#2
Moscow Times
May 14, 2015
Kerry Brings Cautious Signs of Russia Detente to NATO Meeting
By Ivan Nechepurenko

ANTALYA, Turkey - After his whirlwind visit to Sochi on Tuesday for marathon talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry has headed across the Black Sea to Turkey, where he wasted no time in briefing his counterparts on the prospect of renewed cooperation with Russia.

Kerry's comments came at the start of a two-day gathering of NATO foreign ministers in the resort city of Antalya.

"I was privileged to brief my NATO colleagues about my meeting with President Putin and Foreign Minister Lavrov. I think there was a strong agreement among all of the NATO members that this is a critical moment of action by Russia and the separatists to live up to the Minsk agreements," Kerry told a group of journalists first thing Wednesday morning.

"Everybody here is united in that our preference is not to have sanctions, but the sanctions will [remain in place] in an effort to secure the peace that everybody needs in Ukraine," he said.

In Sochi, Kerry had said that "if and when [the Minsk agreements are] fully implemented, it is clear that the United States and European Union sanctions can begin to be rolled back."

Speaking immediately after Kerry in Antalya, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg noted that he appreciated having gotten a sense of Kerry's meeting with Putin before the overall meeting started.

"It was a very useful exchange and a very useful briefing from Secretary Kerry because it is useful for foreign ministers to get an update just a few hours after the talks in Sochi. It wasn't just about Ukraine; it was also about Afghanistan and North Africa," Stoltenberg told journalists.

"We have suspended all practical cooperation with Russia. We support economic sanctions, but at the same time we urge for political dialogue to remain open, and I think that the talks that Secretary Kerry held are in line with this practice," he said.  

Later, during the first day of the NATO gathering, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier told journalists that "significant progress" has been achieved in the realization of the Minsk accords, drawing attention to the creation of relevant working groups.

Earlier on, several senior NATO officials indicated during a media briefing that NATO will attempt in its bilateral relations with Russia to prioritize issues on which the alliance and Moscow can see eye to eye, rather than focusing on issues of contention.

"We have to keep the avenues for dialogue open because the escalation could reach dangerous levels," a senior NATO official said. In media briefings such as these, NATO officials generally decline to be identified as a matter of protocol.

The ongoing civil war in Syria and the political instability in Libya were mentioned as areas rich with possibilities for cooperation between the two sides.

"At the same time, we will continue to emphasize Russia's special responsibility for what happens in Ukraine's east and for actively supporting the separatists there," the official said.

There was a slight but palpable change in the overall atmosphere and rhetoric since Kerry's talks with Putin and Lavrov. No one has mentioned the possibility of sending weapons to Ukraine, and the word "separatists" has been broadly used instead of "Russia-backed insurgents," which was more commonly utilized previously.

In addition, there was talk of the need to maintain working ties with Russian military commanders. According to a NATO official, an emergency communication link could help de-escalate situations that threaten to explode.

He stressed that while there is no "exchange of military information on a regular basis ... there is an effort to avoid misunderstandings in any event possible," adding that "our relationship is not frozen; it is the [formal] partnership that is frozen."

Despite indications of a renewed dialogue, there was no mention of any specific plans for further cooperation.

The meeting took place in Turkey, to emphasize that NATO faces challenges both from the East - in Ukraine - and from the South - where the feared terrorist organization the Islamic State has gained control of large swathes of territory in Iraq and Syria.

Turkey's Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu moved to emphasize Turkey's new role in the ongoing Russia-West crisis. He told journalists during a news conference on Tuesday that "nothing can justify Russia's actions in Ukraine, Crimea and Abkhazia. However, as a country that has good relations with Russia, Ukraine and the West, Turkey is calling for the crisis to be resolved through a constructive dialogue."

"Despite the physical fall of the Berlin Wall, the wall in [people's] mentality has remained intact," he added.

Despite attempts to re-establish dialogue, Russia and NATO remain vociferously opposed to each other. Russia's military doctrine, adopted at the end of 2014, lists NATO as a leading external threat.

NATO was established in the aftermath of World War II in an attempt to counter the military power of the Soviet Union.

Thursday marks the 60th anniversary of the formation of the Warsaw Pact, which was established in 1955 in a bid to counter NATO. It was dissolved upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Since then, many Russian officials have argued that NATO has lost its purpose.

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 #3
Christian Science Monitor
May 13, 2015
Return to pragmatism in Russia-West ties? Kerry-Putin talks hint that way. The US secretary's visit to Russia, on the heels of a visit by Angela Merkel, suggests that the Kremlin and the West are trying to cooperate on international issues like Iran and Ukraine.
By Fred Weir, Correspondent

Secretary of State John Kerry's four hours of talks Tuesday with Vladimir Putin in the Black Sea resort of Sochi may not have resulted in an overnight détente.

But they offer the strongest hint in months that US-Russian relations may yet weather the crisis unleashed by Moscow's annexation of the Ukrainian territory of Crimea just over a year ago.

Russian observers are putting the best face on the flurry of diplomatic activity, which also saw German Chancellor Angela Merkel jet into Moscow on Sunday to lay a wreath in honor of Russian Victory Day and hold talks with Mr. Putin. That, plus Mr. Kerry's visit, suggests that Western governments may be trying to limit the damage from their boycott of Russia's massive V-Day military parade last weekend, and at least keep open the lines of communication with Russian leaders in dealing with major global problems such as Ukraine, Syria, and Iran.

There is a different tone connected with Kerry's visit, says Andrei Klimov, deputy chair of the international affairs committee of Russia's upper house of parliament, the Federation Council.

"Perhaps they're trying to make some course corrections. What they have been doing until now [sanctions and tough rhetoric] hasn't had the desired effect on Russia, so they are changing tactics," he says.

Kerry emerged from his nearly day-long meetings with Putin and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov talking up the value of keeping channels open between Washington and Moscow. "There is no substitute for talking directly to key decision makers, particularly during a period that is as complex and fast-moving as this is," he said. He also laid a wreath at a Sochi memorial for Russian soldiers killed in World War II - a conciliatory gesture after the West's Victory Day boycott.

But there was no indication of any break in the diplomatic logjam over Ukraine, where both sides support implementation of the fragile Minsk accords despite growing indications that neither Kiev nor rebel leaders in east Ukraine are willing to implement the political road map laid out in the deal.

Experts say Russia and the West may be willing to accept a long-term impasse over Ukraine. The main purpose of Kerry's visit, they say, was to ensure continued Russian cooperation in other vital areas, particularly the looming deadline for a final agreement between Iran and the P5+1 (five permanent UN Security Council members plus Germany) to curb Iran's nuclear program.

"We are now coming into the last six weeks of those negotiations," Kerry said. "And we all understand that unity has been key to bringing us where we are today."

But some Russian analysts warn that Ukraine itself could yet derail wider cooperation between Moscow and Washington unless the flagging Minsk peace process is bolstered by fresh initiatives.

"Both sides realize that the Ukraine conflict has been costly, and brought no benefits to anybody," says Viktor Kremeniuk, deputy director of the official Institute for USA-Canada Studies in Moscow. He says that forces on the ground might resume open warfare, and thus scramble any progress that's been made under the Minsk deal.

"Hopefully, there is a new urgency in the air about this crisis. It's time to stop head-butting one another over Ukraine, and start coming to some serious decisions about the way forward."

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 #4
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
May 13, 2015
Are Kerry's Sochi talks with Putin and Lavrov a game-changer?
Russia Direct interviewed Russian and American experts as well as former diplomats to assess the importance of U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry's recent high-profile diplomatic mission to Sochi.
By Pavel Koshiin

Both Russian and American experts have greeted U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry's visit to Sochi on May 12 with cautious optimism. After all, it was Kerry's first visit to Russia in two years - marking the first time since the start of the Ukrainian crisis that Kerry had set foot on Russian soil.

With both sides admitting that the Ukraine crisis has reached a critical point, steps to preserve the momentum of the Minsk II agreement as well as reach some new consensus on what to do next have become even more vitally important.   
      
In an attempt to assess the results of the meeting, Russia Direct interviewed Russian and American experts as well as former diplomats for their opinions.

Robert Legvold, Harriman Institute of Columbia University:

Provided one is realistic about the current very deteriorated U.S.-Russian relationship, the meeting may be more significant than the media recognizes. The two countries start from a very low point, and there is no chance they will soon change the underlying character of the relationship - that is, a deep mistrust of the other side, profound differences over key issues, such as Ukraine, and a tendency to focus on limitations rather than opportunities. But the Sochi meeting may open the way for both sides to take a different approach to the relationship.

It is significant that both Foreign Minister Lavrov and President Putin gave four hours each to the meeting, but even more so, that the conversations in both cases appeared to be constructive, and free of the invective characterizing other meetings. Perhaps the most significant result was Kerry's remark at the press conference that direct dialogue is crucial, particularly in difficult times. That has not been the Obama Administration's position up to this point.

And it appears that they made progress on specific issues. While differences remain in their estimation of what threatens the Minsk II agreement, they appeared genuinely committed to keeping the lid on. In the case of Syria, while there's no indication that they have a clear notion of what would constitute a political settlement, they appear willing to attempt to cooperate in promoting one. All of this represents progress, but it will only be meaningful, if both sides have the will to take the next steps.

Fyodor Lukyanov, Editor-in-Chief of the journal Russia in Global Affairs, Chairman of Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy:

Yesterday [May 12], the main topics of the discussion were quite usual: Syria, the general situation in the Middle East, the final stage of preparations to the signing of Iran agreement. It's a typical array of questions usually discussed between representatives of Russia and the U.S. It's hard to imagine something broader.

While we cannot really discuss the way the negotiations went, as we haven't participated in them, the personal contacts became more comfortable. But I wouldn't overestimate this because the general position most likely will not change.

This meeting shows that both sides, Russia and the U.S., became aware of the fact that the situation when two large nuclear superpowers barely have working channels of communication for over a year is quite dangerous. Because in such situation the question is not of an open military conflict (as no one intends to start a war), but there is a necessity to maintain the contact in order to understand the partner's intentions and logic.

The latest developments probably gave both countries an incentive to re-establish the dialogue that existed even during the period of the Cold War. During that time, the dialogue was not aimed at pressuring someone, but to be aware of what is the general atmosphere. At that time this communication was very constructive.  In my opinion, we are moving towards something similar.

I would not expect the sanctions to be lifted any time soon as Secretary Kerry and his colleagues continue to say that it can only happen if the Minsk agreements are fully realized.  However, the agreements signed in Minsk and their implementation is a very diffused thing that is hard to measure. Most likely, in the near future the sanctions will not be lifted. In the U.S. the mechanism of lifting sanctions is very complex: If sanctions are introduced, it is very hard to lift them later.

Michael McFaul, former U.S. Ambassador to Russia and Professor at Stanford University:

I always believe that direct dialogue is useful in diplomacy, so I applaud the idea of Kerry's meeting with Putin. Positive atmospherics, however, are never a substitute for policy. On the major policy issues in U.S.-Russia relations, nothing has changed.

Steven Pifer, former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine and Brookings Senior Fellow at Center on the United States and Europe:

According to press reports, the discussions in Sochi between Secretary Kerry and President Putin and Foreign Minister Lavrov covered a broad agenda, including Ukraine, Iran's nuclear program, Syria and ISIS, and North Korea.  It does not appear that the visit produced substantive breakthroughs. Indeed, prior to the meeting, American officials had modest expectations in terms of specific outcomes, and the intention of the visit may have been more along the lines of keeping a line of communications open to Putin. That's worth doing, but absent changes in policies, it will be difficult for the sides to make progress in closing their differences.

Andrey Kortunov, President of New Eurasia Foundation, General Director of Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC):

The fact that Kerry's visit to Sochi took place for the first time in two years indicates that it is generally an extraordinary event. Different factors have played a role here. On the one hand, there is the desire to preserve the dialogue, especially, in the times of a growing number of international problems, where Russian and American interests are the same. On the other hand, there is the desire to take part in tackling the Ukrainian crisis.
After all, the U.S. is not a participant of the Normandy format process [a process that involves Russia, Ukraine, France and Germany - Editor's note]. Nevertheless, they have their opportunities and channels of communication with Kiev. In addition, there is the desire of the U.S. to clearly deliver its position on the Ukrainian case and other international problems. However, nobody expected any breakthroughs in these negotiations.         

Observing the Minsk II agreements was the major topic of the talks in Sochi. On Russia's part, it was important that the U.S. would not confine their position to monitoring the situation in Eastern Ukraine, but also take responsibilities to exert pressure on the Kiev authorities. And, remarkably, Kerry made a reference to the comment to Ukrainian President Petr Poroshenko about the Donetsk airport and warned against using force in taking it back, which demonstrates the symbolic readiness to exert pressure on Kiev, if necessary, and use its political heft to influence Kiev to fulfill the Minsk agreements. And this is a very important point. It means the possibility of the U.S. participating in the Normandy format negotiations. But again, for Russia, it is much more important to focus on fulfilling the commitments presented in the Minsk Agreements.  
 
Richard Sakwa, Professor of Russian and European Politics, Head of School at University of Kent, Member of Comparative Politics Research Group:

This [Kerry's visit] is a very positive development. The fact that President Obama has sent his Secretary of State all the way to Sochi suggests the beginning of an understanding that the solution facing the two countries and larger regional and global issues can only be resolved through dialogue. This is the first meeting between Kerry and Putin in two years, and does suggest that the freeze is beginning to thaw.

The key issue discussed was Ukraine, but the Minsk peace process will only work if it is embedded in a larger regional and global settlement, and this is a sign that this may be beginning to emerge. The meeting also discussed the situation in the Middle East, where despite the differences of views, there are many common interests. The key issue is to find a common political language, something that is distinctly missing.

What is the potential for improvement in U.S.-Russian relations? There is a lot of ground to make up, and this is a small sign of a possible path back towards, not so much an improvement, as the beginning of understanding. However, the gulf in understanding between the two countries remains enormous, and the Ukrainian situation will constantly act as an irritant; sometimes it seems deliberately so. With an American election coming up, things will get all the more heated. The two countries operate, as it were, on two different levels of reality, both relatively coherent in their own terms, but ultimately lacking a mode of dialogue between the two.

Nicolai Petro, Professor of Political Science at the University of Rhode Island, specializing in Russian affairs:

It was the meeting itself that was the most significant issue. It was the first high-level meeting between the U.S. and Russian officials in two years. The United States had been the main sponsor of attempts to isolate Russia, but as early as last fall, tried to re-initiate dialogue in secret.

Moscow, in an effort to prove the futility of attempting to isolate Russia, took the position that such contacts must be public. It now appears that Moscow's position has won out. While it may seem to be a concession that Kerry was allowed to break protocol and meet with Russian President Putin as well as [Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov], this only highlights the official and very public standing accorded this "reset."

Another interesting aspect of this visit was the equal emphasis that Kerry gave to Ukraine's need to fulfill its obligations under the Minsk Accords. Traditionally, the United States has made such demands only of Russia, giving Ukraine a free pass.

It is far too early, however, to speak of a return to "business as usual" between the United States and Russia. As Russia sees it, efforts by the United States to promote turmoil in Ukraine, along with its attempts to organize Russia's political and economic isolation are hardly forgotten. It is just that the United States belatedly realizes that it needs Russia's assistance in managing other international crisis, and that its policies of imposing sanctions have led to a great deal of friction with Europe, as well as moved cooperation between China and Russia to a new level. This last item could ultimately threaten the long-term interests of the United States.

To me, however, it is inconceivable that Russia will resume normal relations with the current U.S. administration - too much reckless damage has been done. This does not mean, however, that the stage cannot be set for the resumption of closer ties with some future administrations.

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#5
Washington, Moscow tone down propaganda, get back to dialogue
By Tamara Zamyatina

MOSCOW, May 13. /TASS/. US Secretary of State John Kerry's visit to Russia, the first since the start of the Ukrainian crisis, has brought about no cardinal change in Russia-US relations but was a clear sign Washington has made an attempt to amend its policies towards Moscow, polled experts told TASS.

Director of the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of US and Canada Studies Sergey Rogov believes that what makes Kerry's visit to Russia so important is its heralding a return to normal dialogue between Washington and Moscow after many months of chill. "Up to that moment, propagandistic statements were invariably heard where there should have been diplomatic discussions," Rogov said.

"John Kerry's meeting with President Vladimir Putin in Russia at the initiative of the White House was a clear sign the Barack Obama administration had steered relations with Moscow into a dead end, putting them on the brink of another Cold War. Washington eventually stopped to think what could be done to prevent a further worsening. The Kremlin had the same thoughts," Rogov said.

Specifically, he pointed to the wide agenda of the meeting: nuclear weapons non-proliferation, Syrian settlement, the Iranian nuclear problem and some regional conflicts. "That's a sure sign the previous 12 months when Ukraine invariably took centre-stage are over," the observer noted. "Alongside this, Washington has developed certain shifts in its interpretation of the Minsk Accords for a settlement of the crisis in the southeast of Ukraine," he said.

"The White House invariably brought to the forefront the pullback of heavy weapons away from the line of engagement between the Ukrainian army and the militias' of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk republics and the withdrawal of Russian troops, ostensibly present in Donbass."

Moscow had kept pressing for the beginning of political negotiations by Kiev, Donetsk and Luhansk, Rogov noted. Now, Washington looked prepared to agree that such talks were necessary and had promised to exercise its influence to persuade Kiev to negotiate, which was a positive sign.

While in no mood to over-estimate Kerry's visit to Russia, the scholar judged himself certain that "it makes one hopeful dialogue between Washington and Moscow will go ahead in various formats."

A senior Russian legislator, deputy chairman of the Federation Council's International Affairs committee Andrei Klimov warns that "Kerry's visit to Russia should by no means be interpreted as a sign the White House, in the wake of the large-scale celebrations in Moscow on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of Allied victory over Nazi Germany, has all of a sudden decided to hurry to mend relations with the Kremlin.

"What it surely does mean," he said, "is that the United States is more realistic in gauging Russia's weight in the world and less reliant on its own subjective ideas of what the world order should be like. "Kerry and Lavrov laid wreathes in Sochi at the memorial honouring Red Army soldiers who perished in World War II battles. In this way, Kerry somewhat corrected the impression from the Obama administration's decision to avoid paying respects to the people who rid the world of Nazism," Klimov told TASS.

"It is beyond doubt that the White House could not but be impressed by the May 9 V-day parade in Moscow's Red Square, which featured guest troop contingents from other countries, including China and India, both possessing major nuclear rocket potentials," he said. "Also, the just-started Russian-Chinese naval exercise Mediterranean Maritime Cooperation-2015 is another clear sign the West has failed to achieve Russia's isolation," he said.

"Washington finds it ever harder to conceal the fact that its minions in Kiev are pushing ahead with aggression against the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk people's republics and uttering threats that they may mount another offensive against the Donetsk airport. Kerry promised to caution Ukraine's President Petro Poroshenko against such actions and emphasised United States' commitment to implementation of the Minsk Accords in the southeast of Ukraine. There is hope Barack Obama's current stance will eventually bear fruit," Klimov said.

Ukraine as such was not high priority for United States foreign policy, he added. For Washington, it was far more important to keep in touch with Russia to formulate common approaches to normalising affairs in the Middle East and resolving Iran's nuclear problem. This was well-seen in Kerry's tweeted call for preserving communication links between the US and Russia. "This is the first step towards resumption of a full-fledged process of bilateral negotiations," Klimov noted.

 #6
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
May 14, 2015
Kerry's Sochi visit: Not yet a new reset
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry's visit to Sochi has the potential to change the tone in U.S.-Russia relations and turn down the tensions provoked by the so-called "information war" - but only if both sides act quickly.
By Dmitry Polikanov
Dmitry Polikanov is Vice President of The Russian Center for Policy Studies (PIR-Center) and Chairman of Trialogue International Club. Author of more than 100 publications on conflict management, peacekeeping, arms control, international relations and foreign policy. Member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the International Sociological Association, the All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center Research Council.

Many regard U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry's visit to Sochi, where he met with both Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, as the first positive sign for U.S.-Russia relations in quite some time. Keep in mind - top-level U.S. officials haven't visited Moscow for the last two years, ever since the start of the Ukraine crisis. Nonetheless, how much of this optimism about Kerry's visit will turn into real action?

The resumption of face-to-face dialogue between the U.S. and Russia is good in and of itself. During four hours of talks with Putin, the U.S. Secretary of State had a chance to touch upon a broad range of issues - from Ukraine to Syria and Yemen. Moreover, the Russian expert community and media noted Kerry's changing tone with respect to Ukraine and sanctions.

At the same time, much of this positive spin about the meeting is wishful thinking, of course. None should expect dramatic changes in the U.S. policy towards Russia, since the reasons for the current "mini Cold War" are much more fundamental.

There is no Russian lobby in the United States, for example, and the amount of business ties between the two nations is minimal. Moreover, the Russian establishment is full of people who are critical, if not downright antagonistic, with respect to an "old enemy" - the U.S., which in turn, does not trust the Russian leadership.

Besides, the United States is rapidly approaching the 2016 election campaign, so the window of opportunity (even if U.S. President Barack Obama were thinking about some positive shifts at the end of his term) is closing rapidly. Russian decision-makers understand it quite well and can hardly be convinced to talk seriously with an outgoing head of state.

Moreover, deeds speak louder than words. Kerry was much more decisive in his statements in Ukraine and at the NATO ministerial meeting in Antalya, Turkey. The United States continues to provide military support (fortunately, not arms supplies yet) to the Ukrainian government and back "defensive" initiatives of the East European nations.

Unlike Obama, Russian President Vladimir Putin will stay in power. And there is a high probability that he will stay for another ten years, realizing that the West appears to be searching for a new strategy with respect to Russia.

Visits by German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Kerry come after Russia's Victory Day, which was marked by the unprecedented presence of China in the Russian media and national political discourse. They very much resemble the attempts to tread water and to test the potential for compromise with Russia in the future.

The most productive line in this regard would be to return to an honest and straightforward pragmatic dialogue, which has recently been replaced with loud statements about moral principles in politics. Such statements may sound fine for the ears of the Western voters, but the Russians regard it as a disguise for dirty intentions and treat them as such.

Thus, Kerry's visit is not yet the launch of a "new reset," but its potential may be used, at the very least, to slightly change the tone in U.S.-Russia relations and turn down the tensions provoked by the so-called "information war." However, for any serious developments there should be a quick follow-up, otherwise the effect will be extremely short.

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 #7
US Department of State
May 12, 2015
Press Availability With Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov
Sochi, Russia
[Compare with Russian Foreign Ministry version: http://mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/1832A4FE6BF5B7E643257E440029BBE5]

MODERATOR: (In progress) (Via interpreter) ready to start the press conference. Heads of the foreign policy agencies of the U.S. and Russia.

FOREIGN MINISTER LAVROV: Distinguished ladies and gentlemen, thanks a lot for your patience and waiting till the end of all today's negotiations. Our negotiations took place in (inaudible) the presidential part has just ended, and before that we took very substantive negotiations of the ministerial level with my counterpart Mr. Kerry.

Let me tell you straight ahead that our meeting has taken place during the days of celebrating the 70th anniversary of the Second World War. And we started our today's events with the common ceremony of laying the wreath to the war memorial. That war memorial was built in honor and in memory of the victims of the World War II, and I believe that all the people of Sochi highly appreciated that Secretary Kerry visited the war memorial.

During our negotiations, both at the ministerial level and during the conversation with the president, we discussed the most pressing issues of the modern world. We touched upon counteracting terrorism and other contemporary threats, as well as ensuring security and stability. We also discussed the factors that influence achieving the task of maintaining strategic stability.

One of the key issues in our discussion was the crisis in the Ukraine. There are certain contradiction and divergences between Russia and the U.S., as related to the origins of the crisis and our contemporary assessments of the way it is developing. But we definitely shared a view that it is only possible to resolve the issue through peaceful ways - through a comprehensive and full implementation of the Minsk agreements. And of course, it requires to launch a full-fledged dialogue between Kyiv on the one hand and Donetsk and Luhansk on the other hand.

This is enshrined in the Minsk agreements that were adopted on the 12th of February. They envisage a launch of the constitutional reform, with due consideration of the opinion of people from Donetsk and Luhansk. It also envisages holding the local elections, as well as resolving the issues related to the blockade that had been introduced by Kyiv towards Donetsk and Luhansk. So all the provisions of the Minsk agreements are fully required to be implemented. We, Secretary Kerry and I, agreed to (inaudible) implement all the agreements that had been achieved in Minsk.

We also discussed the ways to settle the conflict in Syria. We agreed to continue or probably even to build up our efforts and that - ensuring the launch of the process that could lead to implementing the agreements that we envisage in the Geneva communique adopted on the 30th of June.

And we also agreed that the problem of the ISIL's activities, as well as the activities of Jabhat al-Nusrah are also very dangerous. Those armed groups are getting even more powerful, and they are threatening the peace not only in the Middle East region but also beyond it. We are absolutely convinced that it is necessary to join our efforts and act together more efficiently. It requires efforts of all leading powers. We believe that it is absolutely necessary to consistently fight that evil with no double standards based on the universally recognized principles of international law.

