#2
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
April 20, 2015
Putin's Direct Line, Russia's culture wars and the Iranian missile deal
Media Roundup: Putin's Direct Line, a controversial dance performance in Orenburg and the resumption of the S-300 Iranian missile deal made headlines last week.
By Anastasia Borik

The main newsmaker of the week was Russian President Vladimir Putin, who once again via his "Direct Line" call-in show, answered questions posed by the people of Russia. In addition, the Russian Foreign Ministry attracted media attention when it announced that it saw no obstacles in supplying Iran with Russian S-300 anti-aircraft missile systems.

1. Live call-in show with Vladimir Putin

This time, the Russian president's question and answer show was anticipated more than ever before, with a new record set for the number of questions posed to the president (in total, the head of state received more than three million questions). In the difficult domestic and foreign policy conditions that the country finds itself in, people were expecting definitive answers from the president.

However, as the media noted, the president did not meet these expectations. The business daily Kommersant noted that this time the President was unusually "cold" and sometimes even "obviously bored."

Kirill Martynov, from the opposition newspaper Novaya Gazeta, believes that the live broadcast showed a switch in focus by the Kremlin, from external to domestic policy. Ukraine, "Ukrainian fascism," and relations with the West retreated to the background of economic and social problems in the country, according to the journalist.

The business publication Vedomosti interviewed a number of experts, who concluded that the restraint showed by the President, and the absence of his customary jokes and stories pulled from his life experiences is the result of the not quite favorable current political situation in the country.

2. S-300 missiles for Iran

In 2010, Russia, in joining the sanctions against Iran, had not fulfilled its obligations to supply the S-300 defensive missile systems. Russian media started asking questions about what had led to this change of policy, and what the consequences may be of such a decision.

Moskovsky Komsomolets reminds its readers that Russia's reputation as a supplier of arms suffered considerably after the suspension of this contract, and now Russia is trying very hard to re-engage the Iranian leadership on this issue, given the new realities.

The pro-government Rossiyskaya Gazeta explains economic interests to be behind the decision of the Russian leadership, as well as the significant progress in negotiations achieved by the "P5+1" on Iran's nuclear program.

The business media outlet Vedomosti talked about the "hidden targets" of the Russian decision, noting that the main player to whom the Kremlin was sending a message is Saudi Arabia, which is Tehran's main rival in regional politics.

3. Dance of the bees

It seems that not a week goes by in Russia without some scandal in the artistic and creative circles. Not too long ago, there was the scandalous statement made by the performance of Wagner's Tannhäuser opera in Novosibirsk, and this week all the attention was focused on the performance of students at a dance academy in Orenburg.

The "Dance of the Bees," in which teenage girls performed highly suggestive dance moves on stage, caused a wave of discussions, for which journalists even learned a new word - "twerking."

Opinions were divided: some believe that this twerking on stage of the Orenburg school is a mockery of morality and a dishonor of today's youth, while others reacted to this event with irony.

To the first group belongs the official Rossiyskaya Gazeta, which published comments of the ultraconservative politician Vitaly Milonov condemning this choreography, and calling for tighter control over institutions of higher education.

The opposition TV Channel Dozhd also had a negative assessment of the performance, quoting a well-known choreographer Yevgeny Papunaishvili, who noted that in this case, it is "fully unacceptable," and that he had a "very big question for the choreographer."

Meanwhile, more ironic views of the incident were stated in the independent Slon and the business newspaper Kommersant.

"The play 'Winnie the Pooh and the Bees' performed in January is more business-like and gymnastic in nature, and no more sexual than a Pioneer acrobatic performance of 'Death to World Imperialism'," notes with irony the author of Kommersant.

4. Murders of opposition figures in Ukraine

Russian media outlets have reacted harshly to the series of political assassinations in Ukraine. This week, several opposition figures were killed (both politicians and journalists), including Oleg Kalashnikov, Olesya Buzin and Sergey Sukhobokov. All these people were prominent figures in Ukrainian politics, who, in recent years, clearly made their views known that they disagreed with the official line of Kiev.

Echo of Moscow draws parallels with the murder of Russian opposition leader Boris Nemtsov, and expresses indignation at how sluggishly European and American media, as well as politicians, reacted to the high-profile murders.

The pro-government "Channel 1" condemned the killings, noting in particular that all the dead had sharply criticized the activities of Kiev, and that it is very likely the threat of a similar demise looms over other opposition figures.

Moskovsky Komsomolets wrote about other political murders in Ukraine in recent years, including a series of "suicides" by politicians from the Party of Regions, headed by former President Viktor Yanukovych.

5. Agenda for the Russian opposition

Last week, the conference "Election 2015-2016: An Agenda for the Opposition" brought together representatives of the Russian opposition forces to discuss and possibly coordinate their actions in the upcoming elections (both federal and regional).

The business media outlet Vedomosti noted that one of the central themes of the conference was the strikingly high approval rating (about 86 percent) of the incumbent president. In such circumstances, the newspaper notes, the opposition will have a hard time winning votes.

The opposition Novaya Gazeta writes about the merger of the parties RPR-Parnas and the Progress Party of Alexey Navalny for joint actions in the elections. The newspaper notes that not everyone believes in the success of the combined forces, because many times in modern history, the general goals of the Russian opposition faded when coming face to face with the ambitions of individual leaders.

Quotes of the week

Kirill Martynov, Novaya Gazeta, on the Direct Line with Putin: "The Direct Line was conceived at one time as an element of television democracy, and to strengthen the legitimacy of a young, modern president, a partner of the U.S. in an antiterrorist coalition. By 2015, the thirteenth Direct Line has become a ritual and even, perhaps, a session in collective psychotherapy. The president, in good physical condition, is shown to the people. Seeing their leader seemingly confident, joking, one finds the soul somehow growing more peaceful."

Sergey Zaporozhye, blogger at the Echo of Moscow, on the Direct Line with Putin: "The communications between Vladimir Putin and the Russian people leaves one with the impression that the President of the Russian Federation is living in some other country, but who sometimes comes to visit Russia."
Sergey Lavrov on the delivery of the S-300 missiles: "We could not ignore the commercial and reputational aspect. As a result of the suspension of the contract, Russia has not received the large sums that were owed to it."

Ivan Davydov, of Slon, on the Dance of the Bees: "The essence of the scandal is not in the desecration of the memory of the heroic Winnie the Pooh, and not in the fact that among the dancers were minors (by the way, it still is not clear, if the dancing girls were under sixteen years of age). It is just the fact that the Orenburg beauties had shown that the shaking of foundations could look very attractive. For this, of course, they should be punished."
Oleg Lurie, Echo of Moscow, on the murders in Kiev: "Not one statement from Western politicians, public figures and human rights activists. Silent are Biden and Nuland, as well as Hollande and Mogherini. Not one article or blog post by Russian liberals and 'human rights activists'. None of them talked about the need for, say, picketing the Ukrainian Embassy in Moscow, or any other actions in support of the Ukrainian opposition, which is daily and methodically being killed off. Silent as mice are Navalny and Khodorkovsky, and Shenderovich and Sobchak and Venediktov. But oh, how loud was the public outcry, from Obama to Sobchak, when Nemtsov was killed. They were ever so quick in condemning that as a crime of 'Putin's Regime.' Instantly - on that same day."
 

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 #3
Rossiya 1 TV (Moscow)
April 30, 2014
Putin accuses West of not sharing "freedom" with Russia after break-up of USSR

Russian President Vladimir Putin has accused the "civilized world" of not sharing "freedom" with Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. A brief trailer for a new film about him, broadcast on Russia's state Rossiya 1 TV on 20 April, showed Putin saying:

"We all had the illusion, we all thought at the time that with the departure of the ideological component that divided the former Soviet Union and the rest of the civilized world shackles had dropped and freedom would greet us at the door with delight." "However, not only were brothers in no rush to give us a sword, but they would have gladly taken the remains of the former military might that the Soviet Union had," he said rephrasing a poem by Aleksandr Pushkin.

One feels a sense of "very big disappointment" in your words, Vladimir Solovyev, the Rossiya 1 host who made the film and interviewed Putin for it, remarked. Putin replied: "These simple things do not occur immediately, but nevertheless there are also geopolitical interests that are not linked to any ideology at all."

Rossiya 1 will broadcast "President" at 1830 gmt on Sunday 26 April. It will be its second major programme about Putin in less than six weeks. The two-and-a-half-our-long "Crimea: Road to the motherland" was broadcast on 15 March.

Solovyev's website says "President" is about the 15 years of the Putin presidency, disregarding the fact PM Dmitriy Medvedev was president for four of the last 15 years. (http://vrsoloviev.com/924_prezident-film-vladimira-soloveva-anons/).

In the trailer for "President", Rossiya 1 announced that it also was a film about "the new Russia". "The new Russia is 15. President," the voice-over said, echoing a statement by Kremlin deputy chief of staff Vyacheslav Volodin, who said in October 2014 that Russia could not exist without Putin. "As long as there is Putin there will be Russia; without Putin there will be no Russia," Volodin told a meeting of the so-called Valday club of Russia analysts, as quoted by government-owned Russian newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta on 24 October.

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#4
Moscow Times
April 21, 2015
Western Rejection Rains on Russia's Victory Day Parade
By Ivan Nechepurenko

The Kremlin's iconic watchtower has been renovated especially for the occasion, new military hardware will be unveiled on Red Square and the clouds will no doubt be seeded to prevent any chance of rain on the parade - but a host of world leaders have rejected invitations to Russia's grand party.

The intense attention being paid in Russia to which world leaders are coming to upcoming Victory Day celebrations in Moscow - and which are not - is a sign that despite its confrontation with the West over Ukraine, Russia's leaders still believe their country is a part of the West, and any sign to the contrary offends them, experts told The Moscow Times on Monday.

Russia will celebrate the 70th anniversary of the Allied victory against Nazism on May 9 with a large-scale military parade on Red Square. Commemoration of the war, in which the Soviet Union lost more than 20 million people, is considered sacred in Russia.

In contrast to the last big Victory Day anniversary one decade ago, most high-profile guests of the upcoming Red Square parade are coming not from Western countries, but from Asia, Latin America and Africa, with Chinese President Xi Jinping being the most prominent confirmed international guest so far.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel will not come to the parade on May 9, but will attend a wreath-laying ceremony at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in front of the Kremlin the next day, RIA Novosti reported in March.

U.S. President Barack Obama will not be coming due to Russia's role in the Ukraine conflict, the White House said last week. Even Alexander Lukashenko, president of Russia's closest ally Belarus, said Saturday he won't be attending the parade because he will preside over another one in Minsk.

Russian leaders have attempted to demonstrate indifference over the issue. Answering a question about the absence of Western leaders at the parade during his annual call-in show on Thursday, President Vladimir Putin said that their presence was not essential.

"It is up to them to decide. We are celebrating our national holiday. ... We pay tribute to the generation of victors. We do this so that the present generation, both here and abroad, never forgets about this and never allows anything like this to happen again," Putin said.

Sergei Ivanov, head of the presidential administration, has said 25 foreign leaders have preliminarily confirmed they will come to the celebrations.

"As a rule, normal people invite their friends and loved ones. Whoever comes or doesn't come, Russia will survive. This is our celebration," he told the TASS news agency earlier this month.

According to Andrei Piontkovsky, a veteran Russian political analyst who is also active with the opposition movement, the Russian government is in a situation of cognitive dissonance in its relationship with the West.

"On the one hand, our leaders are launching an anti-Western campaign, but on the other, they still think of themselves as respectable members of the West," he said in a phone interview.

"This whole hybrid war over Ukraine was an attempt to obtain higher status within the West, not to become fundamentally separate from it. The Soviet Union was separate, Russia is not," Piontkovsky said.

The Way We Were

One decade ago, the atmosphere surrounding Victory Day celebrations could not have been more different. The leaders of all major Western nations, including U.S. President George W. Bush, came to Moscow to see the anniversary parade. Bush drove Putin in a renovated Soviet GAZ-21 Volga car in the presidential dacha estate near Moscow.

In a series of meetings arranged around the commemoration event, Putin signed a statement on the creation of a Russian-Ukrainian intergovernmental commission with Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko, who had been brought to power after a series of pro-Western public protests in Kiev just months before the celebrations.

The Russian leader also signed with EU leaders the most important integration agreement between Russia and Europe since the Soviet collapse.

This time, Russia is under sanctions by the United States, European Union and other countries and organizations over the situation in Ukraine, and the implementation of all previous agreements has been put on hold. Ukraine has declared Russia an aggressor, while Obama listed Russia as an international threat alongside the Ebola epidemic and Islamic terrorists in Syria and Iraq.

Nevertheless, the Kremlin is still not willing to accept that Russia is isolated from the West, and events such as the upcoming Victory Day celebrations demonstrate only too clearly that it is in fact isolated, said Alexander Morozov, a political analyst and editor-in-chief of the online magazine Russian Journal.

"It is very important for Putin to demonstrate that Western representatives will come to the celebrations, there is a struggle for every European leader," he said in a phone interview.

"At the same time, Russia has made a huge about-face in the last decade, because it failed to forge something new to replace the Soviet identity," he said.

The failure to create a new identity has forced Russian leaders to look for inspiration in the past, making Russia's victory over Nazism the main justification of its status as a great power, said Vladimir Gelman, a political science professor at the European University in St. Petersburg.

"Victory in the Great Patriotic War [as World War II is known in Russia] is the main source of national pride for Russia on the global level. The fact that Western leaders are not coming to its anniversary shows that they don't see Russia as a great power," Gelman said in a phone interview.

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 #5
Global Times
April 16, 2015
WWII anniversary parade snubs push Moscow diplomatic shift
By Dmitri Trenin
The author is director of the Carnegie Moscow Center.

Politics, including international relations, is about symbols as well as actions. When Russia staged the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, it sought to present the image of a modern country, open to the world. Next month, when Russia will hold a military parade in Red Square to celebrate the 70th anniversary of victory in the Great Patriotic War against Nazi Germany, it will be restating its role in the allied victory in World War II. The USSR, which the present-day Russian Federation regards as its direct predecessor, lost at least 28 million people in that epic war.

Russians generally believe that their most valuable contribution to humanity was the defeat of Hitler's war machine. May 9, Victory Day, has been Russia's true, and truly sacred, national day, ever since 1945.

Since the end of Cold War, the Kremlin has made a habit of inviting world leaders to the Victory Day anniversaries in Moscow.

In 1995, then US president Bill Clinton came to Moscow; in 2005, it was George W. Bush. In 2015, they invited Barack Obama. However, not only Obama is staying at home; with very few exceptions, Western leaders are collectively boycotting the event. This is a way for them to protest over Russia's actions in Crimea and its policies toward Ukraine.

The trend toward minimizing direct contacts with Vladimir Putin had been evident even before the Ukraine crisis. Most Western countries, led by the US, stayed away from the Sochi Olympics, censuring Russia for other transgressions, such as legislation banning gay "propaganda" to minors. In 2013, Obama, in an unprecedented step, canceled his official visit to Moscow, over the Snowden affair.

This tightening boycott illustrates the depth and breadth of the chasm now separating Russia and the West. To many ordinary Russians, the collective Western no-show is more than a sign of disapproval of their leader's policies. This is a slight against their most cherished national heritage. What is worse, they also hear that the West is supporting a Ukrainian leadership that formally equates communism with Nazism, and blames Stalin, alongside Hitler, for the outbreak of WWII.

As a result, common victory in WWII, which even during the highly ideological Cold War was recognized as a measure of the potential for Soviet-Western cooperation and a thus hope for a better future, is no longer shared.

On May 9, the lineup of Moscow's guests of honor will demonstrate the dramatic change in Russia's international position over the past 18 months. The two dozen or so top-level visitors will come mostly from the non-Western countries of Asia, Latin America, and Africa. Among them, Chinese President Xi Jinping will be the most prominent.

Russia's divorce from its Western partners will be clear for everyone to see. Even the German chancellor will pointedly avoid the Red Square parade, only to appear the following day for a wreath-laying ceremony.

The rupture is as much symbolic as it is real. Russia's quarter-century-long quest for acceptance in or by the West is finally over.

In 2014, the country returned to its traditional Eurasian posture, albeit no longer as an aspiring hegemon in either Europe or Asia. Solidifying relations with its partners in the region such as Armenia, Belarus, or Kazakhstan, will be very important, but the key relationship for Moscow in the foreseeable future will be that with Beijing.

In return for Xi's decision to visit Victory Day parade in Red Square, Putin will visit China to celebrate the event to mark the end of WWII in September, something no Russian or Soviet leader has done before.  

Russia's focus on the non-Western world is not limited to China, of course. Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev has recently completed a visit to Vietnam and Thailand, looking for economic opportunities in Southeast Asia. Kim Jong-un, the North Korean leader, is also expected to make it to Moscow on May 9. Ties to Turkey, Iran, Egypt and Syria are all being expanded. Two months after the parade in Red Square, Putin will be hosting back-to-back summits of BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Ufa.

Anniversaries, parades and even summits are mostly about public relations. However, beyond the fanfares, martial music and the roar of aircraft flying over Red Square, Russia's foreign policy will require a new identity and new orientation.

Having seen, in the past year, its Plan A, Western integration of Russia, fail and Plan B for Eurasian integration around Russia scaled down, Moscow will have to come up with a realistic Plan C, featuring a close and yet balanced partnership with China and expanded relations with non-Western countries around the world.

 #6
U.S. ambassador confirms Obama's non-attendance of May festivities in Moscow

MOSCOW. April 21 (Interfax) - The United States Ambassador to Russia, John Tefft, has confirmed that it will be he who is representing his country at a military parade in Moscow on May 9 on the occasion of the 70th V-Day anniversary.

When asked on the Ekho Moskvy radio on Tuesday why U.S. President Barack Obama declined the invitation to come to Moscow to attend the V-Day festivities, Tefft said that, as the president himself would explain, the reason is Ukraine. And this is not just Obama's decision but also that of most leaders of European countries and, probably, other regions as well, he said.

There is a feeling in the U.S. that during the parade Moscow will also be celebrating what happened in Ukraine, he said.

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 #7
Sputnik
April 21, 2015
Russia Has Never Run Into So Many Challenges at One Time - Medvedev

MOSCOW (Sputnik) - Russia has never run into so many challenges at one time, including the crash of oil prices and severe Western economic sanctions, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev said Tuesday.

"For the first time in Russia's history after the fall of the USSR, we have fallen under the consequences of two external shocks immediately: the sharp decline in oil prices and unjustified serious sanctions. Our country has never run into such a collection of challenges at the same time," Medvedev said in a report before the lower house of parliament.

Medvedev added that these two major challenges were escorted in with Russia's lowering of its investment rating and large-scale capital flight.

In late January, the Russian Ministry of Economic Development revised its economic forecast for 2015 and said that it expects the GDP to shrink by 3 percent and inflation to hit 12 percent with oil prices at $50 a barrel. The minister added capital flight from Russia is estimated to reach $115 billion.

Earlier in April, Russian Economic Development Minister Alexei Ulyukayev said the recession will come to an end in the third quarter of this year and the GDP will begin growing in the last three months of 2015 or early 2016.

During last week's marathon Q&A session, President Vladimir Putin said that the Russian economy is on track to recover in less than two years.

Negative trends in Russia's economy will continue throughout 2015, according to Dmitry Medvedev.

"These negative trends will remain throughout this year. In January-March the GDP dropped by 2 percent, the volume of industrial production by 0.4 percent...the greatest decline felt has been noted in investment activity," Medvedev said.

In his report before the lower house of parliement Medvedev estimated the losses of Western sanctions. "The losses that our economy had sustained are significant, and we are not going to hide them. According to some foreign experts, Russia has already lost 25 billion euro ($26.7 billion, or 1.5 percent of GDP). And it may multiply in 2015," he said.

The United States, the European Union and their allies have imposed several rounds of anti-Russia sanctions in 2014 over Moscow's alleged interference in Ukrainian armed conflict.

Moscow, denying the accusations, responded with a food import ban on countries that introduced the sanctions.

The sanctions target Russia's banking, energy and defense sectors, as well as certain individuals the West suspects of being directly involved in the deterioration of the Ukrainian crisis.

Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev is against limiting the operations of foreign trade chains in the country because they give consumers a choice in goods.

"Import substitution is not simply a nice slogan, it's fundamental work that we have initiated lately. It's understandable that we're not talking about full economic self-isolation. I'll give an example. Our colleagues from the [Communist Party] believe that the existence of foreign trade chains is superfluous, but from the point of view of the consumer, the more choices, the better," Medvedev said in a report before the lower house of parliament.

He said that this did not just pertain to foreign chains, but to Russian ones as well.

"We don't only have foreign chains, but we have our own as well that were built from scratch. We remember the shelves of soviet stores. I think that no one wants to return to them, including our communist colleagues," he added.

Russian economy has learned how to survive without massive inflows of foreign capital, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev said.

"Of course, this situation is not beneficial for us, this is absolutely obvious," the prime minister said. "We will survive, of course. We have learned how to live without an inflow of foreign capital, how to live normally."

The prime minister also noted that the Russian government focuses on creating favorable conditions for the competitive Russian suppliers.

"And not only on the food market. We are identifying sensitive positions where the import substitution is truly justifiable," Medvedev added.

Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev at the same time mentioned that the Russian government's measures taken to stabilize the currency exchange rate has led to the economy gradually adapting to the floating exchange rate of the ruble.

"Last year we began taking the needed measures and many measures were then applied to the Plan of Initial Events, which have already proven effective. The currency market has calmed down and the economy is gradually adapting to the floating exchange rate of the ruble," Medvedev said in a report before the lower house of parliament.

The prime minister said Russia's state debt has climbed since last year but is within the economic safety margin, while the unemployment rate stays comparatively low. The central bank's key interest rate has decreased together with inflation, Medvedev added. At the end of 2014, inflation in Russia stood at 11.4 percent.

The Russian economy has deteriorated in recent months due to a major slump in global oil prices and Western sanctions imposed against Moscow over its alleged role in the escalation of the Ukrainian crisis.

Russia's Finance Minister Anton Siluanov said earlier that the recession had passed its peak. In spring 2015, the Russian national currency began to strengthen against the dollar and the euro.

Pessimistic prognoses on the unemployment level in Russia are so far not coming true, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev said.

"Of course, the situations in the regions are various. Today's level of unemployment, which is 5.8-5.9 percent, is just slightly higher than last year's level. And I believe that it's very important that we sustain this figure. Today, we can say with assuredness that the pessimistic prognoses on the job market are inaccurate," Medvedev said in a report before the lower house of parliament.

Medvedev emphasized that the Russian government in January worked out additional measures to support the labor market while the regions have formed their own programs to tackle unemployment.

In 2015 alone, over 27.2 billion rubles [$510 million] will be allocated from the federal budget to organize temporary employment for those who have lost or may lose their jobs as well as to create vocational training and internships, Medvedev stated.

Russia continues to hold a leading position among world exporters of weapons and the country has approximately $49 billion in arms deals sealed.
"Russia continues to firmly hold one of the leading positions among world exporters of weaponry. The share of arms exports in Russia's overall volume, according to preliminary data, for 2014 is 3.2 percent. Revenues have reached a very high level of $15.74 billion. Orders [for weapons exports] today stand at around $49 billion," Medvedev stressed in a report.

The government has paid particular attention to the development of the defense industry, the prime minister stressed. The share of high-technology production made up 63 percent in 2014 - a growth of almost 10 percent since 2011.

Also Medvedev noted that the Russian federal budget for 2016 will be very difficult and effective cooperation from the parliament will help in finding additional resources to balance it.

"I hope that while working on the budget for next year, which will be very rough, we will work together as effectively [as with the last budget] to find a way to balance it and search for additional reserves," Russian Prime Minister said.

The Russian parliament worked hard on the federal budget for 2015, adopting latest amendments just recently, the prime minister stressed.

Russia's budget heavily depends on energy exports. Due to a dramatic drop in world oil prices, the country is currently experiencing an economic downturn.

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 #8
www.rt.com
April 21, 2015
Russia faces toughest economic challenges in modern history - Medvedev

Russia has never faced so many challenges at once like now, including the crash of oil prices and severe Western economic sanctions. However, it adapted to a new economic reality and even managed to stabilize, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev said.

"For the first time in Russian history since the breakup of the USSR, we have come under the influence of two external shocks immediately: the sharp decline in oil prices and serious unjustified sanctions. Our country has never run into such a collection of challenges at the same time," Medvedev said on Tuesday in an annual report to the State Duma, the lower house of the Russian parliament.

The reality in 2014 appeared to become more complicated than the worst expectations, according to the Prime Minister. He compared the oil prices fall to $9 per barrel in 1998 to the present time, "considering the dollar's changing purchasing power and a number of other economic factors and indicators". The latest sanctions are also the worst in the history of the country, he said.

The losses the Russian economy has sustained from sanctions are significant; according to the Prime Minister some experts have put it at €25 billion. Negative trends in Russian economy will continue throughout 2015, he added.

"In January-March the GDP dropped by 2 percent, the volume of industrial production by 0.4 percent. The greatest decline felt has been noted in investment activity," Medvedev said.

If the external pressure increases and oil prices remain at extremely low levels for a long time, we will have to develop in a different economic reality, which will challenge our strength, the Prime Minister said, adding that he was confident that Russia could live even in such a reality.

'Far from worst-case scenario'

However, the Russian PM says the current crisis is not the worst possible, especially since the situation managed to stabilize. "Everything that is happening is far from a worst-case scenario and could be much worse and much more difficult," Medvedev said pointing to unemployment, the situation with prices, the state of the banking system and the production sector.

He claimed that last year the Russian government started to take steps, given the past experience of the 2008 crisis. The foreign exchange market calmed down and the economy is gradually adapting to the floating exchange rate of the ruble.

"We still maintain a relatively low level of public debt. The federal budget deficit, although slightly increased, according to the results of this year will remain at an economically safe level. Unemployment remains within reasonable parameters, it is low against corresponding conditions in other countries," Medvedev said.

