#2
Moscow Times
July 5, 2015
Muscovites Having More Children Amid Drive to Promote Family Values
By Elizaveta Vereykina

Residents of the Russian capital are having more children and having them closer together - a trend that may increase as the state continues to fight the country's demographic crisis and promote traditional family values.

"While in the beginning of 2014 there were 90,000 families with three or more children in Moscow, in 2015 there are 104,000," Tatiana Barsukova, the deputy head of the Moscow Department of Social Security told The Moscow Times.

According to Natalia Karpovich, a mother of six and the chairperson of the Union of Families with Many Children of Moscow, the trend is only Russia returning to its roots, since big families were traditional before the Revolution.

"The average age difference between siblings in large families now is around three years," Karpovich said. "Families tend to have siblings sooner than in the Soviet times since there are fewer problems with housing now. People have enough space to live and there is also effective state support and promotion of family values."

In the early Soviet era, often people lived in "kommunalki" - apartments shared by many families with separate sleeping quarters, but shared kitchens and bathrooms. Later, families were given separate apartments, but they were very small. In such circumstances, couples preferred to have one child first, then wait to have a second when they had more or better living space. It was not uncommon for there to be an age difference of 10 years or more between Soviet siblings.

State support

"I decided not to take a long break between the birth of my children. I wanted them to have a closer relationship than I have with my brother, who is six years older," Anastasiya Andriyevskaya, 36, told the Moscow Times. Andriyevskaya has three children - seven, four and 18 months. "I also feel financially stable in Moscow. We have a lot of support like free milk, baby food, money, free theater tickets and so on."

In addition to these small perks, Moscow families with three children or more receive a payment of 18,000 rubles ($333) each month from the government.

At the federal level, the state provides a woman who gives birth to or adopts a second or third child a "Mother's capital" of 456,026 rubles ($8,370). The use of the money is restricted, but can be applied to buying a place to live or saved for the child's education.

Vladimir Petrosyan, head of the Moscow Department of Social Protection, and his deputy Barsukova have both called large families a "fashionable trend," while President Vladimir Putin called for the large family to become "symbol of Russia" at the meeting of Presidential council on the implementation of priority national projects and demographical politics in 2013.

Said Barsukova, "It's not only state support, but also the encouragement to have more children that is changing people's minds," adding that her department organizes TV spots with big families telling positive stories about their lives.

The involvement of the state in promoting large families does play an important role, according to Natalia Karpovich. "I think the nation is saving itself - they told us about demographic crisis, then we started to give birth more actively," she told the Moscow Times, adding that 80 percent of large families in Moscow have three children, but there are 125 families with 10 children or more.

Anastasiya Andriyevskaya see motherhood as her main mission in life, although she also has a job as a personal assistant that she carries out mostly from home. "If necessary, I visit the office with my youngest one in sling backpack. I see no problem having a lot of children in Moscow, no problem at all!" 

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 #3
Moscow Times
August 4, 2015
6 in 10 Russians Would Support Internet Censorship During a Crisis
By Anna Dolgov

Nearly six in 10 Russians would support the government if it decided to pull the plug on Internet access inside the country in a crisis situation, a recent poll indicates.

Support for online censorship or cutting off Internet access altogether was the highest among Russians who never or rarely go online, but remained high even among those who surf the web daily, according to a joint survey by Russia's state-run VTsIOM pollster and the University of Pennsylvania's Annenberg School for Communication, the RBC news agency reported Monday.

The number of Russians who describe themselves as daily Internet users has reached 42 percent of the country's population, while another 20 percent said they go online several times a week, and 38 percent said had not used the web during the past six months, the poll indicated.

A majority of Russians, or 58 percent, said that at least in some situations, such as a perceived threat to national security or amid political protests, they would support the government if it decided to cut off Internet access, the report said.

In the absence of those special circumstances, introduction of online censorship is favored by 49 percent of respondents, the report said. The number was only slightly lower, at 43 percent, among those who surf the web regularly, and reached 57 percent among those who rarely or never go online, the report said.

At a time when the government has been telling Russian citizens that the West is supposedly eager to destroy their country and that foreign media defame Moscow's policies, possible "filtering" of foreign media websites won the approval of 45 percent of respondents, while restrictions on "other foreign websites" received the support of 38 percent, the poll indicated, RBC reported.

A total of 42 percent of respondents said they agreed with the statement that although foreign nations use the Internet "against Russia," it is not a threat to their country's "political stability," the report said. But another 24 percent saw the Internet as a threat, according to the report.

After Moscow annexed Crimea from Ukraine last year, Russia's relations with the West have sunk to their lowest since the Cold War. Since then, the Kremlin has moved to ban some foreign nongovernmental organizations and student exchange programs, and some politicians have called for cutting Russia off from the World Wide Web and creating a domestic version of the Internet for Russians' use.

Other types of websites that Russians want blocked or restricted include those featuring gay pornography - with 59 percent of the country's population favoring a ban on such sites - followed by social network pages devoted to staging political protests, with 46 percent, and websites carrying videos of the Pussy Riot punk rock band, with 45 percent

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 #4
Interfax
August 4, 2015
Russian church spokesman calls for "rotation" of political elites

There should be a "rotation of elites" in Russia and young people should come to power, Russian Orthodox Church spokesman Vsevolod Chaplin has said. He was speaking at a meeting with participants in the II International Interfaith Youth Forum in Izberbash (Dagestan), privately-owned Russian news agency Interfax reported on 4 August.

"Today we need a certain rotation of elites," he was quoted as saying. "Young people should replace those who have embezzled, those whose property, souls and hearts are somewhere outside the country, who look pessimistically at the future of Russia, saying: 'Well, what can we do? Some who are no friends of ours have both more money and maybe more weapons, and greater intellectual and media influence,'" Chaplin said.

He went on to say that sometimes such people say "we don't have to do anything but just abandon ourselves to the trends and directives formed beyond our country's borders".

"People who speak like that should leave, and those like you with bright eyes should replace the older, overseas-oriented elites who have embezzled, who have come to terms with talk that Russia should be a community of indifferent, selfish people," Chaplin said.

He said that it was very important that today young people ensure that Russia has a new breakthrough in the informational, intellectual, geopolitical and economic spheres.

Russia very much needs a moral economy as an alternative to the modern global economy, Chaplin said.

"We need a new Russian, Dagestani, Caucasian breakthrough - a breakthrough in a mission that would help Russia change the world," he said

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 #5
Washington Post
August 5, 2015
Russia loves Putin. The rest of the world? Not so much.
By Adam Taylor
[Charts here https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/08/05/russia-loves-putin-the-rest-of-the-world-not-so-much/]

Vladimir Putin's domestic popularity can be confounding for outsiders. His approval rating, recently put at 87 percent by the Levada Center, is the sort of thing other world leaders dream about. Even if you believe these numbers are politically influenced, it still seems like Putin enjoys the confidence of many Russians.

The rest of the world doesn't seem to agree, however.

New data released Wednesday by Pew Global Research paints a picture in which much of the world perceives Russia negatively, and Putin, as a person, even worse. Indeed, Putin's remarkable domestic approval ratings are almost the mirror image of his remarkable disapproval in countries such as Spain, Poland and France.

A closer look at the data shows just how widespread this lack of confidence in Putin was around the world. Of the 39 countries polled, Pew found only three where the majority of people felt "a lot of confidence" or "some confidence" that Putin would do the right thing regarding world affairs. Vietnam, a country with a historic link to Russia and one that Putin has courted, was one. China, a rising power with its own ambivalent relationship with the West, was another.

The last? Russia itself, where 66 percent of those polled said they had a lot of confidence in Putin.

Not every country had a strong opinion about Putin. In a number of countries, a large amount of respondents said they either didn't know or didn't want to answer: In Pakistan, for example, 56 percent refused to answer. However on the whole, things were more negative than positive for the Russian president, with a median of 58 percent saying they had no confidence he would do the right thing.

Interestingly, the median numbers of Putin seem to mirror those of Barack Obama. While many countries, especially those in the Middle East, had their doubts about the U.S. president, most had confidence in him.

Putin hasn't always been so unpopular: These numbers are from spring 2015, and looking over Pew's data from 2003, you can see that many countries once had a positive view of the Russian leader. At that point, 75 percent of Germans had confidence in Putin, for example. Nowadays it's 23 percent.

As his domestic popularity grew over the past few years, Putin became an unpopular figure on the world stage. This trend is particularly noticeable when you compare U.S. attitudes to Putin with Russian attitudes to Obama. Notably, the "reset" does appear to have had an effect, even if it was just a blip.

 #6
CNBC.com
August 3, 2015
Russia will recover, but it needs deep reforms: IMF
By Holly Ellyatt

Russia will slowly recover in the coming year but cheap oil and sanctions continue to weigh on the country's economic outlook along with Moscow's "slow progress" in implementing structural reforms, the International Monetary Fund has warned.

Russia's economy is expected to contract by 3.4 percent in 2015, "although growth should return in 2016," the Fund said. The country's recovery next year would be supported by the ruble's more competitive exchange rate, increasing external demand and normalization of domestic financial conditions, it said.

"However, investment and consumption are likely to remain sluggish and the effects of sanctions in terms of external access to financial markets and new investment technology will linger. IMF staff expect weak GDP growth of around 1.5 percent in the medium term," the report noted.

"The external shocks, added to pre-existing structural weaknesses, are certainly weighing on Russia's growth prospects. Maintaining a prudent fiscal policy and reviving slow-moving structural reforms could help unlock Russia's growth potential," said Ernesto Ramirez Rigo, IMF Mission Chief for Russia.

The comments from the IMF come as Russia continues to remain in the economic wilderness, thanks in no small part to lower oil prices - which have more than halved from a high of $114 a barrel last June - and international sanctions placed on the country by western nations last March due to Russia's controversial annexation of Crimea and role in a pro-Russian uprising in Ukraine, which it denies.

Subsequently, Russia's once-booming economy has been struggling and its currency, the ruble, weakened dramatically against the dollar, in turn prompting soaring inflation, the rate of which currently stands at 15.3 percent in June.

'Slow-moving reforms'

The IMF believed that "prolonged sanctions may compound already declining productivity growth" and estimated that the cumulative output loss could amount to 9 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) over the medium term. In order to mitigate the effect of sanctions and lower oil prices, on which Russia relies for much of its revenues, it needed to implement reforms, it urged.

"While countries around the world have suffered a drop in growth relative to their pre-crisis performance, Russia's reversal of fortunes stands out as being particularly pronounced."

"Slow-moving structural reforms, sluggish investment and adverse population dynamics are all part of the picture. In particular, the state continues to leave a large footprint in the economy, and lack of competition and concentration in a number of sectors (among other factors), have contributed to low productivity growth."

There is an array of reforms that could help boost investment and trade, the IMF said.

"Strengthening governance and the protection of property rights, as well as cutting regulatory red tape would make a difference, as would better customs administration and reduced trade barriers. These measures could increase competition in domestic markets. Public investment could also be made more transparent and efficient."

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 #7
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
August 3, 2015
The Russian ruble roller coaster journey
The Russian ruble rebound could be over. On August 3, both the U.S. dollar and euro posted strong gains against the ruble, leading to questions about the future of the Russian currency.
By Stanislav Tkachenko
Stanislav Tkachenko is Associate professor in the International Relations Department of St. Petersburg State University (Russia) and a visiting professor at Bologna University (Italy). He currently serves as the president of the Post-Communist States in International Relations Department at the International Studies Association (ISA). Stanislav holds a doctoral degree in economics and has written seven books on political economy and Russian economics, as well as more than 200 articles.

It's been a miserable start to the week for the Russian ruble. On Monday, August 3, the euro shot above 69 rubles, while the dollar approached the 63-ruble mark. The drop in value of the ruble is linked to the price of Urals oil, which now trades at less than $50 a barrel amid statements by the Iranian Ministry of Oil that Tehran is ready to start supplying fuel to the world market.

The Russian ruble is truly a commodity currency, so its exchange rate dynamics are largely dependent on world prices for raw materials, including oil and gas. It is not alone in this category - other members of the commodity currency club are the Norwegian krone, the Kuwaiti dinar, and the Australian and Canadian dollar. These currencies also take their cue from energy prices. However, their fluctuations are considerably less pronounced than those of the Russian ruble. Why?

Some of the reasons are all too obvious, but that does not make them any less important.

The disproportionately large share of oil and gas as part of Russia's national economy, exports and budget revenues is among the biggest culprit. Comprising just 4 to 6 percent of budget revenues 20 years ago, the energy sector today accounts for almost 40 percent of federal income. That is unacceptable for the world's seventh largest economy. The situation has been evolving since 2000, when the planet entered a period of "expensive oil," and cannot be rectified overnight, despite the best efforts of the Russian government.

Western sanctions on the Russian economy are another (albeit superficial) reason for ruble volatility. The sanctions themselves target specific Russian banks and companies, with little effect on the national economy and no impact at all on the Kremlin's policies in relation to Ukraine. But their psychological impact on Western business circles in Russia has clearly been underestimated.

When it comes to cooperation with Russia, Western businesses often play overly safe, either walking away or imposing their own sanctions that go far beyond those prescribed by Washington and Brussels. This "self-censorship" reflects the continuing influence of the United States in the developed world, and the anxiety of big business over a further tightening of sanctions.

Fears of a new wave of global economic recession are the third reason affecting the Russian currency market. The euro zone's teetering on the verge of collapse, combined with weak economic growth and record unemployment, is just one dampener on the world of business.

In June 2015 there was bad news from China too, where stock market volatility has exceeded even the most negative forecasts. Fears that the U.S.-initiated Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (with the European Union) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (with Asia) will hurt the liberal nature of the global trading system also cannot be ignored.

Lastly, the long-awaited rise in the U.S. Federal Reserve interest rate could spark a wave of speculation against the currencies of developing countries. Previous experience shows that such a decision will be followed by approximately 12 to 24 months of an overvalued dollar, with inflows of investment to the United States and outflows from emerging markets, which now include Russia.

The Russian currency is losing appeal in the eyes of market operators for structural reasons. They include the weakness of market institutions (corruption, poor contractual discipline), the small capitalization of the Russian stock market (today it is only 33 percent of GDP), and the excessively large role of the public sector in the national economy.

Neither should we forget that today the Russian ruble satisfies the criteria of a freely convertible currency as enshrined in the charter of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). But for investors, it does not have sufficient "credit history" to be used more extensively in the world economy, and remains a newbie in the global financial markets.

Another cause of the volatility is the continuing distrust of Russian and foreign market players in the Bank of Russia's ability to act promptly and effectively-Russia has a reputation for currency crises and "Black Tuesdays."

It is inadmissible for the Russian government to delay reforming inefficient public corporations and liberalizing access for foreign investors to specific sectors of the national economy, or to make half-hearted efforts to ensure the independence of the judiciary and raise the level of transparency in providing financial assistance for crisis-hit state companies.

Government and parliament are no doubt looking at all these areas, but so far positive results have been few and very far between.

Aware of this, market operators find it more convenient to look to the price of oil in determining the exchange rate of the ruble, rather than the multiple factors traditionally taken into consideration by experts. After all, Russia's trade balance, supply of money in the domestic market, inflation figures, unemployment data, agricultural growth and steady industrial sector suggest that the exchange rate should be stable or fluctuate within a limited range.

The openness of the Russian financial market to foreign players makes the highly volatile Russian ruble even more attractive to speculators.

Furthermore, at a time of rising tensions between Russia and the West, both sides are in search of a new modus vivendi, one that takes into account the real alignment of forces and interests of the parties.

The sanctions war is presently going through a lull, and the long process of finding compromises to exit the most acute crisis in Russia-West relations since the Cold War is beginning. If this process gathers momentum, there will be noticeably less pressure on the ruble exchange rate.

For sure, the role of oil prices in the exchange rate of the ruble is greatly exaggerated. Even if one assumes that the Bank of Russia is deliberately softening its monetary policy to keep ruble-denominated revenues from oil exporters steady, its actions do not give grounds to expect a currency crisis in the country. Russia will experience new "currency shocks" only if the central bank abandons its fairly tight monetary policy since December 2014, and under the influence of Russia's industrial lobby opts for an inflationary stimulation of economic growth.

There is no evidence as yet to suggest that the Russian authorities would resort to such scenario. Consequently, Russia still faces a relatively long period (two to three years) of significant, but declining fluctuations in the exchange rate of the ruble.

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 #8
Wall Street Journal
August 5, 2015
Russian Ruble's Red Flag Flies Again
Pressure on ruble creates a headache for Moscow's central bankers

Russia's central bank won plaudits for stemming last December's ruble crisis when it jacked up interest rates up by 6.5 percentage points to 17%. It has since unwound nearly all of that increase to ease pressures on Russia's battered economy.

But the ruble is cause for concern once more.

The renewed decline in oil prices is to blame. Brent crude this week dipped back below $50 for the first time since January, and is now down 12% for the year. With the ruble and oil prices moving almost in lock step, the Russian currency has weakened to 62.8 against the U.S. dollar, a level last seen in March and down over 20% from its May peak.

On the bright side, the fall in the ruble acts as a shock-absorber for the Russian government, which would otherwise face a big budget hole due to the decline in oil prices. More worryingly, though, the currency reacted badly to last week's rate cut by the Bank of Russia, falling sharply. The central bank has already had to abandon purchases of foreign exchange in an effort to restock its reserves with inflation north of 15% and a deepening recession on its hands, it now has even less room for maneuver.

Faced with a weakening ruble-and if the selloff gains pace the way it did in December-the central bank may yet be forced to raise rates into the teeth of an oncoming recession; in last week's statement it dropped a reference to being ready to continue cutting rates.

Of course, this just highlights the vulnerable, oil-dependent nature of the Russian economy, further exacerbated by its isolation from global financial markets. The country has managed remarkably to withstand a virtual stop in foreign financing due to sanctions linked to the conflict in Ukraine. But it still has many fundamental problems.

The International Monetary Fund this week highlighted the decline in Russian growth versus precrisis trends-by over four percentage points-and listed a familiar litany of issues: stalled reform, weak investment, declining productivity and poor demographics.

In the light of that, the Central Bank of Russia has so far done a good job in balancing the demands made of it. But if oil continues falling-a clear risk given concerns about both oversupply and weak demand-then so will the ruble, and policy makers will have some tough choices on their hands.

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#9
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
August 4, 2015
Fresh U.S. sanctions will only boost import substitution - Russian experts
The extension of U.S. sanctions against Russia on July 30 will first and foremost lead to the strengthening of import substitution, say Russian analysts. However, with the blacklist now expanded to include branch companies of the country's main development institute, Vnesheconombank, and Russia's largest oil company, Rosneft, the realization of large infrastructure projects may seriously be affected.
Alexei Lossan, RBTH

The extension of U.S. sanctions against Russian companies and individuals will first and foremost lead to the strengthening of import substitution, say Russian experts.

The American government once again expanded the scope of the sanctions against Russia on July 30, imposing restrictive measures against 11 individuals and 15 legal entities supposedly involved in schemes aimed at bypassing the earlier sanctions, introduced gradually since March 2014 to punish Russia for its role in the Ukrainian crisis.

The new list includes relatives and business partners of Gennady Timchenko and Boris Rotenberg - considered close friends of Russian President Vladimir Putin - but also introduces sanctions against branches of Russia's main development institute, Vnesheconombank, and the country's largest oil company, state-owned Rosneft.

Rotenberg's son Roman has also been included on the list, along with the Finnish company Langvik Capital, whose properties include a small hotel near Helsinki called Langvik. According to Finnish media, this hotel is supposedly owned by the Rotenberg family.

Finnish businessman Kai Paananen also appears on the list "for his material support to Mr. Timchenko" and to a series of companies owned by the Russian.
American companies are forbidden from doing any kind of business with members of the blacklist, whose assets on U.S. territory will be frozen.

Konstantin Korischenko, deputy director of the Department of Capital Markets and Financial Engineering at the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, described the extension of the sanctions list as "more of a political move rather than economic," speculating that the decision may be related to Russia's recent blocking of a UN Security Council resolution on creating a tribunal to try those responsible for the shooting down of Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17 in July 2014.
 
New additions to the list

The American government believes that the Russian companies that were earlier placed on the U.S. blacklist are using their subsidiaries to bypass the sanctions, so subsidiaries belonging to Rosneft and Vnesheconombank, including the bank's VEB Capital subdivision, have been placed on the list.

VEB Capital is one of the investors in the construction of the Turkish Stream gas pipeline in Greece. The project presupposes the laying of a pipeline along the Black Sea seabed from Russia to a distribution hub in Turkey and then to the countries of southern Europe.

The list also includes the Russian Foundation of Direct Investments, an organization that actively sponsors the construction of infrastructure projects. Recently, the foundation signed an agreement with the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority.

Russian experts believe that the blacklisted companies may experience problems with payments in American currency.
 
The main consequences

"The United States' decision is a logical part of the latest events of the sanctions war being fought by the two countries, which is why we can't call it unexpected," said Anton Soroko, chief analyst at the Finam investment holding. "It should not have a big influence on the Russian economy."

According to Soroko, the introduction of new sanctions demonstrates the lack of improvement in bilateral relations, although it had already been taken into consideration by the market.

Furthermore, according to Konstantin Korischenko, the sanctions, which make western resources and technologies inaccessible for Russian companies and banks, "render a service" for Russia since they force the country to make difficult decisions.

"This means the 'pivot towards the east' and an active search for import substitution. These processes have a very negative effect on the current Russian economy, but in the mid-term they may serve to inspire the realization of structural reforms in the country," said Korischenko.

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 #10
www.rt.com
August 5, 2015
Supreme Court objects to current 'right to be forgotten' internet bill

The Russian Supreme Court has passed a negative review on the bill ordering search engines to delete links on false information about users at their request. The judges said that the fines in the draft were excessively large without any justification.

Business-oriented news agency RBC quoted deputy chairperson of the Supreme Court, Tatyana Petrova, as saying in the review that "the prevention of violations must be ensured through legal responsibility measures of similar scale and excessive state compulsion should not be allowed."

Another objection was that the bill in its current form allows state watchdog Roskomnadzor to decide on the cases when internet search companies refuse to comply with court orders. The Supreme Court members hold that the punishment for such actions should be ordered by a judge.

Earlier, the chair of the upper house's Constitutional Committee, Andrey Klishas, said that the bill lacked precise definitions of the minimum and maximum fines for not complying with the order to delete links to false or dated information.