Among other things, we shared our views on the implementation of our agreements aimed at resolving the Iran's nuclear program. We also discussed the situation in Yemen, Libya, and other Middle East countries. We also discussed the situation in Afghanistan, in the Korean Peninsula, and we emphasize that both U.S. and Russia are advocating denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Of course, we discussed the state of our bilateral relations, including some specific irritators that have been in place recently. But in a broader context, we also discussed our views related to bigger problems that had been accumulating for several years. Sometimes our opinions diverged and we did not always find common understanding of the issues. But we fully understand that it is absolutely necessary to avoid any steps that could further detriment relations between Russia and U.S. We believe that it is necessary to continue the cooperation between our countries, especially given the fact that resolution of many international problems really depends on our joint efforts - on the joint efforts of Russia and the U.S. - and I believe this is one of the main ideas about today's negotiations, one of the main conclusions and outcomes of today.

Our president firmly emphasized that we are ready for as broad cooperation as possible and as close interaction as possible with the U.S.A. based on equal rights and mutual respect of interests and positions of each other. I'm very grateful to you, Secretary Kerry, for this long and productive day. The floor is yours. Thank you.

SECRETARY KERRY: Well, thank you very much, Foreign Minister Lavrov, Sergey. I greatly appreciate your comments just now and I agree with your summary of the day. I'm particularly glad to be here in Sochi, and I really want to start by thanking President Putin and Foreign Minister Lavrov for hosting our discussions here today - excuse me. Sergey and I talk pretty regularly, but we rarely have the chance to be able to speak for as long as we did today, as uninterrupted as it was today, and obviously there are a number of very critical issues that President Obama wanted me to be able to share with President Putin and with Foreign Minister Lavrov.

As all of you know, we have just in the last days celebrated the 70th anniversary of VE Day, the day that the United States, Russia, and our allies defeated the scourge of Nazism. And earlier today, I had the privilege of attending, with the mayor of Sochi and with Foreign Minister Lavrov, the war memorial here in Sochi where more than 4,000 of the millions of courageous then-Soviets who died in World War II are buried. And it's a very beautiful memorial and I was very moved by the young children who were there taking part in the ceremony. And I think Sergey and I both came away from this ceremony with a very powerful reminder of the sacrifices that we shared to bring about a safer world, and of what our nations can accomplish when our peoples are working together towards the same goal.

We are obviously in the midst of a challenging time. And here in Sochi today, I was privileged to spend many hours with Foreign Minister Lavrov and with President Putin discussing a number of global issues on which both of our countries are very focused. I'm grateful to President Putin for the significant amount of time that he made available to this discussion, for his directness, and for his very detailed explanations of Russia's position with respect to some of these challenges, and of the ways that he believed that we have an ability to be able to work constructively together in order to resolve these problems.

I think the fact that leaps out at me, certainly, from this day's discussions which is precisely what brought me here in the first place, is that there is no substitute for talking directly to key decision makers, particularly during a period that is as complex and fast-moving as this is. To start with, as Sergey said, we discussed Iran, where Russia and the United States and our other P5+1 partners are working very hard through the nuclear negotiations with Iran. We are now coming into the last six weeks of those negotiations. And we all understand that unity has been key to bringing us where we are today. It is also going to be the key to completing a good deal and to our being confident that that deal will be able to be well-implemented. The United States and Russia remain closely aligned in this effort, as do the rest of our P5+1 allies and friends, EU partners.

We also discussed today the real and present danger of Daesh - ISIL, as many call it - and while Russia is not a formal member of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, Russia is a very important partner in the global effort against violent extremism. And countering violent extremism is a first-order priority for both Russia and the United States. No one should doubt that the reach of groups like Daesh extends far beyond the particular region of its operations, and it affects every single one of us - the United States, Russia, and the rest of the world. And we are in unity with respect to our commitment to continue to push back against Daesh, and ultimately, to drive Daesh out of Iraq, out of Syria, and to eliminate it as a threat to any of us.

From the Geneva communique to the removal of Syria's chemical weapons, I would emphasize that we have seen what happens when Russia and the United States work together. It is clearly possible to make real progress and make important things happen. And Sergey just referenced that in his comments. I would underscore it myself. And it is that confidence in our ability to be able to make a difference on some important issues that help to bring us here today to discuss the road ahead. There is an urgent need, we agree, for that same kind of cooperation that brought about the removal of weapons from Syria - chemical weapons - that has characterized our cooperation on Iran. The same kind of effort is now necessary on some other challenges that we face together.

For one thing, while we have come a long way with respect to the chemical weapons, we also both see reports of the current potential attacks on innocent people. In addition, the threat of violent extremism in the region continues to grow. And as we've said many times, the United States believes that Syria will never be at peace until there is a political solution, a political transition in Syria. What we need is that political outcome, and negotiated by and for Syrians, and supported and facilitated by key external powers.

So today, we discussed at some length how the United States and Russia might work together on this in the days ahead, and Foreign Minister Lavrov and I agreed to examine specific concepts, but more importantly, to continue that conversation in the coming weeks with increased focus and purpose.

We also discussed other regional issues - Libya, Yemen, and President Obama's upcoming summit with the GCC countries. And of course, we did spend time on Ukraine, as Sergey has mentioned. I reiterated America's view that the Minsk agreements are absolutely, in our judgment, by far the best path, the principal path, to peace, and those agreements must be fully implemented, the sooner the better.

I must say we found a fair amount of agreement even as Sergey has accurately disclosed that we continue to disagree on certain components of the walkup to it or certain facts, but we are both in significant agreement on the most important issue of all, which is it will be resolved by the full implementation of Minsk, and we both - all of us and other friends and allies - have responsibilities to undertake in order to effect that implementation. If and when Minsk is fully implemented, it is clear the U.S. and EU sanctions can begin to be rolled back.

But I also made clear our deep concerns regarding the situation on the ground - continued perceived violations of ceasefire in Shyrokyne and at the Donetsk airport; the continued arming, training, command and control of separate forces. And we believe that this fighting, the fighting that is taking place as a result of this - on any side, whoever has instigated it - that it has gone on for too long. And today, I underscored the steps that the United States hopes to see taken by the parties in the coming - excuse me - in the coming days and weeks.

We really believe that a genuine ceasefire in Shyrokyne needs to be undertaken. I think Sergey and President Putin agreed that that is important, as well as the withdrawal of weapons and the demilitarization and monitoring by the OSCE.

Second, there needs to be a real discussion within the Minsk political working groups regarding the path to elections in the Donbas, elections that could be monitored properly and conformed to the Ukrainian constitution, as it set out in Minsk, and also regarding the decentralization that is important, the decentralization status that is important for that region.

We also believe that humanitarian access needs to gain greater freedom of movement - and important very much to the Ukrainian and the U.S. and the UN agencies. We would like, clearly, to see the release of political prisoners, including Nadia Savchenko, and finally, the inspection by the OSCE or IRCC - ICRC of cargo that travels into Ukraine, including humanitarian cargo.

Now, all of these steps can and we believe should be taken quickly, and all of them would make a real difference to the quality of life in Donbas. And they would give all of us the confidence that we need that Minsk is going to be fully implemented and that the conflict can come to an end with that full implementation.

Obviously, I want to leave time for questions, but I want to again say thank you to Russia, to Foreign Minister Lavrov for his very generous welcome here to Sochi today. This was an important visit at an important time, and we didn't come here with an expectation that we were going to define a specific path forward with respect to one crisis or another, or have a major breakthrough. We came here purposefully to have a very full and open dialogue with Russia's leaders, the kind of dialogue that is absolutely essential in making progress on the many challenges that we face today.

And I am particularly grateful and I want to express my appreciation to President Putin for the very significant and serious conversation that he engaged in for the very significant amount of time that he committed to this discussion. And I express President Obama's gratitude for Russia's willingness to engage in this discussion at a time when the exchange of views could not be more important. So we thank them for talking through these issues face-to-face as we try to come together and find workable solutions to very important issues to all of us.

Thank you.

MODERATOR: (Via interpreter) Dear colleagues, now let us proceed to your question. The first question is for the U.S. side.

MS HARF: Matt Lee of the Associated Press, and I think there's a microphone coming.

QUESTION: Thank you. Is this working? It's been a long day, so I'll be as brief as possible. But there's so much to go over, it's a multi-part question. These are for both ministers, please.

Your governments routinely accuse each other of spreading misinformation about the situation in Ukraine and the ceasefire violations. What is the real truth here? Are both sides violating the terms of the Minsk agreement, or is it just one side or some sides of it? And what exactly are you going to do to rein this in and get into compliance?

One (b) would be on Syria. You said you agreed to build up and examine new specific concepts on the political transition plan. What are those new concepts, and how exactly are you going to address the concerns about the reports of new chemical weapons use?

Lastly on Iran, Secretary Kerry, did you ask the Russians again to hold off on the transfer of the S-300 missile system? And Minister Lavrov, if he did, what is the Russian response to that? Thank you.

FOREIGN MINISTER LAVROV: I will make your life easy. He didn't.

QUESTION: He didn't.

SECRETARY KERRY: I'll begin with the last first. I think it is known that we have concerns about the transfer of the S-300, but it is also known that this has been a transfer that was, I think, almost five years ago in the making and was contemplated in the UN resolution as a transfer that was permissible. So it's not a question of any law or rule or judgment being broken; it's a question of timing, in our judgment, as well as impact. But we have already talked about it previously and we did not go into it today.

With respect to the issue of violations, et cetera, my sense is, Matt, that we've had that conversation today. We've talked about the perceptions of violations. What's important is now to make sure that both sides are making the choices to move forward in implementing the Minsk agreement in its full measure.

And I had a brief conversation with President Poroshenko yesterday. I will have a further conversation with him to debrief him with respect to the meetings here today. And I urge him as I urged the Russians today: Everybody who has any control over anybody needs to take every step possible to fully implement Minsk, and clearly, that means including preventing any breaches whatsoever with respect to the ceasefire.

We talked today about the movement of heavy weapons. We talked today about the need to, particularly, as I talked about a moment ago in Shyrokyne, hopefully that is a ceasefire that might be able to be negotiated in full. I certainly called attention to the fact that whichever side is responsible for firing the first shot, there is not yet a full implementation of the ceasefire that was contemplated by Minsk, and we need to work harder in order to try to see that be put into full effect. We are going to engage with all parties in an effort to try to encourage that to happen.

I will tell you that both the president - President Putin and Foreign Minister Lavrov reiterated their desire to see Minsk fully implemented, and we talked about ways in which we might be able to accelerate that and break down some of the mistrust on both sides which has prevented that from happening.

With respect to Syria, I'm not going to go into any details about the conversation except to say that we both understand and fully accept the degree to which the situation in Syria is increasingly not only unsustainable, but dangerous for the region. We both agree that the rise of Daesh within Syria and the increased efforts of other extremist groups threatens not only the Assad regime itself, but threatens the region as a consequence, and that it is even more urgent for all of us to find willing partners who are prepared to do what is necessary to be able to implement the principles of Geneva, which are a transition to a government that can be secular, maintain the institutions of the state, and transition to peace and stability, protecting all of the minorities and all of the people of Syria simultaneously. That's the goal, and we intend to redouble our efforts jointly in order to try to reach it.

On the CW, we talked about exchanging specific information regarding the current situation, which we will do. And subsequent to that, we'll see what our mutual observations are about that information and what steps might be appropriate.

FOREIGN MINISTER LAVROV: (Via interpreter) On my behalf, I'd like to say the following. I agree that John - I agree with John that the ceasefire violations - ceasefire regime violations are still taking place, that the violations of heavy equipment withdrawal are still taking place. Sometimes they occur more often on one side, sometimes on the other.

Today we discussed that just in general terms and we discussed the reports presented by the special monitoring mission of the OSCE. The monitors are carrying out their job quite professionally, though sometimes public officials declare that the monitors are biased, though I do not think that such behavior is in accordance with the Minsk agreements. I know that the - I hope that the Ukrainian authorities have made some conclusions in accordance with the measures that the OSCE monitors took.

There is one more mechanism, which is the Joint Center of Coordination and Control, that is to monitor the withdrawal of heavy armaments. The center was created based on the request of President Poroshenko. Several teams of Russian and Ukrainian officials are working there, and they established quite a good mode of cooperation and they are cooperating with the OSCE monitoring mission as well. They have a very good professional relationship. They have understanding at the personal level, and I believe it is also a very good mechanism of monitoring the violations of the regime. We all hope to reduce the number of violations and in prospect to eliminate violations at all.

Mr. Kerry mentioned some incidents near the engagement line. We'd prefer to call it a disengagement line. We'd prefer it to be a disengagement line, actually. During the preparation for the contact group meeting and the work of its subgroups on the May 6th in Minsk, there were some drafts developed; one of them was dealing with the demilitarization of Shyrokyne and there was another draft that was actually a proposal aimed at supplementing Minsk agreements with withdrawing tanks and armaments with the caliber below 100 millimeters, including mortars.

The representatives of Donetsk and Luhansk were ready to sign the document, as well as the representatives of Russia in the contact group. And as far as I understand, the OSCE representatives to the contact group also were ready to sign that. But the document was not signed and the discussion will continue during the meeting of the subgroup on security that is going to take place this week. I hope that if these documents are signed and are starting to be implemented, it will definitely help us to reduce the risks of ceasefire violations and it will help us to implement all the provisions aimed at withdrawing heavy elements more efficiently.

As for Syria, I agree to Mr. Kerry that we work together to be able to find out the best ways to implement the Geneva communique - of Geneva communique as of 30th of June. The key task of Geneva communique is to resolve all the issues through a direct dialogue of all Syrian parties and to be able to reach agreements on all the necessary reforms, including on transition based on the mutual consent of Syrian parties.

We have been taking every effort to stimulate work in that direction. After two years ago in Montreux, there was a conference that we participated in - and that was followed by the negotiations between the delegation of the opposition of Syria's national coalition and the Government of Syria - it quickly became clear that it was absolutely necessary to make the delegation of the opposition as representative as possible. We have always stated that it was necessary to engage all the groups - as many groups as possible - through the opposition delegation, including the groups that are not part to the national coalition.

With that view, in Cairo, with the efforts that Egypt has been taking, we organized two meetings in Moscow. All opposition groups without any exception were invited to take part in that meeting. There were two meetings, and at final stages the delegations were joined by the delegation of the Syrian Government. Those meetings were indeed very useful, and the last contact in Moscow resulted in agreeing the document that is called Moscow platform. We regret that the coalition did not attend the meeting, and as far as I understand, they experienced some problems with - in relation with attending the conference that Mr. de Mistura is starting now.

With regard to Syria, our positions with our U.S. partners are very similar. We believe that this process should be representatives, but given the contradictions within the opposition groups themselves, it is very important that all the external actors that can influence these other group have to encourage them to continue negotiations and to implement the Geneva communique as of June 30th. And it requires work with different Syrian groups and units, and it also requires participation of some external actors. We have discussed that today as well. We have various ideas regarding the issue, and I hope that we'll continue discussion both between Russia and the U.S. and maybe with other countries - with the countries of the region as well as the states that can also participate in the process.

And regarding the most recent report about chemical weapons and the use of chemical weapons in Syria, let me say that we've seen the report and we believe that there is a certain directorate of the UN Organization on Prohibition of Chemical Weapons that has to deal with this report. They really have to implement a thorough investigation and to prevent any efforts similar to those that we witnessed in August of 2014. There should be no attempts to use the issue of alleged use of chemical weapons to exercise any political pressure. Sometimes those attempts were taken to encourage the use of force against Syrian Government. (Inaudible.) That's it I wanted to say.

QUESTION: (Via interpreter) Now the question of the Russian mass media. (Inaudible), TV Channel Russia. If you don't mind, let me continue the topic of Minsk agreements. Mr. Kerry, you've said several times that Minsk agreements is the best way to proceed to settle the Ukraine conflict. What can you say about what Mr. Poroshenko said when talking to the representatives of Kyiv army when he said that they are going to gain back the Donetsk airport?

And my next question goes to Mr. Lavrov. We all know that U.S. is really very capable of influencing the current Kyiv authorities. Could you please dwell more on that? How do you think the U.S. can influence the Kyiv authorities in order to settle the crisis in the Ukraine? Thank you.

SECRETARY KERRY: Well, thank you very much. I have not had a chance - I have not read the speech. I haven't seen any context. I have simply heard about it in the course of today. But if indeed President Poroshenko is advocating an engagement in a forceful effort at this time, we would strongly urge him to think twice not to engage in that kind of activity, that that would put Minsk in serious jeopardy. And we would be very, very concerned about what the consequences of that kind of action at this time may be.

Now, it may be he was talking about in the long term. He may have been talking about the context of a final resolution or settlement; I don't know the answer to that. But I do know that resort to force by any party at this point in time would be extremely destructive at a moment when everyone has brought together the working groups, the working groups have met, and the working groups have an ability to try to provide a path forward on all of those issues that many of us have been concerned about over the course of the last months. My strongest urging would be for everybody to give the working groups their effort, to stay invested in the Minsk agreement, to continue to push for the political resolution, and to hold back anybody from engaging in self-help through force.

FOREIGN MINISTER LAVROV: (Via interpreter) Let me tell you that I absolutely agree to what John Kerry - John has just said, that any attempts to engage again in a forceful scenario could be really undermining the efforts that we have been taking. Let me emphasize one more time that we have to strictly follow our path to implementing the Minsk agreements. Russia and the U.S. fully share an opinion that we have to provide for their full implementation. And today, we agreed to take every effort in order to intensify the process and to speed it up as much as possible.

We discussed also the specific measures that we could take. But let me only tell you that various countries maintain contacts with the Kyiv authorities and with the representatives of the self-declared Donetsk and Luhansk republics. And we agreed to have meetings with everyone that can affect the implementation of Minsk agreements. We are going to encourage all the sides to the conflict to implement every provision of the Minsk agreements. While the methods to ensure that can vary and the forms of our cooperation can be various, we are fully aware of what diplomatic mechanisms are available, and we are going to further use them.

Thanks a lot for your participation in the press conference. That was our final question. Thank you.

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 #8
New York Times
May 14, 2015
Editorial
A Tiny Crack in the Russian Ice

It is a measure of how low American-Russian relations have sunk that a meeting between President Vladimir Putin and Secretary of State John Kerry that achieves nothing is perceived as good news. But good news it was when they met for four hours in the southern Russian city of Sochi on Tuesday, following talks between Mr. Kerry and the Russian foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov.

With Russia and NATO dangerously shadowboxing around their borders, and American troops and tanks arriving in Georgia for joint exercises, and with the need for cooperation over Syria, Iran, Yemen and Libya, it was wise to engage in diplomacy.

That is not to say that the Cold War redux is over, despite the optimistic headline in Russia's business daily Kommersant that read, "A new season is beginning in relations between the United States and Russia." Nobody seriously expects Russia to cede Crimea, and the Minsk II cease-fire in eastern Ukraine, brokered by the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, in February, is brittle at best, with constant clashes along the separation line.

Secretary of State John Kerry and President Vladimir Putin of Russia meet in Sochi, Russia. Credit Pool photo by Joshua Roberts
A report, which the opposition politician Boris Nemtsov was working on before he was murdered in February, completed by his allies and released on Tuesday, said that despite Mr. Putin's denial of Russian involvement, at least 220 Russian soldiers have been killed in fighting in East Ukraine. Western sanctions remain in full force, and Western leaders boycotted Russia's grand military display on May 9, a holiday commemorating the end of World War II.

Yet the United States and Germany seem more intent at this juncture on getting the Minsk agreement to stick than to push for a final settlement on the secessionist provinces, giving Ukraine time to gain control over its ravaged finances and get moving on needed reforms.

On Mr. Putin's side, the Russian economy is getting a respite from the battering it has taken from falling oil prices and Western sanctions, with the ruble rebounding somewhat over the past three months. A semblance of calm on the Ukrainian front might help him argue against renewal of European Union sanctions when they expire at the end of July. The United States needs Russia's cooperation in Syria, where President Bashar al-Assad's forces have suffered setbacks, raising the question of what next. And, in Iran, where negotiations to limit Tehran's nuclear program, in which Washington and Moscow are partners, are approaching a critical deadline.

Given the realities, both sides seemed ready to tamp down the bitter acrimony of the past year, if only symbolically at first.

The gestures included a gift of local potatoes and tomatoes that Mr. Lavrov gave Mr. Kerry on his arrival, a payback for Idaho potatoes that Mr. Kerry gave Mr. Lavrov at their last meeting in Paris in January 2014, before Russia's annexation of Crimea. Mr. Kerry, in his turn, laid a wreath at a World War II memorial and reiterated President Obama's assertion that if the Minsk agreement takes hold, "sanctions can begin to be rolled back."

There is always the risk that President Putin will claim that Mr. Kerry's visit shows the West is finally giving him the respect that he publicly demands. Yet it was also a concession for Mr. Putin to meet with an American official other than the president. In any case, in these "complex and fast-moving" times, to borrow Mr. Kerry's words, it was a risk worth taking.

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 #9
Wall Street Journal
May 14, 2015
Editorial
Kerry Is So Very Nice to Putin
Easing sanctions if Russia settles for what it's already grabbed.

NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg warned Monday that the Kremlin continues to provide heavy arms and training to its proxy militias in eastern Ukraine-a "blatant violation," he says, of the Minsk deal Russia signed in February to end the fighting. NATO says Russia is also building forces on both sides of its international border with Ukraine. Civilians in the port of Mariupol, a few miles from the front lines, are bracing for an attack and posting signs to the nearest bomb shelter.

So what better time for John Kerry to attempt to reconcile with Vladimir Putin? The Secretary of State arrived Tuesday in the Black Sea resort of Sochi, where he met first with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and then was granted an audience with the Russian President.

"The Kremlin had let Washington squirm about whether Mr. Kerry would be well-received, only confirming that Mr. Putin would meet with him about an hour before his arrival," the Journal reported Tuesday, adding that "Mr. Putin was likely pleased by Mr. Kerry's effort at obeisance" after the secretary paid homage to Russian sacrifices in World War II.

No doubt. Following eight hours of discussions, Mr. Kerry suggested that "U.S. and EU sanctions can begin to be rolled back" if Russia abides by the Minsk deal. That deal is known as "Minsk II" because the Kremlin had already violated September's "Minsk I" accord, which was supposed to freeze the conflict in eastern Ukraine, bringing peace in return for securing Russia's extensive territorial gains. So Mr. Putin may now be rewarded with the lifting of economic sanctions simply by promising to abide by another deal he violated from the moment it was signed.

Mr. Kerry appears to have given up even asking that Russia exit from eastern Ukraine, much less reverse last year's illegal seizure and annexation of Crimea. Barely a year ago President Obama invoked the ghosts of World Wars I and II to warn in Brussels that "casual indifference" to Russia's takeover of Crimea "would ignore the lessons that are written in the cemeteries of this continent."

More than 6,000 people have since died fighting in eastern Ukraine. Casual indifference is official policy.

Mr. Kerry also failed to bring up Russia's sale of the S-300 air-defense system to Iran. In 2010 the Administration persuaded Moscow not to sell the missiles to Tehran, a supposed triumph of the Russian "reset." Now the Administration calls the sale "permissible" and begs for Russia's further cooperation with the Iran nuclear talks-another reminder of how much Mr. Obama is prepared to sacrifice to his Iran diplomacy.

The Ukrainians must be thrilled to see Mr. Kerry volunteering their territory for the sake of America's Middle East interests. Western Europeans will conclude that Americans won't object when they ease sanctions, while Estonians, Moldovans, Poles and other Eastern Europeans will wonder if their territory is also negotiable.

As for Mr. Putin, the lesson is that he can grab what he wants, wait out the faux outrage and sanctions, and then consolidate his gains in return for more promises of peace.

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#10
Daily Times (Pakistan)
May 13, 2015
How to end the war in Ukraine
Telling the rebels to lay down their arms will not be as easy for Putin as western observers often suggest. On one occasion, Putin confessed that only 30 percent of his decisions get implemented
By Jonathan Power
The writer has been a foreign affairs columnist for the International Herald Tribune for 20 years and author of the much acclaimed new book, Conundrums of Humanity - the Big Foreign Policy Questions of Our Age. He may be contacted at jonathanpower95@gmail.com

According to BBC World in a broadcast yesterday morning, its considered opinion is that the ceasefire in eastern Ukraine, where Russian-backed rebels are battling US-backed Ukrainian forces, is working. There are still too many skirmishes, too many guns and mortars being fired but the big guns are largely silent. President Vladimir Putin said the other day that both sides have been guilty of transgressing the ceasefire.

Both the Russians on one side and the US and NATO on the other have been playing with fire with their support of the two sides. Who suffers? The ordinary inhabitants of the eastern provinces. However pro-Russian they were before all the fighting began they are now largely convinced the rebels killing in their name no longer represent them. The businesses they work for or own are working at half power or less. Unemployment has soared, homes have been decimated, pensions are unpaid and hospitals are finding it increasingly hard, struggling to deal with extra patients and a curtailed drug supply.

In Moscow, among thinking people, it has become clear that Russia should have no interest in taking over large swathes of Ukrainian territory, which would be just an economic albatross around its neck. Putin is said to think like that, although he might be glad if the rebels, including a good number of Russian soldiers, captured the port city of Mariupol, making it easier for Russia to integrate Crimea.

