#2
Moscow Times
July 24, 2015
Rethinking Global Diplomacy
By Fyodor Lukyanov
Fyodor Lukyanov is editor of Russia in Global Affairs and research professor at the Higher School of Economics.

This summer the world celebrates the anniversaries of two historic diplomatic achievements. The Congress of Vienna, held 200 years ago, ended a long period of turmoil in Europe and laid the foundation for a system of relations that continued in one form or another for almost a century. Forty years ago in Helsinki, leaders signed the final act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe - also known as the Helsinki Accords - establishing harmonized interests on that continent. Today, those two agreements are considered opposites. The first was a classic of diplomatic backroom dealing and superpower intrigues. The second reflected a new values-based approach and included the so-called "third basket" of measures addressing cooperation on human rights and related issues.

However, these two diplomatic achievements are not opposites at all. Both long-term agreements were based on the existing balance of powers and held sway as long as that balance remained intact. Once it shifted, a new period of convulsion ensued.

It is impossible to achieve such a balance of powers today. Diplomacy now takes place amid complete international disharmony and the breakdown of the final remnants of world order. Consider these three recent examples of modern diplomacy: the Minsk process on Ukraine, the agreement to resolve the debt crisis in Greece and the successful conclusion of negotiations on Iran's nuclear program.

The Minsk process is an example of a desperate attempt to stop massive bloodshed in a conflict without clearly defined participants or goals. Negotiators were forced to use very non-specific language because the participants refused to assume concrete responsibilities or obligations. As result, squabbles erupt not only over fulfillment of the terms, but even over who has the right to make that judgment. At the same time, all parties concur that no better arrangement is possible. And they are right: given the situation, no other approach is possible. Bringing a halt to the large-scale warfare is already a major achievement, but it appears impossible to establish a lasting peace. The situation is fragile and dangerous, but it illustrates a modern reality - namely, that in a world clearly in transition toward an indefinite future, some problems are inherently intractable. At best, leaders can only minimize the bloodshed and hardship they cause.

The talks on Iran's nuclear program took place in the same international milieu, but were the exact opposite in nature. Those negotiations dragged on for so long because the main participants - Tehran and Washington - sought to fix literally every step and contingency in writing, and spell everything out so clearly that nobody could interpret the words for their own purposes. The reason is simple: Both sides distrust the other completely. There was no chance for a gentlemen's agreement: They wanted every point on paper and all the verification and control mechanisms established in advance. Only in that way could they trust in its implementation - and the current agreement does provide grounds for such hope. In contrast to the Minsk agreement, the Vienna process has shown that if the parties know exactly what they want and sincerely want to negotiate, they can achieve a great deal - even in an unstable world.

Greece is another question. The compromise participants reached has left a heavy aftertaste in their mouths, along with the impression that force has been used against them. On the one hand, it has long been apparent that in the absence of a consensus, someone must take the lead and impose order on the euro zone. That "someone" is obviously Germany, the most powerful country in the European Union. On the other hand, that use of force immediately scared everyone and prompted concerns as to whether Germany actually knew what it was doing. Until now, Germany has practically forced Greece and its other partners to continue down a path first chosen five years ago, one that includes severe restructuring of underperforming economies without favoritism or exceptions. Confidence is waning that this is the correct approach, but Germany is a very systematic country: If it starts something, it will fastidiously follow it through to the very end. And this has given rise to a third type of negotiations - that is, when the strongest power dictates its will and the rest either obey voluntarily, or obey reluctantly, with fears and doubts.

The role of diplomacy has clearly increased in the past year and its effectiveness has also risen, in spite of everything. At the same time, there are clear limits to what diplomacy can achieve. One of main events of the past year was the emergence of the Islamic State, whose ability to grow in strength despite the best efforts of politicians, diplomats and armies negates many of the gains mentioned above.

The Islamic State is systematically dismantling the scheme by which the Middle East was arranged in the 20th century. It is a vortex that sucks in people, states and socio-political structures. The bewildering popularity of the movement's almost inhuman cruelty - that goes beyond anything in Muslim culture or scripture and which groups Europeans and Russians together as a common enemy - calls for creating something even more far-reaching than the roots of Islamic extremism.

For years now the world has been experiencing a painful process of change. But now people are uncertain not only of the future, but of whether time-tested methods for coping with social problems are still effective. The growing influence of both right-leaning and left-leaning populism in Europe, the polarization of U.S. society, the destructive radicalization of the Middle East, the search for a new identity among the former Soviet republics, and even nervousness in China - the honor student in the school of globalization - have generated a demand for alternatives. Nobody can guarantee that this or that model will work, but demand, as always, begets supply - now in the form of new diplomatic and political initiatives.

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 #3
RFE/RL
July 24, 2015
Medvedev Upbeat About Russian Economy, Ties With Europe

Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev said he expects Russia's recession-hit economy to start growing again at the end of the year, while he hopes for improving economic ties with friendly countries in southeastern Europe.

 "I think that the economy will return to the path of growth in late 2015, early 2016. It won't be anything spectacular, but it will still go up, which will allow us to address some economic issues," Medvedev said in an interview with Slovenian national broadcaster RTV Slovenija on July 23.

Medvedev plans to visit Ljubljana on July 26-27.

The Russian premier offered to include Slovenia, which he portrayed as relatively friendly toward Russia despite economic sanctions imposed by the European Union over its aggression in Ukraine, in Russia's big Turkish Stream gas pipeline project, which was designed to bypass Ukraine and funnel Russian gas through Turkey and Greece to Europe.

"Slovenia could play a major role in this project" by helping to transport and distribute the gas throughout Europe from gas-storage facilities to be built along the border between Turkey and Greece, he said.

"Several countries have shown interest in this project, including Hungary and Serbia. So I would recommend your leaders take a close look," he said.

Russia recently announced a deal to include Greece in the lucrative pipeline project to help boost the Mediterranean country's failing economy. Medvedev's comments suggest that Russia sees the project as a good tool for courting better ties with other countries in southeast Europe.

Medvedev expressed astonishment that some Slovenian politicians have applauded a 40 percent drop in trade with Russia as proof that the EU's sanctions are working.

"I don't think it's appropriate to celebrate when our economies are decelerating and trade is on the decline," he said.

"There might be different perspectives" between the two countries on Ukraine and other matters, "but when trade is down by 40 percent, this also means bad news for Slovenian producers and businesses," he said. "What is there to celebrate?"

The premier added that, "although Russia-EU relations are not at their best now, Russia's relations with Slovenia are quite good, which is why I decided to make an official visit to your country."

Medvedev said European efforts to cultivate other natural-gas suppliers, such as by purchasing liquified gas imports from the United States, North Africa, and the Middle East, likely will end up costing European consumers.

"As for decreasing energy dependence on Russia, they can do it, of course, but at what price? They should take into account the interests of European consumers," he said, insisting that liquified imports would cost a lot more than piped-in gas from Russia.

"I hope we'll continue to supply gas to European consumers," he said, noting that Europe remains Russia's largest market for energy and other exports despite the EU sanctions and retaliatory sanctions imposed by Russia on European goods.

"The European market is of crucial importance to us," he said. "We've been selling gas to Europe for decades; we have never failed to meet our obligations, and we'd like to continue to supply gas to Europe in large volumes."

Trade between Russia and Europe has created mutual dependence as well as benefits, he said.

"They often claim that poor old Europe depends on Russia too much. Let's be clear: Russia also depends on Europe to the same extent. If we supply gas and invest billions of dollars in our deposits and pipelines, we are depending on Europe to buy our gas, just as Europe depends on gas from Russia. These are mutual investments."
   
Russia's move last year to sell $400 billion worth of gas over a decade to China and jointly build a gigantic pipeline network to transport it there does not mean Russia is now looking to the East and no longer values its economic trade with Europe, he said.

"It's not a shift in emphasis and it's not a change in cooperation vectors. It's just another vector of cooperation." he said. "The fact that we will supply gas to China in no way devalues our cooperation with Europe."

But Medvedev acknowledged that it was no coincidence that the turn toward China occurred after the EU imposed sanctions.

"Access to some European markets is off-limits to us," he said. "Naturally, we opted for an alternative. This is understandable."

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 #4
Government.ru
July 24, 2015
Dmitry Medvedev's interview with Slovenian radio and television company RTV Slovenija
24 July 2015

Transcript:

Vlasta Jeseničnik: Good evening Mr Prime Minister.

Dmitry Medvedev: Good evening.

Vlasta Jeseničnik: You visited Slovenia in 2009, when you attended a football qualification match between Slovenia and Russia, so we could say you know Slovenia a little. How would you describe Russian-Slovenian relations?

Dmitry Medvedev: You began with a sad event, which happened in your home country, as far as I know. It's true that I visited Slovenia in 2009, where our national team met your team and, I'm sorry to say, not only lost but also failed to qualify for the next stage of the championships. But I've been to Slovenia on nicer occasions, for holidays - this was long ago - and also as part of a delegation.

As for our relations, I believe they're very good and meet the interests of our nations. These relations have a long history, more than a century-long history which helps us deal with various problems. Therefore, although Russia-EU relations are not at their best now, Russia's relations with Slovenia are quite good, which is why I decided to make an official visit to your country.

I hope we'll be able to discuss all aspects of Russian-Slovenian relations, from the economy to everything else, including our shared history of the 19th and 20th centuries, during my talks with the president, the prime minister and the parliament speaker of Slovenia.

Vlasta Jeseničnik: You mentioned Russian-Slovenian relations, including economic ties. Bilateral trade exceeded $2 billion in 2013. This is a positive figure and trend that continued last year. But this year our trade has slumped. How will our bilateral economic relations develop in the future? In which industries is the development of investment cooperation possible?

Dmitry Medvedev: There are two reasons behind the decline of Russian-Slovenian and Russian-EU trade. One of the reasons is the current economic situation, because trade comprises export and import commodities. Raw materials, or more precisely oil and gas, are one of the most important Russian exports. The prices of energy resources have dropped, which is not good for the supplier, but is good for the consumer, This needs to be considered. But this is the nature of trade: what goes down yesterday can go up tomorrow. Regrettably, there is also a second reason: the sanctions [against Russia] of course, and our restrictions in response. I don't see this decline as normal, because it's rooted in politics.

I won't talk about the history of this, which everybody seems to remember. I'll only say that this is bad for Russia and Slovenia. In the first five months of this year, our trade plunged by nearly 40 percent. As you said, in its peak year, 2013, it reached $2 billion. It is a good figure and good money. We travelled a long road towards that goal, but unfortunately, our trade has declined due to political decisions. But we didn't start this, and I'm sure that it won't be us that'll end this. Anyway, the political restrictions will pass, while trade and good relations between countries and nations, as well as mutual sympathy between individuals, will live on and take the upper hand.

As for investment, overall we're optimistic about the future despite the hard times we're currently going through. Total cumulative investment exceeds 500 million Euros, with Russian investment in Slovenia a little lower, but close to Slovenian investment in Russia.

In what areas could cooperation be further promoted? It's obvious that Slovenia has a number of areas of interest to Russia which we regard as priorities in terms of investment cooperation. These include the manufacturing and energy sectors, including electric power, the hotel business and tourism. Slovenian investment is also focused on the consumer market. A number of Slovenian companies have opened offices in Russia and set up plants that make popular products, including home appliances and pharmaceuticals. I think we need to build on existing achievements, overcome the temporary issues and expand cooperation.

Vlasta Jeseničnik: You said the sanctions were the main reason behind the decline in Russia-Slovenia trade. The European Union recently extended the sanctions for six months, and Russia followed suit with a one-year extension. Why did Russia renew its sanctions for a year? In your opinion, how long will this standoff between the West and Russia last?

Dmitry Medvedev: I don't know how long this standoff will last, because, as I've already mentioned, we're not the ones who started it. We've said many times that sanctions are futile, because this path leads nowhere and doesn't change anything except a deterioration in relations and the need to conduct lengthy laborious talks afterwards.

Let me give you another example which has nothing to do with neither Russia, nor Europe. This is just a telling example. Or maybe let's even make it two examples. In the course of the 20th century, sanctions were introduced against the USSR ten times. There may be different perspectives on the Soviet Union, since it was quite controversial. Anyway, there wasn't a single time when the Soviet Union gave in on anything. Talks between Iran and the six world powers plus the EU have been completed recently, and I take this opportunity to congratulate everyone on their success. What does this mean? Why did we have to lose so much time? This goes to say that sanctions lead nowhere.

When I was preparing for this interview, I was surprised to learn that a Slovenian leader had said that the sanctions were effective and were producing the expected results, since trade with Russia dropped by 40 percent. There might be different perspectives on Russia and our relations, but when trade is down by 40 percent, this also means bad news for Slovenian producers and businesses. What is there to celebrate? I think that this logic is absurd. It is true that we all have commitments of various kinds. We understand that Slovenia is part of the EU, a NATO member, and that you have certain commitments. But I don't think it's appropriate to celebrate when our economies are decelerating and trade is on the decline.

When will it end? Let's wait and see. I'm an optimist by nature, and I believe that this will come to an end sooner or later.

You mentioned our retaliatory measures. Why were they introduced for a year? This has nothing to do with inflicting pain on Europeans. The reasons behind this are strictly pragmatic. As a matter of fact, our retaliatory measures are related to food products. As you probably know, we are currently proactive in promoting import substitution in the food industry and developing domestic food production. Russia is a huge country; it has a huge agricultural sector, so we can surely provide for our needs in terms of food supply. Agriculture operates in one-year cycles, which enables producers to make plans for a longer term. This is the only reason behind this decision... It is not our intention to show how hard boiled we are by renewing retaliatory measures for a longer term. This is not the case. However, we are committed to protecting national interests and domestic producers.

Vlasta Jeseničnik: For now, relations between the West and Russia are difficult. Is it possible, under the circumstances, to return to the idea of a single economic space from Lisbon to Vladivostok, which Russia has promoted?

Dmitry Medvedev: Of course it's possible. Even though the current situation isn't simple, I'll just talk about Russian-European cooperation: the EU is, in spite of everything, our biggest partner. The European Union, not the East Asian countries, and not the Pacific countries! To be sure, trade has declined, but it's still worth several hundred billion euros - I don't know this year's balance yet - and it remains at a high level. This means we need each other. Europe needs the Russian market, Russia needs cooperation with Europe, and this is why the common economic space idea is here to stay. Economically, it's a completely reasonable approach. More than that, a new idea has been advanced - President Putin mentioned it recently, by the way - the idea to establish relations between the major integration unions in the Euro-Asian space. I'm referring to the European Union, the Eurasian Economic Union, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and the Silk Road economic belt (a Chinese project). To me, bringing these projects together benefits everyone.

Vlasta Jeseničnik: It's interesting that you just mentioned China's Silk Road and the Eurasian Economic Union. This Chinese Silk Road concept is rather new, but generally the future of the Eurasian Economic Union is what has been discussed a lot. Do you think these two concepts and two projects are compatible, or will they compete?

Dmitry Medvedev: You just said the right thing: they are compatible and they will compete. This is very good. They're compatible because the world is big and Russia is a huge country. And naturally we want to continue cooperating with the EU, as I said.

We're also promoting cooperation with the Asia Pacific Region. The amount of cooperation there is considerable too, and we really have new ideas. But I think we have an opportunity to come to terms both on bilateral and trilateral  projects. We've worked with European companies that supply products and have production organisations in Russia. We also supply products and have established some production in the EU. But we have the Russian Far East. It's huge. There is also Siberia that has an immense amount of wealth. We can supply a lot of energy from there and have signed an agreement to this effect with the People's Republic of China. In general, the road from China to Europe cannot bypass Russia. I think that these advantages should be used by both the European Union and the PRC, and incidentally, by our other partners there (like India, Japan, Korea, and many other countries), and finally, by Russia itself, which has vast transit potential, among other things.    

Vlasta Jeseničnik: As we talk, we are shifting slowly towards the East. In principle, the Western sanctions are one of the reasons why Russia has turned towards the East, particularly China. But it is also trying to strengthen its ties with the other BRICS countries. As of now, Russia's is a very slowly growing BRICS economy, while China is the strongest BRICS economy.  As a well-known saying goes, "he who pays the piper, calls the tune." Aren't you worried that Russia will become dependent on China?

Dmitry Medvedev: There is no such threat, of course. We maintain equitable and friendly relations with China. Moreover, let me be frank, our relations are now at the highest point in the entire centuries-old history of Russian-Chinese cooperation. This level of relations was achieved neither before the [October 1917] revolution, nor in the Soviet period. This is the current level of our relations. We need each other. We need a strong and reliable partner like China that has a huge market and immense financial capabilities. China needs the Russian Federation's market. In addition, we have quite similar positions on many international issues.

We've created major cooperation formats, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and BRICS that you mentioned. People often ask me: have you left Europe for Asia and the Pacific region? No, we've always been there. The thing is that now is the time to take this cooperation to the next level. There are two reasons for this. First, it has never been fully developed, including our cooperation with China, even though our current trade with it is just shy of $100 billion, which is nevertheless much lower than with the European Union. Second, let's face it, access to some European markets if off-limits to us. Naturally, we opted for an alternative. This is understandable.

With regard to the growth of our economy, indeed, we are not at our best now. The Chinese economy is growing much faster, although there still is the issue of the base effect. This is my first point.

My second point is that our economy has, until recently, at least until the sanctions, been growing at about the same rate as the EU economy, that is, not too fast. This year, the situation is more complicated, and most likely there will be a certain slump. However, these factors can be dealt with. I think that the economy will return to the path of growth in late 2015 - early 2016. It won't be anything spectacular, but it will still go up, which will allow us to address some economic issues.

Vlasta Jeseničnik: What kind of a partner is China? Are they a demanding partner?

Dmitry Medvedev: China is our neighbour. As I mentioned earlier, we have been cooperating with China and living side by side with them for the many centuries now. We work together on many projects. China goes its own way. At this particular point, we have similar positions on international issues. We are equal partners and we do not interfere in each other's domestic affairs. China is a comfortable partner to work with. By the way, we had multiple government contacts this year. The President of the People's Republic of China joined us in Moscow for our celebration of Victory Day (by the way, I'd like to thank the Slovenian delegation for coming too, despite the political complexities that were involved in this process). This year, the Russian President will take part in the celebrations in China. I have a meeting with my Chinese colleague, Premier Li Keqiang, scheduled for late 2015. We have full and intensive cooperation with China.

Vlasta Jeseničnik : Let's move on to Ukraine, which, with its 18 month-old crisis, is one of Europe's most burning issues. What are your expectations? Do you see any real chances of resolving this situation any time soon?

Dmitry Medvedev: Yes, I do. First, the Ukrainian crisis was engineered. It's not that it originated in someone's head, or is due to some force majeure circumstances. No, it was actually staged, and the former and current leaders of Ukraine are responsible for it. The former failed to restore law and order, while the latter allowed a civil war to break out. The Ukrainian people must hold them accountable for that.

Second, the Ukrainian crisis can be resolved only in Ukraine by the Ukrainians. Neither the Russian Federation, nor the European Union, nor the United States, but only by the Ukrainians must do it. They need to sit down and agree on things. The authorities should show flexibility within the framework of the Minsk Agreements and take the decisions that they must take, including the ones relating to the autonomous republics in southeastern Ukraine. Of course, the self-defence units and political forces in southeastern Ukraine should show a willingness to compromise and reach an agreement with the Ukrainian authorities. Only then will peace come to the Ukrainian land. Perhaps, this is the most important thing to do, because if it doesn't happen, we will witness a very sad process. It is already sad, but it could take on very dramatic proportions.

History is a tough and a fairly quick thing. Let me talk about events that are closer to you. Let's ask young Russians who remembers a country such as Yugoslavia. I think most young people will struggle to remember that Yugoslavia was ever on the map of Europe. At the same time, everyone knows, travels, loves, and has friends in the countries that used to be part of the former Yugoslavia. It was a difficult, painful and, unfortunately, not a peaceful process. I'm referring to Yugoslavia, because when we are told that we must respect international obligations, we fully agree with that. Clearly, it is imperative to adhere to international obligations and generally accepted international rules, but this approach should be applied to all countries and all situations. I bring up Yugoslavia only because I hope that someday we won't have to remember that there used to be a state called Ukraine, as with Yugoslavia. The existence of Ukraine depends on the wisdom, patience, tact, and a willingness to achieve compromise and negotiation between all the decision-makers in Ukraine. I'm talking about the authorities in Kiev and the political forces in southeastern Ukraine.

Vlasta Jeseničnik :  Can Russia help with this? Or Washington?

Dmitry Medvedev: Of course it can, and we are doing our best to help them get there. Anyone who wants them to agree can help. So does Russia, although we do not consider ourselves responsible for this conflict. Indeed, Ukraine is close to us, and the people who live there are very close to us. They are, in fact, our relatives. The European Union can help as well, by the way, and it is helping. I believe that several countries currently play an important role. The United States can also help promote this process, because the US is a major powerful state that plays a key role in NATO, has a controlling stake in the global economy and so on.

Again, let's face it, Ukraine's leaders are actively consulting with Washington. In this regard, we believe that our contact with the US is useful. But we shouldn't impose anything on Ukraine. The problem of Ukraine is that, at some point, some states decided that they could run things there and show how events can unfold. We all know how it ended.

Vlasta Jeseničnik : Let's go back to Russia-Slovenia relations.

Dmitry Medvedev: Yes, it's a more pleasant issue to discuss.

Vlasta Jeseničnik: As you know, Slovenia had planned to join the South Stream project. But Russia cancelled the project earlier this year and has taken up Turkish Stream. As far as I know, Moscow and Ankara have not yet signed an intergovernmental agreement to this effect. At the same time, Europe has been trying to ease its energy dependence on Russia. What can you say about Turkish Stream's fate?

Dmitry Medvedev: Let's start with South Stream. It has fallen victim to Brussels bureaucracy, and that's it. Yes, that's how it happened, I'm sorry to say. We were ready to implement it, we made the necessary plans, invested substantial funds and were ready to start building the underwater section, but officials in Brussels said they couldn't coordinate the matter, were proceeding too slowly - dragging it out, as we say. Bulgaria also failed to make a decision, and so the project was put to rest. This is the first thing.

Second, about Turkish Stream: yes, it is an alternative to South Stream, and we're optimistic about this project. Some of the documents have been signed, but not an intergovernmental agreement. The main reason is that there is no government in Turkey now. Our partners and colleagues in Turkey need to form a new government, which is a far from simple undertaking, as practice shows. We continue to negotiate with them. I hope that when they resolve their political problems and complete the political process, we'll coordinate all the outstanding issues with them. By the way, Slovenia could play a major role in this project, because we are willing to supply gas to Turkey, where a series of large gas storage facilities could be built on the border with Greece and from there gas could be distributed throughout Europe. Several countries have shown interest in this project, including Hungary and Serbia. So I would recommend your leaders take a close look at this project.

And lastly, if there is a gap, something will fill it. Turkish Stream is taking South Stream's place. It's not proceeding as fast as we'd like, but it's not stalled either. And then we thought of building a second Nord Stream line, which delivers Russian gas to Germany across the Baltic Sea. You probably heard that we have signed a memorandum between our companies to increase the gas volume via Nord Stream. So Europe's energy security will be guaranteed.

As for decreasing energy dependence on Russia, they can do it of course, but at what price? They should take into account the interests of European consumers. They can import liquefied gas, for example from the United States, but it would cost a lot. Or they can import gas through some other channels. This is an issue of money and commercial value. We believe that all of our projects have a future. I hope we'll continue to supply gas to European consumers.

And lastly, this is not a one-way street. They often claim that poor old Europe depends on Russia too much. Let's be clear: Russia also depends on Europe to the same extent. If we supply gas and invest billions of dollars in our deposits and pipelines, we are depending on Europe to buy our gas, just as Europe depends on gas from Russia. These are mutual investments.

Vlasta Jeseničnik:  This is a very interesting idea. But do you agree that Europe keeps looking for an alternative to Russian gas? For example, it is considering importing gas from Azerbaijan. This is especially important for south-eastern Europe. How important is the European gas market to Russia?

Dmitry Medvedev: It is very important to us. As I said, the European market is of crucial importance to us. We've been selling gas to Europe for decades; we have never failed to meet our obligations, and we'd like to continue to supply gas to Europe in large volumes. But this doesn't mean we won't supply gas to other locations. This is not shifting our emphasis or changing the cooperation vector; this is adding one more vector of cooperation. Our gas distribution to China will not detract from our cooperation with Europe.

Vlasta Jeseničnik: Mr Medvedev, as prime minister you and your team deal with the most important development issues. What is your vision of Russia five years from now?

Dmitry Medvedev: I'd like Russia to be a more prosperous and economically successful country, so that our people can live better, afford more, have better vacations, but also work better. In a word, I'd like Russia to be a modern and developed country with a friendly attitude to all other countries, including Slovenia, which is our partner.

Vlasta Jeseničnik:  Mr Medvedev, thank you for this interview. I hope you'll return to Moscow with a good impression.

Dmitry Medvedev: I hope so too. Thank you.

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#5
Christian Science Monitor
July 24, 2015
People power, Russia style: Small-town lessons about Russian democracy
Residents of Baltiysk rejected an entire slate of district council candidates from Putin's United Russia party, instead voting in independents. But while the election demonstrated that democracy still exists in Russia, it also showed its limitations.
By Fred Weir, Correspondent

BALTIYSK, RUSSIA - When a slate of local candidates in the Kaliningrad enclave at the western tip of Russia unexpectedly beat the politicians fielded by the powerful, pro-Kremlin United Russia party two months ago, it seemed like a minor political earthquake. Not a single member from Vladimir Putin's party made it onto the 15-seat council no ruled by a coalition of local businessmen, communists and "patriots."

That's not the sort of thing that usually happens in Mr. Putin's "managed democracy." So it prompted comment in Moscow media, and to a lesser extent in the West's, about whether the upset was "an indication of just how soft support for [Putin and his] party" has become.

But upon investigation on the ground here, what emerges is not a sign of United Russia's potential vulnerability, but rather the mistake of thinking of it as a "political party" at all. And at the end of the day, it shows that however much Russia's power flows from Putin, democracy is a factor in Russian politics - and voters do sometimes have the last word.

"What happened in Baltiysk was more the exception than the rule, and you'd be mistaken to view it through your Western prism of party politics," says Solomon Ginzberg, an opposition member of Kaliningrad's regional legislature. "It wasn't an ideological competition, as it would be between two different parties in your country, but between rival economic interests who are actually part of the same political establishment. Still, it created a very interesting precedent, one worth studying."

Closed town

Baltiysk, an impoverished town of about 30,000 perched at the end of a sandy peninsula jutting into the Baltic Sea, was a completely closed naval base until the cold war's end 25 years ago. When the Soviet Union collapsed, so did funding for municipal services from the Russian navy. Unlike military towns in the West, the ill-paid sailors of the Russian Baltic Fleet, which is still based here, don't have much cash to spend in local businesses.

Practically the only way to make a bit of money around here is to engage in harvesting and marketing the semiprecious lumps of fossilized tree sap, known as amber, that wash up on the Baltic seashore or can be dug out from local bogs. The Kaliningrad region is the source of 90 percent of the world's extractable amber. Local people traditionally have known how to find it, craft it into the region's trademark jewelry and handicrafts and smuggle it out to market - all the while keeping the state mostly in the dark about their activities.

It's hard to read the deeper currents that may be running through the popular mood here. But experts say that since the USSR's collapse, one local business clique has organized the amber trade in Baltiysk, and in the process provided jobs and income in a place that is largely populated by impoverished military pensioners and offers few other economic opportunities.

"The local amber operators live in the Baltiysk area, they know the place and the people, and in a variety of ways they take the local population's interests and needs into account. They ran the district council, but nobody claims they were doing a bad job of it," says Vladimir Abramov, an independent political expert. "They were mostly members of United Russia and big supporters of Putin."

That came under threat when Kaliningrad's governor - a Putin appointee - decided to crush the little amber operators and place the industry back under state control.

"The governor wanted to get rid of 'criminal' groupings and place municipal governments under firm control," says Mr. Abramov. "He called emergency local elections in Baltiysk, and he pressured the local United Russia apparatus to ensure that the incumbent members of Baltiysk's council were all excluded from the party list. Then he introduced his own people to be the party's official candidates."

