Johnson's Russia List
2015-#64
1 April 2015
[email protected]
A project sponsored through the Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies (IERES) at The George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs*
www.ieres.org
JRL homepage: www.russialist.org
Constant Contact JRL archive:
 http://archive.constantcontact.com/fs053/1102820649387/archive/1102911694293.html
JRL on Facebook: www.facebook.com/russialist
JRL on Twitter: www.twitter.com/JohnsonRussiaLi
Support JRL: http://russialist.org/funding.php
Your source for news and analysis since 1996n0
*Support for JRL is provided in part by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York to the George Washington University and by voluntary contributions from readers. The contents do not necessarily represent the views of IERES or the George Washington University.

"We don't see things as they are, but as we are"

"Don't believe everything you think"

DJ: Re the first items in today's JRL, some day the New York Times will take a careful look at the foundational myths ("a traditional or legendary story") of the Maidan regime. That's what some people think. April Fool!

In this issue
 
#1
Kyiv Post
March 31, 2015
International report finds numerous failures in Maidan murders investigation
by Allison Quinn

The investigation into the murders of activists during the EuroMaidan revolution was inadequate, biased and, now, possibly even dead in the water. These are some of the conclusions of the Council of Europe's International Advisory Group that studied the process, which has been led by Ukraine's general prosecutor's office in conjunction with the police. [Report here: https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016802f038b]

The group's report, released on March 31, found that the investigation was hampered by numerous "failures", including a lack of willingness to investigate the violence, an insufficient number of investigators, and a lack of independence and transparency.

The advisory group was set up last spring specifically to oversee the investigation and ensure that it met the standards of the European Convention on Human Rights at the request of President Petro Poroshenko.

The bad marks come after the Ukrainian government pulled out all the stops to ensure justice for the victims and their family members of what has been classified as a crime against humanity, the massacre of more than a hundred peaceful protesters in central Kyiv in February 2014.

Yet, even more than a year later, there is still no clearer picture today of who was really behind the shootings, and the endless unanswered questions about the killings have now been amplified by new questions about the investigation itself.

Immediately after the scathing report was published, the General Prosecutor's office announced two new suspects in the investigation into Maidan violence: former acting Kyiv police chief Valeriy Mazan and his deputy, Petro Fedchuk, who are accused of organizing a crackdown on protesters on Feb. 18-19 that killed 13 people and injured more than a hundred others. Both men have been placed on a wanted list.

The investigation, largely seen as a test of the new Ukrainian government's ability to turn a new leaf and rid itself of past corruption, has been faced with setbacks from the very beginning.

Much of the evidence implicating Berkut officers in the shootings - guns believed to have been used, documents and even suspects - "disappeared" in the chaos that followed the tragedy, Nicolas Bratza, chair and former president of the European Court of Human Rights and an author of the new report, noted at a press conference on March 31.

The accused mastermind, Dmitry Sadovnik, fled the country last October, after a court's decision to release him from custody triggered a brawl with victims' relatives in the courtroom and numerous threats against him and his family.

He was accused of handing down the order to shoot protesters on Feb. 20, when 39 were killed, according to official data from the Interior Ministry.

Last year, then-General Prosecutor Vitaly Yarema said 17 Berkut officers were suspected of involvement in the shootings, and 14 of them had fled to Russia.

Many have accused ousted President Viktor Yanukovych of ordering his riot police to shoot protesters to regain control after weeks of street protests.The accusation prompted many Berkut officers to flee the country in fear for their lives, many of them to Russia.

Two remaining defendants, former Berkut officers Pavel Abroskin and Sergei Zinchenko, face their next hearing on April 2, when the jury trial is set to begin.

The lawyers of the accused have echoed the criticism voiced by the Council of Europe's advisory panel, describing the investigation as a travesty of justice that threatens to bring shame to the country's judicial system and saying the entire case against the former Berkut officers is based on flimsy evidence.

"There is no direct evidence whatsoever that these men caused the protesters' deaths," said Alexander Goroshinsky, one of the lawyers for Abroskin, at a press conference on March 30.

"You can't say they are guilty of shooting dozens of protesters dead just because they were seen in the area wearing yellow ribbons around the time of the tragedy," Goroshinksy said, noting that the prosecutors' main argument was that the accused were present at the time of the killings.

"But hundreds of people were there," he said. "That doesn't mean they all killed protesters."

While the upcoming trial focuses on the killings of 39 protesters between Feb. 18-20, the Council of Europe's International Advisory Group on Ukraine noted that the authorities' failure to open any sort of probe into earlier violence during the protests had seriously hindered any further investigation.

Igor Varfolomeyev, a lawyer for Zinchenko, argued at a press conference on March 30 that authorities had apprehended the wrong men in the frantic drive to appease the public by finding the culprits.

Varfolomeyev also slammed what he described as "blatant pressure on the courts" from above and the lack of a presumption of innocence.

"We're not the ones breaking the rules, breaking the laws," he said, noting that all the arrests in the case had been made immediately after reshufflings in the prosecutors' office.

"These coincidences make you think," he said, saying the investigation was more about politics than justice.

While the report by the Council of Europe's International Advisory Group on Ukraine offered criticism of the investigation, Bratza stressed that the group could not comment on the findings of the investigation or the accused, as the group had been tasked only with monitoring the probe's progress.

All three defense lawyers maintained that the sheer chaos of the Maidan protests had prevented authorities from being able to get a clear picture of what really happened - and that they had then rushed to find someone to pin the shootings on.

"It's easier to find scapegoats to pin it on than to admit, 'Sorry, the circumstances of this case are so complicated that we just can't figure it out'," says Stefan Reshko, another lawyer for Abroskin.

Goroshinsky said he would not rule out that some sort of "third party" had been behind the shootings in order to destabilize the situation - a theory which Bratza said "remained an open question."

"There is insufficient evidence to be able to determine whether or not some third party was involved," Bratza said while presenting the advisory group's report along with fellow authors Volodymyr Butkevych, former Judge of the European Court of Human Rights; and Oleg Anpilogov, a former prosecutor in Ukraine.

The "third party" theory has been floated by both sides in the Ukraine conflict, with pro-Kremlin types accusing Western intelligence agencies of involvement and Ukrainian officials pointing the finger at Russia.

Bratza steered clear of speculating on who was behind the tragedy, lauding Ukrainian authorities for their cooperation in the "novel and demanding form of inquiry at a very challenging time for the country," but saying that such challenges "could not excuse the failings" that have been uncovered in the investigation.

"There is a very real problem of impunity and lack of accountability for law enforcement officers," Bratza said, noting that one of the panel's main concerns was the fact that the Interior Ministry had been given a vital role in investigating crimes believed to have been committed by its own employees.

Bratza also noted that the panel had "strong grounds to believe that the Interior Ministry's attitude (in investigating the crimes on Maidan) was obstructive."

He spoke of "intimidation tactics" used by members of the Interior Ministry during questioning of Berkut officers, saying there had been instances in which those being questioned were led into a building surrounded by fellow officers - a fact which may have prevented them from speaking openly about what they witnessed during the protests.

The Interior Ministry issued a statement denouncing Bratza's statements as "baseless" shortly after the report was released.

The fact that there had been three different general prosecutors within the year of the investigation also hindered the process, Bratza said, as it affected the "overall consistency and direction of the investigation."

Noting that "substantial progress" had not been made in the investigation, the report warned that the "serious investigative deficiencies ... have undermined the authorities' ability to establish the circumstances of the Maidan-related crimes and to identify those responsible."

For this reason, the investigation failed to meet the requirements of the European Convention of Human Rights.

Among the other flaws of the investigation, Bratza said there had been insufficient information sharing between law enforcement agencies conducting the probe, with poor cooperation between the Interior Ministry, General Prosecutor's Office and the Special Investigation Division set up specifically for the Maidan crimes.

Despite the heavy criticism in the report, Thorbjorn Jagland, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, offered some positive remarks on the Ukrainian government's actions.

Praising the authorities' "unreserved commitment" to reform and fight against impunity by law enforcement officials, Jagland said the government was determined to show that "beatings and killings with impunity have absolutely no place in this nation anymore."


 
 #2
Facebook
March 31, 2015
Maidan Snipers and Bulatov "crucifixion"
By Ivan Katchanovski
Ivan Katchanovski teaches at the School of Political Studies and the Department of Communication at the University of Ottawa

Report here: https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016802f038b

A report of the International Advisory Panel, set up by the Council of Europe, presents new evidence corroborating my study conclusions that the investigation of the "snipers' massacre" on the Maidan is deliberately and systematically falsified and stonewalled at the highest level in Ukraine, in particular by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Prosecutor General office, as a part of the cover-up. This panel was tasked with assessing the government investigation, and it did not conduct its own investigation. Therefore, this report contains summary of the main findings and evidence by the Ukrainian investigation. The report reveals that contrary to the public statements, the official investigation has no evidence implicating government snipers but has evidence of "shooters" killing protesters from the Maidan-controlled Hotel Ukraina, Music Conservatory, and other buildings and that the version of Maidan shooters is not pursued. This is an important official admission which corroborates my findings of Maidan shooters killing the protesters from these locations. Such my findings were previously dismissed or ignored, and I came under various personal attacks for making such conclusion.

The government investigation determined that Berkut special company members killed the absolute majority from 49 protesters because the majority of victims were killed by 7.62x39 caliber bullets, their trajectories indicate that more than 30 protesters were killed from the Berkut barricade, and because videos show the Berkut members shooting from similar caliber Kalashnikov rifles from this barricade. This conclusion means that the investigation deliberately ignores videos and eyewitness testimonies about Maidan shooters having and firing at both the protesters and the police from the Kalashnikov assault rifles of the same caliber from the Hotel Ukraina, Zhovtnevyi Palace, and the conservatory building and a GPU's own suppressed statement about protesters being killed from the Hotel Ukraina from a Simonov carbine of the same caliber. Furthermore, the report omits official admissions by the investigators that at least 17 protesters were killed with pellets, one by a 9mm bullet from a Makarov gun, and six by other ammunition, such as hunting bullets.My study cites videos and eyewitness testimonies about Maidan shooters possessing and firing at both the protesters and the police from hunting shotguns and rifles from the hotel, conservatory and other Maidan-controlled buildings. My analysis of killings of specific protesters, specifically videos synchronized with a precision to a second, bullet trajectories, and directions of entry wounds, shows that the absolute majority of the protesters in front of the Berkut barricade were killed from the same Maidan controlled buildings, while the Berkut members shot at these buildings. But wounding or killing of some of the protesters by the Berkut cannot be completely ruled out because of the lack of specific information in a small number of cases. But such continuing suppression of the crucial information by the government of Ukraine is consistent with its deliberate cover-up of this mass killing in which far right and oligarchic parties and top government officials were involved.

The Council of Europe report also reveals that to date the only evidence in the government investigation of the Dmytro Bulatov's widely publicized "abduction" is his own statement. The failure by two investigations to produce any other corroborating evidence of his abduction supports a conclusion in my study that this was another false flag operation, similar to the "Maidan snipers' massacre." Absences of previously reported evidence, which was collected by the investigation and pointed to such "false flag case of violence," and testimonies of his fellow Automaidan leaders, who belatedly admitted last fall that the Bulatov's "abduction" and "crucifixion" were staged, also suggest that the Bulatov case investigations are similarly falsified for political reasons as a part of a cover-up.  

    "336. Mr Bulatov was one of the organisers of AutoMaidan and, on the evening of 22 January 2014, he was abducted, detained and severely ill-treated until his release on 30 January 2014.
    337. There are two pending investigations: one opened on 31 January 2014 concerning his abduction and detention and, a second, opened by the PGO on 5 March 2014, concerning his ill-treatment. Given the circumstances of the crime and the events that preceded its commission, the MoI are examining a number of theories as regards his abduction, including that it was an abduction to extort a ransom from Euromaidan leaders or that it was connected to certain debt issues. However, to date the only evidence in the casefile is the statement of Mr Bulatov himself." (p. 54 of the report).


 
#3
www.rt.com
March 31, 2015
Ukraine Interior Ministry was 'uncooperative and obstructive' in Maidan crimes probe - EU report

The investigation into Maidan violence during Ukraine's coup didn't satisfy the requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights, says a report from the European Council, adding that Ukraine's Interior Ministry was "uncooperative and obstructive."

The report specifically concentrated on the investigation of violent acts during the three months of Maidan demonstrations: Violent dispersal of the protest by Berkut riot police on November 30, 2013, clashes on January 22, 2014, which resulted in the first deaths of protesters, and February 18-21, 2014, the deadliest days of the Kiev protests.

Before the February 2014 coup, "there was no genuine attempt to pursue investigations," said a document by the International Advisory Panel. The panel was established by the Council of Europe to review investigations into the violent incidents during the Maidan demonstrations.

"The lack of genuine investigations during the three months of the demonstrations inevitably meant that the investigations did not begin promptly and this constituted, of itself, a substantial challenge for the investigations, which took place thereafter and on which the Panel's review has principally focused," the report stated.

The panel added that "the appointment post-Maidan of certain officials to senior positions in the MoI [Ukraine Interior Ministry] contributed to the lack of appearance of independence."

It also "served to undermine public confidence in the readiness of the MoI to investigate the crimes committed during Maidan."

The EU experts call the number of investigations performed by the Prosecutor General's Office (PGO) on Maidan violence "wholly inadequate."

"The Panel did not consider the allocation of investigative work between the PGO, on the one hand, and the Kyiv [Kiev] City Prosecutor's Office and the MoI, on the other, to be coherent or efficient," says the report.

Map indicating the position of protesters and law enforcement forces18-20 February (from rm.coe.int)Map indicating the position of protesters and law enforcement forces18-20 February (from rm.coe.int)

"Nor did the Panel find the PGO's supervision of the investigative work of the Kyiv [Kiev] City Prosecutor's Office to have been effective."

Cooperation by Ukraine's Interior Ministry "was crucial to the effectiveness of the PGO investigations," according to the document.

"There are strong grounds to believe that the MoI attitude to the PGO has been uncooperative and, in certain respects, obstructive," says the report, adding that the "Prosecutor General's Office didn't take all the necessary steps to ensure effective co-operation" by the Interior Ministry in the investigations.

They also found there were facts of "the grant of amnesties or pardons to law enforcement officers in relation to unlawful killings or acts of ill-treatment" of protesters during the Maidan protests.

This "would be incompatible with Ukraine's obligations under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention," said the document.

"The serious investigative deficiencies identified in this Report have undermined the authorities' ability to establish the circumstances of the Maidan-related crimes and to identify those responsible."

In November 2013, Ukrainians took to the streets after the Ukrainian government postponed an integration deal with the EU.

The Kiev protests lasted months, escalated into street battles, and culminated in the eventual ousting of the government in an armed coup and a civil war in the east of the country.

The brutal dispersal of a protest camp on the morning of November 30 was a turning point in the ensuing events. It's still unclear who ordered the use of force. Then President Viktor Yanukovich laid the blame on the city's police chief and sacked him. The move, however, did not stop the protest as Maidan activists started to demand the government's resignation.

While protests and sporadic clashes didn't stop, February saw the deadliest day in the three-month period of the Maidan unrest. A total of 77 people were killed on February 20, according to officials. Thirteen law enforcement troops died of injuries.

In the immediate aftermath of what was dubbed the February massacre, it's still not clear who the shooters were and whose orders they were following, with both sides blaming one another.

Shortly after a leaked phone call between then-EU Foreign Affairs Chief Catherine Ashton and ex-Estonian Foreign Minister Urmas Paet appeared online.

"There is now stronger and stronger understanding that behind the snipers, it was not Yanukovich, but it was somebody from the new coalition," Urmas Paet, who then confirmed the authenticity of the leaked call, is heard saying.

A police investigation conducted by the post-coup Kiev authorities managed to produce several suspects, all of them Berkut riot police members, who are currently being prosecuted in Ukraine. The evidence incriminating them has never been made public, with Reuters reporting that the investigation process was flawed.
 
 
 #4
Sputnik
April 1, 2015
Kiev Does Not Need the Truth About Maidan Shootings - German Newspaper

Kiev officials have not been able to organize an independent and fair investigation of the crimes committed during the events on Maidan Square. The country's authorities systematically hinder the inquiry process, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung wrote.

Kiev officials are not interested in disclosing the truth about the shootings during the events on Maidan Square, journalist of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Ann Dorit Boy wrote in her article.

Law-enforcement authorities in Kiev have still not revealed who sent snipers to shoot at the peaceful protesters, the journalist said.

According to Ann Dorit Boy, nobody would believe that the mentality of the Ukrainian government can change "overnight".  To organize an independent and fair investigation is difficult for many reasons, but at least worth a try. However, nothing has been done to launch a fair inquiry into the case. Instead, the Ministry of Interior, Security Service and the Prosecutor General of Ukraine have systematically impeded the investigation.

The journalist wrote that even the heavy fighting in Donbass does not justify the betrayal of European values to which the new government expressed its commitment. "The investigation of crimes committed on the Maidan, in the House of Trade Unions in Odessa, Donbass and anywhere in the country as well as [corresponding] punishment are indispensable for the recovery of Ukrainian society," she said.
 
 #5
Le Monde diplomatique
March 31, 2015
The Ukraine crisis is not what it seems
By Robert H Wade
Robert H Wade is professor of political economy and development at the London School of Economics, author of Governing the Market, Princeton University Press, 2003, and winner of the Leontief Prize in Economics in 2008.

In the West, the prevailing interpretation of the Ukraine crisis is that Russia - specifically President Putin - started it and controls most of the military forces fighting the Ukrainian army, often described in the media as "Russian separatists". Martin Wolf of The Financial Times (11 February 2015) claims Russia started it because its leaders fear having a stable, prosperous and West-leaning democracy on their doorstep; they saw this as a distinct possibility after their ally, President Yanukovich, was ousted in a coup in February 2014. By one means or other, Russia's leaders will keep destabilizing Ukraine to prevent such a democracy until stopped by western force or sanctions.

The Financial Times wrote in an editorial on 13 February: "The Minsk II agreement will only succeed if Mr Putin has decided to tone down his confrontation with Ukraine and the West.  But there is no sign he is willing to do so. The Kremlin leader's ambitions stretch beyond Ukraine and ... he strives to reassert a Russian sphere of influence in eastern Europe... [T]he West should be contemplating a range of responses - including extending sanctions on Moscow and providing defensive military assistance to Kiev - in anticipation of Mr Putin's next act of aggression." The New York Times agreed (14-15 February): "What remains incontrovertible is that Ukraine is Mr. Putin's war."

Russia, Nato and Ukraine

It is true that Putin said in 2005: "The breakup of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century". But one cannot infer that righting this so-called catastrophe is an operational objective of Russian foreign policy. Nor can one infer that what drives Russia's policy is fear of a stable and prosperous democracy in Ukraine, for the Russian leaders have not said anything like this.

What they have said repeatedly since the breakup of the Soviet Union is that they will resist allowing a rival great power to incorporate a state on their doorstep into a military alliance. They are in effect applying the US's Monroe Doctrine to their own "near-abroad". The US would not tolerate Mexico or Canada making a military alliance with China or Russia. Russia's resistance to Ukraine joining Nato follows the same logic.

Beyond the general reason why Russia's leaders draw a red line at a foreign military alliance on their borders, there is a more specific reason. The Russian nightmare is that Ukraine and Georgia both join Nato, with the result that almost the whole of the Black Sea is encircled by a hostile military alliance. Russia has fought several wars in the past two centuries to protect ready access to the Black Sea, its only sea route to the south. The strategic imperative of Black Sea access makes the Ukraine situation quite different, in Russian eyes, from other territories with Russian-speaking minorities - a point missed by those who posit a domino effect, whereby success in Ukraine emboldens Putin to grab territory elsewhere in ostensible defence of Russian minorities.

Russia's leaders also dispute the prevailing western interpretation that the core rationale of the Nato alliance was to protect weak western European countries against Russian aggression. They see Nato as needing to invoke an external enemy in order to provide glue for cooperation between its often fractious member states under US leadership. To justify US leadership, and present a unitary front, Nato must present Russia as the common enemy. The recent talk of "Russia threatens Europe" or "Russia threatens the world" helps to strengthen the western state order.

The key point was made by Georgi Arbatov, a political scientist and advisor to Gorbachev (and other secretaries of the Communist Party), and founder and director of the Institute for US and Canada at the Russian Academy of Science.  He said to a group of senior US officials in 1987: "We are going to do a terrible thing to you - we are going to deprive you of an enemy."

The Russian threat has always been exaggerated, as became clear at the end of the cold war when it was acknowledged that the CIA had consistently overestimated Soviet military capabilities. Not just the Soviet threat but the whole "Communist threat", as in the domino theory prevalent from the 1950s to the 1980s, which led the US into such trouble in Vietnam.

The distinguished Washington Post columnist Walter Pincus explained on 12 January why it is so dangerous - to us in the West - to keep framing security issues in the cold war framework, as though Russia and China constitute our major threats. He starts with the US Navy's current claim that it must spend hundreds of billions of dollars in order to keep ahead of Russia and China's rapid upgrading of blue-water naval capabilities. Then he shows how far behind the US Russia and China are, using the examples of nuclear-powered supercarriers and advanced submarines. He goes on to observe: "These days, terrorists are the first threat, and not a single one will be deterred by a nuclear warhead."

So why does "US vs. Russia" and "US vs. China" continue to dominate the security agenda and security budget? Pincus's short answer is that the defence firms earn vast profits from no-competition capital-intensive projects to build armaments against Russia and China; but much less from labour-intensive projects to build capabilities against terrorists.

Once the US (West) versus Russia or China frame dominates, distinctions between Putin's and Russia's wishes, intentions and capabilities blur, and we can be more readily persuaded that Putin's wishes translate into Russia's revanchism.

The interpretation of the Ukraine conflict as controlled by Russia brings to mind the following. My neighbour in Washington DC in the 1980s was in charge of assembling the intelligence from the various intelligence agencies to go to President Reagan each day. He had been Russia editor of Forbes magazine. He came to the attention of William Casey (then head of the CIA, who had power to make the appointment) because he wrote a book arguing that US environmentalists constituted a fifth column for communists, and hand-delivered it to Casey's home. Casey was impressed, contacted him, and the intelligence appointment followed. In one conversation I told him that Vice President Bush had just said that five-sixths of all the wars and civil wars going on in the world were "nickel and dimed" by the Soviet Union. I asked him what he made of that statement. He replied confidently, "He underestimated by one sixth".

The present Ukraine conflict

The tortured history of the present conflict began before the overthrow of President Yanukovich. Putin put him under fierce pressure to reject the agreement on accession to the EU, and he did. Many Ukrainians responded with protests; the Yanukovich regime responded by killing many. His regime lost legitimacy and power.

It is understandable that the response to these events was a profound mistrust among western-oriented Ukrainians of the Russian-oriented ones, who had voted for Yanukovich and wanted to pull the country outside the European orbit in which they wanted to live.

On this point there is general agreement. The differences come next. The standard story in the West is that the tipping point came on 27 February 2014, when Russian soldiers (described as invaders) took over public buildings in Crimea. In doing so, Russia was the unprovoked aggressor towards Ukraine. This interpretation is helped by the fact that Putin blamed Yanukovich's ouster on "fascists", and has stuck to this lie.

In reality, the tipping point came earlier, on 23 February, the day after Yanukovich fled, when the first act of the Ukrainian parliament was to revoke the legal status of Russian as a national language; more broadly, to prevent regions from allowing the use of any other language than Ukrainian. The government set about blocking access to Russian news, TV channels and radio.

These were blatantly belligerent acts towards a very large minority. In Crimea the majority of the population is of Russian culture, and in Ukraine as a whole 40% of the population identifies as of Russian culture - the great majority of whom also see themselves as Ukrainians and proud of it, or did so until the Kiev government moved against them. All through this period the Kiev government and the broadcast media and large sections of the population chanted the motto "One Nation, One Language, One People". It is easy to understand why the many millions of Russian speakers felt under siege; and why they felt emboldened and relieved that the powerful state on their doorstep was supportive.

