#2
RIA Novosti
June 3, 2015
Russian economy in "full-blown crisis" - ex-finance minister

Speaking at the Russian Federation Council in Moscow, ex-Finance Minister Aleksey Kudrin has once again criticized overblown defence spending that squeezes the funds out of other areas of Russia's economy.

A large part of the budget deficit that the country is faced with today comes "not from decreased government earning but from the need to support defence expenditure", Kudrin said, RIA Novosti (part of the state-owned International News Agency Rossiya Segodnya) reported on 3 June.

"This year, despite shortages of financing in some other areas, government spending on defence will grow by R600bn [over 110m dollars at the current exchange rate]," he said.

In 2011 Kudrin was sacked after he had openly disagreed on the level of defence spending with then-President Dmitriy Medvedev.

While the government does not plan to decrease budget spending on arms and armament, Kudrin was pessimistic on Russia's GDP growth, which he put below official estimates.

"We are currently faced with a full-blown crisis under any existing criteria. The Economic Development Ministry estimates Russia's GDP will sink by 2.8 percent this year, which already means a recession. But my thought is that the drop will be sharper, by about 4 per cent," Kudrin said, according to a separate report published by RIA Novosti the same day.

According to a report by privately-owned Russian news agency Interfax that day, the ex-minister expected zero-level economic growth in 2016, followed by a slow pick-up of about 1.5 per cent until 2018.

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 #3
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
June 4, 2015
More and more Russians slipping below poverty line as recession bites
As sanctions continue to take their toll on Russia's faltering economy and salaries shrink in real terms, an increasing number of Russians are finding themselves unable to make ends meet. Data published by Russia's state statistics bureau Rosstat indicates that 11 percent of Russians were living below the poverty line in 2014, but experts have called the veracity of these figures into question.
Yekaterina Sinelschikova, RBTH

As Russia's economy continues to slide into recession under the effect of Western sanctions and falling relative incomes, figures  published by Russia's state statistics bureau Rosstat show that 16 million people, or 11 percent of the population, found themselves below the poverty line in 2014.

However, Russian experts claim that this figure is far too low: The Rosstat statistics are merely the official data, which analysts traditionally see as unreliable. They warn that the official figures underestimate the problem and that in 2015 almost one in five Russians may find themselves in dire financial straits.

According to alternative estimates, even a year ago 25 to 40 percent of Russian citizens described themselves as poor. Yelena Kiselyova of the Institute for Complex Strategic Studies told RBTH that while 40 percent is "certainly an exaggeration," 30 percent is "quite a realistic figure."

"Official" poverty comes when incomes fall below the minimum subsistence level. Today, the minimum is 8,000 rubles a month ($150) per person. "Until recently, the number of poor in the country had been steadily declining since 2000. Even during the last crisis [in 2008] there was no significant increase in the number of poor," said Kiselyova.

But with wages and incomes shrinking, and most of this money going to cover food costs, housing and communal services, and other priority needs, there is no money left for other expenses, such as loan payments. "Today we are seeing an increase in the number of second and third loans that are taken out to service previously taken loans," said Kiselyova.

According to Sergei Smirnov, director of the Institute of Social Policy at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, people are slipping into poverty faster than Rosstat thinks.

This year, as a result of the sanctions, consumer prices have increased by 20 percent on average. If Smirnov's forecasts are correct, it is possible that by the end of the year one Russian in eight will be living from paycheck to paycheck.
 
The new poor

A specific feature of Russian poverty is that it is often those who work who are the most affected. "The salary level of many people is close to the subsistence level or slightly above," said Kiselyova. According to official statistics, this is the case for 13 percent of Russian workers.

"It has become impossible to live on a small pension or salary," says leading Russian sociologist Leontiy Byzov. "This is a very important factor, which we have been trying to leave behind for 15 years after the default of '98, and now we have returned to it."

What has changed during the current crisis is that today's poor are not only people with social problems. According to public opinion surveys carried out in late March-early April 2015, the number of Russians who see themselves as poor has increased by 25-30 percent, he said.

The statistics presented in the annual report by Ella Pamfilova, Russia's human rights ombudsman, for example, are even more alarming: According to the Public Opinion Foundation, 47 percent of the population consider themselves "the working poor." "It's hard to give up what you used to have, so people feel they have become much poorer, even if this is not quite the case," explained Byzov.
 
The depth of poverty

So what steps is the Kremlin taking to combat rising poverty in Russia? When asked about the measures being taken by the government, the press service of Russia's Ministry of Labor and Social Protection reminded RBTH that insurance pensions have been indexed by 11.4 percent (averaging 13,000 rubles, or $241 monthly), welfare payments by 10.3 percent, and benefits for families with children and monthly payments for certain categories of citizens by 5.5 percent.

In turn, on May 23 Russian President Vladimir Putin authorized the use of the state allowance paid for the birth of a second child as mortgage fee payments, as an additional measure to support families.

Sergei Smirnov is unimpressed by the steps the government is taking to tackle the problem. "Pensions are being indexed regardless of the crisis, especially since in February they were indexed at a percentage below the Rosstat rate of inflation [16.7 percent]," he said, calling the permission to invest maternity capital in mortgage payments "a hopeless decision."

According to Smirnov, it is decisions such as these that the officials are counting on, giving the example of plans being considered by the Ministry of Finance to avoid indexing pensions to the rate of inflation: "The State Duma has come up with an initiative not to pay pensions to working pensioners whose annual income is above one million rubles [$18,500]," he warned.

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 #4
www.rt.com
June 4, 2015
Ruble slides on looming OPEC output decision, Donbass fighting

The beginning of the trading day on the Moscow Exchange saw the ruble tumbling, trading at 55.1 against the dollar and 62.6 against the euro - its lowest levels since April 7.

Falling oil and renewed shelling in Donbass are the key factors behind the ruble's slide, experts say.

"The news about resumed fighting influenced [the ruble - Ed.] perhaps even more," Oleg Kuzmin, chief economist for Russia and the CIS at Moscow-based Renaissance Capital, told RBC. "This day reminded the players that the recent lack of news from Ukraine does not mean that the situation is resolved."

The ruble has lost more than 4 percent this week as OPEC member states are expected to keep oil output quota unchanged - at 30 million barrels a day - at a landmark meeting Friday. Brent crude is trading at $64.19 per barrel, nearly 3 percent less than two days ago.

The value of the euro is rising amid growing expectations that Greece will soon put an end to five months of talks and capitulate to its international creditors over its multibillion euro debt. Greece and the troika of international lenders, the IMF, the ECB and the European Commission, expect to reach a debt agreement within days, if not hours, French President Francois Hollande said Wednesday.

Ruble roller-coaster

The Russian currency lost about a half of its value against the dollar in 2014, with the sharp drop in crude prices and Western sanctions being the key factors.

In an attempt to stop the slump, the Central Bank decided to free-float the ruble by abolishing the dual currency soft peg in November.

The decision didn't have an immediate effect, as the ruble remained very volatile till the end of 2014. On December 16, the ruble hit rock bottom, losing more than 20 percent, with one dollar buying 80 rubles.

Last week, German Gref, the CEO of Sberbank, Russia's largest bank, said the events that resulted in a record-high $6 billion bank run were a planned attack on Russia.

This year has seen ruble becoming the world's best performing currency, but this fortnight's trend could see the end of the ruble's remarkable surge.

The Central Bank has recently renewed its currency buying, saying it was trying to restore Russian international reserves that have shrunk by a quarter in 12 months to stand at $360.5 billion.

Russia's monetary authorities and experts agree that the ruble has become less dependent on oil fluctuations. Last week Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov said the country has gotten rid of the excessive dependence on oil known as Dutch disease.

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 #5
Business New Europe
www.bne.eu
June 4, 2015
Russians against Kremlin spending money on Crimea or World Cup
Henry Kirby in London
[Charts here http://www.bne.eu/content/story/bnechart-russians-against-kremlin-spending-money-crimea-or-world-cup]

An overwhelming majority of Russians are against state money for health and education being redirected toward other areas of the economy, according to a recent poll by the Levada Center.

In the wake of announcements that Russia's revised 2015 budget will increase defence spending at the expense of healthcare and education, poll respondents were asked which areas they would support healthcare and education money being directed at.

As the bne:Chart shows, 60% of respondents were against funds benefitting any other areas at the expense of healthcare and education. Just 16% of respondents were in favour of such funds going towards the development of Crimea, the Ukrainian province that was annexed by Russia in 2014, while 11% wanted to see the Far East region benefit.

Following the unexpected fall in oil prices last year, the Kremlin has had to drastically revise its original 2015 budget, which assumed $100-per-barrel oil. Since then, oil has fallen to $65 per barrel at the time of writing after hitting a low of $53 in January, inflation has hit double digits and the outlook for the economy has been revised from 2% growth to a 2.7% contraction, according to the World Bank.

When asked where they would prefer to see state funds going, a massive 67% of respondents said that they would like to see more of the budget allocated to raising the general standard of living of the population, with 55% specifying health services and 26% specifying education, as the second bne:Chart shows.

Support for state funds financing the 2018 World Cup was also very low among those surveyed, with only 1 in 20 respondents supporting state money going towards hosting the tournament, which is set to cost Russia just shy of $8bn of state and regional budget funds.

 #6
Reuters
June 4, 2015
Economy weighs on Russia World Cup plans amid FIFA scandal
BY JACK STUBBS

President Vladimir Putin is still likely to host the World Cup in 2018 despite an FBI investigation into Russia's winning bid but his hopes of staging a tournament that impresses his critics are fading.

Not only is the event mired in scandal because of corruption allegations hanging over FIFA, soccer's governing body, but the Russian government is being forced by an economic crisis to trim spending on its preparations.

Putin will do all he can to ensure the finals are not taken away from Russia - and to boost his own image as well as his country's - especially as a presidential election is due in 2018. But even he has been forced to lower his sights.

"The economic downturn has greatly dented (Russia's ambitions)," said Chris Weafer, senior partner at consulting firm Macro Advisory. "Even before the FIFA scandal, there was a scaling back of the original elaborate plans."

Russia won the right to host the finals in 2010 with a bid promising to overhaul the transport system, build state-of-the-art sport facilities and put several regional cities on the map.

It expects to spend more than 660 billion rubles ($12 billion) on preparations including building six new stadiums, hotels, training grounds and health facilities.

Costly airport renovations and high-speed rail links are also needed to ease travel between the 11 host cities, the most distant of which, Yekaterinburg, is almost 2,000 km (1,250 miles) from Moscow.

But the economy has been hit by Western economic sanctions over Russia's role in the Ukraine crisis, a fall in the price of oil - the country's main export commodity - and the ruble's sharp decline against the U.S. dollar in the past year.

"IMAGE PROJECT"

Last week the government reduced planned spending on the World Cup by 3.5 billion rubles, the latest in a series of cuts made as the economy flags.

Since the start of 2015, the World Cup organizers have axed plans to build 25 hotels, cut the number of training grounds in each host city from four to three and reduced the capacity of some of the venues to save on building costs.

Moscow's Luzhniki stadium, which will stage the opening match and the final a month later, will be able to seat 81,000, down from the 89,000 originally billed.

"This World Cup is an image project for Putin. He really has something to prove here," a source close to the organizing committee said.

But he added: "The approach to this World Cup now is to do what was promised, with no frills, and nothing more."

Michal Karas, editor-in-chief of website Stadium Database, said many high-tech features included in designs for Russia's new stadiums have been scrapped as the weak rouble made imports more expensive.

"The biggest issue is ordering materials from abroad," he said. "But the stadiums were designed by Western companies so in most cases they need advanced materials from Europe."

Building materials are now being sourced locally from Russian providers because of the ruble's decline, which Sports Minister Vitaly Mutko said could push up construction costs by 30-40 percent.

Despite the cuts, stadium construction is largely on track and officials expect to meet FIFA's deadline for hosting another international tournament, the Confederations Cup, in mid-2017.

Of the stadiums being built or updated, three are already complete and work has begun at eight more. Builders are due to break ground at the last one, in the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad on the Baltic Sea, in July.

WATCHING SPENDING

"A more disturbing issue is the price tag," said Karas, adding that there were concerns that corruption could inflate costs by as much as 50 percent.

The Winter Olympics in Sochi last year put the spotlight on Russia's problems with corruption and cronyism, as well as the Kremlin's record on democracy and human rights, prompting many Western leaders to skip the event.

The estimated cost of the Sochi games soared above $50 billion, much more than had been planned. Such costs would be harder for the Russian economy to withstand now - the Sochi Games were held before the Ukraine crisis and the economic downturn.

The resignation of Sepp Blatter as FIFA president this week deprived Moscow of a potentially vital ally if pressure grows for Russia to be stripped of the World Cup.

But Russia has denied wrongdoing in its bid and is not widely expected to lose the right to host the finals, despite investigations by both the FBI and Swiss prosecutors.

"There is no risk to Russia hosting the World Cup," Mutko was quoted as saying by Russia's RIA news agency.

Putin has said nothing in public about this week's moves, though he defended Blatter after he was re-elected for a fifth term as FIFA chief last week and accused the United States of meddling outside its jurisdiction. {ID:nL5N0YJ20J]

Russian officials are portraying things as business as usual with FIFA and say the World Cup preparations continue apace. Experts say a World Cup boycott by other nations is unlikely.
($1 = 55.0750 rubles)

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 #7
Carnegie Moscow Center
June 4, 2015
2016 Elections and the Future of the Russian Liberal Project
By Tatiana Stanovaya
Tatiana Stanovaya - Head of the Analytics Department, Center for Political Technologies

Russia will hold parliamentary elections in 2016. The Kremlin views this as a period of increased political turbu-lence, one it hopes to speed through with as few bumps on the road as possible. The opposition sees elections as a narrow window of opportunity it can use to make political inroads. What can the liberal opposition hope for this time, and will it be able to consolidate power enough to stand up to the regime?

WHO IS OUT?

Strategy in the 2016 elections will be closely determined by the format of political participation and by the resources available to the opposition when campaign season begins. Prominent opposition leader Alexei Navalny, who in late April announced that he would form a coalition with former Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, said he aimed to create a faction in the Duma (Russia's lower house of parliament) that would represent those voters who cast their ballots for him in the 2013 Moscow mayoral election-namely, the progressive middle class, the intelligentsia, and the liberal segment of society.

Today, this goal appears to be clearly unattainable. Protests have ebbed and the Kremlin has reasserted its strategy of maximizing control over society.  The authorities are convinced that President Vladimir Putin's approval ratings are off the chart, which makes the decision to bar Navalny from participating in elections a "truly democratic" choice.

Navalny is the key character in this campaign. Public opinion polls conducted in 2011 and 2012 proved him to be the most popular and recognizable leader of the protest movement. His ability to draw 27 percent of the vote in the Mos-cow mayoral election despite difficult conditions makes him a top-tier politician. Navalny not only demonstrated that he has electoral resources-he was also the only leader to succeed with a specifically anti-Putin stance. No other second or third-tier political players can compete with him.

In Russia's current, unchanging state, the most likely scenario is that Alexei Navalny will be unable to participate in the elections in any capacity (he can't be on the ballot because of two suspended sentences he is already serving). This makes the Justice Ministry's decision to annul the registration of his Party of Progress a "logical" step. The Kremlin doubtless perceives Navalny as a threat in the medium and the long term, and therefore is taking a political rather than a legal stance in its standoff with him. It logically follows that no registered candidate will be able to compete for a seat in the Duma if he or she is affiliated with Navalny.

That is why any discussion about which party should be chosen for the opposition to run in parliamentary elections is meaningless. So far, only two registered parties are prepared to take on that role: the Republican Party of Russia-People's Freedom Party (RPR-PARNAS, led by Mikhail Kasyanov and Ilya Yashin), and the former economy min-ister Andrei Nechayev's Civil Initiative. But neither of these parties can claim to represent the opposition-minded middle class without Navalny.

The Kremlin sees participation in elections as a means of bolstering awareness and shaping an alternative, one which may not be very noticeable on the razed political playing field of 2016, but which could manifest itself in the long term when the stability of the current regime is less predictable. Access to the elections allows contenders to hone political skills, train campaign staff, and gain vital experience. Alexei Navalny was very successful at this in the Moscow mayoral elections, but it cost him the opportunity to participate in any future campaigns. There is little doubt that Putin, who most likely personally signs off on any decisions relating to Navalny, is genuinely convinced that the U.S. State Department is backing him as part of an effort to undermine the Russian people's confidence in their government by any means possible. The question is also not about whether Navalny may win votes, because Putin isn't afraid of that. The main threat for the Russian president is that Navalny could gain or expand support from major players within the Kremlin or within the Russian business community. Alfa Group's interests in Navalny scares the Kremlin more than 27 percent of the vote.

WHO IS IN?

Nonetheless, the Kremlin will look for alternative options which it can use to distract the liberal, anti-Putin segments of society. The first group is made up of the 1990s-era liberals that, unlike Navalny, the Kremlin views as small fry. Whereas Navalny is a politician worthy specific attention, 1990s liberals are the inconsequential background noise of the non-systemic opposition. In fact, Navalny himself has a similar attitude toward them-not because he's arrogant, but because he has so much more political potential. Ultimately, the question of whether or not this group participates in the 2016 elections is meaningless when it comes to the future parliament, unless the Kremlin risks allowing the 1990s liberals to run in an informal alliance with Navalny in order to discredit them completely. The latter scenario significantly increases the risks of strong-arm measures against Navalny himself, who could end up with an actual prison sentence. At the very least, nobody will put up with his ubiquitous promotional campaign booths on the street anymore.

The second group that will likely be allowed to participate in the 2016 elections is comprised of  "constructive liber-als," those who are compatible with the Putin regime. First and foremost this is former finance minister Alexei Kudrin, who once aspired to be an arbiter between the Kremlin and the protest movement. Kudrin can be a conven-ient sparring partner. The liberal elite and the business community trust him, but he has fairly limited potential at the polls-it was the so-called "economic bloc" of the early 2000s government that was among the least popular. Most importantly, Kudrin himself doesn't claim to be a real alternative to Putin. His participation in politics extends only as far as competing programs that are already under consideration by the government from the All-Russia People's Front (a party launched by Putin to present an ostensible alternative to the pro-Kremlin United Russia), professional communities, official political parties, and moderate liberals. Here the only questions are ones about organization: will the Kremlin go with some sort of Union of Rights Forces (SPS) 3.0? The first version lost the 2003 elections in the wake of growing anti-oligarch sentiment and the start of the Yukos oil company's demise. The party was then led by Russian businessman Mikhail Prokhorov, who never succeeded as a politician. Kudrin would be an adequate candidate to lead just such a party.

However the 2016 elections do play out, the regime can use all administrative resources and forceful measures pos-sible to ensure that the ballot list is to its liking. If for some reason RPR-PARNAS's registration is rescinded, there won't be any 100,000-strong crowds protesting in the streets. If the non-systemic opposition understands (as it does) that its battle for a place of its own in the Duma is little more than a political stage piece, what is the real objective of coalition-building? Who can unite with whom, why or why not?

If the Kremlin pushes the real opposition out of the political system, making it unable to compete within the political framework proscribed in the constitution, the non-systemic opposition will also be forced to accept these rules of the game. In practice, we could see the emergence of a political alternative to Putin's platform-a liberal project that has existed de facto for a long time, but which always lacked the right medium. The distinct aspect of this project is that all players with any chance of electoral success are already embedded in the pro-Putin regime. The fight for recognition and votes under the current circumstances is therefore not a means of garnering seats in the Duma, but rather an intermediate step toward amassing social and political resources that can be transformed into tangible political dividends only when the Kremlin loses its ability to maintain the current political system.

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#8
Russia's pro-Kremlin movement fears future polls may be used as triggers for protest

MOSCOW, June 4. /TASS/. Activists of the Anti-Maidan movement believe Russian opposition forces may seize the opportunity of September 2015 regional elections and future parliamentary and presidential polls to mount a "color revolution" in Russia.

The warning comes from a leader in a movement set up to oppose changes of political regime through street protest, named after upheavals that forced former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych from power in Kiev.

To prevent this, the movement will prepare its observers to the elections, Nikolay Starikov told reporters on Thursday. He said "the center of gravity" in the protest movement was now shifting from Moscow to regional centers.

"Pro-Western forces have chosen Novosibirsk [Siberia], Kaluga [central Russia] and Kostroma [central Russia]," he said. These are the regions where candidates from the opposition coalition RPR-Parnas and the Party of Progress of opposition leader Alexey Navalny plan to stand in elections.

Starikov, co-chairman of the Great Fatherland Party, also noted that Western diplomats, notably from the US, had recently been frequenting regions in the Urals and Siberia.

He added that apart from this year's elections, opposition forces looked to Duma elections in 2016 and the 2018 presidential campaign as possible triggers for a color revolution.

"We can already now forecast with a certain degree of certainty the activity they may transform into certain 'orange technologies'. Western media and some civic activists and oppositionists inside the country state in advance that the elections will certainly be rigged," Starikov added.

"Then independent observers at polling stations confirm this. After that, certain media content is created to force people onto the streets and a coup takes place. We will be preparing observers to oppose this," he said.

Elections to legislative assemblies will be held in the Novosibirsk, Kaluga and Kostroma regions on September 13.
 

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#9
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
June 1, 2015
Russian Muslims urged to respect the law and state
The ruling body for Muslims in Russia, the Council of Mutfis of Russia, is urging its followers to be loyal to the state. A new social doctrine adopted by Russia's top Islamic clerics defines the place and role of Muslims in the country's life within both religious and secular laws. Patriotism and loyalty are at the heart of the new doctrine.
Oleg Yegorov, special to RBTH
 
A number of experts, from the council as well leading theologians, religious scholars and academics, have drafted the new doctrine, adopted by the Council of Muftis of Russia on May 27. It combines recommendations to Muslims on a wide range of issues, from attitudes to the state to everyday matters. The provisions of the doctrine are supported both by Muslim sources, the Koran and Sunnahs (teachings and practices of the Islamic prophet Muhammad) and by Russia's secular laws.

The doctrine effectively outlines the views of Muslim theologians that are loyal to the current authorities on what a true Muslim should be like.

Firstly, a true believer must be a patriot. "Love for one's motherland is not only acceptable but is essential from the point of view of teachings of Islam," the doctrine says. This covers not only patriotic sentiments but also compliance with the law. It is prescribed that a Muslim assumes obligations of the social contract envisaged in the constitution. A Muslim should also be a peace-loving person: the doctrine says that every effort should be made to avoid war as a form of jihad. A military jihad can be carried out only if ordered by a lawful ruler.
 
Radical threat

This is not the first social doctrine to be adopted by Russian Muslim scholars. The previous one was published in 2001. In an interview with RBTH, one of the contributors to the 2015 doctrine, Damir Khayretdinov, the vice-chancellor of the Moscow Islamic Institute, explained: "Since the adoption of the first doctrine, the situation has changed. In Russia it has stabilized (meaning the end of hostilities in the North Caucasus - RBTH), whereas for the rest of the world, unfortunately, the opposite is true."

Khayretdinov pointed out that many young Muslims, including those from Russia, have become influenced by extremists and some have even travelled to the Middle East and joined terrorist groups there. One of the main tasks of the new doctrine is to keep the young generation within traditional Islam, he added.

The threat of radicalization of Islam is one of the reasons why the current doctrine deliberately focuses on peace, Khayretdinov said. "The two biggest sections in the doctrine are devoted to Muslims' peaceful co-existence with those of other faiths and the right attitude to jihad and takfir. Takfir is a practice whereby a religious leader declares that a particular state is a godless one and Muslims must fight against it (this practice is one of the fundamental principles of ISIS - RBTH). The doctrine says that takfir should not be applied now."
 
Doctrinal weaknesses

The doctrine will officially come into force in June, after it is signed by the country's three main Muslim organizations (muftiates). Damir Khayretdinov predicts that the Muslim population will respect the document.

Varvara Pakhomenko, an expert in Caucasian affairs and a consultant with the International Crisis Group, told RBTH that the authority of the theologians behind this doctrine is not absolute for all Muslims.

