#2
Moscow Times
May 21, 2015
Where Are Oil Prices and the Ruble Going Next?
By Chris Weafer
Chris Weafer is a senior partner with Macro Advisory, a consultancy advising macro hedge funds and foreign companies looking at investment opportunities in Russia.

The strong rally in the oil price over the past four months has confounded most forecasters. Instead of continuing the late 2014 slide to test the 2009 low of $42 per barrel, the price of Brent came close to $45 on Jan. 13 before starting a steady climb, which brought it close to $68 late last week.

That price rally, which has been replicated in Russia's Urals contract, is a big part of the reason why the ruble has rallied strongly since early February and why there is so much optimism that Russia's economy has weathered the economic crisis relatively unscathed. It is also the main reason why the RDXUSD, the index of Russian equities traded on international bourses, is one of the best in the world so far in 2015 with a gain of 34 percent.

So, has the oil price again helped the country dodge an economic drubbing, or is the rally merely an interruption to a longer lasting downtrend? Most of those who were very confident of their predictions at the start of the year are much less confident today. There is, instead, an almost equally spread range of price predictions from $45 to $90 per barrel by end this year for Brent crude.

The difference between both extremes is whether one believes that the fundamentals of supply, in particular, and demand, to a lesser extent, are changing. Whether the U.S. Fed starts to raise its benchmark interest rate or not is also one of the variables while some of the bulls are also factoring in an expansion of the various conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa.

Let's have a look at the pros and cons for each of the arguments set out by the oil price bulls and bears.

The demand side equation is straightforward; both the bulls and bears expect global oil demand to be higher this year than was the case last year. The International Energy Agency (IEA) agrees with both and has recently raised its total expected demand forecast by 1.1 million barrels per day (mln bpd) to a total expected average of 93.6 mln bpd.

That is better than the incremental growth of 700,000 mln bpd achieved in 2014 and is more consistent with the long-term average growth. A higher average is unlikely, or by very little, given the global economic outlook. A much lower result is also unlikely, as there does not appear to be any potential crisis on the horizon among the big oil-consuming nations.

The main debate concerns the supply side. The traders who helped propel the oil price higher over the past four months cited the reports of rig withdrawals in the U.S. as evidence that output from the shale producers would soon fall. Instead, almost all the rigs have been taken out of speculative sites and not impacted production.

U.S. shale is increasingly a technology improvement story and average producing costs are falling, albeit slowly. The U.S. produced an average of 11.81 mln bpd in 2014, according to IEA data, and this had risen to 12.73 mln bpd by April this year. The IEA does expect a slowing in the second half as new fields come on line more slowly, but still expects a full year average of 12.52 mln bpd. That is hardly the basis to support a bullish oil price scenario.

Elsewhere the optimism that OPEC's major players would yield to internal pressure, also a point often cited by traders, has zero basis in fact. OPEC output is traditionally the balancing factor in the global oil market as non-OPEC producers never willingly cut.

That balancing demand in 2014 averaged 30.3 mln bpd and the IEA estimates that it should be 30.5 mln bpd this year. But in April, the total output from the group was at 31.21 mln bpd with output from Saudi Arabia alone above 10.3 mln bpd. That is nearly one million barrels more from the Kingdom than in the same period last year.

A similarly tough talking position from Saudi Arabia's oil minister at the forthcoming OPEC meeting on June 5, to that heard last December, will put a lot of downward pressure on the price.

Total global output is currently at 95.7 mln bpd, up over 3 mln bpd from April 2014, and that is more than 2 million bpd greater than expected full year demand. Not surprising, therefore, that available storage around the world, in the form of parked oil tankers and onshore tank farms, is getting very full.

Apart from demand and supply, which are the normal long-term price determinants, the medium-term picture is often driven by expectations of a change in direction for the trade value of the U.S. dollar. Almost all oil is traded in the U.S. currency so its value has a significant part to play in the price.

This year currency traders are listening to the Fed and trying to figure out when it may start to raise its benchmark interest rate. The currently still-unclear picture is the reason why the U.S. dollar weakened in recent weeks and why the price of Brent pushed up toward $68 per barrel.

If the U.S. economy strengthens over the summer then the Fed will almost certainly make its first interest rate rise in many years during the autumn. That will boost the dollar and hurt the oil price. That has always been the formula.

Speculative trading has also played a part in this year's rally as hedge funds and other traders built up a record volume of long oil positions at the start of the year. Whether in anticipation of, or the cause of, all the bullish talk of U.S. shale and/or OPEC cuts or as a straight trade on a longer U.S. Fed rate decision? Either way, such a large buildup was certainly a price driver and is now a dangerous overhang.

The one oil price ingredient that neither economists nor oil traders can predict is the course of the various wars across the Middle East and North Africa. For now it seems that all are safely contained away from the oil transport routes and oil facilities but the continuing threats certainly justify some measure of risk premium in the price. Dangerous as it is, the current situation hardly warrants more than a $5 p/bbl risk premium unless any of the conflicts put oil flows directly in harm's way.

The return of Iranian oil is also something which die-hard bulls tend to dismiss as either too vague or too long term. The facts suggest otherwise. Iran is currently producing approximately 2.8 mln bpd whereas just before the last round of sanctions that was at least 1 million barrels higher.

One has only to look at the number of investment forums taking place or planned about the opening of Iran post sanctions to understand that a relatively quick return of those 1 million barrels is neither vague, nor will it take too long.

By now you can see that my preference is quite clearly biased on the bearish rather than the bullish side of the argument. But I also agree with those who assume that a price collapse to $40 or lower, as widely talked about late last year, is most improbable.

Instead a drift back to either side of $50 p/bbl - taking the ruble and the equity market down with it - through the summer seems the more likely course. Even the bears were bitten badly enough in the first quarter not to risk taking a bigger bet than that again.

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 #3
AP
May 21, 2015
IMF Upgrades Russia Growth Outlook

MOSCOW - The International Monetary Fund predicts a less severe recession for Russia and says the country's economy will return to growth in a "mild recovery" next year.

Following a recent staff visit to Russia, the IMF says in a statement that it now predicts a 3.4 percent contraction in GDP this year and says "growth should resume" in 2016.

In its World Economic Outlook last month, the organization had predicted a 3.8 percent contraction this year, with GDP down a further 1.1 percent next year.

On Thursday, the IMF did not estimate the size of Russia's expected 2016 growth, but said medium-term growth would likely be 1.5 percent, accompanied by inflation dropping below 10 percent. "Structural bottlenecks" would impede long-term growth, the statement added.

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 #4
Reuters
May 20, 2015
No quick end to Russia's economic pain
By Darya Korsunskaya and Jason Bush

Moscow - Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov warned on Wednesday the country would face no choice but to rein in public spending over the next few years, highlighting how Russia is still in deep economic trouble even if it has dodged an immediate meltdown.

Russia was tipped into crisis by last year's sharp drop in oil prices, compounded by Western sanctions for the annexation of Crimea and alleged support for rebels in eastern Ukraine, causing sharp falls in the value of the rouble currency.

Sentiment has improved in the last few months, helped by a fragile peace deal in Ukraine and a pick-up in the oil price. As a result, the rouble rose over 20 percent against the dollar this year, while bonds and stocks have rallied.

But predictions that Russia is coming out of economic crisis are premature. A dramatic collapse may have been averted, but instead the patient has been consigned to a long period of being chronically unwell.

The underlying problem is that prices for oil - Russia's main source of revenue - are still substantially below the levels on which the government had based its budget projections for the next three years.

The problem is exacerbated by sanctions that have effectively cut Russia off from international debt markets, while the pool of credit available domestically is shallow.

So far Russia has been dipping into its reserve fund, but it is depleting fast. Worth about $75 billion now, finance ministry projections indicate most of it will be spent over the next two years.

Speaking after a meeting between government ministers and President Vladimir Putin to talk about the budget, Siluanov described a situation where Russia's public finances were running out of choices.

"There's no question, we cannot pretend that nothing is going on," he told reporters.

"It is clear that we will have to review our previous decisions (and) tweak some (spending) programmes."

In a sign of the budgetary challenges Russia faces, the finance ministry has again revised up its forecasts for expenditures and borrowings over the coming years.

Siluanov said that he now expects a deficit of no more than 2.4 percent of GDP in 2016 - double a projection made two months ago - and a balanced budget by 2018 rather than 2017 as previously targeted. This year the deficit is projected at 3.4 percent, slightly below a previous 3.7 percent projection.

But even the new, softer, targets will require painful budget cuts that will be hard to deliver without a major rethink of spending items dear to Putin's heart.

So far no decisions have been made on what cuts to make and where they will fall.

Putin has ordered that spending on defence and national security - which together account for about a third of the federal budget - should not be touched.

Rebuilding the military is a central part of his appeal to voters, many of whom hanker after the days when the massive Soviet armed forces projected Russian might around the world.

"(Russia) cannot possibly manage such a high rate of military spending now," Sergei Guriev, a former rector of the New Economic School in Moscow, said in a commentary published last week.

Putin has also said that pensions should rise in line with inflation for this year, a major drain in a country where inflation is in double digits and government top-ups to the pension fund account for about a quarter of the federal budget.

Those commitments could leave it facing a crunch in 2017, when the reserve fund is forecast to be at its most depleted.

Without any meaningful spending cuts, the only option could be for Russia to return to international debt markets to borrow its way out of the problem, and for that it would need relief from the Western sanctions.

That imperative creates a strong incentive for Russia to move towards a more lasting settlement in Ukraine, Christopher Granville, managing director of London-based consultancy Trusted Sources, wrote in a report.

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 #5
Moscow Times
May 21,2015
Q&A: 'The Barriers Are Going Up' - Derk Sauer on Russian Media
By Peter Hobson

In the 1990s, Russia was "probably the freest place in the world" to be a foreign media entrepreneur, said Derk Sauer, the Dutchman who built a Russian media empire.  

Now, under President Vladimir Putin, that freedom is disappearing. Media law is tightening as the Kremlin promotes its brand of patriotic, pro-government news - a project that has accelerated since Russia's annexation of Crimea from Ukraine last year sparked an information war with the West.

Sauer, 62, came to Russia at the end of the 1980s in the final years of Soviet authoritarianism. He sees a lot of similarities between 1989 and 2015, but one big difference.

"Then the barriers were going down and now they are going up. That's the story in short," he said in an interview.

A steady flow of new laws have pinched the edges of media freedom in recent years, and state media outlets have risen in power and scope. In what became a symbol of growing interference in independent media, Putin last year signed into law legislation that limits foreign ownership in Russian media businesses to just 20 percent by 2017.
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Foreigners built large swathes of Russia's media market and still own majority stakes in tens of magazines, newspapers, radio stations and television networks. The law, which was passed as the West and Russia imposed economic sanctions on one another over Ukraine, sparked fears of forced fire sales to Russian owners willing to kowtow to the Kremlin.

Some commentators said the legislation was aimed at the most critical media - the Russian version of Forbes and newspaper Vedomosti, which was owned by Finland's Sanoma, Britain's Financial Times Group, and Dow Jones, the U.S. publisher of the Wall Street Journal. Sanoma has since sold its stake to a Russian businessman.

The Moscow Times, which Sauer founded in 1992 and used as a base to build a major newspaper and magazine publishing business, was also affected. The paper was recently sold to the same businessman that bought the Vedomosti stake, Demyan Kudryavtsev.

Sauer is currently chairman and president of Russian news agency RBC, which operates on television, Internet and in print and is owned by Russian billionaire Mikhail Prokhorov.

Large and well-established, RBC is still making money, he said. His vision for smaller independent media working in Russia is bleaker.

This interview has been edited for length and clarity.

Q: Why do you think the 20 percent cap on foreign ownership of media was passed?

A: There's a huge amount of speculation about that. All completely different explanations. Some people claim it's to hit Vedomosti and Forbes and so on. I doubt that, to be honest.

I think it is more the general mood of the country at the moment. The general mood of sanctions and counter-sanctions: They hit us with this, we hit them with that. It's this sanctions arms race.

And it was more or less convenient. Don't forget that it started in parliament with debates about Cosmopolitan and how it stood for Western decadence. I think it had to do as much with the anti-glossy movement in the Duma as it had to do with Vedomosti and Forbes.

Q: If it's contingent on the current political mood does that mean it could be reversed?

A: Oh yeah, it can be reversed any day. I am sure. But it depends on what is happening. You could be back to normal sooner than people think.

That's the only good thing about Russia: Nothing is forever. We think now we're deep in the pit, but it can change. It can also stay like this. Or it can get 10 times worse. You just don't know.  

Q: But assuming that the law does go into force as planned in 2017, what will the effect be on the Russian media market?

A: Not much. For the magazines it's pretty easy to circumvent because of the license holders. So the brand name is owned by a foreign company. Instead of having a formal operating company here they'll just license it out and receive the money through a license.

Q: There'll be no mass fire sales?

A: No. They already worked it out. It's not such a big deal for the magazines.

For the newspapers - for Vedomosti - it's complicated. Because with the FT, Wall Street Journal, they are either going below 20 percent - they have to find a solution. Which also is doable. If they want it. The question is do they want it? I don't know.

Business vs. Idealism

Q: In the 1990s you came to Russia and set up your own media company. Would you want to do the same now? Would you be able to?

A: No. But not just because of the political situation. It's for many reasons. The underlying trend, which is much more important business-wise [than the political situation] is the shift to digital. The company that I built in the early 1990s, based on print and magazines and so on, is impossible to replicate today.

Q: Could an online media startup doing independent journalism work in Russia?

A: One very limiting new thing is this new law on foreign ownership. Already there it is impossible to repeat what I have done before, because in 1992 we started our own business and we owned and controlled it. Now you cannot even start as a foreigner your own media business and own it and control it.

If some Russians come to me - I would say just a classic media company is difficult. But if you look internationally, at what a company like Vice is doing. What other new startup companies are doing. That is interesting. I'm sure that sooner or later young people will come that find a much more image-driven solution. This is the future. [A type of] Russian BuzzFeed.

Of course there are possibilities. But you have to be really a digital native for that. You have to understand how it works.

[News website] Meduza for instance. Its a great initiative. It's a good idea. But it's not a business. There is zero business model behind it. It is going to be loss-making for ever. I'm not saying it's wrong - it may be that you do this for civil society. But it's not a business.

Q: You are both a businessman and an advocate of independent journalism in Russia. Which of those is more important to you?

A: I strongly believe that one needs the other. If you really want to be independent you need to make money. Because otherwise you are always dependent on someone else. That's why I always try, in any business I was involved in, to make it a profitable business.

Oligarchs Out, State In

Q: How has the media landscape changed over the past two decades?

A: When Putin came in nothing happened. In the beginning he was quite liberal. What Putin brought in was perceived as more order, more clarity on the legal side. Less wild types around, street mafia. It was all received pretty positively.

In the 2000s Putin was not the issue, the issue was that while the media were officially independent and run by businesses, really they were owned by oligarchs who weren't interested in it as a business but were only interested in it as a political tool. Berezovsky, Gusinsky, Khodorkovsky, Potanin.

You were thinking that the media landscape was developing well and you had these business people running media businesses. But really they were not running media businesses in the way we understand it. They were running propaganda outfits.

Q: When was the best time to make money in Russian media?

There was the crisis in 1998, and it took about a year and a half to recover from that, and then from that moment to 2008 was the heyday of Russian media.

It was very profitable. You had to be really dumb not to make money at that time, because it coincided with the explosion of the consumer society in Russia. All the companies came, everyone had money. All the shops opened. New watches, new products. And they all needed media to support them.

Now it's much more difficult [to make money]. Many things happened in the meantime. One is the shift to digital, which is a worldwide phenomenon. Newspapers and magazines find it much more difficult to operate. Secondly, there are specific Russian trends that have to do with the economy and the fact that media is again under state control so it is not an open market any more.

Q: When did it come under state control?

It really accelerated after the reelection of Putin [in 2012]. This is what gave the big push. And then the Maidan protests in Kiev [in December 2013] and everything that happened around that. That really changed dramatically the landscape for the media.

Q: Why does that make it harder to make money?

Because there is not a level playing field at all. Because state media have unlimited resources, whether it's [television station] Rossia-24 or state newspapers, state-supported media holdings - how do you compete with these guys? In terms of cost of content, but also - they also control the advertising market, especially on television. They have unlimited resources - they don't need to make money.

Rise of Propaganda

Q: I was recently taking to a taxi driver in Crimea about truth in the media. He told me: 'Russian TV channels bend the truth, Ukrainian TV channels exaggerate the truth - If there's one thing that's true in this Crimea situation, it's that you'll never find where the truth is.'

A: That's a huge problem. People don't talk a lot about it, but it's a very big problem globally. The standard of journalism is so confused because of all these propaganda wars. And also because what is perceived to be the authority has been discredited so often that no one believes in any authority any more.

Twenty years ago if the chairman of the Central Bank of a country said something, you assumed that this is the chairman of the Central Bank so he must be right. But after all the financial crises we know they just talk bullshit. If the head judge of a country says something, now we know that many head judges are corrupt, not just in Russia but all over the place. If the Pope said something - well, now we have a more or less OK Pope.

But you know, all the traditional pillars of authority that were always quoted in the news media when I grew up have been discredited. That is why you have no idea who to believe any more. And this creates extremely fertile ground for the Russia Todays and the Fox Newses and all these weird forms of journalism.

 #6
RIA Novosti
May 20, 2015
Russian upper house passes bill on "undesirable" foreign NGOs

The upper house of the Russian parliament, the Federation Council, has approved a controversial bill that would ban "undesirable" foreign and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from operating in Russia, Russian state news agency RIA Novosti reported on 20 May.

Under the law, the Russian authorities would be given new powers to prosecute foreign organizations whose activities were judged as "undesirable" on grounds of national security. As RIA Novosti explained, this would apply to foreign organizations that were deemed to pose a threat to the "foundations of Russia's constitutional order, defensive capacity and security". Organizations that are judged to be "undesirable" would be liable to administrative and criminal prosecution, and their assets could be frozen.

The lower house of parliament, the State Duma, passed the bill in its third and final reading on 19 May. The bill, which was drafted by the pro-Kremlin A Just Russia party, will now be submitted to President Vladimir Putin for him to sign into law.

If the bill reaches the statute books, the decision on whether a foreign organization falls foul of its provisions will rest with Russia's prosecutor-general, currently Yuriy Chayka, or his deputies, based on consultation with the Russian Foreign Ministry. The Office of the Prosecutor-General and the Foreign Ministry will also be responsible for deciding whether an organization should be removed from the list of "undesirable" organizations, which will be maintained and published by the Justice Ministry, RIA Novosti said.

Under a separate law that was passed earlier in Putin's current term as president, Russian NGOs that receive foreign funding and are deemed to be involved in politics must register as "foreign agents". Critics argue that both pieces of legislation are intended to stifle dissenting voices in Russian society.

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#7
Washington Post
May 19, 2015
Here is fascinating new research on crime in Russia
By Matthew Light and Gavin Slade
[http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/05/19/new-issue-of-theoretical-criminology-features-research-on-post-soviet-region/]

The following is a guest post from political scientists Gavin Slade (Freie Universitaet Berlin) and Matthew Light (University of Toronto).  In conjunction with this post, the publishers of Theoretical Criminology have agreed to ungate (provide free downloads for) all of the articles in the special issue described below for the readers of The Monkey Cage through July 8. [http://m.tcr.sagepub.com/content/current]

A spectacular crime was committed on the streets of Moscow in February. Boris Nemtsov, a leading opposition politician, was shot dead against the backdrop of Red Square and the walls of the Kremlin. Who fired the shots? And if it was a contract killing, who ordered it? In the aftermath of the crime, police arrested several Chechens, a primarily Muslim ethnic group that fought, and lost, a war for independence from Russia in the 1990s and early 2000s. Following confessions, the suspects were charged with the murder.

According to pro-Kremlin commentators, the slaying was a hate crime, a reaction to Nemtsov's support for the Charlie Hebdo satirical magazine after the attacks in Paris the month before. Others suggested that Nemtsov's anti-corruption campaigns had upset powerful business interests. Civil monitoring bodies cast doubt on the confessions of the accused, claiming they had been obtained through torture. The general consensus among independent analysts was that justice would not be done and the real culprits would never be found.

As a major political assassination, the Nemtsov killing has garnered attention from Russia-watchers and political analysts. Yet, as a crime, it exposes an array of questions connected to law-breaking and criminal justice in Russia. For example, homicide was a pressing issue in the 1990s when crime and lawlessness exploded, but has fallen out of the headlines since then. How prevalent is homicide in Russia today? How do police, prosecutors and judges go about their work, and how independent are they from national leaders? Why do so many people believe we will never know who ordered the "hit" on Nemtsov? What forms of collaboration exist between organized crime, business and the state? Why are Chechens "the usual suspects" after high-profile killings? What differences in crime trends and criminal justice policies have emerged among post-Soviet countries?

Western audiences hear plenty of political analysis from post-Soviet countries, yet very little about basic questions of public order in those nations. A special issue of a leading scholarly journal, Theoretical Criminology, has just been published to address this gap. The special issue touches on many of the issues brought into focus by the Nemtsov murder. Almost 25 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, this collection of papers shows that crime and policy responses to it are critical to understanding the political dynamics of the region, as also shown by last year's Euromaidan protests against the Yanukovych government in Ukraine. There, public anger at the venality of post-Soviet officialdom helped trigger the crisis of the regime, and the subsequent police attacks on protesters brought about its final collapse. Thus, it is high time for western observers who care about the post-Soviet countries to learn more about crime and social control in this intriguing world region.

Many criminal justice issues in post-Soviet countries will seem familiar to western audiences: abuse of police powers, pressures of immigration and the rise of hate crime, collusion between politicians and business, and crises of confidence in prison systems. Yet these issues take on peculiar, local forms in the region that require specific responses as well as contextually sensitive research. The articles in our special issue work around four key dimensions of post-Soviet crime and criminal justice: Soviet legacies; official malfeasance; violence and social dislocation; and "informality"-the use of unofficial relationships to circumvent formal rules and institutions. Here are some especially provocative findings from our collection (hyperlinks are provided for free downloads of the papers):

-Despite Russia's Post-Soviet political transformation, Russians today are actually more afraid of police violence than citizens of the People's Republic of China, perhaps for good reason (Matthew Light, Mariana Moto Prado and Yuhua Wang).
-Western-inspired prison reforms meant to improve prisoners' living conditions have actually been resisted by many inmates, who still support Soviet-style prison camps (Laura Piacentini and Gavin Slade).
-Russian police massage homicide statistics to hide a murder rate that may be among the world's highest, reflecting the harshness of Russian social relations and everyday life (Alexandra Lysova & Nikolay Shchitov).
-Russia has more skinheads than any other country in the world, and the Russian government is actively courting European racist and ultra-nationalist groups, some of whom have supported Russia's intervention in Ukraine. Yet Putin now fears that violent racists could turn against his own regime (Richard Arnold).
-Despite post-Soviet efforts to reform criminal trials, judges in Ukraine and Russia remain weaker than prosecutors, while little Estonia has become an impressive beacon of judicial independence for the whole post-Soviet region (Peter Solomon).
-In the Republic of Georgia, increasing political competition has been key to taming official corruption, yet in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, political competition actually led to greater corruption (Alexander Kupatadze).
-Although Putin claims to have cleaned up Russian public administration, the market for bribes actually increased in the 2000s. Informal power networks pervade every official institution and help keep Putin in office. Yet they also impede Russia's modernization (Leonid Kosals & Anastasia Maksimova).

These findings invite further research and comparison. In some cases, western criminological concepts - "hate crime," "judicial independence," "white collar crime," "corruption" or "police abuse" - need testing anew and adapting in the changing terrain of the post-Soviet region. In other cases, entirely new concepts may be required for the realities of post-Soviet crime. The issue also poses broader questions: Will post-Soviet countries eventually converge on patterns of crime and punishment (so to speak) similar to those in other industrialized societies? And indeed what role should the United States and other western partners play in promoting criminal justice reforms in post-Soviet countries? The United States actively promoted such reform efforts, yet many of its own criminal justice policies may not work well in post-Soviet countries -  and some U.S. policies have been strongly criticized by scholars and civil society.

Criminological puzzles abound in the post-Soviet region. These papers, temporarily available for free at the link below through Sage publishers, explore the diverse trajectories these countries have followed since independence in 1991. Speculation will continue over scandals such as the murder of Nemtsov or the massacre of protesters on the Kiev Maidan. Yet the contours, contexts and consequences of these events can still be drawn and analyzed - as crimes. They thus concern not only political scientists and journalists, but criminologists, as well, and indeed, any informed observer of this major world region.

Theoretical Criminology, Volume 19, Issue 2, is available now ungated (free downloads) through July 8 here: http://m.tcr.sagepub.com/content/current

 

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 #8
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
May 21, 2015
Russia is seeking dialogue with the West
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov's visit to Brussels showed that Moscow is looking for platforms for constructive interaction with Europe. Though a wide range of issues were discussed - from illegal immigration to the fight on terrorism - special attention was paid to finding ways to resolve or control the crisis in Ukraine.
Alexey Timofeychev, RBTH

During his visit to Brussels May 18-19 Lavrov spoke at a session of the committee of foreign ministers of the Council of Europe, met with Council of Europe Secretary General Thorbjorn Jagland and with the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs Federica Mogherini, and talked with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg.

Lavrov later said that relations between Russia and the European Union remained "dismal due to Brussels' blockage of almost all the channels and mechanisms of interactivity." At the same time he remarked that there is "certain progress," including that in talks related to the free trade zone between the EU and Ukraine that are held with Russia's participation. During the session of foreign ministers in which he took part, Lavrov also praised the work of the Council of Europe.