The fact that language legislation was then not put into force did not suddenly "make everything right again". The damage had been done: the message had been sent that the new regime was instinctively hostile to Russian speakers. It was this that provoked the wave of resistance in the eastern provinces. Putin said he agreed to supply some armaments and troops. Did this constitute a Russian invasion? Russia's annexation of Crimea did constitute an invasion, and deserves condemnation - subject to the qualifications that Crimea had been part of Russia until handed over to Ukraine in 1954; it has a majority Russian-speaking population; it is key to what Russia sees as its vital security interest in Black Sea access, and the new Ukrainian government gave every indication of abrogating the treaty giving the Russian navy access to Crimean ports.

Whether Russia invaded the eastern provinces is less clear. A group of eight retired US intelligence analysts wrote to Angela Merkel on 30 August 2014, alarmed at the anti-Russian hysteria sweeping official Washington and the spectre of a new cold war. They reported the contents of a (leaked) 1 February 2008 cable from the U.S. embassy in Moscow to Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice. The cable said that U.S. Ambassador William Burns was called in by foreign minister Sergey Lavrov, who explained Russia's strong opposition to Nato membership for Ukraine.

The analysts' letter to Merkel continues: "Burns gave his cable the unusual title, 'NYET MEANS NYET: RUSSIA'S NATO ENLARGEMENT RED LINES', and sent it off to Washington with immediate precedence. Two months later, at their summit in Bucharest, Nato leaders issued a formal declaration that 'Georgia and Ukraine will be in NATO'.  In our view, [President] Poroshenko and [prime minister] Yatsenyuk need to be told flat-out that membership in NATO is not in the cards" (1).

The US intelligence analysts sent their letter to Merkel shortly before the Nato summit on 4-5 September 2014. They warned her to be very cautious about accepting the intelligence about Russia's role provided by U.S. leaders. "The accusations of a major Russian 'invasion' of Ukraine appear not to be supported by reliable intelligence. Rather, the 'intelligence' seems to be of the same dubious, politically 'fixed' kind used 12 years ago to 'justify' the U.S.-led attack on Iraq. We saw no credible evidence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq then; we see no credible evidence of a Russian invasion now."

The US intelligence analysts wrote about the situation as of late August 2014. Seven months later, in early March 2015, the German weekly Der Spiegel printed an equally damning article about US exaggeration of Russia's role, based on sources in the German chancellor's office and the German Federal Intelligence Service. The article quoted US General Philip Breedlove, Nato's Supreme Allied Commander Europe, declaring that Russia-backed rebels have prepared "over a thousand combat vehicles [and] sophisticated air defence, battalions of artillery" in the southeast of Ukraine. "What is clear is that right now it is not getting better, it is getting worse every day," Breedlove concluded (2).

Der Spiegel reported that the Federal Intelligence Service had tried to verify Breedlove's claims, only to conclude that his claimed invasion force amounted to "just a few armoured vehicles". A German intelligence agent told Der Spiegel: "It remains a riddle until today" how he reached such conclusions. Der Spiegel also said: "False claims and exaggerated accounts, warned a top German official during a recent meeting on Ukraine, have put NATO - and by extension, the entire West - in danger of losing its credibility." The article further reported that German leaders see the head of European affairs at the US State Department, Victoria Nuland, as working together with Breedlove to erect "hindrances in their search for a diplomatic solution to the Ukraine conflict. [The two are] "doing what they can to pave the way for weapons deliveries." Nuland is the US official who famously exclaimed "F-k the Europeans" in a leaked phone call in which she discussed the future composition of the Ukrainian government.

On the same day as the Der Spiegel article, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE, the security-oriented intergovernmental organization whose membership covers most of the northern hemisphere) reported that progress was being made in the February ceasefire, as seen in the fall in ceasefire violations and withdrawal of heavy weaponry by both sides.

Overlooked in the standard narrative is that there is no social or cultural border between the eastern provinces of Ukraine and western Russia; no language (nor even accent) difference; and lots of intermarriage. Many Russian men and women with close kinship ties to Ukrainians on the other side thought it "a natural duty" to go and defend their relatives against what they saw as an attempt by Kiev and western Ukrainians to subordinate or expel them. These Russians cannot be construed as a "Russian invasion force", as though sent by Moscow. It is an open question how much control Putin has over men and women fighting against the Ukrainian army.

That is why it is so misleading to present the conflict as Ukraine versus Russia. It is a civil war within Ukraine along a longstanding cultural and geographical split; Ukraine is not united against Russia. The great bulk of people resisting the Kiev government forces are local volunteers, not Russian military. The civil war - now better described as an "internationalized civil war" with foreign parties bolstering both sides - is fuelled by the wish by many millions of Ukrainians to avoid being cast as second-class citizens or worse in the country they regard as home. It is being presented in the West as "Russia versus Ukraine" because the US-Nato bloc has seized the opportunity to persuade western publics that Russia under Putin is the "unprovoked aggressor towards peace-loving democracies", and thereby shore up the western alliance under US leadership and curb the ongoing cuts in the defence spending of Nato members.

We know the necessary conditions for durable peace: international guarantees that Ukraine and Georgia will not join Nato (reversing the organisation's declaration in 2008 that "Georgia and Ukraine will be in Nato"); substantial political and fiscal autonomy for eastern provinces, but not independence or political integration with Russia; and removal of heavy weaponry from the eastern provinces. Then all the parties should agree on Ukraine as a neutral country in a free trade arrangement with both the EU and Russia. Russia should accept that it does not own Ukraine and that - within this constraint of Austrian-type neutrality - Ukraine is free to choose its own path. The Ukrainian government should accept equal status for Russian-speaking Ukrainians, as for Ukrainian speakers (just as French speakers in Canada have equal status), and remove the grounds for Russian speakers to fear that the Kiev government is using the civil war to get the West to bolster the ascendancy of Ukrainian speakers.
 
#6
www.opendemocracy.net
March 31, 2015
How Russia's opposition learned to stop worrying and love Crimea
A recent statement by a prominent Russian opposition figure is testament to an unpalatable truth: Crimea's annexation is popular with Russia's 'liberal elite.'
By Daniel Kennedy
Daniel Kennedy is an Associate Editor at oDR. He is an Associate at Global Partners Digital, a social purpose company working to protect and promote human rights values online

Even by Russian standards, Ksenia Sobchak is a rather contradictory public figure. Having launched her television career as an announcer on Russia's remake of 'Big Brother' ('Dom-2'), Sobchak became a political talk show host on TV Rain, one of Russia's few independent news channels.

The daughter of the late Anatoly Sobchak, the former mayor of St Petersburg and a close friend of Vladimir Putin, Ksenia Sobchak was also a prominent opposition figure in Moscow's 2011-2012 protest movement, despite persistent rumours that the Russian president is secretly her godfather.

Herself a scion of privilege, in 2011 Sobchak appeared in a viral video chastising Vasily Yakimenko, leader of the pro-Kremlin youth group Nashi, for lunching at a fashionable and expensive Moscow restaurant. Recently, following the assassination of Boris Nemtsov, Sobchak was reported to have permanently left Russia after she was named on a 'hit-list' of anti-government activists. Sobchak, who regularly travels abroad, denies she has gone into exile.

The liberals

This week, Sobchak commented positively on Russia's annexation of Crimea in March 2014. In an interview with the Polish edition of Newsweek, Sobchak stated that 'for me, just like most teenagers in Soviet times, Crimea brings up positive emotions: holidays, first love and so on. If I had been president then, quite possibly I myself would have dared to reunite Crimea [with Russia].' Sobchak went on to declare that there is 'no sense' in discussing the return of Crimea to Ukraine and that 'the only thing we can do right now is carry out a new, honest referendum for its inhabitants.'

In making these comments, Sobchak joined the ranks of a number of oppositionists who have publically declared their support (or at least reluctant acceptance) of Crimea's annexation. In an interview with Ekho Moskvy in October 2014, Alexei Navalny, possibly the most vocal and public of Russia's 'non-systemic' opposition, said that 'despite the fact that Crimea was seized in violation of all international norms,' it was now 'de facto part of the Russian Federation' and would not become part of Ukraine again.

Once Russia's richest and most powerful oligarch until he was arrested in 2003 (in a case Amnesty International described as 'politically motivated'), Mikhail Khodorkovsky has expressed similar sentiments. Commenting on Navalny's statements, Khodorkovsky said that he too would not return Crimea to Ukraine, although he expressed regret that the situation would likely be a problem 'for decades.'

The nationalists and leftists

This enthusiasm for Crimea's annexation isn't limited to Russia's 'liberal' opposition. Its nationalist and leftist camps have also reacted with approval to Crimea's 'reunion' with Russia.

Nationalist critics of Putin, like Eduard Limonov and Yegor Kholmogorov, have completely changed their tune on government policy. Now when they criticise the Russian government, they do so for not annexing more Ukrainian territory in the Donbas region, utterly devastated by bloody separatist conflict in the past year.
.
Sergei Udaltsov, the radical-leftist leader of the 'Left Front', who was jailed for four-and-a-half years in July 2014, has also spoken approvingly of the annexation - indeed, Udaltsov considers the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself to be a mistake. In Udaltstov's words, Crimea's annexation is a 'small, but important' step towards reviving the USSR.

The avant-garde art group, 'Voina,' whose members are closely associated with Pussy Riot and which shot to prominence by painting a giant phallus on a drawbridge near the FSB's St Petersburg headquarters, has also publically expressed its support for the annexation of Crimea. The group's leader, Oleg Vorotnikov, was unequivocal: 'We're happy that Crimea has returned to Russia and are pleased for the Crimeans,' he said. 'I'm so proud of my country, for the first time in a long time.'

A popular annexation

It is possible Sobchak's statements were an attempt to reaffirm her ultimate loyalty to Russia's elite in the wake of her supposed 'exile.' This interpretation seems unlikely, however, given that in the same interview she went on to declare that 'Putin now considers himself a God and that's where the danger lies' - hardly the most fawning description of her country's leader. More likely, Sobchak's words are in fact testament to what many in the West will likely regard as an unpalatable truth: Crimea's annexation is fantastically popular among Russia's population (with 84% currently claiming to support it) and that popularity extends to the country's 'liberal elite.'

There are numerous factors that explain this popularity. As Sobchak notes, Crimea was a popular holiday destination, especially for young pioneers, and many Russians have fond memories of spending summers there as children. Moreover, the region's significance in Russian popular mythology of World War Two is immense and has only increased in the last year. Despite the illegality of the annexation under international law, Russians of many political stripes view the region's referendum as a genuine (if perhaps problematic) expression of the local population's political will and thus as essentially democratic and legitimate. Regardless of what has happened in the past, many would likely now view any sort of return of Ukrainian de facto soverignty as a betrayal of this population.

Many liberal oppositionists have grown to increasingly distrust the West (particularly for the complicity of its financial sector in Russia's rampant corruption) and they genuinely fear for the loss of Russia's naval base at Sevastopol. Meanwhile, for figures like Khodorkovsky and Navalny, who harbour serious political ambitions, publically stating opposition to a reality accepted and approved of by an overwhelming majority of Russia's population is tantamount to political suicide.

Rethinking sanctions

None of this means the West is obliged to accept Crimea's annexation as a legal act. The fact that something is popular does not make it moral, or legal, or desirable. But if the West is sanctioning Russia in the hope that this will spur regime change (as many suspect), this should probably give them reason to pause.

Even if we accept that sanctions will ultimately lead to a change in Russia's government - which is itself highly debatable - and that the new leadership of Russia will include prominent non-systemic liberals - which is extremely unlikely - there's little reason to expect a liberal Russian government to return Crimea to Ukraine, which is, ironically, the stated goal of Western sanctions.
 
#7
www.rt.com
April 1, 2015
Russian PM seals gas discount for Ukraine of up to 26%
[Chart here http://rt.com/business/245873-russia-ukraine-gas-discount/]

Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev has signed a decree to provide Ukraine with a discount equivalent to the export duty on gas supplied until the end of June. It will be not more than $100 per a thousand of cubic meters.

"The export duty is calculated by the following formula: at a price of $333.3 and higher per 1,000 cubic meters the gas discount will be $100, at a price lower than $333.3 the discount will be 30 percent of the price," according to the document published on the Russian government website on Wednesday.

Ukraine paid Russia $329 per 1,000 cubic meters in the first quarter of 2015. Under the 'winter package' agreed in October 2014 Ukraine pays in advance for the gas it's going to consume.

In the second quarter the contract price for Ukraine, including export duties, could be as high as $350-380 per 1,000 cubic meters, according to Russian Ministry of Energy estimates. Should the maximum discount be included the gas price will come down to $250-280 per 1,000 cubic meters.

Kiev has not yet made an advance payment for April gas supplies, but plans are underway, Ukraine's Energy Minister Vladimir Demchishin said Wednesday.

Currently Ukraine owes an estimated at $2.477 billion for Russian gas already consumed and penalties.

Demchishin also said Kiev will restart importing Russian gas should the $250 per thousand cubic meters price tag be confirmed at trilateral talks in Berlin on April 13-14. He also said Ukraine is seeking a deal with Russia that would last till the end of the 2016 heating season.


 #8
Business New Europe
www.bne.eu
April 1, 2015
Putin approves three-month extension of Ukraine's gas discount
bne IntelliNews

Russian President Vladimir Putin has approved a request by Gazprom to supply discounted natural gas to Ukraine for three more months on March 31, saying the arrangement would be reviewed later as oil prices changed.

Ukraine in the first quarter of 2015 paid $329 per thousand cubic metres for Russian gas under the 'winter package' deal, with Kyiv winning a $100 discount per 1,000 cu m until the end of March.

"Let's do it [extend the discount]," Putin told Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev at a Kremlin meeting, adding that the volatile oil price to which gas prices are pegged would inevitably change in the coming weeks.

"In three months we'll have to check what's going on in the sector and after that make a supplementary decision," Putin added.

Medvedev played up the discount as a boost to Ukraine amid its current economic dire straits. But some observers dismissed it as a contrived gesture that only reflects falling gas prices in general.

Tim Ash, head of emerging markets research at Standard Bank, said in a note that this did not show "Russian 'warming' to the government in Kyiv, rather that Moscow can sell this to its allies in Europe, e.g. the Tsipras government in Greece, as an example of it being reasonable towards Ukraine, when in reality to does not really entail any significant concession".

According to unofficial reports, the price of Russian gas to non-CIS consumers in Europe is projected by the finance ministry to fall as low as $222.1 per 1,000 cu m in 2015 due to lower oil prices.

Meanwhile, Russia's RIA news agency quoted Ukrainian Energy Minister Volodymyr Demchyshyn as saying he expected the gas price to be $248 per 1,000 cu m in the second quarter.

Gazprom CEO Aleksei Miller said on March 30 that the company had asked the government to allow an "optimal" three-month extension of the discount "because the spring-summer season is coming, and also because of high gas price volatility on the global market".

Planned for five months, the discounted rate was set in October last year after talks between Russia, Ukraine and the European Commission. A warm winter since then also reduced Moscow's leverage through gas prices in its stand-off with the West over Ukraine.

Gas from EU neighbours instead

During trilateral talks in Brussels on March 20, Russia and Ukraine agreed most terms of new deliveries from April 1, including a reset of the take-or-pay rule and payment by Ukraine's Naftogaz of $3.1bn of previously accumulated debt to Gazprom.

However, Demchyshyn later upset the apple cart by saying Ukraine would stop buying gas from Russia from April 1 because it was cheaper to get it from EU neighbours.

"There is no reason to buy gas at a higher price than the price at which we can buy it from Europe. We will simply stop buying it," Demchyshyn said.

Disagreements also remain over the sum Ukraine owes Gazprom under an earlier take-or-pay agreement, which is currently being argued in a Stockholm arbitration court. Russia has demanded more than $20bn of penalty fees from Ukraine.  The take-or-pay clause was suspended in the winter package but re-established from April 1 at the recent talks in Brussels.

Gazprom hurting

Meanwhile, Gazprom on March 31 reported a 70% slump in 2014 net profit under RAS, to RUB188.9bn from RUB628bn in 2013. Revenues decreased to RUB3.99 trillion from RUB3.93 trillion in 2013. "If no FX adjustments are made to the net income, the reported financials might imply a dividend of RUB2 per share, with translates into a limited dividend yield of 1.5%," VTB Capital analysts estimated in a note.

Adding to the squeeze, Gazprom had to pay around $1bn (RUR56bn) in compensation to its partners in the cancelled South Stream gas pipeline construction. In December, it bought out the original share in project of Italy's Eni, France's EDF and Germany's Wintershall, the company said.

South Stream was due to run from Russia through the Black Sea to Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary and Slovenia to Austria. Russia pulled out late last year because of obstacles put in place by Bulgaria and the EU, the 2014 Crimean crisis and the imposition of Western sanctions on Russia.
 #9
Voice of America
March 31, 2015
Eastern Ukraine's Children Fall Prey to War
by Lisa Schlein

The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) reported that more than 150 children have been killed and maimed by landmines and unexploded ordnance during the past year in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of eastern Ukraine.  

According to the United Nations, the number of people killed in eastern Ukraine since fighting broke out last April now tops 6,000. This figure includes at least 109 children who reportedly were injured and 42 killed by landmines and unexploded ordnance.

UNICEF noted however, these only represent government-reported figures and do not include reports by Russian-backed rebels of injuries and deaths.

"The number of children killed and maimed by mines and unexploded ordnance would be significantly higher if we include non-government-controlled areas," said spokesman Christophe Boulierac.

"After a year of conflict," he added, "many communities in eastern Ukraine have been exposed to extreme levels of violence, including through the use of heavy weapons - the remnants of these weapons have been left behind in devastated towns and villages."

After fighting has ended, killings go on in battle zones where landmines and unexploded ordnance are left behind. UNICEF noted that the State Emergency Service of Ukraine has located and removed more than 33,700 items of ordnance in government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk.

UNICEF said children are at particular risk from unexploded ordnance and landmines because they are small and brightly colored. Children who play with them often mistak them for toys.

Boulierac said UNICEF and its partners have launched an  educational campaign for 500,000 children and their families in affected areas.  

"The campaign includes risk educational messages in print, video and digital formats as well as the training of 100 teachers and school psychologists on mine risk awareness," he explained.

With the April 4 International Day of Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action just days away, Boulierac said "the situation in Ukraine is a grave reminder that despite global progress in de-mining, children and communities continue to fall victim to mines and explosive remnants of war."  

In its latest report, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines recorded 3,308 casualties from mines and explosive remnants of war in 2013, including 1,112 children, of whom 333 died.
 
 #10
APF
March 31, 2015
Russia steps in as job losses, closures ravage east Ukraine
By Yulia Silina

Donetsk (Ukraine) (AFP) - The year-long conflict in east Ukraine has closed businesses across this industrial heartland, ramping up unemployment, crippling finances and leaving it ever more reliant on Moscow.

Fierce fighting between government forces and pro-Russian rebels has ravaged a region that once provided 25 percent of the nation's exports and has shorn Kiev of a vital source of foreign currency, seeing the Ukrainian economy contract sharply.

For people in rebel-held territory, the destruction of infrastructure and a cut-off of government support along with the legal limbo created by the separatist takeover have left once-flourishing cities in dire straits.

In total, medium and large businesses employed close to 350,000 people in Donetsk in the first half of 2014, according to the city's mayor Oleksandr Lukyanchenko, who fled to Kiev after rebels took the city almost a year ago.

"Half of them have now lost their jobs, and main source of income," he told AFP.

Brutal fighting around the rebel stronghold of Donetsk turned the once-gleaming international airport into a post-apocalyptic ruin, undermining the booming companies that helped make it one of Ukraine's richest cities.

The resulting plunge in income-tax revenue has drained the public coffers of the rebels' self-proclaimed statelet. A new tax department has done little to get business back on its feet.

"Many large companies have been separated from their production capacity across the border of the Donetsk People's Republic (DNR)," explained Yuri Makogon, professor of economics at the University of Donetsk.

"So they are forced to accept double taxation, in Ukraine and the DNR".

In the face of falling business income, DNR leader Alexander Zakharchenko has stressed that coal, the traditional mainstay of the region's economy, must form the backbone of public finances. But the conflict has left Russia as the only viable trading partner.

"Exports from the Donbass region have always been divided into three: one third went to the east (80 percent of that to Russia), a third went towards the European Union and a third went to Southeast Asia and North America," said Makogon.

"Today, the DNR only has Russia because none of the countries of the EU, Asia or America recognise it, therefore cannot accept its goods."

In addition, Russia has alternative sources of cheap coal in the Far East and in Western Siberia.

Moscow holds purse-strings

Before the conflict, which has claimed more than 6,000 lives, "Donetsk spent between 640 and 670 million hryvnias ($27.1-28.4 million, 25-26.2 million euros) annually on health," said former mayor Lukyanchenko.

It spent 540 and 560 million hryvnias on education, and between 45 and 48 million hryvnias on civil-servant salaries.

"Now, there is nowhere to find the money," added Lukyanchenko, arguing that Moscow must be plugging the gap.

A rebel official confirmed that flow of Kremlin cash to eastern Ukraine.

"This money comes directly from Moscow, and all the transfers are controlled by the Russian president's office," he said, on condition of anonymity.

The separatists' budget minister Alexander Timofeyev maintains "DNR income is classified information".

Kiev's decision in November to cease the dispersal of central funds to separatist areas, combined with the closure of banks and retailers, has further darkened the region's economic outlook.

And in a tacit admission that Moscow now wants to shift the economic burden for the war-torn territories back on to Kiev, President Vladimir Putin made Ukraine resuming payments to the east a key plank of a peace deal hammered out in February.

For now the new authorities have only managed to pay pensions on one occasion, and then only at a maximum equivalent to around $40.

Several doctors and teachers told AFP that in 2014 they had received one monthly payment worth around $120, and then another of some $40.

Surgeons nursing wounded fighters added they were receiving no more than $215.

"People in these regions cannot survive on the fruits of their own production," concluded Kiev-based political expert Taras Beressovets.

"The Donbass is already below the poverty line and the situation will only get worse."
 
 #11
Asia Times
www.atimes.com
March 30, 2015
Pepe Escobar in eastern Ukraine: Howling in Donetsk
By Pepe Escobar
[Photos here http://atimes.com/2015/03/pepe-escobar-in-eastern-ukraine-howling-in-donetsk/]

Asia Times' roving correspondent Pepe Escobar just returned from a reporting trip to the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR), the pro-Russian enclave in the Donetsk Oblast province of eastern Ukraine. The area's been the scene of heavy fighting between pro-Russian rebels and the Ukrainian military. Escobar traveled to Donetsk at the invitation of  Europa Objektiv, a German-based non-governmental media project. He traveled at his own expense.

I've just been to the struggling Donetsk People's Republic. Now I'm back in the splendid arrogance and insolence of NATOstan.

Quite a few people - in Donbass, in Moscow, and now in Europe - have asked me what struck me most about this visit.

I could start by paraphrasing Allen Ginsberg in Howl - "I saw the best minds of my generation destroyed by madness."

But these were the Cold War mid-1950s. Now we're in early 21st century Cold War 2.0 .

Thus what I saw were the ghastly side effects of the worst minds of my - and a subsequent - generation corroded by (war) madness.

I saw refugees on the Russian side of the border, mostly your average middle-class European family whose kids, when they first came to the shelter,  would duck under tables when they heard a plane in the sky.

I saw the Dylan of Donetsk holed up in his lonely room in a veterans' home turned refugee shelter fighting the blues and the hopelessness by singing songs of love and heroism.

I saw whole families holed up in fully decorated Soviet-era bomb shelters too afraid to go out even by daylight, traumatized by the bombings orchestrated by Kiev's "anti-terrorist operations".

I saw a modern, hard-working industrial city at least half-empty and partially destroyed but not bent, able to survive by their guts and guile with a little help from Russian humanitarian convoys.

I saw beautiful girls hangin' out by Lenin's statue in a central square lamenting their only shot at fun was family parties in each other's houses because nightlife was dead and "we're at war".

I saw virtually the whole neighborhood of Oktyabrski near the airport bombed out like Grozny and practically deserted except for a few lonely babushkas with nowhere to go and too proud to relinquish their family photos of World War II heroes.

I saw checkpoints like I was back in Baghdad during the Petraeus surge.

I saw the main trauma doctor at the key Donetsk hospital confirm there has been no Red Cross and no international humanitarian help to the people of Donetsk.

I saw Stanislava, one of DPR's finest and an expert sniper, in charge of our security, cry when she laid a flower on the ground of a fierce battle in which her squad was under heavy fire, with twenty seriously wounded and one dead, and she was hit by shrapnel and survived.

