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2015-#78
20 April 2015
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"We don't see things as they are, but as we are"

"Don't believe everything you think"

DJ: My thanks to those who responded to my question about the length of JRL. No dramatic changes planned.

In this issue
 
  #1
Moscow Times
April 20, 2015
Putin Wants Peaceful Coexistence With the West
By Fyodor Lukyanov
Fyodor Lukyanov is editor of Russia in Global Affairs.

The latest live call-in show in which President Vladimir Putin answered questions from ordinary Russians did not have any sensational high points, but it was an important indicator of the leader's mood.

Putin repeated all of his standard phrases and ideas, but without the passion and tension seen in many of his public appearances in recent years. His comments revealed no desire for an escalation of the current conflict. If anything, they conveyed a certain calm fatalism, though not hopelessness.

Putin conceded that, yes, a certain situation had arisen due to sanctions and worsening relations with the West, but that Russia must look for new opportunities and use the current circumstances to its advantage.

Putin almost completely refrained from his usual accusations and recriminations against the United States, not because he had a change of heart, but because his position is so clear that it requires no further explanation or repetition. And judging from the comments from viewers that appeared in a continuous rolling text on the screen, nobody needed any convincing with regard to the United States.

A typical exchange concerned the fate of the Mistral warships. Putin said that the failed deal was not a problem, that Russia did not really need the ships anyway and had only ordered them to strengthen relations with France. He added that Russia does not need France to pay a penalty for breach of contract, that Paris should simply return the money Moscow has already paid for the ships.

A more interesting moment came with a question about recent attempts to equate Stalinism with Nazism. Putin initially gave a traditional explanation of why "the ugly nature of the Stalin regime" was incomparable to the crimes of the Nazis.

And then he made this unexpected remark: "In truth, we, or rather our predecessors, gave cause for this. Why? Because after World War II, we tried to impose our own development model on many Eastern European countries, and we did so by force. This has to be admitted. There is nothing good about this and we are feeling the consequences now. Incidentally, this is more or less what the Americans are doing today, as they try to impose their model on practically the entire world, and they will fail as well."

That put an interesting twist on the government's massive campaign to forbid any denigration of the past - in other words, to prohibit casting doubt on the actions of the Soviet Union. It would normally be unacceptable to compare the past actions of the Soviet Union with what the United States is doing today, but that is exactly what Putin did.

And it sends a wake-up call to those who had been hoping to build Russia's future out of its Soviet past.

And although the show lacked any remarkable highlights, it offered plenty of food for thought and marked a conclusion of a period packed with emotions and events. For the authorities to maintain the strong anti-Western sentiment they have manufactured, they must now take the conflict to the next level, and that is dangerous and extremely expensive.

Turning back is impossible. The Crimean decision is irreversible, without putting the entire political model at risk. Any backtracking on support for eastern Ukraine would lead to serious political repercussions at home and would generally be perceived as a clear defeat for the Kremlin.

Moscow cannot restore its former relations with the West. Regardless of whether sanctions are lifted, the basis for cooperation that was rooted in the balance of powers of the 1990s has been lost. And Russia has no analogous relations left with other partners. Its only choice now is to look for such opportunities elsewhere, with no guarantee it will find them.

That is why Moscow prefers the status quo that developed between Russia and the West following the acute phase of the war in Ukraine. To use a term that is once again in vogue, Russia is entering into a "frozen conflict" with Europe and the United States that none of the parties like, but that they all prefer to open conflict.

It is no coincidence that Putin devoted a great many of his comments to macroeconomic indicators in Russia. He seemed to be pleasantly surprised that the situation is under control, and that things are actually improving in some areas - especially because the economic outlook at the end of last year was bleak, to say the least. The president mentioned several times that Russia's economy had withstood the heavy blow it received, and he apparently concluded that it could therefore continue on in its current condition for quite some time.

The Kremlin does not want to provoke the West into applying greater pressure, but it will refrain from doing anything to reduce the current pressure. That is a fatalistic approach that essentially says: "Whatever will happen, will happen, but the worst is behind us."

In the Cold War terminology that is again gaining currency, the confrontation is moving into a phase of "peaceful coexistence." That is not a rapprochement, but recognition of the fact that neither side can fully gain the upper hand. And that means both must cooperate wherever possible to minimize the risks, even if that interaction is limited to certain, specific areas.

Ratcheting down the conflict does not necessarily mean that the two sides want to end it, but rather that it they want to contain it within a manageable framework. This is especially important now because the number of provocative incidents involving warships and military aircraft flying with their transponders off has increased markedly in recent months, indicating that both sides have largely forgotten and must quickly relearn the "safety measures" that were in place during the first Cold War.

The history of the second half of the 20th century suggests that, inevitably, relations alternately "warm" and "cool" in a global "frozen conflict." "Peaceful coexistence" always follows heated confrontation whenever one or both sides feels it has gathered enough strength to gain a little ground.

On the other hand, during that Cold War, a balance of powers existed that guaranteed neither side could achieve complete victory over the other. That mechanism is missing now, but there is a "larger world," an international community pursuing its own ambitions and coping with its own problems quite independently of Russia's confrontation with the West.

That fact exerts a moderating influence on the contending sides because the interests of that "larger world" might or might not coincide with theirs. That counterbalance did not exist during the first Cold War because global politics were completely tied up in the U.S.-Soviet confrontation.

The downside of the current phase of "peaceful coexistence" is its lack of inner reflection and debate. During the call-in show, Putin categorically rejected the very idea that Russia's policy toward Ukraine had failed. His message was essentially: "Russia is not to blame. It did what it had to do."

Western leaders take a similar approach, heaping all of the blame on Russia and claiming that they only wanted the best for Ukraine. Apparently the two sides will begin formulating a new policy only when the situation in the world becomes so bad that they finally understand that old Cold War-era approaches are inadequate to the current situation.

China's rising influence, the widening havoc that the Islamic State is wreaking and the greater potential for both progress and destruction that new technologies have unleashed - along with numerous other factors - are hastening the advent of that terrible day.

 
#2
The National Interest
April 20, 2015
Russia and America: Stumbling to War
Could a U.S. response to Russia's actions in Ukraine provoke a confrontation that leads to a U.S.-Russian war?
By Graham Allison and Dimitri K. Simes
Graham Allison is director of the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and a former assistant secretary of defense for policy and plans. Dimitri K. Simes, The National Interest's publisher, is president of the Center for the National Interest.

AFTER THE Soviet Union collapsed, Richard Nixon observed that the United States had won the Cold War, but had not yet won the peace. Since then, three American presidents-representing both political parties-have not yet accomplished that task. On the contrary, peace seems increasingly out of reach as threats to U.S. security and prosperity multiply both at the systemic level, where dissatisfied major powers are increasingly challenging the international order, and at the state and substate level, where dissatisfied ethnic, tribal, religious and other groups are destabilizing key countries and even entire regions.

Most dangerous are disagreements over the international system and the prerogatives of major powers in their immediate neighborhoods-disputes of the sort that have historically produced the greatest conflicts. And these are at the core of U.S. and Western tensions with Russia and, even more ominously, with China. At present, the most urgent challenge is the ongoing crisis in Ukraine. There, one can hear eerie echoes of the events a century ago that produced the catastrophe known as World War I. For the moment, the ambiguous, narrow and inconsistently interpreted Minsk II agreement is holding, and we can hope that it will lead to further agreements that prevent the return of a hot war. But the war that has already occurred and may continue reflected deep contradictions that America cannot resolve if it does not address them honestly and directly.

In the United States and Europe, many believe that the best way to prevent Russia's resumption of its historic imperial mission is to assure the independence of Ukraine. They insist that the West must do whatever is required to stop the Kremlin from establishing direct or indirect control over that country. Otherwise, they foresee Russia reassembling the former Soviet empire and threatening all of Europe. Conversely, in Russia, many claim that while Russia is willing to recognize Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity (with the exception of Crimea), Moscow will demand no less than any other great power would on its border. Security on its western frontier requires a special relationship with Ukraine and a degree of deference expected in major powers' spheres of influence. More specifically, Russia's establishment sentiment holds that the country can never be secure if Ukraine joins NATO or becomes a part of a hostile Euro-Atlantic community. From their perspective, this makes Ukraine's nonadversarial status a nonnegotiable demand for any Russia powerful enough to defend its national-security interests.

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Russia was on its knees, dependent on Western assistance and consumed by its own internal affairs. In that context, it was not surprising that Western leaders became accustomed to ignoring Russian perspectives. But since Vladimir Putin took over in 1999, he has led a recovery of Russia's sense of itself as a great power. Fueled by rising oil production and prices that brought a doubling of Russia's GDP during his fifteen-year reign, Russians increasingly bridled at such treatment.

Americans would do well to recall the sequence of events that led to Japan's attack on the United States at Pearl Harbor and America's entry into the Second World War. In 1941, the United States imposed a near-total embargo on oil shipments to Japan to punish its aggression on the Asian mainland. Unfortunately, Washington drastically underestimated how Japan would respond. As one of the post-World War II "wise men," Secretary of State Dean Acheson, observed afterward, the American government's

"misreading was not of what the Japanese government proposed to do in Asia, not of the hostility our embargo would excite, but of the incredibly high risks General Tojo would assume to accomplish his ends. No one in Washington realized that he and his regime regarded the conquest of Asia not as the accomplishment of an ambition but as the survival of a regime. It was a life-and-death matter to them."

Just days before Pearl Harbor, Japanese special envoy Saburo Kurusu told Washington that "the Japanese people believe that economic measures are a much more effective weapon of war than military measures; that . . . they are being placed under severe pressure by the United States to yield to the American position; and that it is preferable to fight rather than to yield to pressure." Despite this warning, the Japanese response to U.S. economic warfare caught the United States off guard, killing nearly 2,500 people and sinking much of the U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Reviewing the recent record of American administrations' forecasts about the consequences of major foreign-policy choices should serve as a bright warning light. The Clinton administration misread an extended and bloody civil war in Yugoslavia before imposing its own shaky partition and angering Russia and China in the process. When George W. Bush decided to invade Iraq and replace Saddam Hussein's regime with a democratically elected one, he believed that this would, as he said, "serve as a powerful example of liberty and freedom in a part of the world that is desperate for liberty and freedom." He and his team held firmly to this conviction, despite numerous warnings that war would fragment the country along tribal and religious lines, that any elected government in Baghdad would be Shia-dominated and that Iran would be the principal beneficiary from a weakened Iraq. Next, the Obama administration joined Britain and France in a major air campaign in Libya to remove Muammar el-Qaddafi. The consequent chaos contributed to the killings of a U.S. ambassador and other American diplomats and to the creation of a haven for Islamic extremists more threatening than Qaddafi's Libya to its neighbors and to America. In Syria, at the outset of the civil war, the Obama administration demanded the ouster of President Bashar al-Assad, even though he never posed a direct threat to America. Neither the Obama administration nor members of Congress took seriously predictions that Islamic extremists would dominate the Syrian opposition rather than more moderate forces-and that Assad would not be easy to displace.

COULD A U.S. response to Russia's actions in Ukraine provoke a confrontation that leads to a U.S.-Russian war? Such a possibility seems almost inconceivable. But when judging something to be "inconceivable," we should always remind ourselves that this is a statement not about what is possible in the world, but about what we can imagine. As Iraq, Libya and Syria demonstrate, political leaders often have difficulties envisioning events they find uncomfortable, disturbing or inconvenient.

Prevailing views of the current confrontation with Russia over Ukraine fit this pattern. Since removing Slobodan Milosevic, Saddam Hussein and Muammar el-Qaddafi from power had limited direct impact on most Americans, it is perhaps not surprising that most Washington policy makers and analysts assume that challenging Russia over Ukraine and seeking to isolate Moscow internationally and cripple it economically will not come at a significant cost, much less pose real dangers to America. After all, the most common refrain in Washington when the topic of Russia comes up is that "Russia doesn't matter anymore." No one in the capital enjoys attempting to humiliate Putin more than President Barack Obama, who repeatedly includes Russia in his list of current scourges alongside the Islamic State and Ebola. And there can be no question that as a petrostate, Russia is vulnerable economically and has very few, if any, genuine allies. Moreover, many among its business and intellectual elites are as enthusiastic as the Washington Post editorial page to see Putin leave office. Ukrainians with the same view of former Ukrainian president Viktor F. Yanukovych successfully ousted him with limited Western help, so, it is argued, perhaps Putin is vulnerable, too.

Nevertheless, Russia is very different from the other countries where the United States has supported regime change. First and most important, it has a nuclear arsenal capable of literally erasing the United States from the map. While many Americans have persuaded themselves that nuclear weapons are no longer relevant in international politics, officials and generals in Moscow feel differently. Second, regardless of how Americans view their country, Russians see it as a great power. Great powers are rarely content to serve simply as objects of other states' policies. Where they have the power to do so, they take their destiny into their own hands, for good or ill.

WHILE MOST policy makers and commentators dismiss the possibility of a U.S.-Russian war, we are more concerned about the drift of events than at any point since the end of the Cold War. We say this having followed Soviet and Russian affairs throughout the Cold War and in the years since the Soviet Union's implosion in 1991. And we say it after one of us recently spent a week in Moscow talking candidly with individuals in and around the Putin government, including with many influential Russian officials, and the other in China listening to views from Beijing. We base our assessment on these conversations as well as other public and private sources.

There are three key factors in considering how today's conflict might escalate to war: Russia's decision making, Russia's politics and U.S.-Russian dynamics.

With respect to Russia's decision making, Putin is recognized both inside and outside the country as the unilateral decider. All available evidence suggests that he relies on a very narrow circle of advisers, none of whom is prepared to challenge his assumptions. This process is unlikely to help Putin make informed decisions that fully take account of the real costs and benefits.

Moreover, Russia's political environment, at both the elite and public levels, encourages Putin to escalate demands rather than make concessions. At the elite level, Russia's establishment falls into two camps: a pragmatic camp, which is currently dominant thanks principally to Putin's support, and a hard-line camp. The Russian public largely supports the hard-line camp, whom one Putin adviser called the "hotheads." Given Russian politics today, Putin is personally responsible for the fact that Russia's revanchist policies are not more aggressive. Put bluntly, Putin is not the hardest of the hard-liners in Russia.

While none of the "hotheads" criticize Putin, even in private conversations, a growing number of military and national-security officials favor a considerably tougher approach to the United States and Europe in the Ukraine crisis. This is apparent in their attacks on such relatively moderate cabinet officers as Vice Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. From their perspective, the moderates fail to comprehend the gravity of the U.S.-European challenge to Russia and hold futile hopes that things can change for the better without Russia surrendering to an unacceptable and degrading foreign diktat. They recommend shifting the game to areas of Russian strength-by using military force to advance Russian interests as Putin did in Crimea and to pressure the West into accepting Moscow on its own terms.

An increasingly nationalistic Russian public also supports this "challenge the main enemy" approach, which draws its language and inspiration from former Soviet leader Yuri Andropov. Putin has clearly contributed to growing nationalist sentiments through his patriotic rhetoric and his harsh indictment of Western behavior. But he was pushing on an open door due to widespread disillusionment with Western treatment of Russia as a Cold War loser rather than an ally in building a new world order. What's more, ordinary Russians may have gone further in their truculent views than Putin himself. Not long ago, Russia's media widely reported a warning from the recently dismissed rebel commander Igor Strelkov, who said that by being too indecisive, Putin would satisfy no one and would suffer the same fate as Slobodan Milosevic-rejection by liberals and nationalists alike. More recently, Strelkov has reportedly placed Putin's portrait prominently in his office, explaining that in his view the Russian president "understood that all compromise with the West is fruitless" and that he is "reestablishing Russian sovereignty." Strelkov often exaggerates, but his views reflect the frustrations of Russia's influential nationalist coalition.

Added support for a more muscular assertiveness comes from an expanding group of military officers and civilians who believe that Russia can brandish its nuclear weapons to good effect. According to this group, Russia's nuclear arsenal is not just its ultimate security blanket but also a sword it can wield to coerce others who have no nuclear weapons, as well as those who are unwilling to think the unthinkable of actually exploding a nuclear bomb. Putin appeared to endorse this view in his controversial Sochi speech last September when he said:

"Nikita Khrushchev hammered the desk with his shoe at the UN. And the whole world, primarily the United States and NATO, thought, 'This Nikita is best left alone, he might just go and fire a missile. We better show some respect for them.' Now the Soviet Union is gone and there is no need to take into account Russia's views. It has gone through transformation during the collapse of the Soviet Union, and we can do whatever we like, disregarding all rules and regulations."

The director of the television network Rossiya Segodnya, Dmitry Kiselyov, has been more explicit, repeatedly warning, "Russia is the only country in the world that is realistically capable of turning the United States into radioactive ash." Russia's 2014 Military Doctrine emphasizes that Russia will use nuclear weapons not only in response to nuclear attacks but also "in the case of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons." And, as a recent report of the European Leadership Network notes, there have been almost forty incidents in the past year in which Russian forces engaged in a pattern of provocations that, if continued, "could prove catastrophic."

Counterintuitive though it may seem, Russia's weakening economy is also unlikely to create public pressure for concessions. On the contrary, the damage to an already-stagnant Russian economy suffering from low energy prices is actually reducing Putin's foreign-policy flexibility. Russia's president needs to show that his country's suffering has been worth it. Retreat could severely damage Putin's carefully cultivated image as a strong man-a style Russians have historically appreciated-and alienate his hypernationalist political base. They resent sanctions, which they see as hurting ordinary people much more than Putin's entourage, and they want their leaders to resist, not capitulate. For many, Russia's dignity is at stake.

This came through clearly in a recent conversation with a top Russian official. When asked why his government would not try to negotiate a deal based on principles it has already articulated, such as exchanging Russian guarantees of Ukraine's territorial integrity minus Crimea and Ukraine's right to move toward the European Union for Western guarantees that Ukraine would not join NATO and that the United States and the European Union would relax sanctions, the official responded by saying, "We have our pride and cannot appear to be pressuring the insurgents to have sanctions reduced."

THE KEY question is this: Will Putin continue to support the relatively moderate pragmatists, or will he turn toward the "hotheads"? So far, he has split the difference: Russia has provided effective but limited support to the separatists, while at the same time hoping against hope to restore many of its ties with the West (or at least with Europe). Putin has also tried to conceal the scale of Russia's intervention in order to temporize and to exploit U.S.-European and intra-European differences.

Currently, the pragmatists retain the upper hand, in no small part because Putin has kept his government team almost intact both in the cabinet and in the presidential administration. While loyal to Putin and prepared to execute his agenda, that team consists primarily of officials whose formative experiences have been in establishing economic interdependence with the West and in attempting to make Russia a major voice in a world order predominantly shaped by the United States and its allies.

Foreign Minister Lavrov and others supporting his more pragmatic approach argue that Moscow can still do business with the United States and especially with the Europeans if Russia doesn't close the door. The "hotheads" take the opposite view, insisting that the West would view any moderation in Russian policy as a sign of weakness. Portraying themselves as realists, they argue that NATO is determined to overthrow Putin, force Russia to its knees and perhaps even dismember the country.

Putin's reluctance to change course dramatically so far explains his hybrid war in eastern Ukraine, which helps the separatists without Russia formally entering the conflict. It also underlies Russia's unpersuasive denials that it is giving military support to the separatists, which simultaneously make Moscow subject to justified criticism and create unfounded hope in Washington and in Europe that Russia will be unable to absorb higher casualties in a war in which it claims not to participate.

Yet Putin's attempt to pursue the pragmatists' broad objectives while accommodating the "hotheads" on the ground in Ukraine may not be indefinitely sustainable. An increasingly prevalent view among Putin's advisers sees hopes of a restoration of Western-Russian cooperation as a lost cause because U.S. and Western leaders will not accept any resolution that meets Russia's minimal requirements. If the United States and the European Union would largely remove sanctions and restore business as usual, they would urge that Russia swallow its pride and reconcile. But if Russia is going to continue to be sanctioned, excluded from financial markets and denied Western technology, they say, then Russia should pursue its own independent path. Putin has yet to face a decisive moment that would require him to make a fateful choice between accommodating Western demands and more directly entering the conflict and perhaps even using force against Western interests outside Ukraine. And if that moment arrives, we may well not welcome his choice.

SANCTIONS ASIDE, two other developments could force Putin's hand. One would be the prospect of military defeat of the separatists; the second would be NATO membership for Ukraine.

Putin drew a bright red line precluding the first in an interview with Germany's ARD television channel on November 17, 2014. Speaking rhetorically, he asked whether NATO wanted "the Ukrainian central authorities to annihilate everyone among their political foes and opponents" in eastern Ukraine. If so, Putin declared categorically: "We won't let it happen." In every instance when the Ukrainian military seemed close to gaining the upper hand in the fighting, and despite U.S. and European warnings and sanctions, Putin has raised the ante to assure the separatists' success on the battlefield.

Though Russia's president has said less about the second red line, there can be no doubt that Ukraine's potential NATO membership is a preeminent Russian concern. One important reason for Moscow's willingness to let Donetsk and Luhansk go back under central Ukrainian control with a considerable degree of autonomy is the Kremlin's desire for their pro-Russian populations to vote in Ukrainian elections and for their autonomous local governments to serve as a brake on Ukraine's road to NATO. Russia's political mainstream overwhelmingly supports preventing the emergence of a hostile Ukraine under NATO security umbrella less than four hundred miles from Moscow.

This feeling is grounded both in Russian security concerns and in nearly uncontrollable sentiments about Ukraine and its Russian-speaking population. The growing popularity of the slogan Rossiya ne brosayet svoikh-Russia does not abandon its own-reflects these feelings and resembles Russia's pan-Slavic attitudes toward Serbia before World War I. One of us saw a powerful example of these emotions while watching a Russian talk-show discussion about Ukraine before a live audience. A Russian panelist declared that "our cause is just and we will prevail" to thunderous applause. Importantly, the speaker, Vyacheslav Nikonov, is not only a member of the pro-Putin United Russia party and the chairman of the parliament's education committee. He is also the grandson of former Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov, who made the same statement after Hitler attacked the USSR in 1941. Nikonov is known for reflecting establishment perspectives. The early nineteenth-century Savoyard diplomat and conservative philosopher Joseph de Maistre saw something similar in his own time: "There is no man who desires as passionately as a Russian. If we could imprison a Russian desire beneath a fortress, that fortress would explode." Russian nationalism today is such an explosive force.

Little imagination is required to find possible triggers for a decisive change in Putin's posture. The most immediate would be a U.S. decision to arm Ukraine's military. Could some in Putin's government actually be seeking to entice the United States into arming Ukraine? While this seems far-fetched at first blush, another Russian interlocutor made a thoughtful case that this is indeed the plan of some around Putin, perhaps even with Putin's consent. According to this theory, this ploy has both a tactical and a strategic rationale.

Tactically, an announcement by Obama that the United States was sending arms to Ukraine would give Putin an easy escape from what has become an increasingly untenable denial of the obvious. To fellow Russian citizens, Putin and his government have unambiguously and repeatedly insisted that Russia is not a party to the conflict, despite the fact that pro-Russian government politicians and separatist leaders brag about Moscow's help on television. Even after the downing of the Malaysian airliner killed nearly three hundred last July, and despite continuous Western reporting of the facts, Putin has stuck to his story.

An announcement that Washington was arming Ukraine would, it is argued, give Putin the pretext he needs to affirm his narrative. He has claimed that the United States sponsored the Maidan coup that ousted Yanukovych, a democratically elected president, and has been supporting the current government's war against fellow Russians in eastern Ukraine. Overtly arming Ukraine will thus unmask previously covert American activity and justify Russia responding with arms or even troops, initiating a game of escalation that plays to his strength.

Strategically, this would be what chess masters call a trap. By shifting the competition from the economic chessboard (where the United States and Europe have all the powerful pieces) to a military one, he will have moved from weakness to strength. In the military arena, Putin owns the commanding heights: there is hardly a weapon the United States can provide Kiev that Russia can't match or trump; logistically, he can send arms by road, rail, sea and air across a porous border, while the United States is a continent away; within the ranks of Ukraine's military, he has hundreds or even thousands of agents and collaborators. And, most importantly, as he has already demonstrated, the Russian military forces are prepared not only to advise separatists but also to fight alongside them-and to kill and to die. He assumes that the United States will never put boots on the ground in Ukraine. The more vividly he can drive this home to Europeans, so hard-line thinking goes, the more respect he can command.

Hard-liners see this as Putin's best chance to snatch what they call "strategic victory" from the jaws of defeat. As they see it, Russia's comparative advantage in relations with Europe and the United States is not economics. Instead, it is deploying military power. Europeans have essentially disarmed themselves and show little will to fight. Americans undoubtedly have the most powerful military on earth and are often prepared to fight. But even though they win all the battles, they seem incapable of winning a war, as in Vietnam or Iraq. In Ukraine, the "hotheads" hope, Russia can teach the Europeans and Americans some hard truths. The professionally executed operation that annexed Crimea virtually without a shot was the first step. But the deeper the United States can be sucked into Ukraine and the more visibly it is committed to achieving unachievable goals like the restoration of Ukraine's territorial integrity, the better from this hawkish Russian perspective. On the battlefield of war in Ukraine, Russia has what Cold War strategists named "escalation dominance": the upper hand at every step up the escalation ladder. This is a proxy war the United States cannot win and Russia cannot lose-unless America is willing to go to war itself.

THE PRIMARY audience for this drama is, of course, Europe. The fact that neither European members of NATO nor the United States can save Ukraine is hoped to sink into the consciousness of postmodern Europeans. When it does, according to this logic, a skillful combination of intimidation and intimation of hope should give Russia an opening to drive a wedge between the United States and Europe, providing relief from the most onerous sanctions and access to European financial markets.

Initially, Putin will attempt to exploit the expiration of EU sanctions, which are scheduled to expire in July. If that fails, however, and the European Union joins the United States in imposing additional economic sanctions, such as excluding Moscow from the SWIFT financial clearing system, Putin would be tempted to respond not by retreating, but by ending all cooperation with the West and mobilizing his people against a new and "apocalyptic" threat to Mother Russia. As a leading Russian politician told us, "We stood all alone against Napoleon and against Hitler. It was our victories against aggressors, not our diplomacy, that split enemy coalitions and provided us with new allies."

At that point, Putin would likely change both his team and the thrust of his foreign policy. As a senior official said, "The president values loyalty and consistency, so letting people go and announcing fundamental policy changes comes hard to him. But he is a decisive man and when he reaches a decision, he does whatever it takes to get results." This would mean a significantly more belligerent Russian policy across all issues driven by a narrative about a Western campaign to undermine the regime or indeed to cause the collapse of the country. Among other things, it would likely mean an end to cooperation on projects like the International Space Station, supplies of strategic metals like titanium, dealing with Iran's nuclear program and stabilizing Afghanistan. In the latter case, this could include not only pressuring Central Asian states to curtail security cooperation with the United States, but also exploiting political differences in the Afghan ruling coalition to support the remnants of the Northern Alliance.

ONCE THE U.S.-Russian relationship enters the zone of heated confrontation, senior military officers on both sides will inevitably play a greater role. As the world saw in the lead-up to World War I, when the security dilemma takes hold, what look like reasonable precautions to one side may well appear as evidence of likely aggression to the other. Clausewitz describes the relentless logic that pushes each side toward "a new mutual enhancement, which, in pure conception, must create a fresh effort towards an extreme." Commanders have to think in terms of capabilities rather than intentions. This pushes them toward steps that are tactically prudent but that invite strategic misinterpretation.

Predictably, leaders and their military advisers will also miscalculate. Before World War I, Kaiser Wilhelm II did not believe that Russia would dare to go to war because its defeat by Japan less than a decade earlier had demonstrated the Russian military's incompetence. At the same time, Russian defense minister Vladimir Sukhomlinov was assuring the czar that Russia was ready for battle and that Germany had already decided to attack. As Sukhomlinov said in 1912, "Under any circumstances the war is unavoidable and it is advantageous for us to start it sooner rather than later . . . His Majesty and I believe in the army and know that the war will only bring good things to us." In Berlin, the German General Staff also argued for quick action, fearing the impending completion of a new network of rail lines that would allow the czar to move Russian divisions rapidly to Germany's border. After the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, as the crisis intensified, military commanders in both Russia and Germany rushed not to be the second to mobilize. As the Russian General Staff told Nicholas II, only an immediate and full-scale mobilization would prevent a quick defeat, if not of Russia itself, then at least of France, whose long-term support Russia needed to withstand the German assault.

LATVIA, ESTONIA, and Lithuania form the Achilles' heel of the NATO alliance. They are protected by its Article 5 guarantee that an attack upon one will be regarded as an attack upon all. Thus, the United States has an unambiguous and undeniable responsibility to deter and defend attacks on the Baltic states. Given their size, proximity to Russia and substantial Russian-speaking minorities, this is a daunting requirement. It is not difficult to imagine scenarios in which either U.S. or Russian action could set in motion a chain of events at the end of which American and Russian troops would be killing each other.

