly every level of society avoid seeking medical attention, even when sick, with reports of hospital avoidance in the case of illness ranging from 68-78% in all but the wealthiest socio-economic quartile.

Indeed, the national average for having visited a doctor in the last 12 months is only 26.4%, as reported by the WHO in 2008. Even for those who are able to afford a doctor's visit, the high cost of medication due to pharmaceutical monopolies that formed during the privatisation process means that many treatments are simply unaffordable for the average citizen.

These problems create the potential for public health catastrophes. In Georgia, diseases such as Tuberculosis and HIV are continually increasing, while more common illness such as Hepatitis A, B and C lack any official support for either prevention or treatment.

The individual and societal cost of such policies, especially after a supposedly progressive string of reforms, is enormous.

Ukrainian health reform

Ukraine has a number of advantages going into the reform process. Firstly, despite a fairly large proportion of out-of-pocket payments as a percentage of total health spending (40.2%) combined with high levels of corruption, Ukrainians do not avoid seeking medical care when sick, in the same numbers that Georgians do.

Although 38% of those surveyed, reported treating themselves with homemade remedies instead of seeking pharmaceutical treatment, and 27.8% reported not seeing a doctor when ill, a full 62% of the general population stated that they had seen a doctor in the last 12-month period.

Secondly, pre-existing conditions and specific provisions in Ukraine's reform plans mean that medicines may become increasingly affordable. As Ukraine produces many of its own medicines, generic brands can be provided domestically.

Additionally, two stipulations of the upcoming reforms will further lower medication costs. The first of these is the streamlining of the process by which medications are approved for import: drugs that have been approved in certain countries, such as the US and the EU, will not need to undergo the same rigorous process of approval in Ukraine, and instead will be automatically accepted for import and sale.

Secondly, Ukraine's government plans to hand over responsibility for drug procurement to the UN; under the terms of this agreement, costs could be cut by as much as 30%, and there will be the opportunity to prioritise those treatments that are most needed, such as medications that treat HIV and key vaccinations. Under such conditions, Ukraine will have the means to ensure that its population can afford and access essential medication, especially those most in need.

The most important issue, however, remains the future balance of public and private expenditure, and what role each will play in Ukraine's reformed health system.

According to the World Bank, a key feature of the new system will be greater emphasis on the private sector in healthcare provision. The plan also contains provisions for health insurance, both public and private; this requires the most careful attention. As demonstrated by Georgia's example, full privatisation has the potential to result in high out-of-pocket payments when insurance is not well utilised.

When combined with substantial expenditure going to informal payments due to corruption, privatisation results in low uptake of medical services due to unaffordable costs. Given the potential damage to public health, not to mention the economic ramifications of a sick workforce, it is imperative that Ukraine maintains or improves accessibility based on financial means, rather than risk following Georgia's path.

Currently, Ukraine is facing a number of crises, from military conflicts in its eastern regions to economic downturn. In violence-torn provinces, the most pressing healthcare issue is neither fiscal nor bureaucratic, but instead centres on medical staff fleeing, and destroyed hospitals.

As such, the country may need to wait for reforms to be implemented at a national level, which will bring substantial change. During this time, reformers would do well to carefully assess the future of Ukraine's healthcare system, and perhaps consider Georgia's pitfalls as a caution against overzealous action.

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 #10
US Embassy Kyiv Blog
https://usembassykyiv.wordpress.com
July 10, 2016
Odesa: Cosmopolitan Crossroads with Extraordinary Potential
Posted U.S. Ambassador Geoffrey Pyatt

On Sunday and Monday, I had the chance to return to Odesa - a cool, multicultural city on Ukraine's coast with extraordinary potential.  It was my first trip back since the fire at the Trade Unions Building, and I was eager to learn about the transformative change the new Oblast Administration has undertaken.

On Sunday afternoon, I took the advice of some of my Twitter followers and visited the shops and beaches of Arcadia City.  It was great to see so many families out (and a lot of American flag t-shirts!) - but I promise you will never see me on the amazingly high water slide that has almost finished construction!  I also took the chance to join the crowds of tourists and locals out walking on Deribasivska Street - one of Ukraine's greatest people watching spots.

My Monday started with Ukrainian civil society.  I wanted to hear the views of young, reform-minded leaders and learn more about their efforts to drive forward the positive change we all want to see for Ukraine.

From there, we went to the Governor's office, where I underscored U.S. support for the Oblast Administration's efforts to tackle the problems of corruption and governance that have been such an impediment to economic development in Odesa.  I talked a lot with Governor Saakashvili about how the United States plans to support these efforts in the days and weeks ahead - providing trainers to help stand up a new patrol police, helping to form an Anti-Corruption Task Force inside the Oblast Administration, and supporting other initiatives to improve policing, root out corruption, and strengthen rule of law, including a new grants program for civil society groups.

I also welcomed the chance to visit the new public service hall - the focal point of the Oblast Administration's efforts to create an atmosphere of transparency and establish practices that ensure a level playing field and guaranteed delivery for government services.  The building's sunny atrium reminded me of the words of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Brandeis:  sunlight is the best disinfectant. Everybody I've ever talked to in Ukraine has stories about the small-scale corruption that has infected the process of receiving government services. This new service center reinforces that government is meant to serve the interests of the citizens, and not the other way around.  That's the foundation that this initiative is being built on.

After meeting with the Mayor, and discussing his own efforts to support these anti-corruption efforts (which I applaud), I headed to the port, where I visited customs officials and a recently expanded grain handling facility.  It reminded me of the huge untapped potential of this part of Ukraine.  Every time I visit Odesa, I am reminded that it is a globally connected, cosmopolitan city.   It should be a thriving gateway, not just for Ukraine's maritime commerce, but really for all of central and eastern Europe.  And I think it has the potential to re-emerge as a great global crossroads once again.

A highlight of my trip was the time I spent on-board the Sahaydachny, to pay my respects to Ukraine's sailors on behalf of the U.S. Navy as they celebrated Ukraine's Navy Day.  The honor guard was terrific, I was moved as the band played the U.S. national anthem on the deck of the ship, and I am so very grateful for Admiral Hayduk's hospitality.

Finally, I had the chance to visit with the members of the American Chamber of Commerce, where I previewed the U.S.-Ukraine Business Forum being held by the U.S. Secretary of Commerce and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in Washington next week.

I come away from this visit to Odesa with a sense of optimism.  Most important to me is the sense I got from people from all over the Oblast - not just the Governor and his inner circle - but from a variety of people that there's a willingness now to focus in a very serious way on the reform agenda, and an eagerness to partner with the international community.

But most important was the validation I heard from members of Ukrainian civil society.  The belief among civil society is that this is not just window dressing, that this represents a real change in direction and change in tone by the Odesa authorities.

Everywhere I go in Ukraine I find an appetite for change, for getting rid of the corruption, for removing the barriers and obstacles to doing business that have had such an awful impact on this country over too many years.  I said to the Governor that I was confident that as long as he drives forward the pace of reform, we will continue to see an active and visible presence from me and my colleagues.  We see real opportunity here - we see change coming.  And as long as Ukraine keeps delivering on the promise of reform, the United States will continue supporting it on its path toward a more democratic, prosperous, European future.

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 #11
Interfax-Ukraine
August 10, 2015
U.S. to allocate extra $500 mln to Ukraine for army training
 
Ukraine will receive an additional $500 million from the United States government to finance the training of its military, the Ukrainian parliamentary committee for foreign affairs said in a press released obtained by Interfax.

This aid was pledged by U.S. Vice President Joe Biden in his letter to the committee chairperson, Hanna Hopko, the spokesperson said.

"Furthermore, the U.S. vice president confirms the U.S. government's readiness to grant an additional $2 billion loan which was tentatively agreed upon in April this year," the spokesperson said.

The U.S. vice president also said that Washington will keep its anti-Russian sanctions in place until the Minsk Agreements have been implemented in full. Biden also said that the U.S. government will be trying to persuade the European Union of the need for further sanctions, the spokesperson said.

If Russia fails to honor its obligations under these agreements or launches new armed offensives along the conflict line, the U.S. will increase the price that Russia will have to pay for its aggression against Ukraine, Biden said.

The U.S. sanctions imposed against Russia over its actions in Crimea will also remain in place until Russia ends its occupation of the independent Ukrainian territory, the U.S. vice president stressed.

At the same time, Hopko wrote on her Facebook page that a part of these funds will be used to finance training programs at the Yavoriv training center (Lviv region) for the National Guard and the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

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 #12
London promises to increase training program for Ukrainian troops

KYIV. Aug 11 (Interfax) - The United Kingdom will double its contribution to efforts to train Ukraine's military, UK Secretary of Defense Michael Fallon has said.

Speaking at a meeting with Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk in Kyiv, Fallon described today's situation in the east of Ukraine as extremely complicated. A lot of people have been killed and there are many refugees, he said.

Fallon said he had come to Ukraine to reaffirm the UK authorities' support for Ukraine and their respect for the country's territorial integrity and state borders.

Fallon also said he was pleased to announce that the UK would double the size of its training program for Ukrainian troops.

The UK remains a friend for Ukraine and will stand shoulder to shoulder with it, he said.

Yatsenyuk, for his part, confirmed that, indeed, the current situation in Donbas was extremely difficult.

"The situation is increasingly complicated," he said.

Fallon said later that the UK would increase the number of Ukrainian servicemen being trained as part of the UK program to 2,000.

The UK has decided to raise the number of Ukrainian servicemen taking the UK training courses to 2,000 and to complete their training before the end of the financial year in the United Kingdom - before September 31, Fallon told a joint press briefing with Ukrainian Defense Minister Stepan Poltorak in Kyiv on Tuesday.

Ukrainian military specialists are expected to receive training in four areas in order to be able to conduct effective mine-clearing operations, operations in a residential area, perform operational planning and provide engineering support, he said.

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 #13
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
August 10, 2015
How Russia's protracted conflict with Georgia impacts how we view Ukraine
Even though the Ukraine crisis has significantly overshadowed the 2008 Russian-Georgian war, the frozen conflict in the Caucasus continues to have important implications for Russian foreign policy.
By Sergey Markedonov
Sergey Markedonov is an Associate Professor at Russian State University for the Humanities based in Moscow (Russia). From May 2010 to October 2013, he was a visiting fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington, DC, USA). In April-May 2015 he was a visiting fellow at the Center for Russia and Central Asia Studies, Institute of International Studies (IIS), Fudan University (Shanghai, China).

Seven years ago in August 2008, the lingering Georgian-Ossetian conflict spilled over into a five-day war between the Russian army and regular Georgian units. Today, although largely overshadowed by events in Ukraine and the Middle East, these events in the South Caucasus continue to impact the way politicians and experts view Russian foreign policy.

In August 2008 a new status quo began to take shape in the South Caucasus. The recognition of independence for two former autonomous territories of the Georgian SSR was an important consequence, marking the first time since the Belavezha Accords that statehood had been granted to an entity that had not been a union republic at the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Hence, the "August topic" had already acquired significance ahead of this year's anniversary, due to the ongoing confrontation between Russia and the West over Ukraine, which has become a symbol of the struggle for influence in the entire former Soviet Union as a whole.

The standoff has been accompanied by a flow of critical statements about "Russian revisionism" and Moscow's responsibility for the destabilization in Europe. At the same time, the events of seven years ago are conveniently embedded into this scheme, which are now perceived as a kind of "trial balloon" on the part of the Kremlin.

Let's try to understand the extent to which this perception reflects reality by taking as the starting point the allegation of "Russian military aggression" in 2008. Frankly speaking, it would be more correct to speak of "military intervention" or "direct involvement in the conflict." In either case, this involvement or intervention did not suddenly arise seven years ago. By August 2008 it had been rumbling for nearly two decades, with varying degrees of Russian participation.

It should be recalled that Russian peacekeepers (which former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili would later describe as "occupiers") were deployed in South Ossetia with the consent of official Tbilisi, which signed the Dagomys Agreements on June 24, 1992. No one declared this legal instrument null and void until August 2008. Moreover, it formed the basis of the mandate for the OSCE mission in Georgia. Having put its signature to the Dagomys Agreements, Tbilisi effectively recognized the alienation of part of its sovereignty over the disputed territory.

The 1992 Agreements conferred supreme sovereignty over the "cool" hot spot on the quadripartite Joint Control Commission (JCC), while the peacekeeping operation was to be carried out by a mixed peacekeeping force comprised of both Russian and Georgian battalions. These Agreements also explicitly prohibited all parties (including Tbilisi) from imposing economic sanctions or blockades, setting up humanitarian obstacles, or hindering the return of refugees. Peacekeepers were even given the right to "take all measures to localize armed clashes and eliminate bandits in districts and villages in the territory of the former South Ossetian Autonomous Region outside the conflict zone and the safety corridor."

What triggered the conflict? Not the Georgian army's attack on Tskhinvali in August 2008, but official Tbilisi's unilateral attempts to tear up the legal foundation for settling the conflict. They began in May 31, 2004, when, under the pretext of combating smugglers in South Ossetia, and without consulting the JCC, the Georgian Interior Ministry sent Special Forces (approximately 300 soldiers) into South Ossetia.

All JCC members, with the exception of Tbilisi, regarded it as a breach of the Dagomys Agreements. There followed an avalanche of statements and mutual accusations, resulting in bloodshed inside the conflict zone for the first time since 1992.

Unlike Abkhazia, for 12 years South Ossetia had enjoyed a relatively stable truce, offering peace a chance. Incidentally, in pre-2004 South Ossetia (again, unlike Abkhazia) Russian "passportization" was not particularly active. But the policy itself was popular simply because it gave people certain human rights, such as the right to cross the border and to receive medical treatment and education outside the de facto entities.

But the haste with which Georgian politicians began to "unfreeze" the conflict, with no proper condemnation by its Western allies, prevented the policy from being implemented. Moreover, the highly selective attitude to the legal aspects of the settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict (supplemented by the unilateral actions of the West in the Balkans over the same period) only strengthened the Russian establishment's view that the true yardstick should not be talk about values, but rather, force and realpolitik.

Today, criticism of "Russian revisionism" in Crimea should be tempered by memories of the "revisionist attempts" of 2004-2008 and the "unfreezing" of the ethno-political conflicts in the Caucasus.

Add to that the domestic political dimension. In the early 1990s, the first phase of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict in North Ossetia (i.e. on Russian soil) saw the arrival of thousands of Ossetian refugees not only from South Ossetia, but also from inner regions in Georgia. They made up 16 percent of the total population of North Ossetia at that time.

This factor was the main culprit for "warming up" the Ossetian-Ingush conflict in Russia in 1992. Needless to say that the logical conclusion of Georgia's "anti-separatist operations" (announced seven years earlier by Georgian General Mamuka Kurashvili in a TV broadcast) was an exacerbation of the Ossetian-Ingush problems.

Hence, Russia was not short of rational grounds for delivering a strong response. The discrepancy between national interests in any particular region and the ability to properly formulate and promote them was another matter entirely.

Unfortunately, many of Moscow's actions in August 2008 backfired, particularly the attempts to copy the information methods employed by the Americans in Kosovo or during the "campaign against terrorism." Instead of a clear, consistent focus on Russian interests, there were histrionic sound bites about "genocide," "our September 11," etc. Substantive reasoning was replaced by propagandist verbiage.

Last but not least, the rhetoric today often draws parallels between South Ossetia 2008 and Crimea 2014. But it is worth noting that even after the five-day war, in which Ukraine's third president Viktor Yushchenko supported his Georgian counterpart Saakashvili's South Ossetian operation, the Kremlin's official position on Ukraine did not change significantly.

The statement by Vladimir Putin (then Russian prime minister) in an interview with German broadcaster ARD on August 30, 2008, is a case in point: "Crimea is not a disputed territory." Moreover, in October 2008 the Russian-Ukrainian Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation was extended for another ten years.

Violation of this agreement, as well as the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, was not an end in itself for Moscow prior to 2014. And it did not occur in a political vacuum. What is even more, it was not some kind of continuation of the trend of South Ossetia.

In many ways, the Kremlin's actions in Crimea were a reaction to the events of "Maidan-2" in Kiev and the attempts to change the status quo in a Russian region of interest without regard to those interests. One can argue about whether Moscow's response was proportional, as well as the extent to which it contradicted international law and created additional risks for Russian policy itself.

But, as in the case of the Caucasus, it was rather a reaction to certain alterations in the customary alignment of forces that seemed to pose a threat (explicit or potential). The response in both 2008 and 2014 was determined not according to general purpose schemes, but rather, the particular set of circumstances in each instance.

All of this suggests that the events of "hot August" were a complex multilayer phenomenon directly linked to the process of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the formation of the nation states that replaced it. The personal factor (in the form of Putin and Saakashvili), though present, was not paramount.

It is still too early to judge whether Russia won or lost strategically. Many risky steps and decisions were taken that defy clear explanation. In solving one set of problems through taking military and political custody of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Kremlin created another one, which requires separate treatment.

And that applies in equal measure to the "Ukrainian decisions" of the last two years. But it would not be amiss to balance the harsh claims against Moscow with an analysis of its reasons-one that is not based upon clearly defined schema, but sifts through the nuances of Russian domestic and foreign policy.

