Johnson's Russia List
2015-#91
7 May 2015
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"We don't see things as they are, but as we are"

"Don't believe everything you think"

In this issue
 
  #1
Vox.com
May 6, 2015
Why one of Russia's top foreign policy experts is worried about a major war with Europe
By Max Fisher
 
During the Cold War, when Europe became a political battleground between the Soviet Union and the Western powers, the stakes were no less than the future of the world. It wasn't just a struggle for Europe's ideological alignment; it was a virtually bloodless military rivalry, in which both sides rallied ever more armies and nuclear warheads to prepare for a war that, had it ever come, would have left the globe in ashes.

We think of that time as over, and in many ways it is. But the Ukraine crisis has renewed elements of that contest over Europe.

Western countries have sought to sanction and isolate Russia over its actions in Ukraine. They have increased their military activity, particularly in the NATO-allied Baltic states along Russia's borders, to deter any more aggression. Russia, in turn, has sought to cultivate European allies who could split the anti-Russian coalition. It has also increased its own military activity along the borders of NATO, and it has warned repeatedly that it could use nuclear weapons to deter a Western attack. Both sides are competing for influence in Germany, which is widely seen as Europe's deciding vote on any Western response to Russia - economic, political, or military.

In Western capitals, policymakers tend to be more focused on Middle Eastern problems such as ISIS or Iran. Those paying close attention, though, warn that Russia could try to permanently split NATO, or even that the saber-rattling could escalate out of control into a full-blown war that nobody wants.

"THE ATMOSPHERE [IN MOSCOW] IS A FEELING THAT WAR IS NOT SOMETHING THAT'S IMPOSSIBLE ANYMORE"

Amanda Taub and I traveled to Moscow to try to understand Russian views of the struggle for Europe. One of the people we spoke to was Fyodor Lukyanov. The editor of the journal Russia in Global Affairs and chair of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Lukyanov is one of Russia's most influential and well-connected foreign policy experts. He is widely considered to reflect the views of Russia's official foreign policy establishment. Our conversation left me deeply concerned about the Russian-Western rivalry in Europe, the mismatch in how the two sides see dangers in that rivalry, and the remote but real possibility of an unwanted spiral into war.

What follows is a transcript of the section of our conversation that touched on these issues. Sections on Russia's relationship with the US and on its approach to the Middle East have been published separately. This has been edited and condensed for clarity.

The great game in Europe

Max Fisher: A lot of people see an effort by Russia to play Western states off of one another as a strategy meant to weaken the ability of Western states to organize action against Russia.

Fyodor Lukyanov: I hear all the time these hysterical statements that Putin is destroying the European Union and widening gaps between different countries and bribing politicians. It's vice versa. The European Union is in very big trouble, and all the splits there are embedded. They're not created by Putin. Mr. [Viktor] Orban became Hungary's prime minister and will maybe remain there until the end of his life, not because of Putin. He was a staunch anti-Communist, anti-Russian guy. Greece became as it is not because of Putin.

But of course since it happened and there are deep structural troubles within the European Union, it would be strange to expect that Russia would not try to use this. So yes, of course we see wide systemic efforts to encourage those forces that can disrupt, for example, the unity of sanctions. That, to me, is very legitimate.

As I said, understanding of how the United States works is very low here. But with Europe, I think Russia understands much better how it works and how it can be influenced. To stimulate those destructive elements that are already there anyway - of course. The problem with this policy is, at the end, we may increase troubles in the EU. It's hard to influence decision-making by encouraging countries like Hungary, Greece, or Cyprus, because they don't have to stay in the European Union. Traditionally, there were two countries to decide: France and Germany. Now it's only one country: Germany. And that means that the more successful Russia is with playing with marginal forces, the bigger trouble will be with the key country.

"WITH EUROPE, RUSSIA UNDERSTANDS HOW IT WORKS AND HOW IT CAN BE INFLUENCED"

Russia and Germany's relationship is in the worst shape since I don't know when, since the 1950s and 1960s. And Germany is really taking a position that was initially very unexpected here. The Russian leadership underestimated the fact that Germany had started to perceive itself as the European leader, and the European leader cannot afford to make tricky deals with Russia as [Germany] did before.

The German Ostpolitik [West Germany's Cold War-era policy of working with the Soviet bloc and emphasizing West German neutrality] was traditionally defined by big business, which was very interested in the Russian market since the 1960s. They had enough influence on the government to get through their interests. They tried to do this last year, as well - companies like Siemens or E.ON or gas companies, machinery companies, they're really keen to keep Russia. But they discovered that for the first time, the government told them to shut up. "It's much higher stakes, it's a much bigger gamble, so shut up." And they shut up. So now we see a completely different environment in Germany.

The contest for Germany

Max Fisher: Germany's policy toward Russia seems to be very divisive among Germans. Opinion polls show that many Germans don't want to take such a hard line on Russia; they don't want to be so involved in the Ukraine crisis. Former German Chancellors Gerhard Schroeder and Helmut Schmidt have called for a policy that's more cooperative with Russia, more in line with Ostpolitik. What's the view in Moscow of this split?

Fyodor Lukyanov: That's been of very low interest, until recently. When Germany took a [harder-line] position, as it took last year, the explanations [in Moscow] were very simplistic. We wanted to believe that this change was entirely because of American pressure on Germany. I spent two months in Germany earlier this year, and I can say American pressure is there, of course. But in fact it's much deeper. This is really about Germany repositioning as the European power.

As for public opinion, it's a very interesting phenomenon that deserves to be studied in depth. On the one hand you see, according to opinion polls, perceptions of Putin and of Russia is very low. Seventy-plus percent of Germans believe Putin is a bad guy, Russia is going the wrong way, and especially this Malaysian airliner disaster [Flight MH17, which was shot down over Ukraine in July 2014 by, it is widely believed, Russian-armed fighters]. At the same time, if you speak to people and seek more detail, the problem is not with Russia - the problem is the population's growing mistrust of the political leadership in Germany and in Europe at large.

"ONE STEP, ANOTHER STEP, AND RECIPROCITY CAN BECOME VERY DANGEROUS"

I had a very interesting conversation with the head of the foreign policy committee with the [German] Bundestag. His staffer told me, "You know, it's such a big problem here in Germany with Putin's Russian propaganda undermining everything." I was really surprised to hear it, because I didn't see it, frankly. She said, "We received a lot of emails criticizing our chairman for his policies criticizing Russia on Ukraine, for being too tough, and so on." I said, "Wait a minute, you see people criticizing him as a product of Putin's propaganda?" She said, "Yes, of course." But don't you think they might just be disagreeing with him? It's a democratic society!

She was a bit confused by this, but this shows a key problem. The population increasingly doesn't trust [Germany's leadership], not because of Russia or because of Ukraine, but because they've lost an understanding of what is going on in the European Union. This is a deep problem with the integration of the European Union. If Putin's propaganda were smarter, this could be used [in Europe]. "If they tell us all the time that Russia is so bad, maybe it's actually that something is wrong with them."

Ukraine became a very interesting phenomenon because on the one hand it consolidated establishments [in Europe against Russia], because establishments see an external threat, and an external threat is always a good thing to further certain policies. At the same time, many of the citizens - in Germany, not even to speak of Southern Europe, where they don't care about Ukraine at all - they don't understand; they asked, "Why should we suffer for this?" The Russian counter-sanctions hit some areas [in those economies]. People ask, "Why should we suffer for something we don't want?"

Fear, tension, and miscommunication between Russia and NATO

Max Fisher: Let me ask you about NATO. There is some discussion of considering steps to integrate Sweden or possibly even Finland into NATO. How are these discussions perceived here in Moscow, and what would be the consequences of actually taking steps toward that?

Fyodor Lukyanov: It's perceived very badly. NATO is back as the main symbolic threat. Sweden is especially active in reestablishing this old agenda of [portraying a] Russian menace. Finland less so, but the same sort of perception.

What's happening now in Northern Europe and the Baltics is a very unfortunate and dangerous development. It's not the goal of Russia, as many believe in the West, to take the Baltic states or to test Article V [the NATO provision for mutual self-defense, in which all member-states would come to the aid of an attacked ally]. I don't think it's the aim of the Russian leadership.

The problem is that since the Cold War, all the mechanisms for taking each other seriously and disposing means to control damage, all those mechanisms were disrupted or eroded.

Max Fisher: What do you mean by mechanisms?

Fyodor Lukyanov: Telephone red lines between chiefs of general staffs, to communicate. Mechanisms to agree where our aircraft might go and might not, where yours will go.

I mean the extensive Cold War infrastructure that was developed, after the Cuban Missile Crisis especially, to manage hostility. Because they understood that they were bound to be adversaries, but measures were needed to prevent fatal collisions. To have proxy war in Afghanistan or somewhere else, to be extremely careful how submarines with nuclear missiles go alongside one another's coasts, that's important. And that has been degraded since the end of the Cold War because the common perception is that we don't need it anymore. Unfortunately, it's back, but we need to reestablish mechanisms.

What happens in the Baltic areas and in Northern Europe, all these claims about Russian aircraft with switched-off transponders and so on, it's very difficult to understand who is lying and who is not. Both sides are, if not lying, leaving a lot of omissions. As one major person told me, of course we switch off transponders, it's a normal thing, they need test different options for exercising what they need to exercise. But it's an issue for communication and agreement. How do we do it? What can you expect us to do and to not do?

"THERE IS A WIDESPREAD BELIEF THAT THE ONLY GUARANTEE FOR RUSSIAN SECURITY ... IS THE NUCLEAR DETERRENT"

Unfortunately, the Baltics have become a centerpiece for that, for understandable reasons. The Baltic states are especially concerned, if not terrified, by what happens. They want NATO physically there in case of emergency. Basically the problem is that they don't trust NATO; they trust only the Americans. They don't trust their European allies, because of their historical experiences. They're afraid that in the case of emergencies, their German friends will say, "Sorry, we cannot protect you now; next time."

To reassure the Baltic states is one of the major tasks for NATO. That's why so many military activities happen in that area. Russia reacts to that because Russia perceives it as a hostile approach to the Russian border. And it's a vicious circle.

Max Fisher: Are there specific areas or triggers that you worry could lead to dangerous misunderstandings?

Fyodor Lukyanov: Without any intention to create the big conflict, it might happen. One step, another step, and reciprocity can become very dangerous. Say a Russian aircraft comes very close to an area that NATO believes is prohibited while Russia believes it's not prohibited, and then British aircraft respond. It might be manageable, and in most cases of course it will be, but who knows.

Amanda Taub: There's a perception in the US that one of the dangers of Russian actions is that it would be politically advantageous for Putin to be seen as aggressive. They look at what happened in Ukraine, and they see that it's really helped his popularity at home. So there's a fear that Russia might be eager to do something like that.

Fyodor Lukyanov: I remember a lot of conversations in 2000 with many Americans and Europeans about NATO enlargement.

I told them there were a lot of risks ahead of us, especially if Ukraine was invited into NATO. The argument I heard several times cited was Poland. When Poland wanted to join NATO, Russia objected several times, but then peacefully accepted it. Lithuania wanted to join, and it was the same. [The Americans and Europeans] said it would be the same story with Ukraine.

I tried to convince them it would not be the same because Ukraine is completely different for Russia - it's seen by many people as something that's actually a part of our country, or if not part of our country then a country that's absolutely essential to Russia's security. If you try [to integrate Ukraine into NATO], that might be very bad. I didn't see a lot of understanding for this argument. I think Putin said about the same in 2008 to President George Bush at their famous Bucharest summit. The message basically was, "Don't touch Ukraine. If you don't touch it, we don't touch it."

Nuclear threats and nuclear deterrents

Max Fisher: Putin has been talking more about Russian nuclear weapons recently. There's a particular quote he gave in September, speaking at a youth conference in Seliger, that's generated a lot of discussion in Washington.

He said, "Let me remind you that Russia is one of the world's biggest nuclear powers. These are not just words - this is the reality. What's more, we are strengthening our nuclear deterrent capability and developing our armed forces."

A lot of people have been trying to figure out why he would say something this provocative and what he was trying to signal.

Fyodor Lukyanov: That's interesting. For me and for a lot of people here, there's absolutely no secret what he was trying to signal.

Russia feels very vulnerable, although maybe a little bit less since the improvement of conventional forces [after the 2008 war with Georgia]. There is a widespread belief that the only guarantee for Russian security, if not sovereignty and existence, is the nuclear deterrent.

After the Yugoslavian wars, Iraq War, Libyan intervention, it's not an argument anymore, it's conventional wisdom: "If Russia were not a nuclear superpower, the regime change of an Iraqi or Libyan style would be inevitable here. The Americans are so unhappy with the Russian regime, they would do it anyway. Praise God, we have a nuclear arsenal, and that makes us untouchable."

That's why, in the very popular view, [the Americans] try to undermine us in different ways by injecting revolutions and regime change through Maidan-ization and so on.

Max Fisher: Some people have read Putin's recent statements on nuclear deterrence as a way of signaling that Russia could potentially use its nuclear weapons in the case of a conventional military attack on Russia, including Crimea.

Fyodor Lukyanov: Yes, I believe it's in the Russian security doctrine, the preemptive use of nuclear arms in the case of conventional aggression [against Russia].

Max Fisher: Given what we talked about earlier, with the risk of an unwanted conventional conflict between Russia and NATO, it seems like this nuclear doctrine could be very dangerous.

Fyodor Lukyanov: Yes, it could be very dangerous, again because of the perception of weakness. Russia is looking at the military superiority of the United States, and it feels unsafe.

That's why you hear all these statements like one from a Russian TV anchor last year that Russia can turn the United States into radioactive dust. This was perceived, of course, as something completely unacceptable, and it was. But it was treated here as nothing new.

Is war imaginable?

Max Fisher: We talked earlier about scenarios that could lead to armed conflict in Europe between Russia and NATO. No one thinks it's likely, no one wants it, but it could happen. Is there a fear of this risk in the Russian leadership, in the Russian establishment? Is it something the decision-makers in Moscow are afraid of?

Fyodor Lukyanov: There is a fear. A question that was absolutely impossible a couple of years ago, whether there might be a war, a real war, is back. People ask it. It's terrible, but it shows how much the atmosphere has changed. Five years ago, nobody could even think about this.

Max Fisher: Those people in the government who are talking about the possibility of a war, how do they imagine it starting?

Fyodor Lukyanov: People don't think of it in that particular of a way, but, for example, massive military help to Ukraine from the United States - it could start as a proxy war, and then [trails off]. It's not a scenario that is explicitly discussed. But the atmosphere is a feeling that war is not something that's impossible anymore.

Max Fisher: Do you worry that this has desensitized people to certain policies or acts, such as Russian military flights in the Baltics or something else, that could be destabilizing? That the acceptance of war as a possibility has weakened taboos against it, rather than scaring people away from it?

Fyodor Lukyanov: According to opinion polls, big majorities of Russians are against a Russian intervention in Ukraine, for example. Of course that might be changed by propaganda means, but in general I don't think Russian people are in the mood of launching a war.

But the Russian people are starting to think it's not impossible. Most Russians don't want more land after Crimea, polls show this. Rather, the perception is that somebody would try to undermine Russia as a country that opposes the United States, and then we will need to defend ourselves by military means.
 #2
Vox.com
May 4, 2015
"Hillary is the worst option": How Moscow sees American politics
By Max Fisher
   
Everyone in Moscow tells you that if you want to understand Russia's foreign policy and its view of its place the world, the person you need to talk to is Fyodor Lukyanov.

Lukyanov is the chair of Russia's Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, as well as the editor-in-chief of the journal Russia in Global Affairs, which are something like the Russian equivalents of America's Council on Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs - though the Russian versions are considered much closer to the state and its worldview.

Widely considered both an influential leader and an unofficial interpreter of Russia's foreign policy establishment, Lukyanov is frequently sought out by Western policymakers and journalists who wish to understand Russia's approach to the world. During a recent trip to Moscow, Amanda Taub and I met Lukyanov around the corner from the looming Foreign Ministry compound (his office is nearby), at a small Bohemian cafe that serves French and Israeli food to a room packed with gray suits.

"THERE'S A WIDESPREAD VIEW THAT WITH HILLARY THERE WOULD BE NO CHANCE AT ALL" FOR EASING TENSIONS

We discussed Russia's foreign policy, the country's role in the world, and how its leaders think about the problems and opportunities facing their nation. Lukyanov, hunched over his coffee, had clearly spent a great deal of time with policymakers in and outside of Moscow, and he peppered his answers with references to political science terminology and wonky policy jargon. But he also reflected the official views of Moscow, which makes his answers a revealing glimpse into how his country sees the world.

What follows is a transcript of the section of our conversation that touched on Russia's relationship with the United States. Sections on Russia's approach to the Middle East and on its increasingly dangerous tensions with Europe will be published separately. This has been edited and condensed for clarity.

Max Fisher: We talked earlier about the disagreements within the Russian foreign policy establishment over the Iran nuclear deal. Given that the United States wants to make the deal happen and that there is so much tension currently between the US and Russia, is this affecting the view within Moscow toward the Iran talks? Maybe some people oppose the Iran deal because it would be seen as beneficial to the US, or they support the Iran deal because it could be an opening to ease tensions with Washington?

Fyodor Lukyanov: It's not part of the discussion at all, to decrease tensions with the West. It's not an issue.

Public opinion is pretty mobilized because of Ukraine. A lot of policymakers, even those who used to lean more toward some kind of rapprochement with the West, are irritated by sanctions and so on, so it's not part of the discussion.

So if Russia does something, it's not necessarily to try to explain it as an effort to decrease tensions with the West. It might be a consequence, but it's not the goal.

Max Fisher: It certainly seems that there's no political appetite in Moscow for a rapprochement with the West. Is that preference widely held within the foreign policy establishment, as well? Or is there a faction that is arguing for rapprochement?

Fyodor Lukyanov: There is a faction, but it's smaller than it used to be. And even many of those belonging to this faction say that, realistically speaking, they don't see any options for it in the future, because on the American side there's a very high level of polarization in the political establishment. And with the election campaigns about to start, it's the worst time to try to launch something.

No American politician will gain anything positive by being softer on Russia. It's not a central issue, but maybe candidates could use it in swing states, where many Eastern Europeans [who are generally skeptical of Russia] live.

So I don't hear any expectations of this, especially since there's a good chance that Hillary Clinton will become the Democratic candidate. I think there's a widespread view that with Hillary there would be no chance at all. For her and for her team, since the 1990s, Russia is a failure. One of the biggest failures of Bill Clinton was that he wanted to transform Russia. He was very sincere in his view of how he wanted to transform Russia and to help this transformation, but by the end of his tenure he was terribly disappointed.

Psychologically, for Hillary and for people like [Clinton-era Deputy Secretary of State] Strobe Talbott and many others, Russia is an unfinished job.

Max Fisher: What it is that they want to accomplish?

Fyodor Lukyanov: Many people here believe they will try to come back to the line of the 1990s to encourage Russia into an internal transformation.

Max Fisher: Does that mean regime change?

Fyodor Lukyanov: As a long-term goal, yes. Not by force, of course, but to encourage some kind of social development that will upend the current system and will promote a new one.

Max Fisher: So it's expected here that Clinton would take a hostile approach to Russia?

Fyodor Lukyanov: Yes, a very hostile approach. Hillary is the worst option of any president [from the Russian view], maybe worse than any Republican.

Max Fisher: Even though she led the US-Russia reset as secretary of state?

Fyodor Lukyanov: She led the reset, but it was done by Obama. She was a disciplined official and did what the White House decided to do. Formally she was in charge, but in real terms she never dealt with this. It was a direct project of Obama and of [former US Ambassador to Russia] Michael McFaul. Hillary pushed the button, but that was just a symbolic move, and then she was never active in this.

By the end of her time as secretary of state, when she'd already announced she would leave, she made a couple of statements without being diplomatic anymore. Statements about Russia, about this re-Sovietization of post-Soviet space, about Putin, that demonstrated her real feelings.

"THE RUSSIAN LEADERSHIP HAS NO CLUE ABOUT HOW THE AMERICAN SYSTEM WORKS, HOW COMPLICATED IT IS"

I think there is a widespread view that she personally hates Putin and personally dislikes [Russian Foreign Minister Sergei] Lavrov. So in the case of her presidency it will be not very good chemistry between them.

Max Fisher: Some people we've spoken to have said something similar about Obama - that Obama dislikes Putin, that he's motivated by personal animus, and that once he leaves office maybe the sanctions will weaken because they're driven personally by Obama.

Fyodor Lukyanov: There is a widespread view that Obama dislikes Putin very much. It's obvious they don't like each other.

I think Obama actually is not at all an emotional person. He looked at first very human and appealing, but he's not at all. He's a very calculating and cold guy without a lot of emotions and feelings. I don't think his personal perception of Putin plays such a big role. He made a big miscalculation because it seemed like he and McFaul really believed [current Russian Prime Minister and former President Dmitry] Medvedev might become president for a second term, which was a wrong expectation. He did not hide disappointment when Medvedev decided to step down.

Obama sees Russia as a big problem that consumes so much of his time that he would like to dedicate to other issues. He mostly would like to keep distance from Russia, to settle the most acute challenges, but after that he doesn't have interest.

The reset was not because he wanted to make Russia the centerpiece of his foreign policy agenda but because actually he failed with other issues. Russia was meant to be supportive and became the biggest achievement, with the reset and the New START [2010 nuclear arms reduction] agreement. But the reset was exhausted by New START and by the Russian accession to the World Trade Organization [in 2012]. They did not have any other agenda. They could have developed a new agenda if the situation had remained favorable as it was under Medvedev, but Putin settled that.

For Obama, Russia turned into a permanent headache. And a headache irritates. It's not such a strong feeling that other [US] politicians have about Russia.

PUTIN IS "UTTERLY ANTI-AMERICAN, DEEPLY AND SINCERELY"

Max Fisher: Let me ask about the flip side of that. How do you think Putin sees the US now?

Fyodor Lukyanov: He's utterly anti-American, deeply and sincerely. And it's not about Obama or Bush or Clinton. It's about his perception of America as a destructive power.

The most interesting foreign policy statement he made was published one week before his third term began in 2012. The article, "Russia and the changing world," was extremely interesting and substantial. He expressed everything that happened after. His core perception was that the United States is a country that misuses its might and creates even more chaos in the contemporary world, which is anyway very chaotic and unpredictable. Americans, by what they do, just worsen the situation.

The idea was not to challenge America, but to protect Russia. This is how he sees the world, with the United States as a really destructive and destabilizing power.

Max Fisher: Is there anything you believe the Russian leadership misunderstands about the United States, or that you wish they understood better?

Fyodor Lukyanov: The Russian leadership has no clue about how the American system works, how complicated it is.

For example, after Putin's 2011 decision to exchange with Medvedev [in which the two switched positions of prime minister and president], he said, "Look at the United States. Obama and Hillary both ran for the presidency, but then they sat down and decided who would be president, and Obama won that." How the American system works, it's not a big interest to our leadership.

I think right now there's a better understanding of the differences between your president and your Congress. Before, it was the perception that the American president can do anything he wants, and all of these references to a hostile Congress are just bullshit. But now I think there's a better understanding that Congress can be extremely disruptive to whatever the administration is trying to do. This has become another argument that it doesn't make sense to try with them.

Max Fisher: Is there no effort to play Congress and the president off of one another?

Fyodor Lukyanov: No, because contrary to Europe, where there are all options to use splits, in the United States, Russia has absolutely no influence in Congress. We don't have a lobby; we don't have special leverage there.
 
 #3
Vox.com
May 5, 2015
There's a big debate in Moscow over whether to support the Iran nuclear deal
By Max Fisher
 
In the decade after the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, the great-power politics of the Middle East were about as clear as things can get in the region. Israel, Egypt, and Sunni Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia generally aligned with the United States. Syria and Iran led an "axis of resistance" backed by Russia. It wasn't as contentious or as neat as the proxy divisions of the Cold War, but it put the US and Russia on clear and opposing sides.

Now everything is changing. The geopolitics of the Middle East has been scrambled by the Syrian civil war, the rise of ISIS, and the ongoing nuclear negotiations with Iran. It is less clear all the time where American and Russian interests in the region conflict and where they coincide. This is especially true in the Syrian war, where the US opposes both Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad and ISIS. It's also true with the Iran nuclear talks, in which both the US and Russia oppose Iran's nuclear program and have worked together on finding a deal - but may want very different things for how this affects Iran's role in the Mideast.

To understand how Russia sees the Middle East's transformation, Amanda Taub and I met with Fyodor Lukyanov in Moscow. The editor of the journal "Russia in Global Affairs" and chair of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Lukyanov is one of Russia's most influential and well-connected foreign policy experts. He is widely considered to reflect the views of Russia's official foreign policy establishment.

"THEY WILL COME TO TERMS WITH THE AMERICANS ANYWAY, WITH US OR WITHOUT US"

Speaking to him, I was struck by the division he described within Moscow's foreign policy establishment over what to do on Iran: the disagreement is not about Iran's nuclear program - both sides, he said, want to end it - but rather over whether this would be too beneficial to the US. On Syria and ISIS, as well, Russian thinking seems preoccupied with the United States and countering it.

What follows is a transcript of the section of our conversation that touched on Russia's approach to the Middle East. Sections on Russia's relationship with the US and on its increasingly dangerous tensions with Europe will be published separately. This has been edited and condensed for clarity.

Max Fisher: In December 2012 you told the New York Times that you had spoken to "people sent by the Russian leadership" to Syria, and that they found Assad had given up all hope. You said, "His mood is that he will be killed anyway. If he will try to go, to leave, to exit, he will be killed by his own people. If he stays, he will be killed by his opponents."

So much has happened in Syria in the last two and a half years. Do you have a sense for how Assad's view has changed since then?

Fyodor Lukyanov: The description at that time was that Assad was very depressed, he was very fatalistic, because he didn't see any way out, which meant it didn't make sense for him to give up or make concessions.

Since then, very many circumstances changed. As I understand it, the view of the Syrian government is now completely different. The fact of the Islamic State, and that they don't control a big part of the country, is bad enough.

In 2012 and 2013, [Assad] really expected direct intervention by the Americans, maybe by a coalition, and he feared the Libyan scenario. Not anymore. Since 2013, first there was the whole zigzag with chemical arms, and then the emergence of the Islamic State. On the one hand, it created a very big threat to Assad, but on the other hand it basically eliminated the issue of regime change in Damascus, because the prioritization is different.

So now I think he's very keen to keep what he still controls. And he firmly believes he can do it. That's what I hear from people who visit Syria.

Max Fisher: Has Russian policy toward Syria changed?

Fyodor Lukyanov: No. The situation has changed; Russian policy has not changed.

I think the Russian position is even more committed to this [policy of supporting Assad and opposing regime change]. I remember a lot of conversations with Westerners and people from the Arab Gulf saying, "Okay, we understand why you do it, but it's completely crazy because don't you understand he's doomed."

Many Russian experts from 2011, when the common wisdom was that Assad would fall very soon, they told me from the beginning, "It will not happen; it's a completely different situation than in Egypt or Tunisia." And I thought at that time, as many Westerners did, that was just because they wanted to save face. But in fact they were right, because they knew better the situation inside Syrian society.

