Johnson's Russia List
2015-#135
9 July 2015
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"We don't see things as they are, but as we are"

"Don't believe everything you think"

DJ: In case it was not already clear, there are many problems in Russia. Just as there are in the US, particularly if you are a subscriber to The Nation. Some of the problems in Russia may be attributed to Vladimir Putin but many cannot. Fox News, of course, blames Obama for most US problems. There is very little focus in Western media on problems in Russia such as education reform, retirement reform, health reform, ameliorating monopolistic business practices, the evolving legal system, protection of small business, funding of non-political NGOs, coping with domestic terrorism, etc. Largely because they are complicated issues that don't easily lend themselves of the "blame Putin" familiar story line. Western media coverage is selective, to be gentle about it.
 

In this issue
 
#1
Vice.com
July 7, 2015
The Pussy Riot Column: It's Up to You to Make Politics Fun Again
By Nadya Tolokonnikova
[Photos here http://www.vice.com/read/its-up-to-you-to-make-politics-fun-again-345]

Imagine if the world reacted to Putin's aggression in Ukraine as it did to the American aggression in Vietnam. If European and American artists, filmmakers, and activists joined Russian and Ukrainian antiwar protesters in sharply condemning Putin's aggression, culture would have won. Screening now would be modern versions of Apocalypse Now and Full Metal Jacket, and next to Book of Mormon on Broadway, something like Hair would be playing, but about a Russian soldier secretly sent to his death in eastern Ukraine (and some kind of Russian hooligan like Pussy Riot would kidnap him from his military unit). Imagine.

The Kubricks and Coppolas go to work when a topic becomes unavoidable. These unavoidable topics come to life via activists, students, office workers, and schoolteachers, who at some point take war personally, very personally. The subject then becomes acute, and is then made legendary through art. It is only then that citizens actually-not only on paper or in protest chants-will have a voice and the power to force the government to end war.

Only then will I be proud to say, "We are the power."

Right now I utter these words embarrassed, insecure. What kind of power are we when not only Russian but also European and American students,say to me that they are "not interested in politics because it's boring"? Who, if not you, should make it more fun? We can hardly expect Jeb Bush to throw a drag-queen party during a rally. So go into politics and organize a campaign, just so you can throw a victory party starring drag queens and feminist DJs. Politics, after all, isn't just Bushes and Clintons but also Harvey Milks and Hunter S. Thompsons.

One night at a bar I tried to persuade Quentin Tarantino to shoot a film about the future Russian revolution. One where Putin is overthrown and the conflict in Ukraine ends. After Inglourious Basterds and Django Unchained, I have no doubt that Tarantino could shoot an awesome film about overthrowing Putin. And if we were all as involved in politics as during the antiwar movement in the 60s and 70s, then Tarantino would definitely make a fucking awesome film about some female superheroes who tunnel under the Kremlin and swap Putin for Lenin's mummy (in the end Putin paces around the Mausoleum, not knowing how to escape), capture the television tower, and stop the war in Ukraine.

And while there isn't a Putin in the Unite States, this country still has its problems. Fox News is the most popular news channel in America. There is the death of Eric Garner. There are countless victims of police brutality. In the US, abortion is still a question-in the minds of Russians, the right to abortion is undeniable, not even a topic for discussion. If God ever took me out of Russia and said that from now on I have to make political art in the US, I would have found a thousand topics for art. Learn to love politics and politics will love you back. Raise hell with political art actions. Help Pussy Riot in our antiwar mission.

On June 26, Pussy Riot stormed the Glastonbury music festival in Britain, bursting onto the scene in a tank, which was parked by the stage. А few minutes after the Pussy Riot performance began, a militant in a black mask and military uniform brandishing an AK-47 burst out of the hatch: "We are founding the People's Republic of Glastonbury! No more Pussy Riot with their rotten liberal beliefs! No more gay parades in the territory of our republic!" he said. "Booooo," the crowd began to heckle. Then two of the Pussy Riot grrrlz angrily tied up the militant, pulling a rainbow balaclava over his black mask before taking away his gun and wrapping his mouth in tape. Then they proclaimed the "Ten Commandments of Pussy Riot," including "Do Not Read the News, Make News," "Have a Break, Have a Riot," "Stay Queer," and "Think Different, Think Feminist."

"I admire Eve," shouted a woman from the tank in a pink balaclava. "While Adam-not a very bright person-just hung out in Paradise and obeyed all the divine orders, Eve hustled and found an apple. In accordance with the Bible it was the apple of knowledge. So, generally, we have Eve to thank for science, space shuttles, iPhones, recording studios, coffee machines, and the internet. They told us that men invent everything, but without Eve man couldn't even start to think and to acquire knowledge about the world. Is it better to take a bite from the fucking Tree of Knowledge, of good and evil, than to sit like a blissful idiot on the shoulders of the Lord? Eve is the first feminist and a generally cool gal."

The girl in the pink balaclava was me, and I stood on that tank because I believe that we-you and I-have to take back arms from our governments. We have to occupy military equipment. And I'm pretty fucking sure that we can use that stuff in much more interesting ways than our governments-we can use it in art, for example, or as stages at music festivals.

The antiwar movement is in the past, and the true tragedy is that war didn't end with it. Our generation watched movies and grew up with the notion that rights have already been won, that they are given to us by default. Conservatives will continue to win power damn easily, that we will assume for now. That's why David Cameron wins elections in England and cuts social benefits. That's why the right wing grows increasingly popular in France. That's why in Hungary Viktor Orban is in power, glad-handing Putin.

If you take your rights and freedom for granted, they will flow out through your fingers. Expand your rights. Conquer new ones. Sometimes, like Alice in Wonderland, we have to run with all our might just to stay in one place. But freedom is worth it.

On June 28, Pussy Riot led the Gay Pride celebration in Toronto, marching through the city on a huge red rocket (or penis). The ballistic missile was a Topol-M, the same type that flows by the hundreds in the streets of Moscow during a military parade, and symbolizes the hundreds of dickish politicians like Putin, who stand only for destruction and war. The male-dominated world of politics tends to measure their penises by the extent of their power. "Look, my cock is huge!" Putin tells you by the wars he starts. Pussy Riot prefers to use cocks for love, not war, which is why we stole one of Putin's rockets and brought it with us to use in a gay pride parade. Now, it's our Pussy Riot Queer Rocket. I'm a woman, but I also have a cock and it's bigger than Putin's. Every woman has a cock.

Putin is telling the world that Russia is a conservative, backward country that is not ready for gay rights, that it is a place where children need to be protected from gays. Well, let me tell you, Mr. Putin, that's a lie. Russia is one of the most progressive countries on Earth-Russian women gained suffrage and other rights before their counterparts in the US. Russia is the birthplace of the avant-garde, not the conservative swamp that Putin is trying to make it resemble. LGBTQ rights are my family values, not their so-called traditional values, which turn out to be oppression and violence.

We don't need no wars, we don't need no gender roles, we don't need no thought control.

Russians want to see more acts of disobedience, like those of the magnificent Yes Men. I don't mean to seem immodest, but after public performances, people come up to us and say that they are very inspired by Pussy Riot's art and activism. Remember, we also want to be inspired, as we once were by the wild, crazy, and sexy riot grrrlz.

Let me be inspired by you!

Translation by Brendan Mulvihill 
 #2
London School of Economics and Political Science
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk
July 9, 2015
The 'Russian threat' has revived nationalism in the 'new' Europe
By Cristian Nitoiu
Cristian Nitoiu is a Dahrendorf Postdoctoral Fellow in EU-Russia relations and Ukraine at LSE IDEAS. Before this he held research positions at Trinity College Dublin and the College of Europe (Natolin campus, ENP Chair). The research for this article was supported by the Dahrendorf Forum, a joint initiative by the Hertie School of Governance, LSE and Stiftung Mercator.

How has the Ukraine conflict affected relations between Russia and Central and Eastern European EU member states? Cristian Nitoiu writes that while the response to the crisis has been heavily dependent on the domestic political circumstances within individual countries, there has been a clear revival of nationalist and anti-Russian sentiments which politicians have sought to use to their advantage.

The current conflict in Ukraine is increasingly making politicians revert to nationalism and history in order to justify their actions. They interpret history in various ways which sometimes conflict with each other. For example, on the one hand, Russia put on a huge military display on the 70th anniversary of the victory in the 'Great Patriotic War' back in May. This enticed the already searing nationalism present in Russian society. On the other hand, June marked 75 years since the Baltic countries and Romania received ultimatums from the Soviet Union to hand over territories. Similarly to the Kremlin, leaders from these countries used the occasion to highlight the 'Russian threat' and stir up nationalist feelings.

The use of nationalist ideas and history by leaders in the new Central and Eastern European EU member states is not new. However, the Ukraine crisis has opened the floodgates for nationalist rhetoric in these countries. This is not surprising as Russia's actions in eastern Ukraine have emphasised that the region is not as safe and conflict-free as many countries in the region thought it was.

Moscow has employed a wide range of tools in order to legitimise in front of its own public the 'hybrid war' waged in eastern Ukraine. The Kremlin has appealed to the nationalist and patriotic sentiments deeply ingrained in Russian society through large scale propaganda. This is a strategy intended to frame the conflict in Ukraine as a 'sacred war' against fascism. Moreover, the West is presented as a promoter of fascism that wishes to undermine the historical legacy of the Soviet Union and the Russian way of being.

In turn, Russia's actions and rhetoric have made people and leaders in the new Central and Eastern European EU member states rediscover and develop similar nationalist feelings. These countries increasingly tend to look back in history and build narratives that put the blame on Russia and to a lesser extent the West (for not coming to their aid in the face of the 'Russian threat'). Public discourse in these states is becoming militaristic, as they opt for conscription, push for the idea of arming Ukraine or host on a semi-permanent basis US and NATO forces.

Poland

The surprise win in the recent presidential election in Poland by the candidate of the conservative party Law and Justice symbolises the shift towards nationalism and anti-Russian feelings in Polish society. The country is split, with the eastern half deeply worried by Russia's actions in Ukraine or Moscow's potential aggression in the Baltic countries. Polish politicians have a long tradition of using the 'Russian threat' in order to score electoral points and strengthen their position. However, the Ukraine crisis has ramped up the instrumental use of the threat posed by Russia and has brought back memories from the Second World War and the Communist period.

On the bright side, the crisis has also led to reconciliation between Poland and Ukraine, as nationalist grievances and tensions between the two countries have dwindled. In defending the country from the 'Russian threat' Polish politicians look towards the US and NATO. Nevertheless, Polish society is starting to realise that a militaristic attitude might not be the best answer to the 'Russian threat' as public support for military aid to Ukraine and integration in NATO has decreased during the past year, even though it remains at a high level.

The Baltic countries

In Lithuania nationalist rhetoric is not as ubiquitous as in Poland. Nonetheless, the 75th anniversary of the Soviet ultimatum was framed by president Grybauskaitė as a day that left deep scars on the Lithuanian people. Moreover, a series of seemingly nationalist policies have been adopted recently. Most prominently Lithuania reintroduced mandatory conscription and was the first NATO country to pledge lethal military aid for Ukraine. In May it staged a series of military exercises against a potential hybrid war on its territory initiated by Russia. There have also been proposals to limit/reduce Russian language content in the media by 90 per cent together with increased fines for media institutions which spread Russian war propaganda. Combating the 'Russian threat' is also the rationale for a proposal to establish mandatory school courses on the history of the Lithuanian fight for freedom.

Latvia and Estonia differ from Lithuania as they have a much larger Russian minority and direct borders with Russia. The status of the Russian language and of the Russian minority has long been an issue of contention in these countries' relations with Moscow. To that extent the 'Russian threat' and nationalist ideas have been much more present in the last 20 years in these two countries than in Lithuania. Hence, the rise in nationalism during the Ukraine crisis has not been as impressive as in Lithuania. Both Estonia and Latvia have also welcomed NATO and US forces, but have had a cautious attitude towards the large Russian minority on their territory.

Romania

Out all the new member states Romanian public opinion has the lowest approval rate for Putin's regime and Russia's actions in Ukraine. This attitude is to a large extent motivated by the memory of the annexation of Moldova in 1940 and the threat that the hybrid war might spread to Transnistria. Romanian leaders have used the 'Russian threat' in order to foster their role as protectors of the nation. They have consistently supported the unification movement with Moldova while promoting the slogan 'Moldova Romanian land'.

The Ukraine crisis has also been used by politicians to shift the focus from cases of high-level corruption to the threat that Russia poses to the statehood of small states. The 'Russian threat' has also led to a recent increase in US and NATO forces in Romania, whose main aim is to safeguard the 'nation' from a potential Russian attack. However, the true rationale behind this rhetoric is questionable. Prime Minister Ponta, who is known for his authoritarian tendencies, was one of the few EU leaders to attend the Sochi Olympic Games and the recent European Games in Baku.

Hungary

Hungary is a special case as the rise of nationalism is related only marginally to the Ukraine crisis. Prime Minster Orban banked on nationalism and the issue of Hungarians living abroad in order to strengthen his rule and undermine democratic processes and institutions. The annexation of Crimea gave Orban the opportunity to suggest a similar outcome for the Transcarpathia region of Ukraine which is mostly inhabited by ethnic Hungarians.

The revival of genuine anti-Russian feelings?

Nationalist and anti-Russian feelings have always been present in varying degrees in the post-Communist/Soviet EU member states. They have now become radicalised. This behaviour is not surprising as when faced with sudden changes and the onset of uncertain times people generally tend to reject change and revert to comfortable well known ideas (in this case nationalism).

Politicians in the new member states are increasingly using nationalist and anti-Russian rhetoric to their own advantage. However, history and nationalism are among the most dangerous and unpredictable tools that politicians have at their disposal. The revival of nationalism in the 'new' Europe could lead to a complete loss of trust in Russia, further escalation of the conflict in eastern Ukraine, and ultimately a deep security dilemma.

Nevertheless, anti-Russian attitudes should not be understood as being directed against the Russian people. Anti-Russian views reflect disapproval with the external expansion of the system of governance promoted by the current government in Russia and with the way it treats its neighbours. This is an outright rejection of the Soviet way of doing politics and business which the Kremlin is currently perceived to be aspiring to.

Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP - European Politics and Policy, nor of the London School of Economics.
 
 #3
The Vineyard of the Saker/Odnako
http://thesaker.is
July 8, 2015
The Self-fulfilling Threat: why the NATO arms stockpiles are a danger to Eastern Europe
About the author: Anatoly Wasserman, journalist, political consultant, scholar. Born in Odessa in 1952. Graduated from university as an engineer of thermal physics. Worked as a programmer for over two decades (15 years as a system programmer). Winner of multiple intellectual games. The most widely recognized face of the Runet. Author of the LiveJournal blog awas1952.livejournal.com .
Original article: http://www.odnako.org/blogs/samoosushchestvlyayushchayasya-ugroza-pochemu-natovskie-oruzheynie-skladi-opasni-vostochnoy-evrope/
Translated by Timofey

The mechanics of threat escalation from many types of arms have been explored a long time ago. In particular, the establishment of new NATO weaponry stockpiles and military vehicle storage sites in Eastern Europe poses the greatest threat to Eastern Europe itself. Above all, it raises the likelihood of it being struck, with those strikes being forced by the presence of these weapons.

The officially stated goal of this build-up of weapons in Eastern Europe is to speed up a NATO response in case of attack by the Russian Federation. The bulk of the combat-ready forces of the West are located in the United States of America, while the European countries aren't simply unwilling to go to war, they're seemingly unable to (Germany has been undergoing a long and thorough process of unlearning this skill; France has had its fill of wars back in the First World War, instantly failing in the Second World War and going on to protractedly and agonizingly lose its colonial wars; the former Warsaw Pact members, upon joining NATO, happily threw all they had learned in the former out the window). Thus, the main scare tactic constantly applied by the NATO PR to its member countries, is very simple: "The Soviet Union (now Russian Federation) is going to attack you, and what will you do if all the combat-ready troops are on the other side of the world? Are you going to wait until they make their way to you across the ocean? There are lots of troops and the ocean is huge, so they'll take a while to arrive. Isn't it better to just transport as much American hardware and as many troops as possible into Europe in advance?"

Nowadays they also sing another tune: "If you don't want American troops to stay on your territory permanently, then take the weapons, at least. If you do, in a moment of crisis, when something happens, we'd only have to transport the troops. Modern military hardware is big and bulky, it takes ages to move - so let's bring it in advance, so that it'll be on the scene and ready for use when a crisis starts."

That seems logical. However...

First of all, it's painfully obvious that the likelihood of an attack by the Russian Federation on any NATO country is not even zero (as it was with USSR), it's negative. Look at how they're straining to get us to attack the Ukraine, at least, a country which is not bound by any treaties with NATO and isn't under any sort of NATO protection - and we keep on turning them down. Whether this is the right thing to do or not is a different matter, a hotly debated one, but the very existence of these debates and lack of actual decisions of this sort being taken are already telling. No-one in Russia is expecting to attack any NATO country, not even in their wildest nightmares. This means that it's principally pointless to consider the scenario of the Russian Federation conducting a surprise attack against a NATO member - the authorities of the RF have eliminated these scenarios from the list of possible actions in advance. Again, I won't judge whether this is a good or a bad thing, but this fact is enough for considering NATO as a defensive organization.

Moreover, even in the context of the words of Otto Eduard Leopold, Prince von Bismarck, Duke of Lauenburg (1815.04.01-1898.07.30): "In politics, intentions don't matter, capabilities do", it is obvious that the Russian Federation lacks both intentions and capabilities to attack NATO. I'm not going to examine the countless possible scenarios for the European war theater (in most of them, the RF is theoretically possible to wipe the battlefield with all of Europe's armed forces, but is subsequently unable to prevent the US' troops landing in neutral states and exerting pressure from the South and the East, with the actual combat being far from predictable). It's enough to know that not only the RF, but also Britain and France possess means of inflicting unacceptable retaliatory damage on an aggressor: Britain and France have few nuclear missiles, but probably enough for several cities.

As a result, creating a stockpile of arms in Eastern European NATO countries a priori makes no sense from the standpoint of defense. Thus, it must be seen as a means of facilitating a surprise attack by NATO against the Russian Federation, an additional threat to it. The RF armed forces have to take preemptive measures to prevent this threat. They have to - that's their job and their duty.

How does one prevent a surprise strike? Obviously, it's necessary to aim our missiles at the weaponry storage facilities and warehouses. The military science has long since proven any other measure of warding off a surprise attack to be substantially less effective.

And if the enemy's (and the term is used consciously, because someone who's preparing to initiate a surprise attack is an enemy even before they initiate the attack itself) means of offense are in our crosshairs and are technically impossible to use if our missiles are aimed beforehand, then they don't have many ways of using this new threat they are creating. They either have to make the attack truly lightning-fast and unanticipated, so that we wouldn't even be able to launch the already primed weapons, or strike in some other way, from another direction, but just as unexpectedly, so that we wouldn't be able to initiate the already prepared disarming strike against the arms stockpiles, but rather forced to react to the new threat in panic mode.

In total, the build-up of weaponry on the eastern fringe of NATO, no matter the official excuse for it, must be considered as preparations for a surprise strike. It is akin to the Chekhov rule: "if there's a gun hanging on a wall in the play's first act, it must fire in the third".

Of course, Anton Pavlovich Chekhov (1860.01.29-1904.07.15) said this in regard to Stanislavsky's "realistic theatre". Konstantin Sergeyevich Alexeyev (Stanislavsky) (1863.01.17-1938.08.07), in an attempt to achieve the highest realism in plays staged in the Moscow Art Theatre, filled them with many colourful details that made the theatre fans ecstatic but had no bearing on the plot. The abundance of fine detail, however, distracted people from the play itself, and it is about these plays that Chekhov spoke when he voiced his disapproval of distracting the viewer with details that are not related to the story.

Sadly, in a war theater, people die for real. The guns hanged all over the theater's walls in the first act already start firing in the second.

Back when NATO and the Warsaw Pact possessed comparable forces, any war scenario spelled unacceptable damage for the attacker, even without the defender using nuclear weapons. Today, the balance of power has shifted so much that the Russian Federation could only adapt to the current situation of the European theater for a heavy price (for all involved): it was forced to admit the necessity of a retaliatory nuclear strike even in case of a conventional attack in its military doctrine.

With this measure being forced upon us, it is clear that any strengthening of the enemy necessarily provokes an increase in the likelihood of a Russian retaliatory nuclear strike. Anyone who tries to somehow avoid it only ends up launching processes that, in the end, further increase the probability of a nuclear response.

All these insane political pirouettes are merely elaborate, painful and expensive ways of suicide. To anyone who's trying to find a way to circumvent our capabilities and try to (like Mikhail Vladimirovich Leontyev puts it) "launch a strike with no response against an unarmed opponent from a safe distance", I can only repeat the age-old rule of "don't run from a sniper - you'll just die tired".

In any case, the delivery of additional weapons to Europe increases the possibility of active combat. It can even begin in the so-called "automatic mode", when one of the sides interprets forced responses as unprovoked aggressive measures and reacts accordingly. For this reason, deploying these weapons in Europe is a most serious threat to Europe itself. And, of course, to the Russian Federation, seeing as we are also largely - but, thankfully, not fully - Europe.

 
 #4
L'Espresso (Rome)
July 9, 2015
Commentary examines roots of stand-off between Russia, West
Commentary by French journalist Bernard Guetta: "The World's Most Stupid Diplomatic Crisis"

Things shouldn't be going this way: Thinking rationally, there shouldn't even be the shadow of a crisis between the West and Russia, because this re-emergence of the Cold War goes against the interests of the United States, of Europe, and of Russia, interests which, in actual fact, are converging. The United States has everything to lose from allowing Russia to draw closer to China, whereas it needs it in order to curb the Middle Eastern crises. As an ally of the United States, Russia could once again become an essential player on the international scene. It could regain the status of super-power which it shows nostalgia for, and would no longer be an obstacle to a peace in Syria, or a factor that triggers problems in Europe, or for its power as a thorn in the side, but for the contribution which it can make to the stabilization of a world in which situations of chaos are more and more worrying.

Let's start from the two pillars of the European continent, which are the European Union and the Russian Federation. Following a rational line of thought, economic cooperation ought to already have been developed a long time ago, if one considers that the Europeans need flywheels for growth, and that Russian infrastructure is now largely obsolete. The Russians and the Europeans would have everything to gain if they managed to establish their relations in the long term: the Europeans, because they would ensure for themselves privileged access to the immense Russian market; and the Russians because, by guaranteeing energy security for Europe, they would guarantee for themselves permanent revenue. Yes, all this ought to lead to an agreement between the three giants which Dimitry Medvedev calls "the three branches of European civilization" -- the European, American, and Russian giants -- and not to the thoughtless thinking that prevails right now.

Russia has annexed Crimea, it has occupied western Ukraine [as published: should read "eastern Ukraine"], and is sponsoring the war in Syria by helping Bashar al-Asad. The Western sanctions are to the detriment both of Europe and of Russia. The Security Council is paralysed. Ukraine is in a state of permanent war, and the Middle East is catapulting whole shiploads of refugees onto the coast of Europe, resuscitating throughout the [European] Union the nationalism of the past. An odor of pre-war is impregnating the world, and all this is so irrational that many are tempted to blame the United States for it. The latter, they say, fearing that cooperation between the two pillars of the Old Continent could one day prevent them from regaining their hegemonic position, is doing everything to increase tension with Moscow. It is clear, they insist, that the Americans are pushing for an expansion of NATO as far as the Russian borders, that they siding with the most anti-Russian Europeans, and that they are promising a stiffening of sanctions, over which they have little to lose.

These lines of thinking are frequently heard in Greece, in Hungary, certainly in Moscow, in the context of all the far-Right parties in Europe, and also in France, where the Gaullists and the left wing of the Left are very sensitive to this kind of argument, but they only see one side of the question. If the United States were to engage in this kind of calculation, it would not have a reason for refusing Ukraine the weapons which Kyiv is asking for. And why would they make such an effort to get the Russians to understand, in an implicit but clear way, that they consider the possibility, and are not rejecting it, that Ukraine is one of their hunting preserves? Moreover, why would they invest so much to "give a new boost" to their relations with Russia -- already six years ago, and again last month with the visit by John Kerry to Sochi? Kerry went there to meet with Vladimir Putin to propose to him a stop to the sanctions, in exchange for total abidance by the Minsk accords negotiated by France and Germany. If the Americans were looking for tension, why would they have found an agreement with the Russians, unbeknownst to France, for the purpose of attenuating possible military reprisals against Bashar al-Asad, after the use by the Syrian Governor of chemical weapons against his own people?

The reality is that, as it did in the past during the Georgia crisis, the United States is conducting its relations with Russia in such a way as to get it on its side in the Middle East, and the only real one to blame over this illogical way of proceeding is an old, irascible, and rancorous lady who has been an inciter of massacre on multiple occasions: That culprit is history, a force more fearsome than any calculation by a power, even if that power is the most important one.

Let's try to go back through time. Toward the end of the 1980s, while the Soviet Empire and the USSR itself was breaking up, the United States was so scared that this implosion would make Europe slip into war, and lead to a spread of nuclear weapons, that it tried, in vain, to persuade the Ukrainians to stay tied to Russia, and to make a commitment, alongside the Kremlin, not to allow the limits of NATO to arrive on the Russian border. This promise, made to Mikhail Gorbachev, would make the transition in central Europe much more simple, but it was not lived up to.