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 #9
Moscow Times
April 21, 2015
Ruble Rebound Slows Russia's Rampant Food Price Inflation
By Delphine d'Amora

The ruble's rapid recovery in recent weeks has seen prices on some foods fall, easing months of spiraling inflation and softening one of the most widely felt blows of Russia's economic crisis.

All major retailers contacted by The Moscow Times last week said that the ruble's rebound of some 30 percent against the U.S. dollar since early February had lowered the prices of some products.

"We are observing a trend toward the reduction of prices for imported goods, as well as goods provided by Russian suppliers but containing imported components [raw materials and/or packaging]," said Oksana Tokareva, a spokeswoman for German retailer Metro Cash & Carry.

Retailers Lenta, Dixy and X5 Retail Group all said that, after securing lower prices from wholesalers in view of the ruble's recovery, they were able to reduce the price of some butter, cheese and other dairy products by between 8 and 15 percent.

The price of grains and canned goods has also visibly dropped, said Maria Kurnosova, head of public relations in Russia for French retailer Auchan.

The ruble's rebound has happily coincided with the onset of summer, when prices on a range of fresh products typically fall thanks to increased supply. Both these factors have pushed the price of imported fresh fish - one of the categories that rose most sharply late last year - down 30 percent compared to December, Kurnosova said.

These price drops are a rare helping of good news for a nation that has endured months of breakneck price rises.

Year-on-year food price inflation soared to a high of 24.7 percent in March, according to state statistics service Rosstat, propelled first by Russia's bans last year on food imports from the West - a response to Western sanctions over Ukraine - and then by a steep drop in the value of the Russian currency.

The ruble plummeted about 40 percent against the U.S. dollar in the second half of 2014 as the price of oil plummeted and international tensions over Russia's involvement in the Ukraine crisis spurred capital flight.

Urgent Issue

As the cost of imported food and ingredients rose, the menace of inflation became an urgent domestic issue.

The Levada Center, an independent pollster, reported in March that 82 percent of survey respondents viewed precipitous price rises as Russia's most pressing problem. Inflation has consistently ranked as a top issue for Russians, many of whom saw their savings evaporate during the runaway inflation of the 1990s.

Russian officials have responded by regularly exhorting retailers to keep prices down. The Prosecutor General's Office in January even organized a four-day wave of inspections in supermarkets across the country, with investigators on the hunt for unjustified price markups.

Major retailers, in turn, took their own steps to subdue food price inflation. Twelve major retail chains - including all those contacted for this article - agreed in February to freeze prices on a list of "socially important" goods for a period of two months.

Along with the ruble's recovery and seasonal factors, this "targeted reduction of prices to stimulate weak consumer demand ... has affected price reductions," said Natalya Kolupayeva, a retail and consumer market analyst at Raiffeisenbank.

There is now a sense among consumers that the peak of inflation is over. After rising sharply from 32 percent in the third quarter of last year, the number of Russians scrimping on food purchases fell from a high of 49 percent in February to 46 percent in March, according to consumer researcher Synovate Comcon.

Statistics too are indicating an ebb in price rises. Total weekly inflation slowed to just 0.1 percent in the week between April 7 and 13, with year-on-year inflation falling for the first time since July last year, according to Rosstat.

Still, many distributors are holding off on sweeping price adjustments. "For the time being, most distributors are maintaining a wait-and-see approach," X5 Retail Group's press service said.

Their reasoning is clear, Kolupayeva said: "We can hardly speak confidently about the ruble exchange rate staying at its current level through the end of the year. There are risks that it will weaken."

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 #10
What can help Russians out of loan trap?
By Lyudmila Alexandrova

MOSCOW, April 20. /TASS/. Russians' loan debts to banks keep growing, while the strained situation in the economy often leaves borrowers no chance to make payments on time. According to the daily Novyie Izvestia, the debt of 4% of the borrowers is dozens of times higher than the average monthly earnings. The situation is quite unpleasant, but not catastrophic yet, analysts say.

"At the moment there are 40 million borrowers in Russia who have taken a total of 78 million loans," the daily quotes financial ombudsman, Pavel Medvedev as saying. "Of this amount 15% are in default."

Twenty percent of the respondents polled by the debt collector company Sequoia Credit Consolidation say they cannot pay the loan back because they have lost their jobs, and 15% say they have suffered wage cuts.

The aggressive growth of consumer lending in 2010-2013 caused a considerable increase in the debt burden on the population. Half of Russia's borrowers take consumer loans with very short repayment terms and super-high interest rates. The number of those having three, four or five loans to pay back is growing. Each consecutive loan is taken to repay the previous one.

Yet the situation is not so bad as it might seem, research fellow at the Structural Analysis Centre of the presidential academy RANEPA, Mikhail Khromov, has told TASS. According to the specialist, Russians' overall debt to banks on loans taken to pay the mortgage or buy consumer goods or motor vehicles stands at 11.5 trillion roubles (about 230 billion US dollars). Since the beginning of 2015 overdue retail loans in Russia have been up 14% to 842 billion roubles (about 16.7 billion US dollars). On April 1, Khromov said, overdue loan debts accounted for 7.1% of the overall indebtedness. During the 2010 crisis the rate at times rose to 7.7%.

This time, Khromov warns, things may get worse.

"We are still in the process of sinking into the crisis and in a far worse conditions. During the previous crisis the problem was tackled differently. Some debts were rescheduled, others written off, and the hopeless ones sold to collector agencies. The law on individual's bankruptcies due to take effect this year probably facilitate the solution of the problem."

"The situation is complicated. People's incomes are shrinking, and debts soaring. Banks make lending terms ever harsher," leading research fellow of the Central Banks Studies Centre at the presidential academy RANEPA, Pavel Trunin, told TASS. The expert sees no disaster on the horizon, but the situation is rather strained "by virtue of the general state of affairs in the economy."

The deputy chief of the Finance, Monetary Circulation and Credit chair at the RANEPA academy, Aleksandr Khandruyev, points to the fact that the amount of overdue debts in Russia is lower than in the advanced countries during the crisis.

Non-payment on loans is not a disaster for banks, he says. "Shortage of capital is a far more serious problem for banks. In general, the overall share of retail loans in Russia is rather small in contrast to what can be seen in the advanced countries - 15%-20% of all lending. As for credits issued to legal entities, there are overdue debt problems, too: 5%-7%, but that is normal."

Experts believe that two laws will improve the situation considerably: one, on the bankruptcy of individuals, effective as of July 1, and the other, on the financial ombudsman, which is still in the drafting phase. One concerns the rescheduling of debts larger than 500,000 roubles, and the other, smaller ones.

In the former case the rescheduling will be done by a judge, and in the latter, by the financial commissioner. It will give a chance to postpone a
settlement of the debt for some time.

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 #11
Moscow Times
April 21, 2015
Russian Global Trade Plummets as Economic Crisis Deepens
By Peter Hobson

Russia's trade turnover with the outside world plunged 30.1 percent year-on-year in the first two months of 2015 as oil price falls, currency devaluation and tit-for-tat sanctions shook the Russian economy.  

The value of Russia's international trade fell to $83.3 billion over January and February, according to data published by the Rosstat state statistics agency Monday.

Total imports plummeted $25.7 billion, a fall of 37.6 percent compared to the same period last year, while exports plunged 23.8 percent to $57.6 billion, the data showed. This left Russia with a trade surplus of $31.9 billion - roughly the same amount as in the first two months of 2014.

According to the data, trade between Russia and the European Union fell by 34.3 percent to $38.2 billion. Among the hardest hit were Poland, whose trade with Russia slumped 48.9 percent, Britain, which saw trade shrink 51.9 percent, and France, where trade was down 42.6 percent year-on-year.

Trade turnover between Russia and the U.S. fell only 6.4 percent, while Russia-Japanese trade volumes grew 16.7 percent - the only rise in Russian bilateral trade outside the former Soviet Union.

The figures came as the Russian economy buckles under a series of shocks. The price of oil, Russia's main export, has fallen 45 percent since highs of $115 per barrel last summer. Moscow and the West, at loggerheads over the Ukraine crisis, have imposed tit-for-tat economic sanctions that restrict the flow of goods and cash across borders. Russia's economy is expected to contract by up to 5 percent this year, and the ruble has weakened by around 40 percent since the start of 2014, making overseas purchases more expensive.

The slump in trade with Russia has ricocheted out to neighboring countries, dampening growth in former Soviet countries and complicating Europe's recovery from an economic slowdown in 2012.

Russian export revenues from oil and gas over January and February fell by almost 40 percent year-on-year to $22.4 billion, according to Rosstat's data.

Imports of machinery and vehicles fell 39.6 percent to $11.4 billion.

Food imports have borne the brunt of sanctions thanks to Moscow's embargo on many products from Europe, the United States and other countries that have sanctioned Russia. According to Rosstat, the value of food imports fell by 42.5 percent year-on-year to $3.7 billion in January and February.

Imports of red meat slumped 55.6 percent, imports of chicken fell 44.5 percent and the quantity of fish entering Russia fell 56.2 percent. Butter imports fell 69 percent, and 60.6 percent less cheese entered the country.

The only products to see imports rise were apples and oils, including palm oil and sunflower oil, Rosstat said.

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 #12
CNBC.com
April 21, 2015
Why Russia is more confident: Finance Minister
By Catherine Boyle    

Russia's economy has been through a series of seismic shocks in the past year - but there are increasing reasons to be optimistic as the amount of money being pulled out of the country slows, according to the country's Finance Minister, Anton Siluanov.

"Capital outflows have decreased as people started to sell their dollars to buy rubles," Siluanov said in an interview with CNBC.

"We also foresee a slowdown in capital outflows in the current quarter by 50 percent compared to the first quarter."

In the past year, Russia has been plunged into an economic mire by the low oil price, sanctions imposed on the country following the conflict in Ukraine, and the resulting high inflation and devaluation of the ruble.

The country is expected to fall into recession this year. Russian businesses are running into increased pressure when doing business overseas - as billionaire oil investor Mikhail Fridman recently found out to his cost.

Fridman's investment vehicle, L1 Energy, chaired by former BP chief executive Lord Browne, has bought North Sea oil assets as part of its $7-billion purchase of German oil company DEA from parent RWE. The U.K. government has now given the company three months to sell off the assets, citing worries about future sanctions against Fridman.

While there have been plenty of "informal" sanctions against Russian businesses by Western companies worried about future penalties, this is one of the first to be made public in this way.

The next test of how much Russian business has been locked out of the international marketplace could come later this year, if one of the big Russian corporates due to refinance debt tries to do so on international capital markets.

"We see that yields are going down, and are almost at pre-crisis levels. So the first step, as we see it - our corporates will borrow funds from capital markets, and we will monitor the situation and possibly we shall not refuse to take into account external borrowing in our plans," Siluanov told CNBC.

There are some grounds for his optimism, as the ruble is the year's best-performing currency to date (from a very low base) and there has been a rally in Russia's dollar-denominated stock markets, following a small oil price rally.

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 #13
USAToday.com
April 21, 2015
Ruble rebounds thanks to high Russian interest rates
By Anna Arutunyan

MOSCOW- Russia's ruble has rebounded by more than 30% from its record low against the U.S. dollar last December, thanks to high interest rates and lower geopolitical tensions.

The ruble had plummeted to 70 to the dollar amid falling prices for oil - Russia's top export - and new Western sanctions over Moscow's support for separatists in neighboring Ukraine. Now, it takes only 54 rubles to equal a dollar, evidence that aggressive moves by Russia's Central Bank to defend the currency have paid off.

The bank's key rate, which was boosted to 17% last December, is now 14%, still sky-high compared to Western economies.

Financial analysts said the ruble's surprising recovery is also due to an upward correction in oil prices, which have leveled off, and less geopolitical risk about a war in Ukraine that could create a new Russian standoff with the West. The Ukraine government and rebels in the east are observing a cease-fire, although fighting in some areas continues.

"There is no bad news, at least, on the geopolitical front," Central Bank first deputy chairwoman Ksenia Yudina wrote in an article for the Vedomosti newspaper on Sunday.

Yudina cited high interest rates as the main reason for the ruble's rally. "Russian assets are some of the most high-yielding in the world," she wrote.

Private analysts said the ruble fell too far during the winter. "The ruble was very much oversold last year, and its collapse was not just due to falling oil prices," said Natalia Orlova, chief economist at Alfa Bank. Oil bottomed out and began a slight recovery, she said, but the real reasons for the ruble's growth over the last month lie in Russia's high yields.

"When we look at comparative yields, Russia is looking pretty attractive" for investors, Orlova said.

Still, Orlova does not rule out continued volatility for the ruble, as its recent decline from just under 50 to the dollar last Friday indicate. "You can't really say that the ruble is strong, given that it was 30-35 to the dollar at the beginning of 2014," she said. "It's merely reached its fundamental value of 50-55 to the dollar. And it will continue to fluctuate."

The stronger ruble has not spilled over to the Russia economy, which appears headed for a deepening recession because of lower oil prices and sanctions from the West. In fact, some members of parliament asked the Central Bank this month to keep the ruble from getting too strong, saying it is hurting exporters.

Inflation is high and projected to reach 16% this year, according to Russia's Ministry of Economic Development. As a result, inflation-adjusted salaries have fallen by 8.3% in the first quarter of 2015, according to figures cited by Vedomosti.

Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, speaking Tuesday during a parliamentary address, said the economic challenges were unprecedented and he called on Russians to prepare for a "new economic reality," Rossiiskaya Gazeta reported.

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 #14
Interfax
April 21, 2015
Civil Assistance NGO defies 'foreign agent' status, ready to go to ECHR

The Civil Assistance human rights organization will appeal the Russian Justice Ministry's decision to assign it 'foreign agent' status.

"Naturally, we will lodge an appeal against this decision with the district court," the organization's lawyer Kirill Koroteyev has said.

"We will also request a suspension of the Justice Ministrys ruling because the filing of a complaint itself is unable to suspend it. If our courts support the Prosecutor's Office and the Justice Ministry, we will go to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)," Koroteyev said in a statement on behalf of Civil Assistance, seen by Interfax on Monday.

A Russian Justice Ministry spokesman told Interfax earlier that following prosecutors' inspection, Civil Assistance had been included in Russia's list of 'foreign agent' non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which receive funding from abroad and are involved in political activities.

Civil Assistance is one of Russia's leading NGOs helping refugees.

The Prosecutor's Office began inspecting Civil Assistance at the end of January. Human rights activists said then that they had provided prosecutors with 700 documents. On March 20, the Prosecutor's Office demanded that this NGO be registered in accordance with the 'foreign agent' law.

The Russian Justice Ministry has already assigned 'foreign agent' status to over 50 NGOs, including the Memorial center, the Sakharov Museum and Public Center in Moscow and the For Human Rights movement.

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 #15
Russia Needs a Civil Society But Not a Liberal One, Rostov Analysts Argue
Paul Goble

Staunton, April 21 - The West and Russia's liberal intelligentsia equate civil society with the liberal opposition, but this is a serious error, two Russian analysts say. Instead, civil society need not be an opponent of the authorities but "yet another 'branch of power'" that can take on itself things that "other branches for one or another reason cannot."

In a commentary on Beregrus.ru, Stanislav Smagin and Natalya Smagina say that a conservative Russian civil society is already on the scene as shown by protests against anti-government broadcasters, the boycott of pro-Ukrainian musicians, and the closing of the production of Tannhauser (beregrus.ru/?p=4201).

"The formation of a civil society," the two Rostov-based analysts write, "is an aspect of a still larger and more serious problem connected with overcoming the atomization of [Russian society] which has taken place in recent decades," an atomization promoted by liberalism which "became from the beginning of the 1990s, the official doctrine of the Russian authorities."

Atomization is just one of "the destructive Western theories" with which Russians must now struggle, the two analysts continue. And to that end, they say, Russians must focus again on common themes and "mutual support at all horizontal and vertical levels of the society, from the family and nation down" the latter to the neighborhood, workplace and so on.

If Russians organize themselves to express their feelings, they will be in a position to insist on "a decisive and harsh revision of newspapers, journals and television" and of the Russian stage," where "at times" writers and actors promote "the position of Ukraine on the Crimean issue."

Civil society rightly understood, they suggest, can play a key role in changing this situation and thus do what the state in some cases is unable to.

The Smagins argue that two key institutions not typically included in the liberal enumeration of civil society organizations can play a key role: the Russian Orthodox Church which they say must be made the state religion and the Russian nation which they argue must be declared the "state-forming" people.

Only by so doing can Russians fight atomization and help the government, the two commentators suggest.

There are three reasons why the article by the Smaginas is important. First, it is a reminder to everyone that civil society is a place of struggle rather than the institutionalization of liberal values. Too many in both Russia and the West have assumed that if there are enough NGOs and thus civil society, there will be a liberal state. That simply isn't true.

Second, their argument that the church and the nation are civil society organizations, a point of view many liberals would object to, is worth noting, especially given that both the church and the nation help shape opinion in ways even more politically effective than groups which are normally classed as being part of civil society.

And third, the Smaginas' argument that civil society can be an ally of the state is important should not be ignored because, on the one hand, many who have a liberal understanding of civil society assume that it will work with the state too; and on the other, many groups the Smaginas would like to see in play will work with the state for other ends.

Looming behind all this, of course, are two other factors both of which deserve attention even if the Smaginas do not address them. What they are talking about could be the first stage of a new mobilization society, one in which the individual's atomized position would be replaced by membership in a corporate-style group.

And it could also point to something else: Such groups in an illiberal civil society could become powerful players in politics, pushing the Russian authorities in directions ever further from the liberal democracy in which so many have placed so much hope.  In that event, their form of civil society could prove to be the death of the other one, yet another Russian tragedy.

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 #16
Moscow Times
April 21, 2015
Russia Is in Denial, But It Belongs in the EU
By Maxim Goryunov
Maxim Goryunov is a Moscow-based philosopher

Russia's place - despite its "special" historical path, fidelity to traditional values and mysterious spirituality - is in the European Union. This is because, to be perfectly honest, the EU is no more a bastion of European values than Russia is a Third Rome.

The European Union is really a club of those who have lost their former empires, and who, for various reasons, have been forced to confine themselves within their own borders.

They represent the last remnants of the Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, Austrian, German, French, Turkish, Polish and Swedish empires.

They have all lost that sweet status of "empire builder." The luckiest was the British Empire, which continues to exist today, albeit in vastly scaled-down form.

This hapless club of empire losers formed an alliance in order to survive in the new world where there are three times as many Muslims, Buddhists and Taoists than there are Christians, where the United States is a towering colossus and the red dragon of China grows more powerful by the day.

That alliance is teeming with imperial slimebags that would be only too happy to get back on top and snatch their own little Crimeas, but their powers are not what they used to be and the situation is not as amenable as it used to be.

Could it be that the EU is so slow to come to Ukraine's aid because, despite all its claims to the contrary, it feels closer to Moscow than to Kiev?

The Czechs, Slovaks, Croats, Finns and Scots - in fact, any people that has had to protect its identity from assimilation by an imperial center - can understand the plight of the Ukrainians.

But how could the French empathize with Ukrainians, if they themselves were only recently forced, under the volley of war guns, to relinquish their chokehold on colonies in North Africa and Indochina?

A Pole of my acquaintance told me that the Polish nationalists he knows are big fans of Russian nationalist Alexander Dugin, and other such figures with outsized geopolitical aspirations.

In the place of present-day Russia, they would like to see Poland rising from its knees, traditional, militarized and with an emphasis on Catholicism.

If they had their way, they would annex the ancestral Polish territories in Belarus, Lithuania and Ukraine, and so on to the ends of the earth if it were possible.

Russia's behavior simply shows what will happen if Washington, as "GloboCop," stops whacking the likes of France and Turkey over the head just long enough for them to remember their predatory past and start pining for the era of white pith helmets and slave collars.

The moment that GloboCop retires from the scene, the world will devolve into the mass mayhem of hybrid and even outright war.

Some country like Hungary, which today behaves like an upstanding citizen, will tomorrow, sensing the absence of controls, ruthlessly invade Slovakia and spill rivers of blood - as Russia is now doing in eastern and southern Ukraine - seizing this or that worthless village because it once belonged to a Hungarian prince.

For that matter, what would stop France from standing up straight, spreading its shoulders and remembering its interests in Morocco, or stop Spain from casting its eye on Colombia?

This has nothing to do with economics. Did Moscow calculate its probable losses when it launched its Crimea escapade?

What is running the show here is a national myth based on imperial propaganda.

That myth is largely a substitute for dogmatic religion: it tenaciously holds the hearts and minds of its adherents, and at the slightest touch, instantly - like some uncanny self-defense mechanism - generates a wave of imperial sentiment like that seen in Russia last spring.

Does the same phenomenon not explain the steadily growing success of nationalists in parliamentary elections in Europe?

Today's Russia is puffed up with false pride, trying not to admit to itself how outsized that gold filament-embroidered tunic of the Romanov empire now looks upon its neck.

Moscow rattles its nuclear arms and makes a scary face, although it has long been clear that with its corruption-ridden and fragile economy, negative demographic trends, capital flight, comatose science, and with giant China casting its shadow over the Far East, Russia should be beating a path to Brussels so fast that it zips past Ukraine along the way.

That will eventually happen. The only question is, under what conditions will Brussels receive Moscow, and will Russia have fully accepted the obvious fact that the 19th century ended in the 19th century?

If rational thinking wins out over propagandistic folly, in the near future the European Union really will stretch all the way to Vladivostok and the Moscow leadership will open branch offices in Brussels.

In fact, Russia has long been over there - after buying European real estate, educating its children there and making faltering attempts at mastering the language.

Russia is already in the EU. It is just too shy to admit it, and is willfully resisting the truth.

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 #17
Stratfor
April 20, 2015
Russia Changes Its Tone

Over the weekend, Russia's President Vladimir Putin appeared to soften his line against the West, particularly the United States. Having previously stated that the United States has no allies, only vassals, Putin this time said: "We have some disagreements on several issues on the international agenda. But at the same time there is something that unites us, forces us to work together. I mean general efforts directed at making the world economy more democratic, measured and balanced, so that the world order is more democratic. We have a common agenda."

There is little that can be drawn from a single statement or conversation. Yet this would appear to be a rational evolution in Russian policy. Amid the Ukrainian crisis, Russia has suffered three economic blows. One came from the sanctions. A second was a cyclical downturn in the Russian economy. The most massive was the collapse of world oil prices. The importance of the sharply declining economy among the Russian people was evident during Putin's call-in question-and-answer session last Thursday, where matters of the economy - not Ukraine or the West - dominated Russians' minds.

Moscow has recently expressed satisfaction at the stabilization of the ruble. However, it knows that the currency has fallen in value from a year ago, as well as that what goes up can come down. The underlying economy remains weak, and those economic stresses are widening fault lines within the Kremlin.

The Russians also understand their weaknesses in Ukraine. Their intelligence services performed poorly there. Their military - or the military of the Ukrainian separatists they have supported - probably has reached its limit. The idea that the Russians might move more deeply into Ukraine, given its intelligence and military weaknesses, is unlikely. The fighting in eastern Ukraine has diminished in the past few days. Like the rhetoric, the fighting could escalate easily, but the fact remains that Russia has not shown itself to be an overwhelming strategic power.

In the meantime, the United States has inserted about 300 paratroopers into western Ukraine for training purposes. It has substantially increased its collaboration with Poland and Romania. The Europeans are far from enthusiastic about this, but they have not chosen to hinder what is still a minor American deployment. The United States also has not chosen to go as far as it eventually could, holding on to the potential delivery of lethal weapons as a future threat.

When we look at the chessboard, we see Russia with a weak economy, a questionable strategic and intelligence capability, and an increasing U.S. presence to the west - and no sign of the United States backing down or much dissent about President Barack Obama's Russia policy. This is not a situation that logically calls for Russian bravado.

Nevertheless, until a few days ago, bravado is what we got. In trying to figure out why the Russian tone changed - beyond that it had to shift at some point - we note the Europeans' indication that they are prepared to continue sanctions. Of Russia's three economic problems, the sanctions are the least. But Moscow's greatest hope had been that a major split between the United States and Europe would not only undermine sanctions, but also potentially cause Europe to block or at least hinder U.S. political and military operations in the region. This does not seem likely now. Even Germany, which is profoundly concerned about conflict to its east, does not wish to challenge the United States.

The Russians had hoped for a broader uprising in eastern Ukraine. That didn't happen. They hoped that instability in Kiev would force a change in government that Moscow could influence. So far, that has not happened. They hoped that Central European countries would be unwilling to confront Russia. That has not happened, except for Hungary. Finally, and most important, they hoped for a German-U.S. split. But on Monday, the German defense minister and the U.S. defense secretary held what seemed to be a friendly meeting.

Things have tilted further against the Russians, and the question of the day is not the future of Ukraine, which Russia appears unable to decisively influence. The question is the economy, or as Putin put it, a "more democratic, measured and balanced" economy. We are not altogether certain what that means, but we suspect it describes a global economy in which Russia is not staggering. The West can help little with that, and Putin, as far as we know, has not offered anything in exchange for whatever economic relief could be provided.

Then again, we don't even know if Putin's passing phrases amount to anything. They could simply be rhetorical gamesmanship, but such remarks hold equal significance at home. We will need to watch closely for the West's reaction to assess whether there is substance behind Putin's words.

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 #18
www.rt.com
April 21, 2015
Russians want their country to follow independent course, poll shows

Over half of Russian citizens want their homeland to pursue its own way of development and only 17 percent think that Russia should take the same path as Western nations, according to the latest research by independent pollster Levada Center.

The share of those who prefer an independent development program for Russia was 55 percent, significantly up from 37 percent two years back. The share of supporters of the European way for Russia on the decreased from 31 percent in 2013 to 17 percent today, Levada's research indicates.

As many as 19 percent of respondents said that Russia should return to the ways of the Soviet Union.

Sociologist Karina Pipiya from the Levada Center said in comments to Izvestia daily that the shift towards support of 'Russia's own path' was a logical consequence of past year's major events - the political crisis in Ukraine, followed by the military conflict, the reunification of Russia and Crimea and the Western policy of anti-Russian sanctions. The combined result was the desire of an average Russian to distance from the West, she noted.