I saw orthodox churches fully destroyed by Kiev's bombing.

I saw the Russian flag still on top of the anti-Maidan building which is now the House of Government of the DPR.

I saw the gleaming Donbass arena, the home of Shaktar Donetsk and a UFO in a war-torn city, deserted and without a single soul in the fan area.

I saw Donetsk's railway station bombed by Kiev's goons.

I saw a homeless man screaming "Robert Plant!" and "Jimmy Page!" as I found out he was still in love with Led Zeppelin and kept his vinyl copies.

I saw a row of books which never surrendered behind the cracked windows of bombed out Oktyabrski.

I saw the fresh graves where the DPR buries their resistance heroes.

I saw the top of the hill at Saur-mogila which the DPR resistance lost and then reconquered, with a lone red-white-blue flag now waving in the wind.

I saw the Superman rising from the destruction at Saur-mogila - the fallen statue in a monument to World War II heroes, which seventy years ago was fighting fascism and now has been hit, but not destroyed, by fascists.

I saw the Debaltsevo cauldron in the distance and then I could fully appreciate, geographically, how DPR tactics surrounded and squeezed the demoralized Kiev fighters.

I saw the DPR's military practicing their drills by the roadside from Donetsk to Lugansk.

I saw the DPR's Foreign Minister hopeful there would be a political solution instead of war while admitting personally he dreams of a DPR as an independent nation.

I saw two badass Cossack commanders tell me in a horse-breeding farm in holy Cossack land that the real war has not even started.

I did not see the totally destroyed Donetsk airport because the DPR's military were too concerned about our safety and would not grant us a permit while the airport was being hit - in defiance of Minsk 2; but I saw the destruction and the pile of Ukrainian army bodies on the mobile phone of a Serbian DPR resistance fighter.

I did not see, as Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe international observers also didn't, the rows and rows of Russian tanks and soldiers that the current Dr. Strangelove in charge of NATO, General Breedhate, sees everyday in his exalted dreams invading Ukraine over and over again.

And I did not see the arrogance, the ignorance, the shamelessness and the lies distorting those manicured faces in Kiev, Washington and Brussels while they insist, over and over again, that the entire population of Donbass, traumatized babushkas and children of all ages included, are nothing but "terra-rists".

After all, they are Western "civilization"-enabled cowards who would never dare to show their manicured faces to the people of Donbass.

So this is my gift to them.

Just a howl of anger and unbounded contempt.
 
 #12
Moscow Times
April 1, 2015
Russia Has Ukraine's Economy in a Choke Hold
By Josh Cohen
Josh Cohen is a former U.S. State Department project officer involved in managing economic reform projects in the former Soviet Union. He currently works for a technology company and contributes to a number of foreign policy-focused media outlets.

The well-known military theorist Carl von Clausewitz once said that "War is a mere continuation of politics by other means." Now, to paraphrase Clausewitz, while the Minsk II cease-fire continues to hold in eastern Ukraine, Russia looks set to use its financial leverage over Ukraine as a "continuation of war by other means."

As part of its effort to stabilize its economy, Ukraine recently agreed on a $17.5 billion bailout program with the International Monetary Fund. This aid from the IMF is part of a planned $40 billion rescue package for Kiev that will include further contributions of about $7 to $8 billion from the European Union and the United States.

The remaining $15 billion hole in Kiev's finances is supposed to be filled with savings to come from restructuring Ukraine's debt through negotiations with its foreign bond holders. Unfortunately for Kiev though, while sovereign debt restructurings are fairly common, this is where Russia comes into the picture.

In December 2013, amid the ongoing Euromaidan demonstrations, Moscow promised then-Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych's government $15 billion to support Ukraine's economy. While government-to-government loans are common, Russia's initial disbursement to Ukraine was actually in the form of a two-year, $3 billion eurobond purchased by one of the Kremlin's sovereign wealth funds.

Now, as Ukraine begins talks with its foreign lenders, the status of Russia's $3 billion Ukrainian eurobond threatens to throw a wrench in new Finance Minister Natalie Jaresko's efforts to restructure its foreign debt - and perhaps scupper its $40 billion aid package altogether.

When Russia purchased Ukraine's $3 billion eurobond, Moscow inserted a "poison pill" clause in the instrument's fine print which mandated that if the Ukrainian government's total debt to gross domestic product rose above 60 percent, Russia could immediately call in the loan.

As Ukraine's economy sank last year, its total debt load soared above 60 percent, providing President Vladimir Putin a financial "sword of Damocles" it has continued to hold over the head of President Petro Poroshenko's government.

Although Russia has so far refrained from calling in its Ukrainian eurobond, the Kremlin is pressuring Kiev in a different way by declaring that the bond should be classified as bilateral debt.

If the bond is considered to be bilateral debt, then any restructuring is guided by the Paris Club, an informal group of countries - including Russia - that was set up to handle the restructuring of government-to-government debt. In this case, Russia's bond is not subject to any private restructuring deal Jaresko might strike with Ukraine's remaining private-sector bond holders.

Ukraine, not surprisingly, is claiming that Russia's bond is not bilateral, and that it should be classified as falling under the London Club, a forum for restructuring sovereign debt held by private sector lenders.

In this scenario, Russia will not get any special treatment in the restructuring talks Jaresko engages in with Ukraine's private bond holders.

Pointing out that no eurobond has ever been classified as Paris Club debt, Jaresko recently snapped that "they are a eurobond but they are saying they are not London Club. I am not going to do the work for them."

While determining which "club" an international bond belongs in may seem like an esoteric issue for lawyers to hash out, in this case it is critical. If Russia's bond is taken off the restructuring table, it opens up a $3 billion hole in Ukraine's financial projections.

"This $15 billion in potential savings from restructuring its debt is critical for Ukraine," said Tim Ash, head of emerging market research at Standard Bank. "When the IMF loans money it needs to be sure it can be paid back, and if Ukraine cannot wring out this $15 billion in savings the IMF will feel very nervous about going forward with this loan," explained Ash.

Even worse for Ukraine, the IMF is not permitted to lend to one state that is in default to another. The IMF stated firmly in 2013 that "private external arrears are tolerated but arrears to official bilateral lenders are not."

In practical terms, this so-called "lending in arrears" policy means that if Ukraine is deemed to be in default to Russia, the IMF's entire $17.5 billion loan to Kiev could be threatened. With barely enough hard currency to cover a few weeks' imports, Ukraine's economy would completely collapse.

While this all sounds like a disaster in the making for Kiev, there are still a number of ways events could play out. Indeed, while all eyes are now on the IMF, even the fund itself can't seem to decide if Moscow is holding bilateral or private debt.

While IMF spokesman William Murray initially supported Russia's position, a fund spokesman subsequently stated that "no determination has been made by the fund as to the status of this claim."

One thing that may work in Kiev's favor is that the Ukrainian eurobonds are actually owned by Russia's National Reserve Fund (NRF), which by its own policy guidelines is only allowed to invest into investment grade securities - a status that the Ukrainian bonds certainly do not possess.

According to Anna Gelpern, a law professor at Georgetown University, "there is further ambiguity when a sovereign wealth fund is involved, and when it lends in contravention of its own guidelines."

In the end, says Gelpern, "my bet is that the 'lending in arrears' issue will not be a block on the IMF's loan, but also that a Paris Club restructuring is not necessarily in the cards either."

Another thing that may help Ukraine is that while the bond is bilateral in substance - in the sense that both the debtor and bond holder are government entities - the debt itself is private in form.

Ash added that "the fact that it is a eurobond - a market instrument - makes the picture a bit blurry, and might allow the IMF to justify some juggling of the rules to allow the loan to go through."

Ultimately, however events play out, two points are clear.

First, with an economy in free fall and a country in the middle of a war, Ukraine does not - to say the least - appear to be a great credit risk for the IMF.

Therefore, even assuming that the IMF does allow Ukraine's $17.5 billion loan to go through, this will be a heavily politicized decision, strongly influenced by the West's desire to support Kiev.

Second, with total hard currency holdings of nearly $400 billion, Russia easily could - if Putin wanted to - help resolve Ukraine's funding crisis without suffering undue amounts of financial pain.

However, until there is some kind of political settlement between Moscow and Kiev that protects what the Kremlin sees as Russia's existential national security interests vis-a-vis Ukraine, Putin is unlikely to provide Ukraine the breathing space it needs to get back on its feet.
 
 #13
Business New Europe
www.bne.eu
April 1, 2015
Fight between Ukraine's govt and oligarchs embroils largest lender Privatbank
Graham Stack in Kyiv

The war between Ukraine's government and the oligarchs has reached into the fragile banking system, as the central bank felt moved to reassure depositors in Privatbank, the country's largest, after allies of President Petro Poroshenko made murder allegations regarding its owner, Ihor Kolomoisky.

The National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) issued an unusual statement on March 27 to quell reports of what it called "false and provocative information in the media regarding Privatbank". The statement referred to an allegedly concerted smear campaign mounted against Privatbank in the media and on social networks. "Clients and partners of [Privatbank] do not have grounds for concern regarding the dissemination of incorrect information pertaining to the activity of the aforementioned institution," the NBU said, without specifying what information was meant.

Privatbank itself said in a parallel statement on March 27 that it was "aware that provocative and fake information about the bank will appear in coming days, disseminated by pro-Russian forces and the Russian media."

Whodunnit?

These attempts to reassure the public follow sensational murder claims made by allies of Poroshenko involving Kolomoisky, Privatbank's co-founder. Kolomoisky, who shares ownership of the bank with his longstanding partner Hennady Boholyubov, is believed to be closely involved in the running of the bank, which is headquartered in his stronghold of Dnipropetrovsk.

The claims were made in the context of a bitter clash between Poroshenko and Kolomoisky over control of key state oil and gas companies, which Kolomoisky is believed to have de facto controlled for over a decade. Kolomoisky lost the dispute when Poroshenko stripped him of control of the companies and fired him as governor of Dnipropetrovsk region in the small hours of March 24.

During the clash, Poroshenko's allies made damaging allegations linking Kolomoisky to past - and recent - murders. Ukraine's security service (SBU) chief Valentyn Nalyvaichenko on March 23 sensationally alleged that the Kolomoisky-led Dnipropetrovsk state administration was linked to the murder of one his officers and the kidnapping of a second, on March 21.  

At a hastily convened press conference on March 23, Nalyvaichenko accused the Dnipropetrovsk administration of abetting "a single organised crime group" involved in trafficking and abductions in the Dnipropetrovsk and Donetsk regions, which had been uncovered by the murdered SBU officer. Nalyvaichenko said officials in Dnipropetrovsk were now trying to block the investigation of the murder.

Headed by Kolomoisky, the Dnipropetrovsk administration was staffed by his longstanding associates Hennady Korban and Svyatoslav Oliynik, who both vehemently refuted Nalyvaichenko's claims at a press conference held in response to the allegations on March 24. Oliynik said he had been questioned about the allegations and had demanded the opportunity to challenge key witnesses. Both also said they fully supported the SBU investigation, while demanding that Nalyvaichenko undergo mental health checks.

Serhiy Leschenko, an investigative journalist-turned-MP for President Poroshenko's party, the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, then escalated the controversy surrounding Kolomoisky in an op-ed published in the Kyiv Post on March 27. Leschenko detailed a criminal investigation in 2005 into the billionaire's alleged involvement in a business-linked murder. "In 2005, Kolomoisky was suspected in the attempted murder of Sergei Karpenko, a lawyer who refused to contribute to the oligarch's attempt to gain control over Dneprospetsstal, a steel producer," Leschenko wrote.

Kolomoisky and his associates claim all the allegations against them are part of a Russian-backed smear campaign. Kolomoisky alleges that Poroshenko has bowed to demands to fire him made by Russian President Vladimir Putin. Kolomoisky also accused rival oligarchs of financing the campaign.

Despite the gravity of the claims, Poroshenko and Kolomoisky appear to have stepped back from the brink, with both now saying that they harbour no animosity towards each other. But the intensity of the locking of horns - inevitably covered on national TV - and the repeated talk of murder would suggest the clash has only abated for now.

The NBU and Privatbank's allegations of an organised smear campaign against it also relate to reports in Ukraine's most read newspaper, the government-critical Vesti. One quoted anonymous sources as saying that other leading banks had already closed lending limits for Privatbank. "This is not the case and amounts to a fabrication," Privatbank press officer Oleh Serga assured bne Intellinews.

Vesti had also quoted Serga as saying that refinancing loans to Privatbank only covered one-third of deposit flight from the bank, and complaining that the NBU is helping only state-owned banks.

The bank has had its share of negative coverage recently. As bne IntelliNews reported, a number of open-source journalist investigations identified apparent large international outflows from Privatbank in 2014. The outflows took the form of lending to related parties, totalling over $1bn allegedly moved abroad via Privatbank's Cyprus branch. The bank says the investigations, although open source, were based on falsified data. On March 30, the Kyiv prosecutor informed MPs that there was no ground for suspicion of wrongdoing on the part of the bank.

Liquidity fears

As Ukraine's leading savings bank with 26% of retail deposits, Privatbank is highly exposed to swings in public sentiment. Ordinary Ukrainians are flocking to the country's troubled banks to withdraw their savings as hard currency cash. This has already led to the crash of Ukraine's fourth largest lender Delta Bank in early March.

According to Privatbank figures filed to the NBU, hard currency deposits held by individuals at the bank dropped from the hryvnia equivalent of $7bn at the start of 2014 to the hryvnia equivalent of around $3bn a year later, allowing for devaluation of the hryvnia to the dollar.

The outflow from Ukrainian banks continued unabated in the first quarter of this year, according to the NBU. "Liquidity is now concentrated in the big state-owned and foreign-owned banks," NBU first deputy head, Oleksandr Pysaruk, told the UNIAN news agency on March 27.

Privatbank's current liquidity ratio of cash assets to short-term liabilities, at 83.9%, remains well within the NBU normative of 40%. At the start of 2015, its 11.2% capital adequacy exceeded the NBU minimum of 10%. The bank is set to boost capitalisation by 26.2% in April, it said on March 18, by issuing shares to its current shareholders.

As evidenced by the NBU's swift dismissal of what it termed the "false and provocative information" against it, Privatbank is confident it will continue to enjoy strong central bank support, despite the controversy surrounding one of its shareholders. "Given that this is the number one bank in Ukraine, it is likely the state will support Privatbank," reckons Dragon Capital analyst Andrey Bezpyatov.

On March 27, the NBU announced a further stabilisation loan to Privatbank of UAH800mn, which takes the volume of its stabilisation credits in February and March alone to UAH4.9bn ($200mn). According to the NBU, all credits were secured with valid collateral, including railway rolling stock, aircraft and shares in the bank, and would be used exclusively to fund payments to retail depositors.

Direct hit

But apart from the damage already done to its reputation that could accelerate deposit flight, Kolomoisky's conflict with Poroshenko will have a very direct impact on Privatbank: the cash-rich state oil companies that Poroshenko reclaimed for the state comprised a major part of Privatbank's corporate business for over a decade and they could now take their business elesewhere.

According to Dragon Capital's Bezpyatov, "it may take some time before real change of management happens" at the oil companies, but when it does, it will be bad for Kolomoisky's bank. Privatbank's accounts show that 20.23% of its lending goes to one customer, fractionally exceeding the maximum of 20% allowed under NBU regulations. The customer is believed to be the Ukrnafta oil and gas company, which is likely to have equivalent funds on deposit at the bank.

Energy Minister Volodymyr Demchyshyn said on March 23 that state companies would now transfer their business to state-owned banks Ukreksimbank and Oschadbank. Ukrtransnafta alone has deposits totalling "several billion hryvnia" with Privatbank, Demchyshyn said, adding, "I do not know whether we can access them".

Privatbank's Serga told bne IntelliNews that the minister's fears were unfounded. "In the whole history of the bank, there has never been an situation when a corporate client has been unable to access its accounts," he said.
 
 #14
Over half of Ukrainian draftees unfit for military service - Poroshenko Bloc

KIEV, March 31 /TASS/. Over half of draftees mobilized during the fourth wave of Ukraine's mobilization campaign are unfit for military service because of mental and nervous disorders, the press service of the Petro Poroshenko Bloc said on Tuesday.

Only 53,000 draftees out of the total number of 117,000 conscripts were found fit for military service.

Olga Bogomolets, the head of the Ukrainian parliament's Public Health Committee, said 32% of the conscripts suffered from mental disorders; 31.1% - from cardio-vascular diseases; 22.7% - from nervous diseases.

She voiced her concern over such a high level of mental disorders during a mobilization campaign. This fact should be thoroughly checked and taken under control, Bogomolets said.
 
 #15
Ukraine's Right Sector nationalists seek to form separate brigade for warfare in Donbas

KIEV, March 31. /TASS/. Ukraine's ultra-nationalist Right Sector intends to organize a separate brigade for operations against militias from the self-proclaimed Luhansk and Donetsk people's republics, its leader said on Tuesday.

They expect to join official structures of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry retaining a special status and independence, the leader of the Russia-banned organization said.

Dmytro Yarosh admitted, however, that there had been no official proposals for volunteer battalions to join the armed forces of Ukraine.

"I have seen proposals only on the Facebook page of [Ukrainian interior minister's adviser Anton] Gerashchenko," Yarosh said. "Neither the president nor the leadership of the Defense Ministry have voiced such proposals to me," he added, mentioning an idea to offer him the position of adviser to the chief of the country's General Staff.

"We will possibly organize a separate brigade," 112 Television quoted him as saying.

As for the pullout of volunteer battalions from the contact line in Donbas, Yarosh said "volunteer detachments cannot be pulled back as this is fraught with the loss of territory".
 
 #16
Kiev launches investigation into Aidar battalion's crimes

KIEV, March 31. /TASS/. Ukraine's Defense Ministry is planning to send troops to the Luhansk region, in the country's east, to investigate the crimes of the Aidar volunteer battalion, the ministry's press service said on Tuesday.

The investigation comes following repeated requests of the Luhansk Region's governor, Gennady Moskal, submitted earlier to the Defense Ministry and Ukraine's President Petro Poroshenko.

"In case these suspicions are confirmed, those guilty will be held responsible," the ministry said in a statement.

Earlier on Tuesday, Moskal presented new facts into the unlawful behavior of the Aidar volunteer battalion members.

The incidents include an attack on a citizen of Lisichansk, a related shooting in the street and a shootout with fighters of a Ternopol battalion in the city, some 90 kilometers from Luhansk.

Such a behavior of the Aidar battalion members in the Luhansk region discredits the Ukrainian troops taking part in the special operation in the country's east, the governor said.
In early March, the Defense Ministry announced it was disbanding the notorious Aidar battalion said to be out of control and replacing it with regular forces unit under army orders.

Moskal said in his statement that a part of Aidar had long ago defected from the battalion and was engaged in looting, robbery, racketeering, auto theft and other crimes in regions controlled by the Ukrainian side.

An attempt had been prevented to take an arsenal of weapons from the area of combat operations in Donbass to Kiev. The arms were meant for "destabilizing the situation" in the capital, Moskal said.
 
 #17
AP
March 31, 2015
US forces to hold exercises in Ukraine

KIEV, Ukraine - The United States plans to send soldiers to Ukraine in April for training exercises with units of the country's national guard.

Ukraine's Interior Minister Arsen Avakov said in a Facebook post on Sunday that the units to be trained include the Azov Battalion, a volunteer force that has attracted criticism for its far-right sentiments including brandishing an emblem widely used in Nazi Germany.

Avakov said the training will begin April 20 at a base in western Ukraine near the Polish border and would involve about 290 American paratroopers and some 900 Ukrainian guardsmen.

Pentagon spokesman Col. Steve Warren said the troops would come from the 173rd Airborne Brigade based in Vicenza, Italy.

U.S. forces also took part in exercises in Ukraine in September.
 
 #18
Bloomberg
March 31, 2015
Belarus Leader Urges U.S. Involvement in Ukraine Peace Process
by Aliaksandr Kudrytski and Ryan Chilcote

(Bloomberg) -- Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko urged the U.S. to play a bigger role in the Ukrainian peace process and said a lasting solution will be impossible without its help.

"The most worrying thing is that the U.S. hasn't been openly involved in this process," Lukashenko said in the new Independence Palace in Minsk, the capital. "I believe that without the Americans, there can be no stability in Ukraine."

Lukashenko's support for more U.S. involvement highlights his balancing act between Belarus's eastern neighbor and the world's largest superpower. The Belarusian leader is appealing to America, which has hit him with sanctions over the treatment of political freedoms, as his alliance with Russian President Vladimir Putin runs counter to growing unease across eastern Europe over the Kremlin's expansionism.

As the crisis in Ukraine unfolded and Russia annexed Crimea a year ago, Lukashenko has repeatedly expressed readiness to protect the independence of his country, which shares borders with Russia, Ukraine and the European Union. The conflict next door also allowed Lukashenko to loosen his isolation as Belarus hosted several rounds of peace talks including the meetings in February that led to a cease-fire.

At that meeting, Putin brokered a deal with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President Francois Hollande and Ukraine's leader, Petro Poroshenko, to quell the yearlong conflict that the United Nations says has left more than 6,000 people dead.

The U.S., the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization say Russia is supporting the separatists with hardware, cash and troops -- accusations the Kremlin denies. Russia says Ukraine is waging war on its own citizens and discriminates against Russian speakers.

Lukashenko, who's led Belarus since 1994, may run for a fifth presidential term this year, potentially facing a divided opposition. The state of the economy may be the biggest campaign issue as the nation struggles to cope with the effect of a downturn in Russia, its main export market.
 
 
#19
Defense One
www.defenseone.com
March 31, 2015
Here's When the Next Incursion Into Ukraine Could Happen
BY PATRICK TUCKER
Patrick Tucker is technology editor for Defense One.

The Minsk II agreement is roughly in place, but not for long, according to one former NATO supreme allied commander.
 
If you think the ceasefire between Ukraine and Russian-backed militants is fragile today, wait until next week. After Easter Sunday, pro-Moscow forces could begin a spring offensive lasting until (Russian) V-E Day, or May 9.

That's the prediction of retired Gen. Wesley Clark, former NATO supreme allied commander and U.S. presidential candidate, who recently visited Ukrainian commanders and forces.

V-E Day, known as Victory Day in Russia, marks the surrender of Axis forces to the Allied forces at the end of World War II, and holds a special significance for Russians. "We see planning in Russia to celebrate this. It would be wonderful for Putin if he could wrap up his conquest and celebrate it on that day if the allies are boycotting his celebration," said Clark.

"Why are they reporting that? Because they feel that Putin's forces require a certain reorganization period. That period began in mid-February with the ending of the Debaltseve campaign, in eastern Ukraine. It normally takes at least a couple of months, maybe longer" for pro-Russian forces to regroup after major campaigns, Clark said Monday at the Atlantic Council, a Washington think tank.

Fighting in the area of Debaltseve began in mid-January and although a ceasefire began on February 12,, Russian-backed forces took control on February 21. The Minsk II ceasefire agreement is largely holding, according to Clark. Despite the veneer of relative tranquility, all is not well in Donbass.

Pro-Russian separatist forces essentially gamed the entire ceasefire, according to Clark. First, under the auspices of the agreement they convinced the Ukrainians to pull equipment back from the front line while separatists kept heavy artillery close to battle zone but concealed. How did they pull it off? The monitoring organization charged with policing the ceasefire agreement, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, or OSCE, has fallen down on the job and can't provide unbiased monitoring, according to Clark.

"More than half of OSCE are Russian military," Clark said. The Russian monitors were "on the honor code" not to pass information on Ukrainian positions back to separatist military forces.

"The Ukrainians have pulled back their heavy weapons systems. They're already at a disadvantage because if an attack were to occur they have to first put their weapons into position and move them forward to be able to engage, whereas the separatist equipment is there. Russian equipment is regularly coming over. Russian units are regularly coming over," said Clark.

Other reports corroborate that statement. On Monday, Ukrainian officials reported 22 tanks rolled into the region according to Newsweek, which also reported firing in the area over the weekend. "Sunday night 15 separatist Grad missiles were fired at the Ukrainian city of Horlivka. The Donetsk administration explains that pro-Russian fighters had received 122mm Grad missiles as part of one of Russia's so called 'humanitarian convoys', which continue to arrive in the rebel-held regions.".

