#2
Sputnik
June 26, 2015
Yevgeny Primakov: Russian PM, FM and Father of Russia-China-India Axis

Yevgeny Primakov, a prominent Russian politician serving as foreign minister and prime minister in a very difficult period in post-Soviet Russian history, passed away in Moscow at the age of 85. Sputnik takes a look back at the life and career of the visionary politician.

Born in Kiev, Ukrainian SSR on October 29, 1929 to Russian and Jewish parents, Primakov grew up in Tbilisi, capital of the Georgian SSR. Educated at the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies, from which he graduated in 1953, Primakov went on to do post-graduate work at Moscow State University.
Between 1956 to 1970, Primakov worked as a journalist specializing in the Middle East for Soviet radio and newspapers, including Pravda.

In 1970, Primakov took up the post of Deputy Director of Moscow's prestigious Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), a job he held until 1977, when he moved on to become the director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences. During this time, he also served as a deputy chairman of the Soviet Peace Committee. Primakov returned to the IMEMO in 1985, serving as director until 1989.

The journalist and academician became involved in politics in 1989, when he was elected Chairman of the Soviet of the Union, one of the two chambers of the Supreme Soviet, the highest legislative body in the USSR. Between 1990 to 1991 Primakov was also invited to serve as a member of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's newly created Presidential Council, a position he held until the failed coup attempt against Gorbachev in August 1991.
From August to December 1991, Primakov temporarily served as the first deputy chairman of the KGB. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, Primakov was appointed Director of Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service, a post which he held until 1996.

The Primakov Doctrine

In 1996, Primakov was appointed to serve Russia's foreign minister, gaining a reputation as a politician from the realist school of foreign policy seeking to protect Russian interests, signaling a shift away from the policy of his predecessor, Andrei Kozyrev, who Russian conservatives characterized as a 'capitulationist' to the West.

An early proponent of the principal of multilateralism opposed to US global hegemony, Primakov became known in the West as an opponent of NATO's eastward expansion, while focusing Russian diplomacy on the improvement of relations with the states of the former Soviet Union and the Middle East. While falling short of his demands, the NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, signed in 1997, eventually led to the formation of the Russia-NATO council, charged with handling joint projects and relations between Moscow and the defense Bloc.

Primakov was noted to have been one of the early proponents of a Russian-Chinese-Indian strategic triangle, aimed at counterbalancing the United States. The ideal of enhanced cooperation promoted by the foreign minister would eventually evolve into the BRICS group of nations.

Commenting on Primakov's legacy as foreign minister on the occasion of his 85th birthday last October, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that he was confident that "in the near future, historians will coin a special term to describe Primakov's role in politics. They may call it the Primakov Doctrine. The moment he took over, the Russian Foreign Ministry heralded a dramatic turn of Russia's foreign policy. Russia left the path our Western partners had tried to make it follow after the breakup of the Soviet Union and embarked on a track of its own."

A Prime Minister Charged With Saving His Country From Economic Catastrophe

In August 1998, Russia, already struggling with a severe economic setback following the collapse of the Soviet Union, was hit by financial crisis, which resulted in the devaluation of the ruble, spiraling inflation, a freeze in the payment of wages and the collapse of state subsidies to Russia's regions. Ultimately, the crisis also led to the country defaulting on its foreign debt.

In the months leading up to the default, facing a political crisis, President Boris Yeltsin dismissed the entire cabinet of Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, and then that of acting Prime Minister Sergei Kiriyenko. Failing to get his candidates for PM approved by parliament, and contending with an enraged conservative and communist opposition, Yeltsin nominated Foreign Minister Primakov as a compromise candidate. Primakov was approved by overwhelming majority on September 11, 1998.

Restoring political stability by inviting members of the leading parliamentary factions into his Cabinet, Primakov's interest rate and monetary easing policies assisted Russian producers with an infusion of cash, allowing enterprises to pay backlogged wages, pay off their debts, and begin to pay taxes, while hiring new workers and reducing unemployment for the first time in years. With more money in Russians' pockets, consumer demand stabilized. The resolution of the 1998 crisis is considered to have laid the foundations for Russia's economic recovery in the 2000s.

Maintaining his stance on defending Russian interests abroad, on March 24, 1999, Primakov canceled his scheduled visit to the United States when he found out that NATO had begun a bombing campaign of Yugoslavia, turning his plane around over the ocean, a maneuver which has since been nicknamed 'Primakov's loop.'

In May 1999, having served as prime minister for only eight months, Primakov was dismissed by Yeltsin, with Russian analysts describing the move as a political calculation connected with the prime minister's growing popularity, and the upcoming presidential elections scheduled for the following year.

Commenting on Primakov's service as prime minister, Lavrov stated that the politician was "a phenomenon not only in our foreign policy, but in the Russian state, because after he was invited to head the Russian government he made the decisive contribution to overcoming the effects of the 1998 default and crisis. His government patched a large hole and made it possible to restore the country to stability."

Following his dismissal, Primakov soon became an advisor and political ally to Vladimir Putin, who became president on January 1, 2000 after Yeltsin's resignation. The veteran politician also continued his diplomatic work, becoming the president's special representative to Iraq in the lead-up to the Iraq War in 2003. Speaking to Saddam Hussein, Primakov attempted to convince the Iraqi leader to hand over all of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction to the UN, thus hoping to avoid a US invasion. Primakov also continued his academic work as a member of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

Primakov is survived by his wife Irina and daughter Nana, losing his first wife, Laura Kharadze, who died of heart disease in 1987, and his son Alexander, who died of a heart attack at age 27 in 1981. The veteran journalist, diplomat and politician spoke Russian, Arabic, English, and Georgian.

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 #3
Gorbachev: Late Russian ex-PM Primakov was 'responsive to society and to individual needs'

MOSCOW, June 26. /TASS/. Former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev conveyed his condolences on Friday over the death of ex-Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov.
Primakov died at 85 on Friday.

In Primakov's obituary written by Gorbachev and obtained by TASS news agency, the former Soviet leader called the ex-premier "a man of high culture, a bright personality responsive to society and to each individual, well-wishing and attentive to his friends, close associates and work colleagues."

"I was bound with Yevgeny Maximovich by many years of friendship and joint work," the former Soviet leader said.

"During the perestroika years, I proposed to him to take direct participation in the reformation of our state system. He became chairman of the Soviet of the Union in a new and democratically elected Supreme Soviet [parliament]. His participation in developing a democratic parliament was active and yielded good results," Gorbachev said.

"It was at that time that Yevgeny Maximovich became known to the entire country and gained wide support and respect," Gorbachev added.

The former Soviet leader also praised Primakov's achievements in developing Russian statehood.

"During the years of establishing and developing a new Russian state, when the country was in a difficult situation, Yevgeny Maximovich assumed the responsibilities of the head of the government. I believe his role in overcoming the crisis was outstanding and will remain in history," Gorbachev said.

"During the perestroika years and afterwards Yevgeny Maximovich acted much and successfully in the sphere of foreign policy, protecting the country's interests and demonstrating his resolve along with flexibility," the former Soviet leader said.

"During all these years, he never weakened interest in scientific work and the study of fundamental processes occurring in the world," Gorbachev said.

Yevgeny Primakov was born on October 29, 1929 in the Ukrainian capital of Kiev. He graduated from the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies in 1953.
In the 1960s he worked as a correspondent of the Communist newspaper Pravda in the Middle East where he met with regional politicians, including Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.

He later headed the Soviet Academy of Sciences' Institute for Oriental Studies and then the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations.
Primakov was elected to the Soviet parliament in 1988. He chaired the Soviet of the Union, one of the two houses of the USSR legislature.

Primakov was Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's special envoy to the Middle East and met with Iraqi President Hussein in an attempt to try to avert the 1991 Gulf War.

After the break-up of the Soviet Union, Primakov came to head the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) and was appointed Russia's Foreign Minister in 1996. He advocated the principle of a multi-polar world in Russia's foreign policy.

President Boris Yeltsin appointed Primakov as prime minister in September 1998 amid financial turmoil in the country. Primakov was picked as a compromise figure to ease political tensions between liberals and hardliners and steer Russia away from a market collapse and the country's default on its sovereign obligations.

On his way to Washington as Russia's premier in March 1999, Primakov ordered the plane to make a U-turn over the Atlantic and head home when he learned that NATO had started bombing Yugoslavia.

Primakov, who was credited with restoring stability in the country after the 1998 financial turmoil and helping Russia recover from the economic crisis, was sacked as prime minister in May 1999.

He later headed the Fatherland-All Russia faction in the Russian parliament from December 1999 to December 2001.

Primakov worked as president of the Russian Chamber of Industry and Commerce in 2001-2011.

Primakov's first wife, Laura Vasilyevna Kharadze, died of a heart disease in 1987. He married his second wife Irina several years later. Primakov had a daughter, Nana, from his first marriage. His son Alexander died of a heart attack in 1981.

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 #4
YaleGlobal Online
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu
June 23, 2015
The New Ukrainian Exceptionalism
Ukrainian leaders, under siege from Russian and separatist forces, resist constructive criticism
By Matthew Rojansky and Mykhailo Minakov
Matthew Rojansky is director of the Kennan Institute at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC; Mykhailo Minakov is associate professor/docent in philosophy and religious studies at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, and was a Fulbright-Kennan Scholar in 2012-13.

Summary

Ukraine struggles to survive as an independent nation against external and internal forces - Russia, the powerful neighbor next door, and Russian sympathizers throughout eastern Ukraine. "Russian-backed aggression, relentless propaganda and meddling in Ukraine's domestic politics have pushed many Ukrainians to adopt a deeply polarized worldview, in which constructive criticism, dissenting views, and even observable facts are rejected out of hand if they are seen as harmful to Ukraine," argue Matthew Rojansky, director of the Kennan Institute at the Woodrow Wilson Center, and Mykhailo Minakov, associate professor/docent in philosophy and religious studies at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. The writers identify this as a new form of exceptionalism. If commitments to tolerance, human rights and freedom to dissent are undermined, Ukraine will differ little from Russia. And that would give the international community pause in coming to the struggling nation's aid. - YaleGlobal

WASHINGTON: The slow boiling war in Southeastern Ukraine is by now well known to the world. It has been projected in stark moral and political terms and in gruesome detail by the international press, Ukrainian and Western political leaders, and ordinary Ukrainian citizens. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that Ukraine is engaged in a struggle not only for its sovereignty, but for its very survival as a nation-state.

In this hour of need, every Ukrainian citizen and every self-described friend of Ukraine in the international community should not only speak but act in support of Ukraine. But speaking out and taking action in support of Ukraine have become increasingly fraught in recent months. Russian-backed aggression, relentless propaganda and meddling in Ukraine's domestic politics have pushed many Ukrainians to adopt a deeply polarized worldview, in which constructive criticism, dissenting views, and even observable facts are rejected out of hand if they are seen as harmful to Ukraine. This phenomenon might be termed the new Ukrainian exceptionalism, and it is worrisome because it threatens the very democratic values Ukrainians espouse, while weakening Ukraine's case for international support.

The new Ukrainian exceptionalism comes at a high price for Ukrainian civil society and for the international community focused on helping Ukraine. There have already been cases in which prominent Ukrainian thought leaders have been threatened and even attacked for expressing views critical of the government, nationalist politicians, or volunteer militias. Likewise, among Ukraine's friends abroad there is precious little tolerance for views that dissent from the dominant party line that Ukraine's current government is the best it has ever had, and that the West must provide not only political and financial support, but also supply it with lethal weapons to fight the Russians in Donbas.