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 #14
Russia-Georgia armed clash on August 8-12, 2008 was Saakashvili's fiasco - experts
By Tamara Zamyatina

MOSCOW, August 10. /TASS/. The five-day armed clash with Russia following Georgia's aggression against South Ossetia in August 2008 highlighted utter adventurism of Georgia's the-then president, Mikheil Saakashvili, caused heavy casualties and resulted South Ossetia's and Abkhazia's decision to break away from Georgia, polled experts have told TASS.

Late in the evening on August 8 the Georgian army attacked the city of Tskhinval - the administrative centre of South Ossetia (formally Georgian territory) with multiple rocket launchers.

Back in 1991-1992 Georgia and South Ossetia were at war following the breakup of the Soviet Union. When the hostilities lulled down, South Ossetia held a referendum on independence and/or reunification with Russia. Ninety nine percent voted for the proposed option. Under the 1992 agreement between Moscow and Tbilisi a mixed peace-keeping force of three battalions - Russian, Georgian and Ossetian - was moved to the conflict zone and a mission of OSCE monitors was deployed in Tskhinval. By 2006 more than 80% of the South Ossetian population had obtained Russian citizenship.

Deputy chairman of the Federation Council's international affairs committee, Andrey Klimov, said Georgia's aggression against South Ossetia was a manifestation of Saakashvili's adventurist policies.

"Saakashvili had hoped should he have problems with storming Tskhinval and occupying the whole territory of South Ossetia, the Americans would provide support. At a certain point he must have had the delusion the United States would be prepared to go to war with Russia for Georgia's interests. In the meantime, according to the available information, Washington did not have any such plans," Klimov said. "South Ossetia and another former Georgian autonomy - Abkhazia - declared independence and were eventually recognized by Russia and four other countries. Saakashvili suffered utter failure."

"Saakashvili's latest appointment as governor of Ukraine's Odessa region shows the limit of his capabilities. In his new capacity acting on instructions from Ukraine's pro-US President Pyotr Poroshenko Saakashvili has been trying to lure Russia into an armed conflict by arranging a blockade of the self-proclaimed republic of Trans-Dniestria, where Russian citizens account for a third of the population and where Russia has a military base. Saakashvili runs the risk of stepping on the same rake again," Klimov warned.

A member of the OSCE Council of Wise Men, Sergey Karaganov, has described Saakashvili as an "adventurist" and "poor player." "In 2008, somebody at the third or fourth tier of the US Administration promised Saakashvili 'the United States would stand by Georgia's side' if Tbilisi tried to restore the country's territorial integrity," says Karaganov, the dean of the world politics and world economy department at the Higher School of Economics. Saakashvili grew certain that the then US President George Bush, who had paid a visit to Tbilisi, felt fatherly affection for him. Saakashvili is a bad player and an adventurist. He got it all wrong," Karaganov said.

"Seven years ago internal rifts were tearing the Georgian leadership apart. It should not be ruled out that Saakashvili had hoped to gain the upper hand in that internal political clash with just one successful military operation. He was wrong again. Misinformation by the Georgian military must have been another factor that pushed Saakashvili towards attacking Tskhinval."

Karaganov believes that the split in Russia's relations with the West was the main outcome of the five-day war of 2008. That split climaxed with the 2014 crisis in Ukraine.

"The year of 2008 saw not just Russia's brief armed clash with Georgia, but also the financial and economic crisis in the West. A war lost by Western ally Saakashvili and the turmoil in the economy and the banking sector dealt a double blow on the West. The United States and the European Union have since been trying hard to regain the lost foothold by stepping up pressures on Russia," Karaganov said.

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 #15
Over 500 shells fired by Ukrainian troops at DPR in past day - DPR defense ministry

MOSCOW, August 11. /TASS/. More than 500 Ukrainian shells have hit the territory of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) over the past 24 hours, a DPR defense ministry spokesman said on Tuesday.

"After the mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) resumed its work, the number of ceasefire violations has reduced to 39 episodes," the Donetsk News Agency quoted him as saying. "As many as 506 artillery shells of 152mm and 122mm calibers, 99 tank shells and 198 mines of 82mm and 120mm calibers have been fired by Ukrainian forces at the DPR."

Most intensive shelling was reported in the Telmanovsky district, where one person was killed and three others were wounded, the spokesman said.

A peace deal struck on February 12 in Minsk, Belarus, by the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, Germany and France envisaged a ceasefire between Ukrainian forces and people's militias starting from February 15, followed by withdrawal of heavy weapons from the line of military engagement and prisoner release. The package of measures envisages the pullback of all heavy weapons by both parties to locations equidistant from the disengagement line in order to create a security zone at least 50 kilometers wide for artillery systems with a calibre of 100 mm or more, a zone of security 70 kilometers wide for multiple rocket launchers and a zone 140 kilometers wide for multiple rocket launchers Tornado-S, Uragan and Smerch and the tactical rocket systems Tochka-U. The final document says that the Ukrainian troops are to be pulled back away from the current line of engagement and the militias of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions, from the engagement line set by the Minsk Memorandum of September 19, 2014.

The ceasefire however has been repeatedly violated.

On July 18, the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk republics (DPR and LPR) announced their plans to unilaterally withdraw heavy weaponry from the engagement line. By late July, the DPR said it had completed the withdrawal of weaponry of less than 100mm caliber from the contact line, leaving tanks only in "hot spots" to the north of Donetsk and in Debaltsevo. The LPR also completed the withdrawal of weaponry from the contact line, leaving tanks and armored vehicles only on positions near the Schastye settlement.

On July 21, the Contact Group on Ukrainian settlement reached an agreement on phased withdrawal of weaponry of less than 100mm caliber by both sides. No final agreement however has been signed as of yet.

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 #16
AFP
August 10, 2015
Ukraine 'repels' rare tank assault by pro-Russian rebels
By Dmitry Zaks

Kiev (AFP) - Ukraine on Monday reported it had repelled a rare tank assault by pro-Russian rebels that threatened to shatter a shaky ceasefire and dangerously escalate the 16-month war in its breakaway east.

President Petro Poroshenko said "about 200 insurgents" had staged a pre-dawn raid on Novolaspa -- a village halfway between the separatists' de facto capital Donetsk and the Kiev-held southern port of Mariupol -- that caught government soldiers off-guard.

Chief of Staff General Viktor Muzhenko "informed the president that the Ukrainian forces gave a fitting rebuff and repelled all the attacks," the presidency said.

But the defence ministry later reported the militants mounting a second attack on the same village whose outcome was not immediately clear.

Local pro-Kiev officials told AFP that separatist fighters had also launched several waves of Grad missile attacks on the eastern outskirts of Mariupol itself.

The Ukrainian foreign ministry called the clashes "a dangerous indication of a further escalation to come".

But the rebels said Kiev's claims made no sense because Novolaspa had always been one of their frontline outposts.

"The armed forces of Ukraine simply put the village under a heavy shelling attack," a local separatist official told the rebels' main news site.

Kiev on Monday reported the death of one soldier while the insurgents accused government forces of killing three civilians in the rebel-held bastion of Gorlivka.

The two self-proclaimed republics of Donetsk and Lugansk launched their revolt shortly after the February 2014 ouster of a Moscow-backed president in Kiev and Russia's subsequent seizure of Ukraine's Crimea peninsula.

The clashes have killed more than 6,800 people and sent Moscow's relations with the West crashing to their lowest point since the Cold War.

The crisis has also left 1.4 million homeless and sent Ukraine's economy -- heavily dependent on exports from the industrial east of the country -- into a tailspin.

The West is still pinning hope on a February truce agreement that has often been ignored but also kept fighting limited to flashpoints in the Russian-speaking east of the former Soviet state.

The latest reported clashes came a day after a special monitoring mission from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) saw several of its armoured vehicles torched outside its headquarters in Donetsk.

The European Union on Monday called the incident "unacceptable".

'Ready for anything'

Poroshenko said Monday's reported tank battles around Novolaspa and Sunday's attack on the OSCE vehicles were all part of insurgent attempts to raise tensions and erase any achievements of the February truce.

But the militants accused Kiev of trying to gain back territory lost in fighting and now under pro-Russian control.

"We are on constant alert for a possible new wave of military activities," rebel chief Alexander Zakharchenko warned on Friday.

"We are ready for anything."

Tensions are rising ahead of the two separatist regions' planned elections this autumn, which Kiev has already condemned as illegal.

A recent rise in the number of protests against the OSCE mission has also alarmed European leaders who had hoped to see the final terms of a peace agreement concluded by the end of the year.

Germany Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Francois Hollande have held two teleconferences with Poroshenko and Russian President Vladimir Putin in the past month, aimed at reviving the peace process and tackling what have become increasingly intractable disputes.

Poroshenko called on Monday for "urgent" new consultations between the four sides' foreign ministers about the purported rebel assault.

But initial indications suggested the talks were making limited progress.

Moscow said Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told his Ukrainian counterpart Pavlo Klimkin that Poroshenko needed to finally engage the rebels in direct negotiations.

The Ukrainian leader has vowed repeatedly never to hold face-to-face talks with "terrorists".

Kiev said Klimkin countered that Lavrov should encourage Putin "to think things over" and drop his alleged support for the revolt.

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 #17
Bloomberg
August 11, 2015
Ukraine Returns Artillery to War Zone as Ministers Hold Call
By Daryna Krasnolutska

Ukraine returned heavy artillery to the front line of its more-than-yearlong conflict with pro-Russian rebels after reporting shelling at levels not seen in weeks.

Weapons, pulled back as part of a February truce, were sent back to a village in the Donetsk region on Monday after separatists stormed it, the military said Tuesday from the eastern combat zone. The latest bout of unrest sparked a call between Ukrainian Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin and his French and German counterparts, who said they'd discuss the worsening tensions with Russia. The rebels denied attacking.

"Artillery was put back and it's still there," Andriy Lysenko, another military spokesman, said by phone. "Militants continue to attack our forces and we have to defend ourselves."

The conflict, which the United Nations estimates has killed more than 6,700 people, has been simmering since the February peace plan. It's threatened to boil over several times since then as Ukraine, Russia and the separatists bicker over implementation of the deal, brokered with help from France and Germany. The U.S. tightened sanctions against Russia over Ukraine last week. Russia denies stoking the unrest.

The renewed violence is another headache for Ukraine as it grapples with a recession and heads for crunch talks with foreign creditors to restructure $19 billion of borrowing. As the debt negotiations draw nearer, the nation's dollar-denominated bond due 2017 gained 1.4 cent to 56.55 cents on the dollar Tuesday, data compiled by Bloomberg show.

One Ukrainian soldier was killed and 13 were wounded in the past day, according to the daily lunchtime update from the military. Most of the casualties occurred near the cities of Donetsk and Mariupol, where attacks were repelled, with the situation stabilizing in the Luhansk region, it said.

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 #18
www.rt.com
August 9, 2015
Ukraine OSCE mission's cars set on fire in Donetsk
[Photoes here http://www.rt.com/news/311983-osce-ukraine-cars-burnt/]

The OSCE's special monitoring mission in Ukraine lost four armored all-roaders last night. The vehicles were allegedly set on fire by arsonists in the early morning hours of Sunday. The OSCE says it will not pull its reps out.

The Emergency Ministry of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic has confirmed that four armored vehicles belonging to the OSCE mission were destroyed in the city of Donetsk.

Altogether six vehicles were set on fire at about 2:30am on Sunday, RIA Novosti reports. The fire was extinguished by 3:30am.

"Three cars have been completely destroyed by the fire," the Emergency Ministry's spokesperson reported.

The arson and its perpetrators are being investigated.

The OSCE promised to reconsider security measures for the mission. Despite the intimidation, it has no plans to withdraw its observers from the unrecognized republics in southeastern Ukraine.

A sabotage and reconnaissance force from Kiev destroyed the OSCE mission's vehicles, says the Donetsk news agency.

"Ukrainian special services have taken advantage of the peace talks recently conducted in Donetsk to implement their plan to get rid of the OSCE mission in the Donetsk territory," the agency reported, citing a national security source.

If the OSCE leaves, Ukraine's leadership would take advantage of the situation and, with international control lacking, would beef up their forces along the front with the unrecognized republics and step up shelling of the rebel territories, say the defense and law enforcement agencies of the Donetsk People's Republic.

"Any man of sound judgment can tell which side is going to profit from blocking the OSCE's work," a source in the parliament said, specifying that it would open the possibility of inflicting, unobserved by outside agencies, artillery fire on the city of Donetsk. It would also prepare the way for an offensive as Kiev's forces are amassed at the frontline.

On August 6, the citizens of Donetsk rallied near the hotel where the OSCE observers are staying. The civilian demonstrators accused the OSCE mission of turning a blind eye to the incessantbshelling of the city by Ukrainian troops.

Demonstrators carried banners, saying: "People die because of you." They spilled red paint all over the street and soaked toys in it, symbolizing the children who have died in shellings by Ukrainian troops.

The crowd chanted: "Open your eyes!" and even attempted to drag the observers out of the hotel, because they refused to speak to the protesters.

After members of the OSCE eventually came down, they were advised to leave their comfortable downtown quarters and go and stay in a hotel in the suburbs, where shelling is an everyday routine. The protestors believe that this is not being reported in Western media because the OSCE mission itself is neglecting to report it.

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 #19
Sputnik
August 9, 2015
History Shows 'Yanukovych Was Right to Oppose EU Association Deal'

Instead of the promised prosperity and cheap Russian gas, Ukraine has to deal with a civil war and an economic collapse, an Austrian media outlet argues.
[http://www.contra-magazin.com/]

Ukrainians were naïve to believe that the association agreement between Kiev and Brussels would usher in an age of careless affluence. When former Ukrainian leader Viktor Yanukovych refused to sign it, they took to the streets in what became known as the Euromaidan revolution. New Kiev authorities finalized the agreement only to give Ukraine "a shock therapy," Contra Magazin noted.

"It is becoming increasingly evident that [Yanukovych, deposed in a US-sponsored coup,] was absolutely right in his reservations" with regard to the document, the publication observed. Ukrainians are increasingly aware of this.

The implications of the deal, which according to Contra Magazin goes further than any other agreement signed between the EU and a third party, are truly damaging. Ukraine has to carry out reforms to converge its legislation to that of the EU to the point when the pan-European laws will become the standard, the media outlet pointed out.

These changes would lead to (and have to an extent already resulted in) a radical privatization and the introduction of market-based pricing. The latter development makes it impossible for the government to offer energy subsidies, which means that ordinary Ukrainians have to pay ever soaring electricity bills. Many can no longer afford this.

"Taking into account the looming winter and the collapsing economy these steps are a death sentence for tens of thousands of Ukrainians," Contra Magazin concluded.

The agreement, hailed by the current Ukrainian leadership and Brussels, also introduced restrictions on Ukraine's main export sector - agriculture.  The European Union has to tackle overproduction in the agricultural sector and it does not need competition from Ukraine.

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 #20
Crimean Anschluss Divides Russian Left Just as Much as It Does Russian Right
Paul Goble

Staunton, August 8 - That Vladimir Putin's Anschluss of Crimea has divided Russian nationalists has been obvious since the opening days of Russian aggression against Ukraine, with some Russian nationalists supporting Moscow's and others going so far as to travel to Ukraine to fight against the imperialism they see as a threat.

But the way in which the Anschluss has divided the Russian left, including those who self-identify as communists, has attracted far less attention, although the split in its ranks over Crimea and the Donbas may be just as profound as the one so widely noted among the Russian right wing.

And what may be more important is that the divisions on the left may presage challenges to the Russian occupation regime from an unexpected source - ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians who are increasingly appalled by what the occupation has wrought for them.

In a commentary on the pro-communist portal Forum-MSK.org, Sergey Kinzhalov addresses this issue head on, pointing out that "'the Crimean question' has split the Russian left" and raised "a multitude of questions" about how Marxists should evaluate the annexation of territory by one "bourgeois" state from another (forum-msk.org/material/region/10940394.html).

A Marxist, Kinzhalov says, must support "the right of every nation (and let us add, more broadly, every region) ... for free self-determination." Those who deny that, he says, "cannot be considered Marxists."  Consequently, "Russian communists unqualifiedly recognize that the residents of Crimea have that right; more than that, they have never denied it."

But, "as V.I. Lenin said, recognition of the right to self-determination in principle and support of a specific national (regional) movement are hardly one and the same thing." Marxists, he taught in Kinzhalov's words, "hardly must support every irredentist or separatist movement only because it appeals to the right of nations to self-determination."

Instead, he continues, they must assess it always and above all from the point of view of class analysis.  What does that mean in the case of Crimea?  According to the analyst, "there is no doubt that the state of Ukraine which arose at the end of 1991 on the wreckage of the Ukrainian SSR was a bourgeois state."

Crimea, he argues, was dominated throughout this period by ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians who identified not with Kyiv but with Russia and displayed "a certain mixed Russian-soviet mentality and way of life." The Ukrainian authorities "did not devote sufficient attention to the national question in Ukraine."

"Naturally, one must not believe Russian propaganda which asserts that the ruling elite of Ukraine conducted a virtual genocide of Russian-speaking Crimeans." At the same time, however, Kinzhalov says, "one cannot deny either that Ukrainization, albeit slowly ... was being imposed on the population and for obvious reasons was viewed by that population negatively."

Nonetheless, the communist commentator says, "the ideas of Russian nationalism never enjoyed great popularity in Russian Crimea." They were always marginal, and in 2010, the Russian nationalist party garnered only five percent of the vote, two percentage points less that the Ukrainian nationalist Rukh.

