#2
Business New Europe
www.bne.eu
April 14, 2015
The rise and fall of the Russian oligarchy
Newly declassified US documents, released to bne IntelliNews, show how Vladimir Putin's candidacy was a compromise after a fierce battle between pro-US oligarchs and pro-state conservatives.  
By Graham Stack

Fifteen years after the then unknown Vladimir Putin took over the Russian presidency, analysts still puzzle over how he arrived in the position. Newly declassified documents from President Bill Clinton's administration, released to bne IntelliNews, show how Putin's candidacy was a compromise after a fierce battle for power in Russia between pro-US oligarchs and pro-state conservatives. At stake was not just power in Russia, but the crucial question of Russia's relationship with the West.

Russia's 'oligarchy' took power during Yeltsin's re-election in 1996, when they used his reliance on funding from Russia's leading seven bankers to acquire the cream of the country's resource-producing assets.

According to the documents from the Clinton administration, which were released under a mandatory declassification review, one of the chief ideologists of Russia's freshly minted oligarch system was Russian-Israeli banker and media magnate, Vladimir Gusinsky, owner of Most Bank and TV channel NTV.

Gusinsky came to a November 1996 lunch meeting with US embassy officials with an important message: the oligarchs were here to stay - but they should not be feared by the US. Oligarchy was a fitting governance system for Russia, and would put the country on a pro-US course.

"Russia, Gusinsky explained, was not a democratic or a European country; it is an Asiatic country," he said, according to embassy records, with Gusinsky's name redacted but implicit. "The country was run by an oligarchy, of which businessmen like him were an integral part, and would be for some time," Gusinsky told the US diplomats.

"Our friends in the West" had been right to criticise the oligarchs in the past, he said, but now they had taken on "responsibilities for Russia's national interests".

Gusinsky "did not deny that many Russian businessmen, including himself, had engaged in dubious activities, especially as they were setting up their operations and accumulating capital", he told the diplomats. "Nevertheless, a number of big businessmen had now emerged - for example, Berezovsky's seven bankers [Boris Berezovsky himself, Vladimir Gusinsky, Mikhail Fridman, Vladimir Vinogradov, Aleksandr Smolensky, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Vladimir Potanin] - who were so big and influential that they no longer had to engage in such activities and no longer did," the document reads. Gusinsky claimed that allegations of oligarchs' links to organised crime were spread by Russia's security services, with the aim of stemming capital flight.

Rule of seven bankers

Of all the 1990s oligarchs, none was more powerful than Berezovsky, who coined the phrase "the rule of seven bankers". Berezovsky attained high political office, allowing him to directly shape Russian domestic and foreign security policy - at the same time as being a citizen of Israel.

Berezovsky acknowledged that his power was based on his control over TV channel ORT. "90% of all TV influence is concentrated in the top three channels: ORT, RTR and NTV," Berezovsky told US diplomats in 2000, according to the declassified documents. Of these, his own ORT was by the far the most powerful, he said.

With ORT as his power base, Berezovsky set himself apart from all other oligarchs in terms of his political ambitions. He sought and gained influence not only on key domestic political questions, including the country's territorial integrity, but also directly on Russia's foreign policy.

At the height of his power, Berezovsky was deputy head of Russia's powerful security council, but, as the documents make clear, security council head Ivan Rybkin was merely his pawn.

In this capacity, Berezovsky actively sought US backing in 1996 for what he promised would be a "radically pro-Western policy", according to an account to US diplomats in 1996 provided by then Georgian president and former Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze.

Shevardnadze was backed in Georgia by Berezovsky's close business partner and friend Bardi Patarkatsishvil, and appears to have acted as wingman for Berezovsky to approach the US in 1996.

In a meeting with a US ambassador-at-large in Tbilisi in November 1996, Shevardnadze told US diplomats that Berezovsky was an "extraordinary person", who "wanted a radically different foreign policy, putting Russia squarely with the West". "He merited US support," Shevardnadze advised, but "support would have to be done in the right dosages". In time, "he would develop into a necessary and useful man," Shevardnadze said.

In particular, Shevardnadze said, Berezovsky was entirely free of any interest in expanding Russian influence across the post-Soviet space, for instance viewing embryonic plans for a post-Soviet customs union as "nonsense".

Berezovsky's plans for a pro-Western revolution in Russian foreign policy had to find a way of countering then foreign minister Evgenny Primakov. Primakov was a former head of the KGB and strongly sceptical regarding the West's intentions towards Russia. According to Shevardnadze, Berezovsky intended to undermine Primakov's position in that he "wanted to create something like a secretary of state within the Russian security council". The powers of the security council were not defined in the constitution, and critics feared it could be used to create a parallel government outside any parliamentary control. At the same time, Berezovksy sought to sideline Primakov.  "Berezovsky felt Russian policy should radically change, and he understood this would be impossible without changes in personnel," Shevardnadze said.

US diplomats were well aware of the negative reports in both Western and Russian media alleging that Berezovsky, the so-called "godfather of the Kremlin", was involved in corrupt schemes such as siphoning funds from state-owned national carrier Aeroflot, as well as benefiting from crony privatisations. There is no sign in the documents they ever committed themselves to support him, as Shevardnadze wished. "Deputy security council chairman Berezovsky is a dangerous figure," Pavel Gusev, newspaper publisher and editor of leading Russian paper Moskovsky Konsomolets, told US diplomats. "He is a pure mafioso, and his appointment is proof that major criminal groups have reached the highest levels of government."

The only question of wrongdoing discussed in the declassified documents is Berezovsky's admission that he held Israeli citizenship along with Russian, which was illegal and especially questionable for the deputy head of the security council. "I did it in 1993 and had totally forgotten about it," he told US diplomats somewhat implausibly.  He also claimed to have recently revoked his Israeli citizenship. "Judging by a phone conversation he had in pol/int chief's presence, he was seeking to have the revocation antedated to precede his appointment to the security council," the dispatch commented drily.

'Do it quickly'

The oligarchs came to power at the same time as Nato launched its controversial eastwards push. US diplomats record encountering deep-seated antagonism to the move in Moscow. "Utterances about the undesirability of Nato expansion and the need for 'special agreements' were heard ad nauseum around town," American diplomats wrote in 1997.

With the US looking to overcome Russian suspicions, the oligarchs offered one obvious channel, given their monopoly on Russian TV and their search for international legitimacy. The oligarchs thus lost not time in showing themselves the strongest backers in Russia of Nato's expansion. Berezovsky even backed an apparent offer to Russia to join the military alliance. "It was a mistake for Russia not to capitalise immediately on Nato's invitation to Russia to become a member, " Berezovsky told US diplomats later at a meeting in February 1999. Berezovsky said at the meeting that there was considerable support for US in Russia among the intelligentsia, both "as the carrier of democratic ideals as well as a powerful country with global plans".

Igor Malashenko, right-hand man of Gusinsky and president of Gusinsky's flagship NTV channel, was even more gung-ho over Nato expansion than the US diplomats themselves. While US diplomats were prepared to work with Russia to overcome misgivings over the policy, Malashenko simply advised US diplomats at a meeting in 1997 to just "do it quietly".

Malashenko compared Russia's position relative to the West in the 1990s to Germany or Japan's position after their World War II capitulations, but said that the country's leadership failed to recognise this. "Russia lost the Cold War, but you will never hear any of our leaders say this," Malashenko said, as quoted by the US diplomats.

"Malashenko's injunction to the US to just get on with Nato enlargement 'but do it quietly' is a useful warning of the need for a deft hand in the present politically charged atmosphere," was the US takeaway from the encounter.

From Primakov to Putin

Open oligarch support for Nato expansion may have deepened suspicion of the Western alliance among conservative figures in Russia's foreign policy and security elites, who feared that the oligarchs were ready to sell out their country to the West.

The diplomatic dispatches show how competing foreign policy positions - pro-US vs Russia-centric - were quickly enmeshed with the domestic struggle over power and money at the end of the Yeltsin era. Berezovsky's struggle for political supremacy with Primakov, whom he called his "ideological enemy", ran parallel to Primakov pushing back against Berezovsky's business practices in 1999.

Primakov had become prime minister in September 1999 following Russia's default in August 1998. By early 1999 he was a strong favourite for the presidency, with elections due in March 2000, and Yeltsin barred from standing for a third time. Under Primakov, government agencies had carried out checks of Berezovsky's business empire. Primakov at the same time opposed the West over military action against Slobodan Milosevic's Serbia.

Berezovsky directly tried to enlist US support to oust Primakov from the post of prime minister in May 1999, and thus to scupper Primakov's presidential ambitions, the documents reveal.

At a crucial meeting with US diplomats in February 1999, following the first government checks of his business, Berezovsky warned that, "Primakov actually is as red as a tomato'" and that, "Primakov would not serve as prime minister beyond May". Berezovsky said he was moving "indirectly" to oust Primakov and sought assurances from the US that they would support what he called a "soft landing" for Primakov in favour of a new government.

Berezovsky then switched to English to ask for US support for a new government. "Such a government would understand and have a 'clearer' approach on who and how the economy should be led. In this case, he asked, would the US be ready to help stabilise the situation in Russia? Would the US be able to move the country forward?" the documents relayed.

US diplomats were cautious about getting caught up in domestic feuding, despite the foreign policy advantages it promised them. "Berezovsky's thinly-veiled query about US support in such a circumstance and his well-developed penchant for scheming should be interpreted as a warning to be extra cautious about reacting to rumors or events in the coming months too quickly," they wrote.

In the event, Yeltsin fired Primakov on May 12, sending shockwaves through Russian politics. Yelstin appointed Sergei Stepashin to succeed Primakov, only to replace him six weeks later with the politically unknown Vladimir Putin.

One year after Berezovsky had conspired to oust Primakov, Vladimir Putin was president and Berezovsky on his way out.

Death of an oligarch

Why did Berezovsky miscalculate Putin so badly? The main reason cited in the US diplomatic dispatches is exactly Berezovsky's longstanding feud with, and fear of, Primakov. "Putin is better than Primakov," Berezovsky told US diplomats bluntly in 2000. In contrast to Primakov, Putin had said he would not revise the controversial privatisations of the 1990s, through which oligarchs acquired ownership of key assets in the resource industries.

Berezovsky appears not to have anticipated that Putin would clip the oligarchs' political wings, perhaps because for him and his fellow oligarchs political and economic power and were one and the same. Putin's ideological mix of capitalism and conservative authoritarianism was new in Russia, which was used to a binary opposition of pro-Soviet statist forces and supporters of pro-Western laissez-fair policies.

Berezovsky was slow to catch on. "Putin is going down the path of Peron or Pinochet - not seeking an authoritarian state per se, but pursuing the goal of a democratic state via an authoritarian path," Berezovsky told US diplomats in late 2000.

Not only was Putin against the oligarchs, but he was also suspicious of their pro-US policy preferences. "Putin fears neither the US nor Nato, but thinks the US holds positions that run counter to Russian interests," Berezovsky warned the US.

Contrary to reports that Berezovsky had selected Putin as presidential candidate, Putin and Berezovsky seem to have had little contact with each other before Putin became president, which may have been another reason for Berezovsky's misjudging him. Berezovsky himself told US diplomats that he backed new foreign minister Ivan Ivanov to succeed Primakov as prime minister in 1999, although Putin eventually got the nod, after an interlude of six weeks.

Oligarch banker Pyotr Aven confirmed to US diplomats that there was no special tie between Putin and Berezovsky, even "noting that he himself had introduced the two", US diplomats wrote. "Putin knows no-one," Aven told the diplomats, while at the same time acknowledging that the oligarchs have "no instrument of influence over him".

Soon Berezovsky realised that his efforts to keep Primakov out of office had backfired, and that his power was in decline. "We understand that from an early stage in the Putin administration, Berezovsky lost his privileged access to the Kremlin, and was required to apply for permission each time he wished to visit there," US diplomats wrote in 2000.

Berezovsky put on a typical show of bravado, boasting of his willingness to resist the Kremlin. "They can put me in jail but it won't help," he boasted to diplomats. In the end he left the country to avoid jail on fraud charges relating to Aeroflot and the car dealership LogoVAZ that he controlled, and settled in the UK, from where he continued attempts to organise opposition to Putin.

Only once did American diplomats see a different, anxious Berezovsky, which may have presaged his suicide from depression in 2013, after a devastating London courtroom defeat to former partner Roman Abramovich in 2012. After Primakov's government had ordered the first checks on Berezovsky's businesses in 1999, spelling the beginning of the end of his business empire, Berezovsky's "obvious signs of worry [were] reflected on the face and in the voice of the reputed oligarch", who "spoke in hushed tones", the US ambassador wrote of his troubled guest.

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#3
Subject: Review of Clifford Gaddy's presentation on "Operative in the Kremlin" Richmond, VA
Date:     Mon, 13 Apr 2015
From:     David Hayter <hayterd@mymail.vcu.edu>

Last week I attended a presentation by Clifford Gaddy on his book on Putin, and did a short write-up of it.  

David Hayter
VCU Globe Assistant
Global Education Office
Virginia Commonwealth University
Richmond, Virginia
--

On April 8, 2015 Clifford Gaddy, author of Mr. Putin:  Operative in the Kremlin, spoke for Richmond Virginia's World Affairs Council.  The talk didn't do much in the way of summarizing the book, and he actually didn't speak of Mr. Putin to any great extent.  One issue here may have been in the format - since it was for a more general audience than say a Slavic Studies conference, more time had to be devoted to background information and some things were spoken of in more general terms.  That said, he was able to give some good historical background on Russia's economy, as well as some hints to the thesis presented in his book (co-written with Fiona Hill.)  Their basic premise is twofold, that we do not know the "real" Putin, and that that is exactly how Putin wants it.

