#2
The National Interest
May 11, 2015
Russia's Victory Day Celebration: Much More Than Just a Parade
Five key takeaways from this year's show in Red Square.
By Dmitri Trenin
Dmitri Trenin is Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center.

This has been the biggest military parade in Russia's modern history: 16,000 servicemen, 200 army vehicles, 150 aircraft. Warships paraded elsewhere-from Vladivostok on the Pacific to Sebastopol on the Black Sea to Severomorsk in the Arctic to Baltiysk in the Baltic. The Moscow parade culminated months of elaborate preparations to mark the seventieth anniversary of Soviet victory in the Great Patriotic War against Nazi Germany. The event has sent a number of important messages, which outsiders would do well to reflect upon.

More Than a National Day

May 9 is, for the Russian people, much more than Victory Day in a war that lasted almost four years and claimed 28 million of their men and women. Since Soviet times, it has been the country's true national day, overshadowing the official ones: the October Revolution Day and Russia Day in June. It was the shared grueling experience defending their country that shaped and formed Russia's modern nation, and has helped keep it together, even after the fall of the Soviet Union. The memory of the war has become sacred, and, for most people, according to a recent poll, May 9 is as important as their own birthday.

Conventional Military Might Redux

A military parade is above all about the military. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia's conventional military might declined dramatically. It was not until seven years ago that Moscow started rebuilding it in earnest. Since then, despite a fair amount of corruption and mismanagement, Russia's military reform has been a resounding success. The difference between the Russian military's haphazard performance in the 2008 Georgia war and its clockwork precision in the 2014 Crimea operation is stunning. The vast sums of money poured into military modernization have been turned into new weaponry. The 2015 parade featured a new-generation battle tank and new infantry combat vehicles, as well as the S-400 air defense system and the RS-24 Yars mobile intercontinental ballistic missile. As a conventional military power, Russia needs to catch up, but it is already making strides.

Russia's Alienation from the West Confirmed

Most of the talk in the run-up to the parade had been about the attendance by foreign leaders. The lineup in Red Square provides a useful illustration of Moscow's current international standing. Western leaders who were present en masse five years ago were now conspicuous in their absence. In his speech, President Putin thanked Britain, France and the United States, but he went on to condemn attempts to impose global unipolarity and the use of military force that undermined the post-WWII international order. The refusal of Western leaders to attend Moscow celebrations was seen by a lot of ordinary Russians as a confirmation of the new era of adversity between Russia and the West. As to "lost opportunities," they were probably lost in the five years since the previous big parade in Red Square.

Sino-Russo Entente Is More Than an "Axis of Convenience"

The star foreign guest in 2015 was President Xi Jinping of China. He was repeatedly shown on Russian TV chatting amiably with President Putin; the two men apparently enjoy each other's company. They watched as a PLA unit marched for the first time in Red Square and the S-400 system drove by, soon to be sold to China. The day before, Putin and Xi had watched dozens of economic cooperation accords signed between China and Russia. At a press conference, Putin talked about "a common economic space of Eurasia" to be built by harmonizing China's "one belt, one road" strategy with the Eurasian Economic Union. This is a clear departure from Putin's own "Greater Europe" idea from five years ago. A number of other leaders from this emerging Greater Eurasia-from Kazakhstan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan-were also on hand in Red Square. This rapprochement is about much more than geoeconomics: in his May 9 remarks, Putin highlighted China's role and sacrifices in WWII in the fight against Japanese militarism-a preview of a Russian leader's first-ever appearance at the Beijing WWII parade in September.

Russia's Place in the "Non-West"

Other world leaders in Moscow came mostly from Asia (India, Vietnam, and Mongolia), the Middle East and Africa (Egypt, Palestine, South Africa, Zimbabwe) and Latin America (Cuba, Venezuela). Increasingly, Russia has been identifying itself as a non-Western country following its own path. Within two months, President Putin will be hosting two summits back-to-back: of the BRICS countries and of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In both, China is prominently present. Ever-closer Sino-Russian cooperation in both fora and at the UN Security Council level would lead to a further consolidation of the "non-West" as the global order keeps changing. The one Western leader to come to Moscow after the parade is the German chancellor, Angela Merkel. On May 10, she will honor the victims of WWII and hold talks with Putin on Ukraine. The political distance between Moscow and Berlin has multiplied. The Russo-German special relationship-a mainstay of post-Cold War cooperation in Europe-is history, like WWII.


 

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 #3
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
May 11, 2015
Russia's Victory Day, through the eyes of the Russian media
Russian media roundup: Russia's celebration of Victory Day on May 9 had a number of important implications for Russian foreign policy, including the future of relations with both China and Germany.
By Anastasia Borik

The nationwide celebration of the 70th anniversary of Victory Day on May 9 was the focus of the Russian media's attention throughout the week. The celebratory events helped to set the context for the arrival to Russia of Chinese President Xi Jinping and German Chancellor Angela Merkel. In addition to the May 9 events, the Russian media focused on the election results in two key European nations - the UK and Poland - and what they might mean for Russia.

Victory Day parade and May 9 celebrations

The Russian media actively discussed the grandiose celebrations of the 70th anniversary of Russia's victory in the Great Patriotic War. The business media outlet Vedomosti, in its op-ed section, argue that the celebration of victory in the Great Patriotic War, for Russia's rulers, have become an ideological weapon aimed at rallying the people. Moreover, they are being used to justify the current aggressive rhetoric in Russian foreign policy.

The tabloid Moskovsky Komsomolets tells the story of the campaign of the Immortal Regiment. The essence of this activity is for people to walk with a portrait of a relative who fought in the war at certain places in the city. This activity was held all over Russia, and was attended by about 12 million people. The newspaper notes that the initiative is certainly a good one, but that it also contains a tragic component - very soon there will be no more living veterans of the war left, and this is particularly evident in the marches of the Immortal Regiments.

The radio station Echo of Moscow also discusses the importance of the Immortal Regiment march that was attended by Russian President Vladimir Putin. The blog post at the radio station's website considers this a purely political move, and noted that this very procession made the May 9 celebrations a "truly national event."

In contrast to the positive articles, the independent Internet outlet, Slon, came out with a largely critical article. In this article, political scientist Andrey Movchan writes about the perversion of the values of Victory Day celebrations in modern society, claiming that "history has been privatized by marauders" who profit from the exploits and sacrifices of real heroes, which, a long time ago, they "pushed off the stage."

Arrival of Angela Merkel in Moscow on May 10

The visit of the German Chancellor to Moscow as part of the commemorative events in honor of May 9 caused a stir among Russian media. The pro-government Rossiyskaya Gazeta sees Merkel's visit on May 10 as an attempt by Germany to mitigate the negativity caused by the Chancellor's refusal to attend the Victory Day parade on May 9.

At the same time, newspapers point out to the mutual desire of Russia and Germany to normalize dialogue, because the political problems have had a serious impact on economic ties between the two countries.

The business newspaper Kommersant argues that due to the "cooling" in Russian-German (and Russian-EU) relations, trade has suffered the most, which in 2014 fell by 6.5 percent.

The tabloid Moskovsky Komsomolets point out to a certain change in Merkel's demeanor, who, as the newspaper noted, "For the first time in a long time, even smiled at Vladimir Putin."

Xi Jinping in Moscow for Victory Day

The Chinese leader arrived in Moscow to participate in the Victory Day festivities. However, the two leaders managed more than just participating in the special celebration activities - they also discussed the future of Russian-Chinese relations, signing 40 bilateral agreements. Among the most significant was a package of investment agreements, supplementing the large-scale "gas contract," as well as an agreement on cooperation in the military and infrastructure sectors.

The business publication Vedomosti calculated the total value of the 40 agreements, while also noting that the parties had signed and a political statement about the "deepening of partnership and strategic cooperation."

The pro-government Rossiyskaya Gazeta wrote not only about joint economic projects, but also about the fact that Russia and China together are seeking peace, and one of the priorities of the two countries is to safeguard peace in the world.

The website of the Echo of Moscow radio station warned against excessive orientation on China, believing that, first of all, this would be an unequal relationship, and secondly, a focus on the complicated bureaucratic regime, with elements of total control, is separating Russia from democratic development.

Elections in Poland

Elections in one of the most anti-Russian countries in Europe - Poland - attracted the attention of Russian journalists. In this regard, all were in agreement - no matter who wins the presidential race and comes to power, relations with Russia would remain the same.

Moskovsky Komsomolets wrote about the variety of pre-election promises of the candidates, noting that, in reality, the "Russian Question" does not concern the Poles that much. The business newspaper Kommersant points to the pro-Russian views of only two of the 11 presidential candidates, while predicting a victory for incumbent President Bronislaw Komorowski, who is distinguished by his aggressive anti-Russian rhetoric.

The pro-government Channel One believes that there are no chances for the pro-Russian forces to win in these elections, while also noting the drop in popularity of the incumbent President Bronislaw Komorowski, due to the deteriorating economic situation in the country.

Elections in the United Kingdom

The parliamentary elections in the UK were also not ignored by the Russian press. The business newspaper Kommersant considers the landslide victory of the Conservatives as unexpected, noting, however, their better and well-thought-out economic agenda within the framework of the electoral program, and the latest achievements in the fight against unemployment.

Another business daily - Vedomosti - paid much more attention to the third place ranking achieved by the Scottish National Party, for which these elections became a real success. The publication notes that the new government will now have to reckon with such a significant political rival.

The Moskovsky Komsomolets also discusses the role of the Scottish Party, noting that the party could give its support to any of the "heavyweights."

The Yevgenia Vasilyeva case

The sensational trial involving large-scale embezzlement, which has been dragging on for more than two years, finally ended in a conviction of the main actor in this case - Yevgenia Vasilyeva.

The "Oboronservis Case" began two and one-half years ago, when large-scale corruption schemes were discovered in the Russian Defense Ministry. This corruption resulted in Yevgenia Vasilyeva, the head of the Department of Property Relations of the Ministry of Defense, causing damages to the state of about $3 billion.

The whole situation was complicated by an alleged love affair between Vasilyeva and former Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov. After a long trial, numerous rumors were circulating about a possible probation sentence being handed to Vasilyeva, yet nevertheless, she was given five years in a penal colony.

The opposition newspaper Novaya Gazeta calls Vasilyeva's sentence a farce, a kind of "gift" to the common people on May 9 (it should be noted that by her behavior and a life of luxury, while under house arrest, Vasilyeva elicited virtually unanimous anger on the part of the public).

The business newspaper Vedomosti listed the details of the sentencing and pointed out that there was a possibility that Vasilyeva could be released after a couple of months on parole; after all, the two and one-half years of her house arrest have been included in the total prison term. The business daily Kommersant said that the sentence is too soft - the result of too much media attention.

Best Quotes of the Week

Angela Merkel during her visit to Russia: "Great expectations have been placed on us. And with my visit today, I wanted to show that we are working together with Russia, and not against it... [But] the criminal and illegal annexation of Crimea, as well as the military actions in Ukraine, have dealt a serious blow to the cooperation [between Russia and Germany]... The annexation of Crimea is a threat to the European peaceful order."

Vladimir Putin at a meeting with Angela Merkel commented on the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between Germany and the Soviet Union: "The security of the Soviet Union was the reason for this pact. This is the first thing. Now the second - I recall that after the signing of the Munich Agreement [in 1938], Poland itself had taken steps aimed at annexing some Czech territories. It so happened that after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and the partition of Poland, this latter country became the victim of the policies that it tried to carry out in Europe."

[Editor's note: The non-aggression pact signed between Germany and the Soviet Union, known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, based on the last names of the foreign ministers who signed it, was concluded in August 1939. This pact was supplemented with secret additional protocol on the delimitation of spheres of mutual interests in Eastern Europe. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact made possible the territorial division of Poland between Germany and the U.S.S.R., which took place in September 1939, as well the annexation of the Baltic countries by the Soviet Union.]

[Editor's note: The Munich Agreement was signed on September 29, 1938, between Great Britain, France, Italy, and Germany. According to this agreement, the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia, where Germans constituted the majority of the population, was given to Germany. Poland also made territorial claims against Czechoslovakia, and after Germany annexed the Sudetenland, Poland sent troops into the Cieszyn Region, the subject of the territorial disputes.]

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 #4
Kremlin.ru
May 9, 2015
Interview to Rossiya television channel

Following the events celebrating the 70th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War, Vladimir Putin answered questions from Sergei Brilev, anchor of the Vesti v Subbotu (News on Saturday) programme on Rossiya television channel.

Anchor of the Vesti v Subbotu programme on Rossiya television channel Sergei Brilev: Mr President, did you see everyone you hoped to see at the parade today?

President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Do you mean the guests, or everyone in general who came to the parade?

Sergei Brilev: Let's start with the guests. At one point, we were expecting the Americans and Europeans to come after all, but in the end they did not. Did this disappoint you?

Vladimir Putin: No. It makes me happy that around the world people are celebrating the Day of Victory over Nazism. I think that no matter where people are celebrating, if this is a genuine holiday for them, this is already a good thing.

There were veterans from the United States and Britain present today at the reception at the Kremlin. They came up and spoke very warm and friendly words. These were people who took part in the northern convoys, in the Normandy landing and in the fighting in Europe. We saw everyone we hoped to see here.

The main thing is for people to understand that the fight against Nazism was very important and that it was a very important milestone in human history.

As for what we saw today, I want to say that we saw many happy faces, our fellow citizens' faces, and this is the main thing. We see May 9 as our great holiday, perhaps the most important date of all in our country's history.

Finally, you saw the event today, the public event that was given the name The Immortal Regiment. People carried portraits of their loved ones, their fathers, mothers, grandfathers, great-grandfathers. People carried these portraits across Red Square.

Sergei Brilev: When did you decide to join in this event and walk together with the people?

Vladimir Putin: I can't say that it was just a last-minute decision, but it was something I had not really thought about. Later, I learned that the march would take place right on Red Square and I decided that I would take part too. After all, my father was just an ordinary soldier, but it was the courage, blood and bodies of the ordinary Soviet soldiers that paved the road to Victory.

When we carry their photos, it is our way of paying tribute to all that they did for our country. At the same time, we realise that the responsibility for Russia now lies on our shoulders. We must be worthy of the feat of our fathers and grandfathers.

Sergei Brilev: Thank you, Mr President.

Vladimir Putin: Happy holiday!

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 #5
Bloomberg
May 11, 2015
Putin's Tanks Draw Cheers in Russian City Jammed Between NATO Nations
By Leonid Ragozin

Tanks and ballistic missiles lumbered past thousands of spectators gathered in Kaliningrad on Saturday to mark the 70th anniversary of the Allied victory in Europe, an historic triumph for Russia that the Kremlin has used to whip up a new nationalist fervor.

"We need to show our enemies, who deem us guilty just because we exist, that Russia is a very peculiar woman-she can knock you down without a second thought," said Aleksandr Sapenko, a 64-year-old history teacher, citing the U.S. and European Union as Russia's main enemies. "Soviet soldiers saved them from the Nazi gas chambers, but they are barking at Russia like a pack of stray dogs."

This Russian enclave was once the German province of East Prussia; the city's Victory Square was known for centuries as Hansa Platz and briefly as Adolf Hitler Platz. On Saturday, when Russia and the former Soviet republics marked the anniversary of Hitler's defeat in World War II, the square was awash in Russian and Soviet flags. Many people brought their children, whom soldiers encouraged to climb tanks and pose for photographs while wearing garrison caps and clutching tank-shaped balloons. Similar parades were held all over Russia, notably in Moscow, the capital, where more than 16,500 troops marched in Red Square.

In the postwar settlement, East Prussia was incorporated into the Russian republic of the USSR, its entire population deported to Germany and the province repopulated with Soviet citizens, primarily ethnic Russians. Nearly flattened by British bombers and Soviet artillery, the East Prussian capital, Koenigsberg, was rebuilt as a drab Soviet city and renamed Kaliningrad, after Mikhail Kalinin, a Stalin functionary who held the largely ceremonial post of Soviet president during the war.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Kaliningrad region found itself wedged between two EU and NATO countries-Poland and Lithuania.
Locals benefit from the region's geography; more than 70 percent of them, compared with 30 percent in Russia, have passports needed for foreign travel, and European visas are easy to get.

At the rally, Nikita, a 21-year-old student sporting a red Soviet flag on his bicycle, complained about the hardware. "Why couldn't they show the new T-90 tanks instead of the old T-72s?" he said, more satisfied with the state-of-the-art Platforma-M robot tanks. Nikita said such parades were necessary so that no one forgets Russia's war sacrifice. "It is also important to show our military might, but it's not to scare the neighbors," he said. "They are not our enemies, and we should all be united."

They may not be Russia's enemies, but they are alarmed by resurgent nationalism here and by the Kremlin's naval base and two air bases in the region-especially after Russian President Vladimir Putin's seizure of Crimea last year and Russia's incursions into eastern Ukraine.

"Ukraine is very close to Poland, so people have the right to be afraid. We are also afraid of exercises conducted by Russian troops," said General Roman Polko, former head of Poland's National Security Bureau. Nine thousand troops and dozens of warships were engaged in December's drill, when Russia moved Iskander ballistic missiles into the Kaliningrad region.

"In Poland, we are not protected from these kinds of weapons. For 10 years, instead of improving our capabilities, we've been focusing on faraway countries, like Afghanistan and Iraq," Polko said.

In January, the Russian army's chief of staff, Valery Gerasimov, said the national priority for 2015 was to beef up the armed forces in the region, as well as in Crimea and the Arctic. The latest massive drill, held in March, engaged forces across the entire Russian northwest, including Kaliningrad.

Solomon Ginzburg, a local democratic opposition leader who sits on the foreign affairs and security committee in the regional parliament, dismissed the increased military activity as "an imitation of imperial might needed to prop up the monumental popularity ratings of the Russian leadership." He doesn't think the Kremlin would seriously consider a war with NATO. His main worry is the economic impact of the standoff with the West.

"Economically, here in Kaliningrad, we are hostages to our country's geopolitical endeavors. Foreign investment has practically ceased to flow in," he said. A Russian ban on food imports from EU countries, imposed in response to Western sanctions over the invasion of Crimea, hit local businesses much harder than European producers. Ginzburg cited 15 small factories, which processed Norwegian salmon, that had to close.

On the day Russia introduced its own sanctions, local businesses lost between $40 million and $70 million because the ban stopped them from importing products they had already paid for. Asked about the losses by Kaliningrad's governor, Nikolay Tsukanov, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev said it was "force majeure," that the Kremlin hadn't had a choice and the businessmen shouldn't count on compensation.

"I don't see it as force majeure," said Vladimir Dianov, who heads the local Federation of Small and Medium-Sized Businesses. "I see it as a deceit, swindle, and foul game against the entrepreneurs." Although territorial expansion is a good thing, Dianov said, Crimea wasn't worth the price Russia has paid for it-financial losses and a war with "the Ukrainian brothers."

Combined with the devaluation of the ruble since Russia's forays into Ukraine, the ban on European food sent prices soaring. The local government puts the 2014 inflation rate at 15 percent, compared with 7 percent in the rest of Russia, reflecting the region's greater dependence on Polish and Lithuanian products. Ginzburg estimates the local inflation figure as 22 percent, quoting research done by his own think tank
.
With fresh memories of large-scale protests that swept Kaliningrad in 2009 and 2010, starting with anger over taxes and broadening to wider economic and political demands, the local authorities are suppressing dissent. Three anti-Putin activists have remained in jail for 14 months for hanging a German flag on the local directorate of the FSB, Russia's security service and the main successor to the Soviet KGB, in March of last year. Their lawyer, Maria Bontsler, said it was their answer to pro-Russian rebels hoisting Russian flags on government buildings in Ukraine.

"They wanted to say that if Russia can claim Crimea, then Germany can just as well claim back Eastern Prussia," she said. Charged with hooliganism and insulting war veterans, the three face up to seven years in prison. Their trial will resume soon after the Victory Day celebrations.

#6
Russia Insider
www.russia-insider.com
May 11, 2015
The Truth About the Soviet German Non-Aggression Pact of August 23rd 1939 and Its Secret Protocol
In no part of its text does the Secret Protocol assign Polish or Baltic territory to the USSR or Nazi Germany
By Alexander Mercouris
Alexander Mercouris is a writer on international affairs with a special interest in Russia and law.  He has written extensively on the legal aspects of NSA spying and events in Ukraine in terms of human rights, constitutionality and international law.  He worked for 12 years in the Royal Courts of Justice in London as a lawyer, specializing in human rights and constitutional law. His family has been prominent in Greek politics for several generations.  He is a frequent commentator on television and speaker at conferences.  He resides in London.

The anniversary of the end of the Second World War has, as is now routine, resurrected the subject of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Non-Aggression Pact of 23rd August 1939.

The subject was even brought up during Putin's press conference with Merkel on 10th May 2015.  Here is what Putin said:

"Concerning the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, let me draw your attention to the historical events, when the Soviet Union... It is not even so important who was in charge of diplomacy at the time. Stalin was in charge, of course, but he was not the only person thinking about how to guarantee the Soviet Union's security. The Soviet Union made tremendous efforts to put in place conditions for collective resistance to Nazism in Germany and made repeated attempts to create an anti-Nazi bloc in Europe.

"All of these attempts failed. What's more, after 1938, when the well-known agreement was concluded in Munich, conceding some regions of Czechoslovakia, some politicians thought that war was inevitable. Churchill, for example, when his colleague came back to London with this bit of paper and said that he had brought peace, said in reply, 'Now war is inevitable.'

"When the Soviet Union realised that it was left to face Hitler's Germany on its own, it acted to try to avoid a direct confrontation, and this resulted in signing the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. In this sense, I agree with our Culture Minister's view that this pact did make sense in terms of guaranteeing the Soviet Union's security. This is my first point.

"Second, I remind you that after the Munich Agreement was signed, Poland itself took steps to annex part of Czech territory. In the end, following the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the division of Poland, they fell victim to the same policy that they tried to pursue in Europe."

The relevance of this pact both to Russia's celebration of the Soviet victory in the Second World War, and to the international situation today, is not obvious, given that today's Russia is not the USSR and Putin is not Stalin.  

However it constantly gets brought up, especially by East European politicians who, out of hostility to Russia, seek to apportion blame equally between Germany and Russia for the start of the Second World War.

That claim is false. It is Putin's version that is correct, as a simple statement of the facts shows.  

The facts are very simple and straightforward and are well-known, and problems of interpretation are (or should be) few.

The starting point is that Stalin had no plans in the spring or early summer of 1939 to attack Poland, and had no territorial claims against Poland.

Hitler by contrast did. In fact not only did Hitler plan to attack Poland, but he was resolved to do so.  

At the end of March 1939 he told General Brauchitsch, the head of the German army, that he would attack Poland if Poland did not surrender Danzig to him.  

On 3rd April 1939 he gave a formal directive to his generals to prepare plans to do so.  

On 28th April 1939 he denounced his non-aggression pact with Poland and threatened Poland publicly in a speech to the Reichstag, saying he would cease to look for a peaceful settlement with Poland if Poland did not give him Danzig and did not abandon its alliance with Britain.  

On 23rd May 1939, in a secret speech made to the top German leadership in his office in the New Chancellery, he put the issue beyond any further doubt, making his decision to attack Poland absolutely clear.

There is no instance of Hitler committing himself to attack a country and then failing to do so. Hitler would have attacked Poland in August 1939 whether Germany had agreed a Non-Aggression Pact with the USSR or not. Perhaps the only thing that might have deterred him was a formal alliance between Poland, the USSR and the Western powers.

That however did not happen, and the story of the diplomacy that preceded the signing in Moscow on 23rd August 1939 of the Non-Aggression Pact shows why.

In the event of a German attack on Poland, Britain and France were committed by the guarantees they gave Poland in March 1939 to come to its defence.

The only outstanding issue in the diplomacy leading up to the war was therefore whether Britain, France and Poland would be able to ally themselves with the USSR to defeat or deter Germany.

The need for such an alliance was obvious and was explained by Winston Churchill to the House of Commons in a speech he gave on 3rd April 1939:

"To stop here with a guarantee to Poland would be to halt in No-man's Land under fire of both trench lines and without the shelter of either.... Having begun to create a Grand Alliance against aggression, we cannot afford to fail.  We shall be in mortal danger if we fail.... The worst folly, which no one proposes we should commit, would be to chill and drive away any natural co-operation which Soviet Russia in her own deep interests feels it necessary to afford."

The story of the diplomacy of 1939 is that "chill and drive away" co-operation with the USSR is precisely what the Western Powers did.

An alliance with the USSR against Hitler ought to have been a straightforward matter given the intense hostility between the USSR and Nazi Germany and Soviet efforts throughout the 1930s to forge an alliance against Nazi Germany.  

Conditions however for forging such an alliance had never been worse than they were in the spring of 1939.

