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Iran's Nuclear Politics and Missed Opportunities
Haleh Esfandiari and Robert S. Litwak, The Wall Street Journal
November 25, 2014
Already, the extension of nuclear talks announced Monday is being portrayed in Iran as a victory for its negotiating team. In a televised interview Monday night, President Hasan Rouhani made clear that Iran would not stop its centrifuges or give up its technology. What's been agreed to is, indeed, a bonus for Tehran as its government continues to access about $700 million a month from its frozen assets.
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What Would Iran Do Without a Nuclear Deal
Cornelius Adebahr, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
November 13, 2014
With little time left before the November 24 deadline in the nuclear talks between the six world powers known as the P5+1 and Iran, and considerable uncertainty about whether a deal will be reached, it is a good moment to examine Tehran's thinking about the possibility that no deal will be struck.
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Chuck Hagel's Nuclear Disaster
The Editors, Bloomberg View
The shenanigans that have been going on at U.S. nuclear bases are almost too clownish to believe: officers running a drug ring across six facilities, widespread cheating on monthly proficiency tests, blast doors on missile silos too rusty to properly seal, six nuclear-armed missiles accidentally loaded onto a plane that then flew across the country, and a curious story of crews at three bases FedExing one another an apparently magical wrench used to connect warheads to intercontinental ballistic missiles.
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Provisions to Limit Future Iranian Illicit Procurements for Its Nuclear Programs
David Albright and Olli Heinonen, ISIS
November 20, 2014
As six world powers, the so-called EU3+3, or "The Six"-the United States, Britain, France, Germany, China, and Russia-negotiate a comprehensive agreement with Iran, it will be vital for them to maintain sanctions and controls on proliferation-sensitive goods, while at the appropriate time creating a verifiable procurement channel for Iran's legitimate nuclear programs. Proliferation-sensitive goods are those needed in Iran's nuclear programs and nuclear weapon delivery systems, the latter typically interpreted as covering ballistic missiles. The most effective means available of accomplishing this goal is to maintain the controls on goods in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and mandates, and the associated national implementing legislation that controls such goods, during the duration of the comprehensive deal. This approach would leave intact the UNSC and multilateral infrastructure created to implement these sanctions, including domestic and UN sanction designations of entities violating the resolutions and aggressive efforts to detect and disrupt Iran's illicit procurement efforts. At the same time, however, a legitimate procurement channel may need to be created to funnel required goods to Iran's authorized sensitive nuclear programs. A challenge will be creating and maintaining an architecture that exempts imports of goods to Iran's legitimate nuclear programs and possibly later to its civilian industries, while preventing imports to a banned or covert military nuclear program. Many proliferation sensitive goods are dual-use goods, which have applications both in nuclear and non-nuclear industries and institutions.
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US Report: China's Nukes Getting Bigger and Better
Wendell Minnick, Defense News
November 19, 2014
A new congressional-funded report paints a dark picture of China's nuclear weapons and missile modernization efforts.
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Iran's Nuclear Missile Delivery Capability
Anthony H. Cordesman and Abdullah Toukan, CSIS
Recently there has been a lot of attention given to the "Possible Military Dimension" of the Iran Nuclear Program, in particular concerns over Iran's ballistic missile program and its nuclear delivery capability.
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Centrifuge Cascades and a Final Deal with Iran
JINSA's Gemunder Center Iran Task Force
November 2014
Significant differences remain between Iran and the P5+1 over the parameters of a comprehensive agreement on the Islamic Republic's nuclear program. In particular, Tehran has resisted agreeing to dismantling any of its existing uranium enrichment infrastructure. With the November 24, 2014, deadline for a final deal looming, U.S. negotiators have reportedly considered several workarounds intended to roll back Iran's breakout timing while leaving its existing centrifuges in place.
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