Speaking during the foreign ministers' session, he again insisted that Moscow is committed to creating a common space for economic, security and humanitarian work "from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean." Lavrov said that the cause of the current crisis in Ukraine reflected the lack of such a vision and the formation in Europe of new dividing lines between western countries and Russia. In order to regulate the Ukrainian conflict he added that it is necessary for Kiev to engage in a direct dialogue with the militias, as well as hold constitutional reforms.
 
Ukraine crisis

Russian observers believe that the regulation of the crisis in Ukraine was the principal theme of Lavrov's visit. They also link it to recent trips to Russia by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and his deputy Victoria Nuland. Those visits suggest a change in Washington's approach to events in Ukraine, they say.

Maxim Bratevsky, an expert at the Center of European Studies at Moscow's Higher School of Economics, says that "after a year of hostile declarations" dialogue has begun between Russia and the West. Bratevsky divides Lavrov's Brussel's agenda into tactical and strategic objectives. Moscow's aim to convince the Europeans to participate more actively in the realization of the Minsk Agreements by exerting more pressure on Kiev and helping Kiev implement its constitutional reforms, is tactical, he says. Lavrov's strategic objective focuses on restoring relations between Russia and the EU and the cancelation of sanctions.
 
Donbass elections

Little definite information has emerged on the results of Lavrov's talks in Brussels. Speaking about his meeting with the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Lavrov mainly talked about the role of the organization in the regulation of the Ukrainian crisis. Concerning his meeting with Federica Mogherini, the Russian Foreign Ministry published a short announcement. After the talks with Stoltenberg, the NATO Secretary General once again repeated his assertion that Moscow is actively backing the rebels and called for an end to that. Moscow denies that it is aiding or supplying pro-autonomy militants in Ukraine.

The scarcity of official information on Lavrov's meetings may reflect the complexity of negotiations that, according to observers, is related to the fact that Russia and the EU have completely different views on how to solve the Ukrainian crisis. Pro-Kremlin political analyst Sergei Markov says that Lavrov's aim was to build bridges and bring the positions of both sides closer together.

There is now likely to be a period of "intensive diplomacy," Markov says, tied to the change in the U.S. position towards the crisis in Ukraine. Washington is no longer betting on a military solution to the conflict in Donbas and "for the first time has seriously started speaking about the realization of the Minsk Agreements," the essence of which is to try to find a political solution to the conflict.

Washington's change of position is a challenge for everyone involved in the conflict in one way or another, a challenge to agree on approaches to elections in the separatist regions, which is the central issue in achieving a political solution to the crisis. Finding a way through that conundrum was Lavrov's key aim in Brussels, Markov says.

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 #9
www.rt.com
May 21, 2015
Re-engagement between Russia and NATO in everyone's interest
By Dr Alexander Yakovenko, Russian Ambassador to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Deputy foreign minister (2005-2011).

The end of the Cold War provided unprecedented opportunities to overcome divisions in Europe. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia extensively contributed to building a peaceful, secure and stable Euro-Atlantic area.

We made a crucial contribution to the elimination of the material legacy of the era of ideological and military confrontation. Our country assumed the obligations of withdrawing its troops and armaments from Germany, Central and Eastern Europe and later from the Baltic countries.

For the last 25 years, Russia has reacted positively to reasonable and mutually beneficial initiatives proposed by its Western partners in the sphere of European security, although those have been scarce and not far-reaching. Russian and NATO navies have been patrolling the Mediterranean Sea under the framework of the "Active Endeavour" operation, cooperating on counter-terrorism issues, and jointly fighting piracy in the Gulf of Aden. Russian peacekeepers participated alongside brigades from NATO Member States in the operation under the UNSC mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995-2003. There are many other examples of mutually beneficial cooperation. In 1990, Russia signed the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and cut thousands of conventional armaments and equipment pieces. Another effort to end the legacy of the Cold War was made by Russia in June 2008, when we proposed concluding a European security treaty that was intended to build a common space of military and political security in the Euro-Atlantic area for all states, regardless of their membership in military or political alliances. It also aimed to find a common denominator in a patchwork security architecture, still littered with institutions inherited from the Cold War era.

Unfortunately, Western countries have opted for a "closed shop" philosophy, i.e. mechanical NATO eastward enlargement at the expense of the development and consolidation of truly regional (in the sense of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter) European institutions. The US has made efforts to build a missile defence system in Europe that directly affects the security interests of our country, and undermines strategic stability. As a result, dividing lines in Europe persist, and the ensuing tensions and deterioration of trust have brought about the Ukrainian crisis as sort of self-fulfilling prophecy.

Since the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis, the alliance has been using the pretext of so-called "Russian aggression" to consistently increase its military presence near Russia's borders. NATO has decided to suspend all practical cooperation and, de-facto, to stop the work of the NATO-Russian Council. This can and actually has already led to negative consequences - military and political risks have increased, and many opportunities have been missed as a result of lack of cooperation with Russia. The alliance's choice to suspend practical collaboration with Russia does not contribute to the fight against threats and challenges which are common to NATO member-countries and Russia.

The current negative trend is not Russia's choice. We are convinced that there is no real alternative to mutually beneficial and broad cooperation between Russia and NATO on the basis of equality, pragmatism and respect for each other's interests. Russia is not interested in confrontation. In a crisis, our cooperation is all the more important, but it has to be all-weather, for better or worse. And it is the only antidote to the temptation of unilateralism, which is always counterproductive, destabilising and self-destructive.

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 #10
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
May 20, 2015
Despite recent US overtures, gap with Russia still exists
Even though the Kremlin sees the visits of high-ranking U.S. officials as a sign of diplomatic victory, Russian and American experts remain skeptical. They point to the significant differences that still exist in how Russia and America view the world.
By Pavel Koshkin
Pavel Koshkin is Executive Editor of Russia Direct and a contributing writer to Russia Beyond The Headlines (RBTH). He also contributed to a number of Russian and foreign media outlets, including Russia Profile, Kommersant and the Moscow bureau of the BBC.

After high-profile U.S. officials - most notably, Secretary of State John Kerry - paid a series of visits to Russia, some Russian pundits and officials regarded it as a diplomatic victory of the Kremlin and expressed hopes that Moscow and Washington would start a new dialogue. However, skeptics tend to discount the value of these visits for improving relations between the two countries because of perennial differences over Ukraine and other international problems.

Shortly after the May 12 visit of U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, experts were both optimistic and pessimistic about its impact on U.S.-Russia bilateral relations, with many welcoming Kerry's negotiations with Russia Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and President Vladimir Putin as a good sign. Likewise, the visits of other U.S. high-profile officials - U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland and U.S. Special Envoy for Syria Daniel Rubenstein - were greeted and viewed as an attempt to restore the damaged relations with Moscow and resume talks on the thorniest issues.

However, Russia's Foreign Ministry tends to interpret the visits by Kerry and Nuland as a victory of Russian diplomacy. These negotiations indicate that "attempts to isolate Russia failed," as Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said during a business lunch at Rossiyskaya Gazeta's editorial office, pointing out that there are many international challenges - from Ukraine to Syria and Yemen - that are impossible to resolve without the involvement of Russia. Lavrov regards Kerry's move as a "responsible" step to tackle regional conflicts and the standoff in U.S.-Russia relations.

At the same time, some Russian experts, interviewed by Russia Direct, agree that the visits of high-profile U.S. officials indicate that there are some changes in the U.S. policy toward Russia. They argue that ignoring and isolating Russia doesn't work as a strategy.

 "The attempts to isolate the Kremlin politically and economically have largely failed," said Andrei Tsygankov, a professor of International Relations and Political Science at San Francisco State University.

"That also means that there Russia would never become 'North Korea' as some commentators are afraid," added Ivan Kurilla, a former Kennan Institute fellow and professor at Volgograd State University.

Why did John Kerry come to Russia?

Mikhail Troitskiy, an international affairs analyst and an associate professor at Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO-University), argues that the reasons behind the visits by U.S. high-ranking officials to Russia are "likely two-fold."

On the one hand, despite differences on key international security problems, Washington seeks to "keep talking to Russia" - at least, to "try to understand Russia's intentions," as some "influential voices in Washington have long been calling on the Obama administration." On the other hand, the U.S. is likely to warn Russia against certain moves in eastern Ukraine, such as providing unconditional support to the separatist entities, Troitskiy explains.
 
"Such warnings were likely met with cold indifference in both Sochi and Moscow, so in case of an escalation in east Ukraine, major negative consequences for the U.S.-Russia relationship cannot be avoided," he told Russia Direct. "A wide gulf still exists between the Russian and U.S. visions of the path towards implementation of the most recent Minsk agreements."

Tsygankov echoes Troitskiy's view. "From the U.S. perspective, Russia may not need to be a partner, but it must not become an enemy," he said. "Both pragmatically and ideologically driven camps in the Obama administration, as exemplified by Kerry and Nuland, recognize this although the Russia debate in the White House is far from over."

Jeffrey Mankoff, deputy director and fellow with the Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS) Russia and Eurasia Program, sees the recent negotiation between Russian and American top officials as a positive sign: a victory of realism of the U.S. foreign policy. According to him, it indicates that there is an interest from both sides of exploring possibilities of diplomacy. However, he warns against making conclusions that both sides reached compromise.

"It is too early," he said pointing out the U.S. has been "surprisingly disengaged of the diplomatic front" of resolving the Ukrainian standoff. Usually the U.S. has been "taking a back seat, when it comes to diplomacy between the Trans-Atlantic allies on the one side, and Russia - on the other" and now Washington is becoming more interested in tackling the Ukrainian crisis diplomatically together with other stakeholders.

Just talks, not a game-changer

During the May 18 business lunch with journalists, Lavrov admitted that restoring trust between Moscow and Washington would be very difficult, given their different interpretations of the details of the Minsk II Agreements.

Likewise, some Russian and American experts warn against being over-optimistic regarding Kerry's and Nuland's visits and argue that it doesn't necessarily mean that Russia and the U.S. have passed a historic low in their relations.

Mark Galeotti, the professor of global affairs at New York University, argues that the Kerry and Nuland visits are hardly likely to "mean any particular change in the situation." In particular, he points to the differences in tone and goal between Kerry and Nuland, who, according to him, "is much more hawkish on Russia."According to him, an internal tension has not been resolved.

"The fact that both Kerry and Nuland visited suggests this contradiction continues to split U.S. policy over Russia, in detail at least," Galeotti said.
Meanwhile, Tsygankov, points to "the gap in the two sides' perceptions" that is still very large.

"What the Kremlin views as a compromise, is not likely to be considered as such by the other side, and vice versa," he explains. "At best, this is a temporary breathing space with no clear sense of direction."

Matthew Rojansky, director of the Wilson Center's Kennan Institute, is also very skeptical, because Russia and the United States are "still very far apart on the core dispute over Ukraine."

"Unfortunately I would not yet read the visits in broadly positive terms," he told Russia Direct. "Simply put, each side is putting words in the other's mouth and badly misreading one another."

Rojansky highlights that the official positions of the Kremlin and the White House remained very different, with the Russian side focusing on the U.S. coming back to the table to seek "normalization" of ties with Russia and realizing that it cannot get very much done without Russia's partnership.

"From the U.S. side it was almost the opposite - sending top diplomats to remind Russia that its past and ongoing bad behavior is unacceptable and underscore why Russia simply must cooperate with the West on Syria and Iran, which the U.S. describes as being 'in Russia's interest,'" Rojansky said.

According to him, Washington's main motivation behind the Kerry and Nuland visits is to demonstrate to domestic and international stakeholders, primarily Germany, that the U.S. is doing its utmost to sustain the "vulnerable" Minsk Agreements before the White House "gives in to what appears to be overwhelming political pressure from Congress to send U.S. weapons to Ukraine."

U.S. President Barack Obama is personally against sending weapons and, like Germany's Chancellor Angela Merkel, he understands the extremely negative implications of such a risky move. However, the U.S. Congress has already authorized sending weapons with a veto-proof supermajority in the case of a major increase in violence in Eastern Ukraine.

This means that "the president will be stuck in a hard position, under huge pressure to act from both parties," Rojansky warns. "His only way forward is to show that he has done everything he can diplomatically even if in the end he authorizes even a symbolic weapons delivery. If that does happen, the conflict will of course become even more intractable with greater casualties on both sides."

Kurilla echoes his view to a certain extent.

"No country has publicly announced any compromise," he said. "The arsenal of diplomacy is wider than concession and compromise. Pressure could also be efficient as well and an ultimatum is also a weapon of diplomats. We do not know what exactly American diplomats brought to Russia. It could be that the Syrian question was discussed and some common ground was found while no such ground was found on Ukraine, or vice versa."

Summing up, Kurilla sees Kerry's visit as a sort of "an ice breaker," which indicates that "we may not have yet overcome the historic low in U.S.-Russian relations, but we passed the period of their 'freeze'."

Troitskiy argues that, generally speaking, Kerry's and Nuland's diplomatic overtures "don't give enough grounds to believe that any compromise between Moscow and Washington on the hottest issues on their bilateral agenda is now in sight."

Likewise, Tsygankov believes that "the shift doesn't necessarily mean that Russia and U.S. have passed the historic low."

"We don't exactly know what went into the decision's black box - strategic considerations or politics," he explains. "It may be that the decision reflects Obama's desire to improve his foreign policy record as a part of his legacy or as a way to preempt a future debate on Russia during the next presidential elections. We may yet remember Obama as the least anti-Russian of all American presidents after the Cold War."

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 #11
Business New Europe
www.bne.eu
May 19, 2015
Russian relations with US warm (a little) as Washington re-engages
Ben Aris in Moscow

Two high-level delegations to Russia from the US suggest that icy relations between the two sides may have begun to thaw a little.

US Secretary of State John Kerry travelled to Sochi to meet his counterpart Sergei Lavrov on May 12 in his first visit to Russia since the conflict in Ukraine began.

Kerry and Lavrov told journalists at the end of eight hours of talks that they saw "eye to eye" on the pressing need to put aside their differences, but still had "agreed to disagree", in comments that analysts took to indicate a warmer tone than in previous meetings. Russian President Vladimir Putin then turned up and hosted Kerry for a further four hours in what was taken as another positive sign.

"We agreed that it is only possible to solve this dispute through comprehensive and full implementation of the peace plan," Lavrov said, referring to the Minsk II agreement signed on February 12 in the Belarusian capital.

US Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland followed Kerry's trip by meeting Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin on May 18, directly after two days of talks in Kyiv with Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko. Nuland repeated the tough rhetoric that US sanctions on Russia cannot be lifted until all the terms Minsk II are met, but the tone was less abrasive. "Today's consultations were very detailed, they were very pragmatic. In both meetings, we were talking about how we build on the conversation in Sochi, on all of the issues that were discussed between President Putin and Secretary Kerry," Nuland said in a statement released at the end of her trip.

For his part Karasin said the discussions were "fruitful", but also resisted the US push to join the so-called "Normandy" talks on Ukraine, which include representatives from Russia, Ukraine, Germany and France.

However, the tensions remain high. During Nuland's trip fighting at the Ukrainian town of Shyrokyne remained intense despite the ceasefire, which is seen as a staging post to the coastal town of Mariupol - a strategic town that if taken by the Russian-backed rebels would give Moscow a land bridge to the annexed territory of Crimea. The Ukrainian forces were reporting a few deaths every day throughout the Kerry-Nuland visits, highlighting that the Minsk II ceasefire is at best very shaky. "Minsk [II] is being violated on a daily basis on the western side of the Minsk line and that is what needs to stop. We need to stop all of those violations and get the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] into all of the hotspots," Nuland said in answer to journalists' questions, referring to Europe's main security-oriented intergovernmental organization.

Four new working groups have recently been established to work towards peace and Nuland said she had also discussed with the Russian side allowing the OSCE to monitor the whole Russia-Ukraine border and to inspect convoys crossing from Russia into the rebel-held territory during the May 18 meetings - something that Russia has so far resisted.

Nuland's comments on the OSCE may even represent a concession by Washington. "Though the Minsk agreements envision Ukraine retaking control of its border with Russia, in both Kiev and Moscow Nuland merely spoke about the necessity for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe to have a presence on the border and the ability to inspect cargo moving into Ukraine," says George Friedman of consultants Stratfor.

Dangerous world

One of the motives for Washington's search for compromise is the raft of international problems the US is facing where Russia can play a constructive role. Kerry and Lavrov admitted that in addition to Ukraine they also discussed the civil war in Syria, the recent violence in Yemen, the political chaos in Libya and Russia's overtures to Iran. The situation in the Middle East is spinning out of control, but Russia remains good relations with many of the regimes the US is facing there. "Of course, [Kerry's visit to Sochi] means, first of all, that attempts to isolate Russia have failed. The issues that were raised by Kerry in Sochi were not only regarding Ukraine, but also Syria, Yemen and many others, the set of these questions suggests that it is very difficult to solve them without Russia," Lavrov told the press after the meeting.

The rising importance of these other talks was highlighted by the less well reported parallel visit to Moscow during Nuland's trip of Daniel Rubinstein, the US special envoy for Syria, who held parallel talks with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov on that conflict and the threat posed by Islamic State to the region.

Another motive for the flurry of US activity is an attempt to take back the initiative in the Ukraine conflict resolution. German Chancellor Angela Merkel very publicly went to Washington ahead of the Minsk I summit last year, but seemed to break with the US during the summit itself, which was a German endeavour and Washington was remarkably quiet in the aftermath. Ever since then, Merkel has been front and centre in all the negotiations (despite dragging French President Francois Hollande along to some meetings to give the negotiations a veneer of European cooperation). Nuland went out of her way to stress that the current diplomatic effort is being coordinated with the Normandy group of European powers. "The United States' role here is to support the full implementation of Minsk. We are doing this in lockstep with ... our colleagues in the EU, with Germany and France ... and Ukraine," Nuland said.

However, no one is buying it, as the US remains excluded from the Normandy group and cracks in the trans-Atlantic alliance are appearing. "For the past year and a half, Germany and France have been at the forefront of Western negotiations with Russia," says Friedman. "However, differences between the German and US views of events in eastern Ukraine and interpretations of the Minsk agreement have come to the fore. Germany has taken a more favourable view of progress in implementing the Minsk agreement, while the United States has maintained a hard line, emphasizing continued active Russian military support for the separatist forces."

These problems come on top of deep divisions within the EU itself over how to deal with Russia. Countries like Poland and the Baltic states have taken a hard line, while Hungary, Czech Republic, Italy, Bulgaria and Spain are all leaning towards bringing sanctions to an end this year. Putin has been travelling the region handing out loans, cheap gas and pipeline deals to anyone who will back him. Greece was the latest to experience Russian largesse, but on May 19 surprised by caving into Brussels pressure and agreed to back extending sanctions to the end of this year. "Germany is having an increasingly difficult time maintaining a hard line in dealing with Russia," Friedman said in a note. "Nonetheless, Germany would rather remain at the forefront of the negotiations with Russia and avoid a scenario in which the United States forces Russia into a confrontation that Berlin does not want."

Putin must be gleeful at the US blundering into the negotiations again, because it presents him with an opportunity to not only play EU members off each other, but now to play Washington off against Brussels. However, the Kremlin also wants to win some key concessions from Washington, with a commitment not to supply Kyiv with weapons at the top of the list. A small contingent of US military trainers arrived in Ukraine in May charged with helping to bring the militias into the regular army, but the significance of US troops on Ukrainian soil was much larger.

Another Kremlin demand is to curb Nato activity on Russia's borders. While the Kremlin has been aggressively flying sorties along the European borders, Nato has responded by talking about setting up six new forward staging units in the Baltics, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria, as well as launching its own exercises.

"In late March and early April, the US Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) held an exercise in Estonia, during which US F-16s destroyed ground targets in an Estonian firing range. Around the same time the Americans held a drill with the Swedish and Finnish Air Forces over the Baltic Sea. The United States has been playing a leading role in the process of strengthening NATO's presence in the Baltic states," Piotr Szymański of the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW) said in a note in May. "Comparing NATO 's military presence in the Baltic states before and after the outbreak of the Russian intervention in Ukraine, it is clear that NATO has stepped up its engagement considerably."

There is a lot of work still to do, but Ukrainian analysts were buoyed by the flurry of Washington activity and believe the threat of an escalation in the violence has receded as a result. "That the Russians view the talks as positive is a good sign for the near term. In our view, it means that the conflict in Donbas will remain frozen at its current stage," says Zenon Zawada, an analyst with Concord Capital in Kyiv. "It also means that an arrangement has been reached that eliminates the need for the US to deliver military hardware to defend the port city of Mariupol, which is near the border of the separatist-occupied territory. That some kind of agreement exists is apparent from the fact that the separatists have refrained from aggressive actions in Mariupol, limiting the fighting to control surrounding villages."

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 #12
www.rt.com
May 21, 2015
Hillary who? Russians skeptical about Clinton as future US president, poll shows

Most Russians know nothing about Hillary Clinton as a politician, a poll shows. Of those who are aware of her political ambitions, most fear that her election could aggravate relations between Russia and US and worsen the overall situation.

The research, released this week by Russian government-owned polling agency VTSIOM, shows that 41 percent of Russians know nothing about former US Senator and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

The poll was conducted in late April this year, over a week after Clinton announced her campaign for the US presidency. Only 19 percent of Russians said they knew about this fact.

Most respondents, 26 percent, described her as "former US First Lady" and 9 percent as "a US politician." Other answers included "US Secretary of State", "an American" and "an Enemy of Russia." A further 9 percent said they had trouble finding an answer.

Of those who said they knew something about Hillary Clinton, 42 percent confessed a negative attitude towards her, 17 percent said their attitude was positive and 41 percent said they found it difficult to answer.

When the same group was asked how Hillary Clinton's election as president could affect relations between Russia and the United States, 34 percent answered that they expected no change, 28 percent said they would deteriorate and 18 percent said some improvement was expected. Some 20 percent said they found it difficult to answer this question.

The head of VTSIOM, Valery Fyodorov, said in comments with Kommersant daily that the largely negative attitude towards Clinton could be explained by the fact that most Russians see her as part of Barack Obama's administration, responsible for introducing anti-Russian sanctions.

Russians see no positive figures among US politicians as the latter send no signals of readiness to review the US policies towards Russia, the researcher said.

Research released by the independent polling center Levada earlier this month showed that 59 percent of Russians currently perceive the United States as a general threat to their country. The share of Russians who don't see any threat coming from the US is now at 32 percent.

When asked to elaborate on the possible nature of Russia-US antagonism, 48 percent said the United States was intentionally creating various barriers in order to hinder Russia's development. Thirty-one percent said they feared a US military invasion on Russian territory and 31 percent thought the US was imposing alien ideas and values on their country through non-military means.

Twenty-four percent of respondents said they feared the US could impose direct control over Russia's political course.

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 #13
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
May 20, 2015
A cold, hard look at why the US should back down on Russia
RD Student Essay Contest finalist: By softening its rhetoric on Crimea, rolling back sanctions and accepting a compromise for eastern Ukraine, the U.S. can avoid a nightmare scenario of instability in Eurasia.
By Alexander Kravchenko
Alexander Kravchenko is a finalist of the fourth Russia Direct student essay competition for young international affairs experts. He is a Master's student in Comparative Politics at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE).

Russia is hardly a challenger to U.S. global dominance. Its army and navy cannot project power across the planet. Russia is also not an economic powerhouse. It lags behind in advanced manufacturing, and its financial sector is fragile and dependent on foreign credit. Even the oil extracting machinery is, to a great extent, foreign-built. Thus, a desire to engage aggressively with Russia owes more to Cold War memories than rational deliberation.

Unfortunately, this mode of thinking rarely gets challenged. Primarily, because Russia is not useful as an ally to the United States in dealing with the Middle East or China.

There is remarkably little that America can gain from cooperating with Russia in the Middle East. It may seem that Russia can help put pressure on Iran, but, looking back at how Iran extorted S-300 missiles from Russia by threatening to look elsewhere for weapons, it is not clear who currently has the upper hand in Russo-Persian relations. Russians, as 2012 events showed, have some influence on Syrian President Bashar Assad, but it is unclear whether it is in the best interests of the U.S. to keep him and accept defeat or to oust him and let ISIS in.

Russia is of limited use to America in dealing with Chinese expansion. Militarily, Russia would not be able to contribute even if it wanted, because the conflict is likely to be seaborne and Russian has only a rudimentary naval force in the Pacific.

It is also highly irrational for Russia to act against the large and growing market for its natural resources. China is also hardly a threat to Russia's security. Unlike Taiwan or Vietnam, Russia possesses a nuclear arsenal and a large land army.

When it comes to other broad international issues, like improved financial regulation, war on tax avoidance, new trade agreements or fighting Ebola, Russia is a minor player due to the size of its economy and limited logistical capabilities beyond its immediate surroundings.

In addition, Russia takes part in all working groups and routinely sends doctors and scientists on humanitarian missions anyway, despite the rapid deterioration of relations with the West over the last few years. So there is actually little room for more cooperation.

However, it makes no sense for the United States to invest political capital into removing Russia from the world scene completely. If Russia were to disintegrate or destabilize, that would create a power vacuum in Northern Eurasia.

Russia's territories in the Far East may fall prey to China, as they were to Japan during the Russian Civil War in 1919-1922. A massive nuclear arsenal might end up in the hands of Islamic radicals. Thus, the threat of radical Islam would be greater than ever and China would be further strengthened.

The Ukrainian conflict and economic downturn caused by financial sanctions and trade disruption is already weakening Russia. A few weeks ago, Ramzan Kadyrov, Chechen warlord-turned politician, threatened to open fire on federal law enforcement officials if they came to Chechnya without his permission.
If Russia were to be forced to fold in Ukraine, it may well be seen as Putin's weakness by the public, which overwhelmingly supports the annexation of Crimea.
 