Britain and France had spurned a Soviet offer of alliance in 1938 and had sacrificed at the Munich Conference (from which the USSR was excluded) the USSR's ally Czechoslovakia.  

On 28th March 1939 Franco's troops occupied Madrid, the capital of the USSR's only other European ally, Republican Spain. Britain and France, whose policy had been instrumental in sealing the fate of the Republican Spain, actually recognised Franco's regime as the legitimate government of Spain on 27th February 1939 - before Madrid fell.

Not surprisingly, and as Putin correctly says, by April 1939 Stalin had as a result become deeply suspicious of the British and French. The debacles in Czechoslovakia and Spain will have taught him that Britain and France preferred an accommodation with Hitler, if that was humanly possible, to an alliance with him. The possibility that in a war with Hitler the British and French might leave him and the USSR hanging out to dry, must in the spring of 1939 have appeared very real to him

In a speech to the Communist Party Conference in Moscow on 10th March 1939 Stalin made his suspicion and disillusionment with the Western powers absolutely clear when he said that he would "not let our country be drawn into conflict by warmongers, whose custom is to let others pull their chestnuts out of the fire."

Very few Western writers have been prepared to acknowledge the influence on Soviet policy of Western policy during the Czech crisis of 1938, and over the course of the Spanish Civil War. Westerners, who are so acutely sensitive to Russian actions, real or imagined, are invariably blind to the effect their actions have on Russia. This has been true in recent years as well, as the West's misreading of Russia's reaction to NATO's expansion and to Western policy in Ukraine and Georgia, shows. It was equally true in 1939.

Despite his suspicions, Stalin did nonetheless make the Western powers an offer of alliance on 17th April 1939. As late as 15th August 1939 he continued making it, though by this point it's clear he had lost hope in it.

The reason the alliance did not happen is because Poland rejected it and Britain and France were not prepared to pressure Poland to accept it.  

The Poles made their position clear during the visit of Polish foreign minister Beck to London in early April 1939.  

In private discussions Beck told the British: "there were two things which it was impossible for Poland to do, namely, to make her policy dependent upon either Berlin or Moscow. Any pact of mutual assistance between Poland and Soviet Russia would bring an immediate hostile reaction from Berlin and would probably accelerate the outbreak of a conflict."  While the British could negotiate with Soviet Russia if they liked - and even undertake obligations towards her, "these obligations would in no way extend the obligations undertaken by Poland."

The Poles stuck firmly by this position throughout the ensuing crisis, categorically rejecting proposals for an alliance with the USSR or for Soviet troops to enter Poland to fight the Germans alongside them.

It was this Polish refusal to accept the offer of a Soviet alliance and of Soviet aid, and the failure of the Western powers to override it, that ultimately caused the failure of the negotiations for an alliance with the USSR.  

That this was a catastrophic failure of Western policy, which deprived the Western powers of the means to defend Poland - which they were committed to defending - was widely understood at the time and was said in a speech in the House of Commons by the former British Prime Minister David Lloyd George:

"If we are going in without the help of Russia we are walking into a trap. It is the only country whose arms can get there.... If Russia has not been brought into this matter because of certain feelings the Poles have that they do not want the Russians there, it is for us to declare the conditions, and unless the Poles are prepared to accept the only conditions with which we can successfully help them, the responsibility must be theirs."

The British and the French were not prepared "to declare the conditions" and the Poles refused to change their stance.  

By mid August 1939 this had become clear to Stalin, at which point, given the certainty of a German attack on Poland, the attractions for Stalin of the Non-Aggression Pact Hitler was offering had become overwhelming. Given Stalin's deep suspicions of both the Germans and the West, and the West's failure to agree his offer of alliance, a peace agreement with Germany that minimised the risk to the USSR of a hostile Germany on its western border, made obvious sense.  

The whole issue has been muddled by constant misrepresentation of the Non-Aggression Pact's Secret Protocol, which is invariably misrepresented as an agreement by Stalin and Hitler for a cynical carve up of Eastern Europe.

The language of the Secret Protocol (reproduced below, together with that of the Non-Aggression Pact and of the subsequent Protocols which amended it) does not bear that out.  

In no part of its text does the Secret Protocol assign Polish or Baltic territory to the USSR or to Nazi Germany.  

The purpose of the Secret Protocol is made clear both by its text and by its context - a pending German attack on Poland. It was to prevent the German army, after it defeated Poland, marching into regions (eastern Poland, the Baltic States and Bessarabia), which the USSR considered vital for its own security.  In private conversations (alluded to in the text of the Secret Protocol) Stalin and Molotov made clear to Ribbentrop that that would be unacceptable and that were it to happen the Non-Aggression Pact would be dead. As its text says, the Secret Protocol was intended to put the substance of these conversations into writing.

Using today's language, the Secret Protocol set out Stalin's red lines, the crossing of which by Nazi Germany would not be tolerated, and which would lead to war. In the context of a pending German attack on Poland, they made total sense. Far from converting the Non-Aggression Pact into some sort of secret alliance, insisting on them was a basic precaution, which made the Non-Aggression Pact possible by placing a limit on German expansion, which for Stalin and Molotov was its whole point.  

In the event, when Nazi Germany did cross the red lines on 22nd June 1941, the Non-Aggression Pact was dead, and war followed.

The issue has been clouded because of certain steps the USSR took between the signing of the Non-Aggression Pact on 23rd August 1939 and the German attack on the USSR on 22nd June 1941.  

Following the German attack on Poland, in October 1939, in an act that understandably continues to cause great bitterness in Poland, the USSR annexed eastern Poland, which was predominantly but by no means exclusively populated by Ukrainians and Byelorussians.  

Over the course of the winter of 1939-1940 the USSR fought a brief but bitter war with Finland, which resulted in the Soviet annexation of Karelia.  

In June 1940, following the defeat by Nazi Germany of France, the USSR annexed the three Baltic States, which in October 1940 it had previously pressured into agreeing mutual defence arrangements.  

Lastly, in July 1940 the USSR annexed Bessarabia (today's Moldova), which it acquired from Romania.

These actions were not authorised by the Secret Protocol or by any of the other Protocols the USSR concluded with Nazi Germany.  There is nothing in the text of the Secret Protocol of 23rd August 1939 that authorises such annexations. The Soviet annexation of the Baltic States and of Bessarabia took place almost a year after the Secret Protocol was signed, making the Secret Protocol's relevance to these annexations dubious, to say the least.  

At the time all of these actions were construed both by the Germans and by the West for what they were - anti-German actions intended to strengthen the USSR's position in light of Nazi Germany's growing power in Europe. Hitler did not prevent them, not because he agreed to them, but because as he was fully occupied in the West when they happened, he lacked the means to prevent them.  

Hitler did however eventually attack the USSR on 22nd June 1941, and in his speech declaring war on the USSR (which directly alluded to the Secret Protocol) he bitterly complained about these Soviet actions, which he made clear he saw as directed against Germany.

In relation to Finland and the Baltic States he said the following:

"The first results were evident in fall 1939 and spring 1940. Russia justified its attempts to subject not only Finland, but also the Baltic states, by the sudden false and absurd claim that it was protecting them from a foreign threat, or that it was acting to prevent that threat. Only Germany could have been meant. No other power could enter the Baltic Sea, or wage war there. I still had to remain silent. The rulers of the Kremlin continued.

"Consistent with the so-called friendship treaty, Germany removed its troops far from its eastern border in spring 1940. Russian forces were already moving in, and in numbers that could only be seen as a clear threat to Germany.

"According to a statement by Molotov, there were already 22 Russian divisions in the Baltic states in spring 1940.

"Although the Russian government always claimed that the troops were there at the request of the people who lived there, their purpose could only be seen as a demonstration aimed at Germany."

In relation to the Soviet annexation of Bessarabia he said the following, making clear how grudgingly he accepted it:

"Russia's threatened attack on Rumania was intended not only to take over an important element in the economic life not only of Germany, but of Europe as whole, or at least to destroy it.

"With boundless patience, the German Reich attempted after 1933 to win over the southeastern European states as trading partners. We, therefore, had the greatest possible interest in their domestic stability and order.

"Russia's entrance into Rumania and Greece's ties to England threatened to rapidly transform this area into a general battleground.

"Despite our principles and customs, and despite the fact that the Rumanian government had brought on these troubles itself, I urgently advised them, for the sake of peace, to bow to Soviet extortion and cede Bessarabia."

Even in relation to Poland Hitler bitterly complained that the victory over Poland had been "gained exclusively by German troops", making his anger at the USSR's annexation of eastern Poland obvious.

Since Hitler's speech of 22nd June 1941 does not bear out claims of a cynical Soviet German carve-up of eastern Europe in August 1939, it is very rarely quoted in the West, though it is one of the most important speeches of Hitler's career.

Of course what Hitler said would by itself count for little. In this case however his words are fully borne out both by the historical record and by the text of the Non-Aggression Pact and of the Secret Protocol.

This has been known for decades, allowing the British historian A.J.P. Taylor to say of the Non-Aggression Pact as long ago as 1961:

"However one spins the crystal and tries to look into the future from the point of view of 23 August 1939, it is difficult to see what other course Soviet Russia could have followed.  The Soviet apprehensions of a European alliance against Russia were exaggerated, though not groundless.  But, quite apart from this - given the Polish refusal of Soviet aid, given too the British policy of drawing out negotiations in Moscow without seriously striving for a conclusion - neutrality, with or without a formal pact, was the most that Soviet diplomacy could attain; and limitation of German gains in Poland and the Baltic was the inducement which made a formal pact attractive."

(A.J.P. Taylor: The Origins of the Second World War, Hamish Hamilton, 1961)

Nothing in the vast tide of literature that has been written on this subject since those words were written has challenged their truth.  Despite the constant obfuscation there continues to be around this issue, they remain the best - and ought to be the last - words on the subject.

Putin's words during his press conference with Merkel on 10th May 2015 show that on this issue too the historical truth is known in Russia, even if for political reasons it is being denied elsewhere.

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There here follows the text of the Non-Aggression and of its Secret Protocols

TEXT OF SOVIET GERMAN NON AGGRESSION PACT Dated 23rd August 1939

The Government of the German Reich and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics desirous of strengthening the cause of peace between Germany and the U.S.S.R and proceeding from the fundamental provisions of the Neutrality Agreement concluded in April 1926 between Germany and the U.S.S.R., have reached the following agreement:

ARTICLE I

Both High Contracting Parties obligate, themselves to desist from any act of violence, any aggressive action, and any attack on each other, either individually or jointly with other powers.

ARTICLE II

Should one of the High Contracting Parties become the object of belligerent action by a third power, the other High Contracting Party shall in no manner lend its support to this third power.

ARTICLE III

The Governments of the two High Contracting Parties shall in the future maintain continual contact with one another for the purpose of consultation in order to exchange information on problems affecting their common interests.

ARTICLE IV

Neither of the two High Contracting Parties shall participate in any grouping of powers whatsoever that is directly or indirectly aimed at the other party.

ARTICLE V

Should disputes or conflicts arise between the High Contracting Parties over problems of one kind or another, both parties shall settle these disputes or conflicts exclusively through friendly exchange of opinion or, if necessary, through the establishment of arbitration commissions.

ARTICLE VI

The present treaty is concluded for a period of ten years, with the provision that, in so far as one of the High Contracting Parties does not denounce it one year prior to the expiration of this period, the validity of this treaty shall automatically be extended for another five years.

ARTICLE VI

The present treaty shall be ratified within the shortest possible time. The ratifications shall be exchanged in Berlin. The agreement shall enter into force as soon as it is signed.

Done in duplicate, in the German and Russian languages.

MOSCOW, August 23, 1939.

For the Government of the German Reich:

V. RIBBENTROP

With full power of the Government of the U.S.S.R.:

V. MOLOTOV

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FIRST SECRET PROTOCOL dated 23rd August 1939

On the occasion of the signature of the nonaggression treaty between the German Reich and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the undersigned plenipotentiaries of the two parties discussed in strictly confidential conversations the question of the delimitation of their respective spheres of interest in Eastern Europe.

These conversations led to the following result:

In the event of a territorial and political transformation in the territories belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern frontier of Lithuania shall represent the frontier of the spheres of interest both of Germany and the U.S.S.R. In this connection the interest of Lithuania in the Vilna territory is recognized by both parties.

In the event of a territorial and political transformation of the territories belonging to the Polish state, the spheres of interest of both Germany and the U.S.S.R. shall be bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narev, Vistula and San.  The question whether the interests of both parties make the maintenance of an independent Polish state appear desirable and how the frontiers of this state should be drawn can be definitely determined only in the course of further political developments.  In any case both governments will resolve this question by means of a friendly understanding.

With regard to southeastern Europe, the Soviet side emphasizes its interest in Bessarabia. The German side declares complete political disinterest in these territories.
This protocol will be treated by both parties as strictly secret.
Moscow, Aug. 23, 1939.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE GERMAN REICH: VON RIBBENTROP

WITH FULL POWER OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE U.S.S.R.: V. MOLOTOV Secret Supplementary Protocol

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SECOND SECRET PROTOCOL dated 28th September 1939

The undersigned delegates establish agreement between the Government of the German Reich and the Government of the U.S.S.R. concerning for the concerning the following matters:

The secret supplementary protocol signed on Aug. 23, 1939 is amended at No. 1 in that the territory of Lithuania comes under the U.S.S.R. sphere of interest, because on the other side the administrative district "Woywodschaft" of Lubin and parts of the administrative district of Warsaw come under the German sphere of influence (cf., map accompanying the boundary and friendship treaties ratified today). As soon as the Government of the U.S.S.R. takes special measures to safeguard its interests on Lithuanian territory, the present Germany-Lithuanian border will be rectified in the interests of simple and natural delimitation, so that the territory of Lithuania lying southwest of the line drawn on the accompanying map will fall to Germany.

It is further established that the economic arrangements in force at the present time between Germany and Lithuania will be in no way damaged by the aforementioned measures being taken by the Soviet Union.

Moscow, Sept. 28, 1939.

VON RIBBENTROP FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE GERMAN REICH.

V. MOLOTOV ON THE AUTHORITY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE U.S.S.R.

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THIRD SECRET PROTOCOL dated 10th January 1941

Graf von Schulenburg, the German Ambassador, acting for the Government of the German Reich, and the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., V. M. Molotov, acting for the Government of the U.S.S.R., have agreed upon the following points:

The Government of the German Reich renounces its claims to the portion of the territory of Lithuania mentioned in the Sept. 28, 1939 Secret Protocol and shown on the included map.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is prepared to compensate the Government of the German Reich for the territory mentioned in Point 1 of this protocol by payment of the sum of 7,500,000 gold dollars, or 31,500,000 reichsmarks to Germany.Payment of the sum of 31.5 million reichsmarks will be accomplished by the U.S.S.R. in the following way: one-eighth, i.e., 3,937,500 reichsmarks, in shipments of nonferrous metal within three months of ratification of this treaty, and the remaining seven-eighths, 27,562,500 reichsmarks, in gold by a deduction from the German payments in gold which the German side was to bring up by Feb. 11, 1941. On the basis of the correspondence concerning the Feb. 11, 1940 economic agreement between the German Reich and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the second section of the agreement between the chairman of the German economic delegation, Herr Schnurre and the people's commissar for U.S.S.R. foreign trade, Herr A. I. Mikoyan.

This protocol has been prepared in both German and Russian (two originals) and goes into effect upon being ratified.

Moscow, Jan. 10, 1941.

(Illegible, presumably von Schulenburg) FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE GERMAN REICH

V. MOLOTOV ACTING FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE U.S.S.R.

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 #7
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
May 12, 2015
The future of Russian conservatism is a lot less scary than the West thinks
Against a background of rising conservative-patriotic sentiment in Russian society, Russian conservatives should explain how their ideology and views differ from those of the far right and far left.
By Nikolay Pakhomov
Nikolay Pakhomov is an expert at the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC). He is a commentator in a number of Russian and international media outlets, including Politcom.ru.

The incorporation of Crimea into Russia resulted in unprecedented pressure placed on Russia by the West, which in turn contributed to the growth of conservative and patriotic sentiments in the country. Most importantly, discussions resumed about so-called Russia's unique destiny of development, the existense of a unique Russian civilization in the world, and the role of Russian traditions and history.

On one side of these discussions stand the Russian conservatives, whose ranks recently started to increase. On the other side stand the relatively small but active number of Russian liberals and representatives of the democratic opposition, supported by Western critics. These critics began to reproach Russian conservatives for various sins, including nationalism, obscurantism and ignorance.

Experts talk about the popularity of conservative ideas among representatives of the Russian political class. In this regard, the obvious question becomes: Just how justified are the accusations by these critics, who largely portray Russian conservatives as backwards looking?

Understanding conservatism as a tool against radicalism

The strategy of the critics who accuse the Russian authorities and society of conservatism, and then attempt to make this conservatism equivalent to a number of unattractive ideas - such as isolationism, irrationalism, clericalism and nationalism - is nothing new. Over the past 100-150 years, opponents of conservatives in various countries have actively used this strategy. However, how much do these accusations correspond to reality?

First of all, we should recall that conservatism is an integral part of the Western tradition of political thought. This tradition was established by the English philosopher and statesman Edmund Burke. Many respected Western scholars of his ideas (such as Samuel Huntington) have always emphasized that conservatism, to a lesser extent than other ideological currents, has its own set of ideals.

Conservatism, at its core, is a rather carefully reasoned appeal to respect the traditions of individual countries and avoid political extremism. In other words, it is wrong to hang the label of "right wing" ideology - with its well-known set of ideas - on conservatism. If we seek a place on the political scale, then conservatism should be located in a position where it is opposed to any form of radicalism.

We also need to clearly understand the fact that Burke had formulated his ideas in a particular historical epoch, that of the French Revolution, which had frightened the world with its bloody extremism. Edmund Burke supported the liberal program of the British "Whigs," but emphasized that he supported this program in Britain, and for Britain - but was categorically opposed to imposing this program in other countries, where its implementation does not have the corresponding historical, cultural, economic and social conditions.

Russia's conservative reforms

Modern Russia had its own destructive "revolution" of the 1990s, the driving force behind which was the desire to break with the historical experience of the country and to implement Western prescriptions for political and economic development, without taking into account existing conditions in the country. Over the past decade, the country has barely started to overcome the serious negative consequences of these efforts.

Just consider the broader context of the "Color Revolutions," the "Arab Spring", and the hardest of all - the Ukrainian crisis. Now Russian conservatives can respond to domestic and foreign critics, who are demanding drastic change, with the words of Stolypin: "You need great upheavals - we need a great Russia!"

This phrase of the former Russian prime minister is well known outside the context in which it was spoken. It is especially important to emphasize that it was spoken in the State Duma during a debate on agrarian reform. It is amazing how this statement is still relevant to this day, as well as many others in the heritage of Stolypin, for today's Russia.

"After working about 10 years on the agrarian portfolio, I have come to the firm conviction that in this case - what we need is hard work, we need long laborious work," Stolypin announced back then. "In Western countries this took decades. We offer you a modest but correct path. The opponents of government would like us to follow the path of radicalism, the path of liberation from Russia's historical past, liberation from our cultural traditions."

We should not forget that Stolypin's conservatism did not mean the rejection of reforms. And in this, Stolypin is the brightest Russian representative of classical conservatism, such conservatism that has been adhered to by many prominent statesmen of the West, whether they be, for example, the British conservative prime ministers that implemented reforms, or the German Chancellor Bismarck.

Over time, the Conservatives have increasingly come to the conclusion that a strong state with a harmonious society of prosperous citizens is impossible without reforms. If such reforms were are not implemented, then one can expect the loss of the country's foreign policy positions, economic disasters, political and social upheavals that could destroy everything that is dear to the conservatives. Another thing is that these reforms must be wisely developed and carefully carried out, taking into thorough consideration all national circumstances and traditions.

Internal and external critics have often reproached the Russian government's commitment to cultural conservatism. However, in today's rapidly changing world, national and cultural traditions, family values, and religion often help people to cope with the rapidly growing informational load, the overall faster pace of life, the erosion of social structures, the weakening of the welfare state, and the pressure of trade and economic commitments.

Under such conditions, the governments in many countries, understanding the importance of family and religion, are doing everything possible to ensure that the state supports these institutions. In this sense, the Russian authorities are not alone.

In search for allies abroad

Thus, upon closer inspection, we understand the reasons for this growth in popularity of conservatism in Russia. In the face of serious domestic and international criticism, the Russian authorities, if they seriously intend to adhere to a conservative agenda, now need to formulate an appropriate program, to show compliance of this program with the interests of the state and society, and its similarity to reasonable and effective ideas of global conservatism.

In seeking to solve this last problem, Russian conservatives are trying to establish dialogue with their international counterparts. However, there are two paths by which this can be achieved. One is the easy path - but it is not necessarily the correct one. The second is the difficult path, but one that promises success in the long term.

For now, Russian conservatives have shown a preference for the first option, establishing contacts with forces of the far right in Europe, rather than conservative circles, repeating the common mistake of mixing the right-wing political agenda and a conservative approach to politics.

This would not be a big problem if these ultra-right-wing, mainly European leaders, would not remain marginalized in the politics of their countries. The expansion of cooperation with these marginalized circles carries the risk that any scandal concerning these forces will have a negative effect on the image of Russian conservatives.

And in the long-term perspective, these forces will not be able to rise to power in their respective countries, and therefore, cooperation with them will have a very limited impact, from the perspective of cooperation between the governments of their countries and Russia. After all, not all European right-wing conservatives are capable of following the example of F - to abandon scandalously radical positions in order to attract new voters.

The other and more difficult path is for Russian conservatives to gradually and diligently establish dialogue with conservatives in the ranks of the dominant European, and eventually American, political parties. The success of these parties is based on comprehensive centrism, and therefore, they should be representative of different forces, including conservative ones.

It is just such dialogue with these conservatives that can be particularly interesting and useful for Russian conservatives. For example, inside the German Christian Democratic Union (CDU), confidently dominating contemporary German politics, the conservative groups have not always agreed with the policies of the government of Chancellor Angela Merkel.

Similar groups exist in most European countries, and if Russian politicians and authorities really adopt conservative ideas, it will be necessary to find an approach to conservative representatives of the political establishment, and be able to convince them of the generality of the conservative agenda, and the existence of potential for cooperation.

The task is difficult, but nonetheless possible, especially if Russian conservatives really want to make progress in solving the problems of Russia's domestic and foreign policy. The first step towards such a success should be a clear recognition of the fact that conservatism and misoneism are two different things. Genuine conservatives are opposed to any radical measures, be they left-wing calls to build an ideal society of the future, or right-wing demands to take drastic measures to return to the realities of an obsolete past.

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 #8
Vedomosti
May 7, 2015
Russian experts question purpose of "Putin majority" research
Syuzanna Farizova, Pro-Kremlin Analysts Will Study 'Putin Majority'; This Is a Preventive Step in Case the President Faces a 'Ratings Slump,' Oppositionists Believe

Vladimir Putin's multiple-year presidency is the result of unique historical circumstances, and the "Putin majority" phenomenon is the logical outcome of the public demand for responsible leadership which had formed by the early 2000s. Those are the conclusions reached by experts from the Foundation for the Development of a Civil Society who have launched a long-term programme to study the "Putin majority." The experts will spend a year analysing the value systems and ideological preferences of the president's supporters, their age, social status, and influence on social and political life, and also the potential for further expanding the pro-presidential majority. The first results of the study have shown that over the course of Putin's rule the number of his supporters has increased 20 per cent and they have become markedly younger and represent all social groups (footnote) (April Figures. According to a recent poll by the "Public Opinion" Foundation, Vladimir Putin's electoral popularity rating has reached 76 per cent while his trust rating is 87 per cent. According to Levada Centre, these figures are 62 per cent and 60 per cent respectively). In the experts' opinion, the economic crisis has not affected Putin's popularity rating and no collapse of the figures should be expected.

Oppositionists see a purely utilitarian and not a scientific purpose to this study. "If a popularity rating slumps, you have to establish the reasons and pour petrodollars and financial reserves onto it all. That was the study's practical purpose," Vadim Solovyev, a State Duma deputy from the CPRF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation], assures us. Experts may advise what should be done in a specific sociopolitical situation, but studies of this kind are conducted inter alia for society itself, the deputy believes. "Putin's rating is high, no one disputes it, he has succeeded in engaging the mood of that part of society which was nostalgic for the USSR and for its lost lands, and when he brought back Crimea, society took heart." But it is important to understand what will happen after the short-lived triumph, the Communist adds. The authorities are seeking and creating new structures for controlling popular support, and that was the case before, but now "a pseudo-scientific basis" must be placed under these constructs, Yabloko party leader Sergey Mitrokhin believes. "The study itself has nothing to do with science but was needed solely for propaganda purposes."