There is little tolerance for views that dissent from the dominant party line in Ukraine.

This exceptionalist worldview is nowhere more evident than in the discourse around Ukraine's President Petro Poroshenko. Poroshenko is a billionaire confectionary baron who also owns banking and agricultural assets, and several influential media platforms, most notably Ukraine's Fifth Channel, and who served in high government posts, including as Yanukovych's minister of economic development and minister of foreign affairs under Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. Today, Poroshenko presides over a state and a government that has committed to a reform campaign it styles as "de-oligrachization."

Yet when queried about whether, as an oligarch himself, Poroshenko can be effective in removing oligarchic influence from Ukraine's politics and economy, many Ukrainians feel compelled to defend their wartime leader by denying that he is, in fact, an oligarch in the first place. Or if he is one, they say, he's a different kind of oligarch, certainly the best of the bunch. After all, they reason, he has used his wealth and influence to help Ukraine and fight Russia, and anyway, his business interests are more transparent and of more value to the country than those of his rivals. Instead of selling his businesses, as he promised to do during last year's presidential campaign, Poroshenko has held onto them, demonstrating that even in the new Ukraine, politics and the private sector remain inseparable.

Exceptionalists argue: While oligarchy in general might be bad, Ukraine's patriotic oligarchs are not.

The exceptionalism does not stop with Poroshenko. In fact, the same tortured logic extends to support for other "good" oligarchs: Lviv's mayor Andriy Sadovyi, who has run that city for nearly a decade, owns major media, electrical utility and financial assets, and has backed his own party in the national parliament, is described as having made Lviv a "lighthouse" for Ukrainian reform, on the model of neighboring Poland. Even Dnipropetrovsk's Ihor Kolomoiskiy, who himself embraces the oligarch moniker, has spent millions in defense of Ukraine against Russian aggression, served as governor of a vulnerable frontline region and held it together, and besides, his Privat Bank group is a pillar of Ukraine's financial stability. So, while oligarchy in general might be bad, Ukraine's most patriotic oligarchs, the exceptionalists argue, are not.

The same goes for the country's far right political forces. Cite the rise of Praviy Sektor, or Right Sector, during and after the Euro-Maidan, and many Ukrainians will point to the radical right movement's poor performance in last year's presidential and parliamentary elections. Point to the resurgence of symbols and slogans of the Second World War ultra-nationalist Union of Ukrainian Nationalists, OUN, or the newly passed laws banning "Soviet symbols," canonizing controversial Ukrainian nationalist figures Stepan Bandera and Roman Shukhevych, and they will say that Ukraine has every right to define its own history, even if it does so with blatant disregard and disrespect for that of millions of its citizens now living under Russian occupation or otherwise not fully represented in the government. The new Ukrainian exceptionalism makes it possible for undercurrents of intolerance and extreme nationalism to cohabit with stated commitments to pluralism and democracy.

New Ukrainian exceptionalism: Undercurrents of intolerance cohabit with commitments to democracy.

The Euro-Maidan was dubbed a Revolution of Dignity because it represented the victory of the people in defense of basic human rights and human dignity. But a year after that victory, the parliament has approved a decree limiting Ukraine's obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. So far, the decree applies only to portions of the two oblasts, or regions, of Donetsk and Luhansk where the war is going on, but it has been accompanied by allegations of torture and unlawful detention by Ukrainian authorities. These steps set a dangerous precedent for limitation of human rights without wide public discussion. Exceptionalism effectively gives carte-blanche to the government to act in the name of Ukraine's security, while it fragments and diminishes the human rights activist community that was once a bulwark of the new Ukraine.

Finally, raise the problem of private armies in Ukraine, and one is told that the famous "volunteer battalions" are actually completely legal and legitimate police, interior ministry or army units that have been integrated under a single, responsible national command. This would be a reasonable position and an extremely important step to constrain possible future internecine violence, corporate raiding and other abuses in Ukraine, if only it were true.

The same goes for so-called soldier deputies, commanders of the volunteer battalions elected to the parliament last October, many of whom still appear in uniform and demonstrate scant regard for the boundaries between civilian and military authority. Dashing but bellicose figures like Serhii Melnychuk, Semen Semenchenko and Dmytro Yarosh, we are told, are not really soldiers any more, their grandstanding is just a PR exercise. Maybe so, but their message hardly confirms Ukraine's commitment to rule of law, civilian control of the military, and national reconciliation. With prominent exceptions like these in the new Ukraine, it is increasingly difficult to identify the rule.

Without a doubt, Ukraine now faces its most severe crisis of the post-1991 period. In the face of attacks by Russia and its separatist allies, Ukraine deserves the support of its citizens and the wider world. Yet the enthusiasm of the world to help Ukraine will be diminished and the damage from Russian aggression magnified if Ukrainians succumb to the kind of exceptionalism described above. Instead, Ukrainians should seek to preserve what have actually been their most exceptional characteristics - a rare and genuine commitment to pluralism, civic freedom, and human dignity that make Ukraine a cause worth fighting for.

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 #5
www.rt.com
June 25, 2015
Despite NATO propaganda, Russia not planning to invade Baltic States
By Bryan MacDonald
Bryan MacDonald is an Irish writer and commentator focusing on Russia and its hinterlands and international geo-politics.

The latest US narrative on Russia is straight from the plot of a Hollywood fantasy: US superheroes versus a Russian villain. Sadly for the Baltic States, they are being used by Uncle Sam as bait.

Here's a starter for ten question: Russia's reunification with Crimea last year was prompted by which of the following...

a.) a very particular set of historical circumstances, allied to the will of the overwhelming majority of the local population.
b.) Vladimir Putin's desire to launch a blitzkrieg military campaign, complete with goose-stepping Russian soldiers marching across Europe?

If you are not a raving-mad neocon or someone who has difficulties with reality, the correct answer is a. Crimea was Russian territory for centuries and had been transferred to Ukraine as part of an administrative re-alignment at a time when both states were part of the Soviet Union. The peninsula is as Russian as Cornwall is British or Texas is American. Furthermore, not even the most myopic anti-Russia activist questions the fact that most Crimean residents wished to join the Russian Federation.

Given what has happened in Ukraine since, it's unlikely that many people in Simferopol or Yalta would change that stance. Certainly, Crimean integration into the Russia state has been far from straightforward. Western sanctions targeted at local denizens haven't helped in that regard and neither has the lack of a physical connection with the Russian mainland.

However, the alternative would have been far worse. Ukraine is now a failed state. Its economy has been decimated, corruption is arguably even more rampant than before the Maidan coup and a civil war rages sporadically in the east. Compared to Ukraine, Crimea is Narnia. Then again, almost every place on the planet, outside of Africa, probably looks attractive to those desperate to flee from Ukraine.

American aggression

According to elements in the Western media and the US propaganda machine, the original poser ought to be answered with option (b). Crimea's 'annexation' was the first phase of an embryonic Russian plan to sweep across Europe, gobbling up lebensraum with gay abandon. Anybody who objects to this narrative is a "Kremlin troll," or "Putin apologist." If old Joseph McCarthy could return to earth for five minutes, he'd be doing cartwheels. Demagogic, reckless, and unsubstantiated accusations have never been as fashionable as they are today. In fact, don't be surprised if Vogue's Anna Wintour soon declares them as the trend for autumn-winter 2015.

Despite the relish with which lazy Western journalism and a highly-organized NATO "information campaign" lambasts "Putin's Russia" as a warmongering 'rogue' state, the facts tell another tale. During the past 15 years, the Russian army has only entered the sovereign territory of two foreign states, with Crimea counting as one of those occasions.

In 2008, former President Medvedev sent his forces into Georgia in response to Tbilisi's aggression against South Ossetia. After five days of fighting, Russian troops controlled much of Georgia's territory. Nevertheless, within two months, the Kremlin had withdrawn all its soldiers. This scenario doesn't sound very Hitler-esque.

At this time, Georgia was ruled by pro-Washington Mikhail Saakashvili, who subsequently abandoned his citizenship to obtain a Ukrainian passport. A move almost unheard of globally for a former head of state, for the precise reason that it's gravely insulting to his homeland. Saakashvili is now a wanted criminal suspect in Georgia. He remains a fugitive.

By contrast, since the turn of the century, the US has intervened in Yemen, Liberia, Haiti, Libya and Syria. In addition, 'Uncle Sam' has invaded Iraq and Afghanistan. A 2011 study suggests that 500,000 people have died as a result of the Iraq war. As it happens, according to the United Nations, George Bush and Tony Blair's bloodthirsty campaign of violence was illegal under international law.

The imaginary threat

Despite the obvious fact that Washington's military has been much busier than that of Russia so far this century, we rarely hear of "US belligerence" in the Western media. However, they are falling over themselves to decry "Russia aggression," so much so that the phrase has become something of a catchphrase du jour.

According to American propaganda, this alleged Russian hostility is apparently focused on the goal of subjugating Eastern Europe. Indeed, Hillary Clinton, currently the bookmaker's favorite to be the next US President, has already compared Putin to Hitler.

In order to sell the 'Hollywood' notion of Russia as global arch villain, the State Department needs to create targets for this imaginary Russian military jaunt around Europe. They've chosen the Baltic States - Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia. Three countries so harmless and innocuous that the only interaction most Westerners have with them is when their citizens migrate to find work. Which they do in huge numbers.

Unlike Crimea, which was of hugely significant strategic importance (hosting Russia's largest Black Sea base for instance), there is nothing especially interesting about any of the Baltic countries. All remain poor, to varying degrees, with Estonia the most prosperous. Lithuania has lost 32 percent of its population since 1989 and Latvia, in particular, remains riddled with corruption.

The leaders of Latvia and Lithuania tend to use Russia as a bogeyman to distract attention from their own graft and ineptitude. Also, the attention currently lavished upon them from Washington and Brussels could bring with it some much needed investment capital. Vilnius' opportunistic President Dalia Grybauskaitė, a former member of the Communist Party, is a master of anti-Kremlin rhetoric.

Estonia's President, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, is a very interesting character. An American, Ilves was once the head of the Estonia desk of Radio Free Europe, which was funded by the CIA in its early days. His Twitter account features a regularly updated stream of support for neocon positions and paranoia about a perceived 'Russian threat.'

A 'Russian threat' that doesn't exist.

Let's just imagine for a moment that Russia did invade one or all of the Baltic States. What would it do with this newly acquired territory? The Kremlin would be faced with an enraged local population and a very angry wider world. That is assuming that this imagined Russian assault didn't trigger a full-scale nuclear conflict with NATO. In which case, as the mushroom cloud envelops your nearest city, you can assume that Putin's 'dastardly plan' has failed.

Even if Brussels and Washington, and this is very unlikely, rolled over and accepted Russian dominion over the Baltic countries, what then? With the greatest respect to the locals, there is little more of economic worth than fields and forests. There is no oil, no gas and no hidden deposits of rare-earth minerals.

Some NATO propaganda claims that Putin's government wishes to use the Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia as staging posts for a wider invasion of Europe. The main problem with this theory is that it's insane; aside from that, Russia already has a Baltic exclave, Kaliningrad. Additionally, Western media frequently runs scare stories about Russian military drills in the region. These take place on Russian territory. Now, guess what? Almost every country in the world, even neutral Switzerland, conducts armed forces training from time to time on its own soil.

The reality is that the Western media is feeding readers, viewers and listeners a lazy narrative driven by the US State Department and NATO for reasons known only to themselves. But one assumes it comes from a desire to ratchet up military spending in Europe allied to anger over Russia's stance on Syria. Now, the neocons have decided that Russia is the new bugaboo.