This was not because the Americans deliberately wanted to lie to the Russians. The reason is that the countries released from the Kremlin's clutches were so convinced that Russia would one day try to get its revenge that they did not hesitate to go knocking on the door of the Atlantic Alliance, to get under the protective umbrella, which the Americans were unable to refuse.

The Americans did not wait to be asked twice, that is true, to give in to the pressure from their new allies. It is clear that back then they should have negotiated the radical change with Moscow, but back then Russia, under Boris Yeltsin, relied so much on itself that it made the mistake of not worrying. Later on, when it was humiliated, impoverished by the brain drain, and having become a negligible player on the international stage, Russia threw itself into the arms of Vladimir Putin, and the enlargement of NATO was a fait accompli.

The hour of revenge has now arrived, and the time for wondering whether its former possessions were right in anticipating this moment, or whether, on the contrary, it was their own membership of NATO that prompted the repercussion, is over.

First Georgia, and now Ukraine, bear witness to the fact that Russia is now engaged in a phase of reconquest and reconstitution of the Empire, by means of the creation of a customs union, which it intends to be the center of. This is the reason why Moscow launched itself into the task of dismembering Ukraine as soon as Kyiv moved closer to the European Union. Russia is all the more aggressive the more it realizes that no member of the Western community is ready to die for the country that looks onto the Black Sea. It's a situation which generates panic among the new NATO members, but the United States cannot calm them down by supplying them with the weapons that they are refusing Ukraine. The supplies of heavy weapons, instead, push Putin into aiming new missiles at Washington.

It's not the Cuban Crisis, but there could be a Sarajevo. In the presence of a Middle East that is in flames, and an exponential development of Chinese military spending -- which is of great concern to all of Asia -- nobody will underestimate the dangers of the mechanism which has been triggered, but what is the way out of this situation?

The game is in the hands of Paris and Berlin. For some time now, France and Germany have let it be known that they are opposed to new enlargements of NATO near the Russian border. Now they could suggest to the Federation a further effort by Paris and Berlin to get the United States, and all the other countries in the Atlantic Alliance, around their dual veto. In this way, NATO overall would recognize the neutrality of Ukraine and Georgia, in exchange for a commitment by Russia to respect the territorial integrity of these countries.

To their great advantage, and to the advantage of all, Ukraine and Georgia would become bridges between Europe and Russia. This would herald an accord of continental stability and cooperation between the Union and the Federation. Vladimir Putin could take credit for having forced this on the Westerners, and profit from it domestically. The United States and Asia would see the specter of a Sino-Russia alliance dispelled, and the major powers could join together to prevent, together, the Middle East from being plunged into a Hundred Years' War. It's not too late, but it is necessary to take action urgently.
 
 #5
New York Times
July 9, 2015
It's a Stretch, but Putin Will Add Yoga to His Repertoire
By NEIL MacFARQUHAR

MOSCOW - Maybe somebody told President Vladimir V. Putin that yoga was all about the warrior poses. Or maybe it was just part of his Asian charm offensive.

But whatever the inspiration, Mr. Putin avowed on Wednesday that he was ready to add yoga, the ancient discipline of mindfulness and gentle stretching, to his repertoire of strictly macho sports.

"I have tried many things, but never yoga, but it cannot fail to attract," Mr. Putin told Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India during a meeting in the southern Russian city of Ufa, according to a transcript on the presidential website.

Mr. Putin expressed admiration for yoga after Mr. Modi thanked him for the enthusiasm with which International Yoga Day - which Mr. Modi helped inaugurate on June 21 - was greeted in Russia.

Mr. Putin, 62, has not been shy about sharing his athletic prowess with the world.

He holds a black belt in judo, has been photographed driving a Formula One racecar and has worked assiduously to improve his hockey game since becoming president.

He even scored eight goals in an exhibition hockey match two months ago with N.H.L. players in Sochi, the site of the 2014 Winter Olympics - which Russian press reports insisted had nothing to do with the fact that he was president.

He also swims, once reportedly downed a charging tiger with a tranquilizer dart and has been photographed hunting and horseback riding while bare-chested.

Whatever is behind his embrace of yoga, Mr. Putin apparently missed the memo from the central Russian city of Nizhnevartovsk last month announcing that it was booting two yoga studios out of municipal space. The city explained that it was doing so for reasons of public order, "to prevent the spread of new religious cults and movements."

Mr. Putin has been going to great lengths to prove that Western efforts to isolate Russia over the Ukraine crisis have failed. So if he can pivot to Asia, why not throw in a headstand as well?

His meeting with Mr. Modi actually came as part of two summit meetings Russia is hosting simultaneously in Ufa that are meant to show, among other things, that Russia has friends.

For the two-day meetings, Mr. Putin welcomed leaders from the Asian countries in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as well as those from Brazil, India, China and South Africa, which, together with Russia, form the BRICS group of countries with emerging economies.

Mr. Putin, in a rare moment of public self-doubt, acknowledged that the asanas might not come easily.

"I will see what my level of fitness allows," he told Mr. Modi. "But when you see real yogis, it seems that it would be impossible to reach that kind of skill, and that's what stops me."
 
 #6
Moscow Times
July 9, 2015
Russian Senators Propose Ban of 12 Foreign NGOs, Reining In Civil Society
By Ivan Nechepurenko

In what experts see as Moscow's latest bid to rein in civil society, Russian senators released a list Wednesday of 12 foreign NGOs whose work they believe poses a threat to national security, and who should thus be declared "undesirable" and prohibited from operating in the country.

The Federation Council - Russia's upper house of parliament - compiled a so-called "patriotic stop-list," consisting of seven American organizations, two Ukrainian diaspora groups, two Polish NGOs and an obscure rights group based in the annexed Crimean Peninsula.

In accordance with controversial legislation signed into law by President Vladimir Putin in May, the senators' recommendations will next be forwarded to Prosecutor General Yury Chaika, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Justice Minister Alexander Konovalov. They will determine whether the listed NGOs pose a "threat to the foundations of the constitutional system of the Russian Federation, its defense capabilities and its national security."

If the stop-list gets their stamp of approval, the 12 organizations will be formally declared "undesirable." At that stage, their work will be prohibited on Russian territory. First-time offenders found guilty of "participating" in their activities will face fines of 15,000 rubles ($261). Recidivists will face up to six years behind bars.

The stop-list is staggeringly diverse. It included several well-known politically-oriented NGOs, such as the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), the International Republican Institute (IRI) and Freedom House. But it also featured Crimean Human Rights Field Mission - which has neither an office to work in nor an annual budget to spend, its head told The Moscow Times.

In a resolution accompanying the list, senators claimed that the organizations share a common aim: to subvert the internal political situation in Russia, carrying out through their work a policy of "soft aggression" against the country and its people, Interfax reported.

In comments to The Moscow Times, a spokesperson for Freedom House - an organization rooted in democracy and civil liberties - said the introduction of the "undesirable organizations" policy attests to the weakness of the Russian state.

"The Russian government is working relentlessly to crush political rights and civil liberties," said the spokesman, who preferred not to be named due to internal Freedom House policy.

"We believe that the government should not fear citizens' rights and liberties. Strong, confident governments support basic freedoms. Vulnerable, insecure regimes fear their own citizens and their rights," he said.

Freedom House - whose first co-chair was Eleanor Roosevelt, wife of U.S. wartime President Franklin D. Roosevelt - describes itself as a "catalyst for freedom through a combination of analysis, advocacy and action."

In its 2015 "Freedom in the World" survey, which ranks countries based on political rights and civil liberties, Russia was listed as "Not Free," a category one step up from "Worst of the Worst."

Putin has repeatedly sounded the alarm over his fear that Western states use NGOs as pawns in their game of manipulating public opinion in strategically important countries across the globe. According to this logic, pro-democracy NGOs stir up popular discontent - sometimes even fomenting revolutions - in a thinly veiled bid to advance murkier foreign policy interests.

In the interest of preventing such a scenario on its own soil, the Kremlin had initiated a series of measures to bolster its control of Russian civil society. Before passing the "undesirable organizations" law, federal lawmakers adopted a 2012 law relegating NGOs that receive funding from abroad and are engaged in vaguely defined "political activity" to a list of "foreign agents" - a label widely associated with espionage in Russia.

Critics have blasted these measures, claiming that rather than protecting national interests, they aim to keeping the ruling elite secure in their positions of power.

"The government's logic is that any human rights work is harmful to the country," said Andrei Zubarev, head of the Crimean Human Rights Field Mission (CHRFM), a joint Russian-Ukrainian organization that has monitored human rights violations in the peninsula since shortly before its 2014 annexation.

After landing on the senators' stop-list, Zubarev said the beleaguered NGO plans to cease operations. "What will happen is that our organization, which consists of five people who receive no funding from anyone, will stop working in Crimea [before it can be officially] declared undesirable," Zubarev said in a phone interview.

Justyna Janiszewska, president of the board of Polish NGO the East European Democratic Center, has linked her organization's appearance on the stop-list with its work in Ukraine.

"We believe that this decision was made because we are very active in Ukraine and because we have supported Euromaidan," Janiszewska said in a phone interview, referencing the large-scale protest movement in Kiev that led to former Kremlin-friendly Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych's February 2014 ouster.

"There seems to be some kind of a close relationship between activity in Ukraine and being on this list," she said. Notably, all of the organizations on the stop-list have carried out advocacy work in Ukraine.

Leonid Gozman, a prominent human rights advocate who completed a fellowship with NED between October 2014 and February 2015, said in comments to The Moscow Times: "I have no grounds to believe that NED is an anti-Russian organization."

Gozman, who presently serves as president of the Perspektiva foundation, a Russian organization that lobbies for the rights of people with disabilities, referred to the list as "unprofessional" and wondered how the authorities plan to prohibit the operations of organizations that lack a formal presence in Moscow.

Both NED and IRI closed their offices in Russia in 2012, citing "harsh conditions." Among the listed organizations, only the MacArthur Foundation and the Ukrainian World Congress still have offices in Russia.

According to the MacArthur Foundation's website, the organization's Russian branch "primarily seeks to support effective protection of the rights of Russian citizens and to foster Russia's involvement into multilateral efforts to address global challenges."

The Ukrainian World Congress advocates for the interests of members of the Ukrainian diaspora in Russia.

Attempts to solicit comments from both organizations were unsuccessful by the time of publication.

"I think it is very sad that our government believes in these primitive schemes, according to which the United States can stir up a revolution in another country via NGOs," Gozman said.
---

The Federation Council's Patriotic Stop-List:

Open Society Foundation

National Endowment for Democracy

National Democratic Institute for International Affairs

International Republican Institute

MacArthur Foundation

Freedom House

Charles Stewart Mott Foundation

Education for Democracy Foundation (Poland)

East European Democratic Center (Poland)

Ukrainian World Congress

Ukrainian World Coordinating Council

Crimean Human Rights Field Mission
#7
www.rt.com
July 9, 2015
Justice Ministry to add Khodorkovsky's Open Russia NGO to list of undesirable groups - report

A new Russian list suggesting 12 undesirable foreign organizations will soon be expanded to 20 groups and include the Open Russia NGO sponsored by Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the Izvestia daily reports.

In an article published on Thursday, Izvestia quoted unnamed, high-placed sources in the Upper House as saying the Justice Ministry is preparing amendments to the "stop-list" approved by the Federation council and had forwarded it to the Prosecutor General's office on Wednesday.

The added groups will include the Ford Foundation, the Jamestown Foundation, the Eurasia Foundation, and the Albert Einstein Institute. The Justice Ministry is also seeking a ban on the Russian activities of the Open Russia association, created and sponsored by former oil tycoon and staunch opposition figure Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the sources said.

"This will not be the end, the network of foundations that implement the politics of the US State Department is quite ramified and our list will be expanded," added the high-placed Upper House official.

The head of the Federation Council's International Relations Committee, Konstantin Kosachev, said in comments that the creation of the stop-list was "a start of the public discussion and not its end" and stressed that the whole project was not targeted against Russia's civil society or its partners abroad. The senator said the main objective of the new law was to "create a barrier against the forces that openly demand regime change in Russia."

In May, the Justice Ministry initiated the prosecutors' probe into the Open Russia public movement in order to clarify its ties with former oil tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky and foreign sponsorship. In April, MP Aleksandr Sidyakin, who represents the parliamentary majority United Russia party, asked law enforcers to check if the Open Russia public movement could be categorized as a foreign agent, and, if so, to see that it duly registers as such.

However, any legal action against the group is complicated by the fact that it is not officially registered as a legal entity and therefore it has never come under the Justice Ministry's radar.

The Open Russia NGO was founded by Mikhail Khodorkovsky and his close allies in 2001. After Khodorkovsky was tried and sentenced for large-scale tax evasion, the organization ceased to exist, but when the former Yukos boss was pardoned and released in December 2013, Open Russia was re-launched as a network structure aiming to assist the "Europe-oriented part of Russian society."

The Law on Undesirable Foreign Organizations came into force in early June. This stipulates that the Prosecutor General's Office and the Foreign Ministry make a list of undesirable organizations and outlaw their activities, including the distribution of information materials or any cooperation with Russian citizens or legal entities. Violation of the ban is punishable with heavy fines, or even prison terms in cases of repeated or aggravated offences.

 
 #8
Russian experts call stop list of foreign NGO's a troubleshooting measure
By Tamara Zamyatina  

MOSCOW, July 8. /TASS/. Official recognition of a number of foreign nongovernmental organizations as "undesirable entities" by the Russian authorities is called upon to rebuff the attempts to meddle with this country's domestic and foreign policies, experts said in an improvised opinion poll taken by TASS.

On Wednesday, the Federation Council, the upper house of Russian parliament endorsed an appeal to the Prosecutor General's Office asking the law enforcers to consider a list of foreign and international NGOs that might be placed on a register of unwelcome overseas entities. The list names George Soros's Open Society Foundations, the National Endowment for Democracy, the International Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, the MacArthur Foundation, the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, the Education for Democracy Foundation, the East European Democratic Center, the Ukrainian World Congress, the Ukrainian World Coordinating Council, and the Crimean Field Mission on Human Rights.

Of the organizations on the list, seven are related to the US, another two to Poland, and three more, to Ukraine. The Russian media have labeled the list as a "patriotic stop list".

Andrey Klimov, a deputy chairman of the Federation Council's foreign policy committee said the upper house had been getting a stream of signals from different parts of the country and experts communities in the previous few months that the activity of a number of NGOs was apparently contravening the national interests of the Russian Federation, the Russian Constitution and the maintenance of national security.

"Since Russia's territory stretches from the Baltic shores to the Pacific Ocean and Russia is an important nuclear power, we're bearing responsibility in the face of humankind for stability on the planet and we can't permit 'public activists' of overseas origin to rock the situation inside the country," Klimov said.

He referred to the experience of the revolution of 1917.

"Public activists, philosophers, artists, and poets were arriving in Russia from abroad en masse then and revolutionaries getting cash from foreign sponsors were setting up their underground 'cells'," Klimov said. "And all of us know what this ended up in."

The recent coup d'etat in Ukraine was also conjured up in keeping with Western political technologies, he said. "Foreign NGOs did an amassed ideological brainwashing of the population with the aid of up-to-date communication tools."

"As we're drawing up the lists of foreign NGOs, the operations of which are undesirable for Russia, we don't apportion blame to anyone," Klimov said. "This doesn't mean at all they will have to wind up their efforts in this country right after the stop list is published officially."

"Very simply, we'd like to concentrate the attention of appropriate agencies of state power on the inconsistency of what these organizations are doing with the country's Constitution and laws," he said.

"It's one thing if an NGO assists in the struggle with cancer or in resolving the problems of orphaned and neglected children but it's quite another thing when an alien visioning of Russia's political system and structure is imposed upon the Russians under the guise of humanitarian cooperation," Klimov said.

"Such activities should be cut short definitely because it is much, much easier to do troubleshooting on time than to clear away the rubble and put out fires afterwards," he said.

"The foreign organizations, which the Federation Council put on its stop list, were immediately involved in the February 2014 state coup in Ukraine," Dr. Sergey Markov, the director of the Institute for Political Research and a member of Russia's Public Chamber.

"The Soros Foundation excelled in sponsoring that coup particularly," he went on. "The activity of the National Endowment for Democracy and the National Democratic Institute is highly undesirable because both are supervised by our explicit foes - senator John McCain and former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright - whose statements verge on the calls to dislodge legitimate state power in Russia."

"The foreign NGOs on the 'patriotic stop list' not only did not condemn the state coup in Ukraine or the or the hair-raising violations of human rights or the killings of innocent civilians by the Ukrainian Army and the 'national guard'," Dr. Markov said. "More than that, they are incorporated in an international coalition that is working to supplant Russia's political system and making no secret of its aspirations."
 #9
RIA Novosti
July 8, 2015
Russian officials express "regret" over closure of prominent "foreign agent" NGO

Russian officials have reacted with "regret" to the closure of the Dynasty (Dinastiya) NGO, Russian news agencies reported on 8 July.

The Dynasty Foundation, headed by telecommunications tycoon and philanthropist Dmitriy Zimin, is one of major donors of academic research in Russia. In a highly controversial move, the Russian Justice Ministry has put it on the list of so-called "foreign agent" NGOs on the grounds that it is allegedly funded from abroad.

Earlier in the day, it was reported that Dynasty board had ruled to liquidate the organization.

"I feel very sorry that Russia has lost one of the most efficient foundations. It is entirely on the conscience of our legislators and law enforcers - the legislators made a poor law and the Ministry of Justice, as a law enforcer, is simply implementing it mechanically," head of the Russian Presidential Council on Human Rights Mikhail Fedotov told RIA Novosti (part of the state-owned International News Agency Rossiya Segodnya).

According to Fedotov, as a result of the foundation's closure, the Russian science "will lose hundreds of millions" which Dmitriy Zimin used to donate.

At the same time, Fedotov said, as quoted in a separate TASS report on the same day, that he "regrets" that the Dynasty Foundation "decided to shut down instead of upholding their justice in court." "It is high time the Supreme Court included analysis of judicial practices in 'foreign agent' NGOs cases in its work schedule," he added.

A similar opinion was voiced by Konstantin Dobrynin, head of the Constitution Legislation Committee of the Federation Council. "This decision is undoubtedly emotional and understandable, and it cannot but cause regret. However, this is a huge disadvantage for our science since the support which the foundation gave to young scientists was not ephemeral, but substantial and it was good," he said, as quoted by privately-owned news agency Interfax. No-one will win from this decision - either state, science or society, he added. "I think it makes sense for the esteemed Dmitriy Zimin to weigh options and revise his decision, as the foundation's work is needed," Dobrynin said.

Commenting on the issue, head of State Duma Committee on the Affairs of Public Associations and Religious Organizations, Yaroslav Nilov, said that Dynasty's decision, in his opinion resembles a "demarche over the Justice Ministry decision". "Obviously, this decision is linked to the fact that the Justice Ministry has forcefully recognized the Dynasty Foundation as a foreign agent. The organization understands that giving transparency to its business activity will not allow it to carry out work as it used to," Nilov said, as quoted in a separate Interfax report.
 
 #10
Reuters
July 9, 2015
Kremlin critics say 'climate of fear' grows in Russia
BY TIMOTHY HERITAGE

Kremlin critics say a climate of fear is growing in Russia after the upper house of parliament drew up a list of "undesirable" civil rights organizations and two similar groups decided to close.

Dynasty, a charitable foundation which sponsors science and education, and the Committee Against Torture said they would stop operating after being branded "foreign agents" under a law that applies to groups that receive funding from abroad.

Twelve more non-governmental organizations were named on a "patriotic stop-list" approved by the Federation Council upper house on Wednesday and sent to the prosecutor general to consider whether they should be closed.

Opposition and human rights activists say the moves are part of a broader clampdown on civil society and Kremlin opponents since Vladimir Putin's return to the presidency in 2012.

The Kremlin denies launching a clampdown but Tanya Lokshina, Russia program director for New York-based Human Rights Watch, said other lists of "undesirables" were likely to be presented soon by lawmakers.

"These lists have no legal power, but they do enjoy the very real power to intimidate and incite self-censorship. They have already become an important part of the witch hunt against critics of the government by creating a climate of hostility, fear, and suspicion," she said in a statement.

In a sarcastic reaction to the decision by the Dynasty Foundation to shut its doors, opposition politician Alexei Navalny said on Twitter it was "mission accomplished".

"An excellent, accurate and effective blow by Putin's Patriots. Right in the nest of these hostile vipers - young physicists, mathematicians and molecular biologists," he wrote.

Navalny, one of the leaders of 2011-12 protests against Putin, has a suspended jail sentence hanging over him on embezzlement charges which he says are politically motivated. Some other Putin critics are in prison or have fled Russia.

"FOREIGN AGENTS"

The 12 NGOs on the lawmakers' "patriotic stop-list" included several that are based in the United States.

Among the groups were Freedom House, a democracy and civil liberties group, and the Open Society Foundation, a grant-making network founded by investor and philanthropist George Soros.

The upper house has asked the prosecutor general to decide whether the 12 are a threat to national security under a new law that allows such groups to be shut and carries a jail sentence.

Putin has warned against allowing the West to use local civil rights groups to foment unrest in Russia and Konstantin Kosachev, a senior member of the upper house, cited similar concerns when presenting the list to the chamber.

Soon after Putin returned to the Kremlin in 2012, he approved a law tightening controls on NGOs funded from abroad, forcing any that engages in "political activity" to register as a "foreign agent", a derogatory term dating to the Cold War.

Dynasty announced its decision to close on Wednesday in a brief statement on its website. Its main sponsor, wealthy businessman Dmitry Zimin, said he was not prepared to let it operate under such a label.

Groups that have been affected say being included on the "foreign agents" register attaches a stigma to them which makes it impossible to find sponsors and collaborators inside Russia, and they are also subject to burdensome official audits.

Supporters of Dynasty, which gave grants to young scholars, have said its treatment shows the law is flawed.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said the decision had nothing to do with the presidential administration, adding that "the foundation could have continued its operations".

The Committee Against Torture, which tries to prevent torture and whose office in the Chechnya region had been attacked, also said it was not willing to work under the "foreign agent" tag.
 
 
#11
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
July 8, 2015
Understanding the context of the Kremlin's post-Crimean ideology
The release of a "patriotic stop-list" of undesirable foreign organizations is just the latest manifestation of the short-term ideological thinking that is currently ascendant in the Kremlin.
By Pavel Koshkin
Pavel Koshkin is Deputy Editor-in-Chief of Russia Direct and a contributing writer to Russia Beyond The Headlines (RBTH). He also contributed to a number of Russian and foreign media outlets, including Russia Profile, Kommersant and the Moscow bureau of the BBC.

This week the Russian authorities announced an initiative that could produce a chilling effect on foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Russia: the so-called "patriotic stop-list" of undesirable organizations that was proposed by the head of Russia's Federation Council, Konstantin Kosachev.

The list will include primarily Western organizations from the U.S. and Europe, including Freedom House, Open Society (the Soros Foundation), National Endowment for Democracy and even the MacArthur Foundation, a prominent U.S. nonprofit organization supporting young researchers and activists.

At the same time, Russian media reported about the decision of the Dynasty Foundation, the well-known NGO that supported science and research projects in Russia, to cancel its activity in Russia amidst controversial accusations of being a foreign agent. It was exactly these accusations that might have forced Boris Zimin, the head of the foundation, to leave the country.

All of these news items highlight the importance of a recent discussion at Carnegie Moscow Center on the future of the Kremlin's post-Crimean ideology. Coincidentally, the discussion took place when the list of the undesirables was confirmed and sent to the Russian Prosecutor General's Office to inspect them to see if they are conducting the type of activity that the authors of the stop-list describe as undermining the country's political stability.

The dangerous undercurrents in the Kremlin's current ideology

A mix of isolationism, nationalism and imperialism is a commonplace mentality now in Russia and- amidst post-Crimean political overtures-this mentality creates a fertile soil for imposing a dangerous political ideology, according to Andrei Kolesnikov, the head of Russian Domestic Politics and Political Institutions Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center.      

Nevertheless, the expert admits that ideology is sometimes necessary as a tool of bringing people together around a common idea and image, for the sake of a strategic understanding of the future. But this can be applied only to politically healthy and robust societies. That's why, for Russian society and the government that cannot propose a cohesive and clear strategy for future development, ideology is very dangerous, according to Kolesnikov.

"Ideology is like cholesterol," he summed up. "There is bad cholesterol, and there is a good one."

Kolesnikov argues that even though the official ideology can be "a tool of governing the country and manipulating the consciousness of huge swathes of the population," it doesn't resolve the key challenge for Russia's current political regime: the lack of a clear understanding of the future and the absence of long-term strategy. He sees the regime as "very situational."

"It [the regime] allows governing and tactically winning today, but it prevents the society from further development," he said. "In this regard it is worse than during the Soviet Union, because the Soviet authorities, at least, had an image of the future: Communism was their goal."

This situation creates a trap for the Kremlin, the very trap that is likely to emerge after 2018.

Yet, experts also agreed that there was demand in Russian society for a conservative political agenda. Putin felt this demand and used it to manipulate society.

"Today the symbol of this ideology is Crimea, abstract spirituality, but this ideology is fed with the bones of the past: the war, Stalinism, some achievements, or rather failure of the Soviet era," said Kolesnikov, adding that the major goal of this ideology is to save the power of a certain group of people in the Kremlin and make this power even more sacred.

Another goal of the ideology is to anaesthetize the protest movement, impose fears and force people to follow the mainstream ideas imposed by the Kremlin, instead of taking to the streets, according to Kolesnikov.   

