#2
The National Interest
July 27, 2015
Obama's Russia Recalibration
U.S.-Russian cooperation on the Iran deal could signal a change in the wind...
By Sean Keeley
Sean Keeley is a research assistant at the Center for the National Interest.

With all the controversy surrounding the recently negotiated Iran nuclear deal, speculation has run rampant about the future of the U.S. relationship with Iran. For all the talk of potential long-term détente between the United States and the Islamic Republic, however, commentators have largely ignored a more immediate diplomatic opening: namely, with Vladimir Putin's Russia.

Speaking to the New York Times' Thomas Friedman in the wake of the Iran negotiations, President Obama struck a surprisingly positive tone about Russia's role in the Vienna talks. "Russia was a help on this. I'll be honest with you," Obama told Friedman. "Putin and the Russian government compartmentalized on this in a way that surprised me, and we would have not achieved this agreement had it not been for Russia's willingness to stick with us and the other P5-plus members in insisting on a strong deal."

Such measured praise does not in itself indicate a sea change in American policy toward Russia. Ukraine remains a source of fundamental disagreement, and just last month the Obama administration successfully convinced the EU to extend sanctions on Russia through January.

Still, the rhetorical shift does suggest a change in Obama's thinking about Russia. Since the annexation of Crimea in March 2014, the administration's policy has been single-mindedly aimed at isolating Russia. Economic sanctions and diplomatic snubs, such as kicking Russia out of the G-8, have joined with disparaging anti-Russia rhetoric to paint Putin's Russia as a pariah country, incapable of behaving itself on the world stage. At times, Obama's rhetoric has gotten quite personal. In an interview last August, Obama dismissed Russia as a country that "doesn't make anything," and that suffers from a shrinking population and lack of immigration. On all three counts, Obama's claims were demonstrably false-yet they served their purpose, both in stirring up anger in Moscow and appeasing Congressional critics who have argued for a harder line against Putin.

Such bluster may now be giving way to a more pragmatic and realistic policy toward Russia, based in selective engagement on issues of mutual interest. In many ways, this formula is not new; it was at the heart of Obama's first-term "reset" policy, designed to improve relations with Moscow following the 2008 war with Georgia and the strained relations of George W. Bush's second term. The new version of the policy will likely be more limited in scope and visibility. The Ukraine crisis cannot be forgotten with the push of a button, after all, and the Obama administration will surely not trumpet its new diplomacy with Putin, since Congressional critics will cry foul at the slightest hint of appeasement. Behind closed doors, though, the administration is subtly beginning to change course from its policy of isolating Moscow. Call it a recalibration, if not a reset.

Consider the recent signs of diplomatic engagement between Washington and Moscow. First, there was Secretary of State John Kerry's trip to Sochi in May, the first diplomatic visit to Russia since the Ukraine crisis began. Meeting with Putin directly for the first time, Kerry was clearly sending the message that engagement would now prevail over attempted isolation. This idea is also reflected in the growing trend of direct telephone diplomacy between Obama and Putin. For the first time in four months, the Russian president called Obama on June 25, discussing the Iranian negotiations and cooperation against ISIS. Since then, the presidents have been speaking more consistently, with Putin delivering a cordial July 4 message to Obama and, most recently, both presidents congratulating each other on the Iran deal and pledging greater cooperation in the Middle East.

These overtures may be largely symbolic, but the Iran deal is a substantive diplomatic achievement for the administration-one that would have been impossible without Moscow's help. In fact, the Russian role in achieving the deal extends far beyond its role in the Vienna negotiations themselves.

Five years ago, Russian support was crucial in securing passage of UNSC Resolution 1929, the crippling Security Council sanctions bill that drove Iran to the bargaining table in the first place. This support was never a guarantee, since Russia's top arms and energy industries had substantial ties to Iran. Russia had sold both Tor-M1 missiles and the S-300 surface-to-air missile system to Iran, for instance, and Russian contractors had built the Iranian nuclear plant at Bushehr. Despite these Russian-Iranian economic ties, however, the United States convinced Russia to support the sanctions and halt their weapons deliveries to Tehran. Although there have been bumps in the road in Russian cooperation with America's Iran policy-notably Moscow's decision to reapprove the delivery of the S-300 system to Tehran, after suspending it in 2010-Obama is correct to note that the Vienna deal would have been impossible without their help.

After Iran, the question remains: where might U.S.-Russian cooperation happen next? Syria and Ukraine have long been areas of stalemate between the two countries, but even on those fronts, there is renewed possibility for compromise. Four years into the Syrian Civil War, the United States has effectively abandoned any ambitions of actively ousting Assad from power, a move that Russia has long opposed. At the same time, Russia has begun to acknowledge the weakness of the Assad regime and the potential for a jihadist takeover of Syria. These realities bring the United States and Russia to a closer understanding, creating the possibility of cooperation in Syria. Indeed, Syria has been a prime topic of discussion between the two presidents, and President Obama said he was "encouraged" by Putin's proactive outreach about resolving the conflict.

Even in Ukraine, there are faint signs of progress. Earlier this month, Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland visited the Ukrainian parliament to urge passage of a controversial provision allowing for "special law" in the war-torn Donetsk and Luhansk regions of eastern Ukraine. Nuland is no friend of Moscow; she has often been perceived in Russia as an American architect of the Ukraine crisis. Yet her official support for greater autonomy in Donetsk and Luhansk may well signify a shift in the administration's Ukraine policy.

By supporting the provision, vague as it may be, the United States is encouraging Ukraine to implement its side of the Minsk agreement and signaling to Moscow its openness to greater autonomy for the rebellious regions, which has been a sticking point for Russia. This in turn may change Putin's calculus in eastern Ukraine, motivating a drawdown of Russian troops in the region and a gradual resolution of the conflict. This scenario is feasible enough that some nationalistic Ukrainians have worried that Obama is "selling out" Ukraine to Putin in exchange for cooperation on Iran.

As that accusation suggests, none of the Obama administration's future diplomacy with Russia will be uncontroversial. Nor will it inevitably produce successes. Ukraine and Syria remain intractable problems, and there is no guarantee that diplomatic engagement will translate into a mutually agreeable solution.

For the time being, though, one thing remains clear: the Obama administration will at least try to engage with Russia, after a largely fruitless attempt at isolating it. There will be no reset button photo-ops to tout this new diplomacy, nor will it lead to a fundamental transformation of the U.S.-Russian relationship. Still, recalibrating the United States' Russia policy toward a more pragmatic agenda could produce meaningful results that align with the interests of both countries.

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 #3
Economic recession in Russia hits bottom - Economic Development Minister

BREST /Belarus/, July 27. /TASS/. Economic recession has hit its bottom in Russia, the Minister of Economic Development Alexey Ulyukayev said on Monday.
"A 3.4% drop is our 1H estimate, around 4.4% is our Q2 estimate. We assume this is probably the lowest point, which will be followed by some certain upwards correction starting from Q3," the Minister said.

The result of the Government's actions within the anti-crisis policy is already obvious, he said. "We see that recession dynamics is decreasing. We expect the trajectory to change within nearest weeks, first month-on-month positive dynamics and later year-on-year economic growth in 2016," the Minister added.

The economic situation in Russia is going to improve in the third quarter as GDP drop will not exceed 2.6-2.8% by the end of 2016, he said.

According to reviewed economic forecast by Russia's Economic Development Ministry published in May, GDP will drop by 2.8% in 2015 while in 2016 and 2017 GDP will grow by 2.3% and by 2.4% in 2018.

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 #4
Sputnik
July 25, 2015
Russian Economy Ready to Thrive Despite Setbacks - Chinese Media

The Russian-language version of the Chinese newspaper Renmin Ribao (People's Daily) said in its editorial that the Russian economy is showing sustainable growth but that it has yet to overcome an array of challenges.

The newspaper recalled that recently, the World Bank and other international organizations made a forecast that in the next few years, the Russian economy would achieve positive growth, which would total 0.6 percent and 2.7 percent in 2016 and 2017, respectively. The Russian government was even more optimistic, saying that in the third and the fourth quarter of this year, Russia will be able to restore the previous rate of growth.

Compared with the pessimistic outlook at the end of last year and earlier this year, it is safe to say that Russia's recovery projections have improved, Renmin Ribao reported.

Despite the fact that the beginning of 2015 saw Russia's economy show signs of plummeting, in the second quarter of the year, the situation improved, the newspaper said, citing the slowing of the GDP's decline and the reduction in monthly  inflation. The financial situation in Russia is now stable, despite the devaluation of the ruble, which remains a freely convertible currency;  compared to the end of last year, it increased by almost a third. Russia has also successfully solved problems pertaining to its external debt, the newspaper said, adding that in addition to repaying 130 billion dollars in 2014, it has already paid off almost 60 billion dollars of foreign debt in the first quarter of this year.

Addressing factors which have added to Russia's economic recovery, the newspaper first pointed to a rebound in oil prices, which Renmin Ribao sad is a big plus for Russia, where oil remains part and parcel of the country's development. Secondly, the crisis in Ukraine, which prompted the United States and Europe to slap economic and financial sanctions against Russia, has yet to be tackled, but the situation has stabilized, which is contributing to the restoration of confidence in the Russian market.

More importantly, the Russian government continues to rely on the country' rich resources in order to pursue its policy of active financial intervention. In the beginning of 2015, the government developed an anti-crisis plan stipulating support for the banking system, major enterprises, small and medium businesses, the active promotion of import-substituting technologies, the optimization of budget expenditures, as well as maintaining the stability of the labor market and assistance to vulnerable social groups.

Many of these tasks have already been successfully resolved, the newspaper recalled, referring to Russia's food industry, where the production of meat and dairy products has increased by almost 13 percent and 3.6 percent, respectively, in the first four months of this year, the newspaper said.

Despite a chill in ties between the West and Russia, the country is not alone on the international stage, Renmin Ribao said, citing Russia's role in hosting the SCO and BRICS country summits, its decision to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the creation of new Bank of BRICS. Additionally, Russia held its 19th St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, which was attended by more than 2,000 people, including many foreign guests from the European and American multinational corporations, according to the newspaper.

It should be noted, however, that Russia's economy still has a very difficult path ahead, Renmin Ribao said, singling out the plummeting world oil prices, among other negative factors. The United States has, meanwhile, threatened to introduce more sanctions against Russia, while the EU has decided to extend its anti-Russian sanctions for six months.

These sanctions and the fight against the sanctions may lead to a "tug of war", which could reach a new level following the Ukrainian crisis, the newspaper concluded, saying that for such a big country as Russia, the path to recovery cannot be completely smooth  and devoid of serious challenges.

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 #5
Moscow Times
July 25, 2015
Most Russians Oppose Renaming Bridge After Nemtsov, Poll Shows
[Chart here http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/most-russians-oppose-renaming-bridge-after-nemtsov-poll-shows/526170.html]

The majority of respondents in a survey conducted by Russian independent pollster Levada Center opposed the proposal to rename Bolshoi Moskvoretsky Bridge after murdered opposition figure Boris Nemtsov.

After the murder, an unofficial memorial was set up on the bridge, which was where Nemtsov was shot last February, with people regularly bringing flowers, candles and posters to pay their respects to the slain activist.

According to the center, 50 percent of Russians polled said they were strongly against the proposal, while 22 percent opposed it in part. Only 4 percent fully supported the initiative.

As previously reported by The Moscow Times, a proposal to set up a memorial on the bridge submitted by Nemtsov's party RPR-PARNAS, was rejected by the Moscow City Duma earlier in July.

 
#6
Carnegie Moscow Center
July 27, 2015
How Authentic is Putin's Approval Rating?
By Denis Volkov - sociologist, expert of the Levada Center

The Moscow-based polling organization Levada Center recently published a survey showing Russian President Vladimir Putin's approval ratings at a record high of 89%. Levada was immediately flooded with accusations of bias, corruption, and lack of professionalism-as well as with assertions that public opinion cannot be measured in an authoritarian state. Some observers say that the president's rating is an inexplicable anomaly: that it's simply impossible in a country where the government is oppressing its citizens and economic crisis is deepening.

These critics are forgetting a few things. Just a year and a half ago, the legitimacy of the entire political system was in jeopardy, and it seemed like nothing could stop political ratings from plummeting-not the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympic Games, not the electoral campaign. If you look at the entire 15 years that Putin has been in power, rather than just the last year and a half, you can see that this is the fourth time his popularity has soared this high. Furthermore, there are simultaneous changes in various indicators, which makes for a more complicated picture than what most observers see.

FOUR PEAKS

Vladimir Putin's popularity first surged in late 1999, when he was still prime minister. In the wake of apartment building bombings in three Russian cities, the ensuing Second Chechen War, and the start of economic revival, Putin's ratings shot up from 31% in August to 80% in November. In January 2000, Putin's ratings helped him secure the presidential election in the first round of voting. His poll numbers peaked a second time in December 2003 (86%), at the height of an election campaign that was accompanied by a crusade against local oligarchs and disagreements with the United States over the war in Iraq.

His approval ratings reached 86-87% for a third time during the 2007-2008 electoral campaign, which saw the "managed transfer" of the presidency from Putin to Dmitri Medvedev. This was the apex of "Putin's stability," and there was no crisis in sight. Putin's approval ratings reached a record high of 88% in September 2008, right after the brief war with Georgia.

But for the four years after that, right up until February 2014, Putin's popularity was gradually waning. During those years, Putin lost about a third of his supporters. But then his rating was back to a historic high for the fourth time in 2014, in the wake of the annexation of Crimea and the resulting standoff with the West. What's different this time around is that his ratings have remained that high for more than a year-albeit in 2007-2008 they didn't dip below 80% for almost two years.

People often forget that several different indicators can be used to better understand changes in the president's public approval. Last year, all of these indicators were positive: for example, only 34% of respondents expressed trust for Putin in January 2014, but 51% did so in March and 59% do today. In early 2014, there was a difference of 15 percentage points between Putin's approval rating and that of the next most popular politician in the country, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. Now this gap has grown to 35 percentage points.

Readiness among Russians to vote for Putin in the next presidential elections has also risen, from 30% in early 2014 to 46% in late March 2014, and finally to 57% in August 2014. Since then, the indicator has hovered at around 55%. Among poll respondents who asserted that they did plan to vote, 80% said they would reelect Putin.

The sentiments people feel toward Putin have also changed. Two years ago, apathy prevailed, with indifference toward the president accounting for 50% of responses (another 20% said they had positive feelings toward him, 25% said they had negative feelings). Russians were beginning to tire of their president.Today, however, positive sentiments are 2.5 times more common (10% said they admired him, and 37% said they had a favorable opinion), while neutral or negative feelings were less common (40% and 11%, respectively). Finally, the distribution of responses to the question "why do many people trust Putin?" has changed. Two years ago, the dominant answer was "because people don't know who else to trust" (42%). Today, this response is about half as popular (23%), while the most common opinion was that "Putin is successfully and commendably resolving Russia's challenges" (up to 38% from 14% over the course of two years).

At the same time, approval of the president, support of the government as a whole, and the popularity of particular government policies are all different indicators with different values, and shouldn't be conflated. For example, 89% approve of Vladimir Putin but only 66% approve of Dmitri Medvedev's actions as Prime Minister, and a mere 19% say they trust him. Yet most people still do not want the government to be disbanded: 62% support the overall performance of the government. As another example, 70% of respondents believe that the majority of the population supports Putin, but the share of those who have the same opinion of public support for the government overall is a bit less than 40%.

Russians have mixed feelings about some of Putin's policies, including on Ukraine. The annexation of Crimea has remained popular over the past year: 88% approved of it in March 2014, and approximately the same number still does. However, opinions on what would be an acceptable outcome of the situation in east Ukraine has changed drastically. In March 2014, 74% were ready to support the Russian leadership in the event of an open military conflict with Ukraine, but by February 2015 that number dropped to 44%. Sentiments about the eastern Ukrainian territories has changed in a similar fashion: at first 48% felt that these territories should be integrated into the Russian Federation, but now that number has dropped by more than three times (15%).

There are a few other important things to take note of. Putin's approval ratings have changed considerably over the 15 years he has been in power. Between 2009 and 2014 he lost about a third of his supporters, but 2014 was a turning point due to extraordinary circumstances. All indicators show that attitudes toward Putin improved. Today, his image is back to that of Putin before the 2008 economic crisis.

Multiple major changes in approval ratings in a matter of weeks undermine the criticism of those who ascribe polling fluctuations to shortcomings in survey methodology. Factors such as respondent inaccessibility, the proportion of individuals who leave their contacts after the interview (to allow for reviewing of the survey process), and the participants' fears that "wrong" answers could have negative consequences for them-all of these factors have remained constant over the past 10-15 years. The question of survey methodology is an important one, but is also enduring, and it can explain neither fluctuations in the surveys nor the high approval ratings shown in the past year. The real reasons lie elsewhere.

SOURCES OF LEGITIMACY

Many experts attribute Putin's high ratings and political stability in Russia to the regime's skill in manipulating public opinion through propaganda, which has been particularly intense since the start of the Ukraine crisis. The results of public opinion surveys support the notion that the events in Ukraine have virtually monopolized the attention of Russian audiences in 2014. Throughout the year, these developments (the annexation of Crimea, clashes in eastern Ukraine, humanitarian convoys, etc.) have been in 6th to 8th place on the top 10 list of "most important and prominent events," monitored by the Levada Center. Notably, Russia's actions in Ukraine are seen in a very different light within Russia compared to elsewhere. For example, only 30% of Russians believe that Russia and Ukraine are at war, while 70% of Ukrainians do. The perception of most Russians is that their country's role is limited to providing humanitarian support for Ukraine's distressed civilian population, shipping humanitarian goods, and sending volunteers.

However, it would be a mistake to say that the propaganda is effective only because Russians have no access to alternative sources of information. At least 30% of Russians regularly get information from at least one independent source; in Moscow and other large cities, this figure is as high as 60% (meanwhile, Putin's Ukraine policy is only marginally less popular in urban areas than it is nationwide). A considerable share of Russians are aware of the existence of other viewpoints, but they don't want to listen or take them into account.

This happens because, for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the annexation of Crimea made Russians feel like they were a superpower again (80% of respondents agreed with this statement in spring 2014). Most Russians are unable or unwilling to shake off the intoxicating illusion of national grandeur. Propaganda also keeps the nation from coming to its senses because it helps shift focus from one topic to another-from the annexation of Crimea to the wrongdoings of the Ukrainian army to the evil of the West and its sanctions, and so on. The spin-doctors are always on the lookout for new stories to keep the public's attention from waning.

Another factor that helps guarantee support for the regime is that there are no real alternatives. As mentioned above, between one quarter and a third of Russians support Putin because there isn't anybody else to compare him with. Independent candidates have no access to TV airtime, and their ability to participate in elections at all levels is seriously limited. The appearance of an alternative candidate can rapidly and radically change the situation. The 2013 Moscow mayoral elections is a good example of that: opposition candidate Alexei Navalny was able to improve his standing in the polls by several times in a matter of months, and he eventually took 27% of the vote. Almost half of Putin's supporters are people without clear political opinions, who have little interest in politics. These people are particularly susceptible to the pressure of propaganda, their bosses at work, and local authorities. They are the ones who have neutral feelings toward Putin ("Can't say anything bad" and "Can't say anything good" about him). Overall, they don't really care who they vote for.

Yet the authorities are not the only ones to blame for the lack of political alternatives. The opposition bears part of the responsibility, because non-systemic opposition parties almost completely ignore issues that concern the majority of the population. It's the Kremlin that plays the lead when it comes to discussing the issues that worry most average Russians. For all of its corruption and red tape, the Russian government remains, in the opinion of most of its citizens, the only place to turn for assistance. The opposition, on the other hand, is frequently disrespectful of the general public. It should therefore come as now surprise that most Russians feel that the opposition "only cares about getting into power, and has no concern for the little people." Only 11% disagree with this statement.

Finally, the key instrument for securing Putin's base of support is the policy of sustaining social stability. This is particularly important given that almost half the Russian population believes that they would have a difficult time surviving without government assistance. Putin is associated with the boom years of the 2000s. One of the biggest challenges to Putin's popularity as of yet was brought on by social instability. In 2005, monetization of benefits brought about a considerable drop in the president's approval ratings (to 60%), as well as nationwide protests. The monetization reform had to be called of halfway through. This development appears to have served as an important lesson for Putin and his team, giving them an appreciation for the value of social stability in upholding the political order.

The managed transfer of power to Dmitri Medvedev in 2007-2008 was carried out under precisely this motto of preserving "Putin's stability." Today, preserving social guarantees is the government's top priority. It is likely that Putin's ratings have stayed so high only because of the decisive actions undertaken by the government in late 2014 in order to quell the growing panic and stabilize the ruble exchange rate. Thanks to these measures, public approval ratings that had crashed in December rebounded by early spring.

ANTI-STATUS QUO

In closing, we should reexamine the criticism of public opinion survey results by liberal segments of society. Such critiques have been common over the years, at some times becoming more intense. In the 2011 elections, for example, some observers were dissatisfied with survey results, where nationwide figures cited by sociologists differed vastly from their own experience with a limited sample of voters (our findings also suggest that data manipulations were possible, but on a much smaller scale than suggested by some critics). Public opinion centers have been accused of trying to demoralize protest-minded citizens with these survey results. When sociologists address pro-opposition audiences, they are always asked to "say something encouraging."

It just so happened that, in the winter of 2011-2012, the interests of those who opposed the status quo aligned with the sentiments of the 35-40% of Russians who were at that point disappointed with the government. Many of the people who came out to Bolotnaya Square were first-time protesters, did not support the opposition's leadership, and did not like many of the slogans they heard at the demonstrations. The government quickly gauged the situation and attempted to drive a wedge between the opposition activists and members of the general public who sympathized with them, but were ultimately fairly passive.Within a few months, the opposition was discredited in the eyes of the population and the protest movement was broken. Nonetheless, the Kremlin was only able to regain the approval of the disenchanted public following Russia's annexation of Crimea. Those who want change in Russia must understand that, unless they can appeal to broad swaths of the population, they will always remain on the margins of political life. The opposition needs to try understanding the opinions of the majority, rather than disparaging them.

What can the history of public opinion polls tell us about the future of Putin's approval rating? The annexation of Crimea and a standoff with the West has given Putin's ratings (though not the ratings of other politicians, and not approval for the government overall), a "Teflon coating." Putin's popularity will remain high for awhile. Skilled propaganda, which is facilitated by control over leading media outlets and plays upon the existing fears and insecurities of the public, will slow a fall in Putin's ratings. However, a further deterioration of the economy could undermine the key basis of the regime's popularity: social stability. It should also be noted that the widespread public approval that is heavily dependent on compelling an apolitical majority to make "correct" political choices can rapidly dissolve. For example, the high ratings that former Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov enjoyed for a long time (at least in Moscow) were gone just a few weeks after he lost his position.

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 #7
RFE/RL
July 26, 2015
Flurry Of Moscow Activism Hints That Mood For Protest Is Very Much Alive
by RFE/RL

MOSCOW -- Three years into President Vladimir Putin's third term and a renewed effort to banish conspicuous political dissent in Russia, local protests are bubbling up all over the capital.

From weekslong sit-ins to save neighborhood parks to pushback against development plans with ties to the political elite, Muscovites are taking their frustrations to the streets.

There are no clear signs that the outrage threatens to spill over into national-level politics.

But even a summer of very local discontent could mark a break with the relative quiet that has accompanied Putin's return to the Kremlin, since pro-democracy protests largely fizzled out under a clampdown that began in 2012.

In a sleepy park in Moscow's north for the past month, hundreds of residents have weathered rainstorms, police detentions, and scuffles with Orthodox radicals to protest what they regard as the "illegal" construction of a church.

In the city's southeast, hundreds of residents -- soccer fans, in many cases -- have rallied against office blocks planned on the historic site of the Torpedo FC stadium.

In its east, public hearings over massive development plans at an industrial park have drawn hundreds of protesters.

And just last week, 50 groups representing citizens' initiatives announced they were joining forces under a citywide umbrella to support one another on myriad district issues, from tariff disputes to corrupt land deals.

Nikolai Petrov, an expert on regional politics at the Center for Political and Geographical Research, suggests that "perhaps what we are seeing now is a kind of accumulation of protest energy."

Growing Grassroots Energy

Russian civil society rose to prominence in the capital in 2010 during a gritty grassroots campaign to defend Khimki Forest, northwest of Moscow, until it was eclipsed by political opposition protests that followed national legislative elections in December 2011 and Putin's return to the Kremlin in the spring of 2012.

But that protest movement lost momentum as activists were marginalized or jailed, draconian new laws imposed heavy fines for "unsanctioned" protests, and "foreign agents" were weeded out of the NGO sector.

Putin has managed to remain largely above the daily political fray in his current term, which ends in 2018, and enjoys sky-high favorability ratings (89 percent in the latest Levada Center polling).

But some Muscovites might be tempted to regard even the most grassroots victories as highlighting chinks in Putin's armor.

At Sparrow Hills, south of the Moscow River, thousands of people celebrated in June after a street campaign succeeded in briefly derailing a Kremlin-linked group's effort to erect an unpopular statue to Kievan Rus's Prince Vladimir, despite intimidation from Putin's favorite biker gang, the Night Wolves.

Marina Matukhina, a twentysomething Muscovite who has been part of a monthlong sit-in at her local park, Torfyanka, to block the construction of an Orthodox church, insists that "we're going to stay put."

Elsewhere, activists are using social networks like VKontakte and Facebook to campaign against the construction of an elite housing complex on the protected grounds of Moscow State University.

And residents of Moscow's Ramenki neighborhood have used social media to circulate an electronic petition (with around 2,100 signatures by a recent count) to oppose a new highway that would include a spur cutting through a protected area around the River Setun.

Aleksandra Andreyeva, an environmentalist, city activist, and municipal deputy for the capital's Lefortovo district, says such protests rarely blame Putin for their woes.

But she also insists of the scattered protests that "no one expected this in the summer."

"The situation is moving to a new level," she adds.

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#8
PARNAS supporters holding rally in Novosibirsk over election committee meeting on registering party lists

NOVOSIBIRSK. July 27 (Interfax) - The rally permitted by the Novosibirsk mayor's office of the supporters of the People's Freedom Party For Russia Without Lawlessness and Corruption (PARNAS) is taking place in front of the Novosibirsk region's government building on Monday, an Interfax correspondent reported.

Five people are declared to participate in the rally, event organizer Vadim Sukhonenko said.

"One of the goals is to hold a picket to protest against the decision of the working group regarding the decision of the Novosibirsk region election committee, which recommended not to register lists due to a lack of authentic signatures," Sukhonenko said.

Information on over 50% of the 1,300 signatures was incorrectly added by employees of the regional election committee, he said.

"The data did not match because of typos and mistakes, as a result the regional federal migration service department rejected signatures," Sukhonenko said.

