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Talking Peace, Making Weapons
Robert L. Brown, Department of Political Science, Temple University
Jeffrey M. Laplow, Department of Political Science, University of California- San Diego
January 14, 2014
A growing literature suggests that nuclear assistance from other countries is an important determinant of whether states pursue nuclear weapons. Existing work does not consider, however, the most widely available source of assistance-the Technical Cooperation (TC) program administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). IAEA assistance is an important piece of the nonproliferation regime's central bargain: member states enjoy nuclear assistance in exchange for agreeing not to seek nuclear weapons. Using a data set of TC projects since 1972, we examine whether international nuclear assistance is associated with the pursuit of nuclear weapons. We hypothesize that some TC assistance reduces the cost of pursuing nuclear weapons, making weapons programs more likely. We find that receiving TC related to the nuclear fuel cycle is a statistically and substantively significant factor in state decisions since 1972 to seek nuclear weapons, with important implications for existing theories of nuclear proliferation.
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Local Event: "Nuclear Russian Roulette:
A Model of Proliferation and Preventive War"
Andrew Coe, Department of International Relations, University of Southern California
Thursday, January 30, 2014
12:30 PM - 2:00 PM
UC San Diego
Social Sciences Building (SSB), Room 107
Presented by IICAS
Andrew Coe develops a formal model of bargaining between two states, where one can invest in developing nuclear weapons and the other imperfectly observes its efforts and progress over time, and uses it to analyze the occurrence of proliferation and war and the role of intelligence-gathering and estimates in these. Surprise proliferation, sporadic crises over the uncertain progress of a proliferant's efforts, and "mistaken" preventive wars can all arise endogenously in the model. The costs of war, effects of proliferation, and technological sophistication of the proliferant influence the probabilities of war and proliferation in ways that are often counter-intuitive and non-monotonic. However, much of the variation in behavior is driven, not by these potentially policy-manipulable factors, but by chance elements such as when the proliferant's program will make progress and when the other state will discover this. In the absence of a non-proliferation agreement, the United States and proliferants like Iran are playing what amounts to a long game of Russian roulette.
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Anthony H. Cordesman, Center for Strategic & International Studies January 17, 2014
Until now, there has been no clear official statement regarding the technical understandings that the P5+1 and Iran reached on the Implementation of the Joint Plan of Action on the Islamic Republic of Iran's Nuclear Program on January 12, 2014. A White House fact sheet was issued on January 16, however, that changes this situation and provides a far more detailed outline of exactly what the understanding agreements reached by the P5+1 (the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Russia, and China, coordinated by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton) and Iran were.
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A Chinese Nuclear Umbrella for Ukraine?
That's Not What Xi Said!
Catherine Dill and Jonathan Ray, Arms Control Wonk January 16, 2014
Two of graduate students review Chinese-language materials to shoot down that silly story from a few weeks ago about China giving Ukraine a nuclear umbrella.
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Task Force Report: Assessment of Nuclear Monitoring and Verification of Technologies
Department of Defense, Defense Science Board
January, 2014
For the first time since the early decades of the nuclear era, the nation needs to be
equally concerned about both "vertical" proliferation (the increase in capabilities of existing
nuclear states) and "horizontal" proliferation (an increase in the number of states and nonstate
actors possessing or attempting to possess nuclear weapons). These factors and others are
discussed more fully in the body of this DOD report.
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Douglas P. Guarino, Global Security Newswire
January 16, 2014
A close read of the omnibus bill for fiscal 2014 appropriations shows that while the U.S. nonproliferation budget remains down from fiscal 2013 levels, some efforts to lock down dangerous nuclear materials actually could receive more funding than expected.
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U.S. Strategy and Added Sanctions on Iran:
The Role of the Administration and Congress in a
"Good Cop, Bad Cop" Approach
Anthony H. Cordesman, Center for Strategic & International Studies
January 16, 2014
The proper handling of new legislation to impose added sanctions on Iran can be a useful tool in serving U.S. strategic interests. The differences between the United States and Iran are not the result of failures in communication, mutual misunderstanding, or the legacy of historical mistakes. They are the result of major strategic differences and Iranian actions that directly challenge U.S. and allied strategic interests.
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U.S. Drops B-61 Bomb Exterior in Earth-Penetration Test
Global Security Newswire
January 15, 2014
The United States on Tuesday said it dropped a B-61 nuclear-bomb exterior in a test that rammed the unarmed weapon through the earth's surface.
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Charm Offensives and Drugstore Cowboys
Michael Krepon, Arms Control Wonk
January 13, 2014
Are the new Iranian President, Hassan Rouhani, and his foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, taking the United States for a ride? Have they agreed to an interim deal on enrichment as part of a master plan to lull the West into a false sense of security so that they can reverse course after eviscerating crippling sanctions? And what's up with their "charm offensive" in the United Nations, Europe, and even the Gulf?
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The Trillion Dollar Nuclear Triad:
US Strategic Nuclear Modernization Over
the Next Thirty Years
Jon B. Wolfsthal, Jeffrey Lewis & Marc Quint, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
January, 2014
The United States maintains a robust nuclear arsenal deployed on a triad of strategic delivery
systems, including land- and submarine-based long-range ballistic missiles and nuclear-capable
bombers. In addition, it also has a significant number of nonstrategic and nondeployed warheads not constrained by US-Russian arms control treaties. Over the next thirty years, the United States plans to spend approximately $1 trillion maintaining the current arsenal, buying replacement systems, and upgrading existing nuclear bombs and warheads....
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