At the same time, Pipiya pointed out that when citizens were asked about their forecast of Russia's future, the answers were much less uniform.

Twenty-four percent of Russians expect that in 50 years their country will be rich and developed and on the same level with Western nations. Some 23 percent said that while science in technology in Russia will be on the same level with the West the life of ordinary people will be different (without specifying if it will be better or worse).

Twelve percent hold that Russia will join "the path of great Eastern nations," like China and India.

Ten percent expect the country to return to socialism and move towards communism. Predictably most respondents in this category were elderly people.

As for the current economic and political situation, 50 percent of Russians maintain that the nation faces only temporary difficulties. Eighteen percent expect a deeper crisis and 8 percent say that the economy will slide into stagnation. Only 4 percent described the current situation as stable development.

In late March this year, the Levada Center released the results of another poll that showed that 68 percent of Russian citizens believe their homeland is a great power that plays a significant role in international politics. The same research demonstrated that the share of Russians who said they supported further expansion of contacts and cooperation with Western nations was still twice as many than those who oppose it - 60 percent v 29 percent.

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#19
Al Arabiya News (UAE)
http://english.alarabiya.net
April 21, 2015
Russia has no allies or enemies
By Maria Dubovikova
Maria Dubovikova is a President of IMESClub and CEO of MEPFoundation. Alumni of MGIMO (Moscow State Institute of International Relations [University] of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia), now she is a PhD Candidate there.

Russia has no allies. President Vladimir Putin acknowledged that his country's size frightens its neighbors, and repeated the famous saying of Emperor Alexander III that Russia has only two allies: its army and navy.

The current international crisis started with the Ukrainian conflict, which has claimed more than 5,000 lives. It has torn off the masks of many international players, which have openly revealed their true intentions and thus pushed the international community to a broad confrontation.

NATO manoeuvres, deployment of U.S. anti-missile defense systems in Europe, and rhetoric against Russia disturbs Moscow, and indicate that they pose a threat to its national interests. Putin has accused the United States of the desire to have vassals rather than allies. Washington has become used to imposing its will on other countries via visits or telephone calls from high-level U.S. officials who believe in American exceptionalism.

Foreign policy

Russia considers itself a great power with the right to have its own foreign policy, to protect its national interests, and to abide by international law rather than dubious rules imposed by a player with little credibility pretending to be a world arbiter.

Russia demands respect for its national interests and asks for fair cooperation. Russia has good and stable relations with Brazil, India and China, and considers those relations as models for prosperous coexistence and cooperation.

Despite great problems in Russian-Western relations, Putin said his country does not view any other as an enemy, and urged the international community not to view Russia as a foe. He considers the real enemies to be international terrorism and organized crime.

Russia feels strong and fears nothing. Putin says the worst period for the country's economy is over, and predicts a speedy recovery assuming that it will adapt fast to new realities. Russia will not yield to external pressure or sanctions. Putin cited Iran, which has survived long-term sanctions and has not yielded to external pressure. According to him, Russia will survive the current crisis with little damage because it is stronger.

Far from good

In reality, however, the economic situation is far from good, with 45 percent of Russians cutting expenditure on essential commodities. Since the West is not eager to reach a detente, the crisis could become deeper and less predictable.

The message of Russian peaceful intentions is not convincing the Baltic states - which have historically considered Moscow a threat - and have been contradicted by hawkish and politically incorrect declarations from some high-level Russian politicians. However, in general Russia has no interest in confrontation or aggravating international or bilateral relations. Its prosperity depends on fruitful cooperation and global economic stability.

Having no enemies or allies makes Russian manoeuvres difficult to calculate. Though Moscow does not see its counterparts as enemies, it does see direct threats to its national interests in their actions. And despite not having allies, Russia enjoys good cooperation with several global players. Thus Putin's message is reminiscent of lyrics from a famous Soviet song: "We are a peaceful people, but our armored train stands at the ready."

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 #20
Russia Insider
www.russia-insider.com
April 20, 2015
Russia Specialist David Kerans: The West Is Trying to Drive a Wedge Between Russia and Eastern Europe
From funding "pro-democracy" NGOs to stoking violence, the West has a staggering array of tools for undermining Russia's relationship with Eastern Europe, explains Russia specialist and author David Kerans in a recent interview.
By Victor Olevich

David Kerans is a specialist in Russian history and the author of "Mind and Labor on the Farm in Black-Earth Russia, 1861-1914" (Central European University Press, 2011). He served as a political observer for the Washington bureau of the "Voice of Russia" in 2013-2014.

Victor Olevich: Western strategists started talking about the idea of igniting the Ukrainian fuse shortly after Russia acted to prevent Washington's plans to launch military action against Damascus in the fall of 2013. What role did growing Russian engagement in the Middle East, the Snowden Affair and Moscow's willingness to stand up to the United States on the international arena play in America's decision to act decisively against Russian interests in Kiev?

David Kerans: The catalysts to US meddling in Ukraine that you mention are plausible, but to different degrees. I would say that Russia's granting of temporary political asylum to Edward Snowden was less significant than Moscow's derailing of US belligerence towards both the Assad regime in Syria and Iran. Prime Minister Lavrov's orchestration of an agreement for the Assad regime to rid itself of chemical weapons minimized US influence on the Syrian conflict. Likewise, Russia's insistence on arranging monitoring programs for Iran's nuclear energy program reduced America's pressure on Iran. Russia's resurgent potency in cases like these implies a more challenging environment for the US on the global stage going forward, so we can safely assume that by the late summer of 2013, Washington was ready to bait Russia, if any opportunities might arise.  It is important to take note of a 2013 op-ed from the President of the National Endowment for Democracy, Carl Gershman, exhorting the West to put heavy pressure on Putin, to undermine Russia's interests in former Soviet republics like Ukraine in particular.

But the National Endowment for Democracy (which the US Congress funds) had been doing this sort of work for many years - since the Orange Revolution of 2004, at least - by funding NGOs that furthered America's political interests in Ukraine.

I think we can agree that America's enthusiasm for the Maidan movement is grounded in antagonism towards Russia, not any deep-seated concern for the people of Ukraine. Ukraine has never played any independent role in US political discourse. It is simply a lever in the struggle to undermine Russia. The deeper question is why the US has continued to target Russia beyond the West's victory in the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. And here we have to speak openly about the corruption of the US political and economic system over the last few decades, and how it has hijacked foreign policy to serve the interests of a narrow elite, not the nation as a whole.

Corruption has blossomed exponentially in the US over the last generation. For the most part, we are talking about "corruption, American-style", as economist Joseph Stiglitz called it. In contrast to most other countries, where vultures pay off officials to look the other way, powerful people in America find ways to suborn legislatures into arranging laws and regulations to cater to their interests. For example. the financial crisis of 2008 stemmed largely from the manipulation and twisting of regulations to allow financial elites to enrich themselves beyond all measure - and crash the economy in the process.

Corruption has also flourished in the US defense sector, but here, I'm afraid, it has been more primitive. Consider first the mushrooming of military spending. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq served as an excuse to inflate the defense budget by 44 percent over the first decade of the century, adjusted for inflation. The base defense budget for the decade was $5.9 trillion. Meanwhile, monitoring and control of these funds are shamefully weak. Already in 2001, then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld admitted that the Pentagon could not track $2.3 trillion in expenditures made over many previous years. And as budget allocations increased thanks to the wars, waste and misappropriation seem to have accelerated. Thus, we know that in 2005 both the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and Office of Management and Budget singled out the Pentagon for being particularly lax in managing its money. And figures made available in 2009 showed an astonishing $300 billion in research cost overruns for 96 ongoing weapons programs. Further, the scale of the overruns had jumped sharply, from an average of 27 percent in 2001 to 42 percent in 2008.

The Pentagon's response to evident mismanagement on an enormous scale was telling: the Department of Defense reduced audits of its contracts with equipment and service providers, inviting ever more rampant abuse, in the form of overpricing-plus-kickback schemes. By 2010, the value of non-competitively sourced contracts had nearly tripled from 2001, to $140 billion. The percentage of non-competitive contracts in the military sector finds no parallel elsewhere in US government. And, not surprisingly, the officials dispensing these contracts reap rewards on leaving government service for private industry. The number of Pentagon functionaries leaving through the "revolving door" has doubled since the 1990s.

Congress is aware of the escalating waste and malfeasance in the defense sector, and it could take steps to clean the sector up. A model is at hand, namely the experience of the US Senate Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program, popularly known as the Truman Committee, which functioned from 1941 to 1948. the Truman Committee genuinely rooted out corruption and war profiteering, and during the mid-2000s, a number of Senators agitated openly for establishment of a similar effort. But the Bush administration actively resisted this proposal, and it got little support in Congress. This raises another question, of course: what is to explain Congress's disinterest in monitoring the use of the funds it sends to the defense sector? The answer is not merely payoffs, campaign donations, and revolving door employment offers, but also the structural dependency of the economies of a large minority of congressional districts on military projects. As researcher Rebecca Thorpe outlines in a recent book, The American Warfare State, the US made a conscious effort from the end of the Second World War to broaden the geographical apportionment of defense sector contracts. In consequence, large numbers of districts depend heavily to this day on the defense sector. A large minority of congressmen, therefore, are predisposed to vote up defense allocations at every opportunity.

So the upshot is that prodigious amounts of defense sector money are sloshing around Washington, which would suffice all by itself to tilt America's foreign policy posture towards confrontation with real or imagined enemies. Combine this with a large and intractable constituency in Congress for ever increasing military spending, and you get a system geared to projecting power beyond its borders. It is a system which does not serve the needs of the American people or the US economy. It is also a system that needs enemies, and Russia is a primary legacy candidate.

Victor Olevich: The coup in Kiev orchestrated a year ago with the assistance of Western powers was made possible, in part, by decades' long engagement with Ukrainian political and business elite, which became increasingly dependent on its American and European partners. How was Washington able to outmaneuver Russia in Ukraine, which only thirty years ago boasted the title of the "second Soviet republic"?

David Kerans: I sense that Western facilitation of the Maidan movement had more to do with sponsorship of NGOs than with courtship of Ukrainian political and business elites. The National Endowment for Democracy that I mentioned above has been very active in building NGO networks in Ukraine since the turn of the century, and these networks did a lot to prepare Ukrainian society for a radical break with Russia. I am not saying that the West ignored Ukrainian politicians and businessmen. But I don't know if the West outperformed Russia with respect to Ukrainian elites. Russia obviously built strong ties with many industrialists and politicians. But did Russia articulate an approach towards Ukrainian society, in the sense of building some vision of an improving future for Ukraine? If so, not sufficiently. Russian policy towards Ukrainian society was complacent. It is true that Russia was a primary beacon for Ukrainian labor, and this is important. According to research in 2007, for instance, 40 percent of young Ukrainians wanted to leave their country for employment. But Ukrainians looking for work abroad did not rely only on Russia. Russia's labor market by itself did not psychologically tie Ukrainian society to Russia. The West, for its part, has powerful ammunition to entrance the Ukrainian into antagonism with Russia: the higher living standards of the EU and the USA. Ukrainians should think twice before assuming they will live just like Germany in the near future. But not everyone thinks twice. Not everyone takes the time to weigh up the burdens and risks of reorienting the economy away from Russia under terms Western financial institutions will more or less dictate.

Victor Olevich: In recent years, Russia has taken a number of steps as part of a "sovereignization" initiative to curtail potential Western influence on government officials and decision makers. Key officials are no longer allowed to purchase or retain real estate and other property abroad. What other steps could be effective in minimizing Western influence on Russia's domestic political process?

David Kerans: The so-called sovereignization measures are fairly bold as they are. I think if the state could conveniently take stronger measures, it would already have done so. Actually, I assume stronger measures are in motion, but behind the scenes, in the form of surveillance and privately expressed pressure on highly-placed officials.

Victor Olevich: Why have European powers taken such an active interest in destabilizing Ukraine, despite potential threats to their own security from an armed conflict essentially raging on their border?

David Kerans: The European powers do have some incentive to destabilize Ukraine, notwithstanding the obvious risk of disorder and war in Ukraine bringing adverse consequences to Europe. Crudely put, European capital stands to profit from wrenching Ukraine completely out of Russia's orbit. I won't be so old fashioned as to assert that European capital welcomes an influx of Ukrainian labor, so as to drive down wages and dilute the strength of Europe's trade unions. The calculations are more subtle than that. First, the financial sector wants the Ukrainian government as a captive customer. And European industry wants the Ukrainian market. It wants a full integration of Ukraine into the commercial and legal codes of the EU - and that is not a bad thing, in that via these codes, the EU has imposed all kinds of environmental and labor protections on its member states and trading partners. If the Ukrainian economy could get back on its feet, therefore, Europe would eventually profit.

Notwithstanding the long-term economic incentives at play, however, Europe is still too closely tied to Uncle Sam to set its own geopolitical course -- even in regard to Ukraine, which is so close to Europe and so far from America. Atlantic solidarity is alive and well, and if the US wants to amplify the pressure on Russia via Ukraine, it is not easy for any major European leader to steer a more sober and constructive course. As soon as eastern Ukraine put up stiff resistance to the Maidan regime, the risks of Washington's and Kiev's belligerent approach came into clear focus, and the major European powers have openly encouraged negotiations between Kiev and the east. This has kept a lid on Kiev's aggression in the east, and now Chancellor Merkel and others are registering strong opposition to proposals afoot in Washington to supply the Poroshenko government with lethal weapons.

The question now is whether pressure to deescalate confrontation with Russia will build from the European left and drive a real wedge between Europe and the US. I cannot say I am optimistic, but perhaps I am overestimating America's hold on European public opinion.

Victor Olevich: During the Cold War, the Soviet Union pursued a foreign policy goal of driving the United States and its Western European allies apart. These attempts at scuttling the transatlantic relationship had very limited success. A similar policy pursued by Russia today is facing the same difficulties. What bonds between the U.S. and Europe are the hardest to break? Economic? Historic? Civilizational?

David Kerans: At the outset of the Cold War, the US had serious advantages over the USSR as regards the shaping of European political opinion. The US economy towered over the rest of the world, and Stalinism's betrayal of the humanitarian dimensions of the Russian Revolution had discredited the Soviet Union even among much of the European left. Moreover, the remarkable achievements of the Roosevelt administration from 1933 to 1945 deprived the Soviets of their most important trump card: Roosevelt's New Deal softened capitalism in the US. The social safety nets and governmental controls over finance and industry that Roosevelt introduced served to protect society from a rerun of the Great Depression. With the New Deal in place, the American economic system was no longer a plausible bogey man for Soviet agitation. The Great Depression wasn't coming back. So it would not be a stretch to argue that the durability of the New Deal was what won the Cold War for the West.

Similarly, the US's willful dismantling of its New Deal structures over the last three decades has opened cracks in the Transatlantic alliance. Europeans feel the threat from neo-liberal economic policy acutely, and their governments remain much more accountable to public opinion than does the US Congress and presidency. Social Democracy has remained a real force in Europe, and complimentary movements like the Green parties reject the US economic model explicitly. Beyond that, America's heavy handedness on the international stage has become increasingly insufferable to wide swathes of the European public. Consider the recent record: wars of aggression in the Middle East, torture programs, NSA mass surveillance, and the financial crisis of 2008. America is digging a deep hole for its reputation, especially now since the Obama administration, the presumed antidote to George W. Bush, has been almost completely inefficacious in correcting these transgressions.

So the relationship between Europe and the US is eroding without any Russian involvement. The problem for Russia is that European consciousness and policy are not diverging quickly enough from the Transatlantic alliance. If they were, the Ukraine would not have endured the turmoil of the last year. Can Russia do anything to speed the process along? Probably not.

Victor Olevich: What role has been assigned to Eastern European nations in American and NATO strategy against Russia?

David Kerans: By now the West has achieved most of its initial post-Cold War goals in Eastern Europe, by absorbing a raft of countries into NATO, and gradually integrating the region into the EU. Of course the proximity of NATO weapons to Russia's border exerts some latent pressure on Russia, even if military strikes (let alone war) are never more than the most remote possibility. Both sides know that Eastern Europe is relevant much more in diplomatic and economic terms than in military terms. The West wants to be able to count on Eastern European support in the UN, in the Council of Europe, and in other ad hoc forums and negotiations. And, of course, it wants Eastern European markets for itself, which means weaning them away from Russia as much as possible.

Russia still has plenty of economic influence in Eastern Europe, but the West is trying to undermine that influence wherever it can, often in behind the scenes negotiations. Instructive examples of Western leverage on Eastern European governments surfaced in US Senator Chris Murphy's account of his diplomatic mission to the Balkans last fall. Murphy was not traveling simply as a Senator, but as Chairman of the Europe Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He was speaking for Washington, not for himself, in other words. And he says he warned Prime Minister Alexander Vucic of Serbia that entering into formal military and energy agreements with Russia (such as the South Stream gas pipeline) could jeopardize Serbia's prospects of entering the EU. His reasoning was legalistic - namely, he advised Vucic that formal agreements with Russia might violate some EU laws. But the message was loaded with power politics: the US doesn't want Serbia strengthening ties with Russia, and if Serbia does not comply, the US is ready to bring pressure on Serbia via the EU.

Meanwhile, Russia is playing its own cards in the region, and some of them are quite strong. President Putin's visit to Hungary in February is illustrative. Hungary is a member of NATO and the EU, but it sees good reasons to cooperate closely with Russia, notwithstanding the friction this might cause it with its formal allies in the West. The Russia-Hungary talks went well beyond fields of ongoing cooperation, such as nuclear energy and natural gas. Thus, Russia is facilitating Hungary's resurrection of its national airline, Malev, which collapsed in bankruptcy in 2012. And Russia is prepared to help Hungary's agricultural sector, which has taken large losses from the combination of EU sanctions on exports to Russia and Russian countermeasures to those sanctions. The EU has programs to compensate exporters for losses related to the sanctions, but the compensation has been far from sufficient. So Putin discussed lifting the Russian countermeasures and opening the door to Hungarian imports. Further, Putin negotiated terms to provide Hungary with a number of small or medium-sized Russian-made non-nuclear power plants.

Even where Russia makes progress in Eastern Europe, however, the West will try to curb this progress with countermeasures of its own. In the case of an EU state like Hungary, EU levers of control can thwart important deals. For example, in early March a plenary session of EU commissioners found a legal argument to veto Hungary's most important project with Russia, the expansion of a large nuclear power facility in the town of Paks. (Euratom, the EU's nuclear power regulatory arm, rejected Hungary's plan to import nuclear fuel exclusively from Russia). We have to assume that many other duels are playing out behind the scenes nowadays as the West tries to undermine Russian influence in Eastern Europe. Russia can be an important partner to a number of countries in the region and is even finding ways to extend its influence in some places. But it is expending quite a lot of energy in this effort.

Victor Olevich: Moscow has been able to make some inroads on the governments in Hungary and Greece, nations that have suffered under the yoke of EU economic policy dictated by Brussels. What further steps could Russia take to gain more leverage with political elites in Eastern and Southern Europe?

David Kerans: As we just discussed in relation to Hungary and Serbia, the EU casts a dark shadow over Russia's relations with Eastern Europe. EU member states like Hungary automatically concede some of their sovereignty to EU regulatory bodies and cannot always deal freely with Russia. Non-member states like Serbia, for their part, have to think twice before running afoul of EU policy when dealing with Russia, unless they are willing to abandon aspirations of joining the EU. Obviously, contemporary Russia has nothing like the platform the USSR had, in terms of tempting other nations with the vision of a sharply different economic system and social order. Russia's critical role as a provider of energy resources does give it a beachhead in negotiating for an extension of its influence in Eastern Europe. But it must rely on tactical opportunities to make progress. It has to capitalize on local crises in individual countries, by offering to fill needs Western powers are not satisfying.

The wild card here, of course, is the prospect of the EU crumbling on the peripheries of Greece, Spain, Ireland, etc. I rate that prospect as remote, but serious analysts have sketched out paths that lead that way - should Greece abandon the Euro currency and set a variety of consequences in motion, for example. The EU is not invulnerable, but I won't hazard a mature analysis of its vulnerability here.

Victor Olevich: The Minsk Agreements have resulted in a temporary cessation of hostilities between forces loyal to the regime in Kiev and the rebels in Donbass. Yet, few observers believe the ceasefire will last. Why was the American side absent at the Minsk talks? Why is Washington pushing the government in Kiev to take a harder line against Russia, even after Ukrainian forces have suffered massive defeat at the front lines?

David Kerans:  The prevailing skepticism regarding the durability of the cease fire makes sense to me, largely because of the cynicism and aggressiveness of the US. Earlier, I registered my conviction that the US does not have the interests of Ukraine in mind in this conflict, and I would add here that Washington has few scruples about the blood being spilled. So the US is ready to encourage Kiev to intensify the fighting. At the same time, and this is important, Washington will not pressure Ukraine into significantly harsher military action if the resistance in eastern Ukraine continues to strengthen. The biggest players on the American side (in this case, the Obama administration, the State Department, and the Pentagon) do have something to lose. They will lose some of their authority at home and on the international stage if they facilitate heavy bloodshed in the conflict but do not break the resistance in eastern Ukraine. It is no wonder, therefore, that Obama has stepped away from proposals from prominent congressmen to provide the Ukrainian army with lethal weapons.

The upshot of this is that the people of eastern Ukraine can affect US policy in the region by standing firm against Maidan. And if US pressure on Kiev slackens, the chances for the east to secure semi-autonomous status in a Ukrainian federation will rise sharply. Whether the conflict in Ukraine resolves in establishment of a stable federation or something much worse, I am not optimistic about US attitudes towards President Putin and Russia. The coarsening of political culture in the US has infected foreign policy as well as domestic policy, and the habit of vilifying opponents is an important feature of the contemporary political culture. In 2008, then-candidate for president Obama reminded Americans of how much US diplomacy had changed - for the worse - when he chastised the Bush administration's refusal to negotiate in any way with regimes it demonized. Obama said he would keep lines of communication open to anyone. He may have kept his word, in the sense that he will at least consider picking up the phone to speak with leaders from any nation. But throughout Washington, the urge to vilify enemies remains as strong as ever. Russia is now being typecast as an enemy, and so it is not surprising that the US did not participate in the Minsk negotiations.

Victor Olevich is a Russian-American political analyst based in Moscow. His articles have appeared in Izvestia, Planeta, Komsomolskaya Pravda and other major Russian- and English-language newspapers and magazines. He is a frequent guest on Russian political talk shows.

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 #21
Atlantic Council
April 20, 2015
No Easy Outs for Putin: US Presidential Candidates United on Ukraine
BY ARIEL COHEN
Ariel Cohen, PhD, is Director of the Center for Energy, Natural Resources and Geopolitics at the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security and Principal of International Market Analysis, Ltd.   

Ukraine will remain at the heart of the conflict between the US and Russia beyond the 2016 presidential election. In the polls, Americans are united on Ukraine; the majority of respondents support increased sanctions on the Kremlin. All of the major presidential candidates, save Senator Rand Paul, take a tough approach with Moscow and support arming Ukraine.

Take Hillary Clinton, the presumed nominee for the Democratic Party. She is not Moscow's favorite, to say the least. The Russian media accuses her of mortal sins: toughness, feminism, political correctness, and a pedantic disposition. In 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin attacked her ad hominem in an interview with French journalists.

"It's better not to argue with women," Putin said.

"But Ms. Clinton has never been too graceful in her statements...When people push boundaries too far, it's not because they are strong but because they are weak. But maybe weakness is not the worst quality for a woman."

The Clintons' foreign affairs circle is tough on Russia. It included the late Richard Holbrooke, the architect of the partition of Yugoslavia, who was no softie on Russia. Victoria Nuland, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, who gave out cookies on the Maidan during the anti-Yanukovych demonstrations and who since has been demonized by the Russians for her outspoken support for Ukraine's independence, is a member. It also counts Alexander Vershbow, the current Deputy Secretary General of NATO and a former US Ambassador to Russia.

As Secretary of State, Clinton talked tough to European leaders about the conflict in eastern Ukraine and her attitude toward Putin was firm. Boris Johnson, the Mayor of London, said that he was struck by the persistence with which she spoke about how Europe must confront the Russian President.

"Her general anxiety was that Putin, if unchallenged and unchecked, would continue to expand his influence in the perimeter of what was the Soviet Union," Johnson said.

Clinton told Johnson that Britons should be less dependent on Russian hydrocarbons and that they must seek alternative sources of energy.

How to confront the Russian enigma is not a new subject for Clinton. In her memoir Hard Choices she writes, "For many years I have spent a lot of time thinking about how to understand Putin."

Clinton's last memo as Secretary of State in January 2013 warned President Barack Obama about Putin's ambitions. She assessed Putin as a threat "to his neighbors and the global order," cautioning that "difficult days lay ahead and that our relationship with Moscow would likely get worse before it got better."

Clinton encouraged Obama to push the pause button on the "reset" policy that she and the President had launched in 2009. She cautioned, "Don't appear too eager to work together. Don't flatter Putin with high-level attention...Strength and resolve were the only language Putin would understand."

The President ignored her advice initially, accepting Putin's invitation for a presidential-level summit in Moscow in the summer of 2013. The visit was cancelled after the Kremlin gave asylum to the defector Edward Snowden. In Clinton's opinion, Putin is "reclaiming the Soviet Empire and crushing domestic dissent."

It will not be any easier for the Kremlin with the Republicans. Governor Jeb Bush has not officially announced his candidacy, but he is known to criticize "naïveté" and "passivity" in foreign policy, including on Ukraine and Russia. His brother former President George W. Bush has little enthusiasm when it comes to Putin.

Jeb Bush's foreign policy team is likely to include key players from his brother's team, including former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and former Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, hardly Kremlin favorites.

