Johnson's Russia List
2015-#127
29 June 2015
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"We don't see things as they are, but as we are"

"Don't believe everything you think"

In this issue
 
#1
The Tribune (Pittsburgh)
http://triblive.com
June 28, 2015
'Strength' is all the Russians understand
By Eric Heyl
 
Adm. James Stavridis is dean of The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and former supreme allied commander at NATO. He spoke to the Trib regarding NATO's continued commitment to containing Russia and the organization's broader agenda.

Q: Given Russia's ongoing rift with the West, are we on the verge of another Cold War?

A: Let's remember what the Cold War actually looked like. It was 5 million troops facing each other, two enormous battle fleets, two nuclear arsenals on a hair-trigger alert. We're not at that point.

We have some disagreements with Russia, which is behaving in ways that clearly violate international law. At the moment, we have some high disagreement with them and we're going to have to work through that.

But no, I don't think we're on the verge of a return to the high level of tension we saw in the Cold War.

Q: Would it be safe to characterize relations with Russia as poor as they've been since the Cold War?

A: Absolutely. We are absolutely at the lowest point in relations between not just Russia and the United States, but Russia and the West - that's NATO, the European Union, the United States and Canada.

Q: For Russia to modify its behavior, do you believe a change in leadership at the top is necessary?

A: As desirable as that would be, I think it's highly unlikely. Vladimir Putin is relatively young - he's 62. We know he's in good health because we see him without his shirt on quite a bit. He clearly has his hand firmly on all the levels of power.

His most significant opponent, Boris Nemtsov, was assassinated under mysterious circumstances. The opposition is fragmented.

I think there's zero likelihood of Putin losing power, so we have to figure out a way to work with him.

Q: What's the best way to negotiate with him?

A: By working with NATO in a position of strength, as we're doing moving weapons systems closer to the Russian border, by in my view arming the Ukrainian military, increasing our exercises around the periphery of Russia, continuing to put political pressure on Putin using the sanctions.

I think we need to negotiate from a position of strength because that's all that the Russians understand.

Q: How do you see NATO moving forward, not just with Russia but globally?

A: First with Russia, NATO will continue to do everything it must to reassure the Eastern European NATO allies of NATO's readiness to protect them. That means the exercises, pre-positioned weapons and the participation of air, sea and ground forces in and around the Russian periphery to demonstrate NATO's capability and resolve against Russia.

More globally speaking, NATO has a bigger agenda than just what's going on in Ukraine. It still has a significant mission in Afghanistan, 15,000 total troops, NATO still has significant piracy operations off the coast of Africa, still has a significant force of about 5,000 in the Balkans as peacekeepers.

I think ultimately NATO may have to take some action with Syria, which is a NATO border with Turkey-Syria, or to protect Italy from waves of potential al-Qaida and Islamic State mixed up with the migrants that are coming across the sea.

So NATO has a big agenda that continues to operate on three continents. But the No. 1 focus of NATO at the moment is deterring Russia from further activity in Europe.
 
 #2
Wilton Park (UK)
June 25, 2015
Russia - their changing relationship with the world
Podcast

President Obama's special adviser on Russia discusses the rise of the new and troubled relationship in Europe's east.

Contributor: Celeste Wallander, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Russia and Central Asia, National Security Council, Washington DC

Audio here:
https://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/podcast/russia-their-changing-relationship-with-the-world-wp1401/

 #3
Russia Insider
www.russia-insider.com
June 28, 2015
Video: Congressman Dana Rohrabacher Grills Liberal Uber Hawk Samantha Power on Ukraine

Wants to know how many civilians have been killed by Kiev so far, suggests one third of Ukraine forces are oligarch-funded paramilitaries

Video here:
http://russia-insider.com/en/politics/congressman-dana-rohrabacher-grills-us-ambassador-un-samantha-power-ukraine/ri8364
 
 #4
http://readrussia.com
June 25, 2015
The Soviet Ghost Still Haunts the West
by James Pearce
James studied History and Intercultural Communication at Anglia Ruskin University, Cambridge. His interests include Western and Russian perceptions of Russia, Russian politics, culture and Russia in the wider world. He now writes for The News Hub and teaches in Moscow.

I took my end of school exams in 2008 after two years of preparation. Which one mattered the most for me? History, the subject where I excelled and came top of the class. Prior to the exam, we learned how Russia and its revolution led to one of history's most brutal dictator's rise to power.

This was the extent of our Russian history lessons. British teenagers leave their compulsory education at Joseph Stalin. So when a country of countries is asked for an opinion of the Russian Federation, an entirely different nation to the one ruled by Stalin's iron fist, it rarely strays far from the negative.

This accompanied by a Western media who, as a rule, is usually negative about the largest country on earth shows where much of the blame for weakened relations and a worsening crisis in Ukraine can be drawn from. Not to mention that our parents grew up in height of the Cold War.

When you say 'Russia' to a Westerner, something makes them take a step back with an imaginary barge pole to prod it with. The new Russia is remarkably different to the one our parents grew up hiding under desks in reaction to, yet the mindset has not matured.

So why is it that a generation after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Western world cannot alter course on its perception of what J.M Barrie called in his novel, Peter Pan, 'the puzzling East'?

Two words provide us with a satisfactory answer: victim and change. If we analyse the Cold War as simply who won and lost, then Russia is the clear victim. There is no Soviet Union any longer and, as the majority of Russians will tell you, the introduction to capitalism in the nineties was a far cry from luxury and paradise.

By analysing 'change' a new kind of story is revealed that not even an a-level student (U.S equivalent, high school senior) is being taught. In the words of Sberbank's Vice President, Aleksandr Bazarov:

"Russia has changed dramatically. In just twenty years, our two countries and societies are very different [...] these changes are felt throughout Russia [...] from 2000 onward, the Putin era has been very positive with a decade of significant development and the impetus for the next stage of development is clear".

By comparison, the UK is in essence still stuck in the Thatcher years. The major political parties are finding it extremely difficult to stray from Thatcherite economics, best shown with the defeat of a left leaning Labour, who may need to select a centre ground candidate to stand a chance in future elections.

Moreover, anyone following debates in the House of Commons will repeatedly hear fears of second tear nations 'catching up'. Russia has shown since 2000 the potential to once again be a great power. This is, in part, due to Mr Putin's attempt to restore Russia to a status of the bygone years, but also the arsenal of resources from population to gas suggest that she is able to outstrip the major Western powers by 2050.

This remains to be seen, however, and the technological inferiority combined with recent Kremlin policies regarding oil and military development hint that Russia could be peddling backwards.

The Cold War races have changed in nature, but the aim of economic supremacy remains. Becoming a fully respected part of BRICS has sent alarm bells to the leading powers of the Western alliances. Russia is no longer the dying dog of the nineties and as with all misunderstood parts of the world, feared for her ability to stand up to the western powers who thrive on remaining centre stage of global affairs.  

It must therefore be concluded that the West is equally victim to the Cold War as Russia. After 'winning' the Cold War, the West has not exceeded economic targets nor created a new political climate. Meanwhile, their Eastern neighbours have sympathisers and great expectations. Russia still has a long journey ahead of it and much to learn, however.

The major western powers possess a huge lack of patience with Russia and expected overnight change after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. However, so often disregarded are two glaringly obvious facts: Russia never received the same assistance as say, post-war Germany, to smoothly transfer into a liberal democracy. Secondly and most importantly, the majority of Russians have never lived in a democracy.

Russia is still on the path to a new kind of country. When Russia eventually reaches the end of this long and winding road, it may unfortunately be the only time that those who are running the western world can begin to change their approach and relationship with Russia. A new generation of politicians who grew up after the Cold War will be ushered in with a new outlook on global affairs.
 
 #5
Moskovskiy Komsomolets
June 24, 2015
Mikhail Nosov, Cold War Underway - Russia Today is Result of Unlearnt Lessons of Yalta and Potsdam

In February 1945 a decision was taken in Yalta by the USSR, America, and Great Britain on the demarcation line in post-war Europe. Stalin reached an agreement with Roosevelt and they were able to convince Churchill to cede to the USSR a significant part of Eastern Europe where the USSR intended to build the socialist camp. The relationship established during the course of the Second World War allowed a short break to be taken in the Cold War, which did not actually start with Churchill's Fulton speech in 1946 but back in 1917 when the slogan of fighting world capitalism was proclaimed.

Between 1917 and 21 June 1941, the ideological confrontation was from time to time interrupted by wars and interventions. On 22 June, we effectively became the allies of Great Britain and America. That day Mayskiy, the USSR ambassador in London, visited the British Foreign Office where he was assured that "England will firmly support the USSR in the war". During the evening of the same day, having listened to a speech by Prime Minister Churchill who confirmed his support for the USSR, the ambassador noted in his diary: "Let us rejoice in today's success, and then we'll see". We will never know what the ambassador was thinking about at that moment but his satisfaction that the English had not reproached him for his former friendship with Berlin and criticism of Western imperialism is obvious.

The Potsdam conference, which took place from 17 July to 2 August 1945, still retained the global configuration drawn up in Yalta, although rather reluctantly. Harry Truman, the new American president who came to Potsdam, was supposed not only to discuss the architecture of the post-war world, including the future of Japan, but also to resolve the issue of the use of nuclear weapons. After the death of Roosevelt, Soviet-American relations as a whole and the American approach to the USSR's involvement in the war with Japan started to change. A day before the start of the conference, Truman learned of the successful test of the atomic bomb that took place on 16 July, which strengthened his intention to toughen America's stance on matters concerning the post-war settlement in Europe. Churchill, after reading an account of the tests, noted that the use of the bomb might hasten the end of the war and rule out the USSR's participation in the war with Japan.

But Truman could not bring himself to break the Yalta decision on the USSR joining the war against Japan and on 8 August, two days after Hiroshima, the Soviet army crossed the border of Manchuria. Later Moscow demanded its share of influence in Asia in return for its week-long participation in the war against Japan. Stalin sent Truman a telegram about the need to create a Soviet occupation zone in Japan. Fortunately for Japan, Truman and Gen Douglas Macarthur, the commander of the allied troops in Japan, resolutely turned Stalin down.

While the world was divided into winners and losers after the First World War, after 1945 the victors divided up zones of influence, which revived the pre-requisites for a resumption of the ideological confrontation between socialism and capitalism.

Our experience of reforming the part of the world that we got under the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, judging by the results of the last 70 years, does not evince delight even among the most unbridled propagandists. The destruction of the Yalta system started as early as June 1948 -with the blockade of West Berlin, it continued with the Berlin uprising of 1953. Further stages in its collapse occurred via Budapest in 1956, Prague in 1968, and Gdansk in 1981.The system collapsed in November 1989 together with the Berlin Wall.

After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, which did not provoke any particular emotions among the Soviet people, the socialist camp's guards disappeared and its residents quickly "scattered". The union of socialist republics proved not to be all that "indestructible" either. The three Baltic republics fled immediately and irrevocably. Georgia and Ukraine took the decision to distance themselves from Russia. Moldova also joined them in June 2014, signing an association agreement with the EU. And this is perhaps the main result and lesson of the destruction of the Yalta system. We were left with a single quasi-ally in Europe -Belarus, which despite the existence of a union state has not recognized the annexation of Crimea or the secession of South Ossetia and Abkhazia from Georgia.

We are not that eager to analyse the internal reasons for the collapse that occurred, writing everything off to "colour revolutions" or the "subversive activities" of the West. The result of this was an unprecedented increase in anti-Western sentiment due to a state ideology that almost word for word repeated the points of the Cold War era. That is what happened in October 1952 when Stalin spoke while addressing a session of the CPSU Central Committee presidium about the fact that "the Americans want to place everything under their own command but America is not respected in a single capital". And it remains the same today when President Putin said in November 2014 that the Americans "want to solve their own problems at our expense, they want to subordinate us to their influence". As for America's allies, according to the president "they are trying to defend other people's national interests -on incomprehensible grounds and with unclear prospects".

How fair is the opinion, which has become firmly established among the elite and the Russian people, that Washington dreams about how to subordinate us to its influence? There is a lot that we may not like in American politics. They are self-confident and often think that they should help the world take the right path. They make serious political mistakes, some of which, incidentally, replicate our errors. At the same time, it is hard to suspect them of striving to seize other people's territories and resources, after all it is much cheaper to buy resources than to wage a war for them, and since the war with Mexico no territorial seizures have been attributed to the Americans.

The theory that the Americans are seeking to subordinate us to their dictates evinces serious doubts. Do they need to, and if so, why? Our relations, devoid of any ideological confrontation in contrast to the last century, are defined for Washington today primarily by fears that Russia will become a threat to global security. When assessing Russian politics, the Americans think that, firstly, Moscow has returned to creating a Soviet zone of influence and, secondly, in their opinion neither Russia's foreign nor its domestic policy always meet the standards that America considers to be generally acceptable.

As far as the first assessment is concerned, the events of 2014 in Ukraine have sown the thought in the heads of Washington politicians that the policies of "defending ethnic Russians" and "the revival of the Russian world" do not exclude the use of force. And this is considered a threat to the European and global world order. As far as the question of the second assessment is concerned, the history of the mismatch in standards of political conduct between Russia and the West has its roots in the complicated and at times tragic history of our relations. It is not only a matter of the West's favourite subject of human rights but also of political behaviour that does not fit in with their notions of the standards of political ethics.

There are many reasons, both objective and subjective, behind the collapse of the alliance and then the entire system created by Yalta and Potsdam as well. However, in my view, the main one was the initial failure of the West's hopes that in the struggle against fascism the Soviet Union had become a country sharing the values of democracy. After Yalta and Potsdam, our allies did a huge amount of work on the denazification, demilitarization, and democratization of Germany and Japan. Two American generals -George Marshall and Douglas Macarthur -were able to lay the foundations for the European and Asian "economic miracles" and the return of Germany and Japan to democracy. We did not that consistently try to rid ourselves of the totalitarian past during the period of the 20th CPSU congress and perestroika. And today, Stalin is again becoming part of our concept of patriotism.

The example of the post-war development of Germany and Japan very clearly shows how a democracy resolves issues of the economy and life in society. We do not want to admit that democracy in Russia is not needed so much by the West as, in the first instance, by ourselves. That without democracy the development of our economy will again and again run up against uncontrolled corruption and ineffective public administration.

In conclusion, I would like to cite the words of America's secretary of war, Henry Stimson, who tried to analyse the complexity of the relations between Moscow and Washington. "It is becoming obvious that solid relations of security cannot be established between two such absolutely different national systems... politics cannot be constant in an autocratic system. They are linked to the life of one person. Even if a certain vision of the situation has taken shape in one head, it can be changed for a completely different policy by his successor."

This was said 70 years ago and we have had a lot of time to emerge from the paradigm described above. But we were not able to do so and, perhaps, did not want to. 
 
#6
Levada.ru
June 26, 2015
Most Russians believe USA wants to turn Russia into second-rate country - poll

A majority of Russians (86 per cent, up from 77 per cent in June 2013) believe that the USA is using Russia's current difficulties to turn it into a second-rate country and a "raw material appendage" of the West, according to an opinion poll carried out by the independent Levada organization, the results of which were published on the Levada website on 26 June.

According to 89 per cent of the respondents, Russia must strengthen its ties with other countries to counter the growing influence of the USA (6 per cent disagreed and 6 per cent could not say).

More than a half (62 per cent) believe that relations between Russia and the West will always be based on mistrust, compared with 51 per cent in 2002; and a quarter (24 per cent) believe that they can be really friendly (39 per cent in 2002); 14 per cent could not say.

Sixty-seven per cent believe that Western culture has a negative impact on Russian life, 26 per cent do not think so and 7 per cent could not say.

According to the poll, Russians believe that Europe sees Russia as the West's "raw materials appendage" (33 per cent; 40 per cent in 2006), as a potential military adversary (30 per cent; 12 per cent in 2006), or undeveloped, unpredictable and aggressive country (27 per cent; 17 per cent in 2006). One in five believes that Europe sees Russia as a place for profitable investment (20 per cent; 24 per cent in 2006) or as a lawless country (18 per cent; 20 per cent in 2006).

According to the poll, Russia sees the European countries as neighbours and partners with whom it is necessary to strengthen and develop the relations (28 per cent; 32 per cent in 2006), as a major trading partner (24 per cent) and as an example of high quality of life (20 per cent; 29 per cent in 2006). About a quarter think that Europe is a potential aggressor (23 per cent; only 8 per cent in 2006) which pursues the USA's policy (23 per cent; 7 per cent in 2006).