Gaddy explained this as the first error that Western leaders make when trying to work with Putin; they think that they understand him, that they know how he will react to certain deals or pressures, that he might react the same way as any of them would.  This incredible oversight is one of the many reasons that we once again see the West in a deadlock with Russia.  The other being that the West has a very US/EU-centric outlook, a club which Russia has been denied access to time and again (see: NATO), and therefore views with enmity.  It is no wonder that little progress is made when one side holds the other in contempt, and the latter is oblivious to this fact, and cannot predict the former's actions.

Before going into an anecdote about Putin himself, Gaddy first drew attention to the importance of the oil and gas sectors in Russia's economy.  True, they are not the only sources of revenue for Russia, but he described them as two pillars on which all other industry stands.  Without successful energy income, the remainder of Russian industry would not be able to operate.  With that background in mind, Gaddy segued into a discussion of the oft-reviled oligarchs of Yeltsin's Russia.  He reviewed information about their seizure of major industries, including those already stressed as most important:  oil and gas.  This scenario was to be kept in mind while Mr. Putin was introduced to us.

The standard information was given on Putin's political career - KGB officer to Committee for External Relations in Petersburg, to head of FSB to Prime Minister to President.  The details Gaddy sought to illuminate were that in his time at the Committee, Putin was amassing incriminating data on the oligarchs - such as failures to pay taxes and corrupt back-door deals.  Gaddy explains that as Putin moved up from each level of the organization, he would have the previous underlying division closed.  This, he explains, kept all of the incriminating files in the hands of Putin and only Putin.  This, Gaddy continued, is one of the keys to executing successful blackmail - making sure that nobody else has access to the information in question.

And so we were brought to a summary of the secret blackmail meeting between Prime Minister Putin and the oligarchs, in which he revealed to them the files that he had been keeping on their activity, and that in return for keeping the details secret, the oligarchs must keep out of political life, and, should the time come where Putin needed a monetary favor, it would be in their best interest to oblige.  The lesson here from this story, is that only someone with Putin's background in the KGB, an operative, could have calculated such a long term plan.  Gaddy claims this to be one of the key things that we also fail to understand in the West:  the mentality of the operative.

In all, the talk provided at least an interesting story of what Putin may have done throughout the 1990s, but that is about where it ended, as a story.  As Timothy Ash described in his review of the newly (2015) revised second edition of the book for Business New Europe, the authors do "a really excellent job in trying to piece together elements of Putin's past to try to understand the man."  This is the main criticism I would make of the presentation, that it is comprised mostly of conjecture, and based very little on fact.  I think perhaps the authors, who have met with Putin in economic settings, caught a glimpse of what they describe as "operative" behavior, in his reluctance to reveal his true self and ambitions, and had to find ways to present their case in book form.

One refreshing element of the presentation, was that Gaddy showed a clear amount of respect for Putin, which is not the norm among most of today's analysts.  He made mention of the fact that Putin's goals lie in his perceptions of what is best for Russia - the state and its people, just as any political leader would.  He didn't talk about quests to rebuild the Soviet Union, he didn't call him a dictator or evil, he simply wanted to shed light on a few facets of Putin's background that one should analyze before attempting to engage with or judge him.  I would deem this a worthy cause, and one that would certainly be helpful in today's world climate.  That said, I do still wish a different title was chosen - since harping on Putin's KGB past is one of the main tools of fear used by western pundits, whose only intent is to make citizens afraid of Russia once again, thereby justifying whatever actions are taken, from economic sanctions to full-scale war.  Certainly that isn't to say that Vladimir Putin should be spoken of in terms of bunnies and sparkles, but casting him as a cold-blooded and tyrannical "operative" is certainly counterproductive at this point.

Despite some of the criticisms of the presentation I have outlined here, I left with a desire to read this analysis of Putin, since as Gaddy indicated, we can only know about him what he allows us to, and reading any and every interpretation of the minimal facts available can only further each of our understanding of Putin, and subsequently, today's Russia.  When the pages of mainstream media editorial sections are filled with uninformed Reagan-esque attacks on Russia as a backwards or evil empire, or decry Putin as an evil totalitarian-dictator-Tsar-Hitler hybrid, the task becomes ever so much more important for those of us who study Russia to provide a counterbalance, and have a thorough, comprehensive understanding of the matter.

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 #4
Newsweek.com
April 13, 2015
What Sanctions? The Russian Economy Is Growing Again
BY  BILL POWELL

Six months ago, the price of oil-the lifeblood of the Russian economy-began to crater, and U.S.-led sanctions, implemented in the wake of Russia's annexation of Crimea in Ukraine, were biting. Russia's currency, the ruble, buckled, and capital flight began to accelerate as rich but nervous Russians moved more and more money out of the country. It seemed plausible then to wonder: Could Vladimir Putin be losing his grip? Might economic pressure be enough to rein him in, or even lead to his downfall?

Today, the answer is becoming clear-and it's not the one the West was hoping for. Not only is Putin still standing, but the Russian economy, against most expectations, is recovering. Its stock market is one of the best performing globally this year; the ruble, after losing nearly half its value against the dollar over the course of a year, is rebounding; interest rates have come down from their post-sanctions peak; the government is taking in more revenue than its own forecast expected; and foreign exchange reserves have risen nearly $10 billion from their post-crisis low.

The lower price of oil still hurts. Citicorp economists estimate that every $10 decline in the price of Brent crude shaves 2 percent from Russia's gross domestic product (GDP). Further declines-not out of the question, given that Saudi Arabia, the world's largest and lowest-cost producer, is still pumping record amounts of crude-will crimp growth even more. But those same Citicorp economists forecast that GDP, after contracting for the past 18 months, could now begin to grow at up to 3.5 percent per year, even without a recovery in crude prices.

What explains this resilience? Consider the city of Cherepovets, where 300,000 people live in the northwestern area known as Vologda. It is dreary, gray and industrial-almost stereotypically so. The major employer in town is a steelmaker born in the Soviet era. In the wake of the sanctions and the plunge in the price of oil, Cherepovets would be one of the more unlikely industrial cities in the world to be thriving.

But thriving it is. In the last quarter of 2014, the hometown steelmaker, Severstal, posted its strongest profit margins in six years, on record output. On April 9, the company signed a contract to supply rolled steel to a Renault-Nissan auto plant, a facility that plans to increase exports from Russia to the former Soviet republics, the Middle East and Africa. Severstal now plans to add at least 2,000 workers to its employee total of 52,000 this year.

Though better run than many Russian firms, Severstal is not an outlier. According to data from Bloomberg, some 78 percent of Russian companies on the MICEX index showed greater revenue growth in the most recent quarter than their global peers did. And Russian companies on the whole are now more profitable than their peers on the MSCI Emerging Markets index.

What's bailing out Moscow? For the second time in two decades, Russia is showing that while a sharp drop in its currency's value does bring financial pain-it raises prices for imports and makes any foreign debt Russia or its companies have taken on that much more expensive in ruble terms-it also eventually produces textbook economic benefits. Since a devaluation raises import prices, it also paves the way for what economists call "import substitution," a clunky way to say that consumers switch to buying less pricey products produced at home instead of imported goods.

For companies such as Severstal, which exports nearly 20 percent of its output, the benefits of devaluation are obvious: All of the costs that go into producing steel in Russia-iron ore, manganese, nickel, labor, electricity-are priced in rubles. That means the companies' costs relative to their international competitors' have plummeted. At the same time, any steel they sell abroad is priced in either U.S. dollars or euros-both of which have risen in value against the ruble. When the companies bring those sales dollars home, they are worth far more in rubles than they were a year ago.

The same phenomenon applies in a big way to Russia's vast energy sector. Moscow exports huge amounts of oil and gas, and brings in dollars for it. That's why Rosneft, a huge oil producer with close ties to Putin's Kremlin, reported a revenue increase of 18 percent last year, compared with an increase of less than 1 percent for its international competitors, according to Bloomberg data. This is a big part of the reason why Russia's tax revenue has not fallen off a cliff, mitigating somewhat the pain of last year's crisis. Russia's oil output is still near record highs-one of the reasons, along with continued full-tilt Saudi output, that prices remain so weak.

The world shouldn't have been surprised by what has happened. More or less the same thing happened in 1998, when the Asian financial crisis spread to Russia and Moscow both defaulted on its international debt and devalued the ruble. There was an immediate negative economic shock, followed by an import substitution-led recovery that was sharper than most international economists at the time believed would occur. "This argues for an economic recovery now similar in nature, if not necessarily in magnitude, to the one after 1998," says Ivan Tchakarov, an economist at Citicorp.

What has changed since then, of course, is the nature of the Russian government and how it is perceived in the West. Back then, Russia was a wobbly new democracy trying to make a transition to capitalism that the developed world was desperately trying to stabilize. Today, less than two decades later, Putin sits atop the Kremlin, openly hostile to the United States with what appears to be a revanchist agenda: slowly but surely reassembling the old Soviet Union.

When oil prices crumbled last year, there was a fair bit of hope in Western capitals that the pain would do what sanctions hadn't yet: force a Russian climbdown in Ukraine, and perhaps prompt Putin to turn back inward and tend to his troubles at home.

Maybe that was wishful thinking. Whatever the case, it's now a moot point. The Russian economy is showing enough resilience that it appears unlikely to check Putin's behavior abroad. Public opinion surveys at home provide little evidence that the people have turned on him. For Washington and its allies, the time for wishful thinking is over. Vladimir Putin is not going anywhere.

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 #5
Fall of Russian economy less than expected - Medvedev

MOSCOW. April 14 (Interfax) - The Russian economy for January-February 2015 declined 1.9% year-on-year and the reduction was less than was forecast, Russian Prime Ministry Dmitry Medvedev said at an expanded meeting of the Finance Ministry on Tuesday in Moscow.

"At the start of the year, we noted a certain decline of the economy. In January-February it was 1.9%, according to the Economic Development Ministry. It is clear that we all expected this, considering all known circumstances. Certain steps were made, certain decisions were made in order to minimize the effect of such a type of problem. There was a reduction, but it probably was less than what was forecast even by conservative optimists," he said.

"The past year has been challenging, it brought various surprises and difficulties. The situation in the economy and the government's activity was complicated by a sharp deterioration in the oil market situation and by sanctions," He said.

"Many issues had to be addressed for the first time, and some of them, let's be honest, could not have arisen in other conditions. We had to address them, literally on the go, as they say. They included the massive, totally unique task of integrating Crimea, that is the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol with the Russian Federation. This is an unprecedented task, but we have to recognize that it has generally come off and today, all services accountable to the Finance Ministry are working in a routine manner, which is certainly to the credit of the ministry itself," he said.

"In general, the ministry has shown itself to be an efficient and highly professional team in a challenging situation. And in general, I think we have managed to cope with the fairly difficult tasks that face the state, faced the government in this period," he said.

 #6
AFP
April 14, 2015
More gloom ahead for Moscow and former Soviet region, says IMF
By Max Delany

The International Monetary Fund on Tuesday predicted more pain for the Russian economy and gloom around the ex-Soviet region despite positive noises from Moscow that the worst of the crisis might be over.

Russia's economy is expected to shrink by 3.8 percent this year as sanctions imposed by the West over the conflict in Ukraine and low oil prices push the country deep into recession.

Across the wider region -- where ex-Soviet nations remain heavily dependent on the Russian economy -- the outlook looks grim too as Moscow's economic woes weigh down its neighbours.

"Economic performance in Russia was a bit stronger than expected in the second half of 2014, but the increase in geopolitical tensions, declining confidence and the repercussions of the oil price decline point to a more severe weakening of the outlook in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as a whole at the start of the year," the IMF said in its World Economic Outlook report.

The projection for the CIS region -- including Russia -- has dropped to minus 2.6 percent, some four percent down from an October estimate, with double-digit inflation expected in many countries.

"The Commonwealth of Independent States region is projected to slide into recession in 2015," the report said.

"For oil exporters, sharply lower oil prices and the significant contraction in Russia imply a much weaker outlook.

"For oil importers, the benefits from lower oil prices will likely be more than offset by domestic economic weaknesses and spillovers from the contraction in Russia through remittances, trade and foreign direct investment."

In the Caucasus and Central Asia, growth is predicted to slump to 3.2 percent in 2015 from 5.3 percent last year.

'Less than predicted'

The West has slapped tough sanctions on Russia over its alleged backing for pro-Moscow rebels in east Ukraine, targeting its key financial, energy and defence sectors.

The gloomy predictions from the IMF come as Russian officials are playing down the economic fallout from the crisis following an unexpected surge in the value of the ruble in recent months.

Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev said Tuesday that a 1.9 percent contraction in the economy in the first few months of 2015 was "less than was predicted".

"It's understood that we expected this given all the well-known circumstances. But we took certain measures, made certain decisions to minimise the impact of this sort of problem," Medvedev was quoted as saying by Russia's Interfax news agency.

"There is a fall but, for sure, it is less than was predicted by even the most sober optimists."

Russia's ruble has soared back to a five-month high after a dramatic slump in December as oil prices have steadied.

Despite inflation soaring to around 17 percent, the Central Bank has cut interest rates twice since the start of the year in a bid to stir the economy after a monster rate hike late last year, arguing that inflationary fears have peaked.

But senior business leaders and economists have previously accused the Kremlin of lacking a comprehensive plan for tackling the economic woes.

Some flummoxed analysts have put the ruble's recovery and optimism in Russia down to short-term financial factors rather than fundamental improvements in the overall situation.

A return to all-out conflict in east Ukraine after weeks of relative calm would end any prospect of an easing of sanctions on Russia and likely eclipse the brief rays of hope, Russia's business daily Vedomosti warned last week.

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#7
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
April 14, 2015
Russian ruble bounces back to become the world's best-performing currency
Between early February and early April 2015, the Russian ruble gained 22.3 percent against key benchmarks, making it the world's best-performing currency. Experts are not yet convinced that this impressive strengthening of the ruble will become a long-term trend: in December 2014, the Russian currency lost about half of its value against the US dollar and the euro.
Alexei Lossan, RBTH

Between early February and early April 2015, the Russian ruble gained 22.3 percent, making it the world's best-performing currency, UFS IC chief analyst Alexei Kozlov has told RBTH.