"Russians delivered more and more tanks and troops," Natan Chazin, a Ukrainian battalion commander told Defense One. He also reported that shots were being fired everyday and called the ceasefire not "real."

Clark predicted that in the next round of fighting, separatist forces will likely look to finish what they started. Clark dismissed predictions that further fighting would be limited to port city of Mariupol, calling Mariupol, "the cork in the bottle," and adding that Putin's ultimate goal probably lies beyond even the Ukrainian provinces, or oblasts, of Donestsk and Luhansk.

"They've been told to cease up the oblast boundaries but it makes sense that they would try to link up to Crimea at some point, because otherwise Crimea is economically unsustainable ... In the January offensive, the Russians were given the objective ... to secure the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblast, up to the oblast boundaries. Apparently, this has some political significance in the Russian mindset ... They launched in mid-January ... they never made it to the oblast boundary and took very high losses," said Clark. "The Minsk II agreement essentially stopped them along a 400 KM line of conflict well short of the oblast boundaries. On our recent visit, we found them there."

Based on current positions, Clark says that the Russian-backed separatists are well placed to launch a potentially devastating offensive, noting that Russian tank forces were engaging the enemy at 7,000 meters, well beyond Ukrainian tank capabilities. Clark also discussed how effectively the separatist forces were using drones for reconnaissance and targeting, describing a situation where Ukrainian forces would spot a drone overhead and experience incoming artillery shells less than ten minutes later.

The Obama administration should prepare an aid package, including long-range counter battery radar and short-range (lethal) anti-tank weapons such as Javelins, equipped with thermal imaging said Clark. Even if the United States does not actually send the package but readies it for immediate deployment, the existence of the aid package and a firm show of willingness to send it in the event of additional Russian ceasefire violations, could offer some sort of deterrence, if only temporarily. Until then, Clark suggested the U.S. could provide the Ukrainian side with better intelligence and analysis.

"Provide joint indications and warning analysis to Ukraine to provide the missing information they need to have firm warning of a Russian offensive," he said.
 
 #20
Interfax-Ukraine
April 1, 2015
Nalyvaichenko says all terrorist attacks in Ukraine coordinated by Russian special forces

Russian special forces and their representatives have set up headquarters in Luhansk and Donetsk and are coordinating the preparation and execution of terrorist attacks in Ukraine, in territory controlled by the Ukrainian government and not controlled by it, Chief of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) Valentyn Nalyvaichenko has said.

"All terrorist attacks that take place in Ukrainian territory (controlled and not controlled by us) are prepared and executed under the supervision of Russian special forces. Currently, the most dangerous terrorist groups are operating in Luhansk and Donetsk regions. They are receiving money and weapons from Russia. They are the ones to carry out the attacks in the south and east of the country by using modern mines... and other explosives," Nalyvaichenko said in an interview with "Den" (Day) newspaper, posted on Wednesday.

According to him, the SBU has been and will be apprehending members of these terrorist groups.

"For example, a Ukrainian citizen, who was sent from Luhansk to Kyiv by officers of Russia's Main Intelligence Department to execute an attack, is currently on trial. Our investigators lead the case and demand she be sentenced to life," he said.

Nalyvaichenko said that Russian special forces are holding training exercise for members of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics (DPR and LPR). According to him, they have also set up camps in Donetsk and Luhansk.

"Russian special forces also facilitate the provision of communications to terrorists, and deliver munitions and Russian armor to them," said.

According to Nalyvaichenko, all these facts are being recorded "for a criminal case against the LPR and DPR terrorist organizations."

"It's necessary for the global community and The Hague tribunal, and to bring every [person] involved with the terrorist organizations to justice when these territories are liberated," he added.

Nalyvaichenko also commented on the statement made by leader of the Communist Party of Ukraine Petro Symonenko, who announced plans to hold a rally in Kyiv on May 1 with the participation of his Russian colleagues.

"Let him gather his crowd. But those involved in terrorist and separatists activities will be detained at once... Those, who facilitated the aggression in the east of our country, will be prosecuted as Kremlin collaborators and as those who committed crimes against humanity," Nalyvaichenko said.
 
 #21
Newsweek.com
March 31, 2015
Russia Launches Next Deadly Phase of Hybrid War on Ukraine
BY MAXIM TUCKER

Pushing his baby daughter in a pram in front of him, 37-year-old Dmitriy Komyakov paused as marchers ahead adjusted their positions around a huge Ukrainian flag. It was a bright day in Kharkiv, Ukraine's second largest city. A good day for the hundreds in attendance to celebrate one year since Euromaidan demonstrators ousted president Viktor Yanukovych.

Just as the march moved off again, an explosion ripped into the crowd. Komyakov was close enough to feel the heat of the blast wave. As bloodied victims slumped to the floor, he searched for his wife and 12-year-old daughter among the panicked crowd. "I could see pieces of metal flying and people starting to fall," he says. "First I checked the baby to see if she was injured, then myself, looked around and that's when my wife and daughter ran to me." Miraculously, the whole family had escaped unscathed. But four people, including two teenage boys, were killed in that blast and another nine seriously wounded.

Ukraine's state security service, the SBU, says Russia has entered into a new phase of its campaign to destabilise Ukraine, with the 22 February attack in Kharkiv just one of a series of bombings orchestrated by Russian spy services, the FSB and the GRU. "It starts with the FSB's security centres 16 and 18, operating out of Skolkovo, Russia," says Vitaliy Naida, head of the SBU department responsible for intercepting online traffic. "These centres are in charge of information warfare. They send out propaganda, false information via social media. Re-captioned images from Syria, war crimes from Serbia - they're used to radicalise and then recruit Ukrainians."

He takes a suspected three-man terror cell from Dnipropretovsk who are currently on trial as an example and walks Newsweek through the evidence, including photographs and video of weapons with Russian serial numbers and intercepted communications. Passed instructions and weapons via dead-drops, the cell never met their handlers.

"They were recruited by the FSB. Instructions were initially given in private messages via internet and in some cases Vkontakte [a Russian social network]," Naida says. "When they were detained and arrested, in their houses we found explosives, grenades, means of communications and printed messages - where to set explosives, where they should be placed to create panic." Naida's unit monitors roughly 600 "anti-Ukrainian" social network groups with hundreds of thousands of members. So far it has intercepted communications between 29 prolific group administrators and individuals using accounts linked to the Russian security services.

A cursory internet search reveals separatist groups are no longer just Ukraine's problem. This year Armenia, the Baltic countries, Moldova and Poland have suddenly acquired new "People's Republic" pages on social media, some overtly pro-Russian, others simply stoking ethnic tensions between majority and minority populations in the same city or country - be they Russians and Latvians, or Poles and Lithuanians.

In the meantime, not a week goes by in Ukraine without some form of terror-related incident - from a hoax bomb threat shutting down Lviv airport in western Ukraine, to a series of blasts targeting pro-Ukrainian political groups in Odessa, southern Ukraine. Infrastructure such as railways and financial institutions are hit, and in cases like Kharkiv, ordinary Ukrainians too.

The Kharkiv bombers, a group known as the "Kharkiv Partisans", say they were aiming to hit soldiers and political figures at the front of the march. In the end a parked truck bore the brunt of the blast, preventing dozens more casualties. Four of the "partisans" were captured immediately after the bombing, en route to destroy a pro-Ukrainian volunteers' club with a rocket launcher.

In a video of one Partisan's interrogation given to Newsweek by the SBU, an exhausted-sounding man whose face has been pixelated to obscure his identity ahead of trial, but possibly sporting a black eye, explains the attack. "I set the mine at a special angle to maximise impact for the front corners, where there were, as I know, volunteer battalion members and representatives of nationalist organisations."

The man tells his interrogator that he met a Russian special forces operative while in Belgorod, Russia, in November, who asked him to video and photograph Ukrainian troop movements. In February, he says he was instructed to collect a MON-100 anti-personnel mine from a dead drop in Kharkiv, which he says he planted and detonated on the march route in return for $10,000 - to be collected in Russia. The confession sounds forced and somewhat rehearsed. In a war where both sides have been caught out disseminating outrageous propaganda, it's difficult to trust the SBU.

Yet Russian claims that the bombing campaign is part of a Ukrainian effort to discredit them are outlandish. Given the dire consequences for Ukraine in terms of damage to economy, potential investment and infrastructure, the idea that it is bombing itself hardly seems credible.

An alternative theory is that Russia is using "partisans" as an extension of its hybrid war in Ukraine. There is already an overwhelming amount of independently verified photo, video and anecdotal evidence to demonstrate Russian involvement in the conflict in Ukraine, although Russian officials continue to deny aiding the separatists or sponsoring terrorism. "The goal is to destabilise the situation, to create panic, to damage the economy," the SBU's Naida says.

"They target Kiev, Kharkiv, Dnipropretovsk, and Odessa, and all along the potential land corridor [between Russia and] Crimea - Mariupol, Kherson and Mykolaiv. The separatists need these cities. They know there is no chance for them to survive without the land corridor."

Whatever the motive behind the attacks, it's clear they are set to continue. On 25 March a railway line was blown up in Dnipropretovsk. A 17 March SBU raid which hauled in five terror suspects in Odessa failed to prevent another bombing on 22 March. For families like the Komyakovs, the intensifying terror campaign is a second, crushing blow. They thought they had escaped the war when they fled their home in Stakhanov, a city in Luhansk region, devastated by shelling and now controlled by pro-Russian groups.

Dmitriy Komyakov had banned his 12-year-old daughter from attending any pro-Ukrainian meetings while in Stakhanov, knowing it would be dangerous. In Kharkiv, he thought it would be different. "My eldest daughter is 12, she's very pro-Ukrainian, as all young people nowadays are," sighs Komyakov. "She was always interested in these marches and meetings, always asking if she can go. But I never let her. Because in war, anything can happen."

Komyakov is utterly despondent. His family have already lost their home, and for months they have struggled to make ends meet as they tried to settle into a new life in Kharkiv. Now he is wondering whether to uproot them again. "It's horrible but I have a feeling . . . and people here say that soon it will be the same in Kharkiv as in the city we came from. That's a terrifying thought."

 

 #22
Russia's political landscape is changing but not radically yet
By Lyudmila Alexandrova

MOSCOW, March 31. /TASS/. Russia's political landscape needs renewal by the time a new State Duma will have to be elected in 2016 and the chances of political parties will largely depend on their attitude to Crimea's reunification with Russia, experts believe. In the meantime, the country's political space has seen some changes already, although not radical ones yet.

State Duma member Oksana Dmitriyeva, one of Russia's leading economists, on Monday quit A Just Russia party to declare plans for creating a political organization of her own, called Professionals' Party. "A Just Russia no longer copes with its task of forming a professional opposition," Dmitriyeva said, adding that her party would seek to fill that niche. Dmitriyeva declared her party would seek to represent the interests of the middle class, business people, and retirees. She described its ideology as "social democracy and economic patriotism." The yet-to-be formed political force may incorporate part of A Just Russia members and representatives of smaller parties with no chances of getting into parliament on their own: Civic Platform, for instance.

As far as the Civic Platform is concerned, its founder and first leader, big business tycoon Mikhail Prokhorov earlier this month left the party together with a group of associates, most of them liberally minded intellectuals. Prokhorov and his entourage were angry the party's new leaders firmly supported Crimea's reunification with Russia and some party members participated in demonstrations by the Anti-Maidan movement.

Nevertheless the party has survived so far, although not in the shape Prokhorov had once wished it to take, and looks determined to stay in politics and participate in elections.

As for the liberal segment of the out-of-parliament opposition, whose members have for many years been unable to team up for participation in the elections, a trend towards some sort of rapprochement developed after the killing of a co-chairman of the RPR-PARNAS party, Boris Nemtsov. A member of the central council of Alexey Navalny's Party of Progress, Leonid Volkov, urged the opposition's leaders to stop quarrelling at last and to begin preparations for Duma elections in earnest. The leader of the Yabloko party, Sergey Mitrokhin, has described his vision of conditions on which a coalition might emerge. In the meantime, the RPR-PARNAS party has called upon all liberals to unite.

If State Duma elections were to be held in the near future, 59% of Russia's electorate would vote for the ruling party, United Russia, as follows from a poll by the public opinion fund FOM. The leaders of the Liberal Democrats and the Communists would receive 6% of the votes respectively, and A Just Russia, Yabloko and Russian Pensioners' party, 1% each.

Russia's political landscape needs renovation by the time the election campaign begins. There is still some time left, says the president of the National Strategy Institute, Mikhail Remizov. "The ruling party and the systemic opposition parties have been drifting ever closer towards each other," he told TASS. "Therefore, the focus is on the main problem of the non-systemic opposition, which has dropped out of the basic political and nation state-oriented consensus - that over Crimea."

Support for this consensus, Remizov said, is a mandatory condition for full-fledged participation in Russia's politics. In all other respects the parties may disagree, be it socio-economic affairs, cultural or other issues.

As for Dmitriyeva's project, Remizov believes, it is too early to say anything definite, although she is "one of the brightest personalities in A Just Russia" and also "fits in well with the Crimean consensus." Civic Platform, he said, was Prokhorov's party, and its founder and first leader displayed "inconsistency and infantilism" and was oriented to a handful of "high bohemians."

But if Civic Platform will survive as a party without him is a big question.

Generally speaking, Remizov said, creation of a right-of-centre liberal party fitting with the post-Crimean consensus is an absolute need. This may happen way before the elections. Over the eighteen months still to go many things may change. But in any case non-systemic liberals have no chances of being "a major factor" in the 2016 parliamentary election race.
 
 
#23
Former Putin allies question his political course
March 31, 2015
By NATALIYA VASILYEVA    

MOSCOW (AP) - As Russian President Vladimir Putin marks 15 years since he was first elected, his former long-term allies are questioning his political course and warning of the economic consequences of his aggressive foreign policy.

Putin's approval ratings peaked last year as the Kremlin annexed Ukraine's Crimean peninsula and have stayed at record high levels as many Russians are basking in what state media present as the glory of the return of this former part of the Russian empire.

Yet in a rare show of dissent several long-time former allies of the president on Tuesday warned about the cost of the foreign policy. They were speaking at a round table to mark Putin's 15 years in power and were moderated by the president's spokesman.

The annexation of Crimea in March last year, which Putin has admitted was his personal decision, and Russia's ensuing role in the bloody conflict in eastern Ukraine caused international outrage and saw Russia slapped with economic sanctions.

Alexei Kudrin, Russia's finance minister in 2000-2011 and a former deputy prime minister, argued that Putin's focus on foreign policy means that Russia won't return to economic growth levels suitable for a great power in coming years.

"We're stuck," he said, adding that growth rates of 1-2 percent, which is the best Russia can hope for in the current environment, "do not reflect Russia's ability to be competitive in the global economy."

What's more, the fallout from the Ukraine crisis, as well as direct financing to Crimea will cost Russia $150-$200 billion in the next three to four years, according to Kudrin. That's roughly half of Russia's foreign currency reserves.

Kudrin warned that the nationalist sentiment, unleashed with Crimea's annexation is spooking stability-seeking businesses because it shows that "priority is given to political goals" and the Kremlin is ready to "pay an economic price."

Russia's economy is expected to contract by 3-6 percent this year in its steepest decline since Putin took office. His third presidential term expires in 2018, but Putin hasn't yet confirmed if he's going to run for a fourth term.

Liberal economists like Kudrin are still believed to have the president's ear but have largely lost influence on decision-making.

Igor Yurgens, a former Kremlin adviser, raised concern about the stifling of dissent and branding liberals as "fifth columnists," which he said hampers Russia's long-term chances for prosperity.

"Without them (liberals) and without the necessary structural reforms, our economy will not survive the policy that the president is pursuing," Yurgens said.

Putin's spokesman Dmitry Peskov brushed off the comments and said that he pins his hopes to a younger "Putin generation" which doesn't "know the horrors of the 1990s" and is fiercely loyal to the president, the only Russian leader they remember.

As a result of the economic downturn the disposable income of Russians is due to drop this year for the first time since Putin took office. Yet the difficulties have not yet led to any major social unrest. Kremlin-friendly pollster FOM expects it to stay this way - at least for a while.

"The majority of people who approve of the president's actions and values are ready to be patient and wait for a long time," FOM's director Alexander Olson said.

Putin became acting president when Boris Yeltsin resigned on New Year's Eve 1999. He won election for the first time on March 26, 2000 and a second time in 2004. He did not run in 2008 because of term limits, but remained Russia's dominant official as prime minister. He won a six-year new term in 2012.
 
 #24
Washington Post
March 31, 2015
Russia - perhaps more restrained and less powerful than you think?
By Brandon Valeriano and Ryan C. Maness
 
The following is a guest post by political scientists Brandon Valeriano (University of Glasgow) and Ryan C. Maness (Northeastern University).

Debates about the origins of Russia's intervention into Ukraine have typically taken as given Russia's position as a muscular, capable regional power, engaged in what Realists regard as power maximization. This perspective suggests the moves by Russia were caused by external forces and NATO's move east, with conquest of the former Soviet space an inevitable response. Critics of this perspective suggest that Russia's aggression was motivated either by the price of oil or domestic concerns, but nonetheless with Russian power on display. When we consider the outcomes of past episodes of Russian aggression, however, a very different conclusion appears warranted: the Russian state actually appears to be both a relatively weak and restrained power that struggles to assert hegemony in post-Soviet space.

It may be paradoxical to consider a state restrained when it has (unofficially) sent troops into Ukraine, invaded Georgia (2008), made antagonistic moves toward Estonia (2007) and recently blatantly threatened Denmark with nuclear weapons.  The key, however, is to examine how coercive power is actually used, as we do in our soon-to-be released book, "Russia's Coercive Diplomacy: Energy, Cyber, and Maritime Policy As New Forms of Power." In examining Russia's use of cyber and energy power, we find the state doing almost the least it can do, and often failing to achieve the desired outcomes. [http://www.palgrave.com/page/detail/Russias-Coercive-Diplomacy/?K=9781137479433]

In 2007, Russia showed its capabilities in cyberspace when the Estonian government decided to move a Soviet era WWII soldiers' grave marker from the center square of the capital Tallinn to the outskirts of the city. Seen as an insult to Russian pride, this action led to a flood of DDoS cyber incidents which bombarded Estonian private and government Web sites, disrupting commerce and government functionality for about two weeks. By 2008, in large part in response to the incident, Estonia became firmly entrenched as the headquarters for NATO's cyber defense. The grave marker was never moved back into town, and the actions lead to the Baltic state completely removing itself from Russia's sphere of influence - hardly a success for showing the coercive nature of Russian power.

Later in 2008, a series of DDoS and Web site defacements originating from Russia preceded the conventional military attack on Georgia. These cyber incidents caused disruptions in communications nationwide and confusion. However, the cyber tactics did very little to decide the outcome of the conventional military conflict. The short military conflict also hardened Georgia to a swifter path to integration with the West.

Russia's recent incursion into the Ukraine did not utilize any cyber methods. As the past two operations failed, it seems that Russian cyber power has been largely muted. The same is true with energy power given new pipeline options and the failing price of oil.  Over and over again, we find Russia using its power in limited and largely symbolic ways, with these power demonstrations producing outcomes that seems largely opposed to what was intended.

Russia uses its power externally because domestic public opinion supports these moves, the price of gas and oil have allowed it to do so, and because its own strategic rivalry with the United States pushes the state to assert its dominion in the region of post-Soviet space.  But these moves do not achieve strategic success beyond limited, seemingly pyrrhic victories. Given this, how just far will Russia really go? Russia seeks to punish its enemies, whether that be the United States, Georgia, Ukraine, or Estonia, but it can only do so in a limited fashion.  And uses of this kind of power always come with consequences, often unintended.

The worry is that as Russian moves continue to fail and as the price of oil drops, it will be less restrained in the future. That being said, past behavior suggests that Russia's leadership will continue to be restrained and rational, with saber-rattling at the forefront. Russia is not a power maximizing state, but simply a middle power trying to maintain its interests with limited strategic capabilities.

As we look ahead, the next potential flashpoint is the Arctic where Russian elites see both tremendous economic opportunities and a good prospect for success on the international stage. Here, however, Russia has worked within international law to assert its territorial rights, along with Canada, Norway, and Denmark (via Greenland). These countries are making underwater exclusive economic zone (EEZ) claims via the laws set forth by the United Nations Law on the Convention of the Sea (UNCLOS); the only state not doing so is the United States.

We side with John Vasquez in the call for foreign policy research that considers outcomes of the use of power, in addition to the beginnings of strategic situations. How these conflict end should tell us much about the next conflicts.  Past uses of force seemed to fail (Estonia-Georgia); will Ukraine be seen as a failure also?  Can it possibly be a positive outcome if it drains resources from the state, lays bare conflicts over the conscription army, and further demonstrates Russia's inability to leverage cyber and energy power?

 
 #25
Moscow Times
April 1, 2015
Fear Makes People Support Putin, But They Will Demand More - Experts
By Ivan Nechepurenko

President Vladimir Putin's sky-high approval ratings are often puzzling to Western politicians and pundits. Some refuse to believe that the president's policies, which have turned Russia into a pariah on the international stage, could really be so popular at home.

Russia's leading sociologists, economists and political scientists attempted to explain the secret of Putin's phenomenal popularity at a panel discussion in Moscow on Tuesday. Their conclusion was that despite the sharp fall in real incomes over the past months, Russians continue to support their leader as they feel he protects them against both external and internal threats and makes them feel proud of themselves and their country.

At the same time, the current record-high levels of support are determined by the ongoing confrontation with the West over the future of Ukraine. This confrontation will either stagnate, pushing Russia into economic independence, or will result in a detente that will shift the focus of attention back to the country's internal challenges.

Under both scenarios Putin's rating will be challenged by growing economic anxiety among the public. In the first scenario, economic isolation will inevitably erode people's living standards to the extent that an external confrontation will no longer be enough to ensure their support. In the second, people will revert to the internal agenda and see Putin's economic shortfalls, experts said.

"While at the beginning of 2014 people were inspired by the Sochi Olympics and Crimea's annexation, later they felt they had to be united against an external enemy," said Sergei Belanovsky, a prominent sociologist.

"Today we see that there is a new factor of fear: People are afraid to lose what they have, and there is a protest against protests," he said.

The analysts' forecasts were made for a report titled "Between Crimea and Crisis: Why Have Russians' Social Aims Changed?" commissioned by former Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin's Civic Initiatives Committee and presented by Mikhail Dmitriyev, a former head of the Russian government's top think tank and his colleague Belanovsky.

These are the same experts who correctly predicted the wave of political protests in Moscow and large urban centers following the 2011 State Duma elections and also foresaw the stagnation of the Russian economy in 2013-14.  

Reinventing Putin

During his 15 years at the helm of Russian politics, Putin has responded to different sociological priorities of the population, the report said.

In the 2000s, Russian society made a great leap in terms of consumption, raising living standards and shifting people's immediate priorities away from everyday survival.

By 2011, Russians had begun to think more about their long-term development, demanding better quality of health care and education. These demands were not fulfilled, and people became increasingly frustrated by their personal prospects, the report said.

By the end of 2013, many social indicators were increasingly negative, with people less confident in their future and the majority believing that the country had entered a period of stagnation, according to polls by the independent Levada Center.

This period ended at the beginning of 2014, when the Sochi Olympics and Crimea annexation propelled people's enthusiasm and Putin's approval ratings to historically high levels.  

Immune Ratings

The euphoria did not last long, as Russia was hit by an economic crisis that resulted from an oil price slump, sanctions imposed by Western governments over Ukraine and the economy's internal structural inefficiencies.

Nevertheless, Putin's approval ratings remained high, as people feel he protects them against an external threat, the analysts said.

"Putin's ratings always corresponded to how people felt about the economy, but today there is a lag between these two variables," said Dmitriyev, a member of the Civic Initiatives Committee.

"If the Ukraine factor fades away or the conflict becomes frozen, the rating will likely decrease quite quickly, bringing it into line with attitudes toward the economy," he said.  

In addition, as the Ukraine conflict begins to appear as less of an emergency, the role of state-run media propaganda will also diminish, like at the end of 2013 when people began to trust alternative sources of information more, Dmitriyev said.  