There is currently a lively discussion among Russian hard-liners about how Russian dominance in both conventional forces and tactical nuclear weapons in Central and Eastern Europe could be used to Russia's advantage. Putin has talked publicly about his willingness to use nuclear weapons to repel any effort to retake Crimea-noting that he relied on Russia's nuclear arsenal during the Crimean operation. In these debates, many ask whether President Obama would risk losing Chicago, New York and Washington to protect Riga, Tallinn and Vilnius. It is a troubling question. If you want to either dumbfound or silence a table next to you in a restaurant in Washington or Boston, ask your fellow diners what they think. If stealthy Russian military forces were to take control of Estonia or Latvia, what should the United States do? Would they support sending Americans to fight for the survival of Estonia or Latvia?

Imagine, for example, an uprising of ethnic Russians in Estonia or Latvia, either spontaneously or at the instigation of Russian security services; a heavy-handed response by that nation's weak police and military forces; an appeal by ethnic Russians to Putin to honor his "Putin Doctrine" declaration during the liberation of Crimea that he would come to the defense of ethnic Russians wherever they were attacked; an attempted replay of the hybrid war against Ukraine; and a confrontation with the battalion of six hundred American or NATO forces now on regular rotations through the Baltic states. Some Russians have gone so far as to suggest that this would provide sufficient provocation for Moscow to use a tactical nuclear weapon; Russia's ambassador to Denmark, for example, recently threatened that Danish participation in NATO's missile-defense system would make it "a target for Russian nuclear weapons." What's more, Russia is exploring stationing Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad-the Russian enclave between Lithuania and Poland-while Sweden's intelligence has publicly stated that it views Russian intelligence operations as preparation for "military operations against Sweden."

IN A climate of mutual suspicion further fueled by domestic politics on both sides, assurances of benign intentions rarely suffice. Christopher Clark's 2013 book, The Sleepwalkers, provides a persuasive account of how, in the days preceding World War I, both alliances contemptuously dismissed the explanations and assurances they heard from the other side.

Of course, alliances are now Putin's weakest point. Russia does not have a single ally committed to supporting Moscow in war. Nevertheless, one should be cautious about counting on Moscow's isolation in a longer-term confrontation with the West. One reason Kaiser Wilhelm II presented his ultimatum to Russia was that he did not believe England would join Russia in a war over the crisis in the Balkans, where London had traditionally opposed Russian influence. Furthermore, without England, few expected France to offer much resistance. What those who count on Russian isolation today do not properly take into account is that a powerful and assertive alliance prepared to pursue its interests and promote its values inevitably stimulates antibodies. It was that sense of Germany's determination to change the geopolitical balance in Europe and in the world that prompted Britain to depart from a century of splendid isolation and become so entangled with allies that when war came, it had little choice but to enter. It is the same sense that is leading China today to expand its ties with Russia during its conflict with the United States.

To be clear, there is virtually no chance that China would join Russia against the United States and Europe in a confrontation over Ukraine. Likewise, China is not prepared to bail Russia out financially or to risk its lucrative economic integration with the West to support Moscow's revanchist ambitions. But neither is Beijing indifferent to the possibility of Russia's political, economic or (particularly) military defeat by the Western alliance. Many in Beijing fear that if the United States and its allies were successful in defeating Russia, and particularly in changing the regime in Russia, China could well be the next target. The fact that the Chinese leadership views this as a serious threat could, over time, push Beijing closer to Moscow, a development that would fundamentally alter the global balance of power.

Moreover, if there were a Russian-American war, one needs to think carefully about what actions the Chinese might choose to take against Taiwan, for example, or even to punish neighbors like Japan or Vietnam whom Beijing believes are cooperating with Washington to contain its ambitions.

Neither China nor Russia is the first state to confront a powerful and growing alliance. Nor is the United States the first to receive enthusiastic appeals from prospective allies that can add marginally to overall capabilities, but simultaneously bring obligations and make others feel insecure. In a timeless passage in his History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides recounts the Athenian response to a troubled Sparta: "We did not gain this empire by force. . . . Our allies came to us of their own accord and begged us to lead them." Needless to say, Sparta did not find that explanation reassuring-and that excuse did not prevent thirty years of war that ended with defeat for Athens, but at a price far beyond any benefits that accrued to the victor.

To recognize the potentially catastrophic consequences of war with Russia does not require paralysis in addressing the challenge of a resurgent but wounded Russia. The United States has a vital interest in maintaining its credibility as a superpower and in assuring the survival and security of its NATO alliance-and thus of every one of its NATO allies. Moreover, in international politics, appetites can grow quickly if fed by easy victories.

The Russian president's currently limited objectives in Ukraine could become more expansive if Russia does not face serious resistance. After all, the smooth annexation of Crimea led to an outburst of triumphalist rhetoric in Moscow about creating a new entity, Novorossiya, which would include eastern and southern Ukraine all the way to the Romanian border. The combination of resistance by local populations, the Ukrainian government's willingness to fight for its territory, and U.S. and EU sanctions quickly persuaded the Russian leadership to curtail this line of thinking. When a nation is prepared to fight for important interests, clarity about that determination is a virtue in discouraging potential aggression.

Yet the United States should be careful to avoid giving allies or friends-like Kiev-the sense that they have a blank check in confronting Moscow. During World War I, even such a strong supporter of the war as Pavel N. Milyukov-leader of Russia's Constitutional Democrats and later foreign minister in the Provisional Government-was shocked at the lengths to which British foreign secretary Sir Edward Grey would go in refusing to assign any blame for the conflict to the Serbs. "Listen," he reports saying to Grey, "the war started because of Serb grandstanding. Austria could think that it was in serious danger. Serbia was aspiring to do no less than to split Austria." To Grey, however, an ally could do no wrong.

The Balkan crises in the several years prior to World War I deserve careful study. Few at the time could conceive that they would become the flashpoint of a fire that would eventually become a continental inferno.

But they did. Meeting the challenge of an angry but weakened Russia today requires a subtle combination of firmness and restraint. Where vital American interests are engaged, we have to be able and willing to fight: to kill and to die. Effective deterrence requires three C's: clarity about red lines that cannot be crossed (for example, attacking a NATO ally); capability to respond in ways that will make the cost of aggression greatly exceed any benefits an aggressor could hope to achieve; and credibility about our determination to fulfill our commitment. At the same time, we should recognize that if American and Russian forces find themselves firing upon each other, this would violate one of the principal constraints both sides respected assiduously during four decades of the Cold War-risking escalation to a war both would lose.

Military force and economic warfare such as sanctions are indispensable instruments of foreign policy. When employed without a sound strategic vision and artful diplomacy, however, instruments of coercion can develop their own momentum and become ends in themselves. Having managed a confrontation over the Soviet Union's attempt to install nuclear-tipped missiles in Cuba that he believed had a one-in-three chance of ending in nuclear war, President John F. Kennedy spent many hours reflecting on the lessons from that experience. The most important of these he offered to his successors in these words: "Above all, while defending our vital interests, nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war." It is a lesson statesmen should apply to meet the challenge Russia poses in Ukraine today.
 

#3
Expert: Russia and NATO should mend cooperation
By Tamara Zamyatin

MOSCOW, April 20. /TASS/. For the sake of preventing threats to peace Russia and Western countries should mend cooperation between their military agencies, the director of the Russian Academy of Sciences' International Security Center, Alexey Arbatov, told TASS in an interview, as he looked back on the 4th International Security Conference Moscow hosted on April 16-17. "Despite the US pressures on NATO countries Russia has many partners and allies interested in military cooperation," he said.

"The conference, devoted to global security, challenges and prospects, gathered delegates from 80 countries, including NATO's member-states. Washington not only boycotted that major international event, but also put pressures on the North Atlantic countries in attempts to persuade their military specialists not to go to Moscow. However, most NATO and European Union countries, except for the United States itself, and also Canada, Britain and the Netherlands, sent officials from their defence and foreign ministries to the conference. Representatives from more than 70 countries and international organizations were discussing global security matters at the security conference," Arbatov said.

"The leaders of major countries not involved in the US sphere of influence, such as China, India, Brazil, South Africa, and the Collective Security Treaty Organization's member-states are aware the modern world is very different from that of the Cold War era. There are far more challenges and threats, and only joint action will be able to prevent them," Arbatov said.

"In fact, the United States is NATO's leading member-state, so the channels of military cooperation between the United States and the alliance's other countries, on the one hand, and Russia, on the other, are totally frozen. The Russia-NATO Council has not been formally abolished, but it does not work. As a result, the alliance's activity on Russia's borders has been growing without any plausible explanations. Moscow has been taking counter-measures. Mutual suspicions are soaring. This is extremely dangerous. Any incident, like the interception of a US spy plane by a Russian jet fighter over the Baltic on April 7, may not only result in a misunderstanding, but entail a tragic mistake, a clash between two nuclear powers with unpredictable consequences," Arbatov said.

"For the purpose of preventing the risk of military games developing into something worse the Soviet Union and the United States back in 1972 signed an inter-government agreement On the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Sea, which set a code of conduct both parties should abide by in case of direct contact. However that agreement applied mostly to ships, while these days military planes get involved ever more often. To ward off threats to international security it will be essential to restore the operation of consultative groups of Russia and NATO in the spirit of the 1972 convention for exchanging information about flights by military planes and voyages by naval ships," Arbatov believes.

"None of the military analysts I chanced to meet at the Moscow conference looked indifferent to the situation in Ukraine. Everybody was for easing tensions in the southeast of the country, which had begun to snowball of late again. Hostilities have resumed, the parties to the conflict keep accusing each other of violating the Minsk Accords' requirement for the pullback of heavy weapons from the disengagement line. There is the unanimity a war in the very centre of Europe would benefit no one and that it will take pooling efforts by all members of the international community to prevent it from happening," Arbatov said.

Against the backdrop of the crisis in Ukraine and the explosive situation in the Middle East in view of the Yemen crisis and the continuing expansion of the Islamic State military cooperation by countries around the world, including Russia and NATO members will begin to be restored on the pragmatic basis. The need for interaction stems from the common threats to international security, such as the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation, terrorism, local crises, and the disastrous effects of the Arab Spring chain of government coups. No single state will be able to cope with these challenges on its own, so military cooperation between a great variety of countries and Russia just has no alternative.
 
 #4
Kremlin.ru
April 16, 2015
Kremlin.ru
Direct line with Vladimir Putin (transcript conclusion)

Anna Federmesser: Thank you very much, and good afternoon.

Today I represent the most vulnerable category of patients: they are patients who are incurably ill; you can't cure them, but you can help them. Which brings me to my two questions, which are really requests.

Number one. Even in this group there are fellow citizens who are even less fortunate. They are people, mainly children and young people, who depend all their lives on artificial lung ventilation. They cannot live without it because they cannot breathe without it.

In our healthcare system they are in intensive care units. Speaking about children, they cannot develop there, they cannot communicate with their mothers and they die early because the environment is far from friendly. Elsewhere in the world such patients are at home, they study and attend school. I have brought some photos: a good many children, including those under the wing of the VERA Hospice Charity Fund, which I head, are already at home with artificial lung ventilation.

But as soon as they are back home they are no longer entitled to state support because the state is not obliged to provide them with expectoration or artificial lung ventilation kits. And medical institutions are also interested in these patients going home because they then vacate a very costly bed, they make room for intensive care people to work with more promising patients.

My request is as follows: to devise a mechanism, to give instructions to the relevant agencies to work out a lending mechanism for temporary use - unfortunately, these patients don't live long - free of charge, funded by the state, of artificial lung ventilators and mucus clearance devices.

And my second question is much more acute and stems from yesterday's situation, which was actively mulled by the media. It concerns narcotic pain relieving analgesics for cancer patients. Yesterday, we tried to help Aminat, a girl from Daghestan, who is in Moscow now, to get analgesia.

I will say at once that everything went well, she received morphine, and I hope that she is not suffering from pain now, but for that we had to appeal to lots of agencies and dozens of officials. In short, many people tried hard to get morphine for the little girl to relieve her of her pain during her last remaining weeks.

This is, in fact, a systemic problem. Today, Russia has no system of palliative aid and analgesia for people where they live, not where they are registered.

In other words, all of this aid can only be provided locally - where a person is registered. And if relatives took him or her out somewhere, for instance, from a village to a big city, to give better care - in that case, the patient is cut off from aid.

These people have no strength for paperwork - reregister, deregister.

And one more request - to help work out a relevant mechanism.

If I understand it correctly, this should be done together with the Ministry of Finance as this will involve mutual settlements between regions - so as to provide palliative, hospice aid to dying patients where they live, where they need it, and not where they should be staying in accordance with their passports.

Thank you very much for your attention.

Vladimir Putin: As for artificial lung ventilators and the rest, why can't they be used at home? To be honest, this is the first time I'm hearing about this problem. I will certainly issue instructions to this effect to the Healthcare Ministry and other parties concerned, as they say.

It has to be determined whether this is a purely financial issue, whether additional funding should be allocated for purchasing this equipment and providing it to patients. Or maybe the problem is that our medical personnel believe that this equipment can't be used at home.

Anna Federmesser: No, not exactly. In fact, the medical personnel are not against sending such patients home, which would allow for better use of intensive care units.

There is no legal mechanism whereby parents would be vested with the necessary rights, so that they feel protected; there is a lack of properly trained doctors in local clinics. Of course, this is a comprehensive issue, and it can't be solved with a single word. However, I think that the medical community and the patients are ready. And it won't be a costly option for the country; since these patients are already using these ventilators in hospitals, transferring them home would be cheaper.

Vladimir Putin: I understand, you mean that this is a legal issue. The state is not entitled to put parents in charge of using this equipment?

Anna Federmesser: The issue is more complex, but this is part of it. If you issue an instruction, the problem will be addressed quicker.

Vladimir Putin: You're right. An instruction will be issued and we will work with you on this problem. I hope that this will pave the way toward a positive solution.

As for other matters, they will also certainly be addressed. You have highlighted an issue to work on, and we will work on it and discuss it. I will hear a report from the Minister and proposals to this effect.

Kirill Kleymenov: Mr President, let's discuss another very important and somewhat controversial issue: pension reform. Today, everyone is saying our reform is troubled.

Valeriya, over to you.

Valeriya Korableva: Pension reform indeed concerns millions of Russians, both those who are near retirement age and those who are still a long way off. I'd like to give the floor to Irina Kosogorova, an entrepreneur from Tyumen.

Irina, your question, please.

Irina Kosogorova: Good afternoon, Mr President.

First of all, on behalf of the business community, I would like to thank you for supporting the restrictions on tax changes for entrepreneurs. Now, this is the third pension reform in my lifetime. And as a matter of fact, every time it becomes more enigmatic and interesting, and less predictable. Now new indicators have been introduced - points and coefficients - and it is totally incomprehensible what they will add up to in 10, 15 or 20 years, when we retire.

In this context, I have a question for you. Do you think such frequent changes in the rules of the game are justified? As far as I understand, every time such changes get less and less public support. Is this really necessary? Perhaps the rules of the game should be set, allowed to work and produce an effect, including on retirement age?

Vladimir Putin: I don't think they are changed very often. It is simply that the proposed mechanism is not very comprehensible to the people and requires an explanation. One of the principal motives - but not the main motive - behind this system was to link a retiree's pension income to his or her previous performance at work. At one point this connection was severed, and the introduction of these points had to do with this basically legitimate goal to link work performance and the level of income during a person's working life to the level of pension. To reiterate, this requires additional explanation and possibly streamlining.

The retirement age is an important issue. What is the problem from the perspective of the financial and economic bloc? Are there problems at all? Of course, there are.

You see, in 2008, transfers from the federal budget to the pension system (if I make a mistake, Mr Kudrin will correct me) amounted to about 1.49 trillion roubles. In 2016, especially if we return the money to the funded part of the pension system, the transfers should amount to 2.7 trillion roubles, or three percent of the GDP.

This raises a question: where do we get the money? Clearly, we should take it from other types of expenses - defence, healthcare, and other spheres, and, perhaps, it will even lead to a decrease in the amount of pensions. This is the first problem.

The second problem - not a problem, but a factor: life expectancy in Russia is up and now stands at 71.5 years on average for women and men. Life expectancy is increasing even faster than we expected. This is due to healthcare improvements, healthier lifestyles and so on, with a slight decrease in alcohol consumption and tobacco smoking. There are many factors at play.

The number of people who work and make their contributions to the pension system is declining and the number of people who use the resources provided by the pension system is on the rise. At some point, we may come to a situation where direct budget support becomes simply unaffordable for the budget.

Are we ready and willing to sharply raise the retirement age? I believe not. I'll tell you why. Yes, life expectancy is increasing, but for men it is 65 and a half years, and setting the retirement age for men at 65 means that, pardon me for this straightforward expression: you've done your fair share, here's your wooden overcoat, have a nice ride? That's impossible.

By the way, in those countries where the retirement age has been increased, such as the vast majority of European countries, the retirement age is set at 65 for both men and women, but life expectancy there is higher. Women's life expectancy in Russia is 77.5 years, while in Europe it is 81 or higher. As life expectancy increases, we will probably get close to addressing these issues, including the retirement age.

First, this should be done in an open dialogue with society. People need to understand what's going on, be aware of the underlying reasons, understand the consequences of our inaction and the implications of failure to take timely decisions. People need to know about this and understand this - not the way it is happening now with these points.

Next. Even in Soviet times we did not have those elements that our retirement system has now in plenty and that make it so unwieldy and expensive.

One more point. If some age-related changes are to be made, they should not apply to those who have practically earned their right to a pension. These changes certainly must not affect people approaching retirement age.

A smooth transition to this system should be made by mature - yet still young - people, who will know what is awaiting them in the next 10 or 15 years. These should be deferred decisions. I would like to repeat again that it is very important that all these issues should be openly discussed and, in the end, accepted by the public. This is the way things should be done.

Kirill Kleymenov: Mr Putin, Crimea is on the line. Crimea is waiting to receive holidaymakers, adults and children alike. Our colleague Nikolai Dolgachev is on the line from the Artek International Children's Centre.

Nikolai Dolgachev: Greetings to Moscow from Crimea! As you can see, we have fine weather here. We are at the Artek Children's Centre, located on the southern coast of the peninsula. Artek will mark its 90th anniversary this year. In a few days, children from all over Russia will come here for recreation. The whole of Crimea is getting ready for the summer holiday season, which is essential to its prosperity. We have talked to many people living in the republic and in Sevastopol and there were many questions about the economy. Some of these people who are well aware of local problems are present here now and they will introduce themselves.

Ulyana Smirnova: I am Ulyana Smirnova, Chernomor travel agency and management company, Crimea.

Mikhail Kozinets: I am Mikhail Kozinets, a representative of international road haulers.

Valery Khasitashvili: I am Valery Khasitashvili, a manager at the Pravda agricultural enterprise.

Yanina Pavlenko: I am Yanina Pavlenko from the Massandra agrarian production company, the head of the Crimean Grape-Growing and Wine-Making Office.

Elmira Akimova: I am Elmira Akimova, I represent the Chaika sanatorium for children.

Oleg Zubkov: I am Oleg Zubkov, the director of the Skazka Zoo and Taigan Lion Park in Yalta.

Nikolai Dolgachev: The first question from Crimea.

Evelina Emiraliyeva: Hello, I am Evelina Emiraliyeva from the Entrepreneurs Association of the Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol. I represent the private sector and am a student at Kazan University. I bought a return ticket recently to go to take my summer exams. It cost 17,800 roubles, which is a lot of money for an average family. Like many Crimean people, I am worried about the upcoming summer season. Have any measures been envisaged to cut the cost of airfare to encourage and support the summer holiday season in Crimea? Thank you.

Vladimir Putin: I have already said that the value added tax (VAT) on domestic transport in Russia has been cut to a minimum, to 10 percent. But Crimea is a special destination; it's a place where millions of people go for their holidays. You may or may not have heard about it, but I can tell you that Aeroflot has decided to cut the price of tickets to Crimea from a number of cities, and the list will be expanded to include 50 cities; I think Kazan is among them as well. The price is 7,500 roubles for a return trip. And some airlines are thinking of cutting the prices even more. I hope this will happen. In any case, we'll keep it under control.

The problem in Crimea is that the infrastructure has been destroyed. The runway is in a very bad state. It hasn't been repaired since the Soviet era.

It still meets flight safety standards, but basically there is a lot to be done starting with the air terminal and ending with the runway. It is big and basically comfortable - I think it was built with an eye for the Buran space shuttle - but the quality still leaves something to be desired. The equipment is outdated and cannot cope with the required number of flights.

However, I repeat, this is a known problem. I hope that the Russian aviation authorities and the Crimean authorities will do everything to make travel to Crimea affordable and comfortable.

Nikolai Maximenko: Nikolai Maximenko, the Association of Crimean Transport Operators.

We have two questions - regarding the ferry crossing and the registration of transport vehicles. You may not be aware of this, perhaps you have not been informed, but I can tell you that lorries have to queue for 12-14 days at our ferry crossing, which means that the drivers live all this time in the cab of their lorry - no toilets, nothing to eat or drink, nothing at all. We tried to resolve the issue by introducing an electronic queuing system, but it failed and only led to corruption. We have proposed issuing electronic tickets that will resolve the queue issue and we won't have this congestion of lorries.

The second issue that worries our owners of vehicles is the Ukrainian registration of our lorries and cars. We are Russian citizens and we have Crimean license plates, but the registration is still Ukrainian. To receive Russian license plates, we must take them to Ukraine, which is impossible due to the lack of Ukrainian insurance or technical inspections. And morally too, you can imagine what it's like taking our cars and lorries to Ukraine. Will we get them back or not? Once we deregister in Ukraine, we have to go through customs procedures to return them to Crimea and this is impossible because our lorries have Euro 2 and Euro 3 standards while the customs agreement allows only Euro 5. Mr Putin, please help us with these issues, so that we can become fully-fledged Russian citizens.

Thank you very much.

Vladimir Putin: All right. As for the ferry crossing, you have plenty of problems there. To be honest, I didn't know that you have such congestion there. How many lorries and cars are queuing there at the moment?

Nikolai Maximenko: Over 2,000.

Vladimir Putin: Two ferries are currently operating there, if I'm not mistaken.

Nikolai Maximenko: Kavkaz, Temryuk and Novorossiysk.

Vladimir Putin: Five should be in operation in the near future, and there is a plan to purchase additional ferry boats. In all, 10 ferries should operate on this line. Some of them would be quite big. I will certainly speak about the current developments with the Ministry of Transport and Crimean authorities. By the way, much of the powers in this respect have been transferred to the Crimean authorities. But they need help. You can't just transfer responsibility to them and wait for a collapse to happen. We will work on this issue.

As for the proposal to replace the queue management system with electronic tickets, I can't comment on this issue. But I promise to explore it along with the issue of reregistering vehicles. I don't know yet how we're going to do it, but we will definitely do it. You have my word.

Kirill Kleymenov: Thank you, Artek. Thank you, Crimea.

Mr Putin, with the holiday season approaching, I think that this text message is highly relevant: "Why were local police officers banned from travelling abroad? They can't possibly disclose any classified information." Indeed, why adopt such harsh measures against rank-and-file law enforcement officers?

Vladimir Putin: This decision was discussed at a National Security Council meeting. Of course, ordinary police officers do not have access to classified information and at first glance this measure seems to be excessive. We assumed, along with the Interior Ministry, that as long as a person is wearing a law enforcement uniform, he or she should be subject to the same rules as all other people in uniform. It would have been wrong if some employees of the Interior Ministry were allowed to travel abroad, while others weren't. This general approach is to a large extent due to the stance adopted by the Ministry. At first glance, this doesn't seem right. But when a person is employed by a law enforcement body or special service, he or she understands what's going on. This information could be of interest to foreign special services. But I do agree with you, this does seem like an excessive measure.

Maria Sittel: We've been on air for nearly four hours now, so I suggest we move over to our traditional blitz Q&A: short question and short answer.

Vladimir Putin: Sure.

Maria Sittel: Mr President, would you like to clone yourself or have an army of look-alikes?

Vladimir Putin: No.

Maria Sittel: You see, Russian officials do not recognise anyone but you.

Vladimir Putin: I've already answered. Let's move on.

Kirill Kleymenov: Mr President, what I have here is not a question but a seriousrequest from a person who has introduced herself, but I will not identify her and I believe you will understand why.

"Mr President, I'm writing from Odessa. My name is Irina, and I will limit myself to this. As I revisit the events of last year, I recall our thousands-strong rallies. Then there was May 2 in Odessa, the Mariupol massacre and finally the war in Donbass. A few days ago the Verkhovna Rada passed legislation prohibiting Soviet symbols and communist ideology. When we were at school, at work and happy in the Soviet Union, our current 'rulers' sat in their dens, building up hatred and malice. Now this mob of man-hating psychopaths is trying to rule us. My cherished dream is to live to see the day when you come to Odessa on May 9 and congratulate Odessa and all of Ukraine on Victory Day. If you can't make it this year, it's all right, we'll wait. In the meantime, please send us your holiday greetings from Moscow."

Vladimir Putin: Best wishes to you. However, we all know about the tragedy in Odessa and of course, I hope that one day the entire Ukrainian people will make a fair assessment of the barbarity that we all witnessed.

Maria Sittel: Why do you choose Thursday for the [Direct Line] programme?

Vladimir Putin: Thursday? I have no idea, it's just a coincidence.

Maria Sittel: All right. Kirill?

Kirill Kleymenov: Here is another serious question: "At some point, Andrei Sakharov was called our nation's conscience. Would you give this title to any of the current politicians?" Let me add that it doesn't have to be a politician.

Vladimir Putin: You know, it was the country and the public that called Sakharov the nation's conscience. I don't think I have the right, even as President, the head of state, to award such an honourable title to anyone. There are many decent people in our country. Let me just recall the police officers who shielded buses full of children with their bodies and their cars, or the officer who threw himself on a hand grenade to save young servicemen. There are many people like this in this country, but only the public can nominate someone from among their ranks to be the conscience of our nation.

Maria Sittel: It is a little embarrassing for me to switch from such a serious issue to mine but here is my question: "When will Gazprom start paying decent salaries to its employees?"

Vladimir Putin: Are they going to lower them?

Maria Sittel: I guess so.

Vladimir Putin: I don't know. I need to ask Mr Miller.

Kirill Kleymenov: Mr Putin, don't you think that your friends are taking advantage of your kindness?

Vladimir Putin: Why only friends? Everybody is taking advantage of kindness.

Maria Sittel: Have you ever invited any foreign leaders to a Russian sauna? Talks could be much more successful there than at a roundtable.

Vladimir Putin: That's a tough one. I don't know if I should tell you but I will. The person I'm talking about is no longer a head of government. Former Chancellor of Germany Mr Schr�der met with me at my residence once, many years ago. So we went to a sauna. Suddenly, it was on fire. True story. He just got himself a beer. I come out and say, "Look, Gerhard, we must leave right now. The sauna is on fire." He says, "I'll finish my beer first." I say, "Are you out of your mind? The sauna is on fire, do you understand?" But he finished his beer. He is a stubborn man with an attitude. The sauna burned to the ground. We never went back. But in general I do enjoy a sauna.

Kirill Kleymenov: "A lot is being said now about the Russia of the past or present, but less about the Russia of the future. How do you envision the Russia of your dreams?"

Vladimir Putin: Well, you know, this is a traditional question. I have answered it many times. All I can say is that I see Russia as a prosperous nation and its citizens as happy people who have confidence in their future.

Maria Sittel: "Would Mr Putin like to become UN Secretary-General in the future?"

Vladimir Putin: No, I wouldn't.

Kirill Kleymenov: Mr Putin, here's the last question: "What is the purpose of the Direct Line with the President? What do you want to learn?"

Vladimir Putin: You know, first, this is the most representative sociological poll. Millions of questions have arrived though different channels and they offer an opportunity to see what people are really concerned about. A farmer spoke here about his mistrust of statistics. Probably, this is sometimes the case: when you look at people and listen to them, you perceive everything in a different way. This is the first point. Second, this is an opportunity to bring home to people the position of the country's leaders and my own position on several key issues and to assess what is going on.

We have repeatedly discussed these sanctions and the problems related to our national currency. The rouble is tied up to the price of a barrel of oil. This is still the case to some extent. But the price of a barrel of oil decreased from $100 to $50. It has halved. Our total oil revenues were about $500 billion, but because of the drop in the oil price we received $160 billion less than expected. Plus, there were payments on the debts of our banks, financial institutions and enterprises of the real economy: $130 billion last year and $60 billion this year. At the peak of payments we could not get refinancing on the foreign markets. Of course, a very alarming situation took shape but we have gone through it. This was a substantial element of consolidation that became the foundation of the efforts to enhance our national currency and confirmed the correctness of the course chosen by the Government towards stabilisation. The nation must know it. That is one of the reasons for holding such events as the Direct Line.