The bill that orders all internet search engines to delete links leading to spurious or dated information about Russian citizens should they request it was passed by the State Duma on July 3 this year and signed into law by President Putin on July 14.

Refusal of internet companies to comply with the rules can be contested in court, including cases when the service provider is registered abroad. If the court proves that the data questioned by plaintiff is false or outdated, the search engine can be fined up to 100,000 rubles (under US$2,000).

The legislation, dubbed by media as 'the right-to-be-forgotten bill', was drafted in late May by MPs representing all four parties in the State Duma. The sponsors of the bill have emphasized in press comments that the restrictions only concerned the links given out by search engines and the bill did not order to delete the data itself.

Data companies, including Russian internet giant Yandex, objected to the new bill immediately after it was drafted, claiming its formula opened way to abuse and that the draft violated the constitutional right to freely seek, obtain and disseminate information.

The sponsors of the draft replied that it was in line with the most recent decisions of European legislatures and courts. In May 2014, a court in Luxembourg for the first time gave internet users the full right to 'be forgotten' and demand the deletion of links on their personal data by search engines.

The process was prompted by the 2010 scandal in which a Spanish citizen searched his name and found an outdated 1998 newspaper article about his house being auctioned off due to debt. The man then claimed the information was no longer correct and demanded it be taken down. This process eventually caused Google to alter its rules and add a new tool for users to request their private information to be deleted.

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#12
http://readrussia.com
August 4, 2015
Leaks and Sneaks in the Nemtsov Enquiry
by Mark Galeotti

After a first few days of chaos and contradiction, an increasingly clear and coherent picture of the investigation into the murder of Boris Nemtsov is emerging, with Chechens at its heart. The triggerman seems to be believed to be Zaur Dadaev (who confessed and then claimed that had been given under duress) and the implication is that he was charged with the task by Ruslan Geremeev, deputy commander of the 'Sever' Battalion. Of course, the loudly unspoken question is whether Geremeev was in turn acting for Chechen leader - and his current protector - Ramzan Kadyrov, or one of his close allies such as his cousin Adam Delimkhanov.

The reason we know this is that although no court case is currently in session, there has been a steady flow of official statements and, above all, strategic leaks to the Russian media throughout the past five months. Whatever the truths behind the case, who decided Nemtsov had to die and why, the very fact that a traditionally tight-lipped system is leaking from every seam on this case does say something about some processes in today's Russia.

Pluralism-by-Leak

First of all, as I've noted in Business New Europe, we should not assume that Putin's essentially-unchallenged autocratic position means that there are no meaningful politics in Russia beyond the intrigues of a handful of courtiers and cronies around the throne. Sure, this is no more than a partial- and pseudo-democracy, but just as there are elements of democracy within the system, so too there are definitely signs of a kind of pluralism.

However, it is rarely open, especially when sensitive issues are being discussed. Instead, it takes a variety of sidewise and sneaky forms, from coding debate in historical allegory (much of the discussion about late nineteenth and early twentieth century modernizers is really about today) or pretending to be talking about foreign countries (visible in much of Russian military discourse about "Western" non-linear warfare) to working behind sock puppet journalists, scholars and "analysts."

Thus, the density of leaks about the Nemtsov case is also an index to the temperature of the debate behind the scenes not about the investigatory truths and juridical process, but how to handle the political dimensions of a case that probably connects back to Kadyrov. This, after all, is something above the pay grades of every official in Russia but one.

Whispering against Kadyrov

So the campaign of leaks is an expression of a covert form of politics and the consensus within the security and law enforcement apparatus that Something Must Be Done about Kadyrov. No one I have spoken to in Moscow has a kind word for the man, and if anything he deserves credit for, in his characteristic mix of the ruthless and the clownish, creating an almost unprecedented meeting of minds within agencies usually divided along and between factional, institutional and philosophical lines.

It is not, let us sadly note, for Nemtsov's sake that these agencies are doing everything they can to keep the case and its Chechen connection in the public eye. Rather, the spectacle of a public opposition figure being gunned down in the literal shadow of the Kremlin and the consequent embarrassment for the government (and yes: regardless of its habit of bullishly dismissing foreign criticisms, this is a regime which does care how others regard it, just not always as much and in the way the West would like) represented too good an opportunity for them to discomfit and discredit Kadyrov.

I have never believed that this siloviki bloc honestly thought they could oust Kadyrov over Nemtsov, not least because Putin - never a man happy to make tough choices when it comes to deciding between his favorites - still seems to feel he needs the Chechen strongman. If anything, the growing concern in Moscow about Islamic State may make it even less willing to take any moves which might further destabilize the North Caucasus. In this context, it may be worth noting that Kadyrov, perhaps realizing he needs to shore up his political flank, has recently stepped up his rhetoric against it, saying that "Not a single IS devil should remain in Chechnya" and even saying he personally would take "great pleasure" in going and fighting against the movement. At the same time, though, he continues to affirm Dadaev's innocence.

However, the nature of bureaucratic politics in Russia - indeed, everywhere - is that it is always worth making hay while the sun shines, and that sneak attacks are always worth a try. Hence the gleeful series of leaks and rumors, keeping the story in the public eye. Bit by bit, the hope is to try and convince Putin, and his closest circle, that Kadyrov is a liability not an asset. When and if the day comes that the decision is finally made that Ramzan has to go, they will be ready.

Venting

But there is also one last dimension to the campaign of leaks. Although it is often said that the ship of state is the only ship that leaks from the top, many actually come from the bottom. However we might focus on the failings and distortions of the Russian legal and investigative system - and there are many - we need also to remember that they are many able, hard-working and honest officers and officials, men and women who joined not to take bribes or genuflect to power, but to do the job, and do it as well as their capabilities and the system would allow.

Rather than assuming that all the leaks are part of deep clashes between rival interests, it is also worth noting that just as such moves are part of covert politics, they are also covert protests, expressions of the frustrations and downright angers of people involved. This is an investigation which has actually been handled rather well - but has now run into politics. Ramzan is directly and overtly protecting Geremeev and this blocking the vital next stage in the investigation. Putin is indirectly and implicitly protecting Kadyrov, blocking any chance to get round the Chechen stonewall. In the circumstances, barring any change in either of these two constraints, then charging and convicting the triggermen is about the best that can be hoped for - as usual. This may be business and usual when it comes to politically sensitive trials in Russia, from Politkovskaya to Starovoitova, but it doesn't mean that everyone involved has to be happy with that.

So in this way, the continuing coverage of the Nemtsov case, however frustrating and depressing for those of us who want to see justice for the man himself, can also be read in some ways as a sneaky sign of some positive characteristics. There are efforts to articulate alternative perspectives, regardless of the seeming singularity of the "Putin line." There are serious figures and interests, even for the most self-interested of reasons, who want to see an end to Kadyrov, perhaps the most grotesque of the cast in today's Russian drama. And there are people who are fed up with not being able to do their jobs honestly and well.

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 #13
Politkom.ru
July 29, 2015
Analyst looks at realities, challenges of "post-Crimea" Russia
Tatyana Stanovaya, chief of the Centre for Political Technologies analysis department, Russia faces challenges of post-Crimea reality

The geopolitical crisis, the fall in world oil prices, sanctions and the fall in the value of the rouble have created a set of consequences that are having a negative effect on the living standards of the Russian population. Moreover, these consequences are both happening now, and may have a delayed effect too.

Set of social risks

Paradox: television against refrigerator. As of today, we can assert that from the financial point of view, the lives of the population, particularly the most unprotected strata, have started to deteriorate markedly. A poll by the Public Opinion Foundation shows that half of those polled have started economizing on food since the start of the year. Equally, we can assert that so far this has had no obvious political consequences for the authorities: ratings have been steadily high (or a rise in the approval rating for Vladimir Putin's activity to a record 89 per cent is even in evidence). This imbalance will undoubtedly be of a temporary nature, but it is not likely to be eliminated in the next few years. The moment when social discomfort and uncertainty about the future develops into political demands may occur in the medium term, since in the short term the mobilizing "besieged fortress" effect will continue to operate.

Until this moment comes, we can expect a rise in the number of local protests of a social nature (for example, against individual reforms, as was the case with the health care reform, if usual concessions are withdrawn [for example, the partial withdrawal of concessions to pensioners in Moscow Region], against the rise in housing and municipal services tariffs, and so on). Such protests will hardly be on a mass, nationwide scale, but if they are acute, they will be able to get onto the federal agenda.

There is a possibility of the emergence of new social irritants of a political nature. For example, regarding the living standards of top managers of major state corporations. An anti-corporate trend may be among the political demands from ordinary people.

If social demands are transformed into political demands, the authorities' ratings will inevitably fall. First and foremost, this will concern the ratings of institutions: the parliament, the government, elections, the party of power and the systemic opposition. Second, it may also entail a drop in Vladimir Putin's ratings, although this process will be of a protracted nature. The president's persona is for many Russians "pivotal", and without it, the existing "world view" will be subjected to serious testing. Moreover, whereas in the "pre-Crimea" period, Russians considered the possibility of alternatives to Putin (although not very actively, reckoning that these alternatives would be proposed to them "from above" and presented with the help of television), then now they have rallied around the leader.

The systemic opposition has stepped its activities, primarily the CPRF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation]. The adoption of state decisions, which pass through the State Duma, may become more politically controversial.

Post-Crimea reality: New Russia finding itself

A separate group of risks concerns the gradual depletion of the consolidating effect of the return of Crimea. The year 2014 was a year of a patriotic upsurge in the country and of society rallying around the president. Meanwhile, the real opposition, which was already weakened as a result of the "conservative wave", was pushed out to the margins. The post-Crimea effect in itself is the basis for the following array of risks:

The accumulation of social aggression, which is the consequence of the militarized media rhetoric that has been dominating the information area (which remains to a considerable extent controlled by the authorities). Aggression against the West, the "junta" and "fascists" in Ukraine, NATO and "foreign agents" and an increase in a kind of new "holy war" against Western ideology, Western interference, blasphemers, and so forth. This aggression will seek an outlet.

A crisis in the substance of the post-Crimea social contract. The victorious rhetoric of the return of Crimea has been replaced by the bellicose rhetoric of patriotism. However, such a replacement cannot fill up the substance of dialogue between the authorities and society fully and for long. The authorities can no longer offer the "pre-Crimea package" either: stability and a rise in wages and pensions. They are limited in putting forward an anti-corruption agenda (the Kremlin is forced to come to the defence of the government, bureaucracy, and major companies more often). But as June's Levada Centre poll shows, 42 per cent are prepared to give up freedom of speech and a right to travel abroad freely only on condition that normal wages and decent pensions are guaranteed. And 49 per cent feel negatively about such a "deal".

The patriotic agenda, when set against social demands, loses strategically in a situation where society comes out of the "besieged fortress" mentality. As things stand now, social grudges against the authorities have not gone anywhere, but have been "stifled" by the domination in public awareness of the agenda connected with confrontation with the West (indeed both in the geopolitical sphere and in the moral sphere) and the Ukrainian events. However, if this is exhausted, the authorities have no new agenda which would be attractive to society.

Strategic impasse. Even before Crimea, the Russian authorities could not fully formulate their strategy in domestic and foreign policy intelligibly, or indeed in their economic policy. After Crimea, this has become even more difficult. A lack of a strategic view of the direction the country should be travelling in will lead to ill-considered and poorly researched decisions, and haste and opportunism in elaborating state policy.

Among the elites, there continues to be a call for reforms (statements by high-profile experts, including some made at the St Petersburg Forum, are evidence of this), but amid an extremely low level of faith in the existence of the authorities' political will to carry them out. It is unclear how the Kremlin sees the country's development in the case of the West's sanctions policy being in place for a long term. This will further aggravate the low quality of the system of state administration.

An increase in conflicts within the elite. Differences of opinion will grow between the state and corporations ([Andrey] Belousov against [Igor] Sechin) and reformers against conservatives (the problem of the call for conducting reforms).

Array of conservative trends in domestic policy

The conservative wave started with the arrival of Vladimir Putin in the post of president at the beginning of 2012. However, the return of Crimea and confrontation with the West have intensified this trend many times over.

An increase in the number of legislative initiatives aimed at the conservation of the regime and its protection against external and internal "enemies" is to be expected. Furthermore, such initiatives may affect increasingly routine spheres of the citizens' private lives (for example, this may concern regulating abortions, social networks and so on).

A tendency towards the spread and expansion of the repressive apparatus of the state can be observed. The police and special services are obtaining additional powers and this process will not be of a one-time nature, but will be a permanent process, steadily gathering momentum.

The tightening of control of political processes is taking place. Political expediency is devaluing the law. This has already been expressed in the adoption of the decision on moving the elections of the State Duma deputies from December to September 2016. To a certain extent, this decision really makes it possible to form the lower chamber of the parliament in more comfortable conditions (and this means the composition will also be more loyal, all other things being equal). At the same time, this approach means a change of the usual "rules of play", which suits the authorities and may set a precedent for the future.

In the long term we can expect the emergence of signs of a crisis in the regime's traditional institutions. This means a crisis of confidence in the institution of governors, the majority of whose representatives are essentially Kremlin stooges. A rise in the number of regional political crises is likely, which may be connected either with the collapse of the governors' ratings or their electoral incompetence, or else with internal conflicts in the elite between governor and mayor or governor and major regional player. A crisis in the institution of the party of power is also likely. At the beginning of 2012 One Russia was on the brink of reform and rebranding. However, after a drop in protest activity, its position remained stable, which does not guarantee a peaceful life for it in the future, if political turbulence intensifies.

A growth in the aggressiveness of the "protectionists" and a growth in the number of conflicts in the intellectual, scientific and civil spheres. The conflict over the opera Tannhauser was exceptional [the culture minister sacked a theatre director because the modern interpretation of the opera offended members of the Russian Orthodox Church]. However, if the country continues to move with the same momentum, such conflicts may become more frequent and painful. Furthermore, politically neutral representatives of society, such as, for instance the depoliticized cultural intelligentsia, politically inactive citizens, scientists and public organizations may increasingly be the victims of such conflicts, initiated by the "protectionists" (members of the Orthodox Church, conservatives, security agencies and so on). Such conflicts are fraught with risks of the formation of a split within society, excessive polarization within it and the radicalization of opinions.

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#14
The Baltimore Sun
July 5, 2015
Is the U.S. less corrupt than Russia?
By Jerome Israel
Jerome Israel is a former senior executive at NSA and the FBI.

Last year, University of Miami professor Karen Dawisha authored the book "Putin's Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia?" She traces the rise of Vladimir Putin and chronicles his rule. Her thesis is this: After a major political change - in this case, the breakup of the Soviet Union - most countries go through a period of instability and corruption but gradually bring lawlessness under control. In Russia, however, the exact opposite has happened: Russia has developed corruption into a fine art.

I've traveled to Russia twice in the past year, and friends and complete strangers have told me how corrupt it really is. Surprisingly, Russian media have depicted this in the award-winning film "Leviathan," and a compelling drama, "The Loser." Against all odds the "little guy" fights corrupt courts, police and city council members. But these tales don't end well. One "hero" was jailed, the other nearly beaten to death by the people he was trying to help.

One Russian friend believes that many regional governors are corrupt. In the absence of a strong federal system, governors run their regions like mobsters. He may be onto something. Earlier this year, the governor of the Far East Sakhalin region was arrested for bribes.

At the highest levels, the U.S. and European Union believe that corruption in Russia is so extensive that after the invasion of Crimea and Ukraine, they directed many sanctions toward Russia's elite. Western powers went after super rich "oligarchs" and wealthy "friends of Vladimir," hoping to punish financially Mr. Putin's inner circle and pressure it into changing his calculus about Russia's aggression. John McCain maintained in 2013 that Putin rules by "corruption, repression and violence," and various news commentators calls Mr. Putin a "thug" at every turn.

Yet, considering some of the legislation and behavior of our own political class, these claims seem sanctimonious. U.S. politicians would do well to examine themselves and consider the admonition to take the log out from their own eye.

Take for example the "Cromnibus" bill, which was rammed through Congress last year. Thanks to K-Street lobbyists, the law allows banks to undertake very risky investments. In some cases, if the banks suffer a loss, the U.S. taxpayer will get the bill. This is a corruption of our system; Congress has sold out the little guy.

Or look at the trade legislation now under consideration by Congress. The details of the bill are still apparently classified. The American people do not know what is in it, and most in Congress have not read it, which requires going to a secret room and not divulging details. This is Soviet-style lawmaking, which is only rivaled by the secretive side deals the Obama administration cut with Iran. Lenin would be proud.

CNN's Drew Griffin reported for "AC360" that 78 members of Congress can count federally registered lobbyists as family members. Those lobbyists number 100, and according to congressional watchdog Legistorm, have worked on lobbying contracts worth $2 billion. Russians are all too familiar with bribes, like an envelope filled with cash. In the U.S., we specialize in "soft bribes" - take care of legislators' families, and the lawmaker will take care of you.

Our system is rife with abuses of power, conflicts of interest, and paybacks to the rich through sole-source contracts, tax preferences or beneficial regulations. These "pay-to-play" schemes are endemic to corruption, making it hard to understand how our politicians are any better than Russia's, whom they are quick to condemn. Of course, many will point out that at least we don't assassinate or jail opposition voices.

The recent indictment on multiple corruption charges of Sen. Robert Menendez of New Jersey is chilling, however. His ethical challenges have been alleged for years: Why was he only recently indicted? Could this have anything to do with his strident opposition to the president's foreign policies?

On my last trip to Russia, I had the opportunity to speak to a Russian Federal Security Service agent. I asked him, "What are you guys doing about corruption?" He said they were pursuing what they could, but that corruption was hard to prosecute.

That sounded about right, in both our countries.

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 #15
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
August 4, 2015
Implications of MH17 tribunal and Iran's impact on oil prices
Think Tank Review: Falling oil prices, the international tribunal on MH17 and Russia's deteriorating relations with the West are the focus of Russian experts in July.
By Anastasia Borik

In July Russian experts were focused on the lifting of economic sanctions on Iran, the prospects of an international tribunal on MH17 and the persisting problems of Russia-West relations.

The Boeing tribunal

The prospect of a tribunal on last summer's downed Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 caused a stir among Russian analysts. Some believe that the veto on the UN Security Council resolution was the right decision to protect the Russian Federation from unfair accusations, while other experts believe that Russia is "fleeing responsibility."

The first group included MGIMO international law expert Dmitry Labin. He believes that there are no grounds for a tribunal in principle, and that Russia was essentially excluded from the process of drawing up the resolution. This neglect and obvious negativity on the part of other UN Security Council members forced Russia to wield its veto. In other words, Russia is protecting itself against unfounded accusations.

"The political situation needs to be taken into account. It is no secret that there is political opposition. The voting of the other UN Security Council members, with the exception of China, was tendentious and an attempt to exert pressure on Russia, whose natural response was to use its veto," remarks the analyst.

Georgy Bovt of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (CFDP) also writes about the dubious grounds for an MH17 tribunal, mentioning that other international tribunals (e.g. Rwanda, Yugoslavia) were ultimately discredited by their politicization.

Bovt reckons that even if a tribunal were held, it would suffer the same fate - the clear anti-Russian sentiment of the majority of the UN Security Council members would guarantee it.

The expert regrets that the initiative does not facilitate the restoration of ties between Russia and its Western partners; on the contrary, it incites Russia to revise its subordination to international law, which is increasingly turning against the country.

Alexander Baunov of the Carnegie Moscow Center is in the second group. For him, Russia is shirking responsibility, despite being well aware that all the same it is guilty in the eyes of the West, with or without a tribunal.

Baunov also believes that for the sake of Russia's image in the short term, it would be more logical to support the proposed tribunal, as that would demonstrate openness and the desire to find those responsible.

However, the expert notes that in the long run the lengthy proceedings (after all, short political tribunals are unprecedented) could mar relations between Russia and the West to such an extent that normal cooperation and partnership become impossible.

Iran's impact on global energy prices

The end of the negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 in July provoked a mixed response from Russian experts. Although the agreement on Iran's nuclear program was hailed as a diplomatic breakthrough, the consequences of the "Iran deal" for Russia could be less salubrious.

There is doom and gloom over the impending price collapse that could follow Iran's return to the oil market, yet many think tank experts see the situation in a more optimistic light. From this perspective, no seller in the market, including Iran itself, wants low oil prices.

For instance, the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (CFDP) published an interview with former Russian Deputy Energy Minister turned expert Vladimir Milov, who believes that "the potential impact of the agreement is greatly exaggerated in the public debate."

Milov points to the large-scale problems of Iran's oil industry, which will hinder its speedy return to the world markets. What's more, the Iranians themselves will not want to lose income as a result of price swings, so will try to bring their oil on stream gradually.

Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) analyst Yuri Barmin also believes that Iran's potential impact on the oil markets is greatly overestimated. Barmin also highlights the need to modernize Iran's oil industry, which will require a tremendous amount of work and foreign investment. The analyst agrees with his CFDP colleague regarding Iran's unwillingness to force down the price of oil.

"Since Iran needs to sell oil at pre-sanctions prices, it is unlikely to flood the market for fear of triggering a new price shock," believes Barmin.

Carnegie Center expert Mikhail Krutikhin is not so optimistic in his assessment, pointing to the desire of various top officials to "make up for lost time after years of sanctions." He predicts an inevitable drop in oil prices, and believes that oil exporters with fully energy-oriented economies will be the most affected.

"Countries like Russia and Venezuela will face enormous challenges," warns the expert. "Their stranded reserves of oil can only provisionally be described as shale. Their development is cost-effective at a price of over $80 a barrel, and is sometimes simply not possible even with today's technologies."

Russia-West relations, still in the spotlight

The ongoing theme of Russia-West relations was again in the expert spotlight this month.

Tatiana Stanovaya, who writes for the Carnegie Moscow Center, says that Russia's problematic relations with the West are the consequence of the illusory and ideological foreign policy of the Kremlin, which, guided by momentary objectives and notions, has no eye on long-term tenability.

The West, believes Stanovaya, really has driven Russia into isolation, but Moscow only has itself to blame for "asking the West to recognize as well-founded what it sees as our unreal strategic objectives."

The analyst foresees a continuation of the standoff with the West, which is gradually becoming a thing and an end in itself, and a means of self-justification for the Russian elite.

CFDP head Fyodor Lukyanov dwells on the accusations of revisionism so often thrown at Russia in recent years, arriving at an unexpected conclusion. Across the whole gamut of issues in a climate of endless confrontation, he says, the labels "revisionist" and "conventionalist" are already blurred.