In short, "the Russian nationalists in Crimea lost to the Ukrainian nationalists!"

The Russian nationalists there or more precisely their leaders were able to seize power in Crimea in February-March 2014 "above all because as in the case with Ukraine, the popular movement in Crimea was spontaneous and unorganized." Crimeans did not rise to defend Yanukovich or Ukraine.

Those who took power in Crimea were members of the local bourgeoisie, Kinzhalov says, and they did so because "the Crimean revolution received support from the political leadership of the Russian Federation which sent into the peninsula contingents of Russian forces which took control all strategically important places in the cities of Crimea [and] blocked and disarmed the Ukrainian forces," so quickly and unexpectedly that no one was ready to resist.

Crimean residents who backed this revolution were divided because they were pursuing different and sometimes "contradictory" interests, Kinzhalov continues.  The population as a whole hoped for a better life and the end of the corruption that they associated with Kyiv, but the bourgeoisie, he says, simply wanted to displace the Ukrainians and control more property.

The latter succeeded, and it soon became obvious that Putin was on their side not on the side of the Russian-speaking population of Crimea. All he wanted was "a short, victorious and bloodless war, a war without shooting, and therefore still more victorious in order to strengthen his regime which had been shaken by the mass protests of 2011/12."

"Naturally," Kinzhalov says, the Crimean bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy and the Putin elite quickly found a common language and "viewed one another as allies," with Putin ready to guarantee the powers of the bourgeoisie and bureaucracy in exchange for declarations of loyalty, and the latter, together with their Russian counterparts, prepared to work with him on that basis.

What that means is this: "In March 2014," Crimea was taken out of one bourgeois state and annexed to another. The Crimean Republic created inside the Russian federation is in no way different from the 'Ukrainian' Republic of Crimea," from a Marxist point of view given that these are all "bourgeois state formations."

But, Kinzhalov argues, "the victory of the Russian bourgeois and petty bourgeois nationalists in Crimea is explained not only by the support from Putin and the Russian armed forces. Also playing a role was the fact that they almost did not meet any resistance."  And that is strange.

"If the positions of the Ukrainian nationalists on the peninsula initially were weak, that could not be said about the communists.  The CPU had always been strong precisely in Crimea," and it was well organized locally and with much influence.  Indeed, "in this regard, Crimea was one of the most 'red' regions of bourgeois Ukraine."

But "both the Crimean and Russian communists during the events of February-March 2014 chose an incorrect tactic. They unqualifiedly supported the position of the Russian authorities and in fact were trapped in the tail of the Russian nationalists and did not make any effort to take power into their own hands."

And that was the case, Kinzhalov adds, "despite the fact that the Russian nationalist parties and organizations were weaker than the Communist Party." Instead of acting, the communists in Crimea passively or even actively supported the inclusion of Crimea within "bourgeois Russia" and the subordination of their republic to "the Russian silovikoligarchy."

Most communists in Russia supported the Kremlin's action, he writes, "welcoming the formation of two new regions in the bourgeois Russian Federation," although a minority of them "took the absolutely incorrect approach of supporting the territorial integrity of bourgeois Ukraine."

Given their experience with the new Russian realities, Kinzhalov says, Crimean residents are rapidly dispensing with their "rose-colored glasses." They don't want to see their republic returned to Ukraine, but "at the same time," they are increasingly angry at the policies the bourgeois Russian Federation is carrying out in their land.

Dissatisfaction is growing in Crimea, he argues, because despite all the claims of Russian propaganda, Crimea's people "are being convinced by their own experience that in Rus, only the rich but not the people can live well."

Is there a way out?  "Bourgeois nationalists of Ukraine and Russia are unsuccessfully trying to impose on all of us a choice between two equally unacceptable evils," a Crimea within Ukraine or a Crimea within the Russian Federation. But the Russian left must now allow either to define the choice.

Instead, Kinzhalov says, the left in Russia and in Ukraine must say "'We are against a bourgeois Ukraine, we are against a bourgeois Russia, [and] we are against a bourgeois Crimea! We are for a Soviet Russia, we are for a Soviet Ukraine [and] we are for a Soviet Crimea." And to that end, the left must expose what the rulers are doing in all three places and demand the formation of a Crimean Soviet Socialist Republic.

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 #21
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
August 10, 2015
Crimean Tatars split as world congress calls for return to Ukrainian rule
Russia's controversial takeover of Crimea in March 2014 has led to a split among the native population of the peninsula - the Tatars. While senior Crimean Tatar public figures generally oppose Russian rule and call for the territory to be returned to Ukraine, another part of the Crimean Tatar elite is in favor of forging a future as part of the Russian Federation.
Oleg Yegorov, special to RBTH

While representatives of the Crimean Tatar community called for an end to Russian rule in Crimea at a world congress in Ankara on August 2-3 and condemned Moscow's takeover of the territory, there appears to be a split developing among those who have chosen to remain on the peninsula, with some in favor of forging closer ties with Russia following its takeover of Crimea in March 2014.

Attended by representatives of the Crimean Tatar diaspora from 12 countries, the congress was organized by one of the ethnic group's longstanding leaders, Soviet-era dissident Mustafa Dzhemilev, who now holds the position of authorized representative of the President of Ukraine on Affairs of the Crimean Tatar people, and Refat Chubarov, the chairman of the Mejlis (the representative body of the Crimean Tatars).
 
Criticism from pro-Moscow quarters

The congress condemned the "annexation of Crimea" by Russia in March 2014, accused the Russian authorities of disregard for fundamental freedoms of the people, and appealed to the United Nations to recognize Russia's actions against the Crimean Tatar people as genocide.

However, Kyrym, a pro-Russian public Crimean Tatar organization formed in 2014 that says its role is to assist in "the revival of the Crimean Tatar people," criticized the congress and accused the organizers of an attempt to mislead the representatives of the Crimean Tatar diaspora.

Meanwhile, Alexander Formanchuk of the Crimean division of the Moscow-based Institute for Socioeconomic and Political Research expressed doubt in an interview with RBTH that Crimean Tatars who are actually from Crimea were adequately represented at the Congress.

"As far as I know, only 17 people at the congress were actually from Crimea, and most of these 17 were not from Crimea itself, but from the bordering territories of Ukraine. The rest of the delegates were representatives of the diaspora," he said.

Yet according to a report by Radio Liberty, Russian authorities made it difficult for Crimea-based representatives to attend the event in Ankara, with two local Crimean Tatar leaders being prevented from leaving the peninsula.
 
Heavy burden of history

Descendants of the Golden Horde that ruled the region from the 13th century onward, the Crimean Tatars were conquered by the Ottoman Turks in the 15th century, resulting in the creation of the Crimean Khanate. The Khanate lasted three centuries before being annexed by the Russian Empire during the Russo-Turkish wars in 1783.

Relations between the Crimean Tatars and Russia have been poisoned ever since the mass deportation of the entire community on the orders of Joseph Stalin, when in just two days in 1944 the Crimean Tatars (numbering around 230,000) were forcibly evicted to remote areas of the Soviet Union, mainly Uzbekistan, accused of having collaborated with the Germans during the Nazi occupation of 1941-1944.

Some historians estimate that up to 100,000 Crimean Tatars died as a result of the deportation - which is widely seen as an example of ethnic cleansing, with some historians classifying it as genocide.

Families were allowed to resettle in their ancestral land from 1989 onward, but the Crimean Tatar population currently stands at just 13 percent of the total population of the peninsula.

"The deportation was the most terrible crime against the Crimean Tatar people, it caused the death of up to 40 percent of the population," Crimean Tatar journalist and public figure Aider Muzhdabayev told RBTH.

"Naturally, it leaves its mark. At the same time the attitude of Crimean Tatars towards the Russian people is absolutely normal -there is only negativity towards the Russian state."
 
The situation today

Their hostility towards the Russian authorities and the memories of deportation meant that many Crimean Tatars took the s of Crimea by Russia very negatively.

"The Crimean Tatars were against it, but their opinion was ignored. Even before the referendum [held on March 16, 2014 on the peninsula's accession to the Russian Federation - RBTH] Crimean Tatars held mass protests, but the Russian media did not report it," said Muzhdabayev.

The representatives of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatars called on members of the community to ignore the March 16 referendum and Dzhemilev warned that Russia would face ethnic violence if the peninsula were to be ruled from Moscow.

Despite the fact that many Crimean Tatars are still dissatisfied with Russian rule, Dzhemilev's prediction has not come true, though he told the congress on Aug. 2 that around 10,000 Crimean Tatars have already fled the peninsula, mostly to Ukraine.

Yet according to Alexander Formanchuk, "despite skepticism towards the Russian authorities, most of the people still live a normal life."

"The vast majority of Crimean Tatars have received Russian passports, [and] receive pensions and social benefits. In 1.5 years under Russian rule there have been no ethnic clashes neither large protests against the government," he said.

However, an official report published in March by international human rights organization Amnesty International documented numerous human rights violations and the disappearance of seven people on the peninsula in the last 12 months, including three Crimean Tatars - one of whom was found dead in spring 2014 with marks on his body consistent with torture.
 
The split

The Crimean Tatar elite, who generally support Dzhemilev and Chubarov, stand for Crimea as part of Ukraine. But there are those who support the new government.

"The Tatars are motivated to participate in building the new Crimea, and no one can advise the authorities how to solve their problems better than them," Russian business daily Kommersant quotes Zaur Smirnov - one of the representatives of the Mejlis who is loyal to the Russian authorities (Smirnov is now chairman of the State Committee of the Republic of Crimea) - as saying.

However, while Alexander Formanchuk describes disagreement as "normal," Aider Muzhdabayev criticizes Crimean Tatars who have taken a pro-Moscow stance, accusing them of a lack of integrity.

"These people have compromised with the Russian authorities in order to keep their business, their status in society. They cannot be called the real Crimean Tatar elite, people do not respect them," he said.

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 #22
Sputnik
August 10, 2015
Ukranian FM Calls to Prepare OSCE-Monitored Elections in Donbass

Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin said that preparations of OSCE-monitored local elections in Ukraine's troubled Donbass region must begin urgently.

KIEV (Sputnik) - Preparations of OSCE-monitored local elections in Ukraine's troubled Donbass region must begin urgently, the country's Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin said Monday in a phone conversation with his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov.

Constitutional amendments in Ukraine, providing more autonomy to the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, were stipulated in the February Minsk agreements between Kiev and eastern Ukrainian militias.

"Klimkin noted that in the framework of the Minsk agreements, there is an urgent need to begin work on preparing local elections, monitored by the OSCE, in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions," the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry said in a statement following the phone talk.

Donbas has been seeking a special status amid fighting in the region, which started in April 2014 when Kiev launched a military operation against local residents who refused to recognize the new coup-installed government.

Kiev authorities have set local elections in the country for October 25. However, the Donetsk and Luhansk people's republics have said that their own separate elections would be held on October 18 and November 1 respectively.

Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko has stated that the elections prepared by the self-proclaimed republics would have "devastating consequences" for the peace process.

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 #23
AFP
August 9, 2015
Ukraine: turning economic basket case into breadbasket
By Oleksandr Savochenko

MALA DIVYTSA (Ukraine) (AFP) - Oleksandr Verzhykhovskiy slips a crisp stalk of wheat through his fingers and surveys the sun-drenched fields that once made war-torn Ukraine the "breadbasket of Europe" -- and now embody its economic hopes.

"This is a treasure -- if you know how to treat it right," the 29-year-old chief executive of the AgroKIM agriculture company said with a wistful air.

But the three brand new combines working these fields about 100 kilometres (60 miles) north of Kiev are integral elements in the maddening state of affairs the crisis-wracked ex-Soviet state faces.

Verzhykhovskiy's booming crop holds the promise of Ukraine regaining its title as one of the world's main suppliers of various grains.

But the nearby hamlet of Mala Divytsa reflects the far more depressing reality of dilapidated houses and potholed roads that seem to have last been patched up in long-gone communist times.

The 16-month-long separatist insurgency has shuttered much of east Ukraine's heavy industry and claimed more than 6,800 lives. It has also sent economic shock waves throughout the country of more than 40 million.

The economy contracted by nearly seven percent last year and is projected to do even worse in 2015. Ukraine depends on Western financial assistance -- funds that primarily go to pay off old debts.

Factory output is down by nearly a fifth from last summer and consumers are buying 25 percent less than they did a year ago.

But Verzhykhovskiy looks at his swaying stalks and smiles.

Ukraine's total crop production reached a post-Soviet record of 63 million tonnes in 2014 and is on course to nearly match that mark this year.

The battled-scarred nation -- so eager to wrestle itself away from Moscow and fully embrace the West -- managed to export an impressive 34.5 million tonnes of grain in 2014.

The Financial Times wrote last month that Ukraine was set to become China's top supplier of corn in the first half of this year.

The London business daily reported that close to an eye-popping 90 percent of China's maize imports came from Ukraine -- and not its direct neighbour and fellow agricultural power Russia.

Moscow's exports have been particularly hard-hit by a trade war with the West that was sparked by the Kremlin's March 2014 seizure of Ukraine's Crimea peninsula.

'Prices are not good'

It has helped that the fighting has left most cultivated fields untouched. A centuries-old farming tradition also inspires many Ukrainians to feel special pride in their land.

But some factors are well outside Verzhykhovskiy's control. A strong dollar has seen commodities lose value and the price of corn drop by about 15 percent since the start of the year.

"Prices are not good," the young farm boss conceded. "We operate without a profit on most of our cereals."

This has cut off foreign investments and left Ukrainian farmers reliant on local banks for loans loaded with exorbitant interest rates few can afford.

"Last year was tough on investment," Agriculture Minister Oleksiy Pavlenko told AFP.

But the minister is placing hope on $1 billion in new farming equipment that has been promised by the United States. Beijing and Kiev signed a $3 billion loan-for-corn deal in 2012 which Ukraine also hopes to extend.

All that machinery would find plenty of fertile land to plough.

The World Bank estimates that more than 70 percent of Ukraine's territory is arable for farming. The rate is Europe's second highest and bested only by small and impoverished Moldova.

High risk, low yield

But economists and the agriculture ministry admit that the sector now needs a push that can only come from private investment.

World Bank data also shows all Ukraine's cultivated land yielding about 4,000 kilograms of cereal per hectare (3,600 pounds per acre) -- about half the rate of Germany and similar to that of Canada.

Ukraine has potential for high growth not only in the cereals sector but also in areas such as fruit and vegetables, said Olena Harmash, spokeswoman in Kiev for International Finance Corporation, the World Bank's private-sector finance unit.

"Everyone focuses on grain, but the agricultural sector as a whole presents the possibility of very lucrative investment," Harmash said.

Yet foreigners remain wary about ploughing money into even the peaceful parts of the unsettled east European country.

Transparency International ranks Ukraine 142nd out of 175 nations on its corruption index. The court system's independence has been suspect for decades and investor rights are often ignored.

"The judicial system has to function before we see any foreigners come running," said ProAgro consultancy analyst Mykola Vernytsky.

Kiev plans to put up 254 state-held farms and agricultural businesses for sale this year.

Pavlenko says foreigners already have the right to sign seven-year land leases. He also encourages buyers to snap up properties before demand and land prices go up.

But analyst Vernytsky questions whether the privatisation programme will make the impact Kiev's pro-Western government anticipates.

"If we open up the agricultural property market but do nothing about the corruption... no one will want that land," he said.

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 #24
BBC
August 11, 2015
Ukraine bans 38 Russian 'hate' books amid culture war

Ukraine has banned 38 books published in Russia, alleging that they spread "hate ideology" and "separatism".

The ban includes works by Russian nationalists Alexander Dugin, Eduard Limonov and Sergei Glazyev.

The blacklist was published by the Ukrainian State Television and Radio Committee. It accused Russia of waging "information warfare" against Ukraine.

Ukraine and Western leaders say Russia is fomenting separatism and helping the insurgents in eastern Ukraine.

"Information war" is seen as all part of Russia's "aggression" against the pro-Western government in Kiev.

Ukrainian troops and pro-Russian separatists exchange artillery fire daily in the Donetsk-Luhansk conflict zone.

Russia also has a blacklist of banned books and other publications, called the Federal List of Extremist Materials. It runs to more than 1,000 banned titles, and is published on the Russian Justice Ministry website.

It includes texts by jihadist groups and Jehovah's Witnesses, and Blowing Up Russia: The Return of the KGB, a book by ex-Russian intelligence agent Alexander Litvinenko, who died from radiation poisoning in London in 2006. UK authorities accuse Russian state agents of killing him.

The Russian books now banned in Ukraine include works called The Ukrainian Front - Red Stars over Maidan, Battlefield Ukraine - The Broken Trident, Forward to the USSR, Superman speaks Russian and Kiev Kaputt.

Sergei Glazyev is an economic adviser to President Vladimir Putin. A prominent Russian TV presenter, Sergei Dorenko, is also a blacklisted author now in Ukraine.

The Ukrainian committee's statement said the ban was aimed at "safeguarding Ukrainian citizens against the use of information warfare and disinformation methods, against the spread of hate ideology, fascism, xenophobia and separatism".

Criticising the ban, Sergei Dorenko said it would hardly be effective in the internet age.