"It is important to remember that, unlike Christianity, Islam does not have the single institution of the church that could say: 'Do this or that'. It goes without saying that the muftiates command respect among a large number of Muslims, but not everywhere. There are many communities, many influential preachers, including radical ones, who are opposed to the muftiates."

Another weakness in the doctrine, according to Pakhomenko, is its focus on "traditional Islam" as a pillar of Russian statehood. Thus supporters of more radical movements are excluded from the dialogue between the authorities and the Muslim community.

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#10
Washington Times
June 3, 2015
Thoughts of jihad, Chechen war keep Russia up all night
By L. Todd Wood
L. Todd Wood, a graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy, flew special operations helicopters supporting SEAL Team 6, Delta Force and others. After leaving the military, he pursed his other passion, finance, and later, writing. The first of his many thrillers is "Currency." Todd is a contributor to Fox Business, Moscow Times, the New York Post, the National Review, Zero Hedge and others, and he is a foreign correspondent for Newsmax TV.

Karma is a funny thing. It tends to bite you when you least expect it or when you can least afford it. This may be happening in Russia - specifically regarding Chechnya, the tiny Islamic region in the Caucasus.

Moscow fought two recent wars with the region. The first was fought incompetently to a draw under Boris Yeltsin. The second saw Russia prevail with overwhelming force. Vladimir Putin rose to power and popularity on the back of the second Chechen conflict. After blaming multiple apartment bombings in Moscow on Chechen terrorists, Mr. Putin brutally and effectively silenced the Chechen opposition. This beside the fact that the post-KGB forces, FSB operatives, were found wiring another apartment building for implosion and blamed it on a "training exercise."

For two decades, since the end of the second Chechen War, Moscow has kept the lid on the festering desire for Chechen independence by relying on strongman Ramzan Kadyrov, son of the late President Akhmad Kadyrov, who has ruled the region with an iron fist, while at the same time enriching himself and his friends.

The problem now is Mr. Kadyrov has built up his own private army that is fiercely loyal to no one but him. Mikhail Khordorkovsky of Open Russia, living in exile in Switzerland after being released from prison by Mr. Putin during the Sochi amnesty, recently released a film about Mr. Kadyrov, alleging he is raping the country by demanding tribute from businesses and citizens alike, in addition to committing brutal human rights offenses against the population. After a man was recently killed in Chechnya by Russian security forces, Mr. Kadyrov was quoted as saying, "I declare to you that if anyone appears on your territory without your knowledge, it doesn't matter whether they're from Moscow or Stavropol, then shoot to kill. People need to reckon with us." Needless to say, that didn't go over very well in the Kremlin, which immediately called the statement "unacceptable," and references to Mr. Kadyrov's statements were deleted from the Chechen media.

Now stage left, enters the Islamic State. Moscow staunchly supports the Assad regime in Syria as a way to combat the Muslim jihadist movement in the Middle East from growing stronger. As ISIS continues to take territory in the face of a weak response from the United States, which conveniently pulled all of its troops out of Iraq, Russia's soft underbelly is exposed. It is only a few hundred miles from the northeastern corner of Iraq, where ISIS currently controls the Iraqi city of Mosul, across Shia Iran and Azerbaijan to the border with Russia. If ISIS can link up with the Islamic separatists movement in the Caucasus region, then Russia would have a real problem on its hands.

But Mr. Kadyrov is loyal to Mr. Putin you say! Mr. Putin calls him his son! But is he? His father, before switching sides and joining the fight against the Sunni warring factions in their desire for independence from Russia, declared jihad against Russia and ordered every Chechen to kill at least 150 Russians when Moscow invaded during the failed first Chechen War. It must keep the Kremlin up at night worrying that Mr. Kadyrov, who could order his forces to kill Russian policemen, could also end up switching sides in a conflict if the opportunity came to secede from the Russian Federation and link up with other jihadis to expand his rule.

The Kremlin is stretched paying for Crimea and supporting the war in East Ukraine. Silencing Chechnya in a third conflict would be a costly endeavor in terms of blood and treasure. Perhaps this is why Moscow leaves Mr. Kadyrov to do as he pleases. Perhaps that is why the money keeps flowing from the federal budget into Mr. Kadyrov's bank accounts. Chechen terrorists can be brutally effective as Russia found out with the September 2004 Beslan school massacre that saw hundreds of children and parents butchered. The conflict in Ukraine would seem like a cake walk in the face of an unruly Chechnya.

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#11
Sputnik
June 4, 2014
Berlin: G7 Format Cannot Last Long, Russia Can Renew Membership

BERLIN (Sputnik) - Earlier in the day, Steinmeier said the G7 needed Russia to resolve existing global conflicts, including those in Ukraine, Syria, Iraq and Libya.

"I believe it's not in our interests to retain the G7 format over a long period of time. The change [of the G8 to the G7] was in line with Russia's breach of international law. I hope that Russia will find a way back into the 'group of seven,'" Steinmeier said at a press conference.

In 2014, the G8 format became G7 after Russia was suspended from the group by the other seven member nations over Crimea's reunification with Russia and allegations over Moscow's involvement in the Ukrainian internal conflict, repeatedly denied by Moscow.

Leaders of the G7, comprising the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy and Japan, agreed to hold a June 2014 summit in Brussels instead of the originally planned Russian city of Sochi. The 41st G7 summit is scheduled to take place in the Bavarian Elmau Castle, outside Munich, on June 7-8, 2015. Russia did not receive an invitation to participate in the meeting of the world's largest economies.
According to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Russia cannot be excluded from the G8 because the group is an informal club bringing together world leaders to discuss issues of mutual interest.

German Development Minister Gerd Mueller said Thursday that Russia's return to the G7 depended on the implementation of the Minsk peace deal on the Ukrainian crisis.

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 #12
Reuters
June 4, 2015
Russia Not an Immediate Threat to NATO States, Stoltenberg Says

OSLO - Russia poses no immediate threat to NATO countries and the military alliance still hopes bilateral relations will improve, its Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said on Thursday.

Russia had been willing to use force to change borders in Europe, he said during a visit to his native Norway, pointing to Crimea, east Ukraine and Georgia as examples.

"What we see is more unpredictability, more insecurity, more unrest... (But) I believe we don't see any immediate threat against any NATO country from the east," he told NRK public radio.

NATO has repeatedly criticized Moscow's involvement in the Ukraine conflict and demanded it fully endorse a ceasefire agreement there. Russia denies providing troops or arms to support separatists rebels in eastern Ukraine.

The Ukraine conflict has in particular unnerved Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, the only parts of the former Soviet Union that have joined NATO.

The Baltic states are small and isolated from the rest of the European Union, and have Russian-speaking minorities which President Vladimir Putin said last year gives Moscow the right to intervene with military force.

Stoltenberg, a former Norwegian prime minister, said he hoped relations between the alliance and Russia could improve.

"Our goal is still cooperation with Russia... That serves NATO and it serves Russia," he said.

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 #13
Reuters
June 3, 2015
U.S. oil exports will not wean allies from Russian crude -memo
BY TIMOTHY GARDNER

Lifting the ban on U.S. oil exports would do little to help Eastern European countries decrease their reliance on Russian energy, a policy research arm of Congress said in a memo to U.S. lawmakers seen by Reuters on Wednesday.

Lawmakers in favor of axing the 40-year-old U.S. crude oil ban are increasingly using the argument the move would bring stability to allies in Europe and Asia by adding a steady alternative supply to markets that currently rely heavily on Russian oil.

Several Republican U.S. presidential candidates have also called for using crude oil exports as a strategic foreign policy weapon against Russia and Iran.

However, oil refineries in countries such as Poland and Hungary are configured to run mostly on Russian medium sour oil and would likely have to invest in costly equipment to run surplus U.S. light sweet oil, said the memo by Congressional Research Service.
 
"This in turn may result in reducing the attractiveness to U.S. producers to export crude oil to the region," the CRS said.

The memo, sent to Congressional offices on May 29, emerged on the same day that Senator John Cornyn, the Senate's No. 2 Republican, announced amendments to the annual defense spending bill that would allow crude and natural gas exports to allies whose security would improve if they had access to U.S. energy. It is uncertain whether those amendments will be included in the final bill.

To the extent the United States exported a wide range of crude oils, including medium heavy oils, it could displace some Russian oil, the memo said.

Many countries in Eastern Europe, however, would need to build pipelines from ports to refineries, as well as other infrastructure to handle U.S. crude, the CRS said. In addition, Russia's state-controlled companies could try to keep market share by lowering the price of crude to Eastern Europe should waves of U.S. oil suddenly be available.

"The financial justification for delivering U.S. crude oil to Eastern Europe may or may not exist over time," the memo said.

Bills introduced in the House of Representatives and the Senate this year to lift the oil ban have gained sponsors recently, but still face uphill battles to get enough support to pass.

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#14
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
June 3, 2015
Pivotal questions about Russia's China pivot
While the continued upswing in Russian-Chinese relations testifies to a higher quality of bilateral interaction, it also raises questions about the potential challenges Russia might face in developing the partnership.
By Ksenia Zubacheva

With Russia still finding itself alienated from partners in the West, it only makes sense that the nation is taking steps to strengthen and deepen its alliance with China. Tied together by common geopolitical and economic goals, Russian and Chinese policy makers are attempting to ensure a long-standing relationship by developing trade, investment, energy, education and scientific ties.

This was highlighted most recently by the arrival of the Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi in Moscow to meet with his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, on June 3. The two discussed a number of bilateral and multilateral issues, as well as preparations for the upcoming BRICS and SCO summit in Ufa, Russia.

In addition, experts at the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) recently hosted an international conference in Moscow at the end of May to discuss the future of the Russia-China relationship: "Russia and China: A New Partnership in a Changing World."

At the conference, experts agreed that there are a number of mutually beneficial opportunities available for both Russia and China. However, there are also doubts about what kinds of risks such a rapprochement might lead to: Will this be an alliance of equals or will Russia have to adapt to China's interests? Should the West really treat this partnership as a long-term project that might potentially challenge the U.S. leadership?

Below, Russia Direct interviews several experts from Russia, China and the U.S. to get their take on the current status of the Russia-China partnership.

Robert Legvold, Professor Emeritus, Department of Political Science and the Harriman Institute, Columbia University

For years, China had emerged as a genuinely important factor in Soviet and Russian foreign policy, but never as a critical strategic front. Now, China represents a primary axis of Russian policy - a critical ally, providing a counter-balance and escape from the isolation and punishment the Western powers seek to impose on Russia.

Three factors, however, set boundaries to the partnership.

First, China has no intention of privileging its relationship with Russia over that of the U.S., and that will only change if the Washington and Beijing fail to manage the rising tensions in their relationship and it turns into a full-scale strategic rivalry.

Second, Russia's equally imperative need to "pivot" to the Asia-Pacific region constantly competes with the priority that Russia assigns to its relationship with China and the felt need to avoid offending China on any of the issues where China's actions worry others in the region. Russia has not, and apparently will not soon, resolve the tension between maintaining close ties with China for global strategic reasons and engaging extensively in the integrative institutions and processes at the heart of Asia-Pacific's international economic agenda.

And, third, the closer Russia draws to China, the more it relies on China as critical ballast for its foreign policy, the more it will emerge as the junior partner in the relationship. That is simply a function of the discrepancy in the power between the two and China's greater room for maneuver in a global setting where Russia has narrowed its options.

All that said, even before the current crisis in Russia-West relations, the Sino-Russian relationship, beginning with Gorbachev's opening in 1989 and then Yeltsin's shift in 1993, had reached a point better than any other in more than 150 years. Even before the Ukrainian crisis, the parallelism in the two countries' foreign policy, the growing economic and energy cooperation, and the similarity in their approach to international politics and the challenges it poses created the basis for a genuine partnership.

It would have been in Russia's interest for that partnership to be matched with a productive partnership with the OECD countries - for that is from where Russia could hope to attract the resources for the modernization of the country. That option having been sacrificed, China becomes all the more crucial to Russia, and Xi Jinping's recent triumphal visit to Moscow for the World War II anniversary underscores the point.

The symbolism, however, is accompanied by significant practical steps toward cooperation, not only on energy, on cyber security, and, in particular, in reconciling Russia's Eurasian Economic Union project with at least a significant part of China's Silk Road Economic Belt project.  Even if all of this ends up being more on China's terms than Russia's, in present circumstances Moscow will take it. How China will look to Russia twenty years from now and what the nature of the relationship will be is a distant place - for now far, far away.

Feng Yujun, Professor and Director, Institute of Russian Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations

I think there are more opportunities than risks, especially due to the development of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Silk Road initiative. Russian President Vladimir Putin once said that Russia wants to become a bridge between Europe and Eastern Asia. If we can cooperate successfully within these projects, then we will see positive results in joint infrastructure projects, bilateral investment activity and other areas.

Although the crisis in Ukraine has not yet been settled, German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that we should develop cooperative links between the EU and the EEU. Over the long term, it is very important.

I disagree with those saying that Russia will have a minor role in the Russia-China alliance. We are equal partners. There never were and won't be a separation between 'big' and 'little' partners. This is Cold War thinking that is not suitable to the relationship between Russia and China.

Andrey Kortunov, General Director of Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC)

The risks for Russia do exist, but they are connected not with Russia-China bilateral interaction, but rather with Russian economic development dynamics. If Russia doesn't modernize and diversify its economy, increase its innovation potential, the ties with China will remain one-sided: Russia will export raw materials, energy resources, military equipment and, in return, receive consumer goods, car manufacturing products and so on. In order to avoid that and proceed to more complex cooperation projects, we need to restructure our economy.

In some areas, Russia could use China's help and experience, especially in infrastructure and transport projects, the development of the Asian region of Russia, and the creation of special economic zones that are so actively experimented with in China. There are plenty of things that we could take over from our Chinese partners.

Regarding the implications of the Russia-China partnership for the West, there are two major areas of concern. First is that such a geopolitical alliance will hamper American leadership in Asia as well as globally. To some extent there are signs of that already happening (Russia and China share the same position on Syria). But I wouldn't overestimate this because on some other issues, for instance on North Korea, Russia and China seem to have the same position as the U.S. Therefore, I don't think such concerns should be taken too seriously.

Another concern that does not seem significant at the moment, but might be important in the future, is that Russia and China undermine the U.S. economic role on the world stage. If Russia steps up its economic growth and China continues growing at the same rates, and if SCO and BRICS multilateral institutions will develop, the U.S. will have to adapt and lose some of its economic power on the world stage.

Zhao Huasheng, Professor and Director, Center for Russia and Central Asia Studies, Center for SCO Studies, Fudan University

[Russia and China] don't pose any threat to each other and in the future will only continue to support each other politically. Chinese public opinion and mass media treat Russia very positively, which was never the case before. The further development of our relationship should be made on the basis of the current positive atmosphere. We need to improve and strengthen the spirit of our political cooperation. Indeed, we need to address the gaps and inertia formed in the period from the 1960s to the 1980s. For instance, we are used to thinking in terms of 'big' and 'little' brother, those who lead and those who follow. We need to get rid of that thinking.

Some say that China is too strong, while Russia is too weak. The truth is that the period when Russia was weakest - in the 1990s - has passed. And even during those times China treated Russia with respect and fairness. As opposed to those thinking that there is a problem with re-orienting our ties from political and security cooperation to the economy, it won't be an issue. If we strengthen our economic ties while maintaining our interaction in the field of politics and security, it will only make our relations stronger. Of course, the closer our economic ties are, the more difficulties and conflicts we'll have to endure, but it's not a problem - this is normal and can be solved through negotiations.

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 #15
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
June 2, 2015
Why the TPP free trade pact does not make sense for Russia
Free trade agreements like Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) seem designed to marginalize or isolate Russia in the global economy. But there is another key reason why Russia will distance itself from TPP.
By Raymond Taras
Raymond Taras is a visiting scholar at the School of Global Studies, Sussex University, and a professor of Political Science at Tulane University's School of Liberal Arts.

The recent history of free trade negotiations has been characterized by secrecy, subterfuge and procedural chicanery. Mistrust has only increased as a result of the stumbling path being followed by the U.S. Congress to invest President Barack Obama with fast track authority to conclude the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). How mega-trade agreements are hammered out -behind closed doors by vested interests - is controversial, to say the least.

Nobel Prize laureate Joseph Stiglitz noted in the New York Times earlier this year that the Office of the United States Trade Representative negotiates these agreements, supposedly on behalf of the American people. In practice, he concluded, the trade representative's office is inescapably linked to large corporations and their interests.

Restricting intellectual property rights, which are frequently at the center of controversies over free trade, represents more than a war on pirated music and video downloads. In the case of TPP, for instance, Stiglitz suggests that new "anti-piracy" rules could help big pharmaceutical companies increase their monopoly profits on brand-name drugs. He worries that TPP will "trade away our health."

According to Stiglitz, these anti-piracy laws would also limit competition from generic drug manufacturers, not allow real price competition in any of the 12 TPP signatory countries, and have the knock-on effect of putting pressure on producers of pharmaceuticals in other countries such as India. The health of billions of people may be affected by a TPP agreement.

This may be an over-the-top conclusion, but there's an important truth in there. Pharmaceuticals are just one piece in a much bigger puzzle affecting citizens everywhere. Free trade deals are the basis of greater socio-economic inequalities as they ruthlessly transform the world into haves and have-nots.

This year the UK-based charity Oxfam reports that by 2016 the combined wealth of the richest 1 percent will be greater than that of the other 99 percent of the world's population. A growing proportion of the 99 percent is now forced into conditions of what can only be called slavery.

It is as if the secret, inscrutable, and hurried free trade pacts among already wealthy countries is a necessity to ensure that such already outrageous levels of economic inequality will only increase further.

Free trade negotiations may be so secretive because they are polarizing and acrimonious. But under a winner-takes-all system, the principle of democratic centralism prevails: a defeated minority must completely submit to the will of the victorious majority.

The obsession with secrecy is troubling because it also raises the question: Whose good is being promoted? Generally free trade pacts do little for most people, suggests Paul Krugman, another Nobel-Prize winning U.S. economist. In a recentcolumn, he argues that the importance of trade policy is exaggerated.

One reason is that "this reflects globaloney: talking about international trade sounds glamorous and forward-thinking, so everyone wants to make that the centerpiece of their remarks."

Krugman continues: "Comparative advantage says 'yay free trade,' but also suggests that once trade is already fairly open, the gains from opening it further are small. But because economists want to keep shouting yay free trade, they look for reasons why those gains might be larger."

He estimates that "hyperglobalization - the expansion of world trade to unprecedented levels since 1990" - has added 5 percent to world incomes. But a host of technological developments from containerization to the Internet accounts for much of this. A more accurate figure might be the European Commission's estimate of the effect of the Single Market Act: It added just 1.8 percent to real incomes.

Such a modest level of growth is not what the richest 1 percent has been recording since the end of the bipolar world, nor is it a rate they aspire to in the future.

For Russia, free trade agreements like TPP seem designed to marginalize or isolate the country. These accords are sometimes given a political reading in which analogies with hostile military and politic blocs are made. It is a mistake to draw such comparisons.

TPP may indeed have incidental effects on the Russian economy - we can't tell just yet. But it can be argued that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization bringing together Russia, China, and four Central Asian states into economic, political, and security collaboration has greater importance for Russia if free trade were put on the agenda (currently all but China are members of the Eurasian Economic Community). Russia's support for deepening the BRICS structure also offers economic promise.

Russia has many reasons to avoid becoming stigmatized as seeking a return to state socialism or to be cast as an intransigent opponent of the global market economy. "Authoritarian," "backward," and "Oriental" are negative images of Russia propagated in much of the West. Russia's leaders would be wise not to rant about Western-forged trade pacts.

Powerful economic actors in Russia itself might not allow this anyway. But Russia can capture much-needed moral high ground, and harness the economic wisdom of Nobel Prize economists, by distancing itself from the "globaloney" hype around TPP. It is the societies of the signatory states that need to battle against its ingrained injustices.

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 #16
Wall Street Journal
June 4, 2015
U.S. Business Consultant Jailed in Russia
Scott Blacklin has been held in Nizhny Novgorod since May 20, for alleged visa violation
By ALAN CULLISON

MOSCOW-Russia jailed a prominent U.S. business consultant for two weeks for an alleged visa violation, the latest sign that a chill in relations could damp trade between the two countries.

Scott Blacklin, a former president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in Russia, has been held in the provincial city of Nizhny Novgorod since May 20. The U.S. raised the issue of his detention "several times at senior levels" in Moscow and in Washington, an official at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow said, arguing that he violated no laws.

Russian officials said Mr. Blacklin will remain in custody until Friday, when he will be deported. He was also fined 5,000 rubles-about $93. A provincial court found that Mr. Blacklin's activities in Russia-he delivered a lecture at a university-were incompatible with his visa.

Mr. Blacklin's travails come as Moscow has toughened its stance toward U.S. citizens who allegedly violate terms of their stay in Russia. When another U.S. citizen last month was late in fulfilling a requirement to register his whereabouts with authorities in St. Petersburg, he was fined and deported.

U.S. officials say Mr. Blacklin appears to have fallen afoul of the vagaries of Russia's bureaucracy, whose branches can give confusing or contradictory information on how to travel legally. Russia's Foreign Ministry issued him a business visa that it said allowed him to lecture at the university, the U.S. Embassy said. Russia's migration service disagreed, however, and arrested him in Nizhny Novgorod. The migration service hasn't specified what was wrong. He has been kept in a special holding facility for foreigners since then, Russian officials say.

Russia's foreign ministry declined to comment on the case.

Mr. Blacklin was deported from Russia once before, last year, the U.S. embassy said, for lecturing at a university while traveling on a tourist visa, activity that was also an alleged violation.

This time, Mr. Blacklin thought he had checked his boxes by explaining his travel plans to the Russian embassy in Washington, D.C. He was advised to travel on a business visa, an official at the U.S. embassy in Moscow said.

"In short, he made every effort to respect Russian visa law and entered Russia and lectured in Moscow with the full knowledge and agreement of the Russian government," a U.S. embassy official said. "We strongly object to his being targeted for arrest after he arrived in Nizhny Novgorod and to the extended and unreasonable length of his detention."

Mr. Blacklin, who runs his own consulting firm, Blacklin Associates, LLC, has worked for 35 years in international business development, mostly in Russia, according to his company's website.

He served as head of the American Chamber of Commerce in Russia from 1997 until 2001.

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 #17
New York Times
June 4, 2015
Pentagon Seeks Easing of Ban on Russian Rockets for U.S. Space Missions
By STEVEN LEE MYERS

WASHINGTON - After Russia annexed Crimea last year, Congress passed legislation that forced the Pentagon to stop buying Russian rocket engines that have been used since 2000 to help launch American military and intelligence satellites into space.

Now, that simple act of punishment is proving difficult to keep in place.

Only five months after the ban became law, the Pentagon is pressing Congress to ease it.

The Pentagon says that additional Russian engines will be needed for at least a few more years to ensure access to space for the country's most delicate defense and intelligence technology.

The retreat has angered Russia's fiercest critics in Congress, including Senator John McCain, Republican of Arizona and chairman of the Armed Services Committee. He said that NPO Energomash, the Russian company that makes the rockets and has close ties to President Vladimir V. Putin, stood to make $300 million from sales that would otherwise come to an end.

"I don't know what the Pentagon's position can be, except for them and the Obama administration trying to placate Putin," Representative Duncan Hunter, Republican of California and a member of the House Armed Services Committee, said. He predicted that the legislative fight would intensify in the months ahead.

"Can you imagine the space race using Russian rockets?" he said.

The Pentagon's position, however, has powerful support from the nation's intelligence chief and two of the most influential defense contractors, Boeing and Lockheed Martin. And it appears to be prevailing, even as the United States has imposed a raft of financial and travel sanctions against Russian officials, including those overseeing that country's defense industry, in order to deter further aggression by Mr. Putin in Ukraine.

In a letter to senior lawmakers dated May 11, the secretary of defense, Ashton B. Carter, and the director of national intelligence, James R. Clapper Jr., said the Pentagon would face "significant challenges" to ensuring access to space for the most delicate military and intelligence missions if the ban on the Russian engines remained in place.