"Everything is mixed up to such an extent that it's impossible even to say who the revisionists are and who the conventionalists are. Even more devastating is Western activism with its mission to transform the world whether it likes it or not, coupled with Russia's retaliatory dagger blows to silence the frisky activist," postulates the expert.

In another article Lukyanov notes the rise in the aggressive tone of the official discourse on both sides, which, in his expert opinion, is doing nothing to resolve the conflict.

RIAC published an interview with renowned German expert on Russia Andreas Metz, in which he advocates non-confrontation. The analyst points to the existence of some major contradictions between Russia and the West (particularly Germany) in political matters, yet believes that in the economic sphere the opposing sides could seek rapprochement, since that is obviously in everyone's interests. Metz believes that sooner or later one of the parties will make concessions.

Natalia Yevtikhevich, another RIAC expert, remarks that the best recent illustration of the lamentable state of relations between Russia and the West was the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act, which took place without Russia.

The analyst believes that Russia's exclusion from "Helsinki" runs counter to the very idea of the Final Act, which  was intended to establish dialogue between even the most irreconcilable political adversaries.

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 #16
www.rt.com
August 5, 2015
Russia submits 1.2 million sq km Arctic claim to UN

Russia has filed an application to expand the boundaries of its continental shelf in the Arctic. Moscow made a similar claim in 2002, but the UN turned it down for lack of scientific support.

"The Russian application covers an underwater space covering an area of about 1.2 million sq km at a distance of over 350 nautical miles from the coast. To justify Russia's bid for expansion, Russian experts used extensive scientific data collected during many years of Arctic research," said a statement from a Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Tuesday.

The application claims for Lomonosov Ridge, Mendeleev-Alpha Rise and Chukchi Plateau, Russia believes the territories to be belonging to "submarine elevations that are natural components of the continental margin." The Podvodnikov and Chukchi Basins that divide the three territories were also added to the claim.

Moscow is acting in accordance with the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The convention allows a country to claim an exclusive 200-nautical mile economic zone over the continental shelf abutting its shores. If the continental shelf expands beyond the limit, the zone may be expanded up to 350 nautical miles with full control of natural resources, including gas and oil.

If Russian scientists prove that these ranges are the continuation of the Russian continental shelf, Moscow will be entitled an exclusive right to develop these resources, the volume of which, according to the Ministry of Natural Resources, may reach 5 billion tons of untapped oil and natural gas reserves worth as much as $30 trillion.

In 2007, Russia made a symbolic claim to the territories by dropping a titanium-encased Russian flag to the sea floor directly below the North Pole.

Greenpeace activists have already expressed concerns about active Arctic development.

"The melting of the Arctic ice is uncovering a new and vulnerable sea, but countries like Russia and Norway want to turn it into the next Saudi Arabia. Unless we act together, this region could be dotted with oil wells and fishing fleets within our lifetimes," said Greenpeace Russia Arctic campaigner Vladimir Chuprov.

In December 2014, Denmark and its autonomous territory of Greenland filed a request claiming a 900 sq km territory in the Arctic. Besides Russia and Denmark, the US, Canada and Norway also have Arctic sectors.

According the US Geological Survey, the Arctic holds an estimated 13 percent (90 billion barrels) of the world's undiscovered conventional oil resources and 30 percent of undiscovered conventional natural gas resources.

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 #17
Interfax-AVN
July 31, 2015
No direct military threat to Russia - unnamed spokesman

Moscow, 31 July: The Russian Federation Defence Ministry is closely monitoring the military threats to the security of the country and believes that the probability of a large-scale war against Russia is very low, a spokesman for the Russian Defence Ministry has told reporters.

"There have always existed military dangers to us. At the present time, however, there is no direct military threat to Russia," the spokesman for the military agency said.

According to him, the probability of a large-scale war is "very low".

"No large-scale war is expected," he added.

"At the same time, there is the danger that we might get dragged into all sorts of local conflicts along our borders. We are forecasting them, we know about them. More than that, we can even predict the dates, what groups of forces will be set up against us, what we'll oppose them with, what it'll all look like," he said.

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 #18
Interfax-AVN
"Nine times" more NATO reconnaissance, patrol flights along Russian borders

Moscow, 31 July: The Russian Defence Ministry has recorded a sharp increase in military activity near the Russian Federation's borders, a spokesman for the Russian Defence Ministry has told reporters.

"We have seen quite a serious increase in reconnaissance flights near our land and sea borders - about nine times more than what it was two or three years ago," he said.

The intensity of flights by the aviation of NATO on patrol near the borders of Russia has increased by about as much, he also said.

"In 2012-2013, an average of 90-95 military exercises a year were conducted near our borders. Their number has now increased to 150," the spokesman for the Russian Defence Ministry said.

According to him, NATO's increased military activity near the Russian border forces the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff to take appropriate military measures.

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 #19
Russians call for better relations with Europe, now rated 'poor' in poll returns

MOSCOW, August 5. /TASS/. Two-thirds of Russians believe that good relations between their country and European states are important for both sides, survey results published by Public Opinion Fund pollsters suggested on Wednesday.

"Nearly 65% of respondents are sure that Russia-Europe relations are poor now," the findings say. The same percentage also believes Russian authorities are striving towards rapprochement with leading European states. Only 37% think Europe aims at convergence with Russia.

The poll was held on July 26 in 104 Russian settlements, involving 1,500 respondents. Half the participants think relations with Europe have worsened, 11% said they had improved and 29% assessed them as stable.

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 #20
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
August 5, 2015
How the Kremlin reassessed its military approaches after Ukraine
By comparing the new Russian naval and military doctrine with U.S. military strategy, it's possible to see that Russia is actually planning a strategy that avoids the risk of military conflict with the West.
By Artem Kureev
Artem Kureev is an expert from the Moscow-based think tank "Helsinki+" that deals with protecting interests of Russians living in the Baltic countries. Kureev graduated from Saint Petersburg State University's School of International Relations.

In late July the Kremlin amended the Russian naval doctrine. The news was reported by some media outlets as Moscow's latest step in developing a strategy to counter NATO and the West. However, although the document reflects current geopolitical realities, it can hardly be said that the Russian naval and military doctrine represents a plan for military-backed expansion.

Moreover, a careful comparison of these documents with the U.S. national security strategy reveals that Russian intentions are limited to planning the development of the country's armed forces, as well as its military and civilian fleet, at the same time as assessing the current threats.

Furthermore, it is rather superficial to directly link the modification of Russia's doctrines - such as amendments made to the military doctrine in December 2014 - with the aggravation of Russia-NATO relations. How has the Kremlin's position altered as a result, and how do Moscow's approaches to security differ from Washington's?

Does Russia's updated military strategy threaten the U.S.?

It should be noted that in 2001, ten years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, a seemingly stable U.S.-led world system took shape. Naturally it contained a few rogue countries, namely Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq, Iran and North Korea, and regional leaders, such as China, India and (with some allowances) Russia and Brazil.

The events of the first decade of the 21st century exposed the fragility of this system. These days it is very difficult to talk about the territorial integrity of civil war-torn Libya and Afghanistan, while Iraq and Syria have seen the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS), which NATO has not yet come to grips with.

Lastly, the Ukrainian events of 2014 caused a rapid cooling of relations between Russia and NATO, whereupon Moscow turned from being a strategic partner of the North-Atlantic alliance into an opponent. Moreover, Washington soon began to perceive Russia as a primary threat.

So it was that in July of this year U.S. Army General Mark Milley, in his report to the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, placed Russia at the top of the list of potential enemies, stating that it was the only country with the nuclear capability to destroy the United States. This view is shared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, whose chairman, General Joe Dunford, also considers Russia as threat number one.

Such statements on the possibility of Moscow unleashing a pointless and suicidal nuclear war are quite strange. After all, Russia's military doctrine, approved in 2010 and closely linked to the naval doctrine, is quite peaceful in content and has always been considered defensive.

And although it was focused on NATO's expansion and the attempts to "endow the force potential of NATO with global functions," with the exception of international terrorism, there was no mention in the document of Russia's likely foes. What's more, attention was paid to cooperation with NATO in peacekeeping missions, and it was noted that the Russian military policy "is aimed at the prevention of an arms race, and the deterrence and avoidance of military conflicts."

The document's approval provoked a public discussion of Article 22, which seemingly allows for the preventative use of nuclear weapons. Yet many experts critical of "Moscow's overly aggressive policy" passed over the clause providing for their use only "in case of aggression against Russia involving the use of conventional weapons that pose a threat to the very existence of the state."

The amendments to the Russian military doctrine adopted in December 2014 did not make the document more aggressive. They merely registered the current geopolitical processes, noting the rising use of information technologies in the military-political sphere and the growing threat of international terrorism. Moreover, it was supplemented with a thesis on regime change, namely the forceful replacement of legitimate authority as a distinct threat in countries neighboring Russia.

The doctrine prescribes mechanisms for deploying troops, and outlines the prospects for developing armed forces, but makes no mention of any country as hostile and includes ample articles on the need for peaceful resolution of conflicts through the mechanisms of international diplomacy.

In both versions of the Russian naval doctrine (the first dates back to 2001), only one section is devoted to purely military aspects. The document examines such areas as the development of maritime transport and marine science, the renovation of infrastructure along the Northern Sea Route, and the development of mineral resources on the Russian continental shelf.

The amendments to the naval doctrine are more copious than those made to its military cousin, primarily since the past 14 years have seen many changes: NATO expansion, chaos in the Middle East, and increased interest in Arctic resources and the Northern Sea Route. Indeed, the revised document mentions the incorporation of Crimea into Russia, and reflects the changes in the balance of power in the Black Sea and Russia's greater capacity to control its waters.

The doctrine pays great attention to the Arctic, the proposed division of which into economic zones among the circumpolar powers provoked a lot of top-level talks well before the events in Ukraine. Besides the military sphere, the Arctic Ocean is Russia's only unrestricted outlet to the Atlantic, in which regard the talking points are offshore development and the upgrading of infrastructure along the Northern Sea Route.

In these aspects the naval doctrine is closely related to another document, which too could shortly be amended in light of the current geopolitical events: the Development Strategy of the Arctic Zone of Russia, approved by Russian President Vladimir Putin in February 2013.

A serious consequence of Western sanctions on Russia is the suspension of joint projects between Russian oil and gas majors and foreign investors on the Arctic shelf. Furthermore, the ban on the transfer of technologies has made it harder to attract foreign companies to take part in offshore hydrocarbon development projects. This is forcing Moscow to alter its plans in the Arctic, and to develop own technologies for the independent production of resources in the circumpolar region.

The above facts indicate that the Russian military and naval doctrines are targeted at solving problems facing the country today. In principle the documents point neither to aggressive intentions on the part of Moscow or a bid by the Kremlin to intervene in the politics of third countries.
How the U.S. military approaches differ from the Russian ones

In contrast to the Russian doctrines, the U.S. national security strategy is in many respects more global, and represents not only a plan of action, but also a political declaration. The long introduction highlights the achievements of the current U.S. administration in the pursuit of peace, and fingers potential threats, including climate change and major energy market disruptions.

Moreover, an entire paragraph is devoted to the leading role of the United States in world politics and the infeasibility of solving global issues without its participation. Russia is mentioned in the context of the violation of Ukrainian sovereignty, and is effectively described as an aggressor. The White House strategy speaks of the need to diversify gas supplies to Europe to avoid dependence on Moscow. The document also pays special attention to Russian propaganda with a view to countering it with the "unvarnished truth."

Although Russia is given quite a few column inches of text, it is hard to say that Washington sees Moscow as its main opponent. Rather, the administration of U.S. President Barack Obama highlights the basic triangular contradiction involving Crimea, Donbas and energy dependence.

It is clear from the strategy that Obama, on the home stretch in his second term as president, wants to convince the American public that his administration has achieved its objectives in the field of security.

As for specific mechanisms to address emerging threats, the Obama-approved document is quite hazy. It is highly likely that the next U.S. administration, which will take office after the presidential elections of 2016, will make significant adjustments to the strategy.

However, it can be assumed that the criticism toward Russia in relation to Ukraine and Crimea, and the growing role of Russia in world politics, will continue. The next U.S. president will clearly be forced to react to Russia's stronger positions in the Arctic, too. Sadly, the U.S. national security strategy cannot be considered as merely a political declaration, since it will guide the actions of military personnel and politicians alike, some of whom, as mentioned above, see Russia as their most likely opponent.

The question as to whether the new U.S. administration will prioritize another arms race remains open. Meanwhile, Russia's approach to drawing up its military and naval doctrines, focused as they are on domestic problems and devoid of anti-Western rhetoric, is a sign to the White House that Russia is unwilling to exacerbate the confrontation with the United States and the European Union, yet ready to defend its interests.

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 #21
www.rt.com
August 5, 2015
Time for the western media to send real journalists to Russia & Ukraine
By Bryan MacDonald
Bryan MacDonald is a journalist. He began his career in journalism aged 15 while still a schoolboy in his home town of Carlow, Ireland, with the Nationalist & Leinster Times. Later he studied journalism in Dublin and worked for the Weekender in Navan before joining the Irish Independent. Following a period in London, he joined Ireland On Sunday, later re-named the Irish Mail on Sunday. He was theater critic of the Daily Mail for a period and also worked in news, features and was a regular op-ed writer. He has also frequently appeared on RTE and Newstalk in Ireland as well as RT.

The media's use of young, inexperienced freelancers in Ukraine has long been a disaster waiting to happen. Last weekend's obviously fabricated "dirty bomb" nonsense is further proof.

I've said it dozens of times. I'll now repeat it. The western media needs to send qualified, experienced journalists to cover Russia and Ukraine. Especially at this particular moment, when civil war rages in the latter and the former is experiencing significant economic and foreign policy challenges.

The practice of using unskilled, amateur hacks in the region, no matter how noble their intentions, is unfair to readers and viewers. It's also unjust to the wannabe journalists themselves. As non-staff members (many don't even have contracts) they lack the usual protections afforded to media professionals on foreign postings. Many working in Eastern Ukraine have only rudimentary Russian-language skills and are unable to afford competent translators and security.

Newsdesks back home will always demand coverage be tailored to certain tastes. However, staff status supplies a safety blanket that empowers them to resist some of the more ludicrous suggestions - particularly those that may endanger them. Freelancers and short-term contract workers don't have such luxuries. The former are usually paid by the article or appearance, which forces them to desperately hustle to be published. It sometimes encourages them to make up or exaggerate stories.

Decline in standards

Since Ukraine's Maidan protests kicked off over a year and a half ago now, the western media has dipped in and out of events. Around the time of the 2014 Kiev coup and later following the MH17 disaster, most credible outlets did send competent reporters from their headquarters.

During these periods, coverage improved immeasurably. Sadly, the rest of the time they've used local stringers or inexperienced hacks who emerged from the Moscow and Kiev expat press. The standard of these publications is, frankly, laughable. Indeed, they'd compare most unfavorably to many local freesheet rags in the British Isles, let alone paid-for newspapers.

There are exceptions, notably the BBC, which, to be fair, has humongous resources. Indeed, the Beeb even sent their renowned foreign correspondent Fergal Keane to Donbass for an extended period. Nevertheless, the rest of the UK and American media has left the A-team at home. Instead, we are treated to the best efforts of low-paid beat hacks, many of whom are learning on the job.

Veterans of the late Soviet period and the Yeltsin years, a time when giants of journalism walked Moscow's streets are, privately, aghast. Following a recent RT op-ed when I questioned the quality of contemporary reportage, I was amazed by how many former Moscow correspondents contacted me.

"Newspapers have no money for translators and drivers and the like. There's a very small pool of people who can speak Russian and write reasonably well in English," mused one former British great. An American legend observed: "They are now using the type of guys (sic) we used to use for illness and holiday cover to actually run the bureau. It's mind-bogglingly silly. Russia is a delicate posting."

The menace of unreality

Indeed it is. Yet, right now, Ukraine is even more sensitive. An inaccurate report from the country's eastern war zone could cost lives or raise tensions. Or both. In February, a hoax report in the Washington Free Beacon encouraged US senators to urge the White House to act swiftly to counter a "Russian invasion" of Ukraine. There was a problem. The photographic evidence was years old and predated the Ukraine crisis. It later emerged that the photos had been supplied to Republican Senator Jim Inhofe of Oklahoma by a Ukrainian "delegation" to the US capital.

A US senator from an earlier age, Hiram Warren Johnson, is credited as first observing that "the first casualty when war comes is truth." During the Ukrainian civil war, Johnson's theory has been proven countless times, by both sides. Far too often, the western media accepts Ukrainian misinformation as genuine. From estimates of hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers inside the country to, obviously inaccurate, death toll numbers. The Russian press is equally guilty of parroting hyperbolic statements from the rebel side. An infamous example was the allegation that a 10-year-old child had been crucified in Slavyansk last year.

While the various reports of Russian "invasions" can be laughed off, like this hilarious Daily Beast propaganda effort, sometimes the deliberate manipulation of facts is far more sinister. Incidentally, as an example of media negligence on Russia, the Daily Beast employs a "Russia expert" who has never lived in the country and can't speak the language. Do the outlet's management even countenance how insulting this is to their readers?

This weekend, in the pages of The Times of London and Newsweek, we saw exactly what happens when media concerns use greenhorn stringers in sensitive situations. Instead of sending an experienced staffer to Ukraine, both have recently collaborated with Maxim Tucker. Tucker, a former Amnesty International activist, who doesn't hide his pro-Maidan credentials, published the same story in both. The Times version was headlined, "Ukraine rebels 'building dirty bomb' with Russian scientists." Meanwhile, Newsweek went for "Ukraine Says Pro-Russia Rebels Are Building a Dirty Bomb."

Incendiary stuff. If true, it could feasibly ignite a major diplomatic, perhaps even military, stand-off. Luckily, the story is fiction. This is blindingly obvious to anyone with even a minute comprehension of the region. Newsweek and The Times have embarrassed themselves. At the same time, Tucker has exposed himself as being seriously out his depth. Even his hack-pack colleagues are distancing themselves from this nonsense. Tucker, either knowingly or unwittingly, has fallen hook, line and sinker for Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) disinformation. Unsophisticated misinformation at that. In fact, typically Soviet in its execution, going for the big lie.

Allow me to explain why Tucker's two, almost identical, pieces are total rubbish. Tucker himself, along with most western hacks in Ukraine, asserts that Russia is backing the east Ukrainian rebels. If this were true, why would the rebels need to "research" dirty bombs? Russia, currently uniquely, can send people into space - such a device would be child's play to its scientists. Or is Tucker contradicting himself and now alleging that Russia is not arming the insurgents?

There are a few more blatantly obvious holes in the supposition. Tucker writes: "The SBU said it was not clear from those conversations whether the specialists were employees of the Russian state or private individuals. The transcripts of these conversations could not be provided." Why could the transcripts not be provided? It's abundantly clear that Tucker's sole source is the SBU, an organization not noted for fealty to the truth.

Social media war

"The dossier includes three documents, written in Russian, that appear to be military orders from DPR leaders to subordinate commanders at the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry for Emergency Situations, and the Donetsk chemical factory. They were allegedly downloaded with hundreds of others when SBU agents took control of a rebel email address in the first week of July."

Is Tucker seriously saying that the rebels discussed bombs by email? Why not VKontakte (Russia's version of Facebook) or Twitter? In fact, if they were that stupid, perhaps they posted a few postcards on the topic too?

Tucker also claims: "The OSCE is believed to have raised the issue with the Kremlin at talks in Minsk on July 21, and is expected to bring in its own specialist to examine the bunker at the plant." He doesn't say who believes the OSCE has done this.

However, the biggest sign this article is a piece of low-grade fiction is contained in what Tucker omits. He fails to explain how the SBU believes the rebels would deliver the "bomb." The Ukrainian rebels have no air force. Hence, the only feasible route would be by truck. If so, how would the vehicle bypass Ukraine's line of control?

I am sure that Tucker is aware that in 2010 the US paid for the installation of Radiation Portal Monitors at all Ukrainian border posts to prevent the smuggling of radioactive material. As a result, the only places the rebels could use a "dirty bomb" are either inside Donbass or inside Russia. Unless their leadership has completely lost its marbles, this would make no sense.

Newsweek and The Times are among dozens of respectable media outlets who need to send proper, qualified journalists to Russia and Ukraine. Cutting corners insults their readers. Journalism is a serious craft. It mustn't be left to amateurs, no matter how well intentioned their efforts.

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 #22
The Independent (UK)
July 31, 2015
Alexander Litvinenko murder inquiry: The five unanswered questions at the end of the proceedings
Mary Dejevsky explains why the proceedings failed to get to the bottom of the former Russian agent's death
One of the country's most respected commentators on Russia, the EU and the US, Mary Dejevsky has worked as a foreign correspondent all over the world, including Washington, Paris and Moscow. A former diplomatic editor and chief leader writer at The Independent, she now writes a weekly column and makes regular contributions to UK and international radio and television. She is a member of the international foreign affairs think-tank, Chatham House, the Valdai Group of international Russia specialists and the Franco-British Council. She also sits on the advisory board of the School of Slavonic and East European Studies at University College London.

The inquiry into the death of the Russian security officer, Alexander Litvinenko, almost nine years ago concluded in a blizzard of invective from the counsel for his widow, Marina. Ben Emmerson QC, who said the guilt of the two accused, Andrei Lugovoi and Dmitry Kovtun, had been proved beyond all doubt, and the chain of command led all the way to President Vladimir Putin.

He described Mr Putin as "an increasingly isolated tinpot despot" and a "morally deranged authoritarian", who had been shown to have political and personal reasons for wanting to "liquidate" Mr Litvinenko.

Speaking outside the Royal Courts of Justice after proceedings closed, Ms Litvinenko said she believed the truth had finally been told and her husband's "murderers and their paymasters... unmasked". She said: "Any reasonable person who looks at the evidence presented in the inquiry will see my husband was killed by agents of the Russian state in the first-ever act of nuclear terrorism on the streets of London. This could not have happened without knowledge and consent of Mr Putin."

In his closing remarks, which ended six months of hearings both in public and in strict secrecy to shield, among others, members of the UK security services, the judge, Sir Robert Owen, praised the diligence of the police and the determination and dignity of Ms Litvinenko. He said he would submit his report to the Home Secretary by Christmas, although it is not clear how much, or even whether, it will be published.

What is known?