It has been reported that on July 24 the working group under the Novosibirsk region election committee did not recognize 1,495 signatures for PARNAS as authentic.

According to the election committee secretary Sergei Lebedev, most signatures were not found to be authentic due to discrepancies of information in the signature lists and data of the Novosibirsk regional migration service department.

"In some cases the place of residence does not match, in some - passport information. In a number of cases citizens are not registered in the Novosibirsk region at all and some are not even Russian citizens," Lebedev said.

On the very same day PARNAS members and supporters held an unsanctioned rally in front of the regional government building while expecting a protocol from the working group of the election committee. Event organizers installed a cube with flags in front of the central entrance. Police did not interfere.

As of now, the regional elections committee registered the lists of Just Russia, United Russia and the Liberal Democratic Party for the elections to the legislative committee of the Novosibirsk region.

At the same time, the regional election committee refused to register the lists of the For Women of Russia and Democratic Party of Russia on Monday. The working group of the election committee also recommended refusing the registration of lists of the Green party on July 24.

On September 13 Novosibirsk region residents are to vote on 476 election campaigns, including the deputy elections to the legislative assembly and for the Novosibirsk city council.

Out of 65 regional branches of the political parties registered in the Novosibirsk region, 61 can participate in elections.

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 #9
Russia's off-parliament opposition unlikely to drive its slogans home to population
By Lyudmila Alexandrova

MOSCOW, July 24. /TASS/. Parties making up what is known in Russia as 'non-system' (off-parliament) opposition have made known their plans to hold a new major street action in September but experts have doubts about the real scale of the new showing, since the political slogans of this opposition do not evoke any interest on the part of the masses or people.

Nezavissimaya Gazeta daily believes the action the oppositionists are planning for the second half of September will center on protests against the laws broadening the powers of the forces of law and order, "Russia's war against Ukraine", and the demands to free those who the opposition terms 'political prisoners'.

The possible organizers are the Committee for Protest Actions, members of the RPR-PARNAS party, the Democratic Choice movement, Yabloko liberal party, Solidarity public association, and the December 5 party.

The previous major protest action was held on September 21, 2014, after which only a mournful march for the slain politician Boris Nemtsov was held on March 1.

Konstantin Kosachov, the head of a political expert group believes the problems of payments for capital repairs, the healthcare reform, and the ban on imports of various products might be actually far more important for society that the "cannibalistic law on the police".

"I think this initiative will end in a flop, partly due to personal qualities of the leaders of this opposition, as each one of them senses a general within himself, and partly due to the agenda they're promulgating," Aktualnye Kommentarii portal quoted political researcher Pavel Salin.

He believes that a very sizable part of society is unwilling to accept a purely political agenda promoted by the oppositionists even in the protest-minded cities like Moscow, Novosibirsk or St Petersburg.

"Russian oppositionists bring up the things they themselves are interested in," Salin said. "The problem is this might have worked some twenty years ago when the Russians were politicized to the utmost, but this doesn't work for the past fifteen or so years and will unlikely start working again anytime soon."

Stepan Lvov, the chief of the department for social and political research at the All-Russia Public Opinion Studies Center (VCIOM) says the people who take an interest in the oppositionist agendas have split into two camps - the pro-Western liberals and the more pro-Russian liberals. "The opposition can draw on support of only one of these camps today," he said, adding that it was not working actively with the pro-Russian liberals at the moment.

The off-parliament opposition has fifty-fifty chances to rally considerable support from protest-minded Russians, said Lydia Timofeyeva, a deputy chief of the chair of political sciences at the Russian Academy of Government Service reporting to the Presidential Administration (RANEPA).

"These chances are breakeven only if the manifestation is organized closer to the yearend but definitely not in September," she said. "September is not the time when people are already prepared to join in street protests en masse."

"And why isn't the opposition supported on a broad scale?" Timofeyeva said. "Because they have political slogans only and the Russians largely support Putin's foreign policy as they believe the country has gained back its dignity thanks to him and has started gathering its historical bits."

"People agree with the postulation that we're rising from our knees, and where are the social and economic problems worrying the people?" she said adding it was precisely these issues that formed a hypothetical basis for protest actions.

In the meantime, the protest sentiments in this country remain at a rather low level, public opinion analysts say. Considerable sections of Russian society do not have any plans to throw their shoulder into mass protests under political slogans, should such protests erupt, a poll taken by the Levada Center research group at the end of June showed.

A total of 87% of those polled stated their reluctance to protest and only 8% respondents were ready to make public claims against the authorities at demonstrations. Only 5% were either undecided or did not have an answer.

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 #10
Moscow Times
July 27, 2015
Russia Has Legitimate Concerns About NGOs
By Devon Tucker
Devon Tucker is an international master's candidate at University College London and the Higher School of Economics, Moscow, where he researches relations between Russia, Japan and the U.S

There is a growing body of credible independent academic and journalistic research suggesting that foundations and nongovernmental organizations which promote democratic values in other countries do more to discredit than to strengthen their cause.

Such criticism comes in many forms. Some criticize the inherent cynicism of turning ideals into political technology. Some fault the arrogance of considering one society's norms to be universal. Some cite the historically cozy ties between such organizations and intelligence agencies. Some make the case that infiltrating "civil society" in other countries for perceived political gain is often both expensive and futile.

Among the 12 organizations on the so-called "stop-list" of undesirable NGOs recently created by the upper house of the Russian parliament, there are three categories. The first contains the pseudo-governmental groups - the International Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and Freedom House - which march in lockstep with the policies of their largest donor, the U.S. government. These are large and slow-moving game.

The second, and much-speculated-upon category is a group of smaller Ukrainian NGOs.

The third category is made up of the large and mostly privately funded organizations: namely, the Open Society Foundation (Soros foundation) and the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation. I find these to be the most interesting because they are the only ones on the list that at least claim to promote democracy both at home and abroad, a much rarer thing than you might think.

But here's the problem: While we might like to think that certain values are universal, our actions will never be perceived the same abroad as they are at home. Supporting an idea, a value, or an agenda in your own country is, by definition, not the same thing as supporting it in someone else's.

Here's why.

Let's imagine that you are outraged (as many Americans are) by our dysfunctional criminal justice system and its devastating effect on the black and the poor. Great news! The Open Society Foundation has grants available for work on this issue.

Now let's imagine that you also care about what's going on in other parts of the world. Imagine that like a significant number of your fellow citizens, you oppose the U.S. habit of supporting regime change, which often comes fast on the heels of our democracy promotion efforts.

While nothing about support for criminal justice reform and opposition to regime change should be incompatible, in practice you're going to have to make a trade-off. No, Soros' democracy-promoting initiatives abroad might not be dictated by the U.S., but they certainly do deserve a best supporting actor award.

You now see the contradiction of a foundation based in a particular country purporting to be transnational. What links advocacy at home and abroad is that both acts are inextricably political. An "open society" is a political objective, regardless of whether or not it is government funded, and regardless of whether or not it sounds nicer than a "closed society."

In practice, support for this particular brand of politics in both societies is too often a prerequisite for dialogue between societies. Even if Soros and others are, as they claim, pursuing the same agenda in the United States as they are in Russia, they reinforce a negative spiral of perceptions between Russia and the United States by encouraging cooperation between tiny slivers of the two societies that already agree with each other, while among the populations at large, Russians object in principle to American interference in their domestic politics, and Americans see this as an objection to the values themselves.

Russia's apprehension about foreign meddling is easy enough to understand. Neither the American exceptionalism of the pseudo-governmental foundations, nor the worldview of the private foundations are in any way consistent with Russia's interests as a sovereign nation-state.

But I sympathize with Soros-funded activists working in disenfranchised communities in the United States. Where else are they going to get funding? They receive nothing from such organizations as the International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute, which only sponsor American ideals outside of America.

But I wonder if Russia hasn't missed a chance to address a larger issue. Ironically, the NGO sector, so much of which advocates for openness, would benefit from just that.

Why not call for greater international cooperation to clarify the funding streams, governance and internal practices of major international donor organizations? What are the criteria for getting a seat on a board of directors, for example. How much money does it really take to influence an NGO's agenda?

And, given the sums involved, where are the objective ratings agencies of the NGO sector? Russia is far from the only country which cares deeply about these questions.

At the very least, Russia could push for a stricter definition of the criminally overused term "NGO," which confuses grassroots activism with "corporate social responsibility" ploys, with tax write-offs, with vanity projects, and with vehicles for foreign meddling.

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 #11
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
July 24, 2015
Press Digest: Russia's mega-rich continue to multiply in spite of crisis
RBTH presents a selection of views from leading Russian media on international events, featuring reports on an increase in the numbers of Russian billionaires over the last year, formal complaints against ridesharing service Uber in Russia, and analysis of the visit by a delegation of French parliamentarians to Crimea on July 23.
Igor Rozin, RBTH

Number of billionaires increases in Russia despite weak economy

The daily broadsheet Izvestia cites the Federal Fiscal Service as saying that, despite the weakening economy, last year the number of wealthy Russians increased. The number of taxpayers who in 2014 declared an income of over one billion rubles ($17 million) grew by 5.8 percent, from 292 to 309 people. The number of millionaires and multi-millionaires also grew.

Earlier, the New World Wealth consulting company reported in a study that there are more than 82,000 dollar millionaires living in Russia, more than 52,000 of whom live in Moscow.

According to experts, this formal growth in revenues is due to the devaluation of the ruble, as well as to the de-offshoring campaigns carried out by the government.

"We see that many well-to-do clients are transferring a part of their offshore capital to Russia," said Mikhail Orlov, manager of the fiscal-juridical department at KPMG.

"Thanks to lengthy currency exchange fluctuations many citizens have been able to adapt to the situation and make a profit," remarked Roman Terekhin, partner at Delovoi Farvater. "It was possible to make money on the exchange spikes, the price increases on imports and so on."
 
Uber and similar services buying off drivers, says auto-owners body

The Kommersant business daily writes that the Russian Auto-owners Federation (RAF) has made formal complaints to the Prosecutor General's Office, the Federal Antimonopoly Service and the Public Chamber about the popular Uber, Gettaxi and Yandex.Taxi smartphone-based taxi services.

The RAF says that the distribution of the app in the regions will lead to the monopolization of the taxi market, while the practice of paying drivers an additional amount for their collaboration with the services is legally suspect. The RAF is asking for criminal charges to be brought for the commercial buy-off of the services' management.

With the help of low taxi tariffs, the mobile app is able to recruit a large number of taxis for carrying out orders, say the authors of the claim. "However, with the reduction of the tariff the earnings of the driver are also reduced," they noted.

Thus the services reduce the tariffs for citizens while promising drivers rewards. Moreover, the RAF remarks that the tariffs do not include expenses for the services' security and quality. The other players on the taxi market are becoming uncompetitive and are being forced to lower their tariffs to the detriment of their earnings.
 
French delegation's visit to Crimea is important sign for Moscow

The Vedomosti business daily writes that on July 23, Russian State Duma President Sergei Naryshkin (from the United Russia Party) met with a delegation of French parliamentarians headed by Thierry Mariani, a member of the National Assembly. Eight out of the 10 parliamentarians who arrived in Moscow are members of the center-right Republican Party (the UMP until recently), which is headed by France's former president Nicolas Sarkozy. Immediately after the talks with their Russian colleagues they departed for Crimea, where they intend to meet with the local authorities and population.

"Unfortunately, the French reality proves the destructive action of the sanctions," said Mariani. "I would like to underline that the sanctions touch not only Russian interests, but also those of France."

A backlash against the "anti-Russian hysteria" is currently underway in Europe, said Leonid Slutsky, member of Russia's nationalist LDPR party and Chairman of the State Duma Committee for the CIS. According to Slutsky, this is not the only initiative by Western parliamentarians, but any wishing to visit Russia are subject to pressure.

Although the visit by the French parliamentarians is unofficial, it is an important sign for Moscow, since besides political contacts it is necessary to establish dialogue on a social and expert level, says Dmitry Danilov, Director of the European Security Department at the Russian Acadmey of Sciences' Institute of Europe.

"Italians and delegates from other countries can also come, but this will not change the mainstream attitude toward Russia," said political analyst Alexei Makarkin. "Even if Sarkozy wins the elections, it will not influence the West until Russia makes some serious concessions."

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 #12
Irrussianality
https://irrussianality.wordpress.com
July 25, 2015
IN DEFENCE OF WHATABOUTISM
By Paul Robinson
Paul Robinson is a professor in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa, and the author of numerous books on Russia and Soviet history, including 'Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich: Supreme Commander of the Russian Army'

A frequent complaint about 'Russian propaganda' is that it engages in 'whataboutism': the response to complaints about the behaviour of the Russian government or about some social, economic, or political ill in Russia is 'what about the bad behaviour of the West?'

The anger which whataboutism provokes in some Western commentators suggests that it hits a raw nerve, possibly because it bursts their bubble of moral superiority. This week, in his blog Russia Without BS, Jim Kovpak describes the finger pointing involved in whataboutism as 'one of the most irritating memes, for lack of a better word, that one encounters in discourse on Russia.' [http://nobsrussia.com/2015/07/24/sounds-just-like-bullshit/] This retaliatory finger pointing, Kovpak writes, is an example of '"fractal wrongness", i.e. wrong on every conceivable level'. Furthermore, he says, 'The culprit is almost always someone wholly ignorant about Russia and commenting on some news story, or it is a pro-Russian expat who attributes their privileged lifestyle to Putin.' 'If you have a problem with a claim in some article,' he concludes, 'put up or shut up. Make a damned argument and while you're at it, bring some evidence.'

Kovpak's view, and I suspect this is an opinion held by many others, is that only one side may legitimately ask 'what about?' The West can point fingers at Russia, because it is objectively better, but Russia has no right to point fingers at the West, because Russia is objectively worse than the West. The comparisons Russian whataboutists make are therefore invalid.

However, even if Kovpak is right that the West is objectively better than Russia, it still seems to me to be completely valid to point out hypocrisy where hypocrisy exists. For instance, when people like Michael Weiss of The Interpreter Magazine denounce the Russian media for their bias, it is surely entirely fair to comment, as I have, that Weiss and The Interpreter are hardly bastions of balanced reporting themselves.

In addition, Russia isn't always and in every way worse than the West. Don't get me wrong here. Quite obviously, Russia is not a properly functioning liberal democracy. It has a serious problem with corruption, and its foreign policy does not always respect international law. Often, when Russians point fingers at Western countries, and argue that things are as bad if not worse over there, they are wrong. But sometimes they are right.

When, for instance, people respond to complaints about 'Russian aggression' by pointing at American and NATO aggression elsewhere, they are making a fair point. Western commentators often claim that Russia is a 'revisionist' power; that in Ukraine it is trying to tear up the existing international order. Whataboutism allows us to see what a ridiculous claim this is, since the people making it are citizens of states which have done more to undermine that order than anybody else, through actions such as the invasion of Iraq and the bombing campaign against Libya.

In a recent episode of RT's Crosstalk show (yes, I know, RT, lackey of the Kremlin, propaganda, lies, blah, blah, blah), Dmitry Babich commented that the real problem in international politics was not whataboutism but 'let's move on-ism'. I like this. Take the example of the torture carried out by Americans during the War in Terror. Nobody apart from whistleblowers has been jailed. Why? According to President Obama, because 'we need to look forward, not back'. Likewise, consider the invasion of Iraq. 'I know a large part of the public wants to move on', said former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, 'I share that point of view.' And so on. Nobody is ever held to account.

In these circumstances, it is a good thing that somebody somewhere is willing to do a bit of finger pointing. Instead of rejecting criticism, we in the West should start taking it a little more seriously.

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 #13
Christian Science Monitor
July 26, 2015
Living on Prussia's ruins, Kaliningraders embrace Germanic past
Leveled by the British in World War II and ethnically cleansed by the Soviets afterward, the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad has long had a shaky relationship with its Prussian past. But now its residents are beginning to restore its history.
By Fred Weir, Correspondent

KALININGRAD, RUSSIA - It started as a hobby for Alexander Bychenko and his wife Natalia.

They were renting a flat in a Prussian-built 19th century building in a leafy Kaliningrad neighborhood, and they fell in love with its high ceilings, elaborate fixtures, and vintage dutch door leading to the balcony. All spoke of a vanished world that had existed on this territory before the German population was expelled in the wake of World War II and completely replaced by Russians from the continental interior.

The Bychenkos began scouring flea markets, and found that Kaliningrad is awash in old items of furniture, bric-a-brac, paintings, and even appliances from the Prussian-German era.

As they gradually restored the flat to how it would have looked around 1907, friends and even strangers started dropping by to admire it. Then tour agencies took an interest, and by now a regular stream of curious visitors flows through their little private museum of life in the then-city of Königsberg, upon whose ruins Kaliningrad was - sometimes thoughtlessly - constructed.

Mr. Bychenko is emphatic that he is not questioning the historical outcome that saw a 700-year-old Germanic culture expunged, not only from Kaliningrad but also vast swathes of neighboring Poland and Lithuania, following the defeat of the Third Reich.

Rather, he is part of a growing movement of mainly younger Kaliningraders - supported by local government - who are working to roll back the Soviet-imposed amnesia that convinced generations of people who grew up on this ancient territory that its history only began in 1945.

"We are the inhabitants of this land. I leave it to historians to judge how and why that happened," says Bychenko. "But we are here, and we are the inheritors of this long and fascinating legacy. It is our duty to assimilate that history, to restore memory, and be the best stewards of this place that we can possibly be."

Remembering Königsberg

Besides hosting excursions, Bychenko also sponsors lectures on Prussian history and culture in the restored flat. He and friends are planning to publish a series of books about the region's history, including a photo album of old Königsberg, memoirs, and even a Prussian cookbook.

It's an uphill slog for those who are trying to push back the historical horizon and heal the sharp break that occurred when one population and its culture was almost totally replaced by a very different one in a brutally abrupt fashion.

It doesn't help that the physical record of Prussian existence here is fragmentary. Old Königsberg, a Baltic city of soaring spires and stout fortifications that was the birthplace of the German philosopher Emmanuel Kant, was mostly leveled in waves of mass bombings by the British RAF near the war's end.

A full-scale assault by the Soviet Red Army in 1945 trampled the ruins, and a Soviet policy of erasing any reminders of Prussian heritage largely finished the work. Thanks to wartime evacuations and Soviet-era expulsions, only a tiny handful of the original German inhabitants - mostly those married to Russians - remained on the territory after 1948.

"The new Soviet people who were brought to the new Soviet city of Kaliningrad after the war needed familiar surroundings. So everything was deliberately rebuilt in Soviet style," says Alexei Laleko, a historian and author of several books on the region's past. "For a long time their was a conscious policy of eliminating any signs of the German presence here."

Perhaps the most egregious act was the Soviet Politbureau's 1967 decision to blow up the ruins of Königsberg's 700-year-old castle and construct a hulking "House of Soviets" in its place. The huge, boxlike structure was built but never completed, some say due to Prussian-era tunnels that make its foundations unstable. Today it dominates Kaliningrad's skyline, and remains a topic of extreme embarrassment for the local inhabitants.

"There's a big discussion about what to do with it. Tear it down, or fix it up and use it somehow?" says Mr. Laleko. "Some people are in favor of razing it and rebuilding the castle, but that would be prohibitively expensive and completely fake. So, there it sits, we can't avoid looking at it every day, but we have no idea how to resolve this situation."

'A new accent on continuity'

Things are changing, in part thanks to the grassroots consciousness-raising efforts of people like Bychenko, and in part thanks to an official change of heart.

Ten years ago the Kremlin agreed to stage a gala celebration of the "750th anniversary of Kaliningrad's founding." The event, attended by Vladimir Putin, French President Jacques Chirac, and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, did much to raise the tiny region's profile. And while Mr. Putin's official speech offered few clues as to how the then 60-year old Russian city of Kaliningrad could boast a 750-year history, locals say it brought a stream of much-needed funding and positive attention from Moscow, and fresh attention to restoring Prussian-era monuments.

"Of course it was a strange-sounding event, but it gave us a push in the right direction," says Vladimir Abramov, an independent political expert. "It put a new accent on continuity, the sense that yes, we are Russians, but we are also part of this land and its history. And that is developing in a normal direction now. A lot of German sources are being translated, or re-written by local historians. Politicians no longer say we shouldn't restore old Prussian monuments; rather, they say, there's no money for it."

But, he adds, such developments are now hostage to a deteriorating international situation that is driving Kaliningrad back into a Soviet-era role as Russia's military bastion on the Baltic, and is nudging the local population back into the bunker mentality that goes with that.

"Odd ideas are appearing, promoted on TV, such as the notion that Russian culture is under attack and must be defended," says Mr. Abramov. "Still, I believe our proximity to Europe, and closer acquaintance with the history of this region is creating a population here that is of Russia, but also different."

Shaig Mamedov, a farmer who has just finished restoring a 125 year old barn and the German-era drainage system that once managed water levels in these overly wet farmlands, says it's not an academic issue, but a matter of sheer practicality to learn from those who occupied this territory for over 700 years.

"I was educated as an engineer, and I am in awe of what my German predecessor did here," he says. "To build such a high, solid structure as this barn, out of wood, and have it still standing today, is amazing. That German farmer in 1890 knew things I'm still trying to learn. There was no alternative but to restore it; to destroy it would have been a tragedy."

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#14
The Wilson Quarterly
http://wilsonquarterly.com
July 1, 2015
THE RISE OF SIBERIAN NATIONALISM
What explains the resurgence in Siberian regionalism in recent years, and what does it mean for Putin's Russia?
BY ELIZABETH PEET

"I'm Siberian." This simple but loud slogan has been emblazoned on merchandise from iPhone cases to T-shirts since 2012, as part of a branding campaign aimed at changing global perceptions of this huge chunk of Russian tundra. The "I'm Siberian" brand encapsulates a growing sense of pride and self-identity among Siberian youth, but where has this sentiment come from, and what does it mean for Russia?

Siberia has historically been a byword for remoteness and unforgiving cold. Scottish explorer John Cochrane wrote in 1824 that "there is so little of interest in Siberia, so little to be seen, that it is hardly possible to form an interesting work on the topic." Covering a vast area of over 13 million square kilometers - 77 percent of Russia's total land mass - Siberia is inhabited by 40 million people, which equates to just 3 inhabitants per square kilometer, making it one of the most sparsely populated areas in the world.

In recent years, this icy expanse has seen political activism and regionalism ignited, as Stanislav Zakharkin, a Russian sociologist, writes in Eurozine. Yet Siberian nationalism is not a new phenomenon. In the nineteenth century, an argument evolved among Siberian intellectuals that the region had effectively been colonized by Russia. Having been tossed aside as a penal colony for centuries, Siberia's economic concerns, long neglected by those in power in Russia's far west, seem to have been paramount to the people who lived there.

According to influential works at the time, such as Nikolai Yadrintsev's 1892 book Siberia as a Colony, the imperial center was exploiting Siberia's abundant natural resources through an uneven trade and revenue system. This system was enforced by a central political bureaucracy and a lack of cultural or intellectual investment in the region, all designed to submerge Siberians into the wider Russian Empire.

Following the collapse of Tsarist Russia, the region was quickly swallowed up again by the highly centralized Soviet Union. The economic inequalities in the relationship between Russia's central government and Siberia have thus never been resolved. In 2012, the Siberian region of Tomsk delivered 130 billion roubles in tax revenues to Moscow, and received just 10.3 billion roubles back in investment; to meet its financial needs and obligations, the region was forced to resort to loans from commercial banks.

The grievances of the Siberian people may have been historically suppressed, but they have never gone away and now rise anew under Vladimir Putin's ever-more-centralized regime. Under Putin, Russian executive powers have been hugely increased at the expense of local autonomy, with reforms from 2004 onwards giving the central government significant influence over the selection of regional governors. This system of "vertical power" has meant that, according to Zakharkin, "Russian governors have finally turned into the mouthpieces of federal policy," and it is this erosion of local power that has inflamed Siberian hostility to Moscow. A separatist rally was held in the Siberian city of Novosibirsk in 2011, with demonstrators chanting the slogan "stop feeding Moscow!" At a press conference, Rostislav Antonov, the protest's key organizer, complained that Siberia "is the main source of wealth for Russia, and yet it does not have enough money for basic necessities."

This growing hostility to Moscow has contributed to a resurgence of regional pride across Siberia, as demonstrated in the popularity of the "I'm Siberian" brand among Siberia's younger generations. Beyond this commercial manifestation, Siberia's insistent pride has blossomed in the region's art scene. In 2013, a popular art exhibition titled the "United States of Siberia" was one realization of a Siberian artistic renaissance led by Anna Tereshkova and the Siberian Centre of Contemporary Art. The centre and its various exhibitions have been denounced by many local MPs and conservative organizations - all eager to show allegiance to Putin - as offensive to Russian patriotism in its celebration of local culture.

Last year, the gulf between the growth of Siberian pride and the conservative federal government reaction found a stark embodiment in a proposed "March for the Federalization of Siberia." The demonstration, due to be held in Novosibirsk in August 2014, was banned by the Russian government, with a media blackout imposed and several organizers arrested. Putin's harsh response implies a degree of fear that the federalist movement is in danger of succeeding and threatening his centralizing agenda. In comments to the press in December 2014, Putin reignited the commonly held suspicion among Russian nationalists that outside powers intend to annex Siberia for themselves. "We have heard it even from high-level officials that it is unfair that the whole of Siberia, with its immense resources, belongs to Russia in its entirety," said Putin. "Why exactly is it unfair? So it is fair to snatch Texas from Mexico, but it is unfair that we are working on our own land? No, we have to share." Stoking anti-American sentiment and Russian patriotism arguably indicates a sense of fear of internal disharmony.

There have always been tensions between local federalists and the central government in Moscow, but the last few years have seen these tensions heat into a rolling boil. Zakharkin makes the case that the Siberian movement, at least in its present form, does not pose any immediate threat to Russian unity. He labels it "a grassroots cultural phenomenon that is gaining popularity against the background of real anti-Moscow sentiment." However, Zakharkin notes that "activists have neither the political nor the financial leverage to influence those in power."

If the status quo continues - and with it, the perception that the centralized government is benefiting from an unequal and exploitative economic and political system - Moscow could face a real problem in the coming years.

The Source: Stanislav Zakharkin, "What's in store for the Siberian movement?", Eurozine June 11, 2015
 

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 #15
Moscow Times
July 27, 2015
A Moscow Education, in More Ways Than One
By Evan Haddad

A recent article published in British weekly Times Higher Education revealed that one in seven Russian undergraduates admits to cheating on exams. The figure is probably much higher. Any expat in Moscow teaching English will confirm that. Cheating in the Russian educational system is rampant, even acceptable.