According to the poll, in the eyes of the West President Vladimir Putin has turned from a strategically-thinking and peaceful politician into a defender of national interests and authoritarian leader. However, 75 per cent of respondents (86 per cent in 2007) believe that the Western leaders respect him.

The poll was carried out in 46 Russian regions on 19-22 June.
 
 #7
Interfax
June 29, 2015
Most Russians sure Russian policy should not change under impact of sanctions - poll

The ongoing Western sanctions are targeting broad strata of the Russian population, 46% of Russians said in a poll held by Levada Center.

Less than a third (29%) believe that the sanctions apply to "a narrow range of persons supervising the Russian policy towards Ukraine" and 19% are confident that the administrations of Western countries do not give thought to this matter, the sociologists told Interfax.

Thirty-three percent of Russians and their families have felt the effect of the sanctions (compared to 16% in September). Some 62% claimed they did not experience any sanctions-related problems. The poll amongst 800 people was held in 134 populated localities in 46 regions on June 19-22.

Most Russians (70%) believe that Russia should carry on its policy irrespective of the sanctions. Another 20% suggest searching for compromises and making concessions in order to be exempt from the sanctions. Ten percent of the respondents were hesitant.

In the opinion of 66% of Russians, the primary objective Western countries tightening sanctions against Russia is "to weaken and humiliate Russia." A fifth of the respondents (21%) think this is an attempt "to restore the geopolitical balance upset by Crimea's accession to Russia." Only 5% see the sanctions as the wish to stop the war in Ukraine.

Given the Western sanctions, Russians think that the national administration should bolsters economic and military relations with Middle East countries, China and India (this opinion is now voiced by 42% of the respondents, as against 32% in January) and to retaliate with strict countersanctions (38% and 34% respectively).

Other countermeasures proposed by the respondents include the proposals to ignore the sanctions and to carry on the domestic and foreign policy the way it was (37% vs. 32% in January), to increase the defense budget and to allot additional funds for strengthening national defense capacity (16% and 18%, respectively) and to refuse to pay foreign debts (7% and 5%, respectively).

The same as in January, 10% of the respondents said compromises should be found and the attitude to Crimea's accession to Russia should be revised.
 #8
Business New Europe
www.bne.eu
June 26, 2015
Russia hails sanctions as an economic wonder tonic
Nick Allen in Berlin

You know Russia's hurting when it moves to cut more than 10% from its defence budget, as written into the 2016-18 draft just approved by the cabinet. But you would never know it from the flow of bullish comments by the political elite about what a splendid thing the extended Western economic sanctions are.

"We are grateful to our European and American colleagues who made us take a fresh look at agriculture, forced us to find our reserves, discover our potential," Agriculture Minister Alexander Tkachev said on June 24, in the latest glass-is-half-full sound bite. "We've learned not only to survive, but to work in this situation."

After the June 22 announcement that the EU had extended the measures into 2016, a finance colleague took it a step further. "The longer the sanctions stay in place, the better it will be for businesses, especially those operating in the sphere of import substitution," said Alexander Brechalov, secretary of the Russian Public Chamber. "Extension of sanctions by our Western partners is only positive for us so far."

"This makes us more fit, stronger," one of Russia's top entrepreneurs, Andrei Guryev, CEO of the prospering PhosAgro fertiliser producer, told bne IntelliNews during the recent St Petersburg International Economic Forum.

In fact, all that's missing now is the launch of a cheeky "Thanx for the Sanx" sweatshirt line, worn by smiling ministers and billionaires in defiant photo ops, just as many seemed proud to be named in the list of individuals sanctioned by the US and EU last year.

That they have since been unable to touch assets frozen overseas has likely dampened their spirits a little. Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov still can't access his two Cologne-stabled race horses Zazou and Dashing Home, and their ability to generate big prize money. (Then again, he has about 50 more thoroughbreds at home).

The events are worlds apart, but it is all somehow reminiscent of how officials of Benazir Bhutto's PPP party jostled in front of the late opposition leader's house during protests in Islamabad in 2007 in order to be seen on TV being detained and carted off in police wagons, having chalked up an essential item on their CV.

As for the man at the top, President Vladimir Putin said during his forum speech on June 19 that Russia had found the "inner strength" to prevent sanctions causing a deep economic crisis, and told the West to stop using "the language of ultimatums". Putin also recently picked up on the €100bn cost of sanctions to the EU calculated by one Vienna-based thinktank.

Bring on the blockade

But if the EU thought it would rattle Russians to be hit with seven more months of sanctions on June 22, the date when the Germans launched their 1941 invasion of the USSR, the diplomats in Brussels stepped on a rake. The spirit of blockade survival is a very powerful thing in Russia, epitomised by the WWII siege of Leningrad, which never surrendered despite the starvation and suffering it endured.

In other attempts to reduce the budget deficit, the government is looking to save $46bn by removing indexation of pensions. It will be unpopular, but support for the leadership is currently so strong that the Kremlin is clearly counting on senior citizens to adopt the same blockade solidarity. They will, is the prediction of most observers. Maybe Winston Churchill got it right when he reputedly said during a wartime winter visit to Moscow that "You cannot defeat a nation that enjoys ice cream at -40�C."

Russia also renewed its own counter-sanctions after the EU sanctions extension. Officials initially said it was based on a strict principle of reciprocity and that new food products were unlikely to be added to the list. But some departments are clearly warming to the task.

"We are raising the proposal of banning confectionery imports to the territory of our nation, [and] canned fish," Agriculture Minister Tkachev said, noting that the idea of including confectionery came from the Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Inspection. And just for good measure: "I think these matters can also be discussed in respect of flowers," Tkachev added.

But if we're really honest...

But behind the defiance and bravado, even companies and industries not directly hit by the sanctions are also recognising their longer-term effects. In the same interview, PhosAgro's Guryev said that even thriving concerns like his will have a hard time growing with lending rates still hiked up high. "If you want to invest and really substitute imports you have to take a very expensive credit, which today [is something] the whole country is facing, and this has really stopped development," he conceded.  

Macroeconomic indicators are looking glum: Russia's foreign trade turnover was 32.7% year-on-year less in January-April at $182.4bn, the statistics office Rosstat said on June 23. Exports of goods declined by 29.3% y/y, while imports fell by 28.7% y/y. The share of fuels and energy sources in exports declined from 73% in January to 65.2% in April.

Russia's ambitious plans for new Arctic energy exploration in June reported setbacks, with Rosneft having to suspend projects because imported drilling rigs and other systems are no longer available. And the French oil company Total just sold its 25% stake in the Shtokman gas field in Western Siberia because the sanctions did not allow it to continue.

The damage isn't all due to sanctions, though. Collapsed global oil prices last year, plus a warm winter that deprived Russia of political leverage and revenues from increased oil and gas consumption in the EU all combined to deal Moscow a lousy hand when it needed aces.

Yet in terms of import substitution, it will be easier to overhaul Russia's dilapidated agriculture sector and score some fast results than replace Western-bought technology in sectors like aerospace and energy. Millions of tons of harvested grain are still rotting due to Soviet-style systemic inefficiency. But with no Gouda or Emmental to contend with, Russian cheese production leapt almost 30% to 180,000 tonnes between January and April.

And the gratitude just keeps coming: "Thank you to those countries which adopted sanctions against us, I mean this absolutely honestly," said Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev. "In economic terms, all the sanctions imposed have of course led us to co-operate with the Asiatic countries more actively."

But unless Russia's technology can fill the gap fast, eating Russian-made ice cream in the economic chill may be the only thing to do until political and trade relations normalise. That, and hope for a rather harsher coming winter than Europe would care for.
 #9
Interfax
June 28, 2015
Russia should get less aggressive towards sex minorities - senator

Deputy chairman of the Federation Council Committee for Constitutional Legislation Konstantin Dobrynin has suggested that the American "don't ask, don't tell" principle be enshrined in the Russian law with respect to people of non-heterosexual orientation.

One may laugh at America or a tolerant Europe for as long as one likes; it should be admitted, however, that the world is global and it is only a matter of time - somewhere sooner, somewhere later - before the minorities obtain the equal rights they do not have at present, Dobrynin told Interfax.

"For Russia, it is important not to turn its back on the reality of our time and not to plunge into a barbate and ancient homophobia, but try and find the legal form that will strike a social balance on this subject between the conservative part of our society and all the rest. For a while, 'don't ask, don't tell' could become the optimal formula that could take place and actually work in our country without causing any aggression," the senator said.

In his view, this principle could be legislated.

"The most important thing is to immediately reduce the aggression towards minorities because the people who are fighting them must understand that their wild fight causes counteraction: more homophobes, more fighters for gay rights; the harsher the persecution, the stronger the protection against it," Dobrynin said.

In his view, only future will judge which path Russia will eventually embark upon, and only time will tell whether Russia's former G8 partners or current BRICS ones, who legalized same-sex marriages, were right.

"But quasi-politicians overtly speculating on homophobia and doing legislative junk must be removed from the political field and our life, the sooner, the better. It is they, and not gays, who pose a direct and overt threat to Russia's security, and it is they the state should fight against," Dobrynin said.

The senator was commenting on yet another initiative by a member of the St. Petersburg Legislative Assembly, Vitaly Milonov, who called for Facebook to be blocked in Russia. According to Milonov, the Facebook administration "has grossly violated the Russian laws by launching a function that enables users to paint their pictures into the colors of the LGBT flag."
 
 #10
Interfax
June 26, 2015
Russians are now more loyal to sex before marriage than they were 25 years ago - poll

Russian society became more liberal to sex before marriage in the past 25 years, a poll conducted by the All-Russia Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) shows.

The poll, which surveys 1,600 people, was conducted in 130 populated areas of Russia. It shows that the percentage of respondents who believe sex before marriage is unacceptable for young men went down from 29% in 1989 to 21% in 2014 and the percentage of people who believe it is unacceptable for young women went down from 37% in 1989 to 26% in 2014.

The poll shows that older people are more conservative on this matter than young people. Responding to a question as to whether sex before marriage is acceptable, 42% of the respondents older than 60 believe it is unacceptable for young men and 47% said it is unacceptable for young women (of the respondents aged 18-24, only 8% said it is unacceptable for young men and 16% said it is unacceptable for young women).

Twenty-six percent of the respondents are tolerant of sex between a young man and his future wife and 32% are tolerant of a relationship between a young woman and her future husband.

The percentage of respondents who believe citizens have a right to have sexual relations with any partner has increased considerably: 27% of the respondents (against 11% in 1989) said young men have a right to have sex with any woman and 20% (against 6% in 1989) said young women have a right to have sexual relations with any man.

Some respondents believe sex before marriage is not only allowed, but also useful for young men (13%) and for young women (9%).

Forty-nine percent of the respondents (against 48% in 1989) who find sex before marriage acceptable believe the acceptable age for beginning sexual life is 18-19, 17% believe it is normal to begin sexual life at 16-17, and 23% believe it is better to wait until at least twenty.

The number of respondents who believe sex before marriage is now widespread has increased considerably from the Soviet times (59% against 41%). Twenty-nine percent of the respondents believe sex before marriage is very common. Only 3% of the respondents said such a thing is rare (the percentage has not changed since 1989).

Fifty-two percent of the respondents said the main reason why sex before marriage is widespread is moral decline (against 42% in 1989). More Russians now mention people's wish to imitate the Western lifestyle as the main factor (from 14% to 34%). Others blame insufficient sexual education of young people (31%), earlier physical maturation (29%), and changes in the ideas of love (27%).

Among the possible negative consequences of sex before marriage, most respondents mentioned the spread of sexually transmitted diseases and AIDS (56%), the probability of many children being abandoned (46%), the increase in the number of weak families, which are created 'out of necessity'(37%).

The percentage of those who believe abortions will increase women's infertility has doubled (from 21% to 40%). More respondents are mentioning consequences such as problems with getting an education due to an early pregnancy (from 12% to 27%) and the worsening of relations between young people and the older generation (from 12% to 25%).
 
 #11
Business New Europe
www.bne.eu
June 29, 2015
CONFERENCE CALL: Russia seen muddling through, with no reform on horizon
Henry Kirby in London

Russia's wobbling economy will likely "muddle through the next couple of years," according to panelists at a bne IntelliNews debate on June 25.

The event, entitled "Russia: Which Way Now", held at Cass Business School in London, aimed to form a broad prognosis for Russia in light of the Western-led sanctions and external forces such as oil prices that have blighted its economic development over the last 12 months.

Panelist Renee Friedman, an emerging markets specialist, said that the obvious factors that will dictate a lot of Russia's near future are oil prices and continued sanctions, which, she said, "aren't going anywhere soon." Any serious and sustainable progress hinges on regional and national structural reforms. However, the political will for that kind of change just does not exist right now, she added.

bne IntelliNews Editor-in-Chief Ben Aris described a "we've been here before" mood at this years St Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF). There were no big announcements, he said, and Putin was instead preoccupied with his geopolitical posturing with the West.

Former Kremlin advisor Valery Morozov pointed to the "tremendous difference in the pictures that Russians and the West see," when a discussion of Putin occurs. Putin is not the engineer of tension that many in the West paint him to be: "he invents nothing - he only reacts," Morozov explained.

A major oversight of the US and EU has been the failure to foresee the galvanizing effect that sanctions would have on Putin's relationship with Russians. Aris noted that a recent study into brand awareness in Russia revealed Vladimir Putin to be the second most-admired brand in the country, after Google.

The debate came only a day after Putin recorded his highest-ever popularity rating, at 89%. The irony of this was not lost on Aris, who reminded the audience that Putin's popularity has always been predicated on the notion that he brings prosperity. In this sense, Aris added, sanctions have been a "massive policy failure, strengthening Putin's hand."

The last couple of months have seen Russians adopt a "firm party line that sanctions are making [them] stronger," panelist Tom Blackwell of EM Advisors said, citing a slow pivot to the East and the benefits of import substitutions. He was, though, quick to add that any benefits of sanctions are "long-term opportunities," adding that the short term is still a "tricky game."

The development of the Russia-China relationship is indeed well underway, according to Aris, who pointed out that 25% of bilateral trade with China is now settled in yuan, up from zero five years ago.

Russia will have more than enough time to cultivate its trade and finance links with China if Blackwell's forecast for another year of sanctions proves correct. When asked by bne IntelliNews Editor-at-Large Liam Halligan - who also chaired the debate - if another 12 months of sanctions are likely, Blackwell said it would be "politically unacceptable" for the EU to withdraw them at this point.

State of the economy

When quizzed about Russia's monetary policy in the coming months, Friedman predicted that there would be little to no movement in interest rates, which will directly affect small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and the retail sector. This result would be contrary to the plans laid out by Putin at SPIEF, in which he pledged to make life easier for SMEs through tax breaks and an easing of the bureaucratic hurdles that they often face.

A key component of any recovery for Russia in 2015 and 2016 will be the protection of the ruble, Friedman said. While its depreciation over the last year - from roughly 32 this time last year to a high of 80 to the dollar in December - has been pronounced, the key now is stability, she added. Aris agreed - its recent rally has actually been damaging, he said, citing April and May's year-on-year industrial production figures of -4.5 %and -5.5%, respectively as evidence of this.

Friedman came back to the theme of the need for reforms in her closing remarks, admitting that while she would love to be positive about prospects in Russia, she does not see the necessary reforms materializing any time soon.

Thomas Blackwell of EM Communications emphasized the need to have open discussions, free of emotion, in order to cool the current Russia-West tensions. Too often, he said, the geopolitical conversation regarding Russia is viewed in "black and white" terms.
 
 #12
The Nation
June 26, 2015
NATO Ups the Ante in the Ukraine Crisis
Placing troops and weaponry on Russia's border will only heighten tensions in the region.
By James Carden
James W. Carden is a contributing writer at The Nation and the executive editor for the American Committee for East-West Accord's EastWestAccord.com. A Washington, DC-based journalist focusing on US foreign policy, his articles and essays have also appeared in The American Conservative and The National Interest.

NATO defense ministers, meeting in Brussels this week, rushed headlong into a new and potentially more dangerous cold war with Russia by taking the unprecedented decision to station men and mat�riel directly on Russia's western border. NATO's decision, which has no precedent in the history of the last cold war, will only serve to heighten tensions with Russia and may well be the catalyst for ever more violence in the breakaway regions of eastern Ukraine.