Max Fisher: Are the US and Russia closer now on Syria, do you think?

Fyodor Lukyanov: The prioritization has changed. Now it's obvious to the Obama administration that Assad is not the biggest problem anymore. He's still a person they hate; that position didn't change. The gap [between the US and Russia] is narrower because the priority of regime change in Syria is much lower on the US agenda.

ASSAD IS "VERY KEEN TO KEEP WHAT HE STILL CONTROLS. AND HE FIRMLY BELIEVES HE CAN DO IT."

The general perception here, shared by many people of different opinions, is that the old US policy in the Middle East since the early 2000s was insane, it was a disaster. So now when Americans call other nations, and Russians also, to join a coalition against, for example, the Islamic State, the answer is, "Okay, to do what? To do what you did before? No, thank you." Otherwise, if we can invent a new strategy, to combat it? Then yes, but no one knows what to do about the Islamic State.

Max Fisher: Let me ask you about Iran and the Iran nuclear negotiations. Is the view in the Russian leadership that this is an issue where Russian and US interests align?

Fyodor Lukyanov: It's not that they align. It's that they don't necessarily contradict.

If they were aligned, it would be that we could work together to achieve something. With Iran, I think the Russian diplomatic team worked very hard to help make this happen. And I think [Russian Foreign Minister] Sergey Lavrov, who was the chief negotiator on the Russian side, is a very good diplomat and he did his best to help the Iranians and Americans reach an agreement.

At the same time, it's not an official line, but there are a lot of people here saying, "Why should we help the Americans to reconcile with the Iranians, or the Iranians to reconcile with the Americans? If Iran is not isolated, it can turn to the West, at least in terms of its economy, in terms of contracts and so on. It's not in our interests."

Max Fisher: So there is a debate within Moscow over this?

Fyodor Lukyanov: It's a debate. It's not an official line; the official line is very firm: we need to settle this issue, we don't want Iran to go nuclear, we need to work together.

But the expert community [within Russia] is split. I personally think it's a very shortsighted view that we need to keep Iran isolated as long as possible. It's senseless. It's a very important country, and Iranians want to get out of isolation. If they want this, it's senseless to try to stop them.

There was a very interesting maneuver, the recent decision by Putin to remove the ban and deliver the S-300 [advanced surface-to-air missile systems] to Iran. I'm not sure it will happen. Military experts say it's not that easy, because you need to have this equipment. They don't just store them in storages. And it's a long process.

Maybe it will not be delivered, but Russia wants to send the message to Iran that we're ready to cooperate. And Iran was extremely furious when Russia [initially canceled the planned S-300 sale to Iran] in 2010. Ahmadinejad expressed this in very pejorative terms about [then-President Dmitry] Medvedev personally. So I think Russia is expecting very hard competition for the Iranian market, and wants to take some preemptive steps to show Iran can be a reliable partner.

Max Fisher: Is the sale just about trying to get into the Iranian market, or is there a political element, as well?

Fyodor Lukyanov: I think it's mostly about commerce, with a political element, of course.

Putin was recently asked publicly about Russia's relationship with Israel, in this context. He explained in detail why Russia, because of Israel, canceled a similar deal in Syria but could not cancel this deal in Iran. In the Syrian case, he said, We heard concerns from Israelis, we studied their arguments, and we concluded they were right that this S-300 might be used against them because it's a very short distance. And so we decided to take their concerns into account.

In the Iranian case, it's not about offense. Iran cannot attack Israel with this S-300; it's only to protect against airstrikes. And airstrikes, as Russia says all the time, is the completely wrong way to solve the Iranian nuclear problem.

Max Fisher: I think some people are wondering whether the S-300 sale was an unofficial component of the nuclear framework deal reached in April.

Fyodor Lukyanov: I don't know. I don't know if it was included. The Russian Foreign Ministry people say they didn't [want to] announce it until the basic [framework] deal was completed, so now they're pretty sure the full deal will come into force in June.

Max Fisher: Really? The view in Moscow about the Iran nuclear deal is optimistic that it will actually happen?

Fyodor Lukyanov: Yes.

And the view is that had this [S-300 sale] been announced before [the framework deal], it would have harmed the negotiations. Now it will not harm the negotiations.

Max Fisher: On the debate within Moscow over how to approach the Iran issue, is it harder to make the argument for a nuclear deal as tensions rise with the West? Are those tensions weakening the pro-deal side of the argument?

Fyodor Lukyanov: No, to argue for the Iran deal is quite easy, because we should help because the Iranians are important to us.

It's a country that plays an increasingly important role in the whole region, and that's their wish to get rid of sanctions and to settle that process. So if we want to enhance our relationship with Iran, we need to help them. They will come to terms with the Americans anyway, with us or without us, now or later.
 
 #4
Berlin Policy Journal
http://berlinpolicyjournal.com
April 27, 2015
The What-Not-To-Do List
If the West really wants to build a new relationship, then it has to understand Russia much better than it does today. Here are a few recommendations on what to avoid when patching up relations with Moscow.
By Fyodor Lukyanov
Fyodor Lukyanov is Editor of Russia in Global Affairs and 2015 Richard von Weizs�cker Fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin.

Stop thinking that Russia can be turned into a country that will live by Western rules and notions. One of the fatal mistakes of the 1990s was the conviction in Europe and the US that Russia should be "steered" onto the right track by actively promoting internal transformations. The complete opposite was the result: Western prescriptions for Russia led to a "hybrid" democracy and market economy that are largely a parody. In addition, many Russians see their governing systems not as products of internal development, but as a model imposed by the West. Had the West refrained from active participation in Russian politics, there would be no reason to hold it responsible for the result.

Do not demonize Vladimir Putin and exaggerate his significance. The role of Russia's president is weighty, but the country is going through a difficult transformation that follows its own logic. Contemporary Russia is not a product of Putin. Rather, Putin is a stage in Russia's development. The fall of the Soviet Union meant not only the collapse of the previous form of statehood, but also of a common lifestyle and identity. Russia is beginning to pull out of the Soviet rut, but its society has yet to build a new foundation. Twenty-five post-Soviet years have amounted to an unsuccessful transition, leading the country into a blind alley. This state of affairs started long before Putin, and its consequences will be felt long after he is gone.

Do not count on coercing Russia with force and military pressure. Russian history shows that all attempts to influence the country from the outside have led to Russian society closing ranks, with disastrous results for those trying to exert influence. Russia's main enemy has always been - and remains - its incapacity for timely internal renewal, but only Russia itself is capable of managing its own development, creating conditions for bringing about or avoiding disasters. Outside pressure gives rise to national pride, even in those who are dissatisfied with the government in place.

Do not think that Russia is destined to interact with the West, and that sooner or later it will realize it. It is true that Russia has witnessed two centuries of intellectual discussion on the subject of its Western or non-Western orientation. Those who regard the Western vector as inevitable have always prevailed. However, until now this was not a real choice - Asia could not serve as a source of economic development and innovation. Today the West is still in the lead, but Asia is growing into an ever-larger competitor. Russian supporters of an Asian orientation are putting forward concrete arguments and are offering concrete opportunities. If current trends persist, the picture of Russia's external relations and its priorities will look quite different. China is ready to invest huge resources into the construction of Eurasian infrastructure, which will bind Russia tightly to the East.

It is pointless to explain to Russia its "genuine interests." Europeans make this mistake often; Americans make it all the time. This causes genuine irritation and triggers an inclination to act differently.

Do leave history alone and do not call on Russia to reevaluate its past. Both Russia and Europe have had many different historical narratives and views of events, and so it is better to avoid going into this altogether. Otherwise a heated conflict is inevitable, especially since Russia is going through a period of creating a new identity wherein the past plays an important role.

Do not tell Moscow that the West has abandoned the zero-sum approach and is formulating its policies based on the common good. First of all, it is not true; each country - or group of countries - regards its own interests as primary. Secondly, no one will believe it anyway, in Russia or in the rest of the world, but will regard it as hypocrisy. A rational conversation about the balance of powers and interests would be much more productive.

Do not pay attention to all of the public statements coming out of Moscow. In today's communication environment, where information flows resemble tsunamis, even diplomats have stopped thinking about what they are saying. What counts is the speed and toughness of the response, which in Internet communication is known as trolling - the art of deliberately, cleverly, and secretly pissing people off. The peculiar irony of Russian responses (especially from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense) is sometimes a reaction to the total dominance of Western opinion on the global media scene. They attempt to outmaneuver it with the help of paradoxical and sarcastic pronouncements.

Do not regard Russia as an anomaly, and Putin as a person "living in a parallel reality." The reality of Russian politics is the reality that the overwhelming majority of the world is accustomed to, one which has existed for the duration of human history. It is the EU that lives in a parallel reality, trying to build an entirely different type of international relations. The deviation from the norm is more likely to be found there.
 
 #5
Moscow Times
May 7, 2015
The Indelible Mark of World War II on Modern Russia
By Ivan Nechepurenko

Victory Day hits a raw nerve among Russians, likely owing to the fact that the vast majority of Russian families have been acutely impacted by World War II.

President Vladimir Putin recently tapped into this widespread sentimentality with a rare act: he penned a family history, published in this month's edition of Russkiy Pioner magazine, recounting the harrowing tale of his own family's struggle to survive.

At the start of the war, Putin's father - also named Vladimir Putin - joined a small detachment of soldiers tasked with carrying out acts of sabotage, targeting bridges, railways, and other strategic points. Due to an act of betrayal, the detachment was almost immediately discovered and ambushed by Nazi forces.

As the Germans chased the Russian fighters through the woods, Putin Sr. managed to escape. He spent hours hiding in a swamp, breathing through a reed, waiting for the last of the enemy combatants to depart.

Shortly thereafter, the elder Putin was deployed to Nevsky Pyatachok, one of the Leningrad siege's most blood-soaked battlefields. He was gravely wounded there. For the rest of his life, shrapnel would remain embedded in his leg.

During a period spent recovering in a Leningrad hospital, his son - Putin's brother - succumbed to diphtheria. He was buried in the city's Piskaryovskoye Cemetery, where the remains of some 470,000 civilians and soldiers remain amassed among dozens of mass graves.

When Putin visits St. Petersburg, he often lays flowers at one of the cemetery's mass graves, where his brother is believed to be buried.

Leningrad endured the deadliest siege in history. Starvation claimed hundreds of thousands of lives between 1941 and 1944.

Upon returning from the hospital, Putin Sr. found medics lugging corpses from the building he lived in to be buried. He then spotted his wife in the medic's clutches. She was still breathing. He ambled toward them on his crutches, screaming that she was still alive. The medics told him it was only a matter of time - that she would soon pass on. He attacked them with his crutches, demanding that they put her back inside.

She would survive, ultimately giving birth to Russia's future president in 1952. She lived until 1999, and his father until 1998.

Putin has described some of these memories before, including to U.S. presidential hopeful Hillary Clinton, who  mentioned the conversation in her latest book.

Over the years, many analysts have speculated that the impact of the war on his own family has largely shaped Putin's worldview, reinforcing fears of betrayal and his loyalty to a close-knit group of friends and allies.

Collective Memory Transformed

The war has left an indelible mark on Russia's national identity.

According to a recent survey conducted by Moscow-based pollster the Levada Center, 52 percent of Russians said in the same poll that at least one of their relatives had died in World War II. Many others grew up hearing their parents' or grandparents' tales of struggle and tumult.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the same poll revealed that 42 percent of Russians view Victory Day as among the most important days of the year, trumped only by family-oriented days such as New Year's Eve and birthdays.  

The poll further revealed an uptick in patriotism with regard to Russia's role in the war. Some 69 percent of Russians believe the Soviet Union could have achieved victory without the help of its wartime allies, a 12 percent increase as compared with the same question five years ago.  The poll was conducted among 1,600 respondents with the margin of error not exceeding 3.4 percent.

The latter finding reflects a decisive shift in Russia's historical narrative, which makes sense in light of the fact that the country's official interpretation of the history of World War II has transitioned over time, often in connection with foreign and internal policy goals.

During the Perestroika era, Russia's role in the war was broadly championed as part of a collective effort effort to crush Nazism alongside Moscow's Western allies.

At that point, the actions of Stalin and the Communist party were interpreted negatively, the typical view being that the Russian people won in spite of - not because of - the party leadership. Popular television series of the day centered on the theory that the war effort was hampered by mass repression and the incompetence of the Soviet leadership.

This interpretation has gradually changed, ultimately leading to an entirely different popular understanding of the war.

"The current interpretation is that we are the main victors in this war, while the allies played  a secondary role. The whole world owes us for saving it from Nazism, this interpretation goes, something it is currently ungrateful for," Alexei Makarkin, deputy head of Moscow think tank the Center for Political Technologies, said in comments to The Moscow Times.

Today, the state and its media outlets work diligently to glamorize the war, prominent media analyst Alexander Morozov said in an interview with The Moscow Times. "War is becoming fashionable. Moreover, the image of the past war is being used to explain the current ongoing [tensions with the West]. For example, U.S. actions on the international stage are often compared with Hitler's actions. The argument is that both wanted to conquer the whole world."

Makarkin echoed Morozov's sentiment, noting: "The popular feeling that war was something bad is going away. Young people feel that in a war you can just push a reload button and everything will be restored to normal just like in a computer game."

Massive Parade

As Russian pride in the victory surges, Moscow is gearing up to host the largest Victory Day parade in post-Soviet history.

In a recent interview with RT, Sergei Ivanov - Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office and Chairman of the Victory Day organizing committee - said a total of 28.5 billion rubles (about $562 million) had been allocated for Victory Day celebrations, though the majority of those funds have been earmarked for veterans.

"I would like to stress one very important point: this money is mainly allocated not for the [celebration] itself; it's allocated for the veterans. To be exact, 12.5 billion rubles are for housing for the veterans... And the next sum, 12.3 billion rubles, is allocated for social benefits for the veterans. So the minor part of the whole budget is allocated for different events," Ivanov said in the interview, the transcript of which was published on the Kremlin's website.  

News site RBC estimated that some 7 billion rubles would be spent on advertisements, fireworks, concerts, monuments, medals and on large-scale military parades across Russia.

Moscow's parade will feature the newest Russian weapons, including the RS-24 Yars systems, which can carry up to 10 independently targetable nuclear warheads, RIA Novosti reported. In addition, 732 foreign soldiers will march across Red Square.

According to Vladimir Gelman, a professor of political science at the European University in St. Petersburg, there is a need in Russia for a visible manifestation of the country's strength - something rhetoric alone cannot offer, but that the parade can.

"The understanding is that the only way for [Russia] to make sure we are seen as a great power is by visibly demonstrating our strength," Gelman told The Moscow Times in a phone interview.
 
 #6
Interfax
May 7, 2015
Gorbachev: Some Western leaders' refusal to attend WWII commemorations in Moscow signals disrespect toward those who defeated fascism

Former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev believes that the refusal of the leaders of some European countries and the United States to come to Moscow to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany in World War II on May 9 comes as a sign of disrespect toward the people of the former Soviet Union.

"Ignoring this opportunity to demonstrate their attitude to the fight waged by the Soviet Union against fascism comes as a sign of disrespect toward the peoples who suffered huge losses, a sign of disrespect toward the boundless courage shown by these people in the fight against the 'brown plague'," Gorbachev told Interfax on Thursday.

"I am convinced that it would have been impossible to achieve this victory without Russia. Furthermore, I cannot image where this black-and-brown wave would have stopped, and whether it would have stopped at all. If some politicians do not understand this, it is their problem, but I am certain that all people of the world understand this," the ex-Soviet leader said.

"There are the Americans and there are the American authorities. The authorities of the United States are pursuing their ideological and political tasks. This is how their refusal to come to Moscow for these commemorations can be explained," Gorbachev said.

"Where is common sense here? The actions of the authorities in America and other countries should have at least a drop of common sense," he added.
 #7
New York Times
May 7, 2015
A Parade Hailing Russia's WWII Dead and Marching Further From the West
By NEIL MacFARQUHAR

MOSCOW - The Russian version of Hitler's defeat emphasizes the enormous, unrivaled sacrifices made by the Soviet people to end World War II, so the country has long staged a colossal military parade on May 9 to recognize Victory Day as the most important event in Russian history.

The government of President Vladimir V. Putin has pledged to make the 70th anniversary celebration on Saturday the biggest ever. Yet where Russia had also used the day to acknowledge the toppling of Hitler as the high point of its cooperation with the West, this year's version seems to emphasize their differences.

Mr. Putin will preside over a thumping parade with 16,000 troops marching across Red Square, more than 140 aircraft streaming overhead and about 190 armored vehicles rumbling through.

The armaments will mix historical weapons with highlights from the Kremlin's sweeping military modernization program, including three updated Yars intercontinental ballistic missiles as well as the Armata T-14, a new generation of battle tank making its public debut.

Since Mr. Putin has recast what he calls the country's most important holiday to celebrate the might of the Russian state, the days are over when former President George W. Bush and other Western leaders joined Mr. Putin on the bleachers along the Kremlin walls.

The nationalistic fervor surrounding the parade and the tensions over Ukraine mean that the United States and most Western countries will be represented by their ambassadors.

China and India are the only major powers sending their leaders among about 25 heads of state expected to attend, emphasizing Russia's quest for friends in Asia. Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany is scheduled to come on Sunday to lay a wreath at a memorial for the war dead.

Mr. Putin uses Victory Day to try to demonstrate that Russia remains a formidable contender despite its lost superpower status, and to promulgate the idea that the vast country is a besieged fortress surrounded by enemies. Asked recently about the absence of important Western guests, he expressed indifference but could not resist a swipe at the United States.

"Some simply do not want to come, but some are not being allowed to come by the 'Washington apparatchiks,' who say, 'No way,' " Mr. Putin said during his nationally televised call-in show last month. "Although many would like to come."

Russia lost an estimated 26 million people in the war, more than any other country. Because virtually every family lost someone, Russians revere the day as a tribute to fallen relatives.

Zakhar Prilepin, a bad-boy novelist with a strong nationalistic streak, said that he was typical of many Russians in that he was raised with a tangible sense of the magnitude of the conflict because both his grandfathers fought. He struggles to keep that tactile quality alive for his own children, he said in an interview.

"This is not simply a day in history for me but an event in the life of my family," he said. Growing up, every holiday feast began with a toast about the war, he said, and everyone present was conscious that they owed their lives to the fact that their grandparents survived.

Mr. Prilepin said he could recall the scar tissue from war wounds on one grandfather's shoulder and palm, and could visualize the grueling trek one grandmother made at age 14 across the war-ravaged landscape to the relative safety of the Russian city of Voronezh from German-occupied Ukraine.

Memorial days in Europe lack the same visceral feeling, he said. "The difference," he said, "is that here in this country it affected everybody."

Russian historians argue about Victory Day, with some maintaining that the Soviet Union resurrected the holiday in 1965 to try to gloss over the fact that Communism was stagnating with no clear future vision.

Some accuse Mr. Putin of doing the same, trying to build legitimacy on history rather than elections.

"For the authority and for some parts of Russian society, it is important to represent history as a long train of beautiful events, one victory following another," said Arseny B. Roginsky, the director of Memorial, an organization founded to document Stalin's crimes. Memorial and others try to show both the good and the "terrible things," he said.

Those who try to oppose the glorified version of Russia, including the new Ukrainian government, are often smeared with the "fascist" label.

When gay rights activists participated in a May Day parade in St. Petersburg this month, for example, Vitaly V. Milonov, the city councilman behind a law banning "gay propaganda" aimed at children, likened the activists to the Nazi "fascists" who besieged St. Petersburg - then Leningrad - during the war.

"Leningrad stood up to the fascists for 900 days, and now here they are walking quietly through our streets," he was quoted as saying by the news website Meduza.io.

Russians' sense of grievance over the war extends to the entire Western attitude toward the war, which they say consistently understates the magnitude of the Russian role. In his brief remarks on Red Square during last year's parade, for example, Mr. Putin said that it was Russia that "saved Europe from slavery."

The tension is partly rooted in different interpretations of the war by countries that fell under Soviet control, like Poland or the Baltic States. They emphasize that Stalin initially forged the Molotov-Ribbentrop nonaggression pact with Germany in 1939 to divide Eastern Europe, and that their "liberation" by the Red Army led to a long Russian occupation.

Russian support for separatists fighting in Ukraine has resurrected old fears about Moscow. The Kremlin, in turn, has accused its immediate neighbors of seeking to undermine Russia's security by bringing NATO forces to its very borders.

Ukraine infuriated Moscow anew by replacing the Soviet-inspired celebrations this year. Although Ukraine will hold parades on May 9 to honor war veterans, President Petro O. Poroshenko signed a law last month designating May 8 the national holiday, aligning the Ukrainian calendar with Europe, and also like Europe making the poppy the holiday symbol.

Poland has also jabbed at the Kremlin, twice drawing sharp rebukes for remarks this year by its senior officials about Victory Day.

President Bronislaw Komorowski, calling Red Square "tank square," described the May 9 parade in Moscow as a "demonstration of force" that illustrated global instability. The foreign minister, Grzegorz Schetyna, said that the end of World War II should not be celebrated in Russia because it was among the countries where it originated, given the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.

Officially, Russia rejects any comparison between the two despots. Mr. Putin recently called such comparisons "groundless," while acknowledging the "ugly nature of the Stalin regime."

Vladimir Medinsky, the culture minister, said in a speech to commemorate Victory Day that trying to discuss such interpretations of history was like "arguing with crazy people." The civilized world exists only because Russia saved it in 1945, he said, emphasizing that it was time for Russians to be proud of their own, unique history, away from the perceptions of others.

Professor Mariusz Sielski, a Polish sociologist teaching in Russia who specializes in historical memory, said that the Kremlin was trying to transform the World War II victory into a triumph of the Russian state, and that it wants other countries to acknowledge that version. "Russia is trying to create a utopia based on past achievements," he said.

Mr. Roginsky of Memorial said that the Kremlin exploits the large celebration to try to strengthen the nationalistic, patriotic version of history to sell the idea that Russians consolidated themselves around the Stalin government in order to win.

"They mean that in order to win, it is always necessary to consolidate around the authority," he said. "It was true yesterday, it was true today and it will be true tomorrow. The fight for history is also the fight for the present day."
 #8
Wall Street Journal
May 7, 2015
Economic Crisis Slows Putin's Plans to Modernize Russian Military
Moscow quietly scales back project to replace Soviet-era armaments amid defense cuts
By THOMAS GROVE

MOSCOW-Russia's economic crisis is forcing President Vladimir Putin to quietly scale back plans to build an "indomitable" military, even as Moscow readies one of the largest-ever displays of its might on Red Square this weekend.

When Mr. Putin promised to spend more than 20 trillion rubles to modernize the military in late 2010-some $650 billion at the time-some senior officials questioned whether Moscow could afford it. Now left with fewer petrodollars and grappling with Western sanctions, the Kremlin is being forced to cut spending and delay other defense plans.

The modernization project was aimed at replacing 70% of Russia's armaments, much of which dates back to the Soviet era, with hundreds of modern tanks, guns, submarines and fighter jets. In turn, Russian military spending doubled between 2007 and 2013.

Little information is publicly available about the defense expenditures, and where the cuts will fall isn't clear. But even Mr. Putin has acknowledged that the dates for the modernization plan may need to be shifted.

"This is connected not only with economics, but also with the fact that the [defense] industry is not entirely ready to produce certain types of weapons on time," Mr. Putin said last month. "But without a doubt, the program will be fulfilled."

Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev has also said the defense budget, which rose by one-third this year to 3.3 trillion rubles, needed to be adjusted. Government data show the 2015 defense budget will be cut by almost 5%, some 157 billion rubles.

Russia's military spending this year has been aimed at replacing 30% of the armed forces' gear with modern weapons. The plans include 50 new warships for the navy and a contract for the next generation T-14 tank that runs on the Russian-built Armata platform, which the country's defense industry boasts will produce the best fighting vehicles in the world.

But a report published in April by Moscow-based defense think tank CAST said Russia's military spending has reached a crisis. "The modern Russian economy just does not generate enough resources to finance the current 2011-2020 rearmament program," CAST said in the report. "This seriously reduces the ability to efficiently renew the Russian armed forces' equipment."

The ruble's devaluation alone has hit Russia's military spending, the third-highest in the world in dollars before the crisis, according to a study by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Now, Russian military spending ranks seventh or eighth globally, Ruslan Pukhov, head of CAST, estimates.

Russia's economy, which is forecast to contract by as much as 4.6% this year, is struggling with a combination of lower oil prices and Western sanctions that have cut off most sources of long-term financing for some of the country's largest companies.

Mr. Putin has publicly supported the military spending, protecting it from the 10% cuts that other government programs are facing.

But Dmitry Gorenburg, a senior research scientist at defense think tank CNA Corp., said that cuts or delays were inevitable and that the Kremlin might have to shelve some expenditures initially slated for 2016 until 2018, in the hope that oil prices recover. "With cost overruns, the money allocated may not be sufficient to build what they want to build," he said.

Mr. Gorenburg added that "regarding what it is they want to build, they won't get as many of them, they may take longer to build, but the programs will keep running as they are now."

One such example is the Armata, which has won praise from Russian defense experts for its remote-controlled turret and automatic loading system, will be on display in Saturday's parade.

In a final rehearsal before the parade, the T-14 Armata tank stopped abruptly on Red Square. It ultimately started moving again after an attempt to tow it away was unsuccessful, the Associated Press reported.

Sources close to the Defense Ministry said the military has already cut the number of tanks it planned to buy from defense company UVZ Group because of the ballooning costs of building them, leaving the future of the project in doubt.

"The Armata, like the majority of new-generation weapons systems produced for the Russian Armed Forces, is extremely expensive. It's angered Russia's Defense Ministry," Mr. Pukhov of CAST said.
 #9
Business New Europe
www.bne.eu
May 7, 2015
MOSCOW BLOG: Is Gazprom a "buy"?
Ben Aris in Moscow
[Chart here http://www.bne.eu/content/story/moscow-blog-gazprom-buy]

With the RTS Index up 30% year-to-date, foreign investors are drifting back into Russian shares simply because they are so cheap. But is the bluest of Russian blue chips and long-time market proxy Gazprom a buy again?

Russian investment bank Renaissance Capital, or Rencap as it is affectionately known in Moscow, certainly thinks so. In a report titled "Gazprom: Discount season is ending", the bank marked the stock up to "buy".

"We raise Gazprom's [target price] to $9.0 (from $7.1), following better cost control demonstrated in the recent FY14 results, an improved outlook for exports and lower purchase costs on Central Asian gas. We re-iterate our BUY rating on Gazprom and prefer it to the three other largest Russian energy companies: Lukoil (HOLD, TP $52.0/GDR, CP $51.0/GDR), Novatek (HOLD, TP $105.0, CP $97.5) and Rosneft (HOLD, TP $4.1/GDR, CP $5.0/GDR)," the bank's analysts Ildar Davletshin and Evgeny Stroinov wrote in a note.