National Pride

While Dmitriyev and Belanovsky stressed in their report that at the current level of consumption, if the Ukraine crisis fades away, Russians will inevitably shift back to their own development and pose higher institutional demands of their government, other experts on the panel were more pessimistic.

"What we are seeing is that people do not have an image of their future, they live by reproducing what they already have," said Lev Gudkov, head of the Levada Center.

"The main fear is losing what they have," he said.

According to Gudkov, Russians act out of a deeply entrenched inferiority complex and the desire to live in a great country. These sentiments were suddenly satisfied by the annexation of Crimea and ongoing conflict in Ukraine.

At the same time, when the Ukraine conflict is resolved, the country will not return to its starting place, the analysts said.
"The regime is now turning from an authoritarian one into a repressive one," Gudkov said.

"The anti-Ukraine propaganda has made a reform agenda for Russia less likely," he said.

Soviet Legacy

Boris Makarenko, chairman of the Center for Political technologies, a Moscow-based think tank, said during the panel discussion that Russia's difficulty is that different interest groups fail to form powers that could be active on a political level. As a consequence, the political landscape is flat and the government is the only active player.

"The Soviet regime suppressed all social, ethnic and cultural divisions that would by now have developed into a vibrant political life," Makarenko said.

"So far these divisions have not been overcome," he said.
 
 #26
Russians Identify with Putin to Cope with Unpredictability He Causes, Moscow Psychologist Says
Paul Goble

Staunton, April 1 - The overwhelming support Russians currently give to Vladimir Putin has less to do with approval of his policies than with their need to find a way to cope with the unpredictability and sense of powerlessness his regime and the world around them have produced, according to Marina Arutyunyan, a Moscow psychologist.

Just as was the case under Stalin but was not in Brezhnev's times, Russians today feel their world lacks predictability and that in turn leads them, on the one hand, to a depressed state of powerlessness and, on the other, to identification with the aggressor who has created that situation, she says (meduza.io/feature/2015/03/23/ya-chuvstvuyu-sebya-rossiey).

"When aggression is equated with force and you have no choice or so it seems," she says, "then this identification with aggression is a mechanism very much in evidence. By identifying with hatred and anger, you as it were [feel that you have become] stronger." Of course, she adds, "this is an absolute fiction, but psychologically, it makes life easier."

That is what is going on among the overwhelming majority of Russians today, she continues, noting, however, that there are some Russians who are not doing so.  But to the extent that they do not, they find themselves in increasing psychological difficulties because they want to negotiate with the authorities, but the authorities have no interest in doing.

One response of the sense of powerlessness and depression is emigration. Another is the displacement of aggression onto those one can attack with relative impunity, a trend that explains the rise in the level of aggressiveness in interpersonal relationships in Russia of all kinds. But internal emigration of the kind that existed in late Soviet times isn't possible, she says.

The reasons for that conclusion are two-fold, Arutyunyan continues.  On the one hand, those who want to separate themselves from the rest of society have to find a consensus among themselves, something they were able to do in Brezhnev's time because people in this category agreed about what they were opposing.

And on the other, the hostile surrounding world needs to be relatively predictable. That was the case under Brezhnev, but it is not under Putin; and that makes it extremely difficult for groups to form and survive because they are under constant threat of being pulled apart by changes in the surrounding society.

Autyunyan insists that she "does not want to say that convictions do not have significance," but the psychological state that Putin has created and in which Russians today live "is also very important."  When people feel suppressed and powerless, it is "very easy" for them to become angry, and they need a target for that anger.

As Theodor Adorno showed after World War II in his studies of authoritarian societies, the Moscow psychologist points out, that is something authoritarian rulers have always understood and been ready to provide because, by providing an explanation for their populations that eases the latter's psychological state, it generates support for themselves.

For extended periods, such a strategy can be effective, but ultimately it is doomed to fail because it does not address the underlying problems people face or allow them to re-acquire the sense of efficacy and a feeling of predictability which allow them individually and collectively to act in a mature and self-confident manner.
 
 #27
Interfax
March 31, 2015
Spokesman sings praises to Putin at forum reviewing 15 years of his rule

Moscow, 31 March: The Russian president's press secretary, Dmitriy Peskov, believes that the more the Russian leader defends the country's interests in the world, the more he comes under attack from the West.

"Let me remind you words by Putin himself, who said that in the case of any leader of our country, the more dogged he is in promoting our country's interests, the more dogged he is in the defence of our country's rights in the international arena, the more he is demonized in the world, and there is no information technology that can do anything about that," the press secretary said.

He also said that a club of world leaders who do now know "what is a Russia without Putin" had emerged. "And they are starting to get used to Russia being very tough in defending its interests and are starting to understand that Russia, with Putin as its leader, will continue doing so," the press secretary said.

He said that "an entire generation of young people has grown up in Russia who do not know what the Soviet Union is, who do not know the horror of the 90s, and who have grown up as a Putin generation". "And the overwhelming majority of such young people find a use for themselves in our country. They know what to do and are ready to work. And they consolidate around Putin, which is what the statistics say," the press secretary said.

Peskov said that "the Russian president, for his part, has an absolutely solid and comprehensive base needed to continue his undertakings and perhaps compensate for some things that have not been implemented in full".

"The president's high approval ratings are, of course, a huge responsibility. It is precisely on Putin, rather than anyone else, that these people are pinning their hopes and readiness to work in order to rectify the situation. That is why this is a responsibility, which Putin has never been afraid of, and an excellent opportunity, which, again, he has never wasted either," Peskov said.
 
 #28
Sputnik
March 27, 2015
Russians' Attitudes Toward Putin Are Changing, And Not How You Might Think

Polling conducted by independent polling and sociological research firm Levada Center has found that Russians' views toward President Vladimir Putin have changed significantly over the past year.

The polling, released Friday, shows that nearly half of all Russians, 49 percent, believe that the president's greatest accomplishment has been his role in returning Russia to the status of great power.

The multiple possible answer polling finds that the president's other most cited accomplishments include the stabilization of the situation in northern Caucasus (34 percent of respondents), the curbing of separatism and saving the country from collapse (33 percent), the rise of pay, pensions and benefits (29 percent), and his success in dealing with the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis (29 percent).

When it comes to the top five things the president hasn't been able to accomplish, 39 percent of respondents cited his inability to assure a just distribution of income in the interests of ordinary people, 34 percent the failure to return the resources and amenities lost by ordinary people in the course of reforms, 23 percent the incapacity to overcome the present economic crisis, 22 percent the failure to ensure the strengthening of law and order in the country, and 15 percent the inability to raise pay, pensions, and benefits.

Polling found that support for the president, sitting at 52 percent in March 2013 and 56 percent in March 2014, has grown by nearly 20 points, with 72 percent of respondents now noting that they 'on the whole support' his leadership, while 14 percent say they 'on the whole do not support' him. in 2013 and 2014, 27 percent answered that they 'on the whole do not support' the president.

Political support or absence thereof aside, Levada's polling found that trust in the president has grown to 83 percent, with 26 percent 'fully' trusting him, and 57 percent 'generally' trusting him. 4 percent of respondents stated that they 'do not trust him at all', with 10 percent answering that they 'more often than not don't trust him'. The figures compare favorably to 2012, when only 57 percent of respondents noted that they 'fully' or 'generally' trust the president, with a combined 35 percent saying that they 'do not trust him at all' or 'more often than not don't trust him'.

Putin's Public Image is Changing

Levada's multiple possible answer polling also found that among the qualities people found most attractive in the president, 41 percent said it was his 'energy, decisiveness, and strength of will', with 40 percent citing his 'experience'. Meanwhile, 25 percent cited his 'ability to lead', 23 his 'defense of state interests', 23 percent his 'visionary leadership', and 17 percent his role in ensuring 'stability in the country'.

Interestingly, the importance of the president's personal appearance among his top personal qualities has fallen from a maximum of 18 percent during the first five years of his administration to 6 percent in this year's results. Political scientist Dmitri Oreshkin told Russian business news service RBC that the decline has to do with shifting expectations among the Russian people. In 2000-2005, people considered it important that Putin was a young man who led a healthy lifestyle, didn't drink, had experience abroad, and was associated with democratic activist Anatoly Sobchak.  Shift to the present, and Russians now look at the president as a strong leader who managed to save Russia from the brink of complete destruction. As a result of this, and the fading of the public memory of the malaise of the Yeltsin era and Yeltsin's own personal image, the relative importance of Putin's appearance in the public mind has declined.

Regarding rumors, spread around the globe, about the president's health, 51 percent stated that this kind of information is a private matter, while 39 percent insisted the contrary, stating that they had a right to know everything about the health of the head of state. Regarding their own personal estimate of the president's health, 55 percent of respondents answered either 'good' or 'very good', with 24 percent answering 'average', and slightly more than 1 percent answering 'bad' or 'very bad', with 20 percent finding it difficult to say.

Levada Center polled 1,600 people across 134 regions in March 2015. The results have an estimated margin of error of no higher than 3.4 percent.
 
 
#29
True Economics
http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie
March 21, 2015
Two Pesky Facts and Russian 'Liberal Democracy' Dream
By Constantin Gurdgiev
Constantin Gurdgiev is a Russian economist based in Dublin, Ireland. He is a former editor of Business & Finance Magazine and a regular panelist on Tonight with Vincent Browne on TV3.
[Graphics here http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/03/21315-two-pesky-facts-and-russian.html]

Here's a problem, folks. Let's take two facts:

    Vladimir Putin's approval ratings are currently in the upper 80s: http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-03-16/a-year-after-crimea-putin-stands-strong  
    Russia ranks as the third country in the world in terms of access to internet: http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/03/19/1-communications-technology-in-emerging-and-developing-nations/

Which gets you thinking.

If Russian public opinion is down to Kremlin propaganda and media control, then how come Russians, enjoying wide access to internet, are not rushing to their web browsers for the alternatives presented  in the Western free press (including in Russian), the independent Russian press (which does exist) and in the new media (which is very rich, diverse and widely available in Russian)?

In the USSR days, when there was no internet and there was no access to foreign publications, media etc and when the Soviet authorities actively suppressed access to foreign broadcasts, while closed borders were enforced for the few who dared to smuggle in foreign press, many Russians tuned to these voices. I grew up regularly listening to the BBC Russian Service and Voice of America and Radio Liberty. Many of my friends and their families did as well. Apparently, today, the survivors of the same channels - available freely - have very little impact on Russian public opinion. Why?

Russian culture is culture of extreme scepticism over authority. Scepticism that borders on cynicism. And Russian culture is a culture of kitchen politics (in modern world perfectly facilitated by social networks and alternative media). Russians have access to these sources at a rate of access that is extremely high and open. And yet their views remain non-liberal in the Western context of this term.

Is today's state of traditional media control reinforcing what is already a prevalent Russian public view: the set of beliefs that are largely consistent with those espoused by the Kremlin? Is it possible that Kremlin is not necessarily actively altering the public opinion, but rather tailoring its own positions to that opinion, while reinforcing existent biases? Can it be that such tailoring of policies is more democratic than the liberal alternative that has no popular support in Russia?

In this, who wags what? The proverbial dog of Moscow, the proverbial tail of the nation or the bone of free media access dangled on the web?

The uncomfortable nature of this problem is that in the West, we are told to believe in the potency of the Russian liberal opposition (which has access to internet and uses it extensively to promote ideas, sketches of policies and even more actively - acts of protest and own image) and that this liberal opposition is democratically anchored. We are told that, were the opposition leaders given a chance, they would win democratic mandate from the people to change and reform Russia. We are told that once Putin is gone, Russia will embrace change led by the liberal opposition. And yet, where is the evidence to support any of this?

I sympathise with the principles and values espoused by some of the opposition leaders (not all, since there is a huge range of views these leaders hold). But, any serious observer of Russian politics and economics will quickly discover that the liberal opposition is incapable of providing a properly designed reforms agenda. I cannot find credibly structured and costed alternative budgets, legislative proposals, regulatory white papers etc - all that we, in the West, tend to associate with functional opposition. The opposition cannot even provide its potential base with a coherent core message, beyond the incessant talk about the need for more democracy, the need for drastic (but unspecified) anti-corruption reforms, and the need for more liberalisation of everything.

While the Russian Government can also be very sketchy on policies impact assessments ex-ante their adoption, at least it provides some data that can be used to measure their effectiveness in the medium term. Russian liberal opposition? Not much, if any.

Western democratic opposition parties publish own policies, own alternative budgets, factually comment on Government policies and produce alternative ideas that are tested in the public domain. Russian liberal opposition is predominantly pre-occupied with promoting itself to its own support base. When personality clashes abate for short periods of time, what is left in the public view is the talk about big ticket changes (opening up to foreign investors, achieving peace and partnership with the West, combatting corruption etc - all good ideas), but no tangible, specific, cost-benefit weighted proposals. The opposition can freely use internet to promote such analysis and proposals. It does not. Instead, it uses the web for sloganeering. An average Russian interested in, say, the expected impact of liberalisation of the domestic monopolies (or near-monopolies) on, say, unemployment is left with vacuum of data, estimates and insight. One cannot expect any, even remotely rational person, to vote for the opposition leaders promoting such a policy, unless that person is fully insulated from any potential fallout from it. Hence, the core support base for the liberals in Russia is... yes, the urban upper middle class

In other words, we, in the West, are being told to trust the dream that has very little basis in reality and feasibility, and despite alleged claims of democratic nature has very little support within the electorate. It all reminds us of the policy that promoted regime change in Iraq as the means for creating a functional democracy there, to be led by the liberal Iraqi opposition. It didn't happen thus, not because we didn't try, but because we couldn't find liberal opposition capable of governing. We based our expectations of Baghdad on a naive dream and we missed the real Baghdad by a mile. Ditto for Cairo, ditto for Tripoli, ditto for Kabul... keep counting.

Yes, Russia is not Iraq - neither philosophically, nor ethically, nor socially, nor economically, nor politically, nor historically, nor culturally, nor geopolitically. In all of these terms it is more complex, statehood and institutionally more developed and stronger. Which means the pretty dreams of the post-regime change nirvana are even more out of touch in the case of Russia than they were in Iraq.

In the Soviet days, people of Russia could have been excused for not actively pursuing the alternative because they didn't know better - they had no access to alternative media, internet and to Western 'voices'. Yet, they desired such access and sought it whenever it was available. Today, Russians support the values represented by Putin, even though they are not actively denied access to alternatives. It is uncomfortable for the Western ideologues of regime change, but it is thus.

Here are some of the opinion polls on public approval ratings for various Russian parties and politicians:

Political parties first:

Yes, the hope of liberal opposition is clearly alive... in the minds of the West, but not in the minds of the Russian voters. About the only two - very remote - democratic choice alternatives per Russian voters are: Communists and LDPR (nationalists). The entire liberal alternative is about powerful enough (if they concentrated all their votes on Moscow alone) to win a couple of seats in the city government.

Politicians next:

And once again, there is no sight of liberal alternatives anywhere in the positive trust territory. And, incidentally, none were present even before the Crimea and during the 'softer' power periods of the Kremlin rule. The entire political spectrum besides Vladimir Putin, even if it were to include Putin's closest allies, does not reach 34% of the voters in terms of trust.

Which brings us back to the first two facts: Russian voters have access to alternatives (even if imperfect, but certainly much wider than their access to the same during the Soviet era); no they do not support any of these alternatives. Firstly, as Hertzen once said: "Who is to blame?" and lastly. as Lenin put it: "What is to be done?"

Just some food for thought...
 
 #30
Moscow Times
Apri 1, 2015
Kudrin to Putin: Use Your Popularity to Save Russia's Economy

President Vladimir Putin should use the sky-high rating he has earned on the back of the Ukraine crisis to reform the economy, former Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin was quoted as saying Tuesday.

"Global leaders' high ratings are a basis for trust and to conduct reforms," Kudrin said, news agency RBC reported.

"If this rating is not used to push through reforms it will be just a rating for the sake of a rating," he said at a round table discussion devoted to Putin's 15 years as Russia's top politician since his first presidential election victory in 2000.

Putin's approval ratings spiked to over 80 percent last year on a wave of patriotic fervor after Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine.

His high approval rating has held even as Western sanctions prompted by Russia's actions in Ukraine combined with a fall in the price of oil to shatter Russian economic growth.

Growth has slowed since 2013 as the effect of the 2000s oil price boom petered out and structural problems hampered the emergence of other economic drivers. Analysts expect Russia's economy to contract by up to 5 percent this year.
 
 #31
Russia's non-systemic opposition to field single list of candidates in 2016 polls

MOSCOW, April 1. /TASS/. Russia's opposition has agreed to field candidates on a single list in 2016 elections to the lower house of parliament, the State Duma, former MP Gennady Gudkov said on Wednesday.

The meeting of the opposition leaders that approved the decision on coordinating actions ended at night.

"The discussion focused on fielding a single list in the elections to the State Duma in 2016. There is a preliminary agreement," Gudkov said without detailing the particular party. "This is still premature," the politician explained.

The ex-lawmaker said the meeting was attended by Alexey Navalny of the unregistered Party of Progress, Mikhail Kasyanov of the RPR-Parnas party, lawmaker Dmitry Gudkov, former economy minister in Yegor Gaidar's government Andrey Nechayev, former co-chairman of RPR-Parnas Vladimir Ryzhkov and the leader of the Democratic Choice, Vladimir Milov.

"We have agreed to coordinate our actions and this meeting will be held on a regular basis and I hope that at least once in a month and also [more often] if needed," Gudkov said.

"This is not a closed club, and we hope that other opposition forces will join us, including the Yabloko party, and they are still thinking about this," the politician said.
 
 #32
TASS
Economic protests in Russia quite likely but not political ones - think tank

Moscow, 31 March: A member of the Civil Initiatives Committee and president of the New Economic Growth partnership Mikhail Dmitriyev forecasts a high probability of economic protests in Russia, while political protests, in the expert's opinion, are unlikely. This conclusion is contained in the committee's report, which Dmitriyev presented today.

"In our view, protests of this kind (as in 2011-2012) are not likely in the foreseeable future. Economic protests, on the other hand, are," he said.

The report presents two scenarios of development of public sentiments depending on whether the international conflict connected with the events in Ukraine continues or eases.

Thus in the event of the "easing of international tension", the committee believes, the development which was characteristic of Russian society in early 2010s will begin. In Dmitriyev's words, "this scenario would increase the likelihood that the economic crisis would be overcome quickly, and people's attention would switch to problems of the country's development". The expert believes that "much will depend on whether the authorities manage to update the agenda for the development of the country". "In 2013, the authorities failed in this, and the mood of the population was pessimistic," Dmitriyev said.

The description of the second scenario notes, among other things, that continuing tensions around Ukraine would contribute to a difficult economic situation in the Russian Federation, but these problems would be smoothed by intense patriotic sentiments in society, and this would keep the authorities' rating high. Nonetheless, in the medium term, the situation could change "under the pressure of the economic crisis and the general psychological fatigue from conflicts and the lack of potential for socio-economic development," notes the Civil Initiatives Committee, which is headed by former Russian Finance Minister Aleksey Kudrin. "The medium-term risks should not be underestimated," Dmitriyev warned.

He reiterated that, "since neither scenario provides for a quick emergence from the crisis, the likelihood of economic protests is quite high in both the first and the second scenario".
 
 #33
Levada.ru
March 31, 2015
Growing number of Russians say Stalin's policies "justified" by "great results"

There has been a significant increase in the number of Russians who think that "the great results achieved" during the rule of "great leader" Stalin "justified" his policies, a public opinion poll suggests.

A survey conducted by the leading independent Russian polling organization Levada Centre in March 2015 found that 45 per cent of Russians either "definitely" (7 per cent) or "to an extent" (38 per cent) believe that "the great goals and results achieved" during Stalin's rule "justified the sacrifices made by the Soviet people". These figures represent a sharp rise on findings of 2012, the year of Putin's re-election as president, when the corresponding figures were 4 per cent and 21 per cent. The number of those who thought "nothing" could justify these "sacrifices" stood at 41 per cent, down from between 58 per cent and 61 per cent between 2008 and 2012.

There has also been a marked increase in the number of those who view Stalin as a "great leader and teacher", and a decline in the number of those who think of him as a "state criminal".

Twenty-four per cent of Russians said that "for them personally" the death of Stalin was "the loss of a great leader and teacher", up from 18 per cent in February 2013 and 10 per cent in February 2010. Just 46 per cent, around the same number as in February 2010 (47 per cent), but down from 55 per cent in February 2013, said his death "stopped terror and mass persecution" and saw "millions of innocent people released from prisons".

As many as 57 per cent said either that they would "completely disagree" (17 per cent) or would "tend to disagree" (40 per cent) with a claim that Stalin was a "state criminal". The corresponding figures for February 2010 were 13 per cent and 37 per cent. Just 9 per cent would "completely agree" with that statement and 16 per cent would "tend to agree" with it. (11 per cent and 21 per cent in February 2010)

Thirty-nine per cent said their "attitude" towards Stalin was one of "admiration" (2 per cent), "respect" (30 per cent) and "sympathy" (7 per cent), and only 20 per cent said their attitude towards him was one of "fear" (6 per cent), "dislike" (9 per cent) and "hatred" (5 per cent). Thirty per cent said they were "indifferent" towards him.

Finally, 37 per cent, up from 24 per cent in March 2010 and 29 per cent in January 2005, said either that they would "fully" welcome or "most probably" welcome the erection of a monument to Stalin on the 70th anniversary of the victory in the war against Nazi Germany.

The Levada Centre report, in Russian, is available at http://www.levada.ru/31-03-2015/vospriyatie-stalina-i-ego-roli-v-istorii-strany.

The head of Memorial, one of Russia's leading rights groups, said the results of the survey represented a "very worrying signal", Interfax news agency reported. It quoted Arseniy Roginskiy as saying that the findings of the poll reflected Russians' attitude towards "the relationships between the state and person". "Stalin is seen as a symbol of a strong and powerful state. That Stalin and all of his policy were anti-human remains secondary for people," he said.
 
 #34
www.rt.com
March 31, 2015
Activists decry Russians' increasing sympathy for Stalin

The head of the Russian NGO that specializes in the investigation of Stalinist purges has voiced concern over the growing popularity of the late Soviet dictator, as demonstrated by public opinion polls.

"This is a very troubling signal. And it is a testimony not even of the citizens' attitude to Stalin, but rather of the relations between the state and a person. Stalin is perceived as a symbol of a powerful and potent state. The fact that Stalin and his policies were inhumane becomes of secondary importance," the head of Memorial, Arseny Roginsky, said in comments to Interfax.

The activist added that he saw this as a very dangerous tendency.

Roginsky's March statement was drawn by the release of the latest research on the attitude to Stalin in the Russian community, conducted by the independent pollster Levada Center in late March this year. According to the survey, the share of those who confessed their respect to Stalin increased from 23 percent in 2010 to 30 percent this year. The number of those who described their attitude as "fascination" and "sympathy" remained unchanged at 2 and 7 percent respectively.

When pollsters asked the public if they would like a monument to Joseph Stalin to be erected in Russia for the 70th anniversary of the victory in WWII, 37 percent said they had a positive attitude to the idea (compared to 24 percent in 2010)and 27 percent said they did not like it (36 percent in 2010).

In late February this year, Memorial criticized a proposal to erect a monument to Stalin in Moscow and to rename the city of Volgograd as Stalingrad.

"No city can be named after a man who has been an organizer, initiator and perpetrator of a mass terror that exterminated Russian peasants in the years of collectivization, and by whose orders over 700,000 people were executed in 1937 and 1938 alone," Roginsky said back then. "In other words, we cannot name a city after a criminal."

The controversy surrounding Stalin's name and his role in Russian history is a popular topic and has been used by various political forces in Russia in recent years. In 2013, leftist parties proposed renaming the city of Volgograd back to Stalingrad, claiming that this was the name used by the city's defenders during the war and that Stalingrad is better-known around the world.

However, both the general public and the Russian officials rejected the idea. Polls showed that 60 percent of Russians were against the renaming. President Putin's press secretary, Dmitry Peskov, said in an interview that Kremlin officials had never considered renaming Volgograd to Stalingrad and did not plan to put this issue on the agenda in the future.
 