After being rejected in the United Russia primaries, the former district council members tried to register as independent candidates. Despite a protracted legal battle, they were eventually allowed to run. And when the voting took place on May 24, the independents swept the board and not a single official candidate of United Russia won.

"The population rallied to their side and supported them in the election campaign, even though it meant defying United Russia," says Abramov. "In short, voters chose to side with the devil they knew."

Losing but still winning

A victory for democracy? Yes. But a blow to United Russia, or even Putin's anointed governor? Apparently not so much, experts say.

"After the voting happened, most of the newly elected deputies immediately rejoined the party of power. And United Russia accepted the result and took them back in," says Mikhail Berendeyev, a political scientist at Baltic Federal University in Kaliningrad.

"The principal conclusion [of this episode] is that United Russia is not a party in the sense that the entire world understands that word. It's more like an elite club, to which those in power must belong. If you're strong enough, and you can win, they will co-opt you - as long as you're not an ideological threat," says Sergei Ribin, a local activist with the grassroots election monitoring group Golos. "You can win an honest election and get that result accepted."

On the other hand, what is possible in a small town like Baltiysk may not hold useful lessons for anyone trying to contest power at a higher level. But Ribin, a lawyer who's been monitoring elections for many years, says he is nevertheless optimistic.

"The system is what it is. But we see in the example of Baltiysk, and some other little straws in the wind, that it's possible to bend it and maybe re-shape it a bit. I have hopes that such incremental changes are gradually, step-by-step, moving us in a more democratic direction."

 #6
www.opendemocracy.net
July 23, 2015
Russia's 'derby grrls' are upending gender politics
As the Russian state continues its conservative turn, could this fringe sport push back against the country's gender politics?
By Ulrike Ziemer
Dr Ulrike Ziemer is Senior Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Winchester. Her research focuses on gender inequalities and young people from ethnic minorities in Russia. Recent publications include a monograph Ethnic Belonging, Gender, and Cultural Practices: Youth Identities in Contemporary Russia (2011) and an edited volume East European Diasporas, Migration and Cosmopolitanism (2012).

In recent years, St Petersburg has emerged as a cradle of conservative politics, with Petersburg politicians such as Evgeny Mironov proposing the 'homosexual propaganda' law, and an enduring association with far-right politics and hate crimes.

Thus the arrival of roller derby-a women's sport inclusive of all sexual identities-to the city on the Neva seems all the more puzzling.

White Night Furies

Just like many other women across the world, Zhanna, the founder and captain of The White Night Furies, Russia's very first roller derby team, encountered the sport by accident.

In 2013, Zhanna's girlfriend at the time, Kat, brought up the idea of setting up a roller derby team in Petersburg. Kat had discovered roller derby via friends in Iceland and, during a subsequent stay in Belgium, decided to join a roller derby team. When Zhanna watched a roller derby match online for the first time, her first reaction was: 'Oh my God, they're trying to kill each other'.

But after the initial shock at its physicality, and with the help of the online roller derby community, Zhanna fell in love with the sport, eventually setting up a team in Russia's former capital.

Created in 1935 by entertainment promoter Leo Seltzer, roller derby was originally envisioned as an endurance game.

A decade later, the sport had become widespread. By the 1970s, though, roller derby was more like a roller wrestling competition. Its popularity then started to fade. However, in 2001, a small group of women in Texas revived roller derby as a volunteer-run, all-girl operated team sport.

Rejuvenated on the backbone of third-wave feminism, roller derby is one of the fastest growing female full-contact team sports in the world. According to the Roller Derby Flat Track Stats there are currently more than 3,000 registered teams in the world: with 2,069 in the USA, 760 in Europe, 362 in Canada, 288 in Australia, and 216 in Latin America.

Played on roller skates, roller derby is organised according to a not-for-profit and do-it-yourself ethos. The sport was founded by women, for women, and is inclusive of sexual minorities. Increasingly, men are also playing the sport (there are currently 258 registered men's teams around the world).

As has been noted by many commentators, 'derby grrrls' are pushing the boundaries of gender as they negotiate pleasure, pain, and power relations.

Skaters often talk about how they get knocked down and bruised, only to get back up again: this is how they celebrate their sporting femininities.

Jammers, blockers and pivots

A large body of feminist work argues that sport is a place for undermining gender inequality. Sport can provide women with experiences that 'empower', 'heal' and 'transform' them as individuals and, more broadly, challenge cultural norms relating to women and femininity.

Roller derby has thus re-emerged as a gender space for self-transformation, belonging and embodied contest. The rules of the game, in short, are as follows: there are five players per team - three blockers, one pivot and one jammer.

On the whistle, play begins with the blockers from both teams skating in a mixed formation known as the 'pack', in a counter-clockwise direction. The two jammers start behind the pack and must try to get through and out of the pack to the other side - the first to do so earns 'lead jammer' status.

While jammers try to chase down the pack and work their way through, blockers from each team try to get their jammer through while preventing the opposing jammer. Jammers score points for every skater they pass on the opposing team, starting from the second time they get through the pack. Within two 30-minute halves, each jam lasts two minutes or until called off by the lead jammer.

Even for the uninitiated or the non-sports enthusiast, roller derby can be intoxicating from the moment they enter the sports hall to watch a game.

When the first jam starts, jammers hurtle around the duct-taped oval track so fast that the crowd can almost hear a 'whoosh'. Blockers on the track work together, lock arms, communicate, and use their hips and shoulders to keep the opposing team's jammer from getting past them.

When one jammer gets through the blockers, this is the moment when the crowd in the sports hall becomes rapturous.

Often, as if out of nowhere, a jammer breaks through the seemingly solid wall of blockers. The seemingly underdog status of the jammer - one woman up against a 'brutal' and 'aggressive' pack - keeps the fans on the edge of their seats.

The most courageous fans can even sit in the so-called 'suicide seats' located on the edge of the track. In short, any newcomer to the sport will be surprised by the athleticism of those skating women in such a highly strategic and physically demanding game.

Record breakers

Russia's recent record on gender equality and feminism leaves much to be desired. How then should the arrival of roller derby as a physically demanding and 'risky' sport, one that transcends ideas of traditional femininity, be understood in terms of Russia's current gender politics?

To answer this question, we need to consider Russia's past in light of its present.

For instance, Russian sociologists Anna Temkina and Elena Zdravomyslova highlight the evolving reaction to the legacy of Soviet gender politics: how the hypocritical policy of gender equality transformed traditional patriarchy, with its naturalisation of gender roles, into an appealing alternative.

When the Soviet Union was formed in 1922, gender equality was introduced from above. Women received the right to vote, and were encouraged to study and work in any profession they chose. Nurseries and kindergartens were set up to allow women to combine full-time work with child-care.

However, in the 1940s, once the Soviet government realised the coming demographic problem, it prohibited abortions and initiated a political discourse, which reduced women to their 'natural role' as mothers, creating a double burden for most women.

Even today, President Putin is very fond of publicising motherhood as the highest achievement for women while presenting himself to the wider public as a macho, bare-chested, gun-toting man.

For example, a greater responsibility has been placed on women as the nation's child-bearers through pro-maternity policies, such as the 2007 'maternity capital' policy offering financial incentives for mothers who choose to raise a second or third child. Feminists have criticised this programme, stressing its gender insensitivity, inefficiency, and the economic consequences of siphoning women out of the labour market. The current government, it should be noted, has persistently attempted to tighten Russia's abortion laws.

However, despite Putin's stellar popularity ratings, not every woman (or man for that matter) is willing to agree carte blanche with his policies.

In fact, a survey conducted by the Russian Levada Centre this year showed that 66% of Russians thought that an abortion is a private decision and that the government should not interfere. Only 20% of respondents thought that the government should control this matter.

Whereas the state continues to promote traditional family values, it does not seem to strengthen the rights of women in the domestic sphere. Instead, for many women, domestic violence still figures in their daily lives.

Indeed, data on domestic violence in Russia from 2013 presents a very grim picture: official figures show that, in a single year, 12,000 women died as a result of domestic violence in Russia. In addition, there were 36,000 reported cases of domestic violence directed against women.

Third-wave feminism

But, perhaps in a reflection of the state's conservative mood on gender, and despite the disturbing levels of violence against women, feminism in Russia is still largely rejected as a 'western idea'.

While in western Europe and the United States, roller derby has appeared as part of a feminist celebration of women's empowerment, putting its own stamp on society through regular media exposure, in Russia, roller derby has only featured in two online publications to date (here and here).

One explanation for this under exposure is that, as an ideology, feminism has always fought for change-something that could easily be interpreted as a threat to the current male-dominated power hierarchy in Russia.

Another explanation relates to the fact that few core texts written by second-wave western feminist writers, such as Betty Friedan, have been translated into Russian, while key writers such as Simone de Beauvoir and other French second-wave feminists have not been translated at all. In this way, one could assume that, in the absence of a fully-fledged 'second-wave feminism', 'third-wave feminism' (of which roller derby is a part) is yet to truly resonate in Russian society and culture.

However, this view is currently being challenged. Some commentators argue that the beginning of third-wave feminism has already emerged following the controversial 'performance art' of the punk girl band Pussy Riot in 2012.

Since the release of Maria Alyokhina and Nadezhda Tolokonnikova in December 2013, these young women have promised to continue fighting for women's rights. Likewise, the emergence of roller derby in Russia could also be interpreted as a sign that third-wave feminism may be gaining momentum.

While third-wave feminism is hard to find in today's Russia, gay rights issues are at the forefront of politics in Russia and the west. Since 2006, there have been regular bans on attempts to organise Gay Pride marches in Moscow, and even this year, little progress on this front has been made. In fact, most recently, United Russia activists created a 'flag for straights' to defend traditional family values and to oppose the LGBT Rainbow Campaign.

These developments serve as a reminder how contentious the public expression of same-sex sexuality remains in Russia. Just like feminism, 'non-traditional' sexualities have been mostly portrayed as 'western' lifestyles, which are alien to Russian traditions. The culmination of these tensions was manifested by the introduction of the 2013 law against the 'propaganda' of 'non-traditional' sexuality to minors. In January 2015, the state included transgender status on the list of medical restrictions for obtaining a driver's licence, and operating a motor vehicle.

So, how can we explain the appearance of roller derby in Russia? Here, Putin's conservative gender discourse may be helpful as an explanation. After all, roller derby is set up by women (whom official discourse pictures as the weaker sex): the sport is thus not perceived as an instant 'alien' feminist threat.

Many gender scholars argue that sport has often had an assumed innocence as a space (in the imagination) and a place (as it physically manifests itself) which is removed from the everyday concerns of power, inequality, struggle and ideology.

In this way, roller derby in Russia, exactly as in other parts of the world, can offer a space for transcendence and freedom, viewed as a free and fun-oriented space, rather than a place were traditional discriminative gender norms promoted by the government are followed and reinforced. As Zhanna told me: 'Roller derby is for every woman who wants to play it. Roller derby is devoid of any kind of discrimination, it is all-inclusive.'

Nonetheless, to keep roller derby growing, Zhanna maintains that she needs to act within the framework of current politics.

She knows that she cannot expect any help from the current government in St Petersburg as 'they are the ones who make our lives hard, they are the ones imposing laws that can stop roller derby from thriving. They are the ones reinforcing traditional gender norms and inequality. We cannot expect support from them.'

Thus, Zhanna sought advice of how to register her team from the opposition party Yabloko (The Russian United Democratic Party). Even though Yabloko has not had a seat in the State Duma since 2003, the city of St Petersburg has always been a stronghold for the party, with Yabloko gaining 11.5 per cent of the vote in the 2011 parliamentary vote (compared to 3.4 percent nationwide). While most opposition parties in Russia reflect mainstream conservative politics, Yabloko has been more supportive of alternative politics and sexual minority rights.

Although Russian 'derby grrrls' do not describe the sport as political, roller derby is quietly challenging gender politics in Russia simply by virtue of its presence. The White Night Furies have created a space for themselves that is socially situated-a liberating act of resistance.

Viewed in the wider context of gender politics in Russia, roller derby has transformative potential. And though there may be only one small team with less than 30 skaters, those jammers still have the skill to break through the pack.

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 #7
Twenty-two million Russians stay beyond poverty line
By Lyudmila Alexandrova

MOSCOW, July 23. /TASS/. The problem of poverty in Russia is most likely to intensify in the coming years, experts say. While the Russian authorities are taking measures to provide social support to the population, these efforts are insufficient to reverse this trend.

About 22 million Russians are living beyond the poverty line in Russia, Vice-Premier Olga Golodets said recently, citing official statistics. She said these figures were "absolutely critical."

The Russian government has recently supported the proposal by the Finance Ministry to freeze social payment indexation in order to save budget funds. The government's social bloc led by Vice-Premier Golodets insists on indexing pensions and social payments in full, i.e. adjusting them in line with inflation.

"Public sector wages and servicemen's money allowances actually have not been indexed in 2015," First Deputy Head of the State Duma Committee for the Budget and Taxes Oksana Dmitriyeva told Ekho Moskvy radio station.

"And these indexations are not expected next year. Efforts have failed to secure the pension indexation by the inflation rate in 2016. As a result, the situation will only worsen," she added.

"Various calculations and studies show that only 20% of the population is financially comfortable in the country," Director of the Institute of Economics at the Russian Academy of Sciences Ruslan Grinberg said.

"For a half of the population, life is a fight for survival," the expert said.

"Economic growth is the best medicine against poverty," Director of the Center for the Analysis of Incomes and Living Standards of the Population at the Higher School of Economics Liliya Ovcharova told TASS.

"If growth is absent, social support for the poor is the second most important measure. Social support should be allocated in a way to make the poor a priority group entitled to social allowances. In our country, however, priority is given to the status of belonging to a certain category and this category does not always embrace the poor," the expert said.

All subsidies for transport rides, housing and utility payments are provided without control of incomes, she added.

It can't be said that nothing is being done, Ovcharova said.

"There are compensatory payments in addition to pensions: each pensioner is guaranteed an individual income at the level of the subsistence minimum. Russia also has monthly child allowances for low-income families and a housing subsidy for the poor. Russia also has a whole number of targeted regional programs for low-income people," the expert said.

But now attempts are being made to cut social expenditures and spend the money saved from these cuts on something else, she added. These plans envisage cutting expenditures without increasing support for the poor, the expert said.

"The poverty problem in Russia will only intensify in the near future," she added.

The Russian government is taking measures to fight poverty within the existing possibilities, Head of the Laboratory of Pension Systems and Social Sphere Forecasting at the Russian Presidential Academy of the National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA) Yelena Grishina told TASS.

"Another thing is that these measures are not enough. But, perhaps, it is wrong to look for funds for overcoming poverty only as part of the social protection system. This is a more comprehensive task and should be addressed, among other things, through assistance to employment and the maintenance of household incomes," the expert said.

The transition to more targeted social support is an area, which the government is currently implementing on the Russian president's instruction, she added.

"The category of social allowance recipients is limited to persons with incomes below the subsistence minimum while the size of allowances does not increase. Social assistance that is provided is insufficient to bring people out of the state of poverty," the expert said.

That is why, the task is both to redirect assistance to the support of low-income people and increase the size of social payments, she added.

"But considering that social support is normally provided regionally, this task is hard for implementation in the current conditions," the expert said.

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 #8
http://emergingequity.org
July 24, 2015
Russia Overtakes U.S. And China In Manufacturing Competitiveness Amid Cheaper Oil, Ruble: BCG

Russia has overtaken the United States and China in terms of manufacturing competitiveness helped by a fall in oil prices and the country's currency, according to a report by the Boston Consulting Group (BCG).

The report from BCG evaluates the competitiveness of the world's top 25 export economies, which account for nearly 90 percent of world exports of manufactured goods, based on the index of production costs. The lower the index is, the lower the production costs are, which raises the competitiveness of a country in comparison with the U.S., the world's largest economy.

The index comprises of four components: wages, labor productiveness, energy prices, and national currency exchange rates.

According to the report, Russia's 2015 manufacturing cost competitiveness rating is at 90 points, whereas China's rating was at 97 points. The U.S. rating is considered as 100.

Indonesia ranks at the top of the list of manufacturing cost competitiveness with a rating of 83, followed by India and Thailand tied with a rating of 88, and Russia and Mexico tied with a rating of 90.

Over the past 10 years since 2004, U.S. competitiveness has continuously grown in comparison with all other countries, except for Mexico. However, in 2015 the strengthening dollar brought this trend to an end as the dollar began to rise against other currencies, and U.S. production costs rose.

From mid-2014 to mid-2015, the euro fell 18 percent against the dollar, and as a result, the majority of European exporters improved their positions as production costs decreased.

Meanwhile, in 2014 the ruble exchange rate fell by 8 percent in comparison with 2013, and then in the first half of 2015 the ruble fell by another 17 percent in comparison with the first half of 2014.

So, it's hardly a surprise that with the Russian ruble falling over 30 percent against the dollar and crude prices tumbling 45 percent in a year that Russia's manufacturing cost competitiveness rating grew.

But this could be just a temporary phenomenon, according to Justin Rose, Partner and Managing Director at BCG. "The fundamental trends that made the U.S. competitiveness in terms of the levels of production costs grow continuously over the last decade, have not changed."

"Manufacturers understand that the national currencies that significantly depreciated against the dollar, can quickly win back their positions," he added.

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 #9
http://readrussia.com
July 23, 2015
The EU's Worsening Crisis and Russia
By Mark Adomanis

Anyone who has taken a survey course on Russian and/or Soviet foreign policy will remember that Moscow has long viewed the European Union (and the more general project of European integration) with extreme suspicion or outright hostility. For decades the Kremlin has insisted that it deal with the Europeans bi-laterally, and has carefully sidestepped "Europe" unless absolutely necessary. And, through methods fair and foul of varying degrees of subtlety, both the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation have worked to undermine European integration.

It's not hard to understand why. When compared to any individual European country, Russia can look quite daunting. In demographic terms it is roughly half as large again as the next largest country (Germany) and roughly as populous as France, Spain, and the UK put together. Even purely judged on its oft-mocked economy, Russia is comparable to the leading European nations (in PPP terms its economy is essentially the same size as Germany's) and quite a bit larger than others.

But when compared to Europe as a whole, Russia is hopelessly, almost laughably outclassed. Even after seven years that are, proportionally speaking, worse than the Great Depression, the EU still has an economy that is more than five times the size of Russia's. And even though their long-term prospects are similar, the EU's population is more than three and a half times larger than Russia's.

The differences in military spending are, if anything, even more dramatic and telling. In 2014, according to the Stockholm Peace Research Institute, Russia spent about $91 billion, measured in constant inflation-adjusted terms, on its armed forces. This was 45% more than France which, by a fairly comfortable margin, was the single biggest military spender in Western Europe. But compared to the EU's collective defense budget Russia's supposedly fearsome armed forces are puny: the Kremlin's 2014 spending was a mere 33% of the supposedly pacifist European Union's.*

Hopefully the above makes clear exactly why the Russians want to see a Europe that remains divided into a bunch of medium-sized nation states: compared to such countries, it is quite powerful. Outside of a Tom Clancy novel Russia will never be able to run roughshod over Europe, even a divided Europe, but absent the EU Russia would be a much more noteworthy force on the continent.

Unite all of the Europeans together, though, and Russia's power position deteriorates quite dramatically.  

Despite their clear logical basis and the not-insignificant resources they've received from the foreign policy apparatus, Russia's anti-EU antics have been resoundingly ineffective. Whether it was through timely donations to Eurosceptic political parties like the Front National, the creation of hazy networks of "think tanks" and research institutes churning out anti-EU reports, or through the creation of outright propaganda stations like Sputnik, Russia's over attempts to undermine European unity have failed to move the needle in any discernible fashion.

Indeed, despite Russian objections, European integration has advanced relentlessly for most of the past thirty years, progressing to the point that the core of the European Union now shares the same currency. Last year, as Russian tanks rolled into Eastern Ukraine, the supposedly divided and shambolic EU responded firmly, unanimously passing, and then subsequently renewing, a tough regime of economic sanctions. People (your humble author included) kept expecting the European consensus to dissolve, but it held. Amidst a terrible crisis, it certainly appeared as if Europe had never been more united.

Midway through 2015, however, things are starting to look very, very different. Due to inherent contradictions in the Eurozone's architecture, contradictions about which entire books can and have been written and which must be skirted over here for the sake of brevity, the decades-long progress of European integration now appears to be coming to a violent halt. The Greek debt debacle, particularly the German leadership's insistence on going out of its way to publicly shame and humiliate the democratically elected head of a European "partner," is the proximate cause. The real frustrations that are now being voiced, however, go much deeper, to the very core of what "Europe" even means.

Basically, the crisis in Greece and the totally unyielding position of the ECB (a position for which there is not even the barest hint of economic support) are getting people to open their eyes. Many are now discovering that what they had earlier assumed was "normal" (the Euro) is actually a totally bizarre and historically unprecedented situation. It is, to use a standby cliché, the moment where everyone realizes that the emperor has no clothes. When The Guardian, famous for its smarmy and borderline insufferable advocacy on behalf of the European Union, prints an opinion column urging people to vote in favor of the UK's exit, something very fundamental has changed (had, by some miracle, a similar piece appeared in The Guardian 10 years ago both the writer and editor would have been fired before the ink on the print edition was dry).

So how does any of this relate to Russia? Well, many had assumed (wrongly, it turns out!) that the EU would find another way to kick the Greek can down the road, that some other unsatisfying but bearable compromise would be negotiated and everyone would persist in the delusion that everything was normal. Anti-Russian sanctions would remain, and European Unity would be preserved. Russia would be isolated, and Europe would be on the same page.

Now, however, it is clear that business as usual is not an option. When even the IMF, hardly a bastion of socialist agitation, argues that Greece needs not more austerity but a radical program of debt relief, the political ground has shifted. The fight over how to deal with Greece has already exposed enormous cleavages between the EU's members, and it's about to get a whole lot nastier.

Being realistic, it seems clear that Moscow will benefit, at least marginally. This is not only because the EU's attention will be focused on internal matters, but because huge damage has been done to the fundamental institutions that make Europe work. Political trust between the various EU members is evaporating almost in real time, and the Russians, in private, have to  be positively delighted.  

If you're upset by the prospect of the Russians gaining an advantage, though, direct your complaints to Brussels, not Moscow. Not in their wildest dreams could the Russians have dreamed of doing as much damage to the EU as the Germans have over the past several weeks. Actions have consequences, and right now the Europeans seem as if they are deliberately trying to undermine past efforts at integration.

*This already huge disparity is likely to grow further in future years as the EU, and particularly its eastern members, substantially boost military budgets that have been under relentless pressure ever since the start of the financial crisis. It's entirely possible that, in a few years' time, Russia's military spending will be less than 30% of Europe's.

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 #10
Sputnik
July 23, 2015
Kremlin to Seize Foreign Assets in Response to Frozen Russian Capital

The Russian government's Commission on Legislative Affairs approved a bill that would allow Russia to seize foreign state assets without consulting them.

According to the new bill, Russia will be able to seize foreign state assets from countries that would infringe Russia's jurisdictional immunity.

The Ministry of Justice said the new law is to bring parity on the existing "jurisdictional imbalance" between Russia and other countries. In other words, Russia will now seize the state assets of other countries in proportion to the amount of Russian assets frozen in those countries.

"The amount of claims against the Russian Federation and its governmental bodies in foreign courts has been steadily increasing, at the same time Russia's consent for involvement in these cases is never sought," the Ministry of Justice said.

Recently, Russia signed several international treaties on mutual protection of investment, according to which all investment disputes and litigations are carried out by international courts. Thus, Russia's recognition of foreign courts' jurisdiction is essentially the surrender of its own sovereignty, authors of the new bill argued.

The bill comes after some European countries seized Russian state assets in mid-June following lawsuits from former Yukos shareholders.

Yukos's stakeholders claimed the Russian government had illegally forced the energy company out of business, allowing Rosneft to snap up its assets and become the country's largest oil producer.

The court in The Hague has awarded three companies representing former Yukos co-owners $50 billion in compensation from the Russian government.

Russia expects that a number of foreign countries will follow Belgium's example and sieze Russia's governmental assets.

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#11
Fort Russ/jpgazeta.ru
http://fortruss.blogspot.com
July 23, 2015
A short list of Kremlin's accomplishments
By Aleksandr Rodzhers
http://jpgazeta.ru/kratkiy-spisok-dostizheniy-kremlya-18-punktov-dlya-vsyopropalshhikov/
Translated from Russian by J.Hawk

At the moment the internet is full of complaints about the mistakes and betrayals by the Russian government--it's a fashionable and well-paying enterprise. There's a national proverb--"thin tea for some, a small pearl for others"--it's always easy to find reasons to be dissatisfied.

But we shall talk about the Kremlin's most recent accomplishments and how they are changing the global balance of power.

1. In Ufa Putin took India and Pakistan and got them involved in the Shanghai Organization integration processes. The Organization's countries now total over three billion people, and include more nuclear powers than NATO.

Moreover, Russia acted as a peacekeeper because it insisted on a bilateral meeting between India and Pakistan which froze their diplomatic contacts a year ago after a border clash.

2. Russia is also acting as an intermediary between Iran and "the six", which will reduce Iran's sanctions burden and allow it more freedom to pursue own policies.

Some are concerned that Iran might greatly increase its oil exports which will cause oil prices to drop further. First of all, it doesn't have the technical ability to do so, and new deposits require considerable time and investment to develop. Secondly, Iran itself is not interested in dumping of this sort.

Moreover, benefits to Russia are plainly visible--Iran will be able to help Syria more actively (both countries are Russia's allies at this stage), and the US won't be able to continue lying about how the ABM system is being built against Iran, which makes its aggressive policies more evident.

3. Russia has cut in half the proportion of US Treasuries in its gold and currency reserves.

4. Russia has considerably reduced its foreign debt. It also reduced the debts of its state firms and has done so at a 10% discount.

5. Russia increased its share of control over strategic state companies.

6. The Crimea group of forces has been strengthened.

7. Nearly all army units have had their combat readiness checked.

8. The army's rearmament is continuing apace.

9. LPR and DPR are now de-facto part of the ruble zone. While formally it's a bi-currency zone, 84% of all transactions are conducted in rubles.

10. LPR and DPR are developing their own banking system under joint oversight and in cooperation with South Ossetia. Once the process is complete, nobody will have to pay Kiev any taxes.

11. DPR and LPR have established centralized military commands. Anarchy has been put down, all military units are now under firm control.

12. DPR and LPR industry is being integrated with the Russian economy, dozens of firms are already working to fulfill Russian orders.

13. Many European corporations (especially German and Italian) are openly ignoring their own governments' sanctions, continuing to work with their Russian partners.

14. Russia has either entered into treaties or is continuing negotiations with several countries to implement currency swaps in order to conduct trade in national currencies without the use of the dollar.

15. The volume of new contracts with China alone is estimated at over one trillion dollars.

16. Russia has become one of the charter members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which is equivalent to, and is supposed to replace, the IMF and the World Bank.

17. The implementation of a an alternative Russo-Chinese payment system.

18. Ukraine's bankruptcy due to the shattering of bilateral industrial and economic cooperation with Russia is now evident. Ukraine is experiencing growing chaos and the Kiev's regime's hold on power is growing weaker. Eurointegration propaganda has been discredit, only the mentally ill continue to believe it.

This list is far from complete, there are many other items which I simply forgot or which it's too soon to discuss in public.

Overall, Russia and China are building an alternative system of international relations which many have dubbed "alter-globalization" a while ago. Its motto is "Another World Is Possible."

In a battle of two systems the better structured one will prevail. That's why Moscow and Beijing are establishing more empowering, more independent, and more just equivalents of nearly all Western institutions, their own versions of IMF, World Bank, NATO, OSCE, and many others.

The next step, ideally, should be the integration of legislation and judicial systems, including the creation of international tribunals and arbitration courts as alternatives to ECJ, London Arbitrage, and The Hague.

