#2
Levada.ru
August 1, 2015
Fewer Russians bothered by Western sanctions, international isolation - poll

Fewer Russians are concerned about Western political and economic sanctions than last year, and fewer are worried about Russia being internationally isolated because of Moscow's position on Ukraine, according to an opinion poll published on the website of Russian independent pollster Levada Centre on 29 July (http://bit.ly/1IvQuHQ).

According to the survey, 41 per cent of respondents said they were either "quite worried" or "very worried" by Western sanctions against Russia in July, down from 51 per cent in December 2014.

As for Russia's international isolation, 38 per cent said they were "quite worried" or "very worried" by it, compared with 46 per cent in December.

The poll, which involved 1,600 people over 18 in 134 towns in 46 regions of Russia, was conducted on 17-20 July.

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 #3
RFE/RL
August 3, 2015
Russian Poll Shows Strong Support For Internet Censorship

A new poll shows that nearly three-fifths of Russians would support "shutting off the Internet" in the event of a national emergency.

According to the poll by the All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM), 58 percent of Russians would support such a move, while 49 percent support the idea of censoring the Internet.

The research also found that 42 percent of Russians regularly use the Internet and 38 percent do not use it at all.

Seventy-three percent of respondents said "negative information" about state employees should not be published on the Internet, while 42 percent agreed that foreign governments are using the Internet "against Russia and its interests."

Forty-five percent of respondents said they support the idea of blocking the websites of foreign media outlets.

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 #4
The Economist
July 31, 2015
Religion in Russia: Russians feel less positive towards religion now than they did in 1990

OVER the quarter-century since the collapse of the Soviet system, Russian feelings about religion have changed a lot, as one might imagine. In Soviet times, the state expected and encouraged citizens to be atheists. Now a loose affiliation to a religious faith has become the national default mode; a plurality of Russians tell pollsters they are Russian Orthodox, while significant minorities identify with Islam, Buddhism or Judaism.

But a survey published a few days ago (link in Russian) by one of Russia's best-known pollsters, VTSIOM, showed something unexpected in its comparison of present-day attitudes in Russia with those of 1990. Although there is a jump (from 23% to 55%) in the share of people who say they are sometimes "helped" by religion in their own lives, the general effect of religion on human welfare is viewed in much bleaker terms than before. The proportion of people who think religion does more good than harm to society has slumped from 61% to 36% while the share detecting more harm than good has risen from 5% to 23%.

One can guess at least part of what is going on here. In 1990, many Russians saw religion in the same rosy glow in which they saw everything non-Soviet, from rock music to fast food to monarchism. If the Soviet Union had been against it, they were for it-or thought it at least worth a try. Religion seemed daring, different and exotic. The Soviet system did tolerate religious structures, including the Russian Orthodox hierarchy, as long as they were loyal to the state, but they were pretty weak. Since then the visible strength and privilege of officially-blessed faiths (mainly but not only Orthodox Christianity) has grown enormously. Religion is viewed as a partner in power, and not in any sense counter-cultural.

In presenting the figures, the pollster observed that around 1990, religion had for a time become a "widespread social fashion" after the limits on its practice were lifted. Since then, people have learned to distinguish faith as such, which many still find personally meaningful, from religion as an institution, which many view critically. The fact that radical Islamist movements, barely on Russians' radar in 1990, have since become a major security threat may also play a role.

In certain ways, though, official religious life in today's Russia is not really all that different from Soviet times, apart from being vastly more prominent. Established religious leaders are still expected to put their prestige at the service of the state, and to get along with one another in ways that preserve social peace and burnish the country's image abroad. While repressing certain forms of Islam, as well as Western-connected religious minorities such as the Jehovah's Witnesses, the state encourages set-piece religious diplomacy involving officially favoured leaders.

In June, for example, prominent Russian Orthodox clerics and Muslim religious leaders from as far afield as Syria and Indonesia attended a grand meeting in Moscow on Russia's "strategic partnership" with the Islamic world. Foreign minister Sergei Lavrov delivered a message of encouragement from President Vladimir Putin. The meeting was chaired by the acting leader of Tatarstan, a historically Muslim territory in central Russia whose skyline (pictured) is dotted with minarets as well as church domes. It was reported Friday that prominent Muslims from around the world, as well as Orthodox Christians, Jews and Buddhists, would be invited to the opening of a large new mosque in Moscow in September.

None of this careful choreography convinces religious-liberty campaigners in the West that Russia has fully accepted freedom of conscience. In an op-ed published this week, two leaders of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom urged Russia to "embrace religious diversity". They also asked the country to reconsider an "extremism" law which, as amended in 2007, is so broadly worded that just about any faith could be charged with "inciting religious discord" merely for asserting the truth of its own beliefs. The European Court of Human Rights is currently considering an appeal against the law lodged by Jehovah's Witnesses.

In Russia's current mood, Western appeals for a change in the official treatment of religion, or of anything else, are likely to receive a grumpy response. But the new opinion polls suggest that the Russian public may be less enamoured with their country's religious leaders than with their secular ones. Or that the state's effort to tame and co-opt the power of religion has not been entirely beneficial-to the state, or to religion.

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 #5
NATO increases number of exercises near Russia's borders by half - Defense Ministry

MOSCOW, July 31. /TASS/. NATO has increased the number of military exercises near Russia's borders from 90-95 to 150 per year, the number of reconnaissance aviation flights has grown nine times, a spokesman for the Russian Defense Ministry told reporters.

"In 2012 and 2013 NATO conducted on the average nearly 90-95 exercises near Russia's borders. Now they conduct about 150 exercises," the spokesman said. "There's been a sharp increase in [reconnaissance aviation] flights - their number grew nine times."

He also noted that the number of NATO patrol missions had grown substantially.

In April, chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov pointed to the sharp increase in NATO's military activities near the Russian borders. He said at the time that the number of NATO exercises had grown about 1,8 times last year compared to the previous year. The intensity of flights by the tactical and reconnaissance aviation along the Russian borders doubled, Gerasimov noted, and the number of early radar warning flights grew nine times.

 #6
Moscow Times
August 3, 2015
Opposition Mayor of Russian City Refuses to Go Without a Fight
By Daria Litvinova

In an office building in Russia's northern city of Petrozavodsk, chance encounters between representatives of the mayor's office and the local legislature who share the building are avoided at all costs.

Petrozavodsk, capital of the republic of Karelia, is one of very few Russian cities with an elected mayor - Galina Shirshina - who is not from the ruling United Russia party. Together with prominent anti-drugs campaigner Yevgeny Roizman, who was elected mayor of Yekaterinburg, she is one of the rare opposition candidates to win the mayoral elections of 2013, despite the authorities' best efforts to push forward United Russia candidates.

Now, in a pattern seen playing out in other cities around the country, the pro-Kremlin local legislature has moved to squeeze out its independent mayor by voting to cancel mayoral elections and replace them with a system in which municipal deputies appoint one from a list of candidates chosen by a special commission.

This tactic has become common practice in other parts of Russia since President Vladimir Putin signed a law allowing the regions to scrap direct gubernatorial elections just a year after they were reintroduced in 2012, in what critics said at the time was a measure aimed at sidelining opposition candidates. But in Petrozavodsk, a city of about 270,000 people, this tried-and-tested technique hit something of a stumbling block a week ago when Shirshina used her right to veto changes to the city charter to shoot down the measure.

Petrozavodsk is a small, industrial city built on the shores of Lake Onezhskoye. Its main thoroughfare, Ulitsa Lenina, connects the two key points of almost every post-Soviet city center - the railway station and the local administration building. The streets of Petrozavodsk are lined with three- to five-story buildings, most of which are dated, but in good repair. The streetlights dotting the city are currently being replaced - a product of Shirshina's latest initiative.

The attempt to cancel mayoral elections was the culmination of a long-standing confrontation between Shirshina and Petrosovet, the legislative assembly of Petrozavodsk, in which most deputies belong to the United Russia faction.

In early June, Petrosovet presented Shirshina with a yearly evaluation of her work, which it declared "unsatisfactory." The lawmakers were unhappy with what they saw as dirty streets, and they felt that Shirshina's administration had mishandled the allocation of apartments to orphans, and of land to pensioners and other residents eligible for state benefits, the TASS news agency reported at the time.

 That same month, Petrosovet introduced an amendment to the city charter to the Karelia parliament canceling mayoral elections in Petrozavodsk for good. The regional legislative assembly passed the law - and Shirshina deployed her veto.

"They can overturn my veto, of course," Shirshina, a slender brunette with a guileless smile, told The Moscow Times in an interview in her office last week. "They want Shirshina out. I feel that. You don't have to be a psychic to see it," she added, laughing.

It was clear just from chatting with Shirshina that she is a unique force in Russian politics. Her tone was lively and confident, and she never passed up an opportunity to tell a joke or share a laugh. She stood in stark contrast to most politicians, who tend to embrace vagueness and heavy-handed use of bureaucratic language.

Under local legislation, two "unsatisfactory" yearly evaluations give deputies the right to initiate the mayor's dismissal. But the media has speculated that Petrosovet plans to try to get rid of her as early as the upcoming fall. It's a textbook case of the ruling elite trying to get rid of an opposition administration head who doesn't fit into their system, observers say.

"I'm genuinely interested in how they're going to try to dismiss me in September," Shirshina said with a smile.

Dark Horse

Shirshina, 36, was an independent candidate in the 2013 election race supported by the liberal Yabloko party. At first she served as a reserve for Emilia Slabunova, Yabloko's number one choice for the race. But Slabunova, accused by the city court of numerous violations during her campaign, was eventually banned from taking part in the elections, and Shirshina had to step in.

In a surprise victory, she won 41.9 percent of the vote - 13 percent more than her main opponent, incumbent mayor Nikolai Levin of United Russia.

"It was a protest vote," Mikhail Sedykh, a political analyst, told government newspaper Rossiiskaya Gazeta at the time.

Sedykh said that people voted for the opposition to express their anger because Levin made too many mistakes right before the elections, such as replacing a local park with a parking lot and demolishing a historic building in the city center that had previously functioned as a children's clinic.

"I voted for her because she was not from United Russia," said Marina Molchun, a student in Petrozavodsk. "It's a good thing to have competition among candidates," she told The Moscow Times on Tuesday.

Shirshina, who moved to Petrozavodsk as a child from the neighboring Murmansk region, was an unlikely winner: She was not a politician and was therefore not well-known. She had previously taught psychology at the local university, and right before diving into the mayoral campaign, she ran a publishing house. Her only connection to politics was helping train participants in several electoral campaigns launched by Yabloko.

"I never wanted to pursue a political career. But a managerial position [like that of mayor] appealed to me," Shirshina said, adding that she had believed in her victory from the very beginning, because "there's no point in working on something you don't believe in."

Unconventional Decisions

Shirshina's first act as mayor of Petrozavodsk - and the second story to make the national headlines following the news of her victory - was to cancel the inauguration ball.

"To be honest, at first I thought the inauguration had some sort of legal purpose. But when I found out that there was no purpose at all, except for the sake of it ..." Shirshina shrugged. "Who needs it? I didn't. City residents didn't," she said.

The New Year's party for City Hall employees met the same fate: It was canceled to save budget funds.

Shirshina also opened up access to the weekly meetings of the Petrozavodsk administration to city residents.

"Not many of them actually come, because we usually hold the meetings on Monday mornings, when everyone's at work," she told The Moscow Times, adding that it has become easier in general to reach city officials since she took office.

"It's really important for me to make the residents realize that they are the masters of the city," Shirshina said.

With rumors circulating that she lived in an ordinary apartment and drove an inexpensive car, the media portrayed her as the kind of official Russians dream of: humble, not there to steal and capable of making reasonable decisions.

Her most notorious policy was to reduce the flat-rate trolleybus fare in the city from 17 rubles ($0.30) to 10 rubles ($0.18).

"We had to do something to make people start using the trolleybuses again. We had to do something to make people like them," because the transport company was on the verge of bankruptcy, she told The Moscow Times.

It wasn't the easiest decision, she admitted. "It was scary. For the first few weeks [after the move] I drove around the city looking at the trolleybuses, trying to figure out how many people were using them," she said.

According to Shirshina, the price slash helped to pull the company out of debt and away from bankruptcy, prompting more people to use the trolleybuses and pay the fare. It was popular with city residents, too.

"Of course I support her, she's the people's mayor - she let us ride the trolleys for just 10 rubles!" Piotr Filimonov, a young Petrozavodsk resident, told The Moscow Times on Wednesday.
 
'Cheap Politics'

But it didn't last forever. At the beginning of this year - 18 months after the new fare was introduced - Petrosovet put a stop to what its chair Gennady Bondarchuk described as an experiment.

"They [Petrosovet deputies] refused to approve a [44 million ruble] subsidy from the budget we had already planned to give the company. We had the money, but they decided to use it for other purposes," said Shirshina.

Shirshina says that Petrosovet has changed a lot since Bondarchuk, a member of United Russia, became its chair in February this year. "With the arrival of the new chairman, the very ideology of Petrosovet changed," she said.

In an interview with The Moscow Times in his office, Bondarchuk said that instead of improving the transport company's finances, reducing the trolleybus fares had only driven it closer to bankruptcy.

"I didn't hear much admiration for this decision. People actually laughed at it [because it was economically unviable]," he said on Tuesday.

Bondarchuk said that the city is practically in ruins, and that it's all Shirshina's fault.

"The city is in a catastrophic condition," he said. "It's not being cleaned, it's not ready for the heating season. The municipal services are not ready to keep the streets clear [of snow] during the winter," he said, adding that the blame lies with City Hall, which he said was undergoing a serious "management crisis."

"We're going to advise the administration head [Shirshina] to stop her engagement in cheap politics and to try to get more involved in things that matter to the city," Bondarchuk added.

He claimed that Petrozavodsk residents were in support of the decision to cancel mayor elections, because they didn't want to risk having an incompetent mayor like Shirshina head the city once again.

"[Her veto on the decision] is pure sabotage," he said angrily. "Basically she vetoed the law of the Karelian republic, under which the elections are canceled. The law states that we have to change the city charter in accordance with it, so her vetoing those changes means she vetoes the law, which is absurd," he added.

Consensus No Option

"I can only laugh when they [Petrosovet deputies] say that canceling the mayor elections is about 'having to' correct the city charter in accordance with the republic's law," Shirshina said. "It was their initiative to pass this law in the republic's parliament, but now they 'have' to change the charter?" she scoffed.

There is no reason to deprive the people of Petrozavodsk of their right to elect a mayor, Shirshina said.

"People here are good at making choices, they're smart and educated. They know how - and like - to ask questions and engage in discussion, and they don't understand why they were denied [this opportunity] for no reason," she said.

As to the numerous problems Bondarchuk said the city was facing, Shirshina said she was perfectly aware of them and that the issues she inherited from the previous administration were not easy ones to resolve. "[That's why] I don't have time for politics - I need to prepare [the city] for the upcoming heating season, for the school season," she said.

She admitted there is much to be done: infrastructure needs modernizing, more kindergartens need to be opened, the streetlight system needs replacing and most buildings need to change their gas supply system.

But Shirshina insists she has already accomplished a lot. "We don't have any violations recorded regarding budget spending, which Petrosovet refused to believe," she told The Moscow Times. "We significantly reduced the budget deficit, too," she added.

"We do our best to open at least one new kindergarten every six months. We've started replacing the streetlight system, which was a disaster before. We've launched a whole series of large-scale cultural events [to boost tourism]," the mayor said.

Her differences with Petrosovet, she said, are rooted in their attitudes to work. "We have a very different understanding of how work should be done. ... Their pretense of working hard [instead of doing real work] is sickening," Shirshina said.

"They claimed my work was unsatisfactory, when the figures in my report proved the opposite, and they were revised by our Audit Chamber before I submitted the report to Petrosovet," she said.

Petrosovet's chair Bondarchuk sees no grounds for compromise. "There's always hope that she will change and right all the wrongs within a month according to the recommendations we gave her [when she received our negative evaluation of her work]," he told The Moscow Times.

But when asked directly what specifically should be done in order to make life better in Petrozavodsk, his response was unequivocal: "The [current] mayor has to go."

The People's Mayor?

According to Bondarchuk, not only is Shirshina incompetent and unprofessional, she is also a protege of Vasily Popov, a well-known Petrozavodsk businessman who fled abroad after being charged with extortion. Bondarchuk alleged that Popov, the informal leader of the regional Yabloko party branch, was behind every step Shirshina took, in order to take advantage of budget funds.

Both Shirshina and Popov have denied the allegations. "Popov did everything in his power to make Shirshina win [the election], but I don't have any obligations to him," she was cited by the Kommersant newspaper as saying last year.

The only reason people believe her to be connected with Popov is because he helped her with a project once when she worked at the university, and it was a widely known fact, said Rudolf Kalinin, Shirshina's university professor and later colleague, the former pro-rector of the Karelia State Pedagogical University in Petrozavodsk.

"I voted for her and I would vote for her again," he told The Moscow Times on Tuesday.

"She does a lot of good for the city, repairs roads and opens new cultural and leisure spaces," he said. "But now she's cornered [by her conflict with Petrosovet]; they're not letting her use the funds or do her job," he said.

Not all the locals agree.

"I can't say I'm very pleased with her," said Alina, a Petrozavodsk resident who asked for her last name to be withheld. "How can you be pleased when the snow isn't cleared away by municipal services and makes it impossible for you to open your front door during winter?" she said.

"But then again, am I in a position to judge her? I'm sure it's hard work, being a mayor," she added.

Several other city residents polled by The Moscow Times couldn't say whether they liked their opposition mayor or not. Most of them said they hadn't noticed any difference in the city, where life goes on, no matter how high the tensions rise in city officials' headquarters.
--

Canceling Mayoral Elections: A Hot-Button Issue

Galina Shirshina is not alone in her conviction that Petrozavodsk should continue holding mayoral elections.

In addition to her veto, Petrosovet faces a judicial obstacle, owing to a complaint filed earlier this month with the region's highest court by a pair of Communist lawmakers.

The first hearing in the case, which was held last Tuesday, inspired hope in Alexander Stepanov, the deputy that initiated the suit.

"Petrosovet rushed this decision because elections scare them," he told The Moscow Times on Wednesday. "But there is precedent for the Supreme Court overturning a law that has already passed, so I'm optimistic," the lawmaker added.

Stepanov made clear, however, that he did not challenge Petrosovet's decision in a bid to do Shirshina any favors, noting that she does not have his political backing. Rather, he is motivated by his belief that city residents should have the right to choose their leader.

Fifteen venerated citizens of Petrozavodsk, most of them veterans of the Great Patriotic war, also expressed their disagreement with the decision, which they referred to as "antidemocratic, unjustified and contrary to the interests of Petrozavodsk's 260,000 residents," in a letter to Petrosovet's chairman Gennady Bondarchuk.

One of them, prominent local architect Vyacheslav Orphinsky, told The Moscow Times that the matter should be determined via a referendum, and said he personally considered Shirshina a great mayor.

"She tolerates criticism very well," he said. "I'm a member of a council established by the city administration, and she always listens to what I have to say, no matter how harsh it is," he added.

--

Business as Usual in Petrozavodsk

Sergei Avishev, chairman of the Karelia Business Association, told The Moscow Times in a phone interview Wednesday that Shirshina's time in office has done little to rouse Petrozavodsk's largely sluggish business climate.

"In general, business in Petrozavodsk is suffering the same stagnation as everywhere in Russia," he said. "A lot of companies have had to shut down and there hasn't been much development," he added.

Though Avishev readily admitted that the mayor herself is not to blame for the state of the business sphere, he asserted that the city administration could have done more to support Petrozavodsk's entrepreneurs.

As an example, he said that though the administration has traditionally earmarked subsidies to support small- to mid-sized businesses in the area, this year's budget for that purpose - which he pegged at 2 million rubles ($33,330) - is too paltry to achieve much..

There are no new investment projects, and the number of small businesses involved in trade has decreased significantly, Avishev said, noting that a lot of business owners simply cannot afford to rent municipal spaces.

"This year, with the help of Petrosovet, we managed - albeit with great difficulty - to lower rental rates to the level [they had been at prior to the economic crisis]. But the City Hall should have come up with the initiative, not us," Avishev said. "In some Russian cities the rates were decreased in order to keep entrepreneurs from leaving [municipal property], and to keep money coming to the budget," he told The Moscow Times.

All in all, there appears to be a dearth of willingness on the official level to actively develop entrepreneurship in Petrozavodsk, Avishev concluded.

--

'No Conflict Is Constructive'

As would be the case with almost any conflict, Shirshina's confrontation with Petrosovet is harmful to the city and contrary to the interests of its residents, said Anatoly Tsygankov, head of the Center of Sociological and Political Research, a Karelia-based think tank.

"Conflicts can at times be constructive," he told The Moscow Times on Sunday, citing as an example: "a fight for funds between the city [administration] and the regional authorities, where each party stands to benefit."

But within the city, the analyst believes, cooperation between different branches of government is imperative.

"This conflict [between Shirshina and Petrosovet] will be extremely difficult to resolve, because it isn't purely economic or purely social - it's mostly political. The positions [of both parties] are too different and don't concur with one another, so it might be impossible to come to an agreement," he said.

According to Tsygankov, Shirshina is more likely to back down at this point than Petrosovet because she is in a comparatively weak position. The lawmakers don't have to worry about their own elections until next year, and in the meantime they can push Shirshina out with a vote of no confidence, he said.

The timing of the latter scenario would be tough to predict, the analyst said, but in early September - when Shirshina is set to introduce a report to the deputies about her administration's progress in fulfilling the recommendations she received along with the "unsatisfactory" evaluation - Petrosovet will have a strong pretext for it.

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 #7
www.thedailybeast.com
August 1, 2015
Trying to Build Democracy in a Hellish Russian Village Called Paradise
The Russian opposition has gone to the hinterlands hold primaries and start a democratic process. It's going to be a long struggle.
By Anna Nemtsova

RAI, Russia-The central square of Vokhma town, in the Kostroma region of central Russia, looked like a scene from some brutal documentary about post-Soviet decay: an abandoned diner called Pelmeni, or Dumplings, on the corner; the remains of a half-destroyed church that was blown up more than 50 years ago; and a few crooked houses along crumbling asphalt roads. Only stray dogs, pigeons and a few barely walking drunks could be seen on the square under the pale northern sky. And Vokhma town was the last outpost of civilization-a few grocery stores, hairdressers, a clinic and gas stations-on the road to this village with the sad name of Rai, or Paradise.

You might think such a town a pretty thankless place to start building a democratic process. The Kremlin's overwhelmingly powerful United Russia party is in full control at all administrative levels. State propaganda in this bankrupt region has inspired deep hatred for everything Western, perhaps including the defamed notion of democracy. But the Kremlin's opponents-even as few, obscure and repressed as they are-decided to give it a try. Last month, for the first time in many years, the opposition RPR-Parnas party ran primaries in three Russian provincial regions: Kostroma, Novosibirsk and Kaluga, where not many people knew what the word "primaries" meant.

A few slow hours on a wildly bumpy, muddy road, and here we were in the half- abandoned village of Paradise, with black, crooked houses, a heavy-drinking population, and everybody depressed and angry with Kostroma and Moscow authorities.  Paradise seemed forgotten among the fields covered in wild grass, the beginning of the taiga that stretches like an enormous blanket over the vast lands of Siberia and beyond. Next to Paradise is a village called Jerusalem. Such names suggest how much faith it took to survive here in the old days, or, indeed, how much it takes now. But that's dwindling.

Kostroma region has lived for a long time on the verge of bankruptcy. Corrupt leaders of business and political monopolies sucked the last juice out of the province. The majority of the male population has been surviving on less than $100 a month in Kostroma villages and the drinking begins in the in the early afternoon. There is deep disbelief that anybody in Moscow would ever show interest in these hopeless parts of Russia.

Part of the RPR-Parnas strategy is to show that's not true. But life can turn into hell for anybody who joins or supports the Kremlin's critics. RPR-Parnas members running in the elections have a greater chance of losing their jobs and being morally or physically attacked than of triumphing on polling day.

This year has been especially grim for RPR-Parnas since the party's leader, Boris Nemtsov, was shot in Moscow right by the Kremlin's wall last February. And yet Nemtsov's followers kept their spirits up, turning memory of their friend into a source of inspiration.

"It was important for us to make the first step to forming legitimate culture for our RPR-Parnas party, to demonstrate that we members interact not as a corporation but as a civil society structure," said Ilya Yashin, the winner of the party's primaries in Kostroma, where in the end only about 1,000 people voted.

Attacks and scandals erupted as soon as the opposition party members arrived in the provincial capital. Somebody distributed fliers warning citizens not to go near the opposition members who had arrived in the region "to rob, rape and kill, as they did in Ukraine."