Experts are less categorical.

"The Putin majority is not that stable and there is some point in focusing on an analysis of the fringe groups which in theory could split off," political analyst Yevgeniy Minchenko says. The practical purpose of the study lies in recommendations for holding onto these groups or reorienting them towards new political projects, he believes. "The 'Putin majority' phenomenon has not been studied today and there is a certain range of stereotypes: The more educated and progressive people are against Putin and the provinces are for Putin," Minchenko reminds us, but sociological studies show a rise in support for the president in Moscow. "We must not forget that in addition to the population at large there are also the elite groups, and it is important to analyse, for instance, the regional elites' attitude towards the local and federal authorities. Sometimes you can have a high level of support from the population but come up against the sabotage of the elites," the expert stresses.

"The transition from analysis to the subject of 'what makes the Putin majority happy and what pleases it' and to the question of what it wants and whether it wants anything at all apart from Putin's leadership is an important and necessary step from the viewpoint of a meaningful sociology," political analyst Mikhail Vinogradov believes. In his opinion, it is important to understand who is less stable - "the old loyalists or the newcomers," who expect stability or exploits from Putin. For the authorities and society that analysis is more useful than the use of high figures as an instrument for further legitimization, the expert says.

"The term 'Putin majority' was formerly used in a completely different sense: During Putin's first terms, it meant the people who really acted as voters and understood that they were the ones on whom whether he was elected or not depended," spin doctor Gleb Pavlovskiy reminisces. But now what they are sampling is the positions of voters on whom nothing depends and who do not have the issue of a real choice, the expert stresses: "This is, rather, utilitarian apparatus practice and an unscientific study and we are talking about offering the regime a new instrument for controlling political risks."

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 #9
Financial Times
May 12, 2015
We Russians need better ideas for life after Putin
We should engage with the west as equals, not as wards, writes Evgeny Gontmakher

The writer is a Russian economist

For a brief moment during the four-year presidency of Dmitry Medvedev, Russians like me hoped that our country might before long be at one with the rest of Europe. Now I feel only fear. Vladimir Putin's Russia is, in the president's mind, a country that charts its own exceptional path. But its citizens are accorded no such freedom. In politics, they are to be subordinate to the state, slavishly following the direction that others have chosen.

That would be worrying enough, even if our destination were known. It is not - even to Mr Putin. The Russian president wields power alone, and he enforces a strict monopoly on political ideas. Yet for all that, he has no vision. We are advancing along a path of which all but a few metres have yet to be carved.

Yes, the president constantly repeats that Russia's traditional values must be respected and that others must steer clear when its interests are at stake. But, even as his actions bend the world order out of shape, we can only imagine the contours of what he would choose to replace it. Sometimes I think our president is bluffing, hoping that his sudden manoeuvres will wear down the west by sheer exhaustion.

Many in Europe and the US are concerned about Russia's behaviour in matters of foreign policy. It is not just that Mr Putin's actions are unwelcome, but also that there seems to be little method to them. So nervous is the west about the Kremlin's erratic behaviour that it sometimes seems as though foreign diplomats would greet even a clearly destructive strategy more with relief than consternation. At least you can offer something to an antagonist whose goals are clear.

What can we Russians do to fill the vacuum of thought? Those of us who fall outside the so-called "Putin majority", which offers the president its reflexive support, need to come together as a movement of civil resistance. It would be better if the future of our country could be discussed full-throatedly in public. But failing that, it is extremely important that those who dissent from the status quo find others who share their views.

We have some advantages. The massive propaganda efforts of the Russian state are pervasive and effective, but they can be avoided. My advice to independent thinkers in Russia: do not watch television. Whereas previous generations were largely cut off from information the state did not want them to see, we have the internet - and there we can preserve our freedom of choice.

We must also seize opportunities to discuss our ideas: on social networks; and face-to-face in universities or the forums provided by non-governmental organisations such as the All-Russian Civil Forum. We must also use official forums wherever we can to make contact with the state, non-violently protecting our rights by all legitimate means.

Sooner or later, the Putin era will be over. This will be no mere changing of the guard. As has happened time and again in Russian history, when the old elite leaves the Kremlin it will take its ideological compass with it, opening the way for the country's development to begin following a new vector. Then we will need all the skills and resources of civil society we can muster. Now is the time to develop them.

If ours were already a country where change could be won at the ballot box, we would already have achieved the European future for which we dare still hope. But we know that change will not happen through democracy - or rather, through the crude, stage-managed simulation of democracy that, in today's Russia, stands in for the real thing. The change we yearn for will come in surprising ways.

How can the west help? Not by sending foreign experts to come to our country as teachers and advisers. That has been tried before. Our mistakes have been serious, and we are intimately acquainted with their consequences. Russians of independent thought are capable of diagnosing and correcting them.

Russians should engage with the west as equals, not as wards. The accumulated problems of modern democracy, market economy, social life - these are the pressing topics of social and political thought, in the west as in Russia. We must be in the mainstream, forging the ideas that will guide liberal democracies everywhere in the world.

Our task is the perfection of western political thought, not the mere assimilation of it. It will be invigorating work, especially if Russians, Europeans and Americans do it side by side. The current stand-off pits an imperfect system against an incoherent one. One way to end it is to collaborate on conceiving an alternative to both.

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 #10
Russia Insider
www.russia-insider.com
May 12, 2015
The Commies Are Coming: Sorting Through the Fog of Propaganda
We must learn to identify where our own prejudices and presuppositions are really inhibiting our view of what may in fact be happening. This is the West's challenge today in response to the volume of propaganda being hurled in our direction about Putin and Russia.
By Sandy Krolick

Propaganda! What is it? Simple question. No? Of course, we all know that propaganda is information that is not impartial, that is biased, not trustworthy - used specifically to influence or to deceive. But, that begs another question. What does non-biased, trustworthy information look like or sound like? News, History, Opinion, Science?

Let us first settle a prior, epistemological question. There is, in the history of philosophy and philosophical theology, a school of thought arguing that all acts of understanding - and therefore all acts of knowing and communication of meaning - are grounded in what is called a pre-conscious mode of understanding. Let us call this 'pre-understanding.' Emerging from the work of Wilhelm Dilthey and the German School of the Human Sciences, this concept was more fully fleshed-out by another German philosopher in the mid-twentieth century by the name of Hans Georg Gadamer (cf. Wahrheit und Methode, or Philosophical Hermeneutics). According to Gadamer and his analysis concerning the science or theory of interpretation, 'hermeneutics,' all understanding (of any text or message), whether it be a biblical passage, a legal brief, or the nightly news with Brian Williams; all acts of understanding are grounded in, and guided in advance by, certain presuppositions or prejudices about the subject matter at hand, its relation to our world, and how it addresses me personally. In other words, there is no objectivity or pure impartiality in human understanding; all meaning is interpretive, perspectival, and constituted upon one's presuppositions or pre-understanding, if you will.

But, if understanding itself is already predisposed in a specific direction, than the act of communicating information must itself be chock-full of certain prejudices and predispositions as well. As Martin Heidegger (another German philosopher) noted, even the act of selecting some topic for thematic development (a news story, for example) is already guided by a pre-thematic grasp of the situation, guided by prejudices lodged in our pre-understanding. In other words, we pick and choose elements to include or dismiss in our story or theory, and how they relate to one another, based again upon pre-conscious assumptions, intuitions, or predispositions. If understanding is itself prejudiced, then there can be NO impartial messages.

It is in this light that we must try to clear away some of the cobwebs, the fog, and the idle chatter that contend for our attention today regarding the events in Ukraine and the confrontation building between Russia and the West. We must be careful not to be guided solely by those historical prejudices and presuppositions that always, already seek to control our present understanding. Those of us in the West, and I mean Americans specifically, have been raised on the mother's milk of Russian fear-mongering and Russia-bashing from at least the days of the Soviet Union. We have been trained since the earliest part of the last century to believe certain 'truths' about Russia, the KGB, the Kremlin, and the 'communist threat.' Even as babes in the womb, ontogenetically, our mental development may have been influenced by such maternal worries and concerns. "Fear the Bear! He wants to devour us and make our children his slaves." There are a host of truisms out there like this that compose a substantive portion of our pre-understanding whenever we approach a text, a verbal report, video, or news story on events in Ukraine or those concerning Putin's Russia.

Now, of course, a similar process occurs in the minds of Russians who see or hear reports in their world about the West. Each side is constrained by, and laboring under, a different (and in this case potentially oppositional) pre-understanding. It is the way we are able to process messages, interpret them meaningfully in our world, and within the worldview with which we are familiar and comfortable. Such preunderstanding affects not only us mortals (i.e., the common people), but our vaunted press, their corporate bosses, and naturally, the politicians and lobbyists who turn the dials, press the buttons, and make the news; or, according to some Presidential aide, those actors who 'make history.'

Of course, each side wants you to believe their understanding of the "facts." But, it is difficult to get beneath that pre-understanding, to shake it loose, if you will, so that one may see things differently. "I" and "Thou" become separated by an invisible wall of misunderstanding grounded in a pre-thematic grasp of the situation that was laid down long ago. We are each, in short, embodied, historical peoples, thrown into a world (with its unique worldview), without grasping that the view is part of the very air we breathe. It informs us without our knowing, and without our blessing. It is what those German philosophers called our intransigent facticity and our unavoidable historicity. It is inscribed in our languages and our customs, in our habits and our preferences, in our values and our desires. It becomes our second nature.

Mind you, it is not human nature per se; indeed, it is not even natural, i.e., given at birth. Rather, it is cultural - a construct, an artifice. But, as civilized human beings this is our legacy and our albatross. It hangs around our necks like a studded choker, determining our reactions, beliefs, motivations, and interpretations. This is the largest problem we face talking to one another across the school yard, the street, the country, or the ocean. It is not a pessimistic view of things, but simply the way things are.

Americans are predisposed to believing that Russia is expansionist, aggressive, evil. We are programmed that way; it is part of our pre-understanding. Of course, the Russians are quick to defend themselves by talking about American imperialism, its cultural hegemony, and its support not only for Ukraine, but for other aggressive world-historical events over the past century. Who is right is often a function of where you come from; what pabulum you've been raised on. But, sometimes it behooves us, when the 'doors of perception' have once been cracked open, (as they were with Edward Snowden's revelations about the US National Security State), to rethink our values, our loyalties.

It may be time to re-evaluate our news reports, and the words of our professional politicians, and see that there may be some 'truth' - value, substance, understanding - in what the other side is saying, a truth that we have not seen before, or have seen previously, but only 'through a glass darkly.' We must work diligently to overcome the limits of our pre-conceived ideas about the 'Other,' learn to identify where our own prejudices and presuppositions are really inhibiting our view of what may in fact be happening. This is the West's challenge today in response to the volume of propaganda being hurled in our direction about Putin and Russia.

Propaganda works because it feeds into and off of our pre-understanding. It is self-validating and self-reinforcing. We must learn to see how that process is working to color, indeed reconstruct, our view of events. Given our philosophical position here, however, I will not suggest that there is some purely objective interpretation of events that can be given to us. There is no strictly objective view; but only variations on a theme. Still, we must try to hear the other side; not because they are 'right' but because we may be listening all-too-absentmindedly to the pre-conscious narrative playing continuously on autopilot in our heads. But, more importantly, it is now the Western narrative, Western propaganda, the vicious and vociferous rhetoric currently coming from America - burdened by such profound prejudice and presuppositions - that is creating this vast amount of global static, a horror that is inching all of us ever closer to war. What a shame!

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 #11
Issue of lifting sanctions from Russia should be raised by EU - Naryshkin

MOSCOW. May 12 (Interfax) - Russian State Duma Speaker Sergei Naryshkin said Russia will not initiate a discussion on the issue of the lifting of the anti-Russian sanctions.

"We, of course, are not going to discuss any criteria for lifting the sanctions. The first step should be taken by the European Union, which took such unfriendly actions on Russia under pressure from the United States," Naryshkin said during a meeting with members of a delegation of the French senate on Tuesday.

Naryshkin reiterated that the anti-Russian sanctions are not helping resolve the conflict in Ukraine. Moreover, he said these sanctions made Russia take "retaliatory measures that were sensitive to the agrarian sector of the European Union and also made us establish trade cooperation with other countries and, of course, work very seriously on import substitution issues."

As to the possibility of discussing the issue of the lifting of the sanctions, some Western countries' leaders spoke in favor of considering the "criteria" for the purpose of a possible decision on this matter, Naryshkin said.

Naryshkin thanked members of the delegation of the French Senate for their visit to Moscow, pointing out its importance. The speaker said the French parliamentarians' visit is regarded by their Russian colleagues as very important "for better understanding of our positions."

The State Duma speaker said attempts to restrict the contacts between the two countries' parliamentarians are pointless and they only complicate the solution of the problems that exist in Europe and in Russian-French relations.

The speaker recalled that the very term "parliamentarism" has French roots and makes us constantly conduct frank and honest dialogue."

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#12
Rossiyskaya Gazeta
April 28, 2015
Russian business union head reviews economy's response to sanctions
Aleksandr Shokhin, president of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, One Year Under Sanctions: Initial Results. In the New Conditions the State and the Business Community Are Maintaining the Course of Creating an Open Economy

For almost one year Russian business has been existing in a new economic reality associated with external and internal challenges. Has its priorities changed in this connection, and has the state adjusted its policy in the sphere of foreign economic cooperation?

At Russian Business Week this year the forum participants attempted to find appropriate answers to pressing questions: How to shape a new foreign economic agenda and create a favourable business climate for our entrepreneurs and foreign partners.

Many participants drew attention to the change in international companies' business strategies. They talked about an emergent trend - a cutback in foreign contacts on the part of Russian businessmen, primarily with representatives of Western companies. But foreign businesses have confirmed their readiness to develop economic ties with Russia.

The heads of foreign business associations talked about this at the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs congress. They also talked about proposals to lift the sanctions on Russia, which are impeding the work of foreign companies, and about the development of import substitution and the encouragement of localization.

The business community is resolving quite a few current problems. They include overcoming traditional barriers in the shape of a heavy administrative and fiscal burden and also adapting to the conditions of the single market that has just started operating - the Eurasian Economic Union. In these conditions it is necessary to broaden cooperation with foreign partners. And proximity to both the West and the East is a competitive advantage for Russia.

For many people the Russian market remains attractive. The lion's share of foreign investors working here are as yet not ready to even cut back on personnel, let alone completely leave Russia. They are rightly afraid that competitors who would take their place would be found quite quickly.

Confirmation of interest in Russia is possibly provided, for example, by the participation of foreign investors in the capital of major Russian companies that are of strategic significance for the economy of not just our state but also West Europe. Today companies like Rosneft and Gazprom have a significant number of foreign shareholders in their share capital. According to the figures for 2014, holders of ADNs [American depositary notes - Rossiyskaya Gazeta note] accounted for more than 26 per cent of Gazprom's share capital. And according to the figures as of 1 April, global depositary notes accounted for 7.5 per cent of the total number of Rosneft shares, while 19.7 per cent are owned by the BP Russian Investments Limited company.

Russian state and private companies are carrying out major projects abroad. For example, through the National Oil Consortium Rosneft is participating in the development of the Junin-6 block located in the oil basin of the Orinoco River heavy oil belt. The company is active in more than 15 countries of the world, including the territory of Canada and the United States. It owns stakes in four German refineries and a stake in the Italian oil refining company Sapas S.p.A.. LUKOIL is developing the West Qurna-2 field in Iraq - one of the biggest in the world with recoverable reserves of 13 billion barrels - and is working on the Kandym-Khauzak-Shady and Southwest Gissar projects in the Republic of Uzbekistan. RUSAL - the world's biggest aluminium-production company - is developing production in Switzerland, Jamaica, Africa, and China. Our Evraz steel and mining company has assets in the United States, Canada, the Czech Republic, Italy, Kazakhstan, and South Africa.

Many of these companies are currently experiencing difficulties working in foreign markets linked not only to the crisis phenomena in the economy but also to foreign policy differences and, undoubtedly, the definite intensification of world competition. But the Russian business community has to continue working abroad. This is a guarantee of both the promotion of state interests and the improvement of Russia's attractiveness to investors.

I believe that this is precisely why Russian President Vladimir Putin sent a clear signal a week ago at a State Council session devoted to the development of the small and medium business sector, talking about the need to shape a favourable business climate for the development of Russian companies in both our own and international markets: "We are obliged to do everything necessary for our entrepreneurs to be able to fully realize their potential. This is vitally important for the development of the country and all its regions and for ensuring that Russian companies occupy a worthy place both in their own market and in international markets," he stressed.

All the decisions linked to legislation relating to involvement in [Russian-]controlled foreign companies and an amnesty for capital - the very logic of this process (for example, the deferment of notifications of involvement in foreign companies) testifies that the Russian political leadership is focused on adopting clear and considered measures linked primarily to improving the transparency of Russian business without detriment to its development. Thus, the purpose and point of the de-offshorization legislation comprises an opportunity and encouragement for capital to be repatriated rather than reducing Russian companies' activity in foreign markets.

Despite the sanctions policy and the difficulties in relations with Western partners, Russia is part of the world economy. Our country continues to participate in economic unions and remains true to the policy of creating an open economy that is attractive to foreign assessments and prepared for extensive cooperation and honest competition.

Comment

Nikita Maslennikov, director of the Finance and Economics Programme at the Institute of Contemporary Development:

The response to the manifest and largely artificial downturn in business contacts with the outside world should in no circumstances be a retreat into isolationism. On the contrary, it is necessary to shape a new strategy for an omnidirectional Russian global presence. And to do so on the basis of the fact that in the next 15-20 years we will see the formation of a new world economic structure in which there will be no place for a clear line between East and West. The optimum new role for Russia is as a systemic integrator, a centre of trilateral production sharing with East and West.

I believe that some import substitution plans will have to be abandoned. In the agri-industry import substitution is extremely promising, and Russia has every opportunity to become one of the biggest exporters of food and agricultural raw material, whereas manufacturing sectors, by contrast, require stronger integration with the outside world.

The point is that world economic prospects are unequivocally linked to global added-value chains. It is no coincidence that people have started talking about export-oriented import substitution recently. And in international markets for sophisticated products (the automobile industry, aircraft and ship building, engineering, electronics, and so forth) the proportion of products developed within the framework of global production sharing chains stands at 60-70 and more per cent. This is precisely the kind of approach that proves productive and makes it possible to conquer markets. We have no alternative but to integrate ourselves into these chains.

And the practical conclusion from this is that we need a powerful, deeply-echeloned strategy to position Russia in the global economy. "Road maps" for structural reforms already need to be produced on the basis of this strategy. This is a serious challenge for state administration and strategic planning. But for its part, the business community has already started to realize in what direction we need to work.
 

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 #13
Wall Street Journal
May 12, 2015
Signs Putin Doesn't Think He's Lost the Sanctions Game
By STEPHEN SESTANOVICH
Stephen Sestanovich, a professor at Columbia University and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, is the author of "Maximalist: America in the World From Truman to Obama." He is on Twitter: @ssestanovich.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel and  Russian President Vladimir Putin hold a news conference after talks at the Kremlin in Moscow on May 10. pool/Reuters
Secretary of State John Kerry's meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin Tuesday has revived one of Washington's top guessing games: Is Mr. Putin impressed by Western sanctions? A well-informed Russian friend of mine told me yesterday Mr. Putin will not rethink his Ukraine strategy until he is convinced that Europe and the U.S. are able to make their current policy stick.

Is he convinced yet? Lately I've heard U.S. officials express confidence that they are getting their message across to Mr. Putin. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has been the pivotal figure here, saying publicly that sanctions can only be lifted if February's Minsk 2 agreement, which called for military withdrawals in Ukraine and political compromise, is really being implemented. Her meaning seems clear enough: a.) nobody believes Moscow is abiding by the agreement, and b.) the most serious test of Russia's compliance will only come at the end of the year, when Minsk 2 calls for it to restore a normal and secure international border with Ukraine. So expect sanctions to hold into 2016.

Meanwhile, the European Union has renewed one round of sanctions last month, and smart money says it will renew a second round in June. Smart money also says the Greeks have been told to forget about currying favor with Mr. Putin by blocking an EU consensus on sanctions.

Listening to U.S. and European officials and experts explain all this, I had almost overcome my skepticism. Then I read Mr. Putin's opening statement at his Sunday press conference with Ms. Merkel, who was in Moscow to lay a wreath in honor of Russians who died in World War II. I've now changed my mind again. The president of Russia does not think this fight is over. He clearly intends to teach smart money a thing or two.

See what you think: On Sunday, after a mere nod to the solemnity of the weekend's observances in honor of the 70th anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany, Mr. Putin went straight into a long complaint about the economic toll that sanctions are taking on both countries. The numbers are impressive. Trade with Germany (Russia's most important trading partner) was down 6.5% last year-the first decline in half a decade. In the first two months of 2015, said Mr. Putin, the drop was a staggering 35%. Playing to the gallery, he informed Chancellor Merkel that German businessmen do not like these "artificial barriers." They're "pragmatic by nature."

Mr. Putin admitted he had homework to do, but he expressed confidence that, slowly, Minsk 2 is gaining traction. He pledged that he would use "all possible influence" to get the separatists in eastern Ukraine to live up to their end of the bargain. And, to leave no doubt about what he's after, he said he is sending a trade delegation to Brussels next week.

This was not the performance of a Russian leader who thinks he has lost the sanctions game. Vladimir Putin, putting on his most "pragmatic," let's-be-reasonable face, is fighting hard.

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 #14
www.rt.com
May 12, 2015
Ruble-yuan settlements booming, set to reshape global finance

Settlements in local currencies between Russia and China now account for 7 percent of the bilateral trade, but the potential for growth is tremendous, experts tell RT. Yuan-ruble trade in Russia has grown 700 percent in a year.

Growing cooperation between Russia and China has become one of the hottest topics in the global economy. It is signaling the emergence of a strong alliance of one the world's richest and strongest economies, which is expected to reshape the existing western-dominated economic model.

While energy deals between the resource - rich Russia and resource - hungry China look natural, bringing the countries' finances closer looks like a real challenge to the US dollar system, experts agree, although the transition won't be quick.

"The transition from the usual scheme of payments in major currencies is not a quick process, but with a certain political will and sufficient mechanisms of hedging currency risks in exports and imports it is quite feasible," Aleksandr Prosviryakov, Treasuries & Commodities Manager at PWC, told RT. He added that the first step towards this was the signing of a three-year agreement on currency swap worth 150 billion yuan in October 2014.

Currency swaps allow companies in both countries to use national currencies in mutual settlements. That means the Russian importers can purchase Chinese products with yuan, and the Chinese can make payments in rubles.

"We see a pretty rapid intensification of trade in the yuan-ruble currency pair in Russia," he said adding that the volume on the Moscow Exchange increased by 8 times in comparison with the previous year, and 6 times in the OTC market.
 
Prosviryakov said the agreement to supply Russian oil to China through the Eastern Siberia - Pacific Ocean pipeline was the first major project implemented through settlement in local currencies.

An increased use of national currencies by major exporting and importing countries will lead to a reduction in the share of traditional currencies in international payments, he added.

The US dollar still remains preeminent in global trade; more than 80 percent is settled in dollars and 60 percent in international reserves. However, in 2014, the yuan leaped to nine percent of international settlements, which gives a chance that its role in the world financial system will become more important.

"There is a reason to believe that this trend will continue in the coming years and the role of the yuan will increase rapidly not only in international trade, but as the currency of international reserves of the central banks," he said.

China's decision to establish and lead the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is "the real crux of Beijing's current long-term international economic and financial strategy," Brendan O'Reilly, China-based writer and educator told RT.

"Now Beijing is making its own global bank that can compete with Western-dominated institutions," he said.

Fifty-seven countries have been approved as founding members of AIIB with Russia expected to become the bank's third largest participant.

"I think Russia's participation in AIIB will have a positive impact on economic and trade cooperation between the two countries," said Prosviryakov. "One of the bank's main tasks is financing infrastructure projects, a large part of which will be located on the territory of Russia. Investments in infrastructure will contribute to the development of bilateral trade, which will increase the likelihood of achieving the ambitious goal of the two countries to increase the turnover to $200 billion dollars by 2020."

Even US allies such as Germany and the UK have signed on despite American objections, O'Reilly said.

"If the AIIB succeeds in its long-term goals of supporting Eurasian transport and trade infrastructure, then China, Russia, and many other states stand to benefit enormously," he said.

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 #15
The Market Mogul
http://themarketmogul.com
May 11, 2015
Gazprom's Undervalued Potential
By Lars Christian Haugen
 
Gazprom holds the world's largest natural gas reserves, which make up 18 percent of global reserves. The company accounts for 14 percent of global gas output and 74 percent of Russian gas output, and it also owns the world's largest gas transmission network. According to the 2014 Fortune 500 ranking Gazprom is the 17th biggest company in the world, based on revenues.