I understand that the couch experts would like everything to be done right now, immediately, a swift, global, and painless victory, but it's never like that. Any change requires time, and global change even more so. Especially since the leadership of China and Russia desire to soften the consequences of the US loss of global hegemony and its likely economic collapse as a result of another, even more severe, crisis.

The ongoing processes are enormous, the efforts applied to advance them are colossal, and if someone can't notice them, it's only because of their own problems with eyesight and hearing.

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 #12
Interfax
July 23, 2015
Russians blame EU, Athens for Greek crisis - poll

The Greek situation has caught the eye of most Russians, the Russian Public Opinion Study Center (VTsIOM) said, adding that 57 percent of its respondents were watching the events in that country.

Speaking of the culprits behind the Greece crisis, 42 percent pointed the finger at the European Union which gave more loans to Greece then it could repay. About a third (30 percent) put the blame on the national government that assumed the back-breaking loan obligations.

Twenty-four percent of the 1,600 people interviewed in 130 populated localities in 46 regions on July 18-19 were undecided.

In the opinion of 46 percent of Russians, Greece's secession from the European Union will weaken the EU. Seventeen percent argued that the EU would even benefit from that, and 37 percent could not answer the question.

Opinions differed on what standpoint Russia should maintain regarding Greece.

A third (33 percent) suggested that Russia assist in diplomatic negotiations between Greece and the European Union. Another third (30 percent) proposed economic assistance through the lifting of sanctions against Greek commodities, promotion of Russian tourism in Greece and so on. Eleven percent said it would make sense to provide subsidies and loans. Thirty-three percent said any Russian assistance to Greece would be unnecessary.

"Russian citizens have lately developed a feeling of the unjust and biased attitude of the Western world to Russia. A significant part of the Russian population sees Greece as a potential ally, a weak link or a hole in the anti-Russian policy and a victim of the injustice of the general world order, and the EU is often blamed for its problems," VTsIOM communications director Alexei Firsov said in his comment on the poll results.

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 #13
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
July 23, 2015
Russia and EU negotiators push toward crisis resolution in Ukraine; U.S. and Russia compete for Cuba; Uzbekistan pays flirting game with global powers
RBTH presents its weekly analytical program TROIKA REPORT, featuring a look at three of the most high-profile recent developments in international affairs.
Sergey Strokan, Vladimir Mikheev

1. Engaging the West
Russia and EU peace negotiators push toward crisis resolution in Ukraine

With the fruitful cooperation between Russia and the West on settling the Iranian nuclear issue still fresh in the memory, four-party negotiations on how bring peace to Ukraine were restarted last week.

The leaders of Russia, France, Germany and Ukraine held the first telephone conversation since late April and urged the warring parties to implement in full the agreement so painfully and painstakingly reached in Minsk in February.

It also comes in the wake of the modest success by Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko in pushing through parliament the draft constitutional amendments on decentralization of power which would give the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Lugansk "people's republics" (DNR and LNR) in the Donbass region of eastern Ukraine a certain degree of autonomy.

The approval of the amendments by the parliament was made possible through pressure from the West, which seems to be irritated by the lack of progress on implementing the terms of the Minsk agreement. Opponents of Poroshenko assumed that he must have come under fire for stalling the peace process by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland.

Nothing is ascertained since the "special status" for the Donbass, as agreed upon in the latest Minsk agreement, will not be enshrined in the constitution of Ukraine itself but in a more easily amended or even annulled law on "local self-rule."

Still, some kind of forward motion in the spirit and letter of the Minsk agreement has evidently in progress, is it not? Professor Alexander Gushchin of the Russian State University for the Humanities shared his views with Troika Report on this complex and controversial issue:

"Recently, there have been indications that the parties have taken a number of steps towards each other. The adoption of amendments to the Ukrainian constitution and the withdrawal of troops (from the frontline zone) by the unrecognized republics in the Donbass show that the hostilities are now more frozen than before. It also shows that Russia supports the autonomy of the two republics within Ukraine.

"However, the West will demand that political steps be taken by Russia, and that is the liquidation of the statehood of the republics by the end of this year, as stipulated by the Minsk agreement. Russia would support broad autonomy (for the Donbass republics), but now it would be difficult. I think at the moment, despite political turmoil (the violence in Mukachevo in Western Ukraine), the tactical advantage belongs now to the Ukrainian side."

"The weakening of the confrontation in Ukraine is connected with the Iranian issue. However, much will depend on the potential Russian concessions. Yet there are only two options: The first is autonomy (for the Donbass republics) with limited rights, and the second a frozen conflict, with Russia continuing to support the republics. I believe the first option is more realistic and acceptable for Moscow."

Optimists in the expert community in Russia share hopes that this movement in the right direction might bring about a face-saving compromise for all sides.

However, the pessimists are not convinced. Andrei Suzdaltsev, deputy dean of the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs at the Moscow-based Higher School of Economics, suspects that the West will now put too much pressure on the Donbass republics (apparently through Russia) to achieve unilateral benefits, and as a result the Minsk accord could crumble. On whose side in this debate does Professor Alexander Gushchin stand?

"It's difficult to be either an optimist or a pessimist. There are nuances. But I do not see a possibility for the outbreak of a big war. A frozen conflict and the granting of autonomy, both are possible."

Whatever the final settlement may look like, the positive mood among the interested parties seem to be gaining momentum. The developments of the last seven days can be interpreted as a welcoming sign that the four negotiating parties and the United States are beginning to interact in good faith and actively engage Kiev and the Donbass insurgents in the search for a lasting formula of national reconciliation.
 
2. Globally speaking
Cuba: Can the U.S. out-friend Russia in the Caribbean?

Following the historic decision by the U.S. and Cuba to restore diplomatic ties, announced on December 17, 2014, two embassies have been just opened in Havana and Washington, respectively.

Russian pundits placed the event into the wider context of what they see as the undeclared drive by the United States to win over friends of Russia and expand its sphere of influence into areas it had previously established, for reasons of political ideology, as no-go zones. It could also signal a turnaround in Washington's policy of keeping "pariah states" on the outskirts of the global political mainstream.

For the Obama administration, it is the culmination of two years of bumpy negotiations with what was traditionally termed in American political and media oldspeak as the Caribbean's "Communist regime." These high-stakes talks required parting with ideological bias in favor of dogma-free pragmatism.

For Raul Castro and his team of still unbending revolutionaries, who used to chant "Cuba Si, Yankee No," it was no less easy to accept the sudden change in attitude of their sworn enemies, who had previously masterminded so many attempts to overthrow the Havana government and plots to kill the founding father of the nation, Fidel Castro.

Both sides agree that this is simply the first step in the right direction. Huge challenges still lie ahead. In particular, there is the controversial issue of restitution, or the return of property of Cuban exiles, who are divided on the benefits of the dramatic overhaul of U.S. policy towards a "Cuba libre."

No less unpredictable is the outcome of the deliberations in the U.S. Congress, where elected officials representing Cuban-Americans claim that Obama has not made the most out of the bargain.

Troika Report reached veteran foreign policy analyst Anatoly Gromyko, assistant member of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Gromyko shares the name of his father, the renowned Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko. The 83-year old Anatoly Gromyko was an acquaintance of the late U.S. president John F. Kennedy. Here is his comment on the restoration of formal diplomatic ties between the U.S. and Cuba:

"I view this development as extremely positive. Basically, it amounts to the United States finally abandoning its Cold War stance. It's no secret that the U.S. goal was to suffocate Cuba with economic sanctions and military pressure. Now Obama is relinquishing this policy. It's a positive move. Cuba bears witness to the fact that even a small country that stands firmly on its feet can face up to any subversion. Sanctions at their core are an act of subversion. Giving up the policy of sanctions and [pursuing] a return to normal diplomatic relations is a good sign, though much will depend on the policy pursued further on by Washington. If there is a suspicion that the U.S. is using the normalization as a shield for staging an "orange revolution," meaning a regime change, it would meet a negative reaction among the Cubans."

The minefield that lies ahead for Cuba and the U.S. should not be underestimated. The fast-track burial of a sanctions regime that lasted for more than half a century is unlikely to overcome the entrenched animosity on both sides. It needs time.

Moreover, Cuban-Americans represent a lobby group with powerful financial leverage and influential supporters, many of whom are found among ultra-conservatives, including those who reside on Capitol Hill.

Strangely enough, according to Troika Report experts who are familiar with the slow evolution of the Cuban political class, today the islanders seem to be more ready and apt to accommodate a more pragmatic relationship with the United States.

Nevertheless, Alexander Domrin, a professor at the Moscow-based Higher School of Economics, sounds no less upbeat about this U-turn in U.S. foreign policy:

"All wars come to an end. All embargoes come to an end. What we have now is really a historical moment."

"From my point of view it might have even a broader global context. There are different Cubans living in America right now. Some of them lost property as a result of the revolution in Cuba. Some, belonging to the new generation, want to re-establish relations with their motherland. This is quite remarkable that President Obama now is not planning to send new troops to the Bay of Pigs or trying to kill Fidel Castro. Obama is more sensitive than his predecessors to the voices of Cuban Americans who want new relations with their motherland."

In any case, no harm is envisaged for the slowly improving interaction between Russia and Cuba, which suffered a major setback after Yeltsin's administration distanced itself from its once close ally in America's backyard. At present, Moscow and Havana are promoting meaningful and tailor-made cooperation in lucrative areas free of ideological tenets, which provides both sides with a certain flexibility.
 
3. Going Eastward
Uzbekistan plays capricious bride to global powers
 
Uzbekistan, the second-biggest nation in Central Asia, long regarded as an isolated dictatorship run by an ex-Soviet apparatchik, is rapidly dropping its image of outsider and geopolitical bystander. Less than a year before assuming the chairmanship of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Tashkent is being courted by global powers who are trying to win the ear of Uzbek leader Islam Karimov, who is performing a delicate balancing act by flirting with all the interested parties.

Take Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who visited Uzbekistan last week, hard on the heels of the talks in Tashkent held with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, which inaugurated his tour of the five countries in the region.

Modi heralded "a new era in relations with the Central Asian republics," triggering off fresh speculation on whether or not the region, and Uzbekistan in particular, is becoming the new center stage for charm offensives by major global powers.

In Tashkent, Modi was attempting to get off the ground a 2013 contract to receive 2,000 metric tons of uranium ore concentrate over five years to help power 10 nuclear reactors. Both sides agreed to expand cooperation in civil aviation, transportation in general, and, above all, in defense.

Similarly, Tashkent welcomes military assistance from the United States and is looking at other potential patrons to ensure equilibrium in the wider region.

India, Russia and the United States seem to be courting Tashkent. What are the stakes in these rebalancing efforts? Vadim Kozyulin, an expert with the Center for Policy Studies, a Moscow-based independent think tank, attempted to clarify matters for Troika Report:

"First of all, it is important to note that the results of the recent high-level meetings are shrouded in secrecy and conspiracy. Information is limited. This is one of the traits of Tashkent's policy: secrecy and unpredictability. But world leaders, when dealing with Uzbekistan, are looking for predictability, mostly in three fields: security, power transition in the country, and economic opportunities.

"Security is the key issue since Islamic State has already set its foot in Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Obviously, it is important to know who will be the major provider of security in the region. The stakes are high for two key players: Russia and the United States, and to a certain extent to India given the turbulence in neighboring Afghanistan and developments in Pakistan.

"All players are ready to pay a price for maintaining stability in the region. Moscow has written off Uzbekistan's debt to Russia, totaling almost one billion dollars, while the U.S. has provided military hardware, equipment and ammunition to Tashkent free of charge. It is projected on the crucial issue: Who will be the main provider of security for Uzbekistan? This is the intrigue which is now being resolved."

Talking of intrigues, is Uzbekistan playing the role of a capricious bride, flirting with all the global powers but unwilling to commit to any one of them? Arkady Dubnov, political analyst and expert in Central Asia affairs, provided an insight into the contours of the emerging new security infrastructure in the region. Here is his comment for Troika Report:

"To follow your metaphor, Uzbekistan is an aged bride who has been marrying and divorcing, and marrying again. There is a good reason for that: Uzbekistan is a much-sought after bride with whom many would like to have a very close relationship. Just hours after the exhausting negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program were finalized in Vienna, Sergei Lavrov paid a lightning visit to Tashkent, where he immediately started planning a state visit by Islam Karimov to Russia. It proves beyond any shadow of doubt that Moscow has come to realize the value of such symbolic gestures.

"Islam Karimov can also appreciate this courteous gesture. As soon as the proposal to make the highest level visit to Moscow was made during the Ufa summit, Karimov, who earlier objected rather vehemently to India and Pakistan joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, or SCO, has changed his tone and rhetoric. Mind you, Uzbekistan will assume the post of chairperson of the SCO next year. There are no geopolitical overtones in this, only the expediency of the opportune moment, and Moscow did not miss its chance.

"It can now be predicted that next year Uzbekistan will show loyalty to Russia's interests in the region. As testimony came the official statement this week that Tashkent will develop its relations with the United States, but not at the expense of relations with Russia. This stance will be highly appreciated in Moscow."

In sum, we are witnessing a sort of a re-discovery by the world's powers of Uzbekistan as an important player in Central Asia, despite the fact that at one point it was regarded as an obsolete autocratic regime. Today, Uzbekistan is calling the shots and is in an envious position to reap the benefits of multiple engagements to rich suitors.

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#14
Russia Beyond the Headlines/Vesti.ru
www.rbth.ru
July 23, 2015
U.S. and Russia introduce visa-free travel for Chukotka and Alaska
New law allows indigenous peoples to cross Bering Strait to visit relatives.
 
The United States and Russia have introduced visa-free travel to the indigenous inhabitants of the Chukotka and Alaska, the official website of the Chukotka Autonomous Region has reported. The new law came into effect on July 17.

The precedent occurred after the Bering Strait Regional Commission (BCRC) on the U.S. side declared its readiness to issue an insert for the passport of an Alaska native who wanted to visit Chukotka visa-free under the Intergovernmental Agreement Concerning Mutual Visits by Inhabitants of the Bering Strait Region, a special accord that exists between Russia and the United States.

The BCRC's American Chief Commissioner Vera Metcalf reported this to her Russian counterpart Leonid Gorenstein.

"A passport insert is proof that the citizen is a resident of the so-called designated area, which is indicated in the U.S.-Russian Agreement Concerning Mutual Visits by Inhabitants of the Bering Strait Region," said Matvei Mikhalenko, an adviser to the international relations department in the administration of the Chukotka Autonomous Region.

"For the American side, this area is Alaska; for Russia, it is Chukotka. When traveling to the designated area, in both cases, a person should have a national passport and this insert."

He specified that the Alaskan authorities have had a sample of the Chukotka insert since the signing of the agreement. It has been in force since 1989 and applies only to the indigenous peoples of Chukotka and Alaska who live on both sides of the U.S.-Russian border and have relatives in these regions.

The term "relative" is understood as blood relatives, members of a tribe, or as indigenous people who share a linguistic or cultural heritage with indigenous peoples of the neighboring territory.

Indigenous people of Chukotka and Alaska can travel visa-free at the invitation of their relatives from the designated area. According to the existing rules, it is necessary to notify the senior commissioner of the opposite side no less than 10 days in advance.

Inhabitants of Chukotka and Alaska may stay in the designated area of the neighboring country for no longer than 90 days.

The U.S. border checkpoints are Nome and Gambell; the Russian border checkpoints are Anadyr, Provideniya, Lavrentiya and Uelen. At the same time, the agreement stipulates that the air and sea routes permitted for travel are set by the chief commissioner.

Russians have been able to enter parts of the United States without a visa since 2012. At that time, a visa-free regime for Russians was introduced on the American island of Guam and the Mariana Islands in the Pacific Ocean.

First published in Russian in Vesti.ru.
 

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 #15
Russia Insider
www.russia-insider.com
July 24, 2015
US Stops Pretending Missile Shield Was Aimed at Iran
Not that anyone with half a brain cell was buying it - US will press ahead with the missile shield despite Iran deal proving it was always aimed at Russia
By Alexander Mercouris

The U.S. has announced that it will press ahead with its plan to station an anti-ballistic missile system in Poland notwithstanding the recent nuclear deal with Iran.

This is despite the fact that the deal with Iran robs the system of its announced rationale.

The U.S. has always insisted that the anti-ballistic missile system was intended to protect Europe from attack by nuclear tipped missiles launched from Iran. It has repeatedly denied that the system is aimed at Russia.

The Russians have never believed these assurances and have always been sure that the system was directed at themselves.

The story of anti-ballistic defence is long and tortuous.

The U.S. and the USSR first began work on anti-ballistic systems in the 1960s. Discussions for their limitation began at the 1967 U.S.-Soviet summit meeting between Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin and U.S. President Lyndon Johnson in Glassboro. The proposal came from the U.S., concerned about the spiraling cost of such systems and their effect on global stability.

The negotiations eventually culminated in the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, a cornerstone of the subsequent program of mutually agreed nuclear arms limitation and eventual reduction, achieved during the heyday of the U.S.-Soviet détente era of the early 1970s. The effect of the treaty was to place severe limits on the extent to which either power was permitted to deploy anti-ballistic missile systems.  In practice the USSR only deployed one system - to protect Moscow - and the U.S. abandoned such systems entirely.

Though the original impulse towards anti-ballistic missile limitation came from the U.S., it was from within the U.S. that criticism of the treaty first circulated in the late 1970s, with rumors appearing in the U.S. defence press of the Soviets supposedly experimenting with various exotic technologies to destroy U.S. ballistic missiles. It is now known that these stories were baseless.

The rumors however paved the way for President Reagan's 1983 announcement of his so-called Strategic Defense Initiative ("SDI") - a futuristic program to install an anti-ballistic missile system in space. The initiative was justified as compatible with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty on the grounds that the treaty did not prohibit research based on "new physical principles".

SDI is sometimes credited with forcing the Soviets to negotiate and precipitating the collapse of the USSR. The reality is that the Soviets barely took it seriously and as a program it was stillborn.

Reagan's endorsement of anti-ballistic missile defence however acquired a totemic importance for parts of the U.S. Republican party and was embraced by U.S. neocons, doubtless in part for its ability to harm relations with Russia. It was endorsed in principle by President George H. W. Bush, who relaunched the initiative in a far more modest land based form. Since in this form it was clearly incompatible with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, in 2002 the U.S. withdrew from it.

The history of U.S. ideas for anti-ballistic defence show that in reality they have nothing to do with Iran. At the time the program was relaunched by the first President Bush shortly after his election, Iran had neither ballistic missiles with the necessary range to reach Europe, nor nuclear weapons. It does not have either to this day.

In reality the system has always been clearly directed at Russia, though its primary purpose seems to  be (1) to benefit U.S. defence contractors; (2) to gratify the self-appointed guardians of Reagan's legacy on the Republican Right; and (3) to establish a permanent U.S. military presence in eastern Europe in violation of promises given to Moscow in the 1990s.

The last factor is the most important of the three. Planting U.S. missiles in eastern Europe while pretending their purpose is to defend Europe from a fictional threat from Iran provides the U.S. with an alibi for forward deployment of its troops and missile forces in eastern Europe in violation of promises given to Moscow. For U.S. defence contractors it has the added benefit of making further agreements for arms control with the Russians far more difficult.

That the system is aimed at Russia rather than Iran is confirmed by the US's consistent refusal to compromise with Moscow on any of its elements. The U.S. refused Putin's offer to develop a joint system, or to cooperate with Moscow on missile defence.  

In 2009, shortly after his election, Obama appeared to cancel the program in return for a further agreement for arms reduction with the Russians. Once the agreement was obtained, he quickly went back on his promise.

As Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov has now pointed out, Obama also said in 2009 that anti-ballistic defence would lose its purpose if Iran ended its nuclear program. Iran has now come to an agreement with the U.S. on its nuclear program. The U.S.'s anti-ballistic missile program however continues. The justification now is that it is intended to defend Europe not from Iranian nuclear weapons but from Iranian ballistic missiles - even if presumably they have only conventional warheads.

What this saga again illustrates is something that is obvious to anyone who follows the evolution of U.S.-Russian relations closely: the U.S. never stopped thinking of Russia as an adversary and never stopped working against Russian interests, even in those periods when it was pretending that relations were good. In the process the U.S. shows an entirely ruthless - and cynical - attitude to arms control treaties it signs with Russia, and to promises it gives to Moscow.

The anti-ballistic missile system the U.S. is deploying in Europe will not change the military balance between the U.S. and Russia, even if it is hugely expanded in the future. One of the other advantages for its U.S. supporters of pretending that it was aimed at Iran is that it has prevented a proper debate in the U.S. of its total lack of effectiveness as against the highly advanced Russian systems. Since it is planting U.S. troops and missiles which is its real purpose, that does not unduly concern its advocates.

The damage done to trust and to the future of arms control between the U.S. and Russia - still the world's two leading nuclear powers - cannot however be overstated. The lesson the Russians will have learned from this affair is that the U.S. cannot be trusted to abide honestly by its arms control commitments. The future of arms control - with all that means for international peace and stability - is growing dimmer. This episode shows why.

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 #16
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
July 23, 2015
Afghanistan: The real vs. imaginary threats to Central Asia and Russia
With Islamic State purportedly increasing its activity within Afghanistan, Russia Direct interviewed experts to find out the new challenges for Russia and Central Asia emanating from Afghanistan.
By Galiya Ibragimova
Galiya Ibragimova is a consultant at the Moscow-based PIR Center, a Russian think tank. Her research interests include regional security in Central Asia, information security and international relations.

On July 17 in Kyrgyzstan there was an antiterrorist operation against militants who, according to Kyrgyz law enforcement agencies, were planning to attack the Russian military air base in the city of Kant. Kyrgyz intelligence asserts that the eradicated terrorists were members of Islamic State of Iraq and the Greater Syria (ISIS).

Earlier, there were reported attempts by ISIS militants to penetrate the republics of Central Asia from neighboring Afghanistan, where they are menacing the Taliban.

Given these growing security concerns, Russia Direct asked experts about the new threats and challenges to Central Asia and Russia emerging from Afghanistan, as well as the severity of the threat to the region posed by IS.

Alexander Knyazev, expert on Central Asia and the Middle East

After the Taliban announced a jihad against ISIS, groups operating under the ISIS brand (not necessarily part of ISIS proper) have been in conflict with the Afghan Taliban. But any talk about the rising influence of IS in Afghanistan is wholly inappropriate.

The country is home to three groups totaling 700 people calling themselves ISIS. All of them are operating in the western and northwestern parts of the country on the border with Iran. One of these groups is led by a former Turkmen citizen and Soviet officer who goes by the name of Akmurad. All these groups are focused mainly on anti-Iranian, anti-Shia operations. There is no reliable information to back up claims that they are active in Central Asia. What's more, today many radical groups, even criminal ones, use the ISIS brand as a stamp of authority.

Inside the countries of Central Asia government bodies, law enforcement agencies and intelligence services are actively exploiting the ISIS brand to reap dividends. It is easy to declare any group as extremist and belonging to the world's most hyped brand of terrorists, in this case, ISIS. For instance, Kyrgyzstan recently routed an alleged ISIS cell planning to attack Russia's air base in Kant. There is no information at all about the dead criminals. But the incident will be used by Kyrgyz intelligence to secure external funding, mostly from Russia, and to divert public attention from the serious socio-economic problems in the country.

Maxim Starchak, expert at the PIR Center for Policy Studies

ISIS adherents are paid 2-3 times more than members of the Taliban. This creates potential for conflict between ISIS and the Taliban as the latter strives to maintain influence in the country. The war of the faithful against the infidels, if such arises, will be the main concern in Afghanistan. Western military in Afghanistan will continue to be the target, diverting the various factions from fighting each other.

As for the Afghanistan-bordering states of Central Asia, only the armed forces of Uzbekistan can be expected to rebuff the aggressor. However, Tashkent is unlikely to go to war, even if ISIS were to attack one of its Central Asian neighbors.

The armies of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are weak and reliant on the operational readiness of Russian troops stationed inside their countries. Russian or Chinese military aid to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan would not greatly improve the combat readiness of their armies, which remain numerically small, poorly trained and demoralized.

Russian military aid to these republics is just a fee for siting military bases there. If Russia is concerned about security in neighboring Central Asia, it should strengthen its bases in both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

Turkmenistan warrants a separate mention. The Turkmen-Afghan border was regularly shelled throughout the winter (no less frequently than the Tajik-Afghan border). Turkmenistan's army is small, but efficient. It can handle small groups of terrorists but, like its neighbors, would struggle against a large force.

The long border with Afghanistan and lack of external support make Turkmenistan the weakest link in the chain of Central Asian security, which is why it would make strategic sense to draw Turkmenistan into bilateral security agreements with Russia.

Sanat Kushkumbayev, deputy director of the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan

The intensifying rivalry between the Taliban and ISIS is largely a media myth. The Taliban and IS are projects with strong external support. The emergence of radical ISIS suggests a rebranding of extremist groups.

Moreover, since the Taliban has stated that it rejects ISIS radicalism, the two groups clearly have different objectives. The Taliban's aim is to regain control of Afghanistan. ISIS, in contrast, is targeting the Middle East, mainly Iran. If we trace the zone of influence of ISIS militants, we see that they are mainly operating in areas settled by Shia and supporters of Iran.

More than anything else, ISIS is a powerful media structure with an extensive informational network worldwide. It has entire TV and movie studios that shoot professional videos and churn out the image of a brutal Islamist structure through media channels.

Journalists disseminate these videos, as well as unverified figures about the number of ISIS recruits. Experts are starting to take these unverified data as fact, hyperbolizing the threat. But the Taliban is also interested in maintaining and spreading its reputation far beyond Afghanistan's borders.

What's more, there are external players also keen to promote the myth of Taliban and ISIS omnipotence. Particularly the Central Asian republics, which, fearing the loss of foreign interest after the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, are trying to present themselves as the front line in the fight against the new global evil and divert attention from more serious domestic issues. Moreover, the battle against ISIS is a source of external military, technical and financial support for the Central Asian regimes.

As the debate continues about the alleged competition between the Taliban and ISIS, Afghanistan's old threats remain the same. The main problem is internal instability, which threatens not only neighboring countries, but also Afghanistan itself.

Abdugani Mamadazimov, chairman of the Association of Political Scientists of the Republic of Tajikistan

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), stationed in Afghanistan for 13 years, was a kind of a security buffer for the countries of Central Asia. It checked the movement of the Taliban into northern Afghanistan, towards the Amu Darya River.

Following the withdrawal of the main ISAF contingent, around 10,000 foreign troops remain on Afghan soil. Concentrated mainly around the capital Kabul, they cannot ensure the security of all provinces. This creates risks for Afghanistan and the neighboring countries of Central Asia.

In December 2014 four border guards were abducted on the Tajik side of the border with Afghanistan by an extremist group linked to drug trafficking. They have yet to be freed. The country clearly needs some kind of compensatory policy, i.e. a military organization able to take on the role of regional security buffer. Despite the varying attitudes towards it in the Central Asian republics, that organization remains the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

Although the Taliban is becoming less active in Afghanistan, the infiltration of ISIS militants and other terrorists means that CSTO support is crucial to Tajikistan. Russia's military base, the largest land-based facility in Tajikistan, is currently being upgraded. Assistance will also be provided to reequip and strengthen the Tajik national army, as announced by Sergey Lavrov at a meeting of CSTO foreign ministers.

The civil war in Tajikistan in the post-Soviet period, when troops and weapons were nationalized in the former union republics, is another reason why assistance is needed. When the war finally came to an end, in 1997, there was virtually nothing left of the Tajik army. Consequently, it is far from being the strongest in the region today. Hence, Russia's military umbrella is vital.

Daniyar Kosnazarov, head of Central Asian and Caspian Studies, Geopolitics and Regional Studies Division, Library of the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan

The infiltration of ISIS militants into Afghanistan is an additional irritant for the government of President Ashraf Ghani, especially now when talks have begun with the Taliban. The Afghan authorities are urging everyone, including the Taliban, to resist ISIS.

But the intra-Sunni confrontation between ISIS and the Taliban could jeopardize the newly launched peace process in Afghanistan. It is possible that the Afghan authorities could give the Taliban an ultimatum: If you fail to accept the rules of the game, you risk energizing ISIS.