The hostility between Russia and Ukraine has spread to cultural life as a whole, since Russia's March 2014 annexation of Crimea.

Ukraine has banned films seen as "glorifying" Russian security services and prevented some pro-Putin Russian celebrities from entering the country.

A Russian rapper, Timati, was prevented from performing in Odessa after he expressed support for President Vladimir Putin and made unflattering comments about Ukraine.

Shows by two Balkan star musicians - Goran Bregovic and Emir Kusturica - did not go ahead in Kiev because of their alleged "anti-Ukrainian rhetoric", BBC Monitoring reported.

In addition, last week Ukraine blacklisted 13 Russian singers and actors, as well as French-born Gerard Depardieu, saying they supported Russia's annexation of Crimea and pro-Russian separatists. Ukraine's culture ministry denounced them as a "threat to national security".

The list includes the veteran variety singer Iosif Kobzon, who is already under Western sanctions. He shot to stardom in Soviet times.

Meanwhile, Russian nationalists have lambasted two veteran Russian rock stars - Boris Grebenshchikov and Andrei Makarevich - for their allegedly pro-Ukrainian stance.

Last week Russian media reported that works by two internationally renowned British historians - John Keegan and Antony Beevor - had been banned in Russia's Yekaterinburg region. Schools were ordered to remove any copies that they found.

In a BBC Russian interview, Beevor said he had been accused of "slandering the Red Army" because he had chronicled mass rapes by Soviet soldiers in World War Two - rapes that were reported in Soviet archives. Many German women committed suicide after being raped.

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 #25
Den (Kyiv)
August 5, 2015
Ukrainian daily notes new escalation in Donbass, views last round of Minsk talks
Valentyn Torba entitled Zero option impasse. Oleksandr Turchynov: 'Military provocations show that Russia's public debate on withdrawal of tanks and arms is an attempt to create favourable conditions for offensive'

The negotiations in Minsk, which began on 3 August and were designed to agree the withdrawal of heavy weapons along the dividing line in Donbass, ended without success late on Tuesday evening [4 August].

The safety subgroup was supposed to develop a new agreement on the withdrawal from the line of contact of weapons with a calibre smaller than 100 mm. On Wednesday [5 August] the contact groups did not conduct negotiations.

Just to remind you: On 21 July, during negotiations in Minsk, the representatives of the tripartite Contact Group agreed on the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the contact line, but did not sign any agreements.

Denys Pushylin, the representative of the DNR [Donetsk People's Republic] terrorist organization, as predicted, accused the Ukrainian side of allegedly not making concessions on political issues and of causing the negotiation process to stagnate. But really, the shelling of Ukrainian troops' positions andcivilians by the militants, which does not cease, and the systematic provocations, including terrorists disguising themselves as Armed Forces representatives, prove that the invaders are not going to take any constructive steps.

Above all, because the bandits are not independent figures, they are only the executors of the Kremlin's will. So we should not expect a reduction of the degree of aggression in Donbass until the Kremlin achieves maximum concessions from Kiev and returns it to the orbit of serving Russia's interests. Putin's ambitions can only be stopped with comprehensive, consistent, and constant pressure by the United States and Europe on Moscow. Obviously, the impasse in which the negotiations are now cannot be broken without the decisive intervention of the West. This in turn is impossible without the international community's having confidence in our clear position and consistency.

In parallel with the meeting in Minsk, on Tuesday the war cabinet had a meeting in Kiev. The meeting was devoted to discussion of the situation on the contact line in Donbass and the results of the Minsk talks. Thus Oleksandr Turchynov, the secretary of the National Security and Defence Council, said: "Lately there has been a systematic tendency to increase the number of provocations by armed forces stationed on the territories of Luhansk and Donetsk regions occupied by Russia. They fire heavy artillery and mortars, mainly from locations in residential neighborhoods of the occupied cities. Again, Russia is employing its elaborate tactics of using civilians as human shields to cover up its war crimes, which was tried and tested in Crimea and Donbass."

Oleksandr Turchynov noted that the politicians of leading democratic countries are on vacation now, so an active reaction to Russia's provocations, including tougher sanctions, is not possible. The secretary of the National Security and Defence Council also said: "The daily military provocations and crimes in the east of the country show that Russia's public debate on the withdrawal of tanks and arms with a calibre smaller than 100 mm is the enemy's attempt to create favourable conditions for an attack by Russian-terrorist groups."

It should also be noted that recently information has emerged that the militants plan to create a so-called "dirty" bomb. This has been reported by the Security Service [SBU] as well as by a number of reputable international publications. For example, on 31 July Newsweek published a big article on this topic. In particular, the magazine writes: "In Donetsk Newsweek was able to verify that the Vostok battalion controls access to a radioactive waste facility.... If the SBU's intelligence is accurate, the development of a rebel dirty bomb would bring an alarming new dimension to a war that has grown increasingly savage as it drags into a second year. The UN estimates the conflict has already taken more than 6,700 lives, with the true number likely to be much higher."

According to Western media, the terrorists are getting help in creating the so-called "dirty bomb" from Russian specialists. A notable point is that the Russian media were quick to blame the Ukrainian side for supposedly planning to use such a prohibited weapon in Donbass. Such reports in pro-Kremlin media indicate that the threat of "dirty" bombs or other weapons of mass destruction really does exist. Of course, we must cover and react to this kind of information, but the possibility that the enemy aims to create panic, tension, and demoralization should also be taken into consideration. The last point is another factor in putting pressure on Ukraine.

Comments

"Kiev Has Become Interested in Guarantees of the agreements' Implementation" - Dmytro Tymchuk, MP:

"At the moment there is a degree of tension in Donbass, so I think we should not relax in the near future. As for the "dirty bomb," it makes no sense to use it at the front. In this regard, great responsibility rests on our security forces, which control the movement of transport in the Antiterrorist Operation area. We must understand that it is not only about the Antiterrorist Operation area. We monitor [the situation] and see that there is still a high level of terrorist threat in Odessa and Kharkiv regions.

As for the negotiations, I have been saying since last year that there is no point in conducting dialogue regarding Donetsk with representatives of terrorist groups that take no responsibility and give no guarantees on the agreements reached. Any agreements, written or verbal, are meaningful only if the parties give some guarantees of their implementation. We do not see these guarantees. Therefore, the dialogue around the Minsk process is turning into clowning, whereby the militants voice any thought that comes to their minds. We have been hearing accusations against Ukraine of breaking the agreements from the first round of negotiations, i.e. from September 2014. However, if we look at the map of the areas that were controlled by Ukraine last September and areas that are controlled by it today, we see that our area is reduced. Therefore the accusations against us are inappropriate. It is possible to accuse the bandits, who are trying to expand their control, carry out constant shelling, and do not cease active offensive.

According to my information, at the moment Ukraine's stance in the Minsk negotiations is quite rigid, and Kiev has finally become interested in guarantees of implementation of the agreements achieved. Let me remind you how Minsk-2 began. While the agreements were being signed, Russian terrorist troops attacked the Debaltseve bridgehead, and as a result we lost a piece of territory. This is the logic of the negotiation process according to the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics and Moscow. Naturally, it is impossible to conduct a dialogue under such circumstances. In all these arrangements there should also be explicit guarantees from the West, which has to determine the responsibility of the conflict's main initiator, i.e. Russia. If some points are not being fulfilled, additional sanctions must be introduced. Only then will there be any point in negotiations. At the moment we are just demonstrating to the West, which is seeking any format if only it leads to a de-escalation of the conflict, that we are committed to peaceful dialogue.

"The EU Wants to Freeze the Situation in the Donets Basin as Much as Possible" - Rostyslav Tomenchuk, chairman of the board of the Ukrainian Institute for International Politics:

"To date we have been unable to get anything useful out of the Minsk agreements. There is a format and there is a document, but practically it cannot oblige the parties to implement it, and that undermines its effectiveness. Obviously Russia is not going to fulfil the Minsk agreements. It is impossible to answer whether the militants are going to continue to expand the territory, because it does not depend on logical steps. It can happen now or later, but it is obvious that it does not end now. The EU's stance is clear: It wants to freeze the situation in Donbass as much as possible. There is no visible stance on returning the occupied territories to Ukraine's control. Russia can use this stance by the West in order to try to expand its area of influence, for which it will be sanctioned correspondingly. Indeed, the experience of Georgia and our own experience show that Russia begins the active phase of an offensive in the summer. So theoretically there is such a threat, but it is hard to tell whether it will be implemented in practice.

However trivial it may sound, economic reforms, fighting corruption, and lustration of power are extremely important. They are the key to resolving the remaining issues. The EU has not taken to heart the problem that Ukraine faces. The average European does not think it necessary to switch completely to helping Ukraine. How can we explain to Europe why it should help us, if we do not carry out rapid reforms and so continue to have an unstable political situation?"

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 #26
Interfax-Ukraine
August 11, 2015
Investigators cannot draw conclusion on 'causal connection' between possible Buk parts and MH17 crash - Netherlands
 
The international group of specialists conducting a criminal investigation into the crash of the Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 in eastern Ukraine in July 2014 is examining "several parts, possibly originating from a Buk surface-air-missile system," the Dutch Safety Board reported on Tuesday.

"In cooperation with the Dutch Safety Board (DSB), the Joint Investigation Team (JIT) are investigating several parts, possibly originating from a Buk surface-air-missile system. These parts have been secured during a previous recovery-mission in Eastern-Ukraine and are in the possession of the criminal investigation team MH17 and the Dutch Safety Board," it said in a press release.

"At present the conclusion cannot be drawn that there is a causal connection between the discovered parts and the crash of flight MH17," it said.

"The parts are of particular interest to the criminal investigation as they can possibly provide more information about who was involved in the crash of MH17," according to the press release.

"For that reason the JIT is further investigating the origin of these parts. The JIT will internationally enlist the help of experts, among others forensic specialists and weapon-experts," it said.

The international group is conducting the criminal inquiry, while the Dutch Safety Board is working to establish the immediate reasons behind the Malaysian Boeing crash, it said.

"Both investigations are conducted separately but the JIT and the DSB occasionally share material. In its final report the Dutch Safety Board will report on the discovered parts," according to the press release.

Dutch Safety Board spokesperson Sara Vernooij said on Monday that the DSB-led group was meeting in the Netherlands to discuss the course of the investigation into the Flight MH17 crash in eastern Ukraine.

These expert consultations are expected to continue for several days.

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 #27
New York Times
August 11, 2015
A Ukrainian Border Town Once Fenced by Soviets Blossoms Into a Shopper's Paradise
By RICK LYMAN

MALI SELMENTSI, Ukraine - The main street is a lovely ribbon of asphalt these days, a far cry from the rutted moonscape that once prevented even buses from bouncing into the tiny, decrepit village.

Lining the narrow road are an equally improbable series of sparkling shops, selling sports clothes, Gucci tank tops, dress shoes, Chanel perfume, flip-flops. There is even a sprawling wedding dress emporium where clusters of excited women contemplate a platoon of mannequins adorned with sequined chiffon and lace.

"It was a small village at the end of the world," said Monika Mondok, standing outside a two-story emporium selling brand-name sportswear. "But then, when the gate opened, it blossomed."

The "gate" is a small cluster of glass-and-metal buildings cut seven years ago through the tall fences that mark the border between Ukraine and Slovakia. One pedestrian path leads from the village Mali Selmentsi to its Slovakian counterpart, Velke Slemence, another leads out. Uniformed border guards calmly peruse the travel documents of the bag-wielding shoppers and the decaying remains of a Soviet watchtower pokes above the corrugated tree line.

The saga of this small Ukrainian village (population 200) and its Slovakian twin (population 400), reads like a "Twilight Zone" episode joining the cruelty and absurdity of the 20th century with a most unlikely 21st-century denouement.

Part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire until its collapse at the end of World War I, the two medieval villages had long ago intertwined, sharing a church, community center and schools. In 1919, the combined area was given to Czechoslovakia. In 1938, it became part of the Kingdom of Hungary.

And then, after World War II, with Ukraine absorbed into a surging Soviet empire eager to claim as much territory as possible, a new international boundary was drawn smack through the center of town.

Overnight, families and friends a few blocks apart found themselves living in different countries, separated by surly border guards and, for 61 years, rarely allowed to visit one another. Even talking through the fence was forbidden.

During funerals, coffins were taken near the border so those on the other side could view the body. Residents outwitted the Russian guards by passing information in songs they sang in the fields. In one oft-repeated incident, a young girl who had been visiting her grandmother was separated from her parents and had to stand near the border fence several years later so her mother could see her in her wedding dress.

Finally, in 2005, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and under pressure from residents and international attention, the Ukrainian and Slovakian governments allowed a pedestrian-only crossing to be cut through the fence.

And then came, perhaps, the strangest twist of all.

Since Slovakia is a member of the European Union, its citizens can travel into Ukraine - which is eager to get closer to Europe - simply by presenting a passport. But citizens of Ukraine must still get a visa, which takes weeks and is, at $38, beyond the means of many.

At the same time, prices for most consumer goods are considerably cheaper in inflation-choked Ukraine. So shoppers from Velke Slemence and other nearby Slovakian towns poured through the new border gate in search of bargains, transforming the little town into something like an outlet center, while Ukrainians faced much greater hurdles to get into Slovakia.

The result is that shops in Slovakia, where the national economy is considerably more robust, have withered, and almost the entire commercial life of the area has shifted to the crumbling Ukrainian side.

"Today, there are only three shops in all of Velke Slemence," said the village's mayor, Ludovit Toth. "In Mali Selmentsi, there are 30."

In the first years after the gate opened, more than 1,000 people a day passed through, some to visit long-lost relatives but most to shop. The number of stores rose to more than 70.

Cigarettes were the main commodity, selling for a fraction of what they cost in Slovakia. But then, in 2008, after Slovakia changed its regulations to limit visitors to two packs per week, the number of shoppers fell sharply.

Ibolya Palfi Szurte, the clerk in a crowded boutique near the border gate on the Ukrainian side, said business had fallen since the cigarette rules changed and many shops had to close. But there were still enough bargains to power the village.

"In summer, we get people coming from as far away as the Czech Republic," she said. "Look at this bottle of Versace perfume. We sell it for 5 euros and 50 cents. People can take it to Slovakia and sell it there for 30 euros, easily. In mall stores it sells for much, much more."

She is surrounded by luxury brand names on tank tops and running shorts; "for Slovakian shoppers, it is all about the brand name," she said.

Outside, groups of shoppers carrying plastic bags and licking ice cream cones moved up and down the narrow road.

"Things have gotten better since the gate opened, no question," she said. "The economy is better. People can fix up their homes. And the road, it has gotten so much better."

The mayor of Mali Selmentsi, Jozef Illar, said that while some families with homes near the border had seen a small windfall, he measured the spread of prosperity in a different way.

"Before the crossing opened, there were 100 cows in the village," he said. "Now, there are 30. From this we can see that people no longer feel they must keep animals to survive."

Judging the opening of the border in terms of profit is the wrong way to look at it, said Tibor Bodnar, the former mayor of the nearby Slovakian town of Velke Kapusany.

"It is really more a matter of setting right a historical wrong committed long ago," he said.

Josef Ivan, 74, a retired bus driver whose pension is just $58 a month, stood in the middle of the road on the Ukrainian side roughly 200 yards from the border gate, about the point where the shops peter out and crumbling homes stretch toward the drab eastern horizon.

"The day the gate opened, people were crying when they met," he said.

Visits with relatives were possible during the Soviet years, he said. But they were limited to once a year, required a letter of invitation, weeks of wrestling with the bureaucracy and a 100-mile round-trip through the nearest border crossing.

He still has a cousin living on the Slovakian side. "For a long time we were not acquainted and, truth is, we rarely visit anymore," he said.

Too many years had passed. Family ties stretched, then snapped. And many who remember those years are elderly, or already gone.

When the Soviets built the wall, Priska Tomoriova was with relatives on the Slovakian side, and was separated from her mother. In the following 44 years, until her mother died, they visited each other only four times.

"But what could we do?" asked Ms. Tomoriova, 81, seated beside her 85-year-old husband in their small, perfectly square living room, plaster reliefs of Jesus and Mary gazing down at them. "We couldn't do anything about it."

She thought back to some of the ways people coped with the situation.

"Our best trick was hiding notes under the wings of a chicken and sending it across the border," she said. "The Russians never discovered that one."

Now, she said, her husband has difficulty walking. So even though the border is open, they rarely cross. She goes once a year to buy candles and flowers to decorate the family graves for All Saints' Day.

"It all happened a long time ago," she said. "But this is history, and what can you do about history? It is what it was."

Miroslava Germanova contributed reporting from Velke Slemence, Slovakia.

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 #28
Canadian Press
July 12, 2015
CP Investigation: Canada's embassy in Ukraine used as pawn in 2014 uprising
Murray Brewster, The Canadian Press

KYIV, Ukraine -- It was one of those events that simply appeared and disappeared during the bloody, swift-moving events of Ukraine in the winter revolution of 2014.

Canada's embassy in Kyiv was used as a haven for several days by anti-government protesters during the uprising that toppled the regime of former president Viktor Yanukovych.
The Harper government never fully acknowledged -- during the upheaval or since -- the depth and extent of the security breach, which has had far-reaching implications on how Canadians are perceived in the region.