Gazprom's share price has been suffering over the last few years. It peaked in 2008 at around $30, and then fell precipitously to around $6.50 during the financial crisis. After such, it started to recover and climbed back to around $16.80 in April 2011, but then it started to decline and has been grinding lower ever since. The current share price is around $6, which is lower than it was at the bottom of 2008.

The Financial Factors

Based on traditional valuation ratios Gazprom appears cheap. Over the last few years it has been trading at a price/earnings ratio between 2-3. Currently, however, the ratio is around 22 because net profits fell approximately 86% in 2014. Non-cash items related to Ruble depreciation in 2014 heavily impaired net profit, however they did not damage free cash flow, which actually increased year over year.

The price/book ratio currently stands at around 0.4 and has been trading around 0.3-0.4 for the last two years. Price-to-sales is currently 0.6 and price-to-free cash flow is around 6.

Gazprom's revenues have been growing at a compound annual growth rate of around 12.3 percent for the last 8 years. From 2006 to 2013 net profit grew at a compound annual growth rate of about 9.5 percent, however as mentioned above, profits fell substantially in 2014. Return on equity has consistently been above 12 percent since 2006, however in 2014 it dropped to 1.66 percent.

From a balance sheet perspective the company is strong. The debt/equity ratio is 0.23 and has hovered between 0.13 and 0.25 for the last eight years. The current ratio is approaching 1.9 and has generally stayed above 1.5 for the last eight years, which is a good level. Both from a short and long-term financing perspective, Gazprom appears a solid company.

Moreover, the dividend yield of the company is currently 6.6 percent, compared to around 2.2 percent for the S&P 500. In other words, Gazprom is paying out 3 times as much in dividends as the average S&P 500 company.

Lastly, according to Gazprom's 2014 annual report, DeGolyer and MacNaughton, the Dallas based petroleum consulting company, performed an audit of Gazprom's reserves and concluded that the present value of those reserves equated to USD 316.3 billion. Gazprom is trading at a 77.4 percent discount to the value of its estimated reserves. Even if the value of those reserves turns out to be half of what was reported, the company would still be trading at less than 50 percent of the value of its reserves.

The Qualitative Factors

One of the primary concerns for foreign investors looking to invest in Russia is corruption. There has been talk of members of the Gazprom management siphoning off money to themselves, which hampers investor sentiment and is of concern. However, Gazprom has improved considerably over the past 15 years. Before Putin took Gazprom under his wing in 200,0 the Chair of the company, Viktor Chernomyrdin, had stripped the company of many assets and sold it to family and friends of the board. However, after he was ousted in 2000 the company began its transformation and Alexei Miller was named CEO, and remains in that position to this day. The looting ended and Gazprom started to regain its strength.

One can debate if the company is still corrupt, however Gazprom is an important part of Putin's plan to strengthen Russia's position on the world stage and from his past actions Putin seems to understand that if Gazprom is to remain strong it cannot have board members selling off valuable assets to family and friends at a discount.

The Macro Picture

It's impossible to talk about Gazprom without mentioning natural gas prices and the future of Russia. Oil is the essential fuel of the modern economy, but natural gas also plays an integral part. There will therefore be demand for Gazprom's product in the years and decades to come, no matter what the price is. The long-term prospects of the company are therefore favorable.

In terms of geopolitics, investing in Russia is obviously more risky than investing in developed economies. However, people tend to overlook Russia's financial position is less shaky than one would assume. Debt/GDP is only around 13 percent, compared to around 100 percent in the US. The country has adequate foreign reserves, despite using some lately to prop up the Ruble. The country also has vast natural resource reserves and has economic and geopolitical ties with China, Brazil, India and Iran. There is no doubt Russia has been suffering lately, but anyone who cares to look a little closer can see that the country is doing better than our own preconceived notions.

Conclusion

Gazprom has been experiencing troubles lately due to the geopolitical and macro economic factors surrounding the company. However, on a long term basis the future appears bright, due to the importance of natural gas in the world economy. From a valuation perspective Gazprom looks undervalued and investors that are comfortable with the risk of investing in Russia, and the oil and gas sector, might see this as a good buying opportunity.

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 #16
www.rt.com
May 11, 2015
Greece & Turkish Stream: 'Athens in Russia v West, investment v debt dilemma'

To solve its financial problems Greece needs to have foreign investment which could come from Russia, but if the Greeks choose the West it means only future debt, says Patrick Henningsen, a geopolitical Analyst at 21stcenturywire.com.

The US is trying to push Greece to reject Turkish Stream, the pipeline that would deliver Russian gas to Europe via Greece. Meanwhile, David Pearce, the US ambassador to Greece, is reportedly going to leave his office a year earlier than planned. This comes amid bailout talks between Athens and the Troika being deadlocked.

RT: Why does the US have such a keen interest in the Turkish Stream project?

Patrick Henningsen: Traditionally, the West has always been incredibly interested in Greece and Russia relations all way back to WWII - the percentages agreement where Winston Churchill felt that he kept Greece within Europe by dividing up the influence between the Soviet Union throughout Eastern Europe and then allowing Europe to keep Greece. So it's always been a pivotal point where East meets West.

But there are a number of pipeline projects that are on the table, not just this one which is being proposed now, which is to bring Azerbaijani gas through Greece into the European market.

Russia has the competing pipeline project which it's calling South Stream through Turkey, from the Black Sea through Turkey and via Greece into Europe.

There is also the Qatari-Turkey pipeline project, which is a non-starter because it would have to pass through Syria which is a contested area at the moment. Jordan and Saudi Arabia are behind Syria for that pipeline project.

And you have this big pipeline project which I believe is what's driving these alternative scenarios - the friendship pipeline from Iran through Iraq through Syria and to the Mediterranean. And this is probably the key driver for the West or for the US-led "coalition" to want regime change in Syria to cut off any chance of that pipeline happening. This would be extremely profitable for all those three countries - Iran, Iraq and Syria - to reach the European market with what is a very rich natural gas field in Iran.

RT: Whose sales pitch is better here for the Greeks? Are they better off throwing their weight behind the Trans-Adriatic pipeline, like the US suggests, or working on the Turkish Stream project? What are the benefits for Greece in the Turkish Stream project, if any?

PH: I think Greece is in a situation where it has to choose between debt and investment. And if the Greeks are looking toward Brussels - they are looking toward a debt restructuring agreement and looking toward future debt.

Where are they going to get investment from? Certainly not from the US, not in a big way, but Russia could be a big source of foreign investment for Greece and it's very important for Greece in the financial situation that it finds itself in.

We also have, just south of Greece, Cyprus that was being courted by Russia for a bailout package only a couple of years ago for its financial woes. So Russia got interested in trying to get alliances within some of these European countries for their own interests.

Obviously Europe is targeting Russia with sanctions right now and that's going to hurt the Russian economy. So any chance Russia has to get its influence into Europe it's going to do it, everyone should expect it and that's going to be the case.

RT: The US State Department envoy suggested that Russia's interests aren't aligned to the needs of the Greek economy. Is he right?

PH: What Amos Hochstein, the US special envoy for energy affairs, is proposing, what he is really doing here is a sales and marketing trip mainly for the US energy firms and other consortiums. But it's not just on a business level, it's about geopolitical influence. If the US can route energy and specifically natural gas via the Azerbaijan route that's going to help the US in terms of its geopolitical goals in the region.

As we know oil might be the form of energy that's most dominant globally, but regionally it's natural gas. And we've learnt this through the Ukrainian situation over the last 18 months. Natural gas is the dominant regional factor, it's the game changer. The US realizes this and if it can win influence along these lines and push forward its own solution for another gas supply to Europe, it's going to do that. There are a number of other competing consortiums in terms of nations teaming up to do exactly the same thing.

RT: Greece has got some big payments to make - do you think Washington and its EU partners could offer a financial incentive so they turn away from Turkish Stream?

PH: A pipeline project of that scale and that distance is going to take quite a while to come online. So in the short term it's not going to make that much difference at all to Greece's economic future.

However any sort of positive financial partnership with a country like Russia and immediate inward investment might make a big difference in the short term. So in terms of Greece, I would be looking toward Russia for cash. With regards to the US and what it's pushing in that region in terms of energy making Greece a partner there - it's difficult to say. I don't see any big benefits in the short term, but maybe political benefits for Greece in terms of teaming up with the US somehow.

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 #17
Moscow Times
May 12, 2015
Russian Polluters Evading Huge Environmental Fines
By Anastasia Bazenkova

Russia's environmental protection watchdog is failing to collect penalties imposed on polluters worth tens of millions of dollars per year.

Penalties worth 2 billion rubles ($40 million) ordered by the Federal Service for Supervising Natural Resources, or Rosprirodnadzor, went unpaid in 2014, Kremlin chief of staff Sergei Ivanov told senators in Russia's Federation Council last month, the Interfax news agency reported.

Russia has a poor environmental record dating from breakneck Soviet industrialization in the early 20th century, when whole regions were blighted in the rush to modernize the economy.

In recent decades ecology has emerged onto the political scene, but still lacks recognition among broad swathes of Russians.

Due Process

Fifty-four million people - over one-third of Russia's population - live in the 57 percent of Russian cities that have high or extremely high air pollution, according to Russia's Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring. Russia ranked 73rd out of 178 countries in the 2014 environmental performance index compiled by Yale University.

Maria Pshenitsyna, a lawyer at Greenpeace in Russia, told The Moscow Times that the number of environmental violations was growing every year, especially in Moscow and the Moscow region.

Rosprirodnadzor in a March report said it was collecting more penalty money from polluters every year. But the report showed that the proportion of fines collected was static - 72 percent of the penalties imposed by the agency in 2014 were paid, a rate that has remained unchanged since 2005.

Nikolai Gudkov, press officer at the Natural Resources and Environment Ministry, which oversees Rosprirodnadzor, rebuffed criticism, defending the rate of collection and saying polluters would pay the 2 billion rubles in outstanding penalties.

"All issues of polluters evading fines are handled by the courts," Gudkov said. "It's a time-consuming process."

Overloaded

But Rosprirodnadzor is also failing to register many environmental violations, according to a review of the agency released in January by the Audit Chamber, a public body that monitors government expenditure.

Rosprirodnadzor last year registered and inspected 1.2 million out of 4.8 million legal entities whose activities are causing negative effects on environment, the chamber's report said.

Rosprirodnadzor imposes fines for violations of environmental regulation including evasion of regular payments by pollutant industries for environmental damage, exceeding emissions limits, improper waste storage and disposal, unsanctioned industrial activity and accidents that cause pollutants to spill into the environment.

Ivan Blokov, head of Greenpeace in Russia, said one reason for Rosprirodnadzor's ineffectiveness is that it is overloaded. Rosprirodnadzor is responsible both for control over violations of environmental regulation and supervision of the use of natural resources. No other country in the world combines these responsibilities in one body, he said.

The government raised spending on environment protection by 100 billion rubles to 479 billion rubles ($9.5 billion) between 2010 and 2013, the last year for which figures are available, according to the Natural Resources and Environment Ministry.

But despite this, Rosprirodnadzor has a woefully inadequate number of inspectors considering Russia's size and the scale of its environmental problems, Blokov said.

Rosprirodnadzor said in March it had only 1,903 employees monitoring illegal pollution, who last year checked 121,474 companies and other legal entities, resulting in 33,000 administrative cases against polluters - 2,000 more than in 2013.

Dividing the Audit Chamber's number of 4.8 million polluters by the number of current Rosprirodnadzor staff, each inspector would have to monitor nearly 2,000 entities to achieve countrywide environmental control.

"The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has 17,500 inspectors," said Blokov. To function effectively, Russia would need at least 20,000 inspectors and a separate body responsible only for controlling environmental violations, he said.

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 #18
Moscow Times
May 12, 2015
Moscow Government Approves Plans for Russian Disneyland

Moscow's urban planning commission has approved plans for a children's amusement park along the lines of Disneyland to be built in the Nagatinskaya Poima park in southeastern Moscow, City Hall said in a statement.

The amusement park will include an indoor theme park operated by Hollywood animation studio DreamWorks, another park operated by Russian animator Soyuzmultfilm, a movie theater, cafes, shops and more. It will have a total area of more than 290,000 square meters, the statement said.

Much of the park's territory will be developed as a public park, including a pedestrian zone along the bank of the Moscow River, according to the statement.

With its redevelopment, Nagatinskaya Poima will join the growing collection of Moscow parks that have been radically revamped thanks to a city facelift initiated by the capital's former culture minister, Sergei Kapkov.

"At the present time, [Nagatinskaya Poima] is essentially not used to meet the city's needs," the city's statement said.

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 #19
Moscow Times
May 12, 2015
Authorities Again Threatened by Bolotnaya Square
By John Freedman

Yelena Gremina's production of "The Bolotnaya Square Case" at Teatr.doc may be the most benign dangerous 65 minutes I have ever witnessed.

A contradiction in terms, you say?

Not in the land, which, as the great poet Fyodor Tyutchev put it, cannot be understood by mind alone.

The fact is that the Russian authorities, clearly alarmed, have gone after Teatr.doc again.

Pulling levers, from the city property department to the Ministry of Culture, the powers that be pushed Doc and its repertoire of socially and politically themed productions out of its famous space near Pushkin Square in December. Perhaps they then heaved a sigh of relief. As if to say, "Phew! We're done with them!"

Ha!

Doc reopened in a new space on Razgulyai Ploshchad in early February. They have been pumping out new shows ever since.

The latest, "The Bolotnaya Square Case," references legal battles that have dragged on between the state and protesters ever since a notorious, violent protest took place May 6, 2012, on Bolotnaya Square.

The police showed up at the theater the day before the May 6 opener. They said they received "a signal." That meant checking for bombs and similar bits of theatrical intrigue, just as the authorities did in December. Finding nothing, they let rehearsals continue, but informed Doc they "would be back."

They kept their word.

When I arrived 40 minutes early for the premiere, six uniformed policeman stood watch on the street. Officers in civilian clothes were busy on cell phones, checking people out, conducting constant conversations with someone, somewhere. They were still there when the show ended, still talking to someone, and the next day they returned in force - sending three separate teams of investigators looking into everything Doc might be up to, checking posters, rental agreements, books, papers and asking questions.

The three teams spent six hours interrogating Gremina and her colleagues. And when Gremina returned home in the final hour of the day, she made a jaunty post on her Facebook page, reminding fans that the authorities cannot legally close her theater, and, even if they do, she'll open another.

So what was this all about?

The performance begins with a short video of protesters on Moscow's streets, but it would be hard to imagine anything more low-key and non-political than "Bolotnaya Square." Written by Yekaterinburg playwright Polina Borodina, based on interviews with family members of those who are in prison on convictions in the Bolotnaya Square case, this is a warm, sad, deeply human performance piece.

Gremina hung the stage with hammocks and put out a few table lamps, giving the space the feel of a place inhabited by individuals engaged in common tasks - resting, talking, taking part in personal hobbies.

The four actors - Marina Boiko, Konstantin Kozhevnikov, Anastasia Patlai and Varvara Faer - share the roles of mothers, sisters and fathers of those languishing in prison. There is no attempt to match the sex of the actors to those they play, a simple device that gives the performance an added sense of democracy.

It's not "who" here that counts, it's "what."

We hear a young woman's story of navigating bureaucracy to marry her sweetheart in prison. We listen to a sister who adores her brother. We hear words of love a prisoner wrote in a letter to his grandparents. We hear parents worry about their children, chastising them some, but making sure all understand how proud they are of them.

This is the human, personal side of what happens after politics hit. This is where families are shattered, lives are crippled, precious years are stolen from lives, and individuals are stuck dealing with the wreckage on their own.

Teatr.doc is known for its anti-theatrical stance, its attempts to put real life on stage. But "Bolotnaya Square" goes farther than anything they have done in the past. There is virtually no "theater" in this piece - only human beings speaking from the heart about the difficulties encountered by people following their conscience.

The only traditional theater taking place the night I attended was the spectacle put on by the sole performers in costume - the policemen milling around inside and outside the theater.

"The Bolotnaya Square Case" (Bolotnoye Delo) plays Mon., May 22, June 19 and 24 at 8 p.m. at Teatr.doc, located at 3 Spartakovskaya Ulitsa, Bldg. 3. Metro Kurskaya, then free shuttle bus on the Garden Ring Road to metro Baumanskaya. Tel. 916-653-0989. teatrdoc.ru. Running time: 1 hour, 5 minutes.

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 #20
www.rt.com
May 12, 2015
60% of Russians see US as threat & hindrance to development - poll

Over half of Russians think the United States poses a threat to their country and will create barriers for Russia's economic development, but only 5 percent thought the US could defeat Russia in an all-out war.

The share of Russians who perceive the United States as a general threat is 59 percent, according to the latest research released by the independent pollster Levada Center on Tuesday. This is up from 47 percent in 2007. The share of Russians who don't see any threat coming from the US is 32 percent now as opposed to 42 percent in 2007.

When asked to elaborate on the possible nature of Russia-US antagonism, 48 percent said the United States was purposefully creating various barriers in order to hinder Russia's development. Thirty-one percent said they feared a US military invasion on Russian territory and 31 percent thought the US was imposing alien ideas and values on their country through non-military means. Only 24 percent of respondents said they feared the US could impose direct control over Russia's political course.

When Russians were asked what their expectations were in case of a real military conflict with the United States, 52 percent said that it would end in mutual annihilation. A third answered they thought Russia would win this war and only 5 percent said they expected the United States and NATO to defeat Russia.

At the same time, the majority of Russians - 55 percent - said they didn't expect their country to be the first to use nuclear weapons, even in the case of war with the US and NATO (13 percent completely ruled out such possibility and 42 percent said such a development was extremely unlikely).Seven percent said that this was possible.

Levada Center's leading researcher Karina Pipiya said in comments to Izvestia daily that the shift in public moods was due to the spreading of the idea that Russia historically follows its own path of development. Such a position is now shared by the Russian authorities and general public. Therefore, most Russians blame any attempts to counter their country's course in foreign and domestic policy as a move aimed as containing and weakening Russia's influence and strength, Pipiya said.

The researcher noted that a different recent poll showed that 57 percent of Russians believe the authorities shouldn't pay any attention to criticism from the West.

In April, the Levada Center conducted a poll that showed 55 percent of Russians want their homeland to pursue its own way of development and only 17 percent think Russia should take the same path as Western nations. Nineteen percent of respondents said Russia should return to the ways of the Soviet Union.

Twelve percent tend to the view that Russia will join "the path of great Eastern nations," like China and India.

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 #21
New York Times
May 12, 2015
Kerry Arrives in Russia for Talks With Vladimir Putin on Cooperation
By MICHAEL R. GORDON

SOCHI, Russia - Secretary of State John Kerry arrived here on Tuesday morning to explore the possibility of cooperating with President Vladimir V. Putin on an array of regional crises, especially the Syrian war.

Mr. Kerry will be the most senior American official to meet in Russia with Mr. Putin since the secretary of state was in Moscow two years ago.

His visit began on an inauspicious note after the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a lengthy statement on Monday castigating the Obama administration for trying to isolate Russia.

The broadside blamed the White House for the crisis in Ukraine, complained that NATO was moving its infrastructure closer to Russia's borders and charged that the disruption in American-Russian relations stemmed from changes in the "political climate" in the United States.

A senior State Department official declined to comment on the Russian "narrative" but pointed to the possibility for cooperation on Libya, Syria, Ukraine and Yemen.

After laying a wreath at a memorial commemorating Russia's victory in the World War II, Mr. Kerry was due to meet with Sergey V. Lavrov, Russia's foreign minister, on Tuesday.

His meeting with Mr. Putin was scheduled for later in the afternoon. Mr. Kerry has met frequently with Mr. Lavrov, but it is Mr. Putin who is in charge and determines how much flexibility his foreign minister has when talking to the United States.

Leaders of Persian Gulf countries met on April 30 to prepare for the meeting with President Obama.Editorial: Beyond the Iran Nuclear DealMAY 9, 2015
"It's important to try to talk to the senior decision maker," said the State Department official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity under the agency's protocol for briefing reporters. "We have a lot of business that we could do together if there is interest."

American officials are hoping that the reversals of President Bashar al-Assad of Syria on the battlefield will give Russia an incentive to withdraw support for the leader and cooperate with the United States on ways to encourage a political transition to a post-Assad government.

The two sides are also expected to discuss the apparent decision by the Assad government to start using chlorine gas again, and possibly other chemical agents. Russia and the United States drafted the 2013 agreement that required Syria to get rid of its arsenal of poison gas, and allegations about the use of chlorine bombs suggest that the pact was less successful than the Americans had hoped.

"We made progress in the chemical weapons," the State Department official said. "There is more to do."

Mr. Kerry is expected to restate the United States' objections to Russia's sale of the S-300 air defense system to Iran, after Mr. Putin recently rescinded a ban on the sale of the weapon to Tehran.

American officials have long been concerned that Iran's acquisition of the S-300 might prompt its leaders to conclude that their nuclear installations would not be vulnerable to an American airstrike. That, in turn, could lead Iran to take a harder line in the nuclear talks and to be less likely to honor an accord that was negotiated, American officials say.

But Mr. Kerry's case may be complicated by President Obama's recent comments that Russia has the legal right to sell the S-300.

Wendy Sherman, who has led the United States' team in the nuclear talks with Iran, is accompanying Mr. Kerry. Russia is among the world powers that are trying to negotiate a final accord to limit Iran's nuclear program, and the current state of the talks was expected to be an important topic in the meetings here.

"We're coming into the final six weeks," the State Department official said, referring to a deadline at the end of June. "It's important to stay tightly aligned."

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#22
Sputnik
April 29, 2015
The Pentagon's 'Long War' Pits NATO Against China, Russia and Iran
By Pepe Escobar

Whatever happens with the nuclear negotiations this summer, and as much as Tehran wants cooperation and not confrontation, Iran is bound to remain - alongside Russia - a key US geostrategic target.
As much as US President Barack Obama tried to dismiss it, the Russian sale of the S-300 missile system to Iran is a monumental game-changer. Even with the added gambit of the Iranian military assuring the made in Iran Bavar 373 may be even more efficient than the S-300.

This explains why Jane's Defense Weekly was already saying years ago that Israel could not penetrate Iranian airspace even if it managed to get there. And after the S-300s Iran inevitably will be offered the even more sophisticated S-400s, which are to be delivered to China as well.

The unspoken secret behind these game-changing proceedings actually terrifies Washington warmongers; it spells out a further frontline of Eurasian integration, in the form of an evolving Eurasian missile shield deployed against Pentagon/NATO ballistic plans.

A precious glimpse of what's ahead was offered at the Moscow Conference on International Security (MICS) in mid-April.

Here we had the Iranian Defense Minister, Brigadier-General Hussein Dehghan, openly stating that Iran wanted BRICS members China, India, and Russia to jointly oppose NATO's uncontrolled eastward expansion, and characterizing NATO's for all practical purposes offensive missile shield as a threat to their collective security.

We also had Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu and Chinese Defense Minister Chang Wanquan emphasizing their military ties are an "overriding priority"; plus Tehran and Moscow stressing they're strategically in synch in their push towards a new multipolar order.

Tearing up the New Iron Curtain

Washington's Maidan adventure has yielded not only a crystallization of a new Iron Curtain deployed from the Baltics to the Black Sea. This is NATO's visible game. What's not so visible is that the target is not only Russia, but also Iran and China.

The battlefield is now clearly drawn between NATO and Russia/China/Iran. So no wonder they are getting closer. Iran is an observer at the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) and is bound to become a member of the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) by 2016.

Russia providing S-300 systems to Iran; S-400 systems to China (with new, longer-range guided missiles); and developing the S-500 systems, which are capable of intercepting supersonic targets, for itself, all point to an ultra high-tech counterpunch. And NATO knows it.

This budding military Eurasia integration is a key subplot of the New Great Game that runs parallel to the Chinese-led New Silk Road(s) project.

As a counterpunch to encroachment, it was bound to happen; after all Beijing is confronted by US encroachment via the Asia-Pacific; Russia by encroachment via Eastern Europe; and Iran by encroachment via Southwest Asia.

Washington would also go for encroachment via Central Asia if it had the means (it doesn't, and especially now with the New Silk Roads bound to crisscross Central Asia).

Eurasian geopolitics hinges on what happens next with Iran. Some selected Washington factions entertain the myth that Tehran may "sell out" to the US - thus ditching its complex Russia/China strategic relationships to the benefit of an expanded US reach in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

The Supreme Leader as well as President Rouhani have already made it clear that won't happen. They know Washington trying to seduce Iran away from Russia and turn it into a client state does not mean Washington ever accepting Iran's expanded sphere of influence in Southwest Asia and beyond.