Meanwhile, transatlantic efforts to undermine last February's Minsk II cease-fire accords continue without surcease. On Monday, June 22, the European Union extended sanctions against Russia in the financial, energy, technological, and defense sectors until January 2016. The decision was made at the EU's foreign ministers meeting in Luxembourg. Russia quickly retaliated, banning food imports from the EU, the United States, Canada, Norway, and Australia for the next 12 months.

The controversy surrounding the tit-for-tat sanctions was followed in short order by US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter's weeklong trip to Europe. A senior defense department official claimed that Carter would spend his time urging NATO allies to "dispose of the Cold War playbook."

Yet ditching the "playbook" obviously didn't entail jettisoning Cold War-style rhetoric, since Carter went on to denounce Russian President Vladimir Putin as a "malign influence" in Eastern Europe.

Senator John McCain, as usual, went even further. Delivering comments redolent of Dwight D. Eisenhower's famously hawkish Secretary of State John Foster Dulles's "rollback" rhetoric last weekend in Kiev, McCain said it was in the interests of the West to "reverse" Russian aggression. According to McCain, only the deluded "still cling to the Minsk cease-fire." He declared that he and the Ukrainians he met with "know this cease-fire is a fiction."

Later in the week Secretary Carter participated in the NATO defense ministers' meeting in Brussels. And the summit's-please forgive the bureaucratese-"deliverables" indicate that the alliance has taken Carter's directive to heart, with plans to triple the number of troops in its Response Force to 40,000 troops. Troops, armored vehicles and up to 250 tanks will be stationed across Europe's eastern frontier, with plans to station them in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania.

Taking this perhaps fateful step is, in fact, going far beyond the "Cold War playbook" and has no parallel in Cold War history.

These maneuvers precede what will be NATO's largest joint exercise of the post-Cold War era, Trident Juncture 2015, which is planned to take place September 28 to November 6.

More worrying still is the fact that the NATO meeting took place amidst a rash of nuclear posturing from both sides. On June 16, President Putin made headlines throughout the West when he announced that Russia would add 40 additional intercontinental ballistic missiles to its nuclear deterrent. His announcement was, in turn, denounced in short order by Secretaries Kerry and Carter as well as by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg.

Such was the import of Putin's comments that the House Armed Services Committee held a hearing on Thursday on nuclear deterrence. The ostensible focus of the hearing was the increasingly aged state of the US nuclear arsenal, but the hearing also served, not surprisingly, as occasion for hard-line Republicans to sound the alarm over Russia's nuclear "provocations."

Questions over just how to shore up the US nuclear deterrent in the face of a resurgent Russia have also been a priority of Washington's think tanks. The Center for Strategic and International Studies just released a report, Project Atom, which urges the Pentagon to add, among other things, a carrier-based nuclear deterrent to the arsenal. The defense journalist Tyler Rogoway explains that the "strategy emanates from the idea that a deterrent is more effective when it's forward deployed to positions in and around an ally's geographical area."

Yet, according to Council on Foreign Relations expert Adam Mount, for all the hand-wringing over Russia's nuclear arsenal, Putin's recent announcement was "entirely in line with previous expectations and did not add major new capabilities to his nuclear arsenal." Russia, according to Mount, continues to be in full compliance "with the New START treaty, which limits strategic launchers like ICBMs."

Nevertheless, all the Sturm und Drang over the sanctions, NATO troop buildups, and nuclear saber rattling masks the uncomfortable fact that it is our clients in Kiev who are acting as the primary-though, of course, not only-obstacles to implementing Minsk II.

In Brussels, NATO signally failed to address Kiev's ongoing economic and financial blockade of the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine, its firing of GRAD rockets into crowded residential blocks in eastern Ukrainian cities, and its refusal to negotiate with the rebel leaders as stipulated by the Minsk accords. Meanwhile, President Obama is said to continue to insist that it is the Russian-separatist side alone that is refusing to implement the accords.

And so the events of this week have extinguished any glimmer of hope that may have been sparked by John Kerry's diplomatic parley with the Russians in Sochi this past May. All the while, the administration, aided and abetted by a compliant Congress and a complacent media, stands idly by as the war parties on both sides of the Atlantic march on, unencumbered and virtually unopposed.

For more about an organization dedicated to opposing this rush toward a new Cold War please visit EastWestAccord.com
 
 #13
Interfax
June 28, 2015
NATO will never invade Russia - McFaul

Former U.S. ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul has said NATO is not planning to invade Russia and there is no need for the Russian leadership to deploy S-400 air defense systems on its Western borders. "NATO will never invade Russia," he twitted on Sunday.

The former ambassador said the Russian leadership is groundlessly concerned about the deployment of NATO armaments near Russian borders. "Russians should also relax about NATO defensive weapons near Russian borders since Russia tells us no plan to invade NATO countries," McFaul wrote.

"Only a complete fool would invade Russia. Thankfully no fools running NATO countries," the diplomat noted.

Previously the Russian Defense Ministry announced new S-400 "Triumf" long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems and "Pantsir-S" combined SAM and anti-aircraft artillery systems will enter service in the air defense divisions stationed in the Northwestern Federal District before the end of 2015.

"In all, more than 30 sets of modern SAM systems will enter service in the air defense divisions of the Western Military District (WMD) before the end of 2015 under the State Defense Order-2015 program," the WMD said in a press release.
 
 #14
Interfax
June 26, 2015
Russia to react "immediately" if NATO increases strength in Europe - source

Moscow, 26 June: By "slightly pushing" Russia by increasing the alliance's military presence in Europe, the USA and NATO are waging a "game of nerves" for now, however should any practical steps be taken towards an escalation near Russia's western border, Moscow will respond without delay, a source in the military and diplomatic circles has told Interfax-AVN.

"So far the military rhetoric of Washington and capitals of European member states of NATO is a sort of the 'political chess' game, a 'war of nerves', and Russia has been playing its part more professionally," the source said.

According to his estimate, the statements by the NATO leadership and US military officials on increasing the combat strength of the alliance's rapid reaction force and stationing of heavy arms in Europe, including 250 tanks, howitzers and infantry fighting vehicles, are a "declaration of intent".

"However it should be noted that it is one thing if the point in question is a declaration of intent without any consequences. However if NATO indeed builds up its military infrastructure close to Russia's western border, response measures will follow immediately," the source said.

He said that this would include "the implementation of a comprehensive plan consisting of both symmetric and not so symmetric measures." "They, and that is very important, will not require big additional resources from the budget, like they expect in Washington," he said.

Among the traditional ways of containing a potential aggressor, he named, in particular, "the colossal potential of Russia's strategic nuclear forces".

"If Western partners started using half-forgotten reasons and terms of the cold war era, let them remember what just one intercontinental ballistic missile [IBM] which reaches Pentagon can do. Compared to Soviet nuclear bombs which, as it was repeatedly said, could wipe the USA off the map several times a minute, the Yars and Bulava IBMs, which now form the foundation of the Russian nuclear triad, are a huge step forward in terms of combat capabilities," he said.
 
 #15
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
June 29, 2015
Does Europe need a new arms race?
With the Pentagon planning to send heavy weapons and artillery to the Baltic states and Eastern Europe, will the stance help counter Russia's policy in Ukraine?
By Artem Kureev
Artem Kureev is an expert from the Moscow-based think tank "Helsinki+" that deals with protecting interests of Russians living in the Baltic countries. Kureev graduated from Saint Petersburg State University's School of International Relations. His research interests include domestic policy of the Baltic countries, ecology of the Barents Sea, national minorities in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, Russia-NATO relations.

Last week the Pentagon announced about its plans to send heavy weapons and artillery to the Baltic states and Eastern Europe. Will the move help protect these countries against what they describe as Russian aggression?

Back in September 2014, during a visit by U.S. President Barack Obama to Tallinn and at the NATO summit in Wales, the governments of the Baltic states and Poland showed concern about the growing threat from Russia. Referring to the conflict in Ukraine and Russia's "lightning-fast" incorporation of Crimea, Warsaw, Riga, Vilnius and Tallinn demanded an increase in NATO's combat readiness on its eastern borders.

Although in Wales the decision was made to set up a 10,000-strong rapid reaction unit, it was not enough. The leaders of the Baltic republics insisted on reinforcements from NATO countries with the most mission-capable armies.

Then on June 22, a symbolic date for Russia [the start of Nazi Germany's operation against the Soviet Union - editor's note], the Pentagon decided to deploy a significant military contingent, including 250 tanks and other heavy equipment, in the Baltic states, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania. What was initially behind the demand for military aid from these powerful allies, and why was there such willingness to provide it?

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Baltic states effectively built up their own armies from scratch. Casting off their Soviet past, Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius actively pursued NATO standards through the purchase of Western military equipment and the hiring of military trainers from the United States, Britain and Germany. In contrast, Poland and other former Warsaw Pact countries already had sufficient combat-ready forces, which, on the contrary, had to be cut.

Poland's entry to NATO in 1999, followed by Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 2004, was tacit recognition that these countries were considered capable of bringing their armies into line with NATO standards. However, some Baltic republics were essentially lacking military aviation and heavy machinery. Only by the end of 2014 were these countries able to fully motorize their troops by purchasing a large number of Dutch and British armored vehicles.

In 2004 the North Atlantic allies provided an "air umbrella," launching a mission to protect the airspace of the three Baltic republics. It involved stationing NATO fighter jets on a rotational basis at the Siauliai (Lithuania), Ameri and Tapa (Estonia) military airbases, tasked with guarding the Baltic skies. Since 2004 the number of NATO warplanes in the region has increased from four to around two dozen.

At the same time, work was carried out on the reconstruction of Soviet-era infrastructure to ensure the rapid deployment of troops and heavy amphibious aircraft, and to create a new network of radar stations. A substantial portion of the expenses were incurred by the Baltic republics themselves under the "Smart Defense" concept, which assumed, as the name implies, that the Alliance was able to allocate its forces wisely.

How the Ukraine crisis is spurring a new arms race

The start of the Ukraine crisis caused Russia's Baltic neighbors to declare all previous measures inadequate. Baltic and Polish politicians began to argue that NATO assistance would simply not arrive in time in the event of a Russian offensive. Latvia and Estonia, both with large Russian-speaking communities, even voiced fears that Moscow may try to incite rebellion in their eastern territories, where Russian speakers make up the majority of the population, on the model of the "people's republics" in eastern Ukraine. That was one of the factors in setting up the rapid reaction force.

However, the proposal for a 10,000-strong contingent was deemed short of the mark. In February 2015, NATO defense ministers agreed that the force would number 30,000 troops, 4,000 of whom would be on constant high alert, with command centers manned by a small staff of permanent employees based in Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria.

But even that did not suffice. On April 12 Estonian President Toomas Henrik Ilves stated that in the present circumstances, NATO would not be able to come to the aid of the Baltic states in time, since "everything could be over in 4 hours." He requested Germany to deploy military units on Estonian soil.

Tellingly, this past year Tallinn has been actively demonstrating its role as the Baltic leader in NATO. This is because Estonia is an "exemplary member of the Alliance," spending 2 percent of GDP on defense as required, taking an active part in NATO missions, and possessing the most combat-ready army of all three countries. That is largely why Obama chose Tallin as the venue for his meeting with the leaders of the three Baltic countries in September of last year, as if to emphasize its leading role in the region.

Moreover, Estonia proved its defense capabilities during "Siil 2015" [Hedgehog 2015], one of the largest military exercises in the country's recent history, in which 13,000 troops took part. Estonian media were quick to tell the world that the number of service personnel involved exceeded the contingent of Russian forces on the other side of the border. At the same time, although the mobilized reservists had been warned a year in advance, Tallinn showed that, if necessary, it was able to "call to arms" a significant number of trained fighters in real time.

Against this backdrop, the May 12 request of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia to send additional NATO troops seemed somewhat strange. After all, at least one of these countries had already shown high combat capability and the ability to achieve parity with the potential adversary in a timely manner.

As already noted, the Baltic states have NATO air cover and will soon see a new rapid reaction force, in addition to which Estonia hosts the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence to combat Russian cyber threats. NATO's new military units will impose a heavy burden on the budgets of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Estonian Defense Minister Sven Mikser has stated that the cost of basing the allies will be added to the 2 percent of GDP that Estonia is obliged to spend on defense as a NATO member.

At the same time, it is still unclear precisely how much heavy equipment will be located in which country, although it can be assumed that one of the tasks of the new contingents will be to retrain Eastern European troops. Looking further ahead, Washington sees these countries as a market for US armored vehicles and hopes to wean the Romanians, Bulgarians and Poles off the Soviet T-72 and T-55, which presently make up more than half of their tank divisions.

Why Europe seeks a new arms race

A new wave of arms proliferation is not in the interests of the small Baltic nations. Hosting other countries' military forces will not come cheap, even with additional funding from NATO . However, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia's logic is simple. On the surface it is about election promises.

Ahead of Estonia's parliamentary elections in March, Prime Minister Taavi Roivas shot a campaign video at Amari airbase, where, to the roar of a fighter jet, he promised to protect his country. Meanwhile, a few weeks ago, Latvia elected as its new president Raimonds Vejonis, who in his former capacity as defense minister beefed up the army with second-hand British armored vehicles.

The ruling political establishments of the Baltic republics are generally exploiting the "Russian threat" to improve their ratings.

Another obvious aim of the redeployment of heavy weaponry to the Russian border is NATO's desire to provoke a response from Russia. In particular, the Alliance hopes that by being forced to send troops to its north-western borders to maintain parity with NATO, Moscow will be unable to continue supplying hardware to the rebels in the Donbas, which the West believes is happening.

Meanwhile, the Baltic region's defense spending is becoming ever more tangible. For instance, the new Estonian government was forced to adopt a set of unpopular laws to increase excise taxes, which led to a significant drop in the ruling Reform Party's ratings.

However, the widely touted success of "Hedgehog 2015" and the creation of new jobs required to service the body of NATO troops will, according to the so-called reformists, help counter their already declining popularity.

Despite the fact that a direct conflict between Russia and NATO leading to nuclear Armageddon is hardly likely, the war games on Russian borders benefit all of the organizers.

It should not be forgotten that the brunt of the burden falls on taxpayers, who are forced by their elected politicians to feed someone else's army.
 
 #16
The Unz Review
www.unz.com
June 29, 2015
Russia: Tit for Tat
By Izrael Shamir

Hail, fire and brimstone, new sanctions or the US tanks on its borders, Russia takes things in stride. President Putin could adopt the motto of William of Orange: saevis tranquillus in undis, calm amidst the tempest. The tempest is all around. American tanks moved into the Baltic states. American warships sail up the Black sea. The EU sanctions against Russia were extended for another six months. Russian assets were seized in France and Belgium. In Syria, Damascus is threatened by the US-armed rebels. Greece wants to embrace Russia, but probably will not dare. Armenia, a small country hidden between Iran and Turkey, just joined the Eurasian Union of Russia-led states, and already there are public disturbances ominously reminding everyone of Kiev 2013. Ukraine is in shambles, sending waves of refugees to Russia. A weaker nation would become hysterical. Putin and Russia remain nonplussed.

I'll tell you a Missisippi joke. A black criminal and a white criminal are being led to the gallows. The black takes it easy, the white guy weeps. Stop whining, said the black. It's easy for you to say, retorted the white, you blacks are used to such treatment. Likewise, Russia is used to such treatment since Soviet days, and even since earlier times, for the rivalry between heirs of Rome and the heirs of Constantinople is very old indeed. Now, a short period of d�tente is over, and it's back to cold war. Surprise, surprise: the majority of Russians would prefer the West's hostility of Brezhnev days to their warm embraces in the days of Gorbachev and Yeltsin. Indeed things do improve, with the cold war and the sanctions.

The Russian idle rich, bereft of Miami and C�te d'Azur pleasures, pay more attention to their less fortunate fellow citizens. They do not steal less, but spend the loot locally.

A most prominent lady, Valentina Matvienko, the Senate Speaker, had been banned from travelling to Europe and the US, so she went for holidays to a Russian resort. She quickly discovered its faults, aside of its considerable charm, and provided the budget needed for improvements. Let them all be banned, was the cry.

Russian cheese makers could never compete with French or Italian ones in the liberal, open-markets-and-borders Russia of yesteryear. Came sanctions, and in the span of six months they almost doubled their output. Their cheaper cheeses are now freely available, while previously supermarkets preferred to stock expensive foreign cheeses.

The Army needs hardware to defend the Motherland, and advanced Russian industry gets more orders from the Ministry of Defence. Factories and workers laid off or semi-retired get a new life, foreign customers queue up, the rouble is steadied. Young men get some purpose beyond watching telly and complaining. A feeling of national pride - after the terrible humiliations of being unheard and taken-for-granted in Yugoslavia, Ukraine and elsewhere - comes back.