The post-mortem examination established that Mr Litvinenko died as a result of radioactive poisoning, from a massive dose of polonium 210. As summed up by the counsel for the Metropolitan Police, the evidence against Mr Lugovoi and Mr Kovtun appears incontrovertible. The police case is that there were two attempts to poison Mr Litvinenko, the first on 16 October 2006, and the second - with a much larger dose, the notorious tea in the Pine Bar at the Millennium Hotel in Mayfair - two weeks later. The phone records, the travel records, and above all, the scientific evidence supports their culpability.

Mr Kovtun had initially refused to co-operate with the inquiry but then secured a four-month delay in the proceedings Mr Kovtun had initially refused to co-operate with the inquiry but then secured a four-month delay in the proceedings

The unasked questions

Although an inquiry is supposed to be investigative rather than adversarial, a weakness of the proceedings was the absence of anything that resembled a cross-examination. The police case is that Mr Lugovoi and Mr Kovtun set out to murder Mr Litvinenko with an untraceable poison, polonium-210, but also that they may not have known what poison they were using or the danger it represented to them. This supposedly explains why Mr Lugovoi was happy for his young son to shake Mr Litvinenko's hand soon after the poisoning. There are other points that might have been contested.

The role of the UK intelligence services

The waiter identified in newspaper reports (courtesy of the police) as having poured the fatal tea testified that he did no such thing.

It emerged that Mr Litvinenko was in the pay of the UK security services, met regularly with his handler "Martin" and travelled on their account in a name other than his assumed UK name, Edwin Carter. It emerged, too, that "Martin" and perhaps other UK agents were at his deathbed. What was the role, if any, of UK and perhaps other intelligence services? What did they know? Mr Lugovoi has said in interviews that MI6 used Litvinenko to try to recruit him. Is this so?

Where does Russia stand?

The Russian authorities were invited to be represented at the inquiry, and, although they co-operated in the early stages, they declined. Mr Lugovoi and Mr Kovtun were invited to be represented and to testify, but refused.

Mr Kovtun - perhaps for his own reasons, perhaps because the Russian authorities saw this as a way of accessing confidential material - made an offer to testify in March, but failed to turn up for the Moscow videolink on the appointed day, citing a host of legal reasons why he had changed his mind. Russia set up its own inquiry soon after Mr Litvinenko's death; the commission continues, but appears to have produced no results. On On 31 July, Kremlin spokesman said the accusations against Russia were familiar and that Russian officials wanted nothing to do with the British investigation into Mr Litvinenko's death.

What is the report likely to turn on?

As of now, it appears inevitable that Mr Litvinenko will be found to have been murdered by Mr Lugovoi and Mr Kovtun for political reasons. The big question that Sir Robert will be called upon to answer is whether the killing was masterminded by the Russian security services (FSB), and, if it was, whether it was done on Mr Putin's orders. Mr Emmerson argued that Mr Litvinenko's greatest "crime" was to have supplied evidence of Mr Putin's alleged complicity in organised crime. Opponents of Mr Putin in exile take the same view, and see Mr Litvinenko's death in the context of other political killings, such as that of the journalist Anna Politkovskaya.

Some witnesses were more circumspect, arguing that the murder could have been the result of a lower-level vendetta. What Sir Robert decides to say about the role of Mr Putin and the Russian state will have implications for UK-Russian relations for a long time.

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 #23
Russia Insider
www.russia-insider.com
August 3, 2015
WaPo Says the NED Does What the CIA Used to Do
But they've forgotten they said that
By Patrick Armstrong

Russia has expelled the National Endowment for Democracy. This is a fully-funded-by-the-US-government entity that has the nerve, on its home page, to describe itself as a "private, nonprofit foundation" with a "nongovernmental character". It has just been declared an undesirable organisation in Russia.

As to be expected, the Washington Post, in its role as Stern Defender of the Right, especially where Russia is concerned, fulminated a few days ago that "Vladimir Putin is suffocating his own nation".

"IN THE tumult and uncertainty that marked Russia after the Soviet Union imploded, when the state was weak and many institutions tottering, a vital lifeline was extended from the West. The U.S. government, as well as foundations and philanthropies, responded generously. The financier George Soros, through his Open Society Foundations, provided small grants that sustained many impoverished scientists. The MacArthur Foundation and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) were vital sources of support to civil society, education and human rights.

"Now, President Vladimir Putin is forcing these organizations out of Russia, using law enforcement and a parliament that he controls. Mr. Putin's larger target is to destroy civil society, that vital two-way link in any democracy between the rulers and the ruled. The latest move, announced Tuesday, is to declare the NED an "undesirable" organization under the terms of a law that Mr. Putin signed in May. The law bans groups from abroad who are deemed a "threat to the foundations of the constitutional system of the Russian Federation, its defense capabilities and its national security."

"The charge against the NED is patently ridiculous. The NED's grantees in Russia last year ran the gamut of civil society. They advocated transparency in public affairs, fought corruption and promoted human rights, freedom of information and freedom of association, among other things. All these activities make for a healthy democracy but are seen as threatening from the Kremlin's ramparts."

The charge is "patently ridiculous" is it? Let's step into the time machine provided by Mr Google and travel back to 1991 when the WaPo thought it had the future of Russia all figured out.

There we find - note the title - "Innocence Abroad: The New World of Spyless Coups" by David Ignatius. "Spyless coups" indeed. That sounds a bit like what the Russian MFA said, doesn't it? [https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1991/09/22/innocence-abroad-the-new-world-of-spyless-coups/92bb989a-de6e-4bb8-99b9-462c76b59a16/]

"The analysis of concrete projects shows that most of them are aimed at destabilizing by various means the internal situation in countries that pursue an independent policy in accordance with their own national interests rather than on orders from Washington."

Anyway, back then, Ignatius positively gloried in the idea of "spyless coups".

"There's an obvious lesson here for Gates, or whoever ends up heading the CIA. The old concept of covert action, which has gotten the agency into such trouble during the past 40 years, may be obsolete. Nowadays, sensible activities to support America's friends abroad (or undermine its enemies) are probably best done openly. That includes paramilitary operations such as supporting freedom fighters, which can be managed overtly by the Pentagon. And it includes political-support operations for pro-democracy activists, which may be best left to the new network of overt operators...

"'A lot of what we do today was done covertly 25 years ago by the CIA,' agrees Weinstein. The biggest difference is that when such activities are done overtly, the flap potential is close to zero. Openness is its own protection.

"Allen Weinstein is just one of many overt operatives who helped prepare the way for the political miracles of the past two years by sponsoring exchanges and other contacts with liberal reformers from the East. It's worth naming a few more of them, to show the breadth of this movement for democracy: William Miller of the American Committee on U.S.-Soviet Relations; financier George Soros of the Soros Foundation; John Mroz of the Center for East-West Security Studies; John Baker of the Atlantic Council; and Harriett Crosby of the Institute for Soviet-American Relations. This has truly been a revolution by committee...

"The sugar daddy of overt operations has been the National Endowment for Democracy, a quasi-private group headed by Carl Gershman that is funded by the U.S. Congress. Through the late 1980s, it did openly what had once been unspeakably covert - dispensing money to anti-communist forces behind the Iron Curtain."

Gershman, still doing business at the same stand, isn't happy either: "the latest evidence that the regime of President Vladimir Putin faces a worsening crisis of political legitimacy" and so on.

QED, as they say; the NED is indeed busy overthrowing governments the USA doesn't like ("undermining its enemies" - what could be plainer than that?).

Just as the Russians say.

I guess the Washington Post people don't read their own paper.

Although I suppose that, for them, "friends" have "democracy" and "enemies" don't. By definition.

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 #24
Financial Times
August 5, 2015
How to beat Vladimir Putin in the battle for hearts and eyeballs
Kremlin still has media hegemony over 142m Russian citizens
By Peter Pomerantsev
The writer is a senior fellow at the Legatum Institute and author of 'Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible'

The west is belatedly waking up to the power of the Kremlin's media machine. The supreme commander of Nato called the annexation of Crimea "the most amazing information warfare blitzkrieg we have ever seen". Zhanna Nemtsova blames the climate of hate created by Kremlin propaganda for the murder of her father, opposition politician Boris Nemtsov.

The Soviet empire may be gone but the Kremlin still has media hegemony over 142m Russian citizens and an estimated 93m elsewhere in the former USSR for whom Russian is a first or second language (plus as many as 3m in Germany). A project by the European Endowment for Democracy, a Brussels foundation - of which I was an author - sought ways to tackle this challenge. We soon found differences between the situation today and the in cold war.

In the 20th century the job of western Russian language media such as the BBC World Service or Radio Free Europe was to break through the information iron curtain. The battle was for alternative points of view and against censorship. Today television is strictly controlled by the Kremlin, though there is access to other media online. Russian speakers in Ukraine, Moldova and the Baltics - the groups of most immediate concern to US and European policymakers worried about Moscow stirring unrest - have access to a plethora of Kremlin, local and western media, each offering strikingly contradictory versions of reality.

Take Estonia, where viewers who followed rival Russian and western stories about the downing of flight MH17 over Ukraine last year ended up disbelieving both sides. Something similar is happening in Kharkiv, a Ukrainian city near the border with Russia, where polls showed a high number of people cynical about all media, whatever the source.

Viewers are nevertheless entranced by Russian channels. The Kremlin blurs the lines between fact and fiction: "current affairs" shows are cinematic and sensational, with scare stories about Russian children crucified by Ukrainian militias or US conspiracies to ethnically cleanse east Ukraine.

The disinformation fits into a consistent narrative. News focuses on fighting in Ukraine, western plots against Russia and positive stories on Vladimir Putin. The president provides stability for a nation beset by enemies. This is reinforced by big-budget historical dramas that strengthen his policies: glorious second world war battles for Crimea, or tales of nefarious liberals collaborating with the motherland's enemies.

Kremlin media, however, ignore local news and social issues. EED experts recommended a news agency or news hub to focus on the details Moscow wants to avoid. They might not be able to convince audiences who downed MH17, but by focusing on local stories about hospitals, schools and courts they could prove more relevant. A content factory could also provide socially engaged documentary material: docu-soaps about schools or hospitals; reality shows exploring ethnic tensions. Local broadcasters need help, both financial and professional, to create such high-quality content. It is something the British especially, with their sophisticated TV industry, should take the lead on.

Ideally such programming would dovetail with development priorities . When the UK's Department for International Development backs judicial re­form in Ukraine or Moldova it should also make TV dramas and documentaries about the court system. BBC Media Action (the charity arm of the BBC) has been working with the fledgling Ukrainian public broadcaster on short dramas about young people caught up in the war. The budget is minuscule but it is exactly the sort of project we need.

High-quality shows are not cheap. A channel such as a BBC Russia would cost more than €20m a year. This may seem like a lot - but take into account a single Eurofighter jet costs €90m.

As Mr Putin knows, media and entertainment are as vital as doctors or soldiers. The west made a bad error in the 1990s, abandoning the development of media in the former Soviet Union to the free market: instead, media were captured by oligarchs or corrupt regimes. After the cold war it was considered part of the "peace dividend" to slash funding for the likes of Radio Free Europe. A much greater cost is being paid now.

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 #25
The Economist: The World If
August 2015
IF RUSSIA BREAKS UP
The peril beyond Putin
The world rightly worries about the prospect of a Greater Russia. But a Lesser Russia could be just as troubling

UNDER Vladimir Putin's presidency, Russia is seen in the outside world as an expansionist power trying to revise post-Soviet borders and rebuild an empire. But what if Russia itself-a country of nearly 200 nationalities that stretches across 11 time zones-is in danger of crumbling?

It would not be the first time that Russia tried aggression and expansion as a defence against modernisation and by doing so undermined its own territorial integrity. In 1904, when Russia was on the verge of a revolution, Nicholas II attempted to stave off change by looking for national traitors and starting a small war with Japan. The war ended a year later in Russia's defeat and 12 years later the tsarist Russian empire faded away in a few days. In 1979, as Communist rule struggled under the weight of its own contradictions, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan; 12 years later the Soviet Union collapsed just as suddenly.

In 2011 Moscow's urban middle class took to the streets to demand modernisation. Mr Putin responded by picking out alleged national traitors, annexing Crimea and starting a war against Ukraine. The idea that Russia's latest foreign-policy adventures might end in the same way as previous ones-with the collapse of the state and disintegration of the country-is not as far-fetched as it might seem.

The Soviet Union came apart because it overstretched itself and ran out of money and ideas. Local elites saw no benefit in remaining part of a bankrupt country. It fragmented along the administrative borders of the 15 republics that made up the giant country.

Yet there was no reason why the process had to stop there. Indeed, many of Russia's regions-including Siberia, Ural, Karelia and Tatarstan-declared their "sovereignty" at the time. To prevent further disintegration Russia's then president, Boris Yeltsin, came up with the idea of a federation, promising each region as much "sovereignty as it could swallow". Yeltsin made this promise in Kazan, the ancient capital of Tatarstan, which acquired many attributes of a separate state: a president, a constitution, a flag and, most important, its own budget. In exchange, Tatarstan promised to stay part of Russia.

Mr Putin has reversed federalism, and turned Russia into a centralised state. He cancelled regional elections, imposed a "presidential" representative over the heads of governors and redistributed tax revenues in Moscow's favour. But he did not build common institutions. The Russian state is seen not as an upholder of law but as a source of injustice and corruption.

In the words of Mikhail Iampolski, a historian, Russia at present resembles a khanate in which local princes receive a licence to rule from the chief khan in the Kremlin. For the past decade the main job of the Moscow-appointed governors has been to provide votes for Mr Putin. In exchange they received a share of oil revenues and the right to rule as they see fit. Chechnya under Ramzan Kadyrov, a former warlord installed by Mr Putin, is a grotesque illustration of this. In the most recent presidential election, Chechnya provided 99.7% of its votes for Mr Putin with a turnout of 99.6%. In return, Mr Kadyrov receives subsidies and freedom to subject his people to his own "informal" taxes and Islamic rules. Moscow pays a dictatorial and corrupt Chechnya a vast due in return for Mr Kadyrov pretending to be part of Russia and pledging loyalty to Mr Putin.

If Mr Putin goes and the money runs out, Chechnya could be the first to break off. This would have a dramatic effect on the rest of the north Caucasus region. Neighbouring Dagestan, a far bigger and more complex republic than Chechnya, could fragment. A conflict in the Caucasus combined with the weakness of the central government in Russia could make other regions want to detach themselves from Moscow's problems.

Tatarstan, home to 2m Muslim ethnic Tatars and 1.5m ethnic Russians, could declare itself the separate khanate it was in the 15th century. It has a strong identity, a diverse economy, which includes its own oil firm, and a well-educated ruling class. It would form a special relationship with Crimea, which Crimean Tartars (at last able to claim their historic land) would declare an independent state.

The Ural region could form a republic-as it tried to do in 1993-around Yekaterinburg, Russia's fourth-largest city, or else it could form a union with Siberia. Siberia itself could revive its own identity, from a base in the cities of Krasnoyarsk and Irkutsk, and lay claim to its oil-and-gas riches, which it would sell to China. Unlike Russia, China might not have much interest in territorial expansion into the sparsely populated Far East and Siberia, but it could (and already does) colonise these regions economically. Vladivostok and Khabarovsk, two of the largest cities in the Far East, are more economically integrated with China and South Korea than they are with the European part of Russia.

Things fall apart-with nukes inside

Despite Russia's deep paranoia that America is trying to break it up, such a scenario is one of the West's worst nightmares. It opens the question of control over Russia's nuclear arms. Although the command centre would remain in Moscow, securing missiles spread across Russian territory could be harder than it was after the collapse of the Soviet Union. At the time, the Russians and Americans worked successfully together to move the nuclear arsenal from Ukraine and Kazakhstan to Russia. Ukraine was given a piece of paper-called the Budapest memorandum and signed by Russia, America and Britain-which guaranteed its territorial integrity in exchange for giving up its nuclear arms. Now, Russia's annexation of Crimea has made any such assurance worthless.

The spectre of disintegration is already haunting Russia. Politicians and pundits are scared to discuss it publicly. Shortly after annexing Crimea and stirring separatism in eastern Ukraine, the Kremlin introduced a law which makes "incitement of any action undermining Russia's own territorial integrity" a criminal offence. Yet the greatest threat to Russia's territorial integrity is posed by the Kremlin itself and its policies in Ukraine.

By breaking the post-Soviet borders, Mr Putin opened a Pandora's box. If Crimea "historically" belongs to Russia as he has claimed, what about Kaliningrad, the former Königsberg, an exclave which Germany lost to Russia after the second world war? Should not eastern Karelia, which Finland ceded to the Soviet Union after the winter war in 1940, be Finnish and the Kuril Islands return to Japan?

Even more perilously for Russia's future, Mr Putin brought into motion forces that thrive on war and nationalism. These are not the forces of imperial expansion-Russia lacks the dynamism, resources and vision that empire-building requires. They are forces of chaos and disorganisation. Eastern Ukraine has turned into a nest of criminals and racketeers. They cannot spread Russian civilisation, but they can spread anarchy.

In short, Russia under Mr Putin is much more fragile than it looks. Vyacheslav Volodin, his deputy chief of staff, recently equated Mr Putin with Russia: "No Putin, no Russia," he said. It is hard to think of a worse indictment.

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 #26
Valdai Discussion Club
August 5, 2015
Forty Years On: What Can We Learn from the Helsinki Final Act?
By Angela Stent
Angela Stent directs the Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies at Georgetown University and is the author of The Limits of Partnership: US-Russian Relations in the Twenty First Century.

Forty years ago this week, Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev and U.S. President Gerald Ford-along with leaders from thirty three other nations-signed the Helsinki Final Act, a landmark agreement that paved the way for closer ties between the East and West and ultimately facilitated the erosion of the communist system and the end of the Cold War. With relations between Russia and the West under great strain today, it is time to revisit and learn from these principles.

As far back as 1954, the Soviet Union had proposed convening a multilateral European security conference to ratify the postwar boundaries of Europe. At that time, the United States and its allies objected to recognizing what they viewed as the imposition of Soviet control over Eastern Europe, and so they demurred. Twenty years later, the success of Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik -including treaties normalizing relations with the USSR, Poland and East Germany -and the détente initiatives of the Richard Nixon administration had completely altered the Euro-Atlantic landscape. The USSR and the countries of the transatlantic alliance and the European neutrals were interested in negotiating an agreement that would stabilize Europe and promote more interaction between its two halves.

The Helsinki Agreement was divided into three "baskets" each of which was an essential triad of the vision of a more peaceful Europe. The first basket was political-military. It envisaged confidence-building measure to defuse the likelihood of war and it committed each signatory to respect the sovereignty and the inviolability of the territorial integrity of each country. In view of the unresolved German question, the agreement also permitted peaceful change of borders-providing all parties were in agreement to the change. The second basket was the economic-scientific one, encouraging trade and scientific cooperation between the signatories.

The third, and most controversial, was basket three, committing all the signatories to promote human rights within their own societies and to encourage free exchange of people and ideas between East and West, including exchanges of journalists and support for freedom of expression. The western countries had insisted on basket three in exchange for signing on to baskets one and two. Immediately after the agreement was signed, Helsinki monitoring groups were formed in all of the signatory countries, including the Soviet Union and the United States. Although these groups were often persecuted in countries that violated human rights, the fact that their leaders had signed the agreement enabled them to maintain some legitimacy in their own societies and to continue working for greater civil rights.

With the hindsight of 40 years, The Helsinki Final Act and subsequent meetings of the Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe (CSCE) achieved more than might have been expected in those tense Cold War days. As a result of  basket one, military confidence-building measures,--including bilateral and multilateral arms control treaties between the United States and the Soviet Union and between NATO and the Warsaw Pact --and the Conventional Forces in Europe agreement-significantly defused the risk of unintended war and forged constructive  ties between the military establishments of the signatory countries. Greater economic and scientific cooperation created groups of stakeholders with long-term interests in improved ties between East and West. And, despite many East-West disagreements over Basket Three, people-to-people contacts between the capitalist and communist countries increased and were undoubtedly one of the factors that eventually brought down the iron curtain.

Today, the world is multipolar, not bipolar and there are no longer two military-political blocks facing each other. The OSCE has replaced the CSCE and includes all the post-Soviet states, bringing the number of members to 57.  The OSCE's mandate has changed and today is focused on peace-keeping and monitoring the situation in Eastern Ukraine and other conflict areas in the post-Soviet space. But, implementation of all three of the Helsinki Act's baskets has been seriously compromised.

Today, much of Europe believes that the post-cold war European order is under a long-term threat of renewed armed conflict. Arms control measures are at a standstill and the rhetoric of nuclear conflict has resurfaced. Economic and scientific contacts have been curtailed, and new barriers are going up. And the continuation of human contacts, while vastly greater than they were during the Cold War, is in question, as some signatory states continue to restrict freedom of expression and movement.  

The current deteriorating situation is cause for alarm. Given the tense state of East-West relations, a first step toward emerging from the dangerous landscape in which the United States, Europe, Russia and the states of Eurasia find themselves would be to meet to revisit the original Helsinki concept even though the global environment is radically altered from forty years ago. But now, as then, a heightened likelihood of "accidents" and even conflict should persuade all sides that they must find a better way forward, one that will increase, rather than threaten, Euro-Atlantic security. This is all the more true with the common interests both sides have today - whether in terms of Islamic extremism or a healthier world economy.

In 2016, Germany will have the presidency of the OSCE. Since Germany played such a crucial role in initiating what became the Helsinki process and benefited greatly from it, Berlin could use this opportunity to initiate a broad discussion of how we can return to the Helsinki principles in the twenty-first century.

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 #27
Ukraine Today
http://uatoday.tv
August 5, 2015
Russian invasion in Ukraine planned since 2013 - Ukrainian official

50,000 Russian troops and 30,000 militants reported in east Ukraine now

UNIAN: Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Colonel-General Valery Gerasimov had been directly managing since 2013 the development and implementation of the criminal plan aimed at violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, Chief military prosecutor of Ukraine Anatoliy Matios said at a briefing in Kyiv on Wednesday, August 5.

"In July 2013, Gerasimov initiated the extension of powers of the General Staff for the coordination of all federal executive bodies," Matios said.

"From December 2013 to February 2014, using all kinds of media resources, the Russian Federation organized and launched information and propaganda subversion and a negative distortion of events during the Euromaidan," Matios said.