There is also a threat that a weakening federal center in Moscow would encourage provincial elites to crave more resources and power. A subtle indication that Moscow may fear the latter is the removal of Alexander Tkachev - a powerful and independent Krasnodar Krai governor - from office. As President Vladimir Putin has no clear successor, the situation could turn dangerous for Russia's stability.

Thus, a détente with Russia can be in America's interest. In spirit, an agreement over Ukraine should be similar to the status quo that existed shortly before the events of February 2014, when U.S. advisors had influence over then-President Viktor Yanukovych and key Ukrainian oligarchs were also under U.S. supervision.

On the other hand, there were no barriers for large Russian investment and, perhaps, further economic integration with the Russian-led Eurasian Customs Union.

To keep the economic integration option open, Russia showed willingness to bail out its neighbor. In December 2013, Putin offered the Yanukovych government a credit line worth more than $15 billion to keep the Ukrainian economy afloat.

Given that even now, during hostilities, Russia is happy to offer Ukraine a rebate on gas prices, restoration of peace is likely to see Russia saving Ukraine from total economic collapse.

That is perfect for America: U.S. policy makers will have full control over the political direction of Ukraine, while American taxpayers would not have to back credit-guarantees for a nation that is on the brink of defaulting on its bonds.

Unfortunately, we cannot travel back to 2013, so some small, but strategic changes will have to be made to American policy.

First, the U.S. will have to soften its rhetoric on Crimea. There is no need for formal recognition - keeping Ukrainian nationalists and militant premier Arseniy Yatsenyuk from severing electricity and water supply to the Crimean peninsula would suffice.

There is nothing new in such an arrangement - the U.S. government followed a similar course of action on the issue of the Baltic States from 1940-1990.

Second, Russia would appreciate a break from at least some sanctions. The U.S. doesn't have to lift sanctions - that would only put further strain on relations between the President and the U.S. Congress. It would suffice to stop pressuring the EU and let them lift the sanctions, as quite a few of the member states want.

That would serve a further strategic purpose for the U.S. With renewed access to EU credit and EU energy markets, Russia would be less dependent on China and thus perhaps less likely to side with the People's Republic in international disputes.

The third problem is the Donbas. The people there clearly don't want back into Ukraine and rebel leaders are talking about expanding the insurgency to as far as Odessa. Here, a Transnistria-style quick fix might work until the situation is further stabilized.

Donbas is unlikely to become an aggressive failed state, because it has some industrial base and the Russians are making sure that the radicals are tamed. For instance, radical Russian nationalist leader Igor Strelkov was barred from entry to Donbas starting in August 2014.

Overall, the strategy proposed here would free up the president, diplomatic and military staff to deal with other issues and restore peace in Eastern Europe, but still keep America in control of Ukraine. As well as that, economic restoration of Ukraine would become Russia's burden.

If Russian banks and companies get renewed access to EU's financial markets, the Russian economy is more likely to get back on its feet. This is bound to strengthen the nation's internal stability and thus make a nightmarish scenario of chaos in Northern Eurasia less likely.

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 #14
New York
http://nymag.com
May 21, 2015
Obama Is Defaming Putin, Complains Harper's Cover Story
By Jonathan Chait  

In the Harper's cover story on the Obama presidency, "What Went Wrong," David Bromwich recapitulates mostly familiar grounds of left-wing disenchantment with the administration. (It is not available online because Harper's hates the internet.) Bromwich, though, arrives on creative new ground when he gets around to denouncing Obama's policy toward Russia, which involves such crimes as "the defamation of Vladimir Putin":

"Victoria Nuland, the assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs, boasted in December 2013 that the United States had spent $5 billion since 1991 in the attempt to convert Ukraine into a Western asset. The later stages of the enterprise called for the defamation of Vladimir Putin, which went into high gear with the 2014 Sochi Olympics and has not yet abated."

Sadly, Bromwich does not spell out the details of this campaign of defamation, leaving his readers to imagine. Poor Putin, viciously smeared by Obama. His only crime was loving the eastern portion of Ukraine a bit too much, and, perhaps, shirtwear too little.

Bromwich explains that the campaign to defame Putin reached its nadir when Obama's minions descended upon Putin's own country to arm his enemies with cookies:

"When Nuland appeared in Kiev to hand out cookies to the anti-Russian protesters, it was as if a Russian operative had arrived to cheer a mass of anti-American protesters in Baja California."

Right, it's exactly as if Russian operatives had come to greet anti-American protesters in California. Except there aren't anti-American protesters in California, largely because California is part of the United States of America. Kiev, on the other hand, is not part of Russia. It is part of Ukraine, which is a sovereign state. Don't take my word on this. Go to the U.N. list of member states and scroll down to the Us:

So this is one small, technical difference between the U.S. sending agents to Kiev and Russia sending agents to California*. Also, Ukrainians have this crazy paranoid idea that Russia is threatening them with a military invasion, and similar fears have yet to take hold in California. Other than that, it's a good analogy.

*Update: I completely skipped over the "Baja" part of the sentence, which obviously changes the meaning, since Baja is part of Mexico, not the United States. Still, the point stands that there are not anti-American protests in Baja because the U.S. is not threatening to invade and annex it, whereas Russia is threatening to invade and annex more of Ukraine. Apologies for the hasty error.

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 #15
New York Times
May 20, 2015
Russia and U.S. Find Common Cause in Arctic Pact
By ANDREW E. KRAMER

MOSCOW - The recent diplomatic thaw between Russia and the United States over the crisis in Ukraine has had little impact there, but it is being felt somewhere else - in the Arctic Ocean, near the North Pole.

Out on the sea, the polar ice cap has been melting so quickly as global temperatures rise that once improbable ideas for commercial activities, including fishing near the North Pole, are quickly becoming realistic.

The United States, Russia and three other nations with Arctic Ocean coastlines agreed last year to regulate trawling in Arctic waters newly free of ice. But the deep freeze in East-West relations after Russia's annexation of Crimea delayed the expected signing.

The day after Secretary of State John Kerry met with President Vladimir V. Putin in the Black Sea resort of Sochi last week, Russia announced it would sign the fishing agreement.

"I think the Arctic genuinely is shaping up to be the exception to the rule," said Scott Highleyman, director of the Arctic Program at the Pew Charitable Trusts. "The U.S. and Russia seem to be trying really hard to keep talking to each other."

The fishing deal was negotiated in February 2014 among Russia, Norway, Canada, the United States and Denmark, which controls Greenland, where the talks were held.

It was expected to be signed within weeks of the meeting, but the timing turned out to be dismal when, that month, street protesters in Kiev, Ukraine, overthrew President Viktor F. Yanukovych, a Russian ally, and most East-West cooperation froze.

As recently as April, ill-will over Ukraine carried into a meeting of the Arctic Council, an international organization created to foster cooperation in the region, despite diplomats' appeals to focus on the melting ice instead.

"There is no room here for confrontation or for fearmongering," said Russia's envoy to the meeting, Sergei Y. Donskoi, the minister of environment and natural resources.

The United States opened negotiations on the fishing accord six years ago, after concluding that enough of the polar ice cap melted regularly in the summertime that an agreement to regulate commercial fishing near the North Pole was warranted.

The accord would regulate commercial harvests in an area far offshore - in the so-called doughnut hole of the Arctic Ocean, a Texas-size area of international water that includes the North Pole and is encircled by the exclusive economic zones of the coastal countries.

The part of the doughnut hole that is thawing most quickly, above Alaska and the Russian region of Chukotka, is well within the range of Asian industrial fishing fleets. Whatever their disagreements over Ukraine, Russia, the United States and the other shoreline states have a shared interest in protecting the high Arctic from unregulated fishing that could affect these countries' coastal stocks, conservationists say.

"Some people call this Arctic exceptionalism," Clive Tesar, the spokesman for the Arctic Program at the World Wildlife Fund, said in a telephone interview. "We can have our disagreements elsewhere, but in the Arctic, we have to cooperate."

The agreement among the five countries is seen as a first step to a broader international accord to protect the open water until the fish stocks there, like Arctic cod, can be more fully studied. Fish may migrate into the ice-free area as the ocean warms, tempting fishing fleets to follow.

The accord is unusual for protecting a huge area from human exploitation before people have had much chance to exploit it. Before the last decade, scientists estimate, the doughnut hole had been icebound for about 100,000 years.

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 #16
Interfax
May 20, 2015
NATO transit through Russia still possible - envoy

Brussels, 20 May: After the International Security Assistance Force completes its operation in Afghanistan, for which a simplified procedure of transit of freight was used, the interested countries will still be able to use the transit scheme in accordance with the general procedure, Russia's permanent representative to NATO Aleksandr Grushko told Interfax.

"I would like to note that this is specifically a question of the simplified procedure for the transit of freight, which took into account ISAF's considerable needs to quickly ship cargo to and from Afghanistan. In the present circumstances, all interested countries retain the possibility to use the transit scheme in accordance with the general procedure laid down in Russian laws and regulations," the Russian diplomat said in Brussels on Wednesday.

He recalled that the simplified procedure for transit of non-lethal equipment through Russian territory had been introduced by the Russian side, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1386 for the needs of ISAF.

"The resolution expired at the end of last year, and ISAF's operation ended too. The alliance has not applied to us with a request to extend the simplified procedure," Grushko said.

It was reported earlier that Russian Prime Minister Dmitriy Medvedev signed a decree on termination of transit to ISAF in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and in the opposite direction.

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 #17
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
May 19, 2015
The U.S. needs Russia's help in solving tough Middle East issues
RD interview: Veniamin Popov, former Ambassador to Yemen, Libya and Tunisia, shares his views on the current crisis in Yemen and suggests that the West may need Russia's help in bringing order and stability to the Middle East.
By Alexey Khlebnikov

The situation in the Middle East has always been a focus of the world's major powers. This has made the region geopolitically explosive, as the interests of too many nations clash there. Of late, there has been little improvement or stability there. In fact, if anything, the situation is getting worse, and that's beginning to change the policy calculus for both Russia and the West.

In March 2015, when a Saudi-led coalition of Arab states with the assistance of the U.S. launched an air strike campaign against Yemeni Houthi rebels, Yemen joined the list of those states that are already on the verge of collapse in the region. The current crisis in Yemen is of crucial importance because it illustrates how a conflict in one state has immediate spillover implications for the broader Middle East region.

For insight into how the Yemen crisis impacts the region and the policy decisions of the major powers, Russia Direct talked with Dr. Veniamin Popov, an experienced diplomat, Middle East expert, and former ambassador to Yemen, Libya and Tunisia.

Russia Direct: How does the crisis in Yemen affect regional politics and U.S. policy in the region?

Veniamin Popov: In fact, the situation in Yemen is a complicated and serious regional crisis that is spreading, causing the rise of extremism, which consequently affects and puts an extra burden on all the great powers. That is why the United Nation's Security Council, which can play a constructive role in resolving the crisis, should reinforce its attempts in dealing with the regional issues.

RD: Does the current situation in Yemen affect the policies of the major powers?

V.P.: Actually, the United States started to understand the real seriousness and danger of the situation. That is why they started to reconsider their approach and seek new contacts [in Yemen].

As I see it, the U.S., Russia and China all support political dialogue in Yemen. This creates the possibility for a discussion, which is the best option in the current circumstances.

RD: How to consider the Yemen crisis in the context of the region?

V.P.: Another story unfolds if you consider the general context of the Middle East, which makes it an extra-flammable and explosive region. This includes Islamic State and its activity in Levant, extremism in Libya and Yemen, civil war in Syria, and war against Islamic State in Iraq.

Generally speaking, the number of conflicts in the Middle East region has risen significantly. The major reason for that is the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, when everything was turned upside down. Before that, people in the region did not pay much attention to the Shia-Sunni division at all, because there was none. The majority of people even did not know the clear difference between the two. Now everyone knows about it and the Sunni-Shia struggle is exploited to further destabilize the regional situation.

This cannot lead to any positive consequences. The Sunni-Shia confrontation has already become a dominant issue in the region. For example, not long ago Saudi Arabia considered the Muslim Brotherhood as the main threat to its security. Recently, it was replaced by the rising Shia threat from Iran, which in the eyes of the Saudis, tries to encircle the Sunni-governed Gulf states and dominate in the Middle East.

RD: Does the crisis in Yemen affect talks on the Iranian nuclear program?

V.P.: Surely, it affects Iran talks. The main reason is that it made the U.S. maneuver and take extraordinary steps to avoid deterioration in relations with regional powers that also are close allies - Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, etc. This is the main reason why U.S. President Obama called the leaders of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to come for a summit at Camp David on May 14.

When the interim deal with Iran was reached in Lausanne on April 2, the prospect for a final agreement, which has to be signed by June 30 this year, loomed. This outcome naturally scared U.S. allies in the Gulf. It is pretty obvious that in case of the successful final deal with Iran, the Middle East's landscape will change dramatically. This is why Obama invited the GCC leaders to Camp David to reassure them in the solid and unchanged position of the U.S. on Gulf security.

On the other hand, the concerns of GCC states are also understandable. In case the final deal with Iran is secured, the sanctions will be lifted, which will let Iran off the leash. Hence Iran's ability to challenge Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Gulf states will increase.

RD: What position Russia should take on the crisis in Yemen?

V.P.: Russia, in principle, has a very good policy towards this conflict. We have to make all parties of the conflict sit around the table and negotiate as Russia has been always proposing. Of course, it is not an easy task to do, but it is possible. If Yemenis do not want to participate in negotiations in Riyadh, then all interested parties should arrange talks in Geneva. Also do not forget that Russia itself is a very suitable ground for holding talks, as was proven by two rounds of inter-Syrian talks in Moscow.

RD: Do you see any change in the Western approach to Middle East issues?

V.P.: The most important thing that has to be understood is that national, ethnic and religious issues in the 21st century cannot be solved militarily. Diplomacy and negotiations are the only suitable tools here.

That is why the U.S. started to evolve its approach. Especially, this started to become more obvious after the shooting at a Mohammed cartoon drawing contest in Texas on May 4, when two gunmen, reportedly connected to ISIS, attacked a crowd of people on American soil. This event has already influenced how the U.S. expert community talks about the issue. They started to express concerns over the possibility of ISIS coming to the U.S. and conducting terror attacks.

To speak about Europe, it is unclear why it conducts such a policy towards the region when members of ISIS are already in Europe. Another side of the story is the issue of African immigrants, which is a result of European policy towards the region as well. In Libya there are about 1 million of those who strive to cross the Mediterranean and end up in Europe to escape the chaos and extremism. The migration crisis is already there, Europe does not have any policy or a program how to cope with the influx of migrants from Libya. They offer to sink the boats but it is not the way out.

RD: What is your vision of change in the Middle East?

V.P.:  In general, I see the situation evolving, although slowly. The understanding in the U.S. and in Europe that their policies should be changed is on the way. Recent visits of Merkel and Kerry to Russia and their talks with President Putin indicate the upcoming change.

The most important thing is that the U.S. started to understand that it couldn't handle Middle Eastern issues alone. Without coordination and cooperation, the result is quite obvious - the rise of extremism and terrorism in the region.

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 #18
Business New Europe
www.bne.eu
May 21, 2015
The Riga summit of disappointment
Ben Aris in Moscow

Several plucky countries of Emerging Europe have put their necks on the block by defying Russian bullying to join its Customs Union, turning instead to the EU and its promise of a better life. But most of these countries are likely to be disappointed, or could even feel betrayed, at the Riga EU summit that kicks off on May 21 in the Latvian capital.

According to draft documents seen by bne IntelliNews, pro-enlargement wording in EU declarations on ties with former Eastern Bloc states is set to hit an all-time low as the EU's enthusiasm to help out any country that is not a member evaporates. Almost nothing of substance is on offer for Europe's so-called "Eastern Partners" and Riga could end up being the summit of their disappointment.

None of the would-be EU members took a bigger risk, or paid a higher price, than Ukraine. The Vilnius summit in 2013 was a media circus as then president Viktor Yanukovych kept the bureaucrats from Brussels guessing until the last minute as to whether he would sign off on the long-negotiated free trade and association deal with the EU. His refusal and decision to sign a deal with Russia in December instead led directly to the Euromaidan protests and subsequent civil war in the east that has claimed more than 7,000 lives.

Two years on and the EU has invited its prospective partners to its next regular jamboree where the Eastern Partnership programme on closer ties will be discussed. The programme was launched in 2009 in Prague and was the brainchild of two hawkish foreign ministers who are no longer in their posts: Poland's Radek Sikorksi and Sweden's Carl Bildt.

The 2009 summit spoke of "facilitating approximation towards the European Union" for the partners. The next one in Warsaw in 2011 went further, saying EU leaders "acknowledge the European aspirations and the European choice of some partners". The apex came in the Vilnius text in 2013 that acknowledged, "the European aspirations and the European choice of some partners" and pledged to "support those who seek an ever closer relationship with the EU". Now several of these countries have defied Russia to the point of fighting a proxy war with their larger neighbour, the Riga summit should have carried the series of declarations through to its logical conclusion; instead, it appears Brussels is turning its back on the region.

Defying Russia comes with a heavy cost. Ukraine has paid in blood, but the other attendees are finding that raising Russia's ire is an unprofitable experience. Present will be Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova in addition to Ukraine.

Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine have all been locked out of the large and lucrative Russian market by trade barriers and bans on their goods to a greater or lesser extent. Belarus and Armenia have been coaxed and cajoled respectively into joining Russia's Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Thanks to its oil and gas wealth, Azerbaijan has so far successful managed to sit on the fence.

Bad economic relations with Russia are a bad idea for countries in the former Soviet bloc. Many of these countries have had to devalue their currencies as a direct result of Russia's slowdown that has only been aggravated by the trade wars running in the region. And despite all the 'we want to join the West' rhetoric, the bulk of the foreign investment into several of these countries remains Russian.

So the Riga summit should be the place where they can turn to their new best friend in Brussels for help. Except very little help will be on offer. As bne IntelliNews reported, "the most striking fact about the Eastern Partnership summit draft conclusions obtained by bne IntelliNews ahead of the gathering is that they leave out any language alluding to the possibility that the EU's so-called 'Eastern Partners' might eventually join the bloc."

With most of the Continent still in recession and saddled by massive public debt, a serious case of expansion fatigue has set in. Matriculating new members comes with a heavy financial burden - Poland was just granted €8bn of new structural transformation funds per year for the next 10 years alone - that nobody in Brussels is willing or able to pay. That is not to mention the immigration issue as long promised visa-free travel regimes also appear to been removed from the agenda.

Even the trade deal that several of the countries have recently ratified will not produce much new trade, as many restrictions remain in place and will only be removed gradually against proven success at implementing reforms demanded by Brussels.

Dissatisfaction rising

Worn down by the added hardships, the aspirant countries are starting to get tired and in some cases even a little desperate.

Georgians were vocal at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) annual meeting held in Tbilisi in May, but have seen little concrete aid in return. For many of these countries just the visa-free regime would be enough to placate their populations, but that seems as far away as ever. "We need a carrot" from the West, Eka Metreveli of the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies told the Financial Times in Tbilisi. "There's the feeling that we're trying, but nothing is happening. And Russia is here."

Displeasure with the EU's foot-dragging on the accession issue is widespread amongst the candidate countries. Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic complained to Euronews in the same week of "patience fatigue" with the EU: "We invested not only a lot of our time, our full energy, our political strength in today's processes, we also started the toughest and harshest possible economic reforms in Serbia. We achieved a lot in the dialogue with Kosovo Albanians, then you see that you are not even respected."

And Turkey, which has been kept on the club's doorstep for decades, recently seems to be doing a volte face by agreeing to build the so-called Turkish Stream gas pipeline to Europe's borders that will give Moscow greatly increased clout in the country.

Finally Ukraine is in an increasingly desperate position, yet is only getting aid from the West in dribs and drabs. The economy had contracted by 17.6% in the first quarter of this year compared with a year earlier and it could contract by as much as a "disastrous" 12% this year, former president Viktor Yushchenko said in an interview on May 20. The government recently sharply downgraded its growth forecast to a 7.5% contraction for the full year, worse than last years 6%-plus contraction.

The government has been banking on Western help, but a donor conference supposed to be held on April 28 was called off because EU officials feared the country could remain a "bottomless pit" and say they will reconvene later this year depending on the progress of reforms. At this point the outlook is not good, as Ukraine's shadow economy has expanded to a record 42% of GDP, according to the Ministry of Economic Trade and Development, rather than shrinking.

The Ukrainian economy is in tatters, but still spending a whopping 5% of GDP on defence that it clearly cannot afford to fight Russian proxies in the Donbas. With the deadline to agree a debt restructuring deal with bondholders in June, the prospects of a major default is now looming large. Kyiv passed a bill on May 19 allowing it to place a moratorium on coupon payments that the Russians said was tantamount to default. One obvious solution to the problem would be to grant Ukraine some debt relief as former US Federal Reserve governor Larry Summers augured in a recent FT editorial, but that is not on the table either.

"The case for debt reduction is as strong as any that I have encountered over the past quarter century. How the issue is resolved will say much about the extent of international commitment to Ukraine and to resisting Russian aggression," Summers wrote.

Consequences

The lack of aid and action that Riga is likely to produce means the EU is running the risk of fuelling a pro-Russian backlash in some or all of these countries. Their leaders - and Georgia and Ukraine standout - have promised their people a better life governed by "European values". However, without significant aid they could fail to deliver. At some point the populations, which are bearing the brunt of the harsh economic reforms being imposed by the IMF and EU, could start to ask themselves if going with Russia was not the better option.

"Most Ukrainians wanted their country to be different by now. Even those who didn't support the Maidan protest two winters ago were fed up with living in Europe's most corrupt country. When then-President Viktor Yanukovych fled office after the demonstrations turned bloody in February 2014, the civic activists behind the protest movement hoped to turn their country from a dysfunctional kleptocracy into a rule-of-law democracy worthy of European Union membership," Lucian Kim, a long-standing eastern European correspondent, said in a blog recently entitled "Why this revolution may be doomed too".

In Kyiv, protestors have launched an "indefinite rally" in front of the doors of the Rada to demonstrate against the more than tripling of household gas tariffs. Likewise, miners travelled to Kyiv to protest against unpaid wages in May. Some have speculated that another Maidan protest, this time directed against the leaders of the last one, could be in the works. Indeed, the indefinite rally was organized by the Anti-Maidan movement and the union for protection of entrepreneurs

In Georgia, as bne IntelliNews reported, pro-Russian sentiment is already on the rise in the face of the same old grinding hardships. A recent poll by foreign affairs think-tank the National Democratic Institute has shown that Georgian approval of Russia's EEU membership has doubled in the last year. Armenia and Kyrgyzstan have both already plumped for the EEU despite the fact that both their leaderships made it clear they would have preferred to move closer to Europe, but were realistic enough to realise they wouldn't get any help from Brussels.

The only good news to come up in the run-up to the Riga summit is that tripartite trade talks between Russia, Ukraine and the EU appear to have started - something that Moscow was demanding for more than a year before the issue came to a head at the Vilnius summit in 2013.

Russian Economy Minister Alexei Ulyukayev was in Brussels on May 18 for talks with EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmstrom and told reporters that he had not raised the issue of postponing implementation of the EU-Ukraine free trade pact from its January 1, 2016 start date, which has already been delayed one at the Kremlin's insistence.

"Our view is that the time remaining must be used as effectively as possible," he said of an agreement to continue negotiations on how the accord would be managed to address Moscow's concerns about its impact on Russian business.

"There were no threats," Malmstrom told reporters. "It was a very constructive atmosphere."

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 #19
BBC
May 21, 2015
Unrest tilts Georgia towards Russia
By Rayhan Demytrie
BBC Caucasus correspondent

As Georgian leaders head to the Eastern Partnership summit in Riga, they will find it hard to hide their disappointment.

Because the one thing that they were hoping to get for their country from Riga was endorsement of a visa-free travel policy to other European countries.
They are likely to come home empty-handed.

This ex-Soviet nation, which has strong pro-Western aspirations, says it has delivered on promised reforms bringing Georgia into line with European and international standards of governance.

But in its assessment of the country's progress, the European Commission said on May 8 that more needed to be done to achieve its goal.

Last year, three former Soviet countries - Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova - signed an Association Agreement with the EU.

Part of this agreement includes a visa liberalisation policy whereby short-term, visa-free travel within the Schengen area will be granted to citizens of those countries.

The aim is to incentivise the EU's so-called Eastern partners to undergo reforms across a broad range of issues, from security and immigration to human rights and corruption.

In early May, in an open letter addressed to the heads of European institutions, Georgia's political leaders urged Europe to endorse a visa-free regime, which they said would be "a long-awaited tangible reward for reforms".

Russian ties

The key word here is tangible. Georgia's political leadership desperately needs to demonstrate to the population that becoming part of the European family is more than just a dream.

But a slide in its popularity and a continuing malaise in Georgia's economy may be prompting Georgians to reconsider the EU's merits.

A recent opinion poll conducted by the US-based National Democratic Institute suggests that while a majority of Georgians still support the country's pro-Western and pro-Nato aspirations, a new trend of increasing support for the Russian-led Eurasian Union has also been spotted.

In some ways, that trend of more Georgians supporting closer ties with Russia makes perfect sense.

Many Georgian businesses and families economically depend on their northern neighbour.

Georgian politics:

Following the collapse of communism in the USSR in 1991, Georgians voted overwhelmingly for the restoration of independence and elected nationalist leader Zviad Gamsakhurdia as president.

However, Gamsakhurdia was overthrown by opposition militias which, in 1992, installed former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze as the country's new leader.