 #35
Main suspect in Nemtsov murder withdraws confession, says he has alibi

MOSCOW, April 1. /TASS/. Zaur Dadayev, the main suspect in the murder case of Russian politician Boris Nemtsov, pleaded not guilty at the Moscow City Court on Wednesday, a TASS correspondent has reported.

Investigator Anton Migunov earlier said that Dadayev had given confessionary evidence many times that confirmed his guilt and complicity of other accomplices in the murder.
"My testimony was given under pressure and under orders. There are no witnesses and I have an alibi as during the murder I was at home," Dadayev said.

Dadayev claimed he was kidnapped on March 5 in Magas, the capital of Russia's Republic of Ingushetia, and was taken to the Investigative Committee's building in Moscow on March 7.
"I was abducted by unknown people and under the threat of my killing and the killing of my friend I gave testimony under orders," Dadayev said.

The investigator said Dadayev's testimony is not the only evidence as Russia's law enforcement bodies have the other proof that cannot be disclosed on grounds of secrecy.
"The investigation into the criminal case is ongoing, investigative actions are carried out extensively including those aimed at finding the possible contractor of the murder," the investigator said.

The Moscow City Court ruled on Wednesday that the arrest of three suspects in the murder case of Russian politician Boris Nemtsov is unlawful and sent the issue for revision to the Basmanny Court of Moscow, a TASS correspondent has reported from the court.

Until the next court session, the three out of a total of five suspects in the case - Tamerlan Eskerkhanov, Khamzat Bakhayev and Shadid Gubashev - are to be kept in custody.

The Basmanny Court is due to review the motion of the investigators until April 8. "The exact date will be clear in the near future when the materials return from the appeals instance of the Moscow City Court," the court's press secretary Anna Fadeyeva said.

On March 8, Moscow's Basmanny court authorized the arrest of five people: Zaur Dadayev, Anzor and Shadid Gubashev, Khamzat Bakhayev and Tamerlan Eskerkhanov.

The Moscow City Court said the decision on the arrest of the suspects was taken by the court during one session and not separately. Such an order of choosing a restriction measure violated the rights of the parties in the case, the judge said on Wednesday.

All the five suspects have been charged with murder committed by a group of persons on previous concert for self-interested aims or on contract; as well as illegal acquisition and storage of weapons. If convicted, the suspects may face up to 20 years in jail or even life sentence.

Nemtsov, co-chair of RPR-Parnas and deputy of the Yaroslavl regional duma, was killed in downtown Moscow late on February 27. Investigators believe that Zaur Dadayev was the killer of the politician, while Anzor and Shadid Gubashev, Khamzat Bakhayev and Tamerlan Eskerkhanov were the accomplices.
 
 #36
Nemtsov murder suspect pleads guilty, testifies against other defendants

MOSCOW, April 1 (RAPSI) - Zaur Dadayev has incriminated himself and implicated the other suspects in the murder of opposition politician Boris Nemtsov in late February, an Investigative Committee representative said  on Wednesday at a hearing on a complaint against the arrest of one of the suspects, Khamzat Bakhayev,  in the Moscow City Court.

"Bakhayev's involvement in the crime has been reaffirmed by Zaur Dadayev's testimony," the investigator said.

The Investigative Committee has appealed to the court to not release Bakhayev, whose attorneys argue that he has health problems and is the father of underage children.Moreover, more severe charges have been brought against Bakhayev, who was initially charged under Part 2 of Article 222 (illegal weapons possession, storage and sale), which stipulates penalties of up to six years in prison. Crimes under Part 3 of the same article (the above crimes committed by an organized group) are punishable with up to eight.

Bakhayev has also been charged under Article 105 (murder by contract) and hence could be sentenced to life imprisonment.However, the Moscow City Court overturned a lower court's ruling to detain Bakhayev.  He will remain in jail until April 7.  In this period, the Basmanny District court must reargue the issue.

A decision to detain another suspect, Shadid Gubashev, will be reconsidered too.

Nemtsov, co-chair of the Republican Party of Russia-People's Freedom Party (RPR-PARNAS) and former first deputy prime minister in the Yeltsin government, was fatally shot as he walked home with a girlfriend in central Moscow late on the night of February 27.

He joined the opposition in the 2000s.

Investigators are considering several motives for Nemtsov's murder, including contract killing.

They have abandoned their initial theory, according to which Nemtsov was murdered for his statements about the shooting at the Paris office of the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo. It turned out that none of the suspects had met the opposition leader personally, most of them did not know anything about him, and, as their relatives said, none of them were devout believers.

Five men were arrested on suspicion of killing Nemtsov: Zaur Dadayev, Anzor Gubashev, Shadid Gubashev, Khamzat Bakhayev and Tamerlan Eskerkhanov.
 
 #37
Witness to Nemtsov murder to be summoned for police lineup - newspaper

MOSCOW. Apr 1 (Interfax) - Detectives investigating the murder of politician Boris Nemtsov intend to summon a main witness to his murder, Nemtsov's Ukrainian girlfriend Hanna Durytska, for a police lineup, the newspaper Izvestia wrote on Wednesday.

"Durytska made the acquaintance of Nemtsov three years ago and they stayed together almost all the time in the recent period, so she might remember the killer or people who appeared near him even sporadically, for instance, in a cafe or near his house. So, she is planned to participate in a police lineup: all the arrested men will be shown to her and she may remember or identify some of them," a source in the law enforcement authorities told the newspaper.

It is still unknown where the procedure may be arranged, either in Moscow or in Kyiv. Durytska returned to Ukraine with her lawyer and promised to be cooperative. Yet she told the local police already on March 5 that she was receiving threats from unknown persons. Ukrainian Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin ordered security services to tighten protection of the young woman.

"Indeed, the detectives are supposed to arrange a police line procedure for the main witness. The detectives can summon the witness to Moscow or visit a foreign country. Such practices are quite frequent. For instance, detectives investigating the murder of Anna Politkovskaya visited other countries to question witnesses. As a rule, foreign citizens are interviewed on the premises of a Russian embassy," lawyer Alexei Mikhalchik told Izvestia.

There may be another way to hold investigative procedures if Durytska refuses to appear in Moscow for a police lineup.

"Russia and Ukraine still have a legal assistance agreement. The Russian Prosecutor General's Office may request Ukrainian colleagues for help. In that case, a local detective may interview the witness or perform the procedure in absentia. Russian detectives may be present there too," Mikhalchik said.

The lawyer of the Nemtsov family and Durytska, Vadim Prokhorov, declined to disclose details of the upcoming lineup procedure. He said he had signed a non-disclosure agreement.

The legal defense of the suspects said their clients were not afraid to meet Durytska because they were not involved in the crime.

"Zaur Dadyev is ready to face Durytska and he is not afraid of the police lineup because he has no relation to the murder of Nemtsov," Dadayev's lawyer Ivan Gerasimov told Izvestia.

In his words, the lineup must be held in Moscow. If the detectives use photographs, there may be mistakes and results of the procedure may be challenged.

The lawyer of another suspect, Shadid Gubashev, has a similar opinion.

"I think that not only my client but also all the others are not afraid of the lineup because there is no one to identify - they are not involved in that murder," lawyer Ilya Trofimov told the newspaper.
 
 
#38
Moskovskiy Komsomolets
March 30, 2015
Journalist: Moscow authorities should let "Nemtsov Bridge" memorial stay
Yuliya Kalinina, 'Nemtsov Bridge' will have to be closed for repairs

Photograph by Gennadiy Cherkasov. White lettering on blue sign reads "Nemtsov Bridge." Sign behind the flowers reads "I am not afraid."

On the night of 27-28 March all flowers and photographs disappeared from the scene of Boris Nemtsov's death. Eyewitnesses report that the clearing operation was carried out by "people dressed in black." Over the following two days it has not actually become completely clear who they were. And on Saturday [28 March] admirers had already restored the actual improvised memorial. Representatives of the capital's municipal services have said that they are maintaining cleanliness and order on the bridge, but that merely means removing withered flowers. All the rest is being kept intact.

The peaceful co-existence of the opposition and the regime moves to a stage involving force when it becomes linked to a geographical area - a point on the ground invested with symbolic meaning.

That could be a building, like the White House in 1991. Or a square, like the Maydan, Tahrir, or Tian'an Men. Or even a monument, like the monument to Abay Kunanbayev at Chistyye Prudy, around which the opposition tried to organize the "Occupy Abay" movement in 2012.

The appearance of such a spot is to the opposition's advantage and if there is an opportunity for creating it, the opposition tries not to let the chance slip.

The oppositionists occupy the spot and the authorities clear it. Passions become heated over the spot. It becomes a place that attracts people. Ideologically driven people go there, as do people without an ideology, because they have nothing to do, but there is some "action" here.

As a result an unhealthy hotbed of dissatisfaction is concentrated at this spot and the authorities are obliged to eliminate it.

However, eliminating it is fraught with the danger of victims if the unhealthiness has already taken root. And victims are precisely what the opposition needs. For instance, the Euro-Maydan grew into an armed uprising following the forcible dispersal of peaceful protesters, when hundreds of people were injured. In China, it is true, it was all the other way around, with the opposition being crushed with tanks. But that is a nightmare too and, of course, any regime will seek to prevent the situation getting to that point. So it is very important for the regime not to allow the emergence of physical "confrontation points".

By ordering the flowers and candles to be removed on Friday night from the place where Nemtsov died on Bolshoy Moskvoretskiy Bridge, that is precisely what the authorities were seeking to do.

But the result was the opposite. The dissidents immediately brought new flowers and candles - and within a few hours the bridge looked just the same as it had the previous day.

We can easily predict how events will develop if the clearing of the bridge continues.

People will start to bring flowers and candles there at three times the rate, they will leave sentries there and start to post photographs of "the memorial's destroyers" on the Internet, and very soon the Bolshoy Moskvoretskiy Bridge will turn into the viable embryo of a full-scale confrontation point where malcontents will gather, mingle, and hang out. Directly opposite the Kremlin, which is very convenient.

The measures the authorities will take to halt this development of events are also easy to predict.

There is a 90 per cent likelihood that the Bolshoy Moskvoretskiy Bridge will soon be closed for repair - by analogy with Triumfalnaya Square, which was closed for repair in order to stop rallies in defence of the 31st article of the Constitution.

And there is a 10 per cent change the authorities will choose a different route - less expensive and more humane to the Muscovites: They will leave the "Nemtsov memorial" in peace. They will not remove it or clear it, and then the embers smoldering there at present will gradually die out, as a fire dies out when it is deprived of oxygen.

Confrontation points become permanent where confrontation between the authorities and the opposition is graphic and visible.

Until the clearing began on the Bolshoy Moskvoretskiy Bridge, you could not sense confrontation of this kind. You could feel grief, sorrow, and dissatisfaction. But an obvious whiff of what the authorities fear appeared only after the "people with black sacks" brought ideal order to the bridge on Friday night.

Because order is all very well. But it should not always be introduced by force.
 
 #39
www.rt.com
March 31, 2015
Worst over for Russian economy, time to talk success - economists
[Chart here http://rt.com/business/245237-russia-economy-government-success/

Economists in Russia and the US agree the worst is over for Russian economy, with Bloomberg changing its tone praising it as an 'underrated land of opportunity'. Experts agree President Putin's economic team managed to turn around a pressing environment.

Russia's economy is recovering from last year's panic following the slump in oil prices, according to experts.

With the Russian Central Bank's currency reserves increasing last week for the first time since July, and all of the major economic indicators improving, Western governments should be convinced that economic sanctions have no discernible effect, a Bloomberg View contributor, Leonid Bershidsky said in his article published on March 27.

The managers of the Russian economy, especially at the Central Bank and the Finance Ministry managed to keep Russia's economy open in a difficult environment, he said.

"We see that the Government has strongly opposed the imposition of any restrictions on the free movement of capital, thus reaffirming the commitment to the course of economic openness," Aleksandr Prosviryakov, Treasuries & Commodities Manager at PWC, told RT.

Chief economist at BCS Financial Group, Vladimir Tikhomirov agreed, telling RT by phone that the government managed to keep the economy going despite all the risks, including currency risk.

Russia held $131.8 billion of US debt in 2014, according to Bloomberg. While reserves as a whole dropped 23.9 percent in 2014, the holdings of US debt fell 37.6 percent, to $82.2 billion, as Russia started cutting its holdings of the US currency amid the sanctions standoff.

The Russian ruble has been performing well lately; it gained 1.5 percent against the dollar last week in its best winning streak since mid-2013. Moreover, oil has played a much less prominent role in the ruble's exchange rate in the first three months of 2015. Last year the ruble closely mirrored every action of oil prices - with the oil benchmark losing 50 percent of its value in the last 6 months of 2014, the ruble lost about 44 percent. Now the ruble is doing better than Brent crude.

The Central Bank decided to start easing its benchmark interest rate, cutting the rate from 17 percent to 14 percent. This helped Russia to become an attractive carry trade destination, Bloomberg economists suggest.

Russia is now one of the most attractive countries in terms of risk/return ratio, Prosviryakov said, adding that there was a significant inflow of foreign investment to the Russian market in the last few weeks. He believes the trend will continue.

Global investors also appear to be optimistic about the future of Russian corporations as the country's economic performance provides evidence to recovery. Around 78 percent of enterprises represented in the MICEX index showed a greater increase in sales than their counterparts around the world.

The growth of quotations for the main Russian financial assets suggests that interest towards Russia is gaining momentum, including from international investors, according to Prosviryakov.

Meanwhile, the Russian government's forecasts point to a full-year contraction in gross domestic product of about 3 percent in 2015. Bloomberg economists expect a 4 percent drop, while Goldman Sachs predicts a decline of 2.7 percent. The Russian economy will shrink 3-4 percent according to Vladimir Tikhomirov's forecasts.

Sanctions and restrictions

Russia remains a major market economy that cannot be "derailed by a few timid restrictions," the Bloomberg analyst wrote in his article, adding that Russia has been named one of the top markets for equity performance this year, along with the US, China and India.

Russian economists say Western sanctions had a double effect on the country's economy. Restrictions imposed by some trading partners, on the one hand, hampered the business relationship between the companies in these countries with their Russian counterparts, but on the other hand, they have opened up new opportunities for friendly companies, Prosviryakov told RT. Meanwhile, Tikhomirov suggests that Russia's food embargo also caused problems for the economy with the following wave of inflation.

New business opportunities

Russia has a lot of new business opportunities with different countries that are now mostly coming from Asia. Moscow and Beijing plan to extend their strategic partnership in finance, aviation and space, as well as improve trade and economic cooperation. The two countries decided to switch to local currencies in trading settlements and also to create a joint rating agency. Russia and China have been boosting cooperation in various fields, including the energy sector in which the countries signed a huge $400 billion gas deal.

Moscow is also looking forward to trade in national currencies with Turkey. The countries are working on completion of the Turkish Stream pipeline which is to deliver 15.75 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas to Turkey, and another potential 47 bcm to Europe via Greece.

Next week Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras is visiting Moscow to hold talks as Russia and Greece want to boost cooperation and strengthen ties.
 
 
#40
Moscow Times
April 1, 2016
Only 2% of Russians Concerned Over Ruble's Collapse - Poll

Only 2 percent of Russians count the ruble's collapse among the most important issues facing their country, according to a recent survey by state pollster VTsIOM.

When asked the question "Which problems do you believe are the most important for the country as a whole?" 21 percent of respondents chose "the economy," 17 percent chose "high inflation," and 13 percent chose "external politics."

The ruble tied with "roads" and lost out to "high utilities fees," which upset 3 percent of respondents.

The ruble has fallen around 40 percent to the U.S. dollar and over 20 percent to the euro since the start of last year, thanks to a collapse in global oil prices and Western sanctions over Moscow's role in the Ukraine crisis. The ruble's slump has also caused a rise in the cost of imports that has helped boost inflation to almost 17 percent in March.  

VTsIOM's survey polled 1,600 people in 46 Russian regions between March 21 and March 22. The margin of error was 3.5 percent.
 
 #41
TASS
March 31, 2015
Russia's economy will stagnate in coming 5 years - ex-minister

The Russia's economy will stagnate in the coming 5 years, head of the Civil Initiatives Committee and ex-finance minister Alexey Kudrin said on Tuesday.

"The average forecast is that economic stagnation will follow the recession because no steps were made earlier for structural reforms," Kudrin said. "The economy that will stagnate during the coming five years at the least is the most serious challenge for the president. Even if reforms are initiated, they will not bear fruit in 1-2 years," the expert added.

The real income of the population will drop in Russia in 2015 for the first time in 15 years. "The situation is unique, no decline in real incomes of the population occurred in 15 years," Kudrin said.

The former official said he does not share the view of the Finance Ministry that the national economy has begun to recover.

"It is difficult for me to estimate whether we have passed the peak of the crisis or not. But I would say that the second quarter of 2015 will be very difficult", Kudrin said.

The expert added that the second quarter of the year will be as difficult as the first one and by the end of the year the economy decline will be about 4%.

Earlier, Finance Minister Anton Siluanov said that the peak of the crisis was behind and the recovery had begun. According to the minister, the ruble has been strengthening and has become one of the strong currencies since the beginning of the year.
 
 #42
Business New Europe
www.bne.eu
April 1, 2015
CONFERENCE CALL: Russia improves - but don't get too carried away yet
Marcus Booth in London

Russia has experienced a "significant rally" in recent weeks, amid "wide acknowledgement" that the country has "significant financial cushions and liquidity buffers," Andreas Kolbe of Barclays told attendees at the "EMTA Special Seminar "Russia/Ukraine: An Update" on March 26.

At the panel session, hosted by the Emerging Markets Trade Association and law firm Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, a range of experts noted the improving market conditions in Russia, but also highlighted worries over the likelihood of sanctions continuing against Moscow and the risks for the reform effort in Ukraine.

Stanislav Gelfer, of BlueBay Asset Management, summed up Russia's current macroeconomic problem as one of flows rather than stocks. "The balance sheet of the country was strong a year ago, was strong three months ago and is still strong now, especially given the ability of policymakers to engineer their way into a flexible currency. This has helped [the authorities] to preserve a lot of that currency strength," he argued.

Gelfer added that: "when we look at Russia right now we are focusing on the balance of payment flows, on the budgetary flows, on GDP and on inflation. These indicators, to us, are the most likely ones to deteriorate or underperform."

Kaan Nazli, of Neuberger Berman, argued that Russian President Vladimir Putin understands these intricacies and that, "in the long run, Russian thinking is that they can ride it out, while taking steps that don't jeopardise other geopolitical aims."

Anna Shamina, of J.P. Morgan's Emerging Market Fixed Income division, also argued that the current outlook for Russia is improving: "As an oil dependent sovereign with a flexible ruble, Russia, politics aside for a second, actually looks pretty good... the flexible ruble is definitely a big benefit."

Shamina admitted, though, that any optimism needs to be checked: "I don't think things can all of a sudden get better. We all know that after a quiet or semi-quiet period, there can be escalations. I think this year [Russia] will be in and out of escalation situations."

Given the well-documented link between oil and the ruble, escalations are often linked to the volatility of the commodity, although as Nazli pointed out: "In the last few months we can see that oil prices and the Russian ruble have begun to decouple a bit from each other."

But Shamina speculated that any deviation would only be slight. "Do I believe there is going to be a big diversification away from oil or a quick diversification away from oil? No. But even if there is going to be a small amount, then it is quite good progress."

Sanctions talk

Western sanctions on Moscow were also prominent throughout the debate. When asked, Gelfer remarked that, "in terms of asset price reaction, the threat from further sanctions may be actually diminishing." However, he admitted that a threat to the banking sector could be completely different. "The sheer fact, for example, that another big bank can be taken out of the system, would be very negative."

"This is not necessarily because Russians could not come up with a way to go round [the legislation]," claimed Gelfer. "It is the threat of more sanctions for the rest of the system that is more damaging."

Jamie Boucher, of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, believed that this threat could remain for some time. "I think that, both on the EU side and the US side the officials have laid down the marker that nothing is getting rolled back till all of the commitments are reached. In the US, at least, there is enormous political pressure," he noted.

"In this day and age, sanctions are the tool of choice to avoid sending troops... I do think that sanctions will be increased, as the other alternatives have such significant consequences," Boucher added.

Signs of hope for Ukraine

Although a large part of the panel session centred on Russia, there was some discussion on recent events in Ukraine and the positive sentiment generated by the recent second International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme for the Eastern European nation.

Detailing that the second IMF programme is definitely an improvement, Gelfer said that: "The democratic side of government is more impressive than six months ago, they have finally brought in new people, professional people, both in central banking and finance. There is also, very importantly, change in the judicial scene and we are already seeing some results."

Shamina agreed that the most recent programme was an improvement: "I think that the first IMF programme was probably overly optimistic and the second IMF programme is a bit more realistic, but I still think that it assumes that a lot of things are going to be the right way."

Even with these improvements, however, Nazli still admits that he, "cannot see Ukraine reforming and becoming part of the EU as part of an acceptable scenario for Russia."

Shamina was also sceptical about any full integration into Europe: "I think the Ukrainian geographical position will always put it in a very difficult situation." However, looking slightly longer term, Gelfer confessed that he thinks Russia cannot win against the EU and US and, "Ukraine may edge towards the European way."

It must be stressed though, that Ukraine still has a long way to go before planned reforms materialize into positive change. As Shamina admitted, even when questioned about how much cushion is built into the IMF programme, for when things to go wrong, the only answer the government could provide was that, "failure is not an option."
 
 
#43
World Bank sees protracted recession in Russia
April 1, 2015

MOSCOW (Reuters) - Russia faces a protracted recession as the impact of Western sanctions lingers and oil prices stay low, the World Bank said in a report published on Wednesday.

In its baseline scenario, the bank expected Russia's gross domestic product to contract by 3.8 percent in 2015 and a further 0.3 percent in 2016, describing medium-term growth prospects as dim.

The World Bank's lead economist for Russia, Birgit Hansl, said "adjustment to the new oil price reality and the sanctions environment" was a key policy challenge.

"If we look more into the medium term, the main challenge for Russia is the continued dearth in investment," she said, presenting the report.

The bank's latest forecasts are more pessimistic than those made in December, when it expected the economy to shrink by 0.7 percent this year and grow by 0.3 percent in 2016.

The new baseline forecasts assume that the oil price will recover only marginally over the next two years, averaging $53 per barrel in 2015 and $57 per barrel in 2016, reflecting ample global supplies and moderate demand.

Under a more optimistic scenario, with oil averaging $65.5 per barrel in 2015 and $68.7 per barrel in 2016, the economy would contract by 2.9 percent this year and grow by only 0.1 percent in 2016, the World Bank said.

Its latest forecasts assume that sanctions imposed against Russia because of its role in the Ukraine conflict would stay in place in 2015 and 2016.

The sanctions could have damaging long-term consequences that may last even after the sanctions are lifted, the bank said, citing the case of South Africa where sanctions imposed in the 1980s caused a major slump in investment.

In Russia's case, sanctions were likely to exacerbate an existing investment shortage.

"Low investment demand hints at the deeper structural problems of the Russian economy and has already initiated a new era of potentially small growth," the report said.

The bank also warned that a projected 3.8 percent budget deficit this year could "severely deplete" the budget's Reserve Fund, currently equal to around 4.7 percent of GDP.

Hansl said, however: "One could argue that it is prudent to use fiscal buffers at these times as a counter-cyclical measure."

The Bank also foresaw a $122 billion capital and financial account deficit this year, reflecting continuing heavy capital outflows, only partially covered by a $74 billion current account surplus.
 
 #44
AFP
April 1, 2015
Climate change: Russia sketches emissions cut of up to 30%

Paris: Russia, moving ahead of a deadline for submitting pledges to tackle climate change has said it could cut its greenhouse-gas emissions by up to 30 per cent compared to 1990 levels, subject to conditions.

In a roster of commitments on the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) website, Russia yesterday announced that "limiting anthropogenic [man-made] greenhouse gases in Russia to 70-75 per cent of 1990 levels by the year 2030 might be a long-term indicator."

But, it said, this was "subject to the maximum possible account" of including forests - deemed absorbers of carbon gases - in the reduction.

And, it cautioned, Russia's "final decision" on the commitment will depend on the outcome of the negotiating process and on the commitments by "major emitters" of greenhouse gases.

March 31 was a rough deadline for the 195 countries in the UNFCCC process to submit so-called "intended nationally determined contributions" (INDCs).