Infrastructure is brought up-to-date. Moscow gets a new hundred miles of bicycle paths, parks are well attended. The capital city is clean and shiny despite the stretch of heavy rains.

Now you understand why Russians are in favour of sanctions. They are quite supportive of the government and of the president, whose American-agency-measured ratings reached an unheard-of 89%. It's not that the Russians want war, but they are tired of their country being pushed to the wall, as they see it. They do not want an Empire for themselves, but they want to be heard and their demands considered. And they want their government to make their erstwhile partners, present adversaries, pay for each anti-Russian action.

Among the very popular retaliatory steps of the Russian government, there is the full termination of transfer arrangements for the NATO troops occupying Afghanistan. President Putin in his first term, in 2001, was an enthusiastic supporter of the US; so after the American invasion of Afghanistan he offered Russian assistance with the transfer of equipment to and from that country. Now, almost 15 years later, this shortest and easiest route to Kabul has been cut; the Americans have to shift their heavy weaponry through Pakistan mountain passes where they are ambushed by the guerrillas with a long experience of fighting invaders from Alexander the Great to Brezhnev.

Russians liked the tit-for-tat decision to ban dozens of Western politicians from entering Russia, as a response to Western banning of Russian politicians from entering Europe. Perhaps Russia is not the world's most popular holiday destination, but surprisingly, the ban did hurt. The very idea of a Russian active response took the Europeans by surprise: they never thought the Russians have the means or guts. Squeaks of excluded Western public figures were music to Russian ears.

Regarding the Ukrainian crisis, there are many who dream of Russian tanks racing to Kiev and restoring civil peace to the troubled Ukraine, but this dream will remain unfulfilled while Putin believes there are other, peaceful ways to solve the problem. Still, the Soviet-style obsessive peace-mongering and fear of war gave way to a more vigorous attitude to war as a forced but unavoidable necessity of life. The soul-numbing mantra of "everything is better than a war" finally has been dropped.

On May 9th celebrations of the 70th V-day were most lavish ever in people's memory, and provided citizens with a chance to view the newest Russian military toys. This year, the Russians stressed their victory rather than their victimhood, suffering and losses. The victory has been perceived as a Russian victory over Europe, not only over Germany; for practically all European nations from France, Spain and Italy to Hungary and Bulgaria fought on Hitler's side against Russia. This is true, but this truth was rarely mentioned until this year. Faded Russian hopes of Europe supporting Russia's independent policies for its own benefit gave place to recognition that the European leaders are as obedient to Washington as their predecessors were to Berlin.

Slowly, oh so slowly the Russian giant remembered days of his youth, the battles on the Volga River and the sack of Berlin. These memories made him laugh over threats of Frau Merkel and Mr Obama. Just after the war parade on May 9th, millions of civilians marched the streets carrying photos of their fathers and grandfathers, the soldiers of the War. This was absolutely unexpected: neither I nor other observers and journalists, foreign or domestic, predicted an event of such magnitude. The city of Moscow planned for ten thousand participants; fifty times more, over half a million marched in Moscow alone, twelve million all over Russia.

This unprecedented act of solidarity for Russia had sent seismic tremors through the whole society. Many marchers carried the picture of the victorious war-time leader, Joseph Stalin. He is far from being generally loved, but anyone whose mentioned name can make fat cats and their apologists shake with rage cannot be wholly bad. People call for returning his name to Stalingrad, the place of the great battle, renamed by Khrushchev. Putin is not keen on that step, yet.

The towering presence of the Chinese President Xi at the May celebrations signified an historic realignment with China: a sea change in Russia's policies. Its connection with China grows stronger every day. This is a new attitude: previously, Russians and Chinese were suspicious of each other, even after overcoming the hostility of late Soviet days. Pro-Western Moscow liberals snubbed the Chinese and planned for an American-led war against China. Now this dream (or nightmare) is over. We are not yet back to 1950s, when Mao and Stalin established their ties, but close to it.

Some eight hundred years ago Russia had been in a similar situation, being hard pressed by the West. The Pope blessed a Crusade against them, demanding they accept Western hegemony and give up their Byzantine Christianity. Then, Prince Alexander preferred to accept the Mongol patronage of Genghis Khan's successors rather than submit to the Western diktat. His gamble worked out: Russia retained its own way, and the plucky Prince was sainted by the Church as St Alexander Nevsky. The Russians still feel that using Easterners' support is less dangerous for the Russian soul than complying with the Western demands.

Could it be that Putin, a native of St Petersburg who cherishes his European contacts, speaks four foreign languages fluently (none of them Chinese), will repeat the deed of St Alexander and realign Russia eastwards? This would be a huge loss for Europe, as the Old Continent will become an American colony in all but name. St Petersburg, the city of St Alexander's last repose, is definitely an European city, west-facing as opposed to east-facing Moscow. It is most delightful in June, the month of White Nights, when it basks in light, cool and lucid light at day and soft and milky light at night, while lilac bushes in full bloom, dressed to kill, gaze into aquatic mirror for channels and rivers criss-cross the Northern Capital of Russia so a stream is never too far. The old Imperial glory still rests on the shores of the Neva River.

This was the heart of the Russian Empire until Lenin shifted the government seat back to the old capital, to Moscow. That's why, during the Soviet years, Petersburg (or Leningrad, as it was called then) did not suffer much from massive low-budget housing programmes that disfigured Moscow. The British historian Arnold Toynbee (all but forgotten due to his anti-Zionist stand) said the move to Moscow ''embodied the reaction of the Russian soul against the Western Civilization''. Putin's presidency, he would say, embodied a pro-European shift of the Russian soul. Could (what some Russians view as) Europe's betrayal cause Putin part ways with Europe, instead?

I saw him at the recent International Economic Forum in St Petersburg. At the Forum, Putin did very well: calm, he kept his poker face, answered every question sincerely, he never became irritated or visibly annoyed. He calmly dealt with the crisis of the seized Russian property. His people would prefer if he were to thump his fist and seize French and Belgian assets. Instead, he promised to deal by legal means through European courts.

He came to St Petersburg after a very successful trip to Baku, the capital of oil-rich Azerbaijan where European Games provided a chance to meet and confer at length with Presidents of Turkey and Azerbaijan. None of Western leaders showed up, but these rulers of the Orient were quite satisfied with their own company.

Summing it up, President Putin speaks softly. If he carries a big stick, he does not flash it around. He does not act heartbroken because of some Western unpleasantness. It seems he is working hard for alternative arrangements but he wants to postpone painful decisions as long as possible. Eventually he may be forced into a strategic alliance with China, which will further undermine Europe's remaining independence.

However, things are not black-and-white. Russia is interconnected with the West in many unexpected ways. The most implacable enemy of Russia is the former Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt. His wife has been banned from visiting Russia. At the same time, Bildt was appointed an advisor to a Russian oil company, belonging to the second-richest oligarch of Russia, Michael Friedman. Friedman, one of the seven original oligarchs of Yeltsin's days, began as a ticket tout. He lavishly spends on Jewish education. His Alfa Bank tried to stop production of the new Russian tank, Armata by bankrupting the armour-building factory. Friedman is friendly with Putin. So much for the simple image of the ruthless Russian dictator, sworn enemy of Jewish oligarchs.

Indeed Russia remains liberal, and Russian liberals copy American liberals, mutatis mutandis. They treat Putin like their US counterparts treated Bush II, though by their choice of vocabulary you'd think he is a Kim Jong Il. Newspapers are free to slight Putin, and they use their freedom to utmost. Theatre directors insert anti-Putin philippics into monologues of classic plays replete with attacks on the Church. Cinema stresses poverty and abuse in his realm just like Jim Jarmusch. But ordinary people like Putin as Bush II was popular in the Red states. They would like him even more were he to give the Americans a double tit for their tat, but meanwhile Putin prefers to do with token retaliation.
 
 #17
Reuters
June 28, 2015
Ukraine debt envoy ratchets up payment suspension warning
By Marc Jones

Ukraine could suspend its debt payments almost immediately if an important meeting with creditors on Tuesday ends in stalemate, the country's chief debt envoy Vitaly Lisovenko said.

Ravaged by conflict and on International Monetary Fund life support, Ukraine is asking its foreign bondholders to accept a 40 percent writedown or "haircut" on the $23 billion of debt they own, but so far they have not agreed.

In an interview with Reuters, Lisovenko said the talks in Washington, which will include the IMF and the Franklin Templeton-led creditor group, needed to end three months of deadlock and open the door to debt restructuring negotiations.

"My personal opinion and sincere belief is that all the parties involved have enough information necessary for making a quick decision," he said.

However, if no progress was made Ukraine could declare a temporary halt to payments, he said. "There are no more excuses not to (start restructuring talks)," he said.

Suspending payments could push Ukraine into fully fledged default. It would also allow bondholders to demand immediate repayment on the country's entire stock of bonds.

But Lisovenko, who will be leading the negotiations for Ukraine at Tuesday's meeting, said those risks mattered little considering the country's precarious situation.

Asked whether creditors could move to seize the country's assets, he replied: "There are no assets, unfortunately."

Until now, most analysts have been expecting Kiev to continue to pay its bonds over the summer. Coupon payments are relatively manageable up until September, when a more substantial $500 million is due.

Ukraine is seeking to plug a $15.3 billion funding gap that has ballooned following Russia's annexation of Crimea and subsequent fighting between government forces and pro-Russian separatists in the east of the country.

A key issue in the negotiations is whether Ukraine will pay a $3 billion bond owed to Russia in December. Failure to do so could strain relations with the IMF, although the fund has said it will continue to support Ukraine.

At the same time, creditors such as Franklin Templeton fear there would be less money left for them if Russia was paid.

"I don't think it will be a subject," Lisovenko said. "I don't think it's very relevant because we have made it clear from the beginning that all external creditors will be treated equally."

SWEET AND SOUR

This week the country's central bank predicted the economy would slump 9.5 percent this year. Hopes of a rebound next year are being dampened by fears of renewed conflict in eastern Ukraine, despite a tentative ceasefire with pro-Russian rebels.

The IMF did a fresh review of Ukraine's prospects at the end of May. They have not yet been made public but will be one of the items on the agenda on Tuesday, along with issues such as the political situation and the likely mechanics of any restructuring.

"What is most important in my personal view is whether it (economic growth in 2016) is minus or plus," Lisovenko said.

Ukraine said last week its updated proposal to creditors included an instrument allowing them to recover more value if the economy performs better than currently projected.

Lisovenko refused to be drawn on what would be considered good enough to trigger this sweetener.

If it was agreed that restructuring talks could begin after Tuesday's meeting, he said that creditors would have to agree not to trade any of the debt they hold.

However, on the key question of how long the process could take, he remained bullish.

"We do want to get the deal done and if on the other side there is the same attitude it could be days. But the situation is changing and the longer they wait the worse it could become."
 
 #18
Kyiv Post
June 26, 2015
After a year of war against Ukraine, Russia is still the country's leading trade partner
by Ilya Timtchenko and Olena Gordiienko
[Charts here http://www.kyivpost.com/content/business/after-a-year-of-war-against-ukraine-russia-is-still-the-countrys-leading-trade-partner-392123.html]

Despite 16 months of war against Ukraine, Russia remains the country's single largest trading partner, with $3.4 billion exchanging hands in the first quarter of this year.

Comprising 14 percent of Ukraine's total foreign trade turnover, the bilateral trade figures signify the extent to which Ukraine's Soviet-era industries of metals, machinery and locomotives are still tied to Russia's. It also underscores the Ukrainian economy's failure to diversify by improving quality standards to tap other markets, in particular, the European Union.

The share of commerce with Russia, however, has declined by 13 percent since 2013 when it accounted for 27 percent of trade. Business with China and the EU has in turn increased.

As a trading entity, the 28-member EU remains Ukraine's largest trading partner with $9.3 billion in bilateral turnover in the first four months of 2015. Ukraine has somewhat benefited from a free trade deal with the EU that went into effect this year through import-free quotas on certain products. China is in third with $2.2 billion worth of business.

Russia and Ukraine have stopped short of engaging in a full-blown trade war despite open military hostilities between the countries. Moscow though has banned many Ukrainian food products such as dairy and meat.

"Despite the opened European Union market... Ukrainian producers still did not manage to reorient towards European and other foreign markets, so the Russian market stays as our main partner," Angela Bochi, senior economist at the International Center for Policy Studies, a Ukrainian think tank, said.

The bulk of Ukrainian products fail to meet international quality and safety standards. Having lower standards, Russia does not mind the cheap prices of Ukrainian goods. This is one of the main reasons why Russia maintains a leading trade role with Ukraine, Bochi said.

"When Ukrainian products will correspond to international requirements, the EU and other international markets will open up for us. This depends on the marketing abilities of our companies and on state export policies" which are not in place in Ukraine yet, Bochi said.

As a result, Ukrainian exports depend heavily on Russia making the country vulnerable to sudden changes in Russian foreign trade policies.

The Russian market, in turn, doesn't substantially depend on trade with Ukraine. With all the losses in exports to Ukraine, Russia's overall exports fell by less than half a percent in 2014 compared to the previous year.

In fact, during the past four years Russia has a pursued a policy of substituting its imports with local production. Because of this, Ukraine feels the pain more from cutting bilateral ties with Russia, according to Bochi.

However, she does see Ukraine gradually moving toward the EU. In the next few years the structure of Ukraine's foreign trade will continue changing and exports to Russia will gradually fall.

Ricardo Giucci, head of the German Advisory Group in Ukraine, a think tank, sees the changes as much more drastic.

"The importance of the Russian market for Ukraine is declining rapidly," Giucci said.

Since 2013, Ukraine's trade with Russia has been declining while on the rise with China, Germany and Poland - the country's three biggest trade partners after Russia.

Ukraine has drastically cut gas and oil imports from Russia, switching towards European reverse flows and thus reducing its energy dependency on its hostile neighbor. The German Advisory Group reports that Ukraine imported $4.1 billion worth of gas from Russia last year - 68 percent of total gas imports - compared to $10.8 billion, or 91 percent, in 2013.

But Ukraine has a long way to go to establish trade independence from Russia. Ukraine's second largest single trade partner, China, accounts for only a third of Russia's trade with Ukraine during the same period.

Ukraine's first four months of 2015 show that Russia is still by far the country's leading trade partner, though its trade share is continuously decreasing.

Giucci said that it makes more sense to look at the EU as a unified trading entity rather than at individual countries. "The EU is a trading block and its members have no independent trade policy," he said.

He continued: "In 2014, 32 percent of Ukraine's exports went to the EU, while only 18 percent went to Russia."

This indicates that the decline in trade with Russia is a long term trend that gained momentum last year.
 
 #19
Sputnik
June 28, 2015
'In Ukraine Oligarchs Fall Like Leaves' to Make Room for Poroshenko's Clan

Those gathered on the Maidan square in Kiev a year and a half ago wanted oligarchs to go, blaming them for some of Ukraine's worst ailments, but it is better to be careful what you wish for.

Petro Poroshenko inaugurated as President of Ukraine, June 7, 2014, following snap presidential elections held May 25, where Porosheko was able to secure victory in the first round of voting.

Some of the superrich, who made fortunes before the February 2014 coup, retained their position in the new Ukraine, because the new leadership needed all allies it could find to fight the independence supporters in the east of the country, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung reported.

The alliance between the Kiev authorities and the oligarchs "lost its binding power" when the situation in the east of the country became relatively calm, the Poroshenko administration and those close to him remained in power and the Western countries started to pour in money to save the economy. It was time to act.

"In Ukraine, the oligarchs fall like autumn leaves: not all at once, not in one dramatic descent into hell, but individually, slowly, sliding," Konrad Schuller said, evoking poetic imagery in his article "The Power of the Billionaires."

Igor Kolomoisky, described by his friends as "the most brutal among the many brutal men of Ukrainian big business" according to Schuller, was the first to go.

In March, President Petro Poroshenko dismissed the billionaire, who served as the governor of the Dnipropetrovsk Region. In late spring, the president removed Kolomoisky's ally, Igor Palytsia from the post of the Odessa governor. This position is currently held by former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, an ally of Poroshenko's.

Gas tycoon Dmytro Firtash and Rinat Akhmetov, a coal and steel magnate, have also fallen out of favor.

Firtash's key person in the power structures Valentyn Nalyvaichenko was dismissed as the head of the Security Service of Ukraine. Coal mines and still mills belonging to Akhmetov were destroyed in the shelling and the billionaire is "only a shadow of himself," Schuller said.