Maria Sittel: Thank you, Mr Putin.

Kirill Kleymenov: Well, we have set an absolute record: we received over three million telephone calls and SMS messages during this Direct Line. Interest has been enormous. It only remains to hope that officials and executives at different levels will promptly react to all questions asked during this Direct Line.

Mr Putin, thank you very much.

Maria Sittel: Thank you.

Vladimir Putin: We'll make sure they react. Thank you.
 
 
#5
Moscow Times
April 20, 2015
Putin Helps Russian Pet Lover to Get a New (Welsh) Puppy

Russian President Vladimir Putin may have set a dangerous precedent after convincing a retired soldier to buy his wife a pet pooch, possibly spawning a wave of similar requests from animal-lovers nationwide.

"Please just say to him: 'Boris, you're wrong! Let your wife have a dog!' We've already tried everything," a woman from Rostov pleaded Thursday during Putin's annual call-in with the nation, which was broadcast live on television.

The woman's appeal to convince her friend's husband to buy her a pet for her 40th birthday was one of a handful of funny moments from this year's marathon call-in, which mostly centered on domestic issues.

After first suggesting he did not have the authority to make such a request, Putin addressed the man in question, a retired soldier, by saying: "Boris, please, allow your wife to buy a dog. It will strengthen your family."

The soldier, Boris Fadeyev, took the hint and has since brought home a Welsh corgi called Gosha, his wife Yelena told the Govorit Moskva radio station on Sunday.

It is unclear whether the Russian president's words alone did the trick or whether Yelena's friend followed Putin's advice to get the job done.

"We can work out an action plan of some kind," Putin said during the call-in. "The two of us together, you and I, can ask Boris to go and meet with his wife, Yelena, and Yelena could say to him: 'No, I don't need a dog, I'll do what you like.'

"And then I'm sure that he would get her not only a dog but also an elephant, especially if she says it at the right time and in the right place. He might even promise her a fur coat," he added.
 
 #6
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
April 17, 2015
Direct Line: This is how Putin talks to the world
The closest analogy to the "Direct Line" between President Vladimir Putin and the Russian people is the practice of European medieval kings, who periodically reached out to their subjects, giving alms or even curing ailments through the royal touch.
By Ivan Tsvetkov
Dr. Ivan Tsvetkov is an associate professor at the School of International Relations of St. Petersburg State University. He is an expert in U.S. policy in the Asia Pacific Region, US history and contemporary US society.

The annual televised "Direct Line with Vladimir Putin," which took place on Thursday, April 16, for the 13th time, has long turned into a media ritual, with clearly prescribed roles for all participants and the manifest triumph of form over content.

The part played by Russian President Vladimir Putin is less "president" than "national leader," since the tradition of "Putin meets the people" was not interrupted even during the period 2008-2011 when he was prime minister.

The second protagonist in "Direct Line" is, of course, the people - in all their manifold guises and permutations: from children to cosmonauts to celebrities. Several dozen of the "best people" are traditionally honored by being present in the studio; others ask questions from all corners of Russia by all means available, electronic or otherwise.

The preparations for "Direct Line," and the actual face time with the president, receive great fanfare in state-run media, and take place in an atmosphere artificially stoked by "record mania." The TV hosts constantly stress that all conceivable communication channels are open and myriad questions are posed, yet Putin's time on air, the number of topics covered, etc., are meticulously calculated.

In 2015 Putin stopped somewhat short of his chronological record for continuous televised chat set two years ago (4 hours 47 minutes), but still delivered a performance capable of astonishing foreign colleagues (or provoking ironic bewilderment).

To endure these conversational marathons year in year out, the head of state needs to be not only physically and emotionally fit, but also seriously motivated, since it is clear that a politician of Putin's standing has more than enough channels of communication with any audience at his disposal, and does not need to exhaust himself and viewers time and again.

Some leaders are famous for waxing poetic in public. Cuban President Fidel Castro once spoke at the UN General Assembly for four and a half hours. Former Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez also liked to exercise his jaw, and when he got tired of speaking, entertained his admiring audience with some half-decent crooning. U.S. senators, too, in their desire to obstruct a bill, have lingered at the podium for more than a day.

However, the case with Putin is, without a doubt, unique.

The Russian president seems to act not out of political necessity, as do the filibusters in the U.S. Senate, and not under the influence of the oratorical ecstasy that grips Latin American's fiery politicians (although it is clear that Putin derives pleasure from the proceedings and tries to remain in his comfort zone for as long as possible). But the president would hardly display such positive emotions and with such regularity were it not for the accommodating reaction of the other side of the discourse, i.e. the people.

The closest analogy to the "Direct Line" is the practice of European medieval kings, who periodically reached out to their subjects, giving alms or curing ailments through the royal touch. And although Putin is not yet qualified to heal scrofula through the laying on of hands, as the French monarchs apparently were, in recent years questions about the price and availability of medicines and medical equipment have invariably cropped up, and they always receive the most concrete answers and assurances that something will be done. Thus, it could be argued that in some instances Putin is even more useful and effective than Saint Louis.

It is no wonder that millions of people across Russia take the time to formulate and send a question to the president, because to some it looks like a free (although not every-ticket-wins) lottery. In Soviet times, a proven method for solving the problems of the world was a letter to a newspaper.

The most effective was believed to be a letter to Pravda, the main mouthpiece of the Communist Party, but it was better to start with a lower authority, such as the factory circular. Editorial offices had large departments responsible for correspondence with readers; and in some cases a biting feuilleton in a newspaper really did help to break the deadlock.

So it was possible to prod the authorities into some sort of response. But in Soviet times, under no circumstances did the top leaders condescend to any form of lengthy or substantial dialogue with ordinary people.

When the young General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev introduced the fashion of periodically stopping his motorcade to chat with the crowd, it created a genuine furor, and the policy of perestroika instantly garnered millions of zealous supporters.

A few years before the "Iron Curtain" between East and West was finally lifted, the analogous metaphor that existed in relations between the Soviet people and their political leaders ceased to be a factor (or so it seemed to very many).

As a child of the transitional period, Putin is well aware of the raw power of the public energy given vent in the 1980s, understands the ingredients that made it possible, and does not want to repeat the mistakes of Soviet leaders who lost touch with the common man. The "Direct Line" helps him maintain this contact, or at least maintain the outward appearance of maintaining this contact.

However, Vladimir Putin's efforts in this direction have had some unforeseen consequences. His carefully built image as a strong man with "human" traits has been attracting more and more admirers from outside Russia, too.

Readers of Time magazine recently voted the Russian president as the most influential person in the world. It seems that Putin's passion for winning the hearts and minds of the people has turned from a domestic into an international hobby. That's what really gives "Direct Line" free scope for new records!

Imagine the headlines: "The people of the BRICS countries ask Vladimir Putin 100 million questions," "Putin promises Brazilian farmers that U.S. hegemony will be dealt with," "Putin encourages all people on Earth to lead a healthy lifestyle," and others in a similar vein.

As a matter of fact, if people in many countries are so unhappy with their leaders and so enamored of Putin, why not give them a chance to communicate directly with their idol?

Then again, asked if he would like to become UN Secretary General, Putin replied in the negative, meaning that all international fans of the Russian president should bear in mind that a Russia without Putin is not an immediate prospect.
 #7
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
April 18, 2015
Putin's 'Direct Line' did not offer any direct solutions
While President Putin continues to show remarkable understanding of what's happening in the international arena, there is growing concern that he may be letting Russia's domestic problems drift without developing any long-term strategy for addressing them.
By Dmitry Polikanov
Dmitry Polikanov is Vice President of The Russian Center for Policy Studies (PIR-Center) and Chairman of Trialogue International Club. Author of more than 100 publications on conflict management, peacekeeping, arms control, international relations and foreign policy. Member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the International Sociological Association, the All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center Research Council.

Russian President Vladmir Putin's "Direct Line" has become a tradition in contemporary Russia. However, like any tradition, it gradually turns into a routine, which affects both the leader and the nation.

The event was preceded with the usual high expectations in the expert community and in the media. It has stimulated internal debate about the potential path of development for Russia. Many believed that the president would voice his vision of the future and provide strategic insight about the further progress of the country.

In fact, there is a growing demand for such visual representation and discussion of Russia's "manifest destiny." The so-called "post-Crimea period" in Russian history requires new strategic approaches, which would help to fit the existing sincere wave of patriotism in society into some constructive forms. Moreover, popular concerns about the ongoing economic crisis, increasing prices and the ghost of unemployment are also waiting for a proper response.

Putin skipped the opportunity to dissipate them during the Presidential Address in December 2014. This made many experts assume that the Russian leadership was taking a tactical pause to formulate its line and would come up with it later this year. "Direct Line" could have been one of the convenient formats.

Nonetheless, this was not the case. Putin still chooses the path of least resistance and maximum flexibility in a world full of uncertainty. Russia is drifting somewhere without clear concept of the final destination. As a result, such an approach leads to frustration and stagnation. The "Direct Line" made them evident.

The three-million-question quiz looked like a kids' evening show - to comfort them before going to bed. The president reluctantly marked key economic achievements, tried to avoid any - even very innocent talk - about problems.

The president did not juggle with figures as he normally does, demonstrating his deep knowledge of the issues. He did not suggest immediate solutions or criticize the government, as he did in previous years, crushing the heads of the bad "noblemen" and showing himself off as a good "monarch."

The entire three-and-one-half-hour conversation seemed to pursue only one goal - to indicate complete stability and consolidation, despite the reality that was trying to penetrate into the studio in the form of questions from farmers, space launch ground construction workers and small business owners.

The same related to the sphere of international relations. In this case, such serenity is a good sign for the rest of the world. Putin was demonstratively calm, constructive and radiated peace, proving once again that Russia has no aggressive intentions with respect to Ukraine or any other country.

He specifically underlined that, unlike Western countries, Moscow is not willing to nominate "official enemies" and that the state will undertake maximum efforts to ensure peace and stability in neighboring countries without meddling into their domestic affairs and with due respect for the Minsk II agreements.

Obviously, some European and U.S. opinion-makers would say that Putin was trying again to deceive the "civilized world." However, it is noteworthy that Russia's official line has always been the same - we are open for equal partnership and we do not want any confrontation, unless we are forced to protect our national interests neglected by others.

Hence, the president showed no desire for further escalation of the conflict and looked like a real peacemaker against the background of belligerent statements that come out of Ukraine and some Western capitals every day.

Thus, the "Direct Line" gave no significant breakthrough in any field. Moreover, it indicated one new sign emphasized by some analysts - a growing willingness to keep the distance between the leader and the nation. There were more selected people in the studio asking questions than people from the regions. There was less humor and interest in the eyes of the president when he was answering questions, many of which seemed ritual. He showed no enthusiasm in granting small "royal gifts."

Perhaps, all this happened because he understood quite well the abnormality of the situation, when every 50th Russian citizen turned his or her question to the head of state rather than to his or her regional or local authorities.

At the same time, there can be a different explanation. In the last 15 years, the president has over-grown the scale of the country and is more concerned about global problems, which take most of his time. No surprise that the various international publications call him one of the most influential global leaders - and this status leads to a new level of responsibility, which does no leave time for assisting average citizens with their everyday problems.

However, if it is so, there is even greater need for articulating Russia's program for the future and the key issues that the authorities plan to tackle - from corruption to various coherent incentives for economic growth.
 #8
The National Interest
April 17, 2015
The Ultimate Game of Chicken: The West vs. Russia
Could Russia become the next 'Iran' as far as sanctions are concerned?
By Nikolas K. Gvosdev
Nikolas Gvosdev, a professor of national security studies and a contributing editor at The National Interest, is co-author of Russian Foreign Policy: Vectors, Sectors and Interests (CQ Press, 2013). The views expressed here are his own.

Reviewing Vladimir Putin's annual marathon national call-in show (and subsequent press conference), the statement that I found most revealing (beyond the categorical denial that there are no Russian troops deployed in Eastern Ukraine) was Putin's comment that Russia was not Iran. This basic statement-a response to a question as to whether or not Russia might face the same set of crippling sanctions that severed many of Iran's connections to the global economy-reflects a confidence that is in marked contrast to the statements made by Western leaders over the last six months. Indeed, it has been a near article of faith in many Western capitals that targeted sanctions against the Russian economy and key Russian business and political figures would force Moscow to reverse course on its Ukraine policy without requiring the West to make much of a sacrifice.

"Russia is not Iran" carries with it several meanings. The first is the declaration that Russia cannot be pressured as a result of Western sanctions. In January, President Barack Obama had declared at the State of the Union, "Russia is isolated with its economy in tatters." Putin, in his comments yesterday, admitted no such thing, highlighting the first signs of a slight economic recovery and touting relations with its partners in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS (Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa) forum. These countries will not even agree to limited global sanctions on Russia.

Putin at several points suggested that, despite their best efforts, the West had failed to compel Russia to change course. He intimated that the West had taken their best shot and that Russia, although taking some hits economically (higher inflation and unemployment, reductions in growth and investment) was still in good shape. In fact, Putin declared, sanctions had a silver lining in that they were spurring indigenous industrial and agricultural production to replace goods and services that Russia had previously found easier to import from Western providers. Predicting substantial economic recovery in two years-prior to the next round of legislative and presidential elections-Putin offered his audience the firm assurance that there is indeed light at the end of the tunnel and Russia would emerge stronger than before-and still in possession of Crimea.

The "Russia is not Iran" declaration also carries a second meaning. The global economy was able to stand cutting Iran from the mainstream of the global economy. Russia is a harder nut to crack. Too many countries are dependent on its energy exports; it is a major supplier of military and nuclear technology; it is a key consumer of important technological goods and services. As Putin was speaking, Gazprom company sources were indicating that the Italian firm SAIPEM is likely to gain the contracts to construct the Turk Stream pipeline across the Black Sea-building on the foundation SAIPEM had laid for the now-defunct South Stream line. German firms like Siemens are fretting about the possible loss of contracts for high-speed rail equipment that Asian firms would be more than happy to provide. And no one is talking about being able to switch from Russian energy to other sources. Even if a final deal is reached with Iran and Western sanctions on its energy industry are lifted, large-scale supplies of Iranian natural gas would be in no position to reach European markets until 2019, while the collapse in world energy prices over the past eight months has damaged the nonconventional hydrocarbon industry in North America, and with it, the prospects of sending large amounts of shale gas to Europe, since it is now less likely that firms will want to make the massive infrastructure investments needed to realize such plans.

The Russian calculation is that Western countries have imposed as many sanctions as they can without risking further economic damage to their own economies. But there remains one major sword that has not been drawn from its scabbard; the West could duplicate a set of sanctions imposed on Iran in 2012: exclusion of Russia from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) network, which facilitates the movement of funds. Such a move could cripple the Russian economy by denying Russian banks and companies the ability to make or receive payments via transfers. Although this idea has been floated by some U.S. lawmakers (like Senators John McCain and Marco Rubio) and discussed by some European leaders (like British prime minister David Cameron), it was ruled out last month in discussions between Europe and the United States as premature, given the damage that would also be inflicted on the global economy as a whole. Putin's comment that "Russia is not Iran" reflects an assessment that this is a step that the West will not take-an assumption that could prove to be a severe miscalculation if Western politicians decide that they have exhausted other alternatives to force Russian disengagement from Ukraine.

The West, Russia and Ukraine are all engaged in a geopolitical game of chicken, with each player assuming that the other will blink first. Putin put the West on notice that he has no such plans-and that Ukraine's crisis is accelerating. What will be the Western response?
 #9
Reuters
April 18, 2015
Putin says ready to work with United States: TV
MOSCOW

(Reuters) - Russia has key interests in common with the United States and needs to work with it on a common agenda, Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Saturday in a television interview.

In his comments to the state-run Rossiya channel, Putin appeared to soften his anti-American rhetoric after being highly critical. Relations between Moscow and Washington and other Western powers have soured over the conflict in Russia's neighbour Ukraine, sinking to an all-time low.

"We have disagreements on several issues on the international agenda. But at the same time there is something that unites us, that forces us to work together," Putin said.

 "I mean general efforts directed at making the world economy more democratic, measured and balanced, so that the world order is more democratic. We have a common agenda."

Putin has in the past fiercely attacked the United States and the West in general, blaming them for the Ukraine crisis, which Russia says was the result of a Western-backed "coup" against Ukraine's former leader Viktor Yanukovich.

Russia has repeatedly denied accusations from Kiev and the West that it is supporting pro-Russian rebels with troops and weapons in eastern Ukraine, where more than 6,000 people have been killed since last April.

His latest remark comes two days after an annual TV phone-in show in which Putin accused the United States of trying to dominate world affairs, saying it wanted "not allies, but vassals". However, his criticisms of the West were more moderate than in some previous appearances.

However, both Russia and the West say they back a peace deal agreed in Minsk in February, as a result of which a ceasefire in the Donbass region is largely holding.

 
 #10
Sputnik
April 20, 2015
Putin Talks Chechen War, Oligarchs, Ukraine, Sanctions in New TV Film

MOSCOW (Sputnik) - Russian President Vladimir Putin covered a wide range of issues, including the Chechen war and Russia's role in world affairs, during an almost two-hour interview to be used for a new made-for-TV film, Russian journalist Vladimir Solovyov, who hosted the interview, said Monday.

Solovyov said Putin shared his view on topics "starting from the Chechen campaign and ending with oligarch friends, attitude to power and attitude toward God."

The president also spoke about what it takes to be a leader on this scale, according to Solovyov.

"He said: 'as a matter of fact [you have to sacrifice] everything, there is no normal life at all, this is why I always honestly say that I do not like to work as president at all,'" Solovyov stated.

Putin's relations with Russian oligarchs also came up in the interview, parts of which will be used in the film, dedicated to the 15th anniversary of Putin's presidency, which will be broadcast on Sunday.

"Putin said that soon after he became president a group of oligarch mates came and said: 'Do you understand that you are not a president? We will rule the country,' and Putin said: "We shall see," Solovyov said.

Putin is currently serving his third four-year term as president of Russia after also holding the post in back-to-back terms from 2000 to 2008. He served as prime minister for four years before being elected president again in March 2012. Putin's current term expires in 2018.
 
 #11
Putin: Westerners only love Russia that would need humanitarian aid

MOSCOW, April 20. /TASS/ Russian President Vladimir Putin believes that the removal of the ideological confrontation after the break-up of the USSR didn't lead to the cancellation of geopolitical contradictions. He said as much in an interview for the documentary film titled President, whose teaser has been shown by the Rossiya 1 TV channel.

"We all had illusions. We thought back then that with the departure of the ideological component, which separated the former Soviet Union and the rest of the civilized world, that "the chains have been broken and freedom was supposed to be just around the corner," Putin said, partially quoting Russia's 19-century national poet Alexander Pushkin who wrote, "The prison walls will crash... Content, at door will freedom wait to meet you; your brothers, hastening to greet you, to you the sword will glad present".

The president noted that Russia's partners were not in a hurry "to present the sword to Russia." Rather, they would have been glad "to take away the leftovers of the Soviet Union's combat power." "There are also geopolitical interests not related to any ideology," the Russian leader said in one of the fragments of the interview.

"The world decided that Russia was ceasing to exist in its present form. The only question was when this was going to happen and what the effects would be," Putin said.
"Sometimes I get the impression that they only love us when Russia needs humanitarian assistance," he added.

Putin also answered other questions posed by TV anchorman Vladimir Solovyov. He noted that the most hard and tragic moments were the "terrible terrorist attacks - in Beslan, at the Dubrovka [Theatre] Center."

In addition to that, the Russian leader commented on his love of direct communication with people. "I feel part of my country, part of the people," Putin said.

Another question concerned the fight against the influence of tycoons on power at the turn of the century, when Putin assumed office. According to the president, it became possible to reign them "in different ways, by using different means."

The President documentary dedicated to the 15th anniversary of Putin's election head of state will go on air on Sunday.

The film creators promise to show some "forgotten and unknown pages of Vladimir Putin's era," including a chronicle of events, unique footage made by the president's personal cameramen, interviews with business representatives and Russia's dignitaries.
 
 #12
Moscow Times
April 20, 2015
Weak Russian Economic Data Blunt Putin's Optimism
By Peter Hobson

The ruble slumped 4 percent and Moscow-listed stocks fell on Friday after official data showed that Russia's economy contracted sharply in the first quarter of this year.

The data, which showed a deep decline in real wages and consumer spending, came a day after President Vladimir Putin told Russians that the worst of the economic crisis was behind them, saying, "We have have passed the peak of our problems. ... Nothing burst, and everything is working," according to a transcript on the Kremlin website.

But despite Putin's positivity, Russia's problems aren't over yet. Economic activity plummeted in the first three months of the year according to figures released by the Rosstat state statistics service.

Retail sales contracted by 8.7 percent in March, compared to the same month in 2014. Real wages fell 9.3 percent year-on-year. Unemployment rose by 100,000 people in March to 4.5 million, or 5.9 percent of the economically active population.

Russia's economy is under pressure from Western sanctions imposed on Moscow over its actions in Ukraine and steep falls in the price of oil, Russia's main export.

Investment slumped by 5.3 percent compared with March 2014, the Rosstat figures showed. Industrial production was down by 0.6 percent year-on-year.

According to London-based economic research company Capital Economics, the data was consistent with the Russian economy contracting 3-3.5 percent in the first quarter compared to the same period last year.

The figures drove a sell off of Russian assets. Dollar-traded shares on Moscow's RTS index closed down 5.9 percent at 998 points, while the ruble-denominated MICEX, which is buoyed by a weaker Russian currency, fell 1.8 percent to 1,657 points.

The ruble on Friday fell 4 percent against the U.S. dollar to 51.9 and 4.5 percent against the euro to 56.1.

Russian shares and the ruble had rebounded sharply since last year, when jitters over Western sanctions and the rapidly falling oil price prompted panic selling that briefly forced the ruble to 80 against the dollar. From one of the world's worst-performing currencies last year, the ruble this year became one of the best-performing.

However, the Russian currency is still one-third weaker to the dollar than at the start of 2014, before Moscow's annexation of Crimea from Ukraine prompted the West to retaliate with sanctions.

The ruble's rally had fueled optimism that Russia would weather the economic crisis better than expected. Finance Minister Anton Siluanov said last week the economy could return to growth in the second half of this year. Inflation, which had sped to its highest in 13 years as the weakening ruble raised the price of foreign goods, this month saw its first weekly fall since last summer, to 16.8 percent year-on-year.

Last Wednesday the ruble strengthened below 50 to the dollar for the first time since November last year, leading Central Bank Governor Elvira Nabiullina to suggest that Russia now had leeway to cut interest rates.

"With other things being equal and no new significant negative factors, the ruble's strengthening will allow us to cut the key rate," Elvira Nabiullina told reporters on Thursday in Washington, where finance ministers and central bankers gathered for International Monetary Fund meetings, the Bloomberg news agency reported.

"The ruble is in a more or less balanced situation," Bloomberg quoted Nabiullina as saying.

The Central Bank last year raised interest rates from 5.5 percent to 17 percent to bolster the ruble, but trimmed its benchmark rate to 14 percent this year as the currency firmed.

Officials and businesses have leaned heavily on the bank to cut rates further and faster to make borrowing affordable and stimulate investment. Russia's economy is expected to contract by up to 5 percent this year.

Timothy Ash, chief emerging markets economist at Standard Bank in London, said in a note to investors on Friday that the Central Bank would likely cut rates. The rate cut would likely prompt the ruble to fall again, he said.

"[The] ruble rally had simply run too far," he wrote. "I expect to see it now weaken back to more like 55-60 [to the dollar]."
 
 #13
Reuters
April 20, 2015
Russian Ruble Rebounds But Analysts Remain Cautious on 'Rally' Talk

The ruble rebounded on Monday after falling sharply on Friday, buoyed by higher oil prices and the beginning of a new monthly tax period, but analysts said a rally similar to the one seen over the last two weeks was unlikely.

At 07:32 GMT, the ruble was around 0.9 percent stronger against the dollar at 51.40 and gained 1.1 percent to trade at 55.40 versus the euro.

The ruble slumped nearly 5 percent on the day on Friday.

The price of oil, Russia's main export, rose on Monday, while demand for the ruble was also higher due to monthly levies that domestic exporters must pay this week.

Central Bank First Deputy Governor Ksenia Yudayeva wrote in a newspaper that the ruble rate would most likely fluctuate in the medium-term, but if there were no big changes to oil prices or sanctions against Russia, the rate should be stable around its current levels.

Analysts say such verbal interventions, which follow comments from Central Bank Governor Elvira Nabiullina late last week that the ruble had found its equilibrium, could keep the ruble from firming further.

Market players also say they are increasingly convinced that the Central Bank will cut its key rate at the next policy meeting on April 30, which could dampen profit prospects from carry trade operations.

The bank's key rate, the one-week repo rate, stands at 14 percent.

"Thus, there are reasons to believe the coming week, the ruble/dollar pair will demonstrate some fluctuation within the range of 49.00-53.87 (rubles per dollar)," Irina Rogova, an analyst at Forex Club investment firm, wrote in a note.

Despite Friday's fall, the ruble on Monday was still some 13 percent stronger against the dollar than at the beginning of the month. Analysts say this could be the end of the ruble's firming trend.

"After the recent rally, the ruble has already appreciated beyond the fundamentally justified levels," analysts at Rosbank wrote in a note. "Thus, we remain cautious in our assessment of the ruble prospects going forward. The strong ruble is posing a threat to Russian fiscal prospects and current account flows."

Rosbank sees the ruble trading between 69-62 rubles per dollar in the medium term.

Russian shares rose on Monday, with the ruble-traded MICEX up 0.7 percent to 1,668 points and the dollar-denominated RTS gaining 2.5 percent to 1,023 points.
 
 #14
Russia Direct
April 17, 2015
The ruble is rebounding, but for how long?
Debates: Top economists weigh in on the implications of the strengthening of the Russian currency for the nation's economy and speculate about possible future scenarios for the ruble in 2015.
Pavel Koshkin and Ksenia Zubacheva

In early spring, the Russian ruble started strengthening significantly regardless of the gloomy forecasts about Russia's economy, the current recession, the unfavorable geopolitical situation and relatively low and unstable oil prices. The ruble retraced its positions and has actually gained 22 percent this year against the dollar. Compare that to 2014, when the currency plummeted about 48 percent. The bad news, however, is that inflation is still running in double digits - almost 17 percent in March, which is a 13-year high.

Meanwhile, in early April, the exchange rates for the dollar and the euro decreased by almost 22 and about 28 rubles, respectively, since January, when they topped out at more than 71 and 81 rubles. On April 17, the exchange rates for the dollar and the euro plunged below 50 and 53 rubles, respectively. Nevertheless, such a trend can be dangerous, because such abnormal volatility may be driven by speculators, according to some experts.

Russia Direct interviewed experts and economists to figure out if the ruble's strengthening is sustainable. Is it a good sign or a bad harbinger for Russia's economy? What are the reasons for such trading volatility and who is behind it: speculators, foreign investors or the authorities?

Christopher Hartwell, president of CASE (Center for Social and Economic Research) in Poland:

The ruble's rebound is due to the same reasons why it collapsed in December. The price of oil has stabilized somewhat and there is a tenuous cease-fire in Eastern Ukraine. There is no longer a sense of panic in Russia that things are going to go very far south very quickly.

The Central Bank of Russia also has some credit in this, given the moves made in crisis mode. Of course, this creeping appreciation of the ruble is also very tenuous - if Russia were to escalate tomorrow in Ukraine, then the ruble's appreciation would be swiftly reversed. Similarly, if the Russian corporate or quasi-corporate sector has another deadline for foreign debt coming due (as happened in December), we can expect to see pessimism takes over again. If anything, we're not seeing a reversal of the ruble's fortune, just a cease-fire.

The negative implications for the ruble's appreciation are basically non-existent. Russia is far too dependent upon foreign inputs for its industry in the short-run to get the full benefit of ruble devaluation for exports, and this appreciation actually can help importers of inputs. Given that this re-appreciation has happened so quickly, there also is little chance of a big devaluation export bump. Right now, basically expectations are attempting to form, but market participants are wary either way.

I don't see any real drawbacks from the appreciation of the ruble.

Will the ruble strengthen further in the future? No one really knows, but one thing is for certain, this, like economic growth, is something that is very much in the Kremlin's hands. Respecting Ukraine's territorial integrity and working on fixing the structural issues in the country will contribute to the stability and even appreciation of the ruble.

Any moves to continue to destabilize Ukraine will rebound directly to the health of the ruble. This is the truth of expectations - the exchange rate will move in a more volatile manner than may be justified by price differences, and this happens in a wilder manner when the situation is more volatile.

Oleg Buklemishev, associate professor in the department of economics at Lomonosov Moscow State University (MGU):

The ruble is strengthening, largely, because three major risks, which were presented in the assessments in the beginning of this year, have not been so far implemented.