So the multi-vector Russia-China-Iran strategic alliance is a go. Because whatever happens with the nuclear negotiations this summer, and as much as Tehran wants cooperation and not confrontation, Iran is bound to remain - alongside Russia - a key US geostrategic target.

That long and winding road

And that brings us - inevitably - to GWOT (Global War on Terror).

The Pentagon and assorted US neo-cons remain deeply embedded in their strategy of actively promoting Sunni-Shi'ite Divide and Rule with the key objective of demonizing Iran. Yemen is just yet another graphic example.  

Only fools would believe that the Houthis in Yemen could get away with mounting a power play right in front of a CIA drone-infested US military base in Djibouti.

Once again, this is all proceeding according to the Divide and Rule playbook. Washington did absolutely nothing to "protect" its Yemeni puppet regime from a Houthi offensive, while immediately afterwards providing all the necessary "leading from behind" for the House of Saud to go bonkers, killing loads of civilians  - all in the name of fighting "Iranian expansion". US corporate media, predictably, has gone completely nuts about it.

Nothing new under the sun. This was already foreseen way back in 2008 by the RAND Corporation report Unfolding the Future of the Long War.

Yes, this is the good ol' Pentagon Long War as prosecuted against enemies, fabricated or otherwise, all across the "Muslim world".

What RAND prescribed has become the new normal. Washington supports the petrodollar GCC racket whatever happens, always in the interest of containing "Iranian power and influence"; diverts Salafi-jihadi resources toward "targeting Iranian interests throughout the Middle East," especially in Iraq and Lebanon, hence "cutting back... anti-Western operations"; props up al-Qaeda - and ISIS/ISIL/Daesh - GCC sponsors and "empowers" viciously anti-Shi'ite Islamists everywhere to maintain "Western dominance".

Iran's nuclear program has been a matter of concern for several countries, with the West accusing the country of attempts to develop nuclear weapons under the guise of a civilian nuclear program, although Tehran has denied the claims.

The Long War was first formulated in the "axis of evil" era by the Highlands Forum, a relatively obscure, neo-con infested Pentagon think tank. Not accidentally the RAND Corporation is a major "partner".

It gets even juicier when we know that notorious Long War practitioners such as current Pentagon supremo "Ash" Carter, his deputy Robert Work, and Pentagon intelligence chief Mike Vickers are now in charge of the self-described "Don't Do Stupid Stuff" Obama administration's military strategy.

What the Pentagon - with customary hubris - does not see is Moscow and Tehran easily identifying the power play; the US government's hidden agenda of manipulating a "rehabilitated" Iran to sell plenty of oil and gas to the EU, thus undermining Gazprom.

Technically, this would take years to happen - if ever. Geopolitically, it's nothing but a pipe dream. Call it, in fact, a double pipe dream.

As much as Washington will never "secure" the Middle East with Iran as a vassal state, thus enabling it to transfer key US military assets to NATO with the purpose of facing the Russian "threat", forget about going back to 1990s Russia under disaster capitalism, when the military industrial complex had collapsed and the West was looting Russia's natural resources at will.  

The bottom line: the Pentagon barks, and the Russia/China/Iran strategic caravan goes on.
 

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 #23
Russia Insider
www.russia-insider.com
May 11, 2015
Russian Studies in the UK: Woefully Inadequate
What has happened to Russian Studies in the UK? University Russian departments are decreasing - not increasing - in number and size. Trying to gain a Russian qualification is now about as easy as pronouncing 'ы' for the first time.
By Johanna Ganyukova
Johanna Ganyukova is a graduate from the University of Edinburgh in Russian Studies and is completing an Msc at the University of Glasgow in Russian, Central and Eastern European Studies. She is RI's Russian Media Editor

Sitting in the Senate Room at Glasgow University recently, listening to the warm words of the Consul General on the importance of Russian Studies for the future of Russian-British relations, I couldn't help but feel despondent. The event brought together scholars of Russian Studies past and present, who gave fascinating presentations on a variety of topics within the field. It was held in commemoration of one of Britain's foremost academics of Russian Studies, Terence Wade, whose grammar books are still studied intently by students of Russian across the world today in a desperate attempt to somehow get to grips with this beast of a language.

However, the room was not a dynamic hub of young scholars looking to seek inspiration and guidance in their future adventures in the Russkii Mir. Instead here were the veterans of Cold War academia and there was a sense of being plunged back to a time when Russian Studies was Soviet Studies, when a wealth of enthusiastic young Russophiles and Communist sympathisers dared to oppose the 'system'. What has happened to Russian Studies in the UK? University Russian departments are decreasing - not increasing - in number and size. Trying to gain a Russian qualification is now about as easy as pronouncing 'ы' for the first time.

One individual in Britain who is determined to do something about it is Jenny Carr, chairperson of the Russia-Scotland Forum. She has fought tirelessly to reinstate Russian language in schools. Various reasons are cited for the subject's demise, including language conservatism (emphasis on other EU languages particularly French, Spanish and German); the recent focus on languages such as Mandarin and, in Scotland, Gaelic; and lack of Russian governmental input. It could also be argued also that the present political climate and general negative attitude towards Russia at a governmental level also prevents support of the subject.

Nevertheless, political cooperation between Britain and Russia was just as volatile during the Soviet period, and yet Soviet Studies flourished. Perhaps, during the Soviet era, socialist scholars were attracted globally to the Soviet cause, but since the fall of the Soviet Union there has been something of an ideological vacuum and students of Russian are either i) lured by the romance of this enigmatic land, ii) require it for commercial reasons or iii) are simply enthusiastic linguists. It is not recognised that in order to maintain international peace, countries need diplomats who have a thorough knowledge of this great nation - and this can only be done within Russian Studies departments. As Jenny Carr comments, "There cannot be intelligent discussion of Russian affairs (political, cultural or commercial) until Russia is better understood by more people."

Only in February this year it was acknowledged by the UK House of Lords EU Committee that a "catastrophic misreading" of Russia's position on Ukraine by British and EU diplomats had contributed to the recent crisis, while simultaneously the Foreign Office announced a dire shortage of Russian speakers. What more reason does one need to support Russian Studies?

Furthermore, to develop a relationship with the subject is the beginning of a lifelong romance. Learning Russian is a window onto a different world and the mind-set of a people who cherish and nurture their identity and history. Once bitten by the Russian bug, you're hooked for life.

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#24
www.politico.eu
May 11, 2015
Poroshenko's Four Ds
The Ukrainian president outlines the roadmap to "a new, democratic, European Ukraine."
By MIKHEIL SAAKASHVILI
Saakashvili, the president of Georgia from 2004 to 2013, is chairman of the International Advisory Council on Reforms for the president of Ukraine.

Post-Maidan Ukraine is at war. Not only against Russian invaders, but more generally against sovietism. This war has a military front in the East, but as important is the political, economic, social frontline in the rest of the country. Resisting the invaders and reforming the nation are two fronts of a same fight: the struggle for the emergence of a new, democratic, European Ukraine.

While receiving the chairmen of the Council of the EU and the Commission, Donald Tusk and Jean-Claude Juncker, for a key summit in Kiev, President Poroshenko announced an ambitious plan, which he summed up as the Four Ds of a new Ukraine: deregulation, debureaucratization, deoligarchization, decentralization.

Deregulation

Overregulation is an essential characteristic of Soviet legacy, a powerful killer for investors and a perpetual generator of corruption. Today, getting a construction permit is an impossible challenge unless you bribe half a dozen useless agencies. According to World Bank Ease of Doing Business Ranking, you need a minimum of 21 days to open a company, you have to go through one of the longest custom procedures in the world and you'll wait an average of 270 days to get electricity to your business. Ukraine has huge human potential, but who would invest in a war torn country that does everything to discourage you from investing? Licenses and permits are going to be erased and reshaped according to European standards. First steps had already been taken by the government, with the ministries of economy and justice scrapping a number of required licenses and permits, but it is only the beginning of the process and a vast amount of work still needs to be done.

Debureaucratization

One of the main features of post-Soviet societies is the inability of a plutocratic bureaucracy to take decisions. Built to implement orders coming from Moscow, the Ukrainian bureaucracy was left purposeless in 1991 and started to serve a local elite behaving as if it owned the state. Bureaucracy used to be an instrument to colonize the people. It is built according to the logics of feudalism. Every agency is a separate fiefdom that refuses to share its information with the others. There is no common database or decision-making process. The fiefdoms will be destroyed and the services merged. The Mexican Army of Ukrainian bureaucrats will be replaced by a young, dynamic, well-paid and clean public service. "Public service" is the key word here, and implies a mental revolution: Bureaucrats have to serve the public and not enslave it.

Deoligarchization

Oligarchs are the pleas of a post-Soviet system. Oligarchy is the main enemy of democracy, liberalism, and pro-market reforms. In a nutshell why did Poland succeed in the 1990s and Ukraine did not? Poland had no oligarchs, and Ukraine has plenty of them. As a result Poland built stable, transparent institutions and a booming market economy while Ukraine has an unstable political landscape and a shrinking economy. Oligarchs have turned elections into a farce by dividing candidates among themselves. The very idea of statehood became a joke, since public servants are on their payroll rather than a budget. Maidan was a revolution for Europe, but also - first and foremost - an anti-oligarchic uprising. Nobody should forget it, or history might repeat itself.

Oligarchs have controlled ministers, parliamentarians, policemen, journalists and tax inspectors for 20 years and this time has come to an end. New laws will be passed to separate business interests from politics and anti-monopolistic regulations will be enforced. Independence from Moscow and integration into the Euro-Atlantic space will never be achieved unless there is a radical change in the socio-economic structures in Ukraine. Western decision makers should have no illusions about it: No matter how much an oligarch spends on PR to convince them that he is pro-European, he will never gracefully accept the radical changes involved in European integration, first of which is the equality of all citizens under the law.

Recently, Poroshenko started to take realistic steps towards diminishing the influence of oligarchs in the energy sector, the largest black hole of the Ukrainian economy. This has traditionally been a sector, divided between several oligarchs who controlled government subsidies with their political leverage and refused to pay taxes or allow any competition in the field.

Decentralization

Ukraine is a very diverse country consisting of many different groups. We should look at this diversity as a tremendous opportunity rather than a threat. The emergence of Ukrainian national identity during the Maidan protests and the war should translate into a less centralized system rather than a more centralized one. A common European and patriotic vision should unite every region, but every region should be allowed to rule itself without having to rely on Kiev to build a road or change the roof on a school premises. From Lviv to Donbass or Odessa, the rule of law is non-negotiable, but local self-governance is the key to economic success and political stability. Every Ukrainian should finally feel they have a stake in the future of their nation.

Putin's primary target in invading Ukraine is to prevent the Maidan revolution from turning into a successful experience of democratic, social and economic reforms on his doorstep. The only way to defeat his neo-imperialistic ambitions is precisely to make sure it happens. President Poroshenko understood it very well, which is why he keeps stressing that the war in the East cannot be a pretext to postpone reforms. Radical changes are the best way to counter Russian aggression. On this front too, Ukraine and its leadership need Europe's full support.
 

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 #25
Janes.com
May 10, 2015
SACEUR, analysts see Russia renewing invasion of Ukraine in next two months
By Reuben F Johnson, Kiev - IHS Jane's Defence Weekly

A consensus is building among NATO officials and military analysts of the situation in Eastern Ukraine that Russia will renew its invasion of the region in the next two months.

However, there is also general agreement that the attack would take only after the 9 May Victory Day celebrations in Moscow, which President Vladimir Putin regards as reaffirming Russia's continued position as a "great power."

The predictions of a new Russian offensive by analysts have coincided with similar statements by officials such as NATO Supreme Commander, USAF General Philip Breedlove. Gen Breedlove testified to this effect before the US Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) on 30 April, stating that the sometimes on-sometimes off ceasefire agreed in February after the second round of Minsk negotiations had been utilised by the Russian forces to "reset and reposition".

NATO's assessment, he added, is that the Russian military's goal is to secure the gains made on territory already taken in the Ukraine Donbass region, as well as to deploy for the launch of a late spring attack. "Many of their [the Russians'] actions are consistent with preparations for another offensive," he said, adding that Russian forces' activities were not just exercises but "preparing, training, and equipping to have the capacity again to take an offensive."

Gen Breedlove's conclusions were based on two major indicators. One is that Russia's armed forces do not typically engage in empty sabre-rattling without following through with real military action. "In the past they have not wasted their effort," he said.

The other is that Russia's military has moved to exert enhanced positive control on the battlefield over the formations of "separatist" combatants and to more closely integrate their actions with those of Moscow's regulars "because there was disunity in some of the earlier attacks. We do see a very distinct Russian set of command-and-control in the eastern part of Ukraine," he stated. "Command-and-control, air defence, support to artillery, all of these things have increased - making a more coherent, organised force out of the separatists."

Dr Phillip Karber of the Potomac Foundation in Washington, DC, a defence and foreign policy thinktank that has led calls for the US to provide Ukraine with military assistance, has traversed the front of the Ukraine-Russia conflict a number of times.

He and former NATO Supreme Commander General Wesley Clark (retd) have given numerous briefings on the lessons learned from the Russian operation and have analysed the scenarios likely to unfold.

The Russian use of "political agents, Spetsnaz, 'little green men', volunteers, and mercenaries provide a variety of low visibility insertion, sabotage, training, and advisory options" and mean it has been able to prosecute its action in Ukraine "...in such a way that allows some European nations to pretend that they cannot recognise the direct control of Moscow in this conflict," Karber said.

"We are probably looking at three potential scenarios at this point," said Karber. "One is that this situation stays as it is now: a frozen conflict with Ukraine partially dismembered and its economy in such disarray that it will never be eligible for EU membership - a central goal of Putin."

"The second scenario," he continued, "is that the Russian forces move out and occupy all of the Donbass [Lugansk and Donetsk] regions. They run up the separatist flag and say 'we play the Abkhazia/South Ossetia [Georgia] game again' and just declare these regions protectorates of Russia."

"The third option that could play out is Putin orders an all-out offensive and the Russian army swings south to take Dnepropetrovsk, Zapaprozhye, and Mariupol, which gives him the land bridge to the Crimea that he wants."

In all of these scenarios Crimea remains in Russian hands and Moscow will not even engage in the pretence that it is a separatist region. It has already been assimilated as Russian territory, say all of the analysts looking at the situation in this region of Ukraine.

This year's Victory Day celebrations - marking 70 years since the end of the Second World War - are the most elaborate and expensive in the history of post-Soviet Russia. The impact of the event has greater implications than many realise.

"It's the only opportunity for the nation to assert itself. There are no other foundations for national pride left," said the sociologist Lev Gudkov, director of the independent polling unit at Russia's Levada Center. "This is the triumph of the Soviet Union over Hitler's Germany and at the same time a triumph over the West. It's a declaration of might, the transformation into a superpower," he said in an interview with the New York Times .

Russia's continued aggression in Ukraine, say other analysts, is seen by Putin as a continuation of the country's "historic mission" of the Second World War - "saving Europe from fascism, extremism, and restoring poryadok i zakony (law and order) to all of the regions he believes still should belong to Moscow."

That the Russian president now views Russia's actions through this prism is part of what prompted Gen Breedlove to state in the same 30 April congressional testimony that "what we do believe is that we should consider changing the decision calculus of Putin. That's what we look at."

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 #26
The Daily Signal
http://dailysignal.com
May 11, 2015
Lessons From Iraq Help US Troops Train Ukrainians
By Nolan Peterson    
Nolan Peterson, a former special operations pilot and a combat veteran of Iraq and Afghanistan, is The Daily Signal's foreign correspondent based in Ukraine.
[Video here http://dailysignal.com/2015/05/11/lessons-from-iraq-help-us-troops-train-ukrainians/

YAVORIV, Ukraine-At a former Soviet military base outside of the western Ukrainian town of Lviv, about 300 U.S. Army paratroopers from the 173rd Airborne Brigade, which is based in Vicenza, Italy, are training the Ukrainian National Guard.

The six-month U.S. training exercise, called Fearless Guardian, officially began on April 20. The training is focused both on teaching individual skills, as well as modeling the institution of the Ukrainian National Guard on the U.S. military.

Yet, beyond the official syllabus, looming over the training is the knowledge that the Ukrainian soldiers here will likely see combat soon after their training is over.

Many of the U.S. paratroopers are themselves combat veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan. And many of the Ukrainian soldiers are fresh off the battlefields of the Donbass, some after more than a year on the front lines.

Consequently, one of the greatest challenges for U.S. soldiers is applying the lessons they've learned from counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to prepare Ukrainian troops for the type of combat they'll soon be facing in eastern Ukraine, which includes heavy artillery, tank battles and in some places, even trench warfare.

For the U.S. soldiers, the training mission in Ukraine marks a return to a Cold War mindset. Soldiers are focused on training for a conventional state-on-state conflict. And they are also adjusting to the type of media attention that comes with training exercises like Fearless Guardian, in which the diplomatic message of having U.S. soldiers on Ukrainian soil is equally as important as the lessons those soldiers are teaching.

Learn more in the video above.

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 #27
International Business Times
www.ibtimes.com
May 12, 2015
To Defeat Rebels, Ukraine Military Might Allow Foreigners To Join Armed Forces
By Julia Glum

Ukraine's parliament gave Tuesday its first approval to a bill that would let foreigners serve in the nation's military. The Rada voted to pass the first reading of the bill, which would enable non-Ukrainians to serve as privates and junior officers in the armed forces, the Associated Press reported. It will now go to a second reading.

The bill was motivated by the ongoing conflict between pro-Russian separatists and the Ukrainian government. Foreigners have joined both sides of the fight, even though Ukraine's current laws forbid it, Sputnik reported. The new legislation would change this. It would also take the pressure off Ukraine's military recruitment efforts and mean fewer payments to soldiers' families, the bill's authors said.

"There are grounds to hope that after foreigners and individuals without citizenship receive the legal possibility to serve in the armed forces, our country will get several battle-ready, experienced, and motivated units of up to 1,000 men," a note attached to the bill explained. The legislation needed 226 votes to pass Tuesday, and it received 257, Sputnik reported.

The concept behind the bill is not new. In January, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree allowing foreigners between the ages of 18 and 30 to take on five-year contracts with Russia's army, firefighters and Interior Ministry, the Moscow Times reported. They must speak Russian and have a clean record.

At the time, military expert Alexander Golts told BBC News there were likely 300 foreigners already in Russia's military. Overall, the conflict has drawn small numbers of citizens from countries like France, Spain, Germany, Poland, and Sweden.

The first foreign casualty for Ukraine came this past August, when an American died with the volunteer Donbass Battalion there. Mark "Franko" Paslawsky, a 55-year-old investment banker from New York, had a military background and Ukrainian citizenship. "Given what I saw, the level of incompetence, the corruption, the lack of activity - I just decided that I needed to go and participate," he told VICE before his death.

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 #28
www.rt.com
May 12, 2015
Poroshenko violates Minsk deal vowing to recapture Donetsk Airport - Kremlin

The Ukrainian president's decision to reclaim Donetsk Airport, a key strategic point in the conflict in the country's east, are in violation of the Minsk peace deal, says the Kremlin.

Petro Poroshenko vowed on Monday to take the airport back: "I have no doubt - we will free the airport, because it is our land. And we will rebuild the airport." He also promised to erect a monument to the "cyborgs," which has become a common nickname for the Ukrainian soldiers that fought against the forces of the self-proclaimed eastern republics for control of Donetsk Airport.

Poroshenko spoke at the premier of the documentary "Airport", which was dedicated to the siege.

When asked if he thinks such words violate the Minsk peace deal, the Russian president's press secretary said they do: "Of course, they are a violation. In fact, we have repeatedly said that Ukraine is not complying with the Minsk agreement."

The Minsk deal is a peace roadmap for Kiev and the self-proclaimed republics in eastern Ukraine. Brokered by Russia, Germany and France, it was signed in the Belarusian capital in February. It aims to implement the peace process agreed upon in the September 2014 talks, also in Minsk. Since February's agreement was signed, the violence in the East has reduced, but both Kiev and the secessionists blame each other for violating the truce regularly.

As part of the Minsk deal, the sides agreed to move heavy weapons away from a demarcation line drawn across eastern Ukraine. The self-proclaimed Donetsk Republic says this leaves the airport in its territory. Its representative to Minsk Denis Pushilin says Poroshenko's vow to reclaim the airport is a call to arms: "This is a direct violation of the Minsk agreements and a call to military action. We ask that the guarantor nations pay attention to these statements."

Donetsk Airport has been one of the hottest flashpoints in the conflict in eastern Ukraine for about eight months. In January, Kiev admitted its forces completely surrendered the airport.

During the lengthy siege the airport was reduced to rubble. The casualty count is impossible to verify, with the two sides giving vastly different numbers, both saying they had lost dozens while claiming the opponent had lost hundreds.

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 #29
Opednews.com
May 9, 2015
Deconstructing the Ukraine War: The Players and Their Interests
By Natylie Baldwin
Natylie Baldwin is co-author of Ukraine: Zbig's Grand Chessboard & How the West Was Checkmated, available from Tayen Lane Publishing. Her fiction and nonfiction have appeared in various publications including Sun Monthly, Dissident Voice, Energy Bulletin, Newtopia Magazine, The Common Line, New York Journal of Books and The Lakeshore. She lives in the San Francisco Bay Area.

As ominous reports of increased violations of the Minsk 2.0 ceasefire continue to surface and the Kiev government paves the way for martial law, the winds of war appear to be picking up again. Russia's Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, has even gone so far as to publicly state, without providing details, that "someone in the European Union" is sabotaging the ceasefire.

Against this backdrop, the EU-Ukraine Summit last week hailed a neoliberal free trade agreement set to take effect on January 1, 2016, but it was also made clear that any EU membership aspirations for Ukraine are still a distant dream, rendering Ukraine's relationship with the EU to be a rather lopsided one in terms of who benefits and who suffers.

It seems like a good time to take a look at the parties in the Ukraine war, their interests and what may be expected in the future.

The Kiev Government -- How it Came to Power and the Nature of its Rule

The European Union, led by Germany, tried to pressure Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich to sign an Association agreement. Upon review of how the agreement would actually affect his country economically -- already the poorest in Europe -- including austerity measures, renunciation of their significant trade with Russia and the supplanting of Ukraine's native oligarchs, Yanukovich balked and opted to go with a Russian deal comprised of a $15 billion loan and reduced gas rates. As it turns out, the West was not in fact offering Ukraine free trade or even visa-free travel but a self-serving deal that had little to no benefit to Ukraine. Most leaders in Yanukovich's place would have done the same.

Throughout the period of negotiating this association agreement, Russia requested three way talks to avert problems. Of course, Russia wanted to protect its own economic and trade interests, but it also had an interest in preventing friction or instability on its border. However, they were basically told by the West to drop dead.

According to an independent investigation by Germany's ARD TV into the events surrounding the ouster of the democratically elected president, specifically the violence on the Maidan, found that sniper shots fired on February 20th, which resulted in almost 100 deaths, came primarily from buildings controlled by the Maidan protesters, including members of Right Sector. A more in-depth forensic investigation was conducted by Ukrainian-Canadian academic Ivan Katchanovski, PhD. His conclusions supported the ARD report. This is all consistent with Estonian Foreign Minister Urmas Paet's account to then European High Commissioner Catherine Ashton in an intercepted phone call posted to YouTube on February 26, 2014, wherein he stated that his sources, including Dr. Olga Bolgomets -- who was an ardent supporter of the original Maidan protests -- reported forensic evidence indicating that the snipers were Maidan protesters. Paet also reported that members of the Ukrainian parliament had been beaten and threatened during the period in question.

Prior to the sniper violence and the ouster of Yanukovich, State Department official Victoria Nuland and US ambassador Geoffrey Pyatt were caught planning the imminent coup in an intercepted phone call posted on February 6th wherein they are discussing how to "glue this thing" and who will be the best person to lead a post-Yanukovich Ukraine, declaring "Yats is the guy." Nuland also famously disparaged the EU's less aggressive approach to engineering a zero-sum position for Ukraine with respect to its relations with the West and Russia.

The Kiev government that has come after the overthrow of the corrupt but democratically elected Yanukovich has, by all reasonable measures, overseen a degeneration of the country into something far more sinister. Neo-Nazis were given posts in the Interior and Education Ministries, were elected to the Rada in small numbers but are also members of and have significant influence in other parliamentary parties that won larger percentages. These Neo-Nazis had allegedly threatened the Kiev government in the past with a coup if it didn't placate their desires. A ministry of truth has been established, creating an atmosphere that allows for the recent killing spree of journalists and opposition politicians, to which the head of the SBU responded by saying, "I think that at the present time, when a war practically going on, "Ukrainophobes," if they don't shut their mouths, should at least stop their rhetoric." World War II era Nazi collaborator, Stepan Bandera, involved in the massacre of tens of thousands of Jews and Poles in Western Ukraine, has become an openly celebrated hero. A government that has such elements will not be inclined to reach a political compromise with the rebels in the southeast, although the Kiev government, as discussed in more detail below, is obligated by the Minsk 2.0 agreement to do so.