Earlier this week, Yashin visited the town of Bui in the Kostroma region, which has for the moment a population of about 24,000 people. Every year a few hundred more people move away. But the local mayor accused Yashin of pushing Russia "to fall apart, to disappear."

Several independent election candidates, campaigning for municipal and regional parliaments, also suffered from pressure by the Kremlin's United Russia party. To register for elections, each independent candidate or party list had to collect at least 2,800 "approved" signatures. Kostroma election authorities rejected independent candidate Maksim Guterman, for instance, due to "invalid" dates under the voters' signatures. Earlier this month, local bureaucrats caused trouble for opposition organizers of an economic forum. Eventually a few hundred delegates had to meet secretly, in the style of pre-Perestroika underground.

The reality in Kostroma contrasts sharply with the Kremlin's rhetoric. At a meeting with the Moscow political elite, Viacheslav Volodin, the Kremlin's key ideologue and deputy head of presidential administration, said that Russia needed "honest, legitimate, transparent and unpredictable elections." Volodin promised to control personally the process of election campaigns in order to avoid scandals. But what could be more scandalous than the reality of nonexistent roads, dying agriculture and hundreds of bright, talented young people trying desperately to escape from the depressed Kostroma region?

Russia's agricultural and timber regions have been waiting for the state to pay attention to their slow death for decades. Today, after 16 years of rule by Vladimir Putin, local people in villages like Paradise do not have much hope left for revival.

But maybe it is the sheer hopelessness that inspires the liberal opposition and also centrists like Yuri Krupnov, who told The Daily Beast that even though the elections look to be non-transparent and scandalous long in advance, "To me, Russia's Paradise village symbolizes Russia: if we figure out how to revive Paradise, we will know how to rebuild industry and agriculture all across our country," he said. "But the problem is that our authorities are not interested in creating jobs, even if the population [in these rural areas] shrinks by half. For as long as there are at least 50 million Russians in a few big cities feeding the oil and gas pipelines and lining their pockets, the men in power feel happy."

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 #8
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
July 31, 2015
Proposed extensions to Russian police powers spark controversy
A new bill proposing to extend policemen's rights, including those concerning the use of weapons, has provoked major disagreements among Russian public figures and rights activists. While its authors believe that extending police authority is necessary for defending the rights of fellow policemen, critics worry that if the law is adopted it will legitimize police brutality and may be used to crack down violently on protests.
Oleg Yegorov, special to RBTH
 
A series of proposed amendments to the law that would see Russia's police awarded additional powers to search and fire on suspects has caused a stir in Russian society, with a number of prominent human rights figures stepping forward to criticize the initiative.

The amendment project to the "On Police" law was introduced in the Russian parliament, the State Duma, on July 1, shortly before deputies went on summer recess (on July 3). The authors are a group of deputies headed by Chairwoman of the Security Committee Irina Yarovaya.

Due to the summer break the Duma has chosen to postpone reviewing the bill until parliament convenes again in the fall. However, the proposed amendments are already sparking controversy, with reactions from public figures ranging from support to harsh criticism.

A number of the proposed amendments envisage the extension of policemen's rights. While at present policemen are prohibited by law from shooting at women in general, if the amendments are adopted it will be illegal to shoot only at only pregnant women. They will also be allowed to use firearms in crowded places in case of a necessity to prevent a terrorist act or the taking of hostages.

The new amendments would also give policemen the right to search citizens based on personal suspicions (without search documents), as well as open vehicles without the owners' consent. The amendments also propose to exempt policemen from any persecution for acts carried out while on duty if these acts do not violate the law.

On the other hand, the bill also contains articles that impose additional responsibilities on the police. The new version of the law would require policemen not only to administer first aid and send the injured party to the hospital (as is presently the case), but also inform his relatives about the incident within 24 hours.
 
A tightening of order...

As soon as the bill's text became accessible, a series of public figures expressed concern that the extension of police authority could lead to an increase in violations of human rights, with activists especially anxious about the amendment on allowing policemen to shoot at women and in crowded places.

Russia's human rights ombudswoman Ella Pamfilova called on independent experts to review the amendments. "The way in which the bill is presented now is very dangerous, it can lead to additional brutality," the TASS news agency cites Pamfilova as saying.

Sergei Babinets, human rights activist and expert at the Committee Against Torture, agrees with Pamfilova. He sees the amendments as a move by the government to authorize the forceful suppression of possible protests.

"If the socio-economic situation continues to deteriorate, people may become indignant, something that may lead to protests, and it is with these amendments that the government is trying to prepare itself," Babinets told the Kommersant business daily.
 
...or a guarantee of protection?

The deputies who developed the bill say its objective is to guarantee citizens their security, including that of policemen, who often die or are wounded on duty. According to statistics provided by the Russian Interior Ministry, 202 policemen and Interior Ministry servicemen died on duty and 1,945 employees were wounded in 2014, while this year 33 policemen and servicemen died on duty and 842 received various injuries.

Yevgeny Chernousov, a lawyer and retired police colonel, believes that in the context of the present situation, when the threat of terrorist acts is growing, such amendments are justified.

"It is necessary to allow policemen to use weapons in order to prevent terrorist acts and attacks on colleagues. And terrorist acts and attacks are also carried out by women. If a 'black widow' is about to blow herself up, policemen must be allowed to prevent this."

Chernousov said that only special forces would be permitted to use weapons in crowded areas, "since they have the necessary skills."

"Regular policemen will not fire on crowds. This police psychology has existed since the Soviet times: He will think 10 times before using his weapon, since if anything happens, he will be held accountable," he said.

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 #9
Interfax
August 3, 2015
Human rights activists fear Soros Foundation to leave Russia

The Soros Foundation could follow the MacArthur Foundation and National Endowment for Democracy and leave Russia, veteran of the human rights movement and head of the Civil Assistance committee Svetlana Gannushkina said.

"I am afraid that the Soros Foundation is leaving Russia," she said.

According to Gannushkina, the probability exists that the Soros Foundation will be on the list of unwanted foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
The Soros Foundation has already stopped accepting applications from NGOs for grants, Gannushkina said.

"They are very worried whether we will be able to complete existing projects and whether we will lose the opportunity to work with funds already allocated," she said.

It appears that the Soros Foundation will leave Russia, head of the Committee Fighting Torture (until recently the Committee Against Torture) Igor Kalyapin said.

"Our organization has received the notification from the Soros Foundation that they could stop financing projects by September 1, 2015," Kalyapin told Interfax on Aug.3.

The Soros Foundation was on "the patriotic stop-list" composed by the Federation Council, Kalyapin said.

"This list included three organizations we worked with - the Soros Foundation, the MacArthur Foundation and the National Endowment for Democracy. The National Endowment for Democracy was recognized as an unwanted foreign organization. The MacArthur Foundation did not wait and announced [its] leaving Russia itself. I suppose that the Soros Foundation will do the same," Kalyapin said.

Amid the National Endowment for Democracy leaving Russia, several projects of the Civil Committee and Memorial human rights center came under threat, Gannushkina said. These are educational projects and projects aimed at assisting children, refugees and fighting corruption, she said.

Russian grants were not received for these projects and human rights activists will try to compensate for lack of funds with volunteer help, Gannushkina said. "But these projects cannot be implemented fully only with the help of volunteers alone," she said.

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 #10
Sputnik
August 3, 2015
Russia Successful in Stabilizing Banking Sector - IMF

WASHINGTON(Sputnik) - The Russian banking system became unstable following the depreciation of the ruble, losing about half its value against the dollar in 2014, due to a sharp decline in global oil prices. During that period several major Russian banks became subject to sanctions by the West over internal Ukraine violence, prohibiting them from obtaining long-term credit on Western financial markets.

"Directors noted that policies have been successful in stabilizing the banking system," the press release, issued following bilateral IMF consultations with Russia's representatives, said.

It added that Russia must "support individual banks according to their specific capital needs while adjusting the parameters of the capital support program to strengthen incentives and minimize cost to the public sector."

The IMF encouraged Moscow banking officials to "phase-out regulatory forbearance along with the implementation of the capital support program."

The fund urged Russia to align its local resolution framework to what it defines as best international practices, boost competition between the local banks by enhancing supervision and adoption of the Basel III international capital standards.

In May, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev said that Russia's banking system was stable and bank capital increased, allowing all financial obligations to be met.

The Russian economy will resume growth in 2016, but geopolitical tensions will remain the primary risk for the country's GDP growth potential, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) said in a press release.

"Growth should resume in 2016 while inflation continues to decline," the press release, issued following bilateral IMF consultations with Russia's representatives, said.

The IMF stated that recovery is "unlikely to be strong" as it will take Russia some time to address growth limiting factors, predicting Moscow's medium-term growth to be 1.5 percent of GDP per year.

"An increase in geopolitical tensions is the main risk to the outlook," the IMF said.

The Russian economy declined in 2014 following a drop in global oil prices, a sharp ruble depreciation and several rounds of anti-Russia economic sanctions imposed by Western countries over Moscow's alleged role in the Ukrainian conflict.

In January, the Russian government unveiled an anti-crisis plan to stabilize and improve the country's economic situation by 2017.

In mid-June, the Russian Central Bank projected a 3.2-percent contraction of the Russian economy in 2015, followed by 0.7-percent growth in 2016, to eventually reach a 1.7-2.4 percent growth over the next two years.

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#11
Moscow Times
August 3, 2015
Russian Food Prices Stabilize After Months of Racing Inflation
By Anastasia Bazenkova

After a year of skyrocketing food prices that have forced many Russians to spend less on what they eat, the cost of many categories of food has finally begun to stabilize or fall, official data show.

Food price inflation has been one of the harshest consequences for ordinary Russians of the country's confrontation with the West over Ukraine and the ongoing economic crisis. A steep devaluation of the ruble and bans on imports of European produce - Moscow's retaliation to sanctions - pushed the average cost of food up by 20 percent in the 12 months to July, according to official statistics.

Now at last a springtime strengthening of the ruble and the start of the summer harvest season in local agriculture are pushing prices down, especially of fruit and vegetables.

But analysts warned that the gains may only be temporary, and Russians should brace for another acceleration of inflation in the fall.

Record Price Drop

The cost of food has seen a record decline since the start of April, the Industry and Trade Ministry said in late July. The ministry published data on a clutch of products that said the price of eggs fell by 20 percent over the period from April to mid-July, the cost of granulated sugar by 2.4 percent, fish by 3.8 percent and cheese by 7.6 percent.

The most dramatic falls were in the cost of fruit and vegetables. The price of cucumbers fell by 58.7 percent over April to mid-July, while the cost of tomatoes tumbled 41.3 percent, the ministry said.

According to state statistics agency Rosstat, from June 30 to July 27 the price of most categories of food fell. Only sugar, candy, chocolate, carrots and apples saw their prices increase by more than 0.5 percent over the period.

But despite recent declines, prices are still far higher than they were one year ago.

Food price inflation accelerated into double digits for the first time since 2011 in August last year, after bans on a range of food imports from the European Union, United States and some other countries caused supply shortages and forced retailers to switch to more expensive suppliers. The inflationary effect of the bans was exacerbated by a sharp fall in the value of the ruble in the second half of 2014, which raised the cost of imported goods and services.

The result is that vegetables and fruit cost on average 22.8 percent more in June than in the same month in 2014, according to Rosstat. Over the same period, the cost of meat and poultry increased by 15 percent, sugar by 29.6 percent, fish and seafood by 31.4 percent, bread and backed goods 14.9 percent and grains and legumes by 43.4 percent, Rosstat data show.

Causes

The recent price decreases have coincided with the local harvest season, which traditionally runs from June to October. Thanks to this expansion of local farming following the food import bans, this year's harvest is a record breaker, according to Alexei Plugov, head of agricultural research company AB-Center. Russian retailers are now importing 20-40 percent fewer vegetables, depending on the type, he said.

Another factor exerting downward pressure on prices is falling demand. High inflation has eroded the value of Russians' wages, and consumers have reacted by slashing their spending and choosing cheaper items. According to the report issued in April by consumer research firm Nielsen, nearly half of Russians said they had cut their spending on basic goods and food by an average of 24 percent in the first three months of this year.
The cost-cutting has boosted lower-cost supermarkets, while higher priced chains have struggled to preserve revenues.

"If demand continues to decline, prices will continue to fall. If not, we will see prices grow again," said Natalya Shagaida, director of the Center for Agrofood Policy at the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.

Yana Mogilyova, regional communications manager of budget hypermarket chain Lenta, said the company had noticed signs of recovering sales in July compared to June, but that it was too early to talk about sustainable trend.

Plugov said that until the harvest season ends in October, prices would decrease, but that they would start creeping up again once domestic supplies end.

A recent weakening of the ruble may help push them up. After strengthening by around 35 percent to the U.S. dollar over February to mid-May, the ruble has reversed half of those gains. It now takes just over 60 rubles to buy a dollar, up from around 35 rubles a year ago, meaning that imported goods will be more costly.

But high inflation may not last for ever. The Central Bank said Friday that overall inflation, which stood at 15.8 percent as of July 27, would fall to 7 percent in July 2016 and to 4 percent in 2017.

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 #12
www.rt.com
August 3, 2015
Ruble extends losses, as weak oil & softening China disappoint

The Russian ruble has lost 1.5 percent since Friday's close, trading at 62.7 against the US dollar on Monday 10:00 GMT. The main drivers are weak oil - down more than 18 percent since the end of June - and poor numbers from China.

Brent oil is trading at $51.05 per barrel. Iran's expected return to crude market is one of the key factors. On Sunday, Oil Minister Bijan Namdar Zanganeh said Tehran is ready to produce 500,000 barrels per day more within a week after sanctions are lifted and by 1 million barrels per day within a month following that. Iran's current daily crude output is 3.1 million barrels.

Chinese factories slowed down in July, with the official purchasing managers' index hitting 50.0 compared to 50.2 in June. Figures below 50 mean a deceleration in the manufacturing sector. A survey from Chinese Caixin and Markit showed manufacturing PMI slump to 47.8 in July, which is the worst result in two years.

Markets in China are also suffering, with key index Shanghai Composite losing about 30 percent over the past two months.

Weak markets and economy slowdown will have Beijing to make urgent measures to reach the 7 percent growth benchmark for 2015.

The poor performance in China means that the biggest oil consumer in the world is buying less crude, thus decreasing the global oil demand.

Another reason for the ruble's further fall is Central Bank's Friday decision to cut the key rate to 11 percent. On July 31, the Central Bank of Russia made its fifth consecutive cut of the key rate, choosing to support economic growth instead of stabilization of the ruble, experiencing strong fluctuations in recent weeks.

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 #13
Moscow Times
August 3, 2015
Haters and Beliebers: 8 Russian-Speaking YouTube Stars
By Elizaveta Vereykina
[Videos and links here http://www.themoscowtimes.com/arts_n_ideas/article/haters-and-beliebers-8-russian-speaking-youtube-stars/526561.html]

It is a well-known fact: everyone can gain access to money and fame on YouTube these days. The trend has also hit Russia: as long as you have a laptop and are not camera-shy, you have a chance at becoming a celebrity from your own bedroom.

The Moscow Times selected 8 Russian-speaking YouTube personalities who enjoy tremendous popularity on the Russian web.

1. Roma Zhelud

625 150 subscribers; 50 823 299 views (RomaAcorn)
156 058 subscribers; 18 917 682 views (RomaAcorbLive)

19-year-old Roma Zhelud is one of the pioneers of Russian video blogging.

As he recalled in an interview to Russian magazine Sobaka in 2013, everything started in 2010, when he was a lonely and bored kid hanging out in his bedroom. He decided to make a video and address the Internet community with a simple question: "Hi, how are you?"

Somehow the video went viral, and now Zhelud's repertoire has expanded up to include travel video journals, commentary on awards ceremonies and even a music video, "Like," which was shown on Russian TV.

"I shoot and edit all the videos myself. Now, thanks to my blog, I have earned enough money to buy professional equipment," Zhelud says in one of his videos.

Zhelud has been called the "Russian Justin Bieber," due to a vague physical resemblance to the Canadian pop star. According to his official site, he also opened for him in Moscow and St. Petersburg in 2013.

His YouTube audience, just like Bieber's, is very polarized, split between devoted fans and rabid haters. While some praise him as the "symbol of a young and free generation," trolls often attack him for being talentless.

Yet, this "spoiled rich kid" has had to face some serious challenges along the way. "I have been beaten and have had to change schools many times," Zhelud told Sobaka. "One time I was found beaten and unconscious."

2. EeOneGuy

3 922 013 subscribers; 775 835 460 views (EeOneGuy)

"I love haters - they increase my popularity," 19-year-old Ukrainian blogger EeOneGuy says in one of his videos.

He appeared on the YouTube scene in 2013, presenting himself as a total goofball and talking about broken iPhones, playing video games and pranking his friends.

Having reached more than 3 million subscribers, he has set yet another ambitious goal for himself. In a recent video titled "50 facts about me," EeOneGuy, who entertains his audience by cuddling with stuffed panda bears and sell-taping his face, declared he wants to be included in YouTube Rewind, an annual overview of the world's most popular videos. Will he succeed?

3. Max Golopolosov

6 424 268 subscribers; 903 840 475 views (AdamThomasMoran)

Max Golopolosov is the producer and host of +100500, one of the most popular web-shows in Russia. In the series, which first came out in 2010, he comments on the most popular amateur videos of the week.

Golopolosov, 25, stands in front of a leopard background, and often relies on vulgar language, edgy jokes and animation. Such a provocative behavior gained popularity among kids - 70 percent of his viewers are 18 and under, according to glossy magazine Cosmopolitan.

After the launch of +100500, entertainment news site TeleVesti.ru reported, Golopolosov was approached by producer Mikhail Orlov, who helped further develop the project and turn into an Internet channel: Caramba TV. In 2011, +100500 started by the TV channel Peretz.

In 2013, the now self-sufficient company Caramba Media earned 125 million rubles ($2, 075 615) in ad revenues, news site RBC reported. Big names such as Nokia and General Motors figure among their clients.

"I am only bothered if someone on the street recognizes me and asks me to tell a joke," Golopolosov told Cosmopolitan. "In that case, I ask my interlocutor what he does for a living. If he is a mechanic, for example, I ask him to fix my car on the spot."

4. Ekaterina Trofimova

3 207 298 subscribers; 306 607 149 views (TheKateClapp)

Vlogger Ekaterina Trofimova, 22, is better known on the web as Kate Clapp, after her popular YouTube show TheKateClapp. In it, she talks about her student life and shares make-up tips and travel impressions.

A recent video about a trip to the Star Wars Celebration, a festival in the U.S. dedicated to the film series by George Lucas, has already reached more than 2,500,000 views on YouTube. The clip shows Trofimova proclaiming her undying love for Darth Vader, after chasing the "Dark Lord of the Sith" around the festival's hall.

When she is not busy fantasizing about fictional characters, she likes to delve deeper into the ultimate philosophical question: Why do people hate Justin Bieber so much?

5. Sasha Spilberg

2 297 579 subscribers; 302 900 999 views (Sasha Spilberg)

"Hello, I am a video blogger, a gamer and a singer", Sasha Spilberg introduces herself on her Youtube channel.

The girl uploads a new video every Friday, performing R'n'B songs, promoting fashion brands and talking about her travels.

Once she staged a phone conversation with U.S. President Barack Obama, asking him to protect Justin Bieber from haters.

She calls herself a "Twitter victim," hates Mondays and is afraid to be at home alone. Odd and honest enough for people to like her!

6. Sonia Esman

1 311 015 subscribers; 118 934 488 views (Sonia Esman)

"I was born in St. Petersburg and moved to Toronto at the age of 5", Sonia Esman writes in the description to her YouTube channel. "I am a contributor to Conde Nast's Canadian platform Fashionation TV, an international Skype fashion ambassador and a model."

With a supermodel look, a slender figure, blond hair and minimalist make-up, Sonia has a romantic temper. She shares make-up and fashion tips as well as details of her first kiss.

Sometimes we get to see the tougher side of her personality. In one video, for example, she sits with fellow YouTuber Zhelud to discuss the meaning of Russian swearwords.

7. JoRick Revazov

602 250 subscribers; 96 000 059 views (JoRick Revazov)

JoRick Revazov has found his own unique niche vlogging about cars. His series is called "Tuning Time," in which he test drives, tunes and races with cars.

Revazov is interested in luxury as well as economy class vehicles, for example installing brand new gear on old Soviet car Moskvitch.

Sometimes he shows impressive acting skills. In one of the episodes, he pretends to be a Russian mobster before conducting a test run of Russian gangsters' darling Mercedes Benz.

8. Polina Repik

158 216 subscribers; 26 357 832 views (Polina Repik)

Polina Repik is the queen of beauty blogging and offers endless variations of hairstyle, make-up and skin-care tips.

"To be in a good mood, a woman must feel beautiful," Repik says. Her mission? Ever the Mother Theresa, she devotes herself to the honorable cause of helping women improve their looks.

Retro waves or hipster pigtails - they all look easy to make and perfect on her. Her fitness-centric episodes, with instruction on how to get in shape, have also attracted the attention of hundreds of viewers.

Repik, who often talks about her experience being pregnant and giving birth, is at times joined on screen by the other star of the blog: adorable 6-year-old daughter Lera.

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 #14
Russia Insider
www.russia-insider.com
August 3, 2015
Why Russia Should Abolish Visas for US, EU This Second
Red tape is keeping away tourists which could help Russia withstand Western sanctions better
Over time, more visitors would serve to improve the skewed perception of Russia abroad
By Stuart Smith

Right now, you can get almost twice as many roubles for your money as you could a year ago. This makes Russia cheaper to visit than it ever was.

However, the current onerous requirements and unnecessary bureaucracy to obtain a visa to Russia has been holding Russian tourism back for many years. The current visa system is inconsistent, inconvenient, and puts many people off travelling to Russia. Visa registration once in-country, differs across Russia and can also prove cumbersome and problematical.

Oleg Safonov, head of Rosturism, the Russian Federal Tourism Agency agrees. He proposes to scrap the lot.

Safonov's latest proposals, as reported on Interfax, include electronic visas, visas on arrival and simplification of the registration process. Travellers to Russia will very much welcome the moves, if implemented. Russia is a little late to the party with this; they should have done it years ago.

Russia already allows visa-free entry to citizens of some countries. But they are not the countries that significant tourism revenue is derived from. Rosturism recently announced that the number of foreign tourists coming to Russia grew in 2015 by 16.5 percent. Chinese tourists account for most of that growth to date. Russia now has an eye on increasing tourism from the rest of the world.

Readers of Russia Insider will be aware of the constant hysterical warmongering and hyperbole that Western politicians and their cohorts in the pliant mainstream media churn out day after day. One of the best ways to counter this misinformation war waged by the West is to allow people to easily visit Russia and see what it is like for themselves.

And who doesn't want a selfie on Red Square?

Only when more people begin to visit Russia will the skewed perception of Russia abroad change. Visitors will see that much of what they read and hear in their local media is patently false and concocted for purely political reasons.

Relaxing visa restrictions means easy travel, especially for Europeans who are only a budget flight away. Over time, more contact between Europeans and Russians will improve political relations. It is hard for politicians to sell us lies about places we have actually been to. Western media will then find it harder to recycle the ludicrous US State Department propaganda we see daily in our newspapers now.

If Russia is to develop the tourism industry it tells us it wants, things need to change faster. Instead of occasionally tinkering around the edges of the visa system to allow for sporting events and cruise arrivals to specified ports with a host of conditions, it is time Russia's visa system had root and branch reform.

Tourist visas could easily be issued on arrival; fingerprints could be taken at the same time. Invitations and registration need to be scrapped altogether. They are relics of the Cold War and serve little practical purpose today. An online visa waiver system, similar to what the US uses would work far better. Oleg Safonov from Rosturism gets this.

If Russia is going to have wider appeal to tourists, the visa system needs urgent radical reform. It will be impossible for destinations such as Sochi and Crimea to become popular with nearby Europeans if obstacles in the form of the current visa system remain in place.

The time for Russia to act is now. The rouble is currently good value for foreigners. Let people come and spend their money in Russia.

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 #15
http://readrussia.com
August 3, 2015
Why Russia Might Be Better for You Than It Is for Russians
By Jim Kovpak
[James Kovpak is a journalist and amateur historian based in Moscow. He is the founder of the blog, Russia without BS.]
 
The words "expat privilege" conjure up images of well-to-do white men living abroad in impoverished developing countries. The host society caters to them by virtue of their financial means and the host country's demand for foreign specialists. However accurate that image may be, few associate it with Russia. Russia, for one, does not typically cater to foreigners, even tourists. Only a few years ago did Moscow's metro get English-language signs, for example. The notorious post office will cut you no slack for being a foreigner. And contrary to the fantasies of many Western men, beautiful twenty-year-old women won't be falling at your feet just because you wield an American or British passport.