First, many expressed their concerns about the exacerbation of the Ukrainian conflict, but it turned out to have been frozen and, thus, the toughening of the sanctions is not expected in the near future. Second, the oil price drop has been stopped and now we can see a slight bounce back. Third, the Government didn't make abrupt moves in its economic policy, while the Central Bank got the situation at the currency and money market under control.

So, the classical overshooting of the exchange rate took place and now it is adjusting [to the current situation]. So far, there is no particular danger in the strengthening of the ruble at today's rate. The other question is that the excessive fluctuation of the exchange rate in the opposite direction might be the ground for a speculative attack on the ruble in the future

From my point of view, the further strengthening of the ruble is unlikely. What is more likely is the currency reverse movement, which is related either to the implementation of one of the three mentioned risks, which, strictly speaking, still exist, or to the speculative game that will change the direction [in which the ruble will move].

One could remember that one of technical factors of the strengthening of the ruble can be the hard currency refinancing provided by the Central Bank and has been lately used by banks to boost the rate of the national currency. The stopping of this program or the probable infusion of additional rubles into the weakening economy will lead to the sudden change of the trend.

Stanislav Tkachenko, Ph.D. in Economics, professor at St. Petersburg State University:

There are a number of factors affecting the ruble's growth. The first is fundamental - sanctions did not destroy the Russian financial and economic system. Our economy suffered from a capital outflow and the slowdown of investment into the real sector. Yet, our economy could successfully neutralize Washington's attempts to cut Russian financial institutions from their contacts abroad and damage our energy and military-industrial sectors.

Other factors, the effects of which should not be underestimated, relate to the growth of oil prices and the end of the "shale revolution," to high interest rates in Russia that attracted foreign financial speculators as well as to the easing situation in Ukraine and Russia's ability to distance itself from it.

The strengthening of the ruble is not dangerous given that it stops at a balanced level, which I think is around 50-55 rubles per U.S. dollar. The strengthening of the ruble exchange rate will help to lower the inflation (imports will no longer be overpriced) and ease the foreign debt burdens of Russian companies.

In addition, such an exchange rate leaves room for potential opportunities for import-substitution in the industrial and agricultural sectors as well as for refilling the state budget with revenues from exports of raw materials and energy resources. If the strengthening of the Russian currency continues, the country will return to the "Dutch disease" characterized by a boost in the number of imports and the degradation of industry and some agricultural sectors.

The ruble is under the total control of the Central Bank of Russia following almost six months of turbulence in world currency markets, so only there we can get a definite answer. My forecast is that the ruble will not strengthen further. A bounce back to 55 rubles for dollar is more possible. The large amplitude of fluctuations is usual for the ruble, but with time, it will decrease and we will get back to the stable rate. This is only possible if a real currency war between U.S. dollar and euro will not expand, the signs of which is already evident.

In this situation, the Central Bank of Russia will have to work on a new strategy that is most likely to be oriented towards the gradual growth of the ruble's exchange rate. This, in turn, is aimed to decrease the costs of urgently needed technological transformation of Russian industry.

Birgit Hansl, program leader and lead economist for the Russian Federation, Europe and Central Asia at the World Bank:

The recent ruble movements are very welcome and coincide with the global oil price movements, which remain key for Russia. As oil prices stabilized the ruble is also becoming less volatile. It would be too early to read into this much more than that. Yes, the ruble has appreciated over 4 percent in 2015, making it the strongest performer in a basket of 24 emerging market currencies tracked by Bloomberg, yet it is still a long way to make up for the 46 percent the ruble lost in value against the US Dollar during 2014. The stable oil price is more importantly leading to a slowly retreating risk perception: both the Russian CDS spread and the Russian EMBIG spread dropped significantly, which is indeed good news for investors and the economy.

Yakov Mirkin, head of the Department of International Capital Markets at the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of World Economy and International Relations:

Is the ruble rebound long lasting? Nobody knows, because we don't exactly understand what is going on. What are the scenarios for the future of the ruble?

The first scenario is that the ruble's growth is a result of the government's policy, which is aimed at strengthening the ruble before the 70th anniversary of the Great Victory [over Hitler's Germany during World War Two]. After all, it is possible to strengthen the ruble artificially and stabilize it for a certain period of time. If this is the case, it can last for months, but afterwards it will explode and [spin out of control].      

The second scenario is leaping forward and leaping backward. The ruble in this case is like a small ball that is bouncing on a downward-sloping asphalt path. Up and down, up and down. But, again, it is a downward movement. It happens frequently in financial markets. The deeper the plunge, the higher is the bounce-back. If so, in April, we might see a new ruble dumping and a new weakening.      

The third scenario is a speculative bubble. The ruble's rebound is a result of a speculative game for strengthening the Russian national currency. It also could stem from so-called "carry trade" deals. In this case, the ruble resembles an artificially inflated soap bubble. Such tricks have never been long-term.

What is the general background? We have a weakening economy under pressure from foreign sanctions, a strong dollar and low prices on oil, gas and metals. And this economy is losing its core partner: the European Union. In addition, there is no strong and adequate response to the current economic challenges.

The general trajectory of the ruble is weakening no matter how high it may rebound. The ruble is like a hot-air balloon in the sky, taken and tossed by air currents. The team on board the balloon is not ideal, but this team is struggling to wrest the balloon down to the ground. But the power of the air currents is so strong, that it is going up in the air, higher and higher. And this is a long-tern trend. If the authorities find good responses to the challenges, they will be able to control this uncontrollable flight.
 
 #15
CNBC.com
April 19, 2015
Russia has bigger concerns than oil, ruble: Deputy PM
By Ansuya Harjani

Faced with the triple whammy of plunging oil prices, currency volatility and Western sanctions, there's no dearth of challenges for Russia's ailing economy, but Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich said what hurts most is the scarcity of financing for new investments.

"The shortness of financing for new investments is where the Russian economy is being hit in the most important way," Dvorkovich told CNBC on the sidelines of World Economic Forum on East Asia in Jakarta.

"How do we deal with this? We are working with new partners. This is why we are in China, in other countries, looking for new partners who can bring new investments into the country," he added.

Russia's economy, which grew by just 0.6 percent in 2014, is expected to enter a deep recession this year under the weight of lower oil prices and sanctions, which have compounded the country's underlying structural weaknesses and undermined business and consumer confidence.

Earlier this month, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) slashed its growth outlook for the country, forecasting a contraction of 3.8 percent in 2015 and 1.1 percent in 2016. Its earlier estimate was for a contraction of 3 percent this year and 1 percent next.

Nevertheless, Dvorkovich says the country has built up enough reserves to weather the rout in the commodities market.

"We were not counting on higher oil prices in our economic policies. We were saving some money for the times like what we face now, so we have reserves that allow us to smooth this stage and to help poor families and increase unemployment benefits," he said.

As for the precipitous fall in the ruble over the past year, Dvorkovich said the implications are not all negative as it gives Russian manufacturing and agricultural exports a pricing edge in global markets.

From economics to geopolitics

Responding to criticism over the Kremlin's decision to lift a self-imposed ban on supplying a sophisticated missile air defense system to Iran, Dvorkovich said: "We are not breaking any sanctions."

"We will fulfill our commitments and responsibilities in full compliance with international legislations. Our partners shouldn't doubt that we would work in that manner," he said.
Read MoreWhy Russia is delivering missiles to Iran
The end to the ban on shipping the S-300 surface-to-air missile system to Iran, which had been in place since 2010, was spurred by the recent progress in talks over Tehran's nuclear program. The U.S. and Israel, among the most vocal critics, fear the S-300s could be used to protect Iranian nuclear sites from future airstrikes.

As for Moscow's deepening ties with Pyongyang, Dvorkovich, said "we are friendly countries to each other."

"We are long standing partners with North Korea. The political and economic systems are different, but it requires big investment especially into infrastructure. We will continue our consultations, and we will be work in a way that is predictable and safe for both partners as we did before."

 
 #16
Bloomberg
April 20, 2015
Russia Economy Recovering as Oil Reliance Eases, Dvorkovich Says
by David Tweed and Haslinda Amin

Russia's economy showed signs of recovery in the first and second quarters amid a declining dependence on oil, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich said.

"Oil prices are not as important to the Russian economy as before," Dvorkovich told Bloomberg TV Monday at the World Economic Forum on East Asia in Jakarta, adding that other factors such as the global environment and Russia's own polices influence its economy. "As far as oil prices are concerned, we can live with different prices and still grow."

U.S.-traded Russian stocks last week posted their longest streak of weekly gains in two years as higher oil prices and a stronger ruble boosted the outlook for companies that depend on domestic demand. Oil exports represented about 13.1 percent of Russia's economy in 2013, down from 14.6 percent in 2011, according to Bloomberg calculations based on the most recent figures from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

Brent crude oil is 44 percent below last year's peak in June, although it has climbed 38 percent since hitting a six-year low in January.

"We look at signs of recovery in the first and second quarters of the year already," he said. "Manufacturing can still go lower, but overall financial markets, our banking system and the economy are stabilizing."

Contracting Economy

Russia's central bank sees the economy contracting as much as 4 percent this year after a 0.6 percent expansion last year. Standard & Poor's stripped Russia of its investment grade credit rating in January as the oil-price decline and sanctions over the conflict in Ukraine push the economy into its first recession since 2009.

Dvorkovich said Russia was in talks with Greece about a "partnership" rather than a rescue. "We believe Greece deserves better," he said.

Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras traveled to Moscow earlier this month and discussed issues including trade, investment, a gas contract and potential financial assistance, Dvorkovich said without elaborating.

"All those issues are under discussion, but I cannot confirm any specific points," he said.

Russia hasn't agreed on an advance of 3 billion euros ($3.2 billion) to 5 billion euros to Greece, Interfax reported April 18, citing comments made to the Business FM radio station by Dmitry Peskov, spokesman for President Vladimir Putin.
 
 #17
Moscow Times/Vedomosti
April 17, 2015
Russian Health Care Is Dying a Slow Death
By Nikolai Epple, Boris Grozovsky, Pavel Aptekar
The authors are columnists at Vedomosti. This comment originally appeared in Vedomosti.

Changes to the Russian national health care system have proceeded according to an obscure logic and led to very mixed results for medical personnel - and sometimes to lethal results for patients.

The authorities wanted to optimize and modernize the system by boosting the quality of medical care and making it more accessible. Instead, medical care has become inaccessible for a large part of the population, especially in rural areas: doctors labor under increased workloads, thereby compromising patient care; mortality in hospitals has increased; general morbidity is on the rise; and doctors are inundated with paperwork.

According to the State Statistics Service, from 2005 to 2013 the number of health facilities in rural areas fell by 75 percent, from 8,249 to 2,085. That number includes a 95 percent drop in the number of district hospitals, from 2,631 to only 124, and a 65 percent decline in the number of local health clinics, from 7,404 to 2,561.

According to Audit Chamber official Alexander Filipenko, 17,500 towns and villages now have no medical infrastructure whatsoever. Regional administrations originally planned to slash the number of rural health facilities and then convert them into offices staffed with general practitioners. They have already taken the first step, but even in many cities the second stage of the plan remains unfulfilled.

In place of small clinics and hospitals with ancient medical equipment, residents of the provinces were supposed to have gained access to treatment in hospitals with modern facilities. Instead, they were simply cut off from medical services entirely.

Now the residents of 11,000 population centers must travel more than 20 kilometers to reach the nearest doctor, but 35 percent of those towns and villages have no public transportation and almost 900 of them have no affiliation with any rural clinic or doctor's office at all.

The Audit Chamber reports that some regions even lack mobile medical teams to provide care in remote areas. When local train service was canceled to many smaller towns in the winter of 2013-14, residents of tiny Novosokolniki, Nevel and Opochka in the southern Pskov region literally lay down on the railroad tracks to force passing trains to stop and carry them to cities with hospitals.

In the cold logic of the accountant, the number of hospitals and clinics is "optimized" in order to cut costs. With all attention focused on the bottom line, nobody worries about the increased mortality, longer periods of illness, shorter healthy life spans and rise in disabilities that have resulted.

Those concerns get shuffled off to other government agencies or filed away for later review. Even the Kremlin's propaganda machine has refrained from mentioning government promises of improving the quality and accessibility of health care. Nobody has bothered explaining to doctors or to patients what principles are guiding the elimination and merging of medical facilities and staff, and how they can ensure that at least the quality of health care will not get worse.

In fact, the "optimization" process has affected not only "unprofitable" medical facilities, but even those with the latest equipment and the most highly qualified personnel. Moscow Cancer Hospital No. 62, one of the best of its kind in Russia, recently had to shutter an entire department even though patients were already waiting in line for weeks to receive treatment.

At Moscow Cancer Hospital No. 40, almost as many patients lie on gurneys in the halls and corridors as have beds in the rooms. This only compounds an already critical situation: According to the International Agency for Research on Cancer, Russia has one of the highest cancer mortality rates in the world.

And worse, the lack of early diagnosis in this country means that the number of patients with first- and second-stage cancer is actually much higher than those statistics reflect. Many cancer patients in Moscow and other regions who suffer from chronic pain see no other solution but to commit suicide, even while Russia's consumer watchdog Rospotrebnadzor and media watchdog Roskomnadzor struggle to suppress that information.

Moscow Deputy Mayor for Social Issues Leonid Pechatnikov suggested that the problem does not, in fact, stem from patients' inability to obtain painkillers. "Brain injury can cause mental disorders," he explained, "and so those suicides cannot be tied directly to chronic pain." How can doctors and patients continue their struggle in the face of such indifference?

The number of hospital beds has also fallen. Even as the birth rate increased from 2005 to 2013, the number of beds for expectant mothers fell by 8.5 percent, from 81,900 to 74,900, and even the number of hospital beds for children decreased by 13.1 percent from 200,300 to 173,900.

While the number of general physicians, surgeons, neurologists and radiologists rose, the number of pediatricians remains practically unchanged and the ranks of drug counselors and tuberculosis specialists declined. Apparently, Russia has conquered tuberculosis, the Federal Drug Control Service has whipped drug addiction and there is no need to even worry about alcoholism.

According to the Audit Chamber, the total number of doctors dropped by 2.2 percent in 2013-14, paramedics and nurses by 2.8 percent and orderlies by 5.3 percent. In all, the number of medical personnel has fallen by approximately 90,000. Meanwhile, the regions report a shortage of 55,000 doctors and 88,000 nurses, paramedics and orderlies.

That decline in medical personnel should have led to higher salaries for those who remained, but no significant change in compensation took place. Ill-considered layoffs and increased paperwork for receiving patients and issuing prescriptions has upset doctors, nurses and patients and their relatives, sparking a series of protests.

According to doctors in Voronezh, a regional capital south of Moscow, many physicians have quit over the increased bureaucratic supervision and paperwork, thus leading to longer lines at the clinics.

The doctors protest to preserve decent working conditions, and patients to preserve decent treatment. As many as 3,235 physicians, or 0.6 percent of all doctors in Russia, have already signed the Russian Doctors' Declaration of Independence published in 2014 that calls for an end to the ill-considered reforms in health care and the interference of the state and insurers in the process of providing care.

In the summer of 2014, the parents of a child receiving treatment in the Russian Children's Clinical Hospital in Moscow staged a hunger strike, in December residents of Zelenograd, a town outside Moscow, managed to prevent the authorities from closing the office of a physical therapist in one clinic, and in 2015, 30 doctors from seven clinics in the capital and the Moscow region resorted to a sit-down strike.

Among their demands: an end to cuts in medical staff, a reduced workload for primary care physicians and more time for treating each patient.

One clinic managed to increase the average time doctors spend with patients from 10 to 12 minutes - the minimum required just to fill out the necessary paperwork. Another clinic managed to wrest 20 minutes for each patient, while officials have promised to pay overtime to doctors in a third clinic.

Medical personnel waging work and hunger strikes have become a familiar scene in Ufa, a regional capital in the Urals region, where they are locked in a protracted conflict with local authorities. On Monday, Svetlana Yusupova, the director of a small medical clinic, was taken to the hospital in serious condition. She and nine others have been on a hunger strike since March 19. They are demanding, among other things, that the authorities cease pressuring them and the dismissal of the head doctor of the clinic.

Physicians at the Peter the Great Hospital in St. Petersburg staged a hunger strike in January 2014, and at the Filatov Pediatric Hospital in that city parents have been struggling since late last year to preserve a ward containing equipment essential to treating acute heart disease and cerebral circulatory problems.

By contrast, residents in remote areas do not stage protests. Their numbers are too few to create a mass movement, and it is useless to stage a demonstration that nobody will see or care about.

Russia's senior health care officials seem completely unaware of this reality. Just days ago, and after the Audit Chamber published its alarming report, Health Minister Veronika Skvortsova cheerily conveyed the results of optimization to President Vladimir Putin.

Funding for health care is up by 200 billion rubles ($4 billion) in 2015, she told him, "and that level of funding is enough to not only maintain health care at last year's level, but will enable us to expand if we manage to keep down the price of drugs and medical implants."

Skvortsova also reported that from 1991 to 2014 infant mortality had fallen to one-third of its former level and maternal mortality to one-fourth, that cancer detection was up by between 50 and 70 percent over the previous year, that the number of rural medical facilities had actually increased and that the level of high-technology medical care available had dramatically increased.

She also said that 67 percent of all vitally important drugs are now produced in Russia, and that by 2020 that number should reach 90 percent.

After hearing this report, Putin did not pose a single difficult question to Skvortsova. Apparently, he remains unaware of the problems mentioned in this article. What's more, he will remain unaware unless he meets with Audit Chamber head Tatyana Golikova and questions her on medical issues.

And he certainly will not learn the truth if he speaks to Deputy Prime Minister Olga Golodets, who echoed Skvortsova, blithely telling conference participants at the Higher School of Economics, "The total number of doctors in Russia is growing, and will continue to grow," "Russia's health care sector is developing vigorously," "In every region now, health care is developing through the partnership between state and private providers."

Any country at war and almost single-handedly fending off the overwhelming array of evil forces leagued against it cannot afford to spend much money on health care. The situation is therefore likely to deteriorate.

The federal center is shifting the health care burden to regional budgets, where, in contrast to Moscow, they have no petrodollars at their disposal. According to HSE professor Larisa Popovich, under such conditions the only solution is to introduce barriers limiting access to health care.

If the government cannot or will not increase the supply of health care services, it must reduce demand by instituting bureaucratic controls and rejecting insurance claims. In the end, doctors will take the blame for poisoning the system and the authorities will charge a fee for all medical services and drugs - even those used in hospitals.

Officials and doctors have been unable to establish the mutual dialogue necessary to "cure" Russia's health care system. The many doctors who are unwilling to consign their fate to government officials are forced to rely on their own resources.

Cardiologist Maxim Osipov of Tarusa Hospital in the Kaluga Region told Radio Svoboda that the survival of hospitals depends on the ingenuity of their staff and on charitable aid. He said the Tarusa Hospital has its own "relief society" that collects enough money to maintain the hospital's day-to-day functions.

However, that approach will not work everywhere. All other doctors and patients will just have to hope that Russia's health care system will survive the current reforms.
 
 #18
BBC
April 18, 2015
Russian town of Oryol trapped in Soviet past
By Bridget Kendall
Diplomatic correspondent
[Photos here http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32349312]

On a small stage in a community hall, still grandly called a Palace of Culture, a powerfully built lady belts out an old Russian gypsy ballad.

Then a choir of podgy teenage girls troops out, all dressed in sky-blue party frocks, like something out of the 1950s.

The mostly elderly spectators, sitting in their raincoats on wooden chairs, listen attentively.

It is a fitting mid-afternoon concert to find in Oryol, a Russian provincial town which prides itself on its cultural heritage, and its links to an extraordinary number of Russian authors.

Ivan Turgenev, the 19th-Century Russian novelist of elegant love stories, came from here. So did Ivan Bunin, who won the Nobel Prize for Literature. So did the ingenious storyteller Nikolai Leskov, the poets Tyutchev and Fet, the short story writer Leonid Andreev...

It is as if one small English town had produced Jane Austen, Charles Dickens, the Bronte sisters, T S Eliot and Philip Larkin and many more.

"How did this one place give rise to so much literary talent?" I asked the mayor, Sergei Stupin, who was taking me on a personal tour in his car, to show me all the writers' statues.

"Who knows?" he answered obliquely. "Something in the air, perhaps."

Old Russia

The director of the Turgenev Museum, an enthusiastic bibliophile called Vera Yefremova, was clearer. "We are in the very middle of Russia," she said. "And in tsarist times Oryol was at the heart of a huge guberniya, or province, which covered a large area and included many estates.

"We like to call this the third literary capital of Russia, after Moscow and St Petersburg. Last year we had 65,000 visitors. But it could be so much more," she added wistfully.
Like everywhere else in provincial Russia, Oryol is looking to Moscow to furnish more federal funding for upcoming anniversaries. "To rebrand ourselves," says the mayor, a former marketing man.

But there's a long way to go before Oryol becomes a mecca for tourism. It feels trapped in time.

The town centre had some charming streets and nice views over a high bank where its two rivers meet.

But overall it looked as though it had been largely bypassed by the Russian boom years - roads filled with potholes, abandoned factory sites.

And in some older parts of town residents did not even have indoor toilets or running water. They were collecting water in plastic buckets from a standing tap in the street.

Communist influence

In political terms Oryol is also a throwback.

Curiously, the town council is half-controlled by Communists. And far from focusing on the upcoming 200-year anniversary of Turgenev, their current obsession is to put up a statue to Joseph Stalin - to commemorate his role as wartime leader.

It's a talking point which has split Oryol. One young journalist launched an online protest petition, which has already gathered thousands of signatures.

But most people I spoke to told me a Stalin statue was a good idea: yes there had been repressions during Stalin's years, but what he had done during the war should never be forgotten. "And anyway Russia always needs a harsh leader," said one of the leading campaigners. "A firm hand at the top, like Stalin or Putin."

Meanwhile the mayor, though he is allied to the Communists politically, says he's against it.

"A statue to Stalin would be too divisive in these difficult times," he told me. Possibly toeing the official line from Moscow, was what I thought.

So is this the old story of the Russian provinces - caught in a time-warp through lack of investment and opportunity?

Possibly Oryol's problem is at heart economic - the loss of factory jobs, with nothing to fill the gap. Hence the protest vote for the Communists, whose rule has not helped, given their lack of interest in helping private enterprise to create local wealth.

So everyone is beholden to the authorities. Everyone watches their back.

Below the radar, however, there were some whispered criticisms of President Putin. But only in private. One man even followed me down the street afterwards, scared in case I didn't understand that I shouldn't use his name.

And now Russia is in economic difficulties, and for these provincial towns life has just got much worse.

My guess is that people here will keep their heads down - unless the crisis becomes so deep that they have nothing to lose by speaking out.

 
 #19
Interfax
April 19, 2015
Sixty percent of Russian citizens deem death penalty acceptable - poll

Sixty percent of Rusian citizens, compared to 80% in 2001, see the death penalty as an acceptable punishment, according to a poll conducted by the Public Opinion Foundation.

The poll was held on April 11 and 12 among 1,500 respondents in 100 localities of 43 regions.

Twenty-two percent of those polled, compared to 16% in 2001, said the death penalty was unacceptable.

Seventeen percent of those surveyed were undecided.

Seventy-one percent of respondents said that the death penalty can only be applied to criminals who have committed sexual violence against minors, 57% said this punishment can be applied to murderers, 55% to terrorists, 46% to rapists and 34% to drug traffickers.

Among other cited crimes deserving capital punishment were high treason and disclosure of state secrets (15%), espionage (9%), bribe-taking (8%), robbery and banditry (5%), desecration of religious relics (4%) and tax evasion (1%).

Forty-one percent of those polled said that the moratorium on the death penalty was a wrong decision. Thirty-three percent of respondents upheld it and 26% were undecided.

Asked whether the death penalty should be restored in Russia 49% of those polled answered in the affirmative, 5% said it should be annulled altogether, 27% would like the moratorium to be maintained and 19% were undecided.

Those who want the death penalty to be used again argued that the current crime rate was too high, or that those committing grave crimes must be duly punished (13% each). Others are convinced that people will fear the death penalty (9%), and still others said that the taxpayers\' money is being used to upkeep criminals at prisons and that criminals often escape punishment (4% each).

The smallest group who advocate the annulment of the death penalty said court errors were likely, that no one has the right to kill, that death is too easy a punishment for a criminal, or that capital punishment is inhuman (1% each ).

The death penalty is not legally banned in Russia. In 1996, when Russia joined the Council of Europe, it imposed a moratorium on the death penalty and replaced it with life imprisonment. The moratorium would have expired on January 1 2010, but it was extended by the Constitutional Court in November 2009 pending ratification of the protocol banning the death penalty.
 
 #20
Bloomberg
April 17, 2015
Why Putin's Next War Will Be at Home
A pollster and a former Putin adviser predict new popularity problems-and renewed focus on domestic enemies
By Leonid Ragozin
 
Vladimir Putin appeared this week in his annual marathon television broadcast to answer questions posed by viewers from across Russia. Of course, the four-hour show, Direct Line With Vladimir Putin, was carefully choreographed to avoid anything that could embarrass the Russian leader. But that doesn't mean the broadcast shied away from criticism and thorny issues. Putin used this year's broadcast to deliver a rebuke to his former finance minister, ruminate on the murder of opposition politician Boris Nemtsov, and opine on the war in Ukraine.

The show has become a yearly fixture dating back to 2001. Why has Putin embraced the call-in format? "It is the most powerful opinion poll," he explained during Thursday's show. "Millions of questions have been submitted via different channels, which allows us to get a realistic idea of what makes people worried."

While Putin's Russia is not a democracy, its leadership remains obsessed with feedback. Policies are shaped by frequent opinion polls and focus-group surveys. This helps explain some of the seemingly reckless and self-defeating moves made by the Kremlin, most of which miraculously result in high approval ratings and greater consolidation behind the regime.

Think back to January 2014, a time when Putin's approval rating was at a record low of 65 percent (the sort of popularity that would be a high-water mark by the standards of more democratic countries). That all changed overnight following Russia's occupation of Crimea. His approval rating shot to 88 percent and has remained more or less the same ever since. "One could expect some kind of a rise, but this result surprised everyone-Putin included," says Gleb Pavlovsky, who served as Putin's domestic policy adviser from 1999 to 2011.

A year after the seizure of Crimea, Putin's ratings remain phenomenally high. Yet he now must contend sharply with the level of frustration caused by Russia's economic downfall, exacerbated by Western sanctions and low oil prices. Lev Gudkov, the head of Levada Centre, an independent polling agency, predicts that before long, Putin's approval ratings will start going down, too.

"The bubble of ideological patriotism is already quite weak. A relative calm in the Ukrainian conflict will give rise to protest sentiments in Russia," Gudkov says. During the call-in show, Putin stressed that unity was vital for Russians: "If we keep the current level of consolidation in society," he told the nation, "we will not be afraid of any threats."

Gudkov believes Putin will soon need a fresh escalation to prevent the newly achieved unity from falling apart. But this escalation is unlikely to come in the form of a fresh attack on Ukraine or another neighbor. The takeover of Crimea was hailed by Russians exactly because it was relatively bloodless and welcomed by the majority of Crimeans. But the overall appetite for war is quite low, according to Gudkov.  

"The system will be pressed into inventing a new emergency, but probably inside the country rather than outside, where it has already gone too far," says Putin's ex-adviser Pavlovsky. He sees Russia's supposed imperialism as more of a PR bubble than a predominant ideology: "It is a show themed on the Cold War. It is a soap opera with empire-related props, not an imperial project."
 
The new target will be those who are seen as agents of the external enemy: the relatively small but vocal and influential part of society that adheres to liberal values and favors integration with the West. Kremlin propaganda likes to refer to this group as a fifth column. "There will be more repression and more acts of provocation [against dissidents]," predicts Gudkov.

Although there isn't yet repression on the Soviet scale in modern-day Russia, domestic tensions have been rising over the past few months. Some 30,000 Putin supporters marched through Moscow in February to demand that the government crush the "fifth column" and put opposition leaders behind bars. A week later came the death of Boris Nemtsov, an opposition leader, who was gunned down a few hundred feet from the Kremlin. Putin condemned the killing at the time and once again called it "a shameful act" during Thursday's television broadcast.

In the months that followed, toxic anti-opposition rhetoric has filled TV airtime and pro-government newspapers as never before. The pressure from zealous officials and pro-Kremlin activists has reached past the political opposition to target theater directors and film distributors. On Friday, for example, Putin's envoy who coordinates the army and law enforcement in Siberia accused the opposition of starting forest fires that have devastated dozens of villages in his region.

Putin hasn't been immune to overheated rhetoric: Last month he claimed that Western secret services planned to use Russian political groups and nongovernmental organizations to disrupt next year's national elections. He avoided this kind of talk during the call-in broadcast, instead welcoming the opposition to take part in the election and enter parliament.