Gazprom has made a lot of investors a fortune in the past as the stock's price soared following the government's decision to remove the so-called ring fence, special restrictions that banned foreigners from owning shares in Russia's most powerful company.

Plus �a change

During the boom years in the mid-noughties the stock rose to an all-time high of RUB365.26 ($15.41) on May 16, 2008, on the local market just before the Lehman brothers storm broke, then tanked to an all-time low of RUB86.60 ($3.19) on October 24 that same year. As of May 6, 2015, Gazprom shares are trading at RUB155.46 ($3.10) as of May 6, almost exactly where it was five years ago to the day in ruble terms, although less in dollar terms, RUB155.0 ($5.08).

Rencap's target prices are referring to the price of the shares on the international markets where the stock trades significantly higher, despite the lack of the ring fence, and cost $5.92 per share as of May 5. Still, irrespective of whether an investor buys in London or Moscow, Rencap are saying the upside in the stock is just over 50%.

Looking at the stock in purely financial terms then buying Gazprom now is a no-brainer. But if you add in the political risks to both the state-owned company, and Russia as a whole, then the trade looks extremely risky indeed. Rencap's upgrade comes partly as the company was minting money in the last quarter of 2014 after gas prices recovered and the company slashed its capex spending: capex was about $55bn in 2011 but Rencap estimate that this will fall to around $20bn a year. Given the company is generating cash of about $40bn a year, says Rencap, it will be spitting out some $20bn a year of free cash flow that can be returned to the government and minority investors. And it seems the process has already started.

"In 2014, Gazprom generated its highest free cash flow ever, at almost $17bn ($5.9bn of that in the fourth quarter of 2014). A main reason for that was an $11bn drop in capital expenditures to just $33bn (although attributable capex was almost unchanged year-on-year in ruble terms)," analysts at Sberbank CIB said in a note on April 30.

Gazprom shares are undeniably cheap when compared to pretty much any previous year, and thanks to a 2012 government order the company has started paying out dividends that are only going to go up. But Rencap are arguing that the nature of the company's business has fundamentally changed. It won't spend as much on capex; the EU demand for gas can only go up; and in addition to an existing $400bn supply deal to China, a second gas deal could be signed as soon as next week when Chinese President Xi Jinping visits Moscow to attend the May 9th Victory Day parade.

"We think the biggest future driver will be the dramatic increase we expect in earnings cash conversion - from just 6% in the past five years to 55% in 2019E. We expect this to come from weaker capex (mainly benefiting from a weaker rouble) and stronger sales, as EU demand recovers and China starts importing Russian gas from 2019," Rencap said in its report.

However, when viewing the coin from the other side the political risks seem significant. Europe seems determined to wean itself off Russian gas eventually, even if will take years to do, which puts a question mark over the company's long-term prospects.

More immediately, Gazprom's business arrangements in Europe are already under attack by Brussels. The European Union (EU) on April 22 charged Gazprom with violating competition laws by using its market dominance to overcharge clients in Central and Eastern Europe.

"We find that [Gazprom] may have built artificial barriers preventing gas from flowing from certain Central Eastern European countries to others, hindering cross-border competition," European Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager said in a statement.

Vestager is out for blood and says EU studies found at least five EU states were being charged monopolistic rents. Under EU competition rules Gazprom could face a fine of up to 10% of its revenues if found guilty, or some $3.8bn, according to VTB Capital in Moscow.  Gazprom rejected the charges as ungrounded, backed up by the Russian government and in particular by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who said the deals with the EU states were "in compliance with the law at the time of signing".

Moscow is also getting into a potentially even more costly legal battle with Kyiv, which said last week it intends to sue Gazprom for $16bn in damages as the 10-year gas supply contract signed in 2009 by former Ukrainian prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko was "unfair". Gazprom has lodged a counter suit for $24bn for non-payment of gas delivered under the terms of the same contract. Both cases are due to be heard in a Swedish arbitration court.

Despite all the rhetoric about reducing Europe's dependency on Russian gas, however, the volumes exported there went up 8% year-on-year in April and are likely to climb further this year as western Europe's economies recovery. Likewise, despite the on-going slug fest with Ukraine, it too doubled imports of gas from Russia in April as it starts stockpiling for later in the year while prices are low(ish).

Taken all together, Rencap says that in the "new" Gazprom the stock will re-rate by 2019 when the China deal comes on stream, from a price to earnings ratio of x3.5 (where the stock is trading now) to x5 earnings, which would produce a 43% increase in the share price by itself, not counting bigger dividend payments, which may go up 26-fold, says the bank. That re-rating would move the London price of the stock from around $6 to some $18 in just a few years.
 
 #10
Bloomberg
May 6, 2015
Oil's Rebound Is Here
By Leonid Bershidsky

As Brent crude oil reached more than $68 per barrel Wednesday, a high for 2015, analysts started to backtrack on earlier predictions of $40-$50 oil. The rebound, however, may not last: Speculators appear to have disrupted Saudi Arabia's strategic game against U.S. shale oil producers.

Predicting oil prices is a risky endeavor. They are determined by a multitude of political, economic, psychological and climate-related factors that cannot be modeled with accuracy. So analysts would suggest that Brent is rising because of unexpectedly fast demand growth in China; another bout of trouble in Libya, where a key oil port has shut down; a decrease in U.S. inventories; the continuing fighting in Yemen; and any number of other events.

It's just as likely, however, that oil's rise is driven by hedge funds holding a net long position of 550,000 futures and options contracts, or 550,000 barrels of imaginary oil. Arguably, when the actual crude oil supply is about 92.5 million barrels a day but futures markets trade about 1 billion barrels a day, speculators are more important than any real-world factors in determining the price. The speculators, though, listen to the analysts who do their best to take the real world into account. That means there's contamination, making the price movements even more unpredictable.

Sometimes, however, there is a bigger story that gets obscured by all the noise.

I predicted the current rebound back in November. The biggest factor is shrinking oil investment as a result of last year's steep price drop. A senior executive at Saudi Aramco, the national oil company, said in March that $1 trillion worth of projects would be canceled globally in the next couple of years. There has been a steady stream of announcements from oil companies about cutting jobs and canceling projects. There's also the shrinking U.S. rig count, which led the U.S. Energy Information Administration to predict last month that crude production would decline in June through September.

By refusing to cut production last fall and thus engineering the price drop, Saudi Arabia and other members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries mainly targeted the U.S. shale producers, whose projects have higher costs than most Middle Eastern, ex-Soviet, African or Latin American plays. Yet gloom spread throughout the industry, and this year, speculators have seized upon the slightest bits of news to bid prices back up. Consequently, $50 Brent didn't last long enough to wreak havoc on the U.S. frackers. They have survived, and at current prices, we should expect a limited "frack counterattack."

The Saudis needed more time, and perhaps a major disruptive event such as Iran's return to the crude markets, for their power play to have a devastating effect. As it is, success has only been partial. The oil kingdom has showed it still has plenty of market power. It has given the highly leveraged, low-margin producers in the U.S. a big scare. It has also won back some market share by making other players reduce investment. Yet, by trading on the Saudi scare, financial speculators, in effect, defused it.

It may well be that, by their combined efforts, the Saudis, the frackers and the hedge funds have created a new equilibrium, and current prices will prevail for a while. Thanks to the Saudi play, shale operators understand the risk well enough to scale back their ambitions. The Saudis, for their part, can't boost production fast enough to cause the shale operators more pain, and they can live comfortably with $65-70 oil. So can non-OPEC producers such as Russia that have devalued their currencies and mostly absorbed the effects of devaluation. Russia's current budget is based on $50 Brent, and the extra revenue will be welcome.

Only the speculators won't be happy as prices settle: They love volatility. When the market is in equilibrium, all they can do is gamble on news headlines. So there will be spikes and troughs, but, for the rest of this year, the oil market should be more stable.
 
 #11
Vox.com
May 6, 2015
Should Putin fear Russia's extremist far right?
by Amanda Taub

For months, as I have written about Russia, a fear that I hear over and over is that should Vladimir Putin fall from power, the result could look very different from the democracy the liberal opposition hopes for. Rather, Russian analysts and others have warned, the country could be overcome by far-right ethnic nationalist forces who hate the country's racial minorities.

Even if the scenarios they described seemed extreme and perhaps outlandish, it's not difficult to see why they worry. Polls find that xenophobic beliefs are widespread in Russia. The country is already home to extreme nationalist parties and to far-right groups like BORN, a neo-Nazi organization whose members murdered the lawyer Stanislav Markelov and the journalist Anastasia Baburova, as well as a number of immigrants. Far-right nationalist activists are fighting as volunteers alongside separatists in eastern Ukraine, gaining new skills in violence that they could bring with them when they return to Russia.

Some of these groups have been sharply critical of Putin. Could they turn against him more fully? What would they do if Putin's regime collapsed?

To find out more about whether those concerns are warranted, Max Fisher and I sat down with Alexander Verkhovsky, the soft-spoken, wild-haired director of the Sova Center, a Moscow-based organization that researches issues of racism and nationalism. His small basement office was accessible through a series of low-ceilinged tunnels - their height, he said, was the result of the building being constructed more than 100 years ago.

As we sat perched on office chairs amid stacks of Sova reports and countless owl figurines - the "wisest bird," Verkhovsky explained, and therefore Sova's mascot - Verkhovsky discussed Russia's widespread problem with xenophobia and racism, the threat that nationalists returning from Ukraine pose to Russian stability, and why he doubts that opposition politicians can build a support base on xenophobia or far-right nationalism.

What follows is a transcript of our conversation, edited and condensed for clarity.

The extremists now fighting in Ukraine

Max Fisher:Many of Russia's extreme nationalist activists have gone to fight in eastern Ukraine. Is there a fear that when they come back they'll be more violent?

Alexander Verkhovsky: Of course. It's for sure.

Hundreds of violent neo-Nazis went to Ukraine to take part in the war. So they left our streets and committed fewer hate crimes. It's just a temporary effect. Sooner or later they will return.

And that's maybe not the only consequence here. Because of course there will be more hate crimes, but I think what our government really has to think about is some other kinds of radical activity.

There are hundreds of nationalists in Donbass on the separatists' side. These several hundred nationalists are among several thousand other volunteers, and most of them, or almost all of them, will return sooner or later.

And what will they do here? Some of them, of course, will just sit at home - but not all. We've seen this already, a little more than 20 years ago. After the crash of the Soviet Union thousands of volunteers participated in the wars in Transnistria and Abkhazia. Then they returned here, and participated in clashes in Moscow until '93. So there is some political threat here.

Amanda Taub: Do you think the popular support for Russia's occupation of Crimea has shifted popular sympathies in Russia toward those militant nationalists who are fighting in eastern Ukraine?

Alexander Verkhovsky: Of course there are sympathies. The problem is what will happen with those sympathies when they return.

Of course they are heroes, and so on and so forth. But they are heroes while they are there. When they return and play some other role, then that will change, depending on their role and on the situation.

This war is really a very new development. It involved a lot of emotions of the majority of people, and all this extra support for Putin is, of course, very nice for him.

But these emotions have to be converted to something. People don't know how to do that. They may now hate Barack Obama - but they cannot do anything about Barack Obama. So that's why some strange phenomena appear.

[For instance] there is a strange organization called the National Liberation Movement led by Yevgeny Fyodorov, who is a Duma member from [Putin's ruling] United Russia party. His ideologies are rather odd - he thinks the country is occupied by "evil forces," and that the whole government is an occupation government, except for Putin personally.

That would be just his own madness, but he's got a group - which is not big, but there are activists in many towns. They commit violent attacks against opposition activists. And it's always with full impunity, which, of course, attracts more volunteers to do it next time

Amanda Taub:Why do you think United Russia would want someone like that to be an MP?

Alexander Verkhovsky: United Russia, it's more like the Communist party of Soviet times.

It's not a party at all. It's kind of a part of the state apparatus. There are different roles, like in theater. They just distribute it. So everything is there. Some crazy people, like Fyodorov, and some respectable experts who may really work on pieces of legislation.

Amanda Taub: Why do you think the government has people like Fyodorov play that role?

Alexander Verkhovsky: Somebody has to attack the opposition. Of course, the police can beat them, but that's not always useful tactically.

Previously, some hooligans were hired for that. But it didn't look pretty, because it was obvious that they were hired. Now it just looks like some activists beat other activists - like, I don't know, fair play.

I think that's the role they play. Because the authorities need different instruments to keep independent activity under control.

Russian support for xenophobic ideas and policies

Amanda Taub: Is there support among ordinary Russians for xenophobic opposition to, for instance, people from the Caucasus, or immigrants?

Alexander Verkhovsky:Sociologists [conduct polls] to ask people some standard questions from year to year:

"Do you support the slogan 'Russia for Russians'?" (meaning ethnic Russians).

"Do you think the population who lived in the region historically should have more rights than newcomers?"

"Do you think certain ethnic groups have to be excluded from your local area, from your town, from your region?" Things like that.

According to the Levada Center, which is most prominent on these issues, from the year 2000 until 2012 about 55 percent of the population answered "yes" to all these questions. I think that's a very high level, but at least it was stable.

In 2013 it became higher, because there was an official anti-migrant campaign that year on TV. Usually the official line is to avoid talking about [migrant issues], but in 2013 something was broken in this mechanism. I really cannot explain why it happened, but this campaign was conducted in several regions, including Moscow and St. Petersburg.

We saw a lot of news about the "crimes of migrants," and other such things. Much more than previously.

Max Fisher:Why would the authorities run that campaign?

Alexander Verkhovsky:Nobody knows. Really, nobody knows. We may guess that people on the top, they felt some pressure from this massive xenophobia. For a long time they understood that it's just dangerous to play with that, because it's easy to provoke disturbances, but they had to react somehow. Maybe it just coincided as different people started to play on these xenophobic things.

But then we had a riot here in Moscow, on the outskirts. It was October 2013, and right after that, the anti-migrant campaign immediately finished, because somebody finally understood that it's dangerous, and finished it immediately, the very next day.

Why support for xenophobic ideas doesn't translate into support for nationalist parties

Amanda Taub:When violent xenophobic attacks happen, what is the public's attitude toward them?

Alexander Verkhovsky:I think it's difficult to say. Mostly people say it's wrong. But usually people say that it's just an "overreaction" of some "hot young guys who just can't control themselves." Because "these aliens, they really make trouble, and we have to do something with them."

But if you ask directly, "Would you participate if something happens in your town?" just a few percent answer yes. And in fact, I think even most of them would not participate.

And we see that in practice. The [annual ethnic nationalist rally] Russian March, for instance: it looks "too Nazi." It's really difficult for the typical person to participate.

Some more moderate groups tried to organize a "Stop feeding the Caucasus" campaign, which would be attractive [to ordinary people]. But more people didn't come.

Amanda Taub: So people hold these xenophobic views, but they're not looking to nationalist or opposition groups to address them?

Alexander Verkhovsky: Russian citizens do not trust independent groups. Not because they like the government so much, but because they like independent groups of any kind even less.

For instance, they do not rely on trade unions when they have a conflict in their workplace.

There are some changes in the middle class. There are some changes in some certain regions. People are more active in self-organizing. But in general, it's still there, this paternalistic approach.

Max Fisher:Separately from the really extremist violent groups, do you worry about some liberal groups embracing ethnic nationalism? For instance, we hear about liberal opposition politician Alexei Navalny as someone who is maybe making these ideas more mainstream.

Alexander Verkhovsky: Yes. Alexei Navalny did a lot.

It's not only about legitimation of the ideas, it's also the legitimation of certain people who were seen as radical.

When we had the protest movement in 2012, when there was an attempt to create formal leadership to elect coordinating committee of the opposition, it was a funny moment, because most of the ultra-left and ultra-right leaders had no chance to be elected. They were not popular enough. So people like Navalny and [former Duma member Ilya] Ponomarev, they pushed the idea of ideological quotas for them.

Without such quotas, none of them would be elected. None of these leftists, none of these nationalists. [But] they were just invited.

And it's not only because Navalny himself is a person of nationalist ideas, but because most of the leaders of liberal parties at the time also knew about the statistical fact that the majority of Russian citizens are rather xenophobic.

So they tried to play that card. To me, it was not a clever idea to involve our nationalists as representatives of the xenophobic majority, because they were not representatives of anybody. But that's how it was.

Max Fisher:Were ideas like "stop feeding the Caucasus" also a way to try to develop broad political support for nationalists?

Alexander Verkhovsky:It was a very clever thing. Because it was not only about the Caucasus, which is most hated, but also about the idea of subsidies. [The Russian government heavily subsidizes the northern Caucasus region.]

Because people think - and mostly they are right - that most of these subsidies are just stolen. So, the idea of "stop feeding the Caucasus" was not only xenophobic, it was also anti-corruption, so it could become popular.

And it was rather popular, but not much. For example, there were specific rallies organized by these moderate nationalists, under this slogan. And Navalny personally came there, when he was already rather popular. But his numerous supporters didn't come, because they didn't want to participate in a nationalist rally.

So Navalny's popularity was not popularity based on nationalism; it was popularity based on anti-corruption.

That's why after these experiments he mostly avoided nationalist rhetoric. Not fully, but much more than previously. It doesn't work.

Amanda Taub:So if xenophobia and nationalism were to become bigger political issues, something that was potentially a problem for Putin's popularity, will that be something the government takes a stronger role in addressing?

Alexander Verkhovsky: This xenophobia could turn again to some riots and clashes in certain cities, which we have had before, especially in 2013.

If the riots come to Moscow, or there are many of them, then something has to be done about that.
 
 #12
Dances With Bears
http://johnhelmer.net
May 7, 2015
AUSTRIAN COURT STARTS LEGAL DOMINOES FALLING - NEXT, POLITICAL SCHEMING TO BE DECLARED ILLEGAL IN EU SANCTIONS AGAINST RUSSIAN CORPORATIONS
By John Helmer, Moscow
[Footnotes, links, and photos here http://johnhelmer.net/?p=13316]

Last week a Vienna, Austria, court ruled [1] that US government charges against Ukrainian oligarch Dmitry Firtash are unsubstantiated and unlawfully motivated by political scheming. Next up for the rule of evidence and of law - the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg must judge whether European Union (EU) sanctions against Russia are unsubstantiated and unlawfully motivated by political scheming.

Last year, starting on July 31 and extending through December, the UK and EU announced what were called sectoral sanctions against several Russian companies and banks. These include the oil companies Rosneft, Lukoil, Gazpromneft, and Surgutneftegaz; gas producers Gazprom and Novatek; state-controlled banks Sberbank, VTB, Gazprombank, Vnesheconombank (VEB), Bank of Moscow, and Russian Agricultural Bank; and more than a dozen other companies, some state-controlled , some controlled by individuals who have also been sanctioned. For the full sanctions lists up to date, including those of the US and other countries, click to open [2].

The EU added individual designations, sectoral sanctions, and rationales through three stages. At each stage, the published EU rationale attempted to tie the sanctions target to the conflict in Ukraine. At first, on March 21, 2014, the EU claimed "sanctions are not a question of retaliation; they are a foreign policy tool, not a goal in themselves, but a means to an end. Our goal is to stop Russian action against Ukraine, to restore Ukraine's sovereignty - and to achieve this we need a negotiated solution". Then on April 29 [3]: "sanctions are not punitive, but designed to bring about a change in policy or activity by the target country, entities or individuals. Measures are therefore always targeted at such policies or activities, the means to conduct them and those responsible for them". At that point in time, before the sectoral sanctions targeted at oil companies and banks, the focus of the EU campaign was on "illegal annexation of Crimea and [sic] Sevastopol" and on "steps by the Russian Federation to destabilise the situation in Ukraine".

By Stage-3 in July, the EU sanctions were aimed at stopping Russian access to EU capital markets; the trade in arms and related material to Russia; exports of dual-use goods and technology for military use in Russia or to Russian military end-users; exports of energy-related equipment and technology to Russia, particularly for deep water oil exploration and production, Arctic oil exploration or production, and shale oil projects in Russia.

The new rationale carried implicit condemnation of Russia for the MH17 catastrophe. According to the official release, the sanctions against oil companies and banks were "meant as a strong warning: illegal annexation of territory and deliberate destabilisation of a neighbouring sovereign country cannot be accepted in 21st century Europe. Furthermore, when the violence created spirals out of control and leads to the killing of almost 300 innocent civilians in their flight from the Netherlands to Malaysia, the situation requires urgent and determined response. The European Union will fulfil its obligations to protect and ensure the security of its citizens. And the European Union will stand by its neighbours and partners." Here's the full text [4].

The test of lawfulness for sanctions, according to the highest court in the UK, the Supreme Court, is a combination of reasonableness of evidence, due process in testing the evidence, and the relationship between the declared purpose and announced sanction. In its ruling on the sanctions applied by the British Government against the Iranian Bank Mellat, the Supreme Court ruled "the direction [for sanctions] was irrational in its incidence and disproportionate to any contribution which it could rationally be expected to make to its objective. I conclude that it was unlawful. .. the Bank is entitled to succeed on the ground that it received no notice of the Treasury's intention to make the direction, and therefore had no opportunity to make representations. The duty to give advance notice and an opportunity to be heard to a person against whom a draconian statutory power is to be exercised is one of the oldest principles of what would now be called public law." For more, see [5].

Jack BeatsonOn November 20, Rosneft went to the UK High Court in London to obtain an injunction to halt the government's application of criminal penalties in the sanctions against the company, while it prepared legal challenges in both the High Court and in the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The ECJ case had commenced on October 9. In its first judgement, the High Court rejected the injunction. "The provisions here," ruled Lord Justice Sir Jack Beatson (right), "could have been more precise and clearer, but in my judgment they do not come near reaching the required threshold for invalidity either at common law or EU law." Here is the first ruling, dated November 27, 2014 [6].

Two months later Rosneft's lawyers went back to the London court for two days of hearing on whether the UK court should overrule the application of the EU sanctions in the UK. Again, it was defeated, Beatson and a brother judge deciding [7] they prefer to pass the buck. "We have accordingly formed the view that a ruling of the CJEU is of considerable importance in providing the domestic authorities with a definitive interpretation of the Regulation. This is important not only to ensure consistency between the competent authorities of the Member States but to ensure... a level playing field for all businesses operating within the EU. A second reason why we consider that these matters are best addressed by the CJEU is that even if this Court considered that it could form a clear conclusion on the matters arising, it would do so without the benefit of submissions provided to it by the institutions of the EU and by other Member States the legality of the sanctions under British and European Union law."

For the time being the European court has decided nothing. The court records show that the Rosneft challenge comprises three cases which are running in parallel. The first, Case no. T-715/14, was filed on October 9; this was the first of the Russian corporations to attack the sanctions in the court.

Then in February of this year Rosneft filed two more cases: No. T-69/15, with commencement date of February 12, 2015 [8], followed by Case no. T-72/15 on February 18. Why Rosneft has filed three separate cases the company spokesman in Moscow isn't saying.

The Rosneft brief makes nine specific legal pleas, arguing that the action by the EU's Council of Ministers "failed to provide reasons sufficient to permit a full review of either the substantive or procedural legality of the provisions"; "there has been no material produced by the Council which could or does justify the relevant measures as having a legitimate or lawful aim"; "the relevant measures are in breach of the EU's international law obligations under the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Russia and/or the GATT"; the Council demonstrated "no rational connection" between the reasons announced for sanctions and "the means chosen"; the sanctions "infringed the fundamental principle of equal treatment and non-arbitrariness"; "they are not proportionate to, or have not been shown to be proportionate to, the aim pursued by the Council Decision"; they amount to "an impermissible interference with the Applicants' fundamental rights to property and/or their freedom to conduct a business"; and they "breach of the constitutional guarantee of legal certainty, including in the lack of clarity of key terms in the relevant measures."

Finally, there is the argument that sanctions are motivated by political scheming for regime change in Russia. This, it is argued, amounts to an abuse of EU powers because "in the absence of any explanation for the relevant measures and their nature, at least part of the purpose of the contested provision could have been to serve an aim other than the stated aim." The full text can be read here [9].

Rosneft has also told the Russian press it has applied to the ECJ for disclosure orders against the EU Council for the production of hitherto secret documents, including drafts of the sanctions announcements and communications between the member governments, as well with US officials, in which the sanctions provisions were rationalized [10].

According to ECJ records, Sberbank mounted its legal challenge soon after Rosneft. Here is its case, T-732/14 (October 23) [11]. The bank lawyers argue there were no reasonable grounds for striking at Sberbank in relation to the published claims of "Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine". Sberbank was illegally deprived of its rights to defend itself; the EU failed its legal obligation to give "adequate or sufficient reasons"; and the sanction imposed on the bank is "an unjustified and disproportionate restriction of its fundamental rights including its right to protection of its business and reputation." Here is the skeleton of the Sberbank case [12].

VTB filed on October 24, the day after Sberbank. This is Case No. T-734/14 [13]. VTB's argument [14] makes similar pleas, adding there is no link with Russian policy in the Ukraine and that the bank "is not managed by the Russian State."

Gazpromneft filed [15] in court soon after Sberbank and VTB; it now has two cases running: Case No. T-735/14 (November 28) and No. T-799/14 (December 5). The company's argument attacks the sanctions on similar grounds, concluding they are illegal under EU law and treaties signed between the EU and Russia and between the EU member states because "they are not appropriate to achieve their objectives (and therefore are also not necessary) and, in any event, impose burdens that very significantly outweigh any possible benefits."
 
#13
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
May 6, 2015
Kerry allegations do nothing to further U.S.-Russia nuclear cooperation
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry recently accused Moscow of violating one of the key Cold War-era agreements and of actions undermining the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons - allegations that Russian experts dismiss as baseless. The latest spat marks the continuing deterioration of relations between Russia and the United States, which is threatening to affect cooperation between the two countries in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
Alexey Timofeychev, RBTH

Speaking at the opening of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference (NPT) in New York on April 27, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry denounced what he labeled a "clear violation" by Moscow of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, urged Russia to further reduce its nuclear arsenal and criticized the Russian Federation for disregarding the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, in which Moscow guaranteed the inviolability of Ukraine's borders in return for Kiev giving up its nuclear stockpile.
 
Need for proof

Kerry expressed concern about Russia's alleged violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty, but failed to provide evidence. Speaking in New York, director of the Russian Foreign Ministry department for non-proliferation and arms control, Mikhail Ulyanov, dismissed Kerry's remarks as "unfounded accusations," which the U.S. "refuses or, most likely, fails to back up with concrete facts."

The Russian diplomat said that "it is the policy of the U.S. that is the most serious obstacle to further nuclear reductions." In particular, Ulyanov mentioned the U.S. concept of the "prompt global strike," its unilateral deployment of a missile defense system and its opposition to opening negotiations to ban the deployment of weapons in space.

Dmitry Yevstafyev, a professor of the Higher School of Economics in Moscow and an expert on nuclear non-proliferation, told RBTH that there is no evidence of violation of the INF by Russia. "This is only a rumor, which is based on the interpretation of certain kinds of scientific research that take place in the Russian Federation," he said.