There is a silver lining at least for one former multimillionaire, who is at the apex of his career now - Ukraine's President Petro Poroshenko. The man with an estimated wealth of $1.3 billion and an array of businesses has not fulfilled his major pre-election promise. After more than a year in office he still has not sold his assets, including the Roshen Confectionery Corporation.

Member of the Ukrainian parliament Viktoriia Voitsitska from the Self Reliance party believes that a new group of oligarchs is forming around Poroshenko. They intend to seize Ukraine's energy market, according to Schuller.

Minister of Energy and Coal Industry Volodymyr Demchyshyn, Valeriia Gontareva, who heads the National Bank of Ukraine, and Dmytro Vovk, the head of the National Commission for State Energy and Public Utilities Regulation are the key members of the president's entourage.

All of them are linked to the Investment Capital Ukraine (ICU). Along with Rothschild CIS, the ICU is tasked with selling Poroshenko's assets, the German newspaper reported.

These are by far not the only vices plaguing Ukraine. Unlawful privatization and questionable tenders help certain oligarchs' get richer. State assets are sold so fast, Western investors have no time to assess whether they are lucrative or not. The only ones, able to purchase profitable properties are members of Poroshenko's inner circle, Schuller concluded.
 
 #20
Russian policy of supporting Syrian authorities remains unchanged - Putin

MOSCOW. June 29 (Interfax) - Russia's policy of supporting the Syrian authorities and people remains unchanged, Russian President Vladimir Putin said.

"We see how complicated situation[al] development in Syria is, firstly the one related to international terrorism aggression. We understand that amid such situations success always corresponds with certain issues, and military failures could occur. But we are certain that in the end the Syrian people will win," Putin said on Monday during a meeting with Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem.

"And our policy aimed at supporting Syria, the Syrian authorities and the Syrian people remains unchanged," the Russian president said.

Syria is ready to move along the path of cooperation with the countries of the region with Russia's support, Muallem said.

We are aware of your merits in the achievements Russia has recently made, however more efforts will be needed to establish the coalition you have mentioned, the coalition of neighboring countries, and for its efficiency, the Syrian minister said.

As you know, the main problem of Syria is that of bordering countries supporting terrorists operating in our country, Muallem said. However, we are ready to lead the way to cooperation in fighting terrorists while leaning on your efforts, he said.

Syria always takes into account the experience of the Soviet Union in fighting fascism, this is why we count on your support and are certain
 
 #21
www.rt.com
June 29, 2015
'Initiative is in ISIS hands', coalition airstrikes not enough to win - Kremlin

Besides controlling large parts of Iraq and Syria, ISIS also has a "military and political initiative" ramping up its activity in other states, a Kremlin foreign policy aide said, insisting on a closer engagement of the anti-ISIS coalition with Damascus.

Islamic State (IS, formerly ISIS/ISIL) "controls large parts of Syria and Iraq, including important facilities of their economic infrastructure," a senior Russian foreign policy adviser, Yury Ushakov said, as quoted by TASS.

The military and political initiative is in the extremist group's hands, one of Putin's top aides said, adding that IS activity has also been growing in Afghanistan's northern provinces, as well as in Libya, Central Asia and on the territory of the northern Caucasus.

"The efforts of the US-led international coalition against radical Islamists and extremists have clearly shown that airstrikes alone do not lead to a decisive success in the fight against the militants," Ushakov said.

Keeping this in mind, some degree of contact between representatives of the Syrian government and other countries involved in the conflict, including Saudi Arabia, "cannot be excluded in the short-term perspective," he said.

"In this dangerous situation ... disagreements should be forgotten in order to coordinate efforts in the fight against IS," Ushakov urged. After the extremist forces are eliminated in Syria, he added Russia and other countries could help facilitate "free parliamentary elections in Syria under the control of international observers."

This all could help bring the Syrian crisis back on the route to a peaceful resolution, Putin's aid said, pointing out that the current Syrian government "is among the most real and efficient forces fighting ISIS."
 
 
#22
www.project-syndicate.org
June 18, 2015
The Sino-Russian Marriage
By Robert Skidelsky
Robert Skidelsky, Professor Emeritus of Political Economy at Warwick University and a fellow of the British Academy in history and economics, is a member of the British House of Lords.

LONDON - The Chinese are the most historically minded of peoples. In his conquest of power, Mao Zedong used military tactics derived from Sun Tzu, who lived around 500 BC; Confucianism, dating from around the same time, remains at the heart of China's social thinking, despite Mao's ruthless attempts to suppress it.

So when President Xi Jinping launched his "New Silk Road" initiative in 2013, no one should have been surprised by the historical reference. "More than two millennia ago," explains China's National Development and Reform Commission, "the diligent and courageous people of Eurasia explored and opened up several routes of trade and cultural exchanges that linked the major civilisations of Asia, Europe, and Africa, collectively called the Silk Road by later generations." In China, old history is often called to aid new doctrine.

The new doctrine is "multipolarity" - the idea that the world is (or should be) made up of several distinctive poles of attraction. The contrast is with a "unipolar" (that is, an American- or Western-dominated) world.

Multipolarity is a political idea, but it is about more than power relations. It rejects the notion that there is a single civilizational ideal to which all countries should conform. Different world regions have different histories, which have given their peoples different ideas about how to live, govern themselves, and earn a living. These histories are all worthy of respect: there is no "right" road to the future.

Eurasia is an idea whose time, it is said, has come around again. Recent historical research has rescued the old Silk Road from historical oblivion. The late American sociologist Janet Abu-Lughod identified eight overlapping "circuits of trade" between northwest Europe and China that, under the aegis of a Pax Mongolica, flourished between the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.

According to Abu-Lughod, Western imperialism superimposed itself on these older circuits, without obliterating them. Islam continued to spread across geographic and political boundaries. Chinese and Indian migrations did not stop.

Now a unique conjuncture of economic and political developments has created an opportunity for Eurasia to emerge from its historical slumbers. In recent years, Western self-assurance was humbled by the financial crisis of 2008-2009 and political catastrophes in the Middle East. At the same time, the interests of the two potential builders of Eurasia, China and Russia, seem - at least superficially - to have converged.

China's motive for reviving Pax Mongolica is clear. Its growth model, based largely on exporting cheap manufactured goods to developed countries, is running out of steam. Secular stagnation threatens the West, accompanied by rising protectionism sentiment. And, although Chinese leaders know that they must rebalance the economy from investment and exports to consumption, doing so risks causing serious domestic political problems for the ruling Communist party. Reorienting investments and exports toward Eurasia offers an alternative.

As China's labor costs rise, production is being re-located from the coastal regions to the western provinces. The natural outlet for this production is along the New Silk Road. The development of the road (actually several "belts," including a southern maritime route) will require huge investments in transport and urban infrastructure. As in the nineteenth century, reduction in transport costs will open up new markets for trade.

Russia, too, has an economic motive for developing Eurasia. It has failed to modernize and diversify its economy. As a result, it remains predominantly an exporter of petroleum products and an importer of manufactured goods. China offers a secure and expanding market for its energy exports. The big transport and construction projects needed to realize Eurasia's economic potential may help Russia recover the industrial and engineering might it lost with communism's fall.

This year Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan have joined together in a Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), a customs union with a defense component. The EEU is seen by its advocates as a step toward re-establishing the old Soviet frontiers in the form of a voluntary economic and political union, modeled on the EU - a project to take the sting out of the West's "victory" in the Cold War.

Official Russian opinion looks forward to "the interpenetration and integration of the EEU and the Silk Road Economic Belt" into a "Greater Eurasia," which will afford a "steady developing safe common neighborhood of Russia and China." On May 8, Putin and Xi signed an agreement in Moscow that envisages the establishment of coordinating political institutions, investment funds, development banks, currency regimes, and financial systems - all to serve a vast free-trade area linking China with Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.

How realistic is this dream? Russia and China both feel "encircled" by the United States and its allies. China's anti-hegemonic aim, expressed in almost inscrutable prose, is to secure "tolerance among civilizations" and respect for the "modes of development chosen by different countries."

Putin, meanwhile, has ratcheted up his much more explicit anti-American rhetoric since the Ukraine crisis, which he sees as a prime example of Western interference in Russia's domestic affairs. Boosting trade flows between Russia and China, and strengthening political and security coordination, will reduce their vulnerability to outside interference and signal the emergence of a new center of world power.

It may be considered a singular success for Western statesmanship to have brought two old rivals for power and influence in Central Asia to the point of jointly seeking to exclude the West from the region's future development. The US, especially, missed opportunities to integrate both countries into a single world system, by rebuffing reforms of the International Monetary Fund that would have strengthened China's decision-making influence, and by blocking Russia's overtures for NATO membership. This led both countries to seek an alternative future in each other's company.

Whether their marriage of convenience will lead to an enduring union - or, as George Soros predicts, a threat to world peace - remains to be seen. There is an obvious sphere-of-influence issue in Kazakhstan, and the Chinese have been squeezing the Russians for all they can get in bilateral deals. For the time being, though, squabbles over the New Silk Road seem less painful to the two powers than enduring lectures from the West.
 
 #23
Asia Times
June 26, 2015
Japan tests West's boycott of Russia
BY M.K. BHADRAKUMAR
Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar served as a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service for over 29 years, with postings including India's ambassador to Uzbekistan (1995-1998) and to Turkey (1998-2001). He writes the "Indian Punchline" blog and has written regularly for Asia Times since 2001.

The Russian diplomacy got a big boost on Wednesday when Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made a phone call to President Vladimir Putin. Abe took the initiative a day after Tokyo had sent out a cryptic signal that Russia's participation in next year's G7 summit (May 26-27), which Japan is hosting, "is undecided yet."

The Kremlin readout said the two leaders "expressed their mutual desire to develop political, economic, humanitarian, and security cooperation". They resolved to "prepare thoroughly" for a visit by Putin to Japan.

Abe has strong reasons to pick up the threads of Japan's bilateral ties with Russia, which suffered through the past year after Tokyo closed ranks with the West and imposed sanctions against Russia. The fact of the matter is that as the Asia-Pacific is celebrating the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, Japan is the odd man out, still without a peace treaty with Russia.

Tokyo had pinned hopes on Putin's leadership to resolve the dispute over the Kurile Islands, which are under Russian occupation and is a hugely emotive issue for the Japanese public. Japan has held out the promise that the resolution of the island dispute could unlock Japanese investments for Russia's Far East and Siberia, which Moscow has been eagerly seeking.

Meanwhile, what makes Tokyo particularly uneasy is the acceleration of the Sino-Russian entente in the Asia-Pacific. Beijing is closer than ever in securing Moscow's support for its "core interests" in the Asia-Pacific. The two countries have pledged to be supportive of each other's core interests and to coordinate their foreign policies.

Abe estimates that the Russian DNA may prefer the country to play the role of a "balancer" in the Asia-Pacific between China and the US, a role that Moscow pundits have expounded in the past as ideally suiting their country's interests and its European identity - that is, until Ukraine erupted and the West turned on Russia.

Abe is making a determined pitch to nudge Russia back to the middle ground even as the countdown begins for yet another visit by Putin to China (to attend the victory celebrations, including a grand parade that Beijing is planning for September), which would in all probability hoist the Sino-Russian entente to newer heights.

Abe tried hard at the G7 meeting last month in Germany to impress upon his western colleagues that it is the South China Sea that should engage priority attention - and not Russia and Ukraine. However, the US and the European members of the G7 forum made some perfunctory noises about China's land reclamation work in the South China Sea (without naming China, of course), but failed to meet Abe's expectation to unite the G7 to apply pressure on China.

Abe's anxieties over the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank were plainly ignored by Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Canada, which have joined the planned China-led bank.

Interestingly, however, Abe also tried at the G7 summit to leave room for dialogue with Russia. Thus, the phone call to Putin on Tuesday did have a backdrop. Moscow might even have expected Abe's phone call.

Indeed, it is only logical if Tokyo began wondering why it should stick out its neck and continue to let the ties with Russia drift on account of the conflict in Ukraine, whereas the West is in no mood to wade into the South China Sea or show any desire to confront China.

Abe's phone call to Putin does not hint at any imminent rethink in the West regarding sanctions against Russia. But then, Japan's patience is running out. It has specific issues to address in its relations with Russia.

The Sino-Russian entente does not worry the US. But the bottom line for Tokyo is that the balance of forces involving Russia is incrementally shifting in China's favor and it hurts Japanese interests.

Suffice it to say, Abe understands that it is in Japan's interests to offer a countervailing relationship that restores the balance in Russia's Asia-Pacific policies.

From the Russian viewpoint, it all depends on what Japan has to offer. An upgrade of ties with Japan at this point means, in principle, an erosion of the US' containment strategy against Russia. But on the other hand, Japan is welcoming the deployment of the US anti-missile system on its territories, which aim at Russia (as much as China).

To be sure, Russia's hands get strengthened vis-�-vis China if Japan offers a substantial relationship. Russia needs all the technology and capital that Japan can commit in its economy.  But the dispute over the islands cannot easily lend to a solution.

In April, Russia conducted military anti-landing drills in the island chain as part of coastal defence from possible sea or air attacks. As recently as a fortnight ago, Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu said Moscow plans to accelerate building work on civilian and military infrastructure on the islands. Clearly, Russia has no illusions about the centrality of Japan's military alliance with the US in Tokyo's policies.

Nonetheless, Abe is pressing hard, given the belief in Tokyo that if any Russian leader can draw the curtain down on the island dispute and purposively launch the Russian-Japanese strategic partnership, it is only Putin who can.

The Japanese reports mentioned that Abe is deputing the National Security Council chief Shotaro Yachi to visit Moscow in early July. Japan is eager to send Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida to Russia this fall. These visits may lay the groundwork for a Putin visit to Japan.
 
 #24
Russia & India Report
http://in.rbth.com
June 27, 2015
Primakov: The man who created multipolarity
Yevgeni Primakov drafted the concept of a Russia, India, China strategic triangle as a counterbalance to the western alliance.
By Rakesh Krishnan Simha

On March 24, 1999, Yevgeni Maximovich Primakov was heading to the United States for an official visit. Midway over the Atlantic Ocean, the Russian Prime Minister learned the combined forces of NATO had started bombing Serbia, a close ally. Primakov immediately ordered the plane to turn around, and returned to Moscow in a manoeuvre dubbed "Primakov's Loop".

Primakov's decision was in sync with what he had set out to achieve. In 1996, as Foreign Minister he had presented before the Kremlin elites a plan to develop a strategic three-way pivot between Russia, India and China. This doctrine of multipolarity would be an alternative to the US-imposed unipolarity of the post Cold War period.

Back then the Kremlin was crawling with pro-western Muscovites. Rotten to the core, many were in the pay of motley American think tanks (read: spy agencies). It was not a time or place to sell an idea as radical as uniting three disparate countries in a strategic embrace.

But like most great ideas, Primakov's was simple. First, Russia must end its subservient foreign policy guided by the US. Secondly, he emphasised the necessity of renewing old ties with India and fostering the newly discovered friendship with China.

Primakov argued that a Russia-India-China (RIC) troika in a multipolar world would allow some protection for free minded nations not allied to the West. He said the economic crisis in Russia had presented a rare convergence of conditions in the RIC.

Leonid Fituni, Director of the Moscow-based Centre for Strategic and Global Studies, explains: "China is practically the only state in the contemporary world that enjoys over 3000 years of uninterrupted statehood. It has its own rich traditions of state governance, not identical to those existing in the (West) today, but by no means inferior. Through millennia, China has accumulated unparalleled experience of social and political organisation and development."

Fituni adds: "India, being different in many respects, enjoys a similar wealth of historical experience, often incomprehensible to westerners. The last couple of centuries have been a time of degradation and humiliation for these two great nations. In the eyes of the Chinese and the Indians, this was inextricably linked to the European/western expansion: colonialism and imperial dominance, including the imposition of a normative and economic servitude that still keeps then trapped in the semi-periphery even after the era colonialism."

Russia found itself in a similar state. It was a time when the former planned economies were "ruthlessly looted by the victorious democracies under the guise of economic reforms or liberalisation. Russian social thinkers and historians noted similarities to the historic period of the destruction and pillage of China and India in the 19th and early 20th centuries", writes Prof Li Xing writes in The BRICS and Beyond.