The gains made by the Russian currency were higher than a rise in world oil prices, a trend the ruble usually closely follows. In the same period, the price of Brent crude oil grew by just 9.8 percent, from $53 to $58.2.

According to Kozlov, the ruble bounce can be largely attributed to investors' interest in the high yields accumulated by developing markets. The gains come after the Russian currency lost about half its value against the US dollar and the euro in December 2014.
 
Favourable factors

Konstantin Korishchenko, deputy head of the Stock Market and Financial Engineering Department at the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, which strongly influences Russian government fiscal policy, told RBTH that a combination of several favourable factors in past weeks had influenced the ruble rally.

Korishchenko said a decision by the Russian Central Bank to grant $30 billion worth of foreign-currency loans to banks and to cut the key interest rate from 17 to 14 percent were key factors, along with lower tensions in eastern Ukraine.

"All this has made investment in the ruble and ruble assets speculatively more attractive," said Korishchenko.
 
Greek deal

Anton Soroko, an analyst with Finam Investment, says the Russian currency may soon strengthen even further if oil prices rise and there are clear signs that sanctions against Russia may be lifted.

Among the positive factors he listed agreements with individual EU countries, including promises of Russian investment made during talks between Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on April 8.

"The overall situation in Ukraine at the moment looks stable, so there seem to be no grounds for the EU and the USA to toughen their rhetoric," Soroko added.

UFC IC's Kozlov agrees that credit for the strengthening ruble belongs with the Central Bank, which has developed a monetary policy that has significantly curbed its volatility. At the same time, he adds, despite the gains made by the ruble, there has so far been no increase in investors' interest in the Russian economy.

Experts are not yet convinced that the sharp increase in the value of the ruble will become a long-term trend.

"Claims that the value of the ruble is no longer pegged to oil prices are not quite appropriate. Rather, one could speak of a different level of ruble/oil prices for 2015," Korishchenko, who is a former deputy chairman of the Russian Central Bank, said.
 
Uncertain outlook

He added that the direction in which international oil prices were headed was unclear: the nuclear deal with Iran was sending a positive signal, while the conflict in Yemen, was a negative influence.

Russia's economy remains saddled with fundamental problems, the experts say.

"The shortage of capital experienced by banks; the lack of economic growth; the continued trend towards an increasing role of the state sector in the economy - all these factors cannot but cause concern and restrain optimism for the future value of the national currency," Korishchenko said.

If oil prices see no growth and capital flight from Russia remains at the same high levels, the ruble's prospects for 2016 will be considerably bleaker than for 2015, he added.

The overall picture for the ruble looks much better than it did several months ago, but for this positive trend to continue, the government should create incentives for market-economy mechanisms instead of hoping for a rise in oil prices, the former deputy chairman of the Central Bank concluded.

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 #8
Bloomberg
April 14, 2015
Russia Sees Further Drop in Capital Outflows as Economy Adjusts
By Olga Tanas and Anna Andrianova

Russian capital outflows will slow further as bonds and the ruble stage a comeback following a sell-off last year, Finance Minister Anton Siluanov said.

Net outflows will slow to $15 billion in the second quarter after a "sharp decline" in the previous three months, bringing the total for the year to about $90 billion, Siluanov said Tuesday at his ministry's annual meeting in Moscow. Russia bore the brunt of economic damage in the first quarter and growth may resume in the second half, he said.

"Financial markets have stabilized, the ruble and Russian sovereign bonds became some of the most profitable assets this year," he said. Even so, "it's now that we are experiencing the most difficult situation in the real economy."

A crash in oil prices last year and sanctions imposed by the U.S. and the European Union over the crisis in Ukraine have spurred capital flight, accelerated inflation and weakened the country's currency, which lost about half of its value last year before rebounding in 2015. That's pushing the economy of the world's largest energy exporter into its first recession since 2009 and forcing the government to run up its biggest budget deficit in five years.

The ruble has strengthened 18 percent this year, making it the best performer among more than 170 world currencies tracked by Bloomberg. It traded 0.7 percent stronger at 51.6790 versus the dollar at 1:52 p.m. in Moscow.

Net private capital outflows eased to $32.6 billion in the first quarter, down from $72.9 billion in the previous three months, according to the central bank. Russia hasn't had a full year of inflows since 2007, central bank data show.

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 #9
Russia Insider
http://russia-insider.com
April 14, 2015
Is Russia's "Bullet Proof" Economy Ready to Blast Off?
Newsweek and other western mainstream media are turning the corner on anti-Russia unreason. The massive sanctions on Russia have led to a reversal of fortunes, but not the result western leadership envisioned.
By Phil Butler

Watching the tide of foreign policy, influence, and business turn concerning Russia, it's a rewarding experience for all the moderates of the world. Bill Powell at Newsweek assures the journalistic faithful of Earth there's even hope for mainstream media today. Despite US and EU sanctions aimed at crippling the Russian economy, Vladimir Putin's economic endeavors of late have apparently saved the Russian nation's day.

The Newsweek article, "What Sanctions? The Russian Economy Is Growing Again," is symbolic of a break in the negative trend toward Russia in many ways. Powell takes something of a leap of faith and credibility in outlining how recent detente has "not exactly what the West was hoping for." Against what seemed like insurmountable economic odds, Putin's ruble has rebounded, the stock market has out performed most competing ones, foreign exchange reserves are up, and the Russian government's revenue has even exceeded expectations.

Russia May Be Bulletproof Economically

While crude oil and energy prices have hit Russia companies hard, they've empowered Russia industry to some of the highest profits in recent history. This and other "unexpected" stimulus as a secondary result of sanctions, spell a kind of policy disaster in Washington, London, and Brussels.The meat of this story from Newsweek can be found in the MICEX index, as well as on the micro level with companies like steelmaker Severstal (New Renault-Nissan deal) . For those unfamiliar with heavy industry, steel for auto makers and other markets depend, price wise, on the costs of energy used to produce. When I was at Nucor Steel in America, other than the costs of scrap and other raw materials, the electricity to power steelmaking was enormous, critical, a make-or-break commodity. The long and short, in competitive manufacturing price opens or closes markets. The dive in energy costs, combined with other cost/revenue benefits Powell describes, have helped Putin's finance ministers' make a fiscal shift toward growth.

Mainstream Media Cracked

While the Newsweek analyst falls short of being a moderate where West-East détente is concerned, his conclusion on "Putin" is sound. The Russian leader western democracies have tried to destroy by hook or crook, he's simply not going anywhere. What's so interesting about the Newsweek piece is the contravening news from the likes of BBC and others in the same day. BBC's headline reads; "Russians reel from economic crisis," this from a diplomatic correspondent and award winning Russia expert Bridget Kendall. Given the disparity in the Newsweek/Bloomberg view on Russia's resilience, and BBC's take via Kendall, it appears journalistic competition may still be alive and well. For Kendall's part, she's clearly not looked at the economic data. Her article speaks of closed factories and shop owners in distress, when this is simply not the case. Even here in Germany one can find For Rent signs all over, dilapidated factories closed, and inefficiency rewarded with bankruptcy. Kendall has fallen victim to BBC's bias it seems, or else she's helping formulate it.

However one forms up a "reality" matrix for investing decisions, Russia's leadership has clearly outdone all their opposition in the last months. The economic and media war against Putin and Russia that was so evident when the ruble crashed some months ago, it's crumbling before our eyes if I don't miss my guess. We see this in the aforementioned BBC disharmony with the likes of Bloomberg, Forbes, even the Washington Post of late. The chart below reveals a separate economic reality. Forbes' top investment guru Kenneth Rapoza reported only yesterday, Brazil and Russia as "buys" in a supposed failed sector. Rapoza is smart, and tuned-in to the investor's "Holy Grail" - yield. I could go on, but the trend seems clear, the mainstream has been forced to revert to reality.

Take Away

Weighing what is certainly a break in media reporting on Russia, and other factors we're seeing in EU and US politics, it's safe to say sanctions on Russia were and are a failed strategy, one that is backfiring too. A report from Sahra Wagenknecht, the vice president of the German Left party and German MP we ran the other day foretells of this backlash. Spurred by Washington and London, the EU enacted sanctions that were supposedly intended to force Russia's hand. Today we are witnessing Greece, Italy, Spain, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and other nations bucking not only those sanctions, but the anti-Russia rhetoric as well. Wagenknecht claims these policies destroyed Ukraine, and damaged Europe at the same time. I think the same will eventually be said for America and the UK, when all is said and done. The euro has taken a big hit, the dollar has new competition from China and Russia, and a general shift away from the US toward the BRICS is paramount now. Even considering the singular potential of the Russia economic/investing internal market, no country actually has more growth potential. The image below from Gazprom showing 2012 energy capacity is symbolic.

Once all the facts and rhetoric are weighed, sometime in the near future, the foolhardy strategy to questionable ends will be revealed in full. Whether or not the Ukraine situation is mediated fully, the escalation of West-East tension via punishing Russia was ill advised. For investors the next move will be to take advantage of a near bullet proof market. After all, Russia's economy was hit by everything but the kitchen sink. My hat is off to Bill Powell, and all those living in the real world.

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 #10
Moscow Times
April 14, 2015
State Companies Back Under Kremlin Control
By Konstantin Sonin
Konstantin Sonin, a columnist for Vedomosti, is professor of economics at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow.

It was announced in early April that government officials would again sit on the boards of directors of state-owned companies - this time as chairmen of the boards of Russian Railways, Rosseti, Rostelekom, RusHydro, Transneft and other major companies.

Previously, those boards were run by independent chairmen elected by shareholders, including the state as a major or majority shareholder. The practice of placing independent directors on the boards of state companies was the result of a recent liberalizing reform.

Why would Moscow install deputy prime ministers, government ministers and department heads on the boards of directors of state-owned companies? The obvious reason is that many state-owned companies are corrupt and inefficient.

In fact, it is not always easy to differentiate between corruption and incompetence. For example, was the 250 billion rubles ($4.8 billion) spent on the now-abandoned railway line from Krasnaya Polyana to Sochi wasted or stolen?

Management experience determines the reputation of an independent director, but officials have one more strength - their government posts, which enable them to directly or indirectly influence operations, depending on whether they fall within their area of responsibility. It is therefore logical to expect that Moscow's already considerable control over state-owned companies will now increase.

Nonetheless, this is a step backward. The use of independent directors in state-owned companies is an imperfect practice, but it is more advanced than exercising direct control through political channels.

It is difficult to manage state-owned corporations: The lack of a real owner makes it impossible to create good incentives for managers. The owners of such private companies as BP or ExxonMobil would have long ago replaced managers producing results - primarily in the area of capitalization - such as those seen in Russia's Rosneft or Brazil's state-owned Petrobras.

It is simply unprofitable to leave ineffectual top managers at their posts. An independent director worried about maintaining his reputation - especially if he is an investment banker or manager - is more likely to behave like a private owner than a government official is.

Although independent directors usually provide better incentives for managers, that is not always the case in Russia. Here, independent directors have not only failed to prevent the large-scale embezzlement that journalists and corporate activists have repeatedly uncovered in recent years, but most of them have never made any attempt to publicize the proof of wrongdoing by senior managers that they had in their possession.

Had they passed that information to the press or to government prosecutors, they would have fulfilled their primary duty of increasing the value of the company for the owners - in this case, Russian taxpayers.

And yet, despite such shortcomings, it would be better to preserve the institution of independent directors and improve it by, for example, punishing those who do not vote in favor of firing ineffective or corrupt senior managers.

In the long run, Russia's leaders will gain nothing by replacing this partially flawed institution with the even more imperfect practice of exercising direct control over state-owned companies.

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 #11
Jamestown Foundation Eurasia Daily Monitor
April 13, 2015
Russian Investigators Have Difficulty Accessing Nemtsov Murder Suspects in Chechnya
By Valery Dzutsev
 
Six weeks after the assassination of prominent Russian opposition figure Boris Nemtsov near the Kremlin in Moscow, authorities have failed to present a coherent explanation for the crime. As one observer has pointed out: "It looks like the Kremlin has quickly cooled to the investigation. It is understandable since in [President Vladimir] Putin's eyes, the crime has been solved and he already knows who organized the murder, when and why. For him, the case has been closed and that means we are unlikely to know the truth soon" (Slon.ru, April 7).
 
Shortly after Nemtsov was killed, on February 27, numerous leaks started to emerge in the media that pointed to the involvement Chechen officials in the murder. Five Chechens were arrested and one allegedly killed himself by detonating a grenade when the police tried to arrest him in Chechnya. At least three of the suspects had served in police and interior ministry militarized units in Chechnya, both of which are under the personal control of the republic's strongman, Ramzan Kadyrov. According to an extensive investigative report by the independent newspaper Novaya Gazeta, Nemtsov's killing created a crisis in the Russian government, with Kadyrov clashing with the Federal Security Service (FSB) over the incident. The FSB was increasingly frustrated with the growing power and impunity of Kadyrov and his forces. While the security situation in Chechnya was still precarious, the security services tolerated Kadyrov's "excesses," but as soon as the situation in the republic calmed down, they started to push back. Novaya Gazeta hinted that Kadyrov was involved in attempts on the lives of, among others, Saigidpasha Umakhanov, the mayor of Khasavyurt, Dagestan and Isa Yamadaev of the Yamadaev clan, which had been at loggerheads with Kadyrov and others. Novaya Gazeta said that Putin was facing the stark choice of picking between Kadyrov and the FSB (Novaya Gazeta, March 10).
 