Who are the ISIS militants in Afghanistan? Most likely they are Afghan field commanders with a grudge against the Taliban, as well as small terrorist groups in search of quick funding and influence, and therefore sworn to ISIS. Afghans are essentially trying to fight each other once again.

The aggravation of the conflict between the Taliban and self-described ISIS militants could lead to "satellite wars," whereby extremist groups in Afghanistan are sponsored by larger rival countries. Iran has extensive links with the Taliban, and these ties have increased of late. But I do not believe that in the context of Iraq, Syria and Yemen, where Tehran is indirectly involved, it wants to escalate another conflict right on its border with Afghanistan.

It is worth noting that China has taken a keen interest in the Afghan settlement, sending signals to official Kabul that only peace in the country can stimulate Chinese financing of various energy and infrastructure projects.

Russia is guided by the logic that a strengthening of the terrorist underground in Afghanistan poses new security risks in Central Asia, which the Kremlin is anxious to avoid. In this regard, Moscow and Beijing could potentially sponsor the fight against IS inside Afghanistan, even if it means involving the Taliban.

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 #17
The Unz Review
www.unz.com
July 24, 2015
The Russia-U.S. Conventional Military Balance
By THE SAKER

the Unz Review I wrote that "under any conceivable scenario Russia does have the means to basically completely destroy the USA as a country in about 30min (the USA, of course, can do the same to Russia). Any US war planner would have to consider the escalatory potential of any military action against Russia."

This still begs the question of whether Russia could challenge the USA militarily if we assume, for demonstration's sake, that neither side would be prepared to use nuclear weapons, including tactical ones. If, by some mysterious magic, all nuclear weapons were to disappear, what would the balance of power between Russian and the US look like?

Why Bean Counting Makes Absolutely No Sense

The typical reply to this kind of question resorts to what US force planners call "bean counting". Typically, journalists use the yearly IISS Military Balance or a source like Global Firepower and tallies of the number of men, main battle tanks, armored personnel carriers, infantry combat vehicles, combat aircraft, artillery pieces, bombers, missiles, surface ships, submarines, etc. presented by each side in a chart. The reality is that such bean counting means absolutely and strictly nothing. Let's take a simple example: if a war happens between, say, China and Russia then the fact that China has, say, 1000 tanks in its Yunnan province, will make no difference to the war at all, simply because they are too distant. When we apply this caveat to the Russian-US conventional military balance we immediately ought to ask ourselves the following two basic questions:

a) What part of the US military worldwide would be immediately available to the US commanders in case of a war with Russia?

b) On how many reinforcements could this force count and how soon could they get there?

Keep in mind that tanks, bombers, soldiers and artillery do not fight separately - they fight together in what is logically called "combined arms" battles. So even if the USA could get X number of soldiers to location A, if they don't have all the other combined arms components to support them in combat they are just an easy target.

Furthermore, any fighting force will require a major logistics/supply effort. It is all very well to get aircraft X to location A, but if its missiles, maintenance equipment and specialists are not there to help, they are useless. Armored forces are notorious for expending a huge amount of petroleum, oil and lubricants. According to one estimate, in 1991 a US armored division could sustain itself for only 5 days, and after that it needed a major supply effort.

Finally, any force that the US would move from point A to point B would become unavailable to execute its normally assigned role at point A. Now consider that "point A" could mean the Middle-East, or Far East Asia and you will see that this might be a difficult decision for US commanders.

"Heavy" warfare

We have one very good example of how the US operates: Operation Desert Shield. During this huge operation it took the US six months and an unprecedented logistical effort to gather the forces needed to attack Iraq. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia had been prepared for decades to receive such a massive force (in compliance with the so-called Carter Doctrine) and the US efforts was completely unopposed by Saddam Hussein. Now ask yourself the following questions:

a) In case of war with Russia, which country neighboring Russia would have an infrastructure similar to the one of the KSA, prepositioned equipment, huge bases, runways, deep ports, etc. ? (Answer: none)

b) How likely is it that the Russians would give the USA six months to prepare for war without taking any action? (Answer: impossible)

One might object that not all wars run according to the "heavy" scenario of Desert Storm. What if the US was preparing a very 'light' military intervention using only US and NATO immediate or rapid reaction forces?

Light (or rapid reaction) warfare

I will repeat here something I wrote in December of last year:

"The Russians have no fear of the military threat posed by NATO. Their reaction to the latest NATO moves (new bases and personnel in Central Europe, more spending, etc.) is to denounce it as provocative, but Russian officials all insist that Russia can handle the military threat. As one Russian deputy said "5 rapid reaction diversionary groups is a problem we can solve with one missile". A simplistic but basically correct formula. As I mentioned before, the decision to double the size of the Russian Airborne Forces and to upgrade the elite 45th Special Designation Airborne Regiment to full brigade-size has already been taken anyway. You could say that Russia preempted the creation of the 10'000 strong NATO force by bringing her own mobile (airborne) forces from 36'000 to 72'000. This is typical Putin. While NATO announces with fanfare and fireworks that NATO will create a special rapid reaction "spearhead" force of 10'000, Putin quietly doubles the size of the Russian Airborne Forces to 72'000. And, believe me, the battle hardened Russian Airborne Forces are a vastly more capable fighting force then the hedonistic and demotivated multi-national (28 countries) Euroforce of 5'000 NATO is struggling hard to put together. The US commanders fully understand that."

In other words, "light" or "rapid reaction" warfare is where the Russians excel and not the kind of conflict the US or NATO could ever hope to prevail in. Besides, if the "light warfare" was to last longer than planned and had to be escalated to the "heavy" kind, would the USA or Russia have its heavy forces nearer?

Shock and Awe

There is, of course, another model available to the US commanders: the "shock and awe" model: massive cruise missile attacks backed by bomber strikes. Here I could easily object that bombing Russia is not comparable to bombing Iraq and that the Russian air defenses are the most formidable on the planet. Or I could say that while the USA has an excellent record of success when bombing civilians, its record against a military force like the Serbian Army Corps in Kosovo was an abject failure.

[Sidebar: 78 days of non-stop US/NATO airstrikes, 1000+ aircraft and 38'000+ air sorties and all that to achieve what? Ten or so Serbian aircraft destroyed (most on the ground), 20+ APC and tanks destroyed and 1000+ Serbian soldiers dead or wounded. That is out of a force of 130'000+ Serbian soliders, 80+ aircraft, 1'400 artillery pieces, 1'270 tanks and 825 APCs (all figures according to Wikipedia). The 3rd Serbian Army Corps basically came out unharmed from this massive bombing campaign which will go down in history as arguably the worst defeat of airpower in history!]

But even if we assume that somehow the US succeeded in its favorite "remote" warfare, does anybody believe that this would seriously affect the Russian military or breaking the will of the Russian people? The people of Leningrad survived not 78, but 900 (nine hundred!) days of a infinitely worse siege and bombing and never even considered surrendering!

The reality is that being on the defense gives Russia a huge advantage against the USA even if we only consider conventional weapons. Even if the conflict happened in the Ukraine or the Baltic states, geographic proximity would give Russia a decisive advantage over any conceivable US/NATO attack. American commanders all understand that very well even if they pretend otherwise.

Conversely, a Russian attack on the USA or NATO is just as unlikely, and for the same reasons. Russia cannot project her power very far from her borders. In fact, if you look at the way the Russian military is organized, structured and trained, you will immediately see that it is a force designed primarily to defeat an enemy on the Russian border or within less than 1000km from it. Yes, sure, you will see Russian bombers, surface ships and submarines reaching much further, but these are also typical "showing the flag" missions, not combat training for actual military scenarios.

The sole real purpose of the US military is to regularly beat up on some small, more or less defenseless country, either in order to rob it of its resources, overthrow a government daring to defy the World Hegemon, or just to make an example of it. The US military was never designed to fight a major war against a sophisticated enemy. Only the US strategic nuclear forces are tasked to defend the USA against another nuclear power (Russia or China) or actually fight in a major war. As for the Russian military, it was designed to be purely defensive and it has no capability to threaten anybody in Europe, much less so the United States.

Of course, the western corporate media will continue to "bean count" US and Russian forces, but that is pure propaganda designed to create a sense of urgency and fear in the general public. The reality for the foreseeable future will remain that neither the USA nor Russia have the means to successfully attack each other, even with only conventional forces.

The only real danger left is an unprepared and unforeseen sudden escalation which will lead to a confrontation neither side wants nor is prepared for. The Israeli attack on Lebanon in 2006 or the Georgian attack on Russian peacekeepers in 2008 are two scary reminders that sometimes dumb politicians take fantastically dumb decisions. I am confident that Putin and his team would never make such a dumb decision, but when I look at the current pool of US Presidential candidates I will tell you that I get very, very frightened.

Do you?

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 #18
New York Observer
http://observer.com
July 23, 2015
Ukraine Spirals Into the Abyss: Pensioner Suicides and Open Talk of Default
With the currency in free-fall and food and fuel skyrocketing, leaders don traditional garb and a brave face
By Mikhail Klikushin
Mikhail Klikushin attended Novosibirsk State University, and received a graduate degree in Russian history before emigrating to the United States.

Natalie Jaresko has the face of a sad magician whose voodoo spells stopped working long time ago'. The Ukraine's Minister for Finance, Ms. Jaresko nowadays is a common figure on Ukrainian TV. Before becoming the Minister for Finance of Ukraine, this dual Ukrainian-American citizen worked for the US State Department. In the 1990s, she was the first Chief of the Economic Section of the US Embassy in Ukraine, then made her millions as the CEO of a number of investment companies working in Ukraine.

Using all her newly acquired Ukrainian vocabulary she is explaining vehemently to her fellow Ukrainians that they should stop worrying about their country's precarious financial position.

On television, she preaches that 'default' is not necessarily a bad word after which hunger and cold automatically loom, that there is a silver lining in everything. If it will happen (she admits it's possible), it will be a "technical" default that won't cause the national banking system's collapse. Nobody, not the banks nor their clients, will ever suffer. She can sing like a siren for Odysseus (uh oh, you are reminded about Greece again), charming those who want to be cheaply charmed-and here is her song:

"Yes, this is a technical default. But-one shouldn't be afraid of this word. In no way this will have an influence on our bank system because our banks do not hold this international debt. This doesn't influence liquidity, has no influence on deposits of our citizens. This is not Greece, this is different situation."

And of course, by her, the default won't have any effect on the rate of the national currency hryvnia, which before the latest revolution one-and-a-half years ago was 7-8 to a dollar and now approaches 25 among the street vendors.

"In my opinion, according to the economic arithmetic, there should not be any negative impact on the hryvnia. Just arithmetically speaking, money-the currency to be used for the payments-would come out of the country, and in case of the suspension of payments, it remains in the country. Arithmetic is better for the hryvnia," she says.

According to Ms. Jaresko, Ukrainians should even feel and proud about their government's possible intention to default on its $27 billion debt because she does not exclude the possibility that part of Ukraine's debt, the part that was accumulated from 2007 to 2012, belongs to the 'dark forces.' Of course, $3 billion of it was given by Russia, the enemy that wants to destroy Ukraine both militarily and through financial pressure, but there is another reason for staying positive, which is more nuanced and intricate. Ms. Jaresko does not exclude the fact that it has been held by another foe-former President Yanukovich's "family." When asked by a reporter if it was 'possible' that 90 percent of the Ukrainian bonds were bought by the hated former President and his cronies, she shrewdly answered, "Everything is possible, because bonds can be bought and sold. They are sold on the Irish stock exchange. I can't know who is a beneficiary owner of the bonds."

So defaulting is not only possible but also would be a just and positive thing to do.

his position makes Ms. Jaresko a moderate. There are others, like the leader of the Radical Party Oleh Lyashko that calls on his Government for an explicit default on all international debt. He said, "As we can see by the example of Greece, the only way to make creditors to agree [to Ukraine's conditions of 40% haircut on principal, lowering the interest rate and maturity extension] is to declare a default. I call on the [Ukraine Prime-Minister] Yatsenyuk's Government to do just this-it's not going to be any worse [than it is now]."

Much Ukrainian press supports the idea in wide-spread articles with headlines such as 'Default Is a Blessing For People' and 'Why One Shouldn't Be Afraid Of Default.'

Mr. Lyashko is right that the situation is bad. Ukraine's external debt, both state and commercial, totaled $125.97 billion or 110.5% of country's GDP as of April 1, 2015, the National Bank of Ukraine reported. A quarter-century ago, when Ukraine became a sovereign nation, it was $0. Government payments coming due in the course of 12 months are $6.6 billion. Payments on obligations totaled $5.4 billion, including $3 billion owed to Russia-plus interest. Every Ukrainian today-excluding children and the senior citizens-owes the international creditors $3,200, and to pay the amount Ukraine owes to the creditors just this year would mean that every Ukrainian has to contribut' at least $350, which is two-six months salary.

According to the State Statistics Committee, the average monthly salary in Ukraine is around $140 (for simplicity, wages and costs will be in US dollars at the street vendors' rate of 25 hryvnias per dollar).

The most vulnerable are retirees with their monthly pension of $43. The desperate situation of these people is often used by the political parties to organize "performances" in their support. New UKROP party, for example, financed by the oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky, recently organized in the town of Chernigov the rally in its support. To mobilize the senior citizens, free food was promised-one package of flour, one package of noodles and two cans of fish per person.

(Once, the word "Ukrop" or "dill" was used as a pejorative term for "Ukrainian"; today it has been widely accepted with pride by the most politically advanced parts of Ukrainian society as the self-ethnonym in their defiance to the 'Moskals' (Russians).)

If one believes the Ukrainian newspaper Vesti, which reported the story, in Kharkov region in July two senior citizens-Sergei Roganin and Vladimir Maryushchenko-committed suicides by hanging themselves after having received the utility bills with new prices. Sergei Roganin did it in a very unusual way-first, he put on the national dress "vyshyvanka"-a shirt with traditional colorful ornament embroidered around the neck and cuffs, then shouted modern day Ukrainian political and military battle cry of the patriots "Glory to the Ukraine !!!" - and jumped into the noose.

'Vyshyvanka' is another modern-day symbol of patriotism, "Vyshyvanka Day' is a new national holiday (May, 21) when every Ukrainian from President down has to wear one-unless, of course, he wants to be suspected of hidden sympathies to 'Moskals.'

US Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt also wears 'vyshyvanka' from time to time to show his country's support and affection for everything Ukrainian.

Ukrainian Minister for Finance Ms. Jaresko is not your "mom, God and apple pie" lady anymore, she loves her "vyshyvanka" above everything, on her Facebook page she called it "the prayer without words, the symbol of unification with the souls of our forebears."

In the meantime, the monthly minimum wage in Ukraine, which is $48, needs an additional $4 to cover the most basic food basket, leaving aside transport expenses, clothes and the rest. In May 2010, the food basket was 55% of the monthly minimum wage, in May 2015, it was 108 percent.

According to Ukrainian State Statistics Office, within last 12 months sunflower oil has risen 200%, fruits 197%, eggs 181%, bread 175%, pasta 171%, fish 171%. But this is not what worries Ukrainian folks - first and foremost they think about their new utility bills. Price for the natural gas has risen 553% since last summer, for electricity 133%, for water 176%.

Government reformers promised that it was just the beginning.

The definition of middle class in Kiev starts with $400 monthly income, in all other places outside the capital $200 will do the trick. The percentage of middle class in Ukrainian society is the lowest in years-about 9%, according to TNS company. If-or "when" by the pessimists-the dollar hits 30 hryvnias, the middle class of the country will be eliminated.

The income level of the Ukrainian so-called well-to-do class can be demonstrated by the salary of the Deputy General Prosecutor of Ukraine Mr. Vitaly Kasko who makes $720 a month, the district prosecutors who work under his command make up to $400.

The level of unemployed during the post-revolution period crawled up from 7.7% to 9.6%, but it looks to be heading higher because reformers'policy includes energy parsimony and getting rid of unpromising industries, which are plenty. The reformers' course of de-industrialization as part of getting rid of country's "energy dependence" will mean a hard landing for the residents of five Ukrainian cities whose population exceed one million, including Kiev with its 3 million inhabitants.

Ukraine, swimming through the ocean of reforms, is in uncharted waters. Other countries that went through the painful period of reforms, the level of urbanization was definitely lower. In Poland, for example, which has about the same number of people as Ukraine, there is only one city with the population over a million - Warsaw with her 1.7 million inhabitants.

Just two years ago, under the previous "corrupt regime," the average salary in Ukraine was $500 a month, average social security check-$200 a month when the prices for goods were less than half what they are today. The sarcastic new Governor of Odessa region, Mikheil Saakashvili, remarked that Ukrainians would have to toil hard for the next 20 years if they want to get back the living standards they enjoyed under the "corrupt regime."

National currency fell into the abyss from 7-8 hrivnias per dollar to an official 22-23 hryvnias per dollar. The only reason it doesn't fall even deeper for now is Ukrainian Government's liabilities for unpaid meager wages reached the unprecedented sum of $72 million, the unpaid wages in private companies cannot be definitely calculated but the number must be humongous.

Some Ukrainians, of course, do not care about the money. Flamboyant new Governor of Odessa Region Mr. Saakashvili openly declares that his lavish lifestyle and the ones of his team (in which some are his fellow-Georgians and there is even a young daughter of the former reformist Russian Prime Minister) doesn't cost Ukraine's budget a hryvnia-all is paid for by American taxpayers. Minister for Finance of Ukraine, Natalie Jaresko, the one who often goes on TV, says that she sends her kids to the private International School in Kiev on the money she made before in private sector as a head of Horizon Capital Investment Company. (Out of respect to her less fortunate co-citizens one might advise her to stop wearing half-pound weights of gold on her wrists, neck, fingers and ears while on television.)

Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko ... well, he is a billionaire.

The Ukrainian Government blames the situation on war in the east of the country and on corruption of the previous-the word "criminal" is always used- regime. There is a big part of truth in this claim, but also political slyness.

Yes, the war takes a heavy toll on Ukraine's economy but 6 million people who barely survive in the regions under the control of anti-Kiev insurgents haven't gotten anything from the Kiev government money-wise for more than a year and a half-no salaries, no retirement money, no social security, no benefits of any kind, effectively being cut off from Ukraine's budget as unnecessary ballast.

As far as the "previous corrupt regime" mantra is concerned, the word "previous" holds just a bit of water. Today's President of Ukraine, oligarch Petro Poroshenko, for one, started his political career in 1998, winning his seat in Supreme Rada, became Secretary for Security and Defense in 2004 (dismissed in 2005 after allegations of corruption) and appointed Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Finance and Banking in 2006, head of the Council of the Ukraine National Bank in 2007. In 2012 previous - "corrupt" President Yanukovich appointed Mr. Poroshenko the Economic Development and Trade Minister of Ukraine.

Prime-Minister Arseny Yatsenyuk ("our guy Yatz") was appointed the Minister of Economy of Ukraine in 2005 and a Chairman of the Parliament in 2007.

So one has to agree with the Assistant Secretary of State Mrs. Victoria Nuland, who said in her interview on Ukrainian "Shuster-Live" TV show on July, 17: "I don't have to tell you this-that pretty much every set of leaders since independence has, in one way or another, either directly ripped off the people of Ukraine or allowed it to happen."

The sad fact is that Ukraine is broke-the National Banks has just a little bit more than $10.264 billion in its coffers. Kiev does not have enough money to prepare for the heating season, which means that most likely people will freeze again this winter. To solve the problem, Ukraine is negotiating with international partners to obtain credit- $1 billion to buy natural gas and $300 million for coal.

Righteously shutting the door and throwing away the key from the Russian market for her industries' products, post-revolution Kiev deliberately closed its eyes to the fact that they have almost nothing to offer to the rest of the world. Europe's quality standards cannot be matched by Ukrainian industry any time soon. Even Ukrainian white salt is used in Europe only to put on the roads during the winter or in the chemical industry as additive, or to put into the boilers - in European Union countries, vaporized salt is used and Ukraine's natural salt is considered 'dirty' for having too many minerals in it.

So, how to come out of the mess the country is in? So far, nobody of the ruling elite has the answer unless one should seriously consider the program of Oleksandr Turchynov, the Secretary of the Council for National Security and Defense of Ukraine and former acting President of Ukraine. He has his own idea on how to improve Ukraine's disappearing economy. Like everything with a touch of a genius, it's very simple-Ukraine must sue Russia for the "annexation of Crimea," which, by Mr. Turchinov's reckoning, is worth $100 billion. Of course, as a patriot, Mr. Turchinov doesn't want to sell Crimea to Russia, he wants Ukraine to receive both the coveted peninsula and the coveted cash. "We don't sell territories," he explained to the "Interfax-Ukraina" news agency, "this is how we will both return Crimea and will get $100 billion-through the court."

Mr. Yatsenyuk, the Prime-Minister, gives Mr. Turchinov's idea thumbs up and orders his subordinates to sue Russia for hundreds of billions of dollars in all kind of international courts-so far, not a single dollar out of the ocean of greenbacks that would help Ukraine prosper has been received.

Meanwhile, the word 'Greece' makes him mad. "We were promised $25 billion over the next 4 years while we have to fight with Russia having lost 20% of our economy. And our friends from Greece whose population is four times smaller than Ukraine`s, already have received $300 billion and they claim that they need another $60-80 [billions]?"

Life is not fair to Mr. Yatsenyuk.

Running out of ideas on how to deliver the promised European living standards to his fellow Ukrainians must be disheartening. His depressive-Freud might even say moribund-mood can be perceived in Mr. Yatsenyuk's constant use of a word 'kamikaze' with regard to himself. After having met Mr. Obama in the White House some days ago, Ukraine's Prime Minister was quoted by The New York Times as having said that he had no choice but to "hang together" with President Poroshenko, the alternative being, by Mr. Yatsenyuk via Benjamin Franklin, to "hang separate."

Yes, there were a lot of promises made. But never before had the truth been told more plainly than in Assistant Secretary of State Nuland's interview on Ukrainian TV some days ago, who said to those who still had illusions left: "There are no miracles ... this stuff [reforms] is painful. And when you have a painful place, and you have a Band-Aid over it, for example, and you have to change the bandage, it's always worse if you pull that bandage off slowly. It's much better to pull it off as quickly as you can, live through that pain, and then start to heal."

Being a politician, Mrs. Nuland omitted one thing - how many years the healing process is going to take. And no, she did not have a 'vyshyvanka' on.

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#19
Interfax
July 24, 2015
Moscow-Washington contact useful; U.S. can help Ukrainian peace process, says Medvedev

Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev has said that the United States can help the peace process in Ukraine, and that he welcomes contact between Moscow and Washington on the issue.

"I believe that several countries currently play an important role. The United States can also help promote this process, because the US is a major powerful state that plays a key role in NATO, has a controlling stake in the global economy and so on. Again, let's face it, Ukraine's leaders are actively consulting with Washington," Medvedev said in an interview with RTV Slovenija ahead of his visit to Ljubljana.

He called for contact with the U.S. over the Ukrainian issue to continue. "In this regard, we believe that our contact with the US is useful," the prime minister said.
He noted that, "the European Union can help as well, by the way, and it is helping."

At the same time, Medvedev stressed that "we shouldn't impose anything." "The problem of Ukraine is that, at some point, some states decided that they could run things there and show how events can unfold. We all know how it ended," he said.

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 #20
Kremlin.ru
July 23, 2015
Putin discusses Ukraine arms pullback with "Normandy" leaders

A telephone conversation has taken place between Vladimir Putin and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President Francois Hollande and Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko.

They continued their discussion of the implementation of the Minsk agreements signed on 12 February of this year, taking account of the results of the 21 July meetings of the Contact Group (CG) and its working groups.

Satisfaction was expressed with the fact that, following the announcement from the DPR [Donetsk People's Republic] and the LPR [Luhansk People's Republic] that they would be withdrawing weapons of under 100 mm calibre on a voluntary and unilateral basis, and following the actual start of that process, the Contact Group's security working group has reached agreement on a document on the withdrawal, to a distance of 15 km from the line of contact, of mortar-launchers under 120 mm calibre and artillery guns under 100 mm calibre. Emphasis was placed on the goal of ensuring that this document is signed as soon as possible and that the agreement, which supplements the Minsk Package of Measures, is implemented.

The importance was confirmed once again of strict observance, under the monitoring of the OSCE's Special Monitoring Mission, of the ceasefire regime and the creation of demilitarized zones. In this regard, the need was noted for the withdrawal of uniformed Ukrainian officers from the village of Shyrokyne, as the militiamen had done earlier as a gesture of goodwill. There was also a discussion of the problem of exchanging individuals held by the parties to the conflict, including the possibility of engaging representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Vladimir Putin stressed once again that a sustainable and comprehensive resolution of Ukraine's internal crisis cannot be achieved without Kiev setting up a direct dialogue with representatives of the Donbass. Russia's president called on the Ukrainian side to follow the letter and the spirit of the Minsk Package of Measures clearly. In particular, Kiev should coordinate with the DPR and the LPR on the legislative formalization of the special status of those regions and introduce that formalization on a permanent basis, as well as coordinating with the DPR and the LPR on an amnesty law, and Kiev should also determine the modalities and procedure for the holding of local elections.

There was an exchange of views on possible moves to resolve a number of acute social, economic and humanitarian problems in the Donbass.

The leaders of the four countries also discussed issues relating to supplies of Russian gas to Ukraine.

They agreed to continue their work in the "Normandy" format at various levels.

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 #21
Kyiv Post
July 23, 2015
Gun Crime Surges In Ukraine
By Pablo Gabilondo and Valeriya Golovina

The number of gun crimes in Ukraine has increased dramatically since war broke out in the east. Experts say the spread of the black market has made buying weapons in Ukraine cheaper and easier, and this coincides with a wave of violence all over the country.

According to the General Prosecutor's Office, the number of weapons-related crimes last year tripled to a record 2,523, representing a 231 percent increase over the previous year.

Moreover, the number of such crimes in 2015 will probably surpass last year's record. There have been 2,494 weapons-related crimes in the first half of this year alone.

The crime data for 2014-2015 excludes the occupied parts of Donetsk and Luhansk, as well as Crimea, which Russia annexed in March 2014.

According to Hryhoriy Uchaykin, founder and chairman of the Ukrainian Gun Owners Association, the increase of gun crimes is mostly due to the spread of illegal weapons coming from the war zone.

"There is a Swiss company called Small Arm Service that in 2007 determined that in Ukraine there were 3.1 million firearms...Today we believe that the number has increased to 4.5 million," Uchaykin said.

The spike is due to the lack of proper checks being made when people travel from the conflict areas to other parts of the country, he said.

"There is demand, and it's easy to get guns from the war zone," he said. "Over the last year, we determined that between 500,000 and 700,000 illegal guns (light weapons) entered the rest of Ukraine from the conflict zone."

But according to Uchaykin, the black market offers much more than light weapons, and people can buy almost any kind of weapon at below-market price − including explosives and submachine guns.
"A Kalashnikov rifle will officially cost $1,100, but on the black market they sell for $100 or $200," Uchaykin said.

Black market prices are much lower in eastern Ukraine than in the rest of the country, making the sale of illegal weapons a potentially lucrative business. Guns and ammunition can be bought cheaply in the conflict areas, and then marked up considerably for sale in the rest of Ukraine.

Another important aspect of the increase in gun crimes is the existence of paramilitary units still not controlled by the nation's military structure. Once these soldiers are discharged and return from the front, they are supposed to give up their weapons - but they rarely do, Uchaykin said.

However, Uchaykin said that is not fair to blame these volunteer groups for the wave of violence in Ukraine.

"People took their hunting weapons and went to the front line, where they got new firearms as trophies. No one gave weapons to them - neither the government, nor the army or the police," Uchaykin said.

"Now there is a fight with the Right Sector (nationalist organization), but what did (the government) do to prevent this situation? Did anyone think about what to do with the volunteer battalions after the war? No one did."

Uchaykin also claimed corruption at the Interior Ministry was to blame for some of the rise in gun crimes in Ukraine.

"Corruption plays a very big part. We need to remember that the Interior Ministry is responsible for the fight against illegal guns," Uchaykin said. "It is important to recognize that while the Interior Ministry regularly reports on the increase of gun crime, they never state that these guns are illegal. Never. And the devil lies in such little details."