He held office for 11 years before being ousted in the Rose Revolution of November 2003 following mass demonstrations over the conduct of parliamentary elections.

The Georgian Dream party has been in power since the parliamentary election of 2012, unseating the United National Movement, whose former chairman Mikheil Saakashvili stood down after two terms as president of Georgia in 2013.

Russia is one of the top destinations for Georgian agricultural produce, wine and mineral water.

It is also the main target for Georgian nationals seeking work abroad.

But the relationship between Russia and Georgia is a troubled one.

In recent months, Russia has extended its control of Georgia's two breakaway territories by signing "strategic alliance" agreements with South Ossetia and Abkhazia - both are backed financially and militarily by Russia.

Government problems

It is against this backdrop, and the fall in Georgia's national currency (it has lost 30% of its value against the US dollar since November) that the country's governing coalition, Georgian Dream, finds itself on shakier ground than it has been at any time since coming to power in 2012.

Earlier in May the government faced a vote of confidence in parliament following the resignation of seven cabinet ministers within the space of 10 months.

It won easily - the coalition holds a majority in parliament - and 32-year-old Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili explained at the time that the vote was merely a formality.

However, many in Georgia suspect that Mr Garibashvili is not fully in control of his government.

Instead the former PM, the country's only billionaire, Bidzina Ivanishvili, is the man Georgians believe truly pulls the levers of power.

Mr Ivanishvili's Georgian Dream coalition won a landslide victory in parliamentary elections in October 2012, defeating former president Mikheil Saakashvili's United National Movement party.

He promised judiciary reforms with the slogan "restoration of justice".

But opponents say that that restoration has been selective.

More than 100 former government officials are under investigation, many have been jailed and others are still awaiting trial.

Mr Saakashvili, who left Georgia shortly after the end of his presidential term, is wanted by the authorities on a number of charges.

After serving just over a year as prime minister, Mr Ivanishvili resigned his position and appointed his former aide Irakli Garibashvili.

And while Bidzina Ivanishvili no longer holds public office, he enjoys giving his assessment of the political situation in the country on his weekly TV show.

Lack of unity

He frequently criticises the country's president, Giorgi Margvelashvili, for his decision to take up residence in the palace built by his predecessor, which irritates Mr Ivanishvili.

And there is not much unity between the president and the prime minister either.

The two men frequently clash over who should represent Georgia on the international stage.

Privately, members of the diplomatic community in Georgia complain that the cat-fighting weakens the Georgian government and the country.

Yet despite the widespread poverty, and the lack of clarity on who is in charge, one thing is tangible - that Georgia is a working democracy.

It has made significant progress in recent years both under the UNM and the Georgian Dream, leaving behind the autocratic rule common in other former Soviet republics, and it has a vibrant and plural media.

But to complete its marathon towards the eventual embrace of the EU, Georgia will have to cross the finishing line without tripping over Russian - or its own - stumbling blocks.

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 #20
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
www.mid.ru
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's remarks and answers to questions during Government Hour at the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly, Moscow, May 20, 2015

Ms Matviyenko, esteemed members of the Federation Council,

I'm happy to have another opportunity to address the upper house of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. We regard close cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Parliament as an important resource in our efforts to promote our national interests and strengthen our country's stature and influence in the international arena.

Factors encouraging instability and conflict continue to accumulate in international relations. This is a very difficult stage in the formation of a more just and democratic polycentric system, which is objectively occurring, reflecting the geographical and civilisational diversity of the world today. Unfortunately, we keep coming up against the desire of the US and its allies to reverse this trend and impose their will, approaches and values on other participants of international relations.

The stakes are high. Fundamental principles of the UN Charter are systematically violated, double standards are widely used, and there is interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states in order to reaffirm a unilateral world order. An array of measures is in store for those who object - from unilateral illegitimate sanctions to direct military intervention. We deem this approach not only unlawful but also short-sighted, ignoring the fact that the fate of the world today cannot be determined by a single state or a narrow group of states.

Russia will continue to firmly uphold truth and justice in international affairs, as well as the rights of our compatriots. No one will force us to abandon our position of principle on key issues. As Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly stressed, we were not the ones who spoiled relations, and the main condition for restoring them is respect for Russia and its legitimate interests.

Our approach is based on a commitment to collective methods of addressing current issues by relying on international law, the central coordinating role of the UN, genuine partnership and cooperation between the main centres of power and influence, and respect for the right of nations to decide their own fate.
A united effort alone can start the ball rolling on resolving the most challenging and complicated international issues. This is vividly illustrated by the successful resolution of the situation with Syria's chemical weapons and talks on Iran's nuclear programme, where, due to the constructive approach of all participants, there is now serious potential to forge a comprehensive agreement. The most important thing is not to destroy this opportunity by reverting to pressure tactics.

The appeal of Russia's balanced foreign policy to partners in various regions continues to grow. The Moscow celebrations of the 70th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War were attended by leaders and delegations from nearly 40 countries and international organisations. We are grateful to all those who shared in the joy and sadness of this sacred holiday with us.

Promoting Eurasian integration processes remains a key priority. The activities of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which was joined by Kyrgyzstan on May 8, are designed not only to enhance the competitiveness and further the socio-economic progress of our countries but also to consolidate regional stability. In the past half a year trade between EAEU member-countries increased by almost $20 billion. Its infrastructure has improved and the share of goods with high added value has grown.

Russian-Chinese relations are the best they've been in history and continue to acquire new content. We signed an impressive package of documents following the visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Moscow. I'd like to emphasise the conceptual importance of two joint statements - on deepening comprehensive partnership and strategic interaction, and on cooperation on merging the development of the EAEU and the Silk Road Economic Belt.

We are committed to further expanding the privileged strategic partnership between Russia and India, deepening multilateral ties with Vietnam and other ASEAN countries, and implementing joint trade and economic projects in Siberia, the Far East and elsewhere.

We place a great deal of importance in the implementation of the initiative to create reliable mechanisms of regional stability in the Asia-Pacific Region. This initiative was jointly formulated by Russia and China and has already been discussed at several rounds of consultations at East Asia summits.

President Vladimir Putin has said repeatedly that cooperation with the Asia-Pacific Region is our strategy for the entire 21st century. Importantly, we want to develop this vector of our policy not at the expense of the Western one but in addition to it, provided, of course, that the West is ready to cooperate honestly and on the basis of mutual advantage, without ultimatums and attempts to gain unilateral advantages.

We are paying increasing attention to the work of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the BRICS association, both of which will hold their summits in Ufa this July. We hope that the SCO summit will confirm the organisation's ability to flexibly respond to changing realities, mark a major stage in implementing the principle of openness enshrined in the SCO founding documents, and start the process of accepting new members.

Russia's Presidency in BRICS is aimed at continuing to transform the association into a mechanism of strategic cooperation and asserting its role as an influential player in the global governance system. The range of cooperation is growing - the parliamentary format of BRICS activities will be launched by the Parliamentary Forum that will take place in Moscow on June 8.

We intend to continue actively promoting the peaceful settlement of crises, particularly the fratricidal conflicts in the Middle East and Northern Africa. We will continue working for national peace and accord in Syria through dialogue between the government and the opposition, which Moscow is willing to host.
We will continue to provide necessary support to the Middle East and Northern Africa to improve capabilities in combatting extremism and terrorism, which have spread beyond this region. The fight against terrorism, including the so-called Islamic State, must be consistent and free of double standards, with the United Nations playing the coordinating role.

The protection of Christians in the Middle East and other parts of the world has special significance for us. We also believe it is important to prevent tensions within Islam from evolving into open confrontation.

As for the Euro-Atlantic region, the settlement of the Ukraine crisis is the top priority. Its genesis is well known, so I will not repeat it here. A realistic political settlement must involve the complete and consistent implementation of the Minsk agreements of February 12, which have the status of an international legal instrument formalised by a UN Security Council resolution.

US Secretary of State John Kerry confirmed this approach during the Sochi talks of May 12. As we see it, the talks helped clarify the need to avoid steps that might cause lasting harm to bilateral contacts and cooperation in many fields, because the resolution of many pressing problems depends on joint efforts by Russia and the US in the international arena.

The United States has long been involved in Ukrainian affairs, though its involvement is not always constructive. We hope that, in light of the results of the Sochi talks, Washington will use its significant influence with Kiev to warn it against new military adventures and encourage strict compliance with the Minsk 2 agreements - in particular, the obligation to launch a direct and ongoing dialogue with Donetsk and Lugansk.

This dialogue is becoming a reality despite all the obstacles and complications. At Russia's initiative, working subgroups on the various aspects of a settlement were formed and began their work. The economic subgroup met on May 14. Another two meetings, on security and humanitarian issues, gathered yesterday, and the subgroup on political issues is due to meet on May 22.

Regarding the fundamental problems of the Euro-Atlantic regions, the resolution of which was stymied by the Ukraine crisis, the primary common goal for all countries in this vast region should be putting in place a system of equal and undivided security built on a non-bloc basis. To this end, we use the "Helsinki +40" process that was started in the framework of the OSCE. We are confident that the interests of all nations both in the east and west of the European continent will be well served by the gradual harmonisation of integration processes with the aim of creating a single economic and humanitarian space from Lisbon to Vladivostok. As a first step, we propose dialogue between the EU and Eurasian Economic Union.

The Council of Europe is designed to play the role of a humanitarian foundation for European security and cooperation - of course, subject to respect for all underlying principles of equality, without any attempts to escalate confrontation, as the case is with PACE, an advisory body of the Council of Europe. We completely support the principled position of the Russian delegation to PACE.

We continue to improve our foreign policy tools. We focus on parliamentary and economic diplomacy and on deepening cooperation with civil society. The protection of the rights and legitimate interests of Russian citizens and our compatriots abroad will remain a crucial part of our foreign policy activity.

We are open to closer cooperation with senators and are willing to provide essential assistance to Federation members in making their external ties more effective. For our part, we are interested in actively using the potential of [Russian] regions in addressing foreign policy issues, including through the mechanism of the Foreign Ministry's Council of the Heads of Constituent Entities of the Russian Federation. All of Russia's agencies abroad and the Ministry's territorial missions are geared toward assisting in the development of the international and foreign economic ties of Russian regions, including new members, specifically the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol.

The foreign policy course, approved by the country's leadership, has a long-term, strategic character and is not subject to short-term political fluctuations. The provision of a favourable external environment for the country's security and internal development in all spheres and thus improving the quality of life for the Russian people remain the Ministry's principal line of activity.

In conclusion, I would like to thank you for your constant attention to our contacts. Naturally, in my opening remarks, I did not touch on many regional and sectoral areas of our foreign policy activity. Written answers to questions from Federation Council members on many of these aspects have been prepared. I am willing to respond to further questions, comments and remarks.

Question: You've placed major emphasis on the strategic character of our relations in the East and the Asia-Pacific Region (APR). On May 22, we are holding a forum with the International Conference of Asian Political Parties (ICAPP) on the basis of the Eurasian dialogue in Vladivostok. Many would like to know where Russia stands on this area of cooperation. Does it contain any pitfalls or hidden reserves?

Sergey Lavrov: There are likely to be pitfalls in any issue because the interests of many players overlap in modern foreign policy and diplomacy, and all the more so with the growth of interdependence in the era of globalisation. Admittedly, the APR is the locomotive of the global economic growth. Powerful centres of economic growth and financial influence are emerging there, and the economy and finances are naturally followed by opportunities for expanding political influence.

Substantial forces are confronting each other in this area. Much is being said about the growth of contradictions between the US and China. We are observing heightened US interest in establishing steady dialogue with China. Right after his visit to Sochi US Secretary of State John Kerry went to Beijing. Based on what we've heard, he discussed economic issues as well as regional security problems, particularly in North-Eastern and Eastern Asia. We believe economic, political, and military-political issues here, and in every other part of the world, should be resolved on a non-bloc basis and on the principles of openness and inclusivity.

I'll give two examples that I think deserve particular attention. We are working on these issues. The first concerns economic integration. The United States created an initiative for establishing the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which includes regional countries, such as Japan, South Korea, the ASEAN states, Australia, and New Zealand, but has not invited China and Russia. Let me repeat that Russian and Chinese leaders have signed a joint statement on uniting the development of the EAEU integration and the Chinese concept of the Silk Road Economic Belt. Running parallel to these processes, China has also suggested establishing other economic integration groups such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). This is a very interesting initiative that 70 countries have already been joined, including Russia, which is one of 23 regional members. The Chinese initiative is open to everyone. We believe this approach contains better prospects because the formation of closed regional trade and integration structures (apart from the already mentioned TTP, the US is promoting the idea of a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) for Europe and the Atlantic) evokes apprehensions that the initiators of such closed investment associations may, wittingly or unwittingly, provoke the devaluation of the universal principles of the WTO and the transfer of the centre of gravity into such narrow formats. This is a large conceptual problem. We believe that in Europe, it is necessary to strive for harmonising integration processes, for instance, between the EU and the EAEU. The same applies to the APR. It is important to guarantee the openness of aspirations and enhance the efficiency of economic and investment cooperation.

The same is true of the military-political sphere. There are several closed blocs involving the United States, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand in the APR. Security is obviously inadequate. There is no common structure that would embrace the entire region and ensure the principle of equal security for each member. Some time ago we, along with China, suggested starting discussions on harmonising basic principles of security in the APR on the basis of a non-bloc approach. Making use the East Asia summits (EAS), Russia, China, Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia and Indonesia have already organised several rounds of consultations for all EAS participants, including the US, on the Russia-submitted project on the basic principles of such open, equitable cooperation. This is relevant not only for the APR but, in terms of security, also for Europe. Everyone remembers our initiative on the European Security Treaty, which still remains topical. Let me repeat that the APR stands out for a broad range of various dialogue mechanisms, including those created around the ASEAN. They have the Regional Security Forum, the mechanism necessary for meetings at the defence minister level, the already-mentioned EAS, and the parliamentary agencies you spoke about. All of them have relative advantages, but to ensure their harmonious, coordinated economic and military-political performance, it is necessary to create an umbrella agreement that would guarantee these processes do not contradict each other. I hope that the forum of the Asian parliamentary parties you mentioned, which takes place in Vladivostok the day after tomorrow, will also contribute to these debates.

Question: In 2013, we were worried amid talk about Ukraine's integration into the EU. We saw this as a tragedy and anticipated destruction on a scale no less than during the disintegration of the USSR. How realistic is Ukraine's admission to the EU and NATO? Is this an element of information warfare, political games or a real prospect in the foreseeable future?

Sergey Lavrov: We do not regard our neighbours' aspiration to strengthen their ties with the EU as a tragedy. Although for all this to move along in a positive manner, it is crucial, while developing ties with the EU, not to undermine the legitimate interests of Russia or other countries neighbouring a particular state that is aspiring to develop ties with the EU. Regarding the CIS space (and Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly spoken about this, including at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 10 years ago), we have always believed that these are our close partners and allies, but Russia does not have a monopoly over activity in this space. We recognise the rights of our neighbours - former Soviet republics, now sovereign states - to a multi-vector foreign policy. This is the kind of policy that Russia pursues, so we respond with understanding to their ties with other players in Europe, the United States and other regions. The only thing we insist on is that all of these processes are open and have no hidden motives or agendas and fully take into account the open, honestly declared and legitimate national interests of the Russian Federation. In other words, we are willing to harmonise these processes and search for a balance of interests.

The problem with the Ukraine crisis emerged because Ukraine started a rapprochement with the EU in a situation where the EU categorically rejected our arguments regarding the need to harmonise the free trade zone that Ukraine wanted to create with the EU with Kiev's obligations on another free trade zone - as part of the CIS (which, following Uzbekistan's recent accession, now has nine participants). The CIS free trade zone was created primarily at Ukraine's persistent request under Viktor Yushchenko. Russia went ahead with it, seeking to support its neighbours and liberalise trade with CIS countries, even though we are not the first country to benefit from this. To reiterate, it was Ukraine's initiative.

As the association and free trade agreement between Ukraine and the EU was prepared to be signed, it became clear that many of its provisions affected Ukraine's obligations to CIS countries, and when we proposed holding tripartite consultations as a matter of urgency to harmonise and bring the principles on which Ukraine traded with Russia and other CIS members in line with the provisions of the Association Agreement, Brussels told us that this was none of our business, and rejected all contacts. Later, when Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich did not refuse to accept the agreement but only asked that its signing be postponed to better understand how to resolve the contradictions between Ukraine's obligations to the CIS and its obligations to the EU, he was subjected to obstruction - there was the Maidan. You know what happened next. Then there was the February 21, 2014 agreement, which was trodden upon in the morning. In response to our appeals to the Europeans, who supported and even ratified this agreement, to raise their voice and bring the situation back to the [earlier] agreements and honour their commitments, we were told that the events had already moved to a new stage, in short, "the train had already left."

Then came Dmitry Yarosh's remarks to the effect that Russians would never be Ukrainians and that the anniversary of Stepan Bandera's birthday would never be observed in Crimea and that Ukrainian will never be spoken there, so Russians had to be kicked out from Crimea or the peninsula's Ukrainisation was to be ensured by other means. You know all this better than I - "friendship trains," the attempt to seize the Supreme Council building, and the referendum.
We are pleased that the people of Crimea made their choice, which we supported, despite the fierce campaign to question the freedom of their choice. This despite the fact that, as everyone knows, it was unequivocal and not made at gunpoint but from the bottom of the heart. Those who were in Crimea on that day or who watched live coverage cannot doubt the sincerity of the Crimean people's decision.

This is not to say that we should now shut ourselves off from the rest of the world and abandon all contacts with it, including the EU. This realisation is also gradually coming to our partners in Brussels who at first responded with unilateral sanctions and threatening statements to our refusal to support the coup d'état in Kiev and the call to support those in Crimea and southeastern Ukraine, who refused to become involved in that coup. There is a growing realisation that it is necessary to leave all of this behind and return to the point of departure, specifically dialogue and talks, including in a tripartite format - Russia, Ukraine and the EU, and in a broader format - the EU and the EAEU.

A few days ago, ministerial meetings took place in Brussels with the participation of Russian Economic Development Minister Alexei Ulyukayev, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Pavel Klimkin and the European commissioner for trade. They discussed and addressed in a business-like manner the concrete problems that have emerged in Russia over Ukraine's obligations under the Association Agreement with the EU. I will not go into details, but they agreed to work on certain issues related to customs, veterinary and plant disease oversight aspects and technical regulation in a concrete, substantive and professional manner. It's better late than never. This is a correct and useful step. Had the European Commission adopted this approach in October or November 2013, then perhaps there would have been no Maidan or bloodshed in southeastern Ukraine or the destruction of social and civilian infrastructure.

In other words, now we are back at the point where we were a year and a half ago, when we proposed these tripartite consultations, but at that time Brussels categorically rejected them. Today, we are back in the same situation, and our proposal is no longer considered unacceptable, but the difference between the two situations is thousands of people killed, tens of thousands injured, and destruction in southeastern Ukraine.

I hope very much that common sense will continue to prevail and that, as the economic aspects of the situation are addressed, all other agreements reached as part of the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements of December 12, 2015, will be honoured. This refers, above all, to the lifting of the blockade, the resolution of humanitarian issues, preventing the violation of the ceasefire and the withdrawal of heavy weapons, but especially with regard to the political process, a special status for the self-proclaimed DPR and the LPR, formalising this special status in the constitution and holding local elections, subject to approval by Lugansk and Donetsk, as well as all other provisions, including the concrete aspects of the decentralisation of power. All of this is recorded in the Minsk Agreements, which were approved by the UN Security Council, and they should be observed.
Regarding the prospects of Ukraine's NATO and EU membership, European countries themselves are reluctant to talk about this. A Ukraine-EU summit was recently held in Kiev. It adopted final documents: They say nothing even about the prospect of Ukraine's EU membership. They prefer to speak about the Association Agreement, which was signed and the implementation of its economic part was postponed until January 1, 2016, and they say that they are committed to these decisions. That's all.

A few days ago, a NATO-Ukraine commission meeting took place in Brussels. A document was adopted that included a denunciation of the Russian Federation. However, other than rhetoric and the assurances that Ukraine's security and military reforms will be supported, they do not contain any concrete promises regarding admission to NATO. This leads to the corresponding conclusions. Such assessments are confirmed by our contacts.

Question: Recently the United States launched an online information war against Russia, telling audiences the so-called "truth" about the developments in Ukraine, Russia's actions and other international events. Against this backdrop, after your meeting with US Secretary of State John Kerry, US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Victoria Nuland and US Ambassador to Russia John Tefft began their tour of Russia's regions with a clear purpose. They are starting to actively work against us. How can we counter this? How does the Russian Foreign Ministry react to this? What measures is it planning? How will this situation develop in your opinion?

Sergey Lavrov: Yes, this probably can be described as an information war. It is being conducted not only on the internet but also in other electronic media, such as TV and radio, and in more traditional media - newspapers. The Americans are sounding the alarm and a proposal is submitted to the US Congress to increase funding for media broadcasting in Europe and Eurasia in the face of Russia's "information aggression." They are accusing the US Government of losing the information war with Russia. Wars do not interest us. The reply to the question "Do Russians want a war?" is obvious and applies to all wars, including information wars.

As for Ukraine, our journalists are the only ones who have been working continuously in southeastern Ukraine and showing live images of the enormous destruction inflicted by the Ukrainian army, and battalions of the National Guard, the Right Sector and other formations that are not subordinate to the government in Kiev. By the way, in Ukrainian-controlled territory, there is nothing even close to the destruction we see in southeastern Ukraine. I don't remember any mention of civilian casualties in the reports from the front on Ukrainian army losses. They report information about killed Ukrainian army and National Guard soldiers but the population does not seem to suffer when the self-defence fighters respond to attacks by the Ukrainian army.

Our journalists are making huge efforts there. Some have already sacrificed their lives or were wounded there. I don't see any reasons to change anything, to try to prohibit them from working there or impose on them any artificial arguments designed to counter the stream of Western falsehoods about Ukraine. I believe the most powerful response is to continue speaking the truth. We are not going to interfere with the work of our media.

As for government support of the media - and not only in the Ukrainian context but in principle - you know more about this than I do. It's a separate issue.

Question: Today every thinking person understands that the methods used in the struggle for world domination are changing. Intelligence agencies and economic and information warfare are playing the key role instead of diplomacy or even the army. US experts write that US intelligence agencies operate and engage in subversion in over 120 countries. We witness how easily regimes change and how economically weak countries are becoming dependent on the United States. These are new methods of warfare. BRICS and other structures are an alternative to US domination. But if we fail to understand and study these methods, if we don't counter their efforts, we'll have a very hard time. We must do this and speak about this. Is there any overlap between Russia and other countries on this issue?

Sergey Lavrov: Our position of principle is that it is inadmissible to interfere by any methods in the domestic affairs of other countries, to encourage, not to mention provoke, government coups. I won't enumerate everything right now. This position is increasingly being enshrined in BRICS and SCO documents, and at the initiative of our partners rather than us. We have submitted to the UN a proposal (it is being resisted for obvious reasons but we will promote it, and it is already being supported by more and more countries) to adopt a declaration that will not only reaffirm the provision of the UN Charter on the inadmissibility of interfering in the internal affairs of other countries and not respecting their sovereignty but will also emphasise that government coups are an unacceptable method of regime change. Incidentally, this principle is observed by the African Union - its members do not deal with regimes that came to power as a result of a coup. This principle is not always observed in practice but it is included in the union's charter. Latin American countries have also adopted this principle after a series of coups that took place decades ago.

This means upholding one's position in classical, political terms and in international diplomacy. But, naturally, we are drawing practical conclusions from what is happening. President Vladimir Putin has already cited an example for which our opponents don't have an answer. When President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi fled from Yemen to Saudi Arabia, why did the entire progressive Western world demand that he be allowed to return and take part in searching for some compromise? This obviously stands in contrast to what happened in Ukraine. Moreover, unlike Hadi, former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych did not flee abroad during the coup. He was in Kharkov and stayed in Ukraine for several more days. We take note of such things. Now attempts are being made to organise something similar in Macedonia where the Albanian factor is being used in the most counterproductive and opportunistic way. This is also a very complicated story.

In conclusion I will agree with you that these processes require not only classic diplomatic methods but also operations by intelligence agencies and special information campaigns that I won't describe because they are not within my competence. But let me reassure you that adequate attention is being paid to this issue.

Question: Just recently, Ukraine unilaterally listed its Russian financial obligations among the debts subject to restructuring, without consulting the Russian side. Yesterday, the Verkhovna Rada amazed the world by granting the government the right not to repay its foreign debts. How, in your opinion, will the civilised world respond to this decision? And what steps will Russia take if this happens?

Sergey Lavrov: I believe that the civilised world will respond in the same way as Russia. It will perceive this situation as an indication of the fact that the regime it supported has been discredited completely. The civilised world has realised long ago who it is dealing with, and is aware that the Ukrainian government does not or cannot keep its word. We have the feeling that Ukrainian President Petr Poroshenko is sincerely trying to implement various measures stipulated by the Minsk agreements and the Normandy format talks. There are many discussions on the failure to implement them and disagreements between various government branches in Kiev. I will not comment on this because the media and political analysts have reported on this in great detail. The problem is that members of the civilised world who realise all this have agreed among themselves not to voice any public criticism of the Ukrainian government. However, some critical remarks are already being voiced, as it is no longer possible to pretend that everything is all right and to issue lofty statements expressing solidarity after various summits. It appears that the civilised world will soon have to break this vow of silence.

As for a specific response to the Verkhovna Rada decision, this is lamentable. Some analysts believe that this step isn't just an indication of impending bankruptcy; it is in fact an attempt to provoke a default so that it will be possible to buy up all remaining assets at rock-bottom prices after the stock market hits an all-time low.