Another participant of the discussion, a member of the Committee of Civil Initiative, Alexander Rubtsov, argues today's ideology in Russia is implicit and latent, rather than explicit. He sees such phenomenon as an "ideological unconsciousness," which drives many Russians who still feel the inferiority complex after the collapse of the Soviet empire.

The recent manifestation of such latent ideology is the government's attempt to come up with a uniform history textbook, which will interpret history in accordance with the Kremlin's patriotic agenda, according to Rubtsov.

Ideology as an institutionalized phenomenon in Russia

Rubtsov broadens the understanding of Russia's ideology. He sees it not only as "the system of ideas, but also as the system of institutions."

Indeed, today the ideological clich�s come from Russia's governmental institutions such as the Ministry of Culture, State Duma or Federation Council. The notorious patriotic stop-list, the laws on undesirable organizations and "foreign agents" are the recent examples of the ideology-driven society and government. Moreover, the rhetoric and the actions of the Kremlin or its fervent supporters aggravate the problem and spur the rise of conspiracy theories in society.

For example, President Vladimir Putin's statement about foreign foundations and their impact on Russia's high school students send a clear anti-Western message to Russians. According to him, Western organizations are searching or, in his words, "ferreting about in the Russian schools under the guise of a charity foundation supporting talented youth," to "get the students on the hook" of these grants and take them away from the country.

Likewise, the controversial case of the dismissal of American entrepreneur Kendrick White from the position of the Vice-Rector of Lobachevsky Nizhny Novgorod University is indicative. It reveals how these ideology-driven institutions work. White was fired after a critical report on a state-owned news channel, a TV program of Russia's chief propagandist Dmitry Kiselev.
        
Tracking the ideological shift in Russian society

Rubtsov argues such a radical ideological shift started not after Crimea's incorporation to Russia, but much earlier, two or three years ago. Before such a shift, the Kremlin had a totally different rhetoric, with its focus on innovation and collaboration with the West. In 2011-2012, the Russian authorities had a sort of strategy, an image of the future, with its attempts to decrease its oil dependence and diversify the economy through investing in innovation.
"But the project of modernization failed before it really started," said Rubtsov.

In pre-Crimean Russia, the authorities talked about material, tangible things (innovation and the Russian Silicon Valley known as Skolkovo); in the post-Crimean Russia there has been a U-turn shift to the idealistic, the spiritual and the emotional.

Previously, people were "flooded with money", today after Crimea "they are flooded with emotions," Rubtsov said pointing out to a very strong, "drastic" and dangerous psychological effect, which Crimea's incorporation produced on Russians.  
      
The head of Levada polling center Lev Gudkov, who also took the floor at the Carnegie Moscow Center discussion, goes even further and argues that the search for Russian ideology-what he describes as the national idea-goes back to 1996, the period when Boris Yeltsin was re-elected. The inferiority complex of the former superpower drove people and, finally, reached its first apex in 2008, during the Russo-Georgian conflict, "the rehearsal of the Ukrainian crisis," in Gudkov's words.

According to him, the Kremlin increased its ideological grip in response the 2011-2013 protests and squeezed the space for discussion and expressing alternative views. The state "monopolized the right" to interpret events and speak on the behalf of the people, it started expressing collective values, Gudkov said. It used pro-European Maidan protests and the psychological trauma of many Russians-their yearning for restoring national and imperial pride-in its favor to discredit liberal and democratic values promoted by Europe.

"The [Russian] society hasn't changed, but was driven in a very agitated condition," he said, adding even those who initially joined the protest movement and didn't support Putin, finally, changed their mind and jumped on the bandwagon of the patriots who supported Crimea's incorporation.   

Gudkov explains that such reassessment and disappointment in the protest movement reveals the deficit of true values and self-sufficiency in Russian society.

Likewise, another participant of the discussion Leonid Gozman, democratic activist and fellow of National Endowment for Democracy, believes that the success of the Kremlin's ideology partly results from the demand in Russian society.

He argues that people had been looking for dignity. It was the sense of offended dignity which drove people to the streets to protest in 2011-2013. Ordinary Russians felt the lack of respect from the authorities and took to the streets to express their indignation.

But the Kremlin re-directed these sentiments in the opposite way and concocted an ideological myth that it was the West (not the Russian authorities) that disrespected Russians and trampled on their national pride, Gozman concluded. And those who tried to find respect, order and stability at the Bolotnaya Square in central Moscow (the place of the first protests in 2011)-they reassessed their opinions of the Kremlin and turned their back on the West. However, such support is also dangerous for the authorities.

"This support has a weakness. It doesn't forgive defeat," Gozman said, implying that it will be very difficult to maintain such sentiment in the long run, especially in the case of failure and the exacerbation of the Crimean standoff.
 
 #12
Russia Beyond the Headlines/Kommersant
July 8, 2015
Nizhny Novgorod State University offers new job to dismissed American
Kendrick White, a U.S. citizen who was fired as vice rector of the Lobachevsky Nizhny Novgorod State University on June 30 after a controversial report on the state-run TV channel Rossiya in which he was openly criticized, is to stay on at the university in a non-managerial role.
Alexander Chernykh, Kommersant

U.S. citizen Kendrick White, who was fired from his post as vice rector of the Lobachevsky Nizhny Novgorod State University, or UNN, on June 30 following the broadcast of a report on the state-run TV channel Rossiya openly accusing him of causing "harm" to Russia, will continue to work at the university as head of its center of technology commercialization.

UNN's management claims that the former vice rector has been transferred to another job as part of the planned reorganization, but White himself told Russian business daily Kommersant that the decision was a "real shock" for him.

The controversy over venture investor White erupted after Dmitry Kiselyov, head of the Rossiya Segodnya international news agency and a television host notorious for his anti-Western stance, reported on the initiative of the upper chamber of the Russian parliament to form a so-called "patriotic stop list" - a list of foreign organizations whose work it is claimed is likely to "destabilize" Russia.

As part of the television show Vesti Nedeli on June 28, Kiselyov presented a report about likely candidates for this "list," one of whom happened to be White. "How it happened that such a position could be held by a U.S. citizen, a businessman from Washington, is still not clear," the report stated. White was reproached for hanging pictures of American scientists on the walls of the university, while "portraits of Russian scientists have disappeared."

The day after the television report all information about White was removed from the university's website and it was reported that White had been dismissed as a result of "the restructuring of the system of UNN's innovation management connected with the need to strengthen its scientific component."

UNN Rector Yevgeny Chuprunov refused to comment on the details of personnel decisions for Kommersant, saying only: "These are the times we are living in."

White himself was on vacation in Florida at the time with his family. "We were in the country, where it is difficult to find Wi-Fi," he told Kommersant.

"At some point I was able to connect to the internet - and I saw hundreds of letters about my work, requests for an interview. It was only then that I learned about my dismissal; I read the news later. This was very bad news, a real shock."

White had already written on Facebook that he was looking for a new job, but later he was contacted by representatives of UNN's administration. "We agreed that I would fly to Nizhny Novgorod, and we'll talk," he said.

On Monday, July 6, White met with the university's management and was offered to stay at the university, but in another position.

"We don't know yet what it will be called, but I will probably head the Technology Commercialization Center at our university," said White, adding that in his new position he would do effectively the same as before.

"I evaluate the commercial potential of university, student developments," said White. "It is natural that I am involved only with open, civil technologies. I look at a project and say; yes, it may be interesting for the business, it can be offered to Skolkovo, RVC [Russian Venture Company] or venture funds."

According to White, he prefers to work with Russian investors, but does not see a problem in promoting student developments in the global market.

However, Russian President Vladimir Putin recently claimed that foreign organizations are deliberately targeting Russian schools with the aim of creaming off talent and arranging for the most promising students to be given work outside the country - a claim that White was quick to deny.

"We recently went to the U.S. with a group of Nizhny Novgorod students; they showed their projects and came back, no one stayed in the States," said White, who later explained to RBTH that the group had visited the University of Maryland and also visited New York for a day together with the representatives of the Russian Trade Rep office in Washington, D.C.

"I have neither the authority nor the possibility to take someone out of the country. But it is not necessary - we are against the brain drain. We want Nizhny Novgorod to develop, so that other regions of Russia take up this example as well."

According to White, this is exactly what he told the correspondent of Vesti Nedeli: "I repeated many times that we, on the contrary, oppose the brain drain. That the university has a great deal of international projects with foreign universities," said White.

"The girl nodded, agreed and said, 'You guys are great.' And then there was such a horrible, biased report, saying that it is bad to cooperate with foreigners. A terrible thing."

White assured Kommersant that he bore no grudge against the university's management. "I am sure that we can further develop the university and the region. In a new position, I will be of use as well, and I do not care what it is called. It is only bad that this decision coincided with such a report."

First published in Russian in Kommersant.
 
 #13
Russian economy expected to come out of crisis in Q4 - Former Finance Minister Kudrin

MOSCOW, July 9. /TASS/. Russian economy expected to come out of crisis in the fourth quarter of 2014, Former Finance Minister Alexey Kudrin said in an interview with Russian television channel Rossiya-24 on Thursday.

"April and May were the worst this year. I think that June will be one of the worst as well. And I have no certainty that July and August will be better. The bad phase of our crisis will last for the beginning of the third quarter. There are expectations, that the fourth quarter will be better," Kudrin said.

Earlier, Finance Minister Anton Siluanov said that the Russian financial sector is recovering, and that the general economic recovery expected in late 2015 - early 2016. We have no doubt that the economic recovery will follow the financial sector. We hope that this will happen by the end of this or the beginning of the next year," Siluanov said.
 
 #14
Bloomberg
July 9, 2015
Russia Signals Tighter Ruble Reins as Economy Braces for Shocks
By Anna Andrianova, Andrey Biryukov, and Olga Voitova

Russia is asserting more control over its currency as crises from Greece to China create new vulnerabilities for the recession-hit economy.

Russia is succeeding at keeping the ruble within an "acceptable corridor" while maintaining its reserves and a positive trade balance, President Vladimir Putin said on Thursday at a meeting of leaders of the BRICS countries in Ufa, Russia. The central bank has the resources to prevent "serious volatility" of the exchange rate, Finance Minister Anton Siluanov said at the same event.

While the central bank has defended its free-float policy, the Russian leadership has been more unabashed in acknowledging a measure of control over the currency market as the economy enters a recession. The standoff over Greece and the market turmoil plaguing China have weighed on Russian assets and some officials are raising questions about the ability of the world's biggest energy exporter to endure the crises gripping the world economy.

"It's probably premature to say that all the risks have already been minimized and we'll soon be enjoying at least a period of recovery," Deputy Economy Minister Nikolay Podguzov said at a banking conference in St. Petersburg on Thursday. "The Chinese events have seriously shaken the situation on outside markets. As long as we have an open economy, we are still subject to serious external shocks."

The Bank of Russia is buying as much as $200 million daily to boost reserves to $500 billion, a process it estimates may take from five to seven years. It's purchased about $7.4 billion since announcing its policy shift on May 13.

Chinese Rout

China has battled to restore investor confidence in a market that lost $3.9 trillion in less than a month, with government efforts helping the Shanghai Composite Index jump the most since 2009 after Wednesday's 5.9 percent slump.

The ruble appreciated for the second time in three days, adding 0.8 percent versus the dollar at 12:42 p.m. in Moscow. The Micex Index climbed 0.6 percent, snapping a four-day slide.

Russia should start replenishing one of its sovereign wealth funds with proceeds from higher oil prices to stem the ruble's appreciation, Siluanov said July 2. Putin said last month that a weaker currency is helping producers struggling amid a recession while the government runs out of options to counter a deepening slump. Russia is succumbing to its first economic contraction since 2009 after energy prices fell and sanctions over Ukraine curbed financing.

"Of course, policy makers keep a close eye on the ruble because of the impact it might have on inflation, financial stability and budget revenues," Liza Ermolenko, an analyst at London-based Capital Economics Ltd., said by e-mail. "But we still think that they are not targeting a particular level of the exchange rate.
 
#15
Oilprice.com
July 8, 2015
Are The E.U. And Asia Turning A Blind Eye To Russian Sanctions?
By Robert Berke

In a previous article on Oilprice, I questioned whether western sanctions imposed on Russia were being regularly breached by E.U. and Asian companies, noting that sanctions only work if all countries unite behind them.

In June, the Financial Times reported that only one year after being imposed, the sanctions are eroding. It seems that government and business policies are pulling in opposite directions, despite the sanction regime being clear on the activities that are banned, as explained by Forbes:

"Last July ('14), the E.U. banned its companies from signing any new financing deals with Russia. In September, the E.U. placed even more restrictions on Russia's access to E.U. capital markets. The sanctions state that individuals and corporations from the E.U. are banned from providing loans to five major Russian state-owned banks, including Sberbank and VTB Bank, and the three state owned energy companies, of which Gazprom tops the list.

The September sanctions, which went into effect on the 12th of that month, said that companies could no longer provide services related to the issuing of financial instruments, including broker relationships.

In addition, certain services necessary for deep water oil exploration and production, arctic oil exploration or production and shale oil projects in Russia were also banned."

Much of the mainstream financial news also began picking up on the 'sanction-busting' story, pointing out that many NATO tied governments did not regard Russian sanctions as an obstacle to doing business with Russian energy companies.

Forbes notes that, as a result of sanctions, western oil companies that were once dominant in Russia are now being replaced by European and Asian companies. The article stated that ExxonMobil was "kicked out of Russia" because of sanctions, and was forced to cap a major Arctic discovery in the Kara Sea, where it had spent some 3/4 of a billion dollars, as part of a joint venture with Rosneft.

ExxonMobil has 10 joint ventures in Russia with the state-owned firm Rosneft, but all of those have been shelved due to the sanctions.

European Union (EU) business and political leaders tend to question the validity of sanctions more than those in U.S., because sanctions have a much greater negative economic impact in the Europe. On the question of energy policy and Russia, clear differences are emerging within the EU, as well as between the EU and U.S.

One example of these differences arose over Iran sanctions, where the EU has recently voted to prolong its suspension of sanctions, until nuclear negotiations are completed.

"European companies are finding ways and are certainly freer to do business than their U.S. counterparts," James Henderson, senior fellow at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, told the Financial Times. "U.S. companies are going to be hugely disadvantaged as we go forward because E.U. sanctions are not retroactive and U.S. ones are."

It remains an open question as to whether China and India's multibillion dollar loans to Russia and their current joint energy ventures with Rosneft were a direct circumvention of western sanctions, with both Rosneft and its Chairman sanctioned. That also raises questions as to whether the sanctions themselves are creating unfair trade advantages for 'busters.'

These potentially sanction busting deals were announced at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum:

* BP buys 20% of Rosneft-owned oil reserves in E.Siberia, in a $700 million deal, creating new Asian-bound oil partnership
* Rosneft and Indian state-run Oil and Natural Gas Corp signed long-term deals.
* Gazprom and Royal Dutch Shell are building a global alliance
* Gazprom signed an agreement with the Greek government to pursue its Turkish Stream Pipeline
* Gazprom signed a 300 million euro loan with Unicredit Bank of Austria
* Gazprom held discussions with Engie (formerly GDF Suez) over gas pipelines to France

The capper came at the St Petersburg Economic Forum, where the Saudis arrived, offering to be a full-fledged finance partner in Russia's energy development, in exchange for Russian nuclear expertise and military arms. Two weeks later, the Saudis raised the bet with a five-year, $10 billion investment in Russia's agriculture, retail, and real estate sectors.

It is one thing to see Russia replace the West with China as client, partner, and financier of energy development; it's quite another to see Russia swap western finance for Middle Eastern finance, sourced from one of the West's strongest allies. That is likely to cause major concerns in western banking circles.

For the investment community, there was another sign at the Forum of the way the investment wind may be blowing. Jim Rogers, an American multi-billionaire investor and former partner of George Soros's Quantum Fund, announced that he was investing in Russian assets precisely because "...they are the most hated in the world."

The famous American contrarian has recently accepted a Board of Director's Seat at PhosAgro, a Russian fertilizer company, where he is also a major stakeholder.

Some six months after sanctions were imposed, the U.S. Secretary of State visited the Kremlin for private talks with Putin, which were widely interpreted as an attempt to ease international tensions over Ukraine. After the St. Petersburg Forum, the first telephone conversation between Presidents Obama and Putin took place, breaking an eighteen month silence.

As tensions ease, and the news becomes more focused on issues like Greece, rather than Ukraine, sanctions vigilance seems to be eroding. There are also signs emerging that some U.S. analysts are beginning to question the western narrative on Russia's actions in Ukraine. One example comes from a senior analyst at Stratfor.com, one of the most widely respected U.S. strategic intelligence newsletters. Senior Analyst Lauren Goodrich argued in a June 29 video on Stratfor's website that the U.S. is actually the one making antagonizing moves while Russia is merely responding:

"The way that the American media has put it out there is that Russia is being the aggressor (in Ukraine), and instead we're seeing Russia be very reactive instead. NATO starts to build up, then Russia starts to build up. The United States helps support the revolution that took place in Ukraine this past year, Russia then takes Crimea and goes into eastern Ukraine. So it really is a reaction to what is taking place out of the United States and out of NATO."

All of this suggests that official government sanctions may continue a good deal longer, while the EU and Asian business community increasingly ignores them. That is likely to result in increased government pressure from the U.S. business community to enable its companies to compete on and equal plane with their EU and Asian peers. This growing dichotomy between the U.S. and EU/Asia is unlikely to be long lasting, as their respective governments seek ways to avoid embarrassment in their respective business communities.

As stated by Chris Weafer, founding partner at Macro-Advisory, a Moscow consultancy, "Goods and services which in theory are subject to sanctions, in reality do not appear to be. Companies seem to be working around it. There is obviously a very big blind eye being turned" by some western governments.... "I think the basic message is if you're not blatant about it you're fine."

A U.S. State Dept. representative may have let the truth slip out when he described the reaction of the State Dept. to questions from U.S. companies about attending the St. Petersburg Economic Forum. "If you tell us you're going, we'll probably order you not to, but if you go and don't tell us, we'll probably do nothing," he said.
 
 #16
TASS
July 8, 2015
Tycoon says Putin strong, Russians resilient, won't buckle under sanctions
[Full interview here http://tass.ru/en/russia/806117]

Metals magnate Vladimir Potanin, Russia's richest man according to Forbes, has said Russia will win the war of sanctions with the West because President Vladimir Putin is a stronger leader than any of his counterparts and Russians are more resilient than Westerners.

In an interview he gave to state-owned news agency TASS, which has been widely quoted by Russian news websites, Potanin expressed concern over the increased cost of borrowing but predicted relations with the West would once again become "comfortable" during "our generation".

"In the meantime," he told TASS, "we shall grit our teeth and wait, for as long as necessary.

"Do you think the West finds this conflict very pleasant? Our counteractions are not comparable to the sanctions imposed on Russia, but Westerners are grumbling perhaps even more than we are. Their pain threshold is much lower; they are not used to inconvenience and discomfort. In this sense, they cannot keep up with us. We will outlast them. One hundred percent!

"In standoff situations, it is he who is prepared to stand pain longer and has a stronger leader that has the trust who wins. The mandate of our president is more powerful than that of any politician in the West. For this reason, I look into the future with cautious optimism. We have time and ability to endure, while our opponents predominantly shout loudly and entertain groundless hopes that we will break down under the pressure of sanctions. This is definitely not going to happen."

Sanctions bite but relations will improve

Potanin said he was a "patriot" and "does not like when bad things are said about Russia". Nor does he like "the hysteria" that surrounds Russia. He praised Putin for making "big effort to explain to the people in general and businesses in particular the motives behind the steps to do with Crimea and not only it".

He is concerned over the rising cost of borrowing for his Norilskiy Nikel company. He is confident however relations with the West will change for the better, and "even our generation will live in a completely different paradigm of relations with the outside world, a much more comfortable one". Russia and America will rebuild relations even if they do not become friends, he predicted.

Russian political elite's "nervous breakdown"

Journalist Oleg Kashin doesn't share Potanin's confidence in Russia's capacity to live under Western sanctions. In a comment published on the website Slon.ru on 6 July, he said State Duma speaker Sergey Naryshkin's recent outburst in parliament, when he described Western leaders as "pathetic clowns", was an indication of members of the Russian political elite being in a state of "hysteria, nervous breakdown".

Kashin also noted a change in terminology used by Putin. He no longer describes his counterparts as "partners", he observed. The Western leaders are now his "geopolitical opponents".

"The impression is that the crisis Russia is going through is, above all, an emotional crisis, a psychological, nervous one," said Kashin.
 
 #17
Christian Science Monitor
July 8, 2015
Back-to-back Russia-hosted summits put Putin in coveted starring role
Images of a Putin alongside leaders of other large countries, signing economic deals, will reinforce Russia's argument that it doesn't need the West. It's a seductive view, but a superficial one, say analysts.
By Fred Weir, Correspondent

MOSCOW - Over the next few days Vladimir Putin will bask in the spotlight of big power summitry, as he hosts leaders of the BRICS and Shanghai Cooperation Organization countries, a demonstration that Russia is neither bowed nor isolated by Western sanctions and opprobrium over his policies in Ukraine.

For Mr. Putin, the successive summits in the Urals city of Ufa represent the Super Bowl of his more than year-long diplomatic efforts to demonstrate that point.

The Russian media is full of stories about the weight and importance of these two groups - the BRICS [Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa] account for 25 percent of global GDP and 40 percent of population - delivering the message that, far from being sidelined by Western pressure, Russia is emerging as a leader, alongside China, of a parallel world structure that has no need for Western approval.

It's a seductive view, and the images of a smiling Putin standing alongside leaders of other large countries this week, and signing major economic deals, will provide strong reinforcement for it. But, analysts caution, it is also a superficial view.

"In terms of rhetoric, Russia will use all the tools to show that it is far from isolated, that it has glowing perspectives in an alternative global project, and that the G8 is yesterday's news," says Alexander Gabuyev, an expert with the Moscow Carnegie Center. "But the reality is far more complicated. Nobody sees these summits as a serious alternative" to good relations with the West, he says.

Most BRICS economies slowing

The BRICS, the brainchild of a Goldman Sachs analyst about a dozen years ago, has surprised many by becoming a real-life going concern, with its own annual summits and working committees. This year it is launching its own $100 billion development bank that proponents believe might one day compete with the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. Yet the first, obvious test for the new bank - could it help struggling Greece? - has been given a cool, silent reception at the Ufa summit.

"If the Germans with all their tools couldn't solve the Greece problem, the BRICS definitely won't want to be dragged into that swamp," says Mr. Gabuyev.

Despite being regarded as rising stars in the global economy, most of the BRICS economies are slowing and some, like Russia, are already in recession. Experts say they are very different countries, with few potential synergies between them - with the exception of Russia and China - and they all trade far more with the West than they do with each other. Nevertheless, they all share a certain level of disaffection with Western-run global institutions, and may be expected to give Putin the appearance of political solidarity that he craves.

"The BRICS holds a certain ideological attraction for Russia, as a counterbalance to the West. But it's a very improbable association of countries that are very far away and have little in common," says Sergei Oznobishchev, director of the independent Institute of Strategic Assessments in Moscow. "Moreover, they are not attractive models for Russia. I don't know of a single member of the Russian elite who buys property, banks, or sends their children to school in any of those countries. Everyone wants to vacation and live in Europe, even if they like to scold the Europeans."

Following the BRICS summit, Putin then greets some of the same heads for the annual summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organizations (SCO) - Russia, China, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan - which is expected to grow this year by inducting new members India and Pakistan.

Russia-China partnership

The SCO was born in 2001 as a forum to manage Russian-Chinese competition in central Asia, and has grown in importance and clout. As the only major global organization that neither the US nor any of its allies belongs to, it has often been employed by Moscow and Beijing to oppose the spread of US influence in the region. With NATO winding down its operations in Afghanistan, leaders of the SCO have been mulling the creation of a stronger security alliance to counter the expected spread of Islamist extremism in the region. And with India and Pakistan joining this year, the organization appears to be moving toward a wider Eurasian focus.

Yet experts say the engine at the heart of both groups is the burgeoning Russia-China partnership. Russia is trying to build its Eurasian Economic Union in former Soviet territory, while China is expanding its Silk Roads project of investment and infrastructure development into the same regions.

"Chinese investment in Russia grew two-and-a-half-times last year, and this is largely the result of the Ukrainian crisis" and Putin's demonstrative pivot to the east, says Gabuyev. "Something is definitely happening there, though not as much or as fast as Putin would like."
 
 #18
China Daily
July 8, 2015
Russia far from isolated in non-West community
By Dmitri Trenin
The author is director of the Carnegie Moscow Center.

Russian President Vladimir Putin will host two important international summits, one of the BRICS group on July 8-9 and the other of Shanghai Cooperation Organizations members on July 9-10.

For public relations, this will allow him to send a message to the world that despite the rupture with Europe and a new "standoff" with the United States, Russia is anything but isolated. With leaders of China, India, Brazil, Pakistan, South Africa, Iran and several other countries in attendance, together representing roughly half of the world's population, Putin will be able to project an image of Russia joining the global "new wave" of non-Western countries raising their profile and expanding their role in the world.

This is a sea change for Russia's foreign policy. Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia has had two strategies, one official and the other held in reserve. The official strategy was aimed at integrating Russia, on its own terms, into the Euro-Atlantic community, i.e. expanded West. The G8 membership symbolized that. The other was to integrate former Soviet republics into a full-fledged Eurasian Union: an economic, political, and security alliance, a Moscow-led power center in Eurasia.

Today, the first strategy is a complete failure; the second one, limited to economics and without Ukraine, qualifies as only a most moderate success.