We now wait anxiously until the end of the year. The agreement made in Minsk in February by German Chancellor Angel Merkel, French President Francois Hollande and President Putin determined that the separatists do not have to hand control of 450 km of the Ukrainian-Russian border back to the central Ukrainian government until the end of the year. That step was made conditional on Ukraine devolving powers to its regions and passing a law granting "special status" to the eastern areas. The regions will be allowed to create their own police forces and appoint prosecutors and judges.

Telling the rebels to lay down their arms will not be as easy for Putin as western observers often suggest. On one occasion, Putin confessed that only 30 percent of his decisions get implemented. If one reads The Russia Hand by Strobe Talbott, President Bill Clinton's chief of Russian affairs, there are innumerable examples during the time of President Boris Yeltsin when senior members of the bureaucracy, including the top ranks of the military, simply went their own way until Clinton and Talbott drew attention to what they were doing and Yeltsin angrily told them, in front of Clinton, to carry out his decisions and orders. In Moscow, at the end of last year, one well-informed observer, close to Prime Minister Dimitri Medvedev, told me how to get the rebels to quit was "the million dollar question". They have their own impetus, their own agenda and are not easy to control. It does not make the problem easier when the top commander of NATO alleges that Russia has invaded Ukraine. It took the chief of the French military intelligence service to knock that untruth on the head.

The Ukrainian government also stirs the pot. It is still not above board about the sanctity of Russian language rights. Last week, the Ukrainian parliament banned Soviet-era World War II veterans from parading at the weekend with hammer and sickle banners. The government still talks loudly about the western promise made at the time of the Georgian War in 2008 that Ukraine and Georgia would be welcome into NATO in due course. Today NATO members, not least the US, do not make it crystal clear that this is not going to happen in the foreseeable future. Even such Cold War warriors as Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski argue that President Barack Obama should speak with clarity on this subject. "Ukraine should not join NATO," says Kissinger. It was the expansion of NATO into the former eastern bloc states, eventually right up to the Russian border, that provoked Russian public opinion to become so anti-US (although there was a degree of Russian government acceptance during the good-will days of presidents Bill Clinton and George W Bush).

It was Clinton and Talbott who initiated this policy, despite 95 percent of Russian experts from the US's top universities telling them that the expansion of NATO was neither needed nor desirable. George Kennan, the US's revered elder statesman on Russian affairs, warned that it would be the beginning of a new Cold War. "There was no reason for this. Nobody was threatening anybody else. Our differences in the Cold War were with the Soviet communist regime. And now we are turning our backs on the very people who mounted the greatest bloodless revolution in history that removed the Soviet regime."

It is time overdue for Obama to change the government's counterproductive Ukraine policies. Only that will truly end the war.

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 #11
www.rt.com
May 13, 2015
Kerry in Sochi: Ukraine's 15 minutes of fame is probably over
By Bryan MacDonald
Bryan MacDonald is an Irish writer and commentator focusing on Russia and its hinterlands and international geo-politics.

John Kerry's Sochi meetings with Vladimir Putin and Sergey Lavrov hardly dissolved years of mistrust between Washington and the Kremlin. However, they probably signaled the end of Ukraine's period as a global cause célèbre.

In 1968, at an art exhibition in Stockholm's Moderna Museet, the celebrated artist Andy Warhol was the star attraction. In the programme notes he wrote that "in the future, everyone will be world-famous for 15 minutes." What was probably a throwaway comment for the painter has become an internationally renowned catchphrase. While the modern art icon was being grandiloquent, it's amazing how many non-entities manage to attain his prophesied quarter-hour, or even much more than that.

Warhol, born Warhola, had ancestral ties to both Slovakia and Ukraine. It's fair to say that the latter has proven his theory repeatedly over the past 18 months. It's actually incredible how a country that is relatively economically and culturally insignificant has managed to hijack the news agenda for so long. Nevertheless, it's finally clear that Ukraine's 15 minutes are over.

John Kerry didn't travel to Sochi because he fancied an early summer jaunt to Russia's tourist showpiece. He flew to the Black Sea pearl to do business. Serious business. By doing so, he signaled that Washington is finally prepared to leave the Ukraine crisis behind and re-engage with Russia on other matters more pressing to humanity. There are deeper headaches than the future of a corrupt, critically divided, failed state on Europe's edge.

Minsk, Minsk and more Minsk?

Kerry's joint press conference with Sergey Lavrov was more notable for what he didn't say than what he did mention. The Secretary of State spoke about the Middle East and the Minsk agreement. He didn't refer to Crimea, nor did he bluster about "Russian troops" in Donbas. Indeed, Kerry made it clear that the only solution to Ukraine crisis is Minsk, Minsk and more Minsk. Moreover, he mentioned the Belarusian capital so frequently that an uninformed viewer might have assumed he was in Sochi to participate in a tongue-twister contest. "Max thinks that Minsk is close to Pinsk. That's Pinsk near Minsk says mixed-up Max," was the entry I doodled for the putative showdown.

The truth is that everyone is tired of Ukraine, except the diminishing band who made their names from the Maidan crisis. The media has exhausted the subject and politicians on both sides are as frustrated with their own proxies as they are with the "enemy" at this stage. What began as an emotional rollercoaster has turned into a bitter disappointment for everyone in the west. The penny has slowly dropped that all the "revolution" did was replace a bunch of corrupt, albeit elected, rulers with a group of malcontents who are now stealing for themselves and their own cronies. The actors have changed but the script sounds the same to me.

I sincerely doubt there is a news editor from Moscow to London to New York who reacts with anything more than a resigned shrug these days when someone pitches a story about Ukraine. This is not to belittle the suffering in the civil war stricken land, which is heinous. I'm merely stating an uncomfortable truth. As far as powerful people are concerned, Ukraine is yesterday's fish and chip paper. As IS continue their murderous rampage a few thousand kilometers to the south, Kiev's travails are now a sideshow within a sideshow.

Obama's legacy

Barack Obama has a year and a half left in the White House and he's got a clear choice to make about his legacy. Does he want to be remembered as a President who left a smoldering Middle East and a new Cold War behind him? Methinks not. The problem for Obama is that the solution to both those problems first requires rapprochement with Moscow. Kerry's Sochi visit probably indicates that Washington is willing to radically change its policy to Russia in order to secure the Kremlins' cooperation on other pressing issues.

In Sochi, Kerry highlighted the need for unity to finalize the Iran deal and to bring peace to Syria through a political transition. He also spoke of the necessity of tacking the so called Islamic State, a bunch of nutters who make Ukraine's extremists look like trainee hospitality professionals by comparison. Kerry also tied the roll back of anti-Russian sanctions to the full implementation of the Minsk agreement. Never mind that the treaty is so byzantine that it can't be actually fully executed, the intention was clear. John Kerry seemed to be offering the Russians a deal: let's agree to disagree on Ukraine and instead engage on other issues (like Syria, Iran and IS) where mutual conformity is possible.

Kerry was also careful to thank Putin for outlining his position in depth and to honor Russia's war dead after Obama had snubbed the VE Day 70 celebrations in Moscow last weekend. The Secretary of State took the opportunity to slap down Ukraine's President Poroshenko after his daft comments about retaking Donetsk airport. A couple of months ago, the Americans would have almost certainly denied ever hearing of such remarks. Now, the ear plugs have been removed and Poroshenko's time in the sun was but a fleeting moment.

Has a deal been struck?

For his part, Sergey Lavrov felt that Russia and the US had now agreed to lean on their 'sides' (the rebels and Kiev respectively) to honour Minsk. The wily Russian Foreign Minister also echoed Kerry's sentiments on the Middle East, fueling the idea that some kind of deal has been made.

Whether or not a gentleman's accord now exists between the US and Russian governments, it's fairly certain that Kerry's Sochi visit was significant. He was the first top American official to visit Russia since before the Ukraine crisis kicked off and the fact that he also met Putin is indicative of a mutual desire for a thaw.

Notwithstanding the tedious Ukraine issue, there is much Moscow and Washington can achieve if they work together. With the Middle East going to hell in a handcart, it's perhaps time for the globe's two military superpowers to leave their differences behind.

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 #12
Moscow Times
May 13, 2015
More and More Russians See America as a Threat, Poll Reveals
By Yekaterina Gladkova

Amid soaring tensions over the Ukraine crisis, Russians have grown increasingly leery of the intentions and capabilities of the United States, according to the results of a survey released by independent pollster the Levada Center on Tuesday.

According to the poll, which was conducted in April among 1,600 adults across the country, 59 percent of Russians believe that America poses a threat to their country. This figure represents a 12 percent increase since the same question was presented to respondents in 2007.

Asked about the nature of the threat posed by the United States to Russia, 48 percent of respondents voiced concern that the United States could hinder Russia's efforts on the path toward further development, 40 percent feared the United States taking control of the Russian economy and 36 percent were wary of the unnecessary imposition of U.S. values and ideals.  

Nearly one-third of Russians - 31 percent - fear U.S. military intervention and occupation, a 10 percent increase since 2007, while 24 percent feared the United States would assert control over Russia's political course.

"Lately we can see that all the measures are directed at the consolidation of [Russians'] national identity. And depicting the United States as the enemy has become one of the structural elements for social consolidation," Karina Pipiya, sociologist at the Levada Center, was quoted by Izvestia newspaper as saying.

When asked about a hypothetical military conflict between the United States and Russia, 52 percent of the population said that no one would end up being a winner in that scenario. Still, 33 percent of respondents expressed certainty that Russia would emerge the victor should such a conflict materialize.

The number of respondents who opined that the United States does not pose a threat to Russia plunged from 42 percent in 2007 to 32 percent now.

The poll's margin of error was no greater than 3.4 percent, according to the Levada Center.

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 #13
New York Times
May 14, 2015
Museum Director at Hermitage Hopes for Thaw in Relations With West
By RACHEL DONADIO

ST. PETERSBURG, Russia - When the British Museum lent one of the sculptures known as the Elgin marbles to the State Hermitage Museum here last year, the move angered Greece, which wants the sculptures back, and set off a spirited debate about restitution. But it was also a diplomatic coup by one man: Mikhail Piotrovsky, director of the Hermitage and a skilled cultural ambassador.

Since Mr. Piotrovsky became director in 1992, after the 26-year directorship of his father, Boris Borisovich Piotrovsky, he has navigated one of the most complex periods in contemporary Russian history: The transition from the Soviet Union to the advent of democracy, the privatization boom of the '90s, the rise of President Vladimir V. Putin and now the dramatic strain in Russia's relations with the West after that country's annexation of Crimea last year.

These days, Mr. Piotrovsky, 70, has a dual mandate: Maintaining the Hermitage's centuries-old ties with the wider world amid the chill, and making the case to the international art world that Russia is still a respectable partner. The loan of the Elgin marbles helped on both counts. He is also hoping to help resolve an impasse that has blocked all museum loans between Russia and the United States since 2011 after a legal dispute over a collection of Jewish books.

The director is not shy about the importance he places on cultural exchange and the talents of museum officials. "We are better economists, we are better diplomats, we are better politicians. We certainly understand better relations between people and religion than politicians do," Mr. Piotrovsky said in a recent interview in his office, which has soaring ceilings, a view of the Neva River and a portrait of Catherine the Great, who founded the museum in 1764.

"I'm sorry," he added, "but it's my arrogant opinion."

There were some tense moments last summer when the Hermitage hosted Manifesta 10, an international contemporary art biennial. While some Russian Orthodox activists protested what they saw as offensive art, others in the art world - including the renowned St. Petersburg collective Chto Delat (What Is to Be Done?) - pulled out of the show to protest Russian government policies and the fact that some Manifesta labels were rewritten or not translated into Russian to avoid offending conservative values.

The boycott resonated. "For Manifesta, the main problem was not Russian activists, with whom we know how to deal; it was the Western opinion that you can't bring an exhibition to such a terrible country as Russia," Mr. Piotrovsky said. His counterargument was, "If you want to hurt the regime, you have to help Manifesta to be there, because it's freedom of opinion."

In 2013, Mr. Piotrovsky, who is trained as an expert on the Arab world and Islamic art and archaeology, held fast after Russian Orthodox activists complained to government authorities when the Hermitage exhibited a diorama by Jake and Dinos Chapman, "The End of Fun," which included a figurine of Ronald McDonald being crucified.

Mr. Piotrovsky made the case to Russian prosecutors that the Hermitage was a place for art. "You can do in the museum what you can't do in the street," he said in the interview. He expressed this position before Russia passed a law that criminalized acts offending religious believers, legislation that he disdains. "Now," he acknowledged, the museum's right to show such art "would be a little bit difficult to protect."

Mr. Piotrovsky's deftness has won him plaudits. "I think most of us regard him as the greatest museum director in the world," said Neil MacGregor, director of the British Museum, who is stepping down at the end of the year.

In the past two decades, "None of us in any great museum has had to confront anything like the changes and the transformations that the Hermitage has," Mr. MacGregor added, referring to the changes in Russia since the fall of the Soviet Union. "It's stayed completely true to its traditions of being a great repository of great things, a full part of the international community. One can only guess at how complicated that must have been - administratively, politically, financially."

Last year, as part of an expansion plan designed by Rem Koolhaas, the Hermitage renovated a large space across the square from the Winter Palace to showcase its world-renowned collection of 19th- and early-20th-century French paintings by Cézanne, Matisse, Vuillard and others.

These masterpieces occasionally travel. In March, the Hermitage lent Matisse's "The Dance" (1909-10) to the Louis Vuitton Foundation in Paris for an exhibition now on view, and the Musée d'Orsay lent a Renoir to the Hermitage this spring.

But you will not see any Russian works on loan to museums in the United States. Russia stopped those in 2011 after a United States federal court ruled in 2010 that Russia had to return a collection of Jewish books claimed by the Chabad-Lubavitch movement, which was based in Russia before fleeing to Brooklyn nearly a century ago. Russia claims the books are part of its national heritage.

Russia worries that the legal complications put any artwork it loans to the United States at risk of seizure. American officials say such loans have immunity against seizure. United States museum officials say they hope Congress will pass a bill shoring up the immunity legislation. For now, in a climate of strained ties and economic sanctions, both sides see no end to the impasse.

"We're trying to find some solution, and we're discussing it with our American colleagues," Mr. Piotrovsky said.

While loans to the United States are out of the question, the Hermitage is busy with expansion plans across Russia - satellites, or "Sputniks," as Mr. Piotrovsky calls them, a program initiated years ago.

Since 2005, the museum has opened branches in Kazan, capital of the republic of Tatarstan, and the city of Vyborg, near St. Petersburg. Plans are afoot for Hermitage outposts in Omsk (in Siberia), Yekaterinburg and Vladivostok. (Past outposts in Las Vegas and at Somerset House in London have closed.) A new international location in Barcelona is expected to open later this year or in 2016. As with the Guggenheim Museum's global branches, each city provides and funds the space, while the Hermitage lends the art.

In March, the Hermitage announced plans to build a contemporary art space at a former automotive plant in Moscow. Mr. Piotrovsky said he had no details, as the plan is in its infancy, and questions linger about whether Russia has the money for such expansion.

While ties between Russia and the West continue to be rocky, Mr. MacGregor, of the British Museum, said he believed the Hermitage and its counterparts would weather the storm. "We've been through the Crimean War, we've been through the Russian Revolution, we've been through the Cold War," Mr. MacGregor said. "And the friendship has survived all the way through."

Sophia Kishkovsky contributed reporting from Moscow.

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#14
Reuters
May 13, 2015
Russian Court Quashes Latest Bid to Jail Kremlin Critic Navalny

A Moscow court on Wednesday rejected a bid by law enforcement officials to have Kremlin critic Alexei Navalny jailed for violating the terms of his suspended five-year sentence on embezzlement charges.

Navalny, who led mass street protests against President Vladimir Putin in 2011-12, denies any wrongdoing in the 2013 case that saw him convicted for stealing from a state firm and says it is part of a Kremlin campaign to stifle dissent.

A judge ruled that any violations of his suspended sentence were not "systemic" and that he could remain at liberty.

"It looks like the presidential administration decided that the cost of jailing me would be too big for now," a smiling Navalny said after attending the hearing with his wife and two defense lawyers.

"We understand that this is all about threats and pressure but we will continue our work. Now our efforts are aimed at preparing for the elections," he said, referring to regional and parliamentary elections scheduled in Russia this year and next.

Navalny is also serving another suspended sentence of three and a half years in jail for a separate conviction last year that saw his brother Oleg imprisoned.

The Kremlin denies using the courts to persecute its opponents. But many opposition activists have faced court cases and jail time or have fled Russia to avoid prosecution after Putin returned to the presidency for a third term in 2012.

Another prominent Russian opposition figure, Boris Nemtsov, was shot dead in central Moscow in February.

Kremlin critics including Navalny say Putin bears political responsibility for Nemtsov's death, accusing him of fomenting an atmosphere of hatred and intolerance towards his opponents.

Putin has called the killing of Nemtsov, a former deputy prime minister, a shameful tragedy and the Kremlin has said it was a "provocation" designed to discredit the president.
 

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 #15
Moscow Times
May 14, 2015
Russia Declared Best of BRICS in Developing Human Capital
By Delphine d'Amora

Russia on Wednesday claimed 26th place in a global ranking of countries' ability to foster human capital thanks to its highly educated populace, putting it first among the BRICS group of developing nations.

Among BRICS members Russia led by a mile, according to the survey of 124 economies published Wednesday by the World Economic Forum, a Geneva-based nonprofit foundation. China came in 64th place and Brazil in 78th, with South Africa and India trailing behind at 92nd and 100th place, respectively.

Accessible education is only the first step in developing a population's skills, however, and poor scores in quality of education, professional training and other categories signaled that Russia is still far from employing its people's potential to the fullest.

The World Economic Forum's Human Capital Report aims to reveal the degree to which countries are developing the talents of all their citizens, who were evaluated in five age groups ranging from 15 to 65.

The leaders in the rating should come as no surprise: Finland and its widely acclaimed education system led the pack, followed by its Nordic neighbor Norway, and Switzerland.

According to Alexei Prazdnichnykh, a consultant who coordinates the World Economic Forum's evaluation of the Russian economy, Russia's lead comes down to one towering factor.

"Russia's strong positions are largely related to the accessibility of the education system on all levels, from elementary school to higher education," Prazdnichnykh said in a statement.

Russia came first in the world for its rate of primary school completion, 10th for secondary education and 13th for post-secondary education.

This strong rate of early education gives Russia a big leg up. Unfortunately, the quality of that education was less impressive, with Russia's primary schools ranking 49th and the education system as a whole coming in 73rd in the ranking.

Historically strong thanks to the Soviet Union's emphasis on learning, Russia's education system has struggled over the past two decades due to underfunding and a string of structural overhauls.

Equally important for fostering human capital is the education that comes after university, such as training in the workplace and professional courses. Here, Russia falls flat, with staff training services ranked 79th in the world.

This lack of on-the-job training is one major reason why the human capital of older workers is not employed as well as that of younger ones, Vladimir Gimpelson, director of the Center for Labor Market Studies at Moscow's Higher School of Economics, told The Moscow Times.

Other sore points include poor health - Russians are only expected to live an average of 61 healthy years - as well as a lack of highly skilled labor and relatively low number of working-age citizens, the report found.

Beyond these questions of education and demographics lie an even larger issue: Demand for highly qualified workers is not growing as it should be.

"The economy is not creating enough jobs that require qualifications, education and developed human capital. If you compare job creation in Russia to the other BRICS countries, Russia is falling very far behind," Gimpelson said.

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 #16
Moscow Times
May 13, 2015
Despite Crisis, Most Russian Companies Aren't Cutting Jobs

Despite the economic crisis, two-thirds of Russian companies aren't cutting jobs and prefer to survive the crisis by shortening work hours or cutting workers' salaries, a study by global management consultancy Hay Group found.

"A lot of companies have refused to take radical measures, as in some sectors the situation has stabilized," said Irina Chernozubova, the head of Hay Group's research department for Russia.

After months of bad news, including steep falls in the price of oil and the value of the ruble, the Russian economy appears to be turning a corner. The price of oil has risen, the ruble has climbed nearly 40 percent against the U.S. dollar since the start of February and investors are taking an interest once again.

This stabilization is seen in the labor market as well. After surveying 400 companies in 18 economic sectors, analysts at Hay Group found that about 42 percent of Russian companies definitely won't cut jobs, while 25 percent say they aren't planning to currently and will act according to the situation.

This is good news for Russian workers, who have in recent months faced a toxic combination of rising unemployment and dwindling vacancies. Registered unemployment rose 12 percent between January and early April even as the number of job vacancies fell 13.6 percent, news agency RBC reported, citing statistics from the Labor Ministry.

Hay Group found that the best conditions were in the agricultural sector, where only 13 percent of companies were planning staff cuts. The biotechnology, pharmaceutical and natural resources industries were also safe havens for employees, with only 17 percent of companies planning to cut jobs.

Less promising was the hospitality industry, where a full 63 percent of bars and restaurants surveyed said they intended to cut a large number of jobs.

Restaurants are cutting costs out of outright necessity. "The demand for restaurants has fallen 15 to 20 percent this year due to falling purchasing power," Igor Bukharov, president of Russia's Federation of Restauranteurs and Hoteliers, told news site RBC.

Half of Russian banks and 56 percent of construction material producers are planning to fire staff too as their respective sectors take a hit from the economic crisis.

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#17
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
May 12, 2015
Debate grows on raising retirement age in Russia, despite discord
Discussions about raising the retirement age have recently intensified in Russia, with the finance and economy ministries calling for the proportion of the budget allocated to welfare spending to be cut. Although Russian President Vladimir Putin has spoken out against this initiative, observers believe that pushing the pensionable age back is a necessary economic measure.
Alexei Lossan, RBTH
[Graphics here http://rbth.com/business/2015/05/12/debate_grows_on_raising_retirement_age_in_russia_despite_discord_45925.html]

Russian Finance Minister Alexei Siluanov has called on the government to raise the retirement age starting in 2016, the TASS news agency has reported.

"From the viewpoint of the economy, the quicker we solve this problem, the better it will be for the budget and the economy," said Siluanov.

International experts suggest that Russia raise the retirement age to 65 for both men and women, instead of the current 55 for women and 60 for men, added the minister. Siluanov believes that delaying retirement for Russia's workforce would provide the country with more labor resources.

However, Russian President Vladimir Putin recently spoke out against the initiative during his annual live TV call-in show.

"The pension reform must be carried out in an open dialogue with society, so that people understand what is happening," said Putin. "Life expectancy is now growing in Russia, but for men it is still 65.5 years."
 
Easing the burden on the state

According to Anton Soroko, an analyst from investment holding Finam, sooner or later the retirement age in Russia will be raised. "For the last several years the pension age has indeed been a headache for the government," says the analyst. "The annual transfers that are needed to make the current payments are not only not decreasing, but are even increasing."

His point is illustrated by the fact that in 2014, due to the budget deficit, the government used about 300 billion rubles ($5.9 billion) of future pension savings to pay today's pensioners.

Soroko points out that Russia's retirement age is in fact one of the lowest, but it is also important not to forget the average life expectancy. Official data from the Health Ministry says that in 2014 life expectancy in Russia grew to 71, having reached a historic maximum of 65.4 for men and 76.5 for women.

According to Alexei Kozlov, chief analyst at UFS IC, raising the pensionable age will cut social expenditure and lead to a growth in the labor force, which will compensate for the demographic collapse of the 1990s - a period in which Russia wallowed in economic depression following the disintegration of the USSR and the switch to a market economy.

Pushing back the retirement age will help balance the pension fund, saving the budget from the additional costs of supporting the country's pension system, says Kozlov.
 
Public opinion set firmly against changes

The majority of Russians is against raising the retirement age. In a Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) survey conducted in April 2015, 80 percent of Russian citizens expressed opposition to the proposal.

The population frequently reacts negatively to any changes regarding pensions, says Anton Soroko. "The question is how will the age be raised: The government would have to create an algorithm of gradual increase connected to real data on the average life expectancy."

For now Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, during an annual account on the government's work, has suggested raising the retirement age of deputies and state officials.

"Raising the retirement age during an economic recession or weak economic growth will substantially increase the risks of unemployment for people of pre-retirement age," warned Alexander Safonov, Rector of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.

According to Safonov, this will lead to employers sending this category of citizens into early retirement. He also cautioned that one of the major consequences of extending the retirement age will be high youth unemployment resulting from a lack of opportunities on the job market as older specialists continue to occupy working places.

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 #18
Bloomberg
May 13, 2015
In Putin's Russia, Universal Health Care Is for All Who Pay
by Ilya Arkhipov and Henry Meyer

Expectant mothers in Moscow must wait as long as six weeks for ultra-sound scans, up from three days last year. Hospital outpatients pay for blood tests and X-rays that were free 12 months ago. And Marif Alekberov, a 27-year-old fireman with leukemia, is being told to find $23,000 to help fund a bone marrow transplant.

"His kidneys are about to fail," said Tatiana Filyeva, Alekberov's mother, who was turned away repeatedly by officials in the southern Rostov region as she appealed for the state to help cover costs for the operation, even writing to President Vladimir Putin in March. "This is his last hope."