The Canadian Press has spent months piecing together the events surrounding the extraordinary incident, which started on Feb. 18, 2014 and occurred at the height of the violent crackdown against pro-European protesters.

ARMED WITH STONES, LEFT BEHIND FLOWERS

It began, according to multiple sources in Kyiv and Ottawa, when one of the protesters being chased by riot police waved a Canadian passport at embassy security. Once the door was open, the individual was quickly followed by other demonstrators armed with sticks and paving stones.

Roman Waschuk, the current Canadian ambassador in Kyiv, confirmed the account in a recent interview with The Canadian Press.

"I understand there was a Canadian passport holder associated in some way with the group," said Waschuk, who replaced Troy Lulashnyk as ambassador in Kyiv last year.

He acknowledged the protesters were camped in the main lobby for at least a week, which is something neither Foreign Affairs nor the Harper government has ever publicly stated.
Waschek also suggested no harm came of it.

"From what I was told, it was several days and they left flowers on departure," he said.

A host of security improvements were made in the aftermath, but that opening of the doors was "a gesture designed to react and to reach out to the people suffering in the turmoil," Waschek said.

ALLIES QUESTION CANADA'S ROLE

But some of Canada's European allies, speaking on background because of the sensitivity of the subject, said the fact protesters were allowed to stay for so long and operate freely made it appear Canada was an active participant in regime change, and not just lending morale support.

That was certainly the perception of Ukraine's interior ministry, which oversees the police, national guard and the country's intelligence services.

Two ministry officials, with knowledge of the case and who agreed to meet as long as their identities were not revealed, said a criminal investigation was opened into the actions of the protesters, but quietly dropped after Yanukovych fled to Russia.

They described an extraordinary scene of chaos and violence outside of the embassy, which is located in the heart of city immediately adjacent to the Maidan -- or independence -- square.

"There wasn't much of an obstacle for them to get in. Not much security," said one official. "Canada was sympathizing with the protesters, at the time, more than the government."
The lobby was used to treat the wounded on the night of Feb. 18 and they were transferred to hospital by ambulance amid the violence, which included a mini-van that was stolen by protesters, according to the officials.

It was later found burned, something Ottawa hasn't acknowledged, they said.

"There was no public statement from the Canadian side about this, and it's really interesting what grounds they would use not to say something," said the second official.

Multiple layers of intrigue surround the occupation, which was first reported by Russian media as an attack on the embassy by pro-Russian groups.

A spokesman for then-foreign affairs minister John Baird acknowledged, on the day itself, that protesters were in the reception area of the building;  they had taken "shelter," and they were "peaceful and have not caused any damage or harm to staff."

After the initial report, there was silence. The embassy was closed and remained so throughout the tumultuous events that culminated with Yanukovych fleeing to Russia on Feb. 22.

How the protesters got in and what happened during their stay was never fully explained by the Harper government, which -- according to sources in Ottawa -- was seized with how to respond and what options there might be to end the occupation.

In the end, a decision was made "at the highest levels" to let events play-out.

STRIDENT CANADA NO SHOCK TO UKRAINIANS

If you talk to ordinary people here, academics or even Ukraine's charge d'affaires in Ottawa, the fact Canada pushed the envelope isn't surprising. They see it as a natural extension of the Harper government's bullish rhetoric, and in fact something they've come to expect.

"Generally speaking in Ukrainian public opinion, as well in the Ukraine government of that time, there was a common understanding that Canadian sympathies are on the side of the protesters, pro-European, pro-democratic," Marko Shevchenko said in a recent interview with The Canadian Press.

Dominque Arel, a noted expert on Ukraine at the University of Ottawa, agreed and said the perception that Canada was more than a disinterested bystander was formed long before the Maidan protests, which erupted in the fall of 2013, turned violent.

Perhaps reinforcing that rebel image, at least one local embassy staffer was targeted for her attendance at anti-government rallies and online blogging that was critical of Yanukovych.

Inna Tsarkova, who was part of a group called AutoMaidan which carried out mobile protests around Kyiv, had her car torched and she faced traffic violation charges in December 2013. She declined to speak about her experience, but as the local spokeswoman for the embassy her treatment fit with a pattern of official intimidation at the time, which targeted journalists and other high-profile figures.

There is no prohibition on locally-hired embassy staff participating in political movements.

EMBASSY INCIDENT REFLECTS BROADER FOREIGN POLICY

The fallout is rarely discussed, but Canadians are not very popular in some quarters and occasionally loathed by pro-Russian Ukrainians. Arel said he knows of one incident where a Canadian journalist was briefly detained by rebels.

Bob Fowler, a former diplomat and senior foreign policy adviser to three prime ministers, says the Harper government has played a dangerous game and pushed the country's involvement in Ukraine to the point where Canada has become a disruptive influence for allies who have more at stake in managing the confrontation with nuclear-armed Russia and are trying to keep the conflict from erupting into all-out war.

"We're not the considered, intelligent players that we used to be," said Fowler, who as a UN representative survived a kidnapping by al-Qaeda. "We have been all mouth and no brain."

The embassy incident is a small but perfect snapshot of what Canada's foreign policy has become, said Fowler.

"I would argue we have very little credibility within NATO. Of course, our friends in NATO aren't going to say that publicly, but the people within NATO who are relevant to our discussion, they know about Canadian military capabilities. They know about what we could and could not do and they know our posturing is utterly vacuous."

NDP foreign affairs critic Paul Dewar was shocked by the recounting of events and demanded the RCMP investigate the security breach. He accused the government of covering up the incident and endangering the lives of not only embassy staff, but Canadian citizens in the country.

"Why are we just learning of this now?" asked Dewar. "And what would have happened had the revolution gone the other way and Yanukovych stayed? If things had gone that way not only would our credibility have been undermined but also the safety and security of our staff."

Waschek says the safety and security for diplomats is a paramount concern, and Canada's backing of democracy in Ukraine should surprise no one.

"The public stance ministers and the prime minister took during the Maidan events; that Canada stood on the side of those who were protesting for freedom and democracy, and certainly we've never made any apologies for that," the ambassador said.

EPILOGUE

The wounds of Maidan are still visible throughout the old city, be it weather-worn shrines with pictures of the dead or gaping holes in the square where protesters clawed bricks from the ground to hurl at kevlar-clad security forces.

The annexation of Crimea and the dismemberment of eastern districts have given Ukrainians little time to reflect, said Marko Suprun, of Winnipeg, who worked for the Globe and Mail and was on the streets Kyiv when the shooting was at its height.

Even today, he can point out the precise rooftop perches where special forces snipers fired on protesters. The wounded and dead would be carried, or dragged, off the streets into any shelter, including the nearby Hotel Ukraine, where there white marble floors were smeared with blood.

Those were the kinds of scenes that were unfolding outside of the embassy doors, he said.

"I just had to help. It's still kind of hard to talk about," said Suprun, who put down his pen and carried the maimed and dying into the hotel. He has stayed to provide combat first aid training to Ukrainian volunteers and hands out F--kUPutin bracelets as his business cards.

Consideration of the bigger picture becomes less important the closer you get to the ground, he said.

"You could say events are still raw because Crimea was annexed and eastern Ukraine was invaded," Suprun said. "And as far as I can tell, the only country that has stood side by side with Ukraine has been Canada, even during the Maidan by closing the embassy in Moscow. These are the right things to do. In finding that friendship, you keep finding the strength to move forward."

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 #29
Fort Russ
http://fortruss.blogspot.com
August 10, 2015
Nuland and Poroshenko Play at Constitutional Reform to Blame Russia
Novorossia.su, translated by Jafe Arnoldski [http://novorossia.su/ru/node/20807]

"Poroshenko changes the constitution in order to blame Russia for disrupting Minsk 2"

Experts interviewed by RIA Novosti believe that amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine, supported by the Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland, are intended to demonstrate the aspiration of Kiev authorities to carry out the Mink agreements, while at the same time blame Moscow for sabotaging them.

The day before, the Verkhovna Rada forwarded the draft of amendments to the Constitution for the decentralization of authority to the Constitutional Court of the country for examination. The President of Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko, brought the draft before Parliament at the beginning of July, but the day prior to voting it was amended. The transitional provisions of the original bill contained regulations envisaging that a special procedure for governance in the individual Lugansk and Donetsk regions (a special status provided by the Minsk Agreements) will be determined by a separate law. In the new version, this provision has been transferred to the text of the future, new constitution, but also in its transitional provisions.

In the Lugansk and Donetsk People's Republics, it's been stated that the changes to the draft amendments made by Poroshenko are not related to the Minsk peace process and do not remove the discrepancies between Kiev and Donbass on the issue of constitutional reform. Nuland, however, who was present in parliament during the consideration of the bill, stated after the session of parliament that the amendments by Kiev suggest that the authorities of Ukraine have fulfilled their obligations under the Minsk Agreements.

Georgy Fedorov, member of the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation, believes that the amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine are a step of Poroshenko designed more for propagandistic rather than real effect.

"The majority of people didn't read the Minsk Agreements - accordingly, this was a propagandistic move by Poroshenko's side designed to show that his party has allegedly done everything possible. This is an old story and a well-known trick" , - stated Fedorov.

The same view is held by the Deputy Director of the Institute of the Commonwealth of Independent States, Vladimir Zharikhin.

"In essence, she (Nuland) publicly acknowledged the whole point of this operation. Obviously...it was getting more difficult to completely, unfoundedly blame Russia for reneging on the Minsk Agreements when Kiev violated all of the provisions of the agreement. Therefore, it was necessary to demonstrate that Kiev is set to fulfill these agreements", - he states

For this purpose, the expert explains, a place was found "where it's possible to create ambiguity - where they could sort of fulfill them and sort of not." Such a place, in his opinion, turned out to be amendments to the constitution. But even making these changes, Kiev violates as a minimum two provisions of the set of measures, the expert notes.

"Firstly, they did not consult with the representatives of the Donetsk and Lugansk republics, which was straightforwardly prescribed (in the set of measures for the fulfillment of the Minsk Agreements). Secondly, they do not fulfill the references which are spelled out there.

According to the fundamental law of Ukraine, changes to the constitution can only be made if such is voted for by the Verkhovna Rada in two sessions with more than 300 votes. In this year only one session occurred, and in Minsk 2 it says that the changes must be made in 2015", Zharikhin clarified.

"This is clearly a theatrical affair so that Nuland can say what she said. And now she will say this in spite of the obvious and despite the fact that these actions do not produce any kind of fulfillment of the Minsk Agreements", - he added.

Assessing the possible goals of such "demonstrative affairs," Zharikhin stated that "Kiev in reality categorically does not want in to include in the Donetsk and Lugansk republics in the framework of the Minsk Agreements in the political economic space of Ukraine."

"Therefore they are doing everything to not include them, and in this way blame the failures of compliance with the Minsk Agreements on Russia. Then there will be such theatrical actions like we just saw", - he explained.

In turn, Fedorov pointed out that the visit of Nuland once again demonstrates "external control is in fact occuring in Ukraine."

"Any step that Poroshenko makes is coordinated directly with specialists from the USA. The SBU and UAF also are under such control, and even Yatsenyuk works with American economic advisors. It is therefore possible to speak here about external management", - concluded the interlocutor of the agency.

The reform of the constitution of Ukraine as part of decentralization is stipulated by the Minsk Agreements from February 12. The amendments should take into account the features of "the separate Donetsk and Lugansk regions, agreed upon with the representatives of these regions." The authorities of the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics repeatedly sent their proposals for reform, but did not receive a response.

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 #30
Euromaidan Press
http://euromaidanpress.com
August 7, 2015
The postcolonial syndrome in Ukraine

Political scientist Karolina Słowik interviews Mykola Riabchuk, Ukrainian literary critic, essayist and journalist, on his new book Ukraine: The Postcolonial Syndrome. The interview was conducted during the conference "Past as Prelude: Polish-Ukrainian Relations for the Twenty-First Century," held at the Sidney Sussex College, University of Cambridge, June 20 - July 1, 2015.

Q: Why such a (negative) reaction ( after first being addressed in Russian - Ed.)?

I came to Cambridge for the Polish-Ukrainian conference. Everybody is speaking English, so I was somewhat surprised. But I'm not surprised in Kyiv when someone asks in Russian.

Q: In what language do you answer?

Ukrainian. After all, everyone understands perfectly. They are taught in school. This language is present on television. In Ukraine there is no problem with understanding. However, there is a problem of status. To speak Ukrainian is similar to being black in a country where the majority is white. People do not want to stand out. Most are trying to be white (as Michael Jackson).

Q: In your new book Ukraine. The Postcolonial Syndrome you write that Ukrainian was the language of the province and Russian of higher culture. Is this still true?

You underestimate the power of speech. And you also underestimate the structural problems that we have inherited after centuries of Russian colonization. Independent Ukraine emerged as the extension of the Ukrainian Socialist Republic: the same institutions, elites, practices - everything remained virtually unchanged.

The party elites spoke Russian since another language was useless for their careers. In fact, it was suspect. The Russian-speaking elites that ruled the country then are still ruling it now. I do not know a single Ukrainian-speaking oligarch. And they are the ones who impose the discourse and influence the media. Ukraine has had 15 prime ministers and only Arseniy Yatseniuk speaks Ukrainian. We have had 5 presidents and only Yushchenko speaks Ukrainian.

Q: And Petro Poroshenko?

I'm talking about authentic language. The one we use at home with our wife and children.

And this does not touch only the elites. It is evident at all levels. Maybe only Western Ukraine avoided real Russification. It is the only region where the use of Ukrainian language is a city phenomenon as well as a village one. This happened because during many centuries of colonization, urbanization and Russification went together.

During Soviet times the cities grew, and from the beginning they were created as Russian-speaking entities. Village migrants were assimilated into the dominant language. And this assimilation was conducted using the carrot and stick method. The carrot was the open door to a career and the stick was prison and a psychiatric hospital for those who resisted this paradigm too much.

Q: Now, after Maidan, are people ashamed to speak Russian in Kyiv?

I rode the elevator with a couple. They were speaking Ukrainian to each other. I asked them for the time (also in Ukrainian). They answered me in Russian.

This instinct is deeply ingrained. It is better not to speak Ukrainian in public because of the fear of being humiliated. This happened frequently in school. When you began to speak Ukrainian you were mocked as a redneck. This is hard to shake, even in a neutral environment.

Kyiv is changing in this respect. You can hear an answer in Ukrainian much more frequently now. Serhiy Zhadan (popular Ukrainian writer and poet from Kharkiv - Ed.) said that in Kharkiv there is no problem in principle - everybody understands, but if you ask for bread in Ukrainian in a store, the clerk will ask if you're by chance from Western Ukraine. The Ukrainian language is viewed as something odd. Something on the order of wearing the national costume in the street.

Q: In Belarus two years ago a member of the People's Party said that Russian-speaking Belarusians are not Belarusians. Doesn't the negative reaction of Ukrainian speakers toward the Russian speakers risk pushing them to the other side?

The war has redefined everything. There are probably more Russian than Ukrainian speakers on the side of Kyiv. People have been convinced that it is possible to be a patriot and not be Ukrainian-speaking. Language is not a determinant.

Q: The war has demonstrated that the division into eastern and western Ukraine is not that clear-cut. You were inclined to accept the concept of two Ukraines. But perhaps there are 22, as the historian Yaroslav Hrytsak maintains?

I'm writing about this in the last chapter of my new book. I divide Ukraine into two, but not into east and west, Russian-speaking and Ukrainian-speaking, but into two projects - communities divided by values. Into the Soviet (postcolonial) and the anti-Soviet (anti-colonial) communities. The determining factor is the answer to Vladimir Putin's favorite thesis: "Are Ukrainians and Russians one people?"

The postcolonial group will respond. No, we are different. Not because we speak Ukrainian but because we have different values. We don't like dictatorship, we don't like the tsar (it doesn't matter if he's foreign or ours). We want to promote European values, to build a liberal democracy. We value freedom. We do not believe that the state is above everything, because the state is for the individual and not the reverse.

Q: And what is the Soviet attitude?

Paternalistic, very conservative, hates change. It is guided by the so-called survival values, as outlined by sociologists. It has no initiative or civic spirit. These are not citizens but subjects. The government needs to take care of everything. Until the late 90s these people represented the majority. The passive majority.

They are hard to mobilize. This is why Maidan was successful. I agree with Igor "Strelkov" Girkin (Russian terrorist, key organizer of "Donetsk People's Republic" - Ed.) who said, "If not for us there would be nothing." Without external aggression there would not have been the so-called "Donetsk People's Republic."

Q: Still, at the beginning of the conflict I heard many Ukrainians say, "let's give up the Donbas, this is non-Ukrainian land. Why die for it?"

To a large extent I agree with that. But it's a question of procedures. On the one hand, as a consistent liberal, I believe that every entity has the right to autonomy: community, nationality, city, tribe, region. If they want and know how to be independent then let them vote, let them try to govern independently.

Kyiv's proposal to carry out elections in the presence of international observers and peacekeeping forces and not fighters and Kalashnikov operatives was not bad. And then negotiate future relations with the legitimate representatives of the region and not local thugs and Russian mercenaries. This did not happen either in Crimea or the Donbas.

I cannot accept the idea that armed Ossetians or Bashkirs (ethnic groups in Russia - Ed.) appear suddenly and decide the fate of the region.

Q: But in the Donbas there are people who believe in Moscow more than in Kyiv.