The struggle between Kadyrov and the Russian security services has been unusually public, with Russian media reporting on the alleged confession of one of the suspects, and on ties between the suspects and people in Kadyrov's inner circle. Kadyrov, for his part, defended the suspects via Instagram and accused the "enemies of Russia" of being behind Nemtsov's killing. The defense of the suspects sometimes took grotesque forms. The commander of a squadron in Chechnya's Sever (North) battalion, Ruslan Geremeyev, remained out of reach of Russian investigators in the heavily guarded Chechen village of Zhalka. The detained suspects reportedly mentioned Geremeyev's name while under interrogation and the authorities also want to interrogate Geremeyev. According to reports, Geremeyev was even briefly arrested in Chechnya on March 8, but he then disappeared and was inaccessible to investigators until at least March 25. Multiple sources reported that Ruslan Geremeyev had close family links to State Duma Deputy Adam Delimkhanov, Kadyrov's cousin and close associate (Rosbalt, March 25).
 
Kadyrov and his entourage have been quite successful in shielding people from the Russian investigators, while the latter have been willing to leak information about these efforts. The investigators reportedly eventually managed to question Geremeyev, but it is unclear whether they could follow up with an arrest if needed (Rbc.ru, March 27). On April 11, the well-known Russian journalist Yulia Latynina refuted the authorities' claims that they had questioned Geremeyev. According to Latynina, the giant Russian propaganda machine, built to prevent a "color revolution" in Russia, is currently fighting the investigation of Nemtsov's murder and a high-profile Moscow official like Vladislav Surkov could be behind the campaign (Ekho Moskvy, April 11).
 
An investigative report by Komsomolskaya Pravda newspaper indicated that the authorities were able to arrest four of the five suspects currently in custody only after they crossed over from Chechnya into Ingushetia. The newspaper also reported that the primary suspect, Zaurbek Dadaev, was not a mere member of the Sever battalion, but served as the head of Adam Delimkhanov's bodyguard detail in Moscow. Kadyrov claimed that, at the time of Nemtsov's murder, Dadaev was no longer a member of the armed forces. However, Dadaev was unlikely to have left the service until the very moment of Nemtsov's murder, according to Komsomolskaya Pravda, because both of the reasons given for his putative departure from service-he himself said it was because his house was destroyed, while Kadyrov said Dadaev left the service because his mother was ill and needed to be taken care of-turned out to be false. Kosomolskaya Pravda's reporter Uliana Skobeida also showed that nearly all the popular official versions of what moved Dadaev to kill Nemtsov were false. Concluding the article, she wrote: "It is now up to the Investigative Committee to question the individuals that people in our investigation and the suspects pointed to. Everybody should be equal before law. If Chechnya is Russia, of course." An indicator of how good Skobeida's reporting was is perhaps the fact that the rest of the Russian media practically ignored the sensational material put together by the journalist, including a photograph of Adam Delimkhanov's massive house in Dzhalka which, the newspaper noted in its caption, looked more like an "airport terminal" (Komsomolskaya Pravda, April 2).
 
Shortly after the Chechen servicemen were implicated in the murder of Nemtsov, Kadyrov and his entourage reportedly took a long holiday in Dubai "to stay out of public attention for a while" (The Daily Beast, April 9). Still, the question remains who killed Boris Nemtsov, and why; neither Kadyrov nor the Russian investigators appear to be willing to back down. Kadyrov does not seem to be in a position to give up the key suspects, who are his subordinates, while Moscow is not closing down its investigation of the Chechen suspects.
 
Kadyrov must have received some reassurances from his bosses in Moscow, as he recently started posing once again in photographs with top Russian officials in his frequently used Instagram account (Instagram, April 7). The overarching question, however, remains: even if Kadyrov was behind Nemtsov's murder, why did he do it? It is unlikely that Kadyrov acted on his own initiative without at least some priming by the Russian security services or other top Russian officials.

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 #12
The National Interest
April 13, 2015
Comeback: How Islam Got Its Groove Back in Russia
Russian state attitudes toward religion changed after the collapse of the Soviet Union. What did this mean for Islam?
By Rebecca M. Miller
Rebecca M. Miller is an assistant editor and illustrator at The National Interest. You can find her on Twitter: @RebecMil.

Vladimir Putin has made religion a central part of his public image, using Orthodoxy as a way to bolster for his political agendas. But Orthodoxy is not the only religion that experienced a revival in the post-Cold War period; among other religions, Islam, once shunned by the Soviet state, has increasingly been embraced by the Russian state.

This was a major theme of an April 7 presentation at George Washington University's Elliott School by Bulat Akhmetkarimov, a PhD candidate at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). At the event, titled "Islam and the Dynamics of Ethno-Confessional Regimes in Russia, 1990-2012," Akhmetkarimov discussed the Russian state's attitudes toward religion and how attitudes toward Islam have evolved in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.

As the largest religious minority in Russia, Muslims make up roughly 11 percent of Russia's total population. Based on statistics provided by Pew Research Center, this percentage is predicted to increase to roughly 13 percent by 2030 and nearly 17 percent percent by 2050, with about twenty million Muslims in Russia.

To highlight just how much has changed with respect to Islam in Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Akhmetkarimov stated that the percentage of Muslim "believers" has increased dramatically over the last two decades or so.

He further asserted that there was a post-Communist Islamic revival in Russia around 1997, commenting that the number of mosques in Russia increased from 160 to 7,000 between the years 1990 and 1997. While these were mostly private initiatives, the increase in the number of these initiatives could have been indicative of a relaxing of attitudes in Russia towards Islam, and perhaps religion more generally.

The number of Islamic missionaries from abroad also increased from zero to one thousand between those same years. Furthermore, the late 90s also saw a spike in the frequency in usage of the terms "Wahhabism" and "Salafism."

Along with these trends, Russian state attitudes towards Islam, and religion in general, were undergoing a huge shift. During the Soviet Union, state policy could be categorized as "assertive secularism." The state clamped down on religious expression. Many Russians started replacing the Orthodox icons in their krasnye ugoly (beautiful corners)-the place in one's house where icons were placed and towards which many would pray-with portraits of Lenin.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Akhmetkarimov asserts, state policies shifted to "passive secularism," with attitudes toward religious education and religious press being categorized as "neutral."

In the 2000s, state policies shifted to "established religions," recognizing not just one religion, as was the case in Russia from 988 through Peter the Great's rule, but recognizing many of them and adopting a more regulatory attitude. Akhmetkarimov dubbed this phenomenon an "organic partnership."

Akhmetkarimov also explained how Russia changed from a multiethnic (as opposed to monoethnic) state in the 1990s, to one that was more supraethnic in the 2000s, emphasizing the importance of being culturally Russian, not necessarily purely Russian by blood. Akhmetkarimov believes these shifts have contributed to a much wider acceptance of religion and a reemergence of Islam in post-Communist Russia society in the late 1990s.

Akhmetkarimov also addressed the limits of the "organic partnership" model, and why the model may not be successful or sustainable. For example, it could confine religion to specific definitions, interfaith relations could become tense, nationalism could increase as a result of immigration, Islamic religious pluralism could emerge, and various other structural problems could arise.

Asked how, if at all, he thought Russian state attitudes toward Islam might be affected by Putin's increasing emphasis on Orthodoxy and actions in Ukraine, he argued that the Orthodox Church has its own goals and is not simply a "tool of the state." He further pointed out that  Russia "certainly is not aiming to become a religious state," but that it is not anti-religious, either.

He generally did not seem to think that the religious freedom of Muslims in Russia would be harmed in the near future. Hopefully he is right.

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 #13
Sputnik
April 14, 2015
Russia to Become Real Competitor Between Europe, Asia for Energy Resources

MOSCOW (Sputnik) - Russia is to become a serious competitor in energy resources between Europe and Asia, Russian gas giant Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller said Tuesday.

The beginning of gas deliveries to China along the western route from Western Siberia will strengthen competition for Russian gas between Europe and the Asia-Pacific region, Miller said in an interview on Rossiya-24 television.

"The resource base of Western Siberia is a resource that is used for delivering gas for exports to Europe. In other words, at this point we are on the cutting edge when actual competitiveness will begin for our energy resources between two mega-markets: Asian and European," Miller said.

The Western route will connect fields in western Siberia with northwest China through Russia's Altai Republic, delivering 30 billion cubic meters of gas annually. Second and third sections may be added to the pipeline at a later date, bringing capacity up to 100 billion cubic meters a year.

The Eastern route will connect Russia's gas fields in eastern Siberia with northeast China through the city of Blagoveshchensk in the Russian Far East.

In May 2014, Russia's state-owned energy company Gazprom and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) signed a 30-year gas supply deal estimated to be worth $400 billion. Under the deal, Russia will to export 38 billion cubic meters of gas to China annually.

The corresponding Russia-China intergovernmental agreement was signed in Moscow in October 2014.

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 #14
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
April 14, 2015
For Europe, a relationship with Russia is of vital importance
RD Interview: Hans Köchler, a prominent political scientist and philosopher at the University of Innsbruck in Austria, shares his views on the current geopolitical tensions between Russia and Europe.
Alexey Khlebnikov

The relationship between Russia and Europe, as well as the ability of the United States to apply pressure on that relationship indirectly via NATO and the EU, continues to provoke discussion across Europe.

Russia Direct recently sat down with Hans Köchler, a prominent Austrian political scientist and philosopher at the University of Innsbruck and the president of the International Progress Organization, to discuss the long-simmering causes of the current confrontation on the European continent that eventually transformed into the Ukraine crisis in 2014.

Köchler also analyzes how the geopolitical issues at the heart of the confrontation between Russia and Europe continues to reverberate globally.

Russia Direct: What do you see as the main reason for the current tensions between the EU and Russia? Is this a difference in values along civilizational lines or it is just pure geopolitics?

Hans Köchler: I think it is mainly geopolitics, and civilizational issues are just used as a pretext. The crisis that we have now is the worst since the 1990s when the Cold War ended, and when one of the power centers of that era - the Soviet Union - disappeared. It led to the situation of imbalance worldwide and in Europe.

This situation would have required that the Western collective organizations, particularly NATO, should not have begun to expand towards the area of the former socialist bloc. It has meant that this imbalance was extremely exploited and it has made it impossible that a new balance of power in Europe would emerge, because we have to be aware that when the U.S.S.R. collapsed, the Warsaw Pact was dissolved.

But on the other side, NATO, its opponent, still exists. And what we have to consider is that after 1991 the countries that were in the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union and were a part of the Soviet bloc gradually were integrated into the European Union.

And at the same time we have seen an overlapping of this process with American-centered structures, particularly in the field of security, as most of those countries also aspired to join NATO and together with the EU enlargement the whole process took on very different undertones.  For many countries that defined their policies after the end of the U.S.S.R. and they started to seek double ambitions to join the EU and at the same time to become a NATO member.

In such an imbalanced situation, when there is a new policy of containment of Russia - we might even say an encroachment of Russia - if events happen like those in Ukraine last year, that will mean a major crisis on the continent with global cleavages. So, what has happened is that Ukraine more or less became a part of this zone of influence and a territory for a wider conflict: not just a civil conflict between the East and West of Ukraine but also a part of a larger regional confrontation with global impact.

Therefore, I think that as far as culture and civilization are concerned, it is only a pretext for people to speak that they have concerns. Anyway, culturally we are one Europe with the Christian tradition, which unites Russia with all Europe. And it does not matter whether it is Roman Catholic or Orthodox or Protestant.

RD: How can you define sovereignty nowadays and do you think that it has been changing and evolving for the last 25 years?

H.K.: First of all, it is a legal - a strictly legal - term of international law that is part of the terminology of the United Nations. In this context, "sovereignty" means sovereign equality of states. It applies to the legal status of a state whether it is a small state like Lichtenstein or a big one like Russia. Each state is equal in terms of the independence of its domestic legal order.

And as a system of laws under a constitution, the state is the supreme authority to an act of legal norms on its territory. There is no right of other states to interfere into that legal system and, at the same time, each state in the UN is equal. That is, so to speak, an official legal meaning. The problem is that this legal doctrine is being more and more eroded over the last decades.

One reason for that is globalization. For instance, what does it mean if I say that I am from Austria? Austria is a small country of eight million people. What does it mean for my government if we say we are the sovereign Republic of Austria when about 70-80 percent of all decisions on economic policy are made and dictated by Brussels and also from the outside because of the international economic pressures, some of those global corporations. Therefore, sovereignty in this sense is eroded because of the international economic conditions on one hand and, in the case of Europe, because of the membership in the regional organization.

Of course in Europe we are witnessing erosion of national sovereignty in favor of the supranational structures of the EU. In these circumstances, I am asking myself a question for the last ten years: In a situation we are in now, how can one organize cooperation among regional states so that they together can better represent their interests vis-à-vis the global pressure? In this sense, regional cooperation makes sense and in this sense it would be bolstering national sovereignty. Also, I think it is a rationale behind the Russian decision to create the Eurasian Economic Union. And that was also the rationale initially in the 1950s behind the creation of the European Economic Community.

RD: Does Europe have a strategy towards Russia? And does the U.S. have one as well?

H.K.: As far as I can see, we must differentiate - and I speak here as a European - between the people and the elites, the decision-makers. And as far as European countries are concerned, I think the majority opinion, the majority sentiment is that, for us - for Europe - it is of vital, even strategic, importance to have a partnership with Russia because we share the same continent and Russia is an immediate neighbor. And it is also important in the sense of bilateral relations, especially trade, if you take Austria, for example.

As for the U.S., I think their policy is just the law of power politics: The U.S. still considers itself as the power that emerged victorious after the Cold War. So, now they want to seize that opportunity and want to expand and to bolster their position of dominance and their unilateral "truth."

And this is, by the way, in the nature of power: One always wants more power and there is no modesty. And as soon you are already on that level, there is almost no way back and this is exactly the strategy of the U.S. in Europe: All the countries of Europe plus those of the former Soviet bloc should be integrated into the West and should become members of NATO.

But in Europe there is a different position. There is one big general difference between the U.S. and Europe politically: Europeans know that it would be shortsighted to engage in permanent confrontation with Russia because it is not sustainable and it would damage European interests. For the U.S., it is totally different because they are far away and also economically there is not so much at stake. It is easy to impose sanctions when one who does so is not damaged. But others do suffer. This is now the situation in Europe.

