#2
The Guardian
June 9, 2015
Moscow 25 years on: do I still recognise the city?
When former Moscow correspondent Mark Rice-Oxley first set foot in the city, the cars were all Zhigulis, no one smiled, and a trip to Pizza Hut was a big day out. A quarter of a century on, how much has life really changed here?
Mark Rice-Oxley in Moscow
[Text with photos here http://www.theguardian.com/cities/2015/jun/09/moscow-25-years-on-city-changed]

Wi-Fi on the metro. Startups in the suburbs. Glass towers in the business parks and rollerbladers on the embankment. What happened to Moscow? It used to be so gloriously haggard, like it was nursing the mother of all hangovers from 200 years of heavy history.

Not any more. Now lovers canoodle by fountains that dance to Tchaikovsky. Middle classes murmur in al fresco restaurants to a bossa nova soundtrack. There are marble malls and 24-hour supermarkets and lots of children's playgrounds. Grass and pedestrian walkways and public conveniences. And still the facelift goes on.

It is 25 years since this correspondent first set foot in Europe's largest city. In those days, the air was thick with cheap gasoline, cars were all Zhigulis (Ladas) and ZiLs - or else dodgy, paperless German saloons driven by men with thick necks and leather jackets. A chic lunch was a kebab at the Baku restaurant on Gorky street; a trip to Pizza Hut was a big day out. The colours people wore really were 50 shades of grey, only not so much EL James as LI Brezhnev. And no one smiled.

The question for someone who lived here through the 1990s but hasn't been back for a decade is this: is it for the better? The answer has to be yes.

There are some things that jar. The first thing you notice is the traffic. In 1990, there were less than a million cars on Moscow's roads. Now there are at least 4 million. Sometimes it feels as if all of them are stuck on the road in front of you.

The authorities appear to have decided that the solution is more roads, so a flurry of construction creates further hold-ups. Eventually there will be four ring roads, which might help. Or it might just bring even more drivers out on to the roads.

The thoroughfares and side streets are infinitely better than 20 years ago, however, when they were so uneven that sometimes it was a smoother ride to drive down the tramlines (trams have now been axed). There are also car parks and designated spaces instead of people just dumping their cars on the sidewalk, and digital departure boards for (new) buses and trolleys - plus an app that shows their current location.

Shopping is a very different experience too. In the late Soviet period, shops were named bluntly after the products that were supposed to be on sale inside but often weren't: Bread, Milk, Products, Clothes, Flowers. In time these gave way to "kiosk capitalism": a messy array of shacks and "pavilions" selling everything from Mars bars to medicine, and shoes to sunflower seeds. Impromptu markets sprang up everywhere: fruit, vegetables, and the sad sight of pensioners selling old radios, flowers, car parts - anything to supplement their income.

Now all that has gone. Instead, Moscow offers a retail experience every capitalist metropolis will recognise. Supermarkets and malls, nail parlours and jewellers, banks and car showrooms - oh, and lots of dentists, for some reason.

If there is an objection here, it's that the architectural charm of old Moscow is being bludgeoned by neon and new monoliths; glass and steel is smothering history and nostalgia. More liveable? Yes. More civilised? Perhaps. More vulgar? In places, yes - although a leafy proliferation of green covers a multitude of sins.

The other notable change is the love affair with English. Twenty-five years ago, there were few clues for non-Russian speakers. Now, though, you can have a pedikyur after a biznes lanch at Coffee Khaus, while checking your gadzhet. This correspondent was directed by a volyunteer to a shattle (shuttle bus) for a meeting with a prshik (P-R-shik, or PR official).

Lifestyles and attitudes seem to have been transformed too - a collective lifting of mood. I'm not the only to notice: Ilya and Svetlana, expatriate Russians living in Germany who are back in Moscow for the first time in six years, say they are so pleasantly surprised that they might consider moving back. "Everyone seems to be free and moving about happily," says Svetlana. "I've never seen the city like this before. It's full of art and culture and just a different atmosphere."

Things I have seen for the first time in Moscow this week include: unicyclists, parking meters, kids on trikes, open-air table tennis tables and slot machines. But not everything has changed. A concrete spray of high-rise buildings still fans out into endless suburbs - though even here, modernity is encroaching. One of my old apartment blocks (a typical 1960s, five-storey affair) is now dwarfed on all sides by high-rise office blocks in a style that new Moscow seems to like: terracotta redbrick punctuated by black glass.

Out in the suburbs, the first thing that strikes you is the space. Because everyone lives up in the air, not cheek-by-jowl on the ground, there are huge open reaches that nobody seems to quite know what to do with. Old Moscow is still very visible out here: kiosks selling fruit and newspapers, old ladies peddling books, shoes, lengths of old cable.

And while the bulldozers and diggers are coming, with manifold signs of reconstruction everywhere you go, perhaps the old tower blocks aren't really all that bad. They may look ugly and tired in places, but they are energy efficient (important in a city which must keep 11 million people warm for six sub-zero months of the year). They also encourage neighbourliness and a community spirit, and deter loneliness. And they have these great rubbish chutes you can use to dump your trash 22 storeys down to the ground.

Other aspects of Moscow remain eternal. This must, for example, be one of the greenest metropolises in the world - there are more trees than ever here. And one of the whitest too, with very, very few black or ethnic faces on the streets. It may also be one of the thinnest - obesity is not something Russia has to worry about - and one of the most musical: there is always a soundtrack playing in the city's public spaces - from tango to techno, Sinatra to Stevie Wonder, plus the full range of Russian favourites: pop, punk and folk.

And then there's the metro, of course. A delicious waft of ancient air, biscuity with notes of damp greatcoats, hits you as you enter. A ride is 60p, less if you bulk buy. Trains every minute. There are more stops than 20 years ago, one or two new lines even, but everything else is remarkably unchanged.

It's easy to imagine you're in a film down here. Deep tunnels, marble and chandeliers. Escalators that plunge further than the eye can see. And that same solicitous female voice (has it ever been changed?) that asks you to be careful when the doors shut, and not to forget your things when you get off.

If anywhere sums up Moscow's transformation, though, it is the city's epicentre: cranes, smart upcycled buildings almost Hanseatic in style, vast pedestrian areas, and a stage in construction for Moscow's next big party: Friday's Russia Day. At the centre of it all is Red Square. And it still isn't red.

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 #3
Kremlin.ru
June 16, 2015
Joint news conference with President of Finland Sauli Niinistö (excerpt)

Question (retranslated): A question for President Putin. Russia and you, personally, have the opportunity to influence the complete fulfilment of the Minsk Agreements and the end of the war in eastern Ukraine. Why haven't you used your opportunities to influence these matters to the fullest extent?

Vladimir Putin: If we did not like something about the Minsk Agreements, we would never have put our signature at the bottom. We feel these agreements are fair and balanced and we exert all our influence on one of the parties in this conflict: the unrecognised republics of Donetsk and Lugansk. You cannot fail to notice that a great deal has changed in their positions. They are ready and willing to engage in talks on all areas of the Minsk Agreements.

The agreements on political settlement - there are several of them - are key elements.

First is the amendment to the Ukrainian Constitution providing autonomous rights to these territories, or, as the official representatives in Kiev prefer to say, resolving the issue of the so-called decentralisation of power.

The second issue is adopting the Ukrainian law on amnesty for many individuals in the Donetsk and Lugansk republics.

The third issue is implementing the law on the special status of Donbass: Lugansk and Donetsk.

The fourth is adopting the Ukrainian law on local government and holding those elections.

The fifth is ending the economic embargo against these territories.

I want to point out that not a single one of these issues falls exclusively under the responsibility of Donbass. These are, first and foremost, the Kiev authorities' responsibility.

Allow me to put this in hockey terms: I will return the puck to you and ask why your colleagues in the European Union and the United States do not exert the necessary influence on the Kiev authorities to resolve all the issues I mentioned. All these positions are laid out in the Minsk Agreements, and each item states, "in agreement with Donetsk and Lugansk." They must sit down at the negotiating table directly with representatives from these territories and come to an agreement. There is no other way.

I hope that today's meeting will end with at least some positive results. We will work to ensure that there is more progress, so the Minsk Agreements are fully implemented.

Question: Good evening. If I may, I'd like to follow up on the previous question. The Minsk Agreements are violated so frequently and we see every day that attacks from the Ukrainian side are continuing. Mr Putin, in your opinion, is the Minsk format alive or is it dying?

Vladimir Putin: I believe there is simply no alternative. However hard it may be, this is the path that must be followed.

Question: I have a second question.

Yesterday, we heard that President Poroshenko made a statement about an alleged bribe that Russia supposedly gave President Yanukovych for not signing the EU Association Agreement. I would like to hear your comments.

Vladimir Putin: It's regrettable that our colleagues should characterise it in such a way. If somebody believes that this is a bribe for President Yanukovych to stop him from signing an Association Agreement with the European Union, then I suppose you can consider all the resources invested by the other creditors and investors towards signing these agreements as bribes, too. And there was a lot of money - for example, from American funds.

Moreover, it is widely known that Ukraine's new leadership signed these agreements but has put off their implementation by over a year, until January 1, 2016. So the question arises, whose pocket did that money go to, if this was a bribe? After all, by delaying implementation, Ukraine's new leadership did all the same things that Yanukovych had suggested doing. What did he suggest? To delay signing. Whereas they have delayed implementation. Finally, the money we took out of our reserve funds went towards purchasing Ukrainian sovereign bonds under English law. They asked for these resources to support the budget - first and foremost, to resolve social issues like paying pensions, benefits and so forth.

We are not interested in how this money was used and by whom, but we are interested in the return of these funds. Once Ukraine's total foreign debt exceeded 60% of the GDP, we had the right to demand early repayment of this money. We will not do this, due to Ukraine's difficult economic situation. But we hope to see this money returned, as stated in the corresponding agreement.

Question (retranslated): People in Finland, as citizens and residents of a NATO member state, are concerned about the active acquisition of arms by both NATO and Russia, as well as the demonstration of military force in the Baltic Sea area. President Putin, how can you respond to such concerns on the part of Finnish citizensin this respect?

Vladimir Putin: I think the best guarantee for Finland's security is its neutral status. Because as soon as some sort of threat occurs from any neighbouring state, Russia must react correspondingly and build its defence policy so as to neutralise possible threats in its direction.

If somebody threatens any of our territories, that means we will need to aim our Armed Forces, our modern weaponry towards the territories from which that threat originates. How could it be otherwise? NATO is advancing towards our borders; it is not Russia that is moving towards them.

Nevertheless, I would not escalate anything here. Naturally, we will analyse everything and carefully monitor it, but so far, I do not see anything that would be cause for particular concern. These are most likely just political messages aimed at Russia or its allies. We are more concerned, for example, about the deployment of the strategic missile defence system - that's a serious matter of strategic importance....

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 #4
Business New Europe
www.bne.eu
June 18, 2015
bne:Chart - Russia and Ukraine 'Despair Index' scores rise after turbulent year
Henry Kirby in London
[Chart here http://www.bne.eu/content/story/bnechart-russia-and-ukraine-despair-index-scores-rise-after-turbulent-year]

Ukraine and Russia's 'Despair Index' scores - a bne IntelliNews economic measure that combines inflation, unemployment and poverty - have continued to worsen throughout 2015 following a turbulent year for both nations.

Rocketing inflation in both countries has been the driving force behind the scores, with Russia's year-on-year consumer prices (CPI) rising by 15.8% in May, with Ukraine's CPI up 58.4% in the same month.

As the bne:Chart shows, the last two years have seen the EU and US Despair Index scores creep lower, with the last 12 months seeing Russia's score move higher than both Western counterparts. Plummeting oil prices and continued Western sanctions have been behind much of this.

Under President Vladimir Putin, the poverty rate in Russia steadily improved to the point of being significantly lower than the rates in the US, EU and many Western European nations in the past few years. However, a recent World Bank report has cast doubt on the continuation of this improvement, forecasting a 2015 poverty rate in Russia of 14.2%, up from 11% in 2014.

The World Bank's 14.2% forecast for Russia would mean its poverty rate is now marginally worse than the US' 14.1%, pushing Russia's Despair Index score higher than the Central and Eastern European/Commonwealth of Independent States (CEE/CIS) score of 33.6.

At the beginning of 2015, Ukraine's Despair Index score had nearly tripled in two years, from an impressive 16.5 in 2013 to a worrying 46.5. Since then, the continued conflict in the country's east has raised consumer prices further, pushing its Despair Index score past Bosnia and Herzegovina's 61.3, making it the worst performing country in the CEE/CIS region.

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 #5
Interfax
June 17, 2015
Over 40 per cent of Russians do not believe corruption could be defeated - poll

A public opinion poll conducted by the independent pollster Levada Centre has shown that two thirds of Russians believe that President Vladimir Putin is making progress in fighting corruption, but, at the same time, more than 40 per cent believe that it will be difficult to defeat it because corruption cannot be eradicated in Russia, privately-owned Russian news agency Interfax on 17 June.

The poll was conducted in May 2015 among 800 respondents in 134 settlements across 46 Russian regions.