Primakov - a former journalist, Orientalist and spymaster - predicted an inevitable degradation of the Russian economy, reduction to "third world" country status, and the continued drain of resources (natural, financial, technological and human) to the victorious West in its attempt to postpone the imminent crisis in the (western core) enfeebled by decades of Cold War competition. (This has an uncanny parallel to the drain of India's resources - black money and high tech talent - to the West.)

Slow start

In 1998, Primakov visited India and pushed the proposal for creating the RIC strategic triangle. The new Russian leadership under Vladimir Putin reversed the Boris Yeltsin era drift in Russia-India ties, signed a major strategic partnership treaty and established the institution of annual summit meetings. Fourteen years after Russia had abandoned its old ally, Indians heard friendly voices emanating from Moscow. "India is number one," Putin said, referring to India's primacy in the subcontinent.

To be sure, the troika took a long time to reach a basic agreement. A key reason for RIC not getting early traction is the India-China border dispute, which has spun off an Asian version of the arms race between the two giants.

Secondly, in any trilateral partnership, the weakest member - in this case India - acquires prestige and power out of proportion to its actual strength. Beijing - which has traditionally viewed India as weak, divided, slavishly pro-West and above all as a potential strategic rival - clearly did not want to help India achieve that status.

Initially, RIC leaders only met on the sidelines of global summits. "Once the format was underway in 2003, broadening it to include Brazil did not present insurmountable challenges," write Nikolas K. Gvosdev and Christopher Marsh in 'Russian Foreign Policy: Interests, Vectors, and Sectors.'

(Goldman Sachs economist Jim O'Neill's term - rapidly adopted by financial and emerging-market analysts around the world - happened to be released at that exact opportune time. O'Neill or not, BRICS would have been a reality, minus that clunky name.)

It wasn't until 2012 - coinciding with India successfully testing long-range ballistic missiles capable of reaching China's eastern seaboard - that RIC talks took off. Finally, the February 2015 meeting in Beijing imparted a fresh momentum, with China endorsing Russia's move to include India in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).

Wider footprint

Large as its scope is, Primakov went beyond RIC. "The Primakov doctrine is designed primarily to dilute America's strength and influence while increasing Russia's influence and position in the Middle East and Eurasia," writes policy analyst Ariel Cohen of the US-based Heritage Foundation in a report titled 'The Primakov Doctrine: Russia's Zero-Sum Game with the US'.

"Primakov has shown himself to be a master at exploiting anti-American sentiments of the Iranian Shiite establishment, the Arab nationalists, and even the French foreign policy elite. On visits to Japan and Latin American, Primakov promised Russia's support for their efforts to secure permanent seats on UN Security Council."

But Primakov was not letting American hawks go unchallenged. In a 2006 speech he thundered: "The collapse of the US policies pursued in Iraq delivered a fatal blow on the American doctrine of unilateralism."

"Having captured more and more countries the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation has approached our borders, and this cannot fail to make us uneasy," Primakov added. "All the more so NATO extension is accompanied by anti-Russian rhetoric, as well as aggressive policies pursued by the US in the former Soviet republics. Moscow cannot fail to regard all this as activities bred by the displeasure of certain circles in the West by the fact that restoring its enormous prospective potential, Russia is regaining its status of a superpower."

New era in Russian diplomacy

Another key contribution was Primakov ended Russia's post-Soviet innocence. Taking advantage of Moscow's conciliatory - and overly trusting nature - the Americans had hoodwinked Moscow in several theatres, including Iraq, Libya, NATO expansion and the ABM Treaty.

"We are too honest in these matters and such naivety in the political arena does not lead to good results," he said in an interview. "I hope that our policy changes."

In a sideswipe at Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civilisations, he said Russia would not accept the division of the world based on civilisation-related and religious principles, but would instead pursue its own policies, "cooling hotheads who fail to learn their lessons in Iraq but are all but ready to repeat pernicious combat techniques against unwanted regimes". In fact, his defining credo was: "Those who do good will be rewarded. Life gets even with those who do bad."

Primakov's legacy was best summed up by current Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov: "The moment he took over, the Russian Foreign Ministry heralded a dramatic turn of Russia's foreign policy. Russia left the path our western partners had tried to make it follow after the breakup of the Soviet Union and embarked on a track of its own."

Pointing to the success of BRICS, which emerged from the RIC, Lavrov said the line of countries eager to join the five-member group "keeps getting longer".
Decades - or perhaps a few years - from now when they chronicle the "Decline and Fall of the West", substantial credit would go to the man who came in from the Cold War - and changed the map of the New World Order.

 
 #25
New York Times
June 27, 2015
Yevgeny Primakov, Former Premier of Russia, Dies at 85
By ANDREW E. KRAMER

MOSCOW - Yevgeny M. Primakov, a former prime minister of Russia, the country's first post-Soviet spymaster and for decades the Kremlin's top expert on Middle Eastern affairs, has died, state news agencies said on Friday. He was 85.

The agencies did not say when or where he died or provide the cause of death.

With hooded eyes and a gravelly voice, Mr. Primakov struck an image of the archetypal Soviet diplomat and intelligence operative. He was well known to kings, dictators and revolutionaries throughout the Middle East.

But as he rose to more senior positions in the post-Soviet Russian government, his sly sense of humor, sharp intellect and willingness to stand up to the United States made him popular in domestic politics. For a time, he was seen as a possible successor to President Boris N. Yeltsin.

In this way, his career and popularity foreshadowed the success of another veteran of the Soviet intelligence services turned politician, Vladimir V. Putin.

On Friday, Mr. Putin's spokesman, Dmitry S. Peskov, said the president saw Mr. Primakov as "a statesman, a scholar and a politician who has left an enormous legacy."

Russian television broadcasts warmly recalled how Mr. Primakov had presided over a turning point, literally, in Russian-American relations. Heading to the United States for talks in March 1999, Mr. Primakov, who was prime minister then, turned his government plane around over the Atlantic Ocean after learning that the United States was about to begin its military intervention in Kosovo.

Mr. Primakov said he would not talk to the Americans while bombs were falling.

Russia's foreign minister, Sergey V. Lavrov, said on Friday that Mr. Primakov had "made an invaluable contribution to formulating the fundamentals of Russia's foreign policy," including, "above all, the independent, self-sufficient course of the Russian Federation."

As Mr. Yeltsin's health weakened in the late 1990s, Mr. Primakov aligned with Yuri M. Luzhkov, then the mayor of Moscow, in a bid to assume control in the Kremlin. But Mr. Putin and his backers quickly sidelined the movement.

After leaving government, Mr. Primakov led a business lobby before returning to his scholarly interests in the Arab world as director of Eastern studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences.

Yevgeny Maksimovich Primakov was born on Oct. 29, 1929, in Kiev, Soviet Union. He graduated from the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies in 1953. Survivors include his wife, a daughter and grandchildren.

Early in his career, Mr. Primakov proved a wily and energetic backer of Soviet interests in the Middle East. He began his decades of experience in the region as a foreign correspondent for Soviet radio and the Communist Party newspaper Pravda in Cairo for most of the 1960s, a posting generally seen as a cover for espionage activity.

He went on to lead ultimately unsuccessful shuttle diplomacy efforts to reconcile a newly ascendant Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, whom the Kremlin was courting, with the Kurdish insurgency in northern Iraq, which was also supported by Moscow.

In 1990, before the Persian Gulf War began, Mr. Primakov led an unsuccessful effort by the Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev to broker a peace agreement between the United States and Iraq, which had invaded Kuwait.

The Gorbachev plan, calling for Iraq to pull out of Kuwait, might have slowed the erosion of Russian influence in the region had it succeeded. But Mr. Hussein resisted until it was too late to accept the proposal.

Back in Russia, Mr. Primakov steered the foreign intelligence branch of the K.G.B. into the post-Soviet era, separating it from the domestic surveillance branch.

In various government positions, Mr. Primakov also tried and failed to broker peace deals that would have prevented American military action in the former Yugoslavia and again in Iraq.

Mr. Gorbachev, in a statement issued on Friday, praised Mr. Primakov for "defending the country's interests with both resolve and flexibility."
 
 #26
Primakov was Putinism's 'Godfather,' Russian Analysts Say
Paul Goble

Staunton, June 28 - Many Western obituaries and appreciations of the late Yevgeny Primakov portray him as an alternative to Vladimir Putin and someone who would have led Russia in an entirely different direction than the current Kremlin leader. But two Russian analysts argue that in fact Primakov laid much of the groundwork for Putinism.

Few would dispute the argument that Primakov was both more intelligent and clever than the current occupant of the Kremlin. Indeed, some in the West are glad that he did not become Russia's leader because he almost certainly would have been able to advance Russia's interests more effectively than Putin has.

But many miss two other things. On the one hand, Primakov's own all-too-obvious cleverness may have been the major reason why Boris Yeltsin ultimately passed over Primakov to choose Putin as his successor. And on the other hand, Primakov's positions instead of being different than Putin's were in fact a more sophisticated version of those Putin has adopted.

Vladimir Milov, head of Russia's Democratic Choice Party, told Novy Region-2 commentator Kseniya Kirillova that Primakov was responsible for two major shifts in Moscow's approach to both the world and Russia itself that have come to fruition under Putin (nr2.com.ua/blogs/Ksenija_Kirillova/Primakov-zalozhil-osnovu-dlya-antiamerikanskoy-vneshney-politiki-Vladimir-Milov-100084.html).

"Already in 1996, when Primakov headed the foreign ministry, he laid the foundations for the anti-American shift in Russian foreign policy," Milov says. Among other things, he pushed the Kremlin to provide support for Milosevich in the former Yugoslavia, Saddam Husein in Iraq, and the Iranian nuclear program at Bushehr.

Moreover, the Russian politician and analyst continues, under Primakov's direction, "foreign ministry documents written in an anti-American tone began to circulate." He first raised the issue of Russia's "concern about NATO's expansion to the east" rather than continuing to ask if and when Russia could join the alliance to meet common threats like Iran.

"Primakov set the tone in all of this," Milov continues. Had Russia put pressure on Milosevich rather than backed him as Primakov wanted, "it would have been possible to save many lives in the former Yugoslavia."  Equivalent achievements would have been possible in the Middle East and Iran were it not for Primakov's influence.

Domestically, Primakov's retrograde positions became obvious when he was named prime minister.  "Micromanagement was raised to such a level of absurdity," Milov says, "that Primakov personally corrected by hand before signing our drafts of decisions on issues about which he could not understand anything."

Indeed, Milov concludes, the successes of Russia after the default for which some celebrate Primakov are the result of the fact that in those difficult times, his government "did nothing and the economy began to recover on its own." Had he acted on some of the ideas he and his ministers were pushing, the Russian economy would have been destroyed "for good and all."

Moscow commentator Kyamran Agayev is even more blunt: he says that Primakov should not be remembered as "an alternative" to Putin who would have led Russia in a more positive direction but rather as "the godfather" of Putinism in all its revanchist horror both at home and abroad (kasparov.ru/material.php?id=558DC48DD303A).

He points out that it was precisely Primakov who "became the first of the representatives of the special services whom Yeltsin began to 'install' in high government posts.  The appointment of SVR director Primakov in 1996 as foreign minister marked the end of the Kozyrev era and he gradual rebirth and practical introduction of isolationist conceptions" that Putin has simply extended.

Moreover, Agayev continues, it was Primakov who "began the Chekist marathon in the Russian Federation government, having handed off the baton to Stepashin who then praised Putin" and did what he could to advance their common program not just in foreign affairs but domestically as well.

"Having become premier, on the recommendation of Yavlinsky if anyone remembers, Primakov advanced his views as 'a state-oriented thinker' regarding the administration of economics and finance by inviting into the government the former chairman of the USSR's Gosplan, Yu. Maslyukov and communist ministers" as well.

It was no accident that Primakov withdrew his candidacy in advance of the 2000 presidential elections, despite the fact that he declared that "if he came to power, he would put 90,000 businessmen, that is, the business elite of Russia, into prison." Younger Chekists explained that was a "primitive" idea and that there were easier ways to restore state control.

Primakov's "true role" in the rise of the KGB/FSB will be a subject for historians in the future, Agayev continues. "But there can be no doubt that he put in place the beginning of the twilight of the so-called 'romantic' period of Russian democracy" and put off for a long time Russia's transition to a legal state and a genuine market economy.

And thus "both chronologically and ideologically," Agayev concludes, "Primakov is the godfather of Putinism in Russia" and will remain as such "in the memory of those who look at the history of Russia with unblinkered eyes.
 
 #27
Antiwar.com
June 26-28, 2015
War Fever, 103.6 and Rising
The Baltic Assault Paradigm
by NORMAN POLLACK

US-EU-NATO, inseparable, cohesive, in its anti-Russian military policies, which include a new round of economic sanctions and concerted demonization of Putin, has focused its war planning on the Baltic nations-Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia-as a staging area for presumed eventual war, presumed, because as the evidence daily mounts, war with Russia increasingly defines the mindset of political and military leaders throughout the Grand Alliance. Brussels is now the adjunct of Washington, a unified global war capital. Washington orders, NATO delivers, itself hardly an autonomous force, its activities largely guided by the US as an extension of American foreign policy. Eric Schmitt and Steven Lee Myers's New York Times article, "NATO Returns Its Attention to an Old Foe, Russia" (June 23), stacks the deck through its heading even before it begins. No, NATO never lost sight of Russia, whether as the Soviet Union or now, and indeed the ingrained insistence of policymakers, shared by the reporters, of strict continuity between the two, has justified the unabated Cold War. Stalin/Putin, a voracious appetite to swallow the West, and why not America as well? But "Returns Its Attention" is also a dead giveaway about NATO's wider role, that of supplementing American power whenever requested in US interventions in far-flung areas-yet without, for the US and NATO alike-taking their eye off the ball, Russia always kept in mind, as with Afghanistan. If NATO represents the militarization of the EU, it still more represents a stalking horse for American global hegemony.

The NYT article precisely because of its bias is a treasure trove of information (boastfully presented) of the stirrings of confrontation. The war fever in the Baltics, transmitted from Brussels and Washington, I put at 103.6 to indicate serious temperature of the patient already, but, for lack of remedies, bound to go up further. Schmitt and Myers are equal to the task, summoning a gargantuan danger: "After years of facing threats beyond its borders, NATO is now reinvigorating plans to confront a much larger and more aggressive threat from its past: Moscow." They continue: "This seismic shift [as though NATO in fact had been indifferent to Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union-utter nonsense] has been apparent in military training exercises in this former Soviet republic [Schmitt writing from Camp Adazi, Latvia], which is now a NATO member and on the alliance's eastern flank, bordering Russia." That these military exercises are occurring near the Russian border appears matter-of-fact, not troubling or provocative.

And what exercises! The usual: "On a recent day, Latvian soldiers conducted a simulated attack on dug-in enemy positions in a pine forest here as two United States A-10 attack planes roared overhead and opened fire with 30-millimeter cannons." But then the highly unusual, the introduction of the B-52 into the training preparations, among America's most feared (its reputation more than earned) weapons in its arsenal: "Two days before, a B-52 dropped nine dummy bombs radioed in by the Latvians on the ground-all just 180 miles from the Russian border." Here the reporters are awe-struck yet uncritical: "The symbolism of the B-52s, stalwarts of the Cold War arsenal, was lost on no one. The bombers' main mission once was to deliver a nuclear knockout punch to Soviet forces, but they were put to use for the first time over this former Soviet republic to show resolve on the new front between NATO and Russia, the heir of the Soviet war machine." 180 miles from the Russian border.

Words are important, not because of NYT reporters, but because they so faithfully mirror the words and thoughts of political and military leaders, particularly in the US and the alliance as a whole, The Times merely serving as the mouthpiece (aka, authoritative voice) of the US government. "To show resolve" is to anticipate an attack (perhaps the projection onto others of one's own plans), while "the new front" is to anticipate actual confrontation, and "heir of the Soviet war machine" directly explicates the aforementioned continuity between the Soviet Union and Russia, Stalin and Putin. Here is Estonia's chief of defense, Lt. Gen. Riho Terras, "who recently mobilized 13,000 soldiers across his tiny country in a separate exercise": "'If the Russians sense a window of opportunity, they will use it to their advantage. We must make sure there's no room for miscalculation." In other words, stand firm, show resolve. The state of preparation augers poorly for a cessation of hostility: "The military drills that unfolded here, part of a series of exercises planned over coming months to demonstrate the alliance's readiness to confront Russia, emphasize the depth of the challenge facing an alliance that for a quarter of a century turned its attention to threats much further afield."