When reached by phone, Interior Ministry spokesman Ivan Kulekha acknowledged the rise in gun crime but refused to comment by phone, saying that he is on vacation. Another spokesman, Artem Shevchenko, wasn't reachable by phone and calls placed with the main Interior Ministry press service line went unanswered.

However, talking about the black market and the role that the Ukrainian authorities may play in it is taboo, Uchaykin said. He said he avoids talking about it because of the consequences he may suffer for doing so.

"I know in general how the black market works, but I try not to go into details because it's dangerous for our organization," Uchaykin said.

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 #22
Kyiv Post
July 23, 2015
War drive soaks up donations for non-military charity funds
By Alyona Zhuk

Charities have always found it a challenge to raise money in Ukraine. Russia's invasion of the Donbas last year has made it a lot harder for many of them.

It's not that people are giving less money. More simply are donating to volunteer organizations that help Ukraine's army, charities say, leaving those that help other vulnerable groups, such as street children, orphans, HIV patients, and the elderly, struggling to raise funds.

While it's still possible to raise money for non-military causes, it now takes much more energy, creativity, and time, charity workers say.

"(A sum of) money that earlier could have been raised in three weeks now takes about three months to collect," says Kateryna Soboleva-Zorkina, spokeswoman for the Association of Charities of Ukraine. "But it's understandable - people donate to causes that they consider their priority - for their own security. So people donate to the army."

Lera Tatarchuk, head of Tvoya Opora (Your Support), a charity that helps orphans and children with health problems, as well as supplying hospitals with medical equipment, says that now it's "many times harder to raise money" than at the same time last year.

War is not the only reason, she says.

"Everyone needs help: soldiers, the wounded, children, sick people, but everyone has become poorer equally. And yes, there's the war. It takes a lot of resources, and not only those from charities,"Tatarchuk says.

Olya Kudinenko, founder of the Tabletochki Foundation, which supports children with cancer, noted that many benefactors who were regular donors have shifted to helping the army.

"The war is something extraordinary - it appears on the front page, (and) everyone wants to be involved in something that appears on the front page," Kudinenko told the Kyiv Post. "But there are people in need who will never appear on the front page, and we can't give up on them under any circumstances: sick children, lonely elderly people, the homeless, orphans."

Yet the foundation manages to grow due to "professional fundraising methods and systematic work," she says. Tabletochki has so far raised about $451,897 during spring and June in 2015, which is five times more than during the same period in 2014, she says.

"I want a person to feel delighted, so that they walk out with the feeling that they've helped (someone) and they're a wonderful person, so that later they come back and help again," Kudienko says.

While the pattern of giving has shifted to supporting the war effort, the alteration hasn't equally affected all non-military charity organizations.

For instance, the Ukrainian Philanthropic Marketplace, another charity initiative, hasn't had to scale back its health projects, according to spokeswoman Viktoriya Bondar.

Groups that help children with cancer or cerebral palsy "always collect the necessary amount of money," Bondar says. Organizations engaged in cultural and educational projects, as well as those that help people with disabilities, get less money.

The Association of Charities of Ukraine last year polled 57 managers of charities and people who have been donating for years. A majority of respondents, the survey found, said that to raise money in the current conditions, a charity must "find creative organizational and fundraising methods that are able not only to attract the attention of potential benefactors, but to spark their delight."

That's what Tvoya Opora is trying to do to keep donations flowing.

Money can be raised if a charity event provides gratitude to donors, Tatarchuk says. To pique the interest of benefactors, her fund organizes charity weekends with Ukrainian celebrities.

"We need to be very inventive, it takes a huge amount of effort," she says.

Soboleva-Zorkina from the Association of Charities of Ukraine believes that donations won't dry up once the war ends because a regular giver usually doesn't stop. She described a person's urge to donate and the enthusiasm of fundraisers as "the charity virus."

Iryna Turchak, a volunteer for the Povernys Zhyvym (Return Alive) Foundation, which supports Ukraine's soldiers, agrees. While she says it's too early to think about raising money in peacetime, when the war does end some volunteers will shift to raising funds for other worthy, but non-military causes.

Whatever shifts happen, the amount of money raised by traditional charities won't match the amounts people are currently giving for the war effort, Turchak says, pointing out that Povernys Zhyvym has already raised $227,272 in July, and the month is not over yet.

"People are paying to strengthen the front line," she says. "They won't pay that much (for other purposes)."

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 #23
Kyiv Post
July 23, 2015
Ukraine's veterans struggle with mental trauma in civilian life
By Pablo Gabilondo

Several Ukrainian psychologists have swapped their white garbs for bulletproof vests and headed to the war zone since the start of Russia's war on Ukraine. As well as working on the battlefield, they've begun thinking about the mental battles that some soldiers might have to fight in peacetime.

Some military psychologists, like Andriy Kozinchuk, who has served in the Kyivshchyna Battalion since August 2014, are not just there to care for their comrades, but to fight as well.

"When the war began I thought I could help the soldiers without being in the war zone, but in my heart I knew that I was a military man. I wanted to have a machine gun and go to Crimea to fight our enemy," Kozinchuk told the Kyiv Post, referring to Russia's annexation of the Ukrainian territory in March 2014.

Other psychologists on the front line are civilian volunteers, such as Tatiana Nazarenko, who decided to join the Aidar Battalion after the EuroMaidan Revolution. She has been to the front seven times since the start of the war.

"I try to help soldiers near the front line and right after they come back from battle. Sometimes it was very dangerous, because (places like) Shchastia were shelled regularly," Nazarenko said.

The tasks that civilian psychologists carry out are far-removed from the jobs they had before the war, forcing them to make adjustments on the front line.

"In civilian psychology the client comes to you, sits on the couch, and tells you their troubles. Military psychology is not like that. Nobody comes to you - you have to find out which soldier is in trouble," Kozinchuk said.

In an environment where bravery is important, not many soldiers even want to talk about their fears with a psychologist.

"They talk about everything: girls, cars, sex, football, politics, the president, the government... But they don't speak about the fears they have in their hearts and souls," Kozinchuk said.

This is why approaching soldiers delicately is an essential tactic.

"You don't go to him and say 'I see trouble in your heart,' you say 'Hi! Lets go and smoke,' or 'Can I help you dig some trenches? And during that time you talk with him," Kozinchuk said.

Civilian volunteer psychologists also have to pay special attention to the reputation they build for themselves in the battalion.

"The day after we were shelled (in Shchastia) we had tickets to leave the war zone, but I told my colleague that we couldn't leave because the soldiers would think that we were afraid. So we decided to stay another day," Nazarenko said.

Both Nazarenko and Kozinchuk said that providing psychological help on the front line is just the start of their work, and that tracking a soldier's mental health after they return to civilian life is essential.

"If we close our eyes after the war, the war they have in their hearts will not disappear. The war in the east of Ukraine will come to their streets and into their homes," Kozinchuk said.

Adaptation to civilian life is very difficult, according to Nazarenko. Veterans often have symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder and can experience bouts of aggression, violence in their families, and depression.

"The first trouble is flashback," Kozinchuk said. "After re-entering civilian life, a soldier might hear a sound or smell smoke that evokes a mental picture about his time in war. During this flashback, he can't control himself, his behavior could be weird, he could crawl under the table, cry, or break something...He doesn't control himself."

Giving money to discharged soldiers isn't enough once their tour of duty ends, Kozinchuk said.

"I'm not saying that we need to give them a million dollars. If a soldier has problems, he won't know how to spend it: $800,000 for vodka, $100,000 dollars for meals... We have to help him so he can make the right choices in his life."

For this reason Kozinchuk is forming a veterans' organization to help soldiers adapt to normal life when they return home.

"We want a rehabilitation center, but not with doctors or psychologists with diplomas," he said. "We try to teach them not to throw the war out of their soul, but to live with it, and open up to life again."

Few are willing to help set up the rehabilitation center.

"Veterans say that this is good idea, the country says that this is good idea, businessmen say that this is a good idea... But they all just say it. There's really only a small percentage of people who actually help us," Kozinchuk said.

Nazarenko also faces problem with funding.

"At the beginning we got some money from the Canadian diaspora - they gave us the (money for train) tickets and some cash, about $5 dollars a day," she said. "But the government doesn't pay us; the government wants to use volunteers without spending money."

Looking the other way won't make these problems disappear, Kozinchuk said. Ukraine must be prepared for the challenge of caring for the mental health of soldiers once the war is over.

"We haven't solved the problem yet. The big problem will come afterwards - from 1 to 3 years after the war ends, I think, and we need to get prepared now," he said. "The Soviet Union won the Second World War, but they didn't win the peace. I don't want the same for us. I believe that we can win the war, and I believe that we can win the peace."

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 #24
The Guardian
July 23, 2015
Gay couple kicked and pepper sprayed by far-right mob in Kiev
Zoryan Kis and Tymur Levchuk were attacked by group of 15-20 young men after deciding to test people's reactions to them holding hands
By Alec Luhn in Moscow
[Video here http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/23/gay-couple-kicked-pepper-sprayed-far-right-mob-kiev-ukraine]

A gay couple in Kiev have replicated a viral video filmed earlier this month in Moscow to test how Ukrainians would react to two men holding hands.

In the original video, which was inspired by the supreme court's decision in late June to legalise gay marriage in the US, two men from the prank-loving YouTube channel ChebuRussia TV walked around downtown Moscow holding hands.

Zoryan Kis and Tymur Levchuk adopted the same format in their video for Bird in Flight magazine, but had a generally more positive experience in the Ukrainian capital. Most passersby simply went about their business, although some stopped and stared. One group of giggling girls joked they should kiss each other and took a photo of the pair on a smartphone.

The couple then decided "to be a little more provocative", and Levchuk sat on Kis's lap on a bench on Khreshchatyk street, downtown Kiev's main thoroughfare, with a bouquet of flowers. They were approached by a group of between 10 and 15 young men with far-right views, Kis said, who told them they had mistaken Ukraine for the US and asked if they were "patriots".

After a nearby police patrol moved on, the young men pepper-sprayed Kis and Levchuk and three of them kicked the couple before bystanders intervened and the attackers ran off.

Kis told the Guardian that although violence against LGBT people has always existed in Ukraine, the video showed most Ukrainians are tolerant and the main cause of the problem is a small, aggressive far-right minority. He said he hoped it would raise awareness of discrimination and encourage the president, Petro Poroshenko, to include protections for LGBT people in the new constitution that is being drafted.

Referring to conservative policies in Russia, including a law against so-called gay propaganda, he said: "Ukraine has definitely made some progress, and the fact that there isn't state homophobia in Ukraine is probably the reason why ordinary people weren't aggressive towards us. But if Ukraine wants to move on and get closer to Europe, the government must act to protect us from people like those attackers."

The Ukrainian far-right has grown in influence after playing a key role in the Euromaidan demonstrations that brought the current pro-Western government to power, and in the conflict with Russia-backed rebels in eastern Ukraine. Earlier this month, a shootout involving the ultra-nationalist militia Right Sector left two dead in western Ukraine and led to a standoff with the authorities. Right Sector's leader, Dmytro Yarosh, called for a referendum to impeach Poroshenko as supporters rallied in the capital on Tuesday.

Maxim Eristavi, a Kiev-based journalist and a member of the LGBT community, said the Mukacheve attack and the assault on Kis and Levchuk were the results of the government's passive stance towards rightwing extremism. He said top officials failed to condemn an attack by dozens of assailants on a gay pride parade in the capital last month.

Eristavi said: "There's a culture of impunity among Ukrainian far-right extremists that is flourishing on the local governing and political elite's inability to issue a condemnation of violent paramilitaries."

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#25
Liveleak.com
July 23, 2015
Ukrainian Journalists get jumped by Nationalists

Lyashko's goon squad swoops in, that's what you get for asking the wrong questions.

Video here http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=0be_1437612261

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 #26
AP
July 24, 2015
Ukraine replaces entire police force to beat corruption

KIEV, Ukraine -- Only a few months ago, Kiev residents would normally avoid the police if they could help it. The officer would be of no use on a complaint - or worse, would demand a bribe.

Not any longer. These days, Kiev residents approach members of a new police force that has hit the streets - and even ask to take a picture with them. It's being welcomed as the Ukrainian government's first visible reform since it came to power in February 2014.

In the first phase of a comprehensive overhaul, the entire traffic police corps of Kiev was disbanded and replaced on July 4 by a retrained force - with new powers to make arrests as well as issue speeding or parking tickets. The police reform ultimately aims to retrain, and possibly replace, the entire Ukrainian Interior Ministry, including elite inspectors on serious crimes such as murder and corporate fraud. The initiative is supported by the United States and managed by Eka Zguladze, who was in charge of a largely successful police reform in her native Georgia.

One of the pledges of the new Kiev government, which took over last year after pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych fled the country, was to combat rampant corruption in Ukraine's police. Just as in neighboring Russia, Ukraine's police corps was perceived as chronically extorting bribes and harassing citizens.

The new government decided to start from scratch. The first phase replaced the old traffic police with a new 2,000-strong patrol team trained by Ukrainians who had themselves received instruction from American officers. While the traffic police were suspended rather than sacked, it is still not clear whether the old cops will be able to come back.

The backbone of the overhaul was a training program this year for 100 Ukrainian police instructors, run by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. They went on to teach the new police course in Kiev for the inaugural class of new officers who hit the streets this month.

William Brownfield, the U.S. assistant secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, has been advising the Ukrainian government on the police shakeup. He had a scathing assessment of the original state of affairs.

"The conclusion appears to be unanimous that - whatever you may think of the politics, external actors or the economy - the police was not working well," said Brownfield, who has been advising nations on police reform for two decades.

The reform, to which the United States has contributed $15 million, is expected to take from five to 10 years to complete. The creation of the new patrol force in Kiev is still described as an experiment. Other branches of the police in Kiev have not been disbanded. Several other big Ukrainian cities like Mykolaiv and Odessa will get new patrol police in the coming months.

Along with the American training, the new officers got American-styled uniforms and are all young and fit, in sharp contrast to their balding pot-bellied predecessors. Good looks sometimes seem like a prerequisite for the job - giving the initiative the air of a publicity stunt, one of the criticisms leveled at the reform.

Kateryna Lyshnevska, a 29-year-old who used to run a small business, signed up for the police course and was accepted in what has been described as 10-to-1 competition for the job. Lyshnevska said she was attracted by the stable pay, as well as the prospect of being able to help bring long-anticipated reforms to life. "I believe in reforms and wanted to help with the reforms to make history in our country," she said.

The new officers' average monthly pay of between 7,000 to 10,000 hryvnias ($320-to-$450) may seem modest but it is still higher than the average Kiev salary of 6,000 hryvnia.

Kiev residents routinely stop members of the new police corps and ask for a photo with them. And they seem genuinely surprised at officers lending a hand - without asking for a bribe.

For Interior Minister Arsen Avakov, the first visible outcome of the reform is a four-fold increase in the number of calls that Kiev police have received since the new force was sworn in.

"People started to call more often because there is more trust," Avakov wrote recently on Facebook. "And this is a challenge for the new police too: we can't let (people) down."

Avakov admits that a lot of police officers are opposing the reforms but says that the government is determined to press on.

"The old system has greeted the creation of the new police with resistance," he said. "(We will) use our will to convince those who want to keep the old ways."

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 #27
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
July 23, 2015
Will Poroshenko's amendments reconcile Russia and Ukraine?
Attempts to amend Ukraine's Constitution and expand the rights of the Donbas could help to resolve the nation's standoff with Russia over the separatist territories of Eastern Ukraine.
By Evheniya Pyrohovska
Evheniya Pyrohovska is a political analyst at the Center for Operational Strategic Analysis (COSA). She graduated from the National University of "Kyiv-Mohyla Academy", Master of Political Science. Field of Interest: approaches to assessing the power of the state, political regimes, the internal policy of Ukraine.

Last week President Petro Poroshenko of Ukraine proposed the introduction of a set of far-reaching amendments to the Constitution that had already been validated by the Ukrainian parliament and submitted for consideration by the Constitutional Court. If approved and then passed by a constitutional majority at the next vote, the amendments would give Ukraine a revised constitution - a fact that may affect its relations with Russia and the self-proclaimed people's republics of Donetsk and Luhansk (DPR and LPR).

The amendments not only propose decentralization, but also introduce a legislative norm on "special order of local governance" of these Donbas regions. After all, today they are no longer under the control of the Ukrainian authorities as a result of the continuing armed conflict.

The Ukrainian authorities have repeatedly stated that the amendment of the Constitution is dictated primarily by the need for decentralization reforms.
However, these reforms should apply to the whole of Ukraine. The presence of a "separate" legal clause (on local governance in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions) indicates that certain areas in the east of Ukraine are being offered a slightly different status, which assumes a greater amount of authority than under the powers granted by decentralization.

Moreover, it should be understood that this "separate" provision in the Constitution is essentially a window through which any amendments can be made to the law-in relation to both the empowerment and the future status of these territories.

The term "special order of local governance" is very often confused with the term "special status." In fact, the concepts are entirely different. Whereas "special status" provides for autonomy, "special order of local governance" refers only to the functioning of local government bodies and the extension of their powers to address issues related to local development in the areas of education, culture, etc.

However, an analysis of the law on the special order of local governance reveals that certain provisions run counter to the norms of decentralization and significantly expand the powers of local government in respect to setting up public prosecutor's offices and people's militias. Thus, the level of intervention by central agencies is greatly reduced, thereby extending the scope of authority of local government, which is due to be elected in off-year elections in October 2017, after which the law will enter into force.

Furthermore, there are marked contradictions between the law and the amendments to the Constitution proposed by Poroshenko regarding the powers to be granted to local MPs elected during these elections.

According to the amendments, should a local council pass an act that threatens the integrity of Ukraine and contradicts the Constitution, the president has the right to suspend its powers and appoint a state commissioner.

However, Article 5 of the law stipulates that the powers of MPs elected in the separate territories of the Donbas in 2017 cannot be terminated prematurely.
A consequence of such lawmaking is that MPs there will be hard to control, especially given the fact that local councils in these areas can be elected by citizens sympathetic to Russia. It creates yet another loophole for potential violation of the Constitution.

In addition, the separate territories of the Donbas will get further dispensation in comparison with other regions of Ukraine, namely "protected" items in the budget. A state target program has been developed under which Ukraine guarantees to support these territories' economic and social development through subsidies from the state budget. This means that Ukraine is committed to financing these territories at the expense of other regions, even though every new amendment to the law has the capacity to further reduce central control.

The adoption of amendments to the Constitution provoked an extremely skeptical response from various Ukrainian experts, who say that it will only further split Ukrainian society, which even now is not united on the issue of the conflict in the Donbas.

The fact that under the adopted amendments and the law more powers are granted to the separate territories of the Donbas than other regions of Ukraine, clearly plays into the hands of the separatists and Russia.

Russia is particularly interested in the fact that the separate regions of the Donbas have greater autonomy with continued financing from Kiev. After all, the elections slated there for 2017 could lead to local councils made up of former separatists and pro-Russian politicians, who even without today's conflict in the Donbas would be numerous enough.

And given the fact that the president will not be able to suspend the powers of any local councils set up by these interest groups, Ukraine has clearly done a great service to Moscow: it has in effect limited its own sovereignty in the east, stripping bare the boundary with Russia.

It is vital to understand that all further conflicts of interests and powers between the center and the region could culminate in the "haggling" of new powers for the Donbas, which will be enshrined in the form of amendments to the law dated September 16, and the impending approach of autonomy-that selfsame "special status" now on everyone's lips.

This was confirmed by a statement made by the head of the State Duma Committee for Foreign Affairs, Alexei Pushkov. He described Poroshenko's amendments as contrary to the Minsk agreements, which means that in future Moscow will try to put pressure on Kiev with the demand to consolidate nothing less than the special status of these territories.

But neither should it be ruled out that the next vote for the amendments (which require the backing of more than 300 MPs to pass) could significantly complicate the process of implementing them, in effect granting Ukraine more time while leaving the issue of the status of the separatist territories of the Donbas unresolved.

For their part, U.S. officials consider the adoption of this law as an important step towards resolving the conflict; since Ukraine has proposed a major change to its Constitution, the next move is expected to come from Russia and the separatists. Europe and the United States are extremely keen for the Ukrainian parliament to adopt the amendments proposed by the president, as evidenced by the presence of foreign dignitaries in the parliament chamber during the vote on July 16.

It is clear that after the imposition of sanctions against Russia, Europe fears a worsening of the confrontation with Moscow, for which reason it is seeking to settle the matter by all possible diplomatic means. Amending the Constitution of Ukraine is seen as one of the most favorable options, able to pacify the Kremlin and divert attention from the Ukraine-Russia conflict, at least for the time being. That the amendments pave the way for the future violation of Ukraine's sovereignty is a problem mainly for Kiev, not the United States and Europe.

As such, the bill to amend the Constitution, voted for by 288 MPs of Ukraine, is an attempt to freeze the conflict in the Donbas at the expense of national sovereignty.

The law on local governance will take effect only after the elections in Donbas, but the run-up could see the alignment of forces in the east of the country change significantly, and not in Ukraine's favor. Hence, it remains an open question as to who will receive the right to participate in the 2017 elections, a process that the Kremlin will try as best it can to influence, while seeking at the same time to extend the autonomy of territories beyond the control of Kiev.

The main problem today is that the United States and Russia do not see eye to eye on Ukraine's implementation of the Minsk agreements. Whereas the United States openly advocates the amendments proposed by Poroshenko as the only possible diplomatic solution to the conflict, Russia, accompanied by the DPR and LPR, will push solely for greater autonomy, thereby exerting pressure on the adoption of the amendments to the law on the special order of local governance.

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 #28
Russia Insider
www.russia-insider.com
July 23, 2015
The Amazing Implosion of Ukraine's PM Yatsenyuk
Support for PM Yatsenyuk's People Front party has slipped to a pitiful 3%
By RI Staff

A new round of polling by the professional and usually reliable Kiev International Institute of Sociology is just out. It reveals something which is at the same time expected and extraordinary. Support for the major party of the governing coalition has shrunk to a pitiful 2.8%.

Where in the first parliamentary elections in post-Maidan Ukraine held last year in October Yatsenyuk's People's Front received 22% of all the votes cast - polling shows that just nine months later the party only retains a fraction of that.

If elections were held today the party would actually fail to clear the 5% census required to take seats in the assembly.

Moreover the biggest beneficiary of 'People's Front' implosion so far has been the 'Fatherland' party which previously barely passed the electoral census, but would currently stand to win some 27% of the votes cast.

'Fatherland', mind you, is led by Yulia Timoshenko whose political fortunes had appeared to be finished once and for all after the implosion of the Orange Revolution - but it seems Yatsenyuk has managed to do the impossible and make Timoshenko look good by comparison.

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 #29
Russia Insider
www.russia-insider.com
July 23, 2015
Ukraine Parliament - The Best Absurdist Comedy Since Monty Python
One MP wants the Interior Minister to form a special task force to saw off pirate satellite dishes that are fooling people with Russian propaganda
Another wants to ban references to Russia as 'Russia' arguing Ukraine is the only real Russia
By Yury Nickulichev

If we sometimes think that the Ukrainian politicians have already exhausted their treasury of the wonderful things with which to amaze the world, I'm afraid that's not correct.

To confess, when PM Arseniy Yatsenyuk was talking about his wet dream to have Russia expelled from the UN or, at the very least, from its Security Council, I thought that was the highest of what's humanly possible and nothing more marvelous could ever come from Kiev. Little did I know!

Since then there has been an eruption of the most breathtaking legislative and other ideas from the parliamentary Radical Party.

-Its leadership has finally discovered an effective way to fight hostile propaganda that's simple as pie and life. And absolutely European in form and essence, too. Look, you organize a special police squad and give them the task of sawing off (their words) satellite dishes on apartment buildings. Basta! That does it. From now on, nobody is being brainwashed by the Kremlin! The proposal to that effect is already being discussed with the Minister of Interior.

A huge injustice, at that, would be to forget that the leader of the Radical party, Oleg Lyasko, has already a solid record of fighting Russian propaganda and promoting democracy in mass media.

In March 2014, with a group of his followers, including a vice- chairman of the Verkhovnaya Rada committee on the freedom of speech (that probably explains the whole story) he burst into the premises of a national TV channel, beat the crap out of its director and made him write a letter of resignation.

The bastard was guilty of translating a few videos and TV series from Russia. He also thought (that's how he tried to explain himself) that "people have a right to know what's going on". Serves him right, it does.

But coming back to the idea of destroying the satellite dishes. It's most timely of course, but not sufficient, I'm afraid. Because people also use the internet and this fact, again, begs for another, and much more powerful, police squad locating those who visit hostile sites and taking away their computers. Now, what about telephone and post services? Gosh, so much work ahead! Listen, if I were in Verkhovnaya Rada, I'd simply ban everything.

Speaking of bans, our readers already know about a bill introduced into the Ukrainian Parliament which demands to legally ban any mention of the word "Russia" in Ukraine.

The big idea is this. According to its author, Oksana Korchinskaya from the Radical party again, originally the word belonged to Ukraine, because it's on the Dnieper bank that the state under the name of Kievan Rus existed from times immemorial and the word was even registered in an ancient chronicle.

That's where I had a thought that the lady PM knows her history, because any history textbook for secondary schools, either in Ukraine or Russia or in many other countries, says exactly the same. Now, with time, she's reasoning, the word was misappropriated by the Russians and the present linguistic situation is kind of humiliating to the history-sensitive Ukrainians.  

And that's where I had several thoughts all at once. First and foremost, historically the Russians are not to be blamed for living in a country called Russia. Up to the 17th century, they had lived in a country called Moscowy, thinking little and caring less about inventing or borrowing any other name for their land.

Interestingly, even today the traditional Ukrainian argo acknowledges this Moscow-centered identification of the Russians, calling them, with a negative connotation, the moscali, i.e. the Muscovites. What's still more interesting, the same moscali is also found both in Belarussian and Polish argos.

So, where did "Russia" come from? Clear as day, the word is of Western origin. Just compare its "... ia" suffix with that of, say, Britannia, Venetia, Austria, Prussia, even Australia, etc., etc. Some historians believe it came from Byzantium; as for me, I tend to think it was Rome, but Constantinople or Vatican, the fact is that the Muscovites had nothing to do with it.

What's also known for a fact is that this "Russia" was adopted by Moscow rather late - in the second half of the 17th century, soon to become, under Peter the First, the Russian Empire.

Now, Oksana Korchinskaya wants to ban "Russia" in just almost everything, including public statements, media, books, etc. The violators of the law, should they pass it in the Parliament, might face up to 12 years in prison. The only way to refer to...(gosh, how should I call it now?)... to refer to the country where the moscali live would be the official "the Russian Federation". Because "the Russian Federation" is quite another matter, if you don't feel this difference between "Russia" and "Russian".

What I am thinking now is that "Belorussia" (or Belarus) also sounds suspiciously, as if it was appropriated from the Kievan Rus. Are they going to ban it, too? What do you think?

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 #30
GlobalVoices
http://globalvoicesonline.org
July 24, 2015
As Ukraine Bans Russian TV Shows for 'Propaganda,' Local Channels Put Up a Fight
By Anna Poludenko-Young

Ukraine has banned a number of Russian TV shows that it claims glorify the Russian government, military, and law enforcement. However, the new law outlining the rules for banning content has run into resistance from national Ukrainian television channels that are already looking for loopholes in the new legislation.

What has been banned

It has been almost two months since the law banning Russian "propagandist" TV shows in Ukraine came into force. A total of 368 TV series and films that allegedly glorify Russian police and military forces have been banned. This might not seem like a big deal, but in reality, the majority of this "made-in-Russia" programming had occupied prime-time slots on major Ukrainian TV channels.

According to Pylyp Illienko, head of the Ukrainian State Film Agency, a cohort of experts reviewed the movies and TV series previously pre-approved for broadcasting in Ukraine. The content that the experts found to contain "propaganda or humiliation on ethnic grounds" was banned.