Yet as he fielded question for nearly four hours, police raided the office of Open Russia, an NGO funded by former political prisoner Mikhail Khodorkovsky, which spreads information about repressions and protest actions.
 
 
#21
Reuters
April 18, 2015
Russian Opposition Parties Combine Forces After Nemtsov Killing

Two Russian opposition parties agreed on Friday to run on a joint platform in 2016 parliamentary elections, aiming to make a first step in uniting fractious Kremlin adversaries after the killing of party leader Boris Nemtsov.

Critics of President Vladimir Putin say he bears ultimate political responsibility for the gunning down of Nemtsov, a former deputy prime minister, on Feb. 27. The Kremlin denies stifling dissent and Putin has urged law enforcement bodies to investigate the case in full.

RPR-Parnas, co-founded by Nemtsov, and Party of Progress, led by anti-graft blogger Alexei Navalny, said they would also run together in local elections due in some regions this year.

"At this difficult time, we call on broad public and civic forces ... to consolidate on a common platform of rejection of lies, corruption and aggression, suppression of economic and civil liberties and for building a democratic state in our country," they said.

The leader of a small rightist opposition party said he would also join, and the parties hope for further support.

Previous attempts to unite the opposition have failed, partly because groups whose ideology spans from left to right agree on little more than the need to oust Putin and fight corruption.

Opposition activists led street protests in 2011 and 2012 but the rallies lost momentum as Putin started a third presidential term and tightened his grip on power.

Navalny and other critics of the Kremlin have faced court cases and convictions on charges they denounce as political, while other activists have been driven into exile.

"There are about 25 percent of people sharing such views in Russia but their influence would be much bigger if it were a fair game," said Lev Gudkov, the head of the Levada sociological research centre.

"The Kremlin fully controls TV. Regular people simply don't know what the opposition is doing. Their capabilities and those of the Kremlin's propaganda are incomparable."

Ilya Yashin, who is seeking to complete a report started by Nemtsov to prove Russia's military involvement in east Ukraine, said of the late politician: "He often joked that infighting among democrats is like competing for prison time.

"It turned out even more dramatic," Yashin wrote on Facebook. "It's a competition for who gets the bullet first. It's clear that if we don't start consolidating, they will kill us all, jail us one by one or, in the best case scenario, squeeze us out of the country."
 
 #22
www.rt.com
April 17, 2015
Navalny pairs with ex-PM Kasyanov for forthcoming elections

The Party of Progress headed by anti-corruption activist Aleksey Navalny has announced a strategic union with the RPR-Parnas party led by former Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov and invited all "people of good will" to run on their election lists.

Kasyanov and Navalny released a joint public statement on Friday saying that the Party of Progress and the Republican Party of Russia - Party of People's Freedom (RPR-Parnas) were forming joint lists of candidates both for the municipal and regional elections that will be held in 2015 and the federal parliamentary elections due in 2016.

The politicians promised that in the nearest future they would agree on and show the public the mechanism for choosing candidates for the joint list. They also emphasized their project was open not only for members of their parties but for all "people of good will" who share their values.

Russian law allows political parties to include non-members in elections lists. In the latest parliamentary elections the majority United Russia party included about 150 candidates from the public movement United People's Front in their elections lists, and many of these candidates later received seats in the State Duma.

The Party of Progress was officially registered by the Justice Ministry in February 2014, after a lengthy row with environmentalists and freemasons, who claimed they had more rights for the project's initially-intended name. In February, it held a major convention in which Navalny announced plans to run in the maximum possible number of regional polls and to participate in the 2016 State Duma elections. However, Navalny's allies have failed to register enough regional offices in time and so far can't run in federal polls on their own.

The alliance with RPR Parnas gives the Party of Progress such an opportunity because the latter has representation in regional legislature and can run for State Duma seats even without gathering supporters' signatures.

Navalny's party hugely relies on their leader's popularity as an anti-corruption activist and blogger. His vocal statements and independent investigations have been marred by the fact that Navalny himself became a suspect in several cases of graft and embezzlement, was convicted twice and received suspended sentences.

The activist has always maintained his innocence and said that all cases against him had been fabricated by the authorities, who wanted to silence him and feared political competition.

The PARNAS initially existed as a non-system opposition movement headed by several people who held major government posts during the Yeltsin Era, including ex-PM Mikhail Kasyanov and ex-deputy PM Boris Nemtsov. It held its first foundation congress in 2010, but was denied registration for technical reasons and eventually merged with the Republican Party of Russia led by veteran politician and parliamentarian Vladimir Ryzhkov. The move gave the opposition a political platform, but in February this year Ryzhkov and several of his long-term allies left the joint party. It caused a scandal when they accused Kasyanov and Nemtsov of hijacking his project. Two weeks later Boris Nemtsov was shot dead in Moscow in an apparent contract hit. The investigation into this assassination is ongoing.
 
 #23
Bloomberg
April 16, 2015
Poor Putin's Wealthy Friends
By Leonid Bershidsky

Russian President Vladimir Putin has an optics problem: Even as he asks people to be patient with the economic turmoil brought on in part by his response to Western sanctions, new income and property declarations are demonstrating that he and his top staffers aren't sharing the pain.

During today's four-hour call-in session with ordinary Russians, Putin spoke about his ban on food imports from Western countries, imposed last year as a response to financial sanctions against state-owned companies:

"Yes, this has negative consequences in terms of a contribution to food inflation, that's true. And indeed, here it will be necessary to put up with it for a while."

On paper, Putin isn't a rich man: His official earnings amounted to 7.6 million rubles ($151,600) last year, and his assets included a third of an acre of land, a modest, 828 square foot apartment and a garage, where he keeps two vintage Soviet cars and a cheap, Russian-made Niva off-roader. That said, he's doing much better than most Russians. His income is almost 23 times the national average, and it more than doubled from 2013 to 2014 thanks to a big salary increase he gave himself in April -- a raise that most Russians could only dream of  at a time when unemployment is growing and companies are cutting costs.

I have written before that I don't believe in multi-billion-dollar estimates of Putin's personal fortune. A man who wields near-absolute power in a country as vast as Russia doesn't need money or property -- though if he ever retires, he will probably be able to turn part of his political capital into cash. Much of his wealth potential comes from the opportunities he creates for friends and underlings. Even the official declarations, which are probably woefully incomplete and do not include investments or bank balances, show that such opportunities are considerable.

Putin's chief of staff, Sergei Ivanov, a career government official, declared an income of 16.2 million rubles in 2014. He owns a big house on five acres of land and a palatial, 2,768-square-foot apartment. His wife drives a Porsche Cayenne. Nikolai Patrushev, secretary of Putin's security council and a former domestic intelligence boss, declared a combined annual income with his wife of 40 million rubles and, among other real estate, a house in Moscow's exclusive Serebryany Bor area which anti-corruption activist Alexei Navalny recently estimated was worth 1 billion rubles. Across the river from the palatial mansion sits an uneven row of ugly high-rise blocks. "The river is like a literal poverty line," Navalny wrote.

The list of Putin administration officials with expensive cars, boats and lots of real estate goes on and on. Alexei Gromov, a deputy chief of staff whom Moscow editors fear for his stringent insistence on the Putin party line, owns a 10,344-square-foot house near Moscow, worth millions of dollars, though he has not worked a day in the private sector. His declared income is 9.2 million rubles, higher than Putin's. The presidential press secretary, Dmitri Peskov, whose artful denials of this or that are in the news every day, made as much as Gromov and owns a Mercedes G500.

Since Russia has few independent media outlets, none with the resources and access to investigate the origins of top bureaucrats' money and property, it's perfectly safe for officials to declare the visible part of their wealth. Putin said as much when asked why the heads of state companies such as the oil giant Rosneft and Russian Railroads do not publicly disclose their incomes and assets. (Rosneft chief Igor Sechin successfully sued journalists who alleged that he made $50 million a year, and Russian Railroads President Vladimir Yakunin threatened to resign if required to report his income.)

Putin explained that, since the management of state-owned Russian companies included foreigners who could not be required to publish their incomes, it was unfair to require their Russian colleagues to do so. Yet, Putin added, "in most Western economies" managers revealed their incomes voluntarily. "I would strongly recommend that ours follow suit," he said. "There's nothing dangerous about it."

Indeed, Russians' reaction to politically-induced economic problems has so far been lethargic, and Putin's support has remained stable. So it seems that the officials he made powerful and rich -- in that order -- need not worry about the people they're asking to "put up with it for a while."

 
 #24
The Guardian
April 19, 2015
There is another Russia beyond Putin
Despite the Russian president's popularity, hopes remain of a post-imperial state at ease with itself and its neighbours
By Timothy Garton Ash
Timothy Garton Ash is a historian, political writer and Guardian columnist. His personal website is timothygartonash.com. He directs the 13-language website freespeechdebate.com. His latest book is Facts Are Subversive: Political Writing from a Decade Without a Name

Russia has lost an empire and not yet found a role. Only the Russians themselves can decide what that should be, and it will take some time. The new Russia will certainly not arrive this 9 May, when Vladimir Putin's Kremlin celebrates the 70th anniversary of the end of what Russians call the great patriotic war. It may not emerge until 9 May 2025, or even 2045, but we should never abandon hope for that other Russia, and we must keep faith with the Russians who are working for it.

The phrase "lost an empire and not yet found a role" was first applied to Britain, by a former US secretary of state. The British know as well as anyone how initially uncomfortable it is to lose an empire, and how difficult to find a new role. Some would say that Britain has still not got there. And, by the way, the fate of the original, heartland empire, the one that forged the four nations of these islands - England, Wales, Scotland and (now only a small part of) Ireland - into a supposedly United Kingdom, is still unresolved. That is a major theme in Britain's general election.

Yet at least these internally complicated islands were surrounded by water, so that most of the British empire was "overseas". Russia's, by contrast, has been a land empire, growing patch by patch over centuries. As the historian Geoffrey Hosking argues in his book Russia: People and Empire, Russia's historical problem is that it has never been able to distinguish clearly enough between the nation and the empire. In fact, "the building of an empire impeded the formation of a nation".

Moreover, while the British empire was slowly dissolved across more than 20 years, the Russian-Soviet empire was dismantled in little more than two years, between 1989 and 1991 - one of history's most spectacular vanishing acts.

It would be extraordinary if there had not been a confused and angry response from many in Russia after such an event. Under the current leadership that reaction has taken a dangerous form. We have to confront that danger firmly right now, but beyond that there is the question of how we think and talk about Russia. One wrong way is exemplified by those who have come to be known throughout Europe as the Putinversteher (literally, "Putin understanders"). Confusing Putin with Russia, they make the classic mistake of "to understand all is to excuse all".

German business people seem particularly prone to this confusion. The Russian writer Vladimir Voinovich, author of two of the finest satirical novels in 20th century European literature, once told me an amusing story about being invited to dinner by a German banker, sometime in the 1980s. Chauffeured out to the villa in a Mercedes the size of a tank, Voinovich was treated to a lavish dinner, through all the many courses of which the German banker explained to the then exiled Russian writer how one should properly appreciate the Russian trauma. Throughout its history, poor Russia had been constantly invaded, by the Mongols, by the Poles, by the French, and then, worst of all, by the Germans. One must verstehen. Finally, Voinovich could stand it no longer: "So I say to him: 'Then why it is so big?'"

Today Voinovich is a still satirical but also bravely outspoken representative of the other Russia. He has criticised the annexation of Crimea and the war in eastern Ukraine. In a recent interview on a Russian website, he said that Russia needs a revolution - not a violent one, or a Ukrainian-style orange one, but "I think that the revolution should take place in people's minds ... Not only Putin is to blame, the society is also, because it allows him to do whatever he wants."

Characteristically, Voinovich articulates a complicated truth. There is another Russia. It is represented by the murdered opposition politician Boris Nemtsov, and the people who come to lay flowers on the bridge where he was assassinated, which they already call Nemtsov bridge. While some must have been frightened by that murder, and the atmosphere of intimidation, a brave few have redoubled their defiance. The blogger-oppositionist Alexei Navalny directly accused the Putin regime of responsibility for Nemtsov's death. The murder has galvanised attempts to unite a fragmented opposition, including a new electoral alliance between the parties founded by Nemtsov and Navalny.

But the other Russia is also represented by activists who planned a "march for peace and freedom" today; by the theatre group Teatr Doc; by Lena Nemirovskaya, the inspirational head of the embattled Moscow School of Political Studies; by Pavel Durov, the founder of the leading Russian social network VKontakte, now living abroad; by Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the oligarch turned political prisoner turned exiled campaigner for a better Russia; and many more - all all in their different ways.

When Thomas Mann arrived in American exile from Nazi Germany, he said: "Where I am, there is Germany." All these Russians have the right to say, "Where I am, there is Russia." But when Khodorkovsky tells an audience in London that "Putin is not Russia; we are", he is making a rhetorical statement of principle, not an accurate description of reality. For the truth is that Putin does, so far as we can judge, enjoy great popular support, and in that sense Putin is also Russia. Germans know better than anyone that this is what sometimes happens to nations, and then one day they wake up with the mother of all hangovers.

Working out what Russia should be, drawing a novel line between nation and empire, involves developing a new kind of relationship with neighbours who speak your tongue and share much of your culture and history. In recent years Putin has misappropriated the term "Russian world" (russkiy mir) and made it a political slogan that almost implies "if you speak Russian you belong in Russia". But it doesn't have to be like that, and most of the neighbours don't want it to be. I was in Minsk three weeks ago, and the Belarusian foreign minister told our visiting study group that his long-term vision is for Belarus to become something like Switzerland. Well, still a little way to go perhaps ... but the point is clear. Switzerland may have a lot of German speakers, but it doesn't need to be part of Germany.

The same is self-evidently true across today's Spanish-speaking, French-speaking, Portuguese-speaking and English-speaking worlds. There are very close cultural, economic and political ties, but we don't want to be in the same state or empire. I have more Canadian cousins than I do British ones. The relationship between Britain and Canada is at least as special as that between Russia and Ukraine. In my case, as in that of many Russians and Ukrainians, it is literally in the family. But (my Canadian cousins may be relieved to hear) the annexation of Toronto and the restoration of British North America are not being proposed in London. Our countries get on much better being together apart.

The same will be true for Russia and its cousins. If the Spanish-, French-, Portuguese- and English-speaking worlds could manage the transition from complex imperial past to today's elective affinities, so can the Russian-speaking world. And one day it will.
 
 #25
Business New Europe
www.bne.eu
April 17, 2015
Is Gazprom's changing export strategy a threat to Europe?
By James Henderson
James Henderson is Senior Research Fellow, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies

The visit of Chinese Premier Xi Jinping to Moscow in May to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II could also mark the next stage in Russia's "pivot to Asia" if, as some expect, the November agreement to complete a second Russia-China gas export pipeline via the Altai region is confirmed.

Russia has already begun construction of a first line from East Siberia that is expected to be in operation by the end of the decade, carrying 38bn cubic metres per annum (cm/y), and the Altai line would allow a further 30bn cm/y of exports, not only making China Russia's largest individual gas customer but also giving it access to gas from West Siberia that could otherwise be flowing to Europe.

This shift in Russian gas export strategy is a direct result of issues that Gazprom and the Kremlin have seen emerging in Europe over the past decade, and has been specifically catalysed by the crisis in Ukraine and the EU response to it, which has been to call for a diversification by European gas customers away from Russian supply. In the short term this would appear to be a viable strategy, as demand has been in decline and availability of gas supply is set to increase, but over the longer term the EU will need to be aware of the risks inherent in its strategy.

Pressure builds

Over the past five years the pressure has been building on Gazprom to adjust its European export strategy. A slowdown in European gas demand due to economic stagnation, rising use of renewables and the availability of cheap coal has combined with the impact of the US shale gas revolution and the high price of Russian gas (linked to high oil prices) to reduce the natural demand for Russian gas on the continent. Gazprom has responded by offering price discounts and contract renegotiations, which generated a rebound in its exports in 2013, but 2014 saw a reversion to the new norm with a fall of more than 10% due to warmer weather a further decline in overall European demand.

However, a more important trend has emerged in the form of EU legislation and legal activity that has called into question Gazprom's entire activities in Europe. Implementation of the Third Energy Package has effectively caused the cancellation of the South Stream gas pipeline and blocked full use of the OPAL pipeline in Germany, despite the fact that the legislation has yet to be fully sanctioned, while EU Competition Authority investigations into Gazprom's business practices in a number of Central and Eastern European countries have raised questions about oil-linked gas pricing and anti-competitive behaviour.

Gazprom's response has the potential to radically alter its export strategy. Firstly, it has switched the direction of its trans-Black Sea pipeline from the South Stream route to Bulgaria and Southeast Europe towards a Turkey-focused route, now known as Turkish Stream. This will allow it to focus on the one growth market for gas in Europe, but has also created the opportunity to catalyse a debate about new delivery points for Russian gas across the continent.

Gazprom has announced that it wants to deliver all the gas that it currently sends through Ukraine via the new Turkish Stream route to a "hub" on the Greek-Turkish border from 2019, when its current transit contracts with Ukraine end. At first glance, this appears to be fraught with legal and operational difficulties.

Gazprom claims that, under the Third Energy Package, infrastructure should be built to collect the gas from its new "hub" for delivery to existing customers. However, a number of customers have responded by stating that they have no desire to receive their gas via a different route. Furthermore any change in the delivery terms could catalyse a complete renegotiation of the contracts in their entirety, and would also mean that any new contracts would have to abide by Third Energy Package rules (the current Gazprom contracts are grandfathered through the TEP until their natural expiry dates).

The consequence of this rather complex set of drivers is that Gazprom appears to have set a negotiation in place concerning its export sales to Europe that is likely to continue through to 2019. Its suggestion of a Turkey-Greece hub seems to be a concession that new delivery points are an option, potentially at the border of Europe rather than at the borders of consuming countries. Indeed, Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller has conceded as much in recent statements where he has declared that: "The principle of our strategy in relation to the European market is changing. The decision on stopping South Stream is the beginning of an end to our operation model of the market [sic] within which we oriented ourselves towards supplying [gas] to the end consumer."

However, a change in delivery point is likely to mean a renegotiation of contracts that could imply a change in price formula (to hub-based pricing) and a change in contract terms, with delivery to hubs in Europe suggesting that the take-or-pay element in contracts may no longer be needed. It is too early to say that this is a definitive Gazprom strategy, or a series of consequences that seem inevitable if Gazprom continues to pursue its current Turkish Stream plan, but in either case it would appear that there is at least some concession to the underlying principles of EU legislation.

Pros and cons

The interesting question is what the impact of this may be on Europe. In the short term at least, the answer would appear to be a positive one, although this may be less to do with the implementation of the Third Energy Package and more to do with the imminent arrival of a wave of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the US, Australia and other new potential suppliers. If Russia has chosen to adapt to EU legislation on market liberalisation, then it will be forced to compete with this new gas on the basis of hub prices, creating a buyers' market in Europe.

However, one consequence may be that it chooses to create a price war and to use the low cost of its gas supply, further reduced by the impact of ruble devaluation, to at least maintain its market share in Europe, and perhaps even increase it in some countries. The benefit to Europe, of course, would be low prices, while the risk would be further reliance on Russian gas. This risk may then be exacerbated as we move towards the end of the decade and into the 2020s as the surge of new LNG supply slackens (in particular if oil prices stay low, undermining the economics of oil-linked contracts for LNG projects). Then Europe could find itself with a reliance on Russian gas at higher prices, while Russia will also have the insurance policy of its growing sales to Asia which can further strengthen its bargaining power. In reality, these eastern contracts should not provide a volume threat, as there is plenty of gas in Russia to serve both markets, but psychologically it may give Russia a stronger hand in any gas-related negotiations.

In truth there is a certain inevitability about this outcome, irrespective of Russia's export strategy. Europe's gas import requirements are set to rise as demand gradually recovers and indigenous supply continues to decline. In the face of this reality, Russia will always have a strong bargaining position, as alternatives to its gas for Europe are limited.

So what is the logical response? In reality it is close to the latest ideas presented in the Energy Union concept in February. Not the coordinated negotiating institution supposed to present a unified force against the might of Gazprom, but rather the concept of increasing interconnectivity between European countries, expansion of supply diversification opportunities where possible and implementation of competition and market rules to ensure that a level playing field will allow customers to make choices that can keep prices reasonable.

If, in this world, Russian gas is the cheapest option, then extra supplies will arrive, with Europe having the comfort that they will have had to better the price of the most competitive alternatives and can be replaced by them if any security of supply threat emerges. Furthermore, Europe can also take comfort from the fact that it will continue to remain a vital market for Russia, even as the latter pivots to Asia, as it is unlikely that any country would want to be dependent on as powerful a negotiating opponent as China for too great a proportion of its export sales.
 
#26
Huffington Post
April 16, 2015
The Russians Are Not Coming II
By Reese Schonfeld
Founding CEO of CNN

Just about a year ago I wrote a piece here, The Russians Are Not Coming, suggesting that Vladimir Putin was not the boogieman that others, particularly Republicans, were suggesting.

Five years ago, I wrote a piece, Tea With Medvedev, which reported that after arriving late to our meeting at the Russian White House that "he [Medvedev] had been held up by a last minute message from Iran's [then] President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad." In it "Ahmadinejad criticized Russia and the Russian President for agreeing with the United States to support further sanctions against Iran because of its continuing nuclear build up... President Medvedev told us that he had informed Ahmadinejad that he appreciated Russian's neighborly and cordial relationship with Iran, and that he wished to continue that relationship, but that, in this case, he would support the United States because he believed that the sanctions were in the best interests of the people of Russia and he always tried to act in the best interests of his country."

At this point it is important to remember that the Russians have veto power at the United Nations and if they had chosen they could have vetoed all UN-imposed sanctions on Iran. They did not do that. And that denial has enabled us, the US, to put the pressure on Iranians that brought them to the table in Geneva, where the US, the Russians and other European countries concluded the agreement that is now being finalized in which the Iranians surrender their right to build a nuclear weapon.

In the interim, Vladimir Putin, has reclaimed the presidency of Russia and has been acting in what he believes to be the best interests of the people of Russia. When the government of Ukraine changed from pro-Russian to pro-NATO and the people of the eastern Ukraine, many of whom are Russians, took up arms to defend their lands, Putin contributed weapons and warplanes to their defense. The result is a continuing scrimmage between a weak Ukrainian army and a Russian-armed resistance force in Donetsk and the surrounding territory which they now hold.

Crimea is a different story. Putin sent Russian forces there to reclaim the region from the Ukrainians. He had a different motive: My friend, Igor Makurin, who had been the New York bureau chief for TASS for many years, and upon his return to Russian had married Nikita Khrushchev's great granddaughter, Xenia, told me that Khrushchev is now remembered in Russia as the man who gave Crimea to the Ukrainians and that Russians would never forgive him for that. I assume, very certainly I think, that Putin was well aware of Khrushchev's mistake and decided to reclaim the Crimea for the sake of Russian pride. He has succeeded and seems to have assured his own presidency.

Today, the AP reports that "Romania, US, British Troops Stage NATO-Planned Exercises." They are taking part in military exercises near the Ukrainian border and will "continue until April 30th at two locations at Eastern Romania: the Mihail Kogalniceanu airbase near the Black Sea port of Constanta..." In the north, US forces are working with Polish, Latvian and Lithuanian troops near their borderline with Russian cities. A US destroyer is at this moment in the waters of the Black Sea near Constanta and a dozen US Airforce A-10 planes are based farther north.

It seems to me that the West is once more struggling to divide Russia from its eastern neighbors' putting increasing pressure on Putin as he struggles to retain Russia's influence in that area. The West is taking advantage of the defeat of a pro-Russian Ukrainian leader to drive the former Soviets away from their previously pro-Russian allies.

Putin is acting as any political leader should, in trying to preserve and protect his country. He may not be a nice man, but he certainly is not the devil that we are making him.

I still remember that more than ten million Russian died battling Hitler who attacked Russia from the east. I can well understand Putin's desire to guard his western flank. The Russians aren't in a position to come at anybody right now.
 
 
 #27
AFP
April 19, 2015
Russia's vast Arctic gas project aims to avoid Ukraine deep freeze
By Germain MOYON

Spread across the frozen whiteness of the Russian Arctic, the ambitious $27 billion Yamal gas megaproject aims to defy both the extreme temperatures and the Ukraine crisis impacting its funding.

Some 2,500 kilometres (1,600 miles) northeast of Moscow, the Yamal site -- a joint venture by Russia's Novatek, France's Total (Swiss: FP.SW - news) and China's CNPC -- is eve
But not long ago the area drew only a handful of geologists and explorers whose neighbours in the virgin territory were polar bears and foxes.

"There was nothing. Just tundra," said Dmitry Fonin, a veteran of industrial projects in the Russian north who is at the helm of construction of Yamal LNG.

Over two years later development is in full gear and around 9,000 workers are toiling away in often fiercely inhospitable conditions to launch the massive facility by 2017 that aims to produce some 16.5 million tonnes of LNG per year.

"It's rather warm now, -10 degrees (Celsius, 14 Fahrenheit)," Ruslan Mikhailov, who captains an icebreaker tasked with keeping the waters around the port navigable, told journalists during a recent press trip.

"The average here in the winter is -30 and it goes as low as -56."

- East-West ambitions -

Plans for the Yamal LNG project date back about 10 years, long before Russia's current standoff with the West over Ukraine and punishing sanctions imposed by the United States and European Union after Moscow's annexation of Crimea.

Russia hopes the location of the plant will allow it to diversify energy exports and ship both to European markets and Asia, via the northern route, the shortest passage between European Russia and the Pacific Ocean though navigation there remains highly seasonal.

Fears have swirled over the future of the vast project, however, as international ties nosedived over the Ukraine crisis and the West slapped tough sanctions on Russia that led to some major energy ventures involving Western and Russian firms being shelved.

Although the vast project was not directly targeted by the sanctions -- and Total and CNPC still remain onboard with 20 percent each -- the economic tit-for-tat has hit the venture in other ways.

In mid-July Novatek was put on the blacklist by the US Treasury, and even though the joint venture is not directly under sanctions, the punitive measures from the West are closing off huge swaths of potential cash.

The project still needs $18 billion of investment and the funding issue has been exacerbated by the current reduced price of oil that has cut down industry revenues.
Gas prices are often linked to crude oil prices.

"(If) we would not have this question of sanctions, the financing would have been done already, let's be clear," Total CEO Patrick Pouyanne said said during a recent visit to the site, adding thought that he hoped it would arrive "in a matter of weeks."
"Because of the sanctions we cannot use dollars, we use financing through Chinese banks, European banks and other Asian banks," said Pouyanne.

Beyond the facility itself, subcontractors and suppliers suffer sanctions too, said Novatek chief Leonid Mikhelson.

"There are technical difficulties with the money, though they can be overcome," he said.

Russia has granted long-term loans worth 150 billion rubles ($2.7 billion), half of which has already been provided.

An employee of a European company present at the facility confirmed potential investors are hesitant: "Banks take time to make sure they don't violate sanctions, and they wonder whether the sanctions will be tightened further. It creates stress."

- Contracts already signed -

Despite the current hitches the energy bosses remained upbeat on the project and insist that it will be seen through to completion.

"We can supply the European market and the Asian market," Pouyanne said, describing it the venture as a "launchpad for growth" in Russia.

Total's commitment to Russia was spearheaded by Pouyanne's predecessor Christophe de Margerie, who died last October when his plane collided with a snowplough in a Moscow airport.
And all sides insist the viability of the project is in no doubt once it gets going.

"We have contracts for almost 100 percent of the gas," Novatek chief Leonid Mikhelson said recently. "Of course large volumes will go to the Asia-Pacific region."

For Russia, analysts say projects like Yamal are vital, as Moscow needs to start tapping new fields beyond its current maturing sites.

So keeping the project on track is a must whatever the obstacles may be in the near future.

"LNG projects are likely to face significant delays, due to high costs, geopolitics and financial sanctions," analysts with energy association Cedigaz said in a recent note.

"But (they) could eventually develop on a significant scale in the next decade."
 
 #28
Sputnik
April 19, 2015
Enter the Dragon and the Bear: US Faces Its Ultimate Nightmare - Eric Kraus
By Ekaterina Blinova
[Charts here http://sputniknews.com/analysis/20150419/1021094012.html#ixzz3XlOuUOiW]

By simultaneously attacking Russia and seeking to contain China, the United States has driven an alliance between the two - which should be Washington's ultimate nightmare, Eric Kraus, an expert on Asian and Russian investments, told Sputnik.

We are clearly moving toward a multi-polar world: while the US is little by little losing its status of top economy, new kids on the block - the world's emerging powers - are rapidly scoring points, Eric Kraus, a prominent expert in Russian, Asian and Latin American financial markets and Director at Principal Asset Management advisory company, told Sputnik.