But Russia doesn't want them. I think the best way out of this situation would be freezing the conflict.

Q: We would have a second Transnistria.

So what? No piece of land is worth having people die for it. Ukraine has no chance to win this war. Putin has already made that obvious. Last year when Donetsk was surrounded, Ukraine was close to victory. Then Russia sent in its regular troops. That was a clear signal: "We will not give you any chance; if necessary we will send new divisions." This means we need to defend what we have now.

Q: What about the western part? Should it strive to join the European Union, which itself has increasingly serious problems?

There is no question. The movement is more important than the result. I don't care what happens with the European Union. What is important is for Ukraine to adopt all the standards now.

Q: Therefore it is most important to acquire the know-how?

It will help us adopt all the necessary reforms.

Q: But does decommunization need to take place, as you propose in your book?

Not decommunization but decolonization. In the context of war it is very important to get rid not only of all the communist symbols but of the colonial symbols as well. Lenin is respected in Donetsk not because he was a communist but because he was a Russian imperialist.

It is not normal that we still have Dnipropetrovsk (named after Grigory Petrovsky, a Russian revolutionary and one of the organizers of the agricultural collectivization in Ukraine - Ed.) on a map, that every Ukrainian city has a street called Kutuzov or Suvorov (Russian field marshals - Ed.). We need to cut ourselves off from that past.

Note: The interview by Karolina Słowik was conducted during the conference "Past as Prelude: Polish-Ukrainian Relations for the Twenty-First Century," organized by Cambridge Polish Studies and Cambridge Ukrainian Studies with the support of the Oxford Noble Foundation.

Translated by: Anna Mostovych
Source: Zbruc

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 #31
http://slavyangrad.org
August 10, 2015
America's Dark History of Supporting Ukrainian Fascists and War Criminals
By Andrey Panevin
[Documents here http://slavyangrad.org/2015/08/10/americas-dark-history-of-supporting-ukrainian-fascists-and-war-criminals/]

The American support of contemporary Ukrainian fascism albeit shocking is in fact not a new political phenomenon. Documents declassified by the CIA under a FOIA request entitled The NAZI War Crimes Declassification Act show that not only was the CIA monitoring Ukrainian fascist groups during and after WWII, it was also actively aiding them and protecting them from prosecution. These and other documents can be found in the CIA's Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room. [http://www.foia.cia.gov/]The following documents are but a few of the many that pertain to America's protection of war criminals the world over.

Stepan Bandera, who was the leader of the OUN (Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists), is a man revered by the current Ukrainian authorities and seen by the fascist Ukrainian battalions as a national hero. Both western politicians and the mainstream media have worked hard to obscure his role in Ukraine's history of ultra-nationalist and fascist movements. He was, in fact, a ruthless mass murderer whose wartime atrocities can only be viewed as crimes against humanity. With his wholesale rehabilitation in Ukraine, the anti-fascist opposition has taken to calling his supporters 'Banderites' and their actions 'Banderism'.

Stepan Bandera's legacy not only benefits from the ignorance engendered by today's corporate media and politicians; he also, from the years of the Second World War up until his death, personally benefited from the aid of the American government. Not only was he protected from the justice of the Soviet Union but he also enjoyed the ability to ask for Washington's help in such matters as obtaining visas and secret accommodation.

The CIA was acutely aware of Bandera's fascist views but they understood that if he was captured by the Soviet Union he would not be accorded the same mercy that was granted due to American interests in post-war Europe. The following series of images details the lengths to which the CIA went in order to keep Bandera out of Soviet hands and to further avoid branding him a 'war criminal'.

The US government's assistance to Stepan Bandera extended up until the year of his death (1959), as the following image shows. Bandera himself knew that matters such as the granting of a visa could only be achieved with "Washington's approval".

Yaroslav Stetsko was a prominent figure in the OUN and its leader from 1968 until his death in 1986. Stetsko's book, Two Revolutions (1951), also provides one of the bases of the ideological platform of the ultra-nationalist party 'Svoboda'. Stetsko's relationship with the CIA and the US government is extensive and stretches from his time in the OUN with Bandera until his death in Munich. The following images show that Stetsko was constantly receiving information from UPA and OUN members within Ukraine and relaying it to American contacts.

Stetsko not only provided information to US authorities about the situation in Ukraine, but he also enjoyed the confidence of Allen Dulles, the director of the CIA at the time. As the letter below demonstrates, Stetsko-as president of the 'Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations'-advised the CIA on how to utilise nationalism as a "potent force" in European affairs.

Another document further proves that Stetsko and other 'Banderists' received support not only from the US, but from the British government as well.

Mykola Lebed was a prominent Ukrainian fascist whose desire to "cleanse the entire revolutionary territory of the Polish population" led to scenes of unimaginable violence:

"...(UPA) are not discriminating about who they kill; they are gunning down the populations of entire villages... Since there are hardly any Jews left to kill, the Bandera gangs have turned on the Poles. They are literally hacking Poles to pieces. Every day [...] you can see the bodies of Poles, with wires around their necks, floating down the river Bug."--Hitler's Shadow: Nazi War Criminals, U.S Intelligence and the Cold War

There can be no doubt that, among the Ukrainian fascist war criminals, Lebed was one of the most sadistic and ruthless. This makes it all the more shocking that he was continuously protected by the CIA until his death. Such was the protection that he received that Allen Dulles personally shielded him from facing justice. Dulles wrote a letter that not only allowed Lebed to enter the United States but vehemently denied his role in the 1934 assassination of the Polish Minister of the Interior and his collaboration with the Nazis in WWII.

The CIA constantly monitored Lebed and did everything in its power to avoid the truth about his past being exposed by journalists or the Department of Justice. Furthermore they reveal collaboration between the CIA and elements of the OSI (Office of Special Investigations), indicating that the two departments worked together to keep Lebed's past from being revealed by their own department.

These documents, among many others, show that the American government has supported and protected Ukrainian fascists and war criminals long before the 'Orange Revolution' or 'Maidan' in Ukraine. These years of supporting Ukrainian fascism have allowed the US and its allies to hone their sordid skills to perfection, to the point that, in 2015, an openly fascist Ukrainian government is terrorising those that it considers undesirable and spewing hatred at its 'subhuman' Russian neighbours. In the meantime the mainstream press and their western paymasters will continue to promote the easily disproved fallacy that "there are no fascists in Ukraine". Not only are there fascists in Ukraine, but they also occupy the highest levels of the American government and its agencies.

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 #32
National Catholic Register
August 10, 2015
Ukraine's Revolution of Dignity - and Its Predators
Ukraine continues to be imperiled by internal and external forces, but a recent USCCB delegation found strong faith amid the nation's confusion and turmoil.
By VICTOR GAETAN
Victor Gaetan is an award-winning international correspondent and a contributor to Foreign Affairs magazine. on Monday Aug 10th, 2015 at 2:13 AM

WASHINGTON - A U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops' delegation, led by its president, Archbishop Joseph Kurtz, visited Ukraine in late June to explore the local Church's strength under duress - and the needs of people caught in the crosshairs of continuing conflict.

Archbishop Kurtz discussed with the Register his first visit to Ukraine, where he was accompanied by Archbishop Blase Cupich of Chicago, who chairs the USCCB's committee on Aid to the Church in Central and Eastern Europe, and several key conference staff.

"There is great complexity within Ukraine. It is very difficult to understand all the implications of the political situation," explained Archbishop Kurtz, who shepherds Louisville, Ky.

The archbishop said the U.S. bishops' delegation had fraternal and humanitarian goals: "It was a trip of solidarity. We spent time with people who are in pain. We visited vulnerable families in a refugee camp and wounded people in a military hospital."

"We saw what it meant to have 1.2 million people displaced due to the war and turmoil. More than 2% of the people in Ukraine have had to move from their homes, and the Church has been very present to those displaced," said the archbishop.

According to Stephen Colecchi, director of the USCCB's Office of International Justice and Peace, who also was on the trip, the two archbishops intervened on behalf of an amputee denied a visa by the U.S. Embassy.

Archbishop Kurtz confirmed, "The good office of the U. S. ambassador was able to cut through the red tape in order to get this man to Chicago" for care at the University of Chicago Medical Center.

'Progress and Growth'

The delegation spent time with both the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC), which represents about 5.4 million Catholics, as well as the smaller Latin-rite Catholic Church.

Archbishop Kurtz was particularly impressed with the Ukrainian Catholic University (UCU) in Lviv, located in western Ukraine, where most Catholics live. At UCU, the delegation saw construction of a new church in the center of campus, exemplifying "great progress and growth" spearheaded by the UGCC.

The archbishop commented, "It's a privilege to be partners" with the UGCC, which was illegal during the communist period and forced to function underground until the late 1980s, but has surged in rebuilding community, confidence and moral relevance.

From Ukraine, Archbishops Kurtz and Cupich traveled to the Vatican, where Archbishop Cupich received his pallium from Pope Francis, and Archbishop Kurtz discussed the Holy Father's September trip to the United States.

Vatican Balancing Act

It is difficult for the Vatican to sidestep complex political aspects of the Ukraine crisis, because it has diplomatic relations with all parties to the conflict. Over the last few months, the Holy See has openly pressed for peace while condemning war.

Pope Francis met with Russian President Vladimir Putin on June 10, urging a "great and sincere effort" to help re-establish a "climate of dialogue" to achieve peace.

While in Bolivia in July, Pope Francis seemed to be referring to the Ukrainian conflict when he remarked, "Do we realize that something is wrong where so many senseless wars are being fought and acts of fratricidal violence are taking place on our very doorstep?"

The Pope used the identical phrase, "fratricidal violence," specifically referring to Ukraine, in February, during a general audience, causing consternation among the UGCC leadership.

UGCC Major Archbishop Sviatoslav Shevchuk countered at the time, "Ukraine is under the direct aggression and invasion of a neighboring country; we're a victim of that, and we expect the whole Christian world to take our side."

Instead, the Holy See has maintained a quiet discussion with the Russian Orthodox Church, exploring ways to contain the crisis that engages the Russian Orthodox directly because the largest Christian community in Ukraine is the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Moscow Patriarchate.

Metropolitan Hilarion, chairman of the Department of External Church Relations (effectively foreign minister of the Russian Orthodox Church), told the Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera in late June that a meeting between Pope Francis and Russian Patriarch Kirill is "getting closer every day."

Vatican sources say Pope Francis is the engine behind this historical initiative that, the Holy Father believes, could speed reconciliation between Russia and Ukraine. It also furthers the Holy See's long-term strategy of reconciliation between the Catholic and Orthodox Churches - ending a 1,000-year-old schism.

Political Progress

A recent Vatican Radio report on the state of play in Ukraine emphasized "efforts to end the conflict with separatists," interpreting as a positive development a ruling by the nation's highest court granting a green light for constitutional reform that allows political decentralization.

The reform should pave the way for limited self-rule in the Eastern Donbas region, which borders Russia.

Granting the separatists more autonomy is stipulated by the Minsk 2 agreement, a cease-fire deal supported by the Holy See that was reached by the presidents of Russia, Ukraine, Germany and France after 17 hours of negotiation last February.

Before the matter went up to the high court, the Ukrainian Rada (parliament) had to approve a constitutional reform package, including the decentralization proposal.

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland personally appeared in Kiev to lobby for the package very publicly, which some observers consider as evidence that the U.S. is pressuring Kiev to honor the Minsk 2 accord and, as well, that the U.S. is beginning to more actively seek a settlement with Russia.

Military Escalation?

Yet, even as hopeful interpretations of political developments emerged, the military picture appears increasingly bellicose: U.S. and NATO exercises, termed "Rapid Trident" and involving 1,800 troops and 18 countries, were under way on Ukrainian soil near Lviv July 20-31.

In response, the Russian government accused the West of provoking potentially "explosive" consequences, according to Germany's Deutsche Welle.

The New York Times broke a disturbing story in early July documenting Islamic soldiers, mainly from Chechnya, fighting alongside Ukrainians at the border.

Because the Ukrainian military has proved to be weak, unprepared and possibly even unwilling to fight pro-Russian separatists, the vacuum is being filled with a motley crew of mercenaries - a situation that makes the conflict increasingly chaotic, thus uncontrollable.

Meanwhile, drone footage collected by Ukrainians in June provided visual proof that Russian troops have rapidly increased their presence and equipment on Ukraine's eastern border.

Two destabilizing factors worry most Ukraine watchers, including Vatican diplomats covering the region - factors that threaten to undermine the government of President Petro Poroshenko, already weakened by an economy teetering on bankruptcy.

The first is the increasingly aggressive attitude of Right Sector, a nationalist political party that played an edgy role in the Maidan protest movement.

The second is the ongoing role of oligarchs, with complicated - and often corrupt - relationships with both the Ukraine and Russian governments.

Right Sector Violence

Right Sector led the way in Maidan's violent clashes with Ukrainian police and security forces - a daring strategy credited with toppling the elected government of President Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014.

Since war broke out in eastern Ukraine in April 2014, Right Sector members and sympathizers have served in independent fighting battalions, challenging pro-Russian separatists.

But Right Sector recently has turned on Ukrainian authorities, and its members don't hesitate to use violence, yet they profess to be Christians. The group's leader, Dmitry Yarosh, announced to a rally, "We are an organized revolutionary force that is opening the new phase of the Ukrainian revolution."

For the first time, in July, fighting broke out between police and members of Public Sector in western Ukraine, in Zakarpattia Oblast, bordering Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania. At least three people died.

Thousands of Right Sector supporters rallied in Kiev on July 21 - in the same square where the 2013-2014 "Revolution of Dignity" was conducted - calling to impeach Poroshenko and dissolve the rada. Right Sector opposes Minsk 2, supporting martial law and a blockade in the Donbas over any form of autonomy.

Oligarchs

One of Right Sector's legitimate complaints about Poroshenko's regime is ongoing corruption. Yet some of the same oligarchs colluding with the government sustain Right Sector activities.

For example, until five months ago, one of Ukraine's most notorious oligarchs, Ihor Kolomoisky, served as a governor of the Dnipropetrovsk region. He also controls many industries and much of the banking system in Ukraine.

Kolomoisky financed pro-Kiev fighting forces, outfitting his private army with equipment and vehicles superior to the regular army. Poroshenko only removed the magnate from his job when the governor turned his army against Kiev.

Besides symbolic gestures like dismissing Kolomoisky as governor, the Ukrainian president has hardly reigned them in - a factor that paralyzes the range of reforms demanded on Maidan Square in early 2014 and threatens the stability of the current government.

"This is a war of oligarchs, and any future peace will depend on the conversion of those oligarchs in Russia and Ukraine, who've kept the conflict going with their lies," Auxiliary Bishop Jan Sobilo of Kharkiv-Zaporizhia, in eastern Ukraine, told Catholic News Service in July.

Oligarchic influence is spread so thoroughly across Ukraine that even the Ukrainian Catholic University is indebted: Dmitry Firtash, a magnate in oil, chemicals and media, who is wanted by the U.S. Department of Justice, gave $8.5 million to help finance construction at UCU with "no strings attached," according to UGCC Bishop Borys Gudziak, who serves as UCU president.

In contrast, the USCCB's current donations to Catholic programs in Ukraine total approximately $1 million (with 70% to 75% going to UGCC), according to Declan Murphy, USCCB's director for Aid to the Church in Central and Eastern Europe.

Same-Sex Unions

In the package of proposed constitutional reforms before the Ukrainian parliament was a proposal for same-sex unions.

The All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations sent a letter to the president stating, "These provisions threaten to plunge the Ukrainian state into the abyss of immorality and sin, to destroy the family as the basic social institution and popularize relationships between persons of the same sex, which are unnatural for human beings."

Joint actions such as this one invariably help preserve fraternal relations and unity among the Churches.

But pressure on Church leaders, who promised in early 2014 a "Revolution of Dignity" that has failed to materialize, is also yielding frustration.

In May and July, Archbishop Shevchuk criticized the Vatican again, as well as Ukraine's allies, for not providing enough support to the country.

The archbishop told France's Catholic paper, La Croix, "We understand Rome is trying to safeguard its ties with Moscow, but we also know Christ has always been on the side of those who suffer. In this conflict, it's Ukraine which is suffering - and the Holy See, whose diplomacy is service of the Gospel, should be at our side."

In June, Archbishop Shevchuk told the Polish Catholic Information Service KAI that the United States and United Kingdom are abandoning Ukraine by not upholding an international security agreement signed in 1994, when Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons.

He also criticized the Pope's characterization of the conflict.

The Vatican "has to stop talking about 'fratricidal war' and say frankly that Ukraine is the victim of outright aggression by Russia," although, Archbishop Shevchuk added, in his meeting with President Putin, the Holy Father gave Ukrainians "strong support."

Yet despite the trials Ukraine is undergoing, Archbishop Kurtz remains hopeful: "The life of the Church is actually surprisingly positive. There was great hope and enthusiasm with everyone we met."

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 #33
Sputnik
August 10, 2015
Holodomor Hoax: Joseph Stalin's Crime That Never Took Place
By Ekaterina Blinova

Playing into the hands of Ukrainian nationalists, a monument to the so-called Ukrainian "Holodomor," one the 20th century's most famous myths and vitriolic pieces of anti-Soviet Propaganda, has been erected in the US capital.