Meanwhile, Vladimir Putin, in the mind of the western media, is the new Saddam/Bin Laden/Joker/Riddler or whatever comic book bad guy you may fancy. If it wasn't so tragically serious, it'd be funny. However, rather than bellicose laughter, there's a danger that this particular farce could end in tears.

 #6
Levada.ru
June 24, 2015
Two in three Russians want Putin to remain president after 2018, believe he will

Two-thirds of Russians would like Vladimir Putin to remain president after the next election, and the same number believe that he will, according to the results of the latest opinion poll by the Russian independent polling organization Levada Centre, published on its website on 24 June.

Asked whom they would like to see as president after the next presidential election, a record 66 per cent chose Putin. In previous Levada polls, the figure rose from 26 per cent in April 2013 through 32 per cent in March 2014 (after the Sochi Olympics) and 49 per cent in April 2014 (after the annexation of Crimea) to 55 per cent in December.

In the latest poll, 8 per cent said they would like "someone else who would continue Putin's policy" while 15 per cent went for "someone who would offer a different solution to Russia's problems" (down from 41 per cent in 2013 and 22 per cent in April last year). Another 12 per cent were undecided.

Asked who they thought would be president, 66 per cent said Putin; 14 per cent, "a successor chosen by Putin"; 7 per cent, "another politician elected regardless of Putin"; and 13 per cent were undecided. The website provided to previous data for comparison.

The poll showed little enthusiasm for an early presidential election. Just 4 per cent said they were definitely in favour and 22 per cent, "more in favour". However, 17 per cent said they were definitely against the idea and 30 per cent "more against". Many respondents - 28 per cent - were undecided.

Dictatorial tendencies

There was plenty of support for the proposition that "Russia needs a strong leader who can restore order, even at the price of temporarily suspending elections and restricting the freedom of speech": 39 per cent "completely agreed" and 33 were inclined to agree, with only 5 per cent completely disagreeing and 17 per cent inclined to disagree. The figures were almost totally unchanged from June 2013. Back in May 1998, support for the idea was even higher, with 56 per cent "completely agreeing".

Asked whether they believed that "it does not matter who you vote for, it changes practically nothing", 14 per cent completely agreed (down from 22 per cent in June 2103) and 24 per cent were inclined to agree (down from 34). However, 24 per cent (up from 9) completely disagreed and 32 per cent (up from 31) were inclined to disagree.

Parliamentary election: timing unimportant, One Russia way ahead

Half of those questioned (50 per cent) said they were "certain" or "likely" to vote in the next State Duma election, a quarter (24 per cent) were "certain" or "likely" not to, and another quarter (23 per cent) were undecided.

The idea of moving the election forward from December to September 2016 left 57 per cent "indifferent", with 12 per cent in favour, 17 per cent against and 14 per cent unsure. Asked which month would be more convenient for them personally, both September and December received 34 per cent of the vote, with 32 per cent unsure.

When respondents were asked which party they would vote if a State Duma election was held next Sunday, the ruling One Russia proved overwhelmingly the most popular, chosen by 47 per cent of all respondents and 68 per cent of those who knew for certain that they would cast their vote. The Communist remained in second place (12 and 17 per cent respectively, marginally higher than before), followed by the other two parties represented in the current State Duma: LDPR (5 and 8 per cent) and A Just Russia (2 and 3). No other party (including the opposition Parnas, the Party of Progress and Yabloko) had more than 1 per cent. Thirteen per cent of all respondents said they would definitely not vote, and 19 per cent were undecided.

The poll was conducted on 19-22 June among 1,600 respondents aged 18 and over in 134 town and villages in 46 regions of Russia. The margin of error was 3.4 per cent, Levada Centre said.

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 #7
Ekho Moskvy radio (Moscow)
June 25, 2015
Referendum on Dzerzhinskiy monument divides Russian society

The decision of the Moscow authorities to allow a referendum on whether the monument to Feliks Dzerzhinskiy should return to its original place in the centre of Lubyanskaya (Lubyanka) Square in Moscow proves to be controversial, judging by opinions expressed by political experts and members of the general public in Moscow.

Feliks Dzerzhinskiy (1877-1926), was director of the first Soviet secret police, Cheka, which was notorious for summary executions following the 1917 October Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. In 1991, the statue was removed in the wake of the failed coup attempt against Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

State-owned news television channel Rossiya 24 reminded viewers that in the past 14 years there had been as many as seven attempts to have the monument returned to its original place but all of them failed.

Commenting on the decision allowing the referendum, Andrey Klychkov, head of the Communist faction in the Moscow Duma which initiated the motion, said that, finally, "common sense has prevailed". The Kremlin's spokesman Dmitriy Peskov has refused to comment.

Dzerzhinskiy seen as "symbol"

According to liberal journalist and Kremlin critic Viktor Shenderovich, Dzerzhinskiy remains a symbol. "The monument to Dzerzhinskiy is a symbol. Everything started with its demolition," he told editorially independent Ekho Moskvy radio, referring to the democratic reforms of the early 1990s which led to the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Shenderovich was sceptical. "It is not a bad idea to hold a referendum. But in a free country a referendum is accompanied by the freedom of speech and the right to have access to information," he said.

The authorities have nothing to lose by allowing the referendum, according to another Kremlin critic, political expert Dmitriy Oreshkin. According to him, the Moscow authorities will make sure that the referendum "has a result that suits the authorities".

The authorities want "to sound out public opinion" and see whether Muscovites "support the idea", he said in an interview with Ekho Moskvy. Another reason behind the decision to allow the referendum is "to distract people from real problems", he said.

In the opinion of Sergey Markov, a pro-Kremlin political commentator and member of the ruling One Russia party, the Moscow authorities which took the decision "were afraid to say anything against Dzerzhinskiy because they think that in the authorities above them there are people who must like Dzerzhinskiy".

"Just to be on the safe side, they decided not to say anything against Dzerzhinskiy," he explained.

The referendum won't change anything, according to Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, the outspoken leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia. The Moscow authorities may have already "sounded out public opinion" and are confident of its outcome. "So let them hold the referendum," he said, adding that he was against referendums in general because there was no guarantee that people will vote the "right way".

Kremlin refuses to comment

The Kremlin refused to comment on the decision. It is an example of the Moscow authorities exercising their powers, Dmitriy Peskov, press secretary to the Russian president, told journalists, according to Ekho Moskvy.

Asked about Putin's attitude to the idea, Peskov replied, according to state news agency TASS: "As far as I know, the president has never publicly expressed an opinion on the matter."

Public opinion divided

Opinions among people on the streets of Moscow were divided. One man told Ekho Moskvy that the times had changed and that "nowadays people defend the president's position more actively", while the president, he said, will "defend" the monument.

Another man also supported the idea. "You can't change history," he said. "What do monuments have to do with it? Let them stay as reminders of things both good and bad," he told Ekho Moskvy.

But a third man said he regarded himself as belonging to a majority and, according to him, the majority of people in Moscow are against the idea. According to him, 80 per cent of young people are against the referendum and the monument to Dzerzhinskiy altogether.

Another young man agreed with him but gave his own reasons. The referendum, he said, will ask people "to support the insanity currently taking place around us". "This has nothing to do with democracy. This smacks more of a concentration camp," he told Ekho Moskvy.

And, in the opinion of prominent film director Nikita Mikhalkov, instead if Dzerzhinskiy, a statue of Russia's pre-revolutionary reformist prime minister, Petr Stolypin, should stand in Lubyanskaya Square.

Source: Ekho Moskvy radio, Moscow, in Russian 1500 gmt 25 Jun 15; TASS news agency, Moscow, in Russian 1030 gmt 25 Jun 15; Rossiya 24 news channel, Moscow, in Russian 1856 gmt 25 Jun 15

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 #8
Consortiumnews.com
June 24, 2015
The Nitwits Are in Charge
By Robert Parry
Investigative reporter Robert Parry broke many of the Iran-Contra stories for The Associated Press and Newsweek in the 1980s.

Exclusive: Pundit Thomas Friedman laments that the new Cold War isn't funny enough for him, but there really isn't anything funny about the U.S. plunging into an unnecessary nuclear showdown with Russia over Ukraine while Friedman and his fellow VIPs misreport what's happening, writes Robert Parry.

Sometimes I wonder if today's crop of U.S. pundits and pols could ever rise to meet some truly urgent need of the American people, let alone the interests of the world. Everything, it seems, is done with a snigger and an attitude - even as we stumble into a wholly unnecessary confrontation with nuclear-armed Russia over which batch of thieves and oligarchs gets to run Ukraine.

There's an old joke about Washington being Hollywood for ugly people, but Washington also turns out to be Comedy Central for unfunny people. We're left with a tedious column by The New York Times' Thomas L. Friedman lamenting that we're having a new "Cold War without the fun - that is, without James Bond, Smersh, 'Get Smart' Agent 86's shoe phone, Nikita Khrushchev's shoe-banging, a race to the moon or a debate between American and Soviet leaders over whose country has the best kitchen appliances."

Yuk, yuk! So clever! But Friedman, the ever-clueless columnist, misses the fact there was another side to the best humor and satire about the Cold War. Movies, like Stanley Kubrick's "Dr. Strangelove" (1964), pointed to the grim absurdity of mutual assured destruction. Even some of the goofier comedies, like "Get Smart," parodied the supposed glamour of Cold War spy-craft.

But there was really very little funny about the very real threat of annihilation of all life on the planet, nor about the vast sums of money wasted on building up super-sized nuclear arsenals, nor about the enduring influence that military contractors and their legions of apologists then had - and still have - on the federal budget.

In 1953, less than three months after becoming President, Dwight Eisenhower decried the diversion of so much money and talent into the pursuit of more and more deadly weapons, saying: "Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed."

Then, in his farewell address in 1961, Eisenhower warned that the nation "must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist."

We now know that both the waste and the influence survived even the Cold War's end - and they are now roaring back to life with the birth of a new Cold War. None of this, however, is funny.

Earlier this year at a New York conference on the renewed prospects for nuclear war, legendary activist Helen Caldicott had the participants watch Stanley Kramer's 1959 movie, "On the Beach," set in Caldicott's native Australia. I had not seen the movie for decades and had forgotten many of the details in the tautly written drama starring Gregory Peck, Ava Gardner, Fred Astaire and Anthony Perkins.

Peck plays a disciplined but very human American submarine commander whose ship finds itself in Australia after a nuclear war has wiped out life over much of the world - though the causes of the conflict remain vague throughout the movie, with the suspicion that the war might have begun as an accident involving a panicky radar man and then quickly raged out of control.

For the people in Australia, the inevitable end was coming, too, and much of the movie deals with the various characters facing not only their own mortality but that of their children and the entire human species. Despite the despairing outcome, there is a warmth and sensitivity to the film.

"On the Beach" even had a touch of genuine comedy, including a scene of drunken Australians crowding onto a favorite fishing stream for a last carousal, singing "Waltzing Matilda," a sadly haunting song that becomes the anthem for the doomed planet.

Juvenile 'Humor'

But the humor in "On the Beach" is not the hoo-hah juvenility that we now see in today's mainstream yucking it up over the fun of provoking a confrontation with Russia by supporting a coup in Ukraine, followed by ethnic cleansing of ethnic Russians and then, of course, blaming everything on Russia and its President Vladimir Putin.

Friedman can't resist the cheap poke-in-the-side of mentioning Putin "riding horses bare-chested," which Friedman deems "an apt metaphor" for the new Cold War. If anyone wants to be taken "seriously" in Official Washington, you must mention Putin riding shirtless with a smirk on your face, just as you must sagely talk about the need to "reform," i.e. slash, Social Security.