Furthermore, Ukraine's economy has imploded with S&P predicting default as "virtually inevitable," a currency that has devalued by 40% in 2015 alone and an inflation rate of 272%. The Kiev government has no money and has had to rely on EU and IMF loans -- with the latter institution actually breaking its own rules about lending to a nation conducting war.

The Novorossiyan Rebels

The West has typically characterized the rebels in the southeast of Ukraine as puppets of Russia with no legitimate grievances or indigenous support. However, American Russia scholar Nicolai Petro, who spent a year in Ukraine and was in country when the upheaval occurred, has cited sociological surveys of Donbas residents from March, April and May of 2014 in which the results show that majorities considered the Right Sector to be dangerous and influential and the Maidan protests to be illegal and representing "an armed overthrow of the government, organized by the opposition, with the assistance of the West."

Independent video journalist Patrick Lancaster, who has been reporting from the Donbas since spring of 2014, stated that most of the fighters he has encountered on both sides are Ukrainian.

British Russia scholar Paul Robinson has estimated that 90% of the fighters in the Donbas are Ukrainian. Furthermore, he states that the original rebellion constituted regular citizens who took control of local government buildings in response to the startling events coming out of post-coup Kiev where laws were introduced seeking to delegitimize the Russian language, neo-Nazis were given posts in the Interior and Education departments and many acts of violence were committed against members of the Communist Party and the Party of Regions.

When Robinson asked a Maidan protester why this political protest had led to a more violent and divisive result than the Orange Revolution in 2004, the protester admitted that this time they didn't care what the Crimeans or the residents of the Donbas wanted. So the divisiveness was not initiated by Russia or the ethnic Russian population of Ukraine, but by a portion of the Maidan protesters who basically believed a whole segment of their country should take a flying leap.

Although Russia has provided some arms and allowed Russian volunteers to cross the border freely, Robinson points out that Moscow has actually had a moderating influence on the rebels by facilitating the replacement of the original military leaders (Igor Strelkov and Alexander Borodai) that supported what was perceived as a quixotic quest for independence. An independent Donbas that would be economically unviable and would provide no counterweight to a hostile and extremist government in Kiev is not in Moscow's interests.

Vladimir Putin: Who is He and What Does He Want?

This brings us to the figure in the Kremlin who has become larger than life on the world stage. Whether vilified or admired, Russian president Vladimir Putin now receives more attention than just about any other person on the planet. In the West, there has been a demonization campaign in the media against Putin that has waxed and waned in intensity over the years. However, the campaign has gone into overdrive since the Ukraine crisis and subsequent civil war.

One level of demonization has been to suggest that Putin is a cold-blooded KGB killer and the equivalent of a mafia don who personally puts out hits on Russian dissidents like journalist Anna Politkovskya and intelligence agent Aleksandr Litvinenko.

According to a diplomatic cable released by Wikileaks, from US Ambassador Bill Burns to Washington regarding the alleged assassination of Litvinenko in 2006, there was a wide variety of speculative opinion in Russia of who was responsible, but it was agreed that there was no evidence supporting any of the theories, including those pointing the finger at Putin. Former BBC Moscow correspondent, Angus Roxburgh, in his political biography of Putin, interviewed Martin Sixsmith who led an investigation into Litvinenko's death, in which he concluded that there was no evidence that Putin was behind it. To this day, the British government has refused to release Litvinenko's autopsy report.

The same diplomatic cable from Burns similarly stated that there was no evidence that Putin was behind journalist Politkovskya's murder either. The publishers of Novaya Gazeta, the newspaper that Politkovskya wrote for, believe the Chechen leadership was behind her murder, not the Russian government.

This has not stopped the western media from reviving these claims in the midst of the Ukraine crisis, including the commencement of a farcical court proceeding in Britain regarding the Litvinenko murder in which a critical piece of forensic evidence (the autopsy report) is still withheld. Hence, this is nothing more than intrigue and innuendo to further poison the western public's mind about both Putin and Russia.

The same dynamic has played out with the murder of Boris Nemtsov whom Putin had no motivation for wanting to eliminate as he was no plausible threat with only a 1% approval rating among the Russian people. Again, the western media has only presented innuendo in its implicit accusations against Putin. And when the innuendo doesn't hold up, they simply stop talking about it. If Putin had thought Nemtsov was a real threat or troublemaker he likely would have followed his usual pattern of finessing the law and having him jailed.

The second level of demonization has been to characterize Putin as personally corrupt, accusing him of holding billions of dollars he systematically ripped off from the Russian people as far back as his days in the St. Petersburg mayor's office in secret bank accounts, owning an opulent Spanish villa and perhaps even stealing lollipops from disabled children.

This has culminated in a recent Frontline program called "Putin's Way" in which a mishmash of unverified claims and discredited conspiracy theories were trotted out in a slick propaganda piece trying to pass itself off as journalism. Only one academic on Russia was interviewed who was allowed to frame the narrative on Putin's "corruption." This academic's tendentious claims were not challenged by other academic and journalistic experts who have done more sober, balanced and in depth research on Russia and Putin. There were plenty of people Frontline could have talked to that would have provided a very different account of Putin's character while working as deputy mayor of St. Petersburg, including many residents of the city who have stated that Putin was the only bureaucrat during that period that did not charge bribes for registering their businesses, which contributed to their decision to vote for him in the 2000 presidential election. It is perhaps best summed up by one of Putin's academic political biographers, Allen Lynch:

For much of this time, given (mayor Anatoliy) Sobchak's frequent and protracted absences and his preoccupation with national affairs, Putin assumed the functions of acting mayor. He supervised the drafting and implementation of countless international business deals and policy reforms. These transactions did not always go according to plan, and no doubt many profited handsomely from Putin's admitted inexperience in these matters. During his attempt to establish municipal oversight over a series of casinos, for example, the city was cheated. In another case, the city was fleeced for $120 million for two shipments of cooking oil. Although during this period his mother bought a choice apartment at an exceptionally low price at a city auction, Putin didn't seem to enrich himself personally. In the one specific public charge of corruption that was brought against him, Putin sued in court for slander and won"
Putin was not corrupt, at least not in the conventional, venal sense. His modest and frankly unfashionable attire bespoke a seeming indifference to personal luxury. While as deputy mayor, he had acquired the use of the summer dacha of the former East German consulate and even installed a sauna unit there, but when the house burned down in the summer of 1996, his $5,000 life's savings burned with it. To have accumulated only $5,000 in five years as deputy mayor of Russia's second largest city and largest port, when hundreds of less well-placed Russians were enriching themselves on government pickings, implies something other than pecuniary motives behind Putin's activities.

As for the Spanish villa that, according to British tabloids, Putin supposedly plans to retire to so he can grow special grapes he can turn into wildly profitable wines, his political nemesis Alexei Navalny discovered that the villa is actually owned by the daughter of a member of the Russian parliament, not Putin.

Last summer, President Obama, Secretary of State Kerry and numerous commentators saturated the mass media with groundless accusations that Putin was responsible for the shoot down of MH17, along with constant claims that Russia had invaded Ukraine -- again, without substantive evidence.

So why is so much energy being put into demonizing Russia's leader -- a tactic that historians and Russia scholars have noted never occurred during the height of the Cold War?

As investigative journalist Robert Parry's sources in the White House have revealed, the massive propaganda instruments of western corporate media are the only real leverage they have in the crisis they helped to engineer:

"In the context of Ukraine, I asked one senior administration official about this behavior and he responded that Russia held most of the advantages there by nature of proximity and history but that one advantage the United States wielded was 'information warfare' -- and it made no sense to surrender that edge by withdrawing accusations that had put Russian President Vladimir Putin on the defensive."

Indeed, many pundits in the media have bloviated about Putin's supposed crimes and imperial ambitions or have lamented that they can't figure out what the mysterious Russian president wants. This, however, indicates dishonesty or laziness. In countless speeches and interactions with western leaders over the course of his presidency, Putin has reiterated that he wants Russia to be accepted by the west or at least for its interests to be taken into account. Judging by his actual past actions, not the distortions and lies that have been put in their stead by western politicians and pundits, he wants stability, friendly or benign neighbors and reciprocal economic exchange.

Putin wants these things because he believes they will create the environment most conducive to increasing Russians' security and standard of living -- two values that are higher on his list of priorities than political democracy, though the latter is not completely rejected out of hand either as Russia is more democratic than it has been in its 1,000 year history of authoritarian rule, except for Gorbachev's brief period of leadership. With Putin's approval ratings never having dipped below the 60s, Russians seem to agree with his priorities.

This brings us to the question of how to resolve the Ukrainian civil war and the larger geopolitical tensions they embody. Instability and possible membership in NATO on his western border does not serve Putin's objectives for Russia. Due to Ukraine's internal cultural divisions, it is imperative for both Ukraine's long term stability and Russia's security that Ukraine serve as a neutral buffer state with decentralized political control, the opportunity to benefit economically from both Russia and Europe and no NATO membership.

The second and third requirements are interrelated as the EU attempted to force Ukrainian president Yanukovich to accede to an association agreement that not only would have created the economic problems already outlined, but would have also required Ukraine to align its military and security policies with NATO as reflected in the language of the association agreement itself as well as the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon requiring the same of all incoming EU members. This posed a major security dilemma for Russia as Putin, Lavrov and other Russian officials had warned American leaders and diplomats over the years that it would.

Unlike the unique situation in Crimea, Putin has shown no interest in absorbing the Donbas into the Russian Federation. Setting aside the likely political repercussions and thornier issues of international law, if Putin were to absorb the Donbas, there would be no viable counterweight to an extremist government in Kiev that would be free to pursue NATO membership.

The US and EU

If German Chancellor Merkel and French President Hollande's initiative with Minsk 2.0 in early February was any indication, Europe seemed to be finally asserting some independence on behalf of its own interests as Kiev's military and economy continued to disintegrate while Washington descended further into hubristic madness with threatened weapons deliveries.

With the town of Debaltseve, which bridges the rebel areas of the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) and the Lugansk People's Republic (LPR), now in the hands of the rebels and the ceasefire appearing to largely hold until recently, it is important to note that the Minsk 2.0 agreement (which did not define the final demarcation line) is not likely to resolve the crisis but did represent an important turning point in the political equation.

In addition to the fact that Merkel and Hollande approached Moscow for another round of diplomacy and not the other way around, there were significant political concessions made verbally by Merkel during the negotiations as reported in an in depth article in Der Spiegel and expounded upon by analyst and international law expert Alexander Mercouris:

It was almost certainly in the talks with Putin in Moscow, where the Ukrainians were not present, that the broad outline of what was formally decided in Minsk was actually agreed. Merkel then flew to Washington to brief Obama and obtain his consent. Poroshenko was then presented in Minsk with what had previously been agreed, leaving him scope only to quibble over the technical details in a way that it is in Merkel's interests to highlight"

Der Spiegel claims Merkel was able to extract one concession from Putin. Der Spiegel claims Putin agreed the forthcoming elections in the rebel regions will be limited to areas the rebel militia was to control in accordance with a ceasefire line agreed on 19th September 2014, and would not take place in territories the rebel militia has captured since the failure of the Ukrainian government's offensive in January.

If Der Spiegel is right about this then this must have been agreed verbally because there is nothing in the text of the agreements that came out of Minsk that refers to it. Der Spiegel probably is right, because the remainder of the article shows a great deal more was agreed verbally by Putin and Merkel than appears in writing".

Ukraine is obliged to pass a law before the end of March granting the rebel regions in the Donbass special status within Ukraine. Ukraine is obliged to enact a new Constitution before the end of the year. As I have previously said, this provides a time line for the settlement of the conflict that did not exist previously.

Far more important, Der Spiegel says that Ukraine is obliged to agree with the rebels the terms of the new law for the special status of their regions within Ukraine and is also obliged to agree the provisions of the new Constitution with them as well".

Even more importantly, Der Spiegel says the two rebel regions are to have a veto over Ukraine's future political orientation, including its joining either NATO or the EU. In Der Spiegel's words:

"Russia has likely already achieved its minimum goal, that of preventing Ukraine from joining NATO or the European Union.

"The deal agreed to in Minsk includes a kind of veto right for separatist areas in eastern Ukraine on important fundamental issues.

"That right would apply to membership in military alliances and to membership in economic blocks such as the EU or Putin's Eurasian Economic Union."

These provisions do not appear in writing in the Minsk agreements. If they exist (which, given that the Der Spiegel article is sourced from Merkel's office, they surely do) they must have been agreed verbally by Putin and Merkel, almost certainly during the talks in Moscow that preceded the ones in Minsk.

There would have been no point in asking Poroshenko to sign a document that contained these provisions since for political reasons he could never have signed it. However the Russians have obtained confirmation in writing that they may control Ukraine's border until the new Constitution is agreed. This gives them a powerful tool which they can use to enforce terms they dictated in Moscow and Minsk, even those that were only agreed verbally with Merkel, if or rather when the Ukrainians try to back out of them".

Der Spiegel calls the Minsk agreements a success for Merkel. It is difficult to see why. If implemented they mean the end of the West's and the EU's Ukraine project.

As also reported in the Der Spiegel article, Putin showed his willingness, as he has in the past, to apply pressure to the rebel leadership to agree to diplomatic compromises. However, there has been no evidence throughout the Ukraine crisis that the West is willing to apply reciprocal pressure on Kiev, which has broken every previous agreement since February of 2014. Unless the West forces Kiev to face reality, the pattern will continue in which the war smolders then flares up again until the Kiev regime collapses from its own incompetence and delusions.

There have been several events after the signing of Minsk 2.0 on February 12th that do not bode well. Svoboda storm trooper Andriy Parubiy was in Washington requesting more weapons for Kiev during the week of February 25. The U.S. has sent troops to Ukraine this month to train the Ukrainian national guard. Ukraine's Interior Ministry admitted the training could include the vicious neo-Nazi Azov battalion, although a US Embassy representative denied that. The Right Sector has also just been officially incorporated into the Ukrainian Army under its neo-Nazi leader Dmytro Yarosh who is now Ukraine's Chief of General Staff. Sending American troops to Ukraine would appear to be a violation of the Minsk 2.0 agreement which requires the removal of all foreign fighters and mercenaries from Ukraine.

But perhaps the most disturbing development was the Kiev parliament's demand in mid-March that the rebels effectively surrender and allow Kiev to organize elections before any federalization would occur. The Minsk agreement reflected no such requirement from the rebels. Instead, Kiev was supposed to begin negotiating with representatives of the rebel republics toward a special status. As DPR official Denis Pushilin stated, "Chancellor Merkel and President Hollande have declared they would guarantee that Ukraine would carryout Minsk 2.0. Therefore, they now have to bring Poroshenko to heel as by his actions he is ripping up the Minsk agreements."

Meanwhile, Germany is reportedly disgusted with shenanigans by American hawks like NATO commander Philip Breedlove and Victoria Nuland that thwart work toward negotiating a settlement. As a subsequent Der Spiegel article detailed, Breedlove's constant assertions of Russia's military incursions, which are contradicted by Germany's intelligence sources (as well as France's), are particularly troubling:

Sources in the Chancellery have referred to Breedlove's comments as "dangerous propaganda."

"It is the tone of Breedlove's announcements that makes Berlin uneasy. False claims and exaggerated accounts, warned a top German official during a recent meeting on Ukraine, have put NATO -- and, by extension, the entire West -- in danger of losing its credibility.

"Berlin sources also say that it has become conspicuous that Breedlove's controversial statements are often made just as a step forward has been made in the difficult negotiations aimed at a political solution. Berlin sources say that Germany should be able to depend on its allies to support its efforts at peace."

Sources in Washington acknowledge that Breedlove's comments are cleared ahead of time with both the White House and the Pentagon.

The German media also exposed how Victoria Nuland, during secret meetings on the sidelines of the Munch Security Conference in early February, pumped up her colleagues on how to "fight against the Europeans, fight against them rhetorically" in order to facilitate the arming of Kiev. This is apparently where Breedlove and other officials were coached by Nuland on their warmongering propaganda, "While talking to the Europeans this weekend, you need to make the case that Russia is putting in more and more offensive stuff while we want to help the Ukrainians defend against these systems. It is defensive in nature although some of it has lethality."

Although Merkel seems alarmed by the potential for an escalating war in Europe, she still appears to be doing the bidding of Washington as she reportedly has made vigorous attempts to persuade China to halt its growing political and economic alliance with Russia. It is unclear why this would be in Germany's long-term interests as an eventual economic partnership among China, Russia and Germany would represent a mutually beneficial Eurasian powerhouse -- something that Washington seeks to prevent at virtually all costs as the Brzezinski- and Wolfowitz-influenced politicians at the helm are making clear.

The major question remains: what will Europe, particularly Germany, do next? Will they continue their past role enabling Washington to act like a bull in a china shop in their backyard or will they finally recognize where their true interests lie and act accordingly?

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 #30
www.opendemocracy.net
May 11, 2015
Victory Day in Kyiv
Ukraine has a new holiday - 8 May, Day of Remembrance - and a new symbol, the poppy. But 9 May remains, as a reminder of the fact that war is 'never a pretty story.'
By Natalia Antonova
Natalia Antonova was born in Kyiv and grew up in North Carolina. She works as a journalist and playwright.

9 May was a blustery day in Kyiv - hot in the sun, bitingly cold in the shade. A day of sharp contrasts: 'The kind of weather that makes my joints ache,' joked Igor Nikolayevich, a local Second World War veteran who turned up in Park Vechnoi Slavy (Park of Eternal Glory) for celebrations commemorating the capitulation of Nazi Germany to the Soviet Union.

In post-revolutionary Ukraine, where de-communisation laws were recently passed by parliament, and where a bloody conflict with Russia-backed separatists continues to simmer in the East, many feared that the 9 May celebrations would be tense.

The 9 May holiday - the traditional date when VE Day is marked in the former Soviet Union - was not, contrary to some people's expectations, cancelled. A new date, 8 May, was instead introduced as the Day of Remembrance, alongside a new remembrance symbol, the poppy.

The adoption of an additional holiday and a new symbol is seen as the Kyiv government's deliberate move to create an historical narrative separate from that of the Russian Federation, which, many Ukrainians are keen to point out, is using the Soviet Second World War legacy, in its efforts to destabilise and divide Ukraine.

In Russia, the conflict in eastern Ukraine has been covered almost as a kind of extension of the Russian fight against the Nazis, with Russia-backed separatists presented as fighting a bloodthirsty fascist junta in Kyiv.

Park Vechnoi Slavy

At Park Vechnoi Slavy, I chatted with Igor Nikolayevich, who fought on the side of the Red Army, about Ukraine's new laws. Particularly, we talked about the fact that the new legislation recognises the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) as 'fighters for Ukrainian independence.' These groups have been accused of siding with the Nazis, committing atrocities and participating in ethnic cleansing, as documented by historians such as Timothy Snyder and Niall Ferguson among others.

Academics have strongly criticised the provision in the new legislation that states that any denial of OUN and UPA's role in the fight for Ukrainian independence is technically criminalised. Critics have pointed out that such politicisation of history could further divide the country, which is already suffering both from armed conflict and a severe economic decline. As of press time, Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko had yet to sign the law.

For his part, Igor Nikolayevich was surprisingly philosophical about what was happening. 'The UPA are not my friends - we will never be friends,' he said with a smile. 'And I can't say that I understand this new poppy stuff. But you have to remember - any war involves atrocities, pain, confusion, this aftermath of arguing, it's like a blanket that people pull in either direction... War is never a pretty story. Maybe if we could all just agree on that ...' He trailed off, bending down to accept a flower from a little girl who, like many other children, came to the park to greet the country's few remaining veterans.

Not everyone adopted Igor Nikolayevich's stance. At the same event, I spoke to another elderly veteran, Vasyl Petrovich, who asked me to 'just please [not] mention these stupid laws, and everything else that is happening, especially the accursed war [in the Donbas].' Vasyl Petrovich was close to tears as he shooed me away, his hands trembling. A middle-aged woman who looked like his daughter - they had the same cornflower blue eyes - wanted to apologise for her father. 'He's very tired, I'm sure you understand,' she said.

Arguments

Next to the monument where, just half an hour ago, Poroshenko and other members of the ruling elite were laying flowers in commemoration of all those who fought, political arguments were breaking out as they are wont to do in Kyiv these days.

An elderly woman got yelled at by showing up with a portrait of Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin. 'This is offensive!' A middle-aged man in fatigues told her. 'You make me want to throw up!' 'Death to Russian occupants!' A lone voice called out in the elderly woman's direction.

A separate group of people was passionately arguing over who was really to blame for both the Donbas conflict and the spate of recent high-profile assassinations, including that of prominent and frequently controversial journalist Oles Buzina. I observed how the arguers switched seamlessly between Russian and Ukrainian, depending on whom they were addressing.

This linguistic duality was always something I have admired about Kyiv, my native city, and it made me want to believe that no matter how loud and passionate the argument would grow, these people would never resort to physically hurting each other. Then again, who knows anymore? Violent horror in the Donbas also didn't seem possible, until it was.

The arguers were briefly shamed into a truce when another group of frail Second World War veterans, flanked by younger and grimmer Afghan War vets, approached the monument to lay flowers.

Political observer and activist Sergei Koshman says he's 'not a big fan' of Ukraine's de-communisation legislation. 'At the same time, I can't come up with a better way for Ukraine to move on, myself,' he confessed.

Sergei is one of many people in Ukraine who are critical of what he says is a 'neo-religion' that Vladimir Putin's Russia has created around the memories of the Great Patriotic War, as it is more commonly known in Russia.

'Honouring veterans and creating this passionate cult that has very little to do with the actual war - but is very useful for manipulating and dividing people - these are two separate things,' Sergei told me. 'Look at European countries, look at how many different stages of [political] development they have gone through after the war. But the post-Soviet space got stuck in one place.'

Ultimately, Sergei isn't sure if Ukraine's de-communisation laws will bring the country closer to the EU. 'Maybe all of this will result in developing our own [socio-political] context,' he said. 'But either way - Ukraine has to emerge from the post-Soviet period somehow.'

Back at Park Vechnoi Slavy, Vladimir Nikolayevich, a veteran who can barely walk anymore, gallantly offered me a cigarette when I approached him for a chat. 'I keep trying to quit again, but life's stressful as of late,' he told me. I asked him if he was worried about the political situation, but he just laughed. 'I have no energy to worry about the political situation, I just worry about my grandson's exams.'

We sat together and puffed away, watching two women argue who was to blame for the Donbas conflict. Appropriately, one of the women was wearing a poppy, the new symbol of Ukraine's Remembrance Day. The other woman had a St George ribbon pinned to her chest - which has come to symbolise both the Great Patriotic War in Russia and the separatist movement in Ukraine's east.

'Who started this war, huh?' The woman with the St George ribbon yelled.

'You tell me!' The woman with the poppy retorted.

'The Jews!' Ribbon woman bellowed.

'That's what I'm telling you! It's always the Jews!' Poppy woman replied.

Veteran philosophy

Vladimir Nikolayevich discreetly rolled his eyes and lit another cigarette. Like many veterans, he told me that he missed the Soviet Union.

'But things around here can always get worse,' he said, waving his hand in the direction of the Victory Day crowds.

Most of the veterans I spoke to were agreed that cancelling a military parade this year was a smart idea. Showing off hardware as people continue to die in the country's east is 'senseless,' an Afghan vet who shied away from identifying himself told me. The ceremonies in Kyiv may have been small, but there was something appropriately sombre and sincere about them - understatement instead of bombast, sorrow instead of triumphalism.

It made me miss my grandfather, Major General Pyotr Nistratov, a Russian who fell in love with Ukraine after being assigned to a post in Kyiv, moving his wife and daughters there, and paving the way for my mother to meet my father eventually.

Grandpa Pyotr had been a pillar of our family, a tough man who saw many savage battles in the Second World War. He had no love for the UPA, but equally hated empty political rhetoric and posturing. Sometimes, I'm glad he didn't live long enough to see the current crisis, though this doesn't make his absence hurt any less.

I was telling Vladimir Nikolayevich about my granddad, dragging on cigarette after cigarette as amused photojournalists snapped pictures of us, and patriotic music played.

'I feel for you young people,' He said, reaching out and patting my arm. 'Our time is over, but what happens next? I can only wish you luck.'