However, "rather than seeking to coopt Beijing by gradually increasing the role of China in the international financial institutions, [Washington has] instead driven the Dragon to realize that it must create parallel institutions instead," Eric Kraus underscored.

The expert elaborated that in 1945 the United States alone accounted for slightly more than 50 percent of global GDP (Gross Domestic Product). So far, it was logical that Washington was allowed to create a system that served as a basis for the post-world financial order.

"It is in the nature of empires to do so - the US was neither the first nor the last, and it benefitted greatly from the system it created - but then ultimately became lazy and complacent."

It is worth mentioning that the United States now accounts for about 20 percent of global GDP, while China has emerged as the "world's largest trading economy, source of most global economic growth, largest importer of most industrial commodities, and increasingly, the largest source of investment capital the world over," the expert emphasized, adding that by PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) measures China has become a slightly bigger economy than the United States.

So far, it is understandable that China is inclined to create a system more beneficial for its own interests, moving away from a dollar-based trading system and establishing competing financial institutions to the US-controlled World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), development banks and etc.  

On the other hand, "by simultaneously attacking Russia and seeking to contain China, [the US has] driven an alliance between the two - which should have been Washington's ultimate nightmare," the expert underscored.

Eric Kraus, a financial strategist and an author of a widely read informative newsletter "Truth and Beauty (...and Russian Finance)," also shared his views on the future of the ruble and the state of the Russian economy in the forthcoming months.

"Those of us in financial markets have long realized that the Russian markets are never as good - or as bad - as they first appear," the expert remarked.

Although there was a wave of panic in December 2014, as people thought that Washington had leverages to arbitrary create a financial crisis for Russia, the sanctions were actually "pretty trivial except for the psychological effect." In contrast, the collapse in oil prices was really damaging.

"The drop in the ruble shielded Russia from the worst of the impact of falling commodity prices - salvaging the budget and the trade surplus. Now, as the panic subsides and commodity prices begin to rebound, the ruble has strengthened a bit too fast for my tastes. At current oil prices - the ruble should be around 55," Eric Kraus underscored.

The expert elaborated that "were the ruble to strengthen this would cause some damage to the real economy - and especially, would deprive Russia of the benefit of a 'good crisis' - like in 1998 the collapse of the ruble is fueling domestic agriculture and manufacture."

He pointed out that the Central Bank of Russia should not allow the currency to again become overvalued, especially if oil prices recover faster than expected. According to the strategist, Brent crude may surge up to $60-80 for the balance of 2015.
At the same time, Iran's return to the market is unlikely to provoke further slide in oil prices, the expert deems. And the point is that "the commodity cycle is turning."

"Five years ago everyone discovered the commodity super-cycle and thought that commodities could only rise and rise. Then two years ago, suddenly everyone decided that commodities were dead and could only collapse. Both ideas were false. The overshoot in commodity prices is driven by financial speculation, and I expect to see the hedge funds taking the bullish side of the trade - pushing prices up," Eric Kraus explained.

"Even iron ore and coking coal are now rebounding - oil will too - whatever happens with Iran," the strategist revealed.
 
 #29
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
April 20, 2015
Moscow and Beijing must learn to be upfront with each other
The Kremlin's much-publicized 'pivot to the east' has seen Moscow pour renewed energy into building relations with China, with landmark agreements on gas and arms supplies accompanying Russia's decision to join the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. However, in order for the partnership to flower into a full-fledged alliance the two sides must be honest with each other on their strategic differences and conflicting interests.
Mikhail Mamonov, special to RBTH
Mikhail Mamonov is Development Director of the analytical agency Vneshnyaya Politika (Foreign Policy), and has a PhD in Political Science.

The visit of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to Russia on April 6-8 was widely covered in the media and caused a new wave of enthusiasm about the future of Russian-Chinese relations. However, Wang's trip was rather technical in nature, being made in preparation for the visit of Chinese leader Xi Jinping to Moscow to take part in ceremonies marking the 70th anniversary of the allied victory in World War II.

Much less attention was paid to the trip to Russia in mid-March of the head of the Office of the CPC Central Committee, Li Zhanshu, one of the Chinese president's closest confidants. From the point of view of the practice of Chinese foreign policy, this was an unprecedented visit - diplomatic missions have never yet been given to high-ranking aides of the Chinese head of state.

Partnership has not yet become an alliance

These visits confirm the strengthening of a "comprehensive strategic partnership" between the two countries. But it is premature to speak about the formation of a Russian-Chinese alliance.

The "struggle for a multipolar world" and opposition to U.S. pressure have different geographical dimensions for Moscow and Beijing; Russia is only marginally represented in the Asia-Pacific region, and the issue of the return of the U.S. to Asia is not so acute for Russia as it is for China. Beijing, in turn, is far less interested in resolving the Ukrainian crisis than Russia is.

Moscow and Beijing are also quite restrained about supporting each other in regional conflicts: Premier Li Keqiang's statement that China respects the territorial integrity of Ukraine and call to solve the problem of Crimea through dialogue is almost a mirror image of the words of Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, who has said that Russia does not support any party in the Sino-Japanese territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands.

In Central Asia, Beijing's policy creates new challenges for the project of the Eurasian Economic Union in the sense that the release of large, privileged loans to Central Asian countries by China with no political strings attached will create an alternative to Russian financial resources and increase their degree of freedom of maneuver - and the price of political bargaining for Moscow. Russia and China also have different visions on the further development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) - as a political platform (Russia) or as a multilateral development tool (China).

Finally, the consolidation of trade imbalance in economic relations between Russia and China is not conducive to the objectives of diversification of the Russian economy - and will inevitably become the subject of bilateral discussions. The level of investment cooperation is also not high enough.

Ultimately, Beijing and Moscow are in different positions even in their relations with Washington - Russian-American relations have reached a low ebb and there is no visible trend toward improvement. China, meanwhile, values its partnership with the U.S. and is seeking to avoid interference in China-U.S. and China-Russian dialogue.

'Pivot to east' shows Moscow's commitment to Beijing

All of the above, paradoxically, does not mean that the Russian-Chinese strategic partnership has exhausted itself. The introduction of sanctions against Russia by Western countries was the catalyst for Moscow's "pivot to the east" - which for Russia is symbolized, in the first place, by China.

The dynamics of this switch in focus are impressive - after more than a decade of negotiations, China and Russia have reached an agreement on the terms of Russian gas supplies; volumes of the latest models of weapons supplied to China have increased; the parties have established joint financial institutions to stimulate investment cooperation, and continue to increase economic cooperation. Russia's decision to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) set up by China also shows that the decision to "pivot to the east" was taken by no means only under the influence of the immediate political situation.

All the current problems of Russian-Chinese relations and risks they engender appear to be related to the fact that the parties have chosen to focus "on the positive side" and avoid discussion of issues that do not quite suit them for the time being.

A new round of cooperation makes it possible to restart the Russian-Chinese dialogue from the positions of two equal great powers, whose interests are largely, but not always, the same, to discuss the questions that emerge regarding with each other, and to understand the potential for interaction as well as the restrictions that objectively exist.
 
 #30
New York Times
April 20, 2015
How to Avert a Nuclear War
By JAMES E. CARTWRIGHT and VLADIMIR DVORKIN
James E. Cartwright, a former Marine Corps general, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and commander of the United States Strategic Command, is the chairman of the Global Zero Commission on Nuclear Risk Reduction, of which Vladimir Dvorkin, a retired major general who headed the research institute of Russia's Strategic Rocket Forces, is a member.

We find ourselves in an increasingly risky strategic environment. The Ukrainian crisis has threatened the stability of relations between Russia and the West, including the nuclear dimension - as became apparent last month when it was reported that Russian defense officials had advised President Vladimir V. Putin to consider placing Russia's nuclear arsenal on alert during last year's crisis in Crimea.

Diplomatic efforts have done little to ease the new nuclear tension. This makes it all the more critical for Russia and the United States to talk, to relieve the pressures to "use or lose" nuclear forces during a crisis and minimize the risk of a mistaken launch.

The fact is that we are still living with the nuclear-strike doctrine of the Cold War, which dictated three strategic options: first strike, launch on warning and post-attack retaliation. There is no reason to believe that Russia and the United States have discarded these options, as long as the architecture of "mutually assured destruction" remains intact.

For either side, the decision to launch on warning - in an attempt to fire one's nuclear missiles before they are destroyed - would be made on the basis of information from early-warning satellites and ground radar. Given the 15- to 30-minute flight times of strategic missiles, a decision to launch after an alert of an apparent attack must be made in minutes.

This is therefore the riskiest scenario, since provocations or malfunctions can trigger a global catastrophe. Since computer-based information systems have been in place, the likelihood of such errors has been minimized. But the emergence of cyberwarfare threats has increased the potential for false alerts in early-warning systems. The possibility of an error cannot be ruled out.

American officials have usually played down the launch-on-warning option. They have argued instead for the advantages of post-attack retaliation, which would allow more time to analyze the situation and make an intelligent decision. Neither the Soviet Union nor Russia ever stated explicitly that it would pursue a similar strategy, but an emphasis on mobile missile launchers and strategic submarines continues to imply a similar reliance on an ability to absorb an attack and carry out retaliatory strikes.

Today, however, Russia's early warning system is compromised. The last of the satellites that would have detected missile launches from American territory and submarines in the past stopped functioning last fall. This has raised questions about Russia's very ability to carry out launch-on-warning attacks.

Partly to compensate for the loss of its space-based system, Russia has deployed prefabricated radar units that can be set up quickly along its borders. Some of these are already operational; some are still being tested. Unlike satellite networks, radar can provide accurate information about the scale and targeting of a missile attack - but only once a missile has entered its vicinity, which would most likely be 10 to 15 minutes after launch.

Continue reading the main storyContinue reading the main storyContinue reading the main story
The upside of radar reporting is more information. The downside of having to wait is that it cuts the time for deciding whether to launch on warning. That in turn increases the likelihood of mistaken retaliation. For a submarine missile fired from the Norwegian Sea, Russia's radar network would give its nuclear decision makers just 10 minutes to respond. America's early warning systems can be expected to provide about twice as much time.

Clearly, for either side, these timelines are very compressed and the opportunities for ill-considered decisions very real. Launch-on-warning puts enormous strain on the nuclear chains of command in both countries.

In theory, no sensible head of state would authorize a launch-on-warning strike after receiving information that just one missile, or a small number of missiles, were inbound, on the assumption that this was not an intentional, full-scale attack. But the launch-on-warning doctrine still rules in both Russia and the United States - in which case the risk, however small, of cataclysmic error remains.

This risk should motivate the presidents of Russia and the United States to decide in tandem to eliminate the launch-on-warning concept from their nuclear strategies. They should reinstitute military-to-military talks, which were suspended over the Ukraine crisis, to pursue this stand-down as an urgent priority. (A joint decision on this would not destabilize nuclear deterrence: Both countries still have nuclear forces designed to withstand a first-strike attack, guaranteeing retaliatory strikes.)

To reinforce this accord, both countries should refrain from conducting military exercises that involve practicing missile launches based on information from early warning systems. Even if this restraint cannot yet be fully verified, it would be a valuable contribution to strategic stability - and, of course, to preventing an inadvertent nuclear war. This would be a positive step ahead of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference that the United Nations will host later this month.

Detailed verification measures can come later, once better Russian-American relations are restored. The technical implementation of a decision to abandon the launch-on-warning concept would fall within the framework of the New Start treaty. A phased reduction of the combat readiness of the strategic nuclear forces would provide a safer time buffer for nuclear decision making.

In periods of heightened tensions and reduced decision times, the likelihood of human and technical error in control systems increases. Launch-on-warning is a relic of Cold War strategy whose risk today far exceeds its value. Our leaders urgently need to talk and, we hope, agree to scrap this obsolete protocol before a devastating error occurs.
 
#31
www.rt.com
April 20, 2015
'We're not interested in a fair fight' - US army commander urges NATO to confront Russia
[Graphics here http://rt.com/news/250981-russian-threat-nato-hodges/]

US army commander in Europe says Russia is a "real threat" urging NATO to stay united. The alliance is not interested in a "fair fight with anyone" and wants to have "overmatch in all systems," Lieutenant-General Frederick "Ben" Hodges believes.

"There is a Russian threat," Hodges told the Telegraph, maintaining that Russia is involved in ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine.

A key objective for NATO is not to let Russia outreach it in terms of capabilities, the general said.

"We're not interested in a fair fight with anyone," General Hodges stated. "We want to have overmatch in all systems. I don't think that we've fallen behind but Russia has closed the gap in certain capabilities. We don't want them to close that gap," he revealed.

"The best insurance we have against a showdown is that NATO stands together," he said, pointing to recent moves by traditionally neutral Sweden and Finland to cooperate more closely on defense with NATO.

Moscow has expressed "special concern" over Finnish and Swedish moves towards the alliance viewing it as a threat aimed against Russia.

"Contrary to past years, Northern European military cooperation is now positioning itself against Russia. This can undermine positive constructive cooperation," Russia's Foreign Ministry said in a statement.

Hodges also said US expects its allies to contribute financially to the security umbrella provided by the NATO alliance, as its member states have been failing to allocate 2 percent of every member nation's GDP to NATO budget.

"I think the question for each country to ask is: are they security consumers or security providers?" the general demanded. "Do they bring capabilities the alliance needs?"

However, the general does not believe that the world is on the brink of another Cold War, saying that "the only thing that is similar now is that Russia and NATO have different views about what the security environment in Europe should be."

"I don't think it's the same as the Cold War," he said, recalling "gigantic forces" and "large numbers of nuclear weapons" implemented in Europe a quarter of a century ago. "That [Cold War] was a different situation."

"We did very specific things then that are no longer relevant. We don't need 300,000 soldiers in Europe. Nobody can afford that anymore," General Hodges acknowledged.

However, there was a sharp increase in the intensity of the training of NATO troops near the borders of Russia last year, Russian General Staff reported.

"In 2014, the intensity of NATO's operational and combat training activities has grown by 80 percent," said Lieutenant General Andrey Kartapolov, head of the Main Operation Directorate of General Staff.
 
 
 #32
Moscow Times
April 20, 2015
No Iran Deal on the Horizon for Russia
By Konstantin Makienko
Konstantin Makienko is deputy director of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST).

Observers have interpreted President Vladimir Putin's recent decision to lift the ban on shipping Russia's S-300 air defense systems to Iran as a sign that the Kremlin intends to immediately deliver those weapons.

However, in doing so they forget that delivery is anything but certain. In fact, no such decision has been made, and in all likelihood, will never be made.

The reality is that the contract signed in 2007 and interrupted by order of then-President Dmitry Medvedev in 2009 cannot simply be reactivated as if the weapons were loaded on trains and had been sitting in readiness for immediate delivery all these years.

The fact is, the weapons systems that Russia built to fulfill the 2007 contract no longer physically exist. The permissible storage period for some of their components expired long ago, and keeping them in usable condition would have required a major investment that neither the manufacturer nor the Russian government was willing to pay.

That raised the question of what to do with the weapons. Because they were custom-built to Iran's specifications, the Russian armed forces could not use them in the same way it had assimilated the MiG-29s that Algeria refused to purchase in 2007. Ultimately, Russia decided to dismantle the weapons intended for Iran and use them for parts.

The legal status of the transaction has also changed. Iran is now demanding not only delivery of the weapons - for which it had already made partial payment - but also that Moscow pay a penalty of $4 billion for breach of contract.

If Tehran shows interest in renewing the project, the two sides will have to draft a new contract, while at the same time searching for a resolution to Iran's demands that Russian pay a hefty penalty.

Regarding the technical parameters, some reports indicate that the S-300PMU-2 system that Iran ordered back in 2007 is no longer in production. That means Moscow will offer Tehran either the S-300VM Antey system or the newer S-400. With a backlog of several years on foreign and domestic orders for both systems, it is unlikely that the weapon will appear in Iran anytime soon.

But that is not the main concern. The problem is that Moscow cannot be certain Iran even wants to purchase Russian air defense systems, or any Russian weapons for that matter. In the past 20 years, Russia has twice unilaterally terminated military and technical cooperation with Iran - in 1996 with the infamous Gore-Chernomyrdin Protocol, and in 2009 when it voted in favor of an arms embargo against Iran.

The decision to back out of the deal in 1996 stemmed from the country's extremely weak political and economic condition at the time. By contrast, the anti-Iran demarche in 2009 was far more opportunistic and cynical. Moscow not only buckled under the usual pressure from the United States and Israel, but also naively fell into a trap set by Saudi Arabia.

Riyadh promised to purchase $10 billion in Russian weapons if Moscow would use its vote on the UN Security Council to support sanctions. And after the embargo was imposed, Saudi Arabia only placed an order for a measly shipment of machine guns, retracting its promise to buy hundreds of Russian tanks and helicopters in a pointedly humiliating manner.

So, Iran has every reason not to trust the Kremlin, and not to make the same mistake a third time. What's more, alternatives to Russian weapons that are far more attractive both politically and technologically have appeared on the market in recent years.

Iran is developing its own defense industry as well. The result is that if Russia has not already lost the Iranian market, it hardly enjoys a privileged position there. And even if the project for Moscow to supply Iran with air defense systems resumes, it will be a difficult and problematic process that will require years to bring to fruition.
 
 
#33
Moscow Times
April 18, 2015
Not In Cinemas, But 'Child 44' Will Be Available in Russia - Culture Minister

A Hollywood film about a Soviet-era serial killer hit cinema screens on Friday, but it will not be shown in Russia after Moscow pulled the movie because of what it called a "distortion of historical facts."

"Child 44," based on the 2008 novel by Tom Rob Smith, revolves around the hunt for a child murderer during the 1950s in Stalinist Russia.

British actor Tom Hardy, due on screens next month in a much-anticipated "Mad Max" remake, plays the lead, MGB officer Leo Demidov, in the thriller. Also starring are Noomi Rapace, Joel Kinnaman and Gary Oldman.

However, Russia's Cultural Ministry banned the film earlier this week after a screening, it said in a statement.

"The [ministry] received questions about the contents of the film, particularly the distortion of historical facts and the peculiar interpretation of events before, during and after the Great Patriotic War as well as the images and characters of Soviet citizens in that historical period," it said.

It added the film's distribution would be "unacceptable" just weeks before the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II.

'No Mysteries'

Culture Minister Vladimir Medinsky said in a statement that the film would be made available in Russia on DVD and online resources.

He said his ministry would also show "Child 44" on its own website "at the first opportunity," accompanied by a detailed, "shot-by-shot" explanation of why the film is not suited for the Russian screen, according to a statement quoted Thursday by state-run news agency RIA Novosti.

"[After the ban] certain civic groups are entertaining suspicions that we are denying them something beautiful," Medinsky said in the statement. "Some even supposed that the film discloses all kinds of secrets of Russian history."

The thriller will be released on DVD and licensed online resources, "as soon as the rights to these kinds of releases become available," Medinsky said, warning people against illegally downloading the film, RIA Novosti reported.

Medinsky earlier accused the filmmakers of depicting the Soviet Union as a land of "physically and morally defective subhumans" where "starving children eat their weaker classmates."

"Hollywood won't succeed in making money on the Russian market with this 'cinematic masterpiece,'" Medinsky said in the statement cited in the report.

Premiere

Word of the ban overshadowed the film's London premiere on Thursday night.

"They didn't say which facts they thought they were distorting. When I wrote the book it didn't strike me as a particularly controversial book. I thought it was a great story," Smith said.

"The facts about that regime are well established. They're published in many books ... When I read the 'distorting facts' I immediately wondered what facts they were referring to."

Rapace, who plays Demidov's wife, Raisa, said she was disappointed by the ban.

"Of course it shocked me a little bit and it's sad because I want people to see the film," she said.

The movie is released in Britain and U.S. on Friday.
(Reuters/MT)
 
 #34
Russia Beyond the Headlines/Kommersant
www.rbth.ru
April 17, 2015
'Let all the flowers bloom': Writer Alexei Ivanov on Russian cultural values
"Bad Weather" is the latest novel by Alexei Ivanov, a writer from the Urals. RBTH is publishing an abridged version of an interview he gave to Kommersant newspaper on the book, as well as Russian history and cultural life
Alena Solntseva, Kommersant-Ogonyok

Alexei Ivanov was born in 1969. He spent his childhood and youth in Perm, and currently lives in Yekaterinburg. He began writing at the start of the 1990s, but only found fame 13 years later with the publication of "The Heart of Parma." Following the novel "The Gold of the Rebellion," the critic Lev Danilkin called Ivanov "Russian literature's gold reserves." The film "The Geographer Drank His Globe Away," which was based on his novel, won many prizes and was commercially successful. Recently Ivanov has been writing a lot of regional non-fiction.

"Bad Weather" begins like a detective story - with the robbery of an armored car - but the novel is actually about time and a country's fate. The plot follows a union for veterans of the Afghan War in an industrial city and interweaves various threads. It takes place simultaneously during the Afghan War, the beginning of the 1990s, when the former soldiers opened their own businesses, as well as in the 2000s.

Kommersant: To what extent is "Bad Weather" based on factual events?

Alexei Ivanov: I would not describe it as a documentary work, but many real events related to the Afghan Veteran's Union in Yekaterinburg are integrated into the novel.

It is an existential work. After World War II a capo from Auschwitz and guards from Kolyma could prove better than Kant that God does not exist. But the experiences that were earlier compensated for with faith became known as existentia. Existentialism is the aggregate of experiences that someone feels when they not have faith. The protagonist of "Bad Weather," Sergei, says that we refused to build communism, but do not believe in God. What do we have left? My characters are left with the myth of the Afghan brotherhood.

Kommersant: And the idea of brotherhood, particularly military brotherhood, is perhaps the most important idea for Russia.

A. I.: Brotherhood is really not that important in the novel. It is not about Afghan syndrome or the contemporary lives of Afghans, who were abandoned by society and the government. It is about how people look for a way to believe each other in a world dominated by predators. They realize that they cannot believe anyone. But they know that they cannot live without trust, which is why they need to find ways to believe each other. The Afghan brotherhood is one such way.

Kommersant: Do you think a common Russian idea, a central national identity, exists?

A. I.: What we call the Russian world is a collection of various elements that are united by a value system, a language and geography. At the moment this composite is developing in a lop-sided way: the majority of its components are withering and dying, and that is utterly unfair. The so-called Russian idea consists of blossoming variety. It should be something like, "Let all the flowers bloom."

Kommersant: But do we really have a common value system?

A. I.: We share common values, but their hierarchical arrangement differs somewhat depending on a person's identity. And at the top of the hierarchy there is always a kind of meta-value through which people with this identity self-actualize. For the Urals the main value is work; for the White Sea region and Siberia the main value is enterprise. For central Russia it is power and property. For southern, Cossack Russia it is social justice.

Kommersant: Don't you feel that this is rather speculative? For example, I live in Moscow, but neither money nor power has any meaning for me - yet I continue living in Moscow.

A. I.: Any scheme is speculative: that is why it is a scheme. You do not necessarily have to share a region's identity. You evidently belong to a different cultural background; not the Russian peasant one, which places most importance on power and property: Moscow is its embodiment. You can live in Moscow or in a village near Chelyabinsk and belong to the culture of globalization.

Kommersant: But in that case, where are the regional values, and how do they influence people?

A. I.: They can manifest themselves in various ways. For example, until recently the southern Russian regions were considered the "red belt." The land there is fertile; people are wealthier than in the north or Siberia and should therefore have bourgeois, capitalist values. However, they elected a communist governor. They did so because the most important value for the people of the Cossack south is social justice, a value that was proclaimed by the USSR. It is useless to place bets on modern ideas such as innovation in that region because locals will not engage with them. Important social projects, however, will be very popular.

Kommersant: Why do you think the modernization project has failed in Russia?

A. I.: It is being held back by the bureaucracy, which doesn't really need it. There is no demand for modernization among the elite and the governing class. I think that it would be supported by the determined part of society: the youth, people between 30 and 40, who really want to do something.

This is an abridged version of the interview first published in Russian by Kommersant-Ogonyok Magazine
 

 
#35
Reuters
April 20, 2015
Truce tenuous as Ukraine leader tackles economy, oligarchs
BY RICHARD BALMFORTH

(Reuters) - President Petro Poroshenko is using the breathing space from a ceasefire with separatists to push reforms and rein in super-rich 'oligarchs' whose influence he says must be curbed for Ukraine to have a future in Europe.

But the truce in eastern Ukraine agreed on Feb. 12 is tenuous, with each side accusing the other of violations and the death toll still rising in a year-long conflict that has killed more than 6,100, and most people do not see it lasting.

Its collapse could derail Poroshenko's agenda.

Two killings in Kiev of pro-Russian lobbyists have meanwhile evoked the prospect of political assassinations and handed easy ammunition to critics in Moscow who deride Poroschenko's commitment to building a new, law-based society.

Poroshenko launched his anti-oligarch campaign after a face-off with banking tycoon Ihor Kolomoisky last month which his supporters say marked a turning point.

The president sacked Kolomoisky as a regional governor after the billionaire staged a show of force in the capital in reaction to legislation threatening his business interests.

"De-oligarchisation" has since vaulted to the top of the policy agenda, a sign not only of presidential confidence but also of the vulnerability of Ukraine's oligarchs in an unpredictable environment of upheaval and conflict.

Parliament has adopted measures to break monopolies in the gas market and bring order and transparency to a dysfunctional economy, orienting it away from the old post-Soviet model.

Poroshenko aides say the campaign will not bring a forced "redistribution" of assets. But they aim to halt the oligarchs' interference in politics and their manipulation of placemen in parliament or government to "fix" advantageous legislation.

As Kiev discusses financial help and debt relief with the International Monetary Fund and Western creditors, any moves to clean out Ukraine's political and economic stables are welcome for Western governments.

The financial empire of Rinat Akhmetov, Ukraine's richest man, has also come under more scrutiny in recent weeks, with the state prosecutor challenging a sell-off of electricity-generating company Dniproenergo to his holding DTEK in 2012.

Akhmetov, whose fortune is put at more than $6 billion by Forbes magazine, was untouchable during the rule of ousted President Viktor Yanukovich. But the conflict in the east, the base of his operations, has had a huge impact on his steel and other industrial interests.

"The power of a certain number of financial-industrial groups who controlled, among others, the parliament, the Cabinet of Ministers and to a large extent the president -- all that was in the past and should stay there in the past," Poroshenko's top aide, Borys Lozhkin, told journalists.

"This (anti-oligarch campaign) does not mean that something negative will happen to certain people. We are not talking about a redistribution of property. But state property should not be confused with private property."

The campaign is not without risk for Poroshenko, who pledged when elected president in May 2014 to sell off the Roshen confectionery business on which his own fortune was built.

"The president wants to sell everything, but the time now is not just bad, but very bad. Investors don't want to come here," Lozhkin said.

"NEITHER WAR NOR PEACE"

Not only is it unclear how long the truce will hold but relations with Russia, now officially labeled an "aggressor state" backing the rebels, are going from bad to worse.

Russian President Vladimir Putin gave no ground on Ukraine in a televised phone-in last Thursday. "We don't choose our partners", he remarked drily when asked about Poroshenko.

Agreed at talks between Putin, Poroshenko and the French and German leaders in the Belarussian capital Minsk, the ceasefire replaced an initial deal last September that failed to hold.

"The situation is neither war nor peace. Nobody is going to deviate from the Minsk agreements," political analyst Olesya Yakhno said of a pact that outlines a withdrawal of heavy weapons, prisoner releases and more autonomy for the east.

A widespread suspicion in Kiev is that Putin wants the truce to hold until May 9, when Moscow stages events commemorating the end of World War Two in Europe. Afterwards, the Kremlin may hope the rebels can seize more land.

One possible hot spot is around the coastal city of Mariupol, which sits between the eastern "Donbass" regions of Donetsk and Luhansk and Russian-annexed Crimea. Others see separatist pressure building on Avdiyivka, the coke-producing northern gateway to the rebel-held city of Donetsk.

Many analysts, though, see a gradual escalation of the conflict rather than a full-scale offensive by Moscow-backed forces which would clearly violate the Minsk agreements and possibly expose Russia to further sanctions from the West.

The West accuses Russia of sending in troops and heavy weapons to back the rebels. Moscow denies this.

Under pressure from Western governments whose credit Ukraine badly needs, Poroshenko has pledged to stick by the Minsk terms.

He is now pushing ideas to amend the constitution to provide a framework for 'decentralization' to the eastern territories. Rebels there sneer at such talk, and are building internal power structures to give teeth to their proclamations of independent 'people's republics'.

For Kiev, there is no clear route to re-establishing control over lost territory in Crimea or the Donbass.

"The Minsk agreements foresee a road to reintegration but this is highly improbable and realizing it is almost Utopian," political analyst Volodymyr Fesenko said.

"Poroshenko understands that we cannot win this war by force of arms. So he has put the accent on strengthening defense and establishing order on the front lines."