Read also Combined Russian forces in Ukraine estimated at 80,000

In addition, according to Matios, in March-April 2014, Russia organized training, financing, and also the supply of weapons, ammunition and military equipment to criminal groups who, under the direct supervision of reconnaissance and sabotage groups of the Main Intelligence Directorate, along with the units of the Russian Cossacks and the Russian Vostok volunteer battalion established the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republic terrorist organizations, having seized the administrative buildings and key facilities of military and civilian infrastructure.

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 #28
Euromaidan Press
http://euromaidanpress.com
August 4, 2015
Moscow mulling 'nuclear provocation' against Ukraine, Kyiv analyst says
By Paul Goble

To overcome the stalemate on the ground and to get itself out of the diplomatic corner it has painted itself into by vetoing the UN Security Council resolution on the Malaysian airliner tribunal, Moscow appears to be planning an act of "nuclear provocation" against Ukraine so as to turn the tables on Kyiv and the West, according to a Ukrainian analyst.

In his article on Khvylya.net, Sergey Klimovsky argues that Moscow is now in a position where one must "consider seriously" the possibility that Russia will try to organize a small nuclear explosion possibly of a dirty bomb that it would be able to place the blame on Ukraine.

The Ukrainian military and its supporters have forced the Kremlin from launching a direct invasion this summer, Klimovsky says, and their firmness have led the Russian side to shift from hybrid war to a more normal kind and "to go from attack to active defense." But that clearly is not sufficient from Moscow's point of view.

For any breakthrough to happen, he continues, Russia will need more fighters and more technology, especially since the shift from hybrid to regular war threatens to make it into a world conflict. Technically, Russia is "more or less" prepared for this. But "psychologically, the Russian Federation is not ready for such a war," and so the Kremlin is trying to remedy that.

Russian military flights over the Baltic and Europe are not only acts designed to intimidate the West, Klimovsky says, they are intended to make Russians accustomed to the idea that "their army can bomb something in Europe and that from this is required the expression of 100 percent approval of the party, government and bombings."

That this is what is going on was suggested by Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the Kremlin's "covert mouthpiece," in comments on July 31. He called for renaming the Russian Federation to the Russian Empire, promised to put "half the world on its knees," and assured Russians that Turks would give them massages and Italians would cook them spaghetti.

His words were warmly supported by his audience almost to Putinesque levels, Klimovsky says.

The next day, "The Times" of London carried a story entitled "Ukraine rebels 'building dirty bomb' with Russian scientists." Its source was the Ukrainian intelligence service, and the "DNR" hastened to respond with a non-denial denial: a bunker with radioactive waste exists there, but no one is working with it.

That wasn't enough, so then propagandists for the Russian-occupied areas suggested that the US was preparing a nuclear bomb there and planning to use it against the Russians in the Donbas. Such absurdities are the norm in Russia's info war, Klimovsky says, "but the threat of a nuclear terrorist act on the occupied portion of the Donbas and in Rostov oblast is real."

The reason for that is "Churkin's veto at the UN" on a resolution calling for a tribunal about the Malaysian airliner. Having cast it, Russia in effect "admitted that its forces shot down the passenger jet. If the Russian Federation had not been involved, then it would have supported the creation of the tribunal."

Having landed in this position, Klimovsky says, "the Kremlin had to immediately create someone who could be called a greater terrorist than Russia." A terrorist act in Africa wouldn't have been enough to end the opprobrium visited on Moscow but an attack supposedly orchestrated by "'the bloody junta from Kyiv" again Russians would be "convincing."

"A nuclear strike on the Donbas" would cause people to forget about the tribunal and would be used by Moscow to "justify its annexation of Crimea." The Russian side would claim that "Kyiv apparently had not given up its nuclear arms" and "therefore Russia had done the right thing by seizing Crimea since Ukraine itself had violated the Budapest agreement."

The most probable places where such an incident could be carried out and then blamed on the Ukrainians are Debaltseve, Shyrokyne and Horlivka. The first, where a train brought "an important cargo" on July 30 that required guards, would work because it is near Ukrainian front lines and the total population is much smaller because many have left.

A thousand casualties from such an explosion would be enough for Moscow to begin talking about "a new Hiroshima." And of course, "the Kremlin would be very happy if the wind would carry the radiation from an explosion further into Ukraine." It might even arrange to have this happen on August 24, Ukraine's Independence Day.

The other two sites would also serve, Shyrokyne because it would reduce Russian losses in an eventual attack on Mariupol and Horlivka because a nuclear explosion there could set up a series of chemical explosions. The number of victims all that would cause make it perhaps "the most suitable candidate for Hiroshima-2," as Russia Today would undoubtedly claim.

Right now, Klimovsky says, "three things can prevent a [Russian-orchestrated] nuclear terrorist act in Donbas:" the creation of a UN tribunal on the downing of the Malaysian aircraft, the introduction of UN peacekeepers into the Donbas, and the winds, which normally at this time of year would carry any radioactive cloud into Russia.

For the time being, the Khvylya.net commentator concludes, "the winds are the most reliable means."

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 #29
Al Jazeera America
http://america.aljazeera.com
August 5, 2015
Reaching the endgame in Ukraine
All parties say they want to comply with the Minsk 2 agreement, but compliance remains uncertain
By John Batchelor  
John Batchelor is a novelist and host of a national radio news show based in New York City.

Over the last several weeks, the 15-month-old Ukraine crisis took fresh steps toward resolution in a series of teleconference calls by the Normandy Four - the heads of France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine.

Beginning July 10, French President François Hollande and German Chancellor Angela Merkel urged Ukraine President Petro Poroshenko and Ukrainian parliament chairman Volodymyr Hroisman to comply with all the terms of the February 2015 Minsk 2 agreement.

Minsk 2 demands, among other things, a cease-fire in the Donbass region; a restoration of Ukraine's control over the border of the whole country, including the conflict zones; and constitutional reform that would decentralize power and grant more autonomy to the Donetsk and Luhansk districts in the separatist Donbass region.

Russian President Vladimir Putin joined in the consultation on July 17 and 24, the first times the four leaders spoke together since April 30.

The fourth teleconference focused on a hot spot on the Donbass cease-fire line, the village of Shyrokyne, and there was a demand by France and Germany that Kiev's and the separatists' forces withdraw by Aug. 3. The deadline has passed with incomplete results and protests in nearby Mariupol by Kiev supporters.

These teleconferences highlight a general desire to resolve the civil war with the terms of the Minsk 2 agreement by the end of 2015. The question is whether the United States, Poroshenko's major backer, will accept these terms.

What Paris and Berlin want

Hollande and Merkel have been adamant that Kiev must accept the empowerment of the two separatists entities of the Donbass: the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic.

Paris and Berlin want Ukraine's constitution reconstructed to permit Donetsk and Luhansk to hold local elections, leading to the creation of legitimate institutions.

"Local elections held under Ukrainian law and with respect for the corresponding commitments will be an important milestone," a statement from Hollande's office said.

Paris and Berlin have insisted to Kiev that the only way to maintain the armistice and restore stability to Ukraine is to follow the Minsk 2 agreement and permit Donetsk and Luhansk a special status that would amount to independence under Russian military and civil protection.

In the calls, Poroshenko complained that there was no cease-fire along the Donbass frontier, that Russia was arming and commanding the separatist forces and that Russia has no intention of honoring the Minsk 2 agreement.

Poroshenko argued that his government plans to allow "specific procedures of local self-administration in certain districts of the Donetsk and Luhansk provinces." However, this change would be far less than the autonomy sought by the separatists.

Congress has been eager for some time to commit lethal aid to Ukraine. In the event of renewed combat, the pressure on the U.S. and NATO to intervene will be even greater.
In addition, the Ukrainian parliament has called for elections to be held on Oct. 25 in all regions of Ukraine except Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk.

What Russia and the US want

Putin has been firm that the Kiev moves so far are inadequate.

"The attempt to present the constitutional amendments ... as some kind of fulfillment by Kiev of its Minsk obligations is just an imitation and should not fool anybody," Russia's Foreign Ministry said.

Putin wants Kiev immediately to establish direct talks with the Donetsk and Luhansk authorities. Putin said this was the critical element in the Minsk 2 agreement, looking to establish a special status for the separatist regions.

Putin also wants Kiev to grant independent powers to all regions of Ukraine and to grant near autonomy in the Russian-dominated regions by year's end.

While the U.S. is not a party to Minsk 2, as the chief supporter of the Poroshenko government, it serves as a counter to the combined weight of Berlin, Paris and Moscow.

During a visit to Kiev to meet with Poroshenko on July 16, Victoria Nuland, the assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian  affairs, demanded that Russia withdraw all its forces from Ukraine, cease supplying the separatists with weaponry and logistics, exchange all prisoners of war and return the Ukraine-Russia border to Kiev's control.

To back up these points, the U.S. announced that it would expand U.S. military training of the Ukrainian volunteer national guard in western Ukraine to include special forces as well as the regular Ukrainian army. More than two dozen U.S. allies participated in the training exercise, outside Lviv, Ukraine.

Endgame

The major concern in Berlin, Paris and Moscow is that the often violated cease-fire along the Donbass front will collapse. This is why the sudden concern for Shyrokyne, where both sides have massed first-rate troops and weapons systems.

The Kremlin understands that a return to the heavy fighting of last winter will give the U.S. and NATO proof that Russia has decided to crush Kiev.

On the other hand, Kiev understands that the longer the cease-fire continues, the more likely it is that the Donbass will be empowered as a Russian protectorate, either by voting or by the facts on the ground.

Also, Kiev knows that there is a larger risk than just losing control of Crimea and the Donbass. Other regions of the remaining state, such as the Russian-sympathetic Odessa province and the Russia-hating neo-fascist cults in western Ukraine, along the border with Poland, may go their own way rather than remain part of a weakened Ukrainian state.

All parties face a crossroads: either diplomacy or a wider war.

Russia will likely achieve its goals as long as direct negotiations continue among the Normandy Four to implement Minsk 2.

On the other hand, if large-scale fighting starts again on the Donbass front, Kiev will be in a strong position to call on U.S. assistance to reclaim its whole territory. Congress has been eager for some time to commit lethal aid to Ukraine. In the event of renewed combat, the pressure on the U.S. and NATO to intervene will be even greater.

In that case, there is a high risk of a wider conflict and a profound European emergency.

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 #30
New York Observer
http://observer.com
August 4, 2015
Can the United States Stop a War With Russia?
Both sides need to try to see the other's point of view
By Jack Hanick
Jack Hanick recently completed the development of a state of the art television network in Moscow, built without government funding. Its evening news program broadcasts to 65 million homes in Russia across eight time zones. Previously Jack was a TV director, where he won the New York Emmy in 1994 for best director. His biography of Desmond Tutu also won a New York Emmy. Currently Jack is Chairman of the Board of HellasNet, a group of TV stations in Greece.

America is heading for war with Russia. Some call the current situation  "an increase of hostility" or "Cold War II." There are two sides to this story. I believe that American journalists from all political persuasions are not offering critical analysis. Understanding the Russian side and taking their arguments seriously can help prevent serious consequences.

Americans believe that Russians are fed propaganda by the state-controlled media. If Russians only could hear the truth, the thinking goes, they would welcome the US position. This is not so. There are more than 300 TV stations available in Moscow. Only 6 are state-controlled. The truth is that Russians prefer hearing the news from the state rather than the Internet or other sources. This is different from almost any other country. It is not North Korea where the news is censored. Each night during the Crimea crisis, anyone could watch CNN or the BBC bash Russia.

With regard to Ukraine, Russia has drawn a red line: It will never allow Ukraine to be part of NATO. Russia sees the US as the aggressor, surrounding Russia with military bases in Eastern Europe at every opportunity since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The US sees Russia as the aggressor against its neighbors. A small misstep could lead to war. This time the war will not be "over there." The Russian bombers flying off the California coast on July 4th clearly demonstrate this point. Russians understand that the US has not fought a war on its soil since the civil war. If new hostilities start, Russia will not let the war be a proxy war where the US supplies weapons and advisors and lets others do the "boots on the ground" combat. Russia will take the war to the US. How did we reach this critical point in such a short time?

First, some background. I moved to Moscow two and a half years ago. I went to Russia to build a non-government funded news channel with editorial views consistent with the Russian Orthodox Church. I have completed that task and returned to the west. I see both sides of this escalating conflict and unless there is a change in thinking, the result will be catastrophic. When I first arrived, the relationship between the US and Russia seemed normal. As an American, my ideas were welcomed, even sought after. At the time, Mr. Obama planned to attack Assad's army in Syria for crossing the "red line" for a chemical weapon attack.  Russia intervened and persuaded Syria to destroy its chemical weapons. Mr. Putin had helped Mr. Obama save face and not make a major blunder in Syria. Shortly after, Mr. Putin wrote an editorial published in the New York Times, which was generally well-received. Relations appeared to be on the right course. There was cooperation in the Middle East and Russia phobia was easing.

t prevented sexual propaganda to minors. This was the start of tensions. The LGBT lobby in the West saw this law as anti-gay. I did not. The law was a direct copy of English law and was intended to prevent pedophilia, not consenting relationships between adults. Gay relations in Russia are not illegal (although not accepted by the majority of the public). Regarding gay protests, they were restricted from view of children. I saw this in the same way that we in America restrict children from seeing  "R" rated films. The punishment for breaking this law is a fine of less than $100. Double-parking a car in Moscow carries a heavier fine of $150. Nonetheless the reaction was overwhelming against Russia.

The boycott of the Sochi Olympics was the West's way of discrediting Russia. Russia saw this boycott as an aggressive act by the West to interfere with its internal politics and to embarrass Russia. Sochi was for Russians a great source of national pride and had nothing to do with politics. For the West, this was the first step in creating the narrative that Russia was the old repressive Soviet Union and Russia must be stopped.

Then came the color revolution in the Ukraine. When the president of Ukraine was overthrown, from a Russian viewpoint this was a Western organized coup. The overthrow of a democratically elected president signaled that the West was interested in an expansion of power, not democratic values. The leaked recorded conversations of Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland and US Ambassador Geoffrey Pyatt suggested that the US was actively involved in regime change in the Ukraine. For Russia, the Ukrainians are their brothers, much more than any other group. The languages are similar; they are linked culturally and religiously. Kiev played a central role in the Christianization of Russia. Many Russians have family members in Ukraine. For Russians, this special relationship was destroyed by outside forces. Imagine if Canada suddenly aligned itself with Russia or China. The US would surely see that as a threat on its border and act decisively.

When the Soviet Union collapsed, from an American viewpoint, the borders of Eastern Europe were frozen. However in the late 1990s, the borders of Yugoslavia changed, breaking that country apart. Russians had accepted Kiev's rule of Crimea since 1954 as a trusted brother might watch a family property. But when that brother no longer is a part of the family, Russia wanted Crimea back. Crimea also wanted Russia back. Crimeans speak Russian and are closely tied to their 300-year Russian heritage. From the Russian point of view, this was a family matter and of no concern to the West, The sanctions imposed were seen as aggression by the West to keep Russia in its place.

Sanctions are driving Russia away from the West and toward China. Chinese tourism in Russia is at record levels. More transactions are now settled directly between Rubles and Yuan, with the US dollar's role as middleman being limited. Although the dollar remains strong now, this is deceptive. China has created the AIIB bank to directly compete against the IMF for world banking power and the US is having trouble preventing its allies from joining. This is the first crack in US financial domination as a direct result of sanctions.

We are moving closer and closer to a real war. Republicans and Democrats talk tough on foreign policy towards Russia. When all politicians are in agreement, there is no discussion of alternative approaches. Any alternative to complete isolation of Russia and a NATO build up on Russia's borders is a sign of weakness. Any alternative to this military build up is criticized as "appeasement," likened to the failed foreign policy of British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain toward Nazi Germany between 1937 and 1939.

Liberal Democrats historically are anti-war, but not this time. In the Czech Republic, there was the start of an anti-war movement when NATO paraded its military along its borders. "Tanks but no thanks" became a rallying cry. Czechs became uncomfortable with a muscle flexing approach to the standoff. Only a lone libertarian, Ron Paul raises a critique of the wisdom of this military build up.

The mistake that will cost America dearly is the assumption that Russia has the same ambitions as the Soviet Union. The cold war strategy used against the Soviet Union cannot be repeated with the same result. The Soviet Union was communist and atheistic. Modern Russia has returned to its Christian roots. There is a revival in Russian Orthodoxy with over 25,000 new churches built in Russia after the fall of Communism. On any Sunday, the churches are packed. Over 70% of the population identifies themselves as Orthodox Christians. Combine this religious revival with renewed Nationalism and Russia is growing in self-confidence.

The Marxist ideology followed by the Soviet Union was evangelistic. Only when the whole world became communist will Marxist principles be realized. When collective farms missed their goals, it was because the whole world wasn't communist yet, not because the ideology destroyed individual initiative. For this reason, the Soviet Union needed to dominate the whole world. For modern Russia, world domination is not its goal. Russia wants to keep its Russian identity and not lose it to outside forces.

Russian history is filled with invaders trying to conquer Russia. Napoléon and Hitler are only the latest examples. Russia has always prevailed. Driving in from the airport, you can see exactly how close Hitler came to Moscow. You are also reminded that it was here that he was stopped. Russia is sure that they will repel the newest invader NATO.

A war with Russia cannot be won economically. Russia has oil and an abundance of natural resources. It occupies the largest landmass in the world. It is growing in its ability to replace goods restricted from the west. A proxy war using the Ukrainian army will not solve the problem.

There is still time to make a deal. More sanctions, and more isolation from the West are not the way to resolve differences. The US flexing its military muscle will not solve the problems. War is not the answer but too often in history becomes the only solution when two sides refuse to see the other's point of view.

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 #31
Moscow Times
August 5, 2015
Old East-West Divide Is Deepening in Ukraine
By Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska
Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska is blogs editor at E-International Relations and the lead editor of Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives.

It wasn't a good idea to drive a car with plates from Donetsk. Driving through the streets of Kiev, Lesia Litvinova, a volunteer with one of the local organizations helping new arrivals from the Donbass, felt overwhelmed. Hearing insults has now become part of her experience on the road.

Ever since the Euromaidan protests early last year and the beginning of the war in the Donbass - which has been accompanied by a huge inflow of internally displaced persons (IDPs) into the rest of Ukraine - the old prejudices about the inhabitants of the eastern part of Ukraine have been on the rise.

Accused by many of supporting the Russian-backed separatists, people from the Donbass have often found it difficult to adjust to the realities of their new cities. Blamed for the war, they arrive in new towns often without any contacts and have nowhere to go, which reinforces their feeling of isolation.

But according to Lesia Litvinova, those who have decided to move to Kiev and other cities far from the war zone are usually those who don't support the actions of the separatists and have run away from political persecution and war.

The Ukrainian government, faced with war in the east as well as economic difficulties, has not made any coordinated effort to tackle the prejudices and stereotypes against the IDPs or disseminate information related to their displacement.

The efforts to improve the general situation of the IDPs have also been largely inadequate, with volunteer organizations virtually taking over the role of the state in supporting the IDPs.

Nevertheless, a benefit system has been established, which entitles every registered internally displaced individual to 440 hyrvnas ($20) a month for the first two months of displacement, and 220 hyrvnas ($10) for the following two months. Pensioners and families with children are entitled to higher benefits, but the amounts are not enough to make ends meet.

Adding to that, IDPs face a number of difficulties concerning access to health care, psychological trauma, inadequate living conditions and a lack of employment opportunities. The two latter issues have been particularly significant, with many employers and landlords in Ukraine stating that applications from former residents of the Donbass will not be considered.

These prejudices combined with the economic crisis have led to deeper social tensions. Tensions are usually even worse in small towns, where IDPs often live next door to the families of soldiers fighting the separatists in eastern Ukraine.

However, according to Galina, an escapee from Luhansk and a volunteer with one of Odessa's organizations working with the IDPs, harmful stereotypes are also widespread in the rebel-held territories. People in Luhansk often resent the new authorities in Kiev. "When there is a shelling, you don't know who is shooting. And then they tell you that it's the Ukrainian army," she said.

''For three months there was no water or electricity, mobile phones didn't work and there was no access to information. People believed in what they were told; that Ukrainians want to kill everyone and that there are concentration camps in Ukraine," she added.

But anti-Ukrainian sentiment in eastern Ukraine is not a new phenomenon. There have never been any major Ukrainian patriotic groups in Luhansk, and Russian was the only language of instruction in the majority of schools. Galina learned Ukrainian at school, but it wasn't compulsory. Luhansk did not develop a strong loyalty to Kiev.

Soon afterward, out of the fear of persecution, Galina left for Odessa. She has recently received a permit to go to Luhansk so that she can visit her elderly mother. But she's not sure if she's going to use it.

Vika, a volunteer living in Kiev, left her home in Luhansk along with her husband and three children during military operations in the area. When the fighting was over and she returned to visit her family, she was greeted with suspicion.

During a visit to her former school, her old teacher warned her that people may not like the fact that she had moved to Kiev and that she should be careful. "I don't want my three kids to grow up in Luhansk," Vika said, "it would be a step backwards."

However, it would be incorrect to assume that all the people who remained in the rebel-held territories support the separatists. Many of those who decided to stay did so out of fear of indiscriminate shelling, a lack of knowledge about how to leave, disability or simply because they had nowhere else to go and didn't want to leave their whole life behind.

And the situation of those who remained has often been dramatic. Many humanitarian organizations were forced out of the territory by the rebels, including the International Rescue Committee. Access to some of the most vulnerable people, especially inhabitants of remote villages in the Luhansk region, has been very limited and a large number of people have been left without any assistance.

To make matters worse, since last year, the Ukrainian government has suspended salary payments to public sector workers and stopped payments such as pensions and social benefits to inhabitants of rebel-held territories. This decision has reinforced the feeling of abandonment and isolation on the part of the population and generated more resentment toward the government in Kiev.

In order to receive their payments, people were forced to travel to government-controlled areas; yet this has often proved difficult, due to frequent shelling and destroyed infrastructure. The introduction of a permit system to enter government-controlled areas has made things even more difficult.

At the same time, since early April, the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk people's republics started paying pensions in Russian rubles and there have been reports suggesting that the rebels have been paying salaries to public sector workers, although on an irregular basis.

This development has further isolated the Donbass region from the rest of Ukraine and it will make the resolution of the conflict even more difficult.

Internal displacement in Ukraine will be a protracted process and there have been few cases so far of people returning home. The Minsk agreements did not stop the exchange of fire in the east and the number of people fleeing from the Donbass is constantly growing.