These are the heart of an intended pact to tackle greenhouse gases that would be sealed in Paris in December and take effect from 2020.

Russia is the fifth biggest emitter of greenhouse gases in the world, after China, the United States, the European Union (EU) and India, according to the US thinktank the World Resources Institute (WRI).

The reference to forests is a highly contentious part of the climate negotiation process.

Trees are so-called "carbon sinks," meaning that they absorb carbon dioxide (CO2) from the atmosphere under the natural process of photosynthesis.

As a result, the argument is that forests should be taken into account, and set against national commitments to reduce carbon emissions.

The issue was a toxic one when it came to putting together the rulebook of the UNFCCC's Kyoto Protocol in 2001, with Russia taking a prominent role in demanding concessions.

Green groups argue that forests are a false way to meet an emissions target, and that "sinks" are usually invoked to avoid the cost of switching to cleaner energy resources or reducing real carbon pollution.
 
 #45
American farmer among the winners in sanctions-hit Russia
March 31, 2015
By JAMES ELLINGWORTH

MOSCOW (AP) - Kansas-born farmer Justus Walker is prospering in Russia - one year after the U.S. and European Union began imposing sanctions against his adopted country over its aggression in Ukraine.

Walker, sporting a bushy beard reminiscent of a Russian peasant from past centuries, uses his Siberian dairy smallholding to support his missionary work.

He shot to fame in August, shortly after the Russian government banned Western food imports in retaliation for the sanctions.

The farmer told Russian TV that said his cheese had been struggling to compete with Italian mozzarella until the ban kicked in. He chortled as he added: "But now your Italian cheese won't be there!"

The clip went viral across Russia, turning the American farmer into an Internet meme, even though he opposes sanctions and says his remarks were taken out of context. His sales soared and there was even a boom in Walker-themed souvenirs.

"It's been nothing I could ever have thought of in my wildest dreams," he told The Associated Press by telephone.

Here is a look at Russia one year after the Western sanctions kicked in hours before Russia's March annexation of Crimea.

SANCTIONS AND INSTABILITY

Russia's "counter-sanctions" ban on food imports has forced up prices within Russia - meaning Walker earns more for his product. But he warns that it has also made the market unstable.

"I think the sanctions do more harm to the market than good because they pervert the cost mechanism," he said. "We have no idea what our product is supposed to cost anymore."

"You go to one place and it says 2,000 rubles ($35) a kilo, you go to another place and it says 900 rubles a kilo. Before it was pretty understandable, you were somewhere right around 750."

Sanctions have also thrown international projects into turmoil.

One of the main state-owned companies to be targeted by punitive measures is oil producer Rosneft. It had to postpone plans to drill in the Arctic with U.S. firm ExxonMobil. At the same time, sanctions have largely cut off state firms from international lending, making refinancing difficult, costly and a burden on the government.

However, Evgeny Gavrilenkov, chief economist at state-owned Sberbank, Russia's largest lender, argued that sanctions have inadvertently helped Russia's main oil and financial companies by forcing them to abandon riskier projects before the oil price fell.

"I think Russia should be very grateful for sanctions which were imposed a year ago," he said. "I can imagine easily that without sanctions, oil and gas companies could have started draining the North Pole and whatever in the Arctic, looking for energy which looked OK with $100, $110 oil, but if $40, $50, whatever, will be the new equilibrium, it's questionable."

POLITICAL IMPACT

U.S. and EU sanctions were meant to force Russia to back down in the Ukraine crisis - first over Crimea, then over its support for separatist rebels in eastern Ukraine.

That has not happened.

"The sanctions did not produce a change in Putin's foreign policy," said Brookings Institute fellow Lilia Shevtsova, although she added that the threat of further sanctions may have prevented open Russian military intervention in Ukraine.

Sanctions aimed at individuals failed to change Kremlin behavior and the broader economic punishment introduced later is mostly hurting ordinary people this year, according to Evgeny Gontmakher, an economics professor and former deputy minister of social affairs.

Government estimates say inflation could hit 12 percent this year, hurting workers whose jobs are already under pressure.

"If the sanctions continue, they mostly hit the ordinary population, not the elite," he said. "Inflation is a tax on the poor, most of all."

He said the oligarchs have not yet become restive.

"Among the business elite, there's a certain discontent, because the channels for economic cooperation with the West are blocked now, that's clear. But there's absolutely no sign yet of any open discontent or pressure on the president."

Sanctions are routinely cited in state media as the cause of most current economic problems. These include woes more properly blamed on over-dependence on oil revenue, Gontmakher said.

The government has managed "to shift the responsibility for it onto the West, and not our own systems and institutions," he said. "In that sense, the initiators of the sanctions have really lost out."

Despite a year of sanctions, President Vladimir Putin's approval rating has hovered well over 80 percent in recent months.

"Sanctions without popular dissent will hardly work" in weakening the government, said Shevtsova.

NEW PARTNERS

While the Ukraine crisis has taken the U.S. government's attention away from its "pivot to Asia" strategy, it has had the opposite effect in Russia, forcing the government to seek new partnerships.

The centerpiece is a 30-year, $400 billion gas deal with China signed in May, accompanied by various other deals with Asian and Middle Eastern nations.

"There is a lot of evidence which confirms that Russian authorities started to look for other partners - in Egypt, in India, in Indonesia, in China and in Turkey," said Yuri Zaitsev, an analyst at the Gaidar Institute in Moscow.

However, he warned that the new deals, such as a major energy deal with China, rarely fit the Russian government's stated goal of diversifying its economy away from oil and gas.

"It is all about natural resources," Zaitsev said. "It is not the high-technology sector, unfortunately, it is not the financial sector ... because these sectors require extra funding, extra investments."
 
 #46
Top managers of Russian state-owned companies won't reveal income publicly

MOSCOW, March 31 (RAPSI) - Top managers of Russian companies partially owned by the government won't have to disclose their income publicly, Kommersant newspaper reported on Tuesday, citing a government decree.

The government proposed amending legislation to require that income declarations be publicly submitted by top managers of non-profit and publicly funded organizations, state corporations and companies that are wholly owned by the government.

Executives of business entities are not public employees but businesspersons, the newspaper quotes Natalya Timakova, the press secretary of Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, as saying.

The fact that the state owns a stake in such a business entity does not change its status, she said.

Top managers of these entities will be required to file their income reports directly to the government, which will keep the information confidential, Timakova added.

Non-profit and publicly funded companies are financed directly from the budget and hence their executives are required to declare their incomes publicly, according to Timakova.
 
 #47
Gazeta.ru
March 26, 2015
Russian website: events in Ukraine putting Russian nationalists under pressure
Amaliya Zatari, Ukraine Has Split Russian Nationalists - Searches of Nationalists' Homes Carried Out, But Experts Talk Of Split in Nationalist Movement

Searches have taken place in Moscow at the homes of the leaders of the nationalist movement, Vladimir Tor and Dmitriy Demushkin. According to some data, the grievances against them are linked to banned slogans heard at the "Russian March". Meanwhile, the Sova human rights centre has published a report, according to which the events in Ukraine have lead to a split among the Russian nationalists. Competitors in the form of the "Antimaydan" have also emerged for the right wing.

"Russian March" came back to bite them

On Thursday 26 March it was reported that searches would be carried out at the apartment of Vladimir Tor (real name Vladlen Kralin), the leader of the National Democratic Party (NDP). Tor's lawyer Matvey Tszen reported this to Gazeta.Ru.

"I know for certain that searches took place at Tor's home. The search was liked to a criminal case that was instigated in relation to some anti-Islamic statements at the Russian March (in reference to the chanting -Gazeta.Ru)," Tszen said. "What do the people being searched have to do with this? Nothing, it would appear. But they are the organizers of the march. And, naturally, this chanting was not an official slogan of the event; no-one was carrying any banners."

According to him law-enforcement officers said that they had a video recording of the incident. "But it needs to be understood that absolutely the same event has been taking place in this very place for several years. And I have encountered such cases, where a recording of an old event is taken, renamed, the year is changed and you get a first-rate report. You can post such a video without leaving your home and collect lots of likes on the social networks," the lawyer says.

Tszen also reported that searches had been carried out at the homes of other leaders of nationalist movements -Dmitriy Demushkin, Vladimir Yermolayev, and Denis Tyukin. The lawyer said that they were all named as organizers of the "Russian March". Demushkin's lawyer Dmitriy Bakharev confirmed that the security forces had visited his client and he specified that they intended to take Demushkin to the police station.

At the point that this text was published neither Demushkin nor Tor were answering telephone calls.

It is worth noting that in October 2011 Dmitriy Demushkin became involved in a criminal case shortly before the "Russian March" was held in 2011. According to the investigators, he called for riots in an interview and spoke about the supremacy of the Russian race [as received] although Demushkin himself stated in justification that he had simply announced the slogans for the forthcoming march.

In 2014 the "Russian March" was held in the Moscow district of Lyublino. It was small by comparison with previous marches -around 2,000 people. The march took place without incident.

On various aspects of the "Russian Spring"

The searches at the homes of the nationalists virtually coincided with the publication of a report by the analytical centre Sova, which deals with problems of nationalism and xenophobia. The experts note a new trend -the events in Ukraine have split the Russian far right into supporters and opponents of the so-called "Russian spring".

Both sides accuse one another of betraying the ideas of Russian nationalism.

"If some have not supported the ethnic Russians in the Ukrainian conflict, that means that they cannot be considered Russian nationalists, if others have betrayed the ideas of nationalism they accordingly do not have the right the call themselves nationalists either," Vera Alperovich, Sova expert and one of the authors of the report, explained the position of the sides.

The nationalists have not managed to obtain any major political bonuses in connection with their support of Russian policy in Ukraine, but there have still been certain benefits, she added, citing as an example the far-right protests in support of the Donets Basin, which assembled several thousand people in Moscow: "This was a great success for the nationalists. Such things rarely happen if you do not count the Russian Marches," Alperovich noted.

The split has had an effect on the Russian March itself. "Last year we got two marches of approximately equal numbers, which in total did not even come close to approaching the figures of past years. For the far right, this was a very big blow because the Russian March is their basic brand," the Sova representative says.

Moreover, the nationalist association Russians was criticized by its own associates for "banderovshchina" and it lost a number of its members over the course of the year, Sova experts note. Quite senior members left the association -the National Socialist Initiative (NSI) and the Russian Imperial Movement (RID), as well as several regional sections.

From Motherland to Wotan Jugend

In a conversation with Gazeta.Ru, Dmitriy Demushkin, the leader of the association Russians, denied a link between the split and the events in Ukraine. He said that the NSI and RID had left the coalition because of an internal personal conflict between the leaders of these subdivisions. Demushkin also added that he had created a separate council with the leaders of the NSI and RID, Dmitriy Bobrov and Stanislav Vorobyev. They remain in contact and jointly plan and coordinate events.

"We have a coalition. Many people take up certain positions, some regional leaders support the National Guard, and some the DNR [Donetsk People's Republic] and the LNR [Luhansk People's Republic].

The fact that they are attributing some sort of "pro-Bandera" views to me -that is not true. I have a position that I do not support both parties to the conflict in the civil war," Demushkin summed up.

According to Demushkin, the nationalist movement in Russia is not monolithic. "There are national democrats, there are national socialists, there are national republicans, there are traditional nationalists. Nationalists in our country start with the Kremlin Motherland party and end with the Wotan Jugend and sub-culture groups of skinheads and fans. So there will always be splits on some issues. But this does not prevent us from working together," he concluded.

Some of the nationalists supported Bolotnaya and took part in Navalnyy's protests, while some categorically rejected Navalnyy and Bolotnaya Square," the leader of Russians says. "Columns of pagans take part in the Russian March and in front of them are Orthodox nationalists. They are not united either."

"Currently some are going to wage war on behalf of the National Guard and the Azov battalion, and some are going to wage war on behalf of the DNR," Demushkin says.

Konstantin Krylov, the leader of the National Democratic Party (NDP), stated that there was a split because of the Ukrainian issue. In his opinion those who support the Kiev regime, "if they are nationalists then they are probably not Russian nationalists". "It is rather strange to support a regime, which is anti-Russian," he explained his position.

According to Krylov, the majority of those who are currently supporting Ukraine do not hold nationalist but national-socialist views. "They profess not a classical nationalism like in our party but they adhere to some strange sort of theories about the white race, white solidarity, and so on. Moreover, they are very strongly linked to the right-wing subculture. Right-wing subculture is currently flourishing in Ukraine, those who sympathize with these ideas naturally want to be with like-minded people," he supposed.

The Sova centre notes that the Ukrainian events have effectively squeezed out the entire traditional subject-matter of the ultra-right. Many of the events conducted annually by the far right (for example, Day of the Right-Wing Political Prisoner and Day of Remembrance of the Victims of Ethnic Crimes) either did not take place last year or they were very poorly organized and unimpressive.

Antimaydan squeezing out right wing

In 2014 competitors emerged for the Russian far right from among the pro-regime conservative movements -the National Liberation Movement (NOD) of State Duma Deputy Yevgeniy Fedorov and other organizations, which subsequently formed the Antimaydan movement -the Sova report also says.

"They are dangerous to the far right in so far as they use about three-quarters of the ideology that the nationalists use, with the exception of their opposition orientation.

These movements, thanks to their pro-government nature, have much greater political resources than the far right. So the nationalists understand that a contingent of xenophobic and aggressively minded Russians will be drawn away from them," Alperovich explained.

An example of this is the "Russian March" in Saint Petersburg, which last year bore the name of "patriotic". In contrast to the other marches that took place in the country, it was successful since it almost doubled the number of participants. At the same time, it took place virtually without any of the traditional far right groups that took part in it each year, since they refused to attend it. This time, the march was carried out by the pro-Kremlin party Motherland, NOD, supporters of MP Milonov, and other organizations not linked to the far right. "To put it crudely, they grabbed the event from the nationalists," Alperovich concluded.

In the opinion of Demushkin, it is not only Antimaydan that is using the ideology of the nationalists but the Russian authorities as well.

"Today's rhetoric of 'Crimea is Ours' and the 'Russian Spring', all their slogans -this is just like the nationalist movement of the 1990s and the 2000s. The nationalists have always stated that Russians are a single people: Russians, Great Russians, and Small Russians. We have always rejected Ukrainians as a nation. And the regime is now making great use of this and it is heightening these hysterics about fascism and the 'Maydan' even more," he said.

"A certain number of these kinds of patriots have been taken away from the nationalists, which may be for the better," Demushkin suggested.

"I do not know what sort of an ideology they have but there is nothing nationalist in it," Krylov says in turn. "These people are now in the most comfortable conditions possible, where the regime is on their side but they are still not doing anything. But when they smell trouble they will be off."

 
 #48
www.opendemocracy.net
March 31, 2015
The Russian Orthodox Church under Patriarch Kirill
Under Patriarch Kirill, the Russian Orthodox Church has become an integral element of the hegemonic narrative that has been created in Putin's Russia, to inoculate the country from pernicious outside influences.
By Victoria Hudson
Victoria Hudson obtained her PhD from University of Birmingham in 2013 for a thesis on contemporary Russian soft power in Ukraine. Now a Research Associate at Aston University, her research interests include the interaction between security and identity, the role of communication in politics, and ideology in IR, with particular emphasis on Russia and Europe.

Enthroned as Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus' in 2009 by the Synod of Bishops, Patriarch Kirill has presided over a period of dynamic change and development in the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). Under his leadership, the Russian Church has increasingly carved out a role as an influential and engaged actor in Russian society, asserting the place of tradition and spiritual values as essential components on the road toward a sustainable state and societal modernisation.

Countering the perceived national humiliation and chaos of the 1990s, Russia under President Vladimir Putin gained in strength and international standing. Yet for all the increased socio-economic well-being, there emerged a sense that such pragmatism was insufficient to truly stem the centrifugal tendencies pulling Russian society apart, rooted in separatist divisions, elite disorientation, and a lack of consensus about the identity and direction of the post-Soviet nation. Both Vladimir Putin and Patriarch Kirill have compared the post-Soviet period to the 'Time of Troubles' [smutnoye vremya]; the decades of the seventeenth century characterised by an undermining of spiritual identity, state weakness, and overshadowing external influences. Prohibited by the 1993 Constitution from having an official ideology, the state lacked a sterzhen [lit. backbone, ground]; a sense of the shared meaning and unifying rationale that bind a society, and provide stability. Self-interest trumped collective endeavour, guided by a prevailing mood of cynicism and breezy utility, which disparaged talk of values and cultural worth as naive and delusional.

Hegemonic narrative

Sections of the Russian elite became persuaded that a modern civil society needs a coherent and consolidated sense of itself and its boundaries; an hegemonic narrative that can inoculate against political and ideological threats, which might destabilise a state and set it loose from its moorings when faced with challenges. A state needs to win the loyalty and esteem of its citizens by standing for 'something' with which the citizenry can identify; that is capable of inspiring creative engagement with political ideas, transcend pragmatism and return 'meaning' to national life.

Increasingly moving towards implementation in recent years, this sentiment has found expression in official policy documentation. An underestimated element of Russia's 'sovereign democracy', this need for 'spiritual security' or 'spiritual sovereignty' is reflected in calls to protect Russia's 'cultural and spiritual-moral legacy', found recurrently in national security and foreign policy concept documents over the past 15 years. So, the ancient Russian Orthodox Church - together with the three other religions designated as the traditional confessions of Russia by Boris Yeltsin in 1997 (Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism) - has, perhaps paradoxically, in its renewal of tradition, a crucial role to play in the state's modernisation.

Mutuality

Despite concerns sparked by recollections of Patriarch Sergei's declaration of loyalty to the Soviet state in 1927, it should not automatically be assumed that the relationship of the church to the state is one of instrumentalisation and subservience akin to those troubled years. Vladimir Legoyda, head of the Synodal Information Department of the Moscow Patriarchate, has declared that the Church has never been so independent from the state, while a number of leading scholarly observers describe the relationship as one of mutuality between the two. While the state looks to the church for active political support, the church has sought and received assistance from the state in furthering its own goals.

Asserting its political influence, in December 2009, the ROC, with the support of the ruling party United Russia, announced its expectation that the government would not merely consult with the Church as asserted in the 2000 Social Concept, but 'must jointly decide ... what their common values are and what modernisation tasks must be accomplished.' Russia's leaders appear to have signalled their acquiescence to such an approach, with President Medvedev using a speech on the day of Patriarch Kirill's inauguration in 2009 to promise that 'the special, trustful relations with the [ROC] will be kept and further developed to the benefit of the Fatherland.'

Furthermore, Vladimir Putin has spoken, with reference to the deprivations of the communist period, of the 'debt' owed to the Church, and has acted accordingly; not only granting the church various long strived-for opportunities, but signalling a broader movement in policy, with support for the construction of 200 new churches in Moscow alone, as well as assistance with the re-acquisition and construction of churches abroad.  Significantly, the Russian Ministry for Economic Development and Trade has submitted a draft bill on the restitution of property confiscated by the Bolsheviks; and now held by the state. The bill would turn the ROC into one of the largest, and therefore most powerful landowners in the country, thereby helping to underwrite its financial independence and secure the Church's future as a steady force of societal influence, independent of shifts in party political conjunctures.

In order to make its voice heard, the Church under Patriarch Kirill has reinvigorated its mechanisms for communication and interaction with most key state institutions by establishing new consultative organs, and appointing senior clergy to existing ones; in short, linking in to the networks of influence within the Russian state. Such fora of interaction include the Presidential Council for Cooperation with Religious Associations that brings together senior clerics and Kremlin insiders; the Working Group for Cooperation between the MFA and ROC, which has been rather active and fruitful in its work on compatriots, church property abroad, and inter-religious and inter-civilisational dialogue; as well as the Government Commission for Religious Associations, headed by influential ideologue, Vladislav Surkov. Other bodies include the Synodal Department for Church-State Relations, founded shortly after the enthronement of the new patriarch, and headed by Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin; and the Expert Council of the State Duma Committee for Public Associations and Religious Organisations.

Linking in to such networks has not only enabled the Church to reinforce its de facto privileged position vis-�-vis other religions and outlooks, but has also placed it in an advantageous position to disseminate its values among the opinion-formers who compose these bodies. Apparently, this strategy is bearing fruit, as Blitt has observed Vsevolod Chaplin comment, the phenomenon of the 'podsvechnik' (slang for politicians who pandered to the Church but lacked an understanding of Orthodox faith) ended under Putin's rule, and that more politicians are actively practising their faith. It would be too much to suggest that the constitutionally secular Russian state might be assuming a religious motivation, but certainly a neo-Slavophile, spirituality-infused discourse is being referenced by senior government officials. While Putin does not elaborate on the references to spirituality that pepper his public speeches, he remains in regular contact with the Patriarch. The extent and effectiveness of church-state communication is evidenced by the dovetailing of the discourse of sovereign democracy with the narrative of Russia's cultural specificity espoused by the Patriarch.

Modernisation with traditional values

Speaking in 2009, the Patriarch stressed that Russia should modernise on the basis of fundamentally moral principles and historical experience. Although reportedly about 1,000 churches and chapels have opened since the fall of communism, plus new monasteries and seminaries, the church's role in modernisation is more deeply embedded in Russian society than its architecture. Indeed, Patriarch Kirill has breathed new life into the process of church renewal, presiding over the Church's gaining of long-desired access to influential socialising agencies in Russian society. Specially selected chaplains are now active in prisons and the army, while school children are now offered optional courses in religious education in the form of the module 'Foundations of Orthodox Culture.' Furthermore, where the Russian Orthodox Church had previously eschewed a more extensive pastoral role, it now seeks to engage with taboo social problems in Russian society. Recent years have, for instance, seen a new focus on implementing the strategy developed in 2004 for engaging with victims of Russia's HIV/AIDS epidemic, in the spirit of 'hate the sin, love the sinner.' Moreover, the Church and its representatives have a visible presence in mainstream Russian society, appearing regularly on TV chat shows and even at rock concerts.

The modern ROC

Yet while a spirit of cooperation characterises church-state relations, the ability of the church to position itself as a credible societal actor in modern times also depends on maintaining a certain distance from state structures and politics. A division of labour is, in principle, outlined in the social concept. Thus, while Patriarch Kirill appears to have endorsed Vladimir Putin as 'a miracle of God' in the run up to the 2012 presidential elections, he did not shy from implicit criticism in urging him to listen to protesters. Indeed, some clerics, such as proto-deacon Andrei Kurayev, have not only criticised the state but also the Church itself.

While speaking out for the restoration of traditional values in contemporary Russia, the Patriarch has taken the lead in initiating reforms to equip the church to deal with the demands of the modern era. He initiated reform of church governance by creating the Supreme Church Council, formed of the heads of all of the approximately 20 synodal departments (effectively the 'ministries' of the ROC), so they might more effectively communicate amongst themselves and better coordinate their work. As well as internal restructuring, reform has also included reviewing the face the church shows the world, including its political stance.

Historically, Russian Orthodoxy has brought together individuals with a broad swathe of views, ranging from pan-Slavism and neo-Eurasianism to Orthodox Communism and Russian Nationalism. Public pronouncements coloured by such thinking have at times produced counterproductive inconsistencies with the Church's official message, with anachronistic chauvinistic or imperialistic narratives undermining the image of the church. Thus, in recent years, the activity of Kirill's team has focussed on co-opting clerics themselves into the renewed discourse, and modes of speech and behaviour. Aiming to phase out off-discourse materials that damage its credibility, the Church has sought to raise the intellectual level and professional sophistication of its media products, and to end church sponsoring of dubious literature on the extremist fringes. Likewise, clergy are asked to work under the guidance of the diocesan authorities in their cooperation with the media, but where opinions diverge from the Church's teaching, they are instructed to make clear that this is a privately-held view.

Emphasis is also placed on ameliorating the spirit in which Church representatives engage with the wider world, with the Patriarch exhorting clerics to conduct their ministry, bearing in mind 'not self-promotion or trying to achieve weight and recognition in society, but the feeling of responsibility for the future of the people, [and] the execution of his vocation in the world'. Clergy are likewise asked to avoid attracting negative attention through unjustified refusals to allow journalists access to information or by over-sensitive reactions to criticism.