According to the poll, 64 per cent of Russians - up from 49 per cent in 2013 - believe that Putin is "restricting the appetite of bureaucrats who are attempting to use Russia's assets in their own interest". At the same time, 42 per cent think Putin will continue his crusade against corruption but will not succeed because corruption cannot be eradicated in Russia. Only 35 per cent of respondents thought so in 2013.

Almost a third of respondents, or 31 per cent, believe the president will succeed in the war against corruption by "carrying out a decisive purge in the ranks of top-level civil service and toughening punishment for such crimes ".

Another 16 per cent of respondents - against 21 per cent in 2013 - believe that it is difficult for Putin to fight corruption because "he himself is very much dependent on corrupt officials"

 #6
Moscow Times
June 18, 2015
Russia's St. Petersburg Forum Opens to New Economic Reality
By Peter Hobson

Last year, Russia's flagship economic forum in St. Petersburg, traditionally held in June, was moved forward to May to make room for a meeting of the G8 group of industrial nations in the Russian resort town of Sochi.

The meeting in the host city of the 2014 Winter Olympics was meant to showcase Russia's ascension on the world stage after the successful Games.

But it never happened.

Russia was instead booted from the club, as Western leaders reacted to Moscow's seizure of Crimea from Ukraine in March last year with a set of economic and political broadsides.

The St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, Russia's version of the Davos economic forum in Switzerland, was caught up in the turmoil.

U.S. President Barack Obama's White House twisted the arms of U.S. business leaders to warn them off attending the forum. With officials in Washington manning the phones and similar actions in some European capitals, major business figures including the heads of financial institutions Goldman Sachs and Citigroup, energy giant ConocoPhillips and beverage manufacturer PepsiCo fell off the forum's guest list.

The 19th annual St. Petersburg forum opens this Thursday not only with Russia still in control of Crimea, but with ongoing violence between separatist fighters and the Ukrainian army in eastern Ukraine - which many blame on Russian backing despite Moscow's denials - and waves of sanctions and counter-sanctions hindering business between Russia and the West.

The U.S. government has again been twisting arms ahead of this year's event, but "less intensely," said Alexis Rodzianko, president and CEO of the American Chamber of Commerce in Russia.

"Last year was closer to the beginning of this crisis, so the campaign from the U.S. administration to keep senior executives out was kind of a surprise. This year it's not a surprise," he said.

But as in 2014, many international executives will still attend the forum, drawn by the country's long-term economic potential, its massive energy reserves and their companies' existing investments in Russia.

The forum's program shows that among the big-name Western executives attending the conference are the heads of energy multinationals BP, Total and Shell, oil services company Schlumberger, commodity traders Trafigura and Glencore, consultants McKinsey and Boston Consulting Group and miner Kinross Gold Corporation.

"Business has a strategic view of this market," said Daniel Russell, president and CEO of the U.S.-Russia Business Council, a Washington-based trade association. Long-term investments and partnerships made in Russia over decades cannot be reversed at the flip of a switch, he said.

Russian President Vladimir Putin will give the event's keynote speech on Friday.

Last year the forum, which serves up hundreds of Russian business and government big shots and lavish oligarch parties, gathered more than 7,500 participants with the total value of agreements signed topping 400 billion rubles ($7.5 billion), according to the forum's website.

"My assumption is that participation will not be very different from last year," said Frank Schauff, head of the Association of European Businesses (AEB), a Moscow-based lobby group.

Economic Doldrums

But if the political situation is still stuck in last year's rut, the economic situation in Russia has changed completely.

Western sanctions over the Ukraine crisis and a more than 40 percent fall in the price of oil, Russia's main export commodity, since last summer have compounded an economic slowdown that began in 2013.

The Russian economy is forecast to contract by around 3 percent this year. Analysts expect the recovery to be anemic, with no easy return to the near 10 percent annual growth rates of the mid-2000s achieved on the back of an oil price boom.

Analysts say Russia's economy needs root-and-branch structural economic reform to ween it off dependence on oil revenues - but Putin shows no sign of delivering that.

The forum looks unlikely to change matters. Citing unidentified sources close to the matter, news agency Bloomberg reported Wednesday that Putin's keynote speech would not raise the subject of much-needed systemic reforms.

In a sign that the crisis is still deepening, Russia's industrial output fell by 5.5 percent year-on-year in May, accelerating from a 4.5 percent drop in April, according to federal statistics agency Rosstat.

The crisis is taking its toll across the Russian economy. Investment fell by 4.8 percent in April compared to the same month in 2014, according to Rosstat. Real incomes declined by 4 percent year-on-year, and consumer spending, a key driver of economic growth, slumped 9.8 percent.

Almost $33 billion fled the country in the first quarter, according to the Central Bank. This followed capital outflows of $151.5 billion in 2014, the highest level on record and nearly triple the previous year's capital flight.

While sanctions have thrown up barriers for Western businesses, Russia has sought to boost trade and investment from Asia.

Last year's forum saw Asian and Middle Eastern participation rise as government pressure eroded Western attendance. This year, a number of session titles point to Russia's increased focus on ties with the East.

Alongside panels on North America and Europe, the forum will have events dedicated to India, the Middle East, Latin America and Turkey, as well as one titled "The Making of the Asia-Pacific Century: Rebalancing East."

Russia is due to host a summit of the BRICS emerging nations in July in the Urals city of Ufa.

But any wholesale reorientation of Russia's trade relationship from West to East is still nascent. Few Western businesses with a presence in Russia have left, and many continue to expand. While they bristle at having to work around sanctions, they have adjusted to the new political and economic conditions.

"People are not happy about the framework but they are working with it," said the AEB's Schauff.

"The mood is much more down-to-earth. It's pragmatic. It's cautious with regard to making major announcement about major investments," Schauff said.

"It's the new normal," said the American Chamber of Commerce's Rodzianko.

The schedule of the forum, which is meant as an entry point for investment and a sounding board for investor complaints, is also full of the classic Russian problems: government and economic reform, boosting efficiency at state companies, helping small businesses and growing investment.

"Life goes on. I guess that's the motto for this year," Rodzianko said.

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#7
Wall Street Journal
June 18, 2015
Russia's Struggling Economy Clouds St. Petersburg Economic Forum
Corporate executives head to President Vladimir's Putin hometown for annual event
By PAUL SONNE and  ANDREY OSTROUKH

ST. PETERSBURG, Russia-When Russia's annual international investor showcase opened here this time last year, the political uproar over Crimea's annexation overshadowed most business deals and financial concerns.

This year, as corporate executives and Russian leaders arrive Thursday in President Vladimir Putin's hometown for the economic forum's opening day, there's a different elephant in the room: Russia's struggling economy, which has fallen into recession amid low oil prices, expensive credit and Western sanctions. Since last year's event, the ruble has lost 37% of its value against the dollar.

"Despite claims that [the economy] has finally bottomed out, economic contraction keeps going and does not seem to be slowing down," said Yevgeny Nadorshin, chief economist at PF Capital, a Moscow-based consulting firm. "The country may now face prolonged recession or stagnation."

Last year, in protest of Crimea's annexation, U.S. authorities actively discouraged top-level corporate executives from attending the annual event, known as the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. What was once Russia's flashy answer to Davos transformed into a far quieter affair, with a limited number of international chief executives choosing to attend.

Few high-profile American CEOs are attending this year, but a number of European companies, including the U.K.'s BP PLC, France's Société Générale SA and Italy's Intesa Sanpaolo SpA, are sending their chief executives. Many American and European companies are trying to limit their public profiles, looking instead to meet with Russian counterparts on the sidelines. U.S. officials don't appear to be discouraging attendance as strongly as last year.

"The quiet advice is, 'If you have to go, go, but keep it low key. No photo ops, please,' " says Alexis Rodzianko, president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in Russia.

Despite the political tension and economic downturn, American companies with sizable operations and investments in Russia still feel a need to send representatives. "The big companies are here [in Russia], and they are here for the long haul," Mr. Rodzianko said. "And they need to keep in touch with their customers."

The reality of Russia's latest economic downturn set in for most Russians last December, when the ruble plunged dramatically, prompting the Bank of Russia to increase its key interest rate by 6.5 percentage points to 17% in one day. The move prevented a currency crisis but dashed hopes of avoiding a recession.

Since then, the ruble has mounted a partial recovery. The Bank of Russia has rolled back its key interest rate to 11.5%. For some corporate executives and analysts, the economic pain so far has proved less severe than they feared. Meanwhile, the government has embarked on a vast $35 billion program to combat the economic crisis, bailing out banks and state enterprises in need.

Still, the picture remains far from rosy. Russia's industrial output fell 5.5% in May from the previous year, the largest year-over-year monthly decline since October 2009, according to the state statistics service Rosstat. The recession is deepening, with analysts predicting a 4.5% economic contraction for the second quarter. Earlier this week, Russia's central banker Elvira Nabiullina warned that Russia's economy still hadn't bottomed out, even though she said inflation had peaked at 17% year-over-year in March.

Even if Russia climbs out of its economic downturn in a year and a half-as Mr. Putin has predicted-analysts worry that sluggish, meager growth could ensue for years, particularly if oil prices remain low. That dilemma is likely to be at the top of the economic forum's agenda.

"We will see many topics on Russia's development in the current conditions, on import substitution, on [possible] new sources of [economic] growth," said Alexander Ivlev, managing partner for Russia at Ernst & Young LLC.

The Kremlin has presented the crisis as an opportunity to make Russia's economy more self-sufficient and reorient trade toward non-Western partners. Russian authorities are promoting import substitution on the back of the weaker ruble and working to deepen economic ties with countries outside North America and Europe, including China.

For the first time, the St. Petersburg conference's organizers have planned special "business forums" for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICs countries, Deputy Head of the Organizing Committee Anton Kobyakov said in a Wednesday interview with state newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta.

Chris Weafer, founding partner of the Moscow-based consulting firm Macro Advisory, predicted that the message from the Russian government would be that the country is "very much open for business," with Western companies welcome to participate in the import substitution and export-led growth Russia needs to revive its economy.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Mr. Putin would hold meetings with Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, as well as with leaders from Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia and China.

The Russian president will also welcome a number of former European leaders with whom he has developed ties, including former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, former French Prime Minister François Fillon and former Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi. Mr. Putin will also give a keynote address Friday. Carla Bruni-Sarkozy is scheduled to give a concert.

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 #8
Business New Europe
www.bne.eu
June 18, 2015
St Petersburg Economic Forum opens under a cloud
Ben Aris in St Petersburg

The St Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF), dubbed the "Davos of Russia", kicked off on June 18 to a reasonably heavyweight turnout from the business world despite global tensions over Ukraine. With thousands of delegates from 144 countries, this is one of the biggest events yet, but the agenda holds only one question of real note: does the Russian leadership have a plan to fix the economy?

The short answer is "no", boiling down to the fact that President Vladimir Putin is preoccupied with his geopolitical showdown with the West, which is largely manifested by events in Ukraine and the vast industrial power and wealth being pumped into building up Russia's military might.

Economic reform and the people will have to wait until Putin is satisfied this programme is complete. Given that the current military strategy calls for 70% of military equipment to be modernised by 2018, it could be at least another three years before a new comprehensive military programme is launched.

The forum opened with a panel discussion that included Sberbank CEO German Gref, First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov and former finance minister and outspoken pro-liberal economic reformer Alexei Kudrin. While the whole event has been themed, "Time to Act: Shared Paths to Stability and Growth", action and plans are almost certainly going to be entirely missing from this year's jamboree.

In a sign of what is very likely to come, the opening panel fell at the first fence, when the moderator asked: Are you satisfied with level of political and media competition in Russia?" "No," Gref and Kudrin replied in unison.

There was no followup as there can be none to this statement. As US banker and Russia investment doyen Bernie Sucher pointed out in an early morning interview with Bloomberg, everything stops with the elite clustered around Putin, who control all economic, bureaucratic, administrative and commercial power in Russia with no checks and balances.

"Political risk trumps economic risk and it all comes down to what is going on in Putin's head," Sucher said. "No one can know that."

Showing at the ball

The need for a large-scale economic reform programme is obvious to everyone and SPIEF has been used in the past to launch some big ideas. In 2008, then president and now prime minister Dmitry Medvedev used the forum to re-launch a large scale privatisation drive that spluttered and stalled six months later in the wake of the 2008 global meltdown. That year, SPIEF was full of businessmen and CEOs and buzzed with optimism as Russia still rode on the crest of a sustained economic boom. Meltdowns notwithstanding, things could only get better as the Kremlin was launching deep and badly needed reforms while it was still ahead of the game.

This year, many of the delegates have come because they have to. It is like attending a ball in Elizabethan England. You go not for the dancing, but because you position at court depends on being seen by the queen.

Still, the mood is lighter than last year's SPIEF, which was marred by the US State Department's bullying of US and even European CEOs to stay away. Privately, European bosses and diplomats were outraged after the US government threatened their US assets with trouble in an effort to work a boycott of Putin's highest profile international forum.