What's more, there is little to suggest that the situation of the internally displaced, or those remaining in the rebel-held territories, will improve any time soon. The mutual resentment, stereotypes, propaganda and often inadequate policies of the government in Kiev make any prospect for future reconciliation difficult, regardless of what happens in the Donbass.

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 #32
Wall Street Journal
August 5, 2015
IMF Says Ukraine Bailout Faces 'Significant Uncertainty'
Weak economic prospects and potential shocks from the conflict with Russian separatists could derail program
By IAN TALLEY

WASHINGTON-Ukraine's bailout faces "significant uncertainty" even if the government is able to secure a debt-restructuring deal, the International Monetary Fund warned Tuesday.

The IMF's comments, made in a report on the fund's bailout program for Ukraine, come as the finance ministry in Kiev signaled it expected to reach a debt-relief deal this week with creditors.

The emergency lender expects Kiev to clinch a $15 billion restructuring agreement as part of a $40 billion international emergency finance package, a deal that will require creditors to accept losses on their bondholdings.

Kiev has threatened a moratorium on payments if the ad hoc creditors' committee doesn't agree to the government's terms. The finance ministry said Tuesday it had sent a revised proposal to the committee, and recent days have seen the two sides move closer to a deal after a rocky start to talks.

"Given the legal considerations around timely implementation of the proposal, this week will be decisive for the negotiations," the government said. The Ukrainian government is scheduling high-level talks in London on Thursday, the ministry said.

But even if Kiev seals a debt-relief deal, the IMF said the continuing conflict with Russian-backed separatists in the east of the country, as well as questionable growth and export prospects could thwart the program.

"Risks to the outlook remain exceptionally high," the IMF's economists said, largely pointing to the threat of the conflict escalating. The IMF has had to repeatedly cut its forecasts for the country over the last two years, saying in July it expects the country's economy to contract by 9% this year. The conflict ravaged Ukraine's already weak economy, sending the exchange rate into a nose dive, depleting emergency cash reserves and forcing a much tougher budget belt-tightening than originally expected.

Still, Ukraine's pro-West government has pushed through a series of stout budget cuts and economic overhauls, including tackling a deeply rooted culture of corruption. Those efforts, along with the emergency financing, appear to be putting the economy back on a path toward health, the IMF said.

"We see tentative signs of macroeconomic stabilization," said Nikolay Gueorguiev, the IMF's mission chief for Ukraine's bailout. The exchange rate is stabilizing, the central bank is building up reserves, deposits are gradually increasing and the state accounts are becoming more sustainable, he said.

One unresolved issue is how the IMF and Ukraine will treat the $3 billion in bonds Russia lent to the country right before Moscow-backed President Viktor Yanukovych fled the country in early 2014 in the face of mass protests.

Under the IMF's rules, the fund can't lend to a country that owes debt to official creditors, such as the Russian government. Moscow says that $3 billion debt is "official" and the Kremlin isn't prepared to restructure. Ukraine, and some in the IMF, have argued those bonds should be considered private-sector debt. That would allow the IMF to move ahead with its bailout even if Kiev institutes a moratorium on payments and doesn't honor its obligation due in December. Some outside economists say it would be difficult, if not impossible, for Ukraine to meet the fund's debt-relief goal without including those bonds in the restructuring, raising questions about whether the IMF can continue to lend to the country.

Mr. Gueorguiev said the board must make the decision on how the fund will treat that debt, but has so far failed to discuss the issue.

"There are a number of ways in which to reach the program objectives" on debt, he said when asked about whether Moscow's refusal to restructure the $3 billion could jeopardize the bailout. He declined to elaborate whether that meant the IMF doesn't believe that debt needs to be restructured, or whether the IMF would give Kiev blessing to initiate a moratorium on payments.

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#33
http://readrussia.com
August 3, 2015
Ukraine: Milk Producer Copes with Russian Sanctions
By Editors

A poster child for Ukrainian business became one of the first big casualties of the Russian-Ukrainian political crisis and is desperately looking for new markets in Europe.

Up until 2014, international media covered the accomplishments of Anatoly Yurkevich, a notable businessman, as a classic success story. The Ukrainian entrepreneur had become of the dairy market leaders, taking his company to a successful IPO and built successful brands in a highly competitive market, brands that represent quality and freshness. Starting in 2014, as the relations between Russia and Ukraine deteriorated and became dominated by political and military conflict, Yurkevich's case became a classic example of political and financial risks that brought a major Ukrainian supplier of dairy products to the brink of bankruptcy.

Anatoly Yurkevich bought his first cheese dairy in 1997. He was 28 at the time, and like many others then, he made his money more or less accidentally. He was a sprat dealer, and dairy products were a completely new business to him. His mother, Olga Yurkevich, took charge of production processes and quality control at the cheese factory. Now, 18 years later, she is still a board member responsible for quality control at Yurkevich's Milkiland dairy holding company.

By 2013, Milkiland was a major dairy market player in Ukraine. The Yurkeviches controlled 72% in the holding company by that time. The company managed 10 milk processing plants in six of Ukraine's regions, making consumer products under Dobryana and Kolyada brands. The company also controls the privately-held Milkiland Agro LLC, comprising 14 farms that lease more than 50,000 acres (23,000 hectares) of farming land to raise dairy cattle and grow grain crops.

Milkiland N.V. has traded on the Warsaw Stock Exchange since 2010, which made a lot of sense, given Poland's proximity to Ukraine and the developed business and trade between the two countries, as well as Poland's strong market potential and its role as a source of advanced technologies for Ukraine. However, investment in a seemingly stable producer of cheeses and dairy products in one of European markets with the largest upside has turned sour for Polish investors: after a short period of stock price growth following the IPO, the stock declined by 96% over the following four years, from its December 2010 high.

Milkiland was one of the earliest and worst victims of political tensions between Russia and Ukraine. The company received 64% of its revenues from Russia in 2012. The Russian consumer watchdog Rospotrebnadzor banned imports of Milkiland Ukraine's dairy products to Russia in July 2014. Milkiland now has only one Russian asset, the Ostankino Dairy Plant, and the Russian market is effectively closed to the rest of the group. Trade restrictions imposed by Russia on Ukraine and the EU have resulted in the group's unit sales of cheese dropping by 28%. The company also lost EUR 41.9 million on foreign exchange fluctuations in March - December 2014.

Milkiland already had to deal with restrictions on exporting its products to Russia imposed by Rospotrebnadzor. The Russian watchdog banned imports of cheeses produced by Prometei, a Milkiland subsidiary, in February 2012. The Russian authorities said at the time that the Ukrainian producer was using excessive quantities of vegetable oil in its products. The ban was lifted in late May 2012.

Rospotrebnadzor's latest ban cut the overall demand for Milkiland's products by 75%, and the company had to find ways quickly to help its sales recover. Weak consumer demand in Ukraine is the worst in the premium segment, which includes Milkiland's cheeses. The company has been forced to step up production of cheaper, low-margin cheeses, which did little to stem the decline of its sales. Because Russia has traditionally been the main market for Ukrainian food producers, many of them had to build semi-legal channels to continue selling their output in Russia.

Dairy market analysts believe that Milkiland could have been engaging in illegal imports of cheese and dairy products to Russia, joining other Ukrainian food producers in flouting Russian sanctions. Ukrainian food would be marked as originating from Russia, then would be taken across the border without paying an import tax at a friendly border crossing checkpoint that would overlook likely violations, and then be sent for repackaging for retail at a Russian facility. Milkiland could use its only Russian asset, Ostankino Dairy Plant, for operating this scheme.

Those who have worked side by side with Yurkevich recall his fanaticism towards his business. Denis Sergiyenko, former CEO of Milkiland Agro, a chain of farms owned by Milkiland, told Forbes in an interview that Yurkevich's office at Milkiland was very Spartan, with nothing but a desk, a chair, and a wall chart of the company's performance. Yurkevich's management style combines personal responsibility with close control over every small detail. He controls everyone in his companies, including his mother, who has to get his approval for any investments in excess of US$ 50,000, Sergiyenko says.

There are substantial benefits to the founder managing the company: he knows the business and key customers like the back of his hand, he can instantly make crucial decisions and he does not need to spend time and effort or build political coalitions to have his decisions approved by management. On the other hand, this can result in treating the company as "his baby" rather than a business venture, sometimes leading to emotionally-motivated decisions which can be destructive for the business in the long term. And the possible violations, while they may seem excusable at the time as the best way to save the company, can damage the company's business prospects in Russia in the future.

Igor Zyuzin's Mechel, a Russian steel and coal giant, is a textbook example of what can go wrong with a company managed hands-on by its owner. The steel company went on a debt-financed M&A spree, building up its vertical integration. Steel price collapsed, sending Zyuzin's business model into turmoil, and his company is now worth a fraction of its debt. Milkiland has run a similar course, although on a smaller scale: Yurkevich added several new processing and farming assets to his holding company to expand its capacity. Milkiland N.V. borrowed EUR 100 million, but then missed several debt repayment dates and breached some of the loan covenants concerning its Debt to EBITDA and EBITDA to Interest ratios. The syndicated loan was arranged by Raiffeisen Bank International AG and provided by UniCredit Bank Austria AG and Raiffeisen Bank ZAO (Russia). Milkiland announced plans to complete debt restructuring by September 2015, however, this is not the first time it is making such promises.

Raiffeisen and Unicredit offer no comment on the status of their loans to Milkiland, but experts believe the loans may have to be a written off, as Milkiland does not have enough cash to pay them back.

In addition to problems with his dairy empire's debt, Yurkevich has also ruined his reputation in the Ukrainian banking community by letting Ukrainian Professional Bank (UPB), which he controlled, to go under. The National Bank of Ukraine put UPB in receivership on May 28, 2015, after detecting multiple regulatory violations and risky financial practices. The regulator-appointed receiver is currently investigating the bank's operations for any possible violations by its owners, but UPB's bankruptcy has already served to lower the confidence in Ukraine's banking system.

Yurkevich has also failed in his attempt to diversify his business and gain direct access to consumers by branching out into retail, by investing in Kraina and Magellan grocery retail chains. Yurkevich told Forbes Magazine in an interview that his mistake was to delegate too much operating control to hired managers and not keeping closer tabs on running his new business. However, a more likely cause of his debacle was the protracted financial crisis which has forced commercial property rents to plummet and dramatically reduced consumer demand in Ukraine. Yurkevich financed his construction projects with a loan from VTB Ukraine Bank. The media reported recently that Yurkevich was not servicing the loan and was getting ready to sell the retail mall properties, while demanding that VTB "forgive" a substantial portion of the loan.

Like many other Ukrainian companies, Yurkevich's Milkiland was geared to sell on the Russian market. And when normal trade between the two countries became no longer possible, Yurkevich was unable to defend his company's long-term interests, effectively blocking its access to the Russian market because of the many restrictions. His company's worsening financials and conflict with banks also made it nearly impossible to raise funds in Ukraine or overseas. Milkiland will most likely have to restructure its business significantly to recover its market positions in Russia and Ukraine.

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 #34
The Huffington Post
August 3, 2015
Ukraine's Ministry of Truth -- A Flop of Epic Proportions
By Samuel Ramani
MPhil student, University of Oxford

The Kyiv Post reported on July 15, 2015, that Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers had registered draft legislation to establish Ukraine Tomorrow, a state-owned foreign broadcasting company. Ukraine Tomorrow strives to be Ukraine's answer to Russia Today: a media outlet that can resist the almost incessant influx of Russian propaganda to the conflict-ridden Donbas region. It is also the signature achievement of Petro Poroshenko's much-maligned Ministry of Information Policy. That ministry was established in December 2014 to stop the spread of "biased information about Ukraine" and "Russian information aggression."

The establishment of this state TV channel has been controversial. Since its inception, critics of Yuriy Stets (Ukraine's Minister of Information Policy) and Poroshenko have derided the information ministry as an organ of censorship or more bluntly, a real-life version of George Orwell's Ministry of Truth. While these accusations are extreme and independent media outlets like Hromadske TV have been unhindered by Stets' ministry, Ukraine Tomorrow faces a massive uphill battle if it is to be taken seriously by the Ukrainian public. There is little evidence that the Ministry's message has resonated with the public thus far.

The ministry's lack of traction can be explained by two factors. First, media market saturation and the Russian state media's massive financial resource advantage have restricted Poroshenko's ability to spread the Ministry's line. Second, the ministry's use of propaganda to fight propaganda has severely eroded its credibility among moderate Ukrainians. Russian media stations have also exploited the ministry's stated mission and rhetoric as proof that Ukraine's leaders are authoritarian extremists. While Ukraine Tomorrow is undoubtedly a major step forward for the Ministry's development, these obstacles will likely prevent it from having the major impact that Poroshenko envisioned eight months ago.

Why Market Saturation and Russian Financial Advantages will undermine the Ukraine Tomorrow Project

One of the main obstacles the Ministry of Information faces in reaching the conflict zone in Eastern Ukraine is Russian media market saturation. Mark Rachkevych, Editor-at-large at the Kyiv Post, described this issue to me in a recent interview as follows: "Eastern Ukraine has been predominantly exposed to Russian media outlets since the 1990s. Marketing research has consistently shown that people in this region prefer Russian television. Satellite TVs are widespread and people who have these TVs choose Russian channels."

The Russian state media's overwhelming financial advantages have further restricted the spread of the Ministry of Information Policy's message. Putin raised the budget for "participation in the international information space" (code for spreading the Kremlin's official line internationally) to $250 million in late 2014. This is an extraordinary deployment of resources in a period of austerity. Paul Gregory of Forbes reported in December 2014 that Putin's army of trolls were instructed to post 100,000 news articles and tweets every day. Such extensive exposure for pro-Kremlin viewpoints makes it very difficult for Ukrainian counter-propaganda to break through.

Many Ukrainian journalists and media watchdogs have therefore expressed opposition to the Ministry of Information Policy, as its goals appear futile and redundant. Tetiana Matychak, Co-founder and Editor-in-Chief of StopFake, an NGO created to counter disinformation about the Ukraine conflict explained these sentiments to me as follows: "We wonder how the state TV channel will be different from the private home TV channel, Ukraine Today established by billionaire businessman Ihor Kolomoyskyi. It cannot possible compete with Russia Today as RT has so much money. I don't think creating a state-run TV channel is a good use of Ukrainian government money, as Ukrainian businessmen can create more successful channels without government support."

Why Ukraine Tomorrow and The Ministry of Information Policy's Propaganda Will Backfire

Many Ukrainian journalists initially expressed alarm that the Ministry of Information Policy was a relic of Soviet-era suppression of the free press. On December 2, 2014, 40 journalists demonstrated outside the Ukrainian parliament, attacking the ambiguity of the Ministry's mission. The Ukrainian government and military responded to this unrest by emphasizing that Russian-backed separatists were actively trying to recruit journalists in Eastern Ukraine. Counter-propaganda and possible travel restrictions for journalists in the conflict zone were therefore necessary contingencies to combat domestic terrorism in Ukraine.

This justification was unconvincing. Protests and organized resistance to the Ministry continued, and RFERL reported that some activists described the Ministry as a Nazi-style apparatus. In light of this opposition, the Ukrainian government has been careful to ensure that the Ministry does not infringe on media freedom in Ukraine. Criticism of the ministry has now shifted towards the debate on whether countering Russian propaganda with Ukrainian propaganda is effective.

Oleg Sukhov, a journalist for the Kyiv Post, described this debate to me as follows: "The Ministry's approach of combatting propaganda with propaganda has given it a very small share of the media market in Ukraine. Ordinary people do not care about it. Most journalists oppose it and believe that propaganda should be countered with truth. There is more than enough objective evidence of the Kremlin's aggression in Ukraine and Russian war crimes in the Ukraine conflict, that we should not resort to using counter-propaganda to resist Putin's disinformation policy."

The long-standing political linkages between Stets, who was also a chief producer for Poroshenko's Channel 5 station, and the Ukrainian president sparked further concern regarding the politicization of the Ministry's project. If Ukraine Tomorrow is perceived to be a patronage project (Stets is the godfather to one of Poroshenko's children), its credibility amongst an already skeptical public could diminish further.

In addition to these controversies and credibility issues, the Ministry's counter-propaganda approach has arguably backfired and provided more ammunition for Russian propaganda outlets to use for their own purposes. Sputnik, a pro-Kremlin news agency derided by critics as an anti-Western, pro-Putin version of Buzzfeed, reported in March 2015 that the Ministry of Information was seeking to give prison sentences of up to 15 years to journalists in Donetsk and Luhansk. RT published quotations by Ukrainian journalists condemning the ministry as "Fascist" and showcased criticisms by international media watchdogs like Reporters without Borders. As Poroshenko's counter-propaganda ministry has negligible reach in Crimea and severely impaired reach in Eastern Ukraine (the regions of Ukraine most susceptible to Kremlin propaganda), these depictions could undermine Poroshenko's credibility in the conflict zone. They could also increase the pro-Russian separatist recruitment that provided the basis for last December's ATO legislation.

Ukraine Tomorrow faces a massive struggle to emerge as a viable and trusted media network in Ukraine. As Ukraine's financial resources dwindle and public opposition to the Ministry of Information Policy increases, Ukraine Tomorrow's long-term future is uncertain. Whatever the outcome, Ukraine's counter-propaganda strategy has been fraught with more criticism and controversy than President Poroshenko could ever have envisioned.

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 #35
Kyiv Post
August 5, 2015
OSCE duped into false 'Russian soldiers' report by separatists
by Allison Quinn

Russian-backed separatists in Ukraine's east have apparently tried to discredit international monitors by planting a fake story about Russian soldiers.

In its report for Aug. 2, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe said separatist fighters had introduced themselves as Russian servicemen, immediately prompting an uproar in Ukrainian and Western media.

"An armed man guarding the facility at one of the sites claimed that he and those present at the site were part of the 16th airborne brigade from Orenburg, Russian Federation. They did not wear identifying insignia," the report read.

The information was widely circulated in Ukrainian and international media and portrayed as proof of Russia's involvement in Ukraine. According to Ukraine's Ministry of Information Politics, however, that is precisely what the separatist fighters had been counting on.

"In regards to the information in the OSCE report for Aug. 2 about how one of the armed terrorists identified himself and other Russian mercenaries as 'part of the 16th airborne brigade from Orenburg - there is no such brigade. So we believe that this may have been a planned information operation to discredit Ukrainian media and the OSCE, or it may have just been the stupidity of the Russian terrorists," a statement on the ministry's Facebook page read.

If the ministry is right, it would suggest the Russian-backed separatists have reverted to the old Soviet tactic of disinformation, or the deliberate spreading of false information to dupe one's enemy.

Michael Bociurkiw, spokesman for the OSCE's Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, could not immediately be reached for comment on the matter.

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 #36
New York Times
August 5, 2015
Cossacks Face Grim Reprisals From Onetime Allies in Eastern Ukraine
By ANDREW E. KRAMER

NOVOCHERKASSK, Russia - The convoy of cars crawled along a potholed road deep in the flatlands of separatist-controlled eastern Ukraine on what was supposed to be a routine trip for a rebel leader. Instead, it ended in disaster.

First, a bomb exploded on the roadside. Then, machine-gunners opened fire on the immobilized convoy. When the ambush was over, five bodyguards, a press secretary and Aleksei B. Mozgovoi, the rebel leader, lay dead.

Rebels have been fighting in Ukraine for more than a year now, but the bloody assault this May was different: a massacre carried out by separatist rebels against another rebel group and former ally, the famed Cossacks, in a clash over the groups' competing territorial claims.

The bitter feuding between the groups raises the prospect of greater factional fighting among the rebel forces, deepening an already grave humanitarian situation and possibly complicating matters for President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, whom the West accuses of arming and supporting the separatists.

"The Cossacks are facing reprisals" from the separatists, Lyubov A. Korsakova, the editor of a Cossack newspaper, the Front Bulletin, said in an interview here in the traditional Cossack capital. "They started to disarm the Cossacks, and not only to disarm them, but to kill them."

When the rebellion erupted in eastern Ukraine last year, the Cossacks, the whip-wielding, onetime horsemen of the southern Russian steppes, sent hundreds of young men as volunteers to fight alongside the rebels. Renowned warriors, as well as darlings of the Putin-era Kremlin, they lent a steely organization to the often ragtag separatist forces.

As the fighting died down, the Cossacks established at least de facto control over three eastern Ukrainian towns which they claimed as "Cossack Republics" and subjected to harsh, traditional punishments, like public horsewhippings for petty criminals.

At the peak of their success last year, the republics run by Mr. Mozgovoi and two other Cossack commanders, or atamans, Nikolai I. Kozitsyn and Pavel L. Dryomov, claimed to control 80 percent of the Luhansk region, including major towns, strategic roads and border crossings to Russia. They were closer than ever before to realizing a long-held dream of having an independent Cossack state.

However, their former separatist allies were not about to cede hard-won territory, and began to purge the Cossacks from their ranks.

At least dozens of the fighters sent to Ukraine by the Don Cossacks, the main Cossack group, have died in mysterious ambushes in recent months, according to local news reports. The Ukrainian Interior Ministry, which tracks the infighting, estimates a death toll for the Don Cossacks as high as 200, according to Valentyn V. Tkalych, a spokesman.

Ms. Korsakova, who has been a vocal advocate of the Cossacks within the pro-Russian side in this internecine conflict, put the toll at more than 100.

The fighting is alarming Cossack organizations, which say Cossack fighters are now being expelled from one of the separatist enclaves they helped create, the Luhansk People's Republic. Mr. Kozitsyn, the most senior Cossack commander, left eastern Ukraine on May 14, telling his supporters he did so to avoid bloodshed.

Outside Russia, the Cossacks tend to be viewed as cartoonish anachronisms, with their whips, papakha fur hats and horses. But in southern Russia, they are a serious political force.

Under the czars, the Don Cossacks ruled as Russian vassals over the Wild Field, an area encompassing parts of southern Russia and eastern Ukraine. They were an anti-Bolshevik force in the civil war, suffered repression under Stalin, and then fought as cavalry on both sides, with the Nazis and the Soviets, during World War II. In 1962, the Soviet authorities put down a Cossack uprising in Novocherkassk, killing 26 people.

After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Mr. Kozitsyn emerged as the best-known advocate of the restoration of Cossack autonomy over the Wild Field, mirroring the demands of other Russian minorities for independence. The Don Cossack independence movement, though, fizzled without a fight.

But it never disappeared.

As Mr. Putin has emphasized traditional values, the Cossacks, known for their bravery, pre-modern codes of honor and Orthodox faith, were granted increasing roles in law enforcement in southern Russia.