At least Friedman does acknowledge that "we fired the first shot when we expanded NATO toward the Russian border even though the Soviet Union had disappeared. Message to Moscow: You are always an enemy, no matter what system you have."

But then Friedman veers back into Official Washington's false narrative blaming the Ukraine crisis all on the diabolical Putin. Though there is not a shred of evidence that Putin wanted the Ukraine crisis, there is substantial evidence that U.S. officials and operatives were seeking to destabilize the Ukrainian government as a scheme to weaken Russia.

Yet, no "serious" pundit or pol can acknowledge that reality. You can't mention how the neocon National Endowment for Democracy was funding NGOs inside Ukraine for years to create an infrastructure to implement U.S. policy preferences or that NED's President Carl Gershman, in 2013, deemed Ukraine "the biggest prize" and a stepping stone toward regime change in Russia.

Nor can you mention that neocon Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland was overheard plotting with U.S. Ambassador Geoffrey Pyatt how to "midwife" the ouster of elected President Viktor Yanukovych and the installation of Nuland's favorite - "Yats is the guy" - Arseniy Yatsenyuk. [See Consortiumnews.com's "The Neocons: Masters of Chaos."]

You also can't mention the role of neo-Nazi militias who prepped for the coup with training in the western city of Lviv and then dispatched hundreds of militants a day into Kiev to turn the Maidan protests into a violent political clash. Nor can you reference the key role of neo-Nazi forces, such as the Azov battalion, in waging bloody attacks on ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine.

Sadly for the mainstream U.S. press, that unpleasant reality was implicitly confirmed when the U.S. House of Representatives voted unanimously to bar U.S. military advisers in Ukraine from training the neo-Nazis of the Azov battalion. [See Consortiumnews.com's "US House Admits Nazi Role in Ukraine."]

But the answer to that inconvenient admission of truth for The New York Times and other MSM outlets was to simply ignore the House vote, much as they also have blacked out Crimea's referendum on a 96 percent vote to secede from Ukraine and join Russia. That gets summarized as simply a "Russian invasion."

So, off we go again into a new Cold War that will transfer trillions of more dollars into the military-industrial complex and could push the world into a nuclear conflagration. Assuming, however, that we don't commit nuclear suicide, there's still the prospect for the planet's slower death - as the United States and other major nations ignore global warming in the rush for more weapon building.

There really isn't anything very funny about any of this nor should there be - despite Thomas L. Friedman's disappointment that this latest madness isn't amusing enough for him.

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 #9
New York Times
June 26, 2015
Putin Breaks Silence With Call to Obama Touching on Ukraine and ISIS
By PETER BAKER and DAVID M. HERSZENHORN

WASHINGTON - President Obama spoke with President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia on Thursday in their first direct contact in four months as the United States and Russia try to manage their conflict over Ukraine while still working together on other issues like Syria and Iran's nuclear program.

Mr. Putin initiated the call, the first between the estranged leaders since February, the White House said. He brought up the war against the Islamic State in Syria and the two leaders agreed to have Secretary of State John Kerry meet with Foreign Minister Sergey V. Lavrov to discuss how to counter the spread of radicalism in the Middle East. They also discussed the Iran talks in advance of next week's deadline for an agreement.

But American officials said that Mr. Obama focused on the continuing separatist war in Ukraine fomented by support from Moscow and pushed Mr. Putin to abide by a shaky diplomatic agreement known as the Minsk accord. Violence has flared in recent weeks even as Russia failed to drive a wedge among the members of the European Union who agreed to renew economic sanctions on Russia for another six months.

"President Obama reiterated the need for Russia to fulfill its commitments under the Minsk agreements, including the removal of all Russian troops and equipment from Ukrainian territory," the White House said.

The Kremlin said Mr. Putin agreed to have his deputy foreign minister, Grigory Karasin, talk with Victoria J. Nuland, an assistant secretary of state, about the fulfillment of the Minsk accord.

Mr. Putin's decision to call Mr. Obama and focus on Syria and Iran may reflect a desire to assert his continuing importance on the world stage despite Russia's isolation and failure to break the Western consensus on sanctions.

The United States and Russia have been at odds over Syria. Moscow supports the government of President Bashar al-Assad, and Mr. Obama has called for his resignation. American officials hope Mr. Putin may see the rise of the Islamic State as enough of a threat to now be willing to apply pressure on Mr. Assad, but they also suspected his renewed interest in the issue may be a way of distracting from Ukraine.

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 #10
Salon.com
June 25, 2015
We restarted the Cold War: The real story about the NATO buildup that the New York Times won't tell you
Our leaders and media push time-worn nonsense about American innocence, while taking aggressive moves. Look out
By PATRICK L. SMITH
Patrick Smith is the author of "Time No Longer: Americans After the American Century." He was the International Herald Tribune's bureau chief in Hong Kong and then Tokyo from 1985 to 1992. During this time he also wrote "Letter from Tokyo" for the New Yorker. He is the author of four previous books and has contributed frequently to the New York Times, the Nation, the Washington Quarterly, and other publications. Follow him on Twitter, @thefloutist.

Have you picked up on the new trope du jour? We are all encouraged to bask in our innocence as we lament the advent of a new Cold War. The thought has been in the wind for more than a year, of course, at least among some of us. But we witness a significant turn, and I hope this same some of us are paying attention.

As of this week, leaders who know nothing about leading, thinkers who do not think and opinion-shaping poseurs such as Tom Friedman are confident enough in their case to sally forth with it: The Cold War returns, the Russians have restarted it and we must do the right thing-the right thing being to bring NATO troops and materiel up to Russia's borders, pandering to the paranoia of the former Soviet satellites as if they alone have access to some truth not available to the rest of us.

James Stavridis, the former admiral and NATO commander, quoted in Wednesday's New York Times: "I don't think we're in the Cold War again-yet. I can kind of see it from here."

I can kind of see it, too, Admiral, and cannot be surprised: NATO has missed the Cold War since the Wall came down and the Pentagon's creature in Europe commenced a quarter-century of wandering in search of useful enemies. At last, the very best of them is back.

The inimitable (thank goodness) Tom Friedman on the same day's opinion page: "This time it seems like the Cold War without the fun-that is, without James Bond, Smersh, 'Get Smart' Agent 86's shoe phone," and so on.

Leave it to Tom to recall the single most consequentially corrosive period in American history by way of its infantile frivolities. He is paid, after all, to make sure Americans understand events cartoonishly rather than as historical phenomena with chronology, causality and responsibility attaching to them.

You have here a classic one-two. Stavridis' successors in the military get on with the business of aggressing abroad and trapping Russia in a frame-up J. Edgar Hoover would admire, while Friedman buries us in marshmallow fluff sandwiches.

A couple of columns back I wondered aloud as to what all the talk of renewed Russian aggression, begun in mid-April, was all about. It certainly had nothing to do with Russian aggression for the simple reason there was none. If you saw any, please tell us all about it in the comment box.

A couple of columns earlier I questioned why John Kerry met Vladimir Putin and Sergei Lavrov, his foreign minister, in Sochi. Altogether weirdly, the secretary of state suddenly appeared to make common cause with the Russian president.

My worst predictions are now realities. We have just been subjected to a tried-and-sometimes-true campaign preparing us for a Cold War reprise-begun, like the original, by spooks and Pentagon planners ever eager to escalate unnecessary tensions in the direction of unnecessary conflict.

Think with history, readers. We are now back in the mid-1950s by my reckoning, when the template at work today was perfected in places such as Guatemala. The Dulles brothers double-handedly transformed Jacobo Árbenz, offspring of a Swiss druggist and Guatemala's second properly elected president, into an agent of "Communist aggression," as the Times helpfully described him at the time. Árbenz was deposed in 1954, of course, and most Americans were obediently relieved that another "threat" had been countered. (I have always loved the purely American thought of an aggressive Guatemala.)

On through the decades, from Ho to Lumumba to Allende to the Sandinistas-every single case falsely cast as a Moscow-inspired challenge to the "free world," every case in truth reflecting America's ambition to global dominance. There is a golden rule at work here, so do not miss it: Americans never act but in response to a threat to human freedom originating among the mal-intended elsewhere.

Any good historian-and stop being so negative, you find good ones here and there-will tell you that the golden rule has applied without exception since the 18th century. It applied to the Mexicans in the 1840s, the Spanish in the 1890s, and countless times during the century we call American.

Even now, the golden rule is inscribed in any American history text you may pick up. It is integral to Americans' consciousness of themselves. And in consequence it is near to impossible for most of us to grasp our role in events as they unfold before our eyes, never mind our true place in history.

So long as the rule applies, all notions of causality and responsibility are erased from the story. This reality is very close to the root of the American crisis, if you accept the thought that we are amid one.

I view the marked deterioration of the West's relations with Russia since April in precisely this historically informed light. We have entered upon a new Cold War, all right, and its similarity to the last one lies in one aspect more important than any other: Washington instigated this one just as Truman set the first in motion when he armed the Greek monarchy-fascist by his own ambassador's description-against a popular revolt in 1947.

You would think it something close to a magician's trickery to conduct a century and more's worth of coups, political subterfuge and military interventions and keep Americans convinced that all done in their names is done in the name of good. But we live through a case in point. We now witness an aggressive military advance toward Russia's borders on a nearly astonishing scale, yet very few Americans are able to see it for what it is.

Such is the power of our golden rule.

The theme of new Russian aggression sounded over the past couple of months reeked of orchestration from the first, as suggested in this space when it was first sounded. It was too consistent in language, tone and implication, whether it came from the Pentagon, NATO or Times news reports-which are, naturally, based on Pentagon and NATO sources.

Anything counted: Russia's military exercises within its own borders were aggressive. Russian air defense systems on its borders were aggressive. Russia's military presence in Kaliningrad, Russian territory lying between Lithuania and Poland, was an aggressive threat.

The caker came 10 days ago, when Putin promised his generals 40 new intercontinental ballistic missiles. Aggressive times 10, we heard over and over. "Loose rhetoric" was the incessantly repeated phrase.

In this connection I loved Ashton Carter in an exclusive interview on CBS Tuesday morning. Announcing NATO's new plans for deployments in Eastern Europe and the Baltics, the defense secretary cited Putin's "loose rhetoric." The correspondent must have lost the playbook and had the temerity to ask him to explain. Whereupon the wrong-footed Carter mumbled, "Well, it's... it's... it's loose rhetoric, that's what it is."

Got it, Ash. Loose rhetoric.

Does the secretary mind if we spend a few minutes in the forbidden kingdom known as historical reality?

Putin has not uttered a syllable of rhetoric-no need of it-since the Bush II White House floored him with its 2002 announcement that it would unilaterally abandon Nixon's 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. "This, in fact, pushes us to a new round of the arms race, because it changes the global security system," the Russian leader said subsequently. Whereupon Russia set about rebuilding its greatly reduced nuclear arsenal, of which the 40 new ICBMs are an exceedingly small addition.

There are no secrets here-only chronology and causality. In the context, I view the 40 new missiles as a very measured message-and of little consequence in themselves-in reply to the immodest lunge into frontline nations Carter disclosed in Estonia this week.

Where did President Obama get the idea to name this guy to head Defense? He outdoes Rumsfeld in certain respects. Not only is he deploying weapons and rotating troops in and out of six of NATO's easterly members-the three Baltics, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania. He now advances a number of bluntly escalating nuclear "options."