It partially worked. Most CEOs cancelled, but almost all of those companies with significant business in Russia sent their deputies and the Kremlin was understanding. A few like German engineering company Siemens defied the pressure and sent their CEO any way - a stand for which the company will almost certainly be rewarded with lucrative contracts.

This year, the same CEOs will be expected to show up if only to show their face. The forum may be under a cloud and reform may lie in the future, but Russia remains a rich country and the state is pumping billions of dollars into areas like infrastructure to buoy the flagging economy, so there is still a lot of money to be made at SPIEF.

Going East

Russia's shift to the East was on prominent display in the agenda and the European CEOs that do make the trip will feel less at home than in the past, as the Chinese delegation is large and obvious. The event will offer SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) business forums, a B20 regional consultation forum, while the Russia-China intergovernmental commission will be devoted to investment cooperation.

Momentum in the latter area has been building fast. In May last year, as Western outrage over Ukraine was transforming into economic retaliation against Russia, Moscow and Beijing signed a 30-year, $400bn gas supply contract to supply 38bn cubic metres of natural gas annually from 2018.

In September, Gazprom launched the construction of the Power of Siberia pipeline to China, due to be operational by 2019, and valued in total with its supporting liquefaction facilities at some $55bn. And during his May visit to Moscow, Chinese President Xi Jinping together with Putin oversaw the signing of 32 contracts involving high-speed rail and other infrastructure loans. More importantly than the cluster of deals worth some $6bn, the Chinese leader sat beside Putin at the May 9 WWII Victory Day parade boycotted by Western leaders, in a firm sign of their countries' growing alliance.

A major coup at this year's SPIEF could also come from the Greek delegation, which says it hopes to sign off on a new pipeline deal that extends the mooted Turkish Stream gas pipeline into an EU country. If, or when, this is inked, it will defy Brussels' attempts to block Russia's gas diplomacy.

So while a vision for Russia's future will be missing at SPIEF, there are plenty of deals to be done. In this sense, Russia has gone backwards from the 2008 forum, when it was an emerging European powerhouse developing a rational economy for the long-term. Today, SPIEF has more of a bazaar mentality, where deals are done and money made in the here and now, as the future is uncertain and the nights are dark.

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 #9
Sputnik
June 18, 2015
Russian Economy Able to Withstand Western Sanctions - Central Bank Head

MOSCOW (Sputnik) - The Russian economy is quite stable in the face of Western sanctions regardless of the country's potential growth, Central Bank head Elvira Nabiullina said Thursday.

"Sanctions are actually negative for everyone who is affected by them, they erode traditional trade ties and they decrease the potential for developing the economy and the potential for increasing workplaces," Nabiullina said in an interview with CNBC television.

She said that the Russian economy could withstand any developments in the economic sense.

"We have both accumulated buffers and gold currency reserves, and we have introduced a floating currency exchange rate in order to absorb various shocks," Nabiullina added.

The European Union, the United States and several of their allies have introduced several rounds of sanctions against Russia since 2014, accusing it of meddling in Ukraine's internal crisis. The restrictions target several individuals, as well as Moscow's banking, energy and defense sectors.

On Wednesday, an EU source familiar with the EU leadership told RIA Novosti that the sanctions would be extended until next January, without introduction of new restrictions.

Moscow has repeatedly denied its involvement in the Ukrainian conflict, and introduced responsive measures in August 2014, banning certain food imports from the countries that imposed restrictions on Russia.

Earlier on Thursday, Russian Economic Development Minister Alexei Ulyukayev said that Moscow would continue the food embargo if the European Union extended the sanctions.

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 #10
Moscow Times
June 18, 2015
What Putin Should Say in St. Petersburg
By Jan H. Kalicki
Jan H. Kalicki is a public policy fellow at the Wilson Center in Washington, D.C. and co-editor of ''Russian-Eurasian Renaissance?''

When President Vladimir Putin speaks before thousands of business leaders and policymakers assembled for the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 18-20, he has an important opportunity to connect with a major international audience and to promote a more positive relationship with the West.

While SPIEF's agenda focuses on economic relations, Putin has not shied away from political issues there in the past. The main question in his audience's mind will be whether Moscow will press ahead with its pressures on Kiev or whether it will shift to serious implementation of the Minsk accords for resolution of the Ukraine conflict.

The Kremlin's future direction on Ukraine will inevitably have either a positive or negative impact on economic ties with the West. Turning to a positive page will not only allow consideration of lifting Western-imposed sanctions and Russian counter-sanctions, but also could set the stage for renewed positive economic engagement. Even more profoundly, this engagement should involve not only Russia but Ukraine and other post-Soviet states with their Western counterparts.

The second set of issues on the minds of Putin's audience is Russia's future economic stance. Is it focused, as the SPIEF agenda proposes, on "shared paths to stability and growth"? If so, Russian policy must commit credibly to pro-investment building blocks, including tax reforms that stimulate growth, legal reforms that protect private investors, and trade reforms that promote e-commerce and protection of intellectual property.

Thus far the gap has been too large between policy proposals and on-the-ground performance. Investors can see for themselves the record amount of capital flight from Russia, which reached over $151 billion in 2014, close to 10 percent of GDP which the Central Bank expects to shrink by up to 4.5 percent in 2015. Not unrelated is the unacceptably high level of corruption which has given Russia 136th place out of 178 in the Transparency International rankings, and candid recognition of this challenge would be a positive step in St. Petersburg.

The third set of issues is strategic in nature. Facing growing disputes with the West, the Kremlin has sought growing cooperation with the East, including trade relations with China and formation of a new Eurasian Economic Union. While the latter can provide advantages, realistically they cannot be substitutes for a full-fledged trade and investment relationship with Western countries. It is clear that Russia's economic prospects depend importantly on restoring the health of this relationship.

SPIEF's agenda captures this strategic choice well, through its business and regional consultations forums involving the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS and the G20. Putin's rational strategy is to engage with each of these forums - but to send a clear message that he recognizes the fundamental importance of the Western relationship.

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 #11
Moscow Times
June 18, 2015
Experts Downplay Trend of Russians Joining Islamic State
By Gabrielle Tétrault-Farber

Reports of Russian citizens taking up arms for the Islamic State terrorist group have dominated headlines in recent days, sparking debate about the cause of the apparent trend.

Andrei Novikov, head of the Commonwealth of Independent States' (CIS) Anti-Terrorism Center, told the Interfax news agency Wednesday that according to certain estimates, as many as 5,000 Russian nationals may be among the ranks of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, a number significantly larger than most official figures.

"According to intelligence agencies, there are about 2,000 Russian citizens fighting for the Islamic State but certain expert estimates have put that number closer to 5,000," Interfax quoted Novikov as saying.

The new estimate comes on the heels of the high-profile case of 19-year-old Varvara Karaulova, a Moscow State University student who returned to Moscow last week after a failed attempt to cross Turkey's border with Syria, where she allegedly planned to join the Islamic State.

Scholars studying terrorism in Russia have warned that the recruitment of Russian nationals by foreign terrorist groups did not begin with the Islamic State, and noted that isolated incidents are not necessarily indicative of a nationwide trend.

Divergent Estimates

Russian and foreign officials have presented divergent estimates in recent years of Russians having joined the Islamic State.

Alexander Bortnikov, the head of the Federal Security Service, said last May that some 200 Russians had joined armed groups in Syria.

Bortnikov's assessment was much lower than that of Syria's ambassador to Moscow, Riad Haddad, who said in December 2013 that some 1,700 Russian nationals from the North Caucasian republic of Chechnya were fighting in his country, the Kavkazsky Uzel (Caucasian Knot) news site reported.

Sergei Melikov, the Kremlin's envoy for the North Caucasus, said in March of this year that about 1,500 people from the volatile region were fighting alongside militant groups in Syria and Iraq.

Alexander Shumilin, a scholar specializing in Middle Eastern studies, told The Moscow Times that Russian nationals joining the Islamic State originate largely from the North Caucasus, which has been ravaged in recent decades by war and insurgency. This phenomenon is often rooted in disenchantment with the authoritarian rule in these recruits' native republics, he explained.

"Cases of Western Muslims joining the Islamic states are often linked to their incomplete assimilation into society," Shumilin said. "But among many Russian Muslims, the desire to join the organization stems from the desire to seek out new opportunities in life, something they are often unable to do at home. This is a common theme in authoritarian regimes with large Muslim populations. The Islamic State provides them with a way to align themselves with what they see as the Islamic spirit."

Experts suggested that money may also serve as a strong impetus for would-be recruits. The dire socio-economic conditions in Russia's Caucasus republics may have prompted the decisions of many of those that have joined the Islamic State. In January, Chechnya's unemployment rate rose to 17.8 percent, the highest figure of any region in the country, according to the Federal State Statistics Service. The republic of Ingushetia's unemployment rate also rose to 16.1 percent, towering above the national regional average of 5.3 percent.

But recruitment has not been limited to the North Caucasus. Bortnikov said Tuesday that more than 200 residents of Russia's Volga Federal District - which includes the republics of Tatarstan and Bashkiria - had joined the Islamic State.

Media Frenzy

Akhmet Yarlykapov, a researcher at the Caucasus department of the Russian Academy of Sciences, said it was virtually impossible to come up with a precise figure for the number of foreign fighters in Syria. The figure cited by the CIS Anti-Terrorism Center, he said, could reflect the total number of Russians who presumably left the country to join the Islamic State but never succeeded in doing so.

The CIS Anti-Terrorism Center could not be reached to elaborate on the figure it cited.

Other Russian terrorism experts agreed that the figure appears to be exaggerated. Alexander Krylov, a senior researcher at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, said that the latest estimate could have been made in the wake of a media frenzy surrounding recent high profile terrorist recruitment case.

"I wouldn't say that recruitment for the Islamic State has become a mass phenomenon in Russia," Krylov told The Moscow Times. "Most of the Russian members of the Islamic State are of Muslim background and the other isolated individuals are often adventure-seekers who have decided to join the organization for mercenary purposes. We had one high-profile case [that of Karaulova] and the media immediately spun it as part of a growing trend. And the media reaction has forced officials to react as well."

Although scholars dismissed the notion that increasing numbers of Russians were flocking to join the terrorist group, they agreed the country will need to devise a plan of action regarding Russian recruits wishing to return to their homeland after having been trained by the Islamic State.

Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov echoed this concern in April during an interview with three Russian media outlets.

"The Islamic State is our biggest enemy at the moment, if only for one simple reason: Hundreds of Russians, hundreds of Europeans, hundreds of Americans are fighting with the Islamic State," Lavrov said. "They are already coming back ... and for their own entertainment could perpetrate horrible acts at home."

High-Profile Cases

Russian law enforcement officers are investigating reports that Mariam Ismailova, a second-year student at the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration in Moscow, has fled the country to join an armed terrorist group. An unidentified source told Interfax on Wednesday that Ismailova was currently in Turkey, and that her father had flown to the country to search for her.

A television crew followed Karaulova, a student of philosophy at Moscow State University who had left Russia in an apparent bid to join the terrorist group last month, on her flight back to Moscow last week. Karaulova, in traditional Islamic dress, lowered her gaze in a bid to evade the media firestorm.

Sensationalist television channel LifeNews reported Wednesday that Karaulova had been recruited by a native of the Tatarstan republic's capital city of Kazan over popular social media website VKontakte and smartphone chat applications. The recruiter reportedly vowed he would marry Karaulova and convinced her to join the terrorist organization in Syria.

The recruiter is currently based in Syria and is thought to have attempted to lure other women to join the terrorist organization, LifeNews reported.

Individuals found guilty of participating in foreign armed conflicts face up to 10 years behind bars under Russian law.

Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said Tuesday that the recruitment of Russian students by foreign terrorist organizations was a "very dangerous process," RIA Novosti reported.

"It's still too earlier to call this a trend and sound the alarm bells," said Alexei Malashenko, chair of the Carnegie Moscow Center's religion, society and security program. "If we start seeing dozens of such cases in coming weeks, then we can reopen this discussion."

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 #12
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
June 17, 2015
The side effects of globalization, or why Russian students join ISIS
With Russian and foreign students seeking to join ISIS, the Kremlin and the world should reassess their approaches to fighting international terrorism in the age of globalization.
By Sergey Markedonov
Sergey Markedonov is an Associate Professor at Russian State University for the Humanities based in Moscow (Russia). From May 2010 to October 2013, he was a visiting fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington, DC, USA). In April-May 2015 he was a visiting fellow at the Center for Russia and Central Asia Studies, Institute of International Studies (IIS), Fudan University (Shanghai, China).

The story of the failed attempt by top Moscow college student Varvara Karaulova to join the jihadi frontline will perhaps one day be made into an action movie. Who knows, it might even become a blockbuster hit at the box office.

Today, the acronym ISIS [the Islamic State of Iraq and the Greater Syria] is on everyone's lips, and the rapid metamorphosis of an exemplary female student into a potential terrorist presents a fascinating psychological case study. Many journalists and experts are racking their brains over how such a transformation could have occurred. The fact it could happen at all seems to be causing something of a sensation.