The new law prohibits movies, television series, documentaries, and even cartoons that "glorify Russian government," military, law enforcement and other "punitive agencies of the aggressor state" that in some way "justify or legitimize the occupation of any part of Ukrainian territory."

However, the sanctions for breaking the new law are hardly unbearable for any of the Ukrainian national channels. If a broadcaster is caught cheating, the fine might vary from $600 to $3150 (13,000 to 68,000 UAH), depending on whether it was a first offence or a repeated violation.

Creativity is everything

The new legislation leaves many loopholes for those willing to get a little creative. For example, according to the new law, movies and TV series made in co-production (by two or more countries) and released before January 1, 2014 do not fall under the ban. So, if a movie has a Ukrainian or any other non-Russian production studio mentioned in the credits, such a product is not subject to the new law. Putting an extra line in the credits is easy, while checking if co-production actually occurred is much more difficult.

Some Ukrainian TV channels have already tried using this loophole for their benefit. "Ukraina," the national channel with the highest ratings (according to data from June 2015), managed to receive a distribution license from the State Film Agency for the Russian TV series "Traces" (След, a CSI look-alike). The trick was that "Ukraina" presented the content as a series with a new title, "Factual Expert Service: International Criminal Investigation Department," allegedly produced by the channel's own production company in 2015.

"In reality, this is an old TV series, and the channel just added a few scenes here and there in 2015. The actors playing Russian security services officers were sheep-dipped and changed their uniforms so that no insignia or badges were visible," said Oleksandr Tkachenko, the CEO of rival "1+1 Media" group at a press conference in Kyiv. "Even the name of the agency was changed. Instead of calling it 'federal,' as in the original Russian version, they called it 'factual.' They want it to look like some sort of a quasi-security agency, but in essence it is very much a Russian TV series."

A matter of taste

Such "adaptation" is certainly convenient for many major TV channels in Ukraine, since Ukrainian audiences are quite used to consuming Russian media products. According to the research conducted by the civic group Vidsich, 33% of all the television content on Ukrainian channels is made in Ukraine, 29% in Russia, 33% in other countries, and 5% are older products made during the time of the USSR.

Now that Ukrainian TV channels are faced with having to find a replacement for "made-in-Russia" content, some of them are starting to look at Western markets, while others are looking to Asian products, such as shows from South Korea. Television critics, however, warn that Ukrainian audiences are so accustomed to the Eastern European production values of their favorite shows that new cultural tropes and unfamiliar story lines most likely "won't work."

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 #31
Kyiv Post
July 24, 2015
Ukraine's Justice Ministry outlaws Communists from elections
By Mariana Antonovych

A year after the Communist Party of Ukraine was expelled from parliament by ex-speaker Oleksandr Turchynov, Justice Minister Pavlo Petrenko on July 24 signed a decree banning the party and two of its satellites - the Communist Party of Ukraine (renewed) and the Communist Party of Workers and Peasants.

From now on, Ukraine's communists may not set up their own political party or enjoy any rights stemming from them, including the right to participate in the electoral process.

National Security and Defense Council Secretary, Oleksandr Turchynov, justifying the ban, said the parties had acted against Ukraine in the interests of Russia.

"These parties supported and promoted the occupation of Crimea by the Russian Federation... the military invasion in the east and the creation of separatist movements in Ukraine," Turchynov said. "Their cooperation with (former Ukrainian President Viktor) Yanukovych grew into cooperation with the aggressor."

Reacting to news of the ban, Donetsk-native Petro Symonenko, who has led the Communist Party of Ukraine for much of Ukraine's independence since 1991, said the communists would run in the Oct. 25 local elections anyway, according to Interfax news agency.

The Justice Ministry was granted powers to assess the activities of political parties and their oblast, city, and regional branches under a law that condemns the Communist and Nazi totalitarian regimes in Ukraine - one of four so-called de-communization laws - which parliament passed on April 9.

"This law opened to Ukrainian society and the authorities the possibility to give a clear response to persons supporting these regimes," Petrenko said.

The very first day after the law came into effect, the Justice Ministry set up an independent commission consisting of both experts from the ministry and representatives of civil society to study the cases of the communist parties in Ukraine.

After a month of consideration, the commission submitted its conclusions to the justice minister.

"Based on these conclusions, I signed three decrees, which say that the communist parties, in their activities, names, symbolism, statutes and programs, are against the law," said Petrenko.

The Central Electoral Commission and local electoral commissions are now obliged to refuse registration of election candidates from these parties.

The minister promised to make the texts of the decrees available to the public on July 24.

Meanwhile, court actions that started in July 2014 will continue in order to exclude Ukraine's communist parties from the country's business registry, Petrenko said.

"Oleksandr Turchynov started an absolutely fair examination of the activities of the communist party and its leaders, who supported the occupation of Crimea," Petrenko said. "We became involved in that process from the very first day, and together with law enforcement bodies we've collected a large amount of evidence, which now forms a voluminous case."

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 #32
Kyiv Post
July 23, 2015
Right Sector calls for continued revolution
By Johannes Wamberg Andersen

Flags waved once again over Kyiv's central Maidan Nezalezhnosti square on the evening of July 21. There were loud shouts of "Glory to Ukraine!" and "Glory to the heroes!" - the slogans of the mass public protests in 2013 and 2014 that toppled the corrupt regime of former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych.

This time it wasn't the blue and yellow national flag of Ukraine or the flag of the European Union that were in abundance on the square. It was the black and red battle flag of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, the freedom fighters who fought Nazi Germans and the Red Army during and after World War II.

Many of them were emblazoned with the name and symbol of nationalist group Right Sector, who came to the square following an eponymous party congress to call a no-confidence vote in Petro Poroshenko's administration.

The group's leader, lawmaker Dmytro Yarosh, voiced frustration with the current government for keeping officials in government who served in the previous administration of Yanukovych. The events came after a paramilitary unit of Right Sector clashed with local police and the private security detail of lawmaker in westernmost Zakarpattya Oblast, on July 11 that left three people dead and a dozen wounded. The shootout, according to Ukraine's State Security Service, involved control over smuggling channels in the region, which borders four European Union countries.

Authorities are currently investigating six Right Sector members involved in the bloody confrontation.

But on the evening of July 21, there was an air of concern and tension on the central Kyiv square, recalling the atmosphere during the EuroMaidan uprising. Platoons of the militant nationalist group's volunteer soldiers, dressed in camouflage, marched down Institutska Street and onto the Maidan. The rally included a minute of silence for those killed in Russia's war on Ukraine.

Addressing the crowd of around 3,000, Yarosh called for a continuation of the EuroMaidan Revolution. He said his organization's aim was to "bring an end to the system of internal occupation" run by "predators in power" who's "evolutionary path" had brought neither the needed changes to the country, nor an end to the war that has raged since the ouster of Yanukovych.

"You will have to help us, without you we are nothing," Yarosh told the crowd of soldiers, activists and Kyiv residents attending the rally.

The native of Russian-speaking Dnipropetrovsk Oblast announced a change in the group's tactics - the group will not run in Ukraine's local elections, which are scheduled for Oct. 25. Instead, Right Sector plans to call a national referendum to impeach President Petro Poroshenko, and sack the government and parliament.

He also called for the conflict in the east to be officially declared a war against Russia, and for a total blockade of the occupied territories.

The rally's attempt to recreate the sense of urgency of the EuroMaidan indeed seemed calculated to take advantage of Russia's ongoing military aggression and the government's foot dragging on reforms.

But left-wing activist and EuroMaidan veteran Vitaliy Dudin wasn't buying it.

"The Right Sector is fighting for their own ideology, not for the nation," he told the Kyiv Post. "They claim to know what's best for the nation and aim to impose it on the state, but they don't have the strength to pull it off, because the state is so much stronger."

However, Dudin said he didn't question the motives of the rank-and-file members of Right Sector - volunteer soldiers who have been fighting to defend Ukraine at the front.

Political expert Vitalii Kulyk from the Center for Civil Society Studies said that Yarosh's call for a referendum was a public relations stunt designed to reconnect with the public. The obvious alternative - to campaign in the local elections - is a non-starter, as it would expose how weak public support for Right Sector actually is in Ukraine, according to Kulyk. The nationalist group's political party garnered only 1.8 percent in last October's parliamentary elections.

Instead, the group's candidates will be on the party lists of the newly founded Ukrop party for this year's local elections. With a patriotic-populist profile, the new party is allegedly backed by tycoon and former governor of Dnipropetrovsk Ihor Kolomoysky.

Kolomoysky is also widely believed to be co-funding Right Sector, although he denied this in an Ukrainska Pravda interview published on July 22.

Nevertheless, the banking and energy billionaire is no friend of the current government, having clashed with it over control of major energy sector assets. Dudin said that Kolomoysky might also be using Right Sector as leverage against the authorities.

But Kulyk adds that Right Sector "is a protest party without a core electorate."

"It's rather a franchise," Kulyk said. He said the group's leadership was making the Right Sector brand available to resourceful politicians throughout the country, and leaving local campaigning to them.

But that model could backfire. The group's reputation was wounded during the July 11 shootout with police in Zakarpattya Oblast.

Political analyst Oleksandr Paliy said that Right Sector had low popularity even as a protest movement because the public in general distrusts all politicians, whom it sees as duplicitous and false.

The analyst said that not only had the Right Sector played a dubious role in the July 11 shootout, but that its public relations policy too often plays into the hands of the Kremlin.

"The KBG is famous for recruiting right wing politicians," Paliy said referring to the Soviet secret service, and hinting at a direct connection between Right Sector and Moscow. "When the nation is under threat of armed invasion, you don't (go up against the government) as Right Sector is doing now."

Speaking at the July 21 rally, Yarosh appeared to acknowledge these fears, saying "the next phase of the revolution" would be peaceful, so as to prevent Ukraine's enemies in Russia from creating "a real internal conflict."

Party tactics aside, rally participants said they were frustrated with the lack of law and order in the country, again echoing original EuroMaidan sentiments.

Oleskiy Haran, professor of political science at the Kyiv Mohyla Academy, said that with its push for faster change and a more radical break with cronyism and abuse of power, the Right Sector, which is commonly described as a far-right organization, was playing the role that leftist radicals usually played in other countries in times of change.

But the risk to the country is that any political destabilization brought about by radicals could ultimately help the forces that oppose reform, Haran said.

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 #33
http://gordonhahn.com
July 22, 2015
Right Sector and the Impotence of Ukraine's Weimar Maidan Regime
By Gordon M. Hahn

Recent event's surrounding Ukraine's neo-fascist organization 'Right Sector' (RS) confirm the Maidan regime's ties and vulnerability to the group and the regime's increasingly resemblance to the Weimar regime that dropped power on the streets so it could be picked up by Adolf Hitler and National-Socialist Party. The latter is best but not solely demonstrated by the Maidan regime's failure to establish a monopoly on the means of coercion. That state power is now openly shared with RS.

Right Sector and the Maidan 'Revolution'

RS was founded by the Maidan revolution and has as its goal a post-Maidan totalitarian, xenophobic, exclusivist, expansionist greater Ukraine/Kievan Rus that is 'superior to Europe', antagonistic and indeed revanchist towards Russia. As the more democratic elements of the burgeoning Maidan revolution began to gather on Maidan Square, three neo-fascist and white supremacist groups founded the group, with Dmitro Yarosh selected as its 'coordinator.' RS and other neo-fascist and ultra-nationalist groups, especially those centered in western Ukraine began to descend on the Maidan, importing weapons in the process. These elements infiltrated the Maidan's self-defence 'heavenly hundreds' and quickly transformed the nascent peaceful revolution from below into a kinetic and violent ultra-nationalist revolt.

Throughout the winter of 2013-14 RS and its allies recruited and intensified Maidan's violent attacks against riot police. On 18-20 February, RS and its allies began burning and shooting elements of the soon-to-be old regime. In the early morning hours of February 20th RS and other neo-fascist snipers killed and wounded some 20 policemen before police finally began to return fire (http://gordonhahn.com/2015/05/08/violence-coercion-and-escalation-in-ukraines-maidan-revolution-escalation-point-6-the-snipers-of-february/ and Ivan Katchanovski, "The 'Snipers' Massacre' on the Maidan in Ukraine (Revised and Updated Version)," Academia.edu, 20 February 2015, www.academia.edu/8776021/The_Snipers_Massacre_on_the_Maidan_in_Ukraine).

The snipers' massacre culminated the next day in the violation of the EU-Russian brokered transition pact agreed on as shootouts continued on the streets of Kiev the previous day by the leading opposition parties and embattled President Viktor Yanukovich. The agreement could have navigated Ukraine away from a revolutionary and violent regime transformation to an orderly negotiated one. Instead of withdrawing from the city center as the police did as required by the agreement, RS and other radical elements began to sieize additional government buildings in the Kiev city center and elsewhere in Ukraine. Yanukovich chose to flee, and the rest is history.

The pivotal, some would say leading role played in Yanukovich's overthrow by RS and the other neo-fascist and ultra-nationalist elements of 'the Maidan' positioned it and its allies to secure  leading positions in the new Maidan regime. Like most extremist elements, they gravitated towards the organs of coercion or 'siloviki'. For example, Yarosh was offered the position of deputy chairman of the Defense and Security Council by its chairman Andriy Parubii, who appears to have helped coordinate the neo-fascist snipers on Maidan. Yarosh refused the offer. A few months ago an agreement was announced that Yarosh would become an advisor to the chief of the general staff of the Ukrainian armed forces, but Yarosh never formally took up the post (http://vesti-ukr.com/strana/94012-gerawenko-zajavil-o-nalichii-vakansii-dlja-jarosha-v-minoborony and http://gordonhahn.com/2015/04/06/neo-fascist-yarosh-appointed-to-ukraine-defense-ministry/).

Instead, he chose to continue preparing for the second 'nationalist' phase of the revolution; something that has been his goal since the Maidan revolution proved too influenced by oligarchs like President Petro Poroshenko.

This did not stop Yarosh from using some oligarchs in order to finance his armed forces' and social-political activists' rampages on the Donbass front and indeed across Ukraine. This and the war in Donbass gave Yarosh an opportunity to organize his own armed batalions under the financial sponsorship of the criminal authority, banker-oligarch, and Maidan-appointed governor of Dnepropetrovsk Ihor Kolomoiskii and the state sponsorship of the Maidan regime's Minister of Internal Affairs Arsen Avakov and his program of forming volunteer battalions to supplement the weak Ukrainian army in the face of the counter-revolutionaries in the eastern Ukrainian area of Donbass (Gordon M. Hahn, "Everyday Neo-Fascism in Ukraine," Gordonhahn.com Russian and Eurasian Politics, 15 March 2015, http://gordonhahn.com/2015/03/15/everyday-neo-fascism-in-ukraine/).

RS and Maidan's 'Anti-Terrorist' Operation

Under the cover of the volunteer battalions - like the notorious white supremacist-oriented 'Azov' battalion - for which many RS and other neo-fascist and ultra-nationalist elements volunteered, Yarosh formed his Ukrainian Volunteer Corps (UVC), which he has refused to subordinate to the Ukrainian military of National Guard to which almost all other battalions were subordinated over time.

RS, Azov and UVC have been involved in various terrorist attacks, war crimes, and pogroms both on the Donbass front and elsewhere in Ukraine for well over a year. Under the cover of the 'anti-terrorist' operation (ATO) in eastern and southern Ukraine declared by the Maidan regime in April 2014, RS and Azov immediately destroyed a police station in Mariupol without giving the policemen a chance to negotiate. Over twenty were killed and wounded.

On May 2nd RS activists carried out a terrorist pogrom against unarmed picketers in Odessa, parlaying a conflict between pro- and anti-Maidan soccer fans and ultra-nationalists into an attack on an anti-Maidan tent city set up weeks earlier in front of the Trade Union House in Odessa. Days later, the RS's website openly claimed responsibility for the terrorist pogrom in which 48 activists opposed to the Western-backed Maidan regime in Kiev were killed; most of them burned alive as Ukrainian 'nationalists' shot at, three Molotov cocktails and sang the Ukrainian national anthem. Hundreds more anti-Maidan regime activists were injured and wounded. "May 2, 2014 is another bright page in our national history." It claimed responsibility by noting that "about a hundred members of 'Right Sector' and patriotic-minded Odessa residents countered the rebels" and that "Dmitro Yarosh ignored the 'expedience' of the election campaign to coordinate the action against the Russian aggression." (Eugene Trofymenko, "ATO Po-narodnomu, Abo chomu ne Vladimir Putin ne vviv viyska," Pravyi Sektor, 2 May 2014, http://pravyysektor.info/articles/ato-po-narodnomu-abo-chomu-ne-vladimir-putin-ne-vviv-vijska/). On the one-year anniversary of the attack, the RS website and at least one RS leader reiterated RS's claim of responsibility for Odessa (http://gordonhahn.com/2015/05/02/ukraines-neo-fascist-right-sector-claims-responsibility-again-for-2-may-2014-terrorist-pogrom/).

As the ATO proceeded through 2014, the UVC, Azov and other RS-tied battalions and volunteer fighters stood at the vanguard of the Ukrainian forces' tendency to fire on residential areas in Donbass killing and wounding civilians, including many hundreds of women and children. RS has also been at the forefront of teaming up with ultra-nationalist elements in the government to harass independent media organs, such as Vesti-Ukraine (see http://gordonhahn.com/2015/06/21/one-day-in-the-life-of-ukrainian-democracy/; http://gordonhahn.com/2015/04/21/maidan-ukraines-authoritarianism-surplus-update-on-maidan-ukraines-democracy-deficit/; and http://gordonhahn.com/2015/03/15/everyday-neo-fascism-in-ukraine/).

The Mukachevo Attack

Eleven days ago, units of RS's militia in Transcarpathia attacked police in the western town of Mukachevo. Taking place far from the Donbass front, this was another case of the PS marauding across Ukraine's countryside. In particular, RS was involved in a settling of scores between two Transcarpatian criminal 'authorities' who are simultaneously deputies in the Supreme Rada - the parliament of the 'new democratic Ukraine'. One of kingpin-deputies, Viktor Baloga, is said to finance RS. A relationship RS struck up an in order to help finance its recruiting, propaganda, political, and military efforts. In the battle that ensued - with PS using machine guns and a grenade launcher - several police and several civilians were killed and wounded, with up to 14 casualties, according to some reports. Security forces flooded in but instead of attacking and arresting the RS fighters, negotiations ensued; some of them involving directly or indirectly Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko himself and his Interior Minister, Arsen Avakov, who implemented the policy of forming volunteer battalions to include a large component of neofascists, given their 'patriotic enthusiasm.' The RS continues to refuse to disarm and convened demonstrations in Kiev at the presidential administration and some ten provincial capitols, and other neofascist groups and their battalions are backing RS. Recently fired head of Ukraine's intelligence service, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), Valentin Nalyvaichenko, backed PS against the Porosehnko-led factions of the Maidan regime (http://anons.uz.ua/news/politics/21855-valentin-nalivaychenko-podderzhal-rebyat-iz-pravogo-sektora-zakarpatya.html). In Mukachevo's wake, RS demanded the resignation of the Ukraine MVD chief, Arsen Avakov, and the prosecution of the leadership of the Transcarpathian Oblast's MVD - the town of Mukachevo is located in Transcarpathia. An article on RS's website accused of Avakov of pedophilia, economic crimes, and the repression and murder of patriots, calling for him to be "eilimnated......from office" (http://pravyysektor.info/news/news/318/avakov-maye-buti-usunutim.html). The SBU claimed several days ago that they had surrounded the hills into which the RS Transcarpathia fighters fled, but no fighting has ensued, not less captures and arrests.

The Lviv Bombings

Two days after the Mukachevo attack, RS's Lviv branch took down the European Union flag flying at the Lviv Oblast Administration's building and replaced it with RS's red and black (blood and soil) flag (www.unn.com.ua/ru/news/1481576-praviy-sektor-zaminiv-prapori-yes-bilya-lvivskoyi-oda-na-chervono-chorni). In addition, RS forces and activists began to set up checkpoints on the outskirts of some cities, including Lviv, where, according to reports, several RS checkpoints have been set up to prevent "titushki" from entering the city. On the next morning, two headquarters of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) in Lviv were mined and the detonations wounded two policeman. One had his foot amputated and kidney removed, and another is now blind from their wounds. RS Lviv has denied any connection with the bombings but has used them as a pretext for sending its goons across Lviv and setting up checkpoints (http://vesti-ukr.com/lvov/107227-postradavshej-ot-vzryva-vo-lvove-amputirovali-nogu-i-udalili-pochku). In response, RS's Lviv branch announced its intention to establish a presence and presumably act in response to any events in the city (http://vesti-ukr.com/lvov/107188-ps-poobewal-vzjat-pod-kontrol-lvov). The MVD has stated it regards the likely RS attack in Lviv as being connected with the conflict in Mukachevo, meaning it too suspects RS, and has categorized it as a "terrorist attack" (http://glavnoe.ua/news/n233989 and http://glavnoe.ua/news/n234002).

Also on July 13th, some two dozen members of RS's militia, the Volunteer Ukrainian Corps (DUK), which has refused to be incorporated into Ukraine's armed forces entered the regional administration offices of Volyn and after several hours of talks a "joint statement and appeal to the leadership of the state" was issued by RS DUK representatives and the Volyn Oblast Administration calling on the all sides to resolve the conflict in Mukachevo peacefully. According to RS's website, the RS DUK in Volyn was backed by the AvtoMaidan's representatives in Volyn (http://pravyysektor.info/news/news/313/u-luc-ku-duk-vlada-i-siloviki-pidpisali-kolektivne-zvernenna.html).

During this more than year-long record of terror, terrorism, vigilantism, and criminality, neither Yarosh nor any other RS official or member has been questioned no less arrested for any of these crimes. As demonstrated above both national and local officials are intimidated or are actively working with RS groups.

RS Congress and Veche: Probing Kiev

Moreover, after this record of political violence and terrorism, Yarosh and his RS thugs were allowed to convene both a congress in Zhivteiny Palace in central Kiev, where some of its snipers shot, killed and wounded police and civilians on 20 February 2014, and a 'people's veche' (assembly) on the Maidan on July 21st. RS delegations, many in camouflage uniform, marched demonstratively through the city in formation to Zhivteiny. The congress's several hundred deputies filled Zhivteiny and heard Yarosh declare, in fact reiterate, his oft-stated goal of a "nationalist revolution" against the Maidan regime he helped bring to power. The congress decided not to take part in Ukraine's local elections to be held on October 25th and to organize a nationwide referendum on a series of questions, including the legalization of the volunteer armed battalions such as its UVC and a vote of confidence or inconfidence in the authorities (http://vesti-ukr.com/kiev/108102-smenit-rezhim-my-mozhem-tolko-putem-revoljucii-v-kieve-proshel-sezd-ps; http://pravyysektor.info/news/news/414/zyizd-pravogo-sektora-v-centri-stolici.html; and http://top.rbc.ru/politics/21/07/2015/55ae7de79a79473857deec29).

The decision not to participate in elections comes with news that RS's popularity has grown in the wake of the trail of blood it has left from Donbass to Odessa to Transcarpathia. A recent survey conducted by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in early July found that for the first time RS would break the 5 percent of the vote threshold needed to secure seats in the Ukrainian parliament, the Supreme Rada, receiving 5.4 percent - this compared to the 1.8 percent RS received in last year's parliamentary elections. Yarosh and several other RS leaders have seats now, but they were won in single-mandate districts in campaigns financed by Kolomoiskii and other oligarchs. If presidential election were held now, Yarosh would receive 5.7 percent compared to the 0.7 percent he garnered in the 2014 presidential elections. Thus, Yarosh and RS have gained nearly a million new voters since last year's elections. Other nationalist parties have also been making gains, according to the KIIS survey. Yulia Tymoshenko's nationalist 'Fatherland' party would receive 22.7 percent of the vote compared to 5.7 percent in last October's elections. The ultra-nationalist Radical Party would receive 10.2 percent compared to 7.5 percent in October 2014. The ultra-nationalist 'Svoboda' party would receive 3.9 percent compared to 4.7 percent. The now very unpopular nationalist prime minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk's National Front has dropped to 2.8 from the 22.2 percent it received in the last parliamentary election. Thus, a near majority - 45 percent - would support nationalist, ultra-nationalist or neofascist parties if parliamentary elections were held now. Moreover, there are ultra-nationalists in President Poroshenko's 'Petro Porosehnko Bloc' and Lviv mayor Andriy Sadoviy's 'Self-Help' party (www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=540&page=1).

The veche, which directly followed the congress, gathered some 3,000 attendees, who were treated to a Uniate Catholic invocation from several priests, political speeches, and an appearance from Mr. Yarosh (http://vesti-ukr.com/kiev/108116-veche-pravogo-sektora-na-majdane; http://vesti-ukr.com/kiev/108109-na-majdane-sobralis-poltysjachi-bojcov-pravogo-sektora; and www.youtube.com/watch?v=RuntSMVfwSQ). The modest turnout means that if Yarosh was probing whether or not to begin his nationalist revolution in a 'Maidan 2.0', then he must conclude that RS lacks sufficient support for this at present.

Conclusion

Thus, RS after committing a myriad of war crimes, terrorist attacks, now 'conventional' crimes and other forms of defiance of the Maidan regime and its siloviki was able to convene its 'congress' and organize a mass demonstration in the center of the capitol, without any real pressure from the regime. It appears that Yarosh still has protectors within the Maidan regime's failing state apparatus, despite the recent firing of one - former SBU chief Nalyvaichenko - and the alienation of another - MVD chief Avakov.

It is very likely that there would be splits within one or more of the siloviki departments - the MVD, SBU, the Armed Forces, and National Guard - on which Poroshenko would need to rely in the event Yarosh's RS and/or one or more of the many other neo-armed fascist volunteer battalions and civilian neofascist activists were to attempt to seize power by force. Many of these departments have been staffed in part with neo-fascists and/or sympathetic ultra-nationalists and national chauvinists.

This begs the question: Why has Yarosh not attempted yet to use force to seize power? It appears that RS still lacks sufficient forces to carry out a successful revolt on its own. Estimates are RS's UVC has some 2,000 fighters. Other RS members in other volunteer battalions would likely double that figure, but this would not be enough to hold on to power if they seized key installations in Kiev. A coup in Galicia might have better prospects, but RS would have trouble moving fighters from the Donbass front and elsewhere en masse without being exposed.  Yarosh is aware of his still relative weakness. His recent demonstrations, congress, and veche in Kiev appear to be efforts to gauge the level of support he could bring to, and muster in to Kiev. The turnout for the veche suggests that despite the Maidan regime's weakness, Yarosh for now is unable to seize power relying on RS alone, and coordinating the other neofascist groups and volunteer battalions nationalist elements control or within which they enjoy a majority is a major challenge. The regime's impotence, therefore, is most unfortunate because this is an opportune time to move against RS. Although this might spark other neofascist groups to rally around Yarosh RS, the same could be true later when the regime may be more impotent and RS more potent given the deteriorating socioeconomic situation in the country. The longer Yarosh and his partners in crime are allowed to operate freely and openly, RS is capable of increasing the financial and other resources needed to accomplish this goal.

In sum, at present it remains unclear whether Yarosh can rally sufficient forces into or around RS in order to mount a coup, and this may be dictating his 'long war' strategy founded on a more broad-based  'nationalist revolution.' In this scenario, a coercive seizure of power could follow the Maidan model, beginning with civil disobedience, the occupation of government buildings, and then the gradual escalation of violence. Initiating this strategy now would be premature.

For President Poroshenko, the Maidan regime, and the West's Ukraine policy, Kiev's acquiescence or impotence before the RS threat is bound to come home to roost. The emperor has no clothes, and the Maidan regime is falling to its knees.
---
Gordon M. Hahn is an Analyst and Advisory Board Member of the Geostrategic Forecasting Corporation. He is also Analyst/Consultant, Russia Other Points of View and Senior Researcher, Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies (CETIS), Akribis Group, San Jose, California. Dr Hahn is author of three well-received books, Russia's Revolution From Above (Transaction, 2002), Russia's Islamic Threat (Yale University Press, 2007), which was named an outstanding title of 2007 by Choice magazine, and The 'Caucasus Emirate' Mujahedin: Global Jihadism in Russia's North Caucasus and Beyond (McFarland Publishers, 2014). He also has authored hundreds of articles in scholarly journals and other publications on Russian, Eurasian and international politics and publishes the Islam, Islamism, and Politics in Eurasia Report (IIPER) at CSIS at http://csis.org/program/russia-and-eurasia-program. Dr. Hahn has been a visiting scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. (2011-2013), the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies at the Wilson Center in Washington, D.C. (1995 and 2005), and the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. He has taught at Boston, American, Stanford, San Jose State, San Francisco State, and St. Petersburg State (Russia) Universities.