Putin's 40 warheads are squirrel guns next to Carter's proposals. The new sec def is talking about an offensive nuclear curtain across Europe, a "counterforce" capable of hitting Russian military installations and "countervailing strike capabilities"-pre-emptively deployed nuclear missiles that include Russian cities among their targets. (Thanks to Pepe Escobar of Asia Times for his analysis of Carter's "Pentagonese.")

I should remind readers at this point, lest you forget, that we American are the aggressed upon, not the aggressors.

One news report can be singled out here as the celebratory herald of the newly unveiled stance. This is the previously quoted piece in Wednesday's Times, which appeared under the headline, "NATO refocuses on the Kremlin, Its Original Foe." Read it here, a real lab specimen, no breach of the golden rule anywhere in its several thousand words.

I needed a minute to get past the "refocuses" in the headline, with its thought that after many years away NATO must now unexpectedly return to the Cold War scene. Preposterous. How many members have been recruited eastward since the Wall came down? I count 12, 10 of which were Warsaw Pact nations. (Slovenia and Croatia, the other two, emerged from the destruction of Yugoslavia.)

Busy time advancing in the direction of the "original foe," one has to say.

What follows the head is an account of new training exercises and dummy B-52 bombing runs-"all just 180 miles from the Russian border," our correspondents report effervescently. This is wound around an exceedingly well-carved account of European views of this new turn backward. The latter is meant to veil ambiguity and reluctance that run wide and deep among many NATO members while making the enthusiasm found in former Soviet satellites appear to speak for the majority.

Fraudulent, top to bottom. One, European resistance to this latest NATO advance is now a matter of record. Recent surveys by organizations such as Pew indicate that among West European members the thought of coming to the aid of any newer member may be rejected by a majority.

Yes, we read, there are divisions within the European camp. But these are put down as the consequence of Russia's campaign to sow disunity in NATO. I had to read that bit twice-and not only because it was reported twice in the same piece. I imagine a lot of Europeans are thinking this assertion over carefully, and not with smiling faces.

Two, East European army officers and civilian officials simply cannot be taken as authoritative judges of Russia and its intentions. This is flatly illogical, and as the Times habitually makes use of them as such I take it to be purposeful trickery to skew Americans' understanding of European views of NATO.

As earlier noted, I ascribe a certain paranoia to the Poles, the Balts and others formerly in the Soviet orbit. For obvious reasons this sentiment is understandable. But that does not make the argument that they are rational analysts. It makes the opposite argument: They may be understandably paranoid, and have a lot of bad history behind them, but paranoids are not to be taken as sound sources of analysis. Zbigniew Brzezinski is our up-close Exhibit A.

There is craft and there is wile, and these correspondents are well on the wily side in their use of sources. To represent the American view they resort to the usual Times scam: a single-source story dressed up as a multi-source story. Everyone quoted is either Pentagon, NATO or formerly one or the other. These people all get dressed in the same locker room every morning, let's say, given they all say exactly the same thing.

(Memo to the Times: A multi-source story means a story representing multiple perspectives.)

On the European side, the mirror image: No one from Western Europe is quoted. Everyone cited is from one or another of the newly accessed member states, most being either military officers with fingers on triggers or defense ministry officials.

It skews the analysis to the point of implausibility. These people are all preparing for a Russian invasion of the Baltics or Poland, but there is no shred of evidence Moscow is within a million miles of any such planning. Evidence of Russia's desire to calm this circus down is mountainous-and for precisely this reason ignored.

A couple of loose ends remain to be tied up at this juncture. The E.U. just renewed its sanctions regime against Russia for an additional six months. Why? There had been considerable resistance to this only a matter of weeks ago.

That visit Kerry paid to Sochi. Why did he make it, if all we see unfolding now was already on the story board, as surely it was at the time of Kerry's curious travels?

These questions are best answered together, to the extent we have comprehensive answers. In my view a certain bargain has in all likelihood been struck.

Prior to Sochi, it was well known that Washington's overplayed hand in Ukraine, especially its efforts to undermine the Minsk II ceasefire, had begun to threaten a trans-Atlantic breach. I have since had it from good sources in Europe and Washington that the Obama administration is disappointed, if not worse, with the Poroshenko government in Kiev. It does not take much to be a puppet, but they do not seem capable of managing even that.

Kerry went to Sochi not to launch any new initiative with Putin and Lavrov, as I had too hopefully suggested, but simply to assuage Chancellor Merkel and other disgusted Europeans. Hence Victoria Nuland's clumsily calculated assertions, noted in this space at the time, that Minsk II was the key to a solution in Ukraine.

Kerry's bargain, in my view, was that if things did not improve post-Sochi, the American option would go forward. And since Sochi we have had inertia in Kiev and the drum beating night and day as to Russian aggression. In effect, NATO and Washington conspired to make sure there would be no post-Sochi progress.

The American option, to finish the thought, now lies before us.

So does the curtain rise on the Cold War revival much of Washington has spoiled for since Putin proved other than the Yeltsin-like client American strategists had initially taken him to be.

"We didn't want to have this new challenge," Defense Secretary Carter told Marines aboard a destroyer floating in the Baltic Sea. "But then all of the sudden here you have behavior by Russia, which is an effort to take the world backward in time. And we can't allow that to happen."

Sure thing, Ash. Taking the world backward. Thrust upon us. Got it. Golden rule always.

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 #11
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
June 25, 2015
Is Russia losing the battle to ISIS online?
The Russian government needs to do more to counter ISIS propaganda in social networks, which has proven successful of late in attracting and recruiting young Russians from both the North Caucasus and the Volga Region.
By Yury Barmin
Yury Barmin is a strategic risk consultant based in Moscow. He holds an MPhil Degree in International Relations from the University of Cambridge. His interests include Russian foreign policy and the politics of the Gulf.

It is no secret that Russian nationals are fighting in Syria and Iraq alongside the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Greater Syria (ISIS). The Russian government has been explicit about its concerns with regard to the effectiveness of ISIS' recruitment in the country among young people. The estimates given by different officials and government institutions as to how many Russian citizens have actually joined the terrorist organization vary from 2,000 to 5,000 people.

Something that experts and Russian officials agree on is the upward trend in ISIS recruitment in Russia. Until now, they also agreed that the problem of recruitment had essentially been limited to the Muslim regions of the North Caucasus. Yet a string of recent events has shown that the scope of this problem has been continuously underestimated in Russia.

On June 16, FSB head Alexander Bortnikov told the National Antiterrorism Committee that young people from Central Russia are now finding their way into Syria where they join the Islamic State. "Over 200 residents of the Volga Region [the Volga Federal District] are fighting for the Islamists in Syria and Iraq," Bortnikov argued. The key takeaway from this statement is that what was previously regarded as a problem of the Muslim regions of the North Caucasus is now plaguing Central Russia as well.

A shocking proof of these words came when four young girls, two of them students at prestigious universities in Moscow and one - only 16 years old, attempted to leave for Syria to join the Islamic State. The Kremlin was certainly taken aback by the fact that ISIS propaganda has reached Moscow and by how effective its recruitment approach turned out to be.

Vladimir Putin's spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told journalists that the National Antiterrorism Committee and FSB are now working on the recently revealed cases. "It [ISIS recruitment] is a serious issue and a dangerous process," he said.

The North Caucasus seems to be a relatively easy target for ISIS in terms of recruitment with members of local defeated extremist groups readily fleeing to Syria, while Central Russia and the Volga Federal District with its large Muslim community have been off-limits until now. 200 Russians from the Volga region that, according to Bortnikov, have joined the Islamic State most likely came from Bashkiria and Tatarstan, where Muslims constitute over 50 percent of the population.

Social networks for aspiring jihadis

Yet the most shocking account of a Russian citizen trying to join the Islamic State happened in Moscow, when a girl named Varvara Karaulova, a student from the prestigious Moscow State University, disappeared from home.  She traveled to Turkey and only after her story went viral on Russian social networks thanks to her father was she detained by the authorities at the Syrian border. The story of Varvara Karaulova sheds light on how the Islamic State recruits new members in Russia and other post-Soviet states.

The girl allegedly intended to travel to Syria to marry a man from Tatarstan, who had already joined ISIS but whom Karaulova had never seen in person. According to a Russian tabloid, she was introduced to her husband-to-be on V Kontakte (VK), a Russian social network. After three years of "virtual love" on VK and WhatsApp the man who goes under the name of Klaus Klaus asked Karaulova, who had secretly adopted Islam, to travel to Syria in order to marry him. The fact that the Russian girl was detained at the Syrian-Turkish border in a group of 13 people indicates that the Islamic State is extremely good at connecting its online recruits with people on the ground, including in Turkey, a key transfer point for many new ISIS members.

The Russian authorities claim that Klaus is a professional recruiter of "jihadi wives" for the Islamic State and that he had several such love affairs on VK.

Russian social networks, including VK and Odnoklassniki, are flooded with extremist sympathizers and have become a key element of the ISIS recruitment strategy in Russia. The Russian General Prosecutor's office demanded in October that VK take down seven pages associated with the Islamic State, but the pace with which the authorities identify extremist content online doesn't match that with which new ones pop up.

In fact, hundreds of ISIS communities still exist on VK, some of them disguised as groups dedicated to Islam or religious preachers, while others operate undisguised. Unlike Facebook and Twitter, VK does not have a policy that requires the social network to block pro-ISIS accounts en masse. According to VK's press secretary, the social network only blocks those accounts that "incite violence or terrorism."

It is estimated that there are over ten thousand small ISIS-related communities on VK that openly post updates about daily life in the Islamic State, poetry romanticizing jihad as well as match-making ads of young unmarried fighters.

ISIS members create accounts both in Russian and Arabic, which is why the social network can only filter part of the content they post. It is even suggested that the organization has decided to move some of its promotion activity from Twitter and Facebook to the Russian social network where extremist posts are less likely to be deleted.

Following the reports that several extremist groups from the North Caucasus gave bayah (pledge of allegiance) to the Islamic State, the organization declared its new governorate in the Southern region of Russia.

This event proves yet again that ISIS is looking to expand its influence into the post-Soviet space. The recruitment mechanism that seems to be working flawlessly at the moment is the major tool that will allow the organization to fill the ranks of the Wilayat Qawqaz (The Caucasus Wilayat).
Recommended: "Central Asia turning to Russia and the US to combat ISIS"

The Russian government has so far primarily been dealing with fighters who intend to join the Islamic State or those of them who return from Iraq and Syria ignoring the roots of the problem. Recent incidents with Russian girls who fell victim to ISIS propaganda prove, however, that it was a one-sided approach. The government needs to counter the threat in the cyber domain where extremist ideas increasingly gain mass appeal, which should include countering ISIS rhetoric, targeting online recruitment communities and engaging social networks in this fight.

Is ISIS propaganda threat exaggeration?

However, regardless of the increasing activity of the Islamic State in recurring young Russians, some experts argue that the threat of ISIS propaganda is exaggerated.  

"So far, it is significantly exaggerated by Russia's intelligence and security services," said Alexei Malashenko, an expert on religion and security matters for the Moscow Carnegie Center, in an interview to Russia Direct. "But at the same time, we should not forget about ISIS propaganda, which is indeed transmitted in about 23 languages, including Russian. And there have been some results. Totally, there are between 1,700 and 3,000 Russian citizens who have joined the Islamic State."

Malashenko highlights that many recruits have disappointed in the ISIS dream and some came back. He believes that "thinking that those who returned to Russia from ISIS pose a significant threat is again an exaggeration."

At the same time, he warns that "in the case of a worsening economic situation and economic crisis, corruption and the growth of indignation in Northern Caucasus, there might be social unrest, which could, partly, turn into religious radicalism."

