Over the weekend, Foreign Policy posted a column of mine on Russia's compliance, or lack thereof, with the 1987 Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF).  The short version is that, while the the treaty is loosely worded, the Russians appear to be deploying two systems that are inconsistent with its viability - what I like to call the RS-26 "intermediate-range ICBM" and the R-500 cruise missile.

A look from the sky at what's happening down in the DPRK.

 Recent commercial satellite imagery shows that North Korea's 5 megawatt-electric (MWe) reactor at the Yongbyon nuclear site appears operational. There have not been recent outward signs of the expansion of the centrifuge facility, suggesting that construction of the building is complete and that North Korea could now be installing equipment or even centrifuges inside. 

Mark Fitzpatrick is a highly respected, careful chronicler of nuclear proliferation. His monograph of A.Q. Khan's activities is required reading. So, too, is his latest, Overcoming Pakistan's Nuclear Dangers, in which he recommends that Pakistan be treated as a normal nuclear state if it facilitates the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, negotiation of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, and helps reinforce other nuclear norms. Mark correctly identifies an intensified nuclear competition on the subcontinent as a grave danger. He reasons that by bringing India and Pakistan into the existing nuclear order, dangers might be averted. He's right. But will inducements succeed in persuading Pakistan (and India) to accept the limits inherent in signing up to the CTBT and FMCT?

Iran is listing out everything its nuclear program has ever done, possibly helping Western nations to clarify any bomb ambitions in Tehran, Reuters reports.

A senior member of Saudi Arabia's royal family said on Wednesday that Gulf states should work on acquiring nuclear know-how to balance any threat from Iran.

The contractor that manages a Texas nuclear-weapons facility has received a government warning over multiple recent incidents that posed safety hazards.

The greatest dangers to nuclear facilities are sabotage and theft from insiders, according to political scientist Scott Sagan. Analysis of past incidents can help boost safeguards at these sites.

In this research paper published by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Stanford Political Science Professor and CISAC Senior Fellow, Scott Sagan, and Matthew Bunn, a professor of practice at the Harvard Kennedy School, write that insider threats are perhaps the most serious challenge that nuclear security systems face today.