If not Bush, then who? The anticommunist Cuban-American Senators Marco Rubio and Ted Cruz, both members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, support lethal aid to Ukraine and have sharply criticized Russia. Rubio and Cruz idolize Ronald Reagan and his policies of peace through strength. Cruz said that the US has an "obligation" to arm Ukraine, much to Moscow's chagrin. Another candidate for the Republican presidential nomination is Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker, who also favors arming Ukraine.

The odd man out is Senator Rand Paul. One Forbes commentator noted that Paul has been all over the map on Ukraine and some of his statements tend to contradict previous ones. His Russia advisers are Ambassador Richard Burt and Dimitri Simes, President of the Center for the National Interest. These foreign policy realists support warmer relations with Russia.

Thus, short of a surprising Paul victory in 2016, Russia is facing a united front of Republican and Democratic candidates who all support the restoration of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Until then, sanctions are unlikely to disappear.

Putin's nationally televised four-hour call-in show last week showed his stiff upper lip and defiance against the US, but the reality of isolation and sanctions over Ukraine will take their toll. However, there are no easy outs for Moscow-either from Republicans or Democrats. On Ukraine, Americans are united.

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 #22
New York Times
April 26, 2015
Fall of Ruble Benefits Tourists to Russia
By CHARLY WILDER

I can't count how many times I've heard that warning in the 14 months since I decided to move to Moscow from Berlin. It's as if I were entering a war zone.

In fairness, those 14 months have seen a string of calamitous events that have left much of Russia transformed: the annexation of Crimea; war in eastern Ukraine; the deterioration of relations with the West; sanctions; President Vladimir V. Putin's clampdown on political opposition, media and the arts; and the collapse of the ruble and slowdown of the Russian economy.

Not surprisingly, tourism is part of that stagnation. Since the beginning of 2014, tourism to Russia has declined 35 percent, according to the Association of Tour Operators of Russia. Tourism from the West has been cut in half.

Yet for visitors, life generally goes on as usual in the affluent, cosmopolitan centers of Moscow and St. Petersburg where the vast majority of foreign tourists spend most or all of their time. Except for areas near the Ukraine border or in the long-embattled North Caucasus, there are no major Western advisories against travel to Russia. The State Department is the most cautious, warning Americans against attending demonstrations and urging "good security practices" in public places.

Still, contrary to the images often evoked by the news media, there's little evidence to suggest that Russia's top destinations are any less safe now for visitors than they were a few years ago.

That's not to say there has not been a change in mood. As a Western tourist anywhere, it's often a good idea to avoid political discussions in places with very drunk people, but even more so in Russia. Helped along by television propaganda, many people in Russia blame the West for their current economic problems and the war in Ukraine. The proportion of Russians who say they have a negative view of the United States has more than doubled over the past year, according to a recent poll by the independent Levada-Center. Yet there's a sizable gap between what is said in opinion polls, and what's represented in everyday interactions.

Or as my friend Maria Baronova, a prominent opposition activist, once put it: "We hate you Americans so much that we treat you like V.I.P.s."

Long gone may be the days when speaking loudly in American English was the best way to make it past "face control" at the entrances of Moscow's exclusive nightclubs, but after nearly a year here, I have yet to see or hear of Western tourists being harassed because of their nationality. I've witnessed more anti-American sentiment in Berlin, albeit of the smug European leftist variety, than I have in Moscow.

"I was expecting way more of a difference," said Kate Wood, a 16-year-old from Chapel Hill, N.C., who was visiting Moscow for the second time as part of an annual church trip to volunteer at an orphanage in the Kirov region. I came upon her and several of her fellow congregants eating ice cream and speaking loudly in English at a cafe on the ground floor of GUM department store on Red Square.

"I guess I was thinking that we would need to keep a lower profile," added Ms. Wood, who was last in Moscow before Western sanctions or the war in eastern Ukraine, "but no one's reacted badly to us at all, and we're even kind of loud."

Probably the biggest selling point for visiting Russia now, though, is the drastic devaluation of the ruble, which lost more than half its worth at the end of last year. Even taking into account inflation (recorded at 16.7 percent in February) and the ruble's considerable rebound over the past few months, the country is more affordable than at any time in recent memory. At the beginning of 2014, a dollar bought 32.86 rubles. In mid-April this year, it bought 49.80.

For tourists, this means paying 15 to 50 percent less for just about everything. A year ago, a cappuccino in Moscow cost the equivalent of $8 or $9. Now it's rarely more than $5. Though airlines, even Russia's Aeroflot, keep their tickets indexed at dollar rates, most hotels have not substantially raised their ruble prices.

This means that the starting room rate in June at the Sheraton Palace, which is 11,900 rubles, has decreased from $362 to $226. A room at a budget hotel goes for around $50 these days, and a double at the Ritz-Carlton, at 28,910 rubles, was once just short of $900 and now comes in just over $550. In fact, luxury hotels in Moscow actually reported an 8 percent uptick in occupancy in the first two months of 2015, apparently because of travelers upgrading from midrange because of the currency rate, according to a recent report cited by The Moscow Times.

Though some tourist attractions have increased the entrance fee in rubles, they are still more affordable for visitors with foreign currency. The Kremlin's entrance fee has increased since the beginning of 2014 from 350 to 500 rubles, but in dollars, it has dropped from $10.65 to $9.54. Entrance for non-Russians to the Tretyakov State Gallery, with its stunning collection of medieval Russian religious art, is now 450 instead of 360 rubles, but its dollar price has dropped 10 percent.

Most cathedrals and churches seem not to have increased their entrance fees, nor has the phenomenal Russian Museum in St. Petersburg, meaning all are around 40 percent cheaper for visitors. The State Hermitage Museum there seems to be the only major attraction that is actually more expensive for foreigners, though not by much. It doubled its price in rubles, but the dollar price increased by about a buck.

Continue reading the main storyContinue reading the main storyContinue reading the main story
Ruble ticket prices to the Bolshoi Theater have not changed. A decent seat for an opera or ballet on the recently refurbished historic stage still sells in the 3,000- to 9,000-ruble range, which used to start around $90 but now starts at $57. Of course, that's only if you manage to buy from the theater itself. The scalper racket is as strong as ever, but even scalpers' more capricious price schemes, anywhere from $50 to upward of $500, are now further within range of budget travelers.

Restaurants and bars are now significantly more affordable for foreigners, and the economic crisis means they are less crowded. But even if a reservation is no longer indispensable, eating out requires a bit more strategizing. The culinary scenes in Moscow and St. Petersburg expanded greatly in the past decade, with international cuisine dominating the field: French, Japanese, Italian, Thai or, to mixed effect, some fusion of two or more. But because of Mr. Putin's retaliatory ban on Western food imports, many Muscovites' most beloved Continental-style restaurants either cannot find or can't afford the ingredients they once relied on, and many have seen a drop-off in quality. The fare at sleek Ragout, urbane Ugolek and Jean Jacques, the favorite French bistro of the Russian opposition, is not what it used to be, and though Strelka Bar still has some of the best cocktails in town, its menu has also taken a hit.

It's a safer bet these days to go for food whose source is closer to home. LavkaLavka in Moscow and Cococo, its even better sister restaurant in St. Petersburg, are the best of the innovative restaurants offering updated, farm-to-table takes on traditional Russian cuisine. Dishes like Cococo's "tourist's breakfast," a cylinder of pearl barley, lightly salted beef tartare, smoked herbs and quail egg served theatrically in a blackened half tin can, or LavkaLavka's memorable borscht with organic beets, brisket and cured pork fat (known in Russia as salo) - plus both restaurants' homemade vodka infusions - will convert the staunchest nonbelievers. And the 40 percent markdown makes dinner feel like a steal.

"This is a very good moment to try to change the image of Russia and to attract tourists from different countries, because the ruble is so cheap," said Maya Lomidze, the executive director of the Association of Tour Operators of Russia. Indeed, some companies have managed to offset losses by using the ruble crash as a marketing angle.

"We make connections on the exchange rate to attract tourists and agents from different countries, and I think it works quite well," said Olya Skoveleva, a travel manager at Visit Russia, a private tour company that actually reports a 15 percent increase in Western tourists in the past year. The Westerners' most popular destinations by far are Moscow and St. Petersburg, but the company also sends them to Sochi and the Black Sea or to smaller towns along the so-called Golden Ring of small cities northeast of Moscow, albeit in the company of an official guide.

Ms. Skoveleva said that many visitors are initially quite concerned for their safety but are ultimately reassured.

"We explain to them that nothing will disturb them regarding the political issues," she said. "Considering the international situation and how it appears in the media, it is even sometimes surprising to me, but it's the reality."

"Putin," she added, "is not the whole country."

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 #23
Moscow Times
April 21, 2015
Rifkind Tells Story of Gorbachev's First Meeting With Margaret Thatcher
By Des Brown

Just over 30 years ago, Mikhail Gorbachev became general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The next day, The Times of London ran an editorial entitled "Mr Gorbachov's Hour"  - the British media had yet to learn to spell his name - saying that he could prove to be a man with whom Western leaders could feel at home with more than Lenin's heirs.

Almost 30 years later, Britain's Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond struck out at Russia in a speech in March: "We are in familiar territory for anyone over the age of about 50, with Russia's behavior a stark reminder that it has the potential to pose the single greatest threat to our security."

Britain's Sir Malcom Rifkind, who leaves the British Houses of Parliament at the election in May, has seen relations come full circle. He was Minister of State at the Foreign Office under Geoffrey Howe in the 1980s, where he was influential in helping change the government's attitude to the Soviet Union and attended Margaret Thatcher's first meeting with Gorbachev. He later served as Defense Secretary and then Foreign Secretary.

"The initial interest in Gorbachev was not in someone who was likely to be as radical as he turned out to be - there was no evidence of that at that stage," said Rifkind in a telephone interview. "But we did have a Politburo that was geriatric and the two youngest members were Gorbachev and [Grigory] Romanov, who had been promoted to full member of the Politburo and represented a new generation as the older ones moved on. They would in one form or another be part of the new leadership."

Gorbachev quickly made an impression on the Foreign Office at the time, said Rifkind, especially after a short visit to Canada. "People in Canada had been quite impressed by him as having a stimulating personality, an interest in discussing ideas, just being generally easier to get on with than some of the previous Soviet leaders."

That helped persuade Thatcher to agree to meet Gorbachev. His visit to Chequers, the British prime minister's country retreat, in December 1984 was groundbreaking, a major step in the thaw between the East and the West.

Decades on and relations between the two are at a low point and scarcely a day goes by without a reference to "a new Cold War," but Rifkind doesn't see the situation as a return to the bad old days.

"It's not a new Cold War," he said. "Throughout the whole period of the Cold War, that was a struggle for global mastery. And not just between two countries and two systems, but between two ideologies. So it was the Soviet Union seeing itself and being seen as a global superpower and it was also a competition between capitalism and communism for economic and ideological supremacy. And it was also Russia as a country expressing its nationalistic aspirations with an empire, Europe's largest empire. If the Cold War had become a hot war it would have been thermonuclear and the possible destruction of the planet. We're nowhere near that at this moment in time."

Rifkind understands that President Vladimir Putin is not seeking global power but is nevertheless dangerous because he is destabilizing the part of Europe that he has influence over. "His ambitions are essentially to recreate much of the old Soviet state - not communism. He's not interested in communism. He wants to recreate the Russian empire ... by controlling the territories around it and he believes that Russia is entitled to do that. And that is hugely destabilizing for the rest of Europe and that it why it has to be resisted."

Tensions in Ukraine have been the flashpoint and Rifkind called the conflict "a crucial moment in the history of Europe," in a speech in the House of Commons in March.

But he reiterates that it is not a new Cold War but serious for a different reason: Russia and other countries agreed at the end of the Cold War to respect territorial boundaries, he said "and when we had the Budapest Memorandum signed, which allowed Ukraine to hand over all its nuclear weapons that had been on its soil, part of the deal was a recognition by Russia of the existing frontiers of Ukraine and Russia, which put Crimea firmly into Ukraine. That's the nature of the problem. It's a serious problem, but it's a mistake to compare it with the Cold War, which was over different issues and a different scale."

Rifkind says that EU and U.S. sanctions were "useless" at first, targeting only Putin's business allies, but that the further sanctions against the financial and banking industries have made a difference. That "has meant that very large swathes of Russian companies cannot borrow on the markets. They have to go to the Russian government and ask for a bailout, which they're getting, but the funds available to the Russian government for bailouts are getting weaker and weaker."

Rifkind was, until February, chair of the parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee, which deals extensively with terrorism and counter-terrorism. This gives him a broader view that sees Russia as not the biggest problem facing the intelligence community.

"We still have problems with individual countries, of which Russia is one. But that is a relatively modest part of the overall effort of [British intelligence and security organizations] MI5, MI6 and GCHQ."

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 #24
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
April 21, 2015
After Minsk: Economics may be the best hope for peace
Damage caused by sanctions to both sides could be key factor in ending stalemate over conflict.
By Dmitry Babich

Recent developments in Ukraine have put the Minsk agreement in question, despite assurances from all involved that observing them is vital. The parties include the Ukrainian government, the rebel "people's republics" with capitals in Donetsk and Lugansk (DNR and LNR, or Donbass region), Russia, the U.S. and EU. Lack of trust between the new government in Kiev and the rebels is cited as the main reason for the tensions, but the recent adoption of controversial new laws (not acceptable to Donetsk and Lugansk) by the Ukrainian parliament makes the situation more volatile.

The essence of the agreement is the preservation of the territorial integrity of Ukraine in exchange for Kiev giving a "special status" to the mostly Russian-speaking rebel territories and a general amnesty for the enemies of the new Ukrainian regime. The problem is that the agreement did not say which side should make concessions first, leading to stalemate.

For example, from Kiev it was required "no later than in 30 days" to have a parliamentary resolution "indicating the territory which falls under the special regime" with that regime presupposing "the right to language self-determination" and general amnesty for the rebels.

Instead, five days after the deadline the Rada adopted a law proclaiming Donbass a "temporarily occupied territory" and postponing the adoption of special status "until the withdrawal of all illegal armed groups and foreign mercenaries, with the re-establishment of Ukraine's control over its territory."
 
Economic blockade

The border between Russia and the territory of DNR and LNR is notoriously porous and the Minsk agreement presupposed the re-establishment of Kiev's control over it. But both Moscow and the rebels make the return of Ukrainian customs officials conditional on the the lifting of the economic blockade Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko imposed on the "occupied territories" in autumn. Ukrainian pensioners and public sector workers on these territories do not receive pensions and salaries (Kiev stopped all banking activity in Donbass last year).

"In this situation, Russian humanitarian aid [going through the rebel-controlled border] becomes the only source of subsistence for these people, and we are not ready to have the Ukrainian customs officials entrusted with this lifeline of ours," said Andrei Purgin, the speaker of the DNR's parliament.     
 
Money transfers halted

The Minsk agreement obliged Ukraine to resume banking in Donbass, possibly with help from western partners. But Andrei Turchynov, head of Ukraine's National Security and Defence Council, said Kiev "was not going to feed terrorists and separatists" by resuming banking activity. Ukraine's prime minister Arseny Yatsenyuk said he did not consider all the pensioners and public sector workers in Donbass criminals, but the transfer of payments was not yet possible for political reasons.

So Kiev blocks money transfers and food, while DNR and LNR stop Ukrainian officials resuming control of the Russian border.

The other stumbling block is the delay in the creation of "working teams" under the Contact Group. The leaders of DNR and LNR, accusing Kiev of dragging its heels on forming Ukraine's part of the group, said they would stop the prisoner exchange until the problem of the Contact Group is settled. This is another breach of the Minsk agreement, since point 6 stipulated the release of all PoWs, hostages and illegally arrested people.

Time may not be on the side of peace, since sporadic fighting is reported on both sides of the front line. In a sign that force could still be used, Mr Poroshenko reiterated his intention to "de-escalate," but not to "freeze" the conflict. A "freeze" would mean creating a situation similar to the one in Moldova, where Moldova and its separatist region of Transnistria (self-proclaimed Trans-Dniseter Moldovan Republic) have been peacefully co-existing for 23 years, after a brief war in 1992. The deadlines imposed by the Minsk agreement are strict but few experts expect them to be honoured. Ukraine was obliged by point 11 of the Minsk agreement to carry out constitutional reform before the end of 2015. The "key element" of the new constitution, according to the agreement, was the "decentralisation" of Ukraine, with the regions unhappy with the new government in Kiev (mostly the Russian-speaking ones) getting more autonomy.

However, opening the first session of the Ukrainian Constitutional Commission, Mr Poroshenko said "decentralisation" should give more power to cities, towns and rural communities, not to regions. He also stressed that the Ukrainian language should remain the only state language. Mr Poroshenko rejected the idea of Ukraine's "federalisation", saying 90pc of Ukrainian citizens rejected this idea.

The president promised not to block a referendum on the issue, so sure was he of the result. Next day, the Rada adopted laws prohibiting praise for the Communist regime of 1917-1991 and making the Ukrainian "independence fighters" (including the temporary allies of Hitler in 1941-44) legally immune from criticism. This may further complicate the return of DNR and LNR back to Ukraine's fold.
 
Concern about delays

Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov said he was "worried" about the delays in the implementation of the Minsk agreement. He  called on France and Germany, as the guarantors of the Minsk agreement, to "apply pressure," forcing Kiev to fulfil the agreement.

But experts are sceptical about Berlin or Paris "pressing" Mr Poroshenko. Since the beginning of the war, the Ukrainian president heard nothing but praise and standing ovations from the officials in the EU, the US and Canada.

The economic losses could help move the peace process forward. The EU announced it would keep sanctions against Russia until the Minsk agreement is fulfilled. Mr Lavrov called this "absurd," reminding his western partners that sanctions were hitting both sides. So, this may be the last hope for the Minsk agreement - its non-fulfilment makes Russia, Ukraine, and the EU poorer every day.

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 #25
PM Medvedev compares Crimea's return with fall of Berlin Wall

MOSCOW, April 21. /TASS/. The reunification with Crimea was as important to Russia as the fall of the Berlin Wall was vital to Germany, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev said on Tuesday.

"There are such milestones in the history of each country, which mark the start of a new epoch. For modern Russia it was the year of 2014," Medvedev said presenting the government's annual report at the State Duma, the parliament's lower house.

He said that 2014 was the Year of Crimea for the whole country.

"Despite its formal post-Soviet borders the Crimean Peninsula always remained our land," Medvedev said.

"I am convinced that every Russian, every responsible politician realised the great importance of this event [Crimea's reunification]," he said.

"Many saw Crimea's return as the restoration of historical justice, the importance and power of which can be compared with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the unification of Germany or the return of Hongkong and Macao to China," he added.

The prime minister said such events "always spark a major geopolitical outcry."

"The unprecedented political and economic pressure is the payment for our position but the authorities and society realised that we there was no other way," he said.

Russia's government has completed work on Crimea's integration in close interaction with the State Duma, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev said. "The development of Crimea became a purely internal affair of Russia. For the first time in the history of modern Russia the government was facing a task unique in its complexity and scale: to ensure within a brief period of time - by the beginning of this year - full-fledged integration of the new regions into the country's management, legal and economic system. We have done this," the premier said.

He stressed that the legal framework had been formed for Crimea's economy and social sphere to work in accordance with Russia's laws. "Together with you, 8 federal constitutional law, 32 federal laws and more than 600 bylaws," the Russian prime minister said.

Medvedev added that the problem of increasing the size of pensions in Crimea had been solved, with payments to pensioners becoming substantially closer to those in Russia. "The introduction of the Russian labor legislation has led to a two-fold increase in the average wages," he said.

Last year, residents of Crimea were granted access to Russia's social support system, Medvedev noted. "As we promised, benefits and payments provided to residents of Crimea under the Ukrainian legislation have been preserved. Programs have been endorsed to modernize the public health services of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol for a total amount of more than 6 billion rubles, " Medvedev said.

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 #26
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
April 21, 2015
Donbas: A limited war for a total revision of the Cold War order
The armed conflict in Ukraine is starting to resemble a "limited war" of the 18th century more than a modern 21st century "total war."
By Alexey Fenenko
Alexey Fenenko is an associate professor at the Faculty of World Politics of the Moscow State University. Previously, he was a leading researcher at the Institute of International Security Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (2004-2013), a project coordinator at the Academic Educational Forum on International Relations and a co-editor for ˝International Trends˝ magazine (2004-2011). He has a Doctorate in History (2003).

April 12 marked the first anniversary of the start of the armed conflict in the Donbas. Experts disagree about who has gained the upper hand - is it Vladimir Putin, Barack Obama, Angela Merkel or Petro Poroshenko? A convincing case can be made for each.

But the very fact that the topic is being debated shows that there are no clear winners or losers. The conflict in the Donbas reiterates that in modern warfare, unlike in its traditional sense, the concepts of "victory" and "defeat" are relative. Paradoxically, modern warfare is reminiscent not of the world wars of the last century, but of the limited wars of the eighteenth.

Total and limited warfare

Back in the 1820s, German military theorist Carl von Clausewitz identified two types of war: total and limited. According to Clausewitz, they differ not by the scale of operations or the number of casualties, but by the culminating point of victory. The aim of total war is to annihilate the enemy or to impose peace in the form of surrender. The purpose of limited war is to force the enemy into a compromise that benefits the victor at the expense of the vanquished.

Over the one-and-a-half centuries from the Napoleonic Wars to World War II, the world was dominated by total warfare. It was characterized by three salient features: first, the stated political goal was to crush the enemy and deprive it of the capacity to resist; second, war was ideological in nature, meaning that the warring sides conceptualized the confrontation in terms of a struggle between "good" and "evil"; third, the view was that war affected "the whole nation" and required the mass mobilization of human and material resources.

The situation changed in the late 1950s. After the United States and the Soviet Union developed nuclear missiles, U.S. strategists posited that victory in total war was no longer possible. As a result, they came up with the doctrine of "flexible response."

Its objectives were to recognize the infeasibility of inflicting direct military defeat, to focus on victory in local conflicts of low and moderate intensity, to limit targeted strikes to mainly military facilities, and to confine the war objective to securing a clearly defined set of political concessions from the enemy.

Officially the Soviet Union denied the concept of "flexible response" and "limited nuclear war." But in the 1970s official journals published articles by Soviet experts on the feasibility of keeping a future conflict in Europe at the pre-nuclear level and forcing the enemy into concluding an advantageous peace.

The "limited nuclear war" envisaged by Cold War strategists did not happen. But the superpower rivalry spilled over into a series of limited wars in the Third World. The objective of these conflicts was to force the opposing superpower into making concessions by inflicting defeat on the "junior partner."
One of the "rules" was that the territories of both superpowers had to remain free of military conflict. Such wars demanded a transition from universal conscription to small-scale professional armies and new types of weaponry intended primarily for counterforce operations.

"What is past is prologue"

There is a historical precedent. After the Thirty Years War in Europe (1618-1648), the logic of limited war reigned supreme for the next 150 years. King Louis XIV of France understood "hegemony" as the acquisition of key positions from which to impose his will on the enemy. His wars did not directly affect the territories of the "great powers," but consisted of a series of demonstrations of power in disputed areas along France's borders.

The large mercenary armies of yesteryear were replaced by small, highly flexible contingents of professional soldiers. The purpose of war was to win a profitable peace, namely the annexation of border areas and forcing other powers into recognizing the redrawing of maps. Therefore, any peace was pregnant with so many compromises that terms such as "victory" and "defeat" were nebulous concepts.

The "limited wars" of the early twenty-first and early eighteenth centuries are strikingly similar. In both cases, the aim is to force the enemy to compromise. In both cases, war is limited to a strictly delineated area of dispute without directly affecting the territory of the great powers involved. In both cases, small professional armies are used, not mass mobilization. And in both cases, negotiations are maintained throughout the conflict.

Amazingly, even the "sanctions war" has faithfully recreated the atmosphere of the eighteenth century. Back then, rabble-rousing kings like Charles XII or Frederick II were "non-handshakable" for other monarchs, which, incidentally, did not prevent them from clinging to power.

War did not develop according to its own logic, but remained under the control of the "great powers." Lofty objectives, if any such were postulated, gradually evaporated. Their place was taken by a compromise beneficial to one of the warring parties. Such compromise, however, could never be considered final: the game could always be resumed.

"The war for Ukrainian succession"

In the early 1990s, the United States invented a new type of limited warfare: peacekeeping operations. These wars were used to consolidate U.S. supremacy in conflicts in Africa, the Balkans and Afghanistan. The second Gulf War exposed the limits of this strategy, whereupon Russia and China began to ponder the option of showing force to coerce the United States itself into a deal. The conflicts around Georgia, the South China Sea and Syria were integral components of such strategy.

Unsurprisingly, the Ukrainian conflict has so far resembled the "wars of succession" of the eighteenth century. After the failure of the "reset" in the fall of 2011, Russian-U.S. relations became strained. Both sides sought a pressure point to force the other to the negotiating table. They found it in Ukraine.
The West supported the February coup in Kiev. Moscow regarded the Maidan uprising as the collapse of Ukraine's statehood. At stake was the overhaul of the established status quo in the Baltic-Black Sea region.

Officially, both sides postulated "lofty objectives." Washington and Brussels saw Ukraine's future in the signing of an EU Association Agreement, which would strike a severe blow to Russia's Eurasian Union project. Moscow postulated the establishment of "Novorossiya" (New Russia) as a new state in southeastern Ukraine.

But by fall 2014 these two "mighty objectives" had been forgotten. An Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU could not be signed, as Kiev had lost control over half of the Donbas. "Novorossiya" emerged only as a small, unrecognized state covering half of that selfsame Donbas.

The Minsk II agreements set in writing a strategic stalemate in which neither side could inflict a decisive defeat on the other. The fate of Eastern Europe was gradually reduced to determining the affiliation of Debaltseve and Mariupol - much like the wars of Louis XIV or Frederick II.

In this context, it would not be surprising if NATO were to supply lethal aid to Ukraine. The experience of the eighteenth century teaches us that "cabinet wars" begin as a show of force before turning into a limited war between great powers inside a third country.