On June 12 Mariam Ismailova, a 19-year-old student at the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, went missing. Ismailova was believed to be trying to reach ISIS through Turkey, via the same route as Varvara Karaulova, who was detained with a group of other people crossing the Syrian border.

But the newsflash about "A-student Varvara" is far from being the first such instance. The republics of the North Caucasus have seen more than a few cases of young and by no means poor, often successful and affluent, men and women rejecting business or college in favor of armed jihad.

However, it would be wrong to limit the analysis of such a complex issue to Russia. Many citizens of Europe are abandoning European values and swearing allegiance to "Islamic State" (whose geographical association with Iraq and Syria is becoming increasingly nebulous).According to a study by British university King's College, ISIS has more than 3,000 citizens of the West in its ranks, including 320 from Germany and about a thousand from France. Others came from across Europe.

In August of last year Spanish intelligence, together with colleagues from Morocco, smashed a recruiting ring operating out of the Spanish exclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in North Africa and the neighboring Moroccan territories. The jihadi hunters' "prey" included subjects of the Spanish crown.

In February 2015, Norway's Oslo District Court saw the start of the first lawsuit against ISIS militants - Norwegian citizens of Somali and Albanian origin who had supposedly been handed a lucky ticket to one of Europe's most socially generous countries.

At the same time it is tempting - but wrong - to link, as some observers do, the "Islamization" of Western countries with the wider issue of immigration.

The Kouashi brothers, Said and Cherif, suspects in the Charlie Hebdo attack, although having Algerian roots, were born in Paris. According to French commentators, they started out no different from other French youths into the rap scene. Before meeting imam Farid Benietou, their knowledge of Arabic was poor.

Nowadays, a good number of publications on terrorism focus on social disadvantage as the primary vehicle for choosing armed violence as a guiding philosophy, although many past and present terrorists have not lacked education.

Take Ayman al-Zawahiri, for instance. In 1981 this certified physician, writer and theologian was arrested on suspicion of the murder of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. Interestingly, after this tragic incident the authorities hired sociologists to study the "collective make-up" of the conspirators. They found a significant percentage of them had higher education in intellectual disciplines. Al-Zawahiri went on to become a leader of al-Qaeda, an organization in which the ideal warrior combines a high level of theological training with knowledge of a Kalashnikov assault rifle.

Hence, it would be delusional to use social background and education as yardsticks by which to judge a person's propensity for political moderation or radicalism. More often than not the roots of extremism lie not in poverty or lack of knowledge, but in the desire to dismantle the existing socio-economic and political models.

This assertion is no apology for barbarism as a means to restructure the world. But it is impossible not to see that today's radicalism, however perverse it may be, is merely a response to globalization and the laying down of common standards in which secularism and relativism of values plays an increasing role.

It is impossible not to notice, too, the utter rejection of hypocrisy, which under the guise of "political correctness" is becoming a kind of entry ticket to the "civilized world." Meanwhile, jihadists in the Middle East, the North Caucasus and Central Asia appeal to the ideas of social justice and speak of a "third way" between capitalism and socialism, with no counter arguments from those who should provide them.

It should also be noted that religious radicalism could spring forth without a visit to a "hot spot" or a personal acquaintance with influential warlords or the social turmoil of the Arab and African world. It is enough simply to communicate with people who do not talk of the fight between "good" and "evil," but outline clear principles, programs and views of the world. Such intimate conversations can produce a significant effect on people who harbor inner doubts.

Yet despite the lively rhetoric about "Crusades" and the "conflict of civilizations," there is no ready prescription for curing such ills. The very real and present threat of Islamic radicalism and extremism does not mean that the confrontation is drawn along clear-cut religious lines.

Within Europe itself there are serious divisions between secularists and supporters of traditional Christian values, while in the Middle East, North Africa and South-East Asia Islamic radicals and extremists have long been waging war against Muslims who support a secular model in which religion does not replace political and social diversity.

In the fight against terrorism, strong-arm tactics, although important, are not the key element. It is far simpler to arrest or eliminate radicals than to minimize the symptoms of the disease. It turns out, in fact, that openness and transparency give rise to higher levels not only of tolerance, but also of ethnic nationalism, religious radicalism and xenophobia (on the part of both minority and majority groups).

Consequently, to defeat the purveyors of destruction the battle for hearts and minds must be won, and the superiority of choosing non-violence over barbarism conclusively demonstrated. The key idea here is choice, and it must be a clear and persuasive one. That means fewer reports about the successful march of democracy that bring to mind the triumphal communiqués of Soviet congresses.

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 #13
Moscow Times
June 18, 2015
Majority See FIFA Scandal as Attack on Russia
By Howard Amos

Most Russians think that corruption allegations against officials at FIFA, football's governing body, leveled by U.S. investigators last month are an attempt to prevent Russia from hosting the 2018 World Cup, according to a survey published Wednesday by state-run pollster VTsIOM.

A total of 65 percent of respondents said that the work of the FBI was an "attempt to pressure Russia and obstruct the World Cup in Russia," according to VTsIOM.

Seven FIFA officials were arrested in Switzerland last month as the organization gathered to elect a new president as a result of a U.S. Justice Department investigation into racketeering, wire fraud and money laundering. Another seven defendants have been indicted in the case.

A popular perception that politics is the reason for the U.S. probe chimes with statements made by President Vladimir Putin and other Russian officials, who accuse the United States of trying to dominate the world. Anti-U.S. rhetoric from officials, and in state-controlled media, has intensified as ties between Russia and the West have deteriorated over the Ukraine crisis, which began in early 2014.

"The arrests look, to say the very least, really strange. ... It is clearly yet another attempt [by the U.S.] to spread its jurisdiction to other states," Putin said in an interview on May 28.

Russian Sports Minister Vitaly Mutko, who is also on FIFA's executive committee, echoed Putin's criticism of the United States' role in the arrests. "For some reason they come to Europe to arrest people," he said last month.

He noted that FIFA's continental federation in the United States is headquartered in Miami. "They could have arrested them there," Mutko said.

Moscow officials have tended to avoid mentioning a parallel probe into FIFA officials launched by Swiss investigators last month looking at possible wrongdoing in the allocation of the 2018 World Cup to Russia and the 2022 tournament to the oil-rich Gulf state of Qatar.

The U.S. investigation is not explicitly looking at the voting procedure for the allocation of the World Cup.

In their questions to respondents, VTsIOM elided the U.S. and Swiss investigations, stating that the FBI had accused the detained FIFA officials of vote-buying to rig the awarding of the World Cup to Russia.

Both Russia and FIFA have said that the criminal inquiries against FIFA will not have any impact on Russia's status as the host of the tournament, which is set to take place between June 14 and July 15.

The survey, which involved 1,600 people and had a margin of error of 3.5 percent, also showed that 65 percent of Russians think the World Cup was awarded fairly and honestly to Russia while just 13 percent believed the voting procedure was likely tainted by violations.

U.S. investigators said this week that they have been eyeing corruption at FIFA since as early as 2011, when they signed an agreement with senior FIFA official Chuck Blazer, who pleaded guilty to bribery and money laundering charges, to pass on information about FIFA, the BBC Sport news site reported Tuesday.

Russia was awarded the 2018 World Cup in 2010 after a bidding campaign marred by allegations of bribe-taking, spying and vote-rigging. An investigation was carried out for FIFA by former U.S. Federal Prosecutor Michael Garcia into allegations of wrongdoing, but FIFA refused to publish Garcia's report, citing legal concerns. Garcia rejected the ruling and resigned.

Swiss prosecutors, who have seized around nine terabytes of data so far in connection with the case, said Wednesday that their investigation was independent of the U.S. probe and they were unconcerned about any impact their work might have on Russia's hosting of the 2018 tournament, the Reuters news agency reported.

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#14
Russia Insider
www.russia-insider.com
June 17, 2015
How to Turn Something Sacred Into Something Sinister - BBC Style
The BBC transforms a monument to unity into a symbol of repression
By Johanna Ross

It doesn't seem to matter these days what aspect of Russia you undermine - its leaders, politics or culture. This article by the BBC's Caroline Wyatt is yet another attempt to find fault with something which is, quite frankly, difficult to find fault with!

The construction of Moscow's own St. Vladimir statue is apparently causing 'alarm' in Moscow.  Really? I think the only alarm being raised at the moment is the plan to station more military at Russia's borders and the escalating global tension in this regard. But instead Wyatt spins a tale of Russians yet again having issues taken out of their hands.

Only as an afterthought does the author mention the purpose of the monument's construction - to commemorate the 1000 year anniversary of Vladimir's death. In addition she completely fails to explain that its location was discussed and debated by city officials for months beforehand. The location on Vorobyevy Gory was eventually decided upon after various other places were ruled out, including a spot near the Church of Christ the Saviour.  From this article one would think the opposite - that this was something imposed on Muscovites against their will. She doesn't even mention that the  current design of statue was the result of a competition held by authorities back in December. But then why give the impression that Muscovites had say in this?  Russians are repressed, remember!

St. Vladimir, the 'Grand Prince of Kiev', brought Orthodox Christianity to Russia and was a spiritual leader for both Ukrainians and Russians. His statue on the banks of the Dnepr in Kiev is one of the city's most iconic images. By erecting its own St. Vladimir statue at this difficult time for Ukrainian/Russian relations Russia is, to my mind, emphasising that although the Ukrainian government may wish to erase its historically close ties with Russia (embodied in 'Kievan Rus'), Russia will not. Wyatt on the other hand misses this symbolism completely and attempts to conflate the construction of a sacred monument with the familiar line of Russian despotism.

The artistic merit in the monument's construction is also completely ignored and yet it cannot be denied that the erection of this sculpture will be an incredible feat of craftsmanship and engineering. What the Kievans will do with their Vladimir is unknown, but Moscow's will certainly look spectacular on Vorobyevy Gory.

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#15
Business New Europe
www.bne.eu
June 18, 2015
BOOK REVIEW: Quiet days for books on Russia published in first half of 2015
Chris Weafer in Moscow

The first half of 2015 can hardly be described as a vintage period for new books about Russia. It seems that the Ukraine crisis and recession have led to many authors delaying completing their work until there is a little more clarity on how the country moves forward and the longer-term implications can be better assessed. It meant that the past six months has been one of the quietest periods for new books about or of relevance to the Russia story.

That said, there have been some very good books published that usefully contribute to the debate about Russia and help those not so familiar with Russia's economy and politics to cut through the dense media noise, which all too often obscures the real issues and real stories.

In that context the most useful book is "Mr. Putin, Operative in the Kremlin", authored by Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy. This is a significantly revised and expanded edition of the book first published by the authors in September 2012. Since then, a great deal has happened that has allowed for more analysis of Putin and what drives him. The sleeve notes say, "Vladimir Putin has become the greatest challenge to European security and the global world order in decades". From that you know where this book is coming from. Even so, it covers the subject well and provides enough information and analysis to allow the reader to reach their own conclusions rather than just automatically accept those of the author. It is well documented - the notes and references run to more than 100 pages alone.

By far the best book to read so as to understand how the system of government works in Russia is Alena Ledeneva's "Can Russia Modernise? - Sistema, Power Networks and Informal Governance" (published in December 2012).

"The BRICS and the Future of Global Order", authored by Oliver Stuenkel, is particularly relevant today given the clear directional change in Moscow's view of world order. Specifically moving away from the West, or certainly de-emphasising what was for two decades a preference for a close political relationship with the US and EU, in favour of building closer political economic ties with the so-called BRICS nations. This book is the first to look at what the formation of the BRICS actually means in terms of geopolitics and economic opportunities. The book also considers whether regime type matters for the development of the BRICS theme and how the various countries may be able to work together, and in some instances not. The role of the new BRICS Development Bank is reviewed and compared to the World Bank and to China's Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank. It considers how the BRICS countries could co-operate in geopolitics, eg. within the UN, and what the group may mean for the future of world order.

"Germany, Russia and the rise of geo-politics", authored by Peter Szabo, examines how Germany views Russia and provides an analysis of how Berlin's policies and approach have changed. The book also looks at the role of German business and finance in the shaping of foreign policy. The author also offers his opinion about how Germany's Russia policy has impacted on the country's broader foreign policy in the region and also how that is perceived by other governments.

"Once upon a time In Russia", by Ben Mezrich, is advertised as the "untold true story of larger-than-life billionaire oligarchs". That description is somewhat misleading, as the story is very focused on Boris Berezovsky and Roman Abramovich. It covers the original relationship between the two and the events that led to the high-profile legal dispute in London's High Court. It also covers the polonium poisoning of Alexander Litvenenko in 2006 and Berezovsky's suicide in March 2013.

For those looking for background about the emergence of Russia's oligarchs and how they built their business empires out of the 1990's privatization of state assets, the two best books are Chrystia Freeland's "Sale of the Century", published in 2000, and David Hoffman's "The Oligarchs" (2002). Freeland's book covers the events of the 1990s that led to the emergence of the oligarchs and their purchase of state enterprises. Hoffman's book expands the story to show how the oligarchs used the state purchases to set up their business empires and how they adapted to the early days of the new Putin regime.