However, while senior clerics may have committed to the official 'politically correct' discourse, as a reformer, Kirill's positions are still controversial in some ecclesiastical circles, not least with regard to his perceived interest in missionary activity, and his putting worldly concerns over spiritual matters. For instance, opinion among hierarchs in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC (MP)), which is under the ecclesiastic jurisdiction of the Russian Church, is not homogenous, but rather as diverse as Ukrainian society as a whole.

Thus, while clerics in eastern and southern Ukraine tend to be loyal to Moscow, the legitimacy of the influence of the Danilov Monastery on the UOC (MP) has been questioned by MP clerics in the western and central region. Yet while some clergy have been removed from their posts for criticising the Patriarch's manner of societal engagement, the fact that priests might defect to the Ukrainian Autonomous Church or the Kyiv Patriarchate if dissatisfied has pushed the Russian hierarchy to develop 'softer' means of ensuring unity. This has entailed positive incentives, rather than threats, such as granting more freedom to UOC (MP) priests relative to their Russian counterparts, in the form of turning a blind eye to involvement in politics, as well as stressing what the MP has to offer; the ideas of canonicity, the Third Rome theory, and simple inertia.

Establishing itself as a powerful opinion-former in these and other ways, the Russian Orthodox Church thus reasserts a narrative of universal spiritual values as a foundation for a meaningful national identity. This in turn informs a coherent view of the political world. In supporting the renewal of tradition, the Church seeks to contribute to the consolidation of post-Soviet Russian society, thereby lending the state the perceived stability and strength necessary for its modernisation.
 
 #49
Global Times
March 29, 2015
Bureaucracy and corruption stand in way of Russia's shift to Asia
By Dmitri Trenin
The author is director of the Carnegie Moscow Center.

Russia's "pivot to Asia" is meeting with a number of challenges. The principal ones are bureaucratic inertia; lack of workable ideas; and high levels of corruption. Deepening economic recession, the dramatic drop in the oil price, and Western sanctions compound the situation. And, of course, Russia's small population east of the Urals makes its Siberian and Far Eastern regional market unattractive to foreign investors. Yet, there are ways of dealing with all of them.

Russia is traditionally run in a top-down fashion. The "pivot to Asia" was originally President Vladimir Putin's idea, which he then imposed on the essentially inert and disinterested bureaucracy. In order to make aides, ministers and governors follow the boss's lead, Putin had to keep the pressure on them. With the outbreak in 2014 of the Ukraine crisis and the incorporation of Crimea, the Kremlin's attention has shifted, and the government's priorities have changed.

It is precisely the rupture with the West, however, that make outreach to the East even more relevant. Russia faces the need to craft a closer and more productive relationship with China, the biggest economy outside the US-led coalition that has sanctioned Russia for its policies in Ukraine.

The way to break through the bureaucratic inertia remains Kremlin leadership. In the next few months, Putin will be seeing Chinese President Xi Jinping three times: in Moscow in May, in Ufa in July, and in Beijing in September. Accords which may follow from these summits would stimulate bureaucratic activism.

New accords, in turn, require new ideas. Russia needs to look at the reasons why its pet infrastructure projects such as upgrading the Transsiberian and the Baikal-Amur railroads have yet to take off.

Meanwhile, it should respond to those that the Chinese have already announced and begun to implement. One that clearly stands out is building a high-speed rail link between Beijing and Moscow with a connection to Europe - Berlin and Helsinki - would open immense economic opportunities.

Speeding up the passage of freight traffic between China and Europe is another area of potential collaboration. The sections of the road that pass through Kazakhstan and Belarus would tie in Russia's closest partners in Eurasia. Rather than competing against each other, the Eurasian Economic Union and the Silk Road economic belt can find synergies.   

Russia itself should take the lead in opening the Northern Sea Route for international navigation. China is known to have a major interest in the matter. Creating infrastructure along the Arctic and Pacific coast of Russia would open up the country's northern fa�ade, spurring economic and social development from Kamchatka to Kola.

Moscow has growing concerns about the security of its High North territories, and economic development of these areas in cooperation with China would bolster its position there. Having agreed in principle to allow China access to its energy deposits, Moscow now needs to lay down the ground rules for expanded energy partnership with Beijing.   

Other ideas that have been floated, but not yet acted upon include expanding food production in southern Siberia for the Asian market; engaging with Asian countries in scientific and technological cooperation; and internationalizing Russia's educational system through closer links to Asian universities.

When it is finished, Russia's new space center in the Far East, Vostochny, can serve the needs of the region. Bureaucracy alone cannot do this. The Kremlin has to unchain the energies of the Russian business community, and support scientists, farmers and college professors and students.

Other activities, however, have to be reined in. The recent arrest of Alexander Khoroshavin, the governor of Sakhalin accused of corruption, illustrates the salient issue of criminality in the Russian Far East, which is reputed to be exceptionally bad even by Russian standards.

The arrest, however, just scratches the surface. Without cleansing the bureaucratic corps and its eventual restructuring on a meritocratic basis, Russia's governance will remain exceedingly dysfunctional.

The same goes for the courts system. These are, of course, fundamental issues, but without addressing them there can be no way forward for Russia as a whole and for its relations with its Asian neighbors in particular.

For the foreseeable future, China is likely to be Russia's main foreign partner, and the economic and political importance of Asia to Russia will rise, even as Europe's will continue to recede. It is time for Moscow elites to begin taking this new situation more seriously.
 
 #50
Kremlin.ru
April 1, 2015
Message at the start of Russia's presidency of the BRICS group

The official website of the Russian presidency of the BRICS group (brics2015.ru) has published a message from Vladimir Putin at the start of Russia's presidency of the group.

The President said, in particular, in his message:

"Russia is now taking the relay in presiding over the BRICS group, which unites five of the world's largest and most influential countries that are home to nearly half of our planet's population and produce around 30 percent of global GDP. The BRICS group is still young as an organisation, but has already proven its effectiveness. Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa are coordinating their policies on key international issues ever more closely, and are playing an active part in shaping a multipolar world order and developing modern models for the world's financial and trading systems.   

The upcoming BRICS summit in Ufa on July 8-9 coincides with two very symbolic anniversary dates: the 70th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War and 70 years since the end of World War II. Aware of the past's tragic lessons, the BRICS countries consistently support peaceful settlement of international conflicts and condemn any attempts to use force and pressure or intervene in sovereign countries' internal affairs. Russia's presidency will focus on putting the BRICS group's possibilities for strengthening global security and stability to most effective use.   

At the same time, Russia will also give priority attention to financial and economic cooperation within the BRICS group. In particular, we support the adoption of the BRICS countries' Strategic Economic Partnership and will facilitate the launch of the New Development Bank and the Currency Reserve Pool. Of course, we will also take steps to expand cooperation in the energy sector, mining industry, and in information and communication technology.

We will continue developing humanitarian contacts in education, culture, science and healthcare. During Russia's presidency, the BRICS Youth Summit and the Global Universities Summit will take place and we will establish the BRICS Network University. We will examine opportunities for developing inter-parliamentary dialogue, through which lawmakers could take direct part in resolving the tasks before the BRICS group.  

The BRICS countries are establishing a joint internet site and a virtual secretariat to inform the public about the group's work.

Overall, the Russian presidency is committed to taking the BRICS partnership to a new, higher level. I am sure that this is in the interests not only of people in the BRICS countries but all around the world."
 
 #51
Russia charts new course for BRICS nations as presidency begins

MOSCOW, April 1. /TASS/. Grand plans have been outlined for the BRICS emerging market nations as Russia begins its presidency of the group on Wednesday.

Transforming the BRICS assembly of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa into "a full-scale mechanism of strategic interaction on key issues of global policy and economics" is a "top priority" for Russia's presidency, which is expected to culminate at a summit in the Russian city of Ufa in early July, the Russian Foreign Ministry said.

There are plans to open new tracks for multilateral industrial cooperation, the ministry said after a meeting on Tuesday. The main goal is to launch the group's development bank and currency reserve pool as outlined in the Strategy for Economic Cooperation of the BRICS countries established until 2020, it said, referring to the plan proposed by Russia at the BRICS summit in Brazil.

The Russian Foreign Ministry's special envoy, Vadim Lukov, noted that some Western partners had already started to explore the possibility of joining the BRICS New Development Bank, noting that: "This is the first time that such institutions have been created without Western countries' involvement."

Speaking about the tasks of the bank, Lukov pointed out that the new structure would operate on commercial principles.

"Shareholders [of the BRICS New Development Bank] believe that all projects should be profitable. This is not a mutual benefit society and not an association providing grants," he said. "The New Development Bank will be based on commercial principles."

The head and the board of directors of the new bank are expected to be appointed before the BRICS summit in Ufa, scheduled for July 9-10.

A distinguishing feature of Russia's presidency of BRICS is involvement of civil society groups and young people in the assembly's work. Moscow will host the BRICS Civil Society Forum in June, while on July 1-5 the inaugural youth forum will open in the Russian city of Kazan. Discussions will focus on youth interaction in culture and economy, alongside prospects for cooperation between young diplomats.

Among the most immediate upcoming events during the Russian presidency is the first official meeting of the BRICS countries' natural resources ministers on April 22 and consultations between deputy foreign ministers in April-May.

Georgy Toloraya, executive director of the Russian National Committee on BRICS Research, said the most import thing was to enlist the moral support of the BRICS bloc in terms of opposing unilateral sanctions and double standards against Russia.

"In this regard, we enjoy the backing of these countries. We hope that this support will also be declared quite clearly at the summit in Ufa," Toloraya said, adding that it would be much more difficult for Russia to stand alone against the West.

The BRICS agenda under the Russian presidency includes plans to strengthen strategic stability and international information security, reinforce the non-proliferation regime, and combat international terrorism.

The BRICS countries collectively represent about 26% of the world's geographic area and are home to 42% of the world's population. In 2013, the share of the BRICS countries reached 16.1% in global trade, 10.8% in military spending and 40/2% in production of non-renewable energy resources. The BRICS consumer market is the largest in the world and is growing by $500 billion a year.
 
 #52
Der Spiegel
March 31, 2015
Fortress of Nationalism: Russia Is Losing Its Political Morals
An Essay by Christian Neef

The murder of opposition politician Boris Nemtsov reveals that Russia has become morally unhinged. The country is transforming into a nationalist fortress and the powers that be are happy to ignore the potentially dangerous implications.

Within a period of four weeks, two events took place in Russia that, at first glance, seemed to have little to do with each other. But on second glance, they appear closely related. The first was the murder of opposition politician Boris Nemtsov; the second was the meeting of the Russian Conservative Forum a week ago on Sunday in St. Petersburg. Both occurrences -- the brazen killing just outside the Kremlin and the attempt to create a kind of nationalist Internationale on Russian soil -- prove the same thing: Russia has become political and morally unmoored.

The event in St. Petersburg saw 150 members of far-right parties, including the right-wing extremist NPD of Germany, gather to examine the "joint political tendencies" they might have with the Russian leadership. Politicians who openly sympathize with Adolf Hitler were among them. More liberal Russians -- those, at least, who still pay attention to such news reports -- were appalled. The event, after all, saw neo-Nazis marching through a city on whose streets hundreds of thousands of civilians starved to death during the World War II siege of Leningrad, as the metropolis was then called. Those deaths came at the hands of Hitler's Germany, a horrific event that transformed the city into a symbol of heroic resistance against the Nazis. Even worse is the fact that the 70th anniversary of the Soviet Union's victory over Hitler is to be celebrated with great pomp on May 9.

Russian President Vladimir Putin's spokesman said he was unable to comment on the event in St. Petersburg, saying it was "not on our agenda." Yet one of the organizers of the event was the Russian political party Rodina (Fatherland), which was co-founded by Dmitry Rogozin, deputy prime minister and a scion of the country's arms industry. Indeed, he sat next to Putin during a recent meeting of the May 9 preparation committee in the Kremlin. But there's more. Not long ago, the opposition television station Dozhd asked its viewers if it might perhaps have been better were Leningrad allowed to fall to the Nazis during the war so as to save hundreds of thousands of lives. The Kremlin reacted immediately, showing that the wartime history of St. Petersburg is very much on its "agenda." The broadcaster was almost driven into bankruptcy.

It is, in short, clear that Putin's leadership circle not only tolerated the recent meeting of European right-wingers, but did so with a significant degree of benevolence.

Nationalist Tendencies

The incident demonstrates the degree of political confusion that is currently present in Russia. The Moscow paper Nezavisimaya Gazeta wrote that the Russian political elite has abandoned its fundamental instincts and can no longer reliably assess what is acceptable and what isn't. The word "fascism," for example, is used so often by the Kremlin these days that few in the country know what it means anymore. The "Junta" in Kiev, is fascist, the Kremlin says, as is what is happening in Europe at the moment. In eastern Ukraine, Russian volunteers are likewise fighting against the fascists.

None of Putin's people appears to appreciate that the nationalist tendencies released in Russia by the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula has prepared the ground in the country for a dangerous form of radicalism. Yet it should be obvious. Some of those fighting in eastern Ukraine haven't been shy about branding Putin a traitor for having agreed to a Ukrainian ceasefire with the West during negotiations in Minsk.

Russia has become a fortress. "It's us against the world:" This view has become something of a national ideology. Russia against America; the Russian way as a contrast to the rotting Western culture; if you're not a patriot, you are a traitor: Thinking in Russia has become limited to such ultimatums. Russian television propagates the view -- popular before the revolution, but also during Soviet times -- that the Russian people are God's chosen people and that Russia is the brightest beacon of peace that exists. The utopian vision of being the best nation in the world has returned. It is obvious that those who isolate themselves in such a manner will have a hard time finding friends in the world --and have little choice but to turn to nationalists, neo-Nazis and anti-Semites.

But it's not just about politics. Even worse is what this daily dose of hate and anger does to the minds of the populace. In Moscow and St. Petersburg, there are still a few liberals. But further afield? Millions of Russians live in underserved towns and villages, in dilapidated houses with no indoor plumbing and merely a wood stove for heating. But even the most remote hovel has a satellite dish, "like a kind of artificially attached ear," as a journalist from the paper Moskovskij Komsomolets once wrote. "In the evening, the residents of these dirt poor cities and villages sit in front of their TV screens. They raptly follow the moderators, who tell them that the whole world hates the Russians only because they are Russians." They don't notice that they are straying further and further from reality.

Fear of Russia

The patriotism that has gripped the country gives even the most down-trodden, powerless Russians in the countryside the feeling of being superior to those who live in much more prosperous and democratic countries. They love it when Putin sends long-range bombers out over the Atlantic, when he stages yet another "unplanned maneuver" involving tens of thousands of soldiers, when people keep talking of the new Russian "miracle weapon." And they love it that the West is once again afraid of Russia.

The problem is that this feeling of superiority is increasingly coupled with hate. Hate for fellow citizens who hold a different opinion. Hate for Ukraine. Hate for the West. This hate, mixed together with the most shameless of lies, is nurtured by Russian television.

"Russian people have always been characterized by kindliness, munificence, and solicitousness," says Andrey Zvyagintsev, director of the film "Leviathan," which portrays the feudalistic conditions in the Russian province and which was nominated for an Oscar for best foreign language film. "But now, inhuman, demonic complexes of revenge, self-assertion and hate are being awakened within and put on display -- characteristics which slumbered deep within us until one or two years ago."

That would explain the hateful reactions to the murder of Boris Nemtsov. The vice deacon of the university where Nemtsov's son studies said of the assassination: That's what happens to "prostitutes." Now, he continued, "there is one less dirty swine" in the country. The fact that the national parliament, the Duma, refused to hold a moment of silence for the man -- who was, it shouldn't be forgotten, deputy prime minister at one time -- is hardly surprising. The feeling that many Russians have of being insulted by the world has become something of a national mythology.

But this uncompromising tough-mindedness has been percolating in the Russian psyche for longer than Zvyagintsev believes. In Moscow, one often hears people say that human life was worth little during Soviet times and that the country was only able to defeat the Nazis because Stalin indoctrinated the population with the idea that victory was worth any sacrifice, no matter how large. That, people say, helps explain why political battles have also become so ruthless. Author Svetlana Alexievich speaks of a "syndrome of violence" that Russia cannot escape. She says that the country has been at war almost constantly throughout its history, a fact which has produced a type of person with a "fundamental inability to live a civil, peaceful life." Instead, she continues, Russians see everything through the lens of victory or defeat.

A Permanent State of War

Following the attack on Boris Nemtsov on the bridge spanning the Moskva River, there was a brief moment when prominent voices from both the left and the right called for a bit of reflection. "We have to pause for a moment," said Anatoly Chubais, the former leader of the Presidential Administration and now head of a state-owned company, "those in power, the opposition, liberals, Communists, nationalists, conservatives -- everyone. We have to spend at least a minute thinking about where we are leading Russia." Even one of the country's best-known nationalist incendiaries called for reconciliation. But the moment passed quickly. And television didn't pay much attention to the calls anyway and continued to act as though the country were in a permanent state of war.

Such is the soil in which Russia's current political philosophy is rooted. The right-wing populist Vladimir Zhirinovsky formulated it thusly: The Ukraine conflict "has provided us with an opportunity to return to the circle of great powers. It is essential that Russia once again becomes an empire as it was under the czars or during Soviet times. Once we have achieved that, we can focus on the development of our economy. But first, we have to free ourselves from the West."

Such a philosophy is absurd and reflects a Soviet mindset. Doesn't the path to strength and attractiveness lead in exactly the opposite direction? Shouldn't one focus primarily on the prosperity of one's own country instead of pursuing geo-political dreams? Russia has earned immense sums from exporting raw materials -- and yet it still hasn't managed to build a decent highway between Moscow and St. Petersburg. In cities in the country's interior, factories, hospitals and schools are closing while the men there are heading to eastern Ukraine to fight for an imaginary Russian world. They are bid a celebratory farewell when they go, with the blessing of the powers that be. It's a grotesque situation.

The Nemtsov murder and the gathering in St. Petersburg are an indication that the mania of political revanchism has infected Russia's political elite. It is a mania that finds resonance with all those Russians who either are uninterested in established a normal life within the country's current borders or who are unable to do so, wrote a journalist with the Moscow-based website gazeta.ru. That, the journalist continued, can only end "in a huge, national catastrophe."
 
 #53
Newsweek.com
April 1, 2015
Putin is 'Playing the Madman' to Trick the West
BY ELISABETH BRAW

Muammar Gaddafi deployed a clever strategy to make sure he was always in the minds of leaders and ordinary citizens around the world: he pretended to be unhinged to confuse and frighten his adversaries. Lately Vladimir Putin seems to have adopted a similar strategy, appearing alternately depressed, out of touch with reality, or else disappearing altogether. Call it his antic disposition.

"There's a rationale in being perceived as unpredictable," says a recently-departed Moscow ambassador, who also knew Putin in St Petersburg. "Russian state television is aiding Putin by creating an atmosphere of collective psychosis. The Russian strategy is to scare the West by portraying Putin as unpredictable. If you've got a madman in power, a country's nuclear weapons take on a completely new dimension."

Indeed, in the past couple of years, Putin has gone out of his way to keep Russia's arsenal in the forefront of the public consciousness. According to Martin Hellman, an emeritus professor at Stanford and adjunct fellow at the Federation of American Scientists who specialises in nuclear risk, the West hasn't properly caught on to Putin's Armageddon game.

"Nuclear weapons are the card that Putin has up his sleeve, and he's using it to get the world to realise that Russia is a superpower, not just a regional power," he explains. "The Russians can turn us into ash in less than an hour." Less grandstanding with Putin is what is needed to prevent the madman game from ending in tragedy, Hellman argues.

The tactic has worked in the past. Gaddafi's nuclear development programme helped him efficiently bargain with the international community. North Korea's Kim dynasty uses the same sinister trick. In fact, a bit of perceived madness is essential to nuclear strategy.

"I call it the Madman Theory," US president Richard Nixon told his chief of staff, Bob

Haldeman, in 1969. "I want the North Vietnamese to believe that I've reached the point that I might do anything to stop the [Vietnam] war." In a classified 1995 report, the US military's Strategic Command recommends that "it hurts to portray ourselves as too fully rational and cool-headed . . . That the US may become irrational and vindictive if its vital interests are attacked should be part of the national persona we project to all adversaries".

Irrational and vindictive: that sounds a whole lot like the current Vladimir Putin. It's no surprise that foreign governments and intelligence agencies are frantically trying to figure out the enigmatic leader.

Several years ago, the Pentagon's in-house thinktank made a valiant attempt, concluding that Putin suffered from Asperger's syndrome. But the CIA is the undisputed leader of the discipline. Enlisting everything from diplomats' observations and intelligence reports to evaluations of the subject's public speeches and demeanour, the agency's Centre for Analysis of Personality and Political Behaviour created dozens of personality profiles of foreign leaders.

The Agency still produces such personality assessments. CIA spokesman Todd Ebitz explains: "Today these specialised analysts still provide policymakers with keen insights on foreign leaders, but they work in units throughout the Agency's Intelligence Directorate where they are integrated with analysts covering political, military, and economic issues."

So how do the CIA psychologists currently assess Vladimir Putin? The Agency won't tell. But according to professor Jerrold Post, who created and for many years led the personality analysis centre, the president "sees himself as a current-day tsar who's responsible for Russian-speaking peoples. But the person who's most important to him is Putin himself, not the Russian people".

The president's steely surface, argues Post, is a result of his being bullied as a schoolboy. "He took up martial arts so as not to be pushed around by other kids. We're seeing the same behaviour in his leadership." Nuclear warheads, then, are the world-leader equivalent of the bullied schoolboy's judo skills.

American billionaire investor Bill Browder is not an entirely dispassionate Putin observer, having been expelled from Russia and seen his upstanding lawyer die a mysterious death in a Russian prison. He has, however, known Putin since his early days in power. He calls Putin a "highly rational sociopath", who thought he had his domestic situation under control until President Yanukovich of Ukraine was brought down by the Maidan protesters. "Putin didn't want to end up like Yanukovich, and the only reason Putin invaded Ukraine is to create a massive distraction," he argues. Yanukovich's helplessness in the face of angry protesters mirrors that of Putin himself, who, aided only by KGB guards, defended the Dresden KGB office in the autumn of 1989 when East German democracy protesters demanded access.

Top politicians are largely cut off from contact with ordinary people. "That changes the mind of anyone," says a former friend of Putin's. "But Putin's KGB background makes him different. Other long-time leaders' psyches change the normal way, but his is changing the KGB way: everyone else is an enemy, you can only trust the KGB network. You become paranoid."

That paranoia fuels the madman game. "On one hand it's easy to say that Putin is crazy," reflects the former friend. "Because of him, now we're starting to think about nuclear war, which is completely different from two-three years ago. But on the other hand, his actions are not crazy at all. He'll do anything to stay in power, and using nuclear rhetoric is a means to that end. It's effective for him, but it's a mad strategy for Russia." That narcissist streak was visible long ago. A West German mole at the KGB office in Dresden became good friends with Putin's wife, Lyudmila, who told the mole that her husband beat her and was an incurable skirt chaser.

It is autocratic leaders such as Putin and Saddam Hussein who offer the most fertile soil for personality assessments, and when such leaders' countries steer into crises, these assessments become crucial. Jimmy Carter later pointed to the importance of the CIA's profiles of Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and President Anwar el-Sadat of Egypt, which highlighted Begin's love of details and Sadat's preference for big strokes as well as for having a "Nobel Prize complex".

But psychological assessments even of the most sophisticated kind will matter little if Putin decides to press the nuclear button. So what if it results in America retaliating by annihilating Russian cities? A narcissist leader who has a problem with empathy can't be expected to care. "The US is the world's only conventional superpower, but Putin can avoid humiliation by nuking us," argues Hellman. According to Browder, Putin is a thin-skinned man who can't back down, and Hellman suggests that the West should do as marriage therapists advise: admit one's own mistakes, thereby making it easier for one's spouse to admit his.

Another solution would be for Putin to step down, keep the $200bn fortune Browder estimates he's amassed and enjoy a pleasant retirement. In the past, discarded leaders have been received by sympathetic countries. Idi Amin found refuge in Saudi Arabia, as did Tunisia's Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali. The Shah of Iran shuttled between reluctant hosts until Mexico offered him sanctuary. Ferdinand Marcos spent his final years in Hawaii.

But which leader would volunteer to host Vladimir Putin? His tenacious efforts to remain in power may be disastrous, but the madman strategy is completely rational.