Under these circumstances, reaching out pro-actively to the non-West is the only realistic option for Moscow. To exercise it, it will need to reform its traditional Western-centric worldview and pay more attention to its neighbors in Asia, and partners across the global South. For that, Moscow will not only need to learn more about them, and about their ways of doing business, but also to treat them as peers. Expanding economic relations, strengthening cultural ties and deepening understanding among the members of elite groups emerge as clear priorities.

On top of the list is China. The relationship with Beijing is emerging as Moscow's most important one, ahead of those with Washington and Berlin. Getting that relationship right - in the face of the obvious disparities between Russia and China - will be crucial for the future of Russia as a great power. Russia recently joined the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and has moved to "harmonize" the Eurasian Economic Union with the Silk Road Economic Belt. The SCO can now serve as both a platform and a vehicle for Sino-Russian economic harmonization.

With India and Pakistan seeking to join the SCO, and Iran drawing closer, the organization is becoming more diverse and will have to have a clear focus in order to become something more than a series of regular meetings. Creating a common Eurasian economic space is one headline goal. Working toward a common security arrangement for Continental Asia - building on the original purpose of the Shanghai Five as it was called in the 1990s - is another. Building lasting partnerships and enhancing trust among its member states is a third strategic objective.

As for BRICS, besides the function of promoting its members' interests in the world of global finance and advancing other elements of the global agenda, it could become a model of the global order writ large. The things that its members are publicly preaching, such as sovereignty and non-interference, equality and justice, and rights rooted in responsibilities, can and should be practiced in relations among these countries themselves. There is nothing more compelling than leading by one's own example.

The new world order will not come through the overthrow of the existing US-dominated system, but by means of the triumph of the global best practices. If the leading countries of the non-West can come up with viable alternatives to established ways of doing business in the world, they will make a difference. To succeed in this, they will need to treat their own institution building as anything but an exercise in anti-Western exploits.

Russia, as the host of the two summits, should view its role as an economic resource base, a diplomatic adviser and a defense arsenal of the emerging community of the non-West. It has to rise to the occasion.
 
 #19
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
July 8, 2015S and the West: Partners or rivals?
The annual BRICS Summit in Ufa, Russia this year marks a breakthrough in the development of the group's political and financial institutions. The big question now is whether these institutions will choose to partner with the West or go it alone.
By Ksenia Zubacheva
The BRIC
Ksenia Zubacheva is a Managing Editor at Russia Direct. Previously she worked as an editor at The Voice of Russia. Ksenia holds a BA (Honors) in Oriental and African Studies from the Institute of Practical Oriental Studies (Moscow) and an MSc in International Relations from the University of Bristol.

The BRICS summit in Ufa, Russia this week might bring about long-awaited changes in the development of the BRICS partnership comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. With the beginning of the New Development Bank's activities and the establishment of a currency reserve pool, these countries will have more access to opportunities to boost their domestic growth as well as achieve their plans of reforming the global financial system to meet their interests.

Should the West be worried? Russia Direct asked both Russian and international experts to share their views and assess how the relationship between the West and the BRICS should be characterized.

Gleb Ivashentsov, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Deputy Director of the Russian APEC Study Center.

The formation of the BRICS is often considered in the East and the West to pose a challenge to Western leadership in world affairs. This challenge is coming from the global East as the bloc unites the economies of the non-Western world representing four continents. Such an assessment might be true to some extent. If in 2000 the BRICS together accounted for 8 percent of global GDP, today it is more than 25 percent. At that time, it was suggested that in 2035 the total GDP of the BRICS would be more than that of the G7 states. Today, it is predicted to happen in 2017. Non-Western corporations from the BRICS states already have joined the ranks of the world leading companies in a variety of industries, most importantly, in energy and electronics.

Such developments posed a question of reforming international financial institutions, which openly put restraints upon the "new economies." The BRICS partners started their work with this. As their suggestions for IMF and World Bank reforms were not accepted by the global West, they announced the establishment of the New Development Bank and a currency reserve pool of $100 billion. Today there are more than 20 frameworks for cooperation within the bloc in the areas of economics and finance (from annual summits to working groups, including in such areas as international information security, health, agriculture, science and technology). The BRICS Business Council and the Exchanges Alliance started their work. There is also a platform for cooperation in education, culture and ecology.

The five member states discuss not only economic issues, but also geopolitics - all those challenges that the world society faces today.  All too often the positions of BRICS do not match those of the U.S. and other Western powers (Libya, Syria, Afghanistan, Iran nuclear program). However, the fact that the BRICS states do not accept the economic and political pressure coming from the West does not mean that the bloc aims to create a political or economic alliance against the West.

The BRICS members believe that the absolute monopoly in world political and economic decision-making (whoever has it - the West or the East) would only lead to global degradation and deterioration. In order for the world to follow the development path we need, on one hand, competition, and, on the other, cooperation of all international actors. That is what the BRICS push for - building a polycentric, more democratic, fair and, consequently, safe world.

Jack A. Goldstone, Professor of Public Policy at George Mason University, Woodrow Wilson Center Visiting Scholar.

The BRICS and the West have an odd symmetry. Both groups view the other as essential to the future prosperity and stability of the world, yet at the same time, as the greatest threat to that stability.

The nations of  "the West" - meaning essentially NATO minus Turkey, plus Australia and, for some purposes, South Korea and Japan as well - believe that stability and prosperity are best supported by democratic governments that are accountable to the rule of law and the interests of their people.

Unfortunately, in advocating this position, Western nations do not always recognize that a rather sophisticated set of institutions, manned by competent officials of high integrity, is necessary for democratic governments to function well. In opposing dictatorships and supporting popular movements, Western nations thus have often inadvertently promoted regimes that have produced instability.  

To the BRICS countries, such Western missteps appear more like a deliberate effort to sow chaos. BRICS countries directly felt the colonial impositions (or in Russia, the German and Japanese aggression) by Western nations up through the 1940s, and remain deeply suspicious that Western nations want only to project power at their expense. They also (with the exceptions of Brazil and India) understand democracy very differently than Western nations, seeing democracy more as the responsibility of state leaders to advance national interests than as the limitation of state power by popular choices and independent judicial authorities.

Thus, today the West and the BRICS have quite different views and strong mutual suspicions. High-level diplomacy can sometimes overcome these differences, as with recent cooperation on Syrian chemical weapons and Iran's nuclear program. Yet repeated collisions seem inevitable; with no convergence on fundamental views in sight, the BRICS and the West will have to learn to live with their differences, while still making progress on vital global issues such as climate change, nuclear weapons control, and terrorism. This will require far greater efforts by both groups to understand each other's views and differences, rather than simply presuming the other is wrong and they are right.

Renato Baumann, Director of Studies on Economic and International Policy Relations at the Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA), Brazil.

To start with, it is difficult for Brazil  - and probably also South Africa  - to consider themselves as non-Western: geography matters. With this clarification, I understand that the question refers to how the main economies - the U.S. and Western Europe - see the BRICS initiative.

My guess is that the economic agents in those countries view the BRICS right now with a mix of curiosity and skepticism. Curiosity, because the group comprises some of the most important economies. But since it is very recent, it is still to be seen how the group will evolve and consolidate. Skepticism, because it is a set of five countries with different histories and objectives, with lower rates of growth now than when the group was formed.

The very reason for forming the BRICS has always been the joint perception by the five countries with regard to the needed changes in global governance. This has led to a demanding position, sometimes rather critical of the status quo. This has also led to a number of initiatives to try and increase mutual knowledge. More importantly, the group has initiated a substantive, unprecedented initiative, with the creation of a joint institution - the New Development Bank - that will allow for some degree of freedom in having an additional source of resources for investment projects in infrastructure. At the same time, it will be a big challenge to joint action by the five countries.

This means that the BRICS countries hardly see "the West" as rivals, with perhaps the exception of one or other members, involved in specific conflicts. As a group, the overall sentiment is that this is a "building up exercise," and not a contest.

Petr Topychkanov, Associate at the Carnegie Moscow Center's Nonproliferation Program.

The BRICS and the West have neither a rival nor partner relationship. There is no basis for such perceptions between the BRICS and the West. The BRICS is not an alliance. It's not a military bloc. The members of this group don't have any intention to transform it into something formalized.

They are not interested in any confrontation with the West, because all of them except Russia have close ties with Western countries. Even Russia, which has problematic relations with many Western countries because of Crimea, is still connected to them via economic, political and cultural links.

The West doesn't have any reason to see the BRICS as something challenging it. There is only one reason to worry [for the West] - its own growing weaknesses. BRICS was created in response to changes in the world order and global economy.

The space for such an initiative was cleared by Western institutions, which turned out to be unable to play the role that they used to play after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The need for the growth and development of Brazil, China, India, Russia, and South Africa can't be satisfied with the sole help of the West. These countries' growth demands injections from many sources.

The BRICS' economic demands dictate the political agenda for its member states. The group's creation reflected their understanding the world as polycentric and free of dominance of one center over others.

This understanding is basic for the BRICS. From this point of view, the West is accepted by the BRICS as one of the other centers in international affairs. Those politicians in Western countries who want to secure the West's superiority over other centers of the world may oppose the BRICS as a manifestation of the world order change.

In short, the more active role of the BRICS is becoming possible because of the growing demands of its member-states and inability of Western institutions to satisfy them.

Nandan Unnikrishnan, Vice President and Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, India.

First, there is no uniformity of views within the BRICS about whether the West is a rival or a partner. The same goes for the West's perception of the BRICS.

The BRICS is not a bloc. While there is commonality of views on some issues, there are divergences of views on others. Moreover, two out of the five BRICS countries are not even geographically contiguous. So, it would be difficult for the BRICS to come to a common security arrangement like NATO. In any case, for each of the five BRICS countries, their bilateral relations with the West, particularly the U.S., is far more important to them than their relations with any of the other BRICS countries.

BRICS is united by a desire for reform in the global governance structure. It wants the world order to reflect the realities of today's world and to recognize the role of new powers and the shift of global power. It feels that the post-1945 global political and economic order must be changed. BRICS does not want a radical change in the global order, but change which is evolutionary. They want to be agenda-setters and not rule followers. So far the West has resisted ceding power and giving them a seat at the global high table. The Western resistance to allow reform of the global order might be perceived in some quarters as a sign of rivalry or bitterness towards the BRICS. But this may not be the case. In fact, no great power will willingly cede power to new and emerging powers and will resist this till the end.

In my view, BRICS does not see the West as a rival. In fact, it would be interesting to see if the BRICS will continue as a forum if the West acceded to its demands for reform of the global governance structures. Also, it would be interesting to see how the BRICS evolve if tensions between some of the great powers exacerbate further.

Dr. Victoria V. Panova, Deputy Head of the International Relations and Foreign Policy Department at MGIMO-University and Strategy Planning Advisor at the National Committee on BRICS Research.

If we look at official discourse - by all means, all sides will tell you that they aren't meant to be opposed to each other and that only their cooperation would be able to secure sustainable and peaceful development and reform of the world order in everybody's interests.

Although, it is fair to say, that this discourse is more characteristic of the BRICS. The West or the G7 prefers to try to not notice the BRICS as much as possible, concentrating on bilateral cooperation (or confrontation) with each of the five countries. This approach could be found in EU official documents. Meanwhile, U.S. officials and experts would be eager to either "hear about it for the first time" or try to prove BRICS inconsistency and a lack of prospects for consolidation and convergence due to the absence of common interests apart from "unhappiness with the Western-based institutional order."

The BRICS, in turn, while proclaiming that they aren't "uniting against anyone, quite the opposite - concentrating on a positive agenda in international relations" (and this is very true, each of them has their proper interests in stable relations with the West), objectively pursues interests that are adversarial to the West at its core. Mere insistence on sovereignty, multilateralism and non-interference, preferences for world diversity and fair representation in the world arena and global institutions in accordance with their objective economic, political and ideological weight - all of those issues undermine the status quo and lead to a lesser role for the "geriatric powers" of the West. Despite all the peaceful intentions of the BRICS, this makes the Big Five unwelcome by the West.

Such an approach is a road to nowhere - neither the BRICS nor the G7 and the West as a whole could provide for mutually beneficial, prosperous and sustainable global development. If this understanding fails to reach the minds of our Western partners, the world is going to suffer severe setbacks.
It is worth remembering our Chinese colleagues suggesting a metaphor for the BRICS as five fingers of one hand. This hand is stretching out to the whole world for partnership and cooperation, but if rejected, could well gather into a fist to drive forward necessary reforms.
 
 #20
Russia woos China before BRICS summit
By Darya Korsunskaya, Denis Pinchuk and Lidia Kelly

UFA, Russia, July 8 (Reuters) - Russian President Vladimir Putin and his government courted Beijing on Wednesday before a BRICS summit, playing down a stock market plunge in China and proposing better terms for investors from Beijing.

Meeting Chinese President Xi Jinping in the Russian city of Ufa, Putin, whose country needs investment to pull out of a downturn worsened by Western economic sanctions over the Ukraine crisis, called for solidarity and unity in bilateral ties.

"We are clearly aware of the difficulties we face, in both the economy and international politics," Putin told Xi on the eve of the meeting of leaders from the emerging economies of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.

"But by combining our efforts, we will surely overcome all challenges before us. We will solve all the problems and tasks."

China has been trying for more than a week to prevent the stock market from tumbling and on Tuesday unveiled yet another set of measures intended to stop the sell-off.

Russian officials played down the slump's impact. Economy Minister Alexei Ulyukayev said he was confident Beijing could stabilise the situation and Finance Minister Anton Siluanov said it held only small risks for Russia.

"The impact on Russia's finances, capital flows, and the balance of payments from the changes in the Chinese financial market, has been minimal," he said.

Details of Wednesday's talks were not disclosed but Russian officials present included the energy and finance ministers.

Putin also had talks with South African President Jacob Zuma and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi before Thursday's summit, at which the leaders are expected to put the last touches to a $100-billion contingency currency reserves pool and launch a BRICS development bank.

The BRICS account for a fifth of the world's economic output and 40 percent of its population. The pool and New Development Bank, with an initial $50 billion in capital, are central to their efforts to reshape the Western-dominated financial system.

The summit, and a regional security meeting on Friday, offer Russia a chance to show it is not isolated globally.

LOOKING TO ASIA

After annexing the Crimea peninsula from Ukraine last year and facing sanctions that cut Moscow off from most Western financial markets, Putin sped up a geopolitical and economic shift towards Asian markets, and China in particular.

Russia's economy, battered by the punitive measures from the West and a fall in global oil prices, has been struggling to attract investment and is sliding towards recession, with gross domestic product expected to decline by more than 3 percent.

A $400-billion gas supply deal signed last year accelerated Russia's eastward expansion though ties have not developed in all areas as quickly as Moscow hoped.

China is Russia's second-largest partner after the European Union, accounting for over a tenth of Russia's overall trade last year, but Russia's share in China's foreign trade was only 2.2 percent, Russian official statistics show.

Both want to more than double trade turnover by 2020 and switch increasingly to local currencies in trading settlements.

The Russian Finance Ministry has estimated that "at some point" half the trade between Russia and China could be carried out in yuan and roubles as long as China removes currency restrictions on Russian banks.

Siluanov said both sides were working on easing the terms of investment and his ministry wanted to remove restrictions on Chinese investors in Russian financial markets: Chinese funds can invest in Russian stocks but Chinese banks cannot.

"We are talking about a gradual lifting of restrictions for Chinese financial institutions investing in (Russian) financial markets," Siluanov said. "This would substantially increase the size of capital flows between our two countries."
 
 #21
Reuters
July 8, 2015
Why Russia's turn to China is a mirage
By Bj�rn D�ben
Dr Bj�rn Alexander D�ben is an Associate of LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics. He is author of a forthcoming report "Banking on Beijing: What the Ukraine Crisis Means for the Future of China-Russia Relations," published by LSE IDEAS.

On July 8 and 9, Russia hosts Chinese, Indian, Brazilian and South African leaders at the annual BRICS summit in the Russian republic of Bashkortostan. The conference takes place at a time when Russia's rift with the West over Ukraine has sparked some concerns that Moscow might turn its back on the West and pivot towards Asia, both economically and politically.

Since Japan has joined the West in imposing economic sanctions against Russia, and India's trade with Russia remains small by comparison, the Kremlin's turn to Asia has in essence been a turn to China. In the months following the escalation of the crisis in Ukraine, Moscow announced plans for a number of projects with China - ranging from a new method of inter-bank transfers, to a joint credit agency - that seek to create a shared financial and economic infrastructure between the two countries that would allow them to function independently of Western-dominated financial institutions.

China and Russia were also among the countries involved in creating alternatives to the Western-dominated World Bank and International Monetary Fund, namely, the New Development Bank (NDB), which will finance infrastructure and other projects in the BRICS states, and a related $100 billion dollar special currency reserve fund that is meant to provide member countries with protection against global liquidity risks.

The most substantial developments, however, happened in the energy sector, including the signing of a landmark $400 billion dollar natural gas supply deal in May 2014, involving the construction of a roughly 2000-mile gas pipeline from eastern Siberia to northeast China. In November the two countries agreed to construct a second major gas pipeline from western Siberia to China's Xinjiang province, along the so-called "Altai" route. Unlike the eastern Siberian pipeline, the "Altai" pipeline would tap the same gas fields in western Siberia that currently supply Europe, potentially giving Moscow the ability to shift gas supplies east or west at will.

Moscow also took the unprecedented step of opening parts of its upstream oil and gas sector to direct Chinese investment, specifically the vast Vankor oil and gas field in northern Siberia. Moscow had avoided this move in the past because it didn't want to grant China influence over its strategically important domestic energy industry. It took similar steps in other sectors that had previously been closed off to Chinese investors, including automobile production.

Chinese companies have stepped in to provide Russian companies with technology that they can no longer access as a result of Western sanctions, and Chinese banks have become an important source of loans for sanctions-stricken Russian businesses.

But more than a year after the two countries initiated most of their bilateral projects, there has been no significant progress, and some projects have been abandoned altogether.

China has been much more interested in developing the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which Moscow was hesitant to join. Compared with its more tepid involvement in the drawn-out process of creating the NDB, where it enjoys no privileged voting rights vis-�-vis other members, Beijing aggressively pursued the AIIB project and made a concerted diplomatic effort to involve as many states as possible. Russia repeatedly rejected Chinese invitations to join the bank, but eventually signed up in March, just days before the deadline to become a founding member.

Even in the energy sector, the two countries have struggled to carry out their plans. Although they began constructing the eastern pipeline in September 2014, energy analysts have recently doubted whether gas shipments can begin in 2018 as scheduled, due to a disagreement over a $25 billion pre-payment to finance pipeline construction that China had pledged. In September Gazprom a official said that the question of the payment was still "hanging in the air."

The two countries have yet to agree on the exact route, construction financing and, above all, the price of gas supplies on the western "Altai" gas pipeline project. Beijing is unlikely to offer Moscow attractive prices for gas imports through the pipeline, since it would deliver gas to remote regions of China that are already well-supplied by Central Asian gas pipelines and far away from China's eastern industrial heartland where gas demand is highest.

Meanwhile, China and Russia have so far also been unable to agree on the price for the proposed Chinese stake in the Vankor oil and gas field.

The limited progress of Sino-Russian economic initiatives is consistent with Beijing's broader response to the Ukraine crisis. Although China's state-controlled media has expressed understanding for Moscow's actions in Ukraine, and senior Chinese officials have publicly opposed the West's sanctions against Russia, Beijing has refused to provide diplomatic support to Moscow where it matters most. The Chinese leadership has not formally recognized the annexation of Crimea. It did not vote with Russia on Ukraine-related resolutions in the UN Security Council and General Assembly, and it was quick to develop good relations with the new authorities in Ukraine.

A few days after the overthrow of the Yanukovych government, the Chinese Foreign Ministry said that China "respects the independent choice made by the Ukrainian people," and Beijing has since deepened cooperation with Kiev in agriculture and other sectors.

Moreover, China's relentless economic expansion in the former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan is causing concern in Moscow. Central Asia analysts warn that the Kremlin's strong-arm tactics in Ukraine - such as spurring separatist unrest among the region's ethnic Russian population, or using its military bases in the region as launch pads for covert military operations - might in the future be directed against China's interests in countries such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan.

China and Russia are often depicted as having closed ranks in response to the Ukraine crisis. But they've made little progress in the bilateral economic and financial projects that they've announced with considerable fanfare.

The recent warming in Sino-Russian relations should not be overstated. It does not mark a tectonic shift in international relations, and Moscow's renewed romance with Beijing has little potential to break its deepening international isolation.
 
 #22
The Vineyard of the Saker
http://thesaker.is
July 5, 2015
The Moscow-Beijing Express: Russian "Oligarchs" versus Chinese Billionaires
By Jeff J. Brown
[Charts here http://thesaker.is/the-moscow-beijing-express-russian-oligarchs-versus-chinese-billionaires/]

China's billionaires and Russia's oligarchs have been in the media lately, due to a variety of business transactions, between these two allies and around the world, not to mention all the absurd sanctions the West has been piling on Russia over the last year and half.

Always suspicious of the mainstream media behind the Great Western Firewall, I asked myself,

Why are the rich Chinese guys called billionaires, while the Russian ones are known as oligarchs?

My suspicions were aroused, because oligarch is very pejorative. Oligarchs govern an oligarchy, which is defined as,

A form of government in which all power is vested in a few persons or in a dominant class or clique; government by the few.

Hmm... Does that sound like Russia today, or more like the United States? I then raised my eyebrows reading this definition of oligarch, on Google,

Oligarch: (especially in Russia) a very rich businessman with a great deal of political influence.

Thus, at least in the English language, the very negative connotation of an oligarch is now officially linked to images of Russians. I always tell my students: words are powerful things.

To get to the bottom of this cognitive dissonance, that superrich Chinese and Russians are given very disparate appellations, I decided to do some research - to find out the truth. I created two tables, one of China's Top Ten Billionaires http://www.forbes.com/china-billionaires/list/ and another one with Russia's Top Ten Billionaires. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Russian_people_by_net_worth For China's wealthiest, I read their biographies in Chinese on Baidu and in English on Wikipedia. For Russia's richest, I referred to English Wikipedia and a few other websites.

First, the Chinese:

China's Top Ten Billionaires
Name    Age    Company    Field    Past    Education    Connections    Dirt
He Xiangjian    72    Midea    Appliances    Entrepreneur    High School    CPC    None
Lei Jun    45    Xiaomi    Smartphones    Entrepreneur    BS IT    NPC 2013    None
Li "Robin" Yanhong    46    Baidu    IT    US IT    US MS IT    Self-Made    None
Li Hejun    47    Hanergy    Solar Power    Mr. Mysterious    Late life PhD    Self-Made?    None
Liu Qiangdong    40    JD.com    IT    Entrepreneur    BA Lib. Arts    Selftmade    None
Ma "Jack" Yun    50    Alibaba    IT    School Teacher    BA Ed.    Self-Made    None
Ma Huateng    43    Tencent    IT    Entrepreneur    BA Lib. Arts    Self-Made    None
Wang Jianlin    60    Wanda    Real Estate    Climbed Company Ladder    BA after PLA    PLA & CPC    None
Wang Wenyin    47    Amer    Mining, Copper    Entrepreneur    High School    Self-Made    None
Zong Qinghou    69    Wahaha    Food Processing    Entrepreneur    High School    NPC 2013    Back taxes?
Note:                            
CPC: Communist Party of China                
PLA: People's Liberation Army                    
NPC: National People's Congress    
Dirt: any kind of known fraud, embezzlement, collusion, organized crime, theft, etc.    
    
At first glance, a number of characteristics stick out. Three of China's richest people are older, while all the others are 50 or younger. Six of the ten are in technology fields (IT, solar and smartphones). Most of them got their start to the top by being entrepreneurs, which is the classic path around the world. The other tried and true method is like Wang Jianlin, who worked his way up the company ladder, the hard way.

Three of them didn't go to college and two others went to university later in life. One of them, Li Hejun, of Hanergy, has almost no information about him, even in the Chinese press, which really stands out.

Only two of them can be construed as having the right connections, to make their way to the top, He Xiangjian and Wang Jianlin, via the CPC and the PLA. Two others, Lei Jun and Zong Qinghou, were recently elected to China's National People's Congress, but only long after they became billionaires.

In the Dirt category, only one out of ten has anything questionable about their business dealings, at least which has been made public. Mr. Zong Qinghou is rumored to owe some pretty significant back taxes. He's rich enough that he could just cut them a check. But it looks like for now, instead of being arrested, he his paying them back quietly. So, it would appear that China's ten richest came about their success, without overtly committing any illegal acts.