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 #34
www.opendemocracy.net
July 24, 2015
Ukraine's left: between a swamp and a hard place
With a new-found reputation for radicalism, Ukrainian politics is in flux. The left, however, are nowhere to be seen.
By Denys Gorbach
Denys Gorbach is a Ukrainian journalist and economic analyst writing on economy, energy, political and social issues. He is a member of the Autonomous Workers' Union.

The events of the past two years-the mass protests that led to the deposing of President Viktor Yanukovych, the subsequent annexation of Crimea, and Russian aggression in the east-have changed much in Ukrainian society.

These events have split the global left, dividing the so-called 'anti-imperialists' (who support Putin's aggression) and those who condemn it. Meanwhile, inside Ukraine, left-wing activists are currently re-grouping in response to the events of the past 15 months. Indeed, the changes taking place inside the radical left community began in 2011-2012; the events that followed served as a catalyst.

From the ground up

When Ukraine became an independent state in 1991, the left movement was in the process of being built from the ground up.

Traditions of left-wing protest had long been eradicated, and talk of a continuous tradition of an organised left, stretching back to Nestor Makhno or the Trotskyists, was preposterous.

In the late twentieth century, the language of democratic protest against Soviet power, leftist at its core, was liberal conservative.

Indeed, in the late 1980s, the Soviet press used to call conservatives, who supported a more authoritarian regime and an end to the democratic process of perestroika, 'right wing' (although formally speaking, they were communists), and the opposition (including conservative liberals like Boris Yeltsin)-'left wing'.

Later, in independent Ukraine during the 1990s, the term 'leftists' became popular when referring to the Stalinist and post-Stalinist parties, which, having taken root in the debris of the recently dissolved Communist Party, went on to exploit people's nostalgia for the Soviet Union.

These parties included the Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU), which drifted away from Stalinism to social democracy; the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU), self-declared successor to the old Soviet Communist Party of Ukraine; the Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine, which broke off from the SPU and quickly took up a nationally-oriented 'socialist' position, with an 'anti-globalisation' bent grounded in religion; and, last but not least, the Peasant Party of Ukraine, rocked by a series of scandals in the past 15 years.

Throughout the 1990s, these political forces made up the majority in the Verkhovna Rada, and acted as the opposition to President Leonid Kuchma. It was precisely these parties, emerging from the Stalinist tradition (indeed, the majority of them never left it), which came to embody left-wing principles for ordinary people in Ukraine.

Thanks to their efforts, socialism and communism are still closely tied to ideas such as Slavic nationalism, a pro-Russian geopolitical orientation, the police state, the death penalty, social conservatism, the defence of 'canonical Orthodoxy', and the wholehearted approval of the Soviet experience.

Gradual regression

In the past 15 years, however, these parties have lost their political influence. This slow defeat has come about not just as a result of demographic processes (the inevitable ageing and diminishing of their supporters), but also due to their own miscalculations.

During the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko, the once powerful SPU squandered its political capital, as it entered unscrupulous coalitions, made bad political deals, and was exposed in a series of corruption scandals.

The Communist Party, which was practically in a governing coalition with the Party of Regions under Viktor Yanukovych, supported the infamous dictatorship laws of 16 January 2014, and in so doing, bound its political future with that of the regime, which quickly fell apart a month later.

After Maidan, with a large portion of their electorate in annexed Crimea and the territories of the 'People's Republics', the communists had little hope of returning to parliament.

'The left swamp'

At the same time, new left-wing organisations of a different breed have emerged: genuinely anarchist initiatives, Trotskyite groups, radical offshoots from the bureaucratic structures of the CPU, left-leaning nationalists, anti-fascists, social democratic circles-the wide spectrum of left organisations and movements typical of any western country.

To distinguish these groups from the post-Stalinist parties, which monopolised the left flank of national politics, Ukrainian journalists coined the term 'the new left'. They did this without paying much attention to the fact that this term refers to a concrete political tradition; and one, which, not every young leftist who doesn't love the CPU belongs to.

Aware of their minimal numbers and influence, these movements kept close to one another: they organised common protests and May Day demonstrations (for Kyiv, with a population of three million, a 500-strong May Day march was considered a success), operated general mailing lists and leased spaces for collective use.

Members of one group would move to another or create their own, but would remain, nevertheless, in the same friendship groups. New people also found themselves here.

This is how a phenomenon that came to be known as the 'left swamp' formed: a relatively stable, close-knit social environment where many people hated one another on political and personal grounds, held different political ambitions, but nevertheless felt a sense of belonging to a common cause.

Drying out the swamp

When one group tried to use the swamp in its own interests, though, this was the beginning of the end of this community.

In 2010, the Organisation of Marxists, a group that unified Stalinist former Komsomol members with Trotskyites, invited the swamp to participate in the creation of a 'left political subject' (the term 'party' was not used to avoid scaring off the anarchists). And so a process was set in motion. Its results turned out to be contrary to its aims: instead of entering the ranks of this new party in droves, the swamp began to dry out.

The anarchists put forward an alternative proposal: unite in radical federative unions on the basis of a syndicalist strategy. In summer 2011, the Autonomous Workers' Union (AWU), which positioned itself against this new 'party', was founded.

By 2011, the Organisation of Marxists had already disintegrated into Stalinist and Trotskyite wings. The former took the name Borotba (the title of a Ukrainian social democratic party active in 1918-1920), while the latter called itself the Left Opposition (a nod to the Trotskyite platform in the Soviet Communist Party of the 1920s). Both groups saw the creation of a leftist party with parliamentary ambitions as their task.

The most influential of these new organisations turned out to be Direct Action (Priama diya), a student union anarcho-syndicalist group founded in the mid-1990s.

Beyond the swamp

With their different political views and aims, the paths of these organisations naturally began to diverge. And though accusations of sectarianism and opportunism began to fly as the 'swamp dried out', this process ultimately benefited everyone.

In 2012, for instance, anarchist organisations were able to hold their own May Day demonstration, raising their own libertarian agenda; Borotba received the opportunity to found their own parliamentary party, bringing police officers into their ranks, co-operating with Russian nationalists as well as developing other initiatives, previously unthinkable in partnership with the anarchists and Trotskyites.

Meanwhile, Left Opposition (Liva opozytsiya) strived to remain in the swamp longer than everyone else, trying to maintain good relationships with everyone simultaneously. The events of 2013-2014, however, marked the end of a general left community.

The pro-Putin left

Initially taking a sceptical position (typical for most leftists) towards the Maidan in Kyiv, Borotba went on to break with Ukraine's other left groups in January 2014.

As the protests took on an anti-police character, and the Yanukovych regime intensified its repressive tactics, one thing became clear: there was no going back. Instead, what we faced was either the victory of Maidan (and an uncertain future) or a new authoritarian regime in the Russian model.

Despite this, Borotba openly took the side of AntiMaidan, a pro-government movement, which later transformed into pro-Russian separatist movements in the south and east of the country.

Today, Borotba's leadership resides partly in western Europe, partly in Russia, and has tied its political future to the separatist movement in the east of Ukraine.

In so doing, Borotba has lost its political appeal for the rest of Ukraine. Have they managed to achieve anything on that side of the frontline? It's hard to say: separatist authorities have arrested Borotba members on several occasions. The CPU has also found it difficult to enter the 'political process' in the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR).

Anarchists

Meanwhile, though it never officially supported Maidan, the position of the Autonomous Workers' Union' on Maidan changed after January 2014.

Many members of AWU participated in protests and infrastructure initiatives, including protecting casualties in hospitals and supporting the occupation of the Ministry of Education (organised by Direct Action).

Indeed, anarchists from AWU were the first to hold a protest after Maidan-against the new government. AWU is still yet to become a syndicate, as it has not managed to set up cells in factories. But it operates as a propagandist anarchist organisation, protesting and holding consciousness-raising events.

The local Kharkov branch of AWU managed to partner up with the liberals in winter 2013-2014, and became an influential force in the Maidan movement there after pushing out the nationalists. Indeed, Kharkov, despite several splits, is home to several anarchist initiatives, including a squat for ATO refugees.

In Kyiv, the left had no such opportunity: nationalists maintained their monopoly on public pronouncements, and pushed the leftists and feminists aside as soon as they unfurled their human rights and socio-economic banners. Nevertheless, Direct Action stubbornly tried to promote its agenda on Maidan (and on the walls of the occupied education ministry). It was in violent confrontations with left activists that the far-right group Right Sector was born.

After Maidan, Direct Action underwent personnel changes: a third generation-young students of an anarchist bent-replaced the second, who were, at last, destined to leave the lecture halls. Today, Direct Action is involved in fighting an anti-religious campaign, resisting the creeping influence of the church in educational institutions, as well as defending the interests of students against neo-liberal education reforms.

Meanwhile, Free Earth, an anarcho-ecological organisation founded in Kyiv, continues to fight against the development of shale gas in Ukraine, and building on Kyiv's green sites. Several activists from this group are currently fighting in eastern Ukraine.

The initial post-Maidan period seems to have produced several new anarchist groups. In autumn 2014, an anarchist initiative called Black Rainbow sprung up in Kyiv, and local anarchists in Zhytomyr managed to set up Chaotic Good, despite nationalist resistance.

All these groups categorically separate themselves from the 'People's Republics' in Ukraine's east, seeing those movements as far-right puppet dictatorships, which are controlled by the neo-liberal Putin regime. At the same time, though, they are against any form of nationalism.

Refusing to lay equal blame for the breakout of conflict on the Russian and Ukrainian governments, Ukrainian anarchists come out against the neo-liberal and conservative initiatives of their 'own' state.

Digital democracy

The departure of Borotba from Ukrainian politics opened up a space for a young left party-one which, just like Syriza and Podemos, could unite grassroots social movements and promote a social democratic agenda.

Left Opposition decided to take this mantle. Shortly after the victory of Maidan, which they supported, they launched the Party of Social Revolution, declaring the principles of digital democracy. In order to avoid the usual bureaucratic hiccups of registering a new party, they reached an agreement to essentially buy a formal party structure created by other people.

This party has had no shortage of scandals. Under pressure from activists in Odessa, Oleg Vernik-leader of the Defence of Labour trade union-found his way into the party management. In the early 2000s, Vernik, a union leader, was suspected of conning international socialist organisations.

Vernik's biography is a full one: during Ukraine's parliamentary elections in 2012, he worked closely with Alexei Kochetkov, the Russian political technologist responsible for CIS-EMO, an election-monitoring organisation. Indeed, Vernik has long tried to establish partnerships with nationalist groups.

In May 2014, however, the organising committee decided to build the party from scratch under the name Social Movement. According to the organisers, they consciously decided to avoid the word 'revolution' in the name, given its lack of popularity among today's electorate.

This new party hopes to repeat the successes of the Greek and Spanish parties-to become a platform for grassroots socio-economic protest, and eventually get into parliament and promote Keynesian economics and progressive politics.

As to their position on the current war in Ukraine, this party tries to please everyone at once: they are smooth in presentation, declaring that both sides are at fault. Yet a scandal over one member of this new party's management, who had been serving in one of the pro-Ukrainian police battalions, has sharply divided the party: for some, this was fine; for others, it was impermissible.

Have Social Movement made the right choice? Only time will tell. After all, larger political projects, with better financing and administrative resources, have already appropriated socio-economic slogans against austerity, rising communal charges and the fall in citizens' income.

These populists have very good chances at the coming local elections in October, and Social Movement will have to fight them on the same ground.

Left nationalists

The Autonomous Resistance (AR) movement stands apart in Ukraine's left scene. Founded in 2009, this group has undergone a political evolution in the past six years.

The founders of AR used to be in charge of the Ukrainian National Labour Party - a national socialist movement, which looked up to Hitler. Gradually, though, a new group emerged with a 'left Nazi' ideology. They were particularly enamoured with the Strasser brothers, and their ideology shifted towards defending the rights of workers (ethnic) and resisting the oligarchs (Jews).

In reality, the rather odious Yury Mykhalchyshyn-a member of Svoboda-used to run this party, but broke off contact after becoming a people's deputy in 2012. A conflict between Svoboda and AR took hold, manifesting itself in regular street violence in Lviv (AR's 'stronghold'). Svoboda, which brought the majority of classic neo-Nazis groups under its wing, sent them to fight AR, the 'communists'. As a result of this conflict, AR swung further to the left.

Currently, this group positions itself against capitalism in its texts, and considers the key contradiction in society to be class, rather than nationality. It condemns xenophobia, though its members desire a 'proletarian' government after the social revolution has taken place (instead of the immediate abolition of the state), and resists progressive social agendas such as feminism, LGBT, and reproductive rights. They have, for all intents and purposes, remained nationalists.

During Maidan, AR was active in Lviv, occupying the regional administration building. After conflict broke out in the east, many AR members set off for the front to fight against 'a more reactionary regime' (they do not support the Ukrainian government).

The Greek crisis

The Ukrainian left is often accused of lacking unity: the bringing together of everyone with everyone else is fashionable, and those who resist it are branded 'sectarians'.

Although all the groups mentioned above are on the left of the political spectrum, they have, at times, expressed very different views. For instance, take their views on Greece.

Of course, all Ukrainian leftists condemn the policies of the Troika, which, as they see it, continues to insist on senseless and merciless austerity, stigmatising Greeks as 'lazy natives'. But there are serious differences.

Borotba and similar groups underline the geopolitical aspect, 'exposing' the role of the European Union, which is stripping the Greeks of all they have, and will soon do the same to Ukrainians.

Autonomous Resistance emphasises the destructive role of usury, and believes that Greece should liberate itself from this yoke-after all, they say, the parasite bankers have trapped Greece in a web of debt.

Social Movement proposes complete solidarity with Syriza, and hopes for a further radicalisation of its politics-the nationalisation of the banks, and reforms in the style of Lenin's NEP.

Anarchists express solidarity with Greek workers, but do not support Syriza as a party (it heads a bourgeois government). For them, there's no point in the proletariat relying on this government: they have to organise themselves and take the initiative. Several of them would add that the problem here resides in capitalism itself, and not the populist dichotomy 'people/oligarchs', and that there is a latent anti-Semitism in the stories of greedy bankers who are at fault for everything.

These are all different positions, and belie the radically different political philosophies at work here. Many on the European right, of course, also 'support Greece'.

The next political battle

For Social Movement, clearly, the next political battle is the upcoming local elections. Given the domination of populist rhetoric heard from their more powerful opponents, they shouldn't expect much in the way of electoral success this autumn. That said, they themselves take a more long-term view, seeing the coming elections as an opportunity for agitation.

The current patriotic hysteria that has swept Ukraine-unavoidable in times of war-is helping left-wing nationalists to gain ground.

When it comes to AR, their political programme is close to that amalgamation of left and right slogans which dominates the minds of many people in Ukraine. Aside from nationalism, AR's demonstrative radicalism and insurrectionism also attracts attention: it draws people who wish to defend the 'achievements of the Maidan revolution', but who are not prepared to work with right-wing movements.

That said, surveys show that the overwhelming majority of people in Ukraine are tired of radicalism and violence: thus, 'ultra-radical' political forces can appeal only to a minority.

Anarchist organisations are aware of this, and opt for different tactics: without hiding their radical programme, anarchists believe their main goal is to help raise the consciousness of workers and build organisational structures.

As Maidan showed, without organisation, there's no point thinking about more ambitious aims.

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 #35
www.rt.com
July 24, 2015
Ukraine pays $120mn debt, avoids technical default - finance ministry

Kiev has made a $120-million coupon payment on its Eurobonds that was due on Friday, according to Ukraine's Deputy Finance Minister Artem Shevalev. The country would have faced technical default if it hadn't repaid the debt.

The coupon payment was in question until the last moment. Ukrainian Finance Minister Natalie Jaresko admitted in June that default was probable this month, adding it won't hit people in the street.

Kiev is trying to persuade foreign private creditors to make concessions to Ukraine and to restructure $23 billion of its $70 billion debt. Last week, Kiev said Ukraine and the special creditor committee headed by the US Franklin Templeton "made progress" on the issue during direct negotiations in Washington, which took place on July 15. The committee includes T. Rowe Price, TCW Group, BTG Pactual and Franklin Templeton investment funds.

On Wednesday, the European Commission transferred its first tranche of €600 million to Kiev as part of the third Macro-Financial Assistance package worth €1.8 billion. Another two similar tranches are expected later in 2015-2016, provided Ukraine makes structural and economic reforms.

The IMF board of directors will hold a meeting to discuss the Ukraine crisis on July 31, TASS reports.

In the second half of this year, Ukraine had to make payments on its external public debt worth about $5 billion at the current hryvnia/USD exchange rate, according to TASS.

This month Kiev's payments on foreign debt should amount to $257 million. Of this $98 million will be payments on official credits of $159 million - loans from international financial institutions.

The negotiations between Ukraine and the Franklin Templeton-led group of private international creditors are tough. Kiev wants a 40-percent haircut worth about $15 billion in order to make the debt sustainable. This is inadmissible to the lenders. So far, the parties have only agreed to swap part of Ukraine's debt for GDP-linked bonds.

Ukraine's economy is now in ruins. The country's GDP is expected to shrink 9 percent this year, with annual inflation jumping to 46 percent, according to the IMF. Its debt will hit 95 percent of GDP this year, according to the National bank of Ukraine. FT expects even worse, saying Kiev's debt will top 100 percent of GDP in 2015.

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 #36
The National Interest
July 23, 2015
Debt: The Next Ukraine Disaster?
By Robert Kahn

After months of standoff, the Ukraine government appears to be making halting progress towards an agreement restructuring its external private debt. On hopes of a deal, and ahead of an IMF Board meeting next week to review its program, the government reportedly has decided that it will make a $120 million payment to creditors due tomorrow. It is possible that decision to repay will be seen as a signal of good faith and create momentum towards an agreement, but I fear it's more likely we have reached a point where continuing to pay has become counterproductive to a deal. Absent more material signs of progress in coming weeks, there is a strong case-on economic, political and strategic grounds-that a decision to halt payments and declare a moratorium gives Ukraine the best chance of achieving an agreement that creates the conditions for sustainable debt and a growing economy in the medium term.

What's at stake?

The move to restructure followed the announcement earlier this year that the IMF had made a debt operation a condition of its lending. The IMF decision, as in Greece, was justified by reference to a debt sustainability analysis showing debt rising above 100 percent. A comprehensive restructuring, including a 40 percent haircut to the nominal value of the debt, was seen as needed to reduce debt to a sustainable level (a target of 71 percent). But the timing of the decision had more to do with financing, the result of inadequate bilateral assistance from Ukraine's main partners that left a gap that was too large for the IMF to fill. The restructuring targets cash flow relief of $15.3 billion over the next four years.

Since the spring, talks have moved forward in fits and starts, and while there have been a flurry of meetings this month, significant differences remain. Most contentious appears to be the call for upfront nominal principal haircuts. Creditors rightly note that, given the extraordinary unknowns associated with the war with Russia, the size of the relief needed is uncertain and there is a case for a two-stage approach, with cash flow relief now and a subsequent restructuring discussion when there is more certainty on the economic and political future of Ukraine.  Indeed, IMF research in recent years has made a compelling case for "reprofiling" when there is significant uncertainty, albeit in cases (unlike this one) where the good outcome does not require a subsequent restructuring. But the Ukraine government, and the international community more generally, are united in their belief that there are significant benefits to a comprehensive debt deal that includes haircuts. Among the benefits are assured financing and a strong political signal to the population that there is light at the end of the tunnel. If, however, creditors doubt their resolve, or hope for much smaller levels of haircuts, and creditors are receiving payments in the interim, the negotiation becomes a game of chicken, difficult to conclude.

That seems to be where we are now. This morning, there were reports that the two sides would not meet as scheduled this week, allowing technical talks to continue but suggestive of a lack of progress in recent days.  A September amortization payment of $500 million appears to be a harder deadline for the negotiations, as the government has clearly stated that it has neither the will nor the resources to make that payment.  So unless a deal is concluded soon, a moratorium is likely, if not now, in September.

To be clear, a moratorium cannot be an excuse to not reach an agreement.  The form of the agreement can vary-there have been suggestions that interest rates could step up after a period of time; that the government could provide extra payments if the economy grows (although GDP warrants traditionally haven't performed well in markets raising questions whether the government will get good value for them); or that there could be a menu of choices that included different combinations of debt relief.  All these ideas deserve examination.

Markets appear to be betting on a deal, or at least on there being sufficient progress toward a deal to justify continued payment (see chart). Prices this morning were steady at around $0.55 on the dollar, up around 6 cents on the month.

The case for a moratorium

Debt policy is always trying to find a balance on the issue of default. There needs to be strong incentives for countries to try and repay their debt, even at times of stress; otherwise risk premium will soar and financing for essential development needs will be squeezed out in non-crisis periods. From this perspective, Ukraine was right to make an extraordinary effort up to this point to remain current on its debt.

But, when a restructuring becomes necessary, it cannot be too hard to get it done, and there needs to be strong formal and informal mechanisms for collective action to ensure the broadest possible participation. Continuing to pay while negotiations proceed can be an act of good faith; but it can also allow reserves and fiscal resources to drain to unnecessarily low levels. In that context, paying until the last minute provides little additional benefit to market access and if continued payment is seen as coming at the expense of those who are restructuring later-could in fact complicate the negotiations. Far more important for the government is the reduced debt and financing uncertainty, ahead of fall elections and a difficult effort to raise new bilateral financing for 2016.

The announcement of a moratorium will no doubt bring down prices, and it is often argued that it will delay Ukraine's return to market.  Unfortunately, international bond market access is a distant hope for Ukraine in the current environment. Imposing a debt moratorium would imply a default (after a 10-day grace period) and trigger cross-default clauses on Ukraine's other eurobonds.  But the default would be cured when the restructuring is completed.

The IMF is scheduled to complete its first review of its Extended Fund Facility (EFF) arrangement with Ukraine next week, following passage of legislation including banking and judicial reform. To complete the review, the Fund's Board will need to waive the usual requirements of assured financing (as the restructuring is not complete) and that is more easily justified absent arrears. But that should not be a reason for delay, if Ukraine is acting in good faith and committed to negotiating a fair deal. The Fund should not be willing to lend indefinitely in the presence of arrears, but should be willing to do so now if it helps get a deal done.

The government's main concern with announcing a moratorium may be that anti-Ukrainian elements could seek to capitalize on the default, comparing Ukraine's actions to the crisis in Greece for example. Any default can create domestic concerns about financial stability, and a bank run at this point would be damaging. Still, these concerns should be manageable. In this regard, the international community needs to provide a strong message of support for the government's action, emphasizing the importance of an agreement and the significance of this step towards a solution, not an intensification, of the economic crisis facing Ukraine.

This piece first appeared in CFR's blog Macro and Markets here.

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 #37
RIA Novosti
July 23, 2015
Supply of US artillery-locator radars to Kiev will have major effect - pundit

The possible supply of artillery-locator radar systems by the United States to Ukraine could treble the effectiveness of the Ukrainian Army in artillery battles with the separatist militias, but will require direct involvement in the war by US troops, the president of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems, Konstantin Sivkov, has said, RIA Novosti (part of the state-owned International News Agency Rossiya Segodnya) reported on 23 July.

The RIA Novosti report follows reports in the US Wall Street Journal saying that the Pentagon was ready to supply Ukraine with AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder artillery-locator radars.

"If these stations are delivered, the effectiveness of the Ukrainian Army's counter-battery fire will increase not less than three times," Sivkov said, according to the report.

He noted, however, that the Ukrainians probably do not have specialists capable of operating the systems and the military did not have the will to fight.

"So there wi! ll have to be advisers taking part throughout the command chain, that is, ensuring the arrival of signals, their transmission to the artillery batteries, and with this data, fire-control data is worked out (for subsequent destruction of the enemy batteries). In sum, this would imply direct involvement of American military personnel in the war in Ukraine," he said.

Location of artillery can be worked out using sound, rather than the radar stations, but accuracy may be reduced to within a few kilometres, Sivkov said.

"As far as is known, the militias also carry out counter-battery warfare, but like the Ukrainian Army, by the look of it, they do not have many effective systems for providing counter-battery fire," he said.

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 #38
Sputnik
July 24, 2015
US Will Be Disappointed by Consequences of Military Drills in Ukraine

Washington and its allies use military maneuvers to force Russia to soften its position on the Ukrainian crisis, but they will be disappointed and it is likely they will receive a similar response from Moscow, says the researcher for China's International Research (CIIS).

Military exercises in the framework of NATO operations Rapid Trident-2015 in the Western Ukraine, as well as the policy of sanctions against Moscow is a political instrument of putting pressure on Russia, says an employee of China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) Xia Yishan, reports Global Times of China.

"In the West it is believed that the joint exercises will force Kremlin to soften its position towards the Ukrainian crisis. However, Washington and its allies will be disappointed," says the researcher.

Yishan notes that Moscow has already warned the alliance about the potential "explosive consequences" of the US military activity in Ukraine.

If NATO is to continue expanding scale of their operations, it is likely that Russia would be forced to respond similarly to constraining measures.

It is clear that the exercise Rapid Trident-2015 will only lead to a result which diametrically opposes the stated goals of NATO, adds the analyst. Military activity in the region will only increase; therefore, the probability of a direct clash will be higher than ever.

The researcher is sure that it is impossible to achieve security and stability in Eastern Europe, which is gradually becoming a hot spot, by conducting a multinational military exercises. Moreover, these maneuvers on part of the western alliance would undermine the credibility of NATO countries in the eyes of Moscow.

Nevertheless, the expert concludes by saying that despite the increasing military activity, the key players of the alliance do not see war as the most wanted option.

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 #39
Chatham House
www.chathamhouse.org
July 23, 2015
US Should Resist Calls to Provide Ukraine with More Weapons
Lethal military support to Kyiv will create more problems than it solves.
By Dr Andrew Monaghan
Senior Research Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme

As the war in Ukraine has dragged on, lobbying to supply lethal weapons to the Ukrainian government − to supplement ongoing diplomatic efforts, sanctions and the provision of some non-lethal military equipment and training to Kyiv − has increased. Both Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk and President Petro Poroshenko have argued that the war is Europe's and the US's as well as Ukraine's, and that lethal weapons are necessary for Ukraine to defend itself. 'Without weapons, we lost Crimea and parts of Eastern Ukraine. This is the lesson,' said Yatsenyuk. US Secretary of Defence Ashton Carter and NATO figures such as Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Philip Breedlove have also raised the prospect of supplying lethal weapons to help the Ukrainians defend themselves and 'raise the costs' to Putin of aggression in Ukraine.

But supplying lethal weapons to Kyiv would be a bad idea for several reasons. First, Western weapons alone will not help Ukraine defend itself. The reason Ukraine could not defend itself in 2014 was because of a 20-year degeneration of its military capability. This was in terms of equipment (in 1991, they were among the largest armed forces in the world), and the long-term lack of government support and leadership. Over that time, investment in the military declined steeply, defence ministers changed frequently, corruption became endemic and combat capacity declined (for several years before 2014, no brigade or battalion level exercises were held). Without first addressing this strategic picture - which has no quick fix - more weapons will make little positive difference.

Second, although the discussion is about 'defensive' lethal weapons, there is no guarantee that the weapons will be used only for defensive purposes if push comes to shove. If the Minsk agreement holds, then Kyiv will not need the weapons. But if it collapses, they may be pressed into service as Kyiv seeks to fulfil its stated aim to regain control over Donetsk and Lugansk (and even Crimea), starting a bigger conflict with Russia. Such concerns already appear to be behind the US decision not to provide counter-artillery battery radars, for fear they might be used to target artillery pieces firing from Russia.