Pyotr Topychkanov, coordinator of the Carnegie Moscow Center's nonproliferation program, noted that the INF Treaty provides mechanisms that allow the parties to discuss emerging concerns, but the U.S. has not made use of them. Topychkanov also pointed out that Washington is not trying to solve the existing problems on a bilateral basis, but actively promotes the topic in the media and airs it on multilateral platforms.
 
Nuclear arsenals are being reduced

In his speech, Kerry touched upon the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START III), which was signed a few years ago. He said that the agreement is being executed by both parties, but stressed that Washington continues to urge Moscow to further reduce its nuclear stockpile by 30 percent.

According to Yevstafyev, Russia is not yet ready to make a further reduction of its nuclear potential. The reduction of strategic nuclear forces below the ceilings set by START III will mean giving the U.S. an "undoubted advantage" in the delivery of conventional weapons, such as cruise missiles.

Topychkanov pointed out that START III is now being executed by both parties "100 percent" and made it clear that Kerry's calls are premature, since the agreement will still be in effect until 2020. The expert also noted that Russia has no reason to fall below the limits set by START III.
 
Ukraine events sent 'wrong message' to potential nuclear powers

Commenting on Kerry's remarks about Russia's disregard for the Budapest Memorandum (on security assurances to Ukraine in connection with its accession to the NPT), Topychkanov said that "what happened in Ukraine [Russia's takeover of Crimea] sent the wrong message to countries that are contemplating acquiring nuclear weapons," which saw Ukraine give up its nuclear weapons and then lose part of its territory.

Yevstafyev claims that when the Budapest Memorandum was signed, Moscow proceeded on the basis that Ukraine would pursue a neutral status, but recently Ukrainian leaders have taken the path toward NATO membership. "From the perspective of the political factors set forth in the memorandum, Ukraine itself has gone beyond the memorandum [by expressing its desire to join NATO]," said Yevstafyev.
 
 #14
http://off-guardian.org
May 6, 2015
Stephen Cohen: We're living through a geopolitical transition

We bring you here a transcript of the major part of Stephen Cohen's analysis of the Ukrainian Crisis on the John Batchelor Show of April 28, 2015.
--

Very loud and authoritative voices in Kiev, in Washington, in Brussels are saying almost daily that a larger war is coming, and coming soon.

Moscow is warning that all this war talk is preparation for US-Kiev assault on Donbass.

It's fully possible that both sides are beefing up for a show down.

The West is accusing Russia under Putin of destroying the post-Soviet security order in Europe.

If we are going to say when did this [most recent destruction of the Westphalian order] begin .... if you are ascribing blame in terms of cause-and-effect, it begins with the American [1999] air invasion of Serbia.

But there's one other point that's exceedingly important, and people either don't remember it or they don't understand it, or they're concealing it: to say that Putin is destroying the post-Soviet order created in Europe after the end of the Soviet Union neglects to mention that Russia was excluded purposefully from that order. It was never invited to join what became the NATO order in Europe, as NATO expanded from Berlin all the way to Russia's borders.

So, Putin's response to this could be, although he hasn't said this, "You're accusing me of destroying something that I protested all along because you left me out."

We talk each week about micro events emanating from the Ukraine crisis, but we're living through a geopolitical transition - and to what, we don't know..... The world will not again be the way it looked 5 or 6 years ago, at least in Europe. These are really historic times and the epicenter is Ukraine. The essential confrontation is between the United States and Russia, but on a parallel line, Europe is splitting over this, China is re-orienting itself, so if it's not global, it's certainly semi-global.

There is absolutely no evidence that Russia is seeking to re-create the Soviet Union as geopolitical phenomenon. None whatsoever. It doesn't have the resources, it doesn't have the ideology, it doesn't have the inclination, it doesn't have popular support, and the leaders have another mission in mind: they are busy rebuilding at home the Russian state that collapsed in 1991.

I would not say that Russia wants a sphere of influence, unless we're talking about trade influence, which every nation seeks. I would say that what Russia wants and is now demanding, and will go to war for, is a zone of security. I prefer that formulation. Which means no foreign military bases on its borders. Which means Ukraine at the moment and Georgia, because NATO is now moving again, as we talk, again against Georgia, trying to bring Georgia into NATO.

It is really that simple: that Russia wants to trade with the world, East and West. Why wouldn't it? It sits between East and West. That's what it's proposed all along: that's good for the Russian economy. Militarily, however, it wants security in the form of no military bases on its borders. Moreover, spheres of influence in military terms - which is kind of an 18th- and 19hth-century concept - are utterly, totally obsolete. Missiles can fly 6 minutes or less, 3 minutes, across an entire sphere of influence. There's no defense against them in that sense. And that's why, by the way, Russia is adamantly protesting the Unites States and NATO building a missile defense right on Russia's border.

So, it wants to be free of military threat - personally, I think that's entirely reasonable. And we take what's a clich�, but it's a meaningful one: what if Russian or Chinese military bases showed up in Mexico and/or Canada? We would object very, very adamantly - maybe go to war over it. We threatened to do so when the Soviet Union put missiles in Cuba.

So it seems to me a benign, healthy, modern-day position. And no great power wishes to have foreign military bases on its borders. Now, everybody says's that's true, in the West, except when it comes to Russia, because we've expanded NATO to Russia's borders and now Russia's pushing back.

Europe is splitting about what to do over this Ukrainian crisis, and a number of them, particularly Germany, France and Italy are now objecting to this non-accommodationist with Russia, very hard line.

NATO itself is now divided into three factions on what to do about Ukraine. The structure of Europe as built in recent years is coming unstuck, including NATO.

You got two colliding narratives now. Moscow presents one and we present one. The question is, which is correct? Or are both correct? And if both are correct, we can have some compromise.

This towering demonization of Putin is made it very hard to do the kind of analysis we did of Russian politics during the Cold War and to think analytically about foreign policy. Everything's now "the demon of Putin" and "you can't make any compromises", "he's probably like Hitler", and the rest. It's completely false. But, if I could have a wish, I would have a national television network show us with subtitles two brilliantly made - because Russians know how to make documentaries - films, about two hours each, that have been shown in Russia over the past two months. The first one was called "The Road to Crimea," and it was about the history of the Russian decision to annex or, as Russia says, re-unify with Crimea. And the centerpiece of that film is about an hour-and-a-half interview with Putin. Then we have the film shown this Sunday night, the documentary devoted to Putin's 15 years - it's an anniversary as he became president in March 2000 so it's now 15 years - and it's about Putin more than anything else. And about Putin and Russia.

There are many interesting moments in it and I think if Americans were able to watch this film, see Putin responding, with a lot of brilliant footage - it's quite exciting, people fighting and jumping out of planes, and all the rest - if people could watch that, it would do something to reduce this demonization. But the most striking thing that Putin said, to me, was - and this has harmed him in Russia, there's been commentary on this - he said: "When I came to power, I was full of illusions about the West. I though they would embrace Russia because we were no longer ruled by the Communist Party. And I was wrong. They continue to behave, as they've always behaved. Because they were not animated by anti-communism, they were animated by geopolitical ambition. And they wanted a Russia that is a supplicant nation, a Russia that needed help, a Russia on its back, and the moment - he said - that Russia began to rise from its knees (and he meant, under his leadership, 14-15 years ago), the West began to turn against us."

Now, think what it is, how often has a leader, especially one in Putin's position while he's in power, said "I was full of illusions." Can you imagine an American president saying that? And in fact, he was widely criticized in Russia, in the newspapers, and there was a particular nuance here: how could a man who had spent his early career in the KGB as an intelligence officer, with the opportunity to read a lot of classified things, have any illusions at all? He must have been a lousy intelligence officer, it was commented on in the Russian press. But it was quite an admission, and I think the way he did it was to explain why he has evolved personally from a man who sought a full partnership with Washington and with Europe and even suggested that Russia itself might join NATO to the man who's now drawn a line in the sand in Ukraine. So much so that Western policy, or depending on whom you think is responsible, they have brought us to the edge of a war. Because during 15 years as a national security leader Putin has changed profoundly. And he admitted it. He explained it. He said basically, "I had a weakness and it was called illusion about the West."

And what are the Germans telling Kiev and Washington? We know now: a day or two ago, the man in charge of the European Union expansion, not NATO expansion, but EU, the economic aspect of this expansion, said that the European Union would take in no new members for at least 10 years. That just left Ukraine out in the cold. Remember that the whole Maidan uprising, the whole political conflict in Kiev over trade agreements was about bringing Kiev into the European Union. So we've had 14 months of war and death and destruction, and the disruption of the international order - probably irreparable - and the end result is "never mind. We can't be taking you in."

Now you know why they don't want to take Kiev in. It was a basket case 14 months ago; now it's an economic cemetery.

Look, about Russia: we don't need specialists to tell us two important facts. Russia, for decades, has been Ukraine's single largest - by far - trading partner. That's point one. Point two: three to four million Ukrainians work in Russia on work permits in order to send their salaries back home to support their families in Ukraine. There's no work in Ukraine. If Russia decides to send them home, it would be a terrible blow to Ukraine. And third: for all its bravado, Ukraine has lived on discounted Russian energy for decades. And on the transit fees it's received from Russia - billions of dollars a year - for shipping Russian energy through Ukraine to Western Europe. All of that is now in the gravest of jeopardies. Russia is still Ukraine's - after a year of war - largest trading partner. Those 3 or 4 million Ukrainian citizens still work in Russia. But Medvyedev, the Prime Minister, is saying "We may send them home if this doesn't stop." And, on the question of energy, as you know, Putin has now said that by the year 2019, I think, in 4 years, no Russian energy will flow through Ukraine. They are going to send it through this terminal they are hoping to build in Turkey and Greece. So, Ukraine is losing everything: it's losing everything from this. And without Russia, Ukraine cannot survive economically. This is just a fact.

Blame whom you will, but why would anybody want to put Ukraine in such economic jeopardy by alienating Russia, and with American backing? This is a folly for which I think historians will really severely condemn the policy makers who are behind this.

The audio file of this interview can be accessed here:
http://www.thenation.com/blog/206089/stephen-cohen-were-living-through-geopolitical-transition
 
 #15
www.paulcraigroberts.org
May 6, 2015
It Is Time to Call Radio "Liberty" What It Is: Radio Gestapo Amerika
By Paul Craig Roberts
Dr. Paul Craig Roberts was Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Economic Policy and associate editor of the Wall Street Journal. He was columnist for Business Week, Scripps Howard News Service, and Creators Syndicate. He has had many university appointments. His internet columns have attracted a worldwide following. Roberts' latest books are The Failure of Laissez Faire Capitalism and Economic Dissolution of the West and How America Was Lost.

Radio "Liberty" has always been a propaganda ministry. Formerly its propaganda was directed against the Soviet Union. Today it is directed against distinguished Americans who are known and respected for their allegiance to the truth.

Radio Liberty's latest target is an American scholar who is far more widely respected than Radio Liberty. Like everything else in Washington the two-bit propaganda ministry is carried away by hubris and a mistaken opinion of its own importance.

A Radio Liberty non-entity named Carl Schreck, of whom no one has ever heard, has declared America's most distinguished Russian scholar, Stephen Cohen, to be "a Putin apologist."

Stephen Cohen, a professor of Russian studies at both Princeton University and New York University, was advisor to President George Herbert Walker Bush. Cohen was also respected by the Soviet government. Consequently, he was able to convince the Soviets to rehabilitate the widow of Nikolai Bukharin, a leading Bolshevik, one of Lenin's favorites, who was murdered by Joseph Stalin. Mikhail Gorbachev also trusted Cohen, and little doubt that Cohen helped to bring about the end of the Cold War.

Like myself, Cohen comes from a time when academic reputations were based on discerning and telling the truth regardless of the government's propaganda line. Those days have passed.

For propagandists like Carl Schreck, truth is whatever serves Washington's agendas. Schreck is incapable of comprehending that truth is independent of Washington's agendas. Therefore, when Cohen speaks the truth, Schreck brands it the Kremlin propaganda line.

Another non-entity of whom no one has ever heard and never will again, Lynn Lubamersky, declared Cohen to be "a mouthpiece for a mass murderer." If the non-entity means Putin, who did Putin mass murder? The mass murderers of our time are George W. Bush and Obama, and clearly Cohen is not a mouthpiece for them.

So many academic careers today depend on federal and corporate money, that it remains to be seen if the academics in Cohen's area of expertise can afford to stand up in his behalf.

Cohen's position on Russia and Ukraine is the same as mine. The crisis began with the Washington organized coup in Kiev that overthrew the democratic government and replaced it with a puppet government answerable to Washington. In the official Radio Liberty propaganda this coup never occurred. Instead, there was a Russian invasion and annexation. No informed person can believe this abject nonsense. Yet, this nonsense is prevailing over the truth.

The Washington establishment is trying to silence Stephen Cohen, but I think he will give the liars the finger and continue to speak the truth.

 
 #16
www.rt.com
Novemeber 11, 2014
RT on Ofcom ruling: Impartiality requirements must apply to all media equally
 
UK media watchdog Ofcom has threatened RT with "statutory sanctions," having ruled the TV channel "failed to preserve due impartiality" in four of its news bulletins aired in March this year and covering events in Ukraine.

We at RT want to reassure our commitment to Ofcom requirements and state that our channel is devoted to continuing to abide by these requirements. But it also remains to be seen if other British broadcasters would be able to pass the monitor's impartiality test, or if other broadcasters will stick to the same rules and conditions, which is currently hardly the case.

"We recognise that TV Novosti [RT], providing a service with a Russian background, will want to present the news from a Russian perspective," the ruling issued on Monday says. "However, all news must be presented with due impartiality: that is with impartiality adequate or appropriate to the subject and nature of the programme."

Specifically, Ofcom believes the RT reports "did not adequately reflect the viewpoint of the interim Ukrainian Government," while its opponents received significantly more air-time.

RT's Editor-in-Chief Margarita Simonyan responded to the ruling by saying, "We accept the decision of Ofcom to have held, in effect, that a government's viewpoint must always be reflected and given due weight when it is criticized in the reporting of major political controversies. We look forward to Ofcom applying today's ruling impartially to all broadcasters reporting on any government, irrespective of its political leaning."

"Broadcasters under UK jurisdiction do not always reflect the viewpoint of governments perceived as politically opposed to European and/or US political establishments. This ruling means that this will have to change, at least for those broadcasters regulated by Ofcom, if double standards are to be avoided."

Examples of the BBC's 'impartial' coverage of the Ukraine crisis and other major events were not difficult to find. Simonyan mentions a few in her blog.

1) The BBC's August 22nd report titled Russian Convoy Sparks Fury in Kiev, Ukraine, cited President Poroshenko accusing Russia of violating international law by sending an "unauthorized" humanitarian convoy, unaccompanied by Red Cross officials and bypassing customs. The report also cited Valentin Nalivaiko, head of Ukraine's Security Service (SBU), who accused Russia of launching a "direct invasion" into Ukraine. However, the report contained no mention of Russia's case for sending the convoy in the first place, including Russia's earlier repeated statements warning of a "humanitarian catastrophe" in Eastern Ukraine.

2) Reporting on the fighting in Eastern Ukraine late in August, a BBC presenter bluntly told his audience that the town of Novoazovsk had been "mainly captured by Russian troops and armor." The same report also cited Ukraine's Prime Minister Arseny Yatsenyuk, US President Barack Obama and a NATO spokesperson, all of them claiming that Ukraine had been "invaded by Russian troops," and that Russia was "responsible for the violence in Eastern Ukraine." The only Russian source cited in the report was Vitaly Churkin, Russia's Ambassador to the UN, who was quoted saying, "The violence in Eastern Ukraine is a direct consequence of Kiev's policies and the war it has been waging on its own people."

3) The BBC took down an August 23rd report by one of its correspondents regarding the MH17 crash, which featured eyewitness accounts and opinions from militia fighters. The broadcaster explained the report in question contained "a number of omissions" and failed to comply with the BBC's "editorial guidelines."

4) During a live debate on Gaza, an external commentator started questioning the BBC's objectivity in covering the issue. The guest's transmission was abruptly disconnected, ostensibly due to a "technical malfunction."

5) In a September 11th report on the Scottish Independence Referendum, the BBC edited out a soundbite from Scotland's First Minister Alex Salmond, who was accusing the broadcaster of distorting facts and colluding with the government in order to frustrate the Indyref campaign. The BBC insists its coverage of the referendum was fair and objective, "in line with the BBC's editorial guidelines." The report claimed that Salmond had not responded to a query from a BBC correspondent, although Salmond had, in fact, provided an extensive response.
 

#17
War on the Rocks
http://warontherocks.com
May 4, 2015
RT as a Foreign Agent: Political Propaganda in a Globalized World
By Matt Armstrong
Matt Armstrong is an author and lecturer on public diplomacy and international media. He serves as a Governor on the Broadcasting Board of Governors since August 2013 and chairs a special Board committee examining the purpose and future of VOA. Find him at MountainRunner.us and on Twitter @MountainRunner. The views here are his own and are not an official representation of the BBG.

In July 1941, the Nazi news agency Transocean, was convicted for failing to register as an agent of a foreign government. Transocean's top leadership escaped trial through a diplomatic exchange for two newspapermen jailed in Germany. In unrelated cases, Friedrich Ernst Auhagen and George Sylvester Viereck were charged under the same law, with Auhagen convicted two weeks before Transocean and Viereck the following March. The crime for all of these was not their association with Nazi Germany, or even the political material they were disseminating, but rather their failure to register as paid agents working on behalf of a foreign government, a requirement of the Foreign Agent Registration Act (FARA) of 1938. Had they registered, they likely would have continued with their activities unmolested until Hitler declared war on the United States in the aftermath of Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor.

Recently, a member of Russia's Duma suggested that a Kremlin organization operating in the United States be designated as a lobbyist under the same law. Ilya Ponomarev, currently in exile in California due to his opposition to the invasion of Crimea, said that calling RT, formerly known as Russia Today, a news media organization was wrong. "I think it's a lobbying tool," he told Buzzfeed, "and it should be regulated as a lobbyist rather than media."

In response to Ponomarev's allegations, Edward Delman looked at this idea in The Atlantic. Delman suggested that Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) are some kind of analogues to RT. This could not be further from the truth. The only attributes shared by VOA and RFE/RL and RT are government funding and work in the international sphere. VOA and RFE/RL, like their sister networks under the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), which I am a member of, provide a platform for the discussion of multiple points of view. They offer the freedom to speak, to listen, and to know the truth. They empower critical thinkers through news and information programs based on professional journalism and information freedom programs that enable people to capture and share events and what they are thinking. While the BBG is an important part of U.S. foreign policy - working closely with the State Department and other parts of the U.S. government - the journalists and their work are intentionally insulated against political pressures. Think of it like a fire hose: The foreign policy bureaucrats select the audience and the BBG opens the valve to unleash uncensored journalism.

RT was launched as a classic public diplomacy operation in 2005, rather than the vitriolic propaganda outlet that it is today. But it turned out they could not find a large enough audience and, as Russian politics turned back to more brazen autocracy, reverted to Soviet-style propaganda. Except this time, the Kremlin would not be constrained by the Soviet practice of having at least a kernel of truth in their propaganda.

For the most part, there is little real focus at RT on interpreting Russian policies or activities. RT is not about Russia as much as it is about everyone else. Their slogan "Question More" is not about finding answers, but fomenting confusion, chaos, and distrust. They spin up their audience to chase myths, believe in fantasies, and listening to faux - or manufactured when convenient - "experts" until the audience simply tunes out or buys whatever RT serves up. Media illiteracy is the fertile soil on which RT thrives and that it in turn enriches. The differences between the VOA and RFE/RL news organizations and the RT operation are stark.

Ponomarev suggested that in the United States RT "should be regulated as a lobbyist," but is it a lobbyist? Because FARA applies to the agent and the intent, rather than the specific activity, it does not define the term. So we turn to the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, which defines a lobbyist as a person or organization "who is engaged for pay for the principle purpose" of influencing legislation in Congress. It seems clear that while RT is attempting to influence public opinion in the U.S., it is not actively seeking specific legislative changes, not even regarding the Magnitsky Act. So it seems the label "lobbyist" doesn't apply.

Is RT a foreign agent? Prior to 1995, a foreign agent was a person or organization working for a foreign government for the "dissemination of political propaganda" and other activities the agent "believes will, or which he intends to, prevail upon, indoctrinate, convert, induce, persuade, or in any other way influence" U.S. foreign policies and domestic affairs. In 1995, this was simplified to influencing the U.S. government or "any section of the public within the United States to affect domestic or foreign policies." The term "political propaganda" became "informational materials." These changes, by the way, were Congress's response to a 1987 Supreme Court decision that upheld the FARA requirement to label three films by the Canadian government (one on nuclear war and two on acid rain) as "political propaganda."

RT is squarely within the parameters of the definition of a foreign agent - and the intent of the legislation - by distributing informational materials on behalf of a foreign government. This is not about silencing speech. Even the Nazis weren't convicted on the basis of their message, but the lack of transparency of ownership, direction, and purpose. Call it truth in advertising.

However, the sensible time to register RT as a foreign agent may have passed. The Kremlin propaganda machine would kick into high gear if RT received a notice to register from the Justice Department or an indictment for failing to register, like Transocean in 1941. While the requirement here is simple registration, in Russia, "foreign agent" is invoked to shutdown groups that are not in lock step with the Kremlin's narratives, regardless of whether or not foreign support is involved. The hypocrisy of the Kremlin's elimination of outside media from Russia through new ownership laws, intimidating affiliates from rebroadcasting foreign content, and denying access to cable and satellite providers would be lost on RT's audience, if they heard it at all. These details, and the striking similarities between the Kremlin's treatment of news media today and the treatment by past fascists, would certainly be ignored by RT and other Kremlin organizations and paid pundits. So, even the label of "foreign agent" is not a shared attribute: While the Kremlin holds VOA, RFE/RL, CNN, Disney, the BBC, and so on as foreign agents, the United States has not reciprocated.

These issues may seem like semantics, but details matter. If we are to respond to the Kremlin's subversion - and RT is a tool of subversion both in the United States and elsewhere - then we must understand the tactics, the issues, and U.S. policy options. The people of the United States and U.S. companies can demand reciprocity in market access, and highlight Kremlin hypocrisy as the Russians falsely pontificate about this freedom or that. But the U.S. government cannot do much more than demand openness because shutting down RT undermines our high ground of promoting the freedom of speech, not to mention that such a move isn't - and should not be - legal in America. In the end, it is the responsibility of the private media to seek the truth, debunk the lies, hold the Kremlin accountable for statements and actions, and, equally important, hold all media accountable. There are bigger media ethics stories than the Brian Williams scandal, and this is one of them.
 
 
 #18
Fair.org
April 14, 2015
Reporting on Russia's Troll Army, Western Media Forget West's Much Bigger, Sophisticated Troll Army
By Adam Johnson
Adam Johnson is a freelance journalist; formerly he was a founder of the hardware startup Brightbox.
[Graphics here http://fair.org/home/reporting-on-russias-troll-army-western-media-forget-wests-much-bigger-sophisticated-troll-army/]

Early this month, Pando Daily's Mark Ames (4/2/15) noticed a curious trend: Western media, somewhat strangely, keep breaking the same story of Russia's paid Internet trolls over and over again as if it's something new:

"The story of how Kremlin trolls are being weaponized to subvert our hallowed social media first broke into the English-language media in mid-March in an article headlined "The Trolls Who Came in From the Cold" - published in, ahem . . . 'scuse me, somethin' caught in my throat here... published on the website of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

"Yes, that's Radio Liberty, aka "Radio Liberation from Bolshevism" aka the US government's psychological warfare media outfit set up by the CIA during the Cold War, and covered extensively in Pando by Yasha Levine.

"The two government outlets [RFE/RL and BBC] bounced the Kremlin Troll Army story back and forth enough times to create critical hack mass, leading to sensational followups everywhere from the tech press to Vice, the New York Post, the Independent, and, today, the Guardian....

"It's the trolling story that keeps on giving, with all the regularity of a herpes outbreak, but with no memory to go with it, because each time this Internet Research Agency story is reported, it's more shocking than the last time."

Both the original report and a follow-up interview on Radio Free Europe that spurred this latest paranoia, it should be noted, came the exact same week NATO announced a new plan to counter the alleged Russian social media propaganda (AP, 3/22/15):

"NATO Commander: West Must Fight Russia in Information 'War'

"NATO's supreme commander says the West must do more to counter Russia by employing a rapid-reaction approach to Internet communications that counteracts Russia's "false narratives" spread on social media."

If this appears to be a coordinated messaging effort on behalf of a US military psychological operation, that's because it almost certainly is. On cue, despite the anonymous sourcing, and the utter staleness of the "revelation" in question, the media uncritically ran with the US government-backed report. In all these stories, however, the rather glaring fact that the US has a long-documented history of manipulating social media is not mentioned once. In fact, the Pentagon's efforts alone-to say nothing of other US intelligence agencies or other NATO nation states-spent at least 200 times more than Russia, according to the last available figures (Guardian, 3/17/11):

"Revealed: US Spy Operation That Manipulates Social Media

"The multiple persona contract is thought to have been awarded as part of a program called Operation Earnest Voice (OEV), which was first developed in Iraq as a psychological warfare weapon against the online presence of Al Qaeda supporters and others ranged against coalition forces. Since then, OEV is reported to have expanded into a $200m program."

As Buzzfeed's Max Seddon (6/2/14) breathlessly reported the third or fourth time this story "broke" last summer:

"The bizarre hive of social media activity appears to be part of a two-pronged Kremlin campaign to claim control over the Internet, launching a million-dollar army of trolls to mold American public opinion as it cracks down on internet freedom at home."

While it's possible the Kremlin has other programs whose budget remains unknown, we can also assume the Guardian's 2011 report was not exhaustive of US efforts as well-to say nothing of staunch US allies UK and Israel,  both of whom have well-documented programs to propagandize online.

As power centers throughout the globe clamor to influence public opinion online, the pretext of the "other guy" doing it better and faster is essential to continuing the arms race and further handing over social media to cynical, militarized interests of all stripes. Indeed, as Pando's Ames pointed out on Twitter, the "Kremlin troll" narrative is new version of the "missile gap"-the wildly inflated assertion by US officials during the Cold War that the Soviet Union had radically more nuclear weapons than the US did.
We now know that was false, and that Soviet military capability was continually hyped up to justify more US military power. But, fed largely by US government sources, convenient leaks, and inevitable cultural myopia, the press routinely frames the manipulation of social media as a uniquely Russian enterprise. This is especially true in how the phenomenon is framed. Indeed, even when acknowledging Western powers manipulate social media, the way it's presented is radically different:

Israel to Pay Students to Defend It Online
-AP

British Army Creates Team of Facebook Warriors
-Guardian

But when it's Russia:

The Kremlin's Troll Army
-Atlantic

How Professional Trolls Help Russia with Online Propaganda
-Vice

Israel has students" "defending" it online. The UK has "warriors" countering "enemy propaganda." The Kremlin has "trolls" spreading "propaganda." The general public's ignorance of how these complicated mechanisms of online infiltration work is heavily shaped by how they're framed. Notice, for example, the images that go with these reports on Israel vs. Russia paying people en masse to spam comment sections and social media. On one side, you have a daytime shot of patriotic young people waving flags outside Auschwitz:

Israeli youth wave flags outside Auschwitz (photo: Alik Keplicz/AP)

Above the Atlantic's piece, a beast-like Russian "troll" hides in an underground bunker:
Computer troll (image: jernvotten/Flickr)

Both these countries are doing the exact same thing: paying people to promote their government's message online. Yet by skimming the headline and graphics, one is given two radically different impressions of their intention and effect.