Now let's look at Russia's Top Ten:

Russia's Top Ten Billionaires
Name    Age    Company    Field    Past    Education    Connections    Dirt
Alekperov, Vagit    64    Lukoil    Hydrocarbons    Climbed Company Ladder    BS Eng.    Privatization, Self-Made    None
Fridman, Mikhail    51    Alfa    Consortium    Entrepreneur    BS Eng.    Government    Fraud
Lisin, Vladimir    59    Novolipetsk    Steel    Climbed Company Ladder    BS Eng.    Privatization, Self-Made    None
Mikhelson, Leonid    59    Novatek    Hydrocarbons    Climbed Company Ladder    BS Eng.    Privatization, Self-Made    None
Mordashov, Alexei    49    Severstal    Consortium    State Company, Entrepreneur    BS Eng., UK MBA    Privatization, Self-Made    None
Potanin, Vladimir    54    Interros    Consortium    Entrepreneur    BA For. Aff.    SCP, Family    Fraud
Prokhorov, Mikhail    50    NY Nets    Consortium    High Level Government    MBA    Government, Politics    None
Timchenko, Gennady    62    Volga    Consortium    State Company, Entrepreneur    BS Eng.    Privatization, Self-Made    None
Usmanov, Alisher    61    Arsenal FC    Consortium    High Level Government    BA Intl. Law    SCP, Family    Early Fraud?
Vekselberg, Viktor    58    Renova    Consortium    State Company, Entrepreneur    BS Eng.    Privatization, Self-Made    Fraud
Note:                            
SPC: Soviet Communist Party                    
Eng.: Engineering    
                    
First, compared to China, Russia's Top Ten are, on average older, but within a fairly tight band, 49-64. Unlike the Chinese, Russian billionaires are much more likely to be widely invested in a number of different sectors, via consortiums (conglomerates). Two of the ten are in hydrocarbons and one is in steel. The rest are all over the place. Russian billionaires are just as entrepreneurial as the Chinese, with eight of them working their way to the top. Russia's billionaires are a very educated lot. All of them have at least a college diploma, with seven of them in engineering.

For connections, four of the ten, compared to China's 2/10, have the kind of Rolodex that may have helped their careers. The other six are self-made success stories. They were undoubtedly in the right place at the right time, back in the 1990s, with the massive selloff - many would say giveaway - of the Soviet Union's state assets. Russia's richest didn't create these conditions, but they too advantage of them, apparently mostly legally.

In the Dirt department, three of the ten are known to have committed some kind of financial legerdemain. Mr. Usmanov was judicially exonerated twenty years later for Soviet era crimes, but a search on the internet will show that some people do not agree with that ruling. They say he was crook. We will probably never know, one way or the other.

To be honest, with the horrible reputation that Russia's rich have been given behind the Great Western Firewall, I was pleasantly surprised at this list. I was expecting a long rap sheet on every one of these guys. I checked the aforementioned Wikipedia list for the next ten richest Russians and was again, very startled to see that most of them have no "controversies". Only one of the #11-#20, Roman Abramovich has definite dirt on his hands. Oleg Deripaska has a bad smell, as it seems organized crime hovers around his dealings a lot, but still, no arrests. Dmitry Rybolovlev was imprisoned but later exonerated, when others were arrested on charges of a contract killing. Like Mr. Usmanov, at this point, who knows?

Does Russia have its fair share of bad guys? Probably no more than the West. Ronald Reagan's administration was the most corrupt in American history. Yet all the hundreds who went before justice then, could easily commit the same crimes, starting in Bill Clinton's presidency, up to today, with no consequences in sight. Now, high ranking members of US government and corporate criminals routinely commit perjury while testifying, walking away with a big pat on the back for a job well done. The insidiously corrupt revolving door between state and business just keeps on spinning. Do we need to discuss the totally rigged stock, bond, gold, silver and derivative markets? The wholly bogus "official" US government statistics on employment, the consumer price index (CPI) or the gross domestic product (GDP)? Or how about the LIBOR and swap rates, as well as the London gold fix? Then there is the plethora of offshore tax havens and the outright looting of billions from middle class pension funds. What can we say about all the stench of corruption in Brussels, which is a laughing stock across Europe? Or the Gilded Age, sunshine bribery racket in Washington, DC, where President Obama and Congress poll lower than a dried dog turd? Just web search these various key word combinations: "scandal", "financial", "corporate", "political", "American", "US", "European", "2014", "2015", etc., for enough eye scorching filth to blind you.

Yes, Russia has some really bad actors. Ihor Kolomoyski, a Ukrainian billionaire, working with the West and Israel, is presumed to be helping organize some of the genocidal butchery in the eastern part of his shattered country, including the 2014 mass murder of 48 innocents in Odessa. Yet, is Barak Obama any better? He signs off on a weekly hit list, sending out drones across the world, killing and maiming thousands of innocents. Bill Clinton and John Major/Tony Blair gleefully exterminated hundreds of thousands of children in the 1990s, while enforcing genocidal sanctions on Iraq. And let's not forget what Mr. Clinton did to Serbia. Later, Tony Blair and George Bush massacred millions in Iraq and Afghanistan. As we have since learned, these two resource rich countries were just a warmup for Western perpetual war and carnage across the planet. In 2011, Nicolas Sarkozy and David Cameron gaily bombed Libya and its people back to the Stone Age. Are these murderers any different than Mr. Kolomoyski?

One very good explanation as to why Russia does have its fair share of criminal billionaires, is that they came to life during a period of social, economic and political anarchy. This happened in the 1990s, when President Boris Yeltsin opened up his country to predatory plunder, literally the rape of nation, by colonizing Western banks, corporations and governments. In that kind of environment, psychopaths thrive at the expense of everyone else. Many of the Wikipedia biographies of the more infamous, criminal Russian/Ukrainian billionaires point out that they were associates of the utterly corrupt Yeltsin, who was in fact their and the West's spineless patsy for pillage. Let's not forget, Russia's criminal corporate class was and still is very much an important ally of Western criminal corporatocracy.

A strong case can be made that if China were put in the same situation as 1990s Russia, it too would have a whole slew of criminal billionaires to deal with. Thanks to history, the Chinese know this all too well. During their 110 year, colonial Century of Humiliation, 1840-1949, there were similar, 1990s-Russia conditions throughout much of the country. Who was in charge? Really nasty oligarchs, called war lords and gangsters, who worked arm in arm with Western colonialists, corrupt government officials and wealthy local compradors, to suck dry the country's natural and human resources. The granddaddy of them all was the fascist KMT's Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-Shek. The first order of the day, wherever the KMT came in control, was to be the Grand Pimp of all the criminal gangs, to control the drug, prostitution, gambling, loan sharking, protection and arms rackets. That doesn't even count all the KMT's financial crimes, like looting treasuries, skimming off contracts, counterfeiting, etc. Such is the order of the day, when chaos and anarchy reign. For the Chinese masses, Mao Zedong and liberation in 1949 couldn't come soon enough.

There are fewer criminal billionaires in China these days, for several reasons. First, the market here is so huge and economic growth has been so torrid, that they can make all their money reasonably ethically. Secondly, Baba Beijing (China's leadership) keeps a very firm grip on the economy. It has many laws and regulations in place, similar to what the United States had, thanks to Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal. Sadly for the US, they were disdainfully dismantled by the 1% elite. This started during the Reagan administration, in the 1980s, picking up rapid pace through later presidencies and is still ongoing today. All the pervasive, Western financial and political corruption we see today can be largely blamed on thousands of abrogated laws and regulations, which were put in place to rein in humanity's avaricious greed heads. Thirdly, unlike the West, corporate and government crooks really get prosecuted in China and do long, hard time in prison. If their actions are egregious enough, they will get a lead bullet in the back of the head. It pays much more, with negligible risk, for billionaires and bureaucrats to blatantly break the law in the West, than in China.

In closing, the Western mainstream media has done a brilliant job of further trashing Russia's reputation, by smearing all wealthy Russians as "criminal oligarchs". In terms of propaganda coups, it ranks right up there with tarring people and countries as conspiracy nuts, liberals, extremists, commies, terrorists, and the whole panoply of slurs, which is ruthlessly used by the Washington-London-Paris consensus. This includes ceaseless attempts to discredit Baba Beijing and the Chinese Communist Party. Behind the Great Western Firewall, this all results in the effective brainwashing and control of the masses. If that sounds like a strong statement, remember, they call it a "free press", and 99% of the people actually believe it is true.
 
 #23
www.thestreet.com
July 8, 2015
Hedge Fund Mgr. Calls Putin 'Single Greatest Threat to World Peace'
By Rhonda Schaffler

Bill Browder, founder and CEO of the hedge fund Hermitage Capital Management, discussed Russia and Vladmir Putin with TheStreet's Rhonda Schaffler at the Aspen Ideas Festival in Aspen, Colorado. Browder is the author of 'Red Notice,' a book that examines corruption in Russia, and the killing of the hedge fund's lawyer Sergei Magnitsky while in custody in a Moscow prison. Browder was once the largest single foreign investor in Russia, but he regrets investing there and what subsequently happened. 'In my situation, first we made made money in Russia. Then they tried to take our money away,' said Browder. 'And then they committed a terrible corruption crime connected to our companies. And then they killed my lawyer, Sergei Magnitsky, after torturing him to death. So if I could turn back the clock, I'd rather have none of that to avoid the death of Sergei Magnitsky.' Browder said Putin is 'the single greatest threat to world peace and U.S. national security.' He says Putin's military prowess serves as a diversion to the problems in Russia, such as a weak economy and a falling ruble.

 
 #24
AP
July 9, 2015
Joint Chiefs nominees: Arming Ukraine is 'reasonable'
|
WASHINGTON (AP) - The nominee to be the next chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff says it is "reasonable" to supply lethal arms to Ukrainians fighting against Russian-backed rebels.

Marine Gen. Joseph Dunford said during his Senate confirmation hearing that without that kind of military assistance, Ukrainian forces will not be able to "defend themselves against Russian aggression."

Relations between Russia and the West have sunk to post-Cold War lows after Moscow's annexation of Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula and its support for a pro-Russian insurgency in eastern Ukraine.

The United States has responded with sanctions but so far has refrained from providing lethal arms to the Ukrainian forces.
 
 #25
Reuters
July 9, 2015
U.S. Air Force Head Sees Russia as Biggest Threat

WASHINGTON - Russia is the biggest threat to U.S. national security and America must boost its military presence throughout Europe even as NATO allies face budget challenges and scale back spending, U.S. Air Force Secretary Deborah James has said.

"I do consider Russia to be the biggest threat," James said in an interview after a series of visits and meetings with U.S. allies across Europe, including Poland.

James said Washington was responding to Russia's recent "worrisome" actions by boosting its presence across Europe, and would continue rotational assignments of F-16 fighter squadrons.

"This is no time to in any way signal a lack of resolve in the face of these Russian actions," she said.

James said she was disappointed that only four of NATO's 28 members had thus far met the NATO target of spending 2 percent of gross domestic product on defense.

"This is not something that came up out of thin air. This is something that we as NATO members agreed to do. All of us need to be advocates," she said.

The top Air Force civilian leader acknowledged that Europe was facing difficult immigration and economic challenges at the moment, but said the NATO military alliance and associated commitments should be a clear priority.

Britain on Wednesday said it would commit to the 2 percent spending pledge for the next five years, which will raise the number of NATO allies meeting the spending goal to five in 2015.

Given the tensions, the Air Force is continuing its effort to reduce U.S. reliance on Russian RD-180 rocket engines for military and intelligence satellite launches, James said.

She said there were huge demands on U.S. Air Force assets now, given the tensions with Russia and the fight against Islamic State, but the Air Force was also working hard to defend its weapons systems and networks against growing cyber attacks.

James said her records were among those involved in a massive breach of personnel records held by the Office of Personnel Management that some U.S. officials have blamed on China. China denies any involvement in hacking U.S. databases.

James said the Air Force took a hard look at its cyber security immediately after the revelations and decided to redouble its efforts, although no new actions were needed.

She said the service was cataloging weapons and IT systems to detect any possible vulnerabilities, while also working to set up 39 cyber security teams around the country.
 
 #26
Defense One
www.defenseone.com
July 8, 2015
Pentagon Moves Money to Counter Russia
BY MARCUS WEISGERBER

The midyear budget request to Congress includes more money for submarine detection devices, more powerful guns on the Army's Stryker vehicles, and improvements to nuclear command centers.

The Pentagon, through a number of largely classified actions, is quickly working to beef up military equipment to counter the Russian military, U.S. Defense Department documents show.

Sent to Congress this month, the two documents asks permission to shift more than $4.8 billion in the current fiscal year's budget. While most of the shifts requested are linked to the airstrike campaign against Islamic State militants in Iraq and Syria, others illustrate a quiet change in Defense Department priorities following Moscow's invasion of eastern Ukraine.

Although Russia is not mentioned in either document, one of 74 pages and the other of 21 pages, several of the requested moves would affect U.S. military commands that defend U.S. territory or would be vulnerable to an attack by Moscow. For instance, the Army wants to spend $160 million to put "increased lethality" 30mm cannons on its Stryker armored vehicles based in Europe. The new weapons "support an urgent Operational Needs Statement ... to fill a capability gap," one document says.

Then there's $5 million to develop sub-hunting acoustic sensors, which "addresses emergent real-world threats." The commanders of U.S. European Command, Northern Command and Strategic Command have all requested this equipment, suggesting that it likely involves Russia, particularly since the military is already concerned about Moscow's subs launching cruise missiles at American cities. There's also $24 million for a sub-detecting sonar system that is towed behind a Navy ship.

Other requests would improve communications for detecting and launching nuclear strikes, including $42 million for upgrades at Cheyenne Mountain, the Pentagon's nuclear command center in Colorado. And there's $10 million to modernize the red phones inside ICBM silos.

A $5.3 million shift would fund electromagnetic pulse hardening at Buckley Air Force Base, a ground site that communicates with satellites that detect missile launches. "The hardening will mitigate the risk of the senior leadership of the United States not having adversary ballistic missile information to support strategic decisions," one document says.

Then there's nearly $30 million at least four separate Strategic Command "joint emergent operational needs." The projects are classified and no descriptions are given.

Every year in June at the end of the Defense Department's third fiscal quarter, the Pentagon sends Congress a series of requests to shift money around within its budget. This reprogramming request, which is of great interest to those who track individual program spending, shows how the Pentagon priorities can shift quickly.

This year's 2015 budget was largely arranged in mid- to late 2013, before Russia invaded Crimea. Pro-Moscow forces invaded the Ukrainian peninsula just days before the Pentagon sent its 2015 budget proposal to Congress on March 4, 2014. Since then, the U.S. and NATO have stepped up training exercises, wargames and rotational deployments to the region. The Pentagon's new National Military Strategy, announced last week, makes numerous references to Russian threats.
 
 #27
www.rt.com
July 9, 2015
'Artificially hostile atmosphere': Moscow blasts US claims of Russian threat

Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has voiced concern over new statements by US Air Force secretary, who called Russia "the biggest threat to US security" and added that this claim had nothing to do with Moscow's actual actions.

"As far as the statements from Washington are concerned, we have already got used to the fact that the Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Air Force secretary regularly make statements that usually come from politicians," Lavrov said on Thursday. He emphasized that the Russian side was very concerned by this situation and noted that they are creating "an artificial atmosphere of hostility" that has nothing in common with Russia's activities in real life.

The comment was prompted by the latest statement by US Air Force Secretary Deborah James, who told Reuters on Wednesday that she considered Russia "the biggest threat," adding that the US allies in NATO should undertake their obligations to spend 2 percent of their GDP on defense in order to negate the alleged Moscow actions.

Earlier this month Vladimir Putin's press secretary Dmitry Peskov blasted the anti-Russian provisions of the new US military doctrine as "confrontational" and promised that Russia would take countermeasures in its own similar document.

In April, Peskov told reporters that in his view blaming Russia for everything had already become a sport in the US and in the Western countries in general. This comment was made after the CNN broke a story about alleged "Russian hackers" attacking the White House infrastructure.

"But what's most important is that they aren't looking for any submarines in the Potomac River, as has been seen in other countries," Peskov added, apparently alluding to the Swedish hunt for what was thought to be a Russian submarine in October 2014.
 
 #28
Belarus Digest
http://belarusdigest.com
July 7, 2015
Failure Of Minsk-2 And The Belarusian Presidential Election
By David Marples, special to Belarus Digest
David is a Distinguished University Professor at the University of Alberta in Canada.

Belarusian president Aliaksandr Lukashenka's role as a mediator in the conflict in Ukraine has received high praise from European officials and partially ended the isolation of the republic. Recently the government has taken part in several high-level events, most notably the Eastern Partnership summit in Riga on 21-22 May.

But the potential impact of the collapse of the Minsk-2 agreement on Lukashenka's popularity three months before the presidential election in October has received little attention. A related question is: where do residents of Belarus stand on various issues of the conflict, which has effectively severed relations between its two neighbours?

Minsk-2 On Shaky Ground

Minsk-2 (February 2015) featured a consolidation of terms reached at the earlier Minsk-1 (the Minsk Protocol) agreement in September 2014, which in turn derived from a 15-point peace plan drafted by Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko. It required a ceasefire, the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the front, preparation for local elections in Donetsk and Luhansk, and monitoring by the OSCE.

In addition to Lukashenka, the presidents of France and Germany initiated Minsk-2, and thus it took on the appearance of a common European effort to stop the war. In Minsk, Lukashenka acted as mediator. After the signing, but before its measures took effect, the separatists mounted a sustained and successful campaign to capture the town of Debaltseve, following their takeover of the remains on Donetsk airport.

The past four months have seen both sporadic and heavy conflict, which approaches once again a full-scale war. Ukraine argues that Russia has committed up to 12,000 troops on the scene, some from the Caucasus and Central Asia. After Ukraine retook the occupied territories, it has seized advanced weaponry produced in Russia, including tanks and artillery. Ukraine in turn has continued to shell the city of Donetsk. The OSCE has neither the numbers nor the authority to monitor the zone, and deception of the monitors is common. Minsk-2 is on the brink of failure.

Outlook Of Belarusians In Summer 2015

Currently, despite a struggling economy, Lukashenka should win the election, though his popularity has taken a dip because of concerns over rising prices and unemployment. The recent June poll conducted by the Independent Institute of Social-Economic and Political Research (NISEPI) indicates that 37.4% of those polled would vote for the incumbent president if he runs, as expected, for a fifth time, and 20.6% for a candidate from the democratic opposition. But individually no member of that opposition is polling more than 5%. The highest is Mikalai Statkevich, who is currently in prison.

The same poll, however, contains interesting insights into popular views on international affairs. A majority of respondents would not want to join either the European Union or a merged state with Russia. On the other hand, appraising the actions of state leaders, the highest levels of approval went to Vladimir Putin (60%), Nursultan Nazarbayev (43.7%), Xi Jinping of China (35.4%), and Angela Merkel (34.6%). Least favoured were President Barack Obama of the United States ((13.5%) and Petro Poroshenko (10.1%). The inescapable conclusion is that Belarusians prefer authoritarian leaders to democrats.

In the event of a Russian invasion of Belarus, only 18.7% of those polled would take up arms in defence of their country
Regarding attitudes to Russia, some 39% supported the concept of the "Russian world," 62.3% considered the annexation of Crimea by Russia in March 2014 as the rightful return of Russian lands, and almost half thought that the people of "Novorossiya" have the right to self-government. In the Ukrainian-Russian conflict, Belarusian sentiment is overwhelmingly on the Russian side. In the event of a Russian invasion of Belarus, only 18.7% of those polled would take up arms in defence of their country, and 52.9% would adjust to the new situation. Still, currently over 60% consider Lukashenka's policy toward the conflict as the right one, reflecting, as the poll demonstrates, the pervasive power of Russian Television.

Lukashenka: Hobson's Choice?

NISEPI polls have consistently been quite accurate. Thus if one takes these results at face value, respondents would prefer to remain out of the conflict, but nonetheless sympathise with Russia. If hostilities escalate, the options for the president may be limited. Moreover, the failure of Minsk-2 would undermine his image of a "peacemaker," and perhaps drag Belarus into the conflict as a base for Russian weapons and servicemen. In this respect, Lukashenka, limited by his own past ardently pro-Russian policies and commitments, might feel compelled to join forces with Putin in order to retain the support of the electorate.

The poll's dismissive attitude toward Poroshenko merits comment. His popularity is falling in Ukraine too but remains respectable, in contrast to that of his Prime Minister Arsenii Yatseniuk. Yet Poroshenko has elevated as governor of Odesa region (and according to some reports potentially the next Prime Minister) the flamboyant former president of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili, not only an implacable opponent of Putin, but also perhaps the closest friend of Lukashenka in Europe. Lukashenka's past neutrality on the conflict reflects his dilemmas: to betray friends like Saakashvili or antagonise Putin?

Lukashenka likely hopes some semblance of Minsk-2 remains in place until October. But if, as seems probable, it collapses before then-the separatists usually favour summer campaigns-he will need to reevaluate the situation promptly and with intricate care. Neutrality may no longer be an option, and the Russian president applies pressure for deeper commitment to a common struggle with the West and "neo-Nazi" Ukraine. But that choice (for Russia) would negate newly built ties with Europe as well as potential reductions of sanctions by the EU and United States. A Catch-22 situation prevails.
 
 #29
Eurasianet.org
July 7, 2015
Armenia: Evaluating Electric Yerevan's Impact
By Marianna Grigoryan
Editor's note:  Marianna Grigoryan is a freelance reporter based in Yerevan and editor of MediaLab.am.

The Electric Yerevan protest in the Armenian capital did not manage to attain the critical mass needed to transform into a Euromaidan-type event, leading to an overhaul of the country's political system. But local analysts believe that Electric Yerevan will nevertheless prompt changes in government policy.
 
Police showed restraint while clearing Yerevan's central Baghramian Avenue of protesters on July 6. The protest had erupted nearly two weeks earlier over announced plans by the Russian-owned Electric Networks of Armenia to impose a massive rate increase.
 
Brought together by discontent over the intended rate hike, the protesters never articulated clear political demands, nor developed a concrete action plan. As the days passed, the number of protesters in the streets dwindled. When police took action on July 6 to remove the barricades, after protesters had pledged to move them slowly toward the presidential residence, resistance was minimal.
 
In contrast to an earlier effort by authorities to break up the protest, police took individuals into custody peacefully on July 6, with some heard saying: "Be careful! They are our sisters and brothers." The 46 detained on July 6 were quickly released from custody, along with 240 individuals detained on June 23.
 
Some civil society activists in Yerevan, including Cooperation for Democracy Center Chairperson Stepan Danielian, said the fact that the protesters held their ground for so long represented a political victory - sending a signal to authorities that they would be held accountable for their actions.
 
"Definitely, the youth won. They kept the street closed for 13 days, the government did not dare to open up the avenue, and that was definitely a victory," Danielian said.
 
Political analyst Aghasi Yenokian, director of Yerevan's Armenian Center of Political and International Relations, expressed a more cautious view when speculating about the protest's potential legacy.
 
"It is hard to say who the winner was in this fight," Yenokian said. "Definitely, Baghramian Avenue [the protesters] could dictate its will, and the government was able to pursue something from Russia, and serious processes have been launched by this fight."
 
While the longer-term impact of the protest may be open to debate, it is clear that it had an immediate impact in several areas of public concern. For one, the Armenian government is pledging to cover the increase in electricity prices itself and to have auditors review the company's operations. Already, regulators have announced a 75-million-dram fine ($158,412). Russia also is agreeing to convene an intergovernmental commission to review the company's transactions.
 
More significantly, in an apparent bid to curry public favor, it agreed that a Russian soldier, Private Valery Permyakov, charged with the murder of an entire family in the northern city of Gyumri, the site of additional protests, will be tried by an Armenian court, instead of a Russian military tribunal.
 
When considering the longer term, the protest showed that authorities cannot act with a sense of impunity. "They [officials] have to consider public opinion," said Artur Sakunts, director of the Vanadzor office of the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly, a human rights organization.
 
"Events in Baghramian Avenue were a lesson for our authorities, and they realized that Armenian society is unpredictable," added Sakunts.
 
Others appear to have that impression as well. Already, the country's water distribution network has scrapped plans for a 1.4 percent price increase.
 
Aside from the Armenian government, Russian media outlets made it plain that the Kremlin "felt the danger" of meeting "t�te-�-t�te with Armenian society," Sakunts noted.
 
Mainstream Russian media outlets characterized the demonstration as a potential repeat of Ukraine's 2013-2014 Euromaidan revolution in Ukraine. Some senior Russian politicians attributed the protest to an alleged American conspiracy.
 
From the start, activists in Yerevan bristled at comparisons between the Electric Yerevan protest and Euromaidan. Many in Yerevan claimed that their fight was not "against Russia," but rather "for the sake of Armenia" and was far removed from politics.
 
On July 2, whistles and criticism met one former Soviet dissident, 65-year-old Paruyr Hayrikian, leader of the National Self-Determination Union, when he came carrying European Union flags to Baghramian Avenue.
 
The fact that political parties had no influence on the protest prevented it from turning into a Euromaidan, analyst Aghasi Yenokian asserted. He attributed the protesters' dislike of the Euromaidan label to Russian media influence and Russian propaganda.

Danielian, however, believes the protest is a starting point. "The movement has all the potential to [take a] step back for a while and return in a new, more powerful and more professional manner to solve the problem and become more powerful," he said.
 
The group that launched the Electric Yerevan protest, No to Plunder, has set July 14 as the day for a planned march on the prosecutor's office.

 
 #30
Moscow Times
July 9, 2015
Raikin Touches Audiences in 'All Shades of Blue'
By John Freedman

Konstantin Raikin knows full well he is sticking his neck out with his production of "All Shades of Blue" at the Satirikon Theater.

He prints a 21+ sign on the front of the program, indicating that no underage spectators will be admitted to the show. He adds an explanatory note on the back of the program, and goes to the extraordinary lengths of playing a long recorded message before the show begins.

He tells the audience that Vladimir Zaitsev's "unusual play" raises matters not commonly raised on the Russian stage. He explains that the show spectators are about to see is one of "spiritual challenges and goodness." He reminds us that, since we have come to a theater, we are part of a cultural process that demands empathy and understanding.

The topic Raikin feels compelled to defend so strongly, even before an audience encounters it, is that of a young man coming to terms with his homosexuality.