In spite of these realities expats in Russia, and in particular Westerners, do still enjoy many privileges simply because they are foreigners. Why do I bother bringing this up? As they say, privilege is often hard to notice when you have it, and often times expats in Russia tend to be oblivious to their privilege when they interact with and judge Russians. This is no moral lecture from a high horse. I've been guilty of ignoring that privilege for years, and I still enjoy the benefits today - it's impossible not to. But by acknowledging that privilege, we long-term expats can better communicate with Russians in a way that actually creates understanding and isn't so patronizing and condescending. We can also better understand ourselves and how we fit in here.

What is expat privilege in Russia?

In my early years in Russia, an American friend and I would joke about Westerners who just couldn't handle life in Russia. A perfect example was this pair of globetrotting teachers who taught at the first school I worked at, in a small town in the Moscow region. This married couple from America had come to us from East Asia. They had worked in China and spent some time in Southeast Asia as well. No doubt they were well acquainted with living in conditions far below those of the United States, if not most industrialized nations. And yet somehow, they couldn't last more than maybe two months in Russia. And keep in mind this was Russia in 2006, the good old days.

We don't associate Russia with those previously-mentioned stereotypical images of developing countries where foreigners live as an overtly privileged class, but you certainly do see some foreigners who expect to be waited on hand and foot, and who expect the exact same level of comfort they had at home in their Western countries. They're the type who will live here for years without making so much as an attempt to learn practical Russian. Or if they do, they make no attempt to approximate anything close to proper Russian pronunciation, so that their speech sounds incredibly lazy and grates on the ears. I remember reading the blog of one such individual maybe five or six years ago, and the attitude could be summed up by her own words which were to the effect of: "I'm the foreigner! You have to take care of me!"

We laugh at or condemn that kind of arrogance and inability to adapt, but the truth is that more often than not, those who are oblivious to their expat privilege aren't the ones who complain about every little thing and refuse to make any attempt at fitting in. In fact it's usually those long-term expats who are totally in love with Russia, and their privilege gives them rose-colored glasses. This causes them to patronize Russians even when they think they are actually being positive about Russia. Worse still, it often causes some to associate Russia with the Russian government, and thus they become slavish cheerleaders for the regime simply because they think it is responsible for the better life they enjoy here, not realizing that this life isn't really accessible to most Russian citizens.

Privilege? What privilege?!

Yeah I get it, maybe you think this doesn't apply to you personally. You're not some well-paid financial specialist in a multinational company whose rent reimbursement alone is several thousand dollars or euros. I've had my share of hard times. I arrived here with about $50-60 to my name and basically nothing to go back to. My starting salary was $700 a month, or more accurately its rough ruble equivalent. It's not easy to pay the rent on $700 a month, but I wouldn't know seeing as how I had a free apartment provided by my employer. What is more, during that contract I took on a larger than usual workload, but even then it couldn't be compared to a 40-hour-a-week, 9-to-5 job. It certainly beat the back-breaking labor that characterized most of my working life.

On later contracts I worked even fewer hours and made even more money. Why was that? The simple explanation is globalization. I came to Russia at the right time, when it was attracting investment and integrating into the global economy. All that international business and travel required English, and native speakers were and still are a premium. It is a harsh but entirely logical fact that in English-teaching alone, native speakers generally make far more than local teachers even though in some cases the latter are far more qualified. Since you can't really artificially create native speakers of a language, they're a limited resource. Not only that, but even in the good old days of the mid-2000's, native speakers were still rare enough to justify ridiculous amounts of money for private lessons.

Being a native speaker opens up all kinds of side benefits as well. You'll get tapped to do odd jobs like voice-over or dubbing work - in fact you might even land a role in front of the camera. This is by no means exclusive to Russia. I remember being in Beijing and seeing an expat on Chinese TV explaining how his acting portfolio probably outweighs some starting professional actors. Doors to the media which would be shut to outsiders in the West are often wide open to foreigners in countries like Russia.

There are social benefits as well. Westerners are still seen as exotic in this country, and thus people are naturally curious and will often hang on your every word. It's very easy to be the center of attention in any group or social situation. It can be very flattering, and for that reason dangerous as one might believe this attention is due to natural charisma rather than cultural differences. And while I hate to discuss this topic due to the preponderance of negative stereotypes, the Western expat, typically male over here, is almost guaranteed to do considerably better with the opposite sex in Russia, as they would in many other countries. Note how I used the term "do better," not "get sexually assaulted by hordes of young model-like women." Restrain yourselves, gentlemen.

Both women and men are naturally more forgiving of someone who they know is an outsider when it comes to social behavior. Also as you might expect, that curiosity toward the exotic applies to women just as much as it does to men. This means that date conversations rarely run out of fresh material. So while the idea that any loser can come to Russia and sleep around like rockstar is largely bullshit, it's generally accurate to say that most males will notice a marked increase in their relations with the opposite sex, and there again is the danger that they will attribute this to their own inherent qualities or some such quality that is exclusive to Russian women in spite of the fact that this improvement via exoticness could reasonably be found in dozens of countries, including those that are better off than Russia.

Beyond these there are a myriad of other privileges you get in the form of social cues you're not expected to know or follow, rules you're allowed to ignore, things your company handles for you, and something I call the ability to live inside your own bubble. You often remain aloof from politics, arguments, irritating pop culture trends - all things you'd be forced to confront or encounter in your home country. You know the problems you dealt with at home all too well. In Russia it's very easy to ignore all kinds of problems, many of which you'll never have to worry about. The problems Russians deal with and complain about seem distant or abstract, whereas whatever problems you dealt with in your home country felt inescapable.

Again, these things might not be exclusive to Russia, but one thing I have noticed is that you aren't really expected to assimilate here. Most people you meet, particularly in Moscow, will assume you haven't been here for a long time and don't plan to stay for long. They'll also assume you know nothing of Russia and probably can't speak Russian well. Obviously those last two can get annoying when that's not the case, but it's still a benefit because people will treat you differently.

Obviously there are many reasons why being a foreign expat can be a disadvantage compared to citizens, but these are typically outweighed by the perks. If living in Russia were a video game, being a Western expat, especially a native speaker of English, is easy mode. In the worst case scenario, you have the ultimate cheat code - a passport back to a leading industrialized country.

Misattribution

Taken as a whole, these privileges often start to become a problem when people make a fundamental mistake of attribution. It goes something like this: "In America, life was hard. I wasn't the most charismatic person, I had bad relationships or virtually no relationships with women, and I was working 40-50 hours a week in a dead end job getting nowhere. But here in Russia everyone listens to me. Beautiful women seem to hang on my every word. I work maybe 18 real hours a week, and in the evening at that. It's almost impossible to get fired here, and just last week I got paid a ton of cash just to talk to some executive about his hobbies. American society rejected me! It didn't understand me! This place gets me. This is where I belong. This society is better."

That oversimplified version might be amusing, but that's basically how it goes and it's entirely understandable. Humans are often bad at perceiving the effects of things we don't readily encounter. In this case we have abstract concepts like globalization as well as concrete factors like oil prices and historical features which combine to create a society which places a high value on certain foreigners and rewards them accordingly. It's entirely natural to ignore or even be totally oblivious to these factors in favor of attributing them to some kind of inherent qualities of one's personality, and deciding that since this society recognizes those qualities, it must necessarily be objectively better.

To be sure, there's nothing wrong with a person admitting that they live qualitatively better in Russia. I know I do. But this has to be tempered with the realization of one's privilege, i.e. understanding that the life of an expat is fundamentally different from that of a Russian citizen. Furthermore, expats who ignore this privilege tend to have a rather annoying habit of attributing their situation to the Russian government as opposed to a confluence of external market forces, foreign investment, and globalization in general. In other words: "I didn't fit in in America, but I seem to fit in here. Putin sure has built a great society!"

The problems with this concept are manifold. First of all, some expat privileges are actually by-products of the negative aspects of Russian society. Corruption greases the wheels at many companies who employ foreigners. And at the risk of perpetuating a stereotype, many women lower their standards when it comes to Westerners due to a variety of societal problems in Russia which make marriage to a foreigner seem like a viable option. This ranges from lack of opportunities and stability to fear of domestic violence. So again, while Russia isn't a place where any neckbearded loser can step off the plane and land some model for a wife, let's not have any illusions- if Russian standards of living and rule of law were more akin to a nation like Finland, Sweden, or Norway, many male expats here wouldn't even be able to get a date. The point I'm making here is that some expat privilege comes at Russia's expense, from the rot that began in the 90's and continued to entrench itself under Putin when he came to power.

The second problem with this misattribution is that it causes expats to talk to Russians in condescending ways, which usually go something like this: Russian voices complaint about something, typically corruption. Expat suddenly gets all defensive and says something like: "You think we don't have problems in the West? Well let me tell you..." Oftentimes what follows will be an example of some high profile scandal that may not necessarily compare well, or at all, to the situation the Russian citizen is talking about.

I've seen this happen quite often and I totally admit that I have probably been guilty of this myself dozens of times, even if I wasn't defending Putin's regime in my argument. The problem is our privilege blinds us to the fact that the problems with our own country are naturally more real to us, while the problems of Russia are more real to them. One has to realize that however angry one might still be over some political scandal at home, it has absolutely no bearing on the life of people in Russia. Their concerns are everyday corruption, steadily rising prices, high interest rates, and increasing censorship and crackdowns on civil rights. Even if the situation in one's home country were actually analogous, the point would be utterly moot - imagine telling a person with cancer that they really shouldn't complain because other people have cancer too.

This kind of thing is also patronizing because when Russians spend their time complaining about their home country and comparing it to the West, the privilege expat assumes that the Russian speaker naively believes the West to be devoid of problems. Those types of Russians who seem to look up to the West have usually spent some time abroad, and might speak English or some other foreign language. They also tend to be internet savvy. The point I'm making is that these people are not unaware of the existence of problems in Western countries, it's just that those problems are often distant to them and thinking about them doesn't negate the problems they actually deal with on a daily basis.

The Cure

How did I go from the privileged condescending expat who countered every negative Russian attitude with detailed histories of American political scandals to someone who accepts the statements of Russian citizens even while disagreeing with some of them? I think the first key event was partial assimilation. Russia became my default reality. While I of course keep track of the headlines, I haven't been inundated with America's political problems for nearly a decade now. I'm inundated with Russia's problems instead. What is more, being married and experiencing more aspects of life beyond working in an English school helps as well. Often people come here to work in these schools where the administration handles almost everything for them. When you strike out on your own and have to see what it takes to accomplish things in Russian society, you'll start noticing the same problems as Russian citizens. If you start thinking about starting a business or anything extremely long term, you'll run up against these issues as well. I'm a skeptic when it comes to full assimilation, but I believe it's possible to reach an understanding about the lives of ordinary working class citizens even if you can't actually give up your foreign privileges and live like them.

Based on my experience, my advice for expats is to recognize your privilege when voicing your opinions or making judgments. Using myself as an example, back in 2011 and 2012 I was definitely guilty of making all kinds of judgments against Russian opposition groups, not because I didn't agree with their position on the regime but because I was ideologically opposed to them or they seemed to have no coherent ideology at all. I wasn't considering the fact that these people had lived under such an inept regime for so long that it was naturally hard to convince any of them of the need to consider some kind of politics beyond "anybody but Putin." I had to remind myself that this was a country where the regime deliberately fostered mistrust and cynicism so as to depoliticize the population, unlike in my home country where political discourse is far more mainstream and actual grassroots movements more numerous.

This doesn't just apply to opposition minded Russians, by the way. Since 2014 a lot of people have switched sides so to speak, superficially at least. Confronted with opinions that run so contrary to what it seems the rest of the world thinks, some people get frustrated and condemn those who express these opinions. It is admirable that there are still Russian citizens who freely express their opposition to the policies of their government; dissent is an example of commonality between Russians and expats from countries where dissent, sometimes for its own sake, is considered admirable and even more patriotic. But don't assume that just because Russians didn't take to the streets after the economy went belly up last year that it means they are actually blissfully unaware of the severity of their situation. How would you feel if you were faced with the realization that your probable leader for life is now actively driving your country off the rails, and voicing your concern about this is becoming increasingly dangerous? These people have jobs and families to care about. There's the normalcy bias that we all have. "The president's got a plan. He's rational. He'll do something. This will blow over. Don't rock the boat." Ideal? No. Stupid or utterly incomprehensible? Not so much. Publicly declaring one's support for the regime, even while saying or doing the opposite on a daily basis, is a coping mechanism.

What it all boils down to is don't assume that just because life in Russia happens to be good for you,  it's just as good for everyone else. You have advantages here that they don't have. You can choose to play the game and interact with society as much as possible, or you can remain aloof and hang out with other foreigners. Your mistakes are met with far more patience because you're not expected to know the rules. You didn't ask for the privilege, and it doesn't make you a bad person, but just remember that you have it and act accordingly.

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 #16
Moscow Times
August 3, 2015
Tips for Russians Working Abroad
By Luc Jones
Luc Jones is a partner with Antal Russia, an international executive recruitment agency operating in the CIS since 1994, employing over 100 staff in Moscow, Kazan and Almaty.

The current expat exodus from Moscow is well-known, yet the subject of Russians leaving Russia has received little attention from the media. Our recent salary survey and market study for Russia (with more than 5,000 white-collar candidates interviewed) showed that 58 percent would consider a move abroad for a better job, which is 21 percent higher than the number who would relocate within Russia for a more attractive opportunity.

Many multinationals in Russia are using the current downturn to send their prized local employees to other destinations when there is a shortage of work for them locally. There are a number of advantages to this, namely that they can hold on to the people they value most by offering them an assignment abroad with the opportunity to simultaneously develop their skills in an international environment.

If you are a manager considering sending an employee off on such a secondment, or if you are a Russian thinking of taking your firm up on the offer, it is worth bearing several points in mind before signing on the dotted line:

1. Life in Western Europe is expensive. You will give almost half of your salary up in income tax, and about half of what's left will go on rent. Moscow hit the headlines a few years ago as being the world's most expensive city for visiting businesspeople, but for native Muscovites who own their own apartment, it isn't. Public transport and utilities cost peanuts in Russia compared with what Westerners are used to paying, and now might be a good time to quit smoking!

2. In Russia, work is generally considered a place where you go, whereas work in Europe is something that you actually do. Arriving late - particularly in Germanic countries - is almost unheard of. Chatting over cups of tea in the kitchen is uncommon and many corporations ban non work-related websites such as social networks.

3. Unless you are working on a Russia desk or on a CIS-focused project, your colleagues are likely to know little about Russia apart from what they have gained from the international media, and this is unlikely to be particularly positive. They are even less likely to have ever visited Russia and may have little desire to do so - it's nothing personal. Russia doesn't feature highly on foreigners' bucket lists, at least for now.

4. Moscow may feel like a cosmopolitan city (and compared to most other Russian cities, it is) but feels almost homogenous if you move to Singapore, Paris, New York or Dubai, which are truly cosmopolitan. While it is not common for you to be judged on your origins, on the flip side don't expect much more than occasional, mild curiosity as to where you come from and how your life is back home.

5. Competition is fierce in more established markets. You might be in the top 10 retail experts in Russia but in any Western country you will be just one of hundreds, if not thousands. It's hard enough to differentiate yourself if you have worked in a particular country for your entire career, yet is even tougher for those recently arrived.

6. Regardless of how good your English is, you are unlikely to receive any compliments on your linguistic skills when moving abroad. In the same way as Russians expect Armenians, Uzbeks or Moldovans to speak Russian fluently, the same is the case with anyone speaking English outside of the CIS region. On top of this there are the various accents and dialects to get your head around; if anything it won't be boring!

Please do not take any of this as a sign that you should stay put - quite the opposite! If you do take the plunge, make the most of it; have a great time and you'll come back richer (at least in terms of experience, if not in actual cash)!

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 #17
The Observer (UK)
August 2, 2015
The Penguin Book of Russian Poetry review - the importance of rhyme and reason
An ambitious anthology spanning 200 years is welcome - though some of the translators need to work on their rhyming
By Carol Rumens

This anthology is ambitious - in scope, biographical apparatus and in what it expects of its translators. Although the chronological arc is shorter than that of the granddaddy anthology, Dimitri Obolensky's The Penguin Book of Russian Verse (1965), which included medieval oral poetry and a pair of important 18th-century literary writers, Lomonosov and Sumarokov, the present editors generously represent and expand - in both directions - the Pushkin era and the 20th century. There are names in the 200-year constellation sprawling between Gavrila Derzhavin (1743-1818) and Marina Boroditskaya (1954-) that will be unfamiliar even to educated Russian readers.

A bigger departure from the Obolensky model, and a bigger problem for English readers, is that the current editors present only verse translations: no Russian texts, no literal prose cribs. Although Robert Chandler is the major contributor, the diversity is considerable, and there is usually more than one hand at work translating a major poet (Pushkin has no fewer than eight different translators). Relatively few of the translators are poets themselves; demanding to be read as poems in their own right, the English versifications shoulder a hefty load.

There's no doubt that it's a bonus to have an anthology of poems that sound, roughly, like poetry. On the other hand, the emphasis on rhyme and metre can cause problems, and leads me to play Ezra Pound, with "a few don'ts" for translators. Don't convenience-shop for rhyme - that is, begin a poem using para- or assonance rhyme and slip into full rhyme when it suits you (and vice versa). Don't invert: avoid lines like: "For years many tourists to visit it came." Keep registers consistent: avoid little dollops of slang in formal diction (and vice versa). Don't pad ("sweet delight"), avoid cliches ("Heaven's vault") and unintentional comedy-rhyme ("Flavius/ wavers"). Finally, check out Pound's original advice to young poets: that it still makes sense.

Some need no advice, such as Gordon Pirie, who renders Krylov's Fables in delightfully colloquial and cleverly lineated English. The "Pushkin" selection is linguistically rockier, though generous and interesting. Surprisingly, there's nothing from Evgeny Onegin, a work very competently Englished in recent years and offering new readers a lively impression of the Byronic Pushkin. Instead we gain the whole of The Bronze Horseman, plus play-scenes and lyrics. Pushkin was many poets, and this selection at least suggests his range and, intermittently, his tone.

Khlebnikov's inventiveness sparkles in translations predominantly by Chandler, but also by James Womack, Paul Schmidt and Christopher Reid. I'd never realised how good Gumilev was before sampling The Sixth Sense, nor Voloshin, before reading Terror (both in Chandler's translation). Other candidates for my "real poetry" award include Anthony Wood's version of Lermontov's The Sail, Sasha Dugdale's Elena Shvarts and Edwin Morgan's Mayakovsky. The Scots brio of "A Richt Respeck for Cuddies" is a reminder that one problem with the English language is that it's aurally dull, and, another, that it's obese from centuries of linguistic absorption. Only the canniest translator senses when he or she is mixing but not matching its infinite idiomatic variety.

As you read through the names which, great and small, form the 20th century's poetic roll of honour, the introductory biographies (excellent throughout) strike repeatedly gloomy notes of censorship, banishment and worse. Times have changed: the uncensored individual voice has lost authority, and the children of the new Russia have yet to be heard. Anthologies such as this should remind them why their country's poetry once so greatly mattered.

On the Street by Elena Shvarts (2008)

A mirror's gaze slipped across me

half-mocking, half-severe

and in it, crooked, staring back

some laughable old dear.

Mirrors have often shown me change

yet in them, always, a face I knew -

till now. It would have seemed less strange

to see a beast come leaping through

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 #18
Moscow Times
August 3, 2015
Russia Faces Facts on China
By Sarah Lain
Sarah Lain is a research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute think tank.
This was originally published by the Lowy Interpreter.

Last month saw a summit of two organizations significant for both Russia and China. An extremely wide range of topics were discussed at the BRICS summit and Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Ufa, Russia.

These included the typical declarations confirming member state cooperation on countering terrorism, ensuring stability and enhancing global economic development. There were also strong indications that these multilateral organizations are fast becoming platforms that China can use to promote and progress its Silk Road Economic Belt project.

Although currently the project seems more of an umbrella term for large energy and infrastructure projects predominantly in Central and South Asia, it has become a centerpiece of China's broader foreign policy vision. Although there are clearly investment gains to be made by all participants along the Silk Road project, the increasing discussions around it within and on the sidelines of these multilateral organizations could cause concern for Russia's own position within them.

Russia has historically endeavored to balance its leadership role with that of China's in organizations like the SCO. Given tensions in its relations with the West, however, Russia has also had to acknowledge a potentially more vulnerable position in relation to China.

The most highlighted achievements of the BRICS summit included the ratification of the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB), and the $100 billion reserve currency pool known as the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA). China will be the largest donor to the CRA, providing $41 billion, with Russia giving $18 billion.

The creation of these two institutions was in fact officially announced at the 2014 summit in Brazil, but they came into force in Ufa. The NDB will fund infrastructure and sustainable development projects, and can do so in non-BRICS emerging markets. Along with China's Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the NDB is likely to contribute to projects that are quickly becoming the hallmark of China's Silk Road Economic Belt project.

The Silk Road Economic Belt featured more explicitly in conversations within the SCO, particularly on a bilateral level with Russia. Until recently, Russia has been relatively quiet on its assessment of China's proposed One Belt, One Road proposal, in part because it was unclear as to what exactly it means for Russia.

In April 2015, Russia committed its full support, however, joining the AIIB as a founding member. In May, Russia was even more explicit in acknowledging the value of China's project: Chinese President Xi Jinping and President Vladimir Putin signed a joint declaration on integrating the Eurasian Economic Union and Silk Road Economic Belt projects.

Russia is very aware that it cannot, and will not try to, compete with China's growing economic influence with its neighbors. Russia's leading multilateral economic foreign policy project embodied in the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) has recently suffered from a variety of tensions, including a Russian economic downturn, trade spats between members and the loss of Ukraine.

Chinese investment via the Silk Road Economic Belt to the EEU project could help revitalize the Russian-led initiative. Chinese trade would certainly benefit from wider access to the single EEU market at a single trade tariff.

Free economic zones and technology clusters would benefit both sides. It is difficult, however, to see how the two projects would fully integrate given the much broader remit of the Silk Road Economic Belt. Instead, on at least a symbolic and political level, it is more likely that the EEU project is subsumed as a small part of the wider Chinese project. In reality, China will increase its share in Russia's infrastructure and finance sectors, mainly on China's terms.

Although the Silk Road Economic Belt project is supposed to be win-win for all, by reinforcing China's foreign policy objectives through the shared goals of these multilateral organizations, the hierarchy within BRICS and SCO shifts in favor of Chinese priorities, in part at the expense of Russia's.

Russia appears to have acknowledged this. To reap the benefits of the One Belt, One Road project more fully, particularly in light of fewer economic options with the West, Russia appears to be willing to accept some loss of status within these multilateral organizations.

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 #19
Wall Street Journal
August 1, 2015
Georgia Dials Down Conflict With Russia
Shift comes as fighting in Ukraine draws the West and Moscow into a contest for spheres of influence
By PHILIP SHISHKIN

TBILISI, Georgia-Aleko Grigolashvili was just 11 years old when he and a friend ran away from home to join Georgian fighters battling Moscow-backed rebels in Abkhazia, a separatist enclave on the Black Sea.

The adventure barely lasted a month in the early 1990s, before Aleko returned to his panicking grandparents, and to school. But it set the tone for a lifetime of war against Russia. In 2008, Mr. Grigolashvili, by then an officer in the U.S.-trained Georgian military, fought Kremlin-backed separatists and regular Russian troops in South Ossetia, another breakaway region of Georgia. He was wounded in the knee.

So when Russia invaded Ukraine last year, using a script honed in Georgia, Mr. Grigolashvili went to war again. "He saw it all as one war, our war," recalled his wife, Christine Svanidze. On a reconnaissance foot patrol in December, near a dreary east Ukrainian town named Happiness, Mr. Grigolashvili was ambushed and killed.

Many Georgians viewed Mr. Grigolashvili as a hero, but in a reaction that illustrates the country's shift in its foreign policy stance, Georgia's Defense Ministry criticized him and other Georgian volunteers for embarking on a dubious foreign adventure.

The small Caucasus country had for years pursued a staunchly pro-Western course that led to the 2008 Russian invasion. Now, it is moving away from a vehemently anti-Kremlin line toward finding a modus vivendi with Russia.

The change comes at a time when a new Cold War is gathering strength in Europe, with the conflict in Ukraine drawing the West and Moscow into a contest for spheres of influence-economic, political and military.

U.S. officials say they understand Georgia's balancing act. "This government is treading more carefully and has attempted to dial down the more confrontational relationship that existed with Russia," a senior U.S. official said. "At the end of the day, the U.S. isn't interested in confrontation between Russia and states on its periphery."