I experienced it firsthand while teaching English literature at a private school in the south of Moscow - a place where "my driver forgot to take my homework" was sometimes an excuse. Parents paid the equivalent of $1,000 a month for tuition, which included an English immersion program with a native speaker starting in the first grade.

The school's educational policy promised parents a rich intellectual experience for their children, who would be fluent in English and another language by the time they graduated. One line of the policy read: "We value academic excellence for its own sake, rather than the sterile pursuit of grades."

The big selling point for the school was the native speaker - however, several months into the academic year, it started becoming clear that it was just a selling point. There were two English classes: one for grammar, taught by a Russian teacher, and my class. Nina, the senior teacher in the English department, told me point-blank the first day that I wasn't allowed to teach grammar.

"The Russian teachers can explain grammar to Russian students better," she insisted. "You teach the kids about holidays and read books with them."

She left me alone in the school's library to make curricula for grades 4-10. There were massive hardcover editions of old American history books and paperback novels. When Nina returned three hours later, she reviewed the lesson plans - a mush of Alice in Wonderland, Native American history and J.D Salinger.

"But where are the poems in the plans?" she asked. "The students should memorize one poem a week." Memorization of poems is a keystone of Russian language classes.

Together, we selected some Robert Burns and Roald Dahl.

On the school's website, everything looked great. But there was a big flaw in the English program: the native speaker could only give students a plus or minus for the term. The Russian English teachers could calculate it into the student's final mark, or ignore it - which they often did to escape the principal's wrath.

The school's grading system invalidated my class - and the kids knew it. The ninth grade class spent a term reading The Catcher in the Rye and wrote essays as a final project. What I got was a stack of plagiarized papers straight from Wikipedia and CliffNotes.

When I went to the principal, Tatiana, an enthusiastic middle-aged woman who had founded the school, she confessed there was little she could do. "Parents pay good money for their children's education here," she told me in her office, a huge room spangled with trophies from the school's victories in various academic competitions. "They expect the best."

On another occasion, Tatiana allowed a girl from my 10th grade class to do her chemistry homework in the corner during lessons. Apparently, the student's mother had called and complained that discussing Nabokov's "Pale Fire" was a waste of her daughter's time.

"She wants to be a doctor. What can I do?," the principal again told me.

Tatiana's job was to dress up the school in Shakespeare festivals, academic competitions and keep it stocked with Americans. She wanted to convince rich parents that here in Moscow was a real American school. And for a while I was the resident American she shoved onstage to illuminate certain American events like the bombing at Pearl Harbor and St. Patricks Day. The theater teacher had written a play about Pearl Harbor in Russian that the kids translated into English. Before the debut, I was to go before 300 parents, the Irish Ambassador and even an American admiral to make a statement. Just what that statement should be and how the Russian parents would understand it was unclear.

"What should I say?," I asked Tatiana.

"Just say something...Talk about the impact on Americans," she replied.

What followed was a three-minute-long nervous rant touching on American isolationism, kamikazes and battleships. When I put the microphone on the stand, the crowd applauded. Tatiana and Nina glowed. I couldn't remember what I had said, but that didn't seem to matter.

After the event, Tatiana and I talked over a glass of champagne in the school cafeteria where the attendees had gathered for snacks. She told me how the school was born. Originally from Ukraine, Tatiana had received a master's degree in education at the University of North Carolina and returned to Moscow with the dream of opening an American-style school. She founded it in September 1990, with official registration in 1991. In the beginning, the school was a small room where she taught Russians English with old grammar books brought back from the U.S.

"It was the right time,' she told me in the cafeteria. 'Nobody knew what they were doing. Getting a school registered nowadays is an unbelievable headache."

Twenty-five years later, Tatiana's dream had blossomed into a financial success, with over 350 students and a modern campus. It was a financial success - but I wondered whether it was a moral one.

By the end of the year, my relationship with the Russian English teachers had soured. The lesson planning each term had become a nightmare. I no longer saw the point in spending long hours inventing projects the kids would cheat on and classes that were not valued. But the administration demanded plans - they needed a native speaker and those quaint lessons on Valentine's Day and the American judicial system. Tatiana put enormous pressure on the Russian English teachers to get my plans done. I was the bumbling foreigner - I was expected to show up, not to know how things really worked.

One day in May, the assistant principal caught me in the hall after class. The fourth graders were screaming and punching each other in the corridor, and she had to shout over them.

"Go to the director, she's looking for you."

When I got to her door, I could hear Tatiana screaming at someone about "Evan's plans." A few minutes later, a tearful Nina ran out of the office. She looked like she wanted to kill me. I went in and sat down on a leather chair before Tatiana's desk. She recomposed herself.

Throughout the year, I had heard Tatiana shout at all the staff. But she never shouted at me. She treated me differently than the Russian teachers. She even paid me more. She asked whether I was planning to stay for another year at the school.

"I'll renew your visa if you plan the next year by the end of the month," she told me.

In spite of everything, it was a tempting offer. I had really bonded with most of the students. They were bright kids and Russia's future. They didn't need to cheat, but they were a product of their environment. After all, it wasn't their fault that the school system was so screwy.

Later that night, I talked it over with my roommate and colleague Maria, a girl whose family had immigrated to Atlanta from Ukraine. She taught in the elementary school. Although she was ethnically Slavic and spoke Russian with her parents, she hated Russia and was counting the days until her flight home. We often swapped opinions about the school.

"Why don't you write a letter to Tatiana?," she suggested.

I did just that.

Two hours later, Tatiana responded with an acquiescent message about my resignation. She finished the letter with this sentence: "People usually go; it's unusual for them to stay."

It was an appropriate conclusion.

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 #16
Revised doctrine asserts Russia's status of maritime power
By Tamara Zamyatina

MOSCOW, July 27. /TASS/. Revision of Russia's maritime doctrine stems from the latest changes in the global political environment: the expansion of NATO's infrastructures towards Russian borders, the reunification of Crimea and Sevastopol with Russia, the priority development of the Arctic and steps to gain a firmer foothold in the Asia-Pacific Region, polled experts have told TASS.

Last Sunday, marked in Russia as Navy Day, President Vladimir Putin approved amendments to the maritime doctrine - the key document of planning the nation's maritime policies. The revised maritime doctrine identifies six key areas: the Atlantic, the Arctic, the Pacific, the Caspian, the Indian Ocean and the Antarctic. The doctrine points to the need for restoring the presence of the Russian Navy in the Mediterranean. "The Atlantic was identified as number one priority. Of late, the North Atlantic Alliance showed rather active expansion towards our borders. Naturally, Russia cannot but provide a response to this," Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin said at a conference at the presidential office.

"Promotion of friendly relations with China and the build-up of positive interaction with other states in the region is a major component of the national maritime policies in the Pacific," the doctrine says. In the Indian Ocean the document points to the development of friendly relations with India as the main development guideline.

Under the state program for armaments, 4.7 trillion roubles is to be invested into the development of the Russian Navy. The list of naval ships due to enter duty looks as follows: eight strategic submarines Borei of project 955 and as many multi-role nuclear powered submarines Yasen of project 885, eight frigates of project 22350 and six frigates of project 11356, as well as 35 corvettes (including 18 ships of project 20380 and 20385, six missile boats Buyan of project 21360 and six amphibious assault ships of project 11711.

The leading research fellow at the centre for military and political studies of the RAS Institute of US and Canada Studies, Yuri Morozov, believes that the maritime doctrine puts such a major emphasis on the Arctic because, as the ice cap melts, the importance of the Northern Sea Route grows. "This is precisely the reason why Russia is stepping up efforts to build its own icebreaker fleet capable of escorting sea convoys along Russia's coast. Besides, the Arctic gives Russia unlimited access to the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. And the huge hydrocarbon resources make the Arctic an area of tough competition among the countries eager to develop them," Morozov told TASS.

The president of the International Centre for Geopolitical Analysis, Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov, retired, agrees.

"The struggle for Arctic resources is bound to expand over years to come. The United States has launched a major program for armaments in the Arctic, split the region into zones of responsibility among its allies and is in fact creating NATO's Arctic twin," Ivashov said. "In the meantime, Russia in the 1980s and 1990s in fact quit the Arctic. There was no radar coverage at all. In the meantime, the North Atlantic Alliance was systematically building up its presence in the Arctic and holding daily military exercises. Moreover, the United States and some of its allies refuse to recognize some Arctic areas, such as that of the Mendeleyev and Lomonosov ridges belong to Russia. Therefore, the status of the Arctic as a priority guideline of Russia's maritime doctrine looks quite reasonable," Ivashov told TASS.

"In the Mediterranean Russia uses some strategically important shipping routes. It is beyond doubt it should maintain and develop relations with such friendly countries as Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Yemen in order to enhance naval presence in the Middle East and in Central Asia," Ivashov believes.

And the president of the National Strategy Institute, Mikhail Remizov, called for remembering Russia had just two ways of access to the World Ocean - one for the Northern Fleet and one for the Pacific Fleet. Russia has always been a Pacific power. "Therefore it is extremely important to strengthen Russia's presence in the Pacific, which is connected with the Indian Ocean and the World Ocean. It is important for the development of Russia's ocean-going fleet, and not just the coastal fleet," Remizov told TASS.

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 #17
Vedomosti
July 21, 2015
US ABM system does not threaten Russian strategic forces - newspaper
Aleksey Nikolskiy, US global antimissile defence system no threat at present to Russian strategic forces, but its development could take more dangerous turn in future

The worst-case potential US ABM [antimissile defence] system that could emerge up to 2030 is modelled in the development of new Russian missiles (including such as the RS-24 Yars and the RS-26 Yars-M).

Although the deployment of US global antimissile defence positions in Romania and Poland represents a threat to Russian Strategic Missile Troops (RVSN), in respect of the tactical-technical requirements for modern RVSN weapons these threats are taken into account in the future up to 2030, and the Russian nuclear potential remains combat capable, according to RVSN spokesmen speaking at an Interfax news conference on Tuesday [21 July].

According to Oleg Pyshnyy, head of the Defence Ministry Central Research Institute Fourth Department (which is involved in RVSN issues), some risk could be represented by the US SM-3 Block IIA missiles planned for deployment in Eastern Europe and which this year commenced drop tests, and the more advanced SM-3 Block IIB missiles.

These latter missiles, as follows from US President Barack Obama's "adaptive approach" to the development of antimissile defence in Europe proposed in 2009, originally were to have been deployed by 2020 and to have the official capability to knock out at the initial trajectory stage ICBMs which, excluding NATO countries in the region, only Russia has, but their development has been delayed. The USA presents this as a political gesture towards Moscow, whereas in fact it is obvious that this missile is incompatible with the Aegis control system and if these technical difficulties are overcome then the missiles will be deployed, Pyshnyy affirmed.

Therefore, the worst-case potential US antimissile defence system that could emerge for the Strategic Missile Troops up to 2030 is modelled in the development of new Russian missiles (including such as the RS-24 Yars and the RS-26 Yars-M), and the requirements for new missiles are based on this modelling, Viktor Yesin, former chief of staff of the Strategic Missile Troops, stated. This spending on the RVSN constitutes only 5 per cent of the R20,000bn state arms programme up to 2020, he said.

During the past quarter, seven mobile launchers (for the RVSN) and eight ICBMs have been adopted... The rate of implementation of the annual plan is about 10 per cent - Deputy Defence Minister Yuriy Borisov.

Apart from that, the waters around Europe are patrolled by US naval ships based in Spain and equipped with Aegis and early modifications of SM-3 antimissile defence missiles. The USA will have a total of 48-49 such ships by 2020 and their capabilities could also in the future threaten the Russian RVSN and naval strategic nuclear forces (missiles on submarines), although the missile positions in the Trans-Ural part of Russia are immune to them, Pyshnyy emphasized.

The USA is building missile positions for GBI heavy interceptor missiles that intercept missiles in the middle stage of the trajectory, even though the physical principles by which the guidance systems of these missiles will be able to distinguish decoys from real ones have not been found, and this is recognized by the US specialists themselves, Yesin added.

Pyshnyy also voiced hope that Russia and the USA in the future will be able to return to the currently stalled dialogue on antimissile defence so that the US side addresses Russian concerns, but at the same time he admitted that the chances of that are very small at present.

According to Pavel Podvig, editor of the russianforces.org website on Russia's strategic nuclear forces, many experts in the USA are of the opinion that, in its present form, all components of US antimissile defence are inadequate, but will not close down this project for political reasons. It is not ruled out, however, that in the future the US antimissile defence system will begin to develop in some as yet unknown direction, he said.

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 #18
Interfax
July 27, 2015
Russian Foreign Ministry calls for resumption of Russian-U.S. bilateral cooperation on counterterrorism

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Oleg Syromolotov has called for the resumption of bilateral cooperation between Russia and the U.S. on counterterrorism, saying he intends to discuss it with his American colleagues.

In an interview published in the July 27 edition of Kommersant, Syromolotov said it is important to "think about resuming direct bilateral cooperation on counterterrorism in the current format of the Russian-U.S. working group."

"I set myself a task to speak about this with the Americans," Syromolotov said.

At the same time, he emphasized that the problems in relations between Russia and the U.S. interfere with the international fight against terrorism.

"The current problems in Russian-U.S. bilateral relations obviously interfere with international efforts in the sphere of counterterrorism," he said.

He said that "unilateral, politically motivated 'freezing' of the work of the working group on counterterrorism does not promote the development of anti-terrorist cooperation between our countries."

At the same time, the deputy foreign minister pointed out the importance of the joint international fight against Islamic State.

"Russia firmly believes that the global terrorist threat, including that created by Islamic State, should be fought together, without politicizing and 'double standards,' on the basis of international law and with the central coordinating role of the UN. The West and the U.S. apparently have a problem with this approach," he said.

At the same time, Syromolotov expressed his satisfaction with the continuing stable dialogue between Russia and the U.S. on issues relating to money laundering and the financing of terrorism, both in the FATF and in the bilateral format.

"Constructive practical interaction with the U.S. continues on some relevant regional platforms. Calm and focused work free from inappropriate politicization is being done. We are talking primarily about the APEC working group on counterterrorism, and also the format of ASEAN intersession meetings on counterterrorism and transnational crime," he said.

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 #19
Interfax
July 24, 2015
US may keep sanctions for years, Russia to run economy, trade accordingly - PM

Russia will be developing its economic and trade policies assuming that the United States may keep the sanctions it imposed on Russia over the Ukraine crisis for many more years, Prime Minister Dmitriy Medvedev has said.

Interfax news agency quoted Medvedev as saying in an interview to the Slovenian newspaper DELO ahead of a visit to Slovenia: "I concede that the momentum of the sanctions may continue in the USA for a long time. It is sufficient to recall the history of the Jackson-Vanik amendment, which existed for nearly 40 years and turned from an economic lever into a political one. We shall take this into account in our economic and trade policy, and shall, if necessary, respond appropriately to new unfriendly steps."

Medvedev said the sanctions are harming American companies as well, and "therefore let the USA decide what it will do with its sanctions. I have said many times: it was not us who started this process, and it will not be us who end it".

"Still, I hope that the American side will return to pragmatic positions. This has happened in our relations on more than one occasion in the past," added Medvedev.

On the EU sanctions, he said that "exchanging sanctions benefits no-one". "Europe needs Russia, while Russia needs Europe."

"Have the sanctions achieved their goal? Of course they have not. Have they complicated life? Yes, they have, but not just for Russia. You can see well for yourself that in many ways they have struck like a boomerang those who introduced them. Members of European business circles are seriously concerned by the losses businesses in their countries are sustaining as a result of the anti-Russian restrictions. In economists' estimates, they may reach tens of billions of euros."

Medvedev expressed confidence that Russia will survive sanctions as it "has and will always have a margin of safety".

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 #20
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
July 24, 2015
The US-Russia trade relationship still hasn't reached its full potential
RD Interview: Aleksander Stadnik, Russian Trade Representative in the U.S., discusses the current state of U.S.-Russia economic relations.
katerina Zabrovskaya

Amidst ongoing sanctions, economic relations between Russia and the U.S. suffer significantly from the influence of the current political environment, hindering these relations from achieving their full potential. Therefore, it is important to learn how to avoid or reduce this influence and enjoy the advantages of mutually beneficial trade and economic cooperation.

On the sidelines of the panel discussion "Future of Russian Hi-Tech/Science Cities and Innovation" in New York, Russia Direct interviewed the Russian Trade Representative in the U.S., Aleksander Stadnik, about the current state of U.S.-Russia trade and economic relations and the role of bilateral business organizations in boosting economic relations between the two nations.

Russia Direct: How would you characterize the current state of U.S.-Russia trade relations?

Aleksander Stadnik: Well, let me start in a traditional way, with statistics: In 2014, U.S.-Russia trade volume increased by over 5.6 percent. However, the first five months of 2015 demonstrated a serious decline of about 20.9 percent (this statistic is based on the Russian methodology, which is different in its approach to trade calculations). Apparently this is a negative trend. If we are talking about absolute numbers, the trade volume of 2014 was more than $29 billion. When we are looking at this number from the fill potential of the U.S.-Russia trade and economic relations, it is definitely not a big volume. But if we are talking about the importance of U.S-Russia trade relations, then we should understand that economic relations between the U.S. and Russia go far beyond the customs territories of our countries.

Today, unfortunately, these relations are overloaded not only with the trade policy itself but also with geopolitics and politics. On one hand, current issues in the U.S.-Russia relationship negatively affect many other states - primarily European; on the other hand, they give an opposite, positive effect, primarily on Asia, Latin America, our immediate neighbors and partners of the Eurasian Economic Union.

Hence, I think that, even with relatively small values of U.S.-Russia trade relations, they are very significant. That is why the sooner our relations come back to civilized interaction, the better it would be for everyone. Moreover, Russian and American businesses continue to cooperate and the absence of the normal political dialogue only hinders the development of new business projects and partnerships.

RD: Do you think that sanctions are the main reason for the decline in trade volumes between Russia and the U.S.?

A.S.: Naturally sanctions play a certain role. They negatively influence trade and finance flows between our countries. In the U.S. agriculture suffers the most but not as much as in Europe. Russian energy companies certainly felt the impact: Many joint projects had to be stopped like the one between Exxon and Rosneft. But Exxon in this case also experienced quite notable losses because it had to give up certain projects in Russia.

RD: How did the structure of the trade turnover between Russia and the U.S. change recently?

A.S.: We are witnessing a decline preeminently in the supplies of our fuels. In some areas, the situation is the opposite, i.e. the supply of Russian aluminum and chemical industry products. So if we talk about the drop in oil supplies from Russia, it is caused by the increase of the oil output inside the U.S.

Most likely, we will observe a certain continuing decline in the U.S-Russia trade relations by the end of this year. We can only speculate on how big this decline is going to be.

However, I can already see certain issues and they are connected not even with sanctions but with particular decisions made at the end of 2014. For example, last year on December 19 by the request of the U.S. steel industry, tax barriers for Russian steel producing companies were introduced. And I cannot exclude the possibility of further actions in this direction.

RD: How has the amount of U.S. investment in the Russian economy changed?

A.S.: According to the data of the U.S. Department of Commerce, the outflow of American direct investment from Russia in 2014 was $287 million. U.S. direct investments into Russia in 2014 are estimated at a little over $700 million. In comparison, Russian direct investments in the U.S. grew by about $1.7 billion in 2014.

Another numbers provided in the report on the global investment climate released by the U.S. Department of State say that in 2014, the capital outflow from Russia reached a record $150 billion by their estimates. I am not ready to evaluate the reliability of this figure but if we will base on it at the American $287 million as a share of $150 billion, then we can see that the U.S. share in the total capital outflow from Russia is insignificant.

RD: What changes, if they exist, can you see in American businesses' attitude towards Russia?

A.S.: I would say that undergoing changes are mutual. First of all, businesses in both Russia and the U.S. aspire to work with each other. They understand that business contacts and collaboration are possible and fruitful. In the estimation of a lot of American businessmen, Russia is not a simple market but it is very hard to find another such market where work would be so profitable.

But both American and Russian businesses work in an environment of political and economic uncertainty. Russian business is apparently free of any political trends, but it has to watch closely what is happening with business here in the U.S., to see how political decisions affect business. Russian companies naturally estimate their investments and risks, i.e. connected with projects in high-tech sphere and innovations, and in the first place they think about the prospect of implementation of those projects. They want to know whether economic processes might be affected by a political decision, which has no economic rational, that will hinder pushing the matter through.

That is why Russian businesses unfortunately have to view American companies as unreliable partners. But this is not because American companies are not reliable, they are very responsible, it is because they can be pressured by the political environment.

Last year, Russia made a serious success in increasing its position in the World Bank's "Doing Business" ranking. Today we hold 62nd place, but moving up in the rating is not an end in itself. The goal is to make conditions for doing business in Russia better; not only for domestic companies but also for foreign businesses. The business climate in Russia is getting better for everyone. And I would like to stress that despite [the fact that] Russia is in 62nd place in the "Doing Business" ranking, in reality, our place is much higher.

RD: What role do bilateral business organizations, like the U.S.-Russia Business Council, play in improving relations between Russia and the U.S. and what influence do they have on our countries' governments?

A.S.: We have a lot of different organizations and associations that contribute to the formation of the positive bilateral agenda. From our side, there is the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Delovaya Rossiya ("Business Russia") etc. From the American side, I would like to emphasize the importance of the U.S.-Russia Business Council (USRBC), Russia Direct, American-Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, etc. Almost every state in the U.S. has chambers of commerce and industries that are interested in developing U.S.-Russia cooperation.

I want to recall the recent International Economic Forum in St. Petersburg where USRBC signed a cooperation agreement with Delovaya Rossiya and with the American-Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry. I believe that such consistent steps help businesses to improve relations with partners. One of the main Russian foreign economic goals is to create better conditions for business, and in order to fulfill this, we need to listen to businesses' demands. And we should not forget the importance of the influence of all these business structures on governments.

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#21
Business New Europe
www.bne.eu
July 27, 2015
Power to the people
As Electric Yerevan showed, governments throughout Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia will face the risk of social and political unrest when they move to compel their citizens to pay market rates for electricity.
Ben Aris in Moscow and Nick Allen in Berlin

The Electric Yerevan protests in Armenia burned brightly before police finally quashed them in early July. But the issue of electricity tariffs that sparked the protests will not go away: nearly half the countries in Emerging Europe also face a similarly grave dilemma over whether to give more respect to market costs or living costs. Armenia's street clashes with police will certainly not be the last in the region.

The cost of lighting and heating homes is a fundamental issue because few countries in the region have managed to bring the costs up to the market prices that prevail in the rest of Europe. At best the price of a kilowatt hour (kWh) is half that of the European Union, with the difference met by some kind of costly state subsidy.

In Armenia's case, because of a series of elections over the last two years, the government kept putting off raising tariffs in line with rising fuel costs. In Ukraine the situation was even worse, as a succession of governments, desperate to avoid the political pain of charging an already poor population more for something that was free in Soviet times, failed to increase tariffs significantly over two decades.

The enormous gap between what the Ukrainian government had to pay Russia for gas to run the power stations and what it charged households and companies that consumed the power is one of the root causes of Ukraine's  current budgetary problems. No wonder that one of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) prerequisites for its rescue plan was a tripling of prices of household power tariffs.

A bne IntelliNews survey has found that about a dozen countries are in a similar bind and in four of them the situation is as bad, if not worse, than in Ukraine. Prices will need to be hiked across the region.

Bringing prices closer to market levels, however, risks political unrest. In Yerevan, talk quickly turned to whether the electricity protests would become an "Armenian Maidan" and trigger the overthrow of the government, just as in Ukraine's 2014 revolution. But the protesters quickly disavowed the parallel, stressing that their protest was just about halting the planned hike in power tariffs by 16.7%.

Yet even the pragmatic demonstrations in Yerevan have radicalised the population, underscoring how decisive an issue electricity bills can be. In the first clashes in June, police trucks carted away 237 demonstrators. But when even more took to the streets in response, the government backed off, afraid of sparking worse unrest. "The more you water us, the more we grow," the crowd in the former Soviet republic's capital chanted as its numbers doubled after the water cannons were sent in.

Nevertheless, from Armenia to Albania, Kosovo to Ukraine and Moldova, governments are having to raise energy prices to realistic levels because of budgetary pressures as economies continue to struggle following the 2008 crisis. "There is no other way except bringing tariffs to the market level," Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseny Yatsenyuk said in June, under the additional pressure of Russia's Gazprom axing the discounted natural gas rates Ukraine enjoyed for the past two decades. "Ukraine has to become a completely energy independent country within 10 years," Yatsenyuk added.

Cushioning the blow

An important factor in calculating both the risk of economic distress and the likelihood of protests is just how much power costs in proportion to the average income in a country.

With a per capita GDP income of only €7,420 a year in purchasing power parity terms (according to World Bank 2014 figures), Armenia is one of the poorest countries in the former Soviet Union and so its population is particularly sensitive to the size of its electricity bills. Its 3mn people are already struggling and simply cannot afford to pay more.

"We won't give up our demands, we will continue our fight," protest leader Arthur Harutyunyan told the crowds on July 6 before the police finally moved in and pulled the plug on Electric Yerevan.

Aware that he had already pushed his luck too far, Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan caved after a week and announced that the rate increase, originally due to enter into force on August 1, would be postponed while an audit commission examined the need for the hike. "I am certain that voiding the electricity rate hike would be extremely dangerous. Thus, prior to reaching a conclusion [by an audit commission], the government will assume the full burden of the rate increase," Sargsyan said, buying himself some more time.

The government also says it will cushion the blow with more subsidies. That placated the people for the meantime, but it doesn't solve Armenia's energy crisis; the government still cannot afford the power it needs to run the country.

Long reach of Russia

Every government in the CIS is subsidising power tariffs to keep the pressure off the population while they work on creating a capitalist market-oriented society. The problem is that energy subsidies are enormously expensive and none of the governments can really afford them.  

In Armenia the rate hike had been requested by the Electric Networks of Armenia CJSC (ENA), a subsidiary of the Russian power company Inter RAO. ENA was no longer making a profit and asked for an AMD7 (€0.013) increase in the price of a kilowatt hour.

The lack of rainfall and problems with the Metsamor nuclear power station (which produces around 40% of the country's energy needs) meant that ENA had to buy more thermal power and ended up losing AMD27bn (€51.7mn) in 2012-2014. A series of local elections in these years meant no-one in government was interested in increasing tariffs, even gradually. ENA losses mounted to hit AMD55.1bn by the end of 2014 and the group was close to collapse.

On June 27, President Sargsyan caved into economic necessity and announced drastic increases to power tariffs to make up some of the shortfall or risk blackouts in the winter.

This increase has now been frozen but - in a sign that Baghramyan Avenue may yet hum again this year - the president has said that if an audit confirmed the need for a rate hike, consumers would still have to pay it.