The book which attracted most attention over the past six months is Bill Browder's "Red Notice: How I Became Putin's Enemy No. 1". In the US the subtitle is "One man's fight for justice". There can hardly be anybody with even a passing interest in Russia who has not heard of the story of Bill Browder, his Hermitage Fund and, especially the death of Browder's investigative lawyer Sergei Magnitsky. To that extent I don't need to spell out what the book is about: Bill goes through in great detail the events which led up to his exclusion from Russia, the attack on his company, the arrest and death in detention of Magnitsky and what has happened since. It is partly a book which shows how you can make a great deal of money by being flexible in emerging economies, such as Russia; and partly it is also about how one can also get into a lot of trouble very quickly. Mainly, however, it is about the human tragedy that was the death of a young lawyer trying to do the right thing.

In the summer reading category is Peter Pomerantsev's "Nothing is True and Everything is Possible: Adventures in Modern Russia". It is an entertaining book about life in Moscow that strays into political analysis, albeit the author mostly confines himself to anecdotes about the heady days of the Russia boom and the political commentary is full of clichés. But it is an easily read book of real stories of life and living in Moscow, which are always slightly unbelievable for those who have not seen it first hand. The author worked "on and off" (sic) in Moscow from 2001 for several years.

We are staring to see a quite a few books coming out covering the Ukraine crisis. Most of them can go straight into the trash, as they are written with blinkers, ie. 100% pro-Russia position or 100% anti-Russia position, or are very focused on the specifics of the economy or current conflict. Amongst the most balanced books is "Conflict in Ukraine: The Unwinding of the Post-Cold War Order", co-authored by Rajan Menon and Eugene Rumer. The book looks at the broader geopolitical and world order implications from the crisis. The authors highlight the considerable threat of a complete breakdown in relations between the US and Russia in such areas as the battle against terrorism and nuclear proliferation. The recent agreement with Iran shows the importance of Russia's role in such negotiations. They argue that the West really should not lose sight of the importance of stable relations with Russia and look at some scenarios of how the current crisis could play out and the implications. It is a real well-structured and rationally argued book. It is also one of the few that leaves the emotion out of it, sticks to facts and offers pragmatic solutions.
 

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#16
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
June 17, 2015
U.S.-China military treaty may threaten Russian interests - experts
The U.S. and China have signed a collaboration agreement on military dialogue. According to the Chinese media, it is the first agreement of its kind in the last several years. While Russian experts believe that for now this is most likely a protocol of intentions, they also think that any rapprochement between China and the U.S. amid Moscow's confrontation with the West is against Russia's interests.
Alexey Timofeychev, RBTH
 
A new deal on military cooperation signed by Washington and Beijing threatens to undermine Russia's efforts to forge closer ties with China, say Russian experts.

Representatives of the U.S. and Chinese defense ministries signed the agreement on the mechanism of interactivity of troops when coordinating humanitarian efforts and reactions to emergency situations (), on June 12. The sides are expected to sign a security agreement by the end of September that will help reduce the likelihood of incidents occurring between the two countries' armed forces in the air and at sea.

The American military says that these agreements will create a better mutual understanding and lower the risk of any accidental confrontations. Meanwhile, China is calling the agreement a big step forward in Sino-American relations. As a result, there have already been announcements about possible American-Chinese military drills in 2016.
 
The 'G2' and 'Chimerica'

Russian experts believe that the signing of the agreement alone helps understand Washington and Moscow's place in Beijing's geopolitical calculations. This is particularly topical in the light of the recent rapprochement between Russia and China as a result of the confrontation between Russia and the West.
Vladimir Korsun, China scholar and professor in the Asian Studies Department at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, said that the signed agreement is most likely only a protocol of intentions for now, adding that China and the U.S. started concluding military agreements back in the 1980s.

Experts believe that while the agreement does not have any signs that would indicate Washington and Beijing are forming some kind of military alliance, it does demonstrate the character of relations between China and the U.S. For example, Korsun states that "de facto the G2 (the U.S.-China duo) already exists," alluding to the realistic concept of Chimerica introduced by historian and Harvard professor Niall Ferguson, a theory that supposes the existence of a single American-Chinese economic space suiting both countries.

Moreover, Korsun also remarked that in the middle of the 2000s the majority of Russia's expert community was inclined to think that a future conflict between the U.S. and China was inevitable, while Russia would have to maintain a distance and "watch the battle of the two tigers" from the sidelines. However, this forecast has not come to pass and the American-Chinese agreement signed on June 12 is further testimony that this outcome remains unlikely for now. For this reason, Korsun is convinced that in the event of a further aggravation in relations between Moscow and Washington, Russia will not have China on its side.
 
The Moscow-Washington-Beijing triangle

At the same time some experts believe that a full-fledged alliance between the U.S. and China is extremely unlikely. This, however, does not make Russia's current situation any better. Alexander Khramchikhin, deputy director of the Institute of Political and Military Analysis, said that the Russia-U.S.-China triangle is experiencing difficult relations. In this configuration each of the three countries is playing on the contradictions between the other two and the forging of closer ties by any two countries goes against the interests of the third. Even though it is hard to imagine a real alliance between any two players, the tactical convergence between Washington and Beijing is leaving Moscow with less space for maneuver.

Andrei Frolov, editor-in-chief of Export Vooruzheny magazine, also believes that the Chinese-American agreement, which he calls a memorandum of understanding, is a sign of a certain rapprochement between the U.S. and China. However, he underlines that in the next couple of years this should not have any practical consequences for Russia.

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 #17
Sputnik
June 16, 2015
One-Third of Ukrainian Military on Oligarch's Payroll - US Legislator

WASHINGTON (Sputnik) - A Ukrainian oligarch has been paying one-third of the people involved with Ukraine's military, US Congressman Dana Rohrabacher stated in a hearing at the US House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee on Tuesday.

"In the Ukrainian military, which was one-third made up of people who were not in the military, but were instead on the payroll of some oligarch," Rohrabacher said.

Rohrabacher noted he received the information while on a trip to Europe, where he met with people involved with intelligence agencies in various countries.

"They [the oligarch's mercenaries] had heavy artillery and were indiscriminately shelling these separatists' villages," Rohrabacher added.

"If that coup, meaning violent overthrow of an elected government, had not happened, we would not be in this situation and the Ukrainians would have been spared this," also US senator stated.

The Ukrainian crisis started in 2014 when pro-European Union (EU) supporters, including radical nationalists, backed by Western powers, ousted elected President Viktor Yanukovych after he did not sign an association agreement with the EU.

In April 2014, the conflict escalated when the new government in Kiev launched a military operation against independence supporters in eastern Ukraine. The independence supporters have refused to recognize the new government arguing that the legitimate, democratically-elected Yanukovych government was removed by a violent coup.

The UN estimates the conflict has claimed more than 6,400 lives. Rohrabacher argued that the majority of the casualties are on the hands of the Ukrainian army.

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 #18
Washington Post
June 18, 2015
Editorial
Guarding against Putin's long reach

VLADIMIR PUTIN recently told an Italian newspaper that "only an insane person and only in a dream can imagine that Russia would suddenly attack NATO." So what is a sane person to make of the vastly expanded military exercises, patrols and incursions ordered by Mr. Putin along NATO's borders since his invasion of Ukraine last year? According to NATO's figures, Russian air activity near NATO territory increased by 50 percent from 2013 to last year; on the ground, there have been multiple last-minute military exercises, kept secret from the West or announced belatedly.

Russian military aircraft have flown unannounced over Poland; the three Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; and the North Sea. In April, a Russian fighter flew dangerously close to a U.S. plane over the Baltic Sea, even as the Russian navy conducted exercises in the waters below. Russian forces also have been deploying in the Arctic, forcing Sweden, Norway and Finland to contend with incursions by planes, and in Sweden's case, a suspected submarine.

All of this might be dismissed as bluffing and posturing by Mr. Putin. But given the fact that the Russian leader has now launched two military invasions across European borders, it is only prudent that NATO prepare for the possibility of an incursion into the Baltics, which joined NATO a decade ago, or even into former Warsaw Pact states such as Poland. Doing so will not only deter Mr. Putin but also reassure those nations, which sometimes question whether the United States, Britain and France would really come to the defense of Eastern Europe's border nations.

The Obama administration took a preliminary step a year ago when it began rotating a brigade of troops through the Baltic states and Poland and increasing military exercises in those countries. NATO has also mounted air patrols over the region. Now the Pentagon is considering a plan to pre-position tanks, infantry vehicles and other arms and equipment for up to 5,000 troops in the Baltics and Poland, as well as in Romania, Bulgaria and possibly Hungary.

It's a good idea for practical as well as political reasons. As a Pentagon spokesman explained this week, NATO can save money by positioning equipment closer to training sites. In a crisis, the gear would be available for a rapid deployment by U.S. or other NATO troops. Even the most paranoid Kremlin analysts cannot regard equipment for 5,000 soldiers as an offensive threat, but the initiative could cause Mr. Putin to think twice about infiltrating special forces and other "little green men" across a NATO border, as he did in Ukraine.

Some in the West oppose any step by Western countries to defend themselves, no matter how small, on the grounds that doing so could "provoke" the Russian ruler. But it is more likely that a rejection of the Pentagon's plan by President Obama would encourage Mr. Putin to believe NATO would crumble if challenged. Mr. Obama should approve the pre-positioning and make it clear that Moscow's belligerence will be matched by tangible defensive acts.

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 #19
New York Times
June 18, 2015
An Optimist's View of Russia
By CAROL GIACOMO
Editorial page editor

With his invasion of Crimea, deployment of troops and weapons to eastern Ukraine and ruthless oppression at home, President Vladimir Putin of Russia has steered his country far off the democratic track. The promise of the early 1990s, when the collapse of the Soviet Union seemed to usher in a new era of rights and freedoms, is over.

Or is it? Andrei Kozyrev, the first foreign minister of post-communist Russia under President Boris Yeltsin, has a more optimistic view.  He thinks it is inevitable that Russia "will come back to democracy" - just don't expect it any time soon.

Since leaving the Russian government - he was forced out as foreign minister in 1996 by opponents who found him too Western - Mr. Kozyrev, 64, has been involved in business, public speaking and writing his memoirs and a novel. Tanned, he now lives in Miami where he devours tomes about democratic change around the world. "The more I read, the less explanation there is" for why and when that change happens, he told me last week during an hour-long conversation in Washington, where he was the guest of the American Foreign Policy Council, a think tank.

Even so, the one-time wunderkind, who became foreign minister at the age of 39, is convinced that the authoritarian, anti-Western system Mr. Putin has re-imposed will not prevail. Mr. Kozyrev argues that most people are innately drawn to democracy, including Russians who made Mr. Yeltsin their first elected president in 1991. More than that, he contends that "Russians are Europeans" who have an affinity for the continent's dominant religion (Christianity), culture and democratic traditions.

He recalls his own conversion from communism to democratic capitalism clearly. His family escaped village life, and benefited under the Soviet system, in part because his father, an engineer, worked and traveled for the Ministry of Foreign Trade, while two uncles served as colonels in the Soviet army.

After graduating from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations with a Ph.D. in history, Mr. Kozyrev joined the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1974 and eventually made his first trip to New York as a junior member of his country's delegation to the United Nations General Assembly. The experience shook his communist economic beliefs when he realized that ordinary Americans, not just fat cat capitalists, owned cars and shopped in well-stocked supermarkets and that his somewhat privileged Soviet family lived a life that was actually more akin to that of lower middle-class Americans. He came to understand why Boris Pasternak's writings were banned in the Soviet Union after spending a day reading "Dr. Zhivago" on a Central Park bench: Rather than an anti-Soviet diatribe it offered something infinitely more threatening, a character who exercised free will.

Mr. Kozyrev does not seem discouraged that opinion polls show strong Russian support for Mr. Putin, his bullying ways and his efforts to destabilize Ukraine. He notes that before taking advantage of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's "glasnost" opening of limited freedom of expression in 1989 to publish an article that repudiated Lenin's concept of international struggle, "I was keeping my mouth shut" along with most other Russians.

"I was never the hero" like Andrei Sakharov, Mr. Kozyrev says of the iconic human rights campaigner whom the Soviets put under house arrest in Gorky and branded a traitor - until communism crumbled and thousands of Russians stood in his funeral line to pay tribute. "Unfortunately, not everyone is a hero but one day a combination of things comes about which makes it possible for more and more people to speak out and do something," Mr. Kozyrev said.

He insists that as in Soviet days, "underneath the façade lots of things are going on even today" in Russia and that in time Mr. Putin will be gone and the corrupt system will change quickly, although "when and how is a little bit of a mystery." Until then, he advises, the West must stand up to Mr. Putin while also leaving room for compromise.

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 #20
Termination of NATO-Russia relations fraught with risk of sudden crisis - analysts
By Tamara Zamyatina

MOSCOW, June 17. /TASS/. NATO's actual termination of cooperation with Russia cannot but raise concerns, polled experts have told TASS.

Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksey Meshkov said on Tuesday that "at the working level not a single program ever launched in Russia-NATO relations is now in action." The latest official contact between Russia and NATO took place several weeks ago, when Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and NATO's Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg met in Brussels.