Among Georgians, the war in Ukraine reinforced the lesson they say they had already learned in 2008: In case of a Russian invasion, the West will not fight for you, or sell you weapons to fight for yourself.

Security considerations are underpinned by economic ones. In 2013, after Moscow lifted a trade embargo against Georgia, the pull of the Russian market began to provide a counterargument to closer economic integration with Europe. The embargo had been imposed as punishment for Georgia's pro-Western course, although the official reason was the alleged health hazards of some Georgian products.

"NATO membership is not the question of today, or of tomorrow. Why create illusions for people? We are not defended, and this is the reality of this difficult region," said Zurab Abashidze, Georgia's special representative for Russia, a post created in 2013 as a backchannel to repair ties with Moscow.

Sphere of Influence

Georgia has toned down its confrontational stance toward Moscow, even as Russia has supported separatists in Georgia and Ukraine.

The two countries severed diplomatic relations after the 2008 war and still don't have embassies. Joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is still Georgia's declared ambition, Mr. Abashidze said. "But we have to get to that day without destroying the country."

For years, it was hard to imagine a more pro-Western state than Georgia, a country that took an outsize role in international diplomacy after the 2003 Rose Revolution. The peaceful revolt brought to power Mikheil Saakashvili, who campaigned to elevate Georgia from post-Soviet morass and bind it to the West. Mr. Saakashvili battled corruption and organized crime, improved the economy and slashed bloated bureaucracy.

In pursuit of NATO membership, he transformed Georgia's moribund military into an expeditionary force that has since deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan in large numbers. Mr. Grigolashvili, the Georgian volunteer who would die in east Ukraine, gained combat experience during a nine-month tour in Afghanistan.

In Washington, the U.S.-educated Mr. Saakashvili became a celebrity. But the West lacked the political will to admit Georgia into NATO, which would have extended the alliance's collective security doctrine deep into the Caucasus. In May of 2008, despite the U.S. support, NATO balked at giving Georgia a road map to membership because of French and German objections. The snub was repeated at another summit last fall.

In August 2008, Russia invaded Georgia, using as a pretext Mr. Saakashvili's efforts to restore Tbilisi's writ over two breakaway provinces where Moscow had long manipulated and encouraged local separatist sentiment. A cease-fire ended several days of fighting, but Russia recognized the two breakaway regions as independent states and has strengthened ties with them.

In 2012, the combative president's political party lost an election to Georgian Dream, a party led and bankrolled by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, who had made a fortune in metals and banking in Russia. During the campaign, Georgian Dream made clear it would avoid provoking Russia while continuing to pursue closer ties with the West.

The new government alleged Mr. Saakashvili and his close associates had developed authoritarian tendencies, and charged the former president with ordering the beating of a Georgian member of parliament and with harassing an opposition television channel, among other things.

"We made plenty of mistakes," Mr. Saakashvili acknowledged in an interview in Kiev in May, where he launched a new political career. "When you do radical reforms, you make mistakes, you overplay your strength, you cut corners." He dismisses the criminal charges as politically motivated and accuses Tbilisi of carrying out the Kremlin's script.

Georgia's Deputy Chief Prosecutor Giorgi Gogadze said the cases against Mr. Saakashvili are based on "heavy evidence."

Ukrainian authorities have ignored Georgia's extradition requests and have instead looked to Mr. Saakashvili's Georgia as an inspiration. In late May, after serving as an adviser to Ukraine's president, Mr. Saakashvili was appointed governor of the strategic Odessa province, on the Black Sea, long a target of pro-Russia separatists, and became a Ukrainian citizen. "The circus continues," tweeted Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev.

On the ground in Georgia, meanwhile, the recalibration of Tbilisi's foreign policy away from the strident anti-Kremlin rhetoric of the Saakashvili years has taken many forms.

The new government, for instance, released from prison people convicted of espionage for Russia. Under Mr. Saakashvili, Georgian counterintelligence aggressively pursued those suspected of being Moscow spies.

One alleged spy network, disrupted in 2010, collected intelligence on Georgian armed forces and their cooperation with Western militaries, and passed it on to Moscow through a Russian handler working as a businessman in Georgia. In another case, a group of Georgian officers with suspected links to Russian intelligence mutinied on their base in 2009, urging fellow servicemen not to fight in case of another war with Russia, according to former Georgian security officials.

Spy games

In 2012, the new government amnestied some 200 people, including the convicted Russian spies and the renegade officers, deeming them all to be political prisoners. A senior Georgian counterintelligence officer who investigated the mutiny was then detained and accused of torturing the suspects' relatives. "You release these people, and then you arrest your counterintelligence guy, it sends a message," said Giga Bokeria, who was Georgia's national security adviser until 2012. Through a lawyer, the former counterintelligence officer, Levan Tabidze, maintained his innocence, according to Georgian media.

"There was no evidence [against the alleged spies] and everything was staged to strengthen Saakashvili's increasingly authoritarian rule," said Levan Karumidze, the Georgian government spokesman, in a statement.

While spy games were playing out in Tbilisi, a different kind of Russian influence began to reassert itself in the rolling hills of Kakheti province, Georgia's wine country.

In 2006, when Russia banned imports of Georgian wine, bankruptcies and unemployment swept through the region, where winemaking goes back thousands of years. "Some people swore at [Vladimir] Putin, others swore at Saakashvili," recalls George Dakishvili, a third-generation vintner. His startup winery found itself in a market glutted with unwanted grapes and had to look for an outside investor to survive.

Having lost their biggest export destination, Georgian wineries that managed to stay in business tried to compete in Europe. They had to make better wine than the cheap, high-volume stuff that was good enough for the average Russian drinker.

When Russia lifted the trade embargo in 2013, grape prices nearly doubled. Mr. Dakishvili's winery, Schuchmann Wines, began selling nearly 40% of its output to Russia.

But Mr. Dakishvili is worried what might happen if the Russian market collapses and people in Georgia lose jobs. "I think they want to make us dependent on Russia again, to have another lever to pressure Georgia," he said. The Russian economic slowdown-a consequence of falling oil prices and Western sanctions over Ukraine-has already reverberated in Georgia by cutting the volume of remittances Georgian migrants in Russia send home.

Last year, over the Kremlin's objections, Georgia signed an association agreement with the EU, which promises closer economic integration with the bloc. Moscow has been promoting a regional alternative called the Eurasian Economic Union, and has already signed up several post-Soviet states, including Georgia's neighbor Armenia, plus Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.

In a public-opinion poll released in May, 31% of Georgian respondents supported the idea of Georgia joining the Kremlin's Eurasian Union, about twice as many as last year, according to National Democratic Institute.

But despite the economic deal, EU leaders didn't give Georgia much-coveted visa-free travel at a summit in late May, promising to revisit the issue later. Russia has indicated it is prepared to abolish the visa requirement for Georgians imposed earlier as punishment for the country's pro-Western course.

Alongside carrots to encourage pro-Russian overtures, Moscow has also used sticks to punish pro-Western drift. Shortly after Georgia made the EU economic deal, Moscow signed sweeping treaties with Georgia's breakaway Abkhazia and South Ossetia provinces, in what Georgian officials described as "creeping annexation."

Georgia recently complained that Moscow-backed local authorities were quietly moving the South Ossetian administrative boundary markers deeper into Georgia proper.

Alarmed by the conflict in Ukraine, Washington has tried to reassure some of Russia's worried neighbors that it isn't abandoning the region. In May, the U.S. and Georgian forces held a military exercise in Georgia, one in a series of regional moves designed to deter Moscow.

In Georgian politics, pro-Russian voices, long viewed as nothing short of seditious, have gained new prominence in recent years. "Loyalty [to Russia] doesn't mean slavery," said Nino Burjanadze, a former speaker of the Georgian parliament whose political party has staked out a pro-Kremlin niche. "Russia must see that Georgia doesn't pose a threat."

Air-defense system

Moscow has steadily objected to Georgia's plan to deploy a sophisticated air-defense system to thwart a repeat of the 2008 invasion.

Following that war, the U.S. and Western Europe, eager to avoid provoking the Kremlin, imposed a de facto embargo on supplying weapons to Georgia. Last year, after years of Georgian lobbying, a deal on the air-defense system with France appeared within reach in Paris.

The timing was fortuitous for the Georgians: France had agreed to sell amphibious assault ships to Russia, which in light of the Kremlin's annexation of Crimea proved to be a public-relations disaster. Though that sale was later canceled, it helped the Georgians make a case that if the West was selling advanced weapons to Russia, then Georgia should be allowed to buy something too.

Irakli Alasania, Georgia's 41-year-old defense minister, said that in late October in Paris, the day before signing the memorandum, he received a call from Mindia Janelidze, a high-ranking Georgian official, urging him not to sign. Although the Georgian cabinet had agreed in principle on the French deal, the last-minute hitch signaled "fundamental disagreements on how to defend the country," Mr. Alasania said. Mr. Janelidze confirmed making the call, according to the government spokesman.

Mr. Alasania signed anyway. Within days, he was replaced by Mr. Janelidze, who himself was later succeeded by a defense minister viewed as more pro-Western. Mr. Karumidze, the government spokesman, said in May that Mr. Alasania's claims "are not grounded in reality" and that the government was committed to finalizing the air-defense deal.

Earlier this summer, Georgia did sign a pair of deals in France to buy an air-defense system. Mr. Alasania, who is now in opposition to the government, said those deals were more limited in scope than the agreement he had tried to negotiate-in part to make the arrangement seem less aggressive to Moscow.

Mr. Karumidze reacted angrily to the allegation, saying the deals include "a complete defense system with significant capabilities" and accused Mr. Alasania of spreading "misinformation" for political reasons. The Georgian government declined to release any details about the deals, saying they are a state secret.

After Mr. Alasania's ouster, the Defense Ministry slammed Georgian volunteers fighting pro-Russian separatists in east Ukraine. "There was some panic [in Georgia] that this would be seen as Georgia launching a war against Russia," said a senior Western official.

The government spokesman said the statement criticizing the volunteers was "mistakenly released" and has since been "retracted."

Mr. Grigolashvili, the volunteer killed in an ambush, had joined the Georgian Legion, a group led by a teetotaling, nonsmoking mixed-martial arts expert Mamuka Mamulashvili. A veteran of wars in Abkhazia and Chechnya, Mr. Mamulashvili said he is picky about whom he admits into the legion, preferring people who know the "psychology" of fighting the Russians.

He said he tells many prospective recruits not to come to Ukraine because he doesn't want to be responsible for their safety. "Aleko came by himself and just called me from Kiev airport," Mr. Mamulashvili recalled.

At home in Tbilisi, Mr. Grigolashvili's widow, Ms. Svanidze, said she can't pay for surgery she needs. She also said she can't afford rent for the dilapidated one-bedroom she shares with her 2-year-old daughter, Nino. She said the government refused to bury her husband in a Georgian military cemetery.

The government spokesman said she is eligible for a military pension and that she herself had declined the honor of a state burial.

Ms. Svanidze said she was baffled by the assertion, and said she is still "fighting to get him reburied in the military cemetery."

On a recent evening in Tbilisi, Nino was talking to her late father's photos scattered around the apartment. He used to call every night from Ukraine on Skype to say good night. "Now Aleko doesn't call, and she doesn't want to sleep," Ms. Svanidze said. "I tell her 'Aleko will visit you in your dreams.' "

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 #20
If Putin Remains in Power, Russia Will Become 'North Korea 2.0,' Gudkov Says
Paul Goble

Staunton, August 1 - Kremlin claims notwithstanding, Russia has not reached "the bottom" of its current crisis because that crisis is systemic and not just the result of the decline in the price of oil and Western sanctions imposed in response to Moscow's aggression in Ukraine, Gennady Gudkov says.

All sanctions have done, the Russian politician says, is intensity the impact of pre-existing problems and made it clear that "either they will force us to change the country or we will be converted into North Korea 2.0, where a half-naked and beaten people happily lives only to support its leader" (echo.msk.ru/blog/gudkov/1595054-echo/).

"When (and if) it becomes finally understood that it is impossible to change the authorities by democratic means and that any further participation in elections is senseless, part of the opposition will begin to seriously prepare itself for revolution and the overthrow of the authorities."

In thinking about such a prospect, Gudkov suggests, one needs to remember that "such events almost always arise unexpectedly both for the revolutionaries and for the authorities themselves." In 1991, the 20-million-strong CPSU disappeared overnight, and in February 1917, 300 years of tsarist rule "ended in an instant."

Russians alas have "an enormous historical experience with revolutions," he points out, and he adds that he hopes that one won't be necessary. "But in certain historical circulations, it can be the ONLY means of removing the obstacles to Russia's movement forward" especially if those in power show no understanding of what is going on.

The opposition politician begins his essay by observing that the economic decline of Russia is "hardly the result of sanctions of 'the ring of enemies.'" It was "inevitable" even if Putin had not invaded Ukraine; and it is far broader than just the economy. Instead, Russia's crisis is, as Gudkov has long insisted, "systemic."

"The events in Ukraine and the actions of the West, shocked by the aggressive actions of its former partner - the Russian state - have only speeded up these processes," although the sanctions have allowed the Kremlin to put up a propaganda smokescreen designed to hide its responsibility for the crisis and its nature.

As Gudkov observes, "it is possible to deceive the people and even to stupefy it for years. [But] it is impossible to deceive the economy which develops according to laws which do not depend on the amount of propaganda, lies and slander on [Russian] state media."

The economy is not the only thing in crisis, he continues. Also there are "the political, social, and moral foundations of the state and society." Money is fleeing Russia but so too are people, and the country's "GDP, culture, education and medicine are all falling [while] crime, prices, mortality, alcoholism, and drug use are all growing."

And this crisis extends down to the individual level: defenseless children and old people are being attacked, cruelty and sadism are spreading. This is the result of "the cowardice, silence and indifference" of the population and its unwillingness up to now to challenge those in power and the luxurious life the latter have provided for themselves but not the population.

No one can end a systemic crisis without changing the system, Gudkov says, "and "therefore in a SYSTEMIC CRISIS, there is no bottom: it will continue until the old system disappears and in its place appears a regime build on NEW PRINCIPLES and thus capable of securing the COUNTRY'S DEVELOPMENT."

That shift could happen in either a "soft" or "hard" way. If the old system is taken apart "without wars and armed uprising, then after a short time the country will begin to really rise from its knees." Indeed, Gudkov argues, "the variant of 'a soft palace coup' could be the first step to a broad agreement and reform of 'the system.'"

But if it occurs in a "hard" way with "armed conflict, uprisings, revolutions and so on," he suggests, there is "the risk of a civil war, even a very limited one" and then "'the bottom' of the crisis will come only at the completion of these tests and will be significantly 'deeper' than in the case of the soft variant."

Sanctions are going to hit Russians ever harder over the coming months and possibly years, the opposition politician and commentator says. But no one should forget that "the sanctions were introduced IN RESPONSE to the actions of the Russian authorities" and not unilaterally and without cause.

As Russians come to an appreciation of where the blame lies, they are likely to realize that they have to take a position, but "of course, the Kremlin won't sit by with crossed hands," even though "it has ever less means to extend its undivided and eternal rule."

In this situation, Gudkov suggests, "Putin will have either to immediately agree on a change of power with guarantees of his security or to go 'to the end' clearly understanding how all this really could end."  Personally, the commentator says, he "does not believe" that Putin will restore the GULAG and mass repressions - his regime is too corrupt for that.

But what the Kremlin leader may choose to do in this situation is to get Russia involved in an even larger war in Ukraine "and temporarily consolidate around his regime the 'patriotic' majority."  Doing that of course involves terrible risks especially since Russia could count on an almost "inevitable" defeat at the hands of a newly mobilized NATO.

What will happen and how deep "the bottom" of Russia's crisis will be is likely to become clear soon, Gudkov concludes. The world is moving quickly and there is little likelihood that oil prices will rise enough to allow the current rulers of Russia to keep themselves afloat for long.

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 #21
Newsweek.com
July 30, 2015
Five Questions Every Presidential Candidate Should Answer About Vladimir Putin
BY LEON ARON
Leon Aron is resident scholar and director of Russian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute, on whose site this article first appeared.

President Obama called Russia a "regional power" with the obvious implication that the U.S. should not worry about it too much. He has praised Russia for its "help" in negotiating with Iran. Secretary of State John Kerry, too, has held up Russia's cooperation on Syria as an example "of what happens when Russia and the United States work together."

Should we follow the administration's lead in its basic sanguinity about Russia-or are there grounds for serious and long-term concern?

1. Is Putin's Russia a mere 'regional power' or is it a clear and present danger to U.S. national security-and if so, why?

Putin's Russia presents an unprecedented challenge for the U.S.: a revisionist (perhaps even revanchist), nationalist, ideologically inflamed, messianically minded, dictatorship in possession of 1,582 strategic nuclear weapons on nearly 500 strategic delivery vehicles.

No, this is not Cold War II in the sense of a long-term global contest between liberal capitalism and totalitarian communism. Yet, paradoxically, the Putin regime may be more dangerous in the long run than the Soviet Union was.

Of course, the Soviet Union had orders of magnitude more strategic than nukes. But it was ruled by a slow-moving, deliberative, "collective leadership" gerontocracy that came of political age at the height of the Stalinist terror and the Nazi invasion. The members of the oligarchy wanted to live out their days in relative luxury and peace.

Although not averse to going after low-hanging fruit in Latin America, Africa or Asia, the Politburo was by and large content with the status quo: strategic nuclear parity with the United States, unchallenged dominance at home and the preservation of the East-Central European empire.

By contrast, Putin makes key decisions alone, brooks no argument and, like every dictator, is furnished by those around him only with the information that supports his adopted policies. This could be a recipe for a disaster.

2. Why after 14 years did Putin suddenly decide that Russia is under attack by NATO and that he needs to assail Ukraine to protect the motherland?

It was not that sudden. Putin began preparing his country for a conflict with the West long before the Ukrainian revolution and the annexation of Crimea. When Putin returned to the presidency in May 2012, it was obvious that the country's economic growth, which had been the source of his popularity, was slowing down to a trickle even as oil prices rebounded to over $100 a barrel.

By the end of 2013, Putin's popularity was the lowest since he was elected president in 2000. And his personal popularity was (and is) the only reliable source of legitimacy for the regime, which is otherwise widely despised by the majority of Russians, as consistently shown by public opinion polls.

After rejecting the institutional reforms needed to radically improve the investment climate by modernizing the economy and diversifying away from hydrocarbon exports, Putin chose to shift the foundation of his support from the growth of incomes to patriotic mobilization.

Repression increased, NGOs were attacked as "foreign agents," national television channels were turned into state propaganda outlets, the Russian Orthodox church was elevated to the position of the arbiter and enforcer of national mores and the "military-patriotic education" of youth became a top priority.

3. What is the end-goal of Putin's war on Ukraine?

It is often argued that Putin will settle for a "frozen conflict" in Ukraine, similar to that in Transnistria or South Ossetia and Abkhazia by creating de-facto Russian protectorates in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions as well as in annexed Crimea.

This course of action is possible but not likely. Ukraine is the largest post-Soviet nation (after Russia) and closest to Russia ethnically (its capital, Kiev, was the historical cradle of the Russian state). A stable, democratic and Europe-bound Ukraine would pose an enormous geopolitical and ideological challenge to the Putin regime. Without Ukraine, Putin's cherished plan of a Russia-dominated Eurasian Union serving as a counterweight to the EU and NATO lacks credibility.

Thus, Putin is not likely to settle for anything short of a smashing victory in Ukraine, which will include a de-facto dismemberment of the country and the creation of a Russian proxy state in the south-east. Yet the ultimate objective is almost certainly the economic and political destabilization and subversion of the current pro-West regime and its replacement with a pro-Russia one.

4. Could Putin start a 'hybrid' war on NATO members in Eastern Europe?

A common view is that Putin would not dare to deploy the "hybrid" war strategy he has implemented in Ukraine against NATO member states. The reason: As NATO members, these countries are protected by Article Five of the NATO Charter and as such are protected by NATO joint military might and, ultimately, the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

But it is precisely because they are NATO members that countries comprising significant Russian-speaking minorities (such as Estonia and Latvia) might be high-value targets for Putin. Patriotic mobilization requires the maintenance of a propaganda narrative of Russia's being at "war" with the West (first and foremost, the U.S.) and occasional  "victories" in the contest with it.

As the Russian economy is contracting and oil prices are likely to decline further following the lifting of the sanctions on Iran, battling Ukraine may not be enough to maintain the patriotic fervor at the pitch demanded by economic hardship.

Putin has already called Ukraine "NATO's Foreign Legion," and testing NATO and exposing it, and especially the U.S., as "paper tigers" unwilling to go to war with Russia over Estonia or Latvia may be just the kind of triumph that domestic politics may demand.

5. What should be the U.S. strategy for dealing with the dangers posed by the Putin regime?

First, understand that Putin is motivated by domestic economic and political imperatives as well as deeply entrenched and centrally held convictions. These are all but certain to prove impervious in the short or perhaps even medium-term to economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure.

The only strategy with a reasonable chance of proving effective in the long-run is a patient, firm and persistent policy aimed at increasing the domestic political costs of the regime's behavior and thus forcing it to make difficult choices and eventually modify its behavior.

Thus denying credit to top Russian companies and banks will force Putin to choose between bailing out Rosneft or Sberbank-and raising pensions and salaries for his political base-the tens of millions of Russian pensioners, teachers, doctors and the military-to keep up with inflation.

In the same vein, providing defensive weapons and timely intelligence for the Ukrainian military may deny Putin a quick and decisive victory and regime change in Kiev. This will force him to choose between a longer war with greater casualties and the resulting domestic backlash-or scaling down his objectives in Ukraine and settling for less.

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#22
www.unz.com
July 31, 2015
The Hunt for Red October
By ISRAEL SHAMIR

These days, Sweden is all agog. In the midst of the coldest summer in living history that deprived the Swedes of their normal sun-accumulating July routine, the country plunged into an exciting search for a Russian submarine in the Stockholm archipelago, and (as opposed to the previous rounds of this venerable Swedish maritime saga) this time they actually found the beast.

Now we know for certain the Russians had intruded into the Swedish waters! The Swedish admirals and the Guardian journalists probably feel themselves vindicated, as they always said so. Does it matter that the U-boat was sunk one hundred years ago, in 1916? Surely it does not, for the Russians are the same Russians and the sea is the same sea!

I would continue in the same vein and have a lot of fun, but many innocent readers (especially on the internet) are not attuned for irony. If they read Swift's Modest Proposal, they'd call the police. For the benefit of the reader in whom is no guile (John 1:47), I'll say it in plain words: the Swedish Navy and the great British newspaper Guardian made fools of themselves again, as they blamed the Russian president Putin for sending a submarine that turned out to be a one hundred year old war relic.

The U-boat called Som (Catfish) had been built in the US in 1901 for the Russian Navy, served in World War I and went down with all hands in 1916. The Swedes admitted that much, but, as in the one-liner about a guest suspected of stealing silver spoons, the spoons were found, but the ill feeling loitered.

The previous round of this pleasant Swedish pastime took place last October 2014 when the search for Russian submarines in the Stockholm archipelago, that is, in the archipelago of thousands of islands in the Baltic Sea, began in earnest. Nessie of the Loch Ness would envy the hunt. In the newspapers, on radio and on television, they spoke only of the mysterious submarine, that allegedly had sent a distress signal to the Russian naval base in Kaliningrad from the Swedish waters. Millions of krona were spent on the futile search. A video of the U-boat rising was released. Eye witnesses reported they saw a man in black emerging from the sea near a tiny island. As the water temperature was about 10�C (50�F) this could not be a Swede, it's got to be a Russian Spetznaz man, as they are immune to cold...

The old-timers told the press that the sailors of the damaged Russian submarine probably landed on an island in the archipelago and waited there for rescue. "There are many uninhabited cottages, they should be searched", they proposed to the horror of wealthy Stockholmers, the cottage owners. Dozens of military vessels in cutting-edge-state-of-art Stealth armour ploughed the waters. Depth charges killed a few dolphins and other sea animals. Newspapers warned that of Russian naval commando hunts for Ukrainians in Stockholm pubs.

There were sane voices, too, but they rarely were given a chance to be heard. Wilhelm Agrella, a professor of Intelligence Analysis at Lund University spoke of "budget submarines" invented by the Swedish navy in order to boost its budget.

In the end, all sightings were accounted for. One was a Swedish private submarine belonging to a Lasse Schmidt Westr�n, another one was a Dutch one that participated in NATO manoeuvres. The alleged distress signal has been sent by a Swedish transponder, and had nothing to do with Russia or Kaliningrad.

There was no Russian U-boat to hunt. The true goal of the hunters has been Swedish neutrality. Sweden was and remains notionally neutral, while the US wants to see the country integrated into NATO.