The confrontation will not go beyond the "deal-equals-victory" logic. Its outcome will be determined not by brilliant victories on the battlefield, but during the course of tortuous wrangling at the negotiating table, reinforced by effective (or ineffective) demonstrations of power.

Looking ahead

Drawing on the experience of the eighteenth century allows us to make an interesting prognosis for the present day. The limited conflicts of Louis XIV gave way to the larger limited wars of Peter I and Frederick the Great. Despite various deals, they resulted not in a lasting peace, but rather a series of temporary alignments. The upshot was the Seven Years War, the decisive conflict of the era of limited warfare. It was that bloody stalemate that proved the dead-end strategy of limited wars.

Something similar appears to be happening in our time. The wars in Georgia, Syria and Ukraine have not resolved any great power disputes. The outcome in each case looks more like a partial compromise, an attempt to buy time to better prepare for the decisive showdown. The pattern of events is leading the United States into a limited confrontation with Russia and China. However, in the age of "nuclear stalemate" such a war is conceived only in the form of a large-scale clash on the territory of third countries.

This fight will be more intense than today's limited wars, but overall the "deal-equals-victory" logic will prevail. Will the coming decades see a large-scale limited war for a revision of the post-1991 order? Time will tell.

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 #27
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
April 21, 2015
Military conflict in Ukraine ushered in a new era of dangerous multipolarity
One year since the military conflict in Ukraine started, we are now better able to comprehend the inherent weaknesses of today's international security architecture.
By Petr Kopka
Petr Kopka is the head of research programs at the Center for Operational Strategic Analysis (COSA). In 2003, he was the acting head of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine and founder of the Analytical Division of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine. From 2004 to 2010, he was the first deputy director of the Institute for National Security under the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine. He is also a major general in the Reserve

The year that has passed since the commencement of large-scale military operations in Eastern Ukraine has been marked by many significant events in the field of international relations. But the main conclusion that presents itself, whether solicited or not, is that the international community was fundamentally unprepared to deliver an adequate response to different scenarios for developments on the ground.

It so happened that in March 2015, within days of each other, two high-ranking international officials effectively admitted that today's global institutions are unable to cope with the new challenges and threats facing the world in the twenty-first century.

First, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg told Sky News in London that, since Ukraine was not part of NATO, the latter would not interfere in the "Ukraine conflict." Stoltenberg stressed that the North Atlantic alliance was responsible for protecting and defending its allies, of which none was under attack. Nevertheless, he said that NATO could not agree with or accept what Russia was doing in Ukraine, for which reason the alliance had offered Kiev its strong political backing.

It is unclear what these words highlight more: the failure to fully grasp the severity of the current threats, the aspiration to unconditionally comply with statutory provisions, or the inability of the alliance to make its impact felt in the field of international security. Perhaps it is a bit of all three. However, such blunt utterances provoke not only surprise, but also anxiety that a world of violent confrontation and fragmentation is becoming the norm.

Where once there was a bipolar confrontation between opposing systems on ideological grounds, today's poorly structured modern world is gradually stoking a confrontation based on the Hobbesian principle of "all against all," replete with all the rapidly changing configurations, objectives, interests, unions, and centers of attraction and repulsion that ensue.

Speaking at a symposium on the 70th anniversary of the United Nations at the UN University in Japan, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon addressed that very issue. In particular, he stated that the security landscape was becoming increasingly complex: There are a few players on the battlefield, but many more acting behind the scenes.

Consequently, as underlined by Ban Ki-moon, the UN Security Council has been unable to frame a common position on Syria and Ukraine. The only way out of the "Ukraine crisis," in his view, is through the "genuine willingness" of the warring parties to "implement the Minsk-2 ceasefire agreement."

On that point he is in agreement with Stoltenberg, who also believes that "the most important thing now is to support the implementation of the Minsk ceasefire agreements," guarantee the withdrawal of weapons from the front line, and maintain control over the process.

However, both international officials, wittingly or otherwise, are leading the global community, their esteemed international organizations and themselves astray. The Ukraine-Russia conflict (which, for the sake of correctness, is what the processes occurring in the east of Ukraine should be called) did not initially presuppose the existence of a mechanism for a peaceful settlement.

What Russia was (and is) doing in respect of Ukraine in no way provided for a possible return to the pre-aggression status quo or even for a compromise solution. Everything is tailored not for a peaceful return to the past, but for the violent overthrow of the existing order with the prospect of an endlessly expanding zone of instability and general havoc to come.

This confirms yet again the inference that Crimea and the escalation of tension in eastern Ukraine was merely a detonator for the time bomb planted under the existing system of international relations and an anti-handling device intended to stymie efforts to restore security within the framework of global reality.

The situation is aggravated by the fact that all this is happening against the backdrop of the complete and irrevocable collapse of the mechanisms designed to ensure the smooth running of the balance-of-power system. Above all, it pertains to the system of international treaties, or rather the mechanism to control compliance therewith.

The latest evidence of this is perhaps Russia's decision to withdraw from the Joint Consultative Group on the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). As emphasized in a statement by the head of the Russian delegation at the talks in Vienna: "Russia's announced suspension of the operation of the CFE Treaty in 2007 is hereby complete."

The suspension of the Treaty adds additional complexity to the already less-than-ideal mechanism for conventional arms control in Europe.

All this requires that the international community, primarily in the shape of a consolidated Europe and the United States, should give its undivided attention to finding a new global architecture of international relations, including, first and foremost, the creation of new, or radically reformed (not in word but in deed), mechanisms and institutions for ensuring international security.

These mechanisms should include not only censure of any form of aggression whatsoever, but also coercion to desist from it. And this, as Ukraine shows, should not be limited to economic sanctions.

If one proceeds from the statement by former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in his latest book that the international system of the twenty-first century will be characterized by an apparent contradiction - fragmentation amidst increasing globalization, one can only conjecture how complex relations between nations will be.

And the intricacy of the challenges involved requires an appropriate, tightly coordinated response both at the prevention stage and in the process of mitigating the consequences of intergovernmental, regional and global conflicts.

Such is the case even accounting for the wholly new circumstance (according to Kissinger) in the emerging world order whereby America can no longer fence itself off from the world or dominate it. Confirmation of this can be seen in the ideas expounded by U.S. President Barack Obama in his 2015 State of the Union address to Congress, in which he emphasized that "the question is not whether America leads in the world, but how."

In that regard, the main criteria of leadership, according to the U.S. president, are the fusion of military power with strong diplomacy and the use of American influence in conjunction with newly formed coalitions. The question of how and in what circumstances these combinations of criteria will be used remains open.

The upshot is that the United States is consciously rejecting the role of universally recognized world leader in today's highly complex system of international relations.

And if that is so, the world is at risk of plunging indefinitely into a state of uncontrollable multipolarity - where each of the emerging poles will defend its own interests to the best of its ability and at its sole discretion, unmindful of the generally accepted rules and norms of international law and behavior, without fear of encountering real resistance or punishment.

The Cold War-era balance of power did not preclude conflict. Its main objective was to ensure stability, primarily through matching and balancing the interests of the various international players.

Whatever the pros and cons, the system provided peaceful international coexistence over a fairly long stretch of time. Society learned to find mutually acceptable compromises. And the main restraining factor was nuclear-tipped, whereupon the world developed a singular apocalyptic consensus.

Given the far greater complexity of today's state of play, the sooner the international community wakes up to the need to start developing and building a new architecture of international relations, the sooner the world will come into possession of new mechanisms to settle arising conflicts.

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#28
Politico.com
April 20, 2015
The whispering train
The last link between Kiev and Moscow.
By OLA CICHOWLAS
Ola Cichowlas is a journalist covering Russia and eastern Europe. Follow her on Twitter at @olacicho

"Suddenly, we are the enemy," Irina whispers to me from the bottom bunk as our Moscow-bound train pulls into Russian border control at around 3am. A year after war broke out in the Donbass, the Kiev-Moscow train is one of the few remaining passenger rail lines linking Russia and Ukraine.

"We never had any problems before," says Irina, a sturdy Ukrainian woman in my carriage. Born in a village in southeast Ukraine, she studied in Moscow in the 1970s before settling in the Ukrainian capital. Now in her mid-fifties, she is employed in the Kiev office of a Moscow-based pharmaceutical firm. Irina has spent 30 years traveling between the two cities.

"I work for a Russian company," she mutters hesitantly to the female border guard examining her documents. After a lengthy pause, the guard hands back her papers. "We can all get on after all," the Russian replies. "There's so little good news these days."

Irina has happy memories of Moscow - the city of her student days where she met her husband. For years she would attend university reunions in the Russian capital, where old friends would catch up over semi-sweet wine high up in the Moscow suburbs. But that was before the Maidan. "It's all different now," she sighs.

Ukrainians and Russians have been torn apart by a war few understand. Kiev and Moscow, once cities with shared histories, are now unrecognizable to one another. On the 13-hour journey between the two capitals, passengers try to make sense of the conflict.

Like many of the men on the train, Vadim is seeking work in Russia, where wages for unskilled labor are still considerably higher than in Ukraine. After spending a week in his family home in Zhytomyr, west of Kiev, he is returning to his factory job outside Moscow. "Nobody wanted this war," murmurs Vadim, a clean-cut man of about 30, as he sips from a bottle of kvass, a fizzy drink made from fermented black bread.

Vadim was at home in Zhytomyr during the last days of the Maidan protests in Kiev. When he returned to Moscow, he found a different Russia. His boss hung a poster that read "Maidan: We Will Not Forget or Forgive." At work, he watched Russian television with his co-workers. But his family and friends painted a different version of events from back home, as did his social media accounts. Vadim says Ukrainian migrants who had been in Russia for longer than he had were particularly receptive to the Kremlin's propaganda. "They are bitter that they had to leave their country to have a better life. I understand them," he says.

Vadim hopes these will be his last six months working in the Russian factory. Moscow's financial crisis is putting migrants off, and he wants to be able to support his family from home. "This country," he says as we travelled through Ukraine, "should be rich." He points to the pot-holed roads outside the train window. "It's not because we can't build roads. It's because the money disappears," he grumbles. A year after President Viktor Yanukovich fled Ukraine, Vadim sees little progress in the fight against his country's rampant corruption.

Ihor, our conductor, has recently been promoted, and it is his first day on the job on the Kiev-Moscow run. "Before the war," he says, using a now-common Ukrainian refrain that, sadly, does not refer to World War II, he was on the Kiev-Voronezh line. It closed last summer due to its proximity to the war zone.

One of this conflict's many victims has been public transportation. Often there is no official information on train and bus cancellations. Russians and Ukrainians have taken to social media to share tips for crossing the border, but Internet forums are notoriously unreliable. Tickets for trains that no longer run are still available for sale online, Ihor says, adding: "You know, the Internet also says Donetsk airport is up and working."

The following morning we wake up in Moscow. The Russian capital is gearing up for Victory Day on May 9 - the World War II commemoration that Vladimir Putin has chosen as a forum to promote his version of Russian history. This year's parade will be especially significant - not only because it marks 70 years since the victory over the Nazis, but also because many Russians believe that, by defying the West and taking Crimea, Russia has turned the tide of history again. In Moscow, giant billboards show "important dates of the Russian army" and the St George ribbon - a Russian military symbol adopted by Russian-backed rebels in eastern Ukraine - is everywhere.

"We don't speak the same language anymore," says Irina, who herself comes from a Russian speaking Ukrainian family. She's right: after we cross into Russia "annexation" becomes "unification," "rebels" become "freedom fighters," "invasion" becomes "liberation".

In Moscow, the Ukrainian conductors have five hours to kill before the train goes back to Kiev. Ihor, not wanting to set foot in Russia, says he will remain in his carriage for the whole time, and sends his female assistant, Halina, to help passengers off the train. As I step onto the platform, I find Halina looking up at Ihor from outside. "We all react differently when we are hurt," she says.
 

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 #29
Wall Street Journal
April 21, 2015
U.S. Army Starts to Train Ukraine Units
Ukraine president hails trainers' arrival as sign of Western commitment
By ALAN CULLISON

YAVORIV, Ukraine-U.S. troops kicked off a training program for their Ukrainian counterparts at a military base in western Ukraine Monday, far from the continuing fighting near Russia's border.

Ukraine President Petro Poroshenko praised the troops' arrival as a sign the West is ready to help Ukraine defend its sovereignty. But the training program comes as NATO members are cautiously limiting their aid to Kiev to avoid provoking Russia.

Speaking before hundreds of U.S. and Ukrainian troops, Mr. Poroshenko hailed the training program as a "new stage of cooperation" between Kiev and Washington, and noted that Ukraine is also getting training from the U.K., which sent advisers last month, and from Canada and Poland, which both promised advisers later this year.

"We are not alone in this fight," said Mr. Poroshenko, who spoke to the crowd on a parade ground during a cold downpour.

Mr. Poroshenko has pleaded for tougher measures from the West to halt a Russia-backed insurrection in eastern Ukraine, including lethal aid and high-tech weaponry that his military lacks. The West has so far balked at the request out of fear of provoking Moscow-and doubts about whether Ukraine's army has the training to handle sophisticated weaponry.

The training program begun Monday aims to address the training worries, as 300 soldiers of the 173rd Airborne Brigade based in Vicenza, Italy, will be helping several Ukrainian battalions hone infantry skills, from dealing with surveillance drones to defusing hidden bombs. The training also aims to bridge a gulf between military traditions of the U.S. and Ukraine, which despite its westward-leaning aspirations has an army with deep Soviet roots.

While Soviet military training has tended to stress a top-down command structure, the U.S. believes its army's success rests on devolving decision-making on missions further down the ranks.

"We don't expect to be talking a lot about leadership development," said Capt. Matthew Carpenter, who arrived in Ukraine last week. "We're talking more about how development needs to go down to the individual level."

Ukraine has largely fought off the Russia-backed rebellion in its eastern provinces with a hodgepodge of regular army units and volunteer battalions financed by Ukrainian oligarchs and public donations. Over time, the government has worried about the reliability of its forces. The army, officials say, is riddled with Russian agents and sympathizers, while the volunteer battalions could become private armies for tycoons, they say.

Recently the government has tried to rein in the volunteer battalions by folding them into the Ukrainian Interior Ministry's heavily armed police units, or into the National Guard, a volunteer force that was hastily revived last year as Russia annexed Crimea and the eastern Donbass region took up arms against Kiev.

The first troops slated to be trained by the U.S. soldiers are from Ukraine's National Guard, and last week Moscow sounded a warning that the West is arming dangerous radicals. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Alexander Lukashevich called members of that entity "Ukrainian ultra-nationalists...who wear Nazi symbols on their uniforms, who have stained themselves with the blood of women, children, the elderly during punitive operations in Donbass.

"A question arises: Do Washington, London and Ottawa really understand who these national guards are?" he said.

At the training center Monday, officials played down fears of radicals in the ranks of the National Guard, with U.S. Ambassador Geoffrey Pyatt calling it "a new institution" and "a new national guard that is part of the new Ukraine."

Igor Stinsky, a warrant officer in one of the battalions being trained, said he knew of no radical leanings among his fellow guardsmen, most of whom he said had worked as riot police.

By Monday, the Ukrainians and Americans had so far done little in common besides speak through translators and eat lunch together. Dmitriy Burskiy, another warrant officer, said he was impressed that the Americans were given an entire hour for their lunch break, while the Ukrainians got 10 minutes.

"They are allowed to talk to one another, discuss what's on their minds," he said. "That is one thing I like about their training."

-Dion Nissenbaum in Washington contributed to this article.

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 #30
Jamestown Foundation Eurasia Daily Monitor
April 20, 2015
The Faltering Russian Economy Makes a Renewed Ukraine Offensive More Likely
By Pavel K. Baev
 
"Boring" is perhaps the prevalent impression of President Vladimir Putin's televised four-hour-long Q & A session that aired last Thursday (April 16), which was meant to demonstrate his good health and relaxed attitude to the great many problems worrying his loyal subjects. The three key points he stressed were that everything is under control, the economy is set to improve from the low point of the crisis, and there will be no war (Slon.ru, April 17). His command of facts and figures was far from convincing to support the first point, and the everyday reality of falling incomes disproves the second one; thus, the commitment to peace inevitably looks dubious. Triumphalism over the "spectacular" annexation of Crimea was gone, overtaken by a return to "mundane" issues such as degenerating health care and the credit crunch to small businesses, which have fueled domestic discontent. And under the Putinist system, such discontent can only be neutralized by a new patriotic mobilization (Moscow Echo, April 17).
 
The Russian president has not found any inspirational idea for such a mobilization and even implicitly distanced himself from the rabid conservatism targeting "corrupt" Western values, which is fanned by the official propaganda (Novaya Gazeta, April 16). Reportedly, more than 3,000,000 questions and pleas were recorded for last week's carefully staged performance. Putin attempted to highlight a few "human stories" but clearly preferred to push the pesky details to subordinates (Gazeta.ru, April 16). Russia's governors and ministers, however, excel in explaining such problems away. Thus, Nikolai Rogozhkin, the presidential envoy to Siberia, suggested that the devastating forest fires raging in Khakassiya were caused by arson executed by specially trained oppositionists (Newsru.com, April 17). Sabotage is indeed a perfect cover-up for man-made disasters caused by rampant embezzlement. And it is typical in this respect that one issue that has disappeared completely from Putin's discourse is the fight against corruption (Navalny.com, April 17).
 
The focus on economic matters yielded few opportunities for positivity, and Putin's promises of recovery in a year or two clashed with the increasingly pessimistic forecasts from the International Monetary Fund (RIA Novosti, April 16). The staged debate with former finance minister Alexei Kudrin was intended to prove that Putin holds social problems close to his heart, but revealed only the president's lack of understanding of the fundamental exhaustion of the old economic model. Kudrin later expressed his disappointment at the Kremlin's procrastination with addressing the accumulating challenges (RBC.ru, April 16). This inability to face the real issues and propensity to self-delusion regarding the robustness of state finances undermines rather than boosts confidence in Putin's supreme "manual management"; quite probably, it condemns the ruble to a new plunge (Slon.ru, April 16). The Kremlin apparently clings to the belief in the forthcoming appreciation of oil and refuses to acknowledge the fact that the "shale revolution" in the United States continues to transform the global energy markets (Kommersant-FM, April 17).
 
Adopting a soothing tone and cutting down on the usual acerbic accusations and crude jokes, Putin stayed clear of foreign policy matters except for a couple of acid asides about the US desire to turn Russia into its "vassal" (Nezavisimaya gazeta, April 17). This moderation was more than compensated for by aggressive rhetoric at the high-level security conference staged in Moscow, in parallel with Putin's show (RBC.ru, April 16). Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov condemned the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) enlargement and the US ballistic missile defense system. The guest of honor at the event was Hyon Yong-Chol, the minister of the People's Armed Forces of North Korea (Kommersant, April 17). While Putin was careful to include only terrorism, organized crime and xenophobia in his list of threats to Russia, his ministers concentrated on the threat of "color revolutions" and argued that the US "has crossed all thinkable lines seeking to pull Kyiv into its orbit" (Moskovsky Komsomolets, April 17). In this context, the reasserted pledges to build up Russian military might describe not a strategic commitment but a surge attempt while sinking in a quagmire, because neither Putin nor the top brass can disprove Kudrin's point that economic backwardness is eroding Russia's defense capabilities (Forbes.ru, April 16).
 
The obvious target for this surge is Ukraine. Putin's rhetoric about political solutions to this crisis-the blame for which he put squarely on the authorities in Kyiv-was far from reassuring. He persisted with denials about the presence of Russian troops in Ukraine's eastern region of Donbas, and gave an evasive answer as to Moscow's intentions regarding possibly recognizing the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk "republics" (Newsru.com, April 18). Only 16 percent of Russians think that the hostilities in eastern Ukraine are over or will be over by summer, and 24 percent believe that they could continue for many years. Whereas, 30 percent are certain that Russian troops are deployed in the war zone (Levada.ru, April 6). Gerasimov argued that the next "aggressive move" from Kyiv, goaded on by "Western curators," could constitute a military danger for Russia (Lenta.ru, April 16). The arrival of US military instructors to the Lviv region for training Ukrainian National Guard units is condemned by the Kremlin as a "destabilizing factor," and violations of the ceasefire have, indeed, become more frequent (RBC.ru, April 17).
 
Typically, such commentary by high officials is merely camouflage for Russia's real intentions. But Moscow is unlikely to try to escalate the conflict in the coming few weeks as the Russian Armed Forces are going through the spring draft cycle. Even more importantly, Putin obviously wants to stage picture-perfect May 9 Victory Day celebrations in Red Square, even if the list of confirmed foreign guests is embarrassingly short. By mid-May, however, these restraining influences will disappear, and any sudden exacerbation of the economic crisis (the recent strengthening of the ruble actually makes it more vulnerable to a new collapse) could trigger the order to launch a new military offensive. Neither Lavrov nor the top brass are apparently involved in the decision-making on this crisis manipulation; while Putin's performance indicates that he is briefed primarily by the Federal Security Service (FSB) and is supplied mostly with news and analysis he wants to hear. His leadership style is turning increasingly self-defensive and mistrustful of even the top elites, whose predatory corruption curtails his options for playing a benevolent "father of the nation." Peace just does not work for him, and it remains to be seen how far he is prepared to go on the "hybrid war" path.

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 #31
Novaya Gazeta
April 15, 2015
Russian liberal paper interviews former Donetsk regional governor on Ukraine conflict
Pavel Kanygin interview with former Donetsk Region governor Serhiy Taruta, 'All approaches to Mariupol defended. We will smash their teeth'

Former Donetsk Region governor Serhiy Taruta on how the authorities missed the start of the war in the Donets Basin a year ago and what should be done now so as not to lose control of Mariupol.

Tell the difference: Taruta vs. Kolomoyskyy

A year ago, at the height of the revolt -the seizure of district police stations throughout the entire region and of the regional administration in Donetsk itself - businessman [co-owner of the Industrial Union of Donbass corporation] Serhiy Taruta was the hope of the Ukrainian regime. Together with [businessman Ihor] Kolomoyskyy, who was appointed governor of Dnipropetrovsk Region at that time, they were supposed to keep control of the two very important regions in the south east. But things went wrong for Taruta's team from the very start - in contrast to Kolomoyskyy's people they did not even manage to occupy the main regional administration building.

Today Serhiy Taruta, the former governor of Donetsk Region, is strengthening the defence of Mariupol - this time as a deputy of the people's council. Admittedly there are visitors from Kiev in the city itself, moving around accompanied by two off-road vehicles with machine-gunners.

[Interviewer Pavel Kanygin] The people who seized the Donetsk Region administration building, who were they?

[Taruta] It was a special operation. But at the time we did not yet think that there were so many representatives of Russia there. Not even of Russia but of Crimea. People who were involved in undermining the situation and the seizure of Crimea. It was clear that they were coordinating their actions with Moscow and the Kremlin. [Sergey (Serhiy)] Aksenov (the head of Crimea - Kanygin) was managing this (the seizure of the regional state administration -Kanygin). At the beginning of April there were already weapons there. But at the time we thought that we would be able to counter the seizure of power by rapid action to prosecute the main ringleaders. The order was given at that time to the security agencies -the prosecutor's office, the police, and the SBU [Ukrainian Security Service] - to find these coordinators. The same people were moving in response to a signal throughout the entire region, appearing first here, then there, they were assembling rallies and stirring things up. We started work on identifying them...

[Kanygin] But I do not think that you succeeded.

[Taruta] Let me finish: the entire system of power demonstrated its ineffectiveness at that moment. Both the legislative and the law-enforcement system. Back in March, the police had prepared court documents for the prosecution of 130 people. But the courts dismissed all these charges. The system worked extremely clumsily in those extraordinary circumstances -strong evidence was demanded, and compliance with all the formal procedures, as should be the case during times of peace. But that time was no longer entirely a time of peace. It was necessary to react immediately, to anticipate. I remember we had the Kuzmenko brothers here -the organizers (of the separatist movement - Kanygin) in Mariupol -the courts released them. When people say that the Donetsk security agencies were unable to work competently, saying that it was because they were from Donetsk and they worked like that (sabotaging -Kanygin), I respond: at that point the security officials here were from the entire country. They were seconded from everywhere. At all the sites - in the administrations, Prosecutor's Office, the SBU -the security officials were from other regions of Ukraine. And none of them were able to do anything.

[Kanygin] But why did Kolomoyskyy manage to stand his ground in the same situation?

[Taruta] Kolomoyskyy did not manage to do anything! Kolomoyskyy did not have anything either. He just had good PR. And I am just astounded by you. It is one thing when an ordinary resident does not understand the situation but it is another when it is a journalist, a forward-thinking young person. You understand that there was nothing in Dnipropetrovsk, there was not the threat of seizure of power. Well in Zaporizhzhya, did you hear about things being stirred up there?

[Kanygin] I do not know about Zaporizhzhya. But two-thousand-strong rallies gathered in Dnipropetrovsk, the seizure of the regional administration was being prepared.

[Taruta] If we had only two thousand people there would not have been any seizure here either. If provocateurs and coordinators had not been brought here, if there had not been a direct border with Russia -everything would also have been calm. It has to be understood that the sabotage scenario only developed in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. All the rest are just attempts to stir things up that would not have led to anything. It is good to treat a sick person when he has no sickness! Well, there was no sickness in Dnipropetrovsk Region.

[Kanygin] But Kolomoyskyy's people there put many of the pro-Russian activists behind bars.

[Taruta] And have you heard anything similar about Zaporizhzhya?

[Kanygin] What has Zaporizhzhya got to do with anything, Serhiy Oleksiyovych?

[Taruta] Zaporizhzhya is closer to Russia that Dnipropetrovsk Region. It has a population of under 800,000.
[Kanygin] So you insist that there was no threat in the Dnipropetrovsk?

[Taruta] You may remember when it was announced that they were buying up sub-machine-guns from the population and were paying 10,000 dollars for each gangster's head (Governor Kolomoyskyy promised such a reward for each separatist - Kanygin). But now tell me, did any of this happen? Did he collect a thousand sub-machine-guns, or fifty or at least ten heads? Did anything come of this? No! And who won in the elections to the Supreme Council in Dnipropetrovsk Region in almost all the single-mandate constituencies? The Opposition Bloc. That is the real result.