Kicking the can down the road

Power tariffs across the CIS are inexorably moving towards parity with typical European levels. For comparison, the average price for the 28 members of the European Union is almost 21 euro cents per kWh and for the richer core 17 members it is 22 cents.

Electricity for the consumer in Armenia, at 8 cents per kWh, is cheap but it is not the cheapest in the former Soviet bloc. Indeed, power across the entire CIS costs about half of what it does in the EU.

Unsurprisingly, the cheapest power in the region is to be found in those countries that also produce the fuel to make it. The cheapest power on offer is in gas-rich Turkmenistan, where a kWh costs a mere 0.6 cents, as compared to Germany where power costs just under 30 cents, the most expensive power rate in Europe.

Most Central European countries that joined the EU in 2003 have already gone through the adjustment process and have power prices over 10 cents per kWh. However, those countries that remained in the CIS have power tariffs well below that, and six of them - Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Georgia and Kazakhstan - still have power costs below 5 cents per kWh. Given that all these countries will have to quadruple their power costs at some point to bring them into line with European prices, they are all highly vulnerable to civil unrest.

Taking 10 cents as the cutoff - half the EU levels and a little more than Armenia's at €0.084 - then the number of countries exposed to the danger of power-hike induced unrest rises to 19 countries: this is more than half the countries in Emerging Europe, and includes some EU members such as Estonia and Bulgaria.

Bulgaria has already been through Armenia's experience, when tempers boiled over in early 2013 as homes began receiving massively increased electricity bills. While officials said the rise should "only" have been 18-20%, social media were flooded with scans of electric bills that were two and even three times higher than the corresponding period of 2012.

Spontaneous protests took place across the country. In Sofia around 500 angry demonstrators gathered at the offices of Economy and Energy Minister Delyan Dobrev, who came out to try to explain why the bills had shot up. It didn't sit well with the mob, and drew chants of "mafia" and "resignation", and a barrage of snowballs.

In Russia - currently the least likely scene of civil unrest because of the popularity of President Vladimir Putin - people are nonetheless feeling the pain of utilities bills amid consumer price inflation now above 15%.   

Russia now has 22mn of its population of 143mn living below the poverty line, the deputy PM responsible for social policy, Olga Golodets, told media on July 13. Private debt for housing and utilities services soared above RUB1 trillion ($20bn) in May, with about 20% of citizens now late on their utilities payments. Around 20% of these debts were for electricity, and 25% for gas. However, unlike Armenia, with a per capita income of $12,926, the population is still well able to absorb the increased costs, which still only represent a tiny fraction of household outgoings.

For now, the hardships are widely seen as the fault of the West and economic sanctions, rather than the fault of the national leadership. But as ever more people fall below the poverty line and providers keep pushing up electricity costs, that patriotic patience could also eventually wear thin.

Between a war and a hard price

Meanwhile, Ukraine is still right down the bottom of the utilities price list, with power tariffs of a mere 3.7 cents per kWh, slightly below Uzbekistan's 4 cents per kWh. The cost of power is indicative of the size of the reforms a country faces, and Ukraine has a mountain to climb if it is to bring its economy in line with the rest of Europe.

A core demand of the IMF's $17.5bn bail-out package for Ukraine is that the government increase domestic consumer power tariffs at least enough to cover the cost of Russian gas imports used to generate the power.

About half of Ukraine's electricity is generated by nuclear power plants, with most of the rest being produced by thermal power plants that burn coal and gas. In September 2014, Ukraine began to import coal to fuel its thermal power plants after domestic production slumped because of fighting in the eastern Donbas region, where most of the country's coal mines are located. Gas shortages, amid tensions with main supplier Russia, and the closure of 80% of the country's mines have resulted in widespread energy shortages.

Following a 13.7% rise in electricity rates in 2014, tariffs in Ukraine  increased again from April 1 by 19% for people who consume less than 100 kWh per month and by 50% for those who consume 100-600 kWh. (A family of four in Ukraine on average consumes around 250 kWh).

The government in Kyiv will have closely watched events unfold in Armenia and drawn its conclusions about how to avoid similar scenes.

Ukraine's tariff hikes are being implemented with a number of variables, depending on consumption levels and other factors. UAH24.5bn ($1.1bn in a country with only about $9bn in hard currency) in funding was allocated for subsidies for some 15mn citizens who can least afford the bigger bills.

The government is also looking to win favour by cutting the bureaucracy needed to receive state assistance. "We have reduced the amount of documents needed, we have almost completely eliminated the red tape and simplified the process," Prime Minister Arseny Yatsenyuk noted. "A person receives an application, fills in answers to 15 questions, sends it to the social service, avoids standing in line."

Stressing the need to reduce wasteful energy consumption, Yatsenyuk cites the example of Poland, which has a GDP four times higher than Ukraine's but consumes one fifth of the energy.

In late November, the Ukrenergo state power company also called for a modest reduction in power consumption because of the coal shortage. The company said that if all households switched off one 60-watt bulb, it would reduce electric power consumption by more than 1,000 MW, accounting for around 4% of the total load in Ukraine during evening hours.

More regional rumblings  

Governments everywhere are trying to find that elusive balance between imposing tariff hikes that are large enough to cover rising costs, but not big enough to provoke protests. Kosovo, Moldova and Albania, along with Armenia, are the four countries in the region most at risk of unrest as they have both the lowest cost of power and the lowest per capita incomes.

In Kosovo last September, more than 30,000 people signed a petition opposing a 5.18% rise in consumer energy prices approved in August. The hike has since gone into effect, with civic society groups warning of street protests if the government fails to reverse the increase. On May 8, Kosovan Minister of Finance Avdullah Hoti managed to keep the lid on tensions by announcing that parliament would shortly receive a bill reducing VAT on electricity to 8%. Prime Minister Isa Mustafa also said there would be no new increase in energy prices this year.

In Moldova, another high-risk country, which imports around 80% of its electricity from abroad, electricity suppliers in March asked market regulator ANRE to hike end-user prices by 50-60%. However, ANRE deferred a decision and hinted that a foreign firm should be hired to evaluate the grounds for such a move.

Energy suppliers in Moldova have not incurred losses in recent years and pressure for upward price adjustments is not yet strong, while the current political turmoil in the country is likely to further delay any radical decisions. Here too, the poverty factor is crucial.

In May 2012, Moldova's energy market regulator set the end-user residential electricity price at MDL162 per MWh, plus 20% VAT - yet the local currency has weakened by 26% against the euro since then, making this equivalent to just 7.8 euro cents. With poverty levels high, any price hike will have a significant impact on the bulk of the population.

In Albania, meanwhile, the World Bank has lent the government $150mn for power sector reforms. In December, the power regulator ERE raised the price of electricity for businesses and scrapped its lower rate for households in an attempt to reduce mounting debt. The reform process seems to be meeting some success: on July 13, the power provider OSHEE said it had received ALL34bn (€246mn) in payments for electricity in the first six months of 2015, up by 50% from a year earlier, after an effective anti-theft campaign.

Illuminating Armenian legacy

One notable legacy of Electric Yerevan is how the tiny republic of Armenia jumped into the world headlines, if only briefly, with an unexpected eruption of grassroots activism. And the stand-off with the government showed that heavy-handed tactics only brought more people onto the streets in defiance.

"The Armenian government thinks they solved the protestor problem with water cannons. Wrong. They baptised [a] new generation of activists," Babken DerGrigorian, a researcher at the London School of Economics and the movement's social media front man, posted on Facebook in the wake of the state's initial brutal response.

Karena Avedissian, a Yerevan-based researcher whose PhD focused on social movements in the North Caucasus, argues that the utilities-driven events on Baghramyan Avenue marked "the beginning of the end" for the old politics of Armenia.

Others also say that even if it was only about electricity prices to start with, the ramifications of the protests go much further. "Yes, it is a game changer," one of the Electric Yerevan leaders Vaghinak Shushanyan told bne IntelliNews. "It has shown that top-down decisions without an open public debate are no longer possible."

"We are not satisfied with the government's decision [to delay implementation of the price hike and grant subsidies], but it is a half step back - the authorities have understood they are there to serve the people, not the other way around," the 24-year-old Shushanyan said.

Such examples will keep the utilities issue firmly in the spotlight for anxious presidents and prime ministers across the Eurasian land mass for years to come until something like pricing parity has been achieved.

But in countries sapped by years of mismanagement and corruption scandals, severe price hikes because of "market necessities" can only look like a further case of plundering the pockets of ordinary folk.

One of 20 tents pitched recently at the parliament in Kyiv by protesters bore a sign "Interim investigation commission against the corrupt government". The Armenian protesters were far more direct, brandishing signs saying: "Stop robbing people!"   
 

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 #22
Business New Europe
www.bne.eu
July 27, 2015
Electric Yerevan and the end of apathy
Electric Yerevan may not have been an Armenian Maidan but activists hope and analysts believe it marks the end of the country's era of apathy.
Monica Ellena in Yerevan

The intricate mandala that Lidia painted no longer adorns the boiling tarmac in Marshal Baghramyan Avenue. The whirling white-chalked pattern got washed away as the Armenian police dismantled a nearby makeshift barricade of rubbish bins and pushed away a few hard-core demonstrators, who were camping a few yards away from the presidential residence and the National Assembly.

"It'll bring a positive karma," the 27-year-old psychologist who uses mandalas to treat depression told bne IntelliNews on June 29, at the height of the demonstration against a 16.7% hike in electricity tariffs, which drew tens of thousands to the capital's key thoroughfare. "It is important to be here, together and in peace."

Lidia is no activist. Reserved and softly-spoken, she did not camp overnight on the pavement, deliver passionate speeches standing on the line of rubbish bins, or join the passionate chants for Hayastan!, the country's name in Armenian. Still, she is one of thousands of Armenians - women, old people, and children - who for the first time took to the streets to show that people have voices and the time had come for authorities to hear them.

Apathy is over

For two weeks the electric mood of thousands of protestors galvanised Yerevan. Police attempts to forcibly disperse the crowd with water cannons and arrests only resulted in bringing more people on to the street - up to an estimated 20,000 at its peak.

"I never had 20,000 guests at my birthday party," 24-year-old activist Vaghinak Shushanyan told a cheering crowd on Baghramyan on June 25, before cutting a cake with the symbol of an electric volt.

It didn't last. As the numbers started to dwindle, the activists continued to demonstrate. But after two weeks, the police dismantled the protests - but less forcibly than before.

Even so, analysts and organisers alike maintain the struggle was not in vain.

"The era of apathy is over," said Richard Gyragosian, founding director of the Yerevan-based think-tank Regional Studies Centre. The street protests marked the emergence of "a newly empowered agent of change, namely an educated youth, with less fear and more commitment for change", he stresses.

Whether out of youthful lack of fear or a new awareness of citizens' rights, the IT-savvy, 20-something activists behind the civic movement No To Plunder masterminded the street protests against the electricity hike - the fifth since the Russian-owned Electric Network of Armenia (ENA) became the sole owner of the power grid in 2006. They said the increase would hit households hard in a country where one third of the 3.2mn population live in official poverty.

And the older generation joined in approvingly.

"They are brave, but this is what we need if we want change, brave young Armenians to stand up for what they believe in," Andrenik Grigoryan remarked on June 30 while watching the young crowd lounging in the shade to escape Yerevan's sweltering heat. His remarkable white moustache and a paling tattoo on his forearm betray the 84-year-old's young spirit. "Yes, brave," he added, gesturing animatedly while fellow senior citizens nearby nodded in agreement.

"Electric Yerevan has irreversibly changed Armenian society," remarked Babken DerGrigorian, a 29-year-old activist and researcher at the London School of Economics. "[Social movements] are seen more and more as a legitimate approach to addressing the problems of our country."

One of the protest's social media front-man, DerGrigorian is skeptical about the importance given to Twitter and Facebook. But the hashtag he coined, #ElectricYerevan, trended across all social media and helped to attract international media attention.

"As long as the government keeps trying to implement policies that are so much at odds with public opinion, I think you'll see similar mobilisations in the near future," he said.

Even though it spread to other cities, Electric Yerevan failed to gather the critical mass needed to turn it into an "Armenian Spring". Some observers fear that the excitement will ultimately turn to disappointment as things return to business as usual.

Certainly, some caution is warranted. "The protest showed there is an enormous energy that could explode, but Armenia's problems are deeply rooted. Enthusiasm and grassroots activism, though valuable, cannot affect the establishment," says Hayk Balanyan, an economist at the State Agrarian University's Agribusiness Teaching Centre.

Electric mood

Past protests set the "ground work" for Electric Yerevan, maintains DerGrigorian, who researches social movements in Armenia. On March 1 2008, thousands of protesters gathered to denounce what they called the fake results of the presidential elections. The riot police's heavy-handed response left 10 people dead and dozens injured.

Ever since, Armenian activists have had more success when focussing on single issues, which are practical and apolitical. In 2013 an anticipated two-fold raise of public transport fares mobilised thousands of mostly young people. Their activism helped to persuade the government to keep ticket prices at AMD100 (€0.18).

"We need to build on this," said Sos Avetisyan, a 56-year-old former journalist detained with 236 others in the first round of arrests on June 23. "People want smooth changes, the wounds of violent clashes from the past are still painful."

Electric Yerevan's leaders also upheld its apolitical, unpartisan nature. "Apolitical doesn't mean the issues lack political substance, it means it doesn't [aim at] trying to take over the government," argued DerGrigorian. "It's more fundamental than that. It's saying that regardless of who is in power, state institutions need to be held accountable to the people."

Frustration over the controversial electricity tariffs brought people together spontaneously. That became both a strength and a weakness, as the lack of leadership left demonstrators confused and hindered the development of a concrete action plan.

Civilnet.am's journalist Maria Titizian, an Armenian-Canadian who moved to Yerevan in 2001, agreed, hoping though that "these kinds of movements understand that leadership is not necessarily an evil, especially when there is transparency and accountability. While consensus decision-making sounds great on paper, at critical junctures, the imperative of leadership becomes even more apparent."

No Maidan-ers, yet

With the Russian company ENA holding a monopoly on Armenia's power grid, some commentators labelled the street protests an Armenian Maidan, after the protests in Ukraine that ousted the corrupt regime of former president Viktor Yanukovych. But this was rejected by most demonstrators, who claimed the protest was not anti-Russian, but rather pro-Armenia. Still, "Free Armenia" chants were heard loud and clear in Moscow.

"The movement isn't anti-Russian, but without doubt there exists an anti-Russian element," admitted DerGrigorian. "And Russia knows it too."

Armenia has been hit hard by Russia's economic downturn as the two countries' economies are deeply intertwined and public grievances with the former imperial master have long been building. In January, Yerevan joined the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), further increasing its economic dependence.

Over the last 15 years, the Armenian government has systematically relinquished control of state assets to Russia, mostly as a means of debt repayment, according to a recent study. Russian companies operate Armenia's key energy supplier and most of the banking, telecoms and transport sectors are in Russian hands. For Stefan Grigoryan, chairman of the Analytical Centre on Globalisation and Regional Cooperation (ACGRC), the decision to deal with one single player is "unwise in any circumstance".

But the demonstrations did achieve some things. The Armenian government did not reverse the hike but addressed concerns about the way the company is being run - hitting ENA with a AMD75mn ($158,412) fine and an international audit into its books.

The Russian government also moved to smooth things over with Yerevan, providing it with a $200mn low interest loan to purchase Russian-manufactured weapons, and agreeing that a Russian soldier, Valery Permyakov, charged with murdering a family of six in the country's second city, Gyumri, in January will be tried in Armenia.

As Lidia's mandala survives only in photos, its good karma may have worked after all.

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 #23
www.rt.com
July 25, 2015
Regime change in Russia? Think again, neocons
By Neil Clark
Neil Clark is a journalist, writer, broadcaster and blogger. He has written for many newspapers and magazines in the UK and other countries including The Guardian, Morning Star, Daily and Sunday Express, Mail on Sunday, Daily Mail, Daily Telegraph, New Statesman, The Spectator, The Week, and The American Conservative. He is a regular pundit on RT and has also appeared on BBC TV and radio, Sky News, Press TV and the Voice of Russia.

As events in Syria have proved, Russia is the biggest block on the endless war lobby's plans for world domination, which is why the removal of Putin and his replacement with a marionette who will do exactly what the neocons want is their overriding objective.
Trends

However, the chances of them achieving their ambitious goal are as slender as was the prospect of Saddam Hussein's WMDs turning up in Iraq. The new neocon instigated 'Cold War' on Russia, which was supposed to weaken the Russian economy and lead to Maidan-style anti-government protests in the country, has actually boosted President Vladimir Putin's popularity, as new polls show.

The approval ratings of the man who Western neocons have demonized for the last twelve years is at record levels - with almost 90 percent of Russians saying they had a positive view of the president.

Support for President Putin's foreign policies is also strong - with 70 percent supporting him on Ukraine.

As British antiwar politician George Galloway tweeted:
Popularity of Putin reaches record highs with almost 90% of the people approving his handling of events. Another NATO success story!

It's not only Putin's popularity that is the stumbling block to neocon plans for 'regime change'. The main opposition to Putin and his United Russia party, are not pro-NATO, pro-Israel 'liberals', but the Communist Party, which is the second most popular party in the country.

Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov polled over 17 percent in the last presidential election, while the Communists won 92 seats in the 450 State Duma elections in December 2011.

The Communists have urged Putin to be even more assertive against those they regard as Russia's enemies. In May 2013, they called for Russia to convene a meeting of the UN Security Council after Israel had illegally bombed Syria.

"Syria is not the first, and obviously not the last victim of the global expansion of the US and its NATO allies. Events of the past twenty years show that Russia is also in the crosshairs. Therefore, our country borders' protection passes through the Syrian cities, which have now become the scene of fierce fighting. The Russian side should not turn a blind eye to the subversion of America and its satellites directed against our allies," the Communist Party Central Committee statement declared.

The serial regime changers in the West are faced with a situation that the most credible opposition to the person they want to see toppled would actually follow policies that they would hate even more.

So what do they do? With breathtaking disdain for the views of the Russian people, they completely ignore the fact that the Communists are the second largest party in Russia - and instead portray so-called 'liberals' - who have minimal levels of popular support (currently around 1 percent), as the 'democratic opposition'.

The neocon line is: 'in the name of democracy, the parties whose views are the most unpopular with the electorate, should be running Russia.' Their interpretation of the word 'democracy' is beyond Orwellian.

"Although 'regime change' has become a dirty phrase, the best thing that could happen to Russia, its neighbors and the world would be a change from Vladimir Putin's brand of strongman authoritarianism to some form of democracy," opined Alexander Motyl in Newsweek in January. The article first appeared on the Atlantic Council's blog.

So, in other words, the man with sky-high approval ratings needs to be toppled, so someone much less popular can rule Russia. And all in the name of spreading "democracy"!

In any case, the neocon plans for promoting their form of undemocratic democracy in Russia face another big stumbling block, namely Russia's foreign agents law. This legislation requires all NGOs which receive funding from abroad and that engage in political activities to register as 'foreign agents'. Russian political parties are also forbidden to receive sponsorship or enter into any business deals with NGOs that have 'foreign agent' status.

This makes the possibility of a foreign-funded 'color coded revolution' in Russia much harder to pull off. Neocons, needless to say, don't like the law:

Anne Applebaum
Putin's "foreign agent" law is now destroying some of the best civic organizations in Russia
 
The neocon plans for regime change in Russia predate the current Ukraine crisis and the conflict in Syria. They be traced back to 2003 when it became clear that Vladimir Putin would stand up for Russia's legitimate interests, in contrast to the more compliant Boris Yeltsin. The first post-Perestroika president stood by, vodka bottle in hand, and brown envelopes in pocket, as NATO illegally bombed Yugoslavia and Western-supported oligarchs plundered the country, impoverishing millions of ordinary Russians in the process.

As I argued in a previous Op-Edge, the turning point was the action taken against corrupt oligarchs who had strong links to the West.

Rebuilding the economy and improving living standards for ordinary Russians inevitably meant action being taken against certain oligarchs, who had made vast fortunes in the Yeltsin years. These oligarchs, such as Boris Berezovksy and Mikhail Khodorkovsky had powerful supporters in the West. As I detailed in an article for the New Statesman in November 2003, influential neocons in Washington, who had links to Russian oligarchs, used the arrest of Khodorkovsky for fraud and tax evasion to push for a hardening of US policy towards Moscow.

The arrest of Khodorkovsky led to neocon calls for sanctions on Russia - calls which were to be repeated over the following years. This anti-Putin crusade was ratcheted up to a new level when Russia had the temerity to block 'regime change' plans for Syria.

In his article 'How war on Syria lost its way', former CIA officer Ray McGovern told of how he was in the same CNN studio as two uberhawks Paul Wolfowitz and Joe Lieberman, after the US's plans to bomb Syria in 2013 had been dropped.

McGovern described the atmosphere as "distinctly funereal."

"I felt I had come to a wake with somberly dressed folks (no pastel ties this time) grieving for a recently, dearly-departed war."

After Damascus avoided airstrikes, a wave of full-on attacks on Russia appeared in the elite media. British 'left' neocon Nick Cohen, who in 2012 had written a piece on Syria entitled 'Russia is playing Western democrats for dupes' complained that Putin had made Barack Obama "look like a conman's stooge."

His thoughts echoed those of Michael Weiss, who, writing for the ultra-neocon Henry Jackson Society in 2012, berated the Obama administration for "still trying to woo the Kremlin" after Russia had vetoed two attempts to pass a UN Security Resolution "condemning the Assad regime."

Ukraine was where the neocons sought to get their revenge for being thwarted on Syria. As I argued in an earlier op-edge piece: "The US sponsored regime change in Kiev, an enterprise in which the State Department's Victoria Nuland, the wife of the Project for a New American Century co-founder Robert Kagan, played a prominent role, finally enabled the hawks to get what they been dreaming of for over 10 years - the sanctioning of Russia. The 'get tough with Russia' stance they've long been calling for has finally become the official policy of the US and leading EU countries. The demonization of President Putin in the West has become 'mainstream'."

Neocons were banking on sanctions leading to mass protests against Putin's rule. But as we see from the polls the opposite has occurred and Putin is more popular than ever. The bullying of Russia has only made the Russian people more determined than ever not to do what the Western hawks want.

The question is now - what will the neocons do next? There have been calls for even tougher sanctions on Russia - sanctions that would ban Russia from the SWIFT banking system.

Ben Judah @b_judah
Ex-MI6 Boss: "At the moment we seem to be powerless to shift Russia away from a de facto situation, which they have largely created."

shay culligan @shaymultimedia
@b_judah Deploy SWIFT ban on Russian banks. Send Putin's Russia back to the Middle Ages. They'll be threatening the West with bows & arrows.

In February, an editorial entitled "No More Appeasement" in the Rupert Murdoch owned Times, Britain's most hardline neocon newspaper, declared its support for "tougher sanctions than those already in force." Meanwhile, Victoria Nuland warned a few days ago that "the costs will go up" for Russia if violence increases in Donetsk and Lugansk, although of course she did not mean violence initiated by Kiev, or violence between the Kiev authorities and the Right Sector.

However, the problem for Ms Nuland and the London Times is that European countries are itching for sanctions on Russia to be eased, not intensified, as their economies are hurting due to counter-measures taken by the Kremlin. How much longer will leading Western Europeans companies allow their profits to be hit because a bunch of political extremists have an obsession with toppling Putin? And how much longer will European governments sign up to a sanctions policy clearly not in their countries' interest?

Some believe that fanatical neocons would even go as far as provoke war with Russia to get their way.

"The most determined push for war in 2015 will come from neocons and interventionists who want a US-Putin confrontation and regime change in Russia," warned America paleoconservative commentator, Patrick J. Buchanan earlier this year.

Certainly, during the worst of the fighting in Ukraine, it has seemed that escalation is what some in the West desired. "Putin must be stopped. And sometimes only guns can stop guns" was the title of a bellicose piece by Timothy Garton-Ash. who praised the serial warmongering US Senator John McCain for spurring on US Congress to pass the Ukraine Freedom Support Act, which allocated funds for the supply of military equipment to Ukraine.

It's worth noting though that neocons like to attack countries that are weak and not ones that are strong. Iraq got 'Shock and Awe' not because it possessed WMDs, but because it didn't. Libya was vulnerable because its defenses were weak and Muammar Gaddafi had surrendered his WMDs. Russia, by contrast has a large nuclear arsenal, up-to-date conventional weaponry, and 771,000 active military personnel.

A neocon-instigated military attack on Russia is unlikely, but we can't rule it out completely, given the fanaticism of the people we are dealing with. In December, Robert Parry wrote of the insanity of the neocon-driven regime change scheme to take down President Putin.

"What we're seeing here is the usual step-by-step progress towards a neocon regime change scenario, as the targeted foreign 'demon' fails to take 'reasonable steps' dictated by Washington and thus must be confronted, with endless escalations, all the more severe to force the demon to submit or until ultimately the sufferings of his people creates openings for 'regime change'".

Perry warned that "the future of the planet" was at stake if Western efforts to 'regime change' in Russia continue.

Veteran award winning journalist John Pilger has warned of a 'new holocaust' if the serial warmongers aren't stopped. "Their man in Moscow used to be Boris Yeltsin, a drunk who handed his country's economy to the West. His successor, Vladimir Putin, has re-established Russia as a sovereign nation, that is his crime."

A few days ago the New York Times published an op-edge by Yelstin's former Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, entitled 'Russia's coming regime change'. Kozyrev said that regime change was "inevitable, maybe imminent." But polls showing the country's leader with 90 percent approval ratings don't really back that assessment up.

Despite all their obsessive efforts, pulling off a regime change in Russia does look too big a project even for the neocons. The Russian people don't wish to the return to the 1990s, and they quite clearly don't want a neocon-approved puppet to lead them. And Russia is ready and able to defend itself if the nightmare scenario of war does come to pass - just take a look at the pictures of the Victory Day military parade if you have any doubts.

As to how we can end the 'new Cold War', it's not up to Russia to change its stance, as it has done nothing wrong, but the neocons in the West... What part of 'Nyet' don't these people understand?

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 #24
Washington Post
July 26, 2015
Helping Russia's sidelined and exiled journalists tell their stories
By Anne Applebaum
Anne Applebaum writes a biweekly foreign affairs column for The Washington Post. She is also the Director of the Global Transitions Program at the Legatum Institute in London

When I first met Yevgenia Albats, it was the 1990s, the Soviet Union had just ceased to exist and she was a rising star in the new Russian journalism - one of many. The explosion of creativity in Russian media in that era is one of the post-Soviet miracles that no one has ever quite explained. The gray and mendacious Soviet press suddenly collapsed beneath the weight of its own tedium. Into the vacuum stepped witty writers, serious columnists and dedicated journalists such as Albats, one of the first real investigative reporters in Russia. Where did they all come from?