The Hunt for Red October in October 2014 was a new round in the Second Cold War, the war against independent Russia. As a Social Democrat government came to power in September 2014, the Swedish Army, Navy and pro-NATO media plotted to prevent a possible rapprochement of Russia and Sweden.

This is not the first plot of this kind. In 1982, the Swedish military conspired with their colleagues in the United States and Britain against its Social Democrat government. Although the Swedish navy knew that NATO submarines operate in the Swedish waters, they played along with the right-wing politicians and talked about the 'Russian threat'. Only much later the truth was found out - the government commission appointed by the Social Democrats after their return to power showed that there were no Russian U-boats.

This was subsequently proven by a member of the Swedish government commission, a leading Norwegian military expert Ola Tunander in his detailed 400 page long work, The Secret War Against Sweden: US and British Submarine Deception in the 1980s (London: Frank Cass 2004).

In the eighties, Ola Tunander did not doubt the reality of Russian submarines, and had written several textbooks and manuals for Swedish sailors on the subject. Only after the fall of the Soviet Union, he gained access to all files at the request of the Swedish government, and came to the unequivocal conclusion that all the evidence about the Russian submarine incursions was falsified or invented.

Classified documents clearly point to the US and the UK as the culprits, and this was confirmed by the former US Secretary of Defence Weinberger and British commanders in the secret hearing, says Tunander. It turned out that in the seventies, after the Vietnam War, the Americans and their British allies were preoccupied with the pro-Soviet sympathies of the Swedes. The Swedes stubbornly refused to see the enemy in his great eastern neighbour. In 1976, only 6% of Swedes believe in the Russian threat, and another 27% thought the USSR is an unfriendly power.

Even the Afghan war had only marginally changed these figures. And only the submarine panic bore fruit - by the mid-80s, 42% of Swedes believed in the imminent Russian threat and 83% considered the USSR being an enemy. In order to achieve this revolution in the minds, the British and American submarines made hundreds of violations of Swedish waters. They intruded into the inner harbour of Stockholm, raised their periscopes and antennas in the archipelago, posing as "the Red Scare."

The USSR did not have submarines of the class detected by the Swedish radar (35-40 meters long), but the United States had the submarine NR-1, that was used to penetrate the Soviet waters.

In 1981 there was an amusing accident - an old Soviet submarine lost its bearings and ran aground close to the Swedish coast. This single incident was been blown out of all proportion; rumours of Russian submarines in every bay flooded Sweden.

In October 1982, the Swedish fleet mounted a huge operation to capture or destroy a submarine sighted near the island of Musk�. The operation was attended by hundreds of journalists from all over the world.

Ola Tunander says the bridge of the sighted submarine had a NR-1's square shape, not the shape of the Soviet submarines. The American submarine had been delivered to Stockholm waters by the American tanker Monongahela, coming on an official visit. They left the submarine, so it went around and scared the Swedes. The command of the Swedish navy had been warned, the navy knew about it, took part in the hunt for the submarine, and concealed the truth from the Social Democrat government.

So the Swedish military conspired with the Americans and British against their own country. The Swedes managed to hit the submarine, and it released a cloud of yellow-green dye - the distress signal of the US submarine fleet. Swedish sailors allowed the submarine to leave.

Henry Kissinger, the US Secretary of State, thanked the Swedish sailors for allowing the U-boat to leave and keeping mum. The Swedish government did not believe that this was a Russian submarine, but under pressure from the media and the navy, they were forced to lodge a protest to the Soviet Union. The Swedish - Russian relations soured.

In October 2014, the then (1982-1985) Foreign Minister Lennart Budstr�m remembered this plot of the right-wing politicians and the Swedish military. He bitterly recalled in an interview for the newspaper Expressen how in 1982 the Swedish navy hunted an alleged Soviet submarine in H�rsfj�rden thirty miles from Stockholm - it was the culmination of the scandal.

The government convened a commission to figure out where the submarine originated - in Russia or NATO. The most active member of the commission was the young right-wing politician Carl Bildt - he practically wrote the commission's report, saying this was a Soviet submarine. He claimed there was an acoustic signal recording and other evidence. Only in 1988 it emerged that the Swedish army and navy did not intercept any signals from submarines. It was all a lie of Carl Bildt, says Budstr�m.

Bildt (with American support) had spread panic in the press. He claimed the Russian submarines make their way right into the centre of Stockholm, land troops and prepare for the invasion. Russian submarine sailors sneak into Stockholm bars to drink beer and squeeze Swedish blondes. Army and Coast Guard supplied photo of submarine periscopes for the front pages of newspapers.

"You are welcome to sink these subs - calmly said the Secretary General Yuri Andropov in 1984, after listening to the Swedish prime minister Olof Palme's complaint. - We'd only approve of such a move."

Only twenty years later, the meaning of Andropov's words became clear. The submarines in the Swedish waters were not Russian, but English and American. Instead of invasion, they had another plan, namely to sow enmity and distrust of Russia.

Budstr�m retired as he stood for friendship with Russia, and in his stead, the Minister of Foreign Affairs became (and remained until recently) Carl Bildt, a staunch pro-American Atlanticist, a supporter of Swedish accession to NATO, the greatest enemy of the USSR and Russia. It is alleged that Bildt in his youth was associated with a clandestine anti-communist combat organization created by the Americans for the event of the Soviet occupation of Western Europe, known as Stay Behind or Gladio.

Its members founded the secret US Fifth Column in Europe. The State Department dispatches published by the Wikileaks, indicate that the US embassy and the State Department took care of Bildt and helped his career. Bildt was a personal friend of Karl Rove, Bush's adviser, and actively supported the US intervention in Iraq.

Carl Bildt, the most inveterate enemy of Russia since the days of Karl XII, is a descendant of an aristocratic Scandinavian family (they had been Prime Ministers and Commanders since the 17th century). For a quarter of a century he was the most influential politician in Sweden, in government or in opposition, and he determined its anti-Russian course.

Carl Bildt has been closely associated with the submarine affair from the beginning to the end. In 1982, he denounced the Soviet invaders and earned brownie points. In 1990, Carl Bildt said that the Soviet Union has created a special force to attack Sweden. According to him, up to 22 Russian submarines participated in three annual manoeuvres in Swedish waters.

This fear-mongering has helped - in 1991 Bildt became the Prime Minister. In 1992 Bildt went to Moscow with the alleged old recordings of the submarine. Now we know for certain that these were sounds made by otters, but in Yeltsin's days the thoroughly defeated Russian government agreed these were Russian submarines.

When the Social Democrats returned to power in 1994, says ex-minister Budstr�m, a new commission was established, and it is completely refuted all allegations of Bildt. The first commission was composed of politicians, and the second - of scientists, and the findings were different. But that was too late. Sweden has been integrated it the EU and began to support American foreign policy.

One of the reasons is the media. The Atlanticist tendency in Sweden has almost complete control over the media. They manufacture a Russian threat a day, to scare the wits out of the Swedes. "Russia is a potential threat," - says a leading Swedish newspaper Svenska Dagbladet (30.05). In the same issue of the newspaper, its Moscow correspondent Anna-Lena Lauren says: "Russia is clearly threatening the Baltic States."

NATO planes fly close to Russia borders through Swedish airspace, in violation of Swedish sovereignty and neutrality, but Swedish media hardly ever reports of such frequent incidents. However, Russian air force training flights that stay clear of Swedish airspace are presented as a proof that the Russians are preparing to invade not only Sweden, but all the Baltic countries.

Even a report on delivering Russian air defence systems to far away Syria has been used to portray Russia as an aggressive monster preparing to subdue Sweden. The army provided the newspapers with a grim prediction: "The Russians can take over Sweden in a few days."

Perhaps it is true, but why should they? Neither now or in their greatest years of power has any Russian ruler-Tsar, General Secretary or President-ever wanted to invade Sweden. The last war between two neighbours took place over two hundred years ago. Russians have not the slightest intention to fight Swedes, but the Swedish army and the Swedish media are determined to present Russia as their mortal enemy. The army wants to increase the military budget; their political allies and their media say that only joining NATO would save the Swedish beauty from the Russian bear's claws.

This attitude is not helpful for the well-being of the two great northern powers. They are closely related. Ancestors of the Swedes were among founders of Russia, many Swedish noblemen served the Russian Crown. The Swedes and the Russians have the same birch trees growing along the river banks; the same mushrooms and berries grow in the same forests on both sides of the Baltic sea. Swedes and Russians experimented with socialism, mined ore and coal, felled trees, love their sauna and hockey. Russians are quite fond of Swedes: Peter the Great drank the health of the Swedish generals and called them 'his teachers', after thrashing them at Poltava.

Russia and Sweden have no dispute, no common border to argue about, no historic mishaps. All major Swedish companies - Ikea and Volvo, to mention some - have a profitable trade in Russia. Russians, especially the dwellers of St Petersburg region, go to Sweden on weekends. It is a short drive via Finland. Many Russians settled in Sweden, and Swedish businessmen are accustomed to Russia.

Russian policies towards Sweden and the West are marked with moderation, restraint and conservatism. They do not want to invade or conquer Sweden or other Western countries. Russia wants to be treated with respect, keep foreigners out of its internal affairs, and it wants other countries to take Russia's legitimate interests into account (read: Ukraine). But these Russian wishes are considered only when the West is not united.

After 1991, all of the major Western countries for the first time in world history were united (to some degree) under the military, political and economic leadership of the United States. They have a single united system of ideological control and hegemony via global media, social networks, and universities. I called this system "The Masters of Discourse." Such setup is detrimental for Russia.

The Atlanticists want to keep the world united under their rule, military via NATO and ideological through the Masters of Discourse system. Russia does not want world domination, does not want to rule over Europe or Asia or Sweden. But it can't accept the US hegemony either, for they would turn it into a snow-bound Nigeria, an oil-producing country of the third world.

For the Russians, normal relations with Sweden are an essential element of peace and stability in the Baltic Sea. Russia appreciates Swedish neutrality and the balanced policy of Sweden in Olof Palme's times. It has no desires to meddle in Swedish affairs and would like to have friendly relations. Now, after Carl Bildt's departure, there is hope for improved relations between the new Social Democrat government in Sweden and Russia. And now the old trick is played again, the scare of Russian submarines. We'll see whether this government will manage the real threat of right-wing plots better than its predecessors.

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 #23
The Wilson Quarterly
http://wilsonquarterly.com
Summer 2015
WHAT 18 FOCUS GROUPS IN THE FORMER USSR TAUGHT US ABOUT AMERICA'S IMAGE PROBLEMS [excerpt]
After talking with dozens of people in Russia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Kyrgyzstan, two contradictory, prevailing themes emerge about the United States.
BY THEODORE P. GERBER & JANE ZAVISCA
Theodore P. Gerber is a professor of sociology and director of the Center for Russia, East Europe, and Central Asia at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Jane Zavisca is an associate professor of sociology at the University of Arizona.
[Complete text here http://wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/summer-2015-an-age-of-connectivity/what-18-focus-groups-in-former-ussr-taught-us-about-americas-pr-problems/]

This material is based upon work supported in part by the U.S. Army Research Laboratory and the U.S. Army Research Office via the Minerva Research Initiative program under grant number W911NF1310303.

THE UNITED STATES has a major public relations problem in former Soviet countries. Not only in Russia, but in Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and even Ukraine, ordinary people see the U.S. as an arrogant, hegemonic superpower that meddles in the affairs of other countries in a cynical pursuit of its own interests - perceptions that dovetail with the Russian government's official critiques of the United States, which may explain the success of these particular memes. At the same time, citizens of these countries respect and admire American economic power, technology, culture, and, to some extent, its political institutions. This dual-sided picture - often obscured by crude survey-based measures of views of America in post-Soviet nations - emerged from 18 focus groups we conducted in Russia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine between April and August 2014.

To restore American soft power in the region, the United States should reduce direct support for civil society organizations in former Soviet countries and others that lack intrinsic demand for civic engagement. American financing of these organizations has played into the hands of authoritarian leaders who portray such backing as evidence of American interference, hurting the reputations of both the U.S. and the local NGOs that receive American funds. Instead, American policies should emphasize programs which spread and deepen knowledge and appreciation of American institutions - more exchanges of people, ideas, and cultural products.

AMERICAN DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE, AND THE RUSSIAN CRITIQUE

Since the late 1980s, the United States has sought to promote democracy in semi-authoritarian and transition countries by providing financial and technical support to NGOs that pursue civic and political causes, election monitoring efforts, and oppositional political parties. These policies appeared to bear fruit when popular democratic movements helped overthrow dictators in Chile, Nicaragua, and Serbia, and with the successful "color revolutions" in Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, and Ukraine.

The approach has been less successful in Russia, and has contributed to a general curdling of U.S.-Russian relations. In 2009, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that from 2006-2008, federal agencies spent nearly $100 million on democracy promotion in Russia - much of it in the form of funding for "civil society programs" - making Russia the sixth-largest recipient of U.S. spending for that purpose.

Russian President Vladimir Putin's October 26, 2014, speech at the "Valdai" discussion club received worldwide attention for its condemnation of American foreign policy. Putin claimed the United States actively interferes in the affairs of other countries, cynically foments "color revolutions," and even supports Islamic terrorists under the guise of promoting "peace, prosperity, progress, growth, and democracy," all in order to preserve its dominant, hegemonic position in a "unipolar" world. The level of vitriol in Putin's Valdai speech may be unprecedented, but its content is not.

If Russian critiques of the U.S. hold sway, it poses a major threat to American "soft power" in former Soviet states.

As Thomas Carothers observed in a 2006 Foreign Affairs article, Putin has been leading a "backlash" campaign against American democracy assistance since 2005, when Russian officials began labeling domestic human rights NGOs with foreign funding as a traitorous "fifth column," a now-standard moniker in official speeches and pro-Kremlin Russian media. In a February 2007 speech in Munich, Putin sounded the themes of unipolarity, U.S. hypocrisy in preaching democracy and human rights, and its interference in Russia's sovereign affairs. After spontaneous protests arose in Russia following allegations of widespread fraud in the country's December 2011 parliamentary elections, Putin blamed the revolts on U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, charging that she sent "a signal" to certain "actors" in Russia - a threatening specter of American menace which became a prominent theme throughout Putin's 2012 presidential campaign. In his March 18, 2014, address on the "reunification" of Russia and Crimea, Putin again labeled those who oppose his policies as a "fifth column, [a] disparate bunch of national traitors" supported by foreign interests.

Although its main audience has been domestic, the Russian government has actively sought to export this message, investing massive resources in its international "RT" (formerly Russia Today) media network, which now can reach 600 million people worldwide with broadcasts in multiple languages. Domestic Russian media broadcasts are ubiquitous in other former Soviet republics, offering a steady diet of reports dramatizing United States interference in other countries' internal affairs, highlighting problems in America, and portraying developments such as the collapse of the Yanukovych government in Ukraine, the downing of flight MH-17, and combat in southeastern Ukraine as direct results of U.S. actions.

Rhetoric aside, the Russian government has passed a series of laws tightening the screws on foreign-funded political NGOs; requirements that they register as "foreign agents," with connotations that they are spying for foreign governments, are just one recent example. The influence of Russia's campaign is evident in copycat legislation enacted in Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, Yanukovych's Ukraine, and elsewhere, which has cracked down on foreign-funded NGOs, domestic protesters, and oppositional groups.

In sum, Putin and his associates have put forward a concerted, sustained critique of American democracy assistance for nearly a decade, threatening not only to undermine efforts at democracy promotion, but also to tarnish the broader image of the United States. If the Russian critique holds sway, it poses a significant threat to American "soft power" in former Soviet republics, much to the long-term detriment of United States foreign policy.

There has been virtually no empirical research into whether the populations in these countries actually buy the Russian critique. Survey researchers regularly investigate how Russians feel toward the United States, and similar studies have been done in Ukraine. Predictably, Russian public opinion on the United States has fluctuated; negative views surged following the Iraq invasion and, even more so, in the last year, after the Crimea takeover and hostilities with Ukraine.

But apart from these flag-rallying, event-driven episodes, generally less than half of the Russian population has expressed unfavorable views of the United States. The more sporadic negative numbers in Ukraine have been consistently below those for Russia, but in 2014, about one-third of Ukrainians polled were unfavorable towards the United States, despite U.S. support for the Ukrainian government and economic sanctions against Russia.

While informative, the survey data offer limited insight into the traction of Russian government arguments about U.S. democracy assistance. By their nature, surveys reduce nuanced and ambivalent attitudes to a single number, thereby potentially masking the underlying complexity of views. Anti-American sentiment within Russia increased modestly in 2006, just after Putin and company launched the Russian critique of American democracy assistance, but temporal coincidence does not demonstrate a causal relationship. Moreover, the waning of negative views in 2009 suggests other factors are at work. Without asking why Russians have negative views we cannot really say what is driving them.

METHODOLOGY

TO FIND OUT HOW AMERICA IS PERCEIVED IN EURASIA, we worked with local research organizations to conduct 18 focus groups in Russia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Kyrgyzstan from April to August 2014. We developed the focus group guides and observed all the groups, save for two in Sabirabad, Azerbaijan, which we could not attend due to logistical and political issues. Our local partners recruited participants (all of whom were 18-49 years old), provided native-speaking moderators, and the translated the transcripts. Each group included 8-10 participants. The timing, location, and composition of the groups were as follows:

These focus groups' small and selective samples mean that they are not necessarily representative of larger public opinion, but they provide substantially more detail than mass surveys about the reasoning behind people's attitudes, and the language they spontaneously use to express their opinions. While journalistic interviews often seek a balance of views on an issue (or else push a particular position), focus groups obtain an objective sense of how a random selection of individuals think about the topics discussed. By comparing groups within and between countries, one can ascertain whether specific logics and narratives represent common themes or idiosyncratic expressions.

Two contradictory themes regarding the United States emerged in the groups: one, skepticism and outright hostility toward American foreign policies and actions in the world; two, respect and admiration for American economic power, technology, culture, and, to some extent, political institutions. The rationales supporting the first theme testify to the resonance of the Russian critique of American democracy promotion, while the second theme suggests that despite such efforts, what might be called the "American way of life" still holds considerable appeal.

SUPPORT FOR THE RUSSIAN CRITIQUE

NOT SURPRISINGLY, the anti-American theme was most pronounced in the Russian groups. With near unanimity, Russian participants voiced negative views of the United States that echo elements of their government's critique.

They characterized America as an aggressive, arrogant superpower that seeks to impose its will on the world, eliminate any competition, and specifically, pressure Russia:

"Americans want to be lords of the world,
and Russia now stands in their way."
(Moscow, university educated)

"[The Americans] think that they are always right and they won't consider any other opinions; they do whatever suits them."
(Moscow, university educated)

In particular, many blamed America for the Ukrainian conflict, claiming, for example, that America caused it in order to profit from arms sales or to install its military technology along Russia's border (Kazan, Tatars). Several asserted that American soldiers were actually engaged in combat operations in Ukraine, and one insisted that the Americans shot down flight MH-17 in a botched attempt to target Putin's plane.

America, some said, uses money and power to turn its allies against Russia:

"America is our enemy for life, our main troublemaker."
(Moscow, less educated)

"'The Party said we need it, the Komsomol answered: it's done!'
[a reference to a Soviet-era slogan] It's the same thing [with America and the EU]. America controls everyone because they apparently depend on America. ... [America] probably pays [the Europeans], probably promises them some kind of property in turn for cooperating."
(Moscow, less educated)

America fears Russia as a competitor:

"Well, it's as if we are helping ourselves to a lot [by taking Crimea], and the Americans think that they are the only ones who can do that. And it's as if Russia showed her teeth, that's why [they imposed sanctions]. ... They think we might take something else in the future. If we took a piece of Ukraine, maybe we will take something else, right?"
(Kazan, ethnic Russians)

Yet, America also seems to crave Russia's resources:

"[They see us as] a tasty morsel, which they want to seize and divide among themselves. We have enormous territory, one-sixth of the earth's mass, and 140 million people. And so they're sharpening their knives for our untold riches. They want to turn us into cattle and seize our territory. And whatever we do, sooner or later they will attack, it seems to me. Whatever we do, there will be war. They cannot resist such a tasty morsel."
(Kazan, ethnic Russians)

No doubt reflecting official statements, some participants specifically singled out America's purported efforts to undermine Russia by sponsoring political NGOs, a "fifth column":

"I heard that [America] sends people here, supplies them with money in order to cause an uprising or something like that. Like in Syria, where Americans purposely sent in people under false pretenses, as if they were going to work there or something, and those people encouraged an uprising against the government, or a coup. And in our country, the 'Bolotnaya' protests were the same thing, most likely. They provide them with money, big money, in order to spur them on."
(Kazan, Tatars)

"[Foreign-funded NGOs] simply play the role of a fifth column. They are all Western supported, and that's it. Take, for example, the well-known George Soros Fund. What are non-governmental organizations and what are they doing here? They have completely transparent and concrete goals: formation of civil society, providing help in the area of medical care, getting to know future doctors, in the realm of education, humanitarian aid, like we had in the 1990s with 'Bush's legs' [a reference to the chicken legs imported by United States during the first Bush administration]. But in fact these non-governmental organizations under this guise attempt to sow pseudo-values that are intrinsically alien to an ethnic Russian person, starting with hamburgers and Coca-Cola and ending with computer games and films about all kinds of scumbags."
(Moscow, less educated)

The breadth of anti-American sentiment expressed confirms the survey findings that both support for Putin's policies and hostility toward the United States are at all-time highs in Russia. But the focus groups add important nuances to the picture obtained from polls. The passion and emotion that Russian participants expressed in regard to the United States were striking, and contrast starkly to the bored and detached tenor of discussions of political topics in past focus groups we have conducted in the country. Had participants merely been parroting official propaganda, it is unlikely the discussions would have been so heated.

Yet, Russians' views of the United States are more complex than pure condemnation. The same groups also expressed admiration for America's economic achievements, democracy, high living standards, and American films, music, and television shows. "I have nothing against the American people, only against the American government," said one participant in the less-educated focus group in Moscow. It was a common sentiment.

Antipathy toward American policies is apparently not severe enough to distort views of the American people. Participants allowed, either explicitly or tacitly, that both sides in the conflict present distorted information about the other. "[T]hey brainwash people there too, just like here," said a participant in the less-educated panel in Moscow. "After all, how do we know all this? Where do we learn about the political situation? From newspapers, from television. That is, we believe the information that is served up to us."

Such acknowledgments that their own government manipulates information to suit its purpose indicate an underlying unease, belied by the evident conviction with which the Russian participants toed the official line.

AMERICAN POLICYMAKERS who expect Ukraine's population to support the U.S.'s foreign policies as thanks for its efforts to counter Russian actions in Ukraine will be disappointed. Although the Ukrainian groups, which were conducted in areas where anti-Russian sentiments predominate, did not express the same hostility toward America as heard in the Russian groups, they voiced ample skepticism about America's motives in foreign affairs, and disappointment in the extent of support for Ukraine:

"[America] is just another empire. We don't know much about either the Russian empire or the U.S.A., but they chose Ukraine as a point of conflict where they can fight it out to show who is 'cooler,' in a word."
(Lviv, 30 and under)

"It seems like they absolutely don't need us for anything, taking into account that for this whole period they gave us no help. ... That is, they gave us something, but it was too little, too late, absolutely nothing. Even those sanctions took so much time and were only implemented after so many people were killed - that all shows that they just don't need us."
(Lviv, 30 and under)

"They prioritize themselves, what is good for them in the first place."
(Lviv, 30 and under)

"I feel neutral toward the United States.
In essence, they don't have anything special for Ukraine."
(Lviv, over 30)

Participant 1:
"Their basic policy is to make money. And they, for the most part, pretend to help Ukraine, but above all, they only look at their own interests."

Participant 2:
"Well, every country looks after its own interests."

