In a region of troubles, the negotiations over Iran's nuclear program stand out. The first-step agreement, signed in November 2013, broke a decade of futile diplomatic forays punctuated by mutual escalation. The product of a rare confluence of political calendars and actors, it set a framework for a balanced arms-control agreement that could form the basis of a comprehensive nuclear accord. But reasons for caution abound. It is easier to pause than to reverse the escalation pitting centrifuges against sanctions. Mistrust remains deep, time is short, and the process remains vulnerable to pressure from domestic and regional detractors. In bringing the sides together, the accord revealed the chasm that separates them.

A collection of analyses and facts on the Iranian Nuclear Challenge from Harvard's Belfer Center. 

An envoy facilitating talks on potentially banning weapons of mass destruction from the Middle East had some positive and negative things to say last week.

Negotiations on Iran's nuclear program are continuing in an effort to produce a follow-on agreement, termed the "Comprehensive Solution," to the November 2013 "Joint Plan of Action" (JPA).  Much of the discussion of the Comprehensive Solution has focused on the terms such an agreement should include to prevent Iran from being able to produce nuclear weapons.  However, this objective will not be attainable unless the agreement addresses key aspects of Iran's nuclear program, fixes the flaws in the JPA which seriously constrain any agreement and recognizes fundamental problems with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards as currently implemented.

More than three months since the implementation of the interim deal with Iran over its nuclear program, formally known as the Joint Plan of Action (JPA), we thought it valuable to offer an assessment of the impact of the agreement. Evidence suggests the JPA has set back Iran's breakout timing by nearly one month. However, that benefit is more than offset by provisions which: allow Iran to enrich uranium more rapidly than before the deal; steadily reduce the pressure on Tehran from sanctions; and fail to resolve international concerns about Iran's weaponization activities. As a result, in our judgment the JPA is not making a comprehensive agreement on Iran's nuclear program more likely to be achieved. 

Some popular misperceptions of the North Korean sanctions regime include that it is "the most heavily sanctioned country in the world and nothing more can be imposed." Responding to indications of an impending fourth North Korean nuclear test, President Obama declared the US would consider "further sanctions that have even more bite."[1] The reality is that the US response to North Korea's nuclear threats has been characterized by firm rhetoric and minimalist actions when compared with stronger punitive measures imposed on Iran and other nations. Sanctions have achieved several of their objectives when applied effectively.

This report examines, among other things, (1) how NNSA measures progress toward its fiscal year 2022 dismantlement performance goal, as well as any challenges it might face in achieving the goal; (2) the schedule for and any challenges in dismantling weapons to be retired as a result of the New START treaty; (3) physical capacity available at Pantex to meet or accelerate planned dismantlement workload; and (4) any challenges in disassembling and disposing of weapon components. GAO analyzed NNSA's future dismantlement schedule, observed weapons dismantlement and component disposition activities at Pantex and Y-12, and interviewed NNSA officials. This report summarizes the findings of GAO's classified report on nuclear weapons dismantlement. 

The head of the recovery effort at the federal government's nuclear waste repository in southern New Mexico said Thursday it could be up to three years before full operations resume at the underground facility.