[Kanygin] Tell us when did the people from Russia seize the initiative in Donetsk? At what point did they push aside the local elite who initially tried to head the protest?

[Taruta] At the first stage, at the beginning of April, it was people from Crimea, as I have already said. Weapons came to Urzuf by ferry via Kerch. Local live-wires constantly received calls from representatives of [former Ukrainian President Viktor] Yanukovych: they said do not try hard there, we will come back soon. At the beginning the live-wires still listened to them, but later they simply stopped responding.

In the end everything started to be controlled by Moscow, when [former defence minister of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) Igor] Strelkov [Girkin] came here with his fighters. That was a strategic mistake (letting them in - Kanygin).

[Kanygin] [Former DPR prime minister Aleksandr (Oleksandr)] Boroday was already in Donetsk at that point. Did you hold any talks with him?

[Taruta] No, it was clear that he was also under the control of Moscow and the Kremlin and had no independence. And there were all kinds of different characters before Boroday - [deputy speaker of the people's council of the DPR, Denis (Denys Pushylin)] Pushilins, [chairman of the DPR council Andrey (Andriy Purhin)] Purgins.

Role of Donetsk tycoon

[Kanygin] Under whose control were they? [Donetsk tycoon] Rinat Akhmetov's?

[Taruta] No, he did not know them at all at that time.

[Kanygin] How could he have not known them when Pushilin went to his office for conversations after the seizure of the regional state administration?

[Taruta] It was Rinat who went there, to the regional administration, for talks with him. He understood that if the special-purpose troops tried to storm the building at that point there could have been a lot of casualties. He confirmed at the time his desire to go and talk to the people, explain that the situation needed to be settled peacefully. Moreover - he promised, as it were, to give a jump start to the issue if they vacated the building. He told them that he was willing to support all of the Donets Basin's peaceful demands and to defend everything with them. And he left for these talks at around eleven thirty at night.

[Kanygin] Why did you not go with him as the governor?

[Taruta] I was an alien to this crowd. I was not an authority to them. Rinat was, for the Donets Basin he is the authority. The football club, young people, they all of course had great respect for Rinat. He was the leader of the Donets Basin for them.

[Kanygin] And when did he cease to be the leader?

[Taruta] When those who seized the regional administration stopped obeying him. His position as the leader was seriously shaken. But for many others he still remains the boss. You know he provides humanitarian aid to many people (the Rinat Akhmetov Foundation supports refugees and residents of the territories not under Kiev's control -Kanygin). He helps at a time when the state has abandoned people.

[Kanygin] Does he retain any influence in Donetsk?

[Taruta] Well, to a certain extent yes. Because there is a huge amount of humanitarian aid.

Generally speaking, if seems that everything he is doing now is an attempt to keep his business. All of his companies and hotels are operating in the city and have not been touched.

[Kanygin] Akhmetov has access to high-ranking offices in Kiev and Moscow. People say he is in touch with [presidential aide Vladislav] Surkov.

[Taruta] Rinat just wants a peaceful political settlement.

[Kanygin] But nothing is being achieved.

[Taruta] The thing is that what is happening now is not his scenario. He cannot influence the situation himself. Surkov is only part of the Kremlin's administrative structure, but he did not commission the war. Neither one of them has a critical influence on the scenario involving force.

Plans and expectations

[Kanygin] What are your expectations regarding the current truce? Will it last for long in your opinion?

[Taruta] The militants' leaders do not need peace. They need war.

[Kanygin] But you have just said that they are subordinates acting on instruction.

[Taruta] Of course. On the whole, the military operation itself has been orchestrated by Moscow. But the separatists nevertheless have a large margin for independent actions. Independent action can be expected from them at any moment.

[Kanygin] Do you expect Mariupol to be captured?

[Taruta] It will be difficult for them to take Mariupol. If they had had the chance they would have already taken it to show Russia: look at what hot stuff we are. But it is impossible to do this with their resources.

[Kanygin] The question is will Russia help with Mariupol as it did with Ilovaysk and Debaltseve?

[Taruta] I do not believe there will be a direct intervention by Russian troops. Yes, this happened in Ilovaysk and Debaltseve. But here, in Mariupol, the situation is different, the location is different, the city is a long way from the border. It is fortified. All the approaches are protected. But they will try to move forward and we must smash their teeth if there is any attempt at provocation. And the separatists must understand that any attempts to strike us will cost them dear. They must use force to cool them down. And we must compel them to implement the Minsk accords.

[Kanygin] Are you implementing them yourselves?

[Taruta] We will implement them ourselves. We are willing to do so on the condition that the other side does not shy away. What has happened, after all? Our people got the order to withdraw heavy weapons, we did so -but they, on the contrary, are advancing, bringing up equipment. Naturally, we have suspended this process. Unfortunately.

[Kanygin] [Ukrainian President Petro] Poroshenko said recently that Ukraine must first establish control over the border and only then will local elections be held. But it states in the Minsk protocols: first elections then the border. So the Ukrainian side is also breaking the agreement, do you not agree?

[Taruta] We have a fundamental disagreement. We did not see any desire on their part to place the situation on a peaceful footing. They are not withdrawing weapons. And that is a prerequisite for other points in the agreement to come into play.

[Kanygin] And what can be done? Wage war again?

[Taruta] Why wage war? Diplomatic pressure needs to be increased. We must use peace efforts as much as possible. Russia is also giving them unambiguous orders: you are part of Ukraine, we do not intend to annex you, you must find a compromise and reach agreement with the Ukrainian regime on how to continue to provide for the vital activities of these territories. Systems for monitoring them must appear within the territories as well. So that they stop robbing and destroying the region's economy. After all, even when the Germans came and occupied them they did not destroy plants and factories but, on the contrary, restored them because they came as the owners. If they took Mariupol, they immediately sent in experts and people to restore everything. And now what we are seeing in Donetsk: the militants are destroying enterprises. It is as if they do not intend to ensure the life of this territory, they fought, they destroyed everything, and they left. That is their ideology.

[Kanygin] And your ideology? You have abandoned the people there, you are not paying pensions, you do not let freight through, and you have made travel as difficult as possible, is that not so?

[Taruta] That is not right, I agree. Well, okay, we can somehow still modernize the pass system, but there is a lot of other nonsense. Again we did not have any experience at all of fighting groups of saboteurs so we did the simplest thing -we made travelling difficult for everyone. I spoke to the military, they say that an old man went through a check point every day on his scooter and it later turned out that this old man was passing information to the "DPR" [Donetsk People's Republic]. There was another episode where militants travelled as workers. So there are risks and we need mechanisms for controlling travel. But there should not, of course, be huge problems for law-abiding citizens.

[Kanygin] What about the pensions that have been frozen?

[Taruta] That is wrong as well! Residents of Ukraine live in the Donets Basin, they have passports and they have not given them up. They have been occupied, they have suffered, they are victims. They have no medicines there, life is altogether intolerable, and instead of helping them we are cutting them off from Ukraine even more, as they see it we have betrayed them.

[Kanygin] There is no love lost between them and the "DPR" but there is probably even less between them and the central government.

[Taruta] Yes, of course. And that is terrible.

[Kanygin] In your opinion, is Poroshenko ineffective?

[Taruta] A year has passed. Of his 10 campaign points, not one has been implemented yet. You may remember, they were "peace in the Donets Basin in a week", "decentralization", "launching economic reforms", and so on. Not a single point has been put into practice! And of course internal dissatisfaction is brewing, and there are threats linked to this.

[Kanygin] Again, about the battalions that are heading to Kiev?

[Taruta] And this risk exists. It must not be underestimated. The regime is using this situation. But it must understand that if the people run out of patience the result will be unpredictable.

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#32
Sputnik
April 21, 2015
Ukrainian Chief Investigator Tells 'Ukrainophobes' to 'Shut Their Mouths'

Speaking on Ukrainian television Monday evening regarding the recent string of murders of prominent opposition journalists and politicians, Ukrainian Security Services Chief Investigator Vasily Vovk recommended that dissidents "shut their mouths" if they want to remain alive.

Appearing on the seemingly ironically titled program Svoboda Slova ('Freedom of Speech') on Ukraine's ICTV, Vovk stated that "I think that in our time, when there is practically a war going on, Ukrainophobes, if they don't shut their mouths, should at least stop their rhetoric. I think that in the present situation, there shouldn't be anyone stepping out directly against Ukraine and Ukrainianness."

The official warned that in the event that the 'Ukrainophobes' do not listen to him, "nothing good will come of it," adding that he says this "as the head of the Investigative Office of the Ukrainian Security Services."

Asked whether his office had developed a scientific or legal definition of 'Ukrainophobia', Vovk answered "no, but everyone knows what we're talking about."
Commenting on the murders of opposition politician Oleh Kalashnikov and journalist Oles Buzina, the chief investigator stated that each case had "an economic component."

Vovk added that "with regard to the journalist Buzina, I would say that for me as an investigator, the same as for journalists, it can't be that one doesn't have enemies. Make your conclusions for yourselves, but I think those who committed these crimes will be found." The investigator also stated that "foreign agents" may have been involved in the killings.

The night before, following the claims of responsibility for the killings by a group calling themselves the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), Vovk had stated that the UPA "does not exist," and that furthermore, "the Ukrainian Security Services (SBU) has no information about the existence in Ukraine of radical right organizations, parties or groups."

Earlier this week, Ukrainian and Russian journalists revealed that less than 48 hours before the murders of both Kalashnikov and Buzina, their names had appeared on a Ukrainian blog called 'Mirotvorec' ('Peacekeeper'), which published their personal details, including addresses, links to social media accounts, and mentions of the persons in the media. The site categorizes the people it writes about with labels such as "terrorist," "supporter of federalization," and more. Interior Ministry Advisor Anton Gerashchenko has praised the website, which he said helped disseminate information about the "terrorists" and "separatists."

Earlier this month, SBU head Valentin Nalyvaichenko stated that the security agency should be reformed along the lines of the security services of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, a group of paramilitaries which operated in Poland and the Soviet Union in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s. Nalyvaichenko commented that the organization worked effectively against an aggressor under conditions of occupation, had a patriotic education, and enjoyed the support of the population. What left out was that the organization's methods also included brutal forms of torture and murder, as well as a policy of mass extermination against 'Ukrainophobes' and 'enemies of Ukrainianness', including the massacre of up to 130,000 Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia, along with thousands of Russian and Ukrainian civilians.

Last week saw the killings of at least four well-known opposition figures in Ukraine. The first occurred on April 13 when journalist Sergey Sukhobok was murdered. This was followed by Kalashnikov's death two days later and Buzina's the day after that. The latest murder was committed Thursday when journalist Olga Moroz, the editor-in-chief of Ukrainian newspaper Neteshinskiy Vestnik, was found dead in her home.
 

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 #33
Sputnik
April 24, 2015
Ukraine Decentralization Key to Peace Process - Council of Europe Chief

STRASBOURG (Sputnik), Daria Chernyshova - The process of Ukraine's decentralization is one of the key issues in the Minsk agreements, Secretary General of the Council of Europe Thorbjorn Jagland said Tuesday.

"All the efforts that we are doing, will be important in order to move forward the Minsk process... To stabilize Ukraine, to build a solid state and then try to find a solution to the crisis in eastern Ukraine," Jagland said.

It is important to asymmetrically decentralize power "which means different powers to different regions," he explained.

"The Council of Europe deployed 25 experts in 25 offices on Ukraine in order to help them with the decentralization process," Jagland said, adding that the Council of Europe's adviser is at the Verkhovna Rada to provide assistance to Kiev authorities.

He added that constitutional changes are required for decentralization but "this is for the Ukrainians themselves to decide."

Constitutional reform in Ukraine with focus on decentralizing power is a part of the 13-point Minsk Deal elaborated in mid-February by the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, Germany and France in Belarusian capital of Minsk. According to the new Minsk Agreements, reforms are to be implemented by the end of 2015.

Ukraine's Constitutional Commission convened for the first time on April 6 to begin the process of creating amendments to the country's main laws.

The same day Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko said that Kiev is ready to hold a referendum on Ukraine's state structure. He expressed certainty that nine out of ten Ukrainians would support unity in the country.

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 #34
Channel One TV (Moscow)
April 20, 2015
Pro-Russian rebel rules out political alliance with Kiev

No political alliance is possible between Ukraine' southeast and the incumbent authorities in Kiev, Andriy Purhin (Andrey Purgin), the chairman of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) people's council, has said. He was speaking during the Russian afternoon talk show "Time Will Tell", broadcast live by state-controlled Channel One TV on 20 April. In contrast to his regular live linkups he appeared in the studio, among the programme's guests.

"Tens of thousands of casualites - the assessment varies now between 6,000 and 60,000 [people killed, as received], destroyed infrastructure, 70 churches that were destroyed on purpose, - this will not make it possible to have a political alliance with Ukraine," Purhin said. "I do not know how it is possible to forget all this blood. This does not mean, however, that we should not carry out a dialogue in terms of the economy and other areas. One thing does not rule out another," he said. "I do not see any political alliance at all," he added.

Asked whether Purhin saw the future of the self-proclaimed republics within Ukraine, he said: "We've paid dozens of lives for our freedom."

There is no dialogue in sight in the near future, veteran journalist and chief editor of the Govorit Moskva (Moscow calling) radio Sergey Dorenko said. "The existence conditions of the incumbent Kiev regime is escalation of violence and blood. They are being paid for this, they were hired to do so. The Americans hired them to do this," he said.

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 #35
Fort Russ
http://fortruss.blogspot.com
April 20, 2015
"We will work on the basis of facts on the ground"-Vladimir Putin on recognizing DPR and LPR
By nkfedor [http://nkfedor.livejournal.com/33051.html]
Translated from Russian by J.Hawk

On April 18, 2015, Sergey Brilyov, the anchor of the News on Saturday TV show, conducted an interview with President Vladimir Putin, during which he clarified a few of the answers he gave during the Q&A sessions. The clarifications concerned the question posed by Academician Torkunov concerning supplying S-300 weapon systems to Iran, and the matter of recognizing DPR and LPR. Both questions directly concerned the events in Ukraine.

Brilyov: The Israelis responded to the idea of supplying S-300s to Iran as follows: well, in that case we'll supply weapons to Ukrainians. Academician Torkunov, incidentally, asked about that, but you did not give him a full answer.

Putin: I simply forgot to.

Brilyov: So what will you say to the Israelis?

Putin: It's the choice for the Israeli leaders to make. They should act as they feel appropriate. I think it would be counterproductive if they have lethal weapons in mind. It will only lead to a new round of confrontation, to greater loss of life, but the outcome will be the same. Concerning our arms supplies to Iran, those are exclusively defensive weapons, and they in no way harm Israel's ability to defend itself.

Brilyov: Could you imagine a situation in which you might consider the possibility of recognizing DPR and LPR?

Putin: Right now I'd prefer not to discuss that, because whatever I say, it will be counterproductive. We will work in accordance with facts on the ground.

When it comes to the possible Israeli arms supplies to Ukraine, Putin's answer probably does not require further comment. It's meaning is perfectly understandable. But when it comes to recognizing the Donbass, there is some ambiguity.

There are reasons to believe that the Russian leadership has changed its approach somewhat to the Donbass problem. Especially when one considers the answer he gave to Brilyov above with the answer he gave on February 24 to Vladimir Solovyov.

Solovyov: In the event of military escalation by Ukraine and the national battalions, is it possible to establish Minsk-3, or to hold a Minsk-3 conference, or for Russia to adopt extreme diplomatic measures, up to and including the recognition of LPR and DPR?

Putin: There is no necessity in that right now-in any extreme measures. These Minsk agreements are not simply a document that was developed by the participants of the Minsk process (I mean Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany), they were also confirmed by a UNSC resolution and have acquired the form of an international legal act, de facto supported by the entire international community. So that's a whole different story, as they say. And we are counting on their implementation. And if they are implemented, they will serve as the pathway toward regulating the situation in that part of the country.

As we can see, less than two months ago Putin felt that there is no necessity to recognize DPR and LPR, and said that rather openly. But today he answered the same question differently: "we will act on the basis of facts on the ground."
--

J.Hawk's Comment: But the facts on the ground are that the Donbass is becoming a ruble zone, with increasing integration into the Russian economy and a near-total collapse of its economic contacts with Ukraine, with possible exceptions of coal supplies, but even those seem to be traveling from the Donbass to Ukraine via Russia. It still doesn't seem likely Russia wants to create another Ossetia-like situation on its border, therefore it will avoid official recognition. In practical terms, however, it's clear the Russian government has decided to integrate the Donbass into the RF in every other way.

Moreover, the "facts on the ground" statement by Putin can also be interpreted as a green light to Zakharchenko and Plotnitskiy to, well, create a fact or two on the ground in their spare time, now that the Russian government appears to be open not only to Minsk-2 implementation, but also a variety of other options.

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 #36
Ukraine Today/RFE/RL
http://uatoday.tv
April 19, 2015
Among Thugs
The story of a Russian citizen, who volunteered to fight against fascism in Donbas but found himself not in any regular army, but among thugs

Ukraine Today provides a translation of an interview originally published by the Russian Bureau of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty on April 17th during the 'Itogi Nedeli' program authored by Dmytry Volchek.

Russian businessman Bondo Dorovskikh, an oil trading and construction executive in Moscow, decided to volunteer to fight in eastern Ukraine. He was certain that he was going to Donbas to fight fascism.

After serving in the 'Ghost' Battalion in Luhansk region led by Alexey Mozgovoy, Dorovskikh returned Moscow, before heading to Donetsk region as a volunteer fighter on the front lines.

Dorovskikh learned that what is actually taking place in eastern Ukraine is much different than what he had imagined before travelling there. There is no so-called 'Russian Cause' there, he said, adding that television propaganda had pulled the wool over his eyes.

Having returned to Russia, Bondo writes: "Everything has turned upside down and now I feel like joining Ukraine's volunteer battalions to protect Ukraine's sovereignty."

Bondo Dorovskikh agreed to speak with Dmytry Volchek of Radio Liberty's Russian Bureau's 'Summary of the Week' (Itogi Nedeli) program about his experiences.

Volchek: Many people go to fight for money. You are a businessman, and well off. What prompted you to go to war?

Dorovskikh: I truly thought at the time that Russia was in danger, that there were [Western] mercenaries trying to take land from our country. I thought that Donbas was the first line of defense for Russia, that we must stand firm and defend our interests there.

Volchek: So you were ideologically - not materially - motivated?

Dorovskikh: I couldn't have been in it for money, because I wound up buying my own gear: a bulletproof vest, etc. I spent about 100,000 rubles of my own money to go there. So it wasn't about money. And they don't pay much there, either, about USD 360 these days, if you can collect it. And not everyone gets paid. People go there for different reasons, some for adventure, others to gain battle experience. Everyone has their own reasons. Of course, most people who wind up going are a little unstable. It just like the people who volunteer to fight for the Islamic State (ISIS). Why do people volunteer? I think it's because people feel they are needed - that's the crux of the matter. But once you arrive in eastern Ukraine it takes only minutes before you understand that you haven't wound up in a military formation, but have entered into a den of thieves.

Volchek: Do you remember what prompted you to finally decide to travel to eastern Ukraine? Was it as certain radio show or television program, or something you read on the Internet?

Dorovskikh: Russia-24 TV channel reports about the 'new history' of Ukraine dominated my thoughts. I said to myself, "I won't go there," and repeated it each morning. But whenever I turned the TV back on, that's all Russia-24 TV was talking about, from day to night. Russian media coverage on the events in Ukraine influenced me greatly.

Volchek: Had you ever been to Ukraine before?

Dorovskikh: No, never. It was my first trip there.

Volchek: How did you apply to become a volunteer fighter?

Dorovskikh: There are several ways to apply, and I tried several of them. There is Limonov's Interbrigade, which has an electronic address and a dispatch point, Shakhty, where volunteers depart from. There is also the Donetsk People's Republic military recruitment office, which accepts applications, and later gives the number of a telephone in Rostov, where you are told where to show.

Volchek: There are no checks? They are only interested in your previous military experience? They are not worried that volunteers may be provocateurs?
Dorovskikh: There are no checks at all. Moreover, there were times when applicants had no documents at all. They just ask for your surname, first name and patronymic, take a photograph, and issue you ID.

Volchek: And give you a gun?

Dorovskikh: Usually they dole out weapons immediately. I was a sniper. I had my own machine gun and rifle. I also had a grenade launcher and machine gun. I had all the firepower necessary. When we arrived at Nikishyne [in Donetsk Region] in the combat zone I was with local separatist fighters who were far less equipped. They had a gun and that's it. But we were armed to the teeth, with everything from hand grenades to rocket-propelled shoulder-held missile systems. We even had two cars for transportation.

Volchek: They gave that all to you in Rostov?

Dorovskikh: No, they didn't give out any weapons in Rostov. I got everything in the Donbas. Militants in Rostov, who used to serve as tank crewmen in the army, were trained there and formed into tank crews. They were given weapons there. I saw it myself. The tanks were hauled to the Russian-Ukrainian border and crossed the border and into the combat I was given my weapons in Donbas.

Volchek: How did you get across the border?

Dorovskikh: We were taken across the field. The first time, we arrived at the checkpoint officially, however I had some restrictions for travelling abroad, so I was not let in. The border guard told me, "No problems, our guys will guide you through." We really taken across the border in a group of about 15 people. We did it in broad daylight. There were no border signs.

Volchek: Were you restricted to travel abroad because you have unpaid debts?

Dorovskikh: Yes, I have be ordered by bailiffs to pay a small debt, so that's why I was denied permission to travel abroad, but I did not know about that.

Volcheck: Was your volunteer unit was formed in Russia or in the Donbas?

Dorovskikh: You join a unit after you have arrived in Donbas. The Rostov region hosts some transfer points, where people (militants) are brought together to be sent to their destination points. Some of them want to join ranks of Donetsk People's Republic, others want to go to the Luhansk People's Republic, still others want to join the 'Ghost Brigade'. These preferences are taken into account, and you will send wherever you want. We arrived after dark where 'Ghost Brigade' was stationed. Next morning representatives of brgade came round to find out which unit you wanted to serve in. You have a wide choice - either the contact line in the village of Verhulivka, Luhansk region, or in intelligence, the tank corps, or counterintelligence unit. You can enlist in whatever unit you want.

Volcheck: But you need to have certain skills, right, to join some units?

Dorovskikh: In theory, yes, you must have some certain skills. But what skills are required for counterintelligence? What kind of counterintelligence troops do they have there? These troops just have the power and they openly abuse it. Skills are required, if you are, say, are a tank crewman. But no skills are needed if you shoot or stay in trenches. You just stay and wait in the trench when the artillery fire is underway. And then this unorganized mob starts moving. Basically, tanks are not equipped with intercom devices and radios, so infantry troops cannot communicate with tank crewmen. As a result, tanks move one way, the infantry goes another one. There is no coherence in their operations, not training, nothing. Do you think this mob is capable of winning the war? Do you know how they won the 2014 summer war? SU fighter jets flew in from Russia. One of militants, who operated anti-aircraft guns, said "We received the order that SU aircrafts would fly in and we must not attack them." Russian troops are most likely to be there in summer. I heard militants say that Russian jets were there. However, I did not see Russian troops myself. I saw many (Russian) officers 'on-leave' who were there. Some Russian staff officers are based at the headquarters of the 'Ghost Brigade'.

Volchek: Did you see them or communicate with them?

Dorovskikh: I knew them very well. I often visited the headquarters. I knew the intelligence chief of the brigade, headquarters chief, some lower chiefs. I got in touch with them when the volunteers arrived. I often communicated with the chief of intelligence; we live not far from each other. He is a Russian. I liked intelligence more, so we communicated more.

Volchek: What did the 'Ghost Brigade' do when you were with them?

Dorovskikh: The Russian members of unit went into business for themselves, making money. Walkie-talkies, armored vests, etc. was all for sale. When I was in the brigade operations were run out of Alchevsk. Our battle-ready units were on the front line in Verhulivka (Luhansk region), Komisarivka (Luhansk region), and in several other towns. There were about 100-150 of us in Verhulivka, and a smaller unit in Komisarivka. Everyone else was in Alchevsk. Neither DNR nor LNR at first recognized the 'Ghost Brigade'. There was an internal conflict and there was a period when no artillery and tanks from Russia were supplied to the unit. But the leaders of the brigade managed eventually to work out a compromise. Fighters from Russia continued to join the brigade when I was there, but no one trained for battle except for foreign fighters from Spain, Italy and France. For everyone else, the route was the same. A morning formation, around 08:00 a.m., and an evening formation. During the interval members of the unit looked for iron fences to tear down and sell for scrap metal. In other words, looting, in order to make money for cigarettes and alcohol. And fighting among themselves. When I was there was a fellow who wanted to blow himself up with a grenade in the hotel. Luckily, he was disarmed in time. Those tired of the boredom went to the front lines.

Volchek: So no one was getting paid? Volunteer fighters had to sell scrap metal for money?

Dorovskikh:  In fact, yes. Some sold weapons, walkie-talkies, ammunition, bullet-proof vests. Everything was on sale. This was how we lived.

Volchek: What was the proportion of local separatist fighters to members of the 'Ghost Brigade'?

Dorovskikh: From 10-30 percent of the brigade members came from abroad. The rest were locals.

Volchek: How did the locals treat you?

Dorovskikh: After we arrived in Alchevsk, we went to the market the next morning to exchange rubles. We met an elderly woman there who asked what we had against Ukrainians. Some 30 minutes later, we went to a church. There a women came up to me and said that elections would be held soon. She asked whom to vote for. I told her to vote her conscience. She said, "We don't need Putin and we don't want to become part of Russia. We want Ukraine to remain independent." This is the first thing people told me right after I arrived. Later, when I was in Nikishyne (Donetsk region), I chatted up a women about what the city was like when Ukrainians were in control. She said that everything was fine when Ukrainian forces controlled the city. She said that when [Oleksander] Zakharchenko's Oplot unit moved it looting was rampant. People said they feared members of that unit would return. Different local treated us differently. They all wanted to know why we had come.