Remarkably, the roots of the "Holodomor" ("deliberate starvation") myth lie in the longstanding Cold War standoff between Soviet Russia and the West. After the defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945, infamous Nazi collaborators - members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and their paramilitary UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army) units - fled into Western Europe and the United States, escaping punishment for their hideous crimes, including ruthless terror against peaceful Jewish, Ukrainian and Russian civilians.

In 1949 the CIA and the US State Department sponsored the OUN-UPA leaders' immigration to the United States, planning to use them as subversion groups and intelligence agents in the Cold War against the Soviet Russia.

One of them, Mykola Lebed was characterized as "a well-known sadist and collaborator of the Germans" by the CIA, according to Swedish-American historian Dr. Per Anders Rudling in his book "The OUN, the UPA and the Holocaust: A Study in the Manufacturing of Historical Myths." However, this fact had not prevented the CIA from recruiting the former Nazi collaborator.

"Mykola Lebed [who was responsible for the murder of Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia] lived in Queens, New York, until the 1990s, totally supported by the CIA or State Department," the US expert in Soviet history Professor Grover Carr Furr of Montclair State University, narrated in an interview with Sputnik in May, 2015.

The CIA believed that Ukrainian nationalism could be used as an efficient cold war weapon.

While the Ukrainian nationalists provided Washington with valuable information about its Cold War rivals, the CIA in return was placing the nationalist veterans into positions of influence and authority, helping them to create semi-academic institutions or academic positions in existing universities.

By using these formal and informal academic networks, the Ukrainian nationalists had been disseminating anti-Russian propaganda, creating myths and re-writing history at the same time whitewashing the wartime crimes of OUN-UPA.

One of these myths was "Holodomor" that claimed that the USSR and its leader Joseph Stalin deliberately starved to death from three to seven million Ukrainians.

"In 1987 the film "Harvest of Despair" was made. It was the beginning of the 'Holodomor' movement. The film was entirely funded by Ukrainian nationalists, mainly in Canada. A Canadian scholar, Douglas Tottle, exposed the fact that the film took photographs from the 1921-22 'Volga famine' and used them to illustrate the 1932-33 famine. Tottle later wrote a book, 'Fraud, Famine, and Fascism: The Ukrainian Genocide Myth from Hitler to Harvard,' about the phony 'Holodomor' issue," Professor Furr elaborated.

After the collapse of the USSR, the Ukrainian diaspora played a substantial role in shaping the ideology of the new Ukrainian state. "Unlike many other former Soviet republics, the Ukrainian government did not need to develop new national myths from scratch, but imported ready concepts developed in the Ukrainian diaspora," Dr. Rudling underscored.

However, it was under Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko (who gained his power after the Western-sponsored Maidan uprising of 2004, also known as the Orange Revolution) when the anti-Russian myth making caught its second wind in Ukraine. Under Yushchenko, several institutes of "memory management" and "myth making" were established in the country.

Both Russian and Western historians have questioned the "Holodomor" concept as well as evidently exaggerated number of victims of the famine of 1932-33 in Ukraine.

American historian Professor Mark B. Tauger, West Virginia University, carried out thorough research on the famine of 1932-33 in the USSR, and came to the conclusion that the disaster was due to environmental circumstances and was evidently not related to the Soviet policy in the region.

"Popular media and most historians for decades have described the great famine that struck most of the USSR in the early 1930s as "man-made," very often a "genocide" that Stalin perpetrated intentionally against Ukrainians and sometimes other national groups to destroy them as nations... This perspective, however, is wrong. The famine that took place was not limited to Ukraine or even rural areas of the USSR, it was not fundamentally or exclusively man-made, and it was far from the intention of Stalin and others in the Soviet leadership to create such as disaster. A small but growing literature relying on new archival documents and a critical approach to other sources has shown the flaws in the "genocide" or "intentionalist" interpretation of the famine and has developed an alternative interpretation," Tauger wrote in his research work "Review of R.W. Davies and Stephen G. Wheatcroft, The Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture, 1931-1933."

Tauger stressed that climatic conditions played the main role in the famine of 1932-33.

Paradoxically, supporters of the "Holodomor" myth remain silent about the fact that Russia (including the territory of modern Ukraine) had suffered from periodic devastating famines since the end of 19th century, long before Bolsheviks came to power in 1917. They also ignore the fact that there were serious famines in 1920-21, 1924, 1927 and 1928.

Interestingly enough, official Soviet Ukrainian primary sources show that the 1928-29 famine, caused by natural disaster, mainly draught, was very serious, and Ukraine received more aid from the Soviet government, than it sent to other parts of the USSR. This obviously disproves the false theory of the Ukrainian nationalists' "malicious" conspiracy against Ukrainian peasants in the Soviet Union, noted Grover Furr in his book "Blood Lies: The Evidence that Every Accusation Against Joseph Stalin and the Soviet Union in Timothy Snyder's Bloodlands Is False."

In response to historians who suggest that the Ukrainian peasants starved and suffered especially because of Collectivization - Stalin's policy of the early 1930s aimed at consolidating individual lands into collective farms - Tauger emphasized:

"These studies minimize or ignore the actual harvest data, the environmental factors that caused low harvests, the repeated recovery from the famine and crop failures, the large harvests of the 1930s, the mechanization of Soviet farms in these years, Soviet population growth, and the long-term increases in food production and consumption over the Soviet period" ("Soviet Peasants and Collectivization, 1930-1939).

According to the scholar, although the Stalin regime implemented collectivization "coercively," the policy "brought substantial modernization to traditional agriculture in the Soviet Union, and laid the basis for relatively high food production and consumption by the 1970s and 1980s" ("Stalin, Soviet Agriculture and Collectivization, 1930-1939").

Remarkably, the famine of 1932-33 was the last famine that struck the Soviet Union with the exception for the famine of 1946-47 the country suffered from after the Second World War.

Although the "Holodomor" myth was never based upon credible evidence and there are enough authentic sources to prove that it is a hoax, it is simply taken for granted. Unsurprisingly, Washington  supports the myth as a part of its recent Cold War-style anti-Russian campaign. Alas, even repeated a thousand times a lie will never become the truth.

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 #34
Huffington Post
August 10, 2015
Putin's Man in Congress
By Kristofer Harrison
Kristofer Harrison was a Defense and State Department advisor during the George W. Bush administration. He is currently a partner at Political Alpha and a co-founder of the China Beige Book.

Are you skeptical that Moscow's crass propaganda efforts could really impact hearts and minds in Europe? Unfortunately, they not only have an impact there; those information operations are making inroads right here in the United States thanks to a senior Democratic congressman and pliable media.

On June 11th, the House passed Amendment 492 to the National Defense Authorization Act. It was rushed through by Rep. John Conyers (D-MI), now on his 50th year in Congress. The amendment would prevent the U.S. from aiding Ukraine's volunteer Azov Battalion based on the Moscow-inspired lie that it is a neo-Nazi organization.

There is no charitable excuse for Conyers' amendment, even if it is stripped from the final bill: It was the product of Russian disinformation. Over the past six weeks, news of the amendment featured prominently in virtually all Russian- and foreign-language propaganda outlets, and is even appearing in some U.S. press. Rep. Conyers should disclose which lobbyist cajoled him into becoming a cog in Putin's propaganda machine.

This matters a lot to Ukraine. The Azov Battalion has been one of the most effective units at halting Russia's advance into Ukraine. The nonsense that Ukraine is filled with Nazis has been part of a propaganda meme pumped through Russia's state-controlled media for more than a year. Russia is trying to create the fiction that Ukraine is beset by Nazis and Islamic terrorists, thus necessitating Russian military intervention. If the idea actually takes hold in the United States, it could also cripple whatever support Ukraine is receiving.

Ukraine's volunteer battalions are slowly coming under the tent of the Ukrainian government, after having been born as private units in the chaos of Yanukovych's abdication, Russia's invasion and Russian-created dysfunction at Ukraine's Ministry of Defense (Yanukovych's defense minister was actually a Russian citizen). And to be sure, the Azov Battalion has not always been a public relations darling. The battalion ceded the early information war, shying from an aggressive defense against Russia's propaganda, and from putting out PR fires.

An aggressive PR defense would have been helpful when a couple of their soldiers allegedly sported swastika or SS patches, and it would have helped to counter Russia's smothering propaganda campaign aimed at convincing people that the Azov's emblem is a Nazi "Wolfsangel" (it's not, it an "N" and an "I" transposed over one another -- the resemblance is merely coincidental). As a result, they have some PR spade work to do. But let's be clear: We're talking about a unit at war, not a daycare. The Azov Battalion should not have to be responsible for defending itself against lies thrown over the transom from Moscow and repeated by irresponsible Members of Congress and reporters. Much of what little support the Obama administration has provided Ukraine is focused on integrating these volunteer units into Ukraine's National Guard. That is helping them regain some much needed legitimacy.

To put things into perspective, in 2010 a photograph surfaced from Helmand Afghanistan of U.S. Marine Scout Snipers posing in front of a Waffen SS flag. The Marines chose the flag because of the SS, for "Scout Sniper." Clearly, they were guilty of bad judgement, but I challenge Rep. Conyers to make a neo-Nazi case about the U.S. Marines. President Putin actually tried that.

The Azov's spokesman, Roman Zvarych, told me that the battalion has a selective screening program that accepts only 50 out of almost 300 recruits each month. He says they have a thorough background check and reject members for various reasons, including having fascist leanings. He explained further that they have actually committed two former members to psychiatric hospitals because of their pro-fascist viewpoints. Were the Azov a neo-Nazi unit it would be mighty odd behavior to intern supporters of fascism in psychiatric hospitals, stridently deny any support of Nazism, as Mr. Zvarych does, and nonetheless suffer 33 fatalities and 196 severe injuries in combat.

Rep. Conyers played an important role in helping the Russian Nazi meme evolve from the stuff of conspiracy theorists, kooks and fellow-travelers into something the mainstream press happily prints. Rep. Conyers took to the floor of the House to submit his amendment and label the unit, "The repulsive Neo-Nazi Azov Battalion." From there, the Daily Beast ran a story titled "Is America Training Neonazis in Ukraine?" using Conyers' bill as factual support. The day after the amendment's passage, Leonoid Bershidsky ran a Bloomberg View article titled "Ukraine's Neo-Nazis Won't Get U.S. Money." Even the Canadians have been affected. On June 16th, the National Post ran a story titled "Fears that Canadian Mission in Ukraine May Unintentionally Help Neonazi Groups."

The New York Times fell for this nonsense in "Islamic Battalions, Stocked with Chechens, Aid Ukraine in War with Rebels." From there it has been a steady drumbeat. Most recently, Reuters got into the game with "Ukraine Struggles to Control Maverick Battalions." Before Conyers' amendment we saw one of the more egregious examples of journalistic lapse: Last summer, Foreign Policy ran the little noticed article "Preparing for War With Ukraine's Fascist Defenders of Freedom." A year later, Rep. Conyers actually used the FP article on the House floor as the main factual support for his amendment. That Rep. Conyers reached back to an article that was more than a year old shows how long and pervasive this calculated strategy of corrupting journalism and Congress has been going on.

The Foreign Policy article references Andriy Biletsky, who the article states is the founder of the Azov, and accuses him of being a member of a group called the Social-National Assembly and Patriots of Ukraine. According to Zvarych this group no longer exists, and when it did, Biletsky was serving a two-and-a-half year prison sentence on political charges. A Telegraph article references a soldier by the name "Phantom." True to his nom de guerre, he does not exist.

The article also references a Mikael Skillt. The article selectively quoted an interview he gave in which he said he considered himself a Nazi as a young man and went on to claim he plans to fight for Assad in Syria because it would pay "very good money." Unlike "Phantom," Mr. Skillt does exist. He is the Azov's head sniper trainer. Zvarych pointed out that Skillt also gave an interview where he said he did indeed harbor neo-Nazi leanings as a young man, but "after having spent some time in Azov he realized that he was mistaken." I didn't ask about the preposterous claim that Mr. Skillt wanted to be a hired gun for Bashar Assad.

This is embarrassing and dangerous. How did blatant Russian propaganda make it past these papers' editors? It's a similar situation as the Rolling Stone UVA rape story, only this one involves dozens of stories from most news outlets and the longest serving Representative in the House blindly repeating lies spun by Vladimir Putin so as to make his invasion of a U.S. ally easier. According to Mr. Zvarych none of the reporters for the above stories contacted them for comment. Yet these reporters felt okay labeling Azov Nazis. Like Rep. Conyers, these reporters simply danced to Putin's tune.

Journalistic standards of Russia's aggression have been pretty poor, even in describing the war itself. Since Russia's invasion, some journalists have inaptly chosen to show their impartiality by adopting some of Putin's verbiage. For example, few news outlets call the war what it is: a Russian invasion. Rather, they prefer to frame it as Putin has, and speak of it as a fight between Ukraine and "pro-Russian rebels." Objective journalism would show that calling them "pro-Russian rebels" is like calling King George's Hessians "pro-British rebels." Yet, this formulation is pervasive.

I find it hard to believe Congressman Conyers reads a lot of press about Ukraine and independently drafted that amendment. It appears that, in addition to the press, someone is hawking Putin's line in Washington. I asked Rep Conyers's press secretary multiple times what proof the congressman used to formulate his opinion and she had no response. Who bent Conyers's ear? Earlier this month, The Blaze ran an article suggesting that Lanny Davis (yes, Hillary's Lanny Davis) might be one of the potential culprits. He quite publicly did President Putin's bidding in 2008 after Russia's invasion of Georgia, penning an op-ed that blamed Russia's invasion, implausibly, on the Georgians. He currently lobbies for U.S.-indicted Putin crony Dmytro Firtash, who was recently released from an Austrian court on a $136 million bond.

Conyers's source should eventually be made public if the participants are obeying the Foreign Agents Registration Act. But who knows if it will be. Meantime, Rep. Conyers should make the truth public now, especially as Congress debates Ukraine and finalizes the Pentagon's budget.

At the same time, the media needs to be more mindful of how it covers Russia's invasion of Ukraine and future belligerence. Reporters should be honest that it is a Russian invasion aided by mercenaries and they should investigate before lazily reprinting Kremlin propaganda. Mr. Zvarych extended an invitation for journalists to embed with them. Go visit them. At least email them.

Lastly, everyone needs to stop falling for neo-Nazi smears. They are ludicrous. Not everyone should be expected to follow events closely in Ukraine. That only makes it more important that our journalists and political leaders get it right.

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 #35
RFE/RL
August 10, 2015
Why Putin Is Losing
by Brian Whitmore

Are little green men about to appear on the North Pole?

Russia's claim last week, using an extremely creative interpretation of international law, to exclusive economic rights to nearly half a million square miles of the Arctic Sea, was certainly a head scratcher.

Sure the territory is valuable due to its untapped reserves of fossil fuels and for the shipping lanes that will open as Arctic ice melts. But the claim is likely to ultimately be rejected by the United Nations.

But sparking a manufactured international crisis over the Arctic, one that pits Russia against the United States and Canada, might be just what the doctor ordered.

Why? Because Vladimir Putin badly needs to make a new action movie to distract his people.

The Kremlin leader is boxed in on so many fronts right now that he badly needs to change the subject.

The Donbas Quagmire

For starters, Putin has no good options in eastern Ukraine.

The old fantasies about seizing so-called Novorossia, the strip of land from Kharkiv to Odesa, and establishing a land bridge to Crimea are dead. And the more modest goal expanding the territory Russia and its proxies currently hold, perhaps with a push to Mariupol, is probably out of the question too.

Either campaign would be costly in terms of blood and treasure, it would certainly spark a fresh round of sanctions, and it would involve occupying hostile territory. The recent uptick in fighting this week reeks more of desperation than of a serious move to acquire more territory.

Russia could, of course, just annex the territories controlled by Moscow's proxies; or it could freeze the conflict and establish a Russian protectorate there.

But in this case, Moscow would be shouldered with the burden of financing an economically unproductive enclave whose infrastructure has been destroyed. And do so while Russia's economy is sinking into an ever deeper recession.

Moreover, Russia would lose any leverage over the remainder of Ukraine, which would quickly move West. Sanctions would be continued, and possibly escalated.
The Kremlin's preferred option, given these limitations, is to force the territories back into Ukraine on Moscow's terms -- with broad autonomy and the ability to veto decisions by the Kyiv government. But Ukraine and the West appear unwilling to let this happen.

Putin has boxed himself into a corner in Ukraine, and it is difficult to see how he is going to get out of the quagmire he has created.

Trapped At Home

It's also difficult to imagine how Putin is going to extract himself from the quagmire he has created at home.

The Kremlin leader is caught in a trap of his own making, between economic and political imperatives.

With the economy sinking deeper into recession, inflation spiking, oil prices dipping below $50 a barrel, and the ruble approaching the lows it reached earlier in the year, Putin badly needs sanctions eased to give the economy breathing space.

But for that to happen, he would need to climb down in Ukraine, a move that would undermine the whole rationale for his rule and infuriate the nationalist supporters who make up his base.

"Putin's return to the presidential seat heralded a rather sudden pivot towards a deep-seated domestic nationalism," Moscow-based journalist Anna Arutunyan wrote recently.

"Yet nationalism as a state policy and identity, initially implemented to shore up Kremlin power, now has the Kremlin itself trapped and threatened by forces that it initially nurtured, but can no longer fully control."