We will not take any legal action for the time being. There are specific deadlines for repaying the $3 billion loan that was issued when Russia purchased Ukrainian government bonds. Although we had the right to demand payments ahead of schedule, we did not do this. But, in any event, standard debt repayment deadlines are to commence in late 2015, and our stance remains unchanged.

Question: The path of truth to Europe, to the consumers of truth who influence decision-making, is becoming increasingly bloody. Are we using enough resources, including financial resources, to protect historical justice and Russia's role in the history of each country, and not only in Europe? If we fail to pay sufficient attention to this today, our grandchildren will live in a future where the price of truth in terms of human lives will keep growing.
Is there an international legal mechanism based on archive materials for protecting historical truth? If not, do you think it should be created, with attempts to rewrite history to be equated to crimes against humanity?

Sergey Lavrov: Before equating attempts to rewrite history on the international scale to crime, we should agree on the definition of history and attempts to rewrite it. It is impossible to do this, because each country will offer its own details, even if we agree on a general concept. I don't think it's a good solution, because it would only increase confrontation.

It is a duty for all of us, including the Foreign Ministry and other agencies, the Russian Government and the state as a whole, to prevent the world from forgetting the truth, let alone distorting it. There are specific solutions to this end.

We maintain archival cooperation with many countries. We are also consistent and systematic in publishing archival collections. I've recently attended a presentation of such a collection, which we prepared jointly with several Latin American countries. Joint commissions of historians have been created at our initiative with the countries that have a different view of history, although they were not always enthusiastic. They are usually chaired by members of the Russian Academy of Sciences. My special thanks go to Alexander Chubaryan, head of the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of Universal History. We have such commissions with Austria, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Poland, the Czech Republic and Kazakhstan. We also had a joint commission with Ukraine, which has not been officially disbanded.

We have recently published jointly with Germany a pilot textbook on the period between the two world wars. Twelve of its 15 chapters have been written in collaboration by Russian and German historians. As for the remaining three chapters, we failed to coordinate our views with the German partners, but they comprise alternative articles, which are not confrontational but provide our different views on the matter. It is a major achievement. We have invited the other countries with which we have joint historical commissions to do the same.

As for the funding, I can assure you that in any area those responsible for their part of the project will certainly tell you that they could use more money. But we have to choose our priorities. Although this is very important work, I don't think that funding should be rerouted to it from some other sphere.

Question: According to recent media reports, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament has released an anti-Russian report which stresses the importance of providing consistent political and financial support to independent, at least in the EP's view, organisations, civil society activists, media and NGOs in Russia and establishing contacts with Russian organisations and officials who are ready to promote an alternative vision of political and diplomatic relations with the EU. The report also calls on the European Commission to immediately allocate funds to this effort. This is clearly reminiscent of attempts to interfere with Russia's domestic affairs. Does the Ministry of Foreign Affairs intend to respond to this? Maybe the Federation Council should respond to the actions of the European Parliament? What is your take on this issue?

Sergey Lavrov: In principle, the European Parliament's decisions are not binding for the European Commission. We are aware of this recommendation (or decision). By its legal nature it does not create an obligation to implement these measures. Let's wait and see how the European Commission responds. We strongly believe that there are reasonable people there.

This is not the only example of interference in domestic affairs by providing funding for those who oppose the current authorities. In the US, Congress passed and US President Barack Obama signed the Ukraine Freedom Support Act. It contains, among other things, a section on the Russian Federation with quite similar provisions. These actions are backed by precise allocations with 60 million US dollars earmarked for this. We have already warned our US partners that we will not allow any such actions and believe these initiatives to be destructive to our relations.

Parliamentarians contribute to neutralising activities of this kind. Legislation is being adopted in Russia regarding the funding of NGOs involved in political activity. These laws receive harsh criticism and condemnation by the West, although control over such activities is much more strident there. All these developments, including the ones you've mentioned, prove to me that bringing such actions under control is the right thing to do.

Question: What are the prospects for Russia's relations with Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela?

Sergey Lavrov: Our relations are in a very good shape. I won't elaborate on specific examples of how they are gaining new substance. The prospects forthese relations are quite good. Heads of state, representatives of ministries, agencies, and the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation regularly visit these countries.

In fact, we have developed an over-arching relationship with these countries, encompassing trade and economic ties, military-technical cooperation, interaction on security issues, contacts on humanitarian and education matters. A number of economic projects are being discussed with Cuba and are expected to yield tangible results. Free trade zones, special economic zones and a multimodal transport hub are being created there. Russian companies are actively following these developments. I have recently travelled to Nicaragua, where a lot is being done as well. We are promoting economic relations, which are evolving from various forms of assistance into mutually beneficial cooperation at the initiative of our Nicaraguan colleagues.

President Nicolas Maduro of Venezuela has recently visited Russia. Meetings were held with Venezuelan ministers at different levels. There are many investment and trade projects, as well as military cooperation projects. All these initiatives are expected to enhance stability in this region and create new vectors for Russian foreign policy.

Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua are three countries that actively support Russia on the international arena. We value this stance. We also note that these three countries command authority and respect in Latin America. A number of Latin American bodies unanimously condemned the sanctions that the Americans tried to impose on the Venezuelan government as well as the decision by the US to label Venezuela as a national security threat. Latin America's solidarity with Venezuela is telling, just like its solidarity with Cuba when the US attempted to "strangle" the island with sanctions.

It is very important that these three countries are among the most active promoters of unification of all Latin American countries. Several years ago they established the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). It was the first time that all countries of North and South America came together within a single structure without the US or Canada. Before that, there was the Organisation of American States with the US' and Canada's participation, but now there is CELAC for Latin Americans only.

All in all, I'm quite optimistic about the future of our cooperation.

Question: What is happening now in Macedonia is basically another colour revolution. It is the Ukrainian scenario or at least its beginning stage. What do you think, has the time finally come for Europe to react to these revolutions with more urgency? Perhaps at the preliminary stage of the coups it is advisable to involve international instruments such as the OSCE and the UN Security Council, in order to prevent this from becoming a common practice of changing power in countries?

Sergey Lavrov: I totally agree with you. This is a cause for grave concern. The current events in Macedonia are being orchestrated rather unsubtly by external parties. There are attempts to accuse Nikola Gruevski's government of incompetence and failure to fulfil his obligations to the nation, as well as great many other sins. The real motive is to put pressure on him because of his refusal to join the sanctions against Russia. We know for certain that this pressure is also a result of his support for the South Stream project at the time when he counted on it to benefit Macedonia. Now he is willing to cooperate in other energy supply projects between Russian and southern Europe, including the Turkish Stream. It is truly regrettable and disturbing that they are trying to use the Albanian issue to undermine Gruevski's government.

Many years ago, there were indeed some dramatic clashes between Slavic people and Albanians. This is when the Ohrid Agreement was signed, establishing peace and concord. Later, when, in our discussions with the EU, we raised the issue of rights of Russians and Russian-speaking people in Estonia and Latvia, we asked, "Why did you support the Ohrid Agreement and provided Albanians in Macedonia with a substantial scope of rights but you can't do the same for Russians in Estonia and Latvia?" There was no answer. However, the conflict in Macedonia was settled at the time.

Now there are talks that Macedonia must be even deeper "federalised", turned into a "flexible federation" or maybe even a "confederation." Someone even suggested that it should be divided, because of its "artificial" (as they put it) nature, between Bulgaria and Albania. Without reference to Macedonia, the prime minister in Tirana is generally declaring slogans of Greater Albania. Leaders of the Albanian parties in Macedonia use to go to Tirana for instructions. Meanwhile, the US ambassador in Skopje is inviting leaders of political parties and opposition to his office. In late April, there was even a visit organised for permanent representatives of several Western countries and the EU with the OSCE. Some five or six officials without a mandate from the OSCE Permanent Council went to Skopje, called themselves "an OSCE mission", and presented some "recipes" and demands for Nikola Gruevski. To prevent similar activity in the future, we made a request with the OSCE headquarters, the OSCE Secretary General and the OSCE Chairman (current Foreign Minister of Serbia Ivica Dačić) to deal with this matter and explain how anything like this could have happened.

Considering this number of self-appointed mediators, in my yesterday's address to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe I proposed that the Secretary General of the Council of Europe and perhaps also the OSCE Secretary General visit Skopje, talk to all the participants in this process and make recommendations for consideration by inter-governmental institutions.

This is a very serious matter. I think you are right and, if any similar cases occur in the future, it is necessary to take more prompt preventive measures and request that international organisations send their independent experts and secretariat representatives, and report later. Decisions must be made by official and legitimate bodies rather than behind the scenes.

To be continued...

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 #21
wwww.rt.com
May 20, 2015
World swatting away Ukraine like 'an annoying fly' - ex-president Yushchenko

Former Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko has warned that Ukraine is falling out of the international spotlight, comparing his country to an "annoying fly" everyone is bored with. A new format is needed for resolving the conflict in Donbass, he said.

"The world is getting tired of the Ukrainian question," Yushchenko told Segodnya. "We're not even second or third on the agenda anymore - Ukraine is being swatted away as an annoying fly." He added that the issue of Ukraine has become mundane and the international community is not paying as much attention to it anymore.

Yushchenko stressed the need to move to a new format where the EU, Russia and the US should get involved in negotiating an end to the conflict in Ukraine.

He also said that the loss of financial stability in Ukraine had led to greater economic damage than the war waged against the rebels in the east of the country.

In 2014 alone, Ukraine lost $US 12 billion in foreign investment while the public withdrew more than $9 billion from Ukrainian banks, Yushchenko said.

"If you lose financial stability and control over prices and money, you lose not only the capability for economic development but all other social issues," he said.

According to estimates, Ukrainian GDP is expected to shrink this year by another 12 percent, Yushchenko said, describing this as a "catastrophe."

Yushchenko was the third president of Ukraine from 2005 to 2010. He was brought to power in the wake of the pro-Western Orange revolution, but by the end of his tenure he saw his support evaporate and he was replaced by his rival, Viktor Yanukovich.

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 #22
E-International Relations
www.e-ir.info
May 20, 2015
Review - Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands
By Paul Robinson
Paul Robinson is a Professor in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa. He is the author of numerous works on Russian and Soviet history, including most recently Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich: Supreme Commander of the Russian Army (Northern Illinois University Press, 2014). He blogs at Irrussianality.

Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands
By: Richard Sakwa
London: I.B. Tauris, 2015

Judging by the coverage of the Sochi Olympics, which often seemed to focus more on allegedly dodgy plumbing and other supposed deficiencies of Russian preparations than on the games themselves, Russophobia had acquired a firm grip on the minds of Western journalists even before the annexation of Crimea in March 2014. Since then that grip has become stronger still. Richard Sakwa complains in his new book Frontline Ukraine that the Western media have displayed 'unabashed militancy. ... Their partisanship and profound lack of historical understanding would demean a Third World dictatorship' (p. 220). Furthermore, he claims, 'This irresponsibility reached the highest echelons of power' as politicians lined up to denounce 'Russian aggression'.

A powerful narrative has taken hold about events in Ukraine which brooks no opposition. According to this, the war in Donbas is solely the fault of Russia, and particularly of Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, and ending the conflict requires the West to stand up to Russia, show resolve, and support the Ukrainian government in all its efforts to regain control of its lost territory. Anybody who dares to suggest anything else is likely to be denounced as a 'Kremlin stooge', or as one of Putin's 'useful idiots'. As Sakwa puts it, 'Those calling for restraint, consideration and dialogue have not only been ignored but also abused, and calls for sanity have not only been marginalised but also delegitimated' (p. 1). 'Arguments in favour of engagement, dialogue and a little understanding are met with a barrage of imprecations and false historical analogies,' he says (p. 116).

In this context, Frontline Ukraine is a courageous book. It analyzes the causes of the current conflict in Ukraine, and in the process directly challenges the prevailing narrative. Sakwa, the author of several previous books on Russian politics, paints Russia as the injured party, and lays the blame for the crisis firmly on those Ukrainians who took power in February 2014 after overthrowing President Viktor Yanukovich, as well as on their backers in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU).

The war in Donbas, says Sakwa, is the product of a clash between two separate pairs of competing visions. The first pair consists of two contrasting visions of Europe; the second of two contrasting visions of Ukrainian statehood. Peace in Ukraine had depended on maintaining a delicate balance between them. The overthrow of Yanukovich destroyed that balance and paved the way for the imposition of one set of visions at the expense of the other. The response to this forcible imposition was rebellion.

At the end of the Cold War, Europe could go down one of two paths, Sakwa claims: towards 'Wider Europe', which is essentially an extension of Western Europe 'with the EU at its heart'; or towards 'Greater Europe, a vision of a continental Europe, stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok' (p. 26). The West chose the former, expanding the EU and NATO eastwards while excluding Russia from the governance of the continent. 'On coming to power in 2000, Putin sought engagement and accommodation with the West ... and was perhaps the most pro-European leader Russia has ever had,' writes Sakwa (p. 30). Putin's efforts to reach accommodation with the West were, however, continually rebuffed.

Worse, after the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, the EU, under the influence of the Swedish and Polish foreign ministers Carl Bildt and Radek Sikorski, designed the Eastern Partnership (EaP) to bring former Soviet states other than Russia within its fold. 'Instead of finding ways to transcend the deepening lines of division in the continent, the two [Bildt and Sikorski] set about giving these divisions institutional form,' Sakwa writes (p. 39). The goal of the EaP 'was to engineer Ukraine's separation from Russia' and thus it 'rendered the EU as much of a threat in Russian perceptions as NATO' (p. 41). The consequence was that Russia put intense pressure on Yanukovich not to sign an association agreement with the EU. His eventual refusal to sign provided the spark which ignited the Maidan protests and eventually set Donbas aflame.

The war is not, however, purely a product of this geopolitical context. The overwhelming majority of the rebel fighters are Ukrainian citizens, not Russians. This is primarily a civil war, and its roots lie within Ukraine 'There are two contrasting visions of statehood,' Sakwa writes, 'and ultimately the Ukrainian crisis of 2013-14 is a battle between the two' (p. 14). The first of these visions he describes as 'monist'. In this, the most desirable future of Ukraine is one in which there is a unitary national identity. That requires the imposition of a single historical memory on the whole country, as well as the maintenance of Ukrainian as the sole official language. The second vision Sakwa calls 'pluralist'. According to the pluralist model, 'Ukraine is not one culture but many ... a richly diverse society. ... For the pluralists multiple religious and linguistic orientations do not represent a danger to the state ... but the opposite: the diversity contributes to a rich and multifaceted culture' (p. 24).

Sakwa's sympathies lie clearly with the pluralist vision. He regards the monist alternative as ignoring Ukraine's reality, as well as being innately anti-Russian. The protests on Maidan began as a liberal, civic reaction to a corrupt government, but were hijacked by monist nationalists; 'A conservative, Russophobic nationalist ideology came to predominate' (p. 91). The new government which came to power in February 2014 instituted policies which thoroughly alienated the population of Donbas. In the face of opposition, it refused to make any meaningful concessions. Moreover, 'some of its ministers used language that was highly suggestive of the "blood and iron" purification through violence of earlier fascist movements' (p. 135). The result was rebellion. Despite the support it received from Russia, this rebellion was 'primarily a homegrown phenomenon' (p. 154). The Ukrainian government and its Western backers have refused to accept this, however, and have instead chosen to point to an external actor - Russia - as the source of their problems. They have thereby freed themselves of responsibility for their own actions, while also making it impossible for them to find solutions to the crisis.

Some may find Sakwa's analysis one-sided. Russia's mistakes and misbehaviours are explained, while those of the West and Ukraine are condemned. Nevertheless, Sakwa supports his thesis with considerable evidence and lays out a powerful case. He is entirely right to point out that the war in Donbas is as much a product of the actions of those who protested on Maidan and subsequently took power in Kiev, as of Russia. The 'blame everything on Russia' narrative which dominates in Kiev and in the West is both inaccurate and unhelpful. Frontline Ukraine brings much needed balance to a subject which badly needs it.

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 #23
Global Times
www.globaltimes.cn
May 17, 2015
Ukraine crisis causes strategic, mental shift in global order
By Dmitri Trenin
The author is director of the Carnegie Moscow Center.

The recent visits to Russia by German chancellor Angela Merkel and US Secretary of State John Kerry have raised the prospect of the stabilization of the conflict between Russia and the West, which broke out in 2014 over Ukraine. Some observers even go so far as to discuss what a new security regime in Europe might look like. Not so fast.

The Ukraine crisis was not just about Ukraine, or even Europe. It was about the global order, which promises a long competition with a yet-unforeseen result. Crucially, it is part of a pattern of changing relationships among the world's powers, with the US struggling to preserve its dominance.

The EU, for now, is not one of the competitors. The Ukraine crisis has demonstrated its woeful lack of both strategic thinking and action. The EU precipitated the crisis with its Eastern Partnership initiative, but then failed to oversee the transition in Kiev, and now is falling short of resources to keep Ukraine afloat financially.

The military conflict has naturally highlighted the role of NATO and the US, pushing the EU to the side. Germany, which after the euro crisis was rising as the EU's sole leader, has to accept that whatever leadership it may be able to exercise now has to be embedded within a broader US leadership.

This leaves Europe's security in a precarious state. The Russia problem which was left unresolved through inclusion since the end of the Cold War, cannot be solved through Russia's exclusion: It is still too big and increasingly assertive of its interests.

Western policies of sanctioning Russia economically and isolating it politically have failed to achieve the stated goal of making Russian President Vladimir Putin change his course. However, changing gears by sitting down with Putin to hammer out some compromise on Ukraine would be politically suicidal for Western leaders, in view of the rhetoric of the past 15 months. Strategically, this would constitute a US retreat which would reverberate around the world.

This means that Europe, for the foreseeable future, will not have a stable security order. The Minsk II agreement which the US, Germany, France, Ukraine and Russia pledged to uphold has little chance of being implemented. Kiev is unlikely to federalize Ukraine and give Donbass the "widest possible autonomy" it seeks, and the Donbass will not just wither away, ceding control of the Russian border to Ukraine. The best one can hope for is a stable truce, with some economic and humanitarian ties across the divide and regular contact between officials. Thus, Minsk would be less about the goal and more about the process.

The only consolation for the West in this situation will be that "Putin has been stopped." No attack on Mariupol by the rebels, no Russian offensive toward Kharkov or Odessa, the notion of Novorossiya has been retired. Transnistria is quiet, for the time being, the status quo in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is undisturbed. Moldova has confirmed its westward orientation, Georgia hosts US training exercises. Crucially, the Baltic States have not been disturbed by Russia, and have received not just moral, but also military support from their NATO allies. All true, except that the Kremlin did not intend to restore the Soviet Union, much less the Soviet sphere of influence in Europe.

The change that the Ukraine crisis has brought about is not territorial, but rather strategic and mental. Russia has finally quit its policy of trying to integrate into the West and become part of the Euro-Atlantic system. It has returned to its home base in Eurasia and has prioritized links to non-Western countries.

Relations with China for the first time are becoming as important for Russia as its relations with the US, and totally the opposite in nature. The Sino-Russian entente can further serve as a catalyst for coordination within such formations as BRICS and SCO, both of which will hold their next summits in Russia in July.

With Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's ground-breaking visit to China and India's forthcoming accession to the SCO, Moscow is putting more effort into its pet project of a closer triangular "RIC" cooperation.

The change of the global order will take a generation. The transition period will be marked by instability: The arrival of ambitious players at different levels and in virtually all regions will overload the capacity of the existing instruments of governance and control. Look at the Middle East, until very recently a playground for competing outside powers. Europe, until recently the world's most stable region, will hardly escape unscathed. Ukraine's domestic situation is fraught with many dangers. The Balkans, as Macedonia has just reminded everyone, are not a done deal. Britain may be headed for exit from the EU, and Turkey, having been denied entry there, is now on a path of its own, both internally and internationally.

The most important developments shaping the future of the world, however, will take place in Asia. What different players there will have learnt from the lessons of Ukraine will matter.

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 #24
The National Interest
May 20, 2015
Abandoned: The Kiev Government's Isolation of Eastern Ukrainians
"[W]hen governments strip people of their identity, they create a vacuum that will inevitably be filled with something else, like extremism, religiosity, nationalism, etc."
By Olena Lennon
Olena Lennon is a former Fulbright scholar from Horlivka, Ukraine, currently teaching Foreign Policy at the University of New Haven. Her hometown Horlivka, located in the Donetsk province of Eastern Ukraine (Donbas), has been one of the main strongholds of Russian-backed separatists in the past year.
 
Growing up in Horlivka, Ukraine, I never took to public holidays. Celebrations of religious holidays seemed too pagan and pretentious, while others lacked a sense of purpose, besides offering an excuse to eat, drink and be merry. Regardless of what many of the holidays commemorated, they did create a sense of culture and social identity-essential to any society's existence.

The only holiday that seemed to unite everyone was Victory Day on May 9. On this day, not only Ukrainians, but people across the post-Soviet space, commemorate victory in World War II and the "Great Patriotic War," a term used to describe the war during June 22, 1941 to May 9, 1945 along eastern fronts of World War II fought between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany.

With its teary-eyed veterans, colorful parades, flowers, balloons, patriotic songs and war movies Victory Day had always been a day like no other. This was perhaps one of the rare occasions when I would bring flowers to my grandparents and listen to my grandfather's war stories for the umpteenth time-but they always sounded new and exciting. His typically stern and unreadable face would light up, and he would beam with excitement like a child getting to recite his favorite scene from an action movie.

Over the last year, my grandfather's enthusiasm to talk to his granddaughter living in the United States seemed to have dwindled. When I talk to my grandmother on the phone, I can hear him in the background, "Is that America calling? Ask her to tell Obama to stop bombing us." With my grandmother trying to change the subject, the calls inevitably end with my grandfather's forceful insertion, "Say hello to Obama,"-an ironic and troubling echo of "Thanks, Obama"-to which my grandfather is rightfully oblivious.

Recently, I called to wish my mother, who still remains in rebel-occupied Horlivka, a happy birthday. Naively, I asked her if she had enjoyed the celebration. Her voice shaking, she said there was little to celebrate. She proceeded to inform me that the new ban on Soviet symbols, which effectively prohibited celebration of the upcoming WWII Victory Day, had left everyone angry and bewildered. "Your grandfather is not taking it well," said my Mom.

On April 9, 2015, the Ukrainian Parliament voted to ban Soviet symbols, a move that further exacerbated the country's divisions. The package of bills was largely drawn up by the head of the Institute for National Remembrance, Volodymyr Viatrovych, widely known for his strong support for the controversial nationalist leaders Stepan Bandera and Roman Shukhevych. The bill replaced May 9 Victory Day with the May 8 Day of Memory and Reconciliation. It also criminalized the term "Great Patriotic War," effectively making almost all war movies, songs, and literature illegal.

The government's zeal for shedding the Soviet past is understandable. But the problem with removing Victory Day and denying the existence of the Great Patriotic War is that it destroys the sense of pride in collective accomplishment that has for so long been a source of culture and identity for Ukrainian people. National identity is often described as a perception of a common past, present, and future. Thus, people often look into the past for sources of social identity, especially when the present and the future become particularly murky.

For many Ukrainians, the Great Patriotic War is not an artifact of Soviet ideology; it is an example of a commemoration of a great collective achievement that cost the lives of many of our ancestors and deserves to be cherished and preserved. And this is true not just for Russian-speaking Ukrainians in the east. A recent survey conducted by the authoritative Democratic Initiatives Foundation and Ukrainian Sociology Service on what unites and divides Ukrainians found that in their attitude to historical events, Ukrainians were most united in their positive view of the victory of the Soviet Union in the war from 1941-1945 against Nazi Germany (84 percent). Across all regions, Ukrainians also demonstrated a unity of views on such events as Ukraine's declaration of independence (71 percent) and national liberation movement under the leadership of Bohdan Khmelnitsky (69 percent). Khmelnytsky was a Ukrainian leader, who in 1648-1657 organized an uprising against Polish rule in Ukraine, which ultimately led to the transfer of eastern Ukraine from Polish to Russian control.

Stripped of the present and the future, eastern Ukrainians need their historical past to fill the voids of the present and uncertainty of the future. Death, dislocation, and destruction have caused enough anguish and confusion in the region. Being denied all sources of their identity has set people into yet another unimaginable crisis, a point at which "habitual reactions are no longer adequate and previous experiences provide no guidance."

Of course, crises bring fundamental changes that call old dogmas into question. They force us to critically examine our present reality and to reevaluate our previous opinions and beliefs about the past. And the Ukraine war has certainly done this.

Yet denying people their history can create a different sort of crisis by destroying people's sense of belonging and threatening the unity created by shared principles and memories. We should be aware of this even if politicians engaged in manipulating history for their own ends are not. Their short-run agenda and the long-run interests of society do not always align. This is why the Ukrainian leaders' effort to strip people of their history and the symbols is short-sighted and poorly-timed.

First, they labeled everyone who lives in rebel-controlled areas as "terrorists" and cut them off from financial aid. In September 2014, President Petro Poroshenko and Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk cancelled government benefits for residents living in separatist-controlled areas. Yatsenyuk said, "The government will not finance terrorists and impostors." Since younger, healthier and more financially stable individuals who had opportunities to immigrate had already done so, these cuts affected the most vulnerable people: the poor, old, and sick, fuelling resentment among those fated to be stuck behind separatist lines.

People felt abandoned, humiliated and lost. Most (especially older generations) have worked for the government their entire lives contributing to their retirement funds by paying heavy taxes. They are now being denied their hard-earned savings. One would think that if the government cut off one of its territories as a gangrene-infected limb, at the very least, it owed hundreds of thousands of "uninfected" people living in those areas help to relocate and survive.