In my view, the big problem is whether the U.S. will mentally be prepared at some stage to accept that it has to share power with other centers of power. Will the U.S. be ready to accept that structures of power, for instance in Europe, will develop independently of its influence?

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 #15
Russia Direct
www.russia-direct.org
April 13, 2015
Greece shows how Russia plans to win friends in Europe
The recent meeting with Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras helped the Kremlin address three urgent political needs without giving away much in terms of financial or political capital.
By Ivan Tsvetkov
Dr. Ivan Tsvetkov is an associate professor at the School of International Relations of St. Petersburg State University. He is an expert in U.S. policy in the Asia Pacific Region, US history and contemporary US society.

Despite the lack of substantive results and the flock of disappointed journalists eager for something more, it is safe nevertheless to categorize the meeting between the leaders of Russia and Greece on April 8 in Moscow as one of Russian President Vladimir Putin's diplomatic successes.

Russian foreign policy is no doubt going through a lean patch, and what today is described as a success, a few years ago would not have merited attention. However, the meeting with his Greek counterpart undoubtedly helped the Russian leader address some pressing political issues.

First, it demonstrated that Russian foreign policy is operating in "normal" mode. It is business as usual for diplomats, continuing to seek ways to develop economic cooperation with Europe and not neglecting even cultural ties.

Throughout its history one of Russia's favored means of dealing with a crisis has always been to pretend that none exists. Putin is adept at employing rhetorical tools, and his spin doctors have eagerly adopted the Western fashion for carefully managing appearances, according to which the reality in which we live is largely made up of images purposefully implanted into the mass consciousness.

On that premise, it is a matter of the utmost urgency that the Russian president should convey to both Russian and foreign audiences the idea that the war in Ukraine is over, the all-night negotiations are past, and it is time for everyone to calm down and return to normal life. Sanctions and accusations of "annexing" and "occupying" neighboring lands jar with this new staid view of global reality.

Russia set the scene at the talks in Moscow, and Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras willingly played along. After all, as the leader of a country on the brink of default, he, like Putin, has to put a brave face on a dire situation.

Second, the reason for the Russian president's upbeat mood after the meeting in Moscow was that he managed to nettle his Western opponents and even provoke them into making reckless emotional statements. In particular, Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves described Tsipras as a "useful idiot," comparing him with the leftist European politicians who sided with the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

The fact that EU leaders were completely straight-faced in accusing Greece of endangering European unity is primary evidence that they harbor serious doubts about such unity. Why get so flustered if everyone including Tsipras himself, ended up admitting, not for the first time, that without European loans Greece cannot solve its problems, and that neither in isolation nor in the company of other Russia-friendly European nations can Greece hope to influence the EU's sanctions policy?

Comparing the statements of EU and Russian representatives on the Moscow meeting between Tsipras and Putin, one might conclude that Russia believes in European unity more than European politicians do. In any event, at the wrap-up press conference Putin cited a long list of convincing arguments to the effect that only cooperation with a united Europe is in the long-term strategic interests of Russia - and on that point it is hard to take issue with him.

Third, another undeniable positive for Russia is that the meeting did not burden the Russian budget, save perhaps for hospitality expenses. Moscow expressed no desire to partake in the rescue of the Greek economy, and Tsipras (if Putin's statement at the press conference is to be taken at face value) did not even make a request.

That the prospect of Russia buying Greek loyalty was so actively discussed in the Western expert community on the eve of the meeting betrays a complete misunderstanding of why Putin needs allies among the "special" European countries, such as Greece, Hungary and Cyprus, and what means he plans to employ to bring them into his orbit.

Putin surely has not forgotten how many billions of dollars the Soviet Union spent on the upkeep of "socialist countries and people's democracies" around the world, and what unreliable allies they turned out to be. Today, a new set of international dependents would sound the death knell for Russia's ailing economy.

When about a month ago rumors began to circulate about an EU ban on the fulfillment of a $12 billion contract between Hungary and Russia on the construction of a nuclear power plant, one got the impression that they were spread not without the Kremlin's involvement. For Russia, it would certainly be a viable strategy: express willingness to cooperate and take on significant costs, and then be rid of them due to circumstances beyond its control.

Despite Putin's assurances to the contrary, it should be recognized that partner relations with Hungary, Cyprus, Slovenia, Greece and other European "dissidents" on the issue of sanctions are essentially viewed by Russia not as strategic, but tactical, whose value depends on the prevailing political climate. That does not preclude the possibility of long-term projects, of course, but these countries would be ill-advised to expect multi-billion dollar Russian investments to be forthcoming, much less loans.

It is important to stress once again that, in the current context, the role of Russia's European friends is less about their ability to influence the EU's sanctions policy (let us hope that the Kremlin understands full well that the future of sanctions does not depend on the position of Greece or Cyprus), but to support the efforts of Russian diplomacy aimed at persuading European public opinion that the Ukraine crisis is over and the time has come to normalize the dialogue between Russia and Europe.

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 #16
No decision yet on new contract for S-300 missiles for Iran - Kremlin

MOSCOW. April 14 (Interfax) - The Kremlin has acknowledged the absence of any legal restrictions for supplying S-300 air defense missile systems to Iran now that the president has signed the relevant decree.

"The question of contracts, to sign or not sign [new ones], is one that will be decided or discussed by the immediate participants of the deal, if need be," Russian President's Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov told reporters on Tuesday.

He was responding to a question whether a new contract will be needed for supplying S-300s to Iran.

"Overall, so far we can only acknowledge one thing: from the legal point of view, with the signing of the decree, there are no more restrictions," Peskov said.

He could not say when deliveries, if any, will be made.

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 #17
Bloomberg
April 14, 2015
Putin's Mideast Gains Trump $27 Billion Loss From Iran Agreement
By Henry Meyer and Stephen Bierman

As Russian President Vladimir Putin has shown in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, he's willing to take an economic hit to expand his political influence.
He's taking the same approach with Iran.

Lifting sanctions and allowing Iranian oil onto global markets would threaten to deepen the plunge in crude prices, curbing revenue from Russia's biggest export. The cost: about $27 billion, based on estimates from the central bank in Moscow.

"The strategic benefits are much more important for Russia," said Nikolay Kozhanov, an expert at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London and a nonresident fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center. "Incorporating Iran into pro-Moscow organizations, Russia is hoping to secure its share in this market or divide zones of influence."

Putin will get an opportunity to bolster an ally, stymie regional adversaries and open business opportunities. The approach was underscored by his decision this week to lift a ban on shipping S-300 air-defense missile systems to Tehran under an $800 million contract.

A deal with world powers over Iran's nuclear program has the potential to shift the balance of power in the Middle East as Iran competes against Saudi Arabia, a U.S. ally.

Regional Influence

Russia, which has lagged behind the U.S. in regional influence since the end of the Cold War, is working with the Persian Gulf state to shore up Syria's Bashar al-Assad and oppose Saudi-led air strikes on pro-Iranian Houthis in Yemen.

The U.S. and five other global powers, including Russia, aim to complete negotiations with Iran by the end of June to end a decade-long dispute over its nuclear program. In return, sanction that have cut its crude exports by more than half would be removed.

Russia is entering its first recession in six years, worsened by sanctions over its support for separatists fighting the government in eastern Ukraine and its annexation of Crimea. The main cause of the slump is the 50 percent drop in oil prices since June 2014 to about $55 a barrel. The price could tumble another $15 a barrel once sanctions on Iran are lifted after a final nuclear deal, the Energy Information Administration said on April 7.

Sanctions Effect

Oil at $40 a barrel could shave almost 2 percent from Russian gross domestic product, according to estimates by the Russian central bank last month before the Iran framework was announced. The Bank of Russia predicts gross domestic product will shrink 3.5 percent to 4 percent this year at an average oil price of $50-55 per barrel under its base case. The economy may contract as much as 5.8 percent under the bank's risk scenario, which assumes an average oil price of $40 per barrel.

"Some Russian experts say that the longer sanctions remain for Iran, the better it will be for Russia because of the risk of falling oil prices," said Elena Suponina, a Middle East expert and adviser to the director of Moscow's Institute for Strategic Studies. "But Russia supports the lifting of sanctions against Iran because it is a long-standing partner and ally, including over many regional problems."

One of those problems is Syria, where Assad has managed to cling to power during a four-year civil war, as military and financial support from Iran and Russia countered Gulf states' backing for his foes.

Syria, Yemen

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry signaled a change of policy of pushing for Assad's immediate ouster last month, saying that the U.S. and its allies will have to negotiate with him to secure a political transition.

In Yemen, where Saudi-led air strikes are in their third week, Russia has been pushing for a UN Security Council resolution to call for an end to the military operation aimed at restoring the ousted Saudi-backed president.

An Iran nuclear agreement would increase the country's ability to support its allies in Syria, Yemen and Iraq, and benefit Russian arms exports, said Firas Abi Ali, head of Middle East and North Africa Analysis at research group IHS Country Risk. "The Iranians and Russians have a shared fear of Sunni militancy."

Russia and Saudi Arabia have had increasingly strained ties since they found themselves on opposing sides of the Syrian civil war in 2011 and some Russian officials accused the kingdom of conspiring with the U.S. to push down oil prices.

Trade Opportunities

In fact, the revival of Iran will be a "huge problem" for Russia's energy industry because of the "serious impact" on the oil market from increased supplies and the likelihood the Iranians will compete with gas exporter OAO Gazprom, Chris Weafer, a senior partner at Moscow-based consulting firm Macro Advisory, said by e-mail.

That could be offset by increased opportunities in a sanctions-free Iran, according to Radzhab Sattarov, head of the Iran committee at the Moscow Trade and Industry Chamber.

Gazprom, its oil arm, OAO Gazprom Neft, and OAO Lukoil have had projects in Iran interrupted by sanctions, and Rosatom is seeking further contracts at the Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran.

Russian-Iranian cooperation on oil shouldn't be underestimated, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said on Monday, according to the Interfax news service. Russia is already supplying goods to Iran in exchange for oil, Putin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on Tuesday.

'Normal Country'

"For Russia, it is more beneficial if Iran becomes a normal country you can have regular business with," said Fyodor Lukyanov, head of the Moscow-based Council on Foreign and Defense Policy. "There will be more competition but still Russia will have more advantages compared to American companies in doing business with Iran as the U.S. will remain the symbol of everything they hate."

The political benefits may not only be in the Middle East.

Iran could join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a group that includes Russia, China and Central Asian states, thereby boosting Russian ability to influence Iran's policies in Central Asia and Afghanistan, Kozhanov said.

"In Russia's strategic thinking, Iran's role is increasing," Kayhan Barzegar, director of the Tehran-based Institute for Middle East Strategic Studies, said in a phone interview. "Russia and Putin have come to the conclusion that relations with Iran must increase."

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 #18
Asia Times
April 14, 2015
Spengler to Bhadrakumar: Russia's missile sale to Iran is retaliation for Ukraine
By David P. Goldman, Chatham House Rules

Why did Russia announce on Monday that it would sell it S-300 air defense system to Iran after years of hesitation? One might as well ask why Karpov used a rook rather than a bishop against Korchnoi in his celebrated 1988 endgame: he had a rook, but didn't have a bishop. Outside its immediate periphery, Russia has only two means of projecting power, namely energy and arms. A declining but still significant power, Russia still makes some of the world's best anti-missile and anti-aircraft systems, and deploys them on the chessboard of its strategic vision.

M.K. Bhadrakumar's learned and informative commentary in this publication on what he calls a new Russian-Iranian axis and a Russian "red line" for US policy makes no mention of the most important word in the whole mix, and that is, "Ukraine." It has been obvious since no later than 2005 that Russia might retaliate for American efforts to pry Ukraine away from Russian influence by thwarting Western interests in the Persian Gulf. I warned in Asia Times on Dec. 6, 2005:

Nonetheless, Russia's evident willingness to upgrade Iran's weapons capability reflects another unintended result of Washington's ideological campaign for democratization. America has offered open support for the "color revolutions" in parts of the former Soviet Union, beginning with Ukraine's "Orange" revolution last year and continuing through the "Yellow" revolution in Kyrgyzstan last spring. The unpleasant regimes Washington helped replace gave way to equally unpleasant regimes, except with greater instability.

Russian President Vladimir Putin fears instability on Russia's borders, but he cannot persuade Washington to desist from stirring the pot. Russian military cooperation with Iran provides him with a bargaining chip to use against Washington's designs on what Putin considers a Russian sphere of influence.

I repeated the warning in 2008: "If Washington chooses to demonize Russia, the likelihood is that Russia will become a spoiler with respect to American strategic interests in general, and use the Iranian problem to twist America's tail. That is a serious risk indeed, for nuclear proliferation is the one means by which outlaw regimes can pose a serious threat to great powers." And I repeated the warning on numerous occasions through 2015. The American State Department is a patzer in chess argot, a beginner who can't think two moves ahead. It never seems to have occurred to Washington that its embrace (if not its sponsorship) of the Maidan Revolution in Ukraine would prompt counter-moves by Moscow, including a new rapprochement with China and the "Russian-Iranian axis" that Bhadrakumar projects. Some American officials, for example Assistant Secretary of State Victoria  Nuland (of "f*** the Europeans" fame), actually believed that Maidan would be repeated in Red Square.

Other factors bear on Russia's decision, to be sure: as Bhadrakumar observes, America has toughened its position regarding the possible deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems in Europe over Russian objections. That is a Russian concern, to be sure, but the rancor over prospective ABM deployment in Europe itself is a result of the Ukraine crisis. There is a broader issue at stake, to be sure, namely whether technology gives advantage to offense or defense in missile technology. Giving Iran the S-300, a generation-old system (in a yet unspecified version) has no bearing whatever on Russia's competitive position in missile technology.