"Everything looks pretty clear: Russia was given the hotline phone numbers it may dial in emergency. And this is it," Meshkov said. Earlier, Lavrov said that all contacts between the Russian and US defence ministries, including those in the context of the Russia-NATO Council had been frozen, and not at Russia's initiative, but by the United States.

The president of the Foreign and Defence Policy Council, Fyodor Lukyanov, believes that the Russia-NATO Council, the way it had existed until just recently, is now history.

"In general, the relations between Russia and NATO over the past twenty years were rather bureaucratic contacts. There have never been prospects for political cooperation and there are none in sight today. Before, NATO and the Soviet Union were in confrontation against each other, but they knew perfectly well where the "red line" not to be stepped over was. Now this awareness has been eroded to a dangerous degree," Lukyanov told TASS.

"In the current strained geopolitical situation it is important to establish contacts between those representatives of NATO and the Russian Armed Forces that are directly responsible for the operative situation and for the redeployment of military hardware. This is crucial not for the sake of achieving some sort of agreement, but for having the understanding what the other side has been doing so as to rule out an unforeseen march of events. It's better to have it this way than no way at all. There have already been situations in which NATO's and Russia's warplanes and ships came too close to each other, which might have provoked a conflict," Lukyanov said.

"That NATO's headquarters has agreed to give Russia the hot line numbers means communication has not been lost altogether and the two sides will be able to give each other a call in emergencies to defuse tensions. In any case, the parties should create some sort of contact agency instead of the Russia-NATO Council that has sunk into oblivion," Lukyanov said.

The director of the International Security Centre under the Russian Academy of Sciences, Aleksey Arbatov, believes that Russia and NATO should by all means stay open to contacts.

"Keeping the door shut would be very unwise. Any careless move by a bomber or a naval ship on either side may instantly trigger a major crisis," Arbatov told TASS.

"An escalation of world tensions, like those observed during the Cold War years during the Berlin or the Caribbean crisis should be prevented by all means. It would be appropriate to recall the 1972 convention on the prevention of incidents on and over the high seas and to project its provisions to the current situation, in which Russia and NATO conduct large-scale exercises," Arbatov believes.

"Last April joint operation was resumed of the military liaison group, which in 1946 through 1990 consisted of Soviet and Western specialists. Moreover, to rule out an unintentional clash contacts must be restored between Russia and NATO at the level of top military officials, or at least the commanders of military districts," Arbatov said. Asked who should pioneer such an initiative, Arbatov replied: "The one who is wiser."

State Councilor Nikolai Mikhailov, Russia's Former Deputy Defence Minister, is certain the disruption of cooperation will harm both NATO and Russia. There will be more misunderstanding, distrust, suspicion and risks. It was not Moscow that took that unconstructive move, but Washington and Brussels," Mikhailov told TASS. "The Russian leadership's stance looks encouraging. It has expressed concern, and not fear over the expansion of NATO's infrastructures towards Russian borders and the termination of contacts with Brussels, but at the same time demonstrates calm, dignity and readiness to make an adequate response," Mikhailov said.

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 #21
Defense News
www.defensenews.com
June 15, 2015
Protecting Nuclear Sanity
By Alexei Arbatov
Arbatov is Scholar in Residence, Carnegie Moscow Center and former Deputy Chair of the Duma Defense Committee.

The threat of nuclear war between Russia and the West, long relegated to Cold War history, reappeared last year as the crisis in East-West relations escalated.

Russian strategic bombers now fly long-range patrols near the coast of the US and its NATO allies, while Russian missile tests and military exercises involving simulated use of nuclear weapons raise the specter of nuclear war. The US responds as its defense analysts discuss options for boosting nuclear deterrence in Europe to counter Russian threats.

President Vladimir Putin unambiguously warned the West in August 2014, as the fighting raged in eastern Ukraine, not to forget that "Russia is not to be messed with. I want to remind you that Russia is one of the largest nuclear powers."

All of this has been interpreted in Europe and the US as aggressive posturing intended to intimidate the West. But inside Russia there is a different conversation. In a recent article in the highly regarded Russian defense weekly Voenno-Promyshelnnyi Kuryer (VPK) (Military Industrial Courier), prominent Russian defense expert retired Col. Mikhail Khodarenok draws alarming - for Russia - conclusions about the Russia-NATO military balance and the Russian military's prospects in a hypothetical conflict with the West.

The war in eastern Ukraine, he writes, is essentially a fight between two Soviet-era armies. "One is the 1991 army (the Ukrainian armed forces); the other is the slightly modernized version of the very same Soviet Army - it is just better prepared tactically, staffed by more skilled personnel, and better commanded."

What would happen if the Ukrainian Army was joined by "volunteers" from the US and Western Europe and their standard weapons and other equipment, he asks.

"Are the [Russian-backed separatists] going to last long if another, qualitatively different adversary enters the war?" No, they will be "lucky to last a few hours," he claims. And if the conflict escalates and both the Russian military and NATO become directly involved with conventional weapons, he believes the West will prevail because "the Russian armed forces unfortunately still can boast only of very few qualitative differences from its 1991 predecessor. For the most part, it lacks the 21st century cutting-edge technology."

The new tanks in the Red Square parade look impressive, but the reality of the Russian military that Khodarenok paints is less so. Its fleet of fighter aircraft is obsolete; the Black Sea Fleet based in Crimea is essentially "a museum;" and the Russian military has deficient logistics.

Against this backdrop, Moscow's nuclear bravado appears in a different light: as a warning to the US and NATO to refrain from a military intervention in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. The rhetoric is intended as a political message, not a military one: It is targeted at the West to impress upon its leaders the exceptional importance of this region for Russia's national security interests.

Speaking in April, the commander of Russia's Strategic Missile Forces, Col. Gen. Sergei Karakayev, reiterated that the message was political. Karakayev said the alert level of the forces he commands had not been increased since the start of the crisis, and the guidance systems of his missiles still had "zero flight programs" as mandated by a 1994 agreement between Russia and the US not to target each other.

There have been no reports of Russian tactical nuclear forces being put on alert. While the dual-capable short-range Iskander missiles were deployed in the Kaliningrad region and the Tu-22M3 medium bombers were transferred to Crimea, there have been no reports of the delivery of nuclear weapons to these regions.

Once, Soviet and US Cold War-era leaders fully understood the consequences of a nuclear exchange; both realized there would be no winners. Both understood the psychological pressure of having to make life and death decisions for the entire world in a matter of minutes. But is the new generation of Russian and US leaders as cognizant of these dangers?

The US and its NATO allies have made clear they are not looking for a military confrontation with Russia. But the escalation of nuclear rhetoric, now on both sides, could lead to unintended consequences. Anyone who thinks that an unintended nuclear scenario over Ukraine is far-fetched should remember that less than two years ago, the US and Russia were discussing how to expand trade, find a compromise on missile defense and further cut their nuclear arsenals.

The sudden return of the specter of nuclear war - whether intentional or accidental - reminds us that peace between the US and Russia is more fragile than previously thought; profound misunderstandings between Washington and Moscow carry grave dangers.

Last month's meeting of US Secretary of State John Kerry in Sochi with Putin and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov was a step in the right direction, but discussions between Washington and Moscow seem to have stalled. That is a shame; more dialogue is needed to defuse tension and tone down irresponsible statements on both sides about nuclear weapons. It should be done without delay.

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 #22
www.rt.com
June 18, 2015
'US bipartisan war party expanding to Russia's border'

NATO policy makers are seeking to expand the alliance to Russia's border, but an accident during war games might lead to a shooting war, James Carden, executive editor for the American Committee for East-West Accord, told RT's In the Now.

RT: After President Putin announced Russia's strategic forces will get over 40 new intercontinental ballistic missiles in 2015, NATO warned Russia is playing with fire. Is it really that hard to see that NATO is on Russia's border and not the other way round?

James Carden: It seems that it is very difficult for some people to understand. In this country and particularly in the administration we are seeing a war party form, it's bipartisan in nature and it seeks to obviously expand NATO to Russia's border and to incorporate many of the republics of the former Soviet Union. And the fact that Russia is reacting to this plan seems to have taken many of them by surprise.

RT: Reports say British RAF planes have been scrambled three times in the last 24 hours to intercept Russian jets flying close to NATO military exercises in the Baltic. How far can the rhetoric go?

JC: Unfortunately, this could be just the beginning. We've seen since the beginning of the Ukraine crisis NATO has increased its air patrols in and around Russian air space, we've seen the Russians respond in kind. What I would hope would dawn upon a lot of these policy makers is that something terrible; it could happen by accident. If something happens involving these flights or with some of the US trainers that are in Ukraine now, we could be well on our way unfortunately to a shooting war in Europe. That's something we really ought to be thinking about and that ought to inform our policy response to the Ukraine crisis in particular.

RT: What can Russia do to convince NATO that expansion is not the way to cooperation or to cooling down some of this rhetoric?

JC: I think a focus on effects on the ground is the place to begin. Right now we have an unfolding humanitarian catastrophe in the Donbass, where over 6,000 people have lost their lives and over a million displaced. The blame for that in this country falls squarely upon the shoulders of Mr. Putin. I saw something kind of extraordinary yesterday on Capitol Hill. Samantha Power [US Ambassador to the UN] was testifying there and she was asked, "How many of the separatists and their families are among these 6,000 people who have been killed?" She said that she didn't know. And the point of the question was how many of these victims have been killed by the force coming out of Kiev, and she claimed ignorance of it. So we need to get straight what's going on in the Donbass in order to have an informed policy response.

RT: How much does media coverage play in the heated rhetoric between the US and Russia?

JC: That's an interesting question. In the US, we hear a lot about Russian propaganda, particularly with regard to RT and Sputnik, the internet news organization sponsored by the Russian government. So news that comes out of Russia that explains Russia's point of view is 'propaganda,' but the incessant coverage coming out of the Washington Post and the New York Times, among others, that continues to religiously hew to the neoconservative line is not propaganda at all. It plays an enormous role, particularly within the Beltway.

RT: If the US understands Russia's reaction to encroachment and Kerry's statements prove that why not try a different policy?

JC: That's a good question. Why not? Because the current policy hasn't worked. I think to Mr. Kerry's credit he did try to begin to institute a thaw in this new Cold War when he travelled to Sochi with President Putin and Foreign Minister Lavrov in May. That was a very good sign, but it was very telling that between his meeting in Sochi and the G7 that the people who are for a very hard-line response to the Ukraine crisis responded and they basically denounced and undercut Kerry's move towards a détente.

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#23
Former president urges Kiev to analyze Donbas-proposed changes to Ukraine constitution

KIEV, June 18. /TASS/. Ukraine's first post-independence president has called on Kiev authorities to study constitutional amendments proposed by the self-proclaimed eastern republics of Donetsk and Luhansk.

"I believe that if these proposals came up, they should be considered and analyzed," Leonid Kravchuk, post-Soviet president from 1991 to 1994, told TASS on Thursday.

He said he had raised the issue at Wednesday's meeting of a constitutional commission, created to review Ukraine's constitution, asking parliament "to consider these proposals with regard to their form and content" and "to explain whether they are suited for amendments or contradict certain provisions of the constitutional process".

"In response, [Verkhovna Rada Speaker Volodymyr] Groysman said he had not received such proposals," Kravchuk added.

As part of peace agreements signed in Minsk, Belarus, in February, authorities of the Donetsk and Luhansk republics in mid-May submitted their proposals for Ukraine's constitutional make up.

They spelt out in detail their special status within Ukraine and provided definitions of their rights and responsibilities.

On June 8, the self-proclaimed republics unveiled their additional proposals concerning powers of the current local authorities. The text of the Ukrainian constitution remained unchanged.

Vladislav Deinego, the Luhansk republic's envoy to the Contact Group of senior representatives from Ukraine, Russia and European security watchdog OSCE, said the sides acted strictly in line with the complex of measures to fulfill the Minsk peace deal.

"We open Ukraine's constitution and look at the respective article. We have not withdrawn anything from it, we only supplemented it," he explained.

Constitutional reform is a key part of the February 12 comprehensive action plan to fulfill the Minsk accords worked out by leaders of Russia, Ukraine, Germany and France.

A key element of the reform is decentralization of government with respect to the peculiarities of certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions agreed with their representatives, as well as adopting permanent legislation on the special status of certain Donbas areas.

In late March, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko signed a decree establishing a constitutional commission tasked with amending the country's constitution.

The commission comprises 72 members, including 13 experts of international organizations. It also includes representatives of parliamentary factions, scientists and experts, as well as three former Ukrainian presidents.

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 #24
www.brianmefford.net
June 16, 2015
Who's Strategic Vision for Ukraine?
By Brian Mefford
H. Brian Mefford is a business and political consultant who is based in Kyiv, Ukraine. Named by the Kyiv Post Newspaper as one of the 20 "Most Influential Expats in Ukraine", Mefford has lived and worked in Eastern Europe continuously for more than 15 years.