Another fact that's left out of stories of Russia's "Kremlin trolls" is how truly amateur they appear to be. We know that even as far back as 2011, the Pentagon was building sockpuppeting software that would allow US military personnel to operate online personas with relatively greater sophistication, operating as many as ten online personas per person. The Guardian would explain:

"The Centcom contract stipulates that each fake online persona must have a convincing background, history and supporting details, and that up to 50 US-based controllers should be able to operate false identities from their workstations "without fear of being discovered by sophisticated adversaries."

"Once developed, the software could allow US service personnel, working around the clock in one location, to respond to emerging online conversations with any number of co-ordinated messages, blog posts, chatroom posts and other interventions."

The Air Force's own RFP makes a lack of discovery by "sophisticated adversaries" essential to awarding the contract; most Russian "trolls" can be spotted by any passing observer. And, it should be noted, what we know about the US's sockpuppeting capacity is almost four years old (possibly because the most tenacious journalist working to uncover it, Barrett Brown, is currently serving five years in federal prison), so it's likely far greater now.

Yet here we are, hand-wringing over "revelations" the Kremlin pays some partisans $700 a month to sit in a room to engage in what is a rather routine and common propaganda initiative. Indeed, given the size and scope of what we know about US sockpuppeting efforts and an overall military budget 735 percent greater than Russia's, one can logically infer that the primary reason US-paid online personas aren't as well-documented is because US trolls are simply much better at what they do.

Reading Western press, however, one would get the distinct impression the US-with a military budget greater than the next eight countries combined-is really a scrappy underdog looking to catch up to the mass of Kremlin troll hordes. This impression, while making for a neat story, does little to provide proper context or truly explain the informational challenge posed by social media manipulation.
 
 #19
The National Interest
May 7, 2015
How America and Russia Could Start a Nuclear War
"As during the Cold War, the keys to a strategic nuclear exchange are rigid military planning, political misperception, and natural human frailty."
By Tom Nichols
Tom Nichols is Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College and an adjunct at the Harvard Extension School. His most recent book is No Use: Nuclear Weapons and U.S. National Security (University of Pennsylvania, 2014) The views expressed are his own. You can follow him on Twitter: @RadioFreeTom.

A few weeks ago, I directed Harvard Extension School's "Crisis Game," in which students had to play out a hypothetical Cold War crisis involving nuclear weapons. The realization that a crisis could escalate to nuclear war shocked younger students who had never given much thought to this issue, especially when they found the game sliding from an exercise in negotiation toward nuclear doom. ("I was literally sweating," one of the players later said.)

But is a nuclear war between Russia and America possible today? After all, there is no longer a Cold War, the Soviet Union and its military alliance were dismantled long ago, and both Russia and America have slashed their nuclear inventories. What could cause a nuclear conflict? How would such an exchange start, and how would it progress?

Unfortunately, nuclear war is still possible. Now, as during the Cold War, the keys to a strategic nuclear exchange are rigid military planning, political misperception, and natural human frailty.

Part of the problem is that Russia now openly considers the use of nuclear weapons in any scenario in which they begin to lose to a superior force. In an ironic reversal of the situation during the Cold War, NATO is now the dominant conventional coalition in Europe, while Russia is a weak state with a large but less powerful army. The Russian Federation has no significant ability to project power far from its borders, and likely cannot sustain a major conventional engagement with a capable opponent for any prolonged period.

As a result of this imbalance, the Kremlin has embraced a doctrine of "de-escalation" in which Russia would threaten to use nuclear weapons during a conflict in order to deter an opponent from pursuing further military gains. (While China maintains a public pledge never to be the first to use nuclear arms, Beijing likely has a similar plan should war with the Americans go badly.)

How might this doctrine come into play during a crisis? There is far less at stake between Russia and the West now, and the Russians are not commanding a global empire dedicated to a revolutionary ideology. That does not mean, however, that Russian leaders, including President Vladimir Putin, accept the outcome of the Cold War.

And so imagine, in the wake of Russia's successes in Ukraine, that the Russian leadership under Vladimir Putin decides to test its belief that NATO, as a political alliance, can be broken with a show of force. To this end, the Kremlin attempts to replicate the 2014 Ukraine operation, only this time in a NATO nation, perhaps in the Baltics or Poland. "Little green men" begin assisting "separatists" in isolating a slice of NATO territory.

This time, however, the target responds forcefully: instead of the hapless and disorganized Ukrainians of 2014, the Russians find themselves facing troops with better training and superior Western weapons, who briskly dispatch the Russian "volunteers" and showcase an array of captured Russian arms.

The Kremlin, now watching its plans unspool, doubles down. Clinging to the assumption that NATO will fracture and abandon the victim to Russian aggression, the men in Moscow send in Russian regulars to help their "brothers" in the struggle. NATO leaders, contrary to these unrealistic Russian expectations, activate Article V of the NATO charter. Now it's a real war, and after they clear the skies of inferior Russian aircraft, Western jets soon begin pounding Russian soldiers and obliterating Russian equipment in numbers that defy even the most pessimistic assumptions of the Russian General Staff.

Russian losses, viewed instantly and globally across the internet, are heavy. The Russians soon realize they face the prospect of a humiliating defeat. Worse, they may fear a counter-offensive that could spill into Russian territory. The idea of NATO stepping even an inch into Russia fills the generals and their president with dread, especially as the Russian public watches their soldiers being cut to pieces in a foreign country.

The Kremlin, at this point, threatens to use nuclear weapons. The West responds by reiterating its demands that the Russians leave NATO territory, by initiating a renewed offensive against the invading forces, and by increasing U.S., British, and French nuclear readiness.

What happens next is too hard to predict in political terms. If the Russians pull back and borders are restored, the crisis is over. If, on the other hand, they decide to go all in on what was supposed to be a bluff, they might launch a limited number of tactical nuclear strikes against NATO targets, such as a small number of airfields or command posts, in order to "de-escalate" the situation. (If all of this sounds crazy, remember that this is exactly the scenario the Russians exercised in 1999-while the far more pro-American Russian President Boris Yeltsin was still in power-and have repeatedly practiced since.)

As the world reels from the news that nuclear weapons have been detonated in Europe, the Kremlin then issues a warning: everything stops right here, right now, with all forces left in place. Or else.

Before the ink dries on the Russian demand, NATO's response is quick, calibrated, and forceful. A few symbolic targets are chosen: a Russian naval formation in the Black Sea or in the Baltic are destroyed with submarine-launched nuclear weapons. Russian territory is not breached (Yet.) All Western strategic forces are on full alert, ready to strike the entire Russian nuclear infrastructure, including Moscow. The Russians, likewise, are ready to strike hundreds of North American ICBM sites, along with U.S., British, and French submarine pens and bomber bases.

If the Russians respond with another round of nuclear strikes inside NATO, a combined Anglo-American (or even Anglo-Franco-American) attack on targets inside Russia near the fighting might be the West's last ditch to convince the Russians to pull away from their failed gambit. Once a nuclear weapon explodes on Russian soil, however, Russian hardliners, civilian and military, will demand a strike on America or Britain, or both, as revenge and as a show of resolve.

If the crisis goes beyond this initial exchange of nuclear force, with hundreds of thousands of people already dead and injured from nuclear strikes in multiple countries, we can expect all sides to execute their Cold War-era plans, since they're really still the only ones anyone has. Driven by fear and military logic, the United States and Russia will attack each other's strategic nuclear capability as quickly as possible, including command and control centers located in or near major cities like Washington and Moscow.

Carefully crafted nuclear war plans, with all their elegant, complicated options, will fall apart in the midst of chaos. Even taking into account weapons destroyed by surprise, rendered inactive by flawed orders, or neutralized by some kind of technical malfunction, a combined total of several hundred nuclear weapons will fall on each country, including a fair number on Canada, the United Kingdom and France.

In the United States, much of the eastern seaboard will burn. Even a limited strike will require the immediate destruction of Washington along with Navy nuclear installations from Virginia to Florida. In the west, San Diego and Seattle will suffer the most. Omaha, the home of the U.S. Strategic Command, will be gone, along with missile bases and airfields in the mountain states. Fallout will kill many more to the east of all of these targets, and irradiate large swaths of America's agricultural heartland.

In the immediate aftermath, governors will take control of their states as best they can until something like a U.S. government can reconstitute itself. National Guardsmen, along with state and local police forces, will be forced to cope with a terrified and gravely wounded population. Soldiers and cops will find themselves doing everything from protecting food stocks to euthanizing doomed burn victims. Along with the grisly human cost, the damage to the fragile, electronically-based U.S. infrastructure will be massive.

Areas that were untouched in the strikes, from Northern New England to the Deep South, will drown under an influx of refugees. Civil disorder will eventually spiral out of the control of even the most dedicated state military organizations and police forces. Martial law will be common and persistent.

In Russia, the situation will be even worse. The full disintegration of the Russian Empire, begun in 1905 and interrupted only by the Soviet aberration, will finally be complete. A second Russian civil war will erupt, and Eurasia, for decades if not longer, will be a patchwork of crippled ethnic states led by strongmen. Some Russian rump state may emerge from the ashes, but it will likely be forever suffocated by a Europe unwilling to forgive so much devastation.

I am not enough of an expert on Chinese strategy to know if this situation would be replicated in the Pacific. I cannot help but wonder, however, if the weak and insecure Chinese state, faced by a stunning conventional loss, might panic and take the nuclear option, hoping to shock America into a cease-fire. The devastation to America might even be worse in this case: in order to achieve maximum effect, the small Chinese strategic nuclear force is almost certainly targeted against American cities, from the West Coast inward. The United States of America, in some form, will survive. The People's Republic of China, like the Russian Federation, will cease to exist as a political entity.

How any of this might happen is pure speculation. The important point is that it is not, in any sense, impossible.

But while it is not impossible, it is also not inevitable, nor even likely. Still, several factors could nonetheless collide to create a tragedy. These factors mean that the possibility of the kind of miscalculation that could lead to nuclear war is now greater than at any time since the early 1980s.

It's time to take this threat seriously again, not only as a menace to American national security, but to our collective existence as a civilization.
 

 #20
Carnegie Moscow Center
May 7, 2015
A New War in the Donbas, or the Old Ukraine Fights Back?
By Bal�zs Jar�bik
Jar�bik is a visiting scholar focusing on Ukraine and Eastern Europe.  

The recent uptick in fighting in the Donbas sends a clear warning sign that the conflict in Ukraine is anything but frozen. Although large-scale fighting stopped with the Ukrainian army's retreat from the town of Debaltseve in February, sporadic shelling and exchanges of gunfire have continued to jeopardize the Minsk agreements. Reports of an imminent Russian-backed separatist offensive have been circulating for weeks.

U.S. State Department, and NATO officials continue to accuse Moscow and the separatists of violating the cease-fire and deploying troops and equipment for an upcoming assault. For its part the Russian government claims, erroneously, that U.S. military personnel have been deployed to the conflict zone.

Amid charges and counter-charges between capitals, the conflict more and more looks-deceptively-like a confrontation between Russia and the United States. However, the dynamics of this conflict are far more complicated and driven as much by Ukrainian domestic affairs and local commanders' decisions in the conflict zone as they are by any Cold War-style stand-off between East and West.

To begin with, both the separatists and the pro-Kyiv forces have violated the cease-fire and other elements of the Minsk accords that each side is obligated to uphold. Beyond any doubt, the separatists have been the most egregious violators of the Minsk agreements. A key separatist objective in violating the ceasefire has been to secure their positions along the line of contact, leading them for tactical reasons to push into territory that is supposed to fall under Kyiv's control according to the Minsk accords.

Still, pro-Kyiv forces, including the far right Ukrainian nationalist Pravyi Sektor organization, appear to have been behind some of the most recent fighting: both the Ukrainian and Russian representatives to the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), a group consisting of military representatives established by the OSCE to monitor the conflict) reported to the OSCE's Special Monitoring Mission that Pravyi Sektor had launched an offensive northwest of the city of Donetsk on April 12.

Yet, the level of violence remains relatively low. In the absence of major fighting at the level of intensity witnessed before the fall of Debaltseve in February, these tactical violations attract disproportionate attention, raising concern about a new major escalation. Another factor contributing to the perception of instability is the improved performance of the OSCE monitoring mission. It is doing more monitoring using its locally-based observers and drone platforms, getting better access, and-very importantly-taking on more ambitious tasks like brokering local ceasefires and directly monitoring local hot spots.

Pravyi Sektor's offensive steps in April coincided with the start of the "Normandy format" talks between Ukraine, Russia, Germany and France on the political components of the Minsk II accords. In some respects their moves seemed almost perfectly timed to undermine Kyiv's ability to negotiate during those talks. The subsequent encirclement of their base near Dnepropetrovsk (where former governor Ihor Kolomoyskyi remains a key power broker) also suggests that the reintegration of some of the irregular battalions fighting alongside the Ukrainian army (namely Azov and Pravij Sektor) is incomplete, and that these groups may continue to keep Kyiv under pressure.

Indeed, Poroshenko's attention has at times been diverted elsewhere. He has been attempting to broker a new "contract" between Ukrainian oligarchs and the state while maintaining the central government's unity and cohesion. A recent spate of attacks on Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenuik indicates there may be severe friction between the two camps inside the government and Presidential Administration. Trying hard both to shore up Western support and maintain working relations with Moscow, Poroshenko is attempting to decrease oligarchs` rents and expand the role of the state.

Poroshenko broke an unspoken arrangement with Kolomoyski by demanding that UkrNafta, a company Kolomoyski effectively controlled, pay dividends to the government. The recent coal miners' strikes in Kyiv were reportedly sponsored by Donbas oligarch Rinat Akhmetov, suggesting that Poroshenko's new "contract" with the oligarchs lacks key signatories.

Last but not least, an Austrian court ruled on April 30 that tycoon Dmytro Firtash could not be extradited to the U.S., strengthening his and other oligarchs' standing ahead of the October 15 local government elections. Remember, it was Firtash who, while under house arrest in Vienna, helped broker a pre-election deal, between the two major political forces who emerged from the Maidan-Petro Poroshenko and Vitaliy Klitschko.  According to this deal, Klitschko reportedly agreed to bow out of the presidential campaign, endorse Poroshenko, and run for Mayor of Kyiv.

The politics of war and peace in Kyiv remains complicated. President Poroshenko's government is reluctant to engage in a dialogue with the separatists and has relatively little interest in actually regaining control over the territories, where the latter holds sway. Kyiv has been gradually cutting ties with Donbas, suggesting that reintegration is not on the agenda. Aside from the financial cost of rebuilding the war-ravaged region, many of the political elite in Kyiv, see the loss of Crimea and Donbas as a political gain. Gone are the regions that were dominated by former President Victor Yanukovych's Party of the Regions. The loss of these regions should help the post-Yanukovych ruling coalition-whose base of support resides in western and central Ukraine-cement its hold on power.

Moreover, parts of the Ukrainian public appear to be coming closer to accepting the loss of the Donbas, in part because of the growing awareness that life is much worse in the breakaway territories. The government and mass media have indicated that severing ties with the region may not be a bad option.

Thus, it is quite possible that the escalation in the Donbas has not been driven by Russia, but by disappointed local actors, including those who feel threatened by Poroshenko's-as they see it-growing grip on power and who believe that he cannot fight on two fronts at the same time. Although the Minsk truce is fragile, major violence in the Donbas is unlikely. But as the fall elections approach, we may see the fights between representatives of the old Ukraine emerge with increased intensity.
 
 #21
Zik.ua (Kyiv)
May 7, 2015
US ambassador: separatists in Donbas getting ready to resume war

There are signs that Donbas separatists are getting ready to resume the war in Donbas, US Ambassador in Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt told, speaking to Radio Svoboda May 7, Interfax-Ukrayina reports.

"I do hope the escalation won't happen. However, we can see the signs that the pro-Russian separatists are preparing to resume the military stand-off," Pyatt said.

The diplomat also told that Russia is actively training the rebel army. "Russia has deployed ground-to-air missiles close to the touchline, Pyatt confirmed.

The rebel leader, Zakharchenko, clearly stated his plans to in his interview to Spiegel  and Wise News that he wants to capture all Donbas. If that is his goal, he forgets the commitments he signed in Minsk, the ambassador stressed.

"The Minsk agreements are no restaurant menu, and Russia cannot chose which items it will fulfil and which it can ignore," Pyatt said.

"Russia is to free Ukrainian Nadiya Savchenko and other POWs, pull out heavy weapons and impose a ceasefire, which Moscow is not doing," the diplomat said.

According to the ambassador, Ukraine has done all it has to do by ordering the ceasefire and pledging to give Donbas unprecedented degree of autonomy.
 
 #22
Interfax
Donetsk rebel leader says Ukraine to start "provocative actions" on 8 May

Donetsk, 6 May: The head of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic [DPR], Oleksandr [Aleksandr] Zakharchenko, expects that provocative actions against the DPR by the Ukrainian side may begin on 8 May.

"According to intelligence reports, provocative actions on the part of Ukraine will begin on 8 May. We have received intelligence reports that for this purpose, Ukraine has sent in special groups," Zakharchenko told reporters on Wednesday, 6 May.

In this regard, he said that the DPR militia are ready for defence.

"We have everything we need to liberate our land and the occupied territories, but we hope that we will peacefully force Ukraine to return our land," Zakharchenko said.

"Poroshenko mistakes his wishes for reality. We have turned against that part of Kiev that overthrew the legitimate government by military ways. Ukraine will sooner become part of the DPR."
 
 
#23
Zik.ua (Kyiv)
May 4, 2015
Russia completes preparations for war in Ukraine

The shelling by rebels of their own territories in Donetsk from Yasynuvata and Makiyivka as well as May 3 night shelling of Holmivsky from Horlivka are part of bloody provocations by the separatists against civilians to fan hatred to hateful Ukrainian government soldiers. Preparations for the war are close to the end, Army SOS NGO activist Yury Kasianov writes in Facebook May 3.

"On Aug. 31, 1939, the Nazis set up an attack by "Polish aggressors" on a German radio station, with German SS-men and criminals disguised as Polish soldiers killing peaceful Germans (the latter were murdered concentration camp prisoners), Kasianov wrote.

The recent merciless shelling of civilians in Donetsk and Holmivsky by Russian/rebel troops may be the casus belli Putin needs to renew the war in Ukraine.

Preparations for war by Russia are almost over, the activist warns.
 
 #24
Zik.ua (Kyiv)
April 27, 2015
Russian/rebel troops ready to attack - Yury Lutsenko says

The probability of the Donbas war escalation is high, Petro Poroshenko Block faction leader warned, speaking late Apr. 26 on the Inter TV, Interfax-Ukrayina reports.

 "There is an 80% probability that the war will be escalated," Lutsenko warned.

The Russian/rebel troops in Donbas have been put on the highest level of combat readiness so far, Lutsenko said.

The number of Russian troops across the border has reached it maximum - about 55,000. According to intelligence, the Donbas rebels are preparing to attack.
 
 #25
The Hill
http://thehill.com
May 6, 2015
Defense chief eyeing moves by Ukrainian separatists
By Rebecca Shabad

Defense Secretary Ashton Carter told the Senate Wednesday that Russia-backed separatists might be preparing for another military campaign in Ukraine.

"It does appear that clearly Russian-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine are preparing for another round of military action which will be inconsistent with the Minsk agreement," Carter told the Senate Appropriations defense subcommittee.

Minsk was a ceasefire deal between the separatists and Ukraine struck last September.

Carter's comments came after a senator raised the idea of the U.S. providing military weapons to Ukraine, which the Obama administration has not done. The U.S. has been providing "defense arms" to Ukraine rather than offensive arms, Carter explained.

He said "the big influencer" is a combination of sanctions and falling oil prices.

"That is what is punishing Russia now," he said.

The Defense chief emphasized the importance of European sanctions and applying pressure against Russia as the U.S. also helps Ukraine defend itself.

Late last week, reporters asked White House spokesman Josh Earnest whether the administration plans to lodge new sanctions against Russia soon.

Earnest acknowledged Russia's violation of the Minsk agreement and said he had no announcement on new sanctions.

"We're going to continue to work closely with our European partners to apply additional pressure to Russia, and continue to keep them isolated until they start to take the steps that they've committed to take," he added.
 
 #26
Moscow warns Kiev against attempts to disrupt Minsk Accords

MOSCOW, May 6. /TASS/. Wednesday's meeting of the Contact Group of OSCE, Russian, Ukrainian and Donetsk and Luhansk envoys is proceeding against the background of a situation in Donbas that Russian experts have described as "brinkmanship fraught with the resumption of full-scale hostilities." The tensions in the region may turn from bad to worse in the near future.

On Monday, the self-proclaimed Donetsk republic's defense ministry said the Ukrainian forces had violated the ceasefire 70 times over the previous 24 hours. The republic suspects that this is part of preparations for the resumption of full-scale combat operations.

Kiev's military activity ahead of the Contact Group's meeting is a clear sign of the wish to disrupt the Minsk Accords, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said. He believes that "any attempts by Kiev to resume combat operations would be a colossal, tragic mistake."

Lavrov reproached the European Union for addressing demands for compliance with the Minsk Accords only to Moscow, at the same time keeping quiet about Kiev's implementation of the very same agreements. "It looks like somebody inside the European Union would like the EU to let Kiev backtrack on the Minsk Accords. I would not like to see this is really so."

The chief of a chair at the presidential academy RANEPA, Vladimir Shtol, is certain that the general trend is towards aggravation, and all this is timed for ceremonies on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the allied victory over Nazi Germany. "I believe that preparations for such an action have been long underway," Shtol told TASS. "The ceasefire is very fragile and is violated now and then." The Minsk Accords, he remarked, must be complied with by all parties, and comprehensively. "Then it would be very hard to shift the process into reverse," he said.

As far as the European Union's stance is concerned, Shtol said that Paris and Berlin as guarantors of the Minsk Accords have in fact stayed idle.

"Had they really wanted the EU to take a common stance on the Ukrainian settlement, achieving that would be no problem for them. A number of countries, such as Slovenia, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Greece and many others would eagerly support any step to ease the EU's stance over Ukraine. If Merkel and Hollande really wanted to put Kiev's actions under control, they would be able to achieve that quite easily."

In many respects the Minsk Accords are not to Kiev's liking. Hence the calls for moving in EU peacekeepers and the refusal to accept the Minsk-2 format, senior research fellow at the Strategies and Technologies Analysis Centre, Vasily Kashin. "Ukraine would like to make everybody think the Accords are ineffective and should be revised. This explains the flare-up of hostilities. But that does not mean that full-scale war is round the corner. We are well aware that in the EU there are forces Lavrov pointed to - apparently, some East European countries, including Poland. But we can also see that Germany and France have begun to gradually step up pressures on Ukraine."

Ukraine, Kashin said, is under pressure from several centres and each is determined to gain the upper hand. Moreover, the international political contradictions in the country are getting more acute.

"The possibility of further progress towards a settlement is great, but the risk of a resumption of full-scale fighting is serious, too," Kashin believes.

Whatever the case, the Minsk-2 format was enshrined in the UN Security Council's resolution, so it cannot be brushed aside. Russia will not agree to this," he said with certainty.
 
 #27
Ekho Moskvy radio (Moscow)
May 6, 2015
One million have fled east Ukraine for Russia - Russian migration service head

Almost a million residents of eastern Ukraine are currently staying in Russia, the head of the Federal Migration Service (FMS), Konstantin Romodanovskiy has said at a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Gazprom-owned, editorially independent Russian radio station Ekho Moskvy reported on 6 May. More than half of them have received residence permits and temporary asylum, he said.

"A total of 2.5m people from Ukraine are now here [in Russia]. And 500,000 of these people are citizens of Ukraine, who are apparently hiding in Russia from participating in the fighting in Ukraine," he said.

Romodanovskiy said that "970,000 people are citizens who have urgently arrived in Russia from the southeast [Ukraine]. Over 550,000 of them have temporary residence permits and temporary asylum and that enables them to work in Russia, and we do not require permit documents," he said.

Putin said that "there are other problems. Formally speaking, they have the right to work, but when they try to get jobs they encounter another issue, that they are required to have a residence registration which they do not have, and so they are not hired. This is an endless circle".

"This is an unusual situation, and unusual working conditions. The people have ended up in a very difficult situation and they are forced to flee from the war. And therefore we need to think how to set out the conditions that will not cause problems on our internal labour market, but at the same time, we need to find a solution that will make it possible for these people to work. They want to earn their own living and support their families," Putin said.
 
#28
Business New Europe
www.bne.eu
May 7, 2015
Time on Ukraine's side? Data suggest otherwise
Mark Adomanis in Philadelphia

Alexander Motyl has long stood out among Ukraine boosters for his near-total unwillingness to admit that anything is going wrong. He even went so far as to write that Ukraine's volunteer battalions (which have been implicated by Amnesty International in a host of human rights violations and have also been involved in a series of murky inter-oligarch power struggles) are actually a good thing.

But Motyl has outdone himself with his latest missive "Out of Kiev's Hands", in which he argues that the economic and social collapse of the Donbas region of the east is not in any way a problem for Ukraine, but is actually "becoming a big headache for Russia." [http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/04/out-of-kievs-hands/]

It's exactly the sort of "the worse the better" analysis that ideologues habitually produce. For Motyl it's actually a good thing that Donbas residents have fled en masse and that continued fighting between Russia-backed separatists and government forces has laid waste to the countryside ("The longer the fighting continues, the less will the Donbass be able to sustain itself and its war-fighting capacity and the less will the separatists be able to create a functioning political entity").

While some parts of the article are up for debate, what seems very clear is that Motyl is confident in Ukraine's long-term prospects. He boldly proclaims that, "the current stand-off is the best of all possible worlds for Kiev" and that "time is on Ukraine's side".

As always, it's helpful to take a step away from political rhetoric and towards hard data.

As noted in the World Bank's most recent macroeconomic update, Ukraine's economic output contracted sharply over the course of 2014, with the year-over-year decrease in GDP hitting 14.8% in the fourth quarter. That is to say that the recent trend is of not of improving but of worsening economic performance. Ukraine's recession isn't slowing down, it's actually speeding up.

Even more troublingly for the country's short- and mid-term prospects, this accelerating decline in output coincided with a further deterioration in the current account balance. After improving during 2013 and the first half of 2014, largely due to the impact of the hrynia's devaluation, the current account balance was "almost zero" over the summer. However the current account balance then deteriorated for the next six months, ending the year with a deficit of 4.1% of GDP.

That is not sustainable. Even after the infusion of International Monetary Fund cash, by March Ukraine's total foreign reserves were less than $10bn, half their level at the end of 2013. Given its extremely precarious financial situation, Ukraine simply cannot continue to run large deficits in the current account. Further devaluation (and the economic pain it will bring to the average Ukrainian) is essentially inevitable.