Volchek: Were locals who served in the brigade with you trying to strike it rich, or were they apolitical?

Dorovskikh: I think that they could have cared less about politics. Many of them were prior convicts. I took pictures of them. Many of them were former police officers. They were not interested in politics. They paid money in the DNR and they decided to sit out the war there. The remainder were armed retards. It's important to understand that there is no law and order in areas controlled by the militants. They run red lights all the time. They say: We are respected and can run red lights with impunity.

Volchek: You are an educated fellow. It was probably difficult for you to find someone to talk with ....

Dorovskikh: I didn't make friends with many, but there were people. There was a guy who had lived 10 years in Germany and a couple of Russians. There was also a young guy from Madrid. So there were people to talk with, but not many. That's probably why I left the unit and went to the front lines to see what was actually happening. There I began to sympathize with the so-called enemy. I was there during the ceasefire when they were being targeted by heavy artillery and rockets. I listened to the radio chatter after 2 Ural military transports were hit. I heard the screams. It's then that I understood that what was happening was the complete opposite of what I actually expected. I sympathized. And those firing from our side were ordinary thugs, bandits, who do not care whom they shoot dead.

Volchek: Did this happen right after the first Minsk Peace Agreement?

Dorovskikh: Yes. It was in November and December last year. It was exactly the same in Verhulivka, from where we shot at the enemy.

Volchek: And did the Ukrainians observe the ceasefire? They did not shoot back?

Dorovskikh: They also shot back, but we shot at them all the time. I remember when they blew up two Ural trucks and an armored personnel carrier. How they attacked a fortified Ukrainian position on the road. The Ukrainians did not attack us in retribution, although they could have easily overrun our positions. We only had 80 fighters then. They could have wiped us out from Kamenka, where they had lots of troops. They just didn't want to.

Volchek: Were there many casualties in your unit?

Dorovskikh: No. When I was in Nikishyne, there was one guy who died from a shell fragment. No one was killed on the other flank, where a fighter nicknamed 'Biker', was stationed.

Volchek: You said that the 'Ghost Brigade' had troubled relations with the Donetsk People's Republic. How did the conflict play out and what were the reasons for it?

Dorovskikh: The DNR and LNR did not want to recognize the political legitimacy of the 'Ghost Brigade' and wanted the brigade commander Mozgovoy to join their ranks, to absorb some units of the brigade. Mozgovoy refused because he wanted to remain an independent player.

Volchek: And did you meet with Mozgovoy directly?

Dorovskikh: I said hello a couple of times, but did not talk with him. I talked with [Ihor] Strelkov, though, whom I met in Moscow between my tours of duty in Donbas. Strelkov told me that Mozgovoy is one of the few commanders left in Donbas whom he trusts.

Volchek: When was the first time that you experienced disillusionment? Was it when you understood for the first time that what Russia 24 TV was reporting did not correspond with reality? Did this take time to seep in, or did you come to this realization immediately.

Dorovskikh: From the very beginning, as soon as I crossed the border. 5 minutes after arriving, I saw a fight between groups of volunteer fighters. Two hours later, a deputy commander of the 'Ghost Brigade' arrived and wanted to shoot two drivers. I understood then that I joined a group of thugs, not a military organization. My disappointment grew stronger over time.  

Volcheck: How did you last there for six months?

Dorovskikh: This is what happened. I told them in July that I would spend another week before heading back home to Russia. There I met with Strelkov by chance in a shopping mall on Rublevskiy Highway. I thought maybe I had misunderstood something, or missed something, during my first visit and decided to return. This time I joined militant fighters with the DNR in Nikishyne. But I saw exactly the same thing as during my first visit. It's the same in the DNR as it is the LNR.

Volchek: How long do you think these self-declared republics will last?

Dorovskikh: If Russia stops supplying them, they will disappear. But Russia looks determined to support them further and that's why these two republics still exist.

Volchek: What would you tell Russians who want to fight for the DNR and LNR in Donbas?

Dorovskikh: I would advise them not to go to Donbas. That would be false patriotism. There is no Russia there. It is simply aggression. Moreover, you will wind up in a band of thugs. When I learned not long ago that a policeman from Moscow, an investigator, joined the militant ranks there, my hair stood on end. He wound up with a bunch of thugs. I don't know how he can live with those people. I would advise people not to travel there because the fighting there has nothing to do with protecting Russian interests. If Russian volunteers stop going there, there would not be thousands of dead people and Russia would stop assisting the leaders of DNR and LNR. The Great Patrotic War is not being refought in Donbas. It's aggression, pure and simple. How did it start? Strelkov and his people, professional military men, started it. But they have been fighting for their entire lives. When I returned back to Russia from my last visit, I was told that 180 Russians had left a week earlier. They asked only that I not tell anyone about this. I told them that I would tell people when I got back not to come to Donbas because the situation is not is as it is portrayed at all. People are murdering and stealing in Donbas. I understood this from the moment I arrived. I understood that the chances of being killed by a volunteer fighter were greater than dying at the hands of Ukrainian soldiers. The chances of being shot dead by a drunken volunteer fighter are higher than being killed by Ukraine's army.

Volchek: Was it easy for you to quit and come home? Did you just put your gun on the table and say, 'That's it for me?'

Dorovskikh: You are regarded as a volunteer, so can leave whenever you like. When I wanted to leave Nikishyne, they asked me to wait. I told them I would stay two more weeks. They repeated the request, I don't think this is the case with local separatists. Finally, I just turned in my weapon they had issued to me and told them I was returning to Russia. I had no further obligations to them. The commander of my company two times a week checked in on us and left as quickly as possible. I felt like I was cannon fodder and not fighting for anything. In fact, there is nothing to fight for there. I would have been happy to find a cause, but there is no reaosn to risk your life for.

Volchek: Your political views have changed since then?

Dorovskikh: Yes. They are the opposite. Earlier I was disillusioned with our acting authorities when I was a businessman ... and lost money because of them. But a year later I changed my opinion about Putin, about the authorities. I thought that they were doing a good thing [in Donbas].  I was wrong.

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#37
Kyiv consistently pursued line of pitting Tartars against other Crimean ethnicities - Aksyonov

MOSCOW. April 21 (Interfax) - When building its ethnic policy the government must take into account that the many years of propaganda hysteria which was stoked in order to instill hatred towards Russia in Crimean Tartars did not pass without a trace, Crimean governor Sergei Aksyonov said.

"Kyiv and its allies in Mejlis consistently pursued the line towards pitting the Crimean Tartars against the other Crimea ethnicities, primarily Russians. The issue of deportation was also used to that end. The Ukrainian government, which never burdened itself with moral principles, was set to turn a whole nation into a weapon of countering 'Crimean separatism'," Aksyonov wrote in an article published in the Izvestiya newspaper on Tuesday.

The central government's national policy in Crimea was built on the divide-and-rule principle, whoever was the president, he said.

However, it is obvious that the situation in inter-ethnic relations has significantly improved in the past year, he said.

"On April 21 the Crimeans will be celebrating the Day of the Revival of the rehabilitated people of Crimea for the first time. A year ago today Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree 'On the rehabilitation of the Armenian, Bulgarian, Greek, Crimean-Tartar and German peoples and state support for their revival and development'," the governor recalled, while stressing that "this was done one month after Crimea's reunification with Russia."

Aksyonov also said that since it rejoined Russia the peninsula has been returning to its natural state of cultural and religious diversity and equality.

An important step in this direction will be the creation of a Public Crimean-Tartar Television and Radio Company (OKTRK). The government is to allocate over 170 million rubles for this purpose.
 

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 #38
Kyiv Post
April 21, 2015
Ex-Kyiv administrator facing trial in violent breakup of EuroMaidan demonstrators, denies charges
by Mariana Antonovych

Judges with Kyiv's Shevchenko District Court on April 20 heard nearly half the 44 civil claims for moral damages against former Kyiv City Administrator Oleksandr Popov. The accusations are related to criminal charges that Popov faces for the violent breakup of a peaceful rally on Nov. 30, 2013 during the early days of the EuroMaidan Revolution.

In a courtroom interview with the Kyiv Post on March 23, Popov said he had been waiting 16 months for this trial. He maintains his innocence and believes the case is meant to divert the public's attention from the real perpetrators of the Nov. 30, 2013 crimes. While he didn't want to specify who they might be, he says it is easy to guess who is responsible.

"I think times have changed in this country and justice will prevail. I count on this. Otherwise I will seek justice in the European Court of Human Rights," he said.

During court proceedings on March 23, Popov challenged the prosecutor's motion to prohibit video recording of the trial. "I want everything I said and am going to say to be available to the public. I do not understand the prosecution's position on the matter. They should be interested in transparency more than I am," he told the Kyiv Post after the trial.

Regarding the civil claims, 84 demonstrators are seeking more than Hr 23 million in damages for for being violently dislodged from Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) in Kyiv on Nov. 30, 2013.

Appointed by ex-President Viktor Yanukovych as Kyiv city administrator Nov. 15, 2010, replacing the elected Mayor Leonid Chernovetskiy, Popov also faces criminal charges of abuse of power.

He had allegedly assisted law enforcement in disbursing the rally and for violating peaceful assembly rights, according to the 23-page indictment that prosecutors filed in court on Feb. 13.

The trial is scheduled to resume on May 15, according to Channel 5.

Ukraine's criminal procedural code allows victims to lodge civil claims in criminal proceedings to receive compensation for damages.

Popov faces up to five years in prison and the Hr 23 million fine equivalent to $1 million, prosecutors said in a Feb. 13 statement.

Dozens of students and activists protesting Yanukovych's refusal to sign an association agreement with the European Union remained at Kyiv's Independence Square after 4 a.m. on Nov. 30, before police violently broke up the encampment. As a result, 35 people were admitted to hospital emergency rooms, while an unknown number were detained, 1+1 channel reported that day.

Prosecutors maintain that on the night of Nov. 29-30, 2013, Popov, in collusion with Volodymyr Sivkovych, former deputy secretary of the National Security and Defense Council, Vitaliy Koryak, Kyiv police chief, and other top-ranked officials gave an order to clear the square in order to set up a Christmas tree.

"The investigation has enough evidence to prove that Koryak used these circumstances to authorize the violent breakup of protesters," the General Prosecutor's Office said in the Feb. 13 statement.

Prosecutors also said Yanukovych as well as Andriy Klyuev, the former secretary of the National Security and Defense Council, and Vitaliy Zakharchenko, are culpable for their involvement in the rally breakup, according to the indictment.

All of them fled to Russia in the wake of the EuroMaidan Revolution.

Popov is confident he'll be acquitted of all charges.

Popov's defense counsel, Mykola Karnaukh, told the Kyiv Post that "one cannot make a person liable for ordering the construction of a Christmas tree. With these actions, Popov secured the right of persons to labor ... which is equal to right to peaceful assembly.

"Moreover, he did not aim at aiding or abetting any crime. He is a conscientious and responsible man. He is not a criminal. It is insulting, that former officials pointed (the finger) at Popov and the new authorities still pursue this direction."

Horbatiuk said it is difficult to prove the charges when the majority of the actual perpetrators have fled the country.

"Of course, for the sake of due consideration of a case and objectivity, it would be ideal to have all the accessories to the crime on the defendant's bench. However, based on Popov's actions themselves, and the consequences they led to, the court can decide whether the investigation's charges are accurate and the evidence is sufficient to prove Popov's guilt in aiding police to commit a crime," he told the Kyiv Post.

Popov was issued two formal notices of suspicion in the last 16 months: The first on Dec. 14, 2013, by ex-Prosecutor General Viktor Pshonka; the second on Jan. 20, 2015 by Vitaliy Yarema who resigned as chief prosecutor on Feb. 10, 2015.

Pshonka accused Sivkovych and Popov of abetting Kyiv police chief Koryak in using force against the protesters. Allegedly, after conspiring in Sivkovych's office, they called Koryak and hatched the plan, according to Karnaukh.

The Jan. 20 notice of suspicion extended the scope of charges to "illegally impinging on peaceful assembly rights," he adds.

While Karnaukh believes it violates the double jeopardy rule, when a person cannot be tried for the same crime, Horbatiuk adjusted the existing notice of suspicion.

On Feb. 7, 2014, Kyiv's Pechersk district court granted amnesty to Popov, Sivkovych and others under a law that parliament, loyal to Yanukovych, had passed on Jan. 16, 2014. The amnesty law was a part of a legislative package that instituted archaic measures designed to stifle the massive EuroMaidan rally.

Horbatiuk believes prosecutors under Pshonka started their investigation of Popov on Dec. 1, 2013 under growing public resentment.

"The government probably decided to bring several people to criminal responsibility to defuse tension. When that goal was achieved, it surreptitiously granted amnesty to those engaged," he said.

When asked why it took 16 months to investigate the case, Horbatiuk said the prosecution quashed the amnesty granted to Popov in an appellate court only on July 30, 2014, while other cases are still pending in court.

"Since the former authorities didn't truly intend to investigate the case, a real investigation commenced only in August 2014 and took six months," he said.

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 #39
Russian diplomat comments on statement regarding training of Maidan snipers in Poland

MOSCOW, April 21. /TASS/. A recent statement made by a member of the Parliament of Europe that snipers, who took part in Kiev's tragic rallies, allegedly underwent training in Poland speaks for the fact that the truth about the so-called Maidan protests makes its way out, a Russian diplomat said on Tuesday.

"A Polish member of the Parliament of Europe has acknowledged that the snipers in Maidan protests were trained in Poland and not in Russia," Konstantin Dolgov, the Russian Foreign Ministry's commissioner for human rights, democracy and rule of law, wrote on his Twitter account.

"The truth makes its way out," the Russian diplomat Tweeted.

"The Ukrainian authorities are afraid of an honest investigation into the Maidan events," Dolgov said. "It [the investigation] would have proved that the western representatives were handing out there not pastries only."

Polish member of the Parliament of Europe Janusz Korwin-Mikke said on Sunday in an interview with Polish news website Wirtualna Polska that snipers, who killed dozens of people during anti-government protests early last year on the Maidan Square in the Ukrainian capital, were trained in Poland.

"I sit in the EU Parliament next to Mr. Urmas Paetz, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Estonia who acknowledged in a telephone conversation with Baroness Catherine Ashton that it was "our people" who shot on the Maidan, and not [former Ukrainian President Viktor] Yanukovych's people, or [Russian President Vladimir] Putin's people. Trained by us, in Western countries," Korwin-Mikke, who is also a Polish presidential candidate, was quoted by Poland's sixth-largest web portal as saying.

"The snipers were also trained in Poland. Even Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung already wrote, who was really shooting on the Maidan. The terrorists had shot 40 demonstrators and 20 police officers in order to provoke riots. The truth is finally coming out," the Polish politician said.

Deep crisis embraced Ukraine at the end of 2013, when then-President Viktor Yanukovych suspended the signing of an association agreement with the European Union. The move triggered mass riots killing dozens of people and eventually leading to a coup  in February 2014.

During the fierce clashes between pro-EU demonstrators and the then-authorities unidentified snipers were shooting at the crowds as well as at law enforcers. Yanukovych fled the country citing security concerns, and new people seized the power in the country.

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 #40
Interfax
April 20, 2015
Ukraine conflict must not damage unity of Russian Orthodox Church - patriarch

Moscow, 20 April: Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Kirill believes the Ukrainian crisis is a challenge to the unity of the Russian church and is opposed to attempts to lend the crisis a religious dimension.

"The Ukrainian crisis and the desire of certain political forces to place it in the context of faith are a challenge to the historical unity of the Russian Orthodox Church," the patriarch said on Monday [20 April] at an Easter reception at the Russian Foreign Ministry's mansion.

At the same time, according to the patriarch, when diplomats ask for an explanation of "the problem in relations with Ukrainian religious organizations, and you tell them that the only connection is praying for the patriarch in churches, then your interlocutors, even those who are very critical of Russian foreign policy, cannot understand the reasons for the conflict".

"That's particularly the case if they are Catholics, who are used to praying for the Pope in all churches, and who cannot understand why praying for the patriarch of Moscow causes such resentment, why it is the focus of huge political efforts intended to destroy even this minimal connection," the patriarch noted.

He expressed his conviction that what lies behind this are "very serious ideas and a serious policy, the aim of which is to destroy everything that connects Russia and Ukraine, that connects our peoples".

"Preserving the unity of our church was always a priority. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, the country's largest community, brings together believers from across Ukraine, irrespective of their political views or their ethnic and cultural identity. That's part of its huge spiritual and moral force," Patriarch Kirill insisted.

At the same time, in his opinion, "only by remaining above political conflict does it manage to preserve its spiritual unity and its exceptional peace-making potential".

"Attempts to sway the church towards one of the parties to the conflict could lead to an even more profound schism in Ukrainian society," he said, expressing hope that the trials being experienced on Ukrainian land would end in the establishing of a stable peace."

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 #41
Russia Insider
www.russia-insider.com
April 21, 2015
Ukraine Has 1 Month to Avoid Default
Ukrainian ideas for defaulting on its debt to Russia cannot be justified on legal grounds. With talks with creditors in deadlock and the economy in a tailspin, default now looks certain.
By Alexander Mercouris

Legal discussions about how Ukraine can "legally" default on its $3 billion loan from Russia are becoming increasingly convoluted.

I thought it might help if I set out what the various proposed schemes are and why none of them look at all convincing.

In doing so I will also say something about the latest stage of Ukraine's negotiations with its creditors and why these are now in deadlock, causing all interested outside observers to conclude that a default is now just weeks away.

Before doing so I should explain that the $3 billion loan Russia made to Ukraine takes the form of a  purchase of a Eurobond Ukraine issued in Ireland, which is governed by British law as administered by the High Court in London.

In summary, the various suggestions made as to how Ukraine can "legally" default on its debt to Russia are these:

The UK Parliament Passes a Law Cancelling the Loan

This was proposed early last year.  

This proposal admits the debt. There would be no point passing a law to cancel a debt if the debt did not exist.

The problems involved in using the national parliament of one country to cancel a debt owed by another country to a third country are legion.  The problems of using legislation to cancel a Eurobond, which is a form of property, are also legion. On the face of it, it looks like an act of outright confiscation.  So far as I know, nothing like it has ever been done before.

The British government has shown no interest in this proposal, which would call into question London's reliability as an international legal and financial centre, even if doing it was legal, which as it is probably contrary to European Union law it probably isn't.   

This idea looks like a non-starter and has been dropped.

A set-off for the loss of Crimea

This proposal also admits the debt.  A debt cannot be extinguished by a set-off if it is not valid.  Asking for a set-off admits the debt.

Extinguishing the debt by setting off against the debt compensation Russia supposedly owes Ukraine for the loss of Crimea is politically speaking a non-starter since it would require Ukraine to admit Crimea is indeed lost to Russia.  That is something the present Ukrainian government is not going to do.

Some people have tried to get round this by proposing the debt be extinguished by setting it off against compensation Russia supposedly owes Ukraine not for the loss of Crimea but for the economic cost to Ukraine caused by Russia's "occupation" of Crimea.  

There are two obvious problems:

(1) Even if it accepted that Russia's "occupation" of Crimea was illegal (which since this is the view of the British government it might well do) the High Court would almost certainly refuse to assess the amount of the cost of this "occupation" to Ukraine. It would probably say this was not something it was competent to do and that this was a matter for the International Court of Justice in the Hague and not for the High Court in London.

In the absence of any figure for the cost of the "occupation" to Ukraine, the High Court would almost certainly refuse to make a set-off. This is quite apart from the fact that it would anyway probably say that it cannot set-off compensation arising from a political conflict against a commercial debt.

(2) The plaintiff seeking recovery of the debt would anyway not be the Russian government, which had "occupied" Crimea, but Russia's National Welfare Fund.   It is not clear that Russia's National Welfare Fund is liable for the actions of Russia's government. The High Court would almost certainly decide that it isn't.

This idea also looks like a non-starter and the Ukrainians are not proceeding with it.

Ukraine demands "disclosure" about Crimea

The idea is that Ukraine uses the British legal procedure known as "disclosure" to force Russia to release confidential information about the events leading up to Crimea's unification with Russia.  The idea seems to be that in order to avoid being put in this position Russia would write off the debt.

This makes no sense.  Why would the Russians agree to cancel the debt simply because Ukraine had obtained an order from a British court for disclosure?  Such an order would be unenforceable and the Russians would simply refuse to comply with it.  The High Court would not cancel the debt simply because Russia had not complied with the order.  The two issues are completely unrelated.  As a matter of fact it is most unlikely the British courts would make such an order at all.

The debt is unenforceable because Russia knew when it made the loan Ukraine was bankrupt and could not repay it so that the real beneficiary of the loan was Yanukovych rather than Ukraine

This argues that despite all outward appearances it was not a loan at all but rather a kind of bribe paid by Russia to Yanukovych to keep him afloat and onside.

This argument suffers from the fundamental difficulty that exactly the same argument can be used to challenge the validity of the various loans Western governments and financial institutions have made to Ukraine since Yanukovych fell.

The terms of the loan anyway refute the argument.  It was clearly intended to be repaid. The loan contains a provision that it becomes automatically repayable if Ukraine's debt to GDP ratio exceeds 60%.  It is impossible to see the point of this provision if the loan was not intended to be repaid.

In reality the loan was part of a larger financial package or action plan intended to put Ukraine back on its feet. This included a substantial discount for natural gas supplied to Ukraine by Russia. In view of this the argument that it was intended to benefit Yanukovych personally rather than Ukraine falls on its face.  

The debt should not be repaid because Russia has undermined a key provision by reducing the size of Ukraine's GDP by taking over Crimea

This argument turns on the provision that the loan becomes repayable if Ukraine's debt to GDP ratio exceeds 60%.

Russia however has not enforced this provision. Russia has not demanded repayment of the loan despite the fact that Ukraine's debt to GDP ratio some months ago passed 60%.

The High Court would anyway be most unlikely to say the whole loan should be simply cancelled because of this provision.

The debt is not repayable because Russia has made its repayment impossible by committing military aggression against Ukraine

Russia categorically denies it is committing aggression against Ukraine.  

The Russians would undoubtedly argue that the question of whether or not Russia is committing aggression against Ukraine has been answered in their favour by Ukraine's signature to the Minsk Memorandum. This treats the Ukrainian conflict as a civil war and commits Ukraine to a process for its settlement.  

The High Court would anyway almost certainly refuse to look at this question.  It would probably again say this a matter for the International Court of Justice. It is anyway doubtful even if Ukraine could persuade the High Court that Russia had committed aggression against Ukraine that this cancels Ukraine's whole debt.  

I have tried to highlight the obvious problems with each of the arguments that have been made to justify Ukraine defaulting on its debt to Russia. To someone unfamiliar with the law in this area and with the practice of the British High Court, some of these arguments might appear attractive. This is not in fact so. On the contrary each has so many problems that they all look frankly farfetched.

A Eurobond, which is the form this loan takes, is a negotiable instrument, in this case one Ukraine itself has itself issued. Defaulting on a Eurobond would be akin to a government bouncing a cheque. If only for that reason the High Court would be almost certain to reject any of the arguments put forward as valid reasons to justify doing it.

The Ukrainians seem, very grudgingly, to have come round to this view themselves. They have not pushed any one of these arguments. They have not disputed the debt. Rather they claim that it is a "private" debt as opposed to a "public" one.

"Private" debt or "public" debt

This argument surfaced in recent weeks as a result of something I warned might happen several weeks ago.

Back in January, when it was becoming increasingly obvious that the previous IMF package was falling apart, I made this point:

"Since neither the Ukrainians nor the Western powers want to talk to the Russians about a formal debt restructuring of Ukraine's debts, they seem to be trying to get around this by adopting Soros's plan of increasing the amount of IMF lending to Ukraine whilst getting Ukraine's private western creditors to take a bigger hit than they would otherwise have done.

The .... point about this plan is that if the Russians are not party to it then the amount Ukraine owes the Russians is unchanged and the Ukrainians must pay the Russians the same amount they pay now, as the loans say.  

It will be interesting to see whether Ukraine's private creditors agree to the sort of voluntary haircut they are being asked to make. Many of them may not be happy to agree to a haircut so that Ukraine and its Western supporters don't have to talk to the Russians.

They may very well balk at a plan whose effect would be to privilege loans Ukraine owes Russia over loans Ukraine owes them. No doubt there will be a lot of arms twisting to get them to agree but it is likely the negotiations will be tough."

What has in fact happened is that since the Ukrainians and the West do not want to talk to the Russians about a restructuring, the Russians have refused to be part of one. My guess that the Ukraine's private creditors would in that case "balk at a plan whose effect would be to privilege loans Ukraine owes Russia over loans Ukraine owes them" has turned out to be completely correct. Not only have the negotiations proved tough. By all accounts they are in complete deadlock.

In order to break the deadlock there has now been a creative reinterpretation of the IMF's rules regarding bailouts.  

Supposedly, if a debt owed by a state is a "private" debt, i.e. a commercial debt owed to a private creditor, the private creditor can be forced into a restructuring whether the creditor wants to be part of that restructuring or not. In that case both the restructuring and the IMF bailout can go ahead regardless of the creditor's wishes.

However, if the debt is a "public" debt,  i.e., a debt owed by one state to another, then the state to which the debt is owed cannot be forced into a restructuring against its will. In that case, if it refuses to be part of a restructuring, and the state which owes the debt defaults on the loan, then the planned IMF bailout cannot go ahead.

Some readers who have read articles about the Ukrainian debt negotiations may have come across references to the "London Club" and the "Paris Club".  The "London Club" refers to Ukraine's "private" creditors.  The "Paris Club" to its "public" ones.

Over the last few weeks the Ukrainian government has argued that the debt Ukraine owes Russia is a "private" debt, that Russia is a member of the so called "London Club" and is subject to its rules and that Russia must therefore accept whatever restructuring Ukraine agrees with its other creditors who are also members with Russia of the "London Club".