When the House passed its annual defense authorization bill, it approved language that would ease the ban. The Senate Armed Services Committee recommended a compromise that would allow the company that uses the Russian rockets, a joint venture of Boeing and Lockheed Martin called the United Launch Alliance, to continue to bid for additional launches through at least the rest of this decade.

The reliance on Russian rockets for national security missions - the ones that place top-secret surveillance and communications satellites in orbit - is a remnant of the "peace dividend" that followed the Cold War. That era has now given way to one of political and military provocation.

Energomash, the Russian company that makes the rocket engines, emerged from the old Soviet space program and formed a partnership with Lockheed Martin in the early 1990s to develop new technologies. It was a time when the United States sought to foster cooperation in space, in part to discourage the proliferation of rocket technology to countries that American officials viewed warily.

Along with Lockheed Martin and Pratt & Whitney, Energomash adapted the RD-180 rocket engine for use in the Atlas series of rockets now made by the Lockheed Martin-Boeing alliance. The engine has been used in 54 launches of the latest version, the Atlas V, for commercial, NASA and military missions. In a statement, the United Launch Alliance called the RD-180 "a technologically advanced and reliable engine."

The arrangement attracted opposition because of Energomash's majority state ownership and, according to an article by Reuters last year, a minority share tied to one of Mr. Putin's closest friends, the billionaire Yuri V. Kovalchuk. The invasion of Crimea and Russia's support for the armed uprising in eastern Ukraine prompted overwhelming support in Congress last year for ending the use of the RD-180 for military and intelligence missions.

"Certainly we cannot have Vladimir Putin and his cronies profit from the sale of rocket engines," Mr. McCain said at a news conference last month.

The Pentagon and the United Launch Alliance agree on the need for rockets that are made in the United States. In testimony before the Senate in April, the secretary of the Air Force, Deborah Lee James, said the invasion of Crimea "made it abundantly clear to all of us that we have to stop relying on Russian engines."

But she also said that halting any new purchases made after the invasion of Crimea, as the law now requires, could leave the Air Force without a viable engine for the Atlas after 2018.

Ending the reliance on the RD-180 "is not as simple as it appears," said David A. Deptula, a retired Air Force general who runs the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies in Arlington, Va. He said "underinvestment, lack of a clear vision and stifling bureaucracy" had slowed innovation of alternatives for years.

"We must always remember that this nation went to the moon in less than a decade," he wrote in an email.

The debate over the Russian engines has become entangled in an emerging rivalry among the companies vying for the lucrative business of space launches, amounting to $70 billion in contracts for military and intelligence missions alone between now and 2030, according to an estimate cited by the Government Accountability Office.

The United Launch Alliance, formed in 2006, has a monopoly on military and intelligence contracts, but it faces competition from Space Exploration Technologies Corporation, or SpaceX, founded by Elon Musk, the entrepreneur behind PayPal and Tesla. SpaceX has developed its own rocket, called the Falcon 9, which has carried out 18 successful missions for NASA and private companies, including the first private resupply of the International Space Station. After months of review, negotiations and a lawsuit that was settled last year, the Air Force last month certified the Falcon 9 for use in national security missions, ending United Launch Alliance's monopoly.

According to Ms. James, SpaceX can now compete for two launches scheduled this year and seven more planned for the next two years. The Air Force announced this week that it had opened bidding on the first of those, with applications due by June 23.

SpaceX has argued that its rockets can carry out the launches at a lower cost than the two used by the United Launch Alliance, the Atlas V and the Delta IV. In a written statement, Mr. Musk called the certification "an important step toward bringing competition" to national security missions.

The United Launch Alliance has pledged to build a new rocket, called the Vulcan, without using the Russian engine, but its first test is not scheduled until 2019 and its certification is not expected until 2022. In their letter, Mr. Carter and Mr. Clapper said the ban on new acquisitions of the Russian engines would mean that the alliance could soon exhaust its supply of Atlas V rockets, leaving only the more expensive Delta IV, which is being phased out.

The debate now is over how many more missions the United Launch Alliance should be allowed to conduct with the Russian engines. The company has ordered 29 engines, 15 of which are paid for and planned for use. The Pentagon wants the company to be able to use the rest. The House legislation would do that, while the Senate version would allow the alliance to buy more engines only if it wins bids, presumably against SpaceX.

If the ban remains, SpaceX could end up as the sole company able to bid for some launches in the coming years. That would recreate the monopoly that the United Launch Alliance enjoyed and that the Pentagon, SpaceX and others have sought to end. Mr. Carter and Mr. Clapper said they wanted to maintain "an environment where price-based competition is possible."

Critics of the Pentagon's efforts said that with SpaceX's certification, the argument for continuing to use the Russian engine was little more than a concession to Boeing and Lockheed Martin - and one that ultimately would provide benefits to Russia.

"Some of our biggest defense companies are lobbying on behalf of the Russians," Mr. Hunter said. "That's a strange position for the defense industry to have.

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 #18
http://readrussia.com
June 2, 2015
The Easy Quiz to Find out What You Think about Russia
By Mark Adomanis

As I was reading a news story about Alexey Navalny's recent statement that the 1996 presidential election was falsified I couldn't help but think that this was going to infuriate a lot of his usual political allies. Now, purely as a matter of logic there's no reason that you believe both that the Kremlin needs to be overthrown and that Yeltsin cheated. Navalny evidently does believes exactly this. Others undoubtedly do too.

But politics is far too infrequently about logic and far too frequently about tribal loyalties and emotional attachments. Among Western Russia watchers, certainly, there is not very much crossover between the people who recognize that the '96 presidential contest was determined by administrative fiat and the people who are most vituperative in their critiques of Putin's current government.

For the most part people tend to lump their critiques together: they either think the 1990's were a fundamentally positive era in which "progress" was being made OR they think that the whole thing was a con job from the very beginning, democratic trappings on what really amounted to a process of organized theft on a world-historical scale. Even though this specific disagreements shouldn't spill over into other areas, they very frequently do.

There would appear to be two (very lumpy and inexact!) schools of thought about Russia: that the country should either be left to its own devices (as Kennan once said "let the Russians solve their problems in a Russian way") or that Russia needs to be actively taught, aided, and generally assisted by the West.

If you know someone's position on the 96 elections, in other words, you can with some exactitude predict their views about most other questions related to Russia. It's a bit of a simplistic example, but a nonetheless telling one, to consider the divergent views on the Yeltsin era by someone like Michael McFaul (who was and remains remarkably upbeat in his estimation of Russia's "democratic experiment") and someone like Stephen Cohen (who all throughout the 1990's denounced Yeltsin just as passionately as McFaul currently denounces Putin).

I thought it would be helpful (and fun) to lay out a few of the key questions that allow you to predict a person's overall estimation of Russia. You will get some mixing and matching, but depending on how you answer the following questions you are very likely to be part of either what I would call the "Russia realists" or the "liberal hawks." It's not exactly a secret on which side of the fence I fall, but I tried to be as fair as possible in laying out the reasoning and rationale behind the respective positions.

1. Are Putin's poll numbers real?

Some people point to Putin's shockingly high approval ratings (over 85% at last count) as evidence that, whatever his faults, he is grudgingly accepted by Russian society. Others react with contempt to the mere mention of poll numbers, considering them purely artificial constructs of the Kremlin apparatus.

[This question can also be written as "should you trust Russian data"]

2. Who is the opposition?

Some note that the Kremlin's most significant domestic political opposition comes from the huge ranks of nationalists and/or Orthodox chauvinists. Others see the liberal opposition, despite its small size, as the "future" of Russia and suggest that, due to its influence and growing wealth, it will be in the best position to capitalize on any political disturbances.

3. Is Russia's economy just a giant gas station?

Some note that Russia's economy is not terribly competitive by world standards but that it has significant employment (and output) in non-resource sectors such as manufacturing. Others see the entire Russian economy as fundamentally Soviet and its recent dynamist as an accident of high energy prices

4. Were the 1990's good or bad?

Some note that the 1990's saw Russia experience a historically unprecedented economic downturn and that this downturn coincided with a terrifying deterioration in health and social welfare. Others note that the Soviet economy was already at a breaking point and that, given the massive incompetence of central planning, a serious crisis was essentially inevitable.

5. Is Russia a threat to the West?

Some note that even with recent spending increases, Russia's military is a shadow of its former self and that its budget is a tiny fraction of NATO's: there's saber-rattling, but there aren't very many sabers. Others highlight the Kremlin's pioneering of "hybrid warfare," and suggest that, at least militarily speaking, that their apparent weakness is a façade and that the Russians are capable of punching way beyond their weight.

6. Can things get better under the current system?

This might be the most important one of all. Some think that, despite the many problems of the Russian government, its role in society is so much more limited than its Soviet predecessor that some economic and social progress is still possible. Other think that any apparent improvements are, ultimately, of little significant so long as the authoritarian system remains fundamentally unchanged.

There are, of course, other questions that one can ask and the above list is meant to be a lighthearted intellectual exercise, not some kind of interrogatory checklist. But I do think that the list hits at most of the important topics and should give you a pretty healthy sense of where someone stands with regards to a country that is alternately maddening and alluring in almost equal measure.

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 #19
www.rt.com/V Novom Svete
June 3, 2015
Stephen Cohen: A lone media warrior in the cause of Russian-American rapprochement
By Dr Leonid Goldin
This article was originally published in V Novom Svete (VNS) weekly.
http://www.vnovomsvete.com/articles/2015/05/14/zvezdnyy-chas-stivena-koena.html

Regarded in US academic and media circles as "Putin's apologist" and criticized by Democrats and Republicans alike, Prof. Stephen Cohen plays a crucial role in the modern political discourse, where a "You're either with us or against us" mindset reigns.

I was recently invited for a ride-along to Mikhail Freydlin's bookstore in Queens by a friend of mine, a prominent Russian diplomat whose career ended at a high-level position in the UN. We shared the car with a married couple of ex-diplomats now teaching at US universities, both from Ukraine. My friend's wife was from Kiev, too, so it was quite obvious that the sore spot, i.e. Russian-Ukrainian-Western relations - would be best avoided.

However, the ride was long, and as we filled our time with some abstract academia talk, everything went well. But then someone mentioned a recent conference in Washington held by the US-Russia organization where Stephen Cohen was a central figure, and I made a remark that probably no one in America knows and understands Russia better than him. No one argued with me, but the conversation stopped. And I'm sensing it will not be resumed.

Grasping Russia with one's mind

In Soviet times, one didn't have to be a scholar acquainted with the American academia to know Stephen Cohen's name. Just like Marshall Goldman and a number of other experts on the USSR he was referred to by the Communist party ideologists as an agent of the State Department, or the CIA, or Zionism, whose sole purpose was, in their view, to undermine the foundations of socialist statehood. Cohen has never been ultra - neither on the left nor on the right - but his historical interests, i.e. Russia and the socialist system, put him on the list on the regime's ideological enemies by default - while in the US he was time and again suspected of having a soft spot for Marxism. No one was allowed to stay unaligned: if you didn't put yourself on one or the other side of the barricades, others did it for you.

During the Cold War, the United States probably had as many experts on the Soviet Union, Kremlin and the "enigmatic Russian soul" as the USSR had propaganda agents. When the Soviet Union dissolved it seemed there was no more need for either kind. The party ideologists woke up to the new world, sobered up and went on to serve the new masters of life, and many of the American experts on the Russian and Soviet history got onto new career tracks. As Zbigniew Brzezinski, the US National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter, also an expert on the USSR, put it: "Russia is no longer of significance."

No need to remind about those events and people, which made Russia and its relations with the US very significant again, and brought the two countries to the brink of a new cold war. The unused developments of the old times came in handy for the modern rhetoric. The world however has become much more pragmatic. Ideology is only relevant for fanatics, whereas the modern Russian policy, like that of the US, is determined by very specific interests. Things that are still suitable for a lecture or in media are now irrelevant for real politics. When making big decisions, the current authorities don't seek academicians' advice or refer to scholarly research.

There are however some expectations, like those who determine the Russian-US policies, and follow Stephen Cohen's speeches and articles. Cohen was born in America; his grandfather was a Russian immigrant. Stephen majored in Russian and Soviet history and politics at university. While studying in England, he went on a trip to the Soviet Union for his practical training. Cohen received his PhD at Columbia University, and then became a professor at Princeton University, and at New York University. Other than doing his studies and academic works, he maintains contacts with Russia's leadership and intellectual elites. Cohen developed close ties with Mikhail Gorbachev, Nikolay Bukharin's widow, Anna Larina, and Joseph Stalin's daughter, Svetlana. He advised George H. W. Bush. He is usually referred to as a leftie, or a liberal, but he essentially doesn't belong to any party. Had there been a dissent party, he could've easily been its leader.

Cohen predicted Perestroika even before Gorbachev, based on hopes for Bukharin's socialism model. Cohen's book about Bukharin made a strong impression on the Soviet intellectuals, who cherished an illusion of "socialism with a human face." Thanks to Cohen, Bukharin's name was reinstated. He was politically rehabilitated in the Soviet Union and in the international socialist movement. Cohen personally helped Bukharin's wife and son, and many other Gulag victims. He dedicated one of his books to the return of those who had been affected by Stalin's political purges.

Stephen Cohen devoted several monographs to current Russian-American relations: "Sovieticus: American Perceptions and Soviet Realities," "Rethinking the Soviet Experience," "Failed Crusade: America and the Tragedy of Post-Communist Russia," "Was the Soviet System Reformable?", "The Question of Questions: Was the Soviet Union Worth Saving?" and "Soviet Fates and Lost Alternatives: From Stalinism to the New Cold War". The titles of Cohen's articles in periodicals also indicate his position: "Obama instead of gratitude to Putin trips it," "America's New Cold War With Russia," "Obama's Russia 'Reset': Another Lost Opportunity?" and "America's Failed (Bi-Partisan) Russian Policy."

Professor Cohen is a regular guest at WABC, the most popular American radio station. WABC hosts are mainly ultra-right media celebrities. You can hear Mark Levin's hysterical talk here; Rush Limbaugh had been stirring up panic here for a long time; but John Bachelor, America's most reasonable commentator, also works here. Stephen Cohen is a co-host of Bachelor's shows and what he says sounds shocking to the American listeners. He reminds them about America's promise not to enlarge NATO membership up to Russia's borders; he asks how the United States would react if Russia would place its missiles in Canada and Mexico; he reminds them of the Cuban missile crisis, which brought the nuclear powers to the edge of nuclear war. He speaks about Russia's attempts to develop strategic cooperation with the West, which were rejected by the American government. But not many people support Cohen's ideas - he is practically a lonely media warrior.

Stephen Cohen is extraordinary both in his political orientation and in his personal life. He is married to the legendary Katrina van den Heuvel, the editor of The Nation magazine, which doesn't hesitate to criticize America's foreign and domestic policy and the financial elite. Katrina is "drop-dead gorgeous," an unbelievably beautiful aristocratic and graceful woman. She comes from a family of government officials, diplomats, businessmen, lawyers, writers and actors. But her Princeton years and Cohen's influence made her a strong opponent of the establishment. She has become one the most prominent experts on the Soviet Union and Russia. She acted as Cohen's coeditor of "Voices of Glasnost: Interviews with Gorbachev's Reformers." A few more details to the couple's portrait: Katrina is much younger than Cohen and she is rich, unlike Stephen. Her money and her business talent saved The Nation from bankruptcy; she also sponsors many Russian projects. If it is true that man's accomplishments are determined by what kind of woman is standing next to him, then Cohen's marriage is a convincing proof of his merits and abilities.

The Nation magazine often publishes Cohen's articles. Here's an excerpt from one of them: "A new Cold War divide is already descending in Europe... If NATO forces move toward western Ukraine or even to its border with Poland... Moscow is likely to send its forces into eastern Ukraine. The result would be a danger of war comparable to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Even if the outcome is the non-military "isolation of Russia," today's Western mantra, the consequences will be dire. Moscow will not bow but will turn, politically and economically, to the East... above all to fuller alliance with China. The United States will risk losing an essential partner in vital areas of its own national security, from Iran, Syria and Afghanistan to threats of a new arms race, nuclear proliferation and more terrorism. ...Prospects for a resumption of Russia's democratization will be terminated for at least a generation."

I've known Stephen Cohen for a long time in that I've read his publications and lectures, but I only talked to him once, about 20 years ago during my visit to the US. He wasn't a celebrity back then, and his attention surprised me. Recently I contacted him by e-mail and asked a question not really expecting to get an answer - today he is popular like a rock star. But he remembered me and answered my question in a very friendly manner and precisely to the point. (Though his answer wasn't exactly what I wanted to hear.) This was an extraordinary experience for me, because the scientific celebrities who were previously happy to have long conversations with me in Moscow, lost interest in me, when my situation changed.

A stranger among friends

Needless to say that Cohen's stance and political activism brought about both fame and quite a few opponents and even enemies. His views are clearly at odds with those of the establishment. Mitt Romney sees Russia as the main strategic opponent of the US. Vice President Joe Biden, former chair of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, says that "we don't think in Cold War terms anymore," but, just like Secretary of State John Kerry, puts the blame for the worsening relations on Russia. Obama is concerned about the Republicans accusing him of being weak and lacking political will, and he resorts to combative rhetoric more often. If we talk about public opinion in the US, more than 60 percent of the population is negative toward Russia. And in Russia over 80 percent view the US in an unfavorable light. The Duma and Russia media worked themselves into an anti-American frenzy. Meanwhile CIA agent Jack Ryan - a character created by Tom Clancy, the author of Ronald Reagan's favorite bestseller book "The Hunt for Red October" - is back on American screens, saving the US from Russian conspirators and terrorists. It's hard to look for compromises and shifts in the countries' respective stances in this situation.

Cohen recently became a professor emeritus, free of the teaching routine, so now he has the opportunity to do what he does best - fight for a lost cause.

In American academia and media, Cohen is regarded with anger and contempt as Putin's apologist, minion or friend. He is criticized by both the left and the right, from the conservative Wall Street Journal and Free Beacon to the liberal New York Times, New Republic, Daily Beast and Newsweek. In his tribute on the occasion of Cohen's birthday, poet Yevgeny Yevtushenko calls him a unique friend and envies his naivety. I won't argue with the poet, but in the course of his long life Yevtushenko said and wrote a lot of things that sound naïve today. Garry Kasparov, on the contrary, doesn't consider Cohen naïve and perceives him as Putin's conscious ally. I think that accusation in naivety is the best compliment a humanist can get. God was naïve when He hoped that people would follow reason, conscience and duty.

I have some objections and criticism of my own when it comes to Cohen's work. When Perestroika began, I was also writing about an alternative development path for socialism, potentially including even Bukharin's model. But NEP, Khrushchev's reforms, Kosygin's moderate attempts and Gorbachev's experience showed that socialism and one-party dictatorship are inseparable. Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin understood this and regarded liberal ideas as a deadly threat to a socialist regime.

It seems to me that, assessing the current situation, Cohen could strengthen his argument by highlighting the fact that the Russian elite - higher officials, oligarchs, pop culture celebrities - are in no way interested in a conflict with the West, with which they have tied their fates long ago. Their capital and real estate are in the West, their children study there; the West is their safe haven if anything goes wrong in Russia or Putin gets angry. Every single one of them understands that the Western authorities have all the means at their disposal to poison their lives, just the same as the Russian prosecutor's office. Putin is their hostage, just like they are his. The elite harbor no patriotic feelings and won't stand shoulder to shoulder with a penniless compatriot who does.

I think Cohen doesn't quite factor into the equation the long-term objectives of American foreign policy. It's not so much about prejudice and Cold War inertia as it is about fear of the future. It's clear that the hopes of liberal democracy triumphing in Russia are lost, and if the political and economic situation deteriorates rapidly, other people will come to power in Russia, and Putin will seem like a democrat and a peacemaker in comparison. The West should be ready for such a turn of events.

Nevertheless, the role that Cohen plays in the modern political discourse is vitally important, because the existing rhetoric - along the lines of "You're either with us or you're against us" - is not helping at all. Cohen is not only a brilliant scholar and speaker, he's also a prime example showing that an intellectual can actively influence decision-making and situation development, and that it's possible remain independent at the time when ideas serve those who can pay more.

Regardless of how you see Cohen's role and views, he is living proof that academic freedom exists in the US and that a serious social and ideological debate is really possible there. The opposition should be very grateful to Stephen and Katrina, without whom no one would know about them or print them.

But most importantly, the opportunity to express and hear out all the points of view allows society to understand the multilayered picture of the current world better. Limiting this opportunity represents a graver threat to democracy and freedom of thought than any criticism. We should not only use the favorite mantra of fighters against tyranny - "I don't share your views, but I'm willing to die for your right to express them" - when addressing others, but also keep it in mind ourselves.

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 #20
Ukraine Today
http://uatoday.tv
June 4, 2015
Full-scale Russian invasion real threat to Ukraine: Poroshenko

Ukrainian president said some 9,000 regular Russian soldiers are deployed in Donbas

President Petro Poroshenko has warned of a future 'full-scale' Russian invasion of Ukrainian territory and said some 9,000 regular Russian troops are already deployed in the country.

He made the comments during an annual speech to parliament in Kyiv on June 4. The statement was part of a speech centred around issues of war, the economy, reforms and Ukraine's path towards further EU integration.

Poroshenko told lawmakers: "A colossal threat of renewal of full-scale military actions by the Russian terrorist groups remains. Now on the territory of Ukraine there are 14 Russian tactical groups with total number of personnel exceeding 9,000 servicemen. Concentration of the Russian servicemen near the state border is bigger by half than a year ago,"

Poroshenko was speaking a day after Ukrainian soldiers fought their most serious battle for months against Russian-backed forces near Donetsk, endangering an already shaky ceasefire.

"The military must be ready as much for a renewal of an offensive by the enemy in the Donbass as they are for a full-scale invasion along the whole length of the border with Russia. We must be truly ready for this."

And ready, Ukraine is. Poroshenko added that some 50,000 servicemen are deployed in eastern Ukraine.

Meanwhile, he added other core challenges of the Ukrainian government in 2016 are deoligarchisation, deregulation and decentralization, economic growth and a visa-free regime with the EU.

Other points from Poroshenko's address:

1. Ukraine must fulfill all technical tasks by August 2015 to get the EU visa-free regime in 2016
2. Ukraine will again expand military defence spending in 2016
3. The final decision on Ukraine's membership to NATO will be made by Ukrainians through a referendum
4. Ukrainian economic constraints for Donbas remain up to the full control of the border with Russia
5. Ukraine was able to avoid a default and stabilise the macroeconomic situation in 2015
6. Ukraine cancelled the gas reliance on Russia for the first time ever in 2015
7. The process of deoligarchisation and state financing for parties will be continuing in the country

The reforms are not yet nearing the finish line, but they are ready to get launched. However, Poroshenko noted that he is not happy with the pace of reforms. "I, like Ukrainian people, am not satisfied with the work of the Ukrainian government," - Poroshenko said, referring to the work of both the government and parliament, as well as his own work.

Kyiv and the West accuse Russia of backing pro-Russian militants in eastern Ukraine, which Moscow denies despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary.

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 #21
Ukraine Today
http://uatoday.tv
June 4, 2015
US Marines prepare Ukrainian soldiers for front line deployment

Different exercises are conducted in simulated battlefield conditions, as part of the training

US Marines and Ukrainian troops - training side-by-side. This is just one exercise - practicing storming a building occupied by armed fighters. The task - take the hostile militants prisoner and vacate the premises, avoiding any fatalities.

Another drill - evacuating injured soldiers in battlefield conditions - all while coming under fire.

This is not traditional training, but rather an exchange of experience. The US Marines are sharing their skills gained in military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Ukraine's Prime Minister oversaw the drills.

Arseniy Yatsenyuk, Prime Minister: "Ukrainian troops are trained corresponding to the best NATO standards; these are new tactics, new techniques. This is actually the new spirit of the Ukrainian army"

The first stage of the exercises will end in less than two weeks. After that, more Ukrainian and American servicemen will participate in the drills, along with coaches from Canada and the UK.

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 #22
Interfax-Ukraine
June 4, 2015
Ukrainian citizens in occupied Donbas have been taken prisoner by aggressors - Poroshenko
 
Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko has said that the Ukrainian citizens who live in the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions are held as prisoners.