Such experiences are increasingly common as Russia slashes health-care services to plug budget gaps left by lower oil prices. That has provoked labor unrest by medical workers -- some have even staged hunger strikes -- and alarm among patients and their families as one government agency said the cuts were responsible for thousands of extra deaths in Russian hospitals last year.

"It's become unbearable," said family practitioner Albina Strelchenko, 35, one of dozens of Moscow doctors who have protested by refusing to work overtime. "We want to provide quality treatment, but that's impossible."

Technically Free

With the memory of Putin's annexation of Crimea starting to fade, more prosaic concerns such as health, education and pensions are taking center stage -- threatening growing dissatisfaction with the government. A poll last August by Moscow researcher Levada Center found that just 19 percent of respondents were satisfied with the state medical system.
"The population is far from happy about these health care problems," said Alexei Grazhdankin, deputy head of Levada. "Ukraine isn't as important for the public now, and these issues are increasingly in the spotlight."

After the Soviet era of universal care, Russia today has a mix of public hospitals and clinics, where most treatment is technically free, and much pricier private facilities with better care. The public system improved rapidly over the past decade as health spending rose from $96 per person in 2000 to $957 in 2013, according to the World Health Organization.

This year, though, Russian health spending is 9 percent lower than two years ago after adjusting for inflation, according to Guzel Ulumbekova, a public health expert who advises Russia's Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

Closing Clinics

"This makes it impossible to implement the president's promises of raising doctors' pay and improving the nation's health," she said.

The government in 2014 initiated what it calls an "optimization" of the medical system. The Health Ministry says the plan is to eliminate waste by concentrating resources in major hospitals and closing many smaller facilities.

"The overall level of medical care isn't being reduced, but rather increased by a more effective distribution of resources," according to a ministry statement.

So far, that has mostly meant job cuts and extra work for those who remain, some doctors say. Strelchenko, the family practitioner, says her workload jumped from eight hours to 12 hours a day plus as many as three weekend shifts a month last year -- without any increase in her 60,000 ruble ($1,200) monthly salary.

'Cry for Help'

In Ufa, a city in the Russian Urals, a dozen paramedics demanding an end to dismissals staged a hunger strike, ultimately winning mediation with local authorities to settle their demands.

"This is a cry for help," said Irina Tishina, a 42-year-old paramedic who didn't eat for five weeks in the strike. "They just weren't listening to us."

RBC newspaper, citing leaked official documents, in March reported that almost 10,000 medical workers in Moscow lost their jobs last year as 28 clinics and hospitals shut down. By 2017, the paper said, the city plans to dismiss an additional 14,000 people -- a reduction of almost one-third from the beginning of last year. The Moscow health department didn't respond to requests for comment.

The Audit Chamber, a government agency that monitors the budget, in April said state medical care has become far less accessible for a large part of the population, especially in rural areas. The chamber said budget cuts played a role in a 3.7 percent increase in-hospital deaths from 2013 to 2014, or almost 18,000 additional deaths.

Restricting Coverage

At the same time, Russians are paying more out of pocket. Last year they paid $8.7 billion for private care or for superior care at state facilities, a quarter more than in 2013, the Audit Chamber says.

The government's aim is to reduce to a minimum free health care, says Andrei Konoval, head of the medical workers' trade union Destviye, or Action.

"They want to restrict 100 percent coverage under the state medical system to the poorest people and top bureaucrats and make everyone else pay something," Konoval says.

At a sprawling Soviet-era hospital in northeastern Moscow, outpatients now have to pay for all medical tests under a policy introduced over the past year, according to a doctor there. The rule restricts the tests to walk-in clinics -- where facilities are typically less sophisticated -- said the doctor, who didn't want to be identified for fear of losing his job.

'Two Choices'

In a cramped waiting area downstairs from the doctor's second-floor office, patients seeking appointments crowd around a reception window. To be seen by a specialist, they must be referred by a general practitioner. Appointments, though, are only for a given day, not a specific time, so patients often end up waiting for hours. Those willing to hand over a bribe of about 1,000 rubles can be seen immediately, says the doctor.

Ekaterina Chatskaya, a Moscow gynecologist, is protesting the budget cuts by "working to rule" -- following every detail of her contract and refusing extra hours. She says she has been ordered to spend no more than 15 minutes with each patient, down from a half-hour last year.

"A doctor has two choices -- either you work like a machine when your patient comes and you just tick off the boxes without helping them, or you stay at work from morning to night and sacrifice your personal life and health," she said.

The wait for an ultrasound now stretches to a month or six weeks, up from a few days last year. That spurs many pregnant women to pay for the tests because it can be dangerous to wait, Chatskaya says.

Toxic Spill

Cancer treatment has become particularly problematic, according to Podari Zhizn (Give Life), a charity that helps fund care for children with severe illnesses. Health authorities this year said the state will no longer pay for many procedures such as radiation therapy for transplant patients, Podari Zhizn says. And the situation for people needing bone marrow transplants is "catastrophic," said Elena Gratcheva, head of Advita, another charity fund.

Tatyana Chemagina, the mother of a boy with leukemia, raised 270,000 euros ($303,000) in an online appeal to pay for a bone marrow transplant and follow-up care in Germany.
"We're really lucky that we can afford to pay for drugs and treatment," she said.

Even if patients can schedule a bone marrow transplant in Russia, which is free, they almost always are asked to pay for various costs -- typically more than $20,000 -- associated with organizing the donation.

The fireman Alekberov, who is married and has a three-year-old daughter, can barely get out of his hospital bed, said his mother, who has only managed to raise about half the money needed. Doctors refused to give him costly imported cancer drugs when he first got the disease a year ago after exposure to a toxic spill on the job.

Officials tell her there's no money available for a donor to enable him to have the transplant as scheduled in May, said Filyeva. In an April 7 letter, the regional Labor and Social Development Ministry declined a request for funding, noting that Alekberov had already gotten a state donation of 9,000 rubles.

"He's all that I have," Filyeva said. "We've tried everything."

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 #19
Moscow Times
May 13, 2015
Currency Crisis Leaves Russian Scientists With No Funds for Foreign Journal Subscriptions
By Gabrielle Tétrault-Farber

After scientists across Russia lost access to thousands of academic journals on Tuesday due to the ruble's sharp devaluation, Education Minister Dmitry Livanov vowed to restore access to academic publishing giant Springer, Russian media reported.

Universities and research institutions across the country lost access to Springer due to a failure to pay for their subscriptions, newspaper Kommersant reported.

The Russian Foundation for Basic Research, a government-controlled organization that oversees scientific research across the country, reportedly owes the company some 890,000 euros ($1 million), having been unable to cover the costs of subscriptions for Russia's many universities and researchers after the ruble lost nearly half its value in 2014.

Matthias Aicher, the head of Springer for Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States, told Kommersant that the Russian Foundation for Basic Research had received the company's publications for free for the past four months but that this situation could no longer continue.

Founded in 1842, Springer publishes books and academic journals, mainly in the fields of medicine, technology and natural sciences, and hosts many scientific databases. The publishing company boasted 2,400 English-language journals in 2014, and offers 170,000 electronic books. The head of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Vladimir Fortov, was quoted by Kommersant as saying that a lack of access to foreign academic publications could undermine the development of science in the country.

Last year, the subscriptions of Russian scientists to Springer's academic journals amounted to 3.2 million euros ($3.6 million). The Russian Foundation for Basic Research receives applications for Springer subscriptions from educational institutions and researchers throughout the country, which are then allocated funds (in rubles) to cover their costs. The institutions then paid for their subscriptions through the National Electronic Information Consortium, which had been responsible for converting the funds into euros and transferring them to Springer.

The convoluted pay scheme has left it unclear which party will be held responsible for paying Springer the outstanding 890,000 euros in unpaid subscriptions, Kommersant reported.

But after news of the cutoff spread, Livanov pledged that Russian scientists would regain access to their Springer subscriptions, saying that the ministry would cover their costs if the Russian Foundation for Basic Research was unable to do so, the TASS news agency reported.

President Vladimir Putin said in December that the state would not slash funding for science, pledging it would be kept above 834 billion rubles ($16 billion at the current exchange rate). Yet Russian scientists have faced trying conditions at home. In 2013, the Russian government ordered the reform of the Russian Academy of Sciences, an umbrella organization that comprises 500 research institutes. The new reforms place the academy's property and some of its affairs under government control, which has sparked fear among scientists that the institution could lose its independence.

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 #20
Bloomberg
May 11, 2015
Russia Was Right: Shale in Europe Has Proved a Dud
by Ladka Mortkowitz Bauerova

When Cuadrilla Resources Ltd. opened an office in Poland in 2009, it had a reason to be optimistic: the shale boom was transforming the U.S. into the world's largest producer of natural gas. To the companies rushing to imitate that success in Europe, Poland looked like the next Texas.

Six years later, the U.K. explorer has yet to drill its first Polish well -- and that's in the country that's most eager to allow hydraulic fracturing in Europe. The so-called super-majors like Exxon Mobil Corp., Chevron Corp. and Royal Dutch Shell Plc have packed up and moved on.

"It's not easy," said Marek Madeja, Cuadrilla's director of well services in the country. "The costs of drilling in Europe are much, much higher than in the U.S., and there are so many regulations every step of the way."

Despite Europe's desire to loosen its reliance on Russian gas, the shale revolution has turned out to be a dud. Difficult geological conditions, fierce environmental opposition, cumbersome regulations and a bloody war in Ukraine have conspired to quash investors' enthusiasm and wear down their patience. The collapse of oil prices to less than $50 a barrel in March was the final straw because the cost of much of Europe's gas, including Russian imports, is linked to crude.

"The problem in Europe is that you never got a critical mass of wells for the synergies and cost efficiencies to kick in," said Michael Barron, London-based director for global energy and natural resources at Eurasia Group. "It's clear that here it will never be the game-changer it was in the U.S."

Russia Imports
That's particularly bad news for Ukraine, desperate to reduce its dependence on energy imports from Russia. A bloody conflict with Russia-backed separatists in the eastern Donetsk region persuaded Shell to abandon its operations in the area late last year. Chevron, albeit operating in the safer western provinces, soon followed suit.

The smaller oil and gas producers that did remain in Europe -- principally in Poland and the U.K. -- continue to battle bureaucracy, arcane tax laws and local authorities that don't want drilling in their backyards. The geology isn't helping either: very few wells have yielded anything close to a commercially viable flow.

Poland requires explorers to provide a detailed five-year operational plan before even breaking ground. For every adjustment of the plan, companies must file a request that can take the government months, or even years, to approve, Cuadrilla's Madeja said.

Cameron's Government

In the U.K., hydraulic fracturing is backed by David Cameron's government, which won reelection last week, but faces strong opposition from local communities who fear that injecting chemically treated water into the ground will pollute the environment and cause earthquakes. Despite the government support, only about a dozen wells are in the pipeline.

The continent's estimated reserves aren't negligible: they probably amount to about four fifths of those in the U.S. The problem is that most countries either have an outright ban on hydraulic fracturing or have imposed a moratorium until its effects on the environment become better known.

"Europe is much more densely populated, so people are living much closer to the activity than in the U.S.," Eurasia's Barron said. "There is still a lot of popular concern to be overcome."

The government in France, estimated to hold the largest reserves on the continent, remains implacably opposed to fracking and will keep a total ban in place at least until the 2017 presidential election. Spain, another country with sizable reserves, extended exploration licenses but hasn't yet granted environmental approvals, and several regions banned the technique out of fear it could contaminate underground water.

Denmark Exploration

There is some enthusiasm for shale gas exploration in Denmark, where Total SA won two concessions and may drill this year. Exploration in the U.K. may also accelerate if the new wells there prove commercially viable.

But shale gas will always remain a complementary source of supply in Europe, where conventional gas, whether piped from Russia or other suppliers, remains the cheapest option, according to Bloomberg Intelligence analyst Philipp Chladek.

"Fracking as a path to independence was a dream that's just not going to come true," Chladek said. "I wouldn't say shale gas in Europe is dead, but it's much more difficult than people thought."

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#21
Interfax
May 13, 2015
NATO silent on Russian efforts to bolster Euro-Atlantic security - Russian NATO delegation

The Russian delegation to NATO has issued an analysis of Euro-Atlantic security, pointing to the causes of the military and political tensions in the regions.

"Recently, NATO's information offices have persistently imposed their simplified black-and-white picture of the history of the difficult relationship between the alliance and Russia on public opinion, ascribing to Russia the myth-making about NATO's 'impeccable' actions," the Russian Delegation to NATO said in a review on "Russia-NATO: facts and myths" (available in Russian) ahead of a meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Antalya. [http://www.missiontonato.ru/news/725/. English version here http://www.missiontonato.ru/en/news/726/]

The authors note that "the alliance's constantly updated material aims to convince that only NATO was bolstering European security and stability, and there was no space in (this material) for any critical self-assessment to the Alliance's actions or the difficult lessons learnt from its military operations in the Balkans, in Afghanistan and Libya."

Crucially, the NATO documentation does not propose a constructive agenda that would help overcome the current trends which might result in most serious risks to the military-political situation on the content, and has clearly maintained a wall of silence on Russia's efforts to bolster Euro-Atlantic security architecture, the authors said.

The Russian analysis, which was presented both in Russian and in English, focuses on issues such as the removal of Soviet troops and weapons from Central, Eastern and Southern Europe and the Baltic States, Russia's participation in multilateral efforts to bolster European security, including in the fight against terrorism and piracy and in the joint effort to ensure safe destruction of Syrian chemical weapons, to resolve crises in Kosovo and Transdniestria, in peacekeeping missions in Georgia-Ossetia and Georgia-Abkhazia conflict zones, in assisting the stabilization of Tajikistan and in the Karabakh peace process.

The document offers facts on the situation around control over conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE), the creation of the U.S. global missile shield, NATO enlargement and advancement of its military infrastructure eastward. The review describes Russian proposals on how to bolster European security, citing Russia's defense spending figures and setting out data about NATO's actions on "the eastern flank."

One section focuses on the impact of the Ukrainian crisis on NATO's cooperation with Russia.

The document's final section - on the missed opportunities as a result of NATO suspending its cooperation with Russia - says that the alliance discontinued its trust fund for assistance in training ground personnel and parts supplies for servicing Mil Mi-17/Mi-35 helicopters of the Afghan army.

The document also mentions the scaled-down project to assist in training anti-drug specialists for Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asian countries and suspending the exchange of data under the NATO-Russia Council's airspace control project.

Also mentioned in the final section is the freezing of a project to develop techniques for remote detection of explosive substances and devices on transport vehicles and during public events (the Standex project).

There is no exchange of information on the terror threats emanating from the Middle East and North Africa, the document says.
 

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 #22
Slate.com
May 13, 2015
The Story of Louis C.K.'s Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Vacation to Russia
By Sharan Shetty
[Video here http://www.slate.com/blogs/browbeat/2015/05/13/louis_ck_moth_award_speech_the_comic_tells_a_hilarious_story_about_his_horrible.html]

In 1994, Louis C.K. was a 26-year-old Late Night with Conan O'Brien writer suffering from a bad case of burnout. As he detailed on Tuesday while accepting an award at the Moth Ball, his response to that situation was an impromptu excursion to a newly independent Russia-a trip that, predictably, was not quite the soothing mental balm he sought.

Strung out over a glorious 10 minutes, C.K.'s story touches on everything from the cavernous subways of Moscow to the rough-edged children that inhabit them, but he ends by noting that his lonely vacation had a purpose after all: "to find out how bad life gets, and that when it's this bad, it's still fu-king funny."

Courtesy of Vulture, here's a full transcript of the tale:

Thank you, I really appreciate that. I mean I really like people. And I even think I'm pretty cool sometimes. I'm very pleased to be here today. I love "The Moth." I listen on the radio all the time, and it kills me every time. It's nice to know that you can reliably cry by listening to something, you know. Always makes me cry. I want to thank the people who told their stories, the kids and all these people, because I think stories [are] the only thing you have that's really only yours. A lot of people have money and other possessions or ideas, but your stories are the only things that you're the only one that has them and then just by telling them, then everybody else has them, so that's why I think stories are great. So they asked me to tell a story, and I told a few to my daughter, and this one she just said, "Yeah, tell that one." And I think it's mostly 'cause she wanted me to stop. It was the last one, she was like, "Yeah, just tell that one, can I go back to what I was doing?"

But anyway, I went to Russia in 19- , no, 20- no, when the fu-k was it? - yes, 1994. I went to Russia. It has just become Russia again. It was the Soviet Union until really that year, everything started to crash down. At the time I was a writer for the Conan O'Brien show and I had written there for two years and I was burnt out and I didn't want to do it anymore, so I went to the head writer and I said, "I have to quit because I think I'm gonna have a nervous breakdown." And he said, "Take two weeks off. And we'll pay you for the two weeks." I said "Okay, I'll do that."

So I had nowhere to go and I thought, Maybe I'll go to Russia. I really don't know why, I can't really explain any of the decisions I made then, because I have children now. You don't have to search when you have children. You're not like, "What could I do to enhance my life?" You're just sort of compelled to do whatever comes at you at a certain age in life. But I was in my 20s, I had no wife, I had no girlfriend even, I was just this guy, and I had money from a TV job. So I decided to go to Russia 'cause when I was a kid I used to read Russian novels and I loved them and I would open all the windows so I would be cold, I wanted to be cold like they were. So I just decided, and also, someone told me that the wall had just come down in the Soviet Union, that Russia was a really crazy place at the time. So I said, "I'm gonna go there." I speak no Russian. I can't even look at the alphabet and understand what I'm looking at. There's no place more foreign to me than Russia.

So I went. I went to Moscow, which, you land in Moscow, and it's just forest, and there's a city in the middle of this forest. It's terrifying. And as the plane goes there, you're like, "No, no, no, I didn't want to really do this." And the whole time there I couldn't fend for myself. It was already a country that was just broken in pieces, and the weirdest things happened to me there, it just became normal after a while. Like I was in a restaurant and a waiter came up to me, not my waiter, he said, "Coca-Cola?" And I said, "Uh-huh." He said, "Coca-Cola!" and I said, "Sure." I don't drink Coca-Cola, but I had learned at that point, don't, just do what they're asking you to do. So he went to the kitchen and he got a Coke in a can, he handed it to me, and he said, "Five dollars." Because only dollars were worth anything there. And I said, "Okay, on my bill." And he said, "No, five dollars, me, now." So I gave him five dollars, and he put on his coat and he left. He just sold me a Coke on the side and then quit his job. So those are the kinds of confusing moments I was having there. And I couldn't talk to anybody, and I was so lonely. It's difficult, you know, I was alone, and I'd just sit in the room and go, "Okay, that was a really fu-ked-up day, I hated that day." And I tried to watch television and the TV was American shows like Dynasty, and the way they translated, they didn't have, what they did was the sound was a little down and there's just one man saying all the dialogue: [imitates Russian dialogue] over the whole show. I was there for two weeks, and it just was crushingly - I made no contact with anyone.

And then one day I went into the subway, and if you've never been to Moscow, the one thing I learned there was that, well, the streets are very - I can't gesture [while holding this award], it's beautiful, but I can't keep punching you in the face with a big white fist. Okay - the streets of Moscow during the Cold War, they were made wider so they could have missiles going down the middle of the street for the parades. If you go there, you find out, if you go behind the big buildings, they actually tore buildings off their foundation and dragged them back and a lot of the bigger buildings in Moscow in the back, they're being held up by bricks, it's really unnerving how unsafe the whole city is. So the streets are very wide and you can't cross the street on a green light, you'll never make it. So they made tunnels so you can go under, and those are connected to the subway. And the subway in Moscow, you go down on the escalator and you keep going until you think, like this, it just keeps going. This is so deep, this is like really upsetting. Anyway, everybody hangs out in these tunnels. I went in the middle of December. I went to Russia in the middle of December, alone. And I'm standing on the subway, and I'm watching a violin player. One thing about Russia, still today I think, is that no one has any money, so when you see a guy playing the violin in the subway, he's like the first-chair violin for like the Russian symphony orchestra, 'cause that doesn't pay shit. And at least he gets a few kopecks in the subway. So I'm watching him and everybody, these other people were sitting on the floor, and we're crying, everybody's crying, everybody. It's just normal. People are just watching, just wiping away tears.

And there's a young fellow sitting here and he looked my age, I was 25 at the time and he looked about 25, he was tattered, he just watched this violin player. And then this group of kids walked by, about eight children ranging from 5 to 10 years old, and their faces were dirty, like you know like in Oliver Twist, like they were in a play, like they rubbed dirt on their face. And they're all wearing men's coats that they're wearing as - like from the neck down to the floor - none of them have sleeves, their hands in their sleeves, their sleeves were just flopping. They were like street-urchin kids and the coats just looked like these men's coats, and you kinda knew all the men who owned those coats were dead, and at least one of these kids killed those guys. Like I swear I looked at an 8-year-old's face and thought, He has murdered. And that's what they looked like, just tough little kids. I'd seen them before in Moscow. They work in groups. The guy sitting below me that I identified with called out to the head kid in the front. I don't speak Russian so I just knew he was just going [imitates Russian]. He was appealing to him. [More fake Russian.] He needed something. And the kid with his hands in his sleeve looked at him, suspicious, and said, [imitates Russian]. Like, "What the fu-k, why, you want something from me?" And the guy went [imitates Russian], explaining himself, and he showed him his shoe had come apart, and he showed that his shoe was like flat. He showed the kid. [Imitates Russian.] And he showed him his shoe, and the kid shrugged, [fake Russian], like okay. And the kid's hand appeared from out of the sleeve and there was a tube of shoe glue in his hand. He didn't rummage for it, it was already there. And he handed it to the guy, and the guy fixed his shoe with the glue. Gave it back, and [imitates Russian], then the kid, his other hand had a paper bag, he put the glue in and he [huffing sound] huffed it, and his eyes rolled back, and he got high, and then the group kept going. And I couldn't believe what I just saw. That the misery in this country at that time was so calculable and so predictable, this guy thought, My shoe's broken. Oh, there's a child. He's sure to have some glue in his hand, because the state of our nation is so wretched. And he looked at me, and I was startled - he laughed, and I laughed. And he was the only person I had any contact with in the whole Soviet Union. And I realized, this is why I came here: to find out how bad life gets, and that when it's this bad, it's still fu-king funny.

That's all I got. Thank you.

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 #23
The Daily Signal
http://dailysignal.com
May 13, 2015
In New Role, US Army Prepares Ukrainians for Different Type of War
By Nolan Peterson    
Nolan Peterson, a former special operations pilot and a combat veteran of Iraq and Afghanistan, is The Daily Signal's foreign correspondent based in Ukraine.

YAVORIV, Ukraine-The sounds of gunfire and explosions are constant on the firing range at the International Peacekeeping and Security Center outside this western Ukrainian town. At one spot, behind an earthen bunker, U.S. Army paratroopers are qualifying Ukrainian National Guard soldiers in Soviet-era shoulder-fired rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). Further down the line, Ukrainian soldiers shoot at targets using different types of Kalashnikov assault rifles and RPK and PKM machine guns.

Together, the sounds of these Soviet weapons form a booming background din with which some of the U.S. soldiers here are all too familiar.

After a Ukrainian soldier fired an RPG, one U.S. paratrooper turned to another and dryly remarked: "I've heard a lot of those things fired in the other direction."

"Yeah, no kidding," the other soldier responded. "For a second there it felt like 'go time.'"

On April 20, about 300 U.S. Army paratroopers from the 173rd Airborne Brigade based in Vicenza, Italy, began training the Ukrainian National Guard as part of a six-month exercise called Fearless Guardian. Like their position relative to the sounds of the Soviet weapons (which the Taliban and al-Qaida often use) on the Yavoriv range, Fearless Guardian marks a reversal for many of the U.S. soldiers here.

For one, unlike U.S. missions to train Afghan and Iraqi soldiers, the U.S. Army paratroopers will not be fighting alongside Ukrainians, leaving the U.S. soldiers in the unfamiliar position of training for a fight in which they don't expect to have a direct role.

"It's hard not to get emotionally involved," Capt. Nick Salimbene, 31, said. "The reality is that in a few months we're going to be back in Italy, and these guys are going to be in the ATO staring down separatist tanks."

Fearless Guardian also reflects an evolution of the U.S. military's role in Europe as it reverts to a Cold War-era mindset.

U.S. soldiers, some of whom have spent their entire careers in counterinsurgency campaigns in the post-9/11 era, are refocusing on state-on-state warfare, such as training to defend against tanks and heavy artillery.

Even the movement of U.S. equipment to Ukraine had a strategic purpose. A convoy from the 173rd's home base in Vicenza to Yavoriv was used to scout lines of transportation across the region that might be needed for the rapid deployment of NATO assets in a crisis.

"It makes you wonder if the Cold War ever really ended," Sgt. Alexander Skripnichuk said.

The U.S. military is also adjusting to the media spotlight that comes with exercises like Fearless Guardian, which, while an independent exercise, comprises part of a larger rebalance of U.S. military power to Eastern Europe. Highlighting the diplomatic sensitivity of having U.S. troops on Ukrainian soil is an April 17 statement by Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Alexander Lukashevich in response to the 173rd's arrival in Yavoriv.