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 #31
http://gordonhahn.com
May 8, 2014
Victory Day, Ukraine, Communism, and Fascism Through a Counterfactual Prism
By Gordon M. Hahn
Gordon M. Hahn is an Analyst and Advisory Board Member of the Geostrategic Forecasting Corporation, Chicago, Illinois; Senior Researcher, Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies (CETIS), Akribis Group, San Jose, California Analyst/Consultant, Russia Other Points of View - Russia Media Watch; and Senior Researcher and Adjunct Professor, MonTREP, Monterey, California.

In light of the ongoing Ukraine crisis coinciding with the 70th anniversary of the victory over Nazism in Europe and fascism more globally, there has been a tug of war over the legacy of the victory. In Ukraine, there is a question of whether there was a victory at all for the Ukrainian people; Ukrainians simply fell victim to a different but equally sinister totalitarian system. What the USSR called and what many in the post-Soviet space, including many in Ukraine, still hail as a victory in the 'Great Patriotic War, many in Kiev and in particular in western Ukraine view as simply bringing a new occupation and tragedy, which it was. Indeed, the civil war in Ukraine that resulted from the Maidan's seizure of power in February 2014 is in significant part driven not just by ethnic and linguistic differences between western and eastern Ukraine but also by differences over which legacy - communism symbolizing the Red Army or neo-fascism represented by the radical Ukrainian nationalist organizations that to one extent or another sided with Hitler and the Nazis against Stalin and the USSR.

Still, can we say that communism or class-based totalitarianism was no better or worse than the ethno-national totalitarianism of Nazi fascism? What would have been the fate of the Ukrainian nation had Hitler and the Nazis defeated Stalin and the USSR in the war? If the war had developed differently, what alternative choices would have been presented to the Ukrainian nation? A couple of counterfactuals might help flesh out the answers to these and other cursed questions.

Imagine the USSR loses the Great Patriotic War or is at least froced to abandon much of its western territories perhaps up to the Urals for decades. Ukraine as well as Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan (with its oil fields) are cut off from the USSR and under Nazi rule. According to Nazi ideology, the Slavic peoples were relegated to just a notch above the Jews. Whereas the Jews were to be systematically destroyed immediately, the Slavs were to function as the Nazi empire's slaves and be worked to death before being discarded into the dustbin of history. This fate would have been a marked downgrade from even the Ukrainians' disastrous and later 'merely' dismal Soviet experience.

Or imagine together with a Soviet retreat behind the Urals that instead of opening up the second front from Europe's western shores in France, the Western powers decided to so through from Europe's southern shores south in Italy. Under this scenario and subsequent alternative scenarios springing from it, it could have come to pass that US forces would have ended up fighting in eastern Europe, perhaps as far as eastern Poland, today's western Ukraine. That region is center of gravity of the Ukrainian nationalism, the birth place of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and later the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). Against whom would our American boys have been fighting? The answer: German Nazis and the Ukrainian ultra-nationalists who eagerly assisted the former in slaughtering tens of thousands of Jews and Poles. Would the Ukrainian-American immigrant acolytes of the OUN and UPA be so welcome here in the US if that had been the case? The counterfactual raises a fundamental question for Americans: On whose side were the OUN and UPA? Ours or the Nazis? A possible, though less likely alternative outcome under this counterfactual is that the OUN and UPA would have defected from the Nazis turning their guns on them and siding with the West.

Indeed, Russians and pro-Soviet sympathizers should not be sanguine in the virtual world of counterfactual histories. Imagine that in our alternative second front scenario, US and Western forces defeat the Nazi, OUN, and UPA forces. If the West established its control over Ukraine or at least western Ukraine without provoking a war with the USSR, Ukraine would have become the flourishing European country of which so many Ukrainians dream today.

Or what if the US had never entered the war? Without doubt, the second front would not have materialized at all, and the USSR would most certainly have been defeated or at least driven beyond the Urals for a significant period of time. Not only Ukrainians but millions of Slavic Russians would have been enslaved and destroyed in that scenario. The rump, essentially Asia-based USSR possibly would have dissolved into chaos and civil wars, destroying not only the Soviet state but making reconstitution of a single Russian state unlikely, if not impossible.

The question of whether the Soviet ideology and system were more or less evil than those of Hitler and the Nazis opens a vast quandary of endless other questions. In real history, we have the USSR's gradual, albeit limited, softening through the post-Stalin decades and the emergence of Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika which began the process of transforming both the ideology and the system into something that in its last years could be recognizable as approximating 'normal', certainly in aspiration, if still not fully in practice.

Presuppose that Nazi Germany survived for 70 years as the Soviet communist system did. Can one honestly imagine a softening of the Nazi ideology and system in comparable ways as that which developed in the USSR from the mid-1950s to 1991? Class-based totalitarianism is not necessarily fatal for nations and ethnic groups. For certain (in our case, non-German) nations - which is the unit of analysis, the reference point for the majority of Ukrainians today - fascist ideology is indefatigably and inevitably fatal. Certainly for many nations and ethnic groups, any imaginable Nazi 'perestroika' would probably have arrived decades late, long after their demise. This would have been true for Ukrainian and Russian Slavs, among others.

Real history as opposed to our counterfactual one demonstrates conclusively that the Ukrainian people and national identity, despite the Soviet project to create a proletarian 'national identity in place of ethno-national ones, survived 70 years of communist rule, golodomor, NKVD, and the Great Terror notwithstanding. Indeed, several decades into Soviet history, Ukrainians became the second to the Russians 'among equals' in receiving coveted party posts overseeing the empire. For example, after Russians it was Ukrainians who held the posts of second secretaries witching over native first secretaries in the USSR's various ethno-national administrative-territorial units - its matryoshka of SSSRs, ASSRs, and ASSOs.

Finally, it needs to be said that no one envies and one should feel sympathy for a Ukrainian nation trapped between the two flames of Hitler's Nazis and Stalin's communists in the first half of the 20th century. It is almost equally sad that now Ukraine and Ukrainians - and to some extent Russia and Russians - must re-live and sort out that tortured history in order to move forward in the 21st century.

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 #32
http://readrussia.com
May 9, 2015
Russian and Ukrainian Propaganda Through the Looking Glass
by Mark Adomanis

The entire world is, by this point, intimately familiar with the modern manifestations of "Russian propaganda." There have been news stories, think tank reports, even a hearing in the US Congress about the dangers posed by Russia's steadily intensifying information war.

Russia's state-run media is, obviously, highly selective in its use and understanding of history and all too eager to tar its Ukrainian opponents as "fascists." Quite a lot of hateful nonsense has come out of Russian media outlets over the past year, things like the famous hoax about the "crucifixion" of a small child in the Donbass.

Much of the criticism that Russian media has attracted is entirely justified. Lying and manipulating history are, of course, very bad things to do. To the extent that Russia attempts to selectively distort and weaponized historical truth it should be vigorously opposed.

There's been precious little, if any, discussion, however, of the propaganda coming from the Ukrainian side. Oddly, for a group that professes to be so resolutely against Moscow's retrograde views, the propaganda has a bizarrely Soviet quality to it.

Consider, for example, a recent op-ed by Askold Lozynskyj, the president-emeritus of the Ukrainian World Congress, "We need a discussion on OUN and UPA without labeling and stereotypes." The editorial is a textbook example of every possible Soviet cliché, particularly and most glaringly whataboutism. There's almost nothing that ties the piece together except a persistent unwillingness to admit that either the OUN or the UPA did anything that they ought to apologize for:

"Think of other countries and nations at war. How many innocent civilians did the Soviets kill? How many civilians did the Americans kill by dropping bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki? The OUN and the UPA were heroic formations. No fighters in the twentieth century were more responsible for Ukraine's independence proclaimed at last in 1991 than those two entities. No one is more deserving of recognition and honor."

Surely the thousands of peaceful civilians massacred by the OUN and UPA will rest more easily in their graves knowing that the people who put them in the ground were "heroic."

Reading Lozynskyj I couldn't help but be reminded of the famous scene at the end of Orwell's Animal Farm. The pigs who have taken control of the farm (being "more equal" than its other inhabitants) have met with a delegation of visiting farmers. After announcing that the farm's name will be changed back to what it was previously (the final betrayal of the animals' revolution) the pigs and humans begin to play a game of cards. However, an argument soon erupts when two of the participants simultaneously try to play the ace of spades.  As the other animals watch through the window of the house they can no longer distinguish the animals from the men:

"Twelve voices were shouting in anger, and they were all alike... The creatures outside looked from pig to man, and from man to pig, and from pig to man again; but already it was impossible to say which was which."

Orwell has precisely described the feeling or disorientation and confusion that I have when I look at Russian propaganda about the "triumph of fascism" or the "fascist putsch" and equally asinine propaganda about the "recognition and honor" due to murderous thugs like the OUN and UPA.

The simple truth seems to be that neither the OUN nor UPA are particularly worthy of praise, having been conclusively implicated by a range of historians (Western, Russian, Polish, and Ukrainian) in a range of horrific and violent crimes. As should be obvious this doesn't in any way delegitimize the idea of Ukrainian independence! It simply means that people advocating for that independence ought to find better examples on which to focus their attention.   

If Ukraine's people want to join the West, if they want to implement the association agreement with the European Union or even join NATO, then they ought to be able to do that. I put very little faith in abstract historical allusions to "Kievan Rus" and to the "fraternal bonds" that supposedly unite Ukrainians and Russians, and a lot more faith in opinion polls and the decisions of democratically elected representatives. Any Russian propaganda which states that it is automatically illegitimate for Ukraine to join up with the West is simply a lie.

But people who want to see Ukraine join the West would very well advised to ditch the strange, obsessive focus on the OUN or UPA visible not only in Lozynskyj's editorial but in the actions of the Ukrainian government itself (which is currently mulling a law that would make it a criminal offense to deny the role played by either group in securing independence).

Regardless of what Ukrainian nationalists say, the plain truth is that neither the OUN nor the UPA played any role whatsoever in the final dissolution of the Soviet Union and modern Ukraine's actual emergence as an independent state. That is to say, if you really want to find someone to thank for Ukrainian independence look at Mikhail Gorbachev or one of Boris Yeltsin's family members, not Stepan Bandera.

Ukraine emerged not because of armed resistance by forest partisans but due to political deal-making at the highest levels of the Soviet state. There's very little that's heroic about that particular struggle (it's much more a story of gray that it is of black or white) but reality is reality and facts care little for our sympathies.

True friends tell hard truths. Ukraine's Western friends should remind the new government in Kiev that propaganda needs to be fought with facts, not lies.

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 #33
AP
May 12, 2015
Ukraine Erases Communist Reminders as It Tries to Ditch Past
By Peter Leonard

KIEV, Ukraine - A hulking steel statue of a victorious female warrior bearing aloft sword and shield looms in dour majesty over the Ukrainian capital. The Motherland Monument's shield bears the Communist hammer-and-sickle, but maybe not for much longer.

Ukraine's leaders are eager to be seen as reinventing the nation. And erasing all visible reminders of the communist past, they say, is an important step toward that goal.

"Elimination of communism has to happen in people's heads and consciousness," said Kiev deputy mayor Oleksiy Reznikov. "Symbolism irritates some people and creates a certain aura that we need to get rid of."

Parliament opened the way last month by backing a package of laws that included a loosely formulated ban on communist, as well as Nazi, imagery and ideology. The provisions, which still require approval from President Petro Poroshenko, will make it illegal to show symbols from the Soviet era, such as the logo of Communist Party, or play Soviet-era anthems. It will also become an offense to deny the criminal nature of the Soviet regime.

Taking down all the communist symbols will take time, money and a fair dose of acrobatics, especially in the case of objects like the 100-meter (330-foot) tall Motherland Monument.

"We will find alpinist patriots, like the famous ones who painted a star at the top of a Moscow hotel the blue-and-yellow (of the Ukrainian flag)," Reznikov said. "We will ask for help from brave guys like that to get this work done."

Eager Ukrainian nationalists have for the past year been racing ahead of the authorities by pulling down dozens of statues of Vladimir Lenin, the Bolshevik revolutionary and founder of the Soviet Union. The sight has typically been greeted with a mixture of glee, indifference or, among mostly older people, dismay.

The thrust of what has been dubbed de-communization has sharply divided views. Supporters argue it has been long in the waiting and will set the stage for Ukraine to leave its history behind.

"I would have got rid of it all years ago. It simply doesn't reflect the mood of the Ukrainian people," said Kiev resident Vasiliy Babkov. "We have to build up that which is truly in the blood of Ukrainians."

But others, like Halyna Coynash, a journalist and member of the Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, said some measures risk reverting to the censorship of the communist era. She sees particular danger in a measure that forbids any positive assessment of the Soviet era.

"They have ended up with a law that seriously endangers freedom of speech," Coynash said.

Dismantling Soviet emblems and renaming streets named in honor of figures known to have been part of the Soviet Union's machine of repression has garnered a wide approval. But misgivings abound.

"Saying that people cannot themselves wear a red star or even have a hammer-and-sickle on their clothing," Coynash said, "is really quite absurd."

Repeated violations could result in prison sentences lasting several years, also a source of anxiety.

"Imprisonment for up to five years for any display of Nazi or communist symbols is manifestly and undeniably in breach of international human rights standards," Volodymyr Yavorsky, an expert with Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, wrote in an article analyzing the laws.

The campaign against the anti-communist laws has been joined by the several dozen signatories to a letter to Poroshenko pleading with him to reject the bill, which sailed through parliament with little debate.

"However noble the intent, the wholesale condemnation of the entire Soviet period as one of occupation of Ukraine will have unjust and incongruous consequences," said the letter, which was signed by dozens of international and Ukrainian historians.

The letter argues that the legislation is so loose as to possibly punish anybody writing approvingly of any policies implemented over 74 years of Communist rule.

"Anyone calling attention to the development of Ukrainian culture and language in the 1920s could find himself or herself condemned," the letter said.

One especially thorny provision makes it illegal to justify historical instances of repression of Ukrainian independence movements in the 20th century.

Those include the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists headed by WWII-era insurgent leader Stepan Bandera, who briefly allied himself with the Nazis. Efforts by Bandera-led forces to carve out an independent territory for Ukraine led them to perpetrate hideous atrocities against Soviets, Poles and Jews alike.

Bandera's name is tantamount to a curse word among many ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers in Ukraine's east, where government troops have since last year been battling Moscow-backed separatists in a war that has already claimed more than 6,000 lives.

And Russia has warned darkly of more trouble for Ukraine should the anti-communism measures go ahead.

"Attempts by Kiev to distort the country's past and to disregard the achievements made in Russian and Soviet periods will only lead to a deep split in society," the foreign ministry in Moscow said in a statement in April. "Doing that by imposing nationalist ideologies will only further cast into doubt the prospects of Ukraine's statehood."

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#34
United State Holocaust Memorial Museum
www.ushmm.org
May 11, 2015
Statement on Ukrainian Legislation on Historical Research and Debate

The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum is deeply concerned about a series of legislative initiatives that the Verkhovna Rada, the Ukrainian Parliament, adopted on April 9, 2015.

Certain provisions of the proposed legislation on "The Legal Status and Honoring of Fighters for Ukraine's Independence in the 20th Century" and "Condemning the Communist and National Socialist (Nazi) totalitarian regimes and prohibiting propaganda of their symbols" attempt to legislate how the history of Ukraine should be discussed and written, especially regarding the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA).

Ukraine from 1917 to 1991, under Soviet, German, and renewed Soviet control, was the setting of enormous suffering inflicted upon Ukrainians and many minorities, especially Jews and Poles, and of varying degrees of complicity from segments of the population with these totalitarian regimes. During this period, ruling authorities dictated the narrative of Ukrainian history solely according to their propagandistic goals.

Only after Ukraine achieved independence in 1991 could archives open to scholars and an honest examination of the past become possible. We applaud Ukraine for the initial steps it has taken and welcome the cooperation of various organizations, archives, and individuals with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.

As Ukraine advances on its difficult road to full democracy, we strongly urge the nation's government to refrain from any measure that preempts or censors discussion and politicizes the study of history.  Ukrainian democracy must continue on the path of unfettered scholarly research and open debate on all aspects of the national past.

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#35
Interfax
May 11, 2015
Donbass "republics" ready to discuss autonomy within Ukraine-rebel chiefs

Donetsk, 11 May: The leadership of the [self-proclaimed] Donetsk People's Republic [DPR] has admitted the possibility of assuming a broad autonomy status, but without any harm to the interests of the self-proclaimed republic.

"We agree to the broadest autonomy without harm to our interests. If Kiev does not adhere to the Minsk agreements, the DPR will be forced to move to full independence," DPR envoy Denys Pushylin [Denis Pushilin] told journalists on Monday [11 May].

According to him, the DPR has "proposed amendments to the draft constitution (of Ukraine Interfax), so that other regions have the right to self-determination."

It was reported earlier that there were several working groups created, including a group on political settlement issues, which would work on the constitutional reform in Ukraine.

[The Interfax news agency reported at 1138 gmt on 11 May, quoting the LPR (self-proclaimed Luhansk People's Republic) prime minister, Hennadiy Tsypkalov [Gennadiy Tsipkalov], that the LPR authorities were ready to discuss the decentralization of power in Ukraine, including the possibility of autonomy status only after the Minsk accords were fulfilled by Kiev along with a constitutional reform.]

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 #36
Donetsk, Luhansk republics say election proposals forwarded to Contact Group on Ukraine

MOSCOW, May 12. /TASS/. Chief peace negotiators from east Ukraine's self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics said on Tuesday they had forwarded their proposals on municipal elections to the Contact Group on the Ukraine crisis.

Denis Pushilin and Vladislav Deinego, plenipotentiary representatives of the Donetsk and Luhansk republics at peace talks aimed at easing the conflict in Ukraine's east, said in a joint statement: "The draft law concept is based on an independent formation by local residents of interim election commissions. These commissions will outline the order of organising polls, election campaigns and vote counts."

Addressing the other representatives of the Contact Group - OSCE special envoy for Ukraine Heidi Tagliavini, former Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, Russia's ambassador Azamat Kulmukhametov and coordinator of the working group on political issues Pierre Morel, Pushilin and Deinego said that their proposals included Ukraine's draft law on modalities of conducting local elections, stipulated in the Complex of Measures for Fulfilment of the Minsk Agreement of February 12, 2015.

The Ukrainian parties whose representatives participated in launching a military operation in the country's southeast, introducing an economic blockade in the region, fanning military propaganda and stirring social and interethnic strife will not be admitted to the elections in the Donbass region, the statement says.

"The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and representatives of other international organisations will monitor the elections. In accordance with the standards of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the elections will be held after the military operation regime is lifted and the Ukrainian law on amnesty of the Donbass militias and political activists is adopted," it says.

Another prerequisite for the elections is enactment of Ukraine's law granting "special status" to parts of the two eastern regions and complete lifting of the economic blockade, the statement says.

The Donetsk republic's Pushilin said: "These proposals comply with points four and twelve of the Minsk Complex of Measures. They will be discussed at a session of the working group in Minsk on May 22."

He added that the issue of cancelling Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko's uncoordinated amendments to the "special status" law was also expected to be raised at the meeting in the Belarusian capital next week.

Pushilin said those amendments were in "blatant violation" of point four of the Complex of Measures, noting that the Minsk peace process would not move forward without cancelling them.

Self-government for the Donetsk and Lugansk regions is a key part of peace agreements worked out by the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, Germany and France in Belarus on February 12.

On March 17, Ukraine's parliament voted to offer limited self-rule to parts of the two eastern regions. But Kiev insisted that the law granting "special status" should come into force only after local elections are held in the areas.

Separately, Ukrainian lawmakers adopted a resolution describing as "temporarily occupied territories" parts of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions, adding that this special status will stay in effect "until all illegal armed groups and military equipment, as well as groups of militants and mercenaries have left Ukrainian territory and Kiev has regained full control of the state border".

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, speaking in Moscow, said the law was a "sharp departure from the Minsk agreements".

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 #37
Kyiv Post
May 11, 2015
Residents in bombed buffer zone between Ukraine, Russian-controlled east cling to peace hopes
By Oleg Sukhov

AVDIIVKA, Ukraine - Avdiivka, a Ukrainian-controlled city on the war front just 10 miles north of Donetsk, is a bizarre buffer zone.

"Neither Ukrainian nor (separatist) Donetsk People's Republic laws work there," Alexei, a taxi driver from the village of Ocheretine, northwest of Avdiivka, told the Kyiv Post. Locals say they don't consider themselves part of either Ukraine or separatist-held areas and, consequently, many -- like Alexei -- don't want to be quoted by name about their opinions.

Despair mixed with hope for peace are the dominant emotions in the industrial city with a pre-war population of 35,000 people, many of whom have left.

Ukrainian television channels are not working and so many locals watch Russian satellite television.

Few stores and almost no cafes are working, and banking services are not available in this buffer zone.

Retired residents have to go to nearby cities to get their pensions from Ukraine's government.

The city's economy is dominated by the Avdiivka Coke and Chemical Plant, Europe's largest coke producer.

The plant could become the target of the next separatist offensive, due to its strategic role as the major supplier of coke for the Donbas steel industry. Many residents have left because of the war, with some of Avdiivka's empty streets looking like those of a ghost town.

Residents say that not a single building in Avdiivka has escaped shelling. Almost all buildings have broken windows, and many have been heavily damaged.

A recurring theme among locals is that shelling allegedly starts after journalists arrive - something that they interpret as a sign of collusion between the Ukrainian army and reporters. Residents say that Channel 112 reporters have recently been beaten here. A couple of pensioners reacted aggressively to the appearance of Kyiv Post reporters and shouted from their balcony about their hatred of Ukrainian authorities, with the sound of their voices resonating throughout the whole neighborhood.

"We don't care if you take pictures or not," one of the pensioners, who gave his name as Viktor, shouted. "We are not afraid of the Security Service!"

Viktor and other locals, however, did not give their last names for fear of reprisals.

Repeating the common mantras of Kremlin propaganda, Viktor ranted against what he saw as an American plot to seize Ukraine and lashed out against the Ukrainian army.

Oleg, a 44-year old unemployed resident, accused Ukrainian troops of "exterminating peaceful residents" and called them "occupiers."

Street market vendors Alexander, 30, and Valeria, 28, disagreed, calling the Ukrainian army "liberators."

They said they wanted the city to be part of Ukraine.

But other residents were less concerned with politics and cared more about the practical consequences of war. Many said they did not support either the Ukrainian army or Russian-backed separatists and only wanted the war to end.

Natalya, an employee of the Avdiivka Coke and Chemical Plant, volunteered to show her heavily damaged apartment. One of the most terrible moments in her life was when she was in her bedroom and just barely escaped being killed when an artillery shell flew into her window and broke the wardrobe's mirror.

She ran out of the room just in time and says she was saved by an icon of Mary, mother of Jesus, at her bedside. Every room in the apartment was damaged. Tile in the bathroom was broken by a shock wave, while in the kitchen the window is broken, and a crack runs through one of the walls.

Natalya says she's planning to repair the apartment. "It's an eerie feeling to live in my town and not to be living at home," she says.

Another apartment fared even worse and was burned almost completely by an artillery shell, with two holes gaping in the walls instead of the windows.

Natalya also showed the place where she and other residents had to hide during shelling. Bending down in a dark, moist basement with a low ceiling and rubbish scattered over the floor, she led the Kyiv Post reporters with a flashlight, bumping into dogs that were hiding there. She then showed chairs and mattresses on the floor where locals used to sleep.

Another horror story was told by Vladimir, a 64-year old pensioner who was standing between two heavily shelled apartment buildings. He was trembling and was on the brink of bursting into tears. He recalls a situation when he was sitting in a basement and counting artillery shells that were hitting a nearby building - nine in total. In another situation shells were flying right over his head. "I bent down my head and then fell on the ground and was lying by a fence until it was over," he says.

Vladimir says his only hope is for peace.

But the current situation is desperate.

"We are not the Donetsk People's Republic and we are not Ukraine," he said. "We are nobody. And no one needs us."

Nikolai, a 56-year old pensioner with a walking stick, told the Kyiv Post that many of his neighbors had left because of the war. "Once we were playing cards in a toilet with an old lady when my apartment building was being shelled," he recalls.

Editor's Note: This content has been produced with support from the project www.mymedia.org.ua, financially supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, and implemented by a joint venture between NIRAS and BBC Media Action. The content in this article is editorially independent of the donors.

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 #38
www.opendemocracy.net
May 8, 2015
Book Review: Rajan Menon and Eugene B. Rumer, 'Conflict in Ukraine: The Unwinding of the Post-Cold War Order'
Truth may well be the first victim of war, and fair-minded and dispassionate accounts of events in Ukraine are rare.
By Richard Sakwa
Richard Sakwa is professor of Russian and European politics at the University of Kent, England. Among his books are Putin: Russia's Choice (Routledge, 2nd edition, 2007) and Russian Politics and Society (Routledge, 4th edition, 2008), Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands (IB Tauris, 1st edition, 2014) and Putin Redux (Routledge, 2nd edition, 2014).
 