"Citizens of Ukraine, who now are in the temporarily occupied territories, I consider to be Ukrainian prisoners, who now are kept by invaders," he said in his annual address to the parliament on Thursday.

Poroshenko said Ukraine and its international partners are prepared to help these areas of Donbas as an integral part of Ukraine.

"But they [Ukraine and its international partners] will finance the restoration of the infrastructure just when they will be sure that all [that is] rebuilt for today won't be destroyed by a full-scale Russian invasion tomorrow," Poroshenko added.

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 #23
Right Sector extremists in Ukraine are advised to be ready for mobilization

KIEV, June 3. /TASS/. Ukraine's nationalists affiliated with the extremist organization calling itself the Right Sector (outlawed in Russia) have been urged to cut short their vacations and all commanders, ordered to begin full mobilization, Right Sector spokesman Andrey Stempitsky has said.

"Those who are away on vacation or have left for home during the lull on the frontline should get ready to return to their units. The commanders of reserve battalions should declare mobilization to build up their squads to full strength and keep their men ready to leave for combat units or a training center," Stempitsky says in a message posted on Facebook.

Stempitsky said that "despite resistance from the advocates of armistice we will go to fight."

The Right Sector is a Ukrainian association of radical nationalist organizations. In November 2014 Russia's Supreme Court declared it as an extremist organization and outlawed its operation in Russia's territory. Earlier, Russia launched criminal proceedings against the group's leader Dmitry Yarosh over calls for terrorism.

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#24
www.rt.com
June 4, 2015
Kremlin: Timing of Kiev-provoked Donbass tensions linked with looming EU summit
[Photos and videos here http://rt.com/news/264897-kremlin-eastern-ukraine-tensions/]

The timing of the new tensions in Donbass, provoked by the Kiev forces, is connected with the upcoming EU summit, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said. He added that Kiev has breached the Minsk deal and Moscow is waiting for the OSCE's reaction.

"The violations are obvious and [Foreign] Minister [Sergey] Lavrov has already said that the representatives of the OSCE are to draw corresponding conclusions and to clearly identify who is responsible for these violations [in eastern Ukraine]," Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told journalists Thursday.

According to Peskov, the Kiev authorities are responsible for the recent escalation of the crisis in the troubled region.

"Donbass is being shelled. Self-defence forces can't shell their own territory," he said.

Peskov said that the attempts to destabilize the situation and provoke the tensions can be clearly seen.

"These provocative actions are organized by Ukraine's military forces and we are concerned with that," the Kremlin spokesman added.

Moscow believes that the timing of the new tensions is connected with the upcoming EU summit, which is to take place in Brussels on June 25-26.

"Yes, indeed, in the past Kiev had already heated up tensions amid some large international events. This is the case, and now we are seriously concerned about the next repetition of such activity," Peskov said.

At the summit, the European Union is looking to extend its broad economic sanctions against Moscow over Ukraine crisis until January 2016, according to several senior officials and diplomats, the Wall Street Journal reported.

Apart from the EU summit, there will also be a G7 summit on June 7-8 hosted by Germany at the Elmau castle near Garmisch-Partenkirchen, in Bavaria.

In 2014, the G7 leaders refused to participate in the G8 summit in Sochi after Crimea reunited with Russia last year following a referendum that was consistent with international law and the UN Charter.

In April, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier said that G7 leaders are not yet ready to welcome Russia back at the discussion table.

Still calling it an "annexation" Steinmeier said the G7 states "could not simply act as if nothing had happened and carry on with business as usual."

Eduard Basurin, spokesman for the Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) Defense Ministry, said that the special OSCE mission is planning to visit those injured in Wednesday's shelling in the city of Donetsk.

Kiev forces shelled the eastern Ukrainian city on Wednesday, mostly the southwest Petrovsky and Kirovsky districts, killing at least six people and injuring 90 others. The bombardment also caused a great deal of destruction at the city's Sokol market, where several rows of shops were burned down.

The RT crew, who were among the first reporters at the scene, recorded dramatic footage of the shelling's aftermath.

According to Basurin, the shelling was "chaotic, but targeted the private sector where people live."

"According to preliminary information, Ukrainian troops opened artillery fire from a 152 mm gun. It is probably a 2A36 Giatsint-B [field] gun," he added.

However, US State Department spokesperson Marie Harf refused to directly acknowledge that the Kiev authorities are violating the Minsk peace agreements, turning a blind eye to daily OSCE reports that equally implicate the government and the rebel forces.

Harf insisted Wednesday that the "majority of violations" have been committed by rebel forces and not Kiev's troops.

"Everything we're getting from the OSCE and other sources of information indicates that a vast majority, as my colleague said, are from the Russian-separatist combined forces," Harf said in reply to a question from RT's Gayane Chichakyan.

The Minsk-2 peace agreement was struck in February 2015 by Kiev and the eastern rebels and brokered by Russia, Germany and France in the Belarusian capital of Minsk. It provided for the steps intended to bring peace to war-torn eastern Ukraine, including a ceasefire, the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the frontline and constitutional reform decentralizing power.

The current escalation of violence led to an increase in fighting, which saw over 6,000 killed since April 2014.

On Wednesday, the General Staff of Ukraine said that Kiev's forces were using heavy artillery that had previously been withdrawn from the frontline under February's Minsk peace deal.

"In order to stop the enemy's offensive and to avoid casualties among the troops, the Ukrainian military command - after warning all of its international partners - was forced to use artillery, which was in the rear areas defined by the Minsk agreements," the General Staff's press service said, as cited by RIA Novosti news agency.

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 #25
www.rt.com
June 4, 2015
'Plumes of smoke everywhere': RT crew witnesses Donetsk shelling aftermath (DRONE VIDEO)
[Video here http://rt.com/news/264725-donetsk-shelling-ukraine-drone/]

Dramatic footage from Donetsk shot by the RT crew, who were among the first reporters at the scene, shows a destroyed city market, private houses on fire and emergencies services trying to cope with the aftermath of the shelling.

Kiev forces shelled the Ukrainian city on Wednesday, mostly the Petrovsky and Kirovsky districts in the southwest, killing at least 6 people and injuring 90 others.

"Everywhere you look you could see plumes of smoke rising towards the sky," RT's Ilya Petrenko reported after visiting the shelled areas.

The bombardment caused a great deal of destruction at the city's Sokol market as several rows of small shops were burnt down.

"It's unclear if anyone was hurt," Petrenko said, adding that when the shelling happened in the morning "the market was closed... because there was heavy fighting in the area."

He said that he also visited a residential area where "at least two houses were directly hit by shelling."

"When we arrived they were on fire. Fire brigades tried to extinguish the blaze," RT's correspondent said.

"People were baffled. They didn't know what to do. Some were hiding in basements, which saved one family, whose house was completely destroyed. Others were looking for cars and vehicles to escape the area," Petrenko added.

The current escalation of violence is one of the largest since agreements, signed between Ukrainian authorities and the rebels in the Belarusian capital in mid-February, led to a decrease in fighting, which saw over 6,000 killed since April 2014.

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 #26
Russia Insider
www.russia-insider.com
June 4, 2015
On Eve of EU Vote to Extend Sanctions War Returns to Ukraine
Resumption of fighting on eve of EU vote on extending sanctions against Russia is a predictable action given the nature of the Ukrainian regime and the multiple crises it faces.
By Alexander Mercouris

Predictably and right on cue, as the date of the review of the EU's sanctions on Russia approaches, there is a major spike in the fighting in eastern Ukraine.

This will come as a surprise to no one.

As we have repeatedly said, the Ukrainians are not genuinely interested in implementing the terms of the Minsk Memorandum.

Those terms, if implemented, would spell the end of the Maidan project.  Not surprisingly the Ukrainian government, which owes its entire existence to the Maidan project, will not willingly let it fail and will turn to war to prevent it doing so.

As we have also repeatedly said, recent indications Western support for Ukraine may be weakening simply give Ukraine more reason to turn to war in the hope this will rally Western support.

The continuing rapid decline of Ukraine's economy, and the growing unpopularity of Ukraine's leaders, also provides a further incentive to turn to war.  For what is ultimately a mobilisation regime, war is always the most obvious way to rally domestic support.

The timing of the latest outbreak - close to an EU vote to renew the sanctions - is not intended to prevent the sanctions being lifted.

No one - certainly not the Russians - ever seriously expected the sanctions to be lifted this June.  The sanctions would have continued whether there was fighting in eastern Ukraine or not.

The EU vote on the sanctions is however useful to Kiev.   It enables Kiev to maximise its political support in the West and mutes criticism of its turn to war.  

Kiev knows those Western countries (such as Germany) that oppose lifting sanctions will be forced to support Kiev if fighting now resumes - if only for the short term - so as to justify their opposition to lifting sanctions.

The diplomatic moves and counter-moves should not however obscure the larger picture.  Given the nature of the government in Kiev, a resumption of the fighting was at some point inevitable.  The late spring or summer was always the likeliest time. That is what is now happening.

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 #27
OSCE SMM publishes special report on Wednesday fighting near Maryinka

KYIV. June 4 (Interfax) - The Special Monitoring Mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE/SMM) has published a separate report concerning the fighting that erupted near the town of Maryinka in the Donetsk region on Wednesday morning.

Between 10:00 p.m. on June 2 and 5:30 a.m. on June 3, SMM observers working in the area controlled by the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) "observed the movement of a large amount of heavy weapons", including T-64 and T-72 tanks, 122mm artillery weapons, "a column of infantry fighting vehicles and military trucks" carrying anti-aircraft guns.

"In addition, the SMM - at the same location - heard approximately 100 artillery rounds fired from a location 1-5 km north-north-west of its position between 04:30 and 04:40hrs; an outgoing salvo of Bm-21 multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) Grad rockets fired from a location 1-5 km west of its position at 04:55hrs; and, 100 outgoing artillery rounds fired from a location5km north-north-west of its position," the mission said in the report.

"Between 07:00 and 08:00hrs, the SMM-mobile in an area 6-9km east of Maryinka - observed seven t-64 MBTs (main battle tanks) facing west. In addition, it heard, on two separate occasions, more than five salvoes of outgoing MLRS (BM-21) rockets and heavy-mortar rounds; and 12 outgoing MLRS Grad rockets and mortars," it said.

"At approximately 06:00hrs, an SMM unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) observed intense shelling targeting an intersection of the H15 highway 3.5 km south-west of Maryinka," the mission said.

"The SMM made several attempts between 10:45 and 12:11hrs to contact high-ranking "DPR" personnel - including the "DPR" "prime minister", "parliamentary speaker" "minister of defense" and "chief of the general staff" in order to facilitate a cessation to the fighting around Maryinka. Either they were unavailable or did not wish to speak to the SMM," according to the mission's report.

"At 15:00hrs the SMM received a letter from the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, saying Ukrainian Armed Forces heavy weapons would be placed on the contact line in order to deal with the "real threat" posed by the fighting in Maryinka, which they said had started at 06:00hrs that morning. Ukrainian officials later publicly acknowledged that the weapons had been used, saying their use was necessary in thwarting a "DPR" attack," the SMM said in the report.

"The Representative of the Russian Federation Armed Forces to the Joint Center for Control and Coordination told the SMM at 15:00hrs that a ceasefire around Maryinka would take effect at 17:00hrs. He told the SMM at 21:00hrs that the situation around Maryinka was currently calm. At around 19:00hrs a representative of the Anti-Terrorist Operation commander in Kramatorsk and the "DPR" "ministry of defense" confirmed to the SMM that Maryinka was under government control," it said.

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 #28
www.rt.com
June 4, 2015
US ignores OSCE data, blames 'majority' of Ukraine truce violations on rebels
[Video here http://rt.com/news/264773-ukraine-ceasefire-violations-osce/]

US State Department spokesperson Marie Harf refused to directly acknowledge Kiev's role in violating the Minsk peace agreements in eastern Ukraine, turning a blind eye on daily OSCE reports that equally implicate the government and the rebel forces.

The video below shows RT's Gayane Chichakyan grilling Harf - and failing to get a straight answer on the issue despite multiple attempts.

Chichakyan reminds Harf about the daily reports compiled by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) listing violations, noting that the breaches are more or less equally split between both sides of the conflict.

Harf continues to insist that the "majority of violations" to the Minsk agreements have been committed by rebel forces and not Ukrainian troops.

Over the past two months, the OSCE has blamed the Donetsk and Lugansk forces for nine violations of the ceasefire, while accusing the Ukrainian government of another eight. Chichakyan added that there were only 33 reports regarding rebel violations of the requirement for heavy weapons withdrawal under the Minsk agreements, compared to 35 reported violations by Ukrainian troops.

"This is hardly a vast majority behind that. Question: where do you - and I mean the State Department - get the information that the rebel forces are responsible for the vast majority of violations?" Chichakyan asked.

Harf responded: "Everything we're getting from the OSCE and other sources of information indicates that a vast majority, as my colleague said, are from the Russian separatist combined forces."

Here is the heated conversation that followed:

Gayane Chichakyan: A simple question. Do you acknowledge that the Ukrainian government too is violating the Minsk agreements?

Marie Harf: I think by saying a vast majority are the Russian separatist forces, that would then indicate that a very small minority are on the other side. But let's also remember here...

GC: That is not clear from the OSCE daily reports.

MH: Broadly speaking though this is Ukrainian territory, the Ukrainians have the right to defend themselves when Russia sent into their territory heavy weapons, tanks, fighters, across that cease...

GC: That was not my question. It's a simple yes or no question.

MH: I think I just answered your question...

GC: Do you acknowledge that the Ukrainian government too is violating the Minsk agreements? Yes or no?

MH: We don't do yes or no here, I think I just answered your question, when I said if a large majority is the Russian separatist forces then there is a very small minority that is on the other side, I think that answers your question.

GC: You did not answer. Yes or no? Answer the question, do you acknowledge that the Ukrainian forces...

MH: I'm not going to say yes or no. I'm going to answer the question in the way I think is appropriate, and I just did.

GC: Which is not answering...

AP's Matt Lee had a similar conversation with State Department spokesman Jeff Rathke last week. Rathke was asked to comment on the use of heavy artillery in residential areas in eastern Ukraine.

"The overwhelming majority of the ceasefire violations have been conducted by combined Russian-separatist forces attacking Ukrainian positions on the Ukrainian side of the line of contact, which is clearly contrary to the Minsk agreements," Rathke stressed citing those same OSCE reports.

When Lee pressed on, clarifying that some of those reports mention Kiev forces violating the Minsk peace agreement, Rathke refused to acknowledge just that, stating that he has not seen these kinds of reports.

"I really don't have anything to add beyond my statement earlier, that the overwhelming number of violations are coming from the Russian separatist side in eastern Ukraine," Rathke told Lee.

Russia has repeatedly denied accusations of providing arms to the Ukrainian rebels or sending troops to fight in the civil war. Moscow maintains that Washington is using the Ukrainian conflict to pursue its own geopolitical goals and isolate Russia.

The Minsk peace agreements were signed in September 2014 and February 2015 by Ukraine, Russia, Germany and France in the Belarusian capital of Minsk. They list required steps intended to bring peace to conflict-torn eastern Ukraine, including a ceasefire, the withdrawal of heavy weapons, and a constitutional reform decentralizing power for Ukrainian regions.

Meanwhile, the situation in eastern Ukraine has intensified. The latest incident was a shelling in Donetsk overnight on Wednesday. Nineteen people, both civilians and militiamen, were killed and over a hundred injured in the bombardment, according to local officials.

Government and rebel forces have been trading accusations with regard to which side opened fire first. The Donetsk People's Republic's (DNR) blames Kiev for "provoking" its troops, while Kiev denies the claim.

Another six civilians had been killed earlier in the day in the city's south-west districts, while another 90 were injured, Donetsk's mayor, Igor Martynov, said.

Last week, three civilians, including a child, were reportedly killed in the town of Gorlovka after a shell fired by the Ukrainian military hit a residential area.

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 #29
Kyiv Post
June 4, 2015
Poroshenko warns of 'full-scale' war, prods to speed up reforms
by Olena Goncharova

Ukraine will stick to the Minsk II peace agreement, even though Russia might launch a "full-scale" invasion in the eastern Donbas, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko said during an address to Parliament on June 4 almost a year after he came to power. He was inaugurated on June 7.

Poroshenko's speech follows one of the toughest days for the Ukrainian army since the February Minsk agreement, losing five soldiers in the successful defense of Maryinka in Donetsk Oblast.

Poroshenko said the army successfully repelled the attack "of Russian soldiery" and had to use artillery to keep a town under Ukraine's control. Poroshenko said they warned the European leaders that Minsk accords were violated.

"The military must be ready as much for a renewal of an offensive by the enemy in the Donbas as they are for a full-scale invasion along the whole length of the border with Russia. We must be truly ready for this," Poroshenko says, adding that at least 9,000 Russian soldiers are being operating in the Russian-controlled area.

Russia's war against Ukraine has put the nation on a war footing, although such a formal declaration has never been made.

Poroshenko said the government will spend at least 5 percent of the nation's gross domestic product on defense for the foreseeable future.

With the help of the volunteers and the Ministry of Defense, Ukraine now has at least 50,000 equipped Ukrainian fighters involved in the war, almost 10 times more than a year ago.

Totally, Ukraine's army has at least 250,000 soldiers and the country has spent Hr 19.2 billion to modernize the equipment.

"We have the powers to defend our land," the president said. "We've provided the minimum level of defense capability and liberated the bigger part of Donbas. We have stopped one of the strongest armies on the continent, because there are not miners and tractor drivers fighting against us, but Russian armed forces."

Poroshenko also focused on key tasks for the Parliament to work on.

The decentralization and a "deoligarchization" campaign aimed at reducing the power and influence of Ukraine's wealthiest businessmen would be a priority for Ukrainian leaders.

Poroshenko said they will focus on securing the country's border, cleaning eastern Ukraine of Russian armament and troops before the elections will take place in Donbas.

"We are ready to restore all economic relations with the temporarily occupied territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk when Ukraine restores control over the border," Poroshenko says.

As Ukraine could possibly benefit from visa-free travel with Europe in 2016, Poroshenko says they will keep working to meet the requirements on refugees, human trafficking, organized crime and corruption

Ukraine expects an EU assessment mission to visit the country in September to report on progress in meeting visa liberalization requirements.

While addressing the lawmakers in Verkhovna Rada, Poroshenko said he dismissed the Head of the State Migration Service Serhiy Radutny because the European partners were not happy with the agency's work.

Speaking about reforms, Poroshenko said he's happy with Interior Ministry's Eka Zguladze, who was appointed deputy interior minister in December. Zguladze is working on a pilot project to create a brand new traffic police force staffed with new people. Poroshenko said the new road patrols in Kyiv will hit the streets in June.

"We have started passing bills regulating reforms of the Interior Ministry. They separate forcible functions from political ones and set up a municipal guard and new traffic police. And, by the way, I see such a person as Eka Zguladze as their future chief," Poroshenko said.

However, Poroshenko is not happy with progress in fighting corruption.

Poroshenko also says the country will do everything to become a member of NATO even though not all the European partners support Ukraine's aspirations. Most Ukrainians want to join the military alliance.

Poroshenko said he's not happy with with his own work.

"Whether I'm satisfied with the work of the government? I'm not. Neither with my work and the work of the Parliament. But most importantly - the people are not happy with all of us."

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 #30
Interfax-Ukraine
June 4, 2015
Referendum to make final decision on Ukrainian membership in NATO - Poroshenko
 
The people of Ukraine will make a final decision on its possible accession to NATO at a referendum, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko has said.

"The people of Ukraine have an exclusive right to make a final decision on this sensitive and extremely important issue. But I will not allow the use of it as a pretext for unsettling the country, because unity is a priority of mine and every one of us," he said in his annual message delivered at the Verkhovna Rada on Thursday.

Judging by opinion polls, the number of people supporting the accession to NATO is larger than the number of persons who think differently for the first time ever, he added. However, many Western partners "are not prepared to open the NATO door to us right now," the president said. "You, dear deputies, and I are not going to look to Moscow in dealing with this matter, but we also have no right to ignore the opinion of our Western partners," the president said.

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 #31
Reuters
June 3, 2015
Russia says Ukraine agrees to fill gas storage for transit flow

Ukraine has agreed to pump enough gas into its storage facilities to maintain pressure in the system for Russian gas to reach Europe in winter, Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak said on Wednesday.

Around 40 percent of Russian gas exports to the European Union traverses Ukraine.

Novak said that Ukraine had agreed to fill the storage facilities after talks in Brussels between officials from Russia, Ukraine and the European Commission on Tuesday.

A source close to the talks told Reuters that Moscow and Kiev had agreed an outline protocol on the gas trade and that ministers would meet later this month to try to resolve the key outstanding disagreements: on how long the protocol would last, the formula applied to discount prices for Ukraine and fees charged by Ukraine for the transit of gas over its territory.

Novak told reporters in Vienna: "They agreed on some positions of the protocol, including on pumping no less than 19 bcm into the storages before the forthcoming winter."

There was no immediate comment from Ukraine, which has said it needs from 14 to 19 billion cubic metres (bcm) in its storage to keep Russian gas transit to Europe intact. Ukrainian gas transport monopoly Ukrtransgaz has said it had 10.27 bcm of gas in its storage tanks as of June 1

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 #32
The National Interest
June 4, 2015
Ukraine's Next Big Battleground
"Ukraine cannot succeed unless its economy succeeds."
By John A. Cloud
John A. Cloud teaches at the U.S. Naval War College. He is a former U.S. Ambassador to Lithuania. The views expressed in this article are his own and do not reflect those of the U.S. Naval War College.

The Economist in its May 23 edition has reminded us of a tremendous advantage that we have in Ukraine: the strength of free-market economics. Clearly, the argument the magazine makes in its Leaders article "Ukraine: The Other Battleground," points out a significant fact-i.e., for Ukraine to succeed its economy must also succeed.

The magazine also compares western assistance to Ukraine to western assistance to Poland beginning in 1989. The Economist argues that the West has been miserly with regard to Ukraine. As someone who was involved in the Western response to Poland, I think it is important to look deeper into this comparison.

First, there are similarities between the Poland of 1989 and Ukraine of today. Poland's economy was in free fall in 1989 and it was a major debtor. In addition, the debt had been accumulated under a previous, discredited regime. There were also important differences. Poland was not facing a war on any of its borders nor was it facing an aggressive Soviet Union (yes, it was still the Soviet Union then.)

Western assistance ramped up slowly. On April 17, 1989, after the successful conclusion of the Roundtable Accords, President George H. W. Bush gave the United States' first formal reaction in Hamtramck, Michigan. In that speech, the president announced that "we're not going to offer unsound credits" and "we're not going to offer aid without requiring sound economic practices in return." In fact, President Bush did not offer any big aid numbers in that speech.

Instead, he announced the administration would support greater Polish access to the U.S. market, more sustainable debt rescheduling, allowing the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation to operate in Poland, and a "private business agreement with Poland to encourage cooperation between U.S. firms and Poland's private businesses."

In early July, President Bush traveled to Warsaw and Budapest enroute to the G-7 Summit in Paris. In Warsaw and Budapest, the president announced that he would work to encourage "coordination and concerted action" among the G-7. He also announced funds to capitalize and invigorate the Polish and Hungarian private sectors that became the enterprise funds. In Paris, he followed through on his call for coordination and agreed that the European Commission would coordinate this effort, as the G-24, which it did for the next several years.

Two events ramped up Western and U.S. assistance to Poland: the seating of a Solidarity-led government and the coming forward of concrete proposals from that government on how the West could help. In September, Polish deputy prime minister Leszek Balcerowicz, in Washington for the IMF-World Bank meetings, asked for $1 billion as a fund to support the convertibility of the Polish zloty. The United States immediately relayed this request to the G-24, which was simultaneously meeting in Brussels. This $1 billion provided the backstop for Poland's move to convertibility. Fortunately, it was not actually needed and these funds could eventually be used to aid in the privatization of Poland's banks.

Poland also received a 50-percent debt reduction from its official creditors (the Paris Club). But this did not come until 1991, after Poland had demonstrated that it had begun the transformation of its economy.