Raikin pushes it to claim no one has addressed this topic in Russian theater. Nikolai Kolyada did it with plays by Konstantin Kostenko and others at Kolyada Theater in Yekaterinburg. I have seen the topic raised in work at Gogol Center, Teatr.doc and other Moscow playhouses.

But Raikin is absolutely right in one sense. This marks the first time that a mainstream theater has embraced the issue so fully.

Let's remember that the Russian government passed a law in 2013 banning the "propaganda of a gay lifestyle" among children. Furthermore, the prosecutor's office singled out Satirikon and "Shades of Blue" two weeks ago when it demanded that six Moscow playhouses answer questions about potentially "pornographic" shows in their repertoires.

Public discussions of homosexuality remain highly awkward in Russia today.

Raikin's commitment to the play is doubly interesting when you consider that over the years he has clung extremely close to classic texts. In my 26 years in Moscow I don't believe I have ever seen him stage a contemporary Russian play.

I differ in my opinion about the quality of this text. Formally speaking, I found it common and melodramatic. The story of the teenager struggling with family and friends over his realization that he is gay is told in all the steps and with all the incidents one might expect - the mentoring of the confused boy by a more experienced individual; the disbelief of the boy's parents; the ridicule of his classmates; and the hostility of a "doctor" called upon to cure him of his "ailment."

It's very much the kind of real-life play that takes a true story and organizes it in dialogues and scenes.

Raikin also talks in his introductory remarks about how much the entire crew of the production fell in love with the play and how they all worked on it with such excitement and conviction.

Here again, I saw in many of the performances a lack of nuance and measure that I have come to expect from the company at the Satirikon. The performance of "All Shades of Blue" is often shrill and over the top, although Nikita Smolyaninov is always smooth and winning as the young man standing up to the world.

I trot out all these complaints in detail for a specific purpose. Because it allows me next to say how none of my criticism matters in the least by the time this performance reaches the end.

This is simply a kind of theater that the Satirikon usually doesn't offer. Raikin doesn't aim to entertain us here, or even to impress us with his artistic prowess.

In "All Shades of Blue," Raikin challenges his audience to step outside its comfort zone - like he and his company did - and to think hard about the injustice and cruelty that contemporary society visits upon some of its members.

It is an extraordinary departure for the Satirikon, and it works. At the performance I attended I would guess that 785 of the 800 people packing the hall leaped to their feet to offer the cast a thunderous, standing ovation.

I am accustomed to seeing satisfied audiences at this great theater. But this was different. This audience was deeply moved and grateful. As was I.

"All Shades of Blue" (Vse Ottenki Golubogo) plays Sun., July 16, 22 and 30 at 7 p.m. at the Satirikon Theater, located at 8 Sheremetyevskaya Ulitsa. Metro Marina Roshcha. Tel. 495-689-7844. Running time: 2 hours, 30 minutes.
 
 #31
Vox.com
July 8, 2015
Putin is weak
The Russian strongman is terrified of losing control. He should be.(excerpt)
By Amanda Taub
[Full text of long article here http://www.vox.com/2015/7/8/8845635/putin-is-weak]

This March, Russian President Vladimir Putin canceled a series of public appearances, and the world promptly seemed to lose its collective mind. Everyone from Russians on social media to mainstream Western journalists speculated wildly about why Putin had "disappeared." Could he be ill? Incapacitated by a stroke? Dead?

After several days passed and Putin failed to surface, the theories grew more exotic. Was this the result of a "silent coup" by the security services? Was there a conspiracy to keep it all quiet? How deep does this go?

Not particularly deep, as it turned out. Putin reappeared a few days later, looking a little pale but otherwise thoroughly alive and un-couped. Although he never offered an official explanation, his waxy pallor suggested he had perhaps been waylaid by a bout of the flu.

The ferocity with which the rumors had swirled - and the fact that the reasons for his disappearance remained secret - was revealing. Underlying the incident was an unspoken fear: that the Russian system, and Putin's hold over it, might be more fragile than it seems. The second there were even suggestions of Putin's ill health, it suddenly seemed reasonable to doubt the health of his entire regime.

And so this spring I traveled to Russia to try to answer a question that until recently might have seemed rather silly: Is Putin weak, or is he strong?

From what you see about Putin in the headlines every day, you might reasonably conclude that it is naive to even ask the question. After all, in between macho, shirtless photo ops, the man has annexed the Crimean peninsula, backed a separatist insurgency in eastern Ukraine, and crushed or co-opted Russia's political opposition, all while allegedly enriching himself by millions or even billions of dollars via corrupt insider dealings.

To the casual observer, those measures seem like signs of strength, indications of a regime that is unchecked by fear of the international community or political opposition, and of a president whose ego is unburdened by the sort of natural shame one might expect a 60-something politician to feel about posing topless.

But appearances can be deceiving, and in the case of Putin's strength, that deception is precisely the point. Those shows of strength actually mask deep, systemic weaknesses.

Long-term strength is being sacrificed for short-term stability.

And weakness is precisely what you will find if you scratch the surface of Putin's rule over Russia: The more I looked, the clearer it became that the Russian strongman and his system of government are operating out of deep insecurity.

One thing you notice quickly in Moscow is the ease with which conversations will turn to predictions of dire and imminent catastrophe, from economic collapse to civil war. Those predictions are often overheated, and to some degree seem like leftovers from the chaos of the 1990s. But they speak to a widespread sense that the system is barely holding together, that it could all come crashing down, and that if it did the results would be unpredictable and potentially disastrous.

To address this, Putin has pursued political tactics that keep him in power in the short term but, in the long term, are creating serious and potentially unsolvable problems for both him and Russia. To be clear, it would go too far to say that the end is nigh for Putin. So far, his short-term tactics have worked: Russia is totally centralized around his rule. He is by far the most powerful individual in that country.

But those tactics of centralizing and strengthening his own power today no matter the long-term costs tomorrow may have worked too well - as the March scare over his disappearance showed. Over time, the more often he's had to play that game, the more extreme his short-term solutions have become, and the more severe the side effects they've produced. And each time he does that, it makes the Russian political system less resilient. Long-term strength is being sacrificed for short-term stability. The costs of those solutions are growing higher and higher. And eventually he will no longer be able to pay them....

Table of contents

I. Putin's crisis
II. Putin's fear
III. Putin's solution
IV. Putin's ally
V. After Putin

 

 #32
Interfax
July 8, 2015
Ukrainian Culture Ministry makes list of 117 Russian performers threatening national security

By way of implementing the law On Amendments to Certain Laws on the Protection of TV and Radio Space of Ukraine the Ukrainian Ministry of Culture has made a list of 117 performing artists from Russia that has been submitted to the relevant authorities, the ministry's website says.

The report notes that by way of enforcing the law the Ministry of Culture shall make a list of persons posing a threat to national security on the basis of motions from the National Security and Defense Council, the Security Service of Ukraine and the National Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting. In keeping with the law the state cinema authority has already barred some 400 Russian-made films from demonstration. The Ministry of Culture also uses other lawful levers to minimize the propaganda impact of Russian cultural personalities.

"The Ministry of Culture has submitted to the relevant authorities a list of 117 performers who in our opinion constitute a threat to national security. The Security Service of Ukraine is conducting an investigation and will submit the findings to court, the judgment of which serves as the reason for inclusion in said list. [...] Such a list will be posted on the website by August 3," Deputy Minister of Culture Yury Zubko said.

He said that the Ministry of Culture is open to cooperation with activists and public organizations monitoring 'anti-Ukrainian' activities of Russian cultural personalities. It intends to study reports from these public institutions and send them to authorities in charge of national security for response.

In addition to the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of the Information Policy, the National Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting Issues, the State Committee for Television and Radio and the state cinema authority have the powers of protecting the information space.
 
 #33
Wall Street Journal
July 9, 2015
U.S., Ukraine Weigh Expansion of American Training Program
Kiev wants U.S. instruction for its conventional and special-operations forces
By JULIAN E. BARNES

LVIV, Ukraine-U.S. and Ukrainian officials are making plans to expand the training of Ukrainian military forces at a training base in the western part of the country, officials said Wednesday.

The U.S. is currently training Ukrainian national guardsmen at the training site, about 28 miles from Lviv, Ukraine. Members of the National Guard, part of the Ministry of Interior, aren't front-line troops but are in charge of defending supply lines and operating check points.

Ukrainian military officials said Wednesday they want to bring their conventional army troops and special-operations forces to the training center to run through the course taught by U.S. soldiers from the 173rd Airborne Brigade, based in Italy.

The Ukrainians have selected mechanized and airborne units that would be part of an expanded training program.

U.S. officials have also begun planning for a potential expansion of the training, lining up funding and beginning planning for the expansion. But officials said a final decision on increasing the training is up to the White House. White House officials didn't immediately respond to a request for comment.

On a visit to the training base, Gen. Ray Odierno, the Army chief of staff, said it was clear the Ukrainian government wanted the U.S. to expand its training, but declined to say whether he would support stepped-up training.

Still, Gen. Odierno said he backed Ukrainian plans to expand the capability of the training base to handle larger units, saying the center is critical for Kiev to prepare and sustain their forces fighting Russia-backed separatists.

Soldiers of the 173rd said the National Guard has fought high intensity engagements against well-armed forces, including sustained barrages of artillery fire by Russian forces, a particular kind of attack that U.S. forces haven't experienced for decades.

Gen. Odierno said that wartime experience meant U.S. forces are learning important lessons from Ukrainians even as they teach Kiev's forces about basic combat.

"This training is shared training," Gen. Odierno said. "It is American forces training Ukrainian forces, and it's Ukrainian forces training American forces."

A Wall Street Journal reporter accompanied Gen. Odierno on his visit to the base. As he toured the training ground, Gen. Odierno told the 173rd soldiers that it was important to learn from Ukrainians how the Russians and separatists were fighting.

"We haven't faced something like this ourselves for a while," Gen. Odierno said.

The U.S. also is teaching the Ukrainians how to disarm roadside bombs. The training is based on the kinds of mines being used in eastern Ukraine and on tactics that U.S. soldiers saw in Iraq and Afghanistan and believe are likely to migrate to Ukraine.

Soldiers from the 173rd also have brought lessons learned in Afghanistan and Iraq on battlefield medicine. At the training center, U.S. soldiers played the part of wounded civilians, complete with fake blood, dummy severed limbs and simulated chest wounds.

Staff Sgt. Brian Kociuruba, a battalion senior medic with the 173rd, said he was teaching the Ukrainians to work with limited supplies, emphasizing that all soldiers need to know how to administer first aid. He said that in recent weeks the units he has trained have quickly improved as medics.

"They have come a long way, I would fight with any of them, I would let any of them treat me," Sgt. Kociuruba said.

Gen. Odierno asked one Ukrainian medic if he was going to be a doctor one day.

"No," the Ukrainian officer responded. "I am going to be infantry"

"It is the same thing," Gen. Odierno quipped.
 
 
#34
Russia, US to continue consultations on defusing Ukrainian crisis - diplomat

MOSCOW, July 9. /TASS/. Russia and the United States will continue consultations at the level of deputy foreign ministers to resolve the Ukrainian crisis, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin told TASS on Thursday following meeting with Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland in Zurich, Switzerland.

"That was our third meeting within the framework of the consultations, which we are holding on behalf of the presidents of the two countries," Karasin said. "The meeting was held in an open, constructive atmosphere. The two sides reaffirmed their commitment to a common goal - to contribute to the greatest possible extent to the resolution of the issues connected with the implementation of the Minsk agreements."

According to Karasin, all provisions of the Minsk agreements have been worked through during the consultations. "The implementation of each of them needs fresh impetus, and we intend to continue working in all existing formats, including the Contact Group and the Normandy Four", the Russian diplomat said. "It's necessary to enforce the Minsk agreements in all areas - security, economy, humanitarian and political, which now deals with the constitutional reform and the preparations for the elections."

Concerning the feasibility of creating new formats to resolve the Ukrainian crisis involving the United States, Karasin noted that "the main task was now not to search for new formats, but use the existing ones to consolidate contacts and make progress in implementing the agreements that had been reached." He described as "rather useful" the current mechanism of consultations at the level of deputy foreign ministers created on behalf of the presidents of Russia and the United States.

"We have agreed to hold the next meeting before the end of this month," Karasin said. "The time and place are yet to be agreed."
 
#35
http://newcoldwar.org
The daily count of Ukrainian army war crimes in Donbas, eastern Ukraine

Excerpt from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) report of July 8, 2015:

At a kindergarten in "DPR"-controlled Dokuchaievsk (32km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM noted some broken windows and shrapnel grooves on a west-facing exterior wall. Inside, it noted some damaged furniture and equipment. The SMM observed no crater impacts.

In "DPR"-controlled Svobodne (49km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM noted 15 shell impacts, assessed to have been caused by 120mm artillery rounds fired from the west. The SMM observed three destroyed houses, which it assessed to have sustained direct hits. A number of other houses had sustained damage. According to "DPR" armed personnel and residents of the village, an elderly woman and her adult son were killed in the shelling. The SMM observed a destroyed house where residents said the victims had lived. Human remains and blood were at the scene. The shelling occurred between 04:10 and 04:50hrs on 7 July, according to residents in neighbouring "DPR"-controlled Telmanove (50km north-east of Mariupol). In "DPR"-controlled Starobesheve (81km north-north-east of Mariupol), the head doctor of the hospital later told the SMM that two civilians killed in Svobodne had been taken to the morgue, which is attached to the hospital.

In nearby Telmanove, the SMM noted six shell impacts in a 75 by 300m rectangular area. The SMM noted shrapnel damage to and broken windows in numerous apartment blocks; a direct impact on the roof of a coal heating plant, one of whose walls had partially collapsed;  a hole in the roof of the maternity ward in the local hospital; shell craters in the yard of a kindergarten, whose walls sustained shrapnel damage and whose windows were mostly shattered; a shell crater on the main street in the village with shrapnel damaging an overhead gas pipeline, fences and homes; and, a large crater in a yard. The SMM assessed that the damage was caused by 152mm artillery shells fired from the west-south-west. In the grounds of the hospital, the SMM noted two new military-type trucks with a cable running from each of them into the hospital. On the roof of a nearby concrete grain silo, the SMM saw radio antennas and repeaters. On the far end of the street, the SMM noted cement blocks cutting off access. According to local inhabitants, the shelling - which occurred between 05:00 and 05:25hrs on 7 July - resulted in a 14-year-old girl sustaining leg injuries.

In "DPR"-controlled Sakhanka (24km east of Mariupol), residents told the SMM of hearing 60 explosions in the direction of nearby Dzerzhynske (25km east-north-east of Mariupol) between 04:30 and 05:30hrs on 7 July. In Dzerzhynske, the SMM observed a small crater caused by an 82mm mortar round in front of a house, which had sustained shrapnel damage to its front wall and windows. At the back of the house, the SMM observed two large craters, which it assessed to have been caused by artillery rounds. At a dis-used boarding school for mentally disabled children, the SMM observed that shrapnel from an airburst had damaged the windows and walls. The SMM observed that a chicken coup in the yard of a house had been completely destroyed by a direct hit. The SMM assessed that all rounds were fired from the north-west. No injuries were sustained, according to residents.


 
 
 #36
IRIN
www.irinnews.org
July 8, 2015
Ukraine tightens restrictions on rebel-held east
By Kristina Jovanovski

ARTEMIVSK, 8 July 2015 (IRIN) - Galina Vodzinskaya, 60, has been walking for five kilometers in 27 degrees Celsius weather in eastern Ukraine but is nowhere near done her journey.

She used to travel by bus for this monthly trip from her home in rebel-held Horlivka to the government-controlled town of Artemivsk for supplies, including the bag of meat she is carrying, but public transport is now suspended.

Instead, she has up to five travel legs, from taxis to private cars - whatever she can get - then walks part of the way through a government checkpoint, where she lines up amid dozens - if not hundreds - of queued cars and piles of garbage strewn along the road. Some people wait 10 hours or more at checkpoints in the summer heat without access to water or washroom facilities.

"Three days ago... there was a crazy queue, just crazy," she says. "Why is it so difficult?"

The situation is so bad that the International Committee of the Red Cross is planning to provide water and other services for civilians waiting in the long lines at checkpoints.

Tank tracks are imprinted on the road, a reminder of a conflict that has killed 6,500 people since it broke out in April 2014 when pro-Russian rebels took over parts of eastern Ukraine following Moscow's annexation of the southern peninsula of Crimea.

In mid-June, Ukrainian security services issued an order prohibiting public transportation into and out of rebel-held territory, which has complicated travel for people crossing the frontline in search of supplies and services that are much more expensive, or altogether non-existent, on the rebel side (See IRIN's longread on conditions in the rebel-held areas).

In what critics call yet another move in a blockade on rebel-held regions, the government also blocked commercial cargo from entering rebel-held Ukraine at any of the six official road checkpoints. This has slowed the delivery of basic goods - including food - for the last three weeks.

 The government says it is trying to prevent "terrorists and their accomplices" from leaving the conflict zone and to protect civilians. In January, 13 people in a passenger bus were killed when a government checkpoint came under attack.

These two orders follow a previous order in January, which required people entering or leaving rebel-held areas to apply for a special permit, a system that has limited people's ability to access humanitarian aid and leave the conflict zone, according to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).   

Congested checkpoints

Last month, a popular crossing point near the town of Maryinka was closed after a battle there that saw some of the fiercest fighting since February, when a ceasefire agreement was reached (violence has continued since).

That closure has added to the congestion at remaining checkpoints - with hundreds of cars lining up on a daily basis as early as at 4am. On one side of the Horlivka government checkpoint, the driver of a white van and a Ukrainian guard yell at each other over paperwork as frustration boils over.

Without buses, many people have to use taxis, which are not only expensive but add yet more traffic to the checkpoints. Since many drivers do not have the special permits required, some riders have to get out of the taxi, walk across the checkpoint, and hire another taxi on the other side.

"Civilians have to go often long distances with a lot of luggage [they themselves are] carrying physically across the contact line because of these restrictions in place," the deputy chief of the Special Monitoring Mission of the OSCE, Alexander Hug, told IRIN.

Hitching a ride

At the checkpoint, Aram Gugasyan stands by the side of the road with food and supplies, his thumb pointed up in search of a ride.

He normally takes his car when he makes the trip between government-held Kramatorsk where he works and rebel-held Donetsk where his wife lives with their young children. But queuing at the checkpoint in his car took too long. Now he hails taxis or other cars passing by.

"[The trip] has become worse and worse... it's much more expensive now." The car he is trying to flag down will be the third vehicle he uses on this trip. The ride, which normally takes an hour and a half one-way, now takes about four hours - more if he's unlucky.

Monitors have seen up to 800 cars lined up at government checkpoints; and at one checkpoint, they noted that 20 percent of civilians attempted to cross without a valid permit and were refused passage.

There are some exceptions to the new rules: joint transportation can be used to take internally displaced people fleeing the conflict across the frontline; humanitarian agencies can bring supplies in; and amid both confusion about rules and alleged bribery, commercial cargo is at times let in on an ad-hoc basis.

"[Authorities] decide what the destination and purpose of the cargo is. If documents are indeed not false and [are] legal, the cargo is let through. Otherwise, it's stopped and seized," Ukrainian military spokesman Andriy Lysenko told IRIN.

Aid delivery affected

But the orders have complicated aid delivery, Only one checkpoint can now accommodate humanitarian trucks; and it has some of the longest line-ups and is sometimes closed.

The UN's World Food Programme (WFP), which was not able to bring in any aid for two weeks in early June due to an increase in fighting and the related closure in the Maryinka checkpoint, is now facing additional delays in distributions.

"We've already been affected because we are not able to move in the amount of food we would like to put in and this will [increase] if the situation remains," said Giancarlo Stopponi, head of WFP's office in Ukraine.

WFP is facing higher needs as an increasing number of internally displaced people return to their homes in rebel-held areas, where many can no longer afford the higher food prices. This month, the agency plans to assess food security, including the availability of food at markets.

Food stocks running low

The ban on the travel of commercial goods is likely to increase pressure on aid agencies to deliver food, which is already running low.

"There is two times less meat than there used to be and three times less [dairy] products," Babenko Yevgeniya, a manager with the Amstor chain of supermarkets, which has 14 locations in rebel-held Donetsk region, told IRIN.

Suppliers from government-controlled areas have not delivered anything in the last month so the company is now relying on local suppliers and shipments from Russia. The only way to get through from government-controlled areas, Yevgeniya said, is for drivers to pay bribes to Ukrainian guards.

Now, she stocks her shelves with whatever products she has: Boxes of tea fill one side of an aisle; water bottles fill the shelves that cheese used to occupy; bags of chips and beach toys lay where packets of meat once were.

If documents are indeed not false and are legal, the cargo is let through. Otherwise, it's stopped and seized.

Yevgeniya says she also faces major problems trying to import non-food products like school supplies for students.

Prices have already doubled in rebel-held regions but the new orders will further limit supplies and push prices even higher.

The rebel-held region had already been isolated by the withdrawal of state services including the funding of hospitals and schools, forcing citizens to pick up pensions and benefits in government-controlled towns.

"Green corridor" for aid agencies

Still, there are some promising signs. Last month, the Prime Minister of Ukraine Arseniy Yatsenyuk met with aid agencies regarding the humanitarian situation in the east and promised a "green corridor" and to simplify procedures for allowing aid to get through.

But the restrictions on civilians and cargo already in place are increasingly angering locals who have been caught in a conflict which, according to the UN, has seen indiscriminate shelling in residential areas on both sides of the frontline.

Back at the government checkpoint, Vodzinskaya complains that despite decades working at a telecommunications company, she now has to make these long journeys just to get her pension.

Her voice shakes and her lips quiver as she talks about not wanting to leave her home. But for now, her first concern is how to get there, unsure if she will be able to grab a bus or hail a taxi once she passes the checkpoint.

"Ukraine is against us," she says. "I was working 40 years for Ukraine and now they don't need me."
 
 #37
DPR allows for further demilitarization, expecting mirror response from Kyiv

DONETSK. July 9 (Interfax) - The self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) is ready to consider demilitarization of other populated localities along the contact line if the Shyrokyne experiment proves successful.

"Shyrokyne is an experiment. We have arranged unilateral demilitarization and we are expecting a mirror response from Ukraine. If this experiment is successful, we may suggest applying it to other populated localities along the contact line," DPR negotiator Denis Pushilin said at a roundtable meeting in Donetsk.

However, this can happen only if it helps stop the shelling of DPR-controlled populated localities, he said.

He also refuted rumors and reports of Ukrainian media outlets about the withdrawal of DPR forces from Horlivka.

"No one is going to leave Horlivka; I have heard rumors that we have unilaterally demilitarized the Donetsk Petrovskyi district but this is not so," Pushilin said.

The Donetsk militia announced its withdrawal from Shyrokyne on July 2. "The DPR army has pulled back all forces from Shyrokyne. Shyrokyne is totally deserted. The OSCE is drawing up a plan to monitor ceasefire in Shyrokyne," senior official of the DPR Defense Ministry Eduard Basurin told reporters.

Pushilin also said it was wrong to organize partial exchanges of prisoners with Ukraine.

"I think it is wrong for us to conduct partial exchanges. It is now much more important to us to free all political prisoners," he said.
 
 #38
Subject: Re: [UTExpertsDiscGrp] Straight talk about Russian aggression in Ukraine
Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2015
From: 'Andrei Liakhov' via "Untimely Thoughts" - An Expert Discussion Group on Russia

    The course for violent (in some form) confrontation was set when in mid-to-LATE JANUARY 2014 "Luhansk partisans" (a 100% local group) emerged as a response to the local right sector and captured Artemievsk and Slaviansk armories which in combination housed weapons and ammo for 3 Soviet armies of full combat strength. In addition Artemijevsk armory is one of the oldest in Europe. When I visited there in 2011 I was shown parts of it which remained sealed since 1916.
    This, by the way, explains, inter alia, the amount of old and obsolete artillery pieces (as shown on TV) used by the separatists/terrorists/volunteers (cross out the extra according to your political inclinations).
    Girkin and his volunteer force emerged at least a month later.
    Furthermore the initial local resistance force was well funded and, in part, armed and supplied by a group of local oligarchs who wanted to protect their assets from raids by the Western radicals who were at the time (much less so now) enforcers of a group of Western Ukrainian oligarghs who were at that time seizing assets left, right and center.
    The "morale" of my tuppence is that undoubtedly conflict in Eastern Ukraine has local origin and initially was another robber barons "razborka" over assets rather than anything else. A combination of sheer local shortsightedness, false hopes raised by the Crimean situation, breach of national (very fragile) accord which was the backbone of post 1991 Ukraine by Western oligarghs who came to power in February 2014 are the prime reasons for the conflict. Please remember, that in 2004 Timoshenko was advocating sending her armed fighters to "pacify Eastern Ukraine". A lot of credit must be given to Yuschenko who in very plain language told her (and Yatseniuk and Turchinov) that he would not run for Presidency if force is used against East Ukrainian protesters. Yes, there was no Crimea in 2004 and Kuchma corruption was baby talk in comparison to Yanukovitch, but still, a threat of something similar was very palpably obvious. Americans did not insist on use of force in the East either - relationship with Moscow was good, DC needed Kremlin's cooperation in a lot of things and there was no Obama.
     All of that changed in 2014.

 
#39
Kyiv Post
July 9, 22015
Think tank sees four policy scenarios for Russian-occupied Donbas
By Yves Souben

What's to be done with the Donbas?