Meanwhile, last week's double shootings in Kiev, apparently by professional "hitmen", have darkened the investment climate.

Former lawmaker Oleg Kalashnikov, 52, and journalist Oles Buzina, 45, a critic of the "Euromaidan" movement that brought down Yanukovich and who had expressed pro-Russian views, were shot dead a day apart, in or near their apartment blocks.

The killings followed a spate of mysterious deaths among ex-allies of Yanukovich in other parts of Ukraine, and Putin accused Kiev of dragging its feet over investigating murders that were political. Poroshenko said the shootings "play into the hands of our enemies".

At a meeting of anti-corruption officials last week, Poroshenko was pouchy-eyed as he laid down the law on the need to break graft at any cost. It was a reminder of the strain on a man who has told fellow politicians to get used to the idea of sleeping with a revolver under the pillow.
 
 #36
Four killed, twelve wounded in DPR over past week - report

DONETSK. April 20 (Interfax) - Four people were killed in hostilities in the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) in the period of April 11-17, DPR Ombudsperson Darya Morozova said.

She posted her weekly socioeconomic report for the DPR on her website on Monday.

Morozova quoted official statistics from the DPR Health Ministry and forensic medicine authorities to say that the hostilities killed one civilian and three militiamen and, besides, seven civilians and five militiamen were hospitalized with injuries.

The DPR administration continues the search for bodies of Ukrainian servicemen, but the precise body count remains unknown, Morozova said. The never-ending bombardments are hindering the search, she added.

"The unfounded detention of DPR supporters by Ukraine goes on. Five people, including two civilians and three militiamen, went missing in the period of April 11-17, 2015," the report said.

According to the report, over 9,400 infrastructure elements, including 5,307 homes, 605 electric power lines, 2,669 gas grid facilities, 53 healthcare facilities, 250 schools and kindergartens, 32 culture centers, 53 road infrastructure elements, 56 industrial sites, and 37 bridges, have been damaged or destroyed in the period of hostilities, with damages totaling more than 1.5 billion hryvni.

Public utilities in schools, hospitals and buildings of the prosecution service, the police and the Emergency Situation Ministry have been fully restored in the town of Debaltseve. Besides, power supply has resumed to 388 private households and 101 residential buildings and mobile phone service is good.
 
 #37
The National Interest
April 18, 2015
Petro Poroshenko's REAL Problem (And It's Not Russia)
"If basic rule of law and tolerance for dissent are not observed, what chance does Ukrainian democracy have?"
By Raymond Sontag
Raymond Sontag is an adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for The National Interest.

Never one to miss an opportunity to point fingers westward and score political points, Vladimir Putin on Thursday used the recent killings of pro-Russian public figures in Ukraine to scold Kiev and its allies. Whereas the murder of Russian oppositionist Boris Nemtsov in Moscow is being solved, he said during a four-hour call-in show, "In Ukraine, which is laying claim to the status of a democratic state and is seeking to become part of a democratic Europe, we are seeing none of this. Where are the killers of these people? There is no sign of them...Both Europe and North America choose to turn a blind eye to this." Such cynicism and obsessing over foreign enemies is what we expect from Putin. What was troubling was how similar Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko's reaction to the murders was. "It is evident that these crimes have the same origin," read Poroshenko's official statement. "It is a deliberate provocation that plays in favor of our enemies. It is aimed at destabilizing the internal political situation in Ukraine and discrediting the political choice of the Ukrainian people." In other words, these crimes are the work of foreigners seeking to undermine his government, not evidence of dangerous tendencies within the country.

Ukrainian officials have presented no evidence as to who is behind these murders, but Poroshenko, like Putin, has used them to remind people about external threats and distract from serious internal problems. Of course Poroshenko has a stronger argument than Putin. Russia has forcibly taken land from Ukraine and may still take more, while the West has yet to attack Russia. Still, just as Putin solves nothing by blaming everything the West, Poroshenko solves nothing by blaming everything on Russia. The war Russia started in Ukraine's east has done much to exacerbate the country's existing divisions, radicalize it and make its politics more violent. But these problems are chiefly domestic ones, and by not acknowledging them as such, Poroshenko is missing an opportunity to address them. And it is these problems, not Russian aggression as such, that will present the biggest threat to Ukrainian democracy and statehood.

Ukraine has had a string of opposition figures die in 2015. Between late January and early March, seven former officials associated with deposed President Viktor Yanukovych died in apparent suicides, but many suspect they were murdered. Then this week, Oles Buzina, a pro-Russian journalist, Oleh Kalashnikov, a former member of parliament from Yanukovych's political party, and Sergey Sukhobok were shot and killed. On Friday, Kiev political analyst Volodymyr Fesenko wrote on his Facebook page that he had received a letter from a group called the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) claiming responsibility for the murder of Buzina and Kalashnikov and for three of the seven "suicides." UPA, incidentally, was the name of the Ukrainian partisan paramilitary force that fought Soviet and German armies in the 1940s, suggesting Ukrainian nationalists were taking credit. For Fesenko, this letter proves what he had believed all along about the murders: that Putin did it. "This strengthens my suspicion that Russia's secret services are behind these people (although the actual murderers may not even know it)," he wrote. "Even if these people...believe they are 'Ukrainian patriots,' objectively they are acting in the interests of the external enemy . . . ." Earlier, Fesenko had suggested that Russia's intelligence services had planned the murders to give Putin something to talk about during his call-in show. "It's as if the proof of political terror in Ukraine was specially delivered to him. These are ritualistic victims for Russian propaganda, although they did not play any serious role in the opposition movement," he told Reuters.

Of course we do not know if the note Fesenko received is genuine, or who committed these murders, or how many were actually murders, as opposed to suicides. We do know, though, that Ukraine has a serious problem with radical politics and politically motivated violence and that these problems are greatly exacerbated by the war in the east. Unable to raise an army sufficient to fight the Russian-backed separatist movement, the government has relied on nationalist paramilitary groups to do a good part of the fighting. While this strategy may be a necessity, it does raise questions about the government's ability to control these groups or even to defend itself from them, should it need to. Last fall, right-wing protesters clashed with police outside the parliament building, and this spring, the Dnipro-1 paramilitary group briefly took a state-owned oil company as part of dispute between the government and the oligarch Igor Kolomoisky. The war has also sparked proliferation of weapons in Ukraine, with gun violence on the rise across the country. Beyond the dangers posed by paramilitary groups and freely available arms, the war has seriously aggravated divisions within Ukrainian society between those who feel culturally or linguistically closer to Russia and those who are more oriented toward western Europe. As these recent killings would seem to show, these divisions can be deadly even outside of areas where the war is being fought.

If basic rule of law and tolerance for dissent are not observed, what chance does Ukrainian democracy have? Therefore, it is in Poroshenko and Ukraine's interest to see that the fighting in the east stops for good, even if it means the country de facto loses control of that territory, at least temporarily. If such a loss proves to be part of the price Ukraine pays for a functioning democracy, it will be well worth it. It is also in the interest of Poroshenko and his supporters to not misdiagnose political violence and radicalism as a purely foreign import or as something that hurts the country only to the extent that it discredits the current government. As Ukrainian sociologist Volodymyr Ishchenko put it, "In this twisted logic the far right are criticized first of all for putting their partisan interests above Ukraine's national interests. In other words, they are criticized not for being anti-democratic, reactionary, xenophobic and for propagating discriminatory ideas, but for not being nationalist enough."

Just as there is a troubling symmetry between Poroshenko's and Putin's reactions to recent political violence in Ukraine, there is a broader symmetry to the crises the two leaders' are facing. Putin came to power in large part thanks to his role in quelling separatism in Chechnya, invoking the threat of the country fracturing and, more recently, foreign interface to justify anti-democratic government, all while largely failing to address a mounting domestic economic crisis. Poroshenko has spent his first year in power fighting separatism and foreign interference and at times using these threats to distract from serious domestic problems. If he truly wants to move his country toward democratic Europe and away from Putin's Russia, both politically and geopolitically, he'd do well to stop using Putin's playbook.
 
 #38
PACE president calls for efficient decentralization system in Ukraine

PARIS, April 20. /TASS/. Ukraine needs an efficient system of decentralization and an inclusive political process, President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) Anne Brasseur on Monday in her opening address for the April 2015 part-session in Strasbourg.

"Ukraine needs solid democratic institutions, a sound constitutional and legal framework, an independent, impartial and effective judiciary, a modern and efficient system of devolution of power, and - above all - an inclusive political process to carry out all these reforms," Brasseur said.

The PACE chief reminded that since February 2015 a ceasefire regime has been in place in eastern Ukraine. She emphasized that this is a "fragile" ceasefire "because it is very difficult to enforce and violations happen on a daily basis."

"However, fragile as it is, I believe that it is our chance to move from violence to dialogue. Now, all of us have to shoulder our responsibilities and seize this new opportunity for building peace. Europe, and the international community for that matter, have to do everything possible to help solve the conflict," Brasseur said.

Last week, the Council of Europe announced that offices for informing citizens about the upcoming Ukrainian administrative reform would be open in all the Ukrainian regions.

The agreement on this was reached in Strasbourg between the secretary general of the Council of Europe, Thorbjorn Jagland, and Ukraine's minister of regional development, construction, housing and utilities economy, Gennady Zubko.

These regional centers will help to pave the way for the decentralization that is very important for ensuring a long-term political stability in Ukraine, Jagland said on Friday.
 
 #39
The Guardian
April 20, 2015
Ukraine to rewrite Soviet history with controversial 'decommunisation' laws
President set to sign measures that ban Communist symbols and offer public recognition and payouts for fighters in militias implicated in atrocities
By Lily Hyde in Kiev

In Kiev, a Soviet memorial to the second world war stands at one end of Shevchenko boulevard, which is named after the poet who formulated Ukrainian language and literature as distinct from Russia's.

The boulevard passes monuments to Mykhailo Hrushevsky, a founder of the short-lived Ukrainian People's Republic in 1917, and Mykola Shchors, who fought for the Bolsheviks against that republic. It ends with an empty plinth where a statue of Lenin stood until toppled by protesters in late 2013.

Round the corner, where men in camouflage collect donations for Ukraine's "anti-terrorist operation" in the east, a bookshop - part of a Russian chain - displays a book about Stepan Bandera, the Ukrainian nationalist leader who is a hero for some but also, in deeply entrenched Soviet and Russian rhetoric, the ultimate fascist and Nazi collaborator.

Here in a nutshell is Ukraine's confused and contradictory commemoration of history. While the country struggles for its future in the ongoing war to reclaim breakaway eastern regions, a war is also being waged to reclaim its past.

The Ukrainian president, Petro Poroshenko, is expected to sign a package of laws on "decommunisation", recently passed by parliament, which will lay down an official version of Ukrainian 20th century history. The laws ban Nazi and Communist symbols and the "public denial of the criminal nature of the Communist totalitarian regime 1917-1991"; they open former KGB archives; replace the Soviet term "great patriotic war" with the European second world war, and provide public recognition to anyone who fought for Ukrainian independence in the 20th century.

Proponents say the legislation, based on other post-Soviet countries such as Poland and the Baltic states, is long overdue to free Ukraine of a painful past and create a new national identity based on events repressed or rewritten by the Soviet regime.

"The Communist totalitarian regime set out deliberately to destroy national identity," said Volodymyr Vyatrovych, the 37-year-old historian and head of Ukraine's National Memory institute, who introduced the laws in parliament. "Many people's ideas here are still formed by Communist propaganda, and many events from the past are viewed exclusively through the prism of Communist propaganda."

But others are concerned that the laws will further divide the country by replacing one officially sanctioned version of history with another. "Of course we need history to form a contemporary national identity," said Vasyl Rasevych, senior researcher at the Institute of Ukrainian Studies in Lviv and editor of the internet journal zaxid.net, in a recent interview. "But unfortunately Ukrainian history is so antagonistic and confrontational, it can't perform a consolidating function. It doesn't unite, it divides."

One of the four bills in the package, On the Legal Status and Honouring of Fighters for Ukraine's Independence in the Twentieth Century, covers a long list of individuals and organisations from human rights activists to guerrillas accused of ethnic cleansing. It would allow veterans of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), followers of Bandera, to receive state benefits, and rules that denial or disrespect of their role in fighting for Ukrainian independence is an unlawful "desecration of their memory".

But even a cursory knowledge of Bandera and the two militias will reveal how contentious their role in history has been - not just for Ukraine and Russia but for Europe. This is especially true for Poland, Ukraine's current ally against Russia.

Imprisoned for fighting Polish authorities in west Ukraine in the 1930s, Bandera briefly joined sides with the German army to fight the Soviets, only to fall out with both half the OUN and with the Nazis who returned him to prison for most of the war.

In 1943-4, fighters from both militias were implicated in the slaughter of an estimated 70,000-100,000 ethnic Poles in Volhyn and Galicia; there were also atrocities against the Jewish population. After the war, the militias continued a partisan struggle until the 1950s; Bandera emigrated to Germany to be courted by French and British secret services until he was assassinated in 1959 by a KGB agent.

Post-war Soviet history propagated the image of Bandera and the UPA as exclusively fascist collaborators and xenophobes. The term "Banderite" to described his followers gained a recent new and malign life when Russian media used it to demonise Maidan protesters in Kiev, telling people in Crimea and east Ukraine that gangs of Banderites were coming to carry out ethnic cleansing of Russians.

Historians and activists such as Vyatrovych believe now is the time to replace that negative view for a positive one. "I think now people will start to understand that the UPA is a part of Ukrainian history," Vyatrovych said. "Ukraine needs to remember those who fought and died for their independence, especially now we have a new generation who are fighting and dying for independence."

Myroslava Petsa is part of that new generation. Her grandmother helped UPA fighters as a teenager while her grandfather was fighting in the Red Army to liberate Europe from the Nazis. "After the second world war they both worked in a collective farm seven days a week, practically as slaves of the Communist and collectivisation system," said Petsa, a Kiev-based journalist.

"UPA was a very broad popular movement, they were real freedom fighters. But there were also dark sides to their story. What makes me wary of the newly adopted bill is that history isn't black or white. It takes courage to recognise the dark pages from the past. Own it, say sorry, and then move forward."

The opening of the archives should allow people to do just that, said Vyatrovych, whose National Memory Institute will now be in charge of the archives. "Not one of these laws aims to regulate or limit academic discussion; on the contrary, opening the KGB archive will stimulate discussion."

Vyatrovych defended the provision that outlaws public denial or disrespect of aspects of the fight for Ukrainian independence. Publicly calling those who fought collaborators, he said, "is a way of breaking Ukrainian society".

But Rasevych in Lviv believes that much archival evidence has already been destroyed by partisan researchers on one or the other side of the historical debate, and that the laws will curtail any critical view of recent history in Ukraine. "All we have now are propaganda constructs," he said. "The ideological struggle is ongoing."
 
 #40
Euromaidan Press
http://euromaidanpress.com
April 14, 2015
Defending decommunization: expert answers criticism (interview with Andriy Kohut)
 
The four decommunization laws [read a summary of them here http://euromaidanpress.com/2015/04/10/summary-of-ukraines-four-new-decommunization-bills/] adopted by the Ukrainian parliament on 10 April 2015 were called "20 years overdue" by many, but also raised questions and sharp criticism among others. Volodymyr Viatrovych, the Director of the Institute of National Remembrance, mentioned that if Ukraine was decommunized immediately after independence, there would be no need for the first and second Maidan. However, critics say that the laws may be used to promote the Institute's version of history and stifle free investigation. We addressed some questions to Andriy Kohut, member of the Center for Research on the Liberation Movement, and one of the developers of Bill #2540, which provides access to communist archives of repressions. Kohut also is a director of Digital Archive of KGB documents - project which made open on-line access for more than 20 000 copies of documents GPU-NKVD-KGB and Ukrainian resistance movement. This project started in 2010 when Yanukovych tried to establish censorship of history.

EP: The bills have met both criticism and approval, abroad and in Ukraine. How do you think Ukrainian society will benefit from these new laws the most?

AK: There are many benefits. The space around us influences both our way of thinking and actions. First and foremost - we will forever close the door to a revanchism of the soviet past, as we see in the "DNR" and "LNR" "separatist" projects in the Donbas. The existence of vague hopes that a return to the USSR, romanticized by Russian propaganda, possibly fueled the pro-Russian sentiments all this time.

Ukraine is finally breaking free of the Soviet past, and it starts with the landscape of symbols that we live in.

EP: One can often hear accusations of the Institute of National Remembrances political agenda. Over what period of time were the bills developed and how did you ensure wide participation and debate?

AK: Actually, the development of the bills actually started after the fall of the USSR. Discussions around decommunization were held starting from 1991; there were multiple bills that were proposed and even adopted ever since. The four decommunization laws adopted a few days are the successors of these discussions. They are part of the transition from a closed, totalitarian or post-totalitarian society to an open, democratic one and are a part of transitional justice in legal terms.

Work on these particular four laws started in the fall of 2014 when a committee was created as part of the Reanimation Package of Reforms (RPR) [a civic initiative to facilitate needed reforms in Ukrainian society], where 20 different experts were invited to participate (directors of institutes, activists - different people). Our platform was included in RPR's roadmap of reforms. Updates on the development of this project were emailed not only to the working group, but the entire RPR mailing list. Furthermore, the intentions to hold decommunization were announced by Volodymyr Viatrovych when he became Director of the Institute of National Remembrance. So it's hard to say that the laws came as a surprise. The bill on opening access to archives of the communist regime was developed over a greater period of time, starting from 2011, with discussions going back to 2005.

EP: The bill #2558 condemns the Communist and National-Socialist (Nazi) totalitarian regimes and prohibits using their symbols. Why not fascism?

AK: In our discussions we came to a vision that it's necessary to give an assessment to the crimes committed by the totalitarian Communist regime on Ukrainian land. Similarly as in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Naturally, then it's necessary to denounce the crimes committed by another totalitarian regime, the Nazi regime. We are not prohibiting ideologies, and neither is it possible for us to do so, as people are free to think as they wish, but denouncing the specific criminal and inhumane consequences that totalitarian ideologies amounted to.

EP: The laws were presented to parliament on 31 March and adopted on 9 April 2015. Why were they adopted so quickly and why was so little time given for discussion?

AK: We need to understand that there were two processes involved: the expert process and political-legal process. I can only assume that the Parliament took opportunity of the political moment.  The fast adoption of the laws came as a surprise for us too, we planned on holding more discussions after Easter [celebrated on 12 April 2015]. But decommunization and opening archives were part of the coalition agreement, it is not surprising that Parliament voted the Government's laws.

EP: Bill #2538 makes it illegal to deny Ukraine's right to have fought for independence...

AK: Every nation has the right to self-determination. The bill in the edition of Shukhevych, it has two articles, one about a respectful attitude to the fighters for independence, and about carrying responsibility for a disrespectful attitude under current law, which would be causing moral damage. And the second article is about prohibiting to deny Ukraine's right to have fought for independence. It's not about them being heroes, but about them having the right to have fought for independence.

EP: So who determines what a disrespectful attitude is and how can a free historical investigation be carried out without fear of reprisal for criticism of participants of the liberation movement?

AK: None of the four bills specifies which organ should be responsible for implementing the new laws. Therefore, any citizen that considers the law violated under this legislature should go to court, and the court should hold an expertise. It should prove in court that there was a violation of the law. The law does not specify on creating a special organ for these functions, and if somebody does come forward with this proposal, we will be the first ones to speak against it.

EP: Where will the experts come from? There are fears that the Institute of National Remembrances will monopolize the right to interpret history.

AK: In developing the law, we involved lawyers, and they stated clearly that implementation of the law must be carried out only through court. In any case, the scientific discussion should be carried out freely and the law does not apply to historical studies. In the Roadmap of reforms, we wrote that there should be a separate law that defines the Institute's status in Ukrainian society, it's a separate discussion.

Generally the laws target propaganda and justification of crimes against human rights, not determine the interpretation of history. The law about open archives will be increase access to facts and documents for historians and citizens.

EP: Publicly denying the criminal nature of the communist regime is also prohibited. What about the good things that happened in communist times? How is an objective assessment of Soviet times possible under this law?

AK: The second article of bill #2558 specifies the criminal nature of which can't be denied: abuse of human rights, mass repressions, torture etc. This can't be denied with propaganda aims. In the same law, it's specified that Soviet monuments/imagery of people or events that contributed to the development of Ukrainian culture or science will not be taken down. Many people misinterpret the bills, saying that the communist ideology has been banned. But that's just a result of people reading it wrong. I want to remind about a current law that we have with a similar prohibition: about prohibiting the public denial of the Holodomor. Basically, the law has two practical implications: renaming geographical objects named after Soviet leaders, and prohibiting the propaganda of the "Soviet" and Nazi brand.

EP: There is a bill that tells about preventing falsifications of the history of WWII. Who determines what a falsification is?

AK: In any case, any implementation of the laws will be done in court. The fairness of our courts is another topic, they need reforms also and last year this reform is started.

EP: About amendments. Who can participate in their development and how?

AK: Our group in RPR will have a meeting next week where we will analyze what has been done and further working plans. I am a manager of this group, so if anybody has proposals, they can submit them to me on facebook.

EP: Prof. Marples wrote: "Presumably now historians can be arrested for denying the heroism of a Stepan Bandera or the father of the introducer of the bill, Roman Shukheyvch." What could you answer to him?

AK: That this will never happen. The law specifies it can't be denied that these people rightfully fought for independence. Who a society considers to be heroes is a different question, the processes involved are different, and can't be regulated by laws. So there are no grounds for such fears.

EP: Where will the money to rename streets and to demolish monuments come from?

AK: Changing street signs doesn't cost that much. The process of renaming should be done by the local self-governance bodies. Of course, it will be hard to influence people that will try to sabotage the process. But our logic was that objects around us influence our actions and thoughts.

There can be no two points of view on sculptures of tyrants and murderers that stand on our streets and squares. That Lenin is a unique sculpture? Take it to the museum. You are used to the names of Kirovohrad and Dnipropetrovsk? But you surely understand that there can be no Hitlerburg and Himmlerdorf in the modern world. There is and can be no street named after Enola Gay in USA, and Torquemada square in Spain.

Establishing historical justice and paying tribute to the millions killed by hunger and executed in Gulags is not a trivial thing. One cannot place "bad roads, the currency rate and rising prices" and symbols, dignity, and a pursuit of justice on the same scale of an ideological discussion. There are acts and meanings in a person's life that can't be measured by money or food.

EP: What about T-shirts with Che Guevara, the flag of China, awards of the Second World War and Eternal Flames?

AK: Neither Che Guevara, nor Karl Marx were involved in the Communist regime crimes in Ukraine, so the law does not influence them. The flag of China is an exception as a flag of a modern country. The laws also specifies that the ban on symbolism does not concern objects related to the victory over Nazism, so it shouldn't involve the awards. As for the Eternal Flames, they are also objects commemorating the victory over Nazism, and the Soviet symbols on them should not be destroyed.

 
 #41
Ukrainian-U.S. Fearless Guardian 2015 military exercise begins in Ukraine

LVIV. April 20 (Interfax) - During the Fearless Guardian 2015 international military exercise, Ukraine's National Guard intends to learn from the United States military the practices they have used in operations worldwide, Ukraine's Interior Minister Arsen Avakov said.

"The U.S. special task force has experience received in operations worldwide, and we want to use this experience. Wars are won by skills, not weapons," Avakov said the opening ceremony of the Ukrainian-U.S. command post exercise in the Yavoriv district of the Lviv region on Monday.

He also said it is important that "the Americans openly support Ukraine, including in this form."

The Ukrainian interior minister said he is hoping that Ukraine will soon receive similar support from other countries.

The Ukrainian-U.S. Fearless Guardian 2015 command post exercise began in the Yavoriv district in the Lviv region on Monday. The exercise will last until November 2015.

According to the training program, each stage will involve two companies of the Ukrainian National Guard (each comprising 150 servicemen) and 25 top military officials and the United States European Command will involve 247 servicemen in each stage of the exercise.
 
 #42
Business New Europe
www.bne.eu
April 20, 2015
Ukraine plays hard ball with private creditors
bne IntelliNews

Ukraine is ready to play hard ball in its bid to restructure $15.3bn in foreign debt, was the signal sent by Finance Minister Natalie Jaresko to corporate bondholders in Washington on April 17.

The government wants to secure a $40bn bailout package assembled with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other institutions in March, but under the bailout terms, disbursals are contingent on successful debt restructuring.

The Ukrainian delegation kicked back the first proposal by a group of five creditors led by Franklin Templeton. Together the creditors own around $10bn of Ukrainian debt.

"The creditors' proposal only includes maturity extension". This "wouldn't meet all [the IMF] programme aims", Jaresko said in her first comments about the meeting. Ukraine's debt payments through 2019-25 cannot on average exceed 10% of its GDP, she said, further tightening negotiating space with creditors.

Kyiv has to reach an agreement by the end of May to save $15.3bn over four years, as a condition for receiving the next tranche of a $17.5bn IMF loan. The hope is that a combination of debt writedown and maturity extension will be enough to hit the target sum, but the clock is ticking faster than Ukraine has so far shown that it can act.

"I'm confident that the creditors will see that it's in all of our interests to agree to a standstill and let us have the time," Jaresko said. Then all sides can "move forward with the rest of the restructuring in a fair and transparent fashion".

Franklin Templeton is Ukraine's biggest bondholder with about $7bn of debt, followed by the Russian government, which is demanding repayment of its $3bn Eurobond by the December maturity.

Ukraine has to pay about $10bn to service its debts this year, including corporate and sovereign loans and bonds, with the total debt amounting to $50bn.

The country's US-born finance minister Jaresko says "we have no right to fail" in the restructuring that is urgently needed to rescue its collapsed economy. But the private creditors are also digging in their heels hard to protect their bonds, with dire possible consequences, commentators warn.

"The refuseniks among Ukraine's foreign creditors are engaged in a perilous game of brinksmanship," David Clark, head of the Russia Foundation, wrote in the Financial Times. "If a refusal to negotiate drove Ukraine to default, blame would fall entirely on the shoulders of intransigent creditors."

Russian spanner in the works

Amid wrangling over whether Ukraine's debt is corporate or sovereign, Russia insists that its $3bn Eurobond bought in 2013 is official, although it was not registered as such with the Paris Club of creditors. Ukraine argues the opposite.

Following the talks in Washington, Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov again said restructuring of the bond should be regulated by Paris Club mechanisms, rather than the London Club mechanisms applied to private investors.

"Any speculations regarding the debt's status are simply inappropriate," Siluanov told journalists in Moscow. The minister stressed earlier that he expects Ukraine to fulfil its obligations, and if it doesn't, Russia will go to international courts. He said also Jaresko had assured him that Ukraine's 2015 national budget made provision for repaying the debt to Russia.

The Eurobonds were issued in December 20, 2013, and traded on the Irish Stock Exchange. Purchased with money from Russia's National Welfare Fund, they were part of a scuppered $15bn aid package for Ukraine that Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed with former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych at the end of 2013, before pro-EU protests in Kyiv toppled Yanukovych in February 2014.

Yanukovych, whose circle is accused of siphoning off huge amounts of state money, now lives in exile in Russia. But the legacy of corruption now threatens to torpedo the restructuring drive.

"The political mood in Kiev is darkening, with influential voices in parliament and the government increasingly moving towards the option of a sovereign default," added the Russia Foundation's Clark. "Few Ukrainians feel any moral compulsion to settle the debts of a Yanukovych regime that defrauded the nation, or to pander to those who sought profit by doing business with it."

Tick-tock

The Ukrainian delegation also included Oleksandr Hrytsenko, the head of Ukraine's state-owned Ukreximbank, which is also battling against the clock to restructure its $750mn Eurobond maturing on April 27. The bank recently informed bondholders that it will restructure the obligation by extending its maturity with no writedown of interest or principal.

The bank had previously asked for an initial three-month postponement of maturity, allowing the bond to be included in the overall process of restructuring Ukraine's sovereign debt, which the IMF says must be completed by June.

Still called default

But Ukraine's funding problems will not be solved even if the government succeeds in restructuring the target $15.3bn of foreign debt, according to the rating agency Moody's. The planned restructuring of its Eurobond will qualify as a distressed exchange, which is still a default by Moody's definition.

Debt restructuring is the second largest source of outside financing for Ukraine's IMF programme agreed in March. The Fund itself brings $17.5bn over four years; $9.6bn comes from governments and multilaterals (including Europe, the US and China).
 
 #43
Ukrayina TV (Kyiv)
April 19, 2015
Premier sees efforts to destabilize Ukraine following "classic Russian scenario"

Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk has said that he expects those responsible for last week's murders of pro-Russian journalist Oles Buzyna and former MP Oleh Kalashnikov to be found and suggested that "anti-Ukrainian forces" were seeking to destabilize the country according to the "classic Russian scenario" ahead of the May Day and Victory Day holidays.