The feigned innocence of the statement: "for a quarter of a century" NATO's thoughts and involvement were elsewhere (the reporters do not realize the damning indictment, a globalized interventionist force), innocence, in that turning toward Russia was only recent-due to Russian conduct-and thus a necessity to ward off aggression (readiness, strength, no room for miscalculation). As for NATO, all is sweetness and light, "conducting expeditionary missions beyond NATO's borders, from the Balkans to Afghanistan to the Horn of Africa," Russia nowhere in sight, and now military spending had to be beefed up and "the alliance has had to reinvigorate plans that commanders and political leaders had largely consigned to the past." No longer. "This week," the article continues, "Defense Secretary Ashton B. Carter [who begins to make Donald Rumsfeld seem like Mahatma Gandhi] travels through several NATO capitals before sitting down on Wednesday and Thursday [June 24-25] with other defense ministers in Brussels to debate how to counter a resurgent Russia." Jens Stoltenberg, NATO's secretary general, with Crimea and Ukraine as proof of the resurgent Russia (in each case I note meriting further debate), states the result has been "'the biggest reinforcement of NATO forces since the end of the Cold War.'"

The Cold War never ended, but we get the picture: an increasing build-up and prepositioning of heavy equipment on the Russian border. In addition to "a marked increase in training rotations on territory" in the Baltic countries, NATO announced last February "that it would set up six new command units within the Eastern allies and create a 5,000-strong rapid reaction 'spearhead' force." The prepositioning more recently (which I wrote about in CounterPunch) includes "heavy American tanks and other weaponry," and, in the offing, when NATO leaders gather in Warsaw for a summit meeting in 2016, consideration of "other measures...needed to adjust its forces, to increase spending that had plummeted as part of a 'peace dividend,' and to revisit NATO's military strategy and planning." The so-called peace dividend did not appear in US military expenditures, and as for Warsaw, the agenda strongly suggests the meeting is for purposes of mobilizing aggression. One of my favorite sources, Julianne Smith, formerly at Defense and the White House, and now at the Center for a New American Security, expresses the current mood: "'During the Cold War we had everything there in the neighborhood we needed to respond. It's all atrophied. We haven't gone through the muscle movements of a conventional attack in Europe for decades.'" Presumably we should now to keep the Strangelovian juices flowing, or in any case, maintain a strong military posture which cannot but help to intensify the vigor of confrontation and war feeling.

James Stavridis, whom I quoted in a previous article, retired admiral and NATO military commander, now dean at the Fletcher School, glibly joined the chorus: "'I don't think we're in the Cold War again-yet. I can kind of see it from here.'" Michael Fallon, Britain's defense secretary, stated last February that Russia's attempt to destabilize the Baltic countries was a "'real and present danger,'" a view the reporters observe that will be presented at the NATO meeting in Brussels-and frankly they add: "But the potential for such an attack has implicitly been the focus of much of the training and planning going on in places like this [Adazi, Latvia]." I say "frankly," because the training and planning has an offensive as well as defensive character. B-52s were not intended for sightseeing. Let's hear now from Tomasz Siemoniak, Poland's defense minister, who, claiming that NATO required a "'strategic adaptation'" in that Russia's hostility to NATO was "'a change in climate and not a summer storm,'" wants "significant deployments of heavy weapons in Eastern Europe," whatever Russia might think. Speaking to the Center for Strategic and International Studies in May, Siemoniak said: "'I think the caution expressed by some of our European allies is excessive.'" Birds of a feather-Warsaw and Washington! One is made to feel that peace is an ignominious condition of humankind.

An undercurrent of lamentation among defense intellectuals because NATO is not more powerful can be seen in the views of David Ochmanek, "a former senior Pentagon official" now at the Rand Corporation. His concern is activating spirit as well as appropriations both having declined with the fall of the Soviet Union. NATO members must "maintain military spending at 2 percent of gross domestic product, a level considered minimal for effective defense." We have dropped our guard; but "'Putin has changed that.'" NATO allies have not wanted to increase military spending: "'Nobody in any military establishment is looking for more bills to pay right now.'" Sorry Ochmanek and the people at Rand; but I think your luck is changing. Depend on the alliance for making clear its intentions: "While American officials say that exercises like the one at this former Soviet tank base are mainly to allow NATO and Baltic states to hone their training together, they are also intended to send a strong message of solidarity." Thus, "More than 6,000 troops from 14 allied nations...conducted the annual Saber Strike training exercise in the Baltics and Poland that ended Friday [June 19]."

Describing one exercise, "both sides trad[ing] simulated artillery and rocket fire," A-10 attack planes roaring overhead, Schmitt and Myers write, "what really snapped back the necks of Baltic and other European observers was the B-52 bomber, on call for any additional strikes." The B-52 is the symbol for steeling the conviction of rightness against the foe: Lt. Gen. Raimonds Graube, Latvia's defense minister, "looked up admiringly at the warplanes, and dismissed any suggestion that a NATO exercise with B-52s might provoke the Russians," instead saying: "'Our soldiers must be ready to train on an international level,'" a somewhat ominous phrase. Estonia to the ready has created a "defense league" of 30,000 civilians who "engage in basic infantry training once a month, receive arms from the government, and in the event of an invasion would be called to active duty to be commanded by professional soldiers," this beyond the regular forces and hinting at the prevailing state of mind. Michael McFaul, former American ambassador to Russia, to whom I give the last word, differs from the rest only in expecting a drawn-out conflict: "'There's a hope this is all a bump in the road and with a little bit of tweaking we can get back to the status quo [itself hardly a desirable state]. In my view, that's na�ve. Putin's not going to change his position, and he's not going away. You've got to be in this for the long haul.'"

Temperature 103.6 and rising.
 
 #28
www.rt.com
June 29, 2015
Armenia protesters leaving barricades amid authorities' call for 'constitutional order'

Scores of protesters have left Yerevan's central avenue, shifting their anti-electricity hike rally to the Freedom Square, as the country's PM urged those who stayed for "unknown political motives" to avoid anti-constitutional actions and provocations.

The organizers of the 'No to Robbery!' movement on Freedom Square have said that people will stay there to decide on their next move and to avoid confrontation with authorities after the deputy chief of Yerevan Police, Colonel Valery Osipyan urged them to vacate Bagramyan Avenue which they have been blocking for almost a week.

Only several hundred protesters remained in Bagramyan Avenue overnight, with some of them trying to persuade those who left to return and support their "common" goal. Those who refused to return to Bagramyan Avenue however said, it was important to find a "worthy way" to fight back without getting drawn into adventurism, Armenia Today reported.

Speaking to the crowd earlier on Sunday, Osipyan said that police will do "all that is necessary to restore public order," but stressed that for now authorities will not take any action against the activists who have paralyzed the center of the Armenian capital.

Osipyan said that police would certainly issue a prior warning if they eventually decide to move in and clear the barricades. The senior policeman also noted that there were some young provocateurs among the protesters and called on politicians who are siding with the activists to properly address these potentially dangerous elements.

One protester from the crowd has already been detained after he took to the stage and urged an armed rebellion against the government.

"You don't negotiate with viruses, you destroy them. In other words through armed struggle," the protester was quoted as saying. As a result the young man was detained by the police for inciting violence.

Meanwhile, Armenia's Prime Minister Hovik Abrahamyan warned that provocateurs are present among the activists gathered in central Yerevan.

The PM said that their "real aim" is not to fight the price hike on electricity, but to "destabilize the situation in the country" and create "clashes among our citizens," to pursue "short sighted political aspirations."

The intent to destabilize the situation is evident, according to Abrahamyan, because demonstrators are continuing to protests, despite President Serzh Sarkisian's Saturday concessions.

"Confirming the readiness of the authorities to engage in dialogue and work together, I once again call upon our fellow citizens who continue to protest on Bagramyan to refrain from unconstitutional actions and not to aggravate the situation," the PM said, as he urged the activist not to provoke police.

On Saturday Armenian President Sarkisian promised that the government would bear the burden of electricity price hikes, pending an audit of how justified the tariff raise was its consequences would be for the country's economy.

Sarkisian said that the government would go ahead with the 16-per cent hike in electricity prices due on August 1. However, he promised that the government would temporarily compensate all costs related to the price hikes until an international audit of the Electric Networks of Armenia company.

"Annulling the tariff raise is extremely dangerous," he said. "If an audit confirms that the tariff raise is justified, consumers will start paying according to a new price."
 
 #29
Asia Times
June 29, 2015
Russia braces for 'Euromaidan' in Armenia
BY M.K. BHADRAKUMAR
Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar served as a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service for over 29 years, with postings including India's ambassador to Uzbekistan (1995-1998) and to Turkey (1998-2001). He writes the "Indian Punchline" blog and has written regularly for Asia Times since 2001.

Yerevan is seldom in the world headlines except when Turkey works itself into frenzy over a fresh move in an odd western capital to pass a parliamentary resolution naming the massacre of Armenians in the early part of the last century as "genocide".

But that may be about to change. That is, if the 6-day-old mass protests in the Armenian capital, ostensibly against a hike in electricity prices with effect from August 1, snowball into another "Euromaidan" as in Ukraine last year.

Why Armenia? The short answer is that the country is a vital piece of real estate to hold for both the West and Russia. Consider the following.

Armenia is the only country other than Tajikistan where Russia has a big military base. A few months ago, Armenia under its current leadership of President Serz Sarkisian joined the Eurasian Economic Union, which the United States regards as a Russian project to integrate the former Soviet republics under its leadership.

If Armenia is brought into the western orbit, Russia gets practically shut out of South Caucasus, given the ambivalences in Moscow's equations with Baku and the unfriendly policies of the pro-western government in Tbilisi.

Equally, Armenia shares a border with Iran and a pro-western government in Yerevan and the consequent shift in the balance of forces impacts regional politics.

Of course, if a regime change such as in Georgia in 2003 were to repeat in Armenia, it has security implications for Russia's North Caucasus, which is a restive region threatened by extremist Islamist groups, some which enjoy external support.

The current protests can easily take an "anti-Russian" direction. The point is, Russia owns Armenia's gas and electricity supply networks and the 40 percent increase in electricity prices is seen as part of excessive profiteering by Russian companies at the cost of the Armenian consumer.

A flashpoint arises if the latent popular frustrations against the corrupt government in Yerevan coalesce with the discontent over the steep hike in electricity prices and the disapproval of the government's perceived kowtowing to Russian pressure. Suffice it to say, the rudiments of a classic "color revolution" seem to be available.

The influential Moscow politician, Konstantin Kosachyov, who heads the Federation Council's (Duma) International Relations Committee has warned that the crisis is following the script of "color revolutions" in Georgia and Ukraine.

The well-known Russian pundit Sergei Markov wired to the Russian establishment has alleged that the protests in Yerevan are "being directed from an external headquarters" (read Washington). Of course, such allegations are difficult to prove in real time and the US media organs have been plainly dismissive, claiming that the "civil society" in Armenia is spearheading the mass protests and there is no "foreign hand" involved.

If the protests gather momentum, Moscow will be caught on the horns of a dilemma. With hindsight, Moscow has estimated that the deposed Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich's refusal to heed Russian advice to use force to quell the 'Euromaidan' protests in a critical period in February last year proved to be his undoing and resulted in his overthrow.

By the same logic, the pro-Russian leadership in Armenia is walking a fine line.

On a broader plane, Armenia becomes a test case of the impact of the Ukraine crisis on the collective psyche of the people in the former Soviet republics in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Are the 'masses' in these regions drawing inspiration from the regime change in Ukraine and are they ready for their own 'Euromaidan'? That is the question.

For sure, a new combative tone has appeared of late in the US' Central Asia policy, possibly predicated on a reading that the "masses" in the Stans are ripe for revolution.

The recent statement at the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission in Washington by the US Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Robert Berschinski took a noticeably tough line regarding the "heavy-handed policies", denial of religious freedom and political space, and prevalence of widespread corruption and "systematic abuse and ill-treatment of citizens" by the authoritarian regimes in Central Asia. It pointedly questioned the legitimacy of the recent re-election of the Presidents of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, the two key states in Central Asia.

To be sure, the US' democracy project in Central Asia seems to be gearing up for action after a decade-and-a-half of hibernation following the American intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 when the accent was on the war on terror and regional stability.
 
 #30
Gazeta.ru
June 24, 2015
Russian authorities should not see "US hand" in Armenian protests - website
Editorial
Maydans here, Maydans there. Why Russia's desire to see State Department's hand in everything hampers its own interests

From the very beginning, the protests in Armenia were doomed to comparison with Kiev's Maydan [popular protests, revolution]. But this comparison is lame. The rallies in Yerevan do not have an anti-Russian character. But they could acquire one if Moscow continues to see the hand of the State Department in all protests in the post-Soviet area. This also applies to internal policy, in which the struggle against the "Maydan" phantom has become almost one of the state's main tasks.

The desire to compare the protests in Yerevan with the Kiev Maydan is understandable. The Ukrainian unrest, which ended with a change of government, the accession of Crimea to Russia, and the war in the Donets Basin, have made all too big an impression on our country. Certain coincidences have added ambience: the authorities initially tried to disperse the not particularly large protest action in the Armenian capital by strong-arm methods, almost exactly as in Kiev on 30 November 2013, only with the aid of water cannons. But like then, instead of the abatement of activity expected by the authorities, thousands more people came out onto the capital's streets.

Both here and there, the protests began under economic slogans. Oppositionist Ukrainians were fighting for "European association," while discontented Armenians protested a 16-per-cent increase in electricity tariffs. Moreover, the monopolist company Electricity Networks of Armenia had originally actually demanded an increase in these tariffs of 40 per cent.

A joke is doing the rounds among the Yerevan protesters: "The more they drench us, the more we grow in number."

The settled hot spell that Yerevan is enjoying only warms people's blood. Moreover, for students, and, as in Ukraine, they account for a significant part of the most active participants in the protest, exams are finishing, and that means, more free time is appearing.

But like all comparisons, this one is lame.

And it is more important than ever before for Russia's leaders, who, it seems, have become carried away by the idea that everything around us is done to harm Russia by its Western ill-wishers, to understand this.

First, although in both cases the slogans of the protests are economic, they are different in type. For ordinary Ukrainian citizens, "European association" acted as the symbol of some kind of historic choice for their country. But the increase in electricity tariffs has the most direct influence on the size of the wallets of every resident of Armenia.

Second, what is happening in Yerevan and in several other major cities of Armenia has only an indirect connection with Russia. Of course, people there recall that Electricity Networks of Armenia is a subsidiary of the Russian company Inter RAO YeES [the Russian joint-stock company Unified Energy System], but this is not the main theme of the protests.

And the main theme is unhappiness with the lack of transparency and unpredictability of the authorities' policies.

So far, official Moscow is reacting very cautiously to the protest actions. Through the lips of [the Russian president's press secretary] Dmitriy Peskov, both sides in the conflict have merely called for there to be no slide towards violent methods of struggle. But it is possible to draw some conclusions already now.

Above all, so far the protest does indeed not have an "anti-Russian" character, but all that could change if Moscow starts to look for the State Department's machinations in what is happening and yet again publicly denounces the technologies of "coloured revolutions".

And here, a disservice is being performed by the "loyal experts" who have already begun their traditional conspiracy contests, as is their wont, without noticing that, with their own conjectures on the made-to-order character of the protest, they are insulting a people whom they themselves describe as "fraternal."

In addition, we should ponder once again the effectiveness of staking exclusively on the current authorities and on almost completely ignoring civil society. After all, even in the opposition in Armenia there are many people who are in favour not simply of further cooperation with Russia, but even of deepening it. Simply because they understand that, otherwise, the country would find itself effectively in a total blockade, squeezed between Turkey and Azerbaijan, which would threaten the South Caucasus republic's very existence.

But if Russia simply supports the current authorities, which have pledged their loyalty to Moscow, but are discredited in the eyes of the participants in the protests, according to a template, this threatens the loss both of popularity inside the country, and of the country itself, which remains the Russian Federation's only reliable ally in the South Caucasus.

Finally, at a more global level, the side effects of the confrontation with the West are becoming increasingly obvious. Whereas in previous years, Russia was able, thanks in many ways to its integration into the world economy, to afford to maintain a whole series of neighbouring countries within its orbit of influence, now this is becoming increasingly difficult.

We are simply no longer able to pay for the loyalty of other countries' elites and populations.

That is to say, it is necessary to either end the confrontation, the saber-rattling and other military preparations, or at the very least to look for ways to achieve our own economic breakthrough.