Participant 1:
"They deceived Ukraine, let's say; abandoned [us]."
(Lviv, over 30)

On the other hand, the Ukrainian groups discussed at length the second overarching theme: admiration for the American way of life. They praised America's respect for laws and human rights and its "social protections":

"If you are a citizen of the United States then you truly have rights, and they are respected, not like in Ukraine."
(Lviv, over 30)

"[In the U.S.], the laws are observed more."
(Lviv, over 30)

"We have been talking a lot about social protections. I have very close friends who live there, and they are ecstatic about life there. They even went driving in the desert and their car broke down - in the naked, empty desert. Even there, they made one phone call and in five-to-ten minutes, a tow truck showed up. They have massively high taxes, which makes their hearts bleed, but they get something in return: social protections, plus work. That means the chance to travel, rent housing. They rent and buy, they are confident in tomorrow."
(Kiev, Russian-speakers)

"Medical care, education, the legal system - everything is on a high level there."
(Kiev, Russian-speakers)

American institutions encourage business and hard work:

"I have a friend who is a programmer who lived there for two years. He said it is the only country in the world where, in his view, a person's talent is truly valued. ... Everything is set up so that if a person is talented and hardworking, then the state in no way interferes with their self-realization."
(Kiev, Ukrainian speakers)

"It is heaven on earth there - except you have to work hard."
(Lviv, 30 and under)

"Conditions for doing business are much easier."
(Lviv, 30 and under)

"You have to work hard there."
(Lviv, 30 and under)

"Our people who migrate there and work make a lot, and they tend to do better than the people who have lived there all their lives, because our people have a lot of internal resources and are used to hard work."
(Lviv, 30 and under)

America's political institutions are more effective and less corrupt than Ukraine's:

"The president there has a lot of power, and somehow - if we exclude Bush, the previous president - they get relatively intellectual people in that position. Everyone said that Clinton was a fool, but under Clinton, they had the strongest economy in the last 30 or 40 years. And in any case, their president is not a twice-convicted criminal, an idiot who cannot say two words without being laughed at. He is a smart person."
(Kiev, Russian-speakers)

"We live in a kind of information vacuum. They have thrown all kinds of dirt at America - mafia, drugs, and so on. If we compare how much they drink in Russia, then there are not so many drug addicts [in America]. They are on a different level there. People who have lived there and come back here tell me how the police behave there. For example, they will give directions, help you find things. That sort of thing. Here when you see a police uniform you immediately try to hide."
(Kiev, Russian-speakers)

"There, they have courts and juries that decide independently of any 'instruction' whether [the accused is] guilty or not-guilty."
(Lviv, over 30)

Even in Ukraine, America's most potent form of soft power is not its effort to counter Russian aggression, but instead, America's political, economic, and cultural institutions.

The logical conclusion is that the U.S. can more effectively build a positive image by focusing attention on its way of life rather than its foreign policy.
Not everyone agreed, but some Ukrainian participants also touted the American "mentality":

Participant 1:
"[I admire] their humanity, the fact that they never just walk by [someone in need]. If you have a misfortune or some bad luck, they will help you; they will even take someone into their home and help them get set up; that's how they are."

Participant 2:
"I think it's not actually like that; it's 'everyone for themselves' there."

Participant 1:
"Well excuse me, but you have never been there."
(Kiev, Ukrainian speakers)

"They have democratic values, that's generally their main priority."
(Lviv, 30 and under)

"[I like their] tolerance and their mentality. There, every American is a patriot in the depths of his soul. Even black drug dealers from the ghetto will take up arms to fight for America. They are patriotic."
(Kiev, Russian speakers)

Despite America's support for Ukraine in its conflict with Russia, the focus group participants endorsed America's institutions more than its foreign policies. If even in Ukraine, the most potent weapons in America's soft power arsenal are not its efforts to counter Russian aggression or to spread democracy, but instead, America's political, economic, and cultural institutions, the logical conclusion is that the U.S. can more effectively build a positive image by focusing attention on its way of life rather than its foreign policies, which include democracy promotion efforts.

Ukrainians expressed concern about possible American meddling in domestic Ukrainian politics:

"Ukraine needs a partner, a strong partner, because we are completely defenseless. But the main thing is that this partner who helps us doesn't then try to interfere in our personal internal affairs. That they don't, you know, say 'we paid for you, so now dance with us.' If they are helping us only out of pure good will, then thanks. But if it is only under certain conditions, then we have to be careful."
(Kiev, Russian speakers)

"There is a lot about the U.S.A. I view positively; I just don't want them to interfere in our internal or foreign policy."
(Kiev, Russian speakers)

These suspicions may have been provoked by video clips showing U.S. officials discussing their preferred candidates among Ukrainian opposition figures. To allay such fears, the United States should avoid providing direct financial support for Ukrainian political NGOs or parties, which could easily be perceived as meddling in Ukraine's internal affairs....

CONCLUSION

FOCUS GROUPS MAY NOT be representative of the populations from which participants are drawn, and the generalizability of these results remains to be confirmed with survey data. However, the recurrence of the main themes across groups within and between countries implies that these views are not idiosyncratic. The core arguments made by Russian officials regarding America's ambition, arrogance, self-interestedness, and penchant for using democracy promotion to meddle in the affairs of others, resonate with publics across Eurasia - even in countries like Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, which have received significant amounts of American aid, and Azerbaijan, which has sought to maintain some diplomatic distance from Russia. The appeal of the Russian critique poses a formidable challenge to American soft power.

To restore a positive image of America, U.S. officials should scale back the type of democracy promotion that looks like meddling in favor of strategies that leverage America's advantages - namely, positive perceptions of American institutions, economic, and technological achievements, and high living standards. The American way of life could be made a positive institutional model that ultimately encourages organic movements for change untarnished by the stain of foreign interference. Ways to do so include bolstering student, scientific, and other exchanges, encouraging more frequent travel, immigration, and trade between the United States and former Soviet countries, and quietly but assiduously promoting programs that expose citizens in Eurasia to concrete examples of American institutions. It is telling that many of positive views of America expressed in the focus groups originated from acquaintances of participants who have spent time in the United States.

While no strategy is guaranteed to work, this approach has a better chance than continuing efforts to promote democratization by directly supporting local political NGOs and oppositional movements.

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 #25
Kyiv Post
August 3, 2015
Violence erupts after rival Kharkiv rallies
by Allison Quinn

Special forces were deployed along with police negotiators on Aug. 3 when a rally in Kharkiv erupted into violent clashes, with pro-Ukrainian activists driving supporters of the Opposition Bloc into a building in a scene frightfully reminiscent of the May 2 Odesa massacre.

The day started out peacefully, with international monitors observing two separate rallies in the city - one in support of the Opposition Bloc registering for local elections and one against it. The Opposition Bloc brings together political parties that did not support the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution and have a decidedly pro-Russian slant.

About 50 people were recorded in attendance at the former rally and 100 at the latter, including members of the ultranationalist group Right Sector. Both of the rallies were held in front of the regional justice department building.

It turned ugly after the two rallies had wrapped up and Opposition Bloc lawmaker Mikhail Dobkin went back to his office. There, unknown masked men began throwing stones and smashing up Dobkin's vehicle, a blue minibus.

A video of the incident shows dozens of masked men destroying the vehicle while being taunted by a separate group of men across the street, apparently supporters of the Opposition Bloc. After a brief period of calm, shots were fired as masked men threw stones the building where the rival group was located.

Police were quickly forced to cordon off the entire area. Dobkin and his aides were driven back into the building, where they barricaded themselves until police negotiators arrived to talk them out. By mid-afternoon, police vans had arrived to take away those detained for the violence, though it was not immediately clear how many people had been taken into custody.

While various media reports placed the blame for the violence on Right Sector, the group's spokesman, Artyom Skoropadsky, said members of the group had only been present at the rally to "support the locals who were against the Opposition Bloc."

"Then clashes broke out when provocateurs started firing at random. So, of course, Right Sector responded, because how can they not respond when they're being shot at?" he said.

"These are the people responsible for killing people on Maidan," Skoropadsky said of the Opposition Bloc, explaining why the group was against the party registering for local elections in Kharkiv.

Dobkin, in comments to Ukrinform, denied that his supporters had initiated the clashes, saying pro-Ukrainian activists had blocked the road to the local justice ministry building in the morning, preventing him from being able to submit the necessary documents for local elections.

In a separate statement issued after the incident, Dobkin described the events as a "violation of all democratic values, rights and freedom," and said he believed local authorities had set the whole thing up to prevent him from being able to register for elections.

Kharkiv has been the scene of numerous violent protests pitting pro-Russians against pro-Ukrainians throughout the conflict in Ukraine, with one such rally culminating in a shootout in March 2014. According to the Security Service of Ukraine, the city is also one of the main flashpoints for pro-Russian subversives seeking to destabilize the political situation, and there is an active separatist underground.

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 #26
Financial Times
August 2, 2015
Fears grow as Ukraine rightwing militia puts Kiev in its sights
Leader of Right Sector battalion turns on Ukraine's president
By Roman Olearchyk

At a thickly forested former youth camp west of Donetsk in war-torn eastern Ukraine, a military instructor is busy teaching hundreds of new recruits how to fire everything from machine guns to rocket-propelled grenades.

The new boys are lean and fit, anti-separatist and - in the instructor's words - have "fire in their eyes".

But this is not Ukraine's regular army. The troops are members of Right Sector, the far-right group that evolved from among the most militant wing of the protesters who toppled Viktor Yanukovich, the country's pro-Russian president, in its pro-democracy revolution last year.

The group is one of dozens of "volunteer" battalions that played a key role in halting advances by pro-Russian rebels a year ago, after the revolution ushered in a pro-EU leadership, when the long-neglected regular army was caught flat-footed.

But fears are growing that Right Sector - the only major volunteer battalion Kiev has not yet managed to bring under regular army control - could turn its fire on the new government itself.

Dmytro Yarosh, Right Sector's leader, called late last month for a nationwide no-confidence referendum in President Petro Poroshenko. He was addressing a rally in Kiev of up to 5,000 Right Sector activists, angry over what they say is the government's slow progress in fighting corruption and excessive concessions to Moscow as it attempts to reach a settlement over eastern Ukraine.

"We are an organised revolutionary force that is opening the new phase of the Ukrainian revolution," Mr Yarosh told the rally.

And earlier last month, two people were left dead in a shootout between off-duty Right Sector fighters and police near Ukraine's previously peaceful western border - 1,500km away from the eastern conflict. The group claimed it was acting to destroy an illicit cross-border cigarette trade. Some observers have suggested Right Sector was actually trying to take it over.

Russian officials and media have long demonised Right Sector as neo-Nazis who, they claim, were the real driving force behind Ukraine's revolution. Moscow media's obsession led some Ukrainian officials to suggest privately that Right Sector might have been penetrated by Russian intelligence as a subversive "project" aimed at undermining the government.

Now some Ukrainians who previously dismissed the threat posed by Right Sector are growing nervous.

"[Right Sector] have been mainly a problem for Ukraine's image in the west, but now there is added concern because they have turned against the government," said Andreas Umland, a German academic based in Kiev who studies the far right. "But they don't yet have the political support or firepower to topple the government, and they know this."

Popular support for the group remains low, although a poll found it had risen from 1.8 per cent last October to 5.4 per cent by July.

Yet as Mr Umland notes, the bravery shown in the east Ukraine conflict by the Right Sector battalion has earned it the esteem of many regular soldiers - posing a dilemma for Kiev.

Though the group agreed to pull back from the front lines weeks ago to comply with requirements of February's Minsk ceasefire accord that "illegal fighting forces" be withdrawn, its red and black flag still flutters over many locations now manned only by regular troops.

"Personally I respect Right Sector. They are a strong, patriotic fighting force," said a Ukrainian deputy battalion commander nicknamed Leon, stationed north of Donetsk. "There is no Right Sector here now but there are lots of boys here who support Right Sector."

But although Right Sector fighters are respected by regular Ukrainian troops for their battle bravery, they are despised by separatists, who allegedly execute them upon capture rather than taking them hostage for prisoner swaps.

As well as attracting scores of new recruits, Right Sector - unlike much of Ukraine's regular army - appears well equipped.

An armoured infantry assault tank captured in combat guards the entrance to the Right Sector base in the village of Velykomykhailivka. Inside, the group's other vehicles, including armour-plated pickup trucks, stand idle as the boom of grenades roars from a training ground hidden in nearby woods.

Right Sector fighters regularly drive outside the base in camouflaged jeeps, passing freely through security checkpoints despite having their own - illegal - licence plates identifying them as Right Sector.

"We could send up to 10,000 fighters to the frontline," said Artem Skoropadsky, a spokesperson for Right Sector. Garik, another spokesperson, said some of their weapons were "donations" or were traded for other equipment with regular Ukrainian troops in the heat of battle; others were captured from the enemy.

Though the group's fighters admit they constitute an illegal armed force, they blame Ukraine's parliament for dragging its feet in legislating to legalise them as a single elite unit under Ukrainian army command.

"We earned our status from the people already, but now we need legal status as a fighting force," says Frantsuz, or "Frenchman" - an instructor who earned his nickname after fighting with the French foreign legion. "Those in government are criminals if they don't give us status."

He denies the group are fascists. "Having lived in [western] Europe, I realise that they often confuse Nazism with nationalism, which for us Ukrainians is more akin to patriotism," he says. "It's not about considering your own ethnic group as superior, but being proud of it, and of defending your country."

Right Sector is now trying to gather enough signatures from voters to force the referendum, although it is not clear if it will succeed.

"It may come to a military coup," said one Right Sector fighter - although many in the group say they would not go that far. He admitted, however, that public support for such a scenario was low. "That's why we haven't done it yet."

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 #27
Financial Times
August 1, 2015
Demoralised Ukraine troops start to lose faith in Kiev
Echoes broader ebbing of public support for political leaders
Roman Olearchyk in Avdiivka

On the road into Avdiivka in eastern Ukraine, Vasyl, a Ukrainian army soldier, gestures at fresh roadside craters - the result of shelling by Russian-backed separatists the night before. His men face attacks almost nightly as they guard a checkpoint in this front line suburb of rebel-held Donetsk, he says.

Their only defences from the barrages are machine guns, a small concrete shelter and a decrepit, Soviet-era armoured personnel carrier.

"Why doesn't the president come here?" spits Vasyl. "Then he'll see first-hand how poorly supplied we are - although we're dodging artillery almost every day under this ceasefire he himself brokered."

Petro Poroshenko, Ukraine's president, seems to prefer visiting training grounds far from the war zone, testing advanced weapons that have yet to make it to the front line, he says, adding: "Our morale is burning out due to their actions."

Vasyl asks not to be identified. But his comments are both typical of those heard among Ukrainian soldiers in the east these days, and significant. They reflect an anger and mistrust towards commanders and the country's political leaders that has grown sharply in the past 12 months.

This time last year, Ukrainian forces were advancing and retaking territory from the rebels, before an invasion by regular Russian forces last August reversed their progress and led to a morale-sapping defeat at the battle of Ilovaisk. Today, they man Ukraine's borders with two rebel-held regions amid a ceasefire that is constantly breached.

They complain they are exhausted, underequipped and feel like cannon fodder in an increasingly forgotten but still smouldering war.

The mood change among the military rank-and-file echoes a broader ebbing of support in society for Ukraine's post-revolutionary leaders, seen - despite praise from international observers - as slow to deliver on pledges to reform governance andcurb corruption.

It also suggests that if Russia's continued backing for the eastern rebels is aimed at destabilising Ukraine, it may be gaining ground.

Most worryingly for Kiev, many frontline soldiers express admiration for Right Sector, a rightwing militia whose leader last week called for a national no-confidence vote in the government and a new revolution.

Further along the front line at Horlivka, 50km north of Donetsk, Yevhen, a 32 year-old Ukrainian soldier, mirrors Vasyl's complaints over lack of resources. He points at the still-flying red and black flag of Right Sector, whose fighters have been withdrawn from the front line.

"We kept their flag up," he says. "They're our buddies, very brave in battle, and have risked their lives side by side with us....We respect them."

Like other Ukrainian soldiers interviewed, however, Yevhen declined to say whether he supported Right Sector's calls for a change of government.

Mr Poroshenko has repeatedly complained about Washington's refusal to provide Kiev with anti-tank weapons such as the Javelin missile, which could deter further advances by rebel and Russian forces. But Ukrainian soldiers say they have yet to see even the much-hyped Stuhna, a Ukrainian-made anti-tank rocket.

Although US-supplied and domestically produced armoured vehicles are periodically visible rolling along highways in the east, advanced combat equipment seems absent from hotspots most targeted by rebel forces.

"If the Russian army advances with tanks - and they have tanks there - we'll fight back, but obviously we won't be able to stop them with our machine-guns and grenades," says Yevhen.

Though fighting is far less intense than during last year's heated battles, which claimed thousands of lives, more than 150 Ukrainian soldiers have died since February's Minsk ceasefire accord. Scores of civilians have also perished, including five in Avdiivka last week when rebels allegedly shelled a residential building.

The country is meanwhile struggling with a double-digit economic contraction, plummeting currency and spiralling inflation - including a fourfold increase in utility prices that was a condition of securing a $17.5bn IMF bailout.

The IMF's executive board on Friday approved the disbursement of the next installment of those funds, a $1.7bn tranche, after its first review of the programme.

"They call all this reform, but a retiree living with a pension of just over $50 per month can't cover such bills and have enough left over to feed themselves" said Yuriy Lozytsky, a retired serviceman of 26 years now working as a car mechanic near Dnipropetrovsk.

Lingering war, economic despair and slow reforms are eroding trust in the leadership dramatically propelled to power by the pro-democracy revolution of February 2014.

Mr Poroshenko mustered 54 per cent support in presidential elections in May last year but would today garner only 14.6 per cent, according to a June survey by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology. Arseniy Yatseniuk, the prime minister, would get only 1.3 per cent in a presidential poll.

"The honeymoon has long passed," said Vadym Karasyov, a political analyst in Kiev, referring to the post revolution that propelled Ukraine's present leadership to power. "These poll numbers are a warning from voters that clearly do not feel reforms in their pockets."

There is no immediate sign of the governing coalition collapsing, and national elections are four years away. But opinion polls suggest support for fringe parties could surge in regional elections in October.

Mr Poroshenko has said he is committed to a negotiated peace in east Ukraine and last week backed an agreement, yet to be implemented, for both sides to pull heavy weaponry back 15km from the front lines. But some voices among the fighters say the way to address falling morale would be an advance.

"The army is demoralised because they're being kept standing, told to hold position as they fall one by one," said a scar-faced instructor, at a Right Sector base. "They need a victory. The enemy is definitely preparing an attack. The best way to pre-empt this is to go on the attack."

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 #28
Sputnik
August 1, 2015
'Moscow Must Burn!' Right-Wing Extremists in Ukraine Mobilize

A prominent leader of Ukrainian extremist volunteer militias is calling for a "crusade" against Russia. He first wants to expel the rebels in eastern Ukraine and then "burn Moscow down," DWN wrote.

The anti-Russian mobilization in Ukraine has developed a new and dangerous dynamic, with right-wing volunteer militia leader Dmytro Korchynsky enjoying much popularity among the country's citizens.

"I want to lead a crusade against Russia. Our goal is not only the expulsion of the occupiers, but also vengeance. Moscow must burn," Korchynsky said.

Korchynsky, a former leader of an ultra-nationalist party and a devout Orthodox Christian, wants to create a Christian "Taliban movement," Reuters reported. He called his battalion "Holy Mary."

Most members of the current 40 volunteer militias are former Maidan activists who were involved in the overthrow of the Yanukovych government. They pose a serious threat to the Ukrainian government and are responsible for mass violence in the country.

Serhiy Melnychuk, who founded the notorious Aidar Battalion and is a member of the Ukrainian Parliament, said he had recruited people between the ages of 18-62 from all social groups: from "homeless to retirees."  Earlier, Amnesty International accused the battalion of "war crimes".

Members of the Tornado militia group founded by Andriy Filonenko were accused of rape, murder and human trafficking. According to reports of Ukrainian officials, there are videos in which Tornado members force two prisoners to rape a third inmate.

The extremist militias are demanding the dismissal of Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko and the imposition of martial law. They criticize Poroshenko's policy, partly because he had ratified the law promoting the decentralization of the country. The militias fear the secession of the eastern regions and seek to preserve the "unity" of Ukraine by any means necessary, the newspaper wrote.

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 #29
Committee for the Salvation of Ukraine believes there will be no peace in Ukraine with its current political administration

MOSCOW. Aug 3 (Interfax) - Mykola Azarov, the head of the Committee for the Salvation of Ukraine and former prime minister of Ukraine, believes peace and accord cannot be established in Ukraine without changing its political administration.

"The Committee for the Salvation of Ukraine believes that it is impossible to establish peace, accord, development and provide people with minimal social standards without changing the country's political administration," Azarov told a press conference in Moscow on Monday.

"The Committee has made a unanimous decision to nominate Volodymyr Oleinyk for president of Ukraine. I have known him personally for twenty years, he has already been nominated and he has been a parliamentarians many times. He is a patriot, we trust him," Azarov said.

Azarov said the Committee is thus giving the people of Ukraine an alternative. "The situation in the country, which this regime of terror, intimidation and censorship has created, has made most people, journalists and political scientists who are in opposition leave the country," he said.

"We have been framed. To our great regret, the Committee is being created outside of Ukraine, but I have no doubts that we will return and will be able to fulfill our obligations to the people of Ukraine. We assume liability for ensuring peace, stability and development in the country," Azarov said.

Azarov said current members of the Committee, whose names cannot be disclosed for security reasons, are now in Ukraine, too.

"I am confident that the full composition of the committee will be presented fully over time. It comprises patriots and professionals who are not related to the current regime," Azarov said.

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#30
Former Ukrainian lawmaker says Kiev pushed away Crimea and Donbas

MOSCOW, August 3. /TASS/. Verkovna Rada former deputy Vladimir Oleinik, who was nominated for president by Ukraine Salvation Committee, has said Monday that current authorities are to blame for losing Crimea.

"Unfortunately, we lost Crimea because of criminal authorities that ignited ethnic strife and pushed away Crimea and Ukraine's south-east by staging a coup," Oleinik told a press conference in Moscow.

'When Crimea saw that there is war at the doorstep, it left Ukraine. You don't remember how [Ukrainian President Petro] Poroshenko came before the referendum, how Crimeans pushed him out from the peninsula," Oleinik said promising that he will make everything possible so that "Crimeans feel comfortable in Ukraine, and Ukrainians - in Crimea."

He also called on Kiev to "remove restrictions on water and electricity."

Crimea's reunification with Russia

Crimea, where most residents are ethnic Russians, refused to recognize the legitimacy of authorities brought to power amid riots during a coup in Ukraine in February 2014. In mid-March last year, Crimea re-joined Russia following a referendum. More than 82% of the electorate took part in the vote. Over 96% backed splitting from Ukraine and spoke in favor of reuniting with Russia. Results of the referendum were celebrated by many Crimeans but the vote was widely criticized by Western leaders and at the United Nations.

In the Soviet Union, Crimea was part of Russia until 1954, when Communist Party head Nikita Khrushchev transferred the Crimean region, along with Sevastopol, to Ukraine's jurisdiction for purposes of logistics.

Direct negotiations between Kiev, Donetsk and Luhansk necessary

Oleinik, who was nominated for president by Ukraine Salvation Committee, also noted that the problem in Donbas cannot be solved without direct negotiations between Kiev, Donetsk and Luhansk.

"If you ask me how I would have acted right after inauguration - I would have immediately signed a decree on returning forces to places of their permanent deployment. I would have gone to Donetsk and Luрansk, where people are suffering, and asked for forgiveness on my knees from all Ukrainian mothers," Oleinik told a press conference in Moscow. "Direct negotiations between Kiev, Donetsk and Luhansk are necessary," he said adding that "it is necessary to make any kind of compromise" for peace.

"For instance, one language and two countries is bad, while two languages and one country is good. And talking about federalization, it is not that bad, it's just a system of government," Oleinik noted.

He called on Ukrainian citizens not to participate in the military operation in Donbas. "Don't let your children go to war!" he stressed. Oleinik said that Ukraine's military recruiting offices "have turned into terrorist organizations" that take to the army all those who disagree with the current authorities. "Conscripts are running away in Ukraine today," he reminded.

Vladimir Oleinik is a Ukrainian politician, famous lawyer, Verkhovna Rada deputy of 5th, 6th and 7th convocations. He was born in 1957 in Ukraine's Cherkassy Region.

In 2006, he was elected to the parliament from Yulya Tymoshenko's Bloc. Since March 2010, he had been member of the Party of Regions and served as deputy chairman of Rada'a committee on industrial and regulatory policy and entrepreneurship.

In December 2014, Ukraine's General Prosecutor's Office charged Oleinik was organizing illegal voting in the parliament for "16 January laws" - a package of measures toughening penalties for various offenses. He was put on Ukraine's wanted list.

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 #31
http://newcoldwar.org
August 2, 2015
Feature interview from Donetsk with Ukrainian pianist Valentina Lisitsa

International concert pianist Valentina Lisitsa traveled to Donetsk in June 2015 to perform a public concert. She also met with civic leaders, and she met with young pianists and other musicians to offer them advice and guidance. She performed an evening concert in the city of Donetsk on June 22.

Earlier during the day of her concert performance, Lisitsa gave a feature interview to the 'Aurora' television program. The interview was facilitated by the Ministry of Culture of the Donetsk People's Republic.

The concert commemorated the 73rd anniversary of the beginning of the catastrophic invasion by Nazi Germany in 1941against the peoples and government of the Soviet Union, including Ukraine.