The Russians of course disagree. Russian Finance Minister Siluanov has said the debt Ukraine owes Russia is a "public" debt and, since Russia refuses to be part of any restructuring, if Ukraine defaults on the debt Russia will take legal action to enforce it and to declare Ukraine in default.

The Ukrainian claim that the debt Ukraine owes Russia is a "private" debt is based on the fact that the debt takes the form of a Eurobond. The Ukrainians argue this means that it is not properly speaking a loan between two states at all, since what the Russians actually did was buy into Ukrainian Eurobonds. The Ukrainians say the Russians are trying to have it both ways, taking the advantage of being holders of a Eurobond (which makes default more difficult) while at the same time resisting calls for a restructuring by claiming it is a "public" debt.

The problem the Ukrainians have is that the legal community and the IMF bureaucracy, by and large, don't agree with them.

The loan was negotiated in December 2013 by Putin and Yanukovych, who was President of Ukraine. It formed part of a package intended to support Ukraine;s economy. The money comes from Russia's National Welfare Fund.

To argue therefore that the debt is a "private" debt rather than a "public" debt is farfetched to say the least.   

As for the argument that Russia is trying to have it both ways, that sounds like an argument that Russia should have made the debt easier for Ukraine to default on. An argument that a creditor owes it to the debtor to make it easier for the debtor to renege on a debt is not one that would persuade most people.

Some say that despite the flimsy nature of this argument it puts Ukraine in a strong position because there is no court or tribunal competent to decide whether or not the debt is "public" or not.  

That is almost certainly wrong. If Ukraine tried to impose a restructuring upon Russia, the Russians would treat Ukraine as being in default and would enforce the debt in London's High Court.  Ukraine would then have to argue in its defence that the debt is a "private" one.  At that point the High Court would have to decide the question.

The IMF could come to Ukraine's rescue by giving evidence the debt is indeed a "private" debt. That however would require Lagarde and the IMF Board to override the IMF's own bureaucracy who quite clearly think differently. It would also involve the IMF in court proceedings in London. That might be embarrassing, exposing the IMF to questions about whether, given that Ukraine is insolvent and in the middle of a civil war, it should be getting IMF funding at all. The IMF would probably be very unwilling to be put in this position.

Some commentators on threads of previous articles I have written for Russia Insider in which I have discussed this question have expressed the view that all these legal considerations are in the end unimportant. Politics supposedly overrides everything. The West's need at the moment is to back Ukraine and that is what it is going to do. The law is not going to be allowed to stand in the way. IMF funding will be railroaded through no matter what and if Ukraine defaults on its debt to Russia it will be allowed to do so.

This is a valid view. In recent years the Western powers - the US especially - have shown that they will ignore the law when it suits them and when they think they can get away with it. The very fact discussions are underway about how Ukraine can "legally" default on its loan to Russia shows this.

The difficulties however should not be underestimated.

Commercial law is the foundation underpinning world trade, which is the lifeblood of the world economy. If the US and its allies play fast and loose with it they risk unravelling the very same trade system upon which they ultimately depend. At a time when they face an increasing challenge from China the risks of doing this are high.  

Frankly, it looks simpler and less risky for the West simply to give Ukraine more money than go down this road. That of course is precisely what they are not prepared to do, which is why these intricate discussions about how Ukraine can "legally" default on the debt it owes Russia are taking place.

Regardless, until this issue is resolved, the negotiations with Ukraine's private creditors will likely remain deadlocked. From their point of view it probably makes more sense to let Ukraine default than agree to a restructuring on unfavourable terms, which the Russians might be able to set aside through court action. If the creditors agree to a restructuring they might find themselves in future up against an argument that they are stuck with whatever reduction in the amount Ukraine owes them that they agreed even if the Russians eventually get the restructuring set aside. By contrast if Ukraine simply defaults, they can come back and demand all their money later when Ukraine recovers, perhaps under a new government.  

The IMF says the issue has to be resolved at the latest by the end of May. If it is not resolved by then, IMF support will be withdrawn. Ukraine will at that point be left with no choice but to default.

As of now that looks like the likeliest prospect.  Certainly, judging by their latest assessments, the international credit rating agencies think so.

 [return to Contents] 

 #42
Rossiyskaya Gazeta
April 14, 2015
Ukraine nuclear power stations pose threat to Europe - Russian pundit
Petr Likhomanov, Dirty Bomb Ready To Explode. In Its Current State, Ukraine Is A Threat to the Whole of Europe

The words of Ukrainian Security Council Secretary Oleksandr Turchynov about his country's intention to develop some kind of "effective weapon," moreover, whether it is "dirty" or "clean" is unimportant, which were spoken on the day of the country's total "decommunization" [9 April, when four laws on ridding Ukraine of its Communist inheritance were passed, inter alia banning Soviet symbols and equating the Soviet and Nazi regimes] have, it would appear, not yet reached the cognizance of European politicians. And the point is not only that one of the most important Kyiv [Kiev] dignitaries is dreaming of weapons of mass destruction, but also that "dirty bombs" ready to explode at any moment are already piled up on Ukrainian territory right now.

The first and most important are the nuclear electric power stations whose security the government handed over to "patriots" from the National Guard last year.

Thus on Monday, the emergency protection system was activated at energy unit no.3 of the Yuzhnoukrainsk nuclear electric power station [Mykolayivs'ka Oblast] - apparently, a transformer had been damaged. Moreover, the incident occurred immediately after the previous emergency shutdown on Saturday. According to the official version, this incident by no means threatens "a second Chernobyl." However, the authorities omit to mention that it was precisely energy unit no.3 of the Yuzhnoukrainsk nuclear electric power station that was shut down on an emergency basis in 2012 because of damage to the rim of the reactor's spacer grid by the fuel assemblies of the American company Westinghouse. On that occasion, all the fuel was unloaded and deemed technically substandard, and deliveries of it to Ukrainian nuclear power stations were suspended. But already in December 2014, 42 supposedly improved fuel assemblies from Westinghouse arrived at the Yuzhnoukrainsk nuclear electric power station.

It is necessary to say that the Czech and Finnish authorities, after several similar incidents in which fuel rods became jammed or were deformed, have categorically rejected Westinghouse's services. But Kyiv, which for a year now has been guided by political considerations alone (American fuel is 20-30 per cent more expensive than Russian fuel), is stubbornly continuing to ignore the signals of the reactor's emergency protection system.

The second bomb is the actual spent nuclear fuel that Ukraine plans to retain in its own backyard from 2014. In the Chernobyl zone, 100 km from the country's capital, the American company Holtec plans to build a new storage facility for the burial of highly radioactive waste - approximately 5 per cent of the total mass of which is entirely suitable for the development of both the clean and the dirty bomb of which Pan Turchynov dreams.

But even this is not the last bomb. After all, together with nuclear scientists, American chemists and "biologists," including ones funded from the Pentagon, have also arrived in Ukraine.

For example, a depositary for the study and storage of highly dangerous viruses and bacteria built by the American company Black & Veatch with the participation of the military department will soon begin work near the Ukrainian town of Merefa. The American medical corporation Baxter, which has previously been embroiled in the scandals around donor blood infected with the HIV virus and also swine and bird 'flu, runs a laboratory near Ternopil'.

Finally, according to the reports of the Ukrainian mass media, a laboratory at which exclusively Americans work and which is absolutely out of bounds to Ukrainian medics sprang up recently at the base of the Institute of Experimental and Clinical Veterinary Medicine in Kharkiv.

The "advocates of Ukraine" in Europe should think about what kind of research is being carried out there and the danger with which it is fraught.

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 #43
Consortiumnews.com
April 17, 2015
How Ukraine Commemorates the Holocaust
By Robert Parry
Investigative reporter Robert Parry broke many of the Iran-Contra stories for The Associated Press and Newsweek in the 1980s.

Exclusive: Pundit Thomas Friedman says the new Ukraine regime "shares our values" but - as much of the world marked the 70th anniversary of the Nazi Holocaust finally being ended by Russian and U.S. armies - politicians in Kiev were busy honoring Ukraine's Nazi collaborators, writes Robert Parry.

The U.S.-backed Ukrainian government came up with a curious way to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the Holocaust being brought to an end. The parliament in Kiev voted to extend official recognition to Ukrainian fascists who collaborated with the Nazis in killing Jews.

Though Official Washington and the mainstream U.S. media continue to dutifully ignore the key role played by neo-Nazis in Ukraine's February 2014 coup and in the post-coup regime's subsequent military offensives against ethnic Russians in the east, Ukrainian politicians can't stop their arms from snapping into Heil Hitler salutes like the fictional character Dr. Strangelove. They can't hold back this reflex even as the world stopped this week to recall the Nazi barbarity that claimed the lives of some six million Jews as well as other minorities.

On April 9, the Ukrainian parliament passed a bill making the ultra-nationalist Ukrainian Insurgent Army eligible for official government recognition, a demand that has been pushed by Ukraine's current neo-Nazi and ultra-nationalist movements, the same forces that spearheaded the overthrow of elected President Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014 and then the slaughter of thousands of ethnic Russians who resisted the new order.

Ukraine's honor-the-Nazi-collaborators vote came amid increased repression of opposition politicians and journalists who dare to criticize the U.S.-backed regime as it moves to repudiate the political settlement envisioned by February's Minsk-2 agreement and instead prepares for a resumption of the war to crush the resistance in eastern Ukraine once and for all. [See Consortiumnews.com's "Ukraine's 'Poison Pill' for Peace Talks."]

Emergence of 'Death Squads'

Over the past several months, there have been about ten mysterious deaths of opposition figures - some that the government claimed to be suicides while others were clearly murders. It now appears that pro-government "death squads" are operating with impunity in Kiev.

On Wednesday, Oleg Kalashnikov, a political leader of the opposition Party of Regions, was shot to death in his home. Kalashnikov had been campaigning for the right of Ukrainians to celebrate the Allied victory in World War II, a gesture that infuriated some western Ukrainian neo-Nazis who identify with Adolf Hitler and the Third Reich and who now feel they have the current government in their corner.

On Thursday, unidentified gunmen murdered Ukrainian journalist Oles Buzina, a regime critic who had protested censorship being imposed on news outlets that didn't toe the government's propaganda line. Buzina had been denounced by a pro-regime "journalistic" outfit which operated under the Orwellian name "Stop Censorship" and demanded that Buzina be banned from making media appearances because he was "an agent of the Kremlin."

This week, another dissident journalist Serhiy Sukhobok was reportedly killed in Kiev, amid sketchy accounts that his assailants may have been caught although the Ukrainian government has withheld details.

These deaths are mostly ignored by the mainstream U.S. news media - or are mentioned only in briefs with the victims dismissed as "pro-Russian." After all, these "death squad" activities, which have also been occurring in government-controlled sections of eastern Ukraine, conflict with the preferred State Department narrative of the Kiev regime busy implementing "democratic reforms."

But many of those "democratic reforms" amount to slashing old-age pensions, removing worker protections, and hiking the price of heating fuel - as demanded by the International Monetary Fund in exchange for a $17.5 billion bailout for Ukraine's collapsing financial structure.

Similarly, the decision by the Ukrainian parliament to bend to the demands of neo-Nazi and other ultra-right groups to honor Ukraine's World War II fascists is also downplayed or ignored by the major U.S. media.

The Holocaust in Ukraine

During World War II, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, an offshoot of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, collaborated with the Nazis in their orgy of mass murder against Jews, Poles and other minority groups. The UIA also joined with the Nazis in fighting against the Soviet Union's Red Army, although some UIA elements did ultimately turn against the Germans over their occupation of Ukraine.

Ukraine was the site of several major Holocaust atrocities including the infamous massacre at Babi Yar in Kiev, where local Ukrainian fascists worked alongside the Nazi SS in funneling tens of thousands of Jews to a ravine where they were slaughtered and buried.

According to the Jerusalem Post, the Simon Wiesenthal Center condemned Ukraine's recognition of the UIA as well as a second bill that equated Communist and Nazi crimes.

"The passage of a ban on Nazism and Communism equates the most genocidal regime in human history with the regime which liberated Auschwitz and helped end the reign of terror of the Third Reich," said Wiesenthal Center director for Eastern European Affairs Dr. Efraim Zuroff, adding:

"In the same spirit the decision to honor local Nazi collaborators and grant them special benefits turns Hitler's henchmen into heroes despite their active and zealous participation in the mass murder of innocent Jews. These attempts to rewrite history, which are prevalent throughout post-Communist Eastern Europe, can never erase the crimes committed by Nazi collaborators in these countries, and only proves that they clearly lack the Western values which they claim to have embraced upon their transition to democracy."

Not Seeing Nazis

Despite propaganda efforts by the Obama administration and the major U.S. news media to play down western Ukraine's legacy of Nazi collaboration, one of the heroes honored during the Maidan protests, which led to the Feb. 22, 2014 coup, was Stepan Bandera, an OUN leader who worked with the Nazis before falling out with them over issues of Ukrainian independence.

After spearheading the 2014 coup, the neo-Nazi and ultra-nationalist militias from western Ukraine were enlisted as the shock troops to attack ethnic Russian cities in eastern Ukraine, which had been the political base for ousted President Yanukovych. Even though some of those militias sported Swastikas and SS symbols, the mainstream U.S. news media either ignored those inconvenient realities or acknowledged them in the final paragraphs of long stories. [See Consortiumnews.com's "Seeing No Neo-Nazi Militias in Ukraine."]

The recognition of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army was demanded last October by Ukraine's right-wing and neo-Nazi groups, including the Svoboda party and the Right Sektor, which surrounded the parliament in Kiev with 8,000 protesters.

At that time, with U.S. officials sensitive to the image of the Ukrainian government caving in to rioters carrying neo-Nazi banners, the legislation was defeated. However, in recent weeks with the Kiev leadership leaning more heavily on the neo-Nazis and other ultra-nationalists to carry out the war against ethnic Russians in the east, more concessions are being made to the extremists.

Lurches to the Right

These lurches to the right have again been largely ignored by the mainstream U.S. media, which continues to blame the ethnic Russians for not submitting to the post-coup regime in Kiev and to demonize Russian President Vladimir Putin as the supposed instigator of all the trouble.

But the Jerusalem Post noted, "While Jewish worries over anti-Semitism have been on the back burner due to the war [in Ukraine], several recent developments have shown that antipathy toward Jews, or at least indifference toward such attitudes when held by important military or political figures, still exists in Ukraine.

"Last November Jewish organizations expressed their displeasure when it was disclosed that the newly appointed police chief for the Ukrainian province in which Kiev is located came under fire after it was alleged that he had past ties with a neo-Nazi organization."

The Jerusalem Post also took note of the Kiev regime's recent appointment of right-wing extremist Dimitri Jarosch, who organized many of the fighters behind the February 2014 putsch, to be an official adviser to the army leadership.

The larger historical context is that Nazism has been deeply rooted in western Ukraine since World War II, especially in cities like Lviv, where a cemetery to the veterans of the Galician SS, a Ukrainian affiliate of the Nazi SS, is maintained. These old passions were brought to the surface again in the battle to oust Yanukovych and sever historic ties to Russia.

The muscle behind the U.S.-backed Maidan protests against Yanukovych came from neo-Nazi militias trained in western Ukraine, organized into 100-man brigades and bused to Kiev. After the coup, neo-Nazi leader Andriy Parubiy, who was commander of the Maidan "self-defense forces," was elevated to national security chief and soon announced that the Maidan militia forces would be incorporated into the National Guard and sent to eastern Ukraine to fight ethnic Russians resisting the coup.

As the U.S. government and media cheered on this "anti-terrorist operation," the neo-Nazis and other right-wing battalions engaged in brutal street fighting against Russian ethnic rebels. Only occasionally did this nasty reality slip into the major U.S. news media. For instance, an Aug. 10, 2014 article in the New York Times mentioned the neo-Nazi paramilitaries at the end of a lengthy story on another topic.

"The fighting for Donetsk has taken on a lethal pattern: The regular army bombards separatist positions from afar, followed by chaotic, violent assaults by some of the half-dozen or so paramilitary groups surrounding Donetsk who are willing to plunge into urban combat," the Times reported.

"Officials in Kiev say the militias and the army coordinate their actions, but the militias, which count about 7,000 fighters, are angry and, at times, uncontrollable. One known as Azov, which took over the village of Marinka, flies a neo-Nazi symbol resembling a Swastika as its flag." [See Consortiumnews.com's "NYT Discovers Ukraine's Neo-Nazis at War."]

Meeting the Nazis

The conservative London Telegraph offered more details about the Azov battalion in an article by correspondent Tom Parfitt, who wrote: "Kiev's use of volunteer paramilitaries to stamp out the Russian-backed Donetsk and Luhansk 'people's republics'... should send a shiver down Europe's spine.

"Recently formed battalions such as Donbas, Dnipro and Azov, with several thousand men under their command, are officially under the control of the interior ministry but their financing is murky, their training inadequate and their ideology often alarming. The Azov men use the neo-Nazi Wolfsangel (Wolf's Hook) symbol on their banner and members of the battalion are openly white supremacists, or anti-Semites."

Based on interviews with militia members, the Telegraph reported that some of the fighters doubted the reality of the Holocaust, expressed admiration for Adolf Hitler and acknowledged that they are indeed Nazis.

Andriy Biletsky, the Azov commander, "is also head of an extremist Ukrainian group called the Social National Assembly," according to the Telegraph article which quoted a commentary by Biletsky as declaring: "The historic mission of our nation in this critical moment is to lead the White Races of the world in a final crusade for their survival. A crusade against the Semite-led Untermenschen."

In other words, for the first time since World War II, a government had dispatched Nazi storm troopers to attack a European population - and officials in Kiev knew what they were doing. The Telegraph questioned Ukrainian authorities in Kiev who acknowledged that they were aware of the extremist ideologies of some militias but insisted that the higher priority was having troops who were strongly motivated to fight. [See Consortiumnews.com's "Ignoring Ukraine's Neo-Nazi Storm Troopers."]

Since the coup, the New York Times and other mainstream U.S. news outlets have decried any recognition of the significant neo-Nazi presence in Ukraine as "Russian propaganda." So, Ukraine's new initiative to honor Nazi collaborators - in legislation coinciding with the commemoration of the end of the Holocaust - also must be ignored.

The pro-coup propaganda in the U.S. media has been so pervasive that a powerful "group think" took hold with the Kiev regime revered as white-hatted "good guys," certainly not brown-shirted neo-Nazis. Or as the New York Times' dimwitted foreign policy pundit Thomas L. Friedman declared in a column earlier this year, the new leaders of Ukraine "share our values."

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 #44
Krytika
http://m.krytyka.com/en
April 2014
Open Letter from Scholars and Experts on Ukraine Re. the So-Called "Anti-Communist Law"
David R. Marples

To the President of Ukraine, Petro O. Poroshenko, and to the Chairman of Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada, Volodymyr B. Hroysman:

We, the undersigned, appeal to you not to sign into law the draft laws (no. 2538-1 and 2558)1 adopted by the Verkhovna Rada on April 9, 2015. As scholars and experts long committed to Ukraine's regeneration and freedom, we regard these laws with the deepest foreboding.  Their content and spirit contradicts one of the most fundamental political rights: the right to freedom of speech. Their adoption would raise serious questions about Ukraine's commitment to the principles of the Council of Europe and the OSCE, along with a number of treaties and solemn declarations adopted since Ukraine regained its independence in 1991. Their impact on Ukraine's image and reputation in Europe and North America would be profound.  Not least of all, the laws would provide comfort and support to those who seek to enfeeble and divide Ukraine.

We also are troubled by the fact that the laws passed without serious debate, without dissenting votes and with large numbers of deputies declining to take part.

In particular we are concerned about the following:

1. Concerning the inclusion of groups such as the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) as "fighters for Ukrainian independence": Article 6 of this law makes it a criminal offense to deny the legitimacy of "the struggle for the independence of Ukraine in the 20th century" and public denial of the same is to be regarded as an insult to the memory of the fighters. Thus questioning this claim, and implicitly questioning anything such groups did, is being made a criminal offense.
 
2. Law 2558, the ban on propaganda of "Communist and National Socialist Regimes" makes it a criminal offense to deny, "including in the media, the criminal character of the communist totalitarian regime of 1917-1991 in Ukraine."

The potential consequences of both these laws are disturbing. Not only would it be a crime to question the legitimacy of an organization (UPA) that slaughtered tens of thousands of Poles in one of the most heinous acts of ethnic cleansing in the history of Ukraine, but also it would exempt from criticism the OUN, one of the most extreme political groups in Western Ukraine between the wars, and one which collaborated with Nazi Germany at the outset of the Soviet invasion in 1941. It also took part in anti-Jewish pogroms in Ukraine and, in the case of the Melnyk faction, remained allied with the occupation regime throughout the war.

However noble the intent, the wholesale condemnation of the entire Soviet period as one of occupation of Ukraine will have unjust and incongruous consequences. Anyone calling attention to the development of Ukrainian culture and language in the 1920s could find himself or herself condemned. The same applies to those who regard the Gorbachev period as a progressive period of change to the benefit of Ukrainian civil society, informal groups, and political parties, including the Movement for Perestroika (Rukh).

Over the past 15 years, Vladimir Putin's Russia has invested enormous resources in the politicization of history. It would be ruinous if Ukraine went down the same road, however partially or tentatively.  Any legal or 'administrative' distortion of history is an assault on the most basic purpose of scholarly inquiry: pursuit of truth. Any official attack on historical memory is unjust.  Difficult and contentious issues must remain matters of debate. The 1.5 million Ukrainians who died fighting the Nazis in the Red Army are entitled to respect, as are those who fought the Red Army and NKVD. Those who regard victory over Nazi Germany as a pivotal historical event should neither feel intimidated nor excluded from the nation.

Since 1991, Ukraine has been a tolerant and inclusive state, a state (in the words of the Constitution) for 'citizens of Ukraine of all nationalities'. If signed, the laws of April 9 will be a gift to those who wish to turn Ukraine against itself. They will alienate many Ukrainians who now find themselves under de facto occupation. They will divide and dishearten Ukraine's friends.  In short, they will damage Ukraine's national security, and for this reason above all, we urge you to reject them.

Signatories:

Tarik Cyril Amar, Assistant Professor of History, Columbia University, USA
Mark R. Baker, Assistant Professor, Koç University, Istanbul, Turkey
J. Arch Getty Distinguished Professor of History University of California Los Angeles (UCLA), USA
Dominique Arel, Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa, Canada
Uilleam Blacker, Lecturer in Comparative East European Culture, University College London, UK
Jeffrey Burds, Associate Professor of Russian and Soviet History, Northeastern University, USA
Marco Carynnyk, Independent Scholar, Toronto, Canada
Markian Dobczansky, Ph.D. candidate, Department of History, Stanford University, USA
Rory Finnin, University Senior Lecturer in Ukrainian Studies, University of Cambridge, UK
Christopher Gilley, Research Fellow, University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany
Guido Hausmann, Ludwig-Maximilian University, Munich, Germany
John-Paul Himka, Professor Emeritus, Department of History & Classics, University of Alberta, Canada
Tom Junes, PhD (historian) - Imre Kertész Kolleg, Jena, Germany
Ivan Katchanovski, Adjunct Professor, School of Political Studies, University of Ottawa, Canada
Olesya Khromeychuk, Teaching Fellow, University College London, UK
Oleh Kotsyuba, Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, Harvard University, USA
Matthew Kott, Researcher at Centre for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Uppsala University, Sweden
Olga Kucherenko, Independent Scholar, Cambridge, UK
Victor Hugo Lane, York College, City University of New York, USA
David R. Marples, Distinguished University Professor, Department of History & Classics, University of Alberta, Canada
Jared McBride, Visiting Assistant Professor of History, Columbia University, USA
Tanja Penter, Professor of Eastern European History, Heidelberg University, Germany
Olena Petrenko, Ph.D. Student, Department of East European History, Ruhr University Bochum, Germany
William Risch, Associate Professor of History, Georgia College, USA
Per Anders Rudling, Associate Professor of History, Lund University, Sweden
Martin Schulze Wessel, Chair of Eastern European History, Ludwig-Maximilian University, Munich, Germany
Steven Seegel, Associate Professor of History, University of Northern Colorado, USA
Anton Shekhovtsov, Visiting Senior Fellow, Legatum Institute, London, UK
James Sherr, Associate Fellow, Chatham House, London, UK
Volodymyr Sklokin, Researcher, Center for Urban History of East-Central Europe, Lviv, Ukraine
Iryna Sklokina, Researcher, Center for Urban History of East-Central Europe, Lviv, Ukraine
Yegor Stadny, Ph.D. Student, Department of History, Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Ukraine
Andreas Umland, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation, Kyiv, Ukraine
Ricarda Vulpius, Research Fellow, Department for the History of East- and Southeastern Europe, Ludwig-Maximilian University, Munich, Germany
Lucan Way, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Toronto, Canada
Zenon Wasyliw, Professor of History, Ithaca College, USA
Anna Veronika Wendland, Research Coordinator, The Herder Institute for Historical Research on East Central Europe, Marburg, Germany
Frank Wolff, Assistant Professor of History and Migration Studies, Osnabrück University, Germany
Christine Worobec, Professor Emerita, Northern Illinois University, USA
Serhy Yekelchyk, Professor of Slavic Studies and History, University of Victoria, Canada
Tanya Zaharchenko, Postdoctoral Fellow, Center for Historical Research, Higher School of Economics, Saint Petersburg, Russia
Sergei Zhuk, Associate Professor of History, Ball State University, Indiana, USA

1.Editor's note: Draft law no. 2538-1 "On the Legal Status and Commemoration of Fighters for Ukraine's Independence in the 20th Century" is avaiable in Ukrainian here. Draft law no. 2558 "On the Condemnation of the Communist and the National-Socialist (Nazi) Totalitarian Regimes in Ukraine and Ban on the Propaganda of Their Symbols" is available in Ukrainian here: http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=54670 

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