There are signs that opinions are hardening in top Ukrainian political circles over the question of the future of the occupied territories in eastern Ukraine, with the former leader of the pro-presidential Bloc of Petro Poroshenko party, Yuriy Lutsenko, in early June calling for a full blockade. This hard-line scenario would allow only humanitarian assistance to cross the front lines under the auspices of international organizations, and would strictly monitor the movement of people coming to and from the occupied territories.

With the issue of the future of the occupied territories now a hot topic in public debate, the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, a pro-European Kyiv-based think tank, on July 7 published a study exploring four scenarios for dealing with the occupied Donbas, comparing them on the basis of four criteria: domestic policy, foreign policy, economic issues, and human rights.

In the first scenario, the policy center highlighted the economic and political benefits of a full blockade. Cutting off the occupied parts of easternmost Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts completely would lead to a reduction in public spending of between 6.5percent and 11 percent, reorienting the national economy to the West and making it more competitive. The Kremlin-backed separatists would have to bear their own administration costs, leading to a worsening of the economic situation, and thus a drop in the support they may have from the population of the areas they control. Freezing the conflict in its current borders would also improve the security situation in other parts of the country.

On the downside, this could fuel tensions on both sides. Ukraine's Western partners, who are continuing to seek a diplomatic solution to the conflict, may not support such a move by the Ukrainian government, while aggressively cutting off ties could mean the conflict escalates towards more violence. Such a blockade could also encourage smuggling across the front line, and would effectively mean Kyiv abandoning part of the Ukrainian population.

The think tank's second scenario sees people being allowed to cross the front under simplified controls, and let them receive cash payments. Although similar in effect to a total blockade, this solution would however reduce tensions in the occupied areas. The state would continue to serve its citizens, who could maintain personal contacts with residents from other regions.

However, the research organization warns that this may lead to a rise in the culture of dependency in the occupied territories, and foster resentment among the rest of the population over their perceived special treatment. But the main threat is that the central government would have no control over the movements of funds, which could be used by the Kremlin-backed separatists.

The government could be even more selective in its isolation of the occupied territories under the think tank's third scenario, where Kyiv would develop functional and administrative ties with the occupied territories by supporting the work oflocal companies under certain conditions.

This solution could reduce fighting through the development of economic ties. As a consequence, relations between the central government and the Kremlin-backed separatists would be more business oriented, giving more security to the population in the occupied areas.

Conversely, this could be seen as legitimizing the leaders of the self-proclaimed breakaway regions in Luhansk and Donetsk, and the effective federalization of the country. Ukraine would also have to bear the cost of such support, which could result in the increase of the cost of living and encourage corruption. Eventually, this would make the position of the separatists more secure and benefit Moscow. And as the conflict dies down, Ukraine's Western allies may start offering less support.

The last scenario would see the soft reintegration of the occupied territories into Ukraine. The central authorities would cooperate with the leaders of the separatists, agreeing on local elections and specific rights for autonomous regions. This solution would protect the rights of Ukrainian citizens living in the occupied territories, and would be a symbolic win for Ukraine's Western allies, who still support the implementation of the moribund Minsk peace agreements. The last truce, signed in February by Ukraine, Russia, France and Germany, included provisions for the occupied territories to be reintegrated into Ukraine.

But the cost of such a solution would be high for Ukraine, not only economically and financially, but also in terms of symbolism. With the conflict no longer perceived as an international one, Ukraine's supporters could start to drift away, abandoning their sanctions on Russia. The government would also lose political and popular support by making concessions to the separatists, who in contrast would be legitimized and strengthened. As a consequence, this could encourage Russia to continue to pursue its hybrid war against Ukraine by creating separatist conflicts in other regions.

Democratic Initiatives says the latter solution is unlikely to come about, as it requires the consent of Russia and its subordinate units in Ukraine. Moreover, the separatist leaders would have to comply with some democratic standards, which is very unlikely in the short term.

The policy center also couldn't find a perfect solution in regards to improving the human rights situation - especially for those who are stuck in the occupied territories. Furthermore, all of the scenarios imply a lot of costs for few benefits,reducing the options for an already cash-starved government.
 
 #40
The National Interest
July 9, 2015
The New Siege of Crimea
Western and Ukrainian sanctions are hurting Crimeans while empowering Russia.
By Thomas de Waal
Thomas De Waal is a senior associate in the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Crimea is renowned for a history of enduring two long and brutal sieges of its most famous city, Sevastopol-in the Crimean War (1854-55) and in World War II.

Now a third siege has begun. Since Russia's annexation of the peninsula in March 2014, the United States and European Union have put Crimea under one of the toughest embargoes in the world. Almost all trade, transport links, and banking transactions have been blocked. The sanctions regime is in fact much harsher than the one on Russia. It is comparable to those imposed on Cuba, Iran, or Sudan, but unique in being applied to a single province of a country rather than a state.

The regime is so strict that American lawyers are advising their clients to have nothing to do with Crimea. Even foreign-made goods that are only 25 percent produced in the United States are subject to the embargo.

More crucially for the residents of Crimea, the government of Ukraine is also imposing tough punitive measures on its lost province, cutting off some transportation links, water, and power. A new draft bill being debated in the Ukrainian Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) proposes turning this into a total blockade.

The avowed purpose is to make Russia pay a high price for its breach of international law, deter it from attempting it again, and force Moscow to come to the negotiating table.

"It basically says you can claim your war prize," a senior U.S. administration official told the New York Times last December, after a new round of sanctions was announced. "But it's not going to be worth much to you, and we're not going to make it easy for you."

Arsen Zhumalidov of the Crimean Institute for Strategic Studies in Kyiv says, "Ukraine sees this situation as the aggressor state has occupied its territory, and it has to win it back by raising the cost to be incurred by Moscow for its deviant behavior." However, he adds, "The population [of Crimea] is not a subject in the process."

According to Russian economist Natalia Zubarevich, the costs of annexation are indeed mounting. Zubarevich calculates that the Russian government spent 125 billion rubles ($3 billion by last year's exchange rates) on Crimea in 2014 in direct subsidy, or more than twice as much as it spent on the second-biggest recipient of handouts, the poor North Caucasian province of Dagestan. She predicted that massive economic subsidies would be needed until 2020.

The influx of cash has had some impact. Russian authorities say they have brought pensions and government salaries in Crimea up to the Russian average (appreciably higher than in Ukraine). But they cannot compensate for a steep drop in tourism since the annexation or for huge logistical problems in supplying Crimea with the essential goods it needs.

The economic siege looks likely to make the plight of Crimeans more miserable. The danger for the Kyiv government and its Western friends is that it may also make them more hostile to Ukraine and dependent on Russia. A point will have been proved, but Crimea may be lost.

Andrei Sambros, a journalist based in the Crimean capital Simferopol who writes for liberal Russian outlets such as Novaya Gazeta and maintains contacts with mainland Ukraine, described to me how daily life has changed in the year since the Western sanctions regime came into force. He can only fly to Russia. Credit cards like Visa are useless. No major banks are open. He cannot buy a pair of jeans or order from Amazon. Packages now take three weeks to arrive from Russia. He is unable to access Google Play-this, even though the United States announced in May that it was easing sanctions on Internet and software applications, which had hurt Internet gamers and Gmail users.

Sambros summed up the predicament of ordinary Crimeans succinctly: "Two million people have suddenly become traitors." He said Ukraine still had "huge resources of loyalty in Crimea which it has not used." Out of the two million people in Crimea, only 20,000 have renounced their Ukrainian citizenship, suggesting that most people want to keep their options open and maintain a relationship with both Ukraine and Russia.

But the overall effect is that locals now pin their hopes on Moscow and in particular on the planned construction of a 19-kilometer bridge across the Kerch Strait to Russia, which the Russian government says will be completed by 2019.

"They are praying for the Kerch Bridge like to an idol," Sambros said.

If Western sanctions are a major inconvenience for Crimeans, then the severing of contacts with mainland Ukraine is fundamental to their everyday lives.

Rail and bus communications with mainland Ukraine have been cut off. The main source of water for the peninsula, the Northern Crimean Canal, is closed, depriving farmers of irrigation for their fields. Power transmissions from Ukraine are intermittent and there were widespread blackouts over the New Year holiday.

New regulations are deterring Crimean students from studying in Ukrainian colleges: they require the graduates to convert their Crimean high-school diplomas into regular Ukrainian diplomas before they are allowed to do so.

These punitive tactics towards a breakaway province are reminiscent of the methods applied by successive governments in Georgia towards their separatist territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. After the 2008 war with Russia, Mikheil Saakashvili, then the Georgian president, instituted a law on "occupied territories," which severely restricted contacts with the two regions and put the onus on Russia to "de-occupy" the two regions.

It is probably no coincidence that the term "occupation" has become prominent in Ukrainian public discourse just as there are former senior Georgian officials, including Saakashvili himself, serving in the new Ukrainian government.

However, that tactic has failed in Georgia, only pushing Abkhazia and South Ossetia deeper into Russia's embrace. Abkhazia suffered years of economic misery but now has few connections with Georgia and has undergone a slow integration into the Russian economy. In South Ossetia in 2008, the Saakashvili government cut the gas supply to the Georgian-majority town of Akhalgori, condemning it to several freezing winters and evoking South Ossetian complaints about Georgian cruelty. The post-Saakashvili government elected in 2012 offered to restore gas flows, only to be told that it was no longer needed because the Russians were building a new gas pipeline instead.

Crimea is, of course, much larger than either Abkhazia or South Ossetia and a much bigger drain on the Russian economy. But it is also a more significant political priority for President Putin. The example of the Caucasus suggests that the next few years will be crucial: if the Russians can develop new water sources for Crimea and eventually build a bridge to the peninsula, Ukraine will loses its current economic leverage and the annexation will be more of a fait accompli.

The Ukrainian government faces a big dilemma in Crimea-how to deal with a territory summarily swallowed up by its bigger neighbor, along with hundreds of assets and properties. So far Kyiv has gone down the path of complete isolation. Trade is still flowing with Crimea, which benefits both farmers and businessmen in southern Ukraine, as well as Crimean consumers. It amounted to more than $500 million between September 2014 and February 2015.

Even this trade is now the target of some nationalist Ukrainian politicians. A draft law proposes a total blockade, which bans all trade with "the occupied regions" of Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk. One of the initiators of the bill, parliamentary deputy Sergei Vysotsky, said he has no humanitarian concerns about this. Asked about Crimea, he told an interviewer that "In the course of a year, every [Ukrainian] patriot could have left there."

But why should they want to leave home? The siege of Crimea is especially painful for Crimean Tatars, who have been indigenous to the peninsula for many centuries and owe more loyalty to Ukraine than to Russia. This unfortunate community is now facing political persecution from Moscow and isolation from Kyiv.

One Crimean Tatar, now a resident of Kyiv, told me he saw no strategy for winning his homeland back for Ukraine. "We are losing Crimea because of this policy," he said.
 
 #41
Moscow not to change its decision on Crimea - Russian Foreign Ministry

MOSCOW, July 9 /TASS/. The assumption that Russia will give up Crimea under the pressure of sanctions is the biggest mistake of the US and EU foreign policies, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov told journalists on Thursday.

"Our restrictive measures (against a number of western countries) depend on the EU actions. Our position remains firm and extremely clear: we were not the first to impose the economic restrictions; all the actions undertaken by Russia were a response, which was fully based on the principle of reciprocity," the Russian diplomat said.

"As soon as the European Union lifts its sanctions imposed on Russia, I am sure that Moscow will do the same. And all the products, which are currently under embargo, will be returned. But the sanctions imposed over Crimea may last forever because Moscow will never change its stance on Crimea," Ryabkov went on to say.

Part of the sanctions linked to Crimea's and Sevastopol's reunification with Russia may last forever because "we are not planning to change our decision on Crimea," Ryabkov stressed. "To think that Russia will change its policy under the sanctions, if they remain in force, is one of the biggest mistakes of a modern foreign policy pursued by the United States and the European Union," the deputy foreign minister said.

"The sanctions imposed on Russia are absolutely illegitimate, and if we discuss the criteria under which they could be lifted, we will be legitimizing them so to speak," Ryabkov concluded.


 
 #42
Business New Europe
www.bne.eu
July 8, 2015
KYIV BLOG: Parliamentary populism embarrasses Ukrainian government
By Sergei Kuznetsov in Kyiv

Ukraine's parliament has sent a series of worrying signals to the country's Western backers: it has approved a populist law that could cost Ukraine's banks up to $4.65bn; at the same time, parliament has failed to adopt a package of bills that are meant to open the door to funding worth $3bn from the IMF and the World Bank.

On July 2, the Rada approved a law which would oblige Ukraine's banks to exchange foreign currency loans into hryvnia, the country's domestic currency, at the rate that was valid when the loan agreements were signed.  According to this law, backed by 229 of the 450 members of the house, the majority of loans should be converted at a rate of around UAH5.05 to $1, while the current exchange rate stands at UAH21-23 to $1.

"The potential cost of this law across our banking system is estimated at UAH95bn  [$4.4bn]. This is more than the government will spend on defence and law enforcement in 2015," Finance Minister Natalie Jaresko said on July 3. "This will lead to a deterioration of our banking system, facilitating bankruptcies among the banks, risking the deposits of innocent citizens, and thus making all Ukrainian citizens pay ."
 
"The adoption of the bill will have a devastating impact on the financial and banking system," the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) said in a statement published the same day. The regulator "strongly urged" that the law be rejected, as it threatened "not only the stability of the banking system, but also the well-being of all citizens".

The central bank added that the potential losses suffered by the banking system could reach UAH100bn ($4.65bn) if Ukraine's banks are forced to exchange foreign currency loans provided to individuals at a rate of UAH5.05 to $1. Yet more importantly, according to the regulator, the law would conflict with the IMF's current bailout programme for Ukraine.

Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko has thrown his weight behind the stance of country's financial chiefs on the issue. "I see populist politicians who are threatening the existence of the country's finance and banking system and making impossible promises to try to please this or that part of society. They understand that it is not fair to satisfy the needs of 65,000 people [i.e. those who will be able to convert their foreign currency loans] at the cost of all taxpayers," Poroshenko said in an interview with Ukraine TV channel on July 3.

Over the past year, hundreds of borrowers have protested outside the parliament and government buildings in the centre of Kyiv, demanding an easing of their financial burden. The hryvnia's depreciation was a painful blow for borrowers who receive their salary in hryvnia but must convert part of it into foreign currency in order to service their loans. In 2014, the Ukraine's domestic currency lost 50% of its value against the dollar, and since the start of this year it depreciated by another almost 25%.

Re-vote?

According to information published by the Rada's secretariat, the populist law was supported not only by the pro-Russian Opposition Bloc, but also by many members of the five-party ruling coalition, which includes: the People's Front headed by Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk; the Petro Poroshenko Bloc; the Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko; Batkivshchyna (Fatherland); and Samopomich (Self-Reliance).

What is even more confusing is that the law was proposed to the parliament by a group within Yatsenyuk's party. This development has revived the rivalry between members of the ruling coalition that could potentially destabilise the political situation in Ukraine and therefore be a painful blow for the country's Western backers.

While the question of why the parliament supported a populist law remains unanswered, it is clear that the main victim of the current situation is Poroshenko. The president cannot sign a law that will damage the banking system, but a rejection of this populist law will surely harm his popularity.

However, it appears the authorities have found a way out of the current impasse. "The law will be subject to a re-vote in parliament on July 9, during an extraordinary session," Serhiy Leshchenko, an MP who represents Poroshenko's Bloc, told bne IntelliNews on July 7. But just hours later, Volodymyr Groysman, the parliament's chairperson, announced that the idea of an extraordinary session had been abandoned. According to the previously agreed schedule, the Rada will have its next session only on July 14.

Leshchenko underlines that the current turbulence in the parliament is not a reflection of "systematic problems" in the coalition, despite frequent examples of disagreement between its members. "Poroshenko's Bloc and the People's Front have the majority of votes, and [other factions] are unable to interfere in their game."

Alexei Ryabchyn, an MP who represents Yulia Tymoshenko's Batkivshchyna (Fatherland) party, also believes that there are no reasons to be worried, at least for now. "The parliament could vote for laws that are necessary for the country. And if one or two factions from the coalition have their own opinion, there are still enough votes to adopt laws," he told bne IntelliNews.

Unlock the funding

Ryabchyn says that all parties that make up the coalition "take responsibility" for the most important bills. "That is why I'm sure that all the bills necessary for cooperation with the IMF will be supported," he added.

However, Ryabchyn underlines that Batkivshchyna has suspicions that the government may, under the pretext of collaboration with donors, try to obtain parliamentary support for bills that allow the "hidden privatisation" of some Ukraine's companies.  "We are concerned that actions in which the government has an interest could be presented as the result of compliance with IMF demands" Ryabchyn says.
 
Meanwhile, Jaresko slammed the Rada's unwillingness to consider a package of four bills that must be passed in order to unlock $3bn in funding from the IMF and the World Bank, money which she says is "badly needed". "The delays in adopting these four laws endanger financial support worth $3bn... This includes $1.7bn from the second tranche of the IMF's Extended Fund Facility (EFF) programme, and $1.3bn from two World Bank programmes," Jaresko said on July 3.
 
"Thus, our government urges Ukrainian MPs to adopt these bills as swiftly as possible when they convene for next week's plenary session. In addition to unlocking critical international financial support for Ukraine, these laws will make our country a fairer and more attractive place to do business," Jaresko stressed.
 
Oleksiy Haran, a professor of comparative politics at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, says that the ruling coalition is facing "interim opposition" from Batkivshchyna and Lyashko's Radical Party. "However, even their exit from the coalition will not lead to its disintegration. The key factor is the interaction of Poroschenko's Bloc and the People's Front. They have enough votes to continue the coalition's work," Haran told bne IntelliNews.
 
 
#43
Russia Insider
www.russia-insider.com
July 8, 2015
Ukraine Nationalist Lawmakers Want to Ban References to Russia as 'Russia'
Because the word properly belongs to Ukraine
By RI Staff

Oksana Korchynska, Ukraine MP from the Radical Party of Oleg Lyashko has submitted a proposed law under which it would be illegal to use the terms "Russia" and "Russian" to refer to any part of territory or the present-day Russian Federation, RIA Novosti reports.

Law would ban such use of the word in official documents and public statements, but also in media, books, advertising, road signs... The only permitted term would be the official name "Russian Federation".

Violators would face up to 12 years in prison and a fine of between 50 and 100 minimal wages.

The law proposal explains that such use of the word "Russia" and "Russia" are inaccurate since the words are derived from 'Rus' which refers to territories of present day Ukraine (the historic Kievan Rus') - as such terms "Russia" and "Russian" properly belong to Ukraine. Ie it is only Ukrainians, rather than Russians, who can be properly called 'Russians', and the only Russia is - Ukraine.

Radical Party of Oleg Lyashko is a populist nationalist party which mixes extremist nationalist positions with attention-grabbing theatrics.

It is unlikely the absurd law will pass, but it goes to show how intertwined the histories of Ukraine and Russia are. The two share a common origin and historical heritage. At a certain context it is even impossible and absurd to draw a distinction between the two - as Ukraine nationalists themselves unwittingly reveal.


 
 
#44
Business New Europe
www.bne.eu
July 8, 2015
Slick new police force takes to Kyiv's streets
bne IntelliNews

As Ukraine moves to clean up its corrupt law enforcement structures, brash new US-style police car patrols on the streets of Kyiv are delighting some locals with the feeling of change. But they also present a neat target for oligarch-owned TV networks looking for government own-goals.

President Petro Poroshenko said in an address to the new patrolmen and women as they took their oaths that they were a "living symbol" of reforms.

"Your task is not only to fight against breach of law, but also to make people believe that reforms are inevitable, that the Ukrainian state is capable of defending itself. You are a living evidence of fundamental changes in our country," Poroshenko said on July 6.

Police reform was one of the most hyped measures introduced by ex-Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili, now governor of Ukraine's Odesa region and informal leader of a contingent of Georgian reformers trying to repeat their success in Ukraine.

A female member of Saakashvili's team, former Georgian interior minister Eka Zguladze, is now Ukrainian deputy interior minister and directly in charge of building a new police force, drawing on the Georgian experience of radical change: Georgia simply fired its existing police force and appointed a new, well-paid force mostly coming from different walks of life.

Since starting work in December 2014, Zguladze has adopted much the same approach with Kyiv's 2,000 new mobile police officers, only 20% of whom have prior experience in the force, according to the interior ministry.

Constrasting sharply with the often slovenly, Soviet-style 'militia', the sight of the new police officers marching out proudly in crisp US-style uniforms, with 200 new Japanese patrol cars now on the roads, has been hailed as a sign that change is really on the way to Ukraine.

Fair cop?

Their salary of UAH8,000-10,000 per month - around $400 - means they have one of the best government pay deals in the country, earning more than government ministers and MPs. This also ensured there was sufficient interest in signing up for the service - and hopefully means the new officers will prove to be more immune to bribes.

Kyiv's police force is now set to be a model for reform across the country, Interior Minister Arsen Avakov told journalists on July 5. "All the services will be reformed, only new services will be called police. First of all, patrol police, they will be followed by district police officers, then the criminal investigation department, then - experts. We have a very big programme ahead," Interfax quoted Avakov as saying.

However, Avakov is unlikely to be happy with plans backed by Poroshenko to eventually move the whole poli�e force out of the competence of the interior ministry. None other than Zguladze is tipped to head the new police force when it is set up, Poroshenko told parliament.

"We have started passing bills regulating reforms of the Interior Ministry. They separate forcible functions from political ones and set up a municipal guard and new police," the president said "And, by the way, I see such a person as Eka Zguladze as their future chief."

Whether average Ukrainian motorists and their cavalier driving practices (the country has one of Europe's highest road death tolls) will be greatly enamoured of non-bribable cops is also an open question. However, a longstanding grievance in the population - that fat cats driving expensive cars brush off traffic cops by flashing IDs and pulling weight - may be eradicated, if things go according to plan.

Lampoon field day

That is a big 'if', and is made bigger by the scrutiny being paid to the new cops by Ukraine's leading TV channels, owned by oligarchs mostly in a clinch with the government, and eager to point up a government own-goal.

Thus the country's two largest TV channels, 1+1 channel owned by oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky and Inter owned by Dmitro Firtash - have been gleefully running news items on every crashed new cop car: four so far , three in the first 24 hours, according to press secretary for the Interior Ministry in Kyiv, and a fourth on July 8 running very photogenically into the back of a bus. The Interior Ministry later ackowledged the accident was the police patrol's fault, saying it was due to "tiredness".

However, the ministry denied media reports that two police guns had been mislaid during the first 24 hours, and said the crashed cars had only damaged bumpers and could still be used for patrol.

Many of the new Kyiv police officers have accessible social network profiles, providing a field day for mischief-makers. People wasted no time in highlighting past inappropriate behaviour by the city's new pillars of the law, or to embarrass female and male officers photographed out of uniform, horsing around or even taking a shower, thereby fuelling mirth at the new force. One officer has been disciplined in connection with photos, according to the Interior Ministry.

Another novelty - the smart new black US-style police uniforms, identical to those in Georgia - have prompted a flood of Internet memes referring to the 1980s Hollywood franchise 'Police Academy', well-known in Ukraine.

As a result, on July 8, a selection of top stories on 1+1 and Inter's newssites mocked the new traffic cops, who look to be fast becoming Kyiv's answer to the summer lull - and a welcome distraction from the country's ongoing economic collapse and the misery of the military stalemate in East Ukraine.

Warning signal

Even the most enthusiastic supporters of the new reform were baffled by one aspect of the new force - that their new Toyota patrol cars donated by Japan have constantly flashing police lights, which under Ukrainian law means motorists have to pull over and cede passage.

It transpires that the reason is mundane - in Japan patrol cars have permanently flashing police lights to increase their visibility and thus so did the Japanese cars supplied to Ukraine. "We are already working on this, we are in talks with our Japanese partners to replace these cars," Zguladze told journalists, acknowledging the flashing police lights were causing a certain "discomfort" in the population.

Other more serious points of criticism relate to the fact that the July 2 police bill has not yet been signed into law by the president, despite the new police having started work.

It also remains unclear what will happen to the thousands of former militia officers who are still in their jobs and on the government payroll, but now off the streets.

"There is a danger that the old traffic police might infect the new officers with bad habits," blogs journalist and activist Dmytro Gnap. "In my opinion, the only patrol work suitable for the old traffic cops is as sleeping policemen," he added.

Gnap had spoken with some of the old guard of traffic police, who said that they had "no idea" what was planned for them next, he wrote.

"Kyiv traffic police won't work any more. By the end of the week Kyiv traffic police loses its functions,with all their former functions fulfilled by patrol policemen," Zguladze said on July 6.
 
 #45
www.opendemocracy.net
July 9, 2015
Saakashvili is turning politics upside down in Ukraine
Down on the Black Sea, the newly appointed governor of Odessa (and ex-president of Georgia) Mikheil Saakasvhili is making waves. Is the balance of the Ukrainian state beginning to shift?
By Victoria Narizhna
Victoria Narizhna is a Ukrainian columnist, essayist, translator, cultural manager, and civil activist from Dnipropetrovsk.

During EuroMaidan, Yaroslav Hrytsak, one of Ukraine's most visible public intellectuals, stated that the weight of the new post-Maidan Ukrainian state, balanced between Lviv (to the west) and Kyiv (in the centre), must be shifted to the east: Ukrainian citizens, he said, will succeed in fundamental change only with three points of leverage. At that moment, Dnipropetrovsk - 'Dnipro' - was considered the best candidate for the eastern outpost of this rebalancing project.