"In this case, those who returned from ISIS, given their military experience, could play a role," he said.

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 #12
Carnegie Moscow Center
June 26, 2015
Who's Afraid of Chinese Colonization?
By Alexander Gabuev
Gabuev is a senior associate and the chair of the Russia in the Asia-Pacific Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center.

The news that Russia's eastern Zabaikalsky region would grant 115,000 hectares of land to the Chinese company Huae Xinban under a 49-year lease stirred up a maelstrom of controversy and anxiety in Russia.  A survey conducted by Rosbalt shows that 50.5% of that news agency's readers fear such a deal "provides fertile ground for China's colonization and then annexation of Siberia, and for a major war."  Another 40% believe that the deal will "deplete Russian agricultural land and bring about the kind of environmental disaster that China has already experienced."

Russian readers were also enraged by comments from retired Major General Wang Haiyun, a senior advisor at the China Institute of International Studies and a former military attache at the Chinese embassy in Moscow. The newspaper Huanqiu Siabao (The Global Times) cited Wang Haiyun as saying that the deal would spur a relaxation of Russian migration law and a large-scale influx of Chinese labor into the Zabaikalsky region.

THE DEAL

But the reality is not as scary as most Russian observers think.  A statement on the website of the Zabaikalsky region indicates that the deal is so far just a letter of intent. Furthermore, the region's Minister of Foreign Trade Bair Galsanov explained that, with this document, the Zabaikalsky government is doing nothing more than giving theoretical permission to lease 115,000 hectares of land that the region does not actually own.  "The Chinese company will have to sign lease agreements with the owners of the land, both private parties and municipal administrations.  Public hearings will be held where local residents, district officials, environmentalists, and social activists can participate," said Galsanov. It needs to be added that the words of a retired general printed in an ultra-patriotic, populist Chinese newspaper merit no more attention than a similar publication in a comparable Russian tabloid might.

Nevertheless, the hubbub about the possible arrival of the Chinese in the Zabaikalsky region is the second time within a month that news of China's potential investment in Russian land has caused a commotion.  In May, the Russian Direct Investment Fund and the government of China's Heilongjiang province, which shares a border with Russia, signed an agreement to establish a $2 billion joint investment fund for agricultural projects in Russia and China.

"They poisoned the land in China using prohibited technologies, and the food grown on that land absorbed toxic substances.  No one knows whether they might do the same thing in Russia," Pavel Grudinin, Deputy Chairman of the Agriculture Development Committee at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry and Director of the Lenin State Farm, said in the wake of the first news story.  "Agricultural chemicals used by the Chinese are known to be very detrimental to the soil.  Most of the soil in China is so polluted that it cannot be used for farming.  Bees have disappeared in many areas of China, poisoned by pesticides.  How do we know that they won't poison our land if they come to farm here?" echoed Oleg Lebedev, member of the parliamentary Committee for Natural Resources, Nature Management, and Ecology. "Every thinking person understands that investment is the precursor to expansion," he added. "The Soviet Union did it, the United States is doing it and now China is doing it."

This kind of reaction is common not only among ardent newspaper readers and Russian agribusiness lobbyists, but also among high-ranking officials.  Despite the marked rapprochement with China that followed the crisis in Ukraine, Chinese investment in agriculture remains a highly charged subject.  A Russian official involved in the development of Russia's Far East once told me in Beijing:  "I see no problem with giving the Chinese access to strategic deposits and infrastructure projects.  But not land.  I have major doubts about [giving Chinese investors access to land].  We inherited the land from our grandfathers and we must leave it untarnished for our grandchildren."

THE FACTS

Do Chinese investors really pose such a threat to Russian land or even to its bees?  What lessons can we draw from the experience that Russia has already acquired?

Oddly enough, despite the importance of the subject, there is a dearth of field research on Chinese investment in Russian agriculture.  Vladivostok-based sinologists Sergei Ivanov and Ivan Zuenko just recently began this kind of analysis in the south of Russia's Primorsky region.  A tiny grant from the Russian Humanities Research Foundation was enough for several case studies.  Their results have yet to be published, but the researchers say they are quite interesting:  for example, in some ways Chinese agricultural investors have a better reputation with local residents and officials than investors from more developed countries, such as South Korea.

Without reliable and extensive research, discussions of the risks and benefits of Chinese investment in Russian land can only rely on isolated facts.

Fact 1:  There are Chinese agricultural investors in Russia, and quite a few of them, though it is difficult to name a concrete number.  I have personally seen many Chinese farms in the Oktyabrsky district of the Primorsky region, along the road from Ussuriisk (Russia) to Suifenhe (China).  Some former Soviet collective farms are now flying Chinese flags, and from morning until night their fields are dotted with the silhouettes of Chinese farmers. Officials and businessmen say that the Chinese control 75% of agricultural operations in the neighboring Jewish Autonomous Oblast. That number is difficult to verify, but local residents speak favorably about the Chinese. They say that if it weren't for them, there would be no affordable vegetables at the region's markets. Asian investors even work in the harsh climate of far northern Yakutia: the best vegetables in Yakutsk come from a local Korean farm.

Fact 2:  It appears that the Chinese really do use harmful fertilizers.  Everyone says this, though yet again there are no reliable statistics. Certain officials in the Far East say that the Federal Security Service (FSB) has data, but it is unclear whether this is true and, if so, how reliable their numbers are.  Local FSB bosses are a bit hawkish about their neighbors, as is usually the case in border regions, in part because the existence of a threat creates a reason for them to receive money from the budget for threat prevention. And that's about it when it comes to publicly available facts in Russia.

THE PROSPECTS

There is a lot more to be gleaned from examining Chinese investment in the agriculture of other countries. This is a rapidly developing sector of international sinology, and new field data emerges with every year. Statistics are available on developing markets such as Africa, as well as developed markets such as Australia and Canada.

The conclusions are fairly straightforward.  Deborah Brautigam, a professor at Johns Hopkins University and a leading expert on Chinese investment in Africa, argues convincingly that the negative image of Chinese agribusiness in Africa presented in the Western media is greatly exaggerated.  She emphasizes that Chinese investors are driven solely by the market, and therefore the quality of investment (including the level of soil pollution) depends on a key factor - the state of the regulatory system in a given country.

The Chinese are on their best behavior in markets where local governments create clear rules of the game and closely monitor the quality of fertilizers used.  This has been the case in Australia, where the government has made it a priority to attract Chinese investment in agriculture.  As the middle class in China grows and becomes increasingly concerned about the quality of domestic food, organic produce from Australia, New Zealand and Canada is becoming wildly popular.

Research by the consulting company KPMG and Australia's University of Sydney shows that Chinese businessmen like predictability - clear rules of the game and the potential for a long planning horizon.  This makes long-term contracts, such as the one that the Zabaikalsky government wants to sign, the optimal approach:  If he's not afraid his acreage can be taken away at any time, an investor will be motivated to take care of his land rather than exploit it.  The cornerstone of success is control over land, and produce quality that is strict but not an insurmountable burden to the investor.

Thus federal officials who worry about Chinese investment in Russian land should be less worried about potential investors, and more worried about their corrupt colleagues in local administrations

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 #13
Bloomberg
June 25, 2015
Russia's Pivot to China Is Real
By Leonid Bershidsky

The search for alternative investors and markets has been a political priority for President Vladimir Putin and his government since Western countries imposed economic sanctions on Russia last year. The resulting pivot to China may seem merely cosmetic, but it is happening.

Admittedly, most of the vague and extremely long-term mega-deals signed by the two countries' governments over the last year will have no immediate effect. Even so, China has become one of the two biggest sources of funding and investment for the Russian economy. The other is the money Russian businesses have stashed in tax havens and bring home as needed. The Chinese share of Russian trade is growing, too.

Russia received only $21 billion in net foreign direct investment last year, compared with $69.2 billion in 2013. Most of the money came from offshore havens such as Cyprus, the Bahamas and the British Virgin Islands. Among non-offshore source countries, China, with its $1.3 billion in direct investment, was second only to France. That's a tiny amount, but a sign of change: In previous years, Chinese investment never exceeded $450 million.

At the same time, Chinese loans became by far the biggest source of foreign financing for the Russian economy last year. According to Central Bank data, Russia's non-financial sector and households received $11.6 billion in net new loans from China. Cyprus -- or rather Russian businesses operating in Cyprus -- was the second-biggest lender, with $3.4 billion.

This presents a radically different picture compared with just two years ago. In 2013, the U.K. dominated lending to Russia with $23 billion in net new loans; China contributed $7.5 billion. But the increase from China wasn't sufficient:  last year, those funds failed to cover the net outflow of money to European countries and in aggregate, net loans fell by $6.3 billion. Still, without the boost from China, that outflow would have been 65 percent higher.

This year, there will probably be another jump in Chinese loans, thanks to a recent deal that allows Russian companies to raise $25 billion from Chinese banks against Russian government guarantees.

Much of the Chinese lending is going to Russian oil companies, especially to state-controlled Rosneft, which has been forced by Western sanctions to tap the government's reserve funds. Rosneft has also increased sales to China, where it can get access to the long-term trade financing that's no longer available in Europe.

In May, Russia sent 930,000 barrels of oil per day to China, overtaking Saudi Arabia in that market for the first time. Although the groundwork for this market share gain was laid before the Western attempt to isolate Russia, Rosneft might have been less willing to send as much oil to China if it weren't for the shift in financing opportunities.

Russia's trade with China has fallen as the economy has stagnated, but the drop has been smaller than with other major trading partners, in part due to the boost in oil exports. In the first quarter of 2015, the sum of Russia's trade with the European Union shrank by 37.5 percent, but China saw a smaller 29.4 percent drop, increasing its market share.

European companies have recognized the trend. This month, BP bet on the growth of Russia's energy trade with China by paying $750 million for a 20 percent stake in Taas-Yuriakh Neftegazodobycha, a Rosneft subsidiary licensed to work a large oil field next to China's northern border.

Another area in which Russia needs Chinese funding and technology is infrastructure. This month, the state-controlled China Railway Group signed a contract with the Russian railroad monopoly to design a high-speed rail link between Moscow and Kazan. Russia then wants to extend the network to Beijing, reducing the length of the trip between the two capitals to 48 hours, from seven days. In previous years, the contract probably would have gone to Putin's billionaire friends. Now, though, the need for funding -- which China will provide to the contractors -- takes precedence even over their interests.

The Russian government has become willing to contemplate deals with China that would have been unthinkable before the sanctions. One of the regions in Russia's Far East recently signed a tentative agreement to lease 284,000 acres of unused agricultural land to a Chinese company. This has generated outrage in the Russian press and on social networks: Russians have always been wary of giving China access to the vast Siberian spaces, suspecting that if Chinese workers arrive, they will never leave and Siberia and the Far East will end up as colonies.

It would be wrong to discount Russia's swing toward China as just a PR campaign to convince Russians their country can do without the West. Russia is a big ship and turning it around is not a quick exercise, but the trend toward closer economic ties with China is real. In that respect, sanctions have done Russia a favor. They have forced the regime to accelerate much-needed market diversification and to pay more attention to the country's huge, underdeveloped eastern regions.