Instead, in January 2015, the Kyiv government introduced a travel ban: they installed new check points and the quagmire of paperwork they required made it harder for people from rebel-occupied territories to travel, sometimes just a few miles down the road, to get access to basic necessities, such as banking and groceries. This policy raised concerns among aid organizations, who warned that a medical crisis could be brewing as the Ukrainian authorities refused to let even essential medical supplies through.

This was the context in which the ban of Soviet symbols and the Great Patriotic War appeared. It made the one thing that remained familiar-the cherished past-no longer acceptable. My mother's reaction was typical. "I am shocked and confused," she said.

One in four Ukrainians was killed in World War II and every single family suffered a loss of some kind. Under the leadership of a less than perfect Soviet government, the survivors dedicated their lives to honoring the deceased and restoring the country. My family, along with many others, worked their entire lives to rebuild postwar Ukraine (both sets of my grandparents and my father worked in the railway). They dutifully paid their taxes. Now they are being denied the fruits of their labor and the memories they hold dear and embraced as Ukrainians.

We must always reevaluate and debate our Soviet history, but we must do it for the right reasons and with care. The ban on commemorating the Great Patriotic War was act of defiance against Russia and an expression of Ukraine's aspirations to be "European." But many in eastern Ukraine regard it as an attempt to deny history in order to smack Putin's face and to please Europe. In their eyes, the Ukrainian government is no better than the Russian government they are defying. If Moscow is using the past for his own ends, they believe, so is Kyiv.

Kyiv's actions are dangerous for two reasons.

First, people in the east are feeling increasingly alienated and are in fact showing more support for the self-proclaimed Donestk National Republic (DNR) and Luhansk National Republic (LNR), thereby making it harder to win this war.

According to the Kiev International Institute of Sociology, in December 2014, only 15.6 percent of people in Donbas (and 11.4 percent in other eastern regions) considered DNR and LNR legitimate governments, with the overwhelming majority not recognizing them as legitimate. Just a few months later, there was a noticeable growth in public support for the rebels: in March 2015, approximately 43.1 percent of Donbas' population deemed the DNR and LNR legitimate-the largest proportion compared to 38.2 percent who viewed the separatist governments as illegitimate and 32 percent who hesitated to respond either way.

Moreover, people feel that the aim of the antiterrorist operation is not just to destroy terrorists, but also to punish everyone who lives in the areas they control. In March 2015, 46.3 percent (the largest percentage since the Ukraine crisis began) of the people in Donbas said that they considered antiterrorist operation to be a punitive measure directed at them.

Second, when governments strip people of their identity, they create a vacuum that will inevitably be filled with something else, like extremism, religiosity, nationalism, etc.

In eastern Ukraine, this vacuum is increasingly filled by a more pronounced Soviet nostalgia. Ten years ago, in 2005, only 25 percent of eastern Ukrainians aspired to the restoration of the Soviet Union, while 48 percent did not. In 2015, the percentage of people in Donbas lamenting the dissolution of the USSR went up to 70 percent; while in western Ukraine, 80 percent still view the fall of the Soviet Union positively.

If the Ukrainian government is trying to follow the example of former communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe by banning Soviet-era symbols and ceremonies, they should reflect on the mixed successes similar policies have had in Eastern Europe, even when timing seemed better. In other words, neither of those areas had raging wars on their territories while implementing anticommunist reforms.

The transition to democracy in post-Soviet societies has often been accompanied by poverty, corruption, street crime and social chaos. This has produced a growing romanticization of the Communist past in parts of East-Central Europe. In 2008, Reuters reported a survey of East Germans that found that 52 percent believed that the free-market economy was "unsuitable." Approximately 43 percent said that they wanted socialism back.

Likewise, the conservative Czech government's strict anticommunism laws have led to "rosier memories" of a "dark system" that offered job security, cheap housing and low-cost food. In 2013, a survey conducted by the Centre for Empirical Research, the main polling agency in the Czech Republic, found that 46 percent of people felt that the present system was better than communism, a twenty-one-year low.

In Latvia, the neoliberal austerity of 2009 has created demographic losses that exceed those created by Stalin's deportations back in the 1940s. As the government cut back on public education, healthcare and other social services, many people found emigration to be the only way out. More than 12 percent of the population (and a much larger percentage of its labor force) now works abroad. Similar trends are observed in Bulgaria and Poland.

Soviet nostalgia is on the rise in eastern Ukraine and hatred of the government is constantly fueled by Kyiv's policies. Still, eastern Ukrainians are not giving up hope of reconciling with Ukraine. On the question of which integration path Ukraine should follow, in Donbas, the responses were almost equally split between joining: the Customs Union (the Russia-led economic alliance of former Soviet states), 28.5 percent; the European Union, 28.5 percent; and neither, 23.6 percent. In other regions of eastern Ukraine, the largest proportion selected "neither," while the second largest fraction chose joining the EU (32.2 percent). In all regions of Ukraine, joining Russia's Customs Union was the least-favored choice.

People across Ukraine are also united in their criticism of Ukraine's war in Donbas. The majority of Ukrainians in the east do not support military operations and are in favor of peaceful resolution. In western and central Ukraine (the Kyiv government's main constituency), approximately 60 percent agree; in southern and eastern regions, the percentage increases to 80 percent and in Donbas to over 90 percent.

So whose opinion does the Ukrainian government represent?

These statistics show that people in the east desperately want to believe that the Ukrainian government is capable of offering them a brighter future. But this belief is increasingly harder to sustain when what they face is abandonment and disillusionment.

If it truly wants to reunite Ukraine, the Ukrainian government must offer more support to those in the east who wish to relocate, as well as restore financial, humanitarian and medical assistance. In short, it's time for a change.

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 #25
Russia Insider
www.russia-insider.com
May 20, 2015
Ukraine Inherited Some of the Best Parts of the USSR - and Completely Blew It
Newly independent Ukraine had:

the world's 10th economy
40% of the Soviet military industry
60% of the heavy industry
well-developed agriculture and the most fertile land in the world
unlimited potential for transit
proximity and borders with prosperous Europe
positive demographic picture
highly trained work force
modern, half a million-strong army
cheap energy subsidies from Russia

This is an excerpt from a longer essay from Rostislav Ishchenko, a prominent and excellent Russian publicist.  

Here, he points out that the newly independent state, formerly central to the power of the Soviet Union, inherited immense wealth which the elites managed to squander in record time, serving their country far worse than their counterparts in Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus.

Translation from the Saker.  Original Russian article appeared on March 4th on the Russian website "Odnako".

The Ukrainian elites, which received upon the division of the Soviet inheritance everything necessary for the successful state building, by their own actions brought the country to the brink of a collapse.

Politics and history are not pre-determined. The "project Ukraine" living its last days was not doomed from the start.

Suddenly emerged new country had the world's 10th economy. It housed on its territory 40% of the Soviet military industry and 60% of the heavy industry. Well-developed agriculture was not only able to provide enough to cover domestic needs but also to actively export agricultural products. The network of the railroad and highways, long-distance pipelines, several large warm water ports more than covered the needs of the foreign trade but also had an almost unlimited potential for transit.

The Ukraine's population was 52 million, and the demographic dynamics in 1991-1992 was still positive. The country possessed highly trained work force, a well developed system of personnel training for the industry and agriculture, high quality scientific base. All these goods were protected by half a million-strong group of the Soviet Army - the largest in the USSR -armed with the most modern weapons, since it was deployed at the peak of the potential main offensive.

At the moment of becoming independent, Ukraine had a lot more than was necessary to build a successful state. Moreover, the geopolitical situation was also in its favor. The country did not have powerful enemies or even serious competitors. On the contrary, in 1992 the Ukrainian political leadership was happy to report the lack of external threats.

The relationships with all neighbors were friendly, and the important world players themselves wished to be on good terms with Kiev. Let me remind you that in 1994-1996 the format G7+ was born that was used exclusively for the contacts with Moscow (G7+Russia) and Kiev (G7+Ukraine). However, the Russian format with time grew into the full-blown G8, whereas the Ukrainian dissipated in time and space, but in 1990s these formats were still equal.

There existed a small problem: Ukraine did not have enough energy sources to support its industry. Not of all kinds, but only of oil and gas. In spite of a relatively high level of domestic production - 4-5 million tons of oil (as much as Romania produces) and 20 billion cubic meters of gas (more, than produced in Azerbaijan) - Ukraine supported only about one fifth of its needs in oil and one quarter in gas. There existed theoretical possibilities to increase domestic production but they were neglected. Similarly neglected were opportunities to reduce the energy dependence of the industry.

However, Russia traditionally supplied the required amounts of oil and gas. Considering that 60-80% of the transit of Russian energy export in the 1990s went through the Ukrainian pipelines, it was not that difficult to agree on the mutually beneficial trade conditions. That was what Kuchma did signing in 2002 a ten-year agreement with "Gazprom" about the gas sale at $50 per thousand cubic meters. The contract was supposed to be valid until 2012 and provided the Ukrainian industry with huge competitive advantages on the world market, which (considering the rapid rise in the price of oil and gas) would only be increasing each year.

The considerable geopolitical and economic potential of Ukraine was also based on the dependence of its foreign trade and efficacy of its industry on the Russian energy resources, Russian markets, and Russian collaborators. In 1992-2003, Russia went through the political crisis of 1993, which came close to a full-scale civil war and led to a long-term split in the society, two Chechen wars, and a default of 1998. Absorbed in its internal problems complicated by increasing geopolitical conflicts with Euroatlantic partners, Russia needed minimal political loyalty of Kiev (Russia did not insist on anything more than neutrality) and was ready to pay (and paid) for it with serious economic concessions.

The today's talk in Moscow about 35 billion dollars invested into the Ukrainian economy only considers the money that could be counted. This includes gifts of the low prices for oil and gas as well as credits on favorable terms and investments in joined projects. The losses Russia suffered from the most favored nation status (MFN) accorded to Ukraine and other indirect forms of supporting the Ukrainian economy cannot be calculated even theoretically (the expects quote the sums of 200-300 billion dollars but this is a speculative estimate).

How come that with such blessings Ukraine has reached the point when horrible end seems preferable to horror without end?

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 #26
Forbes.com
May 20, 2015
The International Republican Institute Just Released A Fascinating Poll On Ukraine
By Mark Adomanis
[Chart here http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2015/05/20/the-international-republican-institute-just-released-a-fascinating-poll-on-ukraine/]

The International Republican Institute (IRI) just released the results of a massive 22 city 17,000 respondent poll it commissioned earlier this spring on Ukrainians' attitudes towards politics, corruption, the economy, NATO, the European Union, Russia, and almost anything else you can think of. The 22 cities in which polls were conducted represent all the regional capitals which are currently under the control of the central government, so essentially the capitals of every oblast in Ukraine outside of Lugansk, Donetsk, and Crimea.

Now Ukraine and its post-Maidan conflict with Russia is an incredibly(!) divisive issue on which there is an extreme level of disagreement among academics, think tankers, financiers, and politicians. Russia in particular and the Former Soviet Union in general have always had a way of summoning strong passions, but the vehemence of recent debates surpasses anything I've ever experienced before. Normally staid organizations such as the American Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies are now the scene of open rhetorical brawls.

I'm not naive enough to think that the Ukraine issue can or will be "solved," but it always helps to provide a baseline level of data so that the people from various sides are at least describing the same reality. The IRI poll is an excellent way in which to establish such a baseline.

So what does the poll say? Well the headline figures are the following: 57% of respondents to the poll would choose to join the European Union (versus 13% who want to join the Russia-led customs union) while 47% would vote yes in a referendum about joining NATO (versus 29% who would vote no).

At the same time, as the following graphs show, there are still some pretty significant regional differences. On NATO membership the percentage of "nos" ranged from 51% in Odessa to 4% in Lviv. On the question of membership in the European Union, the range was, if anything, even greater: 30% of the residents of Odessa, Kharkiv, and Mykolaiv want to join the EU. Meanwhile in Ternopil 92% do.

Now, according to Stephen Nix, the head of IRI's Eurasia program who was kind enough to supply me with the slides cited above, there was actually not a statistically significant difference between the responses of Russian and Ukrainian speakers.

This might sound a bit surprising, particularly because of the hysterical warnings from Moscow about the dangers the "fascist junta" poses to speakers of Russian as well as the serious political disagreements about Ukraine's language laws. Nonetheless, this does generally fit with various other polls I've recently seen from Ukraine, including polls conducted inside Crimea and the Donbass. It's not clear if the main dividing line in Ukrainian opinion was ever really language, but it certainly doesn't appear to be the case today.

On the other hand, the differences in opinion between different regions are significant and would easily pass any statistical test. With individual sample sizes of 800, you would essentially never get results that are as far apart as the observed differences between Odessa and Lviv. I'm not going to to tell people what precise meaning they should take away from those differences, but they differences do exist. I would respectfully add that, given the apparent magnitude of these differences, they don't seem likely to disappear anytime in the near future.

Now there are some caveats. The most traditionally pro-Russian areas of Ukraine were not included in the poll because, um, they're currently being occupied by Russia. It also seems likely that the poll's focus on large urban areas has resulted in slightly more pro-Western results since, by definition, more traditionally politically and socially conservative rural areas were excluded. Finally, there is an argument that in the current environment (a couple of pro-Russian activists have been killed) people might feel compelled to say what they think is the "right" answer.

But even with these caveats, which range greatly in merit, Ukrainian public opinion does appear to be genuinely moving in an increasingly pro-Western direction. Previous IRI polls, which also excluded the Donbass and Crimea, did not show support for NATO or the EU that was nearly as robust. It turns out that invading a country doesn't do very much to build public support among its citizens.

Is Ukraine still divided? Yes. But it's less divided than it used to be.

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 #28
Euromaidan Press
http://euromaidanpress.com
May 20, 2015
"Republics" - Kremlin's Trojan horse in Ukraine
By Vitaliy Portnikov
Vitaliy Portnikov is a Ukrainian editor and journalist. Born in Kyiv in 1967. Since 1989, he works as the analyst of the Nezavisimaya Gazeta, specializing in post-Soviet countries, and cooperates with the Russian and Ukrainian services of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

Based on the statements made by Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at a breakfast meeting at the editorial offices of Rossiyskaya Gazeta, observers concluded first of all that the "people's republics" created with the Kremlin's help in the Donbas should remain a part of Ukraine. However, the core of Lavrov's statement was the declaration that the "people's republics" should remain "people's republics" coupled with support for the territorial unity of Ukraine. As we know, for Ukraine "people's republics" do not exist at all. We consider "DNR" and "LNR" to be terrorist organizations, and we are only prepared to negotiate the status of individual regions of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. There is no mention of "people's republics" in the Minsk agreements either. But Lavrov seems to know nothing about this. He wants Ukraine to agree to the draft constitution developed in Donetsk where "(the draft) deals exactly with the status envisioned in the Minsk agreements: the republics will be part of Ukraine and then the constitution will be reformed to confirm this status permanently."

This is the whole point of the declaration that "the republics will be part of Ukraine." For the Kremlin it is important to achieve a situation where two invented republics become part of Ukraine - "republics" that will be able to veto fundamental decisions of the Ukrainian government, including even decisions on European and Euro-Atlantic integration. And since these "republics" will have their own militias, they will be able to launch a war in Ukraine at any time - naturally, with Russian support. Moscow will again call this war "a civil conflict," arguing that Kyiv, alas, failed to listen to the opinions of the "republics"!

This is the plan of Putin and Lavrov. This is the "Trojan horse" of thugs who will do anything to prevent our country from developing. Of course we could say that we have little choice - incorporation of the "republics" or war. But incorporating "DNR" and "LNR" while assigning them special status is also war. Only this time it will be war in which we will clash with a recognized enemy - not simply with the DNR gang but with the subject of Ukrainian statehood that requires the safeguarding of its rights. And nobody will listen to our explanations that we are really fighting with Russia, that it is really Russia that is behind the "people's republics." That is because their status will not have been approved by Russia but by us.

This is exactly why we absolutely must not accept the Russian "decentralization plan" because it is not a plan for decentralization but a plan for occupation. I have no doubt that it is being proposed to our Western partners and is becoming a major Russian trap for the future of Ukrainian statehood.

Translated by: Anna Mostovyh
Source: Newsru.ua

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 #29
Dozens of priests leave Ukraine, 19 churches of Moscow Patriarchate seized - Russian Orthodox Church representative

Vienna, May 18, Interfax - Dozens of priests of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP) are leaving Ukraine in fear of persecutions, the head of the sector for interreligious liaisons at the Russian Orthodox Church's Synodal Department for External Church Relations Priest Dimitry Safonov told on Monday.

"There are dozens of priests who had to leave Ukraine. The exact statistic is currently impossible. They are pressured into leaving Ukraine. Their families are getting death threats, they themselves are facing the threat of physical violence," he told an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) conference on combating the intolerance and discrimination towards Christians in Vienna.

A total of 77 churches and monasteries have been damaged or demolished during the military conflict in eastern Ukraine, the priest said.

In western Ukraine, religious crimes are manifested in the seizure of UOC MP churches, Father Dmitry said.

"By now there have been credible reports about 19 churches of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church having been violently seized by the so-called "Kiev Patriarchate". This religious organization was formed in Ukraine in 1992 and has not been recognized by any of the Orthodox Churches worldwide," the priest said.

All actions against the Ukrainian Orthodox Church "are motivated precisely by religious and national hatred," he said.

Earlier the UOC MP chancellor Metropolitan Anthony of Borispol and Brovary complained to the Ukrainian president Pyotr Poroshenko about the seizure of the churches.

Nine UOC churches have been destroyed and another 77 damaged as a result of the hostilities in Donbass, which has 1,100 Orthodox churches and 17 monasteries, he said.

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 #30
Bloomberg
May 19, 2015
Nazis Triumph Over Communists in Ukraine
By Leonid Bershidsky

It's goodbye Lenin, hello Nazi collaborators in Ukraine these days. Laws signed into effect by President Petro Poroshenko require the renaming of dozens of towns and hundreds of streets throughout the country to eliminate Soviet-era names. At the same time, Ukraine will begin to honor groups that helped Hitler exterminate Ukrainian Jews during World War II.

Ukrainians' desire for a European identity and a break with the country's Soviet past is Poroshenko's biggest political asset, but these latest steps should worry the country's Western allies.

Standoff in Ukraine

A law Poroshenko signed May 15 bans all Soviet and Nazi symbols, even on souvenirs, and criminalizes "denying the criminal character" of both totalitarian regimes. It bans place names, monuments and plaques glorifying Soviet heroes, Soviet flags and communist slogans. Statues of Lenin have been toppled in many Ukrainian cities since the "revolution of dignity" last year, but the new law goes further.

Big regional centers such as Dnipropetrovsk (named after Grigory Petrovsky, who ran Ukraine in the 1920s and 1930s) and Kirovograd (bearing the name of Sergei Kirov, a Bolshevik leader whose popularity rivaled Stalin's, causing the latter to have him killed), as well as dozens of smaller towns, will need new names. Lots of towns have streets named after Lenin and Soviet saints, and these will also be erased in the next few months, creating lots of confusion for anyone using old maps (or Google maps, for that matter). Soviet emblems will be removed from buildings and bridges, murals in the subway will be altered.

Ukraine doesn't need the expense, which former Tax Minister Oleksandr Klimenko put at 5 billion hryvnias ($236 million), though, as a fugitive to Russia, he is hardly impartial. But cost, or even local residents' nostalgia, are weak arguments against Ukraine's "decommuinization." The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, however, has some more relevant ones.

"While I fully respect the often sensitive and painful nature of historical debate and its effect on society, broadly and vaguely defined language that restricts individuals from expressing views on past events and people, could easily lead to suppression of political, provocative and critical speech, especially in the media," Dunja Mijatovic, OSCE representative on freedom of the media, wrote Poroshenko in April, urging him not to sign the law.

On Monday, she called his decision to sign it "discouraging." The Ukrainian law is broader than any similar ones passed elsewhere in eastern Europe after the fall of communism: In some countries, communist symbols also are outlawed, but trying to whitewash the overthrown Communist regimes is not a crime, whereas in Ukraine, violations of the "decommunization" law are punishable by a maximum of five years in prison.

Ukraine's attempts to eliminate its past as a Soviet republic are as extreme as some of the the actions taken by Vladimir Putin's hated post-modern empire, where the parliament is now considering a bill that would ban likening the Stalin regime to Nazism.

To make matters worse, having banned all kinds of foreign totalitarian symbols, Poroshenko also signed a law prescribing that Ukrainians honor a number of nationalist organizations that operated before and during World War II. The law calls them "20th century fighters for Ukraine's independence," but some of these groups, such as the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) fought alongside the Nazis, and followed the German occupier's orders. In an open letter to Poroshenko and Ukrainian legislators, 40 historians from major Western universities wrote:

"Not only would it be a crime to question the legitimacy of an organization (UPA) that slaughtered tens of thousands of Poles in one of the most heinous acts of ethnic cleansing in the history of Ukraine, but also it would exempt from criticism the OUN, one of the most extreme political groups in Western Ukraine between the wars, and one which collaborated with Nazi Germany at the outset of the Soviet invasion in 1941. It also took part in anti-Jewish pogroms in Ukraine and, in the case of the Melnyk faction, remained allied with the occupation regime throughout the war."

By quoting this letter, I have just violated the Ukrainian law. The punishment is not clear: A separate law will be required for that.

The U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum condemned the bill because it bans media criticism of the nationalist groups. "As Ukraine advances on the difficult road to full democracy, we strongly urge the nation's government to refrain from any measure that preempts or censors discussion or politicizes the study of history," the museum said in a statement.

It's easier to legislate on history than to fix Ukraine's many current problems,  from a Soviet-style bureaucracy to the Russian-backed insurgency in the east that appears to be part of Putin's Soviet revival project. The "decommunization" laws are not only pointless, they also show the chasm that still separates Ukraine from its goal of joining the Western world.

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 #31
Krytyka
http://krytyka.com
May 2015
The Case of Decommunization
By Mykhailo Haukhman
"Candidate of science" in History (Soviet and post-Soviet equivalent to Ph.D.), graduated from Luhansk National Taras Shevchenko University in 2008. Research Fellow at the Luhansk Region Museum (2012-2014). Mykhailo Haukhman currently temporarily resides in Ufa (Russian Federation), where he is Research Associate at the National Museum of the Bashkortostan Republic.

The years of revolution and war of 2013-2015 have shown that the Soviet past is "alive and kicking," and this does not mean a mere stream of pleasant nostalgia for the lost youth of the older generations. The Soviet past has become the basis for internal and external political manipulations aimed at weakening and discrediting Ukraine.

The public response to this is a new wave of "decommunization"-an attempt to defuse the past-in-the-present. It is worth remembering that the first wave of "decommunization" took place at the end of perestroika and its goal was to get rid of Communist party rule and communist ideology. Nonetheless, the Soviet system's institutions and personnel remained untouchable, and for this reason Ukraine remained "Soviet, way too Soviet." Today's decommunization is aimed at liberation from the Soviet mythology of the "Great Patriotic War" and the ideological remnants of the Soviet Union, as embodied in monuments to Communist leaders, as well as in the names of streets and cities.

In this regard, I am particularly interested in the following questions: What is the difference between "decommunization" and "de-Sovietization," and why do we speak of "decommunization" today specifically, and not "de-Sovietization"? "Decommunization" is opposed to the communist regime and communist ideology. Decommunization is based on the nominal separation between the political sphere and everyday social life: the regime and ideology are separate from society. According to this position, society appears as a victim of the regime and a passive object of the actions of the totalitarian party. This corresponds to the classical theory of totalitarianism, which does not account for internalization of the regime and ideology.

In contrast to this, de-Sovietization, in my opinion, is an attempt to (re)interpret the Soviet period in Ukrainian history, to understand to which extent Ukrainians remain Soviet and how much Ukraine remains a successor to the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR. It is to think about which parts of the Soviet legacy deserve condemnation and which are worth accepting, and to deny Russia a monopoly on the Soviet legacy. De-Sovietization is more complicated and deeper than decommunization. If we don't carry out de-Sovietization, we will be compelled to return to decommunization again and again. And what does this spring's return to decommunization, in the form of the four new laws, bring with it?

1. The Law of Ukraine "On the Condemnation of the Communist and National-Socialist (Nazi) Totalitarian Regimes in Ukraine and the Ban on the Propagation of their Symbols"

The parallels between the Communist and Nazi regimes, as registered in the law, appear logical: both regimes were totalitarian and were active in Ukraine. Although there is an important difference: Nazism arrived on bayonets from abroad, while Communism was or became "our own."

The law's phrasing is baffling: "the condemnation of totalitarian regimes and the banning of the propagation of their symbols." Why no ban on their ideologies? This is no doubt because the law would then need to define Communist and Nazi ideologies. And If one wanted to define them, one would find an assortment of misanthropic positions that would not be unique to Communism or Nazism.

The Nazi regime, in contrast to the Communist one, has not left any traces in contemporary Ukraine. So let us concentrate on the avenues for resisting the Communist legacy proposed by the laws that raise questions:

1) Symbols. The law bans the utilization of Communist or Nazi symbols, with exceptions for scientific-educational activities, military-historical reenactments, and imagery in cemeteries. But what is to be done when these symbols appear in non-educational, non-scientific texts-for example in Facebook posts-which do not contains calls for the establishment of a totalitarian regime? The reversed swastika can be used to explain what Nazism was, to condemn Nazism, or to support it. Can symbols be banned without the law's condemnation of misanthropic slogans?