Timing was crucial in the Polish case. The Mazowiecki government took office on August 24, 1989. Balcerowicz's economic program took effect just four months later on January 1, 1990. Unfortunately, the timing is different with Ukraine. As I was recently told in Brussels, this is the twenty-fourth year of Western assistance to Ukraine. While the Euromaidan presents a welcome new opportunity for the success of reform in Ukraine, I was told there is reform fatigue among the Ukrainian people and donor fatigue among the donors. While Ukrainian economists received high marks, the questions are more political. Can the Poroshenko-Yatsenyuk government curb the oligarchs' corruption and implement reform? Recent actions, including raising natural-gas prices, are promising first steps.

The United States needs to determine what its national interest is in Ukraine. If the Obama administration determines that we have a strong interest in an independent and prosperous Ukraine, then we will need to continue and perhaps increase the steps being taken on the security side. However, the success of Ukrainian reform also requires-as the Economist spelled out-that we engage on the "other battleground" as well. Ukraine cannot succeed unless its economy succeeds. This does not mean dumping vast sums into Ukraine. It does mean working with our European friends and allies to provide Ukraine with meaningful support tied to its implementation of reform.

With regard to U.S. assistance, there are more things we could do. One example would be to provide Ukraine with grant aid instead of credit guarantees, as we did with Poland. Given the size of Ukraine's debt, it does not need more debt. We could also be innovative. While Ukraine is not currently eligible for Millennium Challenge Corporation assistance, particularly because of its corruption problems, we could use some of the mechanisms of the MCC to reward sound economic policies. Such a step would allow us to do more to assist Ukrainian reform while still protecting U.S. taxpayers.

The Economist is right that we can learn from our experience twenty-six years ago. President George H. W. Bush focused Western attention on Poland and Hungary at the 1989 G-7 Summit in Paris. Have we done the same in 2014 and 2015? Do donors need our help to overcome the fatigue of the last twenty-four years?

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 #33
Russian experts condemn as blackmail Ukraine's threats to seize Russian property abroad
By Lyudmila Alexandrova

MOSCOW, June 3. /TASS/. Ukraine's statements that it is determined to seek compensation in courts for former Ukrainian property in Crimea under the threat of Russia's property seizure abroad are blackmail designed to get economic concessions, Russian experts said on Wednesday.

While some experts admit that Ukraine may win some lawsuits, this is unlikely to happen soon and it is hardly probable that any significant Russian properties will be seized.

Ukraine intends to seek the seizure of Russian overseas property as "fair satisfaction" for the damage done from Crimea's reunification with Russia, Ukrainian First Deputy Justice Minister Natalia Sevostyanova said.

According to her, Russian overseas properties will be seized, if the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) supports Kiev's complaints against Moscow.
Kiev has filed two lawsuits with the ECHR against Moscow by now, she said. "So far, this is the list of 4,000 enterprises with all the assets we have lost in Crimea. As of now, we have held a preliminary loss estimate, which reaches over a trillion hryvnia ($48 billion)," the deputy justice minister said.

Even if the ECHR sides with Ukraine, the mechanism for the enforcement of its decisions does not envisage the seizure of the debtor's property, Russian business daily Vedomosti quoted Alexey Panich, partner in the Herbert Smith Freehills law firm, as saying.

This problem has been encountered by former Yukos shareholders as they have failed so far to get the ECHR-awarded $1.8 billion compensation from Russia and secure the seizure of Russian property.

The examination of lawsuits by the ECHR is a process that may take years, the Free Press web portal quoted Dmitry Matveyev, head of the Center for Legal Regulation of Interstate Relations at the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), as saying.

"Normally, it takes years for the court to pass judgments on such complaints. After the ECHR passes a ruling, local courts in each specific country will individually determine what is or what is not subject to seizure," the expert said.

'It is far from being guaranteed that they would make decisions in favor of Kiev. Honestly speaking, I have doubts that Ukraine will be able to seize some property even pursuant to the ECHR's decision positive for Kiev," he added.

It is not ruled out that along with the lawsuits filed with the ECHR, which will examine the violation of ownership rights, Ukraine may apply to other courts, in particular, international arbitration tribunals, First Vice-President of the Center for Political Technologies Alexey Makarkin told TASS.

"Theoretically, lawsuits, if they are prepared well, have the chance to win the case but this will not happen soon," the expert said.

If a ruling is passed against Russia, Moscow won't recognize it and won't pay anything. That is why, it is not ruled out that attempts will be made to seize Russian property. "But Yukos shareholders may start these actions even earlier and so what will be left for Ukraine in 5-6 years?" the expert said.

"And, generally speaking, what property can be seized?" he added.

Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, diplomatic missions and their property may not be seized. There are also companies with state stakes operating in the West, Gazprom, for example. But these companies have a lot of private shareholders. So, if corporate assets are seized, damage will be done to these shareholders, including from the West. As for works of art and other exhibits displayed at exhibitions, lawyers meticulously specify their status in agreements, the expert said.

"So, it is hardly possible to talk about any large assets because economic benefits will be small and this may not happen soon," Makarkin said.
In the expert's opinion, both politics and economics can be seen behind Kiev's demarche.

"Ukrainians owe Russia $3 billion and they want this debt to be restructured or even written off. Ukraine is exerting public pressure on creditors - recently it adopted a law on debt repayment moratorium," the expert said.

"Ukrainians are hardly thinking today about starting the hunt for Russian training ships in about five years. But they face the issue of debt repayment and new gas talks are coming. So, this statement is blackmail and an element of pressure on Russia ahead of the negotiations on economic matters," the expert said.

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 #34
Interfax
June 3, 2015
Russian investigators view presence of Ukrainian warplane in Donbass sky as primary theory behind MH17 crash - source

Russian investigators view the presence of a Ukrainian Su-25 warplane in the sky over Donbass as the priority theory behind the Malaysia Airlines Boeing 777 passenger jet's crash in July 2014, a source familiar with the case documents told Interfax.

"For the time being, the theory based on Ukrainian Air Force serviceman Yevhen Ahapov's testimony remains priority one for the Russian investigation," the source said.

It was reported earlier that Ahapov had testified to Russian investigators as a witness that he had served with the Ukrainian Air Force and was aware that a Ukrainian Air Force Su-25 piloted by Capt. Voloshyn had been scrambled for a combat mission in the afternoon of July 17, 2014.

"The plane in question returned to the airfield empty [of missiles], and Voloshyn explained to his colleagues that 'a plane happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time'. The witness learned later that a Malaysian civilian aircraft with passengers on board had crashed earlier in the day," the Russian Investigative Committee reported earlier.

Meanwhile, this statement contradicts the information that representatives of Russia's leading manufacturer of air defense systems, Almaz-Antey, made public at a press conference on June 2.

Mikhail Malyshevsky, an adviser to the Almaz-Antey CEO, said the MH17 that crashed over eastern Ukraine on July 17, 2014 was destroyed by a 9M38M or 9M38M1 guided surface-to-air missile tipped with a 9M314 or 9M314M1 warhead, using a Buk-M1 air defense system. The missile blew up 3-4 meters away from the plane's skin, closer to the left side of the cockpit.

Almaz-Antey CEO Yan Novikov said Almaz-Antey had proof that the Ukrainian armed forces had Buk-M1 missiles on their inventory.

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 #35
Sputnik
June 3, 2015
Russia Urges US to Reveal Satellite Data on MH17 Crash

MOSCOW (Sputnik) - Russia's Foreign Ministry called on the United States on Wednesday to make public any evidence it has on last year's crash of Malaysia Airlines' flight MH17 in eastern Ukraine.

"If the United States has objective control data from satellites or the airborne warning and control system AWACS, it should be made public. The same applies to recordings of talks between controllers and Ukraine's military sector," the ministry said in a statement.

Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 came down in eastern Ukraine in July 2014 as it flew from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur. All 298 people on board were killed, making it the deadliest event since the start of the Ukrainian conflict in April of that year. Ukrainian authorities and militias in the country's southeast traded the blame for the crash.

The Dutch Safety Board in charge of the investigation published a preliminary report last year claiming the plane fell apart after it was hit by numerous high-energy objects.

Kiev and the West were quick to accuse militias of firing a Buk surface-to air missile at the airliner, with the United States citing its spy satellite images and intercepts of controllers' conversations. The data have not been made public or independently verified.

On Tuesday, Russian arms manufacturer Almaz-Antey unveiled the results of its own inquiry that showed the missile allegedly shot at MH17 had not been produced in Russia since 1999, but was still in service in the Ukrainian army.

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 #36
Counterpunch.org
June 3, 2015
Interview With a Member of the Parliament of Novorossiya
'Ukraine Was a Totally Oligarchic State'
by ROGER ANNIS and HALYNA MOKRUSHYNA
Roger Annis is an editor of The New Cold War: Ukraine and beyond. In mid-April 2015, he joined a four-day reporting visit to the Donetsk People's Republic. He is reporting from Moscow for one week after that. Halyna Mokrushyna is currently enrolled in the PhD program in Sociology at the University of Ottawa and a part-time professor. She holds a doctorate in linguistics and MA degree in communication. Her academic interests include: transitional justice; collective memory; ethnic studies; dissent movement in Ukraine; history of Ukraine; sociological thought.  Her doctoral project deals with the memory of Stalinist purges in Ukraine. In the summer of 2013 she travelled to Lviv, Kyiv, Kharkiv and Donetsk to conduct her field research. She is currently working on completing her thesis. She can be reached at halouwins@gmail.com.

June 2, 2015. Interview with Aleksander Vladimirovich Kolesnik, Deputy of the Parliament of Novorossiya, by Roger Annis and Halyna Mokrushyna at NewColdWar.org on April 16, 2015 in the city of Donetsk.

Q:How did you become involved in the movement for Novorossiya?

Aleksander Vladimirovich Kolesnik: I could not remain indifferent when during the winter of 2013-2014, the Maidan events were taking place and I saw how my former colleagues in the Department of Interior (police) where I once served were standing at Maidan Square, protecting the Ukrainian state and law and order but were being bullied and hurt by the crowd and even killed. They could only respond with their rubber clubs.

I served in Odessa way back during military conscription, and then I served in the police in Donetsk and Sumy. [1]

I did not share the so-called values that Maidan proclaimed. It was an aggressive movement of fascist youngsters, proclaiming a Nazi ideology at the state level. Such slogans as "Ukraine is for Ukrainians", "Glory to the nation - death for enemies" and so on I cannot view as anything but a Nazi ideology.

Q: Was it true, the slogans we heard about on Maidan Square such as "Hang the Moskals [Russians] on a branch"?

Of course. But you know, in a way, this was secondary to shaping my views. I was expecting this moment for 24 years. I assumed that sooner or later this would happen, because during the 24 years of Ukraine's existence as an independent country [since 1991], there was a gradual but steady rise of Ukrainian nationalism, specifically at the state level. This was happening right before my eyes, after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 when Ukraine separated.

Before, we could travel freely from Donetsk region [in Ukraine] to Rostov region [in Russia]. There were no border control posts. Then, customs and border posts and procedures began appearing. Inter-urban electric trains were abolished. Everything happened right before my eyes. It all happened gradually, but was aimed at reducing relations with Russia.

It turned into ridiculous measures, such as digging trenches along the border. Right now, Ukraine is building a wall.

During the Maidan events, it was in January [2014], I realized that I couldn't just stand by. I joined a political party (organization), the Russian Bloc. It already had an active involvement in Crimea. There were units here which I joined, specifically the unit in Makiivka in Donetsk [an industrial city located 25 km from Donetsk city].

Q: Was the Russian Bloc a party?

It was initially a party. At the call of the party leadership, we went to a rally in central Donetsk on March 1. Other pro-Russian organizations also took part in this rally. When I saw the masses of people, I realized that my compatriots share the same views with me.

According to police estimates, 60,000 of my compatriots took part in the March 1 rally, on Lenin Square. Not only was the central square full, so too were the adjacent streets. After this, I became actively involved in this process. As a representative of the Russian Bloc, I joined the Yugo-Vostok (South-East) Movement in mid-April, which was led by Oleg Tsarev. Other protesting organizations joined it as well, such as Oplot, Russkiy Vostok (Russian East), Berkut, and others. Together we began undertaking joint activities.

We actively organized rallies. We were the first to hold a motor rally which delivered humanitarian aid to Slavyansk. If you recall, by the end of April [2015], the city was blocked off by the National Guard of Ukraine. We loaded cars with humanitarian aid-there were approximately 100 cars provided voluntarily-we put up flags and we headed straight to the National Guard's blockade posts.

It was right after Easter. Our women brought Easter bread along with us. When the soldiers of the National Guard stopped us, the women wished them a Happy Easter, gave them some Easter bread and asked if we could pass through. No one dared to refuse or shoot. This caused some confusion, but they let us go through.

After that, we took part in preparations for holding the referendums in Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts (regions). They were still oblasts of Ukraine at that time. The people's republics had already been proclaimed, but we still needed to hold referendums.

After the referendums were held [May 11], when Donetsk and Lugansk people's republics were formed, an agreement was achieved by their leaders. The parliaments of the Donetsk and Lugansk republics authorized their representatives to create the parliament of Novorossiya.

We approved a constitutional act which proclaimed Novorossiya a confederal state. We adopted a battle flag of Novorossiya, which then became an insignia of the armed forces of Novorossiya.

Q: When was the Novorossiya act adopted?

In July, I don't quite remember the exact date.

Fifteen candidates from each republic were nominated, from among the deputies of the parliaments of two republics, and 15 representatives of public organizations from each republic were approved.

At the beginning of September, in deference to the first ceasefire agreement signed at Minsk [on Sept. 5], the Parliament of Novorossiya temporarily suspended its legislative work. The reason for this was the fact that, according to the Minsk agreement, an agreement with Ukrainian authorities on the status of the so-called districts of Donetsk and Lugansk was supposed to be reached. Since this status has not yet been determined, the status of the Parliament of Novorossiya is not determined either.

So we then became actively involved in humanitarian missions. And we facilitated measures to address the concerns of citizens in our respective districts. Deputies of the Novorossiya Parliament were assigned to districts. People would come with their problems and needs, which we tried to solve and fulfill.

Q: This continues following the Minsk-2 agreement [Feb. 12, 2015]?

As I already mentioned, yes. Because of these Minsk agreements-where Novorossiya is not considered at all, the term Novorossiya is not even used-we cannot proceed with our work because it may be regarded as a violation of the agreements.

It is mainly because of the Minsk agreements that there are some structural difficulties. Everything has to be built from the bottom. We have first to create the mechanism of the Donetsk and Lugansk Republics. We could have adopted any kind of laws, but they would have been useless without an executive power system in place.

Q: What are your expectations of the Minsk 2 agreement?

We are expecting that as a result of the Minsk agreement there will finally be some sort of recognition of Lugansk and Donetsk republics. If the Ukrainian side wants the agreement to function, it will have to recognize the Republics. If not, the agreement has no future.

Q: What about the borders of Donetsk and Lugansk? Right now, Ukraine holds half of their historic territory.

It is difficult to say. It all depends on how the situation will further evolve.

Personally, I don't think there will be a lasting truce. The same thing happened during the first Minsk agreements-the Ukrainian authorities and army waited some time, conducted reconnaissance, brought more troops, and then began a new offensive.

Unfortunately, everyone here believes that war is inevitable. No ceasefire will lead to peace until the main contradictions causing the conflict in the first place are resolved.

Q: What is meant by 'Novorossiya'. Is this the territories of Lugansk and Donetsk regions alone?

Of course not. Historically, Novorossiya is the territory from Odessa to Kharkiv, the south and east of Ukraine.

I am not sure whether you know this or not, but the city of Dnepropetrovsk, which prior to the Revolution of 1917 was called Ekaterinoslav, was for some period of time called Novorossiysk.

Q: So the political objective is to have Novorossiya include these historical borders?

That is our goal. Fighting on the side of the military forces of the Lugansk and Donest Republics are very many people from Odessa, Kherson, Zaporozhye, Kharkiv and Dnepropetrovsk.

Q: Do you think people in these regions want to join Novorossiya?

Of course. You saw during the Russian Spring last year that people held mass demonstrations involving tens of thousands of people. These protests were suppressed very violently. One example was what happened at the Odessa Trade Union House on May 2. [Dozens of anti-Maidan and pro-autonomy protesters were killed that day in an arson attack by extremist forces acting in the name of the government which came to power in Kyiv on Feb. 21, 2014.]

Q: What have been the results of the actions of the Kyiv government on the people in southeastern Ukraine?

The actions of Ukrainian authorities were mainly aggressive. There were no attempts to negotiate. As a result of this aggression, the people living in Lugansk and Donetsk republics became even more united. More and more people joined our army.

The actions of the government have had a very strong influence on events. After Ukrainian troops began shelling peaceful cities-housing and infrastructure, brutal, senseless shelling-even those people that shared pro-Ukrainian moods changed their views.

Q: Did that change happen in Odessa and Kharkiv as well?

Of course. Our example inspired them. We communicated with a lot of protesting organizations in these cities. Unfortunately, whenever they tried to show any activity, they were immediately arrested by the Security Service of Ukraine.

My personal opinion is that the repressive methods are a dead end for Ukraine. Even here in the southeast, when everything was just beginning, they tried frightening the people with repression and by arresting people. But this didn't help them in any way.

Moreover, I am convinced that the end of the Kyiv regime will come about by the actions of Ukrainians themselves - the people who inhabit the territory of so-called Malorossiya [historically, 'Little Russia']-because, I think, we think that these people are being deceived. No lie can last for a long time.

Q: What would a republic of Novorossiya look like?

I believe, as do many people living here, that most importantly there should be support of close economic, cultural and political ties with Russia. Not just friendly relations. Customs borders should be eliminated. Customs controls at the actual border should serve only to facilitate the free movement of people, capital and goods.

What form, exactly, this will take I don't know. Maybe Novorossiya will become a part of the Russian federation. Maybe it will join the Eurasian Economic Union, or join the EEU with the rest of Ukraine. The exact form is not the most important thing.

Every third citizen of the Russian Federation is Ukrainian by origin. Citizens of Ukraine have moved to Russia in big numbers in order to work, specifically to the North and Far East where gas and oil are extracted and mined. Why should we separate ourselves by borders with Russia when, instead, we can cooperate economically-buying natural gas at domestic Russian prices, for example? It is silly to turn our backs on this.

Yes, federation with Ukraine is possible, but only on the conditions that the Kyiv authorities be held responsible for their crimes, that a new government come to power and, accordingly, the politics with regards to Russia will change.

Q: What about relations with other countries?

Mostly, we communicate only with the Russian Federation when it comes to external contacts.

There have been attempts to help us made by people from Turkey and Germany. They tried sending us humanitarian aid, but there were too many difficulties with such things as crossing borders, going through customs, and getting necessary documentation done.

Q: Would social and economic policy in Novorossiya be different from that of Ukraine?

Yes, of course it will differ. Ukraine was a totally oligarchic state. Most of the members of Parliament there-not all, but many-were funded and sponsored by oligarchs. We have nothing against businessmen or private initiative. We have nothing against even oligarchs, but they should serve interests of the state.

Notes:
[1] Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych abolished compulsory military conscription in 2013. It was reintroduced in April 2014 as part of the 'Anti-Terrorist Operation' launched that month by the governing regime that came to power in Kyiv two months earlier.

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 #37
Sputnik
June 3, 2015
Kiev's Blockade of Transnistria Fraught With New War

On May 21 the Ukrainian parliament voted to suspend all military cooperation with Russia. The new law effectively terminated the 1998 agreement on the transit of Russian military units to Transnistria through the territory of Ukraine.

Kiev's decision to scrap its military cooperation agreements with Russia, including transit rights for Russian peacekeepers and equipment to Transnistria, have created the potential to destabilize regional security, says Transnistrian Foreign Minister Nina Shtanski.

Simultaneously, Moldova tightened the rules of transit for Russian military personnel traveling via Chisinau airport.
Chisinau had periodically blocked and deported Russian soldiers who were not clearly identified as international peacekeepers or who had failed to give sufficient advance notice.

Even though much cooperation was of course already suspended, throughout the current crisis Russia had been able to use Ukrainian territory to supply its peacekeepers in Transnistria, a narrow strip of land on Ukraine's western border. No longer.

Russia's response was quick and stern.

"The Ministry of Defense is left with no other option than to supply Russian forces with all the necessities by air bridge, with military-transport aircraft," Yuri Yakubov, a senior Russian MoD official, said after the Ukrainian vote.

"The Russian contingent will be supplied under any circumstances," he added.

Adding to Russia's worries, the Moldovan authorities have reportedly been arresting and deporting Russian soldiers who try to fly into Moldova en route to Transnistria.

Moldova hasn't stopped all Russian soldiers from traveling through its territory - only those not in the Moldova-supported peacekeeping mission, and only those who don't give a month's notice that they will be traveling to Moldova.

Of the roughly 1,500 Russian troops stationed in Moldova, about 1,000 are in the Operational Group of Russian Forces in Moldova, which Moldova does not support; the rest are peacekeepers regulated by the Joint Control Commission, which includes representatives of Moldova, Transnistria, and Russia.

Though small, the Russian peacekeeping contingent is a potent deterrent guaranteeing the security of the Transnistrian republic, because any outside attack on it will be interpreted as an attack on Russia itself.

Still, the Moldovan transit ban means that the Russian contingent will shrink and may eventually cease to exist.

This, in turn, could encourage Moldova to try to bring the breakaway region back into its fold by force.

Kiev's suspension of defense cooperation agreements with Russia and the Moldovan ban on the transit of Russian soldiers to Transnistria comes as NATO continues beefing up its military presence in neighboring Romania.

The tensions mounting around Transnistria could easily spin of control and just how far the sides are ready to go in this standoff remains anybody's guess...

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 #38
Russia Insider/Odnoko
www.russia-insider.com
June 3, 2015
Who Unleashed the Civil War in Ukraine?
Ex-Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych intended to wait out Maidan, but the people in his circle had other ideas
By Rostislav Ishchenko

The text below is an excerpt from a longer essay from Rostislav Ishchenko, a prominent Russian commentator. This article originally appeared at the Russian website Odnako. It was translated by Eugenia at The Vineyard of the Saker.

However, we need to thank for that [Maidan] not so much the US as Levochkin [Chief of Staff of ex-Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych]. He and Firtash [Ukrainian businessman, former associate of Yanukovych, and in post-Maidan Ukraine main financial backer of extremist Radical Party of Oleg Lyashko] providently protected their business in the association agreement, which was prepared under the watchful eye of the Chief of Staff of the president of Ukraine - that is, the very same Levochkin.

Therefore, after the signing the country economy was supposed to go downhill, most oligarchs to become poorer whereas the group of Levochkin-Firtash - to get richer. The refusal to sign the association agreement put an end to the financial and political wellbeing of the group. Levochkin, who was coordinating his activity with the US embassy from way back and was involved in the Maidan preparations, decided to use that mechanism to put pressure on Yanukovych and coerce him into signing the association agreement. He initiated the students' Maidan, and then it did not make the proper impression on Yanukovych, provided the provocation with beating up the students, after which Maidan stopped being peaceful.

After that, Yuanukovych had only two-three weeks left to disperse Maidan, before his power began to crumble from the inside, before his nominally loyal ministers and generals started negotiations with the opposition about switching to their side, before the West actively intervenes. Yanukovych, too sure of the strength of his position and insignificance of Maidan, started long negotiations with the opposition trying to make Maidan go away by temporary concessions. As soon as his weakness became evident, the West entered the game. The regime was doomed.

Having learned form the previous Maidan, Yanukovych was prepared to defend himself. He intended to simply wait out Maidan behind the police cordons. The idea was: if they do not go away in half a year, then they will after a year; sooner or later they will give up. And then it was revealed that, in contrast with the army, the Ukrainian police are professional and well trained, and peaceful Maidan has no chance to overthrow the government. Only a military coup has that chance.

At the moment when the Ukrainian opposition and the US chose the path of a military coup, and the EU agreed to that decision, the fate of Ukraine was sealed. If until then, despite decades of the cold civil war between the Russian and Galician Ukraine, there still existed options for peaceful compromise-based resolution of the internal conflict, now, with the hot civil war going on, the break down of the country became inevitable. The problem was that the neo-Nazi militants were expected to play the role of the key force of the coup, since the opposition lacked any other organized force. However, if the militants are given weapons (so that they could accomplish the coup), and the adequate response of the law enforcing agencies is blocked, then the militants become effectively the masters of the country.