In contrast to Motyl's optimism about East Ukraine's economic implosion, it's interesting to note what the World Bank thinks. Here's what the report said:

The impact of the currency devaluation was dampened by conflict-related disruptions in export-oriented industries in the east and a seasonal increase in imports of gas and coal (after local coal production was damaged in the conflict areas).

Put simply, Ukraine needs to import a lot less foreign energy, but the only realistic way it has of doing so (coal production in the Donbas) is impossible because of the war. It's not clear how or if that is a problem for Russia (whose current account is positive and whose foreign reserves are still more than $350 billion), but it's very clearly an enormous problem for Kyiv.

As if that wasn't enough, there was also a noticeable weakening in Ukraine's external debt position: huge expenditures to fund the government's ongoing military operations, cover a rising Naftogaz deficit, and recapitalize the Deposit Guarantee Fund resulted in a sharp increase in the ratio of public and publicly-guaranteed debt to GDP from 40.6% in 2013 to 70.3% in 2014. By the end of 2015, this debt is projected to be a full 88% of GDP, before starting to gradually decline. However, even by 2018 publicly guaranteed debt (72.6%) will remain higher than its 2014 level. Ukraine's mid-term fiscal future, then, is a harrowing one full of a sea of red ink.

If, as Motyl says, "time is on Ukraine's side", then we should all tremble to think what the situation would look like if it wasn't.

Ukraine, far from being on course for rapid convergence with the West, remains on the edge of a harrowing economic collapse. You can, like Motyl, pretend that this isn't the case, but reality has little patience for such illusions.
 
 
 #29
www.rt.com
May 5, 2015
Ukrainian political analyst's call to 'exterminate Russian reporters' gets criminal probe

Russian law enforcers have launched a criminal probe into the actions of a Ukrainian political scientist who reportedly called on the pro-Kiev military to "thoroughly exterminate" Russian journalists.

The suspect, Yury Romanenko, said this in early April at a public conference at Harvard University in the USA. Later, Romanenko posted the text of his statement on his Facebook page and it has been repeatedly quoted by mass media. [https://www.facebook.com/yuriy.romanenko/posts/906169656071433]

In his own words, the director of the Stratagema political analysis center and managing editor of the Khvilya (Wave) website wanted to "bring the problem of mass media to the new level."

"The military forces of Ukraine must selectively and thoroughly exterminate Russian journalists who cover the situation in Donbass. They must issue an order to army snipers that people with 'Press' written on their helmets are priority targets," he said.

The case is now being handled by the Investigative Committee - Russia's newest law enforcement agency, created to fight extremely dangerous and high-profile crime.

"In the investigators' opinion the material contains destructive calls that could incline Ukrainian officials and military servicemen towards committing mass murders of Russian citizens who work as journalists. In addition, Romanenko's words incite hatred and hostility towards journalists of the Russian Federation as a social group," committee spokesman Vladimir Markin told the press on Tuesday.

Investigators initiated a case into inciting hatred, punishable by up to two years in prison and complicity with murder, which could result in a prison term for life.

Russian law allows for the prosecution of foreign citizens who commit crimes outside the Russian Federation if these crimes are targeting its citizens or the interests of the state, Markin reminded in his media address.

In mid-March this year the Investigative Committee opened a criminal probe into the statement by retired US Army general Robert H. Scales who, speaking on US TV network Fox News, suggested that the Ukrainian crisis could be settled by "killing Russians."

In June 2014, two Russian journalists - Igor Kornelyuk and Anton Voloshin - were killed by shelling from pro-Kiev forces as they filmed refugees leaving the area attacked by the Ukrainian military. In the same month, 68-year-old Russian TV cameraman Anatoly Klyan was fatally wounded by Kiev troops in the eastern Ukrainian city of Donetsk.

In early September 2014, Russian news agency RIA Novosti confirmed the death of war photographer Andrey Stenin. He died after his car was hit by machine gun fire and caught fire. He had been traveling in a convoy of escaping civilians.
 
 
#30
Some of gunmen who shot police officers dead in Kyiv served in volunteer battalions - Ukrainian interior minister

KYIV. May 6 (Interfax) - Ukrainian Interior Minister Arsen Avakov said some men from the group that shot and killed police officers in a recent attack on a gas station in Kyiv are connected to volunteer battalions.

Avakov said, responding to journalists' questions in Kyiv on Wednesday: "Yes, some of these people served in volunteer battalions. The investigators will make an official announcement and then we will talk about it."

The minister would not say exactly how many of the people served in the volunteer battalions and in precisely which battalions.

In the early hours of May 4, masked gunmen attacked a gas station in the Kyiv Desnyansky district. The attackers wounded a staff member and took some 800 hryvni from the register.

When the police attempted to detain them, the shooting began. Two police officers were killed in the attack and another three were hospitalized with wounds. One of the attackers was wounded and died in hospital. The police seized guns, a grenade launcher and explosives from the other detainees.

Ukrainian Deputy Interior Minister Vasiliy Paskal said, commenting on the information received from the suspects in the attack, that they have arrived in Kyiv from Vinnitsa and planned to carry out a terrorist attack in Kyiv on May 8-9.

On May 5, the Kyiv Desnyansky District Court placed three suspects into custody. Two of the suspects are aged 17 and another is 20.
 
 #31
Sputnik
May 5, 2015
Mass Exodus: Young People Fleeing From Ukraine to Evade Draft

In Kiev alone, 95% of working-age men are evading military service, using a variety of methods from bribery to fleeing to other countries.

Evasion of conscription in Ukraine has skyrocketed, the German newspaper Handelsblatt reported.

Companies are struggling to find a false excuse for their employees in order to help them avoid military service.  The illegal business is thriving, with doctors trading medical certificates and travel agencies organizing "special trips" for those seeking to leave the country.

Residents of Western Ukraine usually flee to Europe, while men from eastern provinces go to Russia, the article said.

The newspaper recalled the recent arrest of a medical worker from Chernivtsi who issued faked medical certificates with his signature for 3,500 euros. In western Ukraine, more than half of the youth population has left the country over last few months.

Overall, 70% of the working population in the western regions of Ukraine went to neighboring Poland and Romania, and many others fled to Italy, Germany and Austria. All of them have Schengen visas and are working in Europe as seasonal workers, pursuing two main goals: to feed their families and evade military service.

The situation in the eastern regions is similar, with many residents going to neighboring Russia for work and staying there to avoid military service, Handelsblatt reported.
 

#32
Reuters
May 5, 2015
In the battle between Ukraine and Russian separatists, shady private armies take the field
By Josh Cohen
Josh Cohen is a former USAID project officer involved in managing economic reform projects in the former Soviet Union. He contributes to a number of foreign policy-focused media outlets and tweets at @jkc_in_dc

While the ceasefire agreement between the Ukrainian government and separatist rebels in the eastern part of the country seems largely to be holding, a recent showdown in Kiev between a Ukrainian oligarch and the government revealed one of the country's ongoing challenges: private military battalions that do not always operate under the central government's control.

In March, members of the private army backed by tycoon Ihor Kolomoisky showed up at the headquarters of the state-owned oil company, UkrTransNafta. The standoff occurred after Kiev fired the company's chief executive officer - an ally of Kolomoisky's. Kolomoisky said that he was trying to protect the company from an illegal takeover.

More than 30 of these private battalions, comprised mostly of volunteer soldiers, exist throughout Ukraine. Although all have been brought under the authority of the military or the National Guard, the post-Maidan government is still struggling to control them.

Ukraine's military is so weak that after the Russian Federation seized Crimea, Russian-sponsored separatists were able to take over large swathes of eastern Ukraine. Private battalions, funded partially by Ukrainian oligarchs, stepped into this vacuum and played a key role in stopping the separatists' advance.

By supplying weapons to the battalions and in some cases paying recruits, Ukraine's richest men are defending their country - and also protecting their own economic interests. Many of the oligarchs amassed great wealth by using their political connections to purchase government assets at knockdown prices, siphon off profits from state-owned companies and bribe Ukrainian officials to win state contracts.

When the Maidan protesters overthrew former President Viktor Yanukovich, they demanded that the new government clamp down on the oligarchs' abuse of power. Instead, many became even more powerful: Kiev handed Kolomoisky and mining tycoon Serhiy Taruta governor posts in important eastern regions of Ukraine, for example.

Many of these paramilitary groups are accused of abusing the citizens they are charged with protecting. Amnesty International has reported that the Aidar battalion - also partially funded by Kolomoisky - committed war crimes, including illegal abductions, unlawful detention, robbery, extortion and even possible executions.

Other pro-Kiev private battalions have starved civilians as a form of warfare, preventing aid convoys from reaching separatist-controlled areas of eastern Ukraine, according to the Amnesty report.

Some of Ukraine's private battalions have blackened the country's international reputation with their extremist views. The Azov battalion, partially funded by Taruta and Kolomoisky, uses the Nazi Wolfsangel symbol as its logo, and many of its members openly espouse neo-Nazi, anti-Semitic views. The battalion members have spoken about "bringing the war to Kiev," and said that Ukraine needs "a strong dictator to come to power who could shed plenty of blood but unite the nation in the process."

Ukraine's President Petro Poroshenko has made clear his intention to rein in Ukraine's volunteer warriors. Days after Kolomoisky's soldiers appeared at UkrTransNafta, he said that he would not tolerate oligarchs with "pocket armies" and then fired Kolomoisky from his perch as the governor of Dnipropetrovsk.

By bringing the private volunteers under Kiev's full control, Ukraine will benefit in a number of ways. The volunteer battalions will receive the same training as the military, which should help them to better integrate their tactics. They'll qualify for regular military benefits and pensions. Finally, they will be subject to military law, which allows the government to better deal with any criminal or human rights violations that they commit.

Poroshenko must contend with challenges like widespread corruption, economic collapse and the Russian-supported separatists. With rumors of a possible spring offensive planned by the separatists, he will not want to risk more confrontations like the one involving Kolomoisky. The Ukrainian government is not going to be able to govern their country if powerful private militias operate as freelancers outside of state control.

Poroshenko's effort to rein in Ukraine's volunteer warriors - like his fight against corruption - may be a case of two steps forward, and one step back.
 
 #33
Moscow Times
May 7, 2015
Cracks Appearing in U.S.-Ukraine Relationship
By Josh Cohen
Josh Cohen is a former USAID project officer involved in managing economic reform projects in the former Soviet Union. He contributes to a number of foreign policy-focused media outlets.

Ever since the Maidan Revolution which overthrew Ukraine's former President Viktor Yanukovych early last year, Ukraine and Russia have been locked in a war on both the battlefield and the court of world opinion. The Kremlin in particular has been emphasizing the nationalist roots of organizations involved in the post-Maidan government as well as among some of Ukraine's volunteer private battalions.

While the Maidan revolution was driven largely by pro-European reformers disgusted with Yanukovych's kleptocratic rule, there have been a smattering of right wing neo-Nazi groups on the Ukrainian side.

The wide visibility of these organizations has damaged Ukraine's image in the West and provided Moscow potent cudgels with which to undermine Ukraine.

As part of its effort to support Ukraine, the U.S. military is sending 290 troops from the 173rd Airborne Brigade based in Italy to train elements of the Ukrainian National Guard.

In taking this step, U.S. President Barack Obama has chosen the middle ground between doing nothing on the one hand or embroiling the U.S. more deeply in the conflict by sending billions of dollars of lethal weaponry to Ukraine.

Unfortunately however, thanks to a Facebook post by Ukrainian Interior Minister Arsen Avakov, the 173rd's training effort has been overshadowed by another controversy.

In his post, Avakov stated that one of the organizations the U.S. would be training is the infamous Azov battalion - a claim firmly contradicted by a spokesperson for the American Embassy in Kiev.

To understand why Avakov's post is troubling, some background is in order. After the annexation of Crimea and the beginning of the war in eastern Ukraine, the post-Maidan government faced a dilemma.

As a result of decades of neglect and corruption, Ukraine's regular military had shrunk so badly that it could only afford to field a few thousand poorly armed troops. As a result, numerous privately funded armed groups sprung up to fill the gap.

Many of these so-called private battalions were funded by oligarchs such as Ihor Kolomoisky and/or were essentially extensions of leading Ukrainian politicians. One of these groups was the Azov battalion.

According to a post last year from a leader of Azov seeking to recruit Europeans to join the battalion, the Azov is the military wing of the Social-National Assembly of Ukraine (SNA), which he described as "Socialist, Nationalist and Radical." However the SNA is much more than that.

The SNA - and a closely related organization Patriot of Ukraine (PU) - were founded by Andriy Biletsky.

In a 2010 article, Biletsky himself outlined his beliefs, writing that "From the mass of individuals must arise the Nation; and from weak modern man, Superman ... The historic mission of our Nation in this watershed century is to lead the White Races of the world in the final crusade for their survival: a crusade against Semite-led subhumanity."

Troops of the Azov Battalion also use the SNA logo on their banner, an inverted Wolfsangel, which was a widely used symbol in Nazi Germany, and many members are white supremacists or anti-Semites.

The reason Interior Minister Avakov would want to see the Azov battalion trained by American forces is clear. Avakov has been a prime sponsor of the Azov battalion, and has had a longstanding relationship with Azov's leadership dating back to his time as governor of the Kharkiv region.

Avakov supported the election of Biletsky to Ukraine's parliament, and arranged for Azov's former deputy commander and top PU official Vadim Troyan to be appointed as head of the Kiev region police.

While all private battalions - including the Azov - now come under the Ukrainian National Guard, many of these battalions are still closely associated with their founders and patrons.

In this respect, it is likely in Avakov's interests to see "his battalion" obtain the military training - and a cloak of legitimacy - gained from being associated with the U.S. military.

The problem though is that while making this association may be in Avakov's interest, it is certainly not in the broader interests of either Ukraine or the U.S..

When the American military is spending time and resources to train Ukrainian forces, it is unseemly of a leading Ukrainian politician to use this effort to try to embroil the U.S. in internal Ukrainian politics.

It is good that the American Embassy in Kiev has just clarified that the Azov is not among the battalions receiving U.S. training, but in the interim period articles with provocative titles like "U.S. to Train Nazi Troops in Ukraine" are proliferating on the Internet.

The American Embassy in Kiev should therefore tell Avakov in no uncertain terms that the U.S. does not appreciate his attempt to link the U.S. to a controversial neo-Nazi organization - an action which undermines both America and Ukraine's position in the court of international public opinion. The U.S. should expect better than this from an ally.
 
 #34
EU to stand by Ukraine trade deal at summit despite Russia-draft
By Robin Emmott

BRUSSELS, May 5 (Reuters) - The European Union will implement a free-trade pact with Ukraine from next year despite Russian pressure for another delay, according to a draft statement prepared for a summit with six of the bloc's eastern neighbours this month in Riga.


The joint declaration, which is likely to antagonise Moscow, commits to the deal from Jan. 1, 2016, a date already a year later than planned as Russia seeks to oppose European efforts to integrate Ukraine and move it out of Moscow's sphere of orbit.

Russia is pushing for the deal to be postponed by at least another year, according to a Ukrainian official, but the EU is insisting there can be no further delay.

Although the EU is willing to discuss Russian concerns, implementation "will be a top priority of the EU and the partners concerned for the coming years," the draft said.

The deal is at the heart of tensions that have grown from a tug-of-war over influence in Kiev to sanctions, the annexation of Crimea by Russia, armed conflict in eastern Ukraine, and concern among some in the West about a new Cold War.

But aside from the EU's show of support for Ukraine, the May 21-22 Eastern Partnership summit will offer little for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia and Moldova, according to the draft, as EU governments lower their ambitions for fear of further provoking the Kremlin.

Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine signed association agreements with the European Union last year and want to join the European Union. But the draft made no mention of their aspirations.

Instead, it said that neither Georgia nor Ukraine will immediately be granted visa-free travel to the European Union, as Tbilisi and Kiev had hoped, and that they need reforms to be able to enjoy the kind of treatment Moldova has obtained.

The tepid tone was far from the ambitions of the last Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013, where the European Union sought to encourage a historic shift away from Russia by the six former Soviet republics.

Brussels now appears to accept that Armenia has chosen to side with Moscow after the country decided in 2013 to join a customs union led by Russia, its former Soviet master and its biggest foreign investor. "It is for the EU and its sovereign partners to decide on how they want to proceed with their bilateral relations," the draft said.
 
 
#35
As Ukraine erects defenses, critics fear expensive failure
By INNA VARENITSA
May 5, 2015

HOPTIVKA, Ukraine (AP) - The flimsy, razor wire-topped fences popping up along bare expanses of Ukraine's eastern frontier are the first line of defense against a much-feared Russian invasion. Trenches fortified by timber have been hollowed out for soldiers to take up positions. And bulky, metallic obstacles looped together with more barbed wire are laid across the fields to halt advancing tanks and infantry.

A little more than a year and-a-half ago, the very idea of creating such fortifications - reminiscent of World War I trench warfare - would have struck many as perverse. But the project was announced with fanfare in summer as fighting against Moscow-backed separatists reached peak intensity. In December, Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk said that the program, dubbed "Project Wall," would cost almost $520 million and take four years to complete.

Now doubts are creeping in.

With much of eastern Ukraine in the hands of Russian-backed separatists, large swaths of the border remain impossible to secure - meaning enemy troops can just sneak in through areas under rebel control. And cash-strapped authorities have already had to revise budgets downward, so there's little money for building defenses.

The project is for now centered on the Kharkiv region, which lies north of the conflict zone and shares a 315-kilometer border with Russia. To insulate that region from any separatist offensive, another layer of protection is being built on the frontier with areas under rebel control.

Views are mixed among residents in the city of Kharkiv, the regional capital, about the wisdom of building defenses.

Some in the economic powerhouse of 1.4 million people embrace the idea, and look with distress to the fate that befell the neighboring, mainly Russian-speaking Donetsk and Luhansk regions. More than 6,000 people have died to date as a result of fighting between government and rebel forces.

"We need to protect ourselves somehow," said Sergei Kotlyar, 46. "But, of course, this won't give us 100 percent guarantees, even if it holds back the enemy for a little time."

Others believe investing in fences and trenches is a waste of money, noting that anti-tank defenses will be of limited use against the rocket launchers widely deployed over the course of the war.

"Who is it going to stop?" said 22-year old Kharkiv resident Anatasia Duda. "A country like Russia definitely has the means to deal with slabs of metal. And what's the use of that wall when the border with Donetsk isn't even under control?"

In earlier times, lines separating the republics of the Soviet Union were viewed as little more than a formality, so families and communities straddled inconspicuously across borders. On paper, that changed with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

But scant security along the 2,300-kilometer (1,400-mile) demarcation between Russia and Ukraine has for two decades ensured a smuggler's dream. Farmers and their livestock blithely crisscrossed in areas where it has never quite been entirely clear which country one was in.

Separatist fighters in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions have exploited the porous borders, moving about with ease. Ukraine accuses Russia of pouring its own army's equipment and manpower across the border to assist rebel offensives. Moscow dismisses all satellite imagery and anecdotal evidence underpinning those claims.

Ukrainian border guards fought bitterly to keep the frontier sealed against overwhelming odds.

"We know from the experience of fighting in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions that fire comes from the neighboring state (of Russia) without them having to cross the border," said Oleksandr Kruk, head of the Kharkiv regional division of the border service.

On top of creating physical barriers, Ukraine is also fortifying obstacles of red tape to deter the numerous Russian citizens known to have voluntarily joined forces with local separatists.

Rules for crossing official frontier points have been stiffened. In Hoptivka, people stand impatiently in crowded and slow-moving lines to get into Russia for work or to visit relatives.

Russian citizens can only enter Ukraine on their international travel passports, whereas they could formerly sail through with their national ID cards. Closer checks by border guards have also slowed things down.

Fifty kilometers (30 miles) of fences have already gone up, but not without complications. The exact coordinates for the location of the fence are hard to fix since the process of demarcating borders after the collapse of the Soviet Union was never properly completed.

Rather than wait around for a laboriously negotiated agreement, Ukraine's security leadership last June unilaterally marked out what it sees as the country's eastern limits.

Although it is illegal to own property within 50 meters (yards) of the border, people near the new fences have been granted control over the land all the same, said Kharkiv regional government Igor Raynin.

"We are not prepared to tell people that this was not done properly and to confiscate land through the courts," Raynin said.

The fortifications under construction go further back than the immediate line with Russia itself. Trenches, shelters and parking areas for armored vehicles have been built along highways running southward from Russia past Kharkiv, a hive of Soviet-built industry.

With the government forced to cut costs across the board as the economy struggles under the weight of war, the budget for the project has been reduced twofold.

But Raynin insists the project is still sound.

"This has been done in such a way that the quality of the wall will not suffer adversely," he said.

Peter Leonard contributed from Kiev, Ukraine.
 
 #36
Interfax
Russian ombudsman checks reports of servicemen being coerced to fight in Ukraine

Moscow, 6 May: Russian Human Rights Ombudsman Ella Pamfilova has not confirmed reports of Russian servicemen's presence on the territory of Ukraine.

"Inquiries concerning each of the incidents mentioned in the press had been sent to military prosecutors of military districts and directly to the chief military prosecutor. It follows from the official replies received by the ombudsman that the abovementioned reports have not been confirmed," says Pamfilova's report on the human rights situation in Russia in 2014.

The document was published on the [government-owned daily] Rossiyskaya Gazeta website on Wednesday [6 May].

Pamfilova's report says Russian media has claimed on several occasions - referencing the human rights organizations "Soldiers' Mothers of St Petersburg" and "For Human Rights" - that conscripts had been forced to sign military service contracts. "It was tied in with the crisis in southeast Ukraine and the alleged deployment of Russian servicemen in the conflict zone," the report said.

Additional checks were conducted on the basis of requests from human rights organizations, the report said.

"The ombudsman's staff have contacted the parents of the servicemen named in the letters by phone. None of the claimants have confirmed that their son had been coerced into signing a contract or, even more so, into taking part in the armed conflict in east Ukraine. All the claimants explained that the absence of information from military units and concern for their sons moved them to file the claims," the report says.

Pamfilova also checked media reports of the detention of 10 Russian servicemen in Ukraine's Donetsk Region in August 2014. The document states that the ombudsman inquired with Russia's chief military prosecutor about the incident.

According to the report, a reply was received from the chief military prosecutor's office from which it follows that the 10 Russian servicemen were patrolling the area near Russia's state border, got lost and were detained by Ukrainian servicemen to be handed over to the Russian side on 21 August.
 
 #37
Reuters
May 6, 2015
Russian Report Blames Kiev for Downing of MH17 Airliner - Newspaper

An independent Russian newspaper has published what it said was a report by Russian military engineers suggesting a Malaysian airliner shot down in Ukraine was hit by a Russian-made surface-to-air missile fired by Ukrainian forces.

Novaya Gazeta, an investigative newspaper, said Wednesday that the report did not prove whether Kiev's forces or the pro-Russian separatists they are fighting had shot down Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 on July 17 last year, killing all 298 people aboard. [http://www.novayagazeta.ru/inquests/68332.html]

But it said the report, the authenticity of which could not be independently verified, debunked one of the main theories put forward by the Russian government - that the airliner was shot down by a Ukrainian fighter jet.

Each side in the conflict in eastern Ukraine accuses the other of bringing down the plane, on which two-thirds of the victims were Dutch.

"It is most likely that Flight MH17 was destroyed in mid-air by the impact of a 9M38M1 surface-to-air missile ... the main missile in the 'BUK-M1' system," said the report published by Novaya Gazeta.

The report, which the newspaper published in full, said the military engineers' calculations, largely based on open sources, suggested the plane was fired on from a position where Ukrainian government forces' BUK missile systems were stationed.

Dutch prosecutors say the "leading scenario" in their investigation is that the plane was hit by a BUK missile and are testing the theory it was fired from a separatist-held area.

Russian officials, who initially said the plane was hit by a Ukrainian fighter jet, have deflected any blame and deny allegations by NATO and Kiev that Moscow has provided the rebels with heavy weapons and soldiers.

Novaya Gazeta, which is often critical of President Vladimir Putin, said it appeared the report had been drawn up by Moscow to send to the Dutch investigators.

"This report does not end things, it raises new doubts and new questions. The main ones are: where was the BUK-M1 fired from and who fired it?" the newspaper wrote.

Kiev has dismissed Russian allegations that its forces shot down the airliner. Russia's Defense Ministry did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
 
 #38
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
May 5, 2015
The imitation game: Is American military aid to Ukraine effective?
Despite Western military assistance to Kiev, its scope has thus far been insignificant and therefore, this gesture is most likely an imitation of support rather than real preparedness by Washington to arm Kiev.
By Vladimir Evseev
Vladimir Evseev, Ph.D, is Lieutenant Colonel, Head of Caucasus Department of the CIS Institute, DIrector of the Center for Public Policy Research, Academic Secretary of the Coordinating Council of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) on forecasting.

At the end of April, American servicemen arrived in Ukraine and started training Ukrainian security forces, mainly in the Lviv region. Within Russian society, this news caused serious unease. Immediately, an official statement was made that such actions could destabilize the situation.

As a result, the Russian Ministry of Defense accused the United States of sending instructors into the zone of military operations, and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the peace process as agreed upon as part of the Minsk 2 agreements had reached a dead-end.

The Americans, on the other hand, claim that Russia is increasing the number of troops along its Ukrainian border and is arming "its separatist henchmen." That said, for some reason, militants in Syria fighting against the legal government of Bashar al-Assad are not called "pro-American" (or pro-Western or pro-Saudi) separatists - they are called the "armed opposition." It would seem that such a term could also be applied to Eastern Ukraine, regardless of how much the West denies it.

All this is taking place against a background of military tension, with much unnecessary talk about militias (i.e. the armed opposition) preparing for an attack on Mariupol, which is not the case. In reality, no one is planning an attack towards Mariupol, this can clearly be seen by the composition of military units in the area. We are talking here about another provocation and an attempt to call in new soldiers to replace heavy losses at Donetsk Airport.

One must observe that, in the West, a lot of attention is placed on anti-Russian sanctions, which have not turned out to be overly effective. Even considering that until June, Russia will hold back from providing assistance to the militias in order to avoid an even tougher financial and economic sanctions regime from the EU. However, this is absolutely not the case.

Moscow is simply supporting a balance of power in the region and will allow it to change in Kiev's favor. And if the West were so concerned about the peace process in Eastern Ukraine, then they could demand that Kiev fulfills the obligations, which its representatives agreed to at the contact group for regulating the situation in Ukraine, the complex of measures for the implementation of the Minsk 2 agreements.

In particular, Russian media announce that Ukrainian security forces, as before, are shelling Donetsk and Luhansk territory using heavy military equipment: tanks, artillery and mortars with a caliber greater than 100 mm. This is a flagrant violation of the Minsk 2 agreements. [Although the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Kiev denies such accusations and declares that Ukraine is not involved in any artillery shelling - Editor's note].

At present Kiev does not have sufficient resources to organize large scale attacks. Another fifth wave of partial mobilization is leading more frequently to largely covert resistance.