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#14
Valdai Discussion Club
http://valdaiclub.com
June 26, 2015
Why Russia and Saudi Arabia Are Resetting Relations
By Irina Zvyagelskaya
Irina Zvyagelskaya, Doctor of History, professor, senior researcher, Institute of Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

Russia and Saudi Arabia appear to be in the midst of resetting relations. The recent meeting between Vladimir Putin and the Saudi defense minister, Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman Al Saud, on the sidelines of the 19th St Petersburg International Economic Forum, where they discussed energy cooperation, mutual investments, the global oil market and military supplies, suggests that there has been a breakthrough in the relationship. According to media reports, 25 Russian companies are interested in investing in agriculture, industry, healthcare and education projects in Saudi Arabia. Although information about the planned projects is scarce, it is clear that Saudi and Russian businesses, as well as politicians, have shared interests in several areas. Another important factor at play is the ambition of the young Saudi prince, who has shown more political independence than is customary in the Saudi hierarchy.

This does not mean that there are no differences between Russia and Saudi Arabia, or that Riyadh would agree to reduce oil production to boost prices, which is of crucial importance for Russia, or change its stance on Syria. It only means that there is a rationale for Russian-Saudi rapprochement, which would help them achieve objectives despite a number of differences.

Saudi Arabia's stance on Syria differs radically from that of Russia, as Riyadh is supporting radical Sunni groups that have been fighting to overthrow President Assad. Saudi Arabia's desire to topple Assad is clearly part of its wider confrontation with Shia Iran. The destruction of the Iraqi military and of the regional counterbalance it provided has liberated Iran's Middle East policy. A stronger Iran with better relations with the West is a nightmare for Riyadh.  

Iran's influence in Iraq and Syria, its support for Hezbollah in Lebanon, indirect meddling in Yemen and influence with Shia communities in Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, make it the main geopolitical rival of Riyadh, although their confrontation may look like a simple aggravation of the Shia-Sunni sectarian divide. But in fact it is a life-or-death battle between the region's major powers, a zero-sum game where no compromise is possible. Some scholars even describe the confrontation as existential.

Russia sees Iran as an important partner not only in the Middle East but also in the Caucasus and Central Asia, where Iran respects Russia's interests despite elements of rivalry. However, Russia does not want Iran to go nuclear. Moscow's stance at the talks between Iran and the P5+1 group of international mediators has been a major factor in the progress made toward a deal.

At the same time, Russia is concerned about the possibility of Iran growing closer to the West, especially in light of rising global tensions. Saudi Arabia could use this concern to its advantage.

Russia and Saudi Arabia also differ on Yemen. Russia is urging a rapid end to the war, economic recovery and reconciliation between the warring groups. But Saudi Arabia would like Russia to take a harder line on the Houthis, whom it views as Iran's proxies in Yemen. Moscow abstained on UN Security Council Resolution 2216, which demanded that the Houthis withdraw their forces from Sana'a, the Yemen's capital.

Another factor affecting Russia-Saudi relations is the support that Islamic foundations with connections to Riyadh provide to Wahhabi radicals in the Caucasus and the Urals-Volga region of Russia. Since Muslims make up 14 percent of Russia's population, Moscow cannot close its eyes to the possible growth of these foundations' destabilizing influence in the country.

But the promise of tactical cooperation could outweigh potential concerns. Stronger ties with Saudi Arabia would not only be in Russia's economic interests and give it access to Saudi funds, which is vital in view of Western sanctions. They could also demonstrate that Russia can be friends with any country, allowing Moscow to play a more active role as an intermediary in numerous local conflicts.

There are several other important reasons why rapprochement is attractive to both Russia and Saudi Arabia.

Riyadh is justifiably disappointed by the policies of US President Barack Obama. Seeking to strengthen its positions, Saudi Arabia is diversifying its international ties, including with Russia, to balance its relationship with the United States and to reduce its dependence on its key ally. Visits by King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud to Russia and President Putin to Riyadh would add powerful symbolism to the progress in Russian-Saudi relations. It is significant that King Salman refused to attend a summit meeting of the Gulf Cooperation Council at Camp David in May.

Considering that Russia's relations with the United States and the West as a whole have deteriorated to near Cold War levels, the Middle East is a region where it could take coordinated action. If Russia bolsters its position in the Middle East by improving relations with Saudi Arabia, it could become an indispensable partner in the fight against common threats and challenges, which is critically important in view of its limited opportunities for cooperation in other spheres.

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 #15
The Unz Review
www.unz.com
June 26, 2015
Why Armenia Isn't Ukraine (Probably)
By ANATOLY KARLIN
[Chart here http://www.unz.com/akarlin/why-armenia-isnt-ukraine-probably/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=why-armenia-isnt-ukraine-probably]

In recent days, some Armenians have been up in arms over increases in electricity tariffs by the evil Russian-owned electricity monopoly that will bring them up to... well, a level slightly higher than in Russia and about 2-3x lower than in most EU countries (don't you love comparative context?). Discourse in both Russia and the West has now shifted to the familiar template of color revolution. Cookie girl Victoria Nuland was in Armenia last February in a closed meeting with NGOs, which is never a good sign, and the Maidanist Ukrainian elites are salivating over the prospect of a color revolution in Yerevan, with Interior Minister (and ethnic Armenian) Arsen Avakov going so far as to express his support for the "Electromaidan" couched in a bizarre anecdote about his adventures with a thermos in (Ukraine's) Euromaidan.

Does this presage the overthrow of Russia's colonial "puppet" in Armenia and its inevitable transition to the promised land of freedom, prosperity, and end-of-history that all such revolutions inevitably entail? At first, one might have cause to be skeptical. The numbers of protesters fhas been few so far: No more than 1% of Yerevan's one million strong population. And while they do include the usual young pro-Western and anti-Russian types, there's also plenty of older leftists and apoliticals, so for the most part it could be said to be a domestic political affair with no particular connection to questions such as Armenia's membership in the Eurasian Economic Union or its hosting of a Russian military base in Gyumri. In opinion polls, Armenians are highly positive towards Russia. On the other hand, pretty much of all of this could also have been said of Ukraine's Euromaidan in Ukraine before November 2013.

There is however one very critical difference between Ukraine and Armenia and it is summarized in the following chart (figures are from SIPRI):

Azerbaijan does not much like Armenia. The two fought a war in the early 1990s soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union over the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, which was officially Azeri but populated by Armenians (thanks to Georgia's Stalin). Occupying favorable defensive positions and enjoying high morale and funds from the diaspora, the Armenians got by far the better of the exchange, and Nagorno-Karabakh has since been de facto theirs, albeit that is hotly disputed by the Azeris and unrecognized by the world community. Azerbaijan is fully committed to revanche, and relations between the two countries are poisonous to an almost slapstick degree. This is mostly amply demonstrated by the case of an Azeri military officer who murdered an Armenian counterpart while on a NATO exchange program in Hungary. Upon being sent back to Azerbaijan to serve the rest of his life sentence, was immediately set free by Presidential decree, named a national hero, and given a free flat. Azerbaijan is backed to the hilt by Turkey, but is constrained by uncertainty over Russia's possible response to overt aggression.

The two countries maintained a rough parity in military spending until the mid-2000s, with Armenia also benefitting from below market cost Russian weapon supplies. Since then, however, Azerbaijan has surged massively ahead, and its oil-fueled military spending is now higher than Armenia's entire state budget. It now enjoys an approximately threefold preponderance in air and armor, and its equipment is on average more modern. Once relatively isolated, Azerbaijan now enjoys good relations with Turkey, Israel, the US (especially its neocon/corporatist nexus), and even Russia. A new war between them - absent Russian support - will almost certainly no longer be a repeat of the early 1990s when the Azeris suffered debacle after military debacle.

As a result, any even minimally sane Armenian administration will take great pains not to alienate Russia, even if they should come to power as a result of a color revolution. For a country surrounded by two avowed enemies (Azerbaijan and Turkey) and one lukewarm friend (Iran), alienating Russia would be so phenomenally stupid and counterproductive that it would be functionally close to treason. The discomfiting thing, though, is that said stupidity and chiliastic fanaticism is a feature of all Maidan-like movements in Eurasia. If the Washington Obkom commands them to sacrifice their national interests just to spite and undercut Russia, they will generally do so with pleasure - as happened in Saakashvili's Georgia and (twice) in Maidanist Ukraine - since if worst comes to worst ,they can always retire to a comfortable position at Columbia University, while it is the ordinary people who are left to pick up the pieces.

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 #16
Kyiv Post
June 26, 2015
Soviet social guarantees for employees scare away investors, often backfire
by Olena Gordiienko

Ukrainian labor legislation is paternalistic and focuses excessively on employee rights, many lawyers and employers say. And it also leads to unintended consequences.

Ukrainians earn less than any other nation in Europe, $180 per month on average. Unemployment rose from 7.3 to 9.3 percent in 2014. More than half of the country's salaries are paid unofficially.

Part of the problem is the country's rigid labor code. It aims to protect employee rights, but actually pushes employers to seek flexibility outside of the law. And employees who need the work often consent, according to Yuriy Kuzovoy, head of social policy department of the Ukrainian Employers' Federation, founded and led by industrial oligarch Dmytro Firtash.

The Labor Code of Ukraine, largely a holdover from Soviet days, causes potential foreign investors to balk. According to Oksana Voynarovska, a partner at Vasil Kisil & Partners, they are daunted by employee guarantees that give "certain categories of employees near-absolute immunity from termination, including for poor performance, prohibiting business trips even if the employee consents... and restrictions on overtime work."

Shareholders also face problems with Ukraine's top managers, who are protected by the employment law, making it difficult to dismiss them or to hold them accountable for bad managerial decisions, Illya Tkachuk of Gide Loyrette Nouel says. In many EU countries executives are not employees of the company, but rather work under a service agreement.

The current labor code was adopted in 1971 and was very effective in protecting employees in a planned economy of USSR, according to Voynarovska. At the time, the state was both guaranteeing and bearing the costs of "safety nets" for its workers.

"However, this approach does not work nearly as well in a modern market economy," Voynarovska says. Private businesses end up paying the price for state guarantees, which distort normal market relations.

To overcome labor-code restrictions, employers often rely on unregistered employees, or are creative enough to have new employee sign an undated resignation letter before signing a contract. In such cases, it is the employee who suffers from the rigid protection policy, Kuzovoy says.

A market economy implies flexibility and allows for employer-employee negotiations, which the current legislation thwarts.

There is no flexibility regarding working hours and days off, for example, under the existing code. Women are not allowed to work night shifts except within certain industries, while those with children under the age of three cannot work night shifts at all - even if they want to.

There have been efforts to make the labor codes more flexible. A new draft law, proposed by lawmaker Mykhaylo Papiyev of the Opposition Bloc, is currently being reviewed by deputies after it has been rejected twice since December 2014. It gives employers more rights and discretion in terms of supervising employees, remuneration, dismissal, suspension, and lay-offs, while also keeping many current protective provisions for employees, says Volodymyr Yakubovskyy, a partner at Nobles.

But trade unions are happy with the existing laws. "In the current crisis and circumstances in the country, it's not worth changing the labor code, because it will not be in favor of workers," Natalia Levitska, deputy head of the Free Trade Unions Confederation, says. She worries that changes will limit benefits and compromise the rights and role of trade unions.

"A change of legislation in favor of employers will not guarantee the shift to more legal employment," Levitska adds.

But many businesses are pushing for the draft law.

"The (new) labor code, if adopted in the current draft, is a step forward in the regulation of employment relations and in many aspects it reflects the needs of businesses," says Nataliya Nakonechna, senior associate with CMS Cameron McKenna.

Others argue that the draft law does not go far enough.

"Generally speaking, the draft code is not changing anything," Voynarovska says. "We are waiting for a radically different European document that would enable us to be more flexible and get away from the stern wording of a country with a planned economy."