The interview with Valentina Lisitsa on Aurora is wide-ranging. She describes her early musical career and the commercial success she eventually achieved by going around the prevailing classical music industry channels which often block talented artists from achieving their due recognition.

Lisitsa describes her background growing up in southern Ukraine, Odessa region. She is the daughter of a Ukrainian father and Russian mother, with Ukrainian, Russian and Polish grandparents. "How can I be divided into parts [by intolerant Ukrainian nationlists]," she asks at one point during the interview.

She describes the rise of the Maidan movement in Ukraine in 2013 and early 2014. She says that she initially supported the goals of EuroMaidan but soon saw that it came to be dominated and controlled by intolerant, right-wing nationalism.

"Euromaidan when is started-now everyone tells a lie, that it was against Russia, against Putin-no, it was for Europe."

"Of course, I know how good it is in Europe. The corruption there. [EuroMaidan] is so na�ve. But naivete and hope for a brighter future is not a crime. A crime is when they start killing in order to reach their brighter future."

Lisitsa describes her outspoken opposition to the war by Kyiv in eastern Ukraine and the price she has paid for her outspokeness-alienating and losing friends, banned by the Toronto Symphony Orchestra from playing two scheduled concerts in April 2015, being labeled an apologist for the Russian government and a "propagandist" for the cause of "separatism" in Donbas.

She reflects on the rise of fascism in Ukraine and elsewhere in Europe. "There were many reasons for me to come to Donbas [for the June 22 concert]. Firstly, as with many people living in the West of Ukrainian or Russian origin, we follow what is going on here and recognize that this is the front line in a civil war. We are united in our souls with the citizens of Donbas because they are the one who have found strength... They have not given up...

"Here is the the fighting line, the front in the struggle against fascism. It is a front of struggle of normal humans, thinking men and women, against fascism."

"We must look at the truth frankly. Seventy years later [after the end of the Great Patriotic War], fascism is lifting its head, and not only in Ukraine. It lifts its head in Ukraine because the West shuts its eyes and turns away. There is the same problem in countries in the West."

Lisitsa says the Ukraine in which she grew up was tolerant and accepting. "We [Russian speakers] learned Ukrainian, we read Shevchenko, Lesya Ukrainka, Mark Vovchok-all noted writers in whose literature there was no hatred... We did not divide people into Russians, Ukrainians and mixed nationalities... What is happening today is Bandera nationalism, preaching blood purity and other ideas of fascism. This is what is happening now."

The final question asked of Lisitsa is her message to the people of Donbas and Ukraine.

"To the people of Donbas, I say, 'Don't give up. You are fighting for all of us. Public opinion is changing in the world. It is changing more slowly than we would like, but we are working on that. You have many, many people in the world who feel for you... I hope there will be peace and we pray for peace'."

"To the people of Ukraine, that other, inseparable part of me...We have to consider the matter and realize we have a common enemy. It is fascism, it has been brought here, imposed on us. We have a common history, common culture... A false history been fabricated by a group of traitors who divide us by race."

"It is time to wake up. I hope this nightmare will end soon."

Watch the full interview with Valentina Lisitsa here
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LcUj87fJSPk&feature=youtu.be

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 #32
Fort Russ
http://fortruss.blogspot.com
August 1, 2015
Rinat Akhmetov's humanitarian aid worker - "Read this letter and curse this war!"

Rimma Fil', Coordinator of the Humanitarian Headquarters of the Rinat Akhmetov Foundation:

When they say that now is not a time for the weak, when I hear the slightest justification for wa��r - I think about the wounded children. About little Milanka from Mariupol, Vanechka from Donetsk, Vladik from Avdeyevka. I cannot understand, accept, and forgive war. And when I see happy families in Kiev parks, I can't help but think that something's not right with their happiness. At the subconscious level, you feel something false and artificial about it. It should not happen while at the same moment, in the same country, less than 500 miles from here, peaceful people are being killed.

For a year already, in the Humanitarian Headquarters of Rinat Akhmetov, we have been living in a maelstrom of woe and tragedy. Our life is cries for help replaced by the silent whispers of despair, we live in the long lists of medications for those injured in the shelling, and in the lines of elderly waiting for humanitarian aid, delivered at great risk to the drivers. We have seen a lot this year.

Several days ago our psychologists, who deal with the trauma of war near the frontlines, sent to our headquarters a letter of a 13-year-old girl living in Makeevka. Due to ethical considerations, I will not say her name. She's had enough without that.

I am convinced that this letter is a symbol of this mindless and merciless war. Read it, don't turn away from it, don't cover your eyes. And don't think that such a thing can not happen. Read it and curse the war.

"A letter to Mama, who died from the shelling.

My Mamochka, my most beloved, the most beautiful, thoughtful, sometimes strict. I did not count the moments when you were next to me. You simply were, and you gave joy and love. But somehow I never noticed it, and simply lived under your wing, without cares and troubles. Only now do I note each moment without you, and all my thoughts come back to you. You became so close and yet so far in one moment, in one instant. Even now, I cannot believe that a grocery trip can be so fatal, that the shell chose you. War came so unexpectedly. We all heard the explosions, saw the flashes of weapons, trembled and hid in the basements, but it all felt distant - this cannot be, this isn't actually happening to me and my relatives.

Why you? The best, the dearest, you who were always against war? I need you. I don't know how to live any longer, I don't know where to find support, how to wash away this pain ...
Babushka has "darkened" from grief, and is closed herself to everyone. It is very hard for her to take care of me, and I don't trouble her. She says that we won't survive just on her pension, and I am not receiving any money since the country is no longer. I feel guilty for being "dumped" on her.

The world has become so colorless and sad. If not for my cousin Anya, I would just sit on my bed and look at pictures of you. She and Aunt Natasha have moved in with us for a short period and constantly engage me, forcing me to do something, play, help with cooking. Mamulechka, I am so guilty before you. I didn't help you, sometimes didn't listen, I argued. If everything could be returned as it was, I would be the best helper, the most obedient, responsive, hard-working. Why do we lose what is most precious?

It's been six months already since the last time there was shelling in our area. I go to school, my classmates support me, but it is unbearable to think that we have to keep going to the cemetery. I am afraid of the cemetery and everything related to funerals. This is where death is, and it takes you away from me over and over. I feel the pain again and again, and I see it in my dreams, so often. I don't want to see it. In my dreams you are next to me, and you embrace and kiss me, like before, on the cheek, and play with my hair.

I have decided to study well, so after 9th grade I can go to medical college and become an emergency nurse. I won't be afraid to run to a wounded person under fire, even if the car stops far away. That could be someone's Mama and I will be on time to help her. Just minutes of human terror cost you your life. I will be strong and bold. I'll stop being a burden. I'll start to support Babushka.

Curse this war! It took away from me the most precious and close thing - you, my Mama. And although each instant you are in my thoughts, I still want to embrace you, kiss you, place my head on your lap. I so love you, Mama!"

[Girl from] Makeevka, 13 years old.
SOURCE (segodnya.ua = Ukrainian portal). Translated by Carpatho-Russian. Edited by Tatzhit.

Background info by the editor:

Whatever one says about Akhmetov himself (as all oligarchs, he is equal parts mafia boss, feudal overlord, and business tycoon), it is an indisputable fact that his foundation delivers a huge amount of humanitarian aid to DPR. I don't have any figures, but his aid appears to be second only to Russia and DPR government itself (my contacts personally saw truckloads of aid to DPR, but did not know if he sends anything to LPR).

Of course, the aid also appears to be part of the arrangement with the DPR, wherein they don't nationalize most of his empire and he feeds civilians, but it is very conspicuous that he is the only oligarch to have made such a deal.

And of course, the people actually handling the humanitarian work for him probably aren't there to steal aid - if for no other reason, then because stealing from Ahmetov is a real bad idea - and in all likelihood are very good, selfless and devoted persons.

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 #33
www.rt.com
August 3,2015
IMF approves new $1.7bn loan tranche to Kiev, plays down debt and security concerns

Kiev is going to receive a new tranche of the $17.5 billion loan from the IMF despite concerns over its growing national debt and shaky truce in eastern Ukraine torn apart by civil war. In return, the IMF expects Kiev to put its economy "on the path to recovery."

Ukraine is going to get the approved $1.7 billion, a tenth of the $17.5 billion financial assistance program adopted by the IMF executive board in March.

Back in March, Kiev already got $5 billion of initial disbursement under the IMF financial assistance program. The policy of the Washington-based institution, representing 188 countries, implies that the IMF would provide financial assistance only to a country that is "sustainable with high probability" of repaying debt.

The IMF assistance program to Ukraine is designed for a period of four years and implies financial assistance to the Kiev authorities to be confirmed gradually, in return for implemented reforms in Ukraine, aimed, according to the IMF statement, to "put the economy on the path to recovery" and "strengthen public finances."

"Ukraine has been an incredibly encouraging situation," IMF managing director Christine Lagarde said earlier this week. "We have seen political determination to change the face of Ukraine," she said.

Kiev has welcomed the new tranche, promising to use it for the replenishment of reserves at the National Bank.

"The new tranche will encourage growth in the economy and reassure financial markets both domestically and internationally," the Ukrainian Finance Ministry said in a statement.

The economic situation in Ukraine is harsh, however. The country's national debt is expected to reach 135 percent of GDP this year, which means it will practically double from last year's 70 percent.

After Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych was ousted in early 2014, the country's new government initiated a number of tough economic programs designed by the IMF, which include sharp increases in utility charges, major cuts to social programs and other unpopular measures.

A large number of workers have either lost their jobs or have to wait for months to get their wages paid.

But the IMF's first deputy managing director, David Lipton, believes that the Ukrainian authorities have made a "strong start" in implementing promised economic reforms.

"The momentum needs to be sustained, as significant structural and institutional reforms are still needed to address economic imbalances that held Ukraine back in the past," Lipton said.

To lessen the financial burden on the country, Kiev authorities have recently asked international credit organizations to write off as much as 40 percent of the country's debt. The creditors, headed by US investment firm Franklin Templeton, only agreed to cut 5 percent.

Within the coming four years, Kiev will have to pay $15.3 billion to private creditors, the IMF said.

"In the event that talks with private creditors stall, and Ukraine determines that it cannot service this debt, the Fund could continue to lend to Ukraine consistent with its Lending-into-Arrears Policy," Lipton said.

In turn, US Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew said that Washington "strongly supported" the IMF's decision to loan a new tranche to Ukraine.

"We urge the creditors participating in the ongoing debt operation to reach a timely agreement with the Ukrainian authorities that fully satisfies the criteria outlined in Ukraine's IMF program - including the debt sustainability target," Lew said.

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 #34
Interfax-Ukraine
August 3, 2015
Support for joining NATO considerably increases in Ukraine -poll
 
Almost two thirds of the Ukrainian public is ready to vote in favor of joining NATO, and more than half of Ukrainians support joining the EU, according to a poll conducted by the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation in cooperation with the sociological service of the Razumkov Center.

"Right now we're seeing serious changes: if a referendum was held now, it would be obviously won [by the pro-NATO side]," Director of the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation Iryna Bekeshkina said at a press conference on Monday.

According to the poll, if a referendum on Ukrainian membership of NATO was held on Sunday, a total of 63.9% of respondents would vote in favor, 28.5% would vote against, and 7.6% were undecided.

Bekeshkina said that in June 2010 only 24.6% would have voted for joining NATO, 67.7% - against, and in June 2014 - 45.4% would have voted in favor and 36.4% - against.

"These are very important changes" the expert said, adding that the issues still divides Ukraine.

In particular, she noted that there were much less support for NATO in Donbas compared to other regions, even though the number of those opposed to joining NATO is now about 60% compared to 95% five years ago.

According to the poll, 51.2% of the respondents considered joining the EU a priority, 17.4% - support joining the Customs Union with Russia. Belarus and Kazakhstan, 31.3% wee undecided.

The poll was conducted through July 22-27, and 2,011 respondents over 18 years old were surveyed in various regions of Ukraine except for Crimea and areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions uncontrolled by the Ukrainian government. The poll' s margin of error was 2.3%.

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 #35
Antiwar.com
August 2, 2015
Our (Neocon) Man in Odessa
by Derek Royden

"People compare my style with that of J.F.K., but in terms of substance, I feel much closer to Ataturk or Ben-Gurion or General de Gaulle - people who had to build nation states."
-Mikheil Saakashvili

If you had to use one word to sum up newly minted Odessa Governor and former Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili, it would probably be slick or, less charitably, phony. Educated at Washington University in DC and Columbia Law School, he 's extremely comfortable addressing North American politicians and power brokers using their own talking points

He's so good at this that he was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize by both John McCain and Hillary Clinton in 2005. In fairness, his hawkish supporters couldn't have known at the time that he'd start and lose a war with Russia at the cost of 25% percent of his country's territory, hundreds of lives and thousands of refugees.

From the grand gesture of barging into the Georgian parliament where he presented a rose to the back of a fleeing President Eduard Shevardnadze while screaming for his resignation in 2003, to his recent, fashionable exile in Williamsburg, New York, Saakashvili has used his obvious charm to build a network of powerful supporters inside the Beltway. He is a man who always has the word democracy on his lips, even when it's meaningless, as when he explained to the New York Times that Brooklyn coffee shop Mogador is "my absolute favorite cafe, because it's very democratic."

Although he has been charged in Georgia with human rights abuses resulting from protests near the end of his reign and the embezzlement of government funds to pay for, among other things, hotels and flights for "two fashion models" and at least $10,000 for services, possibly including "bite massages", by an American masseuse, Dorothy Stein, the American press generally presents the case against Saakashvili as politically motivated. While there is no doubt some truth to this, Georgian politics are a full contact sport, the facts above, as reported by multiple mainstream sources, don't lie.

Tellingly, Saakashvili relinquished his Georgian citizenship for a Ukrainian passport when he accepted his new post, meaning he is unlikely to return to Tbilisi to face his accusers. One wonders if his Dutch wife and younger son, who remained in Georgia throughout his exile, will join him in his new home.

Odessa and its Discontents

Odessa, Saakashvili's new fiefdom, was a warm water port city in Greek antiquity and, because of its prime location on the Black Sea, passed through numerous hands until the Russian Empire captured it from the Ottoman Turks in 1792. Catherine the Great officially founded the city in 1794, giving it its modern name. It also came to be the name of the Oblast (province or state) that contains the city itself and over which the Georgian's remit extends.

The city and surrounding area is majority Russian speaking, a good thing for Saakashvili who doesn't speak Ukrainian, and the region is of great strategic importance for its three major ports. It is also of particular interest to Russia, as it borders the legally autonomous pro-Russian statelet of Trans-Dniester on the Moldovan border to the west. As reported by Time Magazine in March, 2014, Saakashvili predicted that Putin would soon move to establish control over this area which could be one of the reasons he chose to take the post.

The city of Odessa was most recently in the news when it was the scene of one of the most brutal moments in the low intensity civil war that followed the ouster of Viktor Yanukovych after mass protests in Kiev's Maidan. Although not really covered by the Western press, footage that is easily found on YouTube shows an attack by the Neo-Nazi Right Sector on the historic Trade Unions House where dozens of people, including pregnant women were shot, suffocated and burned to death and hundreds injured for the crime of being "Pro-Russian sympathizers".

Seeming somewhat eager to throw this tragedy into the dustbin of history, one of Saakashvili's first acts as Governor was to announce that he wants to re-purpose the building. If he gets his way it will be the new headquarters of the Ukrainian Navy.

Saakashvili has also been accused, like his nemesis Putin, of infringing on press freedoms (famously using police to shut down a Georgian television station, Imedi, which was critical of his handling of the prisons' scandal and resultant protests).This is troubling because the situation for some journalists in the Odessa Oblast is already dire.

Take the treatment of Vitaly Didenko, editor of a local website, infocenter-odessa.com who in May was "arrested on trumped up charges of drug possession which, according to multiple sources in Odessa, are entirely fabricated by the SBU (Security Service of Ukraine) secret police in order to create a pretext upon which to detain him." After having his arm and several ribs broken he was put in an Odessa jail where he remains as of this writing. Hopefully, Saakashvili has learned from his past mistakes and will try to put an end to these kinds of abuses.

The Real Saakashvili Record

Saakashvili was lionized in the western press for his battle against low level corruption in Georgia. His administration had some success at this, as shown by Transparency International's corruption index for the country, progress had been made in combating the problem by 2010. However, the law and order policies that grew out of this focus also had what can only be described as disastrous consequences for the country's justice system.

As reported in the UK Independent, during Saakashvili's reign, Georgia's court system had an acquittal rate of less than 0.1%.. The result of this was the 6th largest prison population per capita in the world and the largest in Europe. The legal system became so Kafkaesque that transcripts of trials were only available three days after their end while appeals needed to be handled within 48 hours!

Saakashvili isn't the only Georgian in the Ukrainian government who must bear some of the blame for the horrific conditions in the prison system which led the Independent to call one of them, Gldani #8, Georgia's Abu Ghraib. Ekaterina Zguladze was the Deputy Minister of the Interior in Georgia when the abuses took place and was temporarily promoted before Saakashvili's government was booted from power. She has also relinquished her Georgian citizenship and will hold the same position in the Ukraine.

Part of her mandate in her new country appears to be transforming Ukraine's "militia" (the term for police there, not to be confused with the often openly Neo-Nazi groups operating in the east of the country) into modern, uncorrupted police forces. To do so, she will have to stand up to some of the country's Oligarchs whose power outstrips anything she or her former boss were faced with in tiny Georgia.

A Danger to Peace

The strange phenomenon of Georgian and other foreign carpetbaggers being given high level positions by the Poroshenko government should raise some alarm not only in the country itself but in other European capitals, who are put at risk by such a forcefully anti-Russian orientation in Ukraine. Saying that these kinds of appointments are to combat Oligarchs is as absurd as saying there was not one qualified Ukrainian for these positions. Poroshenko is himself an oligarch, and is no doubt using his clout to go after rivals, something we've seen time and again in former Soviet states.

This is not to dismiss the genuine historical suffering of the Ukrainian people under Russian and Soviet leaders like Stalin (who, for the record, was actually a Georgian) but rather to recognize that, because of the country's ethnic makeup, there is a real possibility that what is happening in the east of the country could extend into the Odessa Oblast at the cost of many more human lives. This is something that the Western press should be decrying rather than encouraging.

There's no doubt that Vladimir Putin's social policy could have been forged in the extreme right of the Republican Party, but what he isn't, is crazy or a "New Hitler" (can we now retire this useless comparison?). He has shown himself, most recently in twisting Bashar Al Assad's arm into giving up his chemical weapons arsenal, to be a rational actor, that is, someone who can be negotiated with. This quality has been less visible in Saakashvili who, based on the 2008 war alone, has shown he is prone to make rash decisions with awful consequences.

As Alexander Cooley, the Director of Columbia University's Harriman Institute was recently quoted as saying about Saakashvili's Odessa appointment, "Rather than getting on with the difficult internal process of reforming Ukrainian institutions, this move sends geopolitical signals that the Ukrainian government is thinking more about ideology, image and positioning in the eyes of certain western actors, rather than governance." It is a problem which could have serious consequences for all Ukrainians, regardless of their ethnicity.

Derek Royden is a regular contributor to Occupy.com and a news feature writer for Skunk Magazine. You can follow him on Twitter @derekroyden.

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 #36
Experts say EU officials should rather see situation in Crimea with their own eyes
By Tamara Zamyatina

MOSCOW, July 31. /TASS/. It would make much sense for EU officials to follow the French parliament members, who visited Russia's Republic of Crimea last week, and to assess the situation there with their own eyes, Russian experts polled by TASS said on Friday.

Only after that personal familiarization, it would be appropriate to mull an expansion of anti-Russian sanctions or the broadening of the scope of countries that support these sanctions, the experts said.

The French magazine "Valeurs actuelles" on Thursday published an article titled "The Crimean Premiere". It is an account of the trip to Crimea, which a group of French senators and deputies made on July 23 and July 24.

"People are living, working, shopping, spending their vacations and generally happy they have managed to avoid the social, political or military tensions reigning in Ukraine," deputy Yannick Moreau said summing up his impressions.

The author of the report, Raphael Stainville said the presence of the military and police in the places the delegation visited was insignificant. "Residents of Crimea don't resemble the ones who've found themselves under foreign occupation somehow," he wrote. "On the contrary they expressed delight over their current ability to live in peace after they had made a choice in favor of Russia."

The weekly recalled that the President of the French National Assembly, Claude Bartolone, has sent a rather menacing letter to members of the parliamentary delegation, calling their trip to Crimea a violation of international law. Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) said on Thursday the deputies and senators who had visited Crimea were barred from entering Ukraine for three years.

"And why are they so scared of our using this opportunity to look at the situation with our own eyes?" the member of parliament Gerome Lambert asked.

On Tuesday, members of parliaments in Italy, Hungary and France said they would like to visit the Republic of Crimea and the federal city of Sevastopol. On Thursday, Swiss MP Andreas Gross, the leader of the Social-Democratic Caucus at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe made known his willingness to set up a PACE group for visiting Crimea

French MEP Nadine Morano also voiced readiness to go to Crimea.

Simultaneously, another seven non-EU countries said on Thursday they were joining sanctions against Crimea and Sevastopol. A statement issued by the EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini said these countries were Albania, Georgia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Montenegro, Norway, and Ukraine.

Sergey Markov, the director of the Institute for Political Research, said the EU countries introducing or prolonging sanctions against Crimea or Sevastopol or forcing the candidates for accession to support these restrictive measures were interested in a full informational blockade of the Crimean Peninsula.
"The EU's objective is to deny the Europeans an access to truth about what's happening in Crimea, about the majority of local people rejoicing at the reunification with Russia," Markov said. "On this background, there is absolutely no informational blockade of Ukraine in Crimea."

"This month, like for many long years every July before that, I took participants in a summer student camp to the Crimean town of Foros," he said. "We watched Ukrainian TV channels freely there. Cars with Ukrainian number plates are also cruising the peninsula from end to end. One can see signposts and banners in Ukrainian and no one paints them over with dyes because they don't bother anyone."

"The level of freedom in Crimea today is a sequence higher than in Ukraine," Markov said.

An expansion of the scope of countries supporting the sanctions against Crimea and Sevastopol came across as the Brussels' self-styled reaction to the breakthrough of the informational blockade the French deputies and senators had achieved.

"It's quite noteworthy that a modest enough delegation produced so much noise in Europe and caused an uproar in the EU - just because the French MPs shed light on the truth about Crimea and triggered a chain reaction in the form of a desire of other European politicians to visit the peninsular republic and to give an unbiased assessment to its reunification with Russia," Markov said.

"It would be nice if Brussels organized its own delegation to a familiarization trip to Crimea but this is something out of the realm of science fiction at the moment because Brussels doesn't want truth about Crimea," he said.

The French delegation's visit and the intention of politicians from Italy, Hungary and PACE to follow them in the footsteps cannot influence Brussels towards a change of course on Crimea but constant dropping wears away a stone, said Konstantin Zatulin, the director of the Institute for the studies of CIS countries.

He returned from Crimea on Thursday and shared his impressions about the things he had seen there.

"The previously nasty airport in Simferopol (the Crimean capital city - TASS) looks like a European air hub now," Zatulin said. "Last's years mess at the ferry crossing of the Kerch Strait has been cleared away without a trace because eleven ferryboats are functioning like clockwork."

"As for the Crimean residents, they don't have a bit of any doubts as regards their decision to reunite with Russia," he said.

Zatulin admitted Crimea was faced with a pretty big number of difficulties, like a full reorganization of the agencies of power or the problems created by Ukraine that was shutting down freshwater supplies regularly - a practice that had compelled Crimean agribusiness to stop producing rice.

Also, shortages of electricity were felt, Zatulin said.

"A lot is being done to improve the situation, for instance, the current construction of gas-turbine power generating stations and the forthcoming construction of a bridge across the Kerch Strait," he said.

"By 2018, all infrastructural problems in Crimea should be resolved in contravention of the pressure in the form of sanctions that Brussels is building up," Zatulin said.

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 #37
www.rt.com
August 3, 2015
Dutch Safety Board asks for RT's assistance in MH17 probe after documentary

The Dutch agency heading the international probe into Malaysia Airlines MH17 crash in eastern Ukraine has contacted RT over the footage used in our recent documentary on the tragedy. RT's documentary discovered fragments of the plane still in Donetsk.

The RT Documentary film, titled "MH17: A year without truth," showed fragments of the crashed Boeing and pieces of luggage still scattered in the area at the time of filming. The RTD crew collected the parts of the plane's exterior they spotted, bringing them to the administration of the nearby town of Petropavlovsk.

"With great interest we watched your documentary, 'MH17: A year without truth,'" Dutch Safety Board spokesperson Sara Vernooij wrote to RT. "In this film, RT shows parts of the cockpit roof which were found near Petropavlivka. We would like to gather those pieces and bring them over to the Netherlands so the Dutch Safety Board can use them for the investigation and the reconstruction."