Law enforcement structures, having been betrayed by the politicians, rapidly degraded; true professionals left, neo-Nazis joined in, opportunists ready to serve any power remained. Nazis found themselves in favorable position allowing them to not only rapidly increase their numbers and supply of arms, but also institute effective control over the law enforcement structures.

All this was clear and present threat for the Russian population of Ukraine. It was much less organized, lacked military units, was almost without weapons, but in conditions of the imminent Nazi terror the problems were being rapidly solved. 25 millions of anti-fascists could not flee Ukraine. Nor could they accept the victory of the second Maidan, as they had accepted that of the first. The first Maidan stepped on their choice, the Constitution, and the law. The second threatened their lives.

A military confrontation of the two almost equal parts of Ukraine supported, respectively, by the US and Russia made a victory of one side problematic and the war potentially endless. It could have likely turned out that way, and Moscow would have found itself mired in the Ukrainian conflict for many years, but at the time of the coup the internal economic resource that supported the functioning of the Ukrainian state was practically exhausted.

To pull the Ukrainian economy out of the crisis, many billions in credits were required as well as long-term investment projects and capacious markets for Ukrainian goods. Russia was prepared to offer all of this to Yanukovych but had no intention (and could not even if it wanted to) to offer anything to the Nazis.

It immediately became apparent that the EU and US likewise have no intentions to finance Ukraine. The outbreak of a civil war suited Washington just fine: there was no need to spend any money, but both Moscow and Brussels were sure to have problems, and the possibility of a dangerous for the US alliance between the EU and EAEU [Eurasian Economic Union] was blocked. The EU itself did not manage during the entire crisis to emerge from under the US shadow and start to defend its own and not American interests.

Internecine quarrel

The lack of resources not only for a prolonged war but even for the routine functions of the state should have made the Ukrainian civil was short but extremely intense and bloody. Initially, the conflict was indeed developing that way until Moscow succeeded in temporarily reducing the intensity of the fighting forcing Kiev into the Minsk agreement.

Nevertheless, the Minsk agreement did not and could not solve the key Ukrainian problems. Thus, it was from the start considered by both side of the Ukrainian conflict as a pause, which should be used to strengthen their positions and increase their military potential.

Kiev found itself in a worse situation than DPR and LPR. The republics had Russia as their rear, and a part of their relatively small population fled to Russia, while those that remained were able to subsist on the Russian humanitarian aid. Ukraine, on the other hand, suffered economic catastrophe rapidly growing into the political crisis. Accelerating decline in living standards of the majority of the population, increasing unemployment that is now at about one third of workforce, lack of prospects, all this undermined the trust in Maidan politicians, created resentment and radicalization in the society that threatened another Maidan.

The economic catastrophe split the Maidan elite, which was not united to begin with. The political groups will have to fight for the remaining economic resources as well as find and present to people those responsible for the failures in the war and destruction of the economy, which makes any agreement among them virtually impossible.

Considering that every political group in Ukraine already has its own military units (mostly volunteer battalions), the only political experience of whose consists of taking part in the military coup against Yanukovych and in the civil war, it is certain that they will be solving this internecine Maidan dispute by the force of arms.

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 #39
Harvard Business Review
www.hbr.org
June 2015
What It Was Like to Be a Manager in Ukraine
By Christos Tsolkas
Christos Tsolkas is the Vice President of the Global Sales Strategy function for Philip Morris International. Previously, he led Philip Morris Ukraine, Caucasus and Moldova and before Philip Morris Greece as Managing Director. Follow him on Twitter: @chtsolkas

Most of the world views the turmoil in Ukraine as a geopolitical and humanitarian catastrophe. In my former position as Managing Director of Philip Morris Ukraine where I was based from January 2012 until February 2015, I was forced to see it as a business crisis that threatened our people, operations, and bottom line. When peaceful protests turned into violent clashes between demonstrators and police, and fighting engulfed the nation, every rule of normal business collapsed. Our supply and distribution lines were impeded; we lost market territory to war and annexation; we had to manage the impact of military mobilization of our workers, and we needed to relocate or redeploy almost a hundred employees and their families.

In that confusion, I had two clear priorities: to secure the safety of our employees at all costs; and to maintain our operations to whatever degree possible.

I tried to give my team in Ukraine this perspective. It is easy to feel anxiety, responsibility, and even shame when things go wrong in a business. But you can only make good, prompt decisions that move the organization forward if you have enough detachment to view the confusion in a clear-eyed and objective way. Indeed, Ukraine's troubles offered an opportunity to build the leadership capacity of my management team.

Shift from "fog fear" to "tent time." A crisis breeds pervasive dread. I call this the "fog fear" and I've seen it paralyze organizations. The antidote is to help your people feel safe, secure, and supported.

Our behavior as the management team mattered a lot. The eleven of us aimed to be calm, decisive, and hands-on captains to the 200 people in our office, the 450 others spread around the country, and the 750 in the factory. We kept our own feelings under control as we tried to be emotionally "present" so that people could discuss their fears and worries with us. We assured them through our actions that our most important priority was to keep them and their families safe and, to that end, instituted nightly head counts and safety reports during the worst of the crisis. Throughout it all, we provided constant communications with status updates, decisions, changes, and guidelines for how to act and react appropriately to the level of crisis at hand.

Just as critically, we supported each other by spending lots of time together, sharing thoughts, and laughs. We called this bonding "tent time." The expression came from an arctic adventurer who had told us that his team grew closer through the long hours they spent together in their tent at the end of every day. The more tent time we had in Ukraine, the closer and calmer we became as a team.

Become a "what if" machine. A crisis throws predictability out the window and forces everyone to adopt new ways to run the business. To effectively manage that chaos, it's necessary to develop the habit of continuously processing new information, playing out "what if" scenarios, calculating risk factors, and running through checklists. With each new development, we learned to assess what it meant by asking, "What is in front of us and what are the consequences?" Through that discipline, it became almost automatic to imagine options, craft emergency plans, and identify trigger points to propel us into action. We knew what we would do if our factory was shut down, our phones stopped working, or the fighting intensified and evacuation was necessary. It was critical to make decisions quickly and avoid becoming stuck.

Avoid secrecy. During a crisis, it's easy for a senior team to huddle in the war room while making important decisions. But while leaders need time to absorb new information, assess priorities, and have candid conversations it is just as important to be out with the troops and "leading from the front." I helped my team understand that increased communication is a must during a crisis. By nature, people are less confused and prone to panic when they understand what is going on. Tone and body language are also important because everyone is hypersensitive to nonverbal clues. Some leaders sugarcoat reality or take the corporate line. We found that it helped to consistently downplay expectations and confront brutal facts so people knew they were always getting straight talk.

Rely on others as much as possible. To manage a crisis, the leadership team must function at its highest capacity. Each person on my team had different skill sets and personalities. Depending on the circumstances, different people came to the front to lead. Our Director of Information Systems became a technological tactician who worked out a plan in record time to allow us work remotely in the event that fighting encroached on our offices. Our Director of Operations led our special situations management team to respond to threats and constant changes. Others offered psychological support to employees experiencing breakdowns, developed contingency plans, or found temporary shelter for those whose homes were threatened. I never appreciated the diversity of a team more, and our tent time helped us benefit from our collective talents. Disagreements and debate was encouraged because we needed a variety of perspectives to surface problems and good ideas. The cohesion of our team made it safer to discuss difficult issues, innovate solutions, and take risks.

Many foreign companies decided to write off Ukraine. Our company achieved exceptional results - maintaining market share, reaching sales targets and accomplishing the majority of our business objectives - while serving as a beacon of stability to our customers and the people of Ukraine, especially during the most difficult eight months of the crisis until September 2014 when the Minsk Protocol temporarily ended hostilities.

We live in a world where crises are likely and leaders must prepare to face the unexpected. It is important to take advantage of every opportunity, even catastrophe, to learn and grow.

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 #40
http://orientalreview.org/Expert.ru
June 3, 2015
Reformatting Ukraine is on the agenda
By Vitaly LEYBIN
Publication is based on a frontpage article recently released by the Russian Expert journal. Text adapted and translated by ORIENTAL REVIEW. http://expert.ru/expert/2015/22/donbass-rossiya-ne-ujdet-v-storonu/

Donbass by the Kiev's regime are likely intended to demonstrate the "inefficiency" of the OSCE mission to its Western patrons and are evidence of Ukraine's attempts to circumvent the jurisdiction of the Minsk truce co-brokered by Russia, Germany, and France.

Indeed, Minsk-2 is very inconvenient for Poroshenko, because it documents for the first time the need for direct dialog between Kiev and the Donbass. And they need to discuss more than just war and peace, because in fact there are a whole range of issues that must be resolved politically, such as the format for local elections, as well as constitutional reform and economic recovery in Ukraine. Minsk-2 undermines the power structure in Ukraine, which after Maidan has been built around nationalist and military mobilization and the persecution of political opponents. There's a good reason why President Poroshenko immediately tried to disavow the agreement as soon as he returned from Minsk. In March 2015 the Verkhovna Rada passed an amendment to the law on the special status of the districts controlled by Donetsk and Luhansk (in violation of the spirit of the Minsk agreement), rather than adopting a new law as Angela Merkel had asked Poroshenko to do. These actions, as well as others that undercut the foundations of the truce, are causing extreme irritation in Berlin and Paris.

It is already clear that Poroshenko's regime in incapable of negotiating. The two Minsk agreements - dating from Sept. 5 and Feb. 12 - would never have been reached had Kiev not suffered military defeats. As soon as Petro Poroshenko won the election on May 25, 2014, Russia and the EU leaders offered to open a dialog with the Donbass militia. At that time there had been no mass casualties or widespread public acrimony. It seemed that Poroshenko, who had been elected to office (albeit without the voters of the Donbass), was capable of listening to the urgings of the leaders in Europe and Russia and begin a peace process. At least his campaign platform offered some hope of that. However, pressure from US officials forced Poroshenko to embrace a military solution. On May 26, 2014, for the first time since WWII, Donetsk was subjected to an air raid, the Donetsk airport was bombed, civilians were killed, and a real war began.

By late August, Ukraine had suffered a crushing defeat on all fronts and in all directions, and Poroshenko, finding himself trapped in a hopeless situation in which the militia threatened to advance further west, had to hastily sign the Minsk Protocol on Sept. 5, in which the parties agreed to pull back from the zone of engagement. That offered the hope that a political process of reconciliation could begin. But instead Kiev took an extremely harsh stance: a de facto economic blockade of the Donbass began; banks closed; public institutions, schools, and hospitals shut down; the payment of pensions and salaries to state employees was suspended; and later - entry to the Donbass was limited to holders of residential passes, in essence creating an internal border. Unable to win on the battlefield, Kiev declared war on the people of the Donbass in order to deprive the militia of popular support. That culminated in yet another fiasco: Ukraine lost Debaltsevo and other territories.

Autonomy or independence? That depends on Kiev.

The most important step in the establishment of the Donetsk and Luhansk republics was the election in November 2014. That election was not recognized by Kiev or the EU, but played a huge role in establishing a legitimate government in those republics. In spite of Kiev's economic blockade and the constant threat of renewed hostilities, it resulted in an undeniable improvement in the humanitarian situation. Even as hostilities raged, behind the front lines peaceful civilian life continued, infrastructure was restored, doctors were able to save lives, children attended school, and many businesses reopened. Regular payment of pensions and public subsidies has begun again, but in order to accomplish this, a new system of social support had to be built from scratch. Due to the lack of cash in hryvnia (the Ukrainian currency) a multicurrency system was introduced, and pensions are already being paid in rubles.

Direct economic ties between companies in Donetsk and Russia have been revived. Taxes have also been collected from those businesses, and the republics now have actual budgets, and although they have not been formally approved due to the uncertainty of the revenue base, those budgets serve as guidelines for estimating bare-bones expenditures. A clear and transparent system has been put together for distributing humanitarian aid. Humanitarian convoys are arriving from the Russian Ministry of Emergency Management, and community organizations are also doing their bit, including Donbass Fraternity Fund, Dr. Elizaveta Glinka's Fair Aid Foundation, and many others. Throughout the war some local charities in, such as Compassion (Dobrota), have continued their work in Donetsk. In every town, no matter how tiny, volunteers have been laboring selflessly.

The more Kiev drags its feet on any political resolution or recognition of special rights for the areas under the control of the governments in the republics, the worse its chances to maintain its current borders. Ukraine will never be stable until she agrees to change. If Ukraine continues to insist on the status quo and persists in pursuing a military solution to the conflict, she will continue to lose ground.

A range of emotions are being experienced in the republics. It is clear that neither the militia nor the majority of the population can envision any sort of future life with Kiev: too much blood has been spilled and Kiev has brought too much suffering to the people of the Donbass - in addition to bombings, humiliation, and the economic blockade.

Nevertheless, Ukraine still has the potential to devise a more nuanced policy than just their extremely nationalistic current plan. This was clearly evident during the elections for the Verkhovna Rada on Oct. 26, 2014. Opposition Bloc even won in Dnepropetrovsk (where nationalist patrols are stationed on every street corner and government leverage coupled with street gangs worked to thwart any opposition movement), not to mention the cities of Zaporozhye and Kharkov. Certainly not all the credit for that success was due to Opposition Bloc itself - which barely waged any sort of political campaign at all - but could rather be chalked up to the public, who voted against the government and against the war. The turnout in Odessa (39.5%), the lowest seen since the end of the Soviet Union, was virtually an act of popular sabotage against "the outsiders' elections."

The potential for protest is huge, because Ukraine has no desire to be the country that the nationalists have envisioned. Every day of peace means new and difficult questions for the Ukrainian government: the population sees the results of the "reforms," the economy is languishing, social payments are shrinking, prices are rising, political repression is everywhere, political opponents are being murdered, and the bodies of soldiers who died in the Donbass are being shipped home to every district in the country.

The law prohibiting Soviet symbols and the ban on the memory of the Great Patriotic War, the glorification of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army - therein lies the path to the further destruction of their own country. And that's not coming from Russia, but from the Ukrainian people. Most Ukrainians will not tolerate such a policy or such a government.

The problem lies in the immaturity of the Ukrainian political elite. For over 23 years of the country's independence, that elite has been fixated on dividing and redividing the country's resources, in the end always shifting the political blame onto outside factions: sometimes pointing the finger at Moscow, and currently - at the West. They have not yet learned how to be responsible for their own state. Now they follow the lead of the US, crippling their own country.

The big game

A lasting peace in the Donbass is achievable only if Europe and Russia can reach an agreement. It is impossible to imagine Poroshenko - or even less Prime Minister Yatsenyuk - behaving in a constructive manner, if Europe and Russia do not coerce them into working for peace.

With all the problems of the past year, it is clear that France and Germany trust Russia far more than their Ukrainian protégés. They can recognize the issues on which "the Russians cannot be trusted" - and the matters on which they can. But those are fixed, clearly defined questions - because Russia does not change her position minute by minute. But all bets are off when it comes to the politicians in Kiev. They might promise to lay down their arms or adopt a law on special status, and then completely flip-flop after a telephone call with Washington.

Of course Europe has phobias and fears of "Russian expansion," but those are more common among the talking heads and the press, while the leaders and diplomats understand that "expansion" is the very essence of international politics. The European Union itself pursues an active policy of "partnership," and in recent decades has also been expanding, while Russia is doing no more than attempting to safeguard her room to maneuver economically. Europeans understand that Russia would not have taken steps to reunify with Crimea and support the Donbass if the West had not provoked the conflict. After many incidents of the most cynical violence aimed at seizing and retaining power over the last year, it is reasonable to assume that the shootings on Maidan were the responsibility of those forces that took power in Ukraine in February 2014. All this is an example of very dirty politics. No matter how indignant the Europeans might be in public, they understand that Russia could not remain on the sidelines.

And that would not be because of any imaginary "imperial ambitions" or in order to merely seize territory. Russia's most important and closest neighbor had entered into a period of disintegration and civil war after a coup d'etat. Forces had assumed power that did not shy away from overt violence - ideological, cultural, repressive, and military - against their own people. The problem was not Ukraine's "European" path, but the bluff - the West was never planning to spend its resources on the economic development of a foreign country, much less help her integrate into European organizations. The result of Maidan could mean nothing but chaos in Ukraine. And until this chaos is overcome, Russia will not remain on the sidelines.

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 #41
Eurasian Geopolitics
http://eurasiangeopolitics.com
June 1, 2015
Why the West should be pushing for a buffer zone between Russia and NATO
by Edward W. Walker
Edward W. Walker is Adjunct Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley.

In my view, Western decision makers should be thinking hard about an endgame to the current crisis in Russian-Western relations. What is a realistic, least-worst outcome in, say, five years? Where will NATO's and the EU's eastern borders be? Where will NATO's and Russia's military assets be deployed? Will there be any arms control agreements still in effect that limit force dispositions and reduce the risks of war? What kind of constraints on economic relations will there be?

In considering the big picture, it strikes me that there are three realistic possibilities: (1) a return to "normalcy," in the sense that Russia and the West are again cooperating and can reasonably be considered "partners": (2) an unstable hostile relationship in which the dividing line between Russia and "the West" is contested, rules of engagement are uncertain, arms control measures have little effect on force dispositions and fail to enhance military stability, and where there is a significant and constant risk of war - so essentially more of what we have today; and (3) a stable hostile relationship where the dividing line between Russia and the West and rules of engagement are reasonably clear and accepted, where arms control measures enhance strategic and regional stability, where Russia has little incentive to attack its neighbors, and where the risks of a conflict between Russia and NATO are very low - so more or less where we were with the Soviet Union during the second half of the Cold War.

These three possibilities are not exhaustive, but all others (e.g., Russia joining Europe and becoming part of the Western institutional order) strike as either very or extremely unlikely. They should probably also be treated as ideal types - that is, we are likely to get some combination of the three. For example, we might well see a measured return to normalcy in some aspects of the economic relationship along with some progress on rules of engagement, confidence-building measures, and force disposition agreements. Nonetheless, any outcome is going to fall broadly into one of these three categories.

My view is that Russia's annexation of Crimea, its role in the separatist uprisings in eastern Ukraine, and the political atmosphere in Russia in general makes Option 1 very unlikely. That is, I doubt that we are going to see a return to normalcy over the next five years, either as a result of regime change or some kind of dramatic shift in policy in Moscow, or because the West ends up accepting the annexation of Crimea and Russian hegemony in its "near abroad." To put a number on it, I would say the probability of Outcome 1 is maybe 10%.

Outcome 2 strikes me as very undesirable for all parties, including Russia and its immediate neighbors, not only because of the ongoing risk of war but also because an ongoing zero-sum geopolitical struggle is going to hurt all parties economically and politically. Unfortunately, I think its probability is pretty high - maybe 55%.

That puts the probability of Outcome 3 - a stable adversarial relationship - at around 35%. Outcome 3 is, however, not nearly as bad as Outcome 2, so given that it is reasonably possible, it's the one that prudent policy makers in the West (and I would add in Russia) should be pressing for.

What, then, might the specifics of Outcome 3 look like? And specifically, just where will the dividing line between Russia and Europe be, and how could the relationship be made reasonably stable?

Readers of this blog will know that I have been advocating a security arrangement entailing a buffer zone between Russia and NATO consisting, ideally, of Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. The basic arrangement would be straightforward: no security alliances, bilateral or multilateral, that include mutual defense commitments for the buffer zone states, and no foreign troops, rotational or otherwise, on their territories. Each "neutral" state would be free to receive outside military assistance from other countries and alliances, but joint training would have to take place outside the buffer zone. Each would also be free to make non-security arrangements with other states or multilateral organizations (e.g., the European Union or Eurasian Union) as it saw fit.

The arrangement would be contingent upon a genuine ceasefire and a separation of forces in eastern Ukraine, along with an international peacekeeping force in a demilitarized zone, one that will probably require some kind of a Russian contingent to get a separatist buy-in (so a frozen conflict on something like the Transnistria model but perhaps with an EU contribution to the peacekeeping force). Kyiv's insistence on elections and other laws in the separatist zone complying with Ukrainian laws, and its desire to exercise some degree of control over the border between the separatist zone, would be dropped, as would Russian/separatists' demands for any institutional arrangements in Ukraine proper.

One model, among others, would be to institutionalize a buffer zone through a treaty among six states - Russia, the United States, Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. In practice, however, the arrangement would require agreement between two states only - the United States and Russia. If both agreed not to remain part of any alliance (NATO or the CSTO) that included any of the four neutral countries or that placed troops in those countries, that would be sufficient to make it happen.

There are variations on the overall design of the arrangement. For example, Belarus might be allowed to remain part of the CSTO, just as Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania remain part of NATO, but with limitations on the size and capabilities of Russian forces in Belarus and non-indigenous NATO forces in Estonia and Latvia. So some Russian forces would be allowed in Belarus (there are very few now) and some non-indigenous NATO troops would be allowed in the Baltic states. But not many. Moldova might also be included as a neutral state, or Azerbaijan left out of the arrangement entirely given its location.

I am of course aware that there are major political obstacles to any such arrangement, particularly in the short term. It would be difficult for the Kremlin to sell the arrangement to the Russian public generally and to security hawks in particular given the mood in Russia today. It would be ever more difficult for the Obama administration to do so, given that it is already hard pressed on the Iran nuclear deal and the transpacific and transatlantic trade agreements. Nor does it help that a U.S. presidential election is already underway, or that whoever replaces Obama is likely to be considerably less willing to compromise with Moscow on security matters, at least initially.

Perhaps most importantly, many Georgians and especially Ukrainians would feel that formally closing the door to NATO membership and coming to an agreement with Moscow on security matters would be a disgraceful betrayal of their interests and their liberal-democratic aspirations.

The problem, however, is that the likely alternative is worse for all parties, and particularly for the border countries themselves: acute political tensions, economic disruptions, and military instability, with a real risk of war between NATO and Russia, along Russia's very long western borders and the Caucasus for the indefinite future.

To put the point differently, I don't see how hawks in the West, or in Ukraine or Georgia particularly, have good answers to the following questions:

-Is NATO collectively, or the United States individually, prepared to spend the money, and take on the risks, entailed in establishing a credible military deterrent all along Russia's western and Caucasus borders, including Finland but above all in the Baltic states? (I should note that a senior NATO military official just publicly stated that Russia could occupy the Baltic states in two days if it chose to - I think that is a considerable exaggeration, but it certainly highlights the problem.)

-Were it to come to a military conflict with Russia, would NATO necessarily prevail given that Russia would be fighting near its borders, has a very large and now formidable military apparatus, and above all has thousands of tactical and strategic weapons at its disposal, which I suspect it would use if push came to shove.

-If and when large and unannounced Russian military exercises take place near the border with Estonia and Latvia, how large and menacing should those exercises be before NATO orders the deployment of its rapid reaction forces to the Baltic states? Will political decision-makers do so if they fear that it might precipitate a preemptive strike by Russia and given NATO's consensual decision making rules? (NATO's website states the following with respect to a deployment order: "Any decision to use the NRF is a consensual political decision, taken on a case-by-case basis by all 28 Allies in the North Atlantic Council, NATO's principal political decision-making body.")

-How will the West respond, for example, if Russian forces from Kaliningrad suddenly occupy Gotland, other Baltic islands, and/or parts of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and the Kremlin then announces that it will use nuclear weapons before allowing Russian forces to be dislodged from those areas?

Are Western hawks confident that the Kremlin will not succeed, sooner or later if the current unstable hostile relationship persists, in sowing more divisions within an already stressed Europe, in contributing to an unraveling of the European project, or in dividing the Western alliance over matters like military assistance to Ukraine, responses to Russia's military provocations and acts of brinkmanship, or military spending and NATO's buildup of forces on its eastern borders?