[Ukrainian Deputy Chief of Staff Valeriy Chaliy] Chaliy's fears of losing influence might not be unfounded. Last month a working document began circulating in the Presidential Secretariat entitled, "The Strategic Vision of Partnership between the USA and Ukraine". [https://files.acrobat.com/a/preview/8b3f25a4-ae05-4f7c-bc6d-0decb2871752] The draft also includes an impressive list of Western supporters who have apparently endorsed the "strategic vision". These include the Director of Kissinger Associates Thomas Graham, the Director of the Kennan Institute Woodrow Wilson Center for International Studies Matt Rojansky, and Chevron's Manager of International Governmental Relations for Eurasian and European Markets Jay Thompson, among others. It should be noted that Matt Rojansky was quoted in the New York Times on June 11 opposing defensive arms sales to Ukraine. Rojansky said, "There are valid arguments on both sides but you don't get to walk this one back. Once we have done this we become a belligerent party in a proxy war with Russia, the only country on earth that can destroy the United States." A Ukrainian member of this working group, Julia Osmolovskaya added in the same article, that "Ukrainians were divided over the potential benefits of receiving weapons from the United State". This quote contrasts with a March 2015 Kyiv International Institute of Sociology survey in a majority (52%) support receiving US military aid. A full list of members is included here.

The "strategic vision" document, which is written in Russian language (not Ukrainian even though it contains a "strategic vision" for Ukraine), contains some interesting statements such as:

1. "...The instability in Ukraine is both a threat to Russia and the temptation for it to have to intervene in its internal affairs."

2. "America should also uphold the fundamental right of Ukraine to choose its own way in the matter of association, taking into account Russia's foreign policy, aimed at an open denial of any choice of Ukraine."

3. "Development of Ukraine should remain outside the scope of agreements on security between the United States and Russia."

4. "While nothing prevents Ukraine to join the regional institutions or security alliance, such as NATO, encouraging Ukraine on this path is not the original intent of the US."

5. "Cooperation between the United States and Ukraine should be on a clear and time-synchronized letter from the leaders of both countries, as representatives of vested interests against their public and private companies. Potential promoters of cooperation should feel unconditional support at the government level, if they really want to convert the nascent partnership into practical results on the ground. You should follow the contracts, investments and other tangible forms of cooperation in order to demonstrate the success of the chosen strategy and convince those who are focused on specific issues of bilateral assistance, for example, obtaining weapons for Ukraine."

While the document talks in pragmatic terms about partnership with the US, it is more striking what the document does not say. For example, the document never once mentions joining the European Union as a goal of Ukraine (and quote #2 above opposes it). The document skirts the edges of cooperation with NATO (which Ukraine has been doing for 20 years already), but never once mentions joining NATO as a goal (in fact, quotes #3, #4 and #5 above - argue against it). The document also doesn't list obtaining defensive military assistance as a goal either. Essentially, the document returns Ukraine to a "multi-vector" foreign policy of flirting with the West and doing business with the Russians. In other words, if this vision becomes a reality, then those who died in the war and Euromaidan - will have died in vain.

Documents in and of themselves are useless. However what is worrisome is that this document is being circulated within the Presidential Secretariat and to government decision makers in an effort to get 'buy-in'. Poroshenko's Chief of Staff Borys Lozkhin is believed to be the coordinator for getting support for this document. The plan is to first get the President to endorse the document as the strategic vision plan with the US, and then wave it at the American side to for a fait accompli. If Ukraine endorses a strategic vision that doesn't include the EU and NATO, how can Americans tell them they need something different? As they say, America can't want something more for a country, than they want it themselves.

However, there is hope. Deputy Chief of Staff continues to delay his move to the US to take up the ambassadorial post and this document is one of the reasons. Chaliy, a reformer committed to Western integration, is said to be leading the effort within the Secretariat against this "strategic vision", and for a strategic vision that includes EU and NATO membership for Ukraine. If successful, then Chaliy's case to delay his move to Washington will prove wise. In fact, Poroshenko might want to promote him to his new Chief of Staff instead. If unsuccessful then Chaliy can take the Washington appointment to escape what would be a visionless administration, and live quietly in a comfortable diplomatic posting. The stakes remain high...

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 #25
The Huffington Post
June 17, 2015
Greece, the IMF, and Ukraine
By Nancy K. Humphreys

Are you wondering why the IMF is standing by Ukraine against Ukraine's creditors, while the IMF is refusing to extend even a smidgeon of an olive branch to Greece?

Creditors have loaned Ukraine $70 billion dollars. To receive payment of $40 billion from the IMF, the IMF required Ukraine to convince its creditors to agree with a restructuring plan that would enable Ukraine to raise $15.3 billion out of the $70 billion it owes its creditors.

A committee of bond creditors came up with such a plan for settling with Ukraine. In response Ukraine:

(1) Passed a law in May 2015 saying the country could unilaterally declare a moratorium on debt repayment to creditors.

(2) Finance Minister Natalie Jaresko claimed that the current proposal from creditors would force the government to use $8 billion of Ukranian central bank reserves, and such a withdrawal would be in violation of Ukrainian law, plus the proposal would "damage long-term growth" of the country.

(3) And like the Greeks, Ukraine's Finance Minister justified Ukraine's objections to its creditor's repayment terms because the creditors made the debt payment arrangement with a previous government, a government Jaresko called a "dictatorship".

Creditors replied that Ukraine's plan would result in a 40 percent haircut on the $70 billion dollars owed them. Russia's Finance Minister Anton Siluanov announced that his country can and will sue under British law if if Ukraine does not repay Russia $3 billion it lent the country by the end of this year.

You would think these events would result in the same result that the Greek standoff with creditors has? No?

No! The IMF said it will release $40 billion to Ukraine even if the country makes good on its threat to place a moratorium on repayment of its debt to creditors.

Greece has not passed a law allowing it to impose a debt moratorium or even made a threat not to repay its debt until today, yet the IMF isn't demanding Greece's creditors take a haircut. The IMF stands firmly behind Greece's creditors.

The intervention by the IMF on behalf of a debtor country like Ukraine is extraordinary. And it may land the IMF in hot water with Russia.

The IMF's Lending-into-Arrears Policy, the clause that Christine Lagarde used to justify paying the $40 billion to Ukraine in spite of that country's creditors' wishes, prohibits bilateral lending between countries.

This IMF technicality could give Russia the right to veto restructuring of Ukraine's debt if the IMF rules say that Russia has standing as an "official creditor." And here, perhaps we come to the real reason the IMF is favoring Ukraine over Greece.

True, Ukraine is not a member of the European Union nor the eurozone as Greece is, and Ukraine has been far more cooperative with the IMF than Greece has, and it is not as indebted as Greece.

But there is another difference between these countries that could be even more significant. Greece has not been recently invaded by Russia.

Russia seized Crimea from Ukraine in 2014. Ukraine might lose more territory to Russia. Bond creditors in Europe and the US do not want this to happen.

So here we come to the bigger question. Unlike the World Bank which promotes development of poorer countries, "the IMF is a cooperative institution that seeks to maintain an orderly system of payments and receipts between nations."

In other words the IMF is an international clearinghouse used for settling foreign financial transactions among member countries. IMF membership is voluntary. Members pool their funds to back IMF transactions and agree to avoid "practices injurious to the economic well-being of their fellow member nations."

So, is it right for the IMF to be over-riding the wishes of voters in one democratic nation while supporting the wishes of voters in another democratic nation--based solely on the IMF's own criteria for repayment of sovereign debts to creditors?

Is the IMFs favoritism of Ukraine over Greece purely due to financial policy as claimed, or is the IMF's process actually based on a hidden political agenda?

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 #26
Fort Russ
http://fortruss.blogspot.com
June 17, 2015
"Yanukovych No. 2 will be the EU's fault"

"I am beginning to think about Yanukovych No. 2, who will be the EU's fault"
[http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/tylko-w-onecie/jurij-andruchowycz-zaczynam-myslec-juz-o-janukowyczu-nr-2-i-winna-temu-bedzie-unia/n442wt?utm_source=fb&utm_medium=fb_detal&utm_campaign=podziel_sie]
Translated from Polish by J.Hawk

"I am already starting to think about Yanukovych No. 2, and the EU will be once again responsible for that revival," says Ukrainian writer Yuriy Andrukhovych in an interview with Onet. "It turns out that no effort of ours leads to the desired goal. It will cause another wave of disappointment and the return of pro-Russian politicians into power," predicts the writer who is often referred to as the "Ambassador of Free Ukraine."

Ukraine is now the object of geopolitical negotiations, an element of the West's strategy concerning Russia. In theory, the Minsk 2 agreement provides for a ceasefire. What does the situation look like in a country where a war is being waged while theoretically there's peace? Andrukhovych refers to it as an a "ragged peace." We have a ceasefire of the sort which brings us daily news of wounded and even dead on the Ukrainian side. For example, just last night three Ukrainian soldiers were killed," says the author of "Muscoviada. A Horror Story."

The writer emphasizes that Ukraine is in a strange situation in that it's alone in spite of having many allies: "It's absurd that in the eyes of the international community Ukraine has to explain why it is fighting against some terrorist groups on its own sovereign territory. In Ukraine there is a sense of aloneness and of lack of understanding of our problem by every party."

In his book "It's not dead yet and it will not die", Andrukhovych reminisces about Maidan's beginnings when Yanukovych decided to disperse the protesting youths by force. Andrukhovych then told Polish journalist Pawel Smolenski "We will not allow this animal beat our children." According to the writer, it's the parents' anger that gave birth to the Maidan.

When asked how these parents feel these days, how Ukrainians feel, Andrukhovych answers that "the society is still aroused and outraged, but it at the same time very demanding toward those who have come to power. Ukrainians are very skeptical toward the current authorities, but their criticism is exaggerated. In principle, I don't like representatives of any government, but I also think that the scepticism is not wholly justified."

The writer also says that there is a certain paradox in Ukraine. "On the one hand we are experiencing a huge wave of patriotism, which is understandable in an armed conflict, but at the same time a near-total absence of trust toward the authorities. It's a uniquely Ukrainian phenomenon, because usually patriotism leads to an increase of support for the government."

Are Ukraine's rulers afraid of another Maidan? "Of course they are worried, but I believe that any talk of a new Maidan is an exaggeration or simply idle threats. Maidan doesn't simply happen, it's not simply the case of rebels coming out into the streets. It's a complex phenomenon which requires a very specific situation. The situation has not risen to that level yet, and I would not want it to rise."

Andrukhovych is called the ambassador of free Ukraine. His letter, in which he wrote in early 2014 that "Death squads are operating in Ukraine" has been published by media around the world. His books are published and even win awards in the West, thanks to which his voice is heard and listened to there. How does he perceive his role? I don't see myself as an alternative ambassador, but rather an intermediary. I know Western societies which means I can better explain what is happening in Ukraine. He emphasizes his ability to relate information which is not included in news reports. "The dimension of human experiences and gestures is often missed by our Western partners--they view the conflict as a geopolitical game in which Russia and US fight over spheres of influence."

Andrykhovych also talks about Ukraine's future, and about the vicious circle of revolutions into which the country might fall. "I am already afraid of that, I'm beginning to think of Yanukovych No. 2, and once again the EU will be responsible for that revival, just as it didn't want to open itself to us after the Orange Revolution, we were given no prospects for entry and now the situation is repeating itself."

"Once again we are made to feel that it doesn't depend on us. Our partners only want to either harass or not harass Putin. It turns out that no effort of ours leads to the goal. It will lead to another wave of disappointment and the return of pro-Russian politicians in Ukraine. If Europe wants that, that's how it might end," Andrukhovych concludes bitterly.
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J.Hawk's Comment: What a piece of work this guy is! Everything is always the EU fault, as if it was the EU's responsibility to govern Ukraine. No word of criticism of the current Ukrainian authorities--I guess the end justifies the means, as long as they are ostensibly "pro-Western" that is sufficient to warrant his de-facto unconditional support.

Interesting point about war and distrust of the authorities--I guess that's as close someone like Andrukhovych will ever come to openly admitting Kiev regime needs the war to stay in power but, dammit, something is going wrong because the sheeple just aren't rallying around the flag like they are supposed to!

And, finally, one wonders just about what it is that the pro-Western orientation is supposed to do for Ukraine. For Andrukhovych it appears to be a goal in itself, no matter what level of suffering it causes to ordinary people of Ukraine. Because what's left unsaid in his fear of Yanukovych No. 2 is that once good relations with Russia are restored, people of Ukraine will once again know peace and prosperity.

BUT WE CAN'T HAVE THAT, CAN WE?

Ahem, now, what was I saying? Oh yes. I think we can put Strelkov's and Rozhin's fantasies about NATO arming Ukraine, or even NATO troops in Ukraine, to rest. We are down to a sphere of influence agreement that will probably amount to a partition of Ukraine, and not even along the current "line of separation." If people like Andrukhovych are all but throwing in the towel (conveniently blaming the EU rather than themselves), people who are not trolls but well-informed and well-connected political actors, you can be sure that the game is pretty close to being over.  With Putin's/Surkov's/Starikov's strategy actually looking far better than most people were giving it credit at the time.  