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 #17
Russian government does its utmost to let Ukrainian refugees start new life
By Lyudmila Alexandrova

MOSCOW, June 25. /TASS/. Russia by and large copes decently with the continuing influx of Ukrainian refugees fleeing the war and economic turmoil in their home country, although problems are many, analysts say. Naturally, Russia above all is interested in those who are determined to settle forever. But it does not deny assistance to those who say outright they hope to get back home sooner or later. As for ordinary Russians, they treat the forced migrants with compassion and understanding.

According to a survey by the UN High Commissioner's Office for Refugees, Russia has accommodated more asylum-seekers than any other. For the first time in history it has accommodated two times more refugees than the United States.

The chief of the federal migration service, Konstantin Romodanovsky, said last week that 2.6 million Ukrainian citizens were in Russia at the moment.

Roughly, he said, they can be divided into four groups - those visiting relatives, guest workers, defectors reluctant to participate in hostilities and refugees from the south-east of Ukraine.

"The latter number is more than one million," he said. About 550,000 have been granted temporary refuge or temporary residence permit.
"Either status allows them to stay in Russia for a long time," he said.

This is the largest ever wave of refugees Russia has had to accept. Over the five-year period of 2008-2013 those seeking temporary refuge in Russia did not exceed ten thousand.

In all, from the beginning of last year and to last May Russia spent more than 11 billion rubles ($220 million) on Ukrainian refugees and temporary migrants, the RBC Daily quotes the chief of the Federal Migration Service's office for citizenship and residence permits, Valentina Kazakova as saying.

The Russian government takes care of the migrants' basic needs, such as housing, nourishment and medical aid. Accommodation is the participating regions' main spending item on the refugee assistance budget. The migrants are staying primarily at low-price hotels, rest and leisure facilities, sanatoriums and country retreats. Government-run establishments among them are few. The money goes primarily to the owners of private accommodation businesses.

The last tent camp for refugees was closed a long while ago. The refugees are given three meals a day, but the diet is rather modest. The price of each meal has to be no more than 100 rubles ($2). Cereals, pasta and some meat are the most frequent items on the menu.

According to a lecturer at the presidential academy RANEPA, Yelena Nazarova, among those who have fled the war in the south-east of Ukraine approximately one-third hope to settle in Russia forever. Most of them are family people who have managed to settle down more or less decently. The others hope to get back to their homes sooner or later.

"The Russian government has been doing a lot for the accommodation of all migrants and for social support without making any distinctions, but, of course, it is interested primarily in those who have decided to stay. Many of them are skilled personnel," Nazarova told TASS.

Examples of how Ukrainian migrants managed to settle pretty well in remote Russian provinces are many. In many places Ukrainians are highly welcome to many jobs, because they counterbalance Asian migration.

Nazarova cited opinion polls indicating that Russians have no unfriendly feelings to arriving Ukrainians by and large. On the contrary, they display sympathy and understanding.

"Of course, there are certain cases of rudeness and purely utilitarian attitude, which evoke the corresponding reaction, but such incidents are scarce," she said.

The Russian government copes with the influx of migrants from Ukraine by and large, but "some regions receiving them may fail here and there from time to time."

"In some areas everything is organized very well, while in others, sporadic problems occur," she said.

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 #18
Reuters
June 26, 2015
Ukraine's Defense Minister Says Putin Plans to Seize Country

KIEV - The West should not drop its guard over Ukraine, the country's defense minister said on Friday, saying a build-up of Russian forces in support of separatists showed President Vladimir Putin was bent on seizing control of the country.

Stepan Poltorak spoke alongside visiting Canadian Defense Minister Jason Kenney as Kiev military chiefs reported intensified attacks by separatists in the east, despite a ceasefire, with another Ukrainian soldier killed.

"There is a threat still because the military groups of the (separatists)... and Russian troops continue to build up their forces, bringing additional equipment and ammunition and of course their plans are not peaceful," Poltorak said.

"One should not be naive and think that Putin has given up his plans to seize Ukraine, to destabilize the situation in Ukraine. He's just changing his tactics and strategies, but his goal remains the same: to seize Ukraine."

Putin denies accusations by Kiev and the West that Russia has provided pro-Russian separatists in east Ukraine with soldiers and weapons.

Although he is often accused of wanting control of Ukraine, he supports a February peace deal under which rebel-held areas of east Ukraine would be given more autonomy from Kiev but
remain part of Ukraine.

Poltorak was expected to use Kenney's visit to press for the U.S.-led NATO alliance to provide further military assistance to shore up Kiev's forces in a conflict in which more than 6,400 people have been killed, according to estimates by the United Nations.

Canada, like many other NATO members, has provided the ex-Soviet republic only with non-lethal aid. Canadian military trainers are also expected to run programs for new Ukrainian conscripts inside Ukraine this summer.

Government forces and the Russian-backed separatists have accused each other of truce violations since February's deal, brokered by the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, Germany and France.

Poltorak, in his remarks on Friday, accused the separatists of carrying out 5,000 shelling attacks on government positions since the deal was signed in Minsk, Belarus.

Separately on Friday Kiev military spokesman Andriy Lysenko said that one Ukrainian soldier had been killed in separatist rocket and artillery attacks since Thursday.

"The intensity of attacks is growing. They are going on around the clock," he told a briefing, saying hotspots were near the airport of the rebel-held city of Donetsk city and at Shyrokyne east of the government-held port city of Mariupol.

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 #19
Reuters
June 25, 2015
Putin not done in eastern Ukraine, NATO's top general says
BY PHIL STEWART AND ADRIAN CROFT
 
Russian President Vladimir Putin is not done in eastern Ukraine, NATO's top commander said on Thursday, cautioning that Russia has been building up supplies on its border with Ukraine and keeping its military options open.

U.S. General Philip Breedlove, NATO's supreme allied commander, said the border between Ukraine and Russia was "wide open," allowing free movement of equipment and supplies.

Force levels on Russia's side of the border had not changed much in recent months, Breedlove said, but U.S. military officials had observed in Russia a "stocking of important supplies, ammunition, etc, to levels that would support operations"

Inside Ukraine, where pro-Russian separatists are battling Ukrainian forces, Breedlove said "we see a force that has been trained, that is led by Russian leadership, ... and is ready to do whatever mission is required of it in the Donbass (region)."

"I don't think Mr. Putin is done in eastern Ukraine," Breedlove told reporters, and Kiev, despite Moscow's hopes, was still looking to the West for support.

A fragile ceasefire has been in force in eastern Ukraine since February, but each side accuses the other of violations. Kiev fears Russia could commit troops to a push to extend control by separatist forces deeper into Ukrainian territory.

Russia denies having troops inside the country.

NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said it would be unwise to declare the ceasefire dead, despite violations, because it remained the "the best possible foundation for a peaceful solution.

"Without the Minsk agreements I am really afraid that the situation can deteriorate even more," he told a news conference.

REASSURING NATO ALLIES

Russia's annexation of Crimea last year rattled NATO allies, particularly in ex-Soviet Baltic states. With their Russian minorities, they fear Moscow could stir unrest there. Moscow denies any such intention.

U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter announced during a trip to Estonia on Tuesday the United States would preposition tanks and other weaponry in eastern and central Europe, the latest U.S. effort to reassure nervous NATO allies.

It will also provide special operations forces and other high-end military capabilities to a new NATO rapid response force.

Ukraine is not a member of NATO and the U.S.-dominated alliance has not intervened militarily in the conflict. The United States so far has also declined to provide Kiev with lethal weapons, fearing that would lead to a fast-escalating proxy war with Russia.

Ukrainian Defense Minister Stepan Poltorak told a news conference some alliance members might consider sending arms if the ceasefire broke down completely. Lithuania has said it has provided weapons to Ukraine.

Stoltenberg said NATO had also launched a scheme to share air traffic information with Ukraine from regional traffic control centers in Poland, Norway and Turkey. NATO officials said the scheme was aimed at countering terrorism or hijackings.

Nearly 300 people died last year when Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 crashed in rebel-held eastern Ukraine. The plane is widely believed to have been shot down by a missile launched by pro-Russian forces in Ukraine. Moscow denies involvement.

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 #20
Reuters
June 24, 2015
Russian former leader of Ukraine rebels warns of 'big war'
BY ANTON ZVEREV

A ceasefire is likely to collapse in east Ukraine and Russia could be drawn into a "big war" to cleanse the "sore on its borders", the former leader of the region's pro-Russian separatists said.

Violence has eased but not halted in east Ukraine under what are known as the Minsk 2 agreements, reached in the Belarussian capital on Feb. 12 after an earlier ceasefire collapsed.

Alexander Borodai, a Russian citizen and former journalist for nationalist newspapers who emerged last year as prime minister of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic (DNR), said he expects the Ukrainian army to launch a new offensive.
 
"To be honest, I expect that the Minsk 2 agreements will not be observed, in the same manner as the Minsk 1 agreements were not," Borodai said in an interview this week in a Moscow restaurant surrounded by former rebel commanders.

"And at the end of the day the Ukrainian army will launch an offensive. This is a very probable development ... I am not sure that it will end without a big war, as Russia cannot tolerate this sore on its borders forever."

Borodai stepped aside in favor of a local man as the rebel leader last August but is widely believed to have strong political links in Moscow and an open channel to the Donbass region where the war has unfolded in the last 15 months.

His leadership of the rebels in the early stages of their rebellion ensured he was often seen on Russian television, and passersby stop him to talk and pat him on the back when they see him on the streets of the Russian capital.

He also came to worldwide attention as leader of the rebel movement in the area when Malaysian flight MH-17 was shot down by what Western countries believe was a Russian missile fired from rebel territory.

He personally negotiated with Malaysian authorities to turn over the "black box" flight recorders from the airliner and has always denied that rebel forces were responsible for the crash that killed all 298 people on board the plane.

The fact that nearly all top figures in the rebel movement at the time were from Russia was awkward for the Kremlin, which maintained that pro-Moscow sentiment was indigenous in eastern Ukraine, and Borodai stepped aside in favor of Alexander Zakharchenko, a former electrician from the area.

"SANCTIONS WON'T DETER RUSSIA"

Though fighting is now less intense in east Ukraine, the death toll has continued to rise and is now more than 6,400, with each side accusing the other of planning a new offensive.

Borodai, 42, said the "half-frozen state" could not continue for long.

"A big offensive by the Ukrainian troops will mean many casualties among civilians, I am sorry, as well as among the military ... One cannot say Russia doesn't care about Donbass people. Therefore there is a chance Russia won't leave people in the (rebel-led) republics in need," he said.

Asked whether Russian forces could then intervene, he said: "I admit that Russia may lose patience."

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov declined to comment on Borodai's remarks. The West and Kiev say Russia has already sent troops and weapons into east Ukraine to back the separatists but Moscow denies this.

Andriy Lysenko, a Ukrainian military spokesman, said Kiev is abiding by the Minsk agreements and denied Ukrainian government forces were preparing an offensive.

Borodai remains in touch with other Muscovites who held prominent roles as rebel leaders in Ukraine, such as Igor Strelkov, who was the main rebel military commander at the time the Malaysian airliner was shot down.

Strelkov and Borodai, who fought in Moldova's breakaway Transdniestr region in the 1990s, slipped back into Russia several months ago, deeming their job finished as "patriots" in east Ukraine.

Borodai, who is banned under Western sanctions from entering the European Union and the United States, says tightening the sanctions will not "frighten" Moscow.

He reiterated that Russia had not sent troops to east Ukraine, adding that if it had "there would have been no trace of the Ukrainian army left close to Donetsk now."

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