The motivation to continue military operations is possessed not only by volunteer battalions in the territories being defended. It is even more based on the high wages provided by Ukraine's oligarchs. It is their will that will be carried out, and not that of the military or political leadership of the country. For this reason, the Kiev authorities probably fear their own volunteer battalions more than the armed forces in Novorossiya.

Servicemen in the Ukrainian army have absolutely no motivation to continue the war but are afraid of leaving the frontline because of the unavoidable reprisals against their relatives. The technical equipment of the army has fallen substantially, since losing arms and military equipment at the "Debaltsevo boiler" they have not been able to compensate using their own extremely limited manufacturing, nor from delivery of supplies from overseas. [The "Debaltsevo boiler" is part of the territories controlled by the rebels. Militia groups in the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic surrounded the Ukrainian army there, cutting it off from the supply of provisions and ammunition before and during the signing the Minsk 2 agreements - Editor's note.] The material and technical support for the forces remains low.

The question naturally arises: How, in such circumstances, American and British instructors will be able to increase the combat capability of the Ukrainian army? The answer is obvious - in the absence of adequate motivation among the soldiers being prepared, even experienced instructors cannot significantly improve the combat capability of the Ukrainian army.

A striking confirmation of this were the events of August 2008, when in South Ossetia, the Georgian army, which had been well trained by American instructors, was completely broken by Russian forces.

On the other hand, American instructors have not just come to help strengthen the Ukrainian army, but also have appeared near the front line.
During the civil war, the U.S. and its NATO allies have carried out military exercises in Ukrainian territory and some of them (Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary) have supplied (or are supplying) armored vehicles. All of this is extremely provocative, and thereforethe Russian Foreign Ministry and the Defense Ministry have expressed concerns about  the sending of American instructors to Ukraine.

Worse still, the Ukrainian government-owned company Ukroboronprom has reported that Poland will help Ukraine to modernize its 300 T-72 tanks to the level of the RT-91 (the Polish version of the tank). It is unclear how this can be carried out in practice. Perhaps it is a front for the covert transmission of Polish tanks to Ukraine, which has already previously taken place. And, of course, there is little doubt that this Polish initiative was authorized by the United States.

Given the above, one can agree with those Western experts who believe that the American instructors' mission is more of a consolation prize than a valuable contribution to the regulation of the Ukrainian crisis. The American training mission, Fearless Guardian, will do little to change the balance of power in eastern Ukraine.

However, this clearly contravenes Minsk 2 (Point 10), which demands "a withdrawal of all foreign armed units, military technology, and also mercenaries from the territory of Ukraine being monitored by the OSCE [the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe], the disarmament of all illegal groups".

In the current case, American instructors can be seen as "foreign armed units," which in principle should not be in the zones where military operations are taking place, including for training purposes. Besides this, American mercenaries are also present, in various units of military companies.

Understanding this, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko is awaiting, not military instructors, but large supplies of modern, offensive weapons, and even an introduction of NATO forces into Ukrainian territory. However, no one in the West is interested in fighting for Kiev's interests.

Deliveries of modern weaponry to the Ukrainian authorities are not only meaningless, given the unavoidable fact that equivalent supplies will be provided to the militias by Russia, but also dangerous. In particular, the weapons that Kiev is demanding will be sufficient to export them not only to Syria but to Yemen as well. Radical Islamists will be happy to receive such deliveries, and it is doubtful whether they will increase American or European security.

In this manner, the U.S. has sent 300 military instructors to Ukraine for training as well as over the course of six months, 900 National Guard members, and also provided Kiev with 300 armored humvees, which for some reason will be used for Ukrainian security, radiolocation stations for counter artillery suppression and drones.

France is prepared to provide Ukrainian security forces tactical level communication devices, and Poland and several other NATO countries are offering Soviet armored vehicles. All this confirms that the Americans and their allies are providing Kiev with military assistance, but its scope for numerous reasons is insignificant. This leads to the conclusion that it is largely an imitation of support, rather than real preparedness from the U.S. to provide the current Ukrainian authorities with effective military assistance.
 
 
#39
www.opendemocracy.net
May 6, 2015
Media serfdom in Ukraine
Maidan was meant to set Ukrainian media free, but the press remains dependent on the oligarchs.
By Otar Dovzhenko
Otar Dovzhenko lectures at the School of Journalism at Ukrainian Catholic University, L'viv and is the former editor of Telekritika, Ukraine's leading platform for media commentary. He has been involved in monitoring Ukrainian media since 2005.
 
On 25 February 2015, Aleksandr Velichko, an official in the Dnipropetrovsk municipal government, disappeared. Ten days later, a recording appeared on an anonymous YouTube channel in which Velichko exposed the alleged involvement of the city council and mayor in corruption schemes and claimed that he had fabricated his own disappearance. The alarm was soon raised by Opposition Bloc, a political party representing the former allies of deposed president Viktor Yanukovych: they maintained that the official had been kidnapped by people working for Ihor Kolomoisky, governor of Dnipropetrovsk at the time.

One week later, Velichko himself repeated the charges made by Opposition Bloc. Using this online testimony, Kolomoisky allegedly engineered the sacking of the mayor of Dnipropetrovsk on grounds of corruption. No one knows what actually happened and no one is too keen to find out. This gangland story wasn't hidden from the public and, apart from a few opposition TV stations (such as Inter and Ukraine), the press did not report it. For Ukraine's Fourth Estate, covering this story made little sense: neither their investors, nor their political patrons were involved. The events of January and February 2014 may now be known as the 'Revolution of Dignity', but the latest economic crisis has made Ukrainian media even more dependent on handouts from individuals. And what's more, they continue to operate in a less than dignified manner.

How did we come to this?

Cast back to 2004: the protest against censorship was a leading force in the Orange Revolution. In the early 2000s, President Leonid Kuchma's administration acquired more and more control over the editorial lines of state media and private media, issuing regular written instructions as they saw fit - the so-called temniki (a contraction of tema nedeli [theme of the week]).

Prior to the presidential elections, this system was used to ensure the victory of Kuchma's successor, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych. Many journalists who supported Viktor Yushchenko, the pro-European candidate, resigned, refusing to lie on government orders, or sabotaged censorship in their workplaces. None of this prevented the newspapers and television news from defending Kuchma up until the point that Yushchenko's victory became obvious. In the aftermath, Vyacheslav Pikhovshek, chief editor of 1+1 and the man in charge of censoring the most popular TV channel in the country, claimed on more than one occasion that he acted out of patriotic motives, trying to save the country from Yushchenko.

Five years later, the struggle against censorship rose to the fore once again. On election night in 2010, the newly elected President Viktor Yanukovych accepted congratulations (and bouquets) from Ukraine's wealthiest people. Four of them - Viktor Pinchuk, Dmytro Firtash, Ihor Kolomoisky, and Renat Akhmetov - controlled three-quarters of the television market at the time. After the election fever cooled, the Yanukovych team strategy was to build mutually profitable relations with these businessmen, who offered their loyalty and the services of their media empires in exchange for economic benefits. Journalists responded by forming Stop Censorship, which regularly protested at the gates of Mezhyhirya, the presidential residence just outside of Kyiv.

A diligent - if slightly inept - student of Vladimir Putin, Yanukovych did not drive the activists from the gate. Giving up on tackling online publications and blogs, Yanukovych focused his efforts on television. Criticising the government or the president became taboo on the majority of Ukraine's national TV channels. Some of them even had to stop broadcasting news or political talk shows to avoid the almost feudal scenario of being forced to work for the government. The exclusion of the more principled journalists from the profession, which began under Yushchenko, reached a point where the violation of professional standards at the order of a powerful individual (or simply to please them) came to be seen as the norm. After all, 'everyone was doing it.'

But as they justified and praised the authorities, TV channels often contradicted themselves. In July 2013, Inter, owned by Dmytro Firtash, actively promoted European integration, and broadcast disparaging cartoons of Putin. Come October, the same channel claimed that no one in the EU wanted Ukraine and that maintaining friendship with Russia should be the priority.

The authorities bet on the moral decay, passivity, and indifference of society. They didn't even attempt to hide the billions of dollars leaking out of the state budget, the luxurious mansions and yachts, the criminals who had been released, or the rapidly expanding business empire of the president's son. The facts and evidence were accessible online, but failed to cause any sort of outrage.

The 'Revolution of Dignity' in 2014 was supposed to change all this. A civic society that was active, mobile, ready for both conflict and sacrifices, demanded transparency and honesty from the media. And to be fair, for a short time, freedom did blossom in the information business. Once again, journalists began to adhere to the standards of the profession and remember their responsibilities to their audience. The honeymoon, however, did not last.

The clash of the titans

Having shaken off Maidan, the oligarchs continued as if nothing had changed, divvying up property and spheres of influence. Given the threat of Kolomoisky's dominance to the rest of the pack, they united in a coalition against the 'patriotic oligarch'. The clash of the titans began.

Ihor Kolomoisky supported the new authorities in Kyiv, comprised of the leaders of Maidan's political wing, and offered them his help. In turn, Kolomoisky received the governorship of the Dnipropetrovsk region. The son-in-law of ex-president Kuchma, Viktor Pinchuk, attempted to preserve his neutrality. Dmytro Firtash, the business partner of Serhiy Lyovochkin, Yanukovych's chief of staff, announced his willingness to take part in the 'rebirth of the country', while also offering support to pro-Russian forces.

Meanwhile, Renat Akhmetov, the richest man in Ukraine and the main sponsor of Yanukovych's Party of Regions, made a risky bet on destabilising the Donbas, which soon broke out in war. The manager of United Media Holding (a parent company to numerous leading print, radio and online press outlets), 28-year-old Serhiy Kurchenko, a member of the Yanukovych 'family', fled to Russia but managed to preserve his business interests.

The newspaper war was only the tip of the iceberg. The aim of the anti-Kolomoisky oligarchs was to destroy his reputation (considered by many to be the saviour of the country), damage his business, strip his team of government office and block the appointment of 'his' people to the Verkhovna Rada. In terms of possible side effects, this could have led to panic in the financial markets.

Kolomoisky resisted, although not particularly actively. According to Media Sapiens, which monitors standards in television news, the ratio of pieces 'for' Kolomoisky to pieces 'against' him was five to one. In the run up to the parliamentary elections in October, the fight was particularly vicious. Kolomoisky's 1+1 TV channel even tried to take down Oleh Lyashko's Radical Party, backed by Serhiy Lyovochkin.

Inter TV meanwhile criticised Andriy Sadovy, mayor of L'viv, leader of Samopomich (a recently founded political party) and an ally of Kolomoisky. on a daily basis. The defining characteristic of TV reports and articles in this oligarchic struggle was a lack of balance. Neither Inter, nor Ukraine TV broadcast a single word from Kolomoisky; and Firtash, Akhmetov, and Pinchuk never made an appearance on 1+1.

It's likely that the kompromat (compromising material) shown on 1+1 contributed strongly to the fall in Lyashko's party's rating from 16% in August 2014 to 7.5% on election day in October. Samopomich, on the other hand, received an unexpectedly high result (13% on election day) despite Inter's negative coverage. With an audience which is largely elderly, Inter was never going to channel votes to Samopomich anyway. After the elections, Sadovy and Kolomoisky parted ways - although some experts predict that the oligarch will put the mayor of L'viv forward as a candidate. Sadovy lacks the necessary media resources for a successful campaign (though he does have TV 24 and the Lux media group); the owner of a powerful media company would be a useful ally.

Despite the pluralism supposedly reigning in the news (a no-go subject for one channel is a scoop for another), the war between the oligarchs narrows the field of information. Journalists choose stories and information according to the interests of their publications' owners. As Natalia Ligachyova, chief editor of Telekritika, says: 'Television still lacks the resources able to provide otherwise unreported facts and independent expert opinion to the biased information on both sides, which could help audiences gain a proper perspective on what's going on.'

During the crisis in March which led to the sacking of Kolomoisky as governor of Dnipropetrovsk, not a single central television station broadcast the whole truth about the situation with Ukraine's state oil company. Those stations whose owners weren't involved in the clash preferred to steer clear of the oligarch's squabble.

The situation today is becoming more and more difficult as the economic crisis destroys the advertising market and media becomes more and more dependent on grants. Financial and industrial groups are attempting to increase their political influence, using media as an instrument and space for self-promotion.

For example, the fact that Renat Akhmetov has his praises sung daily on Ukraine TV - a channel popular in the Russian-speaking east - has only encouraged people to believe the inhabitants of Donbas survive solely thanks to his help. Ukraine TV is one of the few channels not blocked in rebel held areas and, after the local elections this autumn, Akhmetov will likely take control of the region once again.

Letting go

President Petro Poroshenko, the owner of Channel 5 (and one of the symbols of the Orange Revolution), stands apart from his predecessors due to a more 'enlightened' attitude to the relationship between government and media.

Although the president's relations with the press haven't been particularly smooth (in the first six months of his presidency, Poroshenko made it to only one press conference), the fact that he nominated former media magnate Boris Lozhkin (of UMH) as head of his presidential administration is revealing. Poroshenko is perhaps the first Ukrainian president not only to use social media, but to monitor the news cycle and media market directly.

Despite promises and pressure, Poroshenko has not sold his TV station, which also relies on financial contributions. This provoked both the ire of media activists and the concern of foreign observers. However, Poroshenko did stop interfering in the channel's editorial policy and demanding the loyalty of 'his' journalists. In the past, Poroshenko used his media resources for political or business gains, interfering in editorial policy and, on one occasion, personally firing a journalist. But now Channel 5 is one of a few TV stations you can watch without disgust.

Channel 1, owned by the state, also falls into this category, and it now positions itself as 'civic' rather than 'state' owned. Poroshenko and Arseniy Yatsenyuk have been the first leaders of Ukraine to support this transformation of ownership, from state to society, in word and deed. The underfunded and backward state television and radio services, which for years followed politicians' every whim and ignored the interests of their audience, has been given a chance to become an alternative to oligarchic media.

If, of course, they manage to win real editorial independence. For the time being, civic media remains in the hands of the state and is dependent on the budget. Zurab Alasania, lobbied by media activists to become general director (and reformer) of the National Television Company of Ukraine, hopes that, someday, civic media will manage to outgrow this dependence.

But, in any event, civic media won't be a panacea to these ills. The Ukrainian media environment is saturated, and commercial players pay huge sums for content, meaning competing with them is senseless. In peacetime, privatisation would have been only the first step in liberalising the market and complete deregulation of the media.

At the moment, such a move is highly unlikely. Russian media presence no longer poses a serious threat - the transmission of pro-Kremlin TV stations was banned a year ago. But, at the same time, Russian media holdings like Vesti continue to publish half a million free newspapers a day. For all intents and purposes, Russia is still here.

Yatsenyuk and Poroshenko need to remain true democrats in the eyes of the West, preventing them from shutting down more pro-Russian media outlets. And while experts on Russian media distortion like Oleg Panfilov, Andrei Arkhangelsky, and Arkady Babchenko are convinced that Ukraine isn't losing to Russia in the information war, Kyiv has little chance of an open battle according to the rules laid out by Kremlin propaganda.

Constructing a new world

The problem isn't just the oligarchs, however. To the outside observer accustomed to Western standards, the standards of Ukrainian journalism are worrying. Professionals here are few and far between, and popularity is bought with money. In some cases, literally: Akhmetov once invested millions in buying an audience for his online publications, which still remained unpopular.

The news-feeds of online publications consist of reports from two or three press agencies - finding and writing ones own stories is too expensive. World events are covered overwhelmingly via Russian sources; to read Western originals, even in English, is too much of a stretch for our journalists. Many Ukraine-wide television channels lack the means to send film crews beyond the boundaries of Kyiv. Most news ends up being about the capital.

To have unreliable information refuted is considered humiliating and a blemish on one's reputation. And so editors fight for their mistakes to the last drop of blood. The nihilistic spirit of Russia Today, described so well by Peter Pomerantsev, has long since put down roots in Ukraine's media space in its fertile soil of miserliness, passivity, and thoughtlessness. The Russian mantra of 'why check the facts when truth doesn't exist' has turned into 'why check the facts when my wages are 200 dollars a month.' Which, incidentally, is a fairly decent wage for a journalist. In the provinces it might be less than 100.

The battered advertising market has led many outlets, and even independent media, to publish 'jeans' (a term for paid puff pieces or secret advertorials). This practice, although forbidden by law, has the added benefit of allowing both the publication and the 'client' to avoid tax. And so in the run up to elections, websites, newspapers, and television turn into an exhibition of PR pieces and pre-election promises.

If the Ukrainian media market does become competitive one day, it's unlikely two thirds of today's media will survive. Even the most useless media organisations are being sold, rather than closing down - sometimes even for good money if they have the right broadcast licenses. Outdated pricing, political unpredictability, as well as corrupt governments and societies are the primary reasons the Ukrainian market has long since lost foreign investors. And they aren't planning on coming back.

All the same, hope remains. Maidan resulted in a burst of civic initiatives aimed at cleaning up and renewing the country. Bold media projects created without oligarchic money and outside the old systems of corruption (such as Hromadske, Ukrains'ka pravda, Insider, Radio Aristokraty and Novoe Vremya) have grown and spread to the regions.

The audience for new media remains modest, but they enjoy some advantages - flexibility, understanding of modern media trends, willingness to orientate themselves to the creative minority, rather than the masses. To grow, they'll need money, but we're talking about much smaller sums than the $300 million which oligarch-owned TV spends yearly on Russian programming.

Clearly, the change in generations won't happen all at once. Old media, if it serves its owners, might stick around for decades, catering to people who prefer to get their news from TV. However, among my students studying journalism at the Ukrainian Catholic University in L'viv, practically nobody wants to work for Kolomoisky, Firtash or Pinchuk. Instead, they dream of their own startup, which could become part of Ukraine's new media business.

Ukraine Tomorrow

Finally, the last problem that the government is in no hurry to fix is the lack of an international broadcaster which could show Ukraine to the world. To be sure, the recently created Ministry of Information Policy has set up Ukraine Tomorrow to balance Russia Today, and Kolomoisky has set up his own international propaganda channel - Ukraine Today.

But neither the state, nor the oligarch has declared how much effort and money is worth spending to build an audience for this kind of channel and what its message should be.

Yet where can a mutual understanding with the outside - Western - world come from? For decades, the Ukrainian media industry has imported ideas, content and personnel from Moscow. No one knew or wanted to chart the borders which separated what was Russian and what was Ukrainian, calling everything 'ours'. The war has shown how fatal this dependence could be, and forced the press, society and the state to stop and think.

Today, it is internal problems, including Ukrainian media's lack of competitive edge and financial self-sufficiency, which pose a far more serious threat to post-Maidan Ukraine than external information aggression.
 
 #40
Krytyka
http://krytyka.com
May 2014
Volodymyr Viatrovych and Ukraine's "Decommunization" Laws
By David R. Marples
Distinguished University Professor, Chair of the Department of History and Classics, Director of the Stasiuk Program for the Study of Contemporary Ukraine, and President of the North American Association for Belarusian Studies. Received his M.A. from the University of Alberta in 1980, and Ph.D. from University of Sheffield in 1985. Specializes in Ukrainian, Russian, and Belarussian history. Latest book: Ukraine's Euromaidan: Analyses of a Civil Revolution in Ukraine. Co edited with Frederick V. Mills. Stuttgart Germany: ibidem Verlag and Columbia University Press, 2015.

Volodymyr Viatrovych's response to the Open Letter, written and signed by some 70 scholars from North America, Western Europe, and Ukraine in response to the April 9, 2015, laws makes a number of unwarranted assumptions about our intentions and about Western scholarship on Ukraine generally that need to be addressed. [http://krytyka.com/en/solutions/opinions/decommunization-and-academic-discussion]

In his opening remarks he comments that the letter does not analyze the circumstances "under which the Ukrainian Parliament approved the 'decommunization' package." Later he suggests that we did not read all the laws because we only focused on two of them. Of course we read all the laws. The two laws to which we referred caused most concern. And it was not the circumstances so much as their rapid path to approval without much discussion - not merely in the Parliament, but in the country generally, including among the scholarly community - that elicited our response.

Viatrovych asserts that "similar laws were adopted by other Eastern European countries," a non sequitur as an explanation of the motives for adopting them in Ukraine. First of all, we were not discussing the laws in other countries. Had we focused on them we might well have reached the same conclusions as we did for those of April 9. There is certainly no indication in our letter that we are somehow satisfied with them; they remain a topic for debate and have been roundly criticized in some forums.

Viatrovych dismisses the non-voting MPs on April 9 as pro-Russians who do not have at heart the interests of Ukraine. But are they not elected officials representing their own specific communities? Opinion polls circulating in early 2014 suggest that fear of Euromaidan was as prevalent in Ukraine as support for the protestors. But for Viatrovych all opposition to the laws is either pro-Moscow or of benefit to Moscow and thus should be dismissed and disparaged.

One can accept that there are frustrations with the legacy of the Soviet Union and one can surely remove Lenin statues, which frankly are an eyesore. Yet one cannot force people to change long-held views overnight or ignore their opinions simply because we disagree with them. If one wishes to attain such a goal, it can only be done in stages, by convincing them that a different approach should be taken.

One of the problems of the treatment of Donbas region in general by the Ukrainian authorities is that its residents are somehow backward or not "real Ukrainians" because they do not adhere to a nationalist point of view. For Viatrovych, those in opposition are ipso facto traitors who "confidently hit the 'yes' button on January 16, 2014" to approve the "dictatorship laws." Such intolerance is reminiscent of the Communist period he abhors so much.

He writes further that: "The phrase 'criminal responsibility' does not appear in the text being criticized." True. But much in this law is implicit rather than explicit. It is what is omitted as much as what is included that causes confusion. Public denial is considered "derision," and "humiliation of the Ukrainian people's dignity" is unlawful. But how does one define these phrases? What constitutes humiliation? The law says nothing about that.

It is still unclear what happens to those who fall on the wrong side of these laws. Viatrovych suggests that no scholars will be punished for what they write. But one of the Ukrainian signatories to our letter to Poroshenko and Hroysman has already been harassed and threatened by his superiors, suggesting that opposition to the new laws will not be tolerated.

On UPA he seems to have a blind spot. He suggests inter alia that our comments on ethnic cleansing in Volhynia represent simply one point of view, hinting that perhaps this event never took place or that it has been misconstrued. "It is only one of the opinions that has the right to exist." It is not an opinion, however, but a fact and one that has been carefully documented by a number of scholars, including Timothy Snyder in his Past and Present article of May 2003. I cite this article in particular because Snyder can hardly be accused of being anti-Ukrainian and has been among the most supportive scholars of Ukraine throughout the current crisis.

Viatrovych makes the analogy of Article 2 of the Law of Ukraine on the Holodomor, which recognizes public denial of the event as illegal. There is virtually no scholar alive today, however, who would deny that the Famine of 1932-33 took place and that has been the case for the past 25 years. When President Viktor Yushchenko initially brought this law forward, however, his goals went considerably further. He wished to make it illegal to deny that the Holodomor was an act of genocide, which was not accepted by the Ukrainian Parliament. Such a law would have impeded "comprehensive study of the Holodomor."

The use of symbols and slogans of UPA or Bandera on the Maidan -"the Banderite 'Glory to Ukraine!' became the official Maidan greeting," writes Viatrovych - also seems to me derivative and expedient rather than evidence of commitment to any sort of cause - a statement supported by the miserable performance of far right presidential candidates in the election that followed. Participants in Euromaidan have stated to the contrary that such slogans became popular despite the fact that they originated with prewar and wartime nationalists. Many of those repeating the mantra did not even know its origins. On the other hand, the appearance of the red-and-black flag did seem ominous to some onlookers and Russian propaganda organs instantly exploited their appearance on the square.

Viatrovych's comment on the 1920s also seems misguided. No one is suggesting that the cultural renaissance of this decade justified what followed, or the Stalin regime in general. But it did take place in the Soviet period that is universally condemned by these laws. In other words, the Soviet period was like the curate's egg in that not everything about it was universally bad and evil. In turn, there were "good" Ukrainian Communists just as there were malevolent ones, as well as Communist leaders who left a mixed legacy such as Petro Shelest.

Lastly, Viatrovych objects to certain signatories on our list whose articles on "primordial Ukrainian collaborationism" are "actively used by Russian propaganda." Unfortunately, propaganda organs, Russian or otherwise, regularly exploit and distort scholarly work in this way. But Viatrovych is suggesting also that our naive trust of a group that wishes to malign Ukraine "was a reason for the appearance of this appeal," which "has already become an instrument in this war."

I cannot speak for everyone who signed the Letter, but my hope is for the development of a Ukraine based on freedom of expression and thought rather than the acceptance of diktats by MPs in parliament backed up by the law courts. One cannot erase the past; one can only seek to understand it. Of course OUN and UPA fought for the independence of Ukraine, and no doubt many of their members did so at great cost to themselves and their families. But one should not try to conceal the darker deeds or pretend that they only exist in the minds of anti-Ukrainians.

There is nothing herein that is unique to Ukraine incidentally; Americans have experienced soul-searching about some criminal acts in Vietnam; my own country, Canada, has faced condemnation for its treatment of the indigenous population; Britain has had to come to terms with many aspects of the colonial period; and, more obviously, the Germans have tried to atone for the Holocaust. By and large they have done so. The Turks in contrast have refused to acknowledge the genocide of Armenians a century ago, despite what to many appears incontestable evidence; just as Viatrovych refuses to accept criticism of UPA for crimes on a significantly smaller scale.

I have no quarrel with Viatrovych's views on the moral equivalence of Hitler and Stalin's regimes. Personally, I do not agree with him because I regard the crime of the Jewish Holocaust as unique, but I have long thought that in the Baltic States and Ukraine, and perhaps also Belarus, it is logical that citizens often adopt such a perspective, including many in the Diaspora who fled from the Red Army.

The difficulty with Ukraine's past is that it is intensely contested and controversial. On many issues there can be no definitive conclusions among scholars as the far more reasoned early 21st century debates among Ukrainian historians about OUN and UPA indicated. And the "circumstances" to which Viatrovych refers are critical: it is precisely the reason why such laws should not be rushed through and approved at this juncture, while a war rages in the East, an economic crisis ravages the country, and the government struggles to deal with its oligarchs.

The Parliament and courts of Ukraine have to be more rational and wise than the gangster regimes that preside in Donbas, or for that matter than the Communist regime that was in power for over seven decades. Perhaps, ultimately, they will be. In the West, we can write and think what we want. Our friends in Ukraine should have the same right.
 
 #41
Krytyka
http://krytyka.com
May 2014
Ukraine's "Decommunization": Struggle Against the Past and Its Inconsistencies
By Serhiy Lunin
Historian, translator, Kharkiv, Ukraine. Graduated from the Kharkiv University's Department of History. Translates from English and Portugese. Contributes to the platform Historians.in.ua articles on the Ukrainian rebellions of the 1918-20's, on the history of the "Kholodny Yar," and the life of its author. Latest publication: translation of the first part of Yury Horlis-Horsky's "Kholodny Yar," including a comprehensive historical commentary to it.