It is unclear to me why the law mentions not only the symbols of the Nazi party or Nazi Germany and the the Communist Party or Soviet Union, but the symbols of the "people's democracies." As if the state symbol and flags of the German Democratic Republic and socialist Yugoslavia pose a threat to Ukrainian society. At the same time, the flags of contemporary Belarus and the music of the national anthem of contemporary Russia are not covered by the law!

2) Personalities. It is forbidden to preserve and build new monuments to communist, Soviet, and Nazi leaders, and to disseminate their quotations. It is worth remembering that the great poet Pavlo Tychyna was the people's commissar of enlightenment in the Ukrainian SSR and the head of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR. Will we have to rename all Pavlo Tychyna streets? This ban ought to extend only to those Communist party functionaries who carried out crimes against humanity.

3) City and Street Names. The law forbids toponyms related to the names and pseudonyms of communist and Soviet activists as well as with the activities of the Communist Party. Locals governments are given a six month period for replacing such toponyms. No legislation exists, however, that would provide for local referenda and opinion surveys, which would give members of local communities a chance to choose new names for their cities and central streets.

2. The Law of Ukraine "On the Perpetuation of the Victory over Nazism in the Second World War of 1939-1945"

The law replaces the term "Great Patriotic War" with the non-Soviet term "Second World War" that is used internationally, and to establish the Day of Memory on May 8, which corresponds to European practices. Thus, war is a tragedy, not a celebration. Moreover, the Day of Memory does not replace Victory Day, since Ukrainians are among the victors over Nazism. The formulation "victory over Nazism" is important, because it underscores the victory over one totalitarian regime and does not glorify war.

This law would be worth welcoming were it not for one major reservation: one of its provisions requires the "prohibition of falsification of the history of the Second World War." Has this law been adopted in post-revolutionary Ukraine or in Putin's Russia? Does the state take on itself the responsibility to support "correct interpretations"? Is this not a return to Soviet practices, against which these laws are directed?

3. The Law of Ukraine "On the Legal Status and Commemoration of Fighters for the Independence of Ukraine in the 20th Century"

The law contains a list of structures and organizations that carried on a "fight for independence" in the period from the fall of the Romanov dynasty to the collapse of the Soviet Union, particularly those who opposed the communist regime. Why did I put the phrase "fight for independence" in quotation marks? The problem is that not all Ukrainian revolutionaries of 1917-1920 pursued the independence of Ukraine, although all of them supported its political distinctiveness, which caused conceptual confusion. But there can be no confusion in law.

The list contains organizations, members of which, through their resistance to Soviet power, in the best case risked finding themselves behind bars, as well as organizations in which membership did not even cause career troubles. In the latter case I have in mind the "Popular Movement of Ukraine for Perestroika" [Rukh] and other oppositional organizations from 1989-1991. It is strange to see them included in the same list as the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA).

The law declares that the direct result of the activities of the listed organizations was the creation of an independent Ukraine. Affirming such things means not understanding Ukrainian history in the twentieth century. Here the legislators became intellectual captives of the "from ruin to renaissance" narrative of Ukrainian history. According to this interpretation, Ukraine's time spent under the control of states centered outside of its borders was the time of ruin, and Soviet power supposedly can in no case and in any way be considered a Ukrainian government. But how can the core element of Ukrainian history between 1920 and 1990 be anti-Bolshevik resistance?

One provision of this law baffled me: government agencies and local governments may "grant social guarantees, privileges or other payouts to fighters for the independence of Ukraine in the twentieth century and members of their families." If we are honoring these persons, then they and/or members of their families must receive "social guarantees, privileges or other payouts."

The law requires the state to ensure the perpetuation of memory about the fighters for independence, and also to hold responsible those who "publicly display a disrespectful attitude" toward fighters for independence and "publicly deny the legitimacy of the struggle for the independence of Ukraine."

This raises a great deal of questions. First of all, the "fighters for independence" themselves were oftentimes in opposition to one another, as was the case with the Ukrainian Central Rada, Hetman Pavlo Skoropads'kyi, and the Directory of the Ukrainian People's Republic of 1918, or the "Banderite" and "Melnykite" factions of the OUN during the Second World War. Does stating these oppositions qualify as a "disrespectful attitude"? Second, certain Ukrainian forces committed crimes against humanity. For example, in the spring of 1943 the UPA carried out ethnic cleansing against Polish villagers in Volynhia. Does acknowledgment of this act constitute a case of a "disrespectful attitude"? And from here can it be only a step way from being accused of "public denial of the legitimacy of the struggle for the independence of Ukraine"?

There you have it: we struggled for decommunization-and received an ideological orientation toward history in the "best traditions" of the communist regime.

4. The Law of Ukraine "On Access to the Archives of the Repressive Agencies of the Communist Totalitarian Regime of 1917-1991"

After the fall of the administrative command system and the collapse of the Soviet Union, law enforcement agencies were not reformed: Soviet agencies simply became Ukrainian. The archives of the KGB became the archives of the SBU.1 In contrast, in Poland the secret services of the socialist period were liquidated and their archives were passed along to the Institute of National Memory.

The new archival law was scathingly criticized by the Union of Ukrainian Archivists while it was still in draft form. The Ukrainian Institute of National Memory (UINP), seeking to partly follow the Polish model, decided to transfer KGB documents from the archival system of the SBU to its own sectoral archive. The procedure for transferring these documents will take a great deal of time, during which access to these documents will be impossible.

How this transfer will be made and whether it will include a transfer of storage space, archivists, and the archival apparatus from the SBU to the UINP is unclear. Let us not forget that there are SBU archives in each oblast center. The UINP staff is currently working on a plan for transferring the documents. In view of the fact that the laws have already passed, and the president most likely cannot but sign them,2 all that remains is to hope the historians from the UINP can quickly and carefully draw up plans to implement the law.

Conclusions

The four laws are interrelated, since they are aimed at questions that are highly relevant to the civic life and historical consciousness of the Ukrainian nation. For some reason, they were passed without public discussion and without parliamentary debate, on the first reading and through voting for them in one package. Not to mention, without the requisite thorough legal analysis at the stage of writing this legislation.

Socially significant laws cannot be passed in such a conspiratorial manner. Were representatives of the ruling coalition afraid of their political opponents, as well as of their own people? So "we have what we have":3 four weak and problematic laws.

The post-revolutionary Ukrainian citizenry needs de-Sovietization. Instead, today's political elite and part of the academic elite has proposed another round of de-communization. I hope that Ukrainian society will not allow for manipulations and the rebirth of Soviet practices of promulgating "truth" under the red guise of Ukrainian patriotism.

KRYTYKA expresses deep gratitude to Markian Dobczansky for his volunteer work in translating this article from Ukrainian.

1.Editor's note: Acronym for the Ukrainian Security Service (Sluzhba Bezpeky Ukraïny).
2.Editor's note: Ukrainian President, Petro Poroshenko, signed the draft laws into law on May 15, 2015.
3.Editor's note: A reference to the famous saying by Ukraine's first President, Leonid Kravchuk, which became the epitome of Ukrainian fatalism: "We have what we have" (Mayemo te, shcho mayemo).

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#32
Stars and Stripes
www.stripes.com
May 20, 2015
Ukraine's displaced trade one uncertainty for another
By Matt Millham

PUSHCHA VODYTSYA, Ukraine - Nina Rusalkina wants to go home. But it's a risk the 26-year-old mother of two isn't willing to take.

She and her husband, Zhenya Kravchenko, fled eastern Ukraine with their son in June, when the war in the country's east crept too close to home. She was six months pregnant at the time. Now she has a new baby and lives in a former political retreat outside Kiev with some 240 others displaced by the fighting.

It's safe here, she said, but it's not home.

"If everything quiets down, we'll go back," her husband said. "But for the moment, we're here."

In fleeing west, many of Ukraine's internally displaced people, or IDPs, find they're trading one kind of insecurity for another. The high cost of living in and around the Ukrainian capital has come as a shock, as has the difficulty of finding a job in a city that's taken in some 75,000 war refugees, nearly half of them working-age adults, according to the United Nations.

"Many of the people here are older than 50, and for them it's maybe the hardest time," said Anna, a 25-year-old mother who asked to go by a pseudonym out of fear for her family's safety.

Her husband found a decent job in Kiev after the family fled six months ago from Luhansk, the capital of a separatist enclave that was the scene last year of heavy fighting between separatists and Ukrainian soldiers. If it weren't for that job, she doesn't know where they'd be.

Some of the other families who came to Kiev from Luhansk had to return to their homes in the breakaway enclave, she said, "because they didn't find opportunities or they didn't find a job, and it's too much to rent a flat here."

The cost of renting an apartment in Kiev is about four times what it was in Luhansk, and just making enough to get by has been hard, she said. "I want to go home, but right now I feel that it is not safe."

Anna's father suffered a near-fatal injury in late April when he stepped on a mine in Luhansk while checking on her empty house. She doesn't know if the mine was placed there to target her family for fleeing west or just a remnant of the bloody fighting that choked the city last year. Many people in eastern Ukraine view the government in Kiev, which came to power after the ousting last year of pro-Russia President Viktor Yanukovych, as illegitimate.

"We're trying to make our life here and to get the best for our son," Anna said. "It's difficult, but it's safe."

A report issued in mid-May by the Brookings Institution, a Washington-based think tank, found that most of the aid that IDPs receive comes from international and domestic nongovernmental organizations rather than the Ukrainian government. The government, the report found, had "fallen behind" on every benchmark Brookings uses to assess countries' responses to similar crises.

Nevertheless, because of government propaganda, overly positive news coverage or some combination of the two, some IDPs arrive in Kiev expecting to easily settle into something like a normal life.

"On TV, everything looks beautiful, like everybody's helping out," said Iryna Kipina, who escaped Kramatorsk last summer when Ukrainian troops and separatist rebels fought over the city. "But many people don't want to have IDPs as employees or rent to them."

Kipina, her husband and two daughters headed to Kiev with little savings. Landlords didn't want to rent to them because they didn't know if they could pay, she said. Employers have been reluctant to hire them because they don't want to invest in training someone who is likely to leave when the fighting in the east subsides.

For now, Kipina and her family live in a single room in a former government sanitarium in Vorzel, west of Kiev. A local school took over the complex last summer and turned it into an IDP center.

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 #33
Reuters
May 20, 2015
Russia says Ukraine debt repayment law amounts to default

Russia on Wednesday demanded the timely repayment of all debts owed to it by Ukraine and accused Kiev of effectively preparing the way for default with a new law.

It threatened to take the issue to international courts if necessary.

The law, approved by Ukraine's parliament on Tuesday, gives the government the right to miss payments to its international creditors as it wrangles over the terms for restructuring $23 billion worth of foreign debt.

Russia holds a $3 billion Ukrainian Eurobond whose full repayment is due by the end of the year. Moscow, whose relations with Kiev have been wrecked by a year-long conflict in eastern Ukraine, has declined to join the debt restructuring talks.

President Vladimir Putin, speaking at a meeting with government ministers, said he found the new law "strange".

"To effectively announce an impending default shows a poor level of professional responsibility, all things considered," said Putin, noting that the International Monetary Fund does not lend to countries in default.

Ukraine, its economy battered by recession and rampant graft as well as by the conflict in the east, hopes to secure the next tranche of a $17.5 billion bailout program with the IMF this summer to shore up its foreign currency reserves.

Kiev is also holding talks to restructure sovereign and state-guaranteed debt to plug a $15 billion funding gap, but the negotiations have soured in the past week. Bondholders object to any writedown on the principal owed. Kiev says their stance shows a lack of good faith.

LEGAL REDRESS

Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov said Moscow would seek redress in international courts if Ukraine did not respect the terms of its foreign debt repayments.

"For the time being we don't have any grounds (to act). If a payment is missed, we will exercise our right to go to court," he said. Ukraine was due to make its next Eurobond repayment to Russia, worth $75 million, on June 20, Siluanov added.

Putin said the terms of the Eurobond had been particularly generous to Ukraine and that Russia could have demanded an earlier redemption of the bond but had not done so at the request of the IMF.

In addition to the Eurobond, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev said Russian banks were also heavily exposed to Ukraine through loans worth around $25 billion.

In the event of a default on either commercial or sovereign debt held by Russia, Medvedev added, "it will be essential to use all possible means of defense, including via the courts".

Relations between Kiev and Moscow soured badly after mass street protests toppled Ukraine's pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovich in February 2014, in what Russia called a coup.

Moscow then seized Ukraine's Crimea peninsula and has backed pro-Russian separatists battling Kiev's forces in eastern Ukraine, though it denies Western accusations that it has sent troops and military hardware across the border.

More than 6,100 people have been killed in the conflict.

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 #34
www.rt.com
May 20, 2015
Putin says Ukraine's statement on default unprofessional

Ukraine's statement regarding a possible default is a consequence of Kiev's low level of professionalism, said Russian President Vladimir Putin, ordering the Finance Ministry to sort out the issue of Ukraine's debt to Russia.

"The announcement of the upcoming default shows a level of responsibility and professionalism which is apparently not high," Putin said at a meeting with members of the government.

"As far as I understand, the IMF [International Monetary Fund] doesn't provide any loans to countries that are in a situation of default or bankruptcy," he added addressing Finance Minister Anton Siluanov, requesting that he hold consultations on Ukraine's debt to the Russian Federation.

According to the conditions of the loan, Russia is already within its rights to demand early repayment of Ukraine's debt, but has not done so at the request of Kiev and the IMF, Putin said, adding that Russian banks have issued around $25 billion in loans to Ukrainian creditors.

"We have long had the right to request an early repayment of these funds, bearing in mind that under the terms of our agreement signed according to European law, there is a right to demand early repayment if the total public debt of Ukraine exceeds 60 percent," he said. "However, at the request of our Ukrainian partners and the IMF, we do not exercise this right. We do not want to aggravate the economic situation of our partners and neighbors, which is already complicated," he concluded.

The Finance Ministry hasn't yet noted any violations of the terms of the loan agreement with Ukraine, but if they appear, Russia is ready to resolve the issue in court, Siluanov said.

"Until now, Ukraine has fulfilled all its obligations on debt service. The last payment was made in February this year; the next payment in the amount of $75 million is due on June 20. There have been no violations of the agreement, except for covenants," he said.

"If we see a violation of the commitments that Ukraine took upon itself when we invested our resources in the bonds of its government, we will request a judicial procedure in order to protect our interests," he concluded.

On May 19, the Ukrainian government adopted a law, valid until 1 July 2016, which gives it the power to declare a moratorium on some loan repayments. The country's prime minister, Arseny Yatsenyuk, said that suspension of payments will only be applicable to private loans. However, Ukraine continues to consider its $3 billion debt to Russia private, a position that Moscow completely refutes.

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 #35
Russia Insider
www.russia-insider.com
May 21, 2015
As Ukraine Default Looms, Russia Talks Of Legal Action
Russian Finance Minister Siluanov threatens to bring legal action against Ukraine if it defaults on its debt obligations to Russia
By Alexander Mercouris
Ukraine's announcement of a debt moratorium is now provoking the inevitable response.

Russian Finance Minister Siluanov is threatening legal action if Ukraine fails to pay a $75 million interest payment in June on the $3 billion debt it owes Russia.

Incidentally, reports that Siluanov said Russia's legal action would be in the International Court of Justice are wrong.

The International Court of Justice in The Hague does not have jurisdiction to deal with purely commercial disputes.

It seems Siluanov was misunderstood. He simply answered yes to a question whether Russia would sue in an "international court" if Ukraine went into default. This was misunderstood to refer to the International Court of Justice.

As we have discussed previously, the court with jurisdiction in this case is the High Court in London (see our discussion 26, Russia Insider, 21st April 2015).

Russia will not be the only party taking action if, or rather when, Ukraine defaults. The reference in the Ukrainian government's Statement announcing the debt moratorium to "predatory creditors" seems to apply equally to Ukraine's private Western creditors, with whom Ukraine had a fierce public row last week.

The only question remaining is whether Western financial help will continue to be provided to Ukraine if it defaults. TASS claims a source has told it this help - or at least such help as is being channeled to Ukraine through the IMF - will stop.  

Given the extent of the West's political commitment to Ukraine it is perhaps unlikely that help will be stopped completely. However even before the default the amounts provided to Ukraine came nowhere near close to meeting its needs. It is unlikely they will now.
 

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#36
Russia Insider
www.russia-insider.com
May 20, 2015
Ukraine Doubles Down, Uses Money Owed to Creditors to Fund War
Sensing weakening Western support, Ukraine, under the cover of a debt moratorium, diverts money it owes its creditors to fund more war
By Alexander Mercouris

Ukraine's now all but inevitable default and the diplomatic moves to ease tensions between the U.S. and Russia have received an almost euphoric reception in some quarters.

Some think these point to peace in Ukraine, hoping Ukraine's government will either shortly collapse or will be forced by these events to seek peace.

Such optimism is misplaced.

Ukraine's default will not cause the fall of the Ukrainian government. Nor will it end the war, any more than the diplomatic moves between the U.S. and Russia will.

We would repeat something we said in our discussion of the latest U.S. Russia diplomatic moves (Kerry in Sochi: Better Relations Between Moscow and Washington - No Peace in Ukraine, Russia Insider, 18th May 2015):

"The Putin Kerry talks are in fact far more likely to accelerate the resumption of the war than to end it.  

"Given that for the Ukrainian government retreat is impossible, the almost irresistible temptation, if it senses U.S. and Western support is weakening, will be to double down and renew the war so as to try to rally Western support by blaming Russia."
So it is proving.

Ukraine's response to Kerry's meetings with Putin and Lavrov has been to increase the level of its attacks.

Latest reports speak of intensified shelling of the area of Donetsk close to the airport and of the town of Gorlovka. It appears the shelling is the heaviest these areas have seen since the February ceasefire.

The rhetoric coming out of Kiev is also exactly as predicted.  President Poroshenko called on 20th May 2015 for tougher sanctions on Russia "if the Minsk agreements were not implemented" - a call echoed by the secretary of Ukraine's National Security and Defence Council, Aleksander Turchynov, who is reported to have said:

"The threat to the world that emanates from Russia today requires an appropriate reaction and active steps. I believe it would make sense to think about expanding the sanctions by blocking the passage of their warships through the Bosporus, disconnecting the Russian financial system from the SWIFT system for supporting and financing both aggressive nuclear programs and terrorists, and also other effective actions."
The prospect of default, and the country's deteriorating economic situation, are also likely to push Ukraine's leaders towards more war.

A point that has been largely overlooked is that one of the reasons Ukraine is giving for suspending payment of its debts is that payments to its international creditors equal the amount Ukraine is spending on the war.

The relevant sentence in the Statement announcing the debt moratorium reads as follows:

"[T]he state budget for 2015 contains equal sum for servicing the debt with that of total expenditure on defence and law enforcement - over 9 billion hryvnias each."

Expenditure on "defence and law enforcement" in the Ukrainian context means expenditure on the war.  

When the Ukrainian government therefore says in the next sentence of the Statement "the Government has the right to direct the funds paid by taxpayers in Ukraine for the needs of its citizens instead of refunding loans having borrowed by the kleptocratic Yanukovych's regime," what it is really saying is that the Ukrainian government has the "right" to re direct funds that were previously being paid to Ukraine's creditors to finance the war.

That in fact is exactly what Ukraine is doing.  

On the very same day Ukraine passed the law authorising a moratorium on its debt payments, it doubled defence spending to 17 billion hryvnias.  

The increase is 8 billion hryvnias - almost exactly the same amount as the 9 billion hryvnias the Ukrainian government said in its statement it was paying before the moratorium to its creditors.

As to prospects for the Ukrainian government's collapse, we would refer to what we said in October following the parliamentary elections (see Western Media Get Ukraine Elections Wrong. There's Big Trouble Ahead, Russia Insider,31st October 2014):

"Despite the infighting among Ukraine's leaders (which often results in actual fistfights in the legislature) it's doubtful that the collapse of the regime is imminent or that the fragile peace in the east has been secured.

"The consistent pattern since the 2004 Orange Revolution is that inter-factional fighting and the narrowing of the political base has led to further radicalisation.

"The regime retains a core of popular support in the country's western regions and in Kiev. Having seized power violently and having ruled violently, this is not a regime that will compromise easily or pass away quietly."

Since we wrote that in October opinion polls show the popularity of the Ukrainian government has plummeted.  

However what we said in October still holds.  

The Ukrainian government still has enough support in the western regions and in Kiev to hold on, especially given the violence it is prepared to use against its opponents. The fall in its popularity will simply make it more radical, as it falls back on the most nationalistic sections of its base, driving it to try to rally support from the rest of the population by mobilising it through war.

Ukraine's conflict is nowhere close to ending. On the contrary, in the short term at least, all the indicators point to more war coming.

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 #37
The Economist
May 23, 2015
Ukraine's economy
War-torn reform
Ukraine's government is making some progress. But much more needs to be done

EVEN before the Russian invasion of the east of the country last year, the task of reforming Ukraine's economy was daunting. Its people are poorer than they were when the Soviet Union ended (see chart 1). Corruption pervades Ukrainian life. The traffic police demand bribes at random and newspapers carry advertisements for companies that will forge exam papers for you. To this set of chronic problems, the war has added acute ones: the destruction of much of the country's industrial base, spooked investors and a balance-of-payments crisis. If Ukraine is to build a stable economy, it must fix the public finances, shake up the all-important gas sector and stamp down on corruption against the backdrop of an unresolved conflict.

Ukraine's public debt is around 100% of GDP, much of it denominated in foreign currency. Already unsustainable, its debt burden is on an upward path: in the first quarter of 2015, Ukrainian GDP fell by almost 18% year on year. With nearly $6 billion of foreign debt falling due in the next year, but foreign-exchange reserves of around $10 billion, Ukraine has little room for manoeuvre. Despite the central bank offering interest rates of 30%-the world's highest-the hryvnia, Ukraine's currency, is shaky. If it falls, servicing foreign debt will become even trickier.

The IMF, with which Ukraine agreed a bail-out deal in March, has been clear about what is needed to make the country's debts sustainable. It assumes that the government in Kiev will write off $15.3 billion of debt and interest by 2018, and that it will have reduced its public-debt-to-GDP ratio to about 70% of GDP by 2020. The goal is to reduce debt repayments in any given year to no more than 10% of GDP.

To achieve this, Ukraine must cut a deal with the holders of its debt. Negotiations are going badly. The creditors are trying to get the government to agree only to maturity extensions. Ukraine wants to reduce the total amount of debt it owes, as well as pushing back repayment dates. It looks increasingly likely that Ukraine will fail to reach an agreement by June, which could delay the disbursement of a badly needed $2.5 billion loan from the IMF.

Even in the face of obstinate creditors, says the IMF, all is not lost. It hopes that tax rises and spending cuts will help make Ukraine's debt sustainable. As much as half of the economy operates out of the reach of the taxman: tackling this would boost revenues. Ukraine's big shadow economy is partly down to its high payroll taxes (ie, those that are levied on workers). Low "tax morale" plays a role, too. People see little point in paying their share, since public services are poor and corruption pervasive. VAT evasion is rampant.

The government is acting. It has introduced an electronic VAT system, for instance, which will make evasion more difficult. Payroll-tax breaks should also help to bring more firms out of the shadows. The State Fiscal Service reported in April that it had received about 3,000 applications to take advantage of a tax amnesty-whereby people make an honest tax declaration in exchange for a waiver from penalties-though that boosted revenues by just $12m. Some taxes have risen. The maximum rate of personal-income tax has moved from 17% to 20%. This seems to be paying off: overall tax revenues are rising.

The government is also making tough decisions on spending. Anders Aslund of the Atlantic Council, a think-tank, says that the government has cut the cost of Ukraine's pension system from 18% to 14% of GDP, mainly by changing the way that payouts rise and removing perks enjoyed by the old Soviet elite. (The biggest reform to pensions, raising the retirement age, has been kicked into the long grass.) Spending on education and health care has seen big drops, and a fifth of civil servants are being fired. In the first quarter of this year, state spending in real terms was 17% lower than the year before, leading to a budget surplus (see chart 2).

The government can also save money by reforming the gas sector, the second of its big tasks. It is a huge fiscal hole: in 2014 the state monopoly, Naftogaz, ran a deficit worth 5.7% of Ukraine's GDP. An opaque system of subsidies is to blame. For years, it ensured that Ukrainian households received gas at one-fifth of its cost. That boosted disposable incomes for many (though not for the very poorest, who are cut off altogether from the gas network), but it was also an avenue for graft. Many grew rich by buying gas at the household rate, then selling it on at industrial prices.

The current government, in contrast to predecessors, is making a serious effort to shake things up. On April 9th the parliament passed EU -inspired legislation to "unbundle" Naftogaz-splitting it up into separate production, transit, storage and supply firms. Once implemented, consumers will be able to choose their gas supplier, a radical change.

To close Naftogaz's deficit, the government is increasing the household price of gas fourfold. Ukrainians will not really feel the pain until November, when they see the first bill of the winter. To offset the hardship, the government and the IMF say that spending on social programmes will see "an increase of 30% compared to 2014". These figures are in nominal terms, however; with inflation running at 60%, social spending is probably falling in real (ie, inflation-adjusted) terms.

In other areas, reform is more sluggish. The stations used by Naftogaz to measure imports are inside Russia, meaning that no one is sure how much gas really enters Ukraine. Although the Ukrainian authorities insist that the flow is closely monitored, others fear there is huge scope for malpractice. A senior EU official dealing with energy believes that each year up to €200m ($222m) worth of gas may go astray. Ukraine's foreign allies have repeatedly urged it to install meters on the border, so far to no avail.