-Is it reasonable to expect "regime change" in Moscow, or even a significant change in policy toward the West in the foreseeable future? Are Russian decision makers likely to become more sanguine about NATO expansion or NATO's growing hard power near Russia's borders? (I should make clear I think reinforcing NATO's eastern defenses is entirely appropriate under the circumstances.) Is it not safer to assume that we are in for a long period of adversarial relations with Russia? If so, should we not seek to minimize the risks of war during that period?

-Finally, is it reasonable to expect Georgia and Ukraine to stabilize politically, prosper economically, or become "European" if they share borders with a very large, powerful, and angry neighbor that is determined to make life miserable for them for the indefinite future?

I don't believe Western hawks have good answers to those questions. I am even more confident that Russian hawks don't have good answers to similar questions for Russia. Russia's economy was slowing down even before the Ukraine crisis, and a Russian "pivot" to China is going to be extremely costly and not without its own geopolitical risks, as many Russian specialists are aware. Most importantly, how does a country with a GDP of roughly 1/20th of the West's come out ahead in a long geopolitical struggle with the EU and United States, let alone if it finds itself in a direct military conflict with NATO?

In short, a prolonged period of military instability along a long and contested border, with Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaijan variably "in play," and with the world's leading nuclear powers engaged in periodic acts of brinkmanship, is objectively not in any party's interest. So it would be wise to try to avoid it. And I don't see that happening unless there is some kind of agreement with Moscow on a buffer zone and conventional and theater force dispositions.

That said, let me make seven important points about the implications of an institutionalized buffer zone between NATO and Russia.

1. Neutrality does not mean disarmament

Under international law, neutral countries have certain rights and duties with regard to belligerents, but they are under no obligation to disarm. This is as true for "permanently neutral states," like Switzerland, as it is for non-permanent ones (that is, states that declare neutrality in a particular war). So again, neutrality does entail military restraints on the country's ability to develop its own defense capabilities. With respect to what I'm proposing, Ukrainian and Georgian troops could continue to train jointly with NATO troops abroad, contribute to peacekeeping missions, and receive military assistance, and purchase weapons including lethal weapons, from Western or other governments. Belarusian troops and officers, if Belarus were to be included in the arrangement, could do the same in Russia or elsewhere.

While there would not have to be restrictions on arms procurements or deployments by the neutral countries, they might be parties to multilateral arms control agreements (e.g., a new CFE treaty), or they might even enter into bilateral arms control agreements, eventually, with Russia (e.g., on air defense systems or short-range ballistic or cruise missiles near the border).

2. Neutrality can enhance security for neutral countries

National security has both a supply and demand dimension to it. That is, security can come from unilateral defense measures and foreign alliances (the supply side) or by not posing a threat to other states or otherwise inviting attack (the demand side). Consider Costa Rica, which has not had armed forces since 1948, or Switzerland, which has not been attacked since it was recognized as neutral at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The same has been true, more or less, of Lichtenstein since 1868, and Austria, Sweden, and Finland were all neutral during the Cold War and remain so (more or less - see below) today.

The obvious point is that the demand side of security is particularly important - albeit not sufficient - for small countries bordering on large and powerful ones. Given the nature of their current relations with Russia, the goal for Ukraine and Georgia should be to enhance their defense capabilities in a way that does not pose an objective threat to Russia while otherwise reducing Russia's incentives to attack them, such that the costs of attacking exceed any likely gains. So both sides of the security equation are going to have to be enhanced for either country to be secure and to have the freedom of action they need to develop internally.

3. Neutrality and economic prosperity

Switzerland, Finland, Sweden, Austria, and Lichtenstein are all extremely wealthy countries. What is not conducive to economic prosperity is war. 'Nuff said.

4. Neutrality would not preclude Ukraine and Georgia from joining the European Union

This is a rather more tricky than it appears at first blush, however, because the EU's Lisbon Treaty includes a mutual defense clause as part of the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy.

Were aspirant countries to agree, however, I suspect some kind of opt-out from the CSDP could be arranged for accession countries. Moreover, Austria, Finland, Ireland, Malta, and Sweden are all members of the European Union in good standing but have not formally renounced their "neutrality." In any case, Moscow is far more concerned about bordering states joining NATO or having American troops on their territory, so I suspect something could be worked out eventually that Moscow could live with with respect to EU membership.

I should also note that becoming "European" and joining the European Union are not the same thing. Neither Switzerland nor Norway is an EU member, but each is as European as it gets, not to speak of extremely prosperous. Whether Georgia and Ukraine become "European" is going to be driven primarily by domestic institutions and internal practices and beliefs, not by E.U. membership. (This is not to deny that the goal of membership has been and continues to be very helpful tool for becoming ""European" - rather the point is that membership is not a necessary condition.)

5. Ukraine and Georgia are not going to be invited to join NATO in any case

Controlling external borders is an informal condition for NATO accession, as is enhancing the overall security of the alliance. Neither criterion would be met by Ukraine or Georgia. Joining NATO would put each country in a position to invoke Article 5 of the NATO Charter, which would in effect mean that the member-states of NATO would immediately be at war with Russia. That is not going to happen. Moreover, accession requires ratification by all the alliance's member-states. What is the likelihood that the French, German, or even the British governments, let alone the Greeks or Hungarians, would agree to bring Ukraine into the alliance if doing so risked war with Russia?

In my view, we currently have the worst of all world with respect to NATO enlargement: NATO officials repeatedly asserting that membership for Georgia and Ukraine is on the table; almost no Western governments actually prepared to press for membership; Russia convinced that NATO will relentlessly expand if Moscow does not make dramatic and dangerous steps to stop it; and almost no chance that either country is ever going to benefit from the deterrence effect of accession.

6. Reaching a security agreement with Moscow does not mean recognition of the annexation of Crimea or independence for Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria, the DPR, or the LPR.

Entering into a security agreement with Moscow does not mean accepting the legitimacy of Russia's annexation of Crimea or intervention in eastern Ukraine, any more than signing the Helsinki Final Act meant that the United States or its allies recognized the legitimacy of the incorporation of the Baltic republics into the USSR or Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. (Were Ukraine and Russia ever to come to an agreement whereby Kyiv agreed to some kind of compensation for the annexation, Western countries would and should endorse whatever Kyiv agrees to, but not until then.) Nor would it mean denying that Putin's regime is deeply illiberal and that Russia is, at least for now, an adversary of the West, and a powerful one at that. On the contrary, it takes that for granted.

7. NATO is under no obligation to take in aspirant countries that do not enhance the Alliance's collective security

The Atlantic community's stance is that every country has a right to determine its own external orientation and enter into military alliances as it sees fit. That may be reasonable, but it does not mean that every state or alliance system has an obligation to form an alliance with other states, democratic or otherwise. To put it bluntly, Ukraine and Georgia have every right to seek to join NATO, but NATO has every right to refuse their applications. Indeed, as noted above, NATO accession requires approval by all existing member-states - in the U.S. case, that means approval by at least two-thirds of the Senate, as with any treaty. The obvious implication is that the Senate has every right to deny an application if it sees fit.

Likewise, it misses the point to assert that no third party (read Russia) has a right to keep other states from joining the Alliance. That too may sound principled, but NATO members are fully entitled to take into consideration not only their own national interests, the interests of the Alliance as a whole, and the interests of aspirant countries in making accession decisions, they also have every right to consider the interests of other affected parties - notably Russia. Indeed in my view they have an obligation to be pragmatic about the geopolitical consequences of accession decisions. That was true when Western powers agreed to neutrality for Austria as a condition for withdrawing Soviet troops from the country under the terms of the Austrian State Treaty of 1955, and it is true today with respect to NATO accession for Ukraine and Georgia.

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 #42
The International New York Times
June 5, 2015
Western Defeat in Ukraine
By Roger Cohen
Op-ed columnist

LONDON - It was not a surprise that President Vladimir Putin of Russia came out in strong support of FIFA against the "blatant attempt" of the United States "to extend its jurisdiction to other states." Institutionalized corruption is Putin's thing. The governing body of world soccer has become a near-perfect illustration of how such a system works, almost as good as the once-pliant Ukraine of Putin's ousted puppet, former President Viktor Yanukovych.

American power is Putin's obsession. He professes to see its long arm everywhere, subverting Russia and countries of its former empire. So the Justice Department's move against FIFA fit every Russian geostrategic theory. (In addition, of course, Putin is worried about the 2018 World Cup in Russia, as he should be. To say the event will carry echoes of the Berlin Olympics of 1936 would be an exaggeration, but not a wild one.)

It is not a surprise that various Russian generals and officials have been blustering about nukes, even threatening to wipe out poor little Denmark's navy; nor that they have made clear that they will defend the annexation of Crimea (where the extension of Russian jurisdiction was on the "blatant" side) with every weapon in their arsenal. Force is the language Putin understands better than any other. He knows how uncomfortable much of Europe has become with this lexicon.

There are in fact no more surprises. Putin has turned on the West, seeing opposition to it as the glue of his regime, rather than integration with it as the path to Russian progress. He has opted for his life's work: buying people, compromising them, threatening them.

Perhaps it was the street protests in Moscow of late 2011. Perhaps it was a perception of Western perfidy in Libya earlier that year. Perhaps it was some inkling about a moment of American weakness. Perhaps it really was the ouster through a popular uprising of the grossly corrupt Yanukovych in Ukraine. Perhaps it was simply his inner K.G.B. officer rising to the surface, a yearning for the empire lost. In the end the reasons are secondary to the reality, which is that Putin has opted to ignite Russian nationalism by cultivating the myth of Western encirclement of the largest nation on earth by far. The G-7 will convene in a few days without him. Of course it will. The Russian president is no longer interested in the rules of that club. Controlled antagonism to it suits him better.

Some 15 months have gone by since the annexation of Crimea. A few things have become clear. On the whole, they are troubling. The first is how muted, really, the American reaction has been to Moscow's seizure of a chunk of Ukrainian territory and Russia's stirring-up of a little war in eastern Ukraine with its more than 6,000 dead. The United States is not even a party to the Minsk accords, the deeply flawed agreement to unwind the conflict that looks more like a means to freeze it in place.

Yes, there have been expressions of outrage from Washington. Yes, Secretary of State John Kerry was in Sochi last month for talks with Putin. But the bottom line is that Russian aggression has been met by a degree of American absence unthinkable even a decade ago. Follow-up talks to Minsk tend to find a Ukrainian official in a room with a Russian and two representatives of the breakaway areas of eastern Ukraine. One against three is not a credible formula for progress.

In America's place has stood Chancellor Angela Merkel's Germany. She speaks to Putin regularly. She has been frank in her condemnation of his actions. Without Germany, the sanctions in place against Russia would not have been effectively coordinated. But a fundamental problem remains. Postwar Germany is in essence a pacifist power. Mention of force is near anathema to the vast majority of the German people. Arming Ukraine to level the playing field (and so bolster the chances of diplomacy) is of course rejected by Merkel; it should not have been. Force is precisely what Putin has used to secure what he wanted: a truncated and dysfunctional Ukraine diverted from its Westernizing ambitions. This has been Moscow's core victory and the core failure of Berlin and Washington.

The battle for Ukraine is going to be long. There are no quick fixes at this point. The shows of NATO resolve and presence in the Baltic, where three NATO states feel vulnerable with cause, have been important; they should be reinforced. The bolstering and reform of NATO to face Putin's new threats is critical. There can be no relaxation of sanctions against Russia until Ukraine controls its borders once again. Through parties of the left and right - Syriza in Greece, the National Front in France - Putin is probing to weaken the European Union and the West where he can. Wobbling is not the answer.

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 #43
The National Interest
June 4, 2015
Russia's Ukraine Game: Will Putin Go All In?
"Ukraine may be out of the headlines for now-but it is still very much in play."
By Nikolas K. Gvosdev
Nikolas Gvosdev, a professor of national security studies and a contributing editor at The National Interest, is co-author of Russian Foreign Policy: Vectors, Sectors and Interests (CQ Press, 2013). The views expressed here are his own.

Predicting what the Putin government will do when it comes to the crisis in Ukraine is fraught with peril. I myself did not anticipate the rapid annexation of Crimea last year. At the time, I believed that there was no real danger to the Russian strategic position on the peninsula and that Moscow's long-term interests weren't served by amputating the most reliably pro-Russian part of the country from Ukraine.

With that caveat in mind, however, let us assess some of the factors currently in play.

- The European Union has signaled that current sanctions imposed on Russia will remain in place until the end of the year. Those countries that were agitating for sanctions relief have accepted the extension with the proviso that there will be a serious conversation about the future of those measures in December.

- Sanctions relief is tied to implementation of the Minsk-2 accords, including the durability of the ceasefire and progress taken on the roadmap outlined by the agreement. Significantly, however, the European Union has no alternative to the Minsk process. Despite all of the agreement's flaws, this is the process by which Brussels-and many of the key member states of the Union-have decided to use to regulate the Ukraine crisis.

This might lead Moscow to change course and to let the spotlight focus on the Ukrainian government's shortcomings-its inability to move forward on some of its commitments under the Minsk accords and difficulties in meeting the next round of reform benchmarks. The EU at its Eastern Partnership summit in Riga did not grant Ukraine the right to visa-free travel, citing the failures of the current government to reach the required benchmarks. With local elections scheduled for this fall, the appetite of Ukrainian politicians to push ahead with costly and painful reforms-given the low ratings currently enjoyed by Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk and President Petro Poroshenko-might very well diminish, especially if rising discontent helps the political fortunes of the Opposition Bloc.

Here, the Russian strategy would be to exploit "Ukraine fatigue" on the part of Western governments and harness "reform fatigue" on the part of Ukrainian voters, to repeat the successes of rolling back the Orange Revolution.

But what, then, to make of the ongoing ceasefire violations and the constant remobilization and deployment of Russian forces along the border? Some have suggested that the same mindset that pushed for the rapid annexation of Crimea will inform the suggestion that Russia needs to consolidate the separatist territories in eastern Ukraine now before Ukraine has the ability to field better military forces. Sure, it will provoke a new crisis with the West-but even with sanctions, there has been a modest economic recovery that may give the Kremlin greater confidence to act. Present the world with another fait accompli-after all, no one really talks about Crimea returning to Ukraine anymore-and ensure that Ukraine is saddled with a permanent frozen conflict on its territory.

If the Kremlin strategy is to peel off a permanent pro-Russian buffer in the southeast, an approach like the above makes sense. It of course means writing off any possibility of restoring Russian influence over the rest of Ukraine (which, given the shifts in public opinion-may be a lost cause). On the other hand, developments in Moldova over the past year belie any such simplistic assessments. Such a strategy also runs the risk of permanently damaging Russia's ties to Europe-guaranteeing no sanctions relief in December-and pushing Russia closer into China's embrace.

It also depends on what the West is prepared to do if the Minsk process fails beyond recall. What does Moscow think Washington and the Europeans will do if the ceasefire completely collapses? Will the response be primarily rhetorical, or will there be any serious economic (or military) penalties? Here, of course, Russia runs a risk; having taken what they believe is the temperature of the Obama administration based on previous decisions, they assume that past behavior indicates future performance-whereas renewed fighting in Ukraine might in fact be the red line that the United States is indeed prepared to enforce.

Finally, we have the wild card of the Mikheil Saakashvili factor. The former Georgian president, now governor of the restive Odessa region-which borders on the separatist enclave of Transnistria in Moldova, has in the past blundered into Russian traps set for him and counted on Western support that never quite materialized. Will he be able to avoid provocations that might give the Russians a pretext for further action, either to defend the Russian-speaking populace or in connection with an incident with Transnistria-preventing a miniature repeat of how he was maneuvered into conflict with Russia in 2008?

At the same time, Saakashvili's appointment was justified, in part, on the gamble that he could turn his Western connections into concrete investment that would lead to immediate improvements in the economic quality of life. Will his political friends in the West be able to convince skeptical firms to invest more money into Ukraine? His efforts will not be aided by sentiments that existing investors in Ukraine should accept a "haircut" on the grounds that they should have known the risks of putting money into Ukraine in the first place.

Saakashvili could either jumpstart the economy in Odessa-a critical step in solidifying Ukraine and a powerful rebuff to Moscow's claims if a key Russian-speaking region of Ukraine shows the possibility of reform-or he could preside over a series of failures that would undermine the whole reform effort.

Ukraine may be out of the headlines for now-but it is still very much in play.

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 #44
Carnegie Europe
June 3, 2015
Judy Asks: Does Putin Have to Escalate to Survive?
By Judy Dempsey

Every week, a selection of leading experts answer a new question from Judy Dempsey on the foreign and security policy challenges shaping Europe's role in the world.

Neil Buckley, Eastern Europe editor of the Financial Times:

Russian President Vladimir Putin does not have to escalate to survive right now-but may one day have to. If anything, he seems to be deescalating. The Novorossiya project to pull nine regions away from Ukraine has been declared dead. While massing troops on the Russian-Ukrainian border to maintain pressure, Moscow seems ready to settle for implementation of the February 2015 Minsk II agreement in Donetsk and Luhansk-or at least for the two Ukrainian regions to become the sites of frozen conflicts that Moscow can use to pressure Ukraine.

That Putin has been able to subtly backtrack without damaging his ratings has demonstrated the power of his media propaganda machine to manipulate opinion. Russian media have provided cover by presenting recent visits to Moscow by senior U.S. politicians John Kerry and Victoria Nuland as marking a U.S. climbdown that left Russia the victor in this round of hostilities (even if the visits were nothing of the sort).

The problem with what now seems the most likely scenario in eastern Ukraine-a frozen conflict-is that it will not lead the EU and the United States to lift their sanctions against Russia. Without a huge oil price increase, those sanctions are a vice tightening over time. They will make it more difficult for Russia to maintain oil output, finance its economy, and repay corporate debt. Russians will start to feel the effects.

Putin and his team have now seen three times how small, apparently victorious wars can boost popularity-in Chechnya in 2000, in Georgia in 2008, and in Crimea in 2014. They may feel they have no choice but to try the same trick again.

Joerg Forbrig, Transatlantic fellow for Central and Eastern Europe at the German Marshall Fund of the United States:

Systemically, Russian President Vladimir Putin's regime is now fully based on external conflict. Previously, the Kremlin bought Russians' political acquiescence by handing out material benefits fueled by rising revenues from energy exports. Absent similar riches now, the regime is closing ranks at home by fomenting aggression abroad, by stirring nationalist frenzy, and by declaring it Russia's historical mission to challenge a dominant West. Only by regularly seeking (and winning) conflict with the West-head-on or by proxy, politically or militarily-can Putin regenerate loyalty among both the elites and society.

Ukraine, currently the key theater in this conflict, seems to be in for a Russian escalation, for various reasons. In Russia, the "success" of Putin's March 2014 annexation of Crimea is receding into history, the country's economy and finances are ever shakier, and the elites and society are starting to feel the pinch.

Ukraine, meanwhile, has not collapsed and has even made some modest progress with reforms. And in the country's eastern Donbass region, the upcoming summer lends itself to efforts by Russian-backed separatists to tear away further territories and assets from central government control. It seems the Kremlin will hardly miss this triple opportunity to demonstrate Russian military might, to throw Ukraine back into instability, and to solidify the so-called people's republics in eastern Ukraine-before possibly freezing the conflict at the next round of peace talks.

Andrei Kolesnikov, Senior associate in the Carnegie Moscow Center:

The best way for Russian President Vladimir Putin to escalate in 2014 was by gathering support from the electorate, which was furious and overwhelmed by patriotism. For the moment, the best option for him is to freeze the situation in eastern Ukraine and to use it in a delicate gamble-just like during a KGB examination: sweet talk with prompts and hidden traps.

Putin is ready to continue irritating the West. In some circumstances, he could even convert the cold war in Ukraine into a hot one, but his interests-geopolitical and economic-are moving eastward. Putin is trying to find supporters in Asia, but he has not understood that this will be much harder than he can imagine.

At the same time, the Russian president and his inner circle will escalate in domestic policy. They can't stop themselves. The Russian authorities are manically persecuting dissenters, NGOs, and the independent media; they are restricting and controlling everything around them; and they are classifying sensitive information, including about military losses in peacetime. In their propaganda efforts, the ruling elites are rewriting history. Putin vindicates the actions of Stalin, while Russian television seeks to explain the logic of the 1968 Soviet invasion of Prague.

So, Russian escalation continues-slowly but surely, and primarily in domestic policy.

Gianni Riotta, Member of the Council on Foreign Relations:

Russian President Vladimir Putin might not have to escalate, but he surely will. The Russian economy is lukewarm at best and will not heat up, oil is cheap, and China purrs-but Moscow is and will remain Beijing's junior partner, a new status in history.

Dissidents in today's Russia are even less influential than they were in the Soviet Union. Physicist Andrei Sakharov, poet Joseph Brodsky, and novelist Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn won their Nobel prizes during the Cold War, but journalist Anna Politkovskaya, political activist Alexei Navalny, and liberal politician Boris Nemtsov are shunned to a few cantankerous op-eds, ignored by governments and institutions.

So Putin's rule is safe, but he is riding an overloaded bike on a bumpy road. If he slows down, he'll hit the concrete fast and painfully. Escalation is the only tool he has to keep his powerful but precarious balance. A very difficult exercise for the leader in the Kremlin, and a very dangerous sport for the world.

Paul Saunders, Executive director of the Center for the National Interest and associate publisher of the National Interest:

No, Russian President Vladimir Putin does not have to escalate to survive-at least, not unless the United States escalates first. Russian public opinion continues to overwhelmingly support Putin's conduct in eastern Ukraine, as do Russia's elites. That said, while some hawks in the elite argue for escalation as a means to extract Western concessions and settle the conflict, there is little apparent public pressure for a more expansive Russian role in the fighting. If nothing else changes, the Russian president can likely continue on his current course for some time without significant escalation.

At the same time, Putin cannot easily disengage from Ukraine without having something to show for it. This currently appears to require concessions that the United States, the European Union, and Ukraine are unwilling to offer. Since the two Minsk agreements aimed at ending the fighting do not address Moscow's underlying concerns about the West's relations with Ukraine, implementing the accords will at best buy time rather than establish a lasting solution.

U.S. escalation-such as a decision to provide lethal military assistance to Ukraine-would strengthen those Russian voices arguing for escalation. Simultaneously, such a move by the United States would provide Putin with a ready public justification for escalation that would probably solidify rather than undermine public support, even in the face of possibly rising casualties. Declining to escalate in those circumstances could weaken Putin's political position.

James Sherr, Associate fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Program at Chatham House:

There is no reason to suppose that Vladimir Putin has already answered this question. The menacing buildup of forces on Ukraine's border affords him a diplomatic instrument as well as a military one.

In a rational policy environment, one option for the Russian president would be to exploit the faulty provisions of the February 2015 Minsk II agreement, to enfeeble Ukraine and dismantle the Western sanctions regime against Russia. The linkage between EU sanctions and the Minsk accord makes this course eminently sensible, as do the debilities of the Ukrainian economy and state. Yet this course demands too much patience from a leader under pressure to achieve results quickly.

Today, Russia's separatist protégés control but 4 percent of Ukraine's territory. These entities are not viable, and it was never Moscow's intent that they should be. For Putin, they are a lever to force Ukraine into submission or collapse. So far, two major military offensives have not had this effect. Why should a prolonged period of stability do so? Why should Putin not raise the stakes as he has done in the past?

Instead of deterring him, the West has provided encouragement. The Western response to the military offensive that destroyed the first Minsk accord of September 2014 was not the much-mooted arming of Ukraine, but a second agreement more flawed than the first. Preserving the frozen conflict the West sought to prevent in 2014 is becoming the definition of success. This dynamic does not favor moderation or restraint.

Susan Stewart, Deputy head of the Eastern Europe and Eurasia Research Division at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP):

Russian President Vladimir Putin will need to escalate only if Russia's economic situation severely deteriorates. If it remains stable or improves, then the vast majority of the Russian population will basically be satisfied and will not require constant mobilization around patriotic causes to distract them from socioeconomic woes. In such a case, the regime could also ensure the continued loyalty of key elite groupings through various forms of financial backing.

If, however, the economic situation degenerates further, the regime will likely believe it necessary to divert people's attention away from the consequences of such a deterioration. The most obvious way to do this will be to intensify current rhetoric and actions regarding external and internal enemies. If only a small segment of the elite can be subsidized, this could lead to debilitating infighting for scarce resources, possibly jeopardizing the regime.