In the documentary, the RTD crew talked to witnesses, experts and family members of flight MH17 passengers in a bid to understand whether the truth of what caused the tragedy will ever be established. You can watch the film here.

The documentary also features relatives of those who perished in the MH17 crash who say they have no possibility to get information about the course of the investigation, and believe it is not objective.

RT's Roman Kosarev has recently visited Petropavlovsk and talked to the town's mayor, Natalya Voloshina, who coordinates the collection of fragments in the regional administration. She explained that all the parts of the wreckage found by the locals are stored, awaiting their retrieval by Dutch investigators.

"Many of the residents, who had left their villages when the fighting began, now came back and started finding plane parts that were missed by the experts, as they tended to their yards and gardens," Voloshina said. "Everyone who finds any wreckage, tries to bring it [to us] because they know we can pass the objects on to the investigators."

The investigators advised locals to save any plane parts found from the crash at a meeting with Natalya Voloshina in May, adding that they would try to collect them later. They have since been in touch via email and phone. While no date to pick up the newly found objects has been set, the investigators asked for photographs of the finds.

Moving the objects can be difficult and local residents who find them sometimes bring the parts themselves if they are small enough, but otherwise the district has created a team that collects the wreckage.

Voloshina said she was puzzled that no one had instructed local officials what to do with the wreckage in the aftermath of the crash, and when the fragments were being collected by the experts. She finally established contact remotely and received instructions.

For people, she said, it is not just a duty - many volunteered to comb the fields for remains and plane parts - but a psychological issue, as the wreckage is constant reminder of the tragedy and of the war in general. With the town itself still recovering after fighting in the area, the woman says she hopes the story of MH17 will finally reach its conclusion.

Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 crashed in Donetsk Region on July 17, 2014, killing all 283 passengers and 15 crew members aboard. With the sides of the Ukrainian conflict still blaming each other for the tragedy with no conclusive proof, the world awaits the results of the Dutch-led international probe, which are due to be published in October. The criminal investigation into the crash, however, will continue after the data is made public.

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#38
RFE/RL
July 31, 2015
U.S. Sanctions Official: Russia 'Will Probe With A Bayonet'
by Carl Schreck

WASHINGTON -- A top U.S. diplomat overseeing sanctions policy says punitive economic measures are curtailing Russian "aggression" and testing Western resolve amid Ukraine's war with Russian-backed separatists.

"I think that in true Leninist fashion, the Russian government will probe with a bayonet, so to speak, until it encounters resistance," Daniel Fried, the U.S. State Department's coordinator for sanctions policy, told RFE/RL in a July 30 interview.

"When they do, if they do, as they have in this case, they will pull back and reassess their tactics," he added.

Russian officials, unsurprisingly, have repeatedly denounced Western sanctions targeting Moscow. But Kremlin critics have criticized them as well, saying the measures help state propaganda portray Russia as besieged by foreign enemies, and deepen anti-Western sentiment among Russians struggling in the country's foundering economy.

Fried said, however, that not responding to Russia's annexation of Ukraine's Crimea territory in March 2014 and its role in the subsequent war in eastern Ukraine was not an option.

He suggested that Western sanctions have played a role in prompting Moscow to rein in its potential territorial ambitions related to Novorossia, a tsarist-era label -- embraced last year by Russian President Vladimir Putin -- for a stretch of land reaching through southern Ukraine down to Moldova's breakaway Transdniester region.

"It seems to me a failure to respond might have been interpreted as a green light for still more aggression," he said. "Do you remember the talk of Novorossia, and the extravagant territorial claims that some Russian nationalists were making, probably in a form of a trial balloon?"

Kyiv and Western governments say Russia continues to fuel the conflict in eastern Ukraine by providing weapons, training, and manpower to separatists in eastern Ukraine.

Moscow denies the accusation despite mounting evidence of such support. Russian officials have conceded that Russian soldiers have fought alongside the rebels but that they are doing so as volunteers.

Putin Cronies

Russia, meanwhile, accuses Washington and Brussels of backing a "coup" against Ukraine's former president, Kremlin ally Viktor Yanukovych, and replacing him with pro-Western leaders in order to draw Kyiv away from Moscow's influence.

The United States and the EU have sanctioned numerous Russian companies, officials, and businessmen close to Russian President Vladimir Putin in response to the Kremlin's annexation of Ukraine's Crimea territory in March 2014 and the outbreak of violence in eastern Ukraine the following month.

Fried spoke to RFE/RL on the same day that the U.S. Treasury Department announced additional Ukraine-related sanctions targeting more than two dozen individuals and entities.

The U.S. Treasury Department framed the fresh designations not as an escalation of sanctions, but rather an effort to counter attempts at circumventing existing sanctions, and aligning "U.S. measures with those of our international partners."

Fried said that the announcement makes it clear that "we are going after sanctions-evaders."

Among those added to the sanctions list are eight individuals and companies accused by the Treasury Department of helping a longtime associate of Putin's, billionaire businessman Gennady Timchenko, skirt U.S. sanctions.

Fried reiterated that Washington is "prepared to raise the costs on Russia" with other sanctions "should Russia engage in new additional aggression against Ukraine, especially if Russia or the Russian-controlled separatists launch new attacks across the line of conflict."

"We've made no decisions at all. But...we would be frankly derelict in our duty if we weren't preparing for eventualities, even those we hope never come to pass," he said.

Fried said that while he believes sanctions against Russia have been effective, "we also have to be realistic."

"They take time, they take constant effort to maintain them, and they require policy patience and determination," he said.

He added that he wishes "it weren't necessary to have a robust sanctions program."

"It would be better for everyone if we had a different agenda with Russia now," Fried said. "But our agenda with Russia is a function of their actions, unfortunately, including their aggression in Ukraine. And the day will come, I believe, when we have a better relationship with Russia. But that day, sadly, is not today."
 

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 #39
U.S. should pressure Ukraine into fulfilling Minsk accords - French ambassador to Russia

MOSCOW. Aug 1 (Interfax) - France and Russia have urged the United States to put pressure on the Ukrainian authorities in order to make them honor their commitments as part of the Minsk peace agreements for Ukraine, French Ambassador to Moscow Jean-Maurice Ripert has said.

"Like us, Foreign Minister of Russia Sergei Lavrov has been holding talks with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, and we have been insisting that the American side should put pressure on Kyiv in terms of the need for Ukraine to fulfill its obligations. And this interaction has been positive," he said in an interview with Interfax.

The ambassador also noted that the sub-groups within the trilateral Contact Group for Ukraine would continue their negotiations through the summer, and the next 'Normandy format' meeting should not be expected until September.

"The 'Normandy format' gathers far more frequently at the diplomatic level than at the level of heads of state. As of today, a ministerial meeting within the 'Normandy format' is not expected to take place in the near future, but the working groups will continue to meet through the summer, especially concerning the political settlement issue. And the political working sub-group has a very busy agenda. That is why, obviously, the next session in the 'Normandy format' will be held in September, but I do not know as of yet at what level," the French diplomat said.

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 #40
Normalization of Relations with Moscow Impossible until Russian Occupation of Crimea Ends, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Says
Paul Goble     

Staunton, August 2 - In the most detailed discussion of what might be called Kyiv's non-recognition policy of the Russian Anschluss, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Pavel Klimkin told the Second World Congress of Crimean Tatars that peace with Russia might be possible but that normalization of relations would be impossible until Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea ends.

After saying that Ukraine "would not bring war to Crimea under any circumstances," the top Ukrainian diplomat declared that Kyiv would "never accept the annexation of part of its sovereign territory" and that this would put clear limits on its relations with Moscow (segodnya.ua/politics/pnews/ukraina-ne-budet-voevat-za-krym-klimkin-637041.html).

Klimkin said that "under conditions of the annexation of Crimea, there will not be any normalization of relations. Peace with Russia - yes; cooperation in definite areas - possible. The normalization of relations - no." And he argued that "the Russian occupation of Crimea is temporary because it is illegal. The entire world knows and recognizes this."

Moreover, he continued, Ukraine "has insisted and in the future will continue to insist without compromise on the defense of human rights on the Crimean peninsula." That is necessary because of the horrific violations of the rights of the Crimean Tatars and other residents of the Ukrainian peninsula by the Russian occupiers.

"The latest example," Klimkin said, "are the obstacles" which these officials through up to block Crimean Tatar officials from attending the congress. There is a clear goal behind Moscow's actions: "the world must not learn the truth about the situation in Crimea where murders and kidnappings are a tragic reality."

Despite the Russian occupation and aggression in the Donbas, the Ukrainian foreign minister continued, "Ukraine has found a way to provide financing for the social and other needs of the Crimean Tatars" via the European Investment Bank and via direct Ukrainian funding. And it is working on laws to ensure the rights of Crimean Tatars after the Russian occupation ends.

Ukraine's president and prime minister sent messages of support and encouragement to the World Congress of the Crimean Tatars, but Klimkin spoke to it. And his speech may prove to be the most important because it shows that Kyiv is moving toward the kind of non-recognition policy that the US and other Western countries adopted at the time of the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states.

That policy, it will be recalled, specified that the US would never recognize the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the USSR and set the rules for the behavior of American officials with respect to those three countries, including a ban on visits by senior officials to them and the maintenance of ties with pre-1940 diplomatic representatives.

American non-recognition policy did not, Soviet and Russian claims notwithstanding, ever promise that the US would "liberate" the three Baltic countries, and it did not preclude cooperation with Moscow on other issues. Some criticized it for that, but by defining the issue in the way that it did, that non-recognition policy did three important things.

First, it meant that the US would not sacrifice the status of the Baltic states as a result of some change in relations between Washington and Moscow, something that could more easily have happened had the US not articulated a non-recognition policy of the kind that it did.

Second, it send a signal to Moscow that even if there was progress in other areas, that did not mean that the US would change its position with regard to the Soviet occupation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

And third, non-recognition policy served as a source of encouragement to the peoples of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania during Soviet times that they were occupied peoples and that their occupation would eventually end, as it did in 1991.

Klimkin's declaration in Ankara shows that Kyiv is moving toward exactly that policy for Crimea, even though Western governments have not yet seen fit to go beyond the kind of public declarations that some future change in East-West relations could render meaningless.

Ukraine now has a non-recognition policy for Crimea; it is time for Western governments to articulate one of their own, as carefully crafted as the one Sumner Welles put in place for the Baltic countries in 1940 and as the one Klimkin has just provided.

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 #41
The Times (UK)
August 1, 2015
Ukraine rebels 'building dirty bomb' with Russian scientists
Maxim Tucker Donetsk

Rebels in Ukraine are working to develop a radioactive dirty bomb with the help of Russian nuclear scientists, according to a Ukrainian security service dossier obtained by The Times.

The report draws on hacked emails between rebels and intercepted radio communications, as well as a field agent's findings. It claims that Russian specialists have withdrawn radioactive industrial waste from a secure bunker at the Donetsk state chemical plant and moved it to a rebel military base, where it can be combined with explosives to create a devastatingly effective weapon.

Three of the messages are said to be between Alexander Zakharchenko, head of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic (DPR), and his ministers and generals. Conversations between rebel commanders are cited as evidence that the radioactive material has already been removed and is in the process of being weaponised.

One commander allegedly boasted to his troops that "the DPR will soon have an atomic weapon".

Yuriy Tandit, chief adviser to Vasily Hrytsak, the director of the Ukrainian security service (SBU), said: "The DPR plans to use radioactive material to create a dirty bomb with which it can blackmail the international community and the government of Ukraine. It is possible, because the Donetsk state chemical plant and sources of ionising radiation are located on territory that is under the control of DPR terrorists."

Western intelligence officials said that they were unable to verify the evidence presented in the dossier. However, diplomatic sources said that the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) mission in Donetsk would investigate the claims.

The OSCE is believed to have raised the issue with the Kremlin at talks in Minsk on July 21, and is expected to bring in its own specialist to examine the bunker at the plant.
The Donetsk chemical factory lies within sight of the front line in the battle between pro-Russian rebels and the Ukrainian army. Grey Soviet-era warehouses give way to a tangle of grassland on its southwestern flank. The bunker complex 10ft underneath it is encased in lead, and sheltered by reinforced steel and concrete.

It houses almost 12 tonnes of Soviet-era radioactive waste, mostly isotopes of caesium, cobalt and strontium, as well as radon gas. Between 1961 and 1966 the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic buried its most dangerous radioactive waste here.

Rebel fighters manning checkpoints and armoured personnel carriers along the access roads to the site prevented The Times from entering. The boom of outgoing artillery fire and the dull thud of incoming shells could be heard throughout the devastated district where the factory is housed.

Although sealed, the bunker has been opened periodically to measure the level of radiation remaining. "In order to get to the waste itself, one needs to break the concrete cover, iron and lead layers," said Vladimir Pervoznik, technical director of Radon, the state corporation that was responsible for the bunker's maintenance before it was captured by the rebels last year. "To handle it, one would need special protective equipment, shielding and special instruments."

At the last reading, in 2002, radiation levels inside the bunker measured a massive 725.2 billion becquerels. By contrast, the Japanese government declared vegetables with a caesium radiation count higher than 500 becquerels per kilogram unsafe for consumption after its Fukushima nuclear plant was damaged by the 2011 tsunami.

The State Nuclear Inspectorate in Ukraine said that the radioactive waste posed no threat - as long as it stayed inside the bunker. "Even if there were an explosion at the waste repository, only a negligible area would be contaminated - perhaps 40 metres, depending on the type of explosion," Viktor Riazantsev, head of the safety department, said.

If, however, the waste material were reduced to powder and dispersed by high explosive at altitude, it would be deadly, he said. "To spread over kilometres, the explosion must take place in the air and the radioactive materials must be in the form of powder."

The Ukrainian dossier suggests that the rebels plan to do just that: in mid-June an SBU agent reported that Mikhail Tolstykh, the commander of the rebel Somalia battalion, had bragged to his soldiers that the Donetsk People's Republic was developing an atomic weapon. The intelligence file states that the agent's story was corroborated by intercepted radio and telephone conversations, instructing DPR fighters to prepare for the arrival of nuclear specialists from "the Russian Federation".

The SBU said it was not clear from those conversations whether the specialists were employees of the Russian state or private individuals. The transcripts of these conversations could not be provided. The dossier includes three documents, written in Russian, that appear to be military orders from DPR leaders to subordinate commanders at the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry for Emergency Situations, and the Donetsk chemical factory. They were allegedly downloaded with hundreds of others when SBU agents took control of a rebel email address in the first week of July.

One order, which allegedly bears the signature and stamp of Mr Zakharchenko, instructs the commander responsible for the chemical plant to allow access to "specialists from the Russian Federation" between July 2 and July 18. Rebel fighters from the Vostok battalion are instructed to escort them.

The order stipulates that a two-mile zone around the site be evacuated by the Ministry for Emergency Situations, and that the same ministry provide specialised transport for the waste.

Civilians living near the chemical plant said they had heard heavy vehicles trundling through their neighbourhood on two nights between July 2 and July 18. They confirmed that the area was controlled by fighters from the Vostok battalion. They said that they had been offered evacuation many times in the course of the 16-month conflict, but had not been forced to leave.

"I've spent the whole war here, I don't want to go anywhere," Alexey Kononov, 59, said. "I want to say, we will not choose Zakharchenko any more. We are sitting here under shelling, and they don't give a f***. We don't want him."

A senior DPR official initially denied the existence of the radioactive waste when shown the documents. "These documents make no sense, this is obviously a fake," Eduard Basurin, the deputy defence minister, said. He gave the printouts no more than a cursory glance and added: "We don't have any repository."

Later, drinking beer on the sunny terrace of the Legend caf� in Donetsk, he gradually started to change his tune. "Everyone knows that there is a small repository with waste," he said. "It also existed during Ukrainian times."

Later still, as he finished another beer, Mr Basurin began to exhibit a greater knowledge of the repository's contents. "There were so-called radioactive metals - everyone knows about that. But the story that we signed an agreement with Russia is fake.

"There is an allegation that we were responsible for an explosion at the factory, as if we made an explosion in order to create a so-called dirty bomb," he said, referring to an enormous explosion that was recorded within the plant's grounds on February 9. "A dirty bomb means that radioactive waste is exploded and dispersed."

Rosatom, Russia's state-owned nuclear enterprise, denied that any of its employees had travelled to Donetsk, and questioned the existence of any radioactive waste at the chemical plant.

A Rosatom spokesperson said that there were a number of private companies and individuals in Russia able to carry out the waste removal.

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 #42
RIA Novosti
August 1, 2015
East Ukraine separatist spokesman denies reported plans to create "dirty bomb"

Documents provided by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), which have been mentioned by the foreign mass media and which allegedly contain information about development of a "dirty nuclear bomb" by members of the militia, are Kiev's "yet another lie" and attempt to discredit the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic (DPR), RIA Novosti (part of the state-owned International News Agency Rossiya Segodnya) reported on 1 August, quoting the deputy commander of the headquarters of the DPR militia, Eduard Basurin.

Quoting documents provided by the SBU, the Times newspaper earlier reported that members of the militia together with Russian nuclear scientists were allegedly developing a "dirty nuclear bomb" using radioactive waste from a bunker of the Donetsk chemical plant.

"This is yet another lie on the part of Ukraine. In this way they are simply trying to show that people who live here are terrorists. Such a bunker really exists in Donetsk, but no-one knows exactly what it contains. Naturally, no-one has opened it," RIA Novosti quoted Basurin as saying.

At the same time, the secretary of the Ukrainian National Security and Defence Council, Oleksandr Turchynov, earlier said, answering journalists' question as to whether Ukraine could create a "dirty" bomb, that Kiev will use all the available resources, including for development of effective weapons, and "what it is then, dirty or clean - this is already a separate technological question", RIA Novosti added.

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#43
Antiwar.com
July 31, 2015
Monsters of Ukraine: Made in the USA
Fascists proliferate as the country slides into a sinkhole
by Justin Raimondo

We're in the summer doldrums of the news cycle, a perfect time for our government and the media - or do I repeat myself? - to drop certain inconvenient stories down the Memory Hole. My job, of course, is to retrieve them....

Remember Ukraine? I seem to recall blaring headlines about a supposedly "imminent" and "massive" Russian invasion of that country: the Anglo-Saxon media was ablaze with a veritable countdown to D-Day and we were treated to ominous sightings of Russian troops and tanks gathering at the border, allegedly just awaiting the order from Putin to take Kiev. And it turns out there has been an invasion, of sorts - although it isn't a Russian one. It's the Kiev regime's own foot-soldiers returning from the front and turning on their masters.

The war is going badly for the government of oligarch Petro Poroshenko. The east Ukrainians, who rose in revolt after the US-sponsored coup threw out democratically elected President Viktor Yanukovych, show no signs of giving up: they've repulsed the "anti-terrorist" campaign launched by Kiev, withstanding relentless bombardment of their cities and enduring many thousands of casualties, not to mention widespread destruction. Indeed, the brutal protracted war waged by Kiev against its own "citizens" has arguably steeled the rebels' resolve and made any thought of reconciliation unthinkable.

As is usual with violent fanatics, the war aims of the Kiev coup leaders - to bring the eastern provinces back into the fold - have been rendered impossible by their methods and conduct. The de facto blockade imposed on the east has bound the separatists all the more tightly to Russia, and so economics as well as searing hatred of a government the easterners regard as "fascist" has sealed the country's fate.

Unable to crack the rebels' resolve, the "revolutionaries" who once gathered in the Maiden have begun to turn on each other. Poroshenko, fearful of the rising power of the far-right militias who make up the backbone of his makeshift army, has ordered their dissolution - and the rightists are resisting.

A standoff between the Right Sector militia and Ukrainian police the other day culminated in a pitched battle as the rightists attacked police positions in Mukachevo, in western Ukraine, and took a six-year-old boy hostage. A dispute over control of the local cigarette smuggling operation had ended with two Right Sector thugs killed and seven others - it's not clear which side they belonged to - injured. The rightists used grenade launchers to pulverize two police cars. Oh well, no worries, Washington will send replacements.... for both the cars and the launchers.

The big problem for the Kiev regime is that Right Sector and allied far-rightist militias are the core of their military operation against the east. Right Sector provided the muscle of the Maiden revolution, standing in the front lines against the widely feared Berkut special forces loyal to Yanukovych. If these thugs must be reined in, then the success of the "anti-terrorist" campaign is doubtful: yet Kiev is increasingly unwilling to pay the high price of appeasing their increasingly troublesome Praetorians.

The aftermath of the Mukachevo stand off was a clear victory for the rightists, who saw their leader, Dmytro Yarosh, a member of parliament, negotiating with the Interior Ministry - and Right Sector militia blocking the road from Kiev to the scene of the fighting. The result was an announcement from the Interior Ministry that the police chief of Mukachevo has been suspended, pending an "investigation" of the charges of aiding and abetting smuggling.

In short, Right Sector emerged victorious. Following up their victory, the group declared that a national referendum will be held - without gathering the required signatures, and under their sponsorship - on multiple questions, essentially demanding that their entire program for the nation be adopted. They call for a formal declaration of war against Russia, a complete blockade of the eastern provinces, martial law, and the legalization of their militias. Oh yes, and they also want the present government, up to and including Poroshenko, to be impeached.

Mired in debt, and rapidly sinking into an economic abyss, Ukraine is literally coming apart at the seams - and the ugly underside of the Maiden "revolution" is being exposed to the light of day. The most recent atrocity is the uncovering of a torture chamber used by members of the "Tornado" Battalion, another far-right grouping, in which militia members kidnapped, tortured, raped, and robbed citizens in the eastern Luhansk region, where the government is fighting to retain some modicum of control. Eight members of the Tornado militia were recently arrested and are being held by military prosecutors in Kiev: the Tornado "volunteers," who mostly consist of ex-convicts, defend their actions by claiming that this is just retaliation because they uncovered a smuggling operation run by local officials - who, they say, are collaborating with the rebels. They initially refused to lay down their arms and barricaded themselves into their camp.

The Aidar Battalion, also operating in eastern Ukraine, has been accused by Amnesty International of committing war crimes: that was in 2014, but the charges were largely ignored until the local governor began to complain. Aidar's leader, member of parliament Serhiy Melnychuk, of the ultra-nationalist Radical Party, has been stripped of immunity from prosecution and charged with kidnapping, issuing threats, and operating a criminal gang.  Melnychuk, while admitting there was "some looting," attributed the dissolution of the Aidar Battalion by authorities to "Russian propaganda" and revealed that some members are still operating independently in Luhansk.

Then there's the openly neo-Nazi Azov Brigade, whose members sport fascist symbols from the World War II era, and whose leader, Andriy Biletsky, declares that the goal of his group is to "lead the White Races of the world in a struggle for their survival." There was so much bad publicity surrounding the Azov Battalion that the US Congress unanimously passed legislation forbidding any aid to the group - a provision, as this piece by Joseph Epstein in the Daily Beast points out, that is essentially unenforceable:

"In an interview with The Daily Beast, Sgt. Ivan Kharkiv of the Azov battalion talks about his battalion's experience with U.S. trainers and US volunteers quite fondly, even mentioning US volunteers engineers and medics that are still currently assisting them. He also talks about the significant and active support from the Ukrainian diaspora in the US As for the training they have and continue to receive from numerous foreign armed forces. Kharkiv says 'We must take knowledge from all armies... We pay for our mistakes with our lives.'

"Those US officials involved in the vetting process obviously have instructions to say that US forces are not training the Azov Battalion as such. They also say that Azov members are screened out, yet no one seems to know precisely how that's done. In fact, given the way the Ukrainian government operates, it's almost impossible."

Yes, your tax dollars are going to arm, train, and feed neo-Nazis in Ukraine. That's what we bought into when Washington decided to launch a regime change operation in that bedraggled corner of southeastern Europe. Your money is also going to prop up the country's war-stricken economy - albeit not before corrupt government officials rake their cut off the top.

Dmytro Korchynsky, who heads a group of several far-right "volunteers" gathered together in "St. Mary's Battalion," declares his goal of organizing a "Christian Taliban" that will put Ukraine in the forefront of an effort to "lead the crusades," adding: " Our mission is not only to kick out the occupiers, but also revenge. Moscow must burn."

That's a goal American neocons and their liberal enablers can get behind, but Korchynsky's invocation of the Taliban ought to make the rest of us step back from that precipice. For it was the US, in the throes of the last cold war, that coalesced, funded, trained, and armed what later became the Afghan Taliban - and we all know where that road led.

Once again, in our endless search for foreign monsters to destroy, we're creating yet more foreign monsters who will provide the next excuse for future crusades. It's a perpetual motion machine of foreign policy madness - and the War Party likes it that way.

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