Equally important, however, is the question of where they all went. Despite the auspicious beginnings, almost all of the Russian media have since come under direct or indirect control of the Kremlin. Most of the witty writers either learned to conform or left the country. Some stayed but were forcibly silenced. Anna Politkovskaya, one of Albats's journalism school classmates, was murdered in the stairwell of her Moscow apartment building.

Instead of wit and fine prose, much of the Russian media, but especially Russian state television, now pump out xenophobic, homophobic, anti-Ukrainian aggression and rants against the Sodom and Gomorrah of the West. Until you've watched the Russian evening news, heard the ominous music and seen the blood and violence, it's hard to believe. But there are still a few islands of sanity left, and Albats runs one of them. The New Times, a magazine she owns and edits, faithfully investigates the news, eschews hate speech and reports on reality for those still willing to read about it.

From her own countrymen, Albats has received e-mailed death threats and anti-Semitic slander. Last February, she was attacked on the main evening news, which broadcast her photograph along with the phrase, in Hebrew, "What kind of Jew are you?" But now she has a new problem. Hubert Burda Media, a German company that has become a near-monopolist in the Russian magazine distribution business, has, for the past several months, effectively prevented her magazine from appearing in many Moscow shops and kiosks. The New Times can hardly be found in Moscow; newsstand sales have fallen by half. When I asked about it, Burda told me that the decision to restrict the paper's distribution was purely commercial. But Albats said that a Burda representative in Moscow told her something different: The Munich-based company, which publishes some 60 titles in Russia, didn't want to risk too close an association with anyone critical of the Kremlin.

As it happens, the boss of Burda Moscow is an acknowledged former Stasi informer, and the company fired another employee who wrote positively about Ukraine on his private Facebook page. Still, I don't think that high politics is at the core of this story. It's an uphill battle for any foreign media company in Russia - in the face of new restrictions, CNN went off the air there at the end of last year. But Burda still thinks it can make a profit. So it does what it takes to stay.

Burda isn't the first Western company to make compromises with an authoritarian regime, and it won't be the last. But its actions are more significant now, as the U.S. and European governments finally wake up to the nature of the poison that Russia pumps into its airwaves. The mass campaign against Ukrainian "Nazis," the slander of opponents, the deliberate stoking of nationalist emotions in Russia, the "troll factories" that push out disinformation in multiple languages, all of that is designed to fuel war - and maybe not just in Ukraine.

To counter this onslaught, some now call for a new "European" television channel to project a different set of values into Russia. Others sketch out plans to build radio towers along the border. But this isn't the Cold War, and nothing of the sort is necessary. The West should instead think about creative ways to support the generation of talented Russian journalists who have been sidelined or exiled. We don't need to sponsor "counter-propaganda"; we need to help Russians like Albats tell their own stories in their own language.

There are multiple ways to do this. Maybe it's time to take Radio Liberty seriously again, move its headquarters away from the backwater of Prague, and put it in a place where Russians actually live, such as Riga or Kiev. Maybe we need to set up an institution that commissions documentaries and television programs for existing Russian-language stations in those cities, or a wire service that reports news rather than propaganda from Russia itself. And maybe we need to shame the Western companies that fund hate speech by advertising on Russian television - and embarrass those that limit the circulation of whatever free media still exists.

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 #25
Sputnik
July 27, 2015
Why Neocons Want Putin to Invade the Baltics

We examine why the claims that a confrontation between Russia and Northern European states is apparently inevitable are a road to increased tensions, and the ideologies behind them.

A new article in Politico.eu suggests the idea that a Russian invasion of Baltic states is somehow inevitable, and that military escalation in the region is therefore necessary.

The article is very transparent about a desire to militarize the region, a process already underway with increased US troop presence and even military equipment holdings in the states, which are at Russia's borders. The article also raises more questions about the author, Andrew Michta, and his intentions for the region than it does about Russian foreign policy.

In his conclusion, the author makes an assertion that "It is ultimately academic to try to second-guess [Russian President Vladimir] Putin's ultimate goals" and that "When it comes to Putin's Russia today, expect the unexpected - or rather more of the same." "The same" in this case is that Russia's 2008 peace enforcement action in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict and the 2014 Crimean reunification somehow predict the inevitability of a Russian invasion of the Baltic states.

The assertion is made based on the idea that Russia's military interests lie in a power projection toward Northern Europe. The modernization of Russia's military, made in response to decades-outdated equipment and internal issues such as hazing and discipline issues, are from this perspective a form of expansion.

Baltic Scenarios

The article presents an idea of "a hybrid scenario in which Putin stirred up a Russian-speaking ethic enclave to test NATO's cohesion and capability to respond." The idea of such a "scenario" by itself makes little sense, as even if the Russian military operation to prevent the escalation of armed violence around the time of the Crimean referendum is alluded to as "hybrid warfare," a military operation in a Baltic state would be practically impossible.

Unlike Crimea, which is a peninsula with only two access points by land, Baltic states are continental and it would be nearly impossible to secure a border. In addition, while Crimea had a political autonomy and a legal basis for the referendum provided for by decree from President Viktor Yanukovych, districts of the Baltic states have no such right. Lastly, the Russian military operation was made within the bounds of an agreement between Russia and Ukraine, and troop numbers stayed within a legal limit, while any sort of military operation in a Baltic state would constitute an invasion.

Even if all these facts are ignored, as they are in certain media narratives and the US military, Russia would need a reason to conduct such operations. Russia doesn't have such a reason because for all their loud politics and maltreatment of ethnic minorities, the Baltic states neither threaten minorities with violent oppression, nor do they pose a military threat to Russia, thanks to the NATO-Russia founding act limiting the expansion of NATO bases.
The push to militarize the Baltic states plays a dual purpose this way. On the one hand, it would create a military threat at Russia's borders, and on the other create a hostage Russian-speaking population torn between supporting their Baltic country's general line and being called a threat to national security for their political views.

Recurring Narratives

The idea of militarizing the Baltic states then begins to look like a wish for a self-fulfilling prophecy of sorts. If the Baltic states come to present a military threat and a humanitarian concern for Russia, tensions between the countries would rise. If policies creating such threats and concerns are implemented, tensions would likely rise just as claimed, but portrayed as a part of "Putin's ultimate goals" and not short-sighted policy by those states and the US.

The recent "Russian propaganda" narrative also plays into this. Creating government-funded Russian-language media targeted at Russian-speaking minorities in the Baltic states, as well as the (rather admirable) idea of creating an entire Russian-language university outside of Russia. Without going into the historical depths of Russian identity as it transitioned from one based on language to one centered on religion, and lastly, a secular nationality, the efforts begin to look like an attempt to create an alternative Russian society.

At this point, it becomes unclear why Russia has been increasingly called an "existential" threat to the United States and the Western world. An element could be in neoconservative ideology, which the author of the article appears to espouse.

The apparent preoccupation with Russia (and also the Middle East) for neoconservatives, which no looks more like a relic of the Cold War, appears to have arisen in the 1970s, when the 1973 oil crisis and tensions with the Soviet Union largely shaped American foreign policy.

Despite the massive changes to the world since then, the idea and others like it prominent for policy circles in Washington and receives support from private interests which stand to gain from such fields as oil extraction and military contracts. Even with recent events as the shale oil boom in the US, which reshaped the international oil and gas markets, and the US "pivot to Asia," the looming TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) deal, the preoccupation with Russia continues to drive a wedge between the two countries. In short, expect the unexpected - or rather more of the same.

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#26
Wall Street Journal
July 27, 2015
Living on the Edge of Putin's Menace
Lithuania dismantles the last Soviet statues, but it needs U.S. help against the Kremlin.
By ALLYSIA FINLEY
Ms. Finley is an editorial writer for the Journal.

Vilnius, Lithuania

Lithuanian workers last week began dismantling the last four Soviet statues standing in this Baltic state's capital-which since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 has been transformed from a depressed East European backwater into a beacon of democracy and free markets.

The glorified monuments to Soviet students, workers, farmers and soldiers on Vilnius's Green Bridge were erected in 1952 as homage to Communist Mother Russia. In calling for the statues' removal, Mayor Remigijus Simasius denounced the heroic depiction of the Soviet system as "big lies."

Lithuania long ago vigorously repudiated communism. Removing these few remaining Soviet relics now signals the nation's determination not to be cowed by an imperialist Russia that poses a threat to European democracies.

The apprehensions shared by many Lithuanians stem not just from Vladimir Putin's incursions in Georgia and Ukraine, but from the country's long history of Russian aggression and domination. In 1795, the Russian Empire seized most of Lithuania, which became independent again only in 1918. In 1940, the Soviets occupied Lithuania, followed by the Nazis and, in mid-1944, the Soviets again.

Hundreds of thousands of Lithuanians were deported to Siberia. The Communist puppet government repurposed many Catholic churches and turned the 17th century church of St. Casimir in Vilnius into a museum of atheism. Majestic palaces of the former aristocracy-many of whom were shot or sent to Siberia-decayed while cheap, cramped apartment buildings were built to accommodate multigenerational families. Imagine U.S. public housing without the amenities.

Freed from its Soviet shackles, newly democratic Lithuania developed rapidly. Grocery stores are stocked with a more diverse array of products than many in New York City. The summertime residence of former Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in the seaside town Palanga has been renovated into a resort. Last year Nike opened its first concept store in the Baltics in Vilnius, citing the country's growing sports market.

In 2004 Lithuania joined the European Union, consummating a decade of deepening economic ties. Since 2004 Lithuania's GDP and per capita national income have roughly doubled. Its 2.9% economic growth last year outpaced nearly every country in the EU. This year Lithuania adopted the euro, which is facilitating foreign trade and investment.

Pro-growth policies have helped nurture the economic renaissance. Lithuania's flat 15% corporate and income-tax rates are among the lowest in Europe. Tax revenues make up 27.2% of GDP-the lowest among EU countries-compared with 45% in France. Public and private school education is financed with government vouchers.

Lithuania also has been a full member of NATO since 2004, and thus both contributes to and benefits from NATO's protective shield. It remains a front-line state, though, and the threat of Russian barbarians at Europe's gates is all too real for Lithuania's three million people as they watch Mr. Putin's war of aggression against Ukraine, a country of nearly 45 million. While the ethnic Russian population of Lithuania is relatively small-about 6%, compared with 17% in Ukraine-several hundred thousand other Russians live just outside Lithuania's western border with Poland, in Russia's Baltic Sea enclave of Kaliningrad.

Along with its NATO membership, Lithuania has other advantages. Like Ukraine, Lithuania has been dependent on Russia for energy, yet that is changing. In 2013 Lithuania derived 90% of its energy from Russia-and paid more for natural gas than any other EU state. The opening of a liquefied natural gas terminal in Lithuania's Baltic-port city of Klaipeda last year promises to improve energy security.

What Lithuania needs now is for Washington to approve more LNG export terminals in the U.S. Lithuania's access to more American gas will make it harder for Russia's state-controlled energy giant Gazprom to bring economic pressure to bear as it did in Ukraine. Meantime, an electric-transmission system connecting the power grids in the Baltic countries with Poland and the rest of Europe is nearing completion.

Lithuania is also bulking up on defense. Earlier this year the government reinstated compulsory military service for young men due to concerns about what President Dalia Grybauskaité described as "the current geopolitical environment." This month President Grybauskaité announced further plans, with neighboring Latvia, for the "development of joint military capacities," including the purchase of an air-defense system. She said the two countries also plan to invite Baltic NATO members Estonia and Poland to join them.

The past 24 years represent the longest period of Lithuanian independence since the 18th century. As the American revolutionary Thomas Paine wrote, "tyranny, like hell, is not easily conquered"-a truth that resonates in this free and prosperous former Soviet republic.
 

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 #27
The Wilson Quarterly
http://wilsonquarterly.com
Summer 2015
WHAT WOULD CHURCHILL DO?
Putin isn't Hitler, and this isn't WWII. But as Europe is threatened, it's worth asking: What would Churchill do - and what do the people who invoke him get wrong?
BY MARK W. DAVIS
Mark W. Davis is the director of Uptown Creative Strategies Group, a corporate communications firm. As a White House speechwriter, he drafted START arms-control addresses and the "Europe Whole and Free" speech in Mainz, then West Germany, for President George H. W. Bush in 1989.

Europe's peaceable kingdom is disturbed by the screams of sheep being devoured by lions. The war in Ukraine's east is limited, but increasingly lethal.

Last summer, the world watched the barbarity of the downing of Malaysia Airline Flight 17 and the brutal lack of respect shown to the dead by Russian-backed rebel authorities. The unseen horrors have been much greater. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimated that from the beginning of the Russian-backed conflict up through February 2015, at least 5,793 people (including 63 children) have been killed and at least 14,595 (including 169 children) wounded in the contest over Ukraine's east. More than one million people have been displaced.

For the first time in 75 years, Western leaders are forced to devise a strategy in the face of a major power conflict over European territory. In this task, strategic thinkers are naturally turning back to the darkest lessons of the twentieth century for guidance. But which lessons? Some proceed cautiously in this centennial year of the Second Battle of Ypres, mindful of how escalation and national pride can lead to unexpected consequences and tragedy.

"If we don't manage to find not just a compromise, but a lasting peace agreement, we know perfectly well what the scenario will be," French President François Hollande said earlier this year. "It has a name, it's called 'war.'"

Others look to the lessons of the appeasement of Nazi Germany that led to the Second World War. At the 2015 Munich Security Conference, in the very city where the leaders of Britain and France made their craven deal with Adolf Hitler over Czechoslovakia in 1938, international conferees recently came together to discuss the Ukraine crisis. Senator John McCain, who in February said that he was "ashamed" of Washington's response to the crisis, drew the most explicit comparison to British prime minister Neville Chamberlain's acceptance of Hitler's demands. "History shows us that dictators will always take more if you let them," McCain said. "They will not be dissuaded from their brutal behavior when you fly to meet them to Moscow - just as leaders once flew to this city." Senator Lindsey Graham made an ironic echo of one the most famous Churchillian wartime phrases, telling delegates: "When you turn down a reasonable request to help defend one's self ... it's not our finest hour."

Late last year, British prime minister David Cameron warned his fellow European leaders about the dangers of appeasement: "We run the risk of repeating the mistakes made in Munich in '38 ... This time we cannot meet Putin's demands. He has already taken Crimea, and we cannot allow him to take the whole country." Former Polish prime minister Donald Tusk, now president of the European Council, recently tweeted that "Once again, appeasement encourages the aggressor to greater acts of violence." In a television interview from Munich, Senator Ted Cruz went further, saying that the United States has "a treaty obligation to stand with" the Ukrainians, "and right now, unfortunately, the Obama Administration is not honoring that obligation. We need to come together and provide defensive arms so they can stand up against the Russian aggression."

Cruz was referring to the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, which promised that Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom would uphold Ukrainian sovereignty and borders. In the event of a breach, however, the agreement merely promises that the three powers "will consult." Above all, with apologies to Senator Cruz, the Budapest Memorandum is not a treaty binding the United States to militarily defend Ukraine, as we would have to do with a NATO ally. It is a diplomatic agreement - it is not binding, but does convey moral obligation. In 1994, Ukraine relinquished what was then the third-largest nuclear force in the world in exchange for what it considered the consecration of its sovereignty and borders. While refugees pour into Kiev and the sounds of guns grow louder in the east, Ukraine has every reason to expect assistance from the United States and Britain. But what are the best ways these two countries can help?

As leaders rummage through the crises of the past to inform their thinking, more attention is being turned back to Winston Churchill, the most fertile strategic mind of modern times, the man who defined for all time the price of appeasement. In opposition to the government of his own party, Churchill famously told Neville Chamberlain, "You were given the choice between war and dishonor. You chose dishonor and you will have war."

Is that our choice today? Or to put it another way, is Vladimir Putin another Adolf Hitler, and should we respond to him as the democracies should have responded to Hitler from the start?

CHANNELING CHURCHILL, SEEING HITLER

Policy should not be made on the basis of facile historical comparisons. There are, however, insights to be gleaned from asking if Putin represents a threat similar to that posed by Hitler. The case for this comparison is far from superficial. No less a figure than former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton compared Putin's strategy in Ukraine to Hitler's strategy in Czechoslovakia.

Certainly, further similarities between Putin and Hitler are easily made. Like Hitler, Putin cultivates a cult of personality - though one imagines that even Hitler would have been embarrassed to stage the bare-chested heroics that Putin regularly performs for Russian television viewers. Like Hitler, Putin presents a steely affect that barely masks seething resentments over imagined conspiracies and slights against his homeland. Putin's recent state of the union address identifies a malevolent and scheming "America" in the place of Hitler's international Jewish conspiracy: "they are always influencing Russia's relations with its neighbors, either openly or behind the scenes." Although Putin lacks Hitler's operatic comportment, his more monotone language is by turns hysterical, self-pitying, and militant.

Both Hitler and Putin rose to power through democratic politics to rule by fiat. Hitler discarded the trappings of democracy to become the Führer; Putin has chosen to steadily hollow out Russian democracy by persecuting and imprisoning potential competitors, rewriting the Russian constitution to lengthen his hold on power, and transforming the media into his state-run propaganda mouthpiece. Still, democratic decoration matters to Putin. He cares about his poll results, and feels the need to be elected.

Many sophisticated Russia watchers give a calmer appraisal of Putin - that he is just an autocrat playing for popularity and gain, a cool customer using one engineered crisis at home to justify his power to his people while bluffing the West to achieve incremental victories in his domination of Russia's "Near Abroad." Putin's blend of Russian Orthodox nationalism and authoritarianism is no doubt a heady brew, one whose principal goal is to reassemble Russia's lost empire. Putin's revanchism lacks the moral insanity and Alexandrian ambition that was at the core of Nazi ideology. Invading France is hardly on Putin's timetable. But in terms of personal characteristics alone, suppose for argument's sake that Vladimir Putin is indeed "another Hitler." Would it follow that the West should rush to resist him militarily, even if through proxies? Would anything less than that meet Churchill's definition of appeasement?

ONE UNDENIABLE DIFFERENCE

Those who draw inspiration from Churchill's defiance of Hitler to advocate limited military assistance to Ukraine must factor in one undeniable difference between Hitler and Putin: Hitler never possessed nuclear weapons.

Russia today has invested continuously in updating and modernizing its strategic nuclear weapons, packing multiple warheads on new generations of mobile missiles. Russia's arsenal also includes an estimated two thousand tactical nuclear weapons, some with yields approaching that of the bomb that leveled Hiroshima.

Moreover, Russian military doctrine forthrightly advocates the use of tactical nuclear weapons to stave off a conventional defeat. Through wargames, the Russian military has worked out its concept of operations and possesses the muscle memory to execute it. Putin is now believed to be fielding an unknown number of tactical nuclear weapons on the Crimean peninsula for just this purpose. If Russia were to invade Poland or the Baltic states, it might well follow through on its threats to use tactical nuclear weapons against NATO in battle. If so, Russia runs the risk of underestimating NATO and the serious risk of escalation from the tactical to the strategic.

Those, like Senator McCain, who believe that limited military support of Ukraine would stop Putin in his tracks often cast themselves as following Churchill's assertion that a united and early show of force by the Allies against Germany would have stopped Hitler's adventures. Those who want NATO to militarily back Ukraine today, however, must answer the following question: If nuclear weapons had existed in the 1930s, would Winston Churchill have supported such a preventative war? Would Churchill have supported a motion to declare war with Nazi Germany over the conquest of Poland?

In short, would Churchill have been all out in favor of a physical response if Hitler had possessed an arsenal capable of annihilating the cities of France, Britain, and the United States within a single hour? And if not, what lesser measures might Churchill have sought to counter German aggression?

We do not have to entertain such a hypothetical world to understand Churchill's approach to resisting an encroaching power in the nuclear age. As the current British prime minister and U.S. senators "channel" Churchill and his indomitable spirit, great care should be taken to appreciate the subtleties of Churchill's thinking across the breadth of his career. A closer look at Churchill's speeches, writings and utterances to his Conservative colleagues as leader of the opposition (1945-1951) and during his second premiership (1951-1955) suggests that Churchill would advocate a firm but cautious approach in response to Putin's Russia.

CHURCHILL, RUSSIA AND THE BOMB

In 1945, Winston Churchill had just marshaled the most improbable turnaround victory since the Second Persian War. To his ever-lasting shock, the British voters rewarded the prime minister with an eviction notice from 10 Downing Street, accompanied, he said, by "a sharp stab of almost physical pain" and the realization that the "knowledge and experience I had gathered, the authority and goodwill I had gained in so many countries, would vanish."

Churchill could have absorbed the sting of defeat and rested content, knowing that his place in history would finally be secure. He could have retired honorably to his beloved Chartwell to paint and write and dabble. Few who knew him were surprised that Churchill chose to soldier on, as he always had. He served as leader of the opposition, dealing with the contentious issues of a new age - defining the nascent Cold War at Fulton, Missouri, with his rhetorical flourish about an "Iron Curtain"; coining the idea of a "summit" between leaders; and speaking out in favor of a "United States of Europe." Always prophetic, often an explicit futurist, Churchill was one of the first thinkers to grasp the potential of nuclear deterrence and delineate a doctrine for it.

Churchill did all this while working on his ongoing masterwork, The Second World War, in prodigious fits and starts, in late evening hours and often while on "painting holidays" in Marrakech and the High Atlas, Lake Como, the south of France, Madeira, and Venice. After being returned as prime minister in the 1951 general election, Churchill's work was interrupted by arterial spasms, moments when "everything went misty," and outright strokes that left him spent and bedridden, forcing him to spend days practicing his signature. Then Churchill would throw himself back into his regimen - back to writing in bed, the bath, in his medieval study, with rivers of ink and Scotch to sweep him along.

With a mind shaped by Victorian habits of speech and thought, Churchill stated the theme of his final volume, Triumph and Tragedy, as Macaulay might have done:

How the Great Democracies
Triumphed,
And So
Were Able to Resume
The Follies
Which Had So Nearly
Cost Them Their
Life.

In the early years of the Cold War, Churchill worried that the great democracies were once again tempting fate with an inadequate response to a threat from the East. During the blockade of Berlin in 1948 and 1949, when the United States and Britain were beginning to organize the airlift to supply the beleaguered city, Churchill wrote, "I trust we are not approaching another 'Munich.'"

Those worries intensified after the Soviet Union negated the U.S. unilateral nuclear advantage by detonating its own bomb in August 1949. On the conventional side, Europe had an imbalance of power. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, NATO was a paper vision with little manpower and hardware. Ninety percent of the almost three million U.S. soldiers and 300,000 airmen in Europe had returned home. By 1950, the Soviets fielded at least 175 divisions, 25 or more of which were armored, against a dozen American and Western European divisions, only two of which were armored. To make matters worse, the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 turned America's attention to the Far East, prompting Churchill to worry that Britain's ally and protector would be too distracted to defend Europe. By the late 1940s, Russia loomed almost as large in Churchill's mind as Nazi Germany had a decade before. He privately worried that the West Germans were too intimidated by the Soviet Union to rearm and that even France might become a Soviet satellite.

As leader of the opposition, Churchill told Parliament that Soviet strength had steadily emerged "as a rock shows more and more above an ebbing tide." Russians "in one form or another" controlled half of Europe and China, but showed "no signs of being in any way satiated or satisfied." For the first time in a decade, there were whispered fears in Parliament and Whitehall that Britain could once again face the prospect of an invasion from the East.

SEEING THE FUTURE

In the midst of the Soviet menace, Churchill offered advice to his colleagues that would be ridiculed as sophomoric if made by a U.S. politician today: he suggested that his colleagues try to see the world as the Russians saw it. The point was not to infer fairness in Soviet policies, but to understand the nature of the threat. "There is no doubt that trying to put oneself in the position of the other party to see how things look to him is one way, and perhaps the best way, of being able to feel and peer dimly into the unknowable future," Churchill said.

The Soviet Union then, like Putin today, wanted to divide Europe and keep it divided. Churchill vocally campaigned for a "United States of Europe," a conceptual precursor to the European Union. "I am not attracted to a Western bloc as a final solution," he wrote in 1946. "The ideal should be EUROPE." He would have embraced the Western doctrine set out by President George H. W. Bush of a "Europe whole and free," with the addendum - recently underscored by General Phillip M. Breedlove, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander - "and at peace."

Despite his emergence in the Victorian era, Churchill understood that the concept of "spheres of influence" belong to a bygone era. Although that paradigm has long been discredited in the West, today, it is very much alive in Moscow. Churchill would understand that fear is behind Russia's aggressiveness in seeking to establish a sphere of docile states around its perimeter. A fear of NATO may be irrational - attaching nineteenth-century worries about "encirclement" to a twenty-first-century institution of joint defense between democracies that would rather focus on social welfare spending - but to Putin and his coterie, that fear is palpable. We need to understand this, Churchill might tell us, not to empathize with the Putin regime, but to understand why the regime appears so volatile and dangerous.

What would Churchill have made of Vladimir Putin himself? Undoubtedly, he would have well understood Putin's paranoid brew of resentments and fears, just as he had an instinctive understanding of Hitler's dark psyche. He might also conclude that Putin is probably steeped in the propaganda of his own media, which sees anti-Russian "fascists" in the orange-wearing democrats of Kiev and regularly posts horror stories about Ukrainian atrocities that never occurred.

The same Churchill who was very deliberate in how he countered the Soviets would no doubt see reason for caution in approaching the paranoid Putin regime. Churchill was in power when Joseph Stalin had made his disastrous gamble on Hitler's trustworthiness. During the late Cold War and Boris Yeltsin years, the Soviet Union and its Russian successor came close to launching a first strike on the United States because of sensors spooked by a flare of sunlight and a Norwegian weather rocket. Russia's apparent decision to allow rebel forces in Ukraine to handle surface-to-air missiles in corridors where passenger jets routinely operate is the most recent example of Russian recklessness; Churchill would undoubtedly take into account Russia's ongoing record of extraordinary belligerence, callousness, and strategic miscalculation.

"APPEASEMENT HAS ITS PLACE"

Churchill was outspoken about his darkest fears about nuclear weapons, calling them "that awful agency of destruction."

"What ought we to do?" Churchill asked Parliament in 1955, during his last great speech. "Which way shall we turn to save our lives and the future of the world? It does not matter so much to old people; they are going soon anyway; but I find it poignant to look at youth in all its activity and ardour and, most of all, to watch little children playing their merry games, and wonder what would lie before them if God wearied of mankind."

But there was a catch. At some point of nuclear development, Churchill recognized, "the worst things get the better," because "safety will be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation."

Long before Ronald Reagan, Churchill adopted the Roman emperor Hadrian's maxim - "peace through strength" - as his policy. Churchill set out the means to strengthen the West in the face of the Soviet challenge, which included transforming NATO from a paper institution into a real military force and devising a British nuclear deterrent.