At any rate, Russia has now clearly embarked on a path of destabilizing Ukraine and demonizing the West. This has unleashed political and social forces that are difficult to contain. And it is more convenient for Putin if those groups inclined to fight are involved in Ukraine's eastern Donbass area, rather than bringing their weapons and their penchant for violence to Russia. Thus there are also noneconomic factors that encourage escalation.

Paul Stronski, Senior associate in Carnegie's Russia and Eurasia Program:

The war in eastern Ukraine complicates Russian President Vladimir Putin's domestic position and raises concerns about the stability of Russia's brittle political system. The question of escalation, however, overestimates Putin's ability to control the multiple actors involved in Moscow and in Ukraine's eastern Donbass area, while underestimating the political risks of escalation to Putin.

The Russian president's political longevity has depended on his ability to balance opposing factions of the political and economic elite-the only force that really matters in Russian politics. However, the war has boxed him in, and a struggle is under way between opposing elite groups with ever more polarized interests, complicating Putin's balancing act.

Russian analysts now warn of political warfare and elite revolts behind the Kremlin's walls. Some members of the elite-and they are not exclusively liberals-worry about the collapse of relations with the West, the costs of war for an already-struggling economy, and the potential for popular discontent down the road. They urge deescalation and accommodation.

Hard-line security service elements and reactionary oligarchs want to expand the conflict with the West and have been largely responsible for orchestrating the war so far. These elements are also behind the crackdown inside Russia-a clear sign they too worry about popular discontent and are acting now to squelch it.

In the Donbass, the Russian military presence is real. But so are the criminal groups and warlords (on both sides) who have done much of the fighting and are keen to defend their turf. The separatist leadership is reportedly nervous that the Kremlin will sell them out and is keen to prevent that. There are growing calls for vengeance in Ukraine. The region remains a tinderbox, and an explosion of violence is a possibility-even if Putin does not want it.

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#45
www.thedailybeast.com
June 3, 2015
Can Anyone Stop Putin's New Blitz?
By Michael Weiss
Michael Weiss is a fellow at the Institute of Modern Russia where he edits The Interpreter, an online translation journal. He is a columnist for Foreign Policy and NOW Lebanon.

A shaky cease-fire in Ukraine was shattered Wednesday morning with a new offensive by Russian-backed troops. How will the White House respond?
It looks like Vladimir Putin will spend his second summer in a row going to war.

So now the question becomes: What-if anything-will the United States and Europe do in response?

On Wednesday, Ukrainians awoke to the all-too-predictable news that Moscow-backed separatists-a contingent that consists of quite a lot of Moscow-dispatched Russian soldiers-launched a fresh, multi-pronged assault on Ukrainian-held territory.  The primary targets lie west of a line of the demarcation meant to keep a cease-fire that was over before the ink had dried on the so-called "Minsk II" accords.

"Although we're still assessing details, this is clearly a major, multi-front escalation that reflects continued non-compliance with Minsk by the combined Russian-separatist forces," a senior Western diplomat told The Daily Beast.  When asked if this was the start of a big Russian push for more terrain in the Donbas-the name for the regions encompassing Donetsk and Lugansk-one European leader replied: "Sure looks like it."

So here's what we know. The two main towns hit today were Marinka and Krasnogorovka, both not far from the major industrial city of Donetsk. The nearest separatist lines to these targets are the Petrovsky district of the city to the east, Aleksandrovka to the south-east and Novomikhailkovka to the north-east. Video footage, purportedly shot in Petrovsky today, clearly recorded the sounds of outbound artillery fire, with the attendant description of the footage claiming that the separatists were firing from positions in the immediate vicinity of residential high-rises. (Of course, firing from civilian areas doesn't just violate Minsk II, but the Geneva Conventions.)

Boasts by separatists that Marinka had fallen were met with immediate denials by Kiev.

While acknowledging "a massive bombardment" by separatists using heavy artillery, Ukraine's military spokesman Andriy Lysenko said that the government was "holding off all the attacks." His colleague, Markiyan Lubkivsky, an adviser to the head of the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU), claimed that 10 Ukrainian soldiers had been killed and over 80 wounded. Among the dead on the other side, Lubkivsky said, SBU counterintelligence established that at least four were Russian GRU Spetsnaz (Special Forces) soldiers. If true, their presence would further underscore the Kremlin-orchestrated nature of this escalation.

The "defense minister" of the separatist "Donetsk People's Republic," Vladimir Kononov, meanwhile, has alleged that 15 people were killed on his side, including fighters and civilians. He blamed a Ukrainian "provocation" for the uptick in violence, which is a bit strange given what the DNR media portal proclaimed.

The fighting cut off the electricity at two mines in the Donetsk region, Skochinsky and Zasyadko, leaving nearly 1,000 miners trapped underground. Separatists claimed that the ones at Skochinsky were being evacuated.

The play for Marinka and Krasnogorovka was also accompanied by heavy shelling, possibly using Grad missiles, against Ukrainian-held positions north of Donetsk such as the towns of Peski and Avdeyevka. And to the south, separatists also targeted Ukrainian locations at Beryozovoye, which lies in Kiev-held stretch of a strategically vital road system, the Donetsk-Mariupol highway. To the south of that, below separatist-held territory, there were further sorties on positions in Burgas, previously the site of heavy civilian casualties due Grad attacks.

Novosti Donbassa, a regional news website, reported today that Ukrainian troops had conducted an organized withdrawal from their foremost checkpoint on the stretch of highway that passes directly south of Marinka as this was too exposed to attack.  As my colleague James Miller explains, the separatists have for weeks been testing Ukraine's defenses along the demarcation line in a fairly evenly spaced offensives that amount to pincer moves designed to trap Kiev between two fronts, a "strategy that has proven to be highly effective in the conflict, most notably at Ilovaisk and Debaltsevo," two of the hottest war-zones of the conflict.

Here's why all of this matters. Should Marinka fall and the Russians succeed in pushing the Ukrainians back from the northern stretch of the Donetsk-Mariupol highway, they'd likely next make a push for Volnovakha, a town that Kiev's army needs to keep if it wants to maintain control of Mariupol, the crucial port-city on the Sea of Azov.  Putin would need Mariupol if he did indeed want to erect a "land-bridge" from mainland Russia to occupied Crimea.

This wouldn't be at all easy to do, however. As several analysts have noted, taking Mariupol would require some 100,000 conventional Russian troops. That would be a major departure from Putin's game plan so far: maskirovka warfare whereby Russia's deploys insignia-less paratroops and Special Forces and dispatches advanced artillery and antiaircraft systems into Ukraine, while strenuously denying at home and abroad that it has done any such thing.

So far, Putin's efforts at chivvying or shutting up of the grieving mothers, sisters and wives of "Cargo 200"-the Russian codename for soldiers killed in combat-have helped keep his populace from an open rebellion against an undeclared dirty war next-door. All that would change if Operation Land-Bridge got underway.

But even if Mariupol isn't the next target, isolating and threatening it could keep Ukrainian forces bogged down enough to allow the easier taking of towns and villages in the north and west, such as Slavyansk and Kramatorsk, which were recaptured by the Ukrainian military before the Russian invasion last August.

There are large reserves of forces in the separatist-held hinterland south-east of Donetsk. On April 27, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) reported spotting 11 tanks and 4 armored personnel carriers "50 [kilometers] north of Shirokino," a town just north of Mariupol.  On May 29, the OSCE said that its monitors met had encountered two women in Russian military uniforms as well as a vehicle with Russian license plates carrying armed men in the village of Petrovskoye, in this same area, east of Volnovakha. Hardly a day goes by that the OSCE doesn't document separatist artillery, Grads, or multiple rocket-launchers gone "missing" from where they're supposed to be parked for inspection.

At the moment, all the Pentagon will say officially is that "we've certainly seen the reports of increased violence. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission has reported continued ceasefire violations by Russian-separatist forces," Defense Department spokesperson Eileen Lainez told The Daily Beast.

But it doesn't bode well that Valentina Matvienko, the speaker of Russia's Federation Council (the nation's mostly symbolic senate), told Interfax on Wednesday that the body may meet in emergency session and asked its deputies "not to go far away." The Council later claimed the Interfax report was fake, but not before observers recalled that the last time this assembly convened hastily, it was to retroactively rubber-stamp Putin's invasion of Crimea, an invasion he at first disclaimed. Putin also later copped to having made plans for seizing the peninsula long before the Euromaidan protests erupted in Kiev over a year ago, culminating in the nighttime skedaddling of pro-Putin Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovych from the country.

In spite of its uninterrupted record of audacious bullshitting, the Kremlin has nevertheless enjoyed the spectacle of seeing any number of Western "experts" on Russia take its reassurances that Minsk II is still on at face value. "Novorossiya"-the name given to the dream of erecting a blood-and-soil ethnic Russian empire, of which annexing the Donbas and Crimea are said to be integral-has been obituarized repeatedly over the past several weeks; never mind that the separatists still brandish its pennant with pride gibber openly about gobbling up more of Ukraine.

In fact, as Mashable's Christopher Miller discovered today in Moscow, the former separatist commander Igor Girkin (a.k.a. Strelkov), himself a Russian intelligence operative, has proclaimed Novorossiya alive and well. Told that Marinka may have fallen to his comrades in Ukraine, Girkin replied: "Good."

No war is complete without its psychological dimension. Here, too, we're given contradictory telegraphs of Moscow's real intentions. In forum on the Russian social media site VKontakte evocatively titled Svodki Novorossii-"Novorossiya Dispatches"-Strelkov claimed that Vladislav Surkov, Putin's "grey cardinal" and a man sanctioned by the U.S. and E.U. for his role in fomenting the Ukraine crisis, recently met with DNR leadership. Surkov apparently "yelled a lot and was vile." The reason? He supposedly wanted the DNR to put a cork in it and give up on Novorossiya.

This could easily be a carefully placed piece of disinformation designed to create the impression that the Kremlin didn't authorize this latest offensive, the better to plead innocent in the inevitable diplomatic set-to with the West. It wouldn't be the first time Putin has intimated that the proxies he says he doesn't control have suddenly gone rogue on him. (Strelkov elsewhere admits that only an "idiot" would believe that the separatists operate without a little help from their friends in Moscow.)

Inevitably, Kiev-and, by extension, Washington and Brussels-are now faced with having to call the whole ceasefire off and risk making tough choices about how to prosecute a defensive military campaign or increase the West's economic warfare against Russia. (The E.U. seems set on rolling over current sanctions against individuals and entities in Russia, but not necessarily issuing new ones.) Ukraine's general staff issued a statement today saying it'll deploy heavy weaponry back to the front lines, materiel which was withdrawn in accordance with the ceasefire. This is just as Putin would have it.

His foreign policy has ever been one of Freudian projections and double-binds. He accuses his opponents of the sins and crimes of which he himself is guilty, then fashions a trap for them whereby they lose whatever move they make. Arm Ukraine? Do that and we'll escalate the war. Don't arm Ukraine? We'll escalate anyway. Abide by Minsk? We'll violate it and blame you for breaking it. Break Minsk? Even better!

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 #46
Moon of Alabama
www.moonofalabama.org
June 3, 2015
Media's Beloved "Expert" Eliot Higgins - Wrong Again And Again And Again
[Links here http://www.moonofalabama.org/2015/06/medias-beloved-expert-higgins-wrong-again-and-again-and-again.html#comments]

Eliot Higgins aka Brown Moses, the founder of Bellingcat "by and for citizen investigative journalists", is beloved by NATO media. Higgins is always able to "prove" by amateur "analysis" of open source data that the "bad guys", just as the U.S. or NATO claim, did indeed do the bad thing that happened. The problem is that Higgins is no expert of anything. He was an unemployed office worker who looked at Youtube videos from Syria and tried Internet searches to find out what weapons were visible in the videos. That is all that made him an "expert".

But Higgins claimed to prove that the Syrian government launched rockets with Sarin on Ghouta, an area south of Damascus. An MIT professor and real expert proved (pdf) that he was wrong.

Higgins claimed to "prove" that rockets launched from Russia hit Ukraine by looking at aerial pictures of impact craters. But a real expert of the method said that crater analysis is "highly experimental and prone to inaccuracy" and warned against its use without further corroboration.

Now another "expert" of Bellingcat, who's source of "expertise" is unknown but likely also low, tries to prove that Russia manipulated some aerial pictures it published about the MH17 airline incident in Ukraine. That made some splash in the usual NATO media but is complete nonsense. Yes, the pictures were obviously "manipulated" as labels were added to them. But that the visual content of the pictures were changed, as the "expert" claimed to prove by a JPEG compression analysis, is clearly bullshit. The "expert" claims that "all image content should present roughly the same [compression] error levels if the photo has not been altered." That is nonsense. JPEG compresses a flat white surface with low error level and a rough multicolor part of a picture with a higher compression error level. That is digital compression 101 which I myself learned when I was doing a bit of math work on the early PNG format definition. So it turns out that the "expert" simply does not understand how JPEG compression works.

Out of three big "finds" that made it into the media Higgins and Bellingcat had three that were proven to be wrong by real experts. Any media who further quote "analysis" by the "experts" Higgins and Bellingcat should be regarded as propaganda outlet and not as a serious source of news.

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 #47
Life in the Lanzone
http://life.lanzone.eu
June 1, 2015
An analysis of the analysis
By Alexander Gehret
Alexander Gehret is a young coder and consultant. After his A-Level at the OSZ-IMT in 2012, he started working at Hewlett-Packard. In January 2014 he founded WeBaGe - Technologies to support educational institutions working with information technology. He loves to create new awesome things and is always interested in innovations. Now he is working as a Consultant for the Acando GmbH.
[Photos and links here http://life.lanzone.eu/?p=30]

Spiegel-Online anonunced today, that the satellite pictures which Russia released a few months ago are fake according to experts. More clearly they state:

Russland macht noch immer Kiew für den Abschuss von Flug MH17 verantwortlich. Doch die Fotos, die ukrainische Luftabwehrsysteme in dem Absturzgebiet zeigen sollen, sind offenbar gefälscht. Laut Experten hat der Kreml mit Photoshop manipuliert. - Spiegel Online 01.06.2015

Translated to English that would be:

Russia is still holding Kiew responsible for the shotdown of flight MH17. But the pictures, which should show AA-Systems in crash region, are obviously altered. According to experts, the Kreml manipulated the pictures with photoshop. - Translated to my best knowledge from Spiegel Online 01.06.2015

Every time, media states, that something is obvious, I get suspicious. This is why I had a closer look at the analysis they linked. You can find the analysis either here (german version) or here (english version). I will refer to the english version throughout this post.

Methods of Analysis

First of all, let's have a look at the methods of analysis the "experts" from bellingcat used:

Source Analysis
Metadata Analysis
ELA (ErrorLevel-Analysis)
Reference Analysis

They explain, how the difference analysis techniques work. The source analysis more or less just describes, where they got the picture from. Since uploads on facebook, twitter and similar services do not exclude third party alterations, it is important to use the version for further analysis that was published by an official source.

The Metadata Analysis reads additional information from the picture. Most cameras for example, add some unique code to the picture which makes it easy for the photographer to identify which lense and iso settings he used later on. Software adds code to the metadata as well if altered. On top of that, one can as well strip (remove) metadata from a picture.

The third method they used is the ErrorLevel-Analysis. And now it is getting interesting, so let's have a closer look here:

Error level analysis (ELA): Error level analysis (ELA) identifies areas within an image that are compressed at different levels. With JPEG images (the format of the photographs under consideration here), the entire picture should be at roughly the same level of compression. If a section of the image is at a significantly different error level, then it likely indicates a digital modification.

- Bellingcat Forensics Analysis  of Satellite Images Released by the Russian Ministry of Defense Page 7

The important part here is:

the entire picture should be at roughly the same level of compression.

Which is just wrong. The toolset they used is the fotoforensics homepage which is operated by Dr. Neal Krawetz (@hackerfactor, he does an awesome job btw!). So, why not have a look at the tutorial for ELA over there?

Edges. Similar edges should have similar brightness in the ELA result. All high-contrast edges should look similar to each other, and all low-contrast edges should look similar. With an original photo, low-contrast edges should be almost as bright as high-contrast edges.

Textures. Similar textures should have similar coloring under ELA. Areas with more surface detail, such as a close-up of a basketball, will likely have a higher ELA result than a smooth surface.

Surfaces. Regardless of the actual color of the surface, all flat surfaces should have about the same coloring under ELA.
- Fotoforensics - Tutorial (01.06.2015)

As far as I understand it here, it does not mean, that the whole image has to have the same Error Level. Areas which do not contain just one solid color like white or black should have a lot higher error level than just plain white or black areas. If you have a look at the first unaltered picture, one can spot, that the white book has a completely different error level than the rest of the picture. Is it altered? As far as I know not, it is just easier for the algorithm, to store a complete plain white area than to store a colour gradient.

The only thing we can take away from here is, that similar colors should have a similar error level. And, that alterations made to a picture later on have normally a higher error level than the rest of the picture since every resave the error level drops.

The last analysis method is the reference analysis. They want to compare pictures to other pictures which they believe to be unaltered and correctly dated. In my opinion this analysis is a nice idea, but who assures us, that the other pictures are unaltered? But this is another topic which is too big for this blogpost.

MoD Picture 4

Now, let's start having a look at the picture analysis they did. The short part is the Source analysis. They used the picture from the official homepage and uploaded it to fotoforensics.com

This is why we can assume, that no third party modifications were made. Nothing really interesting here.

So, what do we expect from the metadata anlysis? Therefore, we should have a look at the picture itself:

Picture 4; source: MoD20

As we can see, there are annotations on the picture and the top and the bottom contains a grey bar. As far as I know, there is no camera out there, which automatically adds such annotations and bars. Therefore we can state already, that this picture is indeed altered. The top annotation gives us a date for the picture: 17th of July 11:32 with no specific timezone as correctly stated in the bellingcat report. If we now have a look at the metadata, it states: Timestamp: 2014-07-21 16:14:42 GMT which is a slight difference to the 17th of july in the annotation. But that is easy to explain. Since metadata can be easily altered, most servers change the timestamp to the time, when the image was uploaded to them. Since russian press released this picture on the 21st, this would make sense.

It also states: Creator Tool Adobe Photoshop CS5 Windows. So what does this tell us? That the picture was altered? Yes! That the picture is therefore not authentic anymore? No! Since media releases mostly crop images before publishing that was something we expected. Since we have annotations on the picture, the picture had to be altered. Nothing suspicious here.

Now to the ELA.

Before we get to the details, one should make sure, what one expects to find. Since every resave drops the error level due to the nature of the JPEG algorithm, it is important, to keep in mind how many resaves there are at least.

Let us assume, that they worked with a raw image at first. Then they added all the annotations, cropped it and added the two bars on top and bottom. This makes at least one export to JPEG. Afterwards they uploaded it to the server, which is a second resave. I do not exactly know, how the fotoforensics handles images linked to them, but that could be a third resave.

If we assume, that the annotations or bars were added after a jpeg export, that would mean even more resaves. So, what do the guys from bellingcat state? On page 10 of the report, they identify different brightness areas in the ELA image. (Have a look at them in the report, since I will refer to them here)

The important part is:

The difference in the error levels between areas D and C cannot be explained by the image's content. While error level differences may be caused by blurry image content, the clouds on the right side are sharply defined structures, so the error levels should not exhibit any significant deviations from the central part of the image in this field.

- Bellingcat Forensics Analysis  of Satellite Images Released by the Russian Ministry of Defense Page 11
Well, it definetly can be explained by the images content. As stated before,

Similar textures should have similar coloring under ELA

- Fotoforensics Tutorial on ELA

Since there are different textures, different colors are possible. The rest is in my opinion just due to the multiple resaves. The picture they provide for comparison is pretty similar. You could try out to resave the picture from google as well, and upload it to fotoforensics. I assure you, that the result will be similar to the MoD picture ELA.

Now to the reference analysis. They compare the picture released by the MoD with satelite pictures from Google Earth on page 13-17. I just got one problem here: They do not link the original pictures from google. This makes me wonder why since they linked all other sources correctly. If those pictures are unaltered, than the date of the picture released by the MoD is indeed wrong which should make us question: Why? But as long as they do not provide links to the original pictures from google earth, I would not take it to serious.

Now their conclusion:

The Bellingcat investigation team's forensic analysis revealed that Picture 4 was digitally modified with Adobe Photoshop CS5 software. It is highly probable that clouds were digitally added on the left and right sides of the image, which obscured details that could have been used for additional comparisons with historical imagery.

- Bellingcat Forensics Analysis  of Satellite Images Released by the Russian Ministry of Defense Page 18

In my opinion, this is just a false assumption - and a dangerous one as well. I do not want to point out what this false assumption could cause. To the guys at bellingcat: Please read the tutorials at fotoforensics. And to not make fast assumptions. Especially not in such dangerous and hot political topics. I do not want to judge here, wether the MoD pictures are fake or not. I just want to point out, that from your analysis, it is not possible to determine if at least picture 4 is a fake. I will cover picture 5 in a later blogpost.

Update: Corrected some spelling mistakes, thx to Skyr, Taker!

Update: They offer a guideline how to get the hystorical images from google earth here will include this in a next part later on

Btw: They did read this analysis but did not correct their point of view. Will try to contact them directly and try to get some feedback.

Due to the overhelming response to my last posts, I decided to postpone my damn exam preparations and continue with the analysis of picture 5.

I will go through it a little bit fast since the mistakes made are pretty similar to the first part.

The metadata analysis above shows that Picture 5 has been processed with Adobe Photoshop CS5. After processing, the image was scaled down to a size of 900×600 pixels and saved as a new image with a compression quality of 75%.

- Bellingcat Forensic Analysis of Satellite Images Released by the Russian Ministry of Defense Page 20

Yes, that is correct, but as I pointed out in the first part, this is nothing suspicious. Someone added the seen annotations and therefore he needs some kind of editing software. Well, in this case Adobe Photoshop.

Again, they state:

[...] all image content should present roughly the same error levels if the photo has not been altered.

- Bellingcat Forensic Analysis of Satellite Images Released by the Russian Ministry of Defense Page 23

Which is just wrong again. As written in the tutorial from Dr. Neal Krawetz on fotoforensics, similar structures and similar colors mostly have the same error level. But not everything. Just due to multiple resaves it can happen, that everything appears to have the same EL.

Now we get to the, according to bellingcat, added vehicles:

By contrast, area C of Picture 5 shows soil structures with significantly lower error levels than the square area around the vehicles.\

- Bellingcat Forensic Analysis of Satellite Images Released by the Russian Ministry of Defense Page 23

and again: different structures different colors. On top of that, they compare an ELA from MoD picture 2 with an ELA of picture 5. Since in picture two, we have a contrast between the vehicles and the ground, but see no difference in the ELA, I assume, that this was just due to some resaves. As pointed out already, the Error level is going to get more equal, the more often I save the picture.

That said, the second portion of the ELA they show, shows no big difference betwen the small rectangle around the vehicles and the ground. According to their statement, that all image content  should present roughly the same error levels, this would show, that the rectangle was not added to the picture. But we can clearly state, that the rectangle was added later on. Or does anyone know a camera which adds rectangles automatically?

So... why is the ELA not showing anything for the rectangle except the corners? Since the rectangle consists mostly of solid white lines, it is easy for the jpeg algorithm to store. Theirfore, the level of failures is really low. Have a look at the small box with the A inside. This has a pretty high error level. Why? It is the same color, right? Jeah, it is, but due to the 'A' inside of it it is not as easy to store as the rest since the structure is different.

Now the higher error levels surrounding the vehicles is clear. That area D was digitally modified is unquestionable

- Bellingcat Forensic Analysis of Satellite Images Released by the Russian Ministry of Defense Page 24

And again, they just keep repeat making the same mistake.

Higher error levels are clearly visible in the square shown around the vehicle. It is highly probable, therefore, that the image content in area E has been digitally modified.

- Bellingcat Forensic Analysis of Satellite Images Released by the Russian Ministry of Defense Page 24

Nothing to add here, since I pointed out the mistake already over and over again. I guess I would start to bore you.

As said last time, I will cover the reference analysis in another extra post.

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