"We wonder if Washington, London and Ottawa know that they will train the very same Ukrainian ultranationalists from the volunteer battalions who have Nazi symbols on their uniforms and who killed women, children and the elderly during the punitive operations in Donbas," Lukashevich said. "Will the overseas instructors train them in more efficient methods of killing Russian speakers in Ukraine?"

"It is obvious that U.S. troops will not bring peace to Ukraine," he added.

Citing the Leahy Law, which prohibits the U.S. from supporting foreign military groups accused of human rights violations, a U.S. military official said the Ukrainian National Guard units involved in Fearless Guardian had been thoroughly vetted. Some prominent units have been left out of the training, however, such as the Ukrainian National Guard Azov Regiment, which Moscow has accused of being a neo-Nazi group.

Finding Common Ground

More than a decade of combat experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has helped U.S. soldiers earn the respect of their Ukrainian counterparts. The attitude of the Ukrainian soldiers to their American trainers is not one, however, of unquestioning gratitude.

The Ukrainians, some of whom have been fighting in eastern Ukraine for more than a year, frequently challenge the Americans' techniques, reflecting the challenges of fusing the experiences of militaries that have been tested in two very different types of combat with different resources available.

"These guys just came back, they're fresh," Salimbene said. "You have to tread lightly because it's hard to relate. All five of my deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan have been with Ranger units, and we had air superiority. Talk about being spoiled."

At the RPG range, for example, a Ukrainian insisted on firing left-handed. Initially the American instructor protested, saying, "If you don't shoot right-handed, you're not shooting today."

But after a few minutes of debate, in which the Ukrainian argued that he had shot RPGs left-handed in combat against separatist tanks, the U.S. soldier finally conceded: "Fine. Shoot however you like."

The Ukrainian hit his target on the first shot.

"This is a two-way street," Salimbene said. "They can offer me as much as I can offer them. It's been educational. But it's been more of a challenge than I expected."

The occasional butting of heads also highlights differences in military cultures. At an obstacle-breaching course, a Ukrainian officer peppered the U.S. instructor, Sgt. Caleb Michaud, with a series of questions, challenging his techniques on cutting through barbed wire and quizzing him on what to do if the enemy has machine guns zeroed in on his troops.

"Well, then don't breach there, obviously," Michaud said. "Just go somewhere else."

"But what if we planned to breach at that spot?" the Ukrainian officer countered.

"Then change your plan," Michaud replied. "We can ask 'what-ifs' all day long. Just use common sense."

The U.S. military chain of command decentralizes decision-making from the upper ranks, teaching junior officers and non-commissioned officers to take the initiative to make tactical decisions based on battlefield realities.

"If there's anything we've learned from the last 14 years of war, it's to trust the guy on the ground," Salimbene said. "They know what they need."

The Ukrainian military, however, still reflects the Soviet model, in which decision-making is concentrated at the top of the chain of command, leaving junior officers with little flexibility to exercise their own initiative. Additionally, the role of non-commissioned officers, considered to be the backbone of the U.S. Army, is virtually non-existent within the Ukrainians' ranks.

Despite some initial friction, the U.S. example seems to be rubbing off on the Ukrainians, who have started to adopt the U.S. chain of command model.

"I think initially they were a little bit stand-offish within the ranks themselves just because, 'Why is someone else coming to train me? I've been to the ATO, I've seen what's going on there,'" said Lt. Col. Kyle Reed, 1st Squadron, 91st Cavalry Regiment commander. "But then when they got into the program, and they started seeing why we were here and the capabilities that we can provide them, I think they really took ownership of it."

"We're two very different militaries," Cpl. Nicholas Stevens, 22, said. "But they seem to grasp the concepts we teach them. They seem grateful."

Train to the Threat

The U.S. training syllabus was drafted by Ukrainian officials and approved by U.S. commanders. However, as the training progresses and Ukrainian soldiers share their insights from a year of combat against combined Russian-separatist forces, the U.S. soldiers have adapted the training to match the threats Ukrainian soldiers face in the East.

U.S. soldiers are prohibited, however, from visiting the conflict areas to see firsthand the conditions for which they are training the Ukrainians.

"That's a red line we're not crossing," said Maj. Michael Weisman, the 173rd's public affairs officer, refuting Ukrainian media reports that U.S. Army soldiers had traveled to the ATO ("anti-terrorist operation," the Ukrainian name for the conflict area) as observers.

"As close as we can without going there, we have a sense of what tactics are being used," he added. "We get national military intelligence reports, and we combine that with the feedback we get from the Ukrainian guys coming back from the ATO to adjust the training."

Fearless Guardian is broken into three two-month blocks. Within each block, a new crop of about 300 Ukrainian soldiers moves through a training pipeline that begins with basic individual skills such as shooting and movement drills, progresses through small-unit tactics, and eventually culminates in combined company-level exercises.

Ostensibly, the U.S. training is not focused on preparing Ukrainians to fight a war against Russia. There is, however, some specialized training tailored to the specific threats Ukrainian soldiers face in the ATO from combined Russian-separatist forces.

The U.S. is training Ukrainians, for example, in countering IEDs (improvised explosive devices), which U.S. forces frequently faced in Iraq and Afghanistan, and are now prolific in the Ukraine conflict. Ukrainian troops are also taught how to conceal themselves from drones (which are observed over their front-line positions daily), as well as how to better encrypt their communications.

"We're trying to tailor it to them, but not so much because of the whole politics issue," Sgt. Gregory Crocker, 29, said. "We can't get involved with that-that's way above my rank. But we want them to learn these basic soldier skills."

The training syllabus also includes two days of law of armed conflict training, including instruction in the Geneva Conventions and the ethical treatment of prisoners.

"We're teaching them everything an infantry company should be expected to do," Weisman said. "It's a crawl, walk, run process from the individual to the company level."

Mindful of the propaganda attention focused on their presence in Ukraine, U.S. soldiers are careful about how they describe the intent of Fearless Guardian.

Many paint the exercise as an effort to "help Ukrainians protect their sovereignty," while others claim the exercise is not geared toward any specific threat or country, but is intended to develop the Ukrainian National Guard as a professional fighting force.

"As we look to the provocation of us merely being here, I don't think it was really directed just at the combined Russian-separatist forces," Reed said. "It is really designed for the development of a professional military force within Ukraine."

For both the U.S. and Ukrainian soldiers, however, the reality of the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine looms over the training. U.S. and NATO officials have accused Russia of building up forces in Ukraine to support an upcoming separatist offensive.

"Russian forces used the opportunities presented by the recent lull in fighting to reset and reposition while protecting their gains," U.S. Air Force Gen. Philip Breedlove, commander of NATO forces in Europe, told the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 30. "Many of their actions are consistent with preparations for another offensive."

Russia denies aiding the separatists or having troops in Ukraine.

Faced with the near certainty that many of the Ukrainian soldiers under their tutelage will soon be back on the front lines, the U.S. Army trainers in Yavoriv take their training mission personally.

Speaking to a group of Ukrainian soldiers prior to a training exercise, Michaud said: "I know that a lot of you will be going back to the front lines soon, but take this time to learn the things that can keep you and your men alive."

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 #24
Interfax
May 13, 2015
Russian diplomat likes US warning to Ukrainian leadership

Moscow, 13 May: The warning given by US Secretary of State John Kerry to official Kiev not to try to capture Donetsk airport by force attests to the fact that Washington's efforts for Ukrainian settlement are starting to have future, according to deputy director of the information and press department of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Mariya Zakharova.

"It seemed to me that Mr Kerry very firmly and unambiguously spoke about possible plans, if Kiev has them, regarding some kind of armed revanches and recapturing something that had been lost in battle," she said on Kommersant FM radio station.

"It is important that the US efforts in the sphere of the Ukrainian crisis and a possible solution to it following these statements are actually starting to have a future," the Russian diplomat continued.

She also called on Ukrainian authorities not to divide the population of the country into their own and not their own.

"If they think that this is a single country then all the land is also theirs: not only Kiev, not only Donetsk and Luhansk but all the land is theirs. And all people are theirs and one cannot divide them either," Zakharova explained.

"And you (leader of Ukraine - Interfax) have to understand that this is your responsibility and statements that we will liberate Donetsk airport because this is our land - after statements of this kind one winces not just in Donetsk and Luhansk but one winces in Berlin, Washington and Paris," she added.

The diplomat noted that the words by [Ukrainian President] Petro Poroshenko about Donetsk airport were voiced a day after German Chancellor Angela Merkel's visit to Russia, during which she stressed that there were no alternatives to a peaceful settlement.

"And the next day, as some kind of international trolling, Kiev made a statement that we understood everything and we heard everything and will recapture the airport. Well, these things are not acceptable," Zakharova said.

Zakharova also said that John Kerry flew to Sochi on his own initiative.

"I am not hiding the fact that he has expressed a wish to do this in the recent times. Information about his intention to visit Russia even leaked to the press. However, at the last moment he changed his mind. But this time Kerry said and Kerry did. This time the visit took place," she said.

"We are very glad that this became indeed a constructive and interesting conversation, somewhere also theoretical, somewhere maybe even with historical excursions as we continue to have disagreements particularly regarding the genesis of crises," the Russian diplomat added.

[Passage omitted: At news conference in Sochi, Kerry warned Poroshenko against renewing use of force on the territory of Ukraine.]

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 #25
Poroshenko retracts statement on intention to recapture Donetsk airport

KIEV, May 14. /TASS/. Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko has retracted his statement Thursday about the necessity of "freeing" the Donetsk airport.

In an interview with German ZDF TV channel, Poroshenko said: "I advise you not to read Russian newspapers. They are the only source where you can find such nonsense."

On May 11, Ukraine's presidential press service published Poroshenko's statement at the premiere of Airport documentary. "I don't doubt that we will free the airport because it is our land. And we will restore the airport," Poroshenko said.

Kiev forces controlled Donetsk airport terminals for several months, shelling the city's suburbs from their positions. In January, DPR authorities said that the self-defense forces regained full control over the airport. Ukrainian forces made several attempts to recapture their positions. DPR defense ministry said around 600 Ukrainian military were killed or injured during the armed stand-off around the airport.

Ceasefire is one of the key point of the Minsk agreements on the Ukrainian settlement. Other points include heavy weaponry withdrawal, prisoner exchange, local elections in Donbass and constitutional reform in Ukraine.

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 #26
EBRD forecasts deeper economic slump in Ukraine this year
By Margarita Antidze and Marc Jones

TBILISI, May 14 (Reuters) - New forecasts from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development painted a marginally brighter picture for its 35-country region on Thursday, but predicted Ukraine's economy would now slump by a more-than-expected 7.5 percent this year.

The EBRD, created in 1991 originally to invest in the former Soviet bloc countries of eastern Europe, is holding its annual meeting in the Georgian capital Tbilisi against the backdrop of the worst East-West standoff since the Cold War.

Its latest forecasts pointed to a growing divergence in economic fortunes across the region, with the impact of tensions over the Ukraine overshadowing tentative signs of improvement elsewhere.

Whereas Ukraine is expected to contract even more than it did last year and more deeply than the 5.0 percent the EBRD forecast in January, core economies such as Poland are expected to pick-up on the back of record low interest rates both domestically and in their biggest export market, the euro zone.

Russia is expected to remain in a deep recession as Western sanctions bite, though the EBRD now sees its economy contracting 4.5 percent this year compared with 4.8 percent it forecast in January as global oil prices rebound. That is still below last month's IMF forecast.

"There is definitely scope for optimism especially in countries closely tied to the euro zone," said acting EBRD Chief Economist Hans Peter Lankes. "But the Russian recession is cause for concern in many other economies."

In recent years, the bank expanded its reach beyond eastern Europe and ex-Soviet central Asia to include Mongolia, Turkey and the economies affected directly or indirectly by the Arab Spring such as Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia and Jordan.

Egypt is now expected to grow at a slightly faster 4 percent while Turkey, where the EBRD now invests the largest proportion of its money after it stopped lending in Russia, is expected to track sideways at a below-par 3 percent for the next two years.

"Turkey's competitiveness with the euro zone would be squeezed (by a lower euro) while its borrowing costs and pressures for capital outflows would increase as U.S. monetary policy tightens," the bank said.

RUSSIAN CHILL

The deep recession in Russia is having a larger-than-expected effect on countries with which it has strong economic links, including the eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Russia is expected to shrink close to 2 percent next year, whereas almost every other country the EBRD operates in including Ukraine is forecast to see a pick-up.

"(Russia) may face a protracted period of slow growth or stagnation. Low oil prices and sanctions have taken their toll on an already weak economy with deep-seated structural problems," the EBRD said.

It raised its 2015 forecast for the central European and Baltic states to 2.9 percent from 2.6 percent, though that was mainly reflecting the stimulus spill over for central Europe from the European Central Bank's 1 trillion euro QE programme.

In contrast, Latvia and Lithuania, despite being euro zone members, saw downgrades with neighbouring Estonia also flat. The value of exports to Russia in the first two months of 2015 dropped by between 30 and 50 percent year-on-year in the three countries.

Greece, the EBRD's newest country of operation this year, is expected to see no growth this year. That came with an added warning that the volatility created by its battle to stay in the euro could have a region-wide impact in coming months.

"The EBRD's base case scenario is that Greece will 'muddle through', avoiding drastic policy moves and with just enough reforms to start growing and securing the continued support of the international community," the EBRD said.

Growth in Georgia where the bank's meeting is being held but where the government has just come close to collapse, is expected to decelerate to 2.3 percent this year from a forecast of 4.2 percent in January.

Belarus, which is sandwiched between Russia and Ukraine, also remains under stress, with its forecast revised down to a 2.5 percent contraction and stagnation in 2016 in the absence of any significant economic reforms.

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 #27
Moscow Times
May 13, 2015
Ukraine Doesn't Need Sympathy, It Needs Cash
By Mark Adomanis

U.S. Vice President Joe Biden's recent video address to a Ukrainian donor conference was a handy illustration of the huge disconnect between Western words and deeds.

Ukraine, Biden said, was facing a "humanitarian catastrophe" in the Donbass as more than 2 million civilians have been displaced by fighting between government forces and Russian-backed separatists.

And the vice president pulled no punches in assigning blame for this catastrophe: He placed the responsibility squarely on the shoulders of the Russian government which had sent tanks, missiles, mercenaries and troops into Ukrainian territory. Biden pointedly denounced "Russian aggression" and said that U.S. and EU economic sanctions should remain in effect until the Minsk agreement is implemented in full.

Biden's performance at the conference wasn't a departure from his previous position or any kind of escalation. Rather, it was simply a continuation of the robust rhetorical line that has come from Washington since the crisis started.

Biden, U.S. President Barack Obama, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and other high-ranking politicians have consistently and passionately defended Ukraine's right to make its own political decisions, free from Russian meddling and interference while also being withering in their criticisms of Moscow's mendacity and brutality.

But talk, as they say, is cheap. Rhetorically affirming Ukraine's sovereignty is easy and cheap. Taking practical steps to defend that sovereignty is difficult and expensive.

During his address, Biden noted with pride the fact that the United States will grant an additional $18 million to help alleviate the suffering of refugees in Ukraine's east. He also said that the U.S. has cumulatively given $43 million in humanitarian financial aid since the start of the crisis.

But simply using Biden's own information shows how totally insignificant and paltry American assistance has actually been. A simple calculation shows that the U.S. government has allocated $21.50 of humanitarian assistance per refugee over the past year.

As should be obvious, that's nowhere near what it requires simply to feed someone for that length of time, much less what it costs to pay for their medical care, housing, transportation or education. Indeed, when you take a step back, America's humanitarian assistance can look like a cruel joke when compared to the enormous (and worsening) humanitarian crisis currently facing Ukraine.

The Europeans have been slightly less stingy than their American allies; a fact sheet from early April indicated that the EU has cumulatively given Ukraine a total of 139 million euros in humanitarian assistance since the start of the crisis, but even here the scale of aid is nowhere near the magnitude necessary to feed, clothe and shelter the enormous numbers of refugees, a project that will likely cost billions of dollars and last for many years.

So far, the West has seemed willing to spend just enough money in Ukraine to prevent complete and utter catastrophe, but not enough money to actually remedy the situation.

The West's extreme reluctance to spend resources in Ukraine is actually very well demonstrated by one of the supposed successes - the IMF bailout program. One of the oft-forgotten aspects of Ukraine's "$40 billion bailout" is the fact that more than a third of the total "assistance" ($15.3 billion) was supposed to come through debt restructuring.

This isn't money being given to Ukraine, but money that Ukraine is supposed to pay its creditors but won't. Basically, it's a nice version of default.

This restructuring would obviously impose very real costs on those private groups that have previously lent Ukraine money but, noticeably, it doesn't require any outlay on the part of Western governments.

There won't be a line item in a budget somewhere that will record the billions upon billions of dollars that are going to arise from the restructuring. To politicians, then, restructuring is essentially a cost-free way to provide Ukraine with a necessary financial lifeline.

But just because the costs are hidden doesn't mean they aren't real. Any default on Ukraine's private borrowing will make future borrowing more difficult and expensive: If there weren't enormous costs associated with doing so, every country would simply "restructure" its debts in a similar fashion.

And that's before taking into account the very real possibility that hedge funds (which have been buying up Ukrainian debt on the cheap over the past few months) won't be able to force Kiev to repay all of its bills in full in much the same way they're trying to do with Argentina.

In other words, even if Ukraine can save $15 billion worth of debt repayment as specified in the IMF program, these "savings" will be partially (and perhaps even entirely) wiped out by additional future borrowing costs. That wouldn't be the case if Ukraine were simply given direct financial assistance.

If the West genuinely wants to bring Ukraine into Europe, it is going to have to honestly and forthrightly face the huge financial costs of doing so. The West, in other words, is going to have to put its money where its collective mouth is. The reform process that Ukraine is currently attempting cannot be done on the cheap.

Experience in post-communist Europe demonstrates that those countries that have been most successful (like Poland) have gotten tens or even hundreds of billions of dollars' worth of aid to help smooth the transition. Ukraine isn't going to be any different.

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#28
Business New Europe
www.bne.eu
May 14, 2015
Debt restructuring row flares between Kyiv and creditors as IMF deadline looms
bne IntelliNews

Ukraine's finance ministry and holders of its sovereign Eurobonds have taken their dispute over debt restructuring public, as a mid-June deadline set by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) requiring final agreement on terms draws close.

The ministry criticised the level of secrecy over the identities of the mainly anonymous bondholders, who through their representative, Franklin Templeton, in turn attacked Kyiv's insistence on forcing a haircut on the notes worth around $10bn.

Ukraine's finance chiefs headed by US-born minister Natalie Jaresko said on March 12 they were "concerned" about the approach taken by the ad hoc committee representing the country's external debt holders.  

"Despite numerous requests from the Ministry's side, the [creditors'] committee refuses to reveal its membership, a highly unusual departure from standard practice in similar situations, and in stark contrast with IIF transparency and disclosure principles," the ministry said in a statement posted on its website.

It added that it was "determined to negotiate with the debtholders in a process which fully respects the commonly accepted principles of transparency, responsiveness and good faith".

"In our view, this media outburst inflames unnecessary controversy, muddling both sides' positions," analysts from the brokerage Investment Capital Ukraine (ICU) commented in a note. "Even more damaging, this news was sparked precisely on the day that the IMF mission convenes in Kyiv to assess the program's progress."

Pressure is growing on the government in Kyiv to restructure its debts before the IMF reviews a $17.5bn aid deal on June 15. Only if it is satisfied its terms have been met, will the Fund release subsequent tranches of funding urgently needed to prop up the floundering Ukrainian economy.

Before the transfer of the first $5bn IMF loan injection in March, Ukraine's foreign-currency reserves fell by almost two-thirds in 12 months to just $5.6bn. The IMF targets include saving $15.3bn in four years through debt restructuring. Overhauls in the energy sector and implementing an effective anti-corruption programme are other measures demanded.

Meanwhile, the finance ministry further criticised the Templeton-led bondholders for ignoring the aspect of debt sustainability in terms they had proposed for restructuring.

"Even though Ukraine and the IMF have repeatedly said that the three targets for the debt operation - liquidity, sustainability and payment capacity - have to be met, the committee in its public statements focuses exclusively on the liquidity aspect, and refuses to acknowledge the debt sustainability objective," the statement said.

Earlier the committee of creditors publicly criticised the finance ministry's insistence on a reduction in the principal of the debt, arguing that IMF targets could be reached without a "haircut" that forces them to accept losses on the principal or coupons.

Lack of engagement

The bondholders complained there had been no "substantative engagement" by the government since the committee submitted an initial offer four weeks ago.

But Ukraine's finance ministry retorted that "instead of engaging directly in constructive negotiations, the committee chooses to communicate unconstructively through the media".

It also rejected the claim that it was unwilling to engage with the creditors. "There have been numerous contacts and meetings between the ministry's advisors and the advisors to the ad hoc committee," the ministry said. "Last week, [Minister] Jaresko proposed to speak directly with the one known committee member to accelerate and focus negotiations but was told that it was unavailable to talk to her."  The "one known member" referred to in the statement is believed to be Franklin Templeton, while the indenties of the other creditors remain undisclosed.

To haircut or not to haircut

The creditors are calling for any debt restructuring to avoid reductions in the principal of the debt, referred to in colloquial finacial parlance as a "haircut". "This [creditors' proposal on restructuring] is a compromise that balances the stated debt-reduction interests of Ukraine and one of the investors' objectives of avoiding a principal reduction," the creditor group said in a statement on May 12, as reported by Bloomberg.

Analysts are split on whether creditors can, or should, pressure Ukraine into a soft restructuring with no haircut.

"As the external debt restructuring ... is an integral part of the review, the creditors ... could pressure Ukraine to yield to their demands, namely to avoid a reduction of principal reduction," ICU analysts wrote.

However, they believe it would be "self-defeating" for Ukraine creditors to force their position, since a no-haircut restructuring would render the restructuring unsustainable. "We believe that an effective restructuring must include a reduction of both the coupon rate and the principal. Should this not occur, the unsustainable debt burden inevitably will force Ukraine to endure another round of debt restructuring, mainly to implement the crucial principal haircut," the note concluded.

However, according to Concorde Capital analyst Alexander Paraschiy, the creditors are right to resist any haircut, since the savings to be attained through the proposed haircut are in excess of Ukraine's needs. "The key question is whether Ukraine critically needs the up to $15.3bn in foreign currency savings that the initiated debt operation could bring," Paraschiy wrote in a recent research report. The savings are intended to boost Ukraine's international reserves to the level of 5-6 months import cover, according to the IMF's calculations. "The government must explain to creditors why Ukraine should need to hike sharply its international reserves at the cost of bond holders," Paraschiy argues.

Russian wild card

The key unanswered question, says Paraschiy, is how Ukraine should proceed with a two-year $3bn Eurobond bought by Russia in December 2013 as part of an aborted Kremlin bailout for Ukraine. Russian has since annexed Ukraine's Crimean peninsula and is widely blamed for fuelling an anti-Kyiv insurgency in eastern Ukraine's Donbas region, triggering national economic collapse.

"The core question for bond holders is whether Ukraine has the sincere intention to restructure the [$3bn] Russian bond that matures in December 2015. ... [If] Ukraine intends to repay the debt to Russia, many bond holders would demand pari passu treatment," Paraschiy argues. "In the ideal case, international debt holders would be happy to see that Ukraine is pursuing a very soft - if any - restructuring of its 'marketable' Eurobonds, and is defaulting on the Russian bond," he adds. "Perhaps that's the ultimate plan behind all this operation?"

Ukrain's finance minister Jaresko has been hostile over the Russian bond, apparently refusing to acknowledge it as official Paris Club debt, which may suggest readiness to default on, or restructure the bond. "At this point we see the Russian-issued, Russian- purchased bonds should be treated on equal basis with Ukraine's other Eurobonds. We have no reason to believe at this point that they are anything other than a London type of credit," Jaresko told CNBC Channel on April 16, according to Interfax.

The IMF is not allowed to disburse funds to state in default on official debt, making the technical question of how the Russian-held bonds are classified a key concern for restructuring attempts.

Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov retorted to Jaresko's comments in April that Russia was the owner of the Eurobonds, and Ukraine should address Russia to ascertain this.

In an IMF press conference in Washington DC on May 13, IMF director of communications Gerry Rice said the stipulated conditions for Ukraine's restructuring remained valid. But he refused to commit absolutely on whether the IMF would not proceed with disbursals under the bail-out programme until the conditions were met.

"It is vital that Ukraine and creditors reach an agreement (...)  before our review [in mid-June]," Rice said. "We want and expect that outcome. It will be a very important consideration in the upcoming review as we need the financing assurances for the program to be in place, and assurances that remain sustainable with high probability in order to proceed," he added.

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#29
Sputnik
May 14, 2015
Russia Has No Plans to Restructure Ukraine's Debt of $3 Billion

TBILISI (Sputnik) - Russia remains firm on not restructuring Ukraine's debt of $3 billion, Russian Deputy Finance Minister Sergei Storchak said Thursday.