Speaking during a pre-recorded interview with the Ukrayina TV channel on 19 April, Yatsenyuk said: "I don't have the right to go into any details of the investigation of these high-profile murders, but an investigative-operational group has been set up, which includes the best specialists of the Prosecutor-General's Office and the Interior Ministry. The investigation is being constantly monitored. I think that this investigation will be completed and I am convinced that the culprits will be found. It is clear why this is being done. I cannot accuse anyone, because that would be incorrect - to put it mildly, but the situation is being fired up and is escalating. And this is being done ahead of the May holidays by anti-Ukrainian forces according to the classic Russian scenario for destabilizing countries. It is very important to tighten security measures ahead of the May holidays and ahead of the 70th anniversary of the end of WW II."

Yatsenyuk said that the government had ordered reinforced patrols by police and National Guard on the streets of Kiev, Odessa, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk and possibly other cities where there is a risk of "provocation".

Yatsenyuk said that the conflict in Donbass could be resolved if Russian President Vladimir Putin fulfilled the Minsk cease-fire agreements. "Putin simply has to take the document called the Minsk agreements, read it and fulfil everything that is written there. First, remove his bandits. Second, remove troops. Third, let's hold transparent and democratic elections. Then, restoration of control over the border, restoration of economic life. We're ready to restore the banking system in Donetsk and Luhansk."

He also said it was important to fight for the "consciousness" of residents of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. "They are under incredible pressure from lying Russian propaganda. We need access for Ukrainian channels, including TRK Ukrayina, in order that they can see and hear you and we can deliver our information."
 
 #44
Wall Street Journal
April 20,, 2015
Welcome Back to Kiev
In less than a year, order has been restored and reforms enacted to maintain in Kiev a free and fair business environment.
By VITALY KLITCHKO
Mr. Klitchko is the mayor of Kiev.

This great city is open for business. Anyone who pays attention to the news might read this statement and wonder if it's an outdated April 1 gag. After all, Kiev is the capital of Ukraine, which is enmeshed in a war with Russia. But Kiev's revival is no joke, and bold businesses understand that getting in early and lending us a shoulder as we push back our challenges is the essence of opportunity.

When I was elected mayor nearly a year ago, Kiev was in shambles. We had just overthrown a corrupt autocrat in the Euro Maidan movement. Central Kiev had been in flames in February 2014, as snipers picked off innocent civilians and protesters tore up the streets, built barricades and set tires afire to defend their turf.

Yet today, if you were to stroll across Maidan, only the memorial signs and flowers for the fallen would tell the story of what happened. In a very short period, we came together, cleaned up the rubble and restored order to Kiev.

The entrepreneurial spirit of Ukrainians, and especially the people of Kiev, abounds. Igor Sikorsky, inventor of the helicopter, was born in Kiev, as were many other "disruptors" of 20th-century industry. In the current century, we are a digital capital, where information-technology outsourcing has grown by an average of 10% year on year over the past decade. Last year, IT exports exceeded $800 million.

Richly endowed with human capital, Kiev already attracts a number of high-tech heavyweights-Samsung, NetCracker and Aricent among them-which have located research and testing facilities here. Some 90,000 students graduate each year from the city's universities and technical institutes, complementing what is already one of the best-educated workforces in Eurasia.

Our innovation thrives on freedom.

Beginning with the annexation of Crimea and followed by arming separatists in eastern Ukraine, external aggression against Ukraine was orchestrated with the goal of undermining our economy and proving a European path to be impassable for us. The fighting in the east has targeted Ukraine's industrial heartland, shutting down mines and factories. All of this is a response to the Maidan movement, because from Moscow's perspective it is existentially vital to prove that people can't prevail over corruption, can't determine their own future and can't prosper without bowing to a foreign leader.

But in Kiev, we are everyday proving the Kremlin wrong. After a winter of discontent, we have emerged stronger.

In 11 months, we have applied Ukrainian ingenuity to turning the capital around. By directing revenues to where they are supposed to go, we have proved ourselves able to get the trains running on time, the streets safe and utilities like heat and electricity functioning-all while creating and sustaining the Western quality of life that our citizens have come to expect.

We're enforcing laws without bias or the kind of favoritism that allowed some businesses in the past to prosper while others were denied opportunity. We've reduced and simplified taxes, and brought the corporate rate down to 18% from 23%. We have moved the city's procurement online in the interests of total transparency, and are modernizing our local police force with Western support.

As the situation for business in Russia continues to worsen, we offer a geographically central launch pad for access to growing markets from Europe to Asia. For the first time in Kiev's history, I have established a one-stop shop for investors to clarify and streamline the regulatory process for registering foreign representative offices in the city, to overcome bureaucratic and rent-seeking obstacles to doing business here.

Nationwide reforms are also under way, and the $17 billion lifeline promised by the International Monetary Fund last month is dependent on a fuller implementation of pro-growth legislation. I am not going tell fairy tales. None of this is easy, and the transformation of our economy won't occur overnight. But it is already happening, and its pace will accelerate because we understand that our survival depends on free and open markets.

Foreign investors need assurance that the host government will protect their legal rights and not rob them blind. In Kiev, foreign investors have that assurance in me, if not by virtue of my heavyweight title then by commitment to fighting for a free and fair business environment. Join us, and we will prosper together.
 
 #45
www.rt.com
April 18, 2015
Polish general 'calls back support' of Ukraine over nationalist glorification

Retired General Waldemar Skrzypczak, an influential figure in the Polish military, says he withdraws all words of support for Ukraine due to the country's sliding towards nationalism. Earlier he advocated supplying heavy weapons to Kiev.

The angry U-turn in attitudes towards the Ukrainian government was published on Friday in the Gazeta Prawna newspaper. Skrzypczak said he is outraged with a law that the Ukrainian parliament passed hours after Polish President Bronisław Komorowski spoke before the MPs to express support for Ukraine.

The law gave benefits to all people who fought for Ukraine's independence throughput history. Those include fighters of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, or UPA, which was responsible for mass killings of Polish citizens in 1943-44. The tragic events are known as Volhynian slaughter in Poland.

"I realized that Ukraine has no concern for Polish people. I am talking about what happened in Volhynia, the slaughter of 100,000 Poles by the UPA," the ex-general said.

"The UPA murdered my uncle. They nailed him with forks to a barn door. For what I know, he was dying maybe for three days. Their savagery was beyond imagination. And Nazi Germany didn't invent the things the Ukrainians did to us. They hacked people with axes," he added.

Skrzypczak said some polish politicians are living in illusion and would not criticize Ukraine to avoid sparking controversy.

"I wonder on what foundation is Ukrainian President Poroshenko building the future of Ukraine. Bloodthirsty nationalism? It's frightening. I have long been telling that Ukrainians must get rid of nationalism, because otherwise cooperation with Poland would be very difficult if possible at all," he said.

As early as January, Skrzypczak was calling on the Polish government to send some armor from its reserves to Ukraine to help its government 'fight against Russia.'

The former general, who was overall commander of Polish land troops in the past and is currently deputy defense minister responsible for defense procurement, is a known advocate of having a strong Polish army and being on guard for possible Russian aggression.

He is also famous for being vocal about things he considers important. In 2009, he retired from the Polish army amid a scandal, when he accused the government of failing to properly supply troops deployed to Afghanistan. He said defense ministry officials' knowledge of war was limited to movies and that their incompetence led to the death of a Polish officer, who died in a firefight with insurgents.

The general's Ukraine-skeptic comments are a rare phenomenon in Poland, which has been one of the most vocal supporters of the new government in Kiev since the armed coup in February last year.
 
 #46
Ukrainians View the People as Sovereign; Russians Think Putin Is
Paul Goble

Staunton, April 20 - Ukrainians and Russians differ fundamentally in the source of sovereignty in their countries, with Ukrainians, like citizens of Western democracies, viewing the people as sovereign and with the Russians, like the subjects of autocracies of all kinds, assuming that their supreme leader is, according to a new poll.

Irina Bekeshkin, director of the Kucherin Democratic Initiative Foundation in Kyiv, recently conducted a poll in the two countries in which she asked respondents "Who according to the Constitution is the bearer of sovereignty and the source of power in your country?" (kasparov.ru/material.php?id=5533CAB46E96C).

Although in fact the constitutions of the two countries specify that sovereignty resides with the people, Ukrainians and Russians gave very different answers to this question.  Fifty-seven percent of Ukrainians said the people are the source of sovereignty, while only 23 percent  of Russians did.

Conversely, Bekeshkin told a recent Russian-Ukrainian roundtable in Kyiv, 55 percent of Russians, but only 26 percent of Ukrainians said that the source of sovereignty and power in their countries was the president, yet another indication, Andrey Illarionov says in reporting this result, that "Russians and Ukrainians are not one people" as Putin imagines.

People in Ukraine "have always known that," he says, and over the last 18 months, "millions of people in Russia as well have become convinced of that." Unfortunately, their number does not include Vladimir Putin who not only continues to insist otherwise but to act on his mistaken vision.
The Kremlin leader's attempts to "realize the chimera of 'a single people' in the current Russian-Ukrainian war," the Russian analyst says, has already resulted in thousands of dead, tens of thousands of wounded, and more than a million refugees. And tragically, there is no end to this carnage in sight.

Almost a century ago, Illarionov continues, during the Russian civil war, "millions of people became victims of an attempt" by the anti-Bolshevik White Russian forces "to realize the chimera 'Russia One and Indivisible'" and the victory over them by the Reds "who destroyed by their terror tens of millions more."

"How many citizens - in one's own land and in its neighbors - " he asks in despair about Putin's policies, "are going to be condemned to be sacrificed to the criminal chimera of 'a single people' in the new war that has been unleashed?"
 
 #47
http://thetruthspeaker.co
April 19, 2015
10 Reasons Ukraine is Dead
By Graham Phillips

Hard as it is to say, sad as it is for those of us who liked Ukraine, as I liked Ukraine - over 2 years living there pre-war, it was a country I was very fond of - but post-Euromaidan, Ukraine is dead. Here's why -

1. If there's no law, it's not a country, it's a failed state - the recent wave of killings of anyone perceived to be 'anti-regime' in Ukraine, accompanied by not only resounding failure to investigate, but actually official endorsement of those responsible - the fact that the police in Ukraine defer to terrorist group Pravy Sektor. Just the start of a long list. There's no law whatsoever in post-Euromaidan Ukraine.

2. If there's no democracy, it's not a country. It's a banana state. On February 22nd, 2014, Euromaidan kicked out not only a democratically-elected president, but a democratically-elected government. It waited three months before holding elections for a new president, 8 months before parliamentary. By that time, all too late, the extremist dmitryyaroshelement had already taken a stake way beyond electoral control - neo-Nazi party Svoboda, despite scoring less than 5% in the parliamentary elections, still vocally sit in Ukraine's parliament, regularly send fighters to the front. Leader of neo-Nazi terrorist group Pravy Sektor Dmitry Yarosh, left, who polled less than 1% in the presidential election, on Interpol's wanted list, is now an official aide to to the Ukrainian military.

3. There will never be peace in Ukraine. There's now a history, and future, of violent revolution. Maidan set the precedent, installed its president in Ukraine by violent revolution. Yet Maidan was comprised of different factions, far from all of whom support Nazi Azov1the president. In fact Ukrainian neo-Nazi Azov Battalion (right) have frequently stated their intention for a 'new Maidan' and a desire to 'bring the fight from Donbass to Kiev'. Even the generally pro-Kiev Moscow Times has written of the likelihood of another Maidan.

Maidan set the terms for the institutionalised demolition of democracy in Ukraine - a couple of thousand extremists, and a mass easily gulled by patriotic slogans, in central Kiev can, violently, topple any government they want. Ukraine's president Poroshenko knows it, does everything he can to appease the radicals. Every objective person knows that whatever, there will never be peace in post-Euromaidan Ukraine.

4. Crimea, once the golden territory of the land, held a referendum to vote out of CrimeaUkraine, will never return to Ukraine, even Germany's leader Angela Merkel admitted that with her recent statement of 'we won't forget it' (but we won't do anything about it).

Once a country loses a part of its territory, it's never the same country.

5. The Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics, are never returning. Ukrainian forces haven't taken any territory there since July of 2014, they've only lost territory. DPR and LPR forces have consolidated lines, and if there is movement, it will only be Fullscreen capture 18042015 231746.bmpto take more of Donbass - currently they have around 1/3 of the region which once produced 80% of all Ukraine's coal, but from which the DPR and LPR do not supply to Ukraine any more, while industrial production in the rest of former industrial heartland Donbass has mostly ground to a halt.

The DPR and LPR have held a referendum, and election, to vote themselves out of Ukraine. The majority of those in Ukraine-occupied Donbass voted to secede. Meanwhile those all over Ukraine are becoming both less concerned with the 'retaking' of DPR and LPR territory, and more ambivalent towards Ukraine due to 6. -

6. Normal life is almost impossible in Ukraine. Inflation in Ukraine is at 272%, the Fullscreen capture 19042015 102426.bmphryvnia's worth at less than 40% of what it was. Inflation has rocketed, salaries have collapsed, businesses across Ukraine have closed. In short, people don't have any money in Ukraine anymore - sales of new cars down 67% year-on-year - production of cars down 96%, 46 banks declared insolvent in the last year.

As for the eternal thorn in Ukraine's side, corruption, one which apparently became so pressing one of the defining aims of Maidan was to extricate it - it's even worse than it was before.

And for Ukrainian soldiers killed in action in Donbass, sources were estimating that at over 20,000 last August. I've seen the bodies of dozens of Ukrainian soldiers, how many of those were identified, fewer than a quarter. Across Ukraine - extreme poverty, hyper-inflation, unemployment, and relatives who left, or were mobilised, to fight in Donbass, disappeared forever, whose fate will never be known. There's no normal in Ukraine anymore.

7. Ukraine's debt is over $80 billion - set to hit $100 billion soon, 100% and rising of a sinking GDP. An agreed recent IMF bailout programme of $17,5 billion would only scratch the surface. Ukraine's economy shrunk Ukraine business7.5%, by conservative estimates, in 2014. Estimates for this year range from 6% to over 20%. European governments pledge support, meanwhile European businesses withdraw on mass, hundreds have already left the Ukrainian market, most of the 600 German firms operating in Ukraine conducting an audit about withdrawing from the market.

Trade with the country which was Ukraine's leading export and import parter by far, Russia, understandably decimated, Ukraine's economy is stricken, and only going down.

8. The whole meaning of 'Ukraine' has changed - just look at a Google of Ukraine from 2011, 2012 and 2015 -
[Graphic here http://thetruthspeaker.co/2015/04/19/10-reasons-ukraine-is-dead/]

Ukraine now is associated with blood, death, war. There's blood associated with the Ukrainian flag from its military shootings in Odessa to Mariupol, to its military relentlessly shelling civilian areas of Donbass. The perception, identity, the very definition of 'Ukraine' has changed forever.

9. There's no one who could make Ukraine one again. There's no political figure who can unite the former country. No one elected or placed in Kiev could ever win the support of those regions which have broken away, by the very fact of their being connected to Kiev. No political figure would ever be elected in those seceded regions on a 'united Ukraine' platform.

There's simply no one who can make Ukraine one again.

10. There will be a 'Ukraine', whatever that is, in future. But the 'Ukraine', to some simply 'the Ukraine' is finished. It's dead. The sooner those pro-Ukraine accept that, the more lives will be saved, the quicker they can find what, where, 'Ukraine' is, after all, and start to build that, rather than destroy the former Ukraine.
 
 #48
The Globe and Mail (Canada)
April 17, 2015
The Soviet Union didn't die
By Serhii Plokhy
Serhii Plokhy, professor of history at Harvard University, is the 25th winner of the Lionel Gelber Prize for his book The Last Empire: The Final Days of the Soviet Union. Serhii Plokhy will receive his award and deliver a free public lecture on April 21 at the Munk School of Global Affairs in Toronto.

Last Sunday, as Orthodox Christians throughout the world celebrated Easter, many in Ukraine's war-torn Donbass region prayed for peace. It did not come. That day, in fact, the shelling intensified. According to Ukrainian authorities, there were 11 mortar attacks by Russian-backed separatists. In villages on the Ukrainian side, people were afraid to go to church to bless their Easter bread, and in some places Easter services were cancelled altogether. Monday brought artillery shelling and tank attacks. Six Ukrainian soldiers were killed and 12 wounded. On Wednesday, OSCE observers counted more than 700 explosions around the city of Donetsk.

This kind of news no longer makes headlines in the West. It has become the norm, despite the recently signed Minsk II agreement negotiated by Germany's Angela Merkel and France's Fran�ois Hollande. The key factor in the lack of progress remains the position of Russia, which continues to arm, supply and reinforce with its mercenaries the separatist armies in Ukraine's east. Why does Russia do so?

Some world leaders, including Ms. Merkel, have suggested that Russian President Vladimir Putin is living in another world. Former American president Bill Clinton thinks Mr. Putin is trying to restore the greatness of Russia as a 19th-century empire. Mr. Putin denies that. But he has never concealed his regret, even bitterness, about the fall of the Soviet Union. In a speech on the occasion of the Russian annexation of the Crimea in March, 2014, he referred to the Soviet collapse as a form of robbery of Russia.

That month, the Soviet empire that had disappeared 23 years earlier struck back as the Russian leadership decided to rewrite history. The saga of Soviet disintegration seems to have taken an unexpected turn. What happened in 1991, however, can not only help explain the origins of the current crisis, but also suggest a solution.

In late November, 1991, on the eve of the Ukrainian referendum that showed overwhelming (more than 90 per cent) support for independence, then-president Boris Yeltsin of Russia explained to U.S. president George H.W. Bush that Russia would not stay in the Soviet Union if Ukraine departed - it did not want to be outnumbered and outvoted by the Muslim republics of Central Asia. Mr. Yeltsin's advisers were telling him that Russia could not afford to subsidize other republics: Oil prices were barely above $20 per barrel, after falling to $10 earlier in the year.

Like many other former imperial powers, Russia opted out of the empire because it lacked the resources to keep the costly imperial project going. Unlike most of its counterparts, however, it kept the rich oil and gas resources of the empire - most of the Soviet oil and gas reserves were located in Russian Siberia. Russian control over oil and gas resources made divorce from the empire in 1991 easier in economic terms and prevented armed conflict between Russia and the republics that declared independence. Over the past decade, rising oil and gas prices have made it possible for Russia to rebuild its economic potential and military might, allowing it to reopen the question of disputed borders and territories and step up its efforts to gather back the Soviet republics more than 20 years after the Soviet Union's collapse.

But the events of the past year have shown that there is no easy way back to the imperial past. Russia has paid an enormous political and economic price for its venture into Ukraine. The pressure of Western sanctions, coupled with low oil prices, helped to send Russia's economy into recession. The annexation of the Crimea, which now drains more money from Russia's state budget than Chechnya, and the ongoing war in the Donbass add to the existing price tag.

The time has come for the Russian leadership and the public at large to look back at 1991 not as a year of humiliation to be overcome, but as a time when the Russian leadership realized that the age of empires was over and made a number of pragmatic political and economic decisions that benefited Russia not only in the short but also in the long term.
 
 #49
www.opendemocracy.net
April 17, 2015
Russian dissidents seek asylum in Kyiv
As oppression heats up in Russia, post-revolutionary Ukraine is attracting political �migr�s from the Russian opposition.
By Anna Yalovkina
Anna Yalovkina is a journalist from Kyrgyzstan and a correspondent at the internet portal Vecherny Bishkek. She writes for lenta.ru and films video for RFERL.
 
From the moment the Maidan started in Ukraine, Russian authorities rushed to pass judgement on the emergent revolution, supporting President Viktor Yanukovych in any way they could. Russia's leadership feared that the revolution could spread to Russia. Accordingly, Russian state media responded with a massive information campaign against the Maidan, convincing citizens that Ukraine had suffered an illegitimate coup and that all members of the opposition are 'fifth columnists' and 'agents of the West.'

The Russian government's apprehensions were, in a certain sense, justified. Despite mass propaganda, some citizens in Russia began calling for a Maidan in their own country. After the change of leadership in Kyiv and the outbreak of conflict, the majority of the Russian opposition came out in favour of Ukraine in its war against separatist forces in the country's Donbas region.

But in a country where writing a provocative Facebook post, attending a protest action or making a public declaration out of line with the government's position are potential grounds for criminal prosecution, individuals and groups have started to make their way to Ukraine.

Russia's activists continue the fight in Kyiv

A certain 'clique' of Russian �migr�s has emerged in Kyiv. Despite their ideological differences, they're all one degree of separation or less from one another, and they gather at a certain cafe in the old city centre to discuss politics and their plans for the future of Ukraine and Russia. One wants to simply split up Russia into independent republics, another wants to make Russia part of Europe, and the third is anxious for reform.

But they are united, at least, by a shared dissatisfaction with Putin's government and an inability to return to their homeland.

Take Irina Belacheu, a chemical engineer from suburban Moscow. Belacheu first travelled to Ukraine in December 2013 - first, simply as a tourist to the Maidan, but then as full participant in the proceedings. Given that Maidan protesters were perceived in Moscow as merely a disgruntled mob at the time, Belacheu organised a 'school of resistance' with her colleagues. Here, participants discussed the construction of a democratic state, inviting economists, lawyers, and political analysts to give lectures. The Moscow school continues, but now, after the Maidan, Belacheu decided to open a branch in Kyiv, even if she does miss home.

'I was just an activist,' Belacheu says. 'I went to protests and marches against Putin's policies. We saw that they were leading the country towards a catastrophe. After taking part in various events, I understood that I could no longer fight the propaganda that's infiltrated the whole of Russian society.

'When I protested with a picket that read, "Ukrainians and Russians are brothers, no to war", I encountered strong aggression. One man even wanted to fight me! People in the office reacted very negatively to me. In Russia, people simply do not accept the truth. And I decided to go to Kyiv and organise the School of Resistance,' she explains.

Your average down-on-their-luck Russian dissident can quickly find a home in the centre of Kyiv. Over social media, they can make contact with other people who've already left Russia under a cloud.

This is exactly what Pavel Shekhman, a blogger from Moscow, did. 'I was against Putin from the start. Since 2007, I've been taking part in unsanctioned protests. That was the first time I was arrested. For me, the Maidan was the fulfilment of our dreams. What we wanted to see in Moscow had happened in Kyiv,' Shekhman told me.

In Moscow, a criminal case was brought against Shekhman for a blog post, which reproduced news of the shooting of 11 Ukrainian soldiers. The post stated that the 11 soldiers had been shot for refusing to give interviews to Russian journalists, and in response Shekhman called for these journalists themselves to be killed. Shekhman was first arrested and ordered not to leave the country, then placed under house arrest. Shekhman was later accused of inciting violence and hatred of a social group. On 14 February, Shekhman managed to escape from house arrest and went straight to Kyiv.

Upon arrival in Kyiv, Shekhman was cared for by virtual - now real - friends from Ukraine, who had supported him in his journey. He was known, after all, as a Russian who opposed Putin's government in Russia.

Shekhman was met at the border by Vladimir Malyshev, an activist who regularly took part in marches and protest actions in Moscow and St Petersburg. Malyshev had already been in Kyiv for a year; like many others, he had travelled to the capital of neighbouring Ukraine to take part in the Maidan. He had the same logic for leaving as them: the fight wasn't going to bear fruit in Russia, so it had to start in Ukraine.

Together, Malyshev and Shekhman decided to start a newspaper about Ukraine. They had no desire to leave Ukraine, nor to return to Russia.

'Imperialists are the real traitors in Russia'

Sitting in Kyiv, Olga Kurnosova has been involved in Russian politics for a long time. While Kurnosova was elected a local deputy in St Petersburg (specialising in science and research) during the early 1990s, in 2003 she joined Aleksandr Dugin's Eurasia party.

Later joining Garry Kasparov's United Civil Front, Kurnosova was an active participant in 2006 protests, including the Marches of the Dissenters in Russia's second city, and later the Marches of Millions in 2011-2012. Later, in 2008, Kurnosova joined the Solidarity movement, but was expelled four years later on grounds of nationalism.

More recently, in January 2014, Kurnosova formed the Committee of Solidarity with the Maidan - a Russian anti-war movement which aims to support Ukraine in its conflict with Russia - together with other members of the opposition.

But in October 2014, Kurnosova left Russia in the middle of the night, travelling by train across the territory of Belarus with her mobile switched off. She bought the ticket using someone else's passport.

'My flat in Moscow had already been broken into a few times,' Kurnosova says. 'I wasn't even living there anymore. I was living at friends' flats. Three days after I moved to another friend's place, the police showed up at my flat again. And it was then I understood that there was no point sticking around waiting to find out when I'd be arrested.'

Finding herself in Kyiv, Kurnosova decided to continue the fight for a democratic and European Russia. Kurnosova declined to get into details about how she has been doing this, noting that revealing her methods may hamper her desired results.

The newly-minted �migr� believes that the future of Russia depends on Ukraine and openly confesses her love for both countries. 'In my view, as long as war rages between Ukraine and Russia, I cannot leave this place. Without a victory for Ukraine, there can be no victory for Russia.'

Back in 2003, Kurnosova supported Aleksandr Dugin's Eurasia party and espoused what she now views as 'imperialist' talking points, which centred on the creation of the Eurasian Union in the post-Soviet space. However, she now considers 'imperialists' the main enemies of Russia, criticising the idea of a unified 'Russian world' (Russkii mir).

'It's all a political construct created to justify the debauchery that's currently taking place. It has no relation to the words they use for it. The "Russian world" is Tchaikovsky, Rachmaninoff, Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Gagarin. In no way is it Putin,' says Kurnosova.

According to Kurnosova, the Eurasian Economic Union was established in order to justify an Asiatic style of governance - Russia has gotten lost and ended up in Asia, and needs to return home. And its home is Europe. For Kurnosova, though, home is St Petersburg and she wants to return, even though her work in Kyiv is more important.

'Imperialists are the true traitors. Empire is a feature of the last century. A proper place [among countries] isn't won by brandishing nuclear weapons, but by top-level education, advanced sciences, and cities with good roads and nice buildings. I want Russia to be a country in which people are happy. This is a lot more than empire,' concluded Kurnosova.

'Russia will soon split up'

The political analyst Pavel Mizerin, who specialises in Russian-Ukrainian relations, has lived in two homes since 2004.

Mizerin has worked on election campaigns in both Russia and Ukraine, choosing primarily liberal candidates. Having returned to his hometown of St Petersburg in 2012, Mizerin admits that he could hardly recognise his own country. At that time Mizerin began to feel that democracy in Russia was under threat, while in Ukraine, the situation was, at least, more open.

Mizerin is an activist in the Free Ingria movement, a fringe group which supports the separation from Russia of the former Novgorod Republic (territory conquered by Muscovy in the 15th century). The political analyst believes that St Petersburg and all of 'Ingria' should shift towards Europe and cast off 'Moscow's Asiatic authoritarian type of government.'

It is this very idea that first brought Mizerin to the attention of the authorities. But the FSB intervened directly for an unexpected reason - his position regarding EuroMaidan.

When the first demonstrations began in Kyiv in November 2013, Mizerin often commented on them in the media, connecting the outcome of the EuroMaidan with the future of Russia and the whole of Eastern Europe. Mizerin published a whole string of articles with his predictions on the victory of the protesters. Then the FSB invited him to come in for a chat.

The conversation with the agents was not a friendly one. A young man came in with a thick binder of documents, listing Mizerin's activities in Ukraine over the past two years.

The conversation took on increasingly dark tones. According to Mizerin, the meeting ended with threats directed at both him personally and his relatives.

'My colleagues helped me find a lawyer. He advised me to leave the country for a while. He said that I could be issued a notice not to leave. On 8 February, I left Russia and by 9 February I was in Kyiv,' said Mizerin.

Mizerin ended up in Kyiv at the most critical period of Maidan and immediately got involved in the action. Breaking up cobblestones and building barricades, Mizerin simultaneously described everything he saw on social media and giving interviews to Russian opposition outlets. Two weeks after Mizerin arrived, Viktor Yanukovych fled the country.

This activist for the secession of the northwest part of Russia is sure that the Russian Federation cannot survive without splitting up. 'We're looking at the agony of a state, where Tatar and Mongol political culture has been imposed on Moscow and [the city of] Vladimir's political traditions. The result is a monster - first the Russian Empire, then the Soviet Union and now modern Russia,' Mizerin explains.

Mizerin hopes that instead of Russia there will be a confederation of free provinces and republics, and his region - St Petersburg and Novgorod  - will become independent and join the European Union.

Digging in

While the conflict between Russia and Ukraine drags on, Russian political �migr�s see Kyiv as an island where their brave slogans are not shouted down, but amplified. Finding themselves in a Russian speaking space where the media are prepared to broadcast their ideas, they have no intention of leaving their ideological battlefield in Kyiv.