But in 1950, at the height of the Cold War, Churchill also added some nuance to his view on appeasement:

"Appeasement in itself may be good or bad according to the circumstances. Appeasement from weakness and fear is alike futile and fatal. Appeasement from strength is magnanimous and noble and might be the surest and perhaps the only path to world peace.

"When nations or individuals get strong they are often truculent and bullying, but when they are weak they become better mannered. But this is the reverse of what is healthy and wise. I have always been astonished, having seen the end of these two wars, how difficult it is to make people understand the Roman wisdom, 'Spare the conquered and confront the proud.' ... The modern practice has too often been 'punish the defeated and grovel to the strong.'"

Churchill would see today's Russia as a weak nation with a strong bite. It has a brittle economy, but maintains the ability to wage a devastating war in eastern Europe - and a reckless willingness to test the will of NATO with tactical nuclear weapons. What would Churchill do?

One essential component of appeasement is the deliberate degradation of military capability in an effort to convince an enemy of one's good intentions. By these lights, Churchill would see the Obama administration's public interest in unilaterally reducing the U.S. strategic arsenal by one-third below the plateau reached with Russia in the New START agreement as appeasement.

Churchill would certainly urge the United States, Britain, and France to modernize and maintain their nuclear deterrent. He would also urge Western leaders to bolster NATO's conventional forces, and to devise an effective counter to Russia's tactical nuclear threat. He would applaud recent measures to reinforce NATO's defense of the Baltic republics and Poland, and urge the removal of any uncertainty from the commitment to treaty allies. He might take his pen to paper and doodle useful ideas on how to use crowd-control techniques or technology to stop Putin's "little green men" if they emerge on Baltic soil. He might caution Putin that deeper moves toward Kiev could well result in lethal aid.

Churchill would urge us not to legitimize Ukraine's forcibly changed borders. Just as he welcomed governments-in-exile to operate in London during the Second World War, so too would he likely advise the United States and European Union today to welcome Ukrainian luminaries and highlight the suffering of Ukrainian refugees.

From the First World War to the Cold War, one constant of Churchill's strategic thinking was to identify an enemy's hidden pressure points or his "soft underbelly," whether in the Dardanelles, Italy, or the Balkans. In World War II, Churchill was eager to arm partisans and to find ways to disrupt the enemy from the rear or within his own lines. The lessons from the Churchill of the first and second world wars would argue for sending at least limited military aide to the Ukrainians.

A different lesson, however, could be taken from Cold War Churchill. In that contest, Churchill was much more cautious - not because he had grown soft with age, but because of his carefulness in dealing with a nuclear-armed state. Churchill, no matter how deep his sympathy for the besieged Ukrainians, might not be so eager to jump into the fray as his self-professed admirers like senators McCain, Cruz, or Graham (or, for that matter, his current successor David Cameron).

Winston Churchill no doubt would have dismissed President Hollande's assertion that "a lasting peace agreement" is possible, just as he dismissed Chamberlain's promise of "peace in our time." Putin is all but certain to continue to test Western resolve for as long as he is in power. But Churchill might have rejected the contention that any agreement guaranteeing Ukrainian neutrality would amount to appeasement. He would have understood that to actively get into the conflict - even in the proxy form of providing "defensive" military aid to Ukraine - would be to get into the business of killing Russians. At this stage, arming the Ukrainians could be a profoundly un-Churchillian misapplication of Churchill's thinking.

ENGAGING THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE

During the Cold War, Churchill preached a stoic optimism equal to the long task of countering and containing Moscow's designs. He said of the Russian people that the "machinery of propaganda may pack their minds with falsehood and deny them truth for many generations of time. But the soul of man thus held in trance, or frozen in a long night, can be awakened by a spark coming from God knows where, and in a moment the whole structure of lies and oppression is on trial for its life."

The power of social media is the true "soft underbelly" of this regime. Putin himself revealed his fear of Facebook and Twitter when he signed new laws requiring social networks to store data on Russian users in Russia, subjecting them to censorship. The public murder of Russian opposition leader Boris Nemstov has opened the minds of young Russia, giving the West an opportunity to make the most of cracks and crevices in Putin's firewalls. For the West, the best strategy is a policy of patience, firmness, and determination to undermine the Putin regime and frustrate its forays - for decades, if need be - until the day when the whole structure of its lies and oppression are put on trial by young Russians.

And we should remember Winston Churchill's final bit of advice as he prepared to leave office: "Meanwhile, never flinch, never weary, never despair."

 [return to Contents] 

 #28
London Review of Books
www.lrb.co.uk
July 30, 2015
Book review
Almost Lovable
What Stalin Built
By Sheila Fitzpatrick
Sheila Fitzpatrick's On Stalin's Team: The Years of Living Dangerously in Soviet Politics will be published by Princeton this autumn.

Landscapes of Communism: A History through Buildings by Owen Hatherley
Allen Lane, 613 pp, £25.00, June, ISBN 978 1 84614 768 5

Back in the day, everyone knew that Stalinist architecture was hateful. The Poles notoriously loathed the Palace of Culture and Science that was the gift to war-ruined Warsaw from the Soviet elder brother or - as the Poles saw it - master. Foreigners and sophisticated Russians sneered at Moscow's wedding-cake buildings and lamented the old Tverskaya that had undergone a Stalinist remake as Gorky Street. Some people cherished the onion domes of 17th-century Muscovy, others the grand classical façades of 18th-century St Petersburg, and a few even idolised the dilapidated remnants of 1920s Constructivism in Moscow, but there was a general consensus that Stalinism of the 1930s-50s was the pits. I was one of those trekking around Moscow in the late 1960s, a worn copy of P.V. Sytin's 850-page From the History of Moscow Streets in hand, to see what monstrous acts had been committed against innocent buildings in Stalin's time. I don't know how Sytin ever got that book published. It first came out in 1948, illustrated with smudgy non-glossy photographs, light grey on the yellowing pages, with new editions in 1952 and 1958, each adding hundreds of pages of street by street and building by building close description. I suppose the censor accepted it as a celebration of Stalinist transformation, even if the intelligentsia read it as a lament for the pre-Revolutionary imperial Russian past. It's been reprinted several times since the collapse of the Soviet Union, but who knows in what spirit of Stalinist nostalgia people read it these days. Now, Owen Hatherley tells us, the Poles actually like their Palace of Culture.

I've noticed before the strange tendency of hateful buildings to become almost lovable after the passage of decades. Not all of them, of course. Some, like the 1960s highrise clones lining Moscow's New Arbat (Kalinin Prospekt) become more annoying as they get shabbier. But the Moscow State University building on Lenin Hills, one of Moscow's seven late-Stalinist wedding cakes, has definitely undergone a metamorphosis in my mind. When I lived there in the late 1960s, I regarded it as an anti-people monster, guarded by dragons who, if you had lost your pass, would throw you out to die in the snow. (According to Hatherley, they now use swipe cards to protect the building against invasion.) But I noticed a while back that I had started regarding the wedding cakes with something like affection; apparently the passage of time has naturalised them.

But Hatherley is young, and so are the Poles who like the Palace of Culture; their reassessment must come from somewhere else. Actually it seems to come from two different places. One is the Western pop/youth phenomenon that might be called Soviet ruin chic - a fascination with Soviet imperial ghosts or, as Hatherley puts it, 'tourism of the counter-revolution'. Andrei Tarkovsky's 1979 film Stalker, with its memorable imagery of the Zone, is a reference point here, as is real-life Chernobyl, now a tourist destination for those with a 'ruin chic' sensibility. Hatherley distinguishes his own position from that of the admirers of Totally Awesome Ruined Soviet Architecture, and his ideological and personal baggage is definitely not counter-revolutionary. But there's some family - or perhaps more accurately, generational - resemblance.

The other place this re-evaluation comes from is Eastern Europe, specifically young people who grew up in the Soviet bloc at the end of the communist era, and don't share their parents' bad memories. Hatherley travelled around the old Soviet empire with his Polish partner, Agata Pyzik, who in 2014 published her own take on East-West culture clashes, Poor but Sexy. Freelancers in their early thirties, they live with one foot in London and the other in Warsaw. Agata is the one with Russian and, as a reading of Poor but Sexy suggests, a penchant for film and cultural theory. Hatherley is the one with the eye, the architectural knowledge, and a childhood background in Militant Tendency. They make an entertainingly observant couple as they wander round Moscow, Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Budapest, Vilnius, Kiev, Riga, Tallinn, Bucharest, Sofia and the rest, on the look-out for good cheap meals as well as striking cityscapes and 'weird' (a favourite word, generally approving) buildings.

Hatherley has quite a weird background himself. Son of Trotskyists and grandson of members of the Communist Party of Great Britain, he grew up in the 1980s on a Southampton council estate whose 'cottage'-style buildings he disdained. The brutalist 1960s tower blocks nearby, with their concrete walkways and windswept precincts, seemed by comparison excitingly modern and glamorous. Poignancy was added when some of the towers were demolished during his childhood. He first made a splash with his love song to architectural brutalism, Militant Modernism (2008), and the larger-scale A Guide to the New Ruins of Great Britain (2010), reviewed in these pages by Will Self. Hatherley confesses to 'nostalgia for the future' in Militant Modernism, 'a longing for the fragments of the half-hearted postwar attempt at building a new society, an attempt that lay in ruins by the time I was born'. It makes sense that he should follow up New Ruins of Great Britain with a survey of the ruins and residue of the Soviet empire.

Hatherley didn't go round Moscow with Sytin in his backpack, and indeed it's hard to imagine any point of connection between his sensibility and that of the Russian intelligentsia. Zizek is a hovering presence, and there is a dash of Boris Groys as well. Hatherley would like to think the communist regimes did something right in creating living space for their people and hopes to find some elements of 'real socialism' in their built environments. But there's always something like a wry grin on his face when he hints at these hopes. 'Like many Soviet ideas,' he writes in frustration at one point, 'it is so obviously right and so obviously botched.' Architecturally, his core allegiance is to modernism (the brutalist and utopian kinds, not the defanged 'Ikea modernism', which he disdains), but he has developed a certain affection for Stalinist monumentalism.

Reading the book, I felt sure that Hatherley had done most of his travelling in summer because, despite his affection for Stalker, he seems relatively unaffected by the sense of existential insignificance, exacerbated by cold, that the vast empty spaces of Stalinist city planning can induce. For me, the quintessential meaningless Soviet space was the illegible void between Manezh and the National, Metropol and Moscow hotels near Red Square. (Now it's bad in a different way, with multiple lanes of traffic shooting through en route to somewhere else, and a vast commercial mall underground.) As my Sytin told me, the illegibility was the result of the wholesale destruction of the streets and houses that used to make sense of the space, the result, that is, of a violent, apparently purposeful activity that wasn't in any real sense planned. I took that as a metaphor for a lot of things in the Soviet Union.

Hatherley has a tough-minded approach to huge empty spaces, although he acknowledges that crossing them can be daunting. He views my bête noire, the 1960s-modern Kalinin Prospekt, with relative equanimity, finding it a plus that its wide pavements, lined by 'ridiculously priced department stores', bring in the crowds. Old Arbat, running parallel, has kept its early 19th-century buildings mainly intact in what is now a kitschy pedestrian zone where foreign tourists buy matryoshka dolls and drink beer. The (post-Stalinist) ruin of the Arbat was a great cause of intelligentsia outrage in late Soviet times, but it's typical of Hatherley's sensibility and frame of reference that this doesn't even rate a mention; it's not his form of nostalgia.

Stalinallee (now Karl-Marx-Allee) in Berlin is more in his line, a monster that can inspire admiration and disapproval at the same time. Hatherley nails it as 'by its very existence an indictment of the vainglory, hypocrisy and dubious claims to "socialism" of the Soviet-backed state' but can't deny 'that every time I have visited it I've found it hugely exhilarating'. He compares it to the Paris boulevards, and finds that it expresses 'a socialism with real generosity and grandeur, all its hierarchical features subordinated to the rule of the public's footsteps'. The street may be too wide for pedestrian comfort, but at least it is a street, and a 'surprisingly convincing' one.

I'm confused by Hatherley's perspective on streets. I would have thought that as a modernist and an admirer of council tower blocks in Britain, he would have been against them. But he seems to make an exception for the Soviet-bloc version of grands boulevards, and sometimes he even likes smaller streets, including (surprisingly) those in East Berlin's Nikolaiviertel or Warsaw's old town that have been rebuilt with more or less fake 'historic' buildings (Mariensztat in Warsaw is 'surely the cutest thing ever implemented by the Six Year Plan of an iron-fisted Stalinist regime'). Where he seems most conflicted is on Soviet-bloc housing estates, whose streetlessness is one of the depressing things about them, especially for visitors tramping around in the dark trying to find, say, No. 25, block 5, entrance 3, without benefit of footpaths, adequate lighting or a clear numbering system. The problem is that, on the one hand, Hatherley is bound to reject 'the architectural views of Charles Windsor' (elsewhere, he gives him his title) that such housing estates are 'impersonal, mechanistic, inhumane, boring, ahistorical'. On the other hand, Agata spent part of her Warsaw childhood on one of these council estates, and 'I defer to [her] judgment: it was incredibly depressing living here and she would never do so again under any circumstances.' So he concedes that 'something went seriously wrong when these places were made.' Their current Warsaw residence, where he wrote the book, seems to be a compromise, strategically located just on the break point where the (mostly 1930s) houses and streets stop and the housing estates begin. Some visitors find the towers looming outside their window intimidating, but to Hatherley the area 'has a certain bleak big-city frisson to it, the feeling that you are in some Varsovian remake of Wong Kar-Wai's Hong Kong'.

His perspective on Stalinist architecture and aesthetics is also a bit confusing - in a lively and entertaining way. This architecture, he says, can be 'scary', even 'evil', unambiguously related to Stalinist despotism, with 'the psychoses that created them easy to read'. Of Moscow's wedding-cake buildings, he writes that 'the city centre is literally encircled by six advancing skyscrapers, each with a towering, scraping spire, all of which bear down on you, paranoid and threatening, like an Inquisition; try to escape, and another is waiting for you, wings outstretched, at the Lenin Hills.' The meeting hall of the Czech National Memorial in Prague 'is one of the most memorable, and terrifying, spaces created by Stalinism anywhere in Europe', with 'its cyclopean scale and use of so much red marble that you're practically irradiated as you walk around'. The House of the People in Bucharest (now Palace of the Parliament), a 1980s Romanian-designed pyramid, is 'compellingly alien and sinister'. Fronted with a 'defensive escarpment dense with trees', its monumental front entrance is impossible to approach on foot. Hatherley and Agata both instinctively hate it, but that reaction worries them - evidently they aren't meant to be knee-jerk haters of Stalinist monumentalism. Why not, I wonder. But that becomes clear when we get back to Warsaw, their central point of reference in the Soviet empire.

Warsaw's Palace of Culture and Science was designed by the Soviet architect Lev Rudnev in 1952, the last year of Stalin's life, and completed in 1955. Once, Hatherley notes, it was hated, but now young Varsovians are passionately attached to it. Agata's 'support of the building is unyielding - when she saw the Moscow Seven, she immediately pronounced them inferior to their Russo-Polish sibling.' It's not only the devotees of radical chic who are attached to the palace but also the city's PR people. 'A generational shift has happened in the appreciation of the tower, which now appears on mugs, on the city's promotional literature, on hipster T-shirts, on adverts, on election campaign posters, as ubiquitous as St Paul's or the Eiffel Tower.' Hatherley concedes that 'only the most dogmatic modernist or most devoted anti-communist could possibly prefer the adjacent office towers that were built to break its emphasis from the 1960s onwards,' and judges the building to be 'weird, authoritarian, excessive and absurd', which in his lexicon comes across as fairly positive. He only wishes that it had been possible 'to design something that is as all-encompassing and magnificent, terrifyingly dreamlike as this without recourse to myths and lies'.

The saving grace of the Warsaw Palace, in Hatherley's eyes, is that, in contrast to the Moscow Seven, it is a 'social condenser', a label borrowed from the Moscow avant-garde of the 1920s for public buildings offering citizens a range of activities (including, in the Warsaw case, a multiplex cinema, a swimming pool, a concert hall, museums complete with dinosaurs, an art gallery and cafés) and thus inculcating collective ideology. The pleasures of being socially condensed are left a bit vague, probably because Agata was not much exposed to them as a child, but there are some very likeable riffs about Polish 'milk bars' that appear to be public cafeterias (known in Russian as stolovye) where you line up for food and don't tip. Hatherley and Agata particularly like the one in the Bratislava Trade Union Headquarters, where anyone who walks in can get an enormous three-course meal for about three euros. What Hatherley values, despite the absence of airs and graces, toilets and any encouragement to linger over your food, is 'that sense of filling, slightly stodgy comfort which features so often in the memories of those who remember "real socialism"'. Perhaps that's so in Eastern Europe, but I'm not sure it's how Soviet citizens would remember stolovye. For Russians in late Soviet times, 'filling, slightly stodgy comfort' was to be found at home, not in the outside world. Homes, and, for that matter, dachas, are absent from Hatherley's landscapes of communism. Yet when the Soviet Union collapsed, it was the 'old apartment' (the title of a long-running television programme of the 1990s) that was the focus of nostalgia for a lost 'socialist' world. Hatherley's 'Memorial' chapter includes Berlin's curious Museum of the GDR on the Spree, presenting consumer goods of the 1970s and 1980s in a spirit combining Ostalgie and condescension, but not the nostalgia-infused old apartment museums that sprang up in some Russian provincial towns.

Come to think of it, those home-made museums could also have gone into the chapter called 'Improvisation'. For Hatherley, popular creativity has to be part of a real socialist environment - hence the chapter - but it turns out to be quite difficult to find. He has a nice discussion of kiosks, a characteristic feature of late and post-Soviet-bloc life apparently on the wane in Eastern Europe but still alive and well in Russia, where it remains the basic commercial unit in many squares, underground passages, and around metro stations. My sense of the Soviet kiosk was that it had squared corners and came in drab colours, but in the Eastern Bloc they did things better: the K67 kiosk, mass-produced for the Comecon market until the 1990s, was created in Yugoslavia in 1966 and visibly 'from that Barbarella period of pop futurism where everything was curved, brightly coloured and made of wipeclean surfaces'. The kiosk discussion made me think of the chaotic post-Soviet transformation of apartment-building courtyards into parking lots and the multiplication of those little car-sized portable garages that look as if they could be part of a 1920s avant-garde project for modular living, but that hasn't caught Hatherley's eye. He does give us a nice description of another kind of apartment improvisation, the filling in of balconies by builders capable of creating a monstrous architectural joke by sticking 'a mammoth new room ... into the front façade of a three-storey neo-Byzantine block'.

Graffiti, something new and shocking in a Soviet context when John Bushnell's Moscow Graffiti came out in 1990, is not one of the forms of popular creativity Hatherley embraces, perhaps because its absence was (and remains) such a feature of the Moscow Metro, the focus of Hatherley's greatest enthusiasm. After lovingly describing the Stalinist opulence of its different stations, he concludes that 'these palaces really are for the people,' that they offer 'a glimpse of the practice of everyday life being completely transformed and transcended, with mundane tasks transfigured into a dream of egalitarian space'. Incontestably better than their counterparts in the West, they are the 'most convincing microcosms of a communist future you can walk through, smell and touch', a 'transformation of the everyday that went further than any avant-garde ever dared', even though, he concedes, 'a democratically controlled socialism' might have produced environments 'that don't feel quite so flung in people's faces, that are not quite so monolithic and dominating'. Post-communist consumer capitalism has sheathed the marble columns in the Kiev Metro with giant advertisements, a development he dislikes. In Moscow, the only advertisements are for luxury products, each in a neat standardised frame on the walls beside the escalators. All things considered, the old socialist-palatial aesthetic has survived the transition surprisingly well - the spectacular cleanliness and absence of graffiti in Moscow bespeaking unbending official rejection of popular creativity.

Actually Hatherley underestimates the Metro's socialist potential in one respect, as he seems to think that public transport more or less accidentally took the central place occupied by cars in the West because of the Soviet Union's industrial incapacity. In fact, a decision for the public over the private form was taken under Stalin; Khrushchev did his best to continue it, until, under Brezhnev, car pressure on the part of the citizens proved irresistible. Hatherley might have given more thought to the way people use the Moscow Metro. There is the recent and rather extraordinary fact that the whole thing now has wifi, with the result that people sit smartphones in hand as they once, in Soviet times, used to sit reading books. Metro stations are still widely used as meeting places, usually on a designated part of the platform (ignorant of this Soviet-bloc lore, Hatherley once made the mistake of waiting for Agata outside, near the ticket office, when she, naturally, was down on the platform).

Hatherley is obsessed by the socialist city, and whether parts of it got built, or ever will be. This ideal socialist city is, of course, quite different from the 'real socialist city' that the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc produced. It's a utopian future that never arrived; an archaic modernism, like Grand Central Parkway in New York, evoking brief pangs of nostalgia as you zip out to the airport. But there's another part of Hatherley that can forget socialism and simply revel in the weird transmogrifications of the Stalinist architectural aesthetic - for example, in Shanghai, where 'Le Corbusier meets Lev Rudnev meets neoliberal bling, the Stalinist city gone high tech, its pinnacles and swags slathered in neon.'

The China excursion, which comes as a kind of coda at the end of the book, is a surprise, but underlines one of the book's most valuable aspects, its illumination of a Soviet cultural empire whose imperial motifs were repeated, transposed and subverted all along a far-flung periphery. The scholarly world has been slow to develop this theme. True, the concept of 'empire' came to the fore when the Soviet Union and Soviet bloc collapsed into their constituent national parts, but most of the ensuing scholarship focused on the recovery/reinvention of the national. It's works like this one, closer to pop culture and addressed to a broader audience, that most successfully demonstrate the cultural commonalities that - as with the British and French colonial empires - outlived the imperial institutions that created them.

The Soviet cultural empire, however, is something of an odd case, in that the Moscow metropolis didn't always succeed in imposing its aesthetic will, hard though it tried, because of the Eastern Europeans' strong sense that Russia was 'backward' in comparison with them, a sense that the Russian intelligentsia to some degree accepted. Thus the cultural traffic ran both ways, and some roads in the Soviet cultural empire led not to Moscow, but to Berlin, Warsaw and Prague. Hatherley doesn't examine this in any depth, but his Warsaw-centred perspective makes it obvious. He says at the beginning that his book is about 'surfaces, and about the many political and historical things that can be learned from surfaces, especially in states as obsessed with surface as these'. That's not wholly true, in that his anxious and ambivalent feelings about 'real socialism' periodically lead him into discussion of political and economic depths, but it's true enough to be a welcome relief. I'm tempted to say that anyone can do depths - that is, launch into generalisations and wrestle with ideology without too much fear of empirical contradiction - but surfaces are harder. Ideological preoccupations aside, Hatherley has a wonderful eye for buildings and space, a good grasp of the history that spawned them, and a deft way of describing them. Sometimes, reading this book, I recognised things I'd noticed myself; at other times, he showed me something I had missed or understood differently. Either way, I'd better take his book, big though it is, in my backpack next time I go to Warsaw, Lviv, Bucharest or elsewhere in the old Soviet empire. I might even throw out Sytin and take it to Moscow.

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 #29
The National Interest
July 27, 2015
No Time to Wait: Why Reconciliation in Ukraine Must (And Can) Happen Now
"...because internal reconciliation is such a complex task, it need not wait until Ukraine is formally deemed a 'postconflict' society."
By Olena Lennon
Olena Lennon is a former Fulbright scholar from Horlivka, Ukraine, currently teaching Foreign Policy at the University of New Haven. Her hometown Horlivka, located in the Donetsk province of Eastern Ukraine (Donbas), has been one of the main strongholds of Russian-backed separatists in the past year. Olena's work appeared in Foreign Affairs, The National Interest, Higher Education in Europe, and other publications.

On a recent trip to Ukraine in May-June 2015, during the worst escalation of violence since the Minsk II agreement, I was glued to the TV, concerned about one thing: When would the fighting stop? Yet, at the same time, I had to wonder how any long-term reconciliation might work when the fighting actually did stop. Thus, while in Ukraine, I tried to get a sense of how people on both sides conceived of reconciliation, and its possibility.

My first encounter was a classic kitchen talk, over tea and pastries. As my brother, who currently lives in rebel-occupied territory, and my Kyiv friends argued over who had started the war and which side had killed more people, emotions flared, and it soon became clear that the two sides did not merely believe in different things-they operated with different facts. Finally, as she rose to leave, a Kyiv friend said, "The Donbas people brought this tragedy upon themselves and deserve their suffering." Visibly hurt, my brother quietly surrendered the argument and offered to wrap some leftover pastry for her.

Little did I know at that time that it was going to be one of the more civilized conversations on my trip, as my next memorable exchange involved Ukraine's regular army servicemen. I asked them to imagine that the Ukrainian army had defeated its enemy and quelled the separatist uprising. Could they see themselves working and living alongside people from Donbas when the war was over? After a long silence, two of them muttered that it would be really hard, as they could never trust people from Donbas again; a more vocal ukrop (slang for "Ukrainian patriot") said that there could be no reconciliation with the Donbas "garbage. We have nothing in common with these beggars, loafers and crooks. We never have."

Such kitchen talks, typically informal and seldom rigorous, are naturally vulnerable to bias and ad hominem attack; and the sentiment amongst Ukrainian soldiers is understandably hostile toward the separatist region. I expected to find more analytical and diplomatic conversation in professional settings. At a high-profile forum involving politicians and academics, I repeatedly heard variations of "we do not negotiate with terrorists"-the word "terrorists" being used to refer to all Donbas residents indiscriminately. In a less ceremonial setting, when I told one of my colleagues, a university professor from western Ukraine, that growing up in Donbas and speaking Russian made me no less Ukrainian than him, and that Ukraine needed to embrace her multiethnic and multilingual citizens, he quoted an old poem to suggest that, as in the past, only with "swords" could we "clean out the enemy"-the word "enemy" having suddenly appeared out of nowhere in the conversation.

These sentiments are consistent with the 2015 public-opinion poll conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), one of the most reputable private research companies in Ukraine. It showed that 92.6 percent of Ukrainians believe that the war does not merely usurp those involved in active military combat; the country as a whole is divided. Maybe it is too soon to start talking of reconciliation, then.

Indeed, only 40 percent of Ukrainians think that reconciliation is possible, but it is contingent on Russia's withdrawal from Ukraine's affairs. In Donbas, only 17.5 percent believe in reconciliation, while in western Ukraine the respective number is 53.5 percent. However ready or unready Ukrainians are for reconciliation, the important condition of Russia's withdrawal is not likely to be satisfied yet.