"No, we're not participating in a debt operation. This thing is called a 'debt operation' in the program of extended financing, and we don't participate in debt operations," Storchak told journalists in Georgia's capital of Tbilisi.

Russia has said numerous times that as Ukraine's official creditor, it has no plans on either restructuring or extending the country's $3-billion debt
 

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 #30
Forbes.com
May 13, 2015
Ukraine Still Doesn't Have A Deal With Its Creditors
By Mark Adomanis

Ukraine's high-touted "$40 billion bailout" from the IMF was always a lot less than meets the eye. Much of the money had already been promised to Ukraine in an earlier lending operation, and the amount of genuinely new funding was rather modest. Even more importantly, roughly $15 billion of the $40 billion in "assistance" provided by the IMF was actually predicated on the successful outcome of negotiations with Ukraine's creditors. That is to say that more than a third of the total bailout wasn't money that the IMF gave Ukraine, it was money that the IMF assumed Ukraine would save by defaulting on its debts.

Now the IMF itself really own any of Ukraine's sovereign debt nor does it have any authority over the people who do. The people who actually own Ukraine's debt are (quite understandably!) not terribly enthusiastic about a process that seeks to massively reduce its value. In other words, there were never any guarantee that the IMF's target of $15 billion in savings was going to be met and there was always the chance that negotiations between Ukraine and its creditors were going to turn ugly.

Well, according to stories from both Reuters and The Financial Times things are turning ugly. Quite spectacularly ugly, in fact. Here's how the FT reported on the situation:

"Claiming that the creditor committee refused 'despite numerous requests' to reveal its membership, the finance ministry stressed that it and debtholders needed by June 'to agree on a sustainable debt level and debt service objectives meeting the targets' of an International Monetary Fund programme granted earlier this year.

"'The ministry is committed to transparency, responsiveness and good faith negotiations and expects the creditors' committee to do the same,' Kiev added."

In the usually restrained tone of government finance, that is basically the equivalent of a bar fight.

In its statements about the ongoing negotiations, Ukraine has taken a very strange rhetorical line that fixates on the achievement of the IMF's objectives. But the international creditors, which appear to be informally led by the Franklin Templeton investment firm, are not a part of the IMF program. They did not buy Ukraine's debt in order to achieve macroeconomic stability and they are not particularly concerned with the long-term health of Ukraine's government finances. Their primary interest, their only interest really, is for Ukraine to pay its bills on time and in full.

Ukraine's creditors are taking a very aggressive approach that entirely rejects the IMF's demands for a "haircut" on the value of their holdings. Depending on how the negotiations actually shake out, Ukraine might get nowhere near the $15 billion in savings that the IMF deemed necessary to achieve financial stability. And if that happens Ukraine will have a substantial gap in funding, a gap that will need to be closed in one way or another (likely default).

It's possible that the situation will be resolved in a mutually beneficial manner, a manner in which the creditors feel they are receiving adequate compensation for the delay or reduction in debt repayment and in which Ukraine's government gains a sufficient financial cushion. It seems a lot more likely, though, that the current standoff will not be resolved cleanly and that rather than a calm and orderly process Ukraine will actually suffer a messy default.

Western governments have the financial resources at their disposal to swiftly and easily resolve this particular dispute, but despite their strong rhetorical commitment to Ukraine's sovereignty they have been singularly unwilling to put up any money. As things stand, however, Ukraine's short-term economic future hinges largely on the outcome of negotiations that, to all appearances, are spinning out of control.

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#31
Poroshenko statement on Russian troops in Ukraine is unfounded - Kremlin spokesman

MOSCOW. May 14 (Interfax) - The Kremlin sees Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko's statement on the presence of 11,000 Russian troops in Ukrainian territory as unfounded and not conducive to any positive developments.

"I don't see fit to repeat such unfounded accusations, without any concrete information and proof, which are not conducive to anything positive, to put it mildly," Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov told journalists on Thursday.

Poroshenko claimed on Wednesday that over 10,000 Russian servicemen were present on Ukrainian territory.

"About 11,000 Russian servicemen are on our territory today," Poroshenko said in an interview with the German TV channel ZDF.

The Minsk agreements envision a ceasefire, the withdrawal of heavy weapons, the removal of all Russian forces from Ukrainian territory, and the establishment of control over the borders under the OSCE's monitoring, Poroshenko said. However, "Russian troops are still staying on Ukrainian territory," he said.

The Russian leadership has repeatedly denied the presence of Russian troops on Ukrainian territory. In particular, Russian President Vladimir Putin said during a Q&A session on April 16 that there were no Russian troops in Ukraine

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 #32
http://readrussia.com
May 12, 2015
"You Can't Divide this War": Ukraine's Search for a National Identity
by Anna Arutunyan

It was a confusing sight: a solemn procession of several dozen people marched behind a portrait of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin towards the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, where hundreds of veterans were commemorating the 70th Anniversary of Victory Day over the Nazis.

This was not Moscow, where the Kremlin has sought to use Soviet grandeur and an unprecedentedly lavish military parade to rally its people. This was Kiev, where just an hour ago Ukraine President Petro Poroshenko had laid flowers at the memorial in a conspicuously (and tastefully) low-key ceremony.

The appearance of Stalin's portrait - as well as a number of veterans donning the black and orange St. George ribbon, a Soviet WWII symbol that has also been widely used by Russia and the separatists it has backed in Ukraine's East - upended all sorts of narratives about Ukraine as it struggles to define itself as a nation.

It certainly refuted the narrative dominating Russian propaganda - which describes a "fascist" regime bent on repressing all things pro-Russian and pro-Soviet. There was no "repression" of pro-Soviet sentiment in sight.

But it also defied the Ukraine government's idea that it could "eliminate... communism," as Kiev's deputy mayor Oleksiy Reznikov was quoted by AP as saying, from the minds of its citizens through a series of de-communization laws, and thus work towards building a national idea that would define the country and unite its people. The bills, passed by Ukraine's Rada last month and which have yet to be signed by President Poroshenko, would ban both Communist and Nazi symbols. More controversially, they would outlaw the denial of the criminal nature of the Soviet regime and could make it a crime to criticize nationalist groups that took part in the fight for Ukraine's independence, such as the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalist and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, widely accused to have taken part in ethnic cleansing.

Criticized by international historians as an infringement on freedom of speech, the laws were not taken very seriously by a number of war veterans who turned up at Saturday's memorial.

"This will all pass in two-three years, we will go back to the way it was under the Soviet Union," said World War II veteran Evhen Baranov as he received flowers and gifts. "And if it doesn't, then Kiev won't exist."

Much of this pro-Soviet sentiment could be attributed to the fact that Baranov is from the Donbass, where pro-Soviet and pro-Russian views are ubiquitous, a fact that Russia has used to aid insurgents there and fuel a separatist conflict that has killed over 6,000 people since last April. But Russia's backing of separatists does not negate the fact that 70 percent of respondents in Donbass do in fact have a negative view of the collapse of the Soviet Union, according to a poll conducted this past winter by the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation (DIF). The Donbass figures demonstrate an almost complete reversal of sentiment compared to Kiev and Ukraine on average, where those figures were 16.3 percent and 32.2 percent, respectively.

Opinion polls on decommunization itself are hard to find, mainly because polling agencies have not been particularly active in the last year, especially where the restive East is concerned. Speaking to RFE/RL last month, Ukrainian sociologist Viktor Nebozhenko said public opinion supported greater decommunization, but also said his polling agency had "long ago" stopped conducting surveys on Ukrainian sentiments towards Soviet leaders, so it was unclear if any polls had been done on decommunization specifically.

Given Moscow's Soviet-style show of might on Red Square and its use of World War II rhetoric to vilify the Ukrainian government, the decommunization laws clearly come as an ideological response to Russia on the part of Kiev's government.  But in the scenes unfolding on Kiev's Glory Square next to the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, Russia was hardly part of the equation. The veterans who favored the Soviet Union did so not because they were pro-Russian, but because the Soviet Union was the state that they had fought for. For them, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine was an unthinkable travesty.

"Banning Soviet symbols is foolish," said another vet, Volodymyr Vasylyevich, speaking in Ukrainian-accented Russian. "These people fought together under the same banner - why ban it? I think Poroshenko will use his head [and not sign the bills]."

Those with Soviet symbols and St. George ribbons turned up in large numbers, but they were still a clear minority at the memorial. Shouting matches flared up frequently in a mix of Ukrainian and Russian between them and the younger, more nationalist-minded visitors who turned up to pay their respects. Even so, Russia was largely out of the picture and the arguments centered on which side - the pro-Soviets or the nationalists - were more loyal to Ukraine, and which side was to blame for the war in the East.

"I tried to spit under the Stalin portrait," Ihor, a 50-something entrepreneur and a supporter of the decommunization laws said. But when asked about whether Russia and Ukraine were celebrating separate things on May 9, his response seemed confused.

"The war wasn't between Germany and Ukraine," he said. "It was between Germany and the Soviet Union. You can't divide this war. Even in this war, which wasn't their war, Ukrainians managed to distinguish themselves from other members of this union. They fought against Soviet power," he said, in reference to nationalist groups like the OUN.

Comments like his - and those of the older, pro-Soviet veterans - underscore the pain and confusion that accompany the emergence of a nation from empire. There were no ready-made answers in these views, and neither the nationalists nor the Soviet supporters tended to spout verbatim either Russian or Ukrainian government propaganda. Unlike Russia, where national identity has been imposed by the Kremlin through propaganda, repression and rallying around a perceived enemy and has largely been internalized by the Kremlin's supporters, the rhetoric in Kiev suggested instead a people struggling to make sense of the confusion each in their own way.

"The country is split into three," said Vladimir Rafeyenko, a Russian-speaking novelist who fled Donetsk last summer to Kiev after increasing fighting threatened the safety of his family. "There are those who fight [in the war], those who steal, and those who reflect about what is going on."

There is also evidence of a new civil society emerging in Ukraine, Rafeyenko said. "Connections between people that make up civil society are being formed autonomously from the government and sometimes in spite of the government. Volunteer groups helping the army or the refugees, fighting corruption on a local level."

Aside from the war with Russia-backed separatists, Ukraine is dealing with the basics of becoming a nation, and beyond scoring political points, a top-down government effort to unite society around a historical vision is unlikely to help much (across the border, Russia is trying to do just that - with repressive results).

Even though normalizing the situation in Donass was Ukraine's top challenge according to 79 percent of respondents polled in a Razumkov Center survey last December, economic growth and the fight against corruption came in third and fourth, with 43 and 33 percent respectively. Distrust in the presidential office and parliament - while down slightly from before Maidan - was still high at over 40 percent and 55 percent respectively.

Rallying around a historical vision is easy, as polls with simple questions and simple numbers show. Beyond identity politics, however, there was no clear vision of what would happen next. One refrain heard again and again among aging veterans interviewed at the memorial was, what next for the younger generation? They didn't know.

"The people don't want to live in the old way anymore," Rafeyenko, the novelist, said. "But the government can't live the new way."

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 #33
New York Times
May 14, 2015
In Ukraine, Bones of War Dead Re-emerge to Stir Political Passions
By ANDREW E. KRAMER

LVIV, Ukraine - The calls come in with distressing regularity: A man, out for a walk in the forest, stumbles on a human shinbone; another, digging a basement for a house, finds a skull.

Sadly, as is so often the case in this city swept by murderous Soviet and Nazi armies on the eastern front in World War II, the first sightings often lead to even more disturbing discoveries.

The basement, for example, held more than 240 skeletons, and an excavation crew has still not finished clearing it out. The site in the forest turned up no fewer than 11 mass graves and a still uncounted number of skeletons.

Lviv is a city where bones, not unlike the wartime history that left them here, cannot seem to stay buried. In places, residents can hardly till their gardens without risking turning up a grinning, toothy surprise.

And so the calls come in. Residents find enough war-era bones that the Lviv regional government funds a service, called Dolya, or Destiny, to clear, sort and rebury remains from mass graves.

"People here in Lviv are very traditional" and religious, Svyatoslav P. Sheremeta, a member of the regional legislature who is also director of Dolya, said in an interview. "People want these bones buried."

But the bones are more than a grisly nuisance or a terrible reminder of not-so-distant times. They also stir political passions, depending on which invading army or partisan group is implicated in the killing.

In the separatist east, many people view the Soviet Union as a virtuous force in the defeat of the Nazis. Urged on by Russian propaganda, they tend to view western Ukrainians as Nazi sympathizers complicit in the killing of Poles and others, reinforcing their case to separate from the west. But in Lviv and other parts of western Ukraine, where people are still finding their grandparents' bones in mass graves dug by Soviet soldiers, each discovery confirms deeply held resentments of Russia as a brutal imperial power.

"Different parts of Ukraine had different experiences," Per Anders Rudling, a historian at the University of Lund in Sweden and an authority on midcentury nationalist movements in Ukraine, said in a telephone interview. "In Lviv, they remember the Soviet atrocities much stronger than the Nazi atrocities."

These were lands annexed by the Soviet Union in 1939 under the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, which divided Eastern Europe. Harsh repressions followed, leaving behind one set of mass graves, from the years 1939 to 1941, filled with the bodies of Ukrainian political prisoners executed by Stalin's police.

Given that history, when Hitler broke the nonaggression pact with Stalin and invaded Ukraine, his troops were greeted by some in western Ukraine as liberators, while others fought them, and one another, in Polish, Ukrainian and Communist insurgent organizations, leaving more bones.

The overlapping Soviet and Nazi atrocities in western Ukraine left a good deal of bitterness, a local narrative of World War II far less clearly defined as a battle between good and evil than in the east of the country, and a long-term problem of finding and clearing out mass graves.

On a recent sunny afternoon, the men in Dolya donned work clothes and boots, grabbed shovels from the trunk of a car and headed out to inspect a new discovery in the area where the 11 mass graves had been found.

The site, at the end of a rutted dirt road through a shadowy forest, seemed isolated and mournful, even today. Some bones lay only inches below the surface. An inspector gently scraped at the pine needles on the forest floor to reveal a human skull.

"It's a beautiful place, wonderful nature, and people want to come here with their children to look for mushrooms, not bones," Mr. Sheremeta of Dolya said.

Mr. Sheremeta said he believed the bones were those of members of the nationalist Ukrainian Partisan Army executed by the Soviet police, based on scraps of clothing and shell casings found nearby, but he said more forensic work was needed.

The Dolya group has a mandate to reinter bones from all mass graves, except for those of Jewish victims, as religious leaders prefer to leave them undisturbed. Dolya handles World War I remains, too; those are less contentious.

But tensions still run high between Poles and Ukrainians, who fought vicious wartime battles over territory in western Ukraine that had once been a part of Poland and that the nationalist Polish Home Army wanted to reclaim. A few years ago, members of Svoboda, a contemporary nationalist party, swept into a camp of Polish archaeologists who were exhuming a mass grave in western Ukraine filled with victims of the Ukrainian Partisan Army. The Ukrainian nationalists insisted on counting the skeletons, and based on that held a news conference in Lviv to assert that the Poles were exaggerating the volume of bones found.

Krzysztof Janiga, a Pole who has taken part in excavations in Ukraine and whose family suffered from Ukrainian attacks in the war, said the graves of Poles are "an eternal problem for some Ukrainian nationalist circles."

Since Dolya's founding in 2007, its workers have reburied about 1,500 skeletons, giving preference to exhuming Ukrainian bones, Mr. Sheremeta concedes, but trying to identify and rebury any remains they find as quickly as possible. "Of course, in the first place, we try to find Ukrainian soldiers because these are our grandfathers," he said.

Setting aside Lviv's ossiferous politics, people are often grateful to Dolya simply for clearing out skeletons, Mr. Sheremeta said.

In Lviv, the discovery of mass graves can affect real estate prices. Bogdan Panshishin, whose cellar excavation revealed a mass grave, said he and his wife were undecided about whether to go ahead and build a house once Dolya's work was done, or to sell their plot at a loss, but either way they are grateful to be rid of the bones.

"My wife was very disappointed," he said of the discovery at what they hoped would become their weekend getaway. "It's scary, you understand."

Dmitri D. Boyko, a retired telephone operator, took a different approach.

The 76-year-old has lived for three decades in a house in the town of Skole in the Lviv region that was used during the war by the Gestapo, and local historians believe it sits atop a mass grave.

"It was a long time ago, and it doesn't bother me," he said, shrugging. "Let them lay there. I'm not afraid of ghosts."

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 #34
History News Network
http://historynewsnetwork.org
May 9, 2015
The History Wars in Ukraine Are Heating Up
By Christopher Gilley and Per Anders Rudling
Christopher Gilley is a research fellow at the University of Hamburg. He is the author of "The 'Change of Signposts' in the Ukrainian Emigration: A Contribution to the History of Sovietophilism in the 1920s" (Stuttgart: Ibidem Verlag, 2009).  Per Anders Rudling is an associate professor of history at Lund Univeristy, Sweden and visiting professor at the University of Vienna, Austria. He is the author of "The Rise and Fall of Belarusian Nationalism, 1906-1931" (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2014).

On April 9, 2015 the Ukrainian parliament passed a package of legislation regulating historical memory.  Two laws in particular have provoked a Historikerstreit that may define the country's image at home and abroad.

Law No. 2558, "On Condemning the Communist and National Socialist (Nazi) Totalitarian Regimes and Prohibiting the Propagation of their Symbols" bans "propaganda of the Communist and National Socialist (Nazi) totalitarian regimes," defined as "the public denial, particularly in the mass media, of the criminal nature of the Communist totalitarian regime of 1917-1991 in Ukraine and the National-Socialist regime" or any attempt to justify them. Moreover, it criminalizes the propagation of Soviet and Nazi symbols.

The law places a wide-ranging ban on Soviet symbols but a much more limited ban on Nazi ones. The ban does not include the emblems beloved of contemporary Ukrainian nationalists, for example, the Black Sun and Wolfsangel, now employed by the far-right Azov battalion, or the name and badge of the 14th Waffen-SS Division Galizien. As University of Alberta professor John-Paul Himka has noted, the real aim of the law is to de-Communize Ukrainian society rather than deal with the country's problem with the far right. One stated goal is to root out the remnants of the Soviet mindset supposedly held by parts of the Ukrainian population. In the eyes of the law's authors, Soviet nostalgia is partially responsible for the country's present woes.

Law No. 2538-1 "On the Legal Status and Honoring of the Memory of the Fighters for the Independence of Ukraine in the 20th Century" lists a series of organizations whose members it declares to be fighters for the independence of Ukraine and whose memory must be honored. The last section stipulates that Ukrainian citizens and foreigners who "publicly insult" the fighters for independence "harm the realization of the rights of the fighters for independence" and, consequently, "will be held to account in accordance with Ukrainian law." It adds that  public denial of the legitimacy of the struggle for Ukrainian independence "mocks the memory" of the fighters and "insults the dignity of the Ukrainian people"; it is therefore "illegal." The law specifies no punishments nor does it explain which body will be responsible for implementing it.  However, one individual involved in drafting the legislation has stated that any private person will be able to bring a case to court if they think that the law has been violated.

The initiative for both laws came from Yuri Shukhevych, son of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) commander Roman Shukhevych, a former political prisoner and a deputy in the Rada for Oleh Liashko's Radical Party. Volodymyr V'iatrovych and other members of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory (UINP) were involved in drafting the laws. The UINP is a government agency instituted by president Viktor Yushchenko in 2006 as part of his agenda to intrumentalize history; consequently, it was strongly associated with his Geschichtspolitik.

The intitiative to turn Roman Shukhevych and Stepan Bandera into national heroes originated with the UINP. President Viktor Yanukovych (2010-2014) reversed his predecessor's  history policies; the institute lost its ideological duties and was headed by a member of he Ukrainian Communist Party. After the overthrow of Yanukovych, it was again reassigned ideological tasks under the directorship of Volodymyr V'iatrovych, perhaps the most prominent glorfier of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrianian Insurgent Army.

One must first state clearly: Law No. 2538-1 is, as history, nonsense. The groups whose members were supposedly "fighters for the independence of Ukraine" contained Ukrainian socialists, Russian monarchists, peasant insurgents, Ukrainian far-rightists and Soviet dissidents. Many people belonging to the bodies on this list actually opposed Ukrainian independence, and some even supported the creation of the Soviet Ukrainian Republic or became members of the Communist Party of Ukraine. The groups named include bitter political rivals that, in some cases, repeatedly insulted each other and, in others, actually fought and killed one another.  Thus, Oleksander Shums'kyi, Bolshevik commissar of education in 1923-27, is now a fighter for the independence of Ukraine. Another is Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, who today is celebrated as the father of Ukrainian history writing, but in the 1920s attacked the slogan of Ukrainian independence as being inseparable from chauvinism; he preferred Ukraine to join a socialist federation. [1] Ironically, Law No. 2538-1  prohibits one from insulting these men, yet Law No. 2558 bans support for their views.

Several organizations to be honored were demonstrably guilty of mass murder, for example the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and its armed wing, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). The OUN was a far right, clandestine terrorist organization that sought to establish a totalitarian, one-party, homogeneous Ukrainian state under its own absolute leadership. It was deeply anti-Semitic, collaborated closely with Nazi Germany, and played a key role in the pogroms that swept Western Ukraine in summer 1941. These claimed the lives of  between 13,000 and 35,000 Jews. In 1943-44, the UPA carried out a brutal campaign of mass murder against the Polish minority in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia as part of its strategy of establishing an ethnically homogeneous Ukrainian state.  About 90,000 Poles were among its victims. [2] In addition, the UPA tolerated no dissent among Ukrainians, torturing and murdering on the mere suspicion of treason. [3] Law 2538-1 is but the latest of the current Ukrainian government's measures to celebrate the OUN and UPA. On October 14, 2014, Poroshenko designated the UPA as "defenders of the fatherland" and established an official holiday dedicated to their memory.

The danger is that a prohibition on "insulting" the "fighters" or questioning the legitimacy of their "struggle" is tantamount to a ban on critical research. The law does not specify what constitutes "insulting", raising the question as to what scholars of modern Ukrainian history are allowed to write and say, and what they are not. How is the historian supposed to relate the recollections of Viktor Kharkiv, member of a collaborating unit created by the OUN, on how his men engaged in mass shootings in Vinnytsia in summer 1941, where, he wrote, "in two villages we shot all the Jews we encountered" while also honoring his memory? [4]  What if the historian does not believe his memory should be honored?

Past experience shows that the authors of the law believe that historians investigating such issues critically are conducting political defamation and not sound historical research. In 2012, Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, the author of the first scholarly biography on OUN leader Stepan Bandera, faced furious protests for daring to arrive at the conclusion that Bandera's ideology constituted a form of fascism. He had lectures canceled, received personal threats, and faced angry protesters denouncing him as a "liberal fascist" and the "lying great-grandchild of Goebbels."  During this campaign, V'iatrovych wrote that Rossoliński-Liebe's research was "far from scholarly" and his publications "more scandalous than scholarly." Claims that the new legislation will only be applied to works of propaganda and not scholarship, can be of little comfort for critical historians.

Similarly, V'iatrovych has responded to criticisms of the recent legislation by insinuating that its opponents are useful idiots for Russian propaganda. He disingenuously denies the charge that the legislation will curtail academic freedom by referring to a passage in Law No. 2558 that exempts academic publications from the ban on symbols. This exemption, however, has no relevance to the prohibitions in Law No. 2538-1. Despite trying to enshrine one understanding of Ukrainian history in law, he presents his critics as the people wanting to ban historical interpretations with which they disagree.

Certainly, other countries have legislated history. In May 2014, President Putin signed a law banning "disrespect for the days of military glory" of the Second World War. It is also true that a number of countries have laws prohibiting Holocaust denial. But whereas the ban on Holocaust denial is intended to protect the memory of the victims, the Ukrainian law does the opposite: it shelters perpetrators from critical inquiry and elevates an ideologically motivated amnesia to state ideology.  One cannot but note the irony of a government seeking to banish its population's supposed totalitarian mindset by legislating historical truth.

1.  Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, "Ukrains'ka partiia sotsialistiv-revoliutsioneriv ta ii zavdannia", Boritesia - poborete!,  September 1920, No. 1, pp. 1-51, here pp. 46-48.
2.  Władysław Siemaszko and Ewa Siemaszko, Lubobójstwo dokanane przez nacjonalistów ukraińskich na lodności polskiej Wołynia 1939-1945, two volumes (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo von Borowiecky, 2008); Grzegorz Motyka, Ukraińska partyzantka 1942-1960: Działalność Organizacji Ukraińskich Nacjonalistów i Ukraińskiej Powstńczej Armii (Warsaw: Instytut studiów politycznych PAN, Oficyna wydawnicza Rytm, 2006), 287-297.
3.  Alexander Statiev, The Soviet Counterinsurgency in the Western Borderlands, Cambridge: CUP, 2010, pp. 124-130.
4.  TsDAVO Ukrainy, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 57, ark. 17-18.

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 #35
Reuters
May 14, 2015
Putin ties Ukraine's government to neo-Nazis. A new law seems to back him up.
By Josh Cohen
Josh Cohen is a former USAID project officer involved in managing economic reform projects in the former Soviet Union. He contributes to a number of foreign policy-focused media outlets and tweets at @jkc_in_dc

As Ukraine continues its battle against separatists, corruption and a collapsing economy, it has taken a dangerous step that could further tear the country apart: Ukraine's parliament, the Supreme Rada, passed a draft law last month honoring organizations involved in mass ethnic cleansing during World War Two.