Those joining this Kremlin-sanctioned Cossack revival were called "registered" Cossacks. Those who resisted what they saw as co-optation became known as "free" Cossacks.

"Those who fought on the side of these republics had a choice: Either join the regular army, or leave," said Ivan P. Konovalov, the director of the Center for Strategic Trends Studies, a research organization in Moscow. "The free Cossacks were always a danger."

When the war in Ukraine began a year ago, the free Cossacks nonetheless proved useful to the Kremlin.

They crossed the border and fought in militias loosely organized under the Great Don Cossack Army, led by Mr. Kozitsyn.

Ms. Korsakova said that the collapse of the border last year had rekindled the earlier dreams of autonomy. But not for long.

Ms. Korsakova, 51, spoke from a hospital bed here, where she is recovering from an attack by unknown assailants with metal pipes outside her apartment in June. She said the attack was a reprisal for her reporting on the Cossacks' predicament in Ukraine. The police declined to open an investigation, saying she had slipped and fallen.

The attackers broke her shinbones and left her unconscious on the sidewalk. They also struck her in the mouth, a gesture, she said, indicating that she should stop talking about the infighting. It is not known who was responsible for the attack, but her reporting contradicted the position of the Moscow authorities that the pro-Russian separatists are united.

"A purge of Kozitsyn's people is underway," Ms. Korsakova said. "People who fought with Kozitsyn are disappearing. Only fools cannot see it."

After a series of attacks on their leaders, many of them fatal, the Cossacks went into open revolt. "Is this why we intervened? Is this why we died?" Mr. Dryomov, the Cossack chieftain of the town of Stakhanov, said in a video posted online in January, addressed to Mr. Putin. "This is our land. We were born here, we live here and, God willing, we will die here."

He went on to ask Mr. Putin to remove Igor Plotnitsky, the head of the Luhansk republic. In response, Mr. Plotnitsky set an April 4 deadline for the Cossacks to integrate into the Luhansk army.

Mr. Mozgovoi refused. After his murder in May, a spokesman for Ukraine's Interior Ministry, Anton Gerashchenko, said intelligence suggested operatives from Russia's Main Intelligence Directorate had struck his convoy. The Luhansk republic blamed Ukrainian special forces.

In May, the remaining Don Cossack battalions in eastern Ukraine, including Mr. Dryomov's unit, were renamed "territorial defense brigades" and integrated into the Luhansk People's Republic army.

Today, even the highest-profile Cossack to have fought in eastern Ukraine, a burly, bearded fighter who goes by the nickname Babai and was one of the first Russian soldiers to fight in the Ukrainian town of Slovyansk, is speaking out in protest.

"They asked us to leave; they said, 'If you want to live, leave,'" Babai said last month in an interview with the Russian newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda.

"Being there became very dangerous; they are driving out the Cossacks," he said. "We were forced to leave."

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 #37
Financial Times
August 4, 2015
The museum of New Russia's ambitions
State media has toned down the anti-Ukraine rhetoric but its message lives on
By Courtney Weaver

"Do we look like terrorists?" the rebel fighter who called himself the Caribbean asked, leaning in with a smirk. "We're normal people: we offered you coffee and tea."

The forty-something volunteer fighter and I could have been talking on the front lines of east Ukraine. But this time the self-declared Donetsk People's Republic has come to me.

In St Petersburg, Russia's window to the west and the city where I studied Russian close to a decade ago as a student, a new museum has opened up dedicated to Novorossiya, or New Russia, the tsarist-era term for the area of Ukraine that Catherine the Great won from the Ottomans and the Cossacks. Pro-Russia activists declared more than a year ago that the Novorossiya territory, which stretches from Odessa to Kharkiv, should be returned to Russia together with Crimea. Yet this goal has proved more elusive than some expected.

While Vladimir Putin himself was one of the first people to reintroduce the term Novorossiya to the Russian lexicon, using it in a speech last April, the president has since dropped the term from his vocabulary suggesting that Moscow has abandoned any plans to either annex east Ukraine's Donbass or help it develop into a truly autonomous region.

Against a backdrop of western sanctions and a worsening Russian economy, most people have accepted the reality that east Ukraine will not be re-emerging as part of the Russian empire. But not everybody.

At St Petersburg's newly christened Novorossiya Museum it is back down the rabbit hole with my two hosts: the Caribbean and a fellow volunteer fighter Sergei. Both were injured fighting in east Ukraine over the past year and are now temporarily back in Russia's second capital. The Novorossiya Museum has become their go-to hang-out spot. "It's not just a museum. It's a meeting place for the rebels," Sergei explains.

A grizzled firefighter who was born in Soviet Ukraine but grew up in Russia's far north, Sergei reinvented himself as a rebel soldier last year. His friend the Caribbean is a self-described social activist from St Petersburg whose real name is Konstantin. The nom de guerre, he says, comes from the time he spent stationed on the Caribbean Sea for the Soviets in the 1980s.

Their list of grievances runs long. There are conspiracy theories about the US consumerist cult; the state department official who handed out cookies to Kiev protesters, embodying the witch from Hansel and Gretel; and about Britain, the master manipulator which for decades has used the US as a geopolitical "surgical tool".

Some of the complaints are directed against the Baltic countries, which they say lived like royalty during the Soviet period, yet show nothing but ingratitude to their Moscow overlords. "They had marmalade in tubes, electronics, dairy products," the Caribbean says. "They wanted freedom, but they lived like kings." Now they are suffering for joining the EU, he claims. "They're like Detroit. Or New Orleans after the hurricane."

The two men's wonderland has come to life in the Novorossiya Museum, proof that although Russian state television may have toned down its anti-Ukraine rhetoric, its visions are living on in the minds of many. Inside, exhibits detail the battles of the past year's war. The most troublesome focuses on the enemy the rebels are fighting: the people of Kiev and west Ukraine, whom they confusingly claim are the same ethnic people as Russians, but also the ideological descendants of Nazi Germany.

The Caribbean conducts the tour. "Do I need to explain what this cross is? It's an analogue of the iron fascist cross. We didn't get this from the rebel side." He moves on. "This is a fascist helmet!" he says pointing at a display case. "Is this a sign of peacefulness?"

Next to the fascist helmet are fascist suspenders and a package of soup with English lettering on it, proof that the Americans are providing extensive military help to the Ukrainian side, according to Sergei. Dressed in a green camouflage uniform and decked out in his Novorossiya medals, the fighter says he is planning to return to Donetsk for more military action as soon he receives the doctor's blessing. "People do different things well. Some people can drive well. Some people are good at writing poems," he posits. "Russians are good at fighting."

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 #38
MH17 crash probe not comprehensive, not truly international - Lavrov

MOSCOW, August 5. /TASS/. The investigation of the last year's Malaysian Airlines MH17 flight crash in eastern Ukraine was "not independent, not comprehensive and not truly international", Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said in an interview with Channel News Asia.

"From the very first days, if not hours, of this incident we have been insisting on very thorough investigation," Lavrov said. "And we were among the initiators of the [UN] Security Council Resolution 2166, which was adopted a bit more than one year ago, on July 21 last year, and which called for through comprehensive independent international investigation under the authority of the International Civil Aviation Organization. The [UN] Security Council pledged to keep this investigation under its permanent review."

The foreign minister reminded that UN Security Council has also "called upon the [UN] Secretary General to provide recommendations as to how the Security Council and the United Nations in general can help and assist the investigation." "And it also called upon all countries who might possess any information to submit it to the investigation procedures," he added.

"Unfortunately, the investigation which was started was not independent, was not comprehensive and was not truly international," Lavrov continued. "Instead of acting under the authority of the International Civil Aviation Organization... Ukraine, Australia, Belgium and the Netherlands signed bilateral agreements between themselves, the substance of which was never made fully known, and they organized a joint criminal investigation team last August. It's really very strange that Malaysia was invited to join only in December 2014."

The Russian foreign minister admitted that "technical investigation team is broader, they invited several other countries to participate in this technical investigation, including the Russian Federation." "But the information we receive through this representative is not complete. We are being given less than those who started the investigation, which is also subject to questions," he noted.

Lavrov also drew attention to the fact that "the call of the [UN] Security Council upon all countries to submit information which might have any relevance to the incident, was basically responded only by Russia." "We submitted the data from our radar station in the Rostov region, which monitored these skies at that time. The Americans said that they did have images from the satellite but never submitted them, never made them public. The same is true for the Ukrainians who were asked to provide the recordings of the air controllers and between the planes up in the area of the incident," he explained.

"All this, unfortunately, has been repeatedly brought to the attention of the United Nations, of the general public by us. We suggested that the Security Council couple of times should consider the implementation of that resolution and should call upon everyone to strictly abide by its provisions," Lavrov said. "Unfortunately, the proposals were blocked at the [UN] Security Council. And the Secretary General was also asked by us to appoint a special envoy to monitor the investigation. And we also suggested to dispatch a Security Council mission to the area. All this was blocked, and unfortunately, blocked by those very countries who now insist on creating the tribunal," the foreign minister concluded.

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 #39
Business New Europe
www.bne.eu
August 5, 2015
bne:Chart - Half of Russians in favour of MH17 tribunal
Henry Kirby in London
[Charts here http://www.bne.eu/content/story/bnechart-half-russians-favour-mh17-tribunal]
 
Nearly half of all Russians would support the creation of a UN international tribunal to investigate who was responsible for last year's MH17 crash in eastern Ukraine, according to a poll by Russia's Levada Centre.

This is in stark contrast to the clear Russian state opposition to such a tribunal being formed. The Kremlin, with more knowledge of the facts surrounding the tragedy, in July vetoed a UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution that aimed to assemble an international tribunal charged with prosecuting those suspected of shooting down the passenger jet in July 2014.

Addressing the Security Council at its meeting on July 29, Russia's ambassador to the UN, Vitaly Churkin, suggested "political aims were more important to them [other UNSC members] than practical objectives".

While the global media appear unanimous in their belief that Russia or Russian-backed separatists are to blame for the downing of the flight, in which 298 died, only 5% of Russians surveyed believed the same. 85% of respondents believed that the Ukrainian military or, indirectly, Ukraine's leaders are responsible. 17% blame the US.

The vehement belief among Russians in their county's innocence is reflected by the fact that 47% of respondents would favour the creation of an international tribunal. Only 19% were against the idea, with only 5% saying they were strongly against it.

Who respondents believe to be responsible for MH17 appears to have had a strong effect on whether or not they support the creation of a tribunal, as the bne:Chart below shows. Of those who believe a tribunal should be set up, only 12% think that Russia could be to blame for the crash. Of those who are opposed to a tribunal, this figure rose to 45%.

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 #40
www.rt.com
August 3, 2015
Russian investigators present new 'White Book' detailing crimes of pro-Kiev forces in Donbass

Russia's agency for especially important crimes has presented a major report on war crimes committed by Kiev military and volunteers in the southeastern regions of Ukraine that seek self-determination after last year's coup in the capital. [http://sledcom.ru/]

The head of the Investigation Committee, Aleksandr Bastrykin, said in the Monday press release that the main objective of the project was to attract the attention of the international community and international Human Rights Group and to tell the truth about the "terrible fratricidal war started by the nationalist regime of Ukraine."

He added that the Investigative Committee was looking into 54 criminal cases connected with the civil war in Ukraine and that the combined materials on these cases make 2,500 volumes, including the testimonies of over 100,000 witnesses.

In the same release the agency elaborated that the White Book of Crimes was based on evidence collected by the Investigative Committee during the probes into cases where Ukrainian authorities and volunteers were suspected of using the banned methods of warfare. The evidence includes testimony of eyewitnesses and participants of these events, photos and various materials presented by international organizations.

The document also reads that the agency continues the investigation into the suspected crimes committed on the territory of the neighboring state and that a special department has been created within the Investigative Committee for this purpose.

Bastrykin wrote that the ultimate goal of the project was to ensure that all those involved in crimes receive the just punishment.

The name of the law enforcers' report is apparently made similar to the document earlier released by the Russian Foreign Ministry. This White Book published in May 2014 and updated a few months later was compiled on the basis of reports from Russian, Ukrainian and international mass media as well as interviews by Russian NGOs of victims. It describes the abuse of law, use of torture, inhuman treatment and other human rights violations in Ukraine from the end of November 2013 to the end of March 2014.

According to the authors, the aim of the document is "to focus on facts which the international community and key international human rights bodies have not shown proper and impartial attention to."

In December 2014, the Foreign Ministry's plenipotentiary for Human Rights, Konstantin Dolgov, said that international organizations had confirmed the human rights violations by Kiev troops in eastern Ukraine detailed in the White Book. Dolgov also noted that Russia expected rights activists must to put pressure on the West and on Kiev authorities to prevent further crimes.

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 #41
The Intercept
https://firstlook.org/theintercept
August 1, 2015
Institute of Peace's Hawkish Chairman Wants Ukraine to Send Russians Back in Body Bags
By Lee Fang

The United States Institute of Peace is a publicly funded national institution chartered by the U.S. government to promote international peace through nonviolent conflict resolution.

But its chairman, Stephen Hadley, is a relentless hawk whose advocacy for greater military intervention often dovetails closely with the interests of Raytheon, a major defense contractor that pays him handsomely as a member of its board of directors.

Hadley, the former national security adviser to President George W. Bush, was an advocate for the 2003 invasion of Iraq and more recently appeared in the media to call for massive airstrikes in Syria. Over the last year, he has called for escalating the conflict in Ukraine.

In a speech at Poland's Wroclaw Global Forum in June, Hadley argued in favor of arming the Ukrainian government in part because that would "raise the cost for what Russia is doing in Ukraine." Specifically, he said, "even President Putin is sensitive to body bags - it sounds coarse to say, but it's true - but body bags of Russian soldiers who have been killed."

Hadley also called for European governments to broadly boost military spending, ideally doubling it. "You know, let's show that Europe is going to have real commitment to military forces," he said.

The call to flood Ukraine with weapons not only contrasts sharply with the stated mission of the Institute of Peace, but many scholars believe doing so would provoke more conflict.

"Arming Ukraine is a very bad idea," says Stephen Walt, professor of international affairs at Harvard University. "The core problem is that Ukraine's political alignment is a vital interest for Russia, which is why it intervened in the first place. It is right next door to Russia, which means Moscow both cares more about the outcome and can escalate there much more easily than we can. Doubling down now will intensify and prolong the fighting and get more Ukrainians killed."

Kevin Connor, director of the Public Accountability Initiative, a watchdog group that has criticized Hadley's work for Raytheon in the past, is calling for Hadley to step aside.

"If the U.S. Institute of Peace is just an Orwellian absurdity, then Hadley is an appropriate chairman," says Connor. "If it wants to demonstrate that it isn't that, Hadley's resignation or removal would be a step in the right direction."

Scholars formerly affiliated with the Institute of Peace played down Hadley's role at the institute. Daniel Serwer, the institute's former vice president for peacebuilding innovation, told The Intercept that the board of directors has a "role in setting Institute goals and policy, but generally stays out of day-to-day operations." Hadley "seemed to me a natural as a Republican board member and as chair, but I was not privy to the selection process," Serwer added.

"I have a lot of respect for Steve Hadley and all the former national security advisers, so it doesn't concern me," says Tara Sonenshine, the former executive vice president of the institute.

The institute's "core principles" start with "1. We believe conflicts can be resolved without violence."

But by the law that established it in 1984, it is also bipartisan: No more than eight voting members of board of directors can be from the same political party.

Hadley was nominated to the institute board by President Barack Obama in February 2013. He joined the institute in August and was elevated to chairman of the board in January 2014.

The stock and trade of the institute includes regular lectures on conflict resolution, programs to facilitate cultural exchange, and research regarding international conflicts. The institute website highlights a "culturally-sensitive policing practices" grant for Israeli law enforcement.

But it's not the first time the institute has served as a platform for American hawkish foreign policy. Robert Turner, the first president of the institute and an appointee by President Ronald Reagan, voiced support for the right-wing death squads in Nicaragua known as the Contras.

In more recent history, the institute's board has included neoconservative leaders such as Daniel Pipes, an advocate for ethnic profiling and the invasion of Middle East countries. Eric Edelman, a current board member, has called for the Obama administration to hike military spending, for the U.S. to support an Israeli military strike on Iran, and for NATO countries to deploy nuclear weapons into former Warsaw Pact states that are now NATO members in an effort to confront Russia.

In 2009, Hadley joined with other former Bush officials to launch a consulting firm now known as RiceHadleyGates LLC. The firm says it helps corporations "develop and implement their international strategic plans."

Hadley also serves as a highly paid board member of Raytheon, a company that stands to gain from increased military assistance to Ukraine. Hadley has been a Raytheon board member since 2009 and was paid cash and stock awards worth $290,025 in 2014 alone.

For companies like Raytheon, global instability and intervention have been good for business.

The conflict in Ukraine raised regional defense spending, a dynamic that has greatly boosted profits for Raytheon, which recently posted higher-than-expected quarterly earnings. Dave Wajsgras, Raytheon's chief financial officer, told the Wall Street Journal that European states are hiking their defense budgets in the wake of tensions between Russia and Ukraine, leading to higher revenues for his company.

Raytheon vice president, Tom Kennedy, told investors in October 2014 that his company is competing "in Poland for an integrated air and missile defense system," explaining that the deal "had a heightened sense of urgency in Poland relative to the activities going on in eastern Europe, especially relative to Ukraine."

In July, Senate Armed Services Chairman Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., said the U.S. should supply Ukraine with the Javelin portable missile system produced by Lockheed Martin and Raytheon. "They need a Javelin," McCain said, speaking at the Heritage Foundation.

Through his relationship with RiceHadleyGates, Hadley works for APCO Worldwide, an international lobbying firm for which he serves on the firm's international advisory council. The RiceHadleyGates-APCO business partnership was announced in 2011.

In March of this year, APCO won two contracts to represent the Ukrainian prime minister and Ukraine's minister of finance to help influence relations with the American government and media. The Ministry of Finance has asked international creditors to renegotiate the terms of the country's sovereign debt as Ukraine has struggled to make payments.

Last week, Hadley weighed in on this topic, arguing in a column for the Wall Street Journal that Western powers should extend debt reduction for Ukraine. "The odds may be long, but the prize is great, and the trans-Atlantic community will never have a better chance to invest in Ukraine's success," Hadley wrote.

Hadley, who serves on the Council on Foreign Relations and the State Department's foreign affairs policy board, is also advising Jeb Bush's presidential campaign on foreign policy and national security issues.

In 2011, a bipartisan group of lawmakers in the House voted to withhold the institute's funds - two of them called it "a case study in how government waste thrives." But the funding - $40 million that year - was restored in committee.  The institute, housed in a new $186 million palatial building overlooking the National Mall in Washington, D.C., is also supported by private donations, including a $1 million grant from weapons maker Lockheed Martin.

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 #42
http://gordonhahn.com
August 5, 2015
America's Ukraine Policy and Maidan Ukraine's War Crimes
By Gordon M. Hahn

As in almost any war, especially civil war, there have been terrible war crimes committed by both sides in the Ukrainian civil war (usually called 'Putin's war'). Now Americans might hear from the U.S. mainstream media about the atrocities committed on one side in the conflict - those of the pro-Russian Donbass resistance fighters. All but a handful will ever hear of the democratic Maidan regime's war crimes. The average American might accidentally stumble on a European or Russian mainstream media source and accidentally push Google translation to English, but not likely. To the point: Although there is little evidence that regular Ukrainian army forces have committed a large number of such crimes, there is a mountain of evidence that National Guard battalions and Kiev's more independent neofascist-infused volunteer battalions have.

Recently, one Western newspaper, the German newspaper Der Speigel, actually bothered itself with exposing some of the Maidan neo-fascists' war crimes in an all too brief expose.' True, this is not the first such report. The OSCE, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch have all reported on war crimes by both sides, including Kiev's use of cluster bombs against civilian targets. However, the new report is rather instructive of the kind of atrocities ignored by the West and the Obama administration in particular.

In particular, Der Speigel covered the crimes committed by two Ukrainian neo-fascist entities. First, it discusses the charges against the volunteer battalion 'Tornado', discussed briefly on this site a month ago.[1] Second, it discusses the neo-fascist Right Sector party and its battalions under its Ukrainian Volunteer Corps (UVC), covered on this exhaustively.[2]

Excerpts and summaries from Der Spiegel's article:

--
Tornado's commander Ruslan Onischenko's "fast-paced career" saw him rise "from the criminal to hero and back again." Onischenko commanded 150 men in the Ukrainian volunteer unit which fought at the front in eastern Ukraine against the pro-Russian separatists.

"The unit behaved apparently in accordance with its name: unpredictable and destructive. Onischenko and several more men are now standing trial. The prosecution's documents speak of illegal deprivation of liberty, gang rape and torture. Anatoly Matois, chief military prosecutor of the country, read the accusations on (Ukrainian) television: The fighters had prisoners' tortured by means of an object similar to a power generator. The prisoners were held in the basement, stripped naked, placed on a concrete wall and doused with water. Then they were touched with live wires to various body parts, such as at the temple, the genitals and the testicles."

According to a statement of a former prisoner, prisoners "were forced under threat of death to rape another prisoner."

"Two of around a dozen arrested Tornado fighters are said to have planned to shoot the Kiev below regional police chief. One of them is a sniper. Only a few months ago commander Onischenko was a publicly celebrated hero. Filaret, head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, had awarded him with a medal."

"Other units have committed war crimes. Thus, in May a unit of the nationalist guard Right Sector caught a separatist fighter in eastern Ukraine after an engagement. They threw the man around before later chopping off both his forefingers." Internet photos posted by Rights Sector fighters "show the prisoners shortly after the battle. In some of the shots stumps of cutoff finger can be seen. The wounds are fresh."

"A Right Sector fighter boasted about this fact on his Facebook page. The battle, he wrote, was 'good training for the offensive on Donetsk.' Ilya Bogdanov, a Right Sector commander confirmed the mutilation. The fact discredited his troops. 'The bastard of my unit who cut off the prisoners' index finger is working for Putin,' he wrote on Facebook."

"Tatjana Masur of Amnesty International stressed in Ukraine, there is no evidence of systematic abuse by the Ukrainian side: 'But there are such cases and they are spreading.'"