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 #27
The National Interest
June 18, 2015
Newsflash, America: Ukraine Cannot Afford a War with Russia
Arming Ukraine would only fan the flames of tension between the West and Russia, leading the United States into a conflict it doesn't, and shouldn't, want.
By Rajan Menon
Rajan Menon is Anne and Bernard Spitzer Professor of Political Science at the Colin Powell School of the City College of New York/City University of New York and a Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace at Columbia University. His most recent book (coauthored with Eugene B. Rumer) is Conflict in Ukraine: The Unwinding of the Post-Cold War Order (MIT Press, 2015); his next book, The Conceit of Humanitarian Intervention, will be published by Oxford University Press in 2016

The lobbying for arming Ukraine has been underway for several months, but the passage of time has not increased the quality of what passes for a debate on this topic. This is particularly lamentable because the parties involved (Ukraine, Russia, Moscow's Donbas allies, the United States and the EU) could soon start down a road that leads to a deepening of the conflict.

On one side of the debate stands a disparate coalition that blames Russia for everything that has gone wrong since the February 2014 uprising that deposed Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych. Some within this camp insist that Vladimir Putin has transformed Russia into a neofascist state that is determined to resurrect an empire and trample global norms and international law along the way. To them, any effort to explain why Russia might have viewed the steady movement of the EU and NATO toward its borders with apprehension amounts to blessing Putin's domestic and foreign policy and betraying democratic principles to boot. Explanation, in this view, is equivalent to endorsement. No lack of moral certitude here.

Historically, great powers-including the United States, as a cursory look at its history demonstrates-have resisted their rivals' attempts to extend influence into areas deemed vital for national security and standing. But this observation cuts no ice with those who regard Moscow's behavior as nothing more than an amalgam of mendacity and Machtpolitik.

They dismiss the proposition that Russia might have been unsettled by the prospect of a Ukraine integrated into the EU. The EU, they point out, is an economic entity, not an alliance, and the Kremlin knows this full well. Hence, its supposed apprehension about the strategic consequences of Kyiv's alignment with the EU is bogus-another instance of Putinist propaganda-and those who give it credence are either misinformed or dupes. Besides, they say, Ukraine has no chance of joining the EU anytime soon.

That the EU, by virtue of its Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), has a military element-no matter how inchoate-seems to have gone unnoticed by this group. The same goes for the near-total overlap in membership between the EU and NATO.

Those who believe that Russia alone bears the blame for the Ukraine crisis insist that NATO had no plans to bring Ukraine into its ranks in the run-up to the 2014 crisis and that Moscow's apprehensions on this score amount to little more than propaganda.

But back in the early 1990s, the chances that Romania, Bulgaria and the Baltic trio would join both coalitions seemed remote, and Ukraine's membership in NATO was in fact under discussion during the tenure of President Leonid Kuchma. These, it seems, are inconvenient facts to be forgotten because only lies emanate from the Kremlin.

Russia certainly sought, in multiple ways, to shape Ukraine's internal and external policies-and well before Putin came on the scene, by the way. Yet it did not attempt to annex Crimea or to sponsor secessionist statelets in Ukraine's east prior to 2014. On February 21 of that year, the Kremlin teamed up with the EU to help forge a February 21, 2014 political settlement between Yanukovych and the opposition that called for forming a national unity government, pruning the powers of the presidency (by reverting to the 2004 constitution) and holding early (not later than December) presidential elections.

To be fair, there are, on the other side of the Ukraine debate, those who have also succumbed to hyperbolic simplemindedness. For example, the insistence that the conflagration in Ukraine stems from NATO's expansion pure and simple represents a classic example of the single-factor fallacy. The contention that Ukraine's own politics are fascist in a fashion or that anti-Semitism represents a rising trend in Ukrainian society is no less inaccurate, and anyone who has spent time recently in various parts of Ukraine and met its officials (in Kyiv and the outlying areas), leaders of civic organizations, journalists and academics can attest that it is baseless. As all countries do, Ukraine has its extremists, but they are scarcely the prime movers of its politics and remain a fringe element. While there are sound reasons not to flood Ukraine with American weaponry, the supposed extremism of Ukrainian politics is not among them.

As a sop to those who have pushed for arming Ukraine, the Obama administration has begun training Ukraine's National Guard-regrouped private militias that, at least in an administrative, if not substantive, sense are overseen by the defense and interior ministries. (Canada and Britain are also providing training.) The White House has also allocated some $118 million for "nonlethal" equipment to bolster Ukraine's defenses.

Meanwhile, the creaky Minsk II ceasefire could well collapse. Shelling across the line of control remains routine. Moreover, the Kyiv leadership and the Donbas separatists both have reason to torpedo Minsk II-the former to force Obama's hand, the latter to prevent Putin from abandoning them for a deal with the West that lifts economic sanctions on Russia.

If full-scale war erupts, Obama will face intense pressure to wade in deeper. Having already dipped his toes in the water by training Ukraine's National Guard and providing nonlethal equipment, he will be called upon to ramp up the military training and to send offensive arms. Those favoring a tougher line toward Russia will claim that American "credibility" (a perennial formulation in U.S. foreign-policy discourse) will crumble and that Putin, emboldened, will move on Kyiv, perhaps even on the Baltic states. They will demand that the United States prevent this by demonstrating its resolve in hopes of sending Russia a strong signal.

Yet the case for arming Ukraine remains as incoherent as it was when first unveiled back in February-and this is for three reasons.

First, its proponents have still not revealed the objective that underlies their recommendation. Do they hope to increase Kyiv's bargaining power so that Putin eventually agrees to peace terms that keep Ukraine whole and secure? Do they wish to provide Kyiv the military wherewithal to retake the Donbas "republics" and (eventually) Crimea? Or are they seeking to persuade NATO's skittish eastern flank that Article V of the transatlantic treaty actually amounts to something tangible? Seek, but you will not find.

The advocates of arming have been no less elusive when it comes to specifying the sorts of arms they have in mind (and in what amounts), how shipping weapons to Ukraine can make a positive difference while its army remains dysfunctional, and what procedures they envision for preventing American arms from falling into the wrong hands. There are serious, knowledgeable and patriotic people in Ukraine who have thought hard about these issues. The same cannot be said about the American proponents of arming Ukraine.

Second, those who favor arming Ukraine assume that once American weapons start flowing to Ukraine, Putin will realize that Washington means business, come to his senses and back off. Let's concede that this outcome cannot be dismissed out of hand. Even so, those proposing a dramatic shift in policy-the call to arm Ukraine certainly fits the description-must explain what they propose to do if the party they seek to influence does not respond as expected. The advocates of arming Ukraine have yet to enlighten on this point. Presumably, we are to trust that Putin will react in the way they assume he will. Hope is the coin of their realm.

But throughout this crisis, Putin has confounded prevailing expectations. So we can hardly dismiss the possibility that, taking advantage of propinquity and the presence of Russian regular and irregular forces in the Donbas (the United States by contrast is far from battlefield and has no presence there), he will step up support to the separatists and the Russian personnel backing them rather than dutifully play the part assigned to him by those eager to arm Ukraine.

Putin won't back away if Washington arms Ukraine. He has invested too much of his reputation and political capital in this conflict and cannot retreat without damaging his standing at home, and he has good reason to test America's will because he understands that Ukraine matters to Russia more than it does to the United States.

If Putin does raise the stakes, those demanding that Ukraine be armed won't then say, "Well, we did what we could. Ukraine must now defend itself." Instead, they will once again invoke (what else?) credibility and demand that Washington adopt even tougher countermeasures. If the Obama administration follows their counsel, the United States will be engaged in a war on Russia's doorstep and will have two choices down the line, neither of them good: doubling down or backing down.

The third argument offered for arming Ukraine invokes the sanctity of international norms, human rights and law. From this vantage point, the challenge faced by the West transcends Ukraine; the ground rules and principles undergirding the post-Cold War political order are at stake. Appeasing Russia would amount to condoning or even encouraging aggression and treating sovereignty and the UN Charter as dispensable. Ukraine, in this view, represents the canary in the coalmine. What the West does in Ukraine will determine what kind of political world we will inhabit.

While stirring, this appeal to exalted principles amounts to vacuity; it resorts to the operatic register to skirt the truly important practical questions at hand. Norms and the law are, in principle, worth defending, but decisions about whether and how that should be done cannot be made sensibly from an ethereal perch. Important practical questions arise: Who will do the defending? In what ways, and to what extent? What costs and risks might there be, and who will bear them?

In the debate on the Ukraine crisis, these critical issues tend to be treated as trivia that divert attention from the far-more-important moral matters. At a conference in Ukraine that I attended recently, a European academic insisted passionately that Ukraine had already made the normative choice for the West: It had requested arms. Who are we, he asked, to deny its elemental right of self-defense? QED.

Ukraine certainly has the right to self-defense and self-determination, but it has no parallel presumptive right-nor does any other state-to American arms and security guarantees as a matter of course. Recall the widespread, justifiable outrage that followed the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invasions that crushed the uprisings in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968). No sensible person proposed that the United States had a normative obligation to mount a rescue, the consequences be damned.

Senator John McCain believes that Ukraine deserves American arms because it has not asked for "boots on the ground," merely the means to defend itself. He finds it shameful that the United States refuses to oblige. Here, again, we have an appeal to values. What we are prepared to do for Ukraine measures our moral worth.

Of course, no sensible Ukrainian leader would ask for American arms and American ground troops. That would guarantee that Ukraine gets neither. McCain avoids the truly important questions. What will Kyiv ask for in the event that American arms don't do the trick and Ukraine faces a rout at Russian hands? What should the United States do if Kyiv does call for additional help under such circumstances-send more arms? If that doesn't suffice, and the hazards of going further are deemed prohibitive-even McCain does not favor sending U.S. troops to battle Russia-will the hallowed principles that the case for arming rests on turn out not to be so sacred after all? If so, the normative case would resemble the realism that it condemns.

There has been much talk during the Ukraine crisis about the hallowed principles and treaties underlying global order, and Russia has been castigated for violating them in Ukraine. There's more than a little amnesia at work here. In the aftermath of 9/11, the West saw fit on national-security grounds to disregard several of these principles by, inter alia, launching a preventive war for no good reason, employing torture and "extraordinary renditions" (delivering terrorism suspects to despotic regimes notorious for brutalizing opponents), and conducting drone attacks (a significant number of them "signature strikes")-all without providing a reasoned justification based on self-defense and legal principles. Quite apart from its strategic naiveté, then, the norms-based plea for arming Ukraine exudes more than a whiff of hypocrisy. This has not gone unnoticed in other parts of the world, which is one of the reasons Russia hasn't become the global pariah that one would imagine from reading leading Western newspapers or listening to the orations of American and European leaders.

Meanwhile, things are at an impasse in Ukraine. Sanctions haven't swayed Russia. The EU will certainly agree to extend the existing penalties next month when they come up for renewal, but there is no appetite in Europe for tightening the screws on Russia. Even maintaining the existing economic pressure is likely to prove harder as time goes by. The next deliberations on extending sanctions will occur in December, and the EU will be less united, provided Putin doesn't launch another offensive. Arming Ukraine will provoke even more controversy in Europe, and discussions on that option will divide NATO.

The people who will suffer most from renewed war are the civilians trapped in the Donbas conflict zones. Already, some 600,000 have sought refuge abroad, the overwhelming majority in Russia, and another 1 million are "internally displaced." The rest remain, by choice or for lack of it, in their towns and villages. They live in fear, lack basic necessities and survive by resorting to all manner of maneuvers that are as creative as they are poignant. Kyiv will not pay their pensions and other benefits because it does not wish to subsidize a Russian occupation; Moscow won't support them because it hopes to increase the economic burden on Poroshenko's government and to turn Donbas civilians against it. If the war resumes full scale, these unfortunate people will, literally, be caught in the crossfire. More of them will die, and more of their homes and properties will be destroyed.

The Ukraine conflict cannot be solved by military means; this will only make it more dangerous and harder to control. A political solution will require negotiations among Ukraine, Russia, the EU and the United States. Shoring up Minsk II should be the first order of business. That will require agreement on measures to ensure that the agreement's key provisions-removing heavy weapons and creating demilitarized zones on either side of the line of control-are implemented. That, in turn, will necessitate the deployment of third-party peacekeepers to prevent renewed fighting, stationing monitors to ensure verification and securing the porous Russian-Ukrainian border.

These steps will prove very difficult, given the level of mistrust between Kyiv and Moscow and between Russia and the West. And even if they prove feasible, the parties will have to turn to an even tougher challenge: reaching agreement on terms that will ensure Ukraine's unity and territorial integrity on the one hand, and Russia's security on the other. One can quibble with the details, but the resolution, or at minimum the stabilization, of this conflict will result from a political deal along these lines. As things now stand, a solution along these lines may seem impossible, but the available alternatives are worse. If war resumes, Ukraine could lose even more land, its economy (Poroshenko reckons that the war costs his country roughly $8 million a day) could collapse, reforms would be even harder to enact and NATO and Russia could find themselves on a collision course.

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