Another factor in Russian calculation is the Obama administration's attempt to embrace Iran as a prospective ally, to give the Persian pocket empire a seat the big table ("include Iran in the regional strategic architecture" in American diplo-speak). The White House appears ready to ditch the sanctions regime in return for a vague Iranian promise of good behavior, so why should Russia continue to enforce the sanctions regime? Russia has jumped the gun, as Bhadrakumar observes, but it has done so in the expectation that the sanctions will be gone within months. Russia's submission of its own bid for influence with Iran is hardly surprising.

We do not know what version of the S-300 Russia proposes to sell to Iran: The system itself dates to 1979 and is available under twenty different official designations, and in countless configurations. Whether it will deter Israel (for example) from attacking Iranian facilities is also unknown. Russia sells no military system that it cannot defeat, and countermeasures to its missiles are for sale at some price. As is its usage, Russia has forced the burden of uncertainty onto its opponent. Russia has an inherently weaker position, but is a superior player.

What should America have done differently? First, severing Ukraine from Russia was not an achievable goal (whether or not it was desirable). America should have proposed a Saarland solution for Crimea and Donbass: let them vote to join Russia if they so desired. The remainder of Ukraine, as Angelo Codevilla has observed, would have been Catholic and pro-Western. The US should make clear that it has no strategic interest in Ukraine and no ambitions for regime change in Moscow. Second, Russia has no claims whatever on what ABM technology we develop or sell to others, and we should make no concessions there. If the Russians don't like the system we build, let them build their own. Third, we should crush Iranian ambitions to build nuclear weapons, rather than deluding ourselves that Iran is a prospective strategic partner (there has been a lively debate on this blog among Messrs. Bailey, Codevilla and Ledeen on how best to accomplish this).

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 #19
www.thedailybeast.com
April 13, 2015
Putin's Missile Could Make U.S. Attacks on Iran Nearly Impossible
By Dave Majumdar

For years, Team Obama crowed about keeping this advanced Russian missile out of Iran's hands. Now the Kremlin suddenly seems eager to hand it over to Tehran.

This nuke deal with Iran had better work. Because the Kremlin is lifting a ban on selling a powerful air defense system to Iran that would render an airstrike on Tehran's nuclear weapons facilities nearly impossible.

The delivery of the new weapon, called the Almaz-Antei S-300PMU-1-known as the SA-20 Gargoyle in NATO parlance-would effectively force the U.S. to rely on its small fleet of stealth aircraft to strike targets inside Iran in case the mullahs make a dash for the bomb. But even those aircraft might have a difficult time.

"This would be a huge deal depending on where they [the S-300s] are based...The Persian Gulf would be an interesting place to fly," said one senior defense official with experience on multiple stealth aircraft types. "These new [surface-to-air missiles] change the whole complexion...It's a big move."

According to a report from Russian state media, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on Monday that would allow the sale of the fearsome S-300 air defense system to Iran.

"[The presidential] decree lifts the ban on transit through Russian territory, including airlift, and the export from the Russian Federation to the Islamic Republic of Iran, and also the transfer to the Islamic Republic of Iran outside the territory of the Russian Federation, both by sea and by air, of air defense missile systems S-300," reads the Kremlin statement, according to RIA Novosti.

The U.S. government has lobbied Russia hard for years to prevent the sale of the S-300 to Iran. In 2010, convincing Putin to suspend the sale of the S-300 to Iran was heralded as a major foreign policy coup by the Obama administration. In many ways, it was one of the central achievements of the so-called reset in relations with Moscow, said Heather Conley, a Russia expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

Since then, of course, relations with Russia have cooled to nearly Cold War levels of hostility. Making life difficult for American policymakers is once again a Kremlin priority. "Mr. Putin's policies are not designed to assist the West or to make our jobs and ability to affect policy much more difficult," Conley said. "It's also a reminder to Washington and other Western capitals that they have some cards to play here."

Another factor that might be motivating Moscow is that with the Russian economy in shambles, Moscow needs all of the economic stimulus it can get. The missile deal with Iran would reportedly net Russia more than $800 million.

The air defense system is "a complete game changer...That thing is a beast and you don't want to get near it."
Last year, analysts predicted that if the U.S. sanctions of the Russian economy grew too tight, the Kremlin would respond by selling S-300s to Tehran. "I could see as part of this deal [between Tehran and Moscow] that they would agree to transfer advanced missiles to Iran," Mark Dubowitz, the executive director of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, told The Daily Beast at the time. "If Putin became angry enough over the West's financial punishment of Russia, he could put in play the S-300 deal."

The Kremin's decision now sends a signal to Tehran that the sanctions that brought Iran to the negotiating table are done-even before a final nuclear agreement is signed. "Clearly, this is the sanctions regime already starting to crack and fall apart in anticipation there will be an agreement [on nuclear issues with Iran] on June 30," Conley said. "This is the first major signal that regime is coming to an end."

From a practical military standpoint, the sale of the S-300 would directly challenge the U.S. position that "all options are on the table" should Iran try to subvert the nuclear deal. The addition of the powerful missile defense system would make punitive airstrikes against Iran extremely difficult.

Many U.S. defense officials from the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps agree that the Russian missile system effectively renders entire regions no-go zones for conventional jets like the F-16 or Navy F/A-18 Hornet. Currently, only high-end stealth aircraft like the $2.2 billion B-2 Spirit-of which the Air Force has exactly 20-and the high-performance F-22 Raptor can safely operate inside an area protected by the S-300 and its many variants. The Pentagon's $400 billion F-35 Joint Strike Fighter will eventually be able to operate inside those zones, too. But according to multiple sources within the Pentagon and defense industry, no warplane now operating can remain inside those well-defended areas for long.

A senior U.S. Marine Corps aviator said that if Russia delivers the S-300 missile to Iran, it would fundamentally change U.S. war plans. "A complete game changer for all fourth-gen aircraft [like the F-15, F-16 and F/A-18]. That thing is a beast and you don't want to get near it," he said.

The sale of the S-300 also would neutralize any possibility that Israel could take unilateral action against Iran, one senior Air Force commander noted. The S-300 would effectively prevent the Israeli air force from attacking Iran until the F-35 is delivered to that nation.

"I find it almost hilarious that the Russians are saying, 'It's an entirely defensive system and cannot attack anyone, including Israel,'" the senior officer said. "But it also essentially makes Iran attack-proof by Israel and almost any country without fifth-gen [stealth fighter] capabilities. In other words, Iran, with the S-300, can continue to do what they want once those systems are in place without fear of attack from anyone save the U.S. Brilliant chess move..."

But even when Israel receives the F-35, the relatively short-range stealth fighter can only carry a pair of 2,000-pound bombs-which are not likely to be adequate for the most heavily fortified Iranian targets. Some of the Iranian facilities are likely to require the use of the massive 30,000-pound GBU-57A/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) that can only be carried by the American B-2 stealth bomber.

An attack on Iran's nuclear facilities was going to be a daunting task, even under the best of circumstances, another Air Force official with extensive experience flying stealth aircraft said. The targets are deeply buried-which makes them hard to crack open with bombs-and the facilities are scattered all over the place. The Air Force's tiny fleet of B-2 stealth bombers would have to do most of the work because only those aircraft have the range and weapons needed to hit those targets properly. The introduction of any version of the S-300 would make that extremely difficult job much more challenging, the official said.

But the exact number and exact location of where the S-300s are placed makes a big difference, the official said. That's further compounded by the fact that the S-300 system is mobile-and can move at a moment's notice.

If there is a large number of those S-300 air defense systems in place, even pilots flying stealth jets like the B-2 and F-22 Raptor would find the mission to be extremely difficult. "If they're all over every square inch of the country, then it doesn't matter what you put out there-it's going to be a challenge," the Air Force official said.

But it's not just Iran. If Russia and China continue to sell advanced air defenses around the world, the overwhelming majority of current U.S. warplanes will be unable to fight in many parts of the globe. "We are very concerned with the proliferation of big [surface-to-air missiles]...now in Crimea, Kaliningrad, and Iran if this is true," said one senior U.S. Air Force official. "We're being denied access faster than we can appreciate, in my opinion."

That said, there are some ways in which older non-stealth jets can fight in areas protected by these new missiles, one senior Air Force official said. But it would be very risky. "It would be really classified to discuss specific SAM [surface-to-air missile] counter tactics, but you know that the 'double digits SAMs' [which is what Air Force pilots call the S-300 and its variants] give all of the fourth-gen jets great pause," the official said.

One way would be to use a combination of miniature air-launched drones carrying jammers to try to spoof the S-300's radars by giving it false targets, another Air Force official said. Those drones would have to be combined with stealthy long-range missiles to eliminate the Russian-built air defenses.

It would also be very helpful to have a jamming aircraft to try to suppress the S-300's radar from a distance-which is where the Navy comes in. "[The Navy's] EA-18Gs [carrier-based jamming aircraft] with their ALQ-218 [electronic sensor] will detect, fix, and track that weapons system," said a former senior naval aviator. "Once you have it fixed, they can jam and you can employ weapons from range to destroy it."

But the problem is that the S-300 is a mobile system and thus moves every so often; U.S. pilots can never be sure where a weapon is at any given time. "Well, yes...you can kill it" with the right cruise missile, said Mark Gunzinger, an air power analyst with the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington. "This assumes, of course, that the S-300 launcher remains at a fixed location after a standoff cruise missile is launched at it."

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#20
Far from all inside NATO ready to follow US in its anti-Russian policies
By Lyudmila Alexandrova

MOSCOW, April 13. /TASS/. Resounding statement by the chief of the French intelligence refuting US allegations Russia has been preparing an invasion of Ukraine not just shows that France still prefers to adhere to its special stance within NATO, but also proves the fact that the allies have reached a certain limit of obedience to the United States over the crisis in Ukraine. Saying that NATO is split would be an exaggeration, of course, but it is pretty clear that many of US ideas fail to draw immediate and unequivocal support from other members of the alliance.

Speaking at a session of the defense and armed forces committee of the French parliament the head of the military intelligence directorate (DMR), General Christophe Gomart, complained that NATO's leadership tended to turn an attentive ear to US intelligence sources, while the information provided by French intelligence services was "more or less " taken into account. General Gomart's statement made back last month hit the headlines as late as last Saturday.

"NATO announced that the Russians were about to invade Ukraine. But, according to French intelligence, there is nothing to corroborate this hypothesis - we determined that the Russians were deploying neither command posts nor logistical facilities, including field hospitals, needed for a military incursion... Later it turned out that we were right," General Gomart told the parliamentary hearing, without specifying what period of time he was having in mind.

"There are major rifts among NATO members regarding Russia's role in the Ukrainian crisis," the Internet resource Svobodnaya Pressa (Free Press) quotes the director of the Center for Strategic Research, Ivan Konovalov, as saying. "Far from everybody in NATO sees our country as an aggressor. This statement by the chief of the French military intelligence is fresh evidence contradictions inside the alliance are coming to a head."

No major split inside NATO is in sight, of course, he said. "The alliance is homogenous by and large. No alternative pole of power has emerged in it. Yet the French have demonstrated their intention to ease the grip of US hegemony. Such gestures may now follow from Germany, Italy, and Spain. Also we see such anti-US sentiment in the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Hungary."

France has always taken a special position inside NATO, the deputy director of the Military and Political Analysis Institute, Alexander Khramchikhin, recalls.

"In this particular case it is probably a hint Europe has reached a certain limit of obedience to the United States over the Ukrainian issue, a line it is unprepared to step over. A very vocal statement it was, indeed," he told TASS.

Khramchikhin says there is no evidence France had agreed anything with anybody in advance.

"But there are some EU and NATO member-countries that are unprepared to go beyond a certain limit - namely, the introduction of new sanctions against Russia, supplies of weapons to Ukraine and connivance with every single step Kiev might care to take."

"Possibly, France lacks the resources that are at the United States' disposal, but the French have a well-developed intelligence system. The general would surely not be talking nonsense," the chief of the world politics chair at the Higher School of Economics, Maksim Bratersky, told TASS. "He also regrets the Americans have made all other countries bow to its opinion to the detriment of impartiality and effectiveness."

Bratersky agrees no split inside NATO is in sight: the alliance remains an integral machinery. But it is worth paying attention to the United States' role in the Saudi Arabia-led coalition in Yemen. "That it has been operating there without a UN Security Council mandate no longer surprises anyone," Bratersky said. "But there has been no discussion even within NATO, either. There could not have been any consensus on the issue. Far from all of the United States' ideas evoke automatic approval from the other NATO countries."
 

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 #21
Moscow Times
April 14, 2015
Hillary Clinton as U.S. President 'Wouldn't Fix' Russia-U.S. Relationship
By Ivan Nechepurenko

Should Hillary Clinton - who once compared Russian President Vladimir Putin to Adolf Hitler - become the next U.S. president, no improvement should be expected in U.S.-Russian relations, political analysts said Monday.

Relations between the two countries suffer as the result of a fundamental conflict in which Russia is fighting for a bigger role in global affairs than it has been allocated by the United States, and from what Clinton has said and done in the past, it is unlikely she would yield as an American leader, Russian pundits agreed.

"Regardless of whether Hillary wins or loses, we are in the midst of a fundamental and serious conflict," said Dmitry Trenin, head of the Carnegie Moscow Center think tank. "My main hope is that it will remain cold and not turn hot," he said.

Clinton, who announced her bid Sunday to succeed Barack Obama as the 45th - and first female - U.S. president, has said in the past that Putin's Russia must be contained and checked. Putin, in turn, has repeatedly said that the United States seeks to thwart Russia's legitimate interests abroad and destabilize the political situation inside the country.

No Love Lost

During the last eight years since she became one of the most powerful women in the world as U.S. Secretary of State during Obama's first term, Clinton has also been one of Putin's fiercest critics.

Most recently - in February - she said European governments were "too wimpy" in dealing with Putin, the CNN television channel cited London Mayor Boris Johnson as saying.

"Her general anxiety was that Putin, if unchallenged and unchecked, would continue to expand his influence in the perimeter of what was the Soviet Union. She spoke of alarm in Estonia and the Baltic states. I was very, very struck by that," Johnson told CNN, describing his meeting with Clinton in New York.