A recent report in Novaya Gazeta, for example, claimed that the war in eastern Ukraine risks "metastasizing" as volunteer fighters have been returning to Russia with large quantities of heavy weapons.

During his first two terms in the Kremlin, Putin's team -- and most notably his chief political operator, Vladislav Surkov -- very skilfully co-opted and manipulated both liberal and nationalist groups.

That strategy caught up with him in 2011-12, when liberal disappointment resulted in the largest anti-Kremlin street protests Russia has seen since the breakup of the Soviet Union -- leaving him no place else to turn but toward the nationalists.

"Given the higher prevalence of nationalist views -- especially among members of the security services -- a sense of betrayal could have much bigger consequences for the Kremlin than simply mass protests," Arutunyan wrote.

Losing The Energy Card

And on top of it all, Putin has an energy problem. It's not just that oil prices are low, and will remain so for sometime -- although that certainly is a problem.

But the real essence of Putin's energy woes are structural, not cyclical. The global energy game is changing -- and it is not changing in Moscow's favor.
Shale, liquified natural gas (LNG), and renewables -- three areas where Russia is extremely weak -- are ascendant and are dramatically altering the market.
The potential for ending sanctions on Iran puts a powerful new player and competitor -- the world's third largest natural gas producer -- in the game.

And the Ukraine conflict and Moscow's aggressive posture toward the West have led Europe -- Russia's most important market -- to change its energy policies and seek alternative suppliers.

Moreover, rather than looking the other way as Gazprom repeatedly flouted the European Union's antitrust laws, now Brussels is now cracking down.

If one looks at Gazprom as a barometer of Russia's fortunes, one statistic says it all: in 2008, the company had a market value of $360 billion; today it is worth just $55 billion.

Energy has always been Putin's trump card. He has been able to use it to bully former neighbors into submission and bribe and blackmail the Europeans.
Now it's become a trump card he is losing fast.

Propaganda Can't Buy You Love

But at least Putin is still winning the battle for hearts and minds, right?

For more than a year, we've been hearing about how Russia's slick propaganda machine is crushing the West in the information war.

Moscow has no doubt been very effective mounting guerrilla marketing campaigns aim at sowing doubt and confusion in the West. And they have been skilfull in manipulating and surreptitiously influencing media narratives on issues like the Ukraine war and the downing of flight MH17.

But guess what? After spending nearly half a billion dollars to get its message out to the world, after unleashing armies of trolls to disrupt Western news sites, after launching the most widespread disinformation campaign since the end of the Cold War, after all this, Russia's global image is in the toilet.

According to the Pew Research Center's new report, only three countries in the world have a net positive opinion of Russia: China, Vietnam, and Ghana. Worldwide, a median of just 30 percent view Russia favorably.

Writing in Bloomberg View, political commentator Leonid Bershidsky quipped that "the money might be spent just as wisely buying more $600,000 watches for Putin's press secretary, Dmitry Peskov."

And the numbers are dismal across the board. In Europe, just 26 percent view Russia favorably, in the Middle East, only 25 percent do. In Latin America, it's only 29 percent. In the regions most favorably inclined toward Russia -- Asia and Africa -- it's just 37 percent.

And if Russia's global image is bad, Putin's is dismal. Worldwide, just 24 percent trust him. In Europe, just 15 percent do.

To be sure, Russia's propaganda machine is working wonders at home, where Putin's popularity is stratospheric despite a flailing economy. But one has to wonder how much long that that can last.

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 #36
www.rt.com
August 10, 2015
Mikhail Gorbachev to RT: America wanted to rule the world but lost its way

The Ukrainian issue has intensified the tension that existed between the West and Russia: now, another Cold War is possibly lurking on the horizon. Are we to witness another stand-off - or will it be averted? The relations between Russia and the West seem to be stuck at dead-end, so is there hope common ground will emerge between the two? We ask these questions to the man who prides himself on ending the Cold War, the last leader of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev, on Sophie&Co today.

Sophie Shevarnadze:Mr. Gorbachev, thank you very much for finding the time to talk to us today.

Mikhail Gorbachev:I haven't gone public for 18 months now.

Read the full transcript
 
SS:You recently said that the current situation is getting so intense that someone's nerves might just snap. Why is the threat of mutually assured destruction no longer a sufficient deterrent today?

MG: I do not agree with those who say this - that the threat of nuclear destruction is no longer a sufficient deterrent. Today, we have much better knowledge of what nuclear weapons actually are and what they can do.

I'll give you one example. Just one intercontinental ballistic missile, named Satan in the NATO classification (a very powerful missile of ours )... this one missile alone carries 100 'Chernobyls' in it, and this is why I think everyone understands what an immensely destructive force it is, as we have had enough time to understand that. And now we need to be vigilant and careful to make sure it never gets into the hands of extremists of any kind.

SS:In your article, you wrote that Europe needs its own Security Council. However, Europe already has the OSCE. Does that mean that the OSCE has lost its purpose?

MG: I'll give you my answer. As of today, the OSCE is - [sarcastic cough] - that is my answer. Although I wouldn't say that it "lost its purpose." To say that would be to imply they are completely useless. However, the OSCE is still trying to do something. They are flailing around in Ukraine, their observers are there, and so on.

It is all about a different thing. Whenever we talk about the nuclear arsenal, the levels of control and responsibility are the highest. We need to get back to it. We need to build a united Europe, a Europe that would be home for all. Whereas now, in this European home we only get squabbles and arguments.

NATO seeks to interfere with everything everywhere
 
SS:When the German reunification was negotiated, the US secretary of state pledged that NATO will not go an inch further east of Germany. Those talks were never translated into binding agreements. Now, when the emotions are running high, negotiating something like this in regard to Ukraine seems to be even less probable. Will NATO ever stop until it reaches Russia's borders?

MG: That's all because the US is trying hard to get here. And watching the US, Russia responds with some steps in return, sometimes these are unnecessary steps. That's how all of this grows out of proportion. I gave an interview to Time magazine a couple of days ago. I told them: "I don't really get you. A long time ago, Eisenhower told you to beware - beware of the military-industrial complex. NATO seeks to interfere with everything and everywhere, it wants to expand beyond its designated territory. Eisenhower was a very serious man, a warrior. He went through everything that our country went through. He is a man whose judgement you can trust, that's what I told them.

So what is it that you're doing? Can't you just live without it? It's like America cannot live without its military-industrial complex growing, weapons sales increasing and war costs soaring - can't you live without it?."

And they answered, "Yes, it looks like it."

And I said, "Then look, in this case, this society is sick. It needs help."

SS:So why do you think NATO would want to expand to the East? Why?

MG: That's its political culture, its military culture. For example, in 1990, there was a summit for the European countries - a really great summit. So they adopt a development plan for Europe. And it all looks like Europe is becoming the world's new driving force, it sets the new pace.

So President [George H.W.] Bush delivers one speech, another one, yet another one - about the new world order based on the experience of what is going on in Europe. And Gorbachev says something along the lines after him.

Pope John Paul II also says, "Yes, we do need a new world order, which would be more stable, more fair, more everything, and so on and so forth."

So everyone realized then that we arrived at the moment where there was an opportunity to move in the peaceful direction; the direction that the best people from basically all countries have dreamt of. And one of them was a certain American by the name of John Kennedy, the man who went through the Caribbean [Cuban Missile] crisis and said:

"If you think that future peace should be Pax Americana you're mistaken. It's either peace for all people, or no peace." That's exactly true. It's harsh, it's cruel, but it's the way it is.

The inventors of nuclear power also said that. One of them said that with the arrival of nuclear weapons, the world lost its immortality.

And it all started with the Americans all of a sudden wanting to assert themselves. Why did they do so?

The Cold War was over, we put an end to it together, it was in fact a common victory shared by all nations. And yet Americans said, "No way, we won it. We won. We won the Cold War. We did. Us."

And it seems OK to say 'Oh well, whatever. If you like saying that - just go ahead.' But this leads to something. If the Americans indeed won, they can make a conclusion - and they did go on to make that conclusion and started to say publicly, "We don't need to change anything. We won, the world is at our feet. Why should we have to change anything? We don't need to change a thing. Our policy is right.' And the most extreme thing they came up with - they began creating a new... superpower, a super empire. America wanted to rule the world.

The Americans lost their way. Any attempt to create a one-sided, mono-polar world is just complete and utter nonsense.

US needs its own Perestroika

SS:You suggested holding a Russia-US summit because these countries bear...

MG: Yes, I did.

SS: ...particular responsibility.

MG: Neither Russia nor the US responded.

SS:But if they wanted to resolve the crisis, surely they would have held this summit long ago.

MG: They are going to want to resolve it only when they feel the pressure from the civil society - in the US, here in Russia, and everywhere. It's clear that without civil society and its defined and organized nature, it's difficult to keep the hawks at bay.

SS:We talked about Barack Obama just now. You were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, and so was he. How do you feel about the fact that in this regard he's your colleague in this sense, a member of the same club, so to speak?

MG: In his case it was kind of like an advance. Such things happen in politics, too. One time I was giving a lecture in St. Louis, and after I finished a young man stood up and asked, "Mr. President, what would you advise us Americans to do?" I asked what he meant by that. He said, "You see how bad things are here, and they are getting worse." I said, "Well, that's new. All this time it was America that doled out advice for everyone, even though no one asked for it. No, I will not give you any advice. You Americans have everything at your disposal to figure this out."

A second young man stood up and said, "I would like to support my colleague. Please answer the question. You have gone through all of this. We need to do something about our situation, too." I said, "Very well. I will not give you a plan or a recipe, I just think the US needs its own perestroika." After that the audience of 10 or 15,000 people that were there gave me a standing ovation. Two years later Barack Obama was elected President. So for the most part, the people are changing. The main thing is that Americans don't want to die. Why is it that the US opts for using planes, warships, missiles without deploying ground forces? That's because the society won't let them anymore, it will start putting pressure immediately.

America can't live without old policy of pressure
 
SS:You also said in an interview that the US acts as the world's policeman and thinks it alone can protect the world. But who is America's enemy? Who are they protecting against?

MG: I don't think they have anybody to protect against. They just need an enemy to come back to their old policy of pressure. They can't live without it. They are still enslaved by their old policy. That's why America has to be stopped. It should be stopped in a friendly manner, as a partner. Let's be realistic. America is a phenomenon we can't ignore, and it has certain rights. Its word carries weight, and America can make decisions that benefit the whole world. Yes, Americans can lead. Do they want to lead? Yes, they can lead. But they should do so in partnership with other nations, because the only kind of leadership that is possible today is leadership through partnership.

SS:If I get it right, you also said that Americans want troubles in Europe to continue. How does the US benefit from disagreement among European nations?

MG: Whenever tensions are high, whenever there's instability in a certain country or throughout the region, it's an opportunity for them to intervene. That's my frank answer to your question. I am quite familiar with this policy from my own experience. This is bad for US itself in the first place. In my lectures, I ask a question: Do you really think you'll be happy with the role of the world's policeman? And I say, I'm pretty sure that you won't. And the audience applauds. And in all of my public appearances I ask these questions, probing the public opinion. No, the Americans do not want war. But it is not easy for them, with the society that they have. It has developed certain powerful mechanisms... I'd say they need a Perestroika, I mean it. They can call it any name they want, the American way.

Shifting responsibility is American way, mass media backs it up

SS:The United States benefits from turmoil in Europe because it gives the US a great excuse to interfere - if that's indeed so, why is the USA trying to shift the responsibility for resolving the Ukrainian crisis in its entirety to Russia? Why are the demanding that Russia...

MG: But of course they are!

SS:But why not share the responsibility?

MG: But that IS the American way - shifting the responsibility. Their mass media will provide all-round support, they will prove anything that's needed, however improbable. If they need to prove that a devil incarnate appeared, they will, if that's what it takes.

SS:I'd like to touch upon the sanctions and other current events. The South Stream [gas pipeline project] had to be shut down. The sale of Mistral ships is suspended. All of these issues have been causing a lot of damage to companies, including European ones. Why is the EU harming itself in its relationship with Russia?

MG: Well, just the other day 60 major figures spoke in Germany, including former presidents, as well as Mr. Genscher, Mr. Schroder, and Mr. Mangold, and so on - I knew most of them. Celebrities spoke as well. They all said unanimously that we shouldn't be doing our business in such a way as to damage our relationship with Russia.

This is all happening because Chancellor Merkel finds herself in a very difficult situation for the reason of Germany's dependence on the US; as for the rest of the European nations, Germany can handle them. At one point, Americans cut the oil prices, the oil prices plunge, and we lose dollars because of the measures that had already been taken by Americans according to their arrangements with Saudi Arabia. So this is yet another way of putting pressure.

Some time ago, I spoke at a conference in Passau, West Germany, which we held together with Mr. Kohl when he was still well. The theme of that conference was Individual in the United Europe. As it turned out, we both believed that without Russia, there cannot be a world order that would meet the interests of all nations, right. Then a guy stood up and said, "If that's your opinion then you should accept Russia to the EU." None of us was ready for that, especially my friend the chancellor. He leapt up, knocking the table over almost, and yelled, "What do you think you're saying! This cannot be done, no way!" Why did he say 'no way'? Because without Russia, Germany has a lot of weight in the EU, it's got a very strong position. So when Russia shows up you'll have to accommodate that. Russia will have enough arguments to defend sovereign, strong positions.

West declared Russia enemy
 
SS:President Putin has recently said, and you also confirmed it, that the Ukraine and Crimea issue was just a pretext to impose sanctions against Russia, and that the West would've come up with something to do that anyway.

MG: I tend to share that opinion.

SS:I will discuss Crimea separately in a moment. Now, if you do share this opinion it means that the US and the West want to be Russia's enemies, and that they would've imposed sanctions anyway?

MG: It was them who declared us enemies. So whether they wanted it or not, they did. Not all of them did though. I've heard many of them, to the contrary, defending us saying that Russia is... right. In the course of Russia's long history, all kinds of things have been done to Russia, but no one managed to bring this country to its knees - let's recall Napoleon, or Hitler - and nobody will. But you know what can happen now? If the war begins, considering the kinds of weapons that exist now, then...

SS:Is there a threat of such war?

MG: I believe there's no threat of war right now. But we see the escalation; we can basically say that Cold War has started, or resumed. That's what is happening now. So we have to be alert.

SS:So let's go back to Crimea now. Let me quote you saying, "Earlier Crimea was merged with Ukraine under Soviet laws, to be more exact by the [Communist] party's laws, without asking the people, and now the people have decided to correct that mistake." If that's true, why doesn't the West realize or accept it?

MG: Because it's not to the advantage of the West. Historically, this position hasn't been beneficial for the West. I am always trying to say what I know, to tell the truth in all of my articles, speeches and interviews. So in the times of the Russian Empire, before the Bolshevik Revolution, there was not such state as Ukraine. There was Malorossiya [Little Russia]. You would know that, right? Catherine the Great's lovers used to rule it one after another. Oh, women are so cunning!

Under Lenin, the state of Ukraine was established. Regardless of anything that's been said about Ukraine's living at that time, Ukraine flourished as a state. It had powerful industry and culture; its leaders were represented in the Politburo as key figures. It produced General Secretaries, leaders of the Party and so on. But then passions started to run high; and when passions are revolving around women or having power it hard to get things right.

SS:But Mr. Gorbachev, when you were General Secretary, or the first President of the USSR, why didn't you bring Crimea back as part of Russia? You could've done it.

MG: Why would I have done that, while the Soviet Union still existed? And the boundaries within the Soviet Union were the same as symbolic fences between two neighbors' gardens. The biggest fight would've happened if your geese wandered into your neighbor's garden; but from the state viewpoint, it wasn't divided, or guarded. This is how it used to be.

General Secretary Khrushchev thought he would appease Ukraine. He used to be the First Secretary of Ukraine. So he did appease them, so to say, by handing Crimea over to them. But a lot later, in 1991, when we had the negotiations about the future of the USSR, the Belavezha Accords that were dissolving the Union were introduced, and there were all these meetings, and the signed accords were approved.

So the question is, how could they possibly have approved it in that way? Someone representing Russia tried to speak up, something along the lines of "well what about our people, they live across the Union, what happens to them, etc.". And then cosmonaut Sevastyanov, he was a deputy, so the cosmonaut stood up and said, "Listen, what are you talking about? Gorbachev will be gone from the Kremlin tomorrow - that's what the most important thing is!"

SS: Mr. Gorbachev, you've had such a long and intense political career. What would you now consider your greatest achievement of all?

MG: Perestroika, and everything that's related to it, even though it was interrupted, was never completed. Let me count here, freedom, Glasnost - (freedom of speech), freedom to travel abroad, religious freedom, and so on, I won't list all of them. And finally, disarmament: it made people sigh with relief. Across the globe, particularly in the developed countries, they were all digging shelters in case of nuclear war, which could've broken out any moment. So that has been done, and we completed that part.

People were granted freedom of choice in Central and Eastern Europe. Germany was reunited. The relationship with China was resumed. It was fascinating. That's already enough for a good result. But I do regret that I never managed to lead this project to completion. What we should do now is roll back and resume from those positions. We should come to agreements, and keep moving forward. But all players should participate in this process. As I've written in the article, I suggest creating structures and institutions that would be in the hands of the people. That's it.

SS:Thank you very much.

MG: How many questions did you write?

SS:A lot.

MG: Ooh!

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