Maidan has since been replaced by even greater upsets - the annexation of Crimea and the first rumblings in the east of Ukraine. The south east has been transformed into a frontline: although Russian involvement in fostering conflict in the Donbas is clear to the entire world, this involvement took the real, albeit passive, feelings of resentment in southern and eastern cities as its base.

Dnipro

With the rise of the separatist threat in Ukraine's south and east, Hrytsak's words turned out to be prophetic. But Dnipropetrovsk brushed off attempts by separatists to seize the local administration, and any manifestations of independence were snuffed out quickly, thanks partially to the (risky) decision to appoint oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky as governor of Dnipropetrovsk region.

In response to rumblings of separatism in neighbouring regions, Dnipropetrovsk saw an unprecedented outburst of patriotism. A volunteer movement began to take shape. And with the outbreak of armed conflict in the Donbas, the city found itself on the frontline. These fundamental changes, as well as the controversial figure of Kolomoisky and the strange behaviour of his team, have attracted attention - both foreign and domestic. For the first time in a while, the city began to feature on the front pages of European and American newspapers.

Dnipropetrovsk was more than ready to play the new role of a southeastern outpost of Ukrainian statehood - a regional capital, that 'third point of leverage' which Hrytsak described. But in the past 10-15 years, Dnipro's narcissism has taken a hit: from a city that used to think of itself, jokingly, 'not as a capital, but not the second city either,' Dnipropetrovsk has gradually turned into an ordinary provincial centre - young people continue to flock to Kyiv.

The decline of heavy industry and the inability to move into different industries, to shape a role befitting a modern city (rather than an old industrial centre), and the remains of a once influential 'Dnipropetrovsk mafia', also impacted on Dnipropetrovsk's fortunes. Kolomoisky, it seems, was also ready for a 'Dnipropetrovsk renaissance'. There was talk of taking the rocket industry (still operating and still part of Dnipro identity) to a new level, developing hi-tech industries and, in general, transforming the city into a Ukrainian version of Silicon Valley.

But given that Kolomoisky quickly found himself in open conflict with Poroshenko, we'll never know just how real that talk was. Ihor Reznichenko, the new governor of Dnipropetrovsk region, has not continued this rhetoric: he is the complete opposite of his predecessor and, in general, avoids any rhetoric (as well as cameras and dictaphones) when he can. Regardless of the fact that the city continues to play an important role as a frontline town, the change of governor from an eccentric to a recluse has taken its toll on Dnipropetrovsk's visibility.

Odessa

Now, however, Dnipro residents have the chance to see their dream come true - next door. After the appointment of Mikheil Saakashvili as governor of Odessa region, eyes are fixed on this port city.

Saakasvhili's appointment was presented as an attempt to put an end to corruption and the shadow economy: Odessa is, after all, Ukraine's largest port. It is the main conduit for smuggling, including drugs. The city is an arena for the illegal interests of all Ukraine's oligarchs, and stopping (or at least reducing) corruption in Odessa, particularly in customs and power ministries, will hit the oligarchs hard. Moreover, the reaction of Kolomoisky's 'team' to this appointment - the sharp status updates, a tendentious 1+1 TV 'documentary film' about Saakashvili's abuses in Georgia - suggests perhaps that the arrival of Saakashvili has hit one oligarch harder than the others. At least, that's the impression Kolomoisky and his team has been trying to create.

Saakashvili is a far from one-sided figure - as the Russian media instantly reminded us. Indeed, the Russian reaction was just as stormy as Kolomoisky's. On the one hand, Saakashvili is undoubtedly a successful reformer: Georgia succeeds in terms of the ease of doing business, property and construction rights - in general, a good investment climate. Without a shadow of a doubt, Saakashvili managed to clean up everyday bribery in Georgia, making him a logical candidate for governor of a region defined by corruption. He was re-elected by the people of Georgia for a second term (a solid indicator of success), and was always a great admirer of Ukraine, to which Ukrainians have sought to respond in kind.

On the other hand, the name of Saakashvili brings scandal to mind: the violent dispersal of peaceful protests; the far from transparent closing of opposition TV stations. Several of his decisions have garnered criticism from institutions such as Human Rights Watch. At one stage, there were even concerns that Georgia might turn into an authoritarian state. He left his native country as soon as he left the post of president, leaving behind several criminal cases opened against him (he calls them politically motivated). Georgia recently requested (and was refused) the extradition of the former president. Taking on Ukrainian citizenship should neutralise that risk.

Regardless of what people say, the problems with law or violations of human rights don't overshadow Saakashvili's achievements as a reformer and fighter against corruption - the results are still to be seen today. Analysts in Ukraine are still wondering, though, why this 'glory' is being brought to bear now - for a real fight against corruption or a PR stunt? Several explanations have since emerged: either Saakashvili received the post because Poroshenko has set himself the task of ending the oligarchs' reign in Ukraine, or Saakashvili's real task is to allocate the kickbacks 'correctly' (that is, so only certain oligarchs suffer).

One doesn't know how realistic the second scenario is: given how independent media have grown in the past 18 months, any 'selective treatment' will be noticed and likely become subject to investigation. Corruption schemes can only be  built (and rebuilt) in indifferent societies, and Ukrainian society is no longer indifferent. In a responsive civil society, corruption becomes a risky art, and Ukraine's korruptsionery are clearly far from ready to learn the necessary skills. Instead, they nurture hope that everything has remained the same - just like after the last 'Revolution of Dignity' in 2004.

That said, there are indications that things will be different, and two recent events show that Saakasvhili, despite his 'local' post, is going to turn Ukrainian politics upside down on the national level.

Turning politics upside down

The first involves the now ex-prosecutor of Ivano-Frankivsk Region, Ihor Nastasyak. After a video of Saakashvili criticising Tetyana Hornostayeva, the deputy prosecutor of Odessa Region, went viral ('The interests of Hornostaieva are not the state's interests. This is called racketeering and banditism...'), Nastasyak, his feudal pride insulted, couldn't stop himself from boasting that the situation in Ivano-Frankivsk is very different.

During a round table on social welfare for law enforcement employees, Nastasyak stated that he wouldn't allow the 'public shaming' of a prosecutor as organised by Saakashvili, and that the governor of Ivano-Frankivsk always consults him before doing 'something bold'. Indeed, this is how Nastasyak described his relationship with the governor: 'I say to him: this is how you need to do things, not like this - otherwise you'll be my client.' After a few days, Nastasyak was fired from his post, and this was preceded by a status update by Saakashvili on Facebook, in which he inquired as to how long the General Prosecutor's Office was going to suffer these 'idiots' in the regions.

The second incident, which was far less momentous but much more important, took place during a meeting of the Commission of the State Aviation Service (SAS). Saakashvili, in his usual emotional manner, accused Denys Antonyuk, the head of the service, of permitting only specific companies into the market. This practice has made the price of air tickets even more expensive (clear to most Ukrainians), and is halting the development of domestic air travel. For instance, there is only one company operating air transport out of Dnipropetrovsk, MAU, which is under the control of Ihor Kolomoisky. The fact that low-cost airlines don't operate out of Dnipropetrovsk because it's not profitable for Kolomoisky isn't a secret to anyone.

The day after the showdown at the commission, Poroshenko announced that, after consulting with Saakashvili, a decision had been made to investigate the SAS and temporarily sideline Antonyuk as acting head of the service.

Videos of Saakashvili's emotional exchanges with various public officials have been appearing regularly since his appointment as governor. On the one hand, these videos suggest that the main aim of this project is to create a public image, to win people's sympathies and to create the illusion that everything is working efficiently as it should.

On the other, Poroshenko is using Saakashvili - an outsider without deep attachments to Ukrainian elites - as efficiently as possible; that is as another pair of hands to rake in the fire, which always breaks out in times of great change. These very loud and very public outbursts of Saakashvili, it seems, are fulfilling an important function. They send a clear signal: 'No one is untouchable any longer.'

Of course, the incident with the State Aviation Service can be seen as an attack on everyone's favourite hate figure, Kolomoisky: before Antonyuk took up his post, he worked at MAU for 17 years, and has lobbied their interests since. By contrast, deputy prosecutor Hornostayeva isn't connected to Kolomoisky, but is connected by family ties to Viktor Shokin, the General Prosecutor of Ukraine. And ex-prosecutor Nastasyak isn't connected, it seems, to his own common sense.

In a word, then, it's still too early to make conclusions about how serious are the plans to tackle corruption using Saakashvili (and his experience); we need to wait and see. Indeed, it's still too early to make a decision about whether Saakashvili's appointment is a sign that the south east's centre is being shifted to Odessa, rather than Dnipropetrovsk, where it began to take shape.

Waiting for such a clear (and conscious) decision from Petro Poroshenko is, perhaps, too complimentary a view of his strategy to develop Ukrainian society. But whatever the intention behind it, the result might turn out to be exactly that.

'Capital of the south east'

Of course, Odessa is no less suitable than Dnipropetrovsk for the role of 'capital of the south east'. The city has shown resistance to separatist tendencies. It is a working cultural centre and plays an important role in the country's economy; the city even possesses a well-developed myth. However, transforming Odessa into a city, which 'isn't the capital, but not the second city either,' is a matter more of management than myth.

In the end, if Odessa is to become the 'outpost of Ukrainian statehood' in the south east, then it would have a greater impact on dispelling anti-Ukrainian sentiment in the region than Dnipropetrovsk. Odessa has its own 'anti-Ukrainian' history, and has always positioned itself slightly askew of Ukraine during independence. Changing its course would curtail anti-Ukrainian feelings to an even greater extent.

I'm not sure whether my fellow residents in Dnipro have noticed the competition we're facing, but I hope they will. And this is a good thing. The fact that two cities far from Kyiv, first Dnipropetrovsk, then Odessa, have attracted the media's attention gives one hope that decentralisation is happening - at least in our heads, if not yet on paper. What happens in our heads is far more important. After all, competition is always good.

The feeling that our elevated (but ambiguous) status is slipping through our fingers might prompt Dnipropetrovsk to find its own development strategies, our own myth - one unrelated to such a temporary figure as an eccentric governor. And perhaps this will lead to Ukraine gaining more centres of power - each with its own role, and all of them united within a modern European state.
 
 #46
Atlantic Council
July 8, 2015
Here's Why More Ukrainians Admire Nationalists, and Why the West Shouldn't Freak Out
BY ALEXANDER J. MOTYL
Alexander J. Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers University-Newark, specializing on Ukraine, Russia, and the former USSR.   

Here's a suggestion that will strike you as either painfully obvious or unnecessarily cumbersome. If you really want to understand contemporary Ukraine and Ukrainians, you need to know Ukrainian. If you accept that point, then discard all the writings by linguistically challenged analysts incapable of delving deeper into the Ukrainian psyche-and then go see two plays in Kyiv and visit two villages south of Kyiv.

The plays I have in mind are "Zacharovanyy" (The Enchanted Man) and "Divka (Maiden), a Ukrainian Love Story." The first, a modern adaptation of a nineteenth-century play by Ivan Karpenko-Karyy, tells the well-known story of two proud village lovers. They quarrel, marry the wrong person out of spite, and then-unhappy in their new relationships-reignite their love illicitly. In the final scene, the young man, desperate and confused, accidentally kills his wife.

At first glance, there's nothing new here. Look a little closer, however, and you'll see that the play has the same structure and moral message as an ancient Greek tragedy. The Ukrainian lovers attempt to assert their autonomy, fail, and then succumb to their tragic fate: misery and death.

The second play is by a young Ukrainian playwright, Vira Makovii, from the Bukovyna region of western Ukraine. The plot line is similar to that of "The Enchanted Man"-but with one major difference. The heroine refuses to bow to her fate and, in the final scene, appears to escape its hold, avoiding the misery and death that befalls all the women in her village.

Makovii, obviously, is trying to move Ukrainian culture away from its traditional submissiveness to a dreadful fate and, in decidedly modern fashion, suggesting that Ukrainians can be masters-or mistresses-of their lives. That happened to be the message of the Maidan "Revolution of Dignity": that a humbled people can assert their humanity by rising up against tyranny.

The two villages, both about 170 kilometers south of Kyiv, are Moryntsi and Shevchenkove, where Ukraine's "national poet," Taras Shevchenko (1814-61), spent his youth as a serf-or, to use American terminology, a slave. Visit the huts he lived in and you can't help but compare them with the slave cabins found on American plantations. Shevchenko had the good fortune to be a "house serf," or page, in the employ of his master, Pavel Engelhardt, and accompany him to St. Petersburg in 1831. There, the young slave impressed local painters and writers with his artistic talents, and in 1838 they raised the money to buy his freedom. Arrested in 1847 for his revolutionary activity and writings, Shevchenko spent most of the rest of his life in exile.

There are many reasons for Shevchenko's canonical status as Ukraine's national poet. His poetry is outstanding, his art is impressive, and his commitment to freedom and justice is remarkable. But what may appeal most to many Ukrainians is that Shevchenko never gave up. He never buckled under, refusing to submit to his tragic fate like the slave he was. Instead, he had the courage to say no, loudly and repeatedly.

So much of Ukrainian culture-and perhaps of the Ukrainian "psyche"-is defined by these two dialectically related components. On the one hand, there is the fatalistic acceptance (still) of one's tragic fate. And for Ukrainians, who barely survived two monstrous totalitarian dictatorships, the Soviet and the Nazi, and lost some fifteen million people in the process, it's not hard to find evidence of the correctness of that view.

On the other hand, there is the rebellious rejection of fate, along with the deep-seated admiration of courageous individuals who have the strength of will to say no and to keep on saying no even in the face of overwhelming odds.

Small wonder that growing numbers of Ukrainians admire the nationalists-commonly known as Banderites, or followers of Stepan Bandera-who fought Polish rule in 1921-39, Nazi rule in 1941-44, and Soviet rule in 1939-55. Western observers point to nationalist excesses and condemn them. But that's missing the point, somewhat like saying that Thomas Jefferson and George Washington don't deserve to be founding fathers because they had slaves. Ukrainians see strong-willed individuals who were willing to die for their ideals of independence and freedom. And, perhaps unsurprisingly, the contemporary Ukrainians who are most inclined to view the nationalists as symbols of resistance are the Russian-speaking easterners fighting Putin's troops in the Donbas and dying for the cause.

The similarity with Eastern European Jewish culture and Zionism is striking. Shtetl culture was generally resigned to the inevitability of tragedy, misery, and death. The Zionists were young men and women determined to reject that fatalistic worldview and create "new" Jews-strong, vigorous, and willful. If necessary, the Zionists would also use violence. As Frantz Fanon, the author of the classic anti-colonial tract, The Wretched of the Earth, pointed out, colonial peoples in Asia and Africa have similar cultural mindsets and generate identical individuals committed to national liberation.

On July 2, I attended a book presentation at Kyiv's "Ye" bookstore. Author Bohdan Zholdak had just published a novel about the ongoing war entitled "UKRY"- the derogatory name for Ukrainians that Russians use and that Ukrainians (like blacks with respect to "nigger" and gays with respect to "fag") have now appropriated. He dedicated the book to a young soldier, Zhora, who had been killed while returning to the front. Zhora's mother spoke at the gathering-in Russian. And she concluded her stirring words with the nationalist call, "Slava Ukraini!" [Glory to Ukraine!] The audience responded with the nationalist response-"Heroyam slava!" [Glory to the heroes].

An outsider with no knowledge of Ukrainian language or culture might interpret the exchange as a right-wing nationalist ritual. It wasn't. It was an assertion of dignity, humanity, and the right to determine one's fate.
 
 #47
The Times (UK)
July 8, 2015
We help Ukraine best by hitting Putin's cronies
The way to liberate the country is to freeze Russian money invested in Britain and America
By Edward Lucas

Supporting Ukraine is the duty of everyone who cares about the future of Europe. So last weekend I went there with my father, an 86-year-old Oxford philosopher, to give lectures at the Ukrainian Catholic University (UCU) in Lviv, the main city in western Ukraine.

We were visiting a country at war. Collecting tins - for weapons, refugees and medical care - are ubiquitous. In the city centre, a glorious relic of happier Hapsburg days, recruiting stands for volunteer militias compete for public attention with Hare Krishna dancers. American soldiers, part of a military training mission, were drinking in an outdoor caf� surrounded by appreciative locals.

At the UCU graduation ceremony, some students were still recovering from wounds they had received at the front. We mourned those who had been killed, including at last year's demonstrations against the crooked regime of former president Viktor Yanukovych, who has fled to Moscow.

But the war is fought on other fronts too. Ukrainians are struggling to attract outside attention. The Greek crisis, the wars in the Middle East and migration are more urgent. Russia is playing a long game, hoping that Ukraine, weakened by debt, hardship and corruption, will buckle under the strain of war.

Given the awfulness of past Ukrainian governments, the current mediocre leadership in Kiev looks good. But it is making little headway on the deep changes needed to reform the country, of the kind other ex-communist countries have been working on for the past 25 years. Ukraine is still run by what is in effect a provincial Soviet bureaucracy: slow-moving and self-interested. Behind the scenes (and sometimes in front of them) oligarchs wield far too much power.

There are some bright spots. Mikheil Saakashvili, the dynamic Georgian ex-president, is taking on the mafia in Odessa, Ukraine's beautiful but sleazy main port. The local government in Lviv is importing Estonian expertise in e-government. But for the most part the state is unhelpful at best, predatory at worst. My father's lecture on the state's role in ensuring economic freedom received rapt attention: Ukraine's future turns on such questions.

Ukrainians are the only people to have died in the cause of European Union expansion. But some now feel bitterly disappointed at the lack of support they have received from the West. Talk of "European values" rings a bit hollow when Europe is making its weakest ally bear the greatest burden in defending them.
As moods harden, Russia is making headway by stoking fear and prejudice, equating Europe not with dignity, liberty and justice, but with decadence and decline. Some Ukrainians, wittingly or not, echo Moscow's anti-gay agenda: the Ukrainian Catholic University, a beacon of intellectual freedom and excellence, is under attack because of a "gay scandal" - an openly gay man gave a talk in the journalism school, and a visiting lecturer joined a march in support of tolerance.

A successful, liberal Ukraine is vital for the rest of Europe, just as a failed state beset by extremism and corruption would be a nightmare. There is plenty the West can do to help - supporting independent institutions such as UCU, military assistance, visa-free travel, even a Marshall plan to help to rebuild the country's shattered economy.

But the most important thing we can do is to share the burden of resisting Russia. I pointed out to David Cameron at a conference in Bratislava last month that his robust anti-Putin stance would be a lot more credible if Britain were not renowned for its role in laundering money for Kremlin cronies.

He smoothly assured me that Britain had the toughest laws in the world on financial regulation. Perhaps. But he would have struggled to name a single banker, lawyer or accountant who has been prosecuted, let alone jailed, for breaching them with regard to Russia. As the brilliant Channel 4 documentary From Russia With Cash showed, our system allows even overtly corrupt buyers to stash their ill-gotten gains in the London property market.

Vladimir Putin and his cronies preach a vitriolic anti-westernism. Yet for all the fanfare of the Brics summit that ends today in Siberia, it is not Brazil, India, China and South Africa that the Russian elite depends on for the things that really matter. The Putinistas choose Britain, the US and continental Europe for shopping, holidays, schools, universities, medical treatment - and investment.

If we are serious about helping Ukraine and resisting Putin, we have to start here at home. We need to freeze Russian dirty money, prosecute the Kremlin's accomplices, and deny visas to the Russian elite and their families: the people who are waging war on Ukraine - and on us. It will be painful, but not nearly as bad as the alternative.
 
 #48
Rezonansi (Tbilisi)
July 3, 2015
Volunteers serving Georgia's interests in Ukraine, battalion chief says

Georgian volunteers fighting against pro-Russia separatists in Ukraine are serving Georgia's interests, the commander of the Georgian volunteer battalion, Mamuka Mamulashvili, has said. He stressed that the battalion is not associated with former president Mikheil Saakashvili or any other political group. Mamulashvili said that the Georgians are the largest battalion but there are also volunteers from Chechnya, Switzerland, as well as a few from Italy and France. He also argued that the number of Georgians fighting on the side of the separatists is only three or four, describing the latter as "traitors". The following is the text of Tiko Osmanova's report, published in the daily newspaper Rezonansi on 3 July, headlined "Mamulashvili: the Georgian battalion is fighting in the heart of the frontline"; subheadings inserted editorially:

The chief of the Georgian battalion, Mamuka Mamulashvili, says that his unit is fighting in the very heart of the frontline and that the separatists often deliver major attacks against them.

He also said that Russia deployed a large number of equipment, as well as regular army in Donbas. Nevertheless, constant battles throughout the past months saw the Ukrainian army gain greater experience so that now it can offer fierce resistance to the separatists and the regular Russian army units.

Mamulashvili said that another Georgian fighter died [in Ukraine] as a result of an accident when he was having a rest.

Rezonansi has spoken with Mamuka Mamulashvili, the chief of the Georgian battalion, about the current situation in Ukraine and the Georgians fighting there.

[Mamuka Mamulashvili] We are fighting in the heart of the frontline. We control an eight-kilometre section and have to repel attacks nearly every day. The Russian regular army is seeking to penetrate and shift the frontline forward. They are targeting our line. We repelled the separatist attacks a few dozen times during the past month. Russia has a large number of equipment and regular army units [in eastern Ukraine].

[Tiko Osmanova] Where exactly are you stationed?

[Mamulashvili] In Luhansk region. I cannot tell you the exact location because this is confidential information.

[Osmanova] Political analysts believe that Russia will deliver its major attack on Mariupol in order to cut a land route towards Crimea...[ellipsis as published here and throughout the text]

[Mamulashvili] There were indeed talks about this and the entire attention was focused on Mariupol. However, we are stationed at the other end of the frontline, very far away from Mariupol, and the Russians are more active here.

[Osmanova] How well prepared is the Ukrainian army? How is it coping with the enemy attacks?

Ukrainian army "prepared in every possible way"

[Mamulashvili] It is prepared in every possible way. Our unit alone managed to stop the enemy on a few dozen occasions. In general, the army is much better prepared now, compared to the previous period. Fighters are now well-experienced and do not allow Russia to cross into the current frontline.

[Osmanova] Has Ukraine received any assistance from the USA? The sides have long been engaged in negotiations on the matter...

[Mamulashvili] We are involved in the process to a lesser extent. As far as I know, they have not received any assistance yet but as far as I know, they are expecting it.

[Osmanova] How many Georgian volunteers are currently fighting on the side of Ukraine?

[Mamulashvili] I cannot specify the numbers because this is not public information. However, the number is far greater than the number of Georgians fighting on the side of the separatists.

Only three to four Georgians fighting on separatist side

[Osmanova] How many Georgians are fighting on Russia's side?

[Mamulashvili] These are mostly local Georgians who lived there and are currently fighting on the side of the separatists. However, there are not many of them there. As far as I know, there are only three or four [Georgians] there. Unfortunately, these people are traitors. They receive compensation for this and are trying to provide for their families with this bloody money.

[Osmanova] Are any more Georgian volunteers going to join you?

No need for more Georgian volunteers

[Mamulashvili] I am trying to stop more people from coming. We can no longer keep them. In addition, I am trying to save the resource that is meant to defend Georgia. On the other hand, we are aware that this is a frontline on which Georgia's interests converge.

[Osmanova] In addition to Georgians, what other nationalities are fighting in Ukraine?

[Mamulashvili] There are also our close friends, a Chechen unit - the Dzhokhar Dudayev battalion who are our allies and we operate in coordination. There are others from other countries as well, including volunteers from Switzerland.

[Osmanova] Yet as far as I know, the number of Georgians is greater...

[Mamulashvili] Indeed, because Georgia's interests are directly linked with Ukraine's interests. We will do everything we can to ensure that Russia does not take another step forward in Ukraine.

As for foreign volunteers, we were recently joined by four Italians. There are French volunteers as well. We have a separate Georgian battalion and we cooperate with the Ukrainian battalion but I am an independent commander and I take decisions regarding the operation of my boys.

[Osmanova] Another Georgian volunteer, Kote Lashkhia, died in Ukraine today. How did this happen?

[Mamulashvili] He was on rotation, having a rest, when this happened.

[Osmanova] So was his death accidental?

[Mamulashvili] Yes, it was. He hit his head on a stone as he jumped into the sea and died from this.

[Osmanova] When will his body be transferred to Georgia?

[Mamulashvili] We are currently engaged in negotiations with the Georgian consulate that will probably cover the costs and his body will be transferred to Georgia soon. However, we will pay due respects to him here. We will hold a wake here for him after which he will be transferred to Georgia.

He is survived by his wife and a baby daughter. His wife is a foreign national but I do not know which country she is from. She is not in Georgia at the moment. They were divorced. Kote arrived to fight in Ukraine a few months ago.

No links with former president

[Osmanova] Do you tend to meet the former Georgian president, Mikheil Saakashvili?

[Mamulashvili] Many people think that we are closely associated with Mikheil Saakashvili or some other group. I do not want people to wrongly assume that we represent Saakashvili or any other political group. We are simply fighting for Georgia and for justice. We are where Georgia needs us. We do not meet politicians at all, neither Saakashvili, nor local politicians. We serve the idea of Georgia's unity.

The last time I saw Saakashvili was during an award ceremony which was also attended by Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko. We are on the frontline and have no time to meet politicians.

[Osmanova] Do you have any plans to return to Georgia in the near future?

[Mamulashvili] We were offered to get Ukrainian citizenship but this is not an end in itself for us. We are not serving anything else here, except for the idea of Georgia's independence. Therefore, we cannot return at the moment because the situation in Ukraine is grave.