So far neither approach can be discerned. Instead of this, talk is beginning about foreign foundations that "have been rummaging around Russian Federation schools for many years in the guise of supporting talented young people," intimating that educational exchanges - one of the most effective ways of importing technologies and knowledge - could become undesirable for the authorities in the near future.

And the departments, which you would think had more pressing tasks, are vying with one another in the struggle against the threat of a "coloured revolution". A corresponding programme has been announced by Defence Minister Sergey Shoygu, who, according to the logic of things, should not be concerning himself with the country's internal problems at all - solely with the protection of its borders.

Meanwhile, returning to the experience of Armenia and Ukraine, it becomes obvious from this experience that protests do not spring up suddenly, but are prepared by many years of discontent.

In the meantime, in our country, there are no problems as regards the population's approval of the current authorities: sociologists are recording the president's latest record poll numbers.

But for some reason, the country's leadership believes that this is not the most reliable guarantee. First, the economy is falling, and one day this will become obvious not just to economics experts. And second, nowadays citizens simply have no channels through which to express their own discontent when it arises, if it arises at all.

But after all, it was precisely because of the absence of influential opposition parties capable of influencing the authorities constructively and of courts prepared to adopt decisions to the disadvantage of bureaucrats that the "Maydans" began in Ukraine.

The Russian authorities understand all this, of course. But for some reason, they are working in quite another direction.
 
 #31
http://reconsideringrussia.org
June 28, 2015
How Moscow views Nagorny Karabakh
By Pietro A. Shakarian

One of many hotspots in the former Soviet space is the region of Nagorny Karabakh in the Caucasus. I have written about Nagorny Karabakh in the past, but this time, I would like to focus precisely on Russia's view of the situation.

What is Nagorny Karabakh?

Nagorny Karabakh is a majority-Armenian region in the Caucasus. Its landscape is forested and mountainous, dotted with numerous historical Armenian monuments and churches. It is one of the most beautiful places in the former Soviet Union.

The region is internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan, but is a de facto independent state, closely allied with neighboring Armenia. Armenia, which does not officially recognize Nagorny Karabakh, maintains that its local Armenian inhabitants have the right to self-determination (whether or not to be an independent state, part of Armenia, or an autonomous region of Azerbaijan). This position is supported by the area's majority-Armenian population. By contrast, Azerbaijan argues for the principle of territorial integrity and that Nagorny Karabakh's future should be determined only within the internationally recognized borders of Azerbaijan. Supported by Armenia, Nagorny Karabakh gained its de facto independence from Azerbaijan after a war in the 1990s, one of a handful of post-Soviet ethnic conflicts. Today, the status of Nagorny Karabakh is frozen and can be best described as one of "neither war nor peace."

The name of the region, a testament to its checkered history, is a Russian, Turkish, and Persian amalgam, which literally means "Mountainous Black Garden." The "Nagorny" or "Mountainous" aspect is important because this distinguishes the area from the traditionally majority Muslim Azerbaijani Lowland Karabakh. The term "Karabakh" is often liberally used as shorthand in the West to refer exclusively to majority Christian Armenian "Mountainous Karabakh." However, the term "Karabakh" can also be used to refer to both the Mountainous and Lowland areas in totality. To avoid confusion, I will refer to the area as Nagorny Karabakh (henceforth NK).

NK is also referred to by its historical Armenian name, "Artsakh," by Armenians in Armenia and in NK. The local Armenian population of NK speaks a unique dialect of Armenian that even standard Armenian speakers have difficulty understanding.

Why is Nagorny Karabakh important to Russia historically?

With regard to Russian history, NK is part of the reason that present-day Armenia (historical Eastern Armenia) and the South Caucasus generally became part of the Russian Empire. In the 18th century, Khachen (as NK was then known) and Syunik (today southern Armenia) were the only parts of historic Armenia that were able to retain a semi-independent status amid Armenia being overrun by the Mongols, Turks, and Persians. Formally, the two principalities were semi-independent vassals of Persia. Their princes (meliks), together with the king of eastern Georgia and the Armenian Orthodox Patriarch (Catholicos), formed a coalition beseeching Tsar Peter the Great to liberate their lands from their larger Islamic neighbors.

Peter was interested in the Caucasus not only to help fellow Orthodox Christians, but also as a means for Russia to secure access to profitable trade routes to India, in order to gain access to silk and other riches. Thus began the relationship between Russia and the Caucasus that would eventually culminate in the annexation of eastern and western Georgia (starting in 1801), the further incorporation of historical Eastern Armenia and present-day Azerbaijan in 1813-1828, and the conquest of the North Caucasus in the 1860s.

What are the origins of the present-day dispute over Nagorny Karabakh?

The origins of the present-day dispute over NK date to the Sovietization of the Caucasus in the early 1920s. It is important to understand how the dispute originated in order to comprehend the dynamics of the conflict today. There are two different theories in this regard that are widely repeated in the media. Neither is supported by factual evidence, but both fit conveniently into dominant political narratives.

One theory asserts that the dispute began when Stalin personally decided to assign NK to Soviet Azerbaijan during the Sovietization of the Caucasus. Those who support this theory have given different possible explanations as for Stalin's exact motivation for such a step. Some claim that he wanted to appease Turkey, hoping that under Atat�rk, Ankara would develop into a communist state. Others allege that Stalin had an anti-Armenian bias. However, most proponents of this theory claim that the motivation was for Moscow to divide-and-rule Armenia and Azerbaijan. Overall, this theory is undermined by the fact that Stalin was far from the zenith of his power and was not the sole decision-maker in determining NK's fate, even though he was the Commissar of Nationalities at the time. Moreover, he had good relations with Armenian communists like Mikoyan and was actually sympathetic to Armenian claims over NK.

The second theory holds that the Soviets assigned NK to Azerbaijan because it was economically dependent on the city and surrounding area of Baku during Tsarist times. However, if this was true, then the Armenian provinces of Syunik and Tavush (which, together with NK, were part of the Tsarist-era Elizavetpolskaya Guberniya) would have been logically assigned to Azerbaijan on the same basis. Instead, they became part of Soviet Armenia.

In reality, according to recent research by Caucasus scholar Arsene Saparov, the actual reason behind NK's assignment to Azerbaijan was the fact that, despite its majority Christian Armenian population, it was controlled by Azerbaijani forces at the time of Sovietization. It was therefore easier for the Soviets to sanction the existing situation on the ground, while also offering the "compromise" of local Armenian autonomy. Hence the "Nagorny Karabakh Autonomous Oblast" of Soviet Azerbaijan was established. Again, it is important to emphasize that the Soviets were desperate to secure control of the region at the time and, being communist-internationalists, they believed that national borders would one day be abolished anyway. There were no sinister imperial schemes or machinations behind the assignment of NK to Azerbaijan.

How does Russia view Nagorny Karabakh today?

Today, Moscow ultimately wants to see some sort of resolution, but it realizes that devising one is virtually impossible right now, given current conditions. It therefore favors the status quo and continued peace talks.

Along with the United States and France, Russia is a co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group which facilitates talks on the NK issue. Both the Armenian and Azerbaijani governments are committed to these talks. However, the present government of Ilham Aliyev in Azerbaijan, which has engaged in high military spending and bellicose anti-Armenian rhetoric, is unwilling to compromise on anything short of NK's total return to Baku. Armenia in turn has stood firmly in favor of Karabakh's self-determination. The unrecognized NK Republic is currently not involved in the negotiations, but states that it should be, due to the fact that it is the representative of the local Armenian population.

As of a result of the NK war of the 1990s, the NK Republic also controls a handful of districts of Azerbaijan proper, giving them contiguous frontiers with Armenia and Iran. A potential compromise solution may require forfeiting some of these districts, such as Aghdam. The status of refugees and other issues also need to be discussed, but the main sticking point for both sides remains the determination of NK's ultimate status.

It is important to note that Armenia relies on Moscow for security vis-a-vis Azerbaijan and Turkey, both of which have closed their borders with Armenia since the 1990s. However, Turkish-Armenian relations have improved significantly since Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Justice and Development Party (or AKP) came to office. For instance, though Turkey still denies the 1915 Armenian Genocide, the issue is no longer a taboo in Turkish society and is now openly discussed. However, largely due to pressure from Turkey's domestic nationalists and from official Baku, the border between Turkey and Armenia remains closed, despite the obvious benefits for both Ankara and Yerevan. Nevertheless, Turkish-Armenian relations will continue to improve and will be further helped by growing cooperation between Ankara and Moscow on issues such as the proposed Turk Stream gas pipeline.

Meanwhile, relations between Yerevan and Baku remain tense. In this regard, Armenia looks to Moscow for security and is therefore a close ally of Moscow and Russia's main "center" in the South Caucasus today. By contrast, Azerbaijan was engaged in a flirtation with the West for some time, especially with oil lobbyists and neoconservative politicians in Washington eager to undermine Iran and Russia. The latter two groups have been very interested in creating alternative energy pipelines from post-Soviet Central Asia through Azerbaijan and to Europe, at the expense of traditional energy routes from Russia.

However, Azerbaijan's flirtation with the West appears to have diminished in recent years, amid mounting criticism regarding Baku's human rights record. Baku has therefore engaged in new thaws with Moscow and Tehran. However, it is unlikely to join the Moscow-backed Eurasian Union any time soon, given Aliyev's interest in keeping Azerbaijan independent of any supranational union or alliance. However, Baku has a finite supply of natural energy reserves and will have no choice but to turn to regional cooperation, compromise, and economic diversification in the future. In this respect, it would do well to discard the bellicose discourse and adopt a more balanced and constructive approach.

In Moscow's view, a resolution of the NK dispute is not only desirable for regional stability but also for Russian security. Russia continues to face challenges on its troubled southern frontier in the North Caucasus with Islamic extremists. In order to help contain and isolate this threat, Russia seeks to solidify its position in the former Soviet South Caucasus states. A strong "buffer zone" of secure and friendly countries to the south of the North Caucasus is therefore an important vector of Russia's policy toward the region.

Russia is also concerned about the potential expansion of NATO in the South Caucasus, particularly in Georgia. Additionally, it is concerned about the expansion of US-supported energy projects designed to undermine Russian energy exports to Europe. Moscow is puzzled by these American-backed steps, which are viewed as a throwback to Cold War "containment" and as a provocation intended to isolate and weaken Russia. They are also regarded as spurning potential cooperation on serious matters such as fighting Islamic extremism in the area. Indeed, Georgia has recently faced problems with Islamic radicalism in the Pankisi Gorge and attempts by ISIS to woo the region's local population of ethnic Kists (a Chechen subgroup). Notably, the infamous ISIS commander Omar al-Shishani is originally from Pankisi. Given such concerns, it is clear that if Moscow, Tbilisi, and Washington all worked together to combat this common threat, the benefits would be optimal.

Whatever the future, for Moscow, the Caucasus remains an important area within the post-Soviet space and a potential flashpoint for future conflict. Despite the dispute over NK, Armenians and Azerbaijanis have co-existed and lived together side-by-side in the past. Peace is possible, and indeed NK would greatly benefit from cooperation between Russia and the West.
 
 #32
New York Times
June 29, 2015
Columbia University Press to Publish New Translations of Russian Literature
By ANDREW ROTH

MOSCOW - Russian and American academics, publishers and Russian government officials announced on Saturday that they would collaborate on an ambitious new series of Russian literature in translation to be published by Columbia University Press.

The idea, tentatively named the Russian Library, envisions dozens, and perhaps more than 100, new translations of Russian modern literature and classics, selected by the publisher with support from a committee of Russian and American academics.

Academics at the conference said that the collaboration presented a chance, at least informally, to build the relationship between the two countries, at a time of heightened tensions.

"Think about the good work that can be done by making available a wide variety of perspectives on Russia both from the past and the present," said Stephanie Sandler, a professor in the Slavic Department at Harvard University and one of several American professors to travel to Moscow for the conference.

"For many of us, the reason to be involved in the project and have it happen precisely at what would seem this inauspicious, high-tension political moment, is that we can start to find bridges between the two cultures and ways to talk to each other."

But the project also ignited a bit of scholarly debate. In sometimes raised voices, the academics at the conference tried to tackle a set of thorny questions: Which books will go on the list? Should it include relatively new post-Soviet literature? Will this be perceived as a new canon, and how can that be avoided?

Jennifer Crewe, the director of Columbia University Press, said that the book list should include a "smattering of classics" that needed new translations, as well as post-Soviet and current Russian literature. With time still needed to select the first series of titles and translate them, the soonest they would be published is 2017.

The conference was organized by Read Russia, an American nongovernmental organization partly sponsored by the Russian government that promotes Russian literature in translation. Peter Kaufman, the head of Read Russia, said that the project would help Russia "make up for lost time" in promoting its culture, noting similar initiatives like Spain's Cervantes Institute. The Russian government is also supporting the project through grants from the Institute for Literary Translation, an institute based in Moscow that promotes Russian literature.

Translated works are a niche market in the United States and the appearance of 10 new literary translations each year for the next decade would signify an important development, especially if the authors are not named Tolstoy, Chekhov and Dostoevsky.

Vladimir Tolstoy, a great-great-grandson of Leo Tolstoy and an adviser on cultural affairs to President Vladimir V. Putin, called it the "most ambitious project he could imagine under the current circumstances."

"If Russian literature appears and is read then maybe it will help people understand the way we think," Mr. Tolstoy said after the conference. "Literature is the best bridge to understanding peoples, what they've lived through and what sort of values they have." Mr. Tolstoy added that if the project was successful, he hoped to see new anthologies of American and European literature in Russian.

Russian Library is the brainchild of Mr. Kaufman, who is also an associate director at the Columbia Center for New Media Teaching and Learning, and Vladimir Grigoriev, a former publisher and the deputy head for Russia's Federal Agency for Press and Mass Communication. The two met in the early 1990s at a conference for publishers in Russia grappling with the new institution of copyright law.

Mr. Grigoriev led Saturday's conference and suggested the academics try to choose the first 12 books to be published, an initiative that was postponed after an hour of discussion. Mr. Grigoriev noted wryly that the number of opinions matched the number of Slavists in the room.

"Part of the problem is the delicacy of trying to define a future canon," said Caryl Emerson, a professor of Slavic Literature at Princeton University, who attended the conference. "The past is established. The Russians take their identity from what they read. What happens when you have a traumatic regime shift? People want things out there that are not known in the West but at what point are they worthy of being known?"
 
 #33
New York Times
June 26, 2015
Group Approves Fellowship Named for Controversial Scholar of Russia
By JENNIFER SCHUESSLER  

The main scholarly association covering the post-Soviet world has announced a new fellowship named partly for a controversial scholar, bringing to an end an episode that prompted intense debate about academic freedom amid the fraught politics of the Ukraine crisis.

The Association for Slavic, East European and Eurasian Studies announced this week the establishment of six annual fellowships jointly named for Stephen F. Cohen, a scholar of Russia whose sharply critical views on United States policy in the region had earned him denunciations as "Putin's American toady" (as The New Republic put it) and worse, and his mentor Robert C. Tucker, a distinguished biographer of Stalin who died in 2010.

The fellowships will support research in Russian historical studies, a field that has been hit hard by declining United States government support. They will be supported with an initial $413,000 gift from the charitable foundation of Katrina vanden Heuvel, the editor and publisher of The Nation and Mr. Cohen's wife, with possible additional funds to follow.

The proposed gift was received favorably last summer by the board of the association, which already offers a dissertation prize named for the two men, established in 2006. But after unidentified parties raised objections, the group approached Mr. Cohen and Ms. vanden Heuvel about the possibility of going forward with a "compromise name."

The couple declined, and news of the affair touched off heated debate about whether the request threatened academic freedom by effectively punishing Mr. Cohen, a retired professor at Princeton and at New York University, for his controversial views, which he has aired forcefully in print articles and in television and radio interviews.

Nearly 150 scholars signed a letter in support of the proposed fellowship, saying the failure to accept the gift as offered "reeks of a censuring of public discourse" and was "a profound embarrassment." Others countered that an award named for Mr. Cohen would be unnecessarily divisive in the current geopolitical situation.

In a statement, the board said that a "substantial majority" of members who sent in comments supported the proposed Cohen-Tucker fellowship, but that the views of opponents had been carefully weighed.

"Some members of the board expressed their reservations about Professor Cohen's views on contemporary Russia and Ukraine, while lauding his contributions to Soviet/Russian studies," the statement said, noting concerns that the gift "might make certain members" of the association "feel unwelcome."

"However," the statement continued, "all board members expressed commitment to the principles of academic freedom and pluralism."