The draft law - which is now on President Petro Poroshenko's desk awaiting his signature - recognizes a series of Ukrainian political and military organizations as "fighters for Ukrainian independence in the 20th century" and bans the criticism of these groups and their members. (The bill doesn't state the penalty for doing so.) Two of the groups honored - the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) - helped the Nazis carry out the Holocaust while also killing close to 100,000 Polish civilians during World War Two.

The law is part of a recent trend of contemporary Ukrainian nationalism promoted by those on the extreme right to break with the country's Communist past and emphasize Ukraine's suffering under the Soviet regime. In addition to the moral problem of forbidding the criticism of Holocaust perpetrators, the law hinders Ukraine's European ambitions - and validates Russian President Vladimir Putin's claims that the country is overrun by neo-Nazis.

The OUN was founded in 1929 as a revolutionary organization designed to liberate Ukraine from Soviet rule and create an independent Ukrainian state. Many OUN leaders were trained in Nazi Germany, and the group's philosophy was influenced by Nazi racial theorists such as Alfred Rosenberg. OUN literature, for example, declared the need to "combat Jews as supporters of the Muscovite-Bolshevik regime... Death to the Muscovite-Jewish commune! Beat the commune, save Ukraine!"

The OUN fought both the Nazis and the Soviets, and many Ukrainian nationalists have argued that the OUN was primarily a national liberation movement. But while the OUN's core goal may have been the creation of an independent Ukrainian state, along the way its members were responsible for terrible atrocities.

Starting with a pogrom in Lviv shortly after the Nazis invaded the Soviet Union, OUN militias - with the support of the Nazis - embarked on a killing spree in Western Ukraine that claimed the lives of tens of thousands of Jews. After the Nazis dissolved these militias, many of their members joined the Ukrainian Auxiliary Police in German service, where they received weapons-training and became one of the most important instruments of the Holocaust in Belarus and Western Ukraine.

By 1943 the OUN had seized control of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), a Ukrainian nationalist paramilitary group, and declared itself opposed to both the retreating Germans and the oncoming Soviets.  Although no longer in Nazi service, the UPA nevertheless continued to target and kill Jews, herding them into labor camps for execution. The UPA also engaged in the mass ethnic cleansing of Poles during this time, killing nearly 100,000 people.

Even after the Red Army pushed the Germans from Ukraine in the summer of 1944, the UPA continued to fight a partisan war against Soviet forces well into the 1950s, before it was finally crushed by the massive power of the Red Army. It is this legacy of sacrifice that explains the Rada's decision to pass a law honoring the OUN and the UPA.

This law echoes a recent trend of glorifying right-wing Ukrainian nationalist organizations with controversial pasts. Under former Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko, a number of leading Ukrainian nationalists were honored with a memorial at Babi Yar - site of the single-worst massacre of Jews during the Holocaust. Yushchenko also bestowed the highest government honor of "Hero of Ukraine" upon the controversial former OUN leader Stepan Bandera - a step roundly condemned by the chief rabbi of Ukraine, the president of Poland and the European Union.

More recently, radical nationalists played a key role as "shock troops" on the Maidan, and the anti-government camp was full of OUN-UPA flags and cries of "Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the heroes!" - chants that originated with the OUN. Currently, a number of OUN-UPA apologists occupy important government positions, including the minister of education, the head of the Security Service of Ukraine and the director of the Ukrainian government's Institute of National Memory. Even Poroshenko has gotten into the act, laying a wreath in honor of the OUN at Babi Yar last year.

The draft law has a number of downsides beyond the moral problem of giving the OUN and UPA a free pass for atrocious crimes. Most obviously, making criticism of Holocaust perpetrators illegal is not compatible with Ukraine's European ambitions. It is natural that many Ukrainians would wish to define themselves in opposition to the former Soviet Union, but as a budding democracy, banning criticism of any organizations - particularly those with such dark pasts - is the wrong way to build national identity.

Kiev also must remember that its conflict with Putin's Russia is taking place in cyberspace as well as the Donbass. Kiev has now handed the Kremlin "evidence" for Putin's claim that Russia is facing off against fascists. Not surprisingly, Russian state-owned media outlets have had a field day condemning the law.

Perhaps the worst effect of this law is the way it would split the country. Eastern and western Ukrainians already possess widely diverging views on recent political events such as the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Maidan revolution. The law would only exacerbate these regional differences. Historically, support for the "OUN-cult" originated primarily in the western Ukrainian regions of Galacia and Volhynia, where they are seen as heroic freedom fighters against Soviet oppression. Eastern Ukrainians, by contrast, grew up viewing these groups as Nazi collaborators to be feared and condemned rather than celebrated.

The Rada's passage of this law has already greatly harmed Ukraine. It is now up to Poroshenko to mitigate the damage by vetoing it.

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#36
Los Angeles Times
May 13, 2015
Ukraine's plans to discard Soviet symbols are seen as divisive, ill-timed
Ukraine de-communization efforts
By SABRA AYRES
Ayres is a special correspondent.

Perched high on a hill and standing 334 feet tall, the stainless steel Mother Motherland monument greets visitors to this capital with her stoic gaze across the Dnieper River, where 70 years ago the Soviet army battled Nazi forces in what is known here as the Great Patriotic War.

Or, rather, was known as the Great Patriotic War.

Because of a package of de-communization bills rushed through the new Western-leaning parliament in Kiev last month, Ukraine is embarking on a massive spring-cleaning of its Soviet-era lexicon and symbols.

To start with, the Soviet-era term for the global conflict would be scrapped; henceforth, the Great Patriot War officially would be known as the Second World War from 1939 to 1945, with the first date indicating that the conflict started long before Nazi Germany turned against the Soviet Union in 1941.

The bills are being hailed by some Ukrainians as long overdue for this post-Soviet nation. However, many say they are untimely and divisive as the country is still reeling from last year's political uprising in Kiev, a war in the east to take back territory from pro-Russia separatists and a desperate battle to keep the state from going bankrupt.

In addition, opponents say, the measures would not do much to win over the hearts and minds of the Russian-speaking east, where nostalgia for the Soviet Union and a fear of Ukrainian nationalism can run high. Nor would they help counter Kremlin propaganda claiming that Kiev is being overrun with far-right nationalists hellbent on oppressing ethnic Russians.

"At a time when Russia is waging undeclared war against Ukraine, the need for unity is paramount," wrote Halya Coynash of the Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group shortly after the bills were passed. She warned that the measures "will be used in propaganda against Ukraine, with some of that propaganda, unfortunately, being difficult to refute."

The four bills, which still require the signature of President Petro Poroshenko, condemn the Soviet and Nazi governments as criminal and ban their symbols, flags and monuments. If signed, thousands of streets and cities bearing names associated with the Soviet Union will be renamed, a move that is guaranteed to strain dwindling state coffers.

State archives from the Soviet period would be made public, which proponents say is a crucial step for Ukraine to move forward.

The most contentious of the four measures would give state recognition to the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, an underground guerrilla group formed in 1942 that fought the German and Soviet armies. Some of its units were accused of committing atrocities against Poles and Jews in western Ukraine.

The measures sparked a sharp response from some of the world's top scholars on Eastern European history. They would make it a crime to deny the Ukrainian Insurgent Army's role in the fight for Ukrainian independence or to deny the "criminal nature of the communist totalitarian regime," but the scholars say those provisions threaten Ukraine's ability to honestly debate its most difficult periods in history.

In an open letter to Poroshenko signed by 69 academics from Canada, the United States and Europe, they urged the Ukrainian president to veto the bills. "Difficult and contentious issues must remain matters of debate," the letter said.

Volodymyr Viatrovych, head of the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance and an architect of the legislation, said the letter was "an overreaction" and a misinterpretation of the measures. "Opening the archives will start these discussions, not restrict them," Viatrovych said. "De-Sovietization is a priority for our national security."

Viatrovych blames nostalgia for the Soviet Union and a generation still clinging to Soviet myths about Ukrainians for the current cultural and political divides in the country of 43 million. Playing on these myths, Russian President Vladimir Putin has manipulated the industrialized east into believing Ukraine's tilt toward Europe was an attack on what Putin refers to as a broader "Russian world," Viatrovych said.

Larisa Ignatenko, 79, and Alla Voloshina, 78, walk the length of the park along Kiev's Dnieper River embankment every day as part of their exercise routine. Inevitably, the pensioners' talk turns to politics and prices.

They are fed up with the government, which they see as doing nothing to help as they struggle to survive on their $53 monthly payments.

"Now is not the time to reexamine our history," Voloshina said. "They want to take away what we think are Soviet repressors. Now we have a new regime. Are they not repressing us, then? It's our history they are stealing away from us."

If the bills are signed, Mother Motherland, that great silver statue on the hill built to commemorate the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany, will find herself in a conundrum.

Beneath the huge figure is the History of the Great Patriotic War Museum, a title that may be changed. In her right hand, she hoists a 50-foot sword into the sky. In her left hand, she holds a massive, 13-ton shield decorated with the Soviet Union's seal, which most probably will come down.

"I personally don't think this would be bad," said Zhenya Nuzhdenko, 22, a student at the Institute of International Relations. "But people now are thinking about other things, and I don't think getting rid of all the Soviet symbols is the most important issue right now. People are thinking about how to survive now; that's what is important to Ukrainians now."

Removing the seal will take a team of engineers and specialists and, by some estimates, about $3,500, Viatrovych said.

"Well, you have to remember that activists have already torn down hundreds of Lenin statues in the last year free of charge," Viatrovych said with a grin, referring to the toppling of the Soviet leader's figures across the country since the start of the massive protest movements in Kiev last year.

"So, in that sense, we've already saved the government some money."

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#37
Fort Russ/Vzglyad
http://fortruss.blogspot.com
May 13, 2015
Repressions and Terror in Ukraine
After the coup of February 22, 2014
Vzglyad: http://vz.ru/infographics/2015/5/13/745050.html
Translated by Kristina Rus
Sources: Reporters without Borders; Ukrainian official data; The Foundation of Research of Problems of Democracy; open sources

Political Prisoners

4,023 criminal cases "for support of separatism"
753 people in jail, including for speaking out against mobilization (12 years) and on suspicion of collection of open information about a military base (9 years)

Murders and Persecutions

Oleg Kalashnikov, ex-deputy and anti-Maidan activist - shot to death
8 former high profile officials committed suicide due to persecution, which some referred to in death notes. [In some cases suicides have the hallmarks of homicides - KR]

Witchhunt of Journalists

Contract killings of Oleg Buzina and 4 more journalists
33 journalists kidnapped
47 arrested
215 have been attacked
About 100 Russian journalists deported from Ukraine
5 journalists killed in Donbass

Torture and War Crimes

Hundreds of militia fighters and Donbass civilians tortured to death
Mass cases of rape, robberies and aggravated crimes of national guard confirmed by Ukrainian General Ruban

Lustration of Public Servants

Testing of public servants and judges for loyalty to the new authorities [including using a lie detector - KR]
For working under Yanukovich for more then a year - immediate termination without trial
Public servants suspected of crimes are subjected to "trash lustration" by the radicals, beaten and assaulted

Persecution of Church

More then 20 churches of Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate have been seized
More then 70 cases of attacks of radicals on priests and parishioners
Dozens of priests were forced to leave the country under death threats

Bans on Movies

Legal ban on movies promoting operations of Russian security forces
Separate bans on films "The White Guard" and "Ivan Poddubny"

Communism Outlawed

Ban on communist symbols (with an exception of Soviet medals), including flags and monuments
Communism equated to Nazism as a criminal ideology
5 years in jail for performing the anthem of USSR

Ban of TV channels

14 Russian TV channels banned
Russian "Euronews" lost its license

Restrictions on Interviews

Ukrainian citizens are advised against giving interviews to Russian media
Rules on communication with Russian journalists developed

State Promotion of Snitching

7,500 people in Interior Ministry database "on suspicion of separatism" complied based on complaints posted to the website  "Peacemaker" ("Mirotvorets") instituted by the Interior Ministry, including historian Oles Buzina and activist Maxim Kalashnikov [who were murdered after their personal info was posted on the site - KR].
 

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#38
www.rt.com
May 12, 2015
Ukrainian Parliament approves law allowing forced relocation of Russian citizens

The Ukrainian Parliament has approved new regulations on martial law, which among other things allows for extrajudicial detention and relocation of Russian citizens in the country.

The law was approved by 254 deputies out of 322. It regulates how martial law can be declared in Ukraine and the changes to legal procedures it brings.

These changes include "forced relocation of the citizens of a foreign country who threaten or undertake aggression towards Ukraine," the law's memorandum states as cited by TASS. The parliament declared Russia an aggressor on January 27 by adopting a declaration to that end.

Apart from the relocation of foreign citizens, martial law will allow Ukrainian authorities to confiscate private property, regulate mass media, prohibit any rallies, marches and other mass gatherings and initiate the legal process of banning any political party or mass media deemed "acting against Ukraine's independence."

It also entails labor conscription for all able-bodied Ukrainians not currently in the army and a possible curfew. In areas of actual fighting, the role of local authorities is passed on to the military command.

This is the new version of the law, which was preliminarily approved on April 9.

For martial law to take hold, the parliament has to approve a corresponding ruling by the Ukrainian president. It can be declared in the whole country or selected regions.

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 #39
Interfax-Ukraine
Ukrainian pro-Russian rebels demand special status for Donbass in constitution

Moscow/Kiev, 13 May: The self-proclaimed DPR and LPR [Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics] have put forward their proposals for the reform of the Ukrainian constitution to be considered at the relevant committee meeting in Kiev.

"We have submitted to the Constitutional Commission of Ukraine, addressed to Volodymyr Hroysman and the Minsk contact group, OSCE representative Heidi Tagliavini and Russian representative Azamat Kulmukhametov, Ukrainian representative Leonid Kuchma and interim coordinator of the political affairs group Pierre Morel, our proposals on amending the constitution of Ukraine in accordance with paragraph 11 of the package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements of 12 February 2015," the Donetsk News Agency website reported, citing the respective document.

The proposals envisage the inclusion in the Ukrainian constitution of an additional section that would fix a special legal status of separate areas in Donbass.

DPR and LPR envoys Denys Pushylin and Vladyslav Deyneho [Denis Pushilin and Vladislav Deynego] stressed that the proposals include the creation of people's police units controlled by the local authorities, the official status of the Russian language and a special economic regime.

"There also should be the possibility to enter into a set of agreements between the central authorities of Ukraine and Donbass. We have proposed amendments to the constitution's articles on judicial system, the prosecutor's office, local government, on the administrative and territorial system of Ukraine," Pushylin and Deyneho said.

As reported earlier, the intentions of the DPR and LPR to receive a special status for Donbass were announced on Tuesday [12 May]. Commenting on this statement at the Svoboda Slova [Freedom of Speech] talk show aired by the ICTV channel on Tuesday [12 May] night, Petro Poroshenko Bloc faction leader Yuriy Lutsenko said that Donbass could not get any special autonomy status and could only receive more powers on par with other regions of Ukraine, under the current efforts for the decentralization of power in the country.

"Donbass is an integral part of Ukraine. And no special status, different from the rest of Ukraine, can be granted to it. Crimea is the answer for us, as we remember that the far-fetched special status established in 1991, when the regional council suddenly became the Supreme Council of Crimea, sooner or later leads to separatism and the opposition of a particular part of the country to the whole country," he said.

Lutsenko said that Donbass can receive the same expanded powers as all other regions of the country. "This is called decentralization, enhanced powers for Donbass, Kharkiv, Sumy, my native Rivne, Chernihiv regions or any other region. There should be no special region in Ukraine. They should have a maximum of authorities, but no special preferences. No-one feeds anyone we all live together in one state," he stressed.

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 #40
Irrussianality
https://irrussianality.wordpress.com
May 13, 2015
STUFFING THE REBELS BACK INTO UKRAINE
By Paul Robinson
I am a professor at the University of Ottawa. I write about Russian and Soviet history, military history, and military ethics.

Denis Pushilin and Vladislav Deinovo, two of the political leaders of the rebel Ukrainian Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics (DPR & LPR), caused something of a stir earlier this week when they announced that the DPR and LPR were willing to accept 'broad autonomy' within Ukraine. 'We proposed adding an article to the Ukrainian Constitution that the country's regions have a right to self-determination. We are ready to carry out local elections,' Pushilin said, although he added that, 'If Kiev further breaks the Minsk agreements, the DPR will move to full independence.'

The Minsk 2 agreement signed three months ago obliged the Ukrainian government to enact constitutional reform by the end of 2015. The DPR and LPR have now submitted their suggestions for constitutional amendments to the Ukrainian constitutional commission as well as to the Minsk Contact Group. According to news reports about Pushilin and Deinovo's statements:

Their proposals include the creation of detachments of people's militia under the control of the local authorities, official status for the Russian language, and a special economic regime. 'Also envisioned is the possibility of concluding a whole complex of treaties and agreements between the central powers and Donbass. Amendments to the articles of the Ukrainian Constitution on the justice system, the procuracy, local self-government, and the administrative - territorial structure of Ukraine, are proposed.' ... The draft also envisions a strengthening of Ukraine's neutral status.

In Russian nationalist circles, Pushilin and Deinovo's statements are proof that Moscow is preparing to surrender Donbass to the Ukrainian government. For instance, the well-known military commentator 'El-Murid' writes that Pushilin's talk of a 'move to full independence' is an 'empty threat', and that 'Pushilin continues to hold his post only because he pronounces exactly what he is told to [by the Kremlin].' Moscow's aim, says El-Murid, 'remains the same, to stuff the DPR (and LPR) back into Ukraine as Kremlin puppet territories and to guarantee their existence with this status.'  'One must understand that the idea of an independent DPR and LPR has been eliminated once and for all,' he concludes, 'we are talking about an attempt to find a more or less honourable form of capitulation.'

Others disagree. The author of the popular blog Yurasumy notes that 'Apart from the time of the announcement, there is nothing new. Both sides are weary of the [Minsk peace] agreements, but neither wants to be the first to break them. Thus there are beautiful gestures and beautiful phrases, but no real progress, as neither side is ready for it.' Meanwhile, Boris Rozhin, aka 'Colonel Cassad', one of the best informed commentators on the war in Donbass, remarks that 'it is practically impossible for these proposals to come to life,' as there is no support for them either in the rebel republics or in the rest of Ukraine. Talk of 'autonomy within Ukraine' is 'empty words', he claims, 'At present the objective circumstances are that Donbass will sail further and further away from Ukraine regardless of whoever wants to stuff it back into Ukraine in one form or another by military or political means.' Russia, he concludes, 'de facto supports the two unrecognized state formations, providing them with political, information, diplomatic, and military support.' It is not about to surrender them to Ukraine.

I think that Russia's preferred outcome is indeed for Donbass to remain within Ukraine, but with some form of autonomy. And it is true that the recent declarations are nothing new. Immediately after the Minsk-2 agreement, for instance, the head of the LPR, Igor Plotnitsky, made some very conciliatory statements about the LPR remaining within Ukraine as long as there was political reform in Ukraine. But it is also true that in practice this is unlikely. For, as Rozhin writes, Kiev wishes to 'return Donbass into a unitary state with some abstract "decentralization", where there is no room for "autonomy" and "federalism", as these terms are considered the same as separatism.' The head of the Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko's parliamentary faction, Iurii Lutsenko, declared yesterday that 'Donbass must not receive any special status different from the rest of Ukraine.' Donbass could only receive whatever powers were also decentralized to other regions in the country. This effectively rules out any possibility of Kiev making constitutional concessions which the DPR and LPR might consider acceptable.

And then there is the tricky question of what to do with the rebel army. Pushilin's proposal of a 'people's militia' under local government control suggests that he sees this army becoming that people's militia. That way, the rebel republics could officially re-integrate with Ukraine while not losing their ability to defend themselves. But there is no way that Kiev could ever accept the existence of such an armed force under local government control. At the same time, though, it is simply unimaginable that the rebels would agree to disband it. It is, after all, their only defence against the Ukrainian government reneging on any agreement. While there may be some solution to this problem, I confess that I have no idea what it is.

Overall, therefore, I think that the view that Moscow is preparing to 'capitulate' and sell the rebels down the river seems a bit far-fetched. Even if those in power in Russia do indeed want to 'stuff the DPR and LPR back into Ukraine', it is unlikely they will be able to do so, for that plan relies on the co-operation of the Ukrainian authorities and co-operation does not appear to be forthcoming. Although one cannot entirely rule out the possibility of reintegration, de facto independence for the DPR and LPR remains a more likely outcome. The rebels have made their constitutional demands. How Kiev responds will determine the future of the country.

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 #41
Ukraine can retain Donbas if it treats it as special region - Russian Federation Council member

MOSCOW. May 14 (Interfax) - Kyiv should grant special status to southeastern regions of Ukraine in order to preserve the country's unity, says Konstantin Kosachyov, the head of the Russian Federation Council international affairs committee.

"Only decentralization, reducing everyone to the same level would be not enough, and if Ukraine wants to preserve Donbas as its part, it should treat it as a special region - in particular, taking into consideration the sacrifices that it suffered as a result of the ATO [the antiterrorist operation], which turned out to be a war with one's own people," Kosachyov said in his blog posted on the Federation Council website on Thursday.

The very fact that the leaders of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk people's republics (DPR and LPR) have submitted their proposals to Kyiv on amending the Ukrainian constitution, particularly by granting Donbas special status and proclaiming Ukraine's non-aligned status, attests "to their willingness to reach agreement, despite anything," he said.

"The main issue today is whether Kyiv is willing to do so as well," Kosachyov said. "As is well-known, the Minsk agreements envisioned that the constitution should stipulate decentralization taking into consideration specifics of certain districts in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in coordination with representatives of these districts, along with the simultaneous adoption of permanent laws on special status of certain districts in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions," he said.

Kosachyov pointed out that NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg had said at a meeting of the alliance's foreign ministers on Wednesday that the Minsk agreements play a special role as a foundation for settling the conflict, with the understanding that granting special status to Donbas is part of the Minsk agreements.

"And, judging impartially, it is precisely the LPR and DPR that are strictly following the Minsk track so far by putting forward their initiatives for coordination. If Kyiv's response implies only blockade and shelling, this would mean that it is openly sabotaging the Minsk process. But, as a matter of fact, there is simply no alternative to it. What is at stake is not only the Ukrainian president's already dubious reputation but also the authority of the French and German leaders, who have supported the general document," Kosachyov said.

Letting down its principal partners and creditors would be another unforgivable and tragic mistake for the current Kyiv leadership, he said.

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 #42
Russia Insider
www.russia-insider.com
May 14, 2015
Ukraine: Confederal Solution Looms
Proposals by the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics and comments by Kerry and Steinmeier suggest confederal structure just short of outright partition is the best Ukraine can now hope for.
By Alexander Mercousis

In the absence of any proposal for constitutional reform from Kiev, the space is being filled by the Russians and by the two regions in the Donbass that are resisting the authority of the Maidan government - the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics.

There is little doubt the two People's Republics are coordinating the proposals for constitutional reform they have just announced with the Russians and that the proposals have been agreed with the Russians.

It is also a virtual certainty that Merkel and Kerry were informed of these proposals during their recent visits to Moscow and Sochi.

An Interfax dispatch outlines what is proposed.  In brief:

1. The People's Republics would be authorised to set rates for local taxes and fees for local administrative services;

2. They would draw up their own budgets and have a say over the drawing up of the central Ukrainian budget in Kiev;

3. They would control the law courts and prosecution services within their territories;

4. They would regulate their own borders and be entitled to sign economic agreements with foreign states and individual regions of foreign states;

5. They would be authorized to call local elections and referendums, which would in effect entitle them to form their own local bodies of power, distinct from those in Kiev;

6. They would be empowered to permit the use of Russian and other languages in their territories.

Over and above these provisions the two People's Republics also propose formal non-bloc status for Ukraine by "making an amendment to the Constitution of Ukraine, for instance supplementing Article17 or 18, with the following words: 'Ukraine shall not be a member of any military bloc or alliance, maintain neutrality and refrain from participation in hostilities outside its territory,' and/or bringing out a law of Ukraine to enshrine the non-bloc, neutral status for Ukraine."

These proposals are not just intended as part of the temporary "special status" Ukraine was supposed to grant these regions before the end of March pending a final solution of the conflict.  

They are intended to form the basis of the permanent solution of the conflict, to be enshrined in the new Ukrainian constitution, which the February Minsk Memorandum said should be agreed by the end of December 2015.

These proposals, if implemented, would mark the end of the Maidan project. They would transform Ukraine from a unitary state, not into a federal state, but into the loosest possible confederal state.

They would also put an end once and for all to any possibility of Ukraine ever joining NATO or the EU.  

The proposed provision for Ukraine's neutrality or non-bloc status would preclude forever Ukraine joining NATO, while the provision allowing the People's Republics to control their border(s) and to forge economic links with foreign states or regions of foreign states (meaning of course Russia) would be incompatible with Ukraine's membership of the European Single Market and of the EU.