Clinton's urge to consolidate European leaders against Putin is no surprise, as Europe is one of two principal challenges to the U.S. policy of containing Russia, according to Pavel Zolotaryov, deputy head of the Moscow-based Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies think tank.

"The two main challenges to U.S. policy on Russia are Europe, which is prone to divisions, and China, which could offer Russia some economic relief. Whoever is in the White House will act according to these premises," Zolotaryov said in a phone interview.

Trading Barbs

Some of Clinton's indirect exchanges with Putin have taken on a personal tone.

At the beginning of 2008, before she lost out on the presidential nomination from the Democratic Party to Obama, Clinton told the audience during a campaign event that Putin, as a former KGB agent, "doesn't have a soul," referring to a well-known remark made by George W. Bush upon first meeting Putin in 2001 when the U.S. president said, "I was able to get a sense of his soul."

A month later, Putin said in answer to a journalist's question during a news conference that "a statesman must at least have a head."  

At the end of 2011, Putin accused Clinton and the State Department she headed at the time of inciting anti-Kremlin unrest over the State Duma elections that were condemned as fraudulent by observers.

The mass protests signaled the end of the so-called "reset" of relations between Russia and the United States, a broad effort by Obama and President Dmitry Medvedev to give the ties between the two countries a fresh start.

Last March, as Russian troops fanned out over the Crimean Peninsula shortly before Moscow announced its decision to annex the territory from Ukraine, Clinton said that Putin's actions there were akin to Hitler's moves to occupy neighboring territories in the 1930s, which the Nazi leader justified as necessary to protect German people there.

On that occasion, Putin said Clinton was a weak woman.

"Ms. Clinton has never been too graceful in her statements. Still, we always met afterward and had cordial conversations at various international events. I think even in this case we could reach an agreement. When people push boundaries too far, it's not because they are strong, but because they are weak. But perhaps weakness is not the worst quality in a woman," Putin said, responding to a question from a French journalist.

Reacting in turn to that statement, Clinton said Putin was "not the first male leader who has made a sexist comment like that."

Speaking on CNN back in July, Clinton said that Putin "acts bored and dismissive" and "as though it's a burden on him to be in conversations with other world leaders.

"I would be delighted if the U.S. could have a positive relationship with Russia and I would be thrilled if Russian people, who are so capable, had a normal country that they could chart a different future. I think that would be next to impossible at least for the short term with Putin," she said.

Most recently, at a public event in January, Clinton did a comic impression of Putin, joking about the ease with which he swapped roles with Medvedev when Putin returned to the presidency, and contrasting the procedure with hard-fought U.S. elections.  

Obligatory Statements

According to Alexander Konovalov, head of the Institute for Strategic Assessments, a Moscow think tank, Clinton has to be tough on Putin in order to prove that she will defend national interests.

"The democrats always feel obliged to demonstrate that they can be tough. In Clinton's case this is exacerbated by the fact that Obama has been accused of being too dovish with Putin," he said in a phone interview.

Strongly worded emotive criticism of Putin has become the norm in the West and Clinton has to demonstrate that she can stand up to such a difficult leader, Trenin said.

"It has become popular in the U.S. to criticize political leaders for being weak in their dealings with Putin, so Clinton is simply responding to the agenda here," he said, adding that any personal relationship between the two would likely be professional.

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 #22
Fair.org
April 10, 2015
CNN Wants to Believe: White House 'Russian Hackers' Go From Suspects to Perps
By Jim Naureckas

CNN (4/8/15) ran a story about "Russian hackers" getting into the White House computer system that needed to get out of the White House PR system.
The story, by Evan Perez and Shimon Prokupecz, began with:

"Russian hackers behind the damaging cyber intrusion of the State Department in recent months used that perch to penetrate sensitive parts of the White House computer system, according to US officials briefed on the investigation."

The phrasing implies that the responsibility of said hackers from Russia for an earlier "cyber intrusion" is proven fact, and what the "US officials" (the main source for the news in this piece, along with "investigators") are adding is their culpability in a second security breach.

But if you follow the link in that lead, you find another CNN story (3/10/15) written last month by the same writers, and here's  its complete presentation of the evidence for the "Russian hackers" involvement:

"Russian hackers, likely working for the Russian government, are suspected in the State Department hack."

I was going to ask what new evidence in the past month changed the Russians from suspects to convicted criminals, but it actually happened in the space of just eight words, because that much further down in that same piece from last month, there's a new paragraph that begins:

"In part because of the Russian attack on State...."

A similar rush from allegation to fact happens in the more recent piece. The evidence, again, could hardly be more cursory:

"The intrusion was routed through computers around the world, as hackers often do to hide their tracks, but investigators found tell-tale codes and other markers that they believe point to hackers working for the Russian government."

Unnamed "investigators"-who may come from the "FBI, Secret Service [or] US intelligence agencies," we learn earlier in the piece-"believe" there are "tell-tale codes and other markers" that "point to" Russian government employees-how much fuzzier does evidence get? Yet immediately CNN is talking about the "Russian hack" as though it's proven fact:

"National Security Council spokesman Mark Stroh didn't confirm the Russian hack, but he did say that "any such activity is something we take very seriously."

"The Russian hack"-the definite article is called "definite" for a reason; the sentence would read much differently if it referred to "a Russian hack."

The Russians reappear as certain culprits in the State Department caper:

"The State Department computer system has been bedeviled by signs that despite efforts to lock them out, the Russian hackers have been able to reenter the system."

And the certainty of Russian guilt is a jumping off point for observations about the geopolitical scene:

"The ferocity of the Russian intrusions in recent months caught US officials by surprise, leading to a reassessment of the cybersecurity threat as the US and Russia increasingly confront each other over issues ranging from the Russian aggression in Ukraine to the US military operations in Syria."

(Note that in the CNN stylebook, Russia commits "aggression" whereas the US carries out "military operations.")

A similar lack of skepticism is evident as the article ties the alleged hacking into electoral politics ("The Russian breach is believed to have come after [Hillary] Clinton departed State") and domestic law-making:

"Sen. Susan Collins said the revelations of the Russian hack "are troubling and further expose that our nation's defenses against cyber-attacks are dangerously inadequate."

The word "revelations" means that something actual has been revealed-whereas not only doesn't CNN know for a fact that Russians hacked anything, it doesn't even claim that the US government is certain about Russian guilt. (The story says investigators say they have evidence they "believe point[s] to" Moscow's involvement.) That's why you use a word like "accusations" or "allegations"-or, better yet in this case, "suspicions."

I do want to commend CNN editors for one decision, namely changing the article's headline. Here's the piece's original title, as preserved by Google (also visible in the article's Web tab and URL):

CNN: Russians Hacked the White HouseThere's now a new version of the headline, which appropriately inserts a source for the claim of Russian hacking:

USA Today: How US Thinks Russians Hacked the White House

Now, I'm glad they changed the headline; headlines, as the most-read text of a piece, are important. But they didn't change it fast enough to prevent USA Today (4/7/15) from picking up the story and giving it this headline:

USA Today: CNN: Russians hacked White House computers

Unless CNN has its own experts on cybersecurity who are independently evaluating the evidence, the network is really not in a position to be making charges in its own voice about international computer espionage. By attributing the claim, USA Today's headline did it right, while at the same time pointing up how CNN was doing it wrong.

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 #23
Sputnik
April 14, 2015
America Goes Large: Obama Wants Huge Budget for His Anti-Russian Trolls

While issuing scary revelations about the alleged 'Kremlin Troll Army' operating online, 'perpetuating a pro-Kremlin dialogue', the US government's international broadcaster RFE/RL somehow forgot to disclose it is prepared to spend as much as $15.4 million of taxpayers' money on its own digital media forces to battle phantom Russia in the media.

The US government agency Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) has filed its annual Fiscal Year Budget Request with the US Congress. This year its overall draft budget of $751.5 million requires some extra funding.

Among the notable areas which require intense investing is "Countering a Revanchist Russia", for which it will allocate $15.4 million to battles in the blogosphere. Interestingly enough, it is more than twice as much as the agency is prepared to shell out on "Countering The ISIL Narrative" ($6.1 million).

The reason for the big spending is the fear among the "US and its Western Allies" of an "aggressive Russia" which has had some success lambasting them in the social media, not to mention via TV and radio.

"Over the past 15 years, Russia has been headed in the opposite direction, with authoritarianism and anti-Western policies that today threaten Russia's neighbors and, by extension, the United States and its Western allies," reads the document.

The US international media (USIM) is now set forth to "refute Russian propaganda" and influence the minds of "Russians and Russian-speakers in the former Soviet Union, Europe and around the world."

For the purpose, BGG chose one of its broadcasters, RFE/RL (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty), headquartered in Prague.

Though it still counts on TV broadcasting, as it is "by far the leading platform for news in Russia, the former Soviet space, and markets targeted by Russian propaganda around the world", RFE/RL will extensively use "digital platforms to reach Russians in broadcast-denied zones, which are rapidly gaining in popularity for news, and offer new, creative opportunities to engage and connect audiences."

"In FY 2015 RFE/RL will create a new digital media department, DIGM, that includes a dedicated social media team to confront misinformation in the Russian-media sphere via multiple social-media platforms (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, VKontakte and Odnoklassniki). This team will also utilize WhatsApp to function as a mobile push-messaging service targeting potential new audiences," says the paper.

Russian 'Propaganda' Beats US, Washington Needs Media Reform - Congressman

The document echoes the concerns of the US Congress that the United States is "getting beat by Putin propaganda."

Last month, US Congressman Ed Royce spoke up for the need to reform Washington's media agency, BBG.

"Our nation is getting beat by Putin propaganda and our international broadcasting is floundering. It's unacceptable," Royce then stated in the release.

Royce stressed that BBG, a US federal agency responsible for supervising all government-supported civilian international media, must be reformed.

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 #24
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
April 13, 2015
New U.S.-Russia cultural institute targets better understanding of WWII
The newly-formed Carmel Institute of Russian Culture and History has announced its arrival with a symposium at the American University in Washington, D.C. devoted to "The Strength of Cooperation: Lessons from the Grand Alliance, 1941-1945." Participants included wartime U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower's granddaughter and former American ambassador to Russia John Beyrle.
Ekaterina Komarova, special to RBTH
 
The American University in Washington, D.C. recently hosted its 4th annual symposium, in collaboration with the newly-established Carmel Institute of Russian Culture and History. Titled "The Strength of Cooperation: Lessons from the Grand Alliance, 1941-1945," the April 11 event turned out to be something more than just an ordinary historical meeting.

The first large-scale event organized by the Carmel Institute, the symposium reminded its guests about the profound cooperation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union during WWII and stressed the importance of the role such unity could play in the future, as well as how this might be achieved given the current political situation.

Instead of stating formalities about the countries' significant shared history and the need for future cooperation, symposium participants focused on intimate family stories that appeared to provide much stronger proof of the cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union during World War II.

Susan Eisenhower, for instance, told the audience about the personal, almost friendly relationship between her grandfather, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Soviet Marshal Georgy Zhukov. According to family history, once Zhukov even complained to Eisenhower about some American journalist who had written that Zhukov was shorter than his wife. The Red Army general was deeply offended by this article and asked Eisenhower to punish the reporter.
 
Looking to the past for inspiration

John Beyrle, former American ambassador to Russia, told an incredible story about his father Joseph Beyrle, who is thought to be the only American soldier to have served with both the United States Army and the Red Army in World War II.

Beyrle senior entered the war as a paratrooper in the U.S. army, was captured by German soldiers, then spent seven months in seven different prisons. After two escapes ended in recapture and subsequent torture and beating, Beyrle  eventually succeeded in his third escape attempt, before coming into contact with the Soviet army.

The story goes that Beyrle then decided to join the Red Army to continue his military service, but after only one month he was wounded and evacuated to a field hospital in Poland. There he received a visit from Soviet Marshal Georgy Zhukov. Joseph Beyrle took this chance to ask Marshal Zhukov to give him any document that could prove his identity - by that time he had no I.D. to prove that he was an American citizen.

"The next day a letter appeared; it was written in Russian, which my father could never read. But whenever he showed it, whether in the Russian army or to Russian military, he was given immediately a seat on a train or a hot meal. It was a magic letter. Obviously it was signed by Marshal Zhukov. Thanks to the officers of the Soviet military and the letter from Marshal Zhukov, my father was delivered to the American Embassy in Moscow," said Beyrle.
 
Younger generation's knowledge of war hazy

However, the story of Joseph Beyrle is pretty well known in the U.S., unlike the history of WWII in general. Peter Kuznick, professor of history at the American University, admits that young Americans know almost nothing about this war.

"Last semester I asked my students how many Americans died in WWII and how many Soviet soldiers died in this war. They said about 90,000 Americans and 100,000 Soviets," said Kuznick at the symposium. "The American view is that the war started with Pearl Harbor, then it went to sleep for a couple of years and then started again with the Normandy, with D-Day."

Americans are not the only ones who have gaps in their knowledge of WWII history, though. Sergei Kislyak, Russian Ambassador to the U.S., acknowledges that few people on Russian streets would remember that the United States and the Soviet Union were allies in the war.

"It is so important that this memory carries on, because history teaches us that we have more chances to succeed if we work together rather than if we work against each other. It is important to remember what we did together during WWII today, when we see fewer allies than we expected to see five or 10 years ago," said Kislyak.

"It is also important that Americans and the American younger generation knows Russia, knows what we are and, what is equally important, what we are not," stressed the ambassador.
 
Shared values can help to build bridges

In order to achieve this goal the Russian Embassy has been working in close cooperation with the Initiative for Russian Culture (IRC). However, since March 23, the IRC officially no longer exists. Two weeks prior to the symposium international philanthropist and businesswoman Susan Carmel Lehrman announced that she was establishing the Carmel Institute of Russian Culture and History, which will elevate and expand IRC's robust programming in cultural diplomacy.