Graft is everywhere. A list of the world's most corrupt states, compiled by Transparency International, a pressure group, puts the country at 142nd-little better than the Central African Republic. The government has made much progress in one hotbed of corruption, public procurement, by closing loopholes and making it more transparent. But another flagship policy, an anti-corruption bureau, worries some. A 190-country study by Alina Mungiu-Pippidi and colleagues at the Hertie School of Governance, in Germany, shows that dedicated anti-corruption institutions typically fail. That is usually because the bureau itself ends up becoming a target for corruption and political influence.

Corruption also festers in Ukraine's legal system. The courts use a mixture of a modern Western civil code and a Soviet-inspired economic code. This creates problems, says Daniel Bilak of CMS Cameron McKenna, a law firm, since civil law in general, and commercial law in particular, require certainty and predictability in their application. Judges can choose which code to apply in business disputes, which makes the law confusing and opens the door to bribes. Some reform has begun, however, including making land-registry records available online, and judges are being more closely scrutinised.

This government has the most ambitious economic programme in Ukraine's short history. But one area beyond its control is the situation in the east of the country. Vladimir Putin, the Russian president, has the power to heighten the conflict there at any time, doing further damage to the economy. That is not a comfortable position for any country to be in.

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 #38
Business New Europe
www.bne.eu
May 20, 2015
Ukraine tries to prove that is serious about corruption
bne IntelliNews

Ukraine is trying to publicise its efforts to clamp down on corruption, as a crucial deadline looms for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to review conditions for extending billions of dollars in credits.

In the south-eastern city of Zaporizhia, the head of the local anti-corruption committee and a councillor have been detained on suspicion of extorting bribes, Interior Minister Arsen Avakov said on May 20.

"The head of the anti-corruption committee decided to show how to 'fight corruption' in practice," Avakov wrote on his Facebook page, without revealing the names of the suspects.

The detained official and a local Communist council deputy had demanded the mayor of the  city pay them $10,000 to keep his job, Avakov said. The pair were caught red-handed by the state's economic crimes task force as they received the first part of the money, and now face between five and 10 years in jail.

The incident demonstrates government efforts to halt endemic corruption in Ukraine, which is a condition of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for granting the country $17.5bn in urgently needed credits.

In mid-June the IMF is due to review Ukraine's track record in fighting corruption since the bailout was agreed in March. With the national economy collapsing amid tensions with Russia and the conflict in Ukraine's eastern regions, the government under Prime Minister Arseny Yatsenyuk has been promoting its efforts to stamp out graft.

The public drive began in March with the arrest before TV cameras of the former head of Ukraine's emergency services ministry and his deputy during a cabinet meeting.
However, accusations of complicity in corruption have also been levelled at the prime minister and other top government officials.

The parliament in Kyiv is investigating allegations by the ex-head of the state financial inspectorate that Yatsenyuk and his entire cabinet were aware of embezzlement schemes at state-owned companies that cost the country at least $150mn under their watch. Mykola Gordienko claims he was suspended from his position of top state auditor after detailing the fraud and was finally fired on April 4.

The mud-slinging has not improved Ukraine's image as it tries to raise $40bn in credits and restructured loans to repay the country's debts and rebuild its economy.

The world is growing weary of hearing about Ukraine's problems, former president Viktor Yushchenko said in the Sevodnya newspaper on May 20, comparing his country to "a troublesome fly" in the world arena. "We are not even number two or number three on the agenda," Yushchenko said.

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 #39
Sputnik
May 19, 2015
He is Just Not That Into You: EU Does Not Need Ukraine

The process of Euro-integration failed to bring any positive results for Ukraine, Vesti.ua reported.

Politicians in Kiev lack the courage to admit the bitter truth: the overthrow of former president Viktor Yanukovych did not bring Ukraine closer to the European Union (EU).

Perhaps, ordinary Europeans sympathize with Ukrainians and may even feel truly sorry about what's happening in their country, but nobody is willing to step up and do something real about it.

Ukraine has a large population and it is too big for Brussels to simply drag the country along using the money from the EU budget, similar to tiny Moldova, for example.

Careless EU interventionist policies and the idea of "Europeanization" have failed, causing the widespread political problems in the Middle East, North Africa and Eastern Europe.

It will be hard for the EU to integrate Ukraine. The Eastern European nation has strong potential and resources to become one of the strongest members of the EU, after Germany, France, Italy, Britain and Spain. Even Polish politicians admit that theoretically Ukraine could have a stronger voice in the administrative system of the EU than Poland, Vesti.ua said.

Ukrainian politicians need to understand that they should not expect a breakthrough from a relationship with the EU. Instead, Ukraine should use the example of Turkey, which finally realized that the EU will not let the country into their union in the foreseeable future, and let go of their illusions and start living on their own.

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 #40
Irrussianality
https://irrussianality.wordpress.com/
May 21, 2015
THE MYTH OF THE LAND BRIDGE
By Paul Robinson
Associate Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa. Paul Robinson holds an MA in Russian and Eastern European Studies from the University of Toronto and a D. Phil. in Modern History from the University of Oxford. Prior to his graduate studies, he served as a regular officer in the British Army Intelligence Corps from 1989 to 1994, and as a reserve officer in the Canadian Forces from 1994 to 1996. He also worked as a media research executive in Moscow in 1995. Having published six books, he has also written widely for the international press on political issues. His research focuses generally on military affairs. In recent years, he has worked on Russian history, military history, defence policy, and military ethics.

'It is not our assessment that he [Putin] is bent on capturing or conquering all of Ukraine,' said the American Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, in March, 'he wants a whole entity composed of the two oblasts (regions) in eastern Ukraine which would include a land bridge to Crimea.' The 'land bridge' idea is a popular one among Western politicians and international affairs commentators. A March article in The New York Times, for instance, described such a bridge as one of Russia's 'key goals'. The thinking is that because Crimea is isolated from the rest of Russia, Moscow needs to establish overland communications with it by conquering Ukraine's southern coast. This would involve not only capturing the city of Mariupol, but going beyond the boundaries of Donetsk Province, through Zaporozhe and into Kherson, an advance of around 300 kilometres.

Closely associated with the land bridge concept is that of Novorossiia, a somewhat undefined entity which notionally includes all of the eight provinces of southern and eastern Ukraine. From Russia's point of view, promoting the idea of Novorossiia has the advantage of providing ideological justification for further expansion to secure the alleged land bridge. In line with this, soon after the annexation of Crimea in March 2014 Ukrainian rebels demanded the creation of Novorossiia, invented symbols for it (including competing flags), and even set up institutions which were meant to represent it. Most prominent among the latter was the so-called Novorossia Parliament, chaired by Ukrainian politician Oleg Tsaryov.

This Wednesday, however, Tsaryov declared the Novorossiia project 'frozen'. 'It isn't foreseen by the Minsk agreements', Tsaryov said, 'and we don't want to be blamed for disrupting them'. The 'parliament' was no longer meeting, he added.

From a practical standpoint, this announcement is not very significant. Just one of several competing institutions formed in spring 2014, the self-elected Novorossiia parliament soon lost ground to the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics (DPR & LPR), which became the true locus of loyalty and authority in rebel controlled areas and which eventually acquired some form of legitimacy through the elections held in November 2014. Over time the DPR and LPR have gradually created the basic structures of real states, while Novorossiia has remained moribund. Tsaryov's declaration is no more than an acknowledgement of reality.

Still, from a political point of view this acknowledgement does have real meaning. Tsaryov is a Ukrainian, not a Russian, and it would be a mistake to describe him as a simple puppet of the Kremlin. Nevertheless, had his project had strong backing in Moscow (whether financial or even purely moral), it is unlikely that it would have stalled so completely. Tsaryov's statement is proof that the Kremlin does not support the creation of Novorossiia, but instead backs the provisions of the Minsk agreement which envision Donbass remaining within Ukraine, albeit under an amended constitution.

What, then, does this mean for the land bridge? The answer is simple. Not for the first time Mr Clapper and American intelligence have it wrong: Russia doesn't want it, and isn't doing anything in order to get it. Work began this week on the construction of a real bridge linking Crimea with Russia across the Kerch Strait. Russia, it seems, will be content with that.

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#41
www.rt.com
May 20, 2015
Nuland in Moscow: Squeaky bum time for Kiev?
By Bryan MacDonald
Bryan MacDonald is an Irish writer and commentator focusing on Russia and its hinterlands and international geo-politics.

Victoria Nuland arrived in Moscow last weekend and declared that Ukraine's government doesn't intend to resume the civil war. Either Nuland was being mendacious or President Poroshenko is on a dangerous solo-run.

It's all gone Lethal Weapon. Not in the sense of munitions, although some of those are definitely in play, but rather the movie series. Just as Danny Glover and Mel Gibson delivered four memorable performances in their good cop/bad cop roles, the US State Department is now deploying the tactic.

First John Kerry, who like Glover probably thinks he's getting too old for this, turns up all smiles in Sochi. Convinced the straight man's charm offensive has softened Russian resolve, the Americans then let Victoria Nuland loose on Moscow. The fact that the Russians were so pleasant about it, after she helped coordinate the 2014 Kiev coup, speaks volumes for their tolerance.

While Cold War 2 might have stalled in pre-production, spin-offs from the original remain box office.Just as Cheers led to Frasier, the first installment has left us with Ukraine. As the film director Baz Luhrmann once explained, channeling Mary Schmich, "real troubles are... the kind that blindside you at pm on some idle Tuesday." Ukraine is exactly that kind of thing. Thanks is no small part to Nuland, it's become an albatross for both Washington and the Kremlin.

Nuland was adamant that she came in peace .

"There is no indication from our own information, or from my consultations in Kiev, that anybody on the Ukrainian side, anybody in leadership - and I spoke to President Poroshenko, I spoke to Prime Minister Yatsenyuk, I've spoken to security officials - has any intention of launching new hostilities," she declared.

Given that Nuland was trying to cover every feasible base, her comments just might have been genuine.

Then just a day later, the Ukrainian army shelled Donetsk, killing at least one civilian. RT's Murad Gazdiev, on the ground in the modern-day Sarajevo, described the attack as one of the worst for months. He also reported that the target was the north part of the city, where the previously contested airport is located.

Of course, the assault came just days after Poroshenko passionately vowed to "fight to the last drop of blood" against what he described as "Russian aggressors." Furthermore, on Germany's state-controlled ZDF network, the billionaire Oligarch called the Minsk peace agreement a "pseudo-peace" deal. Before that, Poroshenko said: "I have no doubt - we will free the airport (in Donetsk), because it is our land. And we will rebuild the airport."

Something doesn't add up here. Let's assume that the US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs would not travel to Russia and knowingly lie. In that case, either Nuland has completely lost control of her Ukrainian proxies or those once-useful idiots are performing to a different script. If it's the former, expect more intense violence this week. If the US still calls the tune, Poroshenko and his cronies should fall into line with reasonable haste.

Perhaps, I'm naive but I'd really love to believe that Washington no longer commands the Kiev regime. It would mean that the US bears no culpability for the ridiculous anti-Communist laws and the appalling snub to brave, elderly veterans of WW2 on Kiev's 70th Victory Day, when they were forced to accept parity of esteem with their Nazi opponents.

Assuming Nuland is being sincere, it's then clear that the post-Maidan regime fear the US is washing its hands of them. If Washington is earnestly sacrificing its pet crazies in Kiev in order to secure Russian cooperation in more important areas, the world wins. Ultimately, Ukraine will also benefit. A bad peace for the failed state is still better than a good war. After 18 months of collective hara-kiri, the fractured lands need respite.

Interestingly, the Russian side denied that any deals had been done. The Deputy Foreign Minister, Sergey Ryabkov said: "We focused on the problematic aspects of bilateral relations and some international problems." As for the bilateral relations, he added "Russia said it was dissatisfied with their current form, but we are ready to continue dialogue and discussion of all the existing problems, whether in the military-political sphere or the humanitarian sphere."

The disastrous condition of Ukraine's economy must also be focusing minds. The private intelligence company Stratfor, known as the 'shadow CIA,' noted that Nuland's visit to Moscow "is the latest indicator" that Washington's position on Ukraine and its role in the country's future "may be shifting."

After 18 months of ludicrously soft-soaping the regime, even the US mainstream press is suddenly highlighting Kiev's problems with corruption. This increases the likelihood that Nuland has had a Damascene moment. It's hard to imagine the US' lap dog corporate media straying too far from the State Department line.

The New York Times last weekend quoted Bruce Jackson, President of something called The Project on Transitional Democracies, once a side-project of the supposedly dissolved 'Project For The New American Century (PFTNAC)' who said: "Poroshenko, whether you like him or not, he's not delivering." Jackson is former military intelligence officer. Additionally, he once ran the US Committee on NATO, dedicated to expansion of the alliance.

However, what is far more significant is the fact that, together with Robert Kagan, Jackson served as one of five directors of the PFTNAC, a neocon think tank that also involved Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz. Kagan is the husband of Victoria Nuland. It's reasonable to assume that whatever Jackson is thinking isn't far removed from Nuland's thoughts.

Jackson further observes that "the Ukrainian government is so weak and fragile that it's too weak to do the necessary things to build a unified and independent state."

In British soccer, there's a humorous expression, "squeaky-bum time," attributed to the legendary Alex Ferguson. It relates to the exciting part of a game or season, particularly the last few actions. It's fair to say that it's now "squeaky-bum time" for Poroshenko. His American sponsors could well be abandoning him. If so, his future prospects are beyond grim.

Ukraine's GDP plummeted by 17.6 percent in the first quarter of this year. The New York Times reports that officials in Kiev now believe that the $40 billion pledged by the IMF, US and EU will not be enough to keep the country afloat. The NYT further suggests that Yatsenyuk and his cabinet may have embezzled more than $325 million since taking office.

For his part, Jackson continues: "We don't simply have Russian aggression against the victim Ukraine... Ukraine is now seen as not to be trusted. What the EU is saying is: Where is the decentralization? Where is the commitment? Where are the reforms?"

When somebody like Bruce Jackson, so close to US policymakers on Eastern Europe, to be talking this way, it is reasonable to assume that something has changed dramatically. While Nuland might revel in the role of bad cop, she's also not a law onto herself.

President Obama has 18 months left in office. This crucial period when two-term US Presidents usually strive to finalize their legacy. You will remember that George Bush was much more enthusiastic about Georgia in 2003, than he was in 2008, when he seemed to regard it as an irritant? There's a simple reason for this. By the time Mikhail Saakashvili launched his ridiculous war; Bush was furiously attempting to burnish his place in history.

Obama is now entering the same final lap. The key foreign policy issues on his table are Iran and Syria. On these he can realistically make headway and cooperation from Russia would be extremely useful in both situations. Devoting further time and effort to Ukraine would be as productive as banging his head off a wall.

Russia's tabloid daily Moskovsky Komsomolets suggested on Monday that Nuland was "unlikely to be bringing with her a plan for how to resolve the conflict in Ukraine. It is unusual for a person who started a fire to be involved in the fire-fighting effort."

While that's true, I think it was Kerry who came to mend fences. Nuland's public presence was rather an attempt re-assure Washington's Republicans that Obama is not suddenly going soft on Russia, as they would perceive it. Good cop/bad cop, indeed. Squeaky bum time in Kiev.

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 #42
Washington Post
May 20, 2015
Russians see Ukraine as an illegitimate state
By Mikhail Alexseev and Henry Hale
[Charts here http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/05/20/russians-see-ukraine-as-an-illegitimate-state/]
 
The following is a guest post from political scientists Mikhail Alexseev (San Diego State University) and Henry Hale (George Washington University).

Why have so many Russian citizens seemingly been so cavalier about the dismemberment of Ukraine, a sovereign state that majorities of Russia's population had long viewed quite favorably?

New survey evidence indicates that this is not so much a product of a surge in Russian nationalism, which has actually remained rather stable since the pre-crisis period. Instead, it has much more to do with a stunningly widespread Russian view that Ukraine as it has existed since 1991 is simply not legitimate as a state within its present borders and with its present government.

The findings come from a nationally representative survey of 1,200 adult respondents conducted during Nov. 5-18, 2014, by Russia's ROMIR survey agency as part of the University of Oslo's New Russian Nationalism (NEORUSS) project, led by principal investigators Pål Kolstø and Helge Blakkisrud.

While Ukraine's borders including Crimea have been internationally recognized ever since 1991, including by Russia itself, Russian citizens tend to voice very different perspectives when they are asked "where should the borders of Ukraine be?" As the figure here illustrates, given a finite set of options, only 16 percent of the population answered in line with international law by affirming Ukraine's borders as they have existed since 1991 (and also for much of the Soviet period). Another 29 percent were satisfied with Ukraine minus Crimea, but all other respondents thought independent Ukraine should be even smaller, right down to 11 percent averring that "no part of Ukraine can be an independent state." In all, nearly 84 percent of respondents supported reducing Ukraine's territory.

Russians also clearly see Ukraine's current leadership as illegitimate. The "box plot" graph below summarizes the findings when respondents were asked whether they agreed that the "current leadership of Ukraine" could be characterized in different ways, with 10 representing complete agreement and 1 meaning complete disagreement. The boxes show the range of views reported by the middle 50 percent of the population, with the line inside each box identifying the median response.

Overwhelmingly, one sees that Russians tend to deny not only that Ukraine's current leaders were freely elected, but also that these leaders have any legal standing at all. Instead, the typical Russian citizen is resolute in lambasting his or her neighbor state's leadership as corrupt and even "pro-fascist." Rather than seeing Ukraine's government as representing its people, they see it as merely a puppet of Western powers.

Russia's view of what is happening inside Ukraine seems to boil down to the notion that Ukraine is a failed state, with the roots of the conflict lying mostly in Ukraine's own dysfunctionality. As the figure below illustrates, the typical Russian citizen tended to see the conflict more as a conflict between political forces internal to Ukraine, or as a struggle between eastern and western Ukraine, than as a battle between different countries, civilizations, or transnational corporations. That said, we notice that this typical Russian does not rule out a role for any of these sorts of forces, instead choosing responses that indicate uncertainty.

Perhaps because so many Russians see Ukraine as a basket case, a strong plurality expressed opposition to any kind of Russian intervention in its affairs. Asked what Russia should do and given a list of options, a whole 44 percent replied "nothing," and 3 percent even declared that Russia should help Ukraine join the European Union. Only 27 percent thought Russia should be involved in helping Ukraine elect a new pro-Russian government, a measly 4 percent wanted to help it join the Russian-led Eurasian Union, and just 12 percent thought Russia should actively try to divide it up. A 10th of the survey respondents said the question was too difficult to answer. In response to a separate question, a large majority also thought Russia should not hinder Ukraine's efforts to join the European Union.

Consistent with this interpretation, while most Russians thought Ukraine should be much smaller than it would be even without Crimea, only a quarter or less of the population is found to think that the Donbas (where the Russian-backed insurgency is most active) should actually become part of Russia - about the same as supported Russia's reacquisition of Alaska in the same survey! While a quarter desiring such things is still worrisome for the international community, this is far from a massive groundswell of nationalist sentiment for military expansionism.

While analysis of this survey is ongoing, including preparations for a multi-contributor book with Edinburgh University Press tentatively titled "The New Russian Nationalism" under the editorship of Kolstø and Blakkisrud, the findings presented here clearly indicate that Russian citizens have come to share a very dim view of Ukraine as a state. This is surely a strong enabling condition for Russia's annexation of some Ukrainian territory (Crimea) and its only thinly veiled promotion of further Ukrainian territorial dismemberment.

That is, even as most Russians tend to think Russia should not interfere in Ukrainian affairs and should not take more territory than Crimea, their view of Ukraine as a failed state arguably predisposes them to believe that most of the misfortunes befalling Ukraine (including ones initiated or promoted by the Kremlin) are Ukraine's own fault.

Clearly these views have been strongly shaped by Russian mass media, though exactly how much influence the media have had remains to be adequately explored. In any case, the resulting patterns of public opinion quite adequately suit Kremlin purposes and could well complicate eventual resolution of the conflict.

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 #43
Washington Post
May 21, 2015
Ukraine says it wants a missile shield to protect against Russian aggression
By Karoun Demirjian
Karoun Demirjian is a reporting fellow in The Post's Moscow bureau. She previously served as the Washington Correspondent for the Las Vegas Sun, and reported for the Associated Press in Jerusalem and the Chicago Tribune in Chicago.
 
MOSCOW - Ukraine wants a nuclear missile shield, according to the country's security chief, something that would almost certainly provoke an aggressive response from Russia.

Ukraine is "rebuilding our ­missile shield, the main task of which is to defend against aggression from Russia," Oleksandr Turchynov, the head of Ukraine's National Security and Defense Council, said Wednesday in an interview published by the Ukrainian news agency Ukrinform.

Turchynov explained that the new objective is part of a play to strengthen Ukraine's defenses through "economic, political and military measures" as Kiev continues to fight a war against pro-Moscow separatists in the east. It also comes during a period in which Russia has said that it could deploy nuclear weapons to the recently annexed territory of Crimea. He called on "all leading countries" to help Ukraine defend itself against the potential nuclear threat from Russia through "interaction and systemic coordination."

But if Ukraine is asking to host Western missile defense systems on its soil, the West isn't necessarily going to go along.

"There's no offer or plan to place U.S. or NATO ballistic missile defense systems in Ukraine. I don't think we're exactly sure what they're referring to," State Department spokeswoman Marie Harf said at a briefing Wednesday when asked about Turchynov's comments. "All existing and planned elements are on NATO territory, for example. And certainly, NATO missile defense is not directed against Russia, but against threats from the Middle East."

Russia also expressed its pointed opposition to the idea Wednesday.

"The deployment of missile defense elements in Ukrainian territory would entail the need for Russia to take countermeasures," Kremlin spokesman Dmitry ­Peskov told reporters, adding that if Ukraine hosted U.S. missile defense systems, "this can certainly be viewed only negatively."

When President Obama took office, he scrapped plans to build a missile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic, replacing them with a phased program to deploy defensive systems in Poland and Romania.

Since Russia's annexation of Crimea and the start of hostilities in eastern Ukraine last year, ­Poland and the Baltic states have called on NATO to focus its anti-ballistic missile defense system against Russia. Poland also announced last month that it would spend $8 billion on missile defense and military helicopters.

It is difficult to see how cash-strapped Ukraine could procure a similar missile shield if it were not provided by the West.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov dismissed Turchynov's comments as belonging to a category of statements that are "absolutely futile, counterproductive and nothing more than shaking the air."

Lavrov also was skeptical that Ukraine would ever join NATO or the European Union, noting that "the European countries themselves are talking about this very reluctantly."

The subject of missile defense in Ukraine is fraught with competing emotions of pride and regret. Ukraine once held the world's third-largest arsenal of nuclear weapons, but dismantled it and joined the ranks of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty after the breakup of the Soviet Union, in exchange for security assurances from both Russia and the West.

Those assurances were written in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which Ukraine called upon repeatedly, but unsuccessfully, after Russia annexed Crimea and the West did little to intervene beyond threats and later by imposing sanctions. Ukrainian policy experts and government advisers have since opined that if Ukraine had maintained even part of its nuclear arsenal, Russia would never have annexed Crimea or supported an uprising of pro-Moscow separatists in eastern Ukraine.

Turchynov's interview comes just days after U.S. Secretary of State John F. Kerry and Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland visited Russia for the first time in months, for discussions with their counterparts and Russian President Vladimir Putin. The talks, aimed at coordinating the two countries' efforts to rein in the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria, were not immediately conclusive. But they marked a notable shift in tone, as Russian and U.S. diplomats traditionally at loggerheads spoke of working together. On Wednesday, Lavrov added that Russia is ready to resume cooperation with NATO when the security alliance decides to resurrect "practical cooperation" activities with Russia.

Yet as the United States and Russia take tentative steps to work more closely together, the diplomatic gap between Ukraine and Russia seems to be widening.

This week, Ukraine's cabinet terminated a military-technical cooperation agreement with Russia that has been in place since 1993, while Ukraine's parliament voted to freeze payments on its foreign debts until they can be restructured. Ukraine owes a significant portion of its foreign debt to Russia, which said Wednesday that the new law is tantamount to a default.

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 #44
RIA Novosti
May 20, 2015
Moscow plays down Ukrainian security supremo's remarks about US missiles

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has called the statements of the secretary of the Ukrainian National Security and Defence Council (NSDC), Oleksandr Turchynov, on the necessity to strengthen sanctions against Russia and the possible deployment of missile defence system elements on Ukrainian territory "hot air," state-owned Russian news agency RIA Novosti (part of the state-owned International News Agency Rossiya Segodnya) reported on 20 May.

"I have not heard this statement because I was making a speech at the Federation Council. I should take a look at it, but, honestly speaking, I do not see much sense in reading such kind of things. They are absolutely futile and counterproductive, because they are nothing but hot air," Lavrov told journalists.

Lavrov's sentiments were echoed by the member of the State Duma defence committee, Frants Klintsevich, who said that Turchynov's statement "is of speculative nature", RIA Novosti said in another report.

"Simply said, they want to threaten us. Let me recall that until now the USA has deployed elements of its missile defence system only on the territories of its European allies within NATO," Klintsevich added.

According to him, the USA cannot but understand that "putting Ukraine on this orbit will deal the strongest blow to the entire system of international relations, making the situation in the world completely unpredictable".

"We would like to hear the US Department of State's reaction to this irresponsible statement made by Turchynov," the MP concluded.

Head of the Russian State Duma Committee for International Affairs Aleksey Pushkov believes that Turchynov "is trying to sell his country" as a site for the US missile defence system.

"Having sold [Ukraine's] independence to the West, Turchynov does not know what else to sell. Now he is trying to sell Ukraine as a site for the US missile defence system deployment," Pushkov said in a Twitter post on the same day.

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