The laws adopted on April 9, 2015, have provoked a flood of criticism from those espousing liberal and other positions, not least among whom are professional historians from Ukraine and abroad. The reaction from the laws' supporters is often nervous and overly generalized. In order to have a more substantive dialogue, it is worth separating those who affirm that such laws are entirely unnecessary or ill-timed from those who criticize only certain shortcomings of the texts, which were adopted by the Verkhovna Rada but have yet to be signed by the President.

I belong to the latter group, that is to say, I agree that laws of this sort ought to have been adopted long ago. Nevertheless, I want to draw attention to certain provisions in the laws "On the Legal Status and Commemoration of Fighters for the Independence of Ukraine in the 20th Century" and "On Access to the Archives of the Repressive Organs of the Communist Totalitarian Regime 1917-1991."

The first law is interesting for its list of government organizations, military and other structures, membership in which grants a person the right to be considered a fighter for the independence of Ukraine (Article 1). Such a status, whether granted posthumously or to a living person, will have specific consequences-for researchers, among others, who may be threatened with legal sanctions for a "publicly demonstrated disrespectful attitude" (Article 6). What exactly constitutes a "disrespectful attitude" is not explained. Specialists are already analyzing Article 6, and my purpose here is to share a few examples to indicate to what absurd lengths this could be taken.

I take examples only from the period of the First Struggle for Ukraine's Independence (that is, the period of the Civil War in the former Russian Empire), because even historians in thrall to the myth of the "Great Patriotic War"-as well as the struggle against it-devote very little attention to them. The disputes center on the events of the Second World War.

Some are upset that Article 1 recognizes those who at times shot at one another as fighters for Ukraine. In my opinion, this becomes absurd only when one of the sides was represented by inveterate Ukrainophobes such as White Guard soldiers who, in a twist of fate, temporarily found themselves in the armed forces or other branches of the Ukrainian state. Their attitude towards that state is aptly captured by the phrase "ludicrous operetta" that Bulgakov uses in his The White Guard.

Thus, this status could be given to Count Fyodor Keller, who in November 1918 did not make it out of Kyiv in order to command the Northern White Army, and who led the defense of the city against the forces of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) - that is, against the true fighters for the independence of Ukraine (they, in turn, executed him).

An even more absurd example would be Nikolai Bredov. I don't know if he served in the Ukrainian army in 1918, and it seems highly unlikely that he did, yet as a member of a White Army unit subordinated to the Hetman he might fall under point d) of Article 1: "other military, armed, or paramilitary formations ... of the Ukrainian State (Hetmanate)." The General joined later Denikin's Volunteer Army, distinguished himself by, among other things, forcing Anton Kraus, the Ukrainian army group commander which had almost liberated the Ukrainian capital, to abandon it on August 31, 1919. At that time, he also famously declared: "Kiev is the mother of Russian cities, it has never been Ukrainian nor will it be."

The law does not allow for the forfeiture of this status under any circumstances. Thus, officers and civil servants of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) as well as UNR guerillas remain fighters for Ukraine, even when there is no doubt that they went over to the enemy side and facilitated the killing of their compatriots. For example, Petro Trokhymenko and Iukhym Tereshchenko were recruited by the Bolsheviks and played a key role as provocateurs in the "Zapovit" operation of 1922. In late September of that year, the State Political Directorate (GPU) lured three otamans and many other partisans into an ambush at Zvenyhorodka, after which resistance to the occupiers in Central Ukraine (the area of Kholodny Yar) considerably weakened.

Recently, I read the article "Laws 2558 and 2538-1: On Critical Inquiry, the Holocaust, and Academic Freedom in Ukraine" by Per Anders Rudling and Christopher Gilley and I could not agree, among other things, with this excerpt: "The army of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) and insurgent detachments active after 1917 ... were responsible for the deaths of at least 20,000 Jews in the 1919 pogroms in Ukraine." One should not paint all units of the UNR army and partisan detachments with such a broad brush, because their actions regarding the civilian population varied-each should be researched separately.

If the authors had sought to provide the English-language reader with a true picture of events, they ought to have mentioned the White, Polish, and other pogroms, as well as the fact that specialists do not usually accuse the UNR leadership for inciting Judeophobia. (Having read my comments on the Historians.in.ua Facebook page, Christopher Gilley agreed with me on this point and stated that the authors simply did not want to go too far off topic.)

On the other hand, one ought not idealize all those who at the end of 1918 took up arms under the Ukrainian flag. Let us at least think carefully about whether to include among the fighters for Ukraine the Illya Struk guerillas, led by one of the worst pogromists, who after the above-mentioned occupation of Kyiv by the Denikin forces went over to their side, with no regard for the open Ukrainophobia of those defenders of "one and indivisible Russia," and abandoned them only in February 1920.

Now, on to the opening of the archives of the Soviet repressive organs. Of course, historians welcome this kind of liberalization of access to sources - this is very good news, both generally and in the context of the strictness of the Russian authorities (on general terms, access to the archives of the FSB, which contain many documents on Ukrainian history, is closed, even when they pertain to the events of 1917 or 1918).

Without getting into the possible technical complexities of organizing a new archive - that of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, about which many are writing, I want to draw attention to the disrespect with which the law treats the privacy of relatives of the repressed (Article 9, point 9; the repressed themselves seem to be left with somewhat more rights). The law allows a 25 year embargo only on information related to racial (ethnic) origin, worldview or political opinions, religious affiliation, health, and sexual relations.

In this case, such people - most of all residents of Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine, or for that matter Russia and Belarus - will most likely feel threatened, because they would not be able to prevent the distribution of almost all information from KGB case files on their repressed relatives (and it is not always true). Residents of Kharkiv and Zaporizhia, for example, may also not feel comfortable. A part of their establishment is made up of those who demonstrated their dedication to the regime 30 years ago, and now support, perhaps quietly, Putin and his accomplices.

Accordingly, let me once again welcome full access to the documents of the repressive organs up to and including 1991, while also calling on legislators to provide for the protection of the repressed and their families' private lives.

Whether granting certain individuals the status of fighters for the independence of Ukraine will lead to bizarre cases of unwanted interference in the work of researchers will depend on the tangible content of Article 6 of the law mentioned earlier. As of now, nothing about this latter point is clear.

This is an authorized translation from Ukrainian.
 
 #42
Russia Direct/Komsomolskaya Pravda
www.russia-direct.com
May 6, 2015
How the War in Donbass Will End
The writer Zakhar Prilepin gave his thoughts on the future of Russian-Ukrainian relations in an interview with Komsomolskaya Pravda.
Alexander Kotz and Dmitrii Steshin

This article originally appeared at Komsomolskaya Pravda. Translated for RI by Johanna Ganyukova. Edited by Katy Meigs

Zahkar Prilepin has been called the "voice of a generation," a generation raised under capitalism after leaving behind a happy childhood in the USSR. This is perhaps why Zakhar's perspective on current developments is of such interest to his vast readership. We met with the writer the day before the release of his new book, Ne chuzhaya smuta. Odin den' , odin god [Familiar chaos: One day, one year], a collection of articles and stories based on events in Ukraine and Novorossiya.

Q: Zakhar, your book is a retrospective account of the events of this year to date. What was, for you, the main and biggest illusion of February 14?

I suppose I could have made up something regarding my first impressions to appear more reflective and reliable in my predictions, but when I read over what I wrote before and during Maidan, I was pleased to find that I wasn't under any illusions. In the early days I had formed several conclusions: (a) in Ukraine a civil war is breaking out; (b) Ukraine's European dream will fail; and (c) the sour "anticorruption" war of the Ukrainian people is essentially anti-Russian - they behave as if all their problems stem from Russia. And yet we are not the cause of their problems and did not pay particular attention to what was going on there.

Q: You have termed the events in Novorossiya "smuta"[chaos]. We were taught in school that this means something poetic and ineffectual. So why "smuta"?

Well, you have answered that question yourselves, my friends. Because [the situation] is anarchic. Opportunists, imposters, thieves and prima donnas: they are all gathering and crave power and attention. And there are also romantics. They also gather together and even die for the cause. And, in all this chaos, dodgy businessmen serve their own interests. Of course, there is Russia as well, which has watched and watched, listened and listened to everything that was said in Kiev ("Russian special forces are at work on Maidan!", "Tomorrow Russian forces will arrive on Maidan and shoot everyone!"). Then, with clear antipathy, it was deemed necessary to somehow react to all this chaos. Chaos is chaos, but Russians make up half the population of Ukraine. It was impossible to ignore that fact.

Q: The war will end sooner or later. Based on the experience of history, is it possible to put this country back together again?

These are endless processes. Ukraine will never again be as it was in 1991. Everyone understands this apart from a few thousand Ukrainian bloggers. Crimea won't be returned by anyone. Novorossiya now exists; the only question remaining is to what extent its territory will increase. For it can't get any smaller. The Ukrainian people couldn't cope with the clear imperial legacy they were left with. At some point in Kiev they decided that for the 20 million - or slightly fewer - Russians in Ukraine it is not actually their home but they're just visitors, so they should start to participate in [national] choral singing and dancing and take new crazy versions of Ukrainian history as gospel. When Russians living in Ukraine began to whisper that all this scared them a bit, they got the reply: "What? I don't understand? Either shut up or go moan to the authorities. Is someone stopping you from speaking Russian? Be happy! Ukraine is the most free country in the world!" Of course, that's not to say that everyone in Ukraine behaved in this way. There is an intelligentsia, a group of wonderful, generous kind people, but when such comments were made in their presence, they just turned away and pretended not to hear. These are the results.

Q: Some believe the main issue is not a military victory over Ukraine but the recovery of our Ukrainian brothers from this head injury they seem to have received. What treatment do you suggest for this?

It will be impossible to heal a large part of the population. Ukrainians today are indeed experiencing a final stage in their nation's development. There is an expression - "God doesn't give an angry bull big horns." The "little Russians" [a term for the historical Ukrainian Cossack state]had fantastic folklore and gradually created their own literature, national mythology and cooking. But they weren't part of Russia - although they wanted to be. Why else would they have printed "Rurik" on their money? Rurik doesn't bear any connection to the Ukrainian state. Then the heroic Ukrainian iconostasis was formed, but the main problem of "professional Ukrainianisers" was that they didn't want to be "Russia's younger brother" but instead wanted to be the elder brother. Almost all Ukrainian heroes were those Russians who were born in Ukraine or those who were born there and stood up against Russia. This anti-Russian tradition is centuries old. It is not an illness, it is in their blood; it is part of the system. Any attempts to suppress this tradition will only strengthen it. Those who want to live in Ukraine as Russians ought to be given the chance to live as they wish and to leave others in peace.

Ukraine will be the same for us as Poland or Lithuania. You know, in the great kingdom of Lithuania, there were also times when a huge number of people spoke Russian and one could not really distinguish them from Russians because they were, in effect, Russians. What can we do now that these lands don't belong to us anymore or about the fact that part of the population has changed its faith and lives under the rule of other states? You lose some, you win some. Of course to live in the separate country of Ukraine,where [Gogol's] old tale of "Taras Bulba" about the age-old Russian-Ukrainian conflict was set, is not altogether comforting. However, if we say that Gogol was a "Ukrainian traitor," then everything falls into place. But then we are forced to proclaim that a huge part of our culture is a betrayal, or to castrate it or turn it upside down. But if the goal is freedom and independence, then such things shouldn't be done. However, many such things have been done already and will be done. It's their right. And I'm not being sarcastic. After some time, the intensity of the conflict will pass. Ukrainian national literature will appear, along with perhaps the first genuine, world-renowned Ukrainian writer or composer, and our current views will be become obsolete.

Q: What can be done with the Ukrainian culture that developed on Maidan?

On the territory that will become Novorossiya, they will cultivate embroidery, songs, dancing and celebrate Lesya Ukrainka [one of Ukraine's best-known poets and writers] and the blue and yellow flag. Those in Novorossiya who identify with Russian culture will nurture it, and those who were raised with Ukrainian traditions - let them preserve them. So that at least some elements of the Ukrainian Maidan movement will be all to the good. There is another side to Ukraine, one that is poetic, beautiful, magical and proud: she is Russia's sister, mother of her children, an incredible land. This is the Ukraine of Gogol, Khlebnikov, Bagritskii and Limonov, the Ukraine Kotovskii, of the Odessan literary school, Marshall Pybalko, "The Young Guard" and the Slavyansk rebels. Then there is the other Ukraine, the one that is turned inside out, volatile, crawling on all fours to Europe, where no one knows her, no one awaits her, and where she is secretly regarded with fear and amusement. This is the Ukraine of the "forest brothers" [a nationalist group that rebelled against the USSR], of conflicts, chaos, low-brow nationalism and farcical myths; the Ukraine of the Cossacks who went to serve the Turkish sultan or Hitler. The first Ukraine is still winning over the second one, not only in the nature of its war footing but culturally, in a metaphysical sense. And she ought to win again. But if that very Ukrainian writer and composer will be born here - in this royal fraternity of Russia and Ukraine - it will mean we have won yet again, and this will be a lesson for those who believe a sign of civilization is an anti-Russian soul and nonsensical jumping up and down on city squares.

Q: Everyone knows that Russia is supporting Novorossiya. But has Russia got anything in return for this, apart from sanctions?

It will be her usual fate: a huge responsibility on the Eurasian landscape and the very same "Russian world" that exists and is not just a figment of our imagination. Russia is the higher authority, and she knows for sure now that she won't have a happy retirement in the West. She now knows with certainty that she won't be admitted into the "general European house." At the first opportunity, she will be left standing in the rain and will be deprived of her salmon and smoked ham. It means we'll have to provide our own salmon. Then it will be easier to negotiate with the civilized world. We're not talking about high technology here. I don't know about Russia, but, personally, in Novorossiya I saw that my people and all peoples settled in my country have produced men who are courageous, tough and fearless, who sacrifice so much in fighting for their principles. It was only recently that I became aware of the strength and passion of our people.

Q: You saw how things changed in Novorossiya. What has changed from your first visit there among the rebels, among the local officials, in people's faces?

If you look at how the attitude has changed toward Kiev and Poroshenko it becomes easier to talk about the complex attitude toward Russia. Some are gravely dismayed that Russia did not declare an all-out war on Ukraine. Others understand that she couldn't have done this because the war would have been big and horrible and it would have been difficult to know where it would end. In Lvov? Do we even need Lvov? I don't think so. In any case, Kiev would have been bombed. The killers are in Kiev. And this is what determines attitudes. And all these weak arguments about "if it hadn't been for Russia, none of this would have happened" - these are just funny. Yes, the blame game has begun.
 
 
#43
Wall Street Journal
May 7, 2015
Ukraine Remembers the Lessons of World War II
What's happening today is alarmingly reminiscent of that era. We can't afford to ignore the parallels.
By YAROSLAV BRISIUCK
Mr. Brisiuck is charg� d'affaires at the embassy of Ukraine in Washington.

This weekend we commemorate the end of World War II, the deadliest conflict in the history of humankind. Fueled by false propaganda and hatred, the war crossed boundaries across the globe, unsparing of civilians of all nationalities and races alike. For Ukraine, it was a particularly dramatic and blood-draining fight.

In that conflict, the entire Ukrainian territory was invaded and laid waste by both the Nazi and Soviet war machines. Casualties for my nation were shockingly high, amounting to at least 40% of overall casualties of the former Soviet Union. Ukraine lost 14 million of its sons and daughters, including those killed on the battlefield, civilians and victims of concentration camps and those who were forcefully deported. Some 720 Ukrainian cities and 28,000 villages were turned into ruins, many of them never to be rebuilt completely.

As we approach the 70th anniversary of victory in that war, we must remember the spirit in which nations and their people fought and the high price they paid for their liberty and peace.

After the war, the world community established legal and institutional safeguards to prevent future wars. The United Nations, of which Ukraine is a founding member, as well as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, were put in place to protect the fundamental principles of respect for human rights, sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as to delegitimize the threat or use of force in international relations.

Yet there are clear and chilling parallels between the events in Europe that preceded World War II and what is happening in Ukraine today. Then as now, would-be conquerors sought to play down long-established and generally accepted rules for international behavior by gradually flouting them while engaging in saber rattling to discourage intervention.

In 2014, through a staged, sham referendum in Crimea, conducted at the points of guns held by Russian soldiers, the Kremlin attempted to illegally annex the Ukrainian peninsula, in flagrant violation of the most fundamental norms of international law. Since then, Ukrainians, Tatars and members of other nationalities have lived there under a shadow of fear, suffering from political, linguistic and cultural oppression.

Right after annexing Crimea, Russia went on to destabilize Ukraine's east, using Russian operatives to take over Ukrainian government buildings. The Kremlin installed its puppets and flooded Donbas with Russian militants and weapons, including tanks, artillery and rocket systems, such as the ones with which the separatists brought down Malaysia Airlines Flight 17, killing 298 innocents.

For more than a year now, Russia has fueled this war, continuing to send soldiers, weapons and ammunition, claiming at the same time that is has nothing to do with the "internal conflict," and that disgruntled locals who hate the "Kiev Nazi junta" are waging a full-scale battle against the regular Ukrainian army. Russia's war against Ukraine has left more than 6,100 people dead, more than 15,500 wounded and more than a million displaced.

Today, the aggression continues. Russia and its separatist proxies continue to violate the Minsk agreements. Since the cease-fire was proclaimed on Feb. 15, Ukrainian positions have been shelled almost 3,000 times, 86 Ukrainian servicemen have been killed and nearly 500 wounded.

By waging war against Ukraine, Russia's President Vladimir Putin is trying to force the world into recognizing a Russian sphere of geopolitical influence using the bogus pretext of defending Russian-speaking populations from imaginary threats. He uses the memory of World War II as an instrument of propaganda against the West and neighboring countries. He also deliberately sows antagonism among people whose ancestors fought side by side against the Nazis.

Russian propaganda labels as collaborationists those in Ukraine and other post-Soviet states who stood up to both Nazi and Communist regimes. At the same time, it seeks justification for Stalin's crimes, including the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939, which divided Eastern Europe between two of the most evil tyrants of the 20th century.

A clear lesson from the past is that appeasing the aggressor isn't going to bring peace and security. To prevent the conflict from escalating in Ukraine and spilling over into other countries, it is important that Ukraine's partners in the U.S. and Europe not only maintain but also increase their pressure on the Kremlin.

Without a doubt, sanctions on Russia are an effective tool and must be kept in place, but Ukraine must also receive the weapons it needs to be able to deter Mr. Putin from further adventures and to defend itself. Having voluntarily given up the world's third-largest nuclear arsenal under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum in exchange for security assurances from the West, this is not too much to ask.

Celebrating the 70th anniversary of V-E Day, we must remember that it takes a "global village" to ensure that the universal rules put in place after World War II to prevent future wars are observed by everyone. It is better to learn from history than to see it repeated.
 
 #44
http://slavyangrad.org
May 5, 2015
R.I.P. Ukraine - May 2, 2014
BY OLGA LUZANOVA

Forty three people were reported dead officially by Kiev. According to the witnesses, and even some politicians the real data concealed by Ukrainian government reaches over a hundred people burnt alive and murdered, and two hundred forty-seven people injured on that day. R.I.P.

A year ago, at night on May 2, I and my mother stayed awake almost the whole night watching live reports from Odessa. There were no journalists, either from state-owned or private TV channels; only once in a while videos recorded on mobile phones would appear on YouTube-all from different angles and varying distances. These were people themselves reporting from the ground, near the Trades Union House, and in every recording there was nothing but horror: a real, deliberate massacre. That day became a crucial moment for many people, and for me personally.

Today the name Donbass is familiar to most, but not many of you knew about this small region of big Ukraine before the war there started-a region whose people are peaceful, hard-working and very tolerant. Coal mining has for decades been the main occupation of the inhabitants of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions, and many families used to earn their living from this industry. These people never used to protest or to demonstrate for or against anything-they used to work, taking care of their families. They are my people, and I am just like them.

For me and my peers Donbass was Ukraine. I should mention, though, that we never really considered Russia to be another country because it was no different. I went to Ukrainian school, where I studied both Russian and Ukrainian. The year I started studying was the last when pupils had Russian language instruction in the ten year school curriculum-the following generation had to all the subjects taught in Ukrainian, and Russian was officially proclaimed a "Foreign language" in our schools. Still, we treated this change as a reasonable decision because it was the state language, and absolutely everybody could understand written and spoken Ukrainian perfectly well: we had foreign movies and cartoons dubbed into Ukrainian, shows and news on state TV channels, and newspapers and magazines in Ukrainian. However, Ukrainian was never a mother tongue or a language of everyday usage for the residents of the whole of eastern Ukraine. Moreover, the territory of former left-bank Ukraine has always in fact been inhabited by Russian-speakers (unlike former right-bank Ukraine, where you can encounter people speaking Ukrainian on the streets).

We do not choose our parents or our motherland. I am Ukrainian by citizenship, I was born in the Donbass just after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Following that, the population was divided between 10% who became very rich and 90% who became very poor people. I do not come from a rich family: my father was a mechanical worker, and my mother was unemployed until I began school. Life in the 90s was really hard. Nevertheless I do not remember my parents complaining about it: we learned to value good things (perhaps because they were rather rare). I remember my mother gathered raspberry and currant leaves and twigs to use for brewing tea: she explained, that such "tea" was more healthy than that from tea leaves, but in fact it was just that we had no money to buy normal tea. And yet that raspberry leaf tea was the best tea in the world! As a child, I did not know that we were living in poverty, and that everybody else around us was as well-looking for a better future in the tomorrow of that just established state. Yes, independent Ukraine was a young country-a ship sailing through good and bad weather, trying to make its own way alongside other ships with more experienced crews abroad. Its attempts to be unique and self-determined were understandable. We tolerated the Ukrainisation of the population... Until the very last drop.

I used to love my Ukraine, I used to be proud of it: I know its history very well, its anthem, I know the meaning of its state symbols much better than many of those young "true Ukrainians". If somebody had asked me in early autumn 2013 whether I would like the Donbass to be separated from Ukraine and joined to the Russian Federation, I would have certainly said "no". Not because I disliked Russia, but, rather, but because I loved my Ukraine. It was never perfect, but we could bear it. Everything began to change on November 21, 2013. Eventually, it was Ukraine no more.

When Kiev activists started Maidan under the auspices of American-backed right-wing Western politicians, we remained silent-perhaps it would somehow end. When Right Sector 'revolutionaries' overthrew the President of Ukraine, legally elected in 2012, we remained silent-perhaps it would somehow get fixed. Then Maidan made a decision for us: to throw the entire Ukrainian state into western snare under the motto "Ukraine is Europe." People's obsession with this groundless idea only brought about aggression, impulsive madness and uncontrolled violence in society. This Ukrainian possession has become a mass hysteria, and Ukrainisation today does not mean "Ukraine is an independent state in its own right," but, rather,  "Ukraine is totally opposed to Russia." As though under a spell, activists of the European integration movement repeat the same belligerent mottoes: "Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the Heroes! Death to the enemies!", "Impale a Moskal!", "Who does not jump is a Moskal!"  and so forth. Let me to draw your attention to the fact that there was not yet the slightest hint about a referendum in Crimea-thus there was not the slightest reason to accuse Russia of interference in Ukrainian affairs, though such accusations already existed and were very popular among 'true Ukrainians.'

Events took a new turn in April, when we began preparing the Great Victory Day celebration. Wearing St George's ribbons several weeks before and after the holiday had been a tradition for many decades, and we began pinning them to our clothes as usual. Normally, Ukrainians wore these ribbons as well, until they found for themselves "an old European symbol of the memory of WWII"-the poppy. Whether by coincidence or not, the colours of the poppy symbol match the red and black colours of the Right Sector's flag. After all, Ukrainians associated our St George's ribbon with a Colorado beetle (because of the stripes), and started to identify the people wearing these ribbons as "Colorados. " It is not just a black and orange piece of cloth, and we wear it not because it is beautiful, but rather because it is meaningful. My great grandfather was a veteran of the Great Patriotic War, and I still remember him very well. Everyone in the Donbass has veterans in their family. This ribbon is a material part-a symbol of the triumph over fascism, which we can keep in our hands in the name of the contribution of our great-grandparents. Commemorating the veterans who won peace for us is a major part of the education of several generations. The majority of Ukrainian people have easily rejected their historical values in the name of European ones, and during the last year they have been trying to deprive us of our roots. We have become fed up with this. Nevertheless, in order to kill our memory they will have to kill all of us.

When the people of Crimea organised their referendum, Kiev claimed it was fabricated-they began to use the label "vatnik" (a quilted jacket-but according to 'true Ukrainians', a pro-Russian acting under the influence of a Kremlin agenda). Generally, Ukrainians are good at attaching labels-once you receive it you become a dangerous individual who threatens the safety of Ukraine, and thus you may even be killed, and the Ukrainians will be justified because you were a 'colorado', a 'vatnik', a 'separatist', or the child of a 'separatist' or a parent of a future 'separatist'. Such labels were quickly applied to the whole population of the Donbass. In fact, the Militia had begun seizing administrative buildings in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions before the Crimea had held its referendum. It was peaceful and organised: the people who worked in those buildings were allowed to leave them with their possessions and with important documents; nobody was hurt or injured. All we wanted was to go through a legal process of separation from Ukraine, for a number of reasons, but firstly because we did not want to follow the path of integration with the European Union. By occupying the buildings, the locals made their protest against the Junta regime, because they had not elected them and they did not like its policy. Maidan activists had raised EU flags asserting their desire to join the EU; we did not support this idea, completely understanding that our living standards did not match those of the Union and that we would thus not be equal members. For "Ukraine is Europe", the necessary condition was to sever all relations with Russia. The Donbass raised Russian flags over administrative buildings to assert that we did not want to separate from Russia. This divorce could have gone peacefully, but the 'true Ukrainians' wanted blood.

On May 2, the right-wing extremists committed a crime against humanity: they burnt people alive. This is a fact that nobody can deny, as the amount of pictorial and video evidence is so overwhelming. Watching the Odessa massacre, we could not imagine anything worse, but it appeared to be only the beginning. You could see girls with Ukrainian flags round their necks pouring petrol into bottles, which were certainly intended to be thrown at people (what else could be the purpose?), and that night the Ukrainian flag ceased to exist for me. It was so defiled by being used for carrying Molotov cocktails, but nobody judged this profanation at the governmental level. You could see young guys with Right Sector symbols on their sleeves finishing the people off who had managed to get out of the Trades Union House which was enveloped in flames. These are not my people who call to kill other human beings, and who can triumph above the bodies of dead humans. They burnt Ukraine in the Odessa Trades Union House, they killed it together with young Kristina and her baby in Gorlovka, they downed it along with MH17, they ran it over together with eight year old Polina in Konstantinovka, they gunned it down along with Oles Buzina in Kiev.

Dear readers, please remember and honour your roots, and the deeds of your great-grandparents who made sacrifices for your Peace. It becomes easy to manipulate a population which is willing to forget its past, to rewrite its history, which is obsessed with revolution in the name of revolution. We stand for a better future in the name of our past. The moment of cleavage has happened. It is Donbass, it is Novorossiya. We will have our second Victory Day.