Ukraine's Military Prosecutor Anatoly Matios charged Interior Minister Arseniy Avakow with co-responsibility. One "could have saved many lives if the Interior Ministry made the right personnel decisions'. The "Tornado" unit was - placed under the police - at least on paper. But warnings were ignored. The domestic security service SBU had arrested "Tornado" fighters in November. They were with machine guns and hand grenades on the road, but not on the front, but in the capital Kiev."

"Tornado commander Ruslan Onischenko had several prior convictions several times, but for his political supporters that was no reason for caution. On the contrary, the nationalist Radical Party's boss Oleh Lyashko wants to send even more criminal offenders to the front; offenders would simply 'fight better'."[3]
--

Implication 1

By arresting and trying Tornado's fighters, the Maidan regime is now trying to cover up its tracks, betraying at least these particular neo-fascist fighters (and perhaps some more innocent volunteers who got themselves caught up in the neo-fascists' bacchanalia). That bacchanalia was whipped up by 'strategic communications' and propaganda from officials, media and 'think' tanks in Kiev, Washington, and Brussels, replete with claims of Putin's "fascism" and an imminent Russian march on Europe through Ukraine to "restore the Soviet empire." Moreover, it is very likely that in Kiev, if not elsewhere, the deployment of ultra-nationalist- and neofascist- infused volunteer battalions was immediately conceptualized as a temporary meaure that would provide the Maidan regime with a layer of insulation and thus deniability regarding any direct responsibility for the battalions' atrocities and war crimes, while allowing it to unleash these elements on the 'koloradoes' and 'vatniki' in the Mongolid east.

Nevertheless, the arrest and criminal charges leveled by the Maidan regime against forces like the Tornado battalion raises perhaos even more disturbing questions: Why have no charges been leveled against any leaders or fighters from Right Sector? After all, Right Sector has committed much worse atrocities than those alleged against Tornado: the 20 February 2014 sniper attacks (see below), the April 2014 slaughter of some 20 policemen in Mariupol, the 2 May Odessa terrorist pogrom, the recent attack on police and contrabandists in Mukachevo, and likely the recent bombings of two police headquarters in Lviv (Lvov) wounding two policeman.[4] In the case of the Mukachevo shootout, an official Right Sector spokesman recently stated it is now hiding from law enforcement those involved in the shooting.[5] Thus, the group is openly defying the law by obstructing an investigation and aiding and abetting criminal activity, but Yarosh and its leaders roam free, holding congresses, meetings, and press conferences. Only a few of Right Sector members have ever been detained for the hundreds of cases of murders, beatings thefts, and harassment. One in connection with the Mukachevo affair and another in connection with an attack on a gay parade in Kiev in June.

Could it be that one or more high-place Maidan regime officials are protecting Right Sector - some in the SBU or MVD, Prime Minister Yatsenyuk, Defense and Security Council Chairman and former Maida regime acting president Oleksandr Turchynov? Or is the regime reluctant to move against Right Sector because oligarch and former Dnepropetrovsk governor Ihor Kolomoiskii remains its most powerful sponsor? Kolomoiskii and Ukrainian President Poroshenko were locked in a standoff several months ago which ended in Kolomoiskii's resignation for the governorship and his sudden travel to the U.S.[6]

Shortly after the Poroshenko-Kolomoiskii dustup, Poroshenko fired SBU chief Valentyn Nalyvaichenko, who had been one of Yarosh's patrons. Nalyvaichenko visited a Right Sector training camp, and Yarosh was a non-staff advisor of Nalyvaichenko's when he was a deputy in Ukraine's parliament, the Supreme Rada.[7]

Could Kolomoiskii be (and Nalyvaichenko before him have been) under the protection of some in the Obama Administration, such as Victoria Nuland, requiring Poroshenko to leave Kolomoiskii be? Upon his return to Ukraine, Right Sector undertook the Mukachevo attack. Note that the U.S. congress recently forbade any U.S. military training or weapons being supplied to the neo-fascist Azov battalion, but has not subjected Right Sector to such a ban.

Implication 2

So where lies and how much of the overall responsibility lies on the Barack Obama administration, the State Department, Deputy Secretary of State Victoria Nuland, US Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Payet, and their numerous mouthpieces in the American think tank and journalistic community? Simple. The Maidan regime deliberately recruited criminal and neo-fascists in to the volunteer batalions and helped fund and arm neo-fascist groups like Right Sector that brought the regime to power. All this was openly discussed in the media and described by Maidan regime leaders such as President Petro Poroshenko, Prime Minister Arsenii Yatsenyuk, SBU chief Vitaliy Nalyvaichenko, MVD chief Arsen Avakov, neo-fascist Radical Party leader Oleh Lyashko, and Right Sector leader Dmitro Yarosh. While knowing full well that the Maidan regime was organizing and then had unleashed these and many other criminal and neo-fascist volunteer battalions on the Donbass people, they either denied or remained silent on the issue, as these units raped, killed, and mamed. Moreover, the same neo-fascists actually transformed the Maidan demonstrations from peaceful protest into a violent revolution and who seized power by force, deploying snipers to shoot at police and protestors.[8]

US officials have spent all of their energy covering up for the neo-fascist element in the Maidan revolt. For example, US Congressman Dana Rohrbacher inquired whether there were any neo-fascists on the Maidan -Nuland refused to respond to the question, and arrogantly repeated that there were "mothers, grandmothers, and veterans...all colors of Ukraine, including ugly colors" on the Maidan and that the violence is "subject to investigation."[9] But, as I noted above and detailed elsewhere, the snipers were from the ranks of the neo-fascists, who have never been investigated for these crimes by any official entity in Washington, Brussels, or Kiev, despite one Estonian official's "sense" that elements tied to the Maidan regime were behind the sniper attacks.[10] Nuland tries to insinuate that Russia was behind the sniper attacks by referring to "outside agitators" about whom there is "good evidence" of their role, she claims, though neither Washington, Brussels, nor Kiev has ever presented such evidence.[11] Thus, using its dual-use (regime change by transition or revolution), 'democracy-promotion' political technology, the West politically and financially supported forces that both sought to overthrow Yanukovich and thus paved the way for the neofascist-led overthrow of freely and fairly elected Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich.

The new 'democratic' Maidan regime refused to negotiate with the Donbass rebels and immediately declared its 'anti-terrorist' operation (ATO) against them using heavy artillery, tanks, and bombing from the air against civilians. Neither Nobel Peace Prize recipient President Obama nor any other American official, nor any U.S. mainstream media criticized the Maidan regime for failing to negotiate or took any steps to pressure them to do so. Given the Maidan regime's desperate economic situation and total dependence on US political and military support, a few simple words on or around 14 April 2014 could have forced negotiations: 'no negotiations, no money.' Not a word was said; the Obama administration clearly preferred an intra-Slavic war to intra-Slavic peace. The blood and tears of six thousand deaths, tens thousand wounded, and a million refugees are therefore in good part on its hands. 'Putin's war' in Ukraine is as much, if not more, the West's war in Donbass.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Gordon M. Hahn, "One Day in the Life of Ukrainian Democracy," Gordonhahn.com Russian and Eurasian Politics, 21 June 2015, http://gordonhahn.com/2015/06/21/one-day-in-the-life-of-ukrainian-democracy/.

[2] Just Google-translate at the link http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/ukraine-prozess-gegen-pro-ukrainischer-kaempfer-a-1045801.html.

[3] www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/ukraine-prozess-gegen-pro-ukrainischer-kaempfer-a-1045801.html.

[4] See, Gordon M. Hahn, "Saving Maidan Ukraine From Itself: Mukachev's Implications," Gordonhahn.com Russian and Eurasian Politics, 13 July 2015, http://gordonhahn.com/2015/07/13/saving-maidan-ukraine-from-itself-mukachevos-implications/; Gordon M. Hahn, "Ukraine's Neo-Fascist Right Sector: Preparing a Revolt?," Gordonhahn.com Russian and Eurasian Politics, 14 July 2015, http://gordonhahn.com/2015/07/14/ukraines-neo-fascist-right-sector-preparing-a-revolt/; Gordon M. Hahn, "Right Sector and the Impotence of Ukraine's Weimar Maidan Regime," Gordonhahn.com Russian and Eurasian Politics, 22 July 2015, http://gordonhahn.com/2015/07/22/right-sector-and-the-impotence-of-ukraines-weimar-maidan-regime/.

[5] http://vesti-ukr.com/kiev/109541-pravyj-sektor-ne-raskryvaet-mestonahozhdenie-bojcov-iz-mukachevo.

[6] Gordon M. Hahn, "Poroshenko - 1, Kolomoiskii - 0," Gordonhahn.com Russian and Eurasian Politics, 27 March 2015, http://gordonhahn.com/2015/03/27/poroshenko-1-kolomoiskii-0/.

[7] See the comments of Ukrainian political analyst Mikhail Pogrbenskii about 20 minutes in to his interview on "Kiev ne gotov k miru," 'Arena Sobytii,' Online TV, 31 July 2015, http://www.onlinetv.ru/video/2449/?autostart=1.

[8] Gordon M. Hahn, "Violence, Coercion and Escalation in the Ukrainian Crisis: Escalation Point 6: The 'Snipers of February," Gordonhahn.com Russian and Eurasian Politics, 8 May 2015, http://gordonhahn.com/2015/05/08/violence-coercion-and-escalation-in-ukraines-maidan-revolution-escalation-point-6-the-snipers-of-february/ and Ivan Katchanovski, "The 'Snipers' Massacre' on the Maidan in Ukraine (Revised and Updated Version)," Academia.edu, 20 February 2015, www.academia.edu/8776021/The_Snipers_Massacre_on_the_Maidan_in_Ukraine or Johnson's Russia List, #33, 21 February 2015, Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies at George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs, http://archive.constantcontact.com/fs053/11 02820649387/archive/1102911694293.html.

[9] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6TpZa4OMFVk.

[10] "Breaking: Estonian Foreign Minister Urmas Paet and Catherine Ashton discuss Ukraine over the phone," You Tube, 5 March 2014, www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZEgJ0oo3OA8.

[11] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6TpZa4OMFVk.

Gordon M. Hahn is an Analyst and Advisory Board Member of the Geostrategic Forecasting Corporation, Chicago, Illinois; Senior Researcher, Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies (CETIS), Akribis Group, San Jose, California Analyst/Consultant, Russia Other Points of View - Russia Media Watch; and Senior Researcher and Adjunct Professor, MonTREP, Monterey, California. Dr Hahn is author of three well-received books, Russia's Revolution From Above (Transaction, 2002), Russia's Islamic Threat (Yale University Press, 2007), which was named an outstanding title of 2007 by Choice magazine, and The 'Caucasus Emirate' Mujahedin: Global Jihadism in Russia's North Caucasus and Beyond (McFarland Publishers, 2014). He also has authored hundreds of articles in scholarly journals and other publications on Russian, Eurasian and international politics and wrote, edited and published the Islam, Islamism, and Politics in Eurasia Report at CSIS from 2010-2013. Dr. Hahn has been a Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (2011-2013) and a Visiting Scholar at both the Hoover Institution and the Kennan Institute.

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 #43
Ukraine Today
http://uatoday.tv
August 3, 2015
Ukrainian soldiers 'demoralised' after more than a year of war in east Ukraine

Charting changing attitudes in Ukraine after the optimism of last year's pro-EU revolution

Demoralised, disenchanted... Just two of the words used in recent days in the international media to describe the state of mind of Ukrainian troops stationed in east Ukraine fighting a Russian-backed insurgency.

The conflict has dragged on for more than a year and thousands have lost their lives. How are attitudes changing in Ukraine to the fighting?

That's what we'll look at today on the Press Review with the help of an article from Roman Olearchyk, which appeared in the Financial Times. He's spoken with soldiers on the frontline, one of them was named Vasyl.

Olearchyk writes: "Vasyl asks not to be identified. But his comments are both typical of those heard among Ukrainian soldiers in the east these days, and significantly they reflect an anger and mistrust towards commanders and the country's political leaders that has grown sharply in the past 12 months."

The Financial Times correspondent goes on to say that anger and mistrust since Ukraine's pro-EU revolution last year are to be found not only within the armed forces.

Olearchyk says: "The mood change among the military rank-and-file echoes a broader ebbing of support in society for Ukraine's post-revolutionary leaders, seen - despite praise from international observers - as slow to deliver on pledges to reform governance and curb corruption."

Olearchyk goes on to say that falling support for the current government is not in itself perhaps the worst thing. "Most worryingly for Kiev, many frontline soldiers express admiration for Right Sector, a rightwing militia whose leader last week called for a national no-confidence vote in the government and a new revolution."

The role of the Right Sector militia has been controversial in Ukraine ever since the group was active last year during Ukraine's revolution, when it battled riot police. It has since become an important force in east Ukraine in the fight against Russian-backed militants. But it, and other militias are becoming a problem for the government.

For Reuters, Elizabeth Piper and Sergiy Karazy write: "Recent violent incidents involving members of unofficial armed groups have raised government concerns about radicals running out of control. President Petro Poroshenko now says that all "illegal groups" must disarm because they threaten to make the country even more unstable than it already is."

So after more than a year of conflict, both soldiers and civilians seem to be running out of patience in Ukraine.

There's a lack of progress on peace on the frontline. Meanwhile in the rest of the country the fight against corruption hasn't convinced voters that the current group of leaders are doing enough to fulfill the expections of last year's pro-EU uprising.

Extremist groups and militias like Right Sector appear to be offering alternatives, with efforts to incorporate them into Ukraine's legitimate power structures so far proving fruitless.

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 #44
Ukrayinska Pravda (Kyiv)
July 24, 2015
Ukrainian website says revolution "imminent" amid corruption, lack of reforms
Hennadiy Lyuk, What Poroshenko, Yatsenuk Do Not Understand

1. Impossible To Outwit Economy, Revolution

The third Ukrainian president in a row after the 2004 revolution is trying to do what has never been achieved by anyone anywhere - outwit the economy and the laws of social development.

The third consecutive president is demonstrating his inability to distinguish between the causes of and grounds for revolutions.

A revolution is the economy's signal that it is not capable of supporting the social sphere under the present system of governance anymore.

A second revolution is a signal that the problems have reached a critical level of severity and gradual changes will be insufficient to rectify the situation.

Not only cardinal system reform must be conducted, it is also necessary to do so very promptly.

[President Petro] Poroshenko and [Prime Minister Arseniy] Yatsenyuk have still not grasped that if even one of these conditions is ignored, the next revolution will be inevitable. And they are ignoring both of them.

In October 1917, the Russian Provisional Government had already made such a fatal mistake - and the third revolution promptly and cardinally destroyed both the regime and the entire elite.

Any social revolution is a product of the actions of the regime, not revolutionaries or malevolent neighbours.

When a majority of the population can no longer make ends meet, not just Lenin or Hitler, but even [Radical Party leader Oleh] Lyashko can achieve high approval ratings.

When PR campaigns for the president and generals are paid for by the people with hundreds of soldiers' lives, the Army turns into a revolutionary cauldron.

New tariffs under old "schemes" are the most effective form of revolutionary agitation.

Against the background of the catastrophic decline of the economy and living standards, the profits of the new regime's "family" businesses are the best fuel for the revolutionary flame.

The belief in the magical force of the television picture played a bad joke on [former President Viktor] Yanukovych. Now, Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk are waltzing off the same cliff.

In order to avert a new revolution, it is necessary to influence not the electorate, but the economy.

And the economy does not care a damn either for the president's theatrically heroic poses for TV cameras or the prime minister's reformist PR rhetoric.

The economy does not react to Poroshenko's statements that the criminal underworld will tremble before [former General Prosecutor Vitaliy] Yarema.

It reacts to the ridiculous amounts of stolen money which Yarema returned to the economy.

Nor does it react to ostentatious arrests of several prosecutors and officials.

It reacts to the vast sums of money washed out of the economy through the corruption tax by the entire system comprising the prosecution, judiciary, police, and SBU [Ukrainian Security Service].

The economy does not care what names the president thinks up for areas controlled by the legalized terrorists. Nor does it care that these areas will inadvertently become a "black hole" in which enormous sums of money will quickly disappear without a trace.

The economy will not notice Yatsenyuk's tax amendments until they stimulate national enterprises to move money out of the shadows and invest it in the economy, creating new jobs.

Ask your businessman friends in the regions about the stimuli and prospects for growth and you will receive the complete picture of the prospects for exiting the revolutionary situation.

Eating through international loans does not solve the problem, but only deepens it.

The Ukrainian economy is in its death throes not because of war but because of a lack of money.

It is being killed by total corruption, total "schemes," and total offshores. It is they which are leading the economy towards collapse, and the country towards revolution.

But the regime is stubbornly reluctant to make any cardinal changes. It continues with fragmentary and selective action in order to sell attractive TV images as system changes.

The events in Transcarpathia are very telling in this respect. Until the fatal shoot-out which drew the attention of the general public, both total corruption and total smuggling perfectly satisfied Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk.

When it was not possible to hide the dirt anymore, a decisive president taking decisive action appeared before TV cameras.

In other areas where such dirt stays under the carpet, there are no sudden moves on the part of either the president or the prime minister....

In order to understand the causes, it is necessary to answer two very simple questions:

Where are Poroshenko's key business assets registered, as well as those of the associates and "fellow travellers" of the president and the prime minister?

How many of their own business assets, and how many assets of their associates, have Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk moved from offshore accounts into Ukraine over the past year?

The answer to these questions is the most precise indicator of the reformist potential of the president and the prime minister.

The teams of the offshore president and offshore prime minister are absolutely unwilling to support the Ukrainian economy from their own pockets, where they keep "minimized" funds.

It is no wonder, then, that economic reform boils down to the fulfilment of IMF conditions and donor countries' political demands, and to the raising of tariffs.

How come neither Poroshenko nor Yatsenyuk have a clear systemic business plan for reforming the Ukrainian economy?

Because they have no need for such a business plan - as before, only the bare minimum required to secure another credit tranche will be done.

The offshore authorities have little interest in the prospects of the nonoffshore sector of Ukrainian business.

Offshores are not just business schemes. They are a state of mind.

Billionaires and millionaires in the regime are not ashamed of enriching themselves through "minimization," budgetary privileges, "schemes," and smuggling conducted in a poor, war-torn country.

And millionaire prosecutors, millionaire judges, and millionaire generals continue to lead the "relentless fight" against corruption....

If Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk continue to imitate reform, the economy will send a third revolutionary signal.

And then, neither embroidered shirts, nor Nuland, nor Merkel will be able to rescue the regime and the old elite.

Furthermore, attentive spectators have noticed that a large number of Kalashnikov assault rifles are hanging on the wall in the first act of the play [reference to "Chekhov's gun" principle, whereby a gun hanging on the wall in the first act of a play must be fired subsequently]....

And this means that not all representatives of the regime might be as lucky with their escape as Yanukovych was.

2. War Can Write Off Anybody. Even Regime - Completely

It is not only the lamentable results of its activity that the regime attributes to war.

Imitating the Russian Provisional Government of 1917, the Ukrainian regime has chosen, as one of its principal methods of countering the imminent revolution, to promote the idea of patriotism and the unity of the authorities and the people in the face of mortal danger.

The theme is very powerful. The only thing is that it sounds outright false when articulated by Poroshenko, Yatsenyuk, and their associates.

When offshore "minimizers" of payments into the Ukrainian budget show off in embroidered shirts for TV cameras, it evokes irritation rather than respect.

The "patriotic" president did not even stutter when he talked about the close interrelation between the issue of the rights of Russians in Ukraine, particularly in the Donbas [Donets Basin], and the issue of the rights of Ukrainians in Russia. Which would put the search for the solution to the conflict onto an entirely new level.

Poroshenko clings to every dollar of his wealth with his hands, legs, and teeth.

On the other hand, he instantly agreed to treat Ukrainian interests in a unilateral fashion.

And, as a result, he is six months away from defeat in a political Stalingrad.

It is unimportant what contexts Poroshenko and the Supreme Council insert into transitional provisions of the constitution.

Because it is Putin who will be implementing the "special status," no matter what name it is disguised in. We already have the "bilateral" cease-fire....

The president's son is hiding from the front line in the safety of the Supreme Council. And daddy-president is ordering the sons of ordinary Ukrainians, through [Chief of General Staff Viktor] Muzhenko, to "hold on" with assaults rifles and school buses against tanks and Grads [multiple rocket launchers]....

Does anyone believe that the ill-fated Il-76 [reference to separatists' 14 June 2014 downing of Ukrainian Armed Forces aircraft en route to Luhans'k Airport, killing 49 troops] would have been allowed to take to the skies in the present conditions had the president's son been on board?

Does anyone believe that the Ukrainian soldiers in Ilovays'k would not have been sent early reinforcements, or not given an order to retreat early, had the president's son been in their ranks?

And where did the son of the fiery patriot [Serhiy] Pashynskyy [former acting head of Presidential Staff] decide to apply himself? In the defence of Mariupol' or Pisky? No, in Ukroboronprom [state-owned arms manufacturer].

When people see that the regime holds diametrically opposite truths for itself and for ordinary Ukrainians, speculation on patriotism and unity does not postpone revolution but render it imminent.

The regime refuses to notice that it already believes its own TV picture a lot more sincerely than the people do.

Poroshenko's team is trying to copy Kremlin propaganda's favourite cliche: Only an enemy of Russia (Ukraine) can oppose the Russian (Ukrainian) president at such a difficult time.

A genuine Russian (Ukrainian) patriot should unconditionally unite around Putin (Poroshenko).

Opponents of the regime are agents of the United States (the Kremlin).

Nothing else matters....

3. Final Legal Assessment of Actions of Poroshenko, Yatsenyuk, and Associates Will, in Best-Case Scenario, Be Given by Prosecutors Appointed by NEXT President. In Worst-Case Scenario, by Armed Revolutionary Mob

The president and others should not forget that Poroshenko will not be appointing prosecutors forever.

One should not expect that [General Prosecutor Viktor] Shokin and [Chief Military Prosecutor Anatoliy] Matios will manage to dot all the i's and sweep everything under the rug.

It may well turn out that "heroic deeds" by Muzhenko, Yarema, Shokin, and [National Bank Chairman Valeriya] Hontaryeva will be enough to incriminate Poroshenko himself.

The same applies to the prime minister and his  team.

If by that time the people, driven to the verge of crisis, do not take the law into their own hands....

Especially if we account for the fact that the Kremlin will do everything in its power to make the third Maydan, prepared by Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk, escalate into a form of chaos and a wave of pillaging and violence.

If the regime has created grounds for revolution, the reason and the revolutionaries will always be found.

This has been verified by historical practice.

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