At the same time, despite obvious confrontation among Ukrainians in various parts of the country, they still relate to each other in fundamental ways and consider each other fellow citizens. Thus, only 12.7 percent of Ukrainians said, "we are too different to live in the same country" (among them 9.6 percent lost family members to war). Not surprisingly, the highest percentage of people who considered themselves "too different" was in Donetsk region (37.5 percent).

What these numbers suggest is that most Ukrainians do not disassociate themselves with their compatriots on the other side of the conflict, but they are still not ready for reconciliation.

Many Western scholars confirm Ukrainian people's belief that reconciliation, even if possible, is inherently a postconflict process. For example, Matthew Rojansky, Director of the Kennan Institute at the Wilson Center and an acclaimed expert on the former Soviet Union, notes that reconciliation "will not impose a ceasefire on the current conflict, nor will it bring perfect harmony to Ukraine's deeply divided domestic politics, nor can it resolve the major geopolitical disputes between Russia and Ukraine." Until the fighting has ended and the truce holds, the reconciliation process is equally denied to both sides in the conflict.

Similarly, David Bloomfield, an editor of the United Nations' 2003 Handbook Reconciliation after Violent Conflict, suggests that when we refer to reconciliation, what we typically have in mind is a postconflict situation: "war has ended, a settlement has been reached, and a new regime is struggling to construct a new society out of the ashes of the old."

However, considering the Handbook's own definition of reconciliation, as "a process through which a society moves from a divided past to a shared future," much of the foundational work can and should be done while the war is still raging. In the case of Ukraine, the groundwork for reconciliation can, I believe, be laid in the following three ways: government assistance programs, empowerment of de-politicized organizations and mental-health services.

First, attention from and recognition by high-profile politicians can play an important part in victims' embrace of reconciliation, and this recognition need not wait until the war is over. While Ukraine in general has enjoyed a fair share of compassion from the international community, the victims of war in eastern Ukraine should receive similar recognition, despite their proximity to the enemy. High-profile leaders should continually reinforce the message that preserving Donbas is not just about regaining control over a strategic buffer zone between Ukraine and Russia, but also about helping innocent civilians caught in the crossfire. And even if the contested territory is finally lost, the historical memory of those in the region will remain and impact belief and behavior as much as ever. Government assistance programs do not merely help alleviate hardship, but also enhance and empower such historical memory for good. Examples of such positive initiatives include the employment subsidy law signed by President Poroshenko in March 2015, authorizing state subsidies to companies employing refugees; and the Security Service of Ukraine order of June 16, allowing residents of rebel-occupied territories to flee war zones without a travel permit.

However meaningful government assistance can be, grassroots, nongovernmental entities are equally if not more important, as they engage citizens from different parts of Ukraine in collaborative work providing young leaders both a venue and a future reference frame for democratic governance, tolerance and reconciliation. The Journal of Ukraine's Supreme Court reported that the number of NGOs in Ukraine has been rising steadily since the breakup of the Soviet Union-from 300 in 1991 to nearly 72,000 in 2015. Ukraine Crisis Media Center reported that over fifty volunteer organizations alone were specifically aimed at helping the Ukrainian Army.

While not all NGOs are free of a political agenda, the numerous de-politicized organizations need to be empowered and showcased, both inside and outside Ukraine, as their work creates a favorable environment for future reconciliation and cultivates leaders with constructive, even redemptive, vision. One such organization that I encountered in Ukraine is "Initsiativa E+" (Initiative Exists), which provides assistance to Ukraine's front lines, hospitals and refugee camps. Many of its volunteers have been personally affected by the war and have strong political opinions, but the organization as a whole has made a conscious choice to rise above politics and make human rights its main agenda. My conversation with one of its courageous directors, Valentina Varava, reassured me that such leaders, who have personally experienced war and chosen to dedicate their lives to restoring peace and human values, are already laying an important foundation for reconciliation.

Finally, the most fundamental element for facilitating reconciliation, which can and should be implemented now, is psychological counseling and mental-health services. Numerous psychological studies have shown that widespread mental-health problems among both combatants and civilians may hinder successful postconflict reconciliation, as these mental disorders typically foster resentment and desire for revenge, and can lead to pathological anger. The war has affected a significant proportion of the country either directly or indirectly. According to the United Nations, the continued fighting in Ukraine has left over 6,000 people dead, more than 12,000 wounded, and close to 1 million internally displaced. It is estimated that Ukraine has some 130,000 active frontline personnel, and this number is expected to grow since the Ukrainian Parliament's recent decision to increase the army from 184,000 to 250,000.

The rising proportion of civilians traumatized by the war is alarming. According to KIIS, in 2014, almost 62 percent of surveyed respondents in all regions of Ukraine (including rebel-occupied Donetsk region, but excluding Luhansk region) reported experiencing a particularly stressful situation in the last twelve months, up 10 percent from 2013. A phone survey, conducted by KIIS in conflict zones in Donetsk and Luhansk regions from October 2014 to March 2015, revealed that the three most frequently cited stressful situations of the past twelve months were shelling (80 percent), feeling helpless (57 percent), and losing the means for existence (47 percent).

Whether it is due to an injury, death in the family, displacement or other trauma, the level of severe emotional stress experienced by military personnel, as well as civilians is devastating. It is crucial, then, that counseling services be widely available to the general public in Ukraine, on both sides of the conflict. Any delay in emotional healing during the war will tend to hamper and even jeopardize victims' recovery, as they become further trapped in their pain.

The problem with the availability of psychological help in Ukraine is twofold. On the one hand, there is a stigma that unless one has a serious mental disability, seeing a psychologist is a sign of weakness, especially among men. A military psychologist Andriy Kozinchuk was reported saying, "In our country the culture of psychological help is not that well developed. If somebody is having a problem, they don't go to a psychologist as a rule, they normally go to visit a friend and they get drunk." The second problem is that there are not enough psychological services available. Olena Zhabenko, a Kyiv-based psychiatrist and a researcher at the Ukrainian Research Institute of Social and Forensic Psychiatry and Drug Abuse, noted that lack of psychotherapeutic help, combined with lack of social and peer support significantly hinders timely mental-health assistance. It is therefore critical that in addition to clinical psychologists, more organizations offering peer support are available.

An example of an organization dedicated to helping soldiers and civilians deal with trauma is Wounded Warrior Ukraine. This unique NGO teaches Ukrainians suffering from trauma to relate their suffering to other victims and by doing so help them identify and overcome their own emotional trauma. In my conversation with Roman Torgovitsky, a Russian-born, Harvard-trained, Maidan-inspired founder of Wounded Warrior Ukraine, he stated that when working with veterans from conflicting sides, his priority is to teach them to abstract their minds from their emotions so they can begin to listen to each other. Bringing members of the conflicting sides to such a state of calmness and self-awareness that they can at least acknowledge each other's fundamental humanity is an essential first step, requiring constant practice.

Despite the researchers' claims that cessation of a military conflict is primary for internal reconciliation-and the conflict in Ukraine seems far from being over-we can take some immediate steps on the path toward reconciliation. Developing trust and understanding between former enemies is a challenging task even after the war has ended, let alone when it is still ongoing. But exactly because internal reconciliation is such a complex task, it need not wait until Ukraine is formally deemed a "postconflict" society. The healing of the wounds and the restoration of relationships can and should begin now with the government's recognition of and provision for the innocent civilians' needs, supporting and cultivating NGOs devoid of political agenda and dedicated to human rights, as well as strengthening and popularizing psychological assistance services.

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#30
Russia Beyond the Headlines/Rossiyskaya Gazeta
www.rbth.ru
July 27, 2015
Iranian precedent can help to unravel the Ukrainian knot
In this RBTH exclusive, President of the Russian Council on International Affairs Igor Ivanov, who served as Russian Foreign Minister from 1998-2004, explains why the global community should take heed of the lessons learned about effective cooperation in resolving international problems from the example of the recent talks on Iran's nuclear program, and how this experience can be of use in resolving the Ukrainian crisis.
By Igor Ivanov
Igor Ivanov is President of the Russian Council on International Affairs and served as Russian Foreign Minister from 1998-2004.
 
The agreements reached between the six international mediators (known as the P5+1) and Tehran on the Iranian nuclear program is one of the most significant positive developments in world politics recently.

The nuclear nonproliferation regime has been strengthened, additional opportunities are emerging to bring together the efforts of the world's leading powers in the Middle East and other crisis regions, and a positive response from the international markets can be expected.

The Iranian precedent has been set, and it deserves a thorough analysis in order to use the experience accumulated to deal with other international issues.

First of all, it should be noted that the agreement was reached against the very negative general background of relations between Russia and the West. The negotiators managed to exclude this background from the negotiation process, prevent the collapse of the P5+1, preserve a common position and bring the matter to a successful conclusion. This was also because the goal was very clear and specific, not allowing for arbitrary understandings and one-way interpretations.

The P5+1 and Iran also generally managed to isolate the negotiation process from the impact of domestic policies. In the years since the start of negotiations, most member countries repeatedly changed presidents and prime ministers, while the composition of the negotiating team changed too. However, the political will and determination to solve the problem on both sides won in the end.

The negotiations, of course, were tough, but carried out with respect for each other, with an effort to understand the partner's position, without pumping up hostile rhetoric and unleashing propaganda wars.

The agreements on Iran's nuclear program have once again demonstrated the importance of Russian-American dialogue at the present stage. It is the concerted efforts of Russia and the United States that largely ensured the achievement of these agreements. Iran's example, as well as the recent example of the elimination of chemical weapons in Syria, has once again demonstrated that the United States and Russia remain guarantors of strengthening the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.
 
The lessons of Iran

Of course, talking about the final resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue is premature. But the main conclusion is obvious: political will, clarity in setting objectives, the high professionalism of the participants, their willingness to compromise, the consistency and continuity of the stages of the negotiation process - all these factors make it possible to achieve success even in the most complex international situations.

The Iranian precedent deserves special attention in the context of the continuing crisis in and around Ukraine. Unfortunately, we must note that the current "Normandy format" for discussion of the Ukrainian crisis in many respects is clearly inferior to the format of the negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran.

Not all the participants of the Minsk process demonstrate the political will required to reach agreements. The objectives of the negotiations are not always clearly defined, except when immediate, tactical aims are set.

In addition, the willingness of all parties to compromise and to take mutual interests into account is by no means always manifested. The propaganda war between the West and Russia does not provide even a temporary truce for a period of preparation and implementation of agreements.
 
Finding a holistic approach

The only way out of the Ukrainian impasse is the qualitative improvement of cooperation between the major international players interested in resolving the crisis as soon as possible. This applies equally to the intensity of the work of the negotiating mechanism, the set of problems discussed and the composition of the participants in the Minsk process.

It concerns the formation of a broad international consensus concerning the stages of Ukraine's exit from the crisis and the future of the country in a new system of European security. It also concerns a set of incentives - both positive and negative - that the international community must have at its disposal, working with all parties to the conflict in Ukraine.

First published in Russian in Rossiyskaya Gazeta.

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 31
Interfax-Ukraine
July 27, 2015
If Ukraine fails with applying for EU membership in 2020, this won't happen even in 25 years - Klimkin
 
Ukraine by 2020 must apply for membership in the European Union, otherwise it might not happen even in 25 years, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin said.

"Klimkin: application to gain membership in the European Union in 2020 is not some kind of bravado. If we don't make this step in 5 years, we won't cope with this task even in 25 [years]. Then goes a long-lasting consideration," the European Pravda edition (the European Truth) quoted Klimkin on its Twitter blog.

Klimkin said this during a meeting with his Twitter subscribers at Ukrainian Foreign Ministry's building, the edition said.

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 #32
Newsweek.com
July 24, 2015
Russia's Medvedev: Ukraine Could Face Yugoslavia-Style Break Up
By Damien Sharkov

Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev has warned that Ukraine could disappear from the map of Europe as Yugoslavia did, if Kiev does not "show some flexibility" and grant more autonomy to the territories in the east held by pro-Russian separatists.

Six countries currently on the map of Europe were once members of the Serb-led communist Yugoslav Federation before the Yugoslav wars in 1992, while Kosovo declared its independence from the territory of Serbia in 2008. Ironically Russia has backed Serbia in not recognizing Kosovo's independence and blocking a U.N. resolution recognizing the organised killing of ethnic Bosniaks by Bosnian Serb forces as "a crime of genocide".
 
Speaking to Slovenian broadcaster RTV Slovenija ahead of his visit to the country, a former Yugoslav republic, Medvedev compared the conflict between pro-Russian forces in Ukraine's eastern Donetsk and Luhansk regions to Yugoslavia. The interview transcript was published on the Russian government's website.

"Let us ask, for example, the Russian youth if they remember a country such as Yugoslavia? I think most young people would already be struggling to recall that this country was ever on the map of Europe," Medvedev said. "It was a very difficult, harsh, painful and, unfortunately, unpeaceful process. Why am I reminding you of this? Because, when we are told that it is necessary to respect international obligations, it is something we completely agree with... but this approach must be applied to all states, in all situations."

The early 1990s saw the Yugoslav conflict reach the height of its violence, specifically in Bosnia and Croatia where around 110,000 and 20,000 respectively have been reported killed. Other states seceded more peacefully, most notably Montenegro which parted from Serbia in 2006 after a referendum agreed by both sides. Slovenia's own war of independence lasted 10 days, during which around 100 people were killed.

"I am reminiscing about Yugoslavia, only because I hope that at some point in the future we will not have to remember the country which used to be called Ukraine in the same way," Medvedev added. "The existence of Ukraine at the present moment depends on the wisdom, patience, tact, willingness to compromise and the desire to speak to everyone who makes decisions on the territory of Ukraine."

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 #33
Government.ru
July 24, 2015
Dmitry Medvedev's interview with Slovenian radio and television company RTV Slovenija [excerpt]

Vlasta Jeseničnik : Let's move on to Ukraine, which, with its 18 month-old crisis, is one of Europe's most burning issues. What are your expectations? Do you see any real chances of resolving this situation any time soon?

Dmitry Medvedev: Yes, I do. First, the Ukrainian crisis was engineered. It's not that it originated in someone's head, or is due to some force majeure circumstances. No, it was actually staged, and the former and current leaders of Ukraine are responsible for it. The former failed to restore law and order, while the latter allowed a civil war to break out. The Ukrainian people must hold them accountable for that.

Second, the Ukrainian crisis can be resolved only in Ukraine by the Ukrainians. Neither the Russian Federation, nor the European Union, nor the United States, but only by the Ukrainians must do it. They need to sit down and agree on things. The authorities should show flexibility within the framework of the Minsk Agreements and take the decisions that they must take, including the ones relating to the autonomous republics in southeastern Ukraine. Of course, the self-defence units and political forces in southeastern Ukraine should show a willingness to compromise and reach an agreement with the Ukrainian authorities. Only then will peace come to the Ukrainian land. Perhaps, this is the most important thing to do, because if it doesn't happen, we will witness a very sad process. It is already sad, but it could take on very dramatic proportions.

History is a tough and a fairly quick thing. Let me talk about events that are closer to you. Let's ask young Russians who remembers a country such as Yugoslavia. I think most young people will struggle to remember that Yugoslavia was ever on the map of Europe. At the same time, everyone knows, travels, loves, and has friends in the countries that used to be part of the former Yugoslavia. It was a difficult, painful and, unfortunately, not a peaceful process. I'm referring to Yugoslavia, because when we are told that we must respect international obligations, we fully agree with that. Clearly, it is imperative to adhere to international obligations and generally accepted international rules, but this approach should be applied to all countries and all situations. I bring up Yugoslavia only because I hope that someday we won't have to remember that there used to be a state called Ukraine, as with Yugoslavia. The existence of Ukraine depends on the wisdom, patience, tact, and a willingness to achieve compromise and negotiation between all the decision-makers in Ukraine. I'm talking about the authorities in Kiev and the political forces in southeastern Ukraine.

Vlasta Jeseničnik :  Can Russia help with this? Or Washington?

Dmitry Medvedev: Of course it can, and we are doing our best to help them get there. Anyone who wants them to agree can help. So does Russia, although we do not consider ourselves responsible for this conflict. Indeed, Ukraine is close to us, and the people who live there are very close to us. They are, in fact, our relatives. The European Union can help as well, by the way, and it is helping. I believe that several countries currently play an important role. The United States can also help promote this process, because the US is a major powerful state that plays a key role in NATO, has a controlling stake in the global economy and so on.

Again, let's face it, Ukraine's leaders are actively consulting with Washington. In this regard, we believe that our contact with the US is useful. But we shouldn't impose anything on Ukraine. The problem of Ukraine is that, at some point, some states decided that they could run things there and show how events can unfold. We all know how it ended.

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 #34
Russia stands for Ukraine's territorial integrity - PM

LJUBLJANA /Slovenia/, July 27. /TASS/. Russia stands for Ukraine's territorial integrity with due account on decisions on Crimea taken last year, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev said on Monday.

"Russia stands for Ukraine territorial integrity but, naturally, considering the decisions on Crimea taken last year," he told a news conference after his talks with Slovenian leaders. "We are ready to continue consultation on that matter. I think it will be useful in any case."

He said the most sensitive issue raised at his talks in Slovenia was the conflict in Ukraine. The Russian prime minister said his Slovenian counterpart Miro Cerar had informed him about the European Union's position on Ukraine while he himself had once again states Russia's unchanged stance. "We also proceed from the fact that there is no military solution to this conflict, that it is to be settled by peaceful means, first of all, through talks between all the parties to this conflict, I mean both the official authorities and the authorities in the southeast [of Ukraine]," he said.

Among other topics discussed at the talks were issues of security, including efforts against radical terrorist groups, such as Islamic State, he said, adding that the situation in the Blakan was addressed too.

Slovenia's Prime Minister Miro Cerar also said his country stood for Ukraine's territorial integrity and independence.

"We touched upon the Ukrainian problem among other subjects. I informed my counterpart about Slovenia's position, in particular, that Slovenia stands for territorial integrity and independence of Ukraine and calls to respect the Minsk agreements," Cerar said, adding that Slovenia was among those countries that stood for a political dialogue, for the use of political means in settling the armed conflict.

"Slovenia sticks to this position. We are closely watching the situation and if it improves, it will lead to the abandonment of sanctions," he said.

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#35
Two soldiers in Odessa get prison terms for refusing to fight in Donbas
Almost half of Odessa conscripts have refused to fight in Donbas

ODESSA, July 27. /TASS/. Two soldiers have been sentenced to two years in prison in Odessa for refusing to fight in the Donbas region, the press service of the Military Prosecutor's Office of Southern region of Ukraine reported on Monday. The corresponding decision was made by the Odessa region's Court of Appeals that overturned the verdict of the first-instance court.

"Both soldiers openly refused to do military service when their unit was fulfilling combat tasks in the area of the anti-terrorist operation. They were previously given two years' suspended sentence with one-year probation. The new sentence gives them two years' imprisonment. Both the soldiers after the pronouncement of the sentence were taken into custody in the courtroom," says the document, quoted on Monday by the Timer news portal of Odessa.

Almost half of Odessa conscripts have refused to fight in Donbas. "During the country's three mobilization waves, about 6,000 people have been called up for military service. More than 2,500 dodged conscription," deputy chief enlistment officer of the Odessa region Valery Ishchenko said. According to him, about 900 cases on bringing the "draft dodgers" to criminal responsibility have been filed to the law enforcement agencies.

Last autumn, a wave of protests against the mobilization swept through the region - the protesters were blocking highways, setting military enlistment offices on fire and issuing threats to their staff, destroying military subpoenas. Thousands of people participated in the protest rallies, they adopted at their gatherings appeals to the country's leadership with a demand to stop the war and find a peaceful way out of the Donbass standoff.
 

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 #36
New York Times
July 27, 2015
An AIDS Crisis in Ukraine
By MICHEL KAZATCHKINE
Michel Kazatchkine, a French physician, is the United Nations secretary general's special envoy for H.I.V./AIDS in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

GENEVA - More than 6,500 deaths have been reported in the Donbass region, where Ukrainian forces have battled Russian-supported separatist fighters for control since April 2014. The political violence has led to a humanitarian crisis. More than 8,000 patients being treated for H.I.V. or drug dependence have had life-saving medicines cut off, or will soon be without them, unless action is taken right now to allow a humanitarian convoy through.

Health care was an early casualty of the conflict in the Donbass. The Ukrainian government, saying it wished to ensure that national resources did not fall into the hands of armed groups, cut off funding in November to all facilities in the region, including hospitals, and told patients who remained in the conflict zone that they could travel to government-controlled territory to receive medicines. Unsurprisingly, this has proved impractical for many people who are sick, poor or simply frightened. Mechanisms to monitor and respond to disease outbreaks are no longer functional in the territory; immunization coverage is low, and health experts now fear possible outbreaks of polio and for the safety of blood supplies.

People at risk for, or living with, H.I.V. are already suffering. Ukraine has one of the highest rates of H.I.V. infection in Europe; the majority of patients were infected with the virus through contaminated drug injections. Before the conflict, Ukrainian programs helped control H.I.V. infections in the Donbass by providing sterile needles and syringes and methadone, a medicine the World Health Organization recommends to reduce use of and craving for heroin. Ukraine successfully reduced H.I.V. infections, particularly among young people who inject drugs, for whom infection rates decreased more than fivefold between 2007 and 2013.

Unfortunately, the Donbass conflict now jeopardizes that progress. According to the International H.I.V./AIDS Alliance in Ukraine, a nongovernmental organization based in Kiev, more than 1,000 patients in the Donbass have either had their methadone stopped or reduced to substandard doses, forcing men and women to undergo painful withdrawal or return to street drugs. Requests to the Ukrainian government to replenish methadone supplies, accompanied by an offer by Doctors Without Borders to oversee distribution, were met with the response that the medicine - distributed routinely to hundreds of thousands of patients across Western Europe - could be transported, under Ukrainian law, only by armed convoys. In June, a number of patients sent a video appeal to government officials, saying they feared for their lives because their treatment had been interrupted. It is not known how many people have succumbed to overdose or suicides after methadone treatments were ended, though the video reported nine deaths.

People living with H.I.V. in the Donbass now face a similar interruption in life-saving antiretroviral treatment. The W.H.O. estimates that supplies of H.I.V. medicines will last only until mid-August in some parts of the Donbass. The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria has offered to pay for more antiretroviral treatments, and Unicef is willing to procure them. However, no humanitarian convoy has delivered medicines into the territory since February. Thousands of men and women, many of whom overcame discrimination and financial barriers to secure access to H.I.V. medicines, are now watching their antiretroviral pill supplies vanish, and with them, their hopes for survival. The W.H.O. reports that medicines for multidrug-resistant tuberculosis, diagnosed at high levels in the region, are also running low.

For their part, those in control of the self-proclaimed Luhansk and Donetsk People's Republics in the Donbass have shown little interest in protecting the lives of people with H.I.V. A number of reports have documented violence against people who use drugs and other marginalized groups. The People's Republic of Luhansk has indicated that it does not want to continue opioid-replacement therapy (consistent with Russian policy), and has announced that United Nations agencies must register with them prior to provision of any humanitarian aid. The Ukrainian Parliament has exempted itself from culpability for the Donbass, passing a resolution in May that the rights of those remaining are the responsibility of the "occupier." At the same time, the authorities in Luhansk or Donetsk have not moved to fill the H.I.V. treatment gap, leaving patients in a desperate limbo.

No one should be forced to choose between fleeing their home and stopping life-saving treatment.

This is a humanitarian crisis that can be easily solved. The Ukrainian government, even if reluctant to commit resources in the "temporarily occupied" region, should permit passage of a United Nations convoy with medicines funded by international donors. Those controlling the Donbass could also give the green light for the convoy. The government of Ukraine should work on an interim procedure to provide assistance to the population in these territories and facilitate the passage of humanitarian aid.

The Minsk Group, which is led by France, Russia and the United States and tasked with finding a peaceful resolution to the conflict, should urge immediate action to restore the medicine supply in the Donbass.

Silence and inaction will only bring more suffering. Nothing is gained by making patients hostage to geopolitical disputes. Both the Ukrainian government and the leaders of the separatist Donbass region should ensure that, as a matter of medical ethics and human decency, innocent and vulnerable medical patients do not join the list of casualties in this conflict.

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 #37
Russia Insider
http://russia-insider.com
July 27, 2015
By Now There's Overwhelming Evidence Kiev Sniper Massacre Was a False Flag
Canadian scholar Ivan Katchanovski keeps finding new and new publicly available supporting evidence on basically a weekly basis
By Ivan Katchanovski
[Video here http://russia-insider.com/en/now-theres-overwhelming-evidence-kiev-sniper-massacre-was-false-flag/ri8986]

Originally posted by author on his Facebook account

One of several pro-Maidan snipers (background left in photo) shown in video on YouTube from Feb. 20, 2014

This previously unreported but publicly available video shows [Volodymyr] Parasiuk and some armed members of his special company walking past the Maidan stage from the Trade Union building direction during the Maidan massacre at 9:10am on February 20, 2014 (3:25-3:28 mark in the video). One of them openly carries an AK assault rifle, or its hunting version.

My study contains evidence that Maidan snipers shot at the police from the Trade Union building shortly before the police units fled at 8:50am and that this building remained one of the locations of the Maidan "snipers" or their coordinators during the massacre of the protesters.

From 9:07-9:10am, at least four protesters (Shymko, Solchanyk, Saienko, and Kotsuba) were killed within less than 150 meters of each other. The evidence suggests that at least first three of them were shot from the Hotel Ukraina. At 9:10am, there was a public announcement from the Maidan stage about snipers in the Hotel Ukraina. Armed Berkut police officers were also firing live ammunition in the close distance at this very time.

But this group of the Maidan "snipers" showed no apparent concern about being in a shooting range of the Hotel Ukraina "snipers" and the Berkut special company. Conversely, the Hotel Ukraina "snipers" did not target these and other armed Maidan shooters.

This group of the Maidan "snipers" was not seen in videos and photos from 9:10am till 10:18am, that is, during the time when most of the 49 protesters were killed. This looks like "dog that did not bark." At 10:18-10:19am, they were filmed running into the Hotel Ukraina as a part of a larger armed group, which was then shooting from the hotel as protesters were killed from the same hotel, as even the official investigation now concluded.

Such seemingly irrational actions become rational if the Parasiuk special Maidan company "snipers" and the initial Hotel Ukraina "snipers" were from the same side. Many Maidan activists and leaders and journalists near and on the stage saw this group of the Maidan "snipers" walking past them, but none of them reported this.

The YouTube video has received only a few dozen views.

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#38
Authorities in Kiev crack down on political rivals
By Lyudmila Alexandrova

MOSCOW, July 27. /TASS/. Ukraine's newly-effective ban on Communist participation in forthcoming elections, whatever its ideological disguise, is above all indicative of the authorities' determination to get rid of political rivals, analysts say. In fact, the Communists are the sole political force that may be considered as genuine opposition to the current authorities in Kiev, and it is noteworthy that the West prefers to turn a blind eye on Kiev's obviously undemocratic moves, they add.