"I believe that, given the current political climate between our two nations, now is the most important time to establish this institute. Rather than ignoring the problems between our nations, our program focuses on culture, shared values and common interests as well as differences," said Lehrman.

According to Dr. Anton Fedyashin, director of the institute, in the last four years almost 15,000 people have attended events organized by the IRC. Fifty students have visited Russia either to study Russian or to take summer classes, and 20 more are going to Russia this summer. Yet as Fedyashin explains, this is only the first step.

"The Carmel Institute facilitated the establishment of a direct student exchange program with MGIMO-University and the Higher School of Economics in Moscow. The institute will also offer new courses on cultural diplomacy and Russia's relationship with the West," he said.

Richard Portwood, a student of Georgetown University, who last year received a scholarship from Susan Lehrman and spent several weeks at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, believes that the initiative is invaluable in building bridges between the two nations on a personal scale.

"You can just go somewhere as a typical tourist, see something, enjoy your trip. But what Carmel Institute does for young people is the opportunity to have a deeper understanding of culture and history. Moreover, it gives an opportunity to interact with young Russians," said Portwood to RBTH. "But the most important thing is that this institute as long as other initiatives helps bring together citizens from both countries, improves people-to-people diplomacy."
 
Diplomacy the only answer

The only question that all of the symposium's guests and participants seemed to struggle to answer was how to solve the current crisis in the relationship between the two nations, with none of the speakers being able to present a solution.

Susan Eisenhower, however, hinted that a possible answer could be found in the same joint background that was mentioned so many times during this symposium. She quoted the words spoken by her grandfather at the Geneva Summit in 1955: "War has failed. The only way to save the world now is through diplomacy."

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 #25
Russia Beyond the Headlines
www.rbth.ru
April 14, 2015
New book by William Brumfield reveals the miraculous architecture of the Russian North
Professor's latest book on traditional Russian wooden buildings to appear in mid-June.
Anna Sorokina, RBTH
http://rbth.com/literature/2015/04/14/new_book_by_william_brumfield_reveals_the_miraculous_architecture_45225.html

The Arctic Circle, the White Sea and lonely villages spared by time - William Brumfield, professor of Slavic Studies at Tulane University in New Orleans, has spent years traveling through these most isolated regions of the Russian North photographing the beauty of traditional Russian architecture.

Brumfield's latest book, Architecture at the End of the Earth: Photographing the Russian North, contains some 200 glorious color photographs of legendary centuries-old structures and documents various aspects of Russian architecture, from log houses to grand cathedrals.

In his photographs of onion-domed wooden churches in Varzuga, the massive walled Transfiguration Monastery on Great Solovetsky Island and the Cathedral of St. Sophia in Vologda, Brumfield outlines the region's significance to Russian history and culture. For decades Brumfield has collected material on the art of building in the Russian North, from ancient times to the end of the Soviet era.

"It is especially important to preserve the region's vulnerable achievements of master Russian carpenters," says Brumfield, "all the more so because a number of the wooden churches also contain remarkable paintings - either icons or wall art. It is also important to remember that the architecture of the Russian North is more than just wooden buildings. Working under the most difficult conditions, skilled masons built large cathedrals and monasteries with massive stone and brick walls. The style is always boldly distinctive."

Scholar Blair Ruble, former director of the Kennan Institute for Russian studies in Washinton, DC, writes in a review of the book, "The Russian north lies beyond the American imagination; and is imagined by Russians more than it is known. William Craft Brumfield has done more to uncover this vast and culturally rich area than nearly anyone of his generation either American or, for that matter, Russian. Brumfield reveals a region of vast cultural wealth and natural beauty that has suffered more than its share of history's vicissitudes. His homage to the region's architecture proclaims to the world that no one can understand Russia without beginning in the north."

The Architecture at the End of the Earth will be released on June 12. The book is already available for pre-order on Amazon. [http://www.amazon.com/Architecture-End-Earth-Photographing-Russian/dp/0822359065/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1427979819&sr=8-2&keywords=william+brumfield]

William Brumfield, professor of Slavic Studies at Tulane University, is a historian specializing in Russian architecture, a photographer, a tireless defender of monuments, and the author of 35 books and dozens of articles on the problems of preserving the architecture of Russia, primarily in the Russian North. He is also a regular contributor to Russia Beyond the Headlines.

For the past four years,  Brumfield's special section on RBTH, Discovering Russia, has shown our readers the most beautiful and remote corners of old Russia: the wooden churches of the north, the abandoned villages of central Russia, and historic sites near Moscow and St. Petersburg.

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 #26
www.opendemocracy.net
April 2, 2015
Why Russia watchers should listen to Glenn Greenwald
Elites throughout the former Soviet Union are cracking down on dissent. But before Russia watchers start criticising the region's repressive governments, they should first engage with the criticism, which has long been levelled at them.
By Philip Evans
Philip Evans is an Associate Editor at oDR.

From Minsk to Astana, elites throughout the former Soviet Union are clamping down on dissent as they respond to a host of perceived crises (East Ukraine, Nagorno-Karabakh, Islamic State). And with human rights abuses increasing fast, governments across the region, perhaps now more than ever, are legitimate targets of criticism.

But before charging down this road, Russia watchers in the West might do well to pause, take stock, and (re)engage with the criticism, which has been levelled at Western human rights activists in the past. Doing so would not only help stave off such criticism in the future, it might actually help improve the work they produce today.

The criticism

The criticism traditionally aimed at Western human rights activists can be roughly narrowed down to two main points.

Firstly, they fail to scrutinise their own governments with the same ferocity as they do those of others. If you are going to criticise a foreign government, then you are morally obliged to be just as scrupulous - if not more - with your own. It's easy, Glenn Greenwald and others are keen to remind us, to point to the faults of foreign states. But this criticism counts for very little - particularly in the countries being criticised - if you conspicuously skirt over the failings of your own.

Secondly, by predominantly highlighting the abuses of non-Western governments and the 'unacceptable' norms of non-Western societies, Western human rights activists prop up that pervasive narrative which divides the world up into 'good' and 'bad' countries and 'progressive' and 'primitive' governments. A narrative which has long been used in the service of empire to dehumanise and subjugate the 'other'.

As far as Glenn Greenwald and Noam Chomsky are concerned, Western rights activists should start paying a little closer attention to what's going on at home as well as abroad. And if it means avoiding such criticism in the future, why wouldn't they heed this advice?

But there is arguably a second reason why Western Russia watchers should listen to Greenwald - doing so could help improve the work they produce by giving it some much needed context.
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Establishing context

In all serious analysis, context is king. But it is context that has arguably been missing for so long from so much of the Western criticism aimed at countries like Russia, particularly when it comes to the controversial subject of human rights. While Russia watchers in the West have skilfully provided detailed accounts of the rights abuses taking place throughout the former Soviet Union, they have often failed to place these local situations in their wider global context. This has hampered our understanding of the rights issues at play throughout the region.

Take, for example, the issue of protester's rights. For a long time, Russia watchers and human rights critics more generally have expressed concern over the treatment of activists and protesters throughout the former Soviet Union. From the jailing of rights activists taking part in 'unsanctioned' rallies in Azerbaijan, to the beating of peaceful protesters in Armenia, to the recent arrest of anti-war protesters in Moscow, there are plenty of examples to show that the rights to freedom of assembly and expression are severely restricted throughout the region.

Missing from the vast majority of work on this issue, however, is an appreciation of the wider context within which these abuses are taking place. Looking wider afield, you can see that the same disturbing processes taking place in Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Russia are underway across the globe, including in the 'liberal' West.

Take Europe, for example, where anti-austerity demonstrations are now a semi-regular feature. Scenes of what many would describe as 'excessive' police force against protesters have become increasingly common. Indeed, in 2012, Amnesty International felt it necessary to remind EU countries not to beat protesters as increasing numbers were being kicked, shot at and wounded with rubber bullets, sprayed with tear gas, and denied medical assistance by police.

These violent acts have often provided justification for repressive governments throughout the former Soviet Union to continue with their own abuses. In fact, just last week Azerbaijan's President Aliyev highlighted the brutality against European protesters as a way of deflecting from the criticism he has been receiving for his human rights record in the run up to the European Games. So while Russia watchers have been ignoring context, elites in the region have not.

But excessive police force is just part of the picture. Increasingly, citizens throughout the world are having their rights to express legitimate grievances constrained by a global political and economic elite. States from Egypt to Ukraine, as well as institutions such as universities in the UK, for example, are banning demonstrations outright. In places such as Canada, the UK, and Australia, where protest is still technically legal, security services are employing controversial measures - including spying and broad anti-terrorism laws - to monitor, dissuade, and minimise the effect of protest.

And in states throughout the world, public spaces where protest can take place are rapidly decreasing as they fall ever more into private hands. In the UK, for instance, traditionally public spaces such as city squares and thoroughfares are being sold off to corporations whose patience for social activism is minimal to say the least.

What these examples demonstrate is a world-wide pattern whereby legitimate protest is increasingly being criminalised and neutered. Within this context, the Russian responses to those protesting Moscow's actions in Ukraine and the state's general arbitrary banning of demonstrations represent a continuation of a global trend rather than a shocking departure from international norms. Though one wouldn't think this from the vast majority of commentary out there.

Similar observations can be made about other rights issues affecting the former Soviet Union. For example, while Russia watchers in the West have rightly criticised the cynical and often violent crackdown on independent media by almost all the post-Soviet governments (a crackdown which is intensifying right now), they have largely chosen not to link these developments with those which can be witnessed elsewhere. And not just in 'non-liberal' countries like Egypt or Cambodia. But here in the West too, where journalism is increasingly being conflated with terrorism, where journalists largely work under the assumption that they are being monitored by state security services, and where a 'toxic' combination of a media market in which the majority of newspapers and television news channels are owned by a few men with wide-ranging business interests, coupled with the vast buying power of advertisers has created a situation where big business is able to set the news agenda.

As with protest, there is clearly a wider global crackdown taking place against a free and independent media. Here again, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Russia are merely a small part of what is a much bigger picture (and problem). Largely ignored by Western Russia watchers, this is what context shows us.

Using context

None of this is to minimise the threats which activists and journalists face throughout the former Soviet Union or to crassly and naively suggest that everything is the same the world over. There is a genuine difference between being denied the opportunity to protest in a shopping centre (or even having one's communications monitored) and being repeatedly tortured while languishing in prison for years. (Though it is important to note that this is not the fate, which awaits all citizens who dare speak out against post-Soviet governments.)

Nor is it to suggest that Russia watchers - or China watchers or Middle East watchers - shouldn't critique the abuses taking place within their countries and regions of speciality; they should. But they should do so with a conscious appreciation of the wider global context within which these abuses are taking place. This is particularly pertinent to the Russia watcher today, given all that is going on in the region.

But this is about more than just improving the work of the regional specialists. Context is important also because it is potentially the key to galvanising global constituencies around seemingly distant 'local' issues, thus improving the chances for genuine change in countries like Russia.

In order to encourage meaningful engagement with issues (which involves more than posting a few well-intentioned tweets), people have to feel like they have agency and an ability to instigate change. The lack of any such feeling goes some way to explaining why British publics have largely failed to engage with and act upon the issue of domestic spying. But before people can feel like they have real agency vis-à-vis an issue, they have to first see how that issue relates to them.

People in Sheffield and St Louis have to see what media freedoms in Siberia have to do with them. Providing the context discussed above and showing people the world over that the struggles of Russians or Uzbeks to secure rights to assembly and a free press are part of a wider global fight for citizens to achieve and/or maintain these rights, is one way in which this could possibly be achieved.

Listening

Over the years, the Russia watcher has undeniably improved our knowledge of a vast region that, for many, remains, to quote the old cliché, 'a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma.' But everyone can do with some outside advice from time to time. And if it can help improve their work and help engage more people with important 'local' rights issues, why wouldn't Western Russia watchers listen to Greenwald, and finally start paying a little more attention to context?

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 #27
Washington Post
April 14, 2015
Putin bests pop stars to win the TIME 100 reader's poll
By Karoun Demirjian

MOSCOW - Vladimir Putin is the most interesting person in the world - according to TIME readers, at least.

The Russian president won the magazine readers' poll for who should top its annual list of the world's 100 most influential figures, edging out Lee Chae-rin - a member of the South Korean pop group 2NE1 who is better known as "CL" - to claim the top spot with a whopping 6.95 percent of the vote Monday night.

He was the only world leader to place in the top five, an echelon that was otherwise the fiefdom of female pop stars, including Lady Gaga, Rihanna and Taylor Swift.

What this says about the cultural and political leanings of TIME readers voting in the poll is unclear. Putin is not a pop icon, but the world does have a particularly acute obsession with seeing him shirtless.

It is also difficult to qualitatively compare the contributions Putin and his closest competitors for TIME's top berth had on the world in 2014. For example, Putin may have completed the annexation of Crimea and led Russia into a period of the worst relations it has experienced with the West since the end of the Soviet Union, but Swift completed the transition from country to pop in a chart-topping album named after the year of her birth - which also happens to be the year the Berlin Wall came down.

The poll doesn't count for much, except potentially TIME's Web traffic. TIME's staff was careful to note on the poll invitation page that "TIME's editors will choose the TIME 100" list that is officially announced on April 16. "We want readers to have a say, too," they added.

There is no indication, however, that the readers' preferences will get any proportional consideration when curating the final list.

Nonetheless, Russian state news outlets were crowing about the victory.

"Vladimir Putin steals the show in TIME 100 reader's poll," Russian state-funded news channel RT cheered in a headline.

"Russian President Vladimir Putin has been named the winner" of the poll, boasted Russian state news service Tass, glossing over the part about how he bested a bunch of pop stars and leading with the good stuff: Putin beat out the Dalai Lama, the pope, and President Obama.

That's right: Obama couldn't even break the top 10.

TIME took votes from Twitter, Facebook, and on its Web site. While the magazine did not announce how many people voted in the poll, more than 57 percent of the votes came from within the United States.

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