Furthermore, though some suggest that US weapons will 'raise the battlefield cost to Putin', Russia does not see the 'costs' in the same terms as the US, and adding lethal weapons would provide the grounds for Moscow to escalate its own involvement. Russia could relatively easily match (or better) the supply of weapons to Kyiv with its own to the separatists, before US weapons arrive or could be effectively used. While Kyiv's forces would need training to use US weapons, the separatists are ready to use those that Moscow could supply.

A third objection to supplying lethal weapons is the ongoing instability in Ukraine. The government in Kyiv faces not just major economic, political and social problems, but also serious questions regarding control of the armed volunteer battalions and the far right Pravy Sektor group, of which the shoot-out at Mukachevo is only the latest dramatic example. The risk that weapons might fall into the wrong hands was acknowledged by the (unanimous) passing of amendments on 10 June in the US House of Representatives to the Defence Spending Bill to protect civilians from the dangers of arming and training foreign forces.

The amendments block the training of the Azov volunteer battalion, which they suggested could attack the government in Kyiv. They also made explicit the dangers of supplying shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles to Ukraine (and Iraq), and their concern about the unintended consequences of 'overzealous' military assistance or the 'hyper-weaponization' of conflicts, and the possibility of radical groups acquiring them.

Indeed, lessons from other recent times the US has supplied weapons to unstable, war-torn areas suggest that such conflicts often evolve quickly, and the weapons fall into the wrong hands as interests and alliances change or they are seized by the enemy. In Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, the Taliban and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have gained possession of US weapons, even using them against US forces.

This is important in the Ukrainian case, where problems such as low pay, desertion, corruption and the black market sale of weapons remain strong. It is likely that at least some of those supplied by the US would fall into the wrong hands - be they separatist, Russian or even ISIS.

The White House is among those who have opposed the idea. Officials have suggested that providing lethal weapons would inflame the situation and escalate the bloodshed. Furthermore, the idea is very divisive in the West, splitting the US from major European partners who oppose it, and, as a recent poll by the Pew Centre suggested, there is limited popular support for the measure throughout NATO.

So the downsides and risks of adding lethal weaponry considerably outweigh possible gains. Instead, diplomacy should remain the primary approach. This can be supplemented by other measures that, in due course, will assist the Ukrainians more effectively to defend themselves. First, the US and the EU could increase support to address corruption, smuggling and the black market in weapons. Second, the US and NATO could consider where and how best to assist with more strategic education of the Ukrainian military leadership and the wider reform and re-organization of the Ukrainian forces.

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 #40
The Vineyard of the Saker
http://thesaker.is
July 24, 2015
Kiev is in a stalemate
By Rostislav Ischenko
source: http://pravdanews.info/poroshenko-okazalsya-v-patovoy-situatsii-rostislav-ischenko.html
translation: Alena Scarecrow

On July 21st in Minsk there was held another regular meeting of the contact group devoted to settling the Ukrainian conflict. It resulted in reaching an agreement on the withdrawal of tanks and weapons of up to 100 mm caliber from the delimitation line.

The corresponding document was drawn out - however, not signed. As for the political issues, the parties once again failed to come to the mutual understanding.

Rostislav Ischenko, the President of the System Analysis and Forecasting Centre, is sharing his estimation of the current situation.

"The negotiations on withdrawing weapons were actually being run back during finalizing the Minsk-2 Agreement. Finally putting them in black and white is undoubtedly good, but as long as they are not signed we cannot regard it as any real breakthrough. Practice shows that signed and put in action are not necessarily synonyms, so it is early times yet to express excessive optimism.

From my point of view, this contact group meeting is nonetheless highly significant. Moreover, it can be considered to be a major milestone in a certain respect. For quite a while Russia used to be a solitary fighter struggling for truth under joint attacks of France, Germany, OSCE and the Ukraine.

Now after an OSCE representative's statement that the agreement on the withdrawal of up to 100mm caliber weapons has fallen through - with the transparent implication that it is Kiev to blame - the situation has taken an abrupt turn. It is Kiev now opposing the others' unified position - the document would have been signed had it not been for the Ukraine's disagreement on it.

Unless the parties' unified position changes, the Ukraine risks to get into complete isolation sooner or later - probably, even in the course of the ongoing negotiations. The country under the current circumstances will barely benefit from finding herself devoid of allies, partners and support. Now the Ukrainian authorities certainly have things to ponder.

In the political regard there are two major issues, in my view - Kiev's foreign and domestic policy positions. In the light of the former, the Ukraine could just have made immediate concessions, acting in full accordance with her American teachers' lessons, - to agree to something but never actually put it into life, - had it not been for the latter.

The bottom line is that Kiev's domestic policy is deprived of flexibility or constructivism. Rada found it extremely hard to accept even most meaningless amendments to the Constitution Poroshenko had put forward.

Petr Alekseevich (Poroshenko) overtly declared that Donbass was never going to be given a special status. The corresponding law would never come into force as it presumed that first Donbass should surrender and only after that any such questions could be raised. Despite of all the forceful arguments, Rada refused to vote.

Now all sorts of Nazi battalions, Right Sector being the most vigorous of all, put enormous pressure on Poroshenko hysterically demanding that he denounces "Minsk".

He is actually caught in the crossfire, having to choose whether to give in to the external pressure and comply with "Minsk" or to go along with the internal forces and disregard it.

He has no means that would enable him to either withstand or effectively maneuver.

So actually Kiev has faced a stalemate. Poroshenko would probably not mind implementing all the Minsk provisions but he cannot, due to his domestic opponents and his own inability to suppress them.

It seems to me that the present situation has all the makings of ending in new internal conflicts in the Ukraine rather than any radical change in her position in the negotiations. The international pressure is likely to increase, but Kiev's constructivism - hardly".

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 #41
Sputnik
July 24, 2015
Results of MH17 Crash Investigation Must Be Disclosed - Russia's EU Envoy

MOSCOW (Sputnik), Anastasia Levchenko - Earlier this week, Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister for European Integration Olena Zerkal claimed that the results of the official MH17 international investigation would not be made publicly available.

"It sounds a bit strange. Because this issue [MH17 investigation] is being so widely discussed already, not just in the Western media, but also in the Russian and Ukrainian media... I don't think this statement reflects the real situation. As for the actual results of the international investigation, the Russian position is that they should be made available to all interested countries," Chizhov said.

The EU envoy added that Moscow has maintained this stance when proposing a draft resolution at the UN Security Council.

Earlier in July, Russia submitted a draft resolution to the UN Security Council, calling for the United Nations' role in the investigation into the MH17 crash to be enhanced.
On July 17, 2014, Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 crashed in Ukraine's eastern region of Donetsk while en route from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur, killing all 298 people on board.

According to a preliminary report by the Dutch Safety Board, the plane broke up in mid-air after being hit by a number of high-energy objects penetrating the plane from outside. A final report is expected in October.

New Cross-Party EU Parliament Group May Enhance Dialogue With Moscow

Chizhov also talked about the importance of re-establishing dialogue between the EU and Russia, stating that a newly-formed cross-party group of 15 members of the European Parliament could enhance dialogue between the two sides.

In late June, former French Minister for Apprenticeship and Professional Formation and member of the center-right Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) party Nadine Morano created an international working group in the EU Parliament to engage in dialogue with Russia.

"I am fully aware of this initiative, launched by one of the Members of the European Parliament from France, Ms. Morano. My attitude to this initiative is of course positive. I hope it will be a contributing factor to improving Russia-EU relations," Chizhov told Sputnik, commenting on the group.

On Thursday, French media reported that the working group created by Morano might soon visit the Russian parliament.

Remarking on the potential visit, Chizhov said he looked forward to seeing it come about, adding that he was in regular contact with the members of the group.

Chizhov admitted that he did not expect every member of the European Parliament to join the group, but nevertheless viewed it as a good indication that not all members of the European Parliament support the hard line adopted by European Union toward Russia over the Ukrainian crisis.

"But the very fact that it is happening, I think, is a good indication that not all members of the European Parliament share the official critical view expressed in resolutions adopted at the European Parliament regarding Russia," he stated.

Formed last month, the group named For New Dialogue With Russia consists of 15 members of the European Parliament drawn from France, Italy, the United Kingdom, Germany and Portugal.

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 #42
Moscow supports bringing closer stances with Kuala-Lumpur on MH17 issue - diplomat

MOSCOW. July 24 (Interfax) - Moscow is ready to start work to bring closer the viewpoints of Malaysia and Russia in regard to the investigation of the Malaysian Boeing 777 crash in Ukraine, Russian Ambassador to Malaysia Valery Yermolov said.

The text of the ambassador's speech on the Boeing 777 tragedy and situation concerning the attempts to form an international tribunal for this regard was obtained by Interfax on Friday.

"We are ready to start work to bring closer the different approaches of Malaysia and Russia [on the Boeing situation] with complete understanding, realization of the huge responsibility and respect for the relatives of the deceased," Yermolov said.

Preventing a split in the UN Security Council over the resolution on the Boeing catastrophe is very important, the ambassador said. "Russia believes that it is necessary to prevent a split showing in the UN Security Council," he said.

The attempts to form an international tribunal over the Boeing crash in Ukraine are premature, Yermolov said.

"We consider the issue of forming an international tribunal over the Boeing MH17 catastrophe to be premature and counterproductive. We are convinced that the resolution of the UN Security Council 2166 remains the only acceptable basis for international cooperation and in the interest of an independent and transparent investigation into the reasons behind the Malaysian plane crash," the ambassador said.

According to Yermolov, "Russia is interested in comprehensive, clear, independent and transparent cooperation of the Malaysia Airlines MH17 plane crash."

"But we do not see that this process is taking place right now," the ambassador said.

It is regrettable that regardless of the 2166 resolution, the UN secretary general has not submitted to the Security Council a variant to support the ongoing investigation, Yermolov said.

At the same time, forming an international tribunal on the Boeing crash is unprecedented because nothing like this has occurred in international practice, the ambassador said having listed a number of major plane crashes, including the crash of Russia's Siberia plane in 2001, which was shot down above the Black Sea by Ukrainian armed forces and the tragedy of the passenger plane flying from Iran above the Persian Gulf on July 3, 1988 which was shot down by a rocket from a U.S. ship.

"No international tribunals were formed up until now in similar situations when investigating plane crashes," Yermolov said.

At the same time, the ambassador said he offered his condolences to the relatives of all the people killed in this tragedy.

The Malaysian Airlines Boeing 777 MH17, en route from Amsterdam to Kuala-Lumpur, crashed in east of Ukraine's Donetsk region, the armed resistance zone, on July 17, 2014. The jet had 298 people on board - 283 passengers and 15 crew members - they all died.

Supposedly, the plane crashed as a result of a rocket assault, however official conclusions from the international committee investigating the reasons behind the tragedy have not been released yet.

A number of countries have composed a UN Security Council draft resolution seeking the formation of an international tribunal to investigate the reasons for the plane crash, which claimed 298 lives.

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 #43
Consortiumnews.com
July 23, 2015
NYT Enforces Ukraine 'Group Think'
By Robert Parry
Investigative reporter Robert Parry broke many of the Iran-Contra stories for The Associated Press and Newsweek in the 1980s.

Exclusive: Determined to enforce the "group think" on Ukraine, the editors of The New York Times lashed out at Russia for urging an expanded inquiry into last year's MH-17 shoot-down. But the Times won't join calls for the U.S. government to release its intelligence on the tragedy, writes Robert Parry.

It's good that Arthur Conan Doyle didn't substitute The New York Times' editorial board for Sherlock Holmes in his stories because, if he had, none of the mysteries would have gotten solved or the wrong men would have gone to the gallows.

Thursday's editorial on last year's shoot-down of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 reveals that the Times' editors apparently find nothing suspicious about the dog-not-barking question of why the U.S. government has been silent for a full year about what its intelligence information shows.

This reticence of U.S. intelligence is especially suspicious given the fact that five days after the July 17, 2014 tragedy which killed 298 people, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence rushed out a "government assessment" citing "social media" and pointing the finger of blame at ethnic Russian rebels in eastern Ukraine and the Russian government.

But once U.S. intelligence analysts had time to evaluate the satellite photos, electronic intercepts and other data, the U.S. government went silent. The pertinent question is why, although that apparently is of no interest to the Times which aimed its editorial against Russia for seeking a more inclusive investigation, which the Times does find suspicious.

"On the face of it, that looks like an accommodating gesture from the government that is backing the Ukrainian separatists believed to have fired the fatal missile on July 17, 2014, and that probably supplied it to them. It's not.

"The real goal of the draft resolution Russia proposed on Monday at the Security Council is to thwart a Dutch-led criminal investigation of what happened and a Western call for a United Nations-backed tribunal."

So, the Times castigates the Russians for seeking to involve the United Nations Security Council and the International Civil Aviation Organization in the slow-moving Dutch-led inquiry, which includes the Ukrainian government, one of the possible suspects in the crime as one of the investigators. But the Times takes no notice of the curious silence of U.S. intelligence.

Appeal to Obama

If the Times really wanted to get at the truth about the MH-17 case, its editorial could have cited a public memo to President Barack Obama from an organization of former U.S. intelligence officials who urged the President on Wednesday to release the U.S.-held evidence.

"As the relationship with Moscow is of critical importance, if only because Russia has the military might to destroy the U.S., careful calibration of the relationship is essential," wrote the Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity, a group first created to challenge the bogus intelligence used to justify President George W. Bush's Iraq invasion in 2003.

The memo signed by 17 former officials, including Pentagon Papers whistleblower Daniel Ellsberg, continued: "If the United States signs on to a conclusion that implicates Russia without any solid intelligence to support that contention it will further damage an already fractious bilateral relationship, almost certainly unnecessarily. It is our opinion that a proper investigation of the downing would involve exploring every possibility to determine how the evidence holds up. ...

"What is needed is an Interagency Intelligence Assessment - the mechanism used in the past to present significant findings. We are hearing indirectly from some of our former colleagues that the draft Dutch report contradicts some of the real intelligence that has been collected. ...

"Mr. President, we believe you need to seek out honest intelligence analysts now and hear them out, particularly if they are challenging or even opposing the prevailing group-think narrative. They might well convince you to take steps to deal more forthrightly with the shoot-down of MH-17 and minimize the risk that relations with Russia might degenerate into a replay of the Cold War with the threat of escalation into thermonuclear conflict. In all candor, we suspect that at least some of your advisers fail to appreciate the enormity of that danger."

Along the same lines, I was told by one source who was briefed by some current analysts that the reason for the year-long U.S. silence was that the evidence went off in an inconvenient direction, toward a rogue element of the Ukrainian government, rather than reaffirming the rush-to-judgment by Secretary of State John Kerry and DNI James Clapper implicating the ethnic Russian rebels in the days after the shoot-down.

According to Der Spiegel, the German intelligence agency, the BND, had a somewhat different take but also concluded that the Russian government did not supply the Buk anti-aircraft missile suspected of shooting down the passenger jet. Der Spiegel reported that the BND believed the rebels used a missile battery captured from Ukrainian forces.

Yet, whatever the truth about those intelligence tidbits, it is clear that the U.S. intelligence community has a much greater awareness of what happened to MH-17 - and who was responsible - than it did on July 22, 2014, when the DNI issued the sketchy report. [See Consortiumnews.com's "MH-17 Case Slips into Propaganda Fog."]

No Update for You

When I asked a DNI spokeswoman on July 17, the first anniversary of the shoot-down, if I could get an update on the U.S. intelligence analysis, she refused, claiming that the U.S. government didn't want to prejudice the Dutch-led investigation. But, I pointed out, the DNI had already done that with the July 22, 2014 report.

I also argued that historically investigations into airline disasters have been transparent, not opaque like this one, and that the American public had an overarching right to know what the U.S. intelligence community knew about the MH-17 case given the existential threat of a possible nuclear showdown with Russia. But the DNI's office held firm in its refusal to provide an update.

The New York Times' editorial board could have lent its voice to this need for openness. Instead, the Times used the prime opinion-leading real estate of its editorial page to demand obeisance to Official Washington's prevailing group think on the Ukraine crisis, that everything is the fault of Russian President Vladimir Putin. The editorial stated:

"Throughout it all, President Vladimir Putin ... has blamed Ukrainian 'fascists' manipulated by the United States and its allies for all the troubles in Ukraine. Nobody outside Russia believes this, and the Russians themselves make little effort to conceal their extensive military support for the separatists. ...

"The relatives of the people who died on the Malaysian airliner, most of whom were Dutch, deserve answers and justice. There is little question that Russia will block any tribunal. But the Security Council should not be fooled into believing that the Russian counterproposals are an honorable alternative, any more than anyone should be fooled by any of Mr. Putin's lies about Russia's military interference in Ukraine."

The Times' strident editorial bordered on the hysterical as if the newspaper was frightened that it was losing control of the permissible narrative derived from its profoundly biased coverage of the Ukraine crisis from its beginning in February 2014 when a U.S.-backed coup overthrew the democratically elected President Viktor Yanukovych.

The Times also put the word "fascists" in quotes - presumably to suggest that Ukrainian brown shirts are just one of Putin's delusions. The Times insisted that "nobody outside Russia believes this" suggesting that if you take note of the key role played by Ukraine's neo-Nazis, you belong in Russia since "nobody outside Russia" would believe such a thing.

Yet, even the Times' own correspondents have on occasion had no choice but to describe a central reality of the Ukraine crisis - that neo-Nazi and other ultranationalist militias provided the muscle for the February 2014 coup and have served as the point of the spear against ethnic Russians in the east who have resisted the U.S.-backed coup regime.

Just this month, Times correspondent Andrew E. Kramer reported on the front-line fighting in which the Kiev government has pitted the neo-Nazi Azov battalion and Islamic militants (some of whom have been described as "brothers" of the Islamic State) against the ethnic Russian rebels. [See Consortiumnews.com's "Ukraine Merges Nazis and Islamists."]

The neo-Nazis and ultranationalists also have squared off against Ukrainian police and politicians, including firefights and protest marches demanding President Petro Poroshenko's removal, as reported by the BBC. [Also see Consortiumnews.com's "The Mess that Nuland Made."]

But deviation from the "it's all Putin's fault" group think infuriates the Times' editors into chanting something like the "go back to Russia" insult directed at Americans in the 1960s and 1970s who criticized the Vietnam War. It is just that sort of anti-intellectual conformity that now dominates the debate over Ukraine.

And, unlike Sherlock Holmes who had the astuteness to unlock the mystery of the "Silver Blaze" by noting the dog not barking, the Times editors ignore the curious reticence of the U.S. government in refusing to update its "assessment" of the MH-17 crash. If the editors really wanted to know the truth and achieve some real accountability, the Times would have joined in demanding that the Obama administration end its suspicious silence.

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 #44
Counterpunch.org
July 23, 2015
Obama Should Release MH-17 Intel
by VETERAN INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS FOR SANITY

A year ago, the U.S. government issued a sketchy report on the Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 shoot-down citing "social media" and other flimsy data implicating eastern Ukrainian rebels and Russia, but then - as hard intelligence became available - went silent. Now, U.S. intelligence veterans are demanding release of that intel.

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

FROM: Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity (VIPS)

SUBJECT: Releasing an Intelligence Report on Shoot-Down of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17

It has been a year since the shoot-down of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 over Ukraine, resulting in the death of 298 passengers and crew. The initial response by the U.S. government supported the contention that the likely perpetrators were anti-government forces in southeastern Ukraine (the customary media misnomer for them is "separatists"), and that they were possibly aided directly by Moscow.

On July 29, 2014, we Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity (VIPS) suggested that the United States Government report publicly what intelligence it actually had relating to the shoot-down lest the incident turn into another paroxysm of blaming Russia without cause. We are still waiting for that report.

Executive Summary

Tensions between the United States and Russia over Ukraine are fast reaching a danger point. A major contributing factor in the American public's negative perception of Moscow is last year's downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17.

A public report detailing the investigation of the incident by the Dutch Safety authorities is expected by October but the draft is reportedly already in the hands of the United States government. There is speculation that the report will dovetail with media and leaked government sources that have placed primary blame on the ethnic Russian Ukrainians in southeastern Ukraine opposed to the government put in place after the Western-engineered coup of Feb. 22, 2014, in Kiev.

As the relationship with Moscow is of critical importance, if only because Russia has the military might to destroy the U.S., careful calibration of the relationship is essential. If the United States signs on to a conclusion that implicates Russia without any solid intelligence to support that contention it will further damage an already fractious bilateral relationship, almost certainly unnecessarily. It is our opinion that a proper investigation of the downing would involve exploring every possibility to determine how the evidence holds up.

Currently, the only thing the American public and worldwide audiences know for sure is that the plane was shot down. But the shoot-down might have been accidental, carried out by any one of a number of parties. Or it might have been orchestrated by anti-government forces, with Moscow either conniving in some way in that action or not. It is also possible that the downing was deliberately carried out by the Kiev government or one of Ukraine's powerful oligarchs to implicate the anti-Kiev forces and Russia in this mass murder. And finally, though less likely, it might even be that based on the available intelligence it is impossible to determine who did it.

In light of the high stakes involved both in terms of our extremely important relationship with Russia as well as in establishing a trustworthy narrative that does credit to the White House, the failure of the Administration to issue a coordinated intelligence assessment summarizing what evidence exists to determine who was responsible is therefore puzzling. If the United States government knows who carried out the attack on the plane it should produce the evidence. If it does not know, it should say so.

In what follows, we former intelligence professionals with a cumulative total of some 360 years in various parts of U.S. intelligence provide our perspective on the issue and request for a second time that the intelligence over the downing be made public to counter the fuzzy and flimsy evidence that has over the past year been served up - some of it based on "social media."

The Russian Dimension

It would not be the first time for a tragic incident to be exploited for propaganda reasons with potentially grave consequences. We refer to the behavior of the Reagan administration in the immediate aftermath of the shoot-down of Korean Airlines Flight 007 over Siberia on August 30, 1983.

Hours after the tragic shoot-down on August 30, 1983, the Reagan administration used its very accomplished propaganda machine to manage a narrative emphasizing Soviet culpability for deliberately killing all 269 people aboard KAL-007 in full knowledge that it was a civilian airliner. In reality, the airliner had been shot down after it strayed hundreds of miles off course and penetrated Russia's airspace over sensitive military facilities in Kamchatka and Sakhalin Island. The Soviet pilot tried to signal the plane to land, but the KAL pilots did not respond to the repeated warnings. Amid confusion about the plane's identity - a U.S. spy plane had been in the vicinity hours earlier - Soviet ground control ordered the pilot to fire.

The Soviets soon realized they had made a horrendous mistake. U.S. intelligence also knew from sensitive intercepts that the tragedy had resulted from a blunder, not from a willful act of murder (much as on July 3, 1988, the USS Vincennes shot down an Iranian civilian airliner over the Persian Gulf, killing 290 people, an act which President Ronald Reagan dismissively explained as an "understandable accident").

The story of KAL-007 should come to mind when considering the fate of MH-17. There might be legitimate reasons for opposing the increasingly authoritarian government of President Vladimir Putin, but exploiting a tragedy does not equate to constructive statecraft for dealing with an adversary.

At a minimum, the White House and State Department one year ago displayed unseemly haste in deciding to be first out of the starting gate with a narrative implicating Russia, at least indirectly - a narrative that may not be based on fact. That twelve months have passed and there has been no effort made to either correct or amplify the record is unacceptable.

Someone Is Lying

Both Russia and Ukraine deny any active role in the MH-17 shoot down. So do the anti-coup forces in southeastern Ukraine. Someone knows something and is lying to conceal a role in the incident. From the U.S. perspective what happened needs to be clarified and become a matter of public record. No other nation has the resources that the U.S. had to come up with an evidence-based answer; and intelligence collection and analysis are the tools that must be used. The information released to date does not bear close scrutiny; it does not permit an informed judgment as to who is lying about the shoot-down of Flight 17.

One year ago today, National Intelligence Director James Clapper authorized a background briefing including some sketchy talking points in a very short "Government Assessment" for selected mainstream journalists. It was just five days after the shoot-down and two days after Secretary of State Kerry pointed the finger of blame at anti-coup Ukrainians and Russia. Understandably, corroboration was being sought.

Like Kerry's presentations on the Sunday talk shows of July 20, 2014, however, much of the "Government Assessment" was derived from postings on "social media." The July 22, 2014 briefing addressed, inconclusively, the key issue of who fired the Buk anti-aircraft missile widely believed to have downed the airliner on July 17, 2014.

No update to that five-day-after "Government Assessment" has been provided over the past year. Are we asked to believe that one year later the intelligence community still cannot adduce evidence that goes beyond insinuation regarding the Buk missile?

The July 22, 2014 briefing also suggested that the missile might have been fired by a Ukrainian "defector." Has there been no clarification on that point? It is, frankly, very hard for us to believe that the U.S. intelligence community has been unable to expand its understanding of these key issues over the past year.

To be sure, there has long been a tendency in Washington to "fix the intelligence around the policy," to quote the Downing Street memo relating to the inglorious start of the Iraq War. More recently, we note the claim repeatedly made by Secretary of State John Kerry on August 30, 2013, that "we know" the regime of Bashar al-Assad was responsible for the chemical incidents near Damascus nine days before.

In that case, Kerry also cited a "Government Assessment" to support his charges.  We saw the introduction of this unique genre of "assessment," instead of the normally required "Intelligence Assessment," as evidence that honest intelligence analysts were refusing to go along with the preferred narrative. In fact, Kerry's accusations turned out to have been based on false and even fabricated intelligence provided by opponents of the Syrian government.

Choosing to Reveal the Truth

If the White House has concrete, probative intelligence regarding MH-17, we strongly suggest that the time is right to approve it for release before the "blame Russia" narrative becomes completely dominant. The American people are perfectly capable of judging for themselves what took place but they need to have all the information presented without bias and without any attempt to evade unpleasant conclusions. And it should be done even given the risk of compromising "sources and methods," as the broader issue of war or peace with Russia is something that should be of paramount concern to every American.

What is needed is an Interagency Intelligence Assessment - the mechanism used in the past to present significant findings. We are hearing indirectly from some of our former colleagues that the draft Dutch report contradicts some of the real intelligence that has been collected. Resorting to another "Government (not Intelligence) Assessment" to sidestep the accountability issue is not appropriate and is itself an insult to the integrity and professionalism of the intelligence community.

Mr. President, we believe you need to seek out honest intelligence analysts now and hear them out, particularly if they are challenging or even opposing the prevailing groupthink narrative. They might well convince you to take steps to deal more forthrightly with the shoot-down of MH-17 and minimize the risk that relations with Russia might degenerate into a replay of the Cold War with the threat of escalation into thermonuclear conflict. In all candor, we suspect that at least some of your advisers fail to appreciate the enormity of that danger.

The courtesy of a reply is requested.

For the Steering Group, Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity

William Binney, former Technical Director, World Geopolitical & Military Analysis, NSA; co-founder, SIGINT Automation Research Center (ret.)
Thomas Drake, former Senior Executive, National Security Agency
Philip Giraldi, CIA, Operations Officer (ret.)
Matthew Hoh, former Capt., USMC, Iraq & Foreign Service Officer, Afghanistan (associate VIPS)
Larry Johnson, CIA & State Department (ret.)
John Kiriakou, Former CIA Counterterrorism Officer
Karen Kwiatkowski, former Lt. Col., US Air Force (ret.), at Office of Secretary of Defense watching the manufacture of lies on Iraq, 2001-2003
Edward Loomis, NSA, Cryptologic Computer Scientist (ret.)
David MacMichael, National Intelligence Council (ret.)
Ray McGovern, former US Army infantry/intelligence officer & CIA analyst (ret.)
Elizabeth Murray, Deputy National Intelligence Officer for Middle East (ret.)
Todd E. Pierce, MAJ, US Army Judge Advocate (Ret.)
Coleen Rowley, Division Counsel & Special Agent, FBI (ret.)
Peter Van Buren, US Department of State, Foreign Service Officer (ret.) (associate VIPS)
Kirk Wiebe, former Senior Analyst, SIGINT Automation Research Center, NSA
Ann Wright, Col., US Army (ret.); Foreign Service Officer (resigned)

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