Ukraine's Justice Ministry has stripped the country's three Communist parties of the right to participate in political processes and elections in accordance with the so-called law on de-communization which the parliament voted for last April. The largest of the three - the Communist Party of Ukraine - enjoys a rather high rating and it looked determined to participate in local elections due on October 25.

The authorities in Kiev have two aims, head of the general politology department at the Higher School of Economics Leonid Polyakov told TASS. "The general ideological aim is to get rid of the Soviet past. It was declared as one of the tasks of the so-called 'Revolution of Dignity.' On the other hand, there is a very practical, down-to-earth purpose. The Communists represent an impressive political force with many supporters. The lower the standard of living falls, the larger the Communist electorate will grow. So this is a preventive measure expected to eradicate political sources of likely instability."

Polyakov says it is rather odd that champions of democratic values in the West do nothing to protest against the bans on Communist parties in Ukraine. After all, left-of-centre parties in Europe have a firm foothold. "The United States and its European satellites keep quiet about the persecution of Ukrainian Communists, which is so reminiscent of the notorious (berufsverbot) professional ban practices. They see Ukraine as a tool to counter Russia's 'imperial ambitions', they say. This explains why the authorities in Kiev are forgiven everything, including steps that obviously run counter to the widely professed European values."

The systematic campaign to oust the Communists from the political scene has lasted for quite a while, says the president of the Systemic Analysis and Forecasting Centre, Rostislav Ishchenko. "When power in Ukraine changed hands, efforts to eject the Communists from politics by force went into high gear," the Internet portal Aktualnyie Komentarii (Topical Commentaries) quotes Ishchenko as saying. The analyst attributes this to a worsening economic situation which cannot but contribute to the popularity of socially-oriented parties.

"The Communists had every reason to expect their popularity will be soaring," Ishchenko said. "The more so since the Party of Regions has in fact been ruined. Respectively, it would be quite logical to expect that the Party of Regions' electorate would set their eyes on the Communists as the most radical opponents to the current authorities. The Communists are being literally wiped out."

"As a matter of fact, any ground for normal opposition is being eliminated," deputy dean of the world economy and world politics department at the Higher School of Economics Andrei Suzdaltsev told TASS. He believes that the authorities in Kiev fear the protests in Kiev may "turn red".

"Certainly, protests will rely on a left-wing ideology. The just-enacted laws will make it far easier to curb them. In fact, any ground for the emergence of a normal opposition is being eliminated," he said.

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 #39
"Poroshenko is turning into Yanukovych," says leader of Ukrainian radicals

KIEV, July 24. /TASS/. Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko is turning his power into dictatorship, the deputy of the Verkhovna Rada, Oleh Lyashko tweeted in Facebook on Friday.

"I can see it quite clearly Petro Poroshenko is turning into Yanukovych [Ukraine's former President who was compelled to leave the country after the state coup of February 2014 - TASS]," Lyashko said. "Transformation of state power into dictatorship is Ukraine's permanent tragedy."

He expressed indignation over the fact he was told on Thursday to leave the hall where the National Council for Reforms was holding a session attended by Poroshenko.

"I was forced out of the hall but Poroshenko will be carried out of the Presidential Administration on the forks unless he heeds the people," Lyashko wrote.
He also said that when he asked Poroshenko if he had fulfilled his pre-election promises and had sold Ukraine's Channel Five TV and other businesses, the president said he had never promised any such things.

"For the sake of Ukraine's salvation, it's important to pass a law on impeachment of the president and on provisional parliamentary investigative commission."

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 #40
Human Rights in Ukraine
http://khpg.org
July 27, 2015
Communist party ban will be slammed in Strasbourg, along with original decommunization law
By Halya Coynash

Ukraine's Justice Ministry has used a law likely to be condemned by the European Court of Human Rights as justification for another decision which is certain to be "struck down" by that same court. Justice Minister Pavlo Petrenko announced on Friday that he has signed the order to strip Ukraine's Communist Party and two other linked parties of their registration, and therefore their right to take part in the coming local elections. Ukrainian political parties have thus effectively been banned without any court ruling.

What Petrenko called "a day of historic justice" was viewed very differently by human rights lawyers.  Volodymyr Yavorsky, a Ukrainian human rights activist, believes that the decision, if not overturned in Ukraine, will be found unlawful by the European Court of Human Rights.  It may be in compliance with the relevant 'decommunization law', but it is manifestly in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights.  He warns that the case will seriously damage Ukraine's reputation.  It will effectively demonstrate that the new government is infringing the rights of opposition political parties.

Bill Bowring, Professor of Law at Birkbeck College, University of London, says that he is "100% sure that the Ukrainian ban would be struck down at Strasbourg - but of course only after several years. The policy is stupid and dangerous."

Ongoing battle

The press briefing on July 24 was also attended by Oleksandr Turchynov, now head of Ukraine's National Security and Defence Council.  Exactly one year earlier but as Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada, Turchynov formally announced the dissolution of the Communist Party faction in parliament.  That move was on a formal pretext, after a law was signed making it possible to dissolve factions that had become smaller than the minimum number required.  Earlier in July 2014, Petrenko had  announced that he had applied to the District Administrative Court for a ban on the Communist Party [CPU].  He asserted that the move was taken on the basis of considerable evidence provided by the SBU or Security Service and Prosecutor General's Office of the CPU's active support and financing of separatists. He added that their evidence was extremely strong, with more than 129 pages and a number of videos, and promised that the court case would be as public as possible.

The court case is ongoing or, depending how you look at it, going nowhere.  In May 2015, when consideration of the case was yet again stymied, Petrenko openly asserted that this was because of the corruption of the judicial system and judges' unwillingness to take responsibility for decisions of importance for the country.

Now on July 24, 2015, without having obtained a court ban, the Justice Ministry has nonetheless stripped the Communist Party of the right to take part in political or electoral processes.   At the press briefing given on July 24, the move was explained as being in compliance with the Law on condemning communist and National-Socialist (Nazi) totalitarian regimes in Ukraine and on prohibiting propaganda of its symbols".  The Justice Minister asserted that an independent commission had been formed as soon as the law came into effect, with this including representatives not only of the Ministry, but of civil society  The commission allegedly worked for a month and presented conclusions on the basis of which the Minister signed his decrees which state that the activities, names, symbols, charters and programmes of the three parties are against the law.

There is no indication on the Ministry's website as to who was on this commission and how "representatives of civil society" were chosen.

The law in question does indeed ban the activities of any party that uses communist (or Nazi) symbols in their name or has propaganda of communist (or Nazi) totalitarian regimes and their symbols in their founding documents.

In his damning assessment of the law, Yavorsky pointed out that the European Court of Human Rights is quite unequivocal with respect to dissolution of a political party. This must be on the basis of the party's activities, not on its name or symbols.

Proven activities

Turchynov spoke of the decision being an "act of historical judgement", since "the communist party whose ideology is effectively equivalent to Nazi ideology bears responsibility for the torture of the Ukrainian people, for mass repression and Holodomor"comm [the manmade Famine of 1932/33].

Turchynov did not only cite the past, but asserted that from the first days of Russian aggression, the Communist Party had acted like a fifth column and had supported and abetted Russia's occupation of Crimea and the invasion of Russian forces in the east of Ukraine.  He claimed that material "confirming the criminal activities of the Communist Party against its own country" had been collected and passed to the court.  However, he continued, the court, "as you know", needs radical reform and 100-percent renewal, and the court case is dragging on.

If the activities mentioned are criminal offences, then criminal proceedings must be brought against those individuals believed responsible. This is within the jurisdiction of the Security Service.  It is in this manner that the level of complicity of the Communist Party in violations of Ukraine's territorial integrity should be demonstrated, not through populist rhetoric.

Turchynov claimed that the decrees were demonstrating "responsibility before those who are buried at Bykivnya (where the NKVD buried victims of the Terror in mass graves - HC), those whose graves lie in Siberia, in other places where Ukrainian patriots were tortured and murdered".  This was suspiciously similar to the argument used by President Petro Poroshenko soon after signing into force the highly contentious 'decommunization' laws.  On the third Sunday in May, when Ukrainians remember the Victims of Political Repression, Poroshenko "called on all those who opposed decommunization to come to Bykivnya and feel what the victims of communist terror are calling for."

His words were deeply offensive to many, the author included, who have every reason to condemn the communist regime yet still opposed the 'decommunization' laws.  It is dishonest to cite the memory of victims of a monstrous regime as justification for bad laws.  If political parties and their members have abetted Russia in its war against Ukraine, let them answer before the law - for their deeds, not their political symbols.  Unlike Russia, Ukraine is not questioning its obligations under European and international law and should not be taking decisions and passing laws which move it away from democratic standards and which will be slated by the European Court of Human Rights.

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 #41
Ukrainian PM expects more substantial financial aid from West

KYIV. July 27 (Interfax) - Ukraine does not receive appropriate financial aid from Western countries, Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk said.

"We are grateful for the existing level of support but it is necessary to admit that we are awfully underfinanced," Yatsenyuk said during a board meeting of the Finance Ministry in Kyiv on Monday.

According to the prime minister, the problems of Greece are "nothing compared to the issues of Ukraine." Greece received 380 billion euro, while Ukraine received 17.5 billion euro from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and $7.5 billion from other donors, he said.

Namely because of this Ukraine firstly needs to restructure debts and return funds stolen by the previous Ukrainian government, Yatsenyuk said.

The government sent creditors a market proposal on restructuring foreign debt and it is hoped that they will accept this offer and "help the Ukrainian people with U.S. dollars, not with words."

"It was not us who took out these loans but we realize our responsibility. I hope that the creditors realize their responsibility too, when they issued loans to the former Ukrainian president. As you can see, he gathered 40 billion from private creditors in three years," Yatsenyuk said.

Servicing the foreign debt of Ukraine on credits "we did not take" amounts to 5% GDP, the prime minister said.

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 #42
Ukraine puts new debt restructuring proposals to creditors - minister
By Natalia Zinets

KIEV, July 27 (Reuters) - Heavily indebted Ukraine has made new proposals to its creditors for restructuring $23 billion of foreign debt and is now awaiting their response, Finance Minister Natalia Yaresko said on Monday.

She declined to give reporters any details of the proposals.

Ukraine, whose economic plight is exacerbated by a draining conflict with Russian-backed separatists in the east of the country, is seeking a deal on its debt to make savings of $15.3 billion in the coming four years.

Restructuring negotiations have dragged on for over four months because of disagreement over the need for a writedown on the principal of the bonds as requested by Kiev. The government has threatened to invoke a moratorium on debt repayments if it does not get satisfaction.

"We are waiting for a reaction from creditors to the newest proposals which we have transferred to them," Yaresko said. "I think there should be new negotiations this week."

It was not known if Kiev's new proposals included a retreat from the demand for a "haircut" (reduction) of up to 40 percent that it has pressed for.

The bondholder committee led by U.S. financial giants including Franklin Templeton have opposed a "haircut" and maintained that maturity extensions and coupon reductions will be enough for the Kiev government to make the necessary savings.

Earlier on Monday, Yaresko told a ministry meeting attended by Prime Minister Arseny Yatseniuk that she felt sure a deal would be reached.

She also said she expected a deal to be tied up with creditors on July 30 to restructure the Eurobonds of state-owned Oschadbank as part of the broader $40 billion International Monetary fund-led programme to restructure Ukraine's sovereign and quasi-sovereign debt.

Despite the bleak state of its finances, Ukraine made a crucial Eurobond coupon payment of $120 million last Friday to avoid technical default, though it has more repayment deadlines looming in August and September.

Ratings agency Moody's on Monday said that there was still "an imminent risk" of a Ukrainian moratorium even though Ukraine had met the July 24 interest payment. It added however that Kiev and the creditors could find "common ground" before September.

The IMF has brought relief to Ukraine by saying it will disburse $1.7 billion in fresh funds under a $17.5 bailout package irrespective of a restructuring deal being reached.

Ukraine expects the IMF board of directors to make its decision on July 31.

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#43
Sputnik
July 27, 2015
Hidden Emergency: Kiev Slammed Over Ukraine's Humanitarian Crisis

The Ukrainian government has been criticized for failing to properly look after 1.4 million people who have been displaced as a result of the war in the country's east, in what has been described as a "hidden emergency" by various charities.

Charities and aid agencies have called on the government to do more to help Ukrainians that have been left homeless as a result of the conflict, accusing President Poroshenko of breaking a promise to provide all displaced people with adequate housing.

An estimated 1.4 million people have been forced to leave their homes since the war in Ukraine's east broke out in April last year, leaving the country with one of the highest levels of internally displaced people (IDPs) in the world.

Instead of being housed and looked after through Ukrainian government programs, many fleeing Ukrainians have been forced to rely on charities and volunteer groups for basic needs such as food, clothing and shelter.

In fact, the UN refugee agency UNHCR, estimates that less than 5 percent of IDPs are actually being housed in recognized asylum centers, while it also says that approximately five million Ukrainians - one ninth of the population - are in need of some sort of humanitarian assistance.

Lack of Services Driving Up Prices

The lack of government services has also led to accusations that landlords are trying to cash in on the crisis, with reports suggesting that some property owners in cities like Kiev and Lvov are trebling rental prices due to the chronic shortage of suitable accommodation.

Wasyl Gelbych, head of housing subsidies and benefits at the Department of Social Protection in Lvov, told Reuters that the Poroshenko government had a responsibility to address the issue:

"We would be willing to accept many IDPs, but we do not know where they could stay, because the government has done nothing to create places for them."

UNHCR spokeswoman Nina Sorokopud likened the situation to a hidden emergency, saying that Ukraine's refugee situation wasn't visible on the streets due to the help and support offered by charities and community groups.

However, the government has been warned that the situation is worsening and would have further devastating effects unless adequate solutions were introduced.

No Money, No Work

As a result of a lack of concrete action to solve the refugee problem, many IDPs were being forced to move to isolated villages in the Ukrainian countryside, rather than the cities.

This was creating further problems for Ukrainians, as there was a lack of employment opportunities in many of the villages that refugees were moving to, therefore prohibiting many from earning a living.

Charities have also attacked the Kiev government's monthly allowance of approximately $20 given to IDPs, which has been described as widely inadequate.

More than 6,500 people have been killed as a result of the fighting in Ukraine since April last year, with many communities in the conflict zones of the country's east suffering a devastating humanitarian crises as a result of being cut off from basic supplies such as water, shelter and medicine.

Despite several ceasefire agreements being signed between Kiev forces and eastern Ukrainian separatist groups, fighting continues on an almost daily basis.
 

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 #44
www.thedailybeast.com
July 25, 2015
Can Putin Afford to Keep East Ukraine?
The Russian-backed blitz that seemed imminent hasn't materialized. One reason: confusion about what Moscow and the rebels really want.
By Anna Nemtsova

DONETSK, Ukraine - The military commandant in this embattled city, Andrei Shpigel, was having an emotional discussion with officers and soldiers of his "DPR Army" on the veranda of a local restaurant. They were talking about the future of their self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic. Would it eventually become a peaceful region of Ukraine, or be annexed by Russia, or stay an independent but unrecognized separatist territory?

For Shpigel and perhaps 15,000 other rebel soldiers controlling this part of eastern Ukraine, a return of Kiev's legal and military authority over their "republic" would mean potential prison terms and even worse: "mass physical elimination," they agreed, nodding at each other. The commandant told The Daily Beast that DPR forces would never allow their self-proclaimed republic to reunite with Ukraine.

And yet, the struggle for quasi-independence appears to have lost momentum. "Whatever happened to the Russian 'blitz' that everybody was predicting a month ago?" I asked the soldiers. Then, Kremlin-backed rebel forces launched a violent offensive on Ukrainian positions in Maryinka, a village outside Donetsk city. It seemed that the clashes were going to escalate through the summer, much as they had done last year.

As the soldiers tell the story, there was a bureaucratic and administrative problem. "That blitz has never happened because our DPR Army did not support the idea of the Maryinka operation, the attack was conducted by the DPR interior ministry," Shpigel explained to The Daily Beast. Reaching out for a piece of paper and a pen, the commandant drew a simple optical illusion of cylinders that could be curved or square depending on the angle: "There are at least three truths," he said: "One in Russia, one in Ukraine and one in the DPR- but there is only one reality."

In their ideal reality, the Donetsk separatists would keep all their weapons and power, receive financial support from Russia and do business with the Ukraine. But in the real reality people living in rebel-controlled territories are suffering for lack of medicine, waiting months expecting Moscow to pay their pensions and salaries and even to deliver groceries and consumer goods. A commander named Mamai chimes in: "Putin's man, administrator Vladislav Surkov, is here right now cleaning up the upper circles around Zakharchenko," he says, referring to the supposed leader of the DPR, Alexander Zakharchenko.

But the rebel commanders insisted it's not just a matter of Moscow making decisions for DPR. Shpigel suggested, "The Kremlin's power has at least three heads, liberals from Yeltsin's family, Putin's men and Putin himself."

A 24-year-old soldier named Vladimir put in a word: "What politicians are you talking about? Today two of our guys with guns can enter any minister's office and decide politics in our people's republic," he said.

In spite of the divided opinions and controversial tensions among rebels, Russia has supplied food, gas, clothes and other goods to Donbas residents. On July 16, a caravan of over 30 trucks with "Humanitarian Help from Russian Federation" written on their sides arrived in Donetsk; on Thursday, 100 more trucks loaded with over 1,000 tons of goods reached the border with the rebel controlled territories.

A special investigative report by the Russian RBK agency described the complicated subterfuge by which Russian money flowed to eastern Ukraine through South Ossetia, a breakaway Georgian republic that, unlike DPR, had accounts in Russian banks.

Was Russian President Vladimir Putin's strategy to back the breakaway republics, while expecting Ukraine to pay the pensions and other bills? If so, he miscalculated. Ukraine stopped paying salaries and pensions to the breakaway republics last summer and today the economy, political scandals and internal conflicts have become the Kremlin's headache. To provide pensions for over one million retired people in the breakaway territory, Russia had to take a part of the money from its own budget.

In interviews with The Daily Beast, residents of Horlivka, Snizhnoye, Rassypnoye, and Grabovo complained about tiny pensions of about $25 to $30 a month.

There is also a dramatic shortage of medicine, and speculators bringing medicine from Russia or Ukraine sell it at prices that local pensioners can't afford.

Enrique Menendez, a participant in the Responsible Citizens volunteer movement, , told The Daily Beast that many babies born in Donetsk are premature and need special medicines, but "at the moment there are only four boxes of medicine for premature babies left in all of Donetsk, while we need at least ten boxes." Patients with diabetes cannot buy insulin inside the DPR. A recent United Nations report noted that 8,000 HIV patients have been left without medicine.

Russian officials, including Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, have pointed out again and again that Russia does not have the money to feed Donbas and that the breakaway territories were Ukraine's responsibility.

So, who would supply medicine to millions of people in rebel republics of Luhansk and Donetsk? Donbas should not expect much from Russia on that front. Its own pharmaceutical market depends on for foreign producers who demand payment from dwindingly supplies of foreign currency.
In fact, Russia does not have enough money left to feed itself: on Wednesday, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev admitted that there was no money left in Russia's budget to support 94 so-called "crisis cities" dependent on single industries; about 19 million Russians live in these one-factory towns now without support programs.

Maybe the Kremlin should have thought a year ago whether Russia was prosperous enough for a foreign policy that leaves neighboring areas expecting support from Moscow.

"Very soon crowds of angry Russians will blame the Kremlin for annexing Crimea and backing Donbas while Russia itself is desperate and hungry," Timur Olevsky of Rain TV told The Daily Beast. "Under new regulations, Russian law enforcement will have a right to shoot at protesters," he suggested.

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 #45
Chatham House
www.chathamhouse.org
Jul 23, 2015
To Support Ukraine, West Must Go Beyond Sanctions
Providing critical military assistance to Ukraine would devalue Russia's advantage in negotiations.
By James Sherr
Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme

From the outset of the Ukraine crisis, the West has acted on the premise that economic sanctions would induce Russia to modify its actions. But while sanctions do constrain capacity, they do not constrain behaviour. Their immediate impact is bearable. Moreover, they do nothing to diminish Russia's most usable and effective form of power: military force. Given the stakes, the case for strengthening Ukraine's defences is compelling.

The Russian military offensive of August 2014 secured diplomatic concessions in Minsk that would not have been granted otherwise. An even more devastating offensive of January-February 2015, in blatant violation of the first Minsk agreement, produced a second Minsk accord even more flawed than the first. According to its terms, future election conditions, constitutional reform and the restoration of border control are subject to the agreement of the separatists, who have licence to withhold their consent indefinitely.

It is blindingly obvious to the Kremlin that the separatist enclaves are neither absorbable by Russia nor sustainable in the long term. They are useful solely as a bridgehead for securing Russia's wider objectives in Ukraine: its 'federalization' (loss of sovereignty), 'non-bloc status' (enforced neutrality) and the abandonment of its European course. So far, military force has been the arbiter of this process.

But if Russia's military card is devalued, so is the bridgehead. And there are good reasons to believe strengthening Kyiv's military muscle would be effective.

Russia has underestimated Ukraine's resilience. Ukrainian national sentiment and civil society have been strengthened by the war, especially in the east. It also has underestimated the capacity of Ukraine's fighting forces.  Despite 16 months of armed insurgency and two military offensives backed by regular Russian troops, Russia's separatist allies control less than five percent of Ukraine's mainland territory.

Russia's military system is potent but under strain. Its battle groups are not occupation forces. They strike hard and withdraw. The maintenance of 40-50,000 troops in theatre have placed demands on ground forces units as far away as Kazakhstan and Vladivostok. There is reluctance to risk prolonged exposure of ethnic Russian servicemen to hostile Russian-speaking populations in eastern Ukraine.

Nevertheless, Ukraine's armed forces lack the means to prevail in high-intensity combat against well-armed Russian troops. They are burdened by the hangover of a largely unreformed defence system, by distrust between volunteer units and higher command echelons, and by a deficit of competent command and staff officers above unit level. Yet they are also dangerously outmatched in hard capability. In the Debaltseve offensive, Russia brought into the field advanced weapons systems against which Ukraine had no countermeasures.

Kyiv needs capabilities that will protect its forces and slow down the battlefield.  If opposition forces are likely to face effective resistance and protracted combat, they will be less likely to attack. And the equipment needed to achieve this - secure communications, electronic counter-measures and long-range passive counter-battery radar - are neither 'lethal' weapons nor politically high-profile. Yet, in their absence, even a well-trained and highly motivated force risks evisceration in battle.

Much has changed since President Obama first declined Ukraine's request for non-lethal assistance, and NATO allies are now contributing to Ukraine's defence in a variety of ways. The problem is that the contribution is unsystematic, uncoordinated and unevenly matched to Ukraine's needs.

In many quarters, it is now axiomatic that a refocusing and enhancement of Western assistance will 'provoke' Putin into a dramatic escalation of the conflict.  The risk exists.  Yet there is nothing in Putin's record to support this assumption.  What has repeatedly provoked him however is weakness and bluff.

In a contest with high-risk players, there is no such thing as a risk-free policy.  Failure to modify an ineffective policy invites at least as much danger as a more robust course. Today's dangers are created by Russia's political aims, its military actions and its increasingly febrile and conspiratorial view of the world. So far, within these ominous parameters, the Kremlin has behaved according to a rational calculus. In this calculus, no respect is shown to opponents who are stronger, but unwilling to use their strength.

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 #46
Voice of America
July 24, 2015
Ex-Ukrainian Spy Chief: Russian Camps Spreading Chaos
by Mark Snowiss

Ukraine's former intelligence chief says Russia is financing and organizing training camps from within Ukraine's rebel-controlled eastern provinces in order to destabilize the country.

"Up to 30 camps in Donetsk, Luhansk and Crimea are training subversive groups, providing them with weapons and sending them on missions throughout Ukraine," said Valentyn Nalyvaichenko, who ran the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU), the country's successor to the Soviet-era KGB, until his forced resignation last month.

"Local criminal gangs and separatists, together with Russian active duty troops, are all committing war crimes and violating international law inside Ukraine," Nalyvaichenko said. "That's what we mean by Russian aggression."

VOA's attempts Friday to solicit a response to the allegations from the Russian embassy in Washington were unsuccessful.

Ukraine split

Nalyvaichenko's comments come as a former high-ranking U.S. official said the Minsk accords - a cease-fire deal negotiated in February - had effectively split Ukraine in two.

"This is a partition of Ukraine, imposed by France, Germany and Russia, where you have an eastern part run by separatists, [to which] Ukrainian authorities are forbidden to go - and this division is overseen by the OSCE," said Kurt Volker, who served as U.S. ambassador to NATO under George W. Bush.

"Russia will continue, piecemeal, to push buttons inside Ukraine," Volker said Friday.

He predicted that Russia could step up its military activities in Ukraine.

"The Russians could try to take more territory in the corridor connecting eastern Ukraine to Crimea through Mariupol," Volker said.

Threat reduced

But Nalyvaichenko played down the danger of Ukraine's disintegration, saying the threat is much reduced from a year ago.

Nalyvaichenko said his former agency - like the country as a whole - has moved substantially since the Maidan Revolution deposed former pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014.

"I remember the night I was appointed to head the SBU, just after Maidan. The building was empty, the agency's former leadership had all fled to Russia or Crimea. There were no operative files, no weapons. Institutionally, the place was totally destroyed," Nalyvaichenko said.

The former Ukrainian spy chief said his main challenge had been to weed out Russian infiltration throughout the government, but especially within Ukraine's law enforcement and security services.

"There's no longer a total infiltration of Russian agents. The danger is no longer widespread," he said.

Nalyvaichenko said Ukrainian authorities, at the end of his tenure, arrested a pair of Russian military intelligence officers who have provided a bonanza of information about a special battalion from Russia's GRU, or military intelligence directorate.

"For that brigade alone, we got the names, ranks, positions and orders for 220 people who invaded Ukraine in May," Nalyvaichenko said.

Key security issues

The former intelligence chief, who acknowledged he "was fired" last month for allegedly refusing to reign in an anti-corruption campaign, said Ukraine faces two main national security issues.

"First, we need to provide constitutional guarantees for free and fair elections in Donesk and Luhansk," Nalyvaichenko said. "[The people there] never had that opportunity. All the election commissions [in those areas] were corrupt and people were told whom to vote for."

"Second, we need to beef up regional budgets to resettle the 1.42 million internally displaced people who were forcibly removed and expelled from [eastern Ukraine]," he said.

Aliona Shkrum, a Ukrainian parliamentarian from former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko's "Fatherland" party, agreed that resettling the country's massive refugee population "is one of the keys to Ukraine's stability."

Ukraine's internal refugee crisis is one of the largest in post-World War Two Europe.

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