These proposals are of course completely unacceptable to the present Ukrainian government and to the Maidan movement.

They are however exactly in line with what Der Spiegel tells us Putin and Merkel agreed, both in public and in private one to one discussions, in February in Moscow and Minsk (see Merkel in Moscow and Minsk: Der Spiegel Says Putin Has Won, Russia Insider, 18th April 2015),

The fact that Kerry has now formally committed the U.S. to support Minsk 2.0 and is now warning the Ukrainians against any resumption of military action (see Kerry in Sochi a Huge Win For Russia as US Backs Minsk 2, Warns Kiev, Russia Insider, 13th May 2015) might mean the realists in Washington have finally won, and that the U.S. is now also, however grudgingly, signed up to this plan.  

The fact that German foreign minister Steinmeier is now talking about a "breakthrough" might also mean that the Germans are now confident that the peace process agreed by Putin and Merkel in February, of which the proposals just announced obviously form part, is now finally on track, with the U.S. on side.

None of this of course means that the Ukrainian conflict is over. The Ukrainians will bitterly resist these proposals. It is far from certain that the Western powers will pressure the Ukrainians to accept them, even if they have in private pledged to support them. They must know, as of course do the Russians, that the present Ukrainian government would not survive if these proposals were ever implemented, and that that is reason enough for the Ukrainians to resist them.

Whilst undue optimism would therefore be misplaced, the latest moves do reinforce the impression that the Western powers have grudgingly accepted that the objectives they set themselves when they supported the Maidan coup are unachievable, and that they are now looking for ways to disengage themselves from the conflict.

If so then this in turn might mean that if the Ukrainians not only reject the proposals but opt for war, then they will find themselves on their own, and that even the largely rhetorical support they have had up to now from the West will be toned down.

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 #43
Carnegie Moscow Center
May 13, 2015
Defanging the Ukrainian Oligarchs
By BALÁZS JARÁBIK
Jarábik is a visiting scholar focusing on Ukraine and Eastern Europe.  

As soon as there was a break in the fighting in the Donbas, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko turned his focus to the politics beyond the conflict zone. His main objectives are to establish a firmer grip on the government, prepare for local elections, and better oversee the reform process and the disbursement of Western aid.

To achieve these goals, Poroshenko is trying to reshape the existing contract between the Ukrainian state and the oligarchs. He and the oligarchs are under pressure from the West, Russia, and an increasingly radical Ukrainian public. After providing Kyiv a multi-billion dollar bailout, the West wants him to push ahead on difficult economic and political reforms as the country continues to face military threats from Russia. Parts of the population are growing restless as the war drags on, economic hardship grows, and it becomes increasingly clear that there are limits to Western financial assistance and the government's ability to initiate real change.

As part of this process, President Poroshenko has attempted to assert more control over powerful and relatively independent economic actors in Ukrainian politics. Above all, he is trying to reinforce state interests against personal ones. In the old contract, wealthy private individuals gained actual or de facto control over state entities and used them for personal gain rather than public good. Poroshenko has begun to demand that oligarchs give up some control over state resources in exchange for keeping economic and political power at the regional level.

Ukrainian society-particularly sectors that pushed for greater accountability and transparency during the EuroMaidan Revolution-and Western governments, particularly the United States, are pushing Poroshenko to rein in the oligarchs.

Yet, the president's move to divest former Dnipropetrovsk Governor Ihor Kolomoyskyi from central power structures and large state enterprises-along with his threats against Donbas billionaire Rinat Akhmetov-were reactive moves, responding to the demands of an increasingly vocal and unhappy civil society backed by the West. Poroshenko's standoff with Kolomoyskyi over state-owned oil and gas company UkrNafta was the first major public attack on oligarchic power.

Rinat Akhmetov's recent effort to block the government's electricity reforms by allegedly instigating a coal strike at his own coal mines to manipulate coal supplies was the second notable standoff between Poroshenko and an oligarch.

A final indication that the state's relationship with the oligarchs is transforming is the fate of billionaire businessman Dmytro Firtash. Although an Austrian court rejected the American request for his extradition to the U.S. to face corruption charges, Firtash will return to Kyiv in a much weaker position than he was in under the Yanukovych regime.

Poroshenko's attempts to strengthen his grip on power, defang the oligarchs, and demonstrate state power require him to balance competing interests amidst a shrinking pool of resources. Beyond "managing" the oligarchs, Poroshenko is facing political turmoil ahead on several fronts: he must sell the Ukrainian public bad news on the economy, the slow pace of reform, and the war, while maintaining popular support. He must simultaneously lead peace talks with heavily armed separatists in eastern Ukraine, while fending off their advances. He must placate various Western backers and integrate his country with western political structures, while not antagonizing Moscow any more than he already has.

However, the government's effort to curb the oligarchs' authority over state enterprises has not been persistent enough, especially because men like Kolomoyskyi and Akhmetov have the ability to mobilize a great number of resources to protect their interests. Poroshenko is well aware of the potential damage that oligarchs could inflict on him and his relatively weak government. For this reason, the Prosecutor General's Office has opened up a number of court cases against certain oligarchs. It is unclear whether authorities will move forward with prosecutions, but given their selective nature, the effort appears to be a political strategy ahead of local government elections in October.

Meanwhile, as Poroshenko tries to renegotiate the state's relationship with the oligarchs, Ukrainian society is under growing strain. Ukrainians have returned to a kind of 1990s-era "survival mode" in which people are left to fend for themselves. Parts of society have been traumatized by war; others have been radicalized, particularly the volunteer battalions who are on the front lines of the war and are unhappy with how the government has managed it.

A series of suspicious suicides and open murders of former government officials and pro-Yanukovych figures suggests a radicalization of society. The crime rate in Kiev has grown almost threefold since former President Yanukovych fled. Racketeering, armed robbery, car theft, and widespread fraud have become all too common. Whispers about a third Maidan have surfaced again.

Poroshenko, however, has proven himself to be a politician of compromise; he learned from his polarizing predecessors Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovych that division is not a viable approach to governance. The main actors on all sides of the battle with the oligarchs must surely understand that a third Maidan might finish off the country for good. Although reshaping the contract with the oligarchs is an important goal, Poroshenko and his government must work on developing a new social contract with the population, which, after all, was the main objective of the Maidan.

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 #44
RFE/RL
May 13, 2015
Questions Raised Over Poroshenko's Role In Valuable Kyiv Land Deal
by Maksym Savchuk and Daisy Sindelar

KYIV -- An investigation by RFE/RL shows that Ukrainian leader Petro Poroshenko may have used his presidential influence to shut down investigations into a land deal aimed at building a private mansion on a historic site in the Ukrainian capital.
 
Two reports broadcast on RFE/RL's Ukrainian-language television program, Schemes, reveal that over the course of seven years, Poroshenko quietly appropriated more than a hectare of protected land in Kyiv's elite Pechera district and recently quashed an inquiry into the damage of an 18th-century structure caused by construction work on his plot.
 
The revelations come as Poroshenko, soon to mark his first year in office, faces growing criticism for failing to divest his billion-dollar business holdings and diminish the political influence of Ukrainian oligarchs like Dmytro Firtash, who last week claimed he personally orchestrated Poroshenko's rise to the presidency.
 
Supporters of Poroshenko -- still one of Ukraine's richest men, with an estimated fortune of $750 million -- defend him as a "president of de-oligarchization." But his failure to honor his campaign pledge to divest himself of his assets, as well as new findings about his property holdings, may add to questions about his commitment to separating politics from property and money.
 
Good Neighborhood
 
Radialna Street is short, but it runs through some of the prettiest land in Kyiv. Located in the forested neighborhood known as Tsar's Village, it is part of the protected Pechera district that runs along the western bank of the winding Dnipro River.
 
The district is home to two of the city's best-known historical attractions, the St. Sophia Cathedral and the Kyiv Pechersk Lavra, also known as the Monastery of the Caves. Both are recognized by UNESCO as a World Heritage Site and are protected under Kyiv city law, together with a 220-hectare buffer zone.

Within Tsar's Village, two plots share the address Radialna 5. One, undeveloped and strewn with debris, belongs to Poroshenko. The other, across the street, already boasts a fenced-in mansion and tennis court. It belongs to one of Poroshenko's closest friends and business partners, Ihor Kononenko.
 
Kononenko is a lawmaker who currently serves as deputy head of the Petro Poroshenko Bloc's faction in the Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine's parliament. Bald and solidly built, he is sometimes referred to as the bloc's "gray cardinal." But in 2009, he was a member of the Kyiv government and an ally of then-Mayor Leonid Chernovetskyy, who presided over a city vote handing the Radialna 5 plots to a company co-founded by Kononenko -- for free.
 
Long-Term Plan?
 
How does protected state land with a market value of more than $25 million get handed free of charge to a little-known company run by a city lawmaker?

Documents suggest that Kononenko had his eye on the Tsar's Village land as early as 2003. That was when he helped create Zelenbudservis-K, a private limited company that assumed control of the state landscaping service responsible for the St. Sophia and Pechersk grounds.
 
Until then, the landscapers had operated out of a series of greenhouses and storage facilities located conveniently close to the monastery complex -- at Radialna 5. But almost immediately, Zelenbudservis-K began hatching plans for a new greenhouse facility. Within five years, the landscapers had been moved to their new location, far from the Pechera district in a dreary section of industrial Kyiv.
 
Olha Krystovnikova, the facility's head agronomist, confirmed to Schemes that the landscapers had moved to the new greenhouse complex in 2008, and that they had previously been based at Radialna 5.
 
Google Earth images from 2008 show the landscapers' former greenhouses and storage units still standing on the Radialna plots. Now they're gone, replaced by Kononenko's mansion and Poroshenko's still-empty lot.
 
'Biggest' Land Scheme
 
In an interview with Schemes, Kononenko openly acknowledged his role in the transfer.
"I've really been dealing with this issue since 2004," he said, adding that he had acted at the behest of Chernovetskyy's mayoral predecessor, Oleksandr Omelchenko, in finding a new location for the landscapers.

With the Radianla grounds in the process of being vacated, Zelenbudservis-K -- which still held operating rights to the Tsar's Village plots -- quietly dropped its private status in 2007, reregistering as a housing cooperative society. That switch, under Ukraine's land code, allowed Zelenbudservis-K to receive ownership of the Radialna 5 land for free -- the transaction that was approved by a voting majority of Kyiv city lawmakers in April 2009.
 
Rights activist Oleksandr Dyadyuk said such land-acquisition schemes reached their peak under the notorious mayoralty of Chernovetskyy, a quirky millionaire who was nicknamed "Kosmos" after announcing plans to travel to space with his cat.

" Large lots of valuable land were transferred in precisely this way, through fake housing cooperative societies," said Dyaduk. The acquisition of Radialna 5, he added, "was the biggest and most important free-appropriation land scheme in Kyiv."
 
Inconsistencies
 
There are numerous irregularities in Radialna 5's path from state greenhouse to luxury-home turf. None of the 12 members of the Zelenbudservis-K cooperative society was on the housing register, a legal step meant to ensure that free land is going to those in need. Of the 12, at least six have close ties to Poroshenko and Kononenko, including Kononenko's sister and a Poroshenko political adviser.
 
In addition, Oles Dovhy, the city council secretary who agreed to initiate the process of transferring the land to Zelenbudservis-K, has close ties to Poroshenko. And Ukrsel, the company that officially purchased the Radialna land from Zelenbudservis-K before selling it to Poroshenko and Kononenko, was an Odesa-based shell company liquidated shortly after the final transfer of the land in late 2009.
 
Most worrying to critics, however, are suggestions that Poroshenko may have since used his presidential imprimatur to shut down a probe into his use of the land.
 
Destruction Of Relics
 
In 2012, employees at the Kyiv-Pechersk reserve were alarmed to see construction machinery begin excavation work at the Radialna 5 plot belonging to Poroshenko. In a letter to the Culture Ministry, the reserve's director Lubomyr Mykhaylyna expressed concern that the digging was taking place inside a UNESCO buffer zone and within meters of an early 18th-century fortress that is part of the site's historic properties.

Construction is not prohibited on protected land, but it is strictly regulated. Building projects can only proceed after receiving two separate sets of approvals -- one from the Culture Ministry's cultural-heritage department, and one from archaeological experts at the National Academy of Sciences.

Preservation experts wrote directly to Poroshenko, informing him of the threat to the fortress. Construction work was finally suspended in early 2013, but not before one of the fortress's lunettes -- structural walls in the shape of a half-moon -- was partially destroyed.
 
At the time construction started, Poroshenko had not received permission from either the Culture Ministry or the National Academy of Science. (He ultimately received NAS approval, but only in December 2012, a month after excavation began.)

A Pechera district prosecutor quickly opened a criminal case into the lunette's destruction, citing national laws protecting monuments of cultural heritage. But on November 6, 2014 -- five months after Poroshenko's presidential inauguration -- the proceedings were closed. Olena Yakhno, a spokesperson for the Kyiv prosecutor's office, said no criminal violations were found. Eighteen days later, on November 24, Poroshenko signed off on a new declaration to resume construction at the Tsar's Village plot. (As of May, there has been no sign of work at the site.)
 
Poroshenko and his spokesperson Svyatoslav Tseholko declined to speak to Schemes. Oleksandr Lutskyy, a former deputy mayor of Kyiv and Chernovetskyy ally authorized to speak on the president's behalf, provided RFE/RL with a copy of Poroshenko's construction declaration but later told a correspondent, "You're digging where there's nothing to dig."

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 #45
Sputnik
May 12, 2015
Mission Impossible: Poroshenko's Bold 'Four Ds' Plan Doomed
By Ekaterina Blinova

Ukrainian President Poroshenko has presented his plan aimed at creating "a new, democratic, European Ukraine;" however, the question remains open if Poroshenko's "Ukrainian Dream" will come true?

President Poroshenko announced an ambitious plan, dubbed "Four Ds" - deregulation, debureaucratization, deoligarchization, decentralization - aimed at creating "a new, democratic, European Ukraine," former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili emphasized in his Op-Ed for the mainstream US media source.

Despite the fact that the USSR collapsed 25 years ago, Saakashvili insisted that "the Soviet legacy" remains a stumbling block in Ukraine's way to its bright European future.

Today, Ukraine is ready to break with its past, Saakashvili claimed, adding that due to "deregulation" Ukraine will become more attractive to foreign investors.

"Licenses and permits are going to be erased and reshaped according to European standards. First steps had already been taken by the government, with the ministries of economy and justice scrapping a number of required licenses and permits," the former Georgian president elaborated.

Indeed, the "much-anticipated" reforms will give foreign enterprises the green light and let them increase foreign control over the Ukrainian economy.

"[The World Bank and IMF] intent is blatant: to open up foreign markets to Western corporations. It's telling that one of the key reforms enforced by the Bank is that the government must limit its own power by removing restrictions to competition as well as the role of state 'control' in economic activities," elaborated Frederic Mousseau, Policy Director of the Oakland Institute and a co-author of the report "The World Bank and the IMF Open up Ukraine to Western Interests."

Furthermore, the decision to lift moratorium on land sales in 2016 will allow Western agroholdings to jump at a chance to grab rich arable Ukrainian territories.

"Debureaucratization," the other element of Poroshenko's program, means that the country will rid itself of its "excessive" public servants, replacing them with a "young, dynamic, well-paid team." Remarkably, in Autumn 2014 Poroshenko had already carried out "cleansing" of Ukraine's bureaucratic apparatus, and ousted all officials related to overthrown Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich.

In order to bolster the government's efficiency Petro Poroshenko invited a number of foreign officials, including Mikheil Saakashvili, to assume high posts in the country. Since then, however, the situation has not been improved: the country is still teetering on the brink of economic and political collapse.

The "deoligarchization" of Ukraine looks like a mission impossible, since the country's head, Petro Poroshenko, remains one of the most powerful and super-rich oligarchs in the country. Curiously enough, despite promises, the Ukrainian president has not sold his TV station, and preserved a number of other profitable assets.

In addition, Petro Poroshenko nominated a number of his close friends and Ukrainian tycoons, for high posts in the government. For instance, media mogul Boris Lozhkin (of UMH group) assumed the position as the head of Poroshenko's presidential administration. Other Ukrainian oligarchs like Victor Pinchuk, one of the top Clinton's Foundation donors, are still regarded as powerful decision-makers.

Some experts say that Poroshenko's crackdown against some tycoons is in fact an internal struggle between the Ukrainian oligarchical groups, with the goal of carving up of assets of their rivals.

"The emergence of Ukrainian national identity during the Maidan protests and the war should translate into a less centralized system rather than a more centralized one," Mikheil Saakashvili claimed.

However, Poroshenko's "decentralization" initiative still remains ink on paper, since the eastern Ukrainian regions have yet to gain their official "special status" and independence from Kiev. Furthermore, recognizing that Ukraine is a diverse country consisting of many different groups, Poroshenko, however, has repeatedly stressed that he strongly opposes federalization or greater local autonomy of Ukraine's regions.

Poroshenko's ambitious "Four Ds" sounds like a good plan, but it seems it bears no relation to reality on the ground.

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 46
Sputnik
May 14, 2015
Pollster Reveals That Crimeans Are Satisfied With the New Status Quo

About 80 percent of citizens of Crimea and Sevastopol are satisfied with the current situation on the peninsula, according to a recent poll conducted by the Moscow-based pollster Public Opinion Foundation (FOM).

A survey released by the Moscow-based pollster Public Opinion Foundation revealed that around 80 percent of citizens of Crimea and Sevastopol are satisfied with the situation on the peninsula, the Russian news agency RIA Novosti reports.

According to the poll, 84 percent of respondents in Crimea and 78 percent of those in Sevastopol are on the whole pleased with the current situation in the region.

More than 60 percent of the respondents feel that the situation in Crimea has improved, while 5 percent believe vice versa, the poll revealed.

According to the survey, 49 percent of Crimean residents are mainly concerned over traffic and road problems, such as the quality of roads, traffic jams and communication with other regions of Russia and Ukraine. Many residents of Sevastopol are also upset about high prices and low incomes, the poll said.

More than 60 percent of the respondents said that the quality of housing and communal services has not changed, while 50 percent pointed to improvements in the work of law enforcement agencies.

48 percent of Crimean residents and 39 percent of those in Sevastopol also praised positive changes in the health care sector, the poll showed.
More than 2,000 respondents took part in the FOM survey, which was conducted in late April.

Crimea became an integral part of Russia after the March 2014 referendum, in which an overwhelming majority voted in favor of Crimea's reunification with Russia. Sevastopol, which is located in the southwestern region of the Crimean Peninsula, is a city within the Crimean Federal District.

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 #47
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
May 13, 2015
Boris Nemtsov allies publish report on Russian military role in Ukraine
The associates of murdered Russian liberal politician Boris Nemtsov have published his report dedicated to the supposed participation of Russian forces in the Ukrainian conflict. However, sources interviewed by RBTH believe that the report will go unnoticed in Russia.
Yekaterina Sinelschikova, RBTH

Friends and associates of opposition politician and former Russian Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov, who was murdered just yards from the Kremlin in February 2015, have published the report about Russia's alleged military participation in the conflict in southeast Ukraine on which Nemtsov was working when he was assassinated.

The gathering of information for the report, titled "Putin. War," could have been the motive for Nemtsov's murder, according to one of the theories circulating in Russian society. The report was completed by his colleagues and close friends after his death.
 
A report without sensations

"This is not a report with sensational findings," Mikhail Kasyanov, president of the RPR-PARNAS (Republican Party of Russia - People's Freedom Party) non-parliamentary opposition party, warned at the very beginning. But, he said, it "will help people understand what is happening."

The text itself is a compilation of information published earlier from open sources (first of all from the media), information about the support given by regular Russian army units to the rebels in the Donbass region of southeast Ukraine. For example, soldiers were offered to leave service in order to become "volunteers" and organizations loyal to the Kremlin then sent them to the Donbass to fight against Ukrainian government troops attempting to regain control of the region.

The report says that these organizations also financed the real Russian volunteers - for example, former soldiers and members of the Chechen power structures. Their average salary, the authors of the report affirm, was 60,000 rubles a month ($1,200). The average salary in Russia, according to January 2015 data from the Ministry of Economic Development, is 31,200 rubles or $620 a month.

Military technology also served to compromise the official version of events, according to the authors of the report, who cite the Tornado-S multiple rocket launchers, which, according to the Minsk Agreements, the rebels were to pull back from the frontline. "This system is developed in Russia, it was never exported - this is exclusive technology," said Ilya Yashin, a member of the RPR-PARNAS Political Council, during the presentation of the report on May 12.
According to the report's co-author Sergei Alexashenko, ex-first deputy chairman of the Russian Central Bank and director of Macroeconomic Studies at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, "46 billion rubles ($9,200,000) were directly spent on the 'volunteers' in the 10 months of war."

Yashin told RBTH that a lot of unfounded information "had to be cut out" of the report. "But everything that we published corresponds to reality and has been verified in various sources," he said.
 
All planned in advance

According to the authors of the report, the scenario dealing with the return of Crimea to Russia had been planned by the Russian government back in the summer of 2013, when Russian President Vladimir Putin's rating began to fall.

The report says that Russia started hitting the Ukrainian economy first: regular gas wars, the introduction and repeal of a food embargo, giving advantageous credit on non-market conditions to Crimean businesses and so on. "The revolution in Kiev and President Viktor Yanukovich's escape from the country... created ideal conditions for the Kremlin's decisive action to annex Crimea," said Yashin.

However, Putin never intended to unite the Donbass with Russia, said Yashin, who explained that the region had a more useful function: "The Donbass became a lever of pressure on Kiev and the West," he said. As a ceasefire condition Putin may be able to achieve the recognition of Crimea as Russian territory and the cancelation of sanctions.
 
Too little, too late

For now the report has been published in just 2,000 printed copies and on the internet. The authors have already begun collecting money for an additional print run and are hoping to reach a maximum audience within the country.

"Putin. War" will almost be unnoticed in the Russian reality, said Konstantin Kalachev, director of the independent Political Expert Group, who argues that the publication came too late. According to Kalachev, Russia is tired of the Ukrainian subject and only people outside of Russia will show any interest in the report.

"It is naïve to think that people will read it and will drastically change their position," says Professor of the Political Sciences Department at the Higher School of Economics Leonid Polyakov, a Kremlin loyalist.

In his view, a report prepared by some members of the opposition, set against a large volume of information that purportedly confirms the precise opposite, looks extremely unconvincing. The government will also not react to the report, Polyakov believes: "Our position is known, and it is unchangeable. There are no Russian soldiers in Ukraine. We can't respond to every such accusation."

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 #48
Washington Post
May 14, 2015
Editorial
Boris Nemtsov's last act of courage

IN THE final years of his life, Boris Nemtsov never gave up on politics in Russia, even when many others were discouraged or frightened away from standing up to President Vladimir Putin. Mr. Nemtsov, once in the front ranks of Russia's post-Soviet reformers, in the last decade and a half became a persistent Putin critic. To some, he was a cheerful yet faded political figure. But he was stubborn, sustained by the hope that if only he could get the word out, if only he remained engaged, Russia could recover a chance for democracy. He published reports calling attention to Putin excesses, such as the lavish preparations for the 2014 Sochi Olympics, which he said "highlighted the main flaws of Putin's system in a nutshell: Lawlessness, corruption, high-handedness, cronyism, incompetence, and irresponsibility."

Last year, Mr. Nemtsov was consumed with the war in Ukraine, triggered largely from the shadows by Mr. Putin. While igniting battles that left thousands dead, the Kremlin leader insisted Russian troops were not in Ukraine, armed unrest was of local origin and Russia was not directing the insurrection. Mr. Putin waged what has been called a "hybrid" war of deception, subversion and violence.

This was fertile territory for Mr. Nemtsov. He frequently received death threats but was not intimidated. On Jan. 27, he sent the Russian prosecutor general a formal request asking him to verify information about Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine. Mr. Nemtsov had some insight into the true situation; family members of soldiers were telling him about coffins coming home to Russia. Mr. Nemtsov's idea was to write a report, "Putin.War," and, as he told his colleagues, "publish it in huge numbers and hand it out on the streets. We will tell how Putin unleashed this war. That is the only way to defeat propaganda."

On Feb. 27, Mr. Nemtsov was fatally shot in the back while walking on a bridge within sight of the Kremlin walls. The gunmen were arrested, but whoever ordered the murder has not been charged. This week, Mr. Nemtsov's allies and friends in Moscow published the report that he was working on at the time of his death about the war in Ukraine.

Like Mr. Nemtsov's other projects, the report captures ground truth that is rarely, if ever, documented these days in Russia. Mr. Nemtsov's reports were never perfect, but his stubborn refusal to give up was inspiring. In this case, he and his colleagues found that at least 220 Russian soldiers have been killed in Ukraine; that Russian authorities marshaled mercenaries by taking part in the recruitment, arming and financing; that the war has cost Russia more than $1 billion; and that it has been directed from the Kremlin by Vladislav Surkov, one of Mr. Putin's top aides.

Mr. Nemtsov's last act for his country befits his long pursuit of a Russia open and free - at a time when it is neither.

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