Truth may well be the first victim of war, and in the current crisis provoked by events in Ukraine, fair-minded and dispassionate accounts are rare. In this regard, Conflict in Ukraine: The Unwinding of the Post-Cold War Order by Rajan Menon and Eugene Rumer is all the more to be welcomed. This book is a genuine attempt to engage with some of the more difficult issues, and avoids some of the pitfalls of which so many contemporary accounts have fallen foul. Conflict in Ukraine is an excellent account of some of the main threads which have combined to bring the world to the brink of one of the most dangerous confrontations of the post-war era, and reflects many of the lacunae and limitations of standard Western interpretations of how we have moved towards the edge of the abyss.

This is not a blow-by-blow account of the 'crisis'. Many elements are barely discussed, such as the nature and character of the Maidan protest movement, or the rise of the extreme-right (as evidenced in their electoral breakthrough in the 2012 parliamentary elections). The book's main theme, instead, is the 'unwinding' of the post-Cold War order, and although the notion of 'unwinding' is not defined, some of the structural contradictions of that 'order' are.

Above all, the authors note that, after the Cold War, Europe faced a number of fundamental strategic choices about how to create a mechanism to overcome the logic of conflict on the continent. They note that the Great Powers had learned from the failure to integrate Germany after the First World War and, following the Second World War, ensured that West Germany became part of the new European security system. They do not mention that this move was part of the Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union, and thus did not reflect any grand strategic wisdom, but instead a tactical response to the new challenge. With no major strategic threat to concentrate the mind, the 'victorious' powers after 1991 imposed what Sergei Karaganov has called a 'soft Versailles' on what was considered the losing power.

'Soft Versailles'

Any lessons learned on how to reconcile a former adversary were forgotten at the end of the Cold War. Russia remained an uncomfortable partner outside the core structures of the post-Cold War order. Menon and Rumer note that a 'hedging' strategy was adopted, strengthening and extending NATO in case Russia reverted to what was perceived to be a certain innate aggressiveness.

But this very strategy provoked the reaction which it intended to avert. The obvious dangers of this strategic blindness was that, unlike post-war Germany and Japan, Russia was in no mood to 'embrace defeat' in the ultimately futile contest that we now call the Cold War. This situation gave rise to what has been called the 'cold peace', the fool's paradise in which we have lived for the last quarter century, and which is now slipping into something akin to a new Cold War.

Missing from Menon and Rumer's account is a substantive analysis of European options, although they devote a chapter to 'Europe and the crisis'. It is astonishing that, for over two decades, no substantive strategy to overcome the logic of potential conflict was adopted. The Atlantic community not only survived but intensified with its own distinctive modes of behaviour (which by definition would tend to exclude Russia), regardless of the well-meaning initiatives launched to mitigate the effects of that community's enlargement.

Equally, the role of the United States in inhibiting the creation of a specifically European post-Cold War order is not discussed in Conflict in Ukraine, let alone theorised. Instead, the European Union was enlarged as part of a 'wider European' project, which immediately discounted various possible 'greater European' options. Thus, with the accession of a number of former communist countries to NATO and the European Union, instead of transcending the logic of conflict on the continent, in practice that logic was intensified. All this might be said to have led to the utterly predictable confrontation over Ukraine.

As for developments in Ukraine that provoked the crisis, the authors provide a sober account of how the new Ukrainian state took shape, and the various developmental and political problems since independence in 1991. The account, though, lacks a narrative edge, and instead piles various details together without touching on the contradictions in the Ukraine state-building endeavour which exploded into conflict in 2013-2014. Their account of oligarchic power and the distortions and social pathologies is vivid and informed, but, at crucial moments, it veers away from engaging with some of the more controversial issues.

As noted, the contradictions of the Maidan revolution are barely discussed. This leads to a remarkably superficial analysis of Viktor Yanukovych's options once the central square in Kyiv was occupied, and the encouragement that some Western leaders gave to the movement. Again, one might posit that this was the logical outcome of the Atlantic community's victory in the Cold War, and therefore anything that could induce states along its periphery to align themselves with that community was in some way 'progressive.'

Joining the EU and NATO in due course (although neither were immediate options for Ukraine) appeared to be the 'democratic' thing to do, even if society was sharply divided on both issues (as Menon and Rumer demonstrate by drawing on numerous opinion polls). These polls demonstrate - as argued by the two authors - that Ukraine is clearly a pluralistic and multinational state. It is the failure to provide a capacious constitutional settlement to encompass this diversity, and to give voice to the many people making up the modern Ukrainian state, which has provoked this crisis.

Meanwhile, the escalation of violence on 18 February 2014, culminating in the sniper fire on 20 February, appears to have been the logical outcome of the militant takeover of the protest movement. Equally, the peace deal of 21 February 2014, brokered by the EU foreign ministers and endorsed by the Russian representative, Vladimir Lukin, appeared to offer a negotiated and peaceful way out of the crisis, including pre-term elections that Viktor Yanukovych, in the new circumstances of mass mobilisation, would almost certainly have lost.

Instead, when Yanukovych withdrew the security forces, as stipulated by the agreement, he was left defenceless. He left for the long-planned conference in Kharkiv, and thence via Crimea to Russia. The circumstances of his overthrow - described as an unconstitutional coup d'état by Russia, and the overthrow of a tyrant by the insurgents and their Western backers - has, perhaps, threatened the very basis of Ukrainian statehood. Society today is increasingly polarised and elements of civil war have emerged. The two Minsk agreements will hold only if they are embedded in a broader regional and global Great Power settlement, finally addressing the asymmetries which provoked the cold peace and the present conflict. There is little prospect of that.

Menon and Rumer argue that 'The 2014 crisis in Ukraine was not foreordained' (p. xvi), and while they are right to note that nothing in politics ever is, in this case the writing has long been on the wall. The Russo-Georgian war of 2008 was in effect the first war to halt NATO enlargement, and it became clear that Ukraine would be the second. The authors argue that 'it is important to understand why Russia did what it did, what the background and immediate context of its actions were, what it feared, what it wanted, and what price it was prepared to pay' (p. xvii). Their account of Russian politics is perceptive and on the whole balanced.

However, the effect is spoiled by their claim that Russia has become a revisionist power. Such a conclusion naturally emerges from the lack of a robust theoretical framework. Russia is certainly a dissatisfied power, and the authors' own account gives some powerful arguments why this was the case. Yet to claim that Russia is revisionist assumes that it is out to overthrow, if not to 'unwind', the whole structure of international order as presently constituted - rather like Hitler on the eve of the Second World War. This claim does not emerge from the material presented in the book.

Overall, this is an important book, packed full of useful detail and sharp judgements. It provides a helpful introduction to the complexities of the present crisis, and on the whole avoids the excesses of so much commentary today. In conditions of mass 'groupthink' and media hysteria, this is a major achievement, and all credit should go to the two authors. However, at the end the reader is left dissatisfied. What were the drivers within Ukraine that allowed a legally elected president to be chased out by a popular movement, with the support of the world's remaining superpower? If every odious leader was overthrown in this manner, then whatever is left of world order would not last very long.

Equally, why did Russia feel excluded and marginalised for the quarter of a century after the fall of the Berlin Wall - since it is clear that the resentment was not Vladimir Putin's invention? It was, after all, Boris Yeltsin who first used the term 'cold peace' in 1994; Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov turned back his plane on the way to America when the bombing of Serbia began in March 1999. In other words, without a more structural and theoretical understanding, we are left with many unanswered questions.

Only a few very brave souls in the United States are able to generate such a broader synthesis based on a structural understanding of contemporary world politics and the specific dynamics of the Ukraine crisis. Unfortunately, despite the book's many qualities and its title, Menon and Rumer are not among them.

Rajan Menon and Eugene B. Rumer, Conflict in Ukraine: The Unwinding of the Post-Cold War Order (Boston: MIT Press, 2015).

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#39
RFE/RL
May 12, 2015
Nemtsov Report Says More Than 200 Russian Soldiers Killed In Ukraine War
[Report here https://openrussia.org/]

More than 200 Russian military personnel have been killed in fighting in eastern Ukraine, according to a report based on research begun by slain opposition leader Boris Nemtsov.

The estimated death toll is one of the main findings of the much-anticipated report on Russia's involvement in the Ukraine conflict, which was completed by allies of Nemtsov after his killing in February and released on May 12.

The report -- titled "Putin. War" -- asserts that at least 150 Russian military personnel were killed during a Ukrainian offensive in August 2014. A further 70 -- including 17 paratroopers from the city of Ivanovo -- were reportedly killed during fighting near the bitterly contested town of Debaltseve in January and February.

Families of those killed in 2014 were given 2 million rubles ($39,000) by the government in exchange for signing a promise not to discuss the matter publicly, the report claims.

It says the families of soldiers killed this year were offered similar compensation but have not received it.

Also, according to the 64-page report, Russian service personnel are being compelled to officially resign from the military before being deployed to Ukraine in an effort by the Russian government to mask its involvement in the conflict.

President Vladimir Putin and the Russian military have consistently denied that Russian forces are involved in the fighting in Ukraine, saying that any Russians participating are there of their own accord.

"The most important thing is to tell the truth," activist  Ilya Yashin said at the report's presentation at the Moscow headquarters of the opposition political party RPR-PARNAS.

"The purpose of this report is to tell people the truth. The leadership of our country bears responsibility for a crime. It bears responsibility for an enterprise that has victimized Ukrainian citizens and our fellow Russian citizens," Yashin said.

Kyiv and NATO say there is incontrovertible evidence of direct Russian military involvement in the conflict between Ukrainian forces and pro-Russian separatists, which the United Nations says has killed more than 6,100 civilians and combatants since April 2014.

The Nemtsov report is divided into 11 chapters, including sections on Russia's overall policy toward Ukraine, the use of propaganda, the annexation of Crimea, and the shooting down of a Malaysia Airlines passenger jet over eastern Ukraine in July 2014.

It documents the use of Russian budgetary funds to pay Russian citizens to fight as mercenaries in eastern Ukraine and asserts that the political leadership of the separatists in Ukraine is controlled by Putin aide Vladislav Surkov.

"As shown in this report," the text reads, "the Russian government provided active political, economic, personnel, and also direct military support to the separatists."

The ultimate purpose of Moscow's support for the separatists in eastern Ukraine was "to create an advantageous negotiating position with Western countries" in order to get them to lift sanctions imposed after Russia's annexation of the Ukrainian region of Crimea in exchange for an end to hostilities in eastern Ukraine.

The report also presents information from the Ukrainian government and military about the interrogations of Russian citizens captured fighting in Ukraine. This information has been scantly and skeptically reported by Russian state-controlled media.
Nemtsov, a former deputy prime minister turned fierce Kremlin critic, was shot to death on February 27 in central Moscow, yards from the Kremlin, while he was working on the report.

Nemtsov's friends and colleagues in RPR-PARNAS completed the research following his death, even though many documents were confiscated by investigators looking into his killing and many sources were no longer willing to speak to the researchers.

"If they shot Nemtsov right next to the Kremlin, then they can do whatever they want to our activists in Ivanovo and no one would notice," the report quotes an unnamed lawyer representing the families of two killed paratroopers as saying.

The Nemtsov report also estimates that Russia has spent at least 53 billion rubles ($1 billion) on the war in Ukraine and a further 80 billion rubles supporting refugees from eastern Ukraine, where the rebels hold parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk provinces.

The economic part of the report was written by economist Sergei Aleksashenko, a former deputy chairman of the Russian central bank.

The report has been placed online its entirety and published in an initial print run of 2,000 copies. Organizers are collecting donations online to pay for an eventual mass printing and free distribution.

"Our audience is the entire Russian people," Yashin said at the May 12 press conference. "We want to tell people the truth about what is happening in Russia, about what is happening in eastern Ukraine. We want to catch Putin in his lies. We want to tell people that the president of Russia -- a man who controls nuclear weapons and leads an enormous country -- is lying to the Russian people and to the entire world."

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 #40
PONARS Eurasia
www.ponarseurasia.org
May 2015
A New Wave of Russian Nationalism? What Really Changed in Public Opinion after Crimea
By Mikhail Alexseev and Henry E. Hale
Mikhail Alexsee is Professor of Political Science, San Diego State University. Henry E. Hale is Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington University
[Figures here http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/new-wave-russian-nationalism]

How did the dramatic events of 2014, including the annexation of Crimea and the onset of violent armed conflict in eastern Ukraine, transform the opinion of Russians regarding their ethnic identity, nation, and state? Some have seen these events as sparking a dramatic upsurge in xenophobia and Russian nationalism, marking a new chapter in Russian identity politics. Others have questioned how much change has actually taken place. Evidence from two nationally representative surveys, one taken in May 2013 and the other in November 2014, indicates that what Russia experienced is much better characterized as a "rally 'round the leader" effect than as an upsurge in nationalism per se. In part, this is because Russian nationalism was already strong before the crisis in Ukraine emerged, so current events tapped into preexisting sentiment more than transformed it (with the exception of an evident increase in negative attitudes toward Ukrainians). What did change substantially, however, was the level of support for Vladimir Putin, which surged to nearly half again its May 2013 level. At the same time, concerns about economic and social problems deepened. Together, these findings indicate the main effect of the 2014 events on public opinion was to create a "rallying effect" around Putin personally but not to transform mass consciousness in a way that is likely to benefit the Kremlin in the long or even medium run.

The NEORUSS 2013 and 2014 Surveys

The surveys we analyze here were carried out by Russia's established and respected ROMIR polling agency as part of the University of Oslo's "New Russian Nationalism (NEORUSS)" project, funded by the Research Council of Norway (2013) and the Fritt Ord Foundation (2014) and commissioned by principal investigators Pål Kolstø and Helge Blakkisrud. The May 8-27, 2013 survey included a nationally representative sample of 1,000 respondents interviewed face-to-face long before the Ukraine crisis. The November 5-18, 2014 survey replicated most of the questions from 2013 and also asked new questions to assess the effects of the crisis in Ukraine and subsequent armed conflict. This new survey was carried out according to the same methodology and included 1,200 respondents. On some issues, we were also able to get a sense of longer-term trends by referring to data from a 2005 Russia-wide survey of 680 respondents on ethnic relations by the Moscow-based Levada Center that was organized by Mikhail Alexseev.

No True Surge in Nationalism

The NEORUSS surveys find little evidence of a surge in nationalist sentiments among Russians between May 2013 and November 2014. Levels of ethnic and civic pride, desires to defend dominant ethnic group privileges, and perceptions of national distinctiveness all changed only marginally. In fact, most of these sentiments have remained about the same for nearly a decade.

Ethnic pride stayed constant. Most respondents-55 percent in 2005, 53 percent in 2013, and 56 percent in 2014-said they were "very proud" of their ethnic identity and about 35-40 percent in each survey said they were "mostly proud."[1] These small differences are well within the margin of sampling errors.
Civic pride increased, but only a little. The number of respondents who were "very proud" to be citizens of Russia rose from 44 percent in 2013 to 52 percent in 2014, but this came mainly at the expense of the category of people who were already "somewhat proud." The difference between the number of respondents who reported being proud of their Russian citizenship remained about the same relative to those who reported being not proud. Given the scale of events that took place in 2014, these findings hardly point to a massive nationalist rallying effect.

The dominant ethnic group's sense of entitlement to privileges remained stable. About three-quarters of respondents in 2013 and 2014 believed that top government jobs should go first and foremost to ethnic Russians (russkie)-with about 39 and 40 percent, respectively, supporting this idea fully. Roughly half of the respondents in both years fully agreed that ethnic Russians must play the leading role in the Russian state, with another one third or so backing this notion partially. Stability in a sense of entitlement over time is also reflected in support for the slogan "Russia for [ethnic] Russians" (Rossiia dlia russkikh): 63-66 percent expressed complete or partial support for the slogan in 2005, 2013, and 2014.
The sense of Russia's national distinctiveness changed little. In both 2013 and 2014, a plurality of respondents (about 35 percent) considered Russia to be a unique civilization, neither Western nor Eastern.

Even attitudes on how Russia should relate to the West were not radically transformed, although the survey does register a moderate hostile shift. If in 2013, 60 percent of those venturing an answer thought Russia should treat the West as a "partner" and 13 percent as a "friend," in 2014 the figures went down only to 51 percent and 8 percent, respectively-together still a clear majority of the Russian population (even when non-responses are included). Even in 2014, the share of Russians thinking the West should be treated as an "enemy" was just 13 percent (up from 5 percent in 2013), while 27 percent thought it should be considered a "rival" (up from 22 percent).

Other important nationalist views changed in more pronounced ways, but pointed in different directions. On the one hand, xenophobic exclusionist sentiments somewhat hardened while acceptance of ethnic Ukrainians as "fraternal people" significantly declined (this is an old imperial and Soviet notion reinvigorated in the Kremlin's framing of Russia's putative motivations for Crimea's annexation). On the other hand, general acceptance of ethnic diversity in Russia increased and support for further territorial expansion of Russia weakened.

Public support for deporting all migrants from Russia-legal and illegal and their children-rose from 44 percent in 2005 to 51 percent in 2014, which is unlikely due to sampling error alone. That said, these figures reflect both full and partial support for the demand, and the number of those who fully supported this radical exclusionist measure remained practically unchanged at about 23 percent since 2005. Most of the change in at least partial support appears to have taken place prior to the 2014 events, increasing only by about 4 percent-within the surveys' margin of error-from 2013 to 2014.

The number of respondents strongly opposing their family members marrying ethnic Ukrainian migrants spiked from 28 to 42 percent between 2013 and 2014-an outlier in the general trend for somewhat greater acceptance of migrant non-Russian ethnics as marriage partners. In this sense, Russian respondents appeared to be "defraternizing" with Ukrainians (Figure 1) but not other groups. The fact that opposition to marrying ethnic non-Russian migrants on average changed little from 2005 to 2013 further suggests this "defraternizing" was an artifact of changing Russia-Ukraine relations since 2013.[2]

In 2014, more respondents stated that ethnic diversity strengthened rather than weakened Russia, which was not the case in 2013. The 2005 data suggests that most of this shift took place from mid-2013 to late 2014. The number of respondents who felt the term russkie (Russians by ethnicity or culture) referred exclusively to ethnic Russians dropped from 42 percent in 2013 to 30 percent in 2014.

At the same time, Russians remained more wary of including other ethnic group members into their state through territorial expansion. From 2013 to 2014, the number of respondents who preferred expanding Russia's territory-either to bring Ukraine and Belarus into a Slavic union or to incorporate all territories of the former Soviet Union-dropped from 47 to 38 percent. In 2013, the majority of Russians (56 percent) supported some form of territorial enlargement, while in 2014 a plurality (of about 45 percent) supported the status quo (Figure 2).

Rallying Round the Leader: A True Surge

The biggest beneficiary of true public opinion change in Russia from 2013 to 2014 was the country's leader, Vladimir Putin. Readiness to vote for Putin, positive valuations of Putin's system of rule, and Putin's nationalist credentials all increased strikingly. The NEORUSS surveys show that "rally 'round Putin" effects have been robust-lasting more than eight months after Crimea's annexation and several months after Russians started experiencing economic problems associated with declining oil prices and Western economic sanctions.

The share of all respondents declaring they would vote for Putin if the presidential election were held on the day of the survey leapt from 40 percent in 2013 to an impressive 68 percent in 2014 (Figure 3). Support for Putin not only surged at the expense of almost all other potential candidates-including the notoriously hypernationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky-but also reduced the number of respondents who said they would not vote at all.

Views of Russia's political system turned from predominantly negative to predominantly positive. When respondents were asked to rate "the political system that exists in our country today" on a scale from 1 ("very bad") to 10 ("very good"), the average score shot up from 3.3 in 2013 to 6.0 in 2014.

Confidence in Putin as a leader who could deal with national identity issues also surged. Only 14 percent of respondents in 2013 named Putin as the most competent defender or promoter of Russia's national identity from among a set of likely presidential candidates-just barely ahead of such other leaders as Zhirinovsky, who was picked by 9 percent. In 2014, 34 percent of respondents now selected Putin and only 4 percent indicated Zhirinovsky. Meanwhile, the number of those who said it was hard to answer that question dropped from 27 to 18 percent. Similarly, the number of respondents who felt Putin was the most competent among Russia's prominent politicians to deal with migration from Central Asia, the Caucasus, and China jumped from 15 to 32 percent.
Economic Rain Clouds Looming Over the Parade

As the euphoria over Crimea slides further into the past-particularly given Putin's reliance on Russia's hitherto robust economic growth as an important source of legitimacy-the NEORUSS survey data provide grounds to suspect the rallying effects may erode. Most notably, Russians' assessments of their country's economy and their families' well-being significantly worsened between May 2013 and November 2014, and many Russians at least partially link this decline to Crimea's annexation.

In May 2013, a majority (54 percent) believed the country's economy had remained stable over the course of the previous year, 19 percent thought it had improved, and 21 percent felt it had deteriorated. Eighteen months later, a stunning 55 percent reported the economy had gotten worse in the previous year, with just 9 percent seeing improvement and 30 percent no change.

Respondents' reporting of their own families' economic position over the past year reflects the same pattern. In 2013, 19 percent saw improvement, 60 percent sensed no change, and 18 percent perceived decline. By 2014, a full 45 percent were bemoaning a worsening in their personal economic situation, with only 8 percent citing improvement and 42 percent sensing no change over the previous year.

The NEORUSS survey also sought to assess whether Russians felt Crimea's acquisition was having negative effects. Since one might wonder whether respondents would give frank answers to an interviewer, the survey not only asked people directly but also used an indirect method (an "item count" technique that allows researchers to estimate the share of people holding a view without any individual having actually to state it openly). Boiling down both these findings, the survey indicates that between 38 and 55 percent of respondents believed Crimea's acquisition would "cost Russia too dearly," hardly boding well for the Kremlin. At the very least, these findings highlight conflicting sentiments resulting from the clash of surging pride in the country's leadership on the one hand and ambiguous economic assessments on the other.

Implications

The NEORUSS surveys indicate it would be a mistake to describe what happened in Russian public opinion in 2014 as a surge in Russian nationalism, ethnic or otherwise. Instead, it should be considered primarily a "rally 'round the leader" effect. This has significant implications for both observers and policymakers. For one thing, it means Putin's bold moves in 2014 did not create a new wave of nationalism that might be expected to recede back to "normal" levels later. Instead, Putin tapped into a preexisting Russian nationalism that was already quite strong, mobilizing it for support where previously it was not helping him much. He also clearly reaped "leadership points," support deriving more from the perception that he is a dynamic and decisive leader than from any specific action-something that has long underpinned his popularity but had seemed to be fading in recent years. Questions those interested in Russian politics should be asking moving forward, then, include: (1) Will Putin continue to be seen favorably by Russian nationalists or will this issue start working against him; and (2) Will other factors eventually override or undermine the rallying effect we observe?

On question (1), the NEORUSS surveys suggest it will be difficult for Putin to sustain nationalist support because nationalists themselves are divided. While many still back expanding Russia to the borders of the former USSR (people we may call "imperialists"), others (whom we might call "xenophobes") not only oppose this but want to deport migrants from post-Soviet states who are already in Russia. The 2014 events appear to have somewhat moderated xenophobia and also reduced territorial expansionism, but the shares of both xenophobes and imperialists remain significant and if they return to pre-2014 levels, Putin will face challenges trying to reconcile them. The growing hostility toward Ukrainians as a people detected in the survey may also complicate Russia's relations with an important neighbor state in the future. Given an additional finding that the Russian public has generally bought into the Kremlin-led media characterization of Ukraine as a weak and illegitimate state, however, Putin may be able to overcome those problems with new massive public relations campaigns.

On question (2), the economic worries detected in the survey indicate people may one day tell their leadership something like: "OK, we are happy with Crimea's return, but that is now in the past and we still want economic improvement." The Kremlin might respond by attempting to offer Russians more territory instead of economic development, hoping this will again divert their political attention from material worries. But with support for expanding Russia's territory declining since 2013, it is far from certain such a policy could work as the Kremlin might hope. Of course, Russia's leadership also possesses many other ways to shape public opinion, including a vice-like grip on the political coverage of Russia's highly influential television channels. But bad economic realities (and battlefield deaths if they reach a large scale) will be harder to hide or spin than will events in other countries, even neighboring ones. And the NEORUSS surveys overall suggest that the Kremlin has been successful mainly in generating a rather narrow rallying effect, not in transforming public opinion in a fundamental way that works in favor of the current leadership in the long run. Thus, while public opinion was more of an enabler than a constraint when it came to Crimea, it